UNBRIDLED GLOBALIZATION:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN QATAR

A Dissertation in
Higher Education and Comparative and International Education

by
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ABSTRACT

Qatar is a state that has attempted to develop very quickly since the rise to power in 1995 of Sheikh Hamad Al Thani. One of the cornerstones of this development has been a heavy investment in education, and one that has garnered much attention in the media and in the literature on higher education. This dissertation seeks to understand the transformation of higher education in Qatar through the lens of globalization theories and to juxtapose that against nationalization policies in place in Qatar. In order to achieve this, I conducted interviews with senior-level administrators at Qatar University and Education City. Furthermore, I triangulated my data through personal observations in Qatar and an analysis of extant texts. The results from this study showed that the transformation of higher education in Qatar is being done in a way that replicates Western models and standards, with only slight attempts at infusing Qatari subject matter into curricula or Qatari values into student services. Overarching issues at Qatar University included attracting high quality Qatari students, engaging these students (and especially male students) in activities, social resistance to institutional change, and the presence of Education City as a competitor within Qatar. At Education City, establishing an institutional brand, engaging in reciprocal relationships (with the home campus, with Qatar University, and with Qatar as a whole), and enrolling and engaging quality Qatari students emerged as the issues. The dissertation concludes with recommendations for Qatari policy makers on how to effectively direct future changes in their tertiary education sector.
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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to

my parents, Elias Khoury and Nada Kafity Khoury,
for boundless love, unwavering support, and endless patience

and to

my grandparents, Anton and Margaret Kafity,

You are gone but never forgotten
Chapter 1

Introduction

Nobody predicted the dramatic events that swept the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the Spring of 2011. From Morocco to Oman, the people of the region rose up with loud voices demanding that their voices be heard and that their governments answer to the people. The pacifying of the elite was no longer enough for the people of a region whose history has undergone occupations, revolutions, empires, and kingdoms (Goldstone, May/June 2011). North Africa has been completely changed by the revolutions and protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Morocco. The Levant continues to be rocked by the protests in Jordan and the violent suppression of the uprisings in Syria. The revolution in Libya has resulted in the ouster of the long-time ruler there, Muammar Qaddafi. And the Arabian Peninsula is reeling from mass protests in Yemen and Bahrain. In Oman, peaceful protests across the country prompted Sultan Qaboos to overhaul government ministers and install a completely new cabinet. However, in the rentier states of the rest of the Peninsula, the scene was quite different.

In the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, the demands of the people were handled very differently. Demands in Kuwait were met with the government handing its people lump sums of money. The government quickly quieted Shi’i protests in eastern Saudi Arabia. And in the UAE and Qatar, no protests occurred. The reasons for the lack of uprising of most of the Arabian Peninsula have much to do with the nature of these societies.
The four aforementioned states are all oil-rich and offer their people very high standards of living. From government incentives to land rights, the peoples of these states live in relative comfort. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have been developing since the 1950’s and 1960’s when initial oil discoveries began to reap wealth. And the UAE and Qatar are relative newcomers having initiated rapid development plans in the 1990’s in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Though they developed much later, the amount of wealth that these countries have in natural oil and gas reserves has prompted them to develop at extremely fast rates and offer their citizens and expatriates a very high standard of living in a very short period of time (Schwab, 2001).

Just twenty years ago, Qatar, a small nation-state jutting out of the Arabian Peninsula, was known only for its vast amounts of natural gas and oil reserves. Its independence was closely tied to Saudi Arabia, and its religious institutions were equally tied to the Saudis. Since 1995 the country has taken a turn, with a strong determination to enter the world stage as a major player. When Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani came to power in 1995, he implemented a set of policies that sought to establish Qatar as an independent state that would be a player on the world stage. First, he severed the country’s dependence on Saudi Arabia and began to liberalize his country, although the country’s strong conservative Salafi Islamic roots make liberalization somewhat difficult (Coker, 2010; Zahlan, 1998). The Qatari leadership then embarked on an ambitious agenda toward reform. They established Al-Jazeera in 1996 as the first world-wide Arabic news network that challenged the dominance of Western news outlets (Miles, 2005). Since 2001, the country has hosted the
World Trade Organization’s multilateral talks on improving global economic conditions through liberalization and reform (Schwab, 2001). In 2002, they founded the National Human Rights Committee to ensure Qatar’s compliance with United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (National Human Rights Commission, 2006). In 2004, the Doha Debates were inaugurated as a public forum where pertinent and controversial social and political issues in the Middle East are debated, without any government involvement or censorship (The Doha Debates, 2010). And in 2009, they held the first annual World Innovation Summit on Education, a high profile world-wide forum, awarding a prize touted as the “Nobel Prize for Education”, bringing together stakeholders and policymakers to discuss issues in education (Miles, 2005; National Human Rights Commission, 2006; WISE, 2010). One of the government’s more contentious policies was to establish (and eventually sever) relationships with Israel through the establishment of an Israeli trade office in Doha (Rabi, 2009). Qatar’s GDP per capita is currently among the highest in the world and its large reserve of natural gas and oil point to a secure financial and economic outlook for the country (World Bank, 2012).

It is clear that Qatar has placed itself on the international stage, and quite prominently. Internally, the leadership of Qatar has taken on an ambitious agenda to promote progress. One of the primary tenets of that progress revolves around education. The government has set as one of its goals the establishment of a world-class education system in Qatar that prepares its citizens for a changing and increasingly technological society (General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008). This dissertation will take Qatar University and Education City as case
studies by which to examine the nexus between globalization and nationalization in university reform in the state of Qatar.

Qatar is a small country of less than 4,500 square miles (slightly smaller than the area of Connecticut) bordered to the south by Saudi Arabia, and surrounded by the Arabian Gulf on its western, northern, and eastern shores (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010). The latest population count in Qatar rests at approximately 1.7 million people composed primarily of expatriates (Statistics Authority, 2010). According to the 2010 Annual Census, Qatariis comprise only 15% of the population (The Planning Council, 2005). The rest of the population is comprised of other Arabs (22%), South Asians (36%), Iranians (10%), and other nationalities (14%) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010) The Qatari government has implemented a policy of Qatarization which works toward “the identification and development of quality, competent Qatari males and females to assume permanent positions in our industry [gas and petroleum]”(Qatarization, 2010). According to the RAND Qatar Policy Institute, based in Doha and one of the RAND Corporation’s corporate bodies, “the Qatari population is small, and the country depends on a large expatriate workforce for both low- and high-skilled labor. Few Qatariis have the training or qualifications needed for high-demand, high-skill jobs” (Stasz et al., 2007)

Part of Qatar’s strategy has engendered a tension between global and national demands. The tension between modernization and tradition and between globalization and nationalization is perhaps one of the hallmarks of the modern State of Qatar. The government recognizes this tension and is determined to ensure the preservation of Qatari tradition in the midst of all these global pressures. It
published a document titled “Qatar National Vision 2030” as a road map for its progress over the next twenty years. In the document, five points were highlighted to specifically address the issue of rampant global pressures:

“To remain true to its values, Qatar must balance five major challenges:

• Modernization and preservation of traditions
• The needs of this generation and the needs of future generations
• Managed growth and uncontrolled expansion
• The size and the quality of the expatriate labor force and the selected path of development
• Economic growth, social development and environmental management”

(General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008)

As stated earlier, one of the cornerstones of Qatar’s development centers on education. The primary figure spearheading Qatar’s education reform is the first lady, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Missned. Sheikha Mozah is the daughter of a renowned Qatari democracy activist, and is determined to reverse the educational trend that, according to the United Nations and World Bank, has created economic stagnation and instability across the region (Coker, 2010). In order to achieve this world-class education, reform of education has happened on three levels:

a) reform of K-12 education system

b) reform of Qatar University, the country’s only national four-year institution of higher education

c) establishment of Education City, the flagship project of the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development.
This dissertation will focus on the second and third prongs of this reform. However, in order to situate the reform of higher education, an understanding of the state of K-12 education in Qatar is necessary.

In the first arena, the government requested from the RAND Corporation’s Qatar Policy Institute (RQPI) to examine the country’s K-12 education system. According to the final report produced,

“This request was motivated by concerns that, in general, students were leaving Ministry of Education schools without the academic proficiency needed to pursue post-secondary education in Qatar or abroad and without the skills needed for many high-demand, high-skill jobs in the expanding economy. Building the capacity of each citizen would enable Qatari nationals to take charge of the country’s rapid growth and replace the foreigners who fill many managerial and professional jobs because of the dearth of qualified Qatars.” (Zellman et al., 2009)

The reform of the system resulted in the establishment of Independent Schools that have had a greater success rate at producing students who achieve higher scores in math, science, and language skills when compared to those students who attend the old Education Ministry schools (Coker, 2010). The old-style schools focused on rote memorization, with a heavy influence on Arabic and Islamic studies (Massialas, 1991). Sheikha Mozah claims that this kind of curriculum produced passive citizens, but that it suited the needs of much of the Qatari population, who were initially very opposed to the establishment of these Independent Schools.
(Coker, 2010). However, Maryam al-Naimi, a principal of one of these independent schools, states that they now have waiting lists for admission every year (Coker, 2010).

The second prong of reform involved reform of the country’s only national university, Qatar University. Enrolling over 9000 students in the 2010-2011 academic year, the institution is comprised of seven colleges, and is headed by Dr. Sheikha al-Misnad\(^i\) (Qatar University, 2011). An alumna of the university, and the aunt of Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Missned, Dr. Al-Misnad has moved to make Qatar University a competitive institution by seeking a host of regional and international accreditations for its programs, and is currently working to garner institutional accreditation from the U.S.-based Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. The reform of the university comprises a central part of this dissertation and will be discussed at much greater length.

The final reform effort in Qatar to create a world-class education system has been to establish Education City, a mega-campus that houses branches of elite U.S., French, and British higher education institutions. The branch campuses that operate in Education City (and the corresponding dates they were established in Doha) are: Virginia Commonwealth University (1998), Weill Cornell Medical College (2001), Texas A&M University (2003), Carnegie Mellon University (2004), Georgetown University (2005), Northwestern University (2008), University College London (2010), and HEC-Paris (2011) (Qatar Foundation, 2012d)\(ii\). In addition to these branch campuses that operate in Doha, the Qatar Foundation established the Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, an institution that provides graduate degrees in
Islamic studies, jurisprudence, and architecture, and the Translation and Interpretation Institute to develop a cadre of professionals who are proficient in simultaneous translation and the use of sign language (Qatar Foundation, 2011b).

Both Qatar University and Education City seek to balance the state’s goals of ensuring a strong Qatari workforce and meeting global standards of academic quality, while also ensuring that Qatar’s national and cultural identity is maintained and strengthened.

**The Education Sector in Qatar**

**The Supreme Education Council**

In order to explain the inherent tensions in education reform in Qatar, it is important to elaborate upon the structure that oversees education in Qatar. The Supreme Education Council (SEC), the country’s ministry of education, “determines education policy in Qatar. It monitors the progress of education reform efforts and oversees the Education and Evaluation Institutes, approving the Institutes’ budgets and appointing the directors of each. The Supreme Education Council also approves the contracts for the Independent Schools” (Supreme Education Council, 2010). The SEC was established in 2002 as the agency that would develop and implement structures for Independent Schools, an alternative to the failing government schools that were run by the Ministry of Education. The RAND-Qatar Policy Institute recommended the establishment of the SEC as the agency that would be less bureaucratic than the Ministry of Education, and thus could direct change much faster (Brewer et al., 2007). In 2010, the Ministry of Education was abolished and
the head of the SEC holds the title of Minister of Education and Higher Education and General Secretary of the Supreme Education Council (The Peninsula, 2008).

The members of the Supreme Education Council are selected by Heir Apparent Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. In 2009, the members selected were:

- Chair: Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, Heir Apparent
- Vice Chair: Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al Missned, Chairperson of the Qatar Foundation
- Dr. Mohammed Salah Al Sada, Minister of State for Energy and Industrial Affairs
- Dr. Sheikha Abdulla Al Misnad, President, Qatar University
- Sheikh Abdulla Bin Ali Bin Saoud Al Thani, Vice Chairperson of the Qatar Foundation and President of Hamad bin Khalifa University
- H.E. Dr. Sheikha Aisha bint Faleh Al-Thani, Director, Doha Academy
- Dr. Mazen Jassim Jaidah, Prominent Qatari Business and first Qatari recipient of a PhD from Harvard University
- Dr. Douglas Palmer, Prominent Scientist at the University of Cambridge
- Dr. Sigbrit Franke, Former Chancellor, Umea University, Sweden  
  (Supreme Education Council, 2012a)

The Supreme Education Council is comprised of three institutes: the Education Institute, the Evaluation Institute, and the Higher Education Institute.

The Education Institute monitors and supervises the establishment of Independent Schools. The Evaluation Institute serves as the research and assessment arm of the Council, monitoring student learning and progress. The Higher Education Institute oversees all post-secondary endeavors in the country, and provides scholarships to Qatari students who choose to study abroad (Supreme Education Council, 2010).
As part of the work of the Higher Education Institute, the Institutional Standards Office (ISO) was established to provide regulatory, accrediting, and licensing authority to higher education institutions operating in Qatar (Supreme Education Council, 2012b). The establishment of the Institutional Standards Office points to the ever-growing landscape of higher education in the country and the need for a regulatory body to assure quality. While Qatar University remains the country’s only national university, the fact that Education City has expanded so much in the past ten years has necessitated the need for a body to ensure quality.

The Higher Education Institute is also responsible for administering scholarships to Qatari nationals studying abroad. The Scholarship Office undertakes the process of “developing and updating worldwide lists of eligible, high quality universities for the placement of HEI scholarship recipients” (Supreme Education Council, 2012b). A comprehensive list of eligible universities is presented to Qatari students at which they can study in any number of fields. The Scholarship Office also presents the Hamad bin Khalifa and Tamim bin Hamad Scholarship to study at 50 universities worldwide (Supreme Education Council, 2012d). A seemingly random list, these universities include: seven of the eight U.S. Ivy League institutions; the British institutions of Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial College, and University College London (though a student could only study Economics at UCL); two of the eight “Group of 8” intensive research Australian universities; a random selection of U.S. public universities, including UCLA, UC-Berkeley, University of Washington-Seattle, University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, University of Pittsburgh, and Ohio State University; McGill University and the Universities of British Columbia
and Toronto in Canada; 2 universities in Japan and 1 each in France, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden (Supreme Education Council, 2011a). Out of the fifty universities eligible for these prestigious scholarships (named for the ruler of Qatar, Emir Hamad, and his heir apparent, Sheikh Tamim), 34 are U.S. institutions.

In addition, the Scholarship Office publishes a comprehensive list of universities for which Qatari nationals are eligible for scholarships (not the aforementioned prestigious scholarships). According to their website, “the Higher Education Institute (HEI) has announced a list of 910 names of the best universities and colleges from around the world. The list, which is updated every two years selects the best universities for scholarship recipients based on international ranking criteria” (Supreme Education Council, 2012d). The universities include Qatar University, the branch campuses at Education City, and a number of universities in the US, the UK, Australia, and Canada. The universities in the U.S. and the U.K. are ranked according to the U.S. News and World Report Rankings and the Guardian University League Tables – exactly (The Guardian, 2012; U.S. News and World Report, 2012). The Higher Education Institute takes the exact categories, rankings, and institutions from each of those two sites and offers them as is to university applicants in Qatar.

In addition to the institutions in Qatar, the U.S.A., and the U.K., students are eligible for study in the following countries:

• Africa: South Africa
• North and South America: Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile
• Europe: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
• Asia/Pacific: Australia, Hong Kong, China, India, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey
• Arab world (Arabic language and literature, law, and Islamic studies only): Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria
• Colleges of Medicine at King Abdulaziz and King Saud Universities in Saudi Arabia

(Supreme Education Council, 2012c)

Qatar University

Qatar University was founded in 1973 as the College of Education, and became a full-fledged university four years later (Qatar University, 2010a). Today, it is a comprehensive university comprising seven colleges, and offers bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees (Qatar University, 2012a). The university offers programs in the following colleges: Arts and Sciences, Business, Engineering, Education, Law, Shari’a and Islamic Studies, and Pharmacy. The student body is 59% Qatari (decreased from 62% the previous year) and 77% female (up 1% from the previous year), while the faculty is 30% Qatari and 61% male (Office of Institutional Research and Data Warehouse, 2010; Qatar University, 2011). The almost inverse relationship of teaching staff to students in terms of gender and national demographics is interesting. It speaks to a number of factors: a) the significant number of under qualified Qataris to teach at the university level; b) the apathy of
Qatari men in pursuing higher education; and c) the country’s reliance on expatriates to educate its own population.

The university’s mission is “to promote the cultural and scientific development of the Qatari society while preserving its Arabic characteristics and maintaining its Islamic cultural heritage … [and to] remain committed to strengthening its scientific and cultural ties with other Arab and international universities and educational institutions” (Qatar University, 2010b). Once again, as has been illustrated before, there is a constant focus on maintaining tradition while also having an outward focus that connects it to an increasingly globally interconnected world.

**Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development**

It is the reality of this global interconnectedness that prompted the establishment of the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development in 1995. One of the goals of the Qatar Foundation was to establish Qatar as a knowledge-center. The cornerstone of the Qatar Foundation is the much-acclaimed project known as “Education City”. Education City comprises six prestigious American campuses (plus two European campuses and two local institutions that offer post-graduate degrees and certificates) that were invited by the government of Qatar to establish campuses in Doha. All of these institutions offer undergraduate degrees and work together to provide a collaborative single-campus experience for students that attend each of these universities. The branch campuses in Qatar each offer degrees in only one or two specializations; thus,
Georgetown offers the bachelor's degree in Foreign Service, Carnegie Mellon in information technology and business, Virginia Commonwealth in fine arts and graphic design, Texas A&M in engineering, Northwestern in journalism, and Weill Cornell in medicine. (The most recent branch campus additions to Education City, HEC-Paris and UCL will offer graduate degrees in business and museum studies/conservation respectively. Because of their newness, they will not be included in this dissertation). It is this level of intentional design that makes Qatar’s branch campuses unique, and will be examined at length in Chapter 5. In neighboring Dubai, which is home to the largest number of branch campuses in the world, multiple universities offer the same degree. Students can pursue degrees in business administration or information technology, for example, at any number of branch campuses, thus saturating the education market. The case of Michigan State University failing to ensure adequate enrollment at its Dubai campus is one example of this (Mills, 2010).

**Other Institutions of Higher Education**

In addition to Qatar University and the campuses at Education City, there are two other international branch campuses that do not belong to the Education City Campus. Since this dissertation focuses only on four-year institutions of higher education, these two-year institutions will not be discussed at length. In 2002, the College of the North Atlantic, a Canadian community and technical college, opened a branch in Qatar (CNA-Qatar), under an agreement with the Qatari government, to operate a comprehensive technical college offering training in four areas: Health
Sciences, Information Technology, Engineering Technology, and Business Studies (College of the North Atlantic - Qatar, 2010). In 2010, Houston Community College (HCC) signed a $45 million agreement with the government of Qatar to operate an American-style community college in Qatar (Moltz, 2010). The goal of the newly established Qatar Community College (QCC) will serve to prepare students who are otherwise academically unprepared to enter universities in Qatar (Redden, 2010). Furthermore QCC, through its partnership with HCC, will seek accreditation by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (Redden, 2010).

**The global and the national in Qatar's higher education reforms**

The undercurrent in Qatar's educational reform has been a balance between global and national forces. Qatar is a nation-state where only 15% of its population are actual citizens of the country, i.e. Qatars (U.S. Department of State, 2012). The country has developed largely based on the labor of expatriates, and the leadership of the country recognizes the need to develop while ensuring that national and cultural values and traditions are maintained (Fromherz, 2012). According to Sheikha Mozah, “Qataris value education … [but] we are a society that respects tradition” (Coker, 2010). In other words, the country intends to develop a modern education system, replete with the Western-style curricula, pedagogies, systems, structures, facilities, and technologies that will accomplish this, while ensuring that future generations are firmly rooted in tradition and values. To the Qatari leadership, there is no contradiction in these goals: one can import American educational institutions, use Western institutional and pedagogical theories to
undergird reform, and make English the lingua franca of education without compromising Qatar’s Arab and Islamic values. These seeming contradictions represent the crux of the tension between globalization and nationalization at four-year institutions of higher education in Qatar.

The Qatar Foundation is the umbrella organization that includes research, non-profit, and educational organizations. According to their website, the Qatar Foundation is:

“leading Qatar’s drive to become an advanced knowledge-based society. It is transforming Qatari society by educating the rising generation to the highest world standards - these will be the skilled professionals who will be the country’s future leaders. It is turning Qatar into a producer of knowledge by building a research base. Some of the new ideas will reach the stage of commercialization, helping diversify the economy. Qatar Foundation is also reaching out to individual sectors of the community and addressing social issues to accelerate the human development process in numerous directions.”

(Qatar Foundation, 2012d)

The confluence of the economic and the social is at the heart of the Qatar Foundation’s mission. The mission statement speaks of transforming Qatari society into a knowledge society using world standards. Is there any conflict between world standards and Qatari cultural values and norms? Will “new ideas,” “addressing social issues” and “accelerat[ing] the human development process” merely transform Qatari society into a society that has transplanted its own culture
with that of a globalized or Westernized culture? If one of the stated goals of the Qatar National Vision 2030 is to preserve tradition, how will the Qatar Foundation’s ambitious goals work to achieve that goal? Furthermore, only one-third of the students who study at Education City branch campuses are Qatari citizens (Qatar Foundation, 2012e). The fact that Qatari students are a minority at these campuses poses interesting questions for the leadership of Education City. Is the purpose of this academic experiment to be an educational hub that attracts students from around the world or is it to fulfill the mission of the Foundation, which is to build internal capacity within Qatar? Are these mutually exclusive goals?

The Qatar Foundation is not the only site of tension between global and national forces. Qatar University’s administration is undertaking an ambitious project of reforming the institution, and has taken significant steps in order to achieve three desired outcomes. The Reform Project, begun in 2003, has sought to achieve autonomy from the government, decentralization in administration, and accountability in all university operations (Qatar University, 2012f). The university has achieved the autonomy it has desired by having an independent university administration that is governed by a Board of Regents that in turn answers to the government.

The last two tenets of QU’s reform project are to decentralize the decision-making process in the university while holding persons and offices accountable for their decisions (Qatar University, 2012f). The philosophical underpinnings of these goals are based on the idea of the “modern university,” an idea that is decidedly Western. While al-Azhar University in Egypt is the oldest continuously operating
institution of higher education in the world, the modern university, as we know it today emerged in Europe. Thus, Qatar University, in attempting to maintain an Arab character and promoting Islamic values, is doing this within the context of Western ideals. One of the questions that immediately arise is can Arab and Islamic values survive and flourish within Western institutional, instructional, and administrative structures?

Simultaneously, Qatar University has embarked on a number of projects that have sought to place it on the international educational stage. A number of their undergraduate programs are accredited by international accrediting bodies as ABET (formerly the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology), the National Accrediting Agency for Clinical Laboratory Sciences, the Canadian Society of Chemistry, and most recently, their doctoral program in Pharmacy was awarded Provisional Accreditation status by the Canadian Society for Accreditation of Pharmacy Programs (Qatar University, 2012e). In addition, the University is also seeking institutional accreditation from the Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. The desire to be recognized outside Qatar while catering to Qatari students seems in itself a problematic course of action. How does one reconcile Qatar's need for international validation (a time-consuming costly process) with its mandate to produce graduates who are going to contribute to the development of the nation-state?
The tertiary education sector in Qatar and its relationship to the wider Middle East

The tension between nationalization and globalizations is one that is clearly an issue facing Qatar. In this case, globalization refers to a trend toward accepting and adopting American educational practices. John Waterbury, former president of the American University of Beirut, states that “Western values, to the extent that they are held in common, are widely (albeit not universally) shared and admired in the Muslim Middle East” (Waterbury, 2003). He continues by saying “perhaps no single institutional feature of American dominance is more admired than its system of higher education” (Waterbury, 2003). This view is shared by Moulakis (2011) who states that “American universities abroad educate their audiences, conveying lasting values beyond the catchy but transient phrases put forth by this or that administration in fitful attempts at public diplomacy” (p. 2).

The situation at Qatar University is certainly not unique either in the Arabian Gulf or in the Middle East, as a whole. A number of institutions of higher education have existed in the Middle East that are American-centered. The Lebanese American University (LAU) was founded in 1835, the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1866, the American University in Cairo (AUC) in 1919, the American University in Dubai (AUD) in 1995, the American University of Sharjah (AUS) in 1997, the American University of Kuwait (AUK) in 2003, the American University of Iraq at Sulaimani (AUIS) in 2006, and the American University of Gaza (unknown founding date)iii (American University In Dubai, 2010; American University of Beirut, 2010; American University of Iraq at Sulaimani, 2011; American University
of Kuwait, 2011; American University of Sharjah, 2010; Lebanese American University, 2010; Moulakis, 2011; Murphy, 1987). The American universities in Lebanon, Egypt, and Sharjah all have charters in the United States. Furthermore, five of these institutions are accredited by a U.S. regional accrediting body: AUB, AUC and AUS by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education, LAU by the Northeast Association of Schools and Colleges, and AUD by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (Middle States Commission on Higher Education, 2010; New England Association of Schools and Colleges, 2010; Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, 2010).

Each of the above-mentioned universities was established with the explicit goal of being linked with and to the United States, in character, curriculum, and direction. There is one other university in the Middle East that is not “American” but has decided to gain American accreditation, a move that intentionally seeks to place that institution on par with American institutions, and to give its degrees the caché of American institutions. Zayed University in the United Arab Emirates, which has a decided national character has also sought to branch out and has garnered international accreditation through Middle States (Middle States Commission on Higher Education, 2010).

The admiration of the American system of higher education is what prompted the Qatar Foundation to invite prominent U.S. universities to establish the world-renowned Education City in Qatar. The project is so ambitious that it has been described as “one of the most spectacular partnerships” (Waterbury, 2003, p. 65). In deciding on which universities would make up Education City, the Emir and
First Lady of Qatar toured a number of institutions around the world before deciding on U.S. institutions, as their concern was quality (Mendenhall, 2005). Although the project is still in its infancy stages (less than 200 students graduated from the five undergraduate institutions in 2009), it poses a significant challenge to Qatar University as an alternate institution in which to pursue a baccalaureate degree.

It is clear that Qatar is taking intentional steps to position itself as a world educational center (Wildavsky, 2010). With an ambitious educational reform project, Qatar has been likened to Davos; “if the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, is the meeting place for the global business elite, Doha, Qatar, has its sights set on becoming the global meeting place for leaders in education” (Utley, 2009). It is my assertion that there is no such thing as “Qatari higher education”, i.e. a native higher education sector, but instead, the country is seeking international legitimacy and acceptance by adopting Western standards to guide and direct higher education reform in the country. However, despite the fact that Qatar’s higher education landscape is predominantly American, Qatar also has a stated goal of preserving its Arab and Islamic character and values that will ensure its graduates are grounded in the East but well adjusted global citizens (General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008). However, as Qatar seeks to develop itself as a knowledge society, Välimaa and Hoffman (2008) pose a crucial question: if knowledge society comes with the implicit understanding that modern forms of knowledge acquisition will supplant traditional knowledge, then how will the
development of a knowledge society change the nature of Qatari society, culture, and economics?

Research Questions

The interplay of the international and the national are complicated when examining higher education in Qatar. Qatar’s reform project vis-à-vis Qatar University (QU) and Education City (EC) is large-scale and ambitious, and the government has published a road map in order to chart its future progress. While the Qatar National Vision 2030 sets out a broad goal for education development in the State of Qatar, it has done so by importing American models of higher education. The government of Qatar has also outlined a policy of Qatarization that seeks to place Qatari citizens at the forefront of the nation-state’s labor force, while also ensuring the preservation of its culture and tradition. This dissertation will seek to answer the following questions:

R1. How do the goals of globalization and nationalization interact in the transformation of higher education in Qatar?

R2. What are the goals of higher education reform in Qatar, and how are these related to the changes taking place in Qatar?

R3. What roles do each institution play, and how do the various higher education institutions and bodies in Qatar interact?

Significance of the Study

This study is significant because Qatar represents, or hopes to represent, a new frontier in higher education. The reforms it is implementing are innovative and intentional. For example, Qatar has a unique approach to branch campuses, which
has garnered much recent attention in the literature (Altbach, 2010; Altbach, Reisberg, & Rumbley, 2009; Cichocki, 2005; Kraince, 2008; Lane, Forthcoming-a, Forthcoming-b; Lane, Brown, & Pearcy, 2004). Furthermore, there has been an increased attention in the literature on higher education in the Arab Gulf States (Abdulla, 2006; Davidson & Smith, 2008; Donn & Al Manthri, 2010; Mazawi, 2008). Most recently, Donn & Al Manthri (2010) have examined from an economic vantage point the effect of globalization on higher education in the Gulf States, taking Oman as a special case study.

As a contribution to theory, this study illuminates globalization theory as it applies to the establishment, development, and progress of Qatar University (QU) and Education City (EC). In order to achieve this, I will examine the policies that have guided QU and EC, interview key officials who are involved in these institutions, and engage in personal observations to determine how practices designed to preserve traditional culture have operated.

Furthermore, this study will look at both national and international institutions of higher education to examine synergies between the global and the national. The literature on branch campuses has proliferated in the past ten years, and when branch campuses are discussed in the Middle Eastern context, the focus tends to be on Qatar. The unique example that is Education City has become the topic du jour in much of the literature on higher education in the Middle East. The obvious flaw in this is that the branch campuses in Education City enroll only 5% of Qatari university students who choose to study in Qatar. To study what is undoubtedly a new and innovative model in cross-border educational systems that
educates a minute fraction of the population and then attempt to extrapolate on the future of a country is spurious and problematic.

Additionally, Qatar represents a unique case in the Arabian Gulf region. First, it represents one of the smaller states in the Arabian Gulf – bigger than only Bahrain, whose higher education development strategy is very different than Qatar’s. Second, Qatar’s strategy is comparable to the United Arab Emirates’, although the latter is much bigger and has had the capacity to develop local institutions of higher education (Zayed University, United Arab Emirates University, University of Sharjah, Higher Colleges of Technology) in addition to hosting the largest number of branch campuses within its borders (Becker, 2010; Lane, Forthcoming-a; Wildavsky, 2010). Dubai is now trying to develop quality control and accreditation mechanisms in order to reign in an education system that is perceived to have gone awry. Qatar, on the other hand, is implementing university reform in a manner that, at face value, is both intentional and focused. As a point of fact, much of this intentionality and focus is due to the centralization of the decision-making process in Qatar and that all these universities have been given a blank cheque with which to establish world-class programs. On a personal level, my interest in the topic stems from an internship that I completed in the summer of 2009 in the Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs at Qatar University. My first experience at a primarily Arabic-medium instruction university, I was introduced to new ways of thinking and approaching administration in higher education. Through extensive conversations with administrators and professors at the university, I became interested in the entire higher education landscape in Qatar.
Conclusions

This dissertation centers on the nexus between globalization and nationalization policies. Chapter 2 will review the literature on globalization from various vantage points: as a general idea, from the perspective of Islam and Arab thought, and finally as it relates to higher education. The review will then delve into the literature on branch campuses and on how higher education is involved in the process of developing a knowledge society. This dissertation will seek to provide an analytical framework of how reform has occurred and what threats and opportunities this presents to preserving a Qatari cultural identity. Furthermore, it will also present a social, political and historical analysis of Qatar that is necessary to ground our understanding of the educational reforms in the country.

Chapter 3 will outline the methodology that will undergird this qualitative case study. Through a combination of document analysis, interviews, and personal observations, this study will seek to analyze the complicated relationship of policy and practice.

Chapter 4 will offer an understanding of the very complex nature of modern Qatar. The country has appeared in the news for a host of reasons, and this has caused much confusion about its leadership and its policies. By situating this study in a grounded understanding of modern Qatar, I will then be able to offer a thorough analysis of education in the country.

Chapter 5 will examine the cases of Qatar University and Education City. By analyzing documents, interviewing key players in both of these bodies, and engaging in personal observations, I will uncover how globalization and nationalization
policies are implemented and whether these policies achieve the stated objectives of
the leaders at QU and EC, and how these policies align with the larger educational
goals of the state of Qatar.

Chapter 6 will be a discussion of the findings that have been presented. The
reform of QU and EC cannot easily be understood, but by using the lenses of
globalization and nationalization, I will situate the transformation of higher
education in Qatar. I will conclude with how theoretical constructs are implemented
in Qatar, discuss limitations and future suggestions for research, and discuss
implications of this research for policy makers in Qatar.
Chapter 2  
Review of the Literature

This dissertation centers on the nexus between globalization and nationalization in the reform of QU and the establishment of EC. This review will examine globalization from various vantage points: as a general idea, from the perspective of Islam and Arab thought, and as it relates to higher education.

One of the many questions that arise in the midst of all these issues and development is how the nexus between globalization and nationalization plays out. In order to be able to understand this question, it is important to define and elaborate on these terms, as they are both very complex and value-laden.

Globalization

Sen (2002/2008) puts forth the idea that “globalization is often see as global Westernization” (p. 19). Evans (2005/2008) argues that globalization is often labeled “neoliberal globalization,” “corporate globalization,” or even “neoliberal corporate-dominated globalization”. Many, especially those in the anti-capitalist camp, echo this argument.

Owen (2006) suggests that the concept of globalization “was first popularized by economists who saw it as a technology-driven change that reduced the cost of the movement of people and goods and of interactive communication” (p. 79). Both Owen (2006) and Sen (2002/2008) place globalization in an historical context. Owen (2006) suggests that the first wave of globalization took place in the
late 19th century while Sen (2002/2008) would argue that globalization is a much older phenomenon, and he cites examples of the movement of knowledge, technology, and math in 1000 A.D. as examples of this.

Robertson (1992/2008) and Hobsbawm (2000) take a more neutral approach to the study of globalization. Robertson (1992/2008) argues that globalization refers to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole. This is a very objective approach to globalization, and certainly one that is repeated by Hobsbawm (2000). He says:

"Globalization is not the product of a single action, like switching on a light or starting a car engine. It is a historical process that has undoubtedly speeded up enormously ... [and] is a permanent constant transformation"

(Hobsbawm, 2000, p. 61)

Sklair (2002/2008) adds to this the concept of transnational practices. This, she argues, "refers to the effects of what people do when they are acting within specific institutional contexts that cross state borders" (Sklair, 2002/2008, p. 62). Sen (2002/2008) supports this perspective and suggests that globalization has a long history and is much bigger than a mere function of imperialism or neo-imperialism. In the case of Qatar, the historical interactions between people from all over the region with local Qataris, and the heavy influences of the West suggest that globalization is a process that has been going in Qatar for centuries. Roy (2004/2008) says that there has been a blurring of borders between Islam and the West as the process of Western influence in the region has taken place for over two centuries.
Huntington (1993/2008) put forth a seminal argument in 1993, on the heels of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of a bipolar world that dominated much of the 20th century. His argument asserted that the world is divided into eight civilizations (Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic Orthodox, Latin American, and African) and that the clash between these civilizations would define the post-Cold War era. His argument deserves exploration as it received much attention and is considered a central piece in the literature in political theory. The six tenets of his argument are as follows:

1. There are intractable differences among these civilizations
2. Greater interactions among these civilizations would exacerbate these differences
3. The nation-state would weaken as the primary source of identity and would be replaced by religion
4. There will be an increasing role of “civilization consciousness”
5. This civilization consciousness translates into cultural characteristics that are less mutable and less easily compromised.
6. Economic regionalism will increase

These six points have essentially been heavily refuted in the past fifteen years. His argument probably holds true in the world of fundamentalism and extreme adherence to a religious view. Juergensmeyer (2003) shows how religious violence that is put forth by Huntington’s simplification complicates the very thesis that Huntington puts forth. Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan oppressed and
violated other Muslims. Christian fundamentalists in Ireland attacked other Christians. The battle within China over Tibet is proof that the simplification “Confucian” cannot be applied as a means of categorizing the largest nation in the world.

Ahmed and Donnan (1994) posit that cultural globalization is the primary force operating in the modern period. Although this cultural force is laden with economic and political realities that have implications, the cultural flows of knowledge and information, primarily from the West, have the opportunity to reach much wider audiences. Inglehart and Norris (2003) suggest that the primary divide between Islam and the West is not so much political as it is social. Taking data from the World Values Survey from 1995-2001, they show that the biggest divide between the West and Muslim countries is over the issues of gender equality, abortion, divorce, and homosexuality. The political dimension is not the dividing line, as Huntington argued. However, his points about cultural difference do complicate our understanding of the situation in the Middle East. Are these differences as irreconcilable as suggested by Inglehart and Norris (2003), and if so, what is the future of ambitious projects like Education City and the numerous other Western universities that have established themselves in the Arabian Gulf region?

**Muslim and Arab reflections on the West and Globalization**

While there is not a singular Islamic response to globalization, prominent Islamic scholars have responded to globalization in very different ways. Abu-Rabi’ (2004) is very clear in his position:
“Since the nineteenth century, both the capitalist mode of production and European/American hegemony have to a large extent shaped the Arab world. It is therefore quite impossible to understand the significant political, economic, and religious movements of the modern Arab world without taking these two factors into account” (p. xv)

Abu-Rabi’ (2004) is equally clear on the fact that there is not only one definition of globalization. Unlike Sen (2002/2008) and Owen (2006) however, Abu-Rabi’ (2004) directly locates the origin of globalization in eighteenth century European capitalism. Globalization then imposed itself through hegemonic practices and imperialism. The problem with this argument (especially in the context of the landscape of Qatar’s higher education system) is that it fails to acknowledge the agency of those located on the periphery of his model.

Where Abu-Rabi’s argument deserves merit is in noting that English is the dominant language in the world today, and indeed the *lingua franca* of academia. While a majority of his argument is focused on the economic and political, he notes the rise of the United States as a cultural hegemon in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq in 1991 (Abu-Rabi’, 2004). His argument is problematic in that he essentializes the West in much the same way Edward Said did in *Orientalism* (Said, 1979). While a seminal book in describing how the East was created by the West as an entity that is opposed to the West in every way, Said’s argument falls short in that he posits a dualistic relationship that empowers the West and unequivocally disenfranchises the East. Abu-Rabi’ seems to follow in this same intellectual tradition. The West imposes on the East, and the East, helpless,
succumbs to the demands of globalization. These polar categories are overly simplistic and do not allow for the complicated relationships inherent in the very nature of power. Indeed, a more apt understanding of power relations lies in Foucault's *History of Sexuality* (1978). While both Abu-Rabi' and Said would favor a power relationship that begins in the West and imposes itself on the East (or South), Foucault (1978) argues that

“power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design of institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies” (pp. 92-93)

It is in this regard that Al-Azmeh (1993) offers a more nuanced argument about the relationship between the Islamic and the non-Islamic worlds. He recognizes the agency that Muslims have and that it is not a one-sided relationship that imposes, but instead is a complicated interplay of power relations.

Ahmed and Donnan (1994) agree with this perspective and make clear efforts to debunk Said’s claims of Orientalism. While Said (1979) describes an asymmetry in the power relations between Islam and the West that favors the latter,
Ahmed and Donnan (1994) problematize that asymmetry. They note that the West has not always existed as a monolith that has sought to control or intellectually subjugate the East; indeed many in the West have taken a genuine interest in the intellectual, cultural, and social life of the East and have made it a “labour of love” (Ahmed & Donnan, 1994, p. 5). The important point to note from this reading is that the relationship between the West and the East is not a one-way arrow of power with the East on the receiving end. I do not dismiss Said’s claim that the West did indeed create the East as an entity that is opposed to all the positive values of the West. However, I feel that the power relationship must be questioned in the modern relationship between West and East – all power does not rest with the West, and the East does and indeed exercises its agency in many cases.

However, with that said, one of the most obvious imports from the West into the Middle East is the nation-state. The nation-state was born in 1648 in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War in Europe (Poggi, 1978; Safi, 2003). At that time, the Ottoman Empire was the most powerful presence in the Middle East, extending across North Africa through the Fertile Crescent and into southeastern Europe. In the aftermath of World War I, the Middle East was effectively rendered under the control of Western powers (primarily Britain and France), who modeled the region on their now-established nation-state model. Hourani (1983) puts forth that the Arab world was forced to wrestle with some difficult questions about its interactions with the West and the world:

“First of all, what was the nation? That is to say, what was the community which was and ought to be the source of political authority and the object of
loyalty? Secondly, what was and should be the relationship between the welfare of the community and the inherited precepts and practices of religion? Thirdly, what was and should be the attitude of the nation, and of the State which embodied it, towards the outside world?” (p. 351)

As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, the Middle East was being forced to interrogate itself and its place on the world stage. In the case of the creation of the nation-state, this was an imposition from the West that altered ‘traditional’ Middle Eastern conceptions of self, community, and identity. This questioning occurred within the context of "Western imperialism ... [that] was not a benevolent force in the Arab world; on the contrary, it was a force of social repression and economic manipulation” (Sharabi, 1970). Furthermore, Sharabi (1970) argues that western (read European) imperialism had a number of effects on the Middle East. Imperialism effectively: a) retarded modernization through its repressive social policies; b) controlled education; and c) tried to influence the intellectual and political orientation of the younger generation (Sharabi, 1970).

So, while the Ottoman Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries was seen as a threat to Europe, its dissolution after World War I was seen as a sign of European superiority. The balance in the relationship between Europe and the Middle East shifted and with Britain and France carving up the Middle East to suit their imperialist tendencies, the Middle East's power waned over the next few decades. It was not until the Cold War that the nations of the Middle East would assert their voice by not aligning with either the United States or the Soviet Union as pawns in the Cold War. The participation of large Middle Eastern nations such as Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt in the 1955 Bandung Conference and their subsequent membership in the Non-Aligned Movement would serve as instrumental steps in answering the questions that Hourani (1983) would put forth.

The 1950s and 1960s were particularly significant times in the Arab world as Jamal Abdel-Nasser led Egypt and spearheaded a pan-Arab nationalism that reached its zenith in the rise to the 1967 War. Abdel-Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, emboldened an Arab voice against an unwelcome Israeli/Zionist presence in the region, and even went so far as to create a union with Syria that lasted for three years (Fisher & Ochsenwald, 1996; Khalidi, 1997; Muslih, 1988).

The 1970s and 1980s in the Arab world were marked by some significant events that entrenched the nation-state as the primary political unit in the region and further illustrated the importance of regional blocs in international politics. The 1973 oil embargo by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) caused a world-wide crisis. The embargo was taken as a stand by OAPEC against the United States in its continued support of the Israeli military. While authors such as Abu-Rabi’ would argue against any agency on the part of the Arab world, this was one act in which the complicated nature of power is displayed.

According to Foucault (1978), power is a “complex strategical situation ... exercised from innumerable points” (pp. 93 & 94). This understanding of power is important as both an Islamic approach to the West and globalization is elaborated and as the reforms in Qatari higher education are discussed.

The turning point in the relationship between the Arab world and Europe/U.S. came in 1990 with the Iraqi incursion into Kuwait. More than just a
military act of force, it redefined the positionality and power relations between the U.S. and the Arab world. McAlister (2001) argues that the war redefined the logics of modern nationalism. She argues “The United States was constructed [in the media] as superior and expansive … precisely because the war helped to define (multicultural) America is different from, and superior to, the putatively less liberal identities of other nations, particularly those in the Middle East” (McAlister, 2001).

The United States entered the region as a savior, claiming to safeguard its nation-states from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. The U.S.’s role in the region was firmly established, and the power dynamic between the U.S. and the Arabian Gulf was a very direct power relationship. The U.S. entered the Arabian Gulf to protect and promote liberty and democracy (all conspiracy theories aside) and by expelling Iraq from Kuwait, that goal was achieved. America’s place in the Gulf was solidified. This was no longer just an exercise in military presence – although the U.S. does maintain military bases in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. The dialectic of power changed and has changed significantly since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. invasion over a decade later of Iraq.

Mohammadi and Ahsan (2002) are unequivocal in their perspective toward Islam. As two Muslims, they condemn the Muslim world for being passive and allowing itself to be trampled on by processes of globalization. They see globalization as an imposing and dominating force that has watered down Islamic culture, undermined Islamic organizations, rendered invalid the Muslim world’s leadership, stunted the Muslim world’s socio-economic development, and created
dependency (Mohammadi & Ahsan, 2002). They also go so far as to claim that globalization is a process of recolonization, and that the dialectic of power continues to play out in favor of the West (Mohammadi & Ahsan, 2002). Berger (1998), in Daun and Walford (2004), suggests that “globalization threatens the Muslim way of life and makes it necessary for Muslims to defend their values and belief systems” (p. 13).

However, when a government like that in Qatar makes a concerted choice to invite American institutions to establish campuses within its borders, it is clear that the power relationship is not one-way. Although power is not the central issue in this dissertation, I use this language in response to Islamic theorists who posit that the Arab and Muslim world has forfeited their power for the favor of the West. The power of Qatar to choose to invite institutions and to build an infrastructure that is modeled on an American system is a power that must be recognized. However, this can be put forth as nothing more than the power of the petro-dollar, a superficial power, at best. Ramadan (2010) would argue that this kind of innovation is neither radical nor transformational, but instead adaptive. While he was speaking in the context of religious reform, his message is applicable in the context of globalization. It can be argued that Qatar’s importation of U.S. institutions of higher education is doing nothing to expand its own educational system or even to further the interests of its population. In neighboring Saudi Arabia, for example, foreign campuses are not allowed to operate, but instead the state has built its own, native institutions of higher education that adhere to standards set by the Ministry of Higher Education while also being cognizant of changing international standards. I am not suggesting
that the Saudi Arabian model is better or worse than the Qatari model, but only to say that importing and paying exorbitant amounts of money as a means of developing tertiary institutions of education is not the only model in the Gulf. As far as native institutions are measured, the national universities in Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are all relatively equal in their standards. There have been no remarkable advances in national higher education in the Gulf as to make one country stand out as an exemplar.

An examination of the literature on globalization and higher education will further elucidate the complexity of power relations in play in Qatar. Globalization vis-à-vis higher education can be understood in terms of student mobility, study-abroad programs, internationalization efforts at universities, or even the establishment of branch campuses. The breadth of this topic will be narrowed down in order to provide a framework with which to understand the case of higher education in Qatar. However, it is important to first discuss some major trends happening in higher education across the globe in order to better situate the case of Qatar.

**International trends in higher education**

At a recent conference held at the Rockefeller Institute of Government in Albany, there was a widespread acknowledgement, that despite its absence in international relations theory and literature, higher education institutions are significant players on the international stage (Lane & Kinser, 2012). Although the conveners of the conference came to the conclusion that the focus of those relations
emanated from the U.S. and were off-shored around the world, the legitimacy of their claim remains valid, and this trajectory deserves attention.

Guruz (2011) notes that the international education sector is currently a global $2.2 trillion business, and the World Bank estimates that global spending on higher education amounts to $300 billion per annum, the equivalent of 1% of global economic output (The Economist, 2005). There are more than eighty million students worldwide and 3.5 million people are employed to teach or look after them (The Economist, 2005). In the United States, the largest international education group, NAFSA, indicates that international students and their families contributed $20.23 billion to the U.S. economy in the 2010-2011 academic year (NAFSA: Association of International Educators, 2011). Of the 723,277 international students in the United States, the number of these students from the Arab world (including North Africa) total 39,636, with an overwhelming majority (22,704) coming from Saudi Arabia (Institute of International Education, 2011). According to an independent Arab student magazine, there are a total of 78,000 Arab students studying abroad, meaning that half of Arab students studying abroad do so in the United States (Arab Student Magazine, 2012).

This internationalization and cross-border nature of the global higher education industry is one of the issues that is addressed in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). GATS is an dates back to the post-World War II trade liberalization agreement, the General Agreement on Trade and Tarriffs (GATT), which was an effort by Western powers to liberalize trade. In 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) replaced the GATT, and it was decided to include trade in
services under the umbrella of the WTO, thus became GATS. All members of the WTO are members of GATS and are required to enter into negotiations on trade in twelve service sectors comprising 163 subsectors; the first round of negotiations happened in January 2000 (World Trade Organization, 2012). Less than one-third of the 149 countries participating in GATS in 2006 had agreed to include at least one of the five education subsectors (primary, secondary, higher, adult, and other) and even fewer than that had agreed to liberalize their education subsectors (Guruz, 2011). The last agreement on trade in education was reached in 2005 (World Trade Organization, 2012), and efforts to restart the GATS in 2007 were unsuccessful (Guruz, 2011; World Trade Organization, 2012).

With the international trade in education, there developed an increased need on assuring quality in higher education. In the United States, external review is done by regional, programmatic, and specialized bodies that are authorized to undertake reviews by the Council for Higher Education Accreditation and/or the U.S. Department of Education. U.S. national, regional, and professional/program accrediting bodies such as ABET are selling services in over sixty-five countries, with institutions all over the world lining up to build an international reputation by garnering a “U.S. brand” (Davis, 2010; Guruz, 2011).

In the UK, the Quality Assurance Agency was established to ensure that higher education standards were being safeguarded and enhanced. In Australia, universities function as self-accrediting bodies, with the process, since 2000, being handled and reported on by the Australian Universities Quality Agency (Mishra, 2007).
Multi-country accreditation agencies also exist, such as the International Network for Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education (INQAAHE) that works to promote good practices and to be better informed on issues of international recognition of quality. The Asia-Pacific Quality Network works to strengthen the relationships between quality assurance agencies in the Asia-Pacific Region, thus promoting stronger institutions of higher education in the region (Mishra, 2007). In the Arab World, quality assurance is done on a nation-by-nation basis, with ten nations’ accrediting agencies belonging to the Arab Network for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ANQAHE) (Arab Network for Quality Assurance in Higher Education, 2012).

In 1999, twenty-nine European Ministers of Education signed the Bologna Declaration that committed to establish the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 2010. The Declaration “encourages co-operation in quality assurance of higher education institutions in the European Union to develop comparable criteria and methodologies. It envisages a common system of credit transfer and mobility of students and teachers across European countries” (Mishra, 2007, p. 70). The signing of the Declaration and the establishment of EHEA stems from a philosophical train of thought that links economic mobility to investment in educational growth, and to the growth of Europe by harmonizing degrees and degree structures across the 49 member countries. As part of the mission of ensuring quality across borders, the Bologna Declaration called for the establishment of a quality assurance agency that was established in 2000. The European Network for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) (whose name
changed four years later to the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education, although they retained their original acronym) has as its mission “the maintenance and enhancement of the quality of European higher education at a high level, and to act as a major driving force for the development of quality assurance across all the Bologna signatory countries” (ENQA, 2012). Both ENQA and the EHEA are committed to ensuring the sovereignty of national systems in promoting institutions of higher education that meet the needs of the nation-state while also developing a broader European system that fosters a strong system across the member states that will facilitate cross-border mobility.

**Globalization and higher education**

Dodds (2008) offers a thorough review of the literature on globalization and starts with a quote from Amin (1997): “the more we read about globalization ... the less clear we seem to be about what it means and what it implies” (p. 506). In some articles, globalization is referred to as global flows of information, technology, knowledge, culture, and even identity (Dion, 2005; Muhammad, 2005; Scott, 2005). Similarly, Van Vught et al. (2002) describe the recruitment of international students as ‘the globalization game’ (p. 112), although none of the literature discusses the global flow of students. While the Institute of International Education publishes an annual statistical report on international students and study abroad, this is focused solely on American students studying abroad and international students studying in the U.S. There has been little analysis of the role these students play in the multiple processes of globalization from economic, social, cultural, and political perspectives.
The second trend within the literature on globalization discusses the phenomenon as marketization (Dodds, 2008, p. 508). In this strand of the literature, the market is central as is the competition that is intrinsic in capitalist ideology. Thus, the literature in this strand examines competition between domestic institutions of higher education and those from other countries (Mok & Tan, 2004). Thus, we see universities that aspire to be featured on the Times Supplement of Higher Education’s “Top 200 World Universities” list as an example of this trend. On the other hand, globalization-as-marketization literature can also refer to national university systems that work to increase their standards in order to seek to improve national economic effectiveness (Dodds, 2008).

The final strand within Dodd’s article is the relationship of globalization to particular policy objectives. In this strand of the literature, globalization is understood as an ideology that is innately linked to policy objectives that seek to favor some to the disadvantage of most. This strand of literature is filled with negative references to globalization as leading to “an erosion of human values” (Narsee, 2005), and even as “an ideological justification for neo-imperialist” policies (Imam, 2005).

Strongly related to this strand of the literature is an article by Rui Yang (2003) that offers a scathing attack on the effects of globalization on higher education. He starts by defending the claim that globalization leads to homogenization and that this claim needs to be taken seriously (Yang, 2003). Citing works by Back et. al. (1997) and Knight and De Wit (1997), he argues that globalization leads to “the homogenization of national identities and cultures”
(Yang, 2003, p. 270) since the "origins of globalization are ... largely Western and Western political and economic institutions are reproduced as part of the process" (p. 284). The argument he is essentially making is that globalization originates in the West and therefore its outcomes are nothing more than Western models imposed in developing countries.

He makes a very important point in his article that is directly related to one of the foci of this dissertation. He states that “Education as investment in human capital has become a key plank of educational policy platforms in many countries. “This reductive and functionalist view has never been successful in promoting educational achievement” (Yang, 2003, p. 278). This statement would prove to be problematic to the rulers of Qatar who have invested billions of dollars in educational improvement projects. As we shall see later, Qatar’s investment in education might be challenging Yang’s perspective.

Yang remains critical of the effects of globalization on higher education, while Mazawi (2008) seems to temper his approach as globalization relates to higher education in the Arabian Gulf region. He posits that the influence of the United States on Gulf educational systems has been very strong and that the imperative to adhere to U.S. standards in areas of curriculum and accreditation are very evident (Mazawi, 2008). However, it is important to note that the educational initiatives that are being discussed in this dissertation are neither governed by nor spearheaded by any official U.S. government agency. The partnerships and relationships that are being developed are not meant to achieve some foreign policy goal (although other initiatives such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative of the
U.S. State Department are meant for those purposes). The European Union on the other hand has put forth policy objectives that have specifically meant to bring together the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council states in concrete policy matters through the establishment of European universities in each of the Gulf States (Luciani and Nugart, 2005). The relationship between U.S. and Qatari academic institutions is a symbiotic one, benefitting both sides of the equation. The structures and practices that brought about these relationships strongly indicate that globalization has not been a top-down flow from the powerful to the weak, but instead a unique partnership that has redefined the nature of globalization in the arena of higher education.

Donn and Al Manthri (2010) would argue that this is not the case. Their analysis of globalization and higher education in the Arabian Gulf begins with the assertion that education is an economic benefit that is directly related to the labor market. McClennan (April 28, 2010) would agree with this assertion and in fact suggests that any suggestion to the contrary is indeed “globalloney”. This argument, although undermining the social and cultural imperatives that form the foundation of higher education (i.e. the common good), deserves examination.

They take their cue from Altbach (2002b) who noted that education is an international commodity to be traded and that it has lost its focus on the “common good”. By using this as a premise, Donn and Al Manthri (2010) are able to examine the effect of globalization in economic terms that are free of social or cultural values or prejudices. One of the most poignant points in their book, namely the point that refutes the above argument, is that international higher education has developed
concrete cores and peripheries. The core comprises those countries that are knowledge economies, while those on the periphery are merely consumers of this knowledge. Indeed this fact is confirmed by the fact that Arab States recently doubled their knowledge production rate, to 4% of the world’s knowledge production (Sawahel, 2011; Sharma & Sawahel, 2011). They argue that the Arab Gulf States have become known for adopting Western systems, and did this in one, or a combination, of four ways. Governments in the Arab Gulf States:

a) established American institutions, as in the American University of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates which was established in 1997, licensed in the State of Delaware, and accredited by Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE) in 2004 (American University of Sharjah, 2010; Middle States Commission on Higher Education, 2010);

b) established local institutions such as Zayed University in the United Arab Emirates in 1998 which in turn sought and gained American accreditation (also by MSCHE, in 2008), or as Qatar University which was founded in 1977 is currently doing in seeking American accreditation through the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (Middle States Commission on Higher Education, 2010; Qatar University, 2010a; Zayed University, 2010);

c) imported institutions of higher education, creating international branch campuses within their borders. The subject of international branch campuses will be explored further in the next section.

d) required their local institutions of higher education to affiliate with a foreign institution, as in the case of Oman (Donn & Al Manthri, 2010).
Regardless of the method, Donn and Al Manthri (2010) are clear in their position. The Gulf States are merely consumers in the knowledge economy and they have

“acquired – in the main – Western higher education institutions, they have adopted English-language curricula, they have accepted the demands of internationally driven definitions of ‘quality’, ‘standards’, ‘benchmarks’ and ‘appraisal’ but, nevertheless, they have little control, other than as purchaser and consumer, over the language or the artefacts of that language” (Donn & Al Manthri, 2010, pp. 23-24)

The authors do not accept the possibility that the relationship between core and periphery, which is certainly a valid relationship, is not simply one-way. For the authors, the West produces knowledge and systems that are implemented and accepted by the East. Their argument regarding higher education mirrors the cultural argument that is put forth by Mohammadi and Ahsan (2002), that is, that the East is passive in accepting the standards of the West. The dynamic of power is not complicated as Foucault (1978) would suggest.

Donn and Al Manthri (2010) are able to make their claims because they begin with the economic relationship that has narrowed their study. For those authors, the trajectory of their argument is as follows: education is an economic benefit; these countries have exorbitant amounts of money to spend in order to develop economically; they have bought education from the West and imported it like a traded commodity. The result of this exchange (education for money) is neither the development of a knowledge economy nor the entry of any of these countries into
this economy. Instead, for the Arab Gulf States, this policy has sustained their position on the periphery of the knowledge economy.

Edwards (2007) adds to this argument a point that is crucial to remember in the case of Qatar. She states:

“The American model with its liberal arts basis, however flexible and useful, is rooted, like all such models, in the values and processes of the society that produced it. If this model is picked up and moved into societies with completely different cultures and values, there are implications” (p. 374).

The importance of this point cannot be overlooked or undermined when examining the situation in Qatar. Qatar University educates the overwhelming number of students in Qatar; it has implemented an American-style core curriculum, requires students to be proficient speakers, readers, and writers of the English language, places high importance in faculty hirings on those who have obtained their degrees in the West, all in an attempt to garner accreditation through the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, a U.S. accreditation agency (Qatar University, 2010a). Education City currently comprises a very significant and prominent block of the education sector in Qatar. Five of the nine institutions operating in Education City are American liberal-arts style institutions that have transplanted their curricula and faculty to the posh campus on the outskirts of Doha. There is a significant cultural and paradigmatic shift occurring in Qatar and this is one of the issues that will be explored in this dissertation.
Higher education and the development of a knowledge society

One of Qatar’s stated goals is to establish itself as a knowledge society (General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008). According to Drucker (1993),

“Knowledge is the only meaningful resource today. The traditional ‘factors of production’ – land (i.e. natural resources), labor, and capital - have not disappeared, but they have become secondary. They can be obtained, and obtained easily, provided there is knowledge. And knowledge in this new meaning is knowledge as a utility, knowledge as the means to obtain social and economic results.” (p. 65)

Qatar has an abundance of liquid natural gas, a “traditional” factor of production. Drucker (1993) states that knowledge in the form of resources is not enough in today’s globalized society. For a society to advance, the traditional factors of production are not going to suffice in achieving progress. The new factor of production that is going to propel societies forward is knowledge, and the use of that knowledge to produce more knowledge. Although the traditional factors of production remain present, they are no longer the central economic factor. In Qatar’s case, it has an abundance of liquid natural gas (LNG) from which it derives rents to subsidize its development. This development revolves around using existing knowledge, creating knowledge, importing knowledge, applying knowledge, and then exporting knowledge, i.e. to create a cycle around knowledge, thus transforming society. Drucker (1993) notes that the creation of a knowledge society “changes, and fundamentally, the structure of society. It creates new social
dynamics. It creates new economic dynamics. It creates new politics” (p. 69).

Qatar’s goal to create a knowledge society has wide-ranging implications, and part of this study will be to examine those implications.

According to Välimaa and Hoffman (2008), in knowledge society discourse, everything related to knowledge and knowledge production is interrelated. According to those authors, “Knowledge society discourse also describes the current situation in which the knowledge society is both the objective of policies and debates and an agent promoting policies and debates concerning its’ potentials” (Välimaa & Hoffman, 2008, p. 266). Knowledge society is a goal to which Qatar aspires and has made it clear through the establishment of universities, research centers, and think-tanks, each of which is part of the continuous cycle of knowledge production and use. However, it continues to use the discourse of the knowledge society as a way of reinforcing and enhancing those goals, as Qatar continues to grow its knowledge sector.

Indeed the model that Qatar is using, i.e. importing institutions, is not new. Drucker (1993) suggests that South Korea at the end of the Korean War in 1953 was completely devastated by Japan. By importing U.S. educational and management systems and models, South Korea was able to become a modern country within twenty-five years. However, Moughrabi (2009) has a big problem with this. He states,

“For all practical purposes, the Arab region is in the process of becoming nearly completely Americanized. By this I mean something specific, namely, that the region now falls within the sphere of American security influence,
that American ideas and values are being well received by the modernizing Arab elites, that the region, to varying degrees, has become integrated in the system of global capitalism, that American style consumerism is rampant throughout the Arab world and that American educational prescriptions are now being completely implemented” (Moughrabi, 2009, p. 21).

This Americanization is particularly evident in the Arabian Gulf region, and especially in the educational sector. The majority of universities in the Arabian Gulf have adopted the American model and ascribe to American higher education standards. Universities across the region boast of having received acknowledgement from an American accrediting body. The American University of Kuwait boasts of its affiliate membership in the American Academy for Liberal Education (AALE), a conservative body of 24 members mostly outside the U.S., whose recognition confers little status outside of the AALE. At Qatar University’s College of Education, one of the cornerstone of the College’s reform is to garner admission into the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education and the International Reading Association, both U.S. based organizations. Business programs across the region aspire to AACSB recognition, and national universities work diligently to garner ABET accreditation for their engineering and computer science programs. Although regional bodies such as the Association of Arab Universities (AARU) and local bodies such as the Quality Assurance Agency in the UAE do exist, their prescriptions are applied wholesale from U.S. bodies. The Americanization of Gulf education is evident.
The manner in which Qatar has Americanized is particularly noteworthy, because it did not only directly import American institutions, but also took American model of organizations and developed local Qatari organizations. The cornerstone of Qatar’s development project, especially related to human and social development, is the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development. The Qatar Foundation is the umbrella organization for a number of education, research, and community organizations that work toward developing future Qatari generations, and then taking knowledge being developed in Qatar and using it to help others. Education City and programs such as the Qatar Debates (a program designed to teach Qatari students how to engage in proper debate on meaningful topics) stand as examples of how Qatar is planning to develop future generations. However, Qatar’s goal does not seem to be solely insular. The establishment of organizations such as Reach out to Asia (ROTA), to promote educational development and assistance in poorer parts of Asia seems to point to Qatar’s desire to make an impact globally. This is part of the knowledge society loop – to create, implement, and then disseminate knowledge.

Given this loop that Qatar is trying to implement, it is worth asking, “who participates in the knowledge society?” Castells & Himenan (2002) argue that “knowledge society discourse is dominated by the conditions of the relatively young, well educated working age citizens geographically located in the urban areas of a few rich countries.” Typically these countries have been in the developed north, which has created a core and periphery in the cycle of knowledge production. The Arab Middle East, as some have argued, has existed outside of the loop of knowledge
production, and has primarily consumed knowledge. What Qatar is trying to do is to change that and to be part of the cycle of knowledge production. In attempting this change, Qatar has created multiple silo effects. The first silo is geographical; all efforts have been concentrated in the capital city of Doha, creating an almost city-state where development, wealth, and knowledge are located. The rest of the country contains oil fields and some ruins, but that level of intentional development has been located solely in Doha.

The second silo is class-related in that middle and upper class Qataris and expatriates can contribute to the knowledge society. Those in the lower classes are excluded from the knowledge society. The question then arises about the transience of the participants in a knowledge society; the expatriate population in Qatar comprises the majority of the country but is never given full rights (including nationality, the right to vote, or the right to permanent residency), and as such is a transient population. If 85% of the country’s population is so transient, can Qatar claim itself a knowledge society if the primary population creating, disseminating, and using the knowledge is not Qatari?

The final silo that Qatar has created is generational. The older Qatari generations hold onto traditions and values that are incompatible with that of a Western-idealed knowledge society. Knowledge in the Arab tradition is orally communicated and glorifies past victories, as recited in poetry; a respect for the community over the individual’s aspirations is important. In a knowledge society, the individual must take ownership for her/his own aspirations and pursue knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and not for the sake of community as it has
been interpreted in Arab society. As Drucker (1993) stated, the creation of a knowledge society “changes, and fundamentally, the nature of a society” (p. 69).

The transformation of society toward being a knowledge society “require[s] an empowering social vision that encompasses plurality, inclusion, solidarity and participation” (UNESCO, 2005, p. 27). This brings up an interesting point in a country like Qatar, where only a minority (approximately 15%) of the population is Qatari, with the remaining population comprised of expatriates. South Asians alone make up double the number of Qataris, and this population is expressly excluded from the social vision. South Asians perform much of the manual labor (especially construction) that has transformed the skyline of Doha. However, as a personal anecdote, I witnessed their personal exclusion from Qatari society when I completed an internship in Qatar during 2009. On Fridays, security guards guard the entrances to the capital city’s shopping malls, forbidding South Asian males from entering the malls. When I asked about this policy, I was told that Fridays were “family days” and that single South Asian men (typically laborers) threatened the safety of the family by jeering at Qatari women. There was no evidence to prove this – merely a social perception that justifies the exclusion of one third of the residents of Qatar.

Furthermore, knowledge societies must ensure freedom of expression as well as the promotion of human rights (UNESCO, 2005). Human rights organizations around the world have criticized the countries of the Arabian Peninsula for having abominable human and civil rights records. In the United Arab Emirates, laborers are regularly not paid their salaries on time, and their wages are low which has caused them to strike. In Kuwait, any criticism of the regime (or
indeed of any neighboring regime in the region) is punishable by law (Amnesty International, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). Saudi Arabia is described as living in a “political ice age” for its continued and increasing repression of human and civil rights (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Bahrain recently erupted in protests and the government came out publicly as a flagrant abuser of human rights. And in Qatar, “women faced discrimination and violence. Migrant workers were exploited and abused, and inadequately protected under the law. Hundreds of people continued to be arbitrarily deprived of their nationality” (Amnesty International, 2010c).

Given the contradictions between the ideals of a knowledge society and the reality on the ground in the Arabian Gulf, the question begs itself: can Qatar ever truly become a knowledge society or will it only don the costume of a knowledge society while continuing to behave in ways incongruent with the ideals it purports to uphold?

The cornerstone of Qatar’s plans to become a knowledge society rests in the development of higher education in the country. (At this point, it becomes necessary to note that the relationship between the nation-state and higher education in Qatar is not reflected in much of the mainstream literature on the topic, e.g. Schofer and Meyer (2005),, Bridges, et.al. (2007), Bloom and Rosovsky (2007), and Baker and Wiseman (2008). Higher education is seen as a tool for educating the citizenry who, in turn, are employed by and give back to the economy. In an expatriate-based economy such as Qatar’s, and with an educational model that is relatively new, it is unclear to what extent any of the reforms in Qatar have direct impact on the citizens of Qatar themselves. The country’s reliance on expatriates
also complicates the traditional understanding of the development of the nation-state that has examined the topic from the point of view of citizens and immigrants. In Qatar’s case, expatriates are neither of the above as they are not afforded the right of citizenship and their residence in Qatar is always temporary.) The 1998 UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education emphasized the centrality of a strong higher education system (UNESCO, 2005). According to that conference, a strong system must be respond to the needs of an ever-changing society. Higher education must be responsive:

a) politically, i.e. challenging young minds to constantly challenge and be analytical
b) to the world of work, i.e. preparing generations for work without losing sight of its ultimate goal and that is to educate
c) to other levels of the education system, i.e. preparing teachers and always engaged in the assessment of the system
d) to culture and cultures, i.e. respecting diversity
e) to all, i.e. promoting inclusion for disadvantaged groups, especially women
f) everywhere and all the time, i.e. promoting lifelong education and training
g) to students and teachers, i.e. including students in the teaching, management, and life of institutions of higher education (UNESCO, 2005, p. 97)

The demands above for a responsive education system are very holistic. It requires mature institutions of higher education in mature societies to work together in symbiotic ways that contribute to the greater good of society. Qatari higher education is in its infancy (the only national university was established in
1973) and Qatar became an independent country two years earlier in 1971.

Furthermore, Qatar did not take on its modern form until 1995 with the rise of Emir Hamad and the radical changes he instituted in the country. In addition, the majority of the country are transient expatriates on limited-year employment contracts which contributes to a level of social instability, making it more difficult to mature. And finally, the reforms that Qatar is implementing are American in nature and form. How will foreign ideas be translated locally in ways that will allow Qatar to develop?

There are some structural issues that need to be dealt with as Qatar works to transform itself as a knowledge society. According to the UNESCO report, “learning to learn means learning to think, to doubt, to adapt as quickly as possible, and to be able to question one’s cultural heritage while respecting consensus” (UNESCO, 2005, pp. 57-58). Moughrabi (2009) would argue that educational systems in the Arab world remain a form of social control as Arab governments “prefer to produce subjects rather than citizens” (p. 25). I agree with his assertion even with, in Qatar’s case, of the reform taking place. Questioning in Arab and Muslim countries is confined within the boundaries of culture/traditions and God; given these limitations, can true learning take place? I would argue that these boundaries hinder true learning and innovative knowledge creation; that they restrict the individual from truly questioning and seeking knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Instead, knowledge becomes merely the means to earn a degree, itself a tool for employment. Knowledge and education are thus reduced to socio-economic mechanisms for advancement, which contradicts the very ideals of a knowledge
An important point made by Moughrabi (2009) concerns the nature of Arab societies and governments. The “Arab Spring” (as it has been dubbed) highlighted the nature of repressive regimes in the Arab world, and made clear that Arabs across the region were tired of having their voice silenced. The protests never touched Qatar as Qatars have little to complain about; a rentier state with an enormous amount of rents derived from oil and LNG, the state ensures that its population is well taken care of financially. This serves two purposes: a) it creates a vibrant middle class in the country; and b) it creates a politically subservient population who has little opposition to its own government.

The role of government in the Middle East also includes its control of the education system. In Qatar, although all the higher education institutions in the country (including Qatar University) are independent of government control, they are all financed by the State of Qatar or its subsidiary (the Qatar Foundation in the case of Education City). More importantly, at the primary and secondary education levels, control of the education system is wholly in the hands of the government, that has also subsidized the new independent schools in the country. However, Moughrabi (2009) argues, “Arab states continue to control their educational systems precisely because education offers the kind of legitimacy that they badly need” (p. 23). So, Qatar is seeking legitimacy by using rents as a political silencing tool to a population that has already been reared to legitimize the government.

The Arabian Gulf region has been the focus of attention lately as one of the foci of power where higher education institutions have been imported in large
numbers. This has raised the issue of international branch campuses as a concern. Do they provide the same quality education as their home campuses? Do they enroll the same quality of students? Are they sustainable on a long-term basis? This has been the topic of much academic literature recently and it is to this topic that I will turn to now.

**International branch campuses**

Although there is no official list of branch campuses operating around the world Becker (2010) notes that the number of branch campuses operating has increased by 43% since 2006. Altbach (2010) notes the definition of international branch campuses that has been offered by the Observatory of Borderless Higher Education, a UK-based think tank focused on research on global higher education:

“An international branch campus is an off-shore entity of a higher education institution operated by the institution or through a joint venture in which the institution is a partner (some countries require foreign providers to partner with a local organization) in the name of the foreign institution. Upon successful completion of the course program, which is fully undertaken at the unit abroad, students are awarded a degree from the foreign institution.” (p. 2)

This set-up essentially creates a core-and-periphery model within institutions – the core remains the home campus, located usually in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, or India, while the periphery is the branch campus which is subject to pressures of maintaining the standards and academic
rigor of the home campus. According to Altbach (2010), the challenges of these branch campuses include diluting the professoriate, undermining the quality of the student body, and too-often poor attempts at replicating the campus. At Knowledge Village in Dubai, for example, twenty-eight institutions of higher education from the U.S., U.K., Australia, India, Iran, and France have established programs in fields ranging from child development to fashion design (Dubai International Academic City, 2010). The campuses of many of these institutions comprise only one or two floors in office buildings that are often not equipped to deliver the programs that these institutions are offering.

The benefits to foreign institutions establishing branch campuses are sometimes very alluring. Dubai International Academic City does, for example, “offers campuses 100 percent foreign ownership, a 100 percent tax exemption, and a 100 percent repatriation of profits” (Becker, 2010). In a country where ownership of companies is limited to the nationals of that country, this incentive is substantial. By setting up “free zones” (similar to South Korea), Dubai has attracted institutions from around the world to establish branch campuses on their soil. According to Jaschik (2009), the number of international branch campuses in the United Arab Emirates numbers more than forty, and the UAE is the country with the highest number of branch campuses in the world.

Wildavsky (2010) is convinced that global universities are indeed reshaping the world. Within the United States, he provides examples of how universities are managing the global/international/transnational dialectic that is shaping the landscape, especially in American higher education. He shows how, for example,
Stanford University is determined to use the language of “global” instead of “international” so as not to locate the United States at the center and to peripheralize the world (Wildavsky, 2010). Likewise, New York University, with its ambitious projects of establishing hubs (a term that will be further elaborated on later) around the world, now dubs itself a “Global Network University”, rooted in Greenwich Village in New York City with spokes that span the globe. The University advertizes itself in the following way:

As a student at NYU, you’ll already be living and learning in the cosmopolitan environment of New York City, so it will seem a natural step for you to expand your educational experiences with an integrated, international curricular experience. As you move with ease between locations within the global network university, you may find yourself spending a semester in Buenos Aires and going from there to Abu Dhabi for another, all the while taking major courses and electives that will, with a little careful planning with your adviser, keep you on track to graduate with your class. While you’re studying in Abu Dhabi, Accra, Berlin, Buenos Aires, Florence, London, Madrid, Paris, Prague, Shanghai, or Tel Aviv, you’ll soon also be able to connect with students and faculty at the other sites within the global network via e-courses, cyber exchanges, and global seminars that draw on the worldwide experiences you and your classmates are having in NYU’s classrooms abroad” (New York University, 2010).
The image of a student that is able to globetrot seamlessly is a value that is now a central theme in the identity of New York University. The idea that New York University is not a traditional university and that it transcends national boundaries is an appeal. As a matter of fact, the President of New York University, John Sexton, makes disparaging comments about universities such as Princeton and Harvard for being too traditional and not being able to take the risk of expanding globally (Wildavsky, 2010).

NYU represents one reason of why universities choose to branch out. Of course, it would be myopic to suggest that NYU's goals were purely altruistic. Abu Dhabi (one of the seven emirates that comprise the nation-state of the United Arab Emirates) has fronted an enormous amount of money to lure NYU to the oil-rich emirate. These financial gifts included: a down payment of $50 million to seal the deal of having NYU; the entire cost of building the Abu Dhabi campus on Saadiyat Island in Abu Dhabi, which would also house the world-class Louvre and Guggenheim Museums; scholarships in excess of $3 million for students to attend NYU for free; and digitizing the entire 5.1 million volume collection of the NYU’s libraries, for the benefit of the university’s Abu Dhabi students (Krieger, 2008b; Lewin, 2008a, 2008b).

John Sexton has been heavily criticized for his decision to establish a campus in Abu Dhabi. Olds (April 28, 2008) notes that Sexton has been criticized for undermining the NYU brand, negotiating with an authoritarian regime, complicit and tacit agreement with the UAE’s abuse of human rights towards foreign labor, and for having an authoritarian leadership style. The interesting note here is that
the nexus between global and national forces are at work in the North as much as they are in the South. Sexton is having to negotiate a variety of values as he attempts to negotiate the various stakeholders; on the one hand are his values of globalizing NYU and transforming it into the kind of institution that he envisages, while on the other hand are realities in the United Arab Emirates that are incompatible with the values that are seen as an intrinsic part of NYU’s identity. The negotiation of values, and thus the relationship of power, is not a one-way-street. In a complicated interplay of power, the establishment of branch campuses is an ever-evolving relationship.

In addition, there is a variety of literature that discusses the role of higher education in national development. Initial research in this area shows that much of it has focused on the former nations of the Soviet Union and in Africa. Very little literature has focused on the Middle East, and for this reason, literature from political science will be utilized in order to understand the relationship between nationalization policies and higher education.

**Nationalization in the Arabian Gulf**

In response to an influx of expatriates and a perceived decline of national culture, and decline of nationals in leadership positions, several countries in the Arabian Gulf instituted labor force nationalization policies. Nationalization is commonly understood as the transfer of ownership of a branch/industry from private hands to governmental/state control. However, what characterizes the Gulf
countries is an extreme case of privatization of companies and industries, and the increase of competition. Nationalization in this sense refers to policies instituted by each of the Gulf States to increase and make more national in character many of the industries. These policies are named after the states, thus Qatarization, Kuwaitization, Bahrainisation, Emiritsation, Saudization, and Omanisation. There has been very little analysis of these policies, and so the following will merely serve to describe these policies in order to situate the national and the global in the formulation of higher education policy.

Each of the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council has implemented strategic national policies in order to advance the economic well-being of their own citizens. In Qatar, for example, the “Qatarization” policy seeks to have a fifty percent employment target for Qatars in the energy and industry sectors (Qatarization, 2010). In the United Arab Emirates, the “Emiritisation” policy seeks to have a “smooth transfer of power back to the local work force” (Government of the United Arab Emirates, 2006). In Oman, the policy was established in 1988 and called for a 72% rate of employment of Omanis in government sectors; within 10 years, most government departments had reached an 86% Omani employment rate (Sultanate of Oman Ministry of Information, 2002). The goal in Oman was to replace expatriates with Omani trained personnel, and the government rewarded companies that complied and exceeded the mandates set by the national Omanisation policy (Sultanate of Oman Ministry of Information, 2002). Saudi Arabia’s policy is very ambitious and seeks to have a policy of a minimum of 75% of
the workforce be local Saudis, primarily to counter unemployment by Saudi men (UNHCR, 2010).

Randeree (2009) notes some problems with these policies, namely that “demographic imbalance caused by a high proportion of expatriates working in the region, the challenges of public and private sector employment, the role of national women in society, the reliance on expatriate employment, high rates of unemployment among poorly trained nationals, and cumulatively the need for sustainable development as well as the effective governance of human capital” makes the implementation of these policies particularly difficult (p. 1). The severe imbalance in the population between nationals and expatriates engenders issues that are not easily resolvable. Furthermore, the situation is not ameliorated by visa requirements, especially in countries like the U.S. which has made gaining visas for people of Middle Eastern descent a very big hassle (Myers, 2003).

In Oman, the policy has been aggressive and has been a concern for the government since the mid-1980’s. Valeri (2005) notes that the government in Oman had set as a target a 75% Omani employment rate in both the public and private sectors by the year 2020. Randeree (2009) notes:

“Only 12 per cent of employees in the UAE are Emirati nationals, and similarly, 17 per cent of employees in the State of Qatar are Qatari nationals, 18 per cent of Kuwaitis in the State of Kuwait, 28 per cent of Saudis in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 45 per cent of Bahrainis in the Kingdom of Bahrain and the most successful, the Sultanate of Oman, with 46 per cent of their workforce being Omani. The unique aspect of Emiratisation, that
demographically seems to be in the worst situation, is that the UAE
government is boldly changing its position, by abandoning the region’s quota
based policy for the foreseeable future.”

The policy of Emiritsation has not been successful due to the fact that
Emiratis are such a small minority in their own country. The United Arab Emirates
has gained a lot of international attention in the media because Dubai has been
billed as an economic wonderland full of promise and potential. The economic
downfall of 2008-2009 certainly affected Dubai’s appeal for expatriate workers, but
this has not done enough to increase the Emirati percentage of the population or the
labor force. Because of these factors, Emiratis have been forced to abandon labor-
force nationalization policies. The rate of economic growth and the demands of the
labor market necessitated the government’s abandonment of Emiritisation as that
would have halted or severely slowed down progress on a number of revenue-
generating projects.

The importance of these policies lies not just in their human resource
objectives, but instead in the cultural practices that underlie them. For these
policies to even exist, the government of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) recognized a cultural threat posed to their nation-states in the form of
declining local populations and a burgeoning expatriate population. These
countries are attractive to foreigners in that they offer competitive salaries and
benefits, comfortable lifestyles that are labeled Western and modern (replete with
shopping malls, luxurious amenities, and top-quality amenities and services), and
opportunities for advancement.
However, the corollary to this attractiveness is a perceived threat to cultural identity in these states. One of the issues to be examined in this dissertation will be if and how labor force nationalization policies are translated into cultural policies. Globalization is understood in a variety of ways, as examined earlier. There is not a singular understanding of globalization and nor is there one way that the Muslim and Arab worlds have reacted to globalization. However, what the Arab Gulf States recognize is that the development of their economies has been accompanied with a huge influx of foreign labor. As noted in the NYU example, John Sexton dealt with much criticism over his decision to establish a campus in Abu Dhabi because of the Emirates’ record of mistreating and abusing the rights of their workers, primarily their labor force from South and Southeast Asia. These nationalization policies were meant, albeit seemingly unsuccessfully, to promote nationals to the forefront of the development project in each of these countries. However, maintaining a labor force is not going to ensure the cultural nationalism or unity that these countries desire.

This review of the literature examined central themes that this study will seek to address. It began with a review of the literature on globalization as it was offered by scholars in the West, and then linked those thoughts to reactions from the East. This interplay in the scholarly literature is important, as it is this interplay that is enacted in the arena of higher education. The review then examined how globalization and higher education are connected, and examined that in the context of international branch campuses.

International branch campuses have been widely experimented in the Arabian Gulf, where an overwhelming majority of the population are non-citizens of
the respective countries. If globalization is such a central force in the development of these countries, the governments of these countries have reacted by attempting to enforce labor force nationalization policies, which have not always been successful.

This chapter has examined the complex question of globalization from social, historical, political, and educational perspectives. I conclude this chapter by offering that globalization, as I understand it in relation to Qatar and the transformation of higher education there, is Westernization; it is merely a reflection of the West, whether that involves directly importing Western institutions, systems, curricula and structures, or whether that means mimicking those institutions, systems, curricula and structures and making cosmetic changes/additions as if to appear authentic.
Chapter 3
Conceptual Framework and Methodology

Conceptual Framework

This study takes as its launching point a social constructivist paradigm that views knowledge as socially constructed. This paradigm also demands a set of methodological tools that are naturalistic. This study is anchored by a case study research strategy, thus linking the theoretical perspectives on higher education and globalization with the case in point (i.e. higher education in Qatar).

In order to conceptualize the study of the higher education system in Qatar, I will be combining the perspectives posited by Taji (2004), Altbach (2007), and Marginson and Rhoades (2002). Each offers a unique look on understanding higher education reform, and by taking elements from each of these perspectives, I will develop a unique conceptual framework that will help me understand the higher education landscape in Qatar.

Taji (2004) believes that education reform in Jordan is undergirded by neocolonialism. She is critical of the passive way in which Jordan adopts policies put forth by the World Bank. She warns of the ways in which local knowledge is being transplanted by “diagnosis and solutions advanced by international donors promoting globalization, which support reforms promoting capitalist consumerism under the neo-liberal paradigm of globalization” (Taji, 2004, p. 40). This claim is made on the basis that donor agencies suggest reforms that feed into a capitalist economy – providing experts, materials and machines, and orienting locals to
stimulate the national cash economy. Her conceptual framework included two important elements that I will incorporate into my own conceptual framework: first, she notes how global discourses on education become embedded into the national consciousness and adopted without question in national policy. She cites a particular example of this, and that is the conventional thinking that sees higher education as a mechanism for steering the economy. By controlling and manipulating higher education, policy makers believe that they can engineer the economy into growth and thus accommodate the needs of the global market (Taji, 2004).

The second aspect of her conceptual framework that I will be adopting is her social constructivist position that assesses the impact of globalization on higher education in terms of good and ill (Taji, 2004). In Jordan, she suggests that the country “needs to work towards the creation of new texts, that decentre the centre, by allowing the globalized party and those concerned in both the North and the South to comment upon the underlying ideology of globalization that the dominant texts of the World Bank fosters” (Taji, 2004, p. 47). This perspective, although it merely flips the binary of power and does nothing to create new paradigms, is important in that it opens the door for creating viable national systems of higher education that are authentic to the local context.

Her perspective is strongly connected to Altbach’s (2002a, 2007) on the centers and peripheries in the global higher education landscape. He notes that the centers in this landscape are located in the rich North and that “all of the universities in the world today, with the exception of the Al-Azhar in Cairo, stem
from the same historical roots – the medieval European university” (2007, p. 122). Schofer and Meyer (2005) reiterate this view by pointing to the isomorphism of the university worldwide. Altbach (2007) makes the historical note that foreign universities adapted the European model to suit domestic realities in creative ways. One of the questions this dissertation will seek to answer is whether Qatar has done this effectively, or if the model has simply been adapted without concern for the local context, as Taji (2004) suggests has been done in Jordan.

Altbach (2007) gives tangible examples of what he calls the “new neocolonialism” in higher education: the dominance of English (and the subsequent privilege it continues to direct toward the North), the heavy flow of academic talent from the South to the North, and the dominance of the American-style curriculum (he gives the example of the M.B.A, the American style degree in business administration, and the rise of the U.S.-style general education/core curriculum program across the globe). He warns that U.S. academic globalization should not become the new neocolonialism of the new century.

Marginson and Rhoades (2002) challenge Taji (2004) and Altbach (2007) by introducing a new heuristic through which to understand the multiple effects of globalization. They are not convinced by the underlying tone in much of the literature that examines globalization as simple binaries. Marginson and Rhoades (2002) state that “national and local entities and collective efforts can undermine, challenge and define alternatives to global patterns; they can also shape the configuration of global flows” (p. 289). In order to illustrate their point, they present their ‘glonacal’ (global-national-local) model, which is a hexagonal figure
that places global, national, and local entities and includes the agency of global, national, and local players. For the purposes of my framework, I am not concerned with the actual heuristic, I am interested in the four dimensions of their heuristic: reciprocity, strength, layers and conditions, and spheres of agency (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002).

“Reciprocity refers to the idea that activity and influence generally flow in more than one direction ... Strength refers to the magnitude and direction of the activity and influence, as well as the resources available to agencies and agents ... Layers and conditions refer to the historically embedded structures on which current activity and influence are based, and the current circumstances that make it possible for lines of force and effect to move from one level to another, global, national, and local ... [and] spheres refers to the geographical and functional scope of activity and influence” (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002, pp. 291, 292, 293)

This model directly challenges Taji’s (2004) perspective, and while incorporating elements of her study, I will further complicate the understanding of higher education in Qatar by including this perspective as to understand the complicated nature of the development of Qatar’s higher education landscape.

By combining these three perspectives, the conceptual framework for this study will directly answer the questions that are being posed for this study. This conceptual framework will seek to challenge globalization-dominant texts that are imposed upon countries in the South, while also allowing the space to create new
models that work to understand the intricate relationships that are built between centers and peripheries in higher education.

**Methodology**

The methodology that this dissertation will utilize will be qualitative, which allows the researcher to ask questions that are rich in their complexity and context (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Singleton & Straits, 2010). Stake (1995) adds that qualitative research seeks to interpret the “complex interrelationships among all that exists” (p. 37). Qualitative research allows the researcher to collect data rich in description that is not easily handled by statistical procedures (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). This is especially critical, as I will investigate the complex interrelationships that prompted the reform of QU and the establishment of EC. These rich description will allow me to uncover the nexus between globalization and nationalization, and to understand how local cultural practices exist in Western and Western-style institutions, i.e. Education City and Qatar University, respectively).

The reform project of universities in Qatar has been guided through the work of governmental and quasi-governmental organizations (Qatar Foundation). Hilgendorf (2007) maintains that in order to analyze reforms, an in-depth understanding of the context needs to be undertaken. Without an understanding of the context, the reforms might be misunderstood without any attention to the cultural norms that undergird Qatari society.

This dissertation intends to uncover realities on the ground. Employing a social constructivist approach, there is an understanding that “reality is not [a] fixed,
single, agreed upon, or measurable phenomenon ... instead, there are multiple constructions and interpretations of reality that are in flux and that change over time” (Merriam & Associates, 2002, pp. 3-4). To return to the point of cultural values, the complex interplay of social relations contributes to a wider understanding of how higher education is developing in Qatar. Donn and Manthri (2010) would assert that the Arab Gulf States are at a distinct disadvantage because they lack a native or local higher education culture. The institutions (whether national universities or branch campuses) are Western. However, through an examination of the non-institutional spaces in which culture resides (i.e. student interactions, culture of the institution, etc), I intend to show if, and subsequently, how, Qatar has maintained a sense of cultural norms in the midst of structures that are imported.

In order to answer the questions that are being posed in this dissertation, the case study method will be used. The case study method allows me to engage in an analysis of a wide variety of sources in order to examine a particular case, in the dissertation, specifically Qatar University and Education City.

**Case Study Analysis**

Yin (2009) outlines a two-fold definitional perspective on case studies that will serve as the methodological framework that will guide this dissertation. First, he states that a case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 18).
Merriam (2009) elaborates by suggesting that a case study occurs within a bounded system, in this case, Qatar. This reasoning is a strong rationale for using case study methodology to guide this dissertation. It is especially the latter portion of Yin’s (2009) definition that becomes pertinent. Part of this dissertation will examine how globalization and nationalization policies manifest themselves at Qatar University, which has imported a lot of Western institutional components. One of these components, for example, is the Core Curriculum Program, a uniquely American feature of higher education, and the very notion of a liberal arts education has its roots in U.S. education (Ehrlich, 1997; Potts, 2001; Yale College, 1828). However, the Core Curriculum at Qatar University promotes a distinctly Arab and Islamic curriculum that promotes and preserves tradition. The Core Curriculum is only one example that will be elaborated upon in the examination of Qatar University.

Furthermore, the case of Education City is certainly interesting. It challenges Qatari values and norms by promoting co-educational learning, teaching Western curricula, and by using faculty all of whom are Western-educated. Together, QU and EC will serve as the case studies in which globalization and nationalization policies play out. Yin (2009) would argue that the boundary between the phenomenon and the context is not evident.

Second, Yin (2009) argues that the case study

• “copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will
be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one
result
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result

• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (p. 18)

This dissertation will take QU and EC as case studies of a particular form of higher education transformation in the region. The situation in Qatar is technically distinctive, from cultural, national, religious, and social perspectives. There are so many variables of interest that help to explain the situation in Qatar. Taking higher education as an exclusive entity that is not connected to all these social, cultural, religious, and national variables is to engage in a faulty analysis of the development of higher education in Qatar.

Subsequently, there are multiple sources of evidence that need to be analyzed, and these will be elaborated upon further later. However, suffice to say that these multiple sources taken together answer the questions posed in this dissertation in a very complete manner. Using a variety of sources and methods reduces the risk of systematic bias and allows to gain a broader and more understanding of the issues being investigated (Maxwell, 2005).

In addition to the variety of sources and methods are the theoretical propositions that have been developed prior to guide the data collection and analysis. This will be elaborated upon further but at this point, it is important to discuss the positionality of the researcher.
**Researcher Positionality**

Qualitative research seeks to make meaning and depict connections between variables that exist in the world. This meaning-making cannot occur and is not exclusive of the position of the researcher. Merriam (2009) states “the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis” (p. 15). The researcher brings with him/her an understanding of the world and the phenomena that exist therein that must be clarified. Merriam (2009) puts forth that the researcher approaches the data from either an *emic* perspective (that of the insider to the culture) or an *etic* perspective (that of the researcher or the outsider). For this dissertation, my position as the researcher is both insider and outsider. I am an insider because I am an Arab and have spent half of my life living in the Arabian Gulf region. I am intimately connected to and aware of the cultural and religious norms that govern daily life in the Arabian Gulf. However, I also approach the data from an outsider perspective. I have spent half of my life outside the Arab world and was educated in the United States, thus allowing me to gaze (to use a psycho-analytic term that was elaborated upon by Foucault) at the Arabian Gulf as an outsider. This unique dual-perspective allows me to observe phenomena, understand and present them, and then analyze them as they relate to the development of higher education in Qatar and how cultural practices manifest themselves to preserve tradition and values.

This research will not be based wholly on observations. The case study method necessitates the use of multiple sources, and it is to that that I will now turn my attention.
**Data sources**

Yin (2009) outlines six sources of evidence that are available to the qualitative researcher engaging in a case study: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation, and physical artifacts. This is certainly not an exhaustive list, as he notes, however, the list serves as the most commonly used sources of evidence when engaging in case study research.

The primary source of evidence used in this dissertation is interviews. In order to gain a broad perspective on reform of higher education, the elite interviewing method will be employed. This method involves interviewing “elites in a particular institution [who] are ... subjected to the same interview protocol composed of structured or semi-structured questions” (Berry, 2002). The reasons for employing this kind of method serves to either prove or disprove the hypotheses the researcher have put forth. Bimber (unknown) suggests to the researcher to “map out the landscape of people and institutions, and identify multiple perspectives that will allow you to verify what people say and to triangulate on the best or most accurate and reliable view” (p. 1).

The participants interviewed for this dissertation are key officials who have shaped institutions of higher education in Qatar. Elite interviewing relies on intentional interviewing with select participants who are elites in an institution. Richards (1996) defines elites as those who hold or have held a privileged position in society and thus have had a greater influence on outcomes than the general public. In elite interviews, the researcher is concerned with the perceptions and ideological perspectives of the interviewee, without the goal of establishing the
“truth” in an objective, positivist sense (Richards, 1996). Instead, Richards (1996) suggests that one of the major advantages of elite interviewing is to help interpret documents, events, and observations. This is the reason the researcher has decided to employ this method.

I interviewed leaders in the following institutions: Qatar University, Qatar Foundation, and select universities in Education City. (The specific leaders to be interviewed will be elaborated upon in the next section). I chose these elites because they represent key policymakers in the reform of higher education in Qatar, and can thus supplement my understanding and interpretation of policies that have guided this reform.

In order to supplement the interviews, the second, and equally important, source of information for this dissertation comes from extant texts. Extant texts consist of “various documents that the researcher has no hand in shaping” that can be used with other forms of data for comparison purposes to complement interview and ethnographic methods of data collection (Charmaz, 2006, p. 35). Sources of extant texts may include government reports, mass media, public records, and organizational documents (Charmaz, 2006). The main extant texts for this research came from the Supreme Education Council, Qatar University, and the Qatar Foundation. These include governmental decrees, university publications, annual reports, correspondence, newspaper stories, and historical records. Because the reform of higher education in Qatar involves multiple governmental and quasi-governmental bodies, the use of a multiple sources for document analysis is a central feature of this study.
The final source of evidence for this dissertation is personal observations that I undertook in Qatar in order to ascertain how Arab and Islamic cultural practices manifest themselves in Qatar’s institutions of higher education. These observations took place during a two-month internship that I completed in 2009, and during visits to Qatar in 2010 and 2011. In 2009, I had the opportunity to serve as an intern at Qatar University and authored an article on higher education in the Middle East. In 2010 and 2011, I directed a study abroad program based in Muscat, Oman. As part of this job, I was able to travel with my students to Qatar where I engaged them in observations of cultural and political differences in the Arabian Gulf. In November 2011, I returned to Qatar for an intense period of observation.

Maxwell (2005), Merriam (2009; 2002), and Stake (1995) have all elaborated upon the nature of observations. Maxwell (2005) notes that the immediate result of observation is description and Stake (1995) suggests that an “incontestable description” of these events is necessary to engage in sound analysis (p. 62).

Merriam (2009) provides the rationale for observation and that is to achieve the researcher’s purpose. In this case, these observations are key to answering the final research question: how are local cultural values and norms maintained in institutions that are either explicitly Western (as in the case of EC) or guided by Western practices (as in the case of QU)? Merriam (2009) notes that a variety of elements need to be observed by the researcher: the physical setting, the participants, activities and interactions, conversations, subtle factors (for example, symbolic meanings of words and nonverbal communication such as dress and physical space), and the researcher’s own behavior. My observation notes from
2009, 2010, and 2011 include notes of the architecture of the campuses of QU and EC (namely how spaces serve to preserve culture), interactions of students on campus, interactions between students and faculty, and how university committees function and operate in ways that promote cultural values.

**Access to data and issues of confidentiality.**

As mentioned previously, I completed an internship in the Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs at Qatar University in 2009. At this internship, I was given access to a number of university documents that relate to the university’s reform project. Furthermore, I established relationships with leaders across the university all of whom noted that they would provide me assistance with my research. Using the resources, I was able to make substantial contacts at Qatar University at the most senior levels of the administration in order to garner substantive data for this dissertation.

At Education City (EC), I was able to establish contacts across a number of institutions in Education City that I was able to utilize in order to conduct my interviews there. I interviewed a total of 8 administrators at Education City institutions, all at the senior levels of administration.

As I was completing the Institutional Review Board form to contact administrators at EC institutions, it was made very clear to me that confidentiality was of extreme importance. There is a perception (real or imagined) that any staff member that could be identified through the information they provided in their interviews would result in negative repercussions for that administrator. My goal is
not to dispute this, but instead to respect my interviewees and their generous time by assuring them of confidentiality in this dissertation. In order to be uniform, I will not be referring to any administrators in this dissertation by name. Instead, Qatar University administrators will be referred to as QU-1, QU-2, etc. and Education City administrators as EC-1, EC-2, etc. Furthermore, any identifying information related to job position or to institution has been removed.

The interviewees in this dissertation are all senior, cabinet-level administrators at their respective institutions. They work in academic affairs or student affairs, as those two areas are the ones in which I found the most relevant to discuss how globalization and nationalization most directly manifest themselves. A note needs to be made at this point about the interviews conducted at Qatar University. While the officials with whom I met were most helpful, there was relatively little critique or space opened for critique when questioned on how reform of the university coincides with Westernization. These interviews revealed what Taji (2004) noted, i.e. a tacit acceptance of global educational norms (in this case, read American) as “the best”. In one interview, as I continued to probe this question, my interviewee responded that I was determined to prove that Americanization was in play at the institution, although as noted above, my goal was the exact opposite.

Some of my interviews at Qatar University did not yield much substantive information. During the interview process, I attempted to be cognizant of the cultural factors involved in asking such probing questions, especially ones that might have been interpreted as making negative implications about the University.
Where I was faced with resistance, I backed off of the probing questions, and moved onto my next set of questions. Where information in my interviews is thin, I have completed the information with the extant texts I have collected. Thus, I have been able to provide a complete analysis of the university that answers the research questions posed.

**Data analysis and triangulation**

There are multiple methods of analyzing data in qualitative research (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Maxwell, 2005; Merriam, 2009; Merriam & Associates, 2002; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) elaborates the technique of explanation building, an iterative process by which the researcher continues to build a case upon the evidence that is secured. He notes that this method is particularly useful for explanatory case studies, which this dissertation is.

For the purposes of this dissertation, I compiled all the documents available to me (transcribed interviews, extant texts, and cultural observations), and analyzed them to find themes that emerged across these multiple sources. I used the interviews with institutional leaders to ascertain information that is not publicly available or to elaborate further on information that I found in the extant texts. And finally, through observations of higher education environments in Qatar, I was able to compile a rich narrative description of how globalization and nationalization interact.

Bogdan and Biklen (2007) reject the use of the term *triangulation* since they put forth that the very word evokes more confusion than elaboration. While Yin
(2009) uses the word, his rationale for using multiple sources of evidence is identical to Bogdan and Biklen's (2007). In a case study, the use of multiple sources of evidence is used to give the researcher a fuller understanding of the phenomena under investigation. These sources have been elaborated upon above, and this is how I ensured an accurate analysis that takes into account all the factors that are at play in Qatar’s higher education reform.

**Validity and threats to validity**

Internal validity is the idea that the cause precedes the effect, that they are related and that there is no other plausible explanation for the effect in question. Internal validity seeks to answer the question “How is this variable connected and related to that variable?” (Patton, 1990). I sought to answer that question by utilizing a variety of sources that either prove or disprove a connection between globalization and nationalization policies in Qatar. Furthermore, the elite interviews conducted served to further elaborate upon the relation between globalization and nationalization.

The threat to their internal validity is conveniently categorized as “single group threats”. Trochim and Donnelly (2007) note that threats to internal validity can appear as, among others, history threats (some other historical event than the one noted caused the effect) or instrumentation threats (the instrument is faulty and/or has changed). In the case of this study, the reforms in higher education in Qatar are recent and there is a dearth of analysis and even description on phenomena that are ever-evolving.
External validity is the degree to which the findings of a study can be
generalized to the larger population. There is usually a trade-off between internal
validity and external validity, i.e. where researchers have been able to show a strong
causal relationship, there tends to be a weaker case of generalizability. This is the
case with this study. Although the reform of higher education in Qatar is unique to
that country, the nature of branch campuses and their interactions with national
universities is certainly a phenomenon that is occurring in other places, eg. in Dubai,
Abu Dhabi, Singapore, and Malaysia. And in this regard, the findings of this study
can be generalized to those situations. Furthermore, Qatar’s place in the Middle
East means that it shares much in terms of culture, history and politics with its
neighbors across the region. Because of these similarities, the results of this study
are also generalizable to the Arab world.

At this point, I will turn my attention to a brief historical understanding of
Qatar, and supplement that with a grounded understanding of modern Qatar, as
without this information, the analysis of higher education in the country would be
done in a vacuum.
This chapter will seek to situate Qatar in both an historical context as well as a nation-state in the modern system of nation-states. Historically, the analysis will begin in the modern period (the 1800s) and continue until 1995 with the rise of Sheikh Hamad to the helm of power in Qatar. It must be noted here that there is a dearth of historical information on Qatar, as few scholars have focused on the history of this thumb-shaped peninsula (Fromherz, 2012). Fromherz (2012) is dismayed by the lack of scholarship on Qatar given the country’s “rising regional and global prominence” (p. 14), and specifically “the lack of recent, critical histories on Qatar by Qataris ... due to sensitivity about history as a critical enquiry and a challenge to a prosperous status quo” (p. 17). The modern analysis will examine Qatar as a “late rentier” state, a theory propagated by Gray (2011). Using a framework that identifies seven characteristics of a “late rentier” state, a deeply grounded understanding of Qatar as a player on the world stage will be offered.

In the summer of 2009, I arrived in Qatar to embark on an internship at Qatar University and was nervous. Although I was born and raised in the Arabian Gulf, I had not been back for any significant period of time in nineteen years. Around a year and a half later, I would return to Qatar, this time with students to give them a comparative perspective on political, cultural, and economic
development in the Gulf. The changes in that time are astounding and serve as an apt start to understanding the modern state of Qatar.

Flying on Qatar Airways is a pleasure. Qatar Airways is a 5-star airline with wide, comfortable seats and stellar service from an international staff of airline stewards. The direct flight from Washington to Doha takes around thirteen hours, yet the quality of service and the delicious food psychologically shortens the time of the flight.

Arriving at Doha International Airport, on the other hand, offered a drastically different experience. In 2009, the airport was small and cramped, and it took a very long time to get through passport control. The lack of system and organization at the airport made the over hour-long wait to get my passport stamped even more tedious. The large number of South Asian laborers at the airport were treated with disrespect and disregard as they waited to get their labor visas stamped. When I arrived in 2010, the airport arrival terminal had been expanded, the service drastically improved, and the wait time reduced to a mere ten minutes.

This single example can perhaps illustrate some of the tensions that the modern state of Qatar faces. On the one hand, Qatar has so drastically advanced that it has become a major player on the world stage – from its national airline to hosting major international sporting and cultural events such as the Tribeca Film Festival in 2010 and the Asian Games (Asiad) in 2006. In recent years, the Emir of Qatar garnered much attention for his role in and providing of aid to the Lebanese,
Palestinians, victims of Hurricane Katrina, and even notoriety for his support of the Syrian Free Army (the opposition to current President Bashar al-Assad).

On the other hand, however, Qatar is struggling with a number of issues that have marred its progress. Abuses of human rights in Qatar have been well documented and the limits on freedom have been noted in various reports (Amnesty International, 2009; Amnesty International, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2010; Unknown, 2010a, 2010b; Various, 2009). Qatari youth have noted that modernization and globalization have challenged the existence of national and cultural traditions (Anderson & Rajakumar, 2010). Some of those same writers have suggested that the very essence of the Arabic language was being threatened and that in some years, the language of the Qur’an would not be spoken anymore in Qatar (Anderson & Rajakumar, 2010). The socio-cultural implications of modernization and globalization led the Qatari government to implement the policy of Qatarization which aims to promote Qatari employment in the workforce, albeit with limited success (Qatarization, 2010).

To understand Qatar is to understand the complex forces that have shaped the country since its formation as well as its impressive trajectory of development in the past fifteen years. This chapter will offer a brief historical outline of Qatar in the modern period, and look at the steps Qatar has taken to building a knowledge society.
**History of Qatar**

The small nation-state of Qatar is located on the eastern shore of the Arabian Peninsula. Bordered by Saudi Arabia on the south and the Arabian Gulf on every other border, the State of Qatar is a peninsula whose history has reflected its strategic location in the Arabian Gulf.

The history of the Arabian Peninsula “has had an overwhelming influence on contemporary affairs” on each of the nation-states in the Gulf (Zahlan, 1998). The Arabian Peninsula is marked by tribal loyalties and affiliations that have shaped the boundaries and ruling structures of the states in the region. However, the past also includes a number of foreign powers that have made a marked presence in the region. Beginning in 1498, the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch, French, and British made concerted efforts to control this crucial trade route. Portugal’s presence was solidified in 1914 when they controlled Muscat and Hormuz, the two cities that are strategically positioned at the entry of the Arabian Gulf.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottomans and the Persians unsuccessfullly attempted to control important portions of modern-day eastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The seventeenth century is also marked by three European powers rivaling for power in the region, but that power would be wrested from the Europeans by the Arabs and Persians.

The eighteenth century witnessed the British penetration into India and the subsequent political drive to control and protect trade routes to India. Tribal loyalties were affecting relations in the region, and splits among tribes were slowly beginning to define tribal boundaries and which tribes would control which
territories (Zahlan, 1998). The British defeat of the Qasimi tribe (one of the largest in the region, and the current-day rulers of the emirate of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates) would give Britain a firm control of the region until 1971. By signing treaties with the Trucial States (modern-day United Arab Emirates) in the 19th century, and with Qatar in 1868, Britain effectively sealed all the Gulf States off from the rest of the world (Zahlan, 1998). However, these treaties did not make the Gulf States British colonies, but instead made them territories that were only effectively and by distance ruled by Britain.

The late 19th century saw Qatar embroiled in a number of issues. The first issue was that related to the British and Bahrain. As Britain was attempting to secure safe passageway for East India Company ships through the Gulf, it signed a treaty with the ruling tribes of the coastal areas, including the Al Khalifa of Bahrain, the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, the Al Said of Oman, the Iranians, and the Ottomans (Metz, 1994). The Al Thani of Qatar was not included in this treaty as it was assumed that they fell under the control of the Al Khalifas. The British saw Qatar as a dependency of Bahrain.

However, in response to continued piracy and the taking of slaves, Britain bombarded Doha and forced the residents to flee in 1821, and did so again in 1867. However, in 1867, the Qataris retaliated and engaged the British in a battle (Metz, 1994). This led the British to impose a peace treaty in 1868 that achieved two goals: first, it ended the battle between the British and the leaders of the Trucial States (as the coastal areas of the Gulf were known); second it recognized Qatar as an
independent territory, free from the rule of the Bahraini Al Khalifa, and under the rule of the Al Thani tribe (Metz, 1994).

Second among the issues facing Qatar was the Ottoman presence in the country. There was a deep-seated resistance to the Ottomans in the eastern Arabian peninsula, but in 1872, then ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Thani (who gained independence for Qatar by signing the 1868 peace treaty with the British) was undermined when his son, Jassim bin Mohammed, acquiesced to Ottoman presence in Qatar. This was a political move to challenge the Bahraini claim on Zubara, the original capital of Qatar, located on the northwestern tip of the Qatari peninsula (Metz, 1994; Zahlan, 1998). However, privately, Jassim complained of the Ottoman presence, and this ambivalence deteriorated the relationship between Qatar and the Ottomans. In 1893, frustrated with Jassim’s attitude, the Ottomans sent a force to Qatar to arrest him, but were quashed by Jassim’s forces. Now, only Britain was left with control of the region.

However, this de facto British control was multi-faceted. On the one hand, they had a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf States as long as British interests were not affected. They did not introduce any socio-economic reform, i.e. they did not build any schools or hospitals and nor did they provide any public services. This led to an isolation of the region. On the other hand, the British maintained very tight control on the foreign relations of the region. The British authorities based in India took strong measures to ensure their primacy in the region. Companies sought oil concessions in the region, and when an American company, the Standard Oil Company of California (SoCal), attempted to obtain a
concession in Bahrain, Britain prevented this from happening. Only after establishing a Canadian subsidiary of SoCal, the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), did Britain offer the company a concession to drill for oil in Bahrain (Zahlan, 1998).

These oil concessions seemed to solidify the political divisions and territorial boundaries that had been created by the British. These political fissures were accompanied by a dependence on the British that further would solidify their role in the region. In 1935, Sheikh Abdallah of Qatar asked the British to protect his political position, and sealed that agreement with an oil concession (Zahlan, 1998).

The British policy of non-interference gave rulers autonomy in governing internal affairs. Based on tribal rules, small informal councils (known in Arabic as majaalis, singular majlis) were established. These councils comprised members of the ruling family plus social and religious leaders, and the interaction of the councils were governed by the Islamic principle of shura (consultation) (Zahlan, 1998).

However, the incoming revenues from the discovery of oil and natural gas in the region drastically transformed the nature of the state in the Arabian Gulf. The nations became welfare states, whose demands necessitated a large, bureaucratic government in order to maintain and sustain its new functions. These new governments were built on Western models and included departments, council of ministers, secretaries and undersecretaries, and salary scales (Zahlan, 1998). Since the mid-1800's, the ruling family in Qatar has been the Al Thani family.
The Wahhabi connection

The eighteenth century saw an important political development in the region. In neighboring modern-day Saudi Arabia, a new Islamic movement, Wahhabism had been born. Based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, this movement advocated a purist Islam that looked to the first generation of Muslims as the most perfect example of the faith (Hourani, 1983). They believed that the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire did not represent true Islam and that a state needed to be established in which Islam could be practiced in every facet of life. This claim that the Sultan did not represent the umma (the Muslim community) was a bold challenge to the authority of the Ottoman Empire. It represented one of the many separatist movements that would threaten the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and eventually lead to its demise after World War I.

Abdul Wahhab joined forces with a small dynasty in central Arabia, the ibn Saud dynasty, in order to establish a state in which Islam would be applied according to their interpretation (Haddad, 1982). “In this State the Shari’a [Islamic law] was to be fulfilled in every detail, and no other laws and customs were valid. Authority lay in the hands of the imam, temporal leader and leader in prayer, but he exercised it with the advice of ‘ulama’ [scholars] and community’ (Hourani, 1983). By virtue of this movement’s location in central Arabia, there was an intricate connection with Arab culture. Therefore, the Wahhabi movement threatened the Ottoman Empire on both religious and socio-political fronts. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Wahhabi movement would control the Arabian Peninsula; in 1893, Qasim bin Muhammad (of Qatar) defeated the Ottomans and in 1902, affirmed
their relationship with the Wahhabis by signing a treaty with the ibn Saud's to ensure protection against any Ottoman encroachment.

Thus, Qatar solidified its independence as a sovereign territory, separate from Bahrain in 1868, and closely aligned with the Wahhabi movement in 1902 (this Wahhabi connection remains a significant factor that has shaped modern Qatar’s social norms and outlooks). For most of the twentieth century, Bahrain, Qatar, and what are now the emirates of the United Arab Emirates, were embroiled in tensions as to securing a federation of nine sheikhdoms (Metz, 1994). Furthermore, claims to Bahrain by both Saudi Arabia and Iran hampered the
promotion of a federation in the Gulf. After an appeal to the UN, Bahrain declared its independence, leaving Qatar to do the same three weeks later (Metz, 1994). In 1971, the state of Qatar became an independent and sovereign nation-state. The United Arab Emirates (minus the emirate of Ras Al-Khaymah) formed a union later that year, and in early 1972, Ras Al-Khaymah would join the union.

The Iranian threat on the eastern Gulf was ever present, as was the perception of its desire to promote Shia influence and interest in the region. With large Shia populations in both Kuwait and Bahrain, the Arab states in the Gulf remained vigilant about any possible encroachment on the part of the Iranian state. The 1979 revolution in Iran and the following year’s outbreak of war with Iraq made the Iranian threat more concrete (Metz, 1994). Partly in response to these threats, the six Arab states of the Gulf formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a military, trade, and security partnership. Although the GCC existed, the Gulf States continued to look to Europe and the U.S. for military security, especially throughout the Iran-Iraq war, which came to an end in 1988.

The dependence on the United States and Europe, especially in military affairs, became abundantly clear when Iraq invaded in Kuwait in the summer of 1990. Since 1991, when Qatar and the United States signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement, Qatar and the U.S. have expanded their agreements, especially in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (Blanchard, 2011). Qatar is home to the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East (located at Al Udeid airbase south of Doha), as well as to other facilities that serve as logistics, command, and basing
hubs for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations (Blanchard, 2011).

It is clear that the Qatari leadership is wiling to engage in behavior that is perceived to be risky by some. By allying so closely with the United States, it might be presumed that the threat of terrorism against the state would increase. However, that threat, although present, seems to be muted (Blanchard, 2011).

*The Coup*

The current ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa At Thani came to power in a bloodless coup in 1995. Born in 1952 to Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani and his second wife, he was graduated from the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in 1971, and was named Heir Apparent in 1977 (Fromherz, 2012). He was the head of the Supreme Planning Council in the 1980s, and commanded the Hamad Mobile Battalion in Qatar, giving him intimate contacts with the armed forces, which would prove useful in 1995 (Fromherz, 2012). In the 1990-1991 Gulf War, he led the forced that liberated the Saudi town of Khafji, helping him gain prestige within Qatar and in the international community (Fromherz, 2012).

In 1989 and 1992, Hamad instituted a Cabinet reshuffle that would place his allies in power and would undermine the authority of both Khalifa (his father) and Abdulaziz (Khalifa's eldest son from his first wife) and their allies (Fromherz, 2012). Khalifa’s waning power led him to lose the energy of his youth, and allegedly descend into alcoholism. The account by Fromherz (2012) of the coup is as follows:

“*It was only when he [Khalifa] attempted on several occasions to bring back Abdulaziz from exile that Hamad decided to act. Having carefully assembled*
the necessary support both within Al-Thani and from other prominent Qatari, Hamad took advantage of his military training. Khalifa had left the country for Geneva where he was allegedly undergoing medical treatment. Shortly after he left, Hamad ordered tanks and military personnel to surround the Emiri Diwan [palace]. In a manner of days Al-Thani and the chiefs of prominent Qatari tribes gave Hamad their bayā, or oath of allegiance ... Even as neighbouring Gulf governments met the news of the coup with trepidation and even supported attempts by Khalifa to mount counter-coups, however, recognition by the USA and other, major foreign powers came quickly ... Few sheikhs or family members wanted to be found on the wrong side of the power game. Those who continued to support Sheikh Khalifa were faced with dire sentences, including a 2001 appellate court death sentence for members of Al-Thani conspiring for the overthrow of Sheikh Hamad” (Fromherz, 2012, p. 85).

Thus, in 1995, Sheikh Hamad solidified his position as ruler of Qatar. A failed counter-coup in February 1996, supported by Saudi Arabia, fizzled out quickly and the perpetrators were put on trial. Several enemies of the regime remain in exile, and pose no threat to the rule of Sheikh Hamad (Fromherz, 2012). As for Saudi Arabia, at a 2009 BBC Doha Debate, the 69% of Qatari attendees agreed that Qatar was in a ‘cold war’ with Saudi Arabia (in Fromherz, 2012, p. 92).
Qatar: A Modern State

Fromherz (2012) introduces modern Qatar by making four important points that help one to understand the country:

First, Qatar is ruled by the Al Thani family, which as was seen above, was not always the case. Despite the existence of powerful merchant families of Persian origin, such as the Al Fardan and Al Darwish, Sheikh Hamad Al Thani “has adopted an independent style of rule and has attempted to raise Qatar’s, and Al Thani’s, presence on the international stage” (Fromherz, 2012, p. 25).

Second, Fromherz (2012) notes that, according to the Qatar Statistics Authority, seven out of eight workers in 2007 were non-Qatari. The majority of these are male laborers in their twenties and thirties.

Third, most Qataris are Sunni Wahhabis, although their practice of Wahhabism is not as rigid or strict as Saudi Wahhabism. Despite the existence of a minority Shi’a population in Qatar, the tensions between the two sects have not escalated to the scale that they have in Bahrain or Saudi Arabia (Fromherz, 2012).

Fourth, oil and gas are the dominant exports in the country, and these have made the Qataris the richest people on the planet, as measured by GDP per capita (International Monetary Fund, 2011). With such a large reserve of oil (expected to be depleted by 2020) and natural gas (expected to provide 200 years of production), and a relatively small population, Qatar has secured its future quite comfortably (Fromherz, 2012).
Taking the above into account, I will turn my attention to the theory of “late rentierism.” The theory, as put forth by Gray (2011), is a useful one in understanding the multiple contradictions that form modern Qatar.

The seven characteristics of the “late rentier” Arab State of the Gulf, according to Gray’s (2011) are that these states:

a) Are responsive but undemocratic states
b) Open up to globalization but with some protectionism remaining
c) Maintain an active economic and developmental policy
d) Have transformed from ‘energy-centric’ to ‘energy-driven’ economies
e) Have established ‘entrepreneurial state capitalist’ structures
f) Develop policies that are long-term
g) Engage in active and innovative foreign policies

**Responsive but undemocratic state**

The Arab States of the Gulf are dynastic monarchies, and the ascendancy of the tribe is paramount in the social and political structure of these states. Qatar’s Al Thani family is no different, and as seen by the example of the 1995 coup, has continued a tradition of being undemocratic. Limited attempts at giving the people a voice through consultative councils have produced no real results.

Rosman-Stollman (2009) claims that Qatar’s efforts are merely cosmetic, making little to no effect but having dramatic impact. She claims that popular participation has been given lip service but that the councils that have been established are more consultative and the Emir has the right to veto any of their
recommendations. Furthermore, although the right to vote has been extended, the majority of the population did not participate in the elections and that the number of candidates nominated for seats declined between 1999 and 2003, the first and second elections respectively (Rosman-Stollman, 2009).

She continues and makes the often unstated, yet bold, point that “GCC countries’ leaders understand that making themselves more attractive to the West hold economic benefits ... however, economic reform in the countries has not been accompanied by sweeping political reform” (Rosman-Stollman, 2009, p. 189). This is an accurate point, with the possible exception of Kuwait that has a history of parliamentary democracy. In Qatar, ultimate power rests in the hands of Sheikh Hamad.

However, despite the lack of democracy, the state remains responsive to challenges such as unemployment, the rise of Islamist threats, and “globalization’s technology undermining traditional authority and legitimacy” (Gray, 2011, p. 23). With the lowest unemployment rate in the world at 0.5%, Qatar’s economy is strong and keeps its population placated (Weingarten, 2011). Control of the internet and blocking websites are examples of how the state controls technology that might serve to undermine the state’s authority and legitimacy.

Gray also notes that actors that might support or promote political liberalization are co-opted and controlled. The example that serves this point is that Qatar hosted the Egyptian Islamic scholar, Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Doha until 2011. Known for his extremist political and social views, he was given residency in Doha for forty years, offered a teaching position at Qatar University, and given a platform
to air his views on Al-Jazeera. In return, Qaradawi offered his loyalty to the Qatari regime by publicly advancing their foreign policy position. By placating al-Qaradawi, the government in Doha was able to ensure his loyalty to the regime.

**Globalization with protectionism**

The Arab states of the Gulf are heavily dependent on rents in order to maintain and develop their economies (Gray, 2011). Classic rentier theory states that the only rents are oil and gas. The “Dubai” model became a popular “go-to” model as states in the region began forecasting life after oil. Dubai has a limited amount of oil reserves, and thus opened up its economy to foreign businesses and enterprises in order to ensure the continuity of its economy. Gray (2011) complicates his very theory by stating that although Dubai opened up its economy to new kinds of rents, the basis of its oil economy is the very reason why it was able to engage in this kind of economic activity. Because the emirate of Abu Dhabi and the state of Qatar have much longer-lasting reserves of oil and gas, respectively, the “Dubai model” does not adequately apply. Abu Dhabi and Qatar are trying to establish themselves as knowledge centers – the former by inviting Sorbonne and New York Universities, the Guggenheim, and the Louvre, and the latter by establishing Education City and a inviting and/or establishing a host of non-governmental organizations – serve as examples of how globalization is embarked upon but with some protectionism. The governments of Abu Dhabi and Qatar control all the funding for these organizations, and they have established limited lease agreements with each of these institutions to operate within their borders.
Active economic and development policy

Oman’s National Vision 2020, Qatar National Vision 2030, Abu Dhabi’s Vision 2030, and Saudi Arabia’s Five-Year Plans are the ways that each of these governments has attempted to be forward thinking in developing as late states (Gray, 2011). Qatar’s policy focuses on balancing five different challenges:

- “Modernization and preservation of traditions
- The needs of this generation and the needs of future generations
- Managed growth and uncontrolled expansion
- The size and the quality of the expatriate labor force and the selected path of development
- Economic growth, social development and environmental management” (General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008)

Four of the five points of this vision are focused on economic policy. The need for Qatar to ensure its economic viability in an ever-changing an increasingly competitive world economy is a major driver of Qatari national policy.

Energy-centric vs. energy-driven

In classic rentier state theory, the economy revolves around the primary source of rents. In the Arabian Gulf states in the 1970s and 1980s, the economy was based heavily on the oil and gas fields. The largest and most prestigious companies with which to be employed were the national oil companies. The economy centered on the source of the rents, and there was little thought to developing modern economies that weren’t energy-centric.
The “late rentier” theory addresses the labor issue in the Gulf; expatriate labor comprises a majority of the population of Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The governments of these countries recognize that this is a long-term issue they will have to face, and thus, in order to serve their populations, the reforms they undertake cannot focus solely on the rent economy. While hydrocarbon underwrites reform, the reform is focused on education, training, airlines, ports, etc. (Gray, 2011). Thus, in the Gulf, we see the development of Emirates Airlines (Dubai), Etihad Airways (Abu Dhabi), the various freezones of Dubai, and the development of ports in Oman. In Qatar, the Qatar Foundation, Qatar Airways, and other such initiatives serve as examples of how these economies use the rents from the sale of natural resources to drive a multi-dimensional economy that is not centered on these resources. These countries move from being longer energy-centric, to being energy-driven (Gray, 2011).

“Entrepreneurial state capitalist” structure

The oil and gas companies of the Arabian Gulf states are state-owned but are operated professionally and efficiently (unlike the state firms of the past), because they are run for the political purpose of regime maintenance (Gray, 2011). The hydrocarbon assets are used for political, not just economic goals; thus, these firms are not examples of neoliberalism or a laissez-faire policy. Sheikh Hamad in Qatar wields political power, within and without Qatar, by wielding control of the country’s oil and gas reserves. This is evidenced by the kinds of projects in which he chooses to engage: all projects, including the education reform and development
projects, are state-owned. The Qatar Foundation is labeled a “quasi-governmental” organization, but the reality is that all funding for the organization comes directly from the coffers of the government, paid for by rents from the hydrocarbon industry.

**Long-term thinking**

The points above are inter-related, and long-term strategic thinking involves a managed diversification of the economy, including investing in Sovereign Wealth Funds. These funds ensure a source of income for the residents after rents have depleted. Qatar has established the Qatar Investment Authority to

> “achieve revenue diversification for the state of Qatar over the next 10 to 15 years from its establishment date. As a result of its stated strategy to minimize risk from Qatar’s reliance on energy prices, the fund predominantly invests in international markets (US, Europe and Asia) and within Qatar outside the energy sector” (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2012)

The Board of Directors of this organization comprises members of the Qatari royal family (chaired by the Heir Apparent, Sheikh Tamim) and one non-royal. The QIA is directed to invest funds through the Government.

**Active and innovative foreign policy**

It is in this area that Qatar has probably made itself most noticeable on the world stage. The late Anthony Shadid of the New York Times claimed “Qatar wields an outsize influence in Arab politics” while the UAE-based Gulf Times posed the
question “Is Doha the new Arab political capital?” (Shadid, 2011; Shariff, 2012). From its far-reaching policy of establishing a $100 million Katrina Fund to support the victims of Hurricane Katrina, to helping rebuild Lebanon in the aftermath of Israel’s 2006 attacks, Qatar has wielded much greater power than its size would indicate.

Qatar has pursued a very bold foreign policy in the wake of the Arab revolutions that began in 2011. Shadid (2011) and Shariff (2012) have made the bold claims that Qatar is trying to replace the Arab powerhouses of Egypt and Saudi Arabia as a locus of political power. It strongly supported the rebellions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, while offering support to the Bahraini leadership. The leadership of Qatar attempted to negotiate an agreement for the president of Yemen to step down, a move that was strongly rejected by Saleh, who claimed that this was Qatar’s attempt at undermining Yemeni sovereignty and reducing Saudi influence. This resulted in the withdrawal of the Yemeni Ambassador to Qatar, and, when a GCC-negotiated agreement with the Yemeni opposition was reached, President Saleh rejected any Qatari presence at the signing (Blanchard, 2011).

Qatar’s handling of the Syrian crisis has been laden with opportunism and a desire to impose its personal agenda on the region. The Syrian leadership publicly rebuked the American and French representation in Damascus, and imposed a 25 kilometer travel restriction on all diplomats in Damascus. On the other hand, when demonstrations broke out in front of the Syrian Embassy in Doha, the Syrian Foreign Ministry apologized to their counterparts in Qatar for having to shut down the embassy (Anonymous, 2011).
Qatar’s willingness to provoke the ire of various players on the world stage is evident in how it plays the political game on a regional level. It provides support to the Palestinians, including Hamas. It engages with Iran on military and diplomatic levels, as well as having formal ties with the Syrian leadership, and since 2011, officially with the Syrian anti-government forces. This multi-faceted foreign policy has concerned leaders in the U.S. who have commented that Qatar is an unstable regional partner. It seems that U.S. leadership would like to have an ally who blindly follows U.S. directives in the region; Qatar seems to not be that partner as it pursues a bold agenda of its own. However, its intentions “remain murky” yet “relevant.” (Shadid, 2011).

Qatar’s foreign policy goals have come into question by Tabarini (in Shariff, 2011):

“Some say Qatar has a Napoleonic complex, others say it has an Islamist agenda. Qatar was very active in diplomacy even before the Arab Spring, but I cannot think of a specific interest that the country is pursuing through its expanding role. Qatar has no interests at stake. Its Arab Spring policy seems to be policy for policy’s sake. However, Sunni revival via supporting mainstream Islamist groups in the countries that are witnessing change could make sense from a GCC security perspective to confront Iran ... Qatar is a country without ideology. Its leaders know that the Islamists are the new power in the Arab world. This alliance will lay the foundation for a base of influence across the region.” (Shariff, 2012)
However, this opinion is not universally shared. Steinberg (2012) maintains that Qatar is engaging in a very delicate balancing act of appeasing its Gulf neighbors, maintaining strong ties with both Iran and the United States, and securing its own interests. This complicated balance is obvious in the singular example of what happened with Syria. Al-Jazeera, which Steinberg (2012) claims is merely a “political instrument of the Qatari leadership” (p. 8), paid little attention in the early days of the Syrian uprising. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the well-known Egyptian Islamist cleric who had been given refuge for over 40 years in Qatar, began criticizing the Syrian leadership, despite protests from the latter to Al-Jazeera to make him cease his criticism. This caused a chain reaction. The Syrian state media began to publicly criticize the Qatari government. Then, Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Syrian uprising, which had been casual at best up till that point, became “increasingly detailed and aggressive” (Steinberg, 2012, p. 5). This caused a popular revolt among al-Assad supporters who attacked the Qatari Embassy in the Syrian capital. Qatar became the first Arab Gulf state to close its embassy in Damascus.

One of Qatar’s primary sources of influence is Al-Jazeera, cited as a source of Qatari soft power. Al-Jazeera became the particular topic du jour in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, as the station aired a number of messages from Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden. El-Nawawy (2003) and Miles (2005), among others, wrote books challenging the Western media’s control of information and lauding the contributions of Al-Jazeera to the world information network.

However, the station has had its critics. There are issues with the network that warrant attention. A perceived anti-U.S. and anti-Israel bias, an unspoken
policy of never criticizing the Qatari regime, and being overly critical of other Arab
regimes express the spectrum of critiques of Al-Jazeera. Pro-American
commentators regularly blast Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Iraq and Afghanistan
wars claiming that Al-Jazeera is fomenting an anti-American bias in the Arab world.
Pro-Zionist commentators attack Al-Jazeera’s perceived blatant perspectives on the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and east Jerusalem. Media analysts note
that Al-Jazeera refrains from criticizing its main benefactor, the Qatari government.
And Arab governments have attacked the network (and indeed the Qatari
government) for exposing the flaws of their rule.

To rebuff these claims, Al-Jazeera simply claims that it lives up to its motto,
“al-ra’yy wa al-ra’yy al-‘aakar” (the opinion and the other opinion). Al-Jazeera never
presents just one side of a story – they have been criticized for allowing American
and Israeli government spokespersons to present their views on the network. They
have been “damned if they do, damned if they don’t”. Arab public opinion is critical
of American foreign policy in the region and of the Israeli occupation, and I would
argue that Al-Jazeera is reflecting, and not shaping public opinion toward America
and Israel. The fact that the network has hosted representatives of the U.S. and
Israeli governments to share their views (in both English and Arabic) gives credence
to the fact that they seek to counter claims of bias in their coverage. Where criticism
of Arab governments is concerned, their criticism is not so much a reflection of Al-
Jazeera’s editorial policy as much as it is a reflection of the fragility of their regimes.
With the exception of Lebanon, freedom of the press is limited in the Arab world,
and thus the Arab press treads very lightly, in criticizing their government. As was
mentioned in Chapter 2, the UAE has made criticism of any of the neighboring regimes a criminal offense punishable by law.

The final issue with Al Jazeera concerns its lack of criticism of the Qatari government. In 2011, the network began seeking to become a private entity with independent shareholders in hopes of increasing its editorial independence (Toumi, 2011a). However, critics of the move claim that it already has media independence and thus the move is illogical, especially considering the amount of funding that the Qatari government invested in the network. Furthermore, the station’s proposed motto is “a private organization devoted to public interest,” which means that it will not do anything to harm the national security of Qatar (Toumi, 2011a). How does this change its current operating procedures?

However, the success story of Al-Jazeera is not paralleled in the print media in Qatar, which is heavily regulated, and does not tolerate criticism of the regime. Al-Jazeera’s lack of criticism of the regime has to do with the government being its primary benefactor (Rosman-Stollman, 2009). Print media journalists and bloggers do not enjoy the same liberties as their counterparts on Al-Jazeera.

Zahlan (1998) notes that, since the 1970’s, “the population of the Gulf State has swollen beyond all recognition ... by the influx of expatriates ... The nationals of Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE are now a minority in their own country” (p. 4). The majority of the expatriates that live in the Gulf are South Asian laborers, and there are reports published on a regular basis that indicate abuse of laborers (Amnesty International, 2009, 2010c; Toumi, 2011b).
Various human rights organizations have pointed to the need for Qatar to address human rights violations against women and migrant workers (Amnesty International, 2009; Unknown, 2010b). To address these situations, the Emir of Qatar decreed the establishment of the National Human Rights Committee in 2002 to investigate and remedy violations of individual rights in Qatar. However, the human rights issue remains a contentious one that has yet to be resolved. As the U.S. Department of State notes, there is still a serious issue in the trafficking of human persons in Qatar (Various, 2009). Qatar is classified as a “Tier 2 Watch List” which indicates that the government does not have the minimum standards as implemented by the 2002 Trafficking Victim Protection Act (TVPA). In addition to not reaching those minimum standards, the State Department’s 2009 Report indicates that there is a severe number of persons trafficked and/or this number is increasing, that there is little evidence to show that the government is taking steps to reduce the number of humans trafficked, or that the government has made some commitments to comply with the minimum standards of the TVPA (Various, 2009, p. 49). Qatar’s commitment to addressing social ills is evident in the fact that Doha was the host site for the Doha Forum on the Arab Initiative for Building Capabilities to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings that took place in March 2010 (Unknown, 2010a). Their efforts have not resulted in the fruits that they hoped, as Human Rights Watch just released a report in 2012 condemning the state for its flagrant abuses of construction labor in preparation for Qatar’s 2022 FIFA World Cup games (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
The abuses of labor in the Arabian Gulf region are well documented, and despite claims to the contrary, the leadership of these states is doing little to implement effective policies that create equitable conditions of employment for unskilled labor. However, the development of the modern Gulf is not solely dependent on unskilled labor. While this segment of the population is essential in building the necessary infrastructure, the design and management of the “knowledge economy” is heavily dependent on educated and skilled professionals. The majority of this class of labor in the Gulf is also comprised of expatriates, and there is almost no research done on this population. These expatriates (who hail primarily from the Arab world, India, Europe, North America and Australia) are given lucrative contracts that include housing and travel allowances, medical insurance, airline tickets, and professional development opportunities.

Qatar’s reliance on foreign labor is emphasized by the fact that only 5.8% of the labor force in Qatar is made up of Qatars (Qatar Statistics Authority, 2012). The Qatar Statistics Authority (QSA) presents the workforce statistics by nationality, sex, and economic activity (2012). Qatars are not employed at all as household servants, and maintain a negligible presence (less than 1% of the workforce) in a variety of fields, including agriculture/forestry/fishing, water supply and sewage management, construction, manufacturing, and accommodation and food service activities (Qatar Statistics Authority, 2012). Their biggest presence in the workforce is in the fields public administration/government services/defense where they represent 57% of the total workforce and in education activities where they represent 33% of the total workforce (Qatar Statistics Authority, 2012). Women
represent 33.8% of the total Qatari workforce, and 1.9% of the total workforce in Qatar (Qatar Statistics Authority, 2012). The QSA report does not detail the breakdown of each economic activity category, but a few issues can be elaborated at this point. First, it has been noted that Qataris (and Gulf Arabs generally) prefer to work in the governmental sector as that is seen as providing economic and social security (Janardhan, 2011). Labor nationalization policies, as discussed earlier, also encourage this trend. Second, the fields in which Qataris are absent or negligible are those requiring unskilled labor. There is a social stigma in Qatar against doing this kind of work. Third, Qataris are well represented in the education sector, but this should not be confused with the work and projects that are being done at Education City. According to the statistics provided by the Qatar University and the RAND Corporation, 636 Qataris are employed at Qatar University in teaching and administrative position, and 7,009 Qataris work as teachers or administrators in the public school system (Brewer et al., 2007; Qatar Statistics Authority, 2012). The figures of Qataris employed in the public education system do not reflect the most recent figures, but only the ones available at this point. Furthermore, it is unclear whether administrators at Education City or any of the other colleges/universities operating in Qatar (i.e., College of the North Atlantic, Community College of Qatar, University of Calgary Qatar, or Stenden University Qatar) comprise those working in the Education sector, the government sector, professional/scientific activities, or administrative work, as defined by the QSA 2012 Report.

The dearth of Qatari labor has called into question the sustainability of the knowledge economy project on which Qatar has embarked. While reform of the
education system has been made a priority by the leadership of the country, these efforts have yet to produce the kinds of results that would make Qatar a knowledge society. In 1995, the Emir signed a decree establishing the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development (known as the Qatar Foundation) that has brought together world class non-profit organizations, institutions of higher education, and research institutes to Qatar. The Qatar Foundation brought the best of the world to Qatar. In 1996, an Emiri decree established Al Jazeera, the region’s most prominent Arabic-language, 24-hour news satellite station. This brought the best of the Arab world to the rest of the world, and in the process, challenged and even threatened international news outlets such as the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) and CNN (Cable News Network). In 2004, the Qatar Science and Technology Park was opened as “a home for technology-based companies from around the world and an incubator for start-ups enterprises, ... help organisations develop and commercialise their technologies ... while spurring the development of Qatar’s knowledge economy” (Qatar Science and Technology Park, 2010). Development and progress are at the forefront of the Qatari government’s agenda. One of the questions that must be asked is whether Qatar’s goal is to become a self-sufficient knowledge society or whether it will continue to remain dependent on foreign labor and expertise to propel their society forward. As yet, only one Qatari serves as a faculty member on the world-renowned Education City campus (Brancaccio, 2009), and only 30% of the faculty at the national university, Qatar University, are Qatari citizens (Qatar University, 2011). However, if Qatar conceives of itself as a multinational society that welcomes the world to its doors,
then self-sufficiency becomes unimportant. The traditional model of the nation-state would suggest that a knowledge economy depends on building up a national workforce that is instrumental in all layers and stages of this development. However, in a non-traditional state as Qatar, it seems that the national workforce need not be as actively involved, as long as they can reap the economic rewards of this development. And it seems that that is Qatar’s modus operandi.
Chapter 5
Findings and Discussion

I believe higher education, in particular, plays a vital role in the promotion and sustenance of democratic societies. Indeed, they provide nourishment for critical and analytical thinking, freedom of expression, and debate.

Sheikha Mozah al-Missned, June 23, 2003

This chapter is presented in three sections. The first section presents Qatar University, and provides a detailed understanding of the university, its structure, and the progress it is making in reaching its desired goals. This section includes a review of extant texts and lengthy quotes from interviews conducted with four senior, Cabinet-level officials at the university in order to help ground an understanding of the reform process at that institution. The second section presents an overview of Qatar Foundation and the North American branch campus model in Qatar that includes all American universities that offer undergraduate degrees within Education City. For the purposes of this research, the four non-American institutions operating in Education City (University College, London; HEC-Paris; the Translation and Interpretation Institute; and the Qatar Faculty of Islamic Sciences) as well as Weill Cornell Medical College (which offers the Doctor of Medicine degree) will not be included in this research. Furthermore, quotes from interview participants in this section will be edited to remove any identifying information that could link the participant to any institution. All the participants in this study requested confidentiality.

Before proceeding, it is important to revisit the research questions.


_R1._ How do the goals of globalization and nationalization interact in the transformation of higher education in Qatar?

_R2._ What are the goals of higher education reform in Qatar, and how are these related to the changes taking place in Qatar?

_R3._ What roles do each institution play, and how do the various higher education institutions and bodies in Qatar interact?

I also want to revisit briefly the conceptual framework that guided the interview protocol for this research. Taji (2004) posits that education reform in Jordan is based on a tacit acceptance of global standards and that the reform is thus guided by neocolonial underpinnings. Altbach (2007) discusses the core and peripheries in higher education, suggesting that the former is located in the West/North while the latter is located in the East/South. And finally, Marginson and Rhoades (2002) attempt to complicate this scenario by putting forth that there is reciprocity (to varying degrees) and that universities in the periphery have spheres of agency that challenge their position on the periphery.

The interviews conducted and the extant texts reviewed (in both English and Arabic) seek to answer these questions. The chapter will begin with an analysis of Qatar University, then move to Education City, and then to an overarching view of higher education reform in Qatar. Although this progression seems specious, being able to see the trees before looking at the forest gives the reader a more nuanced understanding of the larger picture of higher education reform in Qatar.

**Qatar University**

Situated on the north side of Doha, the sprawling campus of Qatar University speaks to its ambitions of becoming a world-class university. The university has
two separate entrances – a main entrance for visitors and male students, and another for female students and faculty who teach on the female campus. The campus is divided into two sections – male and female – as instruction is separated by gender. All academic buildings and programs that are offered to both genders are replicated on both campuses, which are divided through a small walk-through doorway that is sometimes manned by a security guard.

The academic buildings consist of a maze of buildings that are not clearly marked, and are named with only letters and numbers. Offices on the female side of the campus (where my office was located during the summer of 2009) are cordoned off by wooden latticework to prevent (especially male) walkers-through from seeing the women who might be working in those offices.

The student centers on both the male and female campuses are impressive buildings that house the typical accoutrements that one would see at any university in the United States: eateries, comfortable seating areas, offices, recreational areas, etc. On the female side of the campus, students' attire ranges from women who are fully covered (niqab) to those who are dressed in jeans and long-sleeved t-shirts. Modesty is the order of the day, as that is an unwritten mandate in Qatari society.

On the male side of the campus, Qatari and Gulf Arab men will sport a kandoora/dishdasha (the long white robe) with a gutra and 'agaal (the checkered or plain scarf kept on the head by the tightly would band of ropes that sits on the top of the head). Non-Gulf Arab students are dressed in jeans and t-shirts. The atmosphere is relaxed and nationalities mix and mingle with ease.
The University was founded in 1973 and is the country’s only national university (Qatar University, 2010a). The university began as a teacher’s college and within four years changed to a full-fledged university. There are approximately 9000 students enrolled at Qatar University, with women making up 77% of the student body (Qatar University, 2011). The university comprises seven colleges: Arts and Sciences; Business and Economics; Education; Engineering; Law; Pharmacy; and Sharia and Islamic Studies (Qatar University, 2012a). A total of 31 undergraduate majors are offered: 13 in Arts and Sciences, 4 in Business and Economics, 2 in Education, 8 in Engineering, 1 each in Law and Pharmacy, and 2 in Sharia and Islamic Studies (Qatar University, 2012a). Three programs exist independent of the seven colleges: Foundation Program, Sports Science Program, and the Honors Program (Qatar University, 2010a). Students in each of these programs are required to take a curriculum similar to those in American universities: a core curriculum program of 33 credits, with the remaining credits being taken in the major course of study. Thirty-three percent of students are enrolled in the College of Arts and Sciences, while 26% are enrolled in the Foundation Program, which provides training in English and Math for those students whose English and Math competence does not meet the standard required for admission to the University (Qatar University, 2011).

Most of the undergraduate academic programs are offered to both male and female students with the following exceptions. Mechanical and civil engineering are only open to male students; human nutrition, Arabic language, English language and linguistics, sociology, biomedical sciences, biology, primary education, architecture,
computer engineering, industrial and systems engineering, and pharmacy are only open to female students (Qatar University, 2012a). There is something inherently problematic with the academic-social engineering that is taking place at the university. Single-gender/separate-gender education is not the issue at hand. The issue at hand is that the University has pre-determined the majors that are available to male and female students. Why male students cannot major in languages (English or Arabic) or sociology and why female students cannot major in two kinds of engineering is incomprehensible. While offering primary and early childhood education majors only to women is socially relevant – only women teach in elementary schools – closing off majors to one gender or the other contradicts the very ideal of a student-centered university.

The language of instruction at Qatar University used to be both Arabic and English until a January 2012 Supreme Education Council decree mandated the language of instruction be changed to Arabic (Qatar University, 2012h). The main programs affected are the Arts programs in the College of Arts and Sciences, the program in Law, and the programs in the College of Business and Economics. Pursuant to the SEC decree, these programs, in addition to the programs in the College of Education and the College of Sharia and Islamic Studies will now be taught in Arabic. The following programs will continue to be taught in English: natural sciences, English language and literature, engineering, pharmacy, and the math/sciences/English concentrations in both primary and secondary education (Qatar University, 2012a). It is yet unclear how this shift to more Arabic-language programs will affect student enrollment considering the very high enrollment rate
in the Foundation Program prior to the decree. However, what is clear is that the change to Arabic in programs that should be international in their scope (namely, law and business) is going to create a cadre of graduates who are not fluent enough in a global language to able to functionally operate in their chosen fields.

The University began a reform process in 2003 that sought to achieve three goals: autonomy, decentralization, and accountability (Qatar University, 2012f). It was able to achieve autonomy by appointing an independent board that would then report to Emir Hamad, the ruler of Qatar. The Board of Governors is chaired by His Highness the Heir Apparent, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani. The Board is composed of twelve members, ten of whom are prominent members of Qatar’s business, government and education sectors, and two international American members: the president of the Council for Aid to Education and the Chancellor of the American University of Sharjah (United Arab Emirates) (Qatar University, 2012c).

The University is governed by Dr. Sheikha al-Misnad. Five Vice Presidents report to Dr. al-Misnad, all Qataris, all holders of the PhD degree, and all with at least ten years of service to Qatar University before their appointment. This fact is important in that the common misconception about labor nationalization policies in the Arabian Gulf is that under-qualified or even unqualified national candidates will be given senior positions. That does not seem to be the case at Qatar University.

Qatar University also established four research centers: environmental science, gas processing, materials sciences and engineering, and social and economic sciences (Qatar University, 2012d). All four of these centers are directly related to national priorities outlined in Qatar National Vision 2030, namely the promotion of
scientific research, the responsible exploitation of oil and gas, and the protection of the environment (General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008).

Four main themes emerged from the interviews at Qatar University and the review of the extant literature: international accreditation, student quality/engagement and the gender imbalance, social resistance to institutional change, and the presence of American branch campuses in Qatar.

**International accreditation**

International accreditation has been made a priority at Qatar University, as the university seeks out the branding of international (mainly American) organizations for its programs. As of 2012, the following programs at Qatar University have been accredited:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Undergraduate Program</th>
<th>Accrediting Agency</th>
<th>Location of Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biomedical Sciences</td>
<td>National Accrediting Agency for Clinical Laboratory Sciences (NAACLS)</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Association for the Advancement of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB)</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>Canadian Society for Chemistry (CSC)</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Center for Quality Assurance in International Education (CQAIE)</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>ABET</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Sciences</td>
<td>Institution of Environmental Sciences/Committee of Heads of Environmental Sciences</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation Program (English)</td>
<td>Commission on English Language Program Accreditation</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy</td>
<td>Canadian Council for Accreditation of Pharmacy Programs (CCAPP)</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistics</td>
<td>Royal Statistical Society (RSS)</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Accreditations garnered by Qatar University (Qatar University, 2012e; The Institution of Environmental Sciences, 2012)
In addition to the above programs, the university has approached a number of other American accrediting agencies seeking institutional or program recognition:

- Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges
- Accrediting Council on Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
- American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools
- American Dietetic Association
- Council on Social Work Education

(Qatar University, 2012e)

The strong presence of American accrediting associations is indicative of the direction in which QU’s leadership is looking. On its website, the goal of accreditation is to

“maintain standards requisite for its graduates to gain admission to other reputable institutions of higher learning or to achieve credentials for professional practice. The goal of accreditation is to ensure that education provided by institutions of higher education meets acceptable levels of quality” (Qatar University, 2012e).

Acknowledgement by Qatar’s Supreme Education Council is not enough. According to a senior official (QU-1) at Qatar University,

“what [is] meant by international standards is that in order to see are we doing fine or not ... is to benchmark ourself with the world, the outside world. I mean, who is leading higher education in the world now? Are the States and Europe. So when you benchmark yourself, you have to benchmark
yourself with who's the top in the field” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

Another senior official at Qatar University (QU-2) reiterated this statement: “It would be natural to seek international accreditation agencies; at the end of the day, you are graduating engineers, pharmacists, lawyers, so no matter where he [sic] works, he will be an engineer and he need[s] to be as good as anyone else. So, it was a natural option for the university to seek the most reliable, rigorous accrediting bodies” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

Another senior official at Qatar University (QU-3) stated “we usually go for high standards, usually the United States, but with adaptation, where we insert measures related to cultural and local issues” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011).

This outward focus toward (primarily) the United States is reinforced by the literature on higher education in the Arab world, and particularly in the Gulf region (Donn & Al Manthri, 2010; Moughrabi, 2009). Not only has Qatar University adopted the structure and system of American higher education institutions, it also looks to the US for recognition and validity. However, both participants QU-1 and QU-2 noted that while the university is adopting American structures and systems, the content of the curriculum is unequivocally Qatari (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011). They gave the example of the core curriculum, an American concept, that infused into it Qatari history and Arabic language, without any American content matter. This is certainly true when one
looks at the structure of the Core Curriculum. There are definitely courses that are tailored to an Arab/Muslim/Gulf context. Students are required to take Arabic, and one history course on the history of either Qatar or the Arabian Gulf or on Gulf politics. Students then choose from the remaining “packages” to complete their 33 credit hour core curriculum program (Qatar University, 2012g). The system and the majority of courses in the Core Curriculum have nothing to do with Qatar, Islam, or the Muslim world. The university mimics American standards and structures while making cosmetic additions to appeal to the population to which it is accountable.

However, an official at QU (QU-1) stated, in response to the question of “why the US?":

“We looked to the US because it is a well known fact that the US higher education is the most developed system of higher education in the world. This is not a statement; you can find this in most of the research on higher education. All countries are trying to aspire to a system similar to that. And because the accreditation as a system is well known and developed in the U.S. Outside the US, it is still evolving. Other countr[ies] have their own quality control, quality assurance, but the system in the US is very old, very developed, very clear, and we thought we need something which has been established, rather than going to a system which is just evolving by itself. So we looked to the United States. Everyone when they want to develop their higher education, they look to the American model. And we did the same.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)
There are two implications in this quote. First is the tacit acceptance of the American model as the strongest, most established, and highest quality system. The statement that the “research” supports this is not accurate, as the research has not made any quality judgments on the strength of higher education systems. The QS World Universities ranking rates American universities highly (20 of the world’s top 50 universities are located in the United States), but this cannot be considered “research” (QS, 2012). The varying systems in Europe, India, China, Australia, Japan, and Malaysia, just to name a few, contradict the statement that “everyone” looks to the American model when developing their systems of higher education.

The second implication is related to how countries develop their own accreditation systems. Official QU-2 elaborated on this idea:

“This is why Qatar as a country did not develop its own national accrediting agencies that accredit universities. Though they have their own in UAE, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, but because of the size of the country [Qatar] and limited number of higher education entities, the issue of cost [arose] – is it worth having a national accreditation agency? The question is people will be questioning the credibility of this thing. Why the trouble? You’ll be developing it, setting it up, though always defending the credibility of this. It’s your own thing. The natural thing is to look at what already exists, well established, something that a lot of worldwide universities are using it, to ask them to look at your programs, whether they are fulfilling the standards or whatever. This is natural” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)
Qatar University stands as the only national institution of higher education in Qatar. Chartered by the Emir in 1977 as a national university, it needed no educational body to give it academic legitimacy. It had been and continues to be accepted academically and in society. It maintains memberships in the Union of Arab Universities, the Federation of the Universities of the Islamic World, and the International Association of Universities (Qatar University, 2010a). These are not accrediting bodies, but they do grant a university legitimacy among its own people, and recognition by its peer institutions.

Until recently, no accrediting body or office existed in Qatar. It was not until the arrival of the branch campuses located in Education City that the Institutional Standards Office (ISO) was established as part of the Higher Education Institute (HEI) of the Supreme Education Council. The ISO is responsible for “ensuring quality of the higher education institutions inside and outside Qatar and granting licenses for the educational institutions based on the policies and procedures set by the HEI” (Supreme Education Council, 2012b). It seems the license is granted without question to Qatar University, as the nation's only university. However, Qatar University's outward focus toward the U.S. stems from the perceived lack of credibility of the ISO, especially in international circles.

The choice of going to an American accreditation system has been discussed, but it is worth noting the choice of regional accrediting body. Qatar University approached the South Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS), and successfully submitted its application for accreditation in August 2012. The reason for this among the senior administration at Qatar University does not seem to be
The first official I asked about this (QU-1) said “I don’t think there was a particular reason why SACS,” while a second official (QU-2) said that SACS was “the only agency that agreed to do an international accreditation” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011). A third official (QU-4) stated that SACS was chosen because it has the most rigorous reporting requirements (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011). The first answer sounds vague and random; the second answer is inaccurate as other U.S. regional accrediting bodies do accredit internationally (four of the five US regional accrediting bodies accredit internationally, and other than SACS, two other bodies accredit universities in the Middle East); and the third answer does not seem to have any evidence attached to it, not by SACS, the Commission on Higher Education Accreditation or the U.S. Department of Education. The most likely reason for choosing SACS comes from a 2002-2003 visit by the Texas International Education Commission to Qatar University, immediately prior to the appointment of Dr. Sheikha al-Misnad as President of the University. Funded by the Office of the Emir of the State of Qatar (Sheikh Hamad Al Thani), the visit was designed to help the university design, draft, implement, and present workshops on the strategic plan (Texas International Education Commission, 2012). It is impossible to verify this given the different accounts of three senior officials who were all present for the 2002-2003 visit by TIEC, but the fact that Texas is one of the states accredited by SACS seems to have been the impetus for Qatar University seeking out SACS to accredit the university. TIEC’s involvement in Qatar has been extensive, assisting Qatar Petroleum with English language training for employees who were sent to the U.S. to complete

It is also interesting to note that at the completion of TIEC’s (fully subsidized) visit to Qatar University, the Office of the Emir then commissioned the RAND-Qatar Policy Institute to assist the university with “reform of its major administrative and academic structures, policies, and practices” (Moini, Bikson, Neu, & DeSisto, 2009, p. iii). This is arguably either a wise investment in the future of Qatar University, or an inefficient use of state resources trying to amass a list of well-known contributors to the development of the nation’s only university. The amount of money that is being spent on education in Qatar has been described as “unsustainable” and “exorbitant” by one of the participants in this dissertation, and this point will be elaborated upon further, as it seems to be at the crux of the globalization impetuses driving the transformation of higher education in Qatar.

**Student quality/engagement and the gender imbalance**

In the RAND-QPI monograph that was produced, one of the roles of Qatar University was to set the standard for secondary school achievement: “the University’s own standards for admission would become de facto standards for required secondary school achievement” (Moini et al., 2009, p. 24). Their seventh recommendation to Qatar University was to “do away with the previous lower admission standard” and to “base its admissions decisions on more and better
evidence of academic potential than the current single school-leaving examination” (Moini et al., 2009, pp. 30, 31).

The challenges of this was that as RAND-QPI was making these recommendations, a second team from that same body was examining reform of the K-12 system, one that is rife with problems. That report, “Education for a new era: Design and implementation of K-12 reform in Qatar,” summarized the weaknesses of the system in Qatar:

“the weaknesses in the existing system were extensive. There was no vision of quality education and the structures needed to support it. The curriculum in the government (and many private) schools was outmoded, under the rigid control of the Ministry of Education, and unchallenging, and it emphasized rote memorization. The system lacked performance indicators, and the scant performance information that it provided to teachers and administrators meant little to them because they had no authority to make changes in the schools.” (Brewer et al., 2007, p. xviii)

The reform of Qatar’s K-12 system began in October 2002, less than one year before the Emir would appoint a new President and other senior officials of Qatar University (Moini et al., 2009). Qatar would begin implementing RAND-QPI’s reforms by establishing the Supreme Education Council, a body that would sit parallel to the Ministry of Education, but would be established with less bureaucracy and financial mismanagement.

While the reform project advanced quickly, the results of the reform did not materialize at that same pace. According to a number of international student
assessments, Qatar lags significantly behind the rest of the world. In the 2006 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), Qatar’s average performance was “significantly lower” than every OECD country, and “significantly higher” than only Morocco, Kuwait, and South Africa (International Association for the Evaluation of Education Achievement, 2006). In the 2007 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS), Qatar’s average scale score in math at the 8th grade level was 307, the lowest scoring participating country, and 319 in science, outranking only Ghana, well below the TIMMS Average Scale Score of 500 in both subjects (Supreme Education Council, 2008). And in the 2009 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), Qatar’s scores on reading, math, and science were all statistically significantly lower than the OECD Average, with scores of 372, 369, and 378 respectively in those subjects, while the OECD average was 493, 496, and 501 respectively in those subjects (OECD Programme on International Student Assessment, 2012). TIMMS and PIRLS were administered again in 2011, and PISA was administered in 2012, but those results are not yet available.

The international assessments are not the only proof of the very slow pace of achieving the results that the Qatari leadership would like in its schools. By the SEC’s own assessment standards, grade 11 students in the 2010-2011 academic year did not achieve the kinds of results hoped for. The SEC administers the Qatar Comprehensive Educational Assessment (QCEA) to each class of students and measures students on three scales: meeting standards, approaching standards, and below standards. In 2010-2011, the results of the QCEA showed the following:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Meeting Standards</th>
<th>Approaching Standards</th>
<th>Below Standards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sciences*</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figures reported are the average of Biology, Chemistry, and Physics scores.

These figures are approximations from bar graphs that were given by the Supreme Education Council. They are not exact figures but come very close to the actual figures reported by the SEC. Furthermore, no results were reported for 12th grade.

There are two ways to interpret these figures. One is to say that a majority (58% average) have met or are approaching the standards set by the SEC for the QCEA examinations. That would certainly be accurate, and a positive indication that Qatar is moving toward a system where most of their students are nearing meeting all standards. “Approaching standards” is a nebulous measure that is interpreted to mean that the student shows an understanding of the subject matter, but is inconsistent in displaying that understanding or is weak in her/his presentation (either writing or coherence) (Supreme Education Council, 2006) However, the measure of “approaching standards” is a misleading one, as it actually means the student has not met the standards, and is therefore not at the level of competence required by the SEC. Using this interpretation, only 21.5% of 11th grade standard program students (across all subjects) in the 2010-2011 academic year had met standards. The figure is a bleak one for Qatar University as it attempts to raise its standards and offer a complete and quality university education to Qatari students.
As mentioned previously, female students outnumber their male counterparts at Qatar University almost 2 to 1. This phenomenon is one that exists across most of the national universities in the Gulf region for reasons that are unclear. QU-1 stated that students (especially) men seek to merely obtain a high school diploma that affords them any number of opportunities for employment (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011). She continued:

“it has been like this for a long time. One of the reasons for this is that women do better in high school so they get admitted at university in larger numbers. I think men tend to join the labor market quicker than women, especially police, the army, and all of this. And the job market in the Gulf, for high school graduates man national is very good, it’s not bad. So I think, while for a women, if she wants to go – if she wants to work, she has to go for a very social – a status job. So women tend to get the degree to get a professional job. But for a man, he can work any job – there is no shame in that. He can work as a driver, as a security, anything with a high school degree. But for a woman ... I think women are more hard working, more ambitious. Why I don’t know. This is something we need to study – nobody has tried. We have an issue in Qatar; we think this is a problem actually. We are happy actually that most of the women in Qatar are getting a good education at the higher level, but we are concerned that the young men are not really interested to put the effort to go to this path. (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

QU-3 was able to give yet another perspective on the gender imbalance.
“There is more than one perspective. Part of it has to do with social setting of Qatari society – it is a very conservative society where families are very hesitant to sending their daughters to study abroad. The same is not valid for male students. To the contrary, it’s a prestigious thing to send male kids to US, UK. Not valid for females. This is why we end up having more female students – we lose male students studying abroad. Also, the venues, the opportunities are more for male than female students – military, air force, marines, army, police – it’s open much more for males than females. If you add these things together, it’s reasonable to have more female students. The Army College (similar to West Point) only accepts male students. This is not unique to Qatar – eg. United Arab Emirates University in Al Ain [UAE], and Sultan Qaboos University in Oman. This is a Gulf region phenomenon.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

The gender imbalance is one that is fairly constant across the Gulf States. At all the national universities that enroll men and women, the figures tend to be fairly constant. Social mobility is easier for men, with or without a university degree, and because of labor nationalization policies, male students enroll in institutions of higher education at lesser rates than their female counterparts. When asked about incorporating figures of male students who study abroad, QU-1 said that the gender imbalance would still rest in favor of women, at approximately a 60/40 ratio (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011).
QU-2 had a different take on the matter, and relates it to a social phenomenon, that that “people are being spoiled here” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011). QU-2 continued and said

“I inherited this [work ethic] from my parents. If you look at Qatar 50 years ago, people used to work hard, but how much has this been passed down? But the young generation has not had someone who lived prior to the discovery of oil, so their forefathers have lived a relaxed lifestyle. So who is going to make sure this is going to continuously be conveyed. Not sure. The university programs are so rigorous; no one gets through our programs without putting an effort. Even if he’s [sic] not had that thing at his home, when he arrives at the university, he has to put that effort or he won’t be continuing. We try to instill this in the young people.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

QU-3 took a different take on this topic, and said,

“You can attribute this to socio-economic setting of Qatar. You can’t examine the education system without looking carefully at how we are living – the social setting and our economic status. Usually, it seems to me that female students have something to prove, so that they work a bit harder (not always the case, but generally speaking), and usually outperform their male counterparts. Level of perseverance, females try hard to achieve and prove themselves – this is not there with males. We need to work more on creating motivation within male students – females are more motivated, males are less motivated. Part of that is due to the fact that they find everything they
want or like. You have to work hard to change this, and have them see things differently. It’s not what you ride or drive or dress – it’s beyond that. You have to have a noble goal – that is more there with females than male.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

There is a social issue at work here, and it speaks to the nature of the development of Qatari society. Prior to the discovery of oil and natural gas, Qatar was a simpler society where hard work was rewarded because it was necessary. In the aftermath of the discoveries, Qatar was flooded with a steady stream of income, where now it boasts the highest GDP per capita in the world (World Bank, 2012). The increase in wealth seems to have translated into what the RAND Institute has called “a lackadaisical approach to studies,” especially among male students (Moini et al., 2009).

The reform project successfully raised admissions standards for both secondary school exam scores as well as TOEFL scores, implemented a strong Foundation Program to help those students who did not meet the standards for admission, and codified academic regulations, especially as they pertain to academic probation (Moini et al., 2009). These changes have clearly outpaced the reform happening at the K-12 level, but they were a necessary step. However, this came at a cost.

**Social resistance to institutional change**

“People in Qatar feel Qatar University is theirs” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011). Prior to the reform project that began in
2003, a student with a 1.5 GPA could matriculate at Qatar University, and with that same GPA, graduate from the institution (Moini et al., 2009). Consequently, he (typically men) could gain civil service employment, the requirements for which were only a university degree (Moini et al., 2009). In this environment, QU faced social pressure to be all things to all students and to continue to enroll and graduate greater numbers of students. The reform project was designed to strengthen the institution, and the senior administration at QU was given that mandate by the Emir. However, they were, and continue to remain heavily scrutinized.

Participant QU-1 was clear about the social resistance. QU-1 came up against resistance

“from the community, when we [the university] said that the students have to achieve that much in order to get into that discipline. The community, of course, didn’t like that, because it used to be [that] everybody’s in and everybody’s out. Now you [the university] are saying, ‘no, there are criteria [and] you have to meet these criteria before you are awarded the degree.’ So we faced a lot of resistance and still we face a lot of resistance” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

Participant QU-3 stated above that Qataris felt ownership over Qatar University. So when the university embarked on reform that was mandated from the upper echelons, the society was not consulted, and that caused discontent among the people. The resistance, according to QU-1 was based on why the university was instituting standards, policies and procedures that were previously foreign to the institution. The resistance was not only societal, but also came from faculty, who
“did not want to see the change with the idea of faculty appraisal, with learning outcomes, of being responsible [for] what you teach. You know, some faculty think you do whatever you want in the classrooms, and there is no accountability, no appraisal ... [but] Change means you have to learn new skills, you have to know new things ... We [the faculty] are used to doing things this way, we are happy with that, we are comfortable. Now you are asking us to learn new skills, to go to professional development, to use the Blackboard, to give our students the chance to appraise us, to give our colleagues the chance to come review us” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

The resistance that came from within and without the university was a big obstacle the university had to face before moving forward. The faculty at the institution were complacent and comfortable in a system that neither demanded nor challenged them to improve their teaching methodologies. They were not accountable to any external or internal actor, as indeed “lower levels of academic leadership had atrophied in the years prior to the reform” (Moini et al., 2009, p. 56).

Participant QU-2 has noted that the changes implemented through the reform project has necessitated the university look beyond the Arab world to recruit faculty who “are eager to bring this kind of experience and expertise to this work, no matter how hard it is” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011).

In the early days of the reform, the university made, as noted above, big changes very quickly. Participant QU-2 notes a particularly salient incident of how this was received by the Qatari community, and even in government circles:
“So the university, when it embarked on the Reform Project, was really focusing on the academic programs, looking at the faculty’s profile, looking at the students’ profile. The university decided that we need to make sure that we are selecting the student, rather than just getting everyone on board. And putting in a way a more stringent system that would ensure students who are not performing would not continue in the system. This was a very harsh decision by the university, and it was courageous enough to face the society, and to revise the probation system where the student earlier would be allowed to continue even though he was failing ... Revising the probation system meant that a big percentage of the students were asked to leave the university; it was a big thing for the whole community. At that time, the president [of the university] was requested by the Shura [Consultative Assembly, the state of Qatar’s legislative body] to come and defend why the university was dismissing this big number of students and putting this new system of probation. I do remember this was the first time the president of the university was asked to come and answer questions. She came and brought all the data, and said ... even though it was a painful measure, we would ensure that this graduate would be someone we would be proud of, someone who deserves to get the job, who would be able to perform it well. She had convinced them” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011).

The university had existed, up until the Reform Project, in a status quo of complacency. Faculty taught courses, provided no service to students or the
university community, and students were accepted _de facto_, as if it was their natural right to earn a university degree. And society expected this of Qatar University. So, when the university instituted these changes, social pressure on the _Shura_ Council resulted in a request by President Sheikha al-Misnad to appear before the governmental body and defend the actions of the university. This is clearly a sign of the level of outrage that was caused by the university’s decision to increase its standards. The move was unprecedented; the university president had not been asked prior to that to appear before the _Shura_.

However, that was not the final time that the university has been asked to answer to the community for actions and/or decisions that it takes. Participant QU-3 notes one of the acute issues with which the university is faced on a regular basis:

“How our students (especially female) are dressed. This is one of the very pressing issues. We are a university and students should feel free to dress how they like. There needs to be a balance between those who think female students should be dressed wholly in black, and those who come from liberal families and who dress in ways that are not very suitable for a university … Students should dress differently than going to a wedding or a funeral. Some students come to campus as if it’s a wedding – overdressed. This is part of the learning process, the education, talking to students. It’s our role to talk to them. In this we don’t go for absolute freedom – we don’t accept that. You need to show respect for this institution and that you are here to learn. This is an example we get all the time. We receive phone calls and visits, even
from old faculty members” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011).

This example illustrates the tension between the global and the national at work in Qatar. The imperative in American higher education is to allow students to pursue their own path in their personal development – including, but not limited to, issues such as piercings, tattoos, dress, personal expression, etc. At Qatar, they are very cognizant of the balance between the personal development of the student and the obligation that one has to being fully present as a member of the larger society. While this is certainly true in American higher education as well, the characteristics of Qatari society make this balance a little more tenuous. When asked how the university dealt with the dress code issues, participant QU-3 said “We decided that whatever [code] we came up with would be subjective, so we decided upon a dress code that read ‘we expect all our students to respect our culture and religion’” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011). Left to individual senior administrators to interpret, the new code is left open enough to allow for individual expression, although it runs into the problem of individual interpretation by administrators. Issues of dress code are never easy, and even in the United States, these remain contentious. The examples of Hampton University’s Business School and Morehouse College in the United States banning students from having dreadlocks or cornrows in the first instance, and from wearing saggy pants and A-shirts in the second, stand as only two examples of how difficult it is to navigate telling students what they can and cannot wear. What Qatar University is trying to do is to find where that fine line between freedom and responsibility rests in a
society that is constantly holding a magnifying glass up to every action the institution takes.

Qatar University provides separate education for men and women, on separate campuses. Participant QU-3 discussed two events that caused some consternation among parents: National Day and inviting famed Egyptian actor, Omar Sharif, to campus. The former event involved planning by both male and female students on the same committee, while the latter involved having male and female students in the same hall. He said

"We keep [these events] very controlled. We are present all the time and it's under our supervision. We usually start to use the explanation that in a short period of time, your kid will graduate from university, and they will find themselves forced to work with the opposite gender. So we see such opportunities as good opportunities to do that in a controlled environment with available supervision and help if needed. It's not easy but we're trying our best ... Usually whenever we mix male and female students, it is very controlled. There is a special place for male and special place for female students. The second argument is that we never force anyone. It is optional for those who would like to attend. We provide segregated education; we don't allow male students to the female campus. If this is your choice, ask your daughter to stay on the female campus" (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

When students arrive at Qatar University, it is understood that they will not mix with the opposite gender. But the administration recognizes that there will
always be instances in which the genders will have to mix. Some in the Qatari community do not share this understanding, and so the university has to be prepared to answer to its constituents. The above quote illustrates three important points. First, the administration recognizes that while it is providing opportunities for students to mix, this is done under their watchful eye. The administration is ensuring that gender mixing is done within appropriate and professional boundaries. This instills confidence by those on the outside that university activities are done within the confines of Qatari values. The second point is Qatar University is responding to and being proactive in being part of the changing Qatari society. The workplace in Qatar is changing and to deny that fact would be to keep one’s head in the proverbial sand. So, Qatar University is taking a bold step and telling parents that this change in the workforce has necessitated the university to take steps to prepare its graduates for that workforce. By learning how to interact in mixed-gender environments in ways that continue to respect cultural and religious values, students will be afforded greater opportunities after they graduate. And finally, it is important to note that no activities are being mandated on students; no students are being forced to interact with members of the opposite gender. All activities remain optional and those students who select to be involved are being given the opportunity to gain leadership skills and engage in “good opportunities.” There is a moral judgment that is being imparted here. The university is telling the community that it recognizes the value of single-gender education and will continue to provide that to its students, but that these controlled-environment opportunities where the genders mix provide multiple benefits, among them leadership and
preparation for the workforce. But, as QU-3 stated, "it is not easy ... because we like the feeling of being a part of this society, even if it comes with scrutiny" (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 28, 2011).

**American branch campuses in Qatar**

This section is not mean to delve into the workings or issues at Education City, as the next section of this chapter will address those. In the interviews at Qatar University, the presence of branch campuses in Qatar was regularly addressed. The RAND-QPI report noted that,

“The SRC [Senior Reform Committee] recommended and His Highness the Emir subsequently agreed that QU could not be expected to meet all of Qatar’s needs for post-secondary education. QU would aim to serve average and above-average Qataris who seek academically oriented university education” (Moini et al., 2009, p. 61).

So the question is asked, how does the presence of the six American branch campuses in Doha affect Qatar University? Participant QU-1 stated

“The present Education City branch campuses [are] a competition, no doubt. But having these branch campuses in the country also raises the public awareness about quality education. So people are more aware about what quality education means. Teaching in English is not quality education – it's more than that. Some people think just take your son or daughter to an English speaking institution, and that’s it. It’s not that. These branch campuses help us in that public awareness about what is good quality
higher education, what does it require, so people realize this.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

However, participant QU-2 took the notion of competition further. It is not merely a benchmark by which Qatari society examines quality education. When asked about the presence of these campuses, in Qatar, the participant responded “Challenging. People compare us to them. [It is] always the case that people will compare. It works in our favor. They are bringing their own faculty, programs, standards and policies – so you are comparing Qatar University with these best universities. It puts pressure on us to be the best in all we do (programs, projects, events, etc) – we need to put more effort to ensure we are on par with them.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

These branch campuses don’t merely exist as an external benchmark by which Qatari society evaluates higher education, but instead, are an ever-present reminder that Qatar University can and should be aiming even higher than it already is. While participant QU-3 did mention that many Qataris “feel the Qatar Foundation is different; very respected but built more for the elites and for a limited number” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011), that these universities exist is an impetus for Qatar University’s continuing improvement.

However, the elite status afforded to Education City campuses presents a challenge and a reward for Qatar University. The challenge is that the university needs to “work hard to not be seen as a second class institution; we [Qatar
University] are providing education of the same value as that in Education City” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011).

The presence of two separate bodies (QU as one, and Education City as the other) seems to be creating niches for different student populations. The RAND-QPI report spoke of Qatar University being that institution for “average and above-average” students, while the perception is that the Education City campuses are for “the elite.” Qatar University has “the comparative advantage in promoting an Arab and Muslim identity” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011), while Education City is for those who don’t mind Western-style interactions.

However, the presence of Education City does not function only at a macro-institutional level. It also brings with it faculty and administrative advantages. Participants QU-1 and QU-2 noted the number of individual faculty collaborations in the area of research. They both pointed to the fact that faculty from Education City are very engaging and wanting to work with faculty at Qatar University to promote research about the country. The faculty come from all disciplines and are fully invested in advancing the research agenda of Qatar. Participant QU-2 also noted how faculty from Education City are willing to help QU as it continues its reform plans:

“We also depend on them if we are embarking on any project, restructuring a program, developing a new program, merging two departments., thinking of initiating a new program – we have a group of them experts, to sit on steering committee etc, to join their counterparts at QU to follow up on a major
project on the university level.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

Participant QU-3 furthered the notion of involvement between the two bodies.

“We get involved in a number of programs – they work on a program called YPI [Young Professionals Institute] where they invite officials from student affairs, from universities in the States, and we participate in that. We work on it together ... A Qatar University Student Affairs employee is going to shadow an Education City institution as her family would not allow her to go abroad to an American institution.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, November 20, 2011)

So the relationship between Qatar University and the campuses at Education City works on three levels: as a benchmarking mechanism, as a measure of continuous improvement, and as a collaborator in completing that improvement. Whether that improvement involves inviting faculty from Education City, or whether it means QU capitalizes on the programs that are held at Education City, the university is finding ways to make the existence of these top-notch universities work to its advantage.

To reiterate, the four issues at Qatar University that emerged through an examination of the interviews and the extant texts were international accreditation, student quality/engagement and the gender balance, and the presence of American branch campuses in Qatar. Each of these issues is fraught with the global/national
tension that is at the center of this dissertation. That tension also exists at the campuses in Education City, and the next section of this chapter will explore those.

**The Qatar Foundation**

Before discussing Education City, it is important to situate it within the larger organization that is the Qatar Foundation. The Qatar Foundation is “an independent, private, non-profit, chartered organization founded ... to support centers of excellence which develop people’s abilities through investments in human capital, innovative technology, state of the art facilities and partnerships with elite organizations, thus raising the competency of people and the quality of life.” (Qatar Foundation, 2012c)

The issue of independence is an interesting one. Six of the seven members of the Board of Trustees are members of the royal family, i.e. Al Thani (Qatar Foundation, 2012a). There is a separate Board of Directors, and three of the seven members of that Board are members of the royal family (Qatar Foundation, 2012a). The Foundation was established by Emiri Decree, is headed by the wife of the Emir, and is fully funded by the state of Qatar. The issue of independence is likely to be a loophole by which to bypass the bureaucracy of Doha’s governmental institutions.

The mission of the Foundation is:

“to prepare the people of Qatar and the region to meet the challenges of an ever-changing world, and to make Qatar a leader in innovative education and research. To achieve that mission, QF supports a network of centers and partnerships with elite institutions, all committed to the principle that a
nation's greatest natural resource is its people. Education City, Qatar Foundation's flagship project is envisioned as a Center of Excellence in education and research that will help transform Qatar into a knowledge-based society.” (Qatar Foundation, 2012b)

This goal is central to one of the questions being posed in this dissertation. It offers a complex, multi-faceted understanding of the goals of higher education reform in Qatar. It is to prepare the people of Qatar and the region to meet global challenges. The priority here is Qatar and the region, first and foremost. In order to achieve this, the Foundation has invested in Education City, the flagship project to educate its citizens, and those of the region (primarily). By bringing world-class universities to Qatar, the Foundation has ensured that the best education will be afforded to these populations. In addition, the Education City project will become a model in transnational education. Finally, the end result of all this is to transform Qatar into a knowledge-based society.

In an interview with the BBC, Dr. Abdulla Al Thani said, “The blessing of the oil and gas won’t last forever - so focusing on something sustainable is more important” (Coughlan, 2011). There is a clear understanding of two issues at play: a) the reservoirs of oil and gas in Qatar will end, at some point; and b) the world economy is slowly moving away from an oil-based economy into different kinds of energies. These two factors have given cause to the Qatari leadership to think about the long-term future of Qatar. A dependence merely on the income derived from oil and gas will sustain Qatar.
It is important to get a sense of the breadth of projects underway at the Foundation, and what follows is a summary of those projects. The programs of the Qatar Foundation can be divided into four categories: Education, Science and Research, Community Development, and Other Initiatives. The goal of this division is not to create silos but instead to facilitate communication between the various components. What follows is a description of each of these programs.

**Education**

In the area of education, the Qatar Foundation has established six K-12 initiatives, and the cornerstone of the Qatar Foundation, Education City. The K-12 initiatives include three schools and two support programs. All the schools adopt international curricula based on the International Baccalaureate Program, they offer a school that caters to students with learning disabilities, and the Academic Bridge Program is meant to provide remedial preparation for college-bound seniors of Qatari high schools.

The cornerstone of the Qatar Foundation’s project is Education City, the complex of post-secondary institutions that offer undergraduate and graduate education in a variety of disciplines. The universities and the degrees they offer are below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution &amp; Location of home campus</th>
<th>Year founded in Qatar</th>
<th>Undergraduate degree offered</th>
<th>Majors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Commonwealth University (USA)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Bachelor of Fine Arts</td>
<td>Fashion Design, Graphic Design, Interior Design, Paintmaking &amp; Printmaking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas A&amp;M University (USA)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Bachelor of Science</td>
<td>Chemical Engineering, Electrical &amp; Computer Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carnegie Mellon University (USA)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Bachelor of Science</td>
<td>Biological Sciences, Business Administration, Computational Biology, Information Systems, Computer Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgetown University School of Foreign Service</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service</td>
<td>International Politics, Culture &amp; Politics, International Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern University</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Bachelor of Science</td>
<td>Journalism, Communication (through Northwestern in Evanston, Illinois)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution &amp; location of main campus</th>
<th>Year founded in Qatar</th>
<th>Graduate degree offered</th>
<th>Majors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Virginia Commonwealth University (USA)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Master of Fine Arts</td>
<td>Design Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weill Cornell Medical College (USA)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Doctor of Medicine, Non-degree</td>
<td>Medicine, Pre-medical education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty of Islamic Studies</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Master of Arts</td>
<td>Islamic Studies (specialization in contemporary Fiqh), Public Policy in Islam, Study of Contemporary Muslim Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Master of Science</td>
<td>Islamic Finance, Urban Design &amp; Architecture in Islamic Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Islamic Studies, Islamic Finance, Public Policy in Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University College London (UK)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Master of Arts</td>
<td>Archaeology of the Arab &amp; Islamic World, Conservation Studies, Museum &amp; Gallery Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEC Paris (France)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Executive MBA</td>
<td>Business Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. Undergraduate and Graduate Programs offered at Education City**

In 2012, the Qatar Foundation began talks with Harvard University to open a law school in Qatar. This would not be a branch campus of Harvard Law School in Qatar; instead HLS’s Institute for Global Law and Policy will serve as consultants and
advisors on curricular, administrative, and admissions matters as the Qatar Foundation establishes this new school (Sloan, 2012). Recently, the Qatar Foundation established a new entity, titled Hamad bin Khalifa University that seeks to serve as the umbrella organization that will oversee all these programs. The new organization is structured like a traditional university with four schools under which each of the programs offered will come. The new structure is still in its infancy stages, and poses interesting questions in the field of higher education organization studies, but will not be elaborated upon further in this dissertation. The complex of universities will be referred to as Education City.

The universities will all be served by a central library that is set to open in 2014. The library will serve as a resource for all the universities and research centers operating at the Qatar Foundation.

**Science and research**

This arm of the Qatar Foundation includes a variety of scientific, policy, and research initiatives that create strong synergies with the universities in Education City as well as with other organizations in the QF. The research centers and institutes conduct research on stem cell research, the Arab and Islamic world, electricity production and environmental sustainability, and applied computing. In addition, this arm of the Foundation includes programs that prepare Qatars for research, bring distinguished lecturers on topics of science, and publish and fund research in the natural and social sciences. In addition, the Foundation is developing a world-class teaching and research hospital with a $7.9 billion
endowment. The Foundation’s last science and research initiative is the Science and Technology Park that gives companies the space to develop and commercialize their technologies.

**Community development**

The last arm of the Qatar Foundation’s initiatives is related to building the kind of community that will compliment the educational and scientific advancements being made in the Foundation. Its programs are divided into one of three goals: the foster a progressive society, to enhance Qatar’s cultural life and protect its heritage, and to address immediate social needs, both in-country and abroad. These programs include career fairs, debate programs, TV programs targeting youth, libraries, museums, an orchestra and music academy, and a publishing house (partnered with Bloomsbury Publishing). Their social outreach activities include work both outside Qatar (primarily in the area of education and empowerment), and within Qatar focusing on counseling, charity, health and family welfare.

**Other Initiatives**

The other initiatives of the Qatar Foundation include corporate joint ventures that established a branding and design company, an IT solutions company, an event planning operation, a convention center, a solar technologies development center, and a mobile phone company (Qatar Foundation, 2011a).
Education City

It is hard not to be impressed when driving through Education City. Located on the outskirts of Doha, the sprawling campus encompasses the branch campuses some of the most recognized universities around the world. Billboards across the 14 square kilometers (approximately 5.5 square miles) are plastered with words that are intended to motivate (primarily) students on these campuses. Students are encouraged to “LEARN,” “CREATE,” “EXPLORE,” “THINK,” “WONDER,” “ACHIEVE,” “GROW,” “INNOVATE,” “DISCOVER,” and “EXPLORE”. In English and in Arabic. These same words are located on lawns across the campus, in front and behind academic buildings, as if a constant reminder of the ethos that is expected of students. The message to be and do more is obvious.

When you enter the buildings, that same impression is left on students. Each of the universities has been allocated one building that it uses to house classrooms, faculty and administrative offices, student space, as well as dining facilities. (The only exception at this point is Northwestern University that occupies the top floor of Carnegie Mellon University’s building. Their building is scheduled to open in 2013). Designed using the most modern architecture, these sprawling buildings are laid with marble floors, have high ceilings, architectural features (as in the built-in amphitheater in Carnegie Mellon’s building), student lounge spaces, and dining facilities. These mammoth sized buildings that accommodate what at campuses in the U.S. is usually absorbed by at least two or three buildings, stand as a testament to innovation and money. Each building has a unique architectural style and has been custom built to suit the needs of each university – so Virginia Commonwealth
has been equipped with modern design labs, while Texas A&M University is equipped with the most up-to-date engineering facilities.

The student center is an enormous building that aims to bring together the students of all the universities, just as the student center does at more traditional universities in the United States. With the same kind of impressive architecture and post-modern look, the student center serves the students of Education City, and is designed to bee at the center of “campus.” Though it is hard to think of six universities as one campus, the leadership of Education City is working to make it so. While the walk between academic buildings in Education City is lengthy and certainly not akin to the walk across a campus in the United States, it is the hope that the student center will break down real and imagined boundaries between the institutions operating there.

Education City is one aspect of the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development, which was founded in 1995 by Emiri Decree. The second wife of Sheikh Hamad Al Thani, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al Missned (the niece of QU President, Dr. Sheikha al Misnad), is the chairperson and driving force behind the initiative (Qatar Foundation, 2012e). With a motto of “unlocking human potential,” one of the primary aims of the Foundation is to create a knowledge economy that can sustain Qatar in a post-oil and gas economy. The goals of the Foundation are supported by both the Qatar National Vision 2030 and the Qatar National Development Strategy (2011-2016) (General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008, 2011).
The current iteration of Education City is not the original one that had been envisaged by the Emir and the Sheikha. The original plan was to invite one university to set up a traditional campus in Doha; the one chosen was the University of Virginia (UVa). The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1999 approved the request to establish a branch campus in Qatar, it was the University itself that chose to not proceed with the project (University of Virginia, 1999; Virginia General Assembly, 1999). A 2008 article in the Chronicle of Higher Education cites the President of the Qatar Foundation, Dr. Fathy Saoud (also Saud), as giving an alternative explanation for why the UVa project fell through:

“We heard it [the University of Virginia] was the second-best public university in the country,” Mr. Saud says — [but] the foundation’s board members were disappointed to learn how inconsistently ranked its programs were. “They said, ‘No, this is not acceptable,’” Mr. Saud recalls. “We wanted Top 10 in every program, and after scanning all the universities, we saw it was almost impossible to find that in a single university.” (Krieger, 2008a)

It is difficult to decipher Dr. Saoud’s statement above. Whether this is truly a quest for excellence, or an overt statement of the kind of quality Qatar expected for the exorbitant amount of money it was shelling out, or even if this was an underhanded insult at the University of Virginia after negotiations with the top-tier public institution failed is unclear. It is unlikely however that “the foundation’s board members were disappointed to learn how inconsistently ranked its programs were” given the fact that the Foundation had been working and negotiating with UVa for nearly one year to make this happen (University of Virginia, 1999). It was
the University that was approached by the Foundation, and took the necessary steps to get approval from the state’s General Assembly. However, the leadership of UVa cited meeting accreditation standards as the main reason for its decision to not open a campus in Doha, and actually suggested the multi-university campus model to the leadership of the Qatar Foundation (University of Virginia, 1999).

Given this new approach, the Qatar Foundation began approaching different schools, seeking their cooperation and participation in the ambitious Education City Project. As of 2012, the five American universities operating undergraduate programs in Doha are: Virginia Commonwealth University, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Carnegie Mellon University, Texas A&M University, and Northwestern University. (In 2001-2001, the Qatar Foundation had approached the University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill to open a branch campus of its business school in Education City, and those negotiations failed to materialize. As a result, Carnegie Mellon was asked to deliver both computer science and business programs (The Chronicle, 2002)).

Kinser and Lane (2010) offer two models of international branch campuses: the archipelago model and the acropolis model. In the former, “institutions are dispersed throughout a state or nation with no geographic concentration of academic efforts” (p. 18). In the latter model, several institutions are brought together in one location. Education City has adopted the acropolis model, and the goal of the creation of Hamad bin Khalifa University is not only to facilitate closer cooperation among its various institutions, but also to create a new model of a university that breaks with the old model. The new university hopes to break
disciplinary silos and create an environment of multi- and inter-disciplinarity that will foster the exchange of ideas across universities, departments, and research centers (Hamad bin Khalifa University, 2012).

As illustrated on pages 154 above, the new university envisages itself as the amalgam of the ten degree-granting institutions operating in Qatar. Because of the infancy of this project, none of the participants interviewed for this dissertation were able to offer any clarity on how this new administrative structure would operate in reality. The universities that accepted to be part of this project were promised autonomy in decision-making, admissions, and academic and operational planning. The establishment of HBKU adds another layer of bureaucracy and reporting mechanism to the institutions operating in Doha. Depending on how much authority this new body decides to wield, it might pose some serious questions about the independence and viability of these American institutions.

In examining the interviews done at Education City and in reviewing the extant texts, three primary themes emerged. First is the idea of reciprocity between the branch campus and the home campus, as well as between the branch campus and Qatar. The second theme is identity, namely how the branch campus build its own identity, while keeping true to the identity it already has in the U.S. And the final theme is Qatari student enrollment and involvement.
Reciprocity

In all the interviews conducted at Education City, there was an important sense of the role of the branch campus vis-à-vis a number of entities: the home campus, Education City campuses, Qatar University, and Qatari society in general. The branch campuses were invited to participate in the development of Qatar as a knowledge society. Their mandate was not only to teach, but also to be fully engaged in the larger project set out by the Emir and Sheikha Mozah, i.e. the creation of a knowledge-economy in Qatar.

Within the broader theme of reciprocity, there are three separate issues that will be discussed: a) reciprocity between the branch campus and the home campus; b) reciprocity between the branch campus and the other campuses in Education City; c) reciprocity between the branch campus and Qatar.

Reciprocity between the branch campus and the home campus.

The establishment of a branch campus always comes with the concern of how this branch campus will operate vis-à-vis the main campus. One of the University of Virginia's pressing issues in deciding to not operate a branch campus in Qatar was the issue of transferring academic and administrative structures to another location in an environment that was foreign to the accreditation standards mandated in the United States (University of Virginia, 1999).

Participant EC-3 offered the following that summarizes very well the nature of this reciprocity, and especially how it is related to the center/periphery
dichotomy that has been discussed in the literature (Altbach, 2002a, 2007; Altbach & Knight, 2006; Taji, 2004). The participant said,

“The whole notion of center and periphery is premised on the assumption that there is a certain fount of knowledge and everybody else is either on the receiving end of it or people don’t have anything to contribute, which is a wrong assumption. That is an assumption that oftentimes people have in the United States assuming, so if you go to a place like China or Qatar or if you go here or there, we dilute the brand, not understanding that actually we significantly enhance the scholarly endeavor and quality through the synergetic relationships. And the assumption is that the fount of knowledge is over there and by the time it trickles down to the satellite operation, it gets somehow watered down and is diluted, not realizing that perhaps, the other place [branch campus], which we mistakenly think of as satellite or periphery, has something worthy to contribute from which the other place [main campus] can learn. What we are doing would not be possible from our location in [the US]. The kinds of access we have, and the kinds of knowledge we are generating, we couldn’t do this anywhere else unless we were here. We are in close contact with the environment, when we really delve into the context and understand the context, and understand the lay of the land ... [A professor from any university] who comes here for two weeks, going around and getting some interviews and maybe buying some data available on the internet, he or she might get published and might get acclaim; we’re
generating knowledge and contributing to knowledge at a fundamentally deeper level.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 1, 2012)

The branch campus operates not merely as an extension of the main campus in the United States. It is not merely an outpost paid for by the Qatari government in order to get acclaim and high salaries for its employees. The branch campus does not merely serve as a financial windfall as some have claimed, especially in the case of campuses such as NYU-Abu Dhabi (Krieger, 2008b). The branch campus gives back to the main campus and enhances the very mission of the university that it represents. In the quote offered by the above participant, the branch campus serves to increase the research portfolio of the home campus, and by extension, contributes “to knowledge at a fundamentally deeper level.” The branch campus not only serves the main campus, but also gives back and enhances the way the home campus operates.

In another quote about this reciprocity, one of the participants from Georgetown University (the university in this case had to be identified because of the overt reference to Jesuit Heritage Week, although the participant will not be identified) said,

“We celebrate Jesuit Heritage Week here, but of course we have to look at the values of Islam and the similarities between both the cultures. And again, the interesting thing about that is that has had an impact on how Jesuit Heritage Week is look at on main campus as well. There is a complement to how both the Qatar campus and the campus in DC celebrate Jesuit Heritage Week … I
think Qatar has offered a lot back to the States as well.” (I. Khoury, personal
communication, December 1, 2012)

What the Qatar campus of GU has done is taken a uniquely Georgetown
University tradition and implemented it in Doha, in ways that are culturally
appropriate, but simultaneously, has also affected the way in which DC celebrates a
tradition that was started in 2001 (Georgetown University, 2012). The reciprocity
between the home campus and the main campus is obvious, both in the areas of
academics and in student affairs. The branch campus does not merely mirror the
home campus without offering innovation. The two campuses operate in a
synergistic and symbiotic relationship that enhances the operations, the academics,
the research output, and the student experience at both locations.

In another example of how this reciprocity functions, another official from
Education City, EC-6, stated,

“Our students who go to main campus come back with mixed stories. One
of them would be how incredibly competitive students are on the main
campus, and that we’re not working as hard as they do on the main campus
because they’re just so competitive with each other. On the other hand, they
would say that the classes here are harder than the classes on the main
campus. And I talked them through that. Their interpretation is that here is
that the faculty here are so intent on maintaining the brand, that this is
supposed to be a tough course, that they really don’t see themselves as
having any wiggle room in what they’re doing, while faculty on main campus
are more relaxed. I’m teaching [this course], and they ebb and flow with the
effort. They’re comfortable with what they’re doing ... The evidence that they [the students] can manage the courses [on main campus] better is that their grades are higher than they are here.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 5, 2011)

The notion of reciprocity between the main campus and the home campus takes on a different iteration here. It is a function of how teaching operates at a branch campus in ways that make students from the branch campus successful on the main campus. This heavily complicates the notion of center/periphery in that the “periphery” is not viewed as less than or inferior to the main campus. The proof that students from the branch campus are succeeding is a testament to that complicated relationship. Another administrator, EC-8, said,

“One of the most rewarding things to me is that we have improved how we do a lot of teaching on the main campus by teaching here to a completely different population. Teaching to a largely English as a Second Language population has meant that I don’t lower my standards, but I think differently about how I evaluate people’s work. I put less of an emphasis on their mastery of the language and more of an emphasis on their mastery of a concept or an idea or their skills. When I’ve gone back and taught on the main campus after that, that’s improved my teaching there as well ... We have [also] taken some of our curricular changes here back to main campus as well, and they’re working there as well.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011)
There is a deeply embedded understanding of the nature of how people learn in the above quote. By adapting teaching to a different population, this participant was able to enhance the student experience by focusing on assessment methods that were relevant to students’ experiences, as well as to enhance the quality of teaching on the main campus by expanding the way faculty in the US thought about and assessed their own teaching methods.

Reciprocity takes different forms, and is often visible in different ways. Whether it is the way a student organization celebrates a university tradition, or in the way that faculty conduct their research, or even in the ways that the teaching enterprise is conducted, the branch campus offers much to the home campus.

**Reciprocity between the branch campus and the other campuses in Education City.**

The establishment of Education City was as a multi-university campus adopting the acropolis hub model. Intrinsic in this model is the idea of cooperation and reciprocity between the institutions. Although there is a limited number of majors that cut across the institutional boundaries, the synergies between the universities have slowly started to manifest.

Participant EC-1 was very emphatic about this point, and said,

“Student Affairs professionals are the connectors; they always have been and always will be ... It was really very organic in its origin. When I arrived here, on my first day on the job ... I got a phone call that the Board of Directors was meeting and that [my supervisor] wanted to introduce me ... At that meeting, Sheikha Mozah advocated the need to get more synergies going and
to have more connections across the campus, and more of a sense of a shared identity among the institutions. We’ve been working on that ... [The] Student Affairs heads at the branch universities ... chose to author a booklet on the student experience at Qatar Foundation. Nobody told them they had to do it or what the structure was supposed to be. They decided that it’s in our best interest to figure out how we connect across institutions.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 5, 2011)

The synergy that was created by the heads of Student Affairs led to the October 2011 publication of “Without Borders: A Collaborative Statement on the Student Experience” (Qatar Foundation’s Education Division Office of Faculty and Student Services et al., 2011). The document recognizes the need for students to build a unique identity in relationship to their home institution, but simultaneously addresses the need for a larger identity that encompasses the other institutions operating in Education City (a topic that will be discussed later). However, the strength of the document lies in its strong foundation in the principles of student affairs, especially from an international perspective. It outlines the four overarching principles of student affairs as outlined by the American Council on Education, and then delves into the seven main areas that will be addressed by each individual institution, as well as the Education City Student Affairs Forum as a whole:

- Student Engagement
- New Student Orientation
- Developing Student Leadership Capacity
- Community Engagement
- Health and Wellness
• Career Services
• Alumni Involvement (Qatar Foundation’s Education Division Office of Faculty and Student Services et al., 2011)

The sense of reciprocity among these institutions at a senior administrative level is strong. For example, while each university conducts an orientation session that coincides with its own academic calendar, the six institutions at Hamad bin Khalifa University conduct a joint orientation session that introduces all incoming first-year students to the larger entity that is Education City. In addition, participant EC-3 told me how these institutions also conduct a joint orientation for students coming from the U.S. home campuses to Qatar to do a study abroad at Education City (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011).

In addition to the synergistic relationships that have developed in Student Affairs, academic connections exist at Education City. Students cross-register for courses, faculty teach cross-listed courses, and the various campuses are in conversations about developing joint minors (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011).

However, these relationships are not always easy to navigate. Participant EC-6 said

“It is a complicated relationship; where we’re funded and we work for the Qatar Foundation and we’re also responsible to the main campus. My employer is [the home campus] but my salary comes from Qatar. On the one hand, you have Hamad bin Khalifa University, which suggests a relationship between these schools, which exists, except it’s Texas A&M, it’s Carnegie
Mellon, and we’re silos; we each have our own Dean, and they report to two masters – one in the US and one here. It limits cooperation but we do the best we can ... Within these silos, we have a common academic calendar with other campuses to facilitate cross-registration, which we started a few years before that. Cross-registration is not quite a consortium, but heading in that direction, but if [our] students take a course at [another institution in Education City], they get grade and figures into their grade point average, and we deal with it as internal course.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 5, 2011)

The complicated nature of the relationship between the branch campus and other institutions at Education City is further complicated by the establishment of this new entity, Hamad bin Khalifa University. However, it seems the universities are maintaining their own administrative and academic integrity and being loyal to their values, while also creating very organic relationships that both foster the student experience as well as create partnerships among universities that would, in other circumstances, not have existed.

**Reciprocity between the branch campus and Qatar.**

One of the founding tenets of the Qatar Foundation’s establishment of Education City was to turn Qatar into a knowledge economy. At the outset, it must be recognized that a minority of Qatar’s population are Qatari and as yet, less than 500 of these Qataris have enrolled at Education City’s universities. The imperative
to turn Qatar into a knowledge economy is a long-term project that will reap its benefits in many years. At this point, that project is in its infancy stage.

However, given this understanding, it is also important to note that Qatar’s transformation to a knowledge economy is going to involve the expatriate population that lives in and calls Qatar home (even if temporarily). It is this population and the research they generate that will be crucial for the slow transformation of Qatar.

However, participant EC-1 noted that “some of these branch campuses don’t take the local capacity building seriously” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 1, 2011). The complicated relationship between these branch campuses and the Qatar Foundation has been noted and elaborated upon, and so will not be bought up again here. It is, however, worth mentioning, that the multiple missions of these universities is a difficult balance that universities have not yet figured out. The same participant above mentioned that if universities don’t take this mission seriously, “all you’ve got is a local outpost of XYZ University that some country can boast about” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 1, 2011).

While the campuses at Education City give back to Qatar to different degrees, each of the universities engages in their own work that seeks to serve Qatar. A list below illustrates some of these initiatives:

- Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service has recently published three volumes that are directly related to Qatar: “Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf,” “Political Economy of the Persian Gulf,” and “International
Relations of the Persian Gulf” (Center for International and Regional Studies, 2012).

- Virginia Commonwealth University has designed a housing project for migrant labor that hopes to improve worker’s overall well being and to prove sustainable economics by demonstrating increased productivity and quality of work for migrant workers (Virginia Commonwealth University in Qatar, 2012b).

- Northwestern University students have partnered with Qatar University students to create a student organization called Film for Change Youth Club. As part of their joint efforts, an initiative titled “Video for Advocacy” project reached out to high school students in Qatar to teach them how to create high quality, social awareness videos (Northwestern University in Qatar, 2012b)

- Texas A&M University hosted a Research-Industry Partnership Showcase that “promoted dialogue between University researchers and industry representatives on collaboration potentials, mutual interests and shared opportunities for advancing the State of Qatar’s national vision and strategic development goals through research” (Texas A&M University in Qatar, 2012)

- Carnegie Mellon University and Weill Cornell Medical College have teamed up to establish a network of life science educators from primary and secondary schools in Qatar and the Arab world to offer them new ways to incorporate into their curricula information about scientific discoveries
and experimental design. This network will “work in line with Qatar National Vision 2030 toward developing an infrastructure for cutting edge research in the life sciences for Qatar and the region” (Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar, 2012).

This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of the kinds of initiatives in which the universities at Education City are engaged. They serve merely as a sample of the ways in which these institutions give back and engage with Qatar in ways that are meaningful. These institutions’ presence in Qatar is not just a boon to Qatar’s image; they work within Qatar to help advance the national goals that were laid out by Qatar. However, by saying that, it is important to remember that the mandate of these universities does not change. However, their presence in Qatar enhances the reach these universities have.

The reciprocal relationship between these universities and Qatar is not only on an institutional level. Participant EC-8 summarized the mission of branch campuses and how they engage in a reciprocal relationship with Qatar and the region:

“We believe that a liberal professional education will help to create people who can solve big hard problems. Broadly speaking, this region has tremendous problems. There’s strife, civil unrest, history of war, human rights issues, and this is true throughout the Middle East. We feel that our being here, and our educating people in the liberal professional model – we’re not going to solve the problems, but we can educate people who will solve the problems themselves. This is somewhat altruistic, but it’s also
somewhat enlightened self-interest. We’re not going to solve the problems of the environment, or wars that have happened in the Middle East, or lack of women’s empowerment ourselves, but by training the next generation of leaders here, we’re going to give people in this region the tools to figure out solutions to those problems.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011)

So, universities in Education City are operating (as universities in the United States do) on multiple levels. Universities have their guiding philosophies that trickle down into institutional initiatives, such as research publications and institutional partnerships. Each university engages in activities that build on the strength of their academic initiatives. What the participant above is alluding to how students are then impacted and create their own spaces that advance the institutional mission. That student interaction is integral to the next theme in this chapter, building an identity in Qatar.

**Identity**

Since 2010, Duke University has been in talks with the city of Kunshan and Wuhan University in China for the establishment of a joint venture university (Duke University, 2012). One of the many issues that have arisen has been the issue of identity. According to Paul Haagen, Duke professor of law who has been appointed chairman of the China Faculty Council, "We will have to wrestle with: Can we do this and preserve what is essentially Duke? Duke is a place with a sense of its own identity, community, purpose, and place" (Wilhelm, 2011). This very idea of
building and maintaining an identity was a central theme in the interviews that were conducted in Education City. The overwhelming response was a positive one, and this section will look at two aspects of identity: institutional identity and student identity.

**Institutional identity.**

When I walked through Education City, the branding of universities was ever-present in their respective buildings. In the areas outside of the buildings, this branding was not as evident, as the public displays were more related to Education City and the Qatar Foundation. But within the buildings, branding, school colors, mascots, and other cultural markers of university identity were everywhere to be seen. In response to the question about whether establishing a branch campus could be done while preserving institutional identity, every participant offered a positive answer to this response, and below are some examples.

Participant EC-2 stated that the university made an effort to make its values prevalent in Doha, and have managed to do this by bringing in a host of officials in student affairs from main campus. By doing so, they were able to bring the culture of main campus to Doha and ensure that students were exposed to that.

Participant EC-8 claimed that building an institutional identity has been one of the university's challenges from the beginning, however “after eight years of effort, I can comfortably say the answer is yes” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011). This participant stated that the only way they were able to do this was to look at the “fundamentals” of their university’s experience, and decided
they need to focus on four factors: interdisciplinarity, solving real world problems, ensuring a rotating faculty, and ensuring close oversight by top level management from main campus.

Participant EC-6 affirmed that it was not an easy task to establish a unique identity in Doha, and that it remains an ongoing effort. After a number of years of attempting this, this participant said that “it’s [an identity] hard to establish, hard to maintain, and easy to let slip away” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 5, 2011).

The three participants above noted how universities work to create a sense of identity that is linked to the home campus. This is an important part of building a branch campus identity. A lot of thought and effort goes into the work of not only the infrastructure and academic programs at the new campus, but also to transporting a well-established identity to a new location. A branch campus must be linked in identity and ethos to the home campus, and that is what the above participants have alluded to.

Another aspect of building an identity is how the branch campus is received in the new site. Participant EC-4 elaborated that the university sponsors events that foster a culture of dialogue, exchange of ideas, and open discourse. This idea gets at the core of what a university does. The events that this participant’s university hosted complemented its academic program offerings, and thus the ethos of the home campus was brought to Doha. In addition, this university’s identity in Doha was linked, in part, to the events the university hosted. In Doha, people associated this university with the events, talks, and conferences it hosted.
Student identity.

An institutional identity is the first part of building a branch campus. Having that institutional identity adopted by students and ensuring that their university identity is strong is as important. Walking through Education City, I was able to see students who were proudly displaying their university’s logo and mascot on t-shirts, backpacks, paraphernalia, and even as window decals on their cars.

Participant EC-5 said that the students at his university in Education City have developed a “very profound” university identity that is “unique and idiosyncratic.” While this participant acknowledged that students “may not have all the referents, all the little things you do on main campus, they have established their own set of traditions here” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011).

Participant EC-7 noted

“When people come from main campus, people are amazed by how much Doha students identify as members of the university community. They identify with the mascot, and with the ethos of our university community.

We infuse our identity into everything we do.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 6, 2011)

That same sentiment about infusing identity was shared by participant EC-3 who said that her university takes a lot of effort in keeping the university’s brand. The administrators at the university talk to students about the values and the ethos of the university. In addition, when programming is done, the values of the university are infused into those efforts.

Participant EC-5 noted how the establishment of his university within
Education City, and the formation of Hamad bin Khalifa University, has affected students’ sense of identity

“We are trying to go beyond our [individual university] identity, and my colleagues within Education City are trying to go beyond having a single identity, and to have an Education City identity – Hamad bin Khalifa University as it’s now called. So while their academic degree is from [this] University and the academic rigor is [this] University, they also have this other identity that allows them to mix and mingle with students from all these other wonderful universities out there, and it gives it more of a feel of being part of a larger university, because here there are [around 200] students, but if you look at Education City as a whole, it has almost 1500 students, so ... there’s much to be gained from living in the residence halls, living with an engineer or a pre-med student, or a business student. I think there’s a cross-fertilization of ideas that happens” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011)

This question of identity is one that is prevalent in the literature on student affairs, and takes on a particular twist on the American campuses in Doha. Students who come to the Doha campuses are lured by the academic quality of the programs offered there. What happens as part of a concerted effort on the part of the university, is that students develop an identity that is linked to their institution. They become Hoyas (Georgetown) or Wildcats (Northwestern) or Aggies (Texas A&M). This creation of an identity is mirrored at universities across the United States, but they have the particular advantage of history, tradition, and location to
ground this identity. In Doha, the challenge becomes to create or inculcate this identity in students without the benefit of all the factors that ground the identity. So, for Texas A&M students in College Station, a number of factors go into building their identity. Sports, the Texas-Texas A&M rivalry, Reveille (the first lady of Aggieland, the school’s mascot), Muster (alumni reunion), the Big Event (the largest single day student-run community service event), eateries, among other things all form the Aggie identity of students in Texas (Texas A&M University, 2012). However, these referents are missing in Doha. And so, the administration of Texas A&M has to make a concerted effort to introduce and maintain those elements that can be transported to Doha ever-present in the student imagination.

Add to this a new layer of a university that is an amalgam of other universities, whose structure is nebulous, whose relationship to these branch campuses is unclear, and whose identity is as yet unformed. What students will now have to develop, and what the administration will have to help them discover, is how their individual university identities are related to this larger structure, and how to relate across institutional boundaries.

Qatari student enrollment and involvement

This theme emerged in all of the interviews and is a different iteration of the issues faced at Qatar University. According to the data, one third of students at Education City degree-granting institutions are Qatari, and of those, 2/3 are female (Al-Misnad, 2012). The issue of Qatari student enrollment is at the heart of the Education City project. The question was posed, “Who is Education City for?”
Participant EC-1 said,

“For Qataris. You have to start there, and that is not necessarily a completely embraced perspective. It has to be. This country has to have its own talent development of its nationals. Secondly other international students, some of whose families have been here for decades or generations – resident non-Qataris – who want to continue to invest in the country. And then true international students who see the potential in a developing economy like this. It’s the mix that is fascinating. We have about 50% Qatari student enrollment, but varies across the program – the Academic Bridge Program (ABP) brings in over three hundred Qatari students, and about one third of ABP students end up in a branch campus in their second year. Without ABP students, a little over one third of our students are Qatari. The remaining two thirds are split between expatriate residents and truly international students.” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 1, 2011)

Education City enrolls approximately 1,500 students across all its institutions (the five undergraduate programs, the Academic Bridge Program, and Weill Cornell Medical College). However, as has been mentioned previously, the reform of the K-12 system happened almost in tandem with the development of Education City, and thus the system has not “caught up” to the high standards demanded of the universities in Education City. While the project is suggested to be “for Qataris,” it seems that Qataris will not enroll in large numbers until the K-12 system reforms are implemented and begin to produce the kinds of results that meet the standards of the American universities in Doha. Admission to Qatar University requires a 2.0
grade point average, taking an international English language assessment (either IELTS or TOEFL), and only if their secondary school grades in English and/or math are not adequate, are then required to sit for either the SAT or the American College Test. (Qatar University, 2012b) The scores required for admission (if the tests are taken) to Qatar University mean that the student must be in the 46th percentile compared to her/his peers entering college (The College Board, 2012).

Admission to the American universities at Education City is at the same standard of these universities in the United States. Indeed, participant EC-8 emphasized that maintaining the same admission and academic standards was written into the first page of the university’s agreement with the Qatar Foundation (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011). The universities at Education City have acceptance rates in the U.S. of, as low as 19% (as is the case for Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Washington, DC), and their programs are ranked in the top 10 in their fields (as with every university in Education City). The application requirements demand high academic performance in school (in the top 95th percentile), high SAT I scores (all the universities’ mean admissions scores place students in the 90th percentile), at least one essay, and an interview. Applicants to Virginia Commonwealth University are required to present a portfolio; those to Georgetown submit a second essay on a current global issue; and those to Northwestern must submit a writing sample as well as take a controlled writing exam (Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2012; Northwestern University in Qatar, 2012a; Virginia Commonwealth University in Qatar, 2012a). These high standards are not meant to suggest that it is
impossible for Qatari students to enter the universities in Education City – almost one third of students at a degree-granting institution at Education City are Qatari. But what it does suggest is that the K-12 reform that was started 10 years ago has a long way to go before producing any critical mass of Qataris who are prepared to enter the universities in Education City.

Participant EC-2 provided a very critical perspective on Qatari student enrollment saying that Qataris not only get their tuition paid, but also receive a stipend when they attend Education City campuses, and thus they have little motivation and arrive on campus feeling entitled. When asked about their numbers, the participant attributed it to the “systemic failure in the education system and its reform in Qatar” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011). There is certainly merit to this thought and it does account for the low enrollment figures that have not mirrored the sentiment offered by the earlier participant that Education City is for Qataris.

Not only are the numbers of Qataris enrolled in Education City low, but their participation in extracurricular activities also seems to be low. Part of that reason, according to Participant EC-6, goes back to the nature of Education City as both a residential campus (especially for the international students) and a commuter campus (especially for the Qatari students). With their families so nearby, and the family being the central social unit in Qatar, these students continue to remain close-knit within that unit, even while spending their day at an American campus.

Participant EC-2 gave another reason for the level of Qatari student involvement. This interviewee said that in the United States, a graduate’s job
prospects are directly related to her/his involvement and leadership while at university. In Qatar, this interviewee states, that was not the case; as a Qatari, employment is guaranteed (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011). A disproportionate number of Qatars are employed in the public sector – approximately 83 percent – and this figure, when combined with Qatariization policies that seek to increase the number of Qatars in all sectors of the economy, leads to the conclusion that Qatari nationals are guaranteed employment upon graduation (Nolan, 2012).

Part of the difficulty of creating programs that will engage Qatari students has been at the crux of the branch campus experience. As Participant EC-5 noted, “If we build it for them, they will never build it for themselves ... and it will be on a Western paradigm or what we imagine a Muslim/Arabic [sic] paradigm to be” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 4, 2011). So, on the one hand, there has been the notion of self-empowerment, i.e., giving Qatari students the tools to build and develop programming for themselves. This empowerment will then create graduates that can go on and develop a knowledge economy and be innovative in the future of Qatar. On the other hand, Qatari students come from schools in which this empowerment model was not practiced, so while the development of independent schools in Qatar has been to engage students academically, the social development model has been largely absent. Furthermore, Qatari society largely depends on conformity and, while curricular changes can be implemented (albeit with much social resistance), the kinds of changes that would lead to Qatari student engagement “require a population that’s used to these things”
(Nolan, 2012). As has been mentioned in Chapter 4, late rentier states engage in a delicate dance of establishing progressive policies while keeping their populations subservient. The ruling family holds power in these states, and one way to keep the population loyal is through financial security. Education remains a form of social control and Qatar’s K-12 system, despite the reform that it has undergone, remains a mechanism to establish the kind of citizens that will not upset the system in place in Qatar. Thus, student development programs in Qatari high schools have not set up the leadership and student engagement programs that prepare Qatari students for active student involvement in universities. This is a problem that must be remedied if Qataris are going to take charge of the burgeoning knowledge economy the states hopes to become.

**Higher education reform in Qatar**

This topic has undergirded this entire dissertation, and the answer about its goals is nebulous. Sound bites about “knowledge economy,” and becoming a model for the region and the world are plentiful. The Qatari leadership and the leadership of the Qatar Foundation have appeared on world media outlets proclaiming the successes and bright future of education in Qatar. However, as Davidson (2011) notes, “The quality of the education available does not matter as long as the majority of the population remain de-motivated due to distributed wealth and a reliance on an expatriate work force” (p. 113). To add another layer to the complexity of this reform, “several scholars and close observers have pointed to Qatar’s liberalization project as aimed towards raising its global prestige and international prominence –

Chapter 4 outlined the very ambitious goals of the State of Qatar, from opening up their economies to pursuing projects around the world to taking a very active role in the riots that have reshaped the Arab World since the spring of 2011. The reform of higher education in the small but very rich monarchy can only be understood within the larger frame of reference that is the changes taking place in the country.

To start, it would be easy to write off Qatar’s reform as merely an aesthetic cover-up aimed at garnering international attention and prestige. That argument was debunked quite candidly by Participant EC-1 who said,

“There are a lot cheaper ways to get public attention than what is being done here. I've heard the argument about Sheikhs in the Gulf competing for visibility and prestige. I think each one of them is charting their own course to suit their national needs” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 1, 2011)

This argument holds a contradiction that probably helps explain the reform of higher education. The first part of the argument presents truth. The Education City project alone is a multi-billion project, while the reform of Qatar University has been an extremely expensive venture. Paying these amounts of money for a national return that will probably not yield equivalent returns is not a wise investment. However, the second part of the argument is also true. Each ruler in the Gulf is charting his own course to suit national needs. Qatar has a very small population and the development of multiple institutions of higher education (as is
done in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates) would not be a wise investment. Thus, by looking outward and inviting (and funding) universities to set up campuses in Qatar, the leadership saw that its investment would not only suit its national population, but also its expatriate and international populations, on whom the country will always rely. For those non-Qatari residents at Education City universities, attending the kind of universities they would like without having to travel to the United States is a big advantage, and increases their personal investment in the country. For expatriate residents and those international students who come to Qatar to attend university at Education City, “they are given loans and if [they] work for a governmental organization or other approved organization that has cooperative purposes with the state of Qatar, the loan is forgiven in 5 years” (I. Khoury, personal communication, December 1, 2011). Not only is this is a lure for prospective students, the Qatar Foundation has found a way to not only invest in its own population, it has found a way to develop the human capacity of all those who live in Qatar. For comparative purposes, NYU-Abu Dhabi offers scholarships and grants to students to attend the institution in the United Arab Emirates, with no conditions attached (NYU Abu Dhabi, 2012). Thus, the graduate of NYU-Abu Dhabi feels little connection to or investment in the future of the UAE. While it is not in the purview of this dissertation to explore the psychological motivations of the expatriate/international graduate student of Education City, the fact that the Foundation has made employment in Qatar a prerequisite for (essentially) a free (and very expensive) university education means that the graduate will invest in the future of Qatar.
Contrary to the multiple articles, books, and theses written on this topic, the discussion of higher education reform in Qatar cannot begin or end solely with a discussion of Education City. The complex development of Qatar University is an essential and integral part of this discussion as that institution enrolls approximately 97% of all Qatari graduates (Nolan, 2012). The university's move from a small college of Education into the modern university it is today is impressive. Enrolling approximately nine thousand students, the university stands at the heart of the changes in higher education in Qatar.

The university slowly moved toward an English language curriculum that was then balanced out by some programs being offered in Arabic. The 2012 Supreme Education Council degree ensured that all humanities, social sciences, law, and business programs were offered in Arabic, seemingly as a social backlash to what was perceived as an over-Westernization of the University’s reform. And so, in response to part of the University’s globalization efforts, pressures to nationalize were introduced, thus acting as a counter-balance. However, the fact that the University has successfully submitted its application for SACS accreditation in August 2012, is an one indication that the tension between globalization and efforts to remain rooted as Qatari national institution that caters to the social, educational, and political needs of its population is ever-present (Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, 2012).

When one looks at the higher education landscape in Qatar, there are a number of institutions in operation: Qatar University, the institutions of Education City, the College of the North Atlantic, the Community College of Qatar, and Stenden
University (a Dutch institution whose branch campus in Qatar offers programs in tourism and hospitality management). What is the connection between these seemingly disparate institutions?

The answer is in Qatar’s vision for the future, guided by its *National Vision 2030* document, which undergirds all the efforts undertaken in the area of education. The leadership of Qatar is offering a variety of institutions that will draw in nationals, expatriates, and international students to its shores to study the full array of programs available. Qatar University is not tailored to meet the needs of everyone, not even of all Qatari nationals, and thus the Qatar Foundation filled that gap, not by building another national university that would mirror Qatar University with only slight modifications, but instead brought in prestigious universities that would offer a completely different experience to the students who selected to go there. Qatar University and Education City offer four-year and graduate degrees, but the Qatari leadership recognized that not all its high school graduates would want and/or aspire to that kind of education, and so they invited the Canadian College of the North Atlantic to offer technical degrees in health sciences, engineering technology, information technology, and business studies, and have recently established the Community College of Qatar (with the assistance of Houston Community College) to offer associate degrees (College of the North Atlantic - Qatar, 2010). Stenden University offers those degrees that no other institution of higher learning in Qatar offers, thus filling yet another niche.
The reform of higher education in Qatar is fraught with the tensions between globalization and nationalization. There is no fine line that separates the two forces and it is often difficult to see where nationalization efforts end and globalization efforts begin. The examples of Qatar University and Education City offered in this chapter are evidence of that tension. Globalization need not be seen as a threat and nationalization need not be approached as maintaining an outdated status quo. However, the Qatari leadership and the leadership of all institutions of higher education in Qatar need to approach liberalization very carefully. Without the consent of the population, the country could be mired in a development strategy that leaves out its own population, and that would negate all the efforts (and money) the leadership has put over the last 18 years to developing its own economy.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

Globalization and nationalization are not easy terms to define or even narrow, but scholars have attempted to do both. And in the arena of higher education, globalization has become a buzzword for American universities. From setting up campuses abroad and attempting to attract more international students, to establishing study-abroad sites in interesting locations and introducing programs in languages and globally-oriented studies, American universities have put forth much effort and time in preparing their students for an ever-changing world where global skills are no longer optional, but necessary.

In Qatar, the reform of higher education has taken the overt form of Westernization. Qatar University has adopted Western structures and forms and infused local and Islamic content throughout the curriculum to appear authentic, while seeking legitimacy from the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. From the structure of its colleges, to the nature of its core curriculum program, to the universities against which it benchmarks, Qatar has a dual focus – preparing its graduates to serve Qatar while doing everything it can to serve standards that are not Qatari.

The Qatar Foundation was established and the cornerstone of that project is Education City, which is anchored by six American institutions that offer undergraduate degrees in politics and economics, fine arts, business, technology, engineering, and medicine. Established as an economic driver with secondary
intentions of becoming a global model, Education City caters to elite Qataris with the preparation for advanced-level university education, as well as to Arabs and other international populations who would rather not deal with the hassle of traveling to the United States for their education.

Both of these projects represent a big chunk of higher education reform in Qatar. Explaining the global/national tension in each case leads to few concrete answers, and in combination, leads to even fewer answers. Are these reforms done to boost the image of Qatari leadership? That leadership certainly likes to rock the boat – the establishment of Al-Jazeera, the public funding of Syrian rebels, and bids to host the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics (the latter failed three times) are certainly indications that this might be true. Education is but one sector of the economy, and if the leadership cares so much about its image, then why should education not be one mechanism for boosting its image? However, that answer could easily be no as well. The country could invest far less money (although money does not seem to be an issue here) and make public statements that would just-as-easily place it in the public spotlight.

Are these reforms being implemented to enhance the Qatari workforce? Certainly, yes. The link between education and economic development have been well-established in the literature although scholars such as Yang (2003) might disagree. However, Qataris only account for approximately 15% of the population of the Qatar, and thus, does the investment yield the desired return? Furthermore, with 97% of the native Qatari population that leans toward public-sector employment, is this level of funding desirable? Should a country develop a
population that continues to rely on the state for its sustenance, and does not develop the entrepreneurial capacity to expand the economy?

This study was an effort to answer these questions and namely to relate the transformation of higher education in Qatar vis-à-vis globalization trends and within the larger context of the nation's development. Below, I provide an overview of the study, a summary of its key findings, and, in light of these findings, a set of propositions on higher education in Qatar for further study. After discussing these directions for future research, I offer a few preliminary ideas about what these findings might mean for Qatari leaders as they continue to transform their higher education landscape and institutions.

An Overview of the Study

The globalization of higher education takes many forms – in the US, it is the institution and faculty members that engage in this enterprise, while in Qatar, the globalization of higher education has taken the explicit form of adopting American forms. The purpose of this study was to examine those forms, to see how these forms and Qatari national policies interact, and to see how these practices are related to national trends occurring in Qatar. In order to explore these issues, the following research questions were proposed:

R1. How do the goals of globalization and nationalization policies interact in the transformation of higher education in Qatar?
R2. What are the goals of higher education reform in Qatar, and how are these related to the changes taking place in Qatar?
R3. What roles do each institution play, and how do the various higher education institutions and bodies in Qatar interact?
To answer these questions, I engaged in a case study research that involved three data sources: interviews with key leaders at Qatar University and Education City, extant text sources, and personal observations over at staggered times over a period of two years. With interviews being the central focus, I spoke to senior-level administrators in Qatar who have primary responsibility for academic and student affairs administration and attempted to probe the tensions between global forces and national imperatives in their work and the policies they implement. In doing so, I was able to ascertain a holistic picture of reform of higher education in the country.

**Conceptual framework**

The conceptual framework for this study came from the work of Taji (2004), Altbach (2002) and Marginson and Rhoades (2002). Taji (2004) suggested that educational reform in Jordan was the product of a tacit acceptance of global standards and thus that the reform was guided by neo-colonial policies. She was critical of policymakers in Jordan who chose not to develop their own standards and culturally-relevant practices, but instead that they bowed to the 2002 World Bank report on the status of education in the Arab world.

Altbach’s (2002) theory is strongly linked to the underlying premise of Taji’s (2004), namely that there are distinct spheres of influence in global higher education. The core is located in the West (namely U.S. and Europe) and that the peripheries exist in the developing world. He posits that the trends in higher education are set in the core and these are emulated in the peripheries.
Marginson and Rhoades (2002) attempt to challenge the binaries that exist in the previous authors’ work by suggesting that even those on the peripheries have something to offer to the core. They developed a heuristic that examines reciprocal relationships between the core and the periphery in an attempt to give agency to the periphery.

**Research procedures and data analysis**

A total of twelve interviews were conducted with senior officials at both Qatar University and Education City. Two of the five undergraduate institutions at Education City were used in order to get a breadth of opinions. I received IRB approval from Qatar University and one of the institutions at Education City with ease, and had to submit interview protocol and confidentiality forms to the second EC institution. After completing these forms, I was given final IRB approval from the Pennsylvania State University, only on the condition that all participants would remain confidential. Interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and one and a half hours, and were conducted over a period of 2 weeks between November and December 2011.

In addition, I collected a large number of documents related to the research project that supplemented the interviews that I conducted. Between the information that I gleaned from the interviews and that from the documents, both the global and national imperatives that were driving higher education in Qatar became obvious.
My final data source came from personal observations undertaken in Qatar between 2009 and 2011, at site visits that I completed as an intern, as a professional while working in Oman, and finally in the final stages of my data collection for this dissertation. I took field notes during all my trips, and used these notes.

Upon completion of my interviews, I transcribed the interviews, saved them on a secure external drive, and password-protected my files. I then read through my interviews multiple times to look for themes that emerged. I used these themes and juxtaposed them against the documents that I had collected in order to corroborate the information I found.

**Limitations**

This study represents one of the earliest attempts to combine an analysis of a national university and branch campuses in Qatar. Other studies on Qatar, and indeed in the region, have focused on one or the other. A combination of both types of institutions can be applied to other case studies in which both national and branch campuses exist in such close proximity, but are not generalizable to the population. The findings of this study can inform studies on the relationship between national and international universities in the Middle East, or between national universities and branch campuses in sites such as Singapore and Malaysia, or even on studies that seek to explore the effects of globalization on national systems of higher education.

I conducted twelve interviews across three institutions and the Qatar Foundation in order to ascertain information. While this study is informed by the
elite interviewing methodology, an interview with more key players at various levels of the institution would have yielded more in-depth results on how globalization and nationalization operate “on the ground” in the transformation of higher education.

Furthermore, at Education City, I chose only two institutions at which to interview participants. While I was cognizant about ensuring institutional similarity, this study would have benefitted by getting information from all five undergraduate institutions at Education City. However, by choosing the institutions that I did, I was able to ensure an analysis of students and structures between schools that were comparable – in terms of governance, structure, curricular offerings, etc. By not having to account for other variables, I was able to parse the data more cleanly.

This study represented a first attempt to look at how institutions respond to global and national tensions. Had I gone one more level up and interviewed officials at the Institutional Standards Office and the Supreme Education Council, I might have gotten some more “big picture” answers to the reform of higher education in Qatar. However, making contact at those offices proved very difficult, and I found no one willing to speak with me, and so only institutional officials, and not national policy makers, were interviewed.

Had I been able to make contact, I might have run into the same problem I did at Qatar University – a lack of willingness to address difficult issues regarding perceptions of the reform underway in Qatar. Although my interviewees at Qatar University were most helpful and giving of their time and their knowledge, I felt a
reticence to delve into the issues of globalization and nationalization that are the purview of this dissertation.

Summary of Key Findings

When I first started writing this dissertation, I was determined to advance the position that Qatar had agency and that globalization was not a one-way flow of power or information from the West/North to the East/South. In the analysis in which I was going to engage, I was hoping to discredit all those theorists who take a negative approach to globalization and who assert that the Muslim world has no power and has been shaped by European and American hegemony. In examining how higher education has been shaped and is being transformed in Qatar, I tried to find the data or to locate those spaces in which Qatar’s agency (other than its financial investment) was actually found. Unfortunately, I couldn’t. Part of the process of writing this dissertation has engendered questioning and challenging my own assumptions and views with which I started this process. I would like to have offered a challenge to the dominant strands in the literature on globalization that would have created new spaces of inquiry in the field. However, when I examined my data and followed the evidence, the facts proved otherwise. I resignedly have been forced to accept the view that globalization, vis-à-vis the transformation of higher education in Qatar has been, as Abu Rabi’ (2004) offered, the product, primarily, of European/American hegemony. I have been forced to accept Mohammadi and Ahsan’s (2002) claim that the Muslim world has been passive in accepting the terms of globalizing forces, which in turn has created a dependency on
the West. Although there are some interesting notes to be made about new institutional structures (the establishment of Hamad bin Khalifa University) that are the purview of organizational and administrative studies, there is little in the way of a debunking of theories the equate globalization with Westernization.

Globalization in the transformation of Qatari higher education is a direct reflection of Westernization. Qatar is a state that has global ambitions that are reflected by investment abroad, involvement in regional politics, hosting major sports competitions, and media influence that far outweighs its small size. It has made its mark both regionally and internationally for the bold steps it has taken and is certainly a topic of discussion.

In this section, I will present a summary of my findings in direct relationship to the research questions that were posed.

**Question 1. How do the goals of globalization and nationalization policies interact in the transformation of higher education in Qatar?**

This dissertation has sought to find the congruence between globalization and nationalization policies in the transformation of higher education in Qatar. Globalization, read Westernization, plays out in all the systems, structures, curricula, and student services that are provided at both Qatar University and Education City. While the latter is obvious (as they are all American institutions), the former is a little more difficult to understand. How can a national university have such a schizophrenic focus – looking to prepare its graduates for productive lives in the country while the steps it takes to ensure this have to do with appealing to
international (namely American) accrediting boards who have little to nothing to do with Qatar?

The three issues at Qatar University that emerged from this study that answer this first research question are international accreditation, student quality/engagement and the gender imbalance, and social resistance to institutional change. These three issues are fraught with the global/national tension. The national university’s outward focus to garner American accreditation is at odds with its inward focus to promote the development of Qatar and maintaining the country’s national character. The university has made its explicit goal to not only accredit individual programs with primarily American accrediting bodies, but to also seek institutional accreditation through the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. The amount of time, effort, and money that the university is taking to appeal to the “best” (as three of my interviewees stated) and claim that accolade has been exorbitant. By doing so, they have set as an explicit goal the American “stamp of approval” in order to conduct their internal business, and the business of preparing graduates for the Qatari workforce. This will be elaborated upon further in the next research question.

Where students are concerned, the global/national dialectic again comes into conflict. The Supreme Education Council has opted to participate in international testing schema, namely TIMMS, PISA, and PIRLS. In each of these tests, Qatari students underperformed compared to participating countries, and scored in the bottom five on all three tests. While Qatar University reworked the standards it requires for admissions and increased them following the RAND-QPI 2009 report
recommendation that the university increase its standards. It did so, and was forced to institute a Foundation Program that would offer remedial math and English courses for students to be able to continue with their university studies. The disappointing results of the reform the K-12 education system in Qatar that is but ten years old has proven problematic for the university in getting the “best” students it would like to have. The “best” seem to be enrolling either at Education City universities or going abroad.

That is, with the exception of women, who make up more than two-thirds of the university’s undergraduate student body. Women, because of cultural norms, are not afforded the opportunity to go abroad to study on the same terms as their male counterparts, and since they clearly have a desire to pursue post-secondary education, do so in large numbers at Qatar University. The genders do not mix at Qatar University, as there exist two distinct campuses; however, where they do mix, it is under close supervision from the administration. Furthermore, the university has pre-determined which majors are available to men and women, thus engaging in a kind of academic-social engineering that forces each gender into different fields. While separate-gender education is not a problem, and certainly is a national imperative within Qatar, here is one case where the national imperative has coexisted nicely with the global. Despite the university’s attempt to garner international legitimacy for its academic programs, it has managed to preserve the cultural norms prevalent in society. While the university approaches the United States for direction on structure, form, and curriculum, it remains responsible to the society in which it is located, and to whom it remains responsible.
This same society, however, resisted the changes that came with the university's desire to advance. There was strong social resistance to increasing admissions standards, and there remains strong social resistance to events and programs that involved gender mixing. The university faces a battle in maintaining a uniquely Qatari identity, and responding to the needs of the larger Qatari society.

At Education City, one of the issues that emerged is directly related to the first research question is that of Qatari student involvement and enrollment. The very existence of Education City is the result of globalization efforts on the part of the leadership of Qatar. The goals of Education City will be discussed in the next question, but there is a dearth of Qatari students that enroll at the degree-granting institutions at Education City. Only 33% of the students who are currently enrolled at one of the five undergraduate degree-granting institutions of Education City are Qatari nationals. And this figure is even lower in student activities on these campuses. The national directive and the one understood at the Foundation is that Education City is “for Qatars”, but more than ten years after the first campus was established in Doha, the figure of 33 percent Qatari enrollment falls shorts of that mandate. The global entities that are these universities were brought to fulfill a national mandate, to develop the people of Qatar. Thus, far, with so few Qatari graduates, Education City is not living up to its mission.
Question 2. What are the goals of higher education reform in Qatar, and how are these related to the changes taking place in Qatar?

Since 1995, Qatar has been taking intentional steps to play a much larger role in regional and international politics. It has distanced itself from Saudi involvement in its internal affairs, has set up the Qatar Foundation to serve as an economic driver toward establishing itself as a knowledge economy, has set up Al Jazeera as an alternative to Western news outlets, and has successfully bid to host major international sports competitions. And that is the abridged list. Qatar has taken intentional steps to move away from being an energy-centric economy to being an energy-driven economy.

However, the country remains an absolute monarchy where freedom of the media and of expression are limited, abuse of labor is rampant, and the ruling family controls and/or directs the country's wealth. This is what Gray (2011) called “globalization with protectionism” – economic globalization with political and social protectionism. The social contract between the ruler of Qatar and the people is that the country will advance in such a way as to benefit the local population (the people of Qatar enjoy the highest GDP per capita in the world), and that through this, the ruling family will remain in power.

These foreign influences are heavily American. Qatar is home to the largest American air force base outside of the U.S. Shopping malls and movie theaters abound across Doha, where 80% of the residents of Qatar live. Grocery stores are replete with American products. Households across Doha air American television shows and movies, and American music can be heard on Doha's airwaves. And the education system is a mirror of this.
The changes in Qatar’s higher education system are undoubtedly American. They are not American-driven; they are not a function of a U.S. State Department office or initiative; they are not a post-9/11 public diplomacy stunt. These changes were decided upon from within Qatar and by Qataris. The drive toward Americanization in Qatar’s higher education system is a reflection of the society in which it exists.

The goals of Qatar’s higher education reform are two-fold: first, to develop a stronger and more competent graduate that will serve Qatar; and second, to establish the higher education sector as a model to be emulated. On the first goal, applying American standards (as in Qatar University) or importing entire institutions (as in Education City) is the way that policy makers have chosen to achieve that goal. At these institutions, hallmarks of American education such as a robust student affairs office, the core curriculum and learning outcomes are evident. Again, the tensions between the global and the national exist in the goals of higher education reform. Preparing Qataris for employment in Qatar comes through the adopting of non-Qatari standards, and approaching the United States for legitimacy of institutional programs.

The second goal also engenders the tension between global and national forces. This dissertation showed just how prevalent American educational norms are in Qatar. Education City is, as Kinser and Lane (2010) noted, set up as an “acropolis” hub; i.e. a conglomeration of institutions that are in close proximity to each other. The global is obvious – they are all American branch campuses. That point has been elaborated upon extensively already. However, at this juncture,
Qatar’s goal is to become a model in the arena of higher education. While the acropolis model is not new, the new structure, Hamad bin Khalifa University, is new. There is not enough information about this new entity as yet, and nor how this will affect reporting lines of senior administrators at the branch campuses. Furthermore, it is unclear how or if this will affect the academic independence that is sacrosanct in each of the universities’ agreement to come to Qatar.

Where Qatar University is concerned, it has a desire to become a model national university in the Arabian Gulf. There are factors that must be mentioned here. First, Qatar and Kuwait are the only two countries in the Arabian Gulf with only one national university. Every other country in the region (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman) has funded the establishment of multiple national universities. Each of the countries in the Arabian Gulf has different economic and political characteristics that make for different higher education needs. The desire to be a model national university in the Middle East cannot be considered reasonable, as the remaining countries of the Middle East are drastically different, not blessed with the wealth of Qatar, and much more nationally homogeneous in their populations. Second, Qatar University is following in the footsteps of the UAE’s Zayed University in seeking accreditation from a U.S. body. Zayed University, one of the UAE’s three national institutions of higher education, garnered accreditation from Middle States in 2008, while QU just submitted its application for SACS accreditation in August 2012.

Where Qatar University has made strides is in its reform project, namely in achieving autonomy from government control, decentralization in decision-making,
and accountability at all levels of the university. In this, the University has set itself apart. The president of Qatar University, while a member of the royal family (being the aunt of the Emir’s wife), was appointed because of her qualifications, not because of her lineage. Second, the President answers to the Board of Trustees of the University that, although headed by the Heir Apparent and includes other members of the royal family, functions as a body independent from the government. This is indeed a model in the Arabian Gulf where few, if any, universities function in the same way. However, as a national institution, it is still responsible and accountable to the government in much the same way that state universities in the U.S. answer to their citizens and legislatures. Thus, decrees such as the January 2012 one issued by the Supreme Education Council mandating that the language of instruction be changed to Arabic must be heeded. This does not imply that the university is not autonomous, only that it is responsible.

**Question 3. What roles do each institution play, and how do the various higher education institutions and bodies in Qatar interact?**

There is a clear hierarchy of institutions in Qatar. While QU is the country’s only national institution, the institutions at Education City are perceived as “elite” and for the elite. The existence of Education City poses a challenge to Qatar University. These universities are directly the result of globalizing efforts on the part of the leadership of Qatar. When the leadership invited these universities to establish campuses in Qatar, they chose programs and schools that were both nationally and internationally recognized for their strength. This put (and continues to put) Qatar University at a disadvantage on one hand, in that top students who
would have otherwise gone to Qatar University are now strongly tempted by the universities at Education City. The EC universities are a direct competition to Qatar University in terms of enrollment, although it should be noted that Education City graduates only a fraction of the students that Qatar University does. Furthermore, the institutions at Education City also pose a challenge to QU in the area of improving its academic standards. Where Education City does not pose a challenge is in the realm of cultural norms. Qatar University has as its mission the preservation and promotion of an Arab and Islamic identity, and the comparative advantage it has over Education City is that the students who choose to enroll at Qatar University are those who value that identity.

In terms of interactions between the institutions in Qatar, they are mostly informal and sporadic. The interviewees at both QU and EC mentioned that faculty work together on research projects and have published together. Furthermore, QU has enlisted the help of members of the EC community in a variety of ways: faculty members from EC help to restructure QU’s academic programs, and members of QU’s administration have gone to EC institutions to shadow staff members there in order to gain a greater understanding of student affairs, finance, etc. In this area, however, there has been reciprocity as members of the QU administration sit on the boards of Education City institutes, for example, Sheikha al-Misnad is a board member of Georgetown University’s Center for International and Regional Studies.

However, the reciprocity between the two bodies (QU and EC) is very limited. Marginson and Rhoades’ (2002) heuristic discusses the “magnitude and direction of the activity” (p. 291) and in the case of QU and EC, the magnitude and direction is
much more heavily weighted in favor of Education City. While the two institutions serve two different functions in Qatar's higher education landscape, the national institution seems to be more heavily dependent on Education City than vice-versa. This is a reflection of Altbach's (2002) argument on core and peripheries. In the larger picture, Qatar University remains on the periphery as it looks to Education City, institutions that are from the core, as the models to be emulated. Furthermore, the core/periphery argument put forth by Altbach also includes the question of dependence. Qatar University remains dependent on the West and Western ideas and ideals as it reimagines itself, and while this university enrolls significantly greater numbers of students, the universities of Education City continue to embody the excellence to which Qatar University aspires. So, even within Qatar, QU sits on the periphery.

Recommendations for future research design

This study represented a first attempt at analyzing the higher education landscape in Qatar. This enterprise was difficult given the infancy of much of the reform happening in Qatar, and given the breadth of institutions that exist in the country. Furthermore, this was one of the earliest projects that sought to examine both Qatar University and the numerous branch campuses in operation in the country. I propose the following recommendations for future research on the topic.

Recommendation 1. Interview officials at all the institutions of higher education in Qatar.

This study examined Qatar University and select institutions of higher
education at Education City. In the future, selecting more American institutions within EC, as well as the non-American institutions (HEC-Paris, University College London, the Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, the Translation and Interpretation Institute) would be helpful. In addition, there are non-EC affiliated institutions that provide post-secondary education in the country that can be included: the Community College of Qatar (in collaboration with Houston Community College), the College of the North Atlantic, and Stenden University. By including all these institutions, a more robust picture of reform in the country can be gleaned.

Recommendation 2. Interview government officials in the Supreme Education Council, its Institutional Standards Office, and key policy makers at Education City.

This study took as its launching point a bottom-up approach, i.e. that an analysis of reform of higher education in any country can be examined by looking at the work of institutions, and not necessarily of governmental policy and procedures (i.e. a top-down approach). Future studies can examine the issue from a top-down approach. Senior officials at the Supreme Education Council can offer much information as to the motivations and directions of the reform process underway in Qatar’s higher education sector. Furthermore, conducting interviews with senior leaders at Education City, as Walsh (2011) did, provides more insight into the reform, especially from a macro perspective.

Recommendation 3. Include faculty, staff, and students in the study.

This dissertation utilized the “elite interviewing” technique in order to
ascertain goals and motivations of reform, as well as how these are translated into policies at institutions. In the future, a study of faculty, staff and students at the institutions selected will give the researcher the opportunity to see the results of these policies and procedures, and especially how the effects of globalization and nationalization are operationalized in the classroom and in programs and services offered to students. In addition, including students will give the researcher an opportunity to measure how these curricular and programmatic changes are affecting their attitudes on scales of global competency and appreciation.

Implications for Policy Makers in Qatar

Although this study was designed to examine the nexus between globalization and nationalization in the transformation of higher education in Qatar, it is my desire to include some tangible recommendations for Qatari policy makers as they continue on their quest to transform the country into a viable knowledge economy.

Recommendation 1. Focus on the improvement and redesign of the K-12 system.

The K-12 sector in Qatar is woefully underperforming. Students in Qatari schools are not prepared for the rigors of the world-class university education the country envisages. The redesign of the country’s education system that began in 2002 has not yielded the results yet that its leaders had hoped for. An intentional redesign that is authentic in the Qatari context, and not one that merely infuses Qatari content into the curriculum, is of paramount importance. The changes that
have taken place have been implemented by the upper echelons of the Qatari government with no buy-in from the country’s population, thus creating a disconnect between goals and outcomes. In addition to a redesign, the Qatari leadership must consider the possibility of opening up the reform of the education system to include stakeholders such as parents, educational administrators, and community leaders. In this way, the buy-in for the reform will cut across all sectors of the society and yield competent and highly able graduates who will then enroll in the country’s institutions of higher education. A higher quality secondary school graduate results in a higher quality university student, which will raise the profile of Qatar University.

**Recommendation 2. Ensure cultural and national relevance in each step of the reform of higher education in Qatar.**

This recommendation sounds somewhat vague, but has a serious implication. Americanizing the curriculum and student services offerings at Qatar University is not the way to ensure success. The American model works in the United States and within its cultural, social, historical, and political context. The American model is foreign to the history and experience of the people of Qatar, and thus cannot be seen as the final answer, simply because of the belief that it is “the best”. This tacit acceptance of Americanization will change the character of Qatar in the long-run in ways that the current reformers will not be able to stem. Qatar’s reform of its higher education sector must take into consideration the needs and desires of the society in which it is located. Qatari values cannot only be implemented in social situation between male and female students, with that being labeled as being
responsible to Qatari society. A much greater infusion of Arab and Islamic ethos in the curriculum and programmatic offerings needs to be undertaken for the university to remain a pillar of the Qatari community.

At Education City, one of my interviewees noted that many members of the Education City community have not bought into the idea that EC is “for Qataris.” All new members of the Education City community need to be imbued with the idea that the goal of the project is to improve and build Qatar’s capacity, and that includes reaching out to actively recruit Qatari students to their institutions, providing student services that engage Qataris, and providing curricular offerings that are directly related to the development of Qatar.

**Recommendation 3. Increase the number of Qatari faculty members teaching at Qatar University and in Education City.**

Thirty-percent of Qatar University’s faculty are Qatari and only one faculty member at Education City is Qatari. The development of a successful knowledge economy cannot be based on the labor and research of non-nationals. There must be a much greater push to educating Qataris at the doctoral level and increasing their numbers on the faculty of institutions of higher education in Qatar. This recommendation will serve the above recommendation as well by ensuring that Qatari presence in institutions of higher education will always promote the country’s values and character.
**Recommendation 4. Qatar University must work to attract greater numbers of students to the College of Education.**

The College of Education at Qatar University works to prepare primary and secondary teachers and administrators. It is the only education school in the country and is not rivaled by any such institution at Education City, which seems to be intentional by design. This is certainly a positive aspect as the nation's leaders choose to keep tighter control of those who teach in Qatar's schools. However, the College currently is the third-smallest entity at the university, larger only than the professional schools of Law and Pharmacy. By attracting and graduating greater numbers of students, the College, which has an innovative curriculum to prepare teachers for Qatar's schools, can work to improve the quality of K-12 students.

**Recommendation 5. Increase collaboration between Qatar University and Education City.**

The interviewees at both QU and EC noted that collaboration between them happens on an individual faculty level. If Education City is to be part of the economic driver that moves Qatar toward a knowledge economy, it must operate as fully part of the society in which it exists. As institutions of higher education, their work must involve collaboration and reciprocity with Qatar University, in areas of academic program administration, student affairs administration, and country-wide initiatives.
Conclusion

This study examined the nexus between globalization and nationalization in the transformation of higher education in Qatar. Through interviews, an analysis of extant texts, and personal observations, I was able to glean that globalization has run rampant in Qatar’s higher education sector. There is an unbridled willingness to accept all things American, to adopt American standards and mechanisms, and looking to the U.S. for legitimacy. Qatar’s leaders have invested exorbitant amounts of money in the reform and are making short-term decisions that will certainly have long-term implications that have not been considered.

Qatar University has made great strides in becoming an autonomous institution free from government control, yet its subsequent actions have been focused on garnering U.S. institutional and programmatic accreditations. While the university graduates the greatest number of students in Qatar, they are currently seen as the university “of the people” with Education City being seen as “for the elites”. A number of issues have arisen at each of the two bodies, and what needs to be remedied is certainly a reform of the country’s K-12 education system, and the ethos of Qatari students who are not becoming involved in extra-curricular activities at their institutions. Remedying these issues will certainly yield the results that will work towards the outlined goals in Qatar National Vision 2030.

As the state of higher education stands in Qatar stands now, there is very little that is authentically Qatari. The pressures of globalization and the tacit acceptance of the American standard have driven the country’s leaders and the leaders of Qatar University to completely Americanize the system. A more
concerted effort to improve the K-12 system, to be more intentional (culturally and academically) in the reform of Qatar University, and to increase Qatari participation on the campuses and in the faculty of its universities might yield positive results on all levels.
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Endnotes

i It should be noted the use of the word “Sheikha”. This is both a title, as in the case of Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Missned. A “Sheikha” is the wife of a “Sheikh”, a religious official, a leader of an Arab family or village, or used as a form of address for such an official or leader. In Sheikha Mozah’s case, the title is an honorific title connoting the wife of the ruler of the country, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. “Sheikha” is also a common female name in the Arabian Gulf, as in the case of the President of Qatar University, Sheikha al-Misnad.

ii University College London is partnering with the Qatar Museums Authority to offer post-graduate qualifications in museum studies, conservation and archeology. HEC-Paris is part of the Qatar Foundation’s Management and Education Research Center’s (MERC) Graduate School of Management. Each of these graduate level programs has been in operation for less than one year, and therefore will not be included in this study.

iii I have decided to use 1950 as the founding date of the Lebanese American University because that was the year it was granted license to award baccalaureate degrees. It has existed since 1835 as the American School for Girls, and became the American Junior College for Women in 1927. In 1948, it became the Beirut College for Women, and two years later received a charter from the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York to grant two-year Associates degrees and four-year Bachelors Degrees. In 1970, the Lebanese Ministry of Education recognized BCW’s degrees as equivalent to the Lebanese License degree. By 1973, the university had become co-educational and changed is name to the Beirut University College, and in 1994 to the Lebanese American University (Lebanese American University, 2010).

iv A note needs to be made about the use of the term “Arabian Gulf”. In the American context, the body of water that separates Saudi Arabia and Iran is known as the “Perisan Gulf”. In the Arabic language, that body of water is referred to as “al-Khaleej al-Arabi” or Arabian Gulf. In order to reflect the nomenclature that respects the subject state of this dissertation, the term “Arabian Gulf” will be used throughout this research.

v The nationalities of expatriate labor do not offer the most accurate statistics as to identity and/or social group belonging. Many Arabs hold the passports of other countries, facilitating their mobility around the world, and especially in the Arabian Gulf where Arab passports (from countries outside the Arabian Gulf) are not always viewed favorably. Citizens of non-Gulf Arab countries are reportedly not given contracts in Gulf countries as lucrative as their counterparts with Western citizenships.
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