IMMIGRATION EFFECTS ON VIOLENT CRIME IN CONTEXT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSIFICATION OF THE LATINO POPULATION

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by
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Abstract

In response to the tremendous growth of the Latino and Latino immigrant populations over the past thirty years, there has been an increase in both studies that examine the effects of immigration on crime or that incorporate Latinos into tests of the relationship between structural disadvantage and racial/ethnic disparities in crime. Despite the contributions of these studies, research in these areas has yet to fully investigate how these relationships may be shaped by the recent geographic diversification of Latino populations to emerging destinations, locales with little or no history of immigration. Rather, these lines of research have largely focused on established Latino destinations, communities with legacies of immigration and “contexts of reception” that are arguably more favorable for Latinos and Latino immigrants.

This study examines relationships between race/ethnicity, social structure, and violence amid the geographic diversification of Latino populations to emerging destinations. Two key objectives are addressed. The primary objective of this dissertation is to examine how the link between immigration and crime is contextualized by immigrant destination types and the race/ethnicity of offenders. Specifically, I examine (a) if the effects of immigration on crime differ depending on whether the movement of Latino immigrants is into established as compared to emerging immigrant communities and (b) whether immigration’s effects vary by the race/ethnicity of the offender (White, Black, Latino). The secondary objective of the study is to advance racial invariance research, which argues that the structural sources of crime are similar across racial groups, by assessing the hypothesis separately in both established and emerging
immigrant destinations. Specifically, using samples of established and emerging destinations, I examine whether there are racial/ethnic differences in the way that structural disadvantage and indicators of social disorganization (i.e. residential instability, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, population density) impact group rates of violence.

To address these issues my study draws on a strong theoretical and empirical framework. **Theoretically**, my study merges theories of immigration and crime (also race and crime) with sociological perspectives that link social change to racial/ethnic stratification. **Empirically**, I address the above objectives using race/ethnicity-specific (e.g. White, Black, Latino) arrest data on violent crime from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) and the crime reporting programs of California, New York, and Texas linked with census place structural characteristics from the 2000 census. I examine the effects of structural factors on crime at the census place-level with a full set of census places (N=528) and with samples of both established (N=297) and emerging destinations (N=117). I use two measures of crime, an *expressive violence index* (sum of assaults and homicides) which captures violence that typically arises out of disputes, and *robbery*, a form of violence that is financially motivated. Seemingly Unrelated Regression is used to compare the effects of structural factors on violence across racial/ethnic groups.

Two important findings emerge from the immigration analyses. First, in general, immigration has small or trivial effects on violence and this pattern holds across most comparisons, including most destination and race/ethnicity specific models. Second, despite the general pattern of immigration having small or trivial effects, the immigration-crime link is contextualized to some extent by immigrant destination type
and by race/ethnicity. The most notable contextualization is moderate to strong crime-generating effects of immigration on Black robbery and Latino robbery in emerging destinations. These findings suggest that when examining the effect immigration has on crime it is important to account for both the immigrant destination type and the race/ethnicity of the offender.

There are two key findings from the racial invariance analyses. First, for the full set of communities, structural disadvantage is associated with higher rates of violence for each racial/ethnic group, but the effects are significantly stronger for some groups compared to others. Second, conclusions regarding racial invariance vary somewhat depending on the destination type under study. In both established and emerging destinations, structural disadvantage is associated with higher rates of violence for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. However, there are more differences (i.e. a greater number of statistically significant differences) in the way structural disadvantage impacts groups in established destinations than in emerging destinations. In established destinations, the effects of disadvantage are more likely to vary across groups, having stronger effects on one group compared to another (e.g. disadvantage has stronger effects on Blacks than Whites). In emerging destinations, the magnitude of the effects of disadvantage are more likely to be statistically similar across groups. Because there are more differences in the effects of structural disadvantage on violence in established destinations, there is less support for the racial invariance hypothesis in established destinations than in emerging destinations. All in all, my dissertation finds that the geographic diversification of immigrant populations to emerging destinations has important implications for the links between immigration and crime and between structural disadvantage and racial/ethnic
disparities in crime, with immigrant destination types shaping how these structural factors impact crime.
# Table of Contents

List of Figures .............................................................................................................................................. x

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................ x

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................... xiii

Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2 Immigration-Crime Link ........................................................................................................ 12
  Background: Latino Immigration, Trends, and Recent Developments .................................................. 14
  The Development of Emerging Immigrant Destinations ...................................................................... 16
  Differences between Emerging and Established Destinations ............................................................... 18
    Differences in Contexts of Reception between Established and Emerging Immigrant Destinations ... 18
  Composition of Migration Flows: Destination Comparisons ................................................................. 21
  Immigration: Effects by Race/Ethnicity ................................................................................................... 23
    Immigration, Immigrant Destination Types, and Race/Ethnicity ....................................................... 25
  Prior Research on the Relationship between Immigration and Crime ................................................ 27
  Recent Developments ............................................................................................................................. 28
    A Focus on Immigrant Destination Types .......................................................................................... 28
    Race/Ethnicity ....................................................................................................................................... 31
  Shortcomings in the Literature .................................................................................................................. 32
  Competing Positions on the Relationship between Immigration and Crime ....................................... 35
    Immigration Increases Crime .............................................................................................................. 36
    Immigration Decreases Crime .............................................................................................................. 36
    Immigration’s Effects are Neutral or Trivial ......................................................................................... 37
    Immigration’s Effects on Crime are Contextualized ........................................................................... 38
      Immigration-Crime Link by Destination Types ................................................................................ 38
      Immigration and Race/Ethnicity Specific Effects ............................................................................. 41
      Joint Effects of Race/Ethnicity and Immigrant Destination Types .................................................. 43
      Type of Crime ..................................................................................................................................... 46
  The Current Study .................................................................................................................................... 47

Chapter 3 Racial Invariance Thesis .......................................................................................................... 51
  Background: The Racial Invariance Hypothesis ..................................................................................... 52
  Recent Advances: Testing the Racial Invariance Hypothesis ............................................................... 55
    Dependent Variable ............................................................................................................................. 55
    Independent Variables ......................................................................................................................... 56
    Spatial Unit .......................................................................................................................................... 58
    Racial/Ethnic Groups Under Study ..................................................................................................... 59
    Strict vs. Lenient Tests ......................................................................................................................... 60
  Shortcomings in the Literature on Racial Invariance ........................................................................... 60
  Racial Invariance Hypothesis-Assessing the Generalizability of Results ............................................. 62
Racial Invariance and Destination Types ........................................63
Crime Comparisons: Expressive Violence vs. Robbery ..................66

Chapter 4 Data and Methods ..........................................................68
Data Sources ..................................................................................68
Census Places...............................................................................68
Destination Types .........................................................................71
Dependent Variable .....................................................................74
Independent Variables ................................................................83
Analytic Procedures ....................................................................86

Chapter 5 Findings: The Effects of Immigration on Expressive Violence .........................................................93
Immigration Effects on Expressive Violence ...............................93
Descriptives ..................................................................................93
Bivariate Correlations ..................................................................97
Multivariate Analyses ..................................................................99
 Immigration-Expressive Violence Link Overall .........................99
 Immigration-Expressive Violence Link by Destination Types ....100
 Immigration-Expressive Violence Link by Race/Ethnicity ..........101
 Immigration-Expressive Violence Link by Destination Types and Race/Ethnicity ........................................102
Summary of Findings .................................................................104
Racial Invariance and Expressive Violence ...............................106
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations .........................107
Multivariate Analyses .................................................................108
 Racial Invariance Overall ..........................................................109
 Racial Invariance by Destination Types ....................................111

Chapter 6 Findings: The Effects of Immigration on Robbery ........128
Immigration Effects on Robbery .................................................128
Descriptives .................................................................................128
Bivariate Correlations ................................................................130
Multivariate Analyses .................................................................131
 Immigration-Robbery Link Overall ...........................................131
 Immigration-Robbery Link by Destination Types ................131
 Immigration-Robbery Link by Race/Ethnicity ........................132
 Immigration-Robbery Link by Destination Types and Race/Ethnicity .........................................................132
Summary of Findings .................................................................136
Racial Invariance and Robbery ....................................................138
Bivariate Correlations .................................................................138
Multivariate Analyses .................................................................139
 Racial Invariance Overall ..........................................................139
 Racial Invariance by Destination Types ....................................141
List of Figures

Figure 4.1 The Spatial Distribution of Established Destinations…………………………90
Figure 4.2 The Spatial Distribution of Emerging Destinations…………………………91
Figure 5.1 All Census Places (N=528)……………………………………………………………123
Figure 5.2 Established Destinations (N=297)…………………………………………………124
Figure 5.3 Emerging Destinations (N=117)…………………………………………………125
Figure 7.1 Predicted Values of Expressive Violence and Robbery Rates for High and Low Levels of Immigration in (A) All, (B) Established, and (C) Emerging Destinations…………………………………………………………182
List of Tables

Table 2.1 Prior Macro-Level Studies Examining the Effects of Immigration on Crime.................................................................50

Table 4.1 Independent Variable Descriptions.............................................92

Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Total Population and by Race/Ethnic Group for (A) All Destinations, (B) Established, and (C) Emerging Destinations.....116

Table 5.2 Bivariate Correlations Between Recent Latino Immigration and Expressive Violence Rates for All Destinations and Established and Emerging Destinations. ..........................117

Table 5.3 OLS Regression of Expressive Violence Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures (N=528)..................118

Table 5.4 OLS Regression of Expressive Violence Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures for Established and Emerging Destinations..............................119

Table 5.5 SUR of Expressive Violence Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos (N=528).............................................120

Table 5.6 SUR of Expressive Violence Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group for Established and Emerging Destinations..............................121

Table 5.7 Summary of Relationships Between Immigration and Expressive Violence by Direction, Within-Group Differences Across Destination Types, and Between-Race Differences Within Destination Types.............122

Table 5.8 SUR of Expressive Violence Rates on Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group......................................................126

Table 5.9 SUR of Expressive Violence Rates on Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group for Established and Emerging Destination..............127

Table 6.1 Bivariate Correlations Between Recent Latino Immigration and Robbery Rates for All Destinations and Established and Emerging Destinations. ......................................................146
Table 6.2 OLS Regression of Robbery Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures  (N=528)………………………………………………..147

Table 6.3 OLS Regression of Robbery Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures for Established and Emerging Destinations………………………………………………………………………………...148

Table 6.4 SUR of Robbery Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos (N=528)…………149

Table 6.5 SUR of Robbery Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group for Established and Emerging Destinations……………….…………………………………………………………150

Table 6.6 Summary of Relationships Between Immigration and Robbery by Direction, Within-Group Differences Across Destination Types, and Between-Race Differences Within Destination Types……………….151

Table 6.7 SUR of Robbery Rates on Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group………………………………………………………………………...152

Table 6.8 SUR of Robbery Rates on Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group for Established and Emerging Destination………………………….153
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Chapter 1 Introduction

In this dissertation I build on and extend previous research in two areas of contemporary interest in criminology and sociology— the links between (a) recent immigration flows and crime and (b) structural disadvantage and racial/ethnic disparities in crime—using recent arrest data that includes racial/ethnic breakdowns and covers localities in which differing types of immigrant communities are represented (established vs. emergent immigrant localities). Both topics represent important theoretical and policy issues that adjoin broad-based substantive interests within sociology, law, criminology, and public health. Despite their importance, however, there is a shortage of empirical research that examines these topics in context of recent demographic transitions in the United States involving the considerable growth of the Latino immigrant population in general and their geographic diversification to emerging immigrant locales with little or no experience with immigration, in particular.

The primary objective of my dissertation is to advance research on immigration and crime by considering how the link between immigration and crime is contextualized by immigrant destination types (i.e. established vs. emerging) and the race/ethnicity of offenders (e.g. White, Black, Latino). Doing so helps adjudicate between competing positions on the link between immigration and crime, including arguments that immigration is violence-reducing, violence-generating, has overall neutral effects, or has effects that are context dependent. The secondary objective of my dissertation is to build on racial invariance research, which posits that the structural sources of crime are invariant across racial groups, by assessing the hypothesis separately in both established
and emerging immigrant destinations and across different types of violence including robbery, a form of violence that is typically financially motivated, and an expressive violence index (i.e. sum of homicides and assaults), which captures violence that typically arises from disputes. To achieve these objectives I draw on an integrative theoretical framework and a unique database that allows me to considerably extend prior research.

For conceptual and theoretical framing, I integrate perspectives on immigration and crime and race and crime with theoretical and substantive literatures concerning (a) the assimilation of immigrants into the host society and (b) the links between social change and racial/ethnic stratification. Empirically, I use 1999-2001 census place arrest data from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) and the crime reporting programs of California, New York, and Texas linked with structural characteristics from the 2000 Census. The database is well-suited for the current study for three main reasons. First, the arrest data provides a Latino arrest identifier which permits race/ethnicity disaggregated analysis of violent offending and comparisons of the effects of immigration and structural disadvantage on crime across racial/ethnic groups. As I spell out later, most databases do not have an identifier for Latino offenders. Second, the database provides robust coverage of established and emerging immigrant destinations. This geographic coverage enhances the generalizability of results and allows for an evaluation of the immigration-crime link and the racial invariance thesis in different immigrant communities. Third, the ability to examine multiple measures of violent offending (i.e. robbery, expressive violence) provides more comprehensive assessments of the immigration-crime link and the racial invariance thesis as prior research in these
areas has largely been limited to analyses of homicide victimization. Understanding how immigration flows impact crime is a crucial policy and political issue that touches upon core substantive interests within criminology and the social sciences. Politically, fears that immigrants are harming the American way of life, reducing job opportunities, and increasing crime have been the impetus behind a recent surge in punitive immigration related ordinances at the state and local level (Lacy and Odem 2009; Marczak et al. 2011). Substantively, because social scientists are interested in social change and inequality, there is a growing interest in the social sciences and law/criminology in how immigration is impacting communities and particular population subgroups (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Van Hook and Snyder 2007). In large part because of its sheer size these interests have primarily centered on Latino immigration and on Mexican immigration in particular. In the past 30 years the Latino foreign born population has increased rapidly from around 4 million in 1980 to over 20 million in 2010 (Acosta and Patricia de La Cruz 2010; Gibson and Jung 2006).

Responding to these concerns, there has been in recent years a growth in the number of studies that examine the criminality of the Latino foreign born (Hagan and Palloni 1999; Rumbaut 2008) or the effect of immigration on crime at the macro-level (see reviews in Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Lee and Martinez 2009; Zatz and Smith 2012). Regarding the later, the general findings are that, net of controls, immigration either reduces crime slightly or has neutral effects.

However, these findings notwithstanding, there are important shortcomings in the research suggesting that the issue is far from settled. The shortcomings vary from one
study to another and include the following. First, in contrast to the sizeable body of research that has examined the immigration-crime relationship in established immigrant communities, there are very few studies that examine the effects of immigration on crime in communities that only recently have experienced sizeable immigration flows (for exceptions see Crowley and Lichter 2009; Harris and Feldmeyer 2013; Shihadeh and Winters 2010). Second, there is a lack of research which examines potential differences in the effects of immigration on crime across racial/ethnic groups (but see Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Martinez, Stowell, and Lee 2010). To date most race/ethnic-specific immigration-crime research has focused on Latinos, or to a lesser extent on Blacks, but has rarely examined the effects of immigration on Whites or compared the effects of immigration across racial/ethnic groups. Third, most studies have relied on homicide victimization data; there are few studies which examine the effects of immigration on offending or across different types of crime (e.g. robbery vs. expressive violence). An underlying theme of these shortcomings is that the extant research takes a global approach, focusing on the *overall effect* of immigration on one specific group (typically the Total population or Latinos) using one measure of crime (most often homicide victimization) in one type of community (typically established destinations). Immigration-crime research has rarely considered how the effects of immigration on crime may be contextualized or vary across different community circumstances or population subgroups.

*Immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity are arguably the two most important factors that may contextualize the immigration-crime relationship.* A consideration of these factors is both timely and has important implications for debates
on immigration and crime and for conceptual frameworks (e.g. place stratification perspective) which link social change with racial/ethnic stratification. Beginning in the late 1980’s there was an unprecedented and massive shift of immigrant populations away from established immigrant destinations (communities with long histories of immigration) to emerging immigrant destinations that, until recently, had little or no experience with immigration (Durand, Telles, and Flashman 2006; Singer 2004). Of particular interest to social scientists and policymakers is whether on the one hand immigrants revitalize these communities which often need population growth and people to stabilize their workforce or on the other hand, whether immigration disrupts these communities because they often lack the experience and resources for successfully integrating immigrants and for mitigating any adverse effects of immigration on the community (Bump 2005; Capps, Koball, and Kandel 2010; Donato et al. 2007; Grey and Woodrick 2005).

Also, because the movement of immigrants into emerging destinations often involves communities that historically have lacked racial diversity, there has been an increased interest in examining the effects of immigration on racial/ethnic inequality (Dondero and Muller 2012; Lichter et al. 2010; Marrow 2011). Some research suggests that the benefits and consequences of immigration vary across racial/ethnic groups with immigration being more likely to compliment Whites in ways that enhance their economic wellbeing, but may marginalize Blacks in ways that diminish their wellbeing (Bean, Van Hook, and Fossett 1999; Borjas 1998; Hamermesh and Bean 1998). Recently scholars have started to examine whether these race/ethnic-specific effects of immigration are conditioned by geographic location, including types of immigrant
destinations (Marrow 2009, 2011; McClain et al. 2006). For instance, recent research on how the geographic re-distribution of the immigrant population is affecting the American Color Line suggests that Blacks in emerging destinations, particularly those in the South, may be especially vulnerable to any adverse effects of immigration (Marrow 2011; McClain et al. 2006). As will be detailed in chapter 2, the structural positions and historical circumstances of specific racial/ethnic groups (e.g. Blacks) often vary by immigrant destination types in ways that may bring them into closer contact, competition (e.g. economic, spatial, cultural, political), and conflict with recent immigrant groups. Unfortunately, as noted above, social scientists have been slow to address how factors, such as immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity may shape immigration-crime relationships.

The primary objective of my dissertation is to address the gaps in research identified above and to advance research on immigration and crime by considering how the link between immigration and crime is contextualized by immigrant destination types (i.e. established vs. emerging) and by the race/ethnicity of offenders (e.g. White, Black, Latino). Four specific questions are addressed:

First, how does immigration impact crime overall? This question considers the overall effect of immigration on two measures of crime: expressive violence and robbery. Assessing the effect of immigration on violence helps evaluate prominent perspectives on immigration and crime and provides a baseline of the effect of immigration on crime before considering how immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity may condition immigration’s effects.
Second, irrespective of race/ethnicity, do the effects of immigration on crime vary by immigrant destination types? For instance, does immigration increase crime in emerging immigrant destinations but have neutral or crime-reducing effects in established destinations? Examining the effects of immigration on crime in emerging destinations is important for assessing the applicability of prominent perspectives on immigration and crime (e.g. social disorganization, immigrant revitalization, Latino paradox) to contexts that until recently have experienced very little immigration.

Third, irrespective of immigrant destination types, do the effects of immigration on crime vary across racial/ethnic groups? For instance, is immigration associated with increases in Black crime but have neutral effects on White or Latino crime? Examining the effects of immigration on crime across racial/ethnic groups is critical for assessing whether theories (e.g. immigrant revitalization) and empirical models of immigration and crime are equally applicable to different racial/ethnic groups. It is also important for informing emergent research on the link between immigration and racial/ethnic stratification which examines how immigration impacts different racial/ethnic groups and their wellbeing relative to other groups (Bean and Stevens 2003; Kritz and Gurak 2001; Marrow 2011; Waldinger 1997).

Fourth, merging questions 2 and 3, I consider whether the effects of immigration on crime are contextualized simultaneously by immigrant destination types and the race/ethnicity of offenders. In examining whether the effects of immigration on crime vary across immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity, I ask two sub-questions: First, do the effects of immigration on crime vary across destination types in ways that are
unique to particular racial/ethnic groups? For instance, does the effect of immigration on Black robbery vary between established and emerging immigrant destinations? The effects of immigration on a particular group may vary by destination types because characteristics of the community and the group (e.g. cultural, demographic, socioeconomic, mode of social organization) may vary by destination types in ways that shape the effect of immigration on crime. If immigration’s effects vary by both race/ethnicity and immigrant destination, it suggests that theories and models of immigration and crime must simultaneously account for both race/ethnicity and characteristics of communities.

Second, do the effects of immigration on crime vary by racial/ethnic groups within particular destination types? For instance, in emerging destinations do the effects of immigration on Black offending differ from the effects of immigration on White offending? Assessing whether immigration impacts groups differently within particular immigrant destinations helps inform nascent research which uses the place stratification perspective to evaluate group differences within particular immigrant destination types (Dondero and Muller 2012; Lichter et al. 2010). The place stratification perspective argues that inequalities exist not only across but also within places (Alba and Logan 1993). If immigration impacts groups differently within particular immigrant destination types, it could be an emerging source of within-place racial/ethnic inequality.

As a sideline aim, I also use the data to assess the racial invariance hypothesis. The hypothesis, which is grounded in major macrostructural theories of crime (e.g. social disorganization, strain), argues that race/ethnic differences in crime are rooted in the
divergent structural conditions of the communities in which these groups tend to reside and that the structural sources of crime behave in a similar way across racial/ethnic groups (Wilson 1987). Examining the racial invariance hypothesis provides an opportunity to examine and refine socio-ecological theories of crime because if structural factors alone are inadequate for explaining race/ethnic differences in crime, it suggests that other factors such as culture may be at play (Ousey 1999; Steffensmeier et al. 2010).

Responding in part to the dramatic growth of the Latino population, there has been an increase in studies that incorporate Latinos into tests of the racial invariance hypothesis (Phillips 2002; Steffensmeier et al. 2010; Ulmer, Harris, and Steffensmeier 2012; Velez 2006). Contributions of these studies notwithstanding, there are several shortcomings in the research that have prevented a better understanding of the racial invariance hypothesis and its applicability to Latinos. Perhaps the most critical limitation is that research has not accounted for the geographic diversification of the Latino population to emerging immigrant destinations. Studies of invariance that incorporate Latinos have focused almost exclusively on established Latino destinations, communities with long histories of immigration and Latino settlement. To date, there are no studies that examine the racial invariance hypothesis in emerging immigrant destinations or that compare findings regarding racial invariance across immigrant destination types. Another significant limitation is the overreliance on homicide victimization data in most tests of the racial invariance hypothesis.

As regards the racial invariance hypothesis, I address the following questions: First, does structural disadvantage and indicators of social disorganization (i.e.
racial/ethnic heterogeneity, population density, residential instability) behave similarly or differently across racial/ethnic groups? Second, do these structural characteristics behave similarly/differently across racial/ethnic groups in both emerging and established destinations? Examining the racial invariance hypothesis in emerging destinations is important for assessing the ability of macro-social theories of crime to explain race-differences in crime in different geographic contexts. If the racial invariance hypothesis receives stronger support in some locations (e.g. established destinations) than others (e.g. emerging destinations), it suggests that factors besides structural conditions may be at play and that these factors are tied to the local context. It also informs recent research which examines how Latinos are faring in emerging destinations overall and relative to other racial/ethnic groups. Third, do structural factors behave similarly/differently across racial/ethnic groups for both measures of expressive violence and robbery? Examining the racial invariance hypothesis across multiple measures of crime helps assess the scope of the hypothesis. Prior racial invariance research has focused mostly on homicide. Much less is known about the applicability of the invariance hypothesis to other crimes, particularly financially motivated crimes like robbery.

Taken together, my study goes considerably beyond prior research on (a) the immigration-crime issue and (b) the racial invariance hypothesis. Considering how destination types and race/ethnicity shape the immigration-crime link helps sort out competing positions on immigration and crime while informing important debates on the link between immigration and racial/ethnic stratification. Assessing racial/ethnic differences in the effects of structural factors on crime across different geographic
locations and types of crime provides a more rigorous test of the racial invariance hypothesis.

My dissertation unfolds as follows. Before empirically examining the relationship between immigration and crime (Chapters 5 and 6) and the racial invariance hypothesis (Chapters 5 and 6) I set the stage for my analyses with chapters 2, 3, and 4. In chapter 2, “Immigration-Crime Link”, I discuss the recent geographic diversification of immigrant populations, review sociological research on the effects of immigration on specific racial/ethnic groups, evaluate prior immigration-crime research, and lay out the conceptual perspectives that guide the current study. In chapter 3, “Racial Invariance Thesis”, I review extant literature on the racial invariance hypothesis and how the data in the current study can be used to advance research on racial invariance. In chapter 4, “Data and Methods”, I provide extensive details on the databases and methods I will be using in my analytic chapters. In chapter 5, “Findings: The Effects of Immigration on Expressive Violence”, I report the findings of my analyses of the relationship between immigration and expressive violence. In chapter 6, “Findings-The Effects of Immigration on Robbery”, I report the findings of my analyses of the relationship between immigration and robbery. As a sideline issue, in both chapters 5 and 6, I examine the racial invariance hypothesis by evaluating whether structural disadvantage and measures of social disorganization (e.g. residential instability) affect crime in the same way across groups. In chapter 7, “Discussion and Conclusion”, I provide an overview of the study including a summary of the main findings, a review of the limitations of the research, and a discussion of the implications of my research for future research and policy.
Chapter 2 Immigration-Crime Link

A longstanding interest in the social sciences is the relationship between immigration and social problems like crime and violence. This line of scholarship emerged in the early 19th century when researchers focused their attention on the criminality of the foreign born (Sutherland 1927) and on the effects of waves of European immigrants on American communities (Shaw and McKay 1942). Immigration-crime research has experienced a resurgence of late in response to new waves of immigration and fears that immigrants increase crime. Because of the explosive growth of the Latino immigrant population and widespread views linking Latinos and Latino immigrants in particular to crime, contemporary research has primarily focused on Latino immigration (Martinez 2006; Zatz and Smith 2012).

Contrary to public perception and policy initiatives that assume Latino immigration is related to increases in crime (Lacy and Odem 2009; Marczak et al. 2011), contemporary research does not support this link (see reviews in Martinez 2006; Zatz and Smith 2012). At the individual level, researchers generally find that immigrants are less likely to commit crime than their native-born counterparts (Greenman and Xie 2008; Hagan and Palloni 1999). At the macro-level, research has consistently shown that recent immigration flows (including Latino immigrant flows) either have neutral (not significant) or trivial (most often negative, sometimes positive) effects on rates of crime for the Total population (i.e. not race/ethnicity disaggregated) and for Latinos (for reviews see Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Zatz and Smith 2012).
To advance this line of research and to provide more rigorous tests, scholars have begun calling for theoretical and empirical models that go beyond an assessment of overall effects to more specifically tease out the nuances of the immigration-crime relationship (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). Far from being a simple phenomenon whereby immigration either increases or decreases crime, immigration’s effects are likely more complex and contextualized by a variety of factors including community context (Velez 2009), the type of crime (robbery vs. homicide), and offender’s race/ethnicity (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Martinez et al. 2010). Such complexity requires empirical models and databases that are better able to assess whether and in which ways the effects of immigration on crime may be contextualized. Failing to consider such nuances may mask important differences in the association between Latino immigration flows and crime at the community level.

Responding to the calls for more theoretical and empirical specificity in testing the relationship between immigration and crime, this chapter highlights the importance of considering how immigrant destination types (i.e. established vs. emerging destinations) and race/ethnicity might contextualize the immigration-crime relationship.

The chapter unfolds as follows. I begin by reviewing trends and recent developments in the Latino population. This section provides background for the current study including a review of the demography of the Latino population and its recent geographic diversification and a discussion of why immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity are crucial to discussions of immigration’s effects. Second, I review prior research on the relationship between immigration and crime. Here I note some of the main observations from immigration-crime research over the past 15 years and highlight
recent developments and shortcomings in the literature which the current study seeks to address. Third, I review competing positions on the relationship between immigration and crime and discuss why the immigration-crime link may be shaped by immigrant destination types, race/ethnicity, and simultaneously by both immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity. Fourth, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the contributions of the current study.

**BACKGROUND: LATINO IMMIGRATION, TRENDS, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

The term “Latino” in the United States encompasses a population that varies widely along a number of dimensions including historical roots and national origins (see review in Tienda and Mitchell 2006). It refers to both immigrants and their descendants from Spanish-Speaking countries in the Caribbean and Central and South America and to the descendants of early Spanish settlers in what became the United States. The Latino population is composed of 20 different nationalities and is represented by a large foreign born population.¹ The Latino population has surged between 1970 and 2010, increasing by nearly 400% from 9.6 million in 1970 to almost 48 million in 2010 (U.S. Census

¹ Those of Mexican origin compose almost 2/3rds of the Latino population (63.3%), including nearly 60% of the foreign-born Latino population and 67% of the native-born Latino population (Rumbaut 2006). The next two largest Latino groups are Puerto Ricans (10% of Latino population) and Cubans (4% of Latino population)(calculated from Rumbaut 2006 Table 2-2). Nearly 45% of the Latino population are foreign-born. This figure is much smaller (7.6%) for non-Latinos. A sizeable share of each Latino subgroup is composed of foreign-born individuals, ranging from around 40% of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, 70% for Cubans and Dominicans, and 80% for Columbians, Salvadorians, Guatemalans, and Central and South Americans.
A sizeable share of this growth is attributable to Latino immigration. The Latino immigrant population has increased rapidly over the past thirty years, from nearly 4 million in 1980 to over 20 million in 2010 (Acosta and Patricia de La Cruz 2010; Gibson and Jung 2006).

Massey and Capoferro (2008) note that a defining characteristic of immigration flows throughout the world is that they tend to concentrate geographically in the countries in which they settle. This pattern of geographic concentration of migration flows held steady into the late 1980’s with nearly 80% of migrants going to 5 key established destination states (Massey 1995). These states include California, Texas, Illinois, New York, and Florida. Beginning in the late 1980s, there was a massive shift of immigrants to emerging immigrant communities (i.e. locales with little or no history of immigration). This geographic diversification included at least two major demographic shifts (see Harris and Feldmeyer 2013). The broadest shift was the movement of immigrants into regions of the country (e.g. South and Midwest) that had never experienced significant influxes of immigration before or to states that had not received sizeable shares of immigrants in decades (e.g. Pennsylvania). Also, even within larger established destination aggregates (e.g. states, counties) there was a movement of immigrants into communities, including rural and suburban areas, that had little or no history of immigration (Frey 2006; Singer 2004; Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon 2005).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGING IMMIGRANT DESTINATIONS

Political, social network and economic factors can be used to explain the geographic diversification of immigrants to emerging immigrant destinations (see reviews in Leach and Bean 2008; Massey and Capoferro 2008). A number of political factors were decisive in encouraging the geographic shift of immigrant populations to emerging immigrant destinations. First, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) provided legal status to millions of unauthorized immigrants enabling them to search for job opportunities throughout the country without fear of being detected and who flooded the labor market in established destinations (mostly California) lowering the demand for jobs, ultimately encouraging out migration to emerging destinations that had more job opportunities. Second, policy decisions in the IRCA and IIRAIRA (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act), which heightened border enforcement along main entry points in California and Texas, redirected immigrants to new entrance points and emerging destination states. Third, anti-immigrant legislation in established destinations (e.g. Proposition 187 in California) sent the message to immigrants that they were not welcome.

Social network factors, most importantly the process of cumulative causation, also played a crucial role in the movement of immigrants to emerging immigrant destinations. Cumulative causation helps explain why migration flows gain momentum after the initial stages of migration (Massey and Espana 1987). As migration networks grow, the costs

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2 Other factors were also at play. Many migrants moved to emerging destinations in an attempt to improve their quality of life, to find better housing and schools, safer neighborhoods, and to improve their prospects of upward mobility (see review in Leach and Bean 2008).
and risks of migration decrease thereby increasing the likelihood of migration to these areas. Cumulative causation processes have had two distinct effects on migration to emerging destinations. First, research suggests that processes of cumulative causation in established destinations generated migration flows that oversaturated local labor markets (Heer 2002; Light 2006), ultimately resulting in outmigration to emerging destinations where there were more job opportunities (Lichter and Johnson 2009). Second, as migrant social networks developed in emerging destinations the costs and risks of migrating to these locales rapidly decreased and the pace of migration quickened (Leach and Bean 2008).

Economic factors also played a pivotal role in encouraging migration to emerging destinations. In many established destinations in the 1990’s the economy was declining, job growth was sluggish, and there was intense competition over available jobs (see review in Kandel and Parrado 2005; also see Light 2006). In contrast, many emerging destinations were experiencing economic growth and expanding job markets.

3 The primary mechanism of cumulative causation is the social capital generated through relationships with individuals (see Fussell and Massey 2004). In the early stages of migration from a community, networks that facilitate migration are small and isolated and only a small portion of the community engages in the migration process. As migration continues the networks expand in size which works to further decrease the risks and costs of migration. This promotes further migration independently of the factors that initially encouraged and supported it. Thus, even though specific factors may be required to initiate migration flows once a certain threshold of migration and density of social network ties is reached, migration becomes self-perpetuating.

4 Research also suggests that continued migration flows to established destination communities that could no longer sustain such flows may have led to other responses (e.g. Proposition 187 etc.) that encouraged outflows of immigrants from established destinations. For instance, housing competition has led to anti-growth policies in certain established destinations communities (e.g. LA) which encouraged migration to emerging destinations (Light 2006).
destinations were experiencing substantial increases in low-skill job growth and became attractive locations for immigrants (Donato et al. 2008; Kandel and Parrado 2005; Leach and Bean 2008).

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EMERGING AND ESTABLISHED DESTINATIONS

In this section I discuss some of the key differences across destination types in both their contexts of reception and in the composition of immigrant flows. These differences are key to arguments presented later in the chapter that immigration’s effects on communities may vary across destination types. Destination differences in contexts of reception are also key to arguments as to why conclusions regarding racial invariance may vary by immigrant destination type (see Chapter 3).

Differences in Contexts of Reception between Established and Emerging Immigrant Destinations

Contexts of reception refer to the characteristics of the communities in which immigrants settle (Portes and Rumbaut 2000; Portes and Zhou 1993). The “contexts of reception” framework has been used by assimilation scholars to achieve a better understanding of how characteristics of the destination community may shape the assimilation process. These contexts are vital in shaping the assimilation process because they influence whether immigrants’ human and social capital can be used to further the process of adaptation. The main dimensions of contexts of reception are: (a)

5 Segmented assimilation theory argues that there is variation in the way that groups assimilate, and this variation is attributable to several factors including the context of reception (Portes and Rumbaut 2000; Portes and Zhou 1993).
governmental policies and institutional resources, (b) public sentiment towards immigrants, (c) the co-ethnic community, and (d) the labor market.

Governmental policies and the institutional resources of a community are essential to the integration process because they structure the economic, political, and social opportunities of immigrants (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). A review of governmental policies and institutional resources in emerging vs. established destinations suggests that immigrants may have a more difficult time integrating in emerging destinations than in established destinations (see review in Marrow 2011; Waters and Jimenez 2005). Compared to established destinations, emerging destinations (a) have policies that are more restrictive towards immigrants and may hinder their ability to attain the human capital necessary for integration (Marrow 2011; Zatz and Smith 2012), (b) lack the experience and institutional resources necessary to help immigrants integrate (Lacy 2009; Massey 2008; Singer 2004), and (c) are often ill equipped to deal with the disorganizing effects of rapid population growth and development and the burden on public services associated with immigration (Bump 2005; Schoenholtz 2005; but see Crowley and Lichter 2009).

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6 In regards to the term “governmental policies and institutional resources” used in this study, Portes and Rumbaut (2006) emphasize the importance of governmental policies towards immigrants from specific countries while Alba and Nee (2003) emphasize the importance of institutions and agencies that monitor institutional compliance with rules against discrimination. For simplicity, I combine (a) governmental responses, (b) institutional compliance with rules, and (c) institutional resources (e.g. civic organizations) under the broad category of governmental policies and institutional resources.
Public sentiment towards immigrants is a crucial characteristic of the communities in which immigrants settle because how the public views immigrants largely determines whether certain opportunities for integration are available (e.g. job opportunities, interracial friendships/marriage, spatial assimilation) (Alba and Nee 2003; Oropesa and Jensen 2010; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Research on public sentiment towards immigrants suggests that immigrants may have a more difficult time integrating in emerging destinations. Compared to established destinations there may be more racial animosity in emerging destinations because these communities (a) lack a history of immigration, (b) are only accustomed to either a homogenous racial structure (e.g. all White) or a binary, Black-White racial structure (Lee and Bean 2004; McClain et al. 2006), (c) tend to have more conservative values, (d) lack pro-immigrant support (Haubert and Fussell 2006), and (e) have a higher proportion of undocumented immigrants (Passel 2005) whose status engenders racial animosity and is often used by natives as a justification for anti-immigrant sentiment (Marrow 2011). Although there may be more racial animosity towards immigrants in emerging destinations, research suggests that like the American population as a whole, attitudes toward immigrants in emerging destinations tend to be mostly ambivalent, with pro and anti-immigrant sentiments at the extremes (see review in Marrow 2011).

The co-ethnic community in the host society is essential for immigrant integration because it helps connect immigrants to opportunities (e.g. jobs) and resources (e.g. credit, services), assists in navigating and adjusting to a new environment, and provides social support (Hagan 1998; Lacy 2009; Portes and Jensen 1989). Research suggests that co-ethnic communities are less developed in emerging destinations (Lacy 2009).
There are competing perspectives on whether labor markets in emerging destinations are more conducive to immigrant integration than the labor markets in established destinations. Some research suggests that immigrants are more likely to economically incorporate in established destinations (Logan, Zhang, and Alba 2002). In established destinations social networks which link immigrants to job opportunities are more well-developed than in emerging destinations. Also, research has shown that the jobs available in emerging destinations offer wages that are lower than those available in established destinations and may offer few opportunities for upward mobility (see reviews in Leach and Bean 2008; Marrow 2011). On the other hand, research has shown that many immigrants moved to emerging destinations because there were more job opportunities in these areas than in established destinations (Kandel and Cromartie 2005; Kandel et al. 2011). Many of the job opportunities were in manufacturing sectors which tend to provide more stable employment and higher wages. Though these job opportunities are not lucrative they offer opportunities for stability and often “short-distance” mobility (Alba and Nee 2003; Marrow 2011).

Composition of Migration Flows: Destination Comparisons

As a number of scholars now note (Leach and Bean 2008; Lichter and Johnson 2009), there are key destination differences in the composition of migration flows. The composition of migrant flows (e.g. gender, SES) is directly related to its stage of development. Established destinations receive migration flows that are much more mature than the migration flows to emerging destinations (Bachmeier 2009). The characteristics of migration flows may have important implications for immigrant
integration and for how immigration impacts a community (Leach and Bean 2008; Lichter and Johnson 2009). Different types of migration flows (e.g. low skill vs. high skill) may have different effects on communities (see Bean, Gonzalez-Baker, and Capps 2001). For instance, the effect that immigration has on a community may largely depend on whether recent immigrants are a source of human capital or if they have characteristics that make assimilation difficult and may pose a burden on the local community (Lichter and Johnson, 2009).

Two key dimensions along which migration flows may vary by destination type are human capital and demographic composition. Research on destination differences in the human capital of migration flows is mixed. Some research suggests that migrants to emerging destinations have less human capital (e.g. more likely to be undocumented) (Passel 2005) than migrants in established destinations, whereas others argue that migrants to emerging destinations have more human capital (e.g. higher education) (Lichter and Johnson 2009; Stamps and Bohon 2006). In terms of demographic composition, researchers have argued (Leach and Bean 2008) and empirical work suggests (Hall et al. 2011) that immigrant streams to emerging destinations are more likely to be composed of young males than those to established destinations. Young males are more likely to migrate during the early stages of the development of a migration stream while females and young children are more likely to migrate as the migration stream matures (Reichert 1981).
IMMIGRATION: EFFECTS BY RACE/ETHNICITY

In this section I briefly review extant literature on immigration’s effects on particular racial/ethnic groups. This review helps inform and structure arguments presented later in the chapter that the effects of immigration on crime may vary by racial/ethnic group. There is a burgeoning sociological literature on how immigration affects particular racial/ethnic groups and their wellbeing relative to other racial/ethnic groups (Borjas 1998; Marrow 2011; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Research suggests that the benefits and consequences of immigration are stratified across racial/ethnic groups and that these racial/ethnic differences are shaped by differences in the social, economic, and historical characteristics of specific groups (Bean et al. 1999; Borjas 1998). Below I discuss some of the key reasons why immigration may have unique effects on particular racial/ethnic groups.

First, Latino immigration may have unique effects on specific racial/ethnic groups because immigrants are more likely to compete economically with certain groups (Latinos, Blacks) than others (Whites). Immigration, especially low-skilled immigration, tends to benefit those who have higher capital and skills and adversely affect those with lower skills (Borjas 1998; Smith and Edmonston 1997). Because race is highly correlated with class and skill profiles, immigrants are more likely to relate to Whites in complimentary ways that enhance White wellbeing but to compete with Blacks in ways that may marginalize Blacks economically (Bean and Stevens 2003; Hamermesh and
Second, Latino immigration may have unique effects on racial/ethnic groups because Latino immigrants are more likely to settle and live closer to some groups (Latinos and to a lesser extent Blacks) than others (Whites). Third, immigration may uniquely affect specific racial/ethnic groups because of the socio-cultural histories of particular groups. For instance, some researchers have argued that immigration may increase feelings of anger or relative deprivation among Blacks (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Gordon and Lenhardt 2008). Research suggests that Blacks may be frustrated that immigrants are often more respected and accepted by American society and that immigrants may be socially and economically leapfrogging

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7 Research on the labor market effects of immigration on natives, including native Blacks, is decidedly mixed (see reviews in Gordon and Lenhardt 2008; Marrow 2011; also see Bean and Bell-Rose 1998). Research which shows that employers prefer Latino and Latino immigrant workers over Blacks (Marrow 2011; Waldinger and Lichter 2003) and reports by African American workers that immigrants have reduced their wages or displaced them from work support arguments that immigration has adversely affected Blacks. Empirical studies are less clear. Some studies show that immigration has harmful labor market effects for Blacks (e.g. Borjas 2004; Reed and Danziger 2007) while others show mixed or only small or negligible effects on Blacks (e.g. Altonji and Card 1991; LaLonde, and Topel 1991). A primary reason for a lack of consistency in the findings may be that aggregate, national patterns mask important local labor market effects (see Bean et al. 1999).

8 Compared to the vast body of research which examines the segregation of domestic Blacks, Latinos, and foreign born populations from domestic Whites (see for example Iceland and Scopilliti 2008; Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004; Reardon et al. 2008), there is a paucity of research which examines the segregation of foreign-born Latinos from domestic Blacks. However, a number of localized studies suggest recent Latino immigrants live closer to domestic Blacks than they do Whites (see for example Marrow 2011; Mohl 1990, 2009; Pastor, De Lara, and Scoggins 2011). Also, the segmented assimilation literature argues that immigrants may face challenges from residing near disadvantaged minority groups under the assumption that recent immigrants, who often have low levels of human capital, are more likely to live closer to poor Blacks than Whites (Portes and Rumbaut 2000; Portes and Zhou 1993).
them. Facing stalling prospects while seeing Latino newcomers, who are often not citizens, get ahead may agitate a sense of injustice that America has not delivered on the full benefits of citizenship to African Americans and that African Americans, not Latinos or Latino immigrants, should be “next in line” to experience upward mobility (Gordon and Lenhardt 2008:1227; also see Gay 2006; Marrow 2011).

**Immigration, Immigrant Destination Types, and Race/Ethnicity**

In this section I briefly review literature which examines how immigration impacts groups within particular immigrant destination types. This review helps inform arguments presented later in the chapter that the effects of immigration on crime for a particular racial/ethnic group may be conditioned by the destination type under study. The way that immigration influences a particular group may vary by immigrant destination type because the social, structural, and historical conditions of racial/ethnic groups vary across geographic locations, including immigrant destination types (Bean et al. 1999; Marrow 2011; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010c). In some settings immigration may benefit a particular group, while in other settings immigration may have negative effects on that same group.

Recent research suggests that Blacks in emerging destinations and especially those in Southern emerging destinations may be particularly vulnerable to any adverse effects of immigration (Marrow 2011). Any harmful effects of immigration on Blacks may be stronger in emerging destinations because, compared to established locales, there may be more job competition between Blacks and Latino immigrants. Moreover, the consequences of immigration for Blacks may be heightened in Southern emerging locales.
where the “racialized class structure” intensifies Black-Latino competition for low-skill jobs and where the South’s history of discrimination may exacerbate feelings among Blacks of animosity and relative deprivation described above (Marrow 2011). Likewise, other research (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010c) suggests that immigration may have deleterious effects on Whites in rural emerging destinations because Whites in rural emerging destinations are more likely to compete with Latino immigrants in the low-skill job market than in other immigrant destination types.

These destination specific effects on particular racial/ethnic groups may have important implications for the geographic configuration of racial/ethnic inequality. Specifically, if immigration impacts groups differently within a particular immigrant destination it may contribute to within-place racial/ethnic inequalities (Marrow 2011; McClain et al. 2006; also see Dondero and Mueller 2012). For instance, in Southern emerging destinations if immigration benefits or even has neutral effects on Whites, but adversely affects Blacks, immigration may deepen White-Black inequalities. Drawing on the place stratification perspective which argues that inequalities exist “not only across places but also within them” (Dondero and Muller 2012, p. 5), researchers have begun examining racial/ethnic inequality within established and emerging destinations. Research has shown that inequality outcomes such as segregation and racial/ethnic differences in educational attainment may vary by immigrant destination types (Dondero and Muller 2012; Lichter et al 2010; Park and Iceland 2011).
PRIOR RESEARCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMMIGRATION AND CRIME

Table 2.1 provides a summary of recent (post 1995) ecological studies examining the impact of immigration on violent crime. The majority of prior studies have: (a) examined the immigration-crime link in established immigrant destinations (often in communities along the U.S.-Mexican Border or in other prominent immigrant destinations sites) or, to a lesser extent, involved studies that covered the nation as a whole, but did not distinguish between types of immigrant communities, (b) relied heavily on homicide victimization data (most often Latino victimization), and (c) entailed cross-sectional analyses of the effects of immigration on crime. Results (d) generally show that immigration’s effect on community rates of violence is either neutral (not significant) or small (mostly negative, with some positive effects), but (e) there is little consistency in the results with findings varying depending on a number of factors, including (but not limited to) study location, type of offense, and the racial/ethnic group under study.

Recently scholars have begun responding to calls for more research that address shortcomings in the literature and that advance prior research in ways that more fully investigate the immigration-crime relationship. These advances include, but are not limited to, a consideration of (a) immigrant destination types and (b) race/ethnicity. I provide snapshots of each of these developments.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A Focus on Immigrant Destination Types

As discussed in detail earlier in the chapter, there has been a massive shift of immigrant populations to emerging immigrant destinations that have little to no experience with immigration. Given important differences in the characteristics of these communities, immigration-crime scholars have called for more research that considers destination differences in the immigration-crime relationship (Bursik 2006; Martinez et al. 2010; Velez and Lyons 2012).

Responding to this call, a few studies have recently considered how immigrant destination types contextualize the relationship between immigration and crime. Though not the main focus of their analysis, research by Shihadeh and Winters (2010) on a national sample of counties finds that immigration is associated with lower Latino homicide victimization in established destinations but has neutral/null effects in emerging destinations. Their research suggests that the revitalizing or protective influence of immigration may be limited to established immigrant locales. Other research by Shihadeh and colleagues suggests that Latinos in emerging destinations may be more vulnerable to any adverse effects of structural conditions because these destinations are more likely to be socially disorganized, lacking “the umbrella of social control available in traditional destinations” (Shihadeh and Winters, 2010 p. 629). Specifically, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010b) examine differences in Latino homicide victimization across immigrant destination types. They find that the “Latino paradox” whereby Latinos have lower levels of homicide than would be expected given the disadvantage they experience does not apply in emerging destinations. They instead find that (a) rates of Latino homicide
victimization are nearly 50% higher in emerging than in established immigrant destinations and (b) Latino linguistic isolation and structural disadvantage are associated with higher levels of Latino homicide victimization in emerging destinations, but not in established destinations.

Using 1999-2001 census place arrest data from New York, California, and Texas, Harris and Feldmeyer (2013) examined whether the effect of immigration on violent offending differed across traditional vs. non-traditional destinations and in ways that were unique to particular racial/ethnic groups. They found that in traditional destinations immigration was associated with higher rates of violent offending for Whites and lower rates for Blacks and Latinos. In contrast, in non-traditional destinations immigration was associated with higher rates of violence for Blacks and Latinos but was unassociated with violence for Whites.⁹

Crowley and Lichter (2009) examined whether Latino population growth between 1990 and 2000 was associated with increases in markers of disorganization and index crime in rural emerging Latino counties. Specifically, they used difference in difference models to compare change over time in crime rates in rural counties that experienced rapid growth in the Latino population to their counterfactual, rural counties that did not

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⁹ Despite advancing immigration-crime research by considering the role of both destination types and race/ethnicity, their study had a number of limitations. First, their primary sample of non-traditional census places were not necessarily emerging immigrant destinations, but rather were census places that were not traditional destinations. Second, their sample was limited to census places from 3 established destination states (California, Texas, and New York). Thus, their sample was lacking emerging destinations in the Midwest and South, the primary regions of emerging destinations.
experience rapid population growth. They found that compared to counties that did not experience rapid Latino population growth, emerging Latino rural destinations experienced significantly larger reductions in crime. Their findings suggest that immigration to emerging destinations is not increasing crime and may even be reducing it.

Using multi-level data with neighborhoods nested within cities, Velez and Lyons (2012) examined how structural disadvantage conditioned the relationship between immigration and crime in traditional and non-traditional immigrant destination cities. For their full sample of cities (i.e. including both traditional and non-traditional gateways) they found that recent immigration flows have stronger crime-reducing effects in neighborhoods with higher levels of structural disadvantage. In essence, immigration buffers communities from adverse effects of disadvantage. The authors suggest that immigration has stronger crime-reducing effects in disadvantaged areas, in part, because there are larger concentrations of immigrants in these areas. More importantly for the present study they found that immigration only mitigates the effects of disadvantage on crime in traditional immigrant destination cities and not in non-traditional destinations. They argue that immigration is more likely to have protective effects in traditional destinations because these cities have the resources (e.g. larger immigrant concentrations) that activate the protective benefits of immigration.

In other work, Lyons, Velez, and Santoro (forthcoming) use multilevel data with neighborhoods clustered within cities to examine how immigrant opportunity structures of cities condition the relationship between immigration and crime at the neighborhood level. Immigrant opportunity structures are seen as the political, social, and economic
environments of cities which can either facilitate or impede immigrant integration and the concerns of immigrants. Open opportunity structures provide environments that are favorable to immigrants, whereas closed structures restrict the opportunities of immigrants. They find that immigrant concentration has crime-reducing effects and that these effects are enhanced in neighborhoods that are within cities that have opportunity structures that are “open” to immigrants. Open opportunity structures are thought to activate the revitalizing aspects of immigration on the community. This study has implications for research on destination differences in immigration-crime relationships as opportunity structures likely vary by immigrant destination types.

Taken together, these studies suggest that there are important destination differences in the effect that immigration has on crime and that empirical models that do not distinguish between immigrant destination types may mask important differences in the relationship between immigration and crime.

Race/Ethnicity

A second advance in immigration-crime research has been a growth in studies that examine how race/ethnicity shapes immigration-crime relationships. These studies build upon earlier research which focused primarily on the effects of immigration for the Total population or for one subgroup, typically Latinos. Researchers have contributed to race/ethnicity-specific immigration-crime scholarship by considering how immigration effects other racial/ethnic groups, including Blacks and to a lesser extent Whites, and by providing greater theoretical articulation of why the effects of immigration on crime may vary by race/ethnicity (see Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Martinez et al. 2010; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a, 2010c). These studies have drawn upon the broader
sociological literature reviewed earlier in the chapter which suggests that the benefits and consequences of immigration may vary by race/ethnicity. Race/ethnicity-specific research has produced mixed findings of how immigration impacts each major racial/ethnic group (e.g. Whites, Blacks, Latinos). For instance, research on how immigration impacts Blacks has produced inconsistent results, including a mix of positive, negative, and neutral/null effects.

SHORTCOMINGS IN THE LITERATURE

The recent developments in immigration-crime research noted above have made major strides in addressing shortcomings in the empirical literature and more fully accounting for nuances in the relationship between immigration and crime. However, several important gaps in the literature remain. Perhaps, most importantly, there is a need for more theorizing and empirical scholarship that evaluates potential destination differences in the link between immigration and crime. To date, there are only a handful of published studies (described above) that examine destination differences in the relationship between immigration and crime. Examining whether the effect of immigration varies across immigrant destination types is important for evaluating the applicability of theories of immigration and crime to communities that have not experienced sizeable immigration flows before. If models of immigration and crime do not behave the same way across immigrant destination types it suggests that different mechanisms and theories may be needed to explain immigration-crime relationships in different areas.
There is also a need to improve upon race/ethnicity-specific immigration-crime research in general and as it relates to destination comparisons in immigration’s effects. First, there is a need for research which examines potential differences in the effects of immigration on crime across racial/ethnic groups. To date most race/ethnic-specific immigration-crime research has focused mostly on either Latinos or, to a lesser extent Blacks, but has rarely examined the effects of immigration on Whites (but see Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009) or compared the effects of immigration on crime across the three major racial/ethnic groups (Whites, Blacks, Latinos). Such comparisons are at the heart of arguments that immigration may be an emerging cause of racial/ethnic inequality (Marrow 2011), benefiting some groups while marginalizing others. Also, comparing the effects of immigration on crime across groups is necessary for refining theories on the link between immigration and crime. Racial/ethnic differences in the effects of immigration on crime suggest that the process by which immigration impacts crime may vary by racial/ethnic group.

Second, there is a need for research which considers the effects of immigration on different types of crime (e.g. expressive violence vs. robbery) for specific racial/ethnic groups. The overwhelming majority of race/ethnicity-specific immigration-crime research has focused on homicide victimization, which only covers a small fraction of crime (less than 1%). It is important to study the effect of immigration on the broader criminal landscape and to assess potential differences in the effects of immigration across crime types. If the effect of immigration varies across types of crime it suggests that different mechanisms and theories may be needed to explain the effect of immigration on different types of crime (Hagan and Palloni 1999; Wright and Benson 2010).
Third, there is a need for research which simultaneously accounts for destination and race/ethnicity differences in the effects of immigration on crime. Of the 4 studies that have examined destination differences in immigration’s effects (note: does not include Lyons et al. forthcoming) only 2 have considered race/ethnicity-specific effects and only 1 examined immigration’s effects for multiple groups. As discussed in detail below, there are important reasons to believe that the way immigration impacts crime for a particular group depends on the destination type under study. The effects of immigration on a particular group may vary by destination type because characteristics of the community and the group (e.g. cultural, demographic, socioeconomic, modes of social organization) may vary by destination types in ways that shape the effect of immigration on crime.

A consideration of immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity is also needed to examine how immigration’s effects may vary across racial/ethnic groups within particular locations. There is a growing interest in the social sciences on documenting inequalities (e.g. segregation, education) within places, with a particular emphasis on inequalities within immigrant destination types (Dondero and Muller 2012; Lichter et al. 2010). To contribute to this body of research, there is a need for studies which examine how the effects of immigration on outcomes (e.g. health and crime) vary across racial/ethnic groups within particular immigrant destination types. If immigration impacts groups differently within a certain geographic area, it could be an emerging source of within-place inequality. A consideration of destination differences in global crime rates (e.g. not race/ethnicity disaggregated) may miss important nuances in the immigration-crime relationship.
An underlying theme of these shortcomings is a lack of research which examines how the immigration-crime link is contextualized, how it may vary across multiple factors both singly and in combination. Instead, researchers have typically relied on a global approach in which they examine the overall effects of immigration on crime for one group (typically the Total population or Latinos) using one measure of crime (typically homicide victimization) in one type of community (typically established destinations). There is a need for more research which examines how the effects of immigration vary across factors such as race/ethnicity and immigrant destination type. Before addressing these issues in empirical models (chapter 5), I review the competing positions on the effects of immigration on crime and discuss how my study advances research on the immigration-crime relationship.

COMPETING POSITIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMMIGRATION AND CRIME

As several scholarly reviews indicate (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Martinez and Lee 2000; Reid et al. 2005), there are alternative or competing positions about the likely effects of aggregate patterns of immigration on crime and violence. As outlined by Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier (2009), on theoretical grounds each of the following outcomes can be plausibly argued: immigration will increase crime, immigration will decrease crime, immigration will have small or offsetting effects, or immigration’s effect on crime is contextualized.
IMMIGRATION INCREASES CRIME

There are solid reasons for expecting that immigration may have crime-increasing effects. First, immigration may increase crime by selecting populations that (a) are more likely to be involved in crime as either victims or offenders than native born populations (i.e. males ages 18-34) (Ousey and Kubrin 2009) and/or that (b) have cultural norms/practices that are conducive to higher levels of crime (Horowitz 2001; Taft 1933). Second, even if immigrants do not have “criminal propensities” they may enter communities that provide structural barriers or disadvantages that increase the likelihood that they will commit crime (Mears 2001). These first two hypotheses suggest that immigration will lead to increases in crime among immigrants. Third, the influx of new residents may destabilize the local community, disrupt community cohesion, and reduce economic resources in ways that make it more difficult to address social problems like crime and violence (see reviews in Healey 2006; Stowell 2007). This hypothesis posits that immigration will lead to increases in crime among both immigrant and native born populations.

IMMIGRATION DECREASES CRIME

On the other hand, immigration may have crime-decreasing effects. First, immigration may decrease crime by selecting populations (a) that have characteristics that make them less likely to commit crime (e.g. hard working, motivated) (Butcher and Piehl 2006; Tonry 1997), (b) have cultural norms unfavorable to crime and violence (Sampson 2008), (c) and because of fears of deportation have strong motivations to avoid criminal behavior (see review in Ousey and Kubrin 2009). This hypothesis suggests that
immigrants will have lower rates of crime than the native born (Hagan and Palloni 1999). Second, at the macro-level, “immigrant revitalization” and “Latino paradox perspectives” argue that immigration may infuse communities with social capital resources (e.g. kinship ties, ethnic entrepreneurship) that lead to reductions in crime (Lee and Martinez 2002; Sampson 2008). These resources revitalize communities by strengthening ties among community members and enhancing community-level and institutional resources that provide residents with buffers against crime and do so in ways that benefit all members of the community (see Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Martinez 2002; Velez and Lyons 2012).

IMMIGRATION’S EFFECTS ARE NEUTRAL OR TRIVIAL

A third position is that the crime-increasing and crime-decreasing effects of immigration are trivial or that they may offset each other in ways that lead to neutral or small effects (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009). Immigration flows may disrupt communities, but at the same time infuse communities with social capital resources that mitigate any adverse effects of immigration. Also, immigration’s effects on crime may vary across racial/ethnic groups, increasing crime for some groups while decreasing crime for others, in ways that offset each other and lead to small or neutral overall effects on crime.
IMMIGRATION’S EFFECTS ON CRIME ARE CONTEXTUALIZED

An emerging position is that immigration’s effects on crime are contextualized (Feldmeyer 2009; Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Velez 2009), that it is likely to have multiple, often offsetting effects that are shaped by a number of variables including the type of immigrant community (Harris and Feldmeyer, 2013; Velez and Lyons 2012) and the race/ethnicity of violent offenders (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009). Failure to consider how the immigration-crime relationship is contextualized risks masking important differences in the effects of immigration on crime. Central to the current study are the ways in which immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity may shape immigration-crime relationships, and also how these two factors, destination types and race/ethnicity, may interact to contextualize immigration’s effect on crime.

Immigration-Crime Link by Destination Types

There are strong reasons to expect that the effects that immigration has on a locality are tied to the “contexts of reception” of the community, including the characteristics of the co-ethnic community (e.g. ethnic enclaves) and the availability of resources for immigrants. Focusing on differences in “contexts of reception”, I discuss some of the major competing positions on how the relationship between immigration and crime may vary across immigrant destination types.
Immigration Will Have Greater Crime Generating Effects in Emerging Destinations

The most prominent argument is that immigration will have less protective, crime-reducing effects (Velez and Lyons 2012; Zatz and Smith 2012) and/or stronger crime-generating effects in emerging than in established destinations (Harris and Feldmeyer 2013; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b). Focusing primarily on research sites in established immigrant destinations, researchers have used the “immigrant revitalization” and “Latino paradox” perspectives discussed above to explain findings that suggest that immigration sometimes reduces crime (Feldmeyer 2009; Martinez 2002; Sampson 2008). However, there are strong reasons to believe that these perspectives may not apply to emerging destinations which, compared to established destinations, have fewer resources (and more barriers) for integrating immigrants (Lichter et al. 2010) and for activating the revitalizing, crime-reducing benefits of immigration (Velez and Lyons 2012). Likewise, emerging destinations have fewer resources for mitigating any adverse effects of immigration on the community (e.g. disorganization, burden on public services) (Bump 2005). Thus, instead of revitalizing the community in ways that decrease crime, immigration may not exert protective benefits and may even disrupt the community (e.g. increased cultural/language heterogeneity, weakened social control, population movement) in ways that increase crime among all groups (Harris and Feldmeyer 2013).

There also are population composition or demographic reasons why immigration may not reduce crime and may even increase crime in emerging destinations. First, there may not be a large enough concentration of immigrants in emerging destinations to change the community (e.g. create institutions, forge social networks) in ways that reduce crime (Velez and Lyons 2012; Zatz and Smith 2012). Research suggests that places
where immigrant concentration is the highest (e.g. disadvantaged communities, established destinations) benefit the most from immigration’s crime reducing effects (Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Velez and Lyons 2012). Second, immigrants to emerging destinations are more likely to be young and male, the demographic group most likely to be involved in crime as either victims or offenders (Steffensmeier et al. 1989). Last, immigrants in emerging destinations are more likely to be undocumented (Passel 2005) and undocumented immigrants are particularly attractive targets of crime.¹⁰

**Immigration Will Have Stronger Crime Reducing Effects in Emerging than in Established Destinations**

Alternatively, immigration may have stronger crime-reducing effects in emerging destinations than in established destinations. Immigration may contribute social capital resources and revitalize emerging destinations (Crowley and Lichter 2009) in ways that lead to reductions in crime (e.g. adding job stability, stabilizing the population, expanding the tax and consumer base). These crime-reducing effects may be stronger in emerging destinations because they are often the communities in most need of the resources (e.g. population growth, people to stabilize their workforce) that immigrants can provide.

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¹⁰ Immigrants and particularly undocumented immigrants are attractive assault and especially robbery targets, often referred to as “walking ATMs” (Bauer 2009: 25), because they are (a) less likely to engage in the formal economy and thus often carry cash on hand, (b) reluctant to contact the police because of distrust and fears concerning deportation, and (c) unlikely to carry firearms which may thwart attacks because of fears regarding deportation (Valenzuela 2006). Moreover, compared to established destinations, immigrants in emerging destinations may be particularly vulnerable because they are less likely to live in ethnic enclaves (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b) which provide a key form of guardianship.
There Will Be No Difference in the Immigration-Crime Relationship Across Destination Types

Last, there may be no difference in the effect of immigration on crime across immigrant destination types. First, immigration may affect crime in the same way across immigrant destination types. In this case, the type of immigrant community may have little influence on how immigration impacts crime. Second, immigration may have unique effects on crime in specific immigrant destinations, but do so in ways that lead to few overall destination differences in immigration’s effects. For instance, immigration’s effects may vary across racial/ethnic groups in established and emerging destinations (e.g. increase Black robbery, decrease White robbery in emerging; decrease Black robbery, increase White robbery in established) in ways that lead to little overall difference in immigration’s effect on the Total population across destination types.

In sum, there are alternate views about how immigrant destination types contextualize the immigration-crime relationship. There are also reasons to believe that the effect of immigration on crime may vary by racial/ethnic groups.

Immigration and Race/Ethnicity Specific Effects

The effects of immigration on crime may vary by racial/ethnic group because, as detailed earlier in the chapter, immigration has unique effects on specific racial/ethnic groups. How immigration impacts a particular racial/ethnic group may depend on a variety of factors including, the degree of economic competition and spatial proximity between immigrants and particular racial/ethnic groups. Most race/ethnicity specific
immigration-crime research has focused on the effect of immigration on Latinos, and to a lesser extent, Blacks.

Latino immigration is likely to have the strongest effects on Latinos because immigrants tend to move into areas with co-ethnics (Martinez 2006; Martinez et al. 2010). For instance, if Latino immigrants establish ties with co-ethnics or with institutions either within or outside of their community, the resources these ties generate may be more likely to benefit Latinos, including leading to reductions in Latino crime, than other racial/ethnic groups. From a compositional standpoint, Latino immigration is most likely to impact Latino crime because Latino immigrants will contribute to both the Latino population that commits crime (numerator) and the Latino population at risk of committing crime (the denominator). Most immigration-crime researchers argue that Latino immigration will revitalize Latino communities and reduce crime among Latinos (but see Feldmeyer 2009).

Researchers have argued that Latino immigration may impact Black crime because Latino immigrants often live close to and compete economically with Blacks. Some researchers contend that immigration may increase crime among Blacks by increasing Black economic hardship (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a), relative deprivation among Blacks (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009), or racial animosity between Blacks and Latinos and Latino immigrants (Cancino, Martinez, and Stowell 2009). In contrast, others have argued that immigration may have revitalizing effects that provide externalities (e.g. economic growth, reduced segregation) that reduce crime among all groups including Blacks (Sampson 2008). Some contend that these crime-reducing
effects may be strongest for minorities (Blacks and Latinos), in part, because minorities tend to live in disadvantaged areas and immigrant concentration is largest in these areas (Velez 2009; Velez and Lyons 2012).

There has been far less theorizing and research on how immigration impacts crime among Whites. Researchers may assume that Latino immigration is less likely to impact Whites than other groups because Latino immigrants are less likely to live close to and compete economically with Whites than with minority groups. Some argue that immigration may decrease crime among Whites by encouraging economic or suburban growth (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009) or by providing other externalities that decrease crime (Sampson 2008). Others have argued that immigration may increase crime among Whites in some circumstances, such as when there is employment competition between immigrants and Whites (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010c).

Joint Effects of Race/Ethnicity and Immigrant Destination Types

Immigration’s effects on crime may be simultaneously conditioned by both immigrant destination type and race/ethnicity. If so, immigration’s effects may vary (a) across destination types in ways that are unique to particular racial ethnic groups (e.g. effects of immigration on Blacks in emerging destinations vs. effects of immigration on Blacks in established destinations) and (b) by racial/ethnic groups within particular destination types (e.g. effect of immigration on Black vs. Whites in Emerging Destinations). I discuss each of these in turn.
First, immigration’s effects may vary across destination types in ways that are unique to a particular racial/ethnic group because the social, structural, and historical conditions of racial/ethnic groups vary by immigrant destination types in ways that may shape immigration-crime relationships (Marrow 2011; also see Bean et al. 1999). In some settings immigration may benefit a group in ways that enhance wellbeing and may reduce crime, while in other settings immigration may be more likely to adversely impact that group in ways that result in more crime.

Recent research on emerging destinations suggests that Latino immigration may be more likely to increase conflict and competition between Latino immigrants and natives (e.g. native Whites and Blacks) in emerging destinations than in established destinations. For example, research on public sentiment towards immigrants presented earlier in the chapter suggests that immigrants in emerging destinations may be particularly likely to elicit racial animosity among native groups, while other research suggests that immigrants in emerging destinations may be especially attractive targets of crime (also see footnote 10). Because natives are predominately White or Black, as opposed to Latino, we may expect greater increases in Black or White violent offending against Latino immigrants. Other research suggests, that at least in some emerging destinations, there may be more economic competition among Latino immigrants and natives, including both Blacks and Whites (Fennelly 2008; Marrow 2011) and that this

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11 Racial animosity towards immigrants and the perception that immigrants are attractive targets of crime may lead to increased offending against Latino natives as well. Assailants may generalize their animosity of immigration towards Latinos as a whole and may also consider Latinos in general attractive targets of crime.
economic competition may lead to increases in crime among Whites (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010c) and Blacks (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a).

In terms of Latinos, there are solid reasons that immigration may have greater crime-increasing effects in emerging destinations than in established destinations. As discussed earlier, because emerging destinations have fewer resources and less experience dealing with immigration, immigration may be more likely to destabilize the community and generate crime in emerging destinations (see Shihadeh and Winters 2010). These effects may have the strongest influence on Latino offending given that immigrants often settle in co-ethnic communities. The argument that immigration may have stronger crime-generating effects, particularly among Latinos, in emerging destinations is supported by studies which suggest that (a) Latino immigration reduces Latino homicide victimization in established destinations but not in emerging destinations (Shihadeh and Winters 2010) and (b) Latinos in emerging destinations are at higher risk of homicide victimization. Researchers argue (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b; Shihadeh and Winters 2010) that Latinos in emerging destinations are more vulnerable to any adverse effects of structural conditions because they are less likely to live in socially organized communities.

Second, immigration’s effects may also vary by racial/ethnic group in ways that are unique to a particular destination type. For example, in emerging destinations immigration may increase crime among Blacks, but have no effect or reduce crime among Whites, whereas in established destinations immigration may affect Whites and Blacks in the same way. The way that immigration’s effects vary across racial/ethnic
groups within a particular destination type may stem from factors such as job market competition (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010c), social organization (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b), segregation (Lichter et al. 2010), and in other characteristics of the groups under study (poverty, discrimination, etc.). The argument that immigration’s effects may vary across groups in ways that are unique to particular immigrant destination is consistent with research which suggests that (a) immigration affects outcomes among groups (e.g. employment) differently within particular destinations (Marrow 2011) and (b) there are racial/ethnic inequalities (segregation, education) that are unique to particular immigrant destinations (Dondero and Muller 2012; Lichter et al. 2010).

**Type of Crime**

Last, it is plausible that “all of the above” (e.g. differences by race/ethnicity, destination, etc.) may vary dependent on type of crime. Researchers have argued that immigration may be more likely to affect instrumental crimes than expressive crimes (Hagan and Palloni 1999; Reid et al. 2005). Instrumental crimes involve financially motivated crimes, including property crimes (e.g. larceny) and robbery; expressive crimes involve crimes that arise from disputes or conflicts, including most assaults and homicides. Among other reasons, immigration may have especially strong effects on instrumental crimes because (a) immigrants may commit property crime out of need, (b) immigrants are attractive targets of acquisitive crimes (particularly robbery), and (c)

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12 Though some assaults and homicides could be considered instrumental in nature as they occur during the commission of crimes that involve a financial motive (e.g. robbery), the overwhelming majority of assaults and homicides are expressive, arising out of arguments (Miethe and Drass 1999).
immigration may adversely affect the economic wellbeing of natives in ways that increase motivations for acquisitive crimes. In contrast, immigration may have weaker effects on expressive forms of violence where the links between immigration and disputes or conflicts may be less strong. As such, destination or race/ethnic differences in immigration’s effects may be more pronounced for instrumental crimes such as robbery than for crimes, like homicide and assault, which tend to be expressive in nature.

THE CURRENT STUDY

Drawing on these themes and prior research, my study examines how the immigration-crime relationship is contextualized by immigrant destination type and race/ethnicity. At issue first, is whether the effects of immigration on crime differ depending on whether the movement of immigrants is into established immigrant destinations (i.e. communities with long histories of immigration) or into emerging immigrant destinations (i.e. communities with little experience with immigration). A second issue is whether the effects of recent immigrant movements on crime vary across racial or ethnic groups (e.g. do effects differ across White, Black or Hispanic comparisons). A third issue, by extension, is whether there is an interaction between these two factors. For instance, do the effects of immigration on Blacks vary by destination type?

Addressing these issues, my guiding hypotheses are as follows. First, I generally expect that immigration flows will have small or trivial effects on both expressive violence and on robbery, and that this pattern will hold across most comparisons. In brief, there will be little in the way of support for either the crime-generating thesis or the
crime-reducing thesis about the effects of immigration on crime for most groups (i.e. Latinos and Whites) and for most circumstances (e.g. in established destinations).

Second, to the extent that immigration does have crime-generating effects, these effects will be most evident in the case of emerging destinations and for Blacks. Prior research and theory suggest that emerging destination communities and Blacks are the most susceptible to any adverse effects of immigration.

My dissertation makes a number of contributions to immigration-crime research. First, by examining whether the effect of immigration on crime is shaped by immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity, the study responds to calls from prominent scholars for research which considers how the immigration-crime relationship is contextualized and to particularly salient calls for research which considers how immigrant destination types (Bursik 2006; Martinez et al. 2010) and race/ethnicity (Velez 2009; Velez and Lyons 2012) shape immigration-crime relationships.

Second, by examining the immigration-crime link in different geographic contexts (e.g. established vs. emerging) and for different racial/ethnic groups my study begins to assess the applicability/relevance of prominent theories of immigration and crime. As noted in the competing perspectives section, there are several prominent perspectives on immigration and crime, but little is known about where and for whom they apply. For instance, scholars have posited that immigration has revitalizing effects, but it remains to be seen whether these effects are limited to established destinations and to Latinos or whether these revitalizing effects extend to emerging immigrant locales and to other racial/ethnic groups (e.g. Whites and Blacks).
Third, the study contributes to the burgeoning sociological literature on the link between immigration and racial/ethnic stratification which examines how immigration impacts particular racial/ethnic groups and their wellbeing relative to other groups. By comparing the effects of immigration on crime across racial/ethnic groups within both emerging and established destinations the study contributes to research on the place stratification perspective which explores the nature of inequalities within particular locales.

Fourth, the study builds on prior research which has focused mostly on Latino homicide victimization by examining the effect of immigration across multiple racial ethnic groups (Whites, Blacks, Latinos) with multiple measures of violence, including both measures of expressive (i.e. assault-homicide index) and instrumental violence (i.e. robbery). Examining the effect of immigration across multiple measures of crime allows me to examine the effect of immigration on the broader criminal landscape and to assess whether the effects of immigration on crime vary by type of crime.

In sum, in this chapter I provided a comprehensive assessment of research and theory concerning the relationship between immigration and crime. I also set forth perspectives as to why the immigration-crime relationship may vary across immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity and detailed the contributions of the current study. In the next chapter, I review the racial invariance hypothesis and discuss how, as an ancillary contribution, the data can be used to build on racial invariance research.
Table 2.1. Prior Macro-Level Studies Examining the Effects of Immigration on Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Spatial Unit</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Victimization</th>
<th>Dependent Measure</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martinez 1996</td>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>Combined violent victimization and offending</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaniz, Cartmill, Parker 1998</td>
<td>Block Groups</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>Combined violent victimization and offending</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Null</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butcher, Piehl 1998</td>
<td>Metro Areas</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Violent index, Crime Index</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Null</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinez 2000</td>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total (Null); Hispanic (Mixed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee, Martinez, Rosenfeld 2001</td>
<td>Tracts</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>El Paso, Miami, San Diego</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinez 2003</td>
<td>Tracts</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinez, Lee, Nielsen 2004</td>
<td>Tracts</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>Miami, San Diego</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nielsen, Lee, Martinez, 2005</td>
<td>Tracts</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>Miami, San Diego</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reid, Weiss, Adelman, Jaret 2005</td>
<td>Metropolitan Statistical Areas</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampson, Morenoff, Raudenbush 2005</td>
<td>Multilevel 1=Persons 2=Tracts</td>
<td>1=2925, 2=180</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Self Reported Violence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stowell 2007</td>
<td>Tracts</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>Alexandria, Houston, Miami</td>
<td>Violent index, robbery, expressive violence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stowell, Martinez 2007</td>
<td>Tracts</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>Houston and Miami</td>
<td>Violent index, robbery, expressive violence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinez, Stowell, and Cancino 2008</td>
<td>Tracts</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>San Diego, San Antonio</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldmeyer, Steffensmeier 2009</td>
<td>Places</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>Homicide, Robbery</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Total &amp; Hispanic (Null); White &amp; Black (Negative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldmeyer 2009</td>
<td>Places</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>New York, California</td>
<td>Homicide, Robbery, Violent Index</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Offsetting Effects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Ousey, Kubrin 2009</td>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Violent Crime Index</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shihadeh, Barranco 2010a</td>
<td>Cities</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3 Racial Invariance Thesis

A second major objective of this dissertation is to contribute conceptually and empirically to assessments of racial disparities in crime and to the racial invariance hypothesis, which posits that structural conditions, and particularly, structural disadvantage indicators predict violent crime in the same way for all racial and ethnic groups. There has been a significant growth in recent years in macro-social or community-level studies analyzing race/ethnic-specific outcomes and explanatory variables. But, as several careful reviews show (Ousey 2000; Steffensmeier et al. 2010), large gaps remain in the empirical literature on racial disparities in crime and the structural sources of those disparities. As I spell out below, my central aim here is to advance the extant research on the racial invariance issue by examining whether racial differences in the effects of structural factors on crime differ across the two spatial units that are the focus of the immigration-crime analysis: established vs. emerging immigrant localities. Added contributions involve the inclusion of Latinos in tests of the invariance thesis as well as testing the hypothesis with both robbery, a form of violence that is typically “instrumental” or financially motivated, and an assault-homicide index (henceforth, expressive violence), forms of violence which typically arise out of interpersonal disputes or conflicts.

The chapter unfolds as follows. I first provide some background on research on the race-violence relationship. In this section I detail the origins of the racial invariance hypothesis and some of the main conceptual and empirical issues that need to be addressed when testing the hypothesis. Then I review some of the remaining
shortcomings in the literature which the current study seeks to address. This is followed by a discussion of how the current study contributes to the racial invariance hypothesis. In particular, I emphasize the importance of examining the hypothesis in both established and emerging immigrant destinations.

**BACKGROUND: THE RACIAL INVARIANCE HYPOTHESIS**

Despite overall declines in violence over the past two decades, racial/ethnic disparities in violent offending have persisted (Steffensmeier et al. 2011). Research indicates that Blacks, and to a lesser extent Latinos, commit a disproportionate amount of violent crime. Although Blacks made up less than 15% of the population in 2011, they accounted for 50% of all homicide arrests and 56% of all robbery arrests (Crime in the United States 2011). Recent research indicates that Latinos are disproportionately represented in violent crime statistics as well, having rates of violence lower than Blacks, but higher than Whites (Harris and Feldmeyer 2013).

Racial disparities in violence have been a longstanding interest among criminologists and sociologists. Drawing on prominent macro-social theories of crime (e.g. social disorganization, anomie) scholars have argued that race/ethnic differences in crime are rooted in the different community circumstances in which groups tend to live (Sampson and Wilson 1995; Wilson 1987). Blacks and Latinos, for example, have higher rates of crime than Whites because they tend to live in disadvantaged environments conducive to crime.
The argument that race difference in crime are the product of race differences in the structural conditions of the communities in which racial/ethnic groups tend to live is at the core of the racial invariance hypothesis (Ousey 1999). In short, the hypothesis argues that, net of structural factors, race does not influence crime rates. This argument can be traced to researchers from the “Chicago school” of sociology who sought to explain neighborhood differences in crime rates (Shaw and McKay 1942). A central finding from their research is that crime rates remained high in certain disadvantaged Chicago neighborhoods despite changes in the racial/ethnic composition of these neighborhoods. This finding is consistent with social disorganization and structural strain/anomie perspectives which propose that (a) structural disadvantage is associated with higher crime rates and (b) this association is invariant or similar across racial/ethnic groups (Ousey 1999).

As reviewed elsewhere (see Ousey 1999; Steffensmeier et al. 2010), these propositions have generated a sizeable body of empirical research which falls into two main groups. The first group of research focuses mainly on the first proposition discussed above and uses global measures of crime and violence (i.e. measures for overall or Total population) to examine how structural conditions explain variations in crime across aggregate units. These studies have provided strong support for the proposition that structural disadvantage, whether operationalized as discrete indicators (e.g. unemployment, poverty) or composite measures (e.g. index of disadvantage), is associated with higher rates of crime (Land, McCall, Cohen 1990; Pratt and Cullen 2005). Though these studies help establish the link between structural disadvantage and violence, they do not use race-specific independent and dependent measures and thus
cannot directly test the racial invariance hypothesis that the effects of structural conditions behave the same way across racial/ethnic groups.

A second and more recent group of studies examines the second proposition, the racial invariance hypothesis, by using race/ethnicity disaggregated independent and dependent variables. Most tests of the invariance hypothesis examine whether structural factors, including discrete and composite indicators of disadvantage influence crime in the same way across racial/ethnic groups (see reviews in Parker 2008; Peterson and Krivo 2005). As noted above, major structural theories of crime argue that race/ethnic differences in crime are rooted in differences in the structural conditions of the communities these groups tend to occupy. Thus, as noted by Ousey (1999), this implies that while there may be differences in the structural circumstances of racial/ethnic groups, the effects of structural factors should be the same across groups. Differences across racial/ethnic groups in the effects (significance, size of effects) of structural factors suggest that other factors such as culture may be at play in influencing crime among specific groups (Steffensmeier et al. 2010). Several reviews of the racial invariance

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13 There are two other main tests of the racial invariance hypothesis. One test examines the extent to which structural disadvantage and other factors can explain away the effect of racial composition (% Black, % Latino) on local crime rates (e.g. Shihadeh and Shrum 2004). An effect of race suggests that other factors such as culture (e.g. subculture of violence) or the interaction between culture and structure may be at play (e.g. normative responses to structural conditions). A second test of the racial invariance hypothesis attempts to explain racial/ethnic gaps in crime using structural variables (e.g. Phillips 2002; Ulmer et al. 2012; Velez, Krivo, and Peterson 2003). This is a test of the racial invariance hypothesis because if race or unmeasured factors correlated with race do not affect crime rates then structural factors should be able to explain away most of the gap in crime between groups.
hypothesis have been conducted. Some of these reviews argue that evidence supports the racial invariance hypothesis (Krivo and Peterson 2000) while others argue that the hypothesis is inconclusive (Ousey 1999; Parker, 2008; Phillips 2002).

RECENT ADVANCES: TESTING THE RACIAL INVARIANCE HYPOTHESIS

In their 2010 article Steffensmeier and colleagues advanced research on racial invariance by outlining important scope and conceptual issues that should be considered when testing the hypothesis. The central argument of the article is that conclusions regarding racial invariance are uncertain and remain “a moving target” because the parameters associated with testing it have been ambiguously defined (Steffensmeier et al. 2010:1160). They argue that when testing the racial invariance hypothesis at least 5 factors should be considered, including the (a) dependent variable, (b) the independent variables, (c) the appropriate spatial unit for testing the hypothesis, (d) the racial/ethnic groups under study, and (e) strict vs. lenient tests. I briefly discuss each of these issues as they are important for structuring and interpreting tests of the racial invariance hypothesis.

Dependent Variable

One important consideration when testing the racial invariance hypothesis is the specification of the dependent variable. There is ambiguity in the research literature as to which dependent variable the racial invariance thesis should apply to. This is an important question because it in part determines whether the hypothesis generalizes to all forms of crime or whether it is more narrow in scope. Most studies have limited their
analyses to homicide (Ousey 1999), others to violence more broadly defined (Sampson and Wilson 1995), and others to crime in general (Miethe and Meier 1994). Results suggest that substantive conclusions regarding the racial invariance hypothesis differ depending on which dependent variable is used. Steffensmeier and colleagues (2010) found more racial/ethnic differences in the effects of structural disadvantage on violent index offending and thus less support for the racial invariance hypothesis than when using homicide offending, for which structural disadvantage had generally uniform or invariant effects across groups.

Independent Variables

A second important consideration when testing the racial invariance hypothesis is which explanatory variables are predicted to behave similarly across racial/ethnic groups. It is widely agreed that the effects of structural disadvantage provide the most crucial test of the racial invariance hypothesis. However, some studies focus on discrete structural factors, such as inequality (Harer and Steffensmeier 1992) or poverty, while other studies focus on the effect of a disadvantage index (Lee 2000). Some researchers argue that rather than comparing the effects of single indicators of disadvantage (e.g. poverty, inequality) the most important test of the invariance hypothesis is that a dimension of disadvantage (i.e. structural disadvantage index) behaves the same way across racial/ethnic groups (Lee 2000; Peterson and Krivo 2005). Structural theories of crime (social disorganization and structural/strain anomie) would argue that disadvantage, whether operationalized as an index or as separate indicators, should predict crime in the same way across racial or ethnic groups. Deviations from this would imply that structural
theories of crime need to be revised in order to explain why disadvantage impacts crime in different ways across groups. While there is widespread agreement that structural disadvantage should be the primary focus of tests of racial invariance, studies differ dramatically in terms of the control variables that they use and in decisions regarding whether they should be considered in tests of the invariance hypothesis. Some argue that control variables particularly social disorganization indicators (i.e. residential instability, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, etc.) should behave the same way across groups.

Steffensmeier and colleagues (2010) tested the invariance thesis using an index of structural disadvantage, discrete indicators of disadvantage (e.g. poverty, unemployment), and “social disorganization” indicators such as residential instability and population density. They found that whether measured as an overall index or as discrete indicators (e.g. poverty, unemployment, female headship), structural disadvantage was generally significantly and positively associated with both homicide and violent index offending for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. Though disadvantage was a robust predictor of violence for all groups, they found some racial/ethnic differences in the magnitude of the effects of structural disadvantage on measures of violence with some measures having significantly stronger effects on one group compared to another. As for the social disorganization indicators, they found as many differences as there were similarities in the effects of these variables across racial/ethnic groups.
Spatial Unit

A third important issue to be considered when testing the racial invariance hypothesis is the spatial unit. Researchers have tested the hypothesis with different spatial units and there are debates about the relative merits of one unit compared to another (see reviews in Peterson and Krivo 2005; Steffensmeier et al. 2010). Consistent with my dissertation, Steffensmeier and colleagues (2010) built on racial invariance research by using census places as the unit of analysis. Census places, which range in size from small towns to large cities, provide several advantages to the study of racial invariance. First, they provide a diverse range of spatial units that vary along a number of dimensions. Second, there are large enough numbers of each of the major racial/ethnic groups and crimes to conduct reliable statistical analysis; it is difficult to construct reliable race/ethnicity specific measures of crime at smaller units of analysis, such as neighborhoods, where crime counts disaggregated by type of crime and race may be low (e.g. neighborhood level White homicides). Third, compared to neighborhoods, census places provide more overlap in structural conditions across racial/ethnic groups and thus allow for tests of similarly situated racial/ethnic groups. When groups under analysis experience drastically different levels of structural disadvantage it is difficult to accurately compare the effects of disadvantage across groups (i.e. problem of restricted distributions).^{14}

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^{14} McNulty (2001) illustrated that comparisons of structural disadvantage on crime across groups may be confounded by the lack of overlap in the distributions of disadvantage between the groups. Blacks tend to live in areas with higher levels of structural disadvantage than Whites. An increase in disadvantage may have stronger effects on
Racial/Ethnic Groups Under Study

A fourth important issue to consider when testing the racial invariance hypothesis is the racial/ethnic groups under study. Although the racial invariance thesis hypothesizes that the causes of crime are invariant across all racial/ethnic groups, the overwhelming majority of research has only compared Blacks with Whites.

Steffensmeier and colleagues (2010) built on studies of racial invariance by including Latinos in their analysis. There are several important reasons for including Latinos in tests of the racial invariance hypothesis. First, they are the largest and fastest growing minority group in the United States. Second, there are strong reasons to expect that disadvantage may affect Latinos differently from other racial/ethnic groups. Namely, research suggests that there is a Latino paradox whereby Latinos do better on a variety of outcomes including lower involvement in crime than one would expect given the levels of disadvantage they experience (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Sampson 2008). The Latino paradox, coupled with the observation that Black rates of violence are higher than would be expected solely on the basis of the levels of disadvantage they experience, suggests that other factors, such as culture, may help explain race/ethnic differences in crime. Third, including Latinos helps to address the issue of restricted distributions of disadvantage between racial/ethnic groups (McNulty 2001) because greater overlap...
occurs in levels of disadvantage between Black and Hispanic (and between Latino and White) populations compared with Black-White comparisons.

**Strict vs. Lenient Tests**

Steffensmeier and colleagues (2010) argue that these issues (independent variable, dependent variable, spatial unit, meaning of race) provide avenues for testing the validity of the racial invariance hypothesis. One can provide stricter or more lenient tests depending on how one conceptualizes these issues. For instance, stricter tests of the racial invariance hypothesis would argue that the sources of violence should be identical (a) in direction and magnitude, (b) across all structural factors, not just discrete indicators or the structural disadvantage index, (c) for all racial/ethnic groups, not just Blacks or Whites, and (d) for all crimes not just violent crimes. A lenient test of the racial invariance thesis would only require that disadvantage would be positively associated with violence and be roughly similar in size, but not require that the effects be statistically equal across all offenses and groups.

**SHORTCOMINGS IN THE LITERATURE ON RACIAL INVARIANCE**

As noted above, recent developments in the racial invariance research have made major advances in addressing the racial invariance hypothesis. These advances notwithstanding, there are several important gaps in the literature that need to be addressed. First, there is a need to assess the racial invariance hypothesis across a broader range of geographic units and in qualitatively different geographic contexts. To date, most racial invariance research which has included Latinos in the analysis has been
limited to established immigrant destination cities such as Miami (Martinez 2002) and Chicago (Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005; Velez 2006) or to established destination states of California and New York (Steffensmeier et al. 2010). These established destinations are primarily in the West (California, Texas) or Northeast (New York, Chicago). There is very little racial invariance research that includes Latinos and provides coverage of emerging destinations and/or coverage of the Midwest and South.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, little is known about whether findings regarding racial invariance in established locales generalize to a broader set of geographic areas and whether findings vary by immigrant destination type. Below I discuss why it is important to study the racial invariance hypothesis across a broader range of geographic units and evaluate perspectives as to why findings regarding racial invariance may vary by immigrant destination type.

Second, there is a shortage of racial invariance research which includes Latinos in the analysis and also considers multiple measures of crime. Most racial invariance research that has incorporated Latinos has focused on homicide which only covers a very small fraction of crime. Little is known about how structural factors impact different types of crime among Latinos (robbery vs. expressive violence) and how these effects

\textsuperscript{15} Though a sizeable share of emerging destinations are in the South and Midwest, I chose to separate these constructs in the text because (a) not all places under study in the South and Midwest are emerging destinations, (b) not all emerging destinations are in the South and Midwest, many are in the East and West, and (c) research has shown that there may be important regional differences in the effects of structural factors on particular racial/ethnic groups, effects that are distinct from destination influences. Though this study focuses primarily on destination differences in findings regarding racial invariance, an important avenue for future research involves regional comparisons.
vary across groups (White, Black, Latino). As discussed below, there are important reasons to believe that conclusions regarding racial invariance may differ depending on the type of crime under study.

RACIAL INVARIANCE HYPOTHESIS-ASSESSING THE GENERALIZABILITY OF RESULTS

As noted above, most research on racial invariance that has included Latinos has focused on established immigrant destination sites. Examining the racial invariance hypothesis across a broader set of study units is important for assessing the generalizability of results. Research has shown that the predictors of violence for particular racial/ethnic groups vary by the geographic area under study (Parker and Pruitt 2000; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b; Shihadeh and Winters 2010).\textsuperscript{16} These within-race differences across geographic locations likely have important implications for assessing

\textsuperscript{16} Research suggests that different geographic areas capture important variation within specific racial/ethnic groups in terms of culture, history, and modes of social organization and that these differences may condition the effect that structural factors have on crime for specific racial/ethnic groups. For instance, research has shown that the structural factors that impact White violence vary across geographic regions with structural factors, structural disadvantage in particular, playing a more prominent role in explanations of White violence in the West than White violence in the South (Parker and Pruitt 2000). Parker and Pruitt argue that these regional differences are likely rooted in the role of culture in Southern White violence. Importantly, these within-race differences across geographic areas in the structural predictors of crime may contribute to between-race differences in the behavior of structural factors within particular areas. For instance, if culture plays an important role in explanations of Southern White violence, then we may expect \textit{more} Black-White differences in the effects of structural factors in the Southern region than in other regions.
race/ethnic differences in the structural sources of crime (see footnote 18). Expanding the units of analysis under study to include emerging destinations and other communities from different parts of the country (e.g. South, Midwest) allows for a more “geographically comprehensive” assessment of the racial invariance hypothesis.

RACIAL INVARIANCE AND DESTINATION TYPES

To date there are no studies to my knowledge that examine the racial invariance hypothesis in emerging immigrant destinations or compare findings regarding racial invariance in established vs. emerging destinations. There are important reasons to believe that conclusions regarding racial invariance in the causes of crime may vary by immigrant destination type. As discussed in detail below, these differences may largely be rooted in variability in how structural disadvantage impacts Latino crime in emerging vs. established destination communities.

Latinos are the crucial group under consideration in tests of destination differences in conclusions regarding racial invariance. Research suggests that the Latino paradox, whereby Latinos have lower crime than would be expected given the structural conditions they experience, may be less applicable in emerging Latino communities (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; Shihadeh and Winters 2010). Latinos in emerging destinations may be more vulnerable to the adverse effects of structural disadvantage because emerging destinations have contexts of reception that offer fewer resources and more barriers for both integrating immigrants and for mitigating any adverse effects of structural factors on the Latino community (see review in Chapter 2). Most important, perhaps, ethnic enclaves thought to offer protective benefits (e.g. employment
opportunities, social support, informal social control) to Latinos are not as well-developed in emerging destinations (Lacy 2009).

Supporting these arguments, research has found that disadvantage has stronger effects on Latino homicide victimization in emerging destinations than in established destinations (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b; Shihadeh and Winters 2010). This within-race difference across immigrant destination types likely has implications for the racial invariance hypothesis. For instance, because of the observed Latino paradox in established destinations, one might expect disadvantage to have weaker effects on Latinos compared to other groups in established destinations. Because disadvantage is predicted to have stronger effects on Latinos in emerging destinations one might expect there to be fewer differences in the effects of structural disadvantage across groups in emerging destinations.

Examining the racial invariance hypothesis in both established and emerging destinations has important implications for criminological theories and prominent debates in sociology. First, if the racial invariance hypothesis receives stronger support in some

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17 Shihadeh and Barranco (2010b) also find that county levels of Latino linguistic isolation (English-non proficiency) are associated with higher levels of Latino homicide victimization in emerging destinations, but not in established destinations. The authors argue that this difference is largely due to destination differences in community social organization. In established destinations, the penalties for lacking English fluency are less because Latinos tend to live in socially organized communities where Spanish language can be effectively used in business and social settings and where there is abundant co-ethnic support. By contrast, in emerging destinations where the community, ethnic-economy, and social support systems are less well-developed, linguistic isolation penalizes Latinos in ways that increase the risk of homicide victimization (e.g. hurts economic prospects).
locations (e.g. established destinations) than others (e.g. emerging destinations), it suggests that other factors besides structural conditions may be at play and that these factors are tied to local context.\textsuperscript{18} Second, it has implications for research on racial/ethnic stratification. In particular, there is an interest in how Latinos and Latino immigrants are faring relative to other groups and whether these racial/ethnic differences vary across immigrant destination types. There is a concern among some that Latinos in emerging destinations are a particularly vulnerable population whose prospects may fall closer to other disadvantaged minorities (e.g. Blacks) than to Whites. In regards to crime, comparing the effects that structural conditions have on crime for each racial/ethnic group (e.g. Latinos, Whites, Blacks) within both established and emerging destinations offers insight as to how Latinos are faring within these two different types of communities.

\textsuperscript{18}Testing for racial/ethnic differences in the effects of structural factors helps assess recent arguments that the applicability of the Latino paradox varies by destination type. As noted in the text, Shihadeh and colleagues argue that the Latino paradox, whereby Latinos experience lower levels of crime than would be expected given the disadvantages they experience, is less applicable in emerging destinations. Specifically, they find structural disadvantage has a stronger effect on Latino victimization in emerging destinations than in established destinations (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b, also see Shihadeh and Winters 2010). By comparing the effects of structural conditions (especially disadvantage) across groups separately in emerging and established destinations, I can see whether the destination specific effects for Latinos are unique to Latinos or apply to each racial group. That is, if the effects of structural disadvantage are stronger for each group in emerging destinations than in established destinations, it weakens arguments that destination differences are unique to Latinos.
CRIME COMPARISONS: EXPRESSIVE VIOLENCE VS. ROBBERY

As noted above, Steffensmeier and colleagues (2010) highlight the importance of testing the racial invariance hypothesis across different types of crime. They found that disadvantage had more similar effects across racial/ethnic groups for homicide than for the violent index. The current study builds on the research of Steffensmeier and colleagues (2010) by assessing the invariance hypothesis across an index of expressive violence (sum of homicide and assault), forms of violence that typically arise from disputes or conflicts, and a measure of instrumental violence (robbery), a form of violence that is financially motivated.

There are important reasons to test the invariance hypothesis across multiple measures of crime. First, measures of crime differ in how reliably they are measured. If findings persist across multiple measures of crime, it suggests the results are robust. Second, the homicide-assault index (i.e. expressive violence index) and robbery tap into different crime motivations and could potentially help identify racial/ethnic differences in responses to structural conditions such as disadvantage. Evaluating the racial invariance hypothesis with each of these measures helps explore whether there are group differences in how structural disadvantage impacts financially motivated violence (robbery) and forms of violence (assault, homicide) which most often arises out of disputes.

In sum, in this chapter I provided an assessment of racial invariance research including a review of recent developments and remaining shortcomings in the empirical literature. I also highlighted the importance of evaluating the racial invariance hypothesis (a) across a broader range of geographic units, (b) with different measures of crime, and
(c) in both established and emerging immigrant destinations. In the next chapter, I detail the data and methods that will be used in my analyses.
The current study examines how the effects of immigration on crime vary across immigrant destination types (emerging vs. established) and offender’s race/ethnicity (White, Blacks, Latinos). As an important side issue, the data are used to examine the racial invariance hypothesis that the structural sources of crime, most notably structural disadvantage, behave similarly across racial/ethnic groups. Information on Total and race/ethnicity disaggregated violence is drawn from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) and the crime reporting files of California, New York, and Texas for the 1999-2001 period. Information on immigration patterns and structural characteristics of the Total population and for White, Black, and Latino populations are drawn from the 2000 U.S Census data. These data sources are described in more detail below.

DATA SOURCES

CENSUS PLACES

The unit of analysis is the incorporated census place. Census places are non-overlapping geographic units, which have a local identity, a sizeable population, and a residential core. There are two main types of census places: incorporated places and non-incorporated places (CDPs) (Census 1994). The majority of census places are incorporated (approximately 83% in the United States). Census places become incorporated under the laws of its state and most have active governing bodies that have elected officials and provide services. The criteria for becoming incorporated vary across states and often include factors such as population thresholds, population density, and
minimum land area. Incorporated places range in size from small towns and villages with several hundred people to large cities with more than one million residents. Census Designated Places (CDPs) resemble incorporated places along several dimensions (e.g. large concentrations of people, a local identity, a residential core), but unlike incorporated places, do not have their own governments. The current study focuses on incorporated places because crime data is rarely available for CDPs.

Census places provide several advantages for the current study. First, census places are large enough to provide reliable measures of social structural characteristics and violence for each racial/ethnic group. It is difficult to find smaller aggregate units (e.g. neighborhoods) that have populations of each racial/ethnic group (e.g. Whites, Blacks, Latinos) that are large enough to construct reliable race/ethnicity-specific measures of crime.

Second, compared to larger study units (e.g. large counties, MSAs), census places provide greater variation on structural characteristics (size, racial composition) and violence, providing a diverse set of units for examining the link between immigration and crime. Research which uses larger study units (large counties, MSAs) tends to limit variation in independent and dependent measures.

Third, compared to neighborhoods, census places provide greater overlap in structural conditions across racial/ethnic groups allowing for stronger tests of the racial invariance hypothesis (see Steffensmeier et al. 2010). Highlighting the problem of “restricted distributions” researchers have argued that it is difficult to compare the effects of structural factors, such as disadvantage, across groups because Whites rarely live in areas with levels of disadvantage similar to those experienced by minority groups (e.g.
Blacks and Latinos) (Krivo and Peterson 2000; McNulty 2001; Peterson and Krivo 2005). Census places, because they are larger, provide greater overlap in the structural conditions of each racial/ethnic group and, thus, a better opportunity to compare the effects of structural indicators across groups. For example, for the full set of communities under analysis (N=528), the average percentage of Blacks (6.5%) and Latinos (5.2%) who are unemployed is notably higher than the percentage for Whites (3.2%); however, the standard deviations for Black, Latino, and White unemployment measures (3.5; 2.5; 1.2, respectively) indicate overlap in census place unemployment levels across racial/ethnic groups (see Table 5.1).

Fourth, census places are strategic because they provide a unit of analysis where differences in the “contexts of reception” between emerging and established immigrant destinations are perhaps most prominent. Census places are political units where decisions that structure opportunities (e.g. education, housing) and barriers (e.g. housing ordinances; exclusionary zoning) that affect wellbeing are made (see review in Lichter, Parisi, and Taquino 2012). These contexts can work to facilitate or hamper immigrant integration and the concerns of immigrants and, in turn, may shape the way immigration impacts a community.  

\[\text{Census places are often the units that pass restrictive (e.g. English only ordinances) or pro-immigrant related ordinances (e.g. sanctuary cities: localities that enact ordinances that prohibit police and other local agencies from inquiring into the legal status of immigrants and/or do not allow local funds to be used to implement federal immigration laws)(see reviews of ordinances in Marczak et al. 2011; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2007). Census places are also often the units of analysis where community planners and nongovernmental agencies help link immigrants to their needs (e.g. transportation, health care, education) and the units that have to adjust public services to account for the}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{19}}\]
Several selection criteria were used to enhance the reliability of measures of violence and structural characteristics. Census places were included only if they had a total population of 10,000 and at least 500 members of each racial/ethnic group under analysis (Whites, Blacks, Latinos) in the year 2000. These selection criteria resulted in 528 census places for analysis. This set of census places was partitioned into established and emerging immigrant destinations

DESTINATION TYPES

Recent social science research, as well as criminological research, suggests that it is important to distinguish between immigrant destination types (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b, 2010c; Shihadeh and Winters 2010). Immigrant destination types offer a useful way to categorize immigrant settlement areas by geographic location and historical settlement trends. A variety of typologies of immigrant destination types (or gateways) (see for example Hall et al. 2011; Singer 2004) have been used but the most common has been the classification of destinations into “emerging” (i.e. new) vs. “established” (i.e. traditional, old).

Conceptually, established destinations are locations that had a relatively large Latino presence before the geographic diversification of Latino populations (which began in the late 1980’s) and retained a large Latino presence into 2000 (Lichter et al. 2010). A sizeable Latino population in 1990 is seen as a proxy for the existing institutional infrastructure for Latino immigrant incorporation. For the purposes of the study, established destinations are defined as census places where at least 10% of the population increased demands associated with immigration (Price and Waters 2008). Some of these processes also occur at the county level (see Price and Singer 2008).
was Latino in 1990 and 2000 (for similar approach to defining destination types see Kandel and Cromartie 2004; Lichter and Johnson 2009). One example of an established destination is San Bernardino, California whose population was 35% Latino in 1990 and 48% in 2000.

In contrast, emerging destinations are locales that had small Latino populations prior to rapid Latino growth over the past decade. They are operationalized as census places whose Latino population composed less than 10% of the census place population in 1990 (i.e. not an established destination) and that experienced at least a 100% increase in the Latino population from 1990 to 2000. An example of an emerging destination is Richmond City, Virginia whose Latino population made up less than 1% of the census place population in 1990 and grew by over 160% between 1990 and 2000.

Descriptive statistics of my sample reveal destination differences in the Latino population which align closely with extant research, thus lending confidence that my samples of established and emerging destinations are tapping into the correct communities. First, the proportion of the Latino population in the crime prone age group (e.g. males age 15-24) is significantly higher in emerging destinations (24.9%) than in established destinations (19%). This is consistent with research which shows that the Latino population (especially Latino immigrant) in emerging destinations is more likely to be young and male (see Chapter 2). Second, descriptive statistics (not displayed) show that emerging destinations have migration streams composed of a greater proportion of males (2.1 males for every 1 female) than established destinations (1.27 males for every female). This finding is consistent with arguments that in the early stages of development of migration streams the streams tend to be dominated by males (see Chapter 2). Below I
show maps of established (Figure 4.1) and emerging destinations (Figure 4.2) for both the full universe of census places in the United States and for the locales under study.

Figure 4.1 shows the spatial distribution of all established destination census places in the United States (N=507). Those that are covered by the database are in black (N=297), whereas those that are not covered are in grey (N=209). The established destinations covered in the current study are primarily located in California (64% of established destinations), Texas (27%), and New York (6%). Colorado (<1%), Utah (<1%), Connecticut (<1%), Kansas (<1%), and Massachusetts (1%) also contribute established destination units to the analysis. The predominance of California, Texas, and New York in the established destination sample is expected given that these are 3 of the main established destination states and because data were collected from their crime reporting programs. Established destination locales from other states were obtained from the NIBRS database.20

Figure 4.2 shows the spatial distribution of all emerging destination census places in the United States (N=578). Those that are covered by the database are in black (N=117), whereas those that are not covered are in grey (N=461). Established destinations under study are located primarily in the South in the states of Tennessee (17% of emerging destinations), Virginia (13%), and South Carolina (11%). A sizeable

20 The sample of established destinations covers approximately 60% (297/507) of established destination census places in the United States. This coverage jumps to 70% (297/423) when CDP’s (who typically do not collect crime data) are not considered. States that have sizeable shares of established destination census places that are not covered by the data include New Jersey, Arizona, Florida, and Illinois. These states do not have census place arrest data that include Latino arrest counts for the years under study.
share are also in the Southwest in states typically viewed as established destinations, including Texas (31%) and California (5%). This indicates that even within larger established destination aggregates there are new pockets of recent Latino growth. A number of Midwestern states also contribute units to the analysis, including Iowa (4%), Kansas (5%), North Dakota (<1%), and Nebraska (<1%). Census places from Northeastern states including New York (4%), Connecticut (<1%), and Massachusetts (3%) are also represented.²¹

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Two main dependent variables are used in the analysis: (a) an index of expressive violence which combines arrests for homicide and assault (see Stowell and Martinez 2007), two crimes that typically arise from interpersonal conflicts or disputes and (b) robbery arrest rates as an indicator of “instrumental” or financially motivated violence.²²²³ The expressive violence index is analyzed in Chapter 5, while robbery is

²¹ The sample of emerging destinations covers approximately 20% (117/578) of emerging destination census places in the country. This coverage increases to 24% (117/484) when CDP’s (who typically do not collect crime data) are not considered. States that have sizeable shares of established destination census places that are not covered by the data include Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and North Carolina. These states do not have census place arrest data that include Latino arrest counts for the years under study.

²² There is some debate in the violence literature (see review in Miethe and Drass 1999; also see Felson 1993) as to the accuracy of the instrumental vs. expressive categorization of violence. For my purposes here, they are terms for separating out a form of violence that is primarily property based (e.g. robbery) from forms of violence (e.g. homicide and assault) that tend to arise out of disputes or conflicts. The categorization of homicides and assaults as expressive violence is admittedly imperfect as some assaults and homicides are instrumental in nature as they occur during the commission of crimes that involve a financial motive (e.g. robberies). However, the overwhelming majority of assaults and homicides are expressive, arising out of arguments (Miethe and Drass, 1999).
analyzed in chapter 6. These variables are measured separately for the Total population and for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. Examining the immigration-crime link for both robbery and an index of expressive violence allows me to test the expectation that immigration’s effects may be stronger for financially motivated crimes (Hagan and Palloni 1999). The arrests were pooled across 3 years (1999-2001) to add stability to the estimates and to ensure adequate offense counts. The rates are square-root transformed to normalize their distributions and account for any non-linearity in the relationships between the predictors and crime outcomes (see Phillips 2002).

Arrest data are subject to many well-known criticisms, but the types of violence under study are violent index crimes which are viewed as more serious than non-index crimes. Compared to non-index crimes, violent index crimes are more reliably

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23 I use an index of expressive violence (combining assault with homicide) instead of homicide, the most reliably reported crime, for two main reasons. First, as part of the study I am interested in comparing the effects of immigration across types of crime. I can analyze the expressive violence index and robbery with OLS, which allows direct comparisons of the effects of structural factors across the two types of crime. Homicide, because of its highly skewed distribution and presence of many zero values, requires the use of negative binomial regression (NBR). NBR coefficients cannot be easily compared to the OLS coefficients for robbery. Second, for some models there were very few homicides, which likely undermines the reliability of estimates even when using NBR. For instance, 74% of emerging destinations have 0 Latino homicides for the years under study.

24 Some of the census places under analysis did not participate in NIBRS for all three years but rather began participating in 2000 or 2001. In these cases the data are adjusted to take into account the number of years reporting. Specifically, before calculating rates census places that provided 2 years of data had their crime counts multiplied by 1.5, whereas census places that provided 1 year of data had their crime counts multiplied by 3. For a similar strategy see Peterson and Krivo 2010.

25 Violent index crimes include homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, and rape.
reported to the police and likely to result in an arrest, and are considered a suitable proxy for violent offending (Krivo and Peterson 1996; LaFree, Baumer, O’Brien 2010; O’Brien 2003). To address some of the concerns with arrest data, police per capita, measured as the number of sworn police officers per 1000 residents, was controlled for because differences in police presence may account for differences in detection and reporting of crime.

The arrest data were culled from two main data sources: (1) the crime reporting files of California, New York, and Texas and the (2) National Incident Based Reporting System’s (NIBRS) arrestee extract file (1999-2001). Before discussing the strengths and limitations of these databases, I briefly introduce the National Incident Based Reporting System.

NIBRS has gained prominence as a “semi-national” source of crime data; as of 2012 it covered roughly 29% of the nation’s population, covering mostly the South and

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26 The main criticisms of arrest data (Mosher, Miethe, and Hart 2010) are that they underestimate true levels of offending and that racial/ethnic differences in arrest may reflect stronger police enforcement in areas with larger minority populations. These criticisms are less relevant to the serious crimes under study which are more reliably reported to the police and more likely to result in arrest.

27 California arrest data were obtained from the California Bureau of Criminal Information and Analysis (1999-2001), the New York data from New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (1999-2001), and the Texas data from the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime and Information (1999-2001).

28 NIBRS extract files were created to make it more accessible and user friendly. Like the crime reporting programs, NIBRS extract files report the most serious arrest. The CAL, NYASD, and NIBRS data provide arrest counts at the police-agency level disaggregated by race, ethnicity, age, and sex. The Texas data provide arrest counts at the census place-level disaggregated by race/ethnicity and juvenile/adult. The agency level arrest data (CAL, NYAS, NIBRS) were merged with the UCR Crosswalk Data (U.S. Department of Justice 2000) to further aggregate arrest data to the census place-level.
Midwest, including several emerging destination states (for review of NIBRS see Addington 2009; Roberts 2009). In contrast to the limited data provided in the more familiar Uniform Crime Reporting program, NIBRS is a complex incident based system which provides rich information including, but not limited to, details of the offense, offender, victim, arrestee, and any property associated with the offense. Once a state becomes NIBRS certified, individual police agencies report this incident-level data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

These data sources (NIBRS and the state crime reporting programs) provide two key advantages for the current study. First, they provide a Latino arrest identifier which permits race/ethnicity disaggregated analysis of offending and comparisons of the effect of immigration on crime across racial/ethnic groups. In contrast, arrest data traditionally collected by way of state crime reporting programs typically lack a separate identifier for coding Latino arrestees. Instead, Latino arrestees are often placed in the “White” category, thus precluding an analysis of Latino crime, confounding crime counts for other racial/ethnic groups, and preventing accurate comparisons of the effect of immigration on crime across racial groups (Steffensmeier et al. 2011).

Second, as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 (also see footnotes 20 and 21), the arrest data provide fairly robust coverage of established and emerging immigrant destinations. NIBRS provides arrest statistics for several emerging destination states while the state

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29 NIBRS provides incident-level data on the race (White, Black, American Indian, Asian) and ethnicity (Hispanic, Non-Hispanic). The California and NY data treat Latino ethnicity as a separate racial/ethnic category from “White” and “Black”, whereas Texas provides separate arrest counts by race and by ethnicity.
crime reporting programs (CAL, TX, NY) cover more than 80 percent of the Latino foreign born population in established destination states (Census 2000). Emerging destination states are defined as states where the Latino population grew by at least 50% between 1990 and 2000 (see Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b). During the time period under study NIBRS provided full or partial coverage of many of these states-- including South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Kansas, Iowa, Colorado, Connecticut, Utah, and Delaware.

There are two main limitations of the data, both of which involve the measurement of the race/ethnicity of arrestees. These limitations include: some missing data on ethnicity in NIBRS and data from Texas on arrestee’s race and ethnicity which are not mutually exclusive (e.g. an arrestee could be coded as both White and Latino). I address each of these issues in turn.

While NIBRS is a particularly useful database for examining the effect of immigration on crime, a persistent concern with the data is missingness on the ethnicity identifier. The ethnicity identifier is an optional data element, meaning that police agencies are not required to code the arrestee’s ethnicity (FBI 2000). Approximately 24% (but see footnote 31) of cases for NIBRS that are within census places eligible for analysis (i.e. meet sample selection criteria) are missing information on the ethnicity of the arrestee.

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30 The six main established destination states are California, Texas, Illinois, Arizona, Florida, and New Mexico (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b). California and Texas are considered the two major established immigrant destination states.
I utilize a three-stage strategy to address this issue. First, all incidents in Michigan and Ohio were excluded from the analysis because agencies in these states either did not code the ethnicity of the arrestee for any offenses or provided ethnic identifiers for only a very small fraction of all incidents.\textsuperscript{31} This was necessary because assumptions of missingness that would allow for the use of advanced imputation procedures were violated (for similar procedure see Roberts and Lyons 2011).

Second, following previous criminological research (Gruenewald and Pridemore 2012) and research with NIBRS (Jarvis and Regoeczi 2009), I imputed missing values using “imputation by chained equations” (ICE procedure in STATA [see Royston, 2004]). ICE is a particularly useful procedure when missing values occur on several variables as it allows for the estimation of one imputation model with a series of regression equations (one for each variable with missing values) to generate imputations. In terms of key variables, logit models were used to impute the arrestee’s ethnicity, while multinominal models were used to impute the race of offenders.\textsuperscript{32} Following best

\textsuperscript{31} Of the 24\% of cases missing on arrestee race/ethnicity approximately 75\% of these cases were from Michigan or Ohio. Approximately 94\% of cases in Michigan and 100\% of cases in Ohio were missing on the ethnicity of the arrestee. In contrast, other NIBRS states averaged 8\% missing on arrestee ethnicity. Diagnostics suggested that including Michigan and Ohio in the analysis resulted in bias in the imputations, producing distributions of arrestee race/ethnicity that differed considerably from the racial/ethnic distributions from complete case analysis. In contrast, when incidents from Michigan and Ohio were excluded from the analysis and imputations were performed the distribution of variables for complete cases (e.g. offender race, victim race, victim ethnicity, racial/ethnic composition of violent incidents) were nearly identical to those for imputed cases, suggesting that the imputation was successful and that excluding incidents from these two states was the correct decision.

\textsuperscript{32} Only about 1\% of cases were missing on race. Following imputation, arrestee ethnicity and arrestee race were collapsed into one variable, arrestee race/ethnicity. Any arrestee
practices, my imputation model included all of the variables in my analysis model and a set of auxiliary variables that are strong predictors of the missing values (Johnson and Young 2011; Rubin 1996). Specifically, I included “auxiliary variables” for both census place characteristics (e.g. % Latino) and incident-level variables (e.g. relationship between victim and offender). 33

Third, using the imputation procedure above, I created ten (10) imputed datasets at the incident-level (Roberts and Lyons 2011). Incident-level characteristics (i.e. ethnicity of arrestee, race of arrestee) were then aggregated to the census place-level to create census place counts of White, Black, and Latino arrests. This process was repeated for each of the incident-level databases which were then averaged to take into account the uncertainty associated with the imputations. Forming aggregate counts of crime from many incidents (some of which have imputed values) within one census place reduces the error component of imputations. The uncertainty associated with the imputations are further reduced by averaging across the 10 different imputed databases. The distribution of key variables (e.g., arrestee ethnicity) for complete cases were nearly identical to those for imputed cases, suggesting that the imputation procedure was successful.

The Texas crime reporting data are an important data source for the present analysis because Texas has a large Latino (19% of the United States Latino population in whose ethnicity was considered Latino was removed from their respective race category (e.g. an arrestee whose race was White and ethnicity was Latino was considered Latino, not White).

33 The following auxiliary variables were included: percent missing on ethnicity to control for variation across agencies in coding of ethnicity (census place-level), percent Black (census place-level), percent Latino (census place-level), offender/victim age, race, and sex (incident-level), and relationship between victim and offender (incident-level).
2000) and Latino immigrant population (15% of United States Latino immigrant population in 2000) and because Texas provides extensive coverage of both established and emerging immigrant destination census places (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Despite these advantages, a limitation of the Texas crime reporting data is that counts of arrests by race and ethnicity are not mutually exclusive. The arrest data include total counts of crime for each of the index offenses separately by (a) racial group (1. White, 2. Black, 3. Asian/Pacific Islander, and 4. Native American) and (b) ethnicity (Latino, non-Latino). These counts are not cross-classified, so the race (White, Black, Asian, or Native American) of a Latino arrestee cannot be determined. When arrestees are marked down as Latino, they are also counted under another racial group (e.g. counted as Latino and White or Latino and Black). If left unadjusted this would result in double counting arrests and overcounting arrests for particular racial groups (e.g. Blacks and Whites).

To address this issue, two different strategies are used. The first strategy involves generating mutually exclusive counts of crime by race/ethnicity (Latino, Black, White) by simply subtracting all Latino arrest counts within a census place from White arrest counts. This strategy relies on the strong assumption that the overwhelming majority of Latino arrestees in Texas are marked as White for race in arrest statistics. This is a strong assumption for two reasons. First, evidence from a set of police agencies in Texas suggests that nearly all Latino arrestees are coded as White under the race category. Specifically, for Texas agencies who participate in NIBRS, 99.3% of Latino arrestees are coded as White (only .4% Black) for race. These same agencies also contribute to the Texas state crime reporting program, and thus likely code Latinos as White for their
arrest statistics. Second, the overwhelming majority of Latinos in Texas are considered to be of White race, and thus the likelihood that a Latino arrestee is White (or at least coded as White) is very high. The CDC Bridged-Race Population Estimates for Texas indicate that 97% of the Latino population in Texas is White (1.2% for Blacks).

Though most Latinos are likely classified as White in arrest statistics, this procedure likely slightly overestimates Latino arrestees that are coded as White in Texas arrest statistics and underestimates Latino arrestees that are coded as Black. For instance, in some Texas localities there are greater concentrations of Latinos who identify as Black on the Census. To check the robustness of my results, a second strategy is used which adjusts for the racial composition of the Latino population at risk of committing crime.

My second strategy uses a two-stage procedure to calculate race/ethnicity disaggregated arrest counts (i.e. mutually exclusive White, Black, and Latino counts) (see Harris et al. 2009). First, I estimate the number of Latino arrests which are White-Latinos and Black-Latinos. For this, I multiply the total Latino arrests (LA\(_{ij}\)) in a census place provided in the Texas data by the year-specific proportions of the “local” population that are White- and Black-Latinos, respectively (PL\(_{jr}\)). The appendix provides additional details on calculating the year-specific proportions of the “local” population that are White-and Black-Latinos. Second, I subtract the White-Latino and Black-Latino arrest counts from the original (“confounded”) White and Black arrest counts (Ui\(_{jr}\)) to yield “true” White, Black, and Latino arrest counts (Aijr) which are mutually exclusive of one

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34 The Texas crime reporting data were used instead of NIBRS data on Texas because only a small proportion of Texas police agencies participate in NIBRS. For instance, in 2003 only 12% of the population in Texas was covered by NIBRS (BJS, 2003).
another (i.e. this removes Latino arrest counts from the White and Black arrest counts). This is summarized in the following formula:

$$A_{ijr} = U_{ijr} - (LA_{ij} \times PL_{jr})$$

where $i$ is the offense, $j$ is the year, and $r$ is the race-group (White or Black).

Both strategies produced substantively similar results. The results presented in the tables are from the second strategy which adjusts for the racial composition of the Latino population at risk of committing crime.  

**INDEPENDENT VARIABLES**

The primary independent and control variables were selected based on theoretical grounds and standard practices of prior research on immigration and crime (e.g. Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Lee et al. 2001; Martinez 2002). These variables are also standard variables in analyses of the racial invariance hypothesis (see Steffensmeier et al. 2010). The variables drawn from the 2000 U.S. Census include: recent Latino immigration, structural disadvantage, residential instability, entropy as a measure of racial/ethnic heterogeneity, young male population, population size, population density, and police per capita. Race/ethnicity-specific measures were used when theoretically appropriate (e.g. structural disadvantage, residential instability, young male population), but were not used when race disaggregation is not applicable (e.g. population density) or theoretically appropriate (e.g. ethnic heterogeneity). Table 4.1 provides more detailed descriptions of the variables used in the analysis.

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35 The first strategy removed 100% of Latino arrests from White arrest counts. The second strategy removed about 92% of Latino arrests from White arrest counts.
The key independent variable is recent Latino immigration measured as the percent of the total population in a census place that is Latino foreign-born and that arrived in the past 10 years (between 1990 and 2000). This is one of the most commonly used measures of immigration in prior research on immigration and crime.

My primary control variable in the immigration analyses and a focal variable in my assessment of the racial invariance hypothesis is an index of structural disadvantage. The structural disadvantage index was created for each group by using principal component analyses which combined information on four race/ethnicity specific indicators including: (a) poverty, measured as the percentage of census place residents below the poverty line, (b) female headship, based on the percentage of households with children under 18 and headed by females, (c) educational disadvantage, measured as the percentage of the population without a high school degree or its equivalent, and (d) unemployment, measured as the percentage of people aged 16 or above who are unemployed or not in the labor force. The index captures the overlap of multiple forms of disadvantage and effectively deals with collinearity issues that arise because structural disadvantage indicators tend to be highly correlated in aggregate data (Land et al. 1990). Prior research (Steffensmeier et al. 2010) and theory suggest that structural disadvantage is a key variable in macro-level analyses of crime and violence. From the strain/anomie perspective, high levels of disadvantage may lead to frustration and alienation, precursors to higher levels of violence. High levels of disadvantage may also lead to an attenuation of norms that discourage violence. From the social disorganization perspective, structural disadvantage may contribute to higher levels of violence by attenuating social ties and impeding social control.
In addition to immigration and structural disadvantage, the analysis includes several other structural predictors of violence. Among the control variables the analysis includes three variables typically viewed as indicators of social disorganization: racial/ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability, and population density. These variables are key control variables in the immigration analyses and are focal variables in my assessment of the racial invariance hypothesis, as their effects are predicted by some to be racially invariant. Entropy (Reardon and Firebaugh 2002) was used as a measure of racial/ethnic heterogeneity. Social disorganization theory argues that increased contact with diverse cultures may attenuate group norms, thereby increasing the likelihood of violence. Residential instability was measured as the percentage of households that experienced turnover in residents in the past 5 years. Social disorganization theory contends that residential instability may increase crime by undermining the ability of residents to form ties, thereby diminishing social controls and increasing crime.

Population density was measured as the natural logarithm of persons per square miles of land. Young male population is measured as the percent of the population that is male between the ages of 15-24. This controls for the presence of individuals in crime-prone groups (Steffensmeier et al. 1989). Other control variables include total population (logged), police per capita, and dataset dummy variables (Texas, New York, NIBRS, and California) to control for potential differences in the recording of crime. For instance, including a Texas dummy variable helps account for the lower crime rates in Texas from 1999-2001, compared to New York, California, and the localities covered by NIBRS. A California dummy variable helps account for the higher levels of assault observed in California compared to the other research sites.
ANALYTIC PROCEDURES

The analyses presented in Chapter 5 (expressive violence) and Chapter 6 (robbery) unfold as a series of stages. In the first stage descriptive statistics are presented to illustrate patterns of recent Latino immigration and Total and race/ethnic-specific violent offending for the full sample of census places and for the subsamples of emerging and established destinations. T-tests for differences in means are provided to highlight differences in these patterns both across and within destination types.

In the second stage bivariate correlations between immigration and measures of violence (Total, White, Black, Latino) are provided for the full set of census places and for both established and emerging destinations. These correlations provide an initial look at the potential association between immigration and violence for specific racial/ethnic groups across different immigrant destinations. The remaining stages (3-7) use multivariate methods.

In the third stage ordinary least squares is used to assess the effect of immigration on global rates of (i.e. not race/ethnicity disaggregated) violence for census place localities as a whole (i.e. not disaggregated by destination type), net of controls. The findings will serve as baseline of the effect of immigration on violence before considering how immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity may condition the effects of immigration.

The fourth stage replicates the above analysis but separately by type of immigrant destination, established as compared to emerging. The goals here are to (a) examine destination differences in the effects of immigration on violence and (b) establish a
baseline for how immigration’s effects vary across immigrant destination types before considering how these effects are further conditioned by race/ethnicity.

The fifth stage uses the full set of census places (i.e. not disaggregated by destination type) to examine the effects of immigration on violence by race/ethnicity (i.e. White, Black, and Latino measures of violence). The goal here is to examine how immigration impacts specific racial/ethnic groups and whether these effects vary across groups. The findings will provide a baseline for how immigration affects particular groups before considering whether these effects vary by destination type. *Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)* is used for this analysis. Because the race/ethnicity disaggregated (White, Black, and Latino) measures of offending are derived from the same set of census places, the sample violates the ordinary least squares (OLS) assumption of independent samples. SUR is more appropriate for comparing effects across multiple groups from a single sample (e.g. same units of analysis) because it accounts for the correlated errors associated with shared, unmeasured predictors across groups and provides more robust standard errors for comparing coefficients across the groups (for more detailed discussions and similar applications of SUR see Ousey 1999; Schwartz 2006; Steffensmeier and Haynie 2000). Wald F-tests will be used to test for differences in the magnitude and significance of immigration effects across racial/ethnic groups (Harris and Feldmeyer 2013).

The sixth stage examines the joint effects of immigration on violence by race/ethnicity and destination type. Using seemingly unrelated regression I examine the effects of immigration on race/ethnicity specific measures of violence separately in samples of established and emerging immigrant destinations. This stage involves two
comparisons: within-race comparisons across destination types and between-race comparisons within destination types. The within-race comparisons across destination types are used to examine whether the effects of immigration on violence vary across destination types in ways that are unique to particular racial/ethnic groups. For instance, does the effect of immigration on Black robbery vary between established and emerging destinations? Z-tests will be used to examine whether the effects of immigration on a particular group vary significantly across destination types (Paternoster et al. 1998). Z-tests are the appropriate significance test when comparisons are made between independent samples (i.e. different sets of spatial units, e.g. Blacks in emerging destinations vs. Blacks in established destinations). The between-race comparisons within destination types are used to examine whether the effects of immigration on violence vary by racial/ethnic group within particular destination types. For instance, in emerging destinations I will examine whether the effects of immigration on Black offending differ from the effects of immigration on White offending. F-tests will be used to test for significant differences in the magnitude of effects across racial/ethnic groups within each destination type. F-tests are the appropriate significance test when comparisons are between dependent samples (i.e. same set of spatial units, e.g. Whites in established destinations vs. Blacks in established destinations).

The seventh stage of the analysis addresses the racial invariance issue. Recall that an important sideline aim of the analysis is to assess whether the structural sources of violence are similar/different across racial/ethnic groups. I address this issue by examining whether important structural sources of violence, including structural
disadvantage, have similar/different effects across racial/ethnic groups for all communities and by destination type.

This chapter described the data and methods for both the (a) immigration and (b) racial invariance analyses. It described the advantages and limitations of the database and provided step by step details as to the analytic methods used. In the next chapter I examine the effects of immigration on expressive violence.
Figure 4.2 The Spatial Distribution of Emerging Destinations

Legend
- Emerging Covered
- Emerging Not Covered
**Table 4.1 Independent Variable Descriptions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent Latino Immigration</td>
<td>Percentage of the total population within a census place that is Latino foreign born and arrived in the past 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage *</td>
<td>Factor score that includes poverty, unemployment, education, and female headship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty *</td>
<td>Percentage of the population with income below the poverty level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment *</td>
<td>Percentage of people age 16+ who are unemployed/not in the labor force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Disadvantage *</td>
<td>Percentage of the total population age 25+ without a high school degree or its equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Headship *</td>
<td>Percentage of households headed by a female with children under the age of 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability *</td>
<td>Percentage of households that experienced turnover in residents in the prior 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy *</td>
<td>Entropy Index (E): Measure of the diversity of racial/ethnic populations within census places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Male Population *</td>
<td>Percentage of the population that is male, age 15-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Size</td>
<td>Total population, logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>Persons per square miles of land, logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Per Capita</td>
<td>Sworn officers per 100,000 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dataset Dummy Variables</td>
<td>Capture whether the data are from Texas, California, New York, or NIBRS database</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *race-specific measure
Chapter 5 Findings: The Effects of Immigration on Expressive Violence

In this chapter I examine the effects of immigration on expressive violence, an index which combines arrests for homicide and assault. I begin by examining descriptive statistics and bivariate results before proceeding to multivariate analyses in which I examine how the effects of immigration are contextualized by immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity. Following the discussion of immigration’s effects, I assess the racial invariance hypothesis by evaluating how the effects of key control variables in the immigration analyses (i.e. structural disadvantage, residential stability, racial/ethnic heterogeneity etc.) vary across racial/ethnic groups.

IMMIGRATION EFFECTS ON EXPRESSIVE VIOLENCE

DESCRIPTIVES

Table 5.1 displays the means and standard deviations of the independent and dependent variables for all immigrant destinations (panel A), established destinations (panel B), and emerging destinations (panel C) for the Total population and for each racial/ethnic group. I focus in particular on differences across groups and destination types in levels of violence and key structural characteristics. I note four key findings.

The first key finding is that there are notable racial/ethnic disparities in violence and socioeconomic characteristics for the full set of census places (panel A). Across my full sample of census places rates of Black expressive violence (828.5) are nearly 5 times greater than Whites (175.8) and over 2 times greater than Latinos (363.3). Both Blacks
and Latinos have rates that are higher than the rate for the Total population (259.4), whereas rates for Whites are lower. These racial/ethnic differences in violence are largely consistent with prior research using race/ethnic-specific measures of offending which show that Whites have lower rates of violence than both Blacks and Latinos, with Latinos having lower rates than Blacks (Harris et al. 2009; Steffensmeier et al. 2011).

Panel A in Table 5.1 also highlights wide disparities in socioeconomic wellbeing across the groups for the full set of census places. Overall, Blacks and Latinos experience more disadvantage than Whites, with Blacks faring the worst of all three racial groups. Blacks and Latinos experience similar levels of poverty, with over 20 percent of each group (21.3% Black, 20.3% Latino) falling below the poverty line, while the percentage in poverty for Whites is far smaller (9.1%). Moreover, Black households are more likely to be headed by a female with children under the age of 18 (20.2%) than either Latinos (12.7%) or Whites (6.3%). In terms of unemployment, a larger percentage of the Black population is jobless (6.5%) than either Whites (3.2%) or Latinos (5.2%). The descriptive statistics for educational disadvantage show that a higher percentage of Latinos (43.1%) are without a high school degree or its equivalent than Blacks (20.1%) and Whites (13.7%). Last, Blacks and Latinos, in general, have higher levels of disadvantage on each indicator than the average for the Total population, while Whites experience lower levels of disadvantage.

The second key finding is that there are striking destination differences in violence and structural characteristics for the Total population and for each racial/ethnic group (e.g. Blacks in emerging destinations vs. Blacks in established destinations). T-tests for differences in means show that mean expressive violence arrest rates for the
Total population and for each racial/ethnic group are significantly greater in established destinations (panel B) than the mean rates in emerging destinations (panel C).

Specifically, the Total rate is 1.7 times greater (315.8 vs. 181.4), the White rate is 1.9 times greater (217.9 vs. 114.3), and both the Black (908.7 vs. 581.1) and Latino (410.1 vs. 263.3) rates are 1.6 times greater in established than in emerging destinations.

Compared to the full set of census places, rates of expressive violence overall and for each racial/ethnic group are higher in established destinations and lower in emerging destinations.

Overall, established destinations (panel B) are characterized by higher levels of structural disadvantage than emerging destinations (panel C), although findings for specific racial/ethnic groups show some deviations from this overall pattern. The Total population has significantly higher levels of unemployment (established=4.3 vs. emerging=3.6) and educational disadvantage (established=25% of population without high school degree vs. emerging=20%) in established destinations, but experience similar levels of poverty and female headship across destination types.

These findings for the Total population conceal important within-race differences (e.g. Blacks in established destinations vs. Blacks in emerging destinations) in structural characteristics across destination types. Blacks in established destinations appear to be less disadvantaged than Blacks in emerging destinations experiencing lower levels of poverty (established=20% vs. emerging=23.8%) and educational disadvantage (established 18.6% of Black population without a high school degree vs. emerging=23.9%). However, Blacks have similar levels of unemployment and female headed households across destination types. On most indicators, Latinos in established
destinations appear more disadvantaged than Latinos in emerging destinations. Latinos in established destinations have higher levels of unemployment (established=5.4% vs. emerging=4.7%) and female headed households (established= 13.2% vs. emerging =10.8%), but lower levels of poverty (established =19.2% vs. emerging=22.7%). With the exception of unemployment which is slightly higher in established destinations (established=3.3% vs. emerging=2.8%), Whites experience relatively similar levels of disadvantage across destination types.

There are other notable differences in structural characteristics across destination types. Established destinations are much more ethnically diverse and have much larger (established=137,163 vs. emerging=60,743) and denser populations (established=4,368 vs. emerging=2,189) than emerging destinations. Yet, established destinations are composed of a smaller share of young males (particularly among Latinos: established= 19% vs. emerging: 24.9%) and experience lower levels of residential instability (particularly among Latinos: established=55.4% vs. emerging=72%). Overall (i.e. Total population), compared to the full set of census places, established destinations tend to experience slightly higher levels of structural disadvantage (i.e. unemployment, education), are more diverse, and have a larger and denser population. In contrast, compared to the full set of census places, emerging destinations tend to be slightly less disadvantaged and have populations that are less diverse, smaller, and less dense.

The third key finding is that the race/ethnic disparities that were observed for the full set of census places (i.e. first key finding) are also observed within established and emerging destinations. In both established and emerging destinations Black rates of expressive violence are the highest, while Latinos rates fall between those of Blacks and
Whites. As with rates of criminal offending, the overall patterning of race/ethnic disparities in disadvantage are similar across destinations. In both emerging and established destinations Blacks and Latinos experience relatively similar levels of poverty, levels that are higher than Whites. Across both destination types Blacks have the highest levels of unemployment and female-headed households, followed by Latinos then Whites. Last, in both established and emerging destinations Latinos are the most educationally disadvantaged, followed by Blacks then Whites.

The fourth key finding is that the relative size of the recent Latino immigrant population, my key independent variable, varies considerably across types of immigrant destinations. Recent Latino immigrants, on average, comprise roughly 5% of the total population in established immigrant census places compared with only about 2.7% of the total population in emerging immigrant localities. The larger presence of Latino immigrants who arrived between 1990 and 2000 in established destinations is unsurprising given that recent immigrants are more likely to move to areas that had more migration during the prior decade (Leach and Bean 2008) and Latino migrants primarily settled in established destinations in the 1980s.

BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS

Table 5.2 displays bivariate correlations between the key independent variable, recent Latino immigration, and expressive violence rates for the Total population and each racial/ethnic group for the full set of census places and separately for established and emerging destinations. Beginning with the full set of census place localities results indicate that there is a moderate to large positive correlation between recent Latino
immigration and overall (i.e. Total population) expressive violence (.33). These results suggest that census places whose population is composed of a higher percentage of recent Latino immigrants also have higher levels of expressive violence. Turning to the race/ethnicity-specific correlations, recent immigration is correlated most strongly with the rate of expressive violence for Whites (.29) with the correlations weaker for Latinos (.19) and Blacks (.12).

Moving to the destination specific models the findings for established destinations largely parallel those for all census places, with recent immigration having a moderate to large positive correlations with rates of expressive violence. As with the full set of census places, the correlations for Blacks and Latinos are weaker than for Whites. Moving to emerging destinations, results indicate that immigration has trivial, non-significant correlations with expressive violence for each group. The finding that immigration has moderate correlations with expressive violence in established destinations but has trivial correlations in emerging destinations is striking. I turn next to the multivariate analysis in

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36 Cohen’s (1992) guidelines for small (.02), medium/moderate (.15) and large/strong (.35) effects are used to classify the magnitude of effects. These guidelines apply to both correlations and standardized coefficients (i.e. Betas) in multivariate regression. Though these cutoff points are largely arbitrary (and a small effect of immigration is substantively important), they provide a useful framework for classifying the magnitude of effects consistently throughout the analysis. Most immigration-crime studies rarely present results on the magnitude of effects; instead, they tend to rely solely on statistical significance to assess the substantive importance of findings (which is problematic, see footnote 42). As noted by Bushway, Sweeten, and Wilson (2006), documenting the magnitude of effects is “critical to understanding the importance and theoretical implications of a finding” (p.7), for building knowledge within a substantive field (e.g. replicating results), and for interpreting effects that though not statistically significant may still be substantively important.
which I address more fully, net of controls, how the effects of immigration on expressive violence are contextualized by immigrant destination type and race/ethnicity.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

**Immigration-Expressive Violence Link Overall**

Table 5.3 displays the results of an ordinary least squares regression examining the effect of recent Latino immigration on the global (i.e. not race/ethnicity disaggregated) rate of expressive violence for the full sample of census place localities, net of controls. The results indicate that recent Latino immigration has a trivial (B=.02), non-significant effect on expressive violence.\(^{37}\) This finding suggests that immigration has negligible effects on expressive violence across census places, net of controls for the structural conditions of these localities. The finding that immigration has little effect on expressive violence is consistent with prior research and inconsistent with public fears.

\(^{37}\) It is important to note that the ability to detect significant effects in my sets of census places (all census places, established, emerging) is compromised by their sample sizes which are small relative to the number of independent variables included in the model (K=11) (see Cohen 1992). My models for all census places (N=528) and established destinations (N=297) have sufficient statistical power to detect medium effects (B=.15) at the .01 and .05 levels of significance, but inadequate statistical power to detect small effects (B=.02). My emerging destination sample (N=117) does not have the recommended statistical power to detect small effects and barely has enough statistical power to detect medium effects at the .05 level of significance. As a result, my interpretations emphasize effect size even in circumstances when the results are not statistically significant. Because my models lack statistical power, when findings are significant it suggests that the findings are robust. The overwhelming majority of cross-sectional immigration-crime studies focus primarily on statistical significance, paying little attention to the magnitude of effects. The reliance on tests of statistical significance is problematic considering that most of these studies do not have enough statistical power to detect significant small effects (see Bushway et al. 2006 for further discussion of these issues in the context of criminological research).
and perspectives which anticipate that immigration will increase crime. Next, I examine whether the effect of immigration on expressive violence is contextualized by immigrant destination type.

**Immigration-Expressive Violence Link by Destination Types**

Table 5.4 displays the results of OLS regressions examining the effects of recent Latino immigration, net of controls, on expressive violence separately for established and emerging immigrant destinations. Findings suggest that there are destination differences in the effects of immigration on expressive violence. Immigration has a significant, small positive effect (B=.08) on expressive violence in established destinations, indicating that established destinations with higher levels of recent Latino immigration have higher rates of expressive violence. In contrast, immigration has a non-significant, moderate negative effect on expressive violence in emerging destinations (B=-.14). Z-tests indicate that this difference in immigration’s effect across destination types is significant (Z=2.10). The finding that there were destination differences in immigration’s effect on expressive violence highlights the importance of examining destination specific models. The destination specific models of expressive violence (Table 5.4) provide different conclusions from the model of expressive violence for all census place localities (Table 5.3). Whereas immigration has negligible effects on expressive violence for the full set of census places, it is significantly associated with higher rates of expressive violence in established destinations as compared to the non-significant, moderate negative effect in emerging destinations.

In the next phase of the analysis I use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to examine how immigration impacts violence among specific racial/ethnic groups and
whether these effects vary across groups. Recall that SUR is more appropriate than OLS for comparing effects across multiple groups from a single sample (e.g. same units of analysis) because it accounts for the correlated errors associated with shared, unmeasured predictors across groups and provides more robust standard errors for comparing coefficients across groups. Wald F-tests will be used to test for differences in the magnitude and significance of immigration effects across racial/ethnic groups. I begin by examining race/ethnic-specific effects for the full set of census places before examining these patterns within both established and emerging destinations.

**Immigration-Expressive Violence Link by Race/Ethnicity**

Table 5.5 displays SUR results of the effects of recent Latino immigration on expressive violence rates, net of controls, for the full set of census places for Whites (panel A), Blacks (panel B), and Latinos (panel C). Immigration has a significant small to moderate positive effect on White (B=.12) and a small effect on Black (B=.06, marginally significant) offending, but has a non-significant, small effect on Latino offending (not sig; B=.05). These results indicate that census places with higher levels of recent Latino immigration tend to have higher levels of White and Black expressive violence. Though small in size, the effect of immigration on Whites and Blacks are comparable in magnitude to other key control variables in their respective models (e.g. Whites: pop density, B=-.14; Blacks: pop density, B=-.11). Though immigration significantly affects expressive violence among Whites and Blacks but not among Latinos, F-tests reveal that there are *no significant differences* in the effects of immigration across racial/ethnic groups.
Immigration-Expressive Violence Link by Destination Types and Race/Ethnicity

The results, so far, suggest that (a) the effects of immigration on expressive violence vary across destination type and (b) there are no major differences in the effects of immigration on expressive violence across racial/ethnic groups. What remains to be determined is whether immigration’s effects are being masked in models that do not consider race/ethnicity and destination differences simultaneously. At issue is whether the effects of immigration on expressive violence are contextualized by the interaction between immigrant destination types and the race/ethnicity of offenders.

In order to address this issue, I examine two main questions. First, I consider whether the effect of immigration on expressive violence varies across destination types in ways that are unique to particular racial/ethnic groups. For instance, does the effect of immigration on Black expressive violence vary between established and emerging immigrant destinations? Second, I examine whether the effect of immigration on expressive violence varies by racial/ethnic groups within particular destination types. In emerging destinations, for instance, does immigration affect Blacks and Whites differently?

As with the race/ethnicity specific analysis for the full set of census places, I address these questions using Seemingly Unrelated Regression. Z-tests will be used to examine whether the effects of immigration on a particular group vary significantly by destination type as they are the appropriate test when comparisons are made between independent samples (i.e. different sets of spatial units, e.g. Blacks in emerging destinations vs. Blacks in established destinations). F-tests will be used to test for significant differences in the magnitude of effects across racial/ethnic groups within each
destination type as they are the appropriate significance test when comparisons are between dependent samples (i.e. same set of spatial units, e.g. Whites in established destinations vs. Blacks in established destinations). Findings pertaining to these questions are presented in Table 5.6.

Starting with Whites, results in Table 5.6 (top panel) indicate that the effects of immigration vary by immigrant destination type. Immigration has a significant, moderate positive association (B=.16) with White expressive violence in established immigrant destinations but a non-significant, small negative (B=-.11) effect in emerging destinations. Z-tests indicate that these effects differ significantly (Z=2.75) from one another. It is important to note that these destination specific effects for Whites were masked in earlier models that looked at all census places together (Table 5.5, top panel) and which suggested that immigration was significantly associated with higher rates of White expressive violence (B=.12). Though the results from the established destination models parallel the results for all census places, the results for emerging destinations differ drastically.

For both Blacks and Latinos, immigration’s effects on each group do not vary significantly by immigrant destination type. In both established and emerging destinations, immigration has non-significant small effects on both Black (established, B=.07; emerging, B=.08) and Latino (established, B=.06; emerging, B=.06) expressive violence.

38 The models for expressive violence explain more variation for each racial/ethnic group within established destinations as compared to emerging destinations (White: Established R²=.69; Emerging R²=.46) (Black: Established R²=.53; Emerging R²=.34) (Latino: Established R²=.67; Emerging R²=.30).
violence. These results suggest that for both Blacks and Latinos the relationship between immigration and expressive violence is not conditioned by immigrant destination type.

Formal F-tests are used to examine whether the effect of immigration on expressive violence varies across racial/ethnic groups within particular immigrant destination types. Starting with established destination census places, the results indicate that there are no significant racial/ethnic differences in the effects of immigration on expressive violence. Specifically, the violence increasing effect for Whites (B=.16) is not significantly different from how immigration impacts Blacks (not sig; B=.07) or Latinos (not sig; B=.06). Moving to emerging destinations, formal F-tests reveal that the way immigration impacts Whites (B=-.11, non-sig) is significantly (marginally, p<.1) different from the way immigration impacts Blacks (B=.08, non-sig). It is important to note that this difference is only marginally significant and that immigration’s effects on both White and Black expressive violence in emerging destinations did not reach statistical significance.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Key findings from the analysis are displayed in Table 5.7. In addition to summarizing the effects of immigration on expressive violence for the Total population and each racial/ethnic group, the table depicts the results of statistical tests for within-group differences across destination types and between-race differences within each study location (i.e. all census places, established census places). The within-group comparisons examine whether immigration’s effects on a group vary significantly by destination type (e.g. Total population in established vs. Total population in emerging) while the between-race comparisons examine whether the effects of immigration vary
across racial/ethnic groups within each study location (e.g. Blacks vs. Whites in emerging destinations). I draw two main conclusions.

First, in line with my expectations, immigration generally has small or trivial effects on expressive violence and this pattern holds across most comparisons. Of the 12 point estimates of immigration’s effects, 8 are non-significant (i.e. ns) and most of these have trivial to small standardized coefficients. These findings offer little support for positions which argue that immigration is crime-generating or crime-reducing but rather offer some support for arguments that the effects of immigration on crime are small or trivial. Moreover, there are only a few differences in the effects of immigration on particular groups across destination types (Within-Group Differences) or differences in the effects of immigration across-groups (Between-Group Differences).

Second, despite the general pattern of immigration having small or trivial effects and there being few destination or race differences in immigration’s effects, the findings reveal some important links between immigration and crime. These links become more apparent in models which investigate whether the immigration-crime relationship is contextualized by immigrant destination type and race/ethnicity. There are a few notable differences in the effects of immigration across destination types and racial/ethnic groups. In terms of within-group differences the models reveal a significant difference in the way immigration impacted the Total population and Whites across destination types. Immigration was significantly associated with higher rates of Total and White expressive

39 Of these 8 effects, 2 have standardized coefficients (i.e. B) at or below .5. Only 2 of these 8 effects have standardized coefficients above .10. These findings suggest that even if these effects were significant, most would be small in size.
violence in established destinations (+), but was unassociated with Total and White expressive violence in emerging destinations. In terms of between-group differences in emerging destinations immigration’s effect on Whites differed significantly from its effect on Blacks. However, it is important to note that immigration’s effects on each group did not reach statistical significance. All in all, these findings suggest that though immigration generally has negligible or neutral effects on expressive violence, the effects are somewhat contextualized by factors including immigrant destination type and the race/ethnicity of the offender. Theoretical interpretations and implications of these finding are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

**RACIAL INVARIANCE AND EXPRESSIVE VIOLENCE**

In this section I present the results for the racial invariance issue by way of testing the effects of structural disadvantage and other key controls included in the immigration-crime models on race/ethnicity disaggregated rates of expressive violence. Recall that as an important sideline aim, the data could be used to assess whether the structural sources of violence behave similarly across racial/ethnic groups. My main focus in this section is on whether the effect of structural disadvantage varies across racial/ethnic groups in general (i.e. for all communities) and by destination type. As discussed earlier, structural disadvantage is regarded as the crucial yardstick for testing the racial invariance hypotheses. Moreover, I also test the racial invariance hypothesis using other structural sources of crime, namely the main indicators of social disorganization (i.e. residential instability, entropy, population density). I begin by examining descriptive statistics and bivariate results before proceeding to multivariate analyses in which I examine the racial
invariance hypothesis across the full set of communities and separately in established and emerging destinations.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS

Recall from earlier in the chapter (see Table 5.1) that there are striking disparities in violent offending and socioeconomic wellbeing across the three racial/ethnic groups. Considering the full set of census places, Blacks have the highest rates of expressive violence while Latino rates fall between those of Blacks and Whites. In terms of socioeconomic status, Blacks and Latinos experience similar levels of disadvantage, while Whites are the least disadvantaged. Notably, these racial/ethnic differences in crime and disadvantage are relatively similar across immigrant destinations. Like the findings for all census places, in both established and emerging destinations Blacks have the highest levels of violence, followed by Latinos and then Whites. Also, in both established and emerging destinations Blacks and Latinos experience similar levels of disadvantage, while Whites are the least disadvantaged.

As discussed in Chapter 2, racially dissimilar distributions of disadvantage, particularly in Black vs. White communities, has posed challenges to tests of racial invariance (McNulty 2001; Peterson and Krivo 2005; Steffensmeier et al. 2010). However, as indicated by the descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 and graphical illustrations presented in Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, the full set of census places (Figure 5.1) and both established (Figure 5.2) and emerging destinations (Figure 5.3) provide a fair amount of overlap in the distributions of disadvantage for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. Specifically, each figure illustrates that Latino disadvantage levels (e.g. poverty and
unemployment) overlap closely with census place distributions of White and Black disadvantage, whereas there is less correspondence in the distribution of disadvantage for Whites compared to Blacks. In particular, there is considerable overlap in the structural conditions of Latinos and Blacks. As a result of these structural similarities, the samples under analysis are less susceptible to problems of racially dissimilar distributions of disadvantage.

Across the full set of communities the correlations (not shown) between structural disadvantage (the key variable in tests of racial invariance) and race/ethnicity specific rates of expressive violence are positive and significant. This suggests that for each racial/ethnic group, places with higher levels of structural disadvantage have higher levels of expressive violence. These correlations persist in both established and emerging destinations, a finding which suggests that the correlation between disadvantage and violence is robust. Next, multivariate analyses are used to examine whether these patterns hold when controlling for other structural characteristics of communities.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) is used to examine how structural conditions impact violence among specific racial/ethnic groups and whether these effects vary across groups. Recall that SUR is more appropriate than OLS for comparing effects across multiple groups from a single sample (e.g. same units of analysis) because it accounts for the correlated errors associated with shared, unmeasured predictors across groups and provides more robust standard errors for comparing coefficients across groups. Wald F-tests will be used to test for differences in the magnitude and significance
of the effects of structural conditions across racial/ethnic groups. I begin by examining
race/ethnic-specific effects for the full set of census places before examining these
patterns within both established and emerging destinations.

**Racial Invariance Overall**

Table 5.8 displays the effects of structural disadvantage and control variables on
expressive violence, net of controls, for the full set of census places for Whites, Blacks,
and Latinos. The results show that disadvantage has a significant positive association for
Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. These results indicate that census places with higher levels
of structural disadvantage have higher rates of White, Black, and Latino expressive
violence. Notably the standardized coefficients are impressive in size (White: B=.40;
Black: B=.41; Latino: B=.39), indicating that the effect of disadvantage is strong. The
findings support structural theories that anticipate an impact of structural conditions on
crime, irrespective of racial or ethnic group.

More crucially for the racial invariance issue, however, is the finding that the size
of the effects of disadvantage on expressive violence vary by race/ethnicity. F-tests
comparing the disadvantage coefficients across groups (see bottom section of Table 5.8),
reveal that the unstandardized coefficient (1.42) for Whites is significantly smaller than
for Blacks (3.35) and Latinos (2.25). Moreover, the Black effect (3.35) is significantly
stronger than the Latino effect (2.25). In other words, the index of disadvantage has the
strongest violence increasing effects on Blacks, followed by Latinos, and then Whites.

Regarding the other control variables in the analysis, several findings in Table 5.8
are noteworthy. First, results indicate that residential instability has negligible effects on
expressive violence for each racial/ethnic group. Residential instability is not significantly related to expressive violence for any racial/ethnic group under study.

Second, entropy, which measures census place racial/ethnic heterogeneity, has small to moderate effects that vary depending on the racial/ethnic group under study. Entropy is associated with lower rates of both Black and Latino expressive violence but is not significantly associated with White expressive violence. Third, population density is significantly associated with lower rates of expressive violence for each group. Fourth, police per capita is not significantly associated with rates of expressive violence for any racial/ethnic group.

Especially noteworthy are race/ethnic differences in the effects of those control variables (residential instability, entropy, and population density) that are often are used as social disorganization indicators and that some analysts suggest also might have racially invariant effects on violence. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 5.8, more than half of the White-Black-Latino comparisons for these effects are significant (5/9). Some comparisons yield especially notable differences. Compared to other groups, the effect of entropy on Black expressive violence is significantly stronger. Notably, though residential instability does not significantly impact violence for any racial/ethnic group, its effect on Latinos differs significantly from its effects on Blacks and Whites. Last, population density effect is statistically similar across groups.

In the next section, I examine whether findings regarding racial invariance are conditioned by destination type. Again, I focus primarily on the effects of structural disadvantage. For parsimony I only show the effects of disadvantage and measures of
social disorganization in the destination specific tables (i.e. residential instability, entropy, population density).

**Racial Invariance by Destination Types**

Table 5.9 shows SUR results regressing race/ethnicity disaggregated measures of expressive violence on the structural disadvantage index and key control variables for established (left panel) and emerging destinations (right panel). Both unstandardized and standardized coefficients are shown in the top section of the table while results of F-tests for racial/ethnic differences in the effects of disadvantage and social disorganization variables are shown in the bottom section of the table. Because disadvantage is the key variable in debates regarding racial invariance, I begin by focusing on its effects before returning to the effects of the social disorganization indicators.

As was the case for all census places (see Table 5.8), in both established and emerging destinations, structural disadvantage is associated significantly and positively with White, Black, and Latino expressive violence rates. Thus, structural disadvantage predicts higher levels of expressive violence among Whites, Blacks, and Latinos in both established and emerging destinations. In both established and emerging destinations the standardized coefficients show that for each group the effect of disadvantage is strong, being considerably larger in magnitude than each of the social disorganization indicators.

Most central to the current study, an analysis of racial/ethnic differences in the size and magnitude of disadvantage effects (see bottom section of Table 5.9) shows that conclusions regarding racial invariance vary somewhat by the destination under study.
Beginning with established destinations and focusing on the unstandardized coefficients for disadvantage, results indicate that the effect of disadvantage on Black expressive violence (3.06) is significantly stronger than for either Whites (1.27) or Latinos (1.68), with the effect of disadvantage on Latinos being significantly stronger than for Whites. Thus, similar to the results for the models which included all census places, in established destinations the index of disadvantage has the strongest effect on Black expressive violence, followed by Latinos, and then Whites.

These findings differ somewhat in emerging destinations. As with established destinations, the effect of disadvantage on Black (2.70) and Latino (2.42) rates of expressive violence are significantly stronger (see bottom section of table) than for Whites (1.29). However, the effects of disadvantage on Blacks and Latinos are statistically similar (i.e. B-L). Thus, whereas in established destinations disadvantage has significantly stronger effects on Blacks than Latinos, in emerging destinations disadvantage affects Blacks and Latinos in a statistically similar way.

Within-Race Comparisons Across Destination Types

Before examining the effects of the social disorganization variables, it is important to note that there are notable differences across destination types in the way that disadvantage influences particular groups. Most importantly, structural disadvantage has stronger effects on Latino expressive violence (emerging=2.42 vs. established=1.68) in emerging than in established destinations. This finding is consistent with the work of Shihadeh and colleagues (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b; Shihadeh and Winters 2010) who find that disadvantage has stronger effects on Latino victimization in emerging than
in established destinations. It provides support for Shihadeh’s argument that the Latino paradox, whereby structural disadvantage has weaker effects on crime for Latinos, operates less strongly in emerging destinations (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b).

Importantly, these within-race differences across destination types likely contribute to destination differences in conclusions regarding racial invariance in the effects of structural disadvantage. In part, because disadvantage has stronger effects on Latino expressive violence in emerging destinations (compared to established destinations), structural disadvantage has statistically similar effects on Blacks and Latinos in emerging destinations. Conversely, in part because disadvantage has weaker effects on Latino expressive violence in established destinations (compared to emerging destinations), structural disadvantage has a significantly stronger effect on Blacks than on Latinos in established destinations.

**Indicators of Social Disorganization**

There are several notable findings in regards to the effects of social disorganization variables on race/ethnicity specific rates of expressive violence. First, residential instability appears to be less influential for expressive violence in established destinations than in emerging destinations. Residential instability has negligible non-significant associations with expressive violence for each racial/ethnic group in established destinations, with the effects not varying significantly across racial/ethnic groups. In contrast, in emerging destinations residential instability has a significant moderate positive effect on Whites and a significant moderate negative effect on Latinos. These effects differ significantly from one another.
Second, population density appears to be more influential for expressive violence in established destinations than in emerging destinations. Population density is associated with significantly lower rates of expressive violence for each racial/ethnic group in established destinations, with its effect on Blacks being significantly stronger than its effect on Whites or Latinos. In contrast, in emerging destinations population density is not significantly associated with expressive violence for any group. Last, entropy has unique effects on race/ethnicity specific rates of expressive violence within each destination type. In established destinations entropy is significantly associated with higher levels of expressive violence among Whites and lower levels of expressive violence among Blacks; it is not significantly associated with expressive violence for Latinos. The effect of entropy on Blacks is significantly different from its effects on Whites and Latinos. In emerging destinations entropy is significantly associated with higher rates of White expressive violence and lower levels of Black and Latino violence. The way that entropy impacts White expressive violence in emerging destinations differs significantly from its effects on Blacks and Latinos. Overall there are slightly more racial/ethnic differences in the effects of the social disorganization indicators in established destinations (4/9 race comparisons) than in emerging destinations (3/9 race comparisons).

To recap, two main findings emerged from the racial invariance hypothesis. First, structural disadvantage has strong effects on expressive violence for each racial/ethnic group in the full set of census places and in both established and emerging destinations. Second, despite the robustness of disadvantage effects, the degree of support for the racial invariance hypothesis varies somewhat depending on the destination type under
study. In general, there is more racial invariance (i.e. fewer significant racial/ethnic differences) in the effects of structural disadvantage in emerging destinations than in established destinations.

In sum, this chapter presented findings on the effects of immigration on expressive violence. The data was also used to test the racial invariance hypothesis. In the next chapter, I examine the effects of immigration on robbery.
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Total Population and by Race/Ethnic Group for (A) All Destinations, (B) Established, and (C) Emerging Destinations

(A) All Destinations (N=528)  
(B) Established (N=297)  
(C) Emerging (N=117)  

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<td>47.8</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>51.2*</td>
<td>46.5*</td>
<td>57.18</td>
<td>55.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.7)</td>
<td>(9.5)</td>
<td>(12.2)</td>
<td>(11.7)</td>
<td>(7.2)</td>
<td>(9.8)</td>
<td>(12.2)</td>
<td>(7.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.74*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Male Population</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>15.4*</td>
<td>12.4*</td>
<td>16.2*</td>
<td>19.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.6)</td>
<td>(6.4)</td>
<td>(6.0)</td>
<td>(6.0)</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>(4.3)</td>
<td>(4.9)</td>
<td>(2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>104141.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>137163.2*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(407368.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(537424.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>3670.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4368.3*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3286.6)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(3708.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: standard deviations in parentheses; * indicates statistically significant Welch’s t test (p<.05) for differences between “Established” and “Emerging” samples.

Race-specific measure

Same value as Total population, variable not race/ethnicity disaggregated.

The N for "All Destinations" does not match the sum of "Established" and "Emerging" destinations because some census places do not fall into either type.
Table 5.2 Bivariate Correlations Between Recent Latino Immigration and Expressive Violence Rates for All Destinations and Established and Emerging Destinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All (N=528)</th>
<th>Established (N=297)</th>
<th>Emerging (N=117)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * not significant at p<.05
### Table 5.3 OLS Regression of Expressive Violence Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures (N=528)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent Latino Immigration</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage$^a$</td>
<td>2.12***</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability$^a$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Pop (15-24)$^a$</td>
<td>-0.18***</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Per Capita</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (LN)</td>
<td>-1.14***</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (LN)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>-9.30***</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-6.34***</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIBRS</td>
<td>-6.12***</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>28.14***</td>
<td>(2.83)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^2 R^2 = 0.66$

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; standard errors in parentheses; $^a$ race-specific measure
Table 5.4 OLS Regression of Expressive Violence Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures for Established and Emerging Destinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Established (N=297)</th>
<th>Emerging (N=117)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Latino Immigration</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage(^a)</td>
<td>1.93***</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability(^a)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Pop (15-24)(^a)</td>
<td>-0.13+</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Per Capita</td>
<td>1.01***</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>2.96*</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (LN)</td>
<td>-1.87***</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (LN)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>-11.60***</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-8.11***</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIBRS</td>
<td>-9.48***</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>31.30***</td>
<td>26.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.73)</td>
<td>(7.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; standard errors in parentheses; \(^a\) race-specific measure
**Table 5.5. SUR of Expressive Violence Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos (N=528)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>b</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Latino Immigration</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.22+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage <strong>a</strong></td>
<td>1.42***</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability <strong>a</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Pop (15-24) <strong>a</strong></td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Per Capita</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-13.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(2.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (ln)</td>
<td>-0.92***</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-1.63*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (ln)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>21.98***</td>
<td>41.45***</td>
<td>39.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.43)</td>
<td>(6.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²</strong></td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Breusch-Pagan**

\[ x² = 549.718 \quad P < 0.000 \]

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; standard errors in parentheses; **a** race-specific measure; W significantly different than Whites, B significantly different than Blacks, L significantly different than Latinos (p<.1). Dataset dummy variables not shown.
Table 5.6 SUR of Expressive Violence Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group for Established and Emerging Destinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Established (N=297)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Emerging (N=117)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Latino Immigration</td>
<td>0.23*** 0.16</td>
<td>0.22 0.07</td>
<td>0.12 0.06</td>
<td>-0.19B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage</td>
<td>1.27*** 0.36</td>
<td>3.06*** 0.37</td>
<td>1.68*** 0.34</td>
<td>1.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability</td>
<td>0.01 0.02</td>
<td>0.02 0.02</td>
<td>-0.01 -0.01</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Pop (15-24)</td>
<td>-0.01 -0.01</td>
<td>-0.05 -0.02</td>
<td>0.01 0.00</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Per Capita</td>
<td>0.67* 0.11</td>
<td>3.15*** 0.22</td>
<td>1.07** 0.13</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>2.66* 0.07</td>
<td>-9.57* -0.11</td>
<td>1.20 0.02</td>
<td>3.42+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (LN)</td>
<td>-1.31*** -0.19</td>
<td>-3.44*** -0.22</td>
<td>-1.87*** -0.21</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (LN)</td>
<td>0.02 0.00</td>
<td>1.31* 0.11</td>
<td>-0.19 -0.03</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>22.73*** 49.36***</td>
<td>38.16***</td>
<td>17.80** -0.00</td>
<td>42.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.69 0.53</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Breusch-Pagan
x2= 250.275,, P < 0.0000
x2= 156.097,, P < 0.0000

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; standard errors omitted; a race-specific measure; see Table 5.5 for additional notes
Table 5.7 Summary of Relationships Between Immigration and Expressive Violence by Direction, Within-Group Differences Across Destination Types, and Between-Race Differences Within Destination Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Emerging</th>
<th>Within-Group Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Between-Race Differences**

- **W-B**
  - Y

- **W-L**
  - Y

- **B-L**
  - Y

Notes:

- a ns indicates a non-significant effect, + indicates immigration increases violence; - indicates immigration decreases violence; ( ) indicates effect is marginally significant p<.1
- b Y indicates significant difference (Z-test) at p<.05 in the way immigration impacts a group across destination types
- c Y indicates significant difference (F-test) at p<.05 in the way immigration impacts one group compared to another; W-B=White-Black; W-L=White-Latino; B-L=Black-Latino
Figure 5.1 All Census Places (N=528)

Plot of Transformed Expressive Violence Rates by Unemployment for Black, Latino, and White Census Places, All Census Places

Plot of Transformed Expressive Violence Rates by Poverty for Black, Latino, and White Census Places, All Census Places
Figure 5.2 Established Destinations (N=297)

Plot of Transformed Expressive Violence Rates by Unemployment for Black, Latino, and White Census Places, Established Destinations

Plot of Transformed Expressive Violence Rates by Poverty for Black, Latino, and White Census Places, Established Destinations
Figure 5.3 Emerging Destinations (N=117)

Plot of Transformed Expressive Violence Rates by Unemployment for Black, Latino, and White Census Places, Emerging Destinations

Plot of Transformed Expressive Violence Rates by Poverty for Black, Latino, and White Census Places, Emerging Destinations
### Table 5.8. SUR of Expressive Violence Rates on Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Communities (N=528)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Latino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recently Latino Immigration</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.22+</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage⁴</td>
<td>1.42***</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>3.35***</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>2.25***</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability⁴</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Pop (15-24)⁵</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.09+</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Per Capita</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-13.56***</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-5.04**</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (ln)</td>
<td>-0.92***</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-1.63*</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-1.12*</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (ln)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.20**</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; standard errors omitted; ⁴ race-specific measure

### Summary of Relationships By Significant Differences for Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>W-B</th>
<th>W-L</th>
<th>B-L</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Disorganization Measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *significant difference between groups p<0.05; + significant difference between groups p<0.1
### Table 5.9 SUR of Expressive Violence Rates on Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group for Established and Emerging Destinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; standard errors omitted

**Summary of Relationships By Significant Differences Between Groups for Key Variables**

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<td>Population Density</td>
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Notes: *significant difference between groups p<.05; + significant difference between groups p<.1
Chapter 6 Findings: The Effects of Immigration on Robbery

In this chapter, I examine the effects of immigration on robbery, an indicator of instrumental violence. I begin by reviewing descriptive statistics and bivariate results before proceeding to multivariate analyses in which I examine how the effects of immigration on robbery are contextualized by immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity. Following the discussion of immigration’s effects, I assess the racial invariance hypothesis by evaluating how the effects of key control variables in the immigration analyses (i.e. structural disadvantage, residential instability, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, etc.) vary across racial/ethnic groups.

IMMIGRATION EFFECTS ON ROBBERY

DESCRIPTIVES

Recall from Chapter 5 (see Table 5.1) that there were striking disparities in expressive violence and socioeconomic wellbeing across the three racial/ethnic groups. Blacks have the highest rates of expressive violence, while Latino rates fall between those of Blacks and Whites. Considering socioeconomic status, Blacks and Latinos experience similar levels of disadvantage while Whites are the least disadvantaged. Notably, these patterns observed for the full set of census places are also evident in both established and emerging destinations. Below I discuss in detail differences across groups and destination types in levels of robbery. I note three key findings.
First, referencing table 5.1 from Chapter 5 (Panel A), we see that there are notable racial/ethnic disparities in robbery across the full set of census places. Black rates of robbery offending (224.2) are more than 11 times that of Whites (19.5) and 4 to 5 times that of Latinos (48.4). Blacks and Latinos have robbery rates that are higher than the rates of robbery for the Total population (40.8), whereas White rates are lower. These racial/ethnic differences in violence are largely consistent with prior research using race/ethnic-specific measures of offending which show that Whites have lower rates of violence than both Blacks and Latinos, with Latinos having lower rates than Blacks (Harris et al. 2009; Steffensmeier et al. 2011).

Second, there are striking destination differences in robbery for the Total population and for each racial/ethnic group (e.g. Blacks in emerging destinations vs. Blacks in established destinations). T-tests for differences in means show that mean robbery arrest rates for the Total population and for each racial/ethnic group are significantly greater in established destinations (panel B) than the mean rates in emerging destinations (panel C). Specifically, the Total rate is 1.2 times greater (44.8 vs. 35.2), the White rate is 1.4 times greater (22.3 vs. 16.2), while the Black rate is 1.5 times greater (242.8 vs. 161.4), and the Latino rate is 2.2 times greater (55.1 vs. 25.2) in established compared to emerging destinations. Compared to the full set of census places, robbery rates overall and for each racial/ethnic group are higher in established destinations and lower in emerging destinations. Third, the race/ethnic disparities that were observed for the full set of census places (i.e. first key finding) are also observed within established and emerging destinations. In both established and emerging destinations Black rates of
robbery offending are the highest, while Latinos rates fall between those of Blacks and Whites.

**BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS**

Table 6.1 displays bivariate correlations between the key independent variable, recent Latino immigration, and robbery for the Total population and each racial/ethnic group for the full set of census places and separately for established and emerging destinations. Beginning with the full set of census place localities, results indicate that there are moderate to large positive correlations between recent Latino immigration and robbery (.28). These results suggest that census places whose population is composed of a higher percentage of recent Latino immigrants also have higher robbery rates. Turning to the race/ethnicity-specific correlations, recent immigration tends to be correlated most strongly with the rates of robbery for Whites (.21) and Latinos (.20), with the correlation being notably weaker for Blacks (08).

Moving to the destination specific models, the findings for established destinations largely parallel those for all census places, with recent immigration having moderate to large positive correlations with most groups’ rates of robbery. As with the full set of census places, the correlation for Blacks is notably weaker than for the other racial/ethnic groups. Moving to emerging destinations, results indicate that immigration has moderate to large positive correlations with robbery for the Total population and each racial/ethnic group. I turn next to the multivariate analysis in which I address more fully, net of controls, how the effects of immigration on robbery are contextualized by immigrant destination type and race/ethnicity.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

Immigration-Robbery Link Overall

Table 6.2 displays the results of an ordinary least squares regression examining the effect of recent Latino immigration on the global (i.e. not race/ethnicity disaggregated) rate of robbery for the full sample of census place localities, net of controls. The results indicate that immigration has a small (B=-.05), non-significant negative effect on robbery. This finding suggests that immigration has a negligible effect on robbery offending across census places. The finding that immigration has little effect on robbery offending is consistent with prior research and inconsistent with public fears and perspectives which anticipate that immigration will increase crime. Next, I examine whether the effect of immigration on robbery is contextualized by immigrant destination type.

Immigration-Robbery Link by Destination Types

Table 6.3 displays the results of OLS regressions examining the effects of recent Latino immigration, net of controls, on robbery separately for established and emerging immigrant destinations. Beginning with the findings for established destinations, results indicate that recent Latino immigration is not significantly associated with robbery offending (B=.00). Likewise, the effect of immigration on robbery is trivial and non-significant (B=-.03) in emerging destinations. Z-tests indicate that the effect of immigration on robbery does not vary significantly across destination types.

In the next phase of the analysis I use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to examine how immigration impacts violence among specific racial/ethnic groups and whether these effects vary across groups. Recall that SUR is more appropriate than OLS
for comparing effects across multiple groups from a single sample (e.g. same units of analysis) because it accounts for the correlated errors associated with shared, unmeasured predictors across groups and provides more robust standard errors for comparing coefficients across groups. Wald F-tests will be used to test for differences in the magnitude and significance of immigration effects across racial/ethnic groups. I begin by examining race/ethnic-specific effects for the full set of census places before examining these patterns within both established and emerging destinations.

Immigration-Robbery Link by Race/Ethnicity

Table 6.4 displays SUR results of the effects of recent Latino immigration on robbery arrest rates, net of controls, for the full set of census places for Whites (panel A), Blacks (panel B), and Latinos (panel C). Results indicate that recent Latino immigration is not significantly associated with robbery offending for any of the racial/ethnic groups under analysis. Moreover, the standardized coefficients for each group are trivial in size (i.e. Whites=not sig, B=.02; Blacks=not sig, B= -.02; Latinos=not sig, B= -.04). Wald F-tests indicate that immigration’s effects do not vary significantly across racial/ethnic groups.

Immigration-Robbery Link by Destination Types and Race/Ethnicity

The results, so far, suggest that (a) the effects of immigration on robbery do not vary across destination type and (b) there are no major differences in the effects of immigration on robbery across racial/ethnic groups. What remains to be determined is whether immigration’s effects are being masked in models that do not consider race/ethnicity and destination differences simultaneously. At issue is whether the effects
of immigration on robbery are contextualized by the interaction between immigrant
destination types and the race/ethnicity of offenders.

In order to address this issue, I examine two main questions. First, I consider
whether the effect of immigration on robbery varies across destination types in ways that
are unique to particular racial/ethnic groups. For instance, does the effect of immigration
on Black robbery vary between established and emerging immigrant destinations?
Second, I examine whether the effect of immigration on robbery varies by racial/ethnic
groups within particular destination types. In emerging destinations, for instance, does
immigration affect Blacks and Whites differently?

As with the race/ethnicity specific analysis for the full set of census places, I
address these questions using Seemingly Unrelated Regression. Z-tests will be used to
examine whether the effects of immigration on a particular group vary significantly by
destination type as they are the appropriate test when comparisons are made between
independent samples (i.e. different sets of spatial units, e.g. Blacks in emerging
destinations vs. Blacks in established destinations). F-tests will be used to test for
significant differences in the magnitude of effects across racial/ethnic groups within each
destination type as they are the appropriate significance test when comparisons are
between dependent samples (i.e. same set of spatial units, e.g. Whites in established
destinations vs. Blacks in established destinations). Findings pertaining to these
questions are presented in Table 6.5.

Starting with Whites, results indicate that the effect of immigration on robbery
does not vary by destination type. In both established and emerging destinations
immigration is not significantly associated with White robbery and the standardized
coefficients are trivial to small in size (established, B=.01; emerging B=.05). These results mirror findings for the models which considered all census place localities together (Table 6.4,) and found that immigration has a negligible effect on White robbery (not sig, B=.02). Moving to Blacks, we see that the effect of immigration on robbery does vary by immigrant destination type. In established destinations immigration has a significant small to moderate negative effect (B=-.11) on Black robbery offending. By contrast, in emerging destinations immigration has a significant moderate positive effect on Black robbery offending (B=.21). Notably, the effect in emerging destinations is strong in size relative to other variables in the model and is only slightly smaller than the effect of structural disadvantage (B=.29). A Z-test for the equality of regression coefficients confirms that the effect of immigration on Black robbery in established destinations (B=-.11) differs significantly (Z=-2.57) from its effect in emerging destinations (B=.21). It is important to note that these destination-specific effects were masked in earlier models that looked at all census places together (Table 6.4) and found that immigration had a negligible effect on Black robbery offending (not sig, B=-.02).

Similar to the models for Blacks, the results for Latinos indicate that models that combine all census place localities together mask important destination differences in the effects of immigration on race/ethnicity-specific measures of crime. Specifically, results for Latinos in Table 6.5 indicate that immigration is not significantly associated with Latino robbery in established destinations (B=-.04), but has a significant, moderate positive effect on Latino robbery in emerging destinations (B=.22). Notably, the effect is relatively strong in size, larger than the effect of population density (B=.17), and only slightly smaller than the effect of structural disadvantage (B=.27). A Z-test of the equality
of regression coefficients indicates that the effect of immigration on Latino robbery
varies significantly across destination types ($Z = -2.51). These destination differences were
masked in earlier models that looked at all census places together (Table 6.4) and which
found that immigration had a negligible effect on Latino robbery offending (not sig, $B = -.04$). The finding that immigration has moderate positive effects on both Latino and
Black robbery offending in emerging destinations is striking considering that most
immigration-crime research has found neutral or trivial effects both overall and for these
racial groups (see Table 5.1 Prior Macro-Level Studies Examining the Effects of
Immigration on Crime).

Next, I examine whether the effect of immigration on robbery varies across
racial/ethnic groups within particular immigrant destination types. Starting with the
established destination sample, formal F-tests show that there are significant differences
in the way immigration impacts White robbery as compared to how it affects Black
robbery. Whereas immigration has a negligible effect on White robbery (not sig; $B = .01$)
in established destinations, it has a significant small negative effect on Black robbery
offending ($B = -1.11$). Also, F-tests indicate that there is a significant (marginally, $p < .1$)
difference in the way immigration impacts Black compared to Latino robbery.

Immigration has a small negative effect on Black robbery offending in established
destinations, but has a negligible, non-significant effect on Latino offending. Moving to
the emerging destination sample, results indicate that there is a significant difference in
the way immigration impacts White robbery offending as compared to Black and Latino
offending. Whereas immigration has a negligible effect on Whites (not sig, $B = .05$), it has
significant moderate positive effects on both Black (B=.21) and Latino (B=.22) robbery offending.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Key findings from the analysis are displayed in Table 6.6. In addition to summarizing the effects of immigration on robbery for the Total population and each racial/ethnic group, the table depicts the results of statistical tests for within-group differences across destination types and between-race differences within each study location (i.e. all census places, established census places). The within-group comparisons examine whether immigration’s effects on a group vary significantly by destination type (e.g. Total population in established vs. Total population in emerging) while the between-race comparisons examine whether the effects of immigration vary across racial/ethnic groups within each study location (e.g. Blacks vs. Whites in emerging destinations). I draw two main conclusions.

First, in line with my expectations, immigration generally has small or trivial effects on robbery and this pattern holds across most comparisons. Of the 12 point estimates of immigration’s effects, 9 are non-significant (i.e. ns) and all of these non-significant effects have trivial to small standardized coefficients. These findings offer little support for positions which argue that immigration is crime-generating or crime-reducing but rather offer some support for arguments that the overall effects of immigration on crime are small or trivial.

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40 All of these 9 effects have standardized coefficients (i.e. B) at or below .5 suggesting that even if these effects were significant most would be small in size.
Second, despite the general pattern of immigration having small or trivial effects, the findings reveal some important links between immigration and robbery. These links become particularly apparent in models which investigate whether the immigration-crime relationship is contextualized by immigrant destination type and race/ethnicity. Using Black robbery (bottom table) as an example, my models reveal important within-group differences across destination types and between-race differences within destination types. In terms of within-group differences, models revealed a significant difference (i.e. indicated by “Y”) in the way immigration impacts Black robbery across destination types. Immigration is significantly associated with lower rates of Black robbery in established destinations (-), but higher rates in emerging destinations (+). As for between-group differences, there are significant differences in the way immigration impacted Black robbery compared to other groups within both established and emerging immigrant destinations. In emerging destinations immigration’s effect on Black robbery (and Latinos) differs significantly from its effect on Whites (i.e. W-B=“Y”). Immigration is associated with higher rates of Black robbery in emerging destinations (+), but has trivial effects on Whites (ns). These findings suggest that, although immigration generally has negligible or neutral effects on crime, the effects are somewhat contextualized by a variety of factors including immigrant destination type and race/ethnicity of the offender. Theoretical interpretations and implications of these findings are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
RACIAL INVARINACE AND ROBBERY

In this section I present the results for the racial invariance issue by way of testing the effects of structural disadvantage and other key controls included in the immigration-crime models on race/ethnicity disaggregated rates of robbery. Recall that, as an important sideline aim, the data could be used to assess whether the structural sources of violence behave similarly across racial/ethnic groups. My main focus in this section is on whether the effect of structural disadvantage varies across racial/ethnic groups in general (i.e. for all communities) and by destination type. As discussed earlier, structural disadvantage is regarded as the crucial yardstick for testing the racial invariance hypotheses. Moreover, I also test the racial invariance hypothesis using other structural sources of crime, namely the main indicators of social disorganization (i.e. residential instability, entropy, population density). I begin by examining bivariate results before proceeding to multivariate analyses in which I examine the racial invariance hypothesis across the full set of communities and separately in established and emerging destinations.

BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS

Recall from earlier in the chapter that there are striking disparities in robbery and socioeconomic wellbeing across the three racial/ethnic groups. Bivariate correlations suggest that racial/ethnic disparities in socioeconomic wellbeing may be associated with race/ethnic differences in violent offending. Across the full set of communities the correlations (not shown) between structural disadvantage, the key variable in tests of racial invariance, and race/ethnicity specific rates of robbery violence are positive and
significant. This suggests that for each racial/ethnic group, places with higher levels of structural disadvantage have higher levels of robbery offending. These correlations persist in both established and emerging destinations, a finding which suggests that the correlation between disadvantage and robbery is robust. Next, multivariate analyses are used to examine whether these patterns hold when controlling for other structural characteristics of communities.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) is used to examine how structural conditions impact violence among specific racial/ethnic groups and whether these effects vary across groups. Recall that SUR is more appropriate than OLS for comparing effects across multiple groups from a single sample (e.g. same units of analysis) because it accounts for the correlated errors associated with shared, unmeasured predictors across groups and provides more robust standard errors for comparing coefficients across groups. Wald F-tests will be used to test for differences in the magnitude and significance of the effects of structural conditions across racial/ethnic groups. I begin by examining race/ethnic-specific effects for the full set of census places before examining these patterns within both established and emerging destinations.

Racial Invariance Overall

Table 6.7 displays the effects of structural disadvantage and control variables on robbery arrest rates, net of controls, for the full set of census places for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. The results show that structural disadvantage is significantly and positively associated with robbery for each racial/ethnic group. Thus, the structural disadvantage
index predicts robbery among Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. The effects are moderate to strong in size with standardized coefficients ranging from .27 for Latinos to .49 for Whites. The findings support structural theories that anticipate an impact of structural conditions on crime, irrespective of racial or ethnic group.

More crucially for the racial invariance issue, however, is the finding that the size of the effects of disadvantage on robbery vary by race/ethnicity. The results of F-tests presented at the bottom of Table 6.7 show that the disadvantage effect for Blacks (1.54) is significantly greater than the White (.64) or Latino (.75) disadvantage effects, while the effect of disadvantage on Whites and Latinos are statistically similar. In short, the index of disadvantage has the strongest effect on Blacks while having similar effects on Whites and Latinos.

Regarding the other control variables in the analysis, several findings in Table 6.7 are noteworthy. First, results indicate that residential instability has negligible effects on robbery for each racial/ethnic group. Residential instability is not significantly related to robbery for any racial/ethnic group under study. Second, entropy, which measures census place racial/ethnic heterogeneity, has trivial to moderate effects that vary depending on the racial/ethnic group under study. Entropy is not significantly associated with White or Latino robbery, but is significantly associated with lower levels of Black robbery. Third, population density has trivial to moderate effects that vary depending on the racial/ethnic group under study. Density has little effect on Whites, but is significantly associated with higher rates of robbery offending for Blacks and Latinos. Fourth, police per capita is
significantly and positively associated with each groups’ rates of robbery. The effects are relatively small for each group.

Especially noteworthy are race/ethnic differences in the effects of those control variables (residential instability, entropy, and population density) that are often are used as social disorganization indicators and that some analysts suggest also might have racially invariant effects on violence. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 6.7, nearly half of the White-Black-Latino comparisons for these effects are significant (4/9). Some comparisons yield especially notable differences. Compared to other groups, the effect of entropy on Black violence (both expressive and robbery) is significantly stronger, whereas the effect of population density is particularly strong for Latino robbery offending.

In the next section, I examine whether findings regarding racial invariance are conditioned by destination type. Again, I focus primarily on the effects of structural disadvantage. For parsimony I only show the effects of disadvantage and measures of social disorganization in the destination specific tables (i.e. residential instability, entropy, population density).

**Racial Invariance by Destination Types**

Table 6.8 shows SUR results regressing race/ethnicity disaggregated measures of robbery on the structural disadvantage index and key control variables for established (left panel) and emerging destinations (right panel). Both unstandardized and standardized coefficients are shown in the top section of the table while results of F-tests
for racial/ethnic differences in the effects of disadvantage and social disorganization variables are shown in the bottom section of the table. Because disadvantage is the key variable in debates regarding racial invariance, I begin by focusing on its effects before returning to the effects of the social disorganization indicators.

As was the case for the full set of census places (see Table 6.7) in both established and emerging destinations structural disadvantage is associated significantly and positively with White, Black, and Latino robbery rates. Thus, structural disadvantage predicts higher levels of robbery among Whites, Blacks, and Latinos in both established and emerging destinations. In both emerging and established destinations, the effects of disadvantage are strong for each group, having larger standardized coefficients than each of the social disorganization indicators.

Though disadvantage is a robust predictor of robbery for each racial/ethnic group in both established and emerging destinations, there are important destination differences in how the effects of disadvantage vary across racial/ethnic groups. Beginning with established destinations and focusing on the unstandardized coefficients for disadvantage, results indicate that the effect of disadvantage on Black robbery (1.51) is significantly stronger than for either Whites (.62) or Latinos (.62), with disadvantage having statistically similar effects on White and Latino robbery (see bottom section for F-tests). Thus, as with all communities, the index of disadvantage has the strongest effects on Black robbery while having similar effects on Whites and Latinos.

The findings for robbery differ in emerging destinations. F-tests for differences in the magnitude of effects show that the effect of disadvantage on robbery does not vary
significantly across racial/ethnic groups; rather, disadvantage increases robbery in statistically similar ways for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. Thus, whereas disadvantage had significantly stronger effects on Black robbery than on White and Latino robbery in established destinations, in emerging destinations the effects of disadvantage are statistically invariant across the three racial groups.

**Within-Race Comparisons Across Destination Types**

Before examining the effects of the social disorganization variables, it is important to note that there are notable differences across destination types in the way that disadvantage influences particular groups. Most importantly, structural disadvantage has stronger effects on Latino robbery in emerging (.73) than in established (.62) destinations. This finding is consistent with the work of Shihadeh and colleagues (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b; Shihadeh and Winters 2010) who find that disadvantage has stronger effects on Latino victimization in emerging than in established destinations. It provides support for Shihadeh’s argument that the Latino paradox, whereby structural disadvantage has weaker effects on crime for Latinos, operates less strongly in emerging destinations (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b).

Importantly, these within-race differences across destination types likely contribute to destination differences in conclusions regarding racial invariance in the effects of structural disadvantage. In part, because disadvantage has stronger effects on Latino violence in emerging destinations (compared to established destinations), structural disadvantage has statistically similar effects on Blacks and Latinos in emerging destinations. Conversely, in part because disadvantage has weaker effects on Latino
robbery in established destinations (compared to emerging destinations) structural
disadvantage has a significantly stronger effect on Blacks than on Latinos in established
destinations.

*Indicators of Social Disorganization*

There are several notable findings in regards to the effects of social
disorganization variables on race/ethnicity specific rates of robbery. First, in general
residential instability has trivial to small effects on robbery in both established and
emerging destinations and its effect only reaches statistical significance for Latino
robbery in established destinations. The effect of residential instability on Latino robbery
in established destinations differs significantly from its effects on Blacks and Whites.
Second, population density has negligible to small effects on robbery in both established
and emerging destinations and only reaches statistical significance (marginally) for
Latino robbery in emerging destinations. There are no racial/ethnic differences in
population density’s effects in established destinations, whereas in emerging destinations
population density’s effect on Latinos differs significantly from its effect on Whites. Last,
entropy has unique effects on the race/ethnicity specific rates of robbery within each
destination type. In established destinations entropy is significantly associated with
lower robbery rates for Blacks, an effect that is significantly different from entropy’s
negligible effects on Whites and Latinos. In emerging destinations entropy is
significantly associated with lower robbery rates among Latinos with this effect being
significantly different from Whites. Though entropy’s effects on both Blacks and Whites
do not reach statistical significance, the effects differ significantly from each other.
Overall, there are slightly more racial/ethnic differences in the effects of social disorganization indicators in established destinations (4/9) than in emerging destinations (3/9).

To recap, two main findings emerged from the racial invariance hypothesis. First, structural disadvantage has strong effects on robbery for each racial/ethnic group in the full set of census places and in both established and emerging destinations. Second, despite the robustness of disadvantage effects, the degree of support for the racial invariance hypothesis varies somewhat depending on the destination type under study. In general, there is more racial invariance (i.e. fewer significant racial/ethnic differences) in the effects of structural disadvantage in emerging destinations than in established destinations.

In sum, this chapter presented findings on the effects of immigration on robbery. The data was also used to test the racial invariance hypothesis. In the next chapter, “Discussion and Conclusion”, I discuss the main findings of my dissertation, their implications, and future avenues for research.
Table 6.1 Bivariate Correlations Between Recent Latino Immigration and Robbery Rates for All Destinations and Established and Emerging Destinations

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Notes: * not significant at p<.05
Table 6.2  OLS Regression of Robbery Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures (N=528)

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<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIBRS</td>
<td>-0.84**</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *** \(p<0.001\), ** \(p<0.01\), * \(p<0.05\), + \(p<0.1\); standard errors in parentheses; \(^a\) race-specific measure
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Established (N=297)</th>
<th>Emerging (N=117)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recent Latino Immigration</strong></td>
<td>0.00 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural Disadvantage</strong></td>
<td>0.73*** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.47** (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residential Instability</strong></td>
<td>-0.04* (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male Pop (15-24)</strong></td>
<td>-0.06 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police Per Capita</strong></td>
<td>0.49** (0.16)</td>
<td>0.32** (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entropy</strong></td>
<td>1.71* (0.82)</td>
<td>3.6** (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Density (LN)</strong></td>
<td>0.12 (0.19)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population (LN)</strong></td>
<td>0.30** (0.11)</td>
<td>0.14+ (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Texas</strong></td>
<td>-1.99*** (0.35)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York</strong></td>
<td>-1.00+ (0.57)</td>
<td>2.90 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NIBRS</strong></td>
<td>-3.00** (0.69)</td>
<td>0.19** (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>3.54* (2.05)</td>
<td>1.85 (3.20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R^2 0.47 .57

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; standard errors in parentheses; a race-specific measure
Table 6.4. SUR of Robbery Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos (N=528)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Latino</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Latino Immigration</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage (^a)</td>
<td>0.64***</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.54***</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability (^a)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Pop (15-24) (^a)</td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Per Capita</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.54**</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-7.03***</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(1.66)</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (LN)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.12*</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (LN)</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.89**</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>-2.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(4.44)</td>
<td>(2.43)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[x^2=222.421 \quad P < 0.000\]

Notes: *** \(p<0.001\), ** \(p<0.01\), * \(p<0.05\), + \(p<0.1\); standard errors in parentheses; \(^a\) race-specific measure; W significantly different than Whites, B significantly different than Blacks, L significantly different than Latinos \((p<.1)\). Dataset dummy variables not shown.
Table 6.5 SUR of Robbery Rates on Recent Latino Immigration and Other Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group for Established and Emerging Destinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Established (N=297)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Emerging (N=117)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Latino Immigration</td>
<td>b Beta</td>
<td>b Beta</td>
<td>b Beta</td>
<td>b Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage</td>
<td>0.01B</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.19*WL</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability</td>
<td>0.62***</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.51***</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Pop (15-24)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Per Capita</td>
<td>0.26+</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>2.11***</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-11.22***</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (LN)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (LN)</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.72*</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>8.86</td>
<td>5.39+</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Breusch-Pagan x^2=131.797 , P<.0000
Emerging x^2= 26.084 , P<.0000

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; standard errors omitted; a race-specific measure; see Table 6.4 for additional notes
Table 6.6 Summary of Relationships Between Immigration and Robbery by Direction, Within-Group Differences Across Destination Types, and Between-Race Differences Within Destination Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Robbery&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Within-Group Differences&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Established</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Between-Race Differences**<sup>c</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>W-B</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>y</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W-L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

<sup>a</sup> ns indicates a non-significant effect, + indicates immigration increases violence; - indicates immigration decreases violence; ( ) indicates effect is marginally significant p<.1

<sup>b</sup> Y indicates significant difference (Z-test) at p<.05 in the way immigration impacts a group across destination types

<sup>c</sup> Y indicates significant difference (F-test) at p<.05 in the way immigration impacts one group compared to another; W-B=White-Black; W-L=White-Latino; B-L=Black-Latino
### Table 6.7. SUR of Robbery Rates on Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group

#### All Communities (N=528)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent Latino Immigration</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage</td>
<td>0.64***</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Pop (15-24)</td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Per Capita</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-7.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (ln)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population(ln)</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.89**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; standard errors omitted; a race-specific measure

#### Summary of Relationships By Significant Differences for Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>W-B</th>
<th>W-L</th>
<th>B-L</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Disorganization Measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *significant difference between groups p<.05; + significant difference between groups p<.1
### Table 6.8 SUR of Robbery Rates on Macrostructural Measures by Race/Ethnic Group for Established and Emerging Destinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Established (N=298)</th>
<th>Updated (N=117)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage &amp; $^a$</td>
<td>$0.62^{***}$</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability &amp; $^a$</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (LN)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; standard errors omitted

### Summary of Relationships By Significant Differences Between Groups for Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Emerging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Disadvantage</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Disorganization Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Instability</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entropy</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *significant difference between groups p<.05; + significant difference between groups p<.1
Chapter 7 Discussion and Conclusion

A longstanding interest in criminology and the social sciences more generally has been the relationships between social structure, race/ethnicity, and violence. Macro-level criminological research has consistently shown that structural disadvantage and other structural characteristics influence crime and race/ethnic disparities in violence. Two of the most prominent areas of research that fall under the macro-level tradition and are of contemporary interest are the links between (a) recent immigration flows and crime and (b) structural disadvantage and racial/ethnic disparities in crime.

Despite the importance of these topics, a critical limitation in both these areas has been the shortage of research which examines these issues amid recent demographic transitions involving Latinos in the United States, including their geographic diversification to emerging immigrant communities—i.e., locales that have little experience with immigration. As a result, not much is known about how immigration flows and structural disadvantage impact overall crime and crime among specific groups (e.g. Whites, Blacks, Latinos) in emerging immigrant destinations or how immigration’s effects might vary across destination types. In addition, immigration-crime research has been further limited by a lack of research which examines potential differences in the effects of immigration on crime across racial/ethnic groups.

The primary objective of my dissertation has been to advance research on immigration and crime by examining how the immigration-crime relationship is shaped by immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity. The secondary objective was to build
on racial invariance research, most notably by examining the hypothesis in both established and emerging immigrant locales. I addressed these issues using an integrative theoretical framework and a unique database that allowed me to go considerably beyond prior research. In this chapter I review the key findings from the study and their implications for future research. I begin with a discussion of the main focus of the dissertation, the relationship between immigration flows and crime.

**IMMIGRATION-CRIME LINK**

**SUMMARY OF KEY IMMIGRATION FINDINGS**

Findings from the immigration analyses are visually illustrated in Figure 7.1, which displays predicted expressive violence (left column) and robbery rates (right column) based on coefficients from the earlier analyses for all census places (row A), established destinations (row B), and emerging destinations (row C). The predicted violence rates demonstrate (a) that for most comparisons immigration has neutral or negligible effects (e.g. flat slopes), but (b) in some cases the relationship is contextualized by immigrant destination type, race/ethnicity, and type of crime.

As reviewed earlier, the majority of immigration-crime studies have examined the effect immigration has on the Total population across all communities (i.e. not disaggregated by destination type) or on Latinos in established destination locales. Models similar to these are represented, respectively, by the Total effects in row “A. All Census Places” and the Latino effects in row “B. Established Destinations”. When one looks at these “global effects”, immigration appears to have little influence on both expressive violence and robbery (as demonstrated by the relatively flat slopes for both the Total population for all census places and for Latinos in established destinations).
Some important differences in immigration-crime relationships are revealed when race/ethnicity and destination types are considered simultaneously. These differences in immigration’s effects include *within-group differences across destination types* and *between-group differences within destination types*. For instance, in terms of within-group differences across destination types, the downward slope for Black robbery in established destinations suggests that immigration has a crime-reducing effect (right column, row B), while the upward slope for Black robbery in emerging destinations suggests that immigration has a crime-generating effect (right column, row C). In terms of between-group differences within destination types, for robbery in emerging destinations (right column, row C) the relatively steep upward slopes for Blacks and Latinos suggests that immigration may increase robbery offending among Blacks and Latinos, while the flat slopes for Whites and the Total population suggest immigration has little effect.

Also, it is visually striking how conclusions regarding immigration-crime relationships for particular groups within particular destination types depend on the type of crime under study. For instance, for both Blacks and Latinos, the slopes for expressive violence in emerging destinations are relatively flat (left column, row C) compared to the steep slopes for robbery (right column, row C). These findings suggest that though immigration may increase robbery among Blacks and Latinos in established destinations, it has little effect on their rates of expressive violence.
Explanation of Key Findings

Though immigration generally had neutral effects on crime for most comparisons some important nuances in the immigration-crime relationship emerge when the contextualizing effects of immigrant destination type and race/ethnicity were considered simultaneously. Perhaps most notably are destination differences in the effects of immigration on Blacks and Latinos. Below I offer some explanations for these destination differences, beginning with key findings for Blacks.

The most noteworthy finding for Blacks is that immigration is associated with higher rates of Black robbery offending in emerging destinations, but with lower rates of Black robbery offending in established destinations. In line with the immigrant revitalization perspective immigration may lower Black robbery offending in established destinations by providing externalities (e.g. economic growth, enhanced social control capacities) that lead to decreases in crime among all groups, especially groups like Blacks who reside in or near immigrant communities (Martinez et al. 2010; Sampson 2008; Harris and Feldmeyer 2012). Also, as noted by Harris and Feldmeyer 2012 socioeconomic and political advancements among Latinos in disadvantaged established destination communities may have generated opportunities for Blacks that have led to reductions in crime.

There are also solid explanations for why immigration appears to be related to higher rates of Black robbery offending in emerging immigrant destinations. First, immigration may economically marginalize Blacks in emerging destinations in ways that increase crimes that are financially motivated, such as robbery. Research suggests that there is more employment competition between Blacks and Latinos in emerging
destinations than in established locales (Marrow 2011). Second, immigration may increase Black robbery in emerging destinations because Latinos, especially Latino immigrants in emerging destinations are particularly attractive targets for robbery. As discussed in detail earlier, immigrants in emerging destinations are especially attractive targets of crime because compared to immigrants in established destinations they are more likely to be undocumented (and thus less likely to report the crime and more likely to carry cash on hand) and less likely to live in ethnic enclaves which provide a key form of guardianship.

It is also important to note that the externalities produced by immigration that may reduce crime among Blacks in established destinations (economic revitalization, decreased segregation) may take time to develop or require that levels of immigration hit a certain tipping point (Martinez et al. 2010). As such, these externalities may be less likely to be at play in emerging destinations as compared to established locales that have relatively recent immigration flows and an immigrant population that is smaller in size.

Last, it is noteworthy that for Blacks destination differences are observed for robbery but not for expressive violence; immigration has little impact on Black expressive violence in both established and emerging locales. This difference by crime types may arise because the economic competition and target vulnerability mechanisms that possibly link immigration to Black robbery are likely less applicable to expressive violence which is dominated by disputes that are not financially motivated. Immigration may have less bearing on crimes by Blacks that are not financially motivated.

Similar to Blacks, there are destination differences in the effects of immigration on Latino robbery. Immigration has neutral effects on Latino robbery in established
destinations, but is associated with higher rates of Latino robbery in emerging destinations. Some of the same explanations used to explain destination differences in the effects of immigration on Black robbery offending may also apply to Latinos. For instance, immigration may be related to higher rates of Latino robbery offending in emerging destinations because, as discussed above, Latinos (and especially Latino immigrants) in emerging destinations are particularly attractive targets of crime. Also, immigration may have stronger robbery increasing effects in emerging destinations because immigration may be more disruptive in emerging destinations, which have fewer resources for mitigating any adverse effects of immigration on the community. By contrast, immigration may have neutral effects on Latino robbery in established destinations because these locales may be better organized to withstand any disruptive effects of immigration on crime.

Implications of Immigration Findings

The findings have important implications for theoretical positions on immigration and crime and for theoretical debates in the social sciences more generally. First, the study informs some of the prominent positions on immigration and crime discussed earlier (see Chapter 2). The study offers little support for positions which argue that immigration increases crime and even less support for positions which argue that immigration decreases crime. Of the 24 point estimates of the effect of immigration on crime in the current study 6 are significant and positive and only 1 is significant and negative.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, instead of increasing or decreasing crime, the findings offer the most

\textsuperscript{41} When statistical significance is not considered there are 15 positive effects and only 8 negative effects (one effect size of 0).
support for the position that immigration’s effects are neutral or trivial and some support for the position that immigration’s effects are contextualized, shaped by a variety of variables.

Second, the findings suggest that popular arguments that immigration’s effects are contextualized, shaped by various factors, are in need of revision. Specifically, the findings do not offer strong support for popular positions which posit that immigration’s effects may vary by (a) destination type, (b) race/ethnicity, or (c) type of crime. A growing argument in the immigration-crime literature is that immigration is more likely to increase crime in emerging destinations than in established locales. However, in the current study immigration has mostly null or negligible effects in emerging destinations (i.e. 6 of 8 effects were ns) and in some comparisons immigration is associated with higher rates of violence in established but not in emerging destinations.42

Another prominent perspective is that immigration is more likely to increase crime among Blacks. However, for most comparisons immigration has neutral or negligible effects on Blacks (i.e. 3 of 6 effects were ns, 1 marginally significant)43 and there are some instances where immigration is associated with reduced crime among Blacks or has negligible effects on Blacks but was associated with higher rates of crime among other groups.

42 Of the 6 non-significant (“ns”) effects 1 has a standardized coefficient (i.e. B) at or below .5, 3 are above .5 but below 11. Only 2 have standardized coefficients at or above 11. These findings suggest that even if these effects were significant in larger samples, most would be small in size.

43 Of the 3 non-significant (“ns”) effects for Blacks all are below .10, suggesting that even if they were significant in larger samples they would be relatively small in size.
Last, some scholars have posited that immigration is more likely to have crime-generating effects on financially motivated crimes, including violent acts such as robbery, than violence motivated by disputes or conflicts. However, for most comparisons immigration has negligible effects on robbery (i.e. 9 of 12 were “ns”) and even a negative effect. Moreover, there are more significant positive effects of immigration on expressive violence (4, though 1 marginally significant) than on robbery (2).

Although the findings do not offer strong support for any of these above positions when they are considered alone (e.g. destination position, race position, crime position), the findings do suggest that each of these factors may influence the immigration-crime relationship when considered in combination with one another. For instance, one of the strongest crime-generating effects of immigration is observed for Black robbery in emerging destinations (B=.22). Thus, though immigration does not uniformly increase Black crime, it may increase certain types of Black crime (e.g. robbery) in certain locations (e.g. emerging destinations). This offers support for positions which argue that the immigration-crime relationship is contextualized, shaped by multiple factors, both alone and in combination with one another.

Third, the finding that immigration is associated with increased crime for some groups but not others within particular destination types informs research on racial/ethnic stratification and the place-stratification perspective. There is a growing interest in the social sciences in how racial/ethnic groups are faring relative to one another within

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44 All 9 non-significant (“ns”) effects have standardized coefficients (i.e. B) at or below .5. These findings suggest that even if these effects were significant in larger samples, most would be small in size.
particular immigrant destinations and how structural conditions impact racial/ethnic inequality within these locales. The finding that immigration impacts racial/ethnic groups differently within particular destination types suggests that immigration may be a new source of within-place racial/ethnic inequality.

FUTURE RESEARCH ON THE IMMIGRATION-CRIME LINK

Future research should build upon this study and immigration-crime research in general in a number of ways. Specifically, there is a need for (a) stronger tests of prominent positions on immigration and crime, (b) methodological improvements in studies of immigration and crime, and (c) research that addresses other remaining gaps in the literature.

Stronger Tests of Prominent Positions on Immigration and Crime

The overwhelming majority of immigration-crime studies examine the overall effects of immigration on crime rates, but rarely provide specific tests of theories or processes linking immigration to crime. As a result, little is definitively known about why immigration affects crime. Thus, there is a need for research models which are better able to test some of the prominent positions on immigration and crime. Below I discuss some prominent positions on immigration and crime that require more empirical research.

First, there is a need for research which better tests arguments that immigration increases crime through the mechanisms of target vulnerability and racial animosity. These theories argue that immigration may affect intra-group and intergroup crime differently. Theories of target vulnerability suggest that Latino immigration might be associated with greater inter-group violence by domestic Whites and Blacks against Latinos because Latinos (Latino immigrants in particular) may be especially attractive
targets of crime (Bauer 2009; Cohen and Felson 1979; Valenzuela 2006). Theories of racial animosity and group threat may predict Latino immigration will be associated with increases in intergroup violence by domestic Blacks against Latinos (Latino immigrants in particular) because of racial animosity among Blacks resulting from fear of losing ground to a perceived subordinate group (Blumer 1958; see also Marrow 2011). These theories would also posit that immigration is particularly likely to increase victimization of immigrants, who are attractive crime targets and possible targets of racial animosity.

Unfortunately, there are few studies that test these arguments because there is a lack of data that measures immigrant victimization or that provides information on the race/ethnicity of both the offender and victim, information that is necessary to study the effect of immigration on intra and inter-group violence. There is a need for research which examines the effects of immigration on inter and intra-group violence using available data sources such as the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). NIBRS is well suited for the study of the effects of immigration on intra and intergroup violence because it is one of the only databases that provides information on the race and ethnicity of both the victim and the assailant. In contrast, other prominent databases code only the race or ethnicity of an arrestee (e.g. UCR, city level agency data) or provide only the ethnicity of the victim (e.g. National Crime Victimization Survey).

Second, there is a need for more research which examines how job competition mediates the relationship between immigration and crime. Researchers have posited that immigration may increase crime, particularly among native groups, through job

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45 NIBRS provides ethnic identifiers (Hispanic, Non-Hispanic) and information on race (White, Black, Asian) for both victims and arrestees.
displacement but very few studies have empirically tested whether job competition mediates immigration’s effects (for exceptions see Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a, Shihadeh and Barranco 2010c). Moreover, research that has examined how job competition mediates immigration’s effects on crime has been limited to studies of homicide victimization. Homicide only covers a small fraction of crime and is typically expressive in nature, arising out of disputes or conflicts. There is a need for research which examines how job competition may mediate the effects of immigration flows on financially motivated crimes such as robbery and burglary. Because job competition may adversely affect the economic wellbeing of natives, the effects of job competition may be stronger for financially motivated crimes than for expressive crimes like homicide. There is also a need for research which examines the effects of immigration flows that are particularly likely to produce job competition and subsequent crime. For instance, low-skill immigration flows may be particularly likely to adversely affect disadvantaged minority groups who are most likely to be displaced by immigrants in low-skill jobs.

Third, there is a need for research which examines how immigration may reduce crime by revitalizing communities. Drawing on immigrant revitalization and immigrant/Latino paradox perspectives, researchers have argued that immigration may reduce crime by infusing communities with social capital resources (e.g. ethnic entrepreneurship, kinship ties) that strengthen ties among community members and enhance community-level and institutional resources. Unfortunately, there are very few studies that test the pathways by which immigration may reduce crime (for exceptions see Feldmeyer 2009; Ousey and Kubrin 2009). Future data collection efforts should incorporate measures of social capital and perhaps indicators of business development as
a means for testing how immigration may revitalize communities by infusing communities with social capital resources and improving the local economy.

Methodological Improvements in Studies of Immigration and Crime

Overlapping with the need to provide stronger tests of prominent positions on immigration and crime is a need for immigration-crime studies with more methodological rigor. Below I briefly discuss some methods considerations that would advance immigration-crime research. These include the consideration of (a) compositional vs. contextual effects, (b) the undercount of the immigrant population, (c) the unit of analysis, (d) instrumental variable techniques, and (e) longitudinal models.

First, there is need for research which decomposes the effects of immigration on crime into compositional and contextual effects (see South and Messner 2000 for a review of compositional and contextual effects in criminological research). Population structure can affect crime through both compositional and contextual effects. Population composition—the relative size of demographic groups—can affect variation in crime rates across study units because different demographic groups are at different risks of crime. Population structure can also have contextual effects. Population structure can alter “contexts” in ways that affect crime, including modifying criminal motivations and opportunities and influencing social controls in ways that affect crime.

Immigration likely has both compositional and contextual effects on crime (see Ousey and Kubrin 2009). There are solid reasons for expecting that the composition of the immigrant population, including its age and sex structure and the characteristics of migrant flows, may affect immigration-crime relationships. For instance, researchers have argued that immigration may increase crime by increasing the proportion of the
population who are in the crime-prone demographic group (Ousey and Kubrin 2009).

Immigrants are often young-adult males, the demographic group most likely to be involved in crime as either victims or offenders.

Immigration may also have contextual effects on crime, altering the context of communities in ways that affect crime. Some have argued that immigration may increase crime by destabilizing the local community, disrupting community cohesion, and decreasing economic resources in ways that make it difficult to address social problems like crime and violence. Others have argued that immigration may decrease crime by infusing communities with social capital resources that strengthen ties among community members.

Unfortunately, to date there is little research which attempts to decompose the effects of immigration into compositional and contextual effects. There is also a lack of research which examines one type of effect, while adequately accounting for the other (e.g. examining contextual effect of immigration while controlling for differences in age and gender structure of population). Though imperfect, researchers could begin accounting for possible compositional effects by modeling the effects of changes in the Latino age structure and/or using measures of Latino crime that are adjusted for the gender and sex composition of the population (e.g. sex and age standardization of arrest rates; juvenile Vs. adult rates).46

46 Though not all Latinos are immigrants (about 40% are immigrants), age and sex standardizing Latino crime rates would help account for possible effects of Latino immigration on Latino crime through its effects on the age and sex structure of the Latino population.
Second, there is a need for research which examines the implications of the undercount of the immigrant population on the relationship between immigration and crime. Research suggests that immigrants, especially unauthorized immigrants, are particularly likely to be undercounted in the census (Van Hook and Bean 1998). This undercount has important implications for estimating the effects of immigration on crime. In studying the effect of Latino immigration on Latino crime, both the rates of Latino crime and resulting regression estimates will be biased by the undercount. In terms of rates, Latino crime rates are likely inflated because the Latino population (the denominator) undercounts Latino immigrants, particularly the unauthorized population. Undercounts also likely bias regression estimates of the effects of immigration on crime. Clogg and colleagues (1989) warn that even if the undercount is controlled for, estimates for covariates are biased if the undercount is related to the predictors in the model. In estimating the effect of immigration on crime, the undercount of the immigrant population underestimates the key independent variable “immigration” and is likely related to other covariates in the regression model. Unfortunately, though there are methods for correcting for the undercount at larger aggregates (nation, state) (see Van Hook and Bean 1998), methods for estimating the undercount of the immigrant population at lower levels of analysis (e.g. county, census place) are underdeveloped (but see Hill and Johnson 2011).

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Clogg and colleagues (1989) note that undercounts in the census often lead to biased rates when census data is used for denominators to construct rates with data from other sources serving as the numerator. If the two sources differ in their undercount of the group under study the rates will be biased. When the undercount is higher in the census data (the denominator) the rates will be biased upward.
Third, to assess the robustness of results and to tap into strategic characteristics of particular units of analysis, there is a need for research which examines immigration-crime relationships and especially destination differences in these relationships at different units of analysis (neighborhoods, census places, counties, MSA’s). Each unit of analysis has merits relative to one another. For instance, because counties are larger than census places, they are more likely than census places to yield adequate counts of race/ethnicity disaggregated homicide, the most reliably reported measure of crime. Moreover, counties are strategic for destination comparisons because they are more likely than census places (which are more urbanized) to capture the recent and sizeable growth in the Latino population in non-metropolitan and rural areas (Donato et al. 2008; Lichter and Johnson 2006).

Fourth, there is a need for research which examines the relationship between immigration and crime within a longitudinal framework. Immigration is a dynamic process, that is shaped by multiple factors, including historical patterns of immigration and other social, political, and economic factors in both the origin and destination countries (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Sana and Massey 2005). The characteristics of immigrants and their receiving communities change over time and thus the effects of immigration may vary across time. Longitudinal frameworks are able to assess how the effects of immigration on crime may vary across time and how social changes, such as immigration, may affect change in crime. Moreover, longitudinal frameworks provide much stronger causal tests than cross-sectional analyses because they can compare study units to themselves at different points in time (i.e. allowing each unit to act as its own control), thus removing the potential confounding effects of
unmeasured time stable characteristics (e.g. region, culture) (Firebaugh 2008). Unfortunately, to date there are very few studies that assess the immigration-crime relationship within a longitudinal framework (but see Martinez et al. 2010, Ousey and Kubrin 2009) and even fewer studies that use longitudinal techniques to examine destination differences in the effects of immigration on crime (but see Crowley and Lichter 2009).

Fifth, there is a need for research that examines the immigration-crime relationship while accounting for potential selection issues in the effects of immigration on crime. A primary threat to empirical conclusions concerning the effects of immigration on crime is that immigrants may be selected into areas that have certain patterns of crime (Lyons et al., forthcoming; MacDonald et al. 2012). For instance, immigration may be “spuriously” related to increases in crime because Latino immigrants, who tend to be low skill and poor, are more likely to enter areas that have higher levels of structural disadvantages (Malone et al. 2003) and higher levels of crime (MacDonald et al. 2012). Immigration may also be spuriously related to decreases in crime because immigrants may move into areas that are experiencing revitalization (e.g. job growth), including decreases in crime (Lyons et al., forthcoming).

Drawing on methodological insights from research on the labor market effects of immigration (Card 2001), a few immigration-crime studies (Lyons et al., forthcoming; MacDonald et al. 2012) have used instrumental variable techniques (see Angrist and Pischke 2009; Bollen 2012) to address the threat of selection bias. The goal of an instrumental variable approach is to estimate an effect that is purged of any bias stemming from the correlation of the independent variable with the error term (ei) of the
dependent variable. Unfortunately, to date there are no immigration-crime studies that have focused on destination or race/ethnic differences in immigration-crime relationships while accounting for potential selection bias using an IV approach. Thus, little is known about whether findings regarding destination or race/ethnic differences in the effects of immigration on crime are biased by selection processes.

Other Gaps in Immigration-Crime Research

In addition to providing stronger tests of prominent positions on immigration and crime and improving the methodological rigor of studies, there are other areas in need of research. First, there is a need for more research which further explores how the immigration-crime relationship varies across different types of immigrant communities. In particular, research should expand upon the current study’s focus on emerging vs. established locales to also consider other types of immigrant destinations. As scholars have pointed out (Singer 2004), there are many different types of immigrant communities that are not fully captured with the emerging vs. established classification scheme. Among others these include immigrant destinations that were prominent immigrant receiving sites in the past but now receive relatively small immigrant flows and destinations who consistently received low shares of immigrants throughout the 20th century (Singer 2004).

Along a similar vein, there is a need to examine immigration-crime relationships across emerging destinations with different racial/ethnic histories. As noted earlier, before the recent influx of immigrants emerging destinations had either a White homogenous or a binary Black-White racial structure. The current study focused on the effect immigration had on communities with sizeable Black and White populations, likely
tapping into emerging destinations that historically have had a Black-White racial structure. There is also a need to examine how immigration is impacting emerging destinations that have historically been predominately White, particularly in rural communities and communities in the Midwest.

Second, there is a need for immigration-crime research which accounts for the heterogeneous nature of the Latino immigrant and Latino population. The Latino population is a heterogeneous group which includes a diverse range of national origin groups, including Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. These groups vary tremendously from each other along a variety of dimensions, including history and levels of immigration, socioeconomic wellbeing, and rates of violence (Martinez 2008). Empirical models that examine the effects of Latino immigration flows on Latino crime without considering subgroups (e.g. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, etc) may mask important differences in the effects of immigration on crime.

Unfortunately, there are few data sources that disaggregate crime data by specific Latino groups. As a result, there are very few studies that examine the effects of immigration flows from specific countries on specific national origin groups. There is a need for data collection efforts that provide more detail on the national origin of individuals involved in criminal incidents. Such data would allow scholars to examine how specific Latino immigrant flows (e.g. Cuban migration flows) are impacting specific Latino communities (e.g. Cuban communities) and to assess these relationships across different types of immigrant communities (e.g. established vs. emerging).
Third, in line with the current study’s focus on destination differences in immigration’s effects, there is a need for research which examines how destination differences in contexts of reception may modify immigration-crime relationships. As noted in chapter 2, there are important destination differences in the contexts of reception of immigrant destinations, including differences in governmental policies and institutional resources, public sentiment towards immigrants, co-ethnic community, and labor markets. These factors may be important in explaining immigration-crime relationships and destination differences in the effects of immigration on crime and, as such, studying how they mediate immigration-crime relationships may help refine theoretical positions on immigration and crime. Unfortunately, to date there is very little research which examines how these factors may modify immigration-crime relationships.

Fourth, there is a need for research which can better inform policy on immigration-related issues including the immigration-crime link. In particular, there is a need for research which utilizes the contextualized approach in the current study, uncovering the circumstances in which immigration is most likely to impact crime. Understanding the routes by which immigration effects crime helps enhance the rationality of public policies because it allows policy makers to craft targeted responses to immigration, responses that are “efficient and effective” (Mears 2001, p. 11, also see Butcher and Piehl 1998).
RACIAL INVARIANCE THESIS

Recall that as an important sideline aim, I used the data from the immigration analyses to examine the racial invariance hypothesis that the effects of structural disadvantage behave similarly across racial/ethnic groups. In particular, I examined the racial invariance hypothesis for both expressive violence (Chapter 5) and robbery (Chapter 6) for the full set of census places and separately by destination type. My primary concern was whether findings regarding racial invariance differed depending on the destination type under study. Below I summarize the key findings from the racial invariance analysis, discuss their theoretical implications, and review some possible avenues for future research.

SUMMARY OF KEY RACIAL INVARIANCE FINDINGS

Three key findings emerged from the racial invariance analysis. First, though structural disadvantage increases crime for all three racial/ethnic groups for the full set of census places, there are some important racial/ethnic differences in the size of these effects. Using the full set of census places, results show that structural disadvantage has strong positive effects on expressive violence for each group and moderate to strong positive effects on robbery for each group. These results are consistent with traditional macro-level perspectives on crime which predict that structural disadvantage will increase crime among all racial/ethnic groups. Though structural disadvantage is associated with higher levels of violence for each group, there are significant racial/ethnic differences in the magnitude of the effects, indicating that structural disadvantage has stronger effects on offending for some groups compared to others. For instance, for expressive violence, the effect of disadvantage on Blacks is significantly stronger than
the effect on Whites or Latinos, while the Latino effect is significantly stronger than for Whites.

The degree of support these findings offer the racial invariance hypothesis depends on whether strict or lenient tests are used (Steffensmeier et al. 2010). By the standard of lenient tests which only require that structural disadvantage is related to higher rates of violence among all groups, my findings offer strong support for the racial invariance hypothesis as structural disadvantage has significant and positive effects on both robbery and expressive violence for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. However, the finding that the magnitude of these effects vary considerably across groups fails to meet strict tests of the invariance thesis which require that the effects of structural factors do not vary significantly across groups. These findings are generally in line with the findings of Steffensmeier and colleagues (2010) who found that structural disadvantage predicted violence (e.g. violent index and homicide) among all groups but that the effect of structural disadvantage varied considerably across groups.

Second, conclusions regarding destination differences in racial invariance differ depending on whether lenient or strict tests are used. When lenient tests are used there is strong support for the racial invariance hypothesis in both established and emerging destinations as structural disadvantage has significant strong positive effects on expressive violence and robbery in each destination type. As discussed above, lenient interpretations of the racial invariance hypothesis only require that structural disadvantage be associated with higher crime rates for each racial/ethnic group.
When strict interpretations of the racial invariance hypothesis are considered, there are important destination differences in conclusions regarding racial invariance. (Remember, strict interpretations require that the effects of disadvantage do not differ significantly across racial/ethnic groups.) There is stronger support for stricter interpretations of racial invariance in emerging destinations than in established destinations as there are fewer significant racial/ethnic differences in the effects of structural disadvantage on violence (i.e. both expressive and robbery) in emerging locales. Particularly noteworthy here are the destination differences in how disadvantage impacts Blacks vs. Latinos. In established destinations structural disadvantage has significantly stronger effects on Blacks than on Latinos for both expressive violence and robbery. In contrast, in emerging destinations the effects of structural disadvantage on both expressive violence and robbery are statistically similar for Blacks and Latinos.

Third, there are important differences in conclusions regarding racial invariance depending on the type of crime that is examined. Using lenient criteria for assessing the racial invariance hypothesis, both expressive violence and robbery models provide support for the racial invariance thesis. Places with higher levels of structural disadvantage have higher rates of expressive violence and robbery for all three racial/ethnic groups. Using stricter tests, conclusions regarding racial invariance differ depending on the type of crime studied. Looking at all models together (i.e. Expressive Violence: Tables 5.8 and 5.9; Robbery: Tables 6.7 and 6.8), there are far fewer racial/ethnic differences in the effects of disadvantage on robbery (4/9 comparisons are significantly different) than in the effects of disadvantage on expressive violence (8/9
comparisons are significantly different). Thus, there is stronger support for stricter interpretations of racial invariance when robbery is the measure under study. 48

Implications of Racial Invariance Findings

The findings described above have important implications for studies of racial invariance in the causes of crime. Most importantly, the results reveal that structural disadvantage is a robust predictor of violence for each racial/ethnic group in the full set of census places and in both established and emerging destinations. These findings attest to the importance of disadvantage in explaining crime. At the same time the results highlight that conclusions regarding racial invariance differ depending on the type of immigrant destination under study. In established destinations structural conditions tend to affect Blacks and Latinos in significantly different ways while impacting Whites and Latinos in similar ways. By contrast, in emerging destinations structural conditions have

48 The finding that racial invariance persists more for robbery than expressive violence can be interpreted in alternative ways. First, it can be argued that racial invariance persists more for robbery than for expressive violence because robbery is more reliably measured. Robbery is one of the most reliably reported crimes (Steffensmeier and Haynie 2000) and thus is more likely to be reported than the expressive violence index which is composed mostly (99%) of aggravated assaults. This view would imply that the findings for robbery should be given precedent and hence might be interpreted as offering stronger support for the invariance hypothesis. Second, there may be more racial/ethnic differences in the effects of disadvantage on expressive violence because expressive violence is dominated by aggravated assaults which may be subject to more racial bias in policing practices. Specifically, in recent years there has been a broadening of definitions of what constitutes a physical attack and this broadening of definitions may affect minorities more than Whites (Steffensmeier et al. 2010). The lesser seriousness and the greater ambiguity in assault classification opens the door for more discretionary enforcement practices by law enforcement.
remarkably similar effects on Blacks and Latinos while affecting Whites and Latinos differently. Models that consider all destinations together mask these important nuances.

These findings also have important implications for other substantive debates in criminology and the social sciences more generally. First, the findings provide additional evidence that the Latino paradox, whereby Latinos do better on a variety of outcomes than would be expected given the disadvantages they experience, is less applicable in emerging destinations. Consistent with prior research, the current study found that disadvantage has stronger effects on Latinos in emerging than in established locales (see Shihadeh and Barranco 2010c; Shihadeh and Winters 2010). Moreover, the incorporation of Blacks and Whites into the analysis helped to further clarify destination differences in the Latino paradox. The finding that disadvantage has stronger effects on Latino crime in emerging than in established destinations, but that there are not similar destination differences for either Blacks or Whites, suggests that the stronger effects of disadvantage in emerging destinations are unique to Latinos and are not a more general phenomenon. Moreover, race/ethnic comparisons within each destination type offered additional support that the Latino paradox varies by destination type. Consistent with the Latino paradox, in established destinations structural disadvantage has significantly weaker effects on Latino violence (i.e. both robbery and expressive) than on Black violence. By contrast, in emerging destinations structural disadvantage has similar effects on Blacks
and Latinos and appears to affect Latinos more strongly than it does in established locales.49

Second, the findings also have implications for research on racial/ethnic stratification. In the context of changing patterns of immigrant settlement, researchers are interested in whether Latinos and Latino immigrants will successfully integrate and where they will fall in America’s system of racial/ethnic stratification (Lee and Bean 2004; Marrow 2011). The finding that structural factors, including disadvantage and social disorganization indicators, behave remarkably similar for Blacks and Latinos in emerging destinations but differ considerably in established destinations offers some support for arguments that Latinos in emerging destinations are a vulnerable population whose prospects for advancement may fall closer to Blacks than to Whites.

FUTURE RESEARCH ON RACIAL INVARIANCE THESIS

Findings from the racial invariance analysis raise important questions for future research. First, additional research is needed to unravel why disadvantage and structural factors affect groups differently within established and emerging destinations. One promising area for future research is examining how segregation (from Whites) contributes to Black and Latino crime in emerging and established destinations. Segregation may help explain why disadvantage affects Latino crime similarly to Blacks

49 The finding that structural disadvantage has stronger effects on Latinos in emerging destinations than in established destinations (though not-statistically significant) in itself provides some support for the racial invariance hypothesis because it suggests that despite cultural similarities between two groups (i.e. Latinos in emerging vs. Latinos in established destinations) community differences shape crime (Shihadeh and Winters 2010).
in emerging destinations but differently in established census places. Research suggests that Latinos in emerging destinations are more segregated than Latinos in established locales (Fischer and Tienda 2006; Lichter et al. 2010; but see Park and Iceland 2011). These patterns of segregation may isolate and produce configurations of disadvantage that are more crime producing for Latinos than disadvantage in established locales.

Second, as with the immigration analysis, future research should replicate the current study while accounting for important destination differences in the population composition of the Latino population. Latinos in emerging destinations are more likely to be young males and Latino immigrants are more likely to be undocumented, demographic groups that may be more vulnerable to the effects of disadvantage. Third, research should consider how destination differences in social organization and resources may explain differences in disadvantage-crime relationships across destination types. Research suggests that disadvantage may have stronger effects on Latino crime in emerging locales because they are not as socially organized as established Latino communities (Shihadeh and Winters 2010). Fourth, as with the immigration analysis, there is a need for tests of the racial invariance hypothesis across different Latino subgroups. The Latino population includes a diverse set of national origin groups (e.g. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans) that vary along a number of dimensions (e.g. modes of social organization, norms for settling disputes) which may modify the relationships between structural disadvantage and crime. Empirical models which examine the effects of structural disadvantage on Latino crime without considering variation by Latino subgroup (e.g. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, etc) may mask important differences in the effects of structural disadvantage on crime.
CONCLUSION

Prior research on the relationship between immigration and crime has generally found that immigration has null or small (often negative) effects. However, definitive conclusions regarding how immigration impacts crime are hampered by a lack of studies which consider how the effects of immigration on crime are contextualized or vary across different community circumstances or population subgroups. The primary objective of this dissertation was to advance immigration-crime research by examining how the immigration-crime relationship is shaped by immigrant destination type (established vs. emerging) and the race/ethnicity (White, Black, Latino) of violent offenders.

Merging theories of immigration and crime with social science literatures on assimilation, social change, and racial/ethnic stratification, my study assessed the immigration-crime relationship across different immigrant destinations and for different racial/ethnic groups. The key findings were (1) that immigration generally has small or trivial effects and that this pattern holds across most comparisons but that (2) some important differences in immigration-crime relationships are revealed when destination type and race/ethnicity are considered simultaneously. For instance, the way immigration impacted both Black and Latino robbery varied considerably by immigrant destination type. These findings suggest that theoretical accounts and empirical models of immigration-crime relationships should be modified to account for destination and race/ethnicity specific effects.

This project addressed important questions about how the impact of immigration and other structural factors on crime are contextualized by immigrant destination types and race/ethnicity. In light of the growth and geographic diversification of the Latino
population there is a need to understand how these social changes are shaping crime overall and crime among particular racial/ethnic groups. Such research touches upon core themes in sociology such as race/ethnicity, stratification, and social control, while informing key debates and theories in the social sciences and important public policy concerns. Future research should build upon the framework presented here for purposes of achieving a better understanding of the relationship between immigration and crime.
Figure 7.1 Predicted Values of Expressive Violence and Robbery Rates for High and Low Levels of Immigration in (A) All, (B) Established, and (C) Emerging Destinations

Note: Low/high levels of recent Latino immigration are defined as one standard deviation below/above the mean. *p<.05. +p<.1 indicates a relationship between recent Latino immigration and violence is significant.
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Appendix

Census place estimates of the proportions of the Latino population that are White and Black are used to adjust the arrest estimates. Census place race estimates are provided in a seven category breakdown. The racial breakdown of Latinos for the state of Texas as a whole is as follows: 58% White, .6% Black, .74% American Indian, .12% Asian, .06% Native Hawaiian, 36.25% Some Other Race, 4.26% Two or More Races (Census 2000). For purposes of correcting my arrest counts the census place population that is considered White-Latino includes Latinos who are coded in the census as (a) White, (b) Some Other Race, or (c) Two or More Races.

Though imperfect, evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of those coded as “Some Other Race” and “Two or More Races” in the Census, would be coded as White in the Census if these other two categories were not provided. First, the Census Bureau's Population Estimates program, created a Modified Race Summary Data File which used other information (e.g. some respondents report "Some Other Race" along with another racial category, e.g. White) provided by census respondents and imputation techniques to assign people in the "Some Other Race" category to other racial categories including single-race (White, Black, American Indian, Asian etc.) and multiple-race combinations (White in combination with Black) (Ingram et al. 2003). The overwhelming majority of the "Some Other Race" population was classified as either “White alone” or “White in combination with another race”. CDC population estimates which use the Modified Race Estimates in conjunction with imputation techniques to collapse bridged-race estimates into single-race estimates show that in Texas the vast majority of the
“Some Other Race Population” and “Two or More Race Population” is placed in the White category (CDC 2010). The CDC’s (bridged race estimates) racial breakdown of the Latino population in Texas is as follows: 97% White, 1.2% Black, 1.1% American Indian, .5% Asian.

Second, in 2010 the Census instructed respondents that Latino was not a race. This lead to an increase in the percentage of Latinos who identified their race as White in Texas from 58% in 2000 to 67% in 2010 (Census 2010). Latinos who identified as “Some Other Race” in Texas decreased from 36% in 2000 to 27% in 2010. These results suggest that many Latinos who were classified as “Some Other Race” in 2000 identified as White when encouraged to select a race.

Last, in the Texas arrest data people can only be coded as White, Black, Asian, or Native American (i.e. there are no codes for “Other” or “Two or More Races”). Evidence from NIBRS indicates that 99.3% of Latino arrestees in Texas are coded as White and only .4% are coded as Black. Given the racial distribution of Latino arrestees and evidence which suggests most Latinos are coded as White if “Some Other Race” or “Two or More Race” options are not available, it is reasonable to assume that most of those who identified as “Some Other Race” or “Two or More Races” in the Census would be coded as White if arrested. Though imperfect this method provides arrest estimates, which unlike the first method used, adjust for the possibility that arrestee is a race other than White.
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The Pennsylvania State University
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Education
Expected Ph.D. in Sociology and Demography, Pennsylvania State University
Summer 2013

Dissertation: Recent Immigration Flows and Violent Crime: Effects By Destination Type and Race/Ethnicity
Committee: Darrell Steffensmeier (Co-Chair), Jennifer Van Hook (Co-Chair), Jeffrey Ulmer, and R.S. Oropesa

2009 M.A. Crime, Law and Justice, Pennsylvania State University
Thesis: The Structural Correlates of Native American Violent Offending
Committee: Darrell Steffensmeier, Michael Massoglia, Lori Burrington

2006 B.A., Psychology, Summa Cum Laude, Susquehanna University

Research Interests
Racial/ethnic, gender, and age differences in crime and punishment; courts and sentencing; quantitative methods; immigration; intersection of demography and crime; violence

Published Manuscripts


Awards
2013 Quantitative Methodology Certification -Department of Sociology, Pennsylvania State University
2012 Co-Third Place, American Society of Criminology Gene Carte Student Paper Competition
2012 First Place, Published Paper Competition-Pennsylvania State University Crime, Law and Justice Graduate Student Paper Competition.
2012 First Place, Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Justice Educators, Graduate Student Paper Competition.