SUBURBAN REFORMERS:
PROGRESSIVE REFORM MOVEMENTS
AND THE MAKING OF SILICON VALLEY,
1880-1980

A Dissertation in
History
by
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Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

May 2013
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ABSTRACT

Silicon Valley is broadly renowned as an economic success story fueled by technological innovation and entrepreneurship, but the region’s suburbs during the 1960s and 1970s were also home to a grassroots movement that articulated a distinctly suburban strand of liberalism. Suburban liberalism in Silicon Valley arose out of an almost century-long process of progressive reform led by professional and middle-class residents and, although ultimately taken up by the Democratic Party, its early origins lay with liberal Republicans in the Progressive Era.

This dissertation makes three primary contributions to recent US political history. First, it identifies and describes an overlooked suburban strand of modern liberalism. In doing so, it challenges several of the tenants of the so-called “Rise of the Right” narrative held by many historians and contemporary political commentators. The coalescence in the 1970s of a suburban liberal municipal order in Silicon Valley belies the common belief that the coalition underlying postwar “growth liberalism” collapsed entirely in the face of an ascendant New Right. Second, this dissertation undercuts the assumption that suburban environments in the US invariably fostered a conservative political orientation among residents during the postwar decades. Silicon Valley provides an example where a majority of residents wanted government action to improve their quality of life, protect the environment, and enhance the livability of their communities. They were also socially liberal and supportive of civil rights, as demonstrated by the high number of female officeholders elected in the region during the 1970s and 1980s.

Finally, by using the city of San Jose and the surrounding Santa Clara County as a case study, this dissertation also offers an economic and political history of Silicon Valley that expands our understanding of the region beyond the narrow time frames and small set of players focused on by many other scholars and commentators. This study reveals how three successive waves of progressive middle-class reform movements – one in the Progressive Era, one in the postwar decades, and one in the 1970s – laid the foundation for, and ultimately sustained the viability of, the Silicon Valley political economy.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of this dissertation is indebted to a long list people who have encouraged or supported me over the years. In particular, I want to express my tremendous appreciation to my dissertation advisor and mentor, Gary Cross, who never stopped believing in this project or me as a non-traditional student. Over the course of many long conversations and several rounds of drafts, his input and suggestions helped to shape and improve this dissertation.

I am grateful to Nan Woodruff for serving on my dissertation committee and for providing extensive input to improve my final draft. I am similarly appreciative of Daniel Letwin and Benjamin Schreier for participating on my dissertation committee.

Research for this project was aided by the staff and librarians at several institutions, including Penn State, San Jose State, San Jose Public Library, Stanford University, De Anza College and the US National Archives.

My intellectual and academic journey was encouraged and inspired by various dedicated educators and staff over the years. I would like to thank the faculty and staff at Penn State where I had the good fortune to work with Jennifer Mittelstadt, Adam Rome, and Mrinalini Sinha. I would also like to thank E. Bruce Reynolds, Daniel Cornford, Patricia Lopes Don, and Terry Christensen from San Jose State and Myron Simon and Lester Milbrath from UC Irvine.

I would like to thank the following friends and colleagues for their company, conversation, and encouragement, including Jason Munday, Howard Tu, James Stein, Sherry Chen, Nari Rhee and all the members of SVRN, Iris Jerke, Rachel Moran, and Aryendra Chakravarty.

All of my accomplishments were made possible by the love, support and encouragement of my parents, Liliana and LeRoy Wolpern as well as my sister Elizabeth. I would also like to acknowledge Fred and Ruth Tilford and Michael Eros, Sr. Finally, I am thankful for the loving support, constant encouragement, and patient proofreading by Marcy Spiker. Her love and company helped me to stay sane while juggling dissertation writing with a full-time professional job and other commitments. I cannot imagine surviving the final stretch without her.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Silicon Valley is renowned for its technological innovation and entrepreneurship, but the region’s suburbs during the 1960s and 1970s were also home to a grassroots movement articulating a distinct suburban strand of liberalism. At the same time that the technology whizzes and venture capitalists of Silicon Valley created a revolutionary high-technology economy, a homeowner-driven political movement pioneered a suburban liberal political culture that blended elements of progressive politics filtered through a middle-class lens. The primary motivation of these suburban reformers focused on repairing the ills of postwar suburbia in the city of San Jose, the largest city in Santa Clara County. Decades of haphazard and headlong growth negatively affected the quality of life for residents and sent local tax rates soaring. The reformers mobilized the power of the state to regulate and redistribute the costs and benefits of growth and improve middle class quality of life. In doing so, they found common cause with elements of local business and industry, developers, unions, minority and liberal groups, and the Democratic Party. The movement, by joining exponents at all levels of local government, displaced the previous pro-growth political establishment and came to dominate San Jose and Santa Clara County’s regional politics by the 1980s.

Suburban liberalism in Silicon Valley arose out of an almost century-long process of progressive reform led by middle and professional class residents and, although ultimately taken up by the Democratic Party, its early origins lay with liberal Republicans
in the Progressive Era. This evolution of the region’s political culture is indebted to the
several particular advantages enjoyed by Santa Clara County, notably windfall mineral
and agricultural wealth, tremendous federal investment, and a privileged position as a
late-developing and lightly industrialized economy largely free from the racial and class
divisions of older industrial parts of the country. These advantages enabled business and
political leaders in Santa Clara County to innovate economically and politically
unburdened by the social and political divisions faced by their peers elsewhere.

This dissertation makes three primary contributions to recent US political history.
First, it seeks to identify and describe an overlooked suburban strand of modern
liberalism. It thus challenges several of the tenants of the so-called “Rise of the Right”
narrative held by many historians and contemporary political commentators.¹ The
coalescence in the 1970s of a suburban liberal municipal governing group in certain
fortunate industrial suburban regions belies the common belief that the coalition
underlying postwar “growth liberalism” collapsed entirely in the face of an ascendant
New Right. Affluent middle class homeowners in high-technology industrial suburbs like
the Silicon Valley region of northern California – one of the greatest beneficiaries of the
Cold War era liberal state – did not reject active liberal governance like suburbanites
elsewhere, instead mobilizing to make growth liberalism more beholden to suburban
priorities. Second, by demonstrating the development of a suburban liberal political
culture, this dissertation undercuts the facile assumption made by many scholars that

¹ For example, see: Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction : The Impact of Race,
Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (New York: Norton, 1991); William A. Rusher, The Rise of the
Right, 1st ed. (New York: W. Morrow, 1984); Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion : Right-Wing Movements
suburban environments in the US invariably fostered a conservative political orientation among residents during the postwar decades. As the Silicon Valley example reveals, suburbanites had an ambivalent view of the role of the state and often held fiscally conservative views, especially in relation to property taxes and government spending not seen as directly benefiting their own neighborhoods. However, a majority of residents in the heart of Silicon Valley wanted government action to improve their quality of life, protect the environment, and enhance the livability of their communities. They were also socially liberal and supportive of civil rights, as demonstrated by the unusually high number of female officeholders elected in the region during the 1970s and 1980s.²

By using the city of San Jose and surrounding Santa Clara County as a case study, this dissertation also offers an economic and political history of Silicon Valley that expands our understanding of the region beyond the narrow timeframes and small set of players focused on by many other scholars and commentators. Existing scholarship on Silicon Valley has examined the contributions of inventors, academics and entrepreneurs as well as the important role of federal military and scientific spending in fostering the economic and technological success of the region.³ Largely absent from these studies,

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² The handful of “firsts” in San Jose speaks to the civil rights orientation of suburban liberals. Norman Mineta was the first Asian mayor of a major US city and became the first Japanese-American member of Congress outside of Hawaii. Janet Gray Hayes was the first woman mayor of a major US city, and the higher than average number of women in local office earned San Jose international attention as the “Feminist Capital.” Moreover, the appointment of minorities to local office (beginning with Mineta) opened the door to a more diverse municipal government, and the subsequent re-election of minority appointees points to the support of local voters for broader community representation.

however, has been an examination of the political and economic history of the surrounding region and its influence on the development of Silicon Valley.

Employing a broader historical perspective that looks at the early political and economic development of the region starting a century before it became known for innovations in semiconductors and computers, this study reveals how three successive waves of progressive, middle-class reform movements laid the foundation for, and ultimately sustained the viability of, the Silicon Valley economy. Each of these three reform waves was associated with a transition in the local political economy that prompted a struggle over the control of municipal government. The first wave culminated in the 1920s during the Progressive Era as reformers attached to the region’s new industrial orchard economy displaced an incumbent political machine run by railroads and Gold Rush interests. The second reform wave was a cohort of boosters arising in the late 1940s in the wake of World War II that adopted the postwar enthusiasm for suburban growth as a means to promote prosperity. This second group during the 1950s and 1960s created the rapid suburbanization and development of Santa Clara County that facilitated the consolidation of the local electronics industry and replaced the region’s agricultural economy with a high-technology industrial economy.

The leadership and constituency of the first two waves were predominantly middle and professional class white men – not surprising given that this group dominated

the business and political ranks of the predominantly homogenous Santa Clara County. After World War II, the region became more diverse, altering the political status quo. The third reform wave arose in the late 1960s out of the successes – and failures – of the previous pro-growth reformers. Comprised largely of managers and professionals hailing from the region’s high-technology economy and led by homeowner activists – many of whom were woman and minorities – this third wave of middle class reformers acted to correct the ills associated with the rapid and poorly planned growth of the postwar decades. This third group eventually coalesced in the 1970s as a suburban liberal governing coalition to counter the growth related problems that threatened the sustainability of Silicon Valley’s economy. In doing so, this wave of reformers built on the progressive legacy of the two prior reform waves while ultimately rolling back many of the measures taken by their predecessors. The region continued to grow, but the suburban liberals renegotiated the terms as well as the costs and benefits of that growth.

The suburban liberal reformers transitioned from outsiders to controlling municipal power in San Jose and Santa Clara County with women and minorities in leading roles. However, the goal of transforming suburbia in ways that primarily prioritized enhancing quality of life for suburban homeowners and protecting the area’s high-technology economy ultimately limited the progressive potential of suburban liberalism and created constant tension in an already tenuous coalition. Minority and working class communities as well as environmental, labor, and other liberal groups often found their interests marginalized in a movement dominated by middle-class homeowners and high-technology business leaders. The suburban liberalism that took shape in Silicon Valley both anticipated the “New Democrat” direction of the national
Democratic Party by over a decade and offered a preview of the kind of divisions and dislocations that the US faced as a whole as suburban priorities came to dominate national policymaking.

**Defining Suburban Liberalism**

I use the term “suburban liberalism” to describe the ideology, political culture, and policies of a reform movement turned incumbent municipal order in San Jose and much of Santa Clara County during the 1960s and 1970s. The movement was “liberal” because its adherents sought to use the power of the state to solve the social and economic problems of the region. It was “suburban” because – in contrast to other strands of liberalism that focused primarily on using government power to promote broad based economic or social equity or improve cosmopolitan urban centers – the proponents of suburban liberalism prioritized the needs of middle- and professional-class suburbanites. In Silicon Valley, this meant that suburban liberalism gave precedence to homeowners and high-technology firms central to the suburban industrial economy. Thus suburban liberal leaders juggled the quality of life and pocketbook concerns of homeowners along with the need for industrial growth and business-friendly policies desired by high-technology employers. Suburban liberals also held socially liberal views, arguing for a government role in addressing discrimination, promoting civil rights, and providing for the less fortunate members of society. However, these progressive social goals were often constrained by the fiscal conservatism and business needs of the homeowners and high-technology leaders that were the primary stakeholders in the suburban liberal coalition.
Suburban liberals held deep ambivalences regarding the role of the state, the rights and prerogatives of private property, and the desirability of growth policies. When it came to issues directly related to the livability of their neighborhoods and their quality of life, suburban liberals saw ample need for state intervention. Free markets and private property were secondary to controlling growth, enforcing zoning ordinances, and protecting the local environment and open space. For fiscal and economic matters outside of their neighborhoods, suburban liberals wanted a more constrained state, advocating instead for austerity, efficiency, and market solutions in municipal, state, and federal government. Especially in relation to the emerging high-technology economy, suburban liberals preferred that the state facilitate business, but otherwise stay out of management and workplace decision-making. Suburban liberals were also skeptical of the ability of the state – and “their” tax dollars – to rehabilitate older urban areas experiencing industrial decline, poverty, and racial strife, thus opposing many social welfare-spending programs.

Suburban liberals were meanwhile libertarian on social issues, eschewing the religiosity and intolerance of their suburban counterparts in the New Right and rejecting the use of the state to interfere in personal affairs. Unlike the contemporaneous backlash suburban voters in the latter part of the 20th century – variously lumped together as Nixon’s “Silent Majority,” “Reagan Democrats,” or the “Suburban Warriors” of Orange County – suburban liberals did not reject growth liberalism and its associated vision of an ameliorative and regulatory function for government. They instead selectively sought to redirect the liberal state’s interventions and growth-oriented policies to serve suburban priorities. This meant marshaling the resources of the state to protect suburban quality of
life by tackling the issues that rapid growth had caused, limiting development and otherwise improving the livability of local communities and neighborhoods. It also included measures to boost the fortunes of the high-technology businesses central to the local economy.

Scholars have described multiple “liberalisms.”¹⁴ Where does suburban liberalism fit in – and is it productive to add an additional “liberalism” to the debate? Suburban liberalism arose out of the 20th century expansion of liberalism into its “modern” form, but it is in some sense a partial rebuke of modern liberal thought and a selective return to more classic liberal formulations.⁵ The mixture of modern and classical inclinations within suburban liberalism allowed many to overlook or to confuse it with the resurgent New Right that also arose in Sunbelt suburbs. Suburban liberalism is thus something of a missing link, helping us to understand that the legacy of New Deal and Great Society policies did not just create a conservative backlash, but also fostered the conditions and constituency for the advent of a distinct suburban type of liberalism. Unlike the other strands of modern liberalism that preceded it, suburban liberalism not only persevered,

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¹⁴ Both political philosophers and historians have come to talk about “liberalisms,” recognizing that the term has been applied to individuals and movements with seemingly disparate, if not outright contradictory, sets of tenants. Scholars have often attempted to offer clarification by appending a descriptor to the liberal label, for example at times referring to classic, race, urban, labor, New Deal, growth, Great Society, and other liberalisms. For further discussion of the varying liberalisms see: Alan Ryan, "Liberalism," in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds. (Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993); Jennifer Mittelstadt, "Consumer Politics: A New History of the Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order," Reviews in American History 33, no. 3 (2005).

⁵ Classic liberalism, with roots in the thought of John Locke, Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville and Fredrich von Hayek, advocated limits on the role and power government as the greatest guarantee of personal liberty. The belief in an expanded role for government marks the radical departure of modern liberalism from these classical tenants. Modern liberals came to see privations and unavoidable adversities (hunger, the risks of old age, and illness or infirmity), inequalities, and the dramatic boom and bust cycles of capitalism as just as significant threats to personal liberty as monarchy had once been. Liberalism thus became associated with an enlarged welfare state, a major shift exemplified in the United States beginning in the late 19th century and continuing with the New Deal and Great Society policies of the 20th century. See: Ryan, "Liberalism."
but also thrived in the late 20th century as the predominant ideology of the Democratic Party – a position it still enjoys.

Suburban liberalism represents a continuation of postwar growth liberalism in many ways, albeit in a constrained and refocused form. Some strands of modern liberalism had seen fostering growth as a way to expand the pie for everyone, while using state intervention as necessary to protect citizens from the excesses of capitalism, yet the more economically fortunate and empowered suburban liberals became skeptical of both of these ends. The issue of controlling growth joined curbing inflation in Santa Clara County as a wedge issue during the 1960s and 1970s dividing middle class suburban liberals from trade unions and the working class. Suburban liberals believed that the government should spend their tax dollars in their communities, not redirect them to urban areas or social programs that did not benefit them directly. They instead wanted the state to harness growth selectively to suit their priorities, which included protecting and promoting the viability, character, and aesthetics of their suburban communities and boosting the high-technology political economy that enabled it. Other 20th century liberals had seen a role for the state to protect individuals from the power and cyclic nature of concentrated capital through regulation and the recognition of unions in the workplace. Suburbanites, however, were a property-owning, professional, and managerial class that was either self-employed or employed by a seemingly new type of large corporation participating in a seemingly new type of economy of seemingly endless expansion. Suburban liberals therefore did not prioritize workplace protections, unions, urban development, civic projects, and social welfare aimed at helping the poor in the emerging high-technology suburban political economy of Santa Clara County. Silicon
Valley’s suburbanites considered their communities and the associated economic and social order to be the new ideal model of the American standard of living. Thus, suburban liberals joined other 20th century liberals in demanding that the state act to protect their version of the American dream and personal liberty, but on much narrower terms. With their economic and political success, they surpassed other members of the broader liberal coalition – many representing communities in decline and in conflict – to become the most prominent constituency within the Democratic Party.

Suburban liberalism in Santa Clara County embraced many of the goals of the contemporaneous environmental movement. As scholars have noted, suburbanites responded to the threat to neighboring green spaces from developers at first with dismay and then with mobilization.6 Santa Clara County is an example of suburban residents motivated to environmental protection as a way to preserve the aesthetics of their neighborhoods and quality of life. To them, controlling growth and imposing environmental protections, such as curbing air pollution, was their right as consumers, property owners, and taxpayers.7 Towards these ends, suburban liberal activists in Santa Clara County saw an ample need for state regulation of private economic activity to slow development and preserve the environment.

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Social issues marked a major contrast between the suburban liberals of Santa Clara County and the suburban New Right of Orange County. Suburban liberals shared with conservatives a desire to protect the suburban quality of life by keeping out undesirable businesses or groups – ranging from bars and liquor stores to sex workers and purveyors of pornography. Still, suburban liberals were not willing to go as far as religious and social conservatives who wanted the state to impose a variety of moral constraints on society. The religious right thus never enjoyed anywhere near the same level of influence or drew large numbers of adherents in suburban liberal Santa Clara County as it did in the New Right-leaning Orange County. Despite howls of protest from conservatives, local leaders in San Jose and Santa Clara County espoused support for issues such as gay rights and feminism with little political cost. Many local suburban liberal leaders took strong progressive stands on gun control, civil rights, anti-war causes, and the environment.

Situating Suburban Liberalism in the Historiography of the Modern US History

Most narratives of American political and social history after World War II ignore the relationship of suburban liberalism to liberal growth politics. The existence of a suburban strand of liberalism in northern California complicates the common political

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narrative of the postwar decades. Scholars have long recognized that no monolithic “liberalism” emerged from the New Deal era. Postwar liberalism was instead a broad, uneasy, and often fractious coalition of various contending liberal interests – including labor, farm, white ethnic, African American and other minorities, and urban blocs – that represented contesting constituencies with divergent and, as later decades revealed, conflicting priorities.⁹ I argue that a suburban liberal bloc, comprised of a fast-growing white home-owning middle class, also emerged in the postwar period to compete with the other constituencies for priority within the postwar liberal policy state. Most scholars, however, have overlooked this suburban liberal constituency, either failing to discern it amongst the noisier and fractious strands of the New Left, or lumping it together with the nascent conservatism of disaffected white suburbanites, many of whom were former working-class Democrats, that shifted in the latter decades of the 20th century toward the Republican Party and the New Right.¹⁰

The fact that suburban liberalism in part owes its lineage to growth liberalism contradicts the broad-brush stroke narratives that claim that liberalism overreached and

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declined in the 1970s because it tried to provide “guns and butter” without sacrifice.\textsuperscript{11} Political and economic change in the 1970s and 1980s put some strands of liberalism into disarray, but suburban liberals seized onto controlled growth as a way to continue and extend their own advantaged position even if they no longer saw growth as a broad-based social palliative that could boost all fortunes. In sum, suburban liberals sought to use the power of the state selectively to promote certain kinds of growth while narrowly acting to minimize the less desirable impacts on suburban quality of life.

Suburban liberalism in effect adopted the primary tenant of the growth liberal consensus, namely that economic growth could allow them to avoid painful choices. In Silicon Valley and other similar regions, suburban liberals sought to capitalize on growing the high-technology suburban economy to broaden regional prosperity without requiring sacrifice in the form of higher taxes or eroded quality of life. This was possible because Santa Clara County was not a traditional suburb on the edge of an older industrial core, thus the dynamics of race and class that were creating tensions in other regions were less prevalent. Moreover, suburban liberals benefited from Silicon Valley’s emerging flexible information and technology economy that drew highly skilled migrants and investment and created wealth and opportunity for the region. As a convenient side effect, these market forces marginalized many of the poor and working classes, driving them to communities on the periphery. The cities of Silicon Valley could thus take advantage of low-wage workers without bearing the cost of affordable housing or social services.

\textsuperscript{11} For example: Davies, \textit{From Opportunity to Entitlement}; Dave Farber, ”The Torch Had Fallen,” in \textit{America in the Seventies}, ed. Beth L. Bailey and Dave Farber (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004); Farber, \textit{The Age of Great Dreams}. 
Suburban liberalism challenges the conventional wisdom that suburbs were and remain bastions of conservatism, retrenchment, and racial exclusion. This common perception of the suburbs as conservative political spaces is a direct outgrowth of the regions and neighborhoods hitherto focused on by scholars. The older suburbs around industrial urban centers were indeed ground zero for race- and class-based contestation between increasingly conservative working-class whites and an emerging African American middle class who also wanted to participate in the “American Dream” of suburban homeownership and all that this entailed.\(^\text{12}\) Many other suburban regions further removed from the older industrial core, including the newer and faster growing suburbs of the Sunbelt, became areas of so-called “white flight” characterized by a putatively colorblind exclusion based on socioeconomic barriers. Consequently, even many of these wealthier and more distant suburbs witnessed a wave of conservative backlash when mandated busing programs aimed at desegregating schools threatened to punch holes in suburban race and class privilege.\(^\text{13}\) Finally, the suburbs of Orange County, California, represent a prime example of suburban conservatism. The region became the nucleus of the politics of the New Right when an invigorated grassroots movement motivated by Cold War anticommunism, fiscal and social conservatism, evangelical Christianity, libertarian anti-statism, and discomfort with changing racial, gender and cultural norms.


\(^{13}\) *The Silent Majority*; Freund, *Colored Property*. 
mobilized a conservative takeover of the local Republican Party before launching a nationwide struggle to shift the GOP to the Right.\textsuperscript{14} 

The suburbs focused upon by scholars in all of the above instances, were associated with a conservative and exclusionary political orientation that was important to the emergence of the New Right and the socially conservative direction of the Republican Party from the 1970s onward. It is therefore understandable that these regional case studies reinforced the assumption that suburban environments were characterized by conservative political and social leanings – but there are contemporaneous counterexamples. Santa Clara County, and other similar suburban regions, developed a distinct suburban liberal political culture that was equally pivotal to the “New Democrat” reconstitution of the Democratic Party and that has had just as lasting of an impact on national liberal politics as the New Right had on conservatism.

Santa Clara County and the suburbs like it that broke with the conservative trend to embrace a liberalism tempered by suburban priorities were more affluent, removed from declining older industrial cores, and less overtly riven by race and class strife.\textsuperscript{15} They were in fact centers of economic, geographic and population growth and expansion that partially insulated them from the worst of the disruptions and malaise of the late 1960s and 1970s. The suburban liberal regions were in most cases and in many ways the direct opposites of the struggling, polarized suburbs where formerly Democratic white


\textsuperscript{15} Santa Clara County and the surrounding regions were not free from race and class-based exclusion. The area had its own shameful legacy of racial strife, discrimination and fights over busing. However, economic barriers, zoning laws, and homeowner groups determined to protect the “character” of their communities typically played the largest role within communities increasingly divided by de facto segregation based on economics.
ethnic suburbanites were defecting to the Republican Party.\textsuperscript{16} As suburban liberals gravitated towards the Democratic Party at the local, state, and eventually national level, they remade it, pushing the party’s agenda and focus to fit their priorities and needs. While the “suburban warriors” of the New Right noisily overthrew the moderate wing of the Republican Party as zealous insurgents, their liberally minded suburban reformer counterparts slowly, quietly and with less fuss remade the Democratic Party in their image. Moreover, due to the economic and social importance of the regions like Santa Clara County and Silicon Valley where suburban liberalism took hold, the priorities of these suburbanites and their employers became predominant in the national political discourse of both parties. This was especially true in relation to economic policies related to free trade, middle-class and corporate tax cuts, immigration, and investment in high-technology industries.

Liberalism did not “decline” with the retreat of the Old Left and labor during the postwar decades, nor with the unraveling of the New Left at the dawn of the 1980s. The already malleable and pragmatic mainstream strand of liberal ideology simply shifted along with the priorities of its suburban exponents. The centrist realignment of the Democratic Party was not, as many pundits argued, the cynically reactive cooption of Republican talking points credited to Bill Clinton’s “triangulation” and Democratic Leadership council strategists. It was instead a forward looking and proactive accommodation by party leaders of the powerful suburban liberal values that developed unnoticed in the postwar decades, overshadowed by the more vocal, disruptive, and

\textsuperscript{16} This is not to say that all affluent and economically expansive high-technology suburbs had strong suburban liberal political cultures. The conservative Orange County, California, for example, fostered the New Right.
ultimately short lived New Left. In place of simpler accounts of a monolithic liberalism waxing and waning in mirror opposition to a monolithic conservatism, the evolution of suburban liberalism complicates the political history of the late 20\textsuperscript{th} and early 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries. The runaway growth of the suburbs – in terms of population, economy, wealth and political clout – owes a great deal to the policies and programs implemented by liberal policymakers from the New Deal to the Great Society. Previous iterations of liberalism in fact fostered the conditions for their own marginalization by empowering, enriching and expanding the suburban political economy. In effect, growth liberalism ironically set in motion the rise of its ultimate usurpers, both from the New Right emerging out of the Sunbelt, and from suburban oriented liberals in areas like Silicon Valley.

**The Role of Labor, Women and Minorities in Silicon Valley**

White men in the affluent middle and professional classes were the primary leaders of the first two progressive political reform waves in Santa Clara County up through the 1950s. As the work of other scholars has demonstrated, however, the roster of players shaping the development of Silicon Valley has been much more diverse at the grassroots level. Santa Clara County, although often described as an area free of labor strife, had several notable episodes of working class activism. Historian Glenna Matthews demonstrated that while the more militant activities of unions in San Francisco and the East Bay overshadowed labor activism in the valley, the region had its own history of working class mobilization from the early years of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century through the
postwar period. Other scholars have also described the longstanding economic, cultural and political contributions – and the struggles against marginalization and discrimination – of Native Americans, Latinos, Asian immigrants, and other minority groups in Santa Clara County. It is worth noting that East San Jose – nicknamed “Sal Si Puedes” (“get out if you can” in Spanish) by its largely Latino and working class residents for its poor infrastructure and services – was the hometown of the United Farm Worker labor organizer and civil rights leader Cesar Chavez.

Much of the political activity by women and minorities in Santa Clara County until the 1960s had been outside of city government. By the 1970s, San Jose and Santa Clara County had a larger and more diverse population, with many new residents coming from other parts of the country. The area also became home to a growing population of immigrants from Mexico, South American and Asia. The third wave thus marked a transition, with women and minorities playing leading roles in the 1960s and 1970s. As the third reform wave mobilized, the majority of its leaders were women and a core part of its coalition was working class and minority residents unhappy with the city’s former homogenous leadership and the neglect and discrimination of their communities.

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17 In 1908, the Union Labor Party of San Jose was able to capture a majority on the city council. During the Depression years, cannery workers – with the local Communist Party playing an active and visible role – organized and waged several strikes, but were not able to solidify concrete gains. A more noteworthy example was the successful mobilization by female cannery workers in the 1940s. Despite a lack of support from male union leaders, they organized and struck for better wages. See: Glenna Matthews, *Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream: Gender, Class, and Opportunity in the Twentieth Century* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003).

Janet Gray Hayes was a major player in this story. Shortly after moving to San Jose with her physician husband in the 1950s, Hayes became active at the grassroots level in the emerging suburban liberal reform movement. Describing herself as “suburban housewife” motivated by concern about the negative impact of runaway growth on the health, safety and quality life of her family, Hayes joined with other middle-class suburbanites in homeowners’ associations, environmental groups, the League of Women Voters, and other similar organizations to address these problems in her neighborhood and community. Over the course of the next two decades, she went from being what she characterized as the “token woman” appointee on various local boards and commissions to being in 1974 the first woman mayor of a large US city. During Hayes’ two terms as mayor, voters elected a number of other women to serve in city and county government. The unprecedented number of women serving in local office earned San Jose and Santa Clara County international attention as the “Feminist Capital of the World.” Many of these new women office-holders were political allies or protégés of Hayes, magnifying the mayor’s influence on local politics.19 The engineers and entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley are widely lauded as pioneers of a new high-technology economy, but Hayes and her allies affected a similarly revolutionary political and social transformation of San Jose. Hayes built a suburban liberal coalition of homeowners, high-technology employers, environmentalists, liberals, labor groups, and minorities around a model of “smart growth” that sustained the viability of Silicon Valley’s economy by addressing quality of life and growth issues.

Three Waves of Reform and the Making of Silicon Valley

This study is organized around the three successive waves of progressive reformers that laid the foundation for, and ultimately sustained the viability of, the Silicon Valley economy.

Chapter 2 covers the early history of Santa Clara County, with an emphasis on the Gold Rush period of the 1840s to the Progressive Period in the 1920s. The chapter examines the transition of the region’s economy from wheat and extractive industries to the development of a fruit based economy in the 1870s. It describes how the first reform wave arose at the close of the 19th and start of the 20th century as a coalition of professional and middle-class residents linked to the emerging light industrial orchard economy of Santa Clara County. Led by liberal Republicans, this group ultimately coalesced with the broader Progressive Era reform movement to displace the incumbent political machine of the Southern Pacific Railroad and lingering Gold Rush era economic order. In the process, these early reformers put in place the Progressive-style machinery of municipal government that was amenable to control by coalitions of middle-class residents at the expense of popular democracy.

Chapter 3 recounts the mobilization of the second wave of reformers in the mid-1940s to push San Jose and Santa Clara County away from its agricultural roots and onto a path of rapid growth and expansion. Led by a tight cohort of boosters and development interests, this second group consisted of bipartisan and progress-minded professional and middle-class residents who favored suburban and industrial growth. This second wave of reformers seized control of municipal power in San Jose in 1944 and morphed into a pro-
growth political machine that dominated local politics through the 1960s by capitalizing on the tools put in place by the Progressives that made municipal power subject to capture by mobilized and moneyed groups. The rapid suburbanization and industrial growth fostered by these reformers in turn facilitated the consolidation of the region’s electronics industries and allowed the development of Silicon Valley. They also created the conditions and discontent that mobilized the suburban liberal reformers in late 1960s and 1970s. This second wave, primarily made up of white male middle- and professional-class members, was distinct from coalitions of ethnic and business interests that dominated many eastern cities.

Chapter 4 offers a brief examination of the factors that contributed to the development of Silicon Valley as a leading economic and technological center, including early technological innovation in the region dating back to the 19th century, the impact of federal and military spending, and the role of Stanford University. Also considered is the impact of Santa Clara County’s advantaged position as a Sunbelt suburb in the postwar period. The chapter highlights how these three factors facilitated experiments with venture capital and labor markets and encouraged rapid growth and development. Finally, it describes the role of the local political culture and the three waves of reform movements in creating and sustaining Silicon Valley.

Chapter 5 describes the early opposition to the rapid and poorly planned growth in Santa Clara County in the postwar decades. Beginning in the 1950s, a small group of the valley’s remaining orchardists and agricultural landowners turned to sympathetic county planners for help slowing the expansion of suburban development. The greenbelt orchardist-planner coalition secured the passage of the first agricultural zoning measure
in the US to protect what remained of the county’s fruit growing economy. Ultimately unsuccessful, the failed coalition marks the definitive collapse of the interests represented by the first wave of reformers and the consolidation of power by the second wave of pro-growth boosters. Next, the chapter describes the first manifestations of homeowner opposition to growth led by the conservative homeowner activist Virginia Shaffer. With ties to the local defense industry and a strong Republican leaning, Shaffer resembles the “Suburban Warriors” of Orange County and represents a path not taken for Santa Clara County. Although she mounted the first effective challenge to pro-growth interests in San Jose, Shaffer could not build a lasting conservative political base in the fast-growing and increasingly diverse region. Liberal activists instead came to the forefront of homeowner opposition to growth. The last part of the chapter describes the tenure of Norman Mineta, the first Asian mayor of large continental US city. Mineta pioneered the policy framework for a suburban liberal coalition in San Jose before attaining another first for Asian Americans by winning a seat in Congress.

Chapter 6 describes the consolidation of the third reform wave as a suburban liberal governing coalition combining suburban homeowners, high-technology employers, and liberal and minority groups. Janet Gray Hayes led this suburban liberal transition as part of a local taxpayer’s anti-growth and anti-tax movement several years before the larger statewide anti-property tax revolt of Proposition 13. Hayes became the spokesperson for the local suburban homeowner’s perspective. Her leadership allowed suburban liberalism to consolidate its hold on the political institutions of San Jose and Santa Clara County. During her two terms as mayor, Hayes and her allies established one of the nation’s most ambitious suburban liberal programs of “smart growth” to regulate
and repair runaway sprawl and to make new development improve, rather than detract from, suburban quality of life.

Chapter 7 provides a conclusion by offering a brief summary of the key arguments. It also discusses how Hayes’s coalition, despite its limits, became an important backdrop to the redefinition of American liberalism as manifested in the 1990s with the emergence of the “New Democrats.”
Chapter 2

San Jose’s Early History: Spanish Pueblo to Progressive Era Bellwether

Suburban liberalism emerged out of the grassroots mobilization of an enlarged middle class linked to a high-technology economy during the 1960s and 1970s, but it is indebted to the legacy of an initial group of reformers who pioneered a distinct strand of Progressive politics around the turn of the century. San Jose’s first wave of reformers mobilized in the late 19th century to oppose the local political machine of the Southern Pacific Railroad. Part of a small but growing middle and professional class, the reformers largely represented the region’s orchard economy that emerged in the wake of the Gold Rush era boom. The discovery of gold near Sacramento had dramatically accelerated the development of California, allowing San Francisco to become a cosmopolitan urban port city and a commercial hub linking the west coast to world markets. The Gold Rush also transformed San Jose from a sleepy village serving the needs of scattered farms and ranches into the home of large-scale wheat farming, mining, and other extractive industries. As the mercantile center of Santa Clara County, San Jose became an important satellite to San Francisco. By the 1870s, however, the growing and processing of fruit overtook wheat farming and other extractive industries as the primary economic driver of Santa Clara County. The area’s pleasant climate and opportunities fostered by the orchard economy soon attracted an influx of new residents. Despite the increasing economic importance of the orchardists and growing middle class, however, political power remained firmly in the hands of the Southern Pacific and allied large landowners and
corporations. The stage was thus set for a clash between reformers representing the new fruit interests and Gold Rush incumbents.

Reformers in San Jose and Santa Clara County mobilized in the 1890s – a decade before their peers in other larger cities like Los Angeles and San Francisco – and were among the first in the state to act to dislodge the Southern Pacific’s political machine. Ultimately converging with the broader Progressive Era reform movement in the early 20th century, the valley’s first wave of reformers broke the hold that the railroad and its allies had on local power by amending the city charter to restructure municipal government. Since the growth of their businesses and professions depended on the fruit economy, the reformers in San Jose eschewed the anti-corporate, anti-labor, or nativist tone of some strands of Progressivism. They recognized the need for a nuanced relationship with large corporations, unions, and immigrants. San Jose’s fruit industry needed capital, settled labor relations, and a low-wage Asian workforce. Local reformers thus differed from the Progressive middle and professional classes found elsewhere that felt stifled by capital and unions, threatened by immigrants, and concerned with the morals of the working classes. In short, San Jose’s reformers not only preceded the broader Progressive reform movement in California, they also represented a different type of Progressivism that scholars have not yet adequately examined. More important for the purpose of this study, Progressivism in Santa Clara County was more entrenched than in other parts of the state, and its lingering legacy influenced and shaped future reform in the region, including the development of suburban liberalism.

20 For an overview of how the reformers in San Jose and Santa Clara County preceded and differed with others prominent strands of Progressivism, see: Timothy J. Lukes, "Progressivism Off-Broadway: Reform Politics in San Jose, California, 1880-1920," Southern California Quarterly 76, no. 4 (1994).
The first wave of reformers in San Jose ultimately pushed aside the Gold Rush economic interests to give greater political power to the orchardists, fruit processors, and aligned middle and professional classes. Like Progressives across the US, local reformers passed a number of measures to make government more efficient and professional. San Jose became the first major town in California to adopt a strict city manager form of government, eliminating the elected office of mayor. Reformers in San Jose also pioneered the adoption of other Progressive reforms in the state, for example passing measures that increased the size of the city council and made councilors elected on a citywide basis instead of by ward. Intended to expand the role and influence of the middle class, many of the measures put in place by San Jose’s reformers restricted the role of popular democracy in city government and concentrated power in the hands of a few appointed officials. An unexpected side effect of these measures made local government subject to capture by mobilized and moneyed special interests. Thus, although the first wave of reformers in San Jose succeeded in breaking the power of the Southern Pacific political machine, the measures that they created allowed a new set of local political bosses in the 1920s and 1930s to wield oversized influence over municipal affairs. The abuses of power by these new political machines in turn provoked the ire of a second wave of reformers. Once again comprised of an enlarged middle and professional class associated with new economic interests, San Jose’s second group of reformers mobilized in the 1940s to overthrow the status quo that the Progressives had helped install.
California’s First Town

San Jose was California's first town.\textsuperscript{21} It was founded in 1777 as Pueblo de San Jose de Guadalupe under the orders of the Spanish viceroy in Mexico by 66 persons, consisting of five settler families, nine soldiers and a "cowboy." The Spanish had a number of forts, trading posts and missions in the expansive Alta California, but they only established two other towns in the territory: Los Angeles (founded in 1781) and Branciforte (part of present-day Santa Cruz and founded in 1797).\textsuperscript{22} Prior to establishing these civic centers, Spain’s activity had not extended past the area around the San Diego harbor. Spain’s renewed push north coincided with the arrival of a colonial rival. The Russian presence in Alaska and their tentative exploration down the Pacific coastline of the Americas in search of trading posts worried Spanish colonial authorities, prompting them to consolidate their hold on the Alta California region and its rich resources –


\textsuperscript{22} Spain’s move to establish civil society in these northern territories lagged almost two and a half centuries after their arrival in North America in the early 16\textsuperscript{th} century. It followed nearly two-hundred years after the English privateer and explorer Sir Francis Drake had sailed into San Francisco Bay in 1579, mounted a few forays into the wilderness, made tentative contact with the region’s native Ohlone people, brazenly claimed the region for England, and then departed. As Kevin Starr recounts in \textit{California: a History}, Herman Cortes moved on from his conquest of Cuba in 1519 to carve out the territory of Mexico in the name of the Spanish crown by conquering the Aztecs and the other indigenous tribes that populated the region. By the 1530s, the Spanish had discovered Baja California as well as the fact that it was not an island, but rather a peninsula connected to the same extensive continental mainland that bordered Mexico to the north. Despite some forays by adventurers and explorers including voyages along the coast or solitary military and trading outposts, Spain’s colonial authorities in the new world largely left Alta California in the hands of Jesuit missionaries. This changed in 1759 when Carlos III of Spain ordered the banishment of Jesuits from Alta California and seizure of their assets; an effort that began in earnest in 1768. From this point on, the Franciscan order possessed theological authority in the region, working more closely with colonial authorities than the independent minded Jesuits.
particularly its mines. Spain sent its first expedition north into the area that would become Santa Clara County in 1769. Located south of the San Francisco Bay, the region lies between the Santa Cruz Mountains to the west and the Diablo Mountain Range to the east. The two mountain ranges create a temperate valley sheltered from the cold, damp climate of San Francisco and the coastal areas west of the Santa Cruz Mountains. The Spanish explorers, struck by the natural beauty of the valley and its lush growth of trees, dubbed the territory the “plain of the oaks” (“Llano de los Robles”).

Spanish authorities intended for San Jose to serve as a civic hub for further expansion and consolidation of the rich valley and the rest of Alta California. The tiny town, however, was overshadowed by its neighbors, the Presidio and port at San Francisco (fortified in 1776) and the thriving religious agricultural community located at the nearby Mission Santa Clara (founded in 1777). When Mexico declared its independence from Spain in 1821, it took four years for the remote San Jose to acknowledge Mexican authority or for anyone to notice the difference. As of 1831, the town only boasted a few hundred residents. The main economic activities were the

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23 “Early History, Santa Clara County”.
24 In 1777, Father Junípero Serra founded the Mission Santa Clara de Asis just a few miles outside of San Jose as the eighth mission of the eventual 21 total in the territory that would become the present-day California.
25 Population figures for the pre-US period vary significantly for San Jose and the surrounding region that would become Santa Clara County. The Federal Writers’ project put San Jose’s population at 531 in 1831 and 3,000 in 1850 when the city was incorporated. Butler in The Valley of Santa Clara lists 68 as the original number of inhabitants in 1777 and claims about 300 a decade later in 1841 – a number that seems too low. Terry Christensen in Movers and Shakers lists 66 in 1777, 240 in 1820, and 2,500 in 1852. These numbers do not include Native Americans who were left off official tallies. US Census numbers, which are only available from 1870 onward, list a population of 9,089 for that year.
raising of stock animals and small-scale agriculture focused on providing for local needs.\textsuperscript{26}

Mexican officials initiated a process of secularization shortly after achieving independence from Spain, selling off church lands. The initiative sought to transfer land back to some of the Native peoples, but most of it instead went to aspiring Mexican rancheros. During the first two decades under Mexican authority, San Jose remained a tiny rural town that served as a hub to numerous nearby ranches. The town’s small population consisted primarily of Spanish Californians, Mexicans, Peruvians, Chileans, and Native Americans. An immigrant en route from New England to San Francisco in 1841 described passing through San Jose that year and found it to be a simple and rather primitive village consisting of adobe and log houses and with coyotes baying nightly on the outskirts.\textsuperscript{27}

San Jose experienced its first small burst of growth during the course of the 1840s. Many pioneering farm families passing through the area on the final leg of the route from Sutter’s Fort to San Francisco found the lush and fertile Valley of San Jose, as the area was known at the time, to be an enticing place to settle.\textsuperscript{28} When Polish immigrant and physician Felix Wierzbicki published his guide to California in 1849, he described the Valley of San Jose as “one of the richest spots in California,” and presciently added

\textsuperscript{26} Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress Administration of Northern California., \textit{California}, 298-303.
\textsuperscript{27} Butler, \textit{The Valley of Santa Clara}, 131-56.
\textsuperscript{28} At this time, members of the Bidwell-Bartleson, Donner, Murphy and other overland expeditions chose to settle down around San Jose. See: ibid; Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress Administration of Northern California., \textit{California}, 298-303.
that it was an area “which would support a million industrious inhabitants.”

The settlers coming into San Jose were just a portion of the numerous American pioneers crossing the border into Mexican territory looking for land and opportunity – and in the process increasing tensions between the two powers, leading to war between Mexico and the US in 1846. At the conclusion of the war in 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ceded Mexico’s northwestern territories, including all of the future California, to the United States. Two years later, California became a state on September 9, 1850. The state legislature incorporated the valley around San Jose as Santa Clara County that same year. A month later, they incorporated San Jose, then with a population of around 3,000, as a city and county seat.

The end of the war prompted a final land grab. The 1851 Land Law made all land grants given under the Spanish and Mexican administrations subject to review and challenge, allowing Americans to take the majority of lands held by the former Californios by the mid-1850s. Over the course of just eight decades, the lands of California had passed in quick succession from the original native peoples, to the Spanish, Mexican, and now white American hands. Santa Clara County followed the same pattern as the rest of the state, with large landowners coming to control most of the appropriated lands.

Perhaps just as important to the development of the future Santa Clara County region as the change in government was the discovery of gold a hundred miles to the

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30 Ibid; Starr, *California*.
north on the American River on January 24, 1848. The ensuing Gold Rush attracted waves of immigrants hoping to find a new life and riches in Northern California, but the time of the small-scale or lone miner was short-lived. National and international corporations with the resources to marshal the latest machinery and field large labor forces rapidly dominated mining in California.\(^{32}\) In 1851, the California State Mining & Smelting Company based in Santa Clara County and founded with $100,000 in capital stock became the first corporation to register in California.\(^{33}\) California’s second corporation was the Mariposa Mining Company. Seven investors from San Francisco incorporated the company with $1,000,000 in capital stock – a staggering sum for the time – and its shares traded on the London and Paris stock exchanges. By 1852, there were already 53 mining corporations formed in California. Investors incorporated dozens more over the course of the 1850s as mining corporations accounted for three quarters of the new companies in California. Millions of dollars poured into the northern part of the state from these multinational corporations with investors located not only from across the country – from places like San Francisco, Sacramento, New York City, and Boston – but also from abroad. British investors alone contributed about $10 million into California mining corporations, and 32 corporations formed in London to mine gold in California.\(^{34}\)


\(^{34}\) “Capitalism Comes to the Diggings,” 65-68.
All of this investment and immigration sparked by the Gold Rush accelerated urban and economic development and growth for San Francisco and San Jose. Almost overnight, San Francisco transformed into a major commercial and banking center while the much smaller San Jose became a convenient point of supply for miners heading north. The cities became home to waves of lawyers, doctors, merchants, and other professionals attracted by economic opportunity.\textsuperscript{35} In just a few decades, San Francisco and San Jose made the economic and cultural leap from rural hinterland towns to commercial centers linked to each other and global markets. The trend would only accelerate.

The corporate consolidation of mining created wealth and opportunity for a few, but for most working people and minorities in the state, it meant laboring to make others rich. Labor in California stratified along racial lines with Anglo and European whites at the top followed by Mexicans, African Americans, Asians, and native peoples. Santa Clara County was no different. Many of the Mexicans displaced by the 1851 Land Law had few options left besides mine labor, but their mixed European ancestry, Catholic religion, and skills put them near white people on the social hierarchy, eventually opening the door of citizenship for some. The population of black people in the state at this time was small and comprised mostly of a few slaves, laborers, farmers, and teachers. Especially few in number in San Jose and Santa Clara County, the small black community lived in segregated areas. Chinese immigrants began to come to California in large numbers in the 1840s, mostly driven by flood to leave the Guangdong Province and seek work and opportunity abroad. By 1860, they accounted for 10\% of California’s

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid; Butler, The Valley of Santa Clara, 137-38; Starr, California, 78-90.
population and a quarter of the state’s work force, mostly through indentured or bonded labor. Chinese workers, targets of discrimination and often violence, provided the primary labor to build California’s rail lines and approximately 35,000 worked in the gold mines. They were also a major source of cheap labor in the fields and orchards of Santa Clara County when the area’s agricultural economy boomed in subsequent decades.\(^{36}\)

The New Almaden quicksilver mine located twelve miles south of San Jose helped make the Gold Rush possible and was a local example of the unequal racial division of labor. Miners used quicksilver to amalgamate particles and dust from the precious metals that would have otherwise been lost. At the time, only gold was more valuable.\(^{37}\) To extract the quicksilver, the New Almaden mine operators relied on a workforce organized around a racial division of labor that gave the more desirable jobs at more than double the wages to whites (mostly Anglo-American and Europeans) while reserving the most arduous and dangerous tasks for Mexican, Chinese, and Native American workers (including children) who earned half as much. A segregated enclave known as “Spanish Town” because of its predominantly Mexican residents formed near the Almaden Mine and was home to the approximately 2,000 non-white workers. The schools, churches, and hospitals near the mine were likewise segregated by race.\(^{38}\)

The burst of growth that the Gold Rush fostered in San Jose prompted the area’s first generation of boosters and speculators. On the eve of California’s entry into the US

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\(^{36}\) Pellow and Park, *The Silicon Valley of Dreams*, 36-45.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 34-36.

\(^{38}\) A lingering legacy of the mine is contaminated water throughout the valley and even into the San Francisco Bay. For more detail on the environmental cost and racial discrimination at the New Almaden Mine, see: ibid., 34-36 and 42-44; Pitti, *The Devil in Silicon Valley*. 
as a state, San Jose’s partisans won out over competitors from Monterey and Vallejo to make the town the first state capital. In a prelude of things to come in the next century, land speculators and boosters created a frenzy, with plots of land climbing to as high as $10,000 before falling to a quarter of that a few years later.\textsuperscript{39} The state legislators, however, were rankled by San Jose’s lack of good accommodations and an unseasonable bout of heavy rainfall.\textsuperscript{40} In a move that dashed the dreams of the speculators in 1852, legislators relocated the state capital to other towns, eventually permanently establishing it in 1854 in Sacramento. Local officials and boosters in San Jose unsuccessfully tried several times over the course of the next several decades to regain the capital.

San Jose lost the capital, but the town continued to grow. Stagecoach and boat lines were the primary links between San Jose and San Francisco until the completion in 1864 of a railroad with service between the two cities. These transportation links solidified San Jose’s role as a hub for Santa Clara County, connecting the local region to San Francisco and the worldwide commerce of the larger port city. The region also became an early center for higher learning in the state. In 1851, Santa Clara County became home to the first college in California when the Jesuits at the Mission Santa Clara established Santa Clara College.\textsuperscript{41} Meanwhile, San Jose State University, which relocated

\textsuperscript{39} Butler, \textit{The Valley of Santa Clara}, 131-56.
\textsuperscript{40} By some accounts, the hard-drinking assemblage earned the nickname the “legislature of a thousand drinks.” The group disliked the town’s shortage of women and other entertainments. For more information on San Jose’s attempt to become the state capital, see: Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Administration of Northern California., \textit{California}, 300-01; Leonard McKay, “The First State Legislature,” SanJoseInside.com, http://www.sanjoseinside.com/news/entries/the_first_state_legislature/.
\textsuperscript{41} The institution started as a preparatory school. Two years later, college level curriculum was added, making the future Santa Clara University the oldest institution of higher learning in the state. By 1875, the school had a student body of 275, about one-third of which were enrolled at the college level and the remainder in the preparatory school. For more information, see: "About SCU – Santa Clara’s History," Santa Clara University, http://www.scu.edu/about/history.cfm; Starr, \textit{California}, 108.
to San Jose from San Francisco in 1870, was the first state-owned public institution in California with roots dating back to 1857. Other institutions followed to educate the state’s growing population. The University of California opened in 1869 in nearby Oakland, moving in 1873 to its present home in Berkeley. The private Stanford University in 1891 enrolled its first class of students. Each of these institutes of higher learning contributed to the development of the San Francisco Bay Area and Santa Clara County and figure prominently in the future success of Silicon Valley.

Over the span of about a decade, the Gold Rush that had fostered the burst of rapid growth and development in northern California ran its course. Gold production declined steadily from its peak in 1852 of $81 million, falling in 1859 to $46.8 million with few of the mining corporations ever paying any dividends to investors. Many companies failed outright and lawsuits consumed a significant portion of the money earned from gold. By the end of the 1850s, California’s economy slowed. The downturn was short-lived, however, as the discovery of gold and silver in Nevada reignited the

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42 San Jose State traces its origins back to Minns' Evening Normal School established in San Francisco in 1857. In 1862, the California legislature incorporated Minns' Evening Normal School as California State Normal School. Soon thereafter, the legislature decided that a new location was necessary for the school to grow. Officials eventually chose San Jose, selecting a 27-acre tract of land known as Washington Square in the city's downtown for the school in 1870. San Jose State would gradually expand its curriculum beyond teaching teachers to meet the needs of a growing community, for example adding manual training courses in the 1880s. See: California, 108; Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress Administration of Northern California., California, 301-02; Annette Nellen, "Sjsu History," http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/nellen_a/sjsu_history_information.htm; "San Jose State University Timeline," San Jose State University, http://www.sjsu.edu/about_sjsu/history/timeline/1857/.


44 "The Birth of the University," http://www.stanford.edu/about/history/.
mining frenzy. Mining the Comstock Lode in the neighboring state restarted California’s economic growth with new investment and commerce opportunities.45

Many farmers, businessmen, and investors in San Jose and Santa Clara County came around to seeing wheat and eventually other crops as more lucrative for the region’s long-term future than mining. Over the course of the 1850s, Santa Clara County produced 40% of the wheat crop in California. This put the valley’s farming industry on a collision course with local mine operators who were rapidly expanding their use of hydraulic mining techniques to get at difficult to reach deposits of ore. Not only was water a precious resource that the farming interests loathed to see squandered, but debris, silt, and pollutants from hydraulic mining clogged waterways, spoiled land, and ruined crops. Farmers in Santa Clara County formed militia-like Anti-Debris Associations to take on hydraulic mining and a series of skirmishes – political and actual – ensued. In 1884, the US Circuit Court in San Francisco issued a perpetual injunction against hydraulic mining in California. The legal ruling marked a victory for the Anti-Debris Associations, which were among the first environmental oriented organization in the United States.46 Wheat production in Santa Clara County peaked and then rapidly declined in the 1880s, but the victory achieved by agricultural interests over mining companies occurred just as the region’s fruit growers and processors were poised to become the valley’s leading economic players.47

45 Jung, “Capitalism Comes to the Diggings,” 65-68.
46 Conservationists formed The Sierra Club eight years later in San Francisco.
47 Pellow and Park, The Silicon Valley of Dreams, 43-46; Starr, California, 333.
The Emergence of the Orchard Economy

The first experiments with larger scale orchard cultivation began in the 1850s when the population boom of the Gold Rush raised demand and prices. With apples imported through San Francisco rising to a dollar each, aspiring orchardists sought to tap into this market and soon apple, peach, pear, plum, nectarine and apricot trees were planted in and around San Jose. Farmers also planted strawberries and other berries in the southern part of the valley, while a few growers experimentally introduced prune trees. By 1856, the first bountiful yields from the pioneering orchardists demonstrated the potential of the ideal soil and climate of the valley. Soon growers put more of the area’s acreage to use growing fruit, and orchards began to extend out from the heart of San Jose throughout the valley and eventually up into the surrounding hillsides. To support this agricultural activity, local entrepreneurs established several thriving nurseries to serve a growing number of orchards in the valley, and businesses providing farm supplies and advanced machinery followed.48

Wheat farming, livestock, and other extractive industries dominated the economy of Santa Clara County, but the upstart orchardists emerged at a time ripe for economic transition.49 The discovery of extensive artesian well water under the valley floor combined with the region’s fertile soil and climate ensured bountiful production, while

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49 Besides mining, San Jose and Santa Clara County also capitalized on the extractive industries of lumber and oil. The still abundant stands of oaks that had prompted Spanish explorers in the previous century to nickname the valley "Llano de los Robles" ("plain of the oaks") fed a significant lumber and manufacturing business. From 1866 to 1880, Santa Clara County produced nearly half of California’s oil before the discovery of other larger sources in later years. See: "Early History, Santa Clara County".
the recently completed rail line between San Jose and San Francisco provided access to
distant markets. The valley’s orchard crop expanded and the area became a worldwide
supplier of not just apples, peaches, pears, plums, nectarines, and apricots, but also
carrots, almonds, tomatoes, walnuts, and cherries. Santa Clara County’s favorable
growing conditions even allowed local growers to displace France as the prime world
producer of high quality prunes. The valley was also noteworthy for a handful of
pioneering wine families, serving as a significant wine-producing region for many years
until other areas overshadowed Santa Clara County in the next century.51

As Santa Clara County transitioned to an agricultural center based on fruit
production, the region experienced its first round of dramatic growth. San Jose’s
population grew from around 3,000 in 1852, to 9,000 in 1870, before doubling to over
18,000 in 1890. Santa Clara County as a whole went from 6,700 in 1852 to 48,000 in
1890. During 1880s, steady growth stimulated a real estate boom that climaxed in 1887.
Land sales reached as high as $2,000,000 a day and then collapsed.52

The abundant bounty of San Jose’s orchards created a new challenge as soon the
region was producing more crop than could be consumed by local buyers or shipped ripe,
and producers risked having excess crops wasted by spoilage. In 1871, a local
entrepreneur established the first basic canning and packing operation in San Jose. Over
the course of the 1870s and 1880s, more soon followed. Using advanced machinery and
techniques, the canning industry allowed orchardists to increase their output for sale to

50 Ibid; History of Santa Clara County, California. 143.
51 Early wine family businesses in Santa Clara County included the Picchetti Brothers Winery and the Paul
Masson Mountain Winery in the hills southwest of Cupertino. See: "Early History, Santa Clara County".
52 Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Administration of Northern California., California, 301.
far off consumers. By the 1880s – and lasting well into the 20th Century – Santa Clara County became the largest fruit producing region in the world as land formerly used for pasture, vegetables, or vineyards were converted to orchards. Fueled by the investment and growth brought on by the Gold Rush, Santa Clara County’s new agricultural order was now firmly in place. Orchards and cannery operations became the primary employer and economic driver for the region for decades to come.53

The demand for cheap, tractable labor in the orchards and canneries of San Jose made the region attractive to immigrants, something local employers encouraged. In addition to immigrants from other parts of the United States and Europe, this brought a significant number of first Chinese (primarily displaced railroad or mineworkers) and then Japanese migrants to the region to work as agricultural laborers. Working for half the compensation of whites, the Chinese took up sharecropping in the most marginal plots of marshland near the bay and served as general agricultural labor. Between 1870 and 1885, mobs of angry whites twice burned down the small segregated portion of San Jose known as “Chinatown,” but Chinese residents rebuilt the area each time. By 1900, Japanese migrants started to arrive, farming the Alviso marshlands formerly worked by the Chinese, as well as providing a significant source of field labor. However, unlike the Chinese laborers who were predominantly a population of single males, the Japanese immigrated as family units, allowing them to achieve more social mobility, albeit in an environment of discrimination, unequal opportunity, and occasionally violence.54 In subsequent decades, this racialized – and eventually gendered – hierarchy of labor

53 Sawyer, History of Santa Clara County, California. 135-40.
54 Pellow and Park, The Silicon Valley of Dreams, 46-47.
persisted with successive waves of non-white immigrants from the Philippines, Mexico, and South-East Asia occupying the lowest rungs of Santa Clara County’s working class as low-wage laborers in the fruit and subsequently the electronic manufacturing industries.\footnote{Over the first three decades of the 20th century, the Japanese community in Santa Clara County established itself as a mix of working class laborers in the fruit industry and a small landowning and entrepreneurial middle class. The outbreak of World War II and forced internment disrupted the gains of the Japanese in Santa Clara County. The local fruit industry, meanwhile, shifted to employ more Mexican and Pilipino laborers to fill the void left by the displaced Japanese. When the electronic industry overtook the fruit processors in 1960s and 1970s, immigrants from Southeast Asia joined Mexican and Pilipino workers at the low-end of the wage labor spectrum. Like the fruit industry, the electronic firms preferred employing women workers. Thus, a racialized – and eventually gendered – hierarchy of labor persisted in Santa Clara County from the mining days and continued when the region shifted from agriculture to fruit processing and eventually to electronics manufacturing. By the 21st century, Santa Clara County was among the most diverse counties in a distinctly diverse state, and foreign born and non-white workers were no longer relegated to the low wage working classes, instead with many achieving great success in the thriving knowledge economy. However, racial disparities lingered.}

Despite the growth spurt in the second half of the nineteenth century, San Jose persisted as a predominantly sleepy rural town. The city’s garden-like avenues, lined with the Victorian houses of the area’s most prosperous settler families, earned San Jose the nickname “the Garden City.”\footnote{Butler, \textit{The Valley of Santa Clara}, 131-56; ”Early History, Santa Clara County”.} The Santa Clara valley likewise retained its rural character, with the surrounding land up to the foothills dotted with farms, ranches, orchards, and vineyards. For the next several decades, many would still probably agree with the words of the renowned conservationist John Muir, who relished in the rural beauty of the valley, writing the following in 1868:

\begin{quote}
It was the bloom-time of the year … [and] the landscapes of the Santa Clara Valley were fairly drenched with sunshine, all the air was quivering with the songs of the meadowlarks, and the hills were so covered with flowers that they seemed to be painted. Slow indeed was my progress through these glorious gardens…. Cattle and cultivation were making few scars as yet, and I wandered enchanted in long wavering curves….\footnote{John Muir, ”John Muir, Prose,” Sierra Nevada Virtual Museum, http://www.sierranevadavirtualmuseum.com/docs/galleries/arts/literature/muirj.htm.}
\end{quote}
Lingering echoes of the valley’s natural beauty noted by Muir persist into the middle of the 20th century. Indeed, as developers paved over the agricultural past of San Jose and Santa Clara County, they continued to market suburban developments in the 1950s and 1960s on the ever-expanding municipal edge as having rural charm. The loss of this cultivated beauty was one of the grievances that lay at the heart of the disaffection felt by the suburban liberal reformers nearly a century after Muir’s visit, prompting them to mobilize politically to protect the legacy of the valley’s rural past.

The still small and primarily agricultural San Jose developed intertwined with its larger northern neighbor, San Francisco, during the second half of the 19th century. The Gold Rush boom propelled San Francisco to become the 10th largest city in the US by 1870 with a population of 149,473. By 1900, the city saw its population nearly double to reach 298,997 and was home to the largest population of foreign-born residents in the nation.58 California historian Kenneth Starr described San Francisco as “a maritime colony of the eastern United States and Europe” that “more or less instantly replicated the economic, social and cultural institutions of advanced urbanism.”59 San Francisco, along with its smaller neighbor San Jose, became interconnected hubs for a vast agricultural economy in northern California linked with national and even international markets. This was in contrast to the more sparsely populated and less urbanized southern California where the Gold Rush revitalized the cattle-based ranchero economy, making it the

59 California, 121.
primary economic driver of the region through the 1870s. Compared to San Francisco, San Jose, and the other towns in the north, even the biggest towns in the southern part of the state were tiny and underdeveloped during the same period. For example, in 1870 the population of Los Angeles and San Diego numbered only 5,728 and 2,300 respectively. Not until the turn-of-the-century would the population balance shift, with the southern cities experiencing a tremendous explosion of growth and development that overtook San Francisco and other northern cities. This differing pattern and pace of growth helps explain the different political and cultural development experienced by northern and southern regions of the state in general, and Orange County and Santa Clara County specifically.

The Southern Pacific’s Political Machine and California’s Big City Progressives

Political and economic power in California during the decades leading up to the 20th century was firmly in the hands of large landowners, corporations, and the railroads, which, in turn, controlled powerful political machines. One railroad in particular towered over all other interests in the state. The Southern Pacific Railroad, or SP, “linked the state, shipped the freight, owned and developed the land, founded the cities of the interior, and controlled the political machines of San Francisco and Los Angeles.” Over the course of the second half of the 19th century, the Southern Pacific Railroad gained

60 Ibid.
61 For example, in 1870 the population of Los Angeles and San Diego numbered only 5,728 and 2,300 respectively. See: "Historical Census Populations of Counties and Incorporated Cities in California, 1850–2010".
62 California, 129 and 56-57.
control of approximately 85% of the freight transported in the state and became the largest private landowner, giving it tremendous political as well as economic power throughout California.  

From the 1880s to the 1910s, the Southern Pacific used its Political Bureau to influence every city, county, and state government as well as the judiciary. The goals of the Southern Pacific Political Bureau were to avoid taxes and regulation on the railroad and otherwise maximize the business interests and profits of Southern Pacific. During this period, agents of the railroad dominated both the Republican and Democratic Party, controlling the conventions of both parties to ensure the nomination and eventual election of friendly candidates. The Political Bureau even boldly mingled with state legislators on the capital floor.  

With so much power and resources at its disposal, the Southern Pacific could, and often did, operate with impunity. In one infamous episode in King County in 1880, the Southern Pacific arbitrarily reneged on its agreement with thousands of tenant ranchers. The ranchers had worked for years to improve the lands based on the railroad’s promise that the renters could eventually purchase the plots at a set price. When the railroad instead evicted the ranchers to auction the lands to the highest bidder, a violent confrontation ensued that left seven people dead.

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63 In a state still largely dependent on exporting raw materials and crops, the control of freight was a stranglehold on the economy. Thus, the Southern Pacific charged what it wanted to ship freight, often using pricing as well as service schedules and routes to reward friends or as an economic cudgel to punish challengers and opponents. It is safe to say that every city and county, as well as essentially every businessperson, farmer and industrialist throughout California was vulnerable to Southern Pacific’s economic power. See: Spencer C. Olin, *California’s Prodigal Sons: Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911-1917* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 2-33.

64 Ibid.

65 In the previous decade, the Southern Pacific had advertised throughout the country to attract migrants to rent land in California’s Central Valley with the promise that the tenants could later purchase the land at a guaranteed price. After the farmers and ranchers had spent nearly a decade working and investing to
The 1880 incident in King County represented a spectacular example of the power and arrogance of the Southern Pacific Railroad, but it was not isolated. By the close of the 19th century, the dominance of the Southern Pacific political machine was becoming increasingly intolerable as California’s population became more diverse and urban. As the state moved past its unruly Gold Rush years, it attracted tens of thousands of new residents who came not to seek gold, but to start families, farm the land, and establish businesses. This small but growing middle class launched a series of reform efforts in cities and towns throughout the state, ultimately joining with the state and national Progressive movement. With the Southern Pacific firmly controlling the governing Republican Party in the state, the Democratic Party was the first to challenge the railroad directly, running in 1898 a candidate for governor. The upstart Democratic candidate, although ultimately unsuccessful, managed to obtain 45% of the vote. Two years later, reformers within the Republican Party in 1900 successfully challenged the dominance of the Southern Pacific with the victory of anti-railroad candidate Thomas Bard, president of Union Oil, for the US Senate.

improve the lands that they expected to purchase, the Southern Pacific informed the tenants that the promised purchase price of $2.50 an acre was void. Instead, the railroad intended to sell the land to the highest bidder in an open auction for $40 or more an acre. To prepare for the sale, the railroad served eviction notices to their outraged tenants. When the ranchers resisted eviction, the railroad called in the US marshals and the resulting “Battle of Mussel Slough” left several people dead. See: Kenneth Howe, "Railroad’s Past Tainted by Mussel Slough Battle," San Francisco Chronicle, July 8 1996; Starr, California, 129 and 56-57.

66 California, 134-64; Olin, California's Prodigal Sons, 2-33.

67 At the state level, one of the first notable political challenges to the railroad came from the Democratic Party. In 1898, the Democratic candidate James G Macquire from San Francisco ran for governor against Southern Pacific’s candidate, Republican Henry T. Gage. Elected as the youngest member of the California legislature in 1875 and a former superior court judge, Macquire opted not to run for a third term in the US House of Representatives in order to challenge Gage for governor. In a four-way race, Macquire earned 45% of the vote to Gage’s 51.7%, a noteworthy showing against the Southern Pacific and its preferred candidate. For the next several elections, the state Democratic Party ran a series of “anti-railroad” candidates for governor and other offices. In California, however, the Democratic Party was the underdog,
Most of the scholarly attention on Progressivism in California has focused on larger cities. Historian Spencer C. Olin argued that the first truly effective victories against the Southern Pacific machine in California came at the municipal level before gaining momentum at the state level. Olin cited the activities of reformers in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Sacramento who mobilized against the railroad’s political machine in the first years of the new century. In 1906, a group of young business reformers in Los Angeles captured four of the nine city council seats and seventeen out of twenty-two open city offices. Three years later the reformers elected an anti-railroad reform mayor. Reformers in San Francisco meanwhile launched a series of anti-graft trials in 1906 against the city’s political boss Abraham Ruef, Mayor Eugene E. Schmitz, and members of the board of supervisors who all had alleged ties to the Southern Pacific.

with the Republican Party operating as the preeminent political organization in the state. It is not surprising that the Southern Pacific Political Bureau kept a firm grip on the state’s “Grand Old Party.” Nonetheless, there was loosely organized anti-railroad opposition in the state Republican Party as well. In 1900, the conservative Republican Thomas Robert Bard ran for the United States Senate in part on an anti-railroad platform. The wealthy Bard was the founder and first president of the Union Oil Company in California, with interests in land development, agriculture and banking. He and a few others in the Republican Party were convinced that the dominance of California politics by the Southern Pacific was becoming a liability for business interests within the state. His Senate victory in 1900 is the first successful state-level challenge to the railroad. For more information, see: California's Prodigal Sons, 2-33; "James G. Maguire," JoinCalifornia.com, http://www.joincalifornia.com/candidate/6821; "Maguire, James George, (1853 - 1920)," United States Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000059; "November 8, 1898 - General Election," JoinCalifornia.com, http://www.joincalifornia.com/election/1898-11-08; "Hiram Johnson, 1911- 1917," California State Library, http://governors.library.ca.gov/23-hjohnson.html; "Bard, Thomas Robert, (1841 - 1915)," United State Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=b000138.

George Mowry’s 1951 monograph on California Progressivism was the foundation for most of the subsequent scholarship on the topic. Mowry only mentions the Hayes brothers and reform efforts “as early as 1900” in San Jose in one brief paragraph. He dismisses their significance however, noting that because San Francisco and Los Angeles had 40% of the state’s population, reform outside these locales had less impact. Later scholars have largely followed his lead. See: George Edwin Mowry, The California Progressives, Chronicles of California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Olin, California's Prodigal Sons; William Francis Deverell and Tom Sitton, eds., California Progressivism Revisited (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
Finally, in Sacramento, reformers secured the election of a reform mayor the next year. Encouraged by these municipal victories, a group of professional and business reformers convened a convention in Oakland in 1907 to retake the reins of the state Republican Party. Dubbing themselves the Lincoln-Roosevelt League, the group called for ridding the California Republican Party of control by the Southern Pacific. The reformers selected delegates for the national Republican convention that would support Theodore Roosevelt as the party’s candidate for president, promoted the election of reform candidates to the state legislature and US Congress, and demanded direct primaries for the nomination of state and local candidates. In 1909, several reform candidates won seats in the California Assembly and Senate. The following year in 1910, voters selected the San Francisco lawyer, Hiram Johnson, as governor based on his call to “kick the Southern Pacific out of politics.” Johnson’s victory as governor, followed by a second term in 1914, established him as a “western Theodore Roosevelt” and heralded the decline of the railroad’s grip on power in the state.

Olin and others who wrote about Progressivism in California overlooked reformers in San Jose and Santa Clara County who in 1896 actually challenged the machine a decade earlier than other larger California cities. Voters in San Jose and Santa Clara County who in 1896 actually challenged the machine a decade earlier than other larger California cities. Voters in San Jose and Santa

69 Olin, *California’s Prodigal Sons*, 6-12 and 18-19.
70 Emboldened by their victories at the municipal level, the reformers persuaded a reluctant Hiram Johnson to head the Lincoln-Roosevelt League’s ticket in a run for governor along with a full slate of reform candidates for other state offices. Johnson, who had come to public prominence as a prosecutor during the anti-graft trials in San Francisco, ran a thriving law practice after leaving his father’s law firm when the two had a falling out over politics. During his time in the California legislature, Grove Lawrence Johnson had been a prominent spokesperson for Southern Pacific and other corporate interests – a position his son repudiated. The younger Johnson prevailed over the Southern Pacific candidate 45.9% to 40.1%. See: ibid., 11-12 and 21-26; "Hiram Johnson," JoinCalifornia.com, http://www.joincalifornia.com/candidate/5418; Joe Mathews, "Channeling Hiram," *Los Angeles Times*, October 30 2005; Steven L. Piott, *Giving Voters a Voice: The Origins of the Initiative and Referendum in America* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2003).
Clara County supported Progressive candidates by higher margins than their peers in cities like Los Angeles and San Francisco that have received much more attention from scholars. San Jose was also the first major town in California to adopt a strict city manager form of government, a mainstay of Progressive reformers across the US. Perhaps one reason that scholars have overlooked the early role played by San Jose reformers – besides the town’s smaller size – is because Progressivism in Santa Clara County took a different course from other dominant strands across the state and nation.⁷¹

**Pre-Progressive Reformers in San Jose**

By the late 19th century, as San Jose had grown into the commercial center of Santa Clara County, local government was firmly in the hands of a Southern Pacific political machine dubbed the “Rea-Edwards gas house gang.” Heading up the “gang” in San Jose and Santa Clara County was James W. Rea, a successful attorney and wealthy businessman with ties to the Southern Pacific Railroad, and Harry J. Edwards, the manager of the Electric Improvement Company, a subsidiary of the San Francisco Power and Light Company. In later years, local political figure John D. Mackenzie assumed leadership in place of Rea. In addition to controlling the local Republican Party, the machine also enjoyed the support of the biggest local paper, the *San Jose Evening News*. Like machines everywhere, the gang rewarded allies and patrons with large contracts and favors and punished enemies with boycotts and slander.Gamblers and saloonkeepers were subject to monthly graft, and the firefighters, police officers and appointed

officeholders who owed their position to the gang paid kickbacks. Even schoolteachers were subject to the gang’s power, keeping their jobs only if they shopped with merchants who were friendly to the machine.\textsuperscript{72}

The machine system in San Jose and Santa Clara County was, for the most part, effective at keeping local stakeholders loyal. After the Southern Pacific, the next most powerful local group was the large landowners. The displacement of the Californios and Gold Rush boom had brought windfall wealth and large landholdings to a small cohort of early residents. With humble origins and with ethnic and religious ties to the valley’s working class, the area’s leading landowners took on the role of a local patrician class. Unlike the aspiring middle-class newcomers, this group was largely “satisfied with mud streets, adept at the cronyism [of the machine], and suspicious of change.”\textsuperscript{73} Managers of the utility, streetcar, and some canning interests also had strong ties to “the gas house gang” because their profit margins and future prospects depended on local government power. The utilities and streetcar operators, for example, needed local monopolies while the canneries needed access to the city’s sewage system to dispose of the massive amount of waste produced by their facilities. Other merchants and business leaders could likewise


\textsuperscript{73} According to Lukes, "the first phase of American settlement in the valley was dominated economically and politically by the large landholders and their proxies. It was a dominance, however, for which they were not wholly prepared..... The community leaders had, for the most part, begun their lives in poverty, ignorance and religious discrimination; and now, suddenly, these individuals were thrust into positions of economic and political leadership...." A prominent example of this group was Martin Murphy and his sons, Bernard and James, whose ethnic and religious ties earned them the loyalty and political support of Catholics and working-class residents who felt no allegiance to the new middle class. Since the large landowners engaged in wheat farming and ranching and thus did not depend on Asian labor like the orchardists and canneries, this group was adept at using racial antagonism to win the political support of poor white laborers. See: Lukes, "Progressivism Off-Broadway."
find their personal and business fortunes well served by cooperating with the machine. The local Republican Party provided the political organization through which the machine recruited and supported cooperative candidates for office. Finally, the machine secured the support of working class voters – similar to all political machines – by the promise of jobs or small favors and by stoking resentment against Asian immigrants. While the machine operated by greasing many hands, the greatest spoils went to the Southern Pacific Railroad and their allied political and business elite.74

The Southern Pacific machine may have been tolerated by, or even useful to, the local business and middle class for a while, but that changed as the new century dawned and the emergence of the orchard economy reshaped local dynamics. Fruit growing did not necessitate large-scale operations to be economically viable. It was labor intensive during harvest time, requiring only part-time maintenance for most of the rest of the year. The orchardists were thus largely small landowners who grew fruit as an adjunct to their primary professional or business pursuits. Because of the low barriers to entry and significant profit potential, the number of small agricultural holdings in Santa Clara County less than 100 acres expanded rapidly from 721 in 1880, to 1,427 in 1890 and 3,057 in 1900. By 1930, there were 5,616 small farms and orchards in the county. The growing of fruit also spurred the growth of associated industries, including canning, fruit processing and equipment companies. As successful local companies like Bean Spray Company (which ultimately became Food Machinery Corporation, or FMC) expanded, so

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74 Herberich and Cannon, "The Discovery of Corruption as a Public Issue; Philip J. Trounstine and Terry Christensen, Movers and Shakers: The Study of Community Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 79-84; Flammang, Women's Political Voice, 36-39.
did the number of skilled union workers in Santa Clara County. By 1900, San Jose had grown to a modest town of 21,500 persons, while Santa Clara County was home to 60,216. Over the next two decades, the population of both the city and county would nearly double as San Jose reached 39,642 residents and Santa Clara County counted 100,676 persons.

For many of San Jose’s new residents, the status quo that the Southern Pacific’s machine presided over was no longer acceptable. A cohort of younger and ambitious businessmen and professionals wanted San Jose to modernize and expand to keep pace with other faster growing cities in the state like Los Angeles. The opening of the Panama Canal created a great deal of excitement among the city’s business leaders and they hoped San Jose could capitalize on the growth and investment it would bring. To achieve their ambitions, they wanted to reform local municipal government to operate with business-like efficiency and according to moral principles. Technological advancements – things such as electric lights and appliances, telephones, streetcars and automobiles – were transforming society in the United States, and the more ambitious newcomers believed that communities like San Jose had to adopt them to stay competitive. They wanted San Jose to undertake large-scale municipal projects to light streets, pave and maintain roads, run power lines, and expand sewer services. Standing in the way of this progressive vision for San Jose was the “gas house gang” political machine that was primarily concerned with upholding the status quo and distributing the resultant spoils.

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75 Lukes, "Progressivism Off-Broadway."
76 “Historical Census Populations of Counties and Incorporated Cities in California, 1850–2010”.
77 Sewage was an important issue for San Jose not only to serve its population, but also its canneries.
while city business, infrastructure, and basic services lagged from neglect, corruption, and incompetence.\textsuperscript{78}

The first effective reform mobilization in San Jose took shape in 1896 when a group of affluent city residents came together to root out machine control of city government. Calling themselves the New Charter Club, the group appointed fifteen property-owners to draft an amended city charter. In 1897, the New Charter Club and their supporters won the support of 60\% of voters – about one-seventh of the population – to adopt the new charter. The goal of these early reformers was to inhibit the “gang” from using the mayor’s office and city council to control the city, especially through abusive political appointments. The new charter thus weakened the appointive powers of the mayor. Another change made one of the five city council seats subject to “at large” election instead of by ward to make one councilmember representative of the city as a whole. Finally, the new charter tightened controls on spending by capping city property taxes at 1\% and mandating that municipal finances operate on a cash basis to keep any administration from passing on expenses to future officeholders. The members of the New Charter Club were encouraged by their victory and voted to continue working as a body to promote efficient, business-minded practices and combat the corruption and waste of the political machine.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{78} Trounstine and Christensen, \textit{Movers and Shakers}, 79-84; David W. Eakins, "Introduction," in \textit{Businessmen and Municipal Reform: A Study of Ideals and Practice in San Jose and Santa Cruz, 1896-1916}, ed. David W. Eakins (San Jose: Soursseau Academy for California State and Local History, San Jose State University, 1976).

Another reform challenge to the Southern Pacific “gas house gang” coalesced in 1897 as a splinter faction within the local Republican Party in San Jose and Santa Clara County. Calling itself the Good Government League and later the Republican Good Government League, the group consisted of successful merchants, managers, and orchardists as well as a handful of doctors, lawyers, judges, professors, and other professionals. The group also attracted support from elements of the skilled labor movement. By 1902, the League eventually numbered more than 1,400 members. The two most visible and influential members of the League were brothers Everis Anson (E.A.) Hayes and Jay Orlo (J.O.) Hayes. Both brothers attended the University of Wisconsin, became lawyers, and got wealthy from iron mine interests in Michigan. The brothers came to San Jose in 1887, purchased ranch homes and invested in fruit growing. They become involved in local reform politics, and during the years that the Good Government League operated in San Jose, E.A. Hayes served as president, while J.O. Hayes was active on its board of trustees.

The April, 1898 election in San Jose was the first under the new charter. The mayor and several incumbent city councilors decided not to seek re-election, which created an opening for the reformers in the New Charter Club and Good Government League. Framing the election as a choice between an efficient and business-like government verses a “gang” of politicians and continued graft, corruption and mismanagement, the reformers ran a slate of candidates that included Sanford E. Smith,

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80 Lukes, "Progressivism Off-Broadway."
president of the New Charter Club, for mayor along with four businessmen and a teacher for city council. All but one of the reform candidates were political newcomers. The machine’s slate, which included a former mayor, an incumbent councilor, and an incumbent city treasurer, benefited from the strong support of the two largest local papers. Meanwhile, without a friendly media outlet, the reformers could only make their case to voters with pamphlets and letters to the editor. When election day came, the reform ticket failed to overcome the machine’s candidates.  

The reformers responded to the setback by adjusting their strategy to focus on the courts, county and state elections, and securing media support to sway public opinion. Alleging improper and illegal balloting procedures, they instigated investigations and then court proceedings that eventually forced reforms at the local ballot box. At the same time, they shifted their focus to the November 1898 county elections. In the same election that Democrat James G. Maquire mounted his narrowly unsuccessful bid for governor against the Southern Pacific’s favored candidate, the reformers put their support behind a Democratic-Republican fusion ticket that secured eight of the sixteen open county offices, including county supreme court judge, district attorney, and tax collector. Although “boss” James W. Rea was able to hold on to his county supervisor seat, his slim margin of victory represented the weakening of the “gang.” During the next election cycle in November 1900, the Good Government League secured more victories at the county level and elected two to the state assembly. Finally, to counter the machine’s media advantage, brothers E.A. and J.O. Hayes in 1901 purchased the local Herald and

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82 Herberich and Cannon, "The Discovery of Corruption as a Public Issue."
Mercury papers. With J.O. Hayes at the helm, the two papers adopted an editorial line strongly in support of the Good Government League and reform causes while launching a scathing attack on the Southern Pacific machine. Two years later, the brothers merged their two papers into the Mercury-Herald, giving the League a powerful venue to promote reform issues. Meanwhile, The Evening News, a longtime Republican establishment paper, remained friendly to the Southern Pacific’s machine.83

With control of two local newspapers, an enlarged membership, victories at the county and state level, and reforms to election practices, the Hayes brothers and Good Government League mounted another bid to capture control of San Jose’s city government. In the 1902 election, the League supported reform candidate George D. Worswick for mayor along with another full ticket of candidates for various local offices. Like most of his peers in the Good Government League, Worswick was a successful businessman and corporate manager. Born in Ketchum, Idaho, he had owned a mercantile business before becoming a district manager for Rocky Mountain Telephone Company. Also like many of the other reformers, Worswick had moved to San Jose recently, drawn to the city in 1890 by its healthful climate. He went into the fruit business, and in 1895 became manager of the California Green and Dried Fruit Company, filing for a patent for an adjustable gate mechanism to improve the efficiency of loading and unloading fruit

83 The Herald had been a Democratic paper, one of the few at the time outside of bigger cities like San Francisco and Los Angeles, before eventually falling into bankruptcy. The Mercury was San Jose’s only morning daily. The Evening News, a longtime Republican establishment paper, for many years had supported the Southern Pacific’s candidates and issues. After the Mercury-Herald became a reform outlet, The Evening News continued espousing strongly anti-Hayes and anti-“goo goo” (the pejorative for good government reformers) positions. See: ibid; Jessica Trounstine, “Challenging the Machine-Reform Dichotomy: Two Threats to Urban Democracy,” in The City in American Political Development, ed. Richardson Dilworth (New York: Routledge, 2009), 82; "Eli Wright," JoinCalifornia.com, http://www.joincalifornia.com/candidate/12356; "George S. Walker," JoinCalifornia.com, http://www.joincalifornia.com/candidate/6972.
cargo. In 1901, he resigned to serve as manager of the Pine Box Manufacturers Agency before the reformers selected him to head their local slate as candidate for mayor the next year. Worswick appealed to other businessmen and professionals in San Jose, arguing that the city’s growth and development were hindered by the graft, corruption and inefficiency in government that kept people and investment away. With the strong support of the Hayes brothers’ papers, San Jose voters elected Worswick as mayor by a thin margin. The machine’s incumbent mayor Charles J. Martin did not give up easily, however, filing suit against the new mayor to contest the narrow election in a case that the California supreme court finally resolved in Worswick’s favor in 1904.

Over the course of his first term, Worswick and his reform supporters worked to achieve their goals of modernizing and expanding San Jose as well as cleaning up city government. His administration set about improving and repairing streets, expanding streetlights, and encouraging development. New construction surged during the first two years of Worswick’s administration. Developers built over 500 new buildings, bringing more than a half million dollars of investment and significant revenue into the city. The

86 The election was so close that the outgoing machine administration was reluctant to relinquish power. Before ultimately winding up in litigation, the reform candidates and incumbents had a tense standoff in city hall. Worswick entered the capital building after the election and seated himself beside the outgoing mayor Martin, while the newly elected city clerk did the same next to the incumbent clerk. With all four men trying to shout over the others to demand control of the proceedings, Worswick and the new clerk finally prevailed upon the befuddled sheriff to remove the incumbent mayor from the room. See: Leonard McKay, "Anatomy of a Street (Part 2)." SanJoseInside.com, http://www.sanjoseinside.com/news/entries/anatomy_of_a_street_part_2/; Appendix to the Journals of the Senate and Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California, vol. 1 (Sacramento, California: W.W. Shannon, Superintendent State Printing, 1905), 36; The Pacific Reporter (February 15 - April 18, 1904), vol. 75 (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1904), 663.
reformers happily took credit for these achievements, citing a 50% increase in real estate prices and a spurt of population growth as proof that their policies benefited San Jose. To stop waste and abuse of city funds, Worswick and the reformers campaigned to amend the city charter once again in 1903. The new charter provisions further tightened control over city finances by empowering the mayor and city council to take funds left over at the end of a fiscal term from any department to fill shortfalls elsewhere, meanwhile prohibiting unplanned, last minute outlays considered to be of dubious utility. In 1904, Worswick secured re-election for mayor, and more candidates supported by the Good Government League won office at the county level.

That same year the League achieved its biggest success yet, supporting its president, E.A. Hayes, in a successful bid for United States Congress. His departure seems to have deprived the Good Government League of its momentum as the organization dissolved in 1905 when Hayes took his seat in Congress. During its decade or so of operation, however, the Good Government League in San Jose played a prominent role in city, county and state politics as the driver of business-like reform to replace machine corruption. Despite the dissolution of the league, the Hayes brothers remained powerful political figures. E.A Hayes secured re-election to Congress six more times. His brother, J.O. Hayes wielded considerable influence managing the family’s newspaper for the next four decades. He also remained active in state and local politics, serving as a delegate to the state Republican convention and as an active member of the San Jose Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Club and various civic groups. The Hayes

87 Wakefield, "The Worswick Reformers and ‘the Push’."
brothers and the other members of the Good Government League had worked to seize control of city and county politics from the machine, and boasted of securing the mutual support and cooperation from reform-minded friends and allies in cities and towns throughout the state as well as in the state capitol in Sacramento. When the Lincoln-Roosevelt League formed in 1907 to unite business and middle-class reformers in opposition to the Southern Pacific machine throughout the state, the new group could tap into the reform foundation set by the Hayes brothers and their allies in San Jose and Santa Clara County.

The decade-long reform movement in San Jose and Santa Clara County ironically suffered a major setback just a year before the formation of the statewide Lincoln-Roosevelt League in 1907. An attorney for the Southern Pacific Railroad won the mayor’s office in 1906 and reformers lost all their seats on the city council to the old political machine. Many of San Jose’s residents missed the jobs and favors that the machine had distributed while others were not pleased with the moralistic tone of the reformers. With their leader gone to Congress and waning zeal, the reformers had left an opening for elements of the old machine to use this discontent to recapture city hall. The resuscitated version of the old machine was able to reassert its hold on power for nearly a decade.

90 Trounstine and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 79-84.
The clash between these early Progressive reformers and the incumbent machine in San Jose represented a struggle for control between the developing fruit economy and an old guard comprised of the Southern Pacific, wheat farmers, large landowners, and a handful of corporations that had come out of the Gold Rush. The machine was able to retake the mayor’s office and city council, but the Good Government League and New Charter Club had put together an important and broad-based reform coalition that would serve as the foundation for further reforms during the Progressive Era. The impetus for the reform coalition came from middle-class businessmen and professionals with close ties to the orchard economy. Thus it is not surprising that the League’s top leadership – including president E.A. Hayes, vice-president J.R. Johns (who would also become a prominent member of Lincoln-Roosevelt League), and Daniel H. Coates – were all affluent orchardists. The League’s candidate, Worswick, had likewise been a manager in companies that served the growing economy of growers, packers, and canneries. Similarly, the group’s membership included a number of other professionals and merchants closely linked to the orchard economy. The San Jose reform coalition also included elements of the local skilled labor movement who worked in trades associated with fruit processing. It is thus noteworthy that the reform movement in San Jose managed to unite, albeit tentatively and ultimately briefly, middle-class orchardists and other professionals with elements of the skilled labor movement, thus foreshadowing part of the later dynamics of the New Deal coalition. Despite the 1906 setback, as the

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91 Lukes, “Progressivism Off-Broadway.”
92 While some Progressives elsewhere felt threatened by large corporations and unions, the reformers in San Jose were willing to work with both to accomplish their ends. Thus, to prominent members of the reform movement, local AFL unions and their members were seen as important economic and political
number of middle-class professionals and skilled laborers expanded in San Jose, the strength of the reformers increased. By the next decade, an enlarged San Jose reform mobilization converged with the broader Progressive reform movement that it had anticipated to drive out the vestiges of the Southern Pacific’s political machine.

The legacy of the New Charter Club and Good Government League in San Jose, although somewhat more inclusive than many of their peers, reflected the less democratic and middle-class bias that characterized the reforms instituted by Progressives nationwide. A side effect of many of the reformer’s measures was diminished democratic access for the majority of poor and working-class residents in San Jose and Santa Clara County. Removing the appointive powers of the mayor was an effort to curtail the machine’s abuse of municipal offices as spoils, but it was also the first step toward the unelected city manager form of government. The creation of an “at large” city council position was intended to have someone on the council speak for the city as a whole and be less susceptible to capture by the machine, but it was a precursor to the eventual elimination of the ward system to the diminishment of neighborhood representation. Finally, the reformers provided an early example of a tax revolt by property owners. Their new charter capped the property tax to 1% and imposed other fiscal restrictions on city spending, thereby limiting the amount of residents’ personal and business wealth that partners with more to be gained through cooperation than confrontation. While in Congress, E.A. Hayes earned the support and praise of local union papers. Lukes quotes Samuel Gompers describing Hayes thusly: “he never hesitated to serve the cause of labor.” See: ibid.
the city could tap at the same time that the demands that they were placing on municipal services and infrastructure were rapidly increasing.  

**Progressive Era Reforms in San Jose**

The reform mobilizations by the New Charter Club and Good Government League in San Jose were only a prelude to further battles to come within the local Republican Party and at the ballot box. As San Jose continued to grow and prosper as an agricultural and commercial town increasingly centered on fruit-production and related industries, that growth increased the professional and middle classes as well as the pool of skilled laborers, thus expanding a political base for reform. At the national and state level meanwhile, dissatisfaction with machine politics and its attendant urban problems and scandals increased the influence of the Progressive Movement. Middle-class reformers in Santa Clara County joined with this broader reform wave to take on the cronyism, corruption, and waste that characterized machine politics. Like other Progressives, those in Santa Clara County took aim at the political machine as an obstacle to their goal of implementing a business-friendly and efficient regional government.  

San Jose’s reformers, however, proved pragmatic and flexible when it came to making...  

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94 Regarding nativism and anti-immigrant sentiment in San Jose and Santa Clara County, Timothy Lukes argues that since the local fruit economy depended on low cost Asian immigrant labor, that the leaders of the local reform movement were never nativist at heart, instead only paying lip service to anti-immigrant measures to defuse the attacks of critics. See: David W. Eakins, "Introduction," ibid; Lukes, "Progressivism Off-Broadway; Trounstine and Christensen, *Movers and Shakers*; Ellsworth and Garbely, "Centralization and Efficiency."
compromises with the Southern Pacific and other large corporate interests. Since their orchards and businesses depended on low cost Asian immigrant labor, they were less ideologically committed to anti-immigrant policies. Finally, San Jose’s middle class Progressive reformers made room in their ranks for cooperative skilled labor unions.

Disappointed at the revival of the old political machine, the reformers in San Jose decided that permanently rooting out machine politics in the city required once again revising the city charter. One idea proposed was a commission system whereby appointed city commissioners managed important government functions and departments, thus creating a professional and efficient municipal government free from corrupting politics. In early 1910, the San Jose Chamber of Commerce formed the Commission Government League to help promote charter reform. When the city council resisted their call for an elected committee of property holders to revise the city charter, the Commission Government League formed their own. The “Committee of Fifty” drafted a new charter proposal and began a citizen petition to force a legally mandated election. At least two other groups also mobilized around the charter issue, including the Women’s Civic Study League and the Citizen’s Charter Committee, led by San Jose Women’s Club president.

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96 Lukes believes that San Jose’s reform leaders reluctantly employed the anti-immigrant and anti-Asian rhetoric of the broader Progressive movement because they wanted to avoid this issue once again being used by the machine as a political weapon against them. He argues that since the operation of their orchards and canneries depended on Asian labor, they were never enthusiastic supporters of any of the anti-Asian measures that they helped to pass. See: Lukes, “Progressivism Off-Broadway.”
leader in the local Red Cross and community activist Mrs. A.A. Fowler. All three groups favored bringing in impartial experts to reform local government. J.O. Hayes and his *Mercury-Herald* newspaper likewise joined the call for charter reform to restructure San Jose city government. An article published as part of a series in the paper in 1912 pointed to the success of the commissioner system adopted in Galveston, Texas in breaking the “saloon rule” and “graft” resulting from the city’s large population and the undue influence of “low class-foreigners and riff raff negroes.” In the San Jose context, middle-class reformers were similarly wary of the lower-rungs of the ethnic white working class that was loyal to the machine based on favors and cronyism.

The local Chamber of Commerce and various reform groups came together to run a slate of candidates for city council in 1914 calling for charter reform. The reformers won back a majority on the council and immediately appointed a committee heavily representing Chamber of Commerce and Merchant’s Association members to redesign local government. Heading the committee was Thomas H. Reed, professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley. A graduate of Harvard University and former executive secretary for California’s Progressive governor Hiram Johnson, Reed had gained a reputation as an authority on municipal matters. He argued against a commission system that he believed was best suited to larger cities. Instead, he convinced reformers and city officials that a city manager system similar to what Dayton, Ohio had adopted would better serve San Jose. Reed and the committee drafted a new charter.

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97 For information on “Mrs. A.A. Fowler,” see: Sawyer, *History of Santa Clara County, California*. 80, 183, 87, and 227.
98 Ellsworth and Garbely, "Centralization and Efficiency."
proposal based on a city manager form of government and included other Progressive measures designed to make San Jose function on a more professional and rational basis.  

The new charter, which drew 40% of the electorate to the polls and passed by a narrow margin of 811 votes, went into effect on July 1, 1916. The charter eliminated the office of mayor, removing the machine’s bully pulpit in city hall. In the mayor’s place, the city council would select a “president” from among its number on a rotating basis based on seniority. However, this new position would have no more power than that of any other council member. Many of the powers formally held by the mayor would instead rest with the newly created position of city manager. The city manager was to be a salaried professional municipal executive appointed by the city council. Meant to be a neutral figure, the city manager’s responsibilities would include implementing policy, administering the budget, and hiring and firing municipal employees. The charter controversially exempted the position from recall by the voters, a measure that went further than city manager systems elsewhere to insulate the manager from majority pressure. Since the council appointed the city manager, the position was therefore only indirectly accountable to the voters and thus in the reformers’ eyes, less susceptible to corruption and incompetence. The reformers hoped that a strong city manager system would put an end to the sort of spoils and cronyism that had allowed the old machine to

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100 Ibid; Trounstine and Christensen, Movers and Shakers; Robert C Brooks, "Commission Manager Government in San Jose, Cal.," National Municipal Review 6 (1917).
curry votes and exercise unchecked power.\textsuperscript{102} The new charter also sought to undermine the power of political machines by increasing the size of the city council from five to seven. More important, the reformers made each council seat elected by the entire city instead of individual wards, thus weakening the role of parochial neighborhood interests. With the new charter, San Jose also adopted other mainstay reforms of the Progressive era, including primary elections for city council and the recall, initiative and referendum.\textsuperscript{103}

The first city manager appointed by the city council was the charter’s primary author, Thomas H. Reed. Within a year of taking office, Reed and his reform supporters boasted of a long list of accomplishments. New policies made the operation of the city’s finances more transparent, with updated accounting practices put in place and cost-saving measures adopted. The new city manager had the municipal funds taken from a vault in city hall where they had hitherto been stored and deposited at a local bank to earn interest. To avoid the spectacle of uniformed police and fire workers and other city officials campaigning while on duty, he issued a "non-participation-in-politics" order. He also modernized the city’s police and fire service with new equipment, formal police training, and additional personnel. Finally, Reed’s academic background benefited the city through free technical advice and assistance from faculty at Stanford University and the University of California, including input from Professor Lewis Terman (father of

\textsuperscript{102} Ellsworth and Garbely, "Centralization and Efficiency; Trounstine and Christensen, \textit{Movers and Shakers}; Brooks, "Commission Manager Government in San Jose, Cal.."

\textsuperscript{103} Ellsworth and Garbely, "Centralization and Efficiency; Trounstine and Christensen, \textit{Movers and Shakers}; Brooks, "Commission Manager Government in San Jose, Cal.."
Frederick Terman, the future founding father of Silicon Valley) who helped to enhance the city’s civil service examination process.104

All of the changes made by the Progressive reformers at the city and state level aimed to disrupt the power of political machines and promote the values and interests of an enlarged middle and professional class. A corollary of the reforms was decreased political participation by the majority of working-class and poor residents. Replacing an elected mayor with an appointed professional city manager and independent committees undermined the ability of political bosses to purchase political power with jobs and other spoils. It also made city government less democratic and less accessible to many residents by creating a power structure that favored business and middle-class interests who could navigate a system predominated by the technical and legalistic discourse of experts, studies, and reports. At the state level, a 1911 amendment to the California constitution made all local elections non-partisan and thus divorced from local party machines. In San Jose, this meant the election of city council members through citywide, non-partisan elections. This achieved the reformers’ goal of undermining the political machine’s ability to work through the local Republican Party at the city ward level. At a time when many ethnic and working class voters relied heavily on political party mobilization and information, these changes also shifted the balance of power away from labor and ethnic candidates to those who had the resources and ability to mount effective non-partisan citywide campaigns. Finally, the recall, initiative, and referendum provided a seemingly democratic means to make government accountable and responsive to democratic forces.

104 “Commission Manager Government in San Jose, Cal..”
In practice, however, these tools opened the door for mobilized and sophisticated groups with deep pockets to pass or overturn legislation that suited their interests and recall disfavored candidates, thereby sometimes usurping democracy to serve narrow constituencies.  

Critics at the time anticipated many of these deficiencies and not all San Jose residents welcomed the changes to the charter. Underscoring the fragility of the San Jose reform alliance between the middle class and the skilled working class, a leader in the local labor movement criticized the charter drafting committee as comprised of moneyed property owners while excluding trade union representatives. He and other critics argued that the city manager position concentrated too much power in one office, and if adopted, should be subject to recall by the voters. As the debate grew more heated, an editorial in the *Mercury-Herald* accused the labor movement in San Jose of being a narrow special interest not representative of the entire city and its best interests – no small irony coming from the mouthpiece for a reform movement primarily championed by a small contingent of affluent business leaders and middle-class residents. Other critics of the charter pointed to the proliferation of appointed rather than elective offices, the document’s failure to limit adequately the level of bond debt that the city could incur, and the fact that

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the school board had the power to levy new taxes. Once passed, the charter and the new city manager also faced attack from the old machine and its beneficiaries. Opponents circulated a “San Jose by San Joseans” petition calling for the removal of Reed and his assistant from office because they were non-residents. Other critics called for the city manager’s removal based on his lack of qualifications since Reed was an academic and not a civil engineer.

The reform movement in San Jose once again had trouble consolidating its hold on city hall. Reed resigned two years after taking office, having endured an exhaustive effort to satisfy the various contending constituencies and facing heated criticism. The next city manager, W.C. Bailey, also served just two years. In 1920, Clarence Goodwin became the third city manager of San Jose in just over four years. Goodwin would go on to serve for almost twenty-four years, in part because he was able to find a way to keep the various interests in San Jose more or less content, including his accommodation to the emergence of a new political machine. As the 1940s brought another round of sweeping changes to the political economy of the United States and San Jose, a second reform group formed in Santa Clara County to take on this new political machine and promote the economic and political changes to advance new economic interests.

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106 Ellsworth and Garbely, "Centralization and Efficiency."
107 Brooks, "Commission Manager Government in San Jose, Cal."
Conclusion

From the time of California’s entry as a state in 1850 to 1920, San Jose grew from a small town supporting a sparse ranchero population to an important agricultural region in a fast growing state. The Gold Rush brought a flood of people and investment that made San Jose and Santa Clara County into an agricultural and commercial hub closely linked to San Francisco. Wheat farming, mining, and other extractive industries fostered the region’s early growth, but by the 1880s, San Jose and surrounding Santa Clara valley transitioned to fruit production, sparking thriving related industries, including packing, canning and agricultural machinery and supplies. Other professional families came to the area drawn by the climate and opportunity. Soon this more diverse business community emerged to challenge the power of the incumbent Republican political machine. Run by large landowners and corporations – with the Southern Pacific Railroad at the top – and dispensing jobs and benefits to influential working class political bosses who could deliver votes, this machine stood in the way of the reforms favored by the city’s growth and efficiency minded middle class. The young and ambitious newcomers in San Jose joined a statewide movement that challenged the machine for control of the Republican Party. Reformers in San Jose and Santa Clara County experienced victories and setbacks at the turn of the century that were bellwethers for the growing middle-class mobilization in California. That statewide mobilization eventually merged with the national Progressive movement and triumphantly passed a number of reforms that broke the Southern Pacific’s hold on the state. After a tug-of-war with the old Republican machine,
San Jose residents successfully retook the local Republican Party and passed Progressive measures intended to break the power of political bosses and machines.

The reform movement in San Jose emerged with the growing political and economic power of the orchardists, cannery operators, and nascent professional class that was no longer willing to tolerate the old Southern Pacific machine that had formed during the state’s coarse Gold Rush period. The reformers were in large part motivated by moral antipathy against municipal graft, waste, and corruption and by a desire to see government behave more like a business. The “progress” and efficiency they wanted intermingled with a boosterish desire to modernize and grow San Jose to be a great commercial city, one that would likewise further their own business and professional interests. They were the first of three such movements in San Jose.

The first wave of reformers in San Jose that other scholars have overlooked is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the San Jose reformers anticipated the mobilization of early Progressive reformers in the rest of the state by a decade and were among the first in California to pioneer key reform measures like the city manager system. Second, with orchard and fruit interests taking the lead, San Jose reformers embraced a pragmatic and flexible Progressivism suited to local conditions. Unlike some of their Progressive peers, San Jose’s reformers were willing to work with corporate interests. The cooperation between San Jose’s middle-class reformers and local trade unions, although fragile and inconsistent, foreshadowed a part of the New Deal coalition. Meanwhile, the Hayes brothers and other reform leaders embraced the corporate structure to benefit their business, for instance helping form the California Prune and Apricot Growers
Third, San Jose and its surrounding cities were among the strongest supporters of Progressive candidates and causes in the state. When Progressive gubernatorial candidate Hiram Johnson visited San Jose in 1910, Mayor Worswick and a throng of 7,000 supporters enthusiastically greeted him and San Jose Congress member E.A. Hayes offered his strong endorsement. Later that fall, Johnson won office with the support of 50% of Santa Clara County's voters, compared to 43% in San Francisco and 46% in Los Angeles counties. The staunch Progressivism of Santa Clara County is in contrast to the “Anglo-Saxon, moralistic Southern California” which was increasingly tepid in its support of Progressive politics and more at ease with mainstream Republicans. In short, reformers in San Jose and Santa Clara County pioneered an early and distinct form of Progressivism in California based on the needs of the local political economy.

This strong Progressive political culture as well as the pace and pattern of development in San Jose and Santa Clara County distinguished the area from other major regions in California, including San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego as well as most notably from Orange County. San Jose and Santa Clara County grew fast in the late 19th century as a small agricultural town benefiting from rapid investment and the growth of a professional and middle class. The valley enjoyed strong links to the urban

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108 Lukes, "Progressivism Off-Broadway."
110 Despite its early burst of development and close link with San Francisco, San Jose’s growth slowed in the late 19th and early 20th century just as the southern part of the state was developing rapidly. San Jose’s own rapid growth would not take off until the 1950s and the beginnings of Silicon Valley. By the 1970s, San Jose was the fastest growing city in the US. Part of the explanation for the very different suburban political cultures that developed in Orange County versus Santa Clara County can be explained by these differing patterns of development and the timing and demographics of migration.
and cosmopolitan San Francisco, including access to capital and global markets, but otherwise remained a cultivated rural garden of orchards and related small-scale industries. During this time, San Jose persisted as a small and mostly homogenous town in contrast to other parts of the state that grew quickly from the late 19th century onward, attracting diverse populations and industrialization. Santa Clara County’s rapid growth did not occur until the second half of the 20th century and was associated with a post-industrial high-technology economy. Meanwhile, Orange County California grew much more slowly throughout the 19th century with a conservative rural political economy dominated by ranchers and farmers. When the southern county experienced its rapid growth over the course of the 20th century fueled by the aerospace and other defense related industries, the political culture that developed was more conservative.\textsuperscript{111} The differing suburban political cultures that developed in the postwar Santa Clara and Orange counties, made one a location for suburban liberals and the other for “suburban warriors.”

\textsuperscript{111} McGirr, \textit{Suburban Warriors}. 
Chapter 3
Postwar Reformers, Boosters, and the Prelude to Silicon Valley

A second wave of reformers intent upon fostering rapid growth and development consolidated their hold in the 1950s on municipal power in San Jose. The cohort of younger and ambitious businessmen and professionals – many recent arrivals drawn by economic opportunities – was motivated by a vision of transforming the still largely sleepy and rural agricultural region into a fast-growing industrial city on par with the likes of Los Angeles, Seattle and Portland. Mobilizing in the 1930s and 1940s, the reformers eventually coalesced on the eve of the 1944 municipal elections into a political organization calling itself the Progress Committee. The group had two primary goals: to root out the small town “bossism” that had exploited Progressive Era reforms to take control of municipal politics and replace it with a more modern and business-like local government; and more importantly, to oust the fiscally conservative and cautious incumbent city manager who had served for two decades as San Jose’s executive officeholder.

The members of the Progress Committee saw the conservatism of San Jose’s longstanding city administration as well as the corruption and inefficiency of parochial political machines as impediments to San Jose’s growth and development. They believed that in order for the city to diversify away from a seasonal fruit-based economy and attract non-agricultural business and industry, San Jose had to fast-track expensive infrastructure projects. The preference of the current city administration and entrenched orchard operators and fruit processors for limited expenditures, low taxes, and minimal
debt stood in the way. In short, to achieve their vision of progress for San Jose, the second wave of reformers needed to remove the political bosses, nudge aside the fruit-industry interests, and replace the city administrators who favored austerity with new leaders who embraced spending and borrowing to promote growth, development and industry.

The 1944 and 1948 elections in San Jose thus marked a second turning point between old and new political and economic orders. The Progress Committee, like the Progressive Era reformers before them, represented a new class of economic interests. Orchardists and the fruit industry this time were the status quo, and the second wave of reformers was a young and ambitious new generation who saw growth as a good unto itself – as well as lucrative for their businesses and personal fortunes. A good number were newcomers attracted by the prosperity fostered by the region’s fruit economy, but with visions of seeing it replaced by a more diverse and less cyclic industrial economy. Several were merchants, managers, and professionals who stood to see their businesses prosper through more growth. Some were orchardists and landowners who saw greater potential profit in selling or developing land for commercial or residential purposes than in cultivating it. A few were speculators and investors happy to buy agricultural land in hopes of reselling it at a profit. Several others were professionals with a direct stake in suburban expansion: realtors, developers, contractors and lawyers. Thus, for the Progress Committee and its supporters, clearing out the inefficiencies associated with San Jose’s small town bosses was only part of the solution. To achieve their vision of making San Jose grow the way that Los Angeles and San Diego had done, they needed to control both the city council and city administration. They needed to undertake a coup to push aside
an incumbent city government compromised by political bosses and beholden to the entrenched fiscal conservatism of the fruit-processing economy.

The Progress Committee’s call to “kick out bossism” resonated with San Jose residents. Voters gave the Progress Committees commanding victories in two pivotal local elections in 1944 and 1948, granting the group control of the city council and the power to appoint sympathetic administrators who favored fostering faster growth through increased spending and borrowing. The Progress Committee dissolved in the early 1950s, but its leaders had achieved their goal of putting San Jose on a path toward rapid growth and development. Once in control of city government, the interests that backed the Progress Committee morphed into a pro-growth machine that over the course of the next two decades transformed San Jose and Santa Clara County into one of the nation’s fastest growing suburbs. Not only was San Jose well-positioned to take advantage of the postwar federal spending and intertwined demographic and economic shifts that underwrote the growth of Sunbelt states like California, the city was also located right next to the emerging technological, organizational, and investment innovations that created the future Silicon Valley phenomenon.

The pro-growth leaders of San Jose did everything that they could during the 1950s and 1960s to make it the largest and most important city in the region. As the local high-technology industry blossomed and technology and professional workers poured into the area, San Jose mushroomed to annex unincorporated land and bulldoze orchards to build subdivisions and shopping centers. The second wave of reformers turned pro-growth boosters thus deserve a portion of the credit for the success of the region’s electronics firms and the creation of Silicon Valley. San Jose attracted and
accommodated rapid population growth, making room for the influx of managers and skilled workers drawn into the region for high-technology work who also expected the postwar American Dream of a comfortable detached single-family home in an attractive and modern suburban community. Ironically, however, by pursuing growth above all else, the development interests turned San Jose into a city notorious for its sprawl, traffic and air pollution. Thus, the second wave of reformers turned growth-machine created a backlash against sprawl and its associated ills that led to the rise of a third wave of suburban liberal reformers intent upon rebalancing growth and quality of life.

The Progress Committee and the subsequent growth machine that grew out of it were noteworthy for enabling collaboration between professional and middle-class Republicans and Democrats in the nonpartisan context of San Jose’s municipal elections. San Jose and Santa Clara County strongly supported the Progressive wing of the Republican Party in the first decades of the 20th Century while developing a pragmatic and flexible local strand of Progressivism. This commitment to Progressive Republicanism explained why Santa Clara County experienced a more moderate realignment compared to the rest of California that dramatically switched from Republican to majority Democratic registration during the 1930s and 1940s.\footnote{Eugene C. Lee, \textit{California Votes, 1928-1960, with 1962 Supplement} (Berkeley,: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1963).} The pro-growth coalition pioneered by the Progress Committee, with its moderate business and middle-class leadership, echoed the Progressive wing of the local Republican Party from a generation before. The lingering moderate progressive political cultural of San Jose enabled the mostly Republican led growth machine to find common cause with
Democrats similarly committed to promoting regional development. This centrist cooperation anticipated the national bipartisan consensus forged between liberal New Deal Democrats and liberal Republicans in the postwar years around the politics of growth.\textsuperscript{113} It also provided a blueprint for the third wave of reformers, this time Democrat led, whose liberal-centrist suburban liberalism marked a renegotiation of the growth politics consensus in San Jose and Santa Clara County. In short, three factors helped put the region on a different path than other large suburban regions such as Orange County that were instead embracing the political and social militancy of the New Right. These included the strong Progressive Republican roots of San Jose and Santa Clara County, the longstanding pragmatic alignment between business and broad middle-class interests that selectively included minority and trade labor groups, and the history of moderate bipartisanship that created a foundation for centrist consensus. All of these elements allowed San Jose’s suburban liberals to come to political preeminence and redefine the consensus for growth and development in Silicon Valley from the 1970s onward.

\textbf{The Interwar Status Quo: Small Town Political Bosses and a Fiscally Conservative City Administration}

The first wave of Progressive era reformers in San Jose and Santa Clara County were successful in largely ousting the remnants of the Southern Pacific’s “gas house gang” political machine. The less democratic legacy of the Progressive reforms, however, soon facilitated the rise once again of machine-style politics in San Jose and Santa Clara

\footnote{113 For more on the bipartisan postwar growth consensus, see: Wolfe, \textit{America's Impasse}; Collins, \textit{More}.}
County during the late 1920s. The new political bosses, operating on a more parochial scale, took advantage of the organizational void left by the shift to nonpartisan municipal elections and at-large city council elections. Without political parties to organize opposition and with various other measures imposed by Progressives keeping voter turnout low, the machines exercised oversized influence. The political machine in San Jose elected handpicked candidates to the city council, exerted influence on the various appointed officeholders, and benefited from the unelected and concentrated power of the city manager’s office. In short, an unintended side effect of the efforts by Progressive reformers to put the control of municipal affairs in the hands of experts and the middle class made the tools of government subject to capture by mobilized and moneyed special interests with little popular recourse.\(^\text{114}\)

During the 1920s to the mid-1940s, businessman and political boss Charles Bigley essentially controlled local politics in San Jose.\(^\text{115}\) Bigley started out fending for himself on the streets of San Jose from the age of 12, making friends all over town as a delivery boy. He became influential in ethnic and working class neighborhoods helping

\(^{114}\) For a discussion of how Progressive era measures allowed for the consolidation and perpetuation of political machines in cities such as San Jose, see: Jessica Trounstine, *Political Monopolies in American Cities: The Rise and Fall of Bosses and Reformers* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
\(^{115}\) Two competing machine factions vied for predominance at the county and city level from the 1920s to the mid-1940s. At the head of one wing with a strong hold on county politics was the former Republican state senator Louis Oneal. Leading another faction focused on San Jose city politics was Charles Bigley, a local business figure, beer distributor and the owner of an ambulance company. Both figures jockeyed for position, sometimes cooperating and sometimes competing, and up until the mid-1940s. For San Jose’s reformers, their primary target was Bigley. For more detail, see: Trounstine and Christensen, *Movers and Shakers*. Also see: George W. Lyle, “To the Voters of Santa Clara County I Pledge You My Word That I Am Not Connected with Either Louis Oneal or Charles Bigley in Any Way [Political Advertisement in Form of Handwritten Note],” *San Jose News*, July 28 1934; “Again Accused,” ibid., July 31 1933; “Lyle for Sheriff Club, Oneal - the Mazzones - Emig [Political Advertisement],” *San Jose News*, August 13 1934.(Political advertisement charging Emig with ties to "bosses" Oneal and Bigley; "Lyle for Sheriff Club [Political Advertisement],” *San Jose News*, August 15 1934.(Open letter to William J. Emig, Sheriff charging ties to Oneal and Bigley; "Think This Over," *San Jose News*, September 1 1934; "Fill Vacancy, Emig Told by Lyle Meeting." *San Jose News*, October 11 1934.
newcomers navigate unfamiliar local politics and serving as a broker for favors. Soon he had his own business, a cigar shop across from the train station. Bigley aspired to bigger things, however, and started a taxi service from the train station, eventually expanding to rent automobiles for funerals and special events. Next, he opened an auto garage and then started the city’s first motorized ambulance service in 1926. When Prohibition ended in 1933, Bigley became a partner and distributor for Tacoma Brewing Company. Rumors circulated that he owned illegal slot machines and was involved in underground gambling. In a genuine tale of rags to riches, the former street kid had become a powerful business leader and political figure with numerous connections.

Bigley soon exerted significant control over local affairs in San Jose, with tendrils extending from city hall down to the beat cops. San Jose’s political boss easily influenced the composition of the city council since only one or two vacancies came open at a time and turnout in local elections was low. With little organized competition, Bigley was able to use his money and connections to secure the election of his preferred candidates. He made friends with local small business owners, and his supporters often coincidentally found their enterprises benefiting from an influx of business from the city and its departments. Meanwhile, because the smooth running of his various ventures, legal and otherwise, required the cooperation of the local police and fire personnel, Bigley made sure that the city’s authorities were friendly to him and his associates. From

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117 Turnout was low in part thanks to the Progressive era reforms that put the local government in the hands of appointed officials and farther from the reach of voters, but also because of various restrictive measures to limit the franchise. For more detail, see: Trounstine, *Political Monopolies in American Cities: The Rise and Fall of Bosses and Reformers*. 
his office located conveniently across from San Jose’s city hall, Bigley made himself the
man to see for jobseekers looking for work in city government and the police and fire
departments. Bigley’s influence with city workers was so strong that police and
firefighters sometimes campaigned openly in uniform to support his candidates.118

The Bigley machine was relatively benign compared to the machines of bigger
cities at the time. Local Santa Clara County historian Jack Douglas characterized the man
himself as “big-hearted..., fond of children, and difficult to dislike.”119 Bigley was thus
an ambivalent figure in San Jose. Details of his business, personal life and charitable
activities appeared in the society page of the local paper.120 On the other hand, Bigley’s
name also reoccurred repeatedly in the same papers intertwined in various scandals.
Editors at the San Jose News felt compelled more than once to offer printed denials that
the newspaper "was governed by the ... Charles Bigley faction in county politics." 121
Critics accused city officials and the fire and police chiefs of being too cozy with Bigley,
and there were recurrent charges of favoritism and corruption in local law
enforcement.122 Allegations also arose that authorities ignored violations of liquor and

118 Douglas, Historical Footnotes Santa Clara Valley, 7-8.
119 Ibid.
120 For example: "Personals - What San Jose People Are Doing," The Evening News, August 1 1927;
"Donors of Gifts to Bond Show Listed," San Jose Evening News, October 7 1942; "$194,000 in War Bonds
Sold at Show," San Jose Evening News, June 29 1943; "Personals - What San Jose People Are Doing," San
Jose Evening News, August 17 1927.
121 The editors went on to add that this was also true for "Louis Oneal, who leads the other faction." See:
"Again Accused."
122 For example, see: "Fill Vacancy, Emig Told by Lyle Meeting; "Emig Sues Newspaper for Libel -
$10,000 Is Asked for Libel - Editorial Charging Beer Racket in County Brings Suit," San Jose News,
August 7 1934; "Lyle for Sheriff Club [Political Advertisement]; George W. Lyle, "To the Voters of Santa
Clarar County I Pledge You My Word That I Am Not Connected with Either Louis Oneal or Charles Bigley
in Any Way [Political Advertisement in Form of Handwritten Note]," ibid., July 28; "Think This Over,"
ibid., September 1; "Council Continues Probe of Charges against S.J. Officials -- Black Target of Council
Inquiry," San Jose News, July 12 1938; "Grand Jurors Indicted Three -- Indictment of Three Reported."
San Jose News, March 1 1940. Until a public scandal erupted, police and fire departments preferentially
gambling laws at establishments that carried beer purchased from Bigley’s distribution company.\textsuperscript{123} Candidates traded accusation of illicit ties to Bigley in local elections.\textsuperscript{124} In one particularly spectacular incident, his name came up in the backdrop of an investigation and trial for murder.\textsuperscript{125}

Despite the antics of San Jose’s political boss and his alleged cohorts, many residents nonetheless had confidence in city manager Clarence Goodwin. The conservative city engineer and Presbyterian elder had been appointed in 1920 at the age of 31. He proved adept at running the city over the next two decades, keeping most key political interests content most of the time. Since his position required the approval of the majority of the city council, this presumably included Bigley.\textsuperscript{126} Goodwin remained as aloof from politicking as possible, focusing instead on administering the city. He took pride in the fact that San Jose maintained a modest and conservative budget, keeping taxes low, its borrowing minimal, and holding per capita expenditures on government services to half that of other comparable cities.\textsuperscript{127} Goodwin worked to deliver balanced
municipal budgets even with the rising costs of a growing population, and despite the unexpected “civilian defense” expenses of the early 1940s. This record of accomplishment earned Goodwin strong praise from the editorial pages of the local papers. During Goodwin’s tenure, the National Chamber of Commerce ranked San Jose as one of the top eight “best governed cities in the United States” based on its economy, low taxes, minimal indebtedness and other similar factors. The fact that he was able to stay on the good side of San Jose’s boss-dominated politics, consistently keep the required support of the majority of the city council, and eventually prevail in two citywide votes of confidence imposed on him by opponents, further attests to Goodwin’s political and managerial abilities.

As San Jose’s executive office-holder during a time when Bigley functioned as a local political boss, however, some residents took a more critical view of Goodwin. Critics saw the city manager’s administration as tainted by association, accusing him of looking the other way on corruption and mismanagement related to the boss politics. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, an “anti-administration” faction gained strength on the San Jose city council that attacked both the Bigley machine and the incumbent city manager. Despite a series of hearings and a county grand jury investigation, the anti-

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128 Despite significant unexpected civilian defense costs, Goodwin announced that the city’s budget would still be balanced and that all expenditures for the year were being closely watched. See: “Expenses, Revenue of City Rise,” ibid., June 24 1942.
129 “City Manager Is Voted Confidence of Civic Fathers; "Looking for a Good Man."
130 “Council Continues Probe of Charges against S.J. Officials -- Black Target of Council Inquiry.”
administration minority on the council was not able to break the hold that Bigley had on San Jose, nor discredit Goodwin and other city officials. Goodwin’s critics, frustrated in their other efforts to discredit him, imposed a measure in 1942 that made the office of city manager subject to city-wide votes of confidence biannually instead of just council votes, a dramatic reversal of the Progressive reformer’s goal of insulating the position from politics. Here again Goodwin thwarted his challengers by surviving the first general vote.  

The critics’ dissatisfaction with Goodwin was about more than the taint of boss politics, they wanted to see San Jose grow and industrialize. During Goodwin’s tenure, San Jose undertook the first major annexations that expanded the city’s boundaries, the largest of which was the Willow Glen area. The municipality’s growth nonetheless remained slow in comparison to other cities such as Los Angeles and San Diego. San Jose’s population had grown from 39,642 in 1920, to 57,651 in 1930 and 68,457 in 1940. Meanwhile Santa Clara County went from 100,676 in 1920, 145,118 in 1930 and 174,949 in 1940. During the late 19th century, San Jose could lay claim to being one of the largest and most important cities in California, but no more. Those who aspired to see the

131 Clark Bradley, a young city council member, took the lead challenging the city manager’s leadership, in particular shining a spotlight on the corruption of the local police and fire departments. In a series of council hearings, Bradley sought to discredit Goodwin as well as police chief John N. Black and fire chief Charles Plummer for their association with Bigley and allegations that city officials ignored the boss’ various illegal activities. Unsuccessful on this front, Bradley became the chief architect of the vote of confidence measure for the city manager. Military service cut the crusading efforts of Bradley short, and the young councilor resigned his post shortly thereafter. For more detail, see: Trounstine and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 85-89; Douglas, Historical Footnotes Santa Clara Valley, 7-8; "Council Continues Probe of Charges against S.J. Officials -- Black Target of Council Inquiry; "Think This Over; "Black, Bigley Linked in Probe," San Jose News, October 11 1936; "Fill Vacancy, Emig Told by Lyle Meeting; "Grand Jurors Indicted Three -- Indictment of Three Reported.; "Dove of Peace - City Council Gets Down to Business," San Jose News, May 27 1941; "Goodwin Is Returned by 672 Votes," San Jose News, April 28 1944.

132 Peabody, "Goodwin Congratulated on 20 Years’ Good Work as City Manager."

133 "Historical Census Populations of Counties and Incorporated Cities in California, 1850–2010".
city develop looked with jealousy at the 1940 population of cities like Los Angeles (1,504,277), San Diego (203,341), and Long Beach (164,271) that had been very successful in the first decades of the 20th century at attracting new residents and industry. In contrast to its more dynamic southern neighbors, agriculture still dominated San Jose’s economy and served as the primary employer. As of 1939, San Jose, with its 18 canneries, 13 dried-fruit packinghouses, and 12 fresh-fruit and vegetable shipping firms remained the largest canning and dried-fruit packing center in the world as well as a leader in mechanized farm equipment.\textsuperscript{134} Despite these impressive figures, agriculture made for a cyclic and unpredictable economic base that would not foster the kind of growth experienced by southern California cities. The fruit growing and related processing industries in San Jose and Santa Clara County were also beginning a steady decline in the face of competition from other regions such as California’s Central Valley that offered lower cost land and a large pool of cheap migrant labor. To those with an ambitious vision of San Jose’s future, it was clear that the city would have to diversify away from a fruit economy and more aggressively pursue growth and development.

Table 3-1. Population of San Jose and Santa Clara County, 1900-1940

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td>21,500</td>
<td>28,946</td>
<td>39,642</td>
<td>57,651</td>
<td>68,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Clara County</td>
<td>60,216</td>
<td>83,539</td>
<td>100,676</td>
<td>145,118</td>
<td>174,949</td>
</tr>
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With these economic changes as a backdrop, the political climate of San Jose began to shift. By the 1940s, the small town bossism of the preceding two decades was

\textsuperscript{134} Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress Administration of Northern California., \textit{California}, 75 and 301.
no longer palatable to a younger generation of residents and newcomers. They wanted San Jose and Santa Clara County to take proactive steps to recruit industry, attract more population, and capture a greater share of state and federal development money. This group pushed for projects such as freeways, an airport, and a naval base to promote growth. For this ambitious cohort of business leaders and professionals, Goodwin and his fiscally conservative policies and the corruption of boss politics were lingering barriers to the kind of growth and progress that they envisioned for the region. When the city manager survived the first vote of confidence, the reformers decided to organize more aggressively to remove him and the taint of Bigley’s machine.  

The Progress Committee

The year 1944 marked a turning point in the city’s politics as six of the seven city council seats were simultaneously up for grabs due to councilors retiring or entering the armed services. Responding to the political opening, a group of younger businessmen and professionals formally organized to put forth a slate of candidates to run for city council to displace Bigley and the incumbent administration and take the steps necessary to make San Jose a thriving industrial metropolis. Eventually having about 150 members, the group was primarily comprised of large landowners, merchants, attorneys, and industrialists. Many of them belonged to the local Chamber of Commerce and Merchants Associations. Several had come to San Jose in recent decades for business or professional

136 Douglas, *Historical Footnotes Santa Clara Valley*. 
opportunities. In other words, they were part of a new and expanded professional and middle class drawn to the area by the previous economic expansion and growth fostered by the orchard and fruit-processing economy, but they were not dependent on it and thus could spearhead a challenge against it. They wanted San Jose to move beyond a seasonal fruit economy and embrace broader industrialization and growth. To do so this second generation of reformers mobilized to take municipal office by overcoming and in some cases capitalizing on the political structures and limited popular democracy that were part of the legacy of the Progressive Era reformers.

San Jose’s second wave of reformers needed a way to organize for nonpartisan municipal elections. Several months of informal conversation among a small group of aspiring reformers thus coalesced with the formation of the nonpartisan group called the Progress Committee in February of 1944 with approximately 40 founding members. At the heart of the Progress Committee was an executive committee made up of a handful of San Jose’s most prominent men. The chair and primary spokesperson for the group was James (Jim) T. Rye. From Illinois originally, Rye had come to San Jose from Sacramento in 1938 when he purchased the San Jose Tractor and Equipment Company, renaming it the Rye Tractor and Equipment Company. As the sole-owner and president of this firm, Rye became the exclusive distributor for several major brands of farm and construction machinery in Santa Clara and San Benito counties, including Caterpillar,

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139 “S.J. Progress Committee's Aims Told,” *San Jose Evening News*, February 24 1944.
John Deere and others. In addition to Rye, the executive committee initially included several prominent and ambitious men. Raymond (Ray) Roberts was the president of the Merchants Association of San Jose. Ernest Renzel, Jr. was president of the E. H. Renzel Company, his family’s wholesale grocery business. Aaron Richards owned a chain of local gas stations and was the cofounder and executive of an oil distribution company. Benjamin Carter was the controller and future chairman of Food Machinery Corporation. Reverend Recter Johnson was the president of the San Jose Ministerial Association and pastor of First Methodist Church in San Jose. Anthony Dorsa, the president and cofounder of Eggo Food Products, subsequently joined the executive committee a few months later. The Progress Committee later removed Renzel and Carter from the list given to the public when the group named the two men as part of their slate of candidates for city council.

The majority of the leading figures in the Progress Committee had a clear professional or personal stake in promoting growth for San Jose. According to executive committee member Richards, the Progress Committee was “not merely a political

campaign” instead it was “more like a crusade” in pursuit of “progress.” Progress for Richards and the others in the group was to make San Jose operate like a corporation. In one of the Progress Committee’s early political advertisements, the group declared “San Jose is a big business” (emphasis in the original) and compared the city council to a board of directors for a corporation. Continuing the analogy, the advertisement argued that voters, as the “citizen taxpayer[s] and stockholder[s],” should select the best men available with training and experience “in specialized fields such as law, finance, accounting, engineering, planning, etc.” In short, men with professional and business experience similar to those who made up the Progress Committee – not politicians. The advertisement listed over one hundred names of prominent local residents who endorsed this platform.143

The Progress Committee sought to present itself as an open and representative group of San Jose residents mobilized by a shared outrage over corruption and mismanagement at city hall. The group placed ads in the newspapers inviting interested parties to attend their meetings and boasted that small donations from members paid for their political advertisements.144 It gave its membership list to the local papers and

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142 “New Group Will Enter Candidates; "S.J. Progress Committee's Aims Told."
143 “Draft the Best Men to Govern San Jose [Political Advertisement],” San Jose Evening News, March 14 1944.
144 See for example: "News of Politics - April 5," San Jose Evening News, April 5 1944. (article describes continuing series of neighborhood meetings being held by the candidates; "News of Politics - March 22," San Jose Evening News, March 22 1944. (Progress Committee begin series of meetings hosted by homeowners to meet candidates and learn about platform, invite anyone interested in being a host to contact the group; "If You Vote You Will Be the Next Political Boss of San Jose.” (Political advertisement, Unknown newspaper, April 28, 1944 [hand dated], Chipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1944” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).(ad notes that "137 representative citizens of San Jose" paid for it, with no one paying more than 3% of the total cost; "Draft the Best Men to Govern San Jose [Political Advertisement].”(political advertisement soliciting anyone with donations or suggestions to visit the Progress Committee headquarters).
enumerated the names of its members prominently in political advertisements. In the lead up to selecting its slates of six candidates, the group also issued a public call for nominations. Despite these gestures, the group’s business-oriented membership and the narrow and elite nature of its leadership belied their claims of broad inclusiveness. Notably missing from the member rolls, leadership spots, and slate of candidates was any significant representation of minorities, the working-class, or women.

Two other factors further undercut the Progress Committee’s claims of being open and democratic. First, from its inception, the group’s leadership had the unspoken goal of removing popular city manager Goodwin and reversing his fiscally conservative policies as the first step toward promoting growth for San Jose. Second, in order to accomplish this goal, the leaders of the Progress Committee tightly controlled the selection process for the group’s slate of candidates. Despite the claims that the process would be open and inclusive, a small number of core leaders handled the decision-making behind the scenes. To vet candidates for the Progress Committee’s slate, the executive committee formed a nominating committee. This new committee was essentially an extension of the five-member executive committee of Rye, Richards, Roberts, Recter and Dorsa plus three additional members. The three members were

145 "Draft the Best Men to Govern San Jose [Political Advertisement]." (political advertisement with list of 100+ names; "Progress Committee Enlarged," San Jose Evening News, March 1 1944. (article listing 100 original members of the Progress Committee and noting that the group was still growing).
146 "S.J. Progress Committee's Aims Told."
147 "Four Councilman Serve 'Resign-or-Be-Fired' Ultimatum on Manager," San Jose Evening News, May 23 1944. (After the election and surprise ouster of Goodwin, Renzel stated that his fellow candidates had agreed to remove the city manager prior to the elections and that his actions were fulfilling the mandate of Progress Committee that secured his election; "Councilman Elect Talk on Ousters," San Jose Evening News, May 24 1944. (Three of the incoming Progress Committee council members confirmed that the group had discussed ousting Goodwin prior to the election, with Carter and Rundle claiming that they would have preferred more investigation before he was removed. Meanwhile, Ruffo expressed strong support for removing him).
Joseph George, Jr., the owner of a candy, tobacco, soda, and alcohol distribution company; Walter Jones, the business agent and secretary-treasurer of the San Jose Cannery Workers’ Union and future city councilmember and mayor of nearby Sunnyvale; and Ernest Renzel, Jr., a founding member of the group formerly listed as part of the executive committee. To manage the campaign, the group also formed a steering committee and named the prominent young attorney Harvey Miller as chairman. Miller was instrumental in selecting and recruiting the group’s slate of six candidates as well as managing the campaign for the open city council seats. Keeping with the insular nature of the Progress Committee’s leadership, the other members of the campaign steering committee were Rye, Renzel, and Roberts. In short, only nine men – most of them the founding members of the Progress Committee – were responsible for managing the group, creating the slate of candidates and running the campaign. Moreover, these nine men and the candidates that they selected privately held the consensus view that Goodwin had to be removed – a key policy position that the group never communicated to the voters during the election.


149 Critics of the Progress Committee faulted the lack of transparency and true democratic input on the selection of the group’s slate of candidates. For example, the selection of Watson as a “labor leader” meant to be representative of working-class interests in the city upset the local labor movement. In part, this was because one of the incumbent city council members that the Progress Committee candidates sought to oust was an active labor leader and head of the Santa Clara County Labor League, a coalition group consisting of the local AFL, CIO, and affiliated unions. Local labor leaders thus interpreted the selection of Watson as an attempt to circumvent the mainstream working-class movement. Shortly after the Progress Committee
Miller and the small inner circle leading the Progress Committee put forth six candidates to run for office as part of the Progress Committee ticket just over a month after forming. The group touted the men selected as representative of all “walks of life” in the city: “accountant” Benjamin Carter, “agriculturist” James Lively, “civic leader” Ernest Renzel Jr., “engineer and attorney” Albert J. Ruffo, “businessman” Roy Rundle, and “labor leader” Fred Watson. The Progress Committee’s slate, however, more closely resembled Miller and the white, upper-middle class business and professional slant of the men who made up the group. Renzel and Carter had been founding members of the group and part of the original executive committee. Like many of the new generation of business leaders in the city, only Renzel had roots in San Jose – the rest of the candidates were migrants drawn to the area by economic opportunity. The candidates were largely young with Carter, Renzel and Ruffo all in their 30s and Watson, at the age announced its list of candidates, Arthur R. Lay, a local labor figure and member of the Santa Clara County Labor League, took out his own political advertisement. In an open letter format, Lay described participating in a Progress Committee meeting ostensibly called to select a slate, but discovered instead that a small subset of the group had already selected the candidates ahead of time. Lay charged that the Progress Committee’s candidates were not selected in a democratic or representative way, and that no labor input went into the decision. Furthermore, he argued that the local labor movement did not consider the unfamiliar Watson as representing their interests. The charge from Lay and others that the Progress Committee’s slate had been handpicked by small clique behind the Progress Committee – and not in an open and democratic way – put the group and editors at the San Jose Evening News on the defensive. For more detail, see: "Attention Voters! -- the Following Letter Is Submitted for Consideration of All Fair-Minded Voters and Citizens," (Political advertisement in the form of an open letter dated March 16, 1944 and signed by Arthur R. Lay, Unknown newspaper, April 22, 1944 [hand dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1944” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library). In another example, a critic of the group charged that most of the Progress Committee members listed were simply called on the phone and their names used without permission, that the group's slate of candidates were selected in advance by a "small hand-picked group" with no involvement by the larger membership, that Renzel was trying to be the "political boss of San Jose," and that "[o]ne hundred of our very fine citizens have been 'bamboozled' by a handful of very clever individuals." See: Ethel Boynton, "Open Letter from Mrs. Ethel Boynton [Political Advertisement in Form of a Letter to the Editor Dated April 19, 1944]." San Jose Evening News, April 20 1944. Another critic also challenged the claim by the San Jose Evening News editors that the Progress Committee selection process had been democratic or inclusive. See: Arthur Roos, "We, the People - Thinks Editorial Was Evasive [Letter to the Editor]," ibid., April 25.

150 Lundstrom, "Harvey Miller, 86, Ex-SJ Civic Leader Lawyer Shaped Political History; "So All May Know - Those Questions."
of 56, the oldest. All but Watson, a foreman, had at least a bachelor’s degree and were business owners, executives, or managers. The “accountant” Carter was an executive at Food Machinery Corporation, a company that, like San Jose, was undergoing tremendous growth during the 1940s underwritten by war contracts. The “agriculturist” Lively was likewise a successful business leader, serving as the president and manager of a fruit processing company. Renzel, the “civic leader,” was an executive at his family’s wholesale grocery company while the “businessman” Rundle owned a manufacturing company booming with war contracts. The “engineer and attorney” Ruffo was a partner in a law practice dedicated to land-use and development.\(^{151}\) In sum, the Progress Committee candidates reflected the core constituency and leadership of the group itself. In the eyes of the reformers, these men were best suited to bring a business mindset to local government and fast track growth and industrial development for San Jose.

The Progress Committee received an immediate boost when the two remaining major papers in San Jose, the *Mercury-Herald* and *San Jose Evening News*, both strongly supported the group and its slate of candidates. The Hayes family – long associated with Progressive reform causes and boosterism since the days of Everis Anson (E.A.) Hayes and Jay Orlo (J.O.) Hayes – controlled both papers.\(^{152}\) The papers’ current publisher,
Elystus Hayes, was committed to seeing San Jose grow and develop as more than an agricultural region subject to seasonal cycles. He was instrumental in working with the local Chamber of Commerce in the 1940s to organize a nationwide advertising campaign to attract industry and business to come to Santa Clara County.\textsuperscript{153} From the moment that the Progress Committee announced its formation and goals right up through the election in May, the two Hayes family papers strongly endorsed the group and its candidates. The day after the group formed, the editors at the \textit{San Jose Evening News} proclaimed that “[t]he \textit{News} is thoroughly and completely in accord with the announced aims of the newly-formed Progress [C]ommittee.”\textsuperscript{154} When the Progress Committee presented its slate of candidates a month later, the editors promptly judged it “[a] good list.”\textsuperscript{155} Over the next several months, the paper ran a series of supportive editorials – at least three of which appeared on the top fold of the front page – that reiterated the Progress Committee’s talking points and countered critics, even offering point-by-point rebuttals to criticisms against the group and its candidates.\textsuperscript{156} and come back from the verge of bankruptcy during Depression. For more information, see: Pamela Kramer, “Newspaper Owner Elystus Hayes Dies,” \textit{San Jose Mercury News}, March 17 1989.\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.\textsuperscript{155} “Committee of 100,” \textit{San Jose Evening News}, February 14 1944.\textsuperscript{155} “A Good List,” \textit{San Jose Evening News}, March 17 1944.\textsuperscript{156} For examples of editorials in support of the Progress Committee, see: “On Which Side?,” \textit{San Jose Evening News}, April 6 1944. (editorial defending Progress Committee candidates from charge that they had preconceived notions about the Goodwin administration, insisting instead that they were open-minded and committed to what was best for the city; “An Important Matter,” \textit{San Jose Evening News}, April 10 1944. (editorial expressing support for Progress Committee candidates and for retaining city manager Goodwin; “So All May Know - Questions Answered,” \textit{San Jose Evening News}, April 17 1944. (editorial refuting charges that the Progress Committee candidates were a special interest clique trying to displace an incumbent clique, reiterating charge of bossism and corruption against incumbents; “So All May Know - Not Politicians,” \textit{San Jose Evening News}, April 20 1944. (page one editorial contrasting “promise-making ... politicians” and the Progress Committee candidates selected for honesty, integrity, business success, and as “democratic representatives of ALL the people”; “So All May Know - Those Questions,” (page one editorial offering a point-by-point rebuttal to critical questions raised a political advertisement that ran in the paper the day before challenging the democratic nature of the Progress Committee and its leadership
The 1944 Election

In addition to the six council races, city manager Goodwin was also up for the biannual vote of confidence that his opponents had convinced San Jose voters to institute in 1942 in an effort to oust him. The behind the scenes consensus of the Progress Committee’s inner circle was that Goodwin had to go along with the incumbent councilmembers. The group had to tread carefully, however, because the city manager still enjoyed broad popularity – and the same editorial pages of the local papers that supported the Progress Committee endorsed retaining Goodwin. The Progress Committee therefore largely left direct criticism of the city manager to others, focusing instead on the city council race. The city manager vote of confidence issue was sensitive enough that the editorial page of the San Jose Evening News twice sprung to the defense of the Progress Committee and its candidates by refuting claims that the group was set on removing Goodwin – a false rebuttal that would later prove embarrassing to the editors.

The 1944 election revolved around two major issues: the taint of political bossism and the best route toward “progress” for San Jose. The Progress Committee and its supporters, including the editors at the San Jose Evening News, repeatedly accused the

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157 “An Important Matter.”
158 See for example this political advertisement signed by Mrs. Clark L. Bradley, the wife of the former San Jose city councilor who was very critical of Clarence Goodwin: “Is Clarence Goodwin Worthy of a Politically Free City Council?,” (Political advertisement [letter signed by Mrs. Clark L. Bradley], Unknown newspaper, April 4, 1944 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1944” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).
159 “On Which Side?; “An Important Matter.”
incumbent council members of being beholden to political boss Charles Bigley or otherwise compromised by narrow interests.\textsuperscript{160} For their part, four of the incumbent councilmembers collaborated to try to counter the Progress Committee’s charges. Without the support of the two local papers, the incumbents relied on a series of political advertisements to refute the charges of bossism and defend the current city council’s record, pointing to low crime rates, low taxes, and various new or expanded city services.\textsuperscript{161}

The allegations of bossism provided a salacious backdrop, but the 1944 city council election in San Jose was more important as a referendum over disputed visions of “progress.” For the Progress Committee and its supporters, progress meant two things. First, it meant a more efficient and business-like municipality. In their political ads, the Progress Committee argued that the incumbent city councilors mismanaged basic services, arguing for instance that San Jose lacked adequate fire protection equipment and facilities. If elected, the Progress Committee candidates promised greater government

\textsuperscript{160} Campaign manager Miller insisted that the Progress Committee candidates would “kick bossism out of the city hall” and the group ran a series of political advertisements decrying boss influence and secretive “star chamber sessions” where a handful of powerbrokers decided important matters. For example: "Progress Candidates Said Foes of City Hall Boss Control," \textit{San Jose Evening News}, April 21 1944; "They're Whispering Now! Why? Naturally to Confuse the Thinking Voter," (Political advertisement, Unknown newspaper, March 23, 1944 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1944” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); "Put an End to 'Bossism' in San Jose - No More Star Chamber Sessions [Political Advertisement]," \textit{San Jose Evening News}, April 10 1944; "If You Vote You Will Be the Next Political Boss of San Jose." Gratuitously taking advantage of wartime patriotism, one Progress Committee ad called upon residents to “keep the faith” and support the group’s candidates as a demonstration of “majority rule” so that the fighting men overseas would know that “it was worth fighting” when they returned home to San Jose. For example see: "Wherever They Are - They Are Thinking of Home and the Kind of Place It Will Be When They Return -- Will the Home Folks Have Kept the Faith? -- Was It Worth Fighting For?,” (Political advertisement, Unknown newspaper, April 27, 1944 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1944” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).

\textsuperscript{161} "Attention Voters! -- the Following Letter Is Submitted for Consideration of All Fair-Minded Voters and Citizens."
efficiency and management that was more professional. Second, at the core of the Progress Committee’s vision for San Jose was promoting faster industrial growth and development. The same editorial page that so emphatically supported the Progress Committee and its candidates was also delighted when a national publication listed San Jose and Santa Clara County as “one of the six” most important industrial regions on the west coast. To many of those involved with Progress Committee, seeing San Jose put on par with Los Angeles, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco and Seattle was encouraging. They were convinced that for San Jose to prosper, it had to act aggressively like those cities to attract business and industry. They had lobbied through the Chamber of Commerce and Merchants Association for more spending on projects to improve and expand roads, freeways, and other infrastructure. This group scored a key victory in 1943 when IBM selected San Jose as the site of its west coast headquarters. Those associated with the Progress Committee looked to a more ambitious future of growth and development.

The status quote stood in the way of Progress Committee’s vision of progress. The group was impatient with city manager Goodwin and the city council for the pace of growth. Only part of this related to the inefficiency and petty corruption fostered by the Bigley machine. The conservative fiscal policy of city manager Goodwin and a city council that was beholden to local agricultural, labor and other parochial interests that

162 “Do You Want Sugar-Coated Statements About Your City - or Do You Want True Facts?,” (Political advertisement, Unknown newspaper, April 29, 1944 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1944” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).
163 “One of Six,” San Jose Evening News, April 4 1944.
164 Trounstine and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 85-89; Douglas, Historical Footnotes Santa Clara Valley, 7-8.
opposed municipal spending and increased taxes posed a bigger obstacle to growth in the
eyes of men in the Progress Committee.\textsuperscript{165} For example, key members of the Progress
Committee, including Renzel and others involved with the local Chambers of Commerce
and Merchants Association, had lobbied to build an airport for San Jose. The group
encountered the initial skepticism of Goodwin who questioned the financial merits of the
project and a city council that was not aggressive in bringing the project to fruition.\textsuperscript{166}
San Jose could only become the “the progressive city it should rightfully be,” if men with
bolder vision and business-orientation were in charge at city hall.\textsuperscript{167}

The politics of growth that guided the vision of the new postwar generation of
federal, state and local leaders separated the Progress Committee from Goodwin and the
incumbents.\textsuperscript{168} The Progress Committee saw growth itself as a good worth pursuing –
even if it required more spending subsidized by municipal borrowing and higher taxes –
because growth would beget more growth and profits. In other words, they believed that

\textsuperscript{165} Trounstine and Christensen, \textit{Movers and Shakers}.
\textsuperscript{166} Renzel was the chair of a Citizens Central Airport Committee created by the local chamber of
commerce. At an initial city council meeting about developing an airport, Goodwin skeptically noted that
most municipal airports operated at a loss. This did not dissuade Renzel, who was convinced that the city
needed an airport to continue growing. He personally negotiated for the purchase of land for the airport and
pushed the city leaders to take action. Renzel was an outspoken advocate, along with the Chamber of
Commerce and Merchants Associations, pushing for a tax increase to fund the airport purchase, declaring
“San Jose must capitalize on the fastest growing industry in America, the aeronautics industry.” When
World War II delayed the airport project, Renzel worked tirelessly with state and federal authorities to keep
the project moving ahead, despite a lack of support or enthusiasm from the city council. Goodwin, for his
part, claimed that the land purchased for the airport was at least serving the war cause by being leased for
agricultural use. After the 1944 election victory, Renzel and other Progress Committee members would be
more aggressive in making the airport a reality. For more detail see: Frank Sweeney, “Bustling Facility Is
Part of Valley's Aviation Heritage,” \textit{San Jose Mercury News}, June 17 2001; Pat Loomis, "San Jose
International Airport,” Mineta San Jose International Airport,
http://www.flysanjose.com/fl/about/history/ploomis.pdf
\textsuperscript{167} "Drafted! -- Candidates Drafted by Progress Group -- Balanced Council Aim of Six-Man Ticket."
\textsuperscript{168} For a discussion of the “politics of growth,” see: Wolfe, \textit{America's Impasse}; Collins, \textit{More}; Meg Jacobs,
\textit{Pocketbook Politics : Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America}, Politics and Society in
growth was the root of other economic goods. Goodwin and the incumbent councilmen did not oppose growth and development; they simply took a more conservative view on how to achieve it, believing that balanced budgets, low taxes and frugal borrowing would bring steady and sustainable development. For example, the city manager had been instrumental in laying the foundation to attract General Electric to select San Jose as the location for a manufacturing plant after the war.¹⁶⁹ He also cooperated with various proposals by the Chamber of Commerce and others to attract businesses, and worked to implement infrastructure improvements and projects – even eventually coming around to support the airport. For every project, however, he insisted on carefully balanced budgets. These fiscally conservative policies had kept Goodwin in office for more than two decades and earned him the support of the editorial pages of the San Jose Evening News and Mercury-Herald even as they endorsed the Progress Committee candidates. The incumbent councilmen also defended their record in terms of fiscal responsibility, noting that despite population growth and a host of new or expanded services, the tax rate had not risen and city debt was low.¹⁷⁰ In sum, the incumbent administration called for progress on a “pay-as-you-go” basis – or as Goodwin put it in his own political advertisement, for “progress with economy.”¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ "Mr. And Mrs. Voter: Here Is the Record [Political Advertisement]," ibid., April 20.
¹⁷¹ "Retain!," (Political advertisement, Unknown newspaper, April 22, 1944 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1944” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library). (incumbent advertisement arguing to retain sitting council members for “for Continued Efficient Government, Low Taxes and Progress”; “Thanks to the News!,” (Political advertisement, Unknown newspaper, April 29, 1944 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1944” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library). (political advertisement arguing for the re-election of the incumbents for government on a “PAY-AS-YOU-GO’ basis”; "Let's Think -- Not Argue!," (Political advertisement, Unknown newspaper, April 29, 1944 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San
On May 2, 1944, the voters of San Jose swept the Progress Committee candidates into office with roughly a 2½ to 1 margin over the incumbents. By a narrow 672 votes, they also voted to retain Goodwin as city manager. The voter turnout was 56% of San Jose's 34,659 eligible voters – up from the 47% that participated during the last primary two years ago. The editors at the San Jose Evening News proclaimed their satisfaction at the results, adding that they would have been “pretty bitter” if Goodwin had been displaced by the vote of confidence. With the divisive election now past, the editors believed that the primary challenge ahead for the new council was growing and developing San Jose and its services and infrastructure without taking on a large amount of debt or raising taxes. Many residents who saw the 1944 election primarily as a vote against Charles Bigley and machine politics in San Jose likely agreed.

For the leaders of the Progress Committee, however, the election was about more than ending bossism; it was also about their vision of accelerating San Jose’s growth and development. Their victory was therefore not complete so long as the fiscally conservative Goodwin remained city manager with tight control over the city administration and budgets. Emboldened by their electoral margins, the group moved

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173 The San Jose Evening News editors said that they would have been “pretty bitter” if Goodwin had been displaced. They describe the vote of confidence measure as having been sold to people by former council member [Bradley] who was Goodwin’s "arch-foe." The editors called the vote a "thoroughly vicious measure" that made the office political when it should be executive with manager serving at will of the council. They reiterated their opinion that the "vicious spite measure" should be repealed. See: "They Liked Them," San Jose Evening News, May 2 1944. (Editorial from evening news expressing satisfaction at election of Progress Committee candidates and Goodwin; "The Goodwin Vote," San Jose Evening News, May 2 1944.

174 "Shall They Go On?" San Jose Evening News, May 3 1944.
quickly to advance its agenda. Since two of the council contests were for unexpired terms, Renzel and Watson joined the city council immediately after the election ahead of their four counterparts who would take office a few months later at the start of the next council term. Less than three weeks after being seated on the council, the pair joined with two outgoing councilmen to serve a surprise “resign or be fired ultimatum” to Goodwin. Opposed by the majority of the council, Goodwin resigned, thus ending his twenty-three year career as city manager. The four-member majority promptly appointed city clerk John Lynch as an acting city manager.175

The ouster of Goodwin by Renzel and the other three councilors surprised and dismayed many residents, including the editors at the San Jose Evening News who had supported both the Progress Committee candidates and the city manager. Over the next few weeks, the paper awkwardly defended the dismissal with which it obviously disagreed in a series of editorials calling for calm.176 The ouster of Goodwin, however, was a central part of the Progress Committee’s vision for San Jose. As an editorial noted the day after his forced resignation, Goodwin had followed a "conservative financial policy which gave [San Jose residents] a well-governed city … with a moderate tax rate." This was in admirable contrast with other cities that spent “their children's money through large bond issues for various projects.”177 His austerity earned the praise of the editors, but it was Goodwin’s reluctance to spend and borrow that made him a target for

175 In appointing Lynch, the council majority bypassed the city engineer who had a close working relationship with Goodwin. For more detail, see: "City Workers Suffer Case of Jitters," San Jose Evening News, May 23 1944; "Councilman Elect Talk on Ousters; "Four Councilman Serve 'Resign-or-Be-Fired' Ultimatum on Manager."
removal by the leaders of the Progress Committee. In short, to achieve their aggressive vision of growth and industrial development, the Progress Committee’s coup was not complete so long as the conservative Goodwin controlled the city’s purse strings and set its administrative agenda.

The Progress Committee led a purge of city hall and other city offices. The new city manager, with the support of the council majority, appointed younger men to head the police and fire departments, bypassing candidates with more seniority. Both departments experienced numerous dismissals, retirements and demotions. With new leaders in place, local authorities cracked down on the illegal gambling and slot machines that had been at the heart of many allegations of local corruption. The Progress Committee had achieved its aims. A younger generation guided San Jose in the postwar decades. Any fear that the old political machine in San Jose might make a resurgence ended with death of Charles Bigley in 1946 at the age of 57.

The Progress Committee itself soon faded from view, but the pro-growth interests that had spearheaded it would more or less control local politics for the next three decades. After the 1944 municipal election, growth and business-oriented candidates dominated the city council using the tools put in place by the Progressives to seize the levers of local power to run the city their way. The second wave of reformers morphed into another machine of sorts, this time oriented toward boosting rapid growth and development. With the boosters in the lead, the city and county joined with the Chamber of Commerce to subsidize an aggressive million dollar national advertising and recruiting

178 Douglas, *Historical Footnotes Santa Clara Valley*.
campaign between 1950 and 1965. The Chamber ran a series of advertisement in publications such as the *New York Times* touting Santa Clara County as "the population center for the Pacific Coast" with access to a $32 million market made up of 20 million customers. The ads listed numerous advantages for the area, including reduced freight costs to reach west coast customers, decentralization, federal dispersal incentives, low real estate costs, large plant size, and a "harmonious labor" pool known for its "cooperation" with industry. The Chamber offered booklets to interested parties explaining how “to let [their] new west coast plant pay for itself.” The campaign worked. Companies like Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation (FMC) and IBM expanded. Other companies such as General Electric, Pittsburgh Steel, Owen-Corning, and Kaiser established local plants.

**Postwar San Jose and Santa Clara County**

Under the San Jose city charter, the city manager was the most important executive and administrative position in the city. To achieve their vision, the leaders and supporters of the Progress Committee needed to find a strong and capable city manager equally committed to industrial growth and development. When city manager John Lynch

180 Trounstine and Christensen, *Movers and Shakers*.
182 *Movers and Shakers.*
failed to secure a majority of the votes from the electorate in 1946 (perhaps as a backlash to the purge he had led cleaning up city departments), the Progress Committee and its majority on the city council scrambled to find a replacement.\textsuperscript{183} Two factors made the search more challenging. First, the position offered a low salary, a lingering policy from the Progressive Era reformers who envisioned city government resting in the hands of part-time city councilors and administrators, not professional politicians. Second, potential candidates disliked San Jose’s unique charter amendment that required the city manager to campaign for voter approval every two years.\textsuperscript{184} After Lynch’s loss of confidence, city officials finally recruited the experienced civic manager Orvin W. (“Hump”) Campbell from nearby Berkeley for the role, but only after agreeing to a sizable pay raise and car allowance.\textsuperscript{185} Campbell proved a capable administrator over the next four years, organizing city affairs and laying the foundation for the rapid postwar growth to come. Campbell disliked the vote of confidence provision, however, and resigned in 1950 to take the city manager position in San Diego.\textsuperscript{186} Having lost two city managers in six years, pro-growth interests in San Jose once again had to seek out a new manager to consolidate their hold on municipal power.

\textsuperscript{183} “Balloting Today Will Name Councilman - City Manager Job Open Tonight,” (Unknown newspaper, May 20, 1946 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1946” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); “City Council Still Puzzled by Task of Finding Manager,” (Unknown newspaper, May 17, 1946 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1946” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).

\textsuperscript{184} “New Appointment Likely Tonight,” (Unknown newspaper, May 27, 1946 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1946” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).

\textsuperscript{185} “Manager Ow Campbell of Berkeley to Head City,” (Unknown newspaper, May 30, 1946 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1946” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); “New City Manager,” (Editorial, Unknown newspaper, May 30, 1946 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1946” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library). (editorial describe Campbell as good candidate based on his record of experience).

The pro-growth leaders needed a candidate with strong local ties who would be loyal to the position, and with the charisma to keep the confidence of the voters. The candidate selected for the job was Anthony P “Dutch” Hamann. Nothing in Hamann’s background made him an obvious choice for running a city. A graduate of Santa Clara University, much of his work experience was with his alma mater, first as an alumni director and then, after the war, as an assistant to the president and business manager. Hamann had also served in the Navy, rising to the rank of Lt. Commander, and before being selected as city manager, had briefly worked as a district manager at General Motors in Oakland. What Hamann lacked in relevant experience, however, he made up for in local connections and zeal:

As a young man, Hamann played football with [Progress Committee member and city councilor Al] Ruffo at Santa Clara University. A portly and jovial attorney, Hamann had served in the Navy, sold Chevy parts in Oakland and oil in Salinas. Eventually, he found his calling: empire building.

In 1946, Hamann’s cozy ties with the Progress Committee candidates on the city council had put him at the top of a short list of candidates considered for the city manager role, but the position eventually went to Campbell. With the city manager position vacant again in 1950, Hamann was now at the top of the list. Despite his thin resume for the position, Hamann shared the same strong commitment as the Progress Committee members.

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189 "No Decision Made on New City Manager," (Unknown newspaper, May 18, 1946 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1946” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library). (The article is subtitled “Santa Clara executive heads list” – a reference to Hamann’s recent appointment as a “business executive” at Santa Clara University. The article also noted that Hamann was the only “outsider” – or non-council member – invited to attend an informal meeting to discuss the city manager position).
candidates to grow San Jose. Hamann proved to be the ideal candidate to fulfill the Progress Committee’s vision, serving as city manager for the next nineteen years and pushing San Jose on a path toward breakneck development and expansion. For both friend and foe, Hamann is credited – or blamed – for making San Jose one of the fastest growing cities in the two decades after World War II and forever changing the character of the former “Valley of Heart’s Delight.”

The new city manager and the other growth advocates in San Jose acquired a strong ally when the Hayes family sold the *San Jose Mercury* and *San Jose Evening News* papers to the Ridder family in 1952. The Ridder group already controlled six papers in Minnesota and North and South Dakota and wanted access to the fast growing California news market. Joseph Ridder, then just 32 years old, became publisher and quickly emerged as a prominent advocate for San Jose’s growth. The change in ownership marked a milestone, since although the paper had previously supported the Progress Committee and industrial development; the editorial page had also consistently favored balanced budgets, limited borrowing, and an overall more conservative course for growth. In contrast, Ridder was “totally committed to the growth and industrialization of San Jose” and under his control, the paper aggressively promoted the bond measures

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190 “The Man Behind S.J.’S Rapid Growth Former City Manager Set Stage for Valley’s Boom - and Sprawl.” (The article quotes Ruffo as saying, “It was just growth, growth, growth. That was everybody’s song. And Dutch sang it the loudest”).

191 For a sense of the dueling sentiments regarding Hamann’s legacy, see: ibid. (Rogers described Hamann thus: “He also paved some of the world's most productive farmland under a hodgepodge of strip malls, freeways and suburbs. Critics say he turned San Jose into a poster child for sprawl, draining life from its downtown and saddling future generations with traffic jams and smog.”); Dick Barrett, “Hamann Critics Misread S.J. History,” ibid., April 20 1987. (Barret countered critics of San Jose’s postwar city manager, arguing that “Hamann dealt ably with the post-World War II explosion in the city's growth, and without the benefit of hindsight.”).

and spending necessary to achieve it while ignoring any criticism or scandals that arose.\textsuperscript{193}

Local boosterism was only one factor working to transform San Jose. Like other emerging boomtowns in the postwar Sunbelt, San Jose took advantage of government investment in new economic development. A variety of federal programs underwrote the rapid shift to suburbia, from tax policy to the creation of a new kind of mortgage market. Another key factor was Cold War defense policy that emphasized the dispersion of manufacturing, population, and defense facilities to mitigate the nation’s vulnerability to nuclear attack. In this way, a combination of private market forces, albeit encouraged by federal policymakers, dovetailed with national defense policies to draw federal dollars to subsidize and encourage suburban development outside of the older industrial cores. For example, partly for defense purposes, partly to develop interstate commerce and partly to serve the convenience of new population centers, federal money built the roads and highways that made the expansion of suburbia possible. Cheaper real estate and open landscapes pulled businesses south and west to the Sunbelt and federal tax incentives pushed them to build new plants in suburban locations. Federal defense spending combined with dispersal policies were further boons to the Sunbelt region as defense contractors and associated firms also moved away from the older urban centers to the newer southern and western suburban locations. States and local governments further sweetened the pot for companies, investors, and developers with a variety of tax breaks.

\textsuperscript{193} Richard Reinhardt, "Joe Ridder's San Jose," \textit{San Francisco Magazine}, November 1965. (quoted in "Ex-Publisher Joseph Ridder Dies.")
loans, grants, and other business-friendly policies and programs aimed at attracting businesses to relocate or invest.  

The cumulative impact of these public and private forces was transformative for San Jose and Santa Clara County. Over the course of the 1950s, California displaced New York to become the nation’s leading recipient of defense dollars. By the end of the decade, Santa Clara County overtook San Diego to become the second largest beneficiary behind the thriving aerospace industry of Los Angeles County. Responding to the flow of federal dollars, defense contractor Lockheed Missiles and Aerospace opened facilities in Santa Clara County, including a major plant in Sunnyvale in 1956. The company would eventually become one of the region’s largest employers with 28,000 employees.  

Lockheed was joining a rapidly expanding cohort of major companies, including large national entities such as IBM, Ford, and General Electric, as well as locally founded firms such as Hewlett Packard, Food Machinery Corporation and others that would be at the foundation of the future rise of Silicon Valley. 

Suburbanization of the Sunbelt in the postwar decades thus acquired a tremendous self-reinforcing momentum where public monies and policies greatly encouraged private market forces, and vice versa. As suburban complexes like San Jose and Santa Clara

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County grew, more companies opened plants and began to advertise for workers. In turn, more educated and mobile white professionals relocated to these new suburbs not only to take advantage of the economic and employment opportunities, but also enticed by pleasant climates, the promise of owning a newer detached single family home, and the appeal of a “rural” suburban flavor that these new communities still offered. Over time, the concentration of other businesses and an educated, largely union-free workforce attracted still more businesses to the area along with additional waves of migrants from other parts of the country.

As San Jose entered the 1950s, all the pieces were in place for San Jose and Santa Clara County to achieve the rapid growth and development envisioned by the Progress Committee. The city now had an energized and aggressive pro-growth business elite in the majority on the city council, it had a city manager who was an enthusiastic booster and charming salesperson, and a local paper dedicated to cheerleading rapid growth. Moreover, the northern California city was in the right place at the right time to take advantage of massive postwar federal investment and the interrelated demographic shifts that were underwriting the Sunbelt migration. As the combined result of all these factors, the pace of growth for San Jose and Santa Clara County over the next decades was stunning.

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196 For more on the conundrum faced by postwar suburbanites who lamented the destruction of nearby rural open space by newer housing subdivisions, see: Rome, *The Bulldozer in the Countryside*. 
San Jose’s Explosive Growth and Hamann’s “Panzer Division”

Making San Jose follow Los Angeles’s lead toward rapid expansion and development required extensive public and private cooperation. In addition to his power as the top administrator in San Jose, a pro-growth majority on the city council and the enthusiastic backing of the largest local paper, city manager Hamann drew on the support and political financing of a cohort of businessmen and real estate developers. Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, Hamann and city council members met frequently with a clique of developers, contractors, investors and others interested in promoting growth. Participants at these informal and secretive meetings, dubbed the “Book of the Month Club,” campaigned behind the scenes to convince local voters to approve multimillion-dollar bond measures to fund various projects to expand roads, sewers, and other infrastructure. Attendees also discussed current and future development projects and the areas best suited for municipal expansion. The meetings were an important venue for business and development interests to learn about and steer the city’s development plans. For attendees involved in the construction and real estate industries, the benefits of participating in these meetings and supporting growth were obvious, but other merchants and business owners participated because growth simply meant more customers. Newspaper publisher Joseph Ridder, a key player at the “Book of the Month Club” meetings, summarized the motivation of business participants with his quip that he supported growth because “prune trees don't buy newspapers” – a sarcastic truism
underscored by the expanding circulation and handsome profits of his papers. \textsuperscript{197} Personal motives also applied to city officials. Hamann and several city councilors and officials had no compunctions regarding participating in these secretive meetings. They also ignored any conflicts of interest involved with making personal investments in real estate or development projects while in office. \textsuperscript{198} In short, for all those in the public and private sectors pushing San Jose toward growth, ideology dovetailed inseparably with self-interest to create what was effectively a growth-oriented political machine.

As the emerging high-technology economy brought new residents into Santa Clara County during the decades after World War II, San Jose’s growth machine leadership was more than happy to accelerate development to accommodate the newcomers and attract more after them. Hamann and the city council eagerly approved virtually every housing development presented to them with few questions asked. Meanwhile, since developers often preferred the higher profit margins available for new construction outside the municipal core, the city’s leaders also happily extended the boundaries of San Jose to claim newly constructed suburban tracts, shopping centers, and

\textsuperscript{197} "Ex-Publisher Joseph Ridder Dies; Paul Rogers, "Mercury, Valley Grow Together," ibid., June 20 2001.

\textsuperscript{198} In his 1971 investigation into the causes behind sprawl in San Jose, \textit{Washington Post} reporter Leonard Downie found that “[w]ith few exceptions, the local officials were also speculators and developers, or had other vested interests in rapid uncontrolled development of the valley, or simply did not want to take the trouble to make a stand against powerful development interests.” He also cited a Stanford University study that found four of the five members of the San Jose planning commission “were deeply involved financially in the untrammeled county growth” during the 1950s and 1960s). Downie concluded that, “[c]ountless other officials were buying and selling land for speculation. Among those admitting it were an influential Santa Clara County supervisor who was outspoken in his opposition to any government control of county growth, and … city manager … Hamann.” See: Leonard Downie, “The Santa Clara Valley’s ‘Appointment with Destiny,’” Alicia Patterson Fund, http://aliciapatterson.org/stories/santa-clara-valley%E2%80%99%E2%80%9Cappointment-%E2%80%9D. For an example of the controversy surrounding the involvement of Hamann and other city officials with real estate transactions, see: "Councilwoman Objects to Three Appointments," \textit{San Jose News}, October 8 1968. (Virginia Shaffer objects to appointment of official based on conflict of interest). For more on the “Book of the Month Club,” see: Trounstine and Christensen, \textit{Movers and Shakers}; "Ex-Publisher Joseph Ridder Dies."
office space. The city’s population and territory both grew at a breathtaking pace as a result. In 1950, San Jose had a population of 95,280 and its territory was concentrated within just 17 square miles. Much of the surrounding Santa Clara County was unincorporated rural land under agricultural use. Ten years later, the population of San Jose more than doubled to 204,196 and the city’s territory expanded to 64 square miles. By 1970, the city’s population doubled again to 445,779 and its boundaries now extended over 149 miles. Between 1970 and 1975, US census figures indicated that San Jose was the fastest growing city in the country and its population was on pace to surpass established cities like San Francisco and Boston in the next couple of decades, which it easily did. However, the territory of San Jose was already almost three times bigger than these cities. San Jose, also unlike these urban centers, was a primarily suburban city predominated by residential dwellings (3/4 of which were single-family homes), automobiles, and shopping centers. ¹⁹⁹

Table 3-2. Population of San Jose and Santa Clara County, 1940-1980

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<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td>68,457</td>
<td>95,280</td>
<td>204,196</td>
<td>445,779</td>
<td>629,442</td>
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<tr>
<td>Santa Clara County</td>
<td>174,949</td>
<td>290,547</td>
<td>642,315</td>
<td>1,064,714</td>
<td>1,295,071</td>
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The almost nine fold territorial explosion of San Jose to 149 square miles in just 20 years was the result of aggressive annexation policies driven by Hamann and the city’s pro-growth majority. During the hundred years prior to Hamann’s tenure, the city performed 42 annexations. Between 1950 and 1960, Hamann and the city council carried out 491 annexations. More than 900 annexations followed in the 1960s. The growth rate fueled by the annexation drive, nicknamed “Hamann’s Panzer Division” in honor of its aggressiveness and rapidity, was so fast that city officials updated local maps on a monthly basis. Hamann believed that San Jose needed to expand to incorporate the best land into the city. Annexing land into the municipal boundaries of San Jose brought

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200 Rogers, "The Man Behind S.J.'S Rapid Growth Former City Manager Set Stage for Valley's Boom - and Sprawl."
201 These figures come from Trounstine and Christensen, Movers and Shakers. Other sources claim that there were 1,377 while Hamann was in office, a figure that seems to come from McKay, "Dutch Hamann - Part Two".
in new sales and property tax revenue – critical at a time when most of the city’s budget came from these taxes and when voters were reluctant to approve bond measures.

Hamann and his allies also saw the annexations as a matter of cutthroat survival: San Jose had to grab the best land or risk being hemmed in by other smaller cities that would stifle the city’s future growth and tax base in the same way that suburban development had choked off the tax base of older urban centers. Hamann wanted San Jose to avoid what had happened in Orange County where several small and medium cities vied with their neighbors. He instead wanted San Jose to grow to become the dominant city of Santa Clara County. Hamann and his growth allies thus used snake-like strip annexations to encircle large swatches of desirable unincorporated territory to gain access to roads and freeways with the expectation that the lands in-between would eventually become part of San Jose. In other cases, expanding the city’s boundaries was part of a broader strategic vision. For instance, Hamann and city leaders envisioned a port for San Jose and sought to incorporate land with access to the San Francisco Bay.

San Jose’s expansion was not the passive result of landowners approaching the city for incorporation as had often been the case in the past, instead it was a program pushed by the growth machine. Since annexations required a majority vote from affected residents, Hamann and city officials tried to induce landowners with a variety of appealing offers and, in some cases, allegedly with coercion and swindling. The grasping

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203 Trounstine and Christensen, Movers and Shakers; Grant, “Annexation Wars Not New to San Jose; Paul Rogers, “The Man Behind S.J.’S Rapid Growth Former City Manager Set Stage for Valley’s Boom - and Sprawl,” ibid., December 30 1999; Downie, ”The Santa Clara Valley’s ‘Appointment with Destiny”.
reach of San Jose to acquire new territory thus drew resistance. For example, the city of Santa Clara waged several annexation battles with San Jose while residents in the small communities of Saratoga, Campbell, Monte Sereno, Milpitas, Alviso and Cupertino incorporated as cities during the 1950s in part to defend against “Hamann’s panzer division.”

Speculation and the erosion of the orchard economy fueled the spread of suburban development and accelerated the annexations of San Jose and other cities. Building suburbia in the Valley of Hearts Delight was tremendously profitable for developers and investors. The flat valley and its orchards made it relatively easy and inexpensive for developers to clear and level building sites, while the mild climate allowed for cheaper and quicker construction methods and materials. Builders substituted low cost concrete slabs in place of basements and used more cost-effective alternatives to the heavy roofs, thick insulation, and other weather-resistant amenities required in areas with inclement weather. Some developers cut costs further by using flat roofs covered with inexpensive tar or gravel. To the delight of developers, homes in San Jose and Santa Clara County sold fast and there was steady demand for more, which meant that builders and speculators were eager to buy property from local orchardists and landowners.

While times were good for homebuilders and other growth interests, orchardists and rural landowners in Santa Clara County meanwhile faced financial hard times. Competition with growers in California’s central valley and other agricultural regions was cutting into the profit margins of the area’s orchardists. Simultaneously, costs were

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205 Downie, "The Santa Clara Valley’s 'Appointment with Destiny'".
rising as growers combated a hard to eradicate tree fungus and others faced the need to replace unproductive older groves. Making matters worse, the cash strapped and increasingly indebted landowners struggled with higher property taxes as suburban and commercial development projects crept closer and pushed up their property assessments. It is not surprising that some orchardists saw more financial sense in selling their lands for subdivisions rather than harvesting them; and with each such sale, the pressure on recalcitrant landowners to sell increased. For developers and investors, the orchardists’ financial predicament and high demand for suburban housing made for windfall profits:

[L]and once worth $500 an acre as farmland soon was selling at $3,000 to $5,000 or more to speculators, who sold it for up to $10,000 and more per acre to developers who, in turn, parcelled it out in lots to homebuyers at the rate of at least $15,000 to $20,000 per acre. “It was not unusual,” [former Santa Clara County planner Karl] Belser remembered, “for land to double in price while changing hands in a single day. Everybody wound up speculating in land.”

Market forces thus provided the push to Hamann’s annexation pull. The orchard economy had become less viable just as a high-technology, post-industrial economy was expanding in the region. To house the influx of new professionals and workers, developers were building as fast as they could. The profits from suburban expansion motivated more speculation, thereby driving up land costs and taxes and further pinching rural landowners. Growth in Santa Clara became self-perpetuating as more landowners cashed out.

206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
The paving over of the former Valley of Heart’s Delight during the 1950s drew resistance from those who wanted to preserve some of the region’s rural character and agricultural past. Ranchers, orchardists, landowners, and others mobilized at the county level to create “greenbelt” areas as buffers around urban development and to protect themselves from rising property tax assessments based on property values pushed up by nearby development. Growth advocates in San Jose, Sunnyvale and other cities sometimes found their expansionist aspirations blocked by county supervisors and planners who sided with petitioning landowners to designate tracts of land as exclusive agricultural zones. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, landowners in areas targeted for annexation and development by local cities made appeals for “emergency” greenbelt zoning by claiming that they used their property for agricultural purposes. In tense county hearings, county and city planners often clashed heatedly. These bitter battles to use county zoning to block city annexations in certain areas slowed the relentless march of suburban developments, strip malls, and roadways, but it did little to promote planned and sustainable growth. Meanwhile, Hamann’s “panzer division,” developers and speculators simply rolled around pockets of resistance in a race to claim the best parcels of land in the valley.

One of the biggest obstacles to San Jose’s expansion came from school districts in the neighborhoods that the city wanted to absorb. Local administrators and communities were reluctant to surrender control of schools and be absorbed into San Jose’s larger school district. To overcome these objections, growth interests in the city prevailed upon

208 Greenbelt zoning is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
San Jose’s state representative to secure the passage of a law in 1954 that ended the requirement that school district boundaries match municipal boundaries. After the measure passed, Hamann and the city council were free to negotiate compromises whereby local interests won the promise that they could maintain separate school systems even if they agreed to annexation by San Jose. The pace of annexations increased with the removal of the school issue as a hurdle. Children in San Jose soon attended schools in a hodge-podge of twenty-four independent school districts of various sizes, many of which were in formerly rural areas that did not have a large enough tax base to support the influx of new students. As San Jose continued to grow rapidly, many local schools became overcrowded and short funded – especially in neighborhoods where poor or minority families were concentrated. These problems and inequalities related to San Jose’s patchwork of school boundaries created an educational system riven by de facto segregation.

San Jose’s city manager and council, heedless of any growing pains, gave developers the red carpet and virtually no thought to planning. City officials did not draft an urban plan until the state made it a requirement for funding in the 1960s, but it was a minimalist document that was often ignored. In lieu of planning, Hamann and his allies focused on luring developers to San Jose with higher profit margins by allowing

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209 Representative Bruce Allen secured passage of AB-1, a measure that changed the previous requirement that school boundaries be contiguous with city borders. For more detail, see: Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream, 98.

210 Ibid., 97-100.

construction on marginal lands and under terms more favorable than neighboring cities. Floodplains, hillsides, fault lines and wetlands were all fair game. City officials allowed smaller minimum lot sizes and were willing to approve projects far away from existing infrastructure and service boundaries. San Jose also had lax construction requirements, rezoning policies very favorable to developers, and generally asked few tough questions about projects. Developers building on marginal land on the periphery not only enjoyed handsome profits, but the rural surroundings enabled them to market the subdivisions as having country charm. San Jose’s growth advocates ignored the fact that the city and taxpayers would eventually have to pay for extending roads, sewers, power lines and other services farther and farther out.\textsuperscript{212}

Financing growth at the pace experienced by San Jose was a challenge. Like other Sunbelt suburbs, some of this growth was subsidized by state and federal funds which helped to pay for roads, freeways, and other infrastructure. Local officials also aggressively used general obligations bonds to finance the capital improvements that would lure developers and encourage landowners to annex to the city. To get the money, San Jose’s pro-growth leadership had to find investors and then convince local voters, historically averse to supporting additional debt spending, to approve the new bond measures. Hamann and his colleagues were effective salespeople, however, armed with the belief that growth was a good unto itself. Finding the money proved easy since, as Hamann bragged, east coast investors were readily convinced to invest in California. Meanwhile, Hamann benefited from the endorsement of new bond measures by the \textit{San}

Jose Mercury and the development interests in the “Book of the Month Club” could also be counted on to raise campaign money to support the cause as well. With voter turnout as low as 15% during some elections, the Mercury’s endorsement and political advertising went a long way. Hamann and his allies managed to obtain $134 million in new general obligation bonds over the course of the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{213} When new money came in, officials invariably channeled it to areas where developers were building or wanted to build. For example, when voters approved a bond measure to improve downtown streets, Hamann and the city council diverted the funds to expand sewer service on the city’s outskirts to entice IBM to build a new plant.\textsuperscript{214} Hamann and his allies were in effect borrowing to fund capital improvements to subsidize and encourage growth and bring profits for developers – and doing so with municipal debt ultimately paid for by San Jose’s taxpayers, but not benefiting them. Because of these policies, San Jose soon carried a notoriously high debt-to-asset-ratio. The city’s bond debt mushroomed at a rate twice as fast as other California cities, with bond indebtedness doubling between 1950 and 1970.\textsuperscript{215} The debt growth accelerated most rapidly over the course of the 1960s. In the 1964-1965 fiscal year, San Jose had revenues of approximately $32.4 million, expenses of $35.8 million and general debt of $67.4 million. By 1970, revenues and expenditures totaled $63.3 million and $69.5 million respectively – while general debt reached $105 million.\textsuperscript{216} Other cities and the county

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{213} Trounstine and Christensen, \textit{Movers and Shakers}.
\item \textsuperscript{214} Scott Herhold, "S.J. Moves to Correct Hamann Legacy," \textit{San Jose Mercury News}, April 13 1987.
\item \textsuperscript{215} "Envision San José 2040 - General Plan", 33-34., 33.
\item \textsuperscript{216} US Census Bureau data, cited in: Deutsch, "Land Use Growth Controls: A Case Study of San Jose and Livermore, California."
\end{itemize}
were likewise resorting to similar bond measures to keep pace, albeit not quite with the recklessness of Hamann’s administration.  

This shortsighted focus on growth without adequate planning produced dramatic changes in the region’s geographic and economic development. Santa Clara County transitioned from a valley of orchards into a sprawling tangle of suburban developments, strip malls and business parks crisscrossed by freeways, expressways, and busy streets. In a pattern similar to other towns and cities across the country, San Jose’s downtown, which has once been the commercial center for the city and surrounding rural hinterland, stagnated as retail sales moved to the surrounding suburbs, often outside the city’s limits. When the extensive suburban Valley Fair Mall opened in the neighboring city of Santa Clara in 1956, Sears and other major retailers had already abandoned the downtown, leaving the locally owned Hart’s as the last remaining major department store in the city’s center. The Hart family had local business ties dating back to 1866, and the store’s owner, Alex J. Hart, initially refused to abandon the downtown despite a precipitous decline in customers and sales. The next year, however, Hart opened the first of three satellite stores in suburban shopping centers. By the end of 1950s, San Jose’s

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217 As Downie explains, “[t]he cost of borrowing money to bury sewers, pave streets, build schools and provide police, fire and other services so rapidly for so many people spread out over so large an area has put the county and several of its cities deeply into debt and left their new residents facing steeply increasing tax bills.” See: Downie, “The Santa Clara Valley’s ‘Appointment with Destiny’”.

218 Opened in 1902 and with roots dating back to 1866, Hart’s was a fixture in downtown San Jose. Loyal to the urban center, the store declined to leave the city’s center to join Macy’s as an anchor store at Valley Fair mall in 1956. Soon that mall – shortly joined by other large-scale suburban shopping centers developments – took all the business from the downtown. Belatedly, Hart tried to remain competitive, expanding in 1957 to open stores in suburban areas of Sunnyvale, Mountain View (Mayfield Mall), and San Jose (Westgate Mall), before selling the stores in 1976. For more detail, see: Herhold, "S.J. Moves to Correct Hamann Legacy; Leigh Weimers, "At 96, Harry Miller's Occupation Fits Him Like One of His Suits," ibid., March 9 1997; Mary Gottschalk and Sue McAllister, "Hart Led Iconic Department Store,"
downtown lost two other important civic institutions when the *The San Jose Mercury News* relocated to a suburban office park and city lawmakers voted to move the city hall out of the downtown area and into a suburban block of lushly landscaped low-rise office buildings outside of the city’s former center. Perhaps most symbolic of the downtown’s decline, the city also demolished its classically styled old city hall built in 1887 as part of San Jose’s past effort to regain the state capital. By the 1960s, critics decried San Jose’s once bustling downtown for the blight of its shuttered buildings and abandoned lots. Not only was San Jose now a city without a cultural and civic center, the decline of its downtown meant lost city revenues from retail sales and business taxes.\(^ {219}\)

**Conclusion**

The Progress Committee and their professional middle-class constituents mobilized to break apart the small town political machine that served the narrow interests of political boss Bigley and his allies. The group captured the city council in a landslide election in 1944 with a vision of transforming San Jose into an industrial city along the lines of Los Angeles. The leadership of the second wave of reformers nudged aside the fiscally conservative city manager Charles Goodwin and the orchard operators and fruit processors that supported him, setting the city on a path toward industrial growth and suburban expansion. The Progress Committee’s victory heralded another transition in the

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region’s political economy. The first wave of reformers during the Progressive Era represented the emerging fruit economy asserting itself politically against a declining Gold Rush economic hierarchy. Now, as the postwar period marked the decline of the fruit economy in Santa Clara County, the Progress Committee similarly represented a new middle and professional class oriented towards growth and industry rather than agriculture. Over the course of less than a hundred years, the political economy of San Jose and Santa Clara County changed dramatically for the third time. Starting with ranching and subsistence farming in the Mexican period, transitioning to wheat farming and extractive industries in the Gold Rush era, becoming an orchard and fruit economy in the late 19th century and Progressive Era, San Jose was now shifting to a postwar economic order centered upon suburban growth and industry.

The Progress Committee soon faded from view after their election victories in 1944 and 1946, but not before installing a standard-bearer in city hall when Anthony ("Dutch") Hamann became city manager in 1950. Operating as growth-oriented political machine, city manager Hamann and his allies oversaw two decades of poorly planned expansion while giving little attention to a host of municipal problems. Growth interests in San Jose thus created the perfect storm that would ultimately sweep them from power. Their policies promoted headlong the growth that brought tens of thousands of new residents, but also produced a range of intractable municipal problems. Many of the new residents who had been attracted by the opportunities created by San Jose and Santa Clara County’s growth quickly found their aspirations for a good life hampered by the unaddressed side effects of that same growth even as they were stuck with the tax bill that subsidized the profits of the developers. The mismatch between desired quality of life and
resentment over the tax burden that benefitted developers over residents created a discontentment that provoked a third wave of middle class reformers in San Jose, this time mobilizing as part of a suburban liberal movement in the 1960s and 1970s. This third group in turn marked a fourth shift in the political economy as emerging high-technology businesses interests and an associated enlarged middle and professional class demanded control of local politics.

A better understanding of the first two waves of reform in San Jose and Santa Clara County offers insight into the success of suburban liberalism in subsequent decades, as well as a partial explanation for why the region did not take the conservative turn of other suburban regions. San Jose and Santa County strongly supported Progressive Republican candidates and reform causes in the first two decades of the 20th Century. Local Progressive Republicans were flexible about working with corporate interests, including trade unions. The lingering moderate Progressivism of the local Republican Party may thus account for Santa Clara County persisting during the New Deal and postwar periods with a relatively high Republican registration and voting patterns at a time when California overall was dramatically shifting towards majority Democratic registration\textsuperscript{220} and with statewide voters giving more election victories to

\textsuperscript{220} California remained a Republican majority state until the 1932 election cycle. By 1934, the state shifted to a majority Democratic Party registered state. Throughout the rest of the 1930s and 1940s, Democrats accounted for more than 60% of registered voters. Although this advantage narrowed in the 1950s slightly, Republicans were never a majority-registered party again, fluctuating from approximately 37% to 42% of registered voters. By 1959, Democrats were closing in on 60% once again. Between 1928 and 1936, there was a statewide increase of 1.1 million registered Democrats, a 40% increase only partially explained by the state’s 15% population growth during the same period. While the Democrats did benefit from several hundred thousand former Republicans switching registration, the majority of the party’s gains came from new voters joining the rolls. For more extensive statistical detail and analysis, see: Lee, \textit{California Votes, 1928-1960, with 1962 Supplement}, 29 and 37-39.
Democratic candidates than ever before. Although Santa Clara County followed the rest of the state to become majority Democratic registered between 1936 and 1960, the margin was narrow and the county had comparably higher Republican registration. In the twenty-five “contested” elections for president, governor, and United States senator between 1928 and 1960, Santa Clara County supported Republicans more often (19 times) than the rest of California (14 times). Conversely, given the above average Republican registration of the county, voting tallies during this time reveal that more registered Republicans in Santa Clara County were willing to buck party affiliation and vote for Democratic candidates. These trends suggest three important characteristics of San Jose and Santa Clara County’s political culture. First, Progressivism remained strong in the local Republican Party. Second, moderates prevailed in the region’s politics. Santa Clara County...
Clara County was more moderate in its shift toward Democratic registration majorities than other parts of California, becoming slightly more Democratic during the period while avoiding the drastic swings of heavily Democratic San Francisco County or heavily Republican Orange County. Third, the first two characteristics combined with nonpartisan municipal elections to promote bipartisanship at the city and county level. As the Progress Committee and subsequent growth coalition demonstrated, the region’s political culture made room for Republicans and Democrats to work together. There was a moderate consensus around the politics of growth led by New Deal liberal Democrats cooperating with moderate Republicans at the national level during the postwar period. In the Santa Clara County context, Republicans emerging out of the Progressive tradition enjoyed a slight majority in local office, but the region otherwise adhered to the same growth politics dynamic. When the Republican Party adopted the populism, anti-statism, and social conservatism of the New Right in the 1970s, suburban liberals in San Jose became the inheritors of the area’s Progressive tradition. Unlike Orange County and other conservative suburban regions, San Jose’s suburban liberals renegotiated the previous bipartisan growth consensus, wielding state power to promote better quality of life and protect the environment while also embracing a socially liberal outlook that made room for minorities and labor.
Chapter 4
The Making of Silicon Valley

How did the “Valley of Heart’s Delight” become “Silicon Valley”? Right up until the middle of the 20th century, there was little obvious about San Jose or Santa Clara County that suggested the region’s future as the center of a high technology economy of global reach and importance. Explaining the rise of Silicon Valley has captivated the attention of numerous scholars and pundits who offer a wide range of interrelated causal factors, including early electronics innovations related to radio and television, federal and military spending, the role of Stanford University, and the advantaged position of Santa Clara County’s as a suburban Sunbelt region. Other commonly cited contributions to Silicon Valley’s success – innovation in venture capital, flexible labor markets, “networks” and “clusters” of individuals and firms, and a critical mass of the “creative classes” – arose out of these four primary factors. However, all of these common explanations for the success of Silicon Valley overlook the critical role of the region’s political economy and its history of progressive politics led by middle-class and business interests.

The development of Silicon Valley is indebted to the political culture of Santa Clara County, with its legacy of middle-class driven grassroots reform finding common cause with business and working class groups. The rapid postwar development of the region, fostered by a second wave of reformers, enabled Silicon Valley to grow and achieve critical mass in the two and a half-decades after World War II, just as the electronics industry in Santa Clara County was attracting tens of thousands of new workers. It is hard to imagine Santa Clara County’s high-technology economy achieving the momentum that it did between 1945 and 1965 without the rapid development policies championed by the second wave of reformers. A lack of planning, however, brought a host of problems that, by the late 1960s and 1970s, had the potential to undermine the future economic growth of Silicon Valley.

A third group of reformers made growth in Santa Clara County more sustainable from the 1970s onward, enabling Silicon Valley to continue its economic expansion. This group represented an enlarged middle and professional class who worked in concert with high-technology industry leaders. Suburban liberal reformers challenged the growth interests to capture municipal government and implemented policies to slow and manage growth while improving quality of life. These measures enabled the region to continue attracting and retaining high-technology industry and workers.

A longer view of Silicon Valley reveals that the region was indebted to a legacy of grassroots progressive political reform comprised of three waves. The first wave established the political blueprint for growth favorable to professional and middle-class residents in the Progressive Era. The second wave exploited that foundation in the postwar decades to pursue explosive growth. Finally, the third wave revised the terms of
growth in the 1970s to make it more sustainable. These three sequential grassroots progressive reform movements played an unheralded, yet critically important, role in the making of the political economy of Silicon Valley.

The Early Roots of Silicon Valley

Many of the scholars and experts detailing the rise of Silicon Valley focus on factors and events from World War II onward, thus bringing to the foreground a few dozen individuals and institutions as well as various key technology and business innovations. Accounts of Silicon Valley therefore often highlight postwar Stanford University and its industrial park as well as men like Frederick Terman, David Packard, William Shockley, Robert Noyce, Steve Jobs, and a handful of early entrepreneurs and venture capital investors. However, these typical origin stories of Silicon Valley begin the analysis of the region in medias res, overlooking other key factors that helped to transform the sleepy and nondescript mid-sized orchard and fruit-processing town of San Jose and the surrounding Santa Clara County into a key high-technology site in the global economy.

Origins in the Gold Rush and Orchard Era

Scholars attribute part of Silicon Valley’s success to its post-1945 entrepreneurial culture and innovations with venture capital as well as abundant federal Cold War spending, but the financial, institutional, and entrepreneurial factors frequently cited as
part of the Silicon Valley model have deep roots in the region. The Gold Rush created windfall wealth for the entire San Francisco Bay Area and it fostered and accelerated economic development and urbanization. The pursuit of gold brought a flood of people and investment, and the region industrialized quickly, leaping past the earlier stages of development experienced by many other parts of the country. Large-scale landowners and corporate entities predominated almost from the very beginning and San Jose and a handful of other major towns in Northern California attracted an influx of middle-class and professional migrants. Banks and investors from the east and elsewhere joined local institutions that sprung up in pursuit of high returns in gold, real estate, farming, ranching, and related industries. The federal government subsidized the region’s growth through massive infrastructure spending and other policies that encouraged expansion. All of this economic activity created powerful incentives for innovations, and individual inventors and companies developed machinery and techniques for mining, farming and other industries. Thus, the region has had almost a century long economic foundation of capital, corporations, speculation, entrepreneurs, inventers, and skilled and professional workers long before the defense and nascent computer industry started to grow in the valley. The precursor to all later “angel investors” was the land itself and the gold that could be dug up from it or crops and fruit gown bountifully on it. Similarly, the entrepreneurial drive cited as a factor driving technological innovation and venture capital investment in Silicon Valley echoed the “get rich quick” drive of the region’s earliest land speculators and Gold Rush and agricultural entrepreneurs. Finally, the
generosity of the federal government did not begin with World War II or the Cold War, but was instead a critical subsidy to the region from the very beginning.226

The Gold Rush profits of the 19th century, and the economic activity that they engendered, also underwrote the higher education system that became important to the future Silicon Valley. Leland Stanford amassed a fortune and significant landholdings first as a merchant selling to gold miners and then as one of the primary stakeholders in the Southern Pacific Railroad. Upon the death of his son, Stanford sought to honor his memory by establishing Stanford University in 1891 as a non-denominational, coeducational, and professionally oriented institution.227 Stanford University was pivotal to the development of the region’s high-technology economy, but other institutions including San Jose State, Santa Clara University, and the nearby University of California at Berkeley also had a role in the future success of Silicon Valley.228 Gold Rush growth and investment subsidized and justified these institutions of learning and science, established in just a few decades after American settlers arrived.229 Most accounts of the

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226 Many of the factors highlighted in this section are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. For a general discussion of the critical role played by the federal government in the success of California and the rest of the west, see: Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest.


228 Each of these universities provided important sources of research and an educated workforce from the mid-19th century onward, and although overshadowed by Stanford, each was part of the education and research ecosystem that fostered the high-technology economy of the Bay Area. For a brief overview of their history, see Chapter 2. For more on the role of Stanford as well as UC Berkeley, San Jose State, and Santa Clara University, see Saxenian, Regional Advantage; O'Mara, Cities of Knowledge.

229 Another example of the technology and scientific development fostered by Gold Rush wealth was the Lick Observatory. Shortly before his death in 1876, Gold Rush millionaire James Lick of San Francisco left funds to establish an observatory managed by the recently established University of California. After considering several sites in California, the project’s planners selected the top of Mount Hamilton in Santa Clara County, 4,250 feet above sea level, as the ideal location for the construction of the Lick Observatory. In order to secure the observatory, Santa Clara County official agreed to build a quality road running 26
success of Silicon Valley point to the role of Stanford, UC Berkeley, and other regional universities, but it is important to remember that these educational facilities were an early asset to the region, developing and growing along with the area and producing skilled workers and professionals.

Although most accounts of the origin of Silicon Valley focus on technological innovation in the postwar period, the region has a long and interconnected history of entrepreneurship and innovation. One of Santa Clara County’s important industrial employers in the first half of the 20th century, Joshua Hendy Iron Works, originated with innovations in mill and mining equipment in the second half of the 19th century. Similarly, when Santa Clara County transitioned to an orchard economy, numerous local entrepreneurs supplied innovative machinery for growers and fruit processors. For example, the Bean Spray Pump Company, which later became Food Machinery Corporation, began with a patent for a high-pressure, continuous flow pesticide pump developed to help the valley’s growers battle a tenacious pest in the 1880s, while other companies like Anderson Barngrover Company developed and sold sophisticated fruit-
processing machinery.\textsuperscript{231} These early companies and the skilled pools of machinists, machine operators, and technicians that they attracted to the area were important sources of expertise in the coming decades when vacuum tubes and transistors – technologies that required precision machinery and artisanship – became the heart of the region’s nascent electronics industry.

**Innovation with Radio and Television in the San Francisco Bay Area**

Mining and agricultural innovations established a general technological foundation in the region, but radio and television technologies were a more direct predecessor to the later high-technology economy.\textsuperscript{232} Italian inventor Guglielmo Marconi transmitted the first radiotelegraph signals in 1895, but technical hurdles remained before radio technology could be viable outside of the laboratory. The San Francisco Bay Area was home to several milestones in the practical and commercial advancement of radio technology. Inventor Charles Herrold, a Stanford graduate and operator of Herrold's College of Wireless and Engineering in San Jose, launched the first commercial radio station in 1909.\textsuperscript{233} Also in 1909, recent Stanford graduate Cyril Elwell founded the

\textsuperscript{231} "Agriculture's Erosion: W.W.Ii Began a Shift to Industry; Joanne Grant, "How Fmc Corp. Blossomed: From an Almond Orchard Inventor's Pump Was Corporate Seed," ibid., August 30 1993.

\textsuperscript{232} Citing early radio and vacuum tube innovation, Timothy J. Sturgen argued that Silicon Valley was more than 100 years in the making and that this long legacy of innovation provided a deep foundation that would be difficult for other regions to emulate. See: Timothy J. Sturgen, "How Silicon Valley Came to Be," in *Understanding Silicon Valley: The Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region*, ed. Martin Kenney (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000).

\textsuperscript{233} Charles Herrold, a graduate of Stanford who ran a college in San Jose specializing in radio technologies, broadcast his first voice transmissions in 1909, and began regularly scheduled broadcasts of music and entertainment in 1912. Herrold originally called his station "San Jose Calling." It later became KQW and then KCBS in San Francisco. For more on Herrold, see: Joanne Grant, "Recognition Sought for S.J. Radio Pioneer," *San Jose Mercury News*, March 30 1992; Mike Cassidy, "Let's Celebrate the Centennial of
Federal Telegraph Company in Palo Alto with the encouragement and financial backing of David Starr Jordan (Stanford University’s first president), banker William Crocker, various Stanford faculty, and others.\(^{234}\) Elwell and Federal Telegraph Corporation designed the first basic global-scale radio communications system using a Poulsen arc transmitter in 1912.\(^{235}\) In 1907, Lee De Forest, also a graduate of Stanford and an employee of Federal Telegraph, invented and worked to perfect vacuum tube technology as a superior method of transmitting and amplifying radio waves for voice, transforming Marconi’s wireless telegraph into modern radio. Federal Telegraph used De Forest’s vacuum tube innovations to provide the US Navy with the first effective worldwide radio communications system.\(^{236}\) The invention and application of the vacuum tube jumpstarted radio and other early electronics innovation and was only superseded by the invention of transistor technology after World War II.

Several technology-related firms started in the Bay Area after World War I, but Federal Telegraph remained a major manufacturer of vacuum tubes as well as one of the most important innovators in the region’s electronics industry through the 1930s. Besides Elwell and De Forest, the company’s Palo Alto labs had other famous employees that would go on to further accomplishments, including Leonard Fuller (the first recipient of a doctorate in electrical engineering from Stanford), Charles Litton, and a young Frederick


\(^{235}\) Sturgen, "How Silicon Valley Came to Be."

\(^{236}\) Matthews, *Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream*, 113.
Terman who served as a summer intern. The company’s early cooperation with Stanford’s High Voltage Laboratory anticipated the close cooperation between the university and technology firms that many credit with the future success of Silicon Valley.\textsuperscript{237} Federal Telegraph spawned several spinoff firms, including Magnavox, Jensen, and, important to the future development of the region, Litton Industries.\textsuperscript{238} Shortly after graduating from Stanford, Charles Litton joined Federal Telegraph in 1927 to manage the company’s vacuum tube manufacturing department. When Federal Telegraph moved to New Jersey in 1932, Litton elected to stay in the Bay Area and found Litton Engineering Laboratories. Litton’s firm designed and sold vacuum tube manufacturing equipment that was widely used by all the major tube makers, including GE, Westinghouse, and RCA. In 1936, at the request of Frederick Terman, Litton helped Stanford to establish a lab for tube research. One of the students who made use of that lab was David Packard, the future co-founder of Hewlett-Packard. During World War II, Litton cooperated with Raytheon to develop a microwave-generating electron tube called the magnetron that significantly enhanced the range and effectiveness of radar systems.\textsuperscript{239} After the war, the company and its subsidiaries expanded with defense contracts and diversified into other

\textsuperscript{237} De Forest patented his Audion vacuum tube in 1906 as a “detector of sound.” The next year, he invented an arc-based radiotelephone transmitter and Audion receiver. Over the course of the next decade, he worked to improve the effectiveness of the Audion for the detection, application and transmission of radio. Between 1920 and 1930, he invented and refined a means of recording and playing back a sound track on a strip of file, leading to the “talking” motion picture. See Sturgen, "How Silicon Valley Came to Be: "Decades of De Forest," LeeDeForest.org, http://www.leedeforest.org/home.html; Mike Adams, \textit{Lee De Forest: King of Radio, Television, and Film} (New York, NY: Copernicus Books,, 2012).

\textsuperscript{238} Edwin Pridham and Peter L. Jensen, former employees of Federal Telegraph, founded Magnavox in 1917 to market their new invention, the loudspeaker. Jensen later went on to found his own company. For more information see: "Federal Telegraph, Magnavox and the Invention of the Tv [Video Excerpt]"; "History of Jensen - Peter L. Jensen," Jensen.com, http://www.jensenton.com/history_jensen.

electronics sectors, remaining a major player and source of employment in the future Silicon Valley for several decades.\textsuperscript{240} The close links with Stanford faculty and alumni as well as the “angel investment” of Jordon, Crocker and the others arguably make Federal Telegraph the first technology startup turned technology-giant in Silicon Valley.\textsuperscript{241} In a pattern similar to future electronics firms in the area, the company played a seminal role in the development of the region’s electronics industry by developing technology and providing skills and experience to individuals who would either found their own spinoff firms or be involved with other key inventions.

The San Francisco Bay Area region was also the site of the first major breakthroughs in television technology. Self-taught inventive prodigy Philo Farnsworth from Utah developed an early system for electronic television in 1924, but lacked the funds to take the idea further. San Francisco banker William Crocker, whose family had made a fortune during the Gold Rush as merchants and then as one of the big four investors in the Southern Pacific Railroad, agreed to finance Farnsworth’s project. Farnsworth relocated to a laboratory in San Francisco where he achieved the first electronic transmission of a television image in 1927. In 1931 as the technology became commercially viable, the eastern firm Philco purchased the rights to the project and


relocated the lab work to Philadelphia. However, early television innovation left a local legacy; Russell Varian, the future cofounder of Varian Associates, worked with Farnsworth for four years, and Frederick Terman, Leonard Fuller, and Ralph Heinz also participated in the project.  

Several scholars of Silicon Valley attributed some of the region’s success to a cooperative and open culture where people and ideas flowed between companies, often resulting in spinoff and start-up firms that advanced new technologies and ideas. A precedent existed for this later cooperation in the early decades of the 20th century as Bay Area inventors and entrepreneurs collaborated to solve regional challenges and to resist the dominance of large eastern corporations. Western firms faced several disadvantages compared to eastern firms, including being at greater distance from suppliers and customers and a lack of experienced and skilled local crafts workers and technicians familiar with new technologies like vacuum tubes. Bay Area entrepreneurs and inventors – including pivotal early innovators such as Charles Litton, Ralf Heintz, Jack Kaufman, William Eitel, and Jack McCullough – cooperated to overcome these challenges, made easier by the fact that their firms were not in direct competition. Key players in the Bay Area thus shared expertise and techniques, and even placed large orders together to reduce costs. Individuals who had refined their skills while working at early firms such as Federal Telegraph and Litton Industries started their own firms, thus expanding the pool of suppliers and customers.

242 Sturgen, "How Silicon Valley Came to Be."
243 For example, see: Saxenian, *Regional Advantage*.
244 Sturgen, "How Silicon Valley Came to Be; Lâecuyer, *Making Silicon Valley*, 22-30.
The market dominance of large eastern companies fostered collaboration between Bay Area firms. In 1919, the eastern firms General Electric, American Marconi Company and Westinghouse formed RCA in New York City as a joint technology development corporation and patent pool. The eastern firms sought to use RCA to keep a tight hold on key emerging technologies. RCA held patents on 250 techniques for power tube technology alone. With its iron grip on key technologies, RCA was “aggressive, litigious and monopolizing,” and the company soon “emerged as the dominant force in the industry, ready to sue, buy out, or collect steep license fees from any fledgling electronics company in its path.”

The aggressiveness of RCA encouraged Bay Area firms to work together. When Ralf Heintz and his partner Jack Kaufman worked on a ship-to-shore radio system for a steamship company in 1926, RCA perceived them as competition and refused to sell them the vacuum tubes that the firm monopolized. Heintz, a Stanford graduate and HAM radio enthusiast from Berkeley who was involved with several technology innovations, was able to draw on local connections and expertise. Using expired and non-patented techniques, Heintz and his firm developed an alternative tube technique called the Gammatron Tube, and with the help of Charles Litton, got the new tube into production. For HAM radio applications, the new tube was superior to existing alternatives, and more importantly, over the course of the 1930s it allowed western firms to avoid the RCA monopoly. In 1937, RCA sued to stop Heintz and Kaufman from selling the tubes, claiming that they infringed on the firm’s patents. Heintz asked his friend and former

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245 Making Silicon Valley; Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream, 113-15.
246 Sturgen, "How Silicon Valley Came to Be," 27.
Stanford classmate Frederick Terman to testify in the case as an expert witness. RCA dropped the lawsuit when the company perceived that it might lose in court and jeopardize its other patents. Local HAM radio enthusiasts William Eitel and Jack McCullough, originally hired by Heintz to manage Gammatron production for his firm, soon started their own tube manufacturing company, providing Bay Area companies with another alternative to the RCA monopoly.247

Interesting parallels existed between the early radio and computer enthusiast communities. Scholars have written about the Homebrew Computer Club and the 1970s “counterculture” movement as important elements in the social networking and cultural development of Silicon Valley.248 Five decades before, the Santa Clara County radio club – an informal group of HAM radio enthusiasts – played a similar role in the area. The HAM radio community operated with an egalitarian and democratic culture where Stanford-educated engineers mixed on equal footing with “farm boys” united by shared interests. It was through the local radio club where Litton, Eitel and McCullough first met.249 Thus, the vaunted cooperative spirit of postwar high-technology firms also had early precedents in the region.

During the 1920s, a key figure associated with the continued evolution of electronics in the region returned home. In 1924, Frederick Terman, son of a Stanford professor and an undergraduate alumnus of the university, came back to the area after earning a doctorate in engineering at MIT and studying with Vannevar Bush, the

247 Ibid; Lâécuyer, *Making Silicon Valley*.
developer of an early analog computer. Terman intended his visit to be short, planning to return to MIT to take a teaching position, but a serious illness kept him from returning east. While recuperating, Terman joined Stanford in 1925 as a part-time faculty member and two years later, the university appointed him to a full-time position. In 1937, he became the head of the electrical engineering department. MIT had impressed Terman during his graduate studies with the active role taken by the university and faculty like Bush in working with local industry in the Massachusetts area. Terman wanted Stanford to do the same, and he became committed to encouraging cooperation between the university and the local electronics industry. Often called the “Father of Silicon Valley,” Terman played a large role in the development of the electronics industry in the Bay Area. Starting with his youthful internship at Federal Telegraph, continuing with his connection with the early electronics pioneers Charles Litton, Philo Farnsworth and Ralph Heinz, and with his involvement in the formation of several of Silicon Valley’s iconic electronics firms, Terman was an omnipresent figure almost from the very beginning.

Stanford and Terman figured prominently in the formation of two electronics firms in the 1930s that helped to position Santa Clara County as a technology center in the postwar period. William Hewlett and David Packard were talented young electrical engineering graduates who had been students of Terman at Stanford. While doing graduate work at Stanford, Hewlett designed and built an audio oscillator that was superior to the existing alternatives that were bulky, complex, expensive, unstable, and

250 Carolyn Tajnai, "Fred Terman, the Father of Silicon Valley," Stanford Computer Forum, Stanford University, http://forum.stanford.edu/carolyn/terman; Tajnai, "From the Valley of Heart's Delight to the Silicon Valley: A Study of Stanford University's Role in the Transformation".
prone to distortion. Terman encouraged Hewlett and his friend and former classmate Packard to commercialize the invention, and helped to secure funding for the project, including modest startup funds from Crocker Bank. Famously starting out in a small garage in Palo Alto with starting capital of $538, the pair founded Hewlett-Packard in 1939. The firm’s first large order came from Walt Disney Company for the production of the animated film *Fantasia*. By 1995, Hewlett-Packard employed more than 100,000 people worldwide with annual revenues of over $30 billion.\(^{251}\) The company and its founders were important to Silicon Valley not just for the products and technologies that they produced, but also for the business culture and practices that they pioneered. The firm’s founders played leading roles in important regional industrial associations, and the “HP Way” style of management predicated on union-free employee relations deeply shaped employment practices in Silicon Valley.

Also during the 1930s, brothers Sigurd and Russell Varian laid the foundation for another Bay Area technology firm. Russell had studied at Stanford, earning a bachelor’s and then master’s degree in physics in 1927. After graduating, he worked in Philo Farnsworth’s television laboratory, consulted for Heintz and Kaufman and other Bay Area electronics firms in the late 1920s and 1930s, and became friends with Charles Litton. His brother, Sigurd, was a pilot and mechanic. The two brothers became interested in the potential of microwaves for use in radars for airplanes. In 1937, they

entered into a partnership with Stanford University to bring their ideas to fruition. The university granted the brothers the use of a physics laboratory and access to consultations with faculty, including physics professor William Hansen. Ed Ginzton, a PhD student studying with Terman, also joined the project. The university provided a small amount of funding for supplies, but no salary for the Varians. In return, the brothers gave the university an equal financial stake in the proceeds of the project. Working together, the Varians, Hansen and Ginzton developed the klystron tube, a device that allowed for the generation and amplification of ultra-high-frequency signals. In 1938, Charles Litton became involved with the project. His firm provided several key pieces of equipment for the manufacture of klystron tubes, while Litton himself helped the Varians to refine and enhance the devices. With the outbreak of World War II, the Varians, Hansen, and Ginzton relocated east to continue their project as part of the war contract work at Sperry Gyroscope in New York. The four returned to California after the war, with Hansen and Ginzton taking faculty positions at Stanford. In 1948, the Varian brothers, Hansen, and Ginzton founded Varian Associates, a company that over the next several decades would be a key technological innovator in Silicon Valley.

In the early decades of the 20th century, Santa Clara County and the larger San Francisco Bay Area played leading roles in electronics innovation by helping to pioneer radio, television, vacuum tube, and related technologies. Many of the factors attributed to the later success of Silicon Valley had precedents in this early period, including the

prominence of Stanford and its faculty and graduates in local firms, the role of local networks fostered by alumni relationships and common interests, timely “angel” investment, and an open and cooperative spirit that encouraged information sharing and tolerated spin-off ventures. The foundation for Silicon Valley was in place before World War II despite the fact that Santa Clara County and much of the surrounding Bay Area outside of San Francisco and parts of the East Bay Area remained rural. Windfall Gold Rush wealth and the rapid urbanization, development and growth that it fostered facilitated this early innovation. The Silicon Valley phenomenon was, in short, a century or more in the making.253

The US Military as an Early “Angel Investor” of Silicon Valley

The United States military was one of the first and biggest “angel” investors in Silicon Valley, a role that began during World War I, accelerated with World War II and continued throughout the Cold War decades.254 Some scholars have minimized the role of defense in the success of Silicon Valley, claiming for example that the top defense

253 Sturgen wrote “Silicon Valley is nearly one hundred years old. It grew out of a historically and geographically specific context that cannot be recreated…. Silicon Valley’s development is intimately intertwined with the long history of industrialization and innovation in the larger San Francisco Bay Area.” I would argue that factoring Gold Rush and early agricultural era developments and innovation into the picture make the origins of Silicon Valley extend well over a century into the early days of American settlement in the region. See: Sturgen, “How Silicon Valley Came to Be,” 47.
254 Stuart Leslie made this argument in essay form. Margaret Pugh O’Mara provided a more in-depth discussion on the role of military spending on science and technology, as well as the broader impact of Cold War policymaking. This section is indebted to them both. See: O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge; Stuart W. Leslie, “The Biggest ‘Angel’ of Them All: The Military and the Making of Silicon Valley,” in Understanding Silicon Valley : The Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region, ed. Martin Kenney (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000).
contractors never accounted for more than a single digit share of the local economy.\textsuperscript{255} Such arguments undervalue the cumulative and early impact of defense money in fostering and sustaining the local technology economy. Defense contractors stimulated the region’s economy directly by being among the leading sources of employment in the area until 1990s, and indirectly by subcontracting and purchasing from a variety of other electronics firms. Federal defense dollars thus provided wider downstream stimulus to electronics suppliers and subcontractors, ultimately underwriting job creation and economic activity outside of the dedicated defense sector.\textsuperscript{256} Federal defense funds also played a critical role in Silicon Valley by helping to incubate unproven technologies without clear commercial viability, thus subsidizing early stages of research and development.\textsuperscript{257} The semiconductor technology originally developed in the 1950s that gave Silicon Valley its name is a prime example, with defense spending accounting until 1967 for at least half of the region’s integrated circuit market.\textsuperscript{258} A number of other technologies similarly had their early research and development underwritten by military funding before eventually finding profitable application in the consumer market, including technologies underlying personal computers and internet communications.

\textsuperscript{255} A 1995 article from the \textit{San Jose Mercury News} cited experts claiming that defense “never amounted to more than 6 percent of the total local economy,” and that by the mid-1990s, it accounted for less than 3 percent. However, this figure is derived by looking only at the top six defense contractors who received the majority of defense dollars. See: Smith, "How Cuts in Defense Affected Valley: Layoffs Hurt Individual Workers, but Economy Remains Healthy."

\textsuperscript{256} The top 10 defense firms in Santa Clara County employed 44,850 workers in 1991, with Lockheed accounting for just under half of that total. See: Mike Langberg, "Top Defense Contractors in Silicon Valley,” ibid., April 15 1991.

\textsuperscript{257} For instance, many of the early tenants of the Stanford Industrial Park were firms either directly receiving military contracts, or benefiting secondhand by selling or subcontracting to large defense contractors. Defense monies subsidized these and other firms to develop technologies without clear commercial prospects. See: O’Mara, \textit{Cities of Knowledge}, 121-22.

\textsuperscript{258} Leslie, "The Biggest ‘Angel’ of Them All: The Military and the Making of Silicon Valley."
Stanford University was also a top Cold War research institution. In the generation after World War II, the university and many of the technology firms closely associated with it received billions of dollars in military research spending. It is therefore misleading to use only a handful of defense contractors as a way to evaluate the role of the military in the larger Silicon Valley economy. Military spending not only employed thousands in high-paying technical jobs directly and indirectly, it provided a steady stream of investment that encouraged research and innovation long before commercial market incentives were in place.

Defense spending also contributed to the making of the future Silicon Valley in other ways. World War II marked a turning point for the electronics industry in Santa Clara County and the San Francisco Bay Area by encouraging broader growth and development. Historian Margaret Pugh O’Mara noted the stimulus that the war years gave the region:

Between 1940 and 1947, the nine-county region surrounding the San Francisco Bay became home to 676,000 more people, 330,000 more jobs, and $2.5 billion more in annual income. The per capita wealth of the region reached the highest level in the nation. Between 1940 and 1945, individual incomes increased by 66%. The more industrialized cities in the region – San Francisco, Oakland, Alameda, and Berkeley – received a majority of this growth and investment from wartime manufacturing. However, because the Bay Area region had a “centrifugal growth pattern,” the industrial development fostered by the war and its wake spread out from

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259 Ibid.
260 O’Mara, *Cities of Knowledge*, 103.
these larger urban centers. Santa Clara County thus captured a significant amount of this wartime growth, with its population growing by 116,000 during the 1940s to approach close to 300,000 residents at the end of the decade – a rate of growth almost four times faster than the previous decade. The county also benefited from wartime manufacturing, with two of the largest local firms, Food Machinery Corp and Joshua Hendy Ironworks, both receiving a steady stream of military contract work while IBM located a factory in San Jose during war years. Military contracts were also a critical lifeline for Santa Clara County’s fledgling electronics startups at a time when venture capital was scarce and consumer demand flagging. Although less than the sums received by larger east coast companies, defense contracts provided millions of dollars to firms like Varian and Hewlett-Packard during the war years. At a time when these electronics firms were still small, federal wartime investment thus helped these firms not only survive, but also grow with cost-plus contracts virtually eliminating risk and supporting technology projects from research and development to production.

Cold War priorities and spending subsidized the rise of Santa Clara County as a postwar high-technology industrial suburb with a variety of other programs. The two most notable examples of this were the federal government’s promotion of “industrial dispersal” and highway subsidies. Believing that the country could reduce its vulnerability to a nuclear attack by dispersing manufacturing and military assets, federal policymakers used tax policies and other incentives to encourage firms doing business

261 Ibid., 103-04.  
262 During the 1930s, Santa Clara County’s population increased by more than 29,000, to about 175,000. See: Peck, “Agriculture’s Erosion: W.W.II Began a Shift to Industry.”  
263 Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream, 115-19.  
with the government to spread facilities out to less populated areas. Similarly, the federal government funded the construction of highways across the country to ensure that, in the event of an emergency or military conflict, vital transportation was not limited to railways and airports, but spread out across multiple roadways. In effect, federal policy, urban planners, and the military were encouraging firms to locate new research and manufacturing facilities outside of the urban core, especially for defense related projects. The cumulative impact of these policies was to promote newly developing suburban areas, often at the expense of older industrial core areas. Thus, like other parts of the South and West, Santa Clara County’s status as a less developed and partially rural area positioned it to take advantage of these subsidies. Boosters and local officials in Santa Clara County clearly understood their advantaged position as advertisements ran in national publications by the local chamber of commerce in the 1950s used federal industrial dispersion incentives as a selling point to encourage firms from other parts of the country to locate facilities in the area.

The cumulative impact of these policies was transformative for San Jose and Santa Clara County. Over the course of the 1950s, California displaced New York to become the nation’s leading recipient of defense dollars. Within the state, Santa Clara County overtook San Diego by the end of the decade to become the second largest beneficiary of defense spending behind the thriving aerospace industry of Los Angeles.

265 O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 6 and 28-45.
266 Ibid.
267 These examples are also discussed in Chapter 3: "Don't Get Cut Off from the Western Market; "Don't Give up This Rich Western Market; "Don't Slap 20,000,000 Western Customers in the Face!; "Let Your New West Coast Plant Pay for Itself!; "Reduce Selling Costs … Distribute Your Product from Santa Clara County; "West Coast Industrial Opportunity."
Attracted by the opportunity to be near Stanford University and responding to the flow of federal dollars to the area, defense contractor Lockheed Missiles and Aerospace opened facilities in Santa Clara County. In 1956, the company leased land at the Stanford Industrial Park (discussed below) for a research facility and established a major 275-acre plant in Sunnyvale that eventually grew to encompass 600 acres. Many attribute the arrival of Lockheed with the explosion of population and residential growth in Santa Clara County and with the dramatically accelerated development of the local technology industry.

By the 1960s, Lockheed employed over 19,000, eventually becoming one of the region’s largest employers with more than 25,000 employees at the company’s peak. Other defense related firms followed Lockheed’s lead and came to Santa Clara County to take advantage of federal Cold War incentives and cheaper labor and land costs – as well as the added benefit of the area’s concentration of electronics, space and defense technology. As demonstrated by a 1964 study by Bank of America, defense manufacturing helped to spur the overall growth of manufacturing in the region, which grew by more than two-and-one-half-times between 1955 and 1963, reaching an almost 13% annual growth rate. By 1963, manufacturing accounted for nearly one out of three jobs, up from one in five in 1955 and one in seven in 1940. Defense related

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268 Blackford, Pathways to the Present, 66-67.
270 Journalist Peter Carey credited Lockheed with “setting the stage for a defense industry buildup that would greatly accelerate the transition of the Santa Clara Valley from orchard land and sleepy towns to a metropolitan region rooted in technology.” According to Carey, with Lockheed’s arrival, “the valley's growth accelerated” and “[e]verything grew rapidly and massively – employment, the sheer mass of technology-related businesses and residential development.” He quotes Robert Arnold of the Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy saying "Lockheed was the one that exploded the growth.” See: Carey, "Defense Boom: Lockheed Arrived in '56, Leading to Economic Explosion."
manufacturing in aerospace and electronics was the leading driver of this industrial
growth, accounting for over 80% of the manufacturing jobs added in the county between
1955 and 1963. Employment in the sector rose from 3,000 in 1940 to 68,000 in 1963,
with an annual growth rate of 14.6%. Defense work paid well and helped to stimulate the
local economy. For example, workers in the "electrical machinery and ordnance
industries" earned $384 million in 1962.\textsuperscript{271} The economic activity surrounding defense
and the larger electronics industry was a powerful lure attracting technology workers and
their families to the region. After the arrival of Lockheed, Sunnyvale grew from a small
orchard hamlet of 9,829 in 1940 to a city of 52,898 in 1964, while San Jose and Santa
Clara County more than doubled to reach populations of 204,196 and 658,700
respectively during the same period.\textsuperscript{272}

Underwriting these jobs and growth were the billions of dollars in defense
contracts and research funding distributed annually. Quantifying the total defense dollars
that flowed into Silicon Valley is difficult because there were multiple sources, including
defense contract work, research and science funds and additional monies for secret
projects. For example, in 1985 Santa Clara County received $4.6 billion in defense
contracts. However, this number does not include the more than $20 billion that the
military spent on defense-related research and science – a significant portion of which
went to Silicon Valley – nor does it include any unrecorded additional spending on

\textsuperscript{271} A study conducted by Bank of America found that in this period "[a]s a result of this sharp expansion,
manufacturing has become the largest single contributor to the county's economic growth" – with defense
related manufacturing as a leading driver of growth. Bank of America study and statistics quoted in: ibid.
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid.
classified projects.\textsuperscript{273} The peak of Cold War spending under the Reagan administration came in 1986, with California receiving $30 billion in defense contracts, $5.4 billion of which went to Santa Clara County. Even as defense spending dropped in the late 1980s and 1990s, Silicon Valley remained a leading recipient. In 1994, the $3.8 billion in defense contracts (numbers that do not include spending on secret projects) received by Santa Clara County was 17\% of California’s $22.6 billion, and was more than the amount sent to 42 states, including New York and Colorado – and was twice as much as that received by Washington.\textsuperscript{274} As defense contract spending leveled out in the late 1990s, the region still received direct military investment ranging from $2.8 to $3.2 billion a year.\textsuperscript{275} Despite the overall smaller military budget, one thing remained constant: Santa Clara County was among the most military dependent regions in the country. Within a state that was by far the biggest recipient of annual defense spending, Santa Clara County ranked as the top defense dollar beneficiary on a per capita basis throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{276}

\textsuperscript{273} According to the San Jose Mercury News, “nearly $4.6 billion in defense contracts poured into Santa Clara County in 1985 … [and] Data Resources estimates that the national budget for defense-related research and development will jump 5 percent to $27 billion in fiscal 1987 … [with much of this defense R&D … performed in Silicon Valley.]” The $25 billion figure is derived from the $27 billion cited in the article. See: John Schneidawind, “Democrats Now Steer Congress, but Probably Will Follow the Same Path on Defense Spending,” ibid., November 10 1986.


Silicon Valley’s high-technology industry started to diversify in the 1980s, but defense contractors continued to play a major role directly and indirectly in the region’s economy, with defense related workers accounting for the majority of high-technology employment in the region. As late as the mid-1980s, when an economic recession and foreign competition battered Silicon Valley’s personal computer (PC) and semiconductor manufacturers, defense sector employment remained a “bright spot” helping the region and its high-technology industry to weather the storm. At the peak of US military spending under Reagan in the mid-1980s, Santa Clara County had over 80,000 employed in defense and defense-related jobs – or roughly 10% of total employment in the county. The payrolls of a few top defense contractors accounted for about half of this number, with Lockheed being the single largest employer. Reagan’s military spending
spree was ultimately not sustainable, however, and the second half of the 1980s marked a contraction in military expenditures. As fewer defense dollars flowed into Silicon Valley, the big defense contractors began to shrink their workforces. From 1986 on, defense and defense related employment fell steadily, to 77,000 in 1989 and 45,000 by 1995. Lockheed’s payroll fell by more than half from its high of 25,000 in 1986 to 11,000 by 1995. With the steeper defense reductions during the Clinton administration, the 1990s marked a protracted and painful realignment for Silicon Valley as downsized defense contractors and their former employees tried to diversify into the commercial technology sector.

Even though defense related employment had fallen by about half over the course of a decade, it still accounted for more than a quarter of the 164,000 technical jobs in Silicon Valley in 1995, which in turn amounted to 30% of the 530,000 high-technology employment in California. Thus, even after the military spending reductions of the 1990s, defense related employment still accounted for tens of thousands of jobs in the

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area up through the end of the century.\textsuperscript{285} The loss of defense industry jobs was a hardship for some (especially older) workers, but the shrinking of the defense contractors coincided with a broader boom in the consumer and other non-defense related high-technology sectors.\textsuperscript{286} In short, the military, as the largest “angel” investor of Silicon Valley, had subsidized close to five decades of high-technology research and development infrastructure and innovation. This investment provided a foundation that allowed the region to reach a critical mass as a high-technology center. By the 1990s, a variety of technological advances – including the advent of computing for personal and business uses, the development of communication technologies (notably the internet), and the diverse application of other high-technology products and services – enabled Silicon Valley to transition away from dependency on its former military patron.\textsuperscript{287}

\textbf{The Role of Stanford University}

Stanford University played a prominent role in the development of the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century electronics industry in the San Francisco Bay Area. After World War II, the synergistic relationship deepened dramatically, with the expansion of the university intimately intertwined with the evolution of the surrounding region’s high-technology

\textsuperscript{285} Pete Carey and Matt Marshall, "Defense Dollars Fade as Valley Booms: High-Tech Expansion Offers New Jobs, Reshapes Firms," ibid., November 28 1999. (Top defense firms still employed 20,600 in 1999, a number that does not include the additional several thousand employed in defense related work).
Many credit Stanford as a key ingredient in Silicon Valley’s success, and it is easy to see why. In addition to the university’s close involvement with the formation of Federal Telegraph Corporation, Varian, and Hewlett-Packard, Stanford had links to dozens of other technology firms in various ways through alumni and faculty founders, research collaboration, and so on. A partial list of some of the most prominent high-technology companies with ties to the university includes Shockley Transistor Corporation, Fairchild Semiconductor, Intel, 3Com, Sun Microsystems, Silicon Graphics, Netscape, Cisco Systems, Yahoo!, and dozens of others. Two more recent examples are Google and Instagram, the latter a small applications start-up acquired by Facebook in 2012 for $1 billion. The opportunity to collaborate with Stanford was a key enticement drawing established technology and defense firms to the region, as was the case with Lockheed, General Electric, Eastman Kodak and many others. Close involvement with industry benefited the university as well, as Stanford often maintained a financial stake in the technologies that it helped to co-develop and its industry partners shared valuable information and expertise with the university. For example, Lockheed helped Stanford to expand and improve its aerospace science program. In short, Silicon Valley and Stanford evolved in tandem, each facilitating and enhancing the success of the other from the early 20th century onward, and the interrelationship continues into the 21st century.


Other high-profile examples include Logitech, Watkins-Johnson, Syntex, Symantec Corporation, Rambus Inc., Network Appliance, and Gigabit Networks. See: Tajnai, “From the Valley of Heart’s Delight to the Silicon Valley: A Study of Stanford University’s Role in the Transformation”.

Why was Stanford able to play such a big role in creating the Silicon Valley success story? Compared to other research universities, Stanford was “among the most blessed by the magic combination of military spending, middle-class suburbanization, and new private-sector wealth that emerged during postwar period.”

Stanford developed as a noteworthy partner in electronics innovation just as military and federal policymakers were turning to science and technology to further Cold War defense. The university also had the intertwined advantages of land and location. Stanford’s extensive landholdings allowed for the creation of the Stanford Industrial Park, a powerful lure for technology firms looking to be located near a top-notch research institution.

Stanford, in addition to establishing the industrial park, initiated innovative programs beginning in the 1950s to foster close relationships with local technology firms and the defense industry. These measures distinguished Stanford from other universities during the Cold War decades that were more restrained in their embrace of private industry and defense research monies.

Stanford’s science and engineering departments had attained some minor distinction in the early 20th century, but its rise as a Cold War research center was the result of networking and exposure gained over the course of the Second World War. During the war years, Terman and several of the Bay Area’s leading technical minds, including Hansen and the Varian brothers, went east to work on defense projects.

291 O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 107.
292 Ibid.
Terman’s experience heading Harvard’s radiation research laboratory reaffirmed his belief in the benefits of close cooperation between universities and industries as well as the importance of government and military investment to subsidize research. After the war, Terman returned to Stanford and redoubled his efforts to make the university a top national research and engineering institution by expanding cooperation with industry, and most importantly, attracting military and government funding. Stanford officials agreed with Terman’s vision. In 1945, Stanford was one of the first universities in the nation to open an office in Washington DC to have representatives close to policymakers and military planners, and over the next several years, the university was increasingly successful at attracting government funding for defense and other projects. The university made Terman dean of the school of engineering in 1947, giving him more influence and resources to achieve his vision for Stanford. The contacts that Terman and other key Bay Area engineers and scientists had made with government and military planners during the war made Stanford and local firms well positioned to vie for federal money in the postwar decades.

Stanford also utilized its extensive landholdings and location to promote the growth of technology and science-related industry in the region. Leland Stanford had endowed the university with over 8,000 acres of land with a prohibition on its sale. Left unused, the land was a tax liability and was subject to condemnation by neighboring cities. Realizing that industry managers would value a location close to the research

294 Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream.
295 O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 27.
facilities of the university, Stanford president Wallace Sterling, Terman and other school officials set aside a portion of the unused acreage as a large industrial research park. Stanford’s park is the “granddaddy” of high-technology research parks, the first of its kind in terms of scale, ambition and focus on technology firms. In addition to the research park, Stanford also designated a portion of the land for high-end suburban development that would be attractive to professional families and a large upscale shopping center to take advantage of the high purchasing capabilities of nearby residents.

University officials were right; the proximity to Stanford was a powerful draw. The industrial park had the added advantage of being nestled in the middle of an affluent suburb punctuated by scenic countryside – making the area attractive to high-technology professionals and managers. With these advantages to offer, Stanford did not have to provide incentives to lure industry as did developers and planners elsewhere. In contrast, Stanford could afford to be selective: the university established a stringent application process, gave preferential treatment to science and technology firms deemed mutually beneficial to the school, and imposed strict guidelines on the facilities and activities permitted to tenants. A primary goal of university officials was to make the park a model for harmoniously integrating science and technology industries into a suburban environment. Stanford’s planners sought to attract the right kind of industry and workers that would be suitable for a research park located in the middle of high-end suburb. Thus, the university deemed smokestack manufacturers employing large numbers of blue-collar workers as unsuitable, instead preferring tenants engaged in cleaner research and

297 For an overview of the Stanford industrial park and its groundbreaking role and comparison to other research parks, see: Luger and Goldstein, Technology in the Garden, 122-54.
development activities and employing smaller white-collar workforces. Similarly, any facilities constructed in the park had to be low, single-story buildings that would blend into the pastoral campus and not offend the suburban sensibilities of neighboring residents by appearing overtly industrial.\textsuperscript{298}

Stanford had no problem attracting applicants for long-term leases in the industrial park despite the restrictions. Varian became the first tenant of the research park in 1951, and Eastman Kodak, General Electric, Performed Line Products, Admiral Corporation, Lockheed, Hewlett-Packard and others soon leased facilities.\textsuperscript{299} Several tenants had strong ties to the university or faculty, and federal money again played a major role in the success of the project since government or military contracts funded many of the companies leasing space in the Stanford Industrial Park.\textsuperscript{300}

Stanford’s experiment was a success. In 1955, the park spanned about 220 acres, but by 1961, it had grown to cover 652 acres and accommodated 25 companies that employed approximately 11,000 employees. The precedent of the Stanford Industrial Park attracted others to follow suit, and over the course of the 1950s, companies such as Westinghouse, Philco-Ford, Sylvania, Raytheon and ITT established research and manufacturing facilities in the area. In the 1970s, the Xerox Corporation established its Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) while NASA established Ames Research Center at Moffet Field in Sunnyvale.\textsuperscript{301} As of 1990, Stanford’s industrial park was home to 59 businesses – three quarters of which focused on research and development – and earned

\textsuperscript{298} O’Mara, \textit{Cities of Knowledge}, 110-26.
\textsuperscript{299} Tajnai, "From the Valley of Heart’s Delight to the Silicon Valley: A Study of Stanford University’s Role in the Transformation”.
\textsuperscript{300} O’Mara, \textit{Cities of Knowledge}, 110-26.
\textsuperscript{301} Saxenian, \textit{Regional Advantage}, 20-27.
the university close to $5 million annually. As of that same year, the businesses at the park employed 28,000 directly, but also helped stimulate additional technological and business development that employed three times that number in Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties. In short, Stanford’s research park promoted and greatly accelerated the growth of high technology in Silicon Valley.  

Stanford and Terman undertook two additional innovations, which along with the industrial park, significantly expanded the university’s cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with local industry. First, at the onset of the Cold War in 1946, the university established Stanford Research Institute (SRI) to conduct applied scientific research, often in cooperation with the defense industry or local high-technology firms. As an entity separate from the academic departments of Stanford, SRI insulated the university and bypassed potential academic cultural resistance to research for commercial or defense related projects. The arrangement allowed SRI to become a major defense contractor, but the university eventually had to sever formal ties with the institute in the 1970s in the face of anti-war protests and controversy. Nevertheless, for over two decades SRI allowed Stanford to benefit from access to cutting-edge military and industrial research.

Second, nudged by Terman, Stanford undertook a variety of initiatives to deepen the connections between the university and local firms. In 1955, the university started the Honors Cooperative Program in cooperation with Sylvania, Hewlett-Packard, SRI

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302 1990 statistics taken from Luger and Goldstein’s monograph: Luger and Goldstein, Technology in the Garden, 122-23 and 53-54.  
303 Saxenian, Regional Advantage, 23-24; Luger and Goldstein, Technology in the Garden, 124.  
304 Detail about SRI listed in “100 Years of Innovation” sidebar in: Harris, "Booming Business in This Economy? - Stanford's Rich Entrepreneurial Culture Still Bursting with Ideas, Nurturing Minds."
International, and General Electric. Under the program, a select number of qualified employees at these firms enrolled at graduate classes at Stanford with costs subsidized by the employers.\textsuperscript{305} By 1961, there were 32 companies participating with 400 employees pursuing advanced technical and science degrees. Stanford expanded these programs dramatically over the subsequent years.\textsuperscript{306} To meet the needs of companies with employees located farther away from the university, Stanford began broadcasting classes via television in 1969 and added video tape curriculum in 1973. As of 1995, the curriculum available from the Stanford Center for Professional development served approximately 146 member companies and 5,000 students a year at 200 sites.\textsuperscript{307} Another initiative launched by Stanford to deepen ties with industry was the Industrial Affiliates Program. Under this program, Stanford opened up its academic departments to industrial sponsored research. Faculty and students shared information and research with scientists and engineers at participating companies. In 1995, there were 500 corporations participating in 41 affiliate programs.\textsuperscript{308} Through these and other programs, Terman and Stanford forged unprecedented ties with high-technology industry.\textsuperscript{309} Stanford broke down the traditional walls between academic and applied research while also earning the financial support and patronage of member firms by fostering dialogue and information sharing between the university and the private sector.

\textsuperscript{305} Tajnai, "Links between Stanford University and Industry".
\textsuperscript{306} Ibid; Saxenian, \textit{Regional Advantage}, 23-24.
\textsuperscript{307} Tajnai, "Links between Stanford University and Industry".
\textsuperscript{308} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{309} In her comparative study, Saxenian found no parallel at MIT for many of Stanford’s cooperative initiatives with industry, including the Honors Cooperative Program and Industry Affiliates Program. See: Saxenian, \textit{Regional Advantage}, 23-24 and 66-67.
Silicon Valley’s semiconductor industry, which gave the region its name, is also indebted to Terman and Stanford. In 1955, Terman helped to convince William Shockley, the co-inventor of the transistor, to return to his native Palo Alto and start a company near the university. Shockley was a brilliant technical mind, but a poor manager. Within a year of the founding of Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories, several of the firm’s brightest technical specialists decided to strike out on their own. In 1957, Gordon E. Moore, Robert N. Noyce, and six others formed Fairchild Semiconductor in Palo Alto. Fairchild went on to play a seminal role in the evolution of the semiconductor industry in Santa Clara County, giving rise to more than 38 spinoff companies, including Advanced Micro Devices, National Semiconductor, and LSI Logic. The most successful offshoot from Fairchild was Intel, founded by Moore and Noyce in 1968. Intel’s introduction of the microprocessor in the 1970s helped to launch a viable personal computer, ushering in a variety of consumer and business applications for semiconductor technology.
The Advantaged Position of Santa Clara County as a Sunbelt Suburb with a Progressive Legacy

Santa Clara County, as a suburban Sunbelt region, capitalized on the postwar consumer preference for single-family detached homes with a yard, pleasant neighborhood, and associated amenities as well as the interrelationship between demographics, regional migration, and labor relations practices. Located in the northwestern corner of the Sunbelt, Santa Clara County shared many of the advantages attributed to that region in the postwar decades, including a warm and pleasant climate, lower density development, lower cost land, and a pro-growth booster leadership eager to do everything that they could to lure industry and development. Indeed Santa Clara County’s relative lack of industrial development, its lingering rural character and associated demographics were important facilitators to the success of Silicon Valley. For firms from other parts of the country looking to decentralize or expand, San Jose and Santa Clara County offered several attractive advantages. Like other parts of the South and West, the county was attractive to employers because of its largely homogenous and non-union workforce. Without entrenched industrial unions, high-technology employers experimented with non-union human relations practices and “flexible” labor markets. Santa Clara County was particularly attractive because it offered a new type of industrial site combining orchards, new suburbs and industry. The area held out the promise that workers could own their own home in suburban enclaves scattered around the countryside. The area’s mix of lightly urbanized areas surrounded by cultivated

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312 O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 83.
313 Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream, 108-09.
rural lands served as a powerful lure for workers looking for suburban living with country charm within commuting distance to employment and urban amenities. The federal government sweetened the deal through tax incentives and other subsidies, ranging from the policies encouraging homeownership to Cold War-motivated highway and industrial dispersal programs.

**Legacy of Local Governance by Middle-Class and Business Interests**

San Jose and Santa Clara County were not, however, rural hinterlands dominated by conservative merchants, ranchers and farmers. The region had benefited from decades of investment, corporate capitalism and urban growth, albeit unfolding at a relatively slower pace up through the 1940s. The orchard economy of the Valley of Heart’s Delight operated within a mid-sized town with an established professional and middle class. Indeed, many of the orchardists themselves were only part-time agriculturists with other careers. Most importantly, San Jose and Santa Clara County developed an entrenched moderate and pragmatic progressive politics originally centered in the local Republican Party.

Two previous waves of middle-class reformers had emerged from this progressive legacy: the first driven by the orchardists and their allies and the second initiated by a young generation of business leaders and professionals intent upon pursuing faster growth and industrialization. The legacy of these two reform waves was important to the

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314 In contrast to the early political economy of Orange County, as well as other staunchly conservative counties within the state – including much of the Central Valley.
future evolution of Silicon Valley. First, the Progressive Era reformers put in place mechanisms of governance that favored the middle and professional class. The first reformers also established the blueprint of a broad-based reform mobilization that united middle- and professional-class residents with trade unions and the emerging fruit industry based on shared economic interests. The second wave of reformers took advantage of the mechanisms put in place by the Progressives to take control of local politics. Once in power, the second group implemented a policy of aggressive growth and development. Just as the high-technology sector in Santa Clara County was taking off from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, San Jose’s pro-growth leadership was ready to accommodate it. Hamann and his Panzer Division were in full swing precisely at a time when thousands of high-technology workers and their families were pouring into the valley to take jobs at Lockheed and other defense contractors as well as the region’s emerging electronics firms. Upscale Palo Alto and other nearby affluent suburbs on the Peninsula were accessible to higher paid science and engineering professionals and managers drawn to work at the Stanford Industrial Park, but for mid- and lower level employees, San Jose and the other cities to the south provided the opportunity for suburban homeownership.315

When the breakneck growth of Silicon Valley started to impair the local quality of life and threaten the region’s economic viability, the legacy of progressive reform driven by broad-based middle-class and business interests allowed a third reform movement to

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315 The residential geography of Silicon Valley had socioeconomic stratifications, with predominantly white professionals (scientists, skilled technical workers, and managers) living along the Peninsula and north western part of Santa Clara County closer to Stanford and the heart of the electronics industry. Meanwhile, other workers – many of them non-white – lived in the southern and eastern parts of the county, thus clustering in San Jose and unincorporated areas. See: A. L. Saxenian, "The Urban Contradictions of Silicon Valley - Regional Growth and the Restructuring of the Semiconductor Industry," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 7, no. 2 (1983).
develop. Once again, middle- and professional-class residents led the way, joining with elements of the working-class and managers of the new high-technology firms acting through groups like the Santa Clara County Manufacturers Group to take the reins of local power. This time, the shared goal of this broad-based reform movement was improving local infrastructure and enhancing quality of life.

Economic changes gave impetus to the first two waves of reform movements in San Jose and Santa Clara County, first through the transition to an orchard economy and then with a younger business and professional class perceiving greater economic opportunity from developing and subdividing land than from cultivating it. In each case, groups like the Good Government League and Progress Committee arose to represent the interests of key economic players. As the technology sector developed in Santa Clara County, the managers of electronics firms likewise formed groups to represent their interests. In fact, business groups helped to shape the evolution of Silicon Valley, and eventually facilitated in the late 1970s the consolidation of the third wave of suburban liberal reformers.

**Business Groups Shape Silicon Valley**

Business groups in the Bay Area have played an active role in local politics since the Progressive Era. From the 1940s onward, a handful of groups were particularly important to the evolution of Silicon Valley, including the Western Electronics Manufacturing Association (WEMA), Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), the Bay Area Council (BAC) and Santa Clara County Manufacturers Group (SCCMG). The
first two – WEMA and SIA – functioned as traditional trade associations focused on furthering the business interests of members. The members of these groups were motivated to cooperate by shared industry problems and challenges too big for any one business to overcome alone, including competitive pressures, taxes, government regulation, and labor issues.

The BAC and SCCMG pursued ambitious agendas more important to the development of the region. The two organizations, although similarly motivated to increase business profits, also embraced broader visions of how to promote industrial growth by addressing large-scale regional challenges. Both groups expanded their efforts to work with local and regional government on issues such as transportation, housing, pollution and other quality of life problems that they saw as potentially harmful to their businesses and the larger economy of the area. The BAC and SCCMG perceived regional quality of life concerns and infrastructure projects as economic issues just as important to the bottom lines of their members as competitive pressures, labor issues, taxes, and government regulation. In particular, the formation of SCCMG in the 1970s coincided with the entry of the third wave of reformers into local office in San Jose and Santa Clara County, and the business group came to be a critical part of the suburban liberal coalition.

Twenty-five electronics manufactures on the west coast formed WEMA in 1943 to work together to attract more federal defense contracts. The group believed that the War Production Board (WPA) showed favoritism toward large eastern firms such as Raytheon and General Electric, and WEMA formed to lobby military planners to spread
more defense work to western firms.316 When the war ended, WEMA continued to lobby for federal contracts for its members. In addition to fostering technical information exchange and promoting business cooperation among members, the staunchly anti-union WEMA collaborated to discourage union activities in the western electronics industry.317

As the nature of the electronics industry that it represented changed, so did WEMA. In 1964, the group relocated its headquarters from Los Angeles to Palo Alto to be closer to the dynamic smaller electronics firms in the region. Since many of these small and mid-sized firms lacked the expertise and resources of larger corporations, WEMA sponsored networking events and seminars on business management, legal issues, finance, and export rules.318 The group expanded its roster beyond electronics manufacturers over the course of the 1970s to include software companies and began recruiting firms outside of the western region. In 1978, with its name no longer matching its membership, the group became the American Electronics Association (AEA).319 With its enlarged constituency, AEA became more active lobbying at the national level, for example seeking favorable tax treatment for research and development spending and stock options during the 1980s.320

316 As originally formed, the group called itself West Coast Electronics Manufacturers Association (WCEMA), but later dropped “West Coast” in favor of “Western.” See: Zoltan J. Acs and David B. Audretsch, *Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research: An Interdisciplinary Survey and Introduction* (New York: Springer, 2010), 404.
320 The AEA and other high-tech industry groups hoped to get a sympathetic ear from the Reagan administration on issues such as tax breaks for stock options and R&D. But high-tech groups found that the new president and his advisors did not understand the technology sector. Instead, Reagan was more focused on tax breaks for individuals and larger manufacturing firms. Thus, when the AEA found that Democrats
In 2009, the AEA merged with other high-technology business associations to form TechAmerica. This larger group’s membership expanded to include new arrivals such as Facebook and Google in addition to established firms such as Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. TechAmerica, headquartered in the Silicon Valley city of Santa Clara, focuses on providing business intelligence and networking opportunities to its 1,000 member companies, as well as lobbying on public policy issues related to technology at various levels of government nationally and internationally.\(^{321}\)

Silicon Valley semiconductor firms faced tougher competition from Japanese challengers over the course of the 1970s. In 1978, executives at National Semiconductor, Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, Motorola, and Fairchild Camera & Instrument formed the SIA to respond. The managers of those firms had belonged to a semiconductor working committee within WEMA, but they chose to form a separate organization to promote legislative action and other measures specifically important to their industry.\(^{322}\) The leaders of SIA believed that Japan’s competitive success in semiconductors was due to lower wages and domestic market protections, so the group lobbied Washington for action. Several executives from member firms testified before Congress regarding the need to protect the US semiconductor industry from what they argued were unfair trade practices by Japan. The lobbying bore fruit with the 1986 passage of the US-Japan

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Semiconductor Trade Agreement, a measure that set minimum prices on certain devices, prohibited “dumping,” and encouraged Japan to open up its domestic market to US firms.\textsuperscript{323} The next challenge facing SIA and its members was collaborating as an industry to close the technology gap with Japan.\textsuperscript{324} In 2012, the members of SIA accounted for 80\% of US semiconductor manufacturing output.\textsuperscript{325}

The WEMA and SIA lobbied at the federal level and addressed global issues of concern to their members, but their focus was largely on the bedrock business concerns of taxation, trade policy, labor relations, and technology collaboration. Both groups helped Silicon Valley firms develop and expand, thus growing the region’s overall economy. Neither group, however, took a strong interest in regional politics. Executives involved with BAC and SCCMG, on the other hand, believed that helping their businesses meant participating in the governing of Silicon Valley.

The BAC helped to transform the larger San Francisco Bay Area from the mid-1940s onward. Founded in 1945 by executives from Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Transamerica, Standard Oil of California, Pacific Gas and Electric, Bechtel, Kaiser Industries, Clorox and others, BAC’s members were the business elite from San Francisco and the surrounding area. The group aimed to promote regional economic

\textsuperscript{323} Saxenian, \textit{Regional Advantage}, 89-90.
\textsuperscript{324} Despite this political victory, US semiconductor firms continued to struggle as they soon confronted the fact that Japanese companies had adopted better manufacturing processes and were producing higher quality semiconductor devices. See: ibid., 90-95.
development, and in particular, BAC’s leaders wanted to take advantage of federal sponsored growth and investment in the wake of World War II.\(^{326}\)

The leaders of the BAC adopted a broader regional vision, recognizing that San Francisco and other urban centers could not support a large amount of new growth. They therefore encouraged development in nearby less developed suburban areas, believing that growth in the surrounding nine county region benefited business in the entire Bay Area. Other towns and counties had booster business organizations, but BAC was one of the first such groups to unite a wide range of geographically dispersed business leaders to define and promote an entire multi-county region. The group took the innovative course of not only advertising the Bay Area business region’s amenities to employers, but also appealing directly to prospective employees by stressing the area’s mixture of urban culture and rural charm – with Stanford University being an enticing selling point to both groups.\(^{327}\)

The BAC helped to make the area attractive to industry and workers, and played a significant role in developing the suburbs along the Peninsula near Stanford.\(^{328}\) Rapid growth in the region strained existing infrastructure, and by the late 1940s and 1950s, the side effects of rapid population and industrial development were becoming a threat to the local economy. The leaders of BAC took an early role trying to combat these challenges through private-sector activism, for example promoting regional transportation solutions,

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\(^{327}\) O’Mara, *Cities of Knowledge*, 104-07.

\(^{328}\) Ibid.
acting to correct local housing shortages, and responding to growing local concern over pollution.\textsuperscript{329}

The SCCMG had the biggest impact on the political economy of Silicon Valley as a key member of the suburban liberal coalition representing the interests of the area’s technology employers. The group formed in 1977 at the urging of David Packard with thirty of Santa Clara County’s most prominent companies joining as charter members, including twenty-six of the largest manufacturers and four major banks. The roster included older established electronics firms such as Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and GTE Sylvania as well as newer players such as Intel, Signetics, and Memorex. Other members included Lockheed, Watson Johnson, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Crocker National Bank, and First National Bank.\textsuperscript{330}

Packard and the other members of the group recognized that the future health of their firms and the high-technology industry in Silicon Valley depended upon the outcome of several large challenges arising from the region’s explosive and poorly planned growth. The executives in SCCMG were concerned that growth-related problems such as the high cost of housing, traffic congestion, and environmental pollution made it

\textsuperscript{329} The BAC’s history page in the “About Us” section of their website credits the group with being an early leader on quality of life issues: “Earlier than most peer organizations, the Council recognized that rapid industrialization could bring with it challenges including housing shortages, traffic gridlock, and air and water pollution. By the late ’40s, the Council was acting as one of the very first regional environmental watchdogs.” Other environmental and conservation groups would probably contest an industry group led by extractive and industrial corporations calling itself an “environmental watchdog.” Nevertheless, the group is an early example of the recognition of quality of life issues by regional industrial leaders, and their embrace of voluntary and industry-led remediation measures to protect their business interests and head-off public pressure for government regulation or other interventions. The group continues to operate into the 21st century, now representing over 300 member corporations to promote continued economic development and related issues such as housing, energy, environment, water, and education throughout the larger San Francisco Bay area region. See: Young, "Bay Area Council Considering Merger"; "The Bay Area Council History”.

harder to attract and retain sufficient numbers of highly skilled technical employees, thus harming the competitiveness of Silicon Valley as a whole. At the same time, these growth-related ills had become a pressing political issue, with some residents calling for restrictions on all growth.\textsuperscript{331} To head off political pressure for mandatory growth restrictions and give local industry a prominent role in shaping the discussion, SCCMG formed to provide a venue for local executives to work directly with each other and regional public officials to resolve the side effects of growth. This expansive agenda, the hands-on role played by the executives of the member companies, and SCCMG’s commitment to working closely with local officials enabled the group to become one of the most powerful political actors in Silicon Valley. Within five years of its founding, SCCMG had expanded in 1982 to include 85 of the largest employers as members.\textsuperscript{332}

Why was SCCMG able to achieve so much influence in the regional politics of Silicon Valley? The group’s clout to a significant degree arose from the economic power of its member organizations. The organization was the voice of Silicon Valley’s high-technology companies, speaking for an industry that employed three-quarters of the manufacturing jobs in the region – with member companies collectively employing about half of the county’s workforce. The SCCMG also represented some of the largest financial institutions and traditional manufactures in the region.\textsuperscript{333} More importantly, the political economy and historical development of Santa Clara County had given rise to few entrenched power blocs, and those that were present were weak. SCCMG thus spoke

\textsuperscript{331} Saxenian, "In Search of Power - the Organization of Business Interests in Silicon Valley and Route 128," 34-37.
\textsuperscript{332} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{333} Non-high tech members included Corning Glass Co. and Gilroy Foods. See: ibid., 37-38.
for the increasingly important high-technology industry at a time when its few other potential rivals were in decline. The fruit industry was virtually extinct in the region, with orchards replaced by suburban subdivisions and office parks. The local chambers of commerce represented primarily retail merchants and developers, groups that had been at the heart of the valley’s pro-growth coalition, but that now represented a small and declining portion of the local economy and a politically unpopular agenda. The region’s remaining traditional manufactures, many of the largest of which were part of the SCCMG, were likewise of diminished economic importance.\textsuperscript{334} Compared to other parts of the country with established industrial bases that had fostered potent workers’ movements, organized labor in Santa Clara County was weak and largely confined to sectors outside of emerging high-technology industry, including the public sector, defense contractors, service industry and building trades.\textsuperscript{335} The SCCMG, with its roster of influential local executives from the region’s biggest corporations acting as spokespeople and its creation of timely reports and studies, had no problem getting the attention of the local media and public officials to make its policy prescriptions known.\textsuperscript{336}

\textsuperscript{334} Ibid., 38 and 58.
\textsuperscript{335} Ibid., 38-39. It is worth noting that labor in Santa Clara County was not impotent. Many of the workers employed at Lockheed and other defense contractors enjoyed high-paying union jobs. Meanwhile, the largely female and minority workforce in the local cannery and food processing industry had fought hard to establish union representation. But the decline of the valley’s fruit industry combined with the disinterest of the male dominated national trade union movements prevented the growth and expansion of these union efforts. Historian Glenna Matthews argues that the sexism and shortsighted bias toward traditional blue collar manufacturing of the national trade union movement prevented the establishment of a union movement within the high-tech industry that employed a largely female and minority workforce in low-level manufacturing jobs. See: Matthews, \textit{Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream}, 9, 122-25 and 37-80.
\textsuperscript{336} Over the course of the late 1970s and 1980s, SCCMG released a series of reports on issues confronting the region, including housing, pollution, transportation, and recycling. Local media and politicians often referred to the reports, and SCCMG member executives spoke to the press to explain the results. In short, SCCMG’s reports helped to frame discussion along the lines of the data and conclusions presented, with the preferred solutions typically being voluntary industry programs.
The group thus emerged in the late 1970s as the most influential voice for local high-technology business interests just as suburban liberal reformers were trying to garner support for their vision of sustainable growth for the region.

The relationship between SCCMG and local government was a critical component of the success of suburban liberals in Silicon Valley. SCCMG was distinct from other business groups in its acceptance of government as a partner, even cooperating with local officials to craft zoning, environmental, and other regulations to address the region’s problems. This distinguished SCCMG from similar high-technology business organizations such as the Massachusetts High Technology Council (MHTC) in the Route 128 region of Boston, Massachusetts, that assumed a more adversarial role with local government. Instead of collaborating with local officials, the MHTC used the economic and political power of its members to resist government interference and force its policy preferences.337 In contrast, the leadership of the SSCMG saw more benefit from working cooperatively with local government to achieve its members’ preferred policy outcomes. Collaborating with the SCCMG gave suburban liberal reformers greater influence, validating their sustainable growth programs as economically viable and offering political cover from the attacks by other business groups opposed to government interventions. For example, when development interests attacked the reformers and their growth controls for being anti-business, suburban liberals in Silicon Valley pointed to the involvement of high-technology executives in shaping smart growth policies.338 The leaders of SCCMG and the emerging suburban liberal bloc of local officials thus came to

337 Saxenian, "In Search of Power - the Organization of Business Interests in Silicon Valley and Route 128," 45-47 and 57-61.
338 Discussed in Chapter 7.
recognize their mutual interdependence and overlapping policy concerns. Close cooperation between county and municipal government and high-technology industry became the predominant model of policy making in Silicon Valley.\textsuperscript{339} It also provided the foundation for the key coalition of suburban liberalism: professional and middle-class residents and high-technology employers united around a vision of growth that balanced profits and quality of life.

In the years after its formation, SCCMG changed its name to the Silicon Valley Manufacturers Group and, in 2005 substituted “Leadership” for “Manufacturing” to represent the broader focus of its expanded membership.\textsuperscript{340} In 2012, the Silicon Valley Leadership Group (SVLG) counted 375 companies as members, including hardware, software, systems and other high-technology companies, as well as organizations in the financial, transportation, health care, defense, communications, education and utilities sectors.\textsuperscript{341}

**Conclusion**

The high-technology economy of Silicon Valley emerged from the confluence of several fortuitous factors not easily emulated. The region benefited from a concentration of capital and urban infrastructure arising out of the windfall wealth created by the Gold Rush. This helped the region to become an early innovator in electronics, in particular

\textsuperscript{339} Ibid., 36-37.
radio and television technologies. Gold Rush wealth also underwrote the creation of Stanford University – an institution intimately involved with the development of the region’s technology industry – as well as other learning institutions and infrastructure.

Another critical ingredient was the boost given to the region by defense spending beginning with World War I, but greatly accelerating in the wake of World War II. Military money incubated Silicon Valley through its startup phase, allowing the area to amass a cluster of technology firms and related infrastructure. Defense spending decreased in the 1980s and 1990s, but it had subsidized research and development to the point where consumer and business markets were ready to make up the difference.

Finally, Santa Clara County was a distinctly fortunate corner of the Sunbelt – sharing most of the advantages of that region – while also having a certain existing level of urbanization and development already in place for decades. Once postwar growth accelerated, the region was not a blank slate or dominated by conservative merchants, farmers and ranchers like other areas such as Orange County. In particular, the region had a legacy of progressive reforms driven by two successive waves of professional and middle-class reformers acting in concert with emerging economic interests. These reformers put in place the mechanisms that allowed for Silicon Valley’s stunning postwar growth.

The Silicon Valley example offers painful lessons that the region almost learned too late. The spectacular takeoff of the area’s high-technology economy almost faltered in the 1970s as decades of poorly planned growth threatened to make it too hard for the electronics industry to attract and retain highly skilled knowledge workers. At the same time, growing outrage over the ills of growth was prompting many residents to call for
strict controls on residential and industrial growth, a move that could have choked off further expansion of the region’s economy. This is why the often-overlooked political history of Santa Clara County is so important. The region’s legacy of progressive reform movements created a foundation that allowed the region to grow rapidly, but also helped to give rise to a third wave of reformers that made that growth viable. In short, a critical factor in the region’s evolution was a suburban liberal movement uniting middle-class reformers with regionally minded high-technology business leaders. This coalition embraced smart growth policies that set Silicon Valley on a more sustainable path of growth, thereby allowing the area’s thriving high-technology economy to keep growing.
Chapter 5

Early Opposition to Growth in Santa Clara County

Silicon Valley may never have coalesced as a high-technology power economy without the third wave of middle-class reform in San Jose and Santa Clara County. The same headlong growth that had allowed Santa Clara County to develop rapidly and attract a tremendous influx of new high technology industry and associated skilled professionals over the course of the 1950s and 1960s threatened to undermine the future viability of the local electronics economy. New residents of Santa Clara County found local infrastructure strained, with schools overcrowded, roadways congested, and the air clouded with pollution. In the span of just a few years, the orchards and green spaces that had made the valley an attractive suburban retreat were almost gone, paved over by subdivisions, strip malls, and roads. At the same time, property taxes were rising and high home prices were making it increasingly difficult for many afford a home. By the 1960s, the status quo was increasingly unacceptable to Santa Clara County’s growing population of professional and middle-class homeowners. It was also unacceptable to local high-technology employers who were concerned about the area’s competiveness and their ability to attract and retain top-caliber employees. Local power, however, was firmly in the hands of pro-growth interests – developers, building contractors, speculators, and retail merchants – who benefited handsomely from development and who had little incentive to address the problems created by such rapid growth.

The 1960s therefore marked a turning point for the region’s transition to a high-technology driven economy. Would the metropolitan area fall victim to its own success,
and implode – or simply stagnate – due to poorly planned growth and expansion?

Alternatively, would the region’s political economy adapt once again to accommodate the interests of its newest stakeholders, the expanding ranks of professional and middle-class homeowners and their high-technology employers? If the local status quo did give way to new leaders representing homeowners, high-technology professionals, and electronics firms, would the new municipal order take on a conservative or liberal orientation?

There were many indications that the region could shift in a conservative direction since Santa Clara County bore some resemblance to the conservative Orange County, a county whose economy had also shifted from agriculture to defense and technology in the postwar decades. Indeed, during the 1960s, opposition to growth in Santa Clara County was a cause initially championed by conservative voices. First, there were rural landowners who exerted influence at the county level to use the nation’s first agricultural zoning measures in an effort to preserve the region’s agricultural economy. Second, conservatives, emerging from the ranks of new residents associated with the defense industry, were the most prominent early grassroots leaders of the suburban discontent over rapid growth, high taxes, and poor municipal services. However, while Orange County embraced the political culture of the New Right in the 1960s and 1970s, Santa Clara County ultimately took a more liberal turn. Suburban liberal reformers became the leading spokespeople for grassroots discontent, attained local elected office, and eventually consolidated their hold on municipal affairs by aligning with key high-technology business interests over the course of the 1970s and early 1980s. The first leader of this suburban liberal coalition in its early and tentative stage at the beginning of the 1970s was Norman Mineta.
The Greenbelt Movement and Agricultural Zoning

The earliest direct challenge to the rapid expansion of suburban and commercial development in Santa Clara County came from the valley’s orchardists and agricultural landowners who aligned with county planning officials in the 1950s to create the first agricultural zoning provisions in the nation. By this time, the pace of development in the region posed a clear threat to the viability of local agriculture. In the first half of the 1950s, county building permits almost doubled from 6,551 in 1951 to 12,580 in 1955 as Lockheed prepared to open two facilities in the county. Between 1942 and 1957, one-third (76,000 acres) of Santa Clara County’s 232,000 acres of cultivatable soils, defined as soil types I-IV, were converted to urban use. With growth accelerating over the course of the 1950s, Santa Clara County was adding 50,000 new residents a year while losing 13,000 acres of agricultural land annually – a pace that, if left unchecked, threatened to use up all of the remaining 156,000 acres of cultivatable soil by 1970. Indeed, much of the best lands were already lost to urbanization, as by 1957, developers had converted 70% of the valley’s prime agricultural land with type I soil to urban use. Even if the pace of development slowed, experts feared that fragmentation already compromised most of the county’s remaining agricultural land. With San Jose and other cities resorting to strip and leap frog annexations of far-flung parcels of land, developers had created islands of commercial and residential development that mixed urban use in close proximity to the remaining agricultural lands. This patchwork of urban and agricultural use not only

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reduced farming efficiency by making it more difficult to tend, spray and cultivate crops, but it also pushed up land values and property taxes for farmers, thereby ultimately making it harder for their businesses to remain viable.\textsuperscript{343} With growth accelerating over the course of the 1950s as cities raced to annex land and attract developers, the valley’s remaining orchardists faced an existential crisis.

Santa Clara County planning commissioner Will Weston and planning department director Karl Belser emerged in the early 1950s as leaders of a movement to protect the region’s remaining farmland from uncontrolled urban expansion. County planners up to this point had been passive in the face of expansion by local cities, but Weston and Belser pioneered the use of greenbelt zoning to protect agricultural lands in Santa Clara County, making the region the first county in the nation to take such steps.\textsuperscript{344} Weston and Belser were able to implement aggressive measures to protect orchards and farmlands because agricultural interests still exerted strong influence on the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors. As of 1958, three of the five-person county board of supervisors represented rural districts that contained only 24\% of the county’s population, while the remaining two supervisors from the more urban parts of the county represented three-quarters of the population.\textsuperscript{345} County government during the 1950s and 1960s thus became the forum for

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\textsuperscript{344} Land use in Santa Clara County was administered by the county planning department and ultimately overseen by a council of appointed planning commissioners, both of which had hitherto been passive in the face of expansion by the cities. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Santa Clara County Planning Commission had been a largely moribund institution, with long-tenured appointees issuing vague zoning ordinances, rubber stamping variance requests, and leaving most of the planning to the cities. Meanwhile, the Santa Clara County Planning Department had completed only one land use study during the 1940s. See: Rebecca Conard, "Green Gold: 1950s Greenbelt Planning in Santa Clara County, California," \textit{Environmental Review: ER} 9, no. 1 (1985): 6-8 and 11-12.
\textsuperscript{345} Ibid., 6.
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those interested in preserving agriculture in the valley to seek redress, pitting expansion-
minded city leaders against Santa Clara County officials.

The political movement mobilized by Weston, Belser and other county planning
officials echoed the old Progressive Era coalition of orchardists and aligned middle-class
professionals, albeit on a much narrower and depleted scale given the erosion of
agriculture in Santa Clara County. Not only was Weston a planning official, he was also
an orchardist, having operated a successful pear orchard in the valley for several decades.
Born in Oakland in 1884, he earned a degree in economics before purchasing a small pear
orchard that he expanded over the years into a lucrative 270-acre business. Weston was
an original appointee to the Santa Clara County Planning Commission, as well as a
member of the Bay Area Council (BAC) during the late 1940s and early 1950s.\(^{346}\) He had
witnessed the rapid industrial and residential development throughout the Bay Area while
working with BAC. As a commercial orchardist, he recognized the threat posed by urban
growth to agricultural operations. Having become familiar with the use of zoning laws
and ordinances by cities to separate industrial and residential zones, he believed that
zoning could also protect agricultural areas from encroachment by housing and
commercial development. In 1951, Weston requested that the Santa Clara County
Planning Department evaluate agricultural zoning.\(^{347}\)

The proposal from Weston to use zoning to protect agricultural lands gained
momentum when Karl Belser became the head of the county planning department in
1952. Belser is widely credited with being one of the earliest and most vocal critics of

\(^{346}\) The Bay Area Council is discussed in more detail in the previous chapter.
urban sprawl in Santa Clara County.\textsuperscript{348} Raised and educated in the east, Belser trained originally as an architect, receiving a bachelor’s degree from the University of Michigan’s School of Architecture in 1925 and a master’s degree in architecture from the Harvard School of Design in 1927. After practicing architecture for a time in Boston, Belser transitioned into university teaching. Eventually becoming interested in urban planning, he traveled to Europe to study planning and housing. He subsequently worked briefly as a planner for the cities of Detroit and Los Angeles before joining the Santa Clara County Planning Department in 1951. Belser believed that agricultural lands were precious national resources worthy of the same protection afforded to national forests and parks. He embraced Weston’s agricultural zoning proposal, believing that greenbelt measures could serve two purposes: first, preserving agricultural land and second, giving definition to urban areas by creating borders between cities and preventing undifferentiated sprawl. In past years, the county planning department had largely deferred to the cities on planning issues. Belser revitalized the department to take a more active role on local planning issues during his tenure as director between 1952 and 1966. The Santa Clara County Planning department, with an enlarged staff of college-educated and professional planners, conducted dozens of studies and more routinely issued recommendations on county planning issues. With Weston’s encouragement, Belser’s

leadership, and an expanded mandate, the Santa Clara County Planning Department and its director earned national distinction for their proactive efforts to protect agricultural land during the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{349}

In April of 1953, the Santa Clara County Planning Commission, acting on a recommendation from Belser and his staff, proposed amending county zoning ordinances to establish exclusive agricultural zoning. The move was in response to a petition by 15 pear growers, including county planning commissioner Weston, whose orchards were located near the path of urban expansion by the city of Santa Clara. Under the proposed ordinances, agricultural zoning would be voluntary and initiated at the request of the landowner. Once the county planning commission and board of supervisors approved greenbelt zoning, surrounding cities could not annex the land without the consent of the landowner. The county Farm Bureau was initially ambivalent about the proposed changes as many of its member farmers were wary of any zoning restrictions on the use of their property, but since the measure was voluntary, the bureau eventually lent its support to the proposal. The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors approved the new ordinances the next year in early 1954, and the planning commission moved to create the county’s first greenbelt zone to protect 744-acres of pear orchards held by the 15 petitioning landowners.\textsuperscript{350} Numerous petitions for agricultural zoning by landowners in the path of urban expansion quickly followed, immediately putting the county at odds with local city

\textsuperscript{349} Conard, ”Green Gold: 1950s Greenbelt Planning in Santa Clara County, California,” 8-10.
\textsuperscript{350} Ibid., 6-7.
governments and attracting national attention as an innovative approach to protecting farmlands.  

Strengthening the county’s hand in the zoning fight with expansionist local cities required help from the state legislature. Westen and Belser worked with the Santa Clara County Farm Bureau and supportive landowners to petition local California Assemblyman Bruce F. Allen to introduce a bill codifying agricultural zoning. Amendments added to the bill during legislative negotiations made it effectively apply only to Santa Clara County and limited its duration to two years. The Greenbelt Law, which passed in 1955 and was renewed in 1957, became the first statute in the country to provide for agricultural zoning that prohibited cities from annexing greenbelt lands without the consent of the landowner. As with the Santa Clara County zoning ordinance, the law made agricultural zoning voluntary, to be applied and removed by a vote of the county board of supervisors only at the request of the landowner. As a result, agricultural zoning did not provide long-term tools for urban or agricultural planning and ultimately served to delay the decline of the region’s fruit economy, but not preserve its viability. Higher prices in the 1950s for certain crops made seeking agricultural zoning worthwhile for some growers. However, when the economic equation changed, it was

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353 As amended, the law required that any county implementing agricultural zoning had to have a comprehensive master plan in place prior to December 31, 1954. Since only Santa Clara County had such a plan in place, the amendment limited the application of the bill to that county. See: ibid; "Preservation of Open Spaces through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt Zoning," Stanford Law Review 12, no. 3 (1960): 640.
easy for landowners to petition for the removal of zoning restrictions to sell their land to
developers.\textsuperscript{355}

Santa Clara County approved petitions from landowners to protect 20,000 acres of
land under agricultural zoning within the first three years of the Greenbelt Law’s
passage.\textsuperscript{356} By 1960, the county had designated 50,000 acres as greenbelt areas, thus
protecting roughly one-third of the remaining cultivatable land in Santa Clara County
from annexation and development.\textsuperscript{357} Despite these impressive milestones, the Greenbelt
Law had several problems that limited its effectiveness. First, the zoning policies of the
county proved contentious. With county planners approving the majority of petitions
from landowners and with much of the protected lands directly in the path of expanding
cities, debate over pending greenbelt applications often sparked intense confrontations
between city and county officials – ultimately giving rise to litigation that curtailed
county zoning powers.\textsuperscript{358} Opposition from the cities, flaws in the implementation and
administration of agricultural zoning, and a breakdown in the alliance between growers

\textsuperscript{355} For example, in the 1950s, pear and cherry growers enjoyed favorable market conditions and wanted to
\textsuperscript{356} Griffin and Chatham, "Urban Impact on Agriculture in Santa-Clara County, California," 206.
\textsuperscript{357} "Preservation of Open Spaces through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt Zoning," 641.
\textsuperscript{358} Most of the petitions seem to have come from landowners located near cities with rapid industrial
growth, such as Sunnyvale, Mountain View, and Santa Clara as well as near the rapidly expanding
subdivisions of San Jose. See for example: "SJ, County Planners in Heated Hassle over Greenbelting,"
\textit{Daily Palo Alto Times}, February 6 1958; "Askam Land Greenbelted by Planners," \textit{(Palo Alto / Peninsula
Times Tribune)} [hand-stamped], July 16, 1959 [hand dated], San Jose Public Library, California Room,
Clipping file, “Greenbelts” envelope; "Court Ruling Awaited on Sc Greenbelt Issue," \textit{(Palo Alto / Peninsula
Times Tribune)} [hand-labeled], November 9, 1960 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara
County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); "Greenbelt' Law Headed for
Test," \textit{(Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune)} [hand-stamped], February 2, 1961 [hand dated], Clipping
File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); "Greenbelting
and planners at the state level ultimately prevented greenbelt zones from achieving the goal of protecting county and state farmland.

The single most important weakness of agricultural zoning was that it failed to reduce the economic pressure that rising tax liability put on Santa Clara County farmers. Agricultural zoning did protect orchardists and other farmers from annexation, thereby preventing cities from forcing landowners under their municipal authority and then imposing special assessments and higher city property taxes to subsidize the costs of roads, sewers, and other infrastructure to serve nearby new development. The presence of neighboring development nevertheless still raised the assessed value of agricultural property, squeezing the farmer with higher county property taxes. In 1957, Santa Clara County’s agricultural interests joined with farm groups statewide to convince legislators to attempt to address this by amending the state tax code to encourage county assessors to value farmlands based on their current agricultural use. However, the state attorney general ruled that tax assessments should take into account nearby land use when determining the value of agricultural land. Thus, for agricultural landowners closest to new or potential development, tax assessors continued to value the land based on its

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359 The Santa Clara County Assessor did not deem the “self-imposed restricted use” under greenbelt zoning as meriting any different treatment compared to other properties. Thus, agriculturally zoned land in Santa Clara County remained subject to the “highest and best standard.” For lands surrounded by development, this meant being accessed based on the sale or developed value. See: “A Statement of Policy Relative to Agricultural Taxation by Assessor of Santa Clara County,” (Exclusive agricultural zoning [booklet], County of Santa Clara Planning Department, February 1958, Clipping File - Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); “Preservation of Open Spaces through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt Zoning,” 641.

developed value even if it was currently under greenbelt zoning and agricultural use.\textsuperscript{361} The resultant higher tax bill was one more factor pushing orchardists and farmers already squeezed by a declining agricultural economy to sell their property to eager developers.\textsuperscript{362}

County officials also struggled with implementing greenbelt zoning in a way that sustained the viability of agriculture in the valley. According to the county’s policy statement for agricultural zoning, the primary purpose of greenbelt zoning was to protect Santa Clara County’s farmland from the “infiltration of urban development.” County officials aimed to use agricultural zoning to "create large contiguous blocks of agricultural land" that was being “proficiently used for agriculture."\textsuperscript{363} County guidelines for landowners described 100-acre parcels as the ideal minimum size for exclusive agricultural zoning, and the early greenbelts approved by planners ranged between 100 and 4,870 acres.\textsuperscript{364} Eventually, however, the county began approving petitions for

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\footnotesize\textsuperscript{361} As the Santa Clara County Counsel explained to the Board of Supervisors, the 1957 amendments provided little relief for the agricultural landowner “ringed by subdivisions and/or city annexations.” This was because “in view of past experience, the assessor will find it difficult to say there is no ‘reasonable probability’ that the agriculturalist will not succumb to the overtures of the subdividers, the annexing city, or both.” See: "State Laws Relating to Greenbelt Zoning - Analysis by Santa Clara County Counsel," (Exclusive agricultural zoning [booklet], County of Santa Clara Planning Department, February 1958, Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library). (Extracts from a July 25, 1957 letter to the Board of Supervisors by Spencer K. Williams, Santa Clara County Counsel).

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{362} Even in the case of greenbelt property, the tax assessor was to take into account the impermanent nature of agricultural zoning and make an assessment for a plot of land based on the most probable use of the land. For farmers closest to new development, this had a perverse, self-fulfilling impact as a decision by an assessor that a landowner was likely to sell led to higher taxes, which in turn made it more likely that a farmer would abandon greenbelt zoning and sell their land for development. See: "Preservation of Open Spaces through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt Zoning," 641-42.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{363} "Planning Commission Statement of Policy," (Exclusive agricultural zoning [booklet], County of Santa Clara Planning Department, February 1958, Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{364} "Ten Questions and Answers on Exclusive 'a' Zones," (Exclusive agricultural zoning [booklet], County of Santa Clara Planning Department, February 1958, Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).
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agricultural zones of just a few acres, undermining the best intentions of planners for continuous and sustainable agricultural blocks.

The greenbelt zoning ordinance also employed a liberal definition of agriculture despite the county’s stated focus on proficient agricultural use. County regulations allowed for greenbelt zoning of not only orchards and farms, but also land uses associated with part-time or hobbyist farmers, including plots used as plant nurseries, botanical conservatories, riding academies, guest ranches, and stables. Parks, playgrounds and community centers operated by a public agency were also subject to designation as agricultural zones. Under a broad catchall category of agricultural “open space,” officials even extended greenbelt protection to golf courses. Indeed, the definition of agricultural use proved extremely expansive. County officials stirred controversy for a “misuse” of agricultural zoning in 1962 and 1963 by approving petitions for greenbelt protection from several dog kennel owners. In short, by straying from the goal of protecting large contiguous plots of agricultural land, the application of greenbelt zoning fell short of its proponents’ original goal of protecting significant acres of viable farmland in Santa Clara County.

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365 “Green Gold: 1950s Greenbelt Planning in Santa Clara County, California,” 6-7; “Extract from County Zoning Ordinance (Excl. ‘A’ Districts),” (Exclusive agricultural zoning [booklet], County of Santa Clara Planning Department, February 1958, Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).
366 “Green Gold: 1950s Greenbelt Planning in Santa Clara County, California,” 6-7; “Greenbelt Limits Outlined,” (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-stamped], February 28, 1961 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); “Extract from County Zoning Ordinance (Excl. ‘A’ Districts).”
367 “Does Dog Raising Qualify as Farming Operation?,” (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-stamped], December 20, 1962 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); “Greenbelt Pleas Won for Kennel,” (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-stamped], February 21, 1963 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).
Administering greenbelt zoning also proved difficult and contentious for the county. Since zoning decisions required a study by the planning department, Santa Clara County officials created a mechanism allowing for “emergency zoning” petitions from landowners threatened by imminent annexation that would compromise their agricultural land use before the county could take action. The resulting influx of emergency greenbelt zoning requests not only created an administrative burden for officials, it also raised tensions between the county and local cities. Landowners in some cases resorted to emergency greenbelt petitions to try to stop annexations that a majority of local residents had approved and that were already in progress, turning agricultural zoning into a minority veto of city expansions. In other cases, landowners filed greenbelt petitions to avoid unwanted ordinances or restrictions that would come with annexation. For example, the managers of the Santa Clara County Fairgrounds sought emergency agricultural zoning to stop the city of San Jose from imposing restrictions on the use of

368 The county received numerous emergency petitions over the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s. The pace seems to have picked up in the 1960s. For example, see: "Morgan Hill Greenbelt Bid Received," (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-stamped], November 11, 1960 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); "Apricot Grower Gets Greenbelt around Ranch," (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-stamped], January 26, 1961 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); "Board Defers Action on Greenbelt," (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-labeled], January 28, 1961 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); "Greenbelting Petition Denied - Camellia Grower," (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-stamped], December 12, 1961 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); "Planners Ok Greenbelt in Sunnyvale," (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-stamped], January 20, 1961 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).

369 To lessen the administrative burden arising from numerous emergency greenbelt petitions, one supervisor recommended giving agricultural zoning to all existing farms. The proposal was unworkable since the existing law and ordinance was voluntary. See: "Greenbelt All Farms, Supervisor Proposes," (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-stamped], August 23, 1960 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).

370 Sixteen landowners filed emergency greenbelt petitions with the county to stop the annexation by Mountain View after a majority of the 500 impacted residents voted to approve annexation. The landowners hoped to stop the annexation already in progress by Mountain View. See: "Greenbelting Recommended for 2.8 Acre Area Egg Ranch."
tents after annexation. In another example, a kennel owner attempted to get agricultural zoning after learning that the city of Mountain View might not approve a new building on his property after a pending annexation. As tensions mounted with local cities, the county attempted to clarify that emergency zoning could not be used primarily to block annexations, but was instead meant to protect agricultural landowners from incurring tax liabilities that threatened the financial sustainability of their operations or to preserve open spaces.

The controversy over greenbelts came to a head in 1960 when the city of Sunnyvale annexed properties granted emergency agricultural zoning by the county, initiating the first legal challenge to the Greenbelt Law. The state attorney general determined in 1962 that Santa Clara County officials had improperly granted greenbelt zoning to the properties in question. The ruling stated that “emergency” proceedings did not remove the requirement that the county base zoning decisions on a thorough land use study and that agricultural zoning should not be a "means of permitting a minority, with

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371 The county studied and ultimately denied a request by the county fair association for greenbelt zoning to prevent annexation by the city of San Jose. The managers of the fair association feared that annexation would bring a restriction on the use of tents. See: "Board Order Sc Fairground Greenbelt Study," (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-labeled], March 28, 1961 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); "Greenbelt Limits Outlined."

372 The planning commission initially recommended agricultural zoning for the kennel. But the county board of supervisors overruled the recommendation, asking Mountain View to instead consider modifying city ordinances to accommodate the landowner’s request. See: "Greenbelt Pleas Won for Kennel; "Greenbelt Zoning Withheld for Mt. View Dog Kennels," (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune [hand-stamped], March 26, 1963 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).

373 "Greenbelt Limits Outlined."

374 "Court Ruling Awaited on Sc Greenbelt Issue; ”Greenbelt' Law Headed for Test."
the aid of the board of supervisors, to block annexations desired by the majority of landowners.\footnote{Findings of the state attorney general quoted in Paul Emerson, "Sc County Greenbelting Flunks Tests," (\textit{Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune} [hand-stamped], March 9, 1962 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).}

Another shortcoming of the measure was that, in practice, it did not allow for careful long-term or efficient urban planning as its proponents had hoped. Due to its voluntary nature, landowners had to opt in to agricultural zoning, and could petition to have the restriction removed if they later decided to sell or develop their property. Planners therefore had no effective way to control which lands became or remained greenbelts.\footnote{For example, planners had little effective recourse regarding 104 acres of formerly agriculturally zoned land that was converted to residential and commercial use: "Councilman Calls Zoning 'a Jesse James Approach',” (\textit{Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune} [hand-stamped], January 8, 1964 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).} The result was a patchwork of unincorporated greenbelt islands surrounded by commercial and residential development.\footnote{Such was Belser’s sentiment in 1959 when a 2.8-acre plot was greenbelted surrounded by development, making the ranch a tiny unincorporated island. The planning director noted that such greenbelts created a patchwork that prevented proper planning. In a second example in 1963, the county gave greenbelt status to a 6-acre orchard despite the fact that the nearby city was annexing the surrounding area for residential development. The move made the orchard a lone rural island amidst subdivisions. See: "Greenbelt Given Green Light,” (\textit{Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune} [hand-stamped], January 30, 1963 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library); "Greenbelting Recommended for 2.8 Acre Area Egg Ranch."} Not only did this make agricultural operations more difficult for the farmer while raising their property tax bill, it muddled jurisdictional boundaries for municipal services and hindered infrastructure projects.\footnote{For example, in the 1960s, the city of Sunnyvale planned to extend a road, but the county gave greenbelt protection to an orchard in the path – effectively delaying the road expansion. See: "Supervisors Approve Greenbelt,” (\textit{Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune} [hand-stamped], January 8, 1963 [hand dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Greenbelts” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).} In short, the voluntary and impermanent implementation of agricultural zoning in Santa Clara County prevented coherent and efficient planning by the county and cities, thus...
creating an intermixed patchwork of zones that ultimately undermined the goal of preserving contiguous agricultural lands and sustaining a viable farm economy.

The use of greenbelt zoning to protect agricultural land never lived up to the vision espoused by Weston and Belser since most farmers wanted to keep the ability to use and sell their land as they wished, but meanwhile wanted some protection from the higher tax bills caused by nearby development. Within Santa Clara County, orchardists and farmers, confident in their ability to influence county government, accepted the concept of agricultural zoning on a voluntary basis. At the state level, however, agriculture zoning proved politically unviable because statewide farmers feared that legislators would eventually impose mandatory zoning restrictions and permanently restrict the usage and sale of their lands. While the Santa Clara County Farm Bureau and county orchardists had supported the Greenbelt Law, the California Farm Bureau and other state farm groups emerged as leading opponents of agricultural planning and land-use legislation, killing any potential for a statewide implementation of a greenbelt zoning policy. Instead of zoning, the state farm bureau and other agricultural groups lobbied for preferential taxation for farmers. State agricultural interests secured the passage of the Land Conservation Act (popularly known as the Williamson Act) in 1965, followed by the Property Tax Assessment Act in 1966. Under a program created by the two statutes, landowners with holdings greater than 100 acres could voluntarily contract to use their lands only for agricultural use for a period of ten years in exchange for preferential tax treatment from the counties. Despite the significant tax benefits, few farmers located near

380 Ibid.
urban areas took advantage of the voluntary program, preferring to keep their lands unrestricted for potential sale or development. In the end, the greenbelt effort that began with a coalition between planners and orchardists in Santa Clara County failed to survive the transition to state level politics.

The attempt to save agricultural land in Santa Clara County through voluntary greenbelt zoning failed in large part because of intense economic pressure that made it more profitable for agricultural landowners to sell land to developers than to try to continue cultivating it in the midst of an increasingly urbanized region. Divisions between Santa Clara County orchardists and rural growers elsewhere also undermined the viability of greenbelt zoning as a solution. The orchardists of Santa Clara County were essentially suburban landowners – growers who operated farms close to expanding cities – and many of them were part-time agriculturalists. Like other urban and suburban landowners, they were more comfortable turning to zoning, an urban land-use tool, to protect their property values and interests. Rural landowners located farther away from the urban centers and in other parts of the state, meanwhile, did not face the same kind of pressure from higher tax assessments as the suburban orchardists of Santa Clara County and thus were wary of zoning restrictions on the use of their lands. The division between growers combined with market pressures to undermine the effectiveness of greenbelts for preserving agricultural lands in Santa Clara County.

The planners and orchardists in the greenbelt movement likewise failed to gain support from the region’s enlarged professional and middle class. Longtime residents

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may have had some nostalgia for the orchard economy of the past, but many new residents associated with the high-technology economy were more concerned with the aesthetics of nearby rural pockets than they were with the actual business of farming. Many homeowners complained of the sights, sounds and smells of nearby agricultural operations, disliking the dust, pesticides, and work crews associated with local orchards.\footnote{383 Griffin and Chatham, "Urban Impact on Agriculture in Santa-Clara County, California," 206.} Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, many residents wanted more parks and open space for recreation and aesthetic reasons, and did not have the same concern that planners such as Weston and Belser had about preserving Santa Clara County’s agricultural heritage.

Greenbelts slowed the conversion of the county’s agricultural land for a time, but over the next several years, more and more of valley’s farmers and orchardists continued to sell their lands to developers or stopped agricultural production. Between 1945 and 1965, 60\% of the Santa Clara County’s agricultural land was lost to development.\footnote{384 The 1945 to 1965 figure is from The Nation. See: Degnan, "Santa Clara: The Bulldozer Crop," 242.} The orchards that had given “The Valley of Heart’s Delight” its name virtually disappeared over the course of the postwar decades. In 1941, Santa Clara County had 100,529 acres of fruit and nut orchards.\footnote{385 "Santa Clara County Crop Report - 2011," (Santa Clara County, Department of Agriculture), 11.} By the 1975, 80\% of the valley’s orchards were gone, and just 6,819 acres of fruit and nut orchards remained a decade later.\footnote{386 "Santa Clara County Agricultural Crop Report - 2005," (Santa Clara County, Department of Agriculture), 8.}

The inability of Weston and Belser’s orchardist-planner coalition to stop the decline of agriculture in Santa Clara County over the course of the 1950s and 1960s underscored the declining importance of the fruit economy in the postwar decades. It also
highlighted the victory of a younger generation of leaders – exemplified by the Progress Committee and city manager Dutch Hamann in San Jose – intent upon pursuing growth and development over agriculture. By the 1950s, pro-growth coalitions had firm control over local power in San Jose and other local cities. The area’s remaining orchardists, despite lingering influence at the county level, could not muster an effective political challenge to the growth-oriented cities and developers. At the same time that orchardists were declining, however, new stakeholders associated with Lockheed and other defense contractors and electronics firms were entering the valley in large numbers. Hamann and the development interests ignored the protests of residents associated with the declining fruit economy. As the number and economic influence of those associated with the defense and electronic industries swelled, however, Hamann and other pro-growth leaders found their authority under attack from another quarter as the new residents that they had attracted with their development policies mobilized against growth.

**Virginia Shaffer and Conservative Opposition to Growth**

San Jose’s growth leadership received its first significant electoral challenge in the 1960s as residents came together in citizen and homeowner groups to counter the side effects of rapid and poorly planned development. Over the course of the previous decade, San Jose became home to tens of thousands of new residents, many of them skilled technical workers and professionals attracted by Santa Clara County’s burgeoning defense and electronics industries. This enlarged middle class of educated and affluent white-collar newcomers and their families was fast becoming a new majority. By the
1960s, the newcomers joined with likeminded residents to speak out against the high taxes, substandard municipal services, sprawl and other ills associated with San Jose’s runaway growth. Soon these mobilized homeowner activists began to challenge the pro-growth leadership by winning seats on the city council, eventually displacing the incumbent municipal regime in the 1970s. For a time, the standard-bearer of this anti-growth and anti-incumbent movement was “housewife” Virginia Shaffer who became the first woman to serve on the San Jose city council from 1962 to 1971.\(^{387}\) With ties to Lockheed and the other defense firms that dominated Santa Clara County’s economy in the 1950s and 1960s, Shaffer and other early homeowner activists offered a fiscally conservative challenge to Hamann and the developers. Shaffer and her supporters, unhappy about high taxes, poor services and encroachment into their suburban neighborhoods by commercial and industrial development, wanted a drastic reduction in growth as well as fiscal austerity. Shaffer and the homeowner groups over the course of the 1960s put Hamann on the defensive, eventually pushing the city manager to step down and leading a grassroots anti-incumbent revolt that reformulated the city council.

By the end of the 1960s, however, the constituency of homeowner groups in San Jose had evolved with the continued influx of new residents into Santa Clara County fostered by an expanding electronics industry that was diversifying beyond defense and aerospace. Unlike the southern part of the state that received numerous migrants from conservative parts of the Midwest and south, the rapid growth experienced by Santa Clara

\(^{387}\) Trounstine and Christensen, Movers and Shakers; Terry Christensen, "San Jose Becomes the Capital of Silicon Valley - Supplemented Excerpt," in San Jose: A City for All Seasons, ed. Judith Henderson (Encitas, California: Heritage Press, 1997); Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream, 107-08; Flammang, Women's Political Voice, 40.
County in the 1950s and 1960s consisted of a younger cohort of professionals and high-technology workers from more diverse origins. Shaffer’s conservative critique of runaway growth and high taxes ultimately gave way to an emerging suburban liberal compromise that blended fiscal restraint with a call for a proactive government role to manage growth while providing for a better quality of life for residents. In short, Shaffer could not draw from a conservative constituency to mobilize a New Right homeowner movement like the “suburban warriors” of Orange County. Instead, suburban liberal reformers led a renegotiation of the terms of liberal growth politics in San Jose and Santa Clara County. Rather than reject the state, suburban liberals put it to work protecting and enhancing suburban quality of life.

Shaffer, like many postwar residents in San Jose, was a newcomer. Born in Chicago in 1922, Shaffer grew up in Wisconsin. She attended the University of Wisconsin, but did not earn a degree. In the 1940s, she met Harold Shaffer, an engineer, while they were both working for Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in Southern California and the two were married in 1946. The couple moved to the San Jose area in 1957 when Harold transferred to Lockheed’s Santa Clara County facility. Concern over zoning issues in her neighborhood motivated Shaffer to begin attending city council meetings in 1960. She also became active with homeowner groups similarly displeased with the

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388 Census figures suggest that Santa Clara County had a younger population compared to other similar regions, with many migrants coming from the north and west.
encroachment of commercial development on residential areas, rising taxes, insufficient parks, and other issues related to poorly planned and rapid growth.  

Shaffer and her homeowner group allies found that San Jose’s city leaders showed little concern for their grievances. The newcomers were shocked to find just how unaccountable the city leadership was to residents. Up until this point, City Manager Hamann and pro-growth majorities on the San Jose city council had cooperated with developers to run city affairs with little scrutiny. The part-time city councilors typically deferred to the expertise and advice of Hamann’s administration and developers for many decisions. It was thus common for the council to meet privately with Hamann to agree on pending issues such as annexations, zoning, and development projects prior to convening public city meetings. Meanwhile, Hamann and city officials had no compunctions about meeting privately with developers and investors at the secretive “Book-of-the-Month” club meetings, or with investing personally in projects pending before the city. In short, San Jose was run by a cohort of mostly white, upper-middle-class men during the 1950s based on a close network of business and personal connections. Many of the city’s leaders had attended the same local private schools, were alumni of nearby colleges, had overlapping affiliation in local clubs and organizations, and stood to benefit personally from promoting growth and development projects.

Finding Hamann and the city council unresponsive to her concerns and wanting to bring more accountability to municipal government, in 1962 Shaffer ran for a council seat

390 “Fischer, Shaffer, Pace Win City Council Seats,” San Jose Mercury, May 9 1962; Flammang, Women’s Political Voice.
392 The “Book-of-the-Month Club” is described in the previous chapter.
393 Flammang, Women’s Political Voice.
as part of an anti-incumbent block of candidates along with Clyde Fisher, a former city
council member, and Dr. Joseph L. Pace. With strong grassroots support from
homeowner groups, San Jose voters elected the three challengers, making Shaffer the first
woman to serve on the city council. The victory of the three candidates over the
incumbents was a significant political upset made possible by the grassroots mobilization
of homeowner groups concerned about zoning issues, high taxes, and controlling
growth. These middle-class homeowner activists, many of whom had connections to
defense and technology companies like Lockheed, played an increasingly important role
in challenging the pro-growth leadership in San Jose and Santa Clara County over the
course of the 1960s and 1970s. As the high-technology economy expanded, so did the
political and economic power of the residents associated with it. Shaffer’s victory made
her an early leader of this new class of technology managers, professionals and
homeowners.

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394 In addition to homeowner groups, the three also enjoyed the backing of San Jose’s private water
company that was eager to block a public buyout supported by the incumbent city council. Council member
Robert Doerr, a longtime supporter of the city buying the water works, secured a 7-0 vote to open
negotiations for the purchase. When the negotiations dragged on, Doerr says that the water company
supported the election of Shaffer, Pace and Fisher in 1962, who then joined another opponent of the plan to
vote 4-3 against the project. See: Harry Farrell, "San Jose Water Buy-out Plan Fails," San Jose Mercury
News, October 7 1986.

395 "Fischer, Shaffer, Pace Win City Council Seats; Flammang, Women’s Political Voice.

396 Fisher and Shaffer appear to have run as “running mates.” The San Jose Mercury News called their
displacement of incumbents Paul Moore (serving as the titular Mayor at the time) and George Siefried “an
upheaval in the city’s political structure,” Meanwhile, Pace ran on an “austerity” platform. See: "Fischer,
Shaffer, Pace Win City Council Seats; Michael Cronk and Mack Lundstrom, "Dr. Joseph Pace, Ex-S.J.

397 According to the later recollection of Charles W. Davidson, a San Jose developer, “Lockheed had come
to the valley in the late 1950s, spurred development in the West Valley and, in 1962, got Shaffer
elected….” As he recalled, “[t]hey decided it was time to do things their way.” Indeed, besides Shaffer,
many of the grassroots reformers worked for or were the wives of employees of companies like Lockheed,
IBM, and the other emerging electronics firms in San Jose. Davidson quoted in: Joanne Grant, "S.J. Recall
Effort in ‘64 Only a Dim Memory," ibid., April 4 1994.
Shaffer became the outsider voice on the city council, speaking for new residents unhappy with the status quo. San Jose city council meetings for the first time saw hot debates over development and zoning issues attended by a restive public. Shaffer and the homeowner groups criticized the lack of stringent standards, poor planning and absent oversight on past and present development projects. The new councilwoman also loudly objected to the secret meetings held by Hamann and the city council outside of the public eye, and questioned the cozy relationship between city officials and development interests. Developers, in a break from years past, found their projects under scrutiny and subject to bitter controversy as Shaffer voted against projects she felt were too expensive or that were not a clear benefit to residents. Since she was in the minority if not the sole dissenting vote, Shaffer often made her case directly to the people. For example, when her former campaign ally Fisher and others on the council considered moving the San Jose city hall back into the downtown in the mid-1960s, Shaffer and the homeowner groups pushed a successful ballot measure preventing the relocation of city offices from their current location without a popular vote. Shaffer and her allies also

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398 According to former San Jose Mayor George Starbird, the election of Shaffer in 1962 based on an anti-incumbent platform and with the support of emerging homeowner organizations changed the tenor of San Jose politics. Starbird observed that "City Hall audiences became unruly for the first time in history...[– y]ou could not seem to get the pulse of the voters - what they actually wanted." For quote and elaboration, see: Trounstine and Christensen, *Movers and Shakers.*

399 Grant, "S.J. Recall Effort in '64 Only a Dim Memory; "Councilwoman Objects to Three Appointments."

400 For example, Shaffer campaigned against the installation of fluoridation equipment in the city water system, arguing it was too expensive. She also voted against the purchase the water company by the city. See: "Letters from the People," *Modesto Bee,* April 23 1967; Farrell, "San Jose Water Buy-out Plan Fails; Mark Lundstrom, "Virginia Shaffer, 1st Woman to Serve on S.J. City Council," ibid., May 14 1998.

raised vocal public challenges to proposed annexations of new areas by the city as well as instances of commercial encroachment on residentially zoned neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{402}

Shaffer and her allies in homeowner groups, unable to unseat Hamann at the ballot box, launched a recall initiative in 1964 against four of the councilors closely associated with the city manager. The reformers cited San Jose’s “hodge-podge development” and “extravagant growth,” charging the four council members with supporting the Hamann administration’s expansionist policies, exercising favoritism in zoning decisions, practicing poor planning oversight and imposing high taxes.\textsuperscript{403}

Frederick U. Nelson, the leader of the Citizen’s Recall Committee that formed to spearhead the recall effort, characterized the homeowners’ grievances thus:

\begin{quote}
[s]uch examples as a hamburger stand on Meridian Road … next to a fine and expensive home, our policy of haphazard and crazy-quilt annexations which are apparent on any multi-colored map, and the lack of adequate police and fire protection in the City are all part of the legacy of troubles given to us by this Council Majority.\textsuperscript{404}
\end{quote}

Underscoring the connection of technology companies and their employees in the homeowner movement, Nelson was an employee of Lockheed and a close homeowner group ally of Shaffer.\textsuperscript{405} Despite the efforts of the Committee, the recall vote took place

\textsuperscript{402} Bill Romano, “'Madam No' Still Says No - First S.J. Councilwoman Eschews Politics Now That She's Retired,” ibid., June 5 1989.

\textsuperscript{403} “Arguments for and against Recall of Certain Elective Officers,” (City of San Jose, Municipal Recall Election, July 14, 1964, Voter pamphlet, Clipping file, “San Jose - Elections - 1964” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).

\textsuperscript{404} Quoted from: "Argument in favor of recalling Parker L. Hathaway," signed by Citizens' Recall Committee, Frederick U. Nelson, Chairman. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{405} Grant, "S.J. Recall Effort in '64 Only a Dim Memory."
during an off-season special election marked by low voter turnout, and Shaffer and her allies failed to win enough votes unseat the incumbents.\textsuperscript{406}

The incumbent majority survived the recall, but the dissatisfaction represented by Shaffer and the homeowner groups was growing stronger. Beginning in 1965, the city’s pro-growth leadership began to take steps to respond to homeowner dissent. First, they proposed removing the biannual vote of confidence for the office of city manager. Hamann had won the confidence of the electorate in recent elections, but his margin of victory was narrowing and the biannual vote gave Shaffer and the homeowner activists an occasion to attack the city manager and his administration. Second, the old guard leadership formed a citizens’ group to propose amendments to the San Jose city charter. Although the charter group heavily represented the city’s traditional growth interests, it also included some representatives from homeowner, minority and labor groups. The most important charter amendment proposed by the group was to make the position of mayor an elected office once again – reversing a key Progressive Era measure. The mayor would have the prestige that came from winning a citywide election and preside over the city council, but the position still only had one vote on the council and no veto power. Thus, the mayor would have to secure the support of a majority of city council members to implement policy. Meanwhile, the city manager remained the primary administrator for San Jose.\textsuperscript{407} Other changes included raising the number of signatures required to put initiatives and referendums on the ballot, making the city auditor an

\textsuperscript{406} Only 19 percent of voters turned out for the special election – and they supported the recall targets by a 2-1 margin. See: ibid.

appointed rather than elected office, and granting more administrative power to the
council. The proponents of the amendments presented the changes as needed
modernizations and reforms to the charter, while critics – including Shaffer – opposed the
measures for increasing the powers of the mayor and city council at the expense of the
people.408 While Hamann and the incumbent majority on the city council abstained from
publically endorsing the charter amendments, the proposals benefited from the support of
other key parts the pro-growth coalition, including development and real estate interests,
utility companies, and Joseph Ridder and his Mercury News. Despite Shaffer’s
opposition, the merits of the proposals divided the homeowner groups and San Jose’s
voters ultimately passed the new charter.409

Prominent local businessperson Ron James became the first elected mayor of San
Jose since the Progressive Era after the first election under the new charter in 1967.410
James originally joined the council in 1966, and the majority had appointed him to the
rotating position of mayor a few months later. When the new separate position of mayor
came before the voters in 1967, James thus ran as the incumbent and easily won
reelection with 79% of the vote.411 James was a fresh face on the council and his
campaign rhetoric stressed the need to listen to homeowner demands, but he had secured

408 “Lengthy Ballot in City April - 26 Candidates,” (North San Jose Sun [hand-labeled], February 24, 1965
[hand-dated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1965, April” envelope, California
Room, San Jose Public Library); “Measures on Ballot Listed,” (Unknown newspaper, 1965? [undated],
Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “San Jose Elections, 1965, April” envelope, California Room, San Jose
Public Library).
409 “Lengthy Ballot in City April - 26 Candidates; Trounstine and Christensen, Movers and Shakers;
“Measures on Ballot Listed.”
410 “Challenger Loses San Jose Mayor Bid - First Popular Vote,” (Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune
[hand-stamped], April 12, 1967 [hand-stamped], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “San Jose - Elections
1967 - April” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).
411 Joanne Grant, ”Time for a Change: S.J. Chamber Head to Retire in 1990,” San Jose Mercury News,
his position with the help of the city’s development-oriented interests and generally held pro-growth positions. The new mayor recognized, however, that changes to the status quo were necessary to address growing political opposition.\textsuperscript{412} He pushed the council majority to appointed Norman Mineta to take the seat vacated when he became mayor. A young Japanese American businessperson and friend of James, Mineta’s appointment was intended to add diversity to the council in the face of growing complaints from minority residents that their interests were not represented on the council.\textsuperscript{413}

By 1970, 22% of the local population was Hispanic and 2.5% were African American. Most members of these minority groups lived in unincorporated neighborhoods to the east which had earned the moniker “Sal Si Puedes” (“get out if you can” in Spanish). Many of the issues facing San Jose generally were worse in these minority neighborhoods – schools were extremely overcrowded and underfunded, infrastructure was missing or subpar, and emergency services inadequate. In addition, these communities complained of harassment and racial bias by law enforcement, housing discrimination, and a lack of representation in the white-dominated local government. Over the course of the 1960s, minority residents left out of the region’s prosperity mobilized to challenge the status quo as well.\textsuperscript{414} By appointing Mineta as the first non-white member of the city council, James and the incumbent leaders hoped to quiet some of the criticism from local minorities – a role that the new Japanese council

\textsuperscript{413} Rick Vogt, ”Mineta Appointment Was a Breakthrough,” (San Jose Sun [undated], Clipping File-Santa Clara County, “Norman Mineta, 1960 to 1979” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).
\textsuperscript{414} See for example: Trounstine and Christensen, Movers and Shakers.
member embraced.\textsuperscript{415} Mineta’s appointment to the council in 1967 and re-election two years later – despite the opposition of Shaffer – heralded a liberal shift in San Jose’s leadership and opened the door for a new coalition uniting homeowner and minority groups. Nonetheless, for a while longer at least, Shaffer remained the primary spokesperson for homeowner discontent.

Shaffer’s political opposition to Hamann and the developers may have earned her the support of homeowner groups, but it made her increasingly isolated on a city council dominated by entrenched “old boy network” politics. Due to her role as a gadfly on the city council when it came to issues of growth and development, Shaffer’s political opponents dubbed her “Madam No” shortly after she took office, a nickname that the \textit{San Jose Mercury News} also adopted.\textsuperscript{416} The first woman on the city council was often bitterly at odds with the other six male councilors, including her two former anti-incumbent allies, and the majority found various ways big and small to snub Shaffer. In 1962, the six male members took turns naming city parks after each other, but there was conspicuously no move to name a park for Shaffer.\textsuperscript{417} Labeling her the “scourge of City Hall” and “prophetess of doom” for her vocal opposition to development projects, the other councilors voted to censure Shaffer the year after she took office, but the

\textsuperscript{415} In his comments to the press after being appointed, Mineta expressed a hope that young African-American and Hispanic youths would see him as an example of achievement and a role model. See: Vogt, “Mineta Appointment Was a Breakthrough.”


\textsuperscript{417} Five the of council members – George Starbird, Robert Doerr, Louis Solari, Robert Welch and Paul Moore – took turns voting to support parks named after each other. The sixth council member, Parker Hathaway, already had a park. Conspicuously absent was any proposal to name a park after Shaffer. See: Harry Farrell, "Public Nomenclature: Fame in a Name Is Often Fleeting," \textit{San Jose Mercury News}, July 14 1986.
councilwoman retained a private attorney to successfully defend herself. On one occasion in 1964, the council majority went so far as to lock Shaffer out of a public council meeting. During her time on the council, the male majority broke the tradition of rotating the positions of mayor and vice mayor based on seniority to bypass Shaffer five times – even skipping over her to give the post to James in 1966 just a few months after he became a councilmember. In 1967, council member Pace – one of the four targeted by the homeowner recall – chose to give up his seat to run against Shaffer in her district. Shaffer beat him handily. Shaffer may have enjoyed the support of homeowner groups and voters dissatisfied with the status quo, but she was an isolated dissenting vote on the council, limiting her political effectiveness.

The pro-growth majority on the city council remained resistant to change, but by the late 1960s, demographic shifts favored Shaffer and the reform activists seeking change. As the region’s electronics industry continued to attract more professional and middle-class residents, local homeowner groups served as a rallying point for residents displeased with the status quo. Discontented homeowners soon had enough numbers to swing local elections. In 1967, Shaffer gained some support with the election of Joseph

\footnote{Shaffer charged that the other councilors violated California law by locking her out of a public city council meeting. See: Bill Romano, "Madam No' Still Says No - First S.J. Councilwoman Eschews Politics Now That She's Retired," ibid., June 5 1989; Mark Lundstrom, "Virginia Shaffer, 1st Woman to Serve on S.J. City Council," ibid., May 14 1998.}


\footnote{Instead of keeping his role as mayor, Pace chose to run against Shaffer, calling her a “poisoned lady” who could not win election as “dogcatcher.” Shaffer beat Pace by a wide margin (22,666 to 9,142 in a field of seven candidates). See: "The Seven Aspirants for Council Seat 3," ibid., April 9 1967; "Challenger Loses San Jose Mayor Bid - First Popular Vote; Cronk and Lundstrom, "Dr. Joseph Pace, Ex-S.J. Mayor Had Roles in Creation of Two Arts Venues; Mark Lundstrom, "Virginia Shaffer, 1st Woman to Serve on S.J. City Council," ibid., May 14 1998.}
Colla to the council. While Colla ran as a maverick and outsider opposed to business-as-usual on the council, his background as a downtown merchant meant that his priorities did not always align with Shaffer and the homeowner groups. For Shaffer and her allies to shape policy outcomes on the council, they would need at least four reliable votes. As the 1969 city election approached, Shaffer and her supporters in the homeowner groups geared up to make a push to gain control of the council by supporting a slate of three candidates for office. Not only would the additional friendly council members give Shaffer the majority necessary to implement policy changes, many observers saw the move as a prelude to her expected run for mayor in 1971. City Manager Hamann, recognizing that the political landscape was shifting, announced in 1968 that he would retire at the end of the next year. With the most visible leader of the pro-growth coalition stepping down, the 1969 elections became a showdown between Mayor James and Shaffer over the future of San Jose.

The year 1969 marked a dramatic disruption in San Jose politics with Shaffer and the homeowner groups breaking the hold that pro-growth interests had on municipal government since the 1940s. Two of the three candidates endorsed and supported by Shaffer, David Goglio and Kurt Gross, won council seats. The president of a homeowner’s association and employee of IBM, Goglio campaigned with sharp attacks

421 “Virginia Shaffer, 1st Woman to Serve on S.J. City Council.”
422 Colla, a longtime downtown drugstore owner, described himself as a lifelong Democrat when he ran for office in the 1960s, but in the 1970s, he adopted a more conservative position, playing a key role in the “Fearsome Foursome” that sided with development interests in opposition to Janet Gray Hayes and the liberal minority on the council at the time (discussed in Chapter 6). See also: "Political Battle Page: Questions and Answers by City Council Aspirants for Seat Four and Five - Sun Newspaper Interviews Candidates," San Jose Sun, March 31 1965.
424 Ibid.
on Hamann and his growth policies. His opponent was Louis Solari, a council member originally elected in 1952 who was seeking an unprecedented fifth term. Solari was a real estate professional and a close ally and supporter of the outgoing city manager.\textsuperscript{425} By replacing Solari, Goglio removed the second longest serving representative of the pro-growth coalition after Hamann. Meanwhile, Gross, a member of the San Jose Planning Commission and critic of San Jose’s past growth policies prevailed over the candidate preferred by the incumbent majority.\textsuperscript{426} Although the third candidate endorsed by Shaffer did not make it past the April primary, voters elected Walter Hays, an attorney originally from San Mateo who had moved to San Jose from San Francisco in 1963. Hays was an outspoken environmentalist and advocate of better-planned growth to make San Jose more livable while also attracting industry.\textsuperscript{427} When City Manager Hamann stepped down at the end of 1969 to end his 19 years in office, he left a city council whose new majority had campaigned in opposition to him and his policies. In short, the retirement was a well-timed recognition of the inevitable.


\textsuperscript{426} "Candidates for Council Seat 2," ibid., April 9 1967. (Born in 1917, Gross moved to San Jose as a child in 1921. He earned his BA from San Jose State; "S.J. Forum Puts Views of 17 Council Hopefuls 'on Record'.” (During his first run for council in 1967, Gross spoke out against the current “shotgun approach” to growth; "Court Suit-Studded S.J. Council Race Nears Finish; Vote Thursday - Thirty Candidates in Contest for Four City Posts," ibid., April 6 1969.

\textsuperscript{427} "Court Suit-Studded S.J. Council Race Nears Finish; Vote Thursday - Thirty Candidates in Contest for Four City Posts." (Hays was native of San Mateo. He received his law degree from Stanford; "Candidates for Seat 5 View Issues," \textit{San Jose Sun}, May 14 1969. (Hays was a member of the Sierra Club and longtime advocate of BART expansion. Critical of Hamann’s growth policies, Hays believed that better planning would help San Jose attract more industry – a stance that echoed the positions of Mineta and Hayes; "Election to Chart S.J. Future." (Hays said that while he agreed with some of Shaffer’s positions, he objected to her “negativism.”).
The departure of Hamann after 19 years was a dramatic indication that the political status quo was changing in San Jose. The pro-growth interests that had risen after the victory of the second wave of reformers led by Progress Committee in 1944 had lost its exclusive hold on political power in the city. However, if the developers, merchants and boosters no longer ran the city, who would emerge as the new leader? Inheriting the mantle of the pro-growth coalition was Ron James, a popular mayor liked by the voters and well respected by the business community. Could he create a moderate growth coalition that promoted development interests while satisfying the competing demands of homeowner groups, minorities and others dissatisfied with rapid growth?

Standing in opposition to James was Virginia Shaffer. The 1969 election had been a vindication of her political opposition to the incumbents and strengthened her hand on the council. If Shaffer ran for mayor in 1971, could she defeat James by campaigning as an outspoken anti-growth conservative and mustering a coalition in the vein of Orange County’s suburban New Right?

The confrontation between James and Shaffer never happened, however. In a double surprise, James did not seek re-election and Shaffer chose not to run for mayor, giving up her council seat at the end of her term. With James and Shaffer deciding not to run, San Jose voters instead elected Norman Mineta as mayor. Meanwhile, homeowner activist Janet Gray Hayes won Shaffer’s council seat. Two years later when Mineta ran for Congress, Hayes won the mayor’s office. First Mineta, and then Hayes, articulated a third path for San Jose that balanced the quality of life concerns of homeowners with the industrial growth required by the region’s important electronics industry. In doing so,
Mineta and Hayes shaped a suburban liberal coalition that came to the forefront of the third wave of reformers in San Jose and Santa Clara County.

Shaffer and her conservative critique of growth represented a path not taken for San Jose and Santa Clara County, a moment when the grassroots homeowner movement in the valley could have followed along the New Right path of Orange County. Shaffer was a lifelong Republican and staunch fiscal conservative who based her critique of growth on an anti-tax view, calling for austerity in local government. She was also a social conservative. While on the San Jose city council, Shaffer opposed the appointments of liberal community activists to various commissions and spoke out against a library exhibit honoring radical voices in the African American Civil Rights movement.\(^{428}\) She opposed the council’s appointment of Mineta as a “political” move, and advocated an “anyone but Mineta” stance in the 1969 election. Shaffer campaigned vigorously against public housing initiatives, joining as an individual appellant in a case that went to the Supreme Court to prevent municipal officials from building housing for the poor and elderly without the approval of local voters.\(^{429}\) Her political aspirations extended beyond the nonpartisan local offices of San Jose. Shaffer was active in the state and county politics, securing a position on the Republican State Central Committee and

\(^{428}\) For example, Shaffer opposed the appointment of Robert Stroughter, an African American community activist from the heavily minority and working class eastside Mayfair neighborhood, to the Human Relations Commission. Shaffer also opposed the appointment of Janet Gray Hayes to the Redevelopment Agency, calling Hayes’ support for public housing “unacceptable.” She joined with other Willow Glen residents to voice displeasure over the inclusion of portraits of Stokely Carmichael and Dr. William B. DuBois in a display commemorating Negro History Week at a local library. See: “Councilwoman Objects to Three Appointments; Conrad Clark, “Willow Glen Residents Reject Dubois, Stokely,” *Afro-American*, March 22 1969; Spalding, “S.J. Requiem: Who Really Won City Election.”

Governor Ronald Reagan appointed her to his planning advisory committee. She ran for higher office as a Republican unsuccessfully three times, campaigning for state Assembly in 1968 and 1970 and for US Congress in 1974. In short, during her more than a decade involved in public affairs, Shaffer was a strong advocate of homeowner interests based on conservative principles, and her stances secured significant local support in San Jose and recognition from New Right Republican leaders at the state level.

Given the above, why was Shaffer unable to build on her successful position as an anti-growth spokesperson and the support of San Jose homeowner groups as a political base for her campaigns for higher office? The short answer is that Shaffer’s conservatism did not match the expectations of an increasingly diverse San Jose. Shaffer’s conservative politics put her at odds with both minorities and the working class and was out of step with the quality of life concerns and social outlook of the region’s fast growing professional and middle-class population.

Shaffer became an early leader among San Jose’s homeowner activists based on her calls for austerity instead of growth, lower taxes, and zoning controls to protect suburban neighborhoods. Her support thus came from homeowner groups and residents in the more affluent and predominantly white west side of San Jose. However, Shaffer’s support of austerity and opposition to civil rights and public housing programs meant that she had little to offer minority and working-class residents concentrated in poorer east side neighborhoods. In an area experiencing explosive growth, she was also the product of a certain demographic window that, although potent for a time, never coalesced into a

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430 Lundstrom, "Virginia Shaffer, 1st Woman to Serve on S.J. City Council."
monolithic conservative political bloc in Santa Clara County. Shaffer was part of a cohort of newcomers and professionals who had arrived in the late 1940s and 1950s as part a defense electronics boom in Santa Clara County. Reminiscent of a similar group of residents in Orange County in the defense and aerospace industries, these first waves of homeowner activists tied to Lockheed and other military contractors were more responsive to Shaffer’s conservatism. Unlike Orange County, however, the presence of defense contractors like Lockheed did not foster an enduring conservative Cold War political culture in Santa Clara County. Defense had been the major driver of the region’s high technology economy, but by the start of the 1970s, the electronics industry was diversifying with the growth of semiconductor and other technology firms.431

As San Jose became one of the fastest growing cities in the US during the 1960s and 1970s, an influx of new residents from all over the country – a group that was young, educated, and affluent – poured into the area pursuing economic opportunity. This is in contrast to other rapidly growing suburban areas in other parts of the Sunbelt or outside of urban cores that expanded during the postwar decades because of the so-called “white flight” movement of working and middle-class whites from the mid-west and south away from encroaching minorities. Unlike other parts of the country riven by race and class issues during the 1960s and 1970s, San Jose’s growing professional middle class was not competing with minorities or the working class over jobs or neighborhoods. San Jose and Santa Clara County residents were thus more concerned with quality of life issues and the well-being of the electronics industry that was the lifeline of the region. They were also

431 The importance of defense and the transition to a more diverse high-technology economy is described in the previous chapter.
more open to seeing government action to serve those interests. In addition, unlike
Orange County, Santa Clara County did not have a strong base of conservative ranchers,
agriculturalists and small town merchants. Many of the region’s orchardists and fruit
interests had been involved in the liberal progressive wing of the Republican Party in
earlier decades.432 The formerly powerful fruit industry in Santa Clara County was in
disarray, with some agricultural landowners selling and leaving the area and others trying
to protect their land through greenbelt zoning. Fruit processing and associated firms were
also in decline. Even if the area’s remaining agricultural interests had been predisposed to
embrace the conservatism offered by Shaffer and the New Right – which is unlikely
given the progressive legacy of Santa Clara County – it would not have mattered much
since agriculture had lost its economic and political influence in the county.

The political culture of San Jose was thus different from other parts of the Sunbelt
or suburbs outside of old urban cores – and the conservative appeals that worked in other
parts of the country did not translate to the region’s distinct emerging political economy
of high-technology firms and affluent middle-class suburban professionals and
homeowners. Local homeowners were unhappy about high property taxes; thus fiscal
conservatism and anti-tax sentiment would be a lingering element of the middle-class
political culture in San Jose and Santa Clara County just as it was throughout the entire
state as demonstrated by Proposition 13. However, fiscal conservatism only addressed
part the discontent that homeowners felt towards the status quo. Shaffer’s conservative
social and fiscal policies estranged her from minority and working-class voters. They

432 Described in more detail in Chapter 2.
were also out of step with the quality of life demands and socially liberal outlook that predominated among the expanding younger cohort of middle-class professionals coming into the area from the 1960s onward (it is worth noting that in the 1970s, San Jose had one of the youngest average aged populations among comparable cities in the nation).\textsuperscript{433} Conservatives in Orange County and elsewhere mobilized voters based on racial antagonisms, exploited class divisions through anti-unionism, took advantage of Cold War anticommunism, or relied on the entrenched conservatism of rural voters and merchants, but none of these tactics applied in the fast growing San Jose and Santa Clara County. Instead, the region’s newer and younger residents were concerned about quality of life issues, favored environmental policies, and generally sympathized with civil rights issues. In short, the social issues that were part of the New Right’s appeal to voters in other suburban areas did not apply in the emerging Silicon Valley political cultural.

\textbf{Mayo Norman Mineta and the Beginnings of Suburban Liberalism in San Jose}

As the 1971 election approached, the city’s electorate had swelled with the influx of new residents. The population of San Jose had more than doubled over each of the postwar decades, going from 95,280 residents in 1950, 204,196 in 1960 and 445,779 in 1970.\textsuperscript{434} Over the course of these two decades, city manager Hamann and the developers had replaced orchards with subdivisions, and in the process, attracted an enlarged home-

\textsuperscript{433} Mineta cites the average San Jose age as 23.9, one of youngest average ages in nation. See: Norman Y. Mineta, “The State of the City,“ (Mayor, City of San Jose, July 8, 1971, City Hall, City of San Jose, California, Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “Norman Mineta, 1960 to 1979” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).

owning middle class that was now the most powerful voting constituency in the city. By the end of the 1960s, Shaffer and her early homeowner-activist allies – a group comprised of affluent white west-side residents that had come to the city in the 1950s and early 1960s and who were largely associated with the defense industry – had managed to capture control of the San Jose city council. The resignation of Hamann in 1969, the most visible leader of the incumbent pro-growth leadership, demonstrated the political strength of these homeowner activist groups. Given the rapid population growth and diversification of the region’s electronic industry beyond defense, however, the homeowner groups increasingly represented an evolving constituency. Thus, while the conservative vision of Shaffer and her fellow early activists had originally prevailed among homeowners in the 1950s, by the end of the 1960s achieving consensus amongst the enlarged middle class in San Jose became more challenging.

San Jose was also becoming more racially diverse during this same period. Between 1950 and 1970, persons of Hispanic origin rose from 11.4% to 15.1% and African Americans went from .6% to 2.5% of the city’s population. By the end of the 1970s, San Jose’s population reached 629,442, with minority groups accounting for approximately one-third of that number (22% Hispanic, 4.6% African American, and 8.5% Asian and Pacific Islander). Minority residents thus comprised an increasingly important portion of the electorate that mobilized to demand that city leaders address the needs of their communities. Any governing coalition in San Jose had to base itself on the recognition that the region had outgrown its mostly homogeneous roots as a

435 Ibid.
predominantly white agricultural community turned postwar high-technology industrial suburb.

The city faced tough challenges as it entered the 1970s accommodating its new residents, expanding its infrastructure and services, and balancing its budgets. More fundamentally, with lingering echoes of its recent small town agricultural past scattered amidst the hastily erected trappings of a sprawling suburban metropolis, San Jose faced a crisis of definition. The stakes were therefore high as the 1971 election for mayor approached. When Mayor James, the assumed moderate standard-bearer of the old guard, and councilor Shaffer, the most visible homeowner advocate, both decided not to run, the future course of San Jose was up for grabs.\footnote{"A Difficult Decision' - James Won't Run," \textit{San Jose Sun}, December 30 1970.} The wide-open field attracted a record 33 candidates to run for the three open local offices, including 15 contenders for the position of mayor and 11 for the city council seat vacated by Shaffer. Underscoring the diversity of the city, amongst the throng of candidates were a handful of minority leaders as well as homeowner activists running on competing visions for the future of San Jose.\footnote{The remaining six were vying for the city council seat held by Colla. Some sources cite 32 candidates, since one of the candidates for Shaffer’s seat withdrew (but their name remained on the ballot). Mike Silverman, "Voters Emphatic in Council Choices - Mineta, Colla, Hayes Primary Victors," ibid., April 16 1971.} With James and Shaffer out of the running, Vice Mayor Norman Mineta became the favorite for mayor.\footnote{Marcie Rassmussen, "Mineta Steps into S.J. Mayor's Race," \textit{San Jose Mercury}, January 9 1971.} His main challenger amongst the crowded field was council member and former homeowner association president David Goglio.\footnote{"Goglio Joins the Crowd - Runs for Mayor," \textit{San Jose Mercury News}, February 4 1971.} Meanwhile, stepping forward...
to seek Shaffer’s seat on the council was homeowner activists and outspoken environmentalist Janet Gray Hayes.440

Mineta was a lifelong resident of San Jose. His father had come to San Jose in 1902 from Japan, achieving some success as a farmer and insurance broker. In 1942, US authorities interned the 11-year-old Mineta and his family for two years during World War II in a concentration camp in Wyoming for persons of Japanese descent. Mineta’s family returned to San Jose after the war ended. He earned a degree in business administration from the University of California at Berkeley and then served two years in the Army as an intelligence officer before returning home in 1956 to join his father’s insurance business. Mineta took a strong interest in civic affairs, and Japanese community leaders appointed him in 1959 as the head of the Japanese-American Citizens League. The outgoing and meticulous Mineta was soon involved in 30 community and civic groups, including appointments to the San Jose Human Relations Commission in 1962, Santa Clara County Grand Jury in 1964, and the San Jose Housing Authority and city goals committee in 1966. Thus, when the council majority appointed him as the first non-white member of the city council in 1967, the ambitious young Mineta had already earned the attention and favor of key members of the city’s incumbent leadership, including city manager Hamann, newspaper publisher Joe Ridder, and Mayor Ron

440 “Two More in Mayor's Race,” San Jose Mercury News, February 3 1971. (Article reports that Hayes, to emphasize her environmental stand, road a bike with 30 supporters to city hall to file papers for her candidacy; Dale Rodenbaugh and Marcie Rasmussen, "Mineta Runaway for Mayor - Colla Council Shoo-in -- Mrs. Hayes Squeaks In," ibid., April 14. (Article describes Hayes as an “enthusiastic environmentalist” who “based her campaign on ecology.”)).
Seen as a protégé and potential heir apparent to James, Mineta won re-election to the council in 1969 and was appointed vice mayor.\textsuperscript{442} When James decided not to seek re-election as mayor in 1971, Mineta became the frontrunner with broad support from the city’s old guard elite.

The primary issues of the 1971 election related to unemployment, taxes, and controlling growth. San Jose was facing tough economic times as its fast-growing population strained the city’s resources at the same time that cuts to the national military budget prompted contractions among local defense contractors. The previous year, the city council majority imposed a 7½-cent utility tax to close a budget shortfall. With the utility tax accounting for 10% of the city budget, proponents of the measure, including Mineta, presented it as the only way to prevent a reduction in city services. Controversy over the tax fueled the campaigns of several candidates and prompted a recall effort against the city manager, vice mayor Mineta, and three other council members who supported it.\textsuperscript{443}

As it had been for the last decade, however, growth-related issues dominated the San Jose elections.\textsuperscript{444} Council candidate Janet Gray Hayes made slow growth, lower

\textsuperscript{441} Bob Weaver, "Norman Mineta's Odyssey: Relocation Camp to Congress," ibid., November 15 1974; Philip J. Trounstine, "His Career Was Based on Diligence, Attention to Detail and Wariness," ibid., September 11 1995.

\textsuperscript{442} Christensen, "San Jose Becomes the Capital of Silicon Valley - Supplemented Excerpt."


\textsuperscript{444} "Utilities Tax, Transportation, Population Look Like Top Election Issues."
taxes, and protecting the environment centerpieces of her campaign. Several other candidates expressed support for slower growth and preservation of the environment, ranging from the moderate but vague statements of the incumbent council member Colla to the extreme opposition to all further growth and any new taxes expressed by mayor candidate Joseph Sunseri.

The April 1971 election in San Jose drew 33% of the city’s registered voters, turnout that exceeded the typical 25-30% voter participation of past years. Mineta was the “runaway” victor, receiving 30,496 votes of the 50,215 cast for mayor (62% of the vote). The next highest vote getter was homeowner advocate and city council member David Goglio who earned 6,902 votes (14%). Anti-utility tax candidate Joseph Donohue, in a demonstration of the strength of fiscal conservatism in the city, finished in third place, fetching 5,112 votes (10.2%). Mineta’s victory made him the first Japanese-American mayor of a US city outside of Hawaii, and the first Asian mayor of a major metropolitan city in the country. Incumbent council member Joseph Colla and newcomer Janet Gray

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447 Rodenbaugh and Rasmussen, "Mineta Runaway for Mayor - Colla Council Shoo-in -- Mrs. Hayes Squeaks In; Silverman, “Voters Emphatic in Council Choices - Mineta, Colla, Hayes Primary Victors.”
Hayes also prevailed in the election. In a field of 11 contenders, Hayes received 50.9% of the vote to avoid a runoff.\textsuperscript{449}

Mineta’s victory marked a turning point in San Jose politics, laying a foundation for a suburban liberal coalition in the city. A week after the election, the \textit{San Jose Mercury News} observed that Mineta had won with “overwhelming support in every community sector, ‘establishment’ and otherwise.”\textsuperscript{450} The paper noted that although he had been a member of the Democratic County Central Committee, Mineta received endorsements from numerous Republicans, including the 1970 county campaign chair for Ronald Reagan. In addition to broad bipartisan support, Mineta earned endorsements from labor and religious organization as well as other liberal and minority groups. He received the backing of a broad range of the region’s business community, including bankers, merchants and executives from local electronics firms.\textsuperscript{451} The editors of the \textit{East San Jose Sun} newspaper asserted that Mineta’s victory margin coupled with his "unique hold on a broad-cross-section of the San Jose electorate" gave him a “mandate” to be an active and strong mayor.\textsuperscript{452}

Mineta had entered San Jose politics as a political appointee at a time when pro-growth interests still clung to the city’s reins, but the new mayor understood the city’s emerging political climate better than his would-be mentors did. Emerging from former

\textsuperscript{449} Rodenbaugh and Rassmussen, "Mineta Runaway for Mayor - Colla Council Shoo-in -- Mrs. Hayes Squeaks In; Silverman, "Voters Emphatic in Council Choices - Mineta, Colla, Hayes Primary Victors."
\textsuperscript{450} Harry Farrell, "Race Non-Issue in Mineta Win," \textit{(San Jose Mercury News}, April ?, 1971 [clipping undated, but article references election a week prior], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “Norman Mineta, 1960 to 1979” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).
\textsuperscript{451} Ibid.
mayor Ron James’ shadow to chart an independent course, one of the first steps that Mineta took after taking office was to enhance the diversity of the city council. Under Mineta’s leadership, the city council appointed Mexican-American teacher and community activist Alfredo (Al) Garza, Jr. as the first Latino to serve on the San Jose City council. Mineta and the council also made Janet Gray Hayes, a homeowner activist and an environmentalist, the city’s first female vice mayor. With his own election as a minority major combined with these appointments, the city council presided over by Mineta was not only the most diverse to date in San Jose, it was also one of the most liberal and Democratic-leaning (although city offices were officially non-partisan).

A test of Mineta’s independence from the old guard arose in 1972 when the city manager who had replaced Hamann resigned. The preferred candidate put forth by prominent members of the growth coalition was former mayor Ron James, then serving as president of the local Chamber of Commerce. Mineta resisted the pressure from his old political benefactors, instead voting with the city council’s liberal majority to hire Ted Tedesco for the position. The city manager of Boulder, Colorado, Tedesco was a respected professional city manager – and, more importantly, an outsider – thus he represented a break from the policies of the past and a rejection of any return to the past.

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453 Garza was appointed to take the seat vacated by the new mayor. See: Trounstone and Christensen, *Movers and Shakers*.

454 Mineta and Hayes both were active in local Democratic politics. The independent minded Colla was an outspoken Democrat when he originally ran for office, although over time he would take a more contrarian and conservative stance in opposition to the liberals on the council. Hays, like Janet Gray Hayes, was an ardent environmentalist who campaigned on a liberal platform (however, I cannot find details about his political party affiliation, if any). The political and ideological orientation of Gross and Goglio is also hard to determine from the record. Both council members were supported by Shaffer as homeowner candidates, but seem to have generally supported Mineta’s policies.

During his five years as city manager of San Jose, Tedesco replaced officials associated with Hamann’s expansionist administration and helped to implement controlled growth policies. Hiring Tedesco signaled that Mineta intended to chart his own course independent from the old pro-growth coalition.

Mineta constructed a new suburban liberal coalition to govern an increasingly diverse and fast growing city. The coalition balanced the grassroots concerns of homeowners and minorities with attentiveness to the best interests of the region’s important electronics and industrial managers. Mineta pledged to homeowners and residents concerned about growth related issues that improving quality of life was his top focus:

[A]ll of our efforts should be designed to recreate San Jose as “The Garden City,” a term by which it was known not too many years ago. I do not mean that we should attempt to return to the days when San Jose was a sleepy, post-war town in the middle of a valley whose major industry was agriculture. Those days are gone forever ….

Mineta’s “Garden City” was based on two things: the improvement of quality of life for residents and a commitment to heed the voices and interests of all the city’s diverse residents:

[B]y “The Garden City,” I mean that all our efforts should be directed toward creating a quality of life in San Jose … in which the needs of the people are provided and in which all the people have an opportunity to participate in determining the delivery of those services.

456 Trounstine and Christensen, *Movers and Shakers*.
457 Journalist and longtime local political observer Philip Trounstine described Mineta’s coalition thus: “On the one hand were grass-roots forces attracted by his call for low-income housing, increased federal aid to cities, greater minority representation and slower residential growth[;]…on the other were business leaders pushing for airport expansion, industrial growth, downtown development and free-trade zones.” See: Trounstine, “His Career Was Based on Diligence, Attention to Detail and Wariness.”
459 Ibid.
To Mineta, “quality of life” meant being concerned about the environment, managing and controlling growth, and improving transportation, especially mass transit. It also meant promoting broad-based economic opportunity for all residents as well as measures to provide for affordable housing. Finally, Mineta empathized with residents concerned about high taxes, promising to pursue greater efficiency and cost savings in municipal government, but also reminding homeowners that the services that they relied upon required city revenue.\(^{460}\) Nonetheless, during Mineta’s tenure, the city council began reducing property taxes. Mineta thus offered a suburban liberal vision of an active, but efficient and low-cost city government, committed to enhancing the quality of life for all residents.

Mineta, in order to govern, could not afford to estrange the city’s development interests and business community. Thus, although he advocated pursuing slower and better-managed growth, Mineta distanced himself from those seeking a drastic reduction or halt to growth. Calling further growth “inevitable,” Mineta embraced the development plan recently passed by the city council that directed future growth primarily within existing urban boundaries.\(^{461}\) Mineta, as a businessperson, saw continued business and industrial growth as essential to the economic well-being of San Jose. He took action for those in the business community – especially the manager of electronics firms – who were concerned that the city was not doing enough to attract more industry or promote their interests. He supported efforts to expand the San Jose airport, revitalize the

\(^{460}\) Ibid., 7.
\(^{461}\) Ibid., 6-10.
downtown, and induce companies to locate in San Jose. He also participated in efforts to have a foreign trade zone opened in San Jose. In sum, Mineta offered an updated vision of liberal growth politics, promising residents unhappy with the area’s rapid and poorly planned expansion that managed growth and industrial development could bring better quality of life in the future.

Despite having a new council majority, an independent minded mayor and a professional city manager, San Jose continued to suffer from a variety of growth related problems. In fact, while development projects were subject to more scrutiny than before by homeowner advocates on the city council, the city continued to expand and develop at a rapid pace. Overcrowded schools were one of the results of this growth. The skilled professional workers who came to the area to work at high-technology firms were outraged that their children attended schools so over-capacity that many districts had to resort to double sessions and temporary buildings.

Grassroots activists succeeded in circulating a petition that put an initiative on the ballot during the 1973 election cycle to address the school overcrowding problem. Ballot Measure B sought to prohibit the council from approving zoning for new homes in districts where schools were already overcrowded. The Measure B campaign was a grassroots effort undertaken by parents, community activists and homeowner associations on a volunteer basis and with a shoestring budget. On the other side of the issue, developers ran a well-funded counter-campaign that outspent proponents of the measure.

462 Trounstine, "His Career Was Based on Diligence, Attention to Detail and Wariness."
by 10-1 and enjoyed the support of the editors at the *San Jose Mercury News* newspaper. Despite deep-pocketed elite opposition, Measure B won a narrow victory and marked a clear warning to city leaders. Mayor Mineta and the liberal majority on the council might be talking about less growth, but residents were not impressed with the results and helped pass Measure B to do something about the problem. Susanne Wilson and Jim Self both won council seats by endorsing Measure B, drawing strong support from newer residents located in some of the fastest growing areas of the city. Both candidates ran as homeowner activists, and further bolstered the liberal vote on the council. With Self and Wilson joining Hayes and Mineta in city hall, the San Jose city council now had the beginnings of a solid suburban liberal bloc. As the Measure B vote indicated, however, governing a city comprised of an increasingly impatient public would be challenging.

Governing municipal affairs in San Jose fell to other leaders. In 1974, Mineta successfully ran for Congress in California’s 13th District as a Democrat. The 13th District included part of San Jose, but also a significant swathe of Republican-leaning areas, including “bedroom” communities in Cupertino, Saratoga, Los Gatos, Monte Sereno, and Campbell as well as the more rural Morgan Hill, San Martin, and Gilroy. The seat had long been a Republican stronghold, but with the retirement of the longtime incumbent, Democratic leaders capitalized on the broad bipartisan appeal of Mineta to

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464 Christensen, "San Jose Becomes the Capital of Silicon Valley - Supplemented Excerpt."
465 Mineta earned 77.8% of the primary vote. See: "Mineta, Milias in Runoff," (*Palo Alto / Peninsula Times Tribune* [hand-stamped], June 5, 1974 [hand-dated], Clipping file-Santa Clara County, “Norman Mineta, 1960 to 1979” envelope, California Room, San Jose Public Library).
pick up the seat. The race attracted national attention, with Mineta receiving more than half of his campaign donations from outside of his district and the national Democratic Party dispatching Edward Kennedy to campaign on behalf of the San Jose mayor.

Mineta labeled himself a “fiscal conservative and civil rights liberal” and campaigned on the strength of his record as mayor in San Jose balancing better quality of life and lower property taxes for residents with measures to attract and grow business and industry in the city. Mineta’s opponent was George Milias from Gilroy. A moderate Republican, Milias augmented his calls for lower taxes and government spending cuts by running on the strength of his legislative record supporting environmental measures, including promoting mass transit, noise emission standards, and a lead role drafting the California Environmental “Bill of Rights” in 1970. The contest between Mineta and Milias was thus a race between two moderates at a time when the state and national Republican Party as a whole was growing more conservative and polarized from the Democratic Party. Milias represented the GOP’s best hope of holding the 13th District given San Jose and Santa Clara County’s history of progressivism and expanding

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468 Farrell, "Congress Race Choice of Mineta."

469 Milias prevailed in the Republican primary against four other Republicans – most notably beating out former San Jose conservative city council member Virginia Shaffer with a plurality, earning 21,250 (46.3%) compared to Shaffer's 13,251. See: “Mineta, Milias in Runoff.”

470 Milias was chairperson of the Assembly Select Committee on Environmental Quality, the body that drafted and adopted the Environmental “Bill of Rights.” See: "Demos Hoping to Seize District Held for Years by Gubser," Palo Alto Times, October 24 1974.
suburban homeowner constituency. In the end, however, it was not enough. Mineta’s victory in a contest between two moderates underscored the developing suburban liberal political cultural of San Jose and Santa Clara County.471

Mineta, elected as the first Japanese American in Congress, positioned himself as a spokesperson for his freshman peers and political observers saw him as a potential future contender for Democratic House leadership.472 Mineta did not become a party leader during his 20-year tenure in office, but he served effectively the same suburban liberal interests that he had cultivated as mayor. He was also adept at bringing hundreds of millions of dollars in federal money back into his district.473 Mineta took a leading role with other liberal Democrats to pass major environmental legislation, including measures to protect clean water, preserve wetlands, and expand the Superfund program to bring federal toxic cleanup dollars to the Bay Area.474 He also worked diligently to secure significant funding for transportation projects in his district, notably a light-rail line for

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473 "A Man of Action but Not Risk-Taking, His Life Was Molded by W.W. II Internment; Philip J. Trounstine, "His Career Was Based on Diligence, Attention to Detail and Wariness," ibid.
Santa Clara County. These positions along with a strong civil rights voting record revealed that Mineta was far more liberal than the majority of his colleagues in Congress in both parties. However, Mineta was keenly attentive to business interests, especially the electronics and technology firms that were important to the economy of his district. Occasionally bucking his party and working with Republicans, Mineta voted in favor of capital gains tax cuts and restrictions on liability damages for so-called “frivolous lawsuits.” In short, with his pro-business orientation and fiscal conservatism coupled with his liberalism on social, civil rights, and environmental issues, Mineta carried the suburban liberalism he had advocated as a mayor to the national stage.

Conclusion

Hamann and others in the pro-growth coalition succeeded at transforming San Jose and Santa Clara County into a fast-growing industrial metropolis in the two decades after World War II. The pro-growth leaders of the region helped to make the Silicon Valley phenomenon possible by encouraging explosive suburban development to house the rapid influx of employees for the region’s expanding high-technology economy.

Ultimately, however, the growth was too fast, too expensive, and poorly planned, which

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476 For example, in 1987 the liberal group Americans for Democratic Action ranked Mineta among the most liberal members of Congress. With 100 being the most liberal, the group scored Mineta a 95. The average in the House was 46 and 43.7 in the Senate. See: "Group Ranks Voting in Senate, House," ibid., January 19 1987.
478 Philip J. Trounstine, "His Career Was Based on Diligence, Attention to Detail and Wariness," ibid., September 11 1995.
created a host of problems and political opposition. The first challenge to the growth machines in San Jose and Santa Clara County came from the remnants of the region’s orchard economy. Orchardists and planners worked at the county level and used the nation’s first agricultural zoning program to try to preserve the viability of the agricultural economy in the region and slow urban growth. Unable to muster a broad enough coalition, and without the support of statewide agricultural interests, the greenbelt program served only to delay, not stop the relentless urbanization of the formerly lush valley. The second challenge to Hamann and the developers was from homeowners linked to the early defense and electronics industry that arose in the region in the postwar decades. Virginia Shaffer led these early homeowner activists who wanted lower taxes, better services, and less growth. Shaffer and her early allies resembled suburban activists in Orange County that mobilized as part of the New Right. The fast growing and increasingly diverse Santa Clara County went in the 1970s along another path. Norman Mineta, Janet Gray Hayes, and other liberal homeowner activists elected to the city council laid the foundation for a suburban liberal compromise that promised better quality of life coupled with smarter growth as well as support for environmental protections and civil rights. Mineta pursued higher ambitions at the national level, leaving to Janet Gray Hayes the leading role of articulating and expanding suburban liberalism in San Jose.
Chapter 6

Suburban Liberal Reformers in the 1970s

Norman Mineta laid the foundation during his time as mayor for a suburban liberal coalition of homeowners, business leaders, the working class, and minorities based on managed growth, fiscal restraint and economic expansion as well as attention to civil rights and other social issues. The coalition was fragile, however, and the policy program that kept the disparate strands together was not fully developed. Janet Gray Hayes built on this foundation established by Mineta, transitioning from being a homeowner activist to becoming mayor of San Jose in 1974. Hayes articulated a distinctly suburban offshoot of liberalism, and worked to consolidate the coalition originally tapped by Mineta into the basis for a new municipal regime in San Jose that persists into the present.

The suburban liberalism pioneered by key players such as Mineta and Hayes in San Jose was a direct outgrowth of postwar growth liberalism at the national level. The stance taken by Mineta, Hayes and their allies was “liberal” because they embraced the use of the power of the state to solve a variety of social and economic problems. It was “suburban” because – in contrast to other strands of liberalism that focused primarily on using government power to promote broad-based economic and social equity or improve cosmopolitan urban centers – the proponents of suburban liberalism prioritized the quality of life and pocketbook concerns of suburban homeowners and the business needs of the region’s high-technology employers. Thus, at the top of their list of priorities were

479 Described further in the Chapter 1 introduction
programs to slow growth, protect the environment, enhance suburban amenities such as parks and open space, and lower property taxes for homeowners. Suburban liberals, unlike their conservative counterparts in Orange County and elsewhere, were also concerned about other social issues. In the San Jose example, leaders such as Mineta and Hayes believed that the government could take a role to address discrimination, promote civil rights, and provide for the less fortunate members of society. They took stands on public housing, gun control, feminism, and social and civil rights issues, including gay rights. However, these broader goals were constrained by the fiscal conservatism of suburbanites unwilling to see too much of “their” tax money leave their own neighborhoods and skeptical of the viability of ambitious social reforms. The resemblance between the suburban liberalism espoused by political leaders in San Jose in the 1970s and the New Democratic shift led by the Democratic Leadership Council in the 1980s and 1990s at the national level is striking. The overlap suggests that fiscally conservative suburban liberal mayors at the municipal level like Mineta and Hayes were the model for the broader shift for the mainstream of the Democratic Party towards a centrist version of liberalism prioritizing the new economy and middle-class voters over other traditional liberal constituencies.

Janet Gray Hayes and the Suburban Liberal “Feminist Capital of the World”

Hayes’ upbringing and education accounted for her blend of pragmatic fiscal conservatism and concern for social justice issues. Born in 1926 in Rushville, Indiana, Janet Gray (Frazee) Hayes grew up in a strongly Republican-leaning family that gave her
firsthand exposure to political activism. In 1940, the family home served as the official base for the Republican presidential candidate Wendell Wilkie in his campaign to unseat Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt.\footnote{Guide to the Janet Gray Hayes Papers,” Online Archive of California, http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt4v19r0fx/} Hayes went on to earn an undergraduate degree at Indiana University and then a master’s degree in social science from the University of Chicago, where she met her husband, Kenneth Hayes. She worked several years in Chicago as social worker while her husband completed his medical degree. The Hayes family moved to California in the 1950s when Kenneth opened a medical practice in San Jose. Hayes and her husband lived in an affluent suburban neighborhood with their four children.\footnote{Joan Jackson, “But She Picks Political Ring,” San Jose Mercury News, June 13 1971; Gail Bernice Sullivan, “The Women Who Run San Jose,” San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle, July 10 1977.}

Hayes became active at the grassroots level shortly after moving to San Jose in the emerging suburban liberal reform movement. Describing herself as a “suburban housewife” motivated by concern over the negative impact of runaway growth on the health, safety and quality life of her family, Hayes joined with other middle-class suburbanites in homeowners’ associations, environmental groups, the League of Women Voters, and other similar organizations to address these problems in her neighborhood and community. Hayes, over the course of the next two decades, went from being what she characterized as the “token woman” appointee on various local boards and commissions to being the first woman mayor of a large US city in 1974. Swept into office as part of an anti-growth and anti-tax revolt by local taxpayers several years before the larger statewide Proposition 13 movement, Hayes became the spokesperson for the
local suburban homeowner’s perspective. It was with the help of her leadership that suburban liberalism consolidated its hold on the political institutions of San Jose and Santa Clara County.

Local voters elected a number of other women to city and county government during Hayes’ two terms as mayor. The unprecedented number of women serving in local office earned San Jose and Santa Clara County international attention as the “Feminist Capital of the World.” Many of these new female office-holders were political allies or protégés of Hayes, magnifying the mayor’s influence on local politics. The engineers and entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley pioneered a new high-technology economy, but Hayes and her allies affected a similarly revolutionary transformation of San Jose, putting in place one of the nation’s most ambitious programs of “smart growth” to regulate and repair runaway sprawl and make new development improve rather than detract from suburban quality of life. Hayes and San Jose in process also led the way opening regional politics to women.

Hayes articulated a bold vision of change to overturn the status quo in favor of the priorities and preferences of the grassroots homeowner movement from which she had emerged. Hayes advocated for an active local government that implemented controlled growth policies, protected the suburban quality of life, and attracted more “clean” high-technology industry. She presented voters with the promise of smart growth that could deliver more and better services while also providing tax cuts to homeowners. In cooperation with the private sector, she called for local government to direct smart residential and industrial growth, prime the pump of the local economy, and ensure suburban residents had clean, safe, attractive neighborhoods as well as all the services
and amenities that they expected. Not all of the platforms that she proposed were original to her. She was building on the efforts of homeowner groups and reformers over the preceding decade that had advocated for slower growth and she advanced and extended many policies that Norman Mineta had championed while mayor. Hayes, more than any other figure in the region, became the spokesperson and standard-bearer for a suburban liberal vision of using municipal government to improve quality of life and serve the priorities of the suburban middle class.

The 1974 Election

Hayes ran for mayor in 1974 as one of the most visible and articulate members of a local grassroots movement opposed to runaway growth. Hayes joined the city council in 1971 and was appointed vice mayor in 1973 as a homeowner reform candidate. She worked with other reform members on the city council to reduce property rates, offset in large part by imposing a construction and conveyance tax on new construction. The new tax ended the old status quo whereby taxpayers subsidized new development and was a victory for suburban liberals opposed to runaway growth.

The 1974 mayor’s race in San Jose was a watershed moment in the city’s history. First, there was the historic nature of Hayes’ bid to become the first female mayor of San Jose, which would also be a national milestone. Second, the city elections coincided with the general election for the first time since the Progressive Era, a shift that promised to boost voter participation. Third, the election was once again a showdown over growth. With Mineta out of the way, pro-growth interests made a concerted push to get a
sympathetic candidate elected to roll back the reforms put in place by homeowner activists.

The old guard rallied around Barton Collins, a 63-year-old retired chief of detectives and 38-year veteran of the San Jose police department, as their preferred candidate. Collins pledged to repeal the recently adopted construction and conveyance tax passed the previous year by Mineta and the other liberals on the city council that required developers and new residents to help pay for the cost of infrastructure and services caused by new development. The tax measure reversed the previous status quo whereby current taxpayers subsidized new development and was one of biggest achievements of the new majority on the council to date. Reversing it, as Collins proposed, was a direct challenge to the priorities of liberal homeowner advocates, including Hayes, who had been one of the biggest proponents of the new tax.

The rest of Collins’ platform was otherwise a modest reflection of his conservative and pro-growth positions. He spoke of restoring “unity” to the city, perhaps a reference to San Jose’s more homogenous past when the old guard leadership ran municipal affairs without challenge. Collins called for tougher crime measures, favored more roads and freeways, and opposed “quotas” based on race in city hiring. As the passage of Measure B indicated, however, many local voters were increasingly dissatisfied with their leaders and the pace of development in the city. Collins therefore also tried to reach out to residents concerned about runaway growth, quality of life issues, and an unresponsive local government. He spoke vaguely about updating the city’s master plan to control growth, developing parklands already owned by the city, and holding more meetings with residents to obtain citizen input. Despite these gestures, the
older Collins was out of touch with the priorities of many of the city’s discontented residents – many of whom were younger professionals and their families – as evidenced by his proposal that the city purchase a local golf course to earn revenue and provide recreation.\textsuperscript{482} Overall, Collins and his proposed repeal of the construction and conveyance tax represented a return to the old status quo. It is thus not surprising that his positions garnered significant donations from pro-growth interests and the support of the \textit{San Jose Mercury News}.\textsuperscript{483}

The younger Hayes, then 47, characterized her opponent as “Mr. Yesterday” and positioned herself as the candidate best suited to represent a new generation of residents and homeowners. Campaigning with the slogan “[l]et's make San Jose better before we make it bigger!,” Hayes put forth a suburban liberal vision of municipal government that proposed renegotiating the costs and benefits of growth to better suit the quality of life and pocketbook interests of suburban homeowners. In contrast to Collins, she pledged to keep the construction and conveyance tax – which she called the “pay as you grow tax” – in place. For Hayes, the tax on new development was a key part of her program that provided the revenue to help fund improved infrastructure and services as well as city amenities like parks to enhance quality of life for residents while still allowing for lower property tax rates.

A second key component of Hayes’ proposal was a “smart growth” policy that would slow further residential growth while working to attract more industry and channel new construction as “in-fill” development within the city’s existing urban service

\textsuperscript{482} Jackson, "But She Picks Political Ring; Sullivan, "The Women Who Run San Jose."
\textsuperscript{483} Sue Beving, "Charged Political Themes in Old Guard's 'Last Hurrah',' (Unknown local paper, October 30, 1974, San Jose Public Library, California Room, Clipping file, "Janet Gray Hayes" folder).
boundaries. In Hayes’ view, her smart growth approach served two interrelated goals. First, by slowing residential growth and promoting in-fill, it would stop the suburban sprawl that was worsening traffic congestion and pollution while destroying the surrounding open space, thus enhancing quality of life for residents. Second, industrial development meant more revenue for the city, while both in-fill development and slower residential growth saved the city money by minimizing costly expansion of municipal infrastructure and services.\footnote{484 In short, Hayes was offering residents a suburban liberal plan to make growth not only pay for itself, but also provide more amenities and services for residents while costing them less in property taxes.}

Hayes, in contrast to Collins, staked out a bold campaign agenda characterized by the suburban liberal goals of enhanced quality of life, controlled growth, economic development, government efficiency, and tax cuts coupled with a progressive stance on social and environmental issues. As one article summarized it, Hayes was “running on a platform which calls for economic development, quality growth, environmental protection, improving the city’s image, credibility in government and responsiveness to the people.”\footnote{485 The election thus became a referendum on growth and taxes as well as a showdown between an old and new generation of residents for control of the city’s government. Although a much smaller paper compared the pro-growth \textit{San Jose Mercury}, Hayes had the \textit{San Jose Sun} newspaper in her corner. Calling Hayes the \ldots}
candidate of the homeless and homeowners, the editorial page endorsed her bid for mayor. The editors contrasted Hayes’ vision of restoring amenities and opposing the “hyper-growth” of the past with Collin’s “establishment” stance. They recommended Hayes for mayor, praising her “tough-minded Indiana fiscal conservatism coupled with a deep concern that local government can be turned around to be humane.”

Collins had the support of deep-pocketed development interests and the editorial page of the major local paper, but Hayes mounted one of the largest grassroots campaigns in the city’s history, with over one thousand volunteers going door-to-door to convince residents to vote for her. She took her ideas directly to residents, attending dozens of living room meetings to talk with voters. With strong support from homeowner groups, Hayes managed to deny Collins the fifty-percent margin he needed to win during the June primary, forcing a runoff between them in November. An analysis of voting patterns from the multi-candidate primary revealed the dividing lines in San Jose, with Collins doing narrowly better than Hayes with voters in the older, more affluent and conservative parts of the city. Meanwhile, Hayes bested Collins by much wider margins in the newer, outlying areas of the city – precisely the fast-growing areas at the forefront of some of the worst growth related problems.

Hayes won a narrow victory in the November run-off election, earning 65,768 votes (50.6%) compared to the 64,108 votes (49.3%) received by Collins. With a margin

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Note: The numbers in parentheses refer to citations at the end of the text. Examples:
488 “Precinct Analysis Shows Who Got the Votes - and Where,” *San Jose Sun* [hand-labeled], July 17, 1974 [hand-dated], San Jose Public Library, California Room, Clipping file, “Janet Gray Hayes” folder).
of 1,660 votes (1.3% of the total), she became San Jose's first woman mayor in the city's 197-year history. Hayes’ win made San Jose, with a population of 540,000, the largest city in the nation to elect a woman for mayor.

The outcome of two other local elections underscored the increasing antipathy towards incumbents and continued growth by San Jose voters. First, Larry Pegram, a 29-year-old former police office and political newcomer, won a seat on the San Jose city council with a campaign based on slower urban growth, improved neighborhood services, and opposition to development in the untouched Coyote Valley and the Santa Teresa Foothills. Pegram’s call to preserve the county’s last extensive expanse of undeveloped land as open space earned him the strong support of homeowner groups, environmentalists and other residents opposed to further sprawl, propelling him to victory over his opponent by an almost 2-1 margin. Given that Pegram’s stance on growth paralleled that of Hayes, his victory promised to strengthen the new mayor’s majority on the council and enable her implement her suburban liberal platform in San Jose. The

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489 Skipitares, "Hayes First S.J. Woman Mayor - Official Makes History - Likes Title 'Madam Mayor'."
490 As local and national papers noted, Hayes’ victory also made San Jose, with a population of 540,000, the largest city in the nation to elect a woman for mayor. Oklahoma City, with a population of 366,000 was the second largest city with a woman mayor. See: Stan Moreillon, "Closest Race Ever for S.J. Mayor," (Unknown local paper [San Jose Mercury?], November 6, 1974 [hand-dated], San Jose Public Library, California Room, Clipping file, "Janet Gray Hayes" folder).
491 Pegram’s opponent was Francis “Nick” Lickwar, age 49, the former manager of the Civic Auditorium. While the two candidates overlapped on several issues, the biggest difference between them was regarding urbanization in San Jose. Lickwar advocated development in Coyote Valley and the Santa Teresa Foothills. Pegram, on the other hand, argued that Coyote Valley and the Santa Teresa foothills should not be developed and instead preserved as open space. Pegram beat Lickwar by an almost two-to-one margin, receiving 75,012 votes compared to Lickwar’s 43,778. His vote total was the highest number received by any council member in city history (the next highest being 59,753). See: ibid; Skipitares, "Hayes First S.J. Woman Mayor - Official Makes History - Likes Title 'Madam Mayor'."
492 Believing that Pegram’s win promised to strengthen Hayes politically, the new mayor proclaimed herself “delighted.” Under the San Jose city charter, municipal policymaking required a council majority and the mayor had only one vote and no veto power. If Pegram’s views did indeed parallel those of Hayes, he could join her and the recently elected Wilson and Self to solidify a potential four person-voting bloc on
election of Rodney J. Diridon to the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors also bolstered Hayes’ political hand. The owner of a political polling and research firm, Saratoga City Councilmember, and friend and supporter of Hayes, Diridon achieved an upset victory to unseat a 14-year incumbent. Like Hayes, Diridon was a strong advocate of improving mass transit in Santa Clara County to reduce the traffic congestion and pollution from automobiles. His victory gave the mayor a likeminded ally at the county level. For the next twenty years, Diridon played a prominent role expanding public transit in Santa Clara County as an influential part of a suburban liberal bloc on the county Board of Supervisors.

San Jose’s Suburban Liberal Mayor

The election of Hayes and her allies in 1974 amounted to a revolution in local politics, seizing the reins of power away from the boosters, developers, and pro-growth leaders that had controlled city politics since the 1940s. Hayes and the suburban liberals were in charge, but leading a city growing as fast as San Jose with a base of restive constituents during the tumultuous 1970s would prove difficult. As Hayes’ narrow the city council on issues of growth. See: Barnacle, "Call Her Madam Mayor - Mrs. Hayes Tells Conference." Any such alliance proved short-lived, however. Pegram was an ambitious young Republican and over time, he adopted a more conservative and pro-growth stance. He later joined forces with other opponents of the mayor as part of the “Fearsome Foursome” voter bloc on the city council in 1978. Subsequently, his politics shifted more drastically when he embraced evangelical Christianity and the politics of the religious right. As of 1974, however, Hayes’ victory combined with Pegram’s, Wilson’s and Self’s represented a significant shift in local politics and the advent of new political establishment that advocated suburban liberal policies.

493 Moreillon, “Closest Race Ever for S.J. Mayor; Skipitares, “Hayes First S.J. Woman Mayor - Official Makes History - Likes Title 'Madam Mayor'.”
victory margin showed, there were deep divisions in the electorate regarding growth. Moreover, keeping the support of homeowners who demanded drastically less growth, better quality of life and lowers taxes, on one hand, and business leaders who wanted economic growth and a business-friendly climate, on the other – while at the same time not isolating liberal and minority groups – was a constant challenge. The task was all the more difficult in a city and a state where citizens made frequent recourse to ballot measures and recalls to override or punish disfavored policymakers.

**Hayes’ Fractious Coalition**

A voter survey undertaken by the Hayes campaign during the 1974 election demonstrated the overlap between her policy prescriptions and the key priorities of many local voters, including their strong opposition to growth, fiscal conservatism and antipathy towards property taxes. The survey not only illuminated a distinct set of suburban priorities amongst a majority of respondents, it also revealed the class divisions in the local political landscape of the emerging Silicon Valley. Finally, the survey highlighted the tension between Hayes’ intention to use industrial expansion to help the city raise revenue and the broad opposition to all growth by significant numbers of voters. In short, the survey was an early indicator of the contours and contradictions of Hayes’ suburban liberal coalition.

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495 After the June 1974 primary, the Hayes campaign commissioned a survey of voter attitudes to prepare for the November runoff election against Collins. The survey focused on uncovering what voters felt were the most important issues as well as ascertaining the strengths and weaknesses of the two candidates heading into the November runoff election. The degree to which sex mattered was a key focus of the survey and the Hayes campaign wanted to uncover how voters felt about the fact that Hayes was seeking to be San
Hayes, a neighborhood activist, brought a homeowner orientation into elected office and it was from grassroots homeowner groups where she drew the strongest political support. The demographics of Hayes’ supporters marked them as part of a cohort of professional and middle-class residents associated with the fast growing electronics industry in the region. The survey revealed, for instance, that support for Hayes increased with education level, and that the mayor enjoyed strong support among voters who were young (especially under the age of 40) and not union affiliated. Hayes’ strength was greatest among Democratic voters, but she also appealed to San Jose residents across the political spectrum. As the survey demonstrated, Hayes’ suburban liberal position on growth and improved quality of life was attractive to a broad cross section of residents in San Jose, but was especially appealing to the technology professionals and home owning middle class that was the fastest growing segments of San Jose’s population. In short, the demographics of Hayes’ supporters marked them as part of the new cohort of residents associated with the electronics industry and as the core of an emerging new economic and political powerbase that would soon dominate local politics.496

The survey also revealed the differing priorities of suburban liberals in San Jose. City residents listed inflation far down their list of problems at a time when much of the rest of the US was struggling with stagflation. Respondents instead favored quality of life

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496 Ibid.

Jose’s first female mayor. The survey was conducted door-to-door and 402 responses were included in the final report. The report’s authors also offered “secondary analysis” of responses to the questions, breaking down answers by various criteria, such as education, area of residence, union membership and the like. Since the overall sample size was small, the report offered a disclaimer about the numeric accuracy of the secondary analysis sections. The survey results showed that Hayes’ positions lined up with the issues that were most important to the voters. See: “A Survey of Voter Attitudes in the City of San Jose - August 17-26, 1974,” (Bound report, [Labeled “Prepared for The Janet Gray Hayes for Mayor Campaign by Diridon Research Corporation”], Janet Gray Hayes papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and Archives).
issues such as overpopulation, transportation, land use planning and zoning, pollution and education as the most critical problem facing the city. A majority of respondents agreed that preserving open space and controlling growth were more important than creating jobs. Two-thirds of respondents believed that protecting the environment was the most important task for local government, followed by better transportation, slower growth, and more parks and recreation facilities. The majority of San Jose residents had the luxury to focus their concerns on quality of life issues in stark contrast to other communities across the US struggling to combat inflation, promote growth and create jobs. Furthermore, they saw local government as having the ability and responsibility to act on these issues.497

The suburban liberal preference for slower growth and suburban amenities were luxuries that not all residents could afford. Differing attitudes on growth among survey respondents revealed some of the class dynamics at work in San Jose. A majority had indicated that controlling growth was more important than industrial growth or curbing unemployment, yet the response varied by socio-economic status. Union-affiliated and working class respondents differed with the majority, instead prioritizing the goal of encouraging job growth in San Jose. Education level and area of residence also affected the strength of anti-growth sentiment among respondents. Sixty-percent of college graduates and 66% of post-graduates agreed or agreed strongly that curtailing growth was a top priority. Among those with a high school or elementary school education, however, support for this position was more tepid. Similarly, while respondents from affluent

497 Ibid.
neighborhoods ranked controlling growth as a top priority, those from working class areas were more likely to disagree with the idea that slowing growth was more important than jobs and other priorities. The broader economic malaise besetting the country during the 1970s affected working class residents not as fortunate in the emerging new technology and professional economy. In contrast to affluent suburban liberals, they therefore prioritized jobs and better basic services and infrastructure in their neighborhoods.498

The survey demonstrated the strength of Hayes’ appeal to many residents, but voter sentiment regarding industrial development and taxes foreshadowed tensions in the suburban liberal coalition in San Jose – and mirrored later divisions between “traditional” and “New” Democrats at the national level. It also revealed the legacy of growth liberalism in shaping the suburban liberal political culture. Hayes coupled her quality of life proposals with calls for what she called “smart growth,” slowing suburban sprawl but accelerating industrial growth to provide needed jobs and revenue for the city. Indeed, the viability of offering all residents better quality of life and services while lowering property taxes depended on the city’s ability to secure revenue from other sources. Sixty-two percent of the survey respondents, however, disagreed with the proposition that San Jose needed more jobs and growth. In fact, fifty-nine percent of the voters in the survey felt that “the curtailment of growth and the preservation of our remaining open space are necessary in San Jose even if it means unemployment.” Many of the same suburbanites that had come to San Jose based on economic opportunity fostered by rapid growth – and

498 Ibid.
who were in fact among the primary beneficiaries of growth – nonetheless adopted a no-growth position.499

Respondents to the survey also foreshadowed the 1978 tax revolt, expressing strong fiscal conservatism and anti-tax sentiment. A majority of residents from both political parties – and a strong majority of Hayes supporters – favored cutting city services as a way to lower taxes and curb inflation.500 The responses also revealed an antagonism to property taxes and a preference, particularly among residents in affluent neighborhoods, for increases in regressive taxes like the sales tax or payroll tax over any increases in the property tax.501 In other words, the city’s more fortunate professional and middle-class residents – the beneficiaries of multiple layers of invisible government subsidies in the postwar decades – favored cuts in city services in order to lower property taxes. Their advantaged position in the new high-technology suburban economy insulated San Jose’s professional and middle-class residents from the pain that these policies entailed. At the same time, they also wanted better quality of life and amenities in their

499 Ibid.
500 One question asked voters to weigh in on the issue of cutting city spending as a way to control inflation. A majority – fifty-three percent - agreed that this was best “even though some programs might be cut back,” while only thirty-four percent disagreed and thirteen percent were undecided. A majority of respondents of both the Democratic (54%) and Republican (56%) parties held this attitude, albeit with more Democrats (35%) than Republicans (26%) disagreeing. Another dividing factor was homeownership, with fifty-eight percent of homeowners agreeing with this position and only thirty-eight percent of renters doing so. Underscoring the fiscal conservatism of Hayes, fifty-seven percent of respondents who indicated that they were likely to vote for her agreed that city spending should be cut compared to fifty-one percent of Collins’ supporters. In fact, nearly twice as many potential Hayes supporters as Collins’ supporters expressed “strong” agreement with this position. Ibid.
501 In response to a question regarding which tax should be raised, assuming that a tax had to be increased, the most common responses favored regressive taxes – with respondents picking either the city sales tax (39%) or payroll tax (15%). The more progressive tax options, either the property tax (9%) or city income tax (10%) were mentioned least. Despite the premise of the question that asked which one tax should be raised “if San Jose had to increase taxes,” 15% insisted that no tax be raised. Perhaps unsurprisingly, residents in the most affluent part of San Jose – the Willow Glen area – were mostly likely (27%) to identify the payroll tax as the tax that should be increased. Ibid.
neighborhoods. In short, the survey underscored the success of the postwar politics of growth in promoting a myth of free markets. Postwar growth politics created an enlarged middle class of suburban homeowners and educated professionals who attributed their success to markets and their own diligence and who never had to acknowledge the legacy and contributions of the postwar liberal state. Hayes’ constituents, located at the center of one of the fastest growing economic centers in the country, wanted a continuance of the postwar politics of growth that had advantaged them, but they did not want to bear the costs or the side effects of growth.

Hayes had to keep the homeowner portion of her coalition together and find a policy that contained the contradictions of her supporters. She settled on the idea of “smart growth” with its emphasis on industrial expansion along with slower residential development that promised a better quality of life along with lower property taxes. It was a difficult balancing act and Hayes often had to defend herself and her policies from homeowners unhappy about the continued pace of growth and industrial development. Moreover, despite the series of property tax cuts that Hayes and her allies on the city council implemented, San Jose voters emphatically joined the statewide property tax revolt, helping to pass the Property 13 ballot measure to dramatically lower property taxes and restrict the ability of the state and municipal governments raise or levy new taxes.

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502 "Mayor Hayes Lends an Ear - Problem Solving in South San Jose," (San Jose News [hand-labeled], December 7, 1976, San Jose Public Library, California Room, Clipping file, "Janet Gray Hayes" folder); Armando Acuna, "They Bent Her Honor's Ear," (San Jose Mercury News [hand-labeled], January 28, 1977 [hand-dated], San Jose Public Library, California Room, Clipping file, "Janet Gray Hayes" folder).
Business and industry leaders represented another critical constituency within Hayes’ suburban liberal coalition, in particular the managers of the region’s electronics firms. The new mayor sought to reassure those in the business community that she and the other liberal members of the city council could balance suburban quality of life issues and business interests. Her early political career and campaign for mayor had earned Hayes the reputation for being “an ardent environmentalist,” reflexive “anti-growth” advocate and a “liberal Democrat.” Once in office, however, Hayes sought to distance herself from the extreme anti-growth position that had earned her the hostility of some in the local business community. She took pains to distinguish herself from the spendthrift and anti-business reputation associated with some liberals. As she explained to a reporter, she could now “see the forest as well as the trees,” explaining that a sound and growing economy as well as frugal and efficient government were key parts of her policy program for San Jose. Hayes characterized herself as a “fiscal tightwad” who was conservative on budgetary, tax, and economic issues. She committed herself to making San Jose attractive to business. As proof, the mayor touted the increase in industrial permits approved by the city during her tenure as well as the increased investment in industrial and commercial projects. Hayes and her suburban liberal program put San Jose on another course at a time when conservatives and some in the business community were denouncing other

503 “All Want to Complain to the Mayor,” (Associated Press [unknown local paper], 1975, [hand-dated, no month or day], Janet Gray Hayes papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and Archives).
liberal politicians as quick to tax and spend or not being responsive to the needs of industry.\textsuperscript{504}

Hayes also made some effort to include working-class, minority, and poor residents in her policies, but as the survey above showed, these groups often found their interests marginalized in the suburban liberal coalition in San Jose. Many affluent residents favored cutting city services to reduce taxes – a step that would fall hardest on the city’s poorer residents – but Hayes sought to tap growth as a resource to help all residents. Despite her fiscal conservatism on municipal taxing and spending, she held the liberal view that “[f]ull employment is necessary for economic growth.”\textsuperscript{505} In neo-Keynesian fashion, Hayes believed that, in addition to seeking continued federal aid for training and employment programs, her smart growth and industrial development policies would “prime the pump” of the private sector, thereby promoting economic growth and jobs to benefit struggling minority and working-class individuals.\textsuperscript{506} The mayor recognized that federal sponsored job-training programs and economic development

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\textsuperscript{504} Ibid; “Stormy Year for Mayor - May Run for Re-Election,” \textit{(San Jose Mercury News} [hand-stamped], January 4, 1976 [hand-dated], San Jose Public Library, California Room, Clipping file, “Janet Gray Hayes” folder).
\textsuperscript{506} For example, at a heated meeting between Hayes and about forty-five young residents from the heavily working class and minority East San Jose, the mayor faced anger and frustration over community problems and unemployment. The area had experienced the same rapid development, strained services, congestion and pollution as the rest of San Jose – in fact, many of these problems had been particularly severe in the eastern neighborhoods due to particular neglect and disinterest in the area by the city’s leadership. East San Jose had other problems, including discrimination and charges of police brutality. It was also particularly hard hit by the economic downturn. Hayes expressed her sympathy for the grievances aired at the meeting. She cited the fact that the city was taking advantage of a number of federal programs, but this by itself was not enough. Thus, Hayes stated that her highest priority was economic development to foster job opportunities. The ultimate solution, she told her audience was to “prime the pump of the private sector.” See: Marita Hernandez, “Angry Youths Demand Jobs - Confrontation with S.J. Mayor,” \textit{San Jose Mercury News}, September 2 1977.
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alone would not address the higher levels of unemployment among minority residents because, while she believed that “overt racism” was not a problem in San Jose, current hiring practices “unintentionally result[ed] in racial bias.” In addition to encouraging private sector employers to address discriminatory hiring practices, Hayes and other liberals on the city council implemented an affirmative action program to hire more minority and women applicants for municipal jobs.507

**Hayes’ “Smart Growth” Policies**

Hayes, in addition to a divided electorate, faced other challenges in trying to implement her policies. The bleak stagflation besetting the national economy and energy crisis had caused a sharp decline in municipal revenues, affecting the city particularly hard because of its modest budget given its population. San Jose, despite being the fourth largest city in the state with a population in excess of a half-million, ranked in the bottom third of California’s eighteen largest cities in per capita expenditures for municipal services. The city workforce was also proportionately the smallest among California cities with populations of 100,000 or more.508 It seemed fiscally unlikely that Hayes and the suburban liberals on the city council could keep their promise to deliver better services while simultaneously cutting taxes given the broader economic situation and an already small municipal workforce. Hayes nonetheless continued to repeat her campaign

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507 To address private sector racial bias in hiring, Hayes tasked the city’s human relations commission to work with the Chamber of Commerce and other business groups to “to design and mount a full scale attack on job discrimination.” See: "State of the City - II."
508 Ibid.
rhetoric that San Jose residents deserved to pay less and expect more throughout her time in office.

Hayes and her allies on the city council dutifully pursued her suburban liberal promise of “smart growth” during her first term. Her approach consisted of four interrelated policies. First, the council implemented more rigorous and disciplined urban planning, slowing residential growth overall while channeling approved development projects to “in-fill” areas. These measures, in addition to slowing sprawl and preserving open space on the borders of San Jose, reduced the burden on the city and taxpayers to expand services and infrastructure to new development outside of the existing urban service boundaries. San Jose was the first city in the nation to adopt a strict in-fill policy, a linchpin of Hayes’ “smart growth” vision.509 Second, Hayes accelerated the yearly property tax cuts that started during the Mineta administration.510 City taxes declined by 0.19% during Mineta’s four years as mayor, dropping from 2.014% for the tax period 1968-1969 to 1.824% for the period 1973-1974.511 Hayes doubled the pace of city tax cuts.

509 In 1975, Hayes and the suburban liberals on the city council passed a strict urban development policy that made San Jose the first city in the nation to adopt such a policy and earned the city and the mayor national recognition for leadership in growth management. Because of the plan, the city no longer extended services to reach outlying development projects at the expense of existing taxpayers. In fact, it was Hayes’ vision that the opposite could happen: that new growth could reduce the tax burden on taxpayers and subsidize improved services and facilities. See: ibid.

510 When running for election in 1974, Hayes took ample credit for pushing tax cuts during her time on the city council and as vice mayor. For example, in her campaign literature, Hayes asserted that “[i]n the four years I’ve been on the City Council, the [property] tax rate has dropped steadily from $1.89 to $1.78 [per thousand?] in spite of inflation.” See: “Let’s Make San Jose Better - before We Make It Bigger!.”

reductions, delivering a 0.42% reduction during her first term, lowering the tax rate from 1.785% in 1974-1975 to 1.363% in 1977-1978 (see Figure 6-1).512

These cuts are remarkable given the inflation of the 1970s and the fact that the city served close to a half million residents and was gaining approximately 25,000 newcomers each year.513 Hayes, having been a suburban activist with strong ties to homeowner groups, recognized that homeowners were heading towards a revolt over property taxes.514 The mayor therefore worked diligently with the suburban liberals on the city council to keep costs down through fiscal frugality and greater efficiency while taking advantage of increased revenue from the city’s construction and conveyance tax. Hayes’ so-called “pay

513 "State of the City - Ji."
514 Despite delivering a 26-cent property tax reduction for 1978, the biggest single reduction to date, Hayes promised residents that they could expect still more. Hayes was not just committed to lowering local taxes; she also promised that she would personally continue her lobbying efforts on behalf of San Jose residents at the state level “for meaningful property tax relief.” According to Hayes, state legislators had to realize that “property tax payers [were] on the verge of a serious revolt” and that they could not waste more time through inaction. Hayes’ sense of urgency was prescient, as San Jose joined with voters statewide to pass Proposition 13 a few months later. See: "State of the City of San Jose" by Mayor Jgh, January 18, 1978," ("Series IV: Public Relations Materials, 1914-2002," Box 8, "Speeches, 1975-1982," Janet Gray Hayes papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and Archives).
as you grow taxes” rose from providing 4% of the city budget in 1973, to accounting for 7% by 1976 (see Figure 6-2).\textsuperscript{515} In short, although Hayes and the other suburban liberals on the city council entered office as part of a homeowner movement strongly opposed to further growth in San Jose, stopping all growth was not economically or politically viable. The mayor and her allies on the council instead sought to use taxes on growth to help fund city services while lowering taxes on homeowners.\textsuperscript{516}

A third initiative that Hayes undertook, and a key to the viability of her suburban liberal policies, was aggressive action to encourage business and industrial growth to stimulate San Jose’s economy and fill its coffers. Under Hayes, the city launched a public-private initiative to work closely with the local Chamber of Commerce and business leaders to make San Jose an attractive city for business. The city drastically sped up the permit process and began offering financial incentives, including millions of dollars in loans and other funds to help develop facilities for businesses willing to locate in San Jose. Because of these efforts, San Jose was extremely effective at attracting businesses large and small to locate in the city, including high-technology companies like


\textsuperscript{516} Lower taxes ranked high on the list of accomplishments touted by Hayes each year, as did promises for still further cuts. For example, see: "State of the City - II; "State of the City of San Jose" by Mayor Jgh, January 18, 1978; "A Survey of Voter Attitudes in the City of San Jose - August 17-26, 1974."
IBM, Hewlett Packard, and Qume. In 1977, the city issued over $70 million in industrial permits, a tenfold increase from the average permit value of past years and making the city second only to Los Angeles in attracting new industry in the state of California. By embracing this close cooperation between city government and the private sector, Hayes hoped to correct San Jose’s lopsided tax base. A side effect of the Hamann years and its emphasis on suburban growth was that San Jose had too much residential development and not enough industry. From a municipal budget standpoint, homeowners cost much more in services and infrastructure than they paid in taxes. Hayes and the suburban liberals, by doing everything that they could to attract industrial taxpayers, hoped to solve San Jose’s budget woes, delivering better quality of life, and lowering homeowner taxes. Much like the construction and conveyance taxes, Hayes and the city council were selectively tapping growth as a resource, but in a way that

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517 At her state of the city speech in January of 1978, Hayes told her Chamber of Commerce audience that San Jose was attracting so much business and industry – often beating out other nearby cities such as Santa Clara and Sunnyvale – because she was ensuring that executives would find a “sympathetic ear at city hall” committed to making the city attractive to business. Under Hayes, San Jose cut the red tape on permits (reducing the wait from 20 weeks to 7 weeks), and provided start-up loans and other funds to help with developing facilities. Hayes stated that she and the city had made a commitment to business by spending millions of dollars in redevelopment loans and front monies to upgrade industrial property to make it ready for business to move in and start production rapidly. In addition to a business friendly local government, the city also boasted a “highly skilled, eager, educated” workforce. In Hayes’ view, San Jose had become the “brightest star on the business horizon” and a “national model for teamwork between government and private enterprise.” See: “State of the City of San Jose” by Mayor Jgh, January 18, 1978; “Mayor Hayes Featured in South Bay Area Program,” (Pacific Telephone Employee Bulletin, Public Affairs, Oct 23, 1975, “Series IV: Public Relations Materials, 1914-2002,” Box 4, “Clippings . 1966-2002,” 1975-1976, Janet Gray Hayes papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and Archives).

518 In late October 1975, Hayes touted the "acceleration of [San Jose’s] economic development program" as one of city's "most notable achievements." According to Hayes, industrial use permits have jumped from recent average of $7 million annually to $42 million in first 6 months of 1975. The 1977 figure is from Hayes’ 1978 “State of the City” address. See: "State of the City of San Jose" by Mayor Jgh, January 18, 1978; "Mayor Hayes Featured in South Bay Area Program."
renegotiated the type and terms of growth to be more amenable to the interests of the suburban middle class.

A fourth and likewise critical part of Hayes first term policies was to obtain more state and federal money for projects in and around San Jose. The city in recent years had been successful in securing federal and state money for a number of projects and Hayes committed herself to expanding this flow of funds. As Hayes frequently told her constituents, she was determined to get more of resident’s federal and state tax dollars back into their neighborhoods. San Jose received tens of millions of dollars during Hayes first term for various projects and initiatives as state and federal funds came to constitute a significant portion of the city’s budget (see Figure 6-2). Federal largess was of particular importance to the city, underwriting studies and initiatives, subsidizing downtown redevelopment, funding a massive upgrade to the municipal sewage system, and providing employment and training programs.

A further federal boon to the city came in 1974 with the approval of a 38-acre foreign trade zone in San Jose. Under federal customs law, the zone offered participating businesses substantial savings on import and export duties, making San Jose particularly attractive to electronic firms who were increasingly taking advantage of an international sales model. The zone meant more business and jobs in the city and thus more industrial revenue. State and federal money – and special programs like the trade zone – made the budgetary math of suburban liberalism work.

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519 Figures in the chart are from the “Pocket Summary of Finances” cited above.
520 Hayes described the importance of the foreign trade zone during a talk with managers and employees at a local company, predicting that the zone would mean 24,000 jobs for San Jose as well as increased business activity. See: “Mayor Hayes Featured in South Bay Area Program.” For more information on the
Hayes’ suburban liberal approach had several internal contradictions. First, it was a delicate balancing act. With her policies of in-fill growth, lower taxes, more industrial development and lobbying for a greater share of federal and state monies, Hayes was offering a pragmatic middle ground between the previous growth-at-any-cost approach championed by Hamann and pro-growth interests and the homeowner activists who wanted a radical reduction in growth. This middle approach, however, left many on both sides of the issue dissatisfied, and Hayes faced the challenge of keeping the support of homeowner groups while fending off challenges from growth-related interests – a tricky predicament that came to the foreground during her 1978 bid for re-election. Second, Hayes was attempting to rehabilitate postwar growth liberalism’s promises at a time when the nation as a whole was encountering a decade of limits. Based on suburban liberal ideology – and perhaps political expediency – Hayes promised homeowners that

Figure 6-2. Percent of San Jose City Budget from Construction and Conveyance Tax and Federal & State Aid, 1973-1978

they could continue to expect more for less. The region was relatively more prosperous compared to other parts of the country. Hayes nonetheless told homeowners -- despite inflation and a city budget and a municipal government that were smaller than other comparable cities -- that they deserved better services without having to pay extra for them.\(^{521}\) Finally, delivering on these promises made Hayes and the suburban liberals dependent on continued growth and industrial expansion. As Hayes soon found, relying on growth to pay for city infrastructure and services was unpredictable as fluctuations in the broader economy could -- and did -- slow down the residential and commercial construction that provided the construction and conveyances tax revenues. Similarly, depending on federal largesse likewise proved unreliable under presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.

The June 1978 Elections and the Suburban Middle-Class Revolt in San Jose

Hayes and her campaign advisors approached the June 1978 election with confidence. The mayor and her suburban liberal allies on the city council could point to an impressive list of accomplishments, including slowing growth outside of the urban core, lowering city taxes, and growing the local economy. Polls showed that the popular Hayes enjoyed much higher name recognition and favorability ranking compared to her

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\(^{521}\) For example, Hayes told residents that “San Jose taxpayers deserve improved city services without having to bear the added burden of higher property taxes.” Embracing the perspective of taxpayer advocate groups, Hayes also promised residents that she would get more of “their” tax money back from the state and federal government to serve local priorities. Quote and example from: "State of the City - II."
likely opponents. Commentators credited Hayes and her policies for making significant strides to solve San Jose’s notorious sprawl and other growth related problems. San Jose and its mayor were also more in the national spotlight than ever before, with Hayes working with various federal agencies, testifying before Congress, and becoming a player in national Democratic politics. San Jose and Santa Clara County received attention from national publications noting the unusual number of women in local public office, depicting Hayes as a trailblazer who opened the way for women. The mayor was even able to capitalize on her good relationship with President Jimmy Carter and his wife Rosalyn when the First Lady headlined a high-profile fundraising dinner for Hayes.

522 In the lead up to the election year, the Hayes campaign committee commissioned a report on select voter attitudes and name recognition as of June 1977. That report was the basis for Hayes’ January 1978 re-election strategy document called “A Plan for Winning.” The most significant challenge to Hayes came from two fellow council members. Al Garza, the first Mexican-American council member, announced his intention to run against Hayes in August of 1977. A month later, Jim Self announced that he was testing the waters for a mayoral run and would challenge Hayes if enough support emerged. The research report and resultant strategy were based on how Hayes could run against these two challengers. Meanwhile, a local newspaper poll ranked Hayes as the most popular politician in Santa Clara County, displacing Norman Mineta as the “most admired.” See: "A Plan for Winning," (bound report, [labeled "Prepared for Mayor Hayes Committee, January, 1978," cover signed by Janet Gray Hayes], "Series II: Campaign & Election Materials, 1971-1982," Box 1 "Mayoral Reelection Campaign, 1978," "Strategy 1978," Janet Gray Hayes papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and Archives); "Garza's Mayoralty Bid Now Official," (Unknown local paper, August 1, 1977 [hand-dated], San Jose Public Library, California Room, Clipping file, "Elections - 1978 - Mayor" folder); "Self Will Run against Mayor Hayes - If Support Emerges," San Jose Mercury News, September 16 1977; "County Poll: Her Honor Leads Political Popularity Contest," San Jose Mercury News, July 31 1977.


524 Carl Irving, "Mayor Hayes' Meteoric Rise to Prominence," San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, January 1 1978. (Norman Mineta, for one, sought to trace many of the accomplishments that Hayes touted as originating under his watch).

attended by 750 guests who paid $50 a person.\footnote{Rosalynn Carter Will Aid San Jose Mayor,} As a popular and high profile incumbent, Hayes took an early fundraising lead as the frontrunner for re-election to mayor.\footnote{Armando Acuna, Mayor Hayes, Pegram Lead Race for Campaign Money - $22,000 Dinner, $17,315 Picnic,} 

Hayes and her advisors, given the advantages that she enjoyed, decided to run a much different campaign compared to her underdog bid for mayor in 1974. During her first run, Hayes had been the grassroots candidate, relying on the strength of homeowner groups and other community organizations as well as the thousand volunteers who went door to door and held events in their homes for their neighbors to meet the outsider candidate. Now the incumbent in 1978, Hayes launched a slick, professional, and top-down campaign for re-election, raising and spending record levels of money to win. Hayes took advantage of her larger campaign budget to run television, radio, and print advertising. The biggest focus of the campaign was a computer and telephone operation using the latest high-technology election tools to reach out to three-quarters of the city’s registered voters. The computer campaign aimed at getting likely Hayes supporters to the polls as well as identifying and soliciting undecided voters using personalized phone scripts and follow-up letters based on where they lived and what issues were important to them.\footnote{The computer operation is described in detail in Hayes’ 1978 reelection strategy document. Hayes and her advisors set a budget of $121,018, with the largest expenditures being for the telephone and computer effort (34.9%), personnel (15.4%) and TV advertising (12.4%). The telephone and computer operation was the most expensive part of the strategy and the Hayes committee considered it the most important.} In a push to reach Hayes’ core constituency – affluent, middle and professional
class residents – the mayor also launched an aggressive national magazine advertising campaign in *Time, US News and World Report, Newsweek, and Sports Illustrated*. The full-page advertisements sought to persuade suburban voters that Hayes had helped to make San Jose better for residents and business. One full-page advertisement in *Newsweek* featured a large photo of Hayes jogging with her dog and a smaller picture of the mayor in business attire at her desk. The advertisement, headlined “To San Jose, This Mayor Means Business,” credited Hayes with bringing more industry and prosperity to the city while lowering taxes and improving quality of life and services for residents.

Hayes’ most significant challenger amongst the four other candidates for mayor was councilmember Al Garza, the first Mexican American to serve on the San Jose city council. The oldest of 10 children, Garza had come to San Jose with his family from Texas at a young age. He attended local schools and community college before graduating from San Jose State University with a teaching degree and working as a high school counselor. Garza subsidized his income while serving on the council by working at a real-estate title firm, a relationship that critics saw as a conflict of interests given the

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Through it, they hoped to reach seventy-four percent of San Jose’s one-hundred and twenty thousand registered households. See: "A Plan for Winning."


530 The advertisement that appeared in the May 1978 issue of *Newsweek Magazine* was headlined “To San Jose, This Mayor Means Business” accompanied by a large picture of an earnest looking Hayes jogging with her dog, dressed in sharp jumpsuit. A smaller picture on the lower right showed a smiling Hayes in business attire. The copy assured readers that the mayor “takes the business of this city and its people seriously” and that under her leadership, San Jose had reached “new heights.” Bullet points reiterated the standard stump points that Hayes stressed: San Jose’s success attracting new industry, that the city had the highest median income in California, that it was named the second most livable in the West, that it had “set an example for other cities by cutting property tax rate,” that it was a “national model for balanced urban development,” and that it had that third lowest violent crime rate in the nation. The advertisement attributed these successes to the work of the mayor, the people, and a “new pride in San Jose.” But the “business of making San Jose a better place to live” was never finished, the advertisement concluded, so Hayes continued working for more affordable housing, for transportation improvements, for reduced city spending, for street repairs and for jobs. See: “To San Jose, This Mayor Means Business [Political Advertisement],” *Newsweek*, May 1978.
role of growth in local politics. Garza had five children and lived with his third wife in East San Jose – the only councilmember to live in that part of town. As one journalist described, Garza was "a stout, chain-smoking politician who favor[ed] three-piece suits and a gold watch fob." Garza unsuccessfully ran in 1970 for the council seat won by Hayes. In 1971, the city council appointed Garza to fill a vacancy. He ran successfully to retain his seat in 1973 and again – unopposed – in 1976. Garza ran for mayor in 1974, but the showdown between Hayes and Collins overshadowed his campaign and he finished a distant third in the primary election. The 1978 contest between Hayes and Garza would be even more expensive and bitter than that between Hayes and Collins four years earlier.

Garza’s strategy before the June 1978 primary was to attack the weak points of Hayes’ suburban liberal coalition. He attempted to peel away the mayor’s support among homeowners by criticizing Hayes for continued growth, not doing enough to improve city services, and generally failing to deliver on her quality of life promises. Garza also positioned himself as the candidate that was more sensitive and responsive to working-class and minority residents, an appeal that resonated with the primarily Latino voters on the east side of San Jose where unemployment was high and neighborhood services and

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infrastructure remained inferior. Garza took advantage of a broad anti-incumbent sentiment among the voters, portraying himself as an outsider despite his several years on the city council and Hayes as a failed incumbent. Overall, however, Garza’s policy proposals lacked focus and the spending and development projects that he supported threatened to undo the smart growth and fiscal austerity program undertaken by Hayes.

As the contest between them grew more heated and Garza attracted the support of development interests, he opportunistically began to adopt a variety of pro-growth positions.

Hayes did not consider Garza much of a political threat and campaigned on the strength of her record, touting the progress that she had made on her smart growth plan lowering taxes, promoting industrial and job growth, and restraining residential development. The editors at the San Jose Mercury News agreed, recommending Hayes for re-election based on her managed growth policies and fiscal responsibility. They

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535 In expressing support for Hayes’ re-election, the editors of the San Jose Mercury News noted that while Garza was a “dedicated public servant with good political instincts” he had an “underdeveloped” sense of fiscal responsibility that made him prone to seeing “more spending as a panacea” for most municipal issues. See: "Re-Elect the Mayor," (Editorial, San Jose News, May 22, 1978 [hand-dated], "Series II: Campaign & Election Materials. 1971-1982," Box 1, "Clippings,1971-1978" "Mayoral Reelection Campaign, 1978," Janet Gray Hayes papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and Archives).

536 For example, in statements to reporters promoting her re-election, Hayes returned to citing her common benchmarks of success in San Jose. The incumbent mayor cited her role in attracting more industrial business to San Jose than any other city in the nation except Los Angeles “while maintaining balanced urban growth.” She also sought to take credit for the addition of 100 police officers, the creation of 20,000 private sector jobs, and the fact that San Jose had just been named the second most livable city in the West by a magazine poll. While proud of many of the accomplishments of her first term, Hayes believed that there were still significant problems that needed to be addressed, including more reasonably priced housing and the completion of several transportation projects. Hayes believed she was more qualified compared to Garza to guide the city in meeting these and other issues. According to Hayes, Garza was “more pro-development” in his orientation, as demonstrated by his support of opening Coyote Valley to residential development. In contrast, she described herself as “more restrained on growth” compared to Garza, but was quick to qualify that she was “not a no-growth advocate.” See: Gary Swan, "Difference Is 'Clear,' Say Mayor of Rival," San Jose Mercury, May 12 1978.
noted that Hayes had efficiently used city resources and reduced city taxes by prioritizing infill development within the urban core, promoting industrial growth, and linking housing starts to job growth. The paper also credited the mayor with championing the policy of limiting budget increases to inflation and population growth, an approach that had allowed further cost savings for the city and tax rate reductions. In sum, the paper credited Hayes with delivering most of what she had promised residents through smart growth, and recommended the mayor and her suburban liberal policies for a second term.

San Jose’s “Unpersuaded Electorate”

The June 1978 primary election sent shockwaves that resonated from the local, state and even national level. San Jose and Santa Clara County voters not only joined with the larger California Proposition 13 taxpayer revolt, but they voiced dissatisfaction with the status quo by punishing incumbent officeholders from judges up to the mayor’s office. For Hayes, the results were a doubly stinging rebuke. First, despite her popularity, the mayor failed to secure the majority amongst a slate of challengers, forcing her into a runoff race with Garza in the November. Second, Hayes and her suburban liberal allies had joined with the local and state political establishment, major newspapers, labor unions and other liberal groups to passionately oppose Proposition 13. Nonetheless, a majority of San Jose and Santa Clara County voters joined the rest of the state in passing the anti-tax proposition. The ballot measure drastically reduced property taxes and made

537 “Re-Elect the Mayor.”
it much more difficult for city and state governments to raise taxes.\textsuperscript{538} In the mayor’s race, the third highest vote getter had been a vocal proponent of Proposition 13.\textsuperscript{539}

The editors of the \textit{San Jose Mercury}, in a series of editorials analyzing the June results, noted that Proposition 13 was only partly to do with taxes, but argued that it was “sure enough a revolt.” In their view, the results were:

\begin{quote}
… a revolt against Big Government, identified by the voters as insensitive politicians, officious bureaucrats, and programs that seem to benefit everybody except those paying the biggest share of the bills, the overtaxed and underheeded Middle Class…
\end{quote}

Stated affirmatively, Proposition 13 is a revolt for Middle Class control of the machinery of government.\textsuperscript{540}

The editors believed that by passing Proposition 13 over the widespread opposition of their political leaders, by voting against incumbents, and by supporting measures that offered them “more direct control of events or processes” that voters in California and locally were demonstrating that “the people intend to be boss.”\textsuperscript{541}

\textsuperscript{538} The hope by Hayes to “get it over with in June” was dashed by the stronger than expected showing of Garza, who received 54,152 votes compared to Hayes’ 67,149 – thereby forcing a run-off contest in November. Two incumbent San Jose city council members also found themselves facing a November runoff when Councilmember Joseph Colla, the longest serving member of the current council, and Larry Pegram both failed to achieve a majority. Pegram’s race underscored the anti-incumbent mood as one candidate managed to garner 27% of the vote with only his name on the ballot and no active campaigning. Meanwhile, in her bid to join the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors, councilmember Susanne Wilson (an ally of Hayes and part of the suburban liberal bloc on the city council), faced a run-off election against real estate developer and political newcomer Ivan Zubow. Even two incumbent county judges, traditionally granted easy re-election, failed to hold onto their offices. See: “Elections - Nonpartisan S.J., County Offices,” June 8 1978; “Judges Feel the Voters’ Wrath,” \textit{San Jose Mercury}, June 8 1978; “San Jose’s ‘Unpersuaded’ Electorate,” (Editorial, \textit{San Jose Mercury}, [undated - June 1978], “Series II: Campaign & Election Materials , 1971-1982,” Box 1, “Clippings,1971-1978” “Mayoral Reelection Campaign, 1978,” Janet Gray Hayes papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and Archives); Connie Skipitares, “Supervisor Runoff to Focus on Land Use,” \textit{San Jose Mercury}, June 8 1978.

\textsuperscript{539} Gary Swan, "Anti-Incumbent Vote Forces Mayoral, Council Runoffs," ibid.

\textsuperscript{540} "Lessons from June 6," ibid.

\textsuperscript{541} Ibid.
The *San Jose Mercury* editors believed that the surprise upset in several incumbent races indicated that Santa Clara County voters had “served notice they will be watching local government as warily and with as little patience as they now regard Sacramento.” In San Jose, a “damn-the-incumbent movement” seemed the only way to explain why voters had failed to re-elect the current officeholder in three different races and among candidates of very different political persuasions. In the mayors’ race, a popular liberal mayor who had spent record sums failed to secure re-election, but so had the conservative councilmember Colla and the moderate Pegram. Across their “broad spectrum of political philosophy,” the editorial asserted that the only thing that they shared in common was city council membership. The voters’ rejection of these three candidates therefore “must be read as a sign of citizen dissatisfaction with city government, if not all government.” Turning to the specific implications of the San Jose mayor’s race, the editors observed that even though Garza was an incumbent council member, a vote for him should be read as an anti-incumbent challenge to Hayes. The editors advised both Hayes and Garza in the upcoming runoff to forgo the charges and countercharges that had characterized their contest so far and to focus instead on the “action” that the public wanted. Specifics regarding just what action the voters wanted was missing from the editorial.543

The June 1978 election results in San Jose indeed represented a continued “revolt” by suburban middle class homeowners – the very group that had provided


543 “San Jose's 'Unpersuaded' Eectorate."
Hayes’ original base. Hayes had come into office as a representative of suburban priorities. She had told residents that they could have improved quality of life and lower taxes through a combination of smart growth, greater efficiency in government, and by tapping into the success of the high-technology wonder economy. The mayor had managed to deliver on most of these promises during her first term, working to make development in San Jose slower, better planned, and more fiscally sustainable while also lowering taxes. Hayes had seen the homeowner/taxpayer revolt taking shape and had worked to defuse it. She had consistently promised San Jose residents more efficiency, more services and more tax reductions while speaking out strongly in opposition to Proposition 13. Nevertheless, the continued growth was still faster than what many residents wanted to occur and the property tax reductions were not enough to prevent San Jose’s electorate from joining the Proposition 13 movement to force further tax cuts and fiscal constraints on local government. The mayor and her suburban liberal allies could not keep ahead of the movement that they sought to represent.

After Proposition 13 passed and Garza forced her into a run-off, Hayes attempted to regain her role as the spokesperson for homeowners in San Jose. The mayor positioned herself as the public’s watchdog, invoking the tax measure and the “will of the voters” to attack her political foes and call for even greater efficiency and frugality. Hayes became more fiscally conservative than before, but unlike the conservative voices involved with Proposition 13, she maintained her suburban liberal orientation. She wanted to give San Jose residents more in terms of quality of life, amenities, and services while adhering to the tax cuts and drastic budget constraints that voters demanded. Hayes, unlike conservatives, saw ample room for local, state and federal programs to achieve these
ends. Finally, while Hayes adopted a more fiscally conservative stance, she maintained her commitment to other liberal social goals – including environmental protection, civil rights, women’s issues, selective social programs and gun control.

The “Fearsome Foursome” and the Pro-Growth Counteroffensive

In the lead up to the November runoff elections – and amidst the backdrop of the middle-class revolt of Proposition 13 and voters’ dissatisfaction with incumbents exhibited during the June primary election – a new majority emerged on the San Jose city council to challenge the suburban liberal policies put in place by a weakened Mayor Hayes. The new council majority, nicknamed the “Fearsome Foursome” by the local press, began to act as a pro-growth bloc, passing a series of measures with 4-3 votes. Flexing their muscle against the suburban liberal minority, the group fired the San Jose city manager closely allied with Hayes. Most controversially, the Foursome imposed a tax that subsidized new development days before Proposition 13 took effect, thereby bypassing the requirement for voter approval. Driven by the individual political ambitions of its members and supported by developers and their allies, the Foursome became a vehicle for the still powerful pro-growth interests to try to retake control of city hall. The municipal coup ultimately failed, however, because the Foursome and their developer patrons misread the mood of voters in the wake of the taxpayer revolt as a conservative rejection of Hayes and her suburban liberal policies. San Jose voters were not rejecting the quality of life, slower growth and lower taxes promised by the mayor; instead, voters wanted faster and more drastic action on each of those fronts. Local
residents believed the mayor when she told them that they deserved more for less. The attempt by the Foursome to impose pro-growth policies ultimately backfired on development interests, instead helping to cement the suburban liberals as the established municipal regime going forward.

The Foursome was an “unlikely alliance” comprised of council members Al Garza, Larry Pegram, David Runyon, and Joseph Colla, leaving Mayor Hayes and councilmembers Jim Self and Susanne Wilson acting as the suburban liberal minority.\textsuperscript{544} Observers labeled them a conservative bloc, but the “Fearsome Foursome” was a curious collection of players united more by ambition and opportunism than by coherent ideological conviction.\textsuperscript{545} This was most obvious in the case of Garza, who had previously positioned himself as a liberal and who typically voted with Hayes and the suburban liberals on the council, but who now saw the Foursome as a way to advance his campaign for mayor.\textsuperscript{546} The same was true of Pegram, who had won his seat in 1974 by running as a homeowner candidate espousing policies very similar to Hayes, including limiting growth, preserving open space, lowering taxes and attracting business investment.\textsuperscript{547} Now running for re-election – and with future intentions of running for mayor or other higher office – Pegram made the political calculation to shift away from

\textsuperscript{545} For example, both Garza and Colla identified as Democrats. Pegram was a Republican, but at this point in his career, he was mildly liberal. The most socially conservative was Runyon, but he had never before taken the side of development interests against the liberal majority.
\textsuperscript{546} As one article noted, up until last year, Garza and Hayes were “widely viewed as having similar views on the issue of growth” and social issues. But that had been before Garza entered the mayor’s race against Hayes and before developers began “shaking bags of money” in earnest at the candidates. See: Acuna, "Unlikely Council Foursome; Tom Gilsenan, "It's a Single Issue Race," \textit{North San Jose Sun}, October 24 1978.
\textsuperscript{547} Acuna, "Unlikely Council Foursome; Gilsenan, "It's a Single Issue Race; Moreillon, "Closest Race Ever for S.J. Mayor; Barnacle, "Call Her Madam Mayor - Mrs. Hayes Tells Conference."
cooperation with the mayor and her policies. The third member of the Foursome, Runyon, had campaigned as a “born again Christian” and conservative, but had otherwise opposed growth during his time on the city council. Indeed, the only member of the Foursome who had taken mildly pro-growth positions was Colla, a councilmember also seeking re-election in 1978. Elected in 1964 to represent one of the oldest and most affluent parts of San Jose, Colla had often been a lone “independent” or contrarian vote on the council. Thus, as one article characterized it, most of the members of the Foursome had not taken pro-growth positions until developers began “shaking bags of money” at them when Hayes appeared weakened. The allegiance of the strange bedfellows that made up the “Fearsome Foursome” therefore arose out of the individual political ambitions of its members who saw political advantage from spearheading an attempt by development interests to recapture control of San Jose’s City Hall from Hayes and the suburban liberals.

The Foursome seized the initiative from the mayor, changing the council’s direction on several major policy issues, most notably implementing tax and spending measures that marked a return to the old pro-growth atmosphere of the postwar decades and a reversal of the Hayes’ “smart growth” initiatives. The three most significant shifts came after a series of bitterly contentious city council meetings that often stretched past

548 Pegram had done fundraising in an exploratory bid to run against Hayes in 1978, but ultimately did not run. Although a Republican, Pegram was mildly liberal, but would later shift towards a more conservative stance as he became more active in state Republican politics. See: Acuna, "Mayor Hayes, Pegram Lead Race for Campaign Money - $22,000 Dinner, $17,315 Picnic."
549 “Unlikely Council Foursome.”
551 Gilsenan, “It’s a Single Issue Race.”
midnight with the mayor, Self and Wilson battling in the minority. First, the “Foursome” abolished a city policy tying new growth to adequate streets. Second, they adopted a $28 million roads program and voted to divert $7 million from a fund created to finance new parks, libraries and fire stations into road construction instead. Third, just days before Proposition 13 would have come into effect and prevented any new taxes without a popular vote, the council majority also approved a tax increase on residential construction. The measure more than doubled the existing residential tax level of 1.75% to 4.5% (although it left the 1% tax on industrial construction unchanged) and imposed a $950 fee on mobile home construction. The Foursome claimed that the tax was to fund road construction and upkeep, but there were no requirements on the use of the estimated $130 million in revenue that the measure would bring to the city over the next fifteen years. As Hayes and other critics noted, the new tax, along with the other votes by the “Fearsome Foursome,” were a return to the past practice of subsidizing new growth paid for by existing taxpayers.552

The tax provoked a firestorm in the wake of Proposition 13 – especially because the council majority implemented the tax just days before the new proposition would have made such a measure illegal. As one article explained to residents, "there's a big new tax on remodeling your home or putting in a pool."553 The editors at the San Jose Sun declared that the Foursome represented an unwelcome return to the unrestrained growth from previous years and that the new tax was “only a plan to help developers who

552 Ibid; Acuna, “Unlikely Council Foursome.”
want to build new subdivisions."\textsuperscript{554} A \textit{San Jose Mercury News} editorial agreed, criticizing the council majority for putting in place a tax that promoted sprawl and undermined the city’s managed growth policies. The \textit{Mercury} editors noted that the four council members who voted for the tax had met with key building industry interests privately beforehand, thus raising questions whether the Foursome had engaged in some form of quid pro quo with developers by trading support for the tax in exchange for road projects to support new growth.\textsuperscript{555}

The controversy heated up when the “Fearsome Foursome” took aim at city manager Ted Tedesco, a controlled growth advocate and an ally of Hayes. Tedesco had worked closely with Hayes to create a new general plan in 1976 for the city that restricted growth on the periphery while promoting “in-fill” development in areas already served by city services and infrastructure. The 1976 general plan, the culmination of months of work and several public meetings with substantial input by community groups, was a key milestone in the smart growth approach favored by Hayes and the suburban liberals on the council. Now that the Foursome had the majority, they saw Tedesco as a recalcitrant obstacle to their agenda. In an angry confrontation that the \textit{San Jose Mercury} editorialists called “a sad spectacle,” the Foursome fired Tedesco with a 4-3 vote on the council. The editors strongly criticized the council majority for the firing, describing Tedesco as a man of “integrity and ability” who had helped reform San Jose’s negative reputation for

\textsuperscript{554} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{555} "Streets: Wrong Way?," \textit{San Jose Mercury}, June 30 1978.
runaway growth by helping to prove that development could be controlled by a rational, planned process.\textsuperscript{556}

Pro-growth positions earned the Foursome the support and financial backing of developers and other pro-growth interests, but at the expense of popular support.\textsuperscript{557} Garza and the other members of the Foursome had misread the temperament of local voters. After the tax measure passed, a coalition of San Jose homeowners groups mobilized to prepare a ballot measure to repeal it. Although the impetus for the neighborhood groups to spring into action was the tax increase, the groups involved expressed a strong dissatisfaction with the continued pace of growth in San Jose. The homeowner groups considered including language that would have imposed drastic restrictions on all growth – residential, commercial and industrial – in the city.\textsuperscript{558} If passed, the measures would severely undermine the political authority of the mayor and city council.

Fortunately for Hayes and the suburban liberals on the city council, the ballot measure never came to fruition. The “Fearsome Foursome” lost its political momentum when Councilmember Runyon tendered his resignation in August of 1978 over a recurring personal scandal.\textsuperscript{559} Losing their four-vote majority and facing widespread...

\textsuperscript{556} Garza claimed that Tedesco was fired because he stood in the way of the agenda of the new council majority. Colla, who said that Tedesco was removed because he was anti-growth, and San Jose was a “pro-growth town”, offered a more blunt assessment. See: "A Sad Spectacle," \textit{San Jose Mercury}, August 16 1978.

\textsuperscript{557} Gary E. Swan, "Builders Giving Garza, Colla $24,000," ibid., October 13.


\textsuperscript{559} Runyon tendered his resignation after an embarrassing late night clash with local police. Runyon, who had campaigned as a “born-again Christian,” had already apologized for an alcohol related incident earlier that year that had led to charges of interfering with police business. In June, the councilmember had a “second early-hours-of-the-morning brush with city police” and was charged with battery, resisting arrest,
criticism, the remaining three conservative council members were decidedly less “fearsome.” With the threat of the homeowner ballot measure looming over the council, Hayes was able to seize the initiative, modifying the tax measure to apply to new development only and exempt improvements to existing property. Hayes also secured a new roads package that made the funds usable only for the repair and expansion of roads in existing neighborhoods. The resulting council policies conformed more to Hayes’ “pay as you grow” approach and commitment to prioritizing the improvement of services and infrastructures for existing residents.

The power grab by the Foursome and development interests was short-lived, but the incident once again propelled the issue of growth to the forefront of local politics in the November run-off election. It also underscored the muddled battle lines over the politics of growth in fast-growing industrial suburbs like San Jose. Development interests were key stakeholders in local politics due to their position as one of the bigger economic players in the region providing jobs and revenue for the city. Thus, despite the strong opposition to growth among residents and the frequent use of anti-growth rhetoric in municipal races, developers were often one of the largest sources of campaign funds for front-running local candidates. Even Mayor Hayes, a homeowner candidate who spoke out against growth, received about half of the approximately $200,000 that she raised to run for re-election in 1978 from developers with the other half coming from business and industry. Hayes had been the primary recipient of developer donations in the mayor’s

and public drunkenness. Although the council did not pursue any action to censure or condemn Runyon’s behavior, the council accepted his resignation in late August of 1978. See: Lane, "The Politics of Growth in San Jose; Richard Doyle, "Censure Policy [Memorandum from Richard Doyle, City Attorney to Honorable Mayor and City Council],” ed. San Jose City Council (San Jose, California 2004). Gilsenan, “It’s a Single Issue Race.”
race in the lead up to the June primary. It was only after Garza forced a runoff and the Fearsome Foursome shook up the local balance of power that this flow of money shifted. As the November election approached and Hayes and the suburban liberals on the council appeared vulnerable, many developers shifted away from the mayor to pour money into the campaigns of Garza and Colla. In his bid to unseat the mayor, Garza raised approximately $400,000 – a sum that shattered previous fundraising records in San Jose – primarily from development interests.\footnote{561} Despite the flood of developer money, both Hayes and Garza professed an opposition to growth, each accusing the other of being more beholden to development interests.\footnote{562} As the candidates traded charges and counter-charges regarding their respective anti-growth credentials, even the seasoned political...
observers at the San Jose Mercury News were confused, writing on the eve of the November election “[w]ill the real limited-growth candidate please stand up?”

Hayes and her suburban liberal allies were not hypocritical when they accepted donations from developers. A key part of the suburban liberal approach to governance was tapping certain kinds of managed growth as a resource. Hayes sought to slow residential growth and to encourage industrial growth while channeling the majority of new development to in-fill areas. The viability of the mayor’s suburban liberal policies – from the “pay as you grow” construction and conveyance taxes to increased revenue from faster economic expansion and the use of federal funds – depended on growth. Similar to growth liberals at the national level who avoided painful questions of equitable distribution of wealth by growing the overall economic pie, Hayes sought to serve the broad needs of San Jose residents through more growth. However, Hayes and the suburban liberals shifted the costs and benefits of growth to serve the priorities of suburban homeowners.

The smart growth supported by Hayes and the suburban liberals in San Jose benefited certain development interests while hurting others. This split amongst growth interests was revealed in the wake of Garza’s success at the June primary and the advent of the Foursome as some developers shifted to supporting Hayes’ opponents while others stuck with the mayor and her allies. The developers who supported Hayes and her

563 “San Jose’s Future Growth the Main Issue in Campaign,” San Jose Mercury, November 3 1978.
564 For example, in October, the Builders and Contractors Committee pledged $14,000 to Garza – an amount believed to be the largest single contribution to date in a San Jose race by a developer group. The group also gave $10,000 to Colla and $10,000 to defeat district elections (district elections were seen by many pro-growth advocates as empowering local areas to better mobilize against growth). In a statement, the group’s chairperson told reporters “the majority of our members felt that those two people [Garza and
suburban liberal policies likely saw the mayor as a pragmatic middle ground between the politically unpopular pro-growth old guard personified by former city manager Dutch Hamann and the homeowner activists who wanted a halt to all growth. For developers willing to operate within the “smart growth” parameters that Hayes laid out, there was ample potential for lucrative projects within city boundaries – especially if their developments did not have to compete with lower cost construction on the periphery now restricted by the mayor’s policies. Hayes was thus a good political investment for developers well positioned to profit from “in-fill” development, notably builders of high-density residential units and commercial and industrial property.

Hayes’s smart growth policies divided development interests, but she meanwhile enjoyed strong support from the local business community, underscoring the appeal of the mayor’s suburban liberal policies to the owners and managers of the region’s non-development related industry. Business and industry groups saw much to like in the suburban liberal approach. Electronics firms concerned about attracting and retaining high-technology workers knew that controlling growth and addressing the quality of life complaints of their employees served their human resources goals by making it easier to attract and retain highly skilled talent. The fact that the suburban liberal leadership was eager to include the private sector in their decisions and invite private experts into city hall to share their expertise offered concerned business executives a direct voice in local

Colla] are better for our industry” – although another member of the group noted that some members preferred Hayes and had supported the mayor in the past. See: Gary E. Swan, “Builders Giving Garza, Colla $24,000,” ibid., October 13.

A significant portion of Hayes’ war chest, and nearly half of the money that she raised between June and November, came from the business sector (not including developers). See: “Finding Money the Key Play in the Campaign Game,” ibid., October 8.
More importantly, Hayes and the suburban liberals on the council had been willing to do whatever they could to attract and keep industry – including maintaining a highly “business-friendly” climate and mobilizing at the local, state and national level to help lobby for special policies and programs to improve the competitive position of the local electronics industry.

Hayes and the suburban liberals in San Jose received a powerful new ally with the formation of the Santa Clara County Manufacturers Group (SCCMG) in 1977 by electronics entrepreneur David Packard and others associated with the region’s high-technology industry. Packard and the other members of the SCCMG mobilized to address the special needs of their industry, and better planned growth and other quality of life issues ranked as a top concern. Developers were divided in their position relative to Hayes and the suburban liberals, but Packard and the SCCMG demonstrated that the powerful electronics industry – the new primary driver of the local economy – was united in their support for smart growth policies.

Merchants, builders, and other pro-growth interests in the early postwar decades had enjoyed a free hand in San Jose, but this changed over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. The fact that developers relied on an attempted coup as feeble as the Foursome to roll back controlled-growth measures underscored the shift in the local political economy. Hayes and the suburban liberals, although caught up in the anti-incumbent mood of the

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566 Hayes and the suburban liberals put in place measures to involve business leaders in the business of government. For example, Hayes touted the city’s Committee of Productivity and Efficiency (COPE) as a resource where private experts donated their expertise to offer suggestions from private industry’s experience to improve government efficiency. See: “State of the City of San Jose” by Mayor Jgh, January 18, 1978.

567 A group described in Chapter 4.
tax revolt, represented a potent coalition that united a significant cross-section of homeowners, cooperative developers, liberal groups, and leaders of the powerful electronics industry. Thus, the gamble by the remnants of the pro-growth coalition to back the “Fearsome Foursome” in 1978 marked its ultimate decline into irrelevance.\textsuperscript{568}

\textbf{The November 1978 Runoff Election and the Suburban Liberal Mandate}

The fallout from the attempted municipal coup by the Foursome gave a significant boost to Hayes’ campaign. Although the mayor and her allies had campaigned vigorously against Proposition 13, after its passage, Hayes took up the anti-tax banner and accused Garza and the Foursome of flouting the will of the voters with the attempted new tax. She reiterated her promise to control growth and deliver more with less as residents demanded. On November 8, Hayes achieved an overwhelming victory over Garza, winning 70.8\% of the vote (107,174 to 44,070). Post-election analysis of voting patterns revealed that Hayes had “swept not only the white, high-income and conservative neighborhoods in San Jose, she also carried minority, low-income and liberal areas.”\textsuperscript{569}

The \textit{San Francisco Chronicle} observed that the mayor’s “commanding victory left no

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\textsuperscript{568} The longtime local political observer Phil Trounstine described the “Fearsome Foursome” episode and its fallout thusly: "It was a moment in time when the old guard overextended itself, and from there on, lost power…. From then on, the civic religion of San Jose was controlled growth." Quoted from: Scott Herhold, "The Days of the 'Fearsome Foursome'," \textit{San Jose Mercury News}, May 16 2010.

\textsuperscript{569} Why had Garza done so poorly – apparently losing support from June – and despite spending nearly $400,000 to unseat Hayes? Political journalist Rick Carroll attributed Garza’s poor showing to his “thinly-veiled pro-growth stance,” erosion of support among Chicano voters, and the fact that his campaign devolved into distasteful personal attacks on the Mayor. Garza’s fortunes would sink even further in a few months as he became caught up in a bribery and corruption scandal that ended his political career in San Jose. For more detail, see: Carroll, "Sweet Triumph for San Jose's Mayor; Philip J. Trounstine, "Why It Happened: An Analysis of Voting Patterns - Looking at Local Results by Areas," \textit{San Jose Mercury}, November 12 1978.
\end{flushright}
doubt that San Jose voters favor her policy of limited growth.” Hayes saw her victory in the same light, declaring that the city’s voters “don’t want another Los Angeles.”

Meanwhile, the *San Jose Mercury News* editors cheered the election results as the start of a “new era” for San Jose, declaring that by re-electing the mayor with such an emphatic margin, voters were giving Hayes a mandate to pursue her smart growth policies. The “new era” that the *Mercury* editors had declared was a suburban liberal one.

In a further victory for Hayes, two of her close political allies also prevailed in their races. Political newcomer and controlled growth advocate Jerry Estruth had ran a longshot, door-to-door campaign against councilmember Colla. After the events of the summer, Estruth won by a wide 62.9% margin over the longtime incumbent and prominent member of “Fearsome Foursome.” Meanwhile councilmember Susanne Wilson, one of the key suburban liberal votes on the city council, prevailed in her runoff bid to join the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors. Wilson’s victory not only put another suburban liberal ally at the county level, but also opened a seat on the city council for an appointment of a political supporter of Hayes’ agenda.

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570 Carroll, “Sweet Triumph for San Jose’s Mayor.”
571 “San Jose’s New Era,” *San Jose Mercury*, November 12 1978.
572 Seen as an ally of Hayes, Estruth had campaigned door-to-door on the issue of limited growth – tying his fortune to the mayor’s policy. He managed to go from being an unknown, longshot challenger to earning 62.9% of the vote (91,616 votes to Colla’s 54,030) to unseat a longtime popular incumbent. See: “Sweet Triumph for San Jose’s Mayor; Gary Swan, “Hayes, Estruth Easy Victories,” *San Jose Mercury*, November 8 1978.
573 Seen as “a Hayes protégé,” Wilson’s 56% to 43.9 % (40,859 votes to 32,033) victory over the developer Ivan Zubow was interpreted as another “stamp of approval” for Hayes’ policies. As an added bonus, the city council seat that Wilson vacated would be filled by the appointment of “a limited-growth disciple of the mayor” – thereby further bolstering the mayor’s strength on the council. See: Carroll, “Sweet Triumph for San Jose’s Mayor; Swan, “Hayes, Estruth Easy Victories.”
In an editorial entitled “The Voters Speak,” the *San Jose Mercury News* editors interpreted the election of suburban liberals Hayes, Estruth and Wilson as a loud message:

…the voters clearly have expressed a desire that future growth needs to be carefully planned, and that there needs to be a balance between jobs and housing, and that residential growth needs to be limited by our ability and willingness to pay for the urban services that go with it.\(^{574}\)

Although the editorial did not elaborate on the point, suburban liberal leaders and the city as a whole had to worry about residents’ willingness to pay for services. Also left unmentioned by the editors was the matter of expectations – were voters willing to accept less in order to pay less or did they believe, as Hayes promised, that they could indefinitely expect to receive more from government while paying less for it?

Hayes and her policies may have prevailed, but Proposition 13 made the suburban liberal “pay as you grow” approach even more difficult to achieve. Hayes’ “smart growth” method of financing city services made San Jose triply dependent on growth: if any combination of new development, federal money, or industrial growth became scarcer, the city would face budget strains. This is precisely what happened during Hayes second term when all three of these pillars became unstable. The impact of Proposition 13 on San Jose’s already strained budget made everything more difficult for the mayor and her allies. The mayor had consistently promised residents more for less, and now Hayes and her allies had to deliver the quality of life and services that residents demanded with much less.

\(^{574}\) “The Voters Speak,” ibid.
The November 1978 election was also noteworthy as a coda to one of the remaining legacies of San Jose’s first wave of Progressive Era reformers. As part of their effort to put municipal power firmly in the hands of efficient business-minded professionals and middle-class residents like themselves, the Progressive reformers had replaced ward-level elections for city council seats with citywide elections. The change made it more difficult for minority and working-class candidates to win election to the council, and helped deliver municipal power to mobilized and deep-pocketed candidates primarily hailing from the city’s affluent business and professional classes. Until the victories of Virginia Shaffer and Norman Mineta in the 1960s, this had kept power in San Jose in the hands of a few affluent white men. Various efforts were made by reformers in the past to restore district elections, but the opposition of the city’s incumbent leadership effectively prevented the change. In 1978, the dynamics shifted, with Hayes and the suburban liberals joining with other liberal, working class and minority groups to support district elections. Voters narrowly passed the ballot measure restoring district election of council members in San Jose by a margin of 51.8% to 48.1% (72,557 “yes” votes to 67,287 “no” votes). The local press called the passage of the measure "the most dramatic restructuring of San Jose city government in this century" – something of an overstatement considering the sweeping changes to the charter made by reformers in the


576 Trounstine, "Why It Happened: An Analysis of Voting Patterns - Looking at Local Results by Areas."
However, the restoration of district elections highlighted the long-term expansion and reconstitution of the middle class in the US. Middle-class Progressives had seen themselves as a minority threatened by the corporate interests of labor and concentrated capital and large numbers of working-class and immigrant voters. Thus, putting in place measures that restricted popular democracy benefited their middle-class interests as Progressive saw them. As successful industrial suburbs like San Jose demonstrated, the policies of postwar growth liberalism had expanded the ranks of the middle class in the US to include an enlarged cohort of educated professionals and a significant contingent of the working class, thereby changing the political dynamics that had motivated the Progressives. Therefore, in the context of San Jose politics, a broad-based coalition of middle-class homeowner activists united with labor and minority groups to remove one of the last remaining Progressive Era restrictions on popular democracy in the city. Suburban liberals, the inheritors and beneficiaries of the banner of progressive reform in San Jose, were thus instrumental at revising the legacy of the two preceding middle-class reform waves.

**Conclusion – The Limits of Suburban Liberalism**

Janet Gray Hayes helped to articulate and cohere a distinctly suburban liberal vision of governance in San Jose during her tenure as mayor between 1975 and 1983. By the time San Jose had taken up the mantle in the 1980s of being the “Capital of Silicon

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577 The quote is from an editorial in the *San Jose Mercury News* that asserted that the passage of a districting plan - which the editors had opposed - was "probably going to provide the most dramatic restructuring of San Jose city government in this century." See: "The Voters Speak," ibid., November 8.
suburban liberalism had become the region’s primary political culture. A suburbanized strand of liberalism predominating in one of the nation’s most economically and politically important regions contradicts much of the conventional narrative about the political history of the US. The history of San Jose qualifies the conventional political wisdom that the suburban environment fostered only a conservative political culture. Suburban liberalism also belies the so-called “Rise of the Right” accounts that see in the 1970s a broad decline of liberalism in the face of an ascendant New Right that heralded a conservative turn nationally. Unlike the “suburban warriors” of Orange County, California, who rejected the liberal state, the suburban liberals of Silicon Valley were reformers who sought to redirect government intervention to serve their interests. Moreover, the fact that Hayes and the suburban liberals of Silicon Valley anticipated the centrist turn of Bill Clinton and the “New Democrat” wing of the national Democratic Party by over a decade must force a reassessment of the evolution of modern liberalism.

The example of Hayes and San Jose during this period also underscores the limits of suburban liberalism. The suburban liberal governing coalition in Silicon Valley tentatively included a range of groups, but two key interests predominated in local politics from the 1970s onward: local homeowners and business and industry leaders. The suburban liberal coalition therefore prioritized the quality of life concerns of middle-class homeowners as well as the retention and expansion of the local high-technology industry. Thus, the more progressive or radical goals of many labor, feminist, or social and environmental justice advocates found little support from – or were outright opposed by - the region’s suburban liberal establishment. Finally, although San Jose can now
claim to be a national success story as the “Capital of Silicon Valley” and for its smart growth planning and preservation of open space, not all residents benefited equally. The region’s income polarity, lack of affordable housing, and varying quality of public services all attest to the middle-class and business orientation of local priorities. As suburban liberalism moved from affluent suburbs like Silicon Valley to influence national policies, the viability of achieving progressive aims through a suburban lens has increasingly become a question for the US as a whole.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

Three successive waves of progressive reformers contributed to the evolution and success of Silicon Valley as a leading technology center. Each wave arose from a transition in the local political economy, prompting a struggle over control of the municipal government. Liberal Republicans attached to the region’s emerging industrial-orchard economy led the first wave in the Progressive Era. They removed an incumbent political machine in the 1920s run by Gold Rush interests and implemented measures that made local government more responsive to middle-class priorities while reducing participation by many working-class residents. This initial wave provided a model of professional and middle-class reform open to corporate interests and bipartisanship.

The second reform wave began in the late 1940s and adopted the postwar enthusiasm for suburban growth as a means to promote prosperity. This second group created the rapid suburbanization and development of Santa Clara County during the 1950s and 1960s that accommodated the expansion of the region’s electronics industry, laying the foundation for Silicon Valley’s high-technology industrial economy. Predominantly professional and middle-class white men led both of these first two waves, a constituency that largely matched the demographics of the region through the early postwar decades.

Santa Clara County became more diverse after World War II, altering the political status quo. The third reform wave arose in the late 1960s and was primarily composed of
managers and professionals from the region’s high-technology economy. This third wave eventually coalesced in the 1970s as a suburban liberal governing coalition combining middle-class and professional residents, homeowners, liberal and minority groups and the region’s high-technology business leaders. Homeowner activists – many of whom were women and minorities – led this second group with the goal of countering the growth-related problems that threatened the sustainability of Silicon Valley’s economy. Many leaders of the third wave had links to the Democratic Party, but like the reformers before them, liberal Republicans also played important roles. The region continued to develop and grow under the leadership of the suburban liberals, with the costs and benefits of that growth rebalanced to suit suburban preferences.

Silicon Valley is thus not only remarkable for the semiconductor, computer and other advanced technologies that it exported, but also for providing a compelling model of a distinct political economy based on suburban liberal priorities serving the middle-class knowledge-workers and high-technology employers of the region. The suburban liberal political culture that arose in the 1970s was in turn indebted to the legacies, positive and negative, of the two reform movements that preceded it.

**Suburban Liberalism in the “Capital of Silicon Valley”**

Norman Mineta, as mayor of San Jose between 1971 and 1975, laid the policy framework for a liberal coalition serving the interests of homeowners, business leaders, and minority groups. Janet Gray Hayes succeeded Mineta as mayor after he left for the US House of Representative in 1975. She took the foundation tentatively established by
Mineta and forged it into a governing suburban liberal coalition. Hayes was educated as a social worker and the wife of a prominent local physician with four children. She rose up the ranks of local grassroots politics, starting out as a homeowner activist and serving on various local boards and commissions before joining the city council in 1971 and becoming mayor in 1974. Hayes was the liberal spokesperson for an anti-growth, anti-tax, and fiscally conservative homeowner movement years before the statewide taxpayer revolt of Proposition 13. Her victory, coupled with the election of other politicians associated with the suburban-homeowner-activist movement during the late-1960s and 1970s, amounted to a revolution in local politics, seizing the reins of power away from the boosters, developers, and pro-growth leaders that had controlled city politics since the 1940s and putting the region on a path towards suburban liberal governance.

Hayes’ political success in San Jose, a city that earned national notoriety for its runaway suburban sprawl and associated problems, was in large part due to her ability to articulate a suburban liberal vision of governance that combined homeowners’ “quality of life” concerns regarding growth issues, fiscal austerity and tax cuts with business-friendly policies. She and other suburban liberals sought to rebalance the terms of regional growth to be more favorable to suburban homeowners compared to the former status quo that has benefited a narrow set of development interest while passing off the costs to taxpayers. They promised residents that, with modification and planning, the city could tap growth as a resource to serve suburban priorities and foster continued economic prosperity.

The centerpiece of Hayes’ political program was a “smart growth” approach that consisted of four interrelated policies. First, she sought to slow residential growth and channel approved development to “in-fill” areas, reducing the burden on the city and
taxpayers to expand services and infrastructure to new construction outside of the city’s service boundaries. Second, Hayes made San Jose as friendly to business as possible by aggressively encouraging industrial and economic growth. The mayor believed that attracting jobs and industry would address San Jose's imbalanced tax base, stimulate the city’s economy and fill its coffers. Third, she called for the use of construction and conveyance taxes on new development. These “pay as you grow taxes” aimed to make growth pay for itself while funding better services and infrastructure for the city at large. Fourth, Hayes worked to secure state and federal money for projects in and around San Jose. She pledged to residents to return more of “their” federal and state tax dollars back into their community, presumably preventing it from going to subsidize other areas or groups.578

Hayes thus promised voters that better planning, more industrial growth, and “pay as you grow” fiscal financing could subsidize both tax cuts for homeowners and better quality of life for city residents. Her message to residents was that if they accepted her suburban liberal approach, that they could expect more in terms of city services and amenities – that they in fact deserved it – and that they would pay less for it in homeowner property taxes. In sum, she offered the voters of San Jose a modified version of growth liberalism and an expansion of postwar suburban entitlements with little sacrifice.

Local business leaders, especially the managers of the region’s important electronics industry, were important stakeholders in the suburban liberal coalition in

578 It seems that suburban residents, known for their “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) propensities when it came to the unpleasant side effects of growth took a reverse position when it came to benefits and taxes – thus resenting the use of tax moneys outside of their local communities “backyard.”
Silicon Valley. Hayes reached out to business executives and developers as partners to promote business and industrial development, believing that the city could engage in “pump priming” to expand the city’s economic base and offset property tax reductions. Business leaders – and even some developers – had much to gain from the suburban liberal approach. Electronics firms favored improving local quality of life to help them attract and retain highly skilled workers. They also welcomed the opportunity to work with suburban liberal leaders in government to address issues of concern to their industry. Meanwhile, developers able to play by the “smart growth” rules received a similarly business-friendly response from local leadership and opportunities to pursue “in-fill” development projects.

The Limits of Suburban Liberalism

Suburban liberalism limited the space for broad-based progressive politics in San Jose and Silicon Valley. The suburban liberal governing coalition included a range of groups, but two key interests predominated in local politics from the 1970s onward: local homeowners and business and industry leaders, particularly in the technology sector. The leadership of the suburban liberal coalition therefore prioritized the “quality of life”

579 The “pump priming” embraced by suburban liberal advocates such as Hayes links this branch of liberalism with a primary tenant of the postwar growth liberalism that grew out of New Deal liberalism. Scholars described a broad policy consensus around a “neo-Keynesian” role for the state in the postwar decades. Tom Wolfe, for example, called this the “politics of growth” whereby policymakers avoided the socially disruptive issues of economic redistribution or confronting the prerogatives of capital. Instead, political leaders pursued policies intended to promote growth and expand the overall size of the economic pie while tempering inflation – assuming that this meant more for everyone – rather than addressing the issue of adjusting the apportionment of the slices. Although Wolfe and others described this as part of a mainstream, bipartisan consensus, the most visible proponents of neo-Keynesian policies were liberal Democrats. See: Wolfe, America's Impasse. Also see: Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics; Collins, More.
concerns of middle-class homeowners as well as the retention and expansion of the local high-technology industry. Fiscal conservatism in regards to tax policy, an emphasis on maintaining a business-friendly climate, and the selective use of state power in the interests of the primary stakeholders thus accompanied the progressive social politics of the area. Suburban liberal politics in the region embraced social liberalism, tolerated the selective expansion of state power, and prioritized certain middle-class quality of life issues, such as protecting the environment or preserving open space. However, the local suburban liberal political culture only accepted these liberal measures to the extent that such policies did not conflict with – or indeed furthered – the economic, property-rights, and business concerns of the key players. The “suburban” character of San Jose’s liberalism limited the scope of what was acceptable in mainstream local politics, while the more progressive or radical goals of many labor, feminist, or social and environmental justice advocates found little support from the region’s putatively liberal establishment. The region’s suburban liberal donors and powerbrokers in fact ignored or worked in opposition to more radical options that would have challenged their economic or political interests.\footnote{580}{Two prominent examples were opposition to toxics in the high-technology workplace and comparable worth claims for women. Both are touched on later in the chapter.}

The priorities of the high-technology business leaders within the suburban liberal coalition determined the course taken by Hayes and other suburban liberals in Silicon Valley. A prominent example arose when Tandem Computer corporation and developers mounted a concerted effort in 1982 to get the city to approve development outside of the urban core in the Coyote Valley area south of downtown San Jose. Hayes and other
suburban liberals had long opposed development in the largely untouched area as a central tenant of the “smart growth” policy. Pressure mounted on Hayes and the suburban liberal city council as the CEO of Tandem and development interests attacked the mayor and her allies for being anti-business. The determination of Hayes and others on the city council received a visible boost when the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group (SVMG), local Chamber of Commerce, and the San Jose Mercury News editorial page defended the suburban liberal leadership from the charge of not being friendly to business interests and publically opposed Tandem’s development plans. Similarly, when local environmental groups drew attention to the toxic pollution and risk to workers from Silicon Valley’s “clean” high-technology manufacturers, the suburban liberals deferred to the industry’s preference for self-regulation. As public outcry grew, Hayes and other suburban liberal leaders in Silicon Valley sought federal legislation to impose national pollution standards, thus avoiding any localized policies that would have made the region less competitive.

Hayes and other suburban liberals often embraced socially progressive positions. At various points in her political career, she took vocal stances in favor of gun control, gay rights, and public housing. Hayes was particularly passionate in supporting women’s issues and advocating in favor of environmental regulation. However, her sense of suburban priorities and commitment to the interests of homeowners and industry often limited the issues that she would - or could – support. In the face of a loud outcry from 

conservatives, for example, Hayes backed away from her endorsement of a “Gay Human Pride Week” in San Jose in the lead up to the 1978 election. Hayes likewise disappointed city workers in the early 1980s who mounted a campaign to address sex-based wage disparities, culminating in the first strike in the US over comparable worth. The strike organizers had expected that the female mayor of the “Feminist Capital of the World” would support their effort, but Hayes took the opposite position, expressing concern about city budgets and echoing the opposition of corporate managers.

The mayor and her suburban liberal allies in San Jose in other cases were unable to overcome the conservative suburban biases of the area. On the issue of public housing, Hayes supported various measures during her years in office, but could not convince local suburban voters to approve even the most limited program targeted at the elderly. Hayes likewise advocated for aggressive mass transit solutions, but San Jose remained a city dominated by cars and congested roadways. Finally, Hayes had delivered yearly tax cuts intended to placate the growing anti-tax sentiment among residents. San Jose residents nonetheless emphatically voted in favor of Proposition 13 despite the best efforts and the vocal opposition of Hayes and other suburban liberals. The drastic reduction in property tax revenue strained the fiscal viability of Hayes’ “smart growth”

583 Dale Lane, “Garza on Attack in Mayor Debate,” ibid., April 27 1978; Acuna, "Unlikely Council Foursome."
585 For the region’s working-class, the combination of “smart growth” restrictions on residential development and the staunch opposition of suburban homeowners to public housing or even many apartment and multi-family units in their neighborhoods exacerbated the lack of affordable housing. This underscores the middle-class bias of suburban liberal priorities. Indeed, Hayes and her allies often drew criticism from minority leaders and union members for not paying enough attention to jobs and housing for all residents. Meanwhile, opinion polls among Hayes’ strongest supporters showed majority support for restricted growth and quality of life concerns as top priorities over inflation, unemployment, affordable housing and other issues.
policies to provide improved services and quality of life amenities, but the mayor and city officials scrambled to maintain the city’s budget. Hayes and the suburban liberals attempted to minimize cuts in city services over the course of her second term by again tapping growth in the form of construction and conveyance tax revenue and taking advantage of state and federal aid (see figure 7-1). The budget of San Jose became even more dependent on growth – and municipal borrowing – to fund services and infrastructure when cuts under the Reagan administration in the 1980s reduced federal money to cities.586

Figure 7-1. Percent of San Jose City Budget from Construction and Conveyance Taxes and Federal & State Aid, 1964-1981

586 In the summer of 2012, three credit agencies downgraded almost $2 billion in debt from San Jose’s once powerful redevelopment agency to “junk” status, putting hundreds of millions of more dollars on a negative watch list. Meanwhile, the city itself carries about $500 million in general-obligation debt and another $1 billion in debt issued through the City of San Jose Financing Authority. This is separate from any debt incurred by other agencies or school districts. The redevelopment agency’s debt raised the threat of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy by the city. See: Eli Segall, "San Jose, County Dispute Leads to Bond Downgrade," Silicon Valley / San Jose Business Journal(2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/blog/2012/06/san-jose-rda-bonds-downgraded.html; Sharon Simonson, "Bond Expert: San Jose Redevelopment Successor Agency ‘Insolvent,’ or Close," The Registry(2012), http://news.theregistrysf.com/bond-expert-san-jose-redevelopment-successor-agency-insolvent-or-close.
Suburban Entitlements

One of the biggest legacies of the suburban liberalism advocated by Hayes in the 1970s was that it perpetuated the illusion of “free markets” and validated suburban middle-class entitlements. Hayes, a former participant in the region’s homeowner movement, understood the growing dissatisfaction among residents regarding poor services, quality of life and taxes. She attempted to address all three concerns through her growth policies. However, not only did the mayor and her suburban liberal allies fail to contain the discontent of local taxpayers exhibited by Proposition 13, but their policies and promises enhanced homeowner entitlement. Hayes had consistently told area residents that they deserved more and should pay less. A majority of voters in San Jose agreed, joining in the “taxpayer revolt” movement to force politicians to provide more for even less.

Hayes and other suburbanites in San Jose believed that homeowners deserved more without recognizing the extent to which the postwar liberal state had already showered the region and suburban middle-class homeowners with advantages. San Jose and Silicon Valley were at the convergence of countless government subsidies, entitlements, and special programs. The government was everywhere in suburban San Jose – from the mortgage market, to the highway and sewer system, to the defense contracts and research money, to special tax policies that enabled venture finance – all of which had made the Silicon Valley phenomenon possible. Many residents owed their

587 For a discussion of how government policy at the local, state, and especially the federal level fostered the kind of suburban “post-industrial” growth of suburban “cities of knowledge,” see: O'Mara, Cities of Knowledge; O'Mara, "Uncovering the City in the Suburb."
professional careers to training received at large state-run research universities that offered tuition-free education and a host of programs subsidized by federal programs and research monies.

How did Hayes and local voters reconcile the contradiction of their expectations of services with their demand for low taxes and free markets? The answer was that all these entitlements and the active hand of the state were hidden – or at least obscured. Decades of rhetoric portrayed the explosive residential and industrial growth of the suburbs as solely the result of free market forces. The role of government subsidies in creating, expanding, and favoring the growth of suburbs such as San Jose was simply invisible by design to those who benefited the most: white, middle-class families, high-technology entrepreneurs, and the electronics industry. The local high-technology business culture – with its streak of libertarianism, cowboy-style independence and a celebration of individual entrepreneurship, invention and risk-taking – conveniently overlooked the subsidies underwriting the area’s “regional advantages.”

Postwar liberal policymakers had hidden the role that government played in creating the affluent suburbs based on Cold War political calculations, making other government activities more conspicuous. Many suburbanites in San Jose and elsewhere thus only saw various government policies that favored the interests of others over their

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588 Scholars have long documented the extent to which federal policy fostered the legal, financial and political factors that promoted suburbanization and advantaged suburban residents and industry over their urban counterparts. David Freund recently offered a convincing argument for how, at the same time that state policy was creating the market conditions that brought windfall wealth and advantaged position to suburban residents, the political culture of the United States required that such direct government intervention be obscured and downplayed. Thus, Freund describes how the federal policymakers at the heart of these programs as well as the mostly white, middle-class beneficiaries embraced the myth of suburbs as a purely free market success story. See: Freund, Colored Property; Freund, "Marketing the Free Market."
own. Nationally this might be declining urban centers, minorities, the poor, or labor unions. Locally, it was realtors, developers, and those who stood to profit from encouraging growth. Since the middle-class homeowners did not have to acknowledge the decades of subsidies that underwrote their suburban neighborhoods and industries, it was easy for many residents of fortunate regions like Santa Clara County to believe that they were not getting back what they had paid for in taxes. Furthermore, because policymakers had long insisted that the success of the middle class was due their own ability to compete and succeed in the capitalist economy, government action that interfered with the operation of the “free market” to benefit others must be inherently unfair.

It is thus understandable why suburbanites, conditioned to believe that the success of their families and businesses was due to their diligence and American capitalism, rejected the idea of subsidies or advantages given by the state to others. Growth liberalism had done exactly what its proponents wanted by creating an enlarged and prosperous middle class committed to the economic and political system of the US. The problem was that the subterfuge worked too well. Growth liberalism masked its interventions behind a myth of free markets, and was therefore left with only the blame for its perceived failures, not the benefit of its most prominent accomplishments of expanding the middle class, fostering an affluent consumer society, and subsidizing the technology innovations that enabled the new “knowledge economy.”

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Understanding the suburban liberal political outlook of San Jose and similarly positioned suburbs requires recognizing the extent to which the breathtaking growth experienced by regions like Silicon Valley was a mixed blessing for residents in the 1960s and 1970s. On the plus side, local real estate values rose steeply as more and more people and industry came to the region. This meant that many residents – especially early arrivals and skilled technology workers and professionals – benefited from windfall wealth in the form of increased property values, investment opportunities, and high-paying jobs. On the negative side, the higher property values meant higher property tax bills. The stagflation and energy crises of the 1970s meanwhile exacerbated the perceived squeeze on middle-class homeowners. Santa Clara County residents were way above the national average for income, but inflation and higher costs of living eroded the perceived class advantages that suburbanites expected. The success of the region meanwhile attracted more industrial and population growth, bringing more congestion, traffic, and pollution. The valley’s open space and remaining rural enclaves disappeared as additional subdivisions, retail space, and roadways were built. Few residents had direct economic connections to the region’s former agricultural economy, but the disappearance of orchards and open fields near their neighborhoods meant the loss of cherished suburban aesthetic amenities. Making matters worse was the poorly planned growth and missing or strained services and infrastructure that were the legacy of the region’s pro-growth leadership. These negative factors contributed to the widely held perception among area
homeowners that rapid growth was negatively affecting their suburban quality of life even if it had also enriched them in the process.  

Growth in San Jose had brought prosperity, but it also brought plenty of problems. In the postwar decades, the greatest benefits had primarily gone to a few while most of the problems were passed off to the community at large and taxpayers. Local government throughout these years was an active and visible player tipping the scale in favor of growth interests. This growth had benefited more than just the pro-growth elite through increased property values and opportunities, but a growing number of middle-class homeowners overlooked these benefits and instead saw themselves as losers rather than winners in the old pro-growth status quo of San Jose.

Hayes and other suburban liberals, having arisen out of the grassroots homeowner movement, shared this perspective. Therefore, instead of simply reforming urban planning and making the tax burden more equitable by stopping the subsidies that benefited the booster interests, Hayes and her allies sought to tilt the scale still further towards the suburban middle-class in San Jose. Taking the industrial suburb as a given, 

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590 Indeed, part of this dissatisfaction with suburban quality of life was because San Jose, like many similar suburbs, was undergoing a transformation. The Anglo-American bourgeois suburb had evolved as an exclusive residential form that presumed separation by class, race, gender, and economic function. The suburban ideal was supposed to be largely a homogenous, genteel, “country-like” residential community that offered a safe and separate space for family domesticity and leisure apart from all that affluent suburbanites found unpleasant about urban density and diversity. Over the course of the 20th century, this idealized vision of suburban communities as something distinct from industrialized and commercial central cites gave way to a new reality where former suburbs were taking on more of the characteristics and functions traditionally served by cities, but without the centralization and density of older urban cores. Robert Fishman characterized this transition as the end of suburbia and creation of “technoburbs” situated in multi-centered metropolitan regions he called “techno-cities.” The “techno” in Fishman’s definitions related both to the technologies – transportation, communication, construction, and even finance – that allowed for the modern suburban form, as well as the fact that these communities increasingly attracted advanced industry to locate there. For a discussion of the postwar transformation of suburban regions like San Jose and Silicon Valley, see: Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Paul L. Knox, Metroburbia, USA (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008).
Hayes and the suburban liberals believed that taxes could be reduced and services and infrastructure expanded. They believed this because they held to the myth of the suburban success story, that the suburban industrial way of life and economy were the natural and unassisted result of technological innovation and the free market.  

Unlike the anti-government “suburban warriors” of the New Right, San Jose and Silicon Valley produced “suburban reformers” bent on redirecting the liberal state to serve their interests and priorities. In their view, it was acceptable for the state to act to restrict growth and land use. It was important for the state to act to preserve open space or protect the environment, even if it meant interfering in the market or restricting the property rights of others. It was also appropriate for the state to channel money and programs to boost industry in the region. On the flipside, however, it was not acceptable for the state to interfere with the “free market” in other instances – especially if the cost were born by suburbanites or suburban industries while the benefits went elsewhere. From the suburban liberal perspective, their “quality of life” and the well-being of the “new economy” became the benchmarks to evaluate the merits of government action.

Associated with this is the cultural phenomenon in the US whereby middle-class suburban homeowners became archetypes of ideal citizen-taxpayers that embodied key American values. In political and popular discourse, what was good for the suburban citizen-taxpayer and their industries was good for the country as a whole. How this ideal was created and perpetuated such that most everyone identified with or claimed to be acting on behalf of the best interests of the “middle class” is an interesting open question worth greater scholarly scrutiny.

The expansive definition of what contributed to a good suburban “quality of life” may also help to explain why Silicon Valley eschewed the social conservatism of the New Right. Although not uncontested, “diversity” came to be seen by many in the Bay Area as a factor contributing to quality of life.
The Impact of Suburban Liberalism on 20th Century Political Historiography

Suburban liberalism was a distinct strand of liberal policymaking that coalesced during the second half of the 20th century in the fortunate high-technology suburban region of Silicon Valley. The political evolution of San Jose and Santa Clara County challenges the assumptions of the “rise of the right” narrative, complicating the idea of a monolithic New Deal liberal coalition overreaching in the 1960s and then giving way to an ascendant New Right by the end of the 1970s. Many argue that liberalism at the national level – a fractious political entity typically defined as urban, race, and labor liberal groups – fell apart due to internal contradictions and an overly ambitious agenda during the 1960s with President Lyndon Johnson and the perceived failure of Great Society social programs. Liberalism was further weakened over the course of the 1970s, a decade when the US encountered a number of painful “limits” at home and abroad. Factors such as inflation, cultural issues and civil rights were wedges in the postwar national liberal coalition, dividing labor, urban, and minority groups from an increasingly conservative suburban middle class.

Many scholars thus conclude that liberalism lost its governing majority with the defection of key stakeholders during the 1970s and early 1980s. Fiscally conservative and affluent suburbanites unhappy over taxes and expensive social spending defected to the

594 For example: Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement; Farber, The Age of Great Dreams; Farber, "The Torch Had Fallen."
Republican Party, as did “backlash” voters, the formerly Democratic-voting working-class ethnic whites upset over busing, shuttered factories, and other erosions of the invisible white privileges that set them above minorities and immigrants in the economic order. An emerging New Right seized the initiative on national policymaking in the late 1970s as suburbanites and backlash voters joined with the various traditional strands of conservatism, including religious, Cold War anticommunists, libertarians, and free market conservatives. Many scholars see Reagan’s election in 1980 as the watershed moment solidifying the “rise” of the New Right over a divided and impotent liberalism.

Suburban liberalism solidified its hold during the 1970s on municipal power in Silicon Valley, a region of tremendous economic, cultural and political importance. Other elements of the uneasy postwar liberal coalition may have been put on the defensive by a conservative backlash in the 1970s – or broke away entirely – but suburban liberals in Silicon Valley managed to redirect a form of growth liberalism toward the preferred ends of its constituents. Suburban liberals redefine liberalism in the latter part of the 20th century, returning it to its market-oriented and ameliorative roots and further stripping away any remnants of Left-leaning radicalism that may have lingered from the New Deal era.

The growing economic and political clout of suburban liberalism and the associated “new economy” empowered centrist elements within the Democratic Party. The shifting orientation of the Democratic Party was not only due to the political push of the New Right, the charismatic conservatism of Ronald Reagan, or the “triangulation” of Bill Clinton. An ascendant suburban liberal political culture in key economic and technological regions of the country like Silicon Valley pulled the Democratic Party to
the center-right on economic issues. Liberalism did not “decline” with the retreat of the Old Left and labor during the postwar decades, nor with the unraveling of the New Left at the dawn of the 1980s. The already malleable and pragmatic mainstream strand of liberal ideology simply shifted along with the priorities of its suburban constituency.

Existing narratives of 20th-century US political history overlook the development of suburban liberalism because most studies of the period do not look at locations like Silicon Valley. Scholars have provided accounts of events in southern cities and of urban centers and their surrounding “white flight” suburbs in the east, Midwest, and other parts of the “Rustbelt”, but almost completely overlooked affluent, economically dynamic, and liberal suburbs like San Jose and Santa Clara County. These narratives, by focusing on places were racial and class boundaries and old political divides were strongest, do not account for the suburban liberalism that emerged in Silicon Valley, instead presenting a simplistic view of suburbs as home to the socially, politically and racially conservative New Right from the 1970s onward. The story told by the Rise of the Right narrative is mostly about the unraveling of political coalitions in the “old economy,” but ignores the emerging dynamics of the “new economy.”

The suburban liberalism of Norman Mineta and Janet Gray Hayes, with its blend of fiscally conservative and socially liberal policies, foreshadowed the transformation of mainstream liberal politics in the United States exemplified by the ascendance of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) within the Democratic Party during the 1980s and 1990s. Silicon Valley residents, so often lauded for their technological innovations, also pioneered a contemporary strand of neoliberal politics that prioritized the interests of middle-class suburban voters and capital in the globalized “new economy.” The active
participation of high-technology leaders in the suburban liberal coalition in the 1970s meanwhile undermines the popular mythology that New Democratic strategists lured Silicon Valley CEOs into politics in the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{595} A longer view of Santa Clara County’s political and economic development reveals a history of political activity and lobbying on the part of the region’s political and technology elite who sought to tap federal military, social and infrastructure spending for decades before the 1970s.\textsuperscript{596}

**Suburban Reformers and the Making of Silicon Valley**

The foundation for Silicon Valley’s success extends back into the region’s early history as a Gold Rush boomtown turned agricultural center. The pace and pattern of Santa Clara County’s development – with its fastest growth and industrial development coming in the postwar period and consisting of “clean” high technology and light industrial manufacturing – set the region apart from other older industrial centers. The region’s largely homogenous postwar population and non-union workforce largely spared business and political leaders from dealing with the same divisive labor conflicts and race

\textsuperscript{595} The idea of the recent politicization of an otherwise apolitical Silicon Valley high-tech leadership is a popular truism taken for granted by many journalists and commentators. Journalist Sara Miles, a contributor to Wired and other business and technology publications, offered a firsthand account premised on this historically shortsighted view. See: Sara Miles, *How to Hack a Party Line: The Democrats and Silicon Valley*, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001).

\textsuperscript{596} Putting aside the long history of federal spending in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Chapter 4 describes the efforts of Professor Frederick Terman and other “founding fathers” of Silicon Valley to secure federal military and science spending before World War II. Meanwhile, the success of San Jose city manager Dutch Hamann and his fellow postwar boosters in rapidly growing the region relied on the ability of local representatives to bring federal and state money into the area. Finally, the formation of industry groups (described in Chapter 3) like the Bay Area Council (BAC) and Western Electronics Manufacturing Association (WEMA) starting in the 1940s, Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) and the Santa Clara County Manufacturers Group (SCCMG) are all examples of political mobilization by technology and business groups decades earlier. In short, the idea that Silicon Valley was an apolitical region until tapped by centrist Democrats during the Clinton years is inaccurate.
and class divisions that their peers faced in other parts of the country. This helped to make possible the coalition of new industry business leaders and suburban homeowners that constituted suburban liberalism.

Santa Clara County through the first half of the 20th century was dotted with orchards with San Jose serving as a mercantile and transport hub linked to San Francisco. The city during this time remained a small urban center surrounded by an expanse of orchards; hence its nickname as “The Garden City” nestled within “The Valley of Hearts Delight.” San Jose, unlike most other parts of the Sunbelt, had a legacy of liberal progressive politics led by professional and middle-class reformers that served as a buttress against the kind of conservatism that took hold of areas like Orange County, California. The lack of entrenched machine politics built on ethnic and racial divisions and the absence of strong working class unions linked to polluting heavy industries in decline meanwhile made the region distinct from the New Deal liberal coalitions of “Rustbelt” cities. Santa Clara County did not have the same kind of fights over busing and “blockbusting” that white flight suburbs in other parts of the country experienced, and it did not have a contentious history of clashes between business and labor in the dominant electronics industry. Therefore, Silicon Valley, with its supposedly non-polluting high-technology industry acceptable to suburbanites and largely non-union and

597 As Lisa McGirr recounts, Orange County’s political culture grew upon the foundation of an incumbent conservative rancher and merchant class, who joined with an incoming population of defense workers, religious and social conservatives, and libertarians to become the New Right. See: McGirr, Suburban Warriors.

598 As Glenna Matthews and others described, the existing unions in Santa Clara County never successfully organized the electronics industry, thus organized labor remained on the sidelines as the high-technology industry and its union-free workforce became the dominant players in the local political economy.
highly educated white middle-class and white-collar workforce created a political economy with very different priorities than other parts of the county. Unlike the regions of the US where growth liberalism no longer held out the promise of an expanded pie improving the collective good, the dynamic high-technology “new economy” of Silicon Valley allowed liberal leaders to offer residents a revised form of liberal growth politics based on suburban values. It also avoided the resentments fostered by socially conservative retrenchment experienced in other areas.

The 20th century in the US was the age of suburbia, and the impact of that shift lingers to the present. Two suburban worldviews heavily dominate the political discourse in the country, one championed by the “Suburban Warriors” of the New Right, and the other articulated by suburban liberal reformers emerging in fortunate “new economy” suburbs like Silicon Valley. Both political parties in the US are largely beholden to the suburban portions of their constituency. Silicon Valley is envied across the world for its wealth creation and innovations, but the region has also led the way with income disparity, a lack of security for workers in its flexible markets, and a high-cost of living that marginalizes an increasing number of its residents. Meanwhile, despite its suburban liberal political culture, the interests of minority and working class groups are often secondary to the needs of local industry and affluent homeowners. As the economic divide in the US accelerates and political commentators of multiple political stripes decry the erosion of the middle class, suburbia – as much as Wall Street or Washington – played a significant role in undermining a more broadly shared prosperity.
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