RELIGIOUS REGULATION’S IMPACT ON RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION:
THE EFFECTS OF DE FACTO AND DE JURE RELIGIOUS REGULATION

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ABSTRACT

Religious persecution is a form of social conflict that has attracted the attention of social scientists and policy makers in recent years. Religious persecution, as used in this dissertation, is the physical abuse or physical displacement of people due to their religious brand affiliation or due to their disposition to other religious brands. This dissertation investigates the proposition that religious regulation leads to religious persecution; specifically, this study investigates whether religious regulation—composed of socio-religious hegemony (de facto regulation) and inequitable legal/policy restrictions (de jure regulation)—offers a strong, significant, and direct explanation for variation in the level of religious persecution. Socio-religious hegemony (de facto regulation) is theorized to have both a direct impact on the level of religious persecution and an indirect effect on religious persecution, working through its impact on the inequitable legal/policy restriction (de jure regulation) of religion. Using improved measures for socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion for 196 countries, a series of hypotheses related to this proposition are developed and tested. Competing hypotheses are also considered and tested. The model of religious regulation put forward in this research also offers a practical approach to understanding the socio-religious forces which contribute to religious persecution, socio-religious conflict, and government responses to religion today.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the high visibility of religion in international social conflicts, most explanations of social conflict ignore the unique role of religion. Some explanations miss the dynamic nature of religion as a social actor. Other explanations conflate religion with other identities, downplaying the religious nature of conflicts which fall along religious lines. Though this research does not attempt to put forward a ‘general theory’ on conflict,¹ it does draw on a particular theory of religion and religious change in order to explain the forces that fuel a specific form of socio-religious conflict² which I refer to as religious persecution. To explain these forces not only requires the development of a theory-driven model, but also appropriate measures and analyses.

In this chapter I will begin by briefly mentioning some of the earlier literature on social conflict. Following this I will consider selected recent sociological studies on social conflict, focusing on empirical measurement issues that apply to the study of socio-religious conflict. I will then introduce how I plan to move beyond past research by juxtaposing two different models (or paradigms) of religion and religious change. I conclude the chapter with an outline of this dissertation.

EARLY LITERATURE ON SOCIAL CONFLICT

The history of the study of social conflict, which has been documented elsewhere (Aron 1968; Coser 1965; Dahrendorf 1959; Nisbet 1966; Parsons 1949), coincides closely with the history of “sociological thinking itself” in the words of Anthony Oberschall (1973:1). A few

¹ Appendix D provides a discussion of what such an endeavor would entail.
² In this dissertation, social conflicts which have an identifiable religious component are referred to as socio-religious conflicts.
general comments are useful, however, as to why religion has been a relatively neglected consideration in the sociological study of conflict. Early scholarly perspectives on social conflict were heavily influenced by the theories of Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim. Lewis A. Coser (1967) suggests that the understanding of socio-religious conflict in particular was hampered by Emile Durkheim’s equation of religion with social cohesion. By focusing on the unifying function of religion, Durkheim ([1915] 1965) missed that religion can be a source of conflict (Carter 1996; Juergensmeyer 2003; Kimball 2002) as well as cohesion.3

Marxian conflict theory, on the other hand, took an entirely different tack on religion. Marx explained such phenomena as religion, social relations and human history as products of class struggle (Marx [1844] 1978; Marx and Engels [1848] 1978). Marx did not consider religion to be a source of cohesion, but rather a result of an oppressed society. Grace Davie captures Marx’s approach to religion succinctly: “Marx described religion as a dependent variable” (2003:62), and as such, religion results from other forces rather than causes them. Not seeing religion as a change agent, Marx and Engels’ proposed solution was a “new social Gospel” ([1848] 1978:498). Though Marx wrote much earlier than Durkheim, his writings became the scriptures of a socialist ‘gospel’ and influenced much of the scholarly work on social conflict even until the 1990s.4 This is another part of the reason why religion has been neglected as an explanation of social conflict.

3 The suggestion by Martin E. Marty that religion “motivates most killing in the world today” (1997:20) could have been made by Durkheim given the plethora of religiously-related wars and lethal religious programs throughout European history. European history can even be framed as the history of socio-religious conflict, considering the Crusades, the Reformation (e.g., the Saint Bartholomew’s Day massacre and ensuing mêlée which left tens of thousands dead) and the Inquisition. The horrendous holocaust of millions of Jews by the Nazis seems not so much an aberration as a continuation of Europe’s previous history of socio-religious conflict.

4 It also influenced religious theology, e.g., Christian Liberation Theology, which emphasized the mission to liberate the poor (cf. Smith 1991 for an analysis; cf. Gutierrez 1988 for a theological statement).
Conflict theory has been used to analyze other social conflicts besides Marxian class struggle. Principle works from this perspective include works by Coser (1967) and Dahrendorf (1959). Conflict has been widely studied from many perspectives, including causes such as economic growth (Hammond 1930; Olson 1963), status (Coleman 1961), scapegoating (Blalock 1967), cultural divisions of labor (Hechter 1974), caste divisions (Hechter 1978), and labor market strife compounded with race and ethnicity (Bonacich 1976). In addition there are literatures which consider interest (e.g., Oberschall 1978), identity (e.g., Sherif 1966), and social organization (e.g., Black-Michaud 1975) as important elements of social conflict.

**RECENT PERSPECTIVES AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES**

The recent literature on social conflict is broad and growing, much of which does not specifically address or include religion as a variable. Many studies address political and economic causes (Hibbs 1973; Krain 1997; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Rummel 1995; Zanger 2000; Ziegenhagen 1996) but do not consider religion as an actor. Matthew Krain (1997), in his study of state-sponsored mass murder, notes that psychological explanations (Charny 1982; Staub 1989), economic explanations (Sartre 1968; Gurr 1986), and internal and external upheaval explanations (Harff 1986) may all play a part. He does not, however, measure the possibility of religious-oriented causes or outcomes, in spite of addressing ethnic fractionalization. In international studies, attention focuses on a variety of explanations including game theories, dyad comparisons, etc. They do not, however, seriously address religion-related causes (see also footnote 29 below).

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5 Randall Collins has a summary work on conflict sociology (1974). Habermas (1975) and others developed a related line of inquiry, critical theory (cf. Horkheimer 1982).
In international studies, there is also a large literature related to the role of hegemony in the world political economy (Gramsci 1966, 1971; Keohane 1984; Wallerstein 1974, 1979, 1990). This literature unfortunately does not pay particular attention to the hegemonic nature of religion in spite of the fact that religions appear to have established hegemonies in certain regions of the world (Huntington 1996), and that the domination of a country by a hegemonic religion may be related to social conflict and persecution (Tocqueville [1789-1799] 1998).

One practical reason why religion is often ignored in cross-national studies of conflict may be that there are few good international measures of religion that go beyond descriptive demographics and which cover most countries of the world. It is therefore important to give careful attention to measurement issues in any cross-national study of social conflict and religion. Davenport (2005) mentions a number of key measurement issues that must be addressed when studying social conflict, including: (1) using a broader array of data sources; (2) using more direct measures of conflict; (3) employing more complex mathematical modeling; and (4) competitively evaluating alternative hypotheses.

First, Davenport (2005) mentions that there is often a heavy reliance on standard data sources, which may not provide sufficient detail. A recent example of a study of social conflict where there was no detail of religious forces was Roger V. Gould’s (1999) study of group and individual vendettas in nineteenth-century Corsica. Corsica, which appears religiously homogeneous (i.e., most all people are Catholic), may follow the Christian Mediterranean island tradition of having competing local religious loyalties and identities (Boissevain 1965). Gould’s analysis, however, does not take into account the hegemonic or activist activities of localized religious identities. It may be that religion had nothing to do with collective violence and group
solidarity in Corsica in the nineteenth century, but it is more likely that Gould’s research assumption was that religion need not be considered as a factor since everyone was more or less Catholic. Yet, the unmeasured “tension between the legal-rational customs of the French state and Corsican traditions for dealing with conflict” (ibid:365) may plausibly have been localized religious traditions and loyalties. Even if this was the case, and even if Gould had wanted to control for potential religious sources of conflict, there may have been no data or measures readily available on socio-religious group activities.

One of the objectives of my research is to propose measures for socio-religious activity in 196 different countries. This not only will address the need mentioned by Davenport (2005) for more detailed data, but it will also addresses a pressing need Errol A. Henderson has identified in the empirical investigation of conflict: the need to “employ large-N research designs” (Henderson 1997:650). The data I use is for an N = 196 countries, which is quite large considering that other recently published work in this field, e.g., Norris and Inglehart (2004), uses Ns of between 17 and 76 countries for most of their analyses.

A second measurement concern mentioned by Davenport (2005) is the need to use more direct measures of repressive activity. I will use such measures in both the dependent variable (religious persecution) and a mediating variable (government threats) of this dissertation. R.J.

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6 Though Gould does not indicate that religion is a particularly important variable in his study, he does mention that ethnicity and race reflect ‘deeper’ cultural differences than other identities (citing Horowitz 1985; Kaplan 1993; and LeVine and Campbell 1972). Interestingly, however, one of the two concrete examples given in the article was the murder of a local priest (Gould 1999:365).

7 In addition to using data from the United Nations, Freedom House, the World Bank, Project Ploughshares, and M. Searle Bates (1945), I have developed and use an entirely new data source (quantitative coding of the U.S. State Department 2003 Report on International Religious Freedom) that includes more than 240 variables specifically related to international religion and socio-religious conflict (Grim 2004a). Also, structural equation modeling is used in my analyses, which employs ‘full information maximum likelihood’ estimates, which is a theory-based approach to the treatment of missing data assuming multivariate normality, based on direct maximization of the likelihood of the observed data (cf. Arbuckle 1996).
Rummel’s (1995) study of democracy, power, genocide, and mass murder, does include religion, but it is conflated with a host of other variables, e.g., the variable for genocide is “people killed because of their religion, ethnicity, race, language, nationality, or other social group membership” (1995:8). The study did control for other “socioeconomic, cultural, and geographic” contexts, but again, religion was mixed in with a host of other overlapping cultural variables including “Catholic society, Muslim society, English influence, cultural/geographical region, etc.” (ibid:20). Of course, no mechanism for religion being an independent causal factor of repression could be included in the study since religion was measured not as a repressive force but as an identity. Moreover, when religion is conflated with other identities, there is a tendency to minimize the religious nature of conflicts. Milton J. Esman takes this reductionist approach in his recent work, An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict.

For most individuals their religion is an ascriptive status, a given in their lives, an identity not of choice but of birth. … When groups mobilize around their religious identities and clash with their adversaries, in modern times at least, they are not disputing theological issues, they are fighting over raw power (2004:84-85).

Esman’s approach, though, misses the point of the ‘fight.’ It is not raw power for power’s sake, but power for those belonging to a particular religion. Just because a conflict may not be explicitly over theology does not mean that a particular theological bent may not be giving the combatants the moral ‘permission’ or compunction to engage in the fight. It is true that most people are born into a general religious tradition, but this does not mean that the religious tradition of birth will define a person’s identity for his/her lifespan.⁸ In order to avoid the

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⁸ In fact, there is some evidence that even ethnicity is a matter of choice (Alba 1985). Certainly, there is a large body of research that supports that proposition that racial and ethnic identities are socially constructed (Astuti 1995; Barth 1969; De Vos 1975; Jenkins 1994; Olzak 1983; Steedman 1995). On the Arabian peninsula I have observed that skin color distinctions among Arab Muslims is not immediately interpreted as an ethnic division, just darker skin and an indication of probable African ancestry.
“conflating of religious variables in definitions of ethnicity” (Henderson 1997:660), I will propose measures that allow the effects of socio-religious actions (and not identities) to be tested, controlling for their overlap with ethnicity.

The third measurement concern is the need to employ more complex mathematical modeling techniques. I will employ structural equation modeling which allows for a theoretical model to be proposed and tested. An example of a structural equation model being used to test a model of conflict is Mansoor Moaddel’s (1994) test of whether a higher level of political conflict is the result of the internal processes of a country or the result of external processes. Moaddel demonstrated that it is not an either/or situation, but rather a both/and situation, at least in regard to the pressures of internal modernization (economic development) versus the impingement of the world system and its economy on a country. Though Moaddel is a frequent writer on religion, he unfortunately did not include religion as a variable in this study.

The fourth measurement concern is the need to competitively evaluate alternative hypotheses. A recent example of this in the literature is Mark Cooney’s (1997) test of three differing positions on Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, in which he argued that a strong centralized state decreased the likelihood of social conflict ([1651] 1952). Cooney challenges a strong version of this thesis. Building on the work of Donald Black (1976, 1984, 1993), Cooney presents evidence that the relationship between state control and lethal conflict is U-shaped, i.e., that rates of lethal conflict tend to be high not only when state authority is absent but also when state authority is extremely strong and centralized. Though he does not test his thesis in regard to religious lethal violence, my research will be able to speak to one of his central conclusions:

States with strong or centralized systems of authority tend to have a high incidence of lethal conflict, especially killings of citizens by the state itself. Centralized states create
enemies, *internal* and *external*, and are quick to resort to lethal violence, sometimes on a massive scale [italics mine] (1997:332).

As mentioned above, a problem many researchers face is the paucity of good measures for socio-religious activity and especially including measures of religious pressures *external* to a country. Jason Beckfield (2003:407) did make an attempt operationalize external pressures related to culture and religion, creating a nine-category nominal variable based on Samuel P. Huntington’s (1996) proposed nine civilizations. However, Beckfield’s variable confines each country to one civilization, which is problematic. I will propose a better measure that will be able to test the effect of the impingement of external socio-religious pressures on a country.

In considering external pressures on a country, one that is often overlooked in basic sociological models is war. The role of war in the development of a society is generally not considered by sociologists, in that war is a relatively infrequent event, and as such, is viewed as an aberration in the normal functioning of social processes. Gregory Hooks (1994) challenges this perspective and argues that war and wartime activities have an independent effect upon the course of a society. Though socio-religious conflicts and religious wars have been a regular part of world history (including the ‘war on terror’ declared after 9/11/01), the empirical study of the impact of war on the level of socio-religious conflict has not been a topic of inquiry. In other words, war is usually considered as a dependent variable—something to be explained. However, the implication of Hooks’ research is that war itself is a causal agent. Since war is infrequent and its effects tend to be long-lasting, I will propose a measure of armed conflict that allows the effect of war upon religious persecution to be tested.9

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9 War, being the highest level of social conflict, should have a discernable effect upon other social outcomes if Hooks’ thesis is correct.
MOVING BEYOND PAST RESEARCH

This research will go beyond past research on social conflict by specifically incorporating religion into the explanation of social conflict, both theoretically and empirically. One of the most widely cited recent works that has taken the role of religion in social conflict seriously is Samuel P. Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* (1993, 1996). Many, if not most, arguments on social conflict ignore cultural explanations, including any serious discussion of religion. Huntington is one of the few leading scholars who treats culture as a driving force and gives religion important consideration.

Huntington’s work has triggered a variety of responses, some of which seek to operationalize his perspective (e.g., Beckfield 2003), and others which critique certain assumptions of his perspective (Fox 2001; Gurr 1994; Jenkins 2002; Midlarsky 1998; Price 1999; Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000; Tipson 1997; Weede 1998). Huntington’s work is wide ranging and, at times, general to the point of being un-testable. He specifically states that his work is “not intended to be a work of social science” but rather a new “paradigm” (1996:12) for the understanding of the post Cold War evolution of global politics. Though he suggests that it is a “highly simplified” picture (ibid:29), there is a part of the picture worth testing. Huntington argues that peoples “and countries with similar cultures are coming together,” while peoples “and countries with different cultures are coming apart” (ibid:125), and that religion is a critical part of culture. This implies that religious hegemonies are a ‘given’ and that there will be less social conflict if the West stays under the hegemony of Christianity and countries like Turkey stay under the hegemony of Islam rather than becoming part of the European Union (ibid:126-7). I will question this assumption, arguing that the struggle to gain or keep a religious hegemony in
a country is a greater source of social conflict than is the ‘unity’ provided by a homogeneous religious culture.\textsuperscript{10} A religious hegemony, like any hegemony, must continually be won: Spain was once a Muslim land and Algeria a Christian land; India was once a Buddhist land; the United States was once a land of native beliefs; Latin America was once indigenous, later Catholic, but may soon be evangelical. Rather than religious hegemonies being a natural source of cohesion, they may be a source of conflict within countries marginalized by Huntington’s ‘paradigm.’

Many other theorists have attempted to explain social conflict more generally from Marx and Tocqueville to Coser and Oberschall to Wallerstein and Habermas. Focusing on a particular work such as Huntington’s is useful for two reasons. First, Huntington (1993, 1996) competently addresses (and even incorporates) many of the basic theories of conflict\textsuperscript{11} in the \textit{Clash of Civilizations}, and second, he makes very specific assumptions about how religion relates to conflict which can be juxtaposed to the theoretical predictions of the religious economies model of religion and religious change. Furthermore, since Huntington addresses policy issues, responding to his perspective may also be of use to policy makers as they try to make the best decisions regarding religion, socio-religious conflict, and religious persecution.

\textsuperscript{10} Please note that Huntington does not specifically address the problem of religious persecution. His basic theory, however, presumes if civilizations are respected, that there will be less conflict. Given the competitive nature of religious brands, however, this could only be accomplished by regulating them. In an unregulated religious marketplace, religious brands will compete to dominate the market and aim to reinterpret what it means to be a part of that civilization according to their religious interpretations.

\textsuperscript{11} I will also address a number of arguments related to Huntington with less direct religious causation that are suggested in the literature. For example, the controversial eighteenth century philosopher Thomas Malthus (1798) suggested that the problems created by consuming more that can be produced will result in population corrections, i.e., either societies regulate (morally restrain) themselves appropriately or it will be done for them through war, violence, famine or disease until enough people die and the proper equilibrium between resources and population is reached. This as well as other demographic arguments, including ethnicity and gender arguments, will be explored.
Central to the arguments that will be made in this dissertation is that the religious economies perspective (Finke 1990; Finke and Stark 1992; Finke and Iannaccone 1993; Iannaccone 1990, 1991, 1997; Stark and Finke 2000) offers a productive analytical framework for advancing the understanding of socio-religious conflict. Contrary to the suggestion that social conflict is mitigated by religious hegemony, the religious economies model predicts that an non-hegemonic (unregulated) religious marketplace will lead to less religious persecution.

One of the key contributions of my research is to develop more fully a cultural component in the religious economies perspective. The lack of a specific cultural component has been a criticism of the religious economies model (e.g., Smith et al 1998:119). The component that I will more fully develop is one that Roger Finke and Rodney Stark referred to as religious ‘cartels’ (1992:60-63, 216-225). I will broaden this concept to include activities on the part of religious brands aimed at gaining (or maintaining) predominant influence in a country or a part of a country at the expense of freedom for other religious brands to do the same. I term this concept socio-religious hegemony. “Socio” in that it involves social posturing as opposed to theological argumentation, “religious” in that the objective is to have a particular religious brand predominate in society, and “hegemony” in that predomination implies hegemony, by definition. I will propose and test whether this socio-religious hegemony fuels the engine driving socio-religious conflict, and in particular, religious persecution.

12 The religious economies perspective (referred to as a ‘paradigm’ by Warner 1993) emphasizes that current religious developments and resurgences are not primarily “a reaction against secularism, moral relativism, and self-indulgence, and a reaffirmation of the values of order, discipline, work, mutual help, and human solidarity” as Huntington argues (1996:98) (a demand-side argument of religious change), but are primarily occurring due to an increase in the ability of religious brands (i.e., suppliers of religious goods) to operate in the world because of the collapse of previously strict state regulations of religion that existed in the communist world. A supply-side perspective does not see the current resurgence of religion as inherently dangerous, but it is does predict that socio-religious conflict will be greater if societies, institutionalized religions, and states attempt to inequitably regulate religion. More will be said about the religious economies model in the next chapter.
In sum, building on the religious economies argument, I offer an explanation of socio-religious conflict and, in particular, an explanation of religious persecution. In doing this, I will address a series of related questions to be empirically tested. First, how do a state’s formal restrictions of religion contribute to religious persecution? Second, how does the larger religious culture in a country contribute to religious persecution? Third, what influence does the larger religious culture in a country have on the restrictions that a state places on religion? Finally, what other factors contribute to religious persecution in addition to the larger religious culture in a country and the restrictions that a state places on religion?

To conduct these analyses, I will be introducing and using new quantitative measures for religion in 196 different countries. The measures are based on the quantitative coding of the best source of religious persecution available, the U.S. State Department’s *International Religious Freedom Report.*

**OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION**

The second chapter of this dissertation will explain in detail my key arguments and hypotheses, as well as competing arguments. The second chapter begins with a general discussion of religious persecution and definitions of key terms and concepts. (Appendix D provides a broader discussion of issues related to a more general theory of social conflict.)

The third chapter describes the specific measures that will be used to test the hypotheses developed in the second chapter. Attention is given to how the measures represent the concepts being tested. The description of the way certain new measures on international religion were developed is briefly discussed, and more detailed comments on the construction of these
measures are included in Appendix A. (Appendix C provides additional descriptive summary information of the variables.)

The fourth chapter describes and presents the results of the analyses conducted to test the hypotheses developed in the second chapter using the measures described in the third chapter. Discussion of the results as they relate to the hypotheses that were tested is incorporated into the flow of the chapter. The chapter ends with an overall summary and discussion of the results. (Appendix B provides a key for reading the structural equation model printouts in the chapter. Appendix E presents a ‘non-trimmed’ structural equation model where all controls remain in the model regardless of their significance.)

Finally, the fifth chapter discusses the implications of the results. It begins by discussing the implications and contributions this dissertation makes to the social scientific study of religion and socio-religious conflict. It then discusses various policy implications. It concludes with brief comments on possible future directions of research. (One anticipated future direction of research is outlined in Appendix F.)
CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND HYPOTHESES

Religious persecution is a particular type of socio-religious conflict that has seldom been the subject of scholarly inquiry, in spite of its prevalence and severity. This chapter begins by explaining religious persecution as well as other concepts important to this study, including definitions of religious brand, soci-religious hegemony, inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion, and religious regulation. Once these basic concepts and definitions have been established, a series of hypotheses related to the religious economies model and the clash of civilizations model will be proposed.

BASIC CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

In the past decade there has been an increase in the international attention paid to religious human rights and religious persecution.\textsuperscript{13} Religious human rights are often overlooked (Shea 2000)\textsuperscript{14} even though religious freedom was established as a basic human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, U.N. Document A/811, Article 18) and is enshrined in one form or another in the constitutions of the vast majority of countries (van der Vyver 1996).\textsuperscript{15} In the mid and late 1990s, the lack of attention to religious human rights began to be addressed, particularly by the United States (Hertzke 2004), and widespread violations of religious human rights came to be well documented (cf. annual US State Department Reports.

\textsuperscript{13} Later in this chapter, \textit{religious persecution} is defined as physical abuse or physical displacement due to one’s religious brand affiliation or due to one’s disposition to other religious brands.

\textsuperscript{14} In a recent sociological exploration of the topic of human rights by Judith Blau and Alberto Moncada (2005), religious human rights were not addressed.

\textsuperscript{15} My quantitative coding of the 196 countries covered in the U.S. State Department’s 2003 International Religious Freedom Reports (Grim 2004a) demonstrated that of the 196 countries covered in the U.S. State Department’s 2003 International Religious Freedom Report, the Constitutions of 161 countries assert religious freedom as a basic right, and the laws of a further 13 offer similar legal protections. Only 22 countries do not guarantee religious freedom.
Partly for political reasons and partly from genuine concern for those who are abused due to their religious orientation (Hertzke 2004), the United States Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 105-292, USC 6401, October 27, 1998). This Act requires the State Department to monitor religious persecution of any faith abroad and to report on the situation in each country where the United States has a presence. It also authorizes (and even requires) Congress to sanction foreign governments which commit severe violations of religious freedom. In spite of such dramatic legislation, in the post-9/11 world there is an increased possibility that religious freedom may become subordinated to the demand that religion be regulated for the sake of security. As sociologist Thomas Robbins notes, “it is possible that religious violence in the West, and particularly anti-American terrorist violence, could have the consequence of altering the way Americans and American law think about religion and religious liberty” (2003:77). It is therefore incumbent upon scholars, policy makers and the general public to have a clear understanding of the effects of religious regulation on religious persecution.

To understand the effects of religious regulation on religious persecution requires a clear understanding of what is meant by religious persecution. Though there is a tendency for any sort

16 Though the vast majority of countries enshrine religious freedom in their constitutions, this does not prevent governments from favoring or campaigning against certain religious brands. Grim 2004a reports that favoritism is widespread: 119 different countries subsidize religion in one form or another. Persecution is also widespread. The governments of 101 different countries have offices charged with supervising or overseeing religion. Government restrictions on religion resulted in campaigns against religious brands which occurred in 69 different countries of the world in 2002-2003. Related to such restrictions, hundreds of thousands of persons have been displaced, physically abused, or killed, i.e., persecuted. Violence related to religion occurred in more than 100 countries in recent years, including 71 countries where abuses included assault, beatings, rape, torture, murder, or armed conflict. Social movements against certain religious brands were present in over 125 countries, and attempts to shut out competing religious brands, prevent proselytism, or forbid conversions to other religions were reported to varying degrees in 140 different countries.

17 Religious regulation is often juxtaposed to religious freedom. While this dissertation does not seek to explain religious freedom, high levels of religious regulation directly imply low levels of religious freedom.
of opposition to a religious brand’s point of view to be interpreted as persecution (Hertzke 2004), opposition or disagreement is not the same thing as persecution because opposition and disagreement are to be expected given the competing claims to truth made by various religious brands. A clearer and more measurable understanding of religious persecution is one which considers religious persecution to be a serious offence against religious believers due to their religious brand association. A serious offence would be one where there is physical abuse and/or physical displacement due to a lack of religious freedom. This way of considering religious persecution also allows persecution to be objectively measured rather than subjectively reported. Therefore, I define religious persecution as physical abuse or physical displacement due to one’s religious brand affiliation or due to one’s disposition to other religious brands.

Before developing the concept of religious persecution further, it is important to operationalize the concept of religion. Though there is an ongoing debate over the exact nature and definition of religion (cf. Christiano, Swatos and Kivisto 2002:7-12), Christiano, Swatos and Kivisto begin their book on the sociology of religion with an aphorism of theologian Arthur A. Vogel: “‘Religion is only itself in practice’” (ibid:3). It makes sense that the foundation of a living religion is the real social manifestation of that religion. I conceptualize this as a “religious brand.” Taking elements from Rodney Stark’s (2003) revision of the definition of religion offered in Stark and Finke (2000), I have defined a religious brand as an organized group of committed individuals that adhere to and propagate a specific interpretation of explanations of existence based on supernatural assumptions through statements about the nature and workings of the supernatural and about ultimate meaning (Grim 2004a). Two things are important to note about this definition. First, a religious brand is not an isolated individual’s belief: it is an
organized group that seeks to propagate its views. Second, a religious brand is not equivalent to a philosophy, i.e., religious brands make exclusive claims that rely on supernatural explanations of reality which transcend time and matter. The use of the term religious brand implies that there is also an inherent competitive nature to religion. This competitiveness is recognized by the term religious marketplace. Rodney Stark and Roger Finke use the term ‘religious economy,’ which they define as consisting of “all the religious activity going on in any society; a ‘market’ of current and potential adherents, a set of one or more organizations seeking to attract or maintain adherents, and the religious culture offered by the organization(s)” (2000:283). A religious brand actively seeks to have people identify themselves with that brand.

It is important to note that identifying oneself with a religious brand is conceived of as a matter of choice. Even if a person is ‘born into’ a faith, there are generally times when a choice to follow that faith is made. It may be official initiations such as a Christian catechism and confirmation or a Jewish bar/bat mitzvah, or it may be a verbal profession of faith such as the Muslim shahadat, or it may be an act of commitment such as a Buddhist taking on monk’s robes, or it may even be a quite informal but still a real choice, such as choosing whether to participate in temple visits and pilgrimages or to do the good works expected of adherents. This expectation of conscious choice gives a special character to religion, and religious brands take on the task of calling people to make that choice. Thus, a basic task of a religious brand is, as

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18 Some propose that hegemony can lead to cooperation in international politics because governments tend to “satisfice rather than maximize” (Keohane 1984:114), making international relations more predictable and secure. Hegemonic stability theory is generally applied to politics (Gilpin 1981; Kupchan 1998; Krasner 1985). Such theory is less transferable to religion where such things as satisficing can be anathema and be interpreted as apostasy or heresy.

19 Change and choice has been show to even apply to ethnicity (cf. Alba 1985). There is also evidence that race is also a flexible concept, for example, Hirschman Alba and Farley “conclude that the concept of ‘origins’ may be closer to the popular understanding of American diversity than is the antiquated concept of race” (2000:381).

20 “There is no God but the one God and Mohammad is the messenger of God.”
mentioned above, the propagation of its specific interpretation of explanations of existence based on supernatural assumptions through statements about the nature and workings of the supernatural and about ultimate meaning. Since this is a serious undertaking with serious consequences in the minds of believers, religious brands have an inherent hegemonic mission, i.e., to make all people aware of their message because it may have very serious temporal and eternal implications. Religious brands often feel compelled to ‘help’ others see the truth (as they see it). This compunction can lead a religious brand to want to establish a hegemony (i.e., a predominant influence) wherever they can since to do otherwise may put people at spiritual risk. This natural hegemonic desire is a desire to define and ultimately regulate the religious situation so that people will be likely to choose the ‘correct’ path.

**De Facto Religious Regulation: Socio-Religious Hegemony**

De facto religious regulation is equated here with socio-religious hegemony. The concept of hegemony is one used in various social science disciplines and approaches including world systems analysis, historical materialism, international relations (Chase-Dunn, Taylor, Arrighi, Cox, Overbeek, Gill, Frank, Modelski and Wilkinson 1994); gender (Boyer, Stern and Wilson 2001); business (So 2000); media (Corkin 2000); culture and sociology (Hall 1988; Wood 1998: a critique of Hall); culture, family and politics (Ling 1994); and politics (Keohane 1984). Recognizing that the concept of hegemony is used and defined in a wide variety of ways, it is important to clearly establish how hegemony is used in this dissertation. A useful statement on hegemony is offered by Thomas R. Bates: “The basic premise of the theory of hegemony is one with which few would disagree: that [people are] not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas” (1975:351). This concept is similar to Durkheim’s concept of ‘social fact’, which can include
“ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which the control him[her]” (1938:3). Hegemony is not just a predominant power, but also a predominant idea and attitude. The coercive or regulatory power of a hegemony is thus both manifested through its overt actions as well as manifested through the ways it is able to establish itself in the minds, feelings and attitudes of people. In the latter manifestation, hegemony can be considered a regulatory aspect of culture in that it can regulate the ideas and systems that people see as legitimate (Hall 1988) and define which ideas and systems offer the holder a greater degree of cultural power or ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu 1984).

Regulation is more than just the laws and policies of a government. Religion itself can regulate society. Writing before the Cold War, M. Searle Bates noted that “religion tends to involve a two-way intolerance” (1945:585), where religion desires toleration from the government but at the same time can be quite intolerant of that which contradicts its own teachings. Writing more recently, Roger Finke and Rodney Stark document the powerful inclination of mainline denominations in the United States toward consolidating and regulating the religious marketplace by establishing religious ‘cartels’ (1992:216 ff.).

There is nothing ‘unnatural’ about a religious brand wanting to establish hegemony in a society in order to regulate the situation so as to maximize the likelihood that people choose the ‘correct path.’ The potential for social conflict comes, however, when there are multiple and conflicting interpretations about the nature and workings of the supernatural and about ultimate meaning, and when socio-religious hegemonic actions of religious brands attempt to give a competitive advantage for some religious brands above others. Thus, the ‘natural’ hegemonic urge becomes a form of cultural regulation that hinders free choice. While religions want people
to freely choose, they do not want people to choose a path that will lead away from ultimate satisfaction or salvation. This desire to regulate the situation by establishing a hegemony (i.e., becoming the predominant religious brand) becomes a “de facto” form of religious regulation when some religious brands are disadvantaged in the process.

This dissertation explores whether socio-religious hegemony is a factor in the displacement, abuse, and/or death of hundreds of thousands of persons related to their religion. More than 100,000 were displaced in Indonesia due to religiously-related conflict. Up to 30,000 evangelicals have been displaced in the Chiapas region of Mexico. Religious persecution may appear to be random, but there is a pattern that is evident in many of the cases. For example, people in Georgia have been harassed for their religious beliefs by the Basilists, a hegemonic religious brand related to the Georgian Orthodox Church (U.S. State Department 2003). The people harassed are not just citizens in general, but Jehovah’s Witnesses who, according to their beliefs, do not pledge national flags. The harassment comes due to their association with the Jehovah’s Witness religious brand and its beliefs, which the Basilists feel threatens the hegemony of the Georgian Orthodox Church.

One important aspect of religion is its propensity to spawn many and various socio-religious movements such as the Basilists. James A. Beckford has argued that the importance of socio-religious movements has been overlooked by social theorists (cf. Beckford 2003).

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1 Roger Finke and Rodney Stark refer to such hegemonic activities as “efforts at de facto establishment” (1992:63).
2 Violence related to religion occurred in more than 100 countries in recent years, including 71 countries where abuses included assault, beatings, rape, torture, murder, or armed conflict. Such abuses range from isolated violent acts (e.g., the religiously-motivated 2004 murder of the Dutch filmmaker van Gogh in the Netherlands), to simmering states of stalemate war (e.g., Armenia versus Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh), to unrelenting bloody conflict (e.g., the Intifada in Israel and the Occupied Territories or the Tamil-Sinhalese civil war in Sri Lanka), to all-out war (e.g., the war between the United States and Islamist terrorists).
3 Numbers reported are from my quantitative coding of the International Religious Freedom Reports (Grim 2004a).
especially chapter 5). In my reading and coding of the U.S. State Department Reports (2003) on International Religious Freedom, I found that persecution often seemed to accompany the attempts of socio-religious movements to regulate the religious marketplace by establishing or protecting their hegemony in a part of a country. *Hegemonic socio-religious movements*\(^{24}\) were present in over 125 countries. Such movements attempted to shut out competing religious brands, prevent proselytism, or forbid conversions to other religions in 140 different countries.\(^{25}\)

When religious brands (sects, churches, denominations, brotherhoods, orders, missions, movements, etc.)\(^{26}\) are hegemonic in society, they either act to protect their position or attempt to carve out a larger position while seeking to deny these same rights to other religious brands.

*Socio-religious hegemony* can be defined as the predominant influence of one religious brand

\(^{24}\) *Hegemonic socio-religious movements*, as used here, refers both to socio-religious movements as well as to countermovements (cf. McCarthy and Zald 1977). Thus, I do not limit the concept of a socio-religious movement to being “collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998:4), but I allow it to include collective defense of existing arrangements of socio-religious power and distribution. Later, I will refer to such hegemonic socio-religious movements as “anti-brand movements.” Also, the term as used here is much broader than New Religious Movements (NRMs) (cf. Beckford 1985, 1986).

\(^{25}\) Numbers reported are from my quantitative coding of the International Religious Freedom Reports (Grim 2004a).

\(^{26}\) My contention that any form of a religious brand can be hegemonic and thus contribute to social conflict is different from earlier conceptualizations which saw sects as the primary source of social conflict (i.e., in their relationship to class struggle). At the twenty-fifth annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, which focused on social conflict, H. Richard Niebuhr offered a perspective on socio-religious conflict and class struggle which synthesizes elements of Durkheim, Marx and Weber. “There are three main interpretations of the role of Christianity in the class struggle: the idealistic, which regards faith as the healer of divisions; the Marxian, in which the church is the supporter of privilege; and the ‘Socialist,’ which pictures Christianity, historically, as a movement of proletarian revolt. These interpretations correspond roughly to the three types of Christianity. Mystic Christianity, highly individual in form, seeks to transcend division, often by non-resistance. Church Christianity … is allied with other dominant social institutions. … [and] the sects, representing the third type, are the result of the impact of the Christian idea on the proletariat. … Sectarian Christianity is the religion of religious and social conflict” (1930:208). There is much to appreciate in this short summary; however, I question the last sentence which identifies sectarian religion as the source of social conflict. While it makes sense that upstart religious brands (sects) will challenge the status quo and thus cause socio-religious conflict, it also makes sense that a pacifist who acts as a human shield against the bombing of a country is also a participant in socio-religious conflict.

Furthermore, an institutional religion, i.e., a Church in Niebuhr’s terms, has much to lose if its dominant hold on power (or hegemony) is threatened by an ‘upstart,’ which might also desire to determine the religious course of society. It is reasonable that institutional religion then would also become the ‘religion of religious and social conflict.’ If this view of socio-religious conflict is correct, then I would expect a measure of socio-religious movements (sect-like activities) to be a manifestation of the same religious tendency of society and its institutionalized religion to protect itself from competitors.
over others through expansionist and/or protectionist actions which are aimed at controlling the religious marketplace. (Elsewhere, using a bit of alliteration, I have defined *socio-religious hegemony* as “the pursuit of religious brands for power, popularity, property, position, proselytes, provisos, and potentates at the expense of freedom for other religious brands” (Grim 2004a, Definition 4).) A *negatively biased attitude toward other religious brands* is an indicator of socio-religious hegemony and, I would argue, is a form of religious regulation in itself in that negative social biases and stereotypes exercise control according to the principle that if situations are perceived as real, they are real in their consequences (Thomas and Thomas 1928).

In sum, socio-religious hegemony is a *de facto* form of religious regulation. It can act as a social form of regulation through direct actions such as religiously-motivated social movements that seek to advance or protect the position of a certain religious brand in society at the expense of other religious brands.  

27 Socio-religious hegemony can also be seen when traditional attitudes and/or edicts of the clerical establishment strongly discourage proselytizing; it is also seen when established or existing religions trying to shut out new religions in any way, e.g., forming cartels (cf. Finke and Stark’s 1992). Socio-religious hegemony also acts as a social form of regulation through indirect actions such as defining rival religious brands negatively. This indirect form of social regulation is revealed through negative or strained relations between religious brands (e.g., between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland that can result in vigilantism), negative social attitudes toward nontraditional religious brands (e.g., defining new religious movements as sects and/or cults and taking actions against them), and negative attitudes toward conversion to another brand (e.g., disowning or punishing relatives who convert).

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27 As mentioned above, James A. Beckford has pointed out that social theorists rarely pay any attention to socio-religious movements (cf. Beckford 2003, chapter 5). My inclusion of them addresses this deficit.
**De Jure Religious Regulation: Inequitable Legal/Policy Restrictions on Religion**

De jure religious regulation is the inequitable legal/policy restrictions on religion by governments in response to religious realities. Socio-religious hegemonic activities can influence a country’s legal/policy framework in two ways. First, if hegemonic religious brands seek to extend their religious influence over people in ways that are viewed as threatening, governments react with laws and policies that regulate the situation to minimize the perceived threat. Governments may enact legal/policy measures restricting hegemonic religious brands viewed as dangerous; governments may also makes laws or policies that allow them to ‘subsidize’ religious brands which are seen as a benefit (Finke 1990). In addition, when a religious brand is or becomes dominant in some way in a country, it may directly press the legal/policy decision-makers to enact and enforce policies that are inequitable to other religious brands.28

Researchers who have studied religious persecution29 (e.g., Barrett and Johnson 2001; Bates 1945; Marshall 2000) generally equate high levels of religious regulation with high levels of persecution. Social scientists and legal scholars have tended to focus, however, only on the

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28 An example of social attitudes and behaviors affecting changes in the legal/policy framework of a country is the current redefinition of marriage occurring in the United States and Europe to encompass more than just heterosexual couples (Barlow 2004). Some religious brands in the U.S. are lobbying for the opposite

29 The study of religious persecution, a specific form of socio-religious conflict, is a new contribution to the broader literature on international social conflict, which has primarily focused on other causal factors, especially when ‘country’ (or ‘national state’) is the level of analysis (Singer 1961). Game theory and deterrence theory are often employed when studying international conflicts (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Putnam 1988), focusing on models which have not always been amenable to the inclusion of cultural or religious variables. The trend within political science in the past decades has been to focus on the relationships between pairs of countries (dyads, cf. Garnham 1976), and evaluate the impact of standard predictors of conflict such as proximity, power, status, alliances, democracy, development, and militarization (e.g., Bremer 1992), the causes of peace rather than conflict (e.g., Silverson and Ward 2002), and the pacific benefits of democracy, economic interdependence, and involvement in international organizations (e.g., Oneal and Russett 1999). Individual and psychological empirical approaches have not addressed religion (e.g., Holsti 1962, Quattrone and Tversky 1988), even when moral dilemmas were part of the analysis (e.g., Shannon 2000). Research on social conflict at the country level has focused on other issues rather than religion, even when the research specifically addresses such things as ethnicity (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2000). Some have even gone so far as to rule out religious causes altogether (e.g., McGarry and O’Leary 1995). Some empirical studies have paid attention to religion (e.g., Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000), but they do so only as general religious traditions, or civilizations, without specific measures for activities of religious brands within the countries.
government’s legal/policy framework as the key element in religious regulation (e.g., Chaves and Cann 1992; Marshall 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004). These researches have paid less attention to the cultural regulatory power of socio-religious hegemony. Part of this focus can be attributed to the Cold War era which pitted the forces of State atheism against religion. In most communist countries, religion was not completely outlawed, but there was a high level of **inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion**, i.e., the favoring or disfavoring of certain religious brands by governmental laws and policies. De jure religious regulation implies that the *legal and policy framework* of a country limits choice by favoring (subsidizing) or restricting (regulating) certain religious brand activity, i.e., there is **inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion**. Government actions against certain religious brands occurred in 69 different countries\(^{30}\) of the world in 2002-2003. Government actions included such things as the stigmatization of Scientology in Germany, where the Economics and Labor Ministry required that an “S” be placed in government records beside the names of firms suspected of employing members of the Church of Scientology. Furthermore, governments of 101 different countries have offices charged with supervising or overseeing religious brands. Similar in effect to regulation is subsidy of religious brands.\(^{31}\) 119 different countries subsidize religion in one form or another, including Venezuela, which disburses State funds directly to the Catholic Church.

Legal/policy restrictions on religious brands have a natural progression in severity. At the lower end are restrictions which create difficulties (but not impossibilities) for certain religious brands to register or having a legally recognized status (such as happens in Thailand

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\(^{30}\) Numbers reported are from my quantitative coding of the International Religious Freedom Reports (Grim 2004a).

\(^{31}\) In fact, regulation and subsidy are often practiced side by side: there is a .249 correlation (p < .001) between countries that subsidize religion and countries with laws regulating religion (Grim 2004a).
and Estonia). Restrictions on the use and/or ownership of property which are not equitable for all religious brands make it more difficult for a registered or unregistered religious group to meet (such as happens in France and Kazakhstan). The legal/policy restrictions become more poignant when the Government denies (or provides) subsidies to some religious brands but not others for such things as religious education, salaries, etc. (such as happens in Malta and Iceland). The denial (or granting) of privilege can be a precursor of a government targeting certain religious brands to be controlled or proscribed (such as happens in Morocco and Nepal). The most serious legal/policy restrictions are when a government has direct involvement in the internal and/or international affairs of religious brands (such as happens in Israel and Tanzania), or goes as far as prohibiting religious practice except for that which is approved by the Government (such as happens in Saudi Arabia and the Maldives).

In sum, there appear to be two general ways that a religious marketplace is regulated: de facto and de jure. These two coincide with how legal scholars sometimes refer to religious regulation (cf. van der Vyver and Witte 1996). The generally recognized way is de jure regulation through a country’s laws and policies toward religion, and also, as I have argued above, by de facto regulation through the socio-religious hegemonic actions of religious brands. **Religious regulation** can thus be defined as the control of the religious marketplace by the hegemonic activities of religious brands and by the inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion by governments.
COMPETING PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS REGULATION

The study of religious regulation has frequently been of interest to those who study new religious movements and minority faiths (e.g., Beckford 1985, 1986, 2004; Richardson 2004) or to those who are concerned about the persecution of their co-religionists (e.g., Sookhdeo 2005). Theories which address the impact of religious regulation on socio-religious conflict, specifically its impact on religious persecution, are less developed. There are, however, two competing social-scientific perspectives on religion and religious change that imply opposite expectations for the impact of religious regulation on conflict. The Clash of Civilizations perspective implicitly suggests that religious regulation will result in less socio-religious conflict, while the Religious Economies perspective implicitly suggests that it will result in more socio-religious conflict. In order to better understand the implications for religious persecution of these perspectives, a discussion of each perspective’s assumptions about the fundamental nature of religion and religious change is useful.

The Clash of Civilizations

The clash of civilizations perspective was proposed by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington (1993, 1996). In this perspective, the world was kept in equilibrium by the alliances that squared off during the Cold War, but the collapse of the Soviet Block threw this balance out of kilter. Now, instead of geo-political alliances, “culture and cultural identities … are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world” (1996:20).

32 cf. James T. Richardson’s (2004) collection of 33 case studies from around the globe (2004) with entries covering: New Religious Movements; anti-cultism; historical and legal developments related to sects; pseudoscience versus minority religions; brainwashing theories; social justice and minority religions; freedom of religion; law and religion; religious diversity; state and federal regulations; and religious regulation and the courts.
Huntington claims that these cultural identities are at their broadest level best conceived of as ‘civilizations,’ which have been primarily “identified with the world’s great religions” (1996:42). The way to avoid conflict (and I would add persecution) from this perspective is to keep the civilizations from clashing. This implies that conflict will be reduced by acknowledging the hegemony of some religious brands at the expense of other religious brands according to geographic location.

While Huntington does not explicitly say that religion should be regulated, the overall thrust of his work is that civilization divides should be respected in order to avoid conflict. This implies a need for greater religious regulation (be it de facto or de jure) to keep the potential combatants from clashing. In the clash of civilizations perspective, an unregulated religious market where religious brands compete against each other and even against Western secularism for adherents could be expected to result in societal disintegration, international conflict, and—arguably by extension—a higher level of religious persecution. Evidently, respecting regional socio-religious hegemony provides protection from the encroachment of secularism (associated with Westernization), which Huntington presumes is the cause of religious resurgence in the world today (Huntington 1996:98). When the hegemony of a regional religious brand is respected and protected, that hegemon can provide stability for geographic regions and the ‘civilization’ under its sway. Thus, each historical religiously-related civilization should define itself around its traditional identity just as the West, i.e., “what used to be called Western Christendom” (ibid:46), should reaffirm a “commitment to Western civilization” and reject “the

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33 Note that Huntington does not specifically address religious persecution. He is explicit, however, that cultural identities (which centrally include religious identities) are shaping the patterns of conflict today (1996:20). Also see footnote 10 above.
34 Robert O. Keohane (1984) provides a critique of political hegemonic stability theory.
divisive siren calls of multiculturalism” (ibid:307). The clash of civilizations perspective on religion, however, faces a number of theoretical challenges.\textsuperscript{35} I will highlight three.

First, the clash of civilizations perspective must theoretically account for the great diversity \textit{within} civilizations and religious traditions. It presumes that religions are intrinsically tied to specific societies and cultures, leading an analyst to proceed as if Arabs were Muslims, Chinese were Buddhists, Indians were Hindu, Europeans were Christians, and so on. This perspective sees religion as a social glue holding societies together (cf. Durkheim 1897, 1912); it also postulates that religion reflects and/or molds the rationale of the society in general (cf. Weber 1930, 1951, 1958).\textsuperscript{36}

Second, the clash of civilizations perspective must overcome the ‘religious explanation’ problem, i.e., the problem that other serious attempts to explain overall social behavior based on \textit{general} religious tradition has not been proven. Max Weber’s \textit{Protestant Ethic and the Rise of Capitalism} (1930) is the classic example of an intellectually captivating but empirically elusive analysis (Bellah 1972 [1963]; Greeley 1972 [1964]; Stark 2004).

\textsuperscript{35} I am not offering a general critique of the clash of civilizations perspective; that has been done elsewhere (e.g., Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000; Tipson 1997; Weede 1998). I am critiquing Huntington’s assumptions about the nature and workings of religion as it relates to religious regulation. For an incisive critique of Huntington’s assumptions about equating Christianity with the ‘West’ and Huntington’s predictions about religious demographic trajectories, see Philip Jenkins (2002).

\textsuperscript{36} This argument is not unrelated to ‘secularization theory.’ For decades it was social scientific dogma that the world was on a course toward rationalized secularization (cf. Weber 1922; Berger 1967): a world where religion retreated to the private sphere (Luckmann 1967), a world where economic conditions explained religion (Marx and Engels 1848), a world where scientific positivism \textit{itself} became a religion (Comte 1858). The clash of civilizations perspective would argue that religion is now trying to regain its past glory. According to the clash of civilizations perspective, religion should be a unifying point for society, not a basis for competition. Secularization theory supported this concept by arguing that the plausibility of a religion lies in the fact that society does not offer contradictory rationales for life which would undermine the plausibility of a shared religious explanation (Berger 1967). Theoretically, in the face of pluralism, religion as a social phenomenon should have gradually faded away. However, such empirical realities as the ‘resurgence’ of religion following the collapse of the Soviet Union have challenged secularization theory to the point that a growing number of sociologists now conclude the exact opposite, i.e., that the world is \textit{desecularizing} (cf. Peter Berger’s 1997 and 1999 \textit{reversals} of his 1967 seminal work on secularization). Moreover, theorists now postulate that even Europe is the exception rather than the rule regarding modernity leading to lower religiosity (Davie 2002).
And third, the clash of civilizations perspective must explain why religion is so active in the modern world. It suggests that “the religious resurgence throughout the world is a reaction against secularism …” [italics mine] (Huntington 1996: 98). This does not explain, however, major forms of religious resurgence throughout the world which are not primarily against a secular civil society, such as in the United States (Finke and Stark 1992), Latin America (Gill 1996), China (Aikman 2003), and Kazakhstan (IMB 2003). David Martin (2002) phrases the impact of secularism quite differently than Huntington, suggesting that religious resurgence is not a reaction against secularism but more a response to secularism which helps to deregulate religious markets.

Religious Economies

An alternative to the clash of civilizations perspective on religion and religious change is the Religious Economies perspective articulated most clearly by Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (2000) (also cf. Bainbridge and Stark 1984; Iannaccone 1990, 1991, 1997). The religious economies perspective does not presume that secularism created the religious resurgence associated with, for example, the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead, it would emphasize that it was the collapse of rigid communist regulation of religion that allowed the natural religious propensities within society to come out of hiding, so to speak. In other words, the causal mechanism was deregulation, not secularism. The religious economies perspective does not consider that the deregulation of religion is dangerous; instead it considers that the regulation of

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37 Sociologist James A. Beckford shares this perspective on the deregulating nature of Western secularism, concluding that the “deregulation of religion is one of the hidden ironies of secularization. It helps to make religion sociologically problematic in ways which are virtually inconceivable in the terms of the sociological classics” [italics mine] (Beckford 1989:172).
religion is dangerous. From the religious economies’ perspective, there is a need for less religious regulation. Less regulation would prevent conflict and persecution by ensuring fair competition for all religious brands within a society. The rationale for this perspective is summarized vividly in a quote from two and a half centuries ago by François Marie Arouet a.k.a. Voltaire: “If there were only one religion … there would be danger of despotism, if there were two, they would cut each other’s throats, but there are thirty, and they live in peace and happiness” (1732). The argument of a non-civilization approach is simple: if governments ensure the freedom for all religious brands rather than taking sides with one religion or another, there will be less conflict and persecution. Though N.J. Demerath III does not speak from the religious economies perspective, the observation in his study of religion and its relation to politics around the globe succinctly lays out the argument for a free and fair religious marketplace:

Some contend that a national government can only be successful when it mirrors the surrounding culture instead of countering it, although others concur … that the state must set the rules for cultural conflict and assure an equitable framework for religious diversity (2001:124).

Specifically, the religious economies perspective addresses the three challenges to the civilizations perspective described above and offers an alternative understanding of the effects of religious regulation. First, the religious economies perspective accounts for the great diversity within civilizations and religious traditions. It presupposes that there are a wide variety of religious preferences within any one given society (Stark and Finke 2000:193-217). This presupposition also acknowledges that Arabs may be Muslim as well as Assyrian and Maronite

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38 Recall that the definition of religious regulation is the control of the religious marketplace by the hegemonic activities of religious bands and by the inequitable legal restriction of religion by governments.
Christians (not to mention Druze who incorporate both Christian and Muslim elements into their religion). It recognizes that Chinese may be Buddhist as well as Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, Confucian, etc. Indians may be Hindu as well as Sikh, Muslim, Catholic, Baptist, etc. Europeans and Westerners may be Christian as well as many other religions (Melton 1989). This presupposition fits the American experience of religion quite well (Finke and Stark 1992) and it certainly fits the religious diversity growing within China today (Aikman 2003). It also fits the religious diversity growing within Latin America (Gill 1996) and among traditionally Muslim Kazakhs39 (IMB 2003). Moreover, Philip Jenkins’ seminal work (2002) on the global variety of movements existing under the general banner of Christianity significantly challenges the notion that there is a ‘Western’ Christendom to which America should belong, as Huntington argues (1996:307).

Second, a religious economies perspective with a religious brand focus avoids the ‘religious explanation’ problem mentioned above by analyzing real social actors rather than general religious traditions. For one, it does not look to general religious traditions to provide explanations for civilizations because religious loyalties can change dramatically on both the individual and societal level. They can change on such large scales as when the Christian Byzantine Empire became the Muslim Ottoman Empire, or on such small scales as when the American boxer Cassius Clay became Muhammed Ali. For another, the religious economies perspective looks at the real actions of religions rather than just the theoretical concepts beneath the religions. It recognizes that a religious text or prophet that preaches ‘love thine enemies’ is different from a religious brand that burns dissenters at the stake. Analyzing real social actors

39 More than 10,000 ethnic Kazakhs have become Christians in the past decade.
rather than general religious traditions also avoids the danger of becoming so ‘nuanced’ as to not be able to perform empirical analysis, such as is the problem with certain sociological approaches, e.g., that of Georg Simmel.40

And third, the religious economies perspective does not see ‘religious resurgence’ as a reaction to secularism but as a natural state of affairs when State regulations on religion are eased. The religious economies perspective posits that the desire for religion across time is generally constant and follows a hypothetical normal distribution (Stark and Finke 2000:197). Thus, given a deregulated market, it is normal to find a small number of vigorous, high tension religious brands and a small number of religious brands verging on atheism. Most religious brands would fall somewhere in between those two extremes. The deregulation of religion following the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed this diversity to emerge, including a minority of religious brands that are aggressively attempting to fill the power vacuum.

The central contribution of the religious economies model to the study of socio-religious conflict is that it suggests that religious regulation has “unintended consequences” (Finke 1990, 1997; Gill 1994; Lu 2004; also cf. Merton 1936). I will test a series of hypotheses related to the proposition that religious regulation leads to religious persecution. Specifically, when the religious marketplace is regulated by hegemonic activities of religious bands and by inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion by governments, religious persecution is the result.

40 A collection of Simmel’s sociological essays (1997) on religion cover the gamut of possible lines of inquiry, including religion and modernity, religion and personality, religion and art, and methods of studying religion (sociology versus epistemology). Specifically, he states that “… the strength of subjective religiousness is … beyond the causes to which an investigation might trace it” (ibid:120), and that “Religion … is only the subjective attitude of human beings” (ibid:121). Such ‘nuanced’ approaches, in the end, offer few testable propositions. While a religious brand focus does not explicitly address such things as culture (Ammerman 1997), morality (Smith 2003), and religious phenomenology (cf. Warner 1993), the inclusion of socio-religious hegemony does include a cultural and ‘moral’ element (in Smith’s 2003 terms) into the analysis.
THESIS, MEASUREMENT ISSUES, AND HYPOTHESES

The first part of this section proposes a thesis and related hypotheses to be tested leading to an explanatory model of religious persecution based on the religious economies perspective. It also addresses several necessary measurement issues foundational at the start. The second part of this section proposes a series of alternative hypotheses to be tested stemming from the clash of civilizations perspective and other alternatives suggested in the literature.

Thesis Related to the Religious Economies Perspective

The basic proposition of this dissertation is that religious regulation leads to religious persecution, which is a specific form of socio-religious conflict. This proposition is based on a theory-driven empirical model which, by considering and testing alternative models, aims to avoid becoming “the prisoner of one’s own preconceptions” (Aydelotte 1971:89). A religious economies perspective provides a good framework for understanding religious persecution because of its attention to the causal aspects of a regulated religious marketplace. Applying this perspective to the problem of religious persecution, I propose the following thesis.

Thesis: Religious regulation—composed of socio-religious hegemony (de facto regulation) and inequitable legal/policy restrictions (de jure regulation)—offers a strong, significant, and direct explanation for variation in the level of religious persecution.

Specifically, socio-religious hegemony is theorized to have a direct impact on the level of religious persecution, and an indirect effect on religious persecution, working through its impact on the inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion. Related to this thesis are three hypotheses (1.1-1.3) that can be empirically tested and which, when taken together, build and test an explanatory model of religious persecution. Before developing the three hypotheses, however, several measurement issues must first be addresses. These issues relate to establishing the
validity of viewing socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion as regulators of religion.

**Measurement Issues**

If it is true that socio-religious hegemony is a ‘social fact’ composed of actions, thoughts, feelings and attitudes (Durkheim 1938; Bates 1975; cf. Finke and Stark’s 1992 identification of religious ‘cartels’), then it has a coercive and regulatory power. If socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions are both means of religious regulation, they should significantly correlate with each another and with other measures of religious regulation.

**Measurement Issue 1: Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion are closely related constructs.**

I anticipate that socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions will relate somewhat equally to Freedom House’s measure of religious regulation (Marshall 2000).

**Measurement Issue 2: Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion are closely related constructs that significantly relate to a recent measure of religious regulation.**

I do expect that a measure of legal/policy restrictions will correlate more strongly with Freedom House’s measure because that scale focuses on the restrictions of religion by the State. However, since I hypothesize that socio-religious hegemony underlies inequitable legal/policy restrictions, socio-religious hegemony should still strongly and significantly correlate with Freedom House’s measure.

Next, I anticipate that socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions will relate somewhat equally to a previous measure of religious regulation (Bates 1945). This hypothesis is important to test for at least two reasons. For one, the impact of legal realities are felt slowly (Gwin and North 2004). Laws protecting a free religious marketplace may not have a
significant impact immediately. For another, religious brands change slowly. Since religious brands make exclusive claims that transcend time and rely on supernatural explanations of reality that transcend matter, it can be expected that socio-religious hegemony is also somewhat stable over time.

**Measurement Issue 3: Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion significantly relate to a past level of religious regulation.**

While I do anticipate that socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions will relate somewhat equally to M. Searle Bates’ 1945 measure of religious regulation, I expect that a measure of socio-religious hegemony will correlate more strongly than inequitable legal/policy restrictions with Bates’ measure because his scale includes “socio-religious pressures” (Bates 1945:547).

The results of testing these three measurement issues will indicate whether it is a valid assumption that socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions on religion are regulators of religion. Once this is done, it will be possible to test hypotheses related to the thesis.

The first Hypothesis (1.1), moves beyond validating socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions as measures of religious regulation to measuring the relationship between those concepts and the outcome that I am attempting to explain—religious persecution. As mentioned above, there is a tendency for any sort of opposition to a religious brand’s point of view to be interpreted as persecution (Hertzke 2004). However, opposition or disagreement is not the same thing as persecution because opposition and disagreement are to be expected given the exclusive nature of religious brands and the competitive nature of religious markets. A clear measure of religious persecution is one that reflects the number of cases of
physical abuse and physical displacement due to the lack of religious freedom in a country. This way of considering religious persecution also allows persecution to be objectively measured rather than subjectively reported. The next chapter will describe how this variable is operationalized and it will clearly show how religious persecution differs from the measures for socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions.\footnote{Religious persecution will be operationalized by a measure of the number of people physically abused or displaced due to a lack of religious freedom in a country.}

I expect that socio-religious hegemony predicts \textit{both} religious persecution as well as inequitable legal/policy restrictions of religion. Governments tend to regulate hegemonic religions that are perceived as a threat. Governments can even regulate the more altruistic actions of hegemonic religious brands. N.J. Demerath III (2001) gives the example of the Egyptian government regulating Muslim Brotherhood relief work, not because the government opposes charitable work, but because the government fears that such charitable work will win the sympathies of society for Islamist causes and thus threaten the secular nature of the State. At the same time, he reports that the Egyptian government turns a blind eye toward the killing of Coptic Christians (Demerath 2001:68) presumably by members of the same by Islamic groups that are regulated. Thus, the socio-religious hegemony of the Islamic Brotherhoods increases both the level of religious regulation and the level of \textit{persecution} (as defined above).

\textit{Hypothesis 1.1:} Socio-religious hegemony has a direct effect on both inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion and religious persecution; inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion also has a direct effect on religious persecution.

Though I am making an argument for the direction of the relationship between socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion, it is plausible that inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion increases socio-religious hegemony just as any
action produces a reaction. Legislators may change laws either in response to socio-religious hegemony, or in order to play to the socio-religious hegemonic tendencies of society. For example, the level of anti-Jewish sentiment in Nazi Germany was probably lower until the Nazis fanned the flames of prejudice. However, while playing to the socio-religious hegemonic tendencies of society surely happens, it seems that the significant factor is that, were socio-religious hegemony not a factor, laws trying to stir it into being would be rather like fanning cold embers in the hope of a flame. This causal direction is also supported by James A. Beckford who found that the initiative to frame legislation to control new religious movements (NRMs) “has usually come from private citizens or their elected officials: not from state officials” (1985:284). More recently he has observed that the two main anti-cult organizations in France “both began as voluntary associations of individuals and families adversely affected by NRMs, but their work is now closely aligned with the emerging policy of recent French governments to obstruct the activities of NRMs as much as possible” (2004:31).

The primacy of socio-religious hegemony in Hypothesis 1.1 sets this model apart from most recent models of religious regulation where the focus has been on the restriction of religion by governments. A recent example of this governmental focus is the measure of religious freedom/regulation42 offered by Pippi Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004). Working from a modified secularization perspective, the measures they use in their religious freedom index presume that religious freedom is regulated by the actions of governments but not by the actions of religions. Of their 20 measures (ibid: 253-254), 15 begin with the words “The state…”, and two begin with the words “The constitution….” Only two of the remaining three items reflect

42 A.k.a. the restriction of religious freedom (See footnote 17 above.)
the actions of religions, and they do so only implicitly. In other words, their measures assume that, at most, 10% of the regulation of religion has something to do with socio-religious actions, but 90% has to do with government actions.43

The role of laws in regard to religion can be positive in that the legal/policy framework may establish a situation where no religious brand is favored or frowned upon, and where all religious brands may compete for adherents equally and freely. There is the possibility that an inequitable legal/policy framework may sometimes reduce the level of persecution by controlling the negative aspects of socio-religious hegemony, as did the rule of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. However, an inequitable legal/policy framework has an overriding downside—it can authorize the use of force against religious brands that are viewed as a threat to the dominant religious sensitivities of the country or the government itself.

**Hypothesis 1.2:** Inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion has an indirect effect on religious persecution by allowing religious believers to be threatened by government or other forces.

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43 Note: Norris and Inglehart (2004) make a series of inaccurate measurement assumptions concerning the model upon which they base their religious freedom measure. On page 102, they cite a ‘scale’ produced by Chaves and Cann (1992) based on coding information from the *World Christian Encyclopedia* (Barrett 1982). This is problematic because Barrett’s categorical Religious Liberty Index is based on narrowly descriptive criteria which are not mutually exclusive. In spite of this, Barrett put each country of the world into only one numeric category, though each country may be (and usually is) a member of multiple categories. This makes valid quantitative comparisons impossible. Furthermore, calling such a measure a ‘scale’ violates the principle that each level of a scale subsumes the level beneath it (cf. Babbie 1991:165 ff.). Thus, Chaves and Cann’s coding is based on un-scalable data, which they do acknowledge, but they do not provide details on how they overcame this flawed data. Similarly, Norris and Inglehart (2004: 52) refer to their 20-item index as a ‘scale’ when it is actually an additive index of items, i.e., a score of 5 does not necessarily mean that items 1-4 are subsumed within the score of 5 (also cf. Babbie 1991:165 ff.). They also talk about their index without presenting it or saying where it can be found. They do present the list of twenty items they used to rank 70 countries, but there is no discussion of their coding methodology or the reliability of their coder(s). Norris and Inglehart also make other factual errors. For example, they say they can compare their index with the summary analysis of religious freedom (ibid: 102) produced ‘every year’ by Freedom House (Marshall 2000). This is not correct. Paul Marshall has produced a scale only one time—in 2000. Also note that Norris and Inglehart draw on the World Values Survey (WVS) for much of their analysis. While the WVS has many strong points, its methodology across nations is not rigorously controlled. It is a confederated project of “equal partners” with each national research center carrying out the survey among a representative national sample of their own nation. “One consequence of this strategy of striving for inclusiveness has been that the quality of fieldwork varies cross-nationally” (Inglehart et al 2000:6).
When considering whether laws lead to persecution, it would be a mistake to consider that a law on the books is the proximate cause of persecution. The better way to consider the impact of laws is whether they actually constrain or permit religious believers to be threatened. Also, if the laws are not clear or are biased in the definition of what constitutes a religious brand, then questionable religious practices of unorthodox religious brands can draw an inappropriate response from the security forces of a government. The lethal U.S. reaction to the Branch Davidian religious brand outside Waco, Texas, on April 19, 1993 (Ammerman 1994) is an example of excess force used to deal with what was a religiously-related problem. Even nonviolent activities such as Falun Gong’s protests\textsuperscript{44} attract abusive responses from Chinese government forces because they treat them as an illegal threat rather than an approved religious brand. When the legal/policy system permits the lethal power of the state’s security forces to be unleashed, the scale of the religious persecution is likely to increase.

Since governments do not generally threaten religious believers without a legitimizing reason, I suggest that a legal/policy framework which inequitably regulates religion will allow religious brands deemed to be threats to be threatened by the government. I suggest that the government will threaten religious believers (or allow them to be threatened as in the case of the Egyptian Copts reported above) when there are inequitable legal/policy restrictions on religion. Threats are one step removed from religious persecution as I have defined it.

I believe that threats to religious believers will be more likely to occur when the legal/policy system does not protect an unregulated religious market. And a threat, just like a clenched fist, is made with some intent to be physically used.

\textsuperscript{44} For example, Falun Gong surreptitiously surrounded the Chinese leadership compound on April 25, 1999, with more than 10,000 of its practitioners in a silent protest.
In sum, *religious regulation* (the control of the religious marketplace by the hegemonic activities of religious bands and by the inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion by governments) leads to *religious persecution* (physical abuse or physical displacement due to one’s religious brand affiliation or due to one’s disposition to other religious brands). Religious persecution is an outcome of religious regulation and not the cause of religious regulation. Though persecution may reinforce socio-religious hegemony and the inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion, I propose that to suggest that persecution causes regulation mistakes the outcome with the causal mechanisms.\textsuperscript{45} This proposition can be stated a hypothesis that can be empirically tested using structural equation modeling, i.e., the type of complex mathematical modeling technique envisioned by Davenport (2005). This technique is used in Chapter 4.

**Hypothesis 1.3: Religious regulation leads to religious persecution and not vice versa.**

An historical perspective is helpful to demonstrate how this process works. Contemporary China, for example, has a relatively high level of inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion (Grim 2004a). This high level of regulation, however, is not explained by the recent religious challenges the government has faced from Falun Gong protestors and Muslim Uygur separatists. Historically, China has been impacted by socio-religious hegemony where various religious brands have tried to define the country (or parts of the country) according to a certain religious interpretation. Tibet, a former and presumptive Buddhist kingdom led in exile by the Dali Lama, is a case in point. Another case from the nineteenth century is the Taiping Rebellion which sought to establish a Christian kingdom in China. This rebellion emanated from an indigenous Chinese religious brand called the *God Worshippers* that

\textsuperscript{45} It also seems to verge on a form of ‘blaming the victim.’
nearly conquered China and claimed up to 20 million lives. Yet another case is the pre-1949 Christian missionary movement which sought to Christianize China. Kenneth Scott Latourette, the Yale historian of Christianity and Christian missions in China ([1929] 1967) speculated that had Mao Ze-deng been in his Sunday School class while he worked in the Y.M.C.A. in China, the post-World War II history of China may have been of “Christianity’s triumph rather than of communism’s.” The communists were of course aware of these efforts, which they associated with a series of unequal treaties forced upon them by foreign powers that opened China’s key ports to foreign domination and what the communists saw as hegemonic foreign religious brands. Socio-religious hegemony causally preceded communist China’s strict laws regulating religion and the persecution of believers in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, socio-religious hegemony (the predominant influence of one religious brand over others through expansionist and/or protectionist actions and attitudes) leads to inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion (the favoring or disfavoring of certain religious brands by the laws and policies of a government), both of which will lead to the increased likelihood of religious persecution.

Alternative Hypotheses

This section will discuss and propose hypotheses to test alternative explanations (Hypotheses 2 - 10) suggested in the literature to a religious economies model of religious regulation and persecution. The alternatives fall into three general categories: (a)

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46 This speculation was made by Latourette to Rev. Dr. William McElwee Miller, Sr., who related it to me in a personal conversation in 1981. Dr. Miller was a Y.M.C.A. colleague of Latourette and a missionary to Persia. Dr. Miller authored the first major scholarly work on the Baha’i faith (1974).

47 Albeit well-intentioned and development-oriented on the part of many Christian missionaries (Latourette 1929, 1967; Woodberry 2004).
civilizational/external; (b) population and economy; and (c) ethnicity and gender. Each of these three categories relates in various ways to issues raised by Huntington (1996).

(a) civilizational/external

The main alternative to a religious economies model of religious regulation and persecution considered in this dissertation is the clash of civilizations, which draws on a secularization model of religious change (see footnote 36). I will propose a specific test for the clash of civilizations perspective as well as tests for other related alternatives.

The implication of the clash of civilizations perspective is that particularly volatile forms of social conflict, which logically would include religious persecution, should be the result of civilizations clashing. It can be expected that when religious persecution is measured at the country-level, then it should primarily be the result of civilizations colliding with each other because civilizations are significantly religious in nature. If one country is bordered by another country from a different civilization or divided internally along civilizational lines, then being situated on this civilization fault line should strongly and significantly explain the level of religious persecution in that country.

**Hypothesis 2: Being located on a civilization fault line explains religious persecution.**

I do not expect being on a fault line to be the predominant explanation of religious persecution, but I do anticipate that it will have some significant effect upon socio-religious hegemony. Civilization divides will only partially account for religious persecution because a significant share of religious regulation is directed at rival factions of the same general religious

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48 To include internal civilization division is a methodological innovation employed in this dissertation which captures civilization divisions better than Beckfield’s (2003) attempt to operationalized Huntington’s Civilizations (see discussion in Chapter 1).
I do not expect being located on a civilizational fault line will ever fully explain socio-religious hegemony because the nature of civilizations is diversity. The clash of civilizations perspective minimizes and verges on the demonization of diversity within civilizations. In contrast, Robert W. Hefner suggests that civilizations are better conceptualized as aqueducts for interaction rather than hermetically sealed systems. Commenting on recent scholarly studies of Indonesia, Hefner noted that the

shift to … heterogeneity of culture seemed especially welcome. In the early 1990s pathbreaking studies by the historians Denys Lombard and Anthony Reid … demonstrated this archipelagic world had long been, in Lombard’s famous phrase, a ‘crossroads’ (carrefour) of civilizations, characterized more by its peculiar genius at integrating disparate influences than a stable cultural core (2000:xvii).

If what Huntington calls ‘civilizations’ are actually crossroads, then it does not make sense to ossify them into hermetic camps; rather they should be seen as organic and mobile. The three most populous countries in Asia—China, India and Indonesia—represent almost a third of the world’s population. None of these three fall neatly into religiously-oriented civilizations; they are crossroads where all the major faiths are significantly represented. Thus, recognizing diversity within civilizations, what Huntington refers to as the “divisive siren calls of multiculturalism” (1996:307), is not a call from a politically correct think tank, but a very real social fact in much of the world today.

49 Though Huntington does recognize internecine religious violence, the overall thrust of his perspective is that conflicts between civilizations are the predominant causal mechanism, and religion “is the principal defining characteristic of civilizations” (1996:253), which minimizes that great diversity is a defining characteristic religion in that religious brands each offer competing interpretations of what may seem a homogenous religious tradition.

50 An example of this near-demonization of diversity is the following statement: “The futures of the United States and the West depend on Americans reaffirming their commitment to western civilization. Domestically this means rejecting the divisive siren calls of multiculturalism” (Huntington 1996:307).
Finally, within these ‘civilizations,’ socio-religious conflicts are not just between general religious traditions, but within them. N.J. Demerath III (2001) poignantly observes that Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated in 1948 “not by a Muslim but by a Hindu whose co-conspirators believed that Hinduism had been betrayed as Gandhi reached out to India as a whole” (2001:118). Demerath also observes that Gandhi’s namesake (but no relation), Rajiv Gandhi, was also assassinated, not by a member of a rival religious tradition, but by a representative of an ‘extremist’ (ibid:122) Hindu religious brand. David Aikman likewise documents Christian-Christian persecution (i.e., kidnapping and murder) happening in China between rival house church groups today (2003:240 ff.).

Another implication of the clash of civilization perspective stemming from its view that each civilization should congeal around its traditional (religious) core is that if a country is dominated by a single religious tradition there will be less religious persecution because of the unity within that tradition. This leads to the next hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 3: There will be little if any religious persecution when a country is religiously homogeneous.**

Hypothesis 3 is not necessarily in contradiction with a religious economies perspective. Rather than persecution being less because society is unified around a common religion, the religious economies perspective would consider that extreme homogeneity (a possible sign of a religious monopoly) may be more of a sign of a stagnant marketplace (Stark and Finke 2000) than a sign of repressive conformity. From a religious economies perspective, when a monopoly situation exists the religious marketplace may exhibit either languidness or largesse. Sweden is an example of languidness, where there is a large degree of homogeneity and low levels of persecution possibly because people have arrived at a laissez faire attitude toward personal
religious affairs. An example of largesse is the United Arab Emirates, where a certain brand of Islam loyal to a popular sheikh holds a monopoly and does not face an internal challenge. In the U.A.E, the country’s rulers provide official meeting places for other faiths and have a relatively high degree of religious toleration.

In addition to languidness and largesse, a monopoly may also exhibit jealousy. This is the case just across the border from the U.A.E. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In the K.S.A. non-Muslim worship is illegal. It is even forbidden to say such a seemingly innocuous holiday greeting as ‘Merry Christmas’ to a Christian. In Saudi Arabia, the monopoly is forced, which results in much less tolerance and much more persecution. The difference is that in the U.A.E. there is a voluntary homogeneity, while in the K.S.A. there is an enforced homogeneity among citizens. In the world today there are very few legally enforced homogeneities (see footnote 15), therefore I expect that the general presence of religious homogeneity will in the majority of cases act as a sort of moral ‘brake’ (characterized either by laissez fare or largesse) that prevents governments from taking a threatening posture toward religious believers.

This does not mean that religious homogeneity is the solution to the problem of religious persecution. In fact, I expect that while higher levels of religious homogeneity will tend to lower the level of religious persecution, it will not counteract the overwhelming effect of religious regulation that emanates from the competitive nature of religion in general. This last point is critical. If religious homogeneity is the cure for the “divisive siren calls of multiculturalism” (Huntington 1996:307), then its effect on religious persecution should become the dominant predictor of decreased religious persecution, and thus overwhelm the effects of religious regulation.
Another one of the key elements of Huntington’s clash of civilization perspective is that civilizational/religious fault lines predict war (1996:253) and thus, it can be expected that war itself, will account for much of the physical abuse or physical displacement of religious adherents (i.e., religious persecution). The importance of war as an independent variable is also suggested by Hooks (1994). In this view armed conflict, correlated with civilization divide, may account for most of the abuse and displacement, and thus have little to do with religious regulation and persecution.

**Hypothesis 4: The level of religious persecution is explained by the level of armed conflict.**

This seems a commonsensical explanation for religious persecution, one which may have nothing to do with religious regulation or even religious fault lines. Persecution may overwhelmingly be an unintentional by-product of armed conflict, i.e., collateral damage (Hiltemann 1991). Nonetheless, there is good reason to question Hypothesis 4 as stated. Persecution in the lead-up to and prosecution of a war has particular religious targets. During the lead-up to World War II, Jews and others were not the only religiously-related target of National Socialism. For example, in May 1936, the Protestant Confessional Church under Dr. Martin Niemoeller, a patriotic former U-Boat commander in the First World War who initially welcomed the revival of German power under Hitler, wrote a critical memorandum to Hitler “denouncing the government’s anti-Semitism and demanding an end to State interference in the churches” (Shirer 1960:238). The persecution was immediate:

Hundreds of ‘Confessional Church’ pastors were arrested, one of the signers of the memorandum, Dr. Weissler, was murdered in the Sachsenhausen

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51 Again, responding to the need for better mathematical modeling (Davenport 2005), it is possible to allow the correlation between a measure of war and civilization divides.
concentration camp, the funds of the ‘Confessional Church’ were confiscated and it was forbidden to make collections (op cit).

During the prosecution of World War II, the Nazis continued to target certain religious brands and personalities. Likewise during the current war on terror, much of the persecution of persons in Iraq (i.e., religiously-related killings) has a specifically religious target, e.g., a key cleric or a certain mosque. Thus, to merely conclude that persecution is explained by armed conflict seems unwarranted. More likely, persecution is intensified during armed conflict.

**(b) Population and Economy**

Huntington links socio-religious conflict with, among other things, “demographic growth and decline, [and] economic developments” (1996:211). Huntington proposes that “the demographic explosion in Muslim societies and the availability of large numbers of often unemployed males between the ages of fifteen and thirty is a natural source of instability and violence both within Islam and against non-Muslims” (1996:265). UCLA geographer Jared Diamond (2005) also offers a demographic explanation for the Rwandan genocide. He links the genocide to the over consumption of the natural habitat where there was high population growth and high density. The crucial point to note in such a demographic argument is that population growth will only matter when the land cannot support the growth, thus leading to social conflict. Following this line of thought, it can be argued that when high population growth and high population density both occur in a country, religious persecution is more likely.

**Hypothesis 5: High population growth when combined with high population density explains the level of religious persecution.**

Jared Diamond does qualify this argument rather strongly, acknowledging the assessment published by Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch concluded that the “‘genocide
resulted from the deliberate choice of a modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power," [which Diamond agreed]… is correct and accounts in large degree for Rwanda’s tragedy” (Diamond 2005:317-318). In other words, in spite of Diamond’s Matlthusian bent (Malthus 1798), he is still agrees that population pressures were secondary.

Having said this, what effect might a high level of population growth, possibly exacerbated by a high level of population density, have on the religious marketplace? I expect that it would primarily impact the level of socio-religious hegemony. For instance, high population growth would increase the number of young people. When there are more young people, and especially young men who may not be fully employed or integrated into society, such young me can become open to the appeals of more radical religious brands (Juergensmeyer 2003). These brands would tend to exhibit higher levels of socio-religious hegemony.

Population growth may also be the result of immigration. For example, the Muslim influx into Europe may contribute to higher levels of socio-religious hegemony. Thus, while I do expect that population growth will be associated with a higher level of socio-religious hegemony, I do not expect that it will be an overwhelming explanation for religious persecution.

Huntington suggests that economic causes are also related to civilization clashes. “Economic growth creates political instability within countries and between countries…” (1996:218; also cf. Hammond 1930; Olson 1963). In the clash of civilizations perspective there seems to be an implied causal connection between changes in the economic marketplace and changes in the religious marketplace. The clash of civilizations perspective considers that the secularization associated with modern economies is driving religious resurgence, presumably by creating a new demand for religious explanations that help people cope with modern life (cf.
Martin 2002). If this is the case, we should expect that religious regulation will be higher in countries with stronger economies; this is because as new religious brands (which may be hegemonic by nature) break into the religious marketplace to meet the new demands of a modernized/secularized society, the protectionist impulses of the current religious players are aroused and they will attempt to regulate the newcomers. For example, in the 1970s there was great concern in the United States and in Europe that cults and exotic religions from the East, such as the Unification Church, were infiltrating the West and preying on the disaffected of society. Court cases allowed parents in America to even take custody of their adult children to extract them from what they argued was brainwashing. In Europe, the cult controversies stimulated a series of official cult watches (Beckford 1985). The civilization clash perspective suggests that as countries modernize they also secularize, causing new or unorthodox religions to counter the secularization. The implication is that society may react against these new religious forces by regulating and persecuting the newcomers and their converts.

**Hypothesis 6: The level of religious persecution will be higher in countries with strong economies.**

There is, however, a counter argument which causes me to question this Hypothesis. Kenneth N. Waltz, in his *Theory of International Politics* (1979), suggests that as a country’s power increases, it can better afford to risk mistakes. This would mean that richer countries have a greater social margin of error than poorer countries. The way this would impact religious regulation should be that while modernization may bring about greater opportunities for new religious brands to make inroads into a country, the greater economic strength of the country will allow society to more readily accept the risks associated with an unregulated religious marketplace. Based on the principle that more powerful economies have “wider margins of
safety in dealing with the less powerful” (Waltz 1979:194), I would expect that the level of modernization as reflected in a comparative measure of per capita income would be associated with a decrease in the level of persecution. I expect this because governments of countries with higher levels of per capita income would be more secure and thus less quick to threaten citizens.

If economic strength does not lead to religious persecution, it may be that economic inequality does. Jared Diamond (2005) makes this point in his analysis of the Rwandan genocide. He proposes that the genocide was related to a high level of income inequality within Rwanda. It may be that such an explanation accounts for religious persecution. This explanation is sometimes given for persecution of European Jews in 1096 as the Crusaders made their way toward Palestine (cf. Runciman 1951:134 ff.). The Indonesian Muslim backlash against the relatively better off Chinese Christian communities in the late 1990s is also another example (Hefner 2000:6).

**Hypothesis 7: A high level of income inequality results in religious persecution.**

While Hypothesis 7 is plausible, there is a substantial literature that suggests just the contrary in regard to other forms of conflict (Hardy 1979; Singelman and Simpson 1977; Weede 1981, 1986), even in regard to rational choice arguments (Lichbach 1990). In regard to religion I doubt Hypothesis 7 because of two reasons. First, it presumes that economic inequality is strictly along religious lines. This is unlikely. For instance, not all Chinese Christians in Indonesia are/were rich, nor are/were all Chinese in Indonesia Christian. Indonesian Chinese may be relatively better off, but within their own ranks there are rich and poor.

I expect the opposite of Hypothesis 7 to be true. The great communist attempts to equalize personal income coincided with high levels of religious persecution. The attempt to
eradicate unequal personal wealth coincided with the attempt to eradicate religion. I expect that economic inequality, i.e., the situation where some people are more economically ‘blessed’ than others, tends to be associated with lower levels of religious regulation and greater levels of freedom. A ‘free’ society is one where the pursuit of wealth is guarded. When societies are forced to be equal, a religious (work) ethic would be a threat that could attract greater persecution. It is not unusual for a religious work ethic (or God or karma or divine fate) to be acknowledged as the source of financial or career success. Of course, this partially follows Max Weber’s line of thought in the Protestant Ethic (1930), where worldly success is the natural result of following a religious ethic that values hard work and sacrifice. I am not suggesting that religious doctrines explicitly promote income inequality, but I would conjecture that the Old Testament story of Job going from rags to riches (Job 42:7-17) is one that may have more general appeal than the New Testament admonition to “go, sell your possessions, and give to the poor” (Matthew 19:21, NAB). This association of income inequality with religious freedom is related to the perspective that religious choices are made along rational lines as are economic decisions. Stark and Finke give evidence that strong religious belief is associated with a higher concern for money and a higher importance on being financially secure (2000:51). The rags-to-riches ideal which tolerates income inequality is associated with greater ‘freedom’ and, I would argue, generally with lower religious regulation and lower religious persecution.

Related to Hypotheses 6 and 7, but somewhat different, is the possibility that a severe turn in the economic system may trigger all sorts of social conflict, including being the cause of religious persecution (Hypothesis 8). For example, the Asian Crisis in the late 1990s may have been a trigger of the conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia (Hefner 2000).
Hypothesis 8: Religious persecution can be explained by economic crisis.

This is different than income inequality, which I see partially as a result of a system that promotes free competition. It is also different than economic strength in that a crisis can happen in a strong or weak nation. I do not expect that an economic crisis will explain religious persecution. Unless the situation deteriorates into armed conflict and anarchy, I would expect that people will generally focus on making ends meet and survival in a time of economic crisis. For example, in the waning days of the Soviet Union, the economy collapsed and the cost of living soared. While the nation still stayed together under the old system, the response of the many nationalities was not immediately to take sides against others from differing religious backgrounds, but to pull together to help one another. This, at least, was my experience having been involved in development work in Muslim Soviet Central Asia from 1989-1993.

To give another example, in the mid 1990’s Libya was cut off from the world economy for a number of years by the embargo resulting from the shooting down of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland. While living in Malta in 1995, I met with the Sisters of Mercy who were working in Libya when they came for a short visit. They reported that due to extreme shortages in food and medicine, Muslim and Christian households uncharacteristically shared food and medicine with each other rather than hoarding or denying medical care. Such examples cause me to doubt that the onset of an economic crisis leads to religious persecution.

(c) ethnicity and gender

In contrast to some who see the relationship between religion (or at least religiosity), ethnicity and social conflict/intolerance as spurious (cf. Kunovich and Hodson 1999), Huntington sees a connection between religion-ethnicity and social conflict. Huntington’s basic
formulation, however, is problematic. In Huntington’s perspective, religion and ethnicity are highly conflated categories (1996: 44 ff.). For example, some of his proposed civilizations are tied closely to ethnicity (Sinic, Japanese), others are religious (Islamic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist), and others are presumably Christian or post-Christian (Western, Latin American). Following this model of conflating religion and ethnicity, Norris and Inglehart (2004: 241) refer to “ethno-religious violence” as a single category, citing the *Minorities At Risk* project as a source on this subject (ibid, 285, n 19). Since there is some question as to the effects of ethnicity in a model explaining socio-religious conflict, it is useful to test whether the empirical conflation of ethnicity with religion may be a primary source of religious persecution. In other words, it may be the overlap of religion with ethnicity that explains religious persecution, not religious regulation.

**Hypothesis 9: Religious persecution is primarily ethno-religious in nature.**

Religion and ethnicity are indeed overlapping categories, but they are not identical as suggested by Hypothesis 9. Religious brands are active within ethnicities and across ethnicities, meaning that not all members of an ethnicity will naturally belong to the same religious brand. For example, religious brands such as the Jesuits or Baha’i include many ethnicities and nationalities; thus, religion is not reducible to ethnicity. A look at U.K. census data comparing religion and ethnicity indicates that ethnicity could not be a reliable predictor of religiously-related abuse (see Figure 1).

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53 According to an official website of the Baha’i faith, it is a functioning religious brand in 235 countries and territories, encompassing over 2,100 ethnic, racial, and tribal groups. http://www.bahai.org/
Such data show that ethnicity and religion are not identical categories. Every ethnicity contains some Christians and most ethnicities contain substantial numbers of Muslims. Also, ethnicity is conflated with nationality, making ethnicity difficult to empirically measure, even by the sophisticated U.K. Census. An additional difficulty is that ethnicity is composed of a variable set of characteristics that overlap but are not coterminous with race. In other words, ethnic boundaries are fluid and layered (cf. Okamoto 2003). The measure of the religion-ethnicity tie I will use is described in the next chapter.

In one way or another, Huntington’s expansive paradigm has included aspects of each of the alternative explanations to the religious economies model suggested by Hypotheses 1.1-1.3 above. There is one variable that Huntington’s tour de force omitted that Norris and Inglehart

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54 The general idea of ethnicity is captured in the term ‘ethnic group’ defined as “a group within a larger society that displays a common set of cultural traits, a sense of community among its members based on a presumed cultural heritage, a feeling of ethnocentrism on the part of the group members, ascribed group membership, and, in some cases, a distinct territory. Each of these characteristics is a variable, differing from group to group” (Marger 1991:35).
(2004) point out. They suggest that the “most basic cultural fault line between the West and Islam … involves issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization” (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 155). The implication of this for a model of religious persecution is that women becoming better off could be a trigger for socio-religious hegemony and religious persecution. For example, religious persecution may specifically single out progressive women, such as was the case in Uzbekistan where women who refused to wear conservative dress had their faces slashed with razor blades (State Department 2003). 55

**Hypothesis 10: As women become better off the level of religious persecution increases.**

The term ‘gender inequality’ usually means ‘women are worse off than men.’ I will follow this convention specifically by looking at what happens to socio-religious hegemony and religious persecution when women become better off than the norm. This is best done in the context of human development, i.e., do women have a better chance of living longer, being better educated, and having a decent income than the norm of society? As Prof. Fadwa El Guindi (1999) argues, what a Westerner may consider a sign of gender inequality may not be seen as such in the local community, such as wearing the *hijab* (covering/scarf). So as a way to not superimpose a Western perspective on gender inequality, the measure used for *women* becoming *better off* will be one that is related to concrete measures of the opportunities for women to live,

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55 If the basic divide between the West and the Muslim world is gender inequality, then the relationship of *women* becoming *better off* to *socio-religious hegemony* should reverse or become insignificant when Islam is controlled for, i.e., *women* becoming *better off* should become a stimulus for *socio-religious hegemony* in Muslim countries but not Christian countries. I ran models to test this, and it was not the case. *Women Better Off* lowered socio-religious hegemony in both models. I expect that the model of religious persecution I am proposing accounts for religious persecution whether the persecution is in a predominantly Muslim or Christian country (or in a country dominated by any religion). The focus of this research is on a general mechanism that explains religious persecution. Differences based on the percentage of the dominant religion could be a study all its own. It is not presumed that the dominant religious tradition will not have an effect; rather, the mechanism (i.e., the Model) that I am proposing will continue to remain significant and strong even when the difference due to a particular religious tradition’s domination is controlled for.
income and education. This approach recognizes that having a better life is measured in real terms, not just status or vocational terms. When considering gender inequality in these terms, I anticipate that women being better off will lower the level of socio-religious hegemony. My rationale is based on the fact that as women have more education and better incomes (either through marriage or employment), that they will act as a moderating force on the more violence-prone actions of ‘their’ men. Since men tend to be the perpetrators of most religiously-related acts of violence (Juergensmeyer 2003), I would expect women becoming better off will influence men to be more moderate. In other words, when women are better off, then men are as well. Thus, as I argued above in relationship to overall economic strength, women becoming better off should decrease the level of socio-religious hegemony and thus lower the overall level of religious persecution.

Overall, I do not anticipate that a reduction in the level of gender inequality (i.e., women becoming better off) to have an overwhelming impact on the level of religious persecution for two reasons. First, many instances of persecution seem to affect whole family units (e.g., entire Jewish families were killed during the Holocaust). Second, there are trends observed where the growth of conservative religion promotes gender equality in developing nations (cf. Smith and Prokopy 1999).

This chapter has explained and defined the concept of religious persecution in such a way that it can be clearly operationalized, as will be discussed in the next chapter. This chapter has

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56 The issue of gender equality often overlooks the question of definitions of ‘power.’ Celia Wolf-Devine, in discussing the empowerment offered by traditional marriages, notes that in them men “have more income, but women control almost as much wealth as men do (and by some measures, more)” (1998:55). In any measure of women being better off, the measure will reflect such things as the economic advantage of living in a family where economies of scale raise the wellbeing of all cooperating members.

57 This line of reasoning was similarly argued in terms of sex ratios by Marcia Guttentag and Paul F. Secord, where “women, can, under certain circumstances, mitigate the effects of … male dominance” (1983:197).
also explained and defined concepts important to this study. Contrary to the clash of civilizations perspective, I have focused on the actions of religious brands rather than the amorphous concept of ethno-religious-cultural-geographical civilizations. As will be shown in the next chapter, this allows meaningful measurements to be made of activities related to religious brands. Drawing on the religious economies model (which identifies religious regulation as an important causal agent in religious change), I have extended the inquiry of the unintended consequences of religious regulation to the topic of religious persecution. In extending this line of research, I have theorized that socio-religious hegemony has a regulatory impact through its overt actions as well as through the ways it is able to establish itself in the minds, feelings and attitudes of people. Socio-religious hegemony is theorized to have a direct impact on the level of religious persecution, and an indirect effect on religious persecution, working through its impact on the inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion. Related to this theoretical model, a series of hypotheses were proposed including hypotheses related to alternative explanations, particularly the clash of civilizations perspective. The next chapter will describe the empirical measures that will be used to test each hypothesis.
CHAPTER III. DATA AND MEASUREMENT REVIEW

This chapter describes the data sources and specific measures that will be used to test the hypotheses from the previous chapter. More information on my primary data set is included in Appendix A. Appendix C provides additional descriptive summary information of the variables.

DATA SOURCES

The data are all aggregate level data on up to 196 different countries or regions. The types of data fall into three general categories: religious regulation/freedom; war and violence; and general economic and development measures.

The data on religious regulation and religious freedom come from three sources. The first source is my quantitative coding of the 2003 U.S. State Department Reports on International Religious Freedom (Grim 2004a).\textsuperscript{58} Second, I use Freedom House’s Religious Freedom Ratings (Marshall 2000) as a recent measure of religious regulation. Third, M. Seale Bates’ summary measures (1945) on religious liberty are used for a measure of religious regulation from the 1940s.

The data on war and violence come from two sources. The first source is my quantitative coding of the 2003 U.S. State Department Reports on International Religious Freedom (Grim 2004a). The second source is my re-coding of instances of armed conflict using data assembled by the ecumenical peace centre of the Canadian Council of Churches (Project Ploughshares 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Regehr 2001).

\textsuperscript{58} See Appendix A for a summary of the qualitative data and their quantitative coding.
Other data used in the analyses are internationally recognized measures on economic and human development from the United Nations and the World Bank.

SPECIFIC MEASURES

This section describes the specific measures that I will use to test the measurement issues and each of the hypotheses described in the previous chapter. I will begin with the variables related to the three measurement issues raised. Then I will describe additional variables which are related to my thesis and three related hypotheses (1.1-1.3). Following this, I will describe the variables associated with alternative explanations (Hypotheses 2-10).

Measurement Issues

Measurement Issue 1: Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion are closely related constructs.

Measurement Issue 2: Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion are closely related constructs that significantly relate to a recent measure of religious regulation.

Three different variables are used to address Measurement Issues 1 and 2. These measures are central to the overall model. The first two are latent variables using observed variables which represent religious regulation: socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions. The third is a recent religious regulation scale (Marshall 2000) which is external to my own coded data.

Latent Variable A: Socio-Religious Hegemony [socmv3, bias4.6]

Socio-religious hegemony will be modeled as a latent variable of two observed variables which empirically function well together as a scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .786). The two observed variables are Anti-Brand Movements and Negativity to Other Brands. These come
from my coding of the 2003 International Religious Freedom Reports. The common element in these variables is that they are indicators of socio-religious forces that constrain religious choice by seeking to dominate and/or regulate the religious market.

The first observed variable is *Anti-(Religious) Brand Movements* (Figure 2). This scale accounts for two related but different types of such social movements. Anti-religious brand movements can be protectionist, aiming to protect an existing order by campaigning against religious brands viewed as a threat. Such movements often target religious brands such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, who do not pledge national flags. Anti-religious brand movements can also be hegemonic, opposing a secular ordering of society and seeking to establish hegemony over the country or some part of the country. Examples of this type are the numerous movements to adopt Shari’a Law throughout the world as well as Hindutva movements in India. Such movements inequitably regulate the religious marketplace in that they seek to ensure security for their favored religious brand(s). Rather than promote real religious brand choice, such movements seek to circumscribe choice.

**Figure 2: Anti-Brand Movements [socmv3]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the situation regarding social movements in relation to religious brands in the country?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Social movement(s) exist that seek national or regional hegemony for a religious brand and/or campaign against certain religious brands through nationally coordinated means. [national &amp; organized activity]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Social movement(s) exist that seek national or regional hegemony for a religious brand and/or campaign against certain religious brands through nationally unconnected, but regionally coordinated means. [regional &amp; organized activity]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Social movement(s) exist that seek national or regional hegemony for a religious brand and/or campaign against certain religious brands, but they are uncoordinated at either national or regional levels. [flashes of activity]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. All social movement(s) that are reported either promote religious freedom or are amicable and do not intimidate people from (other) religious brands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: - Original variable recoded from 0-6 point cul-de-sac scale (cf. Grim 2004c) that originally coded national efforts ‘seeking hegemony’ as 6 and national efforts ‘campaigning against certain religious brands’ as 5, and so on. 6 and 5 (national efforts) were re-coded into 3; 4 and 3 (regional efforts) were re-coded into 2; and 2 and 1 (flashes of activity) were recoded into 1.
The second observed measure of Socio-Religious Hegemony is Negativity to Other Brands (Figure 3). This is an additive index of five different variables which capture specific attitudes within society toward other religious brands. It includes items measuring the views of minority religious brands, relations between religious brands, attitudes toward conversions to other religious brands, and other forms of negative exclusivity. Such attitudes reflect whether religious brands feel that their security is threatened by other religious brands. Attitudes toward conversion and proselytism are indicators of religious brand hegemony which reflect whether there is real choice.

The following items are used to construct this index:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Societal attitudes toward other or nontraditional religions are reported to be: 0=open and tolerant; 1=discriminatory; 2a=negative just in certain regions; 2b=negative just toward certain religious brands; 3=both 2a and 2b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Relations between various religious communities are reported to be generally: 0=amicable; 1=sometimes strained; 2a=negative just in certain regions; 2b=negative just toward certain religious brands; 3=both 2a and 2b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. According to the Report, what are social attitudes to conversions to other religions? 0=no problems reported; 1=some tension; 2=negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Does the Report mention that traditional attitudes and/or edicts of the clerical establishment strongly discourage proselytizing? 0=no; 1=yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. According to the Report, do established or existing religions try to shut out new religions in any way? 0=no; 1=yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Original variables recoded so that low values = lower socio-religious hegemony.
- Items A, B, and C originally had one higher level: ‘hostile’; this was recoded to be equal with the level below it to avoid conflating it with the dependent variable, i.e., these three variables are thus not indicators of physically hostile or violent action.

The descriptive statistics for the socio-religious hegemony measures are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Socio-Religious Hegemony (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Measures alpha = .786</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Brand Movements</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 3</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negativity to Other Brands</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 6 †</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>1.982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Components of “Negativity to Other Brands” alpha = .799

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Religious biases</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 3</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Religious relations</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 3</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Conversion attitudes</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 2</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Proselytizing attitudes</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 1</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Hegemonic activities</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 1</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negativity to Other Brands raw</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 10 †</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>3.303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† (Negativity to Other Brands raw * .6) = 0-6 scale.

**Latent Variable B: Inequitable legal/policy restriction [o.relreg, maclaw.6]**

Inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion is a latent variable of two measures which empirically function well together as a scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .798). The two component measures are *Restrictions on Brands* and *Macro Legal Systems*. The common element in these measures is that they present data on the restrictions that a country’s legal/policy framework places upon religious brands.

The first, *Restrictions on Brands* (Figure 4), is a measure of the level of restrictions a government places on religion and religious brands. It ranges from 0 (no restrictions reported) to 6 (prohibition of religious practice except for that which is approved by the government).

The second measure is *Macro Legal Systems* (Figure 5). This measure represents breaches in legal and policy safeguards for religious freedom in a country. While it includes the absence of Constitutional guarantees, it focuses primarily on whether these guarantees are actualized, including whether there is an official religious bias, e.g., a State religion. It is an...
additive index composed of five measures. *Macro Legal System* also taps into the reality that local and national policies differ.

**Figure 4: Restrictions on Brands [o.relreg]**

What is the highest level of restrictions (or incentives) reported?

6. Prohibition of religious practice except for that which is approved by the Government.
5. Government involvement in the internal and/or international affairs of religious brands.
4. The Government targets certain religious brands to be controlled or proscribed.
3. The Government denies (or provides) subsidies to some religious brands but not others for such things as religious education, salaries, etc. (including ‘national patrimony’).
2. Restrictions on the use and/or ownership of property which are not equitable for all religious brands, e.g., ‘national patrimony’ care or Government ownership of religious buildings.
1. Difficulties for certain religious brands registering or having a legally recognized status, but these difficulties do not proscribe those religious brands.
0. None reported.

**Figure 5: Macro Legal System [maclaw.6]**

The following items are used to construct this index:

A. Does this Section of the Report mention that there is a Constitution? 0=yes; 1=no Constitution, but law functions in its place; 2=no
B. Does this Section of the Report mention that the Constitution provides for freedom of religion? 0=yes; 1=no Constitution, but law provides for freedom of religion; 2=no
C. Does this Section of the Report mention that there is some sort of favored religion? 0=no; 1=historic religion or religious philosophy; 2=yes there is an official, established or state religion
D. How is freedom of religion described in the Report? 0=law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government ‘generally respects’ this right in practice; 1= law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice, but some problems exist, e.g., in certain localities; 2=limited and/or rights are not protected or are restricted; 3=does not exist
E. Does the Report indicate that the Government at all its levels protects religious freedom? 0=yes or no was problem mentioned; 1= protects at most levels; 2= does not protect

Original variables recoded so that low values = less inequitable legal/policy restrictions on religion.

The descriptive statistics for the inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion measures are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Inequitable Legal/Policy restriction of Religion (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Measures alpha = .798</th>
<th>Restrictions on Brands</th>
<th>196</th>
<th>0 – 6</th>
<th>3.20</th>
<th>2.030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro Legal System</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 6 †</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.374</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components of “Macro Legal System” alpha = .687</td>
<td>A. Constitution present</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 2</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Right of religious freedom</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 2</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Officially favored religion</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 2</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Religious freedom protected</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 3</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Protected at all govt. levels</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 2</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro Legal System raw</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 11 †</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.518</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† (Macro Legal System raw * .5454545) = 0-6 scale.

Independent Variable: Religious Freedom Scale (Marshall 2000) [rlfre.fh]

Freedom House has possibly the most objective extant measure of religious freedom (Marshall 2000).\(^59\) It is a ranking of 74 countries on a scale of one to seven, with 1 being religiously deregulated (or free) and 7 being highly regulated. The scale was developed and vetted by Freedom House using a lengthy questionnaire completed by experts on the religious situation in 74 countries. It is not biased toward one religion, but treats the restriction of any religious tradition as a violation of religious freedom.

Table 3: Religious Freedom Scale (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)

| Religious Freedom Scale -- Freedom House 2000 | 74 | 1 – 7 | 3.89 | 1.709 |

In order to further test whether socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion reflect religious regulation, it is useful to compare how they to a past measure of religious regulation (given that religious realities change slowly over time).

Measurement Issue 3: Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion significantly relate to a past level of religious regulation.

\(^59\) It is however limited in focus (legal/policy) and coverage (only 74 countries).
Three variables are used to address Measurement Issue 3. The first two, socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion, are described above. The variable for a past religious regulation scale is used is Bates (1945), which is external to my own coded data.

**Independent Variable: Religious Liberty (Bates 1945)** [relib.sb]

The 1945 Religious Liberty scale was produced by the global study on religious liberty conducted by the Joint Committee on Religious Liberty, coordinated by M. Searle Bates (1945), Rhodes scholar and professor of History at the University of Nanking and later Yale University. The Joint Committee ranked 78 countries on religious liberty, dividing them into five major and three sub levels which I recoded into an 8-point scale (op cit 546-547). The lowest level of religious freedom (i.e., the highest level of regulation) is repressive uniformity and religious freedom (i.e., low regulation) is represented as being free from preferences and discriminations (see Figure 6 and Table 4). It is generally unbiased toward any particular religion, treating the restriction of any religious tradition as a violation of religious freedom.

**Figure 6: 1945 Religious Liberty Scale** [relib.sb]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>high degree of freedom from preferences and discriminations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>preferences and discriminations relatively minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>preferences and discriminations important, but not generally acute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>freedom of religion limited in certain regions, with important social pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>freedom of religion limited, with weighty preferences and discriminations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>freedom of religion limited, with state controls or state effort on behalf of religion or quasi-religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>freedom of religion severely limited, with state restrictions or socio-religious pressures heavy or both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>repressive uniformity, with death or utter ostracism for apostasy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4: Religious Liberty Scale (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Name</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Liberty Scale -- Bates 1945</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 – 8</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>2.449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypotheses Related to Thesis

Though socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion both reflect religious regulation, I hypothesize that socio-religious hegemony causally underlies the inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion. Also, this means that I expect that socio-religious hegemony will have a direct effect on both inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion and religious persecution, and an additional indirect effect on religious persecution through its effect on inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion.

Hypothesis 1.1: Socio-religious hegemony has a direct effect on both inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion and religious persecution; inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion also has a direct effect on religious persecution.

Dependent Variable: Religious Persecution (Physical Abuse and Displacement of People)

Religious persecution is the main dependent variable to be explained. Religious persecution (Figure 7) represents the extent of religious freedom violations. Each State Department Report was careful to document actual situations and estimates of the number of people affected, making this item straightforward to code (Grim 2004a). 58.2 percent of the countries had no physical abuses or displacements reported, but the remaining 41.8 percent of the countries had abuses with continuing effects reported, including 8.2 percent (16 countries) with more than 10,000 people abused or displaced due to a lack of religious freedom.

Figure 7: Religious persecution and Displacement of People

Considering the entire Report, estimate the number of people who were physically abused or displaced due to a lack of religious freedom in this country:

0 = none; 1 = > 0 < 10; 2 = 10 – 200; 3 = 201-1000; 4 = 1001 - 10,000; 5 = > 10,000
Table 5: Religious Persecution (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Persecution</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 5</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.673</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coding the level of abuses as a range is a more appropriate measure than the actual number because in many cases the number reported in the State Department Reports is an estimate. Though specific numbers were counted by the coders to rate each country, the numbers mentioned in the Reports were often estimates within ranges. It was clear in the Reports when there were no abuses or displacements mentioned (0), just a few mentioned (1), more than a few but less than several hundred (2), hundreds (3), thousands (4), or tens of thousands (5). Still, the State Department Reports when giving such numbers almost always cited names, places, and specific situations.  

Note that the dependent variable (religious persecution) is specifically the number of people (expressed as levels) who have been physically abused or displaced. While it can be assumed that any form of physical abuse or displacement presumes a threat, threatening actions by the government or its security forces is distinct from actual abuse or displacement. A threat can also be warnings from the government that if a religious brand constructs a place of worship in a certain area that it will be torn down. Other types of government threats included the Reports include extortion of fines, surveillance, psychiatric treatment, restricting the movement of certain persons, pressuring the family and/or social/job networks of religious believers, etc.

60 The Reports focused on violations that happened during the report period, but included violations considered recent enough to adversely impact the situation of religious freedom in the country. It is theoretically justified to include specific violations mentioned in the Reports that occurred prior to the report period because someone who was abused or is still displaced, e.g., in Indonesia or East Timor, still bears the scars and effects of that experience. Even those who were displaced and have returned home may suffer the effects of that violation for many more years to come, if not for a lifetime. Extensive and severe violations such as rape, torture, and/or the violent death of a relative continue to have an onerous effect.

61 The correlation of government threats and religious persecution is .720, p < .001, two-tailed.
None of these sorts of threats from the government would have been counted in the dependent variable measure unless they resulted in physical abuse or displacement. While threats arguably constitute a form of oppression, I reserve the more precisely-used term, *persecution*, for more objectively measured abuse and displacement of persons. Thus, threats can be considered a distinct measurement that will have a stronger relationship with the legal/policy measure than with the socio-religious measure.

**Hypothesis 1.2:** Inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion has an indirect effect on religious persecution by allowing religious believers to be threatened by government or other forces.

**Mediating Variable: Government Threats [r.thrtgv]**

The usefulness of this measure is that it allows for a more proximate cause of persecution than an inequitable legal/policy situation. Hypothesis 1.2 specifically views *government threats* as a mediating mechanism.

**Figure 8: Government Threats [r.thrtgv]**

*Are people threatened by the Government and/or its security/military forces based on their religious identity or activity?*

- 0. No.
- 1. Yes, some are.
- 2. Yes, all are.

**Table 6: Government Threats (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Threats</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 2</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that there may be a method effect in the measurement of *government threats* and *religious persecution* related to coding *abuse* also as *threat* (but not vice versa).

---

*Displacement* means having to stop living in one’s place of abode due to religious-related causes, including imprisonment, demolition of housing, forced or coerced emigration, etc.
versa). It is important to note that not all threats result in abuse (persecution), which is specifically the number of people who were physically abused or displaced (not just threatened or coerced). In the analysis, this method effect can be tested by correlating the error terms of government threats and religious persecution. If the model remains acceptable and none of the hypothesized relationships change direction or disappear, then this will be evidence that the method effect does not overly conflate these two measurements.

The last hypothesis related to my proposed model of religious persecution is 1.3. There are no new variables added to test this hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 1.3**: Religious regulation leads to religious persecution and not vice versa.

**Alternative Hypotheses**

The variables related to measurement issues and to my thesis its three hypotheses (1.1-1.3) have been described above. The remainder of this chapter describes the variables associated with alternative explanations (Hypotheses 2-9) of religious persecution. They are grouped into three general categories: (a) civilizational/external; (c) ethnicity and gender; and (b) Population and Economy.

**(a) Civilizational/External Control Variables: Civilization Divide, Religious Homogeneity, and Armed Conflict**

**Hypothesis 2**: Being located on a civilization fault line explains religious persecution.

**Control Variable**: Civilization Divide [civ.div]
Using Huntington’s civilization divide map (1997:26-27) as the basic data, I created this measure using the scale in Figure 9. Each of the 196 countries in my data set was coded according to their relation to Huntington’s (1996) eight (or nine) civilization divides (Buddhist is not consistently used by Huntington): Western, Latin America, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, (Buddhist), and Japanese.

**Figure 9: Civilization Divide [civ.div]**

How many borders of this country touch the borders of a country that is predominantly from one of the other major ‘civilizations’ (cf. Huntington 1996)?

- 0. All national borders are with countries of the same ‘civilization’ or the nation is an island.
- 1. One country from another civilization borders this country.
- 2. More than one country from another civilization borders this country.
- 3. This country is internally split between civilizations

**Table 7: Civilization Divide (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilization Divide</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilization Divide</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 3</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.862</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis 3:** There will be little if any religious persecution when a country is religiously homogeneous.

**Control Variable:** Religious Homogeneity [Herfdl2]

Data on the degree of religious homogeneity in each country come from my quantitative coding of the 2003 U.S. State Department Reports on International Religious Freedom (Grim 2004a). This is a measure of the degree to which one religious tradition dominates a country. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a widely accepted measure of market concentration. I use a modified form of the HHI here as a measure of the degree to which the religious

---

His map is imprecise in that it has no country names and it fails to identify some divided countries. Where the map is unclear, or where I considered that the country is split between civilizations, e.g., Sri Lanka (scored 3), I coded them as such. If anything, my coding is more conservative than Huntington’s map in that it takes into account more civilization divides than the map indicates.
marketplace is dominated by a single religious brand (or religious tradition). It is calculated by summing the squared market share of each of the top 5 religious brands or religious traditions in the country. The HHI score can be between a minimum of nearly 0 to a maximum of 10,000. The HHI is calculated for 196 different countries as describe in Figure 10.

**Figure 10: Religious homogeneity [herfdl2]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of religious homogeneity in each country:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Herfdl2} = \left(% \text{ Citizens belonging to 1st largest religious tradition}\right)^2 + \left(% \text{ Citizens belonging to 2nd largest religious tradition}\right)^2 + \left(% \text{ Citizens belonging to 3rd largest religious tradition}\right)^2 + \left(% \text{ Citizens belonging to 4th largest religious tradition}\right)^2 + \left(% \text{ Citizens belonging to 5th largest religious tradition}\right)^2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In this calculation, the % is expressed as a whole number (99% = 99).

**Table 8: Religious Homogeneity (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Homogeneity</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>196</td>
<td>81 – 10,000</td>
<td>5711</td>
<td>2573</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using an HHI calculated as shown in Figure 10 is the best measure available, but it has a serious drawback. It is primarily based on the degree to which a religious tradition dominates a country rather than a particular religious brand. Nonetheless, the State Department Reports are sensitive to differences within religious traditions, and the demographic section of the Reports did provide a breakdown of adherents beyond the main traditions when there was data. Other data sets (e.g., Barrett, Kurian and Johnson 2000) are slightly better about providing measurements for smaller traditions, but they too provide scant data on religious denominations among non-Christian religions.  

---

64 Barrett et al (2000) do not track such “denominations” as Jamaat Ahmadiyya, an Islamic religious brand which came out of India. Jamaat Ahmadiyya claims on its website to have built over 10,000 mosques throughout the world. They also claim they have as many as 200,000,000 adherents in 176 countries. (An academic appraisal of the movement by Louis J. Hammann, a non-Muslim scholar from Gettysburg College, is also available on their website. His paper on the website estimates that the movement has 10,000,000 adherents. Regardless of the actual number of adherents, the movement demonstrates the globality of this religious brand.) They are dedicated to the goal of building mosques “to see the victory of Islam and the unity of mankind” (Rehammatullah 2001). Interestingly, the website uses terminology Western scholars seldom (if ever) use in relation to Islam: “This is the most dynamic
Hypothesis 4: The level of religious persecution is explained by the level of armed conflict.

Control Variable: Armed Conflict (Ploughshares 2003) [armed.pp]

This variable on armed conflict uses a re-coding of data assembled by the Ecumenical Peace Center of the Canadian Council of Churches (Project Ploughshares 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). I use these data for two reasons. First, Project Ploughshares defines armed conflict and employs coding procedures that clearly distinguish armed conflict from other forms of civil disturbances (e.g., theft, looting, extortion). In their definition, an armed conflict is “a political conflict in which armed combat involves the armed forces of at least one state (or one or more armed factions seeking to gain control of all or part of the state), and in which at least 1,000 people have been killed by the fighting during the course of the conflict” (Regehr 2001). They also have strict criteria for determining the cessation of conflict. Second, I use them because these data represent clear measures on both the intensity and the recency of the armed conflict.

Though the three Ploughshares re-coded reports contain overlapping information, it was straightforward to assign a single score for each country of the world by counting whatever score was highest. For example, though Turkey had an armed conflict end in 2002 (scoring it 1 on the scale), the conflict that ended was still on-going in 2001 with 10,001-100,000 civilian and...
military deaths occurring during the course of the particular conflict. Thus, Turkey received a score of 4.

**Figure 11: Armed Conflict [armed.pp]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level and recency of armed conflict in each country:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 = None reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Ended sometime from 1988-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = 2001 conflict involving 1,000-10,000 civilian and military deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = 2002 conflict involving 1,000-10,000 civilian and military deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = 2001 conflict involving 10,001-100,000 civilian and military deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 = 2002 conflict involving 10,001-100,000 civilian and military deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 = 2001 conflict involving &gt; 100,000 civilian and military deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 = 2002 conflict involving &gt; 100,000 civilian and military deaths</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 9: Armed Conflict (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level and Recency of Armed Conflict</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 7</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 7</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(b) Population and Economy Control Variables: Population Growth, Population Density, Purchasing Power Parity and Income Inequality*

**Hypothesis 5**: High population growth when combined with high population density explains the level of religious persecution.

**Control Variable**: *Population Growth [pop_grow]*

The data for this variable are the 2002 population growth statistic developed by the United Nations. It is a measure of the net population growth or decline.

**Table 10: Population Growth (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Growth rate</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193</td>
<td>-.00731 – .04323</td>
<td>.0146</td>
<td>.0111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Control Variable: *Population Density* [density]

This is calculated by dividing the total population by the country’s area in miles. These data are coded from the 2003 International Religious freedom Reports (Grim 2004a). Monaco has the highest density and the Western Sahara has the lowest. (N=195 because the State Department Reports did not provide the land area for Iraq.)

**Figure 12: Population Density [density]**

*Calculation:*

\[
\text{Population Density} = \frac{\text{Population}}{\text{land area in miles}}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11: Population Density (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 6: The level of religious persecution will be higher in countries with strong economies.

Control Variable: *Economic Strength* [ppp.2003]

It is possible to test Hypothesis 6 using the variable *economic strength*. These are data from the World Bank, 2003. They are calculated by estimating the mean per capita income for each country of the world, but standardized to represent the purchasing power of the incomes in those countries for typically used goods and services. This recognizes the fact that a U.S. dollar can buy much more in some countries than it can in others. For example, the mean annual income in China is $4390 in SPPP (purchasing power parity dollars) compared to about one quarter that much using the standard yuan-to-dollar conversion rate. This measure represents the
strength of each country’s economy in a comparative framework. It reveals both economic
strength within a nation and the comparative economic disparity between nations.

**Figure 13: Economic Strength (Purchasing Power Parity Income) [ppp.2003]**

*Purchasing Power Parity per capita annual income for each country
Income in U.S. $ adjusted for purchasing power of local currency in country.*

<p>| Table 12: Economic Strength (Purchasing Power Parity Income) (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics) |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Strength</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>490 – 35840</td>
<td><strong>8288.85</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis 7:** A high level of income inequality results in religious persecution.

**Control Variable:** *Income Inequality [gini.tot]*

It is possible to test Hypothesis 7 using the variable *income inequality*. These are data from the United Nations, 2003. It is a measure of the uneven distribution of income *within* a country. I use the Gini coefficient expressed as a whole number percentage, with a theoretical maximum of 100, with higher numbers representing greater income inequality.

<p>| Table 13: Income Inequality (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics) |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Gini Coefficient as a percentage</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>24.4 – 70.7</td>
<td><strong>40.4183</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypothesis 8:** Religious persecution can be explained by economic crisis.

**Control Variable:** *Economic Crisis [cpi.inc]*

These data are the increase in the consumer price index (CPI) from the United Nations Development Reports for 142 nations for the period 2000-2001. The measure used is the *increase* in CPI rescaled to ranges, with decreases set to zero. Higher scores on this measure
indicate a rapidly deteriorating consumer economy, which can be an indicator of an overall national and/or economic crisis.

Table 14: Economic Crisis (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Crisis (Consumer Price Index Increase)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>142</td>
<td>0 – 7.00</td>
<td>1.6831</td>
<td>1.54539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) ethnicity and gender Control Variables: 
Religion-Ethnicity Tie and Gender Inequality

**Hypothesis 9:** Religious persecution is primarily ethno-religious in nature.

**Control Variable:** Religion-Ethnicity Tie [d.ethnic]

Data on the overlap of religion and ethnicity come from my quantitative coding of the 2003 U.S. State Department Reports on International Religious Freedom (Grim 2004a). This is a measure of the intertwining of religion and ethnicity in a country. The Reports went to some lengths to report only abuses and restrictions that were clearly religious in nature and not ethnic in nature. However, since religious and ethnicity have overlap, the reports indicated when this was clearly the case. Many reports mentioned the general degree to which religion and ethnicity had overlap. If no mention was made of the overlap, the country was coded as ‘0.’ Because of the sensitivity to this issue in the Reports, this coding assumption was deemed acceptable.

(Note: The measure does not require that this intertwining be a source of conflict.)

**Figure 14: Religion-Ethnicity Tie [d.ethnic]**

*Does the Report mention whether ethnic identity is related to religious affiliation?*

0. No or not related.
1. For one or a few ethnicities it is related.
2. Many ethnicities are related to specific religious affiliations.
3. Ethnicity seems to determine religious affiliation.
Table 15: Religion-Ethnicity Tie (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree which Ethnicity &amp; Religion are intertwined</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0 – 3</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 10: As women become better off the level of religious persecution increases.

Control Variable: Women Better Off [genin.m2]

These data are the difference between the 2001 Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Human Development Index (HDI) both developed by the United Nations. The GDI is a composite index that measures the average achievement in the very same dimensions used in Human Development Index (HDI). The components of the HDI and the GDI are: life expectancy at birth (in years); the adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above); the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%); and the estimated earned income (PPP US$). The uniqueness of the GDI is that the component measures of the HDI are adjusted to account for inequalities between men and women. These are re-scaled to be 0 — 1. In the HDI, 1 equals high human development; in the GDI 1 equals high human development with gender equality. In situations where the HDI is higher than the GDI, there is a gender disparity/inequality for women.

A measure for gender inequality indicating that women are better off than the norm of the particular country can be calculated by considering only the negative values obtained by subtracting the GDI from the HDI. When the GDI is more than the HDI, this indicates that women are better off (in terms of income, longevity and education) than the norm in that particular country.
Figure 15: Women Better Off [genin.m2]

\[ \text{Difference between the HDI and the GDI, with positive numbers set to zero, and negative numbers squared (to produce positive values)} \]

\[ \text{Women Better Off} = (\text{HDI} - \text{GDI})^2 \] (positive numbers first set to zero)

Table 16: Women Better Off (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women Better Off</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>0 - .05</td>
<td>.0044</td>
<td>.00831</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS

This Chapter explains how my hypotheses and the competing arguments discussed in the second chapter are operationalized and tested using the measures described in the third chapter. The results of each test are presented and discussed in sequence. The implications of the results are discussed in the next chapter. The first section of this chapter addresses the three measurement issues. The second section tests the three hypotheses (1.1-1.3) specifically related to my thesis and my proposed model of religious persecution (Model B below). The third section of this chapter tests the nine alternative explanations (Hypotheses 2-10). Finally, a summary discussion of the results is at the end of this chapter.

Several Appendices related to this chapter are also provided. Appendix B provides a key for reading the structural equation model printouts. Appendix C provides additional descriptive summary information of the variables. Appendix E presents a ‘non-trimmed’ structural equation model where all controls remain in the model regardless of their significance.

MEASUREMENT ISSUES

The first three tests are related to Measurement Issues 1, 2 and 3. These tests investigate whether the measures I used for socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions are constructs related to each other and to other measures of religious regulation.

Measurement Issue 1: Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion are closely related constructs.

I will evaluate Measurement Issue 1 by using confirmatory factor analysis to test whether socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions of religion are related

\[ \text{Note:} \] The structural equation models in this chapter will place the dependent variable at the top of the diagram. This is done in order to visually represent that the predictors are forces which underlie religious persecution.
constructs. Confirmatory factor analysis proceeds from a theory that specifies the exact relationship between observed variables and hypothesized factors (Maruyama 1998). It provides an empirical way to test the *proposition* that there are two distinct aspects to the regulation of religion, i.e., *socio-religious hegemony* and *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* of religion. AMOS software is used to conduct this analysis, and I use the terminology of Arbuckle and Wothke (1995-1999) to report the analysis.

*Socio-religious hegemony* [S.R.Heg] and *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* [Leg/Pol.R] are treated as unobserved (latent) variables, or *common factors*, represented by ovals in my factor analysis model (Figure 16). This model considers that the two observed socio-religious variables depend on the common factor *Socio-Religious Hegemony*, and the two observed legal/policy variables depend on the common factor *Inequitable Legal/Policy Restrictions*. Conceptually, each common factor predicts the value of the observed variables associated with it. These predictions (regressions) are represented by arrows pointing into the observed variables.⁶⁷

The two latent variables are strongly correlated (.78), indicating that they relate closely to a common concept. This analysis provides estimates of how strongly each observed variable relates to (loads on) the common factors. The standardized path coefficients going from the common factors to the observed variables represent the *factor loadings* or *factor weights*. Each of the observed variables loads strongly onto the two common factors (all load at > .80). This is evidence that each of the observed variables relates strongly to its conceptual factor. The strength of this relationship is further indicated by the amount of variance in the observed variables which is explained by the common factors. For example, the squared multiple

⁶⁷ In order for there to be enough information to conduct the analysis, the regression weights of *anti-brand movements* and *restrictions on brands* were set to 1.
correlations for Anti-Brand Movements is .66, i.e., 66 percent of the variance of Anti-Brand Movements is explained by Socio-Religious Hegemony. All these values are above .66, which means that a good amount of the variance in each observed variable is explained by the common factor to which it is related.

**Figure 16: Measurement Issue 1**

N = 196

All relationships are statistically significant at p < .001. (two-tailed)

Note: All regressions are shown in standardized regression coefficients.

In confirmatory factor analysis – a form of structural equation modeling68 – it is possible that more than one model can fit the data when a model is overidentified, i.e., when a model makes more estimates than there are unknowns. Overidentification is indicated by positive

---

68 Structural equation modeling (SEM) is appropriate to use when testing an overall theory. Though it is often discussed as if it were causal modeling, this is not appropriate since the causal mechanisms in SEM are no surer than in other forms of linear regression analysis. John Fox provides a good summary on this issue: “Structural equation models (SEMs) … are multivariate (i.e., multiequation) regression models. Unlike the more traditional multivariate linear model, however, the response variable in one regression equation in an SEM may appear as a predictor in another equation; indeed, variables in an SEM may influence one another reciprocally, either directly or through other variables as intermediaries. These structural equations are meant to represent causal relationships among the variables in the model. A cynical view of SEMs is that their popularity in the social sciences reflects the legitimacy that the models appear to lend to causal interpretation of observational data, when in fact such interpretation is no less problematic than for other kinds of regression models applied to observational data. A more charitable interpretation is that SEMs are close to the kind of informal thinking about causal relationships that is common in social-science theorizing, and that, therefore, these models facilitate translating such theories into data analysis. In economics, in contrast, structural-equation models may stem from formal theory” (Fox 2002:1).
degrees of freedom (df=1). This overidentification allows for *goodness-of-fit tests* – tests of whether this particular model fits the data. The chi-square statistic (chi-sq=.028, df=1, p=.867) indicates that this model with two distinct common factors is a good fit with the data, i.e., any departure of the data from this model is insignificant (p=.867). Also, when the ratio of the chi-square statistic to the degrees of freedom is close to or less than 1, then the model is generally accepted. The chi-sq/df ratio of .028 suggests that the model fits the data very well.

Since the chi-square statistic is sensitive to sample size, it is useful to discuss the results of three other goodness-of-fit tests reported in Figure 16. First, the Normed Fit Index (NFI) score of 1.000 estimates that the model is 100% away from the worst-fitting model and 0% away from what could be a statistically ideal model. Since models with overall fit indices of *less than* NFI=.9 can usually be improved substantially (Bentler and Bonett 1980), further adjustments to this model would not be expected to make any appreciable improvement. The second test, the Tucker-Lewis coefficient (TLI) developed by Tucker and Lewis (1973), is more consistent across sample size. Unlike the NFI, the TLI is not bounded by 0 and 1. Scores close to 1 are considered to have a very good fit. This model’s TFI=1.015 indicates a very good fit. The third goodness-of-fit test reported in addition to the chi-square test is the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation test (RMSEA). RMSEA goes beyond just a comparison of this model with a worst case scenario model by adjusting for degrees of freedom. It permits the testing of the proposed model against other possible models and uses estimates adjusted for discrepancies in *population* moments and not just *sample* moments in its estimate of the model’s goodness (Steiger 1990). The RMSEA also produces an estimate that adjusts for sample size. This
model’s RMSEA=.000 indicates an exceptionally good fit considering that a value of < .050 indicates a close fit (Browne and Cudeck 1993).

The results indicate that socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion are closely related constructs. In order to determine whether it is valid to consider that these two concepts can be considered as regulators of religion, it is necessary to test whether they relate to other established measures of religious regulation. If they relate strongly and significantly to a recent measure of the regulation of religion (Measurement Issue 2), then this will be supporting evidence.

**Measurement Issue 2:** Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion are closely related constructs that significantly relate to a recent measure of religious regulation.

The results of this test are reported in Figure 17.

**Figure 17: Measurement Issue 2: Correlation with Current Regulation Measure**

All relationships are statistically significant at p < .001. (two-tailed)
The fit statistics are all strong (e.g., chi-sq/df=.369), as are the correlations (.69 and .84, p < .001) with Freedom House’s measure of religious regulation (Marshall 2000) [rlfre.fh]. The stronger correlation between Freedom House’s measure and *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* was expected since Freedom House’s measure focuses primarily on the regulation of religion by governments. These results show that *socio-religious hegemony* and *inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion* significantly and strongly relate to a recent measure of religious regulation.

A further validity test is possible. Measurement Issue 3 recognizes that religious realities tend to remain constant over time, and that current measures of *socio-religious hegemony* and *inequitable legal/policy restriction* of should thus relate to a past level of religious regulation.\(^{69}\)

**Measurement Issue 3:** Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion significantly relate to a past level of religious regulation.

The test of whether they equally relate to past level of religious regulation is the same as the test summarized in Figure 17, only this time a past measure of religious regulation (Bates 1945) [relib.sb] is used in the model and each factor is allowed to correlate with that variable. The results of the test are shown in Figure 18.

Again, the fit statistics are all very strong (e.g., chi-sq/df=.017). The correlations with Bates’ (1945) are significant (.55 and .55, p < .001). It is logical that there is a less strong correlation than with Marshall’s late-1990s measures since time will have changed the situation more since the time of Bates’ study the 1940s. That the correlation between Bates’ measure and *socio-religious hegemony* is the same as the correlation with *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* is not surprising since Bates included socio-religious factors as a component of his index. These results show that *socio-religious hegemony* and *inequitable legal/policy restriction* of religion

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\(^{69}\) Religious Regulation 1945 (Bates) vs. 2000 (Marshall) are correlated at .392; p < .001 (two-tailed).
significantly relate to a past measure of religious regulation. Thus, there is empirical support that these two factors are valid measures of religious regulation.\textsuperscript{70}

**Figure 18: Measurement Issue 3: Correlation with Past Regulation 1945**

![Diagram of correlations between religious regulation and related factors]

All relationships are statistically significant at $p < .001$. (two-tailed)

**TEST OF HYPOTHESES RELATED TO OVERALL THESIS**

**Thesis:** I expect that religious regulation—composed of *socio-religious hegemony* (de facto regulation) and *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* (de jure regulation)—offers a strong, significant, and direct explanation for variation in the level of *religious persecution*.

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, while I expect that other factors influence the level of religious regulation and persecution, I believe that religious regulation is the mechanism which best explains religious persecution.

\textsuperscript{70} Grim (2004a) also provided evidence that similar measures were strongly and significantly correlated with other related concepts such as low levels of civil liberty and low levels of press freedom.
The first hypothesis related to this thesis, **Hypothesis 1.1**, states that *socio-religious hegemony* has a direct effect on both *inequitable legal/policy restriction* of religion and *religious persecution; inequitable legal/policy restriction* of religion also has a direct effect on *religious persecution*. The test for this hypothesis involves regressing *socio-religious hegemony* simultaneously on *religious persecution* and *inequitable legal/policy restrictions*. *Inequitable legal/policy restrictions* is also directly regressed on *religious persecution*.

**Figure 19: Hypothesis 1.1: Un-mediated Model A**

The model fit statistics are within acceptable ranges (e.g., \(\text{chi-sq/df}=1.244\)).

*Inequitable legal/policy restriction* does not have a strongly significant effect upon religious persecution \((p=.021, \text{two-tailed})\), which I have theorized that it should. This leads to Hypothesis 1.2, which suggests that there is a mediating mechanism between inequitable laws on
the books and actual religious persecution. Specifically, **Hypothesis 1.2** states that **inequitable legal/policy restriction** of religion has an indirect effect on **religious persecution** by allowing religious believers to be **threatened by government** or other security forces.

**Figure 20: Hypothesis 1.2: Mediated Model B**

This mediated model (Model B, Figure 20) is better than the un-mediated model (Model A, Figure 19) in a number of ways. First, all the relationships in the model are significant at p < .001 (two-tailed). Second, more of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the mediated model (R-sq. = .66 versus .53). And third, the goodness-of-fit statistics are extremely strong (Chi-sq=5.502, df=7, p=.599, chi-sq/df=.786; NFI=.992, TLI=.1005; RMSEA=.000).

The total effects of **socio-religious hegemony** upon **religious persecution** are the sum of its direct effects and indirect effects (TE=DE+IE) summarized in Table 17. While the
standardized direct effect of *socio-religious hegemony* on *religious persecution* is only .45 (i.e., .449), its total effect also includes its indirect effect working through *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* and *government threats*. Its total effect on *religious persecution* is .449 + (.769*.684*.483) = .703.

Table 17: Standardized Total Effects of variables in Model B (Figure 20) (all effects are significant)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inequitable Legal/Policy Restrictions</td>
<td>.769</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Threats</td>
<td>.526</td>
<td>.684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Persecution</td>
<td>.703</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td>.483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the total effect of *socio-religious hegemony* (.703) on the level of *religious persecution* is far stronger than the effects of *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* (.330) or *government threats* (.483).

Before accepting Model B, two further tests are useful. The first test considers whether the mediating variable, *government threats*, empirically behaves distinctly within the model. *Socio-religious hegemony* relates very differently to *government threats* than it does to *religious persecution*. If *government threats* were somewhat identical with the dependent variable, then *socio-religious hegemony* should predict it in a similar way as it predicts the dependent variable.

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71 AMOS graphics printouts round statistics to 2 figures. *Also note that when no significance level is shown for regression paths on the figures presented here, that the path significance level is p < .001. I only indicate significance levels when they are > .001.*

72 Using bootstrap approximations, *all* indirect (mediate) effects in Model B were significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level (p = .004, two-tailed, for each).

73 The direct path from path *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* to *religious persecution* became smaller, reversed direction, and was insignificant. I therefore removed this path (the fact that it reversed sign makes sense in that laws generally have a controlling effect on violence, and this reversal of direction may have picked this up). Also, reversing the direction of influence between *socio-religious hegemony* and *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* in Model G below produced a model that did not fit the data (p = .002). In addition, I did test for a path between *socio-religious hegemony* and *government threats*, and that path was weak and insignificant.
This, however, is not the case at all. When a regression path from socio-religious hegemony to government threats is included in Model B, the standardized regression coefficient for that path is highly insignificant and extremely small (.015, p=.898, two-tailed). At the same time, all the other paths in the model remain basically unchanged in their strength and continue to be highly significant (all are P < .001, two-tailed).74

The second test specifically correlates the error terms of the two variables to see if a method effect has contaminated the measurement of the mediating and dependent variables. As mentioned in Chapter 3’s discussion of the dependent variable, Religious Persecution (Physical Abuse and Displacement of People) [a.estima], and the mediating variable, Government Threats [r.thrtgv], there may be some method effect that might contaminate their measurements even though they are conceptually distinct. To test this involves correlating the error terms associated with government threats and religious persecution (Model C) to see if the same source of unexplained variance might affect both.

When this is done, the path from government threats to religious persecution remains very significant (p = .009, two-tailed). However, the error terms that have been allowed to be correlated are statistically insignificant (p = .436, two-tailed). Since it is theoretically acceptable to remove statistically insignificant relationships from the model, this correlation of error terms need not be included.75

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74 Even when government threats is treated as a sole dependent variable to be predicted by socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy policy restrictions, only the latter significantly predicts it. Thus, empirically, government threats and religious persecution behave entirely differently in relation to the other variables of the model. Note: Due to space considerations, I have not included these models.

75 Though I will present all subsequent models in this chapter without the error terms being correlated, I have performed each subsequent test with the error terms being correlated. In no case did they substantively or significantly change the results; also, correlating the error terms did not significantly affect the goodness-of-fit results on any subsequent test.
Thus far, the evidence indicates that Model B (Figure 20) fits the data extremely well. Before seeing how well Model B holds up when controls for alternative explanations are added to the model, there is one additional hypothesis that pertains to the general thesis of this research needing to be tested.

Hypothesis 1.3 states that religious regulation leads to religious persecution and not vice versa. It is possible to model a nonrecursive relationship in structural equation modeling where there is a feedback loop between certain variables. To do this requires having an instrumental variable, i.e., a variable that predicts one of the outcome variables in the feedback loop while not
predicting the other (cf. Maruyama 1998:105). Since I hypothesize that socio-religious 
hegemony is the underlying force leading to religious persecution, a test of whether there is a feedback loop between religious persecution and socio-religious hegemony is an appropriate test to see the directional strength of the relationship. While some feedback is to be expected, the path from socio-religious hegemony should remain stronger and statistically significant.

**Figure 22: Hypothesis 1.3: Nonrecursive Model D**

This nonrecursive model (Figure 22) provides strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.3. Not only does the model fit the data (chi-sq=5.485, df=6, p=.483, chi-sq/df=.914), the path
from *socio-religious hegemony* to *religious persecution* remains statistically significant and strong (standardized regression coefficient .43, p=.009, two-tailed). The feedback path from *religious persecution* to *socio-religious hegemony* is, on the other hand, much weaker and statistically insignificant (.06, p=.892, two-tailed). All the other paths remain statistically significant at the p < .001 level. Also, the stability index (.131) is very good. Though this model fits the data, it is not preferred above Model B (Figure 20) in that the path from *religious persecution* to *socio-religious hegemony* is insignificant.

ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES

Thus far the evidence supports my central thesis that the level of *religious persecution* is predicted by the level of religious regulation which is comprised of *socio-religious hegemony* and *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* which permit *government threats* of believers (Model B, Figure 20). I do, however, expect that more than just religious regulation will predict religious persecution. Paul Marshall’s comments in this regard are apposite.

I am not making the absurd suggestion that religion, apart from other cultural, ethnic, economic, political, or strategic elements, is the only or the key factor: societies are complex. But I am saying that it is equally absurd to examine a political order *without* attending to the role of religion (2000:13).

---

76 The stability index .131 is for the variables *government threats, religious persecution, inequitable legal/policy restrictions, and socio-religious hegemony*, which are a ‘nonrecursive subset’ of the variables in the model. According to the AMOS Reference Guide (Arbuckle 1994-2003), this stability index is identical to the stability index described by Fox (1980) and Bentler and Freeman (1983). Since the stability index (.0.131) is < 1, the linear equations associated with the model are considered ‘stable.’ An unstable system would indicate an incorrect model or a sample size that is too small.

77 Also, note that I have allowed this same nonrecursive path in the full model (Model G below), also in other runs allowing for paths between *socio-religious hegemony* and *government threats*, plus a path between *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* and *religious persecution*. Adding those paths and running the various model with all the controls of Model G did not affect the significance, direction or general strength of the variables in Model B. The feedback loop remained insignificant.
This section analyzes whether the alternative explanations operationalized as variables are so strong, direct and significant that the basic model proposed above (Model B) is overwhelmed or made insignificant by their inclusion. Specifically, this section will test/control for the alternative explanations discussed in Chapter 2 (Hypotheses 2-10) using the measures described in Chapter 3. The alternatives fall into three general categories: (a) civilizational/external; (b) population and economy; and (c) ethnicity and gender. Presented below are the results of adding controls for each of these in turn.

(a) civilizational/external hypotheses (2-4)

The measures for civilization divide, religious homogeneity, and armed conflict were added as controls on the four key variables of Model B. This was done by allowing regression paths from these 3 control variables to go to the two independent factors (socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions), the mediating variable (government threats), and the dependent variable (religious persecution) of Model B. The 3 control variables were also allowed to be correlated with each other. After running this model, I disallowed all paths and all correlations that were not significant at p ≤ .10. The model was run again and all paths and all correlations were removed that were not significant at p ≤ .05. All the statistically significant relationships that resulted are summarized in Model E (Figure 23). Model E acceptably fits the data (chi-sq/df=1.227; NFI=.971; TLI=.990; RMSEA=.034).

78 Specifically, if the covariation between two control variables was statistically insignificant (p > .05), then the correlation between them is ‘trimmed’ from the model. An un-trimmed model is presented in Appendix E.
Figure 23: Civilizational/External Hypotheses (2-4): Model E

- N = 196

* significant at p<.05 (two-tailed)
** significant at p<.01 (two-tailed)

All other paths are statistically significant at p < .001 (two-tailed)
All intercepts are statistically significant at p ≤ .001 (two-tailed)
All covariances are statistically significant at p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)

(correlating e6 & e7 is insig. and the model continues to fit, e.g., chi-sq/df = 1.267; gov threats stays sig. p < .001)
The standardized total effects are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Armed Conflict</th>
<th>Civilization Divide</th>
<th>Religious Homogeneity</th>
<th>Socio-Religious Hegemony</th>
<th>Inequitable Legal/Policy Restrictions</th>
<th>Government Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Inequitable Legal/Policy Restrictions</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.317</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>.732</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Threats</td>
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<td>.481</td>
<td>.657</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Persecution</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>.357</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>.645</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>.467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results speak to the questions raised by alternative Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. First, can religious persecution be predominantly explained by the clash of civilizations? **Hypothesis 2** states that being located on a civilization fault line explains religious persecution. I did expect that civilization divide would contribute to the level of religious persecution primarily through its effect on socio-religious hegemony. Being located on a fault line does have a strong and significant influence on socio-religious hegemony (.43, p < .001, two-tailed). It also has a direct impact on government threats (.17, p < .01, two-tailed), possibly because being located on a fault line makes the security forces a bit more pro-active in dealing with potential threats. Likely, even though being located on a civilization fault line partially explains these two variables, its total significant effect on religious persecution (.357) is only indirect. If civilization divide explained religious persecution, then it should have a strong, significant and direct effect on religious persecution, i.e., an effect which is not primarily explained by the explanatory variables of Model B. It does not have such an overwhelming effect. The appropriate way to interpret the effect of civilization divide is that it primarily contributes to the level of socio-religious

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79 Government jitteriness over religious issues seems a plausible explanation for the effect of civilization divide on government threats. This is a topic for further research.
hegemony and contributes slightly to the level of government threats toward religious believers. Civilization divide does not fully explain either, and it certainly does not fully or independently explain religious persecution. The results do not support a strong version of Hypothesis 2 because being located on a civilization fault line only contributes to, but is not the chief explanation of religious persecution. Since civilization divide is predictive of religious persecution, it is appropriate to include it in a final model of religious persecution. Given that civilization divides arguably have a higher degree of consistency over time than fluctuations in socio-religious hegemony or government threats, it is appropriate for civilization divides to remain antecedent to both and be part—but not all—of the explanation for fluctuations in socio-religious hegemony and government threats.

Next, the question raised by Hypothesis 3 is: Is religious homogeneity a solution for religious persecution? Hypothesis 3, also related to the clash of civilizations perspective, states that there will be little if any religious persecution when a country is religiously homogeneous. I did expect that religious homogeneity would lower the level of religious persecution, and it does. Religious homogeneity slightly yet significantly predicts a reduction in the level of religious persecution (−.054). Though religious homogeneity increases inequitable legal/policy restrictions on religion (.16, p = .010, two-tailed), religious homogeneity decreases government threats (−.22, p < .001, two-tailed). This particular negative effect may be due to what I referred to in Chapter 2 as a moral ‘brake’ that prevents the government from being overly threatening. With such a slight effect, the implied argument within the Clash of Civilization perspective that religious homogeneity is an effective countermeasure for socio-religious conflict or persecution misses the main mechanism driving religious persecution. Religious homogeneity does not
significantly affect socio-religious hegemony, which continues to be strongly predictive of religious persecution even when religious homogeneity is controlled for. A clash of civilizations perspective, one that leads an analyst to assume that the most powerful religious differences are between ‘civilizations,’ misses that even in religiously homogeneous societies there continues to be religious persecution. Even in a generally ‘Christian’ or ‘Muslim’ or ‘Buddhist’ society, there can still be a diversity of potential hegemons within those civilizations and religious traditions.80 The results do not support a strong version of Hypothesis 3 because higher levels of religious homogeneity only slightly lower the level of religious persecution, but they do not prevent or explain religious persecution. Since religious homogeneity is significantly predictive of lower religious persecution, it is appropriate to include it in a final model of religious persecution. Given that religious homogeneity arguably has a higher degree of consistency over time than fluctuations in inequitable legal/policy restrictions or government threats, it is appropriate for religious homogeneity to remain antecedent to both and be part of the explanation for fluctuations in inequitable legal/policy restrictions and government threats.

The third civilizational/external hypothesis, Hypothesis 4, asks: Is the level of religious persecution explained by the level of armed conflict? One of the core arguments of the clash of civilization perspective is that civilization fault lines are the flash points for armed conflict, and there is evidence that this is true. The correlation between civilization divide and armed conflict is positive, strong, and significant (.42, p < .001, two-tailed). I expected that armed conflict

80 I ran two separate models in which one controlled for percent Islam and the other controlled for percent Christian (Models not included here). The interesting similarity is that the model continues to fit in both cases. The interesting difference between the models, is that higher percent Islam contributes to higher levels of socio-religious hegemony (.25, p < .001, two-tailed) and inequitable legal/policy restrictions (.18, p = .008, two-tailed), while a higher percent Christianity contributes to lower levels of inequitable legal/policy restrictions (-.24, p < .001, two-tailed). Both models continued to fit the data (RMSEA = .000 for the model controlling for percent Islam, and RMSEA = .026 for the model controlling for percent Christian).
would impact the level of religious persecution primarily through its direct effect on socio-religious hegemony, which it does (.20, p < .01, two-tailed). Model E, however, indicates that armed conflict also has a small but direct impact (.10, p = .026, two-tailed) on the level of religious persecution. Even though armed conflict does have a direct effect on religious persecution, religious persecution is obviously not primarily or purely explainable as the collateral damage of armed conflict. Nonetheless, this finding is significant and direct. It may be that during times of armed conflict, socio-religious hegemonic animosities are ‘allowed’ to have a more violent expression. The results give some support to Hypothesis 4, since armed conflict has an effect upon religious persecution that is not fully explained by the model. This coincides with the argument that war and wartime activities have an independent effect upon the course of a society (Hooks 1994). Still, while armed conflict does directly contribute to the level of religious persecution, it does not overwhelmingly explain religious persecution. Since armed conflict is directly and indirectly predictive of religious persecution, it is appropriate to include it in a final model of religious persecution. Given that my measure of armed conflict was a measure which considered the potential impact of armed conflicts dating back as far as 1988 (see Figure 11), it is appropriate for armed conflict to remain antecedent to socio-religious hegemony and be part of the explanation for its fluctuations.

\[81\] Since the measures used do not support a vice versa influence, a topic for a future study is: Does socio-religious hegemony and/or religious persecution predict armed conflict? Also, given that armed conflict is often analyzed through looking at “dyad” relations between nations and “cumulative processes” (cf. Bennett and Stam 2004; Bremer 1992), any speculative comments on armed conflict based on these findings would be premature.
The next four hypotheses and tests relate to controlling for the effects of the population and economy.

(b) Population and Economy

The measures for population growth, population density, economic strength, income inequality and economic crisis were added as controls on the 4 key variables of Model B in addition to civilization divide, religious homogeneity, and armed conflict. Regression paths were drawn from these 8 control variables to each of the 4 key variables of Model B. The 8 control variables were also allowed to be correlated with each other. As in the analysis related to Model E, after running Model F (Figure 25) I disallowed all paths and correlations that were not significant at $p \leq .10$. The model was run again and all paths and correlations were removed that were not significant at $p \leq .05$ (see footnote 78). All the statistically significant relationships that resulted are summarized in Model F.

One new finding of note is that the effect of armed conflict on socio-religious hegemony became statistically insignificant once the four new control variables were added. This is further support for Hypothesis 4, and somewhat different than had been expected.

Population density was removed from the model because it did not significantly predict any of the key variables from Model B or have a significant covariance with any of the other control variables. Economic Crisis also was an insignificant predictor of any of the variables from Model B, and was likewise removed from the model. Model F (Figure 24) acceptably fits the data ($\text{chi-sq/df}=0.956$; NFI=.963; TLI=1.004; RMSEA=.000).
The standardized total effects are as follows:

- N = 196

* significant at p < .05 (two-tailed)
** statistically significant at p < .01 (two-tailed)

All other paths are statistically significant at p < .001 (two-tailed)
All intercepts are statistically significant at p < .004 (two-tailed)
All covariances are statistically significant at p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)
(correlating e6 & e7 is insig. and the model continues to fit, e.g., chi-sq/df = 0.980; 
gov threats stays sig. p < .001)
These results speak to the questions raised by Hypotheses 5, 6, 7 and 8. The question raised by Hypothesis 5 is: Does high population growth when combined with high population density explain the level of religious persecution? Since population density did not significantly predict or correlate with any of the variables in Model F, that aspect of Hypothesis 5 is unsupported.82 I did expect that population growth would impact the level of religious persecution primarily through its influence on socio-religious hegemony, which is strong and significant (.34, p < .001, two-tailed). The total significant effect of socio-religious hegemony (.625) on the level of religious persecution continues to be far stronger than population growth (.210). While the results do not support a strong version of Hypothesis 5 (because religious persecution is not predominantly or directly explained by population growth), the results indicate that population dynamics do have a significant indirect influence on the level of persecution. Since population growth is indirectly predictive of religious persecution, it is appropriate to include it in a final model of religious persecution. In the model, it seems more appropriate for population growth to remain antecedent to socio-religious hegemony in that the measures used

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82 The only significant covariance population density had was with economic strength in Model G below. Still, even in that model it did not significantly predict any of the 4 key variables from Model B. Population density may have an impact as Jared Diamond argues (2005) when considered regionally rather than nationally. My data do not allow analysis at that level; this would be a topic for further research.
for *socio-religious hegemony* represent reactions to current rival religious brands (see Figures 2 and 3). I am not ruling out that *socio-religious hegemony* could lead to *population growth*, but it seems more likely that the population growth of a rival religious brand is not usually an overt hegemonic strategy, but one perceived as such by rivals. For example, it is more plausible that the growth of Muslim populations in Europe causes hegemonic reactions among non-Muslim religious brands and their members (e.g., banning Muslim headscarves) than it is to assume that Muslims in Europe have more children as a way to establish hegemony over Europe for the religious brand to which they belong.83

The question raised by *Hypothesis 6* is: Is the level of religious persecution higher in countries with strong economies? I expected that the level of economic strength (or modernization) as reflected in a comparative measure of per capita income would be associated with a *decrease* in the level of regulation, and therefore lower levels of persecution. The results support this expectation. The measure for *economic strength*, purchasing power parity income, is a significant predictor of *lower government threats* (-.25, p < .001, two-tailed). Thus, the data do not support Hypothesis 6 which predicted that persecution would be higher in countries with strong economies. This is consistent with Waltz’s (1979) proposition that stronger countries can afford to take risks, and thus will not be as reactive to perceived threats. It makes sense to keep *economic strength* as an external influence on *government threats* rather than moving it within the model. Economic strength does not necessarily lead to lower *socio-religious hegemony* or

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83 While *population growth* could feasibly be the result of *socio-religious hegemony*, in that certain religious brands may try to out-populate rival brands by encouraging high fertility (a possible strategy of the Vatican’s birth control policies), the nature of that relationship is a topic for a future study. I did run a model where *socio-religious hegemony* significantly predicted *population growth*. In that model, however, *population growth* ceases to be a significant predictor of *religious persecution*. 
more equitable laws on religion as much as it makes threatening government reactions to religious brands a liability, i.e., religious persecution is not good for business.

The question raised by Hypothesis 7 is: Does a high level of income inequality result in religious persecution? I expected that (personal within-country) income inequality would not result in religious persecution but rather be a general sign of an unregulated market. The data do not support Hypothesis 7, which expected that a high level of income inequality would result in religious persecution. The measure for income inequality is a significant predictor of lower socio-religious hegemony (-.24, p = .006, two-tailed). Socio-religious hegemony does not necessarily lead to income inequality but may be a reaction against more closed or communistic-style economies that do not allow people to reap what they sow on earth as well as in ‘heaven.’

Income inequality should be kept as an external influence on socio-religious hegemony rather than moving it within the model.

The question raised by Hypothesis 8 is: Can religious persecution be the result of a current economic crisis? The data do not support Hypothesis 8, which expected that religious persecution results from a current economic crisis.

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84 It may be that only religious virtuosos (Max Weber’s term) deny worldly wealth as a sign of a spiritual blessing.
85 Though the relationship between economic crisis and persecution is statistically insignificant in this model and all the other models I ran, there is a small and statistically significant bivariate relationship between economic crisis and government threats (.166, p = .048, two-tailed). This disappears when the other controls are added to the model. Note that this is a measure of a current economic crisis, i.e., one that occurred at the same time as the measure for religious persecution. Given that there is a weak statistical relationship, however, between religious persecution and economic crisis, studying the relationship of economic crisis and persecution would be a potential topic of future study, especially using longitudinal data.
(c) ethnicity and gender

Building on Model F, the measures for religious-ethnic tie and gender inequality were added as controls on the four key variables of Model B. As in the analyses for Models E and F, all 10 control variables were allowed to correlate, and regression paths were drawn from each to the 4 key variables of Model B.

After running this model, I disallowed all paths and correlations that were not significant at $p \leq .10$. The model was run again and all paths and correlations were removed that were not significant at $p \leq .05$ (see footnote 78). All the statistically significant relationships that resulted are summarized in Model G (Figure 26).\(^86\)

Model G fits the data very well ($\text{chi-sq}=55.776$; $df=57$; $p=.521$; $\chi^2/df=.979$; $\text{NFI}=.952$; $\text{TLI}=1.002$; $\text{RMSEA}=.000$).

[continued next page]

\(^{86}\) Model H in Appendix E presents a model with all alternative hypothesis paths and correlations included.
Figure 25: All Alternative Hypotheses (2-10): Model G

N = 196

* significant at p<.05 (two-tailed)
** significant at p<.01 (two-tailed)

All other paths are statistically significant at p < .001 (two-tailed)

All covariances are statistically significant at p ≤ .05 (two-tailed)

All intercepts are statistically significant at p < .001 (two-tailed)

(correlating e6 & e7 is insig. and the model continues to fit, e.g., chi-sq/df = .993; gov threats stays sig. p < .001)

(a nonrecursive model where religious persecution also predicts socio-religious hegemony gives insig. path, p = .947, but model fits, chi-sq/df=.975 & socio-religious heg. to religious persecution remains strong & sig. .49, p < .001)

(other possible paths also found to be insig: SRH→Gov.Thrt, p = .187; Nonrecursive Ineq Legal → SRH, p = .643)
The standardized total effects are as follows:

Table 20: Standardized Total Effects of variables in Model G (Figure 25) (all effects are significant)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Religious Hegemony</td>
<td>-.218</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>.450</td>
<td>-.310</td>
<td>.418</td>
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<td>Inequitable Legal/Policy Restrictions</td>
<td>-1.58</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.326</td>
<td>-.225</td>
<td>.303</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Threats</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>-.141</td>
<td>.327</td>
<td>-.246</td>
<td>-.126</td>
<td>.454</td>
<td>.626</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious Persecution</td>
<td>-.135</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>.279</td>
<td>-.192</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>-.060</td>
<td>.619</td>
<td>.297</td>
<td>.475</td>
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These results speak to the questions raised by Hypotheses 9 and 10. The question raised by Hypothesis 9 is: Is religious persecution primarily ethno-religious in nature? I expected that the religion-ethnicity tie would impact the level of religious persecution primarily through its influence on socio-religious hegemony as is shown in Model G (.16, p = .011, two-tailed), which it does. The total significant effect of religion-ethnicity tie (.114) on the level of religious persecution is far weaker than the total effect of socio-religious hegemony (.619). The results do not support a strong version of Hypothesis 9 because the religion-ethnicity tie only indirectly explains a relatively small portion of the level of religious persecution. If the driving force beneath religious persecution were ethnicity, there should have been a stronger effect, and certainly a direct effect upon religious persecution, which there was not. The measure used for the religion-ethnicity tie measured the degree to which religion and ethnicity were reported to be largely identical (see Figure 14 above), which they were in some instances. The results represent the fact that religion and ethnicity are not identical constructs, though they do overlap. It is appropriate to keep the religion-ethnicity tie as an external influence in the model since socio-
religious hegemony is not a predominant cause of ethnicity, but socio-religious hegemony plausibly increases when religion and ethnicity overlap.

The question raised by Hypothesis 10 is: Does religious persecution increase as women become better off? I expected that women being better off would have a negative effect on socio-religious hegemony, which it does (-.22, p = .002). Thus women being better off indirectly lowers the level of religious persecution (-.135). The results do not support Hypothesis 10, which expected women becoming better off to raise the level of persecution, because women being better off slightly lowers the level of religious persecution. One plausible explanation for this is that women being better off may decrease the proneness of the men in their lives to engage in hegemonic activities that lead to religiously-related abuse. It is important to note that these results hold true even when the level of Islam and/or Christianity is controlled for.

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87 I have intentionally not included an analysis of differences between general religious traditions in this dissertation. While it is an interesting and important question, such an analysis should take into account period effects (like cohort effects) for the analysis to be valid. For example, Christianity today faces different circumstances than did Christianity during the time of the Crusades or the Nazi Holocaust. Likewise, Islam today faces different circumstances. To draw proper conclusions about the differences "caused" by general religious traditions is beyond the scope of this dissertation. My basic contention is that the mechanics of religious regulation can generally help explain any religious context. This was borne out in two tests not reported in this analysis. The tests were to consider two further models—Model J and J.a—by adding a different control to Model G for each—percent Muslim (J.a) and percent Christian (J). If Norris and Inglehart's contention is correct, then I would expect that the effect of women better off in Model J.a controlling for percent Islam versus Model J, controlling for percent Christian should dramatically change in its relationship to socio-religious hegemony, which it does not. The effect of controlling for percent Islam only lessens the effect of women better off from (-.23, p < .01) in Model G to (-.18, p < .01) in Model J.a. Conversely, when percent Christian is controlled for, then the effect should go up dramatically, which it does not. The effect of controlling for percent Christianity in Model J also decreases the effect of women better off from (-.23, p < .01) in Model G to (-.22, p = .011) in Model J. The other interesting difference between the effects of Islam vs. Christianity, is that percent Muslim contributes to higher levels of socio-religious hegemony (.33, p < .001, two-tailed) and inequitable legal/policy restrictions (.17, p = .05, two-tailed), while directly lowering the level of religious persecution(-.12, p < .05, two-tailed). However, percent Christian contributes to lower levels of inequitable legal/policy restrictions (-.27, p < .001, two-tailed) and lower socio-religious hegemony (-.17, p < .05, two-tailed). Both models continued to fit the data. And they do not change the basic explanatory model of religious persecution. Again, as mentioned above, the focus of this research is on a general mechanism that explains religious persecution. Differences based on the percentage of the dominant religion could be a study all its own. It is not presumed that the dominant religious tradition will not have an effect; rather, the mechanism summarized in Model B continues to remain significant and strong even when the difference due to a particular religious tradition's domination is controlled for.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

The analysis of the data supports the overall thesis of this dissertation that religious regulation leads to religious persecution; and specifically, socio-religious hegemony is the root cause of religious persecution because it underlies inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion. There were no findings to the contrary in any of the models presented (or referred to in the footnotes). In Model G, which included all significant influences of the control variables, the amount of variation explained in the dependent variable was increased only from an R-square of .66 in Model B to .68 in Model G. Moreover, neither of the two regulators of religion—socio-religious hegemony or the inequitable legal/policy restrictions on religion—changed in its relationship to the prediction of religious persecution. In Model B and G, socio-religious hegemony strongly, significantly and consistently predicts the following: inequitable legal/policy restrictions (.769 in Model B vs. .725 in Model G), government threats through its relationship to inequitable legal/policy restrictions (.526 in Model B vs. .454 in Model G), and religious persecution (.703 in Model B vs. .619 in Model G).

Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions of religion were found to be closely related constructs that significantly relate to a recent measure of religious regulation (Measurement Issue 1). Socio-religious hegemony and inequitable legal/policy restrictions of religion are correlated with each other (.78) and with Freedom House’s measure (Marshall 2000) of religious regulation, .69 and .84 respectively (Measurement Issue 2). The stronger correlation with inequitable legal/policy restrictions of religion (.84) was expected since Freedom House’s measure focused on government restrictions. These results arguably provide some external validity for the two measures of religious regulation proposed in this dissertation. Further
validation of these measures is provided in the results of testing Measurement Issue 3. *Socio-religious hegemony* and *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* of religion significantly relate to a past level of religious regulation (Bates 1945) (.55 and .55 respectively). The equal correlations indicate that both measures tap in equally to M. Searle Bates’ measure which specifically included both legal/policy and socio-religious forces.

The analyses gave no evidence to doubt the three hypotheses (1.1-1.3) related to my main thesis. The test of Hypothesis 1.1 showed that *socio-religious hegemony* has a direct effect on both *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* of religion (.77) and *religious persecution* (.51). The direct effect of *socio-religious hegemony* on *religious persecution* can take the form of direct citizen action against other citizens, or of religious groups against other religious groups, such as happens in mob violence. Since religious brands can act in such ways, laws and policies naturally come into being to control the security situation. The test of Hypothesis 1.1 also indicated that *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* of religion also has a direct effect on *religious persecution* (.26) significant at p < .05, two-tailed). The weaker influence and less strong significance level of *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* of religion on *religious persecution* made the test of Hypothesis 1.2 particularly important. The results support that there is a mediating variable which allows the relationship of *inequitable legal/policy restrictions* of religion on *religious persecution* to become clear. *Inequitable legal/policy restrictions* have a strong and significant indirect effect on *religious persecution* (.330) through its relationship to *government threats* (i.e., religious believers being threatened by government or other forces).

One question that was discussed in previous chapters is whether *government threats* is the same thing as *religious persecution*. In addition to the measurement and conceptual
distinctiveness discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the results of several tests in this Chapter indicate that the variables government threats and religious persecution are quite different measurements. Not only do they behave very differently in relation to other variables in the models (e.g., socio-religious hegemony significantly predicts religious persecution but does not predict government threats) but the error terms of government threats and religious persecution do not correlate significantly; even when they are allowed to correlate, the overall findings are not changed in any of the models considered.

Another question discussed in previous chapters was whether it is accurate to presume that religious regulation leads to religious persecution and not vice versa (Hypothesis 1.3). The test of this hypothesis gave the clear finding that indeed religious regulation, i.e., specifically socio-religious hegemony, leads to religious persecution (.43, p < .01, two-tailed), but that religious persecution has a very small and highly insignificant effect on the level of socio-religious hegemony (.06, p = .892, two-tailed). The analysis of the data does not show evidence of a feedback loop.

The results from testing the alternative hypotheses (2-10) support the overall thesis of this dissertation that religious regulation (i.e., socio-religious hegemony and the inequitable legal/policy restriction of religion) explains religious persecution. The introduction of controls related to these alternative explanations did not change any of the substantive relationships in Model B (Figure 20) or become a stronger explanation than the elements of Model B.

Being located on a fault line has a strong and significant influence on socio-religious hegemony. It also has a direct impact on government threats, possibly because being located on a fault line makes the security forces a bit more pro-active in dealing with potential threats. Even
though being located on a civilization fault line partially explains these two variables, its total significant effect on religious persecution is only indirect. Rather than concluding that civilizational fault lines are inconsequential, these findings suggest that a civilizational perspective only provides part of the picture and misses the actual mechanism which leads to religious persecution.

As expected, religious homogeneity is associated with a very slight reduction in the level of religious persecution. Though religious homogeneity increases inequitable legal/policy restrictions on religion, religious homogeneity decreases government threats. As mentioned above, this negative effect may be due to religious homogeneity serving as a moral ‘brake’ that prevents the government from being overly threatening.

I expected that armed conflict would impact the level of religious persecution primarily through its direct effect on socio-religious hegemony, which it did in Model E. Armed conflict, however, when all controls were included, had a small, direct and significant impact (p < .01) on the level of religious persecution in Model G. War directly increases the level of religious persecution. This finding indicates that during times of war, religious persecution may increase beyond that which is a result of the mechanism of Model B. This finding makes sense in that during war legal and even religious constraints against killing others are relaxed.  

Population growth did impact the level of religious persecution as expected through its influence on socio-religious hegemony, though there was no significant impact of including

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88 Note, however, that when armed conflict is included in Model B and allowed to regress on socio-religious hegemony and religious persecution, that the overall R-square value of religious persecution only increases from .66 in Model B to .67 with armed conflict included. (Model B with armed conflict alone is not presented. The fit of that model was very good (chi-sq/df=.972), and socio-religious hegemony continued to be the strongest predictor of religious persecution.)
population density in any of the models. Since the data available were all at the country level, there still may be an effect of population density if smaller units of analysis are considered.

The results supported my expectation that the level of economic strength (or modernization) as reflected in a comparative measure of per capita income would be associated with a decrease in the level of regulation, and therefore lower levels of persecution. The results also support my expectation that personal within-country income inequality would not result in religious persecution but rather be a general sign of an unregulated market. Income inequality was associated with a lower level of religious persecution.

As expected, an economic crisis in a country directly prior to and extending into the time period for which religious persecution was measured did not significantly effect the level of religious persecution. Though this may be speculation (based on my own experiences), it seems that the virtues of religion are more apparent when all in society are suffering. Thus, rather than a national economic crisis leading to persecution, it may stimulate greater religious charity.89

I expected that the religion-ethnicity tie would impact the level of religious persecution primarily through its influence on socio-religious hegemony, which it did. The total significant effect of religion-ethnicity tie on the level of religious persecution was far weaker than the total effect of socio-religious hegemony.

Finally, I expected that women being better off would have a negative effect on socio-religious hegemony, which it did. Women being better off slightly lowers the level of religious persecution. Note that using the measure women better off avoids culturally-laden interpretations of gender equality, such as whether wearing a hijab is a sign of inequality.

89 See Appendix E, Table 24. Though the effects of Economic Crisis are insignificant, it does have a very slight overall effect of lowering religious persecution (-0.004).
Women being better off is a measure that focuses on the basic life opportunities of women. This represents an interesting finding that could be explored in detail in subsequent research. For purposes of this research it is most important to note that a reduction in gender inequality represented by women better off has a small negative influence on religious persecution. I have also compared models controlling for percent Islam versus percent Christian in a country. The same relationship of women better off to religious persecution exists in both situations (see Footnote 87).

In sum, the results support the overall thesis of this research: Religious regulation—composed of socio-religious hegemony (de facto regulation) and inequitable legal/policy restrictions (de jure regulation)—offers a strong, significant, and direct explanation for variation in the level of religious persecution. A number of variables which indirectly influence the level of religious persecution were also found to be significant, and the only influence that does not work itself out through its influence on religious regulation is armed conflict, which has an effect on the level of religious persecution independent of the mechanisms of religious regulation.
CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

In this chapter I will discuss the implications of the results. I begin by discussing the implications and contributions that this dissertation makes to the social scientific study of religion and social conflict. I then discuss various implications the findings have for public policy on religious regulation. I conclude with comments on future areas of research.

SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC IMPLICATIONS

Basic Questions Addressed

This research has demonstrated that explanations of social conflict cannot ignore the unique role of religion especially when investigating socio-religious conflicts such as religious persecution. Specifically, this research has found that religious regulation—composed of socio-religious hegemony (de facto regulation) and inequitable legal/policy restrictions on religious brands (de jure regulation)—offers a strong, significant, and direct explanation for variation in the level of religious persecution. Religious regulation was found to be the strongest predictor of religious persecution even when controlling for other possible explanations, including: being located on civilizational fault lines, religious homogeneity, the level of armed conflict, population growth and density, economic strength, income inequality, economic crisis, ethnoreligious overlap, and gender disparity. One of the specific questions addressed by this research was how a state’s formal restrictions of religion (de jure regulation) contribute to religious persecution. The results showed that they do so by legitimating government threats toward religious believers in reaction to pressures created by the socio-religious hegemonic actions of religions brands.
The basic social scientific implication of this research is that religion is an important *independent* variable. Most certainly, the findings of this study show that religion is much more than a Marxian ‘dependent variable’ (Davie 2003). This research has demonstrated that religion is a dynamic social actor that overlaps with, but is not identical to other identities, such as ethnicity or civilization.

The primary alternative model considered was Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* (1993, 1996), which does treat culture as a driving force, and gives religion important consideration. It was found that while Huntington’s *civilization divides* do help predict the level of religious persecution, they are not the key explanatory variable. The practical mechanism that leads most directly and powerfully to religious persecution is not the clash of abstract civilizations, but the concrete hegemonic regulatory actions of religious brands. This explanation emphasizes the dynamic nature of religion within culture. A civilizational approach tends to reify religion and culture as constants from a bygone era. The results also clearly indicate that socio-religious hegemony within countries is a source of social conflict that is not counterbalanced by the ‘unity’ provided by a homogeneous religious culture.\(^9^0\) The pursuit of religious hegemony does not portend social cohesion; rather, it predicts social conflict.

This research has also addressed questions of how the predominant religious culture in a country influences the restrictions that a state places on religion and how the general religious

\(^9^0\) Attaining religious hegemony, like any hegemony, must continually be won: the activity of evangelicals in America (cf. Carpenter 1997; Smith et al 1998) is an example of the ever-active attempt to win a country to the beliefs of a particular religious orientation, which they see as divine truth. As mentioned in footnote 10, Huntington does not specifically address the problem of religious persecution. His basic theory, however, presumes if civilizations are respected, that there will be less conflict. Given the competitive nature of religious brands, however, this could only be accomplished by regulating them. In an unregulated religious marketplace, religious brands will compete to dominate the market and aim to reinterpret what it means to be a part of that civilization according to their religious interpretations.
culture impacts the level of persecution. To address this, two measures of general religious cultural forces were included that directly impact the legal/policy framework of a country. The most powerful religious cultural force is socio-religious hegemony, which directly predicts both higher levels of inequitable government restrictions on religion and higher levels of religious persecution. The second general religious cultural force is the level of religious homogeneity. This also directly predicts higher levels of inequitable state restrictions on religion, though its effect is not as strong. Homogeneity in the larger religious culture of a country does not, however, directly predict a higher level of religious persecution. In fact, it tends to slightly lower the level of religious persecution in that it may act as a moral brake on the threatening actions of governments. Thus, the overall effect of the general religious culture of a country being homogeneous is that it slightly decreases the level of persecution. But this slight effect is overshadowed by powerful socio-religious hegemonic forces that are highly significant and strong even when religious homogeneity is controlled. In other words, as it relates to religious persecution, the slight pacific benefit associated with religious homogeneity is offset by the conflictual cost of socio-religious hegemony.

An important finding is that armed conflict has a direct and significant effect on the level of religious persecution. This result is in line with Gregory Hooks’ (1994) argument that war should be treated as an explanatory variable, not just an outcome variable.

There were a number of other interesting findings. For example, of relevance to the study of gender and family is the finding that when women are better off, the level of religious

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91 For example, income inequality is associated with decreases in the level of socio-religious hegemony. While it seems a virtue to promote the betterment of women’s lives, the promotion of income inequality seems a vice. However, it is in consonance with the various theories explained above, including that religion, itself, promotes the notion that divine blessings are tangible and directed to the faithful.
persecution is lower. The results indicate when the lives of women are better, there is less social conflict. Again, the measure used to test this effect was based on longevity, education and income. Realizing that this measure is not an indicator of income parity should be remembered. This finding therefore indicates that the issue is not strictly gender income equity but better overall quality of life for women. As Wolf-Devine (1998) and El Guinda (1999) point out, empowerment and equality come in many different forms.92

**Additional Social Scientific Implications**

There are a number of additional implications of these findings. This research suggests that religious regulation can contribute to theories of social conflict, and it speaks to three of the six aspects Anthony Oberschall (1973)93 suggests to include in a theory of social conflict. It does this by: (1) clearly investigating a certain type of conflict, i.e., religious persecution, (2) specifically addressing the causes of religious persecution, i.e., *de facto* and *de jure* religious regulation, and (3) suggesting that socio-religious conflict groups come into being out of a desire to establish or protect socio-religious hegemony for their religious brand. The predictive significance of hegemonic socio-religious movements, i.e., *anti-brand movements*, as a key component of *socio-religious hegemony* implies that social theory must redress the lack of attention paid to socio-religious movements (cf. Beckford 2003). Beckford notes that “theorists as divergent as Alain Touraine (1981, 1985), Jürgen Habermas (1981, 1987), Klaus Elder (1985) and Alberto Melucci (1989, 1995, 1996) are all agreed that religious movements do not represent

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92 In a recent conversation I had with Prof. El Guindi (2004), she said that in Egypt she once asked a male taxi driver whether he thought driving a taxi was a suitable job for a woman. He vociferously objected to the idea! She then asked him what his daughter does. “She’s a pilot,” he said without skipping a beat. There was no contradiction in the taxi driver’s mind. A pilot was a dignified job for a woman, while driving a taxi was one where she might come into danger. The concern was for the quality of life.

93 See Appendix D.
a serious challenge to the prevailing social order” ([italics mine] Beckford 2003:161). A clear implication of this research is that social theorists would do well to revisit the impact of religious movements on social order. This of course also implies that social scientific researchers should include religious movements in their research agendas and analytical models.

The findings imply that the concept of socio-religious hegemony—manifested through its overt actions as well as through the ways it is able to establish itself in the minds, feelings and attitudes of people—is a useful theoretical and analytical concept. It is a concept that can be applied to the study of religion just as it has been applied to the study of many other social phenomena (e.g., Bates 1975; Boyer, Stern and Wilson 2001; Chase-Dunn, Taylor, Arrighi, Cox, Overbeek, Gill, Frank, Modelski and Wilkinson 1994; Corkin 2000; Gramsci 1966, 1971; Hall 1988; Keohane 1984; Ling 1994; So 2000; Wallerstein 1974, 1979, 1990).

Another implication is that religious forces are not by definition a force for societal unity as was suggested by Durkheim ([1915] 1965). Religion can clearly be a source of conflict (Carter 1996; Juergensmeyer 2003; Kimball 2002) as well as cohesion.

The findings also imply that the study of religious human rights (e.g., Hertzke 2004; Marshall 2000; Shea 2000; State Department 2003; Witte and van der Vyver 1996) is a line of research that needs extending. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the emphasis on legal/policy regulation that has been the dominant theme of many who have addressed religious human rights (e.g., Chaves and Cann 1992; Marshall 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004) presents a deficient understanding of the forces which lead to religious persecution. Hegemonic religion is itself a regulatory factor that must be addressed in the social scientific understanding of religious human rights.
The results of this study have shown the importance of developing new and better international measures of religion, i.e., measures that go beyond descriptive demographics and which cover most countries of the world. In this study I have given careful attention to measurement issues. I have used a broader array of data sources, including the scientific coding of the best source on religious regulation and persecution available today—the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Reports (see Appendix A for a description of the coding process). These data will eventually be made available to other researchers through the American Religion Data Archive (www.TheARDA.com) at the Pennsylvania State University.

This data set has allowed me to use more direct measures of socio-religious conflict. Most studies conflate religion and ethnicity, not because researchers cannot tell the difference between the two concepts, but most probably because data sources researchers rely upon conflate the categories, especially as they relate to conflict. Since the State Department (2003) International Religious Freedom Reports intentionally distinguish between religion-related conflict and other forms of conflict, this allowed the coding of direct measures of socio-religious conflict. Also, the fact that the data I coded relates strongly and significantly to other major data sources from the U.N., Freedom House, The World Bank, etc., speaks to the quality of this data and the robustness of the findings. The measure I offered for civilization divide was superior to the one offered by Jason Beckfield (2003:407) in that my variable did not confine each country to one civilization, which is not accurate. Instead, it coded countries internally divided by civilization as the highest level of a scale (see Figure 9). Moreover, using scales rather than dichotomous variables was an important objective in my coding. The robust findings, good fit
statistics, and relatively large R-square statistics, may be directly connected to efforts at making the best measurements possible.

The use of structural equation modeling was especially appropriate for this study in that it allowed a theory-driven model to be developed and tested. The various goodness of fit tests and the other ways of testing the model described in the previous chapter increase the level of confidence in the findings. Also, the ability of structural equation models to include unexplained error terms made it possible to test a method effect between the mediating variable and the dependent variable by correlating their error terms.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The two competing social-scientific perspectives with implications for religious regulation that were investigated, i.e., the clash of civilizations and the religious economies perspective, offer opposite points of view on the directions societies should take on the issue of religious regulation. The implication\(^ {94}\) of the clash of civilizations perspective is that greater religious regulation will result in less religious persecution, while the religious economies perspective suggests that less religious regulation will result in less religious persecution.

The findings of this research support the religious economies perspective, i.e., there will be less religious persecution in an unregulated religious marketplace. Thus, the findings suggest that a free and unregulated religious marketplace is in the best interests of society. This seemingly straightforward suggestion—a suggestion that would probably raise supportive cries throughout American society—is a suggestion that is viewed more critically during a time of religiously-related war. The finding that armed conflict is an independent predictor of religious

\(^ {94}\) See footnote 10 above.
persecution is certainly borne out in the various abuses committed by the U.S. military against prisoners from the present Iraq and Afghan wars (Human Rights Watch 2004). In addition, the threat of religiously-related terror within the United States is pressure that will affect not only the legal system, but also arouse protectionist responses from those who would normally support religious freedom. For example, Freedom House (2005) has produced a lengthy document opposing the influence of Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism in the United States, condemning Wahhabis for such things as encouraging Muslims in the United States not to adopt certain American dress and certain economic practices. While there is little difference between such practices and other strict religious brands, e.g., the Amish, the opposition to Wahhabis is justified on the grounds that they are hegemonic and advocate ‘jihad’ (‘struggle’) while the Amish are communal and pacifist. The issue that Freedom House misses is that socio-religious hegemony and struggle against secular society are natural attitudes for religious brands, and that to regulate Wahhabis will likely have the unintended consequence of additional religious persecution.95

Winfred E. Garrison captured this tension many years ago noting that “intolerance is the defense that society sets up for the maintenance of its own security against threatened or supposed dangers from without or within” (1934:267). [Quoted by Bates (1945:565)]. Elsewhere, I have defined religious freedom as the ‘real opportunity’ for religious brand choice within the security provided by the dynamic social processes of commonweal-building and fair religious brand competition (Grim 2004b). N.J. Demerath III recognizes that religion can act in both pacifist and terrorist ways and argues that “…it is important that social scientists treat

95 I am not advocating for Wahhabism. Having lived in Saudi Arabia in a general housing area (as opposed to a foreigner’s enclave) with my spouse and our four children, who went to Muslim schools as Christians (an were told that they are ‘going to the fire’), removes any romanticism about Wahhabism, to say the least.
religion not solely in its own singular terms but rather as only one of a range of sacred causes and commitments that can energize action for \textit{weal} and for \textit{woe}” [italics mine] (2001:171). Thus, rather than oppose Wahhabism as a religious brand, a more constructive approach would be to allow it the freedom to exist and compete for adherents, even if they advocate that their adherents should not conform to the ways of secular society. As long as they do not break civil laws, the danger to society is minimal. Greater dangers may result from regulation.

Nancy T. Ammerman made an eloquent argument for greater understanding of religion by the government in response to the tragic events surrounding the way the Davidians were dealt with in Waco, TX (Ammerman 1994). Unfortunately, her suggestions seem to be ignored today. There is growing evidence that the government (and social scientists) are again dealing poorly with the religion factor as it relates to international terrorism. For example, in a recent American Sociological Association’s \textit{Footnotes} article which celebrated the role of sociologists in a major social scientific project funded by the Department of Homeland Security, the scientist leading the project refers to it as the “social equivalent of the [atomic bomb] Manhattan Project” (Gary LaFree quoted by Ebner 2005:1). Such language overlooks the reality that a religious brand “under siege is likely to turn inward, bonding to each other and to their leader even more than before. Outside pressure only consolidates the group’s view that outsiders are the enemy” (Ammerman 1994, quoted in Christiano, Swatos and Kivisto 2002:314). It is therefore incumbent upon scholars, policy makers and the general public to have a clear understanding of the effects of the regulation of \textit{religion}, which the War on Terror certainly seeks to regulate.

The model of religious regulation developed in this dissertation is built upon the concept that people make choices about religion, and that these choices influence the legal/policy system
of countries. This is a very different perspective than a civilizational approach which begins with the presupposition that religious affiliation is more a matter of geography than choice. While it is true that certain geographic areas are traditionally aligned with certain religious traditions, the socio-religious mechanisms at work within those geographic areas are not fully or even primarily explainable by the dominant general religious tradition. Certain religious brands seek to establish hegemonies within countries even if the majority of the people in a given country belong to the same general religious tradition. Religion is less of a social glue and more of a dynamic social force, one that could change the face of a country or a continent, e.g., Europe may some day become predominantly Muslim, Central Asia may become Christian, and Latin America may become Evangelical. If such changes take place, they will likely happen through the efforts of religious brands which nurture current adherents and their offspring as well as gain new adherents through proselytizing.

Certainly there are differences in belief and practice between the general religious traditions, but these differences may not be as important as the socio-religious hegemonic similarities among religious brands. The religious resurgence throughout the world is probably not as much a reaction against secularism as it is a response to the freer choices in a new world order that is less regulated by the bi-polar constraints of the Cold War era, i.e., people are freer to adopt religious explanations of existence in every corner of the globe.

The religious economies perspective posits that the success or ‘resurgence’ of a religious brand in society depends on its ability to win the hearts, minds and pocketbooks of people in society. A religious brand (and its belief structure) becomes plausible when it can convince a group of people to commit to its specific rationale of human existence based on supernatural
assumptions through statements about the nature and workings of the supernatural and about ultimate meaning. Reason is employed in the recruitment and retention of adherents. The reasoning employed may seem irrational or unreasonable to some, but it is an appeal to human reason/rationality\textsuperscript{96} nonetheless.

Understanding that religious plausibility is based in the ability of a religious brand to successfully ‘market’ and ‘sell’ its message indicates that religious brands can still be plausible which are out of step with the rest of society and/or with the traditional religions of that society. In fact, even in a society dominated by a single religious tradition, such as Catholic Malta, different Catholic religious brands flourish in the many contiguous towns of the country. Each town has its own saint and feast day which is the source of competition, symbolic war and even physical assaults.\textsuperscript{97} This type of diversity of competitive religious brands is also overlooked by some observers of Muslim lands.\textsuperscript{98}

The connection between an unregulated religious marketplace and the concept of \textit{choice} is important. If people do not make religious choices but are merely socialized into belonging to a certain religious brand, then it is reasonable to regulate religion as a government would regulate a public utility company. Though the clash of civilizations perspective might not

\textsuperscript{96} I am using ‘rationale’ as a manifestation of ‘reason.’ NB: Rationality is less rigid than logic in that it accepts uncertain but sensible arguments based on such things as personal experience or preference; logic, however, focuses on provable facts and empirically valid relations between the facts.

\textsuperscript{97} Throughout the year fireworks are set off to celebrate the power of the saint for that town’s parish, and statues of the patron saints are paraded through elaborately festooned streets. On common festivals, such as Easter, if two saints happen to collide at an intersection marking the border between parishes, it is possible to result in blows between those carrying the saints, as I have seen, making it more than mere ritualized competition (Boissevain 1965).

\textsuperscript{98} At the American Association of Public Opinion Researchers (AAPOR) annual conference (5/13/04), a lively debate over this very issue ensued between researchers Cristoph Sahm of Oxford Research International and Richard Burkholder of Gallup versus Gary Langer of ABC News Polling. Gary Langer insisted that regression results conducted by his organization clearly demonstrated that religion was tied to the conflict, while the Oxford and Gallup representatives explained it away as regional loyalties. I was in attendance.
express it in such terms, such is the effect of trying to confine civilizations to religions, i.e., one
dominant religion per civilization. However, if religion is a matter of choice, then to regulate it
as a government regulates a monopolistic utility would create irreconcilable tensions.

What are the consequences of using the wrong model of regulation? Consider the
example of Osama Bin Laden. Were he permitted to operate freely in Saudi Arabia, he may
have been able to advance his religiously related views legitimately within his home country
rather than exporting a more violent version throughout the world.

If we errantly focus only on the competitive nature between general civilizational
religious traditions, then we miss the dynamic, diverse, and competitive nature of religious
brands within general religious traditions. Instead of working for a freer religious economy
within a Muslim land, the civilization perspective seems to box the world into homogeneous
units that are not homogeneous at all. Specifically, it appears that religious brands which seek
socio-religious hegemony for their brand will resort to violent means when they face the
powerful protectionism of a stronger hegemonic religious brand, e.g., the Wahhabis of Saudi
Arabia.

Since religious regulation has socio-religious hegemony at its foundation and inequitable
legal/policies as its superstructure, a strategy for decreasing religious regulation and religious
persecution must address both parts. Whatever strategy is employed, it must involve helping

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99 Huntington does recognize that there is a high degree of violence within Islam (1996:257-8), but he attributes this
to the nature of contemporary Islam and does not generalize this as a basic characteristic of religion. Historically,
however, within-religion conflict is common. This can be seen not only in the conflicts between Catholics and
Protestants in Europe but also within Catholicism and Protestantism. The Catholic suppression of the Jesuits and the
Protestant suppression of the Anabaptists are historical examples of persecution within religious traditions. The
violent house church rivalries in China (described in David Aikman’s 2003 book, Jesus in Beijing) are contemporary
examples of persecution within a religious tradition. The assassination of former Israeli Simon Peres by a Jew (not a
Muslim) also exemplifies the point that within-religion violence must be considered as a characteristic of religion.
religious brands, governments, and the public to consider that an unregulated religious marketplace may ultimately be a safer option.

If religious affiliation involves human choice, a reasoned argument for the value of an unregulated religious marketplace, i.e., religious liberty, has the potential to convince those competing for shares of that marketplace. Given that many religious brands will not give up their desire to win the world to their point of view, the most realistic and effective way to ensure that this socio-religious hegemonic aspiration does not turn into despotic hegemony is to ensure a free and fair marketplace for all who wish to advance their interpretation of the supernatural. As long as such interpretations do not restrict the rights of others, religious deregulation appears prudent. If there is perchance a religious brand that holds the ‘keys to the kingdom of heaven,’ it is quite reasonable to expect that it should be able to win the world to its belief without recourse to coercion.

FUTURE RESEARCH

An important agenda for ongoing research is the further study of the mechanisms within religion that contribute to social conflict. The development of better measures of socio-religious phenomena are also needed, including the development of valid and reliable longitudinal data, to which I hope to contribute. Foundational survey research is needed, i.e., research that specifically aims to test hypotheses about basic religious concepts across cultures and how these concepts relate to socio-religious conflict. For example, certain terrorist organizations have

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100 The religious economies perspective has documented a large amount of evidence (Finke and Stark 1992; Gill 1994; Stark and Finke 2000) that an unregulated religious marketplace promotes the growth of religion. This is a practical insight which may even influence religious brands to accept the importance of a deregulated and fair religious marketplace. If religious brands are willing to moderate their hegemonic tendencies, legal safeguards for an unregulated religious marketplace will likely be easier to put in place and keep in place. If religious brands support an unregulated marketplace, then the level of religious persecution can be expected to decrease.
‘spiritual leaders.’ This poses an interesting question: Might ‘spirituality’ be more closely connected with socio-religious conflict than ‘religiosity’? To even address such a question would require valid measures for religiosity versus spirituality.\(^{101}\)

The research of this dissertation has not fully addressed all of the aspects of a theory of social conflict suggested by Anthony Oberschall (see Appendix D). Further quantitative and qualitative research (including cases studies) is needed. First, the confrontation process itself must be more fully addressed, i.e., “the interaction between the antagonists, the dynamics of the struggle, precipitating factors, polarization, escalation, the factors that account for the dampening or deepening of conflict, the determinants of violence, and so on” (Oberschall 1973:31). Second, the process of conflict resolution must be studied, including the problem of institutionalized conflict. This is the point where a “theory of conflict joins up with a theory of social control” (Oberschall 1973:31). And third, the consequences of conflict must be better understood, i.e., what Coser (1967) “referred to as the ‘functions of social conflict’—theories about the consequences of conflict for the conflict groups themselves and for the social system” (Oberschall 1973:31). For example, the 2003 State Department Report on Rwanda mentioned that thousands of Rwanda Christians converted to Islam in the aftermath of the horrendous 1994 genocide which pitted Christians against Christians, with religious clergy in a few cases presumably directing the slaughter. It may be that the result of persecution will be the decline of the religion perpetrating the persecution. Might the relative ambiguity toward Christianity in Western Europe today be the result of its history of genocidal persecution? Such an inquiry would be intriguing.

\(^{101}\) See Appendix F for my letter of intent to conduct such a survey research project.
Considering the visible resurgence of socio-religious movements that advocate a revitalized role for religion at home and abroad, the need for further empirical and theoretical work into the effects of religion on society is indubitable.
References


http://gunston.doit.gmu.edu/liannacc/ERel/S5-ASREC/S51_REC2004.htm


APPENDIX A: STATE DEPARTMENT DATA AND ITS CODING

Data on international religious freedom and religious regulation come from my quantitative coding of the reports on 196 countries\textsuperscript{102} covered in the US State Department’s 2003 annual *International Religious Freedom Report*, hereinafter referred to as “Reports.” The Reports became available on December 18, 2003, at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf. I use these data because of their fresh currency, breadth of coverage, incorporation of trend information, and depth of inquiry specifically related to religious freedom.

In fulfillment of U.S. law, each U.S. Embassy prepares an annual Report on their host country. Reporting adheres to a common set of guidelines and training is given to Embassy staff who investigate the situation and prepare the Reports (see U.S. State Department 2003). Once an Embassy completes a Report, it is then vetted by various State Department offices with expertise in the affairs of that country and in human rights. The Reports also incorporate information from other human rights reports. The U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom also assists the State Department conduct research that feeds into these reports. They are then arranged and vetted under the supervision of the special U.S. Ambassador for International Religious Freedom. They cover the following standard reporting fields for each country: religious demography, legal/policy issues, restrictions of religious freedom, abuses of religious freedom, forced conversions, improvements in respect for religious freedom, and the US Government’s actions.

The Reports are a loosely structured, retrospective, qualitative survey of most countries of the world. The U.S. State Department has been compiling such annual Reports since 1997. In

\textsuperscript{102} Countries or unique parts of countries, i.e., Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau and Tibet are coded separately from China; the Occupied Territories are coded separately from Israel; and Western Sahara is coded separately from Morocco. Cyprus is coded as a single nation since it was reported as such.
2001, they took on the reporting format described above. Though the Reports are bounded (July 1, 2002, to June 30, 2003), they include retrospective information on events that have been systematically monitored since 1997. Therefore, the data in these Reports approximate a trend study, which captures both recurring problems and specific problems that occurred during the reporting period. The Reports do not have a systematic interview or survey component, but some mutli-modality is approximated in that, for example, Embassies are directly involved in inter-faith dialogs in various countries. The Reports do at times draw on local survey data unavailable to Western researchers.

The Reports are primarily produced by Embassy officials in country capitals and other cities with US Consulates, which limits their scope and may be a potential source of error. The Reports may also be biased by the groups with the loudest national voice. However, these problems are attenuated by the practice of the Reports to incorporate multiple sources of information (as mentioned above). Also, the data reflect a positive balance between nearness and remoteness. Expert analysis by trained staff resident in each country where the United States has an Embassy can be a definite strength. Theoretically, having observers different from the society being studied has merit. Georg Simmel made the argument for the objectivity of differentness in his essay on the social type of “the stranger.”

… the proportion of nearness and remoteness which gives the stranger the character of objectivity also finds practical expression in the more abstract nature of the relation to him. That is, with the stranger one has only certain more general qualities in common, whereas the relation with organically connected persons is based on the similarity of just those specific traits which differentiate them from the merely universal ([1908] 1971:146).

Problems such as satisficing, social desirability response bias (Holbrook, Green and Krosnick 2003) and nonresponse (Curtin el al 2000; Groves et al. 1992; Keeter et al. 2000; Lin
and Schaeffer 1995; Teitler, Reichman, and Sprachman 2003) are not a serious issue for these data. State-of-the-art survey methodology in the United States perennially wrestles with these problems. For international survey data where less research on research exists, these problems may have special and/or unidentified dimensions. For example, in countries where there is higher trust among strangers, like the USA, response may be higher and more truthful than in countries where trust of strangers is lower, like Japan (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). A serious problem for international surveying is that there are no statistically-proven methods to account for such cultural differences within and between countries. These issues speak directly to Corollary 2c.

The varying length of country Reports should be noted. For example, the printed 2003 web Report for Indonesia is 14 pages long (single-spaced 10 pt. font) while many countries in the Caribbean have Reports of less than three pages. Rather than view the shorter Reports as a problem of missing data, the assumption in this study is that if abuses or restrictions were not reported, then they were negligible or nonexistent. While this assumption may be a source of error in the case of unreported or undiscovered abuses, there is reason to believe that any unreported abuses were negligible due to the way the Reports are constructed (as discussed above).

The notable exceptions to this approach to missing data are the data coded from the Reports on North Korea, Libya, and Bhutan, where the U.S. State Department did not have an official presence during the reporting period. In the case of North Korea, the score provided in this study for that country cannot be considered reliable due to a lack of verifiable data from any

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103 During coding, missing data were coded as system-missing. In the final data set, system-missing was recoded as whatever value represented the absence of a problem.
international source. The situation may be worse (or better) in North Korea than the limited information reveals.

One additional source of bias may be the over-reporting of problems in countries where information is readily accessible. For example, in countries with active Jewish human rights groups, firm statistics on anti-Semitism are more likely than in countries without such organizations. Therefore, it is possible that freer countries will appear worse than they are because abuses are freely reported. In spite of this potential bias, the Reports strive to make use of all information available to them from multiple on-the-ground sources. At times, the Reports try to put a good spin on bad situations in countries friendly to the U.S., Kuwait being such a case. These positive spins did not mean that actual abuses and restrictions went unreported; rather, there was less elaboration on them and more mention of positive situations to counterbalance the negative. Due to the approach to coding described below, it was possible to overcome the positive spin bias as is indicated by Kuwait’s ranking on the RRF (30/196) (Grim 2004a).

In spite of such limitations, these Reports are the most comprehensive summary of the religious freedom situation in 196 ‘countries’ of the world representing nearly 95 percent of the world’s population (the one notable exception is the United States). They form a good base of data that can be improved.

**Quantitative Coding of the Data**

The Reports were quantitatively coded using a 243-item *Codebook*, essentially a survey questionnaire, as the research instrument. The goal of the codebook was to create probes that would be useful in extracting information from the data to test the Hypotheses of this study. The
first 225 questions follow the sections of the Reports. The last 18 questions of the Codebook were overall scales. Examples of these are described later in this section.

The initial draft of the Codebook was developed based on my study of the 2001 and 2002 Reports. That draft contained less than 190 items. Two different coders and I used that first draft to code four different 2002 Reports. The Codebook went through two more revisions with eleven additional 2002 Reports being coded. This Codebook development process made use of cognitive interviewing techniques (Presser and Blair 1994) and the “Think-Aloud” strategy (e.g., Willis et al. 1999:3) to lay the groundwork for coder reliability and maximum data exploitation. Each coder independently decided on a rating for each of the items and then described his or her own decision-making processes. Areas of coder discrepancy were discussed at length. After agreeing on the criteria for a disputed item (by adjusting the Codebook item or discovering what we missed in the data), we then proceeded to the next item. Areas of incongruity most often related to question wording and were easily remedied. A number of useful items were added during this process, resulting in the final 243-item Codebook. This process facilitated reliable coding because these same raters were thus well trained and calibrated for the actual 2003 coding task. Coding took place from December 19, 2003, until February 17, 2004. I was the primary coder of all 196 countries. The two additional raters coded 142 of the 196 countries. Coding took an average of 45 minutes per country, with shorter Reports taking less than 30 minutes and longer Reports taking over 2 hours. After the coders finished roughly a set of ten countries, the coders ‘re-calibrated’ by checking the results of commonly coded countries. After data entry, the double codings were again examined as a check on my primary coding, which is the final set of
scores used in the data set. Based on these procedures, inter-rater reliability was quite good, with Cronbach’s alpha = .9047 on average for the double coded countries.\textsuperscript{104}

All of the 243 items are substantive variables (i.e., not subjective variables) in that they measure the increasing intensity of social attitudes, legal restrictions, etc. according to substantive observations of the qualitative data, and not according to the subjective interpretation or opinion of the coder. Coders coded empirical observations of the qualitative data related to actions or patterns of behavior. The vast majority of the items were scales.

\textsuperscript{104} For such coding, .8 and above is conventionally acceptable.
APPENDIX B: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL PRINTOUT KEY

Figure 26: Key to Structural Equation Model Printouts

Unless otherwise noted, all regression coefficients are statistically significant at p < .001. (two-tailed)
Unless otherwise noted, all covariances are statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed)
Unless otherwise noted, all intercepts are statistically significant at p < .001 (two-tailed)

[intercepts not shown on models]
APPENDIX C: MEANS AND CORRELATIONS

This three-page Appendix provides additional summary information for the variables used in this analysis.

Table 21. Means (AMOS and SPSS supplied)

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<th>Std. Dev. (spss)</th>
<th>N (spss)</th>
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<td>1.423</td>
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<td>0.078</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
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<td>0.021</td>
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Table 22. Correlations (AMOS supplied)
Table 23. Correlations (spss)

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<th>N</th>
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<td>0.025</td>
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<td>-0.053</td>
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</table>

| N 74   | 61   | 59   | 63   | 74   | 74   | 74   | 74   | 73   | 74   | 74   | 74   | 59   | 74   | 74   | 45   | 74   | 157 |
APPENDIX D: SOCIO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT THEORY DEVELOPMENT

This dissertation has not proposed a general theory of social conflict. It has, however, begun an investigation into the contribution of the religious economies model to understanding a specific form of socio-religious conflict—religious persecution. Further investigation and theoretical development is needed in order to propose a fuller theory of socio-religious conflict. To develop a fuller theory requires addressing key themes in the general literature on social conflict including: (a) the different aspects of conflict, (b) the demarcation of conflict versus competition, (c) the legitimate need for social order, (d) the relationship of economics and conflict, (e) traditional explanations for conflict versus the role of resource mobilization in conflict, (f) the role of globalization in conflict, and (g) coordinating empirical research and theory.

(a) different aspects of conflict

Anthony Oberschall (1973) identifies six different aspects of conflict which any comprehensive theory of social conflict must address:

1. The types of conflict to be distinguished in order to theorize intelligently about the thousands of varieties and forms in which conflict is manifest.

2. The causes of these various types of conflict.

3. How conflict groups come into being—this topic is an aspect of the theory of mobilization [e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977].

4. The confrontation process itself: the interaction between the antagonists, the dynamics of the struggle, precipitating factors, polarization, escalation, the factors that account for the dampening or deepening of conflict, the determinants of violence, and so on.
5. Processes of conflict resolution and regulation and the institutionalization of conflict. It is here that a theory of conflict joins up with a theory of social control.


(b) demarcation of conflict versus competition

Oberschall’s last point brings up an important point in the sociology of religion. Destructive conflict must be clearly distinguished from healthy competition. In this sense, it is the distinction between the way Max Weber versus Lewis Coser defined conflict. Weber defined conflict as actions which are oriented “intentionally to carrying out the actor’s own will against the resistance of the other party or parties” (1947:132). Weber’s definition could be applied to the competitive actions of sports teams and firms competing for a market. Coser’s definition is more precise: “Social conflict may be defined as a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflict groups are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals” (1967:232). Coser’s definition is closer to the alliterated definition I have previously offered for socio-religious hegemony:

Socio-religious hegemony is “the pursuit of religious brands for power, popularity, property, position, proselytes, provisos, and potentates at the expense of freedom for other religious brands” (Grim 2004a, Definition 4).

(c) the legitimate need for social order

Any full theoretical treatment of social conflict must address the issue that force is needed to maintain social order (e.g., Weber 1958; Hobbes [1651] 1952). Also, democracies and dictatorships may both have their origins and continuation due to violent conflict (Moore 1966).
It may be that persons persecuted for their religion may have been actual threats to the public good, and therefore the force used against them may have been legitimate. In this dissertation, however, having myself coded the dependent variable, the vast majority of cases were clearly not the persecution of criminally-related actions, but of people trying to legally pursue their religious objectives.

(d) the relationship of economics and conflict

The relationship of economics to social conflict must also be addressed in more depth since it is not entirely straightforward. Tocqueville ([1789-1799] 1998) noted that in the very areas where there was economic prosperity were the areas of revolutionary movement during the French Revolution. Marx, on the other hand, saw economic misery as the trigger of revolution (1959). Huntington, in a much earlier work than his Clash of Civilizations, added to the causal complexity, arguing that reform itself is a catalyst of conflict (1968). It may be that the clash of civilizations is more related to the rapid modernizations that have occurred following the end of the Cold War, if Huntington’s earlier theoretical work is correct.

(e) traditional explanations for conflict versus the role of resource mobilization in conflict

Moving away from the traditional ways of understanding conflict as a result of relative deprivation, structural strains and grievances (e.g., Gurr 1970; Smelser 1963; Turner and Killian 1957), a new paradigm for understanding social conflict has emerged. The new paradigm is referred to as resource mobilization (Curtis and Zurcher 1974; Garner and Zald 1985; Mayer 1991; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Zald and Ash 1966). Resource Mobilization theory begins with the simple presupposition that there is always enough discontent within a society to support a social movement; furthermore, people rationally chose whether the costs associated with a
movement are worthwhile. Rather than social conflict being an unexplainable explosion of the masses, it can be a rational movement led by formal organizations.

**(f) the role of globalization in conflict**

Finally, more work needs to be done on the relationship of socio-religious conflict to globalization. Some see globalization as cultural conflict and ideological battle associated with the modern world system (e.g. Wallerstein 1990), and religious globalization as a potential source of civilization conflict (Huntington 1996).

Now that religion is once again being recognized as an active player on the world stage, James A. Beckford makes a plea for “conceptual clarity and for greater familiarity with the findings of research into religion under conditions of globality” (2003:9). Peter Beyer suggests that globalization is much more than the Westernization of the planet. “It is also the creation of a new global culture…” (Beyer 1994:9). Roland Robertson has one of the most concise statements of globalization theory, i.e., that the world is more and more becoming ‘a single place’ (1987a:43). In this new single place, mobility, simultaneity, bypass and multipolarity are the trends (Warburg 2003). It is a place where anyone can use the tools of modernity. In fact, the tools can be turned back upon their producers: “The [9/11] attacks themselves were planned, co-ordinated and executed by two of the technological icons of globalisation: the Internet and the modern passenger plane” (ibid:47). Christiano, Swatos, Kivisto (2002) believe that globalization theory explains both “why the systems of religion that are rising are rising, and why those that are falling are falling” (269). Those that are able to craft a message or adapt their message to the new realities will rise, while those unable to adapt will fall. In a study of the Q’eqchi’es of Guatemala, Siebers found that they used selective adaptation of “both traditional and external
religious elements” to maintain and advance their traditional religion. Such studies are a “clear and concrete illustration of the interaction of the twin forces of globalization and localization” (Siebers 1999:272).

In a global society, we must understand that the traditional picture of religion being tied to geography has changed. Philip Jenkins has demonstrated that the center of Christianity has shifted south (Jenkins 2002), noting that the “future centers of global population are chiefly in countries that are already divided between the two great religions, and where divisions are likely to intensify” (Jenkins 2002:164). Also, given current demographic trends, European and North American Christians will soon be a minority, and in terms of theological liberalism, they already are. David Aikman reminds the world that China is not religiously impotent. In his view, “Globalization is indeed here to stay, and the Christian component of it, more and more, will have a Chinese accent” (Aikman 2003:205).

However, it is wrong to treat the propensity of religions to seek global (or local) hegemony as a new phenomenon. Globalization has always been a normal religious activity. Historically, religion has spread not only by conquest, but also in similar ways as has other ways of thinking and exchanging. Islam spread along the trade routes through and beyond the Indian Ocean, reaching China by sea before the time of Marco Polo. Christianity likewise predated Polo’s visit by centuries as it spread along the Silk Road. In the past century, Christian missionaries have been the aquifer through which modernization has flowed (Woodberry 2004), setting up educational and health infrastructures throughout the world. This last point is important because it emphasizes something initially unanticipated by secularization theorists.

Furthermore, Aikman observes that Chinese Christians plan for 2008, the year the Olympics come to Beijing, to be the year of China’s revival. One Chinese leader has dreams of mobilizing 100,000 Chinese missionaries by 2007.
i.e., religion embraces and utilizes the fruits of modernization to accomplish their propagative, humanitarian, and strategic ends (Carpenter 1997).¹⁰⁶

**(g) coordinating empirical research and theory**

The challenge ahead is to increase the dialog between empirical research and theory. When Beckfield (2003) notes that social theory neglects the impact of religious movements on society, this should not be taken that there are no theoretical treatments. For example, Smith et al (1998) propose ‘subcultural identity theory.’ In this theory, religion (evangelicalism in particular) “thrives on distinction, engagement, tension, conflict, and threat. Without these, evangelicalism would lose its identity and purpose and grow languid and aimless” (ibid:89).

Moreover, there is a substantial body of research on socio-religious movements (e.g., Carpenter 1997, Martin 2002; Richardson 2004). Also, Garner and Tenuto (1997, chapter 8) provide an annotated bibliography of research related to socio-religious movements.

This dissertation is a small step toward a theory of socio-religious conflict drawing on the religious economies model.

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¹⁰⁶ For example, the Amish rejection of modernization is atypical of religion.
APPENDIX E: NON-TRIMMED MODEL (all non-significant paths retained in model)

Figure 27. Model H

The model fits (chi-sq/df = 1.305; p=.133; RMSEA < .050). **Socio-religious hegemony** \( [\text{S.R.Heg}] (.636) \) is the strongest predictor of **religious persecution** \( [\text{a.estima}] \) followed by **government threats** \( [\text{r.thrtgv}] (.453) \) and **inequitable legal/policy restrictions** \( [\text{Leg/Pol.R}] (.307) \).

Table 24. Model H: Standardized Total Effects \( [\text{D.E. + I.E. = T.E.}] \) (not all paths are significant--see p. 163)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women Better Off</th>
<th>Religion-Ethnic Tie</th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>Income Inequality</th>
<th>Civilization Divide</th>
<th>Armed Conflict</th>
<th>Economic Strength</th>
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<td>0.356</td>
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<td>-0.360</td>
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<table>
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The above includes significant and non-significant effects. Next page shows unstandardized direct effects with significance tests for each path.
Table 25. Regression Weights, Model H

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Note: *italics* indicates a non-significant path. The only difference between this model and Model G is that armed conflict [armed.pp] is slightly significant (p = .031) in this model. (Estimates of 0.000 indicate unstandardized estimate is smaller than this value.)
APPENDIX F: SURVEY RESEARCH PROPOSAL

Spiritual versus Religious Capital: Clarification of Concepts
[Copy of Letter of Intent submitted for a open RFP $150,000 grant from the Templeton Foundation, April 15, 2005]

In the developing scholarly inquiry into the concept of *spiritual capital*, Laurence R. Iannaccone and Jonathan Kick note that it is a term that “lacks any clear definition” (2003:2). Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (2000) offer a definition of *religious capital*, but not one of spiritual capital. Is there a difference between spiritual and religious capital? If there is, what is its nature? Possibly there is an ‘ideal type’ (Weber 1968) which personifies a person with high spiritual capital. If there is such an ideal type, would the epitome of spiritual capital also be the epitome of religious capital? It may not even be possible to speak of spiritual capital in the singular; there may be a variety of spiritual capitals (cf. Berger and Hefner 2003) given that there seem to be varying cultural trajectories associated with different religious traditions (cf. Jenkins 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Also, it may be that religious and spiritual resources cannot be measured the same way in every culture (Woodberry 2003). This study will investigate the general proposition that there is a difference between spiritual and religious capital, controlling for general religious tradition. If such a difference is discovered, it is important to investigate whether this may have predictive power relating to the valuation of economic development and success (cf. Malloch 2003; Weber 1930).

In the literature there is a clear distinction between different types of religious actors (e.g., Weber 1968; Niebuhr 1930). Max Weber pointed out that basic distinctions exist between such things as *prophetic calling* versus *priestly careers*. There is a need to empirically investigate whether the distinction between spiritual and religious capital is a distinction between valuing calling versus career. Spirituality may actually be something entirely different than religiosity (Bonner, Koven, and Patrick. 2003; Matthews 1998). Max Weber’s concept of charisma seems to be closer to the essence of spirituality than it is to religiosity: “In contrast to any kind of bureaucratic organization of offices, the charismatic structure … knows of no regulated ‘career,’ ‘advancement,’ ‘salary,’ or regulated and expert training of the holder of charisma or his[her] aids.” [italics mine] (Weber 1946:246).

An important question to address is whether career versus calling, for example, is a distinction which is made across general religious traditions, or if it is a tradition particular to Christianity. Certainly Max Weber analyzed different religious traditions in different ways (1930, 1951, 1958). Foundational to Weber’s thought was that different religious traditions created fundamentally different approaches to the world which had an impact on society and its economic structures (1968). Specifically, I propose to investigate several hypotheses that will help clarify the distinction between spiritual and religious capital.

**First, I hypothesize that the ‘ideal type’ which personifies a person with high spiritual capital is one marked by a calling to self-sacrifice without the promise or hope of return, either here or hereafter.** This is in slight contrast to the suggestion of the rational choice perspective that even a sacrificial act provides a reward to the one making the sacrifice (Stark and Finke 2000). The contrast is that people (including the actor) perceive the act to be self-sacrificing without the guarantee of a ‘return’ on the sacrifice, either here or hereafter.

**Second, I hypothesize that the epitome of religious capital is a person who serves a religious brand or community due to the rewards inherent in such service, be it a parsonage, a sinecure, self-satisfaction, a place in heaven, or better karma.** This is a more justifiable course of life, one which is justified in terms of doing good and building a better world. The costs involved with such service are seen as investments that build religious capital.

**Third, I hypothesize that some highly spiritual actions will be interpreted as deviant and even anti-religious when they involve a ‘calling’ to self-sacrifice.** Self-sacrifice ranges from turning away from benefits to walking willingly into death. In this way, self-sacrifice may not necessarily be viewed as altruism (on altruism, cf. Darlington 1978; Friedrichs 1960; Monroe 1994). The spiritual person who has had an experience (a calling, a vision, and so forth) that calls them to a course of action may follow that course regardless of personal or social consequences; in doing so, such people may find themselves standing outside the conventions of their religion, culture, society, because the strength of that experience supersedes everything else.

**Fourth, I hypothesize that the basic distinction between religious and social capital will be similarly recognized across religious traditions.** Contrary to the civilization clash perspective (Huntington 1993, 1996), there is evidence that conflict within general religious traditions is less than the conflict between religious traditions (Grim forthcoming). In my doctoral research I have found that a similar mechanism regulates religion across religious...
traditions—socio-religious hegemony. In a similar way, it is possible that the distinction between religiosity and spirituality is recognized across religious traditions.

And fifth, I hypothesize that religious capital will be more closely associated with economic development than is spiritual capital. If it is true that spiritual capital is characterized less by a commitment to a stable career and more to a calling, then I would expect that people who place a higher value on economic success will also value religiosity more than spirituality.

METHODOLOGY

I propose to study this question using methodological ‘triangulation’ (Denzin 1970). Drawing on the resources of the Survey Research Center at Penn State (see attached brochure and budget estimate), three methods will be used: focused group interviews, personal face-to-face interviews, and mail-out/mail-back surveys.

Focused Group Interviews

Focused group interviews are an appropriate methodology to use when a new topic of study is being investigated (Krueger 1998; Krueger and Casey. 2000; Merton, Fiske and Kendall 1956, 1990; Morgan 1998; Grim 2003/2005; Harmon, Grim and Gromis 2004). The groups will be homogeneous by religious orientation (e.g., two Christian groups, two Muslim groups, one Baha’i group, and one Jewish group). Homogeneity allows the topic of spiritual versus religious capital to be discussed in depth according to religious tradition. Also, it is possible to control for the overwhelming influence of culture by interviewing adherents of these different faiths who live within the same general culture. This situation is present among residents of a shared small community in central Pennsylvania—State College. Sufficient religious diversity is present due to a large university; at the same time the community is small enough that the ‘public sphere’ is not divided along religious lines. A question route will be used to test the five hypotheses among the different religious groups by using a combination of general questions, follow-up probes, and experiment-like tasks. Questions will focus the groups’ attention on ways they see and define being ‘religious’ versus being ‘spiritual.’ This would be introduced with some very brief comments on ‘cultural capital’ (cf. Bourdieu 1984) or ‘social capital’ (Putnam 2000) in order to clarify the general concept of non-monetary or non-physical capital.

Personal Interviews

The sample of persons to interview personally will be developed using snowball sampling (Goodman 1961; Heckathorn. 1997, 2002, 2004; Salganik and Heckathorn. 2004) to develop contacts identified as examples of religious or spiritual people, with an N=32 (four persons identified as religious and four persons identified as spiritual from each of the four religious traditions (4+4)*4=32).

Mail Survey

The survey contents will be based on the information gained through the focused group interviews and personal interviews. The populations of interest will be Muslims, Christians, Baha’is and Jews living within and sharing the same public sphere. The sample will be constructed from a random sample of the places of worship in State College, PA, with oversampling for non-Christian faiths, N=1000. The best practices in survey methodology will be followed (Dillman 2000; Groves et al. 2004). Some general social capital questions from the Benchmark Survey 2000 (Robert D. Putnam, P.I., Peter and Isabel Malkin 2000) will be included on the survey.

Analysis

Qualitative and quantitative analysis strategies will be employed drawing on experience (Grim forthcoming, 2004a,b,c, 2003/2005; and Grim et al 2002) and professional training (see attached C.V.). The results will be used to produce academic publications submitted to peer-reviewed scholarly journals and contribute to a possible scholarly book aimed at the general readership market.

References


Brian J. Grim
Vita

EDUCATION

Ph.D. 2005: Sociology, Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park, PA
M.A. 2004: Sociology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
M.A. 1985: TESOL, William Carey International University, Pasadena, CA
B.A. 1981: Sociology, University of Delaware, Newark, DE

SELECTED HONORS

"Who's Who Among Students in American Universities and Colleges" 1985
"Citation for Service" from U.S. State Department 1992, as CEO for SENIM, Kazakhstan, USSR
"Kazakhstan Presidential Citation" for establishing business institute KIMEP, 1993
"Joan Hiber & William Form Graduate Scholarship in Sociology" 2004

LANGUAGES

Russian, Chinese, German, Kazakh

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Pennsylvania State University (08/2002-present), Research Assistant/Administrator
Zayed Military College/MLI, United Arab Emirates (08/2001-08/2002), Academic Director
United Arab Emirates University (08/1999-08/2001), Head Entry English Program
Hua Chiao University (08/1982-07/1983), ESL Lecturer

SPECIALIZED TRAINING COURSES

Survey Non-Response—AAPOR Short Course, 2004
Qualitative Data Mining—PRI Workshop, 2004
Missing Data—PRI Short Course, 2003
Organizational Behavior—York College of Pennsylvania, 1994
Ethnic Research Methods—under Dr. David Barrett, 1988
Islamics— Fuller Seminary, under Prof. Dudley Woodberry, 1984
Intercultural Communication—Missionary Learning Center, Richmond, VA, 1988
Education & Theology—Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, KY (20 graduate credits), 1985

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

American Sociological Society (including methodological section)
American Association of Public Opinion Researchers
Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
Association for Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture

Invited reviewer in 2004 for American Sociological Review