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Author:

Mekerishvili, Giorgi

Title:

ESSAYS ON INFORMATION DESIGN

Graduate Program:

Economics

Keywords:

Bayesian PersuasionInformation Design
Disclosure Requirements
Information Disclosure
Crowdfunding
Microtargeting
Kickstarter
Optimal Regulation
Regulation of Disclosure Requirements
political campaigns
political campaigning
Citizen Candidate Model
Principal-Agent Model
Crowdfunding Platform
Reward-based Crowdfunding
commitment power
commitment to information disclosure
reputation
reputation system
long-run reputation
cheap talk
investor protection
capital formation
model of electoral competition
strategic candidates
voter turnout
political awareness
elite polarization
negative campaigning
instrumental voters
rational voters
expressive voting
belief-free equilibrium
strategic communication
dynamic incentives
three stage Maximum Likelihood
campaigning technologies
repeated cheap talk
entrepreneurship
asymmetric information
moral hazard
information intermediary
information intermediation
financial intermediary
Bayesian Persuasion
Information Design
optimal regulation
regulation of disclosure requirements
Moral Hazard
optimal disclosure on crowdfunding platforms
commitment vs. flexibility
commitment vs. flexibility in information disclosure
a fair punishment
microtargeting rational voters

File:

Download Dissertation_Giorgi_Mekerishvili.pdf

Committee Members:

Syed Nageeb Ali, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor
Syed Nageeb Ali, Committee Chair/Co-Chair
Karl Edward Schurter, Committee Member
Kalyan Chatterjee, Committee Member
Bumba Mukherjee, Outside Member
Nima Haghpanah Jahromi, Committee Member
James Jordan, Committee Member