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THE DETERMINANTS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT:

A CROSS-NATIONAL EXAMINATION OF CONFLICT MANIFESTATION

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ABSTRACT

Religion is an important determinant of collective action and can operate on multiple levels to influence social contention. Social scientists are paying increasing attention to the power of religious institutions to shape patterns of social life by fomenting both societal harmony and discord. This research focuses upon the latter. I explore the extent to which established theories of social conflict can be applied to explain patterns of conflict that are affiliated with religious identity.

Chapter 1 introduces the research project and offers an outline of the dissertation. Chapter 2 assesses existing data and provides a detailed description the procedures used to collect the information employed in this research. This research utilizes primary and secondary data to examine religious conflict. Information on the sociopolitical environment is drawn from the 2008 International Religious Freedom Report dataset. Information regarding religious conflict events is collected and quantified in the Religious Conflict Events data. Additional country-level data is drawn from various reliable sources as well.

Chapter 3 examines the structural determinants of religious repression using data coded from the 2008 International Religious Freedom Reports. Regression analysis suggests that the presence and scope of religious repression is associated with levels of general and religion specific measures of restriction and regulation.

In Chapter 4, I analyze the macro-social influences on religious intergroup conflict (RIC). The chapter explores conflict events between non-state actors and tests for the impact of religious diversity, competition, and inequality on the extent of RIC events. The analysis demonstrates that religious conflict between groups is primarily driven by inequality and discrimination based on religious identity.

Past research often explores the factors that cause and escalate religious conflicts of one type or another—rebellion, interstate war, civil war—however, few, if any, attempt to determine which type of conflict is likely to emerge based on the sociopolitical contexts in which the actors exist. Chapter 5 is an exploration of the influences predicting the likelihood of particular forms of religious conflict. Multinomial logistic regression demonstrates that the commonality of religious conflict manifestations is more or less likely in specific sociopolitical contexts. Finally, I synthesize the findings presented in previous chapters, discuss the research limitations, and propose potential directions for future research in Chapter 6.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Religion is an important determinant of collective action and can operate on multiple levels to influence social contention. Across disciplines, social scientists are paying increasing attention to the power of religious institutions to shape patterns of social life by fomenting societal harmony and discord. This research focuses upon the latter. It explores the extent to which established theories of social conflict can be applied to explain patterns of conflict that are affiliated with religious identity. Scholars have contributed a variety of conceptual and empirical insights to the general understanding of conflict, yet the unique influence of religion remains understudied and unspecified. This dissertation addresses this weakness by employing multiple theoretical propositions and hypotheses in a quantitative analysis of presence, frequency, and form of religious conflict.

Studies of religious conflict emphasize different elements of the conflict dynamic. Researchers have endeavored to understand intergroup dynamics that contribute to ethno-religious identity formation and mobilization for collective action and protest (Hafez 2003; Olzak 2007; Smith 1996), while others emphasize religion's influence on rebellion, civil war, interstate conflict, and interactions with the state (Fox 2012 for a thorough overview). More recently, sociologists of religion have employed a rational-choice perspective to explain the influence of religious regulation on religious violence in a cross-national context (Finke and Harris 2012; Grim and Finke 2007, 2011). Unfortunately, the work linking these literatures is sparse, and the insights regarding the impact of religion on conflict tend to remain isolated within their discipline of origin.

Christian Smith (1996) argues that a primary reason for the lack of cross-disciplinary discussion and research is due of the primacy of the secularization paradigm in academic discourse. The belief that religion is in decline has led to its exclusion in much of the macro-level research on social conflict and collective action. Nearly a decade later, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler (2004) expressed a similar concern with the neglect of religion and religious institutions in international relations literature. Scholars, they argue, have simply assumed that there is no need to study an institution that is rapidly losing societal influence. This is a mistake. The inherent inevitability of secularization—in a variety of conceptual forms (Gorski, 2000)—has been roundly criticized and shown lacking both in the United States and abroad (Finke 2005; Froese 2001; Stark 1999; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Research shows that religious identity is often associated with a religious worldview that is often absolute and uncompromising in its ambitions. When religious absolutism overlaps with socio-political objectives, this can lead to intractable conflicts that are difficult to resolve (Fiol, Pratt, and O'Connor 2009; Kriesber 1993; Northrup 1989). More importantly, even the most casual observer could not ignore the importance of religion in contemporary conflict. Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Islam as a global force has been an assumed fact of international relations. To deny the power of the Christian Right in shaping the domestic and foreign policy of the United States would be foolish. Clashes between Muslims and Hindu nationalists have killed millions and displaced many more in India. The importance of religious institutions to the sociopolitical arena presupposed social fact, and it is assumed to have a key role in social conflict. This also leads to conflicts that are more intense than their nonreligious counterparts (Pearce 2005), and, as the examples previously listed suggest, they can have destabilizing effects on a global scale.

The primary objective of this research is examine how religious conflict is manifested under various sociopolitical circumstances. Propositions on the determinants of social conflict in general have deep roots in social scientific thought. Durkheimian (1893[1997]) principles of societal integration suggest social conflict emerges when social institutions and organizations of society are incapable of serving in an integrative capacity. These "breakdown theories" attribute social disruption to structural change; however, the primary mechanism for conflict is individuals' psychological discomfort with the societal configuration. Marxian analyses have developed more competition-driven propositions for conflict that emphasize the dominance and subordination of religious subpopulations. In particular, grievance theories employing a frustration-aggression model has been at the center of the research on ethno-religious conflict (Gurr 1970; Finke and Harris 2012; Fox 2000; Grim and Finke 2011). Grievance, while important, is not a sufficient explanation for collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977), and what is needed is research that incorporates more of the insights of social movement theory and political science into the macro-level research on religiously motivated conflict.

Which circumstances influence the frequency and intensity of conflict among religious communities? Further, what types of religious conflict are most prevalent in nations? In the coming chapters, I will address these questions through the quantitative assessment of propositions that attribute conflict and contentious activity to political openness, grievance, deprivation, and intergroup competition. In addition to broad socioeconomic and political factors, this work addresses the role of formal and informal policies that promote religious discord by affecting perceptions of intergroup equality and competition. First, however, I must offer more precise definitions of the outcomes to be examined.

Religious Conflict: Repression, Insurgency, and Intergroup Conflict

Macro-level studies emphasize the influence of national and transnational institutions on religious conflict; however, most studies examine only one type of religious conflict outcome such as interstate conflict (Henderson 1997, 1998, 2005), religious repression and discrimination by formal authorities (Fox 2000), persecution (Grim and Finke 2011), insurgent protest activity from non-state actors (Fox 1999; Juergensmeyer 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004), and conflict between rival religious communities (Seul 1999). Other work conflates religious disruption into a single conflict outcome (Finke and Harris 2012). The *form* of the religious conflict is rarely considered as important an outcome as its intensity. Little empirical research examines how the interaction of religion, state, and culture shape what religious conflict looks like. The current study explores the cultural and political structures that foment differing types of religious conflict. What sociopolitical factor influence religious conflict emergence? What similar structural factors contribute to the escalation or reduction of religious conflict events? Are certain types of religious conflict more likely than others? These are the major questions I explore in this research.

Central to this research is the conceptualization of religious conflict. Religions demonstrate great variation regarding core beliefs and practices that contribute to contention, but the religious conflict examined here exceeds simple philosophical and ontological disagreements. The current study uses a definition of religious conflict that captures the intentionality and goals of conflicting groups within a country. Religious conflict is *contentious action between religiously-identified actors intended to disparage, restrict, ore harm others based on their religious identity and affiliation.* This definition allows for a broad range of events to be examined from seemingly spontaneous riot behavior to coordinated protest activity to

widespread massacres. However, what distinguishes this research from previous work on religious conflict is that religious conflict is further distinguished into three related, yet distinct categories of events: religious repression, religious insurgency, and religious intergroup conflict.

Past research has often conflated all religious contention and violence into a single measure and overlooks a tremendous amount of variation in this social phenomenon. For example, Finke and Harris (2012) find that religious violence is positively associated with government and social regulation of religion; however, religious violence is defined as "any act of violence to persons or property motivated by the religious belief or profession of the perpetrator or victim (p. 62). Violent conflict ranges from desecration of cemeteries to violent government persecution to upheavals by religious minorities. The actions included are broad, but the *source* of violence is unclear. Similarly, Grim and Finke (2011) define religious persecution as "the physical abuse or displacement of people because of religion" (p.xii) and find that state and societal regulations increase the frequency and magnitude of persecution. This is an important finding and further demonstrates the importance of religion in conflict behavior; however, the conceptualization of persecution is problematic. It is both specific and vague in terms of the outcome being analyzed. The authors assert that religious freedom restrictions can originate from differing sources—government vs. nongovernment actors and institutions—but the persecution variable does not account for which group of actors are actually responsible for the persecution event. Government actions and actors are likely to have access to different resources, differing motivations, and different considerations when considering violent persecution. Nongovernment affiliated persecutors, in turn, are likely to operate through differing channels and employ different tactics to restrict people of the "wrong" religious sort. I argue that the source and target of such violent actions are critical distinctions that shape conflict. A major

objective of this research is to demonstrate that the source of religious restrictions is as important in the conceptualizing and operationalization of the dependent variable as it is in independent variables. In other words, if it is important to distinguish between government and nongovernment restriction contexts, it is equally important to distinguish between government and nongovernment actors in religious conflict events.

Another major objective of this research is to utilize data that affirms the complexity of religious conflict. The data collection procedures utilized in this study address some of the weaknesses of previous collection endeavors. First, the content analysis of religious conflict events reported in the 2008 US State Department International Religious Freedom Reports allows for geospatial and sociopolitical variation critical to large-N research (Henderson 1997). Second, this research provides new data that distinguishes between three distinct religious conflict event types: repression, insurgency, and intergroup conflict. Distinguishing conflict event types by target and initiator allows for a more sophisticated examination of the correlates of specific religious conflict outcomes.

Religious repression is *the systematic use of coercion by government actors to restrict individuals or groups identified by their religious affiliation, practice, or belief*. In other words, religious repression events are characterized by government-initiated actions against nongovernment targets. Religious repression represents a form of government action that can be both violent and nonviolent. Most work on repression focuses on the political structures that account for variations in political repression and emphasize democracy, economic development, and political threats as key correlates of repression outcomes (Davenport 2006; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Earl 2003; Goldstein 1978; Henderson 1991). Threat models of repression, the most common explanatory orientation, suggest that repression is more likely when

confrontational tactics are employed against the state (Davenport 2007; Kriesi 1995; McAdam 1982). Legitimacy and regime continuation is another explanation for repression (Gill 2006). While these arguments are intuitive and they have considerable empirical support religion is conspicuously absent (see Gill 2006 for a notable exception). New data allows for the examination of competing propositions on religiously motivated state coercion.

Government policies are not the only factors to be considered in a cross-national examination of religious conflict and government actors are not always a direct actor in conflict events. Religious intergroup conflict (RIC) is *religiously motivated aggressive or contentious activity between nongovernment actors*. This form of conflict is distinct from religious repression because government representatives are not active participants in the conflict event. Conflict between religious communities is common, and explanations for why communities conflict with one another and the intensification of conflict are varied. Scholars have expounded upon the influences of personal psychology, group dynamics, and government on collective contentious action. Theories of intergroup conflict vary and this research will test many of the most prominent predictors—primordial difference, intergroup competition, and inequality—as they apply to religious groups and religious contexts.

Religious insurgency represents the third and final form of religious conflict examined in this research. Religious insurgency is *contentious action taken by nongovernment initiators against government targets motivated by the religious affiliation of either target or initiator intended to express a desire for sociopolitical change.* Perhaps of all religious conflict types, religious insurgency is tied most closely to social movement explanations of collective action. The literature explaining the factors the lead to mobilization and action against ruling authorities is immense (Snow, Soule and Kriesi 2008). The role of sociopolitical policy and practice is

particularly important. This research focuses on the postulations of the political opportunities literature and shows how specific opportunities that are geared to restrict religious activity influence this form of conflict.

Organization of the Dissertation

The following chapters explore the determinants of religious conflict in a cross-national context. Religious conflict is argued to be a product of distinct sociopolitical configuration and builds upon the previous work in international relations, social movement research, and the sociology of religion. The analyses employ new data on religious conflict that addresses conceptual and operational weaknesses in previous data collection. Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of the procedures utilized to collect the data critical to this research. This project utilizes both primary and secondary data to examine religious conflict. Information on the sociopolitical environment is drawn from the 2008 International Religious Freedom Report dataset. Information on religious conflict events is collected and quantified in the Religious Conflict Events data. Additional country-level data is drawn from various reliable sources as well. Chapter 3 examines the structural determinants of religious repression using data coded from the 2008 International Religious Freedom Reports. In Chapter 4, I analyze the macro-social influences on religious intergroup conflict. While previous research has focused primarily on the religious conflicts involving state actors as instigators or targets, this analysis focuses on conflict events between non-state actors. Chapter 5 is an exploration of the influences predicting the likelihood of particular forms of religious conflict. Past research often explores the factors that cause and escalate religious conflicts of one type or another—rebellion, interstate war, civil war—however, few, if any, attempt to determine which type of conflict is likely to emerge based

on the sociopolitical contexts in which the actors exist. Multinomial logistic regression demonstrates how the commonality of religious conflict manifestations is more or less likely in specific sociopolitical contexts. Chapter 6 synthesizes the findings presented in previous chapters, and I also discuss future directions for this research.

CHAPTER 2

Research Design

Quantitative research tends to treat religious outcomes such as affiliation, practice, and contention as contingent upon subjective experience. Consequently, the bulk of religion research maintains the individual as the primary unit of analysis. Quantitative research employing large, cross-national samples in which countries are the primary unit of analysis is a small but growing subset of the literature on religious activity. The need for systematic and reliable national measures of religious activity has increased as scholars have devoted more attention to testing various theories and propositions regarding the political impact of religion on a cross-country scale. For example, challenges to the secularization paradigm resulted in a flurry of theoretical speculation and empirical investigations comparing national identification and participation rates (Gill 2008; Froese 2001; 2004; Yang 2006; Harris 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2004). The increase in religiously motivated social conflict has also driven the demand for accurate cross-national data. The centrality of religion in Huntington's (1996) "clash of civilizations" thesis generated an even greater interest in the effects of religious identity, pluralism, and political structures on domestic and international conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Henderson 2001; Chiozza 2002; Lai 2006; Fox 2007; Grim and Finke 2007, 2011). This growing branch of religion research demands reliable data.

In order to meet research demands, scholars have collected country-level data characterizing the interaction of religious, government, and social institutions to varying degrees of success and utility. Much of the data utilized in cross-national research is aggregated survey data. This is a particularly useful collection technique when examining religious attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, and identity. For example, explaining variations in religious participation

across countries, researchers have relied on aggregate measures of belief, attendance and prayer (Barro and McLeary 2003; Harris 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Pearce 2005). Identity, attitudes, and beliefs no doubt play an important role in religious conflict (Fiol, Pratt and O'Connor 2009; Pearce 2005), but these data lack important country-level measures and arelimited in their utility. Structural factors accounting for politics, economics, and culture are increasingly recognized as key predictors of religious mobilization and contention, but are absent in survey data. Survey aggregation may provide a useful operationalization of national opinions and behaviors, but as the effects of government discrimination and intolerance cannot be assessed. Moreover, the data is largely limited to Western and developed countries restricting the scope and country variation critical to this analysis. What is needed for this research project is a data source that includes structural measures for a larger number of countries.

Scholars have developed various techniques and measures that capture and quantify the religion and state dynamic. These international data collections focus expressly on the nation as the unit of analysis, and a central feature has been the emphasis on the role of Government in religious affairs. These measures typically provide information on levels of favoritism, restriction, and discrimination based on the religious affiliation of the government or populations (Chaves and Cann 1992; Fox 2008; Grim and Finke 2006). Perhaps the best examples of this type of data are Round 1 and 2 of the Religion and State (RAS) dataset. Researchers for the Religion and State Project have developed a comprehensive dataset that provides detailed and systematic measures of state involvement in religious affairs. The data covers approximately 175 countries for years1990 to 2008 and is taken from information found in human rights reports, news media sources, and academic resources (Fox 2011). To date, there have been two rounds of data collection with future collections in the works. No doubt, the RAS data is an excellent

resource. The measures capture the multidimensional nature of government policy and practice, and the time covered in the data allow for longitudinal analysis and stronger causal arguments. However, like many other similar data, it does not collect and code information indicating the behaviors of non-state actors. This is a major theoretical and analytical weakness. Previous research has demonstrated the importance of societal factors in religious activity (Finke and Harris 2012; Grim and Finke 2011). Collective action ranging from identity formation to widespread rebellion occurs largely in response to nongovernment, cultural stimuli as well as formal state practices. Accurate indicators of the overall opinions and behaviors of the population-at-large are necessary for a more thorough analysis of religious conflict.

The International Religious Freedom Reports

This research employs a cross-country, cross-sectional research design emphasizing data gathered primarily from the International Religious Freedom (IRF) Reports for the year 2008. In accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, the U.S. Department of State collects information describing the state of religious freedom in every country and submits an annual report on national policies that violate the freedom of religious belief and practices of religious groups, denominations and individuals. The IRF reports are submitted annually to Congress and provide extensive information on religion and religious conflict around the world. Moreover, the Reports provide detailed information on the religious activities of government and nongovernment actors. In addition to wide-ranging information on formal national policies and cultural practices, the reports provide detailed information on specific conflictive events within each country. This is critical for this research and is why the information contained in the International Religious Freedom Reports is utilized for this study.

This research utilizes cross-national data collected at two levels from the US State Department International Religious Freedom Reports. The first data collection uses the country as the unit of analysis and provides extensive and effective measures of policies and practices regarding religious freedom and restrictions. These measures serve as the primary indicators of the religious context that is a central theme of this project. The second data collection offers an entirely new source of data on the initiators, targets, and tactics used in religious conflict events. This event-level data allows for analyses that explore the varieties of religious conflict as well as the impacts of policy on more specific elements of religious conflict manifestation.

The International Religious Freedom Reports are a suitable source of event data for multiple reasons. There are several advantages for using the International Religious Freedom Reports as a data source. First, the resources available to the U.S. State Department allow for a much larger number of nations to be analyzed. The reports provide detailed analysis regarding the policies and practices impacting religious freedom for 196 nations and countries. This provides a global scope for the study that represents a severe limitation in other data collections. Second, the Reports make use of multiple sources of information. Information is gathered from multiple official agencies, government employees, media sources, survey data, and religious leaders. Thus, the information on religious policy, practice, and conflicts is likely to be more complete than information gathered from a single source. Third, the Reports represent an unbiased analysis of the state of religion in terms of nations and groups represented. Grim and Finke (2011) argue that bias is effectively reduced by the balance of "nearness (local knowledge) and the remoteness (objectivity)" of data gathering techniques and reporting (p.13). In order to effectively explore the determinants of the form and intensity of religious conflict, observable details of instances of conflict are necessary. Finally, the Reports feature careful, detailed

information on the times, places, victims, and perpetrators of religious conflict. This has been an important quality utilized in the study of religious violence and persecution (Grim and Finke 2011). The Reports also describe the tactics utilized in these events which is a critical outcome examined in this research. The breadth and depth of information provided in the Reports make them an impeccable source of data for the subsequent analyses (Grim and Finke 2006).

A matter of concern with using the Reports as the primary source of data is the issue of underreporting resulting in sample bias. Nearly all sources of event data are lacking in complete event data (Olzak 1992; Earl, Martin, McCarthy and Soule 2004), and the IRF Reports are no exception. The Reports were not designed to be exhaustive enumerations of all instances of religious conflict for every country. They are primarily designed to act as an objective yet concise illustration of the state of religion. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that all conflict events are not presented in the reports. Moreover, the events reported are likely not to have been randomly selected. This is a potential problem as it may result in reporting bias often found in analyses relying on newspaper data (Earl, Martin, McCarthy and Soule 2004), but the purpose of the Reports is to accurately represent what is actually happening in every country. Commercial interests that may alter reporting are simply a non-issue in this case. Representative, unbiased reporting of events is essential for validity, both academic and political. Therefore, the events detailed in each report are treated as representative and valid, if not exhaustive accounts contentious activity. Multiple descriptions are assumed to be demonstrative of the extent of specific types of conflict that are characteristic of the promotion or restrictions of religious freedom.

The International Religious Freedom Dataset

The International Religious Freedom dataset is the product of quantitative content analysis of the IRF Reports and utilizes the country as the unit of analysis. The coding instrument, developed by Brian Grim and Roger Finke, acts as a type of questionnaire that transforms each Report's text into more than one hundred country-level descriptive variables. These 243 quantitative measures capture levels of religious regulation, favoritism, discrimination, tension, violence, as well as numerous other causes and consequences of religious policy and practice. This allows for a quantitative examination of the national contexts in which religious conflict occurs.

The most widely-used product of this thorough data collection are the regulation of religion indexes. Three indexes have been developed as quantitative, continuous measures of the extent to which religious freedom is protected or restricted by formal and informal policies and practices, attitudes, and beliefs throughout the nation. The Government Regulation of Religion Index (GRI) is composed of six items that measure the extent to which the government utilizes policies and practices to restrict the free practice of religion. Unique to the IRF dataset are quantitative measures of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of the society-at-large that act as further restrictions on religious liberty. The five-item Social Regulation of Religion Index (SRI) which is a country-level measure of societal restriction that has been demonstrated to have a powerful influence on religious conflict (Finke and Harris 2012). Moreover, it is a critical measure of social realities outside of the formal ruling institutions that shape religious motivation, mobilization, and conflict. The dataset also provides numerous other useful demographic and socioeconomic measures. Currently, there are datasets for the years 2001 to 2011 available for

download at the Association of Religion Data Archives website (www.theARDA.com). This research utilizes the 2008 dataset is utilized.[1]

Grim and Finke's coding of the Reports is a vital component of this research, and provide useful country-level information regarding the overall nature of religious regulation policy and practice. Indeed, a great deal of cross-national research uses these measures to advance the understanding of religious regulation on various outcomes, including: psychological well-being (Elliott and Hayward 2009); religious participation (Harris 2009; Ruiter van Tubergen 2009); religious violence (Grim and Finke 2007; Finke and Harris 2012); and persecution (Grim and Finke 2012). The current study adds to this body of knowledge by examining how social realities shape. Evidence suggests that religious regulation increases religious violence, but not all conflict is violent. Information on the tactics, violent and non-violent, utilized in conflict events is a necessary to achieve more accurate conflict measures. Further, it is important to account for the source and target of religious contention in order to better explain the manifestation of religious conflict. This requires gathering information at the event level. As stated before, the International Religious Freedom Reports provide much of information regarding the specific instances of religious conflict. In order to explore the determinants of the form and structure of religious conflict, I have developed a 27-item quantitative coding instrument that collects information on each reported incident of religious conflict. This coding produces the Religious Conflict Events (RCE) dataset and is central to the assertion of this research project that not all religious conflict is created equal.

[1] For a more detailed description of the coding procedures used to create the International Religious Freedom Dataset, see grim and Finke (2006).

The Religious Conflict Events Dataset

The Religious Conflict Events (RCE) coding instrument transforms information on conflict targets and instigators, the size of conflict events, and the religious affiliation of actors into quantifiable measures. The unit of analysis for this data is the religious conflict event which allows for an analysis of separate event types and event-level characteristics that influence religious conflict outcomes. As described in Chapter 1, religious conflict is analyzed in three distinct manifestations: religious repression, religious insurgency, and religious intergroup conflict. All forms of religious conflict involve a contentious activity that the Reports indicate is motivated primarily by the religious affiliation of the conflict targets, initiators, or both. For the purposes of coding, this was assumed to be true of any conflict reported since the purpose of the Reports is to detail the state of religion; however, the Reports occasionally describe instances when conflict motivations could be either religious or ethnic. Events that are reported to be more ethnic in nature than religious were not coded.

The RCE coding instrument is designed to create data that allows for the quantitative exploration of internal and external factors on differing types of religious conflict. The primary distinction between each form of religious conflict is the relation of the target and initiator to the official ruling polity. Coders provide a brief description of the event, the date it is reported to have occurred, the number of times this event is described, and the various event-specific pieces of information provided by the report. Over 1500 discrete events are included in this analysis.

Specific criteria were used to identify religious conflict event types. Instances of religious repression were identified by coders as any reported instance of contention in which a government actor(s) was actively engaged in an attack on an individual or group due to religious motivations. Government officials include any individual or group invested with the authority to

act on behalf of the government, and repression events are only coded as such when the Reports indicate that the government initiator is acting in an official capacity. Attacks are coded to include violent and nonviolent tactics ranging from hate speech to destruction of property to beatings to torture and killing. Additional tactics that are primarily available to government officials are arrests, detention, and forced relocation. For each event all tactics described are coded.

Religious insurgency events were identified as any conflict event in which the government is the target of violent or nonviolent contention initiated by nongovernment actors. Government targets include persons or property attacked specifically because of their government affiliation and religious position. Nongovernment initiators include any persons not expressly associated with the ruling authority. Insurgency events include contentious activity initiated by religious actors and non-religious actors against religious or nonreligious states. Like repression religious insurgency tactics include a range of conflictive tactics: rhetoric, property destruction, beatings, and killing. Religious insurgency events can also include petitioning and protest behavior targeting the government.

Religious intergroup conflict (RIC) events are identified and coded as reported instances of religiously motivated contentious activity between two nongovernment affiliated parties. The absence of *official* government presence in contentious events is the distinguishing characteristic in this manifestation of religious conflict. The religious affiliation, or lack thereof, of both parties is coded as are the tactics reported in the specific event.

The RCE dataset does not include information on most African nations. While the reports generally provide ample information on most nations of the world, the African reports are unusually short considering the amount of violence that is described in general. Grim and Finke

(2006, 2001) argue convincingly that the length of the reports tend to coincide with the level of restriction and conflict. This does not seem to be the case with African nations. Moreover, the widespread ethnic conflict that is characteristic of so many sub-Saharan countries result in reports that simply describe conflict as "on-going" with very few if any specific events being reported. This still allows for the collection of IRF data, but it is a major obstruction for RCE data collection. Additionally, much of the quantitative data on necessary for this analysis is missing or woefully outdated. Indeed, even the United Nations Human Development data for African countries is often lacking. Listwise deletion in the statistical analyses would result in their omission from the analysis anyway. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa is omitted from the data collection efforts.

In addition to the primary investigator, two research assistants were trained in the proper procedure for coding event data. Coding took place from August 2009 until June 2010. A total of three coders were utilized in the collection of data. The training process consisted of coders familiarizing themselves with the coding instrument and the criteria for recognizing the distinct types of religious conflict. After a series of meetings in which the primary investigator specified definitions, clarified questions, and revised the coding instrument to increase precision, all coders were given the same five country reports to code independently. The results were compared, and inconsistencies were discussed and debated. These discussions resulted in further revisions to the coding instrument and increased conceptual consistency between coders. The results from the first round of coding were discarded, and three different country reports were independently coded. The results were compared again and further clarifications made. This

clarification process occurred five times until inter-coder reliability reached 85%.[2] Coding time varied depending on the length of the report and the number of events reported but ranged from approximately 20 minutes to 2 hours. The average time was approximately one hour.

Analytical Strategy

This dissertation relies on statistical analyses to test general propositions and previous propositions regarding the causes and consequences of religious restriction and conflict. The analyses are performed using Stata 11.2 and IBM SPSS 19. Chapter 3 explores the correlates of religious repression using the country as the unit of analysis. The primary variable of interest is the *religious repression score*. This measure indicates the reported magnitude of religious repression using the intensity and frequency of repression events reported for each country: frequency is the number of times discrete events are reported and intensity represents the severity of the tactics used in each event. Zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression is used to examine the impact of religious freedom policy, perceived religious threat, and the level of democracy on religious repression presence and intensity. Chapter 4 is similarly analyzed using ZINB regression to examine the impact of religious freedom policy and practice on religious intergroup conflict measured using the computed *religious intergroup conflict score*. Like the repression score, the religious repression score is the primary outcome variable of the analysis and is used as an indicator of frequency and intensity of religious intergroup conflict. The analysis assesses the impact of religious diversity, religious discrimination, and religious

[2] The greatest disparity regarded items measuring religious identity. Often, the Reports did not explicitly mention the religious affiliation of all members of a conflict event; however, the contexts in which the event occurs may have implied specific religious identities. This often led to coders reporting the actors' affiliation as "Unknown." The primary investigator examined each discrepancy and made a final decision on the appropriate coding.

inequality on the level of conflict between non-state affiliated religious communities. Chapter 5 examines the factors that influence the most prevalent type of religious conflict in a nation. The *modal conflict score* represents the most prevalent form of religious conflict reported for each country and is the primary outcome measure of the first analysis.[3] The full complement of measures utilized in each analysis are described in their respective chapters, but Table 2.1 presents the questions utilized to compute the dependent variables utilized throughout this analysis.

[3] See Appendix B for the complete Religious Conflict Events Dataset coding instrument.

Table 2.1 Key Dependent Variable Questions*

Religious Conflict Type

What type of religious conflict event is this?

1=Suspected Religious Repression (Report indicates government support, but no explicit mention of government presences) Skip to Section 1

2=Explicit Religious repression (Government/security authorities initiating conflict with a non-government religious group) Skip to Section 1

3=Religious insurgency (Non-government authorities initiating conflict event against the government or government personnel) Skip to Section 2

4=Collective religious conflict (Conflict between non-government authorities) Skip to Section 3

Event Size

What was the size of the event (i.e. approximate number of participants)?

1=a small event involving few participants (less than 30)

2=a medium event with a fair number of participants (30-200)

3=a large event with a large crowd of participants (More than 200)

4=no number mentioned/unclear

Religious Conflict Tactics

According to the Report, did the activities of this conflict include the following:

0=No, 1=Yes (Select all that apply)

Religious Repression

____ Rhetoric/statements/preaching
____ Distribution of printed information
____ Audio/visual distribution of information
____ Invasion, search, or confiscation of property
____ Vandalism and/or graffiti
____ Destruction/Damage to private property
____ Destruction/Damage to public property
____ Destruction of religious property
____ Detention of persons (e.g., jail or detainment)
____ Forced relocation (e.g., driving individuals or groups out)
____ Beatings or torture
____ Killing of one individual
____ Killing numerous individuals
____ Genocide or widespread massacre
____ Fines
____ Other (Specify)_____

Religious Intergroup Conflict

____ Rhetoric/statements/preaching
____ Distribution of printed information
____ Audio/visual distribution of information
____ Legal complaint or filing
____ Protest events or demonstrations
____ Vandalism and/or graffiti
____ Invasion, search, or confiscation of property
____ Destruction of private property
____ Destruction of public property
____ Destruction of religious property
____ Detention of persons (e.g., jail or detainment)
____ Forced relocation (e.g., driving individuals or groups out)
____ Beatings or torture
____ Killing of one individual
____ Killing numerous individuals
____ Genocide or widespread massacre
____ Other (Specify)_____

Religious Insurgency

____ Rhetoric/statements/preaching
____ Distribution of printed information
____ Audio/visual distribution of information
____ Legal complaint or filing
____ Protest events or demonstrations
____ Vandalism and/or graffiti
____ Invasion, search, or confiscation of property
____ Destruction/Damage to private property
____ Destruction/Damage to public property
____ Destruction/Damage to religious property
____ Detention of persons (e.g. detainment, kidnapping)
____ Forced relocation (e.g., driving individuals or groups out)
____ Beatings or torture
____ Killing of one individual
____ Killing numerous individuals
____ Genocide or widespread massacre
____ Other (Specify)_____

Size of Event

What was the size of the event (i.e. approximate number of participants)?

1=a small event involving few participants (less than 30)

2=a medium event with a fair number of participants (30-200)

3=a large event with a large crowd of participants (More than 200)

4=no number mentioned/unclear

*Dependent variables used in subsequent analyses are calculated primarily from these questions and the number of occurences of each event.

CHAPTER 3

The Structural Determinants of Religiously Motivated Repression

This chapter analyzes national structures and policies that influence a states' propensity to repress part or all of its religious population. Repression research provides numerous theoretical and empirically testable propositions that attempt to explain state actors' decision to utilize coercive force. Specifically, scholars emphasize characteristics of democracy, economic development, and the absence of political threats as key to the reduction of political repression. Most work in this area focuses on the political structures that account for variations in political repression; however, there is little research that includes religion in the analysis.

Despite the secularist assumption of the inevitable decline, demise, or privatization of religious institutions, state involvement and interference in religious affairs is prevalent (Fox 2006, 2007, 2008; Fox and Sandler 2004; Henderson 1997, 1998; Huntington 1996; Johnston 1998; Lai 2006. National and local governments influence and are influenced by their religious institutions, and it comes as no surprise that policies are developed and implemented specifically to control religion. How, then, does religious policy—the officially recognized guidelines, procedures, and practices of the government regarding religious individuals, organizations and institutions—influence the use of repression on targets identified by their religious affiliation?

I define religious repression and survey the literature examining the predictors of repression in general and explain how these factors may be modified to include a nations' explicit policy towards religion. I conduct an empirical analysis comparing the most robust predictors of repression to religion-specific policies, and, finally, offer an explanation of what these findings mean for the greater repression literature.

Religious Repression

In the literature, repression is conceptualized and operationalized in various ways. While most agree that repression is the use of coercion to induce compliance with government wishes, definitions of state repression vary in terms of scope and activity across analyses. There is little consensus on the itemization of repressive activities; however, most studies broadly identify repression as the use of physical coercion against an individual or organization within the geopolitical jurisdiction of the state as a means of deterring activities or beliefs deemed challenging to government actors and institutions (Davenport, 2007; Goldstein 1978). This conceptualization defines repression by a state's coercive efforts to harm or destroy the physical integrity of individuals and organizations. This is the most familiar understanding of repressive activity and usually includes beatings, arrests, murder, forced relocation, destruction of property and other violent forms of state-mandated persecution. Moreover, this type of repression is almost universally recognized as a particularly extreme and egregious government tactic.

Broader conceptualizations of repression tend to use rhetoric that is more inclusive of the state of the sociopolitical environment that leads to specific acts of repression. For example, Regan and Henderson state "Political repression, in the broadest sense, refers to the systematic violation of civil liberties and human rights of groups and/or individuals*"* (2002:3). Here, repression is conceived of as more than just physical attacks by state actor: it is any policies and practices that are employed to suppress an undesirable group. This allows for the inclusion of less corporal, and often unnoticed repression tactics such as the arbitrary enforcement of discriminatory laws and policies that restrict targets' basic freedoms (Grim and Finke 2011). While these tactics are less likely to make the nightly news, they are often just as effective at achieving the goal of reducing dissidence and reinforcing state power. Regardless of the

conceptual scope, the goal of all repressive activity is to increase the costs of mobilization and collective action against the state, and both formulations of repression are useful. The narrower view that focuses on specific acts of violence provides for a simpler operationalization process. State actors targeting and physically harassing individuals or groups is easier to recognize, observe, and record. There is little debate about property destruction, arrests, beatings, or fatal attacks by the government being indicative of a repressive regime; however, the state has many tools in its repertoire – potent, non-violent techniques to enforce social quiescence. This research employs a more comprehensive conceptualization of repression and focuses on the tactics, motivations, and targets that are unique to religious repression.

Religious repression is the *systematic use of coercion by government actors to restrict individuals or groups identified by their religious affiliation, practice, or belief*. Coercion refers to any tactic, violent or nonviolent, that forces actors to act in an involuntary way. This includes physical coercion—arrests, beatings, killing, and forced relocation—as well as non-physical activities like media attacks and property seizure. An array of repressive behaviors are infused with religious components, but the most important designation for repression to be considered religious in this research is that victims are identified by the religious affiliation. In other words, a government action is identified as religious repression when the state attempts to restrict actors for their affiliation with the "wrong" religious tradition or sect or for being religiously affiliated at all. The emphasis, however, is on the use of religion as a social identifier similar to race or ethnicity.

Examples of religious repression are numerous. The brutal persecution of all religious individuals under Communist regimes is a clear example of religious repression (Froese 2004a, 2004b; Yang 2006), as is the harassment and severe restrictions placed on religious minorities in

theocracies like those found in the contemporary Middle East. While not necessarily violent, in the West, religious groups identified as socially or politically undesirable are often marginalized as "cults" and routinely denied the free practice of their religion (U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom Reports 2008). The International Religious Freedom Reports detail frequent and widespread incidents of violent religious repression in the form of the destruction of religious buildings, physical assaults, forced deportations, and religiously-motivated killings. These repressive tactics are well-documented and conceptually intuitive largely because they are more easily observed than incidents of religious repression involving allegations of non-violent discrimination. Furthermore, more violent tactics are often identified as more "newsworthy" and are far more likely to be noticed and reported by the media. As media coverage often provides the only source of data on instances of collective action for resources, newsworthy events are often overrepresented in empirical analyses and theory testing (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Olzak 1989). The continued relevance of religion on a wide array of human behaviors and the purported rise of religious violence has generated a great deal of theoretical and empirical attention (Finke and Harris 2012; Grim and Finke 2007; Huntington 1996; Jurgensmeyer 2000). Further, religiously motivated violence appears to be a media favorite since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Violence, however, represents only a single manifestation of religious repression in a wide range of tactics available to states (Tilly 1978).

Religious repression constitutes more that just attacks on the personal integrity of individuals to induce compliance. Devout individuals of numerous religious traditions are non-violently forced to adhere to government-mandated norms of secularity through the application of educational, financial, and social pressures as well. Non-violent religious repression involves

discriminatory tactics that do not harm the integrity of individuals or property like its violent counterpart, but the consequences are just as real and important.

While correlated, there is a critical distinction between the presence of policies that discriminate along religious lines and acts of religious repression. For example, the law banning all religious apparel in public institutions in France, targets all individuals who wish to profess their religious identity through specific modes of dress. However, conventionally, it is referred to as the "headscarf law." Though no religious tradition is explicitly named, it has been argued that this law violates the French government's adherence to neutrality in matters of religion and disproportionately affects Muslims (Joppke 2007). Arguably, this could be considered religious repression, but it is not in this project. Religious repression involves utilizing coercive tactics to restrict religiously-identified actors. While, the "headscarf law" provides enforcement officials with the legal authorization to arrest, fine, or discriminate against religious individuals, it does not force them to do so. However, when an individual is forced to leave a public place for refusal to remove the headscarf, that action is identified as an act of religious repression. The decision to utilize coercive tactics rests with the agents of enforcement at each setting. Still, this and similar policies across Europe have resulted in numerous expulsions, fines, and the employment termination of those refusing to adhere to the demands of secular dress. Discriminatory policies may be the foundation of religious repression, but I argue that they are neither sufficient nor necessary prerequisites of religious repression.

Religious repression also shares a potential theoretical overlap with what other scholars have called religious regulation (Stark and Finke 2000); more specifically, government regulation and persecution (Grim and Finke 2011). Here, scholars argue that the "religious economy" operates in much the same way as the financial economy. Government favoritism and

restrictions specifically targeting religious institutions in the form of laws, edicts, and practices indicate higher levels of religious regulation. Conceptualizations of religious regulation emphasize on socially constructed barriers to entry into the religious market in an effort to control manifestations of religious expression that is deemed for some reason, religious or secular, harmful to society (Stark and Finke 2000). Religious repression is only one particular tactic employed by the state to coerce compliance and is often representative of more broadly defined policies characteristic of governments with greater regulation of religion[4]. The French headscarf policy is clearly representative of what is meant religious regulation. It is a policy designed to curb certain religious expressions, but only the acts of coercive enforcement of the law qualify as religious repression. The two are highly correlated concepts, but the presence of religious repression is not a necessary expression of government regulation nor is its presence sufficient to understanding the extent of regulation within a country. Religiously homogenous countries with state religions and formal government policies favoring one particular religious brand are highly regulated, but may not have cause to employ religious repression as is the case in Catholic Malta. On the other hand, nations with no formal policies or procedures restricting or favoring religious actors may engage in acts that would be considered religious repression such as raid on a Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints compound in 2008.

Threat, Dissent, and Repression

Perhaps the most intuitive and empirically supported explanation of repressive activity involves the perception of threat to state authority and political order. This model is a largely reactionary explanation of state actors' response to challenges presented by non-state actors,

[4] For a complete discussion of religious regulation, see Stark and Finke, 2000 and Finke and Stark, 2005.

individuals, and institutions. Proponents of the threat model of repression argue that repression is more likely when non-institutional and confrontational tactics are employed against the state (Davenport 2007; Kriesi 1995; McAdam 1982). Tilly (1978) argues that there are two factors that increase the likelihood of repression of collective action: 1) the scale of the action, and 2) the power of the group. As increasingly large and complex strategies brought against the regime, governments are more likely to utilize increasingly repressive tactics (Davenport 1995). This effect is one of the most accepted and supported explanations of repression (Davenport 2006; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003) and has been found so often that effect has become known as the "Law of Coercive Response."

The liberal use of repression is widely looked down upon, but it is hard to argue its immediate effectiveness as a means of enforcing population quiescence. Scholars studying social movements demonstrate that repression, in the proper amounts, reduces protest activity for a while, and the political opportunities model of social movements suggests that collective action and protest is far less likely when protesters perceive a greater chance of severe repression (Tarrow 1998). Indeed, there is an extensive literature demonstrating the importance of such opportunities as states' propensity to repress that has provided numerous insights into the factors that incline individuals to protest and its effects on the protest cycle (Opp and Roehl 1990; Brockett 1993; Koopmans 1993).

According to the threat model, governments are more likely to utilize repression when there are heightened levels of dissent and threats to state power. Research in the public policing of protest has identified various characteristics of protest events that are associated with an increased use of violent repression by the police (della Porta and Diani 2006; Earl, Soule, McCarthy 2003; McAdam 1982); however, understanding the threat perception of the state is

somewhat more complicated and less immediate. When does a state view a religious group as a threat to stability? Is it a group size issue, or perhaps is it a matter of dissident intensity and tactics?

Political dissent has been a consistent predictor of repression throughout the literature (Davenport 2007). Religiously motivated dissent can be viewed as an explicit challenge to government authority. Religiously motivated dissent is any action that utilizes non-institutionalized tactics to coerce government change in personnel, policy, or practice and is infused with some identifiable religious affiliation. Religiously motivated dissent can include activities ranging from peaceful petitioning to protests to full scale religious insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003). If the decision to employ repression is largely based on state actors' perception of threat, protests against the government and attacks on government personnel and institutions should encourage the use of repression as they represent immediate challenges to government authority. Moreover, if insurgent actors are perceived as affiliates of a religious organization or tradition, then the state may utilize overt and covert repression (Earl 2003) to neutralize insurgent capabilities. This may result in the wider repression of uninvolved but religiously similar individuals in addition to insurgent perpetrators.

States also have an explicit interest in maintaining public order. Violent upheaval and continuous disorder suggests that a government has little control over its population, and this lack of control may indicate government weakness and an inability to protect its citizenry from one another. A weak polity will eventually be replaced either through election or violent deposition. Leaders, therefore, may utilize repression to quiet conflict among non-state religious actors. I hypothesize that religious repression will be positively associated with religiously-motivated dissent and disorder.

In short, government actors that perceives itself to be under siege from a religiously affiliated challenger is more likely to utilize religious repression in order to maintain its position. Moreover, religiously affiliated actions that threaten the social order and, subsequently, the ruling polity will increase religious repression.

Government Effectiveness, Legitimacy and Repression

Religious repression is the focus of this analysis, but an understanding of its inverse, religious liberty, may prove to be a useful tool for understanding when governments will utilize religious repression. Religious liberty can be defined as the absence of religious regulation at any level including religious repression. Recall, that government regulation of religion describes any state policies or practices designed to control the belief, profession or practice of religion (Grim and Finke 2006; Stark and Finke 2000). Religious regulation ranges from relatively neutral government policies requiring religious organizations to register with government before meeting to bans on specific religious brands to full on government-mandated persecution. Religious repression, then, can be understood as a more active and coercive form of religious regulation. Variations in the presence and use of religious regulations have been used to predict a variety of religiously motivated behaviors including religious pluralism, participation, conflict, and persecution (Barro and McCleary 2003; Chaves and Cann 1992; Finke and Harris 2012; Grim and Finke 2011; Stark and Finke 2000). The debate regarding the influence of religious freedom continues, but few attempt to explain its origins. Secularization proponents view religious liberty as the inevitable outcome of modernization and suggest it is symptomatic of imminent religious decline (Berger 1969). This research does not delve deeply into the secularization debate (for an overview see Chaves and Gorski 2001; Gorski 2000), but the

modernization-religious liberty link is seems to be an unproven if still widely accepted truth. What is needed is a theory that clearly articulates the events and structures that promote or stymie religious freedom.

Emphasizing the rational-choice theory of human behavior, Gill (2008) posits that religious liberty, the *absence* of religious repression, is an outcome of a series of mutually beneficial tradeoffs between political and religious actors. The theory borrows a great deal from game theory and assumes that politicians are rational actors interested in maintaining their political power and minimizing the cost of ruling (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999). This can be accomplished through coercion, patronage or ideological legitimacy. Patronage and coercion are both costly, so politicians will seek ideological legitimacy to maintain power whenever possible. Religious actors are in a unique position to confer legitimacy upon secular leaders, but have interests of their own. No religion, Stark and Bainbridge (1985) assert, can monopolize the religious market without the resources and coercive power of the state, therefore, in an attempt to solidify and expand the church's position, religious actors may grant approval and legitimacy in exchange for favorable government sanctions and policies that stymie competition in the religious market.

Gill (2008) offers two propositions that affect the bargaining power of religious and secular actors which, in turn, affects states' propensity to regulate religion based on its relative bargaining position with religious institutions. First, the bargaining power of the church is increased when it represents a large majority of the population. Therefore, there will be more incentive to regulate the religious market in favor of the majority religion. This is often at the expense of other minority religious religions and could potentially take the form of religious repression. Gamson (1975) argues along a similar line and suggests that repression will only be

utilized when the targeted group is perceived to be "weak" and likely to collapse under repressive pressures. Failure to successfully repress a politically threatening group will result in the perception of a weak state and reduce its legitimacy. Thus, governments considering utilizing repression against religious targets are more likely to choose repression when those targets are part of a religious minority.

Second, Gill argues that the costs of religious restrictions will overtake the perceived benefits as political actors' power and position becomes more secure reduces the need for continual enforcement. The capacity of religious organizations to mobilize collective action is well-documented (Hafez 2004; Harris 1994; Smith 1996), and it could be argued that a more realist explanation for Communist states' brutal suppression of religion - one that goes beyond the "opiate of the masses" orthodoxy - is that religious suppression was designed to eliminate legitimate rivals for social power. For example, the ruling Communist elite in modern China, the most powerful of the remaining Communist states, have a firm and unquestioned hold on power. This security may be why there has been a relaxation of religious regulation in contemporary China (Yang 2006). Where political actors' positions are less secure, religious repression may be utilized in an attempt to restrict or eliminate all rivals for socio-political dominance. While not focusing explicitly on religious repression, these propositions are clearly linked to states' propensity to utilize religious repression as a means of religious regulation

It is important to note that the influences of threat and political legitimacy on religious repression do not operate independently and work in conjunction with one another to alter the perceptions and decision of political leaders (Earle, Soule and McCarthy 2003). Religious institutions can be viewed simultaneously as granters of political legitimacy and potential threats

and rivals. I hypothesize that *religious hegemony is positively associated with religious repression.* Further, political instability is negatively associated with religious repression.

Democracy

Another core finding in the repression literature is that political democracy is almost always associated with lower levels of repression (Davenport 2006; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1999; see Mann 2005 for a notable exception). Democratic institutions are believed to decrease repression by (1) providing alternative mechanisms of control through political participation; (2) providing citizens with the ability to remove abusive authorities from office; and (3) maintaining characteristically democratic values that are inconsistent with the use of repression and violence. This is known as the "domestic democratic peace" (Davenport 2007). In short, the domestic democratic peace thesis asserts that, compared to their autocratic counterparts, democratic states have less opportunity and willingness to utilize repression (Poe and Tate 1999). *Democracy is associated with lower levels of religious repression.*

Measures of democracy, however, focus primarily on broadly conceptualized civil liberties, executive competition and restraints, and the potential for civic participation. Political and civic liberty, however, should not be conflated with religious freedom. Attitudes toward democratic institutions and religious institutions can vary greatly and for all intents and purposes be logically inconsistent. For example, France boasts very high levels of democracy and civic participation, yet, the recent ban on all religious dress indicates the states willingness to restrict religious expression. The aforementioned characteristics of secular liberty and political democracy are important in reducing overall repression, including religious participation; however, I argue that religion exists in a somewhat separate societal dimension that allows for

exceptions to the democratic peace thesis. This degree of separateness may lead political leaders to ignore the expressly protected civil liberties that allow for political opposition, organization, and mobilization when regarding religious actors.

There is a great deal of variation between what national constitutions legally profess and how states actually behave (Henkin 1990; Kent 1991). Still, constitutional provisions often constrain tactics available to the ruling polity. In a study of legal structure and political repression, Davenport (1996) finds that the presence of specific constitutional provisions resulted in a decrease in repression by the government. Similarly, I argue that specific protections for freedom of religion will limit religious repression, and the absence of such policies will increase the likelihood of religious repression. Moreover, I expect that when the constitution specifically protects religious freedom the reduction in religious repression will be stronger than the reduction associated with broader conceptualizations of democracy. I expect that *government policies protecting religious freedom are negatively associated with religious repression*.

Data and Methods

The unit of analysis for this study is the nation. Data for this analysis are collected primarily from two sources: the International Religious Freedom (IRF) Reports and the Polity IV Project. These sources provide nation-level data on the socio-political structure of nearly every nation and territory in the world as well as information regarding the state of religious freedom and religious repression. In a review of repression research, Davenport (2006) argues that data derived solely from newspapers or NGO reports are limited by several proven problems (McCarthy et al. 1996). "What is needed" he argues "is something equivalent to the human rights-oriented NGO but with an interest in dissent and insurgency" (p.6).

The IRF Reports are a unique and powerful source of information that captures a wide array of conflict activity. The 1998 International Religious Freedom Act requires that an annual report on the state of religious freedom be generated for the host country of every U.S. Embassy. These reports are based on a wide variety of sources including, but not limited to: national and local government records, local NGOs, newspaper accounts, and reliable anecdotal evidence provided by clergy, religious leaders, and other key individuals. The data is then condensed into the annual report and submitted to the U.S. State department. A coding instrument designed to capture and quantify incidences of religious conflict described in the IRF Reports is utilized to generate the two dependent variables analyzed here. Religious repression is defined as any state initiated activity that seeks to control, suppress or eliminate the religious activity of a non-state actor. This includes a wide range of activities including verbal and published threats, attacks on religious property, and religiously-motivated physical assaults and lethal actions.

The Polity IV Project collects data on all major independent states in the global system, and is the most widely used data source for studying the autocracy, democracy, regime change and other trends in global governance. For this research, I utilize the Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Dataset and the State Fragility Index. Data from 2000 and 2007 are extracted from each dataset and assembled along with the religious freedom and event data collected from the IRF Reports. This analysis examines non-sub-Saharan African countries with populations over 500,000.

Dependent Variables

In order to measure the presence and scope of religious repression within a nation, an overall repression score is computed by summing the score of each reported conflict coded as

religious repression. Nations with no reported incidents of religious repression are assigned a score of 0 if no repression events are reported.[5] An event that is assigned a score of 1 indicates non-violent repression which includes speech, media events, and government sponsored peaceful demonstrations; a score of 2 indicates that an event involved the invasion, confiscation, or destruction of property by the government; and a score of 3 represents any reported incidents of violence and directed at individuals or the use of lethal force on non-state actors. Religious repression measure computed as the sum of the score of each event reported in within a country. The sum was then logged for analysis to reduce skew and multiplied by one hundred to be used in the regression analysis discussed below. Country scores for religious repression range from 0-644.

Predictors

The primary purpose of this analysis is to discover the most powerful determinants of religious repression and to find if the robust predictors of political repression utilized in prior studies have similar influences on religious repression. I employ several measures representing each of the competing models to test their effects on different forms of religious repression.

Challenges and threats to government authority are represented by the presence of religiously affiliated protests and attacks against government institutions and representatives. Threat, however, can be indirect as well and violent religiously affiliated conflicts—property destruction, physical assaults of numerous people, torture, and killings—between non-state actors are considered threats as well. This is a dichotomous variable and a nation received a

[5] A zero does not necessarily mean that a nation is free of religious repression. Due to some variations in language and limitations of the coding instrument, reports that describe religious repression as an ongoing feature of society but that do not contain descriptions of specific occurrences receive a score of 0.

score of 1 if any such events were described in the IRF Reports. Threat and violent social disorder should increase the likelihood and use of religious repression.

Stability and legitimacy is measured using states' "effectiveness" score. State's effectiveness is measured and in the Polity IV State Fragility dataset and presented as a single score ranging from 0 to 13. The score is a representation of four dimensions that identify governments' ability to deliver for their citizens: 1) *Political effectiveness*—a measure of stability in governance and durability; 2) *economic effectiveness*—computed using the per capita GDP; 3) *social effectiveness*—a measure of human capital development derived from the United Nations Human Development Reports; and 4) *security effectiveness*—computed from measures of war in Marshall's Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2009 (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). Higher scores on this value indicate lower state effectiveness, and, theoretically, the diminished legitimacy of the ruling regime. To ease interpretation, the index is referred to as state instability. Regime instability is hypothesized to be positively associated with religious repression.

Religious hegemony is computed from data obtained from the World Religion Database (Johnson and Grim 2010) on religious populations around the world. This variable is dichotomous and is coded one if a single religious tradition is claimed by over 75% of the population. Religious hegemony, I hypothesize, will be positively associated with religious repression.

Democracy is represented by the 2007 Adjusted Polity score available from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). This measure of democracy is one of the most widely used measures of democratic institutions within a country. This variable quantifies three interrelated dimensions central to the concept of democracy: (1) the presence of institutions and procedures

that allow for citizens to express preferences for alternative policies and leadership; (2) institutionalized constraints on executive power; and (3) guaranteed civil liberties to all citizens. It is valued so that higher scores indicate higher levels of democracy while lower scores suggest more autocratic, insular tendencies. The variable ranges from -10 to 10.

Legal protections of religious freedom are derived from an item in the International Religious Freedom Report coding instrument. The question asks, "Does this section of the Report specifically mention that government policy contributes to the generally free practice of religious?" Possible answers are "Yes," "Yes, but exceptions are mentioned" and "No." Higher scores indicate an absence of religious policies that contribute to religious freedom and are hypothesized to be positively associated with religious repression.

Population is controlled for using the logged population of the country in 2008. While the variable is simply utilized as a control measure in this analysis, scholars speculate that the population of a nation can and does influence the likelihood of a government to utilize political repression. Henderson (1993) suggests that a large or particularly dense population increases the likelihood of repression by simply increasing the number of opportunities for repression to occur. Moreover, a larger population increases the demand on resources and increasing scarcity which may factor in state actors' decision to utilize repression as a "coping mechanism" (Poe and Tate 1999: 325).[6]

Analytical Strategy

The analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS 19 and Stata 11.1 statistical software packages. To test the impact of macro-level structures on religious repression I utilized a zero-

[6] Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Appendix C, Table C.3.1. Figure C.3.1 illustrates the distribution of Repression Scores.

inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression model and include 112 non-African nations with populations over 500,000 in 2008. The theoretical model and hypothesized relationships are illustrated in Figure 1 and provide a useful way of observing macro-social structures that can be utilized in more nuanced research in the future.

Figure 3.1. Factors Influencing Religious Repression



The selection of the ZINB technique is based on theoretical assumptions of repression and empirical observations of the religious repression variable. Theoretically, and has been argued by numerous critics of empirical analysis, historical contingency will always have an effect on the utilization of repression in any country. Arguably, no amount of modeling could ever capture all influential characteristics of a country that may impact repression. This is true, but should not limit the search for patterns. ZINB regression analysis allows for unexplained individual heterogeneity that can be attributed to contingency and provides more efficient estimates that a Poisson model. Moreover, the distribution of the dependent variable illustrates that the percentage of zero scores is higher than would be assumed in a standard Poisson or negative binomial distribution—approximately 55% of cases. Therefore, the zero-inflated

specification is utilized in this analysis (Greene 1994; Long 1997). ZINB regression assumes the dependent variable *religious repression* is a count variable and the variance of the response is greater than the mean. The technique creates two separate models and combines them. A binary logistic regression model predicts whether or not country is likely to have no reports of religious repression a score of zero. Then, a negative binomial model is generated predicting the counts for those countries that are not zeroes. This statistical technique makes it possible to distinguish between the variables that contribute to religious repression presence and those that contribute to variations in the magnitude. The Vuong statistic tests whether this model better predicts levels of religious repression than a standard negative binomial regression utilizing a z test (Vuong 1989). The probability of the observed z statistics for each model is highly unlikely ($p < .001$) and shows that the ZINB analysis provides improved estimates.

Results

The results of the following analyses suggest that religious repression is associated with the traditional predictors of broader political repression. Prior to the multivariate analysis, a simple bivariate analysis illustrates the associations between religious repression and democracy, threat, regime instability, religious hegemony, religious freedom policy, and population (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Bivariate Correlation of Predictors with Religious Repression

Democracy	-0.489 **
Threat	0.214 *
Regime Instability	0.415 *
Religious Hegemony	0.014
Religious Freedom Policy	0.654 **
Population	0.411 **

*p < .05, ** p <.01

N=112

These findings are consistent with previous work linking macro-level factors to political repression and suggest that religious regulation is influenced by similar forces (Davenport 2007) There is a significant negative correlation between the democracy variable and religious repression while *threat*, *regime instability*, and *population* are positively correlated. *Religious hegemony* has no significant correlation with religious repression. This is the only variable that does not operate in the expected manner. This suggests that there is no association between the presence of a religious hegemony within a nation and religious repression.

An interesting finding in the bivariate correlations is the large and significant negative correlation between *religious freedom policy* and religious repression. The correlation is larger than any other and suggests that nations that maintain government policies protecting religious freedom have less religious repression than those nations that do not. While a more rigorous analysis is necessary to confirm this effect, it seems clear that the legal promise of religious freedom acts as a deterrent to religious repression.

The multivariate analysis in Table 3.2 shows the impact of the predictor variables on both the presence and magnitude of religious repression in a country in the models. The analysis

utilizes two models to demonstrate the impact of religious freedom policy. I will discuss the implications of the results for each hypothesis presented in this chapter.

The threat model of repression is one of the most robust and intuitive explanations of political repression, and religiously-motivated dissent and disorder were hypothesized to be positively associated with religious repression. Recall, coefficients under the zero-inflated portion of Table 3.2 represent the prediction of the likelihood of no religious repression reported at all. Positive coefficient indicates a greater likelihood that there were no reports of religious repression. The *threat* coefficients in Model 1 and Model 2 are statistically significant. They suggest that countries where challenges brought against the state or where violent conflicts between groups have an identifiable religious dimension are more likely to report instances of religious repression. This supports the hypothesized relationship between threat and religious repression. However, for countries that have reported instances of repression, the threat variable does not have any significant effect on the number of reported repression incidents or the reported level of violence. In other words, *threat* increases the likelihood of religious repression but has no statistically significant on the magnitude.

Repression is hypothesized to be utilized more often when a religious hegemony existed within a country. This analysis suggests no support for this argument. An overwhelming religious majority had no significant effect on either the presence of religious repression or its magnitude.

Regime instability is predicted to be positively associated with religious repression, but the effect is only significantly associated with the magnitude of religious repression in countries that have reported religious repression. The instability variable is positively associated with the number and intensity of religious repression reports in both Models 1 and 2 (.086 and .062). The

effect is somewhat mediated when the religious freedom policy variable is included in the regression, but the effect remains. In short, governments that are less politically, economically, and socially effective are associated with more religious repression.

It is predicted that the level of democracy within a country negatively impacts religious repression. The analysis provides mixed support for this hypothesis. In the zero-inflated portion of Model 1, the democracy variable is positively associated with religious repression (.088) which suggests that more democratic nations are more likely to have no reports of religious repression. After controlling for religious freedom policies (Model 2), however, we see that the democracy variable is no longer a significant predictor. The coefficients in the negative binomial portion of the model clearly show that the negative association between the level of democracy and religious repression is robust; the negative coefficient is significant in both Model 1 and Model 2 (-.039 and -.021., respectively). This is consistent with research purporting the pacifying effect of democracy on religious repression and supports Hypothesis 4. This analysis largely agrees with previous research demonstrating the negative impact democracy has on political repression. More important for this research, however, is the diminished effect of democracy after controlling for specific policies protecting religious freedom. When states guarantee religious freedom, they are less likely to utilize repression regardless of how democratic they are.

I hypothesized a negative relationship between religious repression and policies protecting religious freedom. The analysis illustrates overwhelming support for this hypothesis. If this hypothesis is true, then the analysis should show a significant positive relationship between the religious freedom policy variable and religious repression. Recall that higher scores on *religious freedom policy* indicate less or no policies protecting individual religious freedom rights. The religious freedom policy variable is negatively associated with the prediction of a

zero in the analysis which suggests that countries with few or no government policies protecting religious freedom are less likely to report no religious repression. Religious freedom policy is positively associated with the magnitude of religious repression experienced in a country. Incidents of religious repression are greater in number or intensity in countries where religious freedom is not protected. While legal provisions by no means act as complete protections from repression, it seems that they do have a substantial negative effect on religious repression.

Population size has no significant effect on religious repression after controlling for religious freedom policy. While the likelihood of religious repression may be increased simply because larger populations provide more opportunities for repression, or because larger populations strain resources forcing governments to utilize repression (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994, 1999), the effect is not demonstrated in this analysis.

The results provide mixed support for each hypothesis. With the exception of religious hegemony, each variable in the model is significantly associated with religious repression; however, the associations vary in terms of impact. The likelihood of religious repression is positively associated with governmental threat, but not the magnitude. The intensity and number of religious repression events is reduced by increased levels of democracy and increased by regime instability. Policies supporting freedom of religion decrease both the overall likelihood of religious repression and its magnitude.

Table 3.2 ZINB Regression for Religious Repression

	Model 1	Model 2
Neg. Binomial		
Democracy	-0.039 ***	-0.021 *
Threat	0.1	0.149
Regime Instability	0.086 ***	0.062 **
Religious Hegemony	0.022	0.083
Religious Freedom	--	0.279 ***
Policy		
Population	0.031	0.011
Constant	4.615 ***	4.608 ***
Zero -Inflated		
Democracy	0.088 **	0.009
Threat	-1.096 *	-1.21 *
Regime Instability	-0.128	-0.149
Religious Hegemony	0.091	-0.143
Religious Freedom	--	-1.144 **
Policy		
Population	-0.44 **	-0.346
Constant	7.798 **	7.703 **
Model 1: Vuong z= 4.130, Pr > z=0.000		
Model 2: Vuong z= 4.510, Pr >z =0.000		

N=112; * p< .05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Discussion

Previous research on repression emphasizes the influence of macro-structural influences on the use of repression; however, with few exceptions (Hafez 2003), religion and religiously motivated actions have rarely been included in rigorous analysis. Religion is gaining ground in cross-national examinations, though, and this analysis demonstrates that religion plays an important role as an identifier in the repression dynamic. When religious institutions are identified as the source of challenge to government institutions and policies, governments

recognize and repress religious actors. This is consistent with other work examining the effect of religiously motivated conflict on government behavior (Harris and Scheitle, 2010).

The analysis also draws attention to the limitations of the "domestic democratic peace" thesis. Broad conceptualizations of democracy such as those captured in the democracy variable utilized here are less critical to the prevention of religious repression than specific protections of religious freedom. Government policy and government practice are by no means equal, and are often contradictory. For example, the IRF Report for North Korea states "[t]he Constitution provides for 'freedom of religious belief;' however, in practice the Government severely restricted religious activity" (U.S. State Department 2008). This is a common phenomenon in all regions of the world. Moreover, scholars have demonstrated that constitutional protections do not safeguard against repression. Still, government policy protecting religious freedom seems to consistently reduce religiously motivated repression. The question that remains, however, regards the source of religious freedom policies. If they are simply the product of a highly democratic nation, then, the mechanisms attributed to democracy that reduce all repression may be more important than the protective nature of guaranteed religious freedom.

Another interesting finding from this study regards the effect of *regime instability*. The hypothesized relationship between instability and repression draws largely from game theoretic models and assumes the inherent rationality of both political and religious leaders. The robust relationship lends support to the idea that political actors in weakened positions will utilize more aggressive tactics to defend their position than their more established counterparts. The process may also involve some a series of tradeoffs between political actors and influential religious actors, but the indicator utilized here, *religious hegemony*, suggests that this is not necessarily the

case. The measure is crude, though, and future research should find a better measure of clerical influence than population dominance.

This study has room for empirical improvement. First, while the IRF Reports are characterized by a high degree of standardization (Finke and Grim 2006), the reporting of specific religious repression events are likely to introduce inconsistent reporting bias. In particular, the over-representation of zeroes in the religious repression frequency may be, in part, attributed to no specific events reported rather than an absence of repression. This may also be causing under-reporting of events. One way to correct for this maybe to insert a dummy variable that represents a likely higher number of religious repression than described in the report. Future analysis would also benefit from the inclusion of governmental capacity measures. The ability for the government to fund and dispense agents of repression is highly likely to influence the number and intensity of religious repression events.

CHAPTER 4

The Structural Determinants of Religious Intergroup Conflict

Despite the diminished academic presence of societal breakdown theory, many of the more compelling explanations of *religious* collective action ranging from rates of religious affiliation and practice (Norris and Inglehart 2004) to the rise of religious fundamentalism (Emerson and Hartman 2006) to religiously motivated terrorism (Juergensmeyer 1993, 1997; Mousseu 2003; Mamdani 2004) assert that current religious collective behavior is a direct byproduct of mal-integration and the mental turmoil subsequently experienced by individuals in a fractured and changing environment (Marty and Appleby 1992). Similarly, many scholars have cited pluralist societal configurations, competing worldviews, and the failure of modernization to deliver the promised prosperity and privileges as explanation for the continued salience of religious institutions (Sahliyeh 1990). [7] Personal dissatisfaction with society moves individuals and groups to action, but this chapter moves beyond individualist psychological conditions as primary explanatory factors. This does not suggest that individual experiences and psychological disposition are unimportant. Indeed, they are assumed to be critical mechanisms for intergroup religious contentious activity; however, religion specific national policies are also important to the activation and mobilization of collective religious identities and religious intergroup conflict.

Explanations for why communities conflict with one another are varied. Early structural propositions of social conflict emergence are rooted in Durkheimian (1893[1997]) principles of societal integration and argue that collective action as symptomatic of social dysfunction.

[7] Much of the work in this area is derived from scholars arguing against the received and predominant wisdom of the demise of religious influence in an increasingly rational and technologically advanced world. For decades, social scientists linked modernization to secularization (Fox 1999). The very mechanisms argued by the fathers of the secularization paradigm that will end religion are argued to ensure its continued presence.

Conflict emerges when social institutions and organizations of society are incapable of serving in an integrative capacity. This general framework has given rise to theoretical propositions highlighting different structural conditions that contribute to institutional disorganization, societal disintegration, and social conflict. These "breakdown theories," of collective action explain social unrest and disruption from a macro-theoretical perspective and attribute social conflict to structural change; however, the root cause for societal disruption and social movement is still assumed to be primarily a result of individuals' psychological discomfort with the current or changing societal configuration. Lacking stable social institutions and a universal collective conscience increases individuals' sense of anomie. Excessive anomie leads to societal breakdown and dysfunction (Useem 1998). Functionalist theories of collective action have received much criticism for being overly-individualistic and have fallen out of academic favor among scholars applying theories that rely more heavily upon rational choice, organizations, and exploitation of political opportunities (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 1998). Recently, more research energy has been exerted in the development, analysis, and synthesis of resource mobilization and political opportunities orientations. Scholars have explored intergroup conflict between numerous identity groups, but the research exploring religiously motivated conflict between groups is weak. Research rarely links conflict to the broader sociopolitical context, and almost never to religion-specific sociopolitical realities. This is an oversight that this study attempts to rectify. The following discussion and analysis explores the ways religious groups contend with one another in differing environmental contexts. Using insights gained from multiple perspectives and disciplines, I investigate elements that influence the likelihood of intergroup conflict events and their magnitude. Furthermore, I assess theories of religious group

competition and discrimination utilizing a statistical technique that reveals the nuances of the relationship between context and conflict.

This chapter explores the correlates of religious intergroup conflict. *Religious intergroup conflict* (RIC) refers to religiously motivated contentious activity between nongovernment actors. Specifically, conflicts between groups in which government actors (e.g., police, politicians, or anyone acting in an official capacity on behalf of the local or national government) are not explicitly referred to as either instigators or targets of religiously motivated contention. This is distinct from much of the previous research on religious conflict in that the contentious outcomes analyzed do not directly involve the state apparatus. Government is not removed entirely from the explanatory focus of this analysis, but it is not analyzed as a direct participant in the events.[8] National religious policy and practice are the contexts in which religious intergroup conflict occurs. In other words, the emphasis is on religiously distinct groups' intentional conflict with one another in the context of various religion-specific policies.

Religious Intergroup Conflict: A Conflict of Identity

Theorists have explained intergroup conflict as the product of inherent and immutable differences between groups. This classic argument, referred to as *primordialism*, posits that cultural difference alone is a sufficient cause for conflict and violence. This is a particularly long-lived and developed argument in research on ethnic relations; an area of research that, unfortunately, tends to address religious diversity by conflating it with and ethnic diversity (Olzak 1992). While the religion and ethnicity conflation is problematic, the conventional assertion is that religious diversity is sufficient to breed conflict because religious institutions

[8] The influences and consequences of state practices are examined in other chapters of this research project.

make claims to unerring, cosmic truth and tend to transfer that certainty to claims for societal dominance. This unique characteristic of religion renders all other religious orientations intolerable (Fox 2004; Grim and Finke 2011). This negative identification of the out-group is likely to enhance in-group religious identity which enhances the potential for conflict (Seul 1999). Adherents to other religions are, at best, misguided souls in need of guidance and conversion, and, at worst, enemy soldiers in an eternal war between "good and evil, truth and falsehood" (Juergensmeyer 2003:169). Where peaceful conversion fails, then conflict will prevail. Indeed, it has been argued that religious violence could be considered a necessity for religious groups to maintain their boundaries and identity (Wellman and Tokuno 2004). Proponents of religious primordialist orientations view religious intergroup conflict as a predictable element of a multi-religious society (Fox 2003; Juergensmeyer 1991).

Perhaps the most frequently cited articulations of religious primordialism is Huntington's (1996) "clash of civilizations" thesis. Huntington's theory on the future of post-Cold War conflict boldly asserts that economic and ideological factors as conflict grouping mechanisms will wane. Border-traversing civilizations based on religion take the place of economic, ideological, or nationalistic identities. International and domestic conflict in the post-Cold War world will be between civilizations derived from differing religious traditions. Civilizational divides within and between borders will be the locations of the clashes. Utilizing numerous historical examples to support the argument, Huntington presents a compelling prediction for world affairs. Religious pluralism will be a source of unrest and strife. The underlying principle to Huntington's entire thesis is the notion of irreducible, religion-based primordial sameness that will draw countries together while causing "civilizations" to clash.

Subsequent research has yielded mixed results, finding evidence for and against his hypothesis. In an expansive study on the predictive effects of various dimensions of social pluralism on numerous manifestations of collective violence, Rummel (1997) found that increased religious pluralism is positively associated with the intensity of collective conflict within a state independent of numerous other socio-economic, cultural and political indicators. Moreover, research has found that conflicts centered on religious demands are less likely to be ended through negotiated settlement (Svensson 2007). However, many empirical studies find little evidence of clashing civilizations or find mediating variables that better explain the relationship (Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000; Henderson 2005; Chiozza 2002; Fox 2007; Grim and Finke 2007)

Primordialist arguments provide a relatively parsimonious answer to the question "Why do religious groups fight one another?" The answer is "Because they are different." This translates into a straightforward and testable hypothesis. *Religious diversity is positively correlated with religious intergroup conflict.* This explanation, however, lacks nuance or useful predictive capability regarding the likelihood of conflict. This is because the question is understood in terms of the answer. If there is conflict between groups, it is because they are different; if groups are different, they are likely to conflict. This is a particularly appealing tautology when explaining religious conflict because it caters to the ideals of religious absolutes. Ongoing intractable conflicts associated with religious identity such as the Israeli-Palestinian, the clashes of the former Yugoslavia, the Sudanese civil war, or the clashes of Northern Ireland are more simply understood as the product of unending identity clashes rather than the current embodiment of a complicated history involving religion, land, economics, and political inequality. Furthermore, simple primordialist arguments do not account for peace and harmony

between religious groups. Religious diversity, with few exceptions, is the state of the modern world, yet every country is not in a state of perpetual religious battle. Religious diversity as a necessary and sufficient cause for antagonism is an argument of convenience rather than a useful explanation.

Most scholars of religion pay little attention to the primordial explanations of cultural conflict, because this simplistic argument fails to identify any specific contexts that may be of critical importance. Current research tends to employ propositions that distinguish between identity and interests. It addresses the socioeconomic and political environments that make it more likely for religious groups to be mobilized for conflict. The importance of fundamental differences between religious groups is acknowledged as a potential factor, but it is by no means assumed to be explanatory.

Religious Intergroup Conflict: A Conflict of Interests

Marxian perspectives argue that socioeconomic competition is of fundamental importance to identity formation, mobilization and social conflict. The explanatory emphasis for social conflict is directly related to issues of material and social inequity. Perhaps the most familiar explanation references socioeconomic inequality and perceptions of relative deprivation. This approach to mobilization argues that collective religious identity and, subsequently, religiously-motivated conflicts are epiphenomenal symptoms of socioeconomic enmity between groups (Kunovich and Hodson 1999). Cultural identities are strategically activated and maintained for the pursuit of material, political and social resources (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003; Lynch 2009; Seul 1999). This *instrumentalist* orientation to collective identity suggests

that religious identity is only one of many potential identities that can be mobilized for action and conflict.

Gurr (1994) proposes a direct link between deprivation and ethno political conflict in which religious identification is considered, but it is not a central component to the analysis. The central argument is that sociopolitical and economic discrimination against ethnoreligious minorities foments grievance and conflict. This has served as the model for research showing a similar case examining religious groups explicitly (Fox 1999). Unsurprisingly, the research suggests that institutionalized discrimination against religious minorities increases ethno religious grievance formation and conflict. Employing a decidedly less structural and more social psychological approach Klandermans (1997) articulates a similar argument.

Proponents of realist conflict theory argue that intergroup conflict will emerge when the need to obtain scarce resources leads to competition (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Bonacich (1972) stresses the role of economic competition in the development of ethnic antagonisms and conflict using a "split labor market" approach in her research. She suggests that ethnic intergroup conflicts are more prevalent in nations where ethnic groups are in direct, and often unequal, competition for economic and socio-political resources—specifically, employment opportunities. Ethno-religious identity serves as a salient identifier of class and a group's status in the socioeconomic hierarchy. The conflicts that emerge between differing ethnicities are further examples of the ongoing class conflict that classic Marxian theorists would predict (Dahrendorf 1959). Practices and policies that support unequal competition between religious groups increase intergroup conflict. Olzak (1992) identifies competition as the central motivator of ethnic and racial mobilization in U.S. cities. However, Olzak predicts a very different outcome. Social discrimination and economic isolation *decreases* instances of conflict, because groups are

effectively kept apart. Economic desegregation, or *niche overlap*, brings different identity groups into contact with one another and encourages competition for similar resources. Where resources are most scarce, racial and ethnic conflict are more frequent. This argument is later expanded into cross-national study examining the influence of globalization forces on racial and ethnic conflict with similar conclusions (2006). Competition for resources—material and social—fuels intergroup conflict. This argument is startling in its assertion that reducing ethnic occupational discrimination increases instances of ethnic social conflict. Ethnicity is a deeply entrenched individual and collective identity boundary: a characteristic it shares with religion. This leads to the following hypothesis: *religious discrimination is negatively associated with religious intergroup conflict.*

Ethnic mobilization and conflict emergence is largely contingent upon the intensity of competition, but the impacts upon intergroup conflict are quite different. What these competition approaches share is the conviction that identity is not a sufficient cause for conflict. Social identity boundaries are more likely to become contentious fault lines when they influence access to resources. These are testable proposition, and are examined in this chapter; however, materialistic motivation as the major motivator for religious intergroup conflict is a problematic proposition. First, it ignores the idea that religion matters. It is the exact opposite problem posed by primordialist assertions. While primordialist explanations assume religious identity is at the center of religious conflict, instrumentalist perspectives consider it to be an outcome: religious identity is the product of conflict but not a causal factor. Further, there is not enough focus on the religion-specific resources over which religious groups compete.

Religious Intergroup Conflict: A Conflict of Identity AND Interests

The religious economy perspective focuses on religious competition for human resources (Stark and Finke 2000). Proponents of this paradigm emphasize variations in the regulatory environment in which religious organizations function. This line of reasoning suggests that religious pluralism and involvement increases when organizational competition is less regulated. Recent research has harnessed the logic of the religious economies paradigm in an effort to illustrate how religious competition and the regulatory environment influences contention between religious groups and contributes to religious conflict. This line of research places much less focus on economic motivations, and emphasizes the tactics available to religious actors as they compete with one another for adherents, sociopolitical influence, and cultural dominance. This approach provides a conceptual bridge linking identity-based competition to material-based competition. This is based on the understanding of religion as a voluntary and consumable product. Religious organizations create and market a worldview that is not only better than the alternatives, but is the only correct choice. This is a central premise of primordialist assertions. Material realities for institutional growth—places for worship and religious activities are not often free—makes competition for adherents also a competition for the resources that they bring. Spiritual competitors are also economic competitors, and, as has been discussed, competition leads to conflict. In short, religious conflict and violence is viewed as an outcome of religious competition. Religious economy perspectives explain conflict through the lens of competition.

Empirical tests of this proposition examine the effects of religion-specific discrimination and its counterpart, religious freedom. Finke and Harris (2012) show that religious conflict is more likely, intense, and widespread in nations where religious groups are denied economic and political opportunities. Additionally, Grim and Finke (2011) show that persecution is decreased

when there is greater religious freedom. The source of religious violence and persecution is not specified in the previous studies. This is a conceptual weakness in the literature on religious conflict as the intensity and scope of any conflict is dependent upon the target and initiator.

Religion and Contact Theory

The Marxian roots of competition models assume contact between groups lead to inevitable conflict as groups vie for resources. Indeed, Sherif (1966) argues that intergroup contact in a state of competition may actually enhance intergroup animosity. Intergroup tension is an inevitable condition of social life and emphasis tends to be on the determinants of conflict. Another way to understand the emergence and escalation of religious intergroup conflict events is to examine the factors that reduce contention between groups. Allport's intergroup contact hypothesis, offers situational prerequisites that are necessary for reducing prejudice and tension between groups. Allport argues that intergroup prejudice is reduced when groups have equal status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and support from authorities (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). A meta-analysis of the empirical literature testing these situations suggests that these conditions in various combinations are effective in reducing prejudice and conflict but not always necessary. Instead, the reduction of intergroup tensions is attributed to a process in which anxiety and threats are reduced via contact (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).

This social psychological perspective highlights the cognitive aspects of conflict, but research has also suggested that institutional support is especially important influence on intergroup dynamics. While the state is not an active participant in religious intergroup conflict events, it does provide a context in which these events occur. State actors possess societal legitimacy and abundant resources that alter targets' and initiators' propensity and capacity to

act. Democratic institutions are likely to reduce conflict between groups by providing equal access to power and protecting individual rights. Therefore, *democracy will be negatively associated with religious intergroup conflict.* Democracy may also increase conflict by placing identity groups into a state of competition for political influence (Mann 2005; Sherif 1966). A competing hypothesis emerges suggesting *democracy will be positively associated with religious intergroup conflict.*

While democracy and political liberalism may influence the likelihood and intensity of RIC events, religion-specific policies are of even greater significance. Religious groups poised to benefit from state discriminatory policies may be more likely to be emboldened by their position of privilege and engage in more forceful competitive tactics. On the other hand, religious groups being discriminated against by the state may correctly feel denied access to the formal mechanisms of government in redressing religious grievances and may be more inclined to engage in more forceful measures of their own (Fox 2000). Discriminatory policy and behavior serves as the environmental context in which religious intergroup conflict occurs. This research will test the hypothesis that *religious discrimination is positively associated with religious intergroup conflict*. Conversely, the state also has the potential to indirectly affect religious intergroup conflict through its enforcement of religious freedom and equality. As proponents of the intergroup contact hypothesis assert, institutional support for positive contact and existence may reduce tensions. Religious freedom policies reduce religious intergroup conflict by providing official support for equal status and protection under the law. It follows that *policies ensuring the freedom of religion will be negatively associated with religious intergroup conflict.*

Empirical investigations attempting to identify the central cause for conflict have reached varied conclusions and testable propositions. Many continue to argue that religious conflict is an

inevitable product of modern life. Absolutist perspectives and ideals are bound to cause intergroup strife. Wherever different groups meet, they will eventually engage in contentious behavior, and, logically, the more groups that meet, the more contentious activity. Here, I test the hypothesis that religious diversity is positively associated with religious intergroup conflict.

I also empirically test arguments asserting that religious conflict is only one indicator of deeper structural inequalities. Socioeconomic inequalities influence religious intergroup conflict as groups compete for resources but through differing mechanisms. Arguments asserting a positive relationship suggest that the struggle between religious groups is not for ideological dominance, but for economic and political supremacy. Hindering religious groups' ability to compete for or maintain economic and social power increases conflict; religious intergroup conflict is a response to grievances. Ecological arguments have also shown that socioeconomic isolation through discrimination can result in protected economic niches for identity groups. Conflict and mobilization occurs when groups are brought into direct competition with one another (Olzak 1992, 2006). Thus, I examine whether policies and practices encouraging discrimination based on religion are positively or negatively associated with religious intergroup conflict.

Data and Methods

Dependent Variables

The country is unit of analysis for this investigation. Religious intergroup conflict for each country is indicated using the religious intergroup conflict (RIC) score. It is a measure that combines frequency of events and intensity into a single quantifiable measure. The RIC score is a cumulative score of the number of conflict events reported in the 2008 International Religious

Freedom Reports and the tactics utilized by the parties involved. An RIC event is defined as a *contentious confrontation between two or more groups of non-state actors that is religious in character*. An event is characterized as being religious in character when the actors involved are identified by religious affiliation or practice in the 2008 International Religious Freedom Reports. Past research focuses primarily on the presence and magnitude of religiously-motivated violence (Finke and Harris 2012; Grim and Finke 2011), but the RIC score includes non-violent events as well. An RIC event can range from relatively hostile rhetorical exchanges to violent conflicts between religious sects approaching civil war and genocide. Coders recorded all tactics utilized in each reported event using the categories discussed and presented in Chapter 2. To construct the RIC score, each event was assigned a value ranging from 1 to 5 based on the most intense conflict tactic reported. Intensity is judged by the presence and use of violence in reported contention. Events comprised of non-violent contention tactics receive lower scores, property damage rates a higher score, and physical and fatal attacks receive the highest scores. Table 4.1 presents the tactics values assigned to RIC events. .

Table 4.1. Tactics Values for Religious Intergroup Conflict Events

Score	*Code*	*Tactics Utilized*
0	No events reported	No events reported
1	Hostile Rhetoric	Rhetoric/Statements/Preaching Distribution of printed material Audio/visual distribution of information
2	Organized Opposition	Legal filings or complaints Protest events and demonstrations
3	Property Damage	Vandalism and/or graffiti Invasion, search, and/or confiscation of property Damage/Destruction of religious, public, or private property
4	Physical Force/Violence	Detention of persons Forced relocation Beatings or Torture
5	Lethal Tactics	One or more individual killed Killing numerous individuals Genocide or widespread massacre

N=647 RIC Events

A total of 647 discrete events were reported and coded for sixty eight (58.6%) of 116 countries in the sample. The RIC score is representative of the sum of event tactic scores and ranges from zero to 414. Reliability between coders was high with an average interrater reliability of 80%. The distribution of RIC scores is positively skewed (Skewness = 5.62), therefore, the natural log of the sum was then calculated to adjust the distribution towards normality. The final product is used to represent religious intergroup conflict for each country.

The RIC score offers substantive and methodological advantages. First, it provides a comprehensive measure of the tactics utilized in religious conflicts perpetrated by non-state actors. Previous analyses and datasets examining religious conflict often do not distinguish

between various manifestations of conflict that do and do not involve state actors (see Minorities at Risk dataset and Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action). The IRC score, by contrast, is derived solely from religiously motivated conflicts in which the government is explicitly absent. This allows for an examination of group conflicts that are uninfluenced by the physical and social resources associated with government organization. Moreover, the RIC score serves as an efficient measure of both the magnitude and the number of reported events within a country.

Table 4.2. Religious Intergroup Conflict Tactics Intensity

Score	*Most Intense Tactic*	*Freq (%)*
0	No events reported	47 (40.5%)
1	Hostile Rhetoric	5 (4.3%)
2	Organized Non-Violent Opposition	3 (2.6%)
3	Property Damage	11 (9.5%)
4	Physical Violence/Force	36 (31.0%)
5	Lethal Force	14 (12.1%)
	Total Countries	116 (100%)

Predictor Variables

Religious diversity is measured utilizing the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market concentration. It has been used widely as a measure of religious pluralism and competition, in studies testing the propositions of the religious economy model of religious participation (Finke and Stark, 1988; Finke, 1990; Finke and Stark 2005) and abroad (Iannaccone, 1991). The Herfindahl Index is calculated by taking the sum of the squared market shares—in this case, the

percentage of individuals affiliated with a specific religious denomination. The result is a measure ranging between zero and one. Scores closer to zero indicate a large number of religious groups with very small populations, while scores closer to one indicate increasing religious monopoly. Higher scores are also generally associated with less competition. *Religious diversity* is utilized to test primordialist predictions of religious conflict.

Religious discrimination indicates the extent to which discriminatory practices are present in the nation. The measure is taken from the IRF dataset and asks "Are allegations reported of discrimination in education, housing, and/or employment based on religion?" Response categories are "No," "Some discrimination," "Widespread discrimination," and "A caste-like system." Scores range from 0 to 3 with higher scores indicating greater discrimination. This serves as an indirect measure of economic competition between religious groups. Competing hypotheses suggest that this measure may be positively or negatively associated with religious intergroup conflict scores. Grievances attributed to discrimination may increase religious intergroup conflict, or caste-like isolation may reduce contention by keeping groups competing with one another.

Religious Freedom is indicated by a measure taken from the IRF data. The question asks, "Does this section of the Report specifically mention that government policy contributes to the generally free practice of religious?" Possible answers are "Yes," "Yes, but exceptions are mentioned" and "No." Higher scores indicate less protection for religious freedom and are hypothesized to be positively associated with religious repression.

The presence or absence of democratic institutions has a long history in the study of social conflicts, and previous research has shown that restricted access to government power increases the intensity and frequency of conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In this analysis,

democracy is indicated by the "polity score" provided in the Polity IV dataset. This measure ranges from -10 to 10, and scores every country according to its level of institutional democracy. Total democracies receive a score of 10 and absolute autocracies receive a score of -10.

Population indicates the approximate population for each nation in 2008. To correct for skewness, the natural log of the population is taken for each nation in the analysis. The logged population measure ranges from 13.22 to 20.99. This control variable is included to account for influences in conflict attributed to the fact that there are simply more people to conflict in larger countries.

Population density controls for the number of people per square kilometer of land. Contention is more likely to occur in more densely populated nations. Scores range from 0.99 to 8.88. This control variable is included in the analysis to account for the proximity of people to one another and possible influences this may have on the RIC score.

Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev
Dependent					
Religious Intergroup Coflict Score	116	0	414	17.77	45.36
Predictors					
Democracy	113	-10	10	4.23	6.77
Religious Diversity	114	0	1	0.31	0.21
Religious Discrimination	116	0	3	0.63	0.79
Religious Freedom Policy	116	0	2	0.71	0.88
Controls					
Population (logged)	116	13.22	20.99	16.31	1.51
Population density (logged)	114	0.99	8.8	4.25	1.27
Valid N (listwise)	108				

Analytical Strategy

The analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS 19 and Stata 11.1 statistical software packages. To test the impact of macro-level structures on religious repression I utilized a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression model and include 116 non-African nations with populations over 500,000 in 2008. After Listwise deletion due to missing information, the valid number of countries in the analysis is 108.

The selection of the ZINB technique is based on theoretical assumptions of religious intergroup conflict and empirical observations of the RIC score. No amount of modeling could ever capture all influential characteristics of a country that may impact religious intergroup conflict, but this should not limit the search for patterns. ZINB regression analysis allows for unexplained heterogeneity between units that can be attributed to contingency and provides more efficient estimates than a Poisson model. Moreover, the distribution of the dependent variable illustrates that the percentage of zero scores is higher than would be assumed in a standard Poisson or negative binomial distribution—approximately 40.5% of cases. To be certain, a Vuong closeness statistic (Vuong 1989; Greene 1994; Long 1997) is reported for each model to assess the appropriateness of the ZINB compared to a standard negative-binomial regression.

The results of the ZINB regression analyses are presented below in Table 4.4. The coefficients presented illustrate two distinct relationships between predictors and the RIC score. Coefficients in the section labeled "Neg. Binomial" are interpreted in a similar fashion to OLS coefficients and show to what extent predictors influence the magnitude (frequency x intensity) of religious intergroup conflict indicated by the RIC score. The section labeled "Zero-Inflated" shows the likelihood of predicting an RIC score of 0 "No reported events." A negative coefficient means that an increase in the predictor reduces the likelihood of no religious conflict.

This technique allows for a more accurate examination of predictor variables on different aspects of the dependent variable. Factors that are likely to have an impact on the likely presence of religious intergroup conflict in a country may have no effect on how intense conflicts become. Similarly, structural characteristics that make conflicts more frequent or more violent may only be relevant after conflict has already been initiated. By examining the RIC score using this technique I can simultaneously explore both relationships.

Results

Table 4.4 shows the results of the ZINB regression analysis of factors impacting the religious intergroup conflict score. The table is displayed in two parts: the zero-inflated portion and the negative binomial portion. Coefficients in each portion of the table represent specific relationships between variables. The coefficients in the zero-inflated portion of the table represent the likelihood of prediction a score of "0." In this analysis, zero indicates that no religious conflict events are reported. Therefore, a negative score means there is a reduced likelihood of no events reported. The coefficients reported are exponentiated betas. The negative binomial coefficient measures the extent to which the magnitude (frequency multiplied by intensity) of conflict is influenced by the predictors and coefficients are interpreted as they are in OLS regression. Thus, the table illustrates which predictors are likely to influence the presence of religious intergroup conflict as well as the intensity of reported events in each country.

The hypothesized positive association between religious intergroup conflict and religious diversity is not supported. Diversity, measured using the Herfindahl Index, is not significantly associated with the presence (zero-inflated coefficient) or magnitude (negative binomial coefficient) of reported religious conflicts. This analysis does not support predictions suggesting

that there are inherent, primordial differences affiliated with religious group identification that lead, inevitably, to intergroup conflict (Huntington 1996; Wellman and Tokuno 2006).

The evidence suggesting that there is a significant relationship between democracy and religious intergroup conflict is mixed. Model 4 in Table 4.4 shows that an increase in a country's democracy score is associated with an increased likelihood of reported religious intergroup conflict (-0.306). Therefore, countries with a higher democracy score are positively correlated with reports of religious intergroup conflict. Competing explanations for the positive relationship between democracy and conflict would argue that democracy increases conflict by providing motives/need for competition for political power. Compared to an autocratic regime, where power and interests are concentrated and relatively fixed, democracy provide the political opportunity for power transfers which can then develop into non-institutionalized, non-routinized forms of conflict. Democracy, however, has no relationship on the magnitude of religious intergroup conflict. It may also be a simpler explanation. The RIC score operationalization includes non-violent acts as well as violent. In democracies, people may be freer to engage in non-violent contention unhindered by the state.

Religious discrimination is hypothesized to be positively associated with religious intergroup conflict. This hypothesis is supported by the data. When religious identity is the source of material deprivation such as education, economic and living opportunities the likelihood of RIC is increased (-1.148) as is the magnitude (0.472). This suggests that though religion is argued to be a distinct social grouping characteristic rooted in perceptions of the divine and supernatural, it is still greatly influenced by the more worldly motivators that cause groups to rally around other identities. Perhaps, when religious identity takes on the character of class distinctions we should expect religiously identified groups to act like an economic class.

The hypothesis that religious freedom is negatively associated with religious intergroup conflict is partially supported in this analysis. The absence of government policies protecting religious freedom is significantly related to the likelihood of reported religious conflict (-1.247). This can be an indication of the effect of unequal support by the state producing negative social contact and more religious intergroup conflicts. The presence or absence of policy protections appears to have no significant relationship with the magnitude of religious intergroup conflict.

Table 4.4. ZINB Regression on Religious Intergroup Conflict

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Neg. Binomial				
Democracy	--	.026	--	.053
Religious Diversity	--	--	1.076	.951
Religious Discrimination	--	--	--	.472 *
Religious Freedom Policy	--	--	--	.245
Population (logged)	.390 ***	.420 ***	.417 ***	.288 **
Population Density (logged)	.282 **	.26 *	.276 *	.182
Constant	-4.620 **	-5.296 ***	-5.373 ***	-3.797 *
Zero-Inflated				
Democracy	--	-.143 ***	--	-.306 ***
Religious Diversity	--	--	.892	.746
Religious Discrimination	--	--	--	-1.148 *
Religious Freedom Policy	--	--	--	-1.247 *
Population (logged)	-.286	-.413 *	-.271	-.231
Population Density (logged)	.008	.038	-.000	5.350
Constant	4.029	6.600 *		
Model 1: Vuong z=2.42, Pr > z=.007				
Model 2: Vuong z=3.15, Pr > z=.000				
Model 3: Vuong z=2.27, Pr > z=.012				
Model 4: Vuong z=3.53, Pr > z=.000				
N=112				

Discussion

The absolutism attributed to religious perspectives is often stated to be a central motivator for religious conflict, and arguments asserting the inevitability of religious clashes are compelling. However, to state that religious groups will fight simply because they are distinct from one another is inadequate. Even Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis is, at root, a standard *realpolitik* approach to international relations: the primary distinction is the importance of religion as a salient, transnational grouping mechanism. The analysis shows that religious diversity in the population does not significantly increase the presence or the intensity of religious intergroup conflict. Pluralism is not a sufficient cause for religious contention. Religious difference may be a necessary component to conflict, but it is not sufficient.

The likelihood and scope of religious intergroup conflict is a function of the sociopolitical environment in which religious groups interact. Arguments emphasizing competition between identity groups as the primary motivator conflict provide a much more useful set of explanatory mechanisms explaining the empirical results. Moreover, religion-specific policies upheld by the state are of particular importance. The association between measures of religious freedom policy and practice and religious intergroup conflict used in this analysis suggest that religious intergroup conflict is better predicted by understanding the contexts in which religiously diverse groups are competing with one another for human, sociopolitical, and economic resources. Countries with policies and practices that promote specific religious factions while socially, politically, and economically isolating others are more likely to have clashes between religious groups. However, protecting religious freedom does not have a similar reduction in the intensity or magnitude of conflict events. The evidence suggests that once legal barriers to conflict have been crossed, they are no longer considerations to

initiators of conflict. It also suggests that as a positive orientation towards religious freedom and diversity by authorities may result in more positive contact between religious groups reducing the likelihood of RIC events.

Measures of religiously-motivated discrimination, on the other hand, are associated with increases in both the likelihood and intensity of conflict events. Unlike religious freedom policy, measures of religious discrimination are based on actions taken and are much more likely to garner direct responses. It does not appear to be the case that increased access to employment, education, and housing is increasing competition-driven conflict; rather, it is the opposite. Religious discrimination increases antagonisms toward other religious groups.

This analysis is revealing in its outcomes, however, it is not without limitations. A longitudinal analysis of the context in which religious groups operate would provide much stronger evidence regarding the impact of competition. The cross-sectional design used here does not account for changing dynamics that are central to ecological theories of intergroup competition and contention; however, it does allow for a comparison of religious contextual differences that expands upon the current research.

CHAPTER 5

Correlates of Religious Conflict Manifestation

Religious conflict emergence and escalation is linked to structural factors that protect or restrict religious liberty (Finke and Harris 2012; Fox 2006, 2008; Grim and Finke 2011); however, the literature has paid little attention to the characteristics of conflict events themselves, and this chapter addresses this limitation. This chapter conceptualizes religious conflict manifestation as the product of rational, tactical choices based on the political and cultural environment. This emphasis on choice and form of conflict expands upon research exploring the relationship between religious freedom and conflict. The unit of analysis for this inquiry is the country, and the primary outcome of interest is the most prevalent reported religious conflict within a country. The most common form of religious conflict in a country is argued to be symptomatic of the interaction between religion and sources of religious restriction and the rational assessment of collective actors. The current study uses the structural political opportunity framework developed largely in social movement literature to conduct an empirical analysis using the Religious Conflict Event and International Religious Freedom Report datasets.

A Conceptualization of Religious Conflict

Religious conflict as a specific form of collective action provides a conceptually and operationally useful orientation for analysis. Collective action is defined as "emergent and minimally coordinated action by two or more people that are motivated by a desire to change some aspect of social life or to resist changes proposed by others" (McAdam 2007:xx). This comprehensive definition covers a broad range of activities from relatively impromptu protest activities to organized social movements to formal institutional pursuits. Moreover, by not

specifying the initiator or target of collective action it suitably accounts for the conceptual distinctions that distinguish the religious conflict types. Collective action can be violent or non-violent. It can be highly organized and strategic or chaotic and unpredictable. It can involve as few as two individuals in contention or full-scale civil war.

This inclusivity is useful, but potentially problematic. Contentious behavior involving different goals, participants and levels of organization may be incomparable. Consequently, research tends to focus on one type of conflict at a time. Scholars examine repression, protest, or intergroup conflict only. A similar argument could be made of the religious conflict events. Perhaps, religious repression, insurgency, and intergroup conflict are too different to be examined as comparable conflict manifestations. Charles Tilly addresses this matter early in his work on the politics of collective violence in which he states

> Collective violence resembles weather: complicated, changing, and unpredictable in some regards, yet resulting from similar causes variously combined in different times and places. Getting the causes, combination, and settings right help explains collect violence in its many variations (2003:4).

Collective violence, Tilly argues, is a product of uncertainty surrounding interaction between distinct identity groups. More importantly, he attributes much of that uncertainty to institutional power imbalances, real and perceived. Collective violence is a product of choices that are not made in sociopolitical vacuum, and is associated with variations in the context in which it occurs. Regimes vary in tolerance towards forms of claims-making, discriminate against differing groups, and have differing influential capacities, but Tilly argues that the underlying cause, uncertainty, drives these outcomes.

Tilly's historical analysis of collective violence provides a useful framework for examining religious conflict. The causes and consequences of religious conflict are complicated

and, possibly unpredictable, but as Tilly argues they are likely to share some central links to sociopolitical contexts resulting in predictable outcomes. The choice of target and contentious tactics available to religious actors vary, and identifying the religion-specific political and cultural context may help understand religious conflict in its many variations.

Collective action is influenced by opportunities and resources available to movement actors. Multiple components of the larger sociopolitical structure impact the emergence, strategies, and location of political protest (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1996; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Kriesi 2008). National policies and practices provide the impetus for collective action through differing mechanisms, and examining variations in the formal rules of political institutions is the central characteristic of structural analyses of political opportunity.

Empirical evidence suggests that formal and informal restrictions placed upon religious groups have been shown to increase conflict across cultural, economic, and geographic circumstances. It is argued that restrictions produce grievances that increase the likelihood of violent conflict. The research follows much of the logic of deprivation theory (Gurr 1970) and shows that religious-motivated discrimination motivates religious communities for contention and violence (Finke and Harris 2012; Fox 2000; Grim and Finke 2011).

Political Opportunities and Religious Opportunities

Social movement scholars place strong emphasis on the importance of the political environment in understanding and predicting collective action (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978; 2003; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2008). Tarrow refers to the structure of political opportunities as the "consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentive for people to

undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (1994:85). Actors are assumed to be rational and will mobilize for action after a cost/benefit analysis regarding the likelihood of success. Collective action, then, can be enhanced or stymied by institutional contexts real or imagined.

Restricting opportunities for political or social participation and treating particular groups unequally encourages the development of oppositional identities and grievances (Meyer 2002, Seul 1999). This aligns with more traditional grievance and deprivation theories of collective action (Gurr 1970; Piven and Cloward 1977; Buechler 2008). Political opportunities, or the lack thereof, are related to collective action through grievance manipulation. Others assume that potential actors are in a constant state of potential mobilization and base collective action on the perception of emergent political opportunities (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Collective action is not a matter of increased grievance, which is assumed to be constant; rather, it is the product of an assessment of the strength of the ruling polity.

Early political opportunity analyses emphasize positive cues for collective action mobilization; however, recent work has developed threat-based conceptualizations that highlight the negative cues that insinuate that failure to collectively act will result in harm to a group or their interests (Almeida 2003). Van Dyke and Soule (2002) expand the conceptualization of political opportunity to include threats introduced by the ruling coalition as opportunities for mobilization in their study of the patriot/militia organizations. They demonstrate how transitions and unfavorable policies signal the need for mobilization among aggrieved populations. Similarly, Van Dyke (2003) demonstrates that political threat fosters cooperation for collective action among student organizations. Threat as a form of political opportunity provides a useful framework for testing the impact of policies and practices that restrict religious freedoms.

Religious regulation represents a distinct threat to religious individuals and organizations—particularly, minority and marginalized groups (Fox 1999). The presence or implementation of threatening religious policies indicated by higher levels of government regulation would lead to increased mobilization and subsequent religious conflict. More importantly, the *source* of threat is likely to be associated with the form conflict takes. Threats to religious groups can emanate from political and cultural foundations necessitating different forms of collective action. When threats to a religious group are perceived to originate from government authorities, they become the target for contentious activity. Protests, petitions, or even attacks on government facilities and representatives are appropriate tactical choices. To alleviate threats originating from non-state actors, religious collective action must identify a suitable target and act against it. This assumes that leaders respond directly to threats, and suggests that *government restrictions and policies are positively associated with religious insurgency events.* Moreover, it also follows that *government restrictions are more strongly associated with insurgency than other forms of conflict.*

Most theoretical and empirical work focuses on defining and analyzing political and economic opportunities. Political orientation toward religious groups affecting religious mobilization and contentions is a fairly direct inquiry; however, threat and opportunity can emerge from outside of the ruling authority structure. Cultural influences tend to be overlooked in the political opportunity literature in favor of political pluralism, elite fragmentation, political access, potential and proclivity for repression, and elite support (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Kriesi 2008). The context affecting collective action is not entirely derived from formal institutions. Cultural realities are equally important.

Rucht (1996) identifies three distinct dimensions that comprise the context structure: political contexts, cultural contexts, and social contexts. Political contexts involve the way in which actors interact with other groups and authorities with specific emphasis on the activity involving the ruling polity. Cultural contexts are based on the attitudes and behaviors of individuals in the broader environment that may contribute to participation in collective action events. Social context refers to the networks in the social environment that facilitate collective identity activation and the construction of movement structures. The cultural and social contexts are the bedrock of religious identity, but few scholars studying religious components of collective action have emphasized elements of all three (McAdam 1982; Smith 1996; Hafez 2004; Wiktorowicz 2004). Finke and Harris (2012) show that government policies and practices that restrict religion are positively correlated with increased religious violence. The relationship, however, is indirect and operates largely through positive correlations with societal restrictions—the restrictions placed on religious profession, practice, or selection by non-state actors—and social movement. Observable hostility and antagonism between religious groups is likely to be perceived as a threat that warrants mobilization and open contention. This suggests two testable hypotheses. First, *discriminatory attitudes and practices by nongovernment actors are positively associated with religious intergroup conflict events.* Second, *the relationship will be stronger than the association with government sources of regulation*.

It is not enough to focus on religious conflict initiated by non-state actors. Government-sponsored religious conflict events constitute nearly half of all reported conflict events. Religious repression has been shown in Chapter 3 to be linked to perceptions of threat and regime instability. This implies that regime weakness is not only recognized by challengers, but by the regime itself. Moreover, the need for increasingly intensive repression tactics is associated with

the greater measures of regime weakness. This represents the other side of the political opportunities coin. If collective action against the state is more likely when actors perceive a higher likelihood of success, then, state action against non-state challengers is more likely when the state perceives itself likely to be defeated. The analysis of Chapter 3 also demonstrates that a regime that does not expressly protect its populace from religious persecution is more likely to engage in repression activity. Repression is closely tied to the religious political structure and *religious repression is most strongly associated with government religious regulation and restrictions.* The social context in which state representatives must act is also of great importance. Being a part of the ruling polity does not eliminate the importance of the ruled. Government actions against unpopular religious may be more tolerated by the society at large. *Social regulations and restrictions are positively associated with religious repression.*

Domestic conflict emergence, duration, and intensity are impacted by the level of democracy of a nation (Fox 2000; Fox and Sandler 2003). Moreover, while not referencing political opportunities specifically, Fox repeatedly shows the ways in which violent religious conflict is impacted by the political environment. This provides an important context for the inherent and unavoidable relationship between religious institutions and the state. The recognition of religion-state interaction has also aided in the adaptation of the market theory of religion to explain the connection of religious to religious violence. Grim and Finke (2007) argue that the protection of religious freedom allows for pluralism which decreases the levels of religious persecution from state and non-state actors alike. More recent work by Grim and Finke (2011) demonstrates the ongoing connection that religious freedom plays in the reduction on violent religious activity.

The current study makes several contributions to the growing literature exploring the interactions of religion, state, and collective action. Multiple statistical techniques are employed to explore the relationship of religion specific policies, state structures, and religious conflict. Unlike other research, this research attempts to demonstrate that not only are conflicts affected in terms of breadth and intensity by the context structure (Grim and Finke 2011; Finke and Harris 2012), but also in form and tactical selection.

The following section describes the data and methods employed in each analysis. A country-level analysis explores the structural determinants of religious conflict form using the most prevalent form of religious conflict reported for each nation as the dependent variable. Multinomial logistic regression analysis is used to provide empirical support for the previously hypothesized relationships. The general hypothesis that restriction and regulation are positively associated with religious conflict has been demonstrated in other research; however, the more specific relationships posited in this analysis are listed below.

H1: Government restrictions are positively associated with religious insurgency.

H2: Government restrictions are positively associated with religious repression.

H3: Government restrictions are most strongly associated with religious insurgency.

H4: Government restrictions are most strongly associated with religious repression.

H5: Social restrictions are positively associated with religious intergroup conflict.

H6: Social restrictions are positively associated with religious repression.

H7: Social restrictions are most strongly associated with religious intergroup conflict.

Data and Methods

The International Religious Freedom Reports (IRFR) and Religious Conflict Events (RCE) datasets are used to explore the relationship between religious restriction practices and religious conflict manifestation. The analysis is restricted to nations with populations over 500,000 and do not include African nations due to insufficient data quality in the IRF report quality concerns.[9] A total of 116 nations and 1524 unique conflict events are coded from the 2008 International Religious Freedom reports and utilized in the following examinations.

Analytical Strategy

This analysis is performed using IBM SPSS 19 and multinomial logistic regression (MLR) analysis. Multinomial logistic regression is an extension of binary regression analysis that allows for more than two categories in the dependent variable. The logistic coefficient is the expected amount of change in the logit for each one unit change in the predictor. This statistical technique predicts the probability of each category compares to the reference category: in this case, "0" No reported conflict events. MLR assumes that the outcome variables are independent of one another and that no independent predicts outcomes perfectly. It does not assume normality, linearity, or homoscedasticity (Aldrich and Nelson 1984; Schwab 2002; Starkweather and Moskeis 2011). The dependent variable of this analysis, *modal conflict category*, is such a variable.

[9] North African nations of Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco are included in the analysis. However, due to lack of national data, Iran and Afghanistan are omitted.

Dependent Variable

Religious conflict manifestation is a product of tactical choices that are part of a culturally attuned repertoire of contention (Tilly 1978). Tarrow (1998) argues that "[t]he learned conventions of contention are part of a society's public culture" (p.20), and "this is what best explains the predominance of conventional forms over all others" (p.98). It follows that religious conflict is likely expressed in one particular form more than others. This is not to say, however, that multiple forms of religious conflict are not occurring simultaneously; the modal category is simply the focus of this analysis. The dependent variable is modal conflict category (*MCC*). *MCC* is a nominal variable ranging from 0 to 3. Each value indicates the modal category of religious conflict reported in each country (1 = "religious repression," 2 = "religious insurgency," 3 = religious intergroup conflict"). Countries with no reported events are assigned a score of "0" and serve as the reference category for the MLR analysis. Thus, all coefficients in the analysis will be predicting the probability of a specific form of religious conflict compared to "No reports."

Independent Variables

Religion-specific political opportunities and contexts are measured with the regulation indexes developed from the IRF data. The government regulation index (*GRI*) is a continuous measure of the restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by the official laws, policies, or administrative actions of the state. Six items are included in the index that measure nation-level strategies to restrict religious activity through executive and legislative behavior. *GRI* is not a measure of action against religious groups. Therefore, it is an appropriate measure of the institutionalized structure that influences religious collective action that is

instigated by government representatives. *GRI* ranges from 0 to 10. Higher values indicate more state-led restrictions and regulations.

Government actors do not represent all environmental factors that can influence real and perceived structure of political opportunity. Collective action is likely influenced by what Rucht (1996) refers to as the social contexts as well. Social context is measured utilizing the modified social regulation index (*SRI*). It is measured utilizing five items that capture the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of the culture-at-large—non-state actors with influence—that promote or restrict religious freedom. SRI ranges from 0 to 10. Higher values indicate higher levels of societal restrictions.[10]

Religious discrimination indicates the degree to which religious discrimination occurs in a country. Unlike GRI and SRI, the discrimination variable is a direct measure of religiously-motivated actions taken against religious groups in routine situations. The measure does not distinguish between the initiator of religious conflict, but it does indicate the extent to which socioeconomic inequality and discrimination is present in the society. The measure asks "Are allegations reported of discrimination in education, housing, and/or employment based on religion?" Response categories are coded on a four-point scale (0= "No discrimination," 1 = "Some discrimination," 3 = "Widespread discrimination," 4 = "Caste-like system").

Control Variables

This multivariate analysis employs several controls for country characteristics. *Population* is taken from the 2008 IRF Reports and ranges from 552,000 (Solomon Islands) to 1,300,000,000 (China). The population variable is positively skewed (skew= 6.865) which is

[10] See Appendix A for a list of items included in each indexes

problematic for statistical analysis. The natural log of population values has been computed and is utilized in this analysis to reduce this problem. *Area* is measured as the geographic land area under control of the national government. It is measured in square miles and ranges from 231 (Bahrain) to 6,592,769 square miles (Russia). Area values are positively skewed (skewness = 4.85), and the natural log is computed and utilized in this analysis. Both *population* and *area* serve as controls for the "size" of the country. The average income of the population is measured using the per capital gross national income (*Income*) for each nation. Marxian and deprivation theories of collective action often attribute collective action to economic factors such as poverty and inequality (Gurr 1970; Piven and Cloward 1977); therefore, it is controlled for in the analysis.

Political opportunities are a central explanatory mechanism for religious conflict, and previous research in the social movement literature has demonstrated that collective action is related to political openness (Eisinger 1973, Tilly 1978, Meyer 2004). To control for the broader sociopolitical environment in which religious conflict occurs and to be able to demonstrate that religion specific policies have religion-specific outcomes, an overall measure of regime characteristics is utilized as a control (*Democracy*). The democracy measure is taken from the Polity IV Regime Characteristics Time-Series dataset. It is the "Polity Score" and provides a quantitative measure of regime authority. Regime authority is conceived as a continuous variable on which nations are located on a spectrum ranging from fully institutionalized autocracies (-10) through mixed authority regimes (-5 to 5) to fully institutionalized democracies (+10). This 21-point continuous measure is included in the analysis in order to examine the impact of variations in political openness. Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistic of the variables utilized in this analysis.

Table 5.1 Decriptive Statistics for Analysis 1 Data

	N	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Modal Conflict	117	0	3	--	
0 None Reported (28.2%)					
1 Repression (17.9%)					
2 Insurgency (3.4%)					
3 Relig. Intgrp Conflict (50.4%)					
GRI	117	0	10	3.32	3.41
SRI	117	0	10	4.72	3.47
Discrimination	117	0	3	0.63	0.78
Logged Population	117	16.3	1.51	13.22	20.99
Logged Area	117	11.15	1.84	5.4	15.7
Democracy	115	4.3	6.72	-10	10
Logged Income	117	8.72	1.36	5.44	15.7
Valid N (listwise)	115				

This analysis is performed using IBM SPSS 19. Cross-tabulation and multinomial logistic regression (MLR) is utilized to test predictor variables on the likelihood of the most prevalent religious conflict. MLR is well-suited for this type of analysis in that it allows for more than two categorical outcomes.

Results

No religious conflict events were reported in 28.2% of countries. Religious intergroup conflict (RIC) is the most prevalent MCC classification representing 50.4% of countries, followed by religious repression (17.9%). The least common religious conflict type is religious insurgency. Four nations (3.4%) have this classification. An analysis of frequencies show that these modal outcomes are not distributed evenly across religious contexts. For this less complex analysis, the government and social regulation indexes have been recoded into three categories representing “Low,” “Moderate” and “High” levels of regulation.

Figure 5.1 provides evidence that government policy that contributes to the generally free practice of religion. Of countries with low levels of government regulation, 36.9% have no reported religious conflict events. No events were reported in 17.6% and 17.1% of moderately and highly regulated countries, respectively. Additionally, repression MCC values are the most prevalent in nations with high levels of government regulation of religion (48.6%). Only 4.6% and 5.9% of low and moderately regulated nations, respectively, report repression as the most common form of religious conflict. Religious insurgency events are rare in the reports, and are only the modal form of conflict in 1.5% of countries with low levels of government regulation and 8.6% of those with high levels. No nation in the moderate category has repression identified as the modal form. Religious intergroup conflict events (RIC) are the most commonly observed form of religious conflict. A majority of countries with low and moderate levels of government regulation are majority RIC—56.9% and 76.5%, respectively. RIC events are the modal form in 25.7% of countries with high levels of government regulation.

Figure 5.1. Modal Conflict Category and GRI Categories



Figure 5.2 illustrates that the social context influences religious conflict type in ways distinct from government regulation. First, the percentage MCC scores indicating religious intergroup conflict as the most reported form increases as the level of social regulation increases. RIC is the modal event type for 25.6% of nations with low SRI scores, 59.1% of nations with moderate SRI scores, and 64.3% for those with high levels of social regulation. Repression is the modal event category for 10.3% of nations with low SRI scores, 13.6% of those with moderate scores, and 25% of those with high scores. Religious insurgency is the most common event type in 2.6% on countries with low SRI scores, 9.1% of those with moderate scores, and 1.8% of those with high scores.

Figure 5.2. Modal Conflict Category and SRI Categories



These figures suggest that contextual factors are associated with the manner in which religious conflict is most likely to appear. More importantly, they show that formal and informal

authorities play an influential role in determining the style of religious conflict. Countries that do not formally protect religious freedom and restrict religious practice are also much more likely to engage in religious repression. Nations with high GRI scores are associated with more religious insurgency. Religious intergroup conflict is the most common form of religious conflict where government restrictions are moderate. It is a much smaller portion of conflict in high GRI countries. Moderate government regulation may provide reason for the aggrieved to engage in contentious activity, but may signal religious groups that benefit from certain regulatory policies that there is some legal leeway for attacking less favored groups. It may also be the case that potential activists recognize one another as more immediate targets when the state is uninvolved.

When societal attitudes and beliefs are more tolerant, religious conflict of all types is lowered. The majority (61.5%) of countries with no reports of religious conflict have low SRI scores. Religious intergroup conflict is most prevalent in nations with higher levels of social regulation as is religious repression. Religious insurgency is most highly represented in nations with moderate societal regulation. This suggests that like government regulation, social regulation of religion increases conflict; however, the most prevalent type of conflict is very different. Formal restrictions increase the prevalence of insurgency and repression, while social regulation are related to increasing levels of religious intergroup conflict. Still, a more rigorous analysis is necessary to examine how regulations are associated with opportunity structures and subsequent religious conflict.

The results of the multivariate logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 5.2. Coefficients are interpreted as they are in binary regression analysis and represent the expected change in the log odds of being in the designated MCC category holding all other variables constant. The reference category for this analysis "0 No events reported." Coefficients greater

than one indicate an increase in the likelihood of the specific MCC designation values lower than one indicate a lowered likelihood, or a negative relationship between predictor and the specific category. The odds ratios of each conflict type are presented in three models; each adds a new set of predictors. Model 1 represents the base model and examines the control variables, income, and the level of democracy in the country. Model 2 includes the religious discrimination measure in the analysis. All predictors are included in Model 3. Most importantly, the measures of social context, Government Regulation of Religion Index (GRI) and Social Regulation of Religion Index (SRI) are added to the model.

The control variables population, country area, and income are not significantly associated with any form of religious conflict. The averaged wealth of the country, *Income,* is also not significantly associated. *Democracy* is negatively related to religious repression and religious intergroup conflict (Exp(B)=0.871). The log odds of an MCC score indicating religious repression are reduced by about 13% for every unit increase in the democracy score. *Democracy* is positively associated with religious intergroup conflict. The log odds of an MCC score indicating RIC increase (Exp(B)=1.139) with each unit increase in democracy. These findings have interesting implications that will be discussed in greater detail in the discussion of these results.

Model 2 adds religious discrimination and shows that is only statistically significant in the odds of a RIC classification. A unit increase in the religious discrimination measure nearly quadruples the log odds of a religious intergroup conflict MPC (Exp(B)=3.71). Religious discrimination has no significant impact on repression and insurgency. The relationship of democracy remains relatively unchanged; democracy is negatively associated with religious repression (Exp(B)=0.89) and positively associated religious intergroup conflict (Exp(B)=1.21).

In model 3, the discrimination measure is no longer statistically related to any type of conflict. None of the control variables for income, country population, or size are significantly related. Only *GRI, SRI,* and *Democracy* are significant predictors of religious conflict. Moreover, they are related to different forms of conflict in distinct ways. *Democracy* is a statistically significant predictor of all three religious conflict types. However, the relationship with repression has changed directions. Where democracy once reduced religious repression, it is now positively associated with the designation. The odds of a religious repression classification are about 1.45 times as likely with each unit increase in *Democracy.* The relationship is also positively associated with religious insurgency (Exp(B)=1.84). This is after being statistically insignificant in previous models. It is also interesting to note that even though the coefficients were insignificant, they were also in the opposite direction. A unit increase in the democracy measure is associated with an increase in the log odds of a country having an religious intergroup conflict MCC designation (Exp(B)=1.78). After introducing government and social regulation to the model, the independent impact of democracy on religious conflict is decidedly positive.

Government regulation of religion (*GRI)* is significantly and positively associated with each form of religious conflict prevalence. A unit increase in the GRI measure more than triples (Exp(B)=3.21) the odds of a repression classification. A unit increase in GRI increases the odds of a religious insurgency classification 5.06 times. The log odds of a religious intergroup conflict classification are more than doubled (Exp(B)=2.31 with every unit increase in the measure of government regulation of religion. These results support the hypothesis that religious conflict is positively associated with all forms of religious conflict. The strength of these relationships varies, however. Government regulation has the greatest impact on predicting religious

insurgency classification, followed by religious repression and has the weakest impact on the odds of a religious intergroup conflict being the most reported form of conflict in the country.

The results suggest that religious restrictions imposed by nongovernment actors have similar, but distinct associations. Unlike *GRI*, the social regulation index (SRI) is not significantly associated with all forms of religious conflict. *SRI* is significantly and positively associated with predicting religious repression and religious intergroup conflict as modal categories but not religious insurgency. A unit increase in SRI increases the odds of a repression and RIC classification by 1.54 and RIC by 1.65 times, respectively. Further, the social restrictions measure is most strongly associated with the RIC classification. The results show support for Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7.

Table 5.2. Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Mode of Religious Conflict[a]

	Model1 Exp(B)	Model 2 Exp(B)	Model 3 Exp(B)
Religious Repression			
Discrimination	--	1.955	.595
GRI	--	--	3.213 ***
SRI	--	--	1.540 **
Democracy	.871 **	.890 *	1.447 **
Income	.759	.713	.728
Logged Population	1.136	1.034	.634
Logged Area	1.235	1.296	1.321
Religious Insurgency			
Discrimination	--	3.679	1.199
GRI	--	--	5.062 **
SRI	--	--	1.019
Democracy	.918	.959	1.839 **
Income	1.050	1.069	1.386
Logged Population	.660	.531	.417
Logged Area	2.106 +	2.139 +	2.077 a
Religious Intergoup Conflict			
Discrimination	--	3.705 **	1.243
GRI	--	--	2.311 **
SRI	--	--	1.655 ***
Democracy	1.139 **	1.207 **	1.780 ***
Income	1.064	.930	.842
Logged Population	1.510 +	1.314	.951
Logged Area	1.097	1.120	1.194

N=115 + p < 0.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, **p<.001

[a] Reference Category is *No Events Reported*

Conclusions

This chapter builds upon previous research showing that religious contentious activity is linked to societal contexts; however, the link between context and conflict form is less understood. The current study shows that the most common manifestation of religious conflict is influenced by restrictions imposed upon the religious population. Religious restrictions of all

types generally increase the likelihood that a country will have reported religious conflict, but this study demonstrates that the source of those restrictions is an important determinant as well. The relationship between religious restriction and conflict is not uniform.

The political opportunity perspective provides a useful framework for understanding religious conflict type. Religious conflict is associated with political structures in a broad sense. Countries with more robust democratic institutions are more likely to report religious conflict of all types. However, rather than decreasing religious conflict, it appears that more robust democratic institutions increase the likelihood of all forms. The effect is particularly profound when predicting religious insurgency. One explanation for this finding is that more open political institutions, indicated by higher democracy scores, are more likely to promote competition between identity groups. Mann suggests just such an effect in his explanation of ethnic cleansing and genocide (2005). The propensity for more autocratic nations to repress perceived threats (see Chapter 3) dampens the likelihood of conflict emergence. This association may be indicative of larger societal fractionalization and tolerance for diversity that is characteristic of democratic institutions. If this is indeed the case, more democratic regimes may provide more channels for religiously motivate contention and the airing of grievances against a variety of targets. The democracy relationship may also be a product of the operationalization of religious conflict. As religious conflict in this analysis includes institutional as well as extra-institutional events what may be captured is a greater tolerance for non-violent, tolerable religious conflict in democratic regimes.

The impact of state and social restrictions on collective action operate in ways consistent with political opportunities literature suggests; however, in some instances they are also consistent with a more grievance-based approach like those proposed by Gurr (1970) and Fox

(2000). This is a particularly promising mode of explanation regarding insurgency. Restrictions and regulations originating with the state make the state a legitimate target of religious contention. A lack of government safeguards for religious freedom is associated with more religious repression events and may also signal the rest of society that collective actions against other groups will be tolerated if not outright encouraged. In other words, a government that restricts religious freedom may be perceived as a green light for collective action between non-state actors.

Perhaps the most interesting finding is the variety of associations between social regulation and religious conflict. Social contexts that support restrictions on some or all religious groups may foment collective action by signaling society's willingness to accept conflictive and confrontational behaviors. Social networks and support systems that support intolerance is the cultural context necessary to fuel actions that target religiously dissimilar groups. It is also likely that societal restrictions and government restrictions are mutually reinforcing which explains the positive association with repression. The lack of a significant relationship between religious insurgency and social regulation suggests that religious collective action is conscientiously targeted. While social contexts may encourage conflict between non-state actors, it does not encourage making that state or state actors a target of religious collective action.

This analysis makes clear the argument that national social and regulatory policies impact collective action mobilization form and tactics. The findings are consistent with much of the research on collective action, protest, and social movement tactics while also revealing some important nuances and understandings on how religious contentious action is manifested.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusions

Summary of Findings

Whether it is serving as a force for peace or encouraging violent conflict, religion proves to be a central agent for collective action in need of more rigorous empirical study. This study builds upon previous work suggesting religious conflict is linked to sociopolitical configurations that restrict religious freedom and promote inequality between religious communities. More importantly, it demonstrates that religious conflict is a multidimensional social phenomenon, and religious conflict events are characterized by a variety of distinct contentious behaviors that can be understood as products of rational considerations made by collective actors. It is clear that all conflict events are not equal and should not be examined as if they are. The events analyzed all have religious components, but the initiator and target of contention is a critical distinguishing characteristic that differentiates religious repression, religious insurgency, and religious intergroup conflict. This variation necessitates differing explanations to understand the likely form and scope of religious conflict events.

A central objective of this research is to introduce and analyze a new source of data that addresses the conceptual and operational weaknesses of previous research. Most recent research on religious conflict tends to either conflict religious conflict into a single outcome making no clear distinction between actors and targets, or focuses on only a single type of religious conflict in which the actors and targets are implied (Fox 2000a; 2000b; Grim and Finke 2011). This has resulted in data that is useful but limited in terms explanatory scope. The two most prominent and comprehensive data collection endeavors, the Association of Religion Data Archives' International Religious Freedom Reports (IRFR) dataset and Religion and State Project, have

produced a tremendous amount of data on the interaction of religious communities and the political structure. Moreover each collection has produced multiple waves of information critical to this research. Measures of state and societal restriction are key predictors throughout this study. However, the information on religious conflict is lacking. Both sources provide information on the fact that religious conflict has occurred and the extent to which it has spread, but we still know little about who participated in these conflict and what happened. This is a deeply problematic oversight. Religiously motivated actors are likely to have access to different resources, both material and social, that will constrain actions, and failing to account for this will produce findings that overlooks as critical social circumstance that undoubtedly affects conflict of any type. Therefore, while it is important to know that religious conflict has happened, data needs to also account for who was involved in the conflict and what did they do.

Chapter 2 explains how the Religious Conflict Events (RCE) dataset employs data collection procedures designed to produce data that allows for the comprehensive and systematic exploration of distinct forms of religious conflict. Collecting information on the reported religious conflict events in each country allows for a systematic analysis of the religious repression, insurgency, and intergroup conflict. The impact of state and societal restrictions can, and are shown to, differ depending on the source of conflict initiation and the intended target. Moreover, the data collection makes use of a large-N research design (Henderson 1997) that allows for a more comprehensive comparative study. It also gathers information on the specific tactics employed. This quality data can be employed in future research to further analyze differences in tactical choices and to further explore the impact of religious difference on conflict.

As a whole, the subsequent analyses of Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contribute much to our understanding of religion's influence on contentious collective action and violence. Each chapter emphasizes the importance of religious conflict distinct, while also analyzing the impact of social structures on conflict outcomes. The analysis of religious repression in Chapter 3 demonstrates that the likelihood and intensity of government initiated coercion, religious repression, is associated with the general political environment, but more strongly associated with religion-specific contexts. For example, the analysis provides evidence that religious repression is reduced in countries with higher levels of institutionalized democracy in general. However, religious repression is even more strongly predicted by government promises of religious freedom. Policies protecting religious freedom policies are negatively associated with religious repression. This is most clearly understood using a political threat framework for predicting repression. When religion is perceived as a central mobilizing agent in activities perceived as threatening by government authorities, repression of religious individuals and communities far more likely to occur. This is not entirely surprising. Religion is a key motivator for social change and has often lent legitimacy and resources to collective action against the state (Fox 2000b; Smith 1996; Wiktorowicz 2004). Indeed, as in the case of the current Iranian theocracy, the current political structure may very well be the product of such movements. Ruling polities have a vested interest in maintaining their power and place in society. Moreover, national authorities are not likely to be unaware of the power of religious organization. Thus, religious repression, while unfortunate, is a fairly rational expectation in the presence of religious threats. It is when a government has restrained itself that the presence and extent of religious repression varies.

Chapter 4 examines religious intergroup conflict (RIC) between non-state actors. This country-level analysis tests the impact of religious diversity, competition, and inequality on the

extent of RIC events. The analysis demonstrates that religious conflict between groups is primarily driven by inequality and discrimination based on religious identity. The analysis provides no evidence for primordialist assertions that religious difference alone is a significant motivator for contention. This is not to say, however, that religious intergroup conflict is a smokescreen for purely materialistic pursuits. Religion has distinct and measureable effects on conflict (Pearce 2005). The data—likely any data—is not equipped to assess the "true" motives of human behavior. It only captures reported conflict events in which religion is perceived to be a factor in conflict based on expert opinion. It clearly suggests, though, that when religious identity is tied to political and material outcomes, it is much more likely to be associated with an increase in religious strife between communities. This has important implications regarding the influence of national policy on intergroup relations in general. Even in the absence of active government participation, unequal *consideration* by state actors in real or imagined ways heightens competitive processes between religious groups and increases religious conflict between groups.

Finally, Chapter 5 builds upon research linking religious regulation to conflict and violence, and most thoroughly demonstrates the importance of conceptual specificity when analyzing religious conflict. The political opportunity literature provides the framework for the majority of the analysis and reveals that the prevalence of religious conflict forms can be understood as the product of actors' rational assessments of the sociopolitical environment. Religious grievance is an important part of the conflict dynamic, but opportunities afforded or restricted by the state (GRI) and the culture-at-large (SRI) influence the religious conflict manifestation types. Government regulation of religion is positively associated with religious conflict of all types and is the most strongly associated predictor all forms of conflict. This

finding confirms the analyses in the previous chapters demonstrating the government practices are critical contextual factors and will influence a diverse array of contention types. Social regulation, on the other hand, is more weakly associated with repression and intergroup conflict only. These findings suggest that all restrictions are not equal, and that government policies are more powerful motivators for conflict than societal restriction. The influence is not uniform, however, and the extent of government influence on conflict depends on the type of conflict being examined. Further, the consistent positive relationship between democracy and all conflict suggests that democratic institutions may provide pathways and incentives for religious conflict. This could also be attributed to the fact that religious conflicts are more likely to be reported in countries with broader political liberties. The effect may be more of a reporting issue than one of democratic pacification.

In sum, the data collection and analyses show that religious conflict should not be conceptualized as a single conflict category. It is multidimensional and complex. The relationship between religious identity, society, and the state is complicated but not irrational or entirely unpredictable. When religious conflict occurs, it can be understood as the product of logical considerations made by actors regarding the capabilities and propensities of intended targets. A complete understanding of religiously motivated behavior of any sort is impossible, and the measurement of religious conflict and its correlates employed in the current study is not perfect; however, this research adds to our understanding of complicated and perilous social phenomena.

Limitations and Future Directions

The empirical analyses of the research show that religion is an important contextual factor in conflict and does much to add to our understanding of how religious communities interact. However, this project is not without limitations. First, there is the problem of omitted countries. The absence of sub-Saharan African nations in the data and analysis is a significant weakness. These nations represent nearly a quarter of all countries in the world and 800 million people. Omitting these nations greatly reduces generalizability. More importantly, the national governments of Africa are diverse in terms of religious regulation, social diversity, and stability. Religious institutions are powerful and often compete for influence with official authorities (Easterly 2006; Mamdani 1996). Moreover, research has shown that in Africa, like in many other areas religious organizations are important catalysts for dramatic social change (Garner 2000). The factors which have been shown in this analysis to be significant predictor of religious conflict should be examined in contexts less skewed toward more economically developed and Western countries. The utility and limits of the propositions assessed in this research are made less comprehensive by the absence of these nations. The continued paucity of reliable quantitative data on sub-Saharan countries will make such future analyses difficult.

Second, the data may suffer from bias in reporting. This analysis relies heavily on the International Religious Freedom Reports as a source of data which are not exhaustive reports of conflict events. It is conceivable that the results obtained may have differed in the data had been obtained from a different source such as newspapers or other organizational institutions. However, as described in detail in Chapter 2, the International Religious Freedom Reports are one of the best sources of standardized and quality information.

Third, the cross-sectional methodology utilized here is illuminating, but causal assessment can only be implied. Stronger evidence suggesting that collective actors perceive and respond to contextual changes requires longitudinal data. In future research, the Religious Conflict Event coding instrument will be applied to future International Religious Freedom Reports in order to test for changes in religious contexts and religious conflict over time. Moreover, longitudinal data would allow for the assessments of contagion effects. Geopolitical boundaries are permeable and increasingly traversed with ease. Conflict repertoires are likely spread as ideas are wont to do.

This research relies on the country as the unit of analysis. This assumes a degree of homogeneity among nations and conflict events that leads to the omission of important factors that may influence the statistical outcomes. The national government is assumed to have the capability to enforce its policies across its geospatial territory. This may be untrue. Local authorities may act in concert or defiance of national decrees. Therefore, conflict events measured may include actions not supported or sanctioned by national authorities. This analysis also fails to address the role of regional and international influence. The country-level measures and findings offer much for the understanding of religious conflict, but research shows ties to other nations are also important considerations. Research has found international ties, both economic and cultural, impact mobilization for collective action (Lai 2006; Olzak 2006), while others have shown that religion and other cultural influences the unequal spread of social conflict (Fox 2004; Henderson 1997). In future research, I will augment the research on religious conflict by utilizing measures of national capability and scope of national rule. I will also employ measures of international government and societal ties.

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APPENDIX A

CODEBOOK: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND COLLECTIVE CONFLICT

General Coding practices:

1. Read the **Preface, Acknowledgements, Introduction, and Executive Summary** for the 2005 Reports: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/c15674.htm>. Discuss questions on these and the coding instrument with the PI before coding.
2. Once you begin coding a Report, ***do not stop until it is finished.*** This is important since full use of ***short-term memory*** is critical for accurate coding.
3. Calibrate with other Coders (code 5 or more countries as a group with PI).
4. Code Countries assigned and then meet with Co-coder to discuss and decide on items that you have questions about. Circle the item and it will be discussed .Hand in codebooks for data entry. Data entry will then report on discrepancies.
5. Every 25 countries, meet with PI to review and decide on discrepancies.

Specific Coding instructions:

1. Read ***choices*** carefully, since *scales* can have more than one correct answer.
2. Underline information in the Reports that pertains to information you code.
3. All questions relate to what the Report ***specifically mentions.***
4. Make notes on information that helps clarify an item that was difficult to score.
5. Use Pencil and erase stray marks from coding score boxes.
6. If an ***incident from previous years*** is ***reported,*** do not code it in this document. Report only numbers and incidents that occurred during the year under observation..
7. Use the following special codes:
    a) Give the country's score on top if info is in the Report. ---------- →.
    b) Code country by worst region; confirm with PI the reasonability of this.

Country -- Year	**_____ -- _____**	
Name of Coder		c.name
PSU email of Coder	**_____@psu.edu**	c.email
Date of Coding	**__ / __ / __ mm/dd/yy**	c.date
Time* Coding begins	**___:____ hr:min**	c.start
Time* coding ends	**___:____ hr:min**	c.stop

Section i. Introduction of Report				(questions 1-17)
1.	i.countr		Name of country or territory	
	i.region		State Department Reporting Region: 0=not in State Department Report 1= Africa 2=East Asia and Pacific 3=Europe and Eurasia 4=Near East and North Africa 5=South Asia 6=Western Hemisphere	
3.	i.rptyr		What year is this report for? yyyy	
4.	i.pages		How many pages long is the report? ##	
5.	i.appx	—	Is there an "appended report" on embedded territory (indicated at top of Report)? 0=no; 1=yes	
6.	i.consti	—	***Does this Section**** of the Report mention that there is a Constitution? 0=yes; 1=no Constitution, but report says "law functions in its place"; 2=no	
7.	i.freeco	—	***Does this Section*** of the Report mention that the Constitution provides for freedom of religion? 0=yes; 1=no Constitution, but report says law provides for "freedom of religion"; 2=no	
8.	i.gvresp	—	***Does this Section*** of the Report mention that the Government "generally respects" this right in practice? 0=yes; 1= yes, but exceptions or restrictions are mentioned; 2= the phrase 'generally respects' is not used	
9.	i.estrl0		favored religion(s)	*Does this Section or **any***

* **For items 6-12 *only,*** don't refer to other sections of the report. After question 13, if you find an answer to a question in a later part of the report, please adjust you answer.

	i.estrl1		state religion(s)	***<u>other section</u>*** of the Report mention that there is some sort of favored religion? 0= no; 1=yes.
	i.estrl2		official religion(s)	
	i.estrl3		established religion(s)	
	i.estrl4		historical religion(s)	
	i.estrl5		official religious philosophy or doctrine(s)	
	i.estrl6		other (explain in notes) [don't code 'secular']	
10.		—	***Does this Section*** *of the Report specifically mention that the government policy contributes to the generally free practice of religion?* *0=yes; 1= yes, but exceptions are mentioned; 2=no*	
11.		—	***Does this Section*** *of the Report mention that "there were <u>NO</u> reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice?"* *0=Yes; 1=Yes, but with some exceptions 2=No, societal abuses existed*	
12.		—	***Does this Section*** *of the Report mention that the US Government discusses religious freedom issues with the government?* *0=yes; 1=no*	

*The following items may be in **other sections** of the report*

13.	i.tense1		isolated (tensions caused by infrequent and unrelated incidents)	**Are the following types of social tensions reported?** 0=no; 1=yes
	i.tense2		regional (tensions associated with specific region of the country)	
	i.tense3		national (tensions which affect the whole country)	
	i.tense4		international (tensions due to events occurring in another country or a relationship with another country)	

*The following items may be in **other sections** of the report*

14.	i.teror1		victim of terrorism	What is reported about

	i.teror2		respondent to terrorism	**terrorism***?
	i.teror3		perpetrator of terrorism	***0=none; 1=some***
15.	i.terrlf	___	How did *terrorism** affect daily life during the period of the report? 0= did not impede; 1=one impediment; 2=more than one impediment; 3=daily threat/impediments	
16.	i.terrrl	___	Did *terrorism** impede religious practice? 0=no; 1=yes	

Section I. Religious Demography (questions 18-24)

17.	d.area	_____	What is the land area in sq. miles? #,###,###,### (use commas)	
18.	d.pop	_____	What is the approx. population? #,###,###,### (use commas)	
19.	d.1lgpct	___	What is the percentage of the largest religion or religious brand[11]? ##% **(if range, write midpoint of range)**	0 = Atheism 1 = Christian unspecified 2 = Catholic 3 = Orthodox Christian 4 = Protestant 5 = Anglican / Episcopal 6 = Muslim unspecified 7 = Muslim Sunni 8 = Muslim Shi'a 9 = Muslim (other) 10 = Jewish 11 = Animist / Indigenous / Traditional 12 = Hindu unspecified 13 = Hindu (other) 14 = Buddhist unspecified
	x.1lgrel	___	Religion (select from left); if Other (19): Other: _____	
20.	d.2lgpct	___	What is the percentage of the largest religion or religious brand? ##%	
	x.2lgrel	___	Religion (select from left); if Other (19): Other: _____	
21.	d.3lgpct	___	What is the percentage of the 3rd largest religion or religious brand? ##%	
	x.3lgrel	___	Religion (select from left); if Other (19): Other: _____	
22.	d.4lgpct	___	What is the percentage of the 4th largest religion or religious brand? ##%	
	x.4lgrel	___	Religion (select from left); if Other (19): Other: _____	

* The word **"terrorism"** must appear. For purposes of this coding, do not infer that terrorism exists if it is not specifically mentioned. The word 'terrorism' may appear later. If it does, return to these questions and make adjustments.

[11] "A **religious brand** is a group that adheres to and propagates a specific interpretation of explanations of existence based on supernatural assumptions through statements about the nature and workings of the supernatural and about ultimate meaning; it has individuals who make a commitment to this specific set of interpretations." *The brand's founder may or may not be the founder of the more general religion.*

23.	d.5lgpct	___	What is the percentage of the 5th largest religion or religious brand? ##%	15 = Buddhist (other) 16 = Tao 17 = Shinto 18 = Oriental (not Tao or Shinto) 19 = Other
	x.5lgrel	___	Religion (select from left); if Other (19): Other: _____	

Small brands mentioned anywhere in the Report (these brands often attract persecution): 0 = not mentioned 1 = mentioned	Jehovah's Witness	Ba'hai	Jewish	Baptist	Mormon	Sufi	Scientology	Others
	x.jw	x.bhai	x.jew	x.bapt	x.morm	x.sufi	x.scient	x.others
	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	___

Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

A. Legal/Policy Framework (new topic) Questions 25—66

24.	l.freerl	___	How is freedom of religion described? 0= law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government 'generally respects' this right in practice; 1= law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice, ***but*** some problems exist, e.g., in certain localities 2=limited and/or rights not protected or restricted; 3= does not exist	
25.	l.gvlvls	___	What does the Report **indicate** about Government protection for religious freedom? 0=protects *at all levels;* 1=protects at *some* levels; 2=does not protect	
26.	l.gvtype	___	What is the type of State or Official Religion? 7=Hindu; 6=Nonsecular/Theistic; 5=Buddhist; 4=Jewish; 3=Islamic; 2=Christian; 1=Atheistic; 0=Secular (or no state religion specified)	
27.	l.gvintf	___	Does the Government interfere with an individual's right to worship? 0=no; 1=some interference; 2=severe interference	
28.	l.gvfund	___	Does the Government fund some things related to religion, according to the Report? 0=no; 1=the Report does not mention funding, but it gives support that probably includes funding; 2=yes,	

			but equal funding for each religion; 3=yes, but funding is not equal for all	
If **"yes"** (2 or 3 in item 29), what religious things does the Report say are funded by the Government?				
29.	l.school	___	▪ education/schools	0=no; 1=yes, but equal funding for each religion; 2=yes, but funding is not equal for all
30.	l.bldgs	___	▪ buildings/upkeep/repair	
31.	l.salary	___	▪ clergy salary/benefits	
32.	l.media	___	▪ print/broadcast media	
33.	l.charit	___	▪ charity/public service work	
34.	l.activ	___	▪ religious practice or mission work	

35.	l.prosl1	___	Proselytizing	**Is ____ limited or restricted?** 0=no; 1=yes, but for all religions; 2=yes, but only for some religions
36.	l.prosl2	___	Public preaching	
37.	l.prosl3	___	Coversion	
38.	l.litbrd	___	Is religious literature and/or broadcasting limited or restricted? 0=no; 1=literature is; 2=broadcasting is; 3=both	
39.	l.mssnr1.	___	Are ***foreign*** missionaries allowed to operate?	0-allowed with no limits reported; 1=allowed, but within restrictive limits; 2=prohibited
40.	l.party	___	What is the nature of political parties (in practice)? 0=all political parties are secular; 1=correlation between political party and religion; 2=political parties can be religious or secular; 3=political parties must be religious	
41.	l.relife	___	According to the Report, are there laws regulating daily life based on (biased towards) religion? 0=no; 1=yes	(e.g., mode of dress, forbidden times to do business, foods that can be eaten, etc.)
42.	r.policy	___	Does the Report indicate that the Government policy and practice contribute to the relatively free practice of religion? 0=no; 1=only policy does; 2=only practice does; 3=both do	
43.	r.agremt	___	Are religious groups required to subscribe to an Agreement or other set of religion-specific	*That is, do religious groups require a permit to meet. Not

			regulations for public activities including registration needed for public meetings?* 0=no; 1=yes, all are; 2=yes, but only some are	are religious groups required to register for legal status, tax exemption, etc.
44.	r.discrm	___	Are people, based on religious identity or activity, discriminated against? 0=no; 1=yes, some are; 2=yes, all are	
45.	l.reled1	___	Prohibited for children or those < 18 year old	**Are the following mentioned in the report about religious education?** **0=no; 1=yes**
46.	l.reled2	__	Optionally offered in public schools	
47.	l.reled3	__	Required in public schools	
48.	l.reled4	__	Only 1 religion's education is permitted in any school	
49.	l.reled5	__	Optionally offered in non-government schools	
50.	l.reled6	__	Required in non-government schools	
51	r.discr2	___	Are allegations reported of discrimination in education, housing and/or employment based on religion? 0=no discrimination; 1=some discrimination; 2=widespread discrimination; 3=caste-like system	
52	r.fundrl	___	What is the balance of Government funding (including 'in kind' such as funding buildings) to the religious sector? 0=no funding; 1=a proportional balance; 2=has imbalance; 3=only goes to one religion or belief	
53	r.sects	___	Does the Report mention any harassment of minority religious groups? 0=no; 1=yes, but not been recently reported; 2= reported and resolved; 3=reported and unresolved	
54	a.campai	___	Does the Report mention a Government campaign against religion or certain religions? 0=no; 1=yes, but non-coercive; 2=yes, and coercive; 3=yes, lethal	
55	a.bureau	___	Is there a Government bureau that supervises religions? 0=no; 1=no, but consults a non-government religious advisory board; 2=yes, but non-coercive; 3=yes, and coercive	(Ii.e., Is there an organization set up specifically to register and monitor religious organizations? Usually has religion somewhere in the org. title).
56	a.lethal	___	Are killings based on religion reported? 0=no; 1=yes; 2=massacres or warfare	Killing due to perpetrators or victims religious profession.
57	a.harass	___	Do Government or security authorities harass or	

			allow harassment based on or religious brand? 0=no; 1=yes, but isolated or confined to certain locales; 2=yes	

58	a.estim1	_____	***physically abused (A)***	**Considering the entire Report, <u>estimate</u>** the number of people who were _____ **due to religion** in this country: 0=none 1= < 10 2= 10 - 200
59	a.estim2	_____	***Actual ### abused***	
60	a.estim3	_____	***Displaced (D)***	
61	a.estim4	_____	***Actual ### displaced***	

Section II. Status of Religious Freedom—continued

F. Terrorism *(new topic)* **Questions 66—73**

66.	t.report	___	Were there any reported abuses targeted at specific religions by terrorist **<u>organizations</u>**? 0=no; 1=yes	
67.	t.killed	___	How many people are reported to have been killed in the section on terrorism? **[list actual number, or actual <u>minimum</u> number]**	
68.	t.injure	___	How many people are reported to have been injured or accosted (but not killed) in the section on terrorism? **[list actual number, or actual <u>minimum</u> number]**	
69.	t.displc	___	How many people are reported to have been displaced or forced to move (but not killed) in the section on terrorism? **[list actual number, or actual <u>minimum</u> number]**	
70.	t.statem	___	Were anti-religious statements issued following terrorist attacks by the terrorists or their sympathizers? 0=no; 1=terrorists only; 2=terrorists and sympathizers	
71.	t.propty	___	Was property damaged or destroyed by terroists? 0=no; 1=damaged/defaced; 2=destroyed	
72.	t.target	___	Who did the terrorists target? 1=indiscriminate; 2=more than one religious brand; 3=one religious brand in particular	
73.	t.mssy	___	Were missionaries targeted by terrorists? 0=no; 1=yes; 2=yes, and they were killed	

Section III. Social Attitudes			Questions 74—83	
74.	s.othrel	____	Societal attitudes toward ***other*** <u>or</u> nontraditional religions are reported to be: 0=open & tolerant; 1=***isolated*** discrimination; 2=negative just in certain regions or just towards certain religious brands; 3=hostile	
75.	s.relate	____	Relations between various religious communities are reported to be: 0=no societal abuses reported; 1=sometimes strained; 2=negative just in certain regions or just towards certain religious brands; 3=hostile	
76.	s.tolera	____	Are there activities reported that promote tolerance and understanding between adherents of different religions? 0=no; 1=yes	

*The following items may be in **other sections** of the report*

77.	s.vand	____	Are religious groups' properties vandalized including arson directed against their buildings or facilities? 0=none reported; 1=within past 100 years; 2=not presently but within past 10 years; 3=yes	
78.	s.nontra	____	How does the Report characterize citizens' receptivity to proselytizing by nontraditional faiths or faiths other than their own? 0=receptive/no problems reported; 1=yes with concerns; 2=negative	
79.	s.intole	____	Are citizens intolerant of 'nontraditional' faiths, i.e., what they perceive as new religions? 0=no; 1=yes, but only one case cited; 2=yes, and more than one case cited	
80.	s.prosel	____	Do traditional attitudes and/or edicts of the clerical establishment strongly discourage proselytizing (trying to win converts)? 0=no; 1=attitudes only; 2=clerics only; 3=both	
81.	s.bomb	____	Does the Report mention cases of bombings or burnings of ***religious buildings*** or murders of ***religious persons*** <u>by citizens</u>? 0=no; 1=bombings or burnings; 2=murders; 3=bombings/burnings and murders	
82.	s.maliti	____	Are or were there religious militias/vigilante groups ***or*** is the military structured along religious lines? 0=no; 1=yes, groups; 2=yes, the military*; 3=both	* Including de facto structure
83.	s.estab	____	Do established or existing religions try to shut out new religions in any way? 0=no; 1=yes	

Overall Ratings (to be done immediately after completing above coding)			**Questions 114—128**
84.	o.estrel	—	**To what extent is there a Favored (or Established) Religious Brand?** 0=none or all religious brands are treated the same; 1=Cultural or Historical legacies only, e.g., former established religious brand inherits buildings or properties; 2=Some religious brands have privileges or government access unavailable to other religious brands; 3=One religious brand has privileges or government access unavailable to other religions; 4=One single State or Official (Established) Religious Brand / Religion
85.	o.law	—	**To what extent does the Law regulate religion?** 0=laws do not interfere with the free exercise of religion; 1=laws inadvertently cause difficulty to all religions equally, e.g., in registration; 2=laws cause problems, but only for some religions; 3=laws cause problems for all but one religion; 4=laws prohibit the free exercise of religion
86.	o.subsdy	—	**How does the Government subsidize Religion (incl 'in kind' to organizations run by religions, e.g., hospitals, schools, etc.)?** 0=no subsidies or equal to all (e.g., all are tax exempt); 1=subsidies not mentioned, but subsidies are implied by level of government support for a particular religion 2=Cultural or Historical legacies only (e.g., religion inherits Cathedrals from previous Government spending); 3=Only some religions are excluded from available subsidies; 4=Only an approved set of religions receive government subsidies; 5=Only one religion is subsidized (including 'in kind' subsidies)
87.	o.monopl	—	**To what extent does one <u>religious brand</u> seem to monopolize or strongly influence religiously-related activities within society?** 0=religious brands do not seem to monopolize or influence society at all 1=religious influence is shared among various religion "brands" 2= religious influence is shared among various religion brands that dominate in particular regions 3=one religious brand seems to dominate 4=society is centered on one religious brand
88.	o.openrl	—	**To what extent are <u>*societal attitudes*</u> open to all religious brands?** 0=Benign or equal to all. 1=Inadvertent insensitivity to other religious brands (than the dominant religious brand). 2=Prejudices toward other religious brands that are real but hard to document.

			3=Instances of discrimination towards other religious brands. 4=Instances of aggression towards other religious brands. 5=Instances of fatal aggression to other religious brands. 6=Open warfare or ongoing violent conflict along religious lines or between religious brands.
89.	o.relvio	—	**To what extent is there <u>religiously related</u> violence in the nation (victim and/or perpetrator)?** 0=None reported 1=Isolated acts of religiously related violence 2=Widespread acts or covering several regions with religiously related violence 3=Ongoing war with religiously related violence
90.	o.legpo	—	**The Legal/Policy Framework of the country _____.** 0=does ***not*** give privileges, favors, resources, and/or finances to any religion 1=gives privileges, favors, resources, and/or finances to ***any*** religion that asks or applies 2=gives privileges, favors, resources, and/or finances to a ***select*** group of religions 3= gives privileges, favors, resources, and/or finances to only ***3*** religions 4= gives privileges, favors, resources, and/or finances to only ***2*** religions 5= gives privileges, favors, resources, and/or finances to only ***1*** religion 6= gives privileges, favors, resources, and/or finances only ***1*** brand of a larger religious tradition, e.g., only to one denomination or religious brand

91. Religious Violence [o.relvi2]

What is the highest level of religious violence reported?

0. none
1. anti-religious brand graffiti
2. vandalism to religious brand property
3. bombing or burning or religious brand property
4. beating, rape or physical assault of person(s) due to religious brand
5. torture or killing of person(s) due to religious brand
6. massacre of and/or war between religious brands

92. Religious Brand Monopoly [o.relmon]

o.relmon _____	**What best describes the religious coverage of the country?** 0. No single religious brand dominates the population. 1. The two leading religious brands dominate the population. 2. One religious brand dominates the population.

93. Religious Restrictions [o.relreg]

What is the highest level of restrictions reported?

5. Prohibition of religious practice except for that which is approved by the Government.
4. Government involvement in the internal and/or international affairs of religious brands.
3. The Government targets certain religious brands to be controlled or proscribed.
2. Restrictions on certain religious brands in e.g., the use and/or ownership of property which are not equitable for all religious brands, and/or, e.g., 'national patrimony' care or Government ownership of religious buildings.
1. Difficulties for certain religious brands, e.g., registering or having a legally recognized status, but these difficulties do not proscribe those religious brands.
0. None reported.

94. Restriction Score [o.rstrct]

o.rstrct _____	**To what extent do the official <u>laws, policies, or administrative actions of the state</u> restrict the practice, profession, or selection of religion?** 0-None …….…… 10-Extensive restrictions **<u>by government</u>** 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

95. Favoritism Score [o.favor]

o.favor _____	**To what extent does the <u>state</u> provide a select religion or a small group of religions with privileges, financial support, or favorable sanctions?** 0-None …….…… 10-Extensive provisions **<u>by government</u>** 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

96. Protectionism Score [o.protec]

o.protec _____	**To what extent do the society's <u>religious groups</u>, <u>associations</u>, or the <u>culture</u> at large restrict the practice, profession, or selection of religion?** 0-None …….…… 10-Extensive restrictions **<u>by society*</u>** 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

97. Religious Freedom Score [o.relfre]

o.relfre	**How would you rate the level of religious freedom in this country?** 0 = High freedom with no problems reported 1 = High freedom with, e.g., only one or two minor problems reported

_____	2 = Mostly free with, e.g., more than two minor problems reported 3 = Moderate freedom where, e.g., most religions can operate without problems 4 = Low freedom where, e.g., only a few religions can operate without problems 5 = Religious Freedom does not seem to exist

Religious Conflict		
98. ____	**How many unique incidents* of religious conflict are mentioned in the Report?**	"Unique incidents" include speech events, protests, spontaneous clashes of religious groups, and incidents of government action.
99. ____	**How many unique incidents of religious conflict are mentioned in the Report?**	**0=None** **1=Less than 5** **2=5 - 10** **3=11-15** **4=More than 15**

Government Regulation Index Items	Does the Report mention whether foreign missionaries are allowed to operate? 0=Allowed and/or no limits reported; 1=Allowed but with restrictive limits reported; 2=Prohibited
	Does the Report mention that proselytizing, public preaching, or conversion is limited or restricted? 0=No; 1=yes, but (equally) for all religions; 2=yes, but only for some religions
	Does the Report indicate that the government interferes with an individual's right to worship? 0=No or no interference; 1=Some interference; 2=severe interference
	How is freedom of religion described in the Report? 0 = law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government generally respects this

	right in practice; 1=law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice, but some problems exist, e.g. in certain localities; 2=limited rights and or rights are not protected or are restricted; 3=does not exist
	Does this Section of the Report specifically mention that the government policy contributes to the generally free practice of religion? 0=yes; 1=yes, but exceptions are mentioned; 2=no.
Social Regulation Index Items	Societal attitudes towards other or nontraditional religions are reported to be: 0=amicable; 1=discriminatory (but not negative); 2=negative just towards certain religious brands or in certain regions; 3=hostile
	According to the Report, what are social attitudes toward conversions to other religions? 0=no problems reported; 1=some tension; 2=negative; 3=hostile
	Does the report mention that traditional attitudes and/or edicts of the clerical establishment strongly discourage proselytizing? 0=No; 1=yes
	According to the Report, do established or existing religions try to shut out new religions in any way? 0=No; 1=Yes
	What is the situation regarding social movements in relation to religious brands in the country? 0=none; 1=flashes of activity; 2=regional organized activity; 3=national organized activity

APPENDIX B

EVENT # ____ Date_____ **Description** _____ **Num. Occurrences _____**		
c.consz1	**____**	**What was the size of the event (i.e. approximate number of participants)?** 1=a small event involving few participants (less than 30) 2=a medium event with a fair number of participants (30-200) 3=a large event with a large crowd of participants (More than 200) 4=no number mentioned/unclear
c.contyp	**____**	**What type of religious conflict event is this?** 1=Suspected Religious Repression (Report indicates government support, but no explicit mention of government presences) **Skip to Section 1** 2=Explicit Religious repression (Government/security authorities initiating conflict with a non-government religious group) **Skip to Section 1** 3=Religious insurgency (Non-government authorities initiating conflict event against the government or government personnel) **Skip to Section 2** 4=Collective religious conflict (Conflict between non-government authorities) **Skip to Section 3**
Section 1. Religious Repression (Government initiated event)		
c.repauth	**Which authorities were involved?** 0=Uninvolved; 1=Involved	**____** Government-supported militia or militant group (c.repmilta) **____** Police/Security Authorities (c.reppol) ____ Established religious Authorities(c.repclerg) ____ Legislative/Executive/ Judicial authorities (c.repgov)
c.reprel	**____**	**According to the Report, were the initiating Government authorities religiously-affiliated?** 0=No, authorities were secular 1=Yes, but unclear whether they were acting on behalf of a particular religious brand 2=Yes, authorities were clearly religiously-motivated and acting on behalf of a particular religious brand 3=Unclear
c.reprltyp	**[If "Yes" to c.reprel] According to the Report, which religion were Government authorities affiliated with?**	**____** Unknown (c.repauthun) ____ Secular (c.repauthsec)

	0=Not affiliated 1=Affiliated	____ Atheists ____ Christians (unspecified) ____ Catholics ____ Protestants ____ Anglicans/Episcopalians ____ Muslims (unspecified) ____ Muslims, Sunnis ____ Muslims, Shi'a ____ Jews ____ Buddhists ____ Hindus ____ Animists/Indigenous ____ Taoists ____ Shintoists ____ Other (Specify)_____ _____
c.reptrg	**According to the Report, who was targeted in this conflict?** **____** Single individual ____ More than one individual ____ Secular group, association, or organization ____ Religious group, association, or organizations **____** Other (Specify)_____	**0=No** **1=Yes**
c.reptrel	**What was the religious identity of the target(s) in this conflict?** 0=Not affiliated; 1=Affiliated	**____** Unknown **____** Non-religious identity **____** Atheists ____ Christians (unspecified) ____ Catholics ____ Protestants ____ Anglicans/Episcopalians ____ Muslims (unspecified) ____ Muslims, Sunnis ____ Muslims, Shi'a ____ Jews ____ Buddhists ____ Hindus ____ Animists/Indigenous ____ Taoists ____ Shintoists ____ Other (Specify)_____
c.reptct	**According to the Report, did the activities of this conflict include the following: (Select all that apply)** **____** Rhetoric/statements/preaching ____ Distribution of printed information ____ Audio/visual distribution of information ____ Invasion, search, or confiscation of property ____ Vandalism and/or graffiti	**0=No** **1=Yes**

	____ Destruction/Damage to private property ____ Destruction/Damage to public property ____ Destruction/Damage to religious property ____ Detention of persons (e.g., jail or detainment) ____ Forced relocation (e.g., driving individuals or groups out) ____ Beatings or torture ____ Killing of one individual ____ Killing numerous individuals ____ Genocide or widespread massacre ____ Fines ____ Other (Specify)_____	
SECTION 2. Religious Insurgency (Government targeted event)		
c.insint	**According to the Report, who initiated this conflict?** ____ Single individual ____ Spontaneously assembled group ____ Secular groups, associations, and organizations ____ Religious groups, associations, and organizations ____ Unknown	**0=No** **1=Yes**
c.insorg	__ __ **How organized were the initiators of this conflict event as indicated by the Report?** 0=No organizational structures involved or none mentioned in the Report. 1=Some minimal organization suggested (e.g., church membership, schoolmates) but no clear identifiable organization reported as primary instigator 2=One or more organization listed by its proper name **If orgs mentioned, list names** _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____	
c.insld	**If the Report specifically mentions any leader(s), was the leader the following:** ____ religious leader ____ political leader ____ lay person	**0=No** **1=Yes**

c.insrel	**According to the Report, what is the religious affiliation of the instigator of this conflict?** 0=Not affiliated 1=Affiliated	____ Unknown ____ Non-religious group ____ Atheists ____ Christians (unspecified) ____ Catholics ____ Protestants ____ Anglicans/Episcopalians ____ Muslims (unspecified) ____ Muslims, Sunnis ____ Muslims, Shi'a ____ Jews ____ Buddhists ____ Hindus ____ Animists/Indigenous ____ Taoists ____ Shintoists ____ Other (Specify)_____
c.instrg2	**Were the authorities targeted by the instigator(s) religiously affiliated?** 0=No 1=Yes (Select affiliation)	____ Unknown ____ Non-religious group ____ Atheists ____ Christians (unspecified) ____ Catholics ____ Protestants ____ Anglicans/Episcopalians ____ Muslims (unspecified) ____ Muslims, Sunnis ____ Muslims, Shi'a ____ Jews ____ Buddhists ____ Hindus ____ Animists/Indigenous ____ Taoists ____ Shintoists ____ Other (Specify)_____

c.instct	**According to the Report, did the activities of this conflict include the following: (Select all that apply)** **____** Rhetoric/statements/preaching ____ Distribution of printed information ____ Audio/visual distribution of information ____ Legal complaint or filing ____ Protest events or demonstrations ____ Vandalism and/or graffiti ____ Invasion, search, or confiscation of property ____ Destruction/Damage to private property ____ Destruction/Damage to public property ____ Destruction/Damage to religious property ____ Detention of persons (e.g. detainment, kidnapping) ____ Forced relocation (e.g., driving individuals or groups out) ____ Beatings or torture ____ Killing of one individual ____ Killing numerous individuals ____ Genocide or widespread massacre ____ Other (Specify)_____	**0=No** **1=Yes**
SECTION 3. Collective Religious Conflict (conflict between non-government actors)		
c.crcnum	**According to the Report who was involved in the conflict event?** 0=Non-religious actors as both target and instigator 1=One non-religious target and one religious instigator 2=One religious target and one non-religious instigator 3=More than one religious target and one non-religious instigator 4=More than one non-religious target and one religious instigator 5=More than one religious target and more than one religious Instigator	
c.crcngrp	**What is the total number of religious groups involved? _____**	
c.crcinrl	**What is the religious affiliation of the instigator(s) of this conflict event?**	**____** Unknown **____** Non-religious group **____** Atheists ____ Christians (unspecified) ____ Catholics ____ Protestants ____ Anglicans/Episcopalians ____ Muslims (unspecified) ____ Muslims, Sunnis ____ Muslims, Shi'a ____ Jews ____ Buddhists ____ Hindus ____
c.crcinorg	__ __ **How organized were the initiators of this conflict event as indicated by the Report?** 0=No organizational structures involved or none mentioned in the Report. 1=Some minimal organization suggested (e.g., church membership, schoolmates) but no clear identifiable organization reported as primary instigator 2=One or more organization listed by its proper name **(If orgs mentioned, list names)** _____ _____ _____	

		_____ _____	Animists/Indigenous ____ Taoists ____ Shintoists ____ Other (Specify)_____ _____
c.crctgrl	**What is the religious affiliation of the target(s) of this conflict event?**		____ Unknown ____ Non-religious group ____ Atheists ____ Christians (unspecified) ____ Catholics ____ Protestants ____ Anglicans/Episcopalians ____ Muslims (unspecified) ____ Muslims, Sunnis ____ Muslims, Shi'a ____ Jews ____ Buddhists ____ Hindus ____ Animists/Indigenous ____ Taoists ____ Shintoists ____ Other (Specify)_____ _____
c.crcinorg	__ __	**How organized were the targets of this conflict event as indicated by the Report?** 0=No organizational structures involved or none mentioned in the Report. 1=Some minimal organization suggested (e.g., church membership, schoolmates) but no clear identifiable organization reported as primary instigator 2=One or more organization listed by its proper name **(If orgs mentioned, list names)** _____ _____ _____ _____ _____	
c.crctct	**According to the Report, did the activities of this conflict include the following: (Select all that apply)** ____ Rhetoric/statements/preaching ____ Distribution of printed information ____ Audio/visual distribution of information ____ Legal complaint or filing ____ Protest events or demonstrations ____ Vandalism and/or graffiti ____ Invasion, search, or confiscation of property ____ Destruction of private property ____ Destruction of public property ____ Destruction of religious property ____ Detention of persons (e.g., jail or detainment) ____ Forced relocation (e.g., driving individuals or groups out) ____ Beatings or torture ____ Killing of one individual ____ Killing numerous individuals ____ Genocide or widespread massacre		**0=No** **1=Yes**

c.crcld	**__** **__**	**Does the Report specifically mention any leader(s) of the conflicting parties?** 0=None reported; 1=Yes, mentioned as instigator/target of conflict, but not present at the conflict event; 2=Yes, mentioned as instigator/target and present at the conflict event	
c.crcrelld	**If the Report specifically mentions any leader(s), was the leader the following:** Instigator: **____** religious leader (insti ____ political leader ____ lay person Target: **____** religious leader ____ political leader ____ lay person		**0=No** **1=Yes**

APPENDIX C

Table C.3.1. Descriptive Statistics

	N	Min	Max	Mean	S.E.	S.D.
Religious Repression	116	0	644	112.84	14.56	156.82
Democracy	113	-10	10	4.23	0.64	6.77
Threat	116	0	1	0.42	0.05	0.5
Regime Instability	116	0	12	3.1	0.28	3.06
Religious Hegemony	117	0	1	0.68	0.04	0.47
Religious Freedom Policy	117	0	2	0.7	0.08	0.88
Population (logged)	117	13.22	20.99	16.3	0.14	1.51
Valid N	112					

Figure C.3.2. Religious Repression Score Distribution



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2009 Harris, Jaime and Christopher Scheitle. "Religious Regulation and Terrorism." Society for the Scientific Study of Religion Conference, Denver (October).

2006 Grim, Brian, Roger Finke, Jaime Harris, Catherine Meyers and Julie VanEerden. "Measuring International Socio-Religious Values and Conflict by Coding U.S. State Department Reports." Pp. 4120-4127 in *Joint Statistical Meetings Proceedings, American Association for Public Opinion Research - Section on Survey Research Methods [CD-ROM]*. Alexandria, VA: American Statistical Association.

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