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Abstract

This thesis focuses on an emergent urbanism, one that negotiates the contradictory and seemingly incompatible environments of military and tourism as they are interpreted in Famagusta, Cyprus. The unique characteristics of Famagusta invite research into an alternative reading of urbanism: On one hand, it represents a so-called ghost town marked by an amalgamation of borders and boundaries, and on the other hand, the persistent image of a cosmopolitan tourist resort seems to be the only common story between the two contested communities.

What are the spatial preconditions necessary to reshape resistant and tenacious environments into adaptable and negotiable zones? In exploring this question, this thesis hypothesizes that contested zones require the development of a framework for solutions given the situation’s uncertainty and the unpredictability of human behavior. This suggested design framework is based on a re-interpretation of Richard Sennett’s paradigm on the distinction between borders and boundaries. Space develops as an experimental device examining the effects of incremental changes, a relationship between action and reaction over time, rather than one fixed plan.

This thesis was conducted through the layering of three main lenses: (1) the History Lens, which investigates the power of institutional decisions to form, organize, and control spaces; (2) the Border and Boundary Lens, which explores society’s paradoxical tendency to persistently preserve parts of history that cause feelings of hatred, processes of forced displacement, and spatial division; and (3) the Transgression Lens, which examines the way grassroots actors are inspired from the movements of tourists in space and adapt themselves to take advantage of conflict conditions. Tourism and the survival needs of grassroots actors come to soothe the predominant image of space as a conflict zone. Three case studies related to tourist operations a) the Viewpoints, b) the
Tours, and c) the Palm Beach Hotel explicitly depict how before breaking the law, there are many shades of legality that architects should observe when leading themselves to creative design processes.

This thesis develops a strategy for negotiating space to convert a spatial disadvantage into an advantage by unfolding creative forces hidden behind contested zones. The complex urban conditions of contested zones and fields of tension represent a microcosm of contemporary reality, where borders and boundaries are the inevitable nature of architecture. The insistence of architects to re-design borders in conflict spaces and other impoverished social conditions demands architects to take the role of a co-designer along with institutions and grassroots actors.
Table of Contents

List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. v
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... vi
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... vii

Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1
  Why Famagusta? .......................................................................................................................... 2
  Conceptual Lenses: History, Borders and Boundaries, Transgressions ...................................... 7
  Conceptual Framework .............................................................................................................. 8
  Research Question .................................................................................................................... 12
  Definition of Concepts ............................................................................................................. 13
  Research Methodology ........................................................................................................... 16
  Outcome .................................................................................................................................... 21

Chapter 2 Negotiating-Space Conceptual Framework ................................................................. 22
  Strategies and the History Lens ............................................................................................... 23
  Edges: Borders and Boundaries Lens ....................................................................................... 25
  Tactics and the Transgression Lens ......................................................................................... 27
  Negotiating-Space: Richard Sennett Paradigm ......................................................................... 29
  Intellectual Merit ..................................................................................................................... 34

Chapter 3 History Lens ................................................................................................................. 36
  The Institutional Actors ............................................................................................................ 37
  A Chronological Timeline: Separation or Coexistence? ........................................................ 40
  Physical Institutional Lines ....................................................................................................... 49
  Varosha as a Bargaining Chip .................................................................................................. 57
  Unresolveness: Unpredictability ............................................................................................. 58

Chapter 4 Border and Boundary Lens ......................................................................................... 61
  The Grassroots Actors ............................................................................................................. 63
  Varosha: A Boundary or A Border? ......................................................................................... 65
  Deconstructing Boundaries ...................................................................................................... 70
  De-Labeling Identities: De-territorialization .......................................................................... 71
  Incompleteness: EphemeralitY ................................................................................................. 78

Chapter 5 Transgression Lens ....................................................................................................... 80
  The Transgressive Actors: Tourists ......................................................................................... 82
  Military Vs. Tourism ................................................................................................................. 83
  Episodes of Adaptation ............................................................................................................ 87
  88
  Episode of Adaptation 1: Varosha’s Viewpoints ..................................................................... 88
Episode of Adaptation 2: Boat Trip ................................................................. 96
Ambiguity: Heterogeneity ........................................................................ 108

Chapter 6 Conclusions: The Architect’s Contribution .............................. 110
De-Labeling Space ................................................................................. 111
Broader Impact ....................................................................................... 116

Bibliography ............................................................................................ 118
List of Figures

Figure 1: Famagusta’s Coastline ............................................................... 1
Figure 2: Map of Cyprus. The red dot shows Famagusta’s location. ................. 2
Figure 3: Conceptual Model of Reading Contested Zones.............................. 11
Figure 4: Research Methodology Diagram ............................................... 16
Figure 5: Episodes of Adaptation -Viewpoints, Boat Trip, Palm Beach Hotel .......... 19
Figure 6: Strategies vs. Tactics .................................................................. 22
Figure 7: Interpretive Diagram of Richard Sennett’s Paradigm ......................... 31
Figure 8: Negotiating-Space Strategy Diagram .......................................... 33
Figure 9: The Architect’s Contribution Diagram: Architecture needs to find the residence between the big and the small picture............................................. 35
Figure 10: Prohibition Sing in Varosha ..................................................... 36
Figure 11: History Lens Diagram ................................................................ 37
Figure 12: Institutional Actors related to Famagusta’s Conflict ....................... 39
Figure 13: Pyramid Inverted -When the top of the pyramid changes, then everything underneath is affected................................................................. 39
Figure 14: Chronological Development of Famagusta .................................. 40
Figure 15: Famagusta’s Different Kinds of Conflict ..................................... 41
Figure 16: Famagusta, Αμμόχωστος, or Gazimağusa? ................................. 45
Figure 17: Map showing Military Presence in Cyprus .................................... 48
Figure 18: Facts Regarding the UN Buffer Zone ........................................ 50
Figure 19: Vrysoulles Checkpoint ................................................................ 52
Figure 18: Varosha’s Boundary – 1 ............................................................ 54
Figure 19: Varosha’s Boundary -2 ................................................................ 55
Figure 20: Varosha’s Boundary -3 .............................................................. 56
Figure 21: Possible Boundary Line Mutations ............................................. 58
Figure 22: Institutional Unresolveness Diagram .......................................... 60
Figure 23: Varosha's Incompleteness ................................................................. 61
Figure 24: Boundary / Figure 25: Border ............................................................ 62
Figure 26: Grassroots -The existence of common sub-groups beyond spatial boundaries ................................................................. 64
Figure 27: Varosha Today .................................................................................... 66
Figure 28: Homelessness -The incomplete relationship between owners and settlers .. 69
Figure 29: De-Labeling Identities Diagram ....................................................... 71
Figure 30: Sense of Identity ................................................................................ 72
*Statistics are taken from the UNFICYP Survey, February 19, 2007 ..................... 72
Figure 31: Nicosia Walled City -The two museums .......................................... 74
Figure 32: Transfused Identities ....................................................................... 77
Figure 33: Incompleteness: Ephemerality ......................................................... 79
Figure 34: Military vs. Tourism .......................................................................... 80
Figure 35: Transgression Lens Diagram ............................................................. 81
Figure 36: Famagusta's Tourism before 1974 and today .................................. 83
Figure 37: Military and Tourism both look for the same spatial characteristics. .......... 86
Figure 38: Episodes of Adaptation Diagram ...................................................... 88
Figure 39: Map -Viewpoints .............................................................................. 89
Figure 40: Annita's House and Viewpoint ......................................................... 90
Figure 41: House-Viewpoint Hybrid Typology .................................................. 92
Figure 42: Under-Institutionalization Viewpoint's View ..................................... 93
Figure 43: Sign ................................................................................................... 94
Figure 44: The Signs and the Viewpoint ............................................................ 94
Figure 45: Mini Zoo Viewpoint’s View .............................................................. 95
Figure 46: Mini-Zoo Viewpoint .......................................................................... 96
Figure 47: Map -Boat Trip ............................................................................... 97
Figure 48: Boat Program .................................................................................................................. 99
Figure 49: Boat Trip Experience .................................................................................................... 100
Figure 50: Shifting Powers - Who is in charge? .......................................................................... 101
Figure 52: Palm Beach Hotel ....................................................................................................... 103
Figure 53: Tourists and Ghost-Towns .......................................................................................... 106
Figure 54: What is a hotel typology? ............................................................................................ 107
Figure 55: Ambiguity: Heterogeneity ............................................................................................ 109


*All illustrations and photographs are by author unless otherwise noted.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Figure 1: Famagusta's Coastline

This thesis focuses on an emergent urbanism that negotiates the contradictory and seemingly incompatible environments of military and tourism as they are interpreted in Famagusta, Cyprus. Famagusta’s unique characteristics invite research into an alternative reading of urbanism: On one hand, it represents a so-called ghost town marked by an amalgamation of borders and boundaries, and on the other hand, the persistent image of a cosmopolitan tourist resort seems to be the only common story between the two contested communities.

Figure 2: Map of Cyprus. The red dot shows Famagusta’s location.

Why Famagusta?

Famagusta serves as the primary focus in exploring the notion of negotiating space because the whole area is fragmented by distinctive enclaves and controlled by several forces. Following Cyprus’s independence (1960) and
the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974), several polarized social and political ideologies resulted in the establishment of the UN Buffer Zone based on the Green Line, the separation line between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The UN Buffer Zone, a demilitarized zone controlled by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), runs from the western part near Kato Pyrgos to Famagusta’s east-south region. The conflict in Cyprus implies a paradox, as it is characterized as a “peaceful” conflict while, at the same time, the whole island is spatially divided and still has a large part of its territory occupied by military enclaves (Greek-Cypriot - Turkish - Greek - British - UN Army) and prohibited zones.

Close to the buffer zone in the city of Famagusta, the area of Varosha has remained abandoned, enclosed, and barricaded from Turkish troops for more than 36 years. Protected by a UN Security Council Resolution (1984), the only way for this area to be re-opened and resettled is by its original inhabitants. The fact that the area is located on the North side of the island (Turkish-Cypriot side), while most of the owners are Greek-Cypriots, constitutes the opening as a more complex situation, requiring the need for a spatial co-existence between the two communities. Given the area’s relative freedom from human intervention during all of these years, Varosha is becoming more and more disconnected from the entire island. This process of destruction was inevitable, and affects not only the actual area but also the surrounding environments.

However, there is a crucial need for the abandoned area of Varosha and the nearby port of Famagusta to re-open. Both areas are important for the whole island, as they are used as bargaining chips between the two communities. Consequently, failed attempts, occurring almost every five to seven years, assign architects to propose several plans and scenarios of how the enclosed area can
be activated. The main reason these plans can be seen as unrealistic is because they come after a resolved solution, and approach the area as something entirely separate from its existing surroundings. Nicos Mesaritis (2011), architect and president of the Reconstruction and Resettlement Council of the Republic of Cyprus, was involved in the re-opening of Famagusta for many years. The fact that the area has been detached from both communities for more than 36 years caused terrible destruction to all of its networks. The cost for this area to be re-opened will be tremendous, and so the only possible solution is total demolition. While this solution seems to be accurate enough, and even though the cost for demolition is vast, the owners still resist for a renewal plan from scratch. In addition, an international workshop organized by the Architectural Association (No Man’s Land Workshop, 2009), which included participation from both students and professors currently at schools like Delft, the National Technical University of Athens, and Dessau Institute of Architecture, presented proposals for rebuilding the area after demolition. Even though the workshop’s intent was not to present pragmatic solutions, it represents the architect’s dominant tendency toward the area: a totally new area eliminating what existed before.

The most recent scenario started in 2012, also funded by the Reconstruction and Resettlement Council of the Republic of Cyprus, enhances the vision of a bi-communal European community. The project team is comprised of architects from both sides along with other European architects dedicated to the reconstruction and resettlement of destroyed areas like Varosha. However, their research is engaged with the inhabitants’ participation, and the owners of the area do not seem to share the project leaders’ bi-communal vision. Architects and non-architects also suggested many other plans, which were
mostly proposed by local NGOs from both communities. Their main goal is not to propose a design plan for the area but to make explicit the need for a political solution. This is also the reason why all of these plans soon become forgotten by the public and the people interested in them. What would be a case for the site to need more of a preparation process for reconstruction implemented on the surrounding landscapes instead of a definite end-product ready to be applied at one time?

The second reason that makes Famagusta an ideal case study is that historically, the state of Famagusta was characterized by an apparent flux of undisputed barriers until the official separation of the two communities, from unofficial social and physical edges to the establishment of the Green Line and, finally, with the absolute enclosure of Varosha. Famagusta is spatially fragmented by several political contracts: the UN Buffer Zone, the area of Varosha, the British Sovereignty Base, and Turkish military bases. Even the Venetian Walls, first constructed in 1948 to protect the space and to keep out the enemy, are still dominant elements in the urban fabric of Famagusta, creating social division and contrast. The area of Famagusta can be seen as a juxtaposition of negative and positive space, prohibited and accessible, abandoned and livable. Consequently, the site is exposed as a dynamic platform of transitions and mutations that facilitates transgressions over time. This notion of transgression further helps the understanding of how to negotiate space as it implies a mechanism of porous control and compliance.

The third reason relates to Famagusta’s importance as a tourist resort mostly before 1974. While tourist operations in the area decreased radically after the enclosure of Varosha and are in close vicinity to several military bases,
Famagusta's physical characteristics consolidates a dynamic touristic landscape. In addition, the repeatedly so-called "tourist resort" and any other sources associated with Famagusta invite the notion of post-tourism to be a significant part of this research. The term post-tourism makes explicit the existing condition of space; the space is simulated as a tourist resort but, in reality, it is no longer a resort. Both sides, north and south, even though different, keep referring to the area as if it were still one of the most prosperous tourist resorts in the Mediterranean. The way both sides construct, adjust, and deconstruct borders in order to benefit economically through tourist operations expresses an important mechanism of negotiating space.

Every territorial split and union has to transgress multiple scales of decision-making. Given the uncertainty of the existing situation, an efficient design proposal has to embody a type of mutability and adaptability. Due to the ambiguous unresolved political conflict in Famagusta, the challenge is to question how design strategies begin and how they evolve through change. In the area of Varosha, the opening cannot rely on architects or planners, since it is entirely political. Consequently, strategies proportional to the given political solution will be able to be developed and reconsidered as possible scenarios. Small and incremental advances, negotiating and adapting practices that possess an innate capacity to prepare the ground for reconciliation, might be a more promising approach. The existing condition, a space full of enclaves within an enclave, should be investigated in order to show the already effectively shared and key spaces that may have the potential to become new collective spaces.
Conceptual Lenses: History, Borders and Boundaries, Transgressions

The discursive framework of this thesis is established by three main lenses: History, the distinction between Borders and Boundaries, and Transgressions in space through post-tourist operations. Each of these lenses reveals mechanisms of negotiation that are apt to develop a dialogue between a theoretical approach and applicable strategies of adjusting border landscapes. The transition between theory and the empirical component leads to new ways of depicting existing realities in space. These alternative representations enhance both the existing theory on borders and negotiation processes and the design mechanisms for further development of either the specific area of Famagusta or other similar areas.

1. **History Lens**

The History Lens catalogues the major geopolitical, social and economic events related to the set up and fluctuations of the borders that harden the landscape of Famagusta. A chronological timeline helps not only to understand the historical context of the fragmentation process but also engages the research to critically examine whether separation or coexistence between divided communities is preferable. It is the broad picture of the site based on the official institutional changes, negotiations, and rules.

2. **Border and Boundary Lens**

The accumulation of different kind of barriers, prohibitions, exclusions, and enclaves in Famagusta leads this research to organize an architectural taxonomy of boundaries. History and national identity, even though necessary, need to be redefined in conflict spaces in order to be transformed into productive borders.
The ways history and national identity are received in specific localized operations illustrate negotiation tensions to inform new design processes.

3. Transgression Lens

The notion of transgression implies overcoming processes, transforming a close boundary into an open border, and having an intermediate field of enormous interests. They enhance the degree of liminality around the edge, making its width bigger, more porous, and more flexible. This part is focused on three post-tourist operations as episodes of adaptation implemented by the locals over the closed conflicted system.

Conceptual Framework

While borders, by definition, indicate division and fragmentation in the urban fabric, a border for this study is an already shared space. Based on its basic characteristic of simultaneously belonging to no one and to all the parties that claim it, knowing how to negotiate borders and shared spaces is a fundamental pursuit in architectural practice. This study develops a specific way to read borders in conflict conditions through three lenses: historic, borders and boundaries, and transgression lens. Constructing these lenses that allows for a critical investigation of the peculiar, and so this study utilizes arguments from an array of academic theory and practice. De Certeau’s strategies and tactics have a significant role in reading through the historic lens, as it exposes the multiple decisions to construct, negotiate, and occupy a border. A particular focus is given to Sennett’s conceptual theory on the distinction between borders and boundaries for reading through the second lens. Even though Sennett’s theory is
focused on the public realm, this thesis shifts his theory into conflict conditions as the most pronounced precedent of bordering space. Finally, a spatial analysis through the transgression lens is the focal point for investigating design mechanisms of how to negotiate space.

Starting with the historic lens, it is crucial to acknowledge the importance of time in the establishment of a border. A border is more of a process than an end product in the urban landscape. The strategic decision and the institutional arrangement of how the border will be, where exactly and to what degree of porosity is based on its prohibitions, limitations, and allowances illustrate the broader framework of the border’s setup. The examination of previous fluctuations and transformations on a border landscape provides a more comprehensive understanding of the necessity of spaces to be divided and people to live separately. It also embraces the peculiarity of a space and reveals opportunities that can evolve into design ideas.

The border and boundaries lens borrows the distinction of edges from Richard Sennett’s paradigm. While Richard Sennett delineates the distinction between borders and boundaries in the public realm, this thesis tries to reinterpret his theory in order to read conflict zones. Sennett explains the existence of two kinds of systems in the urban landscape: a closed system as the harmonious equilibrium and the most preferable open system as an unstable evolution that uncovers opportunities and upholds creative possibilities. These systems are compounded by the composition of edges: When these edges are rigid and develop a closure they are boundaries, while borders perform like cell membranes, porous and resistant at the same time. Through the borders and
boundaries lens, it becomes clear what he things that need to be separated are and the things are in need of sharing.

Following the first two readings of space, the establishment of a border and conflict seem to be the inevitable nature of architecture. If we cannot avoid it, especially when the decision is political, at least we ought to deal with it and move forward by at least preparing for its conceptual, at least, elimination. The deconstruction of a border is related with transgression processes and leads to a re-interpretation of the notion of a border. This notion of transgression implies an overcoming of the existing arena, showing how people adjust themselves into a framework created by others for them to live in. The theoretical component of the study is enhanced with a spatial analysis based on post-tourist operations. Such operations in conflict and border zones jeopardize the rigidness of a military environment and invent a new reality for the place.
These three lenses provide a new way to recognize peculiarities in space and proceed into innovative ideas. All of these lenses expose possibilities of space that are necessary to be seen and understood differently. The strategy of how to negotiate space exploits this idea of uncovering realities in space in order to set a resilient ground, a changeable and adaptable environment based on the uncertainty of time and space and the way an environment can accept unexpected examining and anticipating possibilities.

Figure 3: Conceptual Model of Reading Contested Zones
Research Question

By investigating the way locals have taken advantage of the conflict situation, this thesis addresses an emergent urbanism focused on how to negotiate space:

What are the spatial preconditions necessary to reshape resistant and tenacious environments into adaptable and negotiable zones?

In exploring this question, this thesis hypothesizes that contested zones require the development of a framework for solutions based on the uncertainty of the situation and the unpredictability of human behavior. In this way, space develops as an experimenting device, examining the effects of incremental changes, a relationship between action and reaction over time, rather than one fixed plan. There are several peripheral questions that lead the investigation of the main research question:

1. How have the locals adapted and confronted themselves in a way that challenges the official institutional constraints and policies?
2. What are the characteristics of this adaptation process?
3. How can this process of adaptation that is already happening accelerate and inform design practices?
4. How does it re-draw the existing border, and what impact might it have between the two sides?
Definition of Concepts

Conflict

A preliminary definition of conflict, based on Webster's Dictionary, is associated with collision and disagreement and contradictory things, entities, conditions and opposition. A territorial conflict, as the most obvious social conflict projected in space, engenders several other spatial conflicts: land use conflict, ownership conflict or decision-making conflict. The reason for this is because a territorial conflict caused by decisions made in the social world, retaliates toward the same world. Processes of division, displacement, and destruction are inevitable and harden both the social and physical landscape. A thorough understanding of the reasons why a conflict was developed and why these disputes still endure is crucial to accurately read conflict. Long term conflict and formal division, like the case of Cyprus, are likely to interpret conflict not as a disagreement but as an agreement of separation. However, political contestation, social antagonism, fear, and mistrust are interpreted into spatial polarization, resulting in many spaces becoming abandoned, prohibited, and declined. To encourage the improvement of these leftover spaces, this thesis examines conflict through the juxtaposition of hybrid realities in one single space.

Edges

Edges can be seen as barriers and the means of division, fragmentation, and separation of two different territories in the urban fabric. According to Richard Sennett, there are two kinds of edges: boundaries and borders.
Boundaries are dead edges, lines that separate and exclude. This notion of difference is clearly expressed by drawing a line either spatially between two territories or socially between two communities. They are concrete, absolute, and readable. They frame a closed system. Boundaries set up a top-down design by an authority that is rigid and allows no transgression. It is specified by rules and prohibitions in order to prevent conflict. On the other hand, borders are living edges and consist of an open system. They allow interaction and exchange between entities. They prevent conflict as a disadvantage but endeavor a creative conflict in order to maintain co-existence between contrasting entities, elements, and activities. As a result, they unfold juxtaposed realities in one space that makes borders into adaptable and mutable devices of space transformation.

**Negotiation**

To negotiate space is an evident reaction in socially conflicting entities. The interrelation between the social and physical world is seemingly visualized in a conflict area, mostly because power relations have the dominant command to shape space not only physically but also socially. Society has no other option than to follow the shape given. However, the notion of negotiation is contained within various sets of contradictory relationships in a contested zone: conflict and resolution, prohibition and approval, and mistrust and agreement. These contradictory relationships allow a small gap of uncertainty, and this is where architecture can negotiate propositions. This gap of uncertainty can be proved fundamental to improve conditions in contested zones. In addition, all borders set
up between conflicting entities are spaces treated as bargaining chips. As a result, they involve several actors and different levels of decision-making. Processes of overcoming the border as a boundary will inform the research concerning how space is affected by the different realities based on the actors’ perception. This study is based on three basic actors: the institutions, the locals and the tourists. The ways they shape spaces, places, and environments create hybrid environments that allow exchange, controversy, or co-existence between them.

**Post-Tourism**

The term post-tourism was first coined by Feifer (1985) to describe the post-tourist as “someone who does not have to leave the confines of their home to “see” the objects of the tourist gaze. They are aware of the similarity between seeing the object within a frame whether it be through a television screen or the window of a car.” The simulated experience offered by post-tourism deludes people. In the case of Famagusta, post-tourism is reflected in two ways: (1) Even though the area of Varosha, once a major cosmopolitan resort in the Mediterranean, has been a prohibited zone since 1974, the image of it as a tourist attraction is still dominant and co-exists with today’s image of a ghost town; and (2) the second evidence of post-tourist characteristics is caused explicitly because of its prohibited access. Being the only enclosed and abandoned area in the world has transformed it into a sightseeing attraction for curious travelers around the world. However, its prohibition only allows the area to be seen from a distance, as no one is allowed even to walk along its fence.
Research Methodology

Through these three lenses, this study pursues a broadening understanding of border landscapes, conflict spaces, and negotiable zones. Using a mixed methodology enacted through different layers of information, this thesis provides a critical lens to explore and investigate the way we perceive and design similar contested territories. The empirical component of the research will be achieved in two ways: (1) archival research and (2) the observation and documentation of tourist operations occurring around the edges. Both research components will result in a series of illustrations in order to analyze the microcosms created between the hybrid environments of military and tourism, between locals and institutional policies and between borders and boundaries.

Figure 4: Research Methodology Diagram
Considering 1974 as the departure point of the major urban transformations, a before and after analysis has significance. However, there are various constraints for data collected after 1974. (1) Most of the areas are military bases, and consequently, any kind of ground existing data is not available. (2) Given the fact that the South side remains an illegal nation after 1974, there are no plans, population statistics, ownership data, and other official information. As a result, the necessary data will be collected through old official plans conducted by the Republic of Cyprus, from on-site conversations with existing inhabitants and site analysis, as well as other sources like the internet, existing academic research, other projects, and documentary films.

**Case Studies: Episodes of Adaptation**

The case studies are based on site observation and documentation. Informal interactions with people and on-site conversations inform the observation of the episodes. The purpose is to collect accurate evidence by different examples that share the same intentions within the space. The observation of three specific episodes that occurred on the edge shows how small grassroots interventions can adapt themselves in spatial conflict. Through these episodes, this thesis identifies certain architectural and urban attributes in order to understand how adaptation can be achieved. Collected data is presented through detailed descriptions of the spatial episodes of adaptation combined with visualized data such as diagrams, images and maps.
This thesis focuses on the area of Varosha. Half of Varosha is abandoned and prohibited, while the other half forms a zone of uncertainty and ambiguity due to political unresolveness. Although it was re-settled after 1974 by Turkish settlers and Turkish-Cypriot refugees from the south side, it still performs as an extension of the enclosed and abandoned Varosha. Its landscape, mostly housing, seems to compound a paradox of a living vacuum. The existing inhabitants and the Turkish-Cypriot municipality of Famagusta, expecting that the area in case of resolution will be returned under the control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus, has paid no effort or money to abort its process of destruction. On the other hand, the area seems to be the most prominent space of co-presence between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots after 2004 (the opening of the first checkpoint). Given the fact that most of these houses are officially owned by Greek-Cypriots, they often visit the area as “tourists in their own home”. As an example of Hillier’s “virtual community”, the area constitutes a field
of potential encounters, where each of the houses constitutes a claimed property and a shared space in different moments in time, with traces from both directions persisting. The area is surrounded by different kinds of borders: the enclosed Varosha, the British Sovereignty Base, and the buffer zone.

This thesis examines the following spatial episodes on these edges that redraw the existing boundary and hold the potential to transform it into a border.

1. Varosha’s Viewpoints

The viewpoint is a building typology that mushroomed as a result of the division of the island where houses near the edge have been transformed into tourist observation posts. Varosha is the focal point of attracting tourists, increasing the “looking from outside” experience of the area. The way a housing typology can adjust to a multi-purpose role brings to the forefront another mechanism of negotiation at the grassroots scale related to flexibility and recombined edges in order to accept or to decline an outsider.
2. Boat Trip

Another “looking from outside” experience of the ghost town is implemented through boat trips. The tours represent myopic illusions of the real condition, a distorted reality where places are transitioning from visible to invisible depending on who is the monitor. At the same time, the tour participants perceive and conceive the space differently according to their motives: relaxation, entertainment, and fun. The contradictory environments created by co-existing realities of space, the one as a military landscape and the other generated by tourist impulse, uncovers a new perspective of what a resilient landscape might be.

3. Palm Beach Hotel

The Palm Beach Hotel is the only operational hotel located on Varosha’s waterfront. It has an interesting story behind its re-opening as it was only closed for two years after the abandonment. When the owners decided to re-open it, they reclaimed spare parts of infrastructure from the vacant hotels in the prohibited area. While it is currently the most popular and luxury hotel in Famagusta, it is located exactly on the edge where the abandoned area starts making the contrast between the two sites even more explicit. Its vicinity to the destructed ghost town does not seem to affect its popularity, and the way it operates provides evidence of flexibility and adaptation over conflict.
Outcome

This thesis does not aspire to provide a solution for Famagusta but rather to create a dialogue for innovative ideas, imaginative tools, and new ways to view spatial conflict. Its design implication is a critical insight of how architecture and urban design can contribute to extreme conflict situations where possibilities of improvement are limited. To do this, architecture needs to go beyond conventional approaches. Given the need for a changeable and mutable urbanism, anticipated outcomes cannot be a definite, limited, and imaginary end-product plan but should rather be a process of healing and incremental intervention strategies implemented gradually over time.
Chapter 2
Negotiating-Space Conceptual Framework

Figure 6: Strategies vs. Tactics
Henri Lefebvre (1984) defines space not as an abstract and neutral void but as a set of relations between processes or elements. Neither neutrality nor a black-and-white scene exists. Several processes that occur simultaneously in space generate change, and consequently, they summon the co-existence of juxtaposed realities in one place. Such juxtapositions are adapted and transfused into the environment, which blurs their edges. Blurring induces nuances in space. Architects and planners have the ability to spatially read these nuances in order to enhance and improve the urban fabric. In order to deconstruct the notion of a border and start negotiating space, this study juxtaposes each term with its opposite in order to unfold nuances in space and advantage design processes.

**Strategies and the History Lens**

A strategy sets boundaries; it draws lines that delineate negative and positive places by marking interior and exterior spaces, social inclusion and exclusion, and closed and open systems. It is the outline of a space that hides living possibilities ready to emerge. In order to uncover these possibilities, one must see beneath the surface, moving from a larger to a smaller scale. However, it needs to be clear that conventional design strategies in conflict spaces are not adequate. As a result, moving from a large to small scale does not refer to citizen participation, as their opinions hold limited potential.

Strategy is a common term in military parlance as the campaign planning and the operations needed to win a war. However, in order to win, subordinated to these strategies is the use of skillful techniques called tactics. Michel de Certeau borrows this terminology and draws a distinction between a strategy and
a tactic. For de Certeau, a tactic is not supplementary to a strategy, where the two terms work together to accomplish a common objective, but it is more of an opposition to the strategy. Writing about people in their everyday lives and not in conditions of extremity and conflict, he explains the difference between the two. De Certeau refers to institutions that hold power and use strategies to control and maintain power. A strategy is

“the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as the subject with will and power can be isolated. It postulates a place that can be delimitated as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed targets and threats can be managed. It is an effort to delimit one’s own place in a world bewitched by the invisible powers of the Other” (de Certeau 1984: 35-36).

The history lens of this study makes use of the notion of strategy in order to read and understand the decisions and under which circumstances of power and control the processes of bordering space take place over time. A strategy perceives power and control. Based on the fact that this control can never be ideal, it is essential to have a complex understanding of its produced field of force. Between the institutional scale and the grassroots reality, low levels of transparency are a crucial problem. There are always some behind-the-scenes stories never understood or clear. The objectives investigated through the official strategies set up into space and the history lens are (1) why the situation is that, (2) what do the actors involved want, and (3) what are the other possible controversies or conformities hidden under their desires. Consequently, the key question this thesis explores is what kind of design can be generated even when the institutions’ truth is partial? More precisely, what kind of design process can
help overcome the institutional boundary that causes social and spatial boundaries?

As a response to this question, this thesis hypothesizes that conflict areas are in crucial need of a third narrative as a liminal zone between the two dominant controversial narratives, based mostly on specific parts of history that fuel division, between the two communities. This narrative requires challenging predominant pressures of division, even national identity, that reinforce the dual character of a contested zone. Famagusta has the peculiarity of being a former cosmopolitan tourist resort on the island of Cyprus, where tourism is still a dominant economic source. The town’s image as a tourist resort seems to be the only common representation both communities share. Going beyond a simple representation, tourism is also a common motive between the two parts in order to profit economically. The history lens illuminates the significance to identify the differences between contested communities in order to explore their similarities. These similarities can open new possibilities, or even reject possibilities, especially if we consider that tourism can also increase antagonism between the two for spatial design over physical, social and political conflict.

**Edges: Borders and Boundaries Lens**

The two dominant representations of space, the cosmopolitan tourist resort on the one hand and the silent vestiges of abandonment on the other, in the area of Famagusta transform the strategically drawn lines of boundaries into a border and a heterogeneous field. Negotiating difference is the primary function of a border. Borders are intermediate fields of enormous interest, a
battlefield. However, they have the capability to prevail conflict as a disadvantage and to endeavor a creative conflict between contrasting entities, elements, and activities. They allow interaction and exchange between different entities as “spaces of communication” (Bataille, 1988; 59). As Sennett asserts, borders are living edges consisting of an open system. It simultaneously resists by framing boundaries and limits, and it endures as a malleable and flexible structure. It thus contaminates homogeneous environments and closed systems.

Borders are the in-between condition between institutional strategies and grassroots tactics. They contribute to the transition from a larger to smaller scale, and they offer an opening from the totality of an enclosure to the possibility of something else. Consequently, they share connections with the notion of liminality. Liminality derives from the Latin world *limen* meaning threshold. This study adapts the notion of liminality as a passage, as it is given in anthropological studies: It is a passage not only for its physical qualities but mostly because, for a person, it is a moment of becoming. Liminal zones are uncertain, ambiguous, and questionable. It is specifically this characteristic of ambiguity that a border needs in order to allow transgressions to become meaningful in space.

The area of Famagusta is composed of different edges that in their large scale operate as boundaries. Instead of trying to erase or stand against them, it is necessary to identify their component parts and explore the features possible to transform them into a border. For that reason, this thesis is structured around one key element: The need to “deconstruct” boundaries into their fundamental elements and identify separate spatial and social episodes found at a smaller scale that already negotiates their width, existence, function, and integrity. The two dominant representations in the area of Famagusta, the conflict condition
and the image of a tourist resort, transform the space into a heterogeneous field, which therefore opens possibilities. Tourists have the ability to turn off their feelings and their sensitivities, as they do not share any of the background of the two opponent communities and can comfortably relax near war zones or military bases. Tourists are the liminal actors that act outside a system framed by the institutions and the locals. “Get me out of the system and I will move it”, Archimedes once said; likewise, tourists unravel packaged conditions of space and unfold new possibilities that either the locals or the institutions can turn into advantages similar to their interests.

**Tactics and the Transgression Lens**

“Transgression does not seek to oppose one thing to another, nor does it achieve its purpose through mockery or by upsetting the solidity of foundations; it does not transform the other side of the mirror, beyond an invisible and uncross able line, into a glittering expanse. Transgression is neither violence in a divided world (in an ethical world) nor a victory over limits (in a dialectical or revolutionary world); and exactly for this reason, its role is to measure the excessive distance that causes the limits to arise. Transgression contains nothing negative, but affirms limited being- affirms the limitlessness into which it leaps as it opens this zone to existence for the first time” (M. Foucault, 1977: 35).

Tactics have the ability of adaptation to an environment already set by the strategies and people in power. They are the processes that transform a boundary into a border and cause liminality. They share all three characteristics mentioned above: heterogeneity, ephemerality, and unpredictability.
“It does not have the options of planning general strategy and viewing the adversary as a whole within a district, visible and objectifiable space. It operates in isolated actions, blow by blow. It takes advantages of “opportunities” and depends on them, being without any base where it could stockpile winning, build up its own position, and plan raids. In short, a tactic is the art of the weak” (de Certeau 1984: 35-36).

In order for a tactic to be appropriately adaptable into the actual environment, observations and an in-depth understanding of the surroundings is crucial.

A tactic is a process of cooperation as much as competition. They are transgressions that create spatial imaginaries by challenging the obvious and imperative reality of space. Architecture needs to address design in a similar way; it needs readiness to take advantage of unpredictable changes in order to improve an existing condition. Transgression, by definition, is inevitably connected with crossing a line, a limit, or a border. Its negative connotation does not apply for this research as it negotiates the way transgressive decisions can advantage conflict territories and promote an alternative thinking of how to treat contested zones. Heterogeneity is a spatial precondition to produce spaces of transgression. Such spaces are created when juxtaposed realities adjust and adapt their environments to co-exist in one place: one does not eliminate the other; neither tries to dominate over the other.

Transgression has a tactical formation in space. However, it acts or/and reacts, having a meticulous knowledge of the historic lens and the processes that it has to encounter and confront. Similarly, it judiciously acknowledges the operation of a border and boundary, the liminality between the expected and the unexpected, between constrain and boundlessness. It does not act against; rather, it runs unobtrusively and discreetly without disturbing the existing condition.
To transgress space is to negotiate space through tactics. This thesis aims to investigate a series of transgressions based on tourist operations around the edges comprised of the outline of Varosha in order to understand how these reactions can benefit design processes. These transgressions are local interventions from one side to the other in the context of ephemeral incremental changes. They act “placelessly”, using the term provided by Derrida. While they invade space, they do not immediately create a new condition. They improve the existing context of space by preparing the ground for a larger and long-term change. Like hidden bombs spread around the place, once they explode, they will agitate the degree of closure in the spatial system.

**Negotiating-Space: Richard Sennett Paradigm**

In order to propose a design framework, this thesis borrows Richard Sennett paradigm related to borders and boundaries. According to Sennett, the contemporary city needs to critically examine its problems. It is necessary to open up an urban closed system, and once we do that, the image of a coherent city will diminish. To make a coherent city is to make a closed system. There are three attributes that make cities today function as closed systems:

1. **Over-determination:** The fitted purpose of a form to accommodate a very specific function does not allow a dialogue between present and past forms. Replacements or any kind of renovation seem to be complicated if not impossible.
2. **Equilibrium:** A little bit of everything in order to have a balanced system is preferable in a contemporary city. However, this tendency results in a low quality operational system. The dilemma posed to us is either to achieve an imbalanced system where some experiences will be declined or to stick with balance and expect a diminished value.

3. **Integration:** In order to prevent dysfunction or other flaws that threaten the system, governmental policies, rules, and laws are accumulated to preserve the existing coherent context.

As a response to these observations, Sennett details three strategies that promote an open city model:

1. **Design Ambiguity:** Based on the discipline of natural ecologies and in particular the theory of Stephen Gould, there are two kinds of edges: (1) the boundary as an edge where things end, a dead condition where transgressions are impotent and (2) the border as an active zone of exchange, a living condition. Similar to this distinction is another natural edge condition: (1) the cell wall, which is the boundary and (2) the cell membrane, which is the border. A cell membrane has a structure that allows contradictory situations to take part simultaneously; it is porous and resistant at the same time. A border membrane is what designers, architects and planners should seek in order to improve the city’s problems.

2. **Design Incompleteness:** Borrowing Peter Eisenman’s idea for Light Architecture, where forms can be revised internally in order to confront the inhabitants’ changed needs, contemporary building forms need to be more flexible. In our epoch, it is better to demolish a building instead of
reconstruct it. In order to achieve that, it is necessary to study the complexity of today’s infrastructure to transcend clarity.

3. **Design Unresolveness:** Realization follows a linear narrative, while real life rarely follows a linear narrative. Sennett proposes that instead of thinking of a design process as consequences it might be better to consider it as a random series of several possibilities.

![Figure 7: Interpretive Diagram of Richard Sennett's Paradigm](image-url)
Given the fact that Richard Sennett’s paradigm was developed in order to propose an open city not in contested zones, an uncritical application of his paradigm in conflict areas would be naïve and inaccurate. Conflict areas have the paradox to be the ultimate closed systems with principal characteristics of openness. They are the ultimate closed systems because of an increased over-specification of function and form: more control, regulations, more rules, more prohibition, and less accessibility. Equilibrium and integration, if not eliminated, follow the rules of over-determination indiscriminately. This occurs mostly because of the dominant function they hold: military. The functions that comprise a system have a significant role to regulate the degree of closure or openness to that system. Consequently, it can be said that a military function holds a high level of closure, and in areas where it is the main use, it closes even more than the existing system.

Beyond their closeness, conflict areas are outlined by ambiguity, incompleteness, and unresolveness; these processes of displacement and settlement cause ambiguous ownerships. Processes of abandonment and destruction cause incomplete spatial forms, and ongoing disagreements retain an unresolved political problem and, consequently, an unresolved spatial transformation. Based on this, a successful process of openness seems to be a difficult task. However, an open city requires conflict in order to transcend the attributes of closure. A productive and creative conflict is the objective of this research. Long term conflicts, like the one in Cyprus, constitute an even more difficult effort as their political and social disagreements tend to expand, and their spatial separation eliminates sharing. Although the level and the way a contested zone is portrayed with mistrust, the potential of decisive separation and
hatred embracing a productive conflict is not promising. Examining these extreme conditions reveals new dynamics of space. This study does not aim to transform a closed system into an open system but to adjust a closed system into an opportunity to achieve openness.

Moving from the specificities of Famagusta to the implementation of a negotiating-space model that goes beyond conventional planning approaches in conflict areas, there are three main elements necessary to be addressed:

1. Ambiguity occurs because of the existence of a heterogeneous environment. Heterogeneity is not created between two different opponents but between their differences and the one particular element they share. The example of Famagusta shows that within the two systems of the two divided communities there exists a third common system that might be the opportunity to share something.
2. Incompleteness needs to be associated with the notion of ephemerality. While the two communities live separately, they are allowed to co-exist, cross borders, and visit each other only for limited periods of time. Consequently, this ephemerality can be the production of a new form of incompleteness with ones willing to share and exchange something.

3. The notion of unresolveness in conflict areas mostly refers to the undetermined political situation. Based on that, unresolveness can imply any possible decision that the specific conflict can have. The decision is always a top-down one, even while it generates manifold bottom-up reactions. A design ready to overcome such reactions needs to identify an adaptation mode to manage the unpredictability of this unresolveness.

**Intellectual Merit**

This thesis proposes an alternative reading of conflict spaces for architects. Given architecture’s insistence to contribute to contested zones despite their apparent incapability due to institutional constrains, architecture, in order to be beneficial, requires a re-thinking of conventional design approaches. To achieve this goal, this thesis suggests an understanding of people and spaces by redefining challenging preconceptions of design. Conflict spaces are mainly characterized as unstable environments. However, the way tourism seems to be the only stable condition in the unstable land of Famagusta suggests the introduction of a third narrative to agitate the dominant narratives favored by the
institutions as the norm and the status quo. Through this narrative, conventional ideas around conflict, mobility, and national identity resolve into new perspectives. Conflict is a natural condition of life. It is necessary and will always exist in space, either physically or socially. The way design finds ways to promote architecture or unravel advantages for society to adapt is the new embodiment presented from this thesis.

Figure 9: The Architect’s Contribution Diagram: Architecture needs to find the residence between the big and the small picture.
Figure 10: Prohibition Sign in Varosha
This chapter presents the actors involved at the institutional scale and the strategies they use to organize space. It examines their spatial rights on Famagusta’s ground and depicts the problem’s complexity. This chapter raises two main questions:

1. What kind of design can be generated even when the institution’s truth is partial?
2. What kind of design process can help overcome the institutional boundary that causes social and spatial boundaries?

The Institutional Actors

Boundaries are institutionalized lines orderly arranged in space. They are set by nations, politicians, and global organizations to satisfy their voracious ambitions to control. As Weizman (2003) refers to the politician and military point of view, the city constitutes an intractable social and physical obstacle to power.
Consequently, the city needs to be reorganized. This insistent attitude of spatial control finds evidence in drawings, marked as lines on plans that become realized as walls, buffer zones, or are even invisibly built through laws. However, even when these lines are supposedly drawn to protect and bring peace between societies, at the same time they mark the continuation of political disputes and disagreements. This is the case in Cyprus, too. General Peter Young, the commander of the British Peace Force in 1964, first drew the UN Buffer Zone, the so-called Green Line, on a map with a green crayon.

Institutional actors in conflict spaces may or may not have direct relation with the actual problem. However, their involvement has its own effect on the system. The totality of an official solution, of what is permitted and prohibited, and the application of law depends on the institution’s decision. The process of bordering space is not the result of war, but is the avoidance and procrastination of resolving disputes. Especially when the boundaries were raised due to violence and social antagonism at the grassroots level, how do you then remove borders if they are supposed to function for peace? Conflict areas with long histories of violence and formal division, like Cyprus, demonstrate greater difficulty for a resolution plan. The unresolveness in long-term conflicts is not something temporary rather than permanent. Contested societies become numb when placed into boundaries. In addition, unresolveness is the comfort zone for the institutions holding the major power so their rule will come naturally considering the issue’s complexity and the actors involved at a multiplicity of levels. On the other hand, it is exactly this complexity and the infinite number of actors involved that leaves the chance for an unpredictable result. Under specific circumstances any possibility is part of a plan that should not be ignored.
Figure 12: Institutional Actors related to Famagusta’s Conflict

*The way the states involved are determined on the diagram has nothing to do with the side they support.

Figure 13: Pyramid Inverted - When the top of the pyramid changes, then everything underneath is affected.
A Chronological Timeline: Separation or Coexistence?

Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were living separately in Cyprus, and therefore in Famagusta, much longer before 1974. Consequently, to restore a nonexistent co-existent is not the issue here. The aim of this chapter is to understand at which level a system composed by two extremely different components can operate cooperatively.

Figure 14: Chronological Development of Famagusta
Famagusta has been a desired place for many conquerors since its establishment. Each of these conquerors left their mark on Famagusta’s territory, and as a result many stories haunt Famagusta’s identity. This multiplicity of stories is a fundamental boundary over the Cyprus issue between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as it cannot be one truth, one result, or one solution. Famagusta’s history starts early in antiquity, as it is considered to be a successor city of Arsinoe, Constantia, Salamis, and Enkomi. These settlements were started at around 1100 BC when the ancient Greeks were in search of establishing new colonies. However, only Arsionoe and earlier before with the Byzantines, Constantia, were located in the position where Famagusta is today. It is clear that Cyprus was an integral part of the Hellenic world. Greek culture and language were dominant elements in the island and Famagusta in particular.

Figure 15: Famagusta’s Different Kinds of Conflict
The island of love, where Aphrodite was born according to the Greek mythology, would later be conquered and ruled by many occupants. In 1191, under the Lusignan rule, Famagusta’s natural harbor increased its significance and contributed to transforming Famagusta into a flourishing trading hub in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its population started to grow, and its rapid economic development in the 13th century turned Famagusta into one of the richest cities in Christendom. Consequently, it became an object of jealousy between the dominant kingdoms of that age. France, Genoa and Venice, the most important commercial and naval forces during the Medieval Ages, occupied Famagusta and fought each other many times for its seizure. Brilliant churches and splendid monuments, as well as defensive walls built during that age, are of great cultural value. Both the Greek and Turkish mayors of Famagusta, acknowledging the importance of this heritage, cooperatively tried to preserve it under the guidance of Europa-Nostra, a European federation for cultural heritage, in April 2008.

After being under siege by the Ottomans for eleven months, the Venetians were forced to surrender in 1571. However, until 1668, they tried many times to unsuccessfully reclaim the territory. During the Ottoman period the main cathedral in the center of Famagusta turned into a Mosque, while many other Christian churches were abandoned. The city in general lost its previous glory, as it was used only as a military base. However, the Ottoman period signifies the starting point of two communities and their shared history. Turks from Anatolia were migrated to Famagusta and, along with the soldiers who stayed after the end of the Ottoman Empire, became one fourth of the Cyprus population. The Ottomans forced the Greeks to live outside the Walled City, the center of Famagusta until then, and as a result the Greeks settled in Varosha.
Another point necessary to mention is that even though Greeks and Ottomans were living separately, they were not totally divided according to the stereotypical Greek ethnicity with Christian religion, speaking Greek versus Ottoman ethnicity with Muslim religion, speaking Turkish (Hadjioannou, 1976). These lines were blurred since the majority of those considered today as Turkish Cypriots were Greek. There were of course many Turkish people who transferred from Anatolia to Cyprus but there were also many Greeks who converted into Muslims. After 1571, the Ottomans left the Greeks in slavery, poor, and exhausted. In order to be Christians they needed to pay taxes and those who declared themselves as Ottomans were exempted from this. Many of them remained secretly Christian even though they were Turkish, while others became Muslims but for many generations did not speak Turkish. This fact raises an identity question: Are these people Greek, Turkish, or both?

Famagusta regained its glory when the British took the rule in Cyprus. The British decided to create a center in-between the living districts: Walled City and Varosha. This center, along with the living quarter of Saraya nearby, was the only shared space. The two communities continued to live apart. They had separate schools with Greek and Turkish teachers, which enhanced their differences and disconnected identity. The British radically improved the port that after Cyprus independence allowed Famagusta to flourish as a popular tourist resort in the Eastern Mediterranean.

After the Second World War, Greece started to claim Cyprus over British Rule through discussions, which were refused constantly by the British. Greek Cypriots who wanted to end British Rule started a four-year military campaign in 1955 to support ‘enosis’ (=union) with Greece. Turkish Cypriots, afraid that they
would be ignored, increased their connection with Turkey and started an anti-
enosis movement. Consequently, the relations between Greece and Turkey were
tense, and so the British declared Cyprus an independent state. This led to a joint
administration that soon reached deadlocks. In 1964, the Turkish Cypriots
abandoned their posts from government. Inter-communal violence broke out,
and the UN established a peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Separation
between the two communities was increased with the division between Greek
and Turkish Cypriot villages and the formation of the Green Line, the first line of
today’s buffer zone, in Nicosia. Contentions had worn the country down. Turkey,
in order to protect the Turkish Cypriot’s rights as one of the three forces to monitor
Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee, invaded the island.

The Turkish armed intervention in 1974 was the end of Famagusta’s
welfare. Turkey took 37% of Cyprus under its control, causing a population of
around 150,000 Greek Cypriots to move from north to south and a number of
45,000 Turkish Cypriots from south to north. Varosha, the main part of Famagusta,
remains unsettled due to a UN Resolution that “considers attempts to settle any
part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and calls for
the transfer of this area to the administration of the United Nations”. The Turkish
army enclosed the area, and it is prohibited for anyone to even walk along its
periphery. After the division of the island, Turkish Cypriots refugees and Turkish
immigrants settled Famagusta, which is located in the north of the buffer zone.
Varosha’s uncertain political situation and the illegal declaration of the north part
of Cyprus as a separated state, called the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
decreased Famagusta’s growth. For many years after the war, Famagusta faced
several urban issues. Particularly after 2003, with the openings and the
establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean University, early stages of
development followed. Turkish Cypriots tried to remain removed from the outskirts
of Varosha and started a linear development from the Walled City to the north.

Historically, Famagusta is seemingly a “pluricultural” area, something that is
evident by its triple name and by the traces left by several occupants:

Is it Famagusta? Ammochostos? Or Gazimaguza? And why it cannot be all of
these?

Its names have instant connotations: Famagusta is the Latin and
international name given to the town by the French during the medieval ages,
Ammochostos is the Greek name, and Gazimaguza is the Turkish one. These
names exemplify that Famagusta, like any other place around the world, has
been marked by “others”. It cannot have a pure, single meaning, as it historically
brought disparate groups into a common ground. However, the tendency that
dominates is that according to the way somebody calls the two sides of Cyprus,
or the events occurred related to the political condition, one immediately takes a
side. Naming something means that you have already chosen a side. Neutrality cannot exist, nor it is desirable.

Since 1974, the Cyprus situation encompasses the paradox of a peaceful conflict. Besides one violent episode in 1996, there has been no fighting between the two communities, not even after the checkpoints opened. The absolute separation from 1974 until today has also physically declined with two examples:

(1) 20,000 Greek Cypriots and Maronites, who decided not to leave their houses in 1974. The emotional connection with their birthplace made them fearless of dying. In 1975, the Third Vienna Agreement was signed in order to protect these people. Even though the agreement was largely violated by the Turkish army, today there are 441 people still living there, 336 Greek Cypriots and 105 Maronites.

(2) The village of Pyla, located in the buffer zone, is the only bi-communal village where Greek and Turkish Cypriots still live even after 1974. Its population is 67% Greek Cypriots and 33% Turkish Cypriots. The village is policed by UN force and by Turkish army watchtowers. “We are proof for the whole country that we can live together without any problems” (Turkish Cypriot, CNN.com, 2009). The village of Pyla was for many years the only option for bi-communal meetings when access permission was prohibited everywhere, even at the buffer zone.

In April 2003, not long after the majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected the Anan Plan, the closest plan to a determined solution, surprisingly the Turkish Cypriot authorities announced relaxed restrictions to visiting the other side. For the people this unexpected change was something hopeful, especially for the Turkish
Cypriots who until then were internationally isolated. Even though people in general welcomed this agreement, it was clearly stated that the key political issues could not be resolved. And it is actually true that the territorial and sovereignty issues around the Cyprus problem are deeply rooted and very complicated.

In 2004, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union. The European Union represents one of the major external actors involved into the Cyprus conflict. Even though the whole island of Cyprus is considered to be part of the EU, the fact that the Government of Cyprus has no influence over the northern part has caused the EU legislation to suspend this side. Every Turkish Cypriot who accepts their citizenship in the Republic of Cyprus benefits as a member of the EU as well. The power of the EU gave hope to many citizens in Cyprus that things will change and a resolution under the EU guidance and support was probable to come. However, disappointment is the main attitude today. The EU financially supports many peacebuilding practices organized by local NGOs in Cyprus. However, at a political level the issue seems to be an intransient obstacle, as other interests demand attention.

According to Andreas Hadjoudes (2008), the person in charge for the public relations at the European commission in Cyprus, the main problem of the conflict is the high presence of armies in Cyprus: armies from Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain. As external monitors, instead of enhancing peace they spreading fear and reluctance. And it is actually true, that all these supposedly peace forces do not guarantee peace; rather, in most cases their existence benefits other interests like gaining territorial and financial control. It is also true that a third entity between two communities does not encourage cooperation or
coexistence. In banks, to overcome the lack of cooperation between the front and the back office, they create a middle office. This middle office does not offer a solution to the problem. All these monitors put in place to resolve the conflict enhance the lack of communication between the two actual components; there is one issue between the middle office and the front office, and another issue between the middle office and the back office. The difference with conflicted communities is that they have the option to transfuse the other two distinct “offices” into the middle one and find a communication line through a common narrative. Both communities need to identify their own liminal zone where understanding their differences and simultaneously identifying their similarities will lead to feasible communication.

Figure 17: Map showing Military Presence in Cyprus

"It is estimated that in recent years there have been in the northern part of the island a little under 30,000 armed forces of the Republic of Turkey making it one of the most militarized areas in the world in terms of numbers of troops and numbers of civilian population."

Ban Ki-Moon Secretary-General UN
Physical Institutional Lines

**UN Buffer Zone**

Given the fact that the enclosure of Varosha was never accepted, especially from the Greek Cypriots, this border is considered to be a crucial one. Even though the Buffer Zone is mostly related with Nicosia, as it is the only divided city bearing this wound in its heart, the border of Dherynia, close to Varosha, has its own part in history. In 1996, the only bloody episode between the two communities after 1974 occurred at this specific point. On August 11, 1996, during a Greek Cypriot protest for the 22 years of occupation, one of the demonstrators, forgetting that an embryonic fight is still a fight, crossed the border. On the other side, counter-demonstrators welcomed him with iron bars and battered him to death. A few days later, in the memory of the murdered demonstrator, another Greek Cypriot, naively measuring the risk of his actions, decided to unhook a Turkish flag. By the time he started climbing the pole, he was shot.

Even though these two episodes brought the end of these annual protests, they simultaneously raised questions about the security obtained by the UNFCYP, as they were incapable of stopping both the beginning and the result of these events. The uncertainty of security issues related with the UN peace force in Cyprus is mutual for both communities and has been proven by several surveys over the years. Many global organizations similar to the United Nations are dedicated to resolve conflict issues. While the power of these organizations is unquestionable, their apparent incapability, proven by the many active conflict zones around the world, raises essential doubts about their existence.
However, the UN Buffer Zone, beyond its apparent implications and the intensification of fear, retains hope. Its unresolveness retains hope. A removal of the buffer zone would immediately imply completeness and determination. Following the most possible scenario of having two separate states, which neglects ownership rights and emotional attachment, the insistent existence of the buffer zone motivates people to still hope and try for a better future.

Figure 18: Facts Regarding the UN Buffer Zone
Under the Treaty of Guarantee, signed to declare Cyprus an independent nation, Britain, along with Greece and Turkey, had the monitor’s right over the Cyprus territory. The British military presence retains two sovereign bases. The one in Famagusta is part of the Dhekelia Sovereignty Base. This military base ensures and maintains dominance of the British in the Eastern Mediterranean. Beyond this base, they hold areas in Famagusta region for military exercises, including a firing range for artillery exercises and an Instrument Flying Area, and they have also maintained rights over the port of Famagusta. While everyone can access the British Sovereignty Base, they have limited rights of actions and activities. The British Base consists of a small, self-organized community that serves and facilitates the needs of British soldiers and their families. For the two communities, the base is a disconnected neutral zone, and a passage through the Vrysoulles checkpoint is controlled by the British. The checkpoint itself dis-programs parts of the military base, as it possess ambiguity. The military base where the checkpoint is located becomes a threshold of crossing lines and developing borders from boundaries. This location represents an overture to the contradictory environment between military and tourism: Right next to the passport control and the police, there is a massive advertisement showing a relaxed woman sunbathing near the beach, made by the Turkish Cypriot tourist organization. The paradox between control and relaxation is set out clear; is it an active military zone with a checkpoint control, or is it just another checkpoint signifying holiday vacations?
Figure 19: Vrysoulles Checkpoint
**Enclosed Varosha**

The enclosed is a strictly prohibited zone. You can look into it only from the outside. Its uncanny mystery revealed through 36 years of abandonment tempts the eyes to examine its scene. And it is actually the presence of this surveillance, not only through the ban signs but also from the houses opposite the barbed wires that surround Varosha. Citizens living near the ghost town have transformed themselves into watchers; some of them because of fear, others due to their great patriotism. Very few people, other than soldiers, have entered the area from 1974 until today. Turkish soldiers who are under instructions would probably shoot anybody trespassing the law. However, images and videos published on the web prove that people actually risked crossing the barbed wires. The images explicitly show the sudden evacuation of the people who used to live there. Shredded laundry still hangs from clotheslines, cars are parked along the street, boutique mannequins, personal belongings are all over the place, and shop signs and advertisements remain from the 60s. Nothing is salvageable. The presence of wild nature dominates the deserted human-absent streets and buildings. Varosha is condemned to remain abandoned for an unknown period of time.

The case of Varosha, both the enclosed and open, is the focus of this study and will be explored in further detail later in the following chapters.
Figure 18: Varosha’s Boundary – 1
*original photographs are taken from: Lia Lapiti, Defining Silent, 2009.
Figure 19: Varosha’s Boundary - 2

*original photographs are taken from: Lia Lapithi, Defining Silent, 2009.
Figure 20: Varosha’s Boundary -3
*original photographs are taken from: Lia Lapithi, Defining Silent, 2009.
Varosha as a Bargaining Chip

Varosha forms a zone of uncertainty due to political games. The Anan Plan was the closest plan to a solution determined by the UN. The plan was vetoed by the Greek Cypriots and agreed upon by the Turkish Cypriots and consequently was rejected. Varosha was one of the first territories returned under the administration of the Republic of Cyprus. In territorial terms, it seems to be the most possible scenario for a future political solution. There have been several proposals for reconciliation between the two communities. Varosha is included in all of them. The main reason is that Varosha for the Turkish side is used as a bargaining chip for future negotiations towards a holistic solution of the Cyprus problem. Former Turkish President Kenan Evren, who named Famagusta as the “trump card”, officially admitted this. It was not part of their occupation plan, but when their army found no resistance, it was wiser for them to occupy it with a view to exploiting this in future negotiations.

(1) Until 2003, Turkish Cypriots had been living in isolation that caused many economic issues. The need to legally open the port nearby Varosha brought many proposals of exchanging Varosha with the permission to reopen the port. However, Greek Cypriots claim the port and British also have rights over it, which makes things complicated. Varosha was also a proposal for the airport in Nicosia. In 2003, Turkish Cypriot leadership suggested the resettlement of Varosha over the re-opening of Nicosia airport for the Turkish Cypriots only. The Nicosia airport has been closed and abandoned since 1974 and is located on the buffer zone.
Turkey has been struggling for many years to enter the European Union. The pretext of the EU for this delay is mainly the Cyprus issue. In trying to show good will, Turkey announces regularly and also unexpectedly the re-opening of Varosha. Most of these announcements come overnight as a surprise for the Greek Cypriots in order to test and terrify. Notably, last year after the Republic of Cyprus faced official economic bankruptcy, the Turkish side has continuously pushed the government of Cyprus to discuss the issue of Varosha.

![Figure 21: Possible Boundary Line Mutations](image)

Unresolveness: Unpredictability

The History Lens is conducted through newspapers and other media articles, official documentation, history books, and other relevant data of how one is informed about geopolitical events occurring in space. This happens mostly to show the limited information one can have and also the misinformation that can easily be applied to conflict issues. What comes from Greek Cypriot propaganda and what comes from Turkish Cypriot propaganda? The History Lens will always mislead and deceive. Haraway (1991) claims, “the political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations.
and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point”. When it comes to conflict zones, there are more than two sides of the story, as there are more actors involved over time. As a result, a lack of transparency as well as a lack of communication is a crucial issue.

Conflict spaces’ futures are held in the hands of politicians. It is interesting how people today can possibly predict weather conditions and natural disasters in order to improve and propose architectural and other technical innovations, but they are incapable of suggesting ways to anticipate human decisions. The History Lens shows the meager access to information citizens have to overnight decisions, sudden displacements, and unexpected loses. This thesis aims to confront this limited information, not because it admits defeat, but because human behavior is mysteriously unpredictable, obscure, and doubtful. Even though political games over contested zones lead to unresolvleness, they preserve unpredictability in terms of a determined solution. This unpredictability leaves the hope that things might actually get improved. There are four possible scenarios for the future of Varosha: (1) to be re-opened for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots under the rule of the European Union or the United Nations; (2) to be given to the Greek Cypriots under the administrative control of the Republic of Cyprus; (3) to re-opened for the Turkish Cypriot community only, violating another human rights resolution between the two communities; (4) to continue as such until something else perturbs the political condition, like an inevitable natural disaster, a monstrous global evolution, or another war.
Figure 22: Institutional Unresolveness Diagram
Chapter 4

Border and Boundary Lens

Figure 23: Varosha’s Incompleteness
This chapter investigates society’s paradoxical tendency to preserve a history that caused a tremendous amount of problems instead of trying to move forward. It examines the way institutions maintain division within society and how local NGOs try to rebuild relationships between the separated communities. This chapter raises the following questions:

1. At which level is national identity becoming a boundary within society?
2. Can architects prepare a ground for change given their knowledge on space? And if this preparation is already happening by other people, how can architects transform this intangible preparation into tangible spatial forms?

Figure 24: Boundary / Figure 25: Border
The Grassroots Actors

Lefebvre (1991: 142) asserts, “Space is once result and cause, product and producer”. While institutional actors produce space by drawing lines, grassroots actors, confronted to live in the environment organized for them by the institutions, read space differently and subsequently re-produce space with their actions. Their actions reveal a potential architecture of change, of unexpected events, and of adaptability. Grassroots’ main spatial achievement is their capacity to identify the looseness of boundaries and explore the shades in between permission and prohibition.

The grassroots actors in the area of Varosha are divided, beyond their discernible distinction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, into settlers and owners: the ones who live there now and the ones who do not live there anymore but own the land. Even though the settlers are also divided in two categories, Turkish Cypriot refugees and Turkish immigrants, this thesis will focus on the Turkish Cypriot people as they are registered legally in the demographics and are connected with the island before and after 1974. Both settlers and owners are refugees, something that separates them from their common national identity, as their actions are mostly driven by emotion due to painful past experiences, which include forced displacement, fear, loss and homelessness.

In addition, grassroots actors are also the neighbors of Varosha: people living nearby the border. Even though they have not experienced forced displacement, the spatial configuration of boundaries has had a direct affect on them as well. The new order of things established after the war altered their way of living. At the beginning, their actions were compelled by fear due to their close vicinity to an active military zone. However, over the years, as the military
presence became naturalized, living on the edge inspired them to adjust their space motivated by their opportunistic survival interest. This approach will be explored in detail in the next chapter.
Varosha: A Boundary or A Border?

Famagusta, especially after the independence of Cyprus and until 1974, has been the major economic source for the whole island of Cyprus. The enclosed area of Varosha covers 6.4 square kilometers space and served 53% of tourists on the whole island. Famagusta’s port, the busiest in Cyprus, had more than 50% of vessels that visited Cyprus ports. In addition, Varosha’s territory contained 37 listed hotels, and including hotel apartments and other hostels, it had around a ten thousand bed capacity. When comparing bed capacity between Famagusta and Turkey in 1973, bed capacity across Turkey was below ten thousand. Today’s Varosha is dead and vanished. Bringing it back to life needs more than good will. And even though in memory Varosha is still “the diamond of the Mediterranean”, reality reflects the opposite. After the war, Famagusta, mostly because it is located on the north side of the island, which is considered illegal to tourism, had a huge decline in numbers. Famagusta’s tourist performance today holds only 7% of the north side (Statistics are taken from a survey conducted by the Initiative for Famagusta NGO, 2013). A potential solution to the re-opening of Varosha does not ensure a revived image of the previous one. Even if the purpose will be the revival of the tourist resort, this revival will require a long period of time. Today, tourist development is relocated in other parts of Cyprus, and these changes will have to be considered in order for Famagusta to regain its vitality or prosperity and contribute positively to the whole island.

The uncertainty and abrupt shifts from its rapid urban growth before 1974 and from prosperity to decay after 1974 that characterize Varosha are explicitly illustrated in its urban fabric. The transformation from agricultural land to suburb
was interrupted by the war. Today, Varosha facilitates both rural and urban environments in addition to several other urban issues caused by its ambivalent future. It is also worth mentioning that most of the immigrants and refugees who settled Varosha after 1974 did not make any adjustments or transformations to the new houses due to ambiguities around property ownership issues. Even the Turkish-Cypriot authorities of Famagusta did not invest any development projects in the area of Varosha. The first site visit was a surprise, as the first impression was that the area remained as it was before 1974, remaining at its bulk an extension of the ghost town of Varosha. The great difference is that people actually live here. This phenomenon does not appear in other parts in the north, as a future political solution most probably will not allow their governance under the Republic of Cyprus. The case of Varosha though is very different from any other part in Cyprus.
Several research articles addressing the urban obstacles of Famagusta and Varosha published by the Eastern Mediterranean University, the university that operates in the Famagusta region not far away from Varosha, consider Varosha a serious problem for the overall city. Its restoration seems impossible, as the level of decay that it faces today requires an extremely high cost. To tear everything down again seems to be very expensive, albeit the most probable solution. However, a decision like that cannot be made until a determinative political solution is given. In addition, the ghost town of Varosha prompts a major discussion about environmental hygiene due to its abandonment. Consequently, adaptable strategies proposing incremental changes to the area before a given final resolution are urgent. The main issue here is how do you bring together both the settlers and the owners to contribute to uncertainty? If the settlers will have to be displaced why should they care? On the other hand, why should the owners trust to put effort into something that may not ever be returned back to them?

“One day I found, in a box, the personal belongings of other people, like photo albums and journals. I asked my grandmother: ‘Who does this belong to?’ She said: ‘It belongs to the real owners of this house’. And that was the first time I realized that we don’t own the house that we are living in. I was shocked. I was thinking about how this happened, why these people had to leave their place and what their psychology was when they were running to get out. What kind of situation they had been faced with in order to leave everything behind – the children’s toys, the photo albums, everything’” (Ceren Bogac, female, CNN.com, 2013).

Most of the Turkish Cypriots are very well aware that they live in houses owned by others and in some cases from another culture. They tend to virtually co-exist with the memories, the belongings, and the spatial structure of the
previous occupants. Nevertheless, not everyone can cope with the situation like Bogac. The ownership issue is a microcosm of the territorial conflict occurring in Cyprus. The house is a physical element in a small scale claimed by two different entities. The owners have claimed the house even if they are not allowed to live in it. On the other hand, the settlers who have claimed the house have been the existing inhabitants for more than 36 years now. Similarly the area of Varosha that was a Greek Cypriot housing district until 1974 was re-occupied by Turkish Cypriots refugees mostly from Paphos and Turkish immigrants.

A recent study based on the open area of Varosha examines the place attachment of the refugees, and not the Turkish immigrants, to this specific location. Focusing on the fact that the refugees were given a home that was involuntarily abandoned by the former residents, the results of the study are that even though they have lived there for more than 36 years, they do not feel attached to the place. The uncertainty of the future and the unfamiliarity of the settlement with their former house have dramatic psychological effects and cause feelings of physical foreignness. It is interesting that the study was conducted with a sample of participants selected from two generations, as it shows that even the younger generation that never lived in their family’s former place shares the same attitude as their parents. Despite their weak attachment to the place, their experience of forced displacement impedes the decision of living elsewhere in the future. For many years, the hope of returning back to their former house was still alive. However, after 2003 when they visited their homes, they realized that nothing was like before. Some of them did not even exist. “Finally we understood that we don’t have a “home” to return back one day. Our houses are demolished and now we have been all alone only with the
memories of our homes. But still we wish that we would still be living in Paphos!” (Sevil Engin, female).

The meaning of homelessness here takes another dimension. Even though refugees have a physical space to live, the fact that this space does not belong to them and given the situation’s uncertainty, has made them live temporarily there for more than 36 years. In addition, it is clearly depicted that in order to give a spatial plan in Famagusta, the process of displacement is a predicament necessary to occur or to overcome. Like 1974, a political decision will catch citizens and institutions on a national level unprepared. The refugee’s only hope is not to be displaced again, while the Turkish immigrants do not mind if they need to move as long as the government will find them another place to live. A forced displacement is not a matter of identity anymore; rather, it is a matter of shelter. Varosha is a silent reminder of a neighborliness never forgotten. The grassroots actors have no actual power to decide their future. They need to be prepared to adjust in any big decision made for them without them.

Figure 28: Homelessness - The incomplete relationship between owners and settlers
Deconstructing Boundaries

Jacques Derrida, when introducing deconstruction, argues that we need to emancipate ourselves from living a sham by deconstructing the relation of the binary form between built environment. The process of deconstruction, for Derrida, is associated with the notion of displacement, where culture as the dominant term should be displaced and replaced by the built environment. The role of identity in conflict spaces is an intransigent boundary. History and identity are preserved in a way that maintains tenacious bias between relationships and societies. They persistently deny co-existence, co-operation, and sharing. The creation of a mechanism with the capacity to re-invent identity issues between contested zones is essential.

Boundaries, as mentioned in the previous chapter, are institutionalized lines within the built environment. They are perpetuations of a history and of an ideology that fragment spaces. However, in reality these boundaries can only be seen as borders. Separation and difference reveal a multiplicity of narratives over boundaries. Consequently, they cannot fully embody the ideology they are assigned to serve. The ambiguity of multiple narratives transforms these lines into fields of tensions, where diverse elements co-exist without eliminating each other. To deconstruct a boundary requires recognizing and determining mutations at a physical, economic, civic, and symbolic level outside the limits of political controversy in order to displace the boundary beyond its obvious image. Moving spatial boundaries beyond their conventional narrative is the main goal of this thesis in order to prepare a ground for long-term future improvements in conflict spaces.
De-Labeling Identities: De-territorialization

Andrew Solomon in his book “Far From the Tree” (2012) separates identities into vertical and horizontal. Even though his focus is based on whether these identities can be cured or not, this thesis borrows this term to interpret the way we tangibly shape these identities, and in particular our national identity. Vertical identities are the ones given to us by birth, passed down from parent to child, like ethnicity and nationality, language and religion. Horizontal identities are the ones we learn from a peer group, which develops the horizontal experience of a person. These identities are not related within a family and people discover them in groups related to their behavior and interests. These identities are reinforced by society through the tangible formation of space. Architects persistently see themselves as social agents trying to create spaces for minorities, impoverished people, and conflict societies. However, architecture treats space the way society stereotypes identities.

Figure 29: De-Labeling Identities Diagram
Vertical Identities: National Boundary and the Museums

The selectiveness of society in choosing history is crucial. Politicians and administrators, as the representatives of society, usually raise the wall of identity. Commonly, when cities are searching for their own identity, they eventually cease into a preferred history comprised with pleasant aspects and beautiful things. However, when it comes to contested spaces, and even more long-term conflicts, the selective history they choose is exactly the opposite. Isn’t it a paradox when a society decides to preserve a history that caused a tremendous
amount of problems? Who decides which parts of history are better to keep and why?

Institutional persistence is reflected in architecture. Architecture has its own role to play in the maintenance of history through the formation of museums. Specifically, in divided Nicosia, there are two identical museums named "Museum of National Struggle", serving two different histories. Both museums are located in the walled city of Nicosia but on a different side, north and south. In terms of typology, both museums are typical of their kind and are almost identical: They are designed to make the visitor follow an illustrated historical path through photographs, archival material, paintings, and traditional artifacts such as weapons, clothes, and personal objects. This path leads the visitor to the top where the museum culminates to the major events. For the Turkish Cypriots the climax is the Turkish invasion and the self-declaration of the northern part as independent in 1983, while for the Greek Cypriots the top represents the end of their struggle with their independence in 1960. Even though they are similarly structured and designed in terms of explicitly illustrating their aims, the two museums tell two distinct narratives. Even the selected specific location of each museum entails connection with their narratives given the neighboring national institutions. In particular, the Turkish Cypriot museum is established in the courtyard of Mucahitler Sitesi, which is a microcosm of a city for soldiers and represents the significance of the Turkish army as their protectors. The Greek Cypriot museum is accommodated into the Archibishop’s quarter, enhancing their relationship to Greek culture and religion.
Most of the problems between the two communities are derived from identifying which history should dominate, the Greek or the Turkish. In infusing both similarities, the history of Cyprus as a separated state might eliminate unresolved issues. Enhancing what does not actually exist, or at least what does not exist anymore, and persisting on past events and situations that are better to be forgotten does not signify a better future. In the end, what exactly is a national identity? Is it an extension of politics or is it real culture? The realization that national identity is becoming a mental boundary within the limitless identity a citizen can have today is essential in conflict areas.

Figure 31: Nicosia Walled City - The two museums
Horizontal Identities: NGOs Contribution

“We need to think ourselves beyond the nation. This is not to suggest that thought alone will carry us beyond the nation or that the nation is largely a thought of an imagined thing. Rather, it is to suggest that the role of intellectual practices is to identify the current crisis of the nation and in identifying it to provide part of the apparatus of recognition for post-national social forms” (Appadurai, 1993: 411).

Living in an era where mobility and displacement are common phenomena, the place where we come from and our given nationality or ethnicity cannot confine our identity. Place is undeniably part of our identity but certainly does not define one’s self. While there is much critique around identity issues and territorialization, good and bad, for conflict spaces, and in particular the Cyprus issue, a degree of de-territorialization is needed. The private geography of the individual in conflict spaces can be seen as more of a curse than a wish.

Local NGOs dedicated to bi-communal work in Cyprus try to enhance the Cypriot identity over the dominant distinction between Greek and Turkish in order to create ‘places’ where both communities can come together. They challenge vertical identities and preconceptions of belonging. There are many obstacles preventing this achievement, as those who cooperate can be seen as traitors who defect the group’s rule. How can somebody who works for peace be at the same time an enemy of their own group? NGOs focus has spread into several other aspects of society beyond politics, including sports, cultural events, entertainment, and education. The creation of a common identity able to absorb
the dualities that separate people is their main goal in every medium and aspect of society they decide to use.

Peacebuilding in Cyprus started in 1990 with the Peace Centre, and today there are approximately 100 NGOs in the Greek Cypriot Community and 40 NGOs in the Turkish Cypriot community. NGOs meeting points are limited to two shared spaces: the Internet and the UN Buffer Zone. Specifically, given their restricted isolation since 1974, the use of Internet and technology was one of the earlier projects attempted by the Future Word Centres (FWC) to bring together the two communities. Personal interaction was not only strictly prohibited but also telecommunication was notably weak, as calls from north to south were, and still are, connected via Turkey. The buffer zone is increasingly used by NGOs to become their home and a potential place of encounter. It is the only space that facilitates both communities in terms of identity, authority, and ownership, as it is perceived as a liminal zone. Without crossing the border to the other side, it is not necessary to get permission or be passed by any security control.

Several examples of their actions are related to training forums of bringing people together where the distinction between Greek and Turkish is eliminated. For example, the Association of Historical Dialogue and Research has tried to implement, in a renovated house located in the buffer zone, The House of Cooperation, where they train teachers to develop critical skills to help students talk about their identity, their history, and the general conditions of the conflict. The Hand Across the Divided organization is focused on women and gender equality through bi-communal practices. The Peace Bus, one of their projects, gathers female refugees to allow visits to their former houses and villages. The Peace Players International creates female and male basketball teams and
arranges championships, while the North Cyprus Mediation Centre develops mediation as a medium to empower relationships between communities. While these actions do not seem to affect the community as a whole on a radical level, they do change people on an individual basis, which again is important. In addition, they set the ground for ‘good’ architecture to come. The issue here is how these intangible places and bridges of communication these NGOs create can be tangibly implemented in space, and what can the role of architecture be once others have already prepared the ground? Can architecture play a role into this preparation?

NGOs action is important not only because they contribute to societal change, but also because they endure connections with the state and the authorities. They have the ability to reach people at a grassroots level that governments and international organizations cannot, and at the same time they can reach politicians and major decision makers. Even though they do not have the right to officially participate in political discussions, they can put pressure on the government with their actions and the practical cooperation they achieve within communities. Research conducted to identify the role of NGOs in Cyprus (Frostrom, 2008) show that people tend to not trust politicians in contrast with the
trust they show to the NGOs. However, a lack of communication in a multiplicity of levels within society still obscures improvement. In addition, the amount of people who engage themselves into these bi-communal practices remains low. Given the fact that it is voluntary work and the motive of a successful result due to the long lasting unresolved conflict is extremely minimum, disinterest and pessimism are the dominant feelings.

**Incompleteness: Ephemerality**

In 2003, the lost interaction between the two populations was revived after the encouraging decision to open checkpoints. People from both sides have permission to cross the border at any time, but they are not allowed to remain on the other side for more than 24 hours. Their individual visits along with the work coming from the NGOs produce an incomplete relationship based on occasional and ephemeral events. However, this ephemerality holds a potentiality to test the level of their cooperation. It can be seen as the middle stage of an established interplay re-strengthened.

Why might a complete relationship not be preferable? Mostly because completeness implies a determined and fixed relationship. A relationship that is preconceived and fueled with hatred and mistrust can be difficult to change due to social bias. Incompleteness allows time to act, think, and react. Most importantly, it allows the citizens to understand the real content of the ‘other’. It lies somewhere in between the homogeneity caused by the total separation and the danger behind heterogeneity. However, this incomplete relationship requires and demands some specific qualities in order for it to be productive: (1) the risk to
cooperate needs people willing to engage themselves into something uncertain, (2) to take responsibilities, and (3) to remove their selves out of insulation. To do that, they will probably need a motive force, an interest, or a reward. Why should someone whose home is located in Varosha be part of an improvement plan if they know that they might not ever return, given the fact that someone else presently occupies their home? On the other hand, why should someone, who does not own the house, knowing that sometime they might be forced to leave, help?

Figure 33: Incompleteness: Ephemerality
Figure 34: Military vs. Tourism
This chapter presents the way grassroots actors who live near the boundaries surrounded Varosha, have found ways to adapt themselves and their ownerships inspired by the tourists’ activities and movements around the ghost town of Varosha.

1. How can these episodes of adaptation inspire design processes and architecture?

2. How architects deal with such contradictory heterogeneous environments to re-invent conventional ideas around conflict spaces and proceed into ideal plans?

Figure 35: Transgression Lens Diagram
The Transgressive Actors: Tourists

Tourists as actors hold a potential subjectivity to transcend meanings in space. Being a tourist, a total stranger to a situation, a place, and a person, one’s perception and understanding of things can be different. It might not be always an appropriate representation, wondering, or question, but it will still be something possible that the people directly involved with the condition have not thought about. Tourists are characterized by many as a new sort of urban nomad in the contemporary globalized society, even though they have a significant distinction from the nomads. Instead of being contained in a specific location, tourists go everywhere spending money. The locals grasp the chance to transform themselves into inventive entrepreneurs who serve the needs of tourists.

Even though activities related to tourism first appeared in the classical era, when young rich British citizens were taking the Grand Tour to travel around Europe, the word “tourism” was introduced in the 19th century. The French Litre Dictionary presents the tourist as a new born actor “…from the English tourist, from tour, journey. Said of travelers who only visit foreign lands out of curiosity or because they are at a loose end…” While the idea unraveled for the tourist is generally a negative one, related with a bad territorialization, as the nomadic experience of the tourist is fundamentally economic, this thesis focuses on the ability of tourists to de-territorialize space. Michel Foucault’s definition of transgression shows ephemeral and temporal actions that test and negotiate limits. These actions can open up boundaries and, following the aim of this thesis, adjust them into borders. It is not an opposition, nor a resistance. Their few interactions with the locals can lead to a more permanent transformation of space that declines the history of the conflict, the military dominance, and the
ubiquitous presence of surveillance. Consequently, tourists do not create a new system. Rather they present the existing system differently using a new lens. They are exactly the transgressive actors in between two distinct stories, two contested parties, and two separated conditions.

Figure 36: Famagusta's Tourism before 1974 and today
*original photographs are taken from:

**Military Vs. Tourism**

Instead of listing all of the differences between military and tourism, their similarities might be proven to be more interesting, as soldiers and tourists are both urban nomads looking spatially for the same thing. At least that is what seemed to happen and still happening in Varosha. In the Medieval Ages, the French, and later the Lusignans and the Venetians, all chose to establish Famagusta, located on this specific coastline, based on its spatial qualities to satisfy their military goals. The same occurred with the Ottomans and the British, though the British took the area a step forward by expanding economic strategies. They combined
Famagusta’s spatial qualities and added infrastructure capable of both territorial control and economic success and benefit.

After 1960, the inhabitants took advantage of the British infrastructure to prosper economically. Given the fact that they were finally an independent nation with no more conquerors, they focused entirely on tourism. Famagusta’s tourism belongs to the coastline type, which is the dominant tourist type today in the Mediterranean. The coastal zone tourist destinations are based on geographical characteristics compiled as the three ‘S’’s: sea, sun, and sand. As a tourist resort, Famagusta was one of the most important coastal zone tourist destinations of the Mediterranean, with features like Costa Brava and Costa del Sol in Spain, the Adriatic Beaches in Italy, the Dalmatian coastline of the former Yugoslavia, the coastline of Varna in Bulgaria, the beaches of Costanza in Romania, and the coast sides in Greece.

Varosha differs from any other abandoned place, not because of its enclosure but because people did not actually abandon it. For example, Detroit could not keep pace with the contemporary economy. Its productive life cycle came to an end, its technologies became unsupported, and its spaces became obsolete. Detroit’s specificity created a complete product with an expiration date. It is exactly what Sennet tries to encourage with the notion of incompleteness. Today’s spatial infrastructures are complex because of technological advancements and the specific requirements they demand. However, this complexity declines these infrastructures’ flexibility. Most of them are better, easier, and less expensive to tear down instead of sustaining them, transforming them, and reviving their purpose in society. As a result, the same society that built them, fails them. Society changes, and so does its needs. The
built environment is much more difficult to change, adapt, and move forward. Such spaces consist of leftovers in space until another societal change will save them.

There are so many remainders in Famagusta’s space that their narrative empowers to bring the separate parties together. This occurs with many spaces around Famagusta: the Venetian walls, the archaeological ruins of Enkomi and Salamis, and its main cathedral that later on became a mosque. These war trophies remain as a cultural heritage that both communities appreciate even though perhaps not for the same reasons. The Turkish Cypriots do not consider these spaces as part of their history, but they still acknowledge their cultural importance and their economic significance for tourist sightseeing. This acknowledgment is also what has led to their preservation and protection and to cooperation between the two groups. Varosha is also an essential remainder in the urban fabric, but unlike other built or spatial remainders, Varosha’s life cycle did not end naturally. It is repressed by the memory of sudden loss and the desire that is left undone. Because of its significant narrative, today’s ghost town remains part of the people’s lives. Furthermore, it remains as the only shared narrative between the two communities, which is why Varosha became invaluable for a collective society.

Today, the area of Varosha tries to combine both a military base and a tourist destination, although the militarian control dominates for several reasons due to unresolved political issues. To conclude, both military and tourism in coast zones are in search for the best locations that seemingly share the same qualities of space. Their apparent incompatibility as functions does not necessitate very
different characteristics of space. However, the way these two environments are combined in the island of Cyprus and especially in Famagusta entails a process of transgression, transcending conventional boundaries of what is supposed to be a military zone and what is supposed to be a tourist resort. The space qualities of Famagusta do not stand in a binary opposition to the limits of a military environment or the limits of a tourist resort but rather outline the nuances between restricted and permitted, rigidness and relaxation, blackness and whiteness.

According to Bataille’s and Foucault’s theories of transgression, a transgressive behavior does not decline nor eliminate boundaries or limits, as every kind of edge carries its own refusal to conform: “Transgression opens the door into what lies beyond the limits usually observed, but it maintains these limits just the same. Transgression is complementary to the profane world, exceeding its limits but not destroying it” (Bataille). The tourist presence holds an ambiguity that suggests or makes easier a process of transgression to occur. Both institutionalized power and grassroots are confronted by this ambiguity. The space itself cannot be transgressed, but the way people interpret a specific space encourages transgressive actions to take part.

Figure 37: Military and Tourism both look for the same spatial characteristics.
Episodes of Adaptation

Moving from the big picture of real politics to the actual city where people are confronted to live with borders, prohibitions, and mistrust, this thesis makes an argument through Famagusta’s heterogeneous environments for a new role of the architect. Institutions are related to conflict and militarism, while locals, take advantage of that conflict using tourism in order to make profit. Tourists are outside of the system. The locals improvise, observe, and follow what the tourists do and want, and they transform the tourists’ ephemeral tactics into permanent strategies to attract more tourists. In other words, tourists suggest ideas and the locals adapt them. They are both confronted by an intransigent situation given by the institutions. However, their actions are flexible enough to serve their own motives, defecting the disadvantages of the conflict’s reality. The architect needs to stand somewhere in between outside and inside the system of the conflict in order to progress idealistic ideas in extreme conditions like contested zones. The architect needs to be a tourist and a local at the same time. Lefebvre (1974) claims that in order to be successful, a revolution requires the production of its own space. For this thesis, the revolution is the way people adapt their political controversies and their society, giving space a new meaning, beyond the conventional image of conflict. The tourists, with their actions and activities, hold the power to push the inhabitants into spatial transformations of their own territory.

Following Boeri’s method of working within space, the view from below is crucial to understanding people’s spatial adaptivity. This thesis focuses on three different case studies that depict a process of adaptation in the contested zone of Varosha based on tourist operations. These case studies are spots located on
the edges around Varosha. Their operation challenges the width of the border between the two sides. Even though they are born from opportunistic need, they imply a willingness to relax predominant realities of Varosha’s control and sovereignty. In other words, they ignore in their own way the conflict zone they are located in and reveal different realities in space. The Palm Beach Hotel is a planned case study, while the Viewpoints and the Tours are unplanned, self-organized processes.

Figure 38: Episodes of Adaptation Diagram

**Episode of Adaptation 1: Varosha’s Viewpoints**

Given the prohibition on entering and taking pictures, views of Varosha are rare. Even though these Viewpoints were more popular before 2003, when looking at Varosha could only happen with binoculars, even after the crossing openings they still decently operate due to the prohibition to walk along the edge. These viewpoints are houses located on the edge of the buffer zone close to Varosha. The owners adjusted their houses based on specific non-regulated and unplanned transformations to combine their housing typology with an
appropriate infrastructure for a viewpoint. It is an example of self-organization and grassroots improvisation to negotiate the conflict conditions they had to confront after 1974.

Figure 39: Map - Viewpoints

‘Annita’s House: The Ghost City’s nearest ViewPoint’ was the first I noticed during my observations around the Dherynia’s border. Annita, a grassroots actor, established this business, grasping the opportunity to take advantage of the conflict literally imposed outside of her house. It is located exactly opposite the Greek-Cypriot’s military border outpost and the point where the last violent episode after 1974 occurred. This close vicinity to historical events and important military spots has been inventively incorporated as part of the functional adjustments Annita has made to her house.
Her house is a two-storey independent residence. The second floor was supposed to be a separated home, usually for one of her children, traditionally the first daughter. Consequently, it has a staircase disconnected from her house on the first floor but instead of a second house there is a café, a museum, and a real estate office. Up on the roof, accessed through an improvised metal staircase, there is a lookout post with a close view of Varosha. Cross-programming as defined by Bernard Tschumi (1981) can have a result greater than the sum of its parts, and this is exactly what Annita obviously aspires to. Beyond these cross-programming processes Annita sufficiently jointed to her house, she also has the amazing ability to cross-personalize herself, from a Greek-

Figure 40: Annita’s House and Viewpoint
Cypriot patriot to a real estate business woman, to a coffee maker, depending on what the tourists show interest in. Her marketing ability is enhanced through her talkativeness.

She basically works only with organized tourist tours by appointment. However, if other individuals find her viewpoint open they are more than welcome to join, too. In cases when the viewpoint is closed, Annita’s personnel always provide information about the working hours and appointments. The first thing one finds when entering the viewpoint is the café. Annita is there to welcome everyone with a pair of binoculars. Her questions to the tourists are related to the Cyprus problem and what they know about it. She is willing to summarize the whole story and repeat it indefinitely if it is necessary, to anyone who asks or does not know, using accurately the Greek-Cypriot semiotics related to the Cyprus issue. To sufficiently support her explanations, she combines photographs from Varosha before and after 1974. Additionally, nearby the café there is an improvised museum. There the visitor can find press cuttings of the events related to the Cyprus problem. There are photographs of Famagusta with a particular focus on Varosha. A television plays nonstop the same short video that shows the episode of 1996 that happened exactly opposite Annita’s house.

On one of the walls there are posters advertising villas for sale in Dherynia. Even the villas for sale have been built in order to attract foreigners. The island of Cyprus is a popular destination for European retirees to live by the sea. Consequently, Annita’s opportunistic behavior could not leave this behind, as Dherynia is a village of the Famagusta region. The villas she sells are painted blue and white, reminiscent of the Greek islands, but are colors that have nothing to do with Cyprus’ traditional housing color palette based on earth colors. However,
the blue and white color probably attracts more foreigners as it refers to Greece, a more famous and common country compared to Cyprus. The way Annita’s house has assigned a multi-purpose role reveals the flexible capability of grassroots to engage negotiation mechanisms in order to rethink edges and limits raised after the arrangement of the buffer zone near their house. While, the normal behavior that occurred after 1974, especially in Nicosia, was to run away from the buffer zone due to the fear of military presence, in Dherynia the buffer zone was perceived differently, mostly because of Varosha being enclosed. Annita’s viewpoint is not the only example of a house transformed into a business.

Figure 41: House-Viewpoint Hybrid Typology
Two more viewpoints share interesting adjustments when comparing their programs and physical positions. Both are located in significant spots of the buffer zone in close vicinity with Varosha. One is also the main opponent of Annita, as it situated in the village of Dherynia, not far away from Annita’s house.

**The Under-Institutionalization Viewpoint**

Even though its location is close to Annita’s house, it is not easy to find. Consequently, the owner added a mark to every possible turn in order for the visitor not to get lost or confused. And normally, his signs start much earlier than Annita’s. When the visitor finally reaches the viewpoint, it is the last house on a cul-de-sac street. The road ends abruptly, as it becomes a military road afterwards. There are many ban signs to clearly warn the drivers to stop. Along with these ban signs there are also prohibitions on taking pictures, as the area is considered to be an active military zone. However, if somebody wants desperately to take photos there is a suggestion:

“For security reasons binoculars, cameras, and videos are only allowed from the viewpoint upstairs”.
At once the prohibition sign marks a synergy with the viewpoint opposite them.

Figure 43: Sign

Figure 44: The Signs and the Viewpoint
The Mini-Zoo Viewpoint

This viewpoint is located in Paralimni. It is much closer to the beach than the other two. The owner expanded his programmatic facilities by adding not only what the other two already have but also a small “zoo”. The ground floor of this viewpoint accommodates several cages with different kind of small animals, mostly landmarks animals of Cyprus’ fauna: donkeys, lambs, sheep, and specific kinds of birds and rabbits. However, there are also animals that may have nothing to do with Cyprus but are still part of the zoo. In addition, trees planted around the cages are accredited a small label to inform the visitor about its species. There are again trees and plants related to Cyprus’ flora. This small zoo is an extension of the traditional museum, identical to the one Annita has.

These viewpoints share in common a vast combination of apparent incompatible programs. Their business opportunistic behavior, unconsciously prompts the emergence of new events and an adaptive re-use of common architectural typologies as the housing typology. Even though most of the spatial configurations are seemingly temporary unplanned structures, the actors
manage to combine them with the permanent structure of their house to programmatically boost their business.

Figure 46: Mini-Zoo Viewpoint

**Episode of Adaptation 2: Boat Trip**

The second episode is not only unofficial but is also ephemeral. It exists only during the time it is happening, and then it is difficult to determine its effect on space. However, its purpose for this episode is twofold:

1. It is another example of how grassroots actors take advantage of the conflict.

2. It explicitly reveals the different subjectivity between grassroots and tourists, and why it is sometimes necessary to take a look from the outside.
This is not a boat trip. This is not a beach.

The boat trip is organized by Greek-Cypriots using a boat from the Paralimni Fishing Shelter. Today, Paralimni is one of the most popular tourist resorts in Cyprus, likewise Varosha was the most popular before 1974. Its vicinity with Varosha though gives the opportunity to organize short boat trips as a closer look to Varosha’s coastline combined with dives to Famagusta’s beach. Of course, even the beach is bordered, so boats can only approach at a specific point. For these boat trips there are flyers and advertisement signs all over Ayia Napa, Paralimni and Protaras, the three main tourist destinations today in the non-occupied Famagusta region. After 2003, bus and shuttle tours started and have
become as popular as the boat trips, even though diving in the blue water of Varosha is not considered to be part of the tour program. These advertisements are in English and Russian, as Great Britain and Russia are the traditional source of tourism for the island. Tourism is part of the life of any citizen in Cyprus and, consequently, it does not take a lot of imagination or intelligence to adopt language as a marketing device, even if you never studied marketing and economics.

Using bold large fonts, the advertisements call for attention using words like “Famagusta”, “The only Ghost Town in Europe”, “Trip”, “Special Offer”, the fees to participate, and the phone number of the organizer. It is an “emotional” trip with the real story of somebody who grew up in Varosha, but it offers other tourist qualifications as well as sightseeing, food and drinks, diving, and cave visits. This emotional trip does not apply to any other Greek Cypriot, who probably shares the same emotions and who might really have the desire to have a closer approach to Varosha, as Greek language is not included. In the case a Greek-Cypriot wants to actually participate, the organizer is more than happy and the fees might even be for free. These tours have nothing to do with any other kind of conflict tourism, like the “Green Line Tour” in the buffer zone organized by the UN personnel, or visits to Chernobyl and Nazi concentration camps. The beach, the sun, and the boat eliminate any intended or unintended emotional approach.

The boat for the emotional trip to Varosha is called Aretousa, a female name taken from a 17th century myth written by Vintsentzo Cornaro in Crete. This myth is a love story between Erotocritos and Aretousa, a worker in the palace who falls in love with the princess. Aretousa, like Varosha is a forbidden object of desire. The boat has also a second name, “The Yellow Boat”, which refers directly
to the color of the boat so everyone can notice it easily, as it differs utterly from
any other boat in the fishing shelter. When the visitor reaches the boat, in order to
gain access, a ticket is required. The cashier is more than willing, polite, and
happy to see everyone who is interested in the tour and also he is ready to
provide any information for all the other trips the yellow boat is scheduled to do.
There is an improvised steel structure that accommodates the cashier and
prepares entry into the boat: a mini table with a chair, a small tent to prevent
direct exposure to the sun, and a panel with the schedule, more advertisements,
and more flyers that are yours to keep.

Once you enter the boat, it is transformed as a multi-purpose mobile
structure, equipped with a hot dog machine, a mini kiosk selling snacks and
drinks, swimming and fishing equipment, and binoculars for a better view of
Varosha. There is also an information panel about the Cyprus problem. As part of
the crew, a girl, goes around to the tourists to ask if they want something to drink,
prepares everything they want, and serves their orders. When the tour starts,
Captain Andreas, like a qualified tourist guide, has constructed his visits on historically facts, anecdotes, and a detailed presentation of what is on your left or what is on your right. Some of the tourists find themselves confronted by a paradox: experiencing something they have no experience of and most probably do not ever intend to experience. It is more of a curiosity of what happened than understanding something that was not theirs. Their reactions were divided for those who wanted to know and those who did not. Some of them asked questions to learn more; some others preferred just to observe through the binoculars. However, the culmination point of the tour is when captain Andreas finally ends his story and informs them that they are allowed to dive and spend time swimming. Their enthusiasm and their excitement unifies the divided feelings they felt minutes ago and changes the whole scene, which it was anything but emotional. The view of Varosha does not matter anymore. The beach is still a beach.

Figure 49: Boat Trip Experience

Varosha and the military posts from the UN as adjusted on the buffer zone, are invisible infrastructures related to the diving activity. It is quite interesting that, exactly on the edge of the buffer zone and the beach, there are several improvised temporary tents where people, either Cypriots or foreign tourists,
camp in order to have alternative vacations close to the best beach in Cyprus. This area, due to its proximity with the buffer zone and the beach, has no permission for any permanent built structure. Consequently, it remains officially unused but is exploited through other appropriative ways. The contrast between these holiday tents and the military post right above them is compelling in terms of which one actually holds this territory. Shifts of power are revealed as tourists show no fear over the military presence. Borders in conflict zones are supposed to be the ultimate spaces of control, prohibition and surveillance. However, relaxing in the buffer zone entails an ambiguity that allows things to occur. This ambiguity introduces a new relationship between space and activities that not only proposes but demands a reinterpretation of space.

Figure 50: Shifting Powers -Who is in charge?
**Episode of Adaptation 3: Palm Beach Hotel**

The Palm Beach Hotel is the only hotel still in operation on the waterfront of Varosha. The Palm Beach Hotel depicts an illustration of political power. By acknowledging the economic benefits this hotel could give due to its unique location, not only to the individual owner but in a broader scale, the adjustment of a fence in order to be excluded from the obvious prohibitions can avoid any kind of procrastination. The Palm Beach Hotel was formerly known as The Constantia Hotel and was one of the most famous hotels before 1974 in Varosha. An old advertisement of the hotel enhances the physical characteristics of the hotel's location along with its services:
“This modern hotel has the most attractive situation; to one side lies the ancient port of Famagusta with a range of mountains behind it, to the other there stretches the best beach in the Eastern Mediterranean –a “Cote d’ Azur” beach of infinite charm. The Constantia with the blue water of the sea lapping at its terrace, prides itself on the perfection of its personal service –with justice. You will feel at home and refreshed in this unique modern hotel. Nearly all rooms have private bathroom and balcony, telephone and thermostatically controlled heating in air condition spacious public rooms, separate dining room for children, ballroom, garden and swimming facilities”.

The advertisement is followed by weather temperatures for the months of December, January, February, and March the only months excluded from the holiday period in Cyprus.

Two years after the enclosure of Varosha in 1974, the foundation that owned the hotel and some property north of Varosha requested permission to reopen it. They asked a British electrican engineer, who was living in Famagusta, to do all necessary electrical work. Alan Weisman in his book “The World Without Us” (2007) in asking us to witness the results of a place when humankind abandons it, presents the experience of Allan Cavinder, the British engineer. They requested Cavinder to restore the air-conditioning system. Because of the persistence of the north part of Cyprus to be a separate nation from the UN recognized legitimate Cyprus Government, its isolation was also economic. The incapability to find spare parts for the air-conditioning system from other countries put in front the idea of dismantling parts from the vacant hotels in Varosha. Consequently, they gave him permission to enter the prohibited zone and take
everything he lacked. For six months, Cavinder was struggling in unbearable silence to disassemble air conditioners, washers and dryers, and kitchens.

The hotel finally reopened in 1980, and since then, still operates today. It was closed again in 2008 and sold to another corporation, but reopened again in 2012. It is now a five-star luxury hotel, even though its resort architectural appearance does not look like luxury. It remained a typical hotel architecture typology of 1960s in Cyprus, making the connection with Varosha notable. Its vicinity to Varosha does not intimidate the arrival or the relaxation of tourists. In some cases the resort’s location is consciously selected by tourists that consider the ghost town of Varosha an extraordinary place. Being curious how the Palm Beach hotel is advertised through the many booking and holiday destination sites, a search into several blogs and websites disclosed the invisibility of Varosha. In most of them Varosha is not mentioned at all, and in a few cases Varosha was the reason to choose the Palm Beach Hotel:

“We chose the Palm Beach Hotel because it was next to the deserted border ghost district of Varosha, a place that has fascinated me for years. Before 1974, this was THE place to stay in Cyprus, but now its deserted and a military zone. The Palm Beach lies just outside the area, so its got both a fab beach and easy access to old Famagusta too. You can walk up to the wire fence and look into the deserted streets. Don’t let the soldiers see you take photos, though –better to get a zoom lens and do it from your hotel balcony...” (hotel review, northcyprushotels.co.uk, 2008).
Prohibiting photography to a tourist is a paradox itself. However, its unique location allows the co-existence between the two activities and the two environments. In a way this co-existence becomes a synergy between the hotel and the so-called ghost town.

The beach at the Palm Beach Hotel is the most popular in Famagusta today even though it is split into two contradictory images. You can enter it only through the hotel as the barbed wire on the other side keeps everyone away. The first image is of the luxury hotel, with wealthy tourists, and clean white umbrellas. The other image is the deserted Varosha, silent, empty and ruined. The contradiction becomes more explicit with the hotel right next to Palm Beach; it included a machine-gun placement put during the war and half of its side had collapsed after a bombing seizure. The waterfront of Varosha today is divided into the debris of war and an atmosphere of relaxation. The beach itself is a
continuation of the banned zone, disconnected with a metal fence and a red ban of taking photos and allowing entry.

The contradictory waterfront of Varosha doubts the foregone architectural typology. The deserted hotels are now imperceptible watch towers that house armed soldiers and nearby, another building that holds the same typology as the Palm Beach five-star resort. What is precisely a hotel with machine-gun placements and what is a military base with a sandy beach? The confusion of what is what lies mostly evident to hotels being military observation posts as opposed to the one and only hotel that operates “normally”. Which one is the reality, what is the norm, and which one is wrong.

Figure 54: What is a hotel typology?
**Ambiguity: Heterogeneity**

One might question why these episodes of adaptation are important, and what can design and architecture gain from observing these? These episodes are examples of how individuals that compose society react to forces that they are not able to control. It is the way society learns to deal with some unpleasant events. If architecture wants to play a role in society, and in particular conflict spaces, then an approach that transcends conceptual thinking and does not limit itself in pragmatic knowledge is required. Searching for new ways of thinking and acting is crucial. The episodes of adaptation all lead to one vital design principle for imaginative creation and visionary ideas: The grassroots improvisations reveal shades between breaking and observing the law, surveillance, and prohibitions. They have found ways to deal with what is forbidden and what is not, and these ways are extended in space and architecture. These case studies do not present the way architects should act, but their observation and critique have the capacity to push architecture to its limits. Architecture needs to change constantly, and experimenting with new terminology and alternative perceptions of space can only lead to visionary ideas.

The Transgression Lens leads to three main conclusions:

1. The heterogeneous environment between military and tourism, space and activities reveals contradictions and holds ambiguities. It doubts conventional preconceptions of conflict, control, and relaxation.
2. A seemingly incompatibility between activities, typologies, and spatial characteristics might be fruitful for new ideas.

3. Instead of breaking or going against the law, we can identify the nuances of legality to create new facts on the ground. These facts will promote change over time.

Figure 55: Ambiguity: Heterogeneity
Chapter 6
Conclusions: The
Architect’s
Contribution
De-Labeling Space

While borders and boundaries in conflict spaces seek peace, elimination, and co-existence, each society in a smaller scale raises its own walls: against poverty, against religion, against ethnicity, against anything that is called “the other”. Nowadays this “other” is basically everything. These walls are built up in explicitly determined architectural typologies specifying clear limits, serving control and exclusion, and they explicitly differentiate the other through gated communities, increasingly privatized public spaces, corporation enclaves, urban voids, and abandoned economic centers or infrastructures. When you continuously fragment society, how do you then reunify it? And how do you expect to improve conflict spaces, where all the aforementioned boundaries are incorporated with the ‘real’ conflict?

The power of architecture to form the world is critical and reflective, especially when designers employ themselves as social agents. Contested zones demand a redefinition of a collective identity. The architect’s engagement with the material world should not be ignored. While NGOs and other institutions improve society, behaviors, and attitudes, architecture has the potential to shape this improvement. The architect’s contribution towards this demand needs to go beyond the societal change the NGOs and other willing individuals are committed to do. Shaping society includes the process of making, the symbolic meaning of this shape, and its multiplicity of meanings in reality. How can architects interpret the intangible bridge of communication into a tangible form? How can architecture, through practice, contribute to this endeavor of redefining a collective identity? Tourism is presented as the common narrative, showing a potential linkage between the two communities.
This thesis uses the three lenses as an attempt to underline the complexity of how we or others see the world. Some of these lenses are inherent to us or are constantly changing. Particularly in conflict conditions, the lens metaphor is explicitly illustrated: the same situation can be analyzed in as many stories as the number of people involved. Architecture requires the designer to see the world anew. The History Lens, associated with the Border and Boundary Lens, contributes to the understanding of existing socio-political condition. However, if architecture wants to truly contribute to conflict areas, it has to proceed into visionary ideas beyond limited pragmatic plans. Relying on a pragmatic plan equates the role of the architect as a problem-resolver, something that constrains the possibilities of architecture and design.

A pragmatic plan accepts the socio-political conditions without challenging them. It maintains conventional definitions, activities, and meanings without enhancing the reconfiguration of the status-quo. Design builds society, but it also needs to agitate it. A pragmatic plan, in order to be achievable, focuses on bottom-up practices by identifying actors and specific outcomes. While these plans are undoubtedly acceptable because they propose tangible and feasible solutions, they overlook paradoxes implicitly contained in conflict conditions. Consequently, conventional approaches of shared and social spaces around the border or along a wall, reconfiguration of the buffer zone to house both communities, modification of other contentious parts around the city, and other similar proposals based on establishing co-existence do not differ from the stereotypes and ideal models society builds for people. Real contribution occurs when we use the lenses of what we actually see in the world to find residence between what we see and what we want the world to be.
The deconstruction of boundaries is a call to find the residence between top-down admissions and bottom-up participatory design methods. The main reason is because conventional planning approaches cannot provide solutions for conflict spaces, as they imply complicated design disputes due to the existence of multiple narratives. While these approaches are not rejected as possibilities, they need a strict organization from scratch so that all of the accumulated layers will start acting in a fruitful manner. In contested zones, both institutions and grassroots actors are not in conflict only with another community but also within the seemingly same group. In addition, contested zones ignore common ideas of equality, co-existence, and sharing. Services and institutions are provided unequally, supporting either the majority or the “powerful” side. This inequality is fused from the institutional level to the grassroots, poisoning identity issues within society. Bias is the inevitable trait of any kind of participatory method, and in conflict spaces bias is an enormous obstacle. Longstanding forms of inequality and injustice, persisting infringement of human rights, and asymmetrical information are design constrains that cannot be overlooked. Reinventing conventional design methods along with conventional narratives is fundamental if architects want to contribute to contested zones.

Space holds tremendous power over society. It is proven through the dependency of the institutional actors to organize the built environment, to conquer it, and to control it. Grassroots actors share a similar dependency, even though their motivation is either emotional or individual survival. In both cases though, they manage to spatially form societies. What is the role of the architect then, if they are obliged to serve forces of power under specific circumstances and laws and are constrained to compromise their design with the desires of the
users and grassroots interests? The seemingly powerlessness of the architect over space is ironic compared to the fact that space is where the architect is supposedly qualified to have the best knowledge. Should architects abandon the idea of contributing to conflict issues and do nothing except what they are asked to? Or should they find new ways to support these spaces?

Camillo Boano (2011) argues that this dependency on the built environment enhances vulnerability. And it is over this vulnerability that architects should involve themselves. Borders are the ultimate examples of vulnerable architecture. Vulnerability does not mean or equates with weakness. Based on contemporary psychologists vulnerability has to do with uncertainty, risk, and emotional exposure. Borders hold major levels of uncertainty based on their unresolveness, require the risk of trust and fear, and suggest cooperation between differences, which means emotional exposure for the individuals involved.

The three lenses and the case of Varosha unfold what Victor Margolin (1995: 121-145) claims that the capacity of design is obtained by everyone. And it is actually true if we consider that self-made cities today are more than architect-made buildings. The power of architecture to form the world is critical and reflective, especially when architects consider themselves as social agents. Conflict zones demand a redefinition of conventional planning approaches, meanings, and conceptions. This thesis suggests three main aspects necessary for the design process:

1. Unpredictability is unavoidable. However, it can be beneficial because it allows every possibility, bad or good. The institutional unresolveness, even
though it promotes fear due to the military presence, which is necessitated most of the time, simultaneously gives hope to people that things will change. Extending the shadow of the future can also expose people to the consequence of their actions: war, displacement, and disputes.

2. Ephemerality implies incremental changes in time. It tests and questions the limits of architecture in conflict zones. Even though the direct result of ephemerality seems to be incompleteness, it simultaneously implies repetition, preparation, and recognition. Ephemerality has the capacity to establish new facts on the ground that will bring change by consequence.

3. Heterogeneity between space and activities promotes ambiguity and as a result challenges preconceptions about space. It pushes the understanding of the real content of space, and not only the dominant forces and stories that persistently try to hide other spatial qualities.

Architects tend to talk about spaces the same way society stereotypes people: Trying to build an open, shared, cooperative society, where co-existence and transparency dominates, is like choosing between a white, fit, handsome man versus a black, fat, ugly woman. Are open spaces really what society needs? Or is it what the architect assumes that society needs? This thesis encourages the architect to be a co-designer. A co-designer does not only give the basis for society to occupy a space but gives society time to transform this
basis and afterwards react, add, delete, or transform the occupied space again. It requires a design loop, with short ephemeral actions within a long term contribution. Not in terms of achieving a participatory design or decision-making as both are not desirable due to the many aforementioned obstructions. This co-design enhances an open-ended process where the deliverable might be a service, a product, or a building, but it is not determined yet. This ambiguous stage inspires the exploration and the observation of society’s behavior and raises questions of what next? It is a future oriented design, not in an abstract manner but concretely leading to a different future, based on encountering difference.

**Broader Impact**

The broader impact of this thesis is not limited to the area of Famagusta or Cyprus. Such extreme conditions, like the contested Famagusta, are places that simultaneously request creativity and confront architecture’s limits. Consequently, the complex urban conditions of similar fields of tension represent a microcosm of contemporary reality. Conflict is an unavoidable consequence in any design process. As a result, to examine and understand peculiarities in intense conflict spaces, where ambiguity and uncertainty dominate, can inform productive design processes. It also opens new questions related to established conventional notions around space and society as well as challenges norms of equity, peace, and institutional power that are not only apparent in contested zones but are apparent in every aspect of social life. This thesis manifests a healthy demand of paradoxes and contradictions in addition to a call to reevaluate seemingly disadvantageous ever present conditions, like conflict, to promote creative ideas.
To identify shades of legality, what is permitted and what is allowed and how this perception can have many different interpretations, can give architecture the potential to re-invent its own policies, rules, and norms. The identification of shades of legality can open many design possibilities and can incrementally lead to societal change. Architecture’s struggle is not to eliminate the bad and build for the good, but to reveal the good hidden behind the bad.
Bibliography


