CITIES AT WAR:
UNION ARMY MOBILIZATION IN THE URBAN NORTHEAST, 1861-1865

A Dissertation in
History
by
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ABSTRACT

During the four years of the American Civil War, the twenty-three states that comprised the Union initiated one of the most unprecedented social transformations in U.S. History, mobilizing the Union Army. Strangely, scholars have yet to explore Civil War mobilization in a comprehensive way. Mobilization was a multi-tiered process whereby local communities organized, officered, armed, equipped, and fed soldiers before sending them to the front. It was a four-year progression that required the simultaneous participation of legislative action, military administration, benevolent voluntarism, and industrial productivity to function properly. Perhaps more than any other area of the North, cities most dramatically felt the affects of this transition to war. Generally, scholars have given areas of the urban North low marks. Statistics refute pessimistic conclusions; northern cities appeared to provide a higher percentage than the North as a whole. Out of a population of twenty million, the North sent two million, or ten percent of its total population to war. Three of the largest cities—New York City, Philadelphia, and Boston—numbering over 1,592,000 people altogether—alone sent 260,000 men to the seat of war, or sixteen percent of their combined populations. Thus, urban military history of the war offers a strange paradox: were northeastern cities the most important wellsprings of the war effort or were they thorns in the side of Union mobilization? This dissertation explores this question by examining Union army mobilization in four cities—New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore—explaining how each city came to raise and equip Union army regiments during all four years of the conflict. My study combines a variety of historical approaches, including urban history, military history, economic history, labor history, and political history, explaining how these metropolises mobilized for war in their own unique way. Contrary to the belief that cities offered the North a decisive advantage, this dissertation demonstrates how urban residents faced difficulties in extracting resources from their communities. Indeed, it suggests that the forces of urbanism and war ran counter to each other, placing northeastern city residents at tremendous disadvantage.
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This is for Mom and Dad, because they believe in me more than anybody else.
Introduction: The “Endless and Noisy Chorus” of War.

The tableaus of the Civil War stayed with its participants forever. Few scenes tugged at the heartstrings of northerners as did the unforgettable sight of soldiers marching off to the front. The exhilaration of wartime urbanism—replete with its parades, recruiting broadsides, bounty funds, draft riots, seamstress strikes, returning veterans, and thunderous drums of patriotism—formed a musical refrain that urban residents remembered in the aftermath. Renowned poet Walt Whitman captured one of these poignant scenes in his poem, “Give Me the Splendid Silent Sun.”

Whitman remembered:

Give me such shows—give me the streets of Manhattan!
Give me Broadway, with soldiers marching—give me the sound of trumpets and drums!
(The soldiers in companies or regiments—some starting away, flush’d and reckless,
Some, their time up, returning with thinn’d ranks, young, yet very old, worn, marching, noticing nothing;) . . .
The dense brigade bound for war, with high piled military wagons following;
People, endless, streaming, with strong voices, passions, pageants,
Manhattan Streets with their powerful throbs, with beating drums as now,
The endless and noisy chorus, the rustle and clank of muskets, (even the sight of the wounded,)
Manhattan crowds, with their turbulent musical chorus!
Manhattan faces and eyes forever for me.1

Although Whitman cast his verse in the self-serving glow of Union victory, he captured the essence of the military mobilization in the urban Northeast. From 1861 to 1865, a constant stream of volunteer troops flowed out of the cities, marching shoulder-to-shoulder, while throngs of admirers crowded city streets cheering them on. Weapons and wagons loaded with equipage—all produced by local arsenals and manufactories—clanked and groaned as the inexperienced soldiers became accustomed to their new gear. “People, endless, streaming,” shouted and groped, as the chaotic process of sending men to war stumbled its way from the

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home front to the battle front. Most importantly, Whitman characterized the scene as a “turbulent musical chorus.” No stamp of organization or efficiency marked the progress of urban mobilization. Underneath the “splendid silent sun,” the cities witnessed a transition to war marked by chaos, tumult, and inexactitude.

This dissertation is an examination of four large northern communities and how they contributed to the Union war effort. In it, I examine Boston, Philadelphia, New York City, and Baltimore, four of the most populous metropolitan areas of the Northeast. My principle objective is to explore and analyze the difficulty that urban communities experienced by undertaking the task of mobilization, the process of transitioning all elements of urban life from peace to war to support the national war effort. Urban mobilization consisted of several elements: raising troops, providing all manner of logistical support for military operations, and sustaining popular will in a socially diverse and politically charged environment. In April 1861, the northern cities commenced all three efforts and continued to pursue them until April 1865.

I have chosen to study Boston, Philadelphia, New York City, and Baltimore because of their size and their interlocking narratives of the Civil War. I avoided cities from the Middle West and Far West—not because of any presumption of their insignificance in the grand narrative of Union mobilization—but because they faced different demands for troops and equipment, different demographic, regional, and environmental conditions, and a different political and military outlook. Because eastern and western cities experienced a different chronology of wartime events, I considered it impractical to draw instructive comparisons between them.
The first aspect of mobilization—raising troops—entailed the recruiting, mustering, and organizing of volunteer soldiers into companies, regiments, and batteries, and the appointment of officers to command these units. Northern citizens built and administered their commands around a formalized military structure, complete with required ranks and minimum numerical criteria to determine when and if any given regiment, company, or battery completed its organization. Although no formal codification delineated the exact process of building a military unit, all participants who created them agreed that it was a process, one that took weeks—even months—to finalize. To use the parlance of the day, Civil War manpower mobilization became the means by which any given community answered the federal call for troops, the technique through which any region “filled” its “quota.” Then, after filling that quota, urban communities had to give their volunteers some cursory military discipline and transportation to the front. Such efforts produced intricate challenges burdened with danger, discomfort, and hardship.

All northern communities, rural and urban, engaged in manpower mobilization, but in cities, the process of raising troops and sending them to the front became unusually fraught with confusion, criminality, and intrigue. In 1861, the federal government retained precious little power to raise volunteer armies, and it allowed local authorities to direct manpower mobilization in its absence. By 1862, the War Department organized its official subdivisions and increased its authority to control and direct the raising of troops. That year, federal officials began competing against state and local controls that had directed recruiting efforts for nearly a year. In 1863 and 1864, federal officials issued four calls for conscription, essentially taking power from the hands of local governments. In this regard, ineffective rural councils could do little but accept federal intrusion, but powerful city governments, like those in Baltimore, Boston, New York City, and
Philadelphia, defied the War Department at every step, resolutely holding onto their provincial recruiting strategies even as late as 1865.

Most northern communities raised troops for the war, but not all supplied the necessary equipment. The second aspect of urban mobilization—supplying the materiel of war—involved the production and distribution of uniforms, accouterments, weapons, ammunition, tents, and other items essential to service. Throughout the war, urban workers assiduously produced “equipage,” the common phrase used to describe military and camp equipment. Not only did soldiers require an initial supply of equipage when they first mustered into service, but those already at the front had to be continuously resupplied. After meeting the initial requisitions set by the War Department’s Quartermaster Office, northern factories remained open to produce more military goods for the growing force of bluecoats, whether they came from the city or from the countryside. Although far fewer urban citizens worked inside factories or did piecework in their homes than enlisted the army, this minority of equipage laborers sustained the Union war effort despite the many obstacles thrown against it. Quite often, during the political tumult of war, the rights and dignities of factory employees—many of them women and immigrants—went ignored, unappreciated, or exploited. Even strikes, then an undeveloped tactic among struggling workers, did little to help their cause. Nevertheless, from time to time, urban labor organizations challenged the war effort by making their grievances known, and historians have yet to appreciate the importance of such strikes in slowing the progress of military production.

The third aspect of mobilization—popular will—is the least tangible of the three components, and unlike manpower mobilization and materiel mobilization, it is impossible to measure quantitatively. Unnumbered residents who remained on the home front joined patriotic
organizations to sustain the peacetime traditions of city life despite the jarring turmoil of war. City dwellers established “relief societies” to aid indigent members of soldiers’ families. They also organized “refreshment saloons” to supply troops who passed through the city. They formed soldiers’ general hospitals to provide professional and volunteer medical aid for the sick and wounded, and they held parades, flag presentation ceremonies, homecomings for returning veterans, and fund-raising fairs, all to confirm that patriotism flourished the urban Northeast.

Labor strikes, draft resistance, peace activism, bounty frauds, crime, the return of deceased soldiers, and a prevailing sense of loss and misfortune required urbanites to mobilize patriotism inside their homes, at their recruiting stations, inside their city halls, and at their election polls. Thus, the mobilization of popular will—the creating of a personal connection with the Union war effort—became as important as recruiting soldiers and producing equipage.

Thus, under my definition, mobilization was not merely the outcome of early war enthusiasm—as many historians have viewed it—but it was a process, one that extended throughout the entire conflict, one that required a host of participants, and one that took an excruciatingly long time to execute. Mobilization necessitated the rearrangement of the North’s economy to enable its industrialists to produce war materiel; it required state, federal, and local legislative and executive action to superintend and finance it; and it required a reshaping of political responsibility to enable various levels of government to direct and share the powers of raising, organizing, and supplying northern fighting men. Not only that, but as the war progressed, communities experimented with different techniques, strategies, and philosophies related to the various aspects of mobilization, some of which worked and many of which did not. Even as late as 1865, Union cities persisted with some of their innovative procedures—substitute brokerage, draft insurance clubs, black regiments, amended militia laws, sanitary fairs, soldiers’
family relief societies, and bounty funds—hoping that these efforts would somehow meet one or another of the onerous demands. Throughout the war, the constant requirements of mobilization had a deeply saturating effect upon the local people. Not a day went by when they did not think of the war and what they had to contribute to it.

Essentially, this study explores how the broad, sweeping forces of war required multiple layers of urban society—men, women, Irish, Germans, African Americans, politicians, workers, wealthy, poor, Republicans, Democrats, and many more—to participate in the Civil War’s complex military build-up. This dissertation also reveals the manifold means that northeastern urbanites employed to meet altruistically the demands of mobilization, the systems, plans, and methods they developed to make urban mobilization more efficient. Equally, it examines city-dwellers’ selfish behaviors, demonstrating how they took advantage of the North’s precarious situation to distend their purses. Ultimately, I purport to show how this hitherto unexplored aspect of the Civil War became a point of collision between the selfless devotion and the self-seeking impulses that guided northeastern city-dwellers during the middle of the nineteenth century, and that, in the grand narrative, these points of collision revealed a society struggling to adapt its peacetime life to the burdens of war, falling well short of efficiency.

My analysis of mobilization in Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City, and Boston draws upon several important fields of historical inquiry. First and foremost, this is a military history. By default, this dissertation required me to know the regiments organizing in all four cities at any given time. Except for Fred Shannon’s dated but exceptional, “top-down,” two-volume history, *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army*, no scholarly work as
ever considered mobilization in a collective way.\textsuperscript{2} This is largely due to the plethora of regimental histories that sprang up after the Civil War. These valuable resources, written by the veterans themselves, detailed the history of their regiments in isolation from larger issues. This dissertation considers regimental histories collectively to show how the cities themselves shaped soldiers’ military experiences.

Equally significant, this dissertation draws on theories from social history, or more specifically, urban history. I utilize the hypotheses of Sam Warner, Robin L. Einhorn, Philip Ethington, and Susan Davis to argue that urban social institutions—both public and private—shaped, altered, limited, or facilitated the processes of mobilization in specific ways.\textsuperscript{3} Most importantly, accounts delivered by city newspapers have shaped my understanding of urban mobilization. Although newspapers must be used cautiously because of their flagrant party biases and shameless exaggeration, it is important to recognize that these publications were social institutions themselves that participated in the mobilization effort, shaping public discourse about it. Most importantly, they served as the literary space for recruiters to run their advertisements and to explain and progress of recruitment, information that is virtually absent from regimental histories. Newspapers also led public debate by publishing local correspondence, by endorsing candidates for political office, and by explaining the plight of urban workers or the status of military production. In essence, newspaper editors, even

\textsuperscript{2} Fred A. Shannon, \textit{The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865}, Two Volumes (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1928).
shamelessly partisan ones, considered themselves the unfiltered voice of the urban public, or at least a sector of it.

Finally, this is a political history. The tension between state-level politics that dominated the administration of mobilizing urban regiments and the distribution of equipment produced in urban factories rarely has received the attention it deserves. Although the War Department introduced a streamlined system of manpower and materiel mobilization by revamping its Adjutant, Quartermaster, and Provost Marshal Offices in 1862 and 1863, the Union governors sat atop a vastly larger bureaucratic pyramid at their state capitol. Certainly, interaction between the city governments and the central administration at Washington resulted in no lack of confrontation, but the disputes between major cities and their state executives produced equally alarming altercations that have yet to be addressed by historians.

Indeed, Civil War historians have addressed the broader concept of national mobilization only in a cursory way. Early scholars underdeveloped it, assuming incorrectly that the North’s stronger economy foreordained Union victory. The implicit assumption that northern resources overwhelmed the Confederacy found its genesis in the farewell order of General Robert E. Lee, who in an effort to console his surrendering soldiers at Appomattox, informed them that they had not been bested by a worthy foe, but had been “compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.” After Lee’s address, various historians, from Edward Pollard in the nineteenth century, to Douglas Southall Freeman in the mid-twentieth century, have offered some adaptation of Lee’s explanation for Confederate defeat.4 Adherents to this explanation—the

“Lost Cause” interpretation of the Civil War—have ignored the question of Northern military mobilization entirely; they simply assumed the process of building armies occurred efficiently and that victory came from the eventual implementation of weighty numbers by competent generals. As Richard N. Current observed in 1960, “For the North to win, she had only to draw upon her resources as fully as South drew upon hers; or, rather, the North had to make use of only a fraction of her economic potential. Her material strength was so much greater that she could, as it were, lick the South with one hand tied behind her back.” Current, like others who had preceded him, assumed that northern urbanism and industrialism ensured that the South “was all but beaten before the first shot was fired.” However, those historians who believed that God stood on the side of the “strongest battalions” did not consider how the extraction of resources in northern cities, in respects to both manpower, materiel, and patriotism, might have been more difficult than in the rural South, that the complexities of urban life rendered organization, administration, and synchronization of wartime energies trickier to manage.

Following the rise of economic history in the mid-twentieth century, Civil War scholars became interested in a rather limited notion of mobilization, still viewing it as an outcome rather than a process. Historians considered mobilization through the lens of “total war,” the notion that any modern society could automatically assemble all of its military resources for the purposes of fighting a protracted conflict. Such scholars assumed that the North had, in fact, mobilized in so effective a manner that it achieved complete and “total victory” over the rebellion. In the early

Gary Gallagher, “Blueprint for Victory: Northern Strategy and Military Policy,” in James McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr., eds., Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 8. Although Pollard re-introduced Lee’s concept of “overwhelming numbers and resources,” he believed that internal factors within the Confederacy, particularly the “mal-administration” of Jefferson Davis, paved the way to defeat.

twentieth century, economic historians Charles and Mary Beard—later reinforced by Louis Hacker—contended that the Civil War had a profound effect on the North’s society and economy, propelling it into a “Second Revolution.” As Hacker proclaimed, “Industrial capitalism was now in control of the state.” The Beard-Hacker thesis, as Phillip Paludan coined this interpretation, dramatically shaped scholars’ understanding of the Civil War mobilization. Early on, they assumed that industrialization and modernization restructured the Northern war effort, bringing it into an ordered condition. Beard-Hacker supporters argued that his supposedly feverish need to fight for the nation’s survival produced a sudden rise in state-controlled industrial capitalism that propelled industrialism well into the Gilded Age.6

In 1971, Allan Nevins described this changeover as the result of “the sweep of organization” caused by the war, declaring that, “the formless, protoplasmic United States of 1861 emerged from the war four years later eagerly groping toward organization, and much more aware of the path it must take forward.” According to Nevins, the “forcing-blast of necessity and opportunity” caused the North to shift from “an improvised war” in 1861 and 1862 to “an organized war” in 1863 and 1864. Nevins built his argument around a top-down study of the U.S. War Department and a general military and diplomatic history of the Union’s path to victory, concluding:

Of all the changes effected by the war, this replacement of an amorphous, spineless society by a national life even partially organized for efficient action—organized first to win the war, and then

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to develop the continent—was perhaps the most striking. As the first two years might be called the improvised war, the last two could be termed the organized war. The transition from one to the other was a transition from the old America to the new, and not in material terms, but in psychological terms also.\(^7\)

Nevins’s assumption endured criticism from scholars who published their findings a few years earlier, most notably by Thomas Cochrane and Stanley Engerman, both of whom contended that the Civil War held back industrialization in the North. Despite Cochrane and Engerman’s statistical evidence, under Nevins’s lead, the Beard-Hacker thesis held firm, and in recent years, thanks to a legion of adherents, most notably Richard Bensel and Phillip Paludan, the notion has persisted that northerners somehow organized victory from chaos.\(^8\) More recently, in his economic history of the Quartermaster’s Department, *The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State*, Mark Wilson concluded that, “the war had exposed Americans for the first time to a truly massive national state, which featured a robust administrative bureaucracy and large-scale public enterprises.” Ignoring the cities as distinct regional entities, Wilson implicitly concluded that the Quartermaster’s Department organized Union victory as well, or rather it organized “the giant economic project” of fighting the war, and despite the Union’s thorough demobilization in 1865, this economic mobilization left a lasting bureaucratic legacy, touching every aspect of economic life well into the Progressive Era, which trend Wilson called, “the unacknowledged militarization of America.”\(^9\)

This dissertation contests the belief that the North’s victory rested on its ability to organize its manpower and economic resources behind the common good. Certainly, the Civil


War produced a bloated federal bureaucracy, as Nevins and Wilson contended, but a systematic examination of northeastern cities reveals a declination, not a build-up, of organization. In fact, urban organizations resisted federal control, and resisted it well. The Union’s northeastern cities “improvised war” in 1861 and they continued improvising their way to victory in 1865. A new approach, a comparative “bottom-up” history of the cities’ war, reveals a more complex answer than suggested by Nevins, Bensel, Paludan, or Wilson. Although they responded similarly to wartime burdens, Baltimore, New York City, Philadelphia, and Boston each fought their own private wars, with residents concocting different solutions, some successful, others not.

Unfortunately, previous community histories have not provided considerable guidance to help historians explain mobilization at the local level. Since the 1980s, only a few social historians of the Civil War have used the word “mobilization” to describe the effects of the conflict on everyday life. Maris Vinovskis, Thomas Kemp, Russell Johnson, and Mark Snell have all examined community action during the war, showing how such towns as Newburyport, Massachusetts; Claremont and Newport, New Hampshire; Dubuque, Iowa; and York, Pennsylvania, all responded to the federal calls for troops. However, these authors focused more on the after-effects of manpower mobilization, the reverberations upon the communities, not upon the comprehensive process of supplying the various means of making war. As Kemp described in his article, “Community and War,” he meant to “measure the effect of the Civil War on nineteenth-century America,” both physically and psychologically. Social historians have done great service by presenting these untold “effects of war” in new and illuminating ways, but by so doing, they have obscured the importance of mobilization as a process that absorbed the

In turn, the stilted nature of the historiography of Civil War mobilization has shaped the status of Civil War urban history. Currently, urban history has reached a state of divided equilibrium. Urban scholars partition themselves along two oppositional cleavages. Those who argue that the forces of war dramatically overburdened the metropolises with problems and those who contend that the forces of urbanism met the demands of the war represent one cleavage. Essentially, these historians might be divided into the “success” and “failure” schools of thought. Those who believe that the war altered society and those who argue that urban life continued uninterrupted represent the other cleavage. These historians might be divided into the “change” and “continuity” schools of thought.

The earliest scholarly work on northern cities came from the “continuity” and “success” camps. J. Matthew Gallman’s classic study, \textit{Mastering Wartime: A Social History of Philadelphia during the War}, drew its inspiration from Cochran and Engerman, arguing that “during the four years of war Philadelphia functioned much as it had for the previous decades.”\footnote{J. Matthew Gallman, \textit{Mastering Wartime: A Social History of Philadelphia during the Civil War} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 333.} When assessing the Quaker City’s mobilization, Gallman concluded that Philadelphia’s “organizational diversity and breath of involvement” successfully “adjusted” to the challenges of
the war “within the context of its existing social and institutional structures.” In short, war and mobilization had little effect on life in the Quaker City, and “continuity” bred “success.” Ernest A. McKay’s *The Civil War and New York City* took its cues from Gallman, arguing that Gotham’s urbanism won the day. Contrary to other scholars who lambasted New York City because of its ardent draft resistance, McKay believed that the Empire City’s supposed inconsistencies, its timorous entreaties to compromise, and its legions of southern-minded dissidents did not foster obstructionism. Instead, McKay believed that voices of disagreement served as “democracy in action.” Thus, he wrote, “The clashes in opinion throughout the war did not detract from the strength of the city. The reverse seemed to be true. New York was a diverse place, and the diversity could be called democracy in action in a time of crisis. . . . The city answered the reveille, but it was a strange reveille.”

Other historians of Civil War-era urbanism responded negatively to the “Gallman-McKay thesis.” Edward K. Spann’s *Gotham at War: New York City, 1860-1865* reached an opposite conclusion about New York. “Did the metropolis contribute its full share of manpower to the Union cause?” Spann asked. “Using the state census of 1865, I conclude that it did not.” Like Gallman, Spann affirmed that New York City demonstrated a strong continuity between its antebellum and post-bellum ages, suggesting that war never significantly altered life in the conurbation. However, Spann concluded that continuity bred failure, not success. Indeed, he pointed out, while New York City made up twenty-five percent of the state population, city dwellers accounted for less than ten percent of those state citizens who perished during the war.

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An older, but lesser-known essay, Russell Weigley’s “The Border City in the Civil War, 1854-1865,” supported Spann’s explanation with reference to Philadelphia. After examining Philadelphia’s wartime experience by focusing heavily on its conservative antebellum traditions, Weigley dubbed the Quaker City’s wartime sacrifice, “uninspiring.”\(^{15}\)

A third group of urban historians went beyond Spann and Weigley, contending that the Union’s cities—regardless of their “successes” or “failures” meeting the federal demands—experienced more change than continuity. Thomas O’Connor’s *Civil War Boston: Homefront and Battlefield* argued that the Bay City underwent a “lifetime of changes” thanks to the war. Another important book, Theodore J. Karamanski’s *Rally ‘Round the Flag: Chicago and the Civil War*—although it discussed a Midwestern city—contended that Chicago emerged “forever changed” by the war and it retained a “legacy of commitment and service [and resistance]” that forever affected the way its municipal politics and social services operated. Essentially, urban historians cannot agree on whether northern cities experienced more “change” or “continuity.” Neither can they agree on whether this change or continuity produced “failure” or “success.”\(^{16}\)

Of course, these historians based their conclusions on comprehensive examinations of their particular urban communities. My analysis is more focused. Although I am partially concerned with judging the “successes” and “failures” of urban mobilization in the Northeast, it is not my intent to engage directly this debate of “continuity” versus “change”—but my conclusions will certainly modify that dialogue. The forces of war and the forces of antebellum

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life collided in northern cities, that much is clear. Instead of adding to this stagnant debate, I see greater value in determining the points of contention, elucidating their nuances and analyzing the struggles between the forces of war and the forces of antebellum society. When it came to mobilization, Baltimore, Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia experienced similar confrontations between urbanism and war, and all four cities found ways to deal with them to varying degrees of success.

I have identified three important antebellum forces that limited the capacity of northern cities to mobilize: federalism, pluralism, and capitalism. At various times during the conflict, these forces offered minor advantages, but for the most part, they virtually ruined the local apparatuses required to raise armies. By federalism, I refer to the division of power among the three primary levels of government—local, state, and federal. This dissertation draws from the work of Fred Shannon and another author, William Hesseltine, who viewed the sharing of military powers as a detriment to the Union war effort. During the war, all three levels of government competed for the same responsibilities: the authority to appoint officers and recruiters, the authority to raise bounties, the authority to issue military contracts, and the authority to superintend the draft. Of course, the entire North suffered from this collision of power, but because antebellum cities required stronger local governments than rural districts—to reduce crime and to direct city services—the scramble for control over mobilization became more frenzied in the metropolises. Mayors, city councils, special committees, and even informal organizations such as churches, fire halls, and neighborhood clubs refused to relinquish their influence. In a sense, urban America’s tradition of political insularity—exacerbated by its fiercely partisan political system—worked against its wartime mobilization.

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The cities’ second disadvantage stemmed from pluralism, the multiplicity of social groups: political, ethnic, occupational, religious, and class-oriented sub-communities. As Warner, Einhorn, Davis, and Ethington have already shown, antebellum cities exhibited continual interchange between the realm of public and private life. Politics compelled urban residents to adapt their daily routines for the betterment of all, for the “public good,” but when crises arose, too often private interest, or “privatism,” as Warner termed it, directed political and social discourse from the bottom up.¹⁸ Too many voices, all of them competing or counteracting each other, slowed the pace of mobilization. This feature of urban life initially aided mobilization, but not for long. Diversity linked minority groups to the cause, logically sorting them into military organizations. However, as the war dragged on and economic stress increased, these contentious groups retaliated mightily, impeding each other’s authority.

Finally, capitalism—initially seen as the urban Northeast’s greatest strength—became one of its most perilous pitfalls during the war. As city-dwellers invested more money into their mobilization schemes, unscrupulous individuals looked upon the system of recruitment as a means of fiscal enrichment. Competition between cities and competition within cities turned recruits into capital and turned soldiers into veritable slaves, bought and sold to rival regiments or oppositional agencies. Mobilization businesses—bounty funds, substitute brokers, draft insurance clubs—proliferated as the war progressed, not diminished, and they showed no signs of stopping. In a sense, these three traits suggest that cities’ traditional virtues became their vices

¹⁸ Warner and Einhorn both contend that private interest directed city affairs, while Ethington and Davis dissent, arguing that public interest was supreme. This dissertation does not argue in favor of either school of thought. Instead, it shows how private interest and public interest both played major roles in mobilization. But of the two, this dissertation unveils how privatism had the most negative effects.
during a time of war and that, far from supporting Allan Nevins’s contention that the North “organized” its war, the cities’ experience proves that disorganization abounded.

It is important to remember that mobilization dramatically affected people on a personal level. At first, this process appears like an impersonal event, as its progression centered upon faceless quotas and bland statistics. But that would be a misconception. Mobilization shaped people’s lives in profound ways. Young men violated their parent’s wishes to enlist. Bounty committees went door-to-door, begging people for donations. Wives rioted at city relief funds, shouting for food. Soldiers in camp shivered, clothed in ill-made garments, under leaky tents, with rifles that would not fire. Bounty brokers intoxicated foolish volunteers, beat them, and robbed them of their pay. Black troops with blue uniforms and fluttering flags marched through city streets with the threat of white violence surrounding them. Young officers made impassioned speeches, telling their volunteers to enlist willfully and to endure frustrating delays with courage. Rioters fought police, police fought firemen, and urbanites fought each other. No person can say that mobilization passed without great emotion. Ultimately, this is dissertation is an investigation of that sentiment and the actions that followed from it.
Chapter 1:
“The Popular Sentiment is Everywhere Peaceful”:
Northeastern Cities in 1861.

The cities of the Northeast confronted the Lincoln administration with a strange enigma. Put simply, the first Republican president knew that New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston would be supremely important to the Union cause, yet at the same time, these cities presented the wartime government with more hardship and annoyance than any other communities of the North. On February 20, 1861, when he visited New York City as President-Elect, Lincoln recognized that he would face an arduous challenge in getting city residents to follow his lead. While standing alongside the city’s pro-southern mayor, Fernando Wood, at Barnum’s Museum, Lincoln addressed a large crowd: “It is with feelings of deep gratitude that I make my acknowledgement for this reception which has been given me in the great commercial city of New York. I cannot but remember that this is done by a people who do not by a majority agree with me in political sentiments.” Lincoln hoped that whatever their political loyalties, New Yorkers would not “consent to the destruction of this Union, under which not only the commercial city of New York, but the whole country has acquired its greatness.”

After the commencement of the war, Lincoln knew he had to rely upon the dubious Unionism of the northeastern cities to fight the Civil War. These metropolises possessed ample resources, manpower, industrial capability, and wartime labor necessary to raise and support armies the size of which Lincoln envisioned. Yet, Lincoln also knew that no formalized system existed to govern the progression of the Union’s urban military mobilization. Lincoln, like many

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of his contemporaries, hoped that perseverance and throbbing patriotism would handle the task. As early as May 1861, Abraham Lincoln wrote to Governor Edwin D. Morgan of New York, telling him that nothing must stand in the way of mobilization in New York City. Lincoln wrote, “The enthusiastic uprising of the people in our cause, is our great reliance; and we can not safely give it any check, even though it overflows, and runs in channels not laid down in any chart.”

Lincoln’s letter showed that he understood that no organizational conduits existed to channel the cities’ patriotism. However, to ply a strong arm of administration control, he thought, might stifle the Empire City’s newfound patriotism.

All evidence from the preceding months suggested that New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston were woefully unprepared, even unwilling, to fight a war caused by slavery. Throughout the antebellum years, leaders in these four cities had cautioned peace and conciliation to southern demands. A host of political, economic, and social forces—all established during the previous decade—infused the four major metropolises of the Northeast with a lukewarm sense of Unionism and a disinclination to chastise the South. Only when gunfire finally rippled across the tides of Charleston Harbor did these communities summon a sense of collective outrage against southern secession and only then did they pledge to make whatever sacrifices were necessary to restore the Union.

The same social, political, and economic circumstances that limited these cities’ preparedness also predestined their importance. Between them, New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston numbered more than 1,769,000 people, accounting for over 5.6 percent of the nation’s 1860 population. Not only did these vast urban centers boast a large “fencible”

demographic—that is, a population of military-age males—they also contained a great many young men who actually possessed both the will and the opportunity to join the Union’s ranks. Sadly, this prospect stemmed not from urban prosperity, but from rampant joblessness. The Panic of 1857 worsened a growing unemployment crisis across the urban Northeast—leaving over 40,000 jobless in New York City alone—and by 1861, industrial recovery had not reached pre-depression standards.³ Stories abounded in newspapers across the nation of success farther west, and in efforts to rid the metropolitan environs of the jobless, some newspaper editors encouraged emigration. “Poverty reduces big towns as well as big people,” admitted a Cincinnati editor. Lurid ales of western recovery served to drain the eastern cities of unwanted immigrant communities. A New York City banker commented that, “Numerous immigrants who have gone to the United States in the flattering expectation of having full employment in the various arts and trades, have realized disappointed hopes and broken spirits.”⁴ Despite the pressures from a few nefarious newspapermen, however, urban communities continued to grow. The cities increased in population in spite of the panic. Philadelphia enlarged by 38.4 percent during the 1850s (although it had increased by fifty-eight percent the preceding decade) and New York City grew by sixty percent during the same decade.⁵

Although urbanites often demonstrated strong attachments to their neighborhoods, their social circles, their families, their schools, their churches, and even their employers, peacetime obligations could not keep citizens inside the cities when war finally broke out. Not only did northern urbanites view military mobilization as an opportunity for gainful employment, but city

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dwellers worried less about abandoning their antebellum pursuits than their rural counterparts. For the unskilled laboring classes, switching jobs became a fact of life. Family commitments and work contracts shackled few urbanites to their communities. If noted urban historian Sam Bass Warner is to be believed, then the progress of industrialization forged an atmosphere that stressed private interest, not civic duty. In a sense, city-dwellers thought more about their personal aggrandizement than ensuring local stability. Bolstering this trend, northeastern cities contained large “floating populations,” a class of arrivals from the countryside or from abroad who moved to urban America only recently—within the past two to five years—to commence a new livelihood. Philadelphia, for instance, had surged in population by over 157,000 between 1850 and 1860, with thirty percent of its total 1860 population claiming foreign birth. Demographic explosions in the northeastern cities created unsolvable housing problems. During the same period, Philadelphia built only 28,000 new homes, placing—so one resident guessed—six and two-thirds persons per house. In the overcrowded environs of New York City, that ratio climbed to thirteen and five-eighths persons per house.

Many new arrivals had yet to settle on permanent occupations. In fact, many did not stay in their ports of entry. During the 1850s, three of every five New York City immigrants left the metropolis each year to work their way west for better opportunity. Army service sought to relieve dense neighborhoods of their compactness, and in addition, to provide a modicum of respect for immigrants who chafed under xenophobic nativism. Germans and Irish—the ethnic blocs that formed the majority of the foreign-born populations in all four cities—hoped that

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military service might, in some small way, reduce Know-Nothing pretensions or solidify ethnic communities with martial strength and leadership. Native-born city dwellers, meanwhile, thought they could stand to lose thousands of residents while the economy recovered. Indeed, when an Irish regiment from Boston left for the front in June 1861, it left to the jeers of a few, “There goes a load of Irish rubbish out of the city.”9 Back when the Panic of 1857 reached its horrible zenith, newspapers encouraged young men to enlist in the U.S. Army and relieve the cities of their burdens.10 When war erupted in 1861, some saw the same opportunity afoot. Urbanites sometimes preferred the loss of unproductive residents, and certainly, some expected that the “floating population” would shoulder cities’ manpower burdens.

Urban life preordained an easy transition to federal military service in other ways; at least, theory suggested that it might. Each northeastern city contained a well-oiled militia system, each multiple brigades in size. State officials had designed their militia to quell riotous dissent, but they could be retooled to deal with southern insurrection. Fifteen years earlier, each city had provided volunteers to serve during the Mexican-American War. At the outset of that war, Congress authorized the recruitment of 50,000 volunteers to serve for twelve months or the duration of the war. Next, the state governors called up their militia, expecting local communities to satisfy the national demands. Once the executives issued their military edicts, the cities armed, uniformed, and equipped the volunteers (or recruited additional men if they deemed it necessary). These troops took an oath to serve the federal government for the given period of time and then—after joining their rural compatriots—marched to Mexico. However, in 1846, each city mobilized no more than a few companies. For instance, federal demands limited

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Pennsylvania to two infantry regiments. Of these, Philadelphia filled the ranks of only six companies, or 600 men.\textsuperscript{11} Farther south, Baltimore raised four companies for the six-company “District of Columbia and Maryland Battalion.”\textsuperscript{12} On paper and in a perfect world, each city should have been able to raise tens of thousands of men at a moment’s notice. Under this assumption, the cities of the Northeast were the essential wells of manpower—the “wellsprings of the war effort,” to use Philip S. Paludan’s words—the North so desperately needed to execute a full-scale war.\textsuperscript{13}

Finally, cities possessed the necessary industrial capabilities to produce war materiel. Gun factories, textile mills, and shoe- and leather-making sweatshops could, in theory, meet the necessary requirements of arming and equipping a volunteer army the size that Lincoln initially envisioned—75,000 men. The cities of the Northeast already had accepted female seamstresses and foreign-born tailors in the workplace, so each community had a ready-made class of wartime workers eager to spring to the occasion and demonstrate their national pride and usefulness. Shipyards, wharves, warehouses, and train depots offered the final cog in the process of Union military mobilization, as these cities could offer essential storage for food and equipage, barracks to house soldiers, and transportation systems to get them to the front.

At first glance, no one could doubt that the cities of the Northeast would become essential to Union prosecution of the war; however, even as the war clouds loomed in 1861, politically, economically, and socially, all four metropolises exhibited a tepid devotion to the Union cause.

\textsuperscript{12} Charles J. Wells, \textit{Maryland and District of Columbia Volunteers During the Mexican War} (Westminster, MD: Heritage Books, Inc., 2008), 1-2.
\textsuperscript{13} Phillip Shaw Paludan, “\textit{A People’s Contest”: The Union and Civil War, 1861-1865} (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1988), 32.
The same economic crisis that produced the recent joblessness, troubling businessmen and factory laborers alike, also made it unsafe for northeastern cities to turn against the South. If interstate trade dried up during war, would economic disaster again fall upon the urban North? These four cities contained talented Republican leaders, but compared to their Democratic opponents, urban Republicans found themselves greatly outmatched or outnumbered. New York City boasted a two-to-one Democratic majority, and in Baltimore, that number reached fifteen-to-one. It seemed as if the party of Lincoln could not expect support from the cities if he inaugurated war against their Democratic brethren in the South. One Philadelphia pamphlet boldly admonished in early 1861, “Nullification of Mr. Lincoln’s election . . . seems necessary for the public good at this time.”

14 Each city also contained a sizable population of free African Americans—between 12,000 and 25,000 apiece—but segregationist laws, political oppression, or street violence tyrannized each black community with impunity. Fearful of breaking from southern Democrats who supported white supremacy, urban northerners worried that Republican ascendance might embolden black city dwellers. A war begun by slavery, it seemed, could hardly unite northern city-folk. With little convincing, the fear of severing connections with the South—political, social, racial, and economic—made the prospect of war a nightmarish resolution for many urban northerners.

Nestled between the Charles River and the Fort Point Channel, the City of Boston stood on a mile-wide bulb of land called Shawmut Peninsula, a hilly protrusion that jutted eastward from a swampy, narrow neck into the salty waters of Massachusetts Bay. Founded by Puritan

immigrants in 1630, the Bay City had grown steadily during the years following the American Revolution. The city’s prosperous harbor, a haven for its vast merchant and whaling fleet, predestined the city’s economic importance and its cultural preeminence in New England. By 1860, Boston numbered over 177,000 inhabitants. Although many of these had come over as expatriates from Ireland and Germany, the majority of Boston residents held high esteem for those who could trace their lineage back to Puritan forebears. Being “Yankee-born” became a badge of honor, and although the city’s Puritan ways had long vanished, the traditional colonial religion’s community-driven values—frugality, modesty, and assiduousness—still held tremendous sway among political and cultural figureheads.

Known affectionately as the “Hub of the Universe” by its residents, Boston stood out as a bastion of Yankee ingenuity, progress, and liberalism. The fires of the Second Great Awakening impregnated it with, as one historian described it, a “reform impulse.”¹⁵ Cognizant of the injurious side-effects of rapid urbanization, Boston’s intellectual elite devised a host of religious and secular organizations designed to transform the great “Hub” into a bastion of tolerance, cooperation, progressivism, and perhaps, social control. A vivid kaleidoscope of ideas ranging from the necessarily rational to the totally absurd swept through the streets and captivated social clubs and parlor talks. While some Bostonians adhered to these new social changes, a great many more wondered whether certain wacky fads—temperance, spiritualism, sabbatarianism, communitarianism, women’s suffrage, labor activism, and, most controversially, abolitionism—would truly last. White Bostonians tormented abolitionists whenever the opportunity arose. In October 1835, an enraged mob attacked William Lloyd Garrison—the city’s leading antislavery newspaper crusader—and dragged him through the streets by a rope. Garrison might have been

killed if the mayor and a posse of citizens had not wrestled him “from the fury of the mob” and conveyed him to a jail for safe-keeping.\textsuperscript{16} A newspaper from a neighboring town commented on the furious anger exhibited by proslavery Bostonians. “In the land of the free, in one of its most refined cities,” commented the editor, “in sight of the building where liberty was first cradled, in open and broad day, citizens calling themselves ‘respectable,’ to the number of five thousand, roused by the notice for a meeting of females, have assembled in riot, and hunted down . . . an innocent, terror-stricken man, whose greatest offence is, that he has used that liberty which God had given him, and which the constitution has guaranteed to him, in wrestling in behalf of the oppressed.”\textsuperscript{17} Abolitionism became a more powerful political force in Boston over the next two decades, but it never became more than a despised minority. However, as national political events concerning slavery infiltrated the Massachusetts State House, Bostonians grew increasingly suspicious that a conspiratorial “slave-power” had ensnarled the country.

The decade preceding the Civil War had not been politically or economically kind to the great “Hub.” First, in 1854, Massachusetts’ powerful Whig Party shivered apart. Unable to cope with the decline of national Whiggery caused by the party’s fracture over the Compromise of 1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, the party belonging to the Commonwealth’s eminent statesman, Daniel Webster, reached an unfortunate termination. For a time, the city’s two-party system wandered listlessly, dabbling briefly in political Know-Nothingism, but eventually finding voice in the political antislavery of the nascent Republican Party. As one Congressman proclaimed after the Kansas-Nebraska crisis, “We went to bed one night, old-fashioned,

\textsuperscript{16} Boston Daily Advertiser, 21 October 1869.  
\textsuperscript{17} Hampshire Gazette, 28 October 1835.
conservative, compromise Union Whigs, and waked up stark mad Abolitionists.” Then, three years later, the great Panic of 1857 wounded the city’s flourishing economy. In the late autumn, dozens of banks collapsed and credit dried up. Thousands of factory workers became jobless, and for several months, it seemed that financial Armageddon had arrived.

However, despite the overactive exhortations of a few panicked businessmen, Boston avoided fiscal apocalypse, and in the ensuing months, a slow economic recovery based on continued reciprocal trade with the cotton states stabilized the crisis. This near disaster gave Bostonians a chance to reevaluate their earlier commitment to antislavery. They received a colorful reminder when, on October 11, 1858, Mississippi’s senator, Jefferson Davis, spoke at Faneuil Hall, enlightening city dwellers and explaining how southern cotton had saved the city from irredeemable poverty. If southern cotton growers had not extended a friendly hand, where would the city’s textile workers and merchant shippers have gone for business? Davis declared, “Your interest is to remain a manufacturing and ours to remain an agricultural people.” Of course, Davis had an ulterior motive for his visit: to end the city’s agitation regarding the question of slavery. Diversity in economic pursuits had been a fortunate element in Boston’s spirit of progress, so Davis noted, but regrettably, it promoted a strong diversity of opinion. “This accursed agitation,” Davis snarled, “this offensive, injurious intermeddling with the affairs of other people, and this alone” would sever the important economic connection to the South that kept the Bay City afloat in its time of crisis.

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Davis was not alone in his suspicion that Boston harbored disunion sentiment. Over the final years of the decade, many politicians, North and South alike, suspected that the city had grown purposefully confrontational on the sensitive issue of slavery. In this way, few other northern cities held as integral a role in fomenting the nation’s sectional crisis. Americans universally viewed Boston as the epicenter of the abolition movement, whose intellectual leadership appeared central in fueling the nation’s sectional antagonism. Throughout the previous decade, the Bay City had been the scene of countless pivotal events or had been home to some of abolitionism’s most dynamic personalities. The “Kidnapping Committee,” the Anthony Burns Riot, and John Brown’s “Secret Six” topped local headlines. It came as no surprise, then, that as the sectional crisis deepened, many southerners demanded silence from Boston’s moralists. For instance, in the wake of John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, the editor of South Carolina’s *Charleston Mercury* lamented the Bay City’s supposed abolitionist fanaticism, which, he affirmed, fueled Brown’s act of domestic terrorism. “In Boston,” he wrote, “when the news came . . . , whether walking in the street, riding in the cars, wherever you met any one who spoke about Harper’s Ferry, the first expression used by all was, what a pity it did not succeed. . . . This was the sentiment which indicated the true feeling of every one who spoke in Boston.”

In the minds of many southerners, Boston’s intellectual elite—embodied by such strong-hearted and silver-tongued orators as William Lloyd Garrison, Samuel Gridley Howe, Wendell Phillips, and Thomas Wentworth Higginson—posed the supreme threat to southern prosperity. It boggled many slaveholders to consider that Boston’s wealth owed its success to the toil of slaves and the harsh discipline imposed by their masters. Fanatical principles, southerners argued,

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20 *Charleston Mercury*, 5 November 1859.
would only overturn the recent economic recovery. The Mercury’s attack continued: “Although largely dependent on the South for their daily increasing prosperity and wonderful expansion and enrichment, at heart we are hated and despised. Avarice alone keeps them in association with us—avarice gratified at our submission to their policy of plunder and aggrandisement.”²¹

Such blinding hatred against Bostonians stemmed from southerners’ belief that the Bay City was the cradle of abolition. In reality, few Bostonians accepted immediate and unconditional emancipation as a sign of social progress. The importance of economic steadiness, made dreadfully clear by the Panic of 1857, forced Bostonians to accept cotton agriculture as a stabilizing force on the northern market economy. Boston merchants and textile manufacturers who resided in the honeycomb of mills in surrounding Suffolk County relied upon southern cotton for employment. Like other cities in the Northeast, Boston’s businesses directly or indirectly profited from textile manufacture, and to relinquish cotton importation in the wake of the recent financial crisis spelled potential disaster.

Nevertheless, the cotton plant itself did not ensure affable relations between residents of the Bay City and the citizens of the slaveholding states. Few honest Bostonians believed the theory espoused by South Carolina’s radical senator, James Henry Hammond: that New England dared not make war upon cotton. Instead, Boston clothing merchants believed that southerners assumed the height of arrogance by withholding the precious fabric from New England as punishment for its abolitionism. Nathan Appleton, Sr., a Boston mill owner, wrote to a South Carolina acquaintance shortly after the Palmetto State seceded. Appleton declared, “You say that the cotton states are rich & strong enough to sustain themselves. I admit it in a state of peace, but

²¹ Charleston Mercury, 5 November 1859.
not of war. This precious resource, cotton, is in my opinion, much overstated. . . . The power of cotton is in the money which it would bring. To withhold it from sale is to make it powerless.” If war came, Appleton warned, Boston manufacturers would simply import cotton from India. He wrote, “There is nothing in politics and in political economy more surprising than the cotton planters of the South towards their best customers, the cotton manufacturers of the North.”

In general, many Bostonians held a low opinion of southerners. In the popular imagination, they often depicted them as backwards “crackers,” ungentlemanly, effete, or unrefined. One Bostonian who once lived in Savannah, Georgia, described his ex-neighbors in laughable terms: “The Cracker always wears a very short jacket and a very broad hat, . . . and is the most stooping, long-strided, lantern-jawed, crooked-backed man that a strong imagination can picture.” He went on, “He is always armed, is a capital rifle shot, hates Yankees, and believes Charleston to be the most opulent and powerful city in the universe. Not one in seventy of them could print his own name, much less write it. Most of them own a black woman remarkably prolific of yellow children.”

Boston’s political leadership yielded mixed opinions about the coming of the war. Mayor Joseph Milner Wightman, who entered office in January 1861, represented the city’s conservative element. A reformist Democrat and the son of an Irish immigrant, Wightman professed no love for the city’s abolitionist sect. Seventeen days after assuming office, he forcibly closed a meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society at Tremont Temple. When

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22 Nathan Appleton to friend, 7 January 1861, in Appleton family papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter MAHS).
23 Boston Daily Journal, 10 May 1861.
abolitionists protested, Wightman called out a squad of police and ousted them from the hall.\textsuperscript{24} Democrats applauded, perhaps none so vociferously as Boston’s 46,000 Irish residents. Ever fearful of empowering black citizens, Boston’s Irish-born residents championed the continuation of a white man’s government in the North. When time came for Bostonians to vote for President in 1860, the city gave the Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln, only 9,723 ballots. His opponents—the Democratic Party and Constitutional-Union Party—polled 10,649 votes altogether. In some ways, then, even Boston—the supposed abolitionist bastion of New England—rivaled the conservatism of such other northern urban centers as New York City or Baltimore.

However, the graces of a new governor, John Albion Andrew, inaugurated on January 5, 1861, may have championed the city’s majority opinion when it came to judging the wisdom of southern secession. A Republican lawyer, Andrew had won the admiration of city abolitionists in 1854 by successfully defending the would-be liberators of the fugitive slave, Anthony Burns. Since then, Andrew had made antislavery a lynchpin of his political life. The question of federal regulation of slavery in the territories recurrently surfaced as a campaign issue, and Andrew often made his stance abundantly clear. “The normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom,” he affirmed in a campaign speech. Publicly, he expressed his wish to see the “salvation of the un-peopled territories of the continent from the curse of human bondage.” Andrew’s political radicalism helped propel Massachusetts—and Boston—in a prewar mobilization. During the secession winter, Congressional Democrats attempted to compromise with the South by demanding a repeal of Massachusetts’ Personal Liberty Law—the

\textsuperscript{24} Thomas Wentworth Higginson, \textit{Cheerful Yesterdays} (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1868), 244; Edith Ellen Ware, \textit{Political Opinion in Massachusetts During Civil War and Reconstruction} (New York: Columbia University, 1916), 89-90.
decree that prevented commonwealth residents from aiding or abetting slave-catchers. Andrew journeyed to Washington to defend his state’s decision to adhere to the law, but upon arrival, he received rebukes from conservative members of his own party who accused him of disunion. An early biographer termed this a “gratuitous insult to New England.” Returning home for inauguration, Andrew knew that “the only reply . . . was war.”

Immediately upon assuming office, Andrew asked his fellow Bay Staters to make the necessary preparations to meet the conflict. Andrew’s inaugural address made it clear that the Bay State would be ready to participate in the coming battle. He asked aloud, “[I]n the possible contingencies of the future, can we be sure that Massachusetts has taken care to preserve the manly self-reliance of the citizens, by which alone, in the long-run, can the creation of standing armies be averted, and the State also be ready, without inconvenient delay, to contribute her share of force in any exigency of public danger?” His implied answer was, “yes.”

Unlike other northern governors, Andrew wasted little time in calling up his state militia. On paper, Massachusetts had 5,600 volunteers, about one-third of them residing in Boston. Commonwealth law, however, decreed that the governor could not activate more than 5,000 militiamen during a time of peace. On January 16, at the urging of the state adjutant general, William Schouler, Governor Andrew issued General Orders Number 4, requiring that Massachusetts “should be at all times ready to furnish her quota upon any requisition of the President of the United States, to aid in the maintenance of the laws and the peace of the

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26 William Schouler, A History of Massachusetts in the Civil War, Volume 1 (Boston: Published by the author, 1871), 15-6.
Several Democratic papers attacked Andrew’s decree, calling it sensationalist. Mayor Wightman, a borderline Copperhead, did nothing, waiting for the state legislature to rescind the order. However, the legislature, sympathetic to Andrew’s opinion, upheld the governor’s cry for preparedness, passing a new militia bill that allowed unlimited militia recruitment, a $100,000 emergency fund, and a $31,500 appropriation for the purchase of knapsacks, blankets, and camp equipage. For the next three months, militia companies from across the state took advantage of this generous provision and activated their men, outfitting them with weapons, uniforms, ammunition, and other trappings of war.

As the Fort Sumter crisis worsened, city dwellers looked anxiously toward a resolution of the stand-off. When the confrontation ended in hostilities, Boston citizens, like those elsewhere in the urban North, embraced the fight with a zealous patriotism. Although conservatives and Democratic partisans had once derided Boston’s abolitionism as fuel for disunionism, after the first cannon shot, Bay City residents blamed the conflict on the obstinacy of their southern foes. The editor of the conservative Evening Transcript wrote, “The new Confederacy is not a government by primary action of the States composing it. . . . It is a revolutionary government in rebellion against the United States. As such, in spite of every endeavor on the part of the latter to avoid bloodshed, the former has opened fire and inaugurated civil war—because the United States undertook to feed one of its own garrisons.” Meanwhile, the Jackson Club, an organization composed of the city’s leading Democrats, formally resolved to “stand by the union and to sustain the President and his administration.”

Certainly, many Bostonians viewed war as the savior of urban business. Government spending would offer temporary employment by

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27 Ibid., 15, 20.
28 Ibid., 28.
29 Boston Evening Transcript, 15 April 1861; Boston Daily Journal, 16 April 1861.
calling for the production of war materiel, while enlistment into the ranks of the Union army would provide jobs for the unemployed. Still, it would be unfair to speculate that Bostonians looked at the war solely as an economic opportunity. Perhaps more than any other city in the Northeast, its residents held strong convictions about the integrity of the Union. They would not let secession ruin the nation’s democratic process. Whatever the city’s mixed messages regarding the South during the previous decade, Boston was going to war and it declared itself quite prepared to wage it. Would it actually be prepared for battle? The next few months would answer that question.

About 214 miles southwest of Boston sat New York City, the Empire City, or the great “Emporium,” as many visitors called it. There, in addition to some of the great architectural achievements of the world, a visitor could see an incredible demographic accomplishment, over 814,000 inhabitants crammed onto a tiny spit of land—Manhattan—about thirty-four square miles in size, where a wide array of religions and ethnic cultures thrived in close proximity. Although Irish and Germans dominated the scene, many other immigrant groups—Britons, French, Hungarians, Polish, Italians, Scottish, Scandinavians, and Cubans—all squeezed into the “Emporium’s” hotels, boarding rooms, and tenement houses.

New York City boasted both a diverse history and a variegated physical infrastructure, both equally as complex as its demographics. Founded in 1614 by Dutch settlers, and later traded to the British Empire for a tiny island in Indonesia, New York City swelled in population and rapidly industrialized during the antebellum decades. By 1860, factories everywhere buzzed with thrift and industry, new immigrants with colorful expressions of culture arrived daily, local
theaters and parks sparkled with mirth, and moneyed socialites filled news headlines. Of course, serious social ills and iniquitous problems accompanied the Empire City’s brisk and uneven state of modernization. Many families lived in poverty. Some sections of the city reeked of manure and animal decay. Street gangs—ethnic or occupational in nature—roamed ill-defined territories, battling rival groups, while prostitution and commercialized sex districts proliferated, creating a seedy underworld full of vice and crime.

Municipal politics fared little better. In 1860, the *New York Herald* proclaimed, “Our city legislators, with few exceptions, are an unprincipled, illiterate, scheming set of cormorants, foisted upon the community through the machinery of primary elections, bribed election inspectors, ballot box stuffing, and numerous other illegal means. The consequence is that we have a class of municipal legislators forced upon us who have been educated in barrooms, brothels and political societies; and whose only aim in attaining power is to consummate schemes for their own aggrandizement and pecuniary gain.”

Corruption ruled the hour inside city political circles and despite sanitary reforms and anti-prostitution laws, plutocracy, cronyism, and gang warfare ran amok. Still, visitors could not fathom eradicating New York’s ethnic or class diversity; the city’s eclectic nature and its insular life was something to behold. Antebellum critics affectionately—but sometimes sarcastically—dubbed New York City as the “London” of the New World. To lose such a bohemia would be sacrilege.

New York City boasted something that few northern cities possessed: a movement analogous to a working-class consciousness. Historians disagree on the degree to which a “class consciousness” united laboring people against the controllers of capital prior to the Civil War.

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but historian Sean Wilentz proved that in New York City continuing waves of labor protest reflected a continuum of pro-labor ideology that, at the very least, united artisanal workers around the idea that politics should be used to perpetuate the dignity of skilled craftwork. Wilentz described this philosophy as a “class-conscious, inter-ethnic New York labor movement,” one capable of forging powerful protests against class exploitation. New York City’s trade unions, he explained, did not mobilize merely for their own narrow benefit, but for the continuation of an untarnished representative democracy. Other historians of New York City disagreed with Wilentz, claiming that “class-consciousness” did not intersect ethnic rivalries; however, some further proof from gender historian Christine Stansell suggested that New York City’s laboring-class ideology managed to consume gender divisions. Stansell proved that women held important leadership roles in the New York City labor movement. She admitted that, for a variety of reasons, their window of political activism closed shut by 1860, but for a time, specifically gender-oriented labor protests among seamstresses and domestic workers emerged. As Stansell described, “trade union women asked . . . why they were oppressed, what they could do about it, and who could help them in their struggles. Their questions were fresh and direct, partly because their situation as manufacturing wageworkers was new, partly because other interested parties—working-class men and middle-class reformers—had not yet monopolized the answers.” Male labor activists had not yet adhered to the notion that women should be kept out of the workplace. Consequently, female labor activists found themselves free to confront class oppression in the Empire City, injecting their own gendered critiques into the dialectic stratum. However, neither Wilentz nor Stansell considered the impact of war upon the labor movements in New York City. Of course, probably they did not need to, since federal purchases during the Mexican-American War consumed an unimportant amount of local
production in terms of uniforms and equipage. Nevertheless, the significance of Stansell’s and Wilentz’s work suggests that working-class unity—to the degree that it existed—fashioned an uneasy tension between the makers of war materiel and those who labored for them. Although it remained unspoken, most residents understood that, should New York City become embroiled in a protracted conflict, wartime laborers, as organized as they were, would undoubtedly have a say in the ensuing political situation. The turbulence created by working-class protests—most notably in 1836 and 1850—foreshadowed the potential strife of New York City’s Civil War.31

New York City possessed a large and reasonably disciplined militia. Similar to other states, New York had abolished its unpopular “enrolled” militia which dominated the early-federal period, adopting all-volunteer units. By 1858, after a recent legislative change, New York’s state militia consisted of eight divisions, or over 16,000 men (equal in size to the U.S. Army). One division, the 1st Division, headquartered in Manhattan.32 During the antebellum years, New York City’s militia had acquired a modicum of respect among men of all classes and ethnic divisions, not only because regiments served as excellent means of instilling fraternity and community action, but because they served the will of law and order by helping to subdue riots—including the Astor Place Riot and the Dead Rabbits Riot. Also, they offered immigrant communities a veneer of protection against Know-Nothing gangs. Rarely did foreign-born militia actually fight thugs in all-out turf wars, but the prospect of revenging the nativists thrilled naturalized citizens. In 1860, the all-Irish 69th New York State Militia refused to parade during a visit by the Prince of Wales. For awhile, this insult seemed as thought it would foster nativist

retaliation; however, anti-British Democratic newspapers applauded the behavior of the 69th New York and its commander, Colonel Michael Corcoran, validating foreign-born militia service as an essential component to the Empire City’s military family.

The city’s 1st Division profited from state-level attention. In 1859, the state established a new arsenal at the corner of Seventh Street and Thirty-Fifth Avenue, which the state inspector general considered the best structure for firearm storage such that he recommended all surplus weapons from across the state be stored there. The Albany legislature took militia regulation a step further, when, along with its 1858 revisions, it imposed stringent uniform and weapons requirements for the volunteer units. These regulations closely mirrored those of the U.S. Army. Despite these state-level changes, New York City’s martial ardor did not increase as the Civil War approached. Although some regiments drilled regularly, others simply showed up only at the required inspection dates. The threat of insurrection never propelled unit leaders to suspect that an order of mobilization would come in the near future. Also, regimental and company commanders rarely enforced the new state codes. Although most militia regiments required each member to own his own uniform and weapon, after the rank-and-file paid unit dues, most commanders turned a blind eye to the state regulations. In the 1st Division, probably less than one-third of its soldiers possessed complete uniforms and sets of equipment. By 1861, only two New York City regiments had enough equipment to depart immediately.33

Two key aspects dominated city life prior to the Civil War: economics and politics. By 1860, dominated as New York City was by political and economic conservatives, few northeastern cities exhibited a more dubious loyalty to the Union at the outset of the Civil War.

As armed conflict approached, New Yorkers, by and large, espoused a passionate loyalty to the South. As in Boston, the prospect of war frightened residents with the specter of economic ruin. The Panic of 1857 had taught capitalists and workers alike that southern agricultural imports preserved the city’s financial vitality. When western banks failed to get New York out of its financial jam, the cotton trade stabilized the city’s industrial production. The ensuing years brought steady recovery, and in 1860, economist Thomas Kettell declared, “[T]he South produces . . . vast wealth, she does little of her own transportation, banking, insurance, brokering, but pays liberally on those accounts to Northern capital employed in those occupations. . . . The history of the wealth and power of nations is but a record of slave products.”

Although New York’s Republican Party and a small core of free-labor Democrats might have disagreed with Kettell’s assessment; many residents firmly believed that the city benefited from its southern connections. In December 1860, cabinetmaker Julius Wesslau argued that secession’s effect “on business here can’t be put into words, but business all over the country has collapsed. The South always bought its industrial goods from the North, and we can’t continue to exist without them.” Each year, the five leading cotton states brought $200,000,000 worth of commerce into New York City. New Yorkers supposed that war and the resultant loss of southern trade would devastate the city—a city already burdened by decades of over-crowding, ethnic tension, sanitation dilemmas, and political corruption.

New York City’s southern sympathies found a voice in its powerful Democratic Party. Since the 1850s, municipal politics partitioned between the city’s rival political machines—Tammany Hall and Mozart Hall—but, during state and federal elections, Democrats dominated the polls. Southerners applauded New York Democrats whenever they mobilized the city’s 90,000 voters for their preferred national candidates. In October 1860, even Alabama’s leading “fire-eater,” William L. Yancey, received a warm welcome during his visit to rally support for Southern Democratic presidential candidate, John C. Breckinridge. No less than four popular New York City presses supported Breckinridge’s candidacy in 1860, and one paper, the *Evening Post*, declared, “The City of New York belongs almost as much to the South as to the North.”

The potential loss of southern political brethren filled New York City Democrats with alarm. Perhaps no group fretted more than New York City’s 203,000 Irish-Americans, the city’s largest ethnic voting bloc. New York’s Irish conveyed passionate anti-abolitionism, and, throughout the secession crisis, Irish leaders feared that Republican control of the national government would inaugurate an unwelcome period of racial equality. As Election Day neared, James Gerard, a congressional candidate, warned Irish-Americans that if the Republicans won, “Negro labor [will begin] dragging you from your free labor.”

New York City’s African Americans offered little threat to Irish job security. As one historian commented, “In 1860 the city’s 12,574 African Americans had no territorial base, no cultural stronghold. The Irish had pushed them out of Five Points, and they were strewn about the city in isolated, vulnerable clumps.” Impoverishment among the African American

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37 Ibid., 20.
community in New York City limited black church activism, while segregationist policies stifled employment and education. A few modest efforts to improve colored schools sprang up, and in 1860 a black suffrage group attempted to alter the state constitution which then barred black men from voting. A state-wide referendum easily sank this proposal, and in New York City, white voters rejected it by a margin of ninety-five percent. Generally, white New Yorkers wanted their black neighbors purged from the city. Even Gotham’s intellectual “moralists” held to this belief. They supported the “African Civilization Society,” a colonization program designed to ship African Americans to Latin America. Fearing a dismal future for black New Yorkers, even Henry Highland Garnet, the noted black abolitionist, supported this organization. James Gordon Bennett, a Democratic newspaper editor, also advocated removal. In 1853, he wrote:

All persons having a shade of philanthropy in their composition, must have that feeling excited by witnessing the poverty and degradation in which the African race exist in this city. Systematically shut out from all mechanical pursuits, and expelled from almost all the inferior positions they were once allowed to hold here, they have seen their place filled by German and Irish; and now there are not more than half a dozen occupations in which they can engage. . . . The expulsion of the negroes from almost every branch of industry has had its natural effect in thinning their numbers. . . . Under such circumstances, would not the wisest and most philanthropic measure be, to promote, by all possible means, the emigration of the colored people of this State to the republic of Liberia?40

White hatred of African Americans maintained a steady course throughout the 1850s, retarding all efforts to strengthen the black community. Despite this impotence—perhaps even because of it—white Democrats touted the dangers of black progress unrelentingly. In their view, persons suspected of aiding black community life in any way bordered on demagoguery or disunionism. Thus, it came as no surprise that the Republican Party—the party of political antislavery—met little success in New York City in 1860. When Republicans organized a torchlight parade of 20,000 “Wide Awakes” in early October, the spectacle attracted moderate

39 Ibid., 858.
40 New York Herald, 12 April 1853.
attention at best. The Democratic Party easily surpassed this with a rival procession a few nights later, drawing over 37,000 participants. Lincoln managed to carry 32,000 votes in November, but his Democratic opponents easily defeated him on a fusion ticket, polling over 59,000 votes, overwhelming him in every ward in the city.\footnote{Edward K. Spann, \textit{Gotham at War: New York City, 1860-1865} (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002), 3-4.}

But even these statistics were deceptive. Moses Grinnell, a wealthy shipper and city Republican, wrote Lincoln that, “Many of those who voted with the Republican party at the late election did so with no view of pronouncing definitely upon the question of Slavery in the territories; they were disgusted with the abuses which had grown up with the [Democratic] party which had for so many years been dominant and desired a change.” Such reluctant Republicans, Grinnell admitted, “shudder at the thought of risking the advantages of the Union, in all its integrity, on the territorial question.”\footnote{Moses H. Grinnell to Abraham Lincoln, 29, January 1861, Abraham Lincoln Papers, the Library of Congress. [Transcribed and Annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois].} Gothamites, it seemed, could hardly stand behind a war that seemed to come from the obnoxiousness of the administration.

The Democrats carried this sentiment to its furthest point. During the secession winter, city politicians debated the possibility of leading the city into secession. Congressman Daniel E. Sickles of Tammany Hall suggested that the City Council should declare New York an independent city-state to continue free trade with both sections. Few residents took notice of Sickles’s wild proposal, but many Unionists angrily stirred after they heard New York’s Democratic mayor, Fernando Wood, declare his intention during an address to the Common Council on January 7 to lead New York City into secession. He asked, “Why should not New York City, instead of supporting by her contributions in revenue two-thirds of the expenses of
the United States, become also equally independent [as the South]?” Wood’s announcement irked a few of his fellow Democrats, but it did not dissolve Gotham’s powerful peace movement. Lincoln effectively quelled this sentiment during this inaugural trip to Washington when he stood alongside Wood at Barnum’s Museum and declared in his presence that “There is nothing that can ever bring me willingly to consent to the destruction of this Union.” Lincoln’s remark might have invited a reply from Wood on any other occasion, but for whatever reason, he remained respectfully silent. Still, the antiwar sentiment lingered. Even as late as April 9—when the federal government prepared for a showdown with Confederate forces in Charleston Harbor—James Bennett, editor of the *New York Herald*, lambasted the “vicious, imbecile, demoralized administration” and declared it “[f]ar better that the Union should be dismembered forever, than that fraternal hands should be turned against one another, to disfigure the land by slaughter and carnage. . . . [T]he popular sentiment is everywhere peaceful.”

Unlike its New England neighbor farther north, New York City expressed firm reluctance to engage in armed conflict. Either from a desire to look inward rather than outward, or because its residents feared the severing of the economic ties that had saved the city from financial crisis in 1857, New York City wavered on the issue of preparedness. In April, when the Confederate government announced its new tariff policy calling for massive reductions, city business leaders recanted their earlier southern sympathies. Cleverly turning a statement from J. D. B. De Bow’s pro-slavery journal on its head, one newspaper argued that if secession remained uncontested, the city wharves would rot and “grass [would] grow in the streets.” Still, despite the new specter

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46 *New York Herald*, 9 April 1861.
of economic devastation, few residents entertained the thought of calling up the militia until the Battle of Fort Sumter intervened.\textsuperscript{47}

Farther south, yet another great metropolis pondered the coming conflict; this one, the “City of Brotherly Love,” Philadelphia, sat wedged between the Schuylkill and Delaware Rivers. Numbering 565,000 inhabitants, and covering about six square miles of ground, Philadelphia had grown at an expansive rate in recent decades, over thirty-eight percent between 1850 and 1860. Once it filled with 138,000 German and Irish immigrants, it exhibited an ethnic diversity greater than Boston but far smaller than New York. However, although it dated back to 1681 with the arrival of energetic Quaker William Penn, Bostonians and New Yorkers viewed Philadelphia as an upstart city, far behind in industry and culture, a comparison that many Philadelphians noted and took personally. However, city boosters took solace that, in recent years, Philadelphia’s industry flourished. Its annual product in 1861 amounted to over $141,000,000—mostly in textiles, clothing, and iron production. The city boasted 99,000 factory operatives, including 29,600 women.\textsuperscript{48} Other immense political, economic, and social changes occurred in recent decades, most notably the City Consolidation Act in 1854, which united the entire county under one metropolitan government. A response to the bloody Kensington and Southwark Riots of 1844, the Consolidation Act meant to curtail anti-Irish violence and wean the city off a reliance on militias for quelling local disorder by establishing a stronger, professional police force. The Panic of 1857 had collapsed Philadelphia’s economic vitality the same as in Boston and New York City, crumbling every one of the city’s banks. But after the initial distress, banking

\textsuperscript{47} Burrows and Wallace, \textit{Gotham}, 865-8.
\textsuperscript{48} Shankman, \textit{Pennsylvania’s Antiwar Movement}, 41.
bounced back, specie payments resumed, and interstate trade rejuvenated the economy to near pre-depression levels. Historian Russell Weigley confirmed, “The rapidity of recovery made the whole affair seem almost a confirmation rather than a denial of Philadelphia’s essential economic solidity.”^49 However, this did not mean that Philadelphians did not look to Dixie for fiscal aid. One local newspaper reminded its readers, “Can Philadelphia with the South cut off, compete with New York in ships, in trade, and other branches of enterprise? We opine not.”^50

Occupations had changed little in Philadelphia since the revolutionary era. Although machinists and factory operatives had emerged as new industrial trades within the past thirty years, older occupations that thrived during the eighteenth century, including carpenters, clerks, weavers, tailors, butchers, cordwainers, and blacksmiths, continued to dominate the job market. Nevertheless, the rapid pace of industrialization caused Philadelphia to bifurcate along distinguishable social fissures. Instead of promoting civic boosterism, the thirty years of antebellum growth caused Philadelphians to compartmentalize their social gatherings with an eye for homogeneity. As twentieth century urban historian Sam Bass Warner described, Philadelphians gravitated toward “privatism,” a subconscious respect for private interest. Warner explained that city consolidation, immigration, and rapid industrialization spurred a retreat from “informal neighborhood street life.” He continued, “In response to these conditions all Philadelphians, of every class and background, reacted in the same way to the loss of old patterns and of sociability and informal community. They rushed into clubs and associations.”^51

^50 Shankman, Pennsylvania’s Antiwar Movement, 57.
^51 Warner, Private City, 57-8, 61.
Philadelphia possessed over 400 churches and, according to Warner, twice the number of lodges, clubs, and benefit societies.\(^{52}\) Irish societies including the Ancient Order of the Hibernians and Nativist groups including the “Wide-Awakes” drew followers based on religious and ethnic conformity. Fire departments, street gangs, and reformist societies sprang up too, asking for devotees whose social, economic, gendered, and racial attitudes mirrored their own. This social pluralism emulated that of New York City. In many ways, New York City and Philadelphia appeared similarly demographically, with New York City edging out Philadelphia in terms of its diversity and its Democratic Party commitment. However, Philadelphia’s privatism may have been more saturating than that exhibited in other Northeastern urban areas. J. Matthew Gallman, one of Philadelphia’s wartime scholars, suggests that the compartmentalization of the city by private interest established strong peacetime continuities that could not be easily broken.\(^{53}\)

Still, despite their impulse to look inward for companionship, Philadelphians focused on the same national events that caused the rest of the nation to stumble awkwardly toward war. The controversies of slavery made their way into the environs of Philadelphia forcing residents to take sides. Despite its Quaker heritage, the proslavery forces dominated city life. In May 1838, an infuriated anti-abolition mob razed Pennsylvania Hall, the meeting house of the Pennsylvania Antislavery Society; this too, after the building had been open for only four days. In 1851, Philadelphia witnessed the controversial trial of the Christiana rioters in a federal court room. Several men from Lancaster County faced charges of treason for violating the Fugitive Slave Act of 1851 by aiding a Maryland runaway and then protecting the murderers of Edward Gorsuch,

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\(^{52}\) Ibid., 61.  
the master who tried to claim him. Although a federal court acquitted the rioters, another legal case gained local attention when an abolitionist group, the City Vigilance Committee, attempted to free several slaves traveling through the streets, demanding their freedom based on Pennsylvania’s anti-slavery interstate transit law. But this judicial appeal fell short of victory for abolitionism. The Vigilance Committee members who interfered with one slave owner’s attempt to transport his chattel through the streets faced jail time. Although pro-slavery activism did not always carry the day, it experienced victory after victory in stifling abolitionist sentiment in the city founded by Quakers.\footnote{Weigley, “The Border City in the Civil War,” in Philadelphia: A 300-Year History, 388.}

Like other cities farther north, a conservative Democratic leadership fiercely loyal to the South headed the city government. The first Republican mayoral candidate, William B. Thomas, ran in 1856, but he carried less than one percent of the vote. Although the city reelected an ex-American Party mayor in 1860—Alexander Henry, who ran that year as a Union-allied “People’s Party” candidate—Democrats steadfastly dominated the city council. Most Philadelphia Democrats despised anti-slavery activism, hoping that issues such as Kansas-Nebraska and Dred Scott would forge sectional compromise. Even the city’s independent paper, the Public Ledger, labeled the city’s abolitionists a “band of fanatics.” Insurrectionary moments sparked violent reprisal. The execution of John Brown in December 1859 resulted in a potentially hostile situation. According to one chronicler, the city’s abolitionists “were in a fever-heat of indignation.” James and Lucretia Mott and several other prominent abolitionists gathered at National Hall to speak out against Brown’s execution, but a crowd of southern sympathizers disrupted the meeting and drowned the abolitionist voices with a storm of groans and hisses. On December 4, 1859, the body of John Brown arrived from Virginia by train. Mayor Henry hoped
the coffin would not remain in then city too long. A few black and white abolitionists protested, asking for time to hold a prayer meeting at Shiloh Baptist Church, but Henry retorted, “The peace of the city is more important than your arguments.” When Brown’s body arrived at the Washington Street Depot, Henry ordered an empty box decked out to look like a coffin, so when a clamorous anti-abolitionist crowd clawed its way into the station, they dragged off an unfilled sarcophagus, leaving the real coffin unmolested.55

Abraham Lincoln could hardly count the Quaker City as a Republican ally. During the Election of 1860, Lincoln, in fact, did carry the city by fifty-two percent, but only because the Unionist “People’s Party” ticket rallied behind tariff reform, not anti-slavery. Following the Election of 1860, Philadelphia’s Democrats tried to placate the South. In November, several of them—including a future Union army officer, Ashton Tourison—passed a set of resolutions regretting the results of the election. The resolutions declared Lincoln’s election a constitutional act, but they resolved to “extend to that portion of our fellow country-men of the South, who think differently, the assurance of a respectfully fellow-feeling, under the invasion of their constitutional rights and domestic peace and dignity to which they have been so long subjected by the controlling voice of the party which has now prevailed in the choice of a Chief Magistrate.”56 During the months preceding the bombardment of Fort Sumter, Philadelphians demurred from saber-rattling and focused all attention on sewing up the sectional fissure. In January 1861, Philadelphia socialite Sidney George Fisher optimistically maintained that “the plan of the government seems now to avoid anything that will irritate the South and bring on

56 Ibid., 738.
Thus, despite its Quaker background and a talented assortment of abolitionists, proslavery ideology and southern sympathy dominated local conversation.

For months preceding the conflict, Democratic politicians led antiwar demonstrations in public squares. On January 16, Democrat Charles Ingersoll led a mass meeting suggesting that Pennsylvania should hold a secession convention and “determine with whom her lot should be cast.” In a flagrant display of effrontery, southern sympathizers established a newspaper at 337 Chestnut Street called the *Palmetto Flag* just as South Carolina’s military forces prepared to open fire upon the federal garrison at Fort Sumter. Finally, in a damning appraisal of Philadelphia’s racism, abolitionist Frederick Douglass conceded, “There is not perhaps anywhere to be found a city in which prejudice against color is more rampant than in Philadelphia. . . . The whole aspect of city usage at this point is mean, contemptible and barbarous.” Even though Philadelphia contained a sizable free black population at 22,000—the second largest in the nation—the prospect of aiding African Americans appeared ridiculous to some and dangerous to many others. For various reasons, then—strong Democratic loyalty, traditions of peace, economic ties to the South, or racist convictions—Philadelphians cautioned only restraint as the war approached.

Unlike Boston or New York, Philadelphia had a militia system of dubious quality. Since the Mexican-American War, volunteer militia companies stood at the foundation of Philadelphia’s military establishment. After the contentious riots of 1844, to promote military ardor, the Commonwealth’s legislature passed a series of militia acts between 1851 and 1858.

59 Douglass’ *Monthly*, February 1862.
disbanding the widely discredited enrolled militias, replacing them with volunteer companies as the Commonwealth’s sole means of defense. Fencible Pennsylvanians could join one of any number of volunteer organizations or pay a tax for non-participation.60

The Act of April 21, 1858, organized Philadelphia’s militia into one division, or four brigades of infantry, artillery, cavalry, and riflemen.61 In addition, six historic independent commands augmented this force.62 On paper, Philadelphia had about 15,000 militiamen, but due to the newness of this act and the city’s money shortage—preventing militia members from paying their dues—few of these men stood ready for action in April 1861. Similar to their enrolled predecessors, discipline in Philadelphia’s volunteer militias atrophied. Following the passage of the 1858 militia bill, only commissioned officers held the power to fill their rosters and enforce drill attendance. Militia companies such as the Washington Grays, which included the Marquis de Lafayette and Henry Clay as honorary members, simply devolved into fraternal societies for the city’s elite. Others, such as the Scott Legion, became social clubs for conspiring politicians to debate their next electoral moves. During the three years between the passage of the new militia act and the outbreak of the Civil War, officers rarely imposed stringent fines for

61 The 1st Brigade consisted of the 1st Regiment, the Rifle Battalion, and the 1st Regiment (Pennsylvania Artillery). The 2nd Brigade consisted of one regiment, the 2nd Regiment. The 3rd Brigade consisted of two regiments, the 1st Regiment (3rd Brigade) and the 3rd Regiment (Philadelphia Light Guard). The 4th Brigade, or “Reserve Brigade,” dedicated to city defense, contained three regiments, the 1st Regiment (Gray Reserves), the 2nd Regiment (Blue Reserves), and the 3rd Regiment (Gray Reserves).
62 These were the 1st City Troop (Philadelphia City Cavalry), the Artillery Corps Washington Grays, the National Guards Regiment, the Landis Battery, the Scott Legion, and the State Fencibles. Frank Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 18-25.
non-attendance, and most companies barely surpassed the minimum requirement of keeping thirty soldiers on their roster.63

In sum, at the eleventh hour, Philadelphia appeared quite unready to meet the burdens heaped upon it by the Civil War. Mildly peaceful, somewhat proslavery, viciously racist, and well understaffed in terms of its militia, the Quaker City seemed ready to live up to its name.

Finally, sitting 105 miles southwest of Philadelphia was the City of Baltimore, a bustling waterfront metropolis founded by English Catholics in 1729. In the antebellum era, Baltimore’s residents called their home the “Monumental City.” In 1860, at over 212,000 inhabitants, Baltimore boasted a good harbor, easy access to the Chesapeake Bay, and several fast-moving rivers to power local industry. All of this helped propel Baltimore’s rapid industrialization. With over 1,100 manufactories by that year, Baltimore rivaled other major manufacturing centers, including Boston and Philadelphia. Baltimore also stood at the hub of three major railroads: the Baltimore and Ohio; the Northern Central; and the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore. Thus, the city interdicted nearly all traffic between the Northeast and the nation’s capitol. As a center of industry and a nexus of interstate seaborne and railroad interchange, Baltimore’s businesses closely associated with northern and southern communities. In a sense, the city’s geography almost predetermined its importance during the Civil War.

Baltimore’s beauty astounded its visitors. If they could afford it, sightseers went sailing down the bay. Modest classes simply toured the city, gazing at the architecture and monumentation. In 1862, while stationed in the metropolis, a Union soldier wrote to his parents:

Saturday and yesterday I was in the city to see the Lion (the great sights). First I saw the “Battle Monument” as it is called, erected in honor of the battle of “North Point” it is covered with the names of various persons and events. Next I went to “Speare Wharf” to see the shipping. There I saw some fine Clipper vessels, and one three-mast vessel—they were all middle size vessels. The masts all lean to the stern, being placed in that position for easy sailing. Opposite is federal hill of which the breastworks only are visible. Some day I intend to visit it. From there I went to Washington Monument situated on Monument Street near Calvert Street Station. It is of white marble, has a figure of a man on top, arms stretched forth papers in hand. The monument occupies the highest point in the city near about the center. We have a fine view of it and the principle part of the city. To the right of Camp is spring garden bay, we can see the sail boats passing.\(^{64}\)

Visitors usually claimed that Baltimoreans exhibited a likable blend of northern and southern attitudes. An English visitor once remarked that the “society of Baltimore was the most warm-hearted, generous and hospitable that we had met with in any of the large cities.” He opined that Baltimore’s “central position” between North and South “seems favourable for getting the intelligence of the North with the frankness and generosity of the South; they [Baltimoreans] appear to avoid the mercenary spirit of the one, and the reckless daring of the other.”\(^{65}\)

These observations reflected only one side of Baltimore’s street culture. During the 1850s, the city demonstrated continual malignant unrest, mostly stemming from electoral confrontations. The years leading up to the Civil War severely tested the integrity of Baltimore’s democratic process. Beginning in 1857, the anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant American Party


established a tight hold on the City Council and mayor’s office, a change that the rival Democratic Party did not admit peacefully. Since the late-1830s, street violence had held Baltimore’s public life in check. This violence stemmed from the politicization of local nativism. Baltimore’s nativism was closely bound to Protestant fears of Catholic conspiracy. As historian David Grimsted observed, “Baltimore . . . had a complicated relation to Catholicism.” On one hand, the city had always been a popular haven for Catholic expatriates, and it boasted an old, elite English Catholic leadership dating back to the first landing in Maryland in 1634. Baltimore also boasted the nation’s oldest Catholic cathedral, the Basilica (completed in 1821), and it hosted the national Catholic Council of Bishops. Yet, at the same time, a rising group of Protestant reformers aimed to purge Catholicism from schools, politics, and other social institutions. Anna Ella Carroll—later renowned as “Lincoln’s Invisible General”—made her first start in public affairs by publishing bellicose pamphlets denouncing foreigners and Roman Catholicism. In one of her first major works, *The Great American Battle: Or the Contest Between Christianity and Political Romanism* (1856), Carroll explained, “Foreigners have trampled into dust the naturalization laws, and destroyed the purity of elective franchise. They have demanded that their own children be taught in a tongue foreign to our own. They have organized military companies, anti-American not only in language, spirit, and political association, but have required our laws to be printed in their respective foreign tongues for their own especial use!” Occasionally, Carroll mentioned Baltimore’s centrality to Catholic-American

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Violence occurred randomly in the 1840s. However, this changed in the next decade when rioting synchronized with the electoral calendar. The period after the Irish potato blight and the failed revolutions in Germany propelled thousands of Catholic immigrants into Baltimore during the early 1850s. By the middle of the decade, the number of naturalized Catholics had increased to the point that voting power had turned Baltimore’s Democratic Party into a veritable political dynasty. Naturally, Baltimore Whigs grew suspicious of the election results, and blamed the defeats on the anti-democratic influence of the Pope. This paranoia pointed to “papal conspiracy” as the cause, and it became so severe among Baltimore’s Protestants that, instead of rushing to the ranks of the Republican Party—as many northern Whigs did elsewhere—Baltimore’s disaffected Whigs joined the ranks of the Know-Nothings. The American Party, the name of Baltimore’s nativist political movement, started its life on August 18, 1853, when it held a mass meeting at Monument Square that attracted the attentions of over 5,000 concerned citizens. The meeting had been occasioned by a July fiasco caused by Mayor John Smith Hollins, who prohibited a blind street preacher known as “Blind Johnny” from speaking at the local market houses. Protestants viewed this as a sign of Hollins’s unabashed “popery” and they demanded that he resign his post. Hollins refused, and this commenced a political war that exploded onto the streets.68

68 J. Thomas Scharf, *The Chronicles of Baltimore; Being a Complete History of ‘Baltimore Town’ and Baltimoroe City from the Earliest Period to the Present Time* (Baltimore: Turnbull Brothers, 1874), 543.
The first moves were non-confrontational. In September, Baltimore’s Catholics laid a cornerstone for the new St. Ignatius Church on Calvert Street, and then, on Independence Day, 1854, the American Party held a grand celebration at Rider’s Corner. (Sadly, this celebration resulted in the deaths and mutilations of over 130 people when two excursion trains accidentally collided.) However, it did not take long for Democrats and Americans to fight each other physically. Partisan contingents usually took the form of street gangs and fire companies. Fire companies, as one Baltimorean stated, became the “organized fighting force in the community[,] . . . the natural ally or instrument of contending political parties.” Skirmishes occurred regularly over the next year, but the first horrific firemen’s riot occurred on August 18, 1855, in Lerew’s Alley, where two rival fire companies, the New Market Fire Company (a Democratic company), collided with the Mount Vernon Hook and Ladder (an American Company, sometimes known by its street gang moniker, the “Plug-Uglies”). These two companies drew pistols and commenced a shoot-out and donnybrook that left at least two dead and dozens more wounded. Street violence escalated in 1856, when the American Party stood a chance at seizing the mayor’s office with candidate Thomas Swann. On September 12, two Know-Nothing gangs, the “Rip-Raps” and “Wampanoags,” assailed the house of James Clark, which then served as the Seventeenth Ward’s Democratic Headquarters. The Know-Nothings let loose a barrage of bricks against the structure and then attacked the Democrats inside with Bowie knives. This resulted in at least two fatalities. Then, on Election Day, October 8, the Rip-Raps and the New Market Fire Company fought each other at Lexington Market. As one historian later wrote, “the firing was as regular as if it were by platoons. A great many persons were wounded and carried from the ground, and the drug shops near the scene of the action were filled with the wounded and dying.”

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At least four people died from the violence and over fifty more suffered injuries. The federal elections in November witnessed even more hostility. On November 4, election riots occurred all across the city, but most seriously did they erupt in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and the Irish Eighth Wards. This fighting left another twelve dead and 150 wounded.\textsuperscript{70}

At the conclusion of the 1856 chaos, Thomas Swann claimed victory by a 1,500-vote majority. To ensure American Party stability, he commenced a series of improvement projects aimed at decreasing the power of the Democratic gangs. Most notably, in 1858, he established a paid fire department to be equipped with steam engines. This change, he hoped, would end the rowdiness of the volunteer fire departments and decrease election violence.\textsuperscript{71} Baltimore’s American Party politicians did little to police their own street gangs, so of course, election violence continued. It surfaced again in 1857 during the elections for City Council and again in 1858 during the mayoral election. Know-Nothing street gangs watched the polls closely, allowing only known American Party members to cast their ballots. Swann won re-election that year and the American Party captured a majority of the council seats. The situation became so “farcical” to Democratic eyes that the mayoral candidate in 1858, A. P. Shutt, attempted to withdraw his name at the last minute.\textsuperscript{72}

Although hardly innocent of wrong-doing themselves, the Democrats blamed the American Party for fomenting disorder and subverting democracy. Governor Thomas W. Ligon told the Maryland Legislature in 1857 that, “In a word, the Democrats of the city, both native born and naturalized, were, to an extent that a few years since would have been absolutely

\textsuperscript{70} Scharf, \textit{Chronicles of Baltimore}, 548-51.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 563-5. The first steam engine, the “Alpha,” arrived in May 1858 and the City Council Approved the paid fire department ordinance in September.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 566.
incredible, virtually disfranchised.” For a time, Ligon threatened to mobilize Baltimore’s militia division, known as the 1st Light Division, to guard the polls. Commanded by Democrats, the 1st Division’s potential mobilization threatened to unleash a new wave of destruction on the Monumental City. Baltimoreans of both parties castigated Ligon for his plan to inaugurate martial law, and the governor wisely backed down. Ligon’s political career did not make it past the 1858 election; Maryland voters elected American Party candidate Thomas Holliday Hicks for governor. Nevertheless, spurred by Ligon’s impassioned plea to rid the city of Know-Nothings, Baltimore’s Democrats founded the City Reform Association, a political committee that advocated new polling judges and a stronger police force. American Party members lashed back with their own message, demanding the disfranchisement of all foreigners; at local rallies, they condemned the Reform Association, chanting, “Reform Movement, Reform Man, if you can vote, I’ll be damned!”

Before another gory election could intervene, news of John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry reached Baltimore on October 17, 1859. Major General George H. Steuart, Sr., the slave-holding commander of the 1st Division, immediately offered his services. A special eleven-car train—with six cars loaded with the militia—departed the city amid boisterous cheering and enthusiasm. The 1st Division returned a few days later, having arrived too late to take part in the apprehension of Brown and his raiders. The raid seemed to pass like a quick scare for Baltimore’s southern sympathizers, but a few concerned Democrats made provisions for the future. In December, General Steuart authorized one of his regiments—the 53rd Maryland—to

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73 Ibid., 560.
74 Kevin Conley Ruffner, Maryland’s Blue and Gray: A Border State’s Union and Confederate Junior Officer Corps (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 28.
raise a new battalion to be called the “Maryland Guard Zouaves.” This detachment would be ready to serve during future contingencies of slave rebellion.

In Baltimore, the controversial question of slavery subsided quickly after Brown’s capture and execution, and the Democrats and Know-Nothings returned to politics as usual. Like clockwork, the next election in November 1859 resulted in yet another bloody riot at the polls, one that perpetuated the grim shame of Baltimore’s decade of political violence. At first, the American Party appeared to carry the day. However, Democratic triumph in the state legislature ended the American Party’s control in Baltimore. In Annapolis, state-level Democrats refused to seat Baltimore’s Know-Nothings. Although the American Party boasted the support of their new governor, this defeat soured them on further resistance. Their national party had long since collapsed, and with over 52,000 foreigners in the city—many of them naturalized and voting—ethnic hatred could no longer make substantial headway. After 1859, Baltimore’s Know-Nothings began searching for new political affiliations.

This was just as well; due to the election of Abraham Lincoln, the “Secession Crisis” overshadowed all other matters. Straddling the border between North and South, Baltimore appeared to possess no primary allegiance. One visitor remarked, “Baltimore had Northern characteristics of finance and commerce which greatly resembled Philadelphia, New York, or Boston, but culturally and socially Baltimore had Southern ties which were most evident.”

However, Baltimore’s “southern culture” did not resemble that of Atlanta, Richmond, Charleston, or Montgomery. Baltimore had only 2,200 slaves and only 1,200 slave holders, and

75 Ibid., 29.
meanwhile, 25,000 free black residents thrived in the city’s environs, the largest free African American population in the United States.

If anything, Baltimore reflected a desire to remain neutral throughout the impending conflict. In January 1861, Maryland’s American Party governor, Thomas Hicks, corresponded with Delaware’s Governor William Burton, suggesting that Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Georgia should form a neutral “central confederacy,” should civil war become a reality. Hicks wrote, “We of the Border States cannot allow our interests to be compromised by the extremists of the South whose interests, social & pecuniary, differ so widely from ours. Above & beyond all, I believe that by a firm . . . prudent course we of the border states may at last secure a restoration of the Govt. to its former vision & effect. At all events, let us try it.”

Baltimoreans felt similarly. No one embraced the coming conflict, for it meant that Baltimore would be torn asunder, half-Confederate, half-Union. Charles C. Fulton, editor of the Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, declared, “It is enough to say that we are on the border, where all experience proves that the greatest aggravation of war’s evils do congregate[,] . . . [that] we declare war against the war spirit, and are not to be bullied or cajoled into the snares that are spread before our feet. We will not fight this senseless quarrel except in defense of our firesides.” During the months preceding the Battle of Fort Sumter, nearly every Baltimorean, regardless of sectional sympathies and political affiliations, became an ardent “Unionist.” To most Baltimoreans, Unionism meant pacifism. William Louis Schley, a die-hard

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76 Thomas Hicks to William Burton, 2 January 1861, in Hicks papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland (hereafter MDHS).
77 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 13 April 1861.
American Party member, wrote, “The ‘Union’ meeting here was a crusher. Composed as it was of all parties it reflects what is the true sentiment and position of Balt.”78

However, despite Baltimore’s active neutrality, the Presidential Election of 1860 firmly set sectional allegiances into place, and once the conflict commenced, these divisions rendered themselves readily apparent. In Baltimore, this election pitted Southern Democratic Party candidate John C. Breckinridge against Constitutional Union Party candidate John Bell. The other two candidates, Stephen A. Douglas and Abraham Lincoln, gleaned only minuscule support. The pivotal moment occurred when Breckinridge assisted the Democratic Reform Party’s mayoral candidate, George William Brown, causing the American Party vote to split. Over 12,600 votes went to Bell, and 1,000 votes went to Lincoln. William L. Schley admitted, a “full 900 Americans cast their votes for Lincoln last fall like myself and for nothing more than ‘revenge.”’79

Breckinridge took Baltimore with 14,970 ballots, and the Constitutional Union Party dissolved after its dismal national showing. This left American Party voters with just one choice: the Republicans. Schley told Governor Hicks that he, like many Americans, considered the Republican Party too “aggressive and non conservative” for his tastes, but he would join it willingly, “so long as they do not conflict with public and private rights.” Although they did not yet know it, the Republicans now had powerful allies in Baltimore with strong northern allegiance and unquestionable Unionism. To unite these two groups, party heads dubbed their alliance the “Union Party.” As the national condition grew more precarious, Schley added a warning for Hicks, “A most lamentable and fierce conflict is upon us—Law & order are put in

78 William Schley to Thomas Hicks, 16 January 1861, Hicks papers, MDHS.
79 Ibid.
defiance. Public prosperity and even private is in danger, and personal safety at a discount. . . .

Keep the old State right—don’t let her drift.”

Baltimore’s Union Party stood in a tight spot. Democratic Reformers controlled the mayor’s office, both branches of the city council, and most of the leadership in the city’s militia regiments. Negotiating their steadfast rule presented a significant challenge. As the war clouds loomed, Governor Hicks commenced secret correspondence with Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, the ranking commander of the U.S. Army, asking him to send arms to Baltimore. He estimated that 2,000 weapons could be secured from local arsenals, but he desperately needed more. On March 18, Hicks asked for 50,000 stands-of-arms: “I am convinced that matters in Baltimore are in a very unsatisfactory condition, and there can be no harm in being prepared for any emergency.”

Baltimore’s militia consisted of one division, the 1st Light Division, commanded by Major General George H. Steuart, Sr. The Light Division comprised one cavalry regiment, one artillery regiment, one rifle battalion, and two regiments of infantry, an aggregate of 1,417 officers and men. Secessionists controlled most of the officers’ positions and they dominated the rank and file. One regiment, the 5th Maryland Militia, had formed in 1794. Known as the “Dandy Fifth,” membership required expensive dues and privileged family connections, qualifications met only by the city’s Democratic elite or its slaveholding aristocracy. The other infantry regiment, the 53rd Maryland Militia, dated back to 1836. That year, officers established

80 Ibid.
81 Thomas Hicks to Winfield Scott, 18 March 1861, Hicks papers, MDHS.
82 Not all of these men showed for drill or had weapons. The 2nd Light Brigade, one of the 1st Division’s two brigades, reported only 484 men present at its May 1860 muster, 329 men present at its June 1860 muster, and 369 present at its October 1860 muster. The adjutant reported that the brigade lacked 500 muskets. Consolidated morning reports, Adjutant Generals Papers, Maryland State Archives, Annapolis, Maryland (hereafter MDSA).
it as a working-class unit. Initially, this regiment consisted of one three-company battalion called the “Independent Grays,” and it filled with mechanics. Later, in 1859, in response to John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, the field officers of the 53rd Maryland Militia added a six-company battalion called the “Maryland Guards.” Predictably, this battalion filled with secessionists and southern sympathizers.

Still, secessionist control of the police and militia and their domination of the military academy failed to deter Unionist mobs from wreaking havoc upon unsuspecting southerners. On April 14, two days after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, a “large, knotty-looking” North Carolinian dressed in an orange jacket, bent on proselytism, began stirring up trouble at the corner of South and Baltimore Streets. A crowd of Unionists surrounded the visitor, threatening to tear him limb-from-limb, but a squad of sympathetic policemen intervened, escorting the North Carolinian to a hotel. The crowd followed, so wrote a reporter, castigating the southerner for his “ultra expressions.” Three days after this incident, Mayor Brown issued a proclamation calling for citizens to “refrain from harshness of speech,” that is, not to provoke their southern-minded neighbors.83

Baltimore presented a unique scene in April 1861. While its size, ethnic composition, industrial productivity, and militia establishment did not deviate wildly from that of Boston, New York, or Philadelphia, it did possess a Democratic leadership with unmatched secessionist proclivities. Also, it possessed a Unionist element that exhibited more Know-Nothingism than Republicanism. Correspondingly, Baltimore’s sizable Irish population became more secessionist than ambivalently racist, unlike the Irish communities in Boston, New York City, and

Philadelphia. However, a majority of Baltimore’s population favored Unionism or neutrality, or so it seemed, but negotiating the pro-southern rule would be tricky. Preparedness, by circumstance, was out of the question. The city stood in denial, hoping that war would be avoided so that a civil war within the streets would not occur. However, years of electoral rioting had not fatigued the still hateful Know-Nothings-turned-Unionists and their Democratic opponents, and as the opening shots approached, mob law threatened to explode on the streets once more.

Taken together, these four populous cities of the Northeast proved ill-prepared to greet the Civil War. All of them possessed strong economic connections to the South and worrisome memories of the Panic of 1857. One of them, Baltimore, feared that war would bring bedlam to its neighborhoods if sectional conflict became a reality. Political conservatism and strong national Democratic loyalty muted sectional saber-rattling in all four, and despite each city’s comparatively useful militia system, local governments took no action—except in Boston—to ready them for the coming conflict.

Between them, the four cities possessed only one military school, St. Timothy’s Military Academy, an institute launched during the Mexican-American War at Catonsville, Maryland, just outside of Baltimore. St. Timothy’s faculty established a strict curriculum for their cadets.

84 Across the nation, the aftermath of the Mexican-American War produced a flurry of military academies, but New York City remained quiet on this front. Not until 1869, with the founding of Manlius Military School outside of Syracuse, and in 1889, with the establishment of the New York Military Academy at Cornwall-on-the-Hudson, did New Yorkers find alternatives to the popular U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Like Boston and New York City to the north, Philadelphia endured the absence of a private military school. The closest institution was the Delaware Military Academy, founded in 1821 by John Bullock. Bullock originally established it as a boarding school in Wilmington, but in 1858, the new head, Theodore Hyatt, began military education there, and the next year, Delaware’s governor provided the school with muskets for drill. The Civil War caused the academy to expand its
As one historian described it, “What St. Timothy’s required was a white-hot lust for order. Students were outfitted in gray uniforms of infantry soldiers and drilled in accordance with the U.S. Army’s infantry manual. Their days were long and strictly regimented, with only two breaks in the course of a week.” Generally, St. Timothy’s became a school where sons of southern sympathizers went to receive military educations. Abraham Lincoln’s assassin, John Wilkes Booth, scion of a family of illustrious actors, attended as a cadet. A few future Union warriors matriculated also. Among the more prominent success stories was Benjamin Franklin Taylor. In May 1861, Taylor enlisted as a private in the 2nd Maryland Infantry and by the end of the war, he attained the rank of colonel. Fellow officers agreed that Taylor ascended because of his talent, not from politics. Throughout his service, he received three wounds, and he commanded his regiment—gallantly by all accounts—during the opening assault on Petersburg, Virginia, at Poplar Springs Church, and during the assault on Fort Mahone, April 2, 1865. However, by the outbreak of the conflict, none of the remaining cities had comparable schools for professional military education.

Of course, none of the four cities could have predicted their wartime importance in 1861. Thus, when it came to preparedness, neither Boston, nor New York City, nor Philadelphia, nor Baltimore considered the prospect of readying itself to meet the onerous manpower and materiel demands of the national government. Political conservatism, racism, peace activism, fear of financial collapse, and general indifference held back urban mobilization during the opening campus, and in April 1862, under state legislation, it rented a series of buildings in Chester County and changed its name to the Pennsylvania Military College. (Today, these buildings are part of Widener University.) Ira Louis Reeves, Military Education in the United States (Burlington, VT: Free Press Printing Company, 1914), 180-1.


86 Benjamin Franklin Taylor papers, MDHS.
months of 1861. When the war finally came, it forced each of these four cities to scramble to action.
Chapter 2:  
“A Perfect Frenzy of Excitement”:  
The Cities Respond, April 1861—May 1861.

When Lincoln called for 75,000 three-month volunteers on April 15, 1861, his national demand caught Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, and Baltimore woefully unprepared. During the opening months of 1861, the cities had taken little precaution to ready their people and industries for war. Although they had approached the secession crisis with cautious moderation or blissful indifference, to fuel the early period of mobilization—during the first month of the war—the cities exploded with patriotism. At first, it seemed that this throbbing devotion might do the job. Individually and corporately, city denizens came forward to offer their support. These cities’ diversity, it seemed, became an asset during the war’s early days. Ethnic divisions—normally the cause of strife—aided matters since they propelled immigrants’ attachment to the cause and compartmentalized their dedication into ethnically homogenous regiments. Other marginalized groups—women and the working class—rallied to the cause. Working-class men joined occupationally unique regiments and both groups took to the shops to produce uniforms, tents, shoes, and camp equipage. Diversity, it seemed, might be the savior of the cities’ mobilization. Instead of conducting an orderly chorus of patriotism, urban diversity produced a discordant cacophony of voices, each striving to achieve their own oppositional goals, either from selfless or self-interested motives.

The bombardment of Fort Sumter dramatically altered the collective opinion of the population of the urban Northeast in support of the Union. Even New York City’s fickle populace suddenly affirmed its allegiance. On April 16, the New York Times declared, “Nothing
for years has brought the hearts of all the people so close together—or so inspired them all with common hopes, and common fears, and a common aim, as the bombardment and surrender of an American fortress.”¹ Lawyer George Templeton Strong noted in his diary, “The Northern backbone is stiffened already. Many who stood up for ‘Southern rights’ and complained of wrongs done the South now say that, since the South has fired the first gun, they are ready to go to all lengths in supporting the government.”² The Times reported that Lincoln’s proclamation was “hailed with acclamation” throughout the city. Crowds roamed the main thoroughfares, visiting various newspaper offices, checking for obligatory displays of the stars and stripes. When a crowd discovered the New York Herald’s office without flag or bunting, they “hooted and indulged in various expressions of dislike” until the editor, James Gordon Bennett, flaunted the national colors. Mayor Wood, anxious about the sudden change in public sentiment, expressed uncertainty over his city’s abrupt enthusiasm. On April 15, he issued a counter-proclamation, urging New Yorkers to unite—not in defiance of their southern neighbors—but “to unite in obedience to the laws in support of the public peace, in the preservation of order and in the protection of property.” Wood’s pleas “to avoid excitement and turbulence” fell upon deaf ears. On April 17, a mob verbally assaulted the office of the Journal of Commerce. When the editor hoisted an American flag, “the crowd sent up a cheer that stirred one’s blood a little,” wrote George T. Strong, “and the surface of the black mass was suddenly all in motion with waving hats.” Soon, a line of police chased them away. Strong noted that the crowd was no mere rabble; he claimed they “were mostly decently-dressed people.”³

¹ New York Times, 16 April 1861.
³ New York Times, 16 April 1861; New York Herald, 16 April 1861; George T. Strong diary, 17 April 1861, Nevins, ed., Diary of the Civil War, 123.
The mood in Philadelphia was much the same. Sidney Fisher wrote that he “Found the city in a state of dangerous excitement.” Mobs visited the offices of the Argus, the city’s only Democratic Party organ, and the pro-secessionist Palmetto Flag, threatening to raze the buildings and kill all those inside. Peoples’ Party Mayor Alexander Henry quelled both mobs with a small police force and impassioned entreaties for order. Mobs also visited the houses of Major General Robert Patterson, commander of Philadelphia’s militia division, now accused of southern sympathies, and noted Peace Democrats William B. Reed and Josiah Randall. Philadelphia’s ubiquitous mayor halted these mobs and warned them that he would stop any violence with force if necessary, and, claimed one witness, told them that “their blood would be on their own heads.” One Peace Democrat confided to his diary that the first week of the war in Philadelphia seemed to be a “reign of Terror State in the ascendant” perpetrated by “Black Republican ruffians.”

Within hours of Lincoln’s announcement, the cities began raising troops for ninety days of federal service. In Massachusetts, Lincoln’s call met instant endorsement from Governor Andrew. Although Secretary of War Simon Cameron asked Massachusetts for only two regiments, Andrew called up four. In Boston, Mayor Wightman opened up Faneuil Hall as a temporary barracks, and on April 16, the first troops began arriving. On a drizzly, overcast day, twenty infantry companies descended upon this storied meeting place, while excited citizens thronged the streets to see the armed patriots. A reporter wrote that, “Windows everywhere were crowded with ladies who joined in the general enthusiasm, waving handkerchiefs and saluting the troops as they passed. The liveliest feeling of patriotism is rapidly being aroused among our people of all classes and we have no fears that it will subside.” Another observer wrote, “The

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sound of the drum and fife and the movement of armed men through our streets has revived a feeling which has not been manifested since the Mexican War.”

Thousands of young recruits made their way to the Massachusetts capitol to compete for the limited vacancies, and many eager volunteers had to be turned away. One desperate young man, Samuel Gilbrath, tried to enter Faneuil Hall and enlist, but a guard told him to leave. Undaunted, he climbed the waterspout, hand-over-hand, and broke in through the third floor window. Gilbrath’s persistence so impressed the company that occupied the room, Company A, 8th Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, that its members voted him a part of their company on the spot. Applicants for officers’ positions in the four militia regiments proved so numerous that Adjutant Schouler had to use armed guards to clear chaotic throngs out of his office. Those lucky enough to acquire positions forever remembered the cacophony of voices that ruled the subsequent hours. Abolitionist Charles Bowers, a new recruit for the 5th Massachusetts Militia encamped at Faneuil Hall, remarked to his wife Lydia, “The novelty and excitement of the occasion together with free portions of bad whiskey made [the scene] rude and noisy beyond measure so that no one was able to sleep.” It all seemed too much to endure.

The day after Lincoln called for troops, the New York Times asserted that “the same unanimity which is everywhere manifested on the question of sustaining the Union and the honor of its flag prevails among the city military.” The Times may have spoken the truth, but New York City’s local militia stood in an incomplete state of readiness. Lincoln’s call required New York State to provide 17,000 men, or seventeen regiments of infantry. Under the state’s militia

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5 Boston Evening Transcript, 16 April 1861; Boston Daily Journal, 16 April 1861.
7 Charles Bowers to Lydia Bowers, 21 April 1861, MAHS.
statutes, the Empire City already fielded one division, the 1st Division, under command of Major General Charles W. Sandford. The 1st Division consisted of four brigades, or sixteen regiments of infantry. At its annual muster in October, only 5,242 men showed for drill, and many of these men did not own a complete set of equipment. For instance, of the 1,050 officers and men enrolled in the 69th New York State Militia (N.Y.S.M.), only 380 possessed entire uniforms. Nevertheless, Major General Sandford prepared for federalization of the militia. As early as January 16, he sent General Winfield Scott a message, claiming that he could field five or six “good regiments.” Unwilling to accept so many troops before any shots had been fired, Scott politely rejected the offer. Thus, little military preparation occurred until April.8

Lincoln’s call for troops put New York City’s militia into a flurry of activity. Members of the 1st Division transformed their shops and residences into recruiting stations and makeshift armories. The Herald reported, “Everywhere throughout our city the note of preparation is sounding, and our armories, meeting halls, and drill rooms night and day give token of the busy activity which pervades every class of the community. Recruiting, enrolling, organizing, and drilling seem indeed the order of the day, and the banding together of men for warlike purposes is proceeding on a most extensive scale.” Regiments drilled in public squares, desperately trying to attract attention, either to get recruits or to induce private donations. The 380 members of the 71st N.Y.S.M. drilled in a vacant lot on the rainy afternoon of April 16. One hundred ladies came to watch them snap their caps while their regimental band played “The Star Spangled Banner.” This demonstration elicited cheers from the rain-soaked crowd and a reporter asserted that the

71st N.Y.S.M.—a regiment that only allowed native-born Americans in its ranks—“ought to be the foremost in the field and in the fight.”

Philadelphia likewise experience a renewed military ardor. The Quaker City expected to raise eight regiments and the populace came alive with war fever. In dramatic fashion, the city turned into a vast camp of instruction as citizens transformed their shops, taverns, stores, barrooms, hotels, offices, fire-halls, and homes into recruiting stations, drill fields, armories, and barracks. Everywhere, recruiting parties roamed the streets with fifes, drums, placards, and flags, hoping to fill their units. Artist and schoolteacher Joseph Boggs Beale noted “most every other man in the street is in some kind of uniform.”

Thirty-three-year-old lawyer and soon-to-be volunteer Evan Morrison Woodward remarked in his diary that, “In Philadelphia business was suspended, flags were thrown to the breeze in every street, rendezvous were open in every section, and placards calling for volunteers, covered the walls of every corner. . . . [T]he quietude of the Sabbath was forgotten amidst the preparation for war.”

Only in Baltimore did Lincoln’s decree face resistance. The War Department called on Maryland to provide four regiments, or 4,000 aggregate. Immediately, Governor Hicks sent Lincoln a message, telling him that he would, under no circumstances, organize four regiments, unless they operated only within the boundaries of the state. Many Baltimoreans agreed with Hicks’s course of action. Meeting Lincoln’s request might force the city’s citizens to choose sides, or at worst, it might invite a Confederate invasion. Unionist papers cautioned against rashness. The American announced, “We implore our countrymen to reflect upon the subject. It

9 New York Herald, 17 April 1861.  
10 Joseph Boggs Beale diary, 30 April 1861, HSP.  
is not merely or mainly whether or not seven states shall be arrayed against twenty-seven, but whether each state in the twenty-seven shall be divided against itself.”  

By comparison, the explosion of patriotism in the northeastern cities exhibited little exceptionality. Other cities experienced the same untended outpouring of enthusiasm. A woman living in Chicago remembered that, immediately following Lincoln’s call for troops, “ten thousand men of all religious creeds and party affiliations came together to deliberate the crisis of the hour.” Moreover, she concluded, like northeastern urbanites, Chicago residents did not think; they acted. She remembered, “There was no talking for effect. All the speeches were short and to the point. The time for harangue was over, the time for action had come.” Like the northeastern cities, Chicago also saw various social groups—fire companies, Germans, Irish, Democrats, Republicans—all forming homogeneous military units. Although the breadth of patriotism suggested that urban pluralism might be diminished by the war, in fact, the organization of urban units proved that the forces of war solidified municipal diversity.

Although they exhibited less pluralism, smaller towns faced greater challenges than large metropolises, since their militias had devolved into mere skeletons. Without massive law and order problems or the threat of street conflict to keep local militias in a moderate state of readiness, discipline in some small towns had become nonexistent. For instance, in Auburn, New York, the town’s sole militia regiment—the 49th N.Y.S.M.—had become, in the words of one chronicler, “long neglected, run down, half disbanded, only duly kept alive by the activity and purses of a few martial spirits.” When the war came, the residents of Auburn considered it easier.

12 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 16 and 18 April 1861.
13 Mabel McIlvaine, Reminiscences of Chicago during the Civil War (Chicago: R. R. Donnelly and Sons Company, 1914), 68.
to build a new regiment from scratch rather than fill the four undersized companies of the 49th N.Y.S.M. Auburn’s example further suggests how residents in small towns dealt with the problem of urban pluralism. Populations proved so small and dispersed that small town residents implicitly knew that they could not afford to have multiple companies recruiting simultaneously. When Auburn raised its first company, once its organizers filled it with seventy-five volunteers—the minimum number of privates allowed by law—they decreed that all surplus volunteers should go to fill the second company, and when that company filled, the surplus would go to the third company, and so forth. Rural towns outside of Auburn had to consolidate their undersized companies with rival companies from other towns if they wished to go to war. In Cayuga County, they did so peacefully, if begrudgingly. Within a few weeks, this efficient system formed the basis of the 19th New York Infantry. The main point is obvious: small town residents took no chances to let diversity muddle their mobilization. They took few risks to delay their recruitment. Only one exception seemed to interfere. Like urban recruiting, ethnic animosity fostered some competition. Even Auburn exhibited nativism, so Irish residents formed a separate company.14

The northeastern cities could not yet consider such organizational planning because the emergency of the hour precluded prudent deliberation. More than anything, Lincoln demanded immediate protection of the national capitol, and the major cities vied for the honor of having the first regiment to enter it. In Boston, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts assembled its four required regiments in less than a week, and it also commenced the mobilization of a fifth regiment and an additional battalion of riflemen. “A regiment a day in four days! . . .” wrote an

exuberant reporter, “[N]obody could have anticipated that so large a quota would be required from the state on such short notice.” Bostonians filled the ranks of three companies: one in the 5th Massachusetts Militia, one in the 6th Massachusetts Militia, and one in 3rd Rifle Battalion, accounting for about 160 volunteers. The 6th Massachusetts under Colonel Edward F. Jones departed the city first, marching from its barracks at Boylston Hall (opened up to the troops due to lack of room at Faneuil Hall) to the State House on the afternoon of April 17. There, Governor Andrew presented the regiment with a flag. Colonel Jones received the colors and made a few appropriate remarks. Then, he paraded his twelve-year-old daughter, Lizzie Clauson Jones, down the line of the regiment. Lizzie Jones blew kisses to each of the soldiers in her father’s regiment, which caused the men to erupt with the “wildest demonstrations of joy.”

Over the next forty-eight hours, the 6th Massachusetts commenced its epic journey through Worcester, New York City, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. During the journey, the volunteers displayed considerable enthusiasm, as many incorrectly supposed that their regiment would be the first organized body of volunteers to reach the front. Meanwhile, a Philadelphia organization threatened to surpass them. In a foolish move, one aspiring Quaker City officer, William F. Small, chose to leave before his men possessed weapons or uniforms. “General” Small (he gave himself that rank) took charge of the “Washington Brigade,” two incomplete

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15 *Boston Daily Journal*, 19 April 1861. These companies were Company F, 5th Massachusetts, and Company K, 6th Massachusetts, and Company D, 3rd Massachusetts Rifle Battalion.
16 Ibid., 17 and 18 April 1861.
17 A five-company battalion from Pennsylvania—known as the “First Defenders”—arrived at Washington one day ahead of the 6th Massachusetts.
regiments organized at Military Hall, Third and Green Street. Small’s unit left the city without orders on April 18.18

On the morning of April 19, the Philadelphians arrived in Baltimore, and the Bostonians joined them several hours later. Together, this force totaled about 2,200 men. Unfortunately, neither group could directly reach Washington by rail. The unusual system in Baltimore required all travelers to de-train at President Street Station and make their way through the city to Camden Street Station on streetcars where the rail line continued to the capitol. However, Baltimore’s secessionists had no intention of letting a single federal soldier enter the Monumental City unmolested. The previous day, the first Union soldiers—four Pennsylvania militia companies sent from Harrisburg, the so-called “First Defenders”—arrived with the intent of boarding a capitol-bound train. A hostile crowd threw bricks at them, injuring several men, but the Pennsylvanians reached their destination. On the 19th, a secessionist mob led by city attorney Francis X. Ward and customs officer Edward Beatty threatened to close the gate. At President Street Station, the Philadelphians and Bostonians waited patiently for the order to press on, but soon, word reached them that crowds of Baltimoreans now blocked their advance. The men of the Washington Brigade had no weapons, but the 6th Massachusetts had just received new Springfield rifled-muskets. Colonel Jones decided to forge ahead and clear the way. The soldiers of the 6th Massachusetts took cars down Pratt Street, one company at a time, facing a barrage of insults and pavement stones. Boston’s Company K suffered three men injured by flying bottles.

18 The Washington Brigade formed in January 1861 under the authorization of the City Council. On March 2, Governor Andrew Gregg Curtin accepted the Washington Brigade for emergency service. On April 17, General Small claimed command of twelve partially-filled companies, seven in the 1st Regiment and five in the 2nd Regiment, perhaps eight-hundred men altogether. Frank Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 27-9; Philadelphia Daily Evening Bulletin, 20 April 1861; Scott Sumter Sheas and Daniel Carroll Toomey, Baltimore During the Civil War (Linthicum, MD: Toomey Press, 1997), 13-16.
and one soldier had his finger shot off. But, even without returning fire, this company pressed on to Camden Station and its capitol-bound train.

However, the last four companies—C, D, I, and L—had to dismount their streetcars after secessionist gangs dumped sand and anchors onto the rails to prevent their movement. Beyond Jones Falls Bridge, gunfire from the crowd killed Private Luther Ladd and Corporal Sumner Needham, so the men of the 6th Massachusetts returned fire. The Bay Staters fought their way through a gauntlet of abuse, incurring bludgeonings, shootings, and stabbings. The march left two more of their own dead and thirty-six wounded. In the process, they killed eleven rioters and wounded dozens more. Once these four companies reached the train station, they boarded a train and reached Washington D.C. that afternoon. The Philadelphia regiments met no such luck. The enraged mob surged toward President Street Station. As the secessionists approached, General Small knew that his outnumbered, unarmed men could not withstand the attack, and ordered them to return to the cars. As his men fell back, a donnybrook ensued. Private George Liesenring, a twenty-six-year-old German-American, received a stab wound and soon died. The Quaker City had suffered its first fatality of the war. During the excitement, the train departed, leaving perhaps one hundred Philadelphians to flee Baltimore on foot. Appalled by this embarrassing affair, the City Council launched an investigation, and, on May 16, passed resolutions of censure upon General Small for his misconduct and imprudence.19

As this drama unfolded, from Albany, Governor Edwin Morgan directed General Sandford to forward any prepared regiments from New York City’s 1st Division. Although it was not in his power to do so, Morgan also authorized Sandford to send regiments for only thirty

days. However, having received only two days’ time to prepare, none of the 1st Division regiments could head off except one: the 7th N.Y.S.M. Dating back to 1824, the “Dandy Seventh,” as it was popularly known, represented the cream of New York City society. This regiment adhered to strict standards of selection. Unit by-laws required each member to serve for at least seven years and own his own uniform. Failure to attend drill resulted in severe fines. Thus, while most the city’s volunteer militia units had deteriorated in the 1850s, the “Dandy Seventh” always kept its rosters filled and kept its equipment in pristine condition.

General Sandford ordered Colonel Marshall Lefferts to assemble the 7th N.Y.S.M. at Tompkins Market Armory on April 19 to receive ammunition. Although Lefferts insisted upon departing as soon as possible, Sandford feared that secessionists would contest the regiment’s passage through Baltimore. News of the 7th N.Y.S.M.’s departure set the city’s benevolence agencies into motion. Sixty-six private citizens, including August Belmont, Moses Grinnell, James Wadsworth, and Hamilton Fish, donated over $6,000 to members of the 7th N.Y.S.M. to help maintain their businesses. Likewise, the New York Stock Exchange donated $1,000. Quite probably, few of these soldiers needed financial assistance; most of the 7th N.Y.S.M came from affluent families, and Lefferts vowed to return them after only thirty days. 20

In the afternoon, word reached Lefferts that he would have to take a seaborne route into Washington. The Baltimore Riot had just occurred and, accordingly, train conductors refused to run cars from Philadelphia into the Monumental City. At 3:00 P.M., Lefferts marched his command to the Jersey City Ferry. Over 3,000 people gathered to see the 7th N.Y.S.M. depart. Adorned in black-trimmed, gray coats and trousers, with white cross belts and kid gloves, the

20 Roehrenbeck, The Regiment that Saved the Capital, 41, 55-68.
945 members of the 7th N.Y.S.M. represented the pinnacle of the city’s moneyed elite. The Times declared: “New York loves the Seventh. It has distilled all its best blood into it.”21 The 7th N.Y.S.M. left the docks at 5:30 P.M. For the next 138 hours, the soldiers underwent a series of boat rides, train rides, and marches that took them through Jersey City, Philadelphia, and Annapolis, and put them into Washington, D.C. at noon on April 25. Thus, ten days after Lincoln issued his call for troops, New York City’s first volunteers reached the front.

The Baltimore Riot taught constructive lessons to each city. Because they outflanked the fiasco, New Yorkers experienced self-congratulation. Philadelphians, however, suffered in misery. Because of their proximity to the capitol, Quaker City residents thought they would be among the first to send troops Washington. J. Edgar Thomson, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, remarked, “The people of Philadelphia are mortified that the Bostonians have got nearly a week ahead of them, and that few troops are ready.”22 Philadelphians now understood that mobilization required detailed preparation. To send soldiers into a hostile city without weapons or uniforms amounted to criminal irresponsibility. Technically, such a move was also illegal. As governor, Andrew Curtin had the responsibility to inspect each regiment and declare it ready for service before it left the commonwealth. Small’s decision to leave Philadelphia on his own hook violated Curtin’s authority as commander-in-chief. News of the Baltimore Riot met mixed emotions in Boston. On one hand, Massachusetts had suffered its first deaths from the war. On the other hand, Boston had placed its first armed volunteers at the front. One Bostonian expressed his desire to send all of the commonwealth’s regiments through Baltimore, regardless of their state of readiness. He wrote, “I want Massachusetts to do

something to keep up its prestige. . . . Send us . . . through Baltimore. Let us show them that Massachusetts isn’t dead yet, that while she can in a day’s notice send on her half equipped levies who will render any sacrifice & go under all disadvantages to save the country, she does this because the times demand it, not because she does not know better.”

On the other hand, news of the riot shocked the peace-loving residents of Baltimore. George Whitmarsh confided to his diary: “O[!]—riot Civil War—bloodshed in our city[,] 18 killed & wounded—awful excitement. the northern volunteers were so offensive to the secession element they assailed them & they returned the injury[,] hence death &c.” The southern sympathizers hooted and cheered. Crowds met at Monument Square at 4:00 P.M. on the day of the riot to applaud the vigilante efforts. Cheers for “Jeff Davis,” the “Southern Confederacy,” and “South Carolina,” filled the air. Mayor Brown arrived and assumed the role of the mob’s demagogue, stating, “We all feel and know, as we trust the people of the North will soon feel and know, that it is the height of madness or folly for one portion of the country to attempt to subjugate the other. The South could never be coerced. Never! Never! NEVER!” At this, the crowd sent up a wild cheer.

That night, Governor Hicks sent Lincoln a telegram, reading, “A collision between the citizens and the Northern troops has taken place in Baltimore, and the excitement is fearful. Send no more troops here.” Brown also sent his own telegram to the President, warning, “I . . . hope and trust, and most earnestly request, that no more troops be permitted or ordered by the Government to pass through the city. If they should attempt it, the responsibility for the

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23 George Wells to John Andrew, 27 May 1861, MASA.
24 George Whitmarsh diary, 19 April 1861, MDHS.
bloodshed will not rest upon me.” Meanwhile, Baltimore’s police chief, Marshal George P. Kane, sent a request to a future Confederate general—Bradley T. Johnson—who was then in Frederick, asking for Virginia riflemen to protect the city. He wrote, “Fresh hordes will be down on us tomorrow. We will fight them and whip them, or die.” Brown scrounged for weapons. He called upon “all citizens bearing arms suitable for defence of the city” to deposit them at Marshal Kane’s office at Old City Hall.26 Within days, secessionists began bringing in what they had. By the end of the week, Old City Hall had become a veritable fortress.27

Baltimore’s southern sympathies continued to simmer, and for a moment, it looked like they would close the gate to Washington for the other cities. On April 20, acting under Brown’s orders, the soldiers in Captain John G. Johannes’s Baltimore City Guard marched to the railroad bridges north of town and began tearing them up. Johannes’s men destroyed the bridges at Melvale, Relay, and Cockeysville, but a Baltimore County company, the Union Rifles under Captain John Wilson, stopped them at Gunpowder Bridge. Although this action preserved the vital rail link between Philadelphia and Baltimore, the War Department had already sent orders redirecting all incoming troops to take a seaborne path from Philadelphia to Annapolis, thereby circumventing the Monumental City.28 For a now, it seemed that Baltimore would support the Confederacy and sever the capitol. The Monumental City’s mobilization appeared to be over.

27 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 22 April 1861. Isaac M. Denson deposited 900 condemned Harpers Ferry muskets which he had bought off the federal government several years earlier. An auctioneer, F. W. Bennett, brought in 137 muskets and eighty rifles. Policemen removed 120 muskets from the Central High School’s drill team arsenal, and later, they confiscated five artillery pieces from St. Timothy’s Military Academy at nearby Catonsville.
28 Ruffner, Maryland’s Blue and Gray, 56-7.
Although Baltimore rejected the War Department’s plea for three-month men, the North’s other major east coast cities continued to fill their requirements. In fact, these cities overflowed with volunteers. Political rivalries exacerbated the confused situation. For instance, Secretary Cameron had set Pennsylvania’s quota at 14,000, the equivalent of fourteen regiments of infantry. Cameron’s old political nemesis, Governor Andrew Gregg Curtin, was certain that the commonwealth could provide more. Thus, on April 18, he arbitrarily raised Pennsylvania’s contribution to 25,000 men, or twenty-five infantry regiments, allotting eight regiments to be filled by Philadelphia. By April 25, Philadelphians filled all 8,000 vacancies in the 17th through 24th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments. Unwilling to reject the efforts of the commonwealth’s largest city, Cameron reluctantly accepted the increase. Unfortunately, the recruiting process in Philadelphia continued to flounder in disorganization.

Recruits rushed to makeshift enrolling stations established by the city’s prewar militia regiments, authorized by the Act of 1858. These served as the foundation of Philadelphia’s first Civil War regiments. Competition for places in the three-month regiments was fierce. Simply put, far more Philadelphians volunteered than the city’s quota required. Recruiters rejected anyone who possessed a physical deficiency, no matter how minor. Youth also precluded enlistment. Seventeen-year-old David Moaut, a house carpenter’s apprentice indentured from

29 Samuel Penniman Bates, Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: T. H. Davis and Company, 1875), 653; Philadelphia Public Ledger, 29 April 1861; Anthony McDermott, A Brief History of the 69th Pennsylvania Volunteers (Philadelphia: D. J. Gallagher and Company, 1889), 5-6. Philadelphians managed to sort themselves into regiments that reflected the city’s diverse prewar social and political affiliations. For instance, Democrats filled the ranks of the 19th Pennsylvania, upper-class gentlemen joined the 20th Pennsylvania, German-Americans from Kensington and Northern Liberties enlisted in the 21st Pennsylvania, and Irish-Americans from Southwark and Port Richmond joined the 24th Pennsylvania. The Artillery Corps Washington Grays became the 17th Pennsylvania Infantry, the 1st Regiment (1st Brigade) became the 18th Pennsylvania Infantry, the National Guards Regiment became the 19th Pennsylvania Infantry, the Scott Legion became the 20th Pennsylvania Infantry, the 1st Rifle Battalion became the 21st Pennsylvania Infantry, the Philadelphia Light Guard became the 22nd Pennsylvania Infantry, the 1st Pennsylvania Artillery became the 23rd Pennsylvania Infantry, and the 2nd Regiment (2nd Brigade) became the 24th Pennsylvania Infantry.
Girard College, endeavored to join the “Cadwalader Grays,” a company accepted to the 17th Pennsylvania Infantry. However, when Moaut arrived at the recruiting station at the Jones Hotel, there were more than enough adults to fill two companies. Moaut was told to leave, and hurried on his way by a kick to his backside.  

In New York City, organizing regiments drew upon a host of formal and informal associations to recruit volunteers. While the 71st N.Y.S.M. excluded foreigners, the 69th N.Y.S.M., commanded by Irish exile Colonel Michael Corcoran, enlisted only men of Celtic heritage. Although Corcoran’s men were known for their potent ethnocentrism—they caused quite a stir in October 1860 when they refused to turn out for a parade in honor of the Prince of Wales—local papers expected New York’s loyal Irish to embrace the cause of preserving the Union. The *Times* explained that Irishmen should fight for their adopted home because the cause of Irish independence closely mirrored that of the Union’s independence from Britain in 1776.  

New York City’s German-American population also stirred to action. Max Weber, a German exile from the Grand Duchy of Baden and owner of a hotel at the corner of William and Frankfort Streets—a rendezvous for other south German exiles—transformed his business into a recruiting station for patriotic *Turnvereine*, or “Turners,” free-thinking republicans who stressed gymnastics and physical fitness as part of their daily regimen. As Weber’s “Turner Regiment” began filling, the *New York Herald* reminded its readers of the failed Revolutions of 1848 and 1849 and the German-American commitment to republican government: “Though defeated in their efforts to free their country from the despotic yoke of tyranny, they are not disheartened, and by the spirit of freedom still burned in their breasts.”

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30 David Moaut, “Three Years in the 29th Pennsylvania Volunteers,” manuscript copy, HSP.
31 *New York Times*, 16 April 1861.
Alexander Asboth, an engineer who led revolutionaries in Hungary in 1848, printed a declaration to his “Fellow Countrymen” asking them to lend their services to the armies of the United States. He wrote, “In this distracted state of the country, it behooves us Hungarians to remember that we belong to that nation which struggled gallantly, but unsuccessfully, for that same liberty, which crowned the effort of Washington.” At the same time, 400 Franco-Americans joined another ethnically exclusive regiment, the 55th N.Y.S.M. The Herald reported, “[M]ost of these citizen-soldiers have felt the smoke of the battlefield in the Crimea and in the French Revolution, and are, therefore, no novices in the use of arms.” Companies consisting exclusively or principally of Italians, British, Polish, Scandinavians, Austrians, Swiss, Cubans, Spanish, Dutch, and Belgians also offered their services. Truly, New York City promised to raise an army of many nations.32

Civil War scholars have long debated the motivations of ethnic recruits. Some argued that military service fostered a sense of Americanization among foreign-born recruits. William Burton called them, “Melting Pot Soldiers.” Others have argued that service served an opposite function: to link them to their native land. Postwar Irish memoirists, for instance, demonstrated their attachment to Fenianism and Irish nationalism, showcasing the ways in which they viewed the war as a training ground for future battles against England. More recently, in her analysis of Irish-born Union soldiers, Susannah Bruce has taken a middle-ground approach, stating that both Irish and American identities counted in sustaining motivations among Irish soldiers. She wrote, “There is . . . one common link between the Irish-Protestant farmer in Iowa and the Irish-

Catholic laborer in New York City: they always explained their views of the Northern war effort in terms of both their Irish and American identities.”\textsuperscript{33}

Ethnic regiments in New York City appear to have exhibited two simultaneous identities also. For instance, during his plea to New York City’s Hungarians, Asboth reminded them that the federal government had sent the \textit{U.S.S. Mississippi} to rescue Hungarian exiles during the revolutions of 1848 and “brought us safely from a gloomy prison to the free shores of America,” Consequently, Asboth proclaimed, Hungarian-Americans had a solemn obligation to repay that government in military service. Max Weber told his Turners the same thing. Seeing the land of their adoption “about being despoiled by a rebel horde,” Weber wrote, Germans had a commitment “to offer their services to perpetuate that Union for which Washington, Putman, Sumter, Warren, and others have shed their life’s blood.”\textsuperscript{34}

But, at the same time—even the same breath—as they praised American institutions, foreign-born soldiers also established their commitment to the land of their birth. Thomas Meagher, a captain in the 69\textsuperscript{th} N.Y.S.M., recalled later that, “Above all, it is the duty of us Irish citizens to establish . . . [a Republican] form of government in our native land. It is not only our duty to America, but also to Ireland. We could not hope to succeed in our effort to make Ireland a Republic without the moral and material aid of the liberty-loving citizens of these United States.” Urban residency probably had little to do with the motivations of foreign-born soldiers. However, the degree of nativism no doubt colored foreigners’ views of the war. In Boston and Baltimore, where anti-Irish nativism still carried potent political force, volunteers exhibited less


\textsuperscript{34} \textit{New York Herald}, 18 April and 7 May 1861; \textit{New York Times}, 3 May 1861.
attachment to their adopted county. Indeed, in Baltimore, the city’s Irish population almost wholly sympathized with the South. In New York City and Philadelphia, where the foreigners possessed a degree of autonomy, they exhibited more attachment to the lofty causes of defending the American Republic.\(^{35}\)

Occupation and political affiliation also sorted the first volunteers. In New York City, over at the Republican Committee Room at 618 Broadway, twenty-four-year-old Chicago lawyer Elmer Ellsworth commenced raising a regiment of “Fire Zouaves,” asking New York City’s volunteer firefighters to step forward. His pronouncement read: “The emergency in question requires men inured to hardship—those already accustomed to a soldier’s life—in fact, soldiers ready made, which our firemen are known to be.” On April 17, Engine Company Number 14 joined Ellsworth’s regiment “en masse.” On the second floor of 594 Broadway, 459 men signed their names to the roster of the 12\(^{\text{th}}\) N.Y.S.M., quickly filling the ranks of the elite Engineer Company.\(^{36}\)

The Republican Committee Room also opened its doors to the “Union Volunteer Battalion,” a group known as “Billy Wilson’s boys.” Colonel William Wilson, the regimental commander, came from a rough-and-tumble neighborhood, having earned a reputation as a prize fighter and alderman. On April 24, he called upon New York City’s laboring classes to meet him at Tammany Hall for formal muster. These “extraordinary proceedings” began at 7:00 P.M.; Wilson’s entire regiment, dressed in gray jackets, gray trousers, and brown felt hats decorated with Union cockades, assembled around Wilson in concentric circles. Each soldier wielded a


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pistol and a seven-inch knife, “between a sort of Bowie knife and butcher’s knife in shape,” wrote a reporter. Holding the stars and stripes in one hand and a saber in the other, Wilson bade his men kneel and swear loyalty to the colors and vow never to flinch when following its path through “blood or death.” Referring to the recent Baltimore riot of April 19, Wilson promised to lead his men “through Baltimore or die.”

At this exhortation, the Union Volunteer Battalion soldiers arose “with a tremendous yell,” flung their hats in the air, brandished their knives, and continued with “prolonged, frantic cheers,” shouting “Death to the Plug Uglies!” and “Blood! Blood! Blood!” Wilson then instructed his men on the proper technique to hack and slash through crowds with their knives. All the while his troops sang perverted renditions of “Dixie” with references to killing Baltimoreans. A reporter declared them “the most determined set of men we ever saw. . . . [Their] drill appears to be of the most promiscuous imaginable and dangerous too.” George Templeton Strong, who also saw them, called them “a desperate looking set,” and he cringed whenever they waved their knives in public. Accordingly, they “danced and yelled with delight.” They informed Strong that, “We can fix that Baltimore crowd! Let ‘em bring along their paving stones; we boys is sociable with pavin’ stones!”

Without federal protection, Baltimore continued in an agitated state. On April 20 and 21, Confederate mobilization progressed. Three companies from rural Maryland arrived in the city, included Bradley Johnson’s riflemen, the “Frederick Volunteers.” Major William H. Hayward opened a recruiting office at Old City Hall, enlisting about 400 men. Meanwhile, the City Council voted a $500,000 sum to arm and pay these volunteers. On April 22, apparently not

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37 New York Herald, 25 April 1861; George T. Strong diary, 23 April 1861, Nevins, ed., Diary of the Civil War, 132.
knowing that Baltimore was raising a Confederate army, 300 free black men offered their services, but Mayor Brown immediately turned them away. Finally, a major Unionist setback occurred at the headquarters of the 53rd Maryland, when Colonel Charles W. Brush accidentally shot himself with his pistol. The 53rd’s executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Langdon Ervin, proved too sick to take charge of the regiment and Major Charles E. Phelps, an ardent Unionist, rather than accept Brown’s authority as commander-in-chief of the city militia, resigned his post in disgust. In consequence, Brown appointed Major Benjamin Huger—a Citadel-trained South Carolinian—to command the 53rd Maryland. One paper guessed there may have been as many as 5,000 armed soldiers in the city, presumably all with southern sympathies. 38

As these Confederate units organized, nervous Unionists scoured the city for weapons to protect themselves. In response, secessionists undertook countermeasures to prevent them from acquiring arms. On April 22, mobs broke into no less than four weapons manufactories. A gun-seeking crowd of 300 attacked a store owned by Merrill, Thomas, and Company. Here, Mayor Brown intervened. He posted sentries from the 53rd Maryland around the gun shop and then formed a special committee to distribute weapons to purchasers, dispensing 250 firearms to local citizens, presumably all secessionists. By the end of the week, hundreds of promiscuously armed men roamed the streets, shooting at anything they pleased. A resultant increase in firearm-related mishaps prompted the American to comment, “The frequent accidents which in the past two or three days have resulted from the careless handling of loaded arms have apparently impressed upon all minds the necessity of exercising more caution in the handling of weapons.” 39

38 *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 22 and 23 April 1861.
39 Ibid., 22 and 23 April 1861.
These incidents did not stop Baltimore’s diehard Unionists, who by now equated Unionism with loyalism, not neutrality. Unionists displayed American flags from their windows and poles. In retaliation, Marshal Kane issued an order prohibiting the exhibition of any flags, so as “to prevent disorder and violence.” On April 26, the day after Kane’s decree, 800 mechanics from South Baltimore led by William Daneker ascended Federal Hill and raised a flag, while a local band played “The Star Spangled Banner” and “Hail Columbia.” Kane dispatched a police force consisting of twenty-five officers commanded by Captain Frederick Boyd to disperse the Unionists. When one Union man asked Boyd what he wanted, Boyd replied, “I’ll be God-damned if you don’t pull down that flag!” After some angry parley, Boyd drew his pistol and boldly rushed the crowd. An enormous row ensued; Boyd pistol-whipped an old man, but the Unionists routed his police, and the flag continued flying. The next day, Marshal Kane had seventeen of the Unionist flag-raisers arrested, but after a storm of protest, he subsequently released them.40

The flag incident at Federal Hill emboldened Baltimore’s Union crowd. George Whitmarsh commented in his diary, “The Union feeling is rising again.” Charles Fulton of the American noted, “Our citizens are beginning to feel that they are recovering the right to think.” Finally, on April 27, Bradley Johnson’s militia reluctantly left the city with the Stars and Bars flying above their company, returning to Frederick to guard a special session of the state legislature, recently removed from Annapolis to debate the possibility of secession. While this

40 Ibid., 27 and 29 April 1861.
change did not bode well for the state as a whole, Baltimore’s Unionists rejoiced now that Johnson’s secessionist invaders had gone.41

On April 29, under orders from Mayor Brown, the 1st Light Division held a parade, but this gathering of pro-southern militiamen could not substitute for the loss of Johnson’s troops. The muster merely proved that many companies possessed neither arms nor uniforms. Many Unionist commanders in the 1st Light Division showed up for this event, and consequently, the affair never turned into an armed secessionist rally as Brown had hoped. That same day, Unionists held their own public meeting at Fell’s Point, passing resolutions castigating the April 19 rioters and entreating all loyal men to display the American flag no matter the cost. Two days later, Baltimore’s newly appointed customs house director, Henry W. Hoffman, and the city’s new postmaster, William H. Purnell, began their first day on the jobs. Federal orders required both men to raise the national colors outside their offices, defying Marshal Kane’s proclamation. Hoffman and Purnell dutifully complied. However, a young member of the Maryland Guards, Private George Lemmon, cut down the flag outside the Customs House. An angry Unionist mob chased Lemmon, but a police officer arrested him before the crowd could lynch him. Charles Fulton applauded this increasingly persistent rise of Baltimore’s Unionism. He wrote, “So far as the city of Baltimore and the State of Maryland are concerned, every friend of the Union here; even the humblest and most uninformed can say to every secessionist, in view of the recent events of the past few weeks, ‘that whereas I once was blind, now I see.’”42

Maryland’s legislature, now meeting in Frederick, upheld the Unionist position. The lower house denounced the Confederacy’s rebellion and vowed not to take part in it. Both houses

41 George Whitmarsh diary, 27 April 1861, MDHS; Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 27 April 1861.
42 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 2 and 9 May 1861.
refused to consider an ordinance of secession and would not call a convention to debate the matter. Disheartened Baltimore secessionists viewed their situation with increasing clarity. If they wished to mobilize an army, they would have to do so in Virginia. On May 13, they received an added shock, for then they learned that a Unionist force from Annapolis planned to enter the city the next day. The Maryland Guards Battalion began securing all remaining uniforms and weapons from its armory, commencing an emergency evacuation of its military resources. In about three hours, the Maryland Guards had removed about 400 rifles, secreting them in their residences.  

As Baltimore oscillated between Unionism and secessionism, Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia underwent wild enthusiasm. By now, though, state officials realized that urban mobilization required determined governmental action from the state capitol. Upon receiving Lincoln’s request for troops, New York’s Republican Governor Edwin D. Morgan addressed the state legislature in Albany—which planned to adjourn the next day—and called upon them to pass special legislation providing for the mobilization of state volunteers. Before the Assembly quit the chambers, its members established a State Military Board composed of the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Comptroller, the State Engineer and Surveyor, and the State Treasurer. They also passed an act allowing the state to spend $3,000,000 to organize, arm, and equip a division of infantry consisting of 30,000 men to serve for two years.

Morgan’s plan to bring order out of chaos did not move quickly enough. Undirected, New York City’s war fever reached its pitch on April 20 when over 200,000 people gathered in

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Union Square to hear a series of patriotic speeches affirming their commitment to the war. The *Herald* commented that the “Monster Meeting” proved “beyond all cavil that there was but one sentiment in New York.” Even the intractable Mayor Wood briefly discarded his southern sympathies. He told his audience, “I am willing to say here that I throw myself entirely into this contest with all my power and all my might. . . . I am with you in this contest. We know no party now.” This voluminous outpouring of patriotism led New Yorkers to suppose the Empire City could easily meet national demands. Caught up in the excitement of the hour, Henry J. Raymond of the *New York Times* affirmed, “To judge from present indications, the full quota of troops required from the State of New York can be had on Manhattan Island alone—and these, or a majority of them, are not raw recruits unused to discipline or organized action; but men who, in the militia or fire department, have already learned obedience and habit of acting in concert—those most necessary elements of a soldier’s education.” Truly, it seemed, there was no better place to raise an army than New York City.

Volunteers continued to flock to recruiting stations by the hundreds during the war’s first week. In Gotham, so many recruits wished to be mustered at once that Brigadier General Charles Yates, Morgan’s newly-appointed commander of the Depot of Volunteers of New York City, published orders stating he would not accept volunteers under the age of eighteen or over the age of forty-five. Further, to prevent competition between units, Yates outlined the process by which officers raised their troops. He decreed that when any company recruited between thirty-two and thirty-seven enlisted men, a mustering officer would inspect it. Upon passing inspection, the enlisted men could elect their officers and non-commissioned staff. Then, once any six inspected

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44 *New York Herald*, 21 April 1861.

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companies chose to associate, they could form a regiment and elect their field and staff officers with written ballots.\textsuperscript{46}

Naturally, some illicit breaches in New York’s recruitment system occurred. For instance, all recruits under the age of twenty-one required a parent’s or guardian’s permission to enlist. If a minor had no parent or guardian, recruiting officers were obliged to reject him. Frequently, recruits violated this criterion. The \textit{New York Herald} commented that, after rejection, “The minor turns this piece of information over in his mind so frequently and ponders on it so deeply that by the time he reaches another rendezvous—some ten or fifteen minutes walk perhaps—he has aged so rapidly and mysteriously that he is twenty-two or twenty-three years old, and is ready to take his oath upon it.” Thus, the city’s unemployed youth joined the ranks with little difficulty.\textsuperscript{47}

Yates’s orders substantially aided any new regiments attempting to organize—specifically, Morgan’s two-year regiments—but many recruiters encountered difficulty because the old prewar militia organizations predominantly attracted the first recruits. Undoubtedly, the prospect of joining an elite brotherhood—decades old, in some cases—and wearing a unique uniform led to the three-month militia’s popularity. However, in addition to quitting their jobs, recruits had to pay membership dues and purchase expensive uniforms, the cheapest in the city costing $40.00 and the most expensive costing over $70.00. One 1\textsuperscript{st} Division recruiter suggested that merchants should start uniform subscriptions because these expenses kept “many excellent young men . . . from joining.”\textsuperscript{48} Governor Morgan tried to get recruits to join instead his units of two-year volunteers by expressing distaste for the “fancy dress adopted by so many of the

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{New York Herald}, 23 April 1861.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 23 April 1861.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 19 April 1861.
volunteer corps,” and he decreed that all men enlisting in his state-funded division would wear uniforms of “regulation pattern gray cloth.” Although he admitted these orders would “disappoint many of the new organizations,” he believed they would ensure a rapid mobilization.\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, 2 May 1861.}

The first Union regiments absorbed thousands of working men, both skilled and unskilled. The unit rosters of Philadelphia’s three-month regiments (the only rolls from any of these northern cities to survive) reveal that few jobs went unrepresented in the ranks. The 20th Pennsylvania Infantry represented more than 130 different occupations.\footnote{Alphabetical Rolls, 20th Pennsylvania, PSA. The total number of rostered soldiers in this regiment with listed jobs was 598. This accounts for only eight of the regiment’s ten companies Two companies, Companies F and H, did not list occupations.} The metal trades dominated. Forty-six molders represented the most common occupation. (Altogether, there were eighty-nine metal-workers: molders, welders, finishers, smiths, turners, and foundry-men). Shoe and clothing trades followed at with sixty-two, this category including tailors, hatters, trimmers, dyers, spinners, weavers, pattern makers, boot-makers, and shoemakers. However, nearly all of the common city trades filled the ranks proportionally. Carpentry trades, office personnel, leather workers, food service, home furnishing services, house builders, transportation services, and salesmen each represented between twenty and fifty-six volunteers. It is difficult to determine if urban occupations propelled group enlistment. However, the abundance of certain uncommon occupations suggests that job connection played a part. For instance, the 20th Pennsylvania had a large number of law enforcement officers—constables, police, or watchmen—twenty-one altogether. No doubt, occupational associations played a part in getting some of these men to enlist together.
Overall, early in the war, it seems that Philadelphia and elsewhere, businesses offered few, if any, obstructions to prevent employees from enlisting. Even seemingly important trades necessary for city commerce were not excluded. For instance, the Philadelphia depended on its shipping industry to function, so ship building and ship joining became essential to the continuance of maritime trade. In 1860, Philadelphia had fifteen ship building establishments that, together, employed 960 hands. In addition, seventy-six ship joiners worked in the city’s environs.\(^{51}\) The 20\(^{th}\) Pennsylvania’s ranks included four ship builders and two ship joiners, accounting for a higher percentage of both occupations than the city’s population as a whole. Of course, none of these workers came from the establishment essential to naval prosecution of the war. In Southwark, another 3,000 hands worked at the U.S. Naval Yard, and these men stayed at their post in the navy’s hour of need.\(^{52}\) However, it came be stated that, in addition to raising an army of many nations, the cities raised an army of workers.

Despite the chaos, the major cities of the Northeast replied to Lincoln’s April 15 call with alacrity. New York City’s 1\(^{st}\) Division responded especially quickly because its militia armories usually possessed the requisite numbers of uniforms and weapons, even if many were outdated percussion muskets, some forty-years-old. The first batch of three-month men—the 6\(^{th}\), 12\(^{th}\), and 71\(^{st}\) N.Y.S.M.—departed on April 21. The parades accompanying the departure of these troops, and others that followed, displayed passionate excitement.\(^{53}\) The 8\(^{th}\) and 69\(^{th}\) N.Y.S.M. left on April 23, an unseasonably warm day. When Corcoran’s Irish Legion marched down Broadway, crowds mobbed the soldiers, obstructing the march. Because of the balmy weather, several soldiers and citizens passed out from heat exhaustion. Even Colonel Corcoran seemed “much

\(^{53}\) *New York Tribune*, 22 April 1861.
worn and emaciated” during the procession. After pushing through the mass of spectators with considerable difficulty, the 8th and 69th N.Y.S.M. reached the railroad depot. By the end of the month, New York City had sent six three-month regiments to the front, a total of 5,950 men.54

Morgan’s first two-year regiment, Colonel Ellsworth’s 11th New York, left on April 29, over 1,000 strong. They had nearly mutinied a few days earlier when their shipment of weapons failed to arrive. But, now resplendent in red kepis, red shirts, and gray jackets, they represented sixty-eight hook, ladder, hose, and engine companies. The Fire Zouaves assembled on Canal Street to receive their flag and hear the address of William H. Wickham, President of the New York City Fire Department. Wickham reminded them of their solemn duty, cleverly linking the heroism of the urban fireman to that of the volunteer soldier: “When the fire bell rings in the night, the citizens rest secure, for they know that the New York firemen are omnipresent to arrest the progress of destruction. You now go forth to exhibit your gallantry and your energies in another field. You are called to quench the flames of rebellion, and we know that whether in the midst of burning cities or in the heated fields of war, you will sustain your own high character, and that this banner will ever wave in triumph, though it be in the midst of ruins.”55

Boston’s war fever reached its pitch too; thousands of able-bodied young men wanted positions in its first regiments. Popular figures in the city aroused considerable enthusiasm and few Bostonians professed themselves willing to miss this opportunity of a lifetime. Perhaps no regiment became more popular during these halcyon days than the one organized by Fletcher Webster, the only son of the legendary politician, Daniel Webster. On April 21, he called a

54 New York Times, 24 April 1861. This force consisted of the 6th N.Y.S.M. (ten companies), 12th N.Y.S.M. (ten companies), 71st N.Y.S.M. (nine companies), 8th N.Y.S.M (ten companies), 69th N.Y.S.M. (ten companies), and 5th N.Y.S.M. (six companies). The seventh three-month regiment, the 2nd N.Y.S.M., did not leave until May 18.
55 New York Herald, 30 April 1861.
meeting at the Merchant’s Exchange, but so many people showed up that none could hear him speak. The throng moved so he could speak from the State House balcony. In a spirited address, Webster promised to raise his regiment in a mere two weeks. He declared, “Let us show to the world that the Massachusetts of 1776 is the same in 1861!”^56 According to a newspaper, Webster’s remarks “were received with the greatest enthusiasm” and a league of wealthy gentlemen pledged to form the “Webster Committee” then and there to raise funds to support the new regiment. The next day, the Merchant’s Exchange opened a recruiting station, and it filled sixteen full companies. Unfortunately, eleven of these companies never joined Webster’s regiment. As the unit historian wrote later, “What became of . . . these companies is not known, but doubtless they were swallowed up in the hurry and confusion then everywhere prevailing among those engaged in organizing troops.”^57

Although Webster was a Democrat, very few of Boston’s Irish Americans responded to his Puritan-minded entreaties. Neither did they heed the calls of a host of other Republican and Bell-Everett officers who commanded the 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2\textsuperscript{nd}, and 11\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts Regiments or the 4\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts Rifle Battalion. Instead, Boston’s Irish-born patriots flocked to recruiting stations opened by Thomas Cass and Smith Rice, men who commanded regiments then called the 13\textsuperscript{th} and 14\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts. Boston’s Irish residents looked upon the Republican-dominated militia establishment with distrust. In 1855, the commonwealth’s Know-Nothing governor had disbanded all militia companies composed exclusively of soldiers of foreign birth. Cass, an Irish-born merchant ship owner, managed to sustain one company—the Columbian Artillery—with private funds, even though its members had to face the humiliation of drilling without weapons.

^56 *Boston Daily Journal*, 22 April 1861.
or state pay for six years. Although Governor Andrew courted Cass’s favor to raise an Irish regiment, Boston’s sons of Erin looked exclusively to their own community for support. Patrick Donohoe, the editor of the city’s popular Irish newspaper, the *Boston Pilot*, generously contributed funds to support Cass’s and Rice’s regiments. Several defunct companies—the Emmett Guards, the Jackson Guards, the Shields Guards, and the Sarsfield Guards—all disbanded under the 1855 decree—quickly reorganized for service with these regiments. As did urban Irishmen elsewhere, Boston’s Irish volunteers professed to fight for the Union and the continuation of republican government, a right denied them in their home country. Daniel Macnamara, a recruit for Cass’s regiment, recalled, “Patriotism and love of country was publicly prominent in the voices and hearts of the Irish-American citizens as it was in the native born.”

Although the three-month regiments filled quickly across the Northeast, serious problems remained: the recruits lacked uniforms and supplies. In Philadelphia, the only nearby stockpiles of military goods, Schuylkill and Frankford arsenals, contained, at most, 16,000 uniforms, 12,000 muskets—mostly old flintlocks—and 4,000 rifles. Although this would have been more than enough to arm Philadelphia’s troops, the state quartermaster’s office had decided to apportion these weapons and equipment among all twenty-five of Pennsylvania’s three-month regiments raised across the entire state. To solve this dilemma, the War Department promised that if Philadelphia’s soldiers came to Washington immediately, they could swear into federal service and receive arms and uniforms provided by federal quartermasters. Governor Curtin,

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however, had no desire to see a repeat of the Baltimore riot. He decreed that no Pennsylvania regiment could leave the state unless properly armed and uniformed.⁵⁹

Most of Philadelphia’s regimental commanders agreed with Curtin’s decision. Four colonels rejected defective weapons issued to their regiments. Many muskets had broken or rusted locks, fouled barrels, or bayonets that would not fix. “The guns are horrible,” claimed Major Fitz-John Porter, the Assistant Adjutant General for the Department of Pennsylvania, “and if a collision should arise, the responsibility is fearful. The officers will not take it.”⁶⁰ Philadelphia’s soldiers grew impatient with the delay. One week after Lincoln’s call, despite the overabundance of willing volunteers, no troops had left for the front.

Major General Robert Patterson, the recently appointed commander of the Department of Pennsylvania, partially broke the impasse by marshaling all of the city’s available uniforms, weapons, and equipment and issuing them to a single regiment, the 17th Pennsylvania Infantry. After procuring the last cadet gray militia jackets and barely serviceable percussion-altered flintlocks, the regiment assembled for departure on the west side of Washington Square early on May 7. Dressed in their gray uniforms and tall felt hats, the regiment quickly won the nickname of the “Quaker Regiment.” No one in the North could mistake the city that fielded them.⁶¹

The departure of Philadelphia’s first regiments occurred amid cheering and enthusiasm. On May 30, the soldiers of the “Scott Legion,” also known as the 20th Pennsylvania—fancifully attired in their privately purchased uniforms—departed for Chambersburg. According to Sergeant James H. Walker of Company F, “There was the usual amount of excitement attending

⁵⁹ Frank Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 26.
⁶⁰ Ibid., 32.
the departure of volunteers for the seat of war. There was any quantity of my old friends at the cars to bid me good bye.” First Lieutenant Milton S. Davis of the same company remembered the gripping outpouring of enthusiasm: “I never had anything touch my feelings more in my life. . . . I did not think I had so many friends before the morning I left.”

Grand parades through the streets gave the regiments a chance to reinforce the cities’ newfound sense of pro-war activism. As Susan G. Davis suggested, parades represented a visual style of street politics. Those who participated in urban parades sent a powerful message to the cheering public. Additionally, occupationally unique regiments, such as the 11th New York Fire Zouaves, could use the regimental parade to reinforce their social power. City folk often held firemen in high regard, but their rambunctious behavior often led many to question the wisdom of relying on volunteer departments for fire protection. Now, with a chance to showcase their devotion to the Union New York City’s volunteer firemen could reinforce their social standing with a military parade. In many ways, parades became akin to advertising campaigns for each different social group. For the firemen, each engine company in the 11th New York Fire Zouaves carried its own banner. One Engine Company’s pennant read: “If Our Country Calls, the Best Are Ready.”

A reporter described the scene as the fire rowdies of the 11th New York paraded on April 29. The whole affair brought together a host of people, soldiers and citizens alike, all of whom wished to take part in the celebration:

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62 James H. Walker diaries, 23 and 30 May 1861, HSP; Milton S. Davis letters, 1 June 1861, R. Stewart Brunhouse, Jr. collection.
A steam fire engine, stationed near by, shrieked its salute, the firemen cheered till they were hoarse, a party with a small cannon fired several discharges, the ladies all waved their handkerchiefs and small flags, the crowd on the sidewalks and in the windows on Broadway clapped their hands, and the whole demonstration was one of unparalleled enthusiasm. The flags were then escorted to the color corps, where there were already five new silk standards of various colors floating side by side. The line of march was then resumed up Broadway and down Canal street to the Collins’ pier, where the Regiment embarked on the Baltic. The scenes of enthusiasm and excitement continued the whole way. In front of the Astor House there was but one deafening roar of cheers and one prolonged shriek from the steam engine until the last of the cortege had passed. Broadway was a jam of people, who gave the Zouaves a thorough ovation.64

For all of the departing troops, the next few days were filled with excitement and privation. The men traveled by a combination of train, steamship, omnibus, and foot to reach the national capitol. For those coming from Boston, the trip took them a few days. Most soldiers had only morsels of food to eat, those hastily stuffed into their knapsacks by loved ones on the day of their departure. As soldiers went from town to town, they begged for provisions to reduce their hunger. The 20th Pennsylvania left Philadelphia on May 30, and it did not reach its destination—Williamsport, Maryland—until June 8. Its trek took it through Harrisburg, Carlisle, Chambersburg, and Greencastle. Sergeant James Walker wrote in his diary, “every time the cars stopped, hundreds of the boys would jump out & make tracks for the nearest farm house where milk pies & all sorts of eatables were devoured at a rate that astonished the country folk.” Officers remonstrated against such misbehavior, for not only did these voracious appetites anger the locals, but with soldiers jumping off the train, there always existed the danger of them not returning to the cars in time leaving them stranded, or, as sometimes occurred, one of them slipping from the cars and getting run over and horribly mangled.

64 Undated clipping, New York State Archives Unit History Project, http://www.dmna.state.ny.us/historic/regnist/civil/infantry/11thInf/11thInfCWN.htm.
Nevertheless, the urban soldiers persisted in foraging, so train-jumping became a common practice along the way. Some towns did not welcome the uniformed beggars. Sergeant Walker wrote that the men of the 20th Pennsylvania met with “about the meanest reception on record” when they passed through Harrisburg. No crowds came to cheer, only to sell provisions at high prices. Vendors charged soldiers ten cents for coffee. Walker wrote, “The plebian portion of the population seemed to have caught the swindling fever from their superiors & vied with each other in their efforts to make the most of us.”

Eventually, this wave of urban Yankees reached the front. For many, the first order of business was to re-open the closed gate at Baltimore and re-established the rail line from the Monumental City to Washington. On May 14, the first Union troops arrived. That day, the 6th Massachusetts (from Boston) and 8th New York State Militia (from New York City), under the command of Brigadier General Benjamin Butler, arrived from Relay. When the 6th Massachusetts paraded down Lee Street, Baltimoreans exited their houses and cheered its passage. The American noted, “The ladies . . . were not wanting in their demonstrations of patriotism, and appearing in front of their residences with lamps and candles in their hands, gave a welcome to the soldiers by the waving of their handkerchiefs.” The Massachusetts soldiers commenced a series of raids to uncover the city’s concealed weapons. Thirty-five Bay Staters assaulted a munitions warehouse at Second and Gay Streets. Marshal Kane protested this intrusion, stating that the arms were property of the city. After some heated discussion, the Board of Police Commissioners reluctantly sent Kane a note, ordering him to relinquish all arms to the

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65 James H. Walker diaries, 23 and 30 May 1861, HSP.
soldiers. The Massachusetts squad seized thirty-five wagons and drays filled with 2,200 muskets and 4,020 spears. They immediately took these weapons to Fort McHenry.\(^{66}\)

With characteristic bravado, Butler issued a proclamation to the people of Baltimore, warning them to respect the laws of the United States or face a barrage of gunfire from a newly posted battery inside Fort Federal Hill. He vowed to confiscate all weapons from Baltimore’s citizens unless they could prove the “lawfulness of their occupation.” Displeased with the zealousness of Butler’s announcement, General Scott removed him and ordered Major General George Cadwalader to assume command in Baltimore. The next day, Cadwalader arrived with three Philadelphia regiments, the 18\(^{th}\), 19\(^{th}\), and 22\(^{nd}\) Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments. The arrival of Cadwalader’s troops prompted the last vestiges of Confederate militia to vacate the town. By now, it became clear that the Monumental City stood firmly in federal hands.\(^{67}\) But, to some urban Marylanders, the feeling of being under military occupation took root.

The first three weeks of the war created a “perfect frenzy of excitement” inside the cities of the Northeast. Several reasons accounted for this. First, their lack of preparation during the preceding months caused them to play a fast-paced game of organizational and administrative catch-up when the first call for troops went out. Second, with the exception of Baltimore, which remained hostile to the federal call, the cities tried to compete with one another to send their first regiments to the capitol ahead of the others and thus win national recognition. This healthy competition produced an unhealthy collision in Baltimore on April 19 that ultimately dissolved Philadelphia’s ill-prepared Washington Brigade. Finally, all elements of urban life demanded representation in the ranks of the forming army—Republicans and Democrats, Germans and

\(^{66}\) *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 14 and 15 May 1861

\(^{67}\) Ibid., 15 May 1861.
Irish; firemen and street toughs; gentlemen and clerks—all of these and more formed their own homogenous units. This pluralism fostered a scramble for weapons and uniforms because too many regiments competed for the limited stockpiles in the existing arsenals. Despite the few fits and starts, it seemed that an urban military mobilization based on political, occupational, and ethnic pluralism would become the cities’ saving grace. However, as the year 1861 progressed, this hallmark would become urban mobilization’s worst enemy.
Cities offered distinct advantages to the Union cause early in the war, and some of these advantages—money, manpower, and industry—vitaly aided the process of mobilization. From the outset, urban residents implicitly believed that the demands of raising troops could be met with thousands of men and resources to spare. The first few weeks of the cities’ transition to war demonstrated a moderate amount of chaos, but they also suggested that these heretofore ambivalently Unionist cities had more than enough enthusiasm to fight the conflict. Surely, thought many, the cities’ wealth of manpower and materiel seemed bottomless. However, urban residents did not realize that the mere fact of having too many volunteers debilitated mobilization. Put simply, when recruiters became too many, recruits appeared to become too few. Competition for places in regiments and rivalry among regimental organizers engendered administrative inefficiencies. Cities’ significant antebellum qualities—pluralism, political insularity, and capitalism—channeled these resentments into corruption. The first cracks in the system emerged—not only in the recruiting service—but also in wartime industries during the summer months of 1861, revealing that urbanism had placed great disadvantages upon mobilizing societies.

On May 3, the federal government made its second call for troops, this time for 42,000 men. Unlike those called up in April, these men would serve three-year enlistment contracts. Also, these troops would swear directly into the service of the federal government, bypassing state regulations entirely. This posed a potential problem for several states, since their constitutions required militia regiments to pass gubernatorial inspection before leaving for the
The May 3 call for three-year troops met with high interest in each of the four northeastern cities, but it held especial importance in Baltimore, now three weeks behind in raising troops. The arrival of occupation forces had finally dispersed the Confederate militia, so Unionists felt safe to commence their own mobilization. However, Maryland’s executive leadership thought it best to proceed with the state’s dilatory three-month mobilization first. On May 14—the same day General Benjamin Butler’s men entered Baltimore—Governor Hicks authorized the recruitment of the four three-month regiments called up by Lincoln, all to serve within the borders of the state, exactly as requested one month earlier. Hicks directed Captain John C. McConnell, a local real estate agent, to establish a federal recruiting station at 112 West Baltimore Street. Hicks also appointed John Reese Kenly, a Baltimore lawyer and popular veteran of the Mexican-American War, to command the first regiment. Kenly issued an order calling Baltimore’s loyal militiamen to enlist with alacrity. Within two days, Kenly and McConnell filled five companies. This recruitment was not without turbulence. At 9:00 P.M. on the first night of recruiting, a gang of secessionists fired into the headquarters of the first organized company, commencing a back-and-forth barrage of bricks. After a few minutes, the

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1 Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution allowed the federal government to “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, [of] the Militia,” but it did not specify how long militia could be held under federal control. On May 2, 1792, Congress passed a Militia Act that enumerated the president’s powers when calling out the militia. Section 4 of the 1792 Militia Act decreed that the president could not compel militia to serve for longer than three months in any given year. Thus, the May 3, 1861, call for three-year troops appeared to violate the 1792 Militia Act. On September 10, 1861, the Supreme Court upheld the May 3 call despite the evidence against it. In July 1861, a soldier in the 1st Minnesota Infantry, Private Edward Stevens, demanded release from the army by arguing that, at the time of his muster, Congress had not yet validated the May 3 call. After hearing the private’s case, Justice James Wayne determined that Stevens had to be remitted to duty with the 1st Minnesota because Lincoln’s call for troops—although illegal at the time of its enactment—could be upheld retroactively since it had been “done for the public good.” David M. Silver, Lincoln’s Supreme Court (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1956), 17.
secessionists scattered, and the incident left no casualties on either side. Unfortunately, Secretary Cameron would not allow any new three-month units, and on May 17, he cancelled Kenly’s regiments. Cameron justified his decision, stating his intent to reduce the number of new recruiters. The army needed long-term volunteers, not three-month men. Kenly and McConnell expressed understandable frustration at this decision, but they hoped to achieve more success in recruiting three-year volunteers. Consequently, Kenly dismissed Baltimore’s three-month recruits, applauding them for their rapid reply.

Over the next few days, it seemed that Baltimore would provide no troops whatsoever. To break the impasse, Kenly proceeded to Washington to seek an audience with President Lincoln, and in due course, he received a commission as colonel of a three-year regiment. He immediately returned to Baltimore and asked his recently discharged men to come forward again. Three-hundred-fifty-two of them did so, and Kenly sent them to the National Hotel on Camden Street for muster. These volunteers formed Companies A, B, C, and D of the new, three-year 1st Maryland Volunteer Infantry. Baltimoreans eventually filled the enlisted ranks of every company except Companies F, G, and a portion of Company H. Altogether, the regiment contained 670 Baltimoreans.

Kenly’s authorization to raise three-year volunteers prompted other efforts to confront the Baltimore’s waning Confederate mobilization. As the 1st Maryland came together, General George Cadwalader’s Philadelphians continued making military arrests and seizing arms still hidden by southern sympathizers. On May 21, two companies from the 22nd Pennsylvania

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3 Camper and Kirkley, *First Regiment Maryland Infantry*, 5.
4 Scharf, *Chronicles of Baltimore*, 636.
discovered 1,500 muskets and 4,000 rifles hidden in an abandoned building on York Street.

Three days later, Captain John M. Gosline’s Company A, 18th Pennsylvania, seized a quantity of arms inside a restaurant at 85 North Street.⁵

On June 7, Governor Hicks finally caught up with Cadwalader’s efforts to stifle the secessionists, and he issued his own order requiring all city militiamen to relinquish their arms. Hicks appointed Colonel E. R. Petherbridge, commander of the 39th Maryland Militia, and Henry Stockbridge, a lawyer, to scour the known armories and convey all weapons found in them to Fort McHenry. Petherbridge and Stockbridge took fifty-one muskets from the Middle District Police Station and six cannon from Old City Hall, all of which had once been the property of St. Timothy’s Military Academy. The sweep was non-partisan. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Warner, the Unionist commander of the Baltimore City Guard, reluctantly surrendered 149 muskets to Hicks’s agents. The Eagle Artillery, meanwhile, proudly submitted four cannon, forty muskets, and sixteen harnesses. Marshal Kane had earlier demanded this battery’s equipment, but its Unionists refused to hand them over.⁶

While Baltimore embraced the new call and threw its efforts behind the three-year regiments exclusively, the other cities to the North did their best to complete this new requisition while still filling the incomplete three-month regiments. Generally, in the state capitols, Cameron’s May 3 call for three-year troops did not receive a hearty welcome. In fact, several governors found themselves in prickly positions. Governor Andrew asked for information regarding Massachusetts’ quota. Cameron reiterated his expectation for six regiments, and in no

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⁵ *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 20, 22, 24, and 25 May 1861.
⁶ Ibid., 3, 4, and 7 June 1861.
case would the War Department accept more. This announcement vexed Governor Andrew, since the City of Boston alone had commenced raising seven additional regiments.

The May 3 call confused many recruits in Boston, because volunteers assumed they would serve for three months only. Before the three-month regiments had filled, Cameron’s order reached them that the War Department would no longer accept short terms of service. What was to be done with the three-month men already enlisted? The officers of Colonel Robert Cowdin’s 1st Massachusetts attempted to serenade Governor Andrew, urging him to ignore Cameron’s decree, but Andrew replied that he could not supersede orders from the War Department. With little choice, the officers of the 1st Massachusetts went back to their commands and asked the men if they would stay on for three years. Luckily, whole companies of men jumped at the chance.7

Much of the confusion about the May 3 call related to its dubious constitutionality, and Cameron’s political rivals quickly pointed it out. Under the federal Militia Acts of 1792 and 1795, the Secretary of War could not call upon state militia to serve longer than three months. Also, under General Orders Number 15, Cameron could not appoint officers in the state militia regiments; each officer from second lieutenant to colonel required a commission signed by the governor or his adjutant general. When Governor Andrew reminded him of this rule, Cameron finally endorsed it, but he offered strict guidelines about age and schooling for potential officers in Massachusetts regiments.8

7 Boston Daily Journal, 8 May 1861.
8 Simon Cameron to John A. Andrew, 22 May 1861, MASA. Cameron cautioned Andrew “To commission no one of doubtful morals or patriotism and not of sound health[, and] To appoint no one to a Lieutenancy (second or first) who has passed the age of 22 years or to a captaincy over 30 years, and appoint no field officers (Major, Lieutenant
Although Cameron allowed Governor Andrew to appoint officers, the secretary hoped to circumvent state authority by calling newly recruited troops from the states directly into the service of the federal government. As of May 3, the only Pennsylvania officers then serving—those in the three-month regiments—all held commissions approved by Governor Curtin, Cameron’s long-time political adversary. Not surprisingly, Cameron’s new call instantly displeased Governor Curtin. Intending to appoint officers to the three-year regiments just as he had for the three-month regiments, Curtin requested that Cameron increase Pennsylvania’s quota so that, as governor, he could have his share of the spoils. Instead, on May 14, Cameron instructed him to stop organizing the three-month regiments and transfer those who already enlisted to the three-year regiments. By this time, Cameron already courted several potential colonels. Cameron wrote, “It is important to reduce, rather than enlarge this number [of new regiments].” To Curtin, however, this appeared to be excessive federal interference with the Commonwealth’s mobilization process, and Curtin refused to abide by Cameron’s request.  

When it became clear that Cameron would not let him appoint the officers for the May 3 call, Curtin called for a special session of the state legislature, asking for the formation of a state-funded Reserve Division of fifteen regiments to serve for three years. In fact, due to a miscommunication between his office and the War Department, Curtin had called up twenty-five additional regiments. Cameron refused to accept them, and Curtin faced the embarrassment of discontinuing these new organizations. Curtin announced to the legislature that the War Department would accept only a limited number of new regiments. But, the wily Curtin declared

Colonel, Colonel) unless a graduate of the United State Military Academy or known to possess military knowledge and experience, who have not passed the respective ages of 35, 40, 45 years.”  
that “the army of the United States was wholly inadequate for the maintenance of order and for the protection of public and private property.” Therefore, the commonwealth of Pennsylvania required its own private reserve force. On May 15, the legislature approved a $3,000,000 loan arming and equipping these men. Curtin retained sole authority to appoint officers to command in this Division, including three brigadier generals and one major general.

To complicate matters in the Quaker City, the City Council sought to raise troops its own way. On May 16, the mayor and council elected to raise ten regiments of Home Guards independent from the state militia and subject only to the orders of the City Council. Additionally, the Council levied a special tax to arm and to equip these men. Naturally, the diverting of city funds to arm and equip Home Guard units angered the three-month and three-year volunteers who still waited for the state and federal government to provide them with weapons and uniforms.

The arrivals of the three-year colonels in Philadelphia—those appointed by Cameron and Curtin—filled the Quaker City with a renewed patriotism. Those who thought that they had missed the chance to serve in the three-month regiments rushed to the recruiting stations, believing that if they joined a company that filled fast enough, they would certainly go to war. One of those who decided to enlist was Ambrose Henry Hayward, a twenty-year-old needle-maker who lived in Northern Liberties. Hayward had wanted to join the army from the moment the first shot was fired. On April 14, he wrote to his older brother, Augustus, attempting to describe the unrequited fervor that the war had sparked within him: “I have a feeling at times of

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late a find of burning in my bosom since these troubled times have commenced. it may brake out
and perhaps Induce me to take a step that I should hereafter regret. (not on my own account.) He
who dares not come at his country’s call is a coward (I never answered to that name).”

When Hayward’s parents learned of his desire to enlist, they urged him to reconsider,
telling him that a soldier’s life would handle him too roughly. At first, Hayward complied with
his parent’s wishes, but the military zeal of the city got the better of him. On April 20, he
watched the 7th New York State Militia march through Philadelphia. The next day, while reading
over one of the local papers, he discovered that his older brother, Melville, a New York attorney,
had been among them. Hayward snapped off his apron in anger, complained to his boss of a
headache, and took the rest of the day off. He then went to the post office and discovered
Melville’s letter confirming the newspaper’s accuracy. On May 21—his twenty-first birthday—
in a premeditated decision, Henry Hayward went to the armory of the 2nd Company, Independent
Grays, and signed his name to their roster. Although the Grays had not yet affiliated with a
regiment, Hayward correctly assumed it would go with one of Cameron’s appointments.

David Mouat, the young carpenter’s apprentice who had been unceremoniously kicked
out of the Cadwalader Grays’ headquarters in April, decided to try again. He saw a placard
K. Murphy’s Regiment.” His decision to enlist was spontaneous. At the time, he did not know if
the Marion Guards had affiliated with a three-year regiment. Mouat wrote, “Marion was my
favorite General of the Revolutionary war and the thought struck me to try again to enlist.”

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13 Ambrose Henry Hayward to brother, 14 April 1861, Gettysburg College Special Collections Archive [Hereafter GCSCA].
14 Ambrose Henry Hayward to brother, 3 and 24 May 1861, GCSCA.
signed his name to Captain App’s roster that night, received some cursory drill from a corporal about marching and facing, and then rushed home before his 10:00 P. M. curfew. Moaut lived with his boss’s family, and, since he was still under indenture, he decided to keep his enlistment secret. He feared his boss’s wife, known for her hatred of the war, might try to prevent him from joining. The Marion Guards’ muster was scheduled for 10:00 A. M., June 22. Thus, when the school bells rang at nine o’clock that morning, Moaut informed his boss, Riego Taylor, that he was now a soldier: “Mr. Taylor, I have enlisted, and the Captain gave us orders to be on hand at ten o’clock. I am going.” Taylor looked at him for a moment, and then replied, “Hell, if you are determined to go, I do not see anything in the indenture to prevent you, so do as you please, but take the wheel barrow into the shop.” Moaut joyously departed.15

Most scholarship describing the motivations of Civil War soldiers has taken little effort to analyze the dynamics of urbanism at the moment of enlistment. For instance, James McPherson’s well-known For Cause and Comrades consolidated all regional experiences to describe the universality of the fighting man’s experience. In a way, urban enlistees did not deviate from McPherson’s model; urbanites did not suffer for want of ideological convictions. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that many city dwellers came from jobs that bound them closely to their trade and thus to civic republicanism. Relinquishing important urban occupations in a time when recollections of the Panic of 1857 still stood fresh in the metropolitan mind would have been difficult for some urban workers to accept. Moreover, if historians of city boosterism are to be believed, then the ideology of republicanism bound urbanites to the maintenance of the

15 David Moaut, “Three Years in the 29th Pennsylvania,” HSP.
civic good.\textsuperscript{16} And yet, despite these bonds that connected them to the home front, city dwellers found army service especially alluring. Maintaining the wider republic, and not merely servicing local needs, stood higher in the hearts of some urban volunteers. Indeed, the thought of not going to war filled some laborers with dread. In New York City, after recruiting officers at Tammany Hall turned away Thomas Raedy for being too short, Raedy—a twenty-five-year-old unemployed man—walked around the corner and hanged himself.\textsuperscript{17}

Nevertheless, recruiting in the cities was a confusing endeavor. By early June, Philadelphia recruits had a variety of options when they decided to enlist: they could join one of the remaining three-month regiments still filling, they could join one of the five federal, three-year regiments, they could join Curtin’s three-year Reserve Division, or they could join one of the city’s Home Guard regiments. Recruiters erected dozens of enrolling stations all over the city in a feverish race to fill their companies and receive acceptance to the regiment of their choice. Recruitment slowed to a snail’s pace because so many companies vied for the same pool of potential volunteers. Evan Morrison Woodward, a recruiter for the “Taggart Guards Company”—a Pennsylvania Reserve unit—complained, “The only trouble the men had was to find companies that were sure to fill up . . . while all were rapidly filling up. In fact,” he continued, had there not been so many companies recruiting at one time, “twenty thousand men could have been raised in the city in one week.”\textsuperscript{18} John L. Keys, recruiter for the “Curtin


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{New York Times}, 13 June 1861.

Fencibles,” likewise complained “if we do not get through immediately I shall lose my men inch by inch in other companies.”

The sluggish pace of recruiting created problems for officers and men. Colonel William Small’s 26th Pennsylvania—a three-year regiment—took six weeks to fill, as did two other three-year regiments, Colonel John W. Geary’s 28th Pennsylvania and Colonel John K. Murphy’s 29th Pennsylvania. The slow pace required the new commanders to use new recruiting tactics. Colonel Max Einstein set up recruiting stations in Kensington and Northern Liberties to fill the 27th Pennsylvania with German-Americans, but he could raise only seven companies. To speed up the pace, Einstein simultaneously recruited three companies from Philadelphia’s Irish neighborhoods. The mix of German-Americans and Irish-Americans did not breed camaraderie. The Philadelphia Inquirer commented, “The two races, it is said, do not agree well in juxtaposition, and are mutually pugnacious.” Altercations between German and Irish soldiers broke out almost daily, and, on May 14, this mutual detestation led to a knife-fight that killed German Private Godfried Koch. Einstein saw to it that police arrested Koch’s Irish attacker, but this resulted in mass desertions from the three Irish companies. In early August, Colonel Einstein begged Secretary Cameron to have the Irish companies transferred.

The slow pace of recruitment also created difficulties for the recruits themselves. Many men had to give up lucrative occupations to enlist. A delay in mustering and deployment meant weeks with no income. Henry Hayward discovered, after nearly one month, his company had still not filled, nor had he been mustered. Unable to pay his rent, Hayward bunked on the floor of the Arch Street armory. When his former landladies, Quaker sisters named Alice and Rebecca

19 John L. Keys to Andrew G. Curtin, 11 July 1861, PSA.
20 Philadelphia Inquirer, 2 August 1861.
Shotwell, discovered this, they insisted that he return to his old room and stay free of charge.\textsuperscript{21} Needing money, Hayward returned to his old boss, Horace Keith, demanding all his back pay at once. Keith paid Hayward what he could, but turned up $45.00 short. To make up the difference, Keith paid the rest in needles. Hayward graciously accepted them from “the kind fool,” and sold them on the street. By the last week of June, all his needles ran out, but luckily, Colonel Geary accepted Hayward’s unit, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Company, Independent Grays, into the 28\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania. The Grays headed to Camp Coleman in Oxford Park, just north of the city where they received uniforms, weapons, tents, and rations, all privately purchased by Geary. Hayward was relieved, and he quipped to his father, “I understand that Honest Old Abe has taken the contract to remodel the Old Union and build up another in Republican style, and in order to make a sure thing of it he is employing men to remove all obstructions. now if I thought he was mean enough to pay off[ f ] his help in needles I would not have any thing to do with him.”\textsuperscript{22}

Philadelphia’s officers and enlisted men did their best to avoid the delays, even willfully participating in unlawful acts to hurry the process of mobilization. Private David Moaut reasoned that illegal activities were justified if they expedited departure to the front. He expected to be mustered on June 22, but still fearing that his boss’s wife would interfere with his enlistment, he spent the next week sleeping at the Marion Guards’ headquarters. On June 29, after daily drill, Colonel Murphy suddenly received orders to send his troops to the arsenal at Sixteenth and Filbert Streets for muster. The Marion Guards could not muster because most of the men had gone home. Colonel Murphy desired to complete his regiment as soon as possible, so he approached Moaut and several other members of the Marion Guards who lingered after drill,

\textsuperscript{21} Ambrose Henry Hayward to sister, 23 June 1861, GCSCA  
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 23 June 1861; and to father, 24 May 1861, GCSCA.
asking them to join Company G, the “Federal Guards,” to ensure that its ranks were full enough to pass inspection. Although it was illegal to interfere with a muster by taking men from one company to fill another, Moaut made no complaint: “As there were several like myself anxious to be sworn into the service there was not difficulty in getting men to go, so enough men were sent over to Company G and we marched out to the Arsenal.”

When the recruits arrived at the arsenal, Major Charles Ruff, the U.S. mustering officer sent to Philadelphia, trooped the line of men. When he came to seventeen-year-old Moaut, he stopped. Because he was underage, Moaut required his mother’s permission to enlist, and because he was indentured, he also required his employer’s permission. Moaut and Ruff had a brief exchange:

Ruff: “Young man, how old are you?”
Moaut: “Nineteen.”
Ruff: “Are you sure?”
Moaut: “That’s what I’m told.”
Ruff: “Are your parents living?”
Moaut: “My father is dead, but my mother is living.”
Ruff: “Does your mother know you are going to be a soldier?”
Moaut: “Yes, sir, and she says if she was a man, she would go too.”
Ruff: “I guess you will do.”

After Ruff mustered him, Moaut grinned, for he had simultaneously broken two federal laws without being caught.

While Cameron’s and Lincoln’s three-year regiments organized, Curtin’s Pennsylvania Reserve Division encountered its own problems. From May 15-29, twenty companies organized in Philadelphia, each expecting assignment to the division. In an entirely unauthorized move,

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23 David Moaut, “Three Years in the 29th Pennsylvania,” HSP.
24 Ibid., HSP.
some of the companies resorted to popular election to assign themselves to field officers. Four companies elected to serve under Colonel Gabriel De Korponay, a Hungarian with European military experience. Seven others elected to serve under Colonel William B. Mann, Philadelphia’s Republican district attorney. Six more assigned themselves to Colonel Robert G. March. The other three remained independent. On May 29-30, Curtin ordered all of these companies to head to Camp Washington at Easton, Pennsylvania, to be fully organized into regiments; to receive uniforms, weapons, and supplies; and to swear into the service of the Commonwealth. When they arrived, however, none of the three colonels possessed a full regiment of ten companies, even after ten non-Philadelphia companies arrived in early June.

On June 14, Curtin sent Major General George Archibald McCall, the West Point graduate assigned to command the Reserve Division, to organize the companies into complete regiments. Curtin’s instructions were simple: assign ten companies to Colonel Mann first. McCall found Mann with only eight companies, seven from Philadelphia and one from Bristol. To complete Mann’s regiment, McCall decided to assign companies based on the order in which they arrived in camp. Unfortunately, the four companies who voted to join Colonel De Korponay’s regiment had all arrived together right after Mann’s eight companies. When two of these companies were reassigned to Mann’s regiment, De Korponay’s men immediately expressed outrage. Further, a large number of Korponay’s soldiers were Irish-American, and, consequently, they did not wish to serve under Colonel Mann, an ardent Republican.

According to Captain Evan Woodward, commander of one of the re-assigned companies, “It cannot be denied, the officers and men were deeply attached to De Korponay, and the effect of this blow upon them was severely felt.” Upon hearing the decision, Captain George Abisha
Woodward, commander of the other re-assigned company, “threw himself on his hands and wept like a child.” His company broke out in open mutiny and attempted to seize weapons from a nearby officer’s tent. The two companies still assigned to De Korponay—the “Scotch Rifles” and the “Consolidation Guards”—also could not be kept quiet. Fearing a general mutiny, two company commanders assigned to Mann’s regiment—Captain Robert McClure of the “Quaker City Guards” and Captain William S. Thompson of Bristol’s “Montgomery Guards”—elected to swap places with the “Scotch Rifles” and the “Consolidation Guards.” That way, the four De Korponay companies remained together. Thus, Colonel Mann’s regiment, now designated the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserve Infantry, became an all-Philadelphia regiment. But this arrangement created a powder-keg of unrest that waited to explode.25

McCall organized the ten remaining Philadelphia companies and ten non-Philadelphia companies into two more regiments, the 3rd Pennsylvania Reserve Infantry commanded by Colonel Horatio G. Sickel and the 4th Pennsylvania Reserve Infantry commanded by Colonel Robert G. March. Colonel De Korponay, who had worked for over one month to raise his regiment, returned to Philadelphia with no regiment and no commission.26

In New York City, the organizational situation grew equally confusing and provoked a sharp conflict between local, state, and federal officials. Gotham’s last three-month regiment left on May 3, the same day that the call for three-year volunteers became known. Cameron determined the State of New York should fill fourteen three-year regiments. Governor Morgan had already forwarded one of his two-year regiments to Washington—Colonel Ellsworth’s 11th New York Infantry—and he replied to this request by stating that he would complete his other

25 Evan Morrison Woodward, Our Campaigns, 14-22.
26 Clinton G. Stees to Andrew Curtin, 30 May 1861, PSA.
two-year regiments before raising any three-year regiments. Cameron impolitely ignored Morgan and, on May 15, directed him to send fourteen three-year regiments to Washington and Fort Monroe. When Morgan reiterated his disapproval, Cameron asked the Union Defense Committee to circumvent Morgan’s authority and use the regiments organizing in New York City to forward the required three-year men.27

New York City’s Union Defense Committee eagerly accepted Cameron’s offer. The Committee abhorred the State Military Board in Albany. Much of this animosity derived from the Board’s May 3 decree that no new regiments could be raised except those authorized by the governor. Morgan allowed the Union Defense Committee to raise independent infantry companies, but Morgan warned that he would attach these to the state’s thirty-eight two-year regiments as he saw fit. New York City residents hated this directive. The Times commented: “The object of this measure is understood to be the prevention of the completion of regiments without the Albany authorities having a chance to provide their friends and favorites with colonelcies and majorities.”28

Thus, even without Cameron’s help, the Union Defense Committee devised its own appeal to the federal government. In a complaint sent directly to the President, the Committee insisted that three city-raised regiments could depart immediately, but the Albany Board refused to authorize their departure. Editor James Gordon Bennett charged the Board with “red tapeism” and shameless favoritism to “preferred regiments.” He argued that New York City’s regiments

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“already completed are becoming disgusted with inactivity and suspense to which they are condemned. The present system works badly, and will lose the government good soldiers.”

On May 16, the Union Defense Committee sent an eight-man delegation to Washington to meet with Lincoln and the cabinet, asking them to override Morgan’s orders. Lincoln agreed and ordered the Committee to forward fourteen regiments of three-year men from New York City. This, he said, would be in addition to the thirty-eight two-year regiments Morgan planned to raise. This meeting, however, did not end entirely in the Union Defense Committee’s favor. Lincoln also stated that five of these fourteen regiments should come from the “Excelsior Brigade,” a unit raised by Democratic Congressman Daniel Sickles. In violation of the state constitution, Sickles had decided to organize a brigade directly for federal service. When Governor Morgan got word of this, he granted Sickles the authority to raise one regiment, but no more. But the crafty congressman flouted Morgan’s authority by obtaining Lincoln’s authority to raise five regiments.

When Morgan discovered that Lincoln had given Sickles authority to raise a brigade, he responded by appointing his own officers as colonels of the new regiments, declaring his intention to keep Sickles as colonel in command of only one regiment. Upon hearing this, Sickles journeyed to Washington to plead his case, and he received assurance from Lincoln that he alone retained the authority to appoint officers to his command. When Lincoln informed the Union Defense Committee’s delegation that they must accept Sickles’s troops and support them financially, not only did Lincoln displease Morgan at Albany, but the Committee members also declared themselves unsatisfied. Sickles’s questionable personal habits and his shameless self-

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30 Ibid., 20 May 1861.
promotion to brigade command caused some members of the Union Defense Committee to suggest turning down Lincoln’s offer. However, the Committee decided to accept their small victory and reluctantly agreed to Lincoln’s decree.\textsuperscript{31}

In late May, when federal officials visited the Union Defense Committee expecting to find at least eleven three-year regiments ready for departure, they discovered 4,500 soldiers fully equipped, only enough to fill four regiments. Unfortunately, these were distributed between seven different regiments. Thus, not a single regiment could leave. The massive competition between the Union Defense Committee’s Regiments, Sickles’s regiments, and Morgan’s two-year regiments prevented newly-forming units from filling quickly.\textsuperscript{32} Horace Greeley asserted, “Such a reckless disregard of the dictates of common sense as has been shown at Albany is enough to destroy the splendid enthusiasm with which our citizens are hurrying to respond to the call of duty.”\textsuperscript{33}

To calm the bitterness between the Union Defense Committee and the Military Board, General Sandford addressed Governor Morgan on May 19, asking him to draft orders accepting the three-year regiments. Sandford argued that the Committee desired to see its regiments mustered because it spent exorbitant sums to support officers in their recruiting efforts. Disbanding these units, he argued, would foster “embarrassment[,] excitement and clamor.” He added, “The Public feeling of the State of the City is strong for immediate action.—much dissatisfaction exists at the necessarily slow pace in which the new Regts. are organized and sent forward, and if the (14) Regts. should be withheld & any repulse should take place, which their

\textsuperscript{31} Meneely, \textit{The War Department, 1861}, 160-1.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., \textit{1861}, 163.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{New York Tribune}, 3 May 1861.
presence might have prevented, there would be a most violent excitement raised throughout the country.” Three days later, President Lincoln demanded that Morgan journey to Washington to resolve the matter. Morgan discourteously refused, but he nevertheless heeded Lincoln’s wishes by accepting the three-year regiments.³⁴

Competition, collision, and chaos ruled the hour, with no end in sight. Sometimes, the state government threw obstacles in the path of hopeful officers. Colonel Charles H. Innes, commander of the 36th New York Infantry, faced considerable trouble with the State Military Board. In late May, he proceeded to Albany with signed statements from ten company commanders indicating their willingness to join his regiment. Flagrantly violating their own rule, the Military Board re-assigned five of Innes’s companies to other regimental commanders and gave him five companies from a struggling regiment, the “British Volunteers,” directing him to fill them instead. A soldier in the 36th New York noted that “in the endeavor of the Board to organize the British Volunteer companies, they prevent accepted and harmonious companies from organizing.” The Board’s interference detained the 36th New York another two months.³⁵

In other cases, boastful promises fell short. By early July, Colonel Sickles had 3,000 men distributed among his five regiments. A few of the companies had traveled from rural New York, Massachusetts, Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania to join the Excelsior Brigade. When these companies arrived at Camp Scott, many contained only fifty or sixty men, well below the requisite minimum. Sickles ordered the undersized companies to consolidate, but this

³⁴ Charles Sandford to Edwin Morgan, 19 May 1861, Adjutant General’s papers, NYSA; Meneely, The War Department, 1861, 162-4.
inaugurated more unrest and “difficulties arose among company officers unwilling to relinquish rank.”36

In some instances, company officers sold their recruits to other regiments. The Times noted this growing abuse with disdain:

The continued formation of new regiments, and the anxiety of colonels to get the ranks of their commands filled out at the earliest possible moment, has induced unprincipled men, who have extensive acquaintance among the mechanics and laboring men, to open recruiting offices on speculation, under pretense of raising companies of which they are to take command. . . . The enterprising captain at once agrees to a transfer of his men to the colonel at rates varying from $1 to $2.50 per head; and though he retains nominal command, this only continues until after the men are mustered into the service, when he goes through the formality of resignation, upon some vain excuse, and the men discover how quietly and without their knowledge they have been made subjects of bargain and sale. Their late captain is again free to organize another company.37

In many ways this was a heavy-handed assertion—officers bought and sold enlisted men like chattel, trading them from regiment to regiment! To some observers, urban capitalism had sunk to a new low.

Adding to the confusion in the cities, especially in New York City, the U.S. Army—the Regulars—chose to enlist new recruits. General Winfield Scott, the Army’s senior general, insisted that all the regular regiments be left intact. Under his policy, he would not allow regular officers to accept positions in the volunteer regiments unless they resigned their commissions first. Doubtful of the war’s length, many valuable line officers refused to raise volunteer organizations. Many War Department agents—and also Lincoln himself—disliked Scott’s plan since it withheld experienced officers from the volunteer service. But, they nonetheless accepted the aging general’s decree. Scott hoped to increase the size of the regular army by almost 25,000

36 New York Herald, 9 July 1861.
men and deploy it on the battlefield as part of the army’s “elite” force. By circumstance, the burden of Scott’s regular army recruitment plan fell upon the cities. In addition to calling for three-year volunteer troops, Lincoln’s May 3 call authorized ten new regiments of regulars, eight of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery. The task of recruiting these new troops fell to the U.S. Army’s “General Recruiting Service,” which had its headquarters in New York City, with additional offices in Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Albany, and Providence. Thus, the responsibility of mustering new regular recruits fell to the northeastern cities.

Predictably, Regular Army recruiting did less well than volunteer recruiting. Up to July 1861, enlistment contracts required soldiers to serve for five years instead of three, and at that time, the army still allowed flogging as a form of punishment. After Bull Run, the War Department made important changes: it reduced the enlistment to three years, it added a $100 bounty to regular service, and it abolished the flogging punishment. Still, even these revisions did not spur recruitment in the regular service. U.S. Regulars never made up more than four percent of the Union army at any given time. However, the additional recruiting stations in the major cities created another competing force, and in New York City, the Regular Army recruiting service created another military camp. All infantry soldiers—those recruited from across the nation—received their first assignment at Fort Columbus in New York Harbor, where they received drill and instruction.38

Once large numbers of recruits for the three-year regiments assembled, they went into camp. Some settled in beautiful areas outside the confines of their cities, as did Colonel George Henry Gordon’s 2nd Massachusetts. Gordon’s unit pitched its tents at Brook Farm, the

transcendentalist commune in West Roxbury, Massachusetts. The soldiers of the 2nd Massachusetts enjoyed their encampment immensely, so much so that, during their joyous stay there, they caused $200 worth of damage to the site. Surprisingly, Brook Farm’s patriotic owner, James Freeman Clark, elected to pay most of the expenses himself. Other regiments fared considerably worse. Cowdin’s 1st Massachusetts had to spend its first days in the confines of an abandoned ice house in Cambridge. Illness spread among the members of the regiment, as Chaplain Warren Cudworth remembered, “The universal prevalence of colds and other complaints, however, [proved] that the old ice-house was not a suitable structure for the temporary home of a thousand men.” After considerable agitation from his miserable recruits, Colonel Cowdin and his field officers demanded that the Commonwealth erect a set of barracks. Workers completed these structures one month later, but the soldiers of the 1st Massachusetts stayed in them for only a few days, when orders finally arrived compelling them to leave for the front. Meanwhile, Cass’s Irish regiment—now called the 9th Massachusetts—sweated its days inside Faneuil Hall. Sergeant Daniel Macnamara called his regiment’s close confinement “very irksome and . . . quite unsatisfactory,” and when it finally moved to “Camp Wightman” on Long Island (in Boston Harbor), “The freedom of the island, with its green fields, pure salt air, and bright sky infused new life into both officers and men.”

Quartering issues were not unique to the cities. Smaller towns responded with equally provisional solutions to house incoming troops from larger cities as well as their own local recruits. In York, Pennsylvania, for instance, the town leaders erected a campground on the local

39 James Freeman Clark to John Andrew, 9 October 1861, Massachusetts State Archives, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter MASA); George H. Gordon, From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain: In the War of the Great Rebellion, 1861-62 (Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1883), 13.
fairgrounds, called “Camp Scott.” These quarters were, in essence, converted animal stalls with makeshift huts to deal with the overflow. However, while large urban centers did their best to move soldiers’ camps outside of the metropolitan boundaries, smaller towns had no trouble keeping them in. Camp Scott housed over 5,000 soldiers in 1861. When the 6th New York Cavalry arrived there later in the year, they enjoyed their opportunity to mix among York’s citizens, especially the town’s female population. One New Yorker, impressed with the benevolence and attention he received at Camp Scott, remarked in a letter to one of York’s newspapers, “The whole regiment unites in earnest thanks to the ladies of York, for their many kindnesses to us.”

Some cities could not send their soldiers to the countryside quickly. Those areas experiencing fragmented recruiting reluctantly had to quarter its soldiers in city environs. With thousands of half-uniformed soldiers roaming the city streets indiscriminately, New York City officials made requisitions for shelter. By the middle of May, the Herald declared that “all the prominent buildings” had been seized by the state for purpose of quartering troops and every arsenal, including the gigantic City Arsenal, had been filled to the brim. To relieve the burden placed on the militia arsenals, General Arthur ordered the construction of a barracks in City Park to accommodate 2,000 men.42

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42 New York Herald, 4 and 12 May 1861. Once completed in late May, City Park Barracks possessed four large soup boilers and employed thirty cooks, capable of feeding 5,000 men each day. While the barracks’ construction was no special feat of engineering, the New York Herald stated, “When the rapidity with which the place was run up is considered, the artisans who conducted it cannot be too highly complimented.”
Construction of the City Park Barracks invited more trouble, for now the state sought to use it as a rendezvous for incomplete regiments from rural New York. Perhaps the worst situation occurred in early June when four city-raised companies of Colonel Calvin Pratt’s “Montezuma Regiment” (31st New York Infantry) quartered in the City Park Barracks alongside a country regiment, the “West Chester Chasseurs” (17th New York Infantry). Quarrels between these two regiments occurred almost daily, which, according to a reporter, “often terminated in a fisticuff encounter, and occasionally a free fight would take place, when some twenty or thirty combatants sailed in and damaged each other’s good looks, with stools, rails, and any other effective weapons on which they could conveniently lay their hands.” Normally, little harm resulted from these altercations, except black eyes, cut lips, and bruises, engendered by the fact that the West Chester men had rifles and the Montezuma soldiers did not. Some guessed that if it had been in reverse, the city boys might have routed the country soldiers and driven them from the barracks. The Herald blamed the frequent altercations on liquor smuggling, especially on the part of the country troops, and a newspaper reporter vehemently opposed “stationing men fresh from the country in the barracks, . . . as from their exposed condition, and, in some measure, enforced idleness of the men, they are led to many temptations to which they would not be inclined in a less public situation.”

Baltimore’s two infantry regiments, the 1st and 2nd Maryland Infantry, faced the same serious issues, as discipline problems surfaced with increasing frequency. Keeping soldiers in the city proved a hazard to law and order. At 10:00 A.M. on June 24, a police officer found Private Peter Streetzer, a German recruit in Company K, 1st Maryland, wandering the streets drunk in broad daylight. The officer charged Streetzer with disorderly conduct, at which point Streetzer

43 New York Herald, 7 June 1861.
tried to stab him with his bayonet. Other officers intervened, and soon they carted off the inebriated private in a paddy-wagon.\textsuperscript{44}

The distractions of the cities proved too great, and constant interaction between citizens and soldiers disturbed the peace. Soldiers frequently ran the guard or visited friends in the cities. Some volunteers viewed these untroubled days in the army as a pleasure excursion. For instance, one beautiful day in late June, five soldiers from Boston’s 9\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts went boating on the bay. None of the men possessed boating experience and they recklessly drifted their craft too close to a schooner, and they capsized. One soldier, Private David F. Buckley, drowned. A reporter for the \textit{Daily Journal} stated, “The propriety of allowing many of them [the soldiers] to come to the city, under the circumstances, is questioned by many.” \textsuperscript{45}

However, even if Boston’s officers had tightened their sentry lines or limited the number of furloughs they issued, they would not have prevented thousands of visitors from coming to camp to visit their friends, and when visitors came, misbehavior abounded. On July 4, unnamed parties smuggled several hundred gallons of rum-punch into Fort Warren. The ensuing Independence Day celebrations resulted in the inebriation of a majority of Colonel Webster’s 12\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts, and the party lasted well into the morning hours of July 5. Angry citizens demanded an investigation, but the hung-over soldiers of the 12\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts were in no condition to reply to it.\textsuperscript{46}

Ideally, officers conceived training camps as places where regiments could organize and learn discipline. In reality, they became locations where urban mobilization nearly unraveled. Of

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 18, 20, and 25 June 1861.
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Boston Daily Journal}, 24 June 1861; \textit{Boston Evening Transcript}, 6 and 10 July 1861.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
the four cities, Boston had the best situation, because Governor Andrew and Adjutant Schouler erected “Camp Meigs,” a training camp at Readville, a suburb of Boston. There, some regiments managed to thrive. Just before it left for the front and its inglorious defeat at Ball’s Bluff, the 20th Massachusetts had quartered there. That unit struck many observers as a model regiment. Used to close-quarters life in their dormitories, the Harvard officers imposed strict rules and guidelines upon their enlisted men, promoting proper sanitation and nutrition. One reporter remarked:

The excellent sanitary condition of the camp is owing in great part to the care which is exercised in the management of the culinary department. . . . [W]hen it is necessary, disinfecting agents are freely employed to purify the quarters. The soldiers are taught the principles of housekeeping, being required to air their bedding and sweep out their tents every morning, and to strike the latter every third day. On the whole, the camp of the 20th is a model of neatness, order, and discipline.47

Some cities—New York and Philadelphia particularly—became surrounded by tent cities consisting of troops from all across the state. These huge military communities became too tempting for city-dwellers to avoid visiting. Wives and children wanted to visit their fathers regularly; girls wanted to chat with eligible boys in uniform; recruiters wanted to steal recruits; and mothers wanted their sons to come home. The longer these encampments remained, the worse the situation became.

Unlike Boston, a semicircle of camps ensnared Philadelphia. Visitors came each day to bother the regiments, often to take soldiers away from the camp. One interested recruiter, B. C. Brooker, hoped to pinch the 81st Pennsylvania’s six Philadelphia companies while its colonel was away in Mauch Chunk. Since many Philadelphians hated Colonel Miller, Brooker’s scheme seemed to catch on. Fortunately, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Johnson, the second-in-command, convinced the Philadelphia recruits to remain with the 81st Pennsylvania. After speaking to his

47 Boston Daily Journal, 10 August 1861.
men, Johnson proclaimed that “Brooker . . . has lost every friend in the regiment—last Tuesday he sent a captain to camp to get the Philad’ companies to withdraw from us, which would have left me with but two full companies and of course I would have been mustered out of service, [but] when I explained it to them [my men] they insisted that I should order his agent off the grounds which I did without delay—he is dead so far as we are concerned.”

Soldiers’ families also caused problems for mobilizing regiments. Anxious mothers and wives frequently visited camps to extract their sons and husbands from the bonds of service. On October 3, Sergeant James Walker of the 81st Pennsylvania witnessed one of these archetypal events. An Irish woman had tracked down her seventeen-year-old son to bring him out of the regiment. Walker recognized her because she had repeatedly visited the camp to seek an audience with Colonel Miller. She stated that this was her only child and she could not get along without him. Although the law favored the Irish mother, Walker doubted that such a request could be granted, but he attempted to console her as they walked. On their way, Colonel Miller rode up on horseback and the Irish woman began pleading. Walker recalled:

> the poor creature threw herself on her knees directly in his path and in a strain of most impassioned eloquence, implored for the release of her boy; vain were her pleadings; with a look and gesture of impatience the man before her bade her rise and give him no further trouble—as he trotted on she rose and with hands outstretched, implored and plead like one bereft of reason—at last finding herself left behind and the Col’s resolution unshaken, she uttered a shriek so heart rending that even the arch enemy of mankind might have been moved to pity and pursued her way homeward, wringing her hands, she [the] very picture of despair—I must confess the touching scene I had just witnessed, impressed me rather unfavorably with my commander—not of course with his abilities as a soldier but his feelings as a man. On my way to the station I could not help ruminating on the wonderful depth of love and hate so manifest in the Irish character.

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48 Charles F. Johnson to Mary Johnson, 13 October 1861, USAMHI.
49 James H. Walker diary, 3 October 1861, HSP.
The issue involved in this incident was a serious one. Put simply, the law stood on the side of the Irish woman. Most likely, Colonel Miller knew that she had every right to reclaim her underage son. If he had let the law prevail, as he said, how many other urban mothers might come to camp and pluck their sons from his ranks?

Even seemingly innocent camp visitors caused problems for mobilizing Philadelphia regiments. Officers regularly invited friends, loved-ones, and family to their nearby camps of instruction to brighten morale and present home-made gifts to the soldiers. However, officers’ guests remained ignorant of the minutiae of camp life and became more pesky than helpful. While in his camp of instruction, William H. Manley of Company E, 72nd Pennsylvania, witnessed the chaos caused by the teenage daughters of one of his lieutenants. The two young ladies had built a fire too close to their marquee tent, and owing to a high wind, the tent caught fire. Dressed in only their night gowns, the two ladies came shrieking out of their tent like banshees, raising an alarm. Sarcastically Manley wrote, “it was gay I tell you to see the gals running up and down darn near frightened to death.” Conveniently, the 72nd Pennsylvania, composed of Philadelphia’s fire companies, sprang into action. Manley continued, “The Fire Zoo Zoo were on the ground quick as you could wink.” Manley saved his captain’s tent by cutting its ropes, although he scorchèd his hands in the process. His quick thinking prevented the fire from spreading, and thus, he saved the camp from destruction. The only losses were the ladies’ dresses and underwear and two full uniforms owned by the lieutenant.50

Frequent visits from friends and family could sometimes erode soldiers’ morale by making them homesick. Unused to leaving the city for a prolonged period of time, Philadelphia

50 William H. Manley to friend Crooks, 19 November 1861, HSP.
volunteers required extended time to acclimate themselves to army life. Private John Wheaton Lynch of the Commonwealth Artillery, a unit assigned to Fort Delaware, grew steadily despondent over his separation from his sweetheart, Bessie J. Mustin. After two months of service, Lynch could not hold back his nostalgia any longer. In that time, he managed to secure two furloughs to visit her in the city. When he failed to get a third, he encouraged Bessie to visit him by joining a flag presentation excursion, giving her detailed instructions, telling her which officers’ wives she should approach on the subject. He told her, “you see you can make a pleasant trip in the same day. we rec[eive] visiters every day from the city & I can assure you that it will be a pleasant excursion & if you can make up a party to come down you will all have a jolley time.” In July, Lynch received another furlough, but upon his return, he missed his ferry-boat arriving late, a breach of regulations that resulted in his temporary arrest. Lynch admitted, “I got off much easier than what I had expected.” Nevertheless, he held no remorse for overstaying his furlough. He told Bessie, “words will not convey to you the expression of my heart,” and vowed he would gladly secure another furlough as soon as he could.\(^5\)

The distance between the camps and the cities could sometimes be so great that homesick recruits could slip away en transit. On October 10, Sergeant James Walker of the 81\(^{st}\) Pennsylvania attended his brother’s wedding in Philadelphia. His company commander, who then recruited in the city, asked him to escort a squad of new recruits to the camp at Easton. Walker described these men as, “a crowd of the dirtiest, most disagreeable fellows outside the almshouse—over these, I had not control or authority whatever and as I was sometimes called in absence of their own sergeants to act in that capacity, I had to endure an endless amount of grumbling.” When the train arrived at Easton, Walker’s detachment met a heavy rain shower.

\(^5\) John Wheaton Lynch to Bessie J. Mustin, 16 June and 1 July 1861, HSP.
Walker had to march the men several miles to camp, but in the growing darkness and torrent, five men “slipped the guards and made off.”

Baltimore, however, faced the worst predicament, since the quartering of Union troops in the city aroused the hatred of the Irish and Confederate populations. In late September, the 2nd Maryland finally filled with 880 Baltimoreans present in its ranks. Unfortunately, the regimental commander, Colonel John Sommer, wished to keep his men in the city near Camden Station. His enlisted men persisted in the bad habit of leaving camp whenever they pleased, and this often resulted in their own misfortune. A gang of pro-Confederate Irishmen patrolled the outskirts of camp, looking for vulnerable 2nd Maryland men to attack. In two separate incidents in October and November, the gang accosted Private Hiram Couch and Private Thomas Cusick and asked them to go drinking. In each incident, they got the soldier in question intoxicated, stabbed or beat him in the head near Jones Falls Bridge, and left him for dead.

Eventually, the 2nd Maryland’s officers took matters into their own hands. In late November, when a private named Gardner made his third attempt to run the guard, Second Lieutenant David E. Whitson, Jr. shot him dead. One of Gardner’s close friends, Private Joseph H. Kuhnes—another frequent guard-runner—vowed to avenge his comrade’s death at Camp Carroll. On December 10, when the drums beat the long roll, Kuhnes deliberately loaded his musket inside his tent, stepped out, and shot Whitson in the chest, killing him. A captain collared Kuhnes as he attempted to flee and a throng of angry soldiers nearly lynched him, until Colonel Sommer and Lieutenant Colonel Duryée intervened. Kuhnes did not live long; a court-martial

52 James H. Walker diary, 10 October 1861, HSP.
53 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 24 September 1861.
54 Ibid., 19 October and 30 November. The paper identified the Irishmen as Samuel Donohoe, Patrick Collins, and Daniel Madden.
found him guilty of murder, and the U.S. Army hanged him on March 7, 1862. Still, the greater problem reflected by this murder—the proximity of the soldiers to the city—did not go unnoticed. The *Baltimore American* reflected, “In this connection it is proper to add that the discipline of some of the regiments stationed near the city is far from approximating to the standard of army regulations. Already the most pernicious consequences have ensued, and if permitted to continue will produce still more injurious results.”

Eventually, in January, Colonel Sommer secured a new camp for the 2nd Maryland at Pikesville Arsenal, eight miles from the city. The *Baltimore American* reported, “now that they have removed to such a distance outside the city, it is hoped that no more trouble will be experienced[..] . . . orders have been issued to the picket guard to shoot any man who attempts to run the guard, and there is no doubt but that the orders will be obeyed.” However, the reporter added, “In justice to the men, it should be stated that they are really tired of the long period of inaction, and long for a brush with the enemy.”

Camping in and around the cities did not cause discipline problems only among the enlisted personnel. Officers also participated in the mayhem. Almost instantly, the officers in the three-year regiments began to bicker. Perhaps none of the regiments faced as serious a problem as the 2nd Massachusetts, a Boston regiment whose officer corps became dominated by a clique of tight-knit Harvard and Amherst graduates. On May 9, eight ambitious officers wrote to Colonel Gordon, registering their disapproval of a fellow 1853 Harvard graduate, Wilder Dwight, who sought a position as major. These officers disapproved of Dwight on the grounds

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that he was “too young and inexperienced for us to be able to entrust our lives and the lives of
the men under our command into his hands.” Because many of these college-educated officers
had once held positions in the antebellum militia, they condemned Gordon’s plan to offer the
regimental majorship to an outsider who, for whatever reason, had not “established [a] reputation
for [good] conduct and judgment.” Luckily for Dwight, Gordon declined to submit to the
officers’ remonstrations. Gordon, a veteran of the regular army, objected to the notion that
officers could be popularly elected by the subordinates beneath them, and he believed that only
regiments with appointed officers fostered “true discipline.”

Major Dwight retained his position, but Captain J. Parker Whitney, another wealthy
gentleman, did not. In late June, Colonel Gordon spied Captain Whitney sharing a glass of rum-
punch with one of his corporals. Believing that such behavior violated proper military decorum,
Gordon ordered Whitney arrested, arguing that Whitney “had not the first trait of a gentleman, or
the least appreciation of a gentlemans position, and was consequently unfit to command [a]
company.” Captain Whitney tried to explain himself at regimental headquarters, complaining
that the corporal, who had recently been placed under arrest, had grown faint. So, Whitney’s
wife—who was also present—tried to stimulate him with a glass of punch. Whitney complained
that, “I endeavored to extenuate myself but was constantly interrupted in a hurried and excited
manner and informed that it was impossible by logic or excuse to mitigate an offense which was
unpardonable.” Whitney could scarcely believe he had committed “the most atrocious and
ungentlemanly offense it was possible to be guilty of,” and in a fury, he stormed out of Gordon’s
headquarters and tendered his resignation.

57 Greely Stevenson Curtis, et. al. to George H. Gordon, and Wilder Dwight to George H. Gordon, 9 May 1861,
George Henry Gordon Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter MAHS); Gordon,
Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain, 20.
This incident, although small, attracted the attention of Governor Andrew and the City of Boston. On July 2, Whitney attempted to retract his resignation and submitted his own statement, recounting Colonel Gordon’s “ungentlemanly” conduct. Andrew sent a harsh warning to Gordon, telling him to relax his discipline. In Andrew’s opinion, Whitney had endured “censure beyond his merits,” and he told Gordon that the “traditions and even necessities of the regular army service, by which Colonel Gordon seems to have interpreted an act of no significance when judged of by the light of peaceful militia camp-life, are hardly to be enforced by harsh judgments or ultimate penalties.” Quite simply, Andrew noted, Gordon needed to shift militia officers to the rigid discipline of wartime service more smoothly. He continued, “In the militia service with which Captain Whitney is familiar, the first officer in rank may in no sense be superior to many a person doing his duty of citizen soldier in the ranks.” Still, Andrew could not override Whitney’s resignation once he tendered it, and he deemed it “unwise” to return him to the regiment. Gordon endorsed the measure, but he took Andrew’s rebuke personally. He remembered, “[H]ow [could] such a man as Governor Andrew [not understand?] . . . –how even he failed to appreciate what was wanting to secure efficiency in a regiment!”

Generally, the gentlemen officers in Boston’s three-year regiments adhered to Gordon’s inflexible notions of discipline rather than Governor Andrew’s effort to promote social class harmony. Minor breaches of discipline often resulted in the immediate censure or dismissal of any officer in question. For instance, in Webster’s regiment—now designated the 12th Massachusetts—Second Lieutenant John Abbott of Company A rejoiced over the death of Colonel Elmer Ellsworth, the famed Union officer who had been killed by a secessionist

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58 J. P. Whitney to John Andrew, 2 July 1861, and John Andrew to George Gordon, 2 July 1861; MASA; George Gordon, Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain, 19-21.
hotelkeeper in Alexandria, Virginia. In a mere matter of hours, Colonel Webster ordered Abbott arrested. Several witnesses came forward, each claiming that Abbott had denounced New England as a region ruled by a “damned set of hypercritical abolitionists.” A court-martial found him guilty and stripped him of his uniform and rank. A corporal’s guard marched Abbott to a steamboat with a band playing the “Rogue’s March” all the while. A reporter remembered, “He appeared deeply humiliated as he left the fort, and sought retirement upon reaching the steamer.”

Boston’s regiments had a high percentage of gentleman officers because its principle academic university—Harvard—encouraged the enlistment of its students and alumni. When the first two students—members of the Junior Class—went with the three-month regiments on April 16, President Cornelius Felton cheered them on. After Fort Sumter, John Sibley, Harvard’s librarian, noted in his diary, “Very little studying going on. . . . The college is full of the spirit of war & indignant at the treatment of the country’s flag.” About 120 young men, most of them Harvard lads and recent graduates from the Class of 1860, joined a unit called the “New England Guards” (formally known as the 4th Massachusetts Battalion Volunteer Militia) commanded by Major Thomas G. Stevenson. The Guards performed a thirty-day tour of duty at Fort Independence out in the harbor, and then returned to Boston eager to participate in the organizing of the new three-year regiments. Colonel George Gordon, the former commander of the New England Guards, believed that the soldiers of the New England Guards would be excellent choices for officers in the three-year regiments. He wrote to Governor Andrew that this “small body of well-instructed gentlemen” would be ideally suited to lead the “undisciplined mobs of

59 Benjamin F. Cook, History of the Twelfth Massachusetts Volunteers (Webster Regiment) (Boston: Twelfth Regiment Association, 1882), 12; Boston Daily Journal, 28 May 1861.
raw militia.” The members of the New England Guards agreed. William F. Bartlett, who had entered Harvard in 1859, wrote that during his thirty-day service at Fort Independence, “I have learned more than I could have learned in a year in the armory or from books. . . . I value the knowledge acquired in the last month more highly than all the Greek and Latin I have learned in the last year.” Many Harvard lads went with Gordon’s 2nd Massachusetts. But due to the limitations placed upon the number of regiments raised in Boston, there were few opportunities for officers’ positions in other regiments. Some young men, Bartlett included, preferred to wait for a chance at officer’s bars. Later, when a Norwich Graduate, William R. Lee, began raising the 20th Massachusetts, Bartlett and seven other Harvard graduates acquired commissions for his regiment. Out of an enrollment of 2,400, some 500 Harvard students chose to enlist at the war’s outset. More than twenty-four percent of graduates from the years between the years 1841 and 1861 enlisted.

New York City’s Columbia University followed the same trajectory as Harvard. President Charles King harbored Unionist sentiments, and on April 23, 1861, in a display of faithfulness to the federal administration, he held a ceremonial flag-raising on campus to honor the heroes of Fort Sumter. His son, Lieutenant Cornelius King, stood alongside him. By war’s end, Columbia provided 395 alumni to the ranks. Also in the Union’s ranks was a member of the faculty, Colonel Francis L. Vinton, of the 43rd New York, and John Jacob Astor, Jr., one of the

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61 O’Connor, *Civil War Boston*, 69.
Institutions of higher learning served important functions in cursory military training, or at least many city dwellers believed they should. A writer for the Philadelphia Inquirer believed that the Quaker City’s two most prestigious schools, University of Pennsylvania and Central High School, ought to make “military instruction a part of the course in all our colleges, high schools and private schools for boys of the proper age.” In the wake of the Bull Run disaster, the writer contended that the Union’s deficiency was not in numbers but in competent officers. If the officers had knowledge, “we would have been spared much disaster and mortification.” Moreover, contended the newspaper correspondent, “Beside national security to recommend this system [of military instruction], it is now urged by the most eminent physiologists who have made the matter their study, that the minds of our children are overtasked, and that their mature powers would be far more vigorous if physical were united with mental as a requisite part of education.” The trustees of the University of Pennsylvania took this advice to heart and hired Professor Henry Coppée, a graduate of West Point who then taught history at the university, to teach a course on military instruction. In the true “spirit of conservatism” reflective of most universities, so wrote another newspaper correspondent, Coppée’s class would not go into effect for another year. But when it did, it proved popular among the students. Coppée required them to purchase textbooks on the “military art,” books on the organization of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, books on the manufacture of projectiles, and books on the construction of field fortifications. The students at University of Pennsylvania formed their own company, the

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“University Light Infantry,” which drilled three times a week. Quickly, the University of Pennsylvania’s new curriculum came to be seen as an indispensible component of mobilization, serving as a school for volunteer officers. Wrote a contributor to the *North American*, “With an experienced instructor, and all needed material, it is hoped that the course will be as complete and satisfactory as it can be made in any other than a purely military institution, and that the diploma of graduation . . . from our University will come to be regarded as a passport to a commission in our service, both regular and volunteer.”63

The task of disciplining the enlisted men fell not only to the officers—many of whom seemed terribly deficient themselves—but also to the regimental chaplains, who considered themselves able barometers of judging obedience. They represented most of the major urban denominations. Chaplain Warren Cudworth, pastor of the Unitarian Church of East Boston, attested that the moral and religious condition of the 1st Massachusetts was not significantly high. He wrote Governor Andrew that, “There are . . . any number of profane swearers, a considerable number that drink and a few who gamble.” During required Sunday services, Cudworth spoke out against these vices, but he seemed to have little effect. Although Cudworth expressed reluctance to opine on military discipline, he stated that “the rules are not enforced quite so much as the comfort of the good and the correction of the bad require.” Cudworth went so far as to contact Senator Henry Wilson, who told him to speak to Colonel Cowdin and advise “more strictness &c.” To facilitate matters, Reverend T. N. Haskell of East Boston’s Maverick Church, a member of the American Tract Society, donated to the 1st Massachusetts 350 volumes each of two books authored by himself, “A Sketch of the Life of Sir Henry Havelock,” and “A Sketch of

the Life of Captain Hedley Vicars.” Haskell hoped his religiously-oriented “instructional” books would awaken faith inside the regiment.64

Religion also served to instill the new troops with courage, and by so doing, it surreptitiously asked the volunteers to accept more rigid forms of discipline. On June 26, Reverend Dr. Edward N. Kirk spoke to Colonel George Clark, Jr.’s 11th Massachusetts. In a long address, Kirk steeled the nerves of Clark’s men. Kirk encouraged the soldiers to obey their officers, refrain from drink, and prepare themselves to meet God. “None of you should be afraid to meet your God,” he said. “The old Puritan soldiers went into their tents and prayed and groaned and cast out of their hearts before their father in heaven; and they came forth with swords in their hands and placed their feet on the necks of kings. A man so prepared as they were is surely fit to meet the devil on the battlefield.”65

New York City’s Protestant leaders also flocked to the camps to save their soldiers’ threatened souls. Reverend William B. Darrach visited City Park Barracks in June and dispersed hundreds of Testaments. Darrach cleverly alluded to the soldiers’ new habits of living, their new responsibilities, and their new temptations, “speaking of the element of obedience, he said obedience to human authority was founded on submission to the law of God.” The New York Bible Society also commenced a massive campaign to spread the Word of God to soldiers. The society’s president, William Allen Butler, vowed “to place the New Testament in the hands of every soldier as the very best manual of duty.” By late May, Butler guessed that there were twenty-nine New York City regiments fully supplied, and five more in the process of supply. Of these soldiers, 23,000 had received Testaments. Butler believed, “men who loved Bibles” would be the first “to employ those Bibles to press home more bullets which were to be fired in defense

64 Warren Cudworth to John Andrew, 25 June 1861, MASA; Boston Daily Journal, 22 May 1861.
of rights.” In mid-October, the city’s Army Committee of the Evangelical Alliance reported sending 5,000 hymnals and religious journals to organizing regiments, thanks to liberal donations from five churches, twenty Sunday schools, and ten individuals. 66

Religious groups also addressed the needs of foreign-born soldiers. In September, the American Tract Society rummaged through its collection of German-language publications and sent tracts to New York City’s 12,000 German soldiers, those currently at the front and those still in organization. The Society possessed eighty-six German volumes and 220 German tracts, including such stories as “Haversack,” “The Story of Lucknow,” “The Soldier and his Bible,” and “Death of a Christian Soldier,” tales that reinforced moral behavior and soldierly obedience. 67

Baltimore’s religious figures did the same. The Maryland Bible Society distributed pocket testaments to the 1st and 2nd Maryland and to all the sick soldiers housed by the Union Relief Association. However, the Bible Society became heavily invested in saving the souls of a new regiment, Colonel William Schley’s “Public Guard Regiment,” a regiment authorized by Simon Cameron to serve only within the boundaries of Maryland. Obviously, so guessed Baltimore’s ministers, any home guard regiment demanded extra attention, since its members would serve within the state, and citizens’ property would be at their mercy. On September 22, at the request of Reverend Robert Piggott, Colonel Schley held religious exercises in the Public Guard Regiment’s camp at Lafayette Square. Visitors flocked to see the services and one witness called Reverend Piggott’s homily “impressive and appropriate.” 68

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66 New York Tribune, 6 and 20 May 1861.
67 New York Times, 8 September and 16 October 1861.
68 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 11 and 23 September 1861.
City-born soldiers proved equally concerned—if not more so—about the appointment of their regimental surgeons. All states required their surgeons and assistant surgeons to pass a State Board Examination. Strangely, although the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not regulate its volunteer officer corps—unlike New York, which had an easily passable officers’ examination—it set up an elaborate system to ensure that quality medical officers would be assigned to its regiments. Philadelphia, of course, faced the brunt of these examinations since it contained the most prestigious medical schools in the state. In all, Pennsylvania appointed 1,131 surgeons and assistant surgeons during the war. Of these, 204 (18.03 percent) resided in Philadelphia and 571 (50.48 percent) had graduated from medical schools in Philadelphia, principally the University of Pennsylvania and Jefferson Medical College.69

Pennsylvania’s medical exam tested applicants on four areas of expertise: “Practice of Medicine,” “Materia Medica,” “Anatomy,” and “Surgery.” Each section required short-answer responses for ten to fourteen questions. Examiners graded the responses on a ten-point system with pluses or minuses to denote quality gradations in answers. Scores from ten to seven-minus qualified an applicant as a surgeon and scores from six-plus to five qualified an applicant as an assistant surgeon. A score less than five denoted failure, although an appointment as a hospital steward remained possible. Philadelphians generally did well, scoring higher than rural Pennsylvanians. For instance, on October 6, 1861, the State Board of Surgeons examined 163 candidates, awarding a single ten and only two nine-plus scores. William H. Taggart, who scored

the ten, and William J. Fleming, who scored one of the nine-pluses, both came from 
Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{70}

Philadelphians scored well due to the high degree of textbook medical knowledge 
required by the exam. William H. Gobrecht, a ten-year practitioner and teacher of anatomy, 
scored a perfect ten on his August 6, 1861, examination, for he could accurately describe the 
knee joint and the layers of the eye. He also suggested the use of leeches as a treatment for 
dysentery, a widely-held but inaccurate belief of nineteenth-century medicine. The exams did not 
stress practical field surgery. When asked, “How would you treat a Gun-shot Wound of the 
Knee-joint?” Gobrecht answered tersely, “Amputations as a general rule.” Philadelphia also 
provided its share of middle- and low-level scorers, as well as walk-outs. Twenty-eight-year-old 
George Yeomans, a graduate of Jefferson Medical College and an active practitioner for one year 
and four months, scored a six. When asked what could be done to arrest an internal hemorrhage 
of the chest, Yeomans answered, “Cannot do much to arrest it.”\textsuperscript{71}

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth took its medical officer appointments seriously, 
castigating field officers who appointed their own medical staff in defiance of regulations. 
 Colonel Peter Lyle, the commander of the heavily Democratic 90\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania, tried to install 
a loyal party member as surgeon, but Surgeon General Henry H. Smith informed him that this 
was in violation of General Orders Number 25 of the U.S. War Department and General Orders 
Number 8 of the Commonwealth’s office at Harrisburg. Smith wrote, “I cannot therefore 
recognize the gentleman official [assigned] by [you] & shall hereafter be compelled to assign

\textsuperscript{70} State Board of Medical Officers Examination, 6 August 1861 and 6 October 1861, PSA. 
\textsuperscript{71} William H. Gobrecht State Board Medical Examination and George Yeomans State Board Medical Examination, 
6 August 1861, PSA.
you others in accordance with law.” Smith made it clear: Lyle would have to submit to his appointment or face a court-martial.

A few surgeons found this arrangement obnoxious. Philadelphia’s antebellum associations of medical scholars and practitioners took their prejudices with them to war. George Rex, a practitioner who lived at 1211 North Third Street, believed that Surgeon General Smith denied his appointment because of a prewar dispute. Rex argued, “The late legislature in their enactment organizing a State Medical Board did not contemplate the establishment of a Medical Inquisition by which its citizens should be guillotined at the will and caprice of a tyrant.” Rex had passed his State Board Examination as a surgeon and received an appointment to the 73rd Pennsylvania. However, Smith inexplicably replaced Rex with another man, William H. Gunkle, a candidate who scored only a six-plus on his examination, thus qualifying him as an assistant surgeon only. Rex guessed that this abuse of power came from “a fiendish and malignant pertinacity, and for the sole purpose of gratifying alone, Dr. Smith to wreak his vengeance on me for an inferred professional delinquency.” Rex went on to accuse Smith of denying another candidate—a scholar of anatomy—for filling the chair of surgery at the University of Pennsylvania. Rex further pointed out that his own ousting was of serious character, for his regiment, the 73rd Pennsylvania, was fourth-fifths German, and none of the medical staff, except him, spoke the language. To him, this looked like unprofessional favoritism. Rex maintained that Smith “seriously impaired and retarded” the efficiency of the army by “unjust and improper interference.”

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72 Henry H. Smith to Peter Lyle, 16 October 1861, PSA.
73 George Rex to Andrew G. Curtin, 11 December 1861, PSA.
Surgical appointments proved especially vicious within New York City’s ethnically diverse environs. Many foreign-born regiments demanded particular surgical appointments. When Dr. Augustus Koehler received appointment to the 52nd New York, other officers immediately resented him. After ten days in camp, Colonel Paul Frank told Koehler to go to the Medical Purveyor’s office and pick up supplies. When Koehler returned to camp, he discovered that his regiment had boarded a steamer for Washington without him. When the regiment reached Washington, the assistant surgeon, Henry Gerke, who had left the city dressed as surgeon, asked the Albany Medical Board to remove Koehler because he had several antebellum malpractice suits pending against him. Gerke also claimed that Koehler had spent six months in a lunatic asylum and was “unfit to fill the position as surgeon of the Regiment.”

Dr. Jules Dubreuil experienced a similar ousting from the 53rd New York. He received an appointment as assistant surgeon but another man offered him $150 to resign. Dubreuil, in a statement to New York’s Surgeon General, wrote, “Of course I would not listen to him and disregarded his offer because I am not accustomed to such bargains, which, in my opinion, if carried on a large scale would be a source of drawbacks, nay, a shame for your liberal institutions in America.” This did not dissuade the interloper, who, one day, showed up dressed in an assistant surgeon’s frock coat. Then, when the regiment departed suddenly, the staff failed to inform Dubreuil. Nevertheless, Dubreuil jumped on board another out-bound steamer and arrived in Washington just behind his regiment. As he descended the gang-plank, a squad of men arrested him. After consultation with his commander, Colonel d’Epineuil, Dubreuil learned that the regiment’s seething animosity came from rumors started by the regimental surgeon who

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74 Augustus Koehler to S. O. Vanderpoel, 11 October 1861; Henry Gerke deposition, n.d.; Paul Frank, Phillip Lichtenstein, and C. G. Freudenberg to S. O. Vanderpoel, n.d.; Paul Frank to S. O. Vanderpoel, 8 November 1861, NYSA.
despised Dubreuil for an unstated professional reason. After some bargaining, d’Epineuil managed to get Dubreuil transferred to another unit.\textsuperscript{75}

Prospective medical staff for New York City’s regiments shamelessly manipulated the medical appointment system to their advantage. When John L. Dodge, a medical practitioner of fifteen years, failed to pass his surgeon’s examination, he listed his accomplishments to Surgeon General S. Oakley Vanderpoel, stating, to his inevitable success, “I hope you will find sufficient excuse in the humiliation I must feel in being recommended as assistant only over men who have known me for years in practice.” Charles W. Torrey, the man that Dodge replaced, suddenly found himself called in for re-examination. After standing six hours before the Medical Board, he was rejected because he believed in the principle of homeopathy. Charles W. Hager, the surgeon of the 54\textsuperscript{th} New York, attempted to get Dr. Adolphus Drescher appointed assistant surgeon in his regiment, even though Drescher had failed his examination. Hager listed Drescher’s various accomplishments as a surgeon in the Austrian Army, guessing, “I am quite sure that he would have passed his examination if it not had been for the English language and I am inclined to presume that he misunderstood entirely the English questions which were given to him.” Colonel Robert Betge of the 68\textsuperscript{th} New York simply distrusted his surgeon, Dr. Louis Schultz, and agitated for a new appointment, admonishing Governor Morgan, “a clever surgeon is indispensable to a regiment.”\textsuperscript{76}

Despite the many inefficiencies of urban recruiting, the patriotic chaos had its desired effect, and once completed, regiments began to leave for the front. In Boston, when each

\textsuperscript{75} Jules Dubreuil to S. O. Vanderpoel, 24 October 1861; Henry J. Phillips to Lionel J. d’Epineuil, 4 November 1861, NYSA.

\textsuperscript{76} John L. Dodge to S. O. Vanderpoel, 3 October 1861; Charles W. Torrey to S. O. Vanderpoel, 28 November 1861; Charles W. Hager to S. O. Vanderpoel, 9 November 1861; Robert Betge to Edwin Morgan, n.d., NYSA.
regiment departed, it marched through the streets of the city to receive a flag near the State House with an elaborate ceremony. Thousands of spectators, friends, and relatives came to witness these popular events. On June 15, when Colonel Cowdin’s 1st Massachusetts received its colors on Boston Common, a “mass of humanity”—the crowd of spectators—bull-rushed the police force, trampling the constabulary outposts and rushing “in overwhelming numbers to the embraces of husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers.” Wrote a reporter, “Touching scenes, the remembrance of which years will not efface from memory of the participators, were witnessed, contradicting by their stern reality the burden of the song, ‘a soldier’s life is always gay,’ calling for the exercise of the loftiest patriotism, which gives up home, friends, and life itself for country, and testing the strength of the tenderest affections.”

Public addresses at color presentations made it clear that Boston and Massachusetts stood on the right side of this conflict. The orators frequently connected Boston’s Unionist sentiment to its revolutionary heritage. Edward Everett, the former vice presidential candidate of the Constitutional-Union Party, told Colonel Webster’s 12th Massachusetts that “the memories of Bunker Hill, Lexington, and Concord will hover around your march.” Flag presentations also served to link Irish soldiers to the cause. On June 23, the 9th Massachusetts received a $200 Emerald Banner at Tremont Street Mall. The golden motto on the flag read, “Thy sons by adoption, from duty, affection, and choice,” and on the scroll: “As aliens and strangers thou didst us befriend; as sons and true patriots we do thee defend.” Two days later, Governor Andrew honored the regiment, presenting it with an American flag, reminding the Irishmen of their duty to their adopted land. He said, “As religion makes no distinction in the human family, so the United States of America knows no distinction between its native born citizens and those born in

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77 Boston Daily Journal, 17 June 1861
other countries. In one common tide flows the blood of a common humanity inherited by all, and into our hearts, by the inspiration of the Almighty, has been breathed a common understanding. . . When you look upon the Stars and Stripes, you can remember that you are American citizens.”

Flag presentations held especial importance in Baltimore, where they served to confirm the loyalty of the city’s Unionists. On June 6, the 1st Maryland moved to a new camp of instruction—Camp Carroll—near the junction of the Camden Station and Mount Clare branches of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. On June 18, Colonel Kenly assembled his regiment at Carroll Mansion to receive its colors. Over 1,200 spectators arrived to witness this magnificent event. A “bevy of young ladies” from West Baltimore—thirty-four in number—arrived as part of the flag delegation. Each lady crowned her head with a wreath of flowers and each wore a white dress to symbolize one of the stars on the American flag. The regimental band of the 22nd Pennsylvania provided music, while Miss Emma Lawrenson—who represented the State of Maryland—presented the colors to Colonel Kenly. In exchange, Kenly placed a wreath of “beautiful flowers” upon Lawrenson’s neck and expressed his gratitude, especially since the banner came “from those who lived in the section of the city where he had so long resided.” After the keynote speaker, S. Morris Cochran, finished, the ladies sang “The Star Spangled Banner” and the 22nd Pennsylvania’s regimental band struck up the “Gay and Happy Quickstep.”

78 Cook, History of the Twelfth Massachusetts Volunteers, 20; Alonzo Quint, The Record of the Second Massachusetts Infantry, 1861-1865 (Boston: James P. Walker, 1867, 25; Macnamara, History of the Ninth Regiment, 23; Boston Evening Transcript, 24 June 1861.
Now, no one could doubt that a portion of Baltimore, at least, committed itself to the preservation of the Union.79

Eight days later, the first three companies of the 2nd Maryland received their colors in an identical ceremony at Camp Carroll. Forty women wearing white dresses with floral wreaths in their hair conducted these silk flags to Colonel John Sommer. John L. Thomas, a lawyer, delivered this keynote address. While Cochran’s lecture had hinged its rhetoric upon Maryland’s Revolutionary heritage, Thomas focused his speech on the current crisis at hand and Baltimore’s earlier hesitancy in answering the call. “Soldiers, Maryland soldiers! . . .” Thomas began, “You are not called upon to wage an ‘unholy war’ upon friends and kinsman. You are asked to defend your country—to protect this flag—to wipe out the foul stigma that has attempted to be put upon it by its foes— . . . It is not the war of Lincoln. It is the war of Jeff Davis and his Confederate traitors upon the Great American people and the Great American Republic.” When Thomas finished, a soldier from the regiment proposed three cheers for the ladies, three cheers more for General Scott, and three-times-three cheers for the Union.80

The departure of regiments revealed some imminent danger, as the excessive celebratory attitude bred carelessness. Boston’s 1st Massachusetts’ departure seemed riddled with problems, yet, wrote a reporter, the troops were “boisterously hilarious.” Chaplain Cudworth remembered that women and children were “jumping about in a perfect frenzy of excitement.” First, a valuable horse owned by one of the officers leaped from a railroad car while it was in motion. The regimental wagoner opened the door to give all the horses some air, but one horse became

79 Camper and Kirkley, First Regiment Maryland Infantry, 9-12; Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 19 June 1861
frightened, bolted from the car, fell onto the tracks, and was run over. Then, near Groton, Connecticut, Private Daniel B. Miller of Company D, fell from the cars himself and had both legs run over by twenty-four railroad cars. The horribly mangled private died after a few hours of agonizing pain. Then, at New York City, the soldiers boarded the steamer “Commonwealth” to head to Jersey City. On the steamer, Private Timothy Ahearn of Company A fell overboard and was nearly pulled under by the weight of his heavy knapsack. Luckily, his comrades threw him a line and pulled him to safety.\textsuperscript{81} While other regiments experienced fewer problems in transit, similar issues plagued their journey to the front. Governor Andrew, though, tried to make an example of Cowdin, and a few days after the 1\textsuperscript{st} Massachusetts arrived in Washington, Andrew demanded that Lincoln remove him from command. Cowdin avoided removal, and in October, he received a promotion to brigadier general.\textsuperscript{82}

New York City’s regiments departed in awkward fits and starts. The summer departures demonstrated far more confusion and mismanagement than those from the spring. Colonel John H. McCunn’s “Irish Rifles” (37\textsuperscript{th} New York Infantry) missed its scheduled departure date of June 22 because hundreds of men were missing or absent. When Colonel Calvin Pratt’s 31\textsuperscript{st} New York Infantry arrived in the city from Riker’s Island on June 22 to depart, it exhibited “more or less insubordination” on account that many, although duly sworn into federal service, had not received pay. Unexpectedly, the regiment’s departure was delayed, giving the soldiers two days to keep “their spirits up by pouring spirits down.” When the soldiers arrived at the docks to receive their colors on June 24, hundreds of them showed up inebriated and, according to a

\textsuperscript{81} Cudworth, \textit{History of the First Regiment}, 20-1; \textit{Boston Evening Transcript}, 17 June 1861; \textit{Boston Daily Journal}, 17 June 1861.

\textsuperscript{82} John Andrew to Abraham Lincoln, 8 July 1861, MASA.
witness, it became “chaos, come again. . . . Soldiers and citizens, hoops and drums, bayonets and walking sticks, bonnets and havelocks, became an almost inextricable mass of confusion.”

Many soldiers adamantly refused to leave until they received pay. Colonel Pratt pleaded with his men, telling them that he was good for it: “Can’t you take my word? . . . I promise you shall be paid.” Pratt met instant resentment. “Damn you!” called a private, “I will not go until I get my money!” At 1:00 P.M., Pratt ordered the grounds cleared for departure, but the soldiers refused to separate from their visitors. Eventually, a sizable police force shoved the citizens off the docks and closed the gates. Numerous fist fights erupted between soldiers, citizens, and policemen, and the lieutenant in charge of the gate “was often grossly insulted by privates who defied his authority.” After five hours, the regimental officers formed the intractable men into line, and a representative from the leather merchants of “the Swamp” presented colors to the regiment. Afterwards, the despondent, hung-over soldiers boarded a steamer bound for the seat of war.84 When the 31st New York finally went to the front, it lost two soldiers en route. One private sprained his ankle in Philadelphia and had to be left behind in a local hospital. Another man—Private Carran McCormick—leaped off the steamer before it safely docked at the Philadelphia wharf. He plunged into the Delaware River and drowned. Undoubtedly, the awkward exodus of the summer troops contrasted sharply with 7th N.Y.S.M.’s orderly departure from New York City back in April.85

Even though they had a shorter distance to travel, departing Philadelphia regiments experienced danger too. On August 3, the 29th Pennsylvania marched through Philadelphia on its

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84 Ibid., 25 June 1861.
way to the depot. Private David Moaut recalled, “It was a terrible hot day, several of the Regiment were sun struck and a large number gave out, we were like all green soldiers, having our knapsacks loaded with everything imaginable most of all with under clothing to last for the whole three years.” Just before the 29th Pennsylvania paraded, a gun held by a nervous private discharged, wounding a captain, a sergeant, a private, and an African American cook. When the column reached the wire suspension bridge over the Schuylkill River, the cadence caused the bridge to sway so violently that it nearly threw several men into the river. When the regiment reached the corner of Broad and Locust Streets, crowds of excited well-wishers broke the line of march. Private Moaut’s eighty-year-old grandmother shouldered her way through the ranks to hand him a pie, a bundle of cakes, and a pair of recently-knit wool socks. Moaut easily succumbed to the excitement. He wrote, “I ran out of line took the things kissed her good bye and fell into line again.” Colonel Murphy found it impossible to maintain the “quick step,” and he gave the command, “route step.” His soldiers heard this and broke ranks permanently. Defying military convention, many took streetcars to the depot. A lieutenant remembered, “[M]any took advantage of different vehicles to reach the Depot so that all the companies were greatly reduced when the head of the regiment arrived there.”

From the end of April to the period immediately after the Battle of Bull Run, the four cities of the Northeast responded haphazardly to the War Department’s call to arms. Lincoln had issued two calls for volunteers, one on April 15 and another on May 3. In addition to meeting their quotas, the cities and state governments added more demands that complicated the recruiting process. For instance, during this period, New York City sent 26,450 men to the front.

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86 David Moaut, “Three Years in the 29th Pennsylvania,” and unknown manuscript (probably written by George Johnson), David Mouat papers, HSP.
This included 164 companies distributed among nineteen of Governor Morgan’s two-year regiments, forty-four companies distributed among five of the Union Defense Committee’s three-year regiments, one independent cavalry company, one artillery battery and 5,950 three-month volunteers. While New York progressed in this manner, the governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Massachusetts agitated for additional regiments. Curtin added ten three-month regiments and fifteen “Pennsylvania Reserve” regiments, while Andrew agitated for ten additional regiments from Massachusetts, a demand he received in mid-June. Only in Baltimore, still in the throes of subduing the Confederate population, did mobilization continue without reckless enthusiasm. Only there did mobilization occur cheaply and efficiently. In the other cities, where chaos ruled the hour, too many recruits came forward at once. While cities demonstrated the zeal necessary to rush troops to the front in this time of crisis, the process of mobilization disclosed a host of tumultuous issues wrought by ill-prepared city residents and city institutions, and frequent collisions between local, state, and federal levels of government became regular matters of concern.

Why did the cities of the Northeast refuse to take steps to correct the recruiting problems, even though they had been obvious throughout the spring of 1861? The answer is simple: few urbanites believed that the war would last longer than a few months. Living in a community of excess—filled with money, capital, and manpower—urbanites believed that Union victory was inevitable. What urbanites could not yet conceive was how such a large scale mobilization could

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87 Morgan’s regiments included all or portions of the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 15th (afterwards the 15th New York Engineers), 17th, 20th, 25th, 29th, 31st, 32nd, 36th, 37th, and 38th New York Infantry Regiments. The Union Defense Committee’s regiments included all or portions of the 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, and 79th New York Infantry Regiments. The cavalry company was the 1st N.Y.S.M. Cavalry, a three-month company commanded by Captain Thomas Devin. The artillery battery was the 9th Independent Light Artillery.
so easily stretch the bounds of their resources. That lesson would yet be taught in the coming months.
Chapter 4:
“Northern Cities Do Not Furnish the Supplies as Expeditiously as the Wants of Soldiers Require”: Supplying and Feeding the Troops, May 1861—December 1861.

The mobilization effort to provide the necessary supplies and equipage for urban troops followed a path similar to that required to raise volunteers. As important industrial centers—in some cases, as the only means of mass production of certain military articles in its state—Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City had to take the lead in the production of military goods. Also, since the new volunteers’ families relied upon wages—not subsistence—to live, cities proved to be key testing grounds where the strength of local charity could offset the “wage-less” period experienced by soldiers’ families, the period after a soldier quit his job and enlisted but before he received his first pay. As hundreds of wives came forward demanding relief, urban agencies opened to ameliorate their sufferings. Nevertheless, despite good intentions, the cities failed to create an efficient supply and relief system, leaving the new volunteers and their families hovering on the brink of destitution.

The size of the problem was obvious to urbanites at the outset. Even the first few days of the war revealed to city dwellers the scarcity of money, uniforms, weapons, and provisions necessary to support the new regiments. After the three-month volunteers departed the cities, it became obvious that urban residents would have to continue to support soldiers and their families, and to accomplish this, they would have to respond liberally.

The process of mobilizing the three-month and three-year regiments required a massive shift in the cities’ industrial production. Clothing sellers and leather-makers altered their businesses to meet military demands. Naturally, merchants viewed the war as a godsend. Initial fears that businesses would falter as a result of secession evaporated when certain tradesmen
realized that state procurement of military goods would save their establishments. For instance, New York City businessmen came to understand that the army did not only require weapons and uniforms, but camp equipage as well. Home furnishing businesses could adapt their manufactures to meet military needs. During the first seven weeks of the war, Brigadier General Chester A. Arthur, Quartermaster of the Depot of New York City, bought and dispersed 10,720 blankets, 11,674 mattresses, 9,990 cups, 10,180 spoons, 4,969 caps, fifty-six boxes of soap, twelve gross of matches, twenty shovels, 363 pails, fifty-eight boxes of candles, 1,445 yards of toweling, 10,413 sets of knives and forks, 12,191 shirts, 14,765 pairs of socks, 433 brooms, 6,315 pairs of shoes, thirty-one cots, and 312 lanterns.¹

Initially, the cities found it difficult to provision troops because officials did not know how much to spend on military equipage during the early months of the war. New York City’s various firms competed aggressively for contracts while military officers made inexpert demands for supplies. Within days of the commencement of the war, State Quartermaster General Cuyler Van Vechten lamented to an aide, “We find ourselves in about as much of a ‘singular position’ as when the services of ‘us Generals’ was first required by the state. . . Oh! For a lodge in some wilderness, [I] don’t care whether it is vast or not, if it is only thick woods!!!!” Van Vechten attributed his daily problems to the inevitable collision of self-interested capitalism and political confusion:

Now is this not delightful, yes refreshing to enquiring minds? Then again this subject of ‘tents’ greatly excites the minds of the officials, and I am directed by everybody to secure a sample tent & after it has been inspected & approved &c. proposals are to be invited for furnishing a supply. Somebody says that ‘Crimean Tents’ can be bought for about $25.00 each. (I never saw a ‘Crimean Tent’ in my life, so of course I must take somebody’s word for all I do) I presume that somebody must know that the cost is about $25.00 for each tent so I send to your department & ask to be furnished with a sample.—sample comes— man wants $55.00 each. Board of Officers

¹ *New York Herald*, 7 June 1861.
say can’t be done—monstrous dear! Wait !! Col. Van Buren writes that ‘a man says that he considers a lot sold to the State by the order of the Governor at $90. each.’ His excellency says ‘no such thing.’ I have not bought a tent at any price.\textsuperscript{2}

The failure of New York’s State Military Board to agree on prices for military equipage resulted in multiple delays in provisioning the troops. Some, like Van Vechten, refused to purchase military goods until they could confidently declare fair prices. Others simply purchased inferior material at high cost. On April 23, the State Military Board made a requisition for 12,000 uniforms, awarding the entire contract to Brooks Brothers, a ready-made clothing firm in the city, which pledged to sew complete uniforms for $19.50 a piece. Brooks Brothers employed 6,000 operatives in a four-story building at the corner of Grand Street and Broadway. The \textit{New York Herald} applauded the contract, for it gave “employment to many poor people.” Although the firm promised to supply only heavy wool broadcloth, two days after signing the contract, it asked for an amendment to allow the use of “shoddy,” recycled wool scraps refashioned into a thinly woven cloth. On May 1, State Inspector General William Jackson approved this change. In sixteen days, the operatives completed 5,000 uniforms and the firm dispersed them among two New York City regiments and three Albany regiments. The \textit{Herald} claimed that the firm had filled its duty “in a creditable and highly satisfactory manner,” and boasted, “With such machinery at hand the federal government need not fear to levy large armies.”\textsuperscript{3}

Quite often, New York City’s prewar patronage system interfered with the business of supply, and contracts recurrently went to personal friends and colleagues. On April 20, Commissary General Benjamin Welch, Jr., advertised a request for 28,000 cartridge boxes,

\textsuperscript{2} Cuyler Van Vechten to Chester A. Arthur, 4 May 1861, Quartermaster General’s papers, New York State Archives, (hereafter, NYSA).
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{New York Herald}, 10 May 1861.
cartridge belts and plates, bayonet scabbards and frogs, waist belts and plates, cap pouches and picks, gun slings, knapsacks, and haversacks. Welch asked for sealed proposals submitted by April 30, but when the time came to issue the contract, Welch simply awarded the entire allotment to Thomas C. Smith, a construction contractor with no leather-making experience who subcontracted the work to various out-of-state leatherworkers. Welch’s selection of Smith, some guessed, had much to do with favoritism.⁴

Farther south, Philadelphia struggled fitfully to create order out of its chaotic supply system. At first, it seemed like selfless patriotism would meet the demand. Hundreds of local women, ranging from the city’s elite to working class, manufactured uniforms to outfit seven regiments at the Girard House, an emergency clothing depot established by the Commonwealth’s quartermaster-general, Reuben C. Hale. On April 20, Colonel Robert L. Martin took command of the Girard House depot and oversaw the production of complete uniforms costing a mere $17.00 each. By the second week in May, the Girard House’s workers finished 4,000 uniforms, enough to clothe four Philadelphia regiments.⁵

Far behind New York City and Philadelphia in industrial production, Boston struggled to supply its volunteers. Leading citizens estimated that it cost $60,000 to outfit a ten-company infantry regiment, not including its weapons or food. Benevolent groups sponsored particular regiments, subscribing munificent funds to meet their demands. Colonel Gordon’s regiment of “blue bloods” did quite well, receiving $11,000 from wealthy benefactors. As a result, Gordon purchased clothing from a private company, “the best the regiment ever had,” remembered the

regimental chaplain. Other regiments were not so fortunate. Colonel Cass’s Irish 9th Massachusetts acquired its funds from Boston’s struggling North End and it received only $4,000. As a result, it had to wait to receive uniforms from the state.6

As in Philadelphia, Boston’s female residents and laboring classes endeavored to produce uniforms for the men as quickly as possible. Some ready-made clothing establishments could easily adapt their businesses to meet the exigencies of the hour, as did George W. Simmons and Company, which completed 1,000 uniforms in one month, advertising them: “Cheap! Cheap!” However, most contractors became overworked, because, as one reporter commented, “The demand . . . has reduced the stock of military goods and munitions of war of our city tradesmen to a low ebb.” Nevertheless, the war provided hundreds, if not thousands, of jobs to male and female sewers and cutters.7

The cities’ three-month soldiers faced supply challenges immediately after their deployment to the front. Within days, the uniforms manufactured at Philadelphia’s Girard House began to give out. A combination of poor quality material and unskilled workmanship caused shoes, blankets, and uniforms to fall apart. A reporter visiting the camp of one three-month regiment remarked that the regiment’s shoes had gone soft after only two days of marching. He stated facetiously, “I am happy to say that they made a real good piece of pine shavings.” Soldiers from other states camped nearby, laughed derisively at the Philadelphians, tagging them with an assortment of abusive nicknames including the “Dirty Shirt Boys,” the “Fancy Men,”

6 Quint, The Record of the Second Massachusetts Infantry, 23; Boston Evening Transcript, 19 April 1861.
7 Boston Evening Transcript, 1 June 1861; Boston Daily Journal, 23 April 1861. Whitten, Hopkins, and Company on Milk Street employed over 1,000 tailors and seamstresses by late April and it managed to produce 4,700 overcoats for Massachusetts regiments and 1,000 overcoats for New Hampshire regiments, roughly 500 jackets each day. By the same time, this company had collected $75,000 in contracts.
and, perhaps most originally, “The Joseph Soldiers,”—a Biblical reference to Joseph’s “coat of many colors,” derived from the fact that rain washed the dye out of the Girard House uniforms.  

A correspondent for the Daily Evening Bulletin found the Philadelphia uniforms deplorable. He wrote, “Only so far as the guns were concerned did they [the men] present any appearances of the soldier.” The correspondent noted how the blankets of the regiment he visited shed like dog hair, giving rise to yet another nickname, the “Dog-Haired Soldiers.” He continued, “To see the men shaking the hair off their persons on getting up in the morning is truly laughable, the hair goes up like the dust cloud raised by a whirlwind.” One clever wag wrote a poem, expressing his disgust at the poor uniforms:

*I, Lieutenant Colonel Graham, of the twelfth depose to say,  
That the coats contractors gave us were of shoddy cloth of grey;  
Badly made and badly fashioned, much too large or small for men;  
Only for a day we wore them and they came to pieces then . . .  
Close the record. Oh my country could it be you did intend;  
Whether draped in shamefully shoddy to the battlefield to send?  

Who then blundered, who then swindled? Let us print his blasted name!  
Let us hang this suit of shoddy on his own dishonored frame!  
Let us make him then betake him in his own contractor clothes  
Where his service will be something fearing from the corn the crows!”

The uniform failures in Philadelphia stemmed from the elaborate subcontracting system hastily authorized by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. To meet the pressing demands, Governor Andrew Curtin authorized Quartermaster General Hale to contract out much of the necessary labor. Nearly all of Philadelphia’s three-hundred textile firms, large and small, responded to this summons. In turn, successful bidders subcontracted their work, allowing rapacious middlemen to take kickbacks by supplying low-quality wool. The failure of

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Pennsylvania’s state military department to inspect the material before giving it to the Girard House seamstresses led to these uniform malfunctions.\footnote{Richard Sauers, \textit{Guide to Civil War Philadelphia}, 5.}

Philadelphia’s newspapers identified the problem instantly, and knew right where to lay the blame: the greedy contractors and the negligent state government. “Is this not humiliating to our State Pride?” raised a correspondent to the \textit{Philadelphia Inquirer}. “First in the field, the most liberal of all states with her men and money, it is a deplorable fact that our State authorities, designedly or innocently, have fallen into the hands of rapacious contractors, who are paid enormous sums of money for clothing, which is so inferior to that furnished to the soldiers of other states that our men are made a by-word when they put it on.”\footnote{“A Friend of the Soldier,” \textit{Philadelphia Inquirer}, 18 May 1861.}

Many Philadelphia officers complained directly to Curtin about the quality of the uniforms. Colonel William D. Lewis, Jr. of the 18\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania wrote the governor “that the Uniforms from head to foot are in a very bad condition, and that I shall be compelled in a few days to make another requisition for boots and pantaloons, . . . those furnished by the state having entirely given out.” When no requisition came, the 18\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania’s quartermaster, John J. Marshall, sent Curtin a letter claiming that he would have to ask the federal government for new uniforms, “in consequence of the very inferior quality of those articles furnished by your State. All the shoes received by the privates of our regiment are entirely worn out and the persons of many of them indecently exposed by reason of the rottenness of the cloth in their pants—and the consequence is that but few of them are fit for duty.”\footnote{William D. Lewis, Jr. to Andrew G. Curtin, 29 May 1861, PSA; J. J. Marshall to Andrew G. Curtin, 22 June 1861, PSA.} Even more shocking, Philadelphia’s two ethnic regiments did not receive uniforms at all. Although the German 21\textsuperscript{st}
and Irish 24th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments both received arms quickly, uniforms did not show until May 30, and even then, there were not enough to equip every soldier. Recruiters blamed this oversight on lingering ethnic hatred in the state government, and ethnic leaders asked the German-American and Irish-American communities to raise money and sew clothing for their men.

New York City regiments suffered many of the same problems wearing poorly-tailored uniforms and underclothing. Some of the first regiments left the city with no uniforms at all. Colonel John E. Bendix’s “Steuben Guard” (7th New York Infantry) offered a dilapidated appearance before it left the city on May 24. A witness recalled that many men “were not in uniform, but very poorly dressed.” Some even wore “flip-flap shoes”—sandals—a surprising choice of footwear given the regiment’s parade route along Third Avenue, then coated with several inches of mud. On June 8, General Sandford reported the condition of the regiments organized by the city. After observing several encampments outside the city boundaries, he wrote, “They have to endure very severe privations for want of sufficient clothing and equipments and the clothing they brought with them has been worn out and destroyed by the labor & exposure they have undergone. Without tents, they have many of them been compelled to sleep night after night on the wet and muddy ground (one Regt 19 nights, & others from 10 to 15).” He asked the state to re-supply them immediately, imploring, “Without tents cooking utensils, haversacks, canteens, wagons, or anything but arms ammunition, & clothing, they have endured all the privations to which this state of destitution exposed them & now that their clothing is worn out they ask the State to supply them. I have seen men returning from the entrenchments without shoes, & with scarcely clothing enough to cover their limbs from

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exposure. . . . I have only now to ask that if possible you will relieve the New York Regiments in this City & neighborhood from the destitution under which they are now suffering.”

Many Empire City soldiers lived in misery because they received a bad batch of uniforms. By the first week in June, the Brooks Brothers’ first consignment had fallen apart. A reporter for the *Times* wrote, “Paper garments would have served almost as well.” Uproar occurred in Albany—since three Albany regiments had received a supply—and the State Military Board launched an investigation. The investigatory committee determined that over 7,300 uniforms were unfit for service. They censured Inspector General Jackson and four civilian inspectors appointed by Quartermaster General Arthur, claiming that they only inspected the garments in piles, and did not examine each garment up close. They suspended all payments to Brooks Brothers, and demanded a new batch of uniforms with military-grade cloth prepared at no extra cost. The four inspectors—Wilson Hunt, George Opdyke, John Gray, and Charles Buckingham—defended themselves by claiming that their duties “were strictly limited to the examination and comparison of the samples agreed upon and the uniforms furnished under the contract.” Thus, they obtusely argued that they did not possess authority to determine the uniforms’ suitability. The *New York Herald*—a independent paper that leaned Democratic—laid the blame, not on Brooks Brothers, but on the “shortcomings of others,” these Republican-appointed inspectors who, no doubt, received ample sums for their services.

In the aftermath, Brooks Brothers promised to produce new uniforms to replace the deficient shoddy, but with more cries of scandal echoing across the state, in June, the State

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15 Charles Sandford to Edwin Morgan, 8 June 1861, Adjutant General’s papers, NYSA.
17 *New York Herald*, 9 June and 18 July 1861.
Military Board issued another bid for contracts, this time for $270,000, among six New York City firms, this time fixing prices at $18.00 per uniform. Ever critical of Governor Morgan’s administration in Albany, the Herald declared this “a change which we rejoice we are able to record, although it comes at the eleventh hour.” Editor Bennett made his opinion clearer in a June 6 editorial when he described the clothing frauds as a shameless way for city merchants to dispose “of their inferior or unmarketable goods at higher prices than for good articles.” Bennett primarily blamed the Military Board for awarding the contracts in the first place. He wrote, “Men who will resort to that betrayal of trust in times like these, to force their incompetent sons and relatives upon the soldiers as officers, to lead them into the battlefield to be slaughtered, are capable of committing any amount of outrage.” In the end, the outcome did not satisfy Bennett. He noted that, of the three-man investigatory committee, two of the members had awarded the Brooks Brothers contract. Thus, the decision smacked of a Republican Party cover-up.\(^\text{18}\)

However, this did not end the swindling. In June, the Military Board awarded a cap contract to the firm of Murphy and Childs for 15,000 caps at $11.40 per dozen. The Association of City Cap-makers protested, crying for justice and respect to New York City artisans. The Cap-makers Association pointed out that Murphy and Childs were not cap-makers by trade, nor could they have been the lowest bidders.\(^\text{19}\) In an incriminating move, Murphy and Childs subcontracted the order to J. & L. J. Phillips and Company at a rate of $7.00 per dozen. Phillips and Company, in turn, paid their workers sixty-two cents per dozen, about half the usual rate, thus drawing an inexperienced class of laborers to toil in their shops. After seeing these shrewd capitalists use loopholes in the military contracting apparatus to circumvent the unity of skilled labor, the cap-

\(^\text{18}\) Ibid., 6 and 23 June 1861.
\(^\text{19}\) Generally, caps sold at $8.00 to $8.50 per dozen.
makers remonstrated at the Phillips’ office. However, the firm called in policemen to disperse the crowd and arrest the ring-leaders. The defiant cap-makers declared, “The consequence is, that the regular journeymen have revolted; the consequence will be, that poor and inexperienced workmen will be employed, the caps put upon the soldiers half made, and that too at a cost to the State greater than they could have been furnished in good order.” Although collusion clearly existed between the Military Board, Murphy and Childs, and Phillips and Company, not everyone in New York City cried “scandal.” Indeed, some benevolent organizations gladly welcomed the hiring of “poor and inexperienced workmen [and work-women]” as a means of curtailing indigence. Clearly, New Yorkers had not reached an agreement on the proper role of patriotic workers in wartime.  

New York City and Philadelphia both became the centers of uniform scandals in the summer of 1861. Why did northeastern cities—in particular, those two leaders in textile manufacture—fail to forge a decent supply system? Certainly the prevailing sentiment, that which demanded immediate action, carelessly placed unscrupulous contractors at the head of the urban supply system. However, it would be unfair to blame the atmosphere of urgency as the prevalent cause for the 1861 uniform failures. Evidence suggests that another underlying reason was at fault: the capitalistic spirit of competition. Government policy required contracts go to the lowest bidder, and businesses connived to undercut their competitors. Once the scandals in Philadelphia and New York City erupted, Boston and Baltimore firms attempted to acquire out-of-state contracts under the belief that the quartermaster offices might reject deficient local products.

20 *New York Herald*, 20 June 1861.
F. M. B. Reynolds, a hopeful shoe contractor from Boston, ridiculed the quality of Philadelphia’s footwear businesses. Reynolds’s letter to Pennsylvania’s Quartermaster General Hale offers a good account of the established spirit of competition. Reynolds explained his plan to provide pegged shoes—as opposed to sewed shoes—to Philadelphia’s burgeoning military. Reynolds letter spoke like an advertisement:

I have seen the diagrams in the [Philadelphia] Enquirer [of faulty sewed shoes] and yet claim for our pegged sole, that they will wear as long as sewed. In our poorer qualities we put in for filling between inner and outer sole a narrow strip of wood instead of scraps of leather. In our best shoes none at all. I told Mr. Thacher [Philadelphia’s shoe inspector] our goods would not rip up and would not wear and every pair not up to sample left with you I would cheerfully pay freight here and back again on them. I wear pegged shoes myself and know them to be easy for I walk back and forth daily between Roxbury and Boston. There was no pegged I [can] show you that would pay to us more than 10 cts. a pair and some not so much profit to be made today. You save one profit by buying [from me], . . . I know our $1.20 ct. shoe is to be a better shoe than ever came to Phila. for a pegged shoe. . . . I am thus particular because I am in earnest and desire that you will give me an order if but for one Regiment to shoe that Yankee pegged shoes are not so bad after all. I know of a 75 ct shoe in Phila. being sold for $1.00 which I know a wet day would not last a mile. I should think from enquiries that parties in Phila. had bought everything that looked like a shoe up to furnish the troops. I beg your very favorable consideration for our goods.21

This competitive spirit was quintessentially urban. Contractors in large cities spoke a language of commercialism. Unlike the individual soldiers who enlisted, they lacked a vernacular of sacrifice. They considered wartime through a lens of opportunism, a means to improve private business; rarely did they speak of forfeiting commerce for the good of the republic. Considering the antebellum history of urban America, this explanation should not be unexpected. For decades, economic competition had served as the lynchpin of the urban market economy. Without it, urbanites feared that industry, labor, and artisanal skill might unravel. When the war started, urban capitalism made little effort to change its style and adapt to the exigencies of the supply situation. The surplus of troops engendered an unhealthy competition

21 F. M. B. Reynolds to R. C. Hale, 25 May 1861, PSA.
among contractors who hoped to undercut each other. Few actually believed that their own material would fail to do the job. Like Reynolds, all swore by their product. In peacetime, capitalism would sift the durable products from the substandard. However, in a time of war, the climate of competition forced contractors to spread thin their resources to win a chance to supply the army with its equipage. Had they worked collectively, perhaps the cities might have produced some sense of quality assurance. Instead, they covered their soldiers’ backs with slipshod workmanship.

The uniform frauds in Philadelphia and New York City made headlines, showcasing the inability of state and municipal politics to organize a reasonable system of supply. The War Department hoped to take control of the situation eventually, but still unable to meet the demands of the hour, it authorized the states to issue government contracts, under the promise that the federal government would eventually reimburse contractors for their services. State officials tried to rectify their pathetic situation. In late May, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania doled out a new set of contracts to several untested Philadelphia clothing businesses. Initially, Quartermaster Hale demanded at least 11,000 sets of uniforms, accouterments, and shoes to equip the Pennsylvania Reserves, but he steadily increased this number as the summer progressed. The federal government also issued contracts directly, offering them to at least 128 firms in Philadelphia. Unwilling to see a repeat performance of the Girard House scandal, Pennsylvania officials wrote the new contracts with scrupulous attention to detailed specifications. Thomas Webster, Jr. took a contract for 11,100 overcoats, “of the pattern adopted by the United States Army, and of a quality equal and conforming in every respect thereto, the cloth not to weigh less than eleven ounces per yard, and to be according to the samples
furnished.” Webster had a set delivery schedule from which he could not deviate: he had to deliver 1,500 coats on June 7 and 2,500 coats every week thereafter.²²

The July 22 call for troops after Bull Run had little additional effect on the process of provisioning troops. Factories and arsenals buzzed with activity without pause. Unfortunately, military tailoring became more confusing. In the late summer, federal and state contracts went out to local clothing providers simultaneously, but the price of uniforms remained high because speculators bought up large amounts of military-grade cloth. One New York City firm bought up the output of four eastern mills until February 7, taking a contract to supply 40,000 yards of wool per week. Furnishing houses usually made enough material to render them independent of market fluctuations for some time; however, most of the manufactories were hard-pressed to find experienced laborers. Some 15,000 tailors sewed hurriedly to complete federal, state, and out-of-state orders “with little hope of response,” wrote a New York City reporter. Many experienced tailors refused to purchase sewing machines, assuming that the introduction of technology would spell future doom of organized labor. Some New Yorkers guessed, were it not for the few manufactories that employed sewing machines, the completion of the latest uniform contracts would “have experienced a more depressing check.” Still, Inspector General Stewart Van Vliet, who feverishly demanded the forwarding of overcoats before the onset of winter, charged, “[T]he contractors in Northern cities do not furnish the supplies as expeditiously as the wants of soldiers require.”²³

Further, the Brooks Brothers scandal sobered city tailors. Quartermaster Arthur and the new clothing inspectors now rejected uniforms unconditionally for any minor defects. The Times

²² Thomas Webster, Jr. contract, 31 May 1861, PSA.
²³ New York Times, 15 October and 10 November 1861.
noted that new contracts offered incentives to all grades of tailors, but “neither journey work nor apprentice labor is available upon the uniforms.” Sewing labor declined because of the unspoken fear of rejection and forfeiture of wages. Thus, fewer and fewer tailors rushed to meet the call to sew uniforms. One reporter noted that bribery theoretically could solve the tailors’ dilemma, “but no such move is countenanced among respectable tailors, and they especially ignore the imputation of having intentionally foisted upon our earlier volunteers the perishable trash dignified by the name of clothes.”  

Nevertheless, skilled tailors mobilized to dominate military production, and, if possible, exclude cheap labor from the shop. Indeed, skilled tailors possessed a few genuine fears. Often, contractors disbursed bundles and required tailors to leave $5.00 to $10.00 deposits in case a clothing rejection forced them to salvage their business. To break even, contractors could defraud tailors of their deposit. By the late summer, the *Herald* reported that tailors’ “indignation . . . had reached a culminating point.” Several thousand cap-makers and tailors held meetings in Germania Hall and Columbian Hall, petitioning the War Department and Mayor Wood to alleviate their suffering. They denounced the “greedy and parsimonious contractors” as a “band of swindlers, thieves, and robbers, through whose misdeeds they and their families have to suffer and starve.” Wages stood at a pittance—“six shillings,” some claimed—and many tailors professed that they were “compelled to work like slaves from early until late.”

Still, despite tailors’ attempts to force city authorities to respect the dignity of skilled labor, a number of unskilled laborers kept sewing in manufactories. Brooks Brothers hired 1,800 full-time laborers and gave outwork to an unnumbered host that came by to pick up weekly

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24 Ibid., 10 November 1861.
bundles. During the fall, the firm took two contracts, one from the federal government for 4,000 uniforms and one from the state of Missouri for 8,000. Another uniform manufactory, Arnoux and Company, took a federal contract to supply 28,000 overcoats and 45,000 pairs of trousers, supplying 500 pairs daily for ninety days. Since May, the firm produced $500,000 worth of garments. The firm mainly hired German and Irish women, most of them wives, mothers, and sisters of soldiers. Meanwhile, over on Broadway, Seligman and Company employed 2,500 regular employees of both sexes, producing about 3,000 garments daily.²⁶

By contrast, uniform production continued to frustrate Philadelphia in the late summer and fall. Apprehensive contractors worried that the overlapping aims of the state and federal government would ruin them. Lippincott, Hunter, and Scott—contractors for overcoats and trousers—complained that it was impossible to meet contracts because of state and federal competition for usable material. In their opinion, blue kersey could not be had at any price in “any Commission House from Boston to Phila. in consequence of the U.S. Government having consumed all the material in the different markets.” To meet their $80,000 contract, this firm started a mill to supply 1,000,000 overcoats, placing them $20,000 in debt. Although the mill might eventually enable them to complete their contract and reap a profit, they refused to start production, fearing that they would not get paid. Their contract stipulated that if the federal government did not pay for their services, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania would have to step in and pay them. The managers of the clothing firm wondered, “How long will the state require for the Government to decline paying these contracts (time is a very great and material matter with us).” Contractors, in general, wondered what might happen if the War Department filled its contracts without the aid of the states. Such an outcome would leave contractors with

²⁶ New York Times, 10 November 1861.
unnecessary surplus and considerable debt. Lippincott, Hunter, and Scott—who stood among the largest uniform producers in Philadelphia—withheld their uniforms until they had assurance that the Commonwealth could pay them. As they put it, it was better for the Commonwealth to demand money from the federal government, because “the state can better afford to do it than your contractors can. The money market is now in so precarious condition that we cannot as private individuals, suffer from unnecessary delay.”

If slipshod uniform production resulted in scandalous media headlines, so did issues of malnutrition. On a steady basis, city troops began returning as a result of malnourishment. Some three-month regiments departed the cities or went into camp so quickly that they neglected to attain enough edible provisions to sustain the new recruits. As early as May 5, thirty soldiers from the 2nd N.Y.S.M. returned to New York City, and one of them, Private John Racy, offered a scathing condemnation of the ill-prepared hardtack issued to his regiment. The Herald reported the biscuit “in question is about two inches square and flinty, and would tempt the gastronomy of only a very hungry man to eat it.” Commanders realized that fresh water also had to be carried to the front in large quantities because none of the city troops would drink from springs in Maryland or Washington because all feared that Confederate spies had poisoned them. The Herald admonished, “The departure from New York was conducted in such a hasty manner that the proper arrangements for provisioning the men were not made.”

It is well to remember that food and clothing shortages were no small matters. An insufficient supply sometimes forced regiments to disband. For instance, on May 18, Colonel G. W. B. Tompkins’s 2nd N.Y.S.M. left the New York City and arrived in Washington on May 21.

27 Lippincott, Hunter, and Scott to R. C. Hale, 22 August 1861, PSA.
28 New York Herald, 6 May 1861.
Under instructions from Simon Cameron, the mustering officer ordered the soldiers to swear into service for three years, not the three-month tour many expected. When so informed, 450 of them refused to take the federal Oath of Allegiance, claiming that they had been treated badly and wanted proper clothing, food, and shelter. Private Peter Snedden wrote that most of his regiment was in “a sad plight, and I among the number. I had to walk around for two days with nothing but a bit of drawers on, having no pantaloons at all.” Sergeant Charles P. Morehouse did not believe any of the men received a full ration at any time; many had no meals after leaving the city. Thirteen men sent a complaint to the local newspapers, declaring that the 2nd N.Y.S.M. would willingly serve for three years, but they felt aggrieved at their mistreatment. Colonel Tompkins wasted no time with the mutineers; he sent them home and began recruiting another 450 soldiers. Eventually, the 500-man remnant took the federal of allegiance for two years’ service and became the 2nd New York Infantry.29

In addition to food and clothing problems, the new volunteers could not receive suitable weapons fast enough. Except for Philadelphia, none of the cities had major weapons manufacturing facilities. New York City had to draw its weapons from Watervliet Arsenal, 157 miles north in the town of Troy. The nation’s leading arsenal, Springfield Arms, stood ninety miles away from Boston. Baltimore normally relied upon the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, only seventy miles away, but, by the end of April 1861, it no longer functioned. The first days of the war witnessed multiple levels of government demanding the resources from these vital ordnance and munitions caches. The unfortunate commanders of these depots could not meet all the demands fast enough. Too many burdens fell upon Major Alfred Mordecai, the commander of Watervliet, and as a result, the War Department demanded that he resign his post

29 Ibid., 31 May and 2 June 1861.
in May 1861. It did not help that Mordecai was a North Carolinian; many high-ranking officers in the War Department suspected him of treasonous proclivities. However, Mordecai sealed his fate when he reported to the War Department that he had given away all of Watervliet’s 19,800 muskets and 30,000 cartridges, mostly to the State of New York. “First come, first served,” he replied. When Mordecai inexplicably cancelled an order for gun carriages and harnesses for the federal government, Colonel James Ripley, the Chief of Ordnance, asked for his resignation.30

Clearly, the most insurmountable bottleneck in urban mobilization centered on weapons production. The existing stockpile of weapons went quickly. First to go went the pristine Springfield rifles in Massachusetts. As a result, even regimental commanders in Boston could not receive the weapons they wanted, despite their relative proximity to the place of production. Soon, Bostonians had to accept the older 1853 model British Enfields kept in the state arsenal. By mid-May, Boston’s blue-blooded 2nd Massachusetts had over 600 recruits but only 160 antiquated smooth-bored muskets assigned to its ranks. The regimental adjutant knew that nearby Cambridge arsenal housed 4,000 Enfield rifles, but the commonwealth owned these weapons and Governor Andrew refused to give them up, declaring he did not want these weapons ruined in federal service during a short rebellion. Quartermaster R. Morris Copeland asked Andrew to reconsider. He wrote, “[O]ur men are becoming disaffected for want of arms to drill with.” After “considerable effort,” commented the regimental chaplain, Andrew released 400 rifles to the 2nd Massachusetts and it served with these until Springfield arsenal gradually replaced them with Model 1861 rifled-musquets.31

Only Philadelphia had a local arsenal, the Frankford Arsenal, a sixty-two acre plot consisting of over a dozen buildings located at the confluence of Frankford Creek and the Delaware River. Frankford’s hired hands primarily produced munitions. Contracted machine shops located a short walk over the creek bridge into the village of Bridesburg handled much of the weapons production. Like Watervliet, Frankford Arsenal experienced its own leadership troubles when its commander, Captain Josiah Gorgas, defected to the Confederacy. Although Gorgas’s departure placed undue burdens on his successors, Frankford Arsenal worked around the clock to catch up with the necessary industrial production. It even extended its hours during the week and also on Saturday, and by the end of April, it even began instituting Sunday hours. Every day of the week, the arsenal steamed ahead producing war materiel. By the end of April, Frankford claimed to produce 130,000 percussion caps daily. The continuous hours of work made it difficult for ordnance officers to pay their hired hands, so they often complained to the Treasury Department to send more funds with the disbursing officer. The Ordnance Department urged Frankford’s officers to cease paying contractors and only compensate hired men. Of course, this could not be done since contractors did much of the necessary rifle production. Eventually, the paymaster began paying off the workers in “Certificates of Indebtedness”—IOUs. These certificates became a viable alternative money supply in Bridesburg, but as the war dragged on, they grew increasingly worthless when venders refused to accept them.\(^32\)

Despite the effort of Bridesburg’s gun manufactories to meet the call for arms, weapons could not be assembled fast enough. As a result, the commonwealth experimented in some alternative methods of arming its volunteers. In early July, Pennsylvania undertook a dramatic

effort to refit its militia arms. Rather than begin production on new weapons, the adjutant
general’s office called upon Philadelphia’s gunsmiths to upgrade the old model muskets into
something that resembled the U.S. Model 1861 Springfield rifled-musket. The commonwealth
signed twelve-part contracts that required contractors to alter the outdated weapons by replacing
the flintlocks with new breeches, rifling the barrels, straightening and refinishing the bayonets,
re-welding the rammers, fixing the mainsprings, re-screwing the lock-plates, adding new sights,
and refinishing the stocks. One gunsmith, J. Butterfield, had forty-two days to complete 1,000
alterations, while the commonwealth required delivery of at least 300 arms per week, with a
forfeiture of one dollar per musket if Butterfield fell short of his quota.33

Other cities experimented too. Lacking a sufficient weapons manufactory, New York
City officials knew that it would have to purchase weapons from other sources. When the three-
month troops left the city in April and May, they emptied the city of all available smoothbore
weapons. This did not matter much anymore; now city residents demanded only rifled-muskets
for its soldiers. Unfortunately, Springfield Arsenal could produce only 2,500 to 3,000 arms per
month. Additionally, rifled weapons cost an incredible sum.34 At a city meeting, when
Congressman Sickles suggested arming infantrymen with pistols too, Captain Mansfield
Lovell—a federal army officer—laughed him off the floor; such a measure would turn each
soldier into a “walking arsenal” and perhaps ruin the city financially.35 In the end, many
regiments that expected top-of-the-line arms met disappointment. When “The Advance Guard
Zouaves” (5th New York Infantry) assembled for departure on May 21, they anticipated a

33 J. Butterfield contract, 2 July 1861, PSA.
34 At a meeting of the Board of Alderman in late April, Captain Mansfield Lovell, a U.S. Regular, guessed it would
cost the city between $75,000 and $100,000 to arm each infantry regiment with 1,000 rifled muskets.
quantity of Springfield rifles, but instead, only percussion-altered George Law flintlocks arrived. The Times raged, “It is madness to place such pieces in the hands of our soldiers and send them forth to cope with men armed with Enfield Rifles and Minié muskets.” The Zouaves begrudgingly took these weapons and departed two days later.

Shifty arms dealers exacerbated the already desperate situation. A New York City man named Boker managed to import 5,000 Enfield rifles from Hamburg, Germany, in April and, when they arrived in late June, he hoarded them to turn a high profit. On June 22, the Herald editorialized, “Our soldiers are very bad off for proper arms. Many of our regiments that have left this city have gone away carrying with them the old fashioned and almost useless smoothbore musket.” Tension increased when, on June 10, 1861, three New York City regiments—the 3rd, 5th, and 7th New York—engaged Confederate forces at Big Bethel, Virginia. This inconsequential battle resulted in Union defeat, primarily from poor generalship, but Empire City newspapers blamed it on the outmoded weaponry of the New York regiments. Editor Bennett pointed out that “one of our best regiments”—Colonel Abram Duryée’s 5th New York Infantry—still used smoothbores, “which places them at a terrible disadvantage as the enemy can at all times keep out of range, while with their rifles, they pick off the Zouaves with perfect safety to themselves.” During that week, five regiments still in the city reported themselves ready to leave, but claimed they lacked rifled small arms.

To meet the growing demand for rifled weapons, New York’s State Military Board contracted the arms importing firm of Schuyler, Hartley, and Graham to purchase 24,000 stands.

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36 *New York Times*, 22 May 1861.
38 Ibid.
of Enfield rifles “either in market or from the armories in England or France.” The firm sent Jacob Schuyler to Europe with instructions to forward weapons to ports in New York City or Boston, with accompanying ammunition, on steamers consigned to New York City’s Bank of Commerce. If Schuyler could not purchase this quantity of arms, the State Military Board authorized him “to engage their manufacture in Europe if he can contract for their delivery within three months or for such portion as he can procure to be manufactured within that time.” The State Military Board gave Schuyler $100,000 to complete his mission. Schuyler made contact with the Baring Brothers firm in London, who took the contract on the payment of £100,000 sterling silver. Unfortunately, Schuyler could not procure any arms until mid-July, and, even then, he collected only 6,000 to 7,000 Enfield rifles.

By the time of the defeat at Bull Run, only one-third of the arms purchased by emissary Schuyler had arrived. But to complicate matters, now the federal government wanted a piece of the foreign market. Schuyler promised to leave on July 31 with a $10,000,000 appropriation from Secretary Cameron to purchase 100,000 rifled-muskets and bayonets, 20,000 sabers, 10,000 carbines, and 10,000 revolvers. However, four days after he arrived in London, Schuyler learned that no more Enfield rifles could be had in England. Most of the private armories in London and Birmingham were busy filling other orders for Connecticut, Ohio, Massachusetts, and the Confederacy. This did not matter much anyway because the War Department failed to send Schuyler’s letter of credit to him. In the meantime, Schuyler began scouring markets in France, Austria, and Belgium to complete the state and federal orders.

39 State Military Board Contract, 16 April 1861, Comptroller’s papers, NYSA.
40 New York Herald, 12 July 1861.
As the summer wore on, the Baring Brothers firm in London desperately tried to complete the New York State Military Board’s May order for weapons. Like Schuyler, the firm began importing rifles from Belgium. These additional purchases almost provoked an international incident. On August 3, fifty cases of rifled-muskets purchased from gun-makers in Antwerp landed in Liverpool to be transferred to New York City on board the Steamer City of Washington, a ship consigned to the Liverpool, New York, and Philadelphia Steamship Company. All fifty crates (numbered 2200 to 2249) bore the mysterious label, “hardware.” When Belgian seamen unloaded the crates, an officer of Her Majesty’s Customs Service sympathetic to the Confederacy opened the containers and seized the arms. After weeks of bitter protest, Customs eventually relinquished the shipment. The affair concluded New York’s business with Baring Brothers, and the last shipment of 6,020 rifles arrived in December at the cost of $16.00 to $17.00 per rifle.\(^42\)

Thus, New York City remained desperately short of arms into the winter. Even in November, when an officer in a two-year regiment requested new weapons for his men, a clerk from the State Adjutant General’s office replied that there was not “arms enough in possession of the State to arm the Regiments now nearly organized and ready for marching orders,” much less for those who had already gone. The clerk reported that the federal government monopolized all the manufactories throughout the country and no source of arms could be had by state or local authorities. Generally, the slow production of arms at Springfield Arsenal proved to be the final requisite that kept New York City regiments from marching to war.\(^43\)

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\(^42\) J. R. Schuyler to Edwin Morgan, 2 September 1861, Patrick Sword affidavit, Comptroller’s papers, NYSA.

\(^43\) William Wallace Perkins to S. B. Hayman, 6 November 1861, NYSA.
After Bull Run, the cities had to arm a new batch of three-year recruits. The return of the three-month regiments opened up a supply of infantry arms, but there were not enough for all the three-year men. Simon Cameron insisted that arms would be available at Washington as troops arrived by train. Pennsylvania’s Governor Curtin, however, still refused to allow any regiments to pass through Baltimore unless properly armed. Cameron, in turn, refused to send weapons to Philadelphia, fearing that they might be seized by secessionists during their passage through Baltimore. In the meantime, organizing regiments in Philadelphia had to drill without weapons. The 88th Pennsylvania, encamped at Wissahickon Creek outside the city, performed sentry duty with large clubs. Private John Vautier of Company I remembered the embarrassing scene, the sentries “making a ludicrous and unsoldierly-like appearance patrolling their beats in this primitive fashion.” Colonel George P. McLean did not wait for weapons to arrive; instead, he ordered his regiment to leave camp on October 5, and it passed through Baltimore without incident.44 One inventive commander, Colonel Heinrich Bohlen of the 75th Pennsylvania, procured 1,000 unusable eighteenth-century flintlocks that the three-month commanders had earlier rejected. Figuring that Baltimore’s secessionists would be unable to tell whether weapons were unserviceable, he declared his regiment ready to leave on September 26. Along the route, his men discovered a stockpile of Harpers Ferry smoothbores, so Bohlen had his men exchange weapons. When they arrived in Washington, they received rifled-muskets.45

Bostonians refused to take chances with the Baltimore mob. They had lost men in April 19 riot and they had lost men at Bull Run. By late July, Boston’s citizens demanded that all of its regiments receive top-quality firearms. Unfortunately, by then, only on Boston regiment, the 1st

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Massachusetts, possessed American-made rifled weapons. Federal contracts with the Springfield Arsenal backlogged weapon production to such an extent that the commonwealth could no longer purchase ordnance. In fact, of Massachusetts’ first twenty-two three-year regiments, only two received Springfield rifles. Eleven other regiments—including seven Boston regiments—received an able substitute, British-made Enfield rifled-muskets, chiefly acquired by state agents sent to England to purchase them. The rest received smooth-bored weapons. Over 5,000 Springfield rifled-muskets had gone to the three-month regiments, but very few of these had returned to the city; those belonging to the 3rd and 4th Massachusetts had been retained at Fort Monroe by the order of Brigadier General Benjamin Butler—recently reassigned from his Baltimore command post—who deemed it essential to keep them in Virginia to arm incoming three-year regiments, regardless of their state affiliation. Those rifled weapons that returned to Boston required repair and cleaning, and because of their deplorable condition after three months’ service, this process took months for armory workers to complete.46

Of the four cities, Baltimore experienced the easiest time finding weapons since it never had more than four or five regiments simultaneously competing for them on any given day of the summer. Also, Union troops began to discover weapons stockpiles previously secreted by Confederate sympathizers. On June 23, Major General Nathaniel P. Banks assumed command of the post of Baltimore, displacing General Butler, and he used some of Baltimore’s first Union volunteers to seize weapons and arrest those who concealed them. Incidentally, this wave of arrests removed Mayor Brown and Marshal Kane from their respective offices and elevated

46 Benjamin Butler to John Andrew, 9 July 1861, MASA.
Colonel John Kenly to Baltimore’s temporary provost marshal. On June 27, Kenly’s Baltimoreans took over Old City Hall, where they found an abundance of military supplies, including two cannon, 120 muskets, forty-six rifles, eleven shotguns, seventy-four pistols, 48,000 percussion caps, and 10,500 cartridges.\(^{47}\)

Kenly’s seizure of several Baltimore weapons caches sparked a heated debate in the Maryland legislature. Southern sympathizers rebuked Banks and Kenly, passing a resolution that required them to return the firearms, claiming they belonged to the state militia. Naturally, Baltimore’s Unionists saw this as an undisguised attempt to foment treason. A member of the Baltimore City Guard wrote to Governor Hicks, warning him not to listen to any overtures from the legislature. He wrote, “It is well known to the members of the Legislature that the military of this city are almost unanimous for Secession, therefore it would be strengthening the rebel ranks by re-arming these men. Should your Excy. decide to cause the return of said arms I will prophesy that in less than one week thereafter they will be disposed of as were those of the Maryland Guard & should an opportunity occur they would be used to oppose the Government or the Union men of our own State.”\(^{48}\) Hicks followed the advice of the City Guardsman, and the weapons remained in the hands of Unionists.

\(^{47}\) Scharf, *Chronicles of Baltimore*, 612-3; *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 28 and 29 June 1861.

\(^{48}\) Unionists remembered the loss of the Maryland Guards Battalion’s weapons. In fact, a concerned soldier from the Baltimore City Guard wrote to Governor Hicks, condemning the legislature’s course of action. An extended draft of his letter follows: “As a Union man, I have taken this liberty to call on you to refuse their request & to beg of you to instruct Maj. Gen. Banks to retain all arms until he receives your written order for their delivery. I am a member of the Baltimore City Guard of whom there are but 30 Union men, the remainder being secessionist & commanded by officers two thirds of whom are of the same stamp. It is well known to the members of the Legislature that the military of this city are almost unanimous for Secession, therefore it would be strengthening the rebel ranks by re-arming these men. Should your Excy. decide to cause the return of said arms I will prophesy that in less than one week thereafter they will be disposed of as were those of the Maryland Guard & should an opportunity occur they would be used to oppose the Government or the Union men of our own State.” See, “One of the Old Guard” to Thomas Hicks, 25 June 1861, Hicks papers, MDHS.
While the procurement of infantry rifles discomfited urban mobilization, the procurement of cavalry equipment mortified city officials. Simply put, cavalry cost more than infantry. Infantry regiments cost tens of thousands of dollars to outfit; cavalry cost hundreds of thousands. Not only did each horse cost several hundred dollars, but each mounted trooper required additional weaponry—a saber, pistol, and carbine—and each mount required fresh shoes, a saddle, a blanket, a bridle, grooming supplies, and feed. The initial cost of raising a twelve-company cavalry regiment could be staggering. Moreover, cavalry regiments required military-grade horses, animals not in abundance in the cities. Few city horses were suitable for riding. Most had experience pulling hacks or streetcars but nothing else. As one New York City paper related, “Cavalry regiments . . . are things not perfected in a day.”49

In June, New York City began raising its first cavalry unit, the 1st New York Cavalry, under command of Colonel Andrew T. McReynolds. The city began mounting and equipping six companies while Pennsylvania and Ohio mounted and equipped another five. The Herald reported that “many of our wealthy citizens have signified their willingness to contribute” to the process of preparing the regiment. Carl Schurz, a German revolutionary, fronted the money for the 1st New York Cavalry’s weapons and uniforms, but he could not muster enough money to procure horses. Nevertheless, the companies practiced dismounted maneuvers, making quite a silly appearance in the public squares. Colonel McReynolds opened headquarters at Disbrow’s Riding School and advertised for donations, informing equine owners that they would receive forty cents per day for their horse’s service, and, if the animal were to be killed, the federal government would remunerate them. Despite these entreaties, few residents donated their

49 Undated clipping, c. 1861, New York State Archives, Unit History Project, 1st New York Cavalry, Civil War Newspaper Clippings, http://www.dmna.state.ny.us/historic/regnist/civil/cavalry/1stCav/1stCavCWN.htm.
mounts. Also, renting the riding stables for the Ohio and Pennsylvania companies proved too costly, even for the moneyed officers in McReynolds’s regiment. In July, the Herald reported that “the regiment is considerably embarrassed for want of funds to pay expenses that have been incurred to keep up the organization.” Although the Ohio and Pennsylvania companies successfully secured mounts, the city companies did not. So, in mid-July, over a month after recruiting commenced, the federal government promised to mount all the remaining troopers, provided they arrived in Washington by rail. The cavalrymen departed for Washington on August 22, leaving behind a massive amount of debt.50

Prior to Bull Run, only New York City had attempted to raise a regiment of horsemen. After the battle, the other three cities tried their hands at it. Baltimore benefited from the fact that it had a shrewd federal agent in the city who procured the best available mounts. Major James W. Belger, assistant quartermaster for the U.S. Army, ran Baltimore’s federal supply depot. Immediately upon arrival, he advertised the purchase of 200 horses and 150 mules, hiring a local expert, Samuel Lee, to judge the quality of horse-flesh. Public notice of Belger’s announcement attracted a large crowd, including a number of speculators, men who had bought up horses and mules from poor draymen and carters, and in the words of the American, “endeavored to create a monopoly.” Belger did his best to turn away these unprincipled capitalists, and in two days, he cheaply purchased 180 horses for between $90 and $130 apiece. As Belger’s purchases continued into the summer, Governor Hicks authorized the recruitment of the 1st Maryland Cavalry.51

50 New York Herald, 14 June and 4 and 14 July 1861.
51 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 7 June 1861.
Horse procurement took on an unusual tone in Baltimore. Some secessionists tried to pawn off their worthless animals on government. Confederate sympathizers applied for the horse contracts after July 22, fostering disputes among competing contractors, who believed that federal quartermasters should deal with loyal men only. Baltimore’s 1st Maryland Cavalry, raised in late August, became a fierce point of contention. Of course, accusations of disloyalty usually came from rejected applicants—and, consequently, their allegations were often suspect—but such outcries prompted the city’s federal quartermaster, Major Belger, to sift carefully through candidates with intense scrutiny. Eventually, Belger issued a contract for 1,000 horses to the firm of Jonathan Brock and Frederick C. Crowley. Predictably, allegations surfaced that Belger had awarded contracts to men inimical to the Union cause. These charges proved so widespread that the new department commander, General John Dix, had to launch his own investigation, but he found the accusations groundless. A reporter opined that Belger, a stranger in Baltimore, might appoint disloyal men accidentally, but “whenever he has found himself deceived as to the Union proclivities of his agents, even down to carters and draymen, he has applied the corrective immediately by dismissing them from the service.”

In September, Boston commenced raising the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry. To supply this regiment, army quartermasters bought old, used horses from anyone eager to sell. By November, 500 mounts arrived at the regimental camp at Readville. Major Greely Stevenson Curtis, a Harvard graduate from a wealthy Boston family, declared them “damned clodhoppers.” An observer wrote that the regimental horses “looked rather inferior to what might have been expected.” The regimental historian wryly noted, “[I]t was said that the regiment possessed nearly all the unruly beasts in New England.” On one November afternoon, Major Curtis

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52 Ibid., 27, 29, and 30 August 1861.
received a new batch of mounts, and as an accomplished rider, he attempted to break in one “powerful brute who to my eye looked old, vicious, and of good blood.” When Curtis mounted the beast, it thrashed, kicked, bucked, and jumped, and tried any assortment of “pleasing tricks” to throw its rider. Frustrated, Curtis dismounted and a regular army officer—the man who had helped purchase the animal—tried to mount it in an effort to embarrass the young Harvard major. After a few minutes of thrashing, the regular officer dismounted quickly, to which Curtis remarked, “If you wish your neck broken, that is the horse for you!” The officer turned pallid and ambled away. Another officer came to Curtis after this exchange, claiming that he recognized the animal as one that a fellow Harvard classmate had nearly run to death on the racetracks at Saugus. Writing to his fiancée, Curtis declared that the steed “wasn’t worth 25 cents.”

Oddly, the enlisted men of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry seemed even weaker than the horseflesh. Only the dregs of society, it seemed, would risk their lives on dangerous mounts in exchange for the higher pay of a cavalryman. One newspaper claimed that the regiment contained “some roughs” that could have been “easily weeded out by that judicious tact that seems to have been wanting.” Few, it seemed, possessed the necessary skills needed to control a wild horse. Writing to a friend in the 2nd Massachusetts, Major Curtis—who had a low tolerance for such ungentlemanly behavior as the inability to ride—admitted that he often “let out some of the damns & goddamns” to the point that they were “at present choking me.” One day, Curtis lost his temper when he saw an officer dismount a plunging horse, breaking a champagne bottle in the process. Writing to a friend, Curtis recalled, “Presently, he jumped off whereupon I pitched into him, telling him that he had better break his neck than be a coward.” Under such scrutiny, the officer steeled himself and uttered, “Break [my] neck it is then.” He rushed upon the
animal and mounted it. In fright, the horse reared up on its hind legs, throwing the officer to the ground. Curtis closed by admitting, “[T]here isn’t a drill but what 2 or 3 loose horses are galloping over the field.” Lieutenant Benjamin Crowninshield, an 1858 Harvard graduate, agreed. “Mounted drill,” he wrote, “. . . afforded great amusement to everybody but those unfortunates who were thrown from their fiery steeds, or kicked and bruised by those of others.” Nevertheless, despite their ill training and poor horseflesh, 925 soldiers left Readville on December 19, bound for the front.53

Philadelphia faced the same cavalry trials. In the summer and autumn, Philadelphians filled portions of eight cavalry regiments, approximately 4,750 officers and men. Unhappily, the pressing need for cavalrymen compelled recruiting officers to leave the city regardless of their regiment’s state of readiness. One enterprising officer, Colonel William H. Young, rushed detachments of eight companies to Washington as early as July 18 without uniforms or equipment. Fortuitously, his men ran into no misfortunes in Baltimore, and because his men were the first cavalrymen to arrive in Washington, they received the first unused stockpiles of cavalry equipment.54

Other Philadelphia cavalry regiments were not so fortunate. The “Cameron Dragoons,” later designated the 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry, raised ten companies in Philadelphia under direct orders from Secretary of War Cameron. On August 22, they began reporting by companies to Washington. Due to the shortage of military-grade horses, they had to wait a week before receiving their mounts. Eventually, they received mounts in two five-hundred horse installments.

53 Greely Stevenson Curtis to Charles Morse, 5 and 21 November 1861, and to Hattie Sumner Appleton, 9 November 1861, MAHS; Boston Daily Journal, 18 November and 19 December 1861; Boston Evening Transcript, 23 September 1861; Benjamin W. Crowninshield, A History of the First Regiment of Massachusetts Cavalry Volunteers (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1891), 47.
54 Frank Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 157.
The officers then took the time to sort the mounts by color: two companies received grays, three companies received bays, three others received blacks and browns, and the last two received sorrels. Even then, it took some time for the 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry to receive all the necessary riding, shoeing, brushing, and feeding equipment. Corporal James A. Cornett of Company F noted, “The amount of equipments required for a regiment of cavalry is immense.” Secretary Cameron visited the regiment shortly after their arrival at Washington, declared that the regiment was composed of the “rite material” for cavalry and assured them that they should receive anything they wanted. Cameron’s appraisal of the 5th Pennsylvania’s Cavalry could not have been too astute, for even after two weeks of practice, Corporal Cornett believed that his regiment was far from being ready for action. He wrote to his sister, “there are many bad riders [in our regiment]. they frequently fall off[.] one man in company G had his thy broke on Sat.—his horse fell[.] we have hard work to do.”

Sewing uniforms, buying weapons, and procuring horses posed severe challenges to urban mobilization, but city officials knew that their political careers rested upon their ability to supply needy family members. With thousands of male breadwinners in the army and awaiting their pay muster, back in the cities, starvation and impoverishment became a foreboding danger. Benevolence and relief needed to rise to the occasion. Even in April, the cities took steps to avoid the impending hazards of absent family income. In New York City, Mayor Wood called upon the City Council to pass a $1,000,000 loan to arm and equip the volunteers and supply the wants of their families. By the end of April, thirteen Empire City banks provided $465,000 of this sum. Meanwhile, the social and political leaders who stood at the center of the whirlwind of the April 20 rally formed the Union Defense Committee, an organization composed of thirty-one

55 Ibid., 160; James A. Cornett to sister, 29 August and 8 September 1861, HSP.
elite members of New York City society who proposed to raise and mete out funds to organizing units and their indigent family members. Additionally, smaller neighborhood organizations rallied to support the Union cause. Dozens of volunteer seamstresses met at Potts’s Church and began sewing uniforms with cloth donated by William Parker and *Times* editor Henry Raymond. In a matter of days, they completed 1,000 shirts and 1,000 pairs of drawers for Colonel William H. Allen’s 1st New York Infantry. By April 27, thirty-nine contributors donated over $2,300 to the families of volunteers in Colonel Wilson’s “Union Volunteers,” the 6th New York Infantry. The next day, a large number of ladies met at 11 East Fourteenth Street to make haversacks for Colonel G. W. B. Tompkins’s 2nd New York Infantry.\(^5^6\) Other early organizations included the New York Ladies Relief Union, the Nightingale Association, the Calvary Baptist Church Association—all bandage and lint-making organizations; the Home Samaritan Organization, the Jewish Ladies Relief Union, both community relief programs; and St. Bartholomew’s Church Association, a sock and shirt-sewing circle.\(^5^7\)

New York’s women frequently took the lead in the movement to aid families of volunteers. On April 25, an assortment of upper-class women met at 5 Clinton Hall, headquarters of the Samaritan Organization, where Austa French, wife of Dr. Mansfield French, appealed to the moneyed women of New York City to “sympathize with, to visit, to comfort, and assist the families of those who had gone.” A few days earlier, Mrs. French had interviewed a young mother on Centre Street, who, with baby in her arms, revealed that all the men in her family had gone to war. Struck by the young mother’s fortitude, she embraced her sisterly and vowed to

\(^5^6\) *New York Times*, 25, 27, 29 April 1861.
\(^5^7\) *New York Tribune*, 24 April 1861.
mobilize the benevolent impulses of New York’s women. “Such women [as the young mother],” French argued, “needed comfort; others needed work, others aid.”

Inspired by French’s plea, the wives of Major General John Adams Dix and Hamilton Fish organized a larger meeting of women at the Cooper Institute to unite the various organizations under a common purpose. On April 29, over three thousand women listened to a keynote address by Vice President Hannibal Hamlin. This meeting resulted in the formation of the Women’s Central Association of Relief, an umbrella organization that proposed to collect and distribute information about military needs to the public, to establish good relations with state and federal medical staff, to act as a medical auxiliary in New York City, to unite with the New York Medical Association as a source of medical supplies, to examine and instruct volunteer nurses, and to solicit aid for soldiers and their families. Twelve women and twelve men headed the executive committee.58

At their first meeting on May 3, the Women’s Central Association of Relief reported that women’s groups should cease making bandages. Not anticipating a bloody conflict, the executive committee stated that “no special demand [for medical supplies] exists at any time, or is likely to exist.” Instead, the committee suggested that women turn their attention to the wants of the well, “who need precautionary supplies.” Women should agitate for the return of unhealthy recruits and commence training military cooks, because, the committee declared, “Beans kill more soldiers than bullets.”59

In all the cities, employment of female seamstresses met the problem of providing aid to soldiers’ families. Josiah Quincy, Jr., son of one of Boston’s illustrious ex-mayors, devised a

58 *New York Herald*, 26, 27, and 30 April 1861.
“self-sustaining scheme” to employ wives and sisters of soldiers in the construction of military garments. In late May, Quincy opened a business at Union Hall, acting as a subcontractor for a middleman who secured a contract for 8,000 army shirts. Benevolent women directed by Sally Foster Otis, wife of one of Boston’s ex-mayors and ex-senators, did the cutting for free, then turned the material over to approximately 690 applicants each week, paying the indigent women twenty cents per shirt, double the pay of a typical seamstress (but giving them no more than two shirts per week). This was a difficult but effective enterprise. Quincy called it, “no holiday work,” for it was “not at all the same thing as a ‘sewing circle’ in a luxurious parlor; but is hard work of the hand and head.” He lamented, “It is no trifling matter to prepare work for 600 women; to instruct the ignorant among them; to satisfy the unreasonable; and to ‘inspect’ the work, and act with tenderness toward the needlewomen, and justice toward our contractor.”

Quincy’s scheme received praise, but it did not fully relieve all the economic distress. Regimental commanders understood that unless the cities promised comprehensive relief to their soldiers’ families, volunteers would not come forward in large numbers. One Bostonian wrote to Colonel George Gordon, commander of the 2nd Massachusetts, lamenting, “My tale is soon told. For some time I have been out of employment, and I need a little assistance, if through your kindness something could be done to enable me to leave where I am boarding I would enlist in your regiment and thus avoid expence.”

To meet the deepening plight of the families of Boston’s volunteers, the city formed the “Committee of 100,” a group of concerned citizens that hoped to dole relief to the city’s patriotic indigents. The committee worked quickly, subscribing $80,000 from 100 subscribers by mid-July and paying $58,000 to needy families in the same

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60 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 24 June 1861.
61 “Volunteer” to George H. Gordon, 25 April 1861, George H. Gordon papers, MAHS.
period. Popular figures donated munificent sums. Edward Everett, Robert Anderson, and the Massachusetts Horticultural Society led the way in donations. Still, the Committee distributed its relief conservatively. As the Committee reported, “applications have not been large.” Typically, the Committee directed applicants to relief offered by other towns, or to relief offered by the commonwealth, said the committee, “as the relief fund which the committee have in charge is intended to be applied in extreme cases, which the aid from other sources will not reach.”

The addition of the three-year regiments to the initial three-month units greatly enlarged the pool of families who demanded relief. The long delay before muster into federal service impeded the arrival of the army paymaster. No pay meant that soldiers’ families had to live off of their savings. If a family had no savings, or if money ran out during the mobilization period, then starvation loomed. Boston’s Committee of 100—its benevolent organization designed to relieve soldiers’ families—had earlier claimed that it would dole out relief only in “extreme cases.” By the third week in May, hungry families protested against the Committee’s conservative approach to charity. Colonel Thomas Cass of the 9th Massachusetts—the well known Irish leader—became especially vocal. He argued that the Committee had turned away many Irish families due to ethnic prejudice. If any families exhibited extreme cases, he implied, it would be them. In addition to pointing out Boston’s prejudice against Catholic regiments, Cass noted that the increasing sense of inter-town rivalry among Bostonians prevented efficient relief from occurring. The city of Boston promised $20 per day to each Boston-raised company, but it would not pay for any troops credited outside the city. This posed a problem for Cass’s regiment, as it contained six Boston companies and four rural companies. To sustain his regiment on Long Island, Cass’s officers had to pay for cooking utensils, sheds, and storerooms out of their own

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62 Boston Daily Journal, 10 July 1861.
pockets. Cass’s Irish regiment had exhausted a starting fund of $4,000 offered to it by wealthy Irish citizens and now, with the four additional companies, the 9th Massachusetts approached destitution. To feed his rural troops, Cass had to split up the city fund ten ways.

Cass wrote to Governor Andrew and asked him to provide state relief: “The men, too,” he argued, “are in humble circumstances and cannot well afford to give their services and hold themselves in readiness without remuneration.” It angered Cass to know that much had been accomplished by well-meaning Bostonians to provide comforts for Colonel Fletcher Webster’s regiment, including Webster’s out-of-town volunteers. Cass continued, “The balance of our indebtedness will fall on a very few friends of the regiment, while nearly thirty thousand dollars have been subscribed in aid of Mr. Webster’s regiment. We have scarcely realized three thousand, yet our expenses have been greater than his.” Cass implied that partisanship—bias against Democrats—had much to do with the apparent neglect of his regiment.63

Boston’s apparent antipathy toward its Irish soldiers led many of them to seek service elsewhere. During May and June 1861, dozens of Irishmen fled the city. Most journeyed to New York City, where they hoped to find sympathetic commanders willing to accept their religion and their foreign birth. Several hundred deserted the ranks of Colonel Rice’s 14th Massachusetts on Long Island. Despite his prior inaction in aiding Cass’s regiment, Governor Andrew hoped that one of Boston’s three-year regiments might be of Irish descent. Since the 9th Massachusetts had 800 men and the 14th Massachusetts had only 760 men, on June 4, Andrew ordered Adjutant General Schouler to proceed to Long Island and transfer 200 soldiers from ranks of the 14th Regiment to that of the 9th Regiment. At least then, he thought, one Irish regiment would get to

63 Thomas Cass to John Andrew, n.d. and 31 May 1861, MASA; Boston Daily Journal, 21 May 1861.
the front. News of this scheme reached the 14th Massachusetts before Schouler arrived, and the officers passed resolutions condemning the proposed consolidation. Schouler suppressed these resolutions upon his arrival and called the men of the 14th Massachusetts into line without their officers present. He asked them to enlist in the other regiments that still required filling. Rather than follow his suggestion, the angry Irishmen shouted reproachful obscenities at Schouler, and of the entire band, only five stepped forward, and these recruits, wrote a reporter, suffered “rather severe abuse by their fellow soldiers for leaving them.” Angrily, Schouler drafted orders disbanding the 14th Massachusetts. Two hundred men joined their Irish comrades in the 9th Massachusetts, but the remaining 560 fled to New York City, where they hoped to receive better treatment and efficient state relief.\textsuperscript{64}

The 40th New York, the 66th New York, and the Excelsior Brigade received the lion’s share of this exodus. Unfortunately, many Irish Bostonians expressed disappointment upon reaching New York. Once there, they came to discover that the Empire City’s mobilization stood in greater disarray than Boston’s own. In Yonkers, Irish Bostonians found the ranks of the 40th New York, “instead of a regiment in uniform,” wrote a reporter, “only five or six hundred men, without uniforms, and to all appearances not drilled. Further investigations were of an unsatisfactory character, and they could not ascertain that any uniforms had been furnished, though it was stated they were in New York City.” Twenty-one Irishmen returned to Boston.

The situation was nearly as bad in the Excelsior Brigade. One Boston-raised company expected to receive arms, uniforms, and equipment upon its arrival. Finding none of their expectations met, the soldiers pronounced the brigade “a humbug,” as the New Yorkers had no

\textsuperscript{64} Schouler, \textit{Massachusetts in the Civil War}, 210-2; \textit{Boston Daily Journal}, 5 June 1861.
uniforms, weapons, food, or commissioned officers, and many of the Excelsior soldiers simply left at will to visit friends in the city. When this Boston-raised company desired to leave, the regimental commander berated them in an abusive manner. Eventually, Massachusetts’ State Agent in New York, Dr. Samuel G. Howe, whom Andrew appointed for the purpose of monitoring Bay State troops as they passed the front, confronted Brigadier General Daniel Sickles, demanding that he release these Boston men. At first, Sickles refused, but eventually, he granted permission for their departure. The regimental commander, however, refused to abide by the decision and posted guards around the Bostonians’ camp. Under the cover of darkness, in twos and threes, the Boston volunteers gradually slipped out, reached the train station, and returned to their city of origin.65

Still, a majority of Boston’s Irish exodus remained in New York. Any casual glance at New York State’s Adjutant General’s records and muster rolls reveals a plethora of Boston volunteers in New York’s regiments. Additionally, the State’s Adjutant General received voluminous correspondence from Boston’s Irish population throughout the war, as wives, mothers, sisters, girlfriends, and daughters attempted to track down their wayward husbands, sons, fathers, brothers, and boyfriends in New York’s regiments or to apply for New York’s state financial aid.66

65 Boston Evening Transcript, 14 and 27 June 1861.
66 See, for instance: Catherine Hastings to John T. Sprague, 28 July 1864, Adjutant General’s Records, NYSA: “South Boston, July 28th 1864, To the Adjutant General of the State of New York, My Dear Sir, Can i trouble your valuable time to tell me if Henry C. Hasting 1st Regt. Excelsior Brigade is discharged or not dear sir i have not got any state aid since may and Dear sir if you would send a few line i would get the state aid and by Doing so you would greatly oblige your Humble Servant Catherine Hastings No. 21 Second St. South Boston, Mass.” See also, Adelaide Sadler to John T. Sprague, 5 August 1864, NYSA: “Boston, August 5, 1864,To the Adjutant General of the State of New York, Sir, Please inform me as soon as convenient if the State allows any aid to the families of re-enlisted soldiers. If so whether any arrangement can be made so that I can receive it in Boston. Yours Truly, Mrs. Adelaide Sadler, 47 Eliot St., Boston, Husband[:]Chas. J. Sadler, Commissary Sergt. 99 Regt. N.Y.S. Vols.” Or, Cornelius Scully, to John T. Sprague, 5 September 1864, NYSA: “Boston, Mass, September 5th, 1864,Sir,I beg to be
As thousands of volunteers went to their training camps in the summer and autumn of 1861, thousands of individual families had to make decisions about applying for state or city relief. Sergeant Enoch J. Baker of the 110th Pennsylvania had been unemployed before the war began. For him, the war came as a godsend because he could finally earn cash. However, his regiment, plagued by slow enlistment, forced Baker to admit that he was “not Entitled to eney pay” for several months. Fortunately, Baker’s wife in Philadelphia had several options for economic relief, including Peter Williamson’s Commission for the Relief of Families of Volunteers. Sergeant Baker directed his wife to apply for relief. He wrote, “if the Committy have not bin to See you by the time you get this go to Peter Williamson Pine above 8th St. you heard What he said to me the day i went to get the Certificate signed for you i think he will get it for you if not let me know in your next and When the Captin gets back i will get another for you With Colonels Signature to it As Well as a note for you to them the other mens wives get it and so shall you.”

The prolonged period of mobilization induced more and more families to ask for relief, causing some charity funds to run dry. In New York City, even the vaunted Union Defense
Committee fell into disrepute for its inability to provide for soldiers and their families. The *Times* declared, “The Union Defense Committee to which the [Excelsior] Brigade might have looked for an appropriation has disbursed all its means. In this emergency, the generosity of the people is about the only resource remaining.”

Private donations did little better, as they opened the door to fraud, and some dishonest women took advantage of gullible neighbors. In late June, the New York City police began searching for a female imposter—newspapers described her as a rapid-talking, toothless woman with a general lady-like appearance—who claimed to be the daughter of an esteemed military officer assigned to collect donations. By taking advantage of people’s good nature, she absconded with “quite a handsome sum.”

In late June and early July, newspapers reported the desperate condition of some soldiers’ families, now famished for want of funds and provisions. New York City Councilman William Orton declared the Eighteenth Ward in “absolute suffering” for lack of food. The *Herald* harangued, “How is this? Only three months have elapsed since [the relief appropriation] . . . was subscribed, and yet there are hundreds of helpless women and children who are without the means of bread.” One correspondent to the *Times* wailed, “Shall these poor people starve while thousands of peoples’ money lies unused in the hands of the [Union Defense] Committee?”

Reports of starving families induced city officials to take action. The New York City Council assumed that the Union Defense Committee had allotted $1,000,000—half of all appropriations issued to them—for the aid of families. On June 13, the Board of Councilmen sent a resolution to the Committee asking them to send copies of their financial records. The

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Committee replied that they had discontinued payment to needy families after spending $200,000; the balance went to supply troops. Displeased with this answer, on July 8, the Board of Councilmen passed resolutions calling for “prompt and vigorous action” due to the “intense suffering which now prevails throughout this city, occasioned by the sudden withdrawal of the only means of support from a large number of families.” The Board demanded the federal and state governments reimburse the Committee’s previous expenditures. It also resolved to examine the Committee’s financial papers and suspend further payments to the Committee from proceeds of sales of Union Defense Bonds. Finally, the Board voted an appropriation of $250,000 for the relief of families of volunteers. The Board of Alderman and the Board of Supervisors followed suit with votes of $500,000 and $250,000 appropriations for needy families.71

For many, the new appropriations did not come soon enough. On July 15, a procession of starving women gathered in front of the Union Defense Committee’s headquarters at 14 Fourth Avenue, chanting, “Bread! Bread! Bread!” When an agent informed them that they did not have any funds, “the look of disappointment and indignant reproach depicted on every countenance was truly heart-rending.” Finding no joy at the Committee office, the crowd journeyed to City Hall to confront Mayor Wood, but, again, they received no attention. Women protested for the next three days. On July 17, crowds of poor women, “chiefly German and Irish,” according to the Times, gathered at the Committee’s disbursing office. Many carried infants in their arms or dragged toddlers by the hand. According to a reporter, “All of them complained bitterly of the privation they have had to suffer, and many stated that they had not a bit of bread in the house, and that their children were suffering from hunger.” A Committee agent again informed the protestors that no funds were forthcoming. Their protests grew louder as the morning progressed,

and one German woman vociferously declared that she would go to Mayor Wood’s office, as she declared it “all his fault.”  

On July 19, after securing an adjacent building with benches, the Union Defense Committee began disbursing funds. Thousands of female heads of households arrived and presented distribution tickets issued by their husbands’ company commanders. Over 1,200 people received cash on the first day. The Times reported: “From early in the morning until late in the afternoon, both rooms were densely crowded with women and children, and, although the paying-out process was conducted with surprising facility, no apparent diminution was observed in the large numbers of applicants until about 4 o’clock P.M.” Part of the delay resulted from lengthy cross-checking of the tickets. Every agent had to verify the tickets against a list of 1,000 New York City deserters. If a lady presented a deserter’s ticket, agents immediately destroyed it and turned her out of the building empty handed.

After the initial confusion of the first few days of disbursement, the Union Defense Committee settled on a more organized plan of relief. It issued payments of $2.00 per week to every head of family with $1.00 per week for every eldest child and fifty cents per week for each additional child (not exceeding four in number), provided each applicant presented proof of residency anteceding May 1, 1861. The Committee opened offices in the various wards and only disbursed funds from 9:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M. four days a week. Eights wards received relief on

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Mondays; five others received relief on Tuesdays; five others on Wednesdays; and the remaining four received aid on Thursdays.\textsuperscript{74}

Unfortunately, the process of distributing relief to soldiers’ families became burdened with criminality. Female swindlers did their best to abscond with money unlawfully obtained. Dishonest women posed as soldiers’ wives or mothers to claim the funds, even though they had no connection with anyone in the army. In Boston, one curious case involved a woman named Mrs. Rooney who owned a boarding house recently vacated by a soldier, Patrick Callahan. Callahan, it seemed, owed Rooney rent money, but he could not pay her because the federal paymaster had not arrived to pay his regiment. Callahan left his landlady an “IOU,” but the impatient Mrs. Rooney decided to collect the money herself by posing as Callahan’s wife and drawing $12.00 per month from the commonwealth’s Relief Committee. Eventually, the relief secretary discovered her scheme and had her arrested.\textsuperscript{75}

The situation was the same in New York City. Dozens of deceitful women defrauded the Union Defense Committee’s Sub-Committee on Relief. Authorities apprehended more than a few; in September, the Relief Committee arrested Julia Boland, wife of a private in the 32\textsuperscript{nd} New York, for taking money from both the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Ward disbursement offices and absconding with $46.50 in illegal funds. In October, Eighteenth Ward agents arrested Anne Fellen for defrauding the city of $17.50 by posing as Anne Bauer, the wife of a soldier in the 8\textsuperscript{th} New York. Frauds became so frequent that the Relief Committee refused to issue funds until after soldiers had properly mustered and left for the seat of war. This decision, in turn, slowed

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 24 July 1861. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Nineteenth Wards received relief on Mondays; the Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, Fifteenth, and Twentieth Wards received relief on Tuesdays; the Sixth, Seventh, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-First Wards received relief on Wednesdays, and the Fourteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-Second Wards received relief on Thursdays.

\textsuperscript{75} Boston Daily Journal, 19 August 1861.
the pace of recruitment. One soldier considered this a dreadful rule because “regiments cannot be organized and dispatched as rapidly as they formerly were.” He continued, “… many families are suffering while the father is waiting for his regiment to complete its organization. … [T]he Committee should modify their rule regarding the city residents, unless they desire to obstruct recruiting as much as possible.”76

Boston’s relief agents tried to implement tighter security too but did equal damage to the people by turning away those rightfully entitled to such funds. Stricter identification denied some soldiers’ relatives because clerical omissions caused certain claims to be viewed as suspect. A mere matter of handwriting, it seemed, could impoverish a family. Colonel William Raymond Lee, commander of the 20th Massachusetts, sent an angry letter to the State House when he learned that the wife of one of his volunteers had been turned away. Although she had a certificate authenticating her husband’s enlistment and muster, Lee wrote, “because the whole certificate was not in my hand writing & other like nonsense,” officials refused to help her.77

Boston reporters identified these problems and began accusing the recruiting officers of clumsy enlistment practices, and thus the ultimate cause of this impoverishment. An editor of the Daily Journal offered this dilemma of a hypothetical soldier, “Tom Jones.” Jones, the editor said, might live in Boston but work in Roxbury, so he enlisted there. Thus, when his wife, who lived in Boston, applied for relief, officials sent her to Roxbury. When she reached Roxbury, agents told her that the law would not pay for people who lived outside of town. The editors noted that slapdash enlistment papers caused this predicament and new rolls needed to be made. “Much trouble and even suffering has arisen from errors of this class,” wrote one reporter, “and every

77 Boston Daily Journal, 19 August 1861; W. Raymond Lee to unknown, 17 October 1861, MSA.
A captain of a Massachusetts company who has not already revised the descriptive roll of his command and forwarded it to the Adjutant General should do so, forthwith.”

Colonel Rudolph Rosa and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Gorham of New York City’s “Frémont Regiment” agreed. When city authorities refused to pay volunteers’ families until the regiment left for Washington, Rosa and Gorham angrily remonstrated. They petitioned Governor Morgan to order forward their incomplete companies immediately, but Morgan—ever a stickler for rules—promptly refused, demanding the regiment fill its ranks first. Gorham resented Morgan’s action, stating, “[W]e cannot expect but to see the greatest dissatisfaction breaking out in the ranks if these men find their families starving before their very eyes.” Gorham wrote to James Lesley, Chief Clerk of the War Department, asking him to override Morgan’s directive. Gorham argued, “Retail business in New York is improving by degrees, employment is easier found, and certainly we have recruited so very little within the past two days that it is in no proportion with the expenses. Sundry signs forebode most conclusively that the regiment will loose [sic] members instead of gaining them if not speedily ordered to march.” Gorham’s wish came true; Morgan ordered the Frémont Regiment to leave the next day.

The exploitation of the relief funds sapped potency sooner than benevolent organizers expected. As consequence, family relief funds required constant replenishment. Although patriotic fervor remained high, as autumn drew on, donations across the urban Northeast decreased. Contributions, many civic leaders argued, should not be borne by the wealthy alone. The entire population needed to put in. “Charity begins at home,” read one Boston editorial. “. . . The wealthy can give to these general funds also—but every Massachusetts man, woman, and

78 Boston Daily Journal, 23 November 1861.
79 Joseph Gorham to James C. Lesley, 13 September 1861, NYSA.
child, should this fall do something toward promoting the comfort of Massachusetts soldiers and supplying their wants.” A few neighborhoods took up the call. In Boston’s Eleventh Ward, one enterprising lady on Rutland Street went door-to-door canvassing her neighbors, asking them to donate blankets to the army. Every family on the street donated a blanket except one, and this prompt action, recorded one observer, “it is hoped, will be followed by other ladies in all of our streets and the result will be most gratifying to every patriotic heart.” In any event, regimental officers and families had to look to private charities as the autumn progressed. By late August, New York’s Union Defense Committee had disbursed $968,292.64 of its initial $1,000,000 appropriation.

Relief efforts became of salient importance in Baltimore as they served a means of validating the city’s loyalty to the Union. Most importantly, Baltimoreans expressed their appreciation for the Union volunteers by doling out relief and provisions to passing regiments. In late May, a group of patriotic women formed the Union Relief Association, an organization that became the Union’s leading wartime benevolent institution. Several women, including Mary M. Johnson—wife of Maryland’s Democratic senator, Reverdy Johnson—became concerned that the families of the Baltimore volunteers could not sustain themselves while their loved ones languished in organizing regiments. At first, the patriotic women asked for benevolent donations from wealthy friends, but when these funds ran out, they organized a second meeting at Temperance Temple in June. Several prominent citizens formed an executive committee and set

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81 New York Herald, 22 August 1861; McKay, The Civil War and New York City, 96-7. $157,336.97 had gone to supply the three-month men, $352,424.63 had gone to supply the two-year men, $21,947.77 had gone to various three-year regiments, $236,598.27 had gone to the purchase of arms and ammunition, and $230,000.00 had gone to the families of soldiers. The remainder went to supply some of the new three-year regiments in early autumn. In all, over 12,000 families had received aid, whether fraudulently or genuinely.

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about the task of raising $1,500 to disperse to 400 women, the wives and mothers of soldiers in the 1st Maryland.

By August, Baltimore’s Union Relief Association accelerated its new program to take care of sick soldiers left behind by passing regiments, establishing infirmaries on Sharp Street and Lombard Street. They also created a Committee of Arrangements headed by representatives from each of the city’s twenty wards. This Committee began the task of procuring food, beverages, bandages, and medical supplies to distribute to all sick and passing soldiers. Additionally, the women of the Union Relief Association organized a refreshment saloon from which they doled out provisions to passing regiments. The Working Committee, the committee designed to run the saloon, employed fifteen cooks, who daily cut huge rounds of cheese, cooked sides of bacon and ham, and prepared fresh loaves of bread. A handful of black Baltimoreans—paid a trifling ten cents per regiment—hauled heavy barrels of water up to the Camden Station platform to quench the travel-weary boys in blue, many of whom had been given nothing to eat or drink since leaving their places of origin. Together, the Union Relief Association saloon workers fed over 500 passing soldiers each week. Arriving soldiers from the northeastern states expressed surprise to see the benevolent impulses of Baltimore flow so freely. One regiment, New York City’s “Tenth Legion” (56th New York Infantry), received such care and attention that it sent up cheer after cheer inside the saloon and it serenaded the relief workers with its fine brass band. One officer from a cavalry regiment claimed, “Both officers and men were much pleased with the kind treatment they received, and state that they will ever have occasion to remember the day they spent in Baltimore.”

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82 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 27 and 28 August and 9 and 15 November 1861.
While the Union Relief Association workers distributed food and water, other members of the Working Committee commenced the difficult process of collecting donations from a diffident public and distributing aid to needy families. For many workers, the sojourn into the poorer wards proved eye-opening, and they found themselves expending money unexpectedly. One Working Committee member recounted:

In the distribution of the funds thus collected the Committee saw squalid poverty, which they had read of, but had never witnessed. In one house, perfectly denuded of furniture, not a chair, not a knife, not a broken cup, nor utensil whatever [could be found]—all had been pawned for food and drink—there a woman sat in unwomanly rags, who had not a morsel of bread—blind, and lame, with but one article of clothing to cover her nakedness, her husband a drunkard, and she living on scraps sent in by neighbors scarcely less poor than herself.  

By the end of August, the Relief Association estimated that it had provided comfort and relief to over 100,000 Union volunteers. During the first four months of its existence, the Union Relief Association tallied a host of significant accomplishments. In addition to its astonishing output and its dramatic propaganda efforts, it won over the hearts of Union soldiers, who had pegged Baltimore as a city of traitors. However, the Association’s greatest accomplishment may have been its unique ability to merge the multivalent benevolent issues attendant to mobilization—soldiers’ aid, family aid, and medical and sanitary relief—into one organization. Even some larger cities, including Philadelphia and New York, could not manage this. While this certainly created a large and sometimes unwieldy bureaucracy, it prevented separate agencies from competing against each other for the same resources.

Philadelphia residents realized that their city held an important geographic position as it was positioned to receive hungry troops from all cities and towns in the Northeast as they passed to Washington. The constant influx of soldiers prompted several citizens to take action. Barzilai

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83 Ibid., 28 August 1861.
S. Brown, a grocer and fruit dealer, proposed to establish a refreshment saloon for passing troops in Southwark, where many New York, New England, and New Jersey troops landed from ferries on the Delaware River. On May 21, Brown rented a small boat shop at the corner of Swanson Street and Washington Avenue from which he handed out provisions. On May 27, fifty-five Philadelphia residents formed a committee and founded the Union Volunteer Refreshment Saloon. As funds permitted, the committee added additional buildings, establishing a washroom, dining room, and reading room for the soldiers. By early June, enough civilian volunteers worked at the saloon to feed 15,000 soldiers each day. The Union Volunteer Refreshment Saloon refused all state and federal aid, the committee insisting that it rely wholly upon the generosity of Philadelphians. Barzilai Brown commented, “Soldiers should not be allowed to leave our city without some manifestation of our appreciation for their patriotism.” On May 26, another committee of fifty-five citizens organized the Cooper Shop Volunteer Refreshment Saloon at the corner of Ostego Street and Washington Avenue. Here, civilian volunteers erected two 150-foot tents where soldiers could sit and drink coffee and other beverages.84

The two refreshment saloons in Philadelphia served as an optimistic counterpoint to the uniform scandals. Soldiers who passed through them universally described their treatment with pleasant surprise. Workers in the Union Volunteer Saloon ushered incoming soldiers in a methodical way. Each arriving unit stacked its arms on the north side of Washington Avenue and then un-slung its knapsacks. Philadelphia units often marched in from camps on the west side of the Schuylkill River, and units from farther North arrived via transport ship by docking at the Washington Street Wharf on the Delaware. On pleasant days, a band and a large crowd of

onlookers serenaded the soldiers as they entered. Workers split the regiment into two columns, and one-by-one, soldiers entered along two sides of a long table. Along the table, soldiers discovered a seemingly endless buffet of food, along which they slowly inched, consuming its bounty and stuffing their haversacks. While they ate the victuals, female workers filled their knapsacks with individualized parcels that included paper, envelopes, stamps, pen and ink, and sometimes added items for personal hygiene, including soap, toothbrushes, needle and thread. As the soldiers reached the end of the buffet, a bevy of ladies descended on them, seizing their canteens, filling them with coffee or milk. With any remaining time, the soldiers and ladies mingled, often flirting or exchanging addresses for future correspondence. These ladies, remembered one Philadelphia soldier, “(God bless them) will ever be remembered for their kindness to us.” Afterwards, if they wished, soldiers could file into a “reading room,” where they could pick up free newspapers. Illiterate troopers could meet a female volunteer who could write a letter to a loved one back North. A Philadelphia soldier described this treatment as “glorious, generous, and enlightened.” He continued effusively:

If the city of Philadelphia did nothing more than establish this refreshment saloon during the rebellion, it were enough and more too; but it is not my province to write of Philadelphia’s wondrous work—the world knows it all. I do want to say here, that upon many occasions when conversing with men from other states, when told that we were from Philadelphia their faces lit up at once and they were quick to recognize her care for the soldiers, exclaiming, “Oh, yes! That’s where they fed us so well.” “Yes, that’s the greatest place in the country!” and “We’ll never forget that place as long as we live.”

The success of the Philadelphia saloons earned wide acclaim. As historians Matthew Gallman and Lori Ginzberg have shown, a tradition of benevolence that drew upon traditional connections—social, urban, and gender-oriented—vitally aided this movement. However, as

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successful as this effort was, it served only as a temporary measure, relieving soldiers by treating them during a single day of their mobilization. The other equipage inefficiencies, those designed to prepare soldiers for garrison and campaign life, overshadowed the saloon movement with insurmountable difficulties.\footnote{Gallman, \textit{Mastering Wartime}, 126-44; and Lori Ginzberg, \textit{Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and Class in the Nineteenth-Century United States} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 133-73.}

Benevolence tried to meet new demands as they came. When the temperature dropped, “blanket donation movements” emerged in all four cities. Residents went door-to-door asking neighbors to donate old blankets to the soldiers before winter set in. Baltimore’s blanket charity might have become the most well-known since Brigadier General James Cooper, commander of all Maryland volunteers in federal service, directed it. In October, he became concerned that no winter clothing or blankets had arrived to equip his organizing troops. Unable to quell the growing numbers of sick Baltimore volunteers who now filled the beds of the city’s improvised hospitals, Cooper appealed to the citizens of the Monumental City to donate their blankets and clothing to his desperate men. An editor of the \textit{American} pleaded, “There must be in almost every household an extra blanket or two, a quilt, and dozens of smaller things, needful in camp, which would be of vast service; things which would be scarcely missed by those with a tight roof over their heads.”\footnote{\textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 18 October 1861.}

Slow distribution of winter weather equipment slowed recruitment and fostered demoralization. While encamped at Easton, the Philadelphia soldiers in the 81st Pennsylvania received no tents, overcoats, or blankets and were forced to live in leaky shanties patched together from loose boards. On his second night in camp, Sergeant James H. Walker weathered a
torrential rain storm, writing, “Our situation was anything but comfortable.” Blankets arrived in camp the next day, but there were not enough for all the men. Because it arrived last, Walker’s company received nothing. After another “shivering night,” Walker remonstrated with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Johnson, who expressed his complete ignorance regarding the supply deficiency. Walker wrote, “he told me that I might arrange it so as to have three men sleep under two blankets—quite consoling that, when we didn’t happen to have any! The Camp seemed to be entirely demoralized.”

The work of clothing, arming, equipping, feeding, (and in the case of cavalry, mounting) became a process no less disordered than the simultaneous process that recruited, organized, officered, quartered, and drilled the volunteers. Certainly, the incredible scope of mobilization played a significant part. Even the industrial centers of the Northeast were not prepared to meet the impressive demands that mobilization entailed. The cities took center stage in the notorious uniform scandals of 1861, they saw the decrease in wages of experienced tailors, and they saw thousands of desertions caused by poor nutrition, poor clothing, and lack of monetary support. A few bright moments occurred, particularly, the benevolence of the Philadelphia and Baltimore refreshment saloons. However, even the benevolence movement experienced maladministration, as it saw abuse by fraudulent applicants, “bread riots” in New York City, complaints of ethnic discrimination, and questions pertaining to the efficacy of charity. Again, federalism, pluralism, and capitalism each had their roles to play in these fiascos, forcing urbanites to endure frustration and inconvenience. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1861, much of the necessary equipage needs had been met. So, to participants’ eyes, it appeared that urbanism carried the day despite the

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88 James H. Walker diary, 25-28 September 1861, HSP.
initial disorganization. Three more uninterrupted years of war would put that viewpoint to the test.
Chapter 5:  
“Embarrassment, Delay, and Confusion”:  
The Politics of Manpower, July 1861—April 1862.

In the thirteen weeks between April and mid-July, the North’s cities had yet to devise an organized system of mobilization, but what hope they had that feverish patriotism might quell southern secession and end hostilities quickly evaporated when news of the defeat at Bull Run reached them. On July 21, a 34,000-man Union army—then called the Army of Virginia—engaged an equally sized Confederate force near Manassas Junction. Since most of his volunteers had signed three-month enlistment papers, Major General Irvin McDowell needed to capture Richmond by the end of the month or he would have no army left to command. In its early stages, the ensuing battle went well for the untested Union troops, but after midday, Confederate reinforcements from the Shenandoah Valley arrived and pitched into the disorganized Union attack. Many Union regiments panicked and ran for the rear with little organization or discipline. In all, the bluecoats suffered 2,900 casualties, including 460 killed. The survivors participated in what became known as the “Great Skedaddle,” an embarrassingly unsystematic twenty-five mile retreat back to Washington.

In the aftermath of the Bull Run defeat, New Yorker George Templeton Strong noted in his diary on July 22, “Today will be known as BLACK MONDAY. We are utterly and disgracefully routed, beaten, whipped by secessionists.” But he remained optimistic about ultimate victory, even though it might take longer than initially expected: “If the North be not cast down and discouraged by this reverse, we shall flog these scoundrels and traitors all the more bitterly for it before we are done with them.”¹ Generally, this bad news did not sour the

¹ George T. Strong diary, 22 July 1861, in Nevins, ed., Diary of the Civil War, 169.
cities’ warlike patriotism. Instead, remarked the New York Herald, “a great impulse has been given to military movements, and the enthusiasm of the people, one and all, has been wrought up to such a pitch as to dispel the transient gloom. . . . Nothing is now talked of among the people but the speedy organization of new regiments.”\(^2\) The mood was similar elsewhere. Philadelphian Sidney Fisher initially “found the city in a ferment.” But Philadelphians soon calmed down. Fisher remarked, “Everyone is impressed with the conviction that the war is a very stern and serious reality.”\(^3\) Bostonians initially fumed and raged. Two of their regiments—the 1\(^{\text{st}}\) and 5\(^{\text{th}}\) Massachusetts—had fought at Bull Run, and in addition to being ignominiously routed, both suffered losses which city-goers then considered heavy. News of the battle produced a mournful impression, wrote one reporter, “The families and friends of those who had fallen were stricken with poignant grief.” Many Boston citizens advocated renewed interest in the war. In an attempt to increase patriotic vigor, the Daily Journal wrote, “[T]he Federal Government looks to Massachusetts for aid to avenge the blood of her slaughtered citizens. And the old Bay State stands ready to respond. From every camp, the cry breaks forth, ‘let us have a chance at them.’”\(^4\) In Baltimore, news of Bull Run elated friends of the Confederacy and depressed the spirits of Union men. Fights broke out everywhere, but police made few arrests. Thankfully, a drenching rain kept many violent offenders off the streets.

In the immediate aftermath of Bull Run, Lincoln and the War Department faced a serious dilemma. Their three-month troops were set to muster out, and the government had only 42,000 three-year men on hand to repulse any possible Confederate counterattack. On July 22, Congress passed an act allowing the president to call for more three-year volunteers, and Lincoln

\(^2\) New York Herald, 24 July 1861.
\(^4\) Boston Daily Journal, 22 July 1861.
immediately asked the northern states for 500,000 men. This time, city residents—and their rural compatriots—hoped they could meet Lincoln’s new quota efficiently. On July 27, the *New York Times* warned, “the teachings of the past will furnish some instructive lesson in regard to future organization and management of the volunteer forces.” \(^5\) The response to this new call, many hoped, would carry on smoothly. Unfortunately, as the manpower demand became a long-term issue rather than a short-term problem, the politics of the urban Northeast—with its heavy ethnic pluralism and its Democratic partisanship—ran afoul of the Republican-dominated upper levels of government. When the politics of manpower played out, the competing levels of government offered more problems than solutions.

First and foremost, the call of July 22 hurried into service many incomplete regiments and brigades that had started organizing in the spring. However, the urgency of the hour exacerbated the chaos and confusion. New York City suffered particularly from the post-Bull Run frenzy. New York Governor Edwin Morgan tried to reclaim control of the city regiments that had been denied to him by War Department interference earlier in the summer. On July 25, he issued orders directing all incomplete and newly authorized regiments to rendezvous at depots in Albany, Elmira, and New York City.

These orders mobilized the unit commanded by his political rival, Brigadier General Daniel Sickles’s “Excelsior Brigade,” sending it to Washington, leaving behind $283,000 in debt.\(^6\) The urgency of protecting the capitol unleashed a heated struggle between Sickles and

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\(^6\) Ibid., 17 September 1861. The 1\(^{st}\), 2\(^{nd}\), and 3\(^{rd}\) Excelsior Regiments (70\(^{th}\), 71\(^{st}\), and 72\(^{nd}\) New York Infantry Regiments)—contained ten city-raised companies. They departed on July 23 and 24. The *New York Times* reported that they departed “with little parade and show,” taking no time to visit with friends, hear speeches, or receive colors. The remaining sixteen New York City companies raised by Sickles left as part of the 4\(^{th}\) and 5\(^{th}\) Excelsior Regiments (73\(^{rd}\) and 74\(^{th}\) New York Infantry Regiments) on August 20 and 22. Admirers pointed out that no
Morgan to appoint officers to the Excelsior Brigade. Since Morgan approved the departure, he considered it his right to make appointments, but since Lincoln had accepted the brigade under federal authority back in May, Sickles believed he alone possessed that right. Shortly after arriving in Washington, Sickles purged the officer corps of all persons suspected of loyalty to Morgan. Morgan tried to stop Sickles by forwarding commissions to officers previously approved by the State Military Board, but Sickles intercepted them and turned the documents into “waste paper” for his orderlies. This action removed, among others, the 1st Excelsior’s highly qualified regimental surgeon, William H. Tingley, who strongly resented that “Sickles had destroyed the commissions sent to his officers by Gov. Morgan, declaring that he would have no officer in his command who would hold one from the Governor.” Thus, he wailed, “I who wish to serve under the state of New York have been fraudulently deprived of my commission to gratify Sickles hostility to Gov. Morgan.”

Although the squabble had stemmed from a personal dispute between Sickles and Morgan, the incident underscored the complicated problems originating from divided authority. Sickles claimed it his prerogative to appoint officers based on authority granted him by New York City’s Union Defense Committee (with War Department approval) while Morgan took his authority from the state. Ambiguous harmonizing of different levels of authority—state, local, and federal—occurred across the North, but they occurred more contentiously in cities where ever-present local authorities had more power to resist than in rural areas.

individual had recruited as many troops as Sickles and the nation owed its safety to his ingenuity. The Times recorded, “Whatever may be said of Gen. Sickles’ political career, it must be acknowledged that his military career, so far at least, has been a most brilliant success.”

7 Thomas A. Smith to Edwin Morgan, 20 December 1861; J. L. Palmer to Nelson Taylor, 17 March 1862; Nelson Taylor to Thomas Hillhouse, 19 March 1862; William H. Tingley to Thomas Hillhouse, 23 March and 3 April 1862, NYSA; James Stevenson, History of the Excelsior Brigade or Sickles’ Brigade (Patterson, NJ: Van Derhoven and Holmes, 1863), 5-7.
Indeed, similar conflicts complicated mobilization efforts in all major cities. Rarely did they derail the completion of regimental organization. However, when urban America’s ethnic and social pluralism mixed into the equation, mutiny could ensue. Several high profile mutinies marked the post-Bull Run period, all concerning urban regiments. Nearly all involved homogenous minority groups and nearly all of the mutineers used the pretense of divided authority to validate their disobedience.

Two shocking mutinies occurred in popular New York City regiments, the “1st Fire Zouaves” (11th New York Infantry) and “Cameron’s Highlanders” (79th New York Infantry), two regiments that had fought at Bull Run. After the battle, without orders, the Fire Zouaves—a regiment that routed during the fight—unexpectedly boarded trains and returned to New York City, “proclaiming loudly against the ill-usage they had received.” Much of their disgust stemmed from city newspapers’ lambasting of their poor battlefield performance. The Fire Zouaves also aired deeply felt grievances. They complained that they did not receive the weapons promised them—Sharps Rifles, pistols, and Bowie knives—they accused the state and federal government of giving them bad rations and no pay, and they claimed that mustering officers had intimidated them into swearing into service for two years rather than for three-months. When their new commanding officer, Colonel Noah Farnham, who assumed command after a Virginia secessionist murdered their first Colonel Ellsworth in May, discontinued the popular Zouave bayonet drill and replaced all of the line officers with inactive members of his old unit, the disgruntled Fire Zouaves decided to quit and reorganize in New York City, as “everything was going to the d—l.”8 None feared interference, as “the government was disorganized as well as the regiment; and the politicians were squabbling amongst themselves.”

On August 19, after Colonel Farnham died of a head wound received at Bull Run, the Zouaves reassembled in the City Assembly Room. Their lieutenant colonel refused to take command, so Major C. McK. Leozer pleaded with the 608 present for duty to take up arms again. Of those present, only 300 chose to serve for the full two years. A witness declared, “Thus, one half of those [Fire Zouaves] known to be in the city refused to do duty, and it is believed confidently that the other half will soon follow suit—so great is the disaffection of the men, and the utter inability of the officers to control them.”

Maladministration also led to mutiny in Cameron’s Highlanders, a three-year regiment accepted under the May 3 call. Following the death of Colonel James C. Cameron at Bull Run, Secretary of War Simon Cameron—the colonel’s brother—appointed Isaac I. Stevens, an old political crony and ex-governor of Washington Territory, to command the regiment, ignoring the claim of the popular Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Elliott. This displeased the Scotsmen, who, as members of the city’s old 79th N.Y.S.M., expected to elect their officers. Additionally, Secretary Cameron revoked an order allowing the Highlanders to return to New York City to replenish their ranks. Instead, he transferred them to Brigadier General Sickles’s Excelsior Brigade. The company officers vociferously complained that only the State Military Board could appoint regimental officers, not the Secretary of War. In abhorrence, many of the officers resigned, much to Cameron’s delight. Immediately, Sickles began suggesting replacements, and he demanded the regiment pitch camp in the vicinity of his brigade.

Fueled by a large quantity of alcohol, the enlisted men in the Highlander Regiment mutinied. All but two companies refused to join “Mr. Sickles’s Brigade,” as they derisively

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9 Ibid., 20 and 21 August 1861.
called it. The Times sympathized with the Highlanders, claiming that the War Department had treated them injudiciously, for “they saw so many of their officers resigning at pleasure and going to New York, which they themselves were unable to do.” On August 13, Colonel Stevens ordered the men to strike tents and move to the Excelsior Brigade’s encampment, but the inebriated Scotsmen refused to budge. Under the direction of Major General George McClellan, thousands of U.S. regulars and artillerymen surrounded the Highlanders’ encampment. The regulars arrested thirty-seven ringleaders and stripped the regiment of its colors. Over 140 Scotsmen fled the scene and made their way back to New York to organize a new regiment.¹⁰

Mutiny did not spare Philadelphia during this period. The call for 500,000 also brought the Pennsylvania Reserve Division into federal service, forcing Secretary Cameron to accept this unit created by his political rival, Governor Andrew Curtin. Once Cameron issued the order calling the Reserves into federal service, Colonel William Mann of Philadelphia’s 2nd Reserves, on his own authority, ordered his men to board cars on July 24 to proceed to Harrisburg to swear out of service of the Commonwealth. Unfortunately, no U.S. mustering officer met them there. Mann refused to wait, and with Curtin’s permission, he put his men on a train to Baltimore, hoping that they might find a mustering officer there. The 2nd Reserves arrived at Baltimore on the afternoon of July 26, but since Mann had departed “on his own hook,” the Department commander, Major General John A. Dix, refused to accommodate the unit. Secretary Cameron then redirected the regiment to Sandy Hook, Maryland, instead of Washington. Although discouraged, for it appeared that Cameron intended to send them away from the action, the Philadelphians boarded another train, arriving at their new destination that night. Cameron, however, neglected to telegraph their new Department commander, Major General Nathaniel P.

¹⁰ Ibid., 18 and 22 August and 8 September 1861.
Banks, to prepare for them. When they reached Sandy Hook, Banks had made no effort to draw necessary rations. He assigned the travel-weary soldiers to a campground where they begged nearby regiments for food.\(^\text{11}\)

Growing discontent flared up when the men of the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Reserves discovered that their fellow Philadelphians of the 28\(^{\text{th}}\) Pennsylvania, including its new field officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel De Korponay, camped adjacent to them. The four companies of the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Reserves once pledged to serve under De Korponay remembered their earlier ordeal. Disgusted at the treatment they received from the disorganized federal government, groups of men in each company realized that they possessed a way out: they had sworn out of Pennsylvania service but had not yet sworn into federal service. Currently, no one could keep them at Sandy Hook. If they refused to take the Oath of Allegiance, they could return to Philadelphia to reorganize under a new commander, presumably the ring-leader of the mutiny, Lieutenant Colonel Albert L. Magilton. Undoubtedly, the mutiny commenced in the Irish companies of the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) Reserves, for not only did they have reason to despise Mann for the organizational fiasco in June, but since he was a Republican politician, they wanted to break free from his yoke.\(^\text{12}\)

On the sweltering afternoon of August 1, the U.S. mustering officer, Lieutenant Colonel Fitz-John Porter attempted to administer the oath, company by company. Over one quarter of the men refused to swear and instead registered a list of grievances. Appalled at this turn of events, Porter lost his temper and directed “injudicious remarks” at them.\(^\text{13}\) The next morning, the regiment formed again and Porter ordered all men to retake the Oath. Such “injudicious

\(^{\text{12}}\) Ibid., 28.
\(^{\text{13}}\) Ibid., 28-9.
“proceedings,” remarked Captain Woodward, predictably infuriated the men. Now, fully one half of the regiment—476 men—refused to swear. The officers rounded up the mutineers, ordered them to stack arms, and unceremoniously stripped them of their uniforms. Placing eleven officers as guards, Mann sent them on a train back to Philadelphia. As the train departed, the mutineers offered three cheers for Lieutenant Colonel Magilton. Although everyone knew that a cabal of disgruntled officers had organized the mutiny, there was no way to punish them, for they had all sworn into federal service individually upon receiving their commissions. Thus, they did not officially participate in the refusal to swear.\textsuperscript{14}

News of the mutiny infuriated Curtin, for the Reserve Division had been his brainchild. Curtin was in Philadelphia when the mutineers returned and he held an audience with the eleven commissioned officers. Two weeks later, Curtin ordered all of Philadelphia’s major newspapers to print the names, occupations, and addresses of the mutineers with a warning to recruiters to refuse to accept them for any new regiments. “We do not need their services,” announced Curtin sharply, “nor do we risk our cause in their hands.” Predictably, Curtin’s pronouncement carried little potency; recruiters desperately needed bodies. Over one-half of the mutineers re-enlisted during the war; one-third re-enlisted immediately upon their return to the city. The 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 69\textsuperscript{th}, 72\textsuperscript{nd}, and 82\textsuperscript{nd} Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments recruited in Philadelphia reaping the benefits.\textsuperscript{15}

In the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Pennsylvania Reserves, companies B, F, G, and I disbanded, for each had lost over

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 29. Even though they were already sworn into service, officers usually took the Oath of Allegiance alongside their enlisted men as an act of good faith. Philadelphia newspapers indicated that one second lieutenant was removed for refusing to serve. Of all the mutineers, this lieutenant’s name was the only one withheld from publication. This officer was probably Second Lieutenant Francis Fox of Company C.

\textsuperscript{15} Philadelphia Inquirer, 21 August 1861

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sixty-six percent of its enlisted men. The officers of these companies lost their commissions and returned to the enlisted ranks.  

Colonel Edward Baker’s 1st California—another Philadelphia Regiment—also faced an ominous insurrection in early August after it arrived at Washington. This mutiny exhibited a strange quality in that the soldiers became constitutional scholars for a day. Company M, one of five additional companies added to Baker’s command during its brief stay in Philadelphia in late June, suddenly refused to serve. Because Baker had sworn the men into service himself—and for three-years’ service in seeming violation of the U.S. Constitution—the men of Company M claimed that they could no longer be held. To appease them, Baker acquired a Regular Army mustering officer, but the intractable men refused to take the Oath of Allegiance. To Sergeant Francis Donaldson of Company H, Baker made the wrong move, for it “proved to the rebellious fellows that they were not really in the service.” When this failed, Baker ordered the mutineers placed under guard. The following day, former U.S. Vice President and a future Confederate general, John Cabell Breckinridge, arrived in camp and encouraged further disaffection. Breckinridge—who, according to one soldier, was “a good deal intoxicated”—told Company M that Lincoln could not hold soldiers longer than three months without a congressional act.

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16 It is interesting to examine the social composition of the 2nd Reserves’ mutineers. The bulk of them came from Philadelphia’s unskilled or semi-skilled working-class, and most were Irish-American. The “Governor’s Rangers” (Company B), the company that lost the most men—seventy-nine out of ninety-six—reflected the greatest amount of socio-economic homogeneity. This company contained thirty-two watermen and ten laborers, all of whom mutinied. Additionally, half of this company lived in Southwark, seventeen within three blocks of each other (five of whom lived in the same building, 752 South Front Street). The tugs of community loyalty were perhaps stronger in this company than in most others recruited during this time. It cannot be argued that the 2nd Reserves’ mutineers were disloyal soldiers; their immediate reenlistment disproved this. Rather, their occupational, ethnic, neighborhood, and political loyalties conspired to fashion a sense of entitlement that drove these men to negotiate the terms of their enlistment in a public way. This should come as no surprise. Nineteenth-century cities were havens of democratic-minded protest. This mutiny more likely reflected the unique composition of the prewar urban North than a lackluster sense of patriotism from Philadelphia’s poor, Irish-American population. Andrew Curtin, raised in the rural central Pennsylvania countryside, could not have understood this. Muster and alphabetical rolls, 2nd Pennsylvania Reserve Infantry, PSA.
Although Congress had passed such an act three weeks earlier, everyone assumed that Baker’s men were credited to the May 3 call. Thus, Breckinridge argued that the men of Company M were illegally mustered and should demand to return to their homes immediately.\textsuperscript{17}

After Breckinridge departed, Baker asked his men to overlook the constitutionality of their muster and pledge themselves to the protection of the Union. In a daring move, he promised that if any man wished to leave the 1\textsuperscript{st} California immediately, he would grant their request without reprisal, but, following that, anyone who refused to serve would be treated as a deserter. He repeated his ultimatum three times, but not a man stepped out of the ranks.\textsuperscript{18}

In the post-Bull Run chaos, confusion and inefficiency spawned a serious issue—mutiny. This seemed especially likely when urban pluralism intervened. In the case of the 11\textsuperscript{th} and 79\textsuperscript{th} New York and the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Pennsylvania Reserves, some prewar urban bond—firemen, Scottish or Irish ancestry—had bound the mutineers together to fight against the authority responsible for their perceived mistreatment. Federalism, it seemed, posed a severe threat to mobilization. But even as these early warning signs emerged, none attempted to address them.

Now aware of the growing danger of combat, post-Bull Run volunteers exhibited more deliberate decisions to enlist. In late July, Henry Livermore Abbott, a fiercely conservative Boston Democrat from Harvard’s Class of 1860, joined the officer corps of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts as a second lieutenant. Abbott’s older brother, Ned, had already joined the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Massachusetts; now, young Henry Abbott explained to his mother his choice to serve. In mid-July, he wrote, “I came to the conclusion that it was the thing I ought to do, that nothing could

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
possibly be so good for me in the way of experience as going into the army. . . . I felt that I had never done any thing or amounted to any thing in the whole course of my existence, & that there was no better prospect in view for a long time, if at all. And what is more, that seemed to be the opinion of every body else.” Certainly, peer pressure had reached its zenith in Boston by mid-summer and it propelled many young men into the ranks, but as Abbott described it, “It isn’t as it was when the [war] first began & taking a commission was venturing into some unexplored region full of perils & uncertainties. Now it seems a matter of every day life. It is nothing more serious than going into trade or a profession. The edge is all taken off. Every body has got so used to it that nobody minds it [at] all.”

Despite the lessons taught in the spring, the cities continued to raise multiple regiments at the same time. By July, Baltimore had filled only one complete regiment even though dozens of companies had started to recruit. Although the city’s next regiment, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Maryland, had not yet filled, Baltimore’s chief recruiting officer, Captain James McConnell, announced that he would begin raising another, the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Maryland. Days later, a group of Germans declared that they would raise a fourth regiment, “The German Rifles.” Another group of concerned Unionists proposed they raise a “City Guard Regiment,” also known as the “Dix Light Infantry,” named for Major General John A. Dix, the commander of the newly established Department of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Finally, Postmaster William Purnell pledged to raise the “Purnell Legion,” a nine-company battalion of infantry augmented with two batteries of artillery and four companies of cavalry. With no regulation from federal or state authorities, random persons and corporate organizations in Baltimore called for troops at will.

Personal suasion continued to carry the greatest weight when it came to recruiting. In Boston, the most fashionable regiment of late summer proved to be the 22nd Massachusetts, or “Henry Wilson’s Regiment.” This illustrious Republican senator returned to Boston in late August, asking patriotic volunteers to fill out a regiment which he proposed to command. Wilson’s speaking tour through the city revitalized patriotism and created fervor equal to, if not greater than, that which Fletcher Webster had induced several months earlier. Once again, spectators and recruits flocked to thoroughfares and public squares to hear speeches and cheer on the cause.\(^{20}\)

While political popularity played a vital role in aiding recruitment, a few recruiters appealed to soldiers’ religion and morality. In Philadelphia, two abolitionist brothers, George and Joseph McLean, proposed to raise the “Cameron Light Guard”—later known as the 88th Pennsylvania—as a regiment of “Christian young men,” advertising their leaders’ devout qualities to induce enlistments. This ploy, in turn, led to support from pious organizations. The Union Methodist Episcopal Church at Fourth and Arch Street formed sewing groups to make shirts, drawers, socks, and other clothing articles specifically for the McLean brothers’ regiment. Another church, the Methodist Episcopal Church on Green Street, sewed tents and shelters.\(^{21}\)

Occupationally homogenous units continued to yield success. In Philadelphia, Colonel DeWitt C. Baxter recruited “Baxter’s Fire Zouaves,” the 72nd Pennsylvania Infantry. Baxter’s appeals to the bravery of the city’s firemen caused his regiment to fill rapidly, perhaps the fastest


of the entire summer. In seven days, he filled ten companies representing every fire company in the city. However, the quick departure of the Fire Zouaves spelled near disaster when, in late August, several fires burned out of control in South Philadelphia and the under-staffed fire departments could not put them out. When Philadelphians later proposed raising a regiment of Heavy Artillery Fire Zouaves, Mayor Henry shut down the recruiting offices.\(^{22}\)

In addition to enlisting recruits new to military service, northern city dwellers expected the returning three-month men to fill the ranks of Lincoln’s July 22 call. The *New York Times* mused that the returning recruits “had a taste of war,” but “the fire once lit in . . . [the volunteer’s] heart . . . will yearn again for excitement. . . . City life will begin to be tame and spiritless to them; and in two weeks time,” the editor, Henry J. Raymond guessed, they would volunteer again. As before, the new three-year regiments required competent officers and recruiters. Many of the junior and non-commissioned officers in the two-year and three-year regiments already in the field jumped at the chance to raise their own units to gain promotion. In July and August, officers resigned in droves and returned to the city to establish recruiting headquarters. The *New York Herald* optimistically supposed their short terms of service, “small as it may appear to be, will be of incalculable advantage to them” and offer a favorable way for new recruits to attach themselves en masse.\(^{23}\)

In all four cities, too many regiments competed with each other for recruits. In Philadelphia, Major G. G. Ferguson proposed to raise the 109th Pennsylvania out of “Republicans and Curtin Men,” but after eight weeks, he informed Governor Curtin that he had


“about 350 men, allowing a shrinkage of 50.” Ferguson begged Curtin for more help, lamenting “there are a thousand disappointments & difficulties in the way.” Another officer complained similarly; he had four-hundred men in August, but claimed that Colonel Baker “cajoled me out of some three hundred” when he proposed to raise an additional five-company battalion to augment the 1st California.24

State agencies tried to make some sense out of the chaos. By late August, Massachusetts had five infantry regiments in the process of forming, each still requiring over 200 men to reach their full complement. To ensure a more expeditious recruitment process, Governor Andrew established a central recruiting office in Boston at 14 Pitt Street headed by Brigadier General William W. Bullock. Festooned with patriotic bunting and paintings, and often serenaded by popular local bands, Bullock’s office proposed to enlist the bulk of the recruits and dole them out to the regiments most in need. Bullock’s efforts did little good. Everywhere in Boston, posters and placards covered the walls. The physical space of urban America provided a non-stop advertisement for army recruiters. Neighborhood recruiters posted announcements that ran counter to Bullock’s centralizing scheme, fragmenting the city’s recruiting efforts.25

The summer of 1861 offered a tremendous opportunity to exploit northeastern cities’ ethnic minorities, especially its Irish and German populations. For years, many native-born residents viewed German inhabitants with suspicion and feared what might happen if the federal government issued weapons to them. Bostonian George Hampton recounted to Governor Andrew a scene he witnessed in a German beer saloon in late July. He wrote, “I was suddenly surprised of hearing the most disunion sentiments (much as I would expect to hear from that

24 G. G. Ferguson to Andrew Curtin, 19 October 1861, PSA; Unknown to Andrew Curtin, 3 October 1861, PSA.
25 Boston Evening Transcript, 20 August 1861.
riotous city Baltimore, but how for God’s sake in Boston?) from a young German individual, who, as much as I could from his bad English explain, with most common language damned the present actions of all the American (!) officers of the U.S. Federal government as the highest treason against their own people.”

26 Even as the threat of defeat loomed large in their minds, some native-born urbanites believed that calling up Germans posed a danger.

Although once allied with the American Party, Massachusetts Governor Andrew understood that most German residents believed in the cause of abolitionism, as many middle-aged Germans had fled Europe after the failed peasant uprisings of 1848. Viewing their plight similarly to that of black slaves, many German immigrants championed the cause of freedom in America. Sampson Urbino, an advocate of German rights, argued that, “It ought to be considered that the Germans are the avant-garde for the Union & Freedom.” Two companies of Boston Turnveriene, or “Turners,” under Captains Ferdinand Dreher and John Herschenroder—refugees of the Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt revolutions—had attempted to affix their companies to Boston’s first regiments, but both the 2nd and 11th Massachusetts only agreed to accept German recruits individually, and not German companies as single units. However, thanks to the agitation of Urbino and two German instructors at Harvard—one of whom elected to serve himself—Andrew authorized the recruitment of German speaking companies, and the 20th Massachusetts became a home to Dreher’s and Herschenroder’s Turners.

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Boston faced a far more difficult time luring Irish recruits into its ranks. Irishmen’s fear that nativism infested the Massachusetts state house caused many to look to other states for a chance to serve. New York City had begun sending agents to lure away Irishmen, drawing off

26 George Hampton to John Andrew, 25 July 1861, MSA.
27 Miller, Harvard’s Civil War, 10-1, 21-2.
potential recruits at a rate of over 100 men per day, and many Irish Bostonians participated in this tactics for financial gain. In early August, Dr. W. M. Walsh paid for 500 men to go to New York City to join Thomas F. Meagher’s “Irish Brigade.” Boston’s Irishmen continued to go to Gotham to join the Excelsior Brigade and the Mozart Regiment as well. These three New York organizations sent their own agents to Boston to lure recruits from the Bay City. During the first week of August, Meagher’s agents lured away 350 men from Boston, even raiding Massachusetts encampments outside the city. Twelve men of the 20th Massachusetts, including a sergeant, took an agent’s offer and fled as far as Mansfield before guards arrested them for desertion and held the agent for enticing desertion.28

Bullock did his best to thwart the out-of-state agents. He reminded those who planned to enlist in New York City that they deprived their families of Massachusetts’ state aid, amounting to $12.00 per month for a family of three persons. But Boston’s Irishmen countered with claims that they had found better comradeship in New York organizations under officers more favorable to their political affiliation. One Massachusetts native wrote home, “[D]id we make a mistake in joining the Mozart Regiment of New York? I think not.”29

Bullock’s office tried to combat the loss of German and Irish recruits by running large advertisements in the local newspapers.30 Ethnic recruiting advertisements displayed obtrusive propaganda and often smacked of desperate ingratiation, even bordering on ethnic stereotyping:

Sigel! Heintzelman! Germans of Massachusetts!
As you battled for the “Faderland” battle now for your adopted country!
REMEMBER FRANZ SIGEL!
Corcoran! Shields! Mulligan! Nugent! Cass! Meagher! Sprague! Burnside! Sherman! Banks!
Anderson! Murphy! Irishmen of Massachusetts!

28 Boston Evening Transcript, 5 August 1861; Bruce, Twentieth Regiment, 7.
29 Boston Evening Transcript, 24 August 1861; Boston Daily Journal, 7 August 1861.
30 Boston Daily Journal, 26 October 1861.
‘Acushia machree, our hearts beat for thee: Erin mavoureen, our hearts beat for thee!’
We have known you of old!
‘Pat is fond of fun, and was never known to run, from cannon sword or gun, says the Shan Van Vough! . . . .
A Roman Catholic Priest goes with each regiment, and in the hottest of the fight you shall be ‘side by side with him still, Soggarth Aaron!’”

Such obvious pandering failed in its purpose. By September, Governor Andrew attempted to reclaim large numbers of Irishmen who had enlisted in New York Regiments to fill a Massachusetts regiment not yet full. Colonel Edward J. Riley, the 40th New York’s commanding officer, argued, “[T]he city of New York has spent a considerable sum funding those companies, uniforming them, &c. . . . These companies having been brought into a high state of discipline by my men and money, such a proceeding would be an insult and an injury to the State of New York.” Curiously, in his letter to New York’s Governor Morgan, Colonel Riley, a man appointed to his position by the influence of Fernando Wood’s New York City Democratic machine, added, “These four companies being entirely composed of Republicans and myself being one also I should regret exceedingly to lose their support.” It seems unlikely that any of Boston’s Irishmen would have affiliated with the Republican Party. In this case, Colonel Riley lied to gain the support of New York’s Republican governor.32

In the end, Boston’s efforts to retain its ethnic minorities for service in its regiments had little effect. Germans and Irishmen continued to leave the Bay City in great numbers. Boston raised only one Irish regiment after Bull Run, the 28th Massachusetts.33 Boston never raised an exclusively German regiment. It cannot be determined with accuracy how many Bostonians left

31 Boston Evening Transcript, 10 October 1861.
32 E. J. Riley to Edwin Morgan, 4 September 1861, NYSA.
33 The small number of Irish recruits raised for the 29th Massachusetts transferred to the 28th Massachusetts in early 1862. Although the 29th Massachusetts retained its Irish officers, its ranks filled with Puritan stock.
for New York City and enlisted in regiments there, but that number probably reached close to 4,000.\textsuperscript{34}

Philadelphia’s Democratic proclivities—unlike Boston’s strong Republican composition—made ethnic recruiting an easier chore there. Thirty-two German companies formed in Philadelphia during the summer and autumn, filling the ranks of the 73\textsuperscript{rd}, 74\textsuperscript{th}, 75\textsuperscript{th}, and 98\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments. Like their Boston brethren, Philadelphia’s German leaders boasted an impressive military heritage. Colonel W. Heinrich C. Bohlen of the 75\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania was a veteran of the Siege of Antwerp, the Crimean War, and the Mexican-American War, and Lieutenant Colonel Franz Mahler of the same regiment was a veteran of the Baden Revolution of 1848. Indeed, the 75\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania boasted a large number of men in their mid-forties, expatriates from the 1848 uprising, mostly natives of Prussia, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemburg.

In early August, Joshua Owen began to recruit what was then called the “2\textsuperscript{nd} Regiment, Baker’s Brigade” from veterans from the defunct three-month and heavily Irish 24\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania. Similar to Boston’s Irish, Philadelphia’s Celts did not expect much support from the local or state governments.\textsuperscript{35} Secretary Cameron attached Owen’s regiment to Colonel Edward Baker’s new brigade, under the promise that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—with its Republican governor—could not interfere with its recruitment. Ironically, however, Colonel Owen’s regiment—later renamed the 69\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania—dodged a threat to its survival thanks to Curtin’s timely aid. In late August, out-of-state recruiters from the New York National Guard

\textsuperscript{34} This number is a careful estimate made by conducting a cursory survey of New York company rosters known to have large numbers of Boston-born volunteers.

\textsuperscript{35} Philadelphia Public Ledger, 25 July 1861.
arrived in Philadelphia to nab Irishmen to fill two regiments, promising green-trimmed uniforms and Catholic chaplains. In early September, Curtin drafted a message, printed in several Philadelphia papers, warning that if Irishmen chose to enlist in regiments from other states—the 69th N.Y.S.M., for example—their families would not be able to collect the state pension. Colonel Owen also reminded Philadelphia’s Irish “not to be carried away by any delusive promises of unauthorized persons” or join those “who made capital out of your loyalty to your adopted country.” Owen made it clear; his recruits had to consider their Philadelphia residency over their Irish heritage. In the end, thanks to Curtin’s announcement, Owen’s regiment filled.

Of all the ethnic communities in the urban North, none responded as well as that of New York City. New York City’s German community had already sent five regiments to the front before Bull Run; now, it rallied to field seven more. Typically, German regiments promised to provide their men with officers of extensive military experience. Colonel Eugene A. Kozlay, commander of the “Schwarze Yaeger” (54th New York Infantry), once served in the Hungarian Army, fighting in the Battles of Capolina, Comorn, Nardi, Carlo, and Solnock. Kozlay’s executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hoch, had served in Russia. Colonel Wladimir Krzyzanowski, a civil engineer who commanded the 58th New York Infantry, served in the Polish Revolution in 1848, and his executive officer, Colonel Wadislas Leski, served in the Russian army.

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36 Philadelphia Inquirer, 31 August 1861; Philadelphia Public Ledger, 3 September 1861.  
37 Philadelphia Inquirer, 31 August 1861; Philadelphia Public Ledger, 17 December 1861.  
38 The first five regiments included the 5th N.Y.S.M. (three-month), the 8th, 20th and 29th New York Infantry Regiments (two-year), and the 41st New York Infantry (three-year). Six of new three-year regiments included the 45th, 48th, 52nd, 54th, 59th, and 68th New York Infantry Regiments. The seventh new regiment, the 58th New York Infantry, contained a mixture of Germans, Swiss, and Poles.  
39 O. P. Wells to Edwin Morgan, 28 February 1862, NYSA.
However, German families could not expect monetary support from nativists in the Union Defense Committee or the State Military Board. The Schwarze Yaeger Regiment learned this lesson the hard way. Although officers had recruited for weeks and the Union Defense Committee had appropriated an additional $25,000 to aid the families of new regiments in advanced stages of organization, the *Herald* noted that the Committee conspicuously “ignored its [the regiment’s] existence.”

To meet the monetary demands, local action served to supply the needs of German regiments and their families. Swiss merchants armed and equipped two companies of Swiss sharpshooter teams and attached them to Colonel Krzyzanowski’s 58th New York. Hiram Barney, the Republican Port Collector in Brooklyn, stepped in and outfitted so many men in Colonel Kozlay’s Schwarze Yaegers that the regiment forever after bore his name, the “Hiram Barney Rifles.”

German communities made especial efforts to support their ethnic regiments. On September 30, German ladies from Hoboken, New Jersey, presented an embroidered flag to Colonel George Von Amsberg’s “5th German Regiment,” 45th New York Infantry. After a stirring presentation ceremony and several speeches delivered in German, Von Amsberg held a grand farewell festival and ball and allowed the dancing to continue all night. The *Times* reported, “Our German citizens came out in strong force, and enjoyed themselves hugely, as is their want on such festive occasions.” Similarly, the Frémont Regiment held a picnic at Conrad’s Park on September 8, and the *Herald* reported that the “outpouring of the Teutonic element [was] quite in keeping with the ardor they have exhibited in the cause of freedom in their contributions from their ranks to the army of the Union.” The picnic featured shooting galleries, swings, merry-go-rounds, itinerant shows, weighing machines, lung-testers, a band, and a dance.

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40 *New York Herald*, 30 August 1861.
According to one reporter, “a constant stream of people” entered the park all day. The proceeds from both festivals went to the families of the German volunteers.\(^{41}\)

Still, problems plagued the mobilization of New York City’s German regiments. For instance, some nativist residents found the gritty mechanics of the 54\(^{th}\) New York too alien to handle. Reporters noted that the regiment kept its “indispensable lager” too near; as well, the regiment presented a frightening appearance with their skull-and-crossbones badges and bloodthirsty motto: “We Give No Quarter, Nor Do We Ask Any.”\(^{42}\) Some German officers had questionable reputations. Alexander Dupré, a German engineer from New York stationed in Washington, wrote his parents about the arrival of Colonel Robert J. Betge of the “Cameron Rifles” (68\(^{th}\) New York Infantry): “First lieutenant von König was here with his colonel Betge who is from Braunschweig. He claims to have been an officer, but there is no trace of it, nothing but connections, all humbug.” Native-born residents occasionally resented the festivals that accompanied the departure of German regiments. After Colonel Betge’s 68\(^{th}\) New York received its colors at City Hall Park, a mob of disgruntled Fire Zouaves invaded their camp at the U.S. Arsenal, requiring the police to intervene.\(^{43}\) Betge suffered another indignation when, on the day the 68\(^{th}\) New York departed, a feisty sheriff attempted to arrest him under the pretense that Betge had not paid all his debts. When the regiment formed at Hoboken Ferry, the sheriff unceremoniously yanked Betge from his horse to drag him to City Hall, handling him “in a most

\(^{41}\) *New York Times*, 2 August and 1 and 6 October 1861; *New York Herald*, 9 September 1861.
\(^{42}\) *New York Herald*, 30 August and 22 September 1861.
unmerciful manner.” Betge called to his soldiers, who summarily pummeled the sheriff and demanded that he apologize to their colonel.44

New York City’s Irish community also assembled to meet the July 22 call. Under the leadership of Captain Thomas Francis Meagher of the 69th N.Y.S.M., New York’s Irishmen proposed to raise three regiments for an “Irish Brigade,” so-named for the famed unit of Irish exiles who turned the tide at the Battle of Fontenoy in 1745. Meagher went on a speaking tour to raise money to support the brigade’s formation. When he spoke at the Astor House on October 21, he described the problem besetting Irish volunteers: “When the call of the President was first issued, in April last, the people acted spontaneously and by the impulse of enthusiasm, but now, the process of enlistment had become a rather slow and labored movement, not from any lack of patriotism in the masses, but because a vast number of those likely to enlist were deterred by a natural anxiety to care for their families.”

Meagher guessed that a lack of funds for indigent families was the “chief source of slackness in enlisting that prevails among the Irish-born citizens.” Meagher pointed out that Irish men and women should rely on their own initiative to raise the Irish Brigade. Specifically, the Irish community needed to raise money to supply officers’ uniforms, hire drum and fife music, purchase tents, and fund officers’ trips to recruit in the outlying country. These expenditures, Meagher affirmed, were the chief necessities of successful recruiters, and the best officers would likely spend $900 or more to recruit their companies. Additionally, once recruiting got under

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way, thousands more would have to be spent to sustain the men in camp until they mustered into federal service.\textsuperscript{45}

Getting New York’s Irish to meet the call took strenuous convincing. The Irish community resented invidious nativism exhibited by some political leaders. Moreover, many Celts harbored doubts regarding the war. During an address delivered to an Irish crowd at the Academy of Music, Meagher mentioned the patriotic endeavors of noted Republicans Horace Greeley, Henry Ward Beecher, and Wendell Phillips, only to receive a chorus of hisses. Meagher begged for three cheers for Greeley, but to no avail. Meagher then spent the remainder of his speech affirming his allegiance to the Democratic Party. Nevertheless, Meagher made his point. A reporter noted that he “boldly disavowed any sympathy with Irishmen who could shrink from such a cause as this. He gloriously painted the expanse of liberty here to Erin’s sons, and asked, should he, as a crowning reason, beg them to fight for the North because England’s sympathy was with the South.” A mixed cry of “Yes!” and “No!” with intermingled cheers and hisses went up from the audience. Undeterred, Meagher continued by eulogizing the Union cause “as worth living for, fighting for, and dying for, and besought Irishmen here . . . to come forward boldly.”\textsuperscript{46}

Meagher’s message did not fall entirely upon deaf ears. On October 25, a group of elite Irishmen formed the Friends of the Irish Brigade Association and met at the Astor House to formulate a plan to raise money for Irish families. In November, they appealed to the public, “particularly to all who claim Irish birth or lineage, for assistance in this most important object.”\textsuperscript{47} Thirty leading Irish citizens organized themselves into a series of committees: one to

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{New York Times}, 22 October 1861.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 7 October 1861.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 26 October and 1 November 1861.
regulate finances for the regiment, one to relieve soldiers’ families, one to take collections, one to provide camp equipage, and one executive committee to rule them all. A committee of Irish women organized too; they focused on getting up an embroidered stand of colors. Recruiting for the Irish regiments proceeded splendidly; soon, all three regiments assembled at Fort Schuyler on Long Island to receive uniforms and equipment. The 69th New York Infantry departed first on November 18 and the other two regiments—the 63rd and 88th New York Infantry Regiments—departed on November 28 and December 16. On the day the 69th New York departed, all three regiments marched to Archbishop Hughes’s residence on Madison Avenue, where the ladies’ committee presented six colors—two to each regiment—all manufactured by Tiffany’s of New York. One banner represented the Stars and Stripes, the other banner was emerald green in honor of the Irish Brigade’s ancestry. Neither of the two orators during the flag presentation mentioned New York City’s role in raising the regiments. Clearly, the community leaders believed that transplanted Ireland had raised these three regiments, not the Empire City. Although Judge Charles Daly mentioned the United States as a country where Irishmen’s “native energy and stimulated industry have met with appropriate rewards,” when he asked Irishmen to consider their role in the conflict, he announced: “Does an Irishman, therefore, ask what his duty is in this contest? Let him learn it in the history of his own country, in the story of that green flag. Let him, contemplating the sorrows of his mother Erin, ‘Remember the days of old, Ere her faithless sons betrayed her.’” With that, the 69th New York boarded the transport Atlas and went to front.

As the regiments called up on July 22 attempted to fill their ranks, desperate commanders deliberately schemed to steal recruits from other units. All types of dishonesty and friction abounded. New York City experienced some of the worst cases of abuse. In September, on Riker’s Island, Colonel L. S. Ayer, commander of four incomplete companies of “Yates’s Rifles,” later part of the 43rd New York Infantry, induced a private soldier in Company B, the “Scott Rifles,” later part of the 51st New York Infantry, to desert and join his regiment, triggering the complaint of the aggrieved colonel who stated that, “If officers of Colonel Ayer’s rank can commit such acts with impunity why not subordinate officers and soldiers also until all military subordination in Regiments is destroyed?”

On September 22, Private Oscar Deicke quit the ranks of Company A, “Sigel Rifles,” later part of the 52nd New York Infantry, and induced nine soldiers to go with him. Colonel Paul Frank of the 52nd New York heard that Deicke applied for a lieutenancy in the Barney Rifles, and, if he brought others from the Sigel Rifles with him, he was certain to receive a commission.

Colonel William G. Bliss made no apology for stealing recruits from the “Ira Harris Guard,” later part of the 6th New York Cavalry, to fill the ranks of his “Bliss Cavalry,” later part of 5th New York Cavalry. When Bliss learned that soldiers in the Harris Guard complained of mistreatment, he recruited a number of them and began supplying their wants. To explain himself to Governor Morgan, Bliss wrote that the Harris Guard officers had “been to no expense in recruiting these men. I claim them all and ask your concurrence in bringing them from the Island today that no military insubordination may be exercised on my part without due deliberation, but the men now recruited are at my quarters, and I claim them all

49 John C. Henshaw to Thomas Hillhouse, 14 September 1861; John C. Henshaw to Edwin Morgan, 14 September 1861, NYSA.
50 Paul Frank to Charles Yates, 27 September 1861, NYSA.
Unfortunately for Bliss, as Lieutenant A. H. Hasbrouck asserted, “All the men were unanimous in proclaiming themselves satisfied to remain where they were—and distinctly avowed their determination not to be connected with the said Bliss in any manner whatsoever,” and “Col. Bliss left the grounds amidst the jeers of the men—one and all.” Amid such constant bickering, the exact opinion of the transferred soldiers may never be known.

It soon became clear to New York City dwellers that the effort to organize their regiments lacked a unity of purpose. Amid the feverish process of recruiting, officers and men grew to despise each other, and, if soldiers intensely disliked their officers, they considered it in their right to leave and join competing regiments. Enlisted soldiers’ hatred of their officers impaire mobilization in severe ways. For one, it sometimes led to mass desertion. Men who disliked their commanders deemed it easier to quit the ranks and start looking for work than to follow a distasteful or incompetent officer into battle. A mass exodus occurred in the “Clinton Guards” (61st New York Infantry) because the urban soldiers disliked the strict moral code of its commander, Colonel Spencer W. Cone, a contributor to the New York Mercury and the son of a well-known Baptist Minister. In September, Cone brought 350 up-state Baptists into camp at Fort Wadsworth, but soon discovered that he would have to consolidate them with “distasteful companies” raised in the city to field a complete regiment. Cone’s moral piety enraged the urban recruits, and within days, the city officers circulated a false petition accusing Cone of “drinking on drill, using profane language on parade, and being incompetent as an officer.” Once a majority of the urban soldiers signed the petition, on October 20, the lieutenant colonel and major ordered Cone physically ejected from camp. Two weeks later, Cone returned to reclaim

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51 William Bliss to Edwin Morgan, 16 October 1861, NYSA.
52 A. H. Hasbrouck to Charles Yates, 19 October 1861; William Bliss to Edwin Morgan, 16 October 1861, NYSA.
his command, demanding an apology from his New York City recruits. The two ringleaders, the lieutenant colonel and major, resigned in disgust, and when the regiment left for Washington on November 9, three hundred urban men deserted. The loss of these men angered one of Cone’s detractors, Captain Francis C. Barlow, a Republican lawyer from the city, who denounced Cone as “not fit to command a drove of hogs.” Shortly after the regiment’s arrival in Washington, the officers circulated another petition, this time to Governor Morgan, insisting upon Cone’s removal. Newly-promoted Lieutenant Colonel Barlow wrote his mother that, “I had nothing to do with starting or originating this though I could of course do nothing other than concur in it. . . . [Cone] is a generous kindhearted gentleman . . . but he is utterly unfit for this place & under him the Regt. is going to ruin & private feelings must be sacrificed to the public good.” After another five months of agitating, Cone finally stepped down and Barlow unexpectedly found himself in command of this incomplete regiment.53

Perhaps the most serious case of poor discipline and dishonest recruitment occurred in the ranks of Colonel Charles W. LeGendre’s “New York Rifles,” later part of the 51st New York Infantry, encamped at Willett’s Point. In mid-September, Captain Roch Crasto of Company B, an Italian veteran of Garibaldi’s Army, left the New York Rifles, convincing forty men to accompany him. Crasto started the exodus after he learned of a scheme hatched by one of his lieutenants, Fortunato Barbetta, who hoped to raise a company for a competing regiment of Italian-Americans. The organizer of the competing regiment, Enrico Fardella, promised Barbetta a captaincy if he stole Crasto’s recruits. Crasto believed that if he took his men to Fardella’s

53 Francis C. Barlow to mother, 24 December 1861 and 30 January 1862, in Christian G. Samito, ed., “Fear Was Not In Him”: The Civil War Letters of Major General Francis C. Barlow, U.S.A. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 31, 43-4; Spencer W. Cone to Daniel Sickles, 19 September 1861; Spencer W. Cone to Simon Cameron, 21 October 1861; Spencer W. Cone to Edwin Morgan, 23 October 1861; Elliott F. Shephard to Thomas Hillhouse, 29 October 1861, NYSA.
headquarters first, he might retain his captaincy. He made contact with Fardella, who promised $300.00 for pilfering the men. So, with that informal arrangement, at 11:00 P.M. on September 9, after his company came off guard duty, Crasto led it in an armed, mass exodus from Willett’s Point.54

Outraged at Crasto’s counter-duplicity, Lieutenant Barbeta informed Colonel LeGendre, who prepared to stop Crasto’s mutiny. He ordered First Lieutenant A. Edward Georgi to take a detail of twenty-five men from Companies A and C and place them across the road at the isthmus with orders to “arrest Capt. Castro [sic] at all hazards.” When Crasto saw Georgi’s soldiers blocking the neck, he halted his troops and shouted at Georgi’s men to step aside. Georgi ordered Crasto to surrender himself and return his men to their quarters. He openly declared, “The first man that passes, we shoot.” Crasto retorted that he was a free man and demanded the privilege of leaving camp at will. For about ten minutes, both sides parlayed in their lines of battle until Sergeant John Henry Thompson—one of Crasto’s men—drew a pistol and shot Lieutenant Georgi in the face. Others in Crasto’s command shouted, “Fire!” and they delivered an ill-executed volley. Georgi’s squad dropped to the ground, letting the bullets pass over them. When Georgi went down clutching his wound, he screamed, “Fire!” His soldiers rose and poured a volley into Crasto’s mutineers, killing two, Private Ferdinand Markoe and Private Dominic Sassi; mortally wounding another, Private Louis Germani; and wounding three others non-mortally, including Sergeant Thompson. Crasto’s men fled back to camp, “flying in disorder.” LeGendre placed the surviving mutineers under arrest; however, fifteen of them eluded the guards and made their way to the city. Captain Crasto and one armed private reached Flushing

54 New York Herald, 11 September 1861.
by next morning, when a sergeant’s guard arrested them, to which Crasto indignantly replied, “I am an officer, you have no right to arrest me; I am Captain Crasto of the New York Rifles!”

A coroner’s jury determined that no criminal charges could be preferred against Crasto for the deaths of the three men, but General Yates demanded that Crasto be charged with violating the Articles of War. Colonel LeGendre defended himself by claiming that he “did all in his power to avert the calamity.” He guessed the situation could have been diffused peaceably, but for “the determined and mutinous disposition of Sergeant Thompson by whose rash act the firing was caused.” LeGendre hoped his regiment might continue recruiting, despite the “sad affair,” but his 175-man unit now stood in a petulant state of morale and General Yates believed a new man should take charge. The excessive competition of recruiters in urban communities—one that seemed to mimic the very capitalism that created local business—led to such violent outbreaks as the Willett’s Point fiasco. Also, they placed a severe strain on city services. It is important to remember that this mobilization occurred in a period before armies adopted their own professional military police force. In most cases, local law enforcement had to sift through the controversies to determine right and wrong.

Local and state officials recognized that political and ethnic rivalries often caused organizational problems. In New York City, by early October, Governor Morgan and General Yates had enough of this squabbling and criminal behavior. On October 4, Yates issued General Order 53 requiring all under-strength city regiments to consolidate: “It being necessary to form companies into regiments as early as practicable . . . If not effected by themselves, they will be

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55 New York Times, 11 and 14 September 1861; New York Herald, 11, 12, and 13 September 1861; Charles LeGendre to Charles Yates, 10 and 13 September 1861, NYSA. In his deposition before the Coroner’s Jury, Sergeant Thompson claimed that he discharged his pistol accidentally. Thompson stated that, while he had his finger on the trigger, Captain Crasto unexpectedly put a hand on his shoulder, causing him to fire the weapon.
consolidated by the Commander-in-Chief [Morgan.]” Throughout October and November, Yates began consolidating New York City’s regiments. Some units came together peaceably. The “Governor’s Guard” and “Mechanic Rifles” united under the command of Colonel Joseph C. Pinckney, and three units, the “Union Guards,” the “President’s Life Guard,” and the “President’s Vanguard,” consolidated into the 59th New York Infantry. Even ex-Lieutenant Colonels Leski and Lutz of U.S. Rifles and the Morgan Rifles, who had earlier quarreled over recruits, came together to form the “Polish Legion” (58th New York Infantry), each accepting subordinate positions under Colonel Wladimir Krzyzanowski. Yates even disbanded the regiment named after him, the “Yates Rifles,” and consolidated the city-raised battalion into two companies assigned to the 43rd New York Infantry.  

However, most officers either begrudgingly accepted or refused to abide by the consolidation order. Most New York City recruiters did not want seemingly arbitrary directives from the state military office in Albany to interfere with local organizations. When ordered to consolidate the Scott Rifles, Captain Marcus Monck of Company B, furiously wrote Adjutant General Thomas Hillhouse, calling the order a “gross injustice” because he had “been connected with the first starting of the regiment, & furnished more of men & means than any other captain.” He could not “see why I am passed over in favor of men who have borne neither the burden nor heat of the day.” When Colonel LeGendre realized that Albany would revoke his command of the New York Rifles on account of its incompleteness, he hurried into camp toting three kegs of lager beer to bribe his soldiers into consolidating with Colonel Edward Ferrero’s “Shepard Rifles.” If he offered his men freely, he hoped to bypass the Albany consolidation.

56 Empire Zouave soldiers to Charles Yates, 9 September 1861, NYSA.  
57 Marcus Monck to Thomas Hillhouse, 14 October 1861, NYSA.
order and receive a major’s commission. Surgeon Joseph Colgan believed LeGendre’s “mysterious transaction” was meant to “barter off the Regt.,” for LeGendre considered “it more profitable, no doubt, to be one of the contracting parties.” Colgan noted that when the lager did not have “magic enough for his purpose,” LeGendre brought hundreds of bottles of whiskey three nights later, and, only then, did he convince his men to consolidate with the Shepard Rifles.  

As per Morgan’s instructions, Yates’s General Order 53 also required all regimental and company officers at the City Volunteer Depot to pass competence examinations administered by Colonel W. W. Tompkins and Colonel Henry P. Martin. While some aspiring commanders used this order as a means to supplant unwanted officers, most viewed it as unabashed political interference in city business by political hacks in Albany. To ensure that none slipped through the cracks, on October 18, Yates ordered all mustered officers in command of companies of thirty-two men or more to report to the New York City Depot within one week for examination or face removal. In defiance, several regiments left the city without authority to avoid the officer examinations. 

Of course, most issues relating to officer appointments usually stemmed from political rivalry. In Boston, the city’s Democratic leaders constantly complained about the appointment of Republican officers. According to the War Department’s directive, all state governors had the authority to appoint officers from the grade of second lieutenant to colonel. The poor performance by certain Republican officers at Bull Run, including Colonel Cowdin of the 1st Massachusetts, led many Democrats to accuse Governor Andrew of bowing to political 

58 Joseph Colgan to S. O. Vanderpoel, 4 October 1861, NYSA.  
59 Louis Blenker to Edwin Morgan, 23 November 1861, NYSA.
favoritism in making appointments. The city’s leading Democratic paper, the *Boston Herald*, ran a scathing article entitled, “ABOLITIONISM AT THE STATE HOUSE.” It read, “No man, however well qualified, can obtain favor from Governor Andrew or the military dandies about him, providing he is a Democrat.” This allegation struck a tender nerve with the Republican Party, already feeling the shame of Bull Run and another Union defeat at Ball’s Bluff. The *Boston Daily Journal* replied that such accusations proved “utterly groundless” and that Andrew’s appointments came “from the ranks of those who have always been his political opponents.” Republican presses tried to counter Democratic criticism by researching officers’ voting habits. (No doubt, they fabricated a few of them.) Eventually, they concluded that, of the first fourteen three-year regiments, five had Republican commanders, five had Democratic commanders, three had Bell-Everett commanders, and one had an independent commander. Such responses failed to placate the growing number of Democratic critics, who demanded more control over the process of raising Boston’s regiments.⁶⁰

In Philadelphia, by contrast, Republicans found the process of officer appointments vexing. Although the city boasted a Republican mayor, Democrats tended to control the city militia. For instance, the 90th Pennsylvania, recruited from the remnants of the old 19th Pennsylvania, had long been a Democratic stronghold. The 90th Pennsylvania commenced recruiting late; members of the National Guards Militia Regiment voted to raise a three-year regiment only on August 29, and it took all winter to fill the regiment. To speed the pace of recruitment, Colonel Peter Lyle uncharacteristically offered positions as officers to well-known Philadelphia Republicans provided they raised complete companies. One Republican physician, Dr. T. N. E. Shoemaker, accepted Lyle’s offer, enlisting recruits for Captain John Magee’s

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Company D. Lyle promised Shoemaker that if he filled Company D he would promote him to captain after promoting Magee to major. Shoemaker relinquished his practice and expended over $200 in recruiting costs. Magee, however, could not stand to have a Republican take charge of his old company and told Lyle not to endorse Shoemaker’s request for a captaincy. Shoemaker appealed to Governor Curtin in the matter, expecting sympathy. Shoemaker wrote, “I am to be wheeled out of my position. The fact is simply this, the Field Officers and nearly all of the line officers are Democrats, and I being a Republican, they wish to dispose of me the best way they can.” Despite his plea that “there is too much of the New Republican in me to remain at home when my country is in danger,” he did not receive a commission.\(^6\)

Even in Baltimore, where the Democratic Party held little sway, Union Party members dealt with vexatious feuds over officer appointments. Most complaints came after the regiments had already left for the front, threatening to unravel the successful work already accomplished. For instance, no sooner had the 2\(^{nd}\) Maryland Infantry landed in Newbern, North Carolina, when a Democratic clique arose against its commander, Colonel John Sommer. New York-born Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Eugene Duryée, described by one Marylander as “a Northern adventurer,” led the anti-Sommer faction. Duryée’s cabal, which included a number of other New York-born officers, “will oust every one of us [Marylanders] if possible,” complained Lieutenant Charles Bowen of Company D. Duryée’s New Yorkers managed to have Sommer and seven other Maryland-born officers called before Major General Ambrose Burnside’s officer examination board. After asking questions based on trifling military minutiae, the examiners found each officer incompetent and subsequently dismissed him. Yet, for some reason, so it seemed, Duryée’s faction never faced dismissal or charges of dereliction of duty. Lieutenant

\(^6\) T. N. E. Shoemaker to Andrew G. Curtin, 28 December 1861, PSA.
Bowen complained, “I have seen officers [from Duryée’s cohort] so drunk in the streets of Newbern that they could not walk and so drunk as to fall off their horses in the streets and like the sow that was once blessed returned to its wallowing in the mill[.] . . . I have seen the officer of the guard helping Ladies of ill fame out of their dens and placing them in carriages with other officers to take an evening ride.”

For the Marylanders of the 2nd Regiment, it seemed that the New York cabal—led by a host of jealous Democrats—meant to take over the regiment. One of the Marylanders claimed to overhear a New Yorker, Lieutenant George Zimmerman, damn the whole State of Maryland while Lieutenant Colonel Duryée laughed. Lieutenant Bowen, one of the leaders of the Maryland faction—perhaps so disgusted because he had once been choked by an angry New York-born officer and called “a damn negro” in front of his company—implored Maryland’s newly elected Governor Augustus Bradford, “sir, if we had a Marylander for our commander we would be treated as soldiers and gentlemen[.] . . . All I want is justice and I hope the day is not far distant.”

Bradford and Adjutant General Nicholas Brewer of John did their best to oust the New York faction. They called one of them, Surgeon Edward Moroney, before the state medical board—“[w]ithout one moments time for preparation,” Moroney later complained—and issued him a series of difficult questions. Moroney protested his dismissal, writing, “the Board was unnecessarily harsh and rigid, and to have passed safely through one should have been just from College or a thorough posting up of six or eight weeks. . . . But to be handled so roughly after some eight months service, and those the most trying, with no opportunity whatever for preparation, I feel to be unjust in the extreme, and seriously reflecting upon ones whole future professional life.” Duryée, however, did not take the Governor’s threat too lightly, and he replied
by using Burnside’s examination board to expel Bradford’s new appointment for commander, Colonel Thomas B. Allard. Before Allard even set foot in camp, Burnside summoned him before the examination board, where—after issuing the usual set of unnecessarily tricky questions—the board found him incompetent. Lieutenant Bowen believed, “the whole proceedings were gotten up expressly for Colonel Allard; such a thing was unprecedented in the Division; the like had never been done before.” Bowen, characteristically, blamed the New York conspiracy, as all the officers “would have resigned had the command been assumed by any one, but their much beloved Lieut. Colonel, J. E. Duryéé.” Certainly, this prickly situation in the 2nd Maryland—which persisted the entire war—exemplified the biting nature, if not the particular circumstances, of officer feuds in the other Baltimore regiments, and it also exemplified the altercations in Union regiments in general, as it showcased the ways that conniving officers manipulated both the state and the federal military bureaucracies to their advantage.62

Throughout 1861 and into early 1862, cities’ pluralism and bitter partisan warfare stifled the organization of regiments and caused constant bickering among officers of competing regiments. Although city residents initially looked at their communities’ plurality as an asset—since it compartmentalized recruits—it created administrative woes that could not be overcome easily. These dilemmas foreshadowed future drama, but as of the fall of 1861, no one attempted to correct the problems.

In the fall, the cities experienced their first major military crisis, the Battle of Ball’s Bluff, which produced a wave of political controversy. The fiasco occurred on October 21, 1861, when four regiments made an expedition into Virginia. By mere circumstance, three of these

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62 Edward Moroney to Augustus Bradford, 21 April 1862; Charles Bowen to Augustus Bradford, 4 June and 23 July 1862; Andrew B. Brunner to Augustus Bradford, 17 July 1862; Adjutant General’s papers, MDSA.
regiments came from large Northeastern cities: the 42\textsuperscript{nd} New York from New York City, the 1\textsuperscript{st} California from Philadelphia, and the 20\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts from Boston. The fourth regiment, the 15\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts, came from a smaller city, Worcester.

The battle began when a reconnaissance mission into Virginia led by the 15\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts discovered a Confederate “encampment” on the moonlit evening of October 20. (In fact, the Union patrol had merely discovered a clump of haystacks. In the dark, the company commander in charge of the reconnaissance mistook them for tents.) Excited by the possibility of launching a surprise attack, divisional commander Brigadier General Charles P. Stone authorized a “slight demonstration.” The first phase of this demonstration required an amphibious landing at Ball’s Bluff, an eighty-foot acclivity on the Potomac shore with an open meadow at its peak.

The engagement went poorly. Over 1,700 Union troops ferried themselves across the Potomac River on small boats. Oddly, none of the commanders considered the logistics if the bluecoats had to retreat. In that event, there were not enough boats to ferry all back at once. As Stone’s command assembled atop the Bluff, an equally sized Confederate force moved out of Leesburg to meet the Union foray, and after making first contact near the field of haystacks, the Confederates slowly encircled the remaining Union troops in the glen. During the height of the battle, the ranking Union officer, Colonel Edward Baker—the same eloquent speaker from New York City’s “monster rally” and the same Union officer who thwarted the mutiny caused by John C. Breckinridge—fell dead. Panic ensued among the Union troops, and many of them scrambled off the slippery bluffs and then swam to safety. The Confederates took position at the edge of the bluff and fired into the river, picking off Union soldiers as they struggled in the water. Some bluecoats drowned, either shot while swimming or overtaken by the cold, swift-moving current.
Bodies floated downstream, washing ashore near Washington. In all, the useless incursion cost Stone’s division 1,002 men, including 550 captured and 223 killed or drowned. One participant in the battle wrote afterward, “Ah, who ever saw [casualty] figures such as those[?] Horrid, Horrid. Horrid. May . . . [we] never experience another such Calamity as this.”

Naturally, the general public fumed over the embarrassing defeat. Not only had Stone’s troops been ingloriously routed and many drowned, but a popular senator had been killed. In reaction, Congress formed a joint committee to hold Union generals accountable for their actions, and in February 1862, the U.S. Army arrested Stone for suspicion of treason, partly caused by the public outcry at the debacle.

Of course, no communities screeched louder than Boston, Philadelphia, New York City, and Worcester, since their regiments had paid the price for the incompetent operation. Captain Ned Abbott of the 2nd Massachusetts feared for his younger brother, Henry, a lieutenant in the 20th Massachusetts. Writing to his father, Abbott declared, “I am fearfully worried about Henry and the Twentieth. . . . What if anything should have happened to Henry! The thought drives me almost crazy. He may be here in the city [wounded, in Washington] and I not looking after him. I could never forgive myself if he were. He ought not to have gone to the war. If he did go, he should have gone with me. . . . I never felt so nervous before in my life.”

Renowned poet Herman Melville could not stop worrying about the “Harvard Regiment” either. Upon hearing the news, he penned a three-stanza poem entitled, “Ball’s Bluff.” His first thoughts drifted back to the day that he saw the 20th Massachusetts depart Boston. He wrote:

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64 Edward Abbott to father, 24 October 1861, in Scott, ed., Fallen Leaves, 6.
One noonday, at my window in the town,
I saw a sight—saddest that eyes can see—
Young soldiers marching lustily
Unto the wars,
Wife fifes, and flags in mottoed pageantry;
While all the porches, walks, and doors
Were rich with ladies cheering royally
. . . How should they dream that Death in rosy clime
Would come to thin their shining throng?65

In addition to grief and anguish, the urban public raised a host of questions about the efficacy of their mobilization. Were the soldiers they sent forth adequately prepared for the fight? Were they given the right equipment? Were they led properly? Were they adequately trained? These answers did not come easily. The three major urban centers each blamed the other. In Philadelphia, the papers claimed that Baker’s California regiment had behaved splendidly, while the Tammany Hall Regiment and the Harvard Regiment had routed shamefully. In New York City, Democratic papers defended the Tammany Regiment, blaming the Republican-led California Regiment. In Boston, the varying accounts and opinions were so muddled that few could make any sense out of it. Lieutenant Henry Abbott—who had survived the fight, relieving his family’s worries—wrote his father, telling him to ignore all newspapers articles about the battle. He declared them full of “inaccuracies, being written before consultation with others.” He dismissed one in particular, written by a member of Baker’s regiment. “Above all,” he chided, “be sure to disbelieve all ridiculous yarns about a certain California capt., formerly of Boston, then of New York, whose previous occupation was so loathsome that his name would pollute a gentleman’s page. . . . Discredit every thing told of that fellow. . . . Pah! I have wasted too many words for such a creature.”66

66 Henry Abbott to father, 7 November 1861, in Scott, Fallen Leaves, 73.
Critics of Governor John Andrew made him an especial target after the Ball’s Bluff fiasco. Because a large portion of one of the regiments—the 15th Massachusetts—used smooth-bored muskets, detractors attacked Andrew for approving the distribution of inferior weapons to Massachusetts men, incorrectly believing that these firearms had been the determining factor between victory and defeat. Bostonians now wondered how many of their men carried smooth-bores. Andrew ordered a list of all the regiments then serving from Massachusetts printed in the local papers to prove that few regiments carried them. This did not sit well with some Democrats, who argued that even one Boston regiment armed with smooth-bores was too much. Under severe censure for the catastrophe, Andrew retaliated by arguing that, given the state of production at Springfield and Watertown Arsenals, “smooth bore muskets must be used by some portion of the army.”

Ball’s Bluff was the first major military disaster experienced by the urban Northeast. Although the Baltimore Riot and Bull Run produced an equal amount of dissatisfaction, Ball’s Bluff was the first time these cities paid a high price in human life. The first six months of the war had been filled with careless enthusiasm. Until October, city-dwellers had taken few steps to correct their mistakes. Now, these mistakes had taken on a tragic meaning. As winter began to set in, the cities did their best to close down mobilization without any more costly mistakes. They hoped that once they had met the call for 500,000 men, no more troops would be needed.

When fully organized, armed, officered, and equipped, the three-year regiments from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore departed their homes according to the style presented in the spring, with an elaborate parade and ceremony. The departure of these regiments

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67 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 28 October 1861.
perpetuated the chaos of the spring and summer. In fact, the new departures proved even more boisterous. Undoubtedly, in Boston, Colonel Wilson’s 22nd Massachusetts received the largest and most untidy send-off. The regiment formed on Canal Street on October 8, the soldiers wearing neat, gray uniforms and their illustrious colonel mounted on a $500 dark bay. Congressman Robert C. Winthrop delivered the dedicatory remarks and presented the regiment with its colors. Meanwhile, policemen lined the streets in a desperate effort to prevent citizens from mingling with the soldiers. But, when the regiment paraded, they proved unable to hold back the throngs of loved ones and onlookers with only their stern language. So, the police found it necessary, in the words of a reporter, “to use considerable muscular strength to prevent women, as well as the sterner sex, from forcing their way into the ranks” to say goodbye to their loved ones.

The 22nd Massachusetts marched to the depot, with Boston’s citizens raving and groping at them. At the corner of Albany and Oak Streets, a woman called out the name of a soldier in Company E. The crowd pushed her forward past the police, who immediately jumped upon the startled lady and apprehended her. The soldier who had his named called bolted from the ranks and rushed in to offer her aid, but the police forcibly subdued him as well. At this scene, the entire line of Company E gave way and attacked the city police, and wrote an observer, “for a few minutes quite a rough scene was enacted between soldiers, police, and citizens.” During the melee, Private James Nolan bayonetted a police officer in the forehead, inflicting a severe cut. Without a pause, Nolan turned his sights on another police officer, bayoneting him in the face and then he stabbed another policeman through the jacket. Continued the reporter, “The officers of Company E used their best endeavors to protect the police from assaults by the soldiers but this was not effectually accomplished until swords and revolvers were drawn.” When order
finally prevailed, the police arrested Private Nolan and carted him off to the tombs of the Fourth District Police Station. Captain William S. Cogswell, commander of Company E, apologized for the fracas and ordered Nolan stripped of his uniform, telling the police that his company no longer wanted him as a member. Thus, lighter by one soldier, the 22nd Massachusetts marched to the depot and boarded a New York-bound train, complete with a calliope that played the entire way to the Empire City.68

Troop departures meant a great deal to the Unionists in Baltimore, as the arrival of troops by rail kept their secessionist neighbors in check. Each new regiment, it seemed, spoiled for a fight with the Baltimore mob. Shortly after Bull Run, on July 28, Colonel John W. Geary’s 28th Pennsylvania passed through the city with weapons loaded. Geary wrote that he “would have fired the city” if any Baltimorean insulted his regiment. When a train conductor mentioned the possibility of a delay, Geary threatened to shoot him. Commissary Sergeant David B. Hilt wrote, “Col. Geary told him that he had no Col. Small to fool with, and if he did not put the cars on he would make the ‘Blue Pills’ [bullets] fly until the ground was red.” The 29th Pennsylvania reached Baltimore on August 4. Colonel John K. Murphy gave orders to his men to load “buck and ball” into their percussion-altered flintlocks. Private David Moaut remembered, “The feeling towards the people of Baltimore was still very bad for the way in which the men of Small’s Regiment and the 6th Massachusetts Regt. had been used in April, and our Colonel was determined to be prepared for business should the same thing occur to us.”69

68 Boston Daily Journal, 8 and 9 October 1861; Boston Evening Transcript, 8 October 1861.
The military presence aided Baltimore’s Union Party. In August and September, General Dix, the department commander, accelerated his effort to repress secessionist politicians and newspaper editors, and he had many “seditious” men arrested. On September 12-13, Dix culminated his campaign by ordering his new provost marshal, George Dodge, to arrest eighteen prominent suspects, including Mayor George W. Brown. Dix’s move elicited mixed opinions. Although many Unionists despised Brown, some expressed revulsion that the federal government would dare to remove the city’s mayor. However, Brown’s arrest and summary imprisonment under charges of treason meant that secessionist control of the remnant of the 1st Light Division could no longer threaten Baltimore with the specter of rebel mayhem.70

Still, even with the secessionists in hibernation, Baltimore’s mobilization did not proceed briskly. As the winter of 1861 became the spring of 1862, only one new regiment—the Purnell Legion Infantry with five Baltimore companies—left the city. Federal and state authorities took drastic steps to facilitate the departure of Baltimore’s other regiments. In May 1862, Adjutant General Nicholas Brewer of John ordered the consolidation of several incomplete units. The five Baltimore companies of the 3rd Maryland consolidated into two companies, D and G. Two incomplete battalions, the German Rifles (also known as the 4th Maryland) and the Dix Light Infantry, both disbanded. The debris consolidated into companies E, H, I, and K, 3rd Maryland. Three new companies from Washington County and western Virginia joined the regiment to fill its roster to a bare minimum.

General Dix made an equally bold move when he ordered the Public Guard Regiment—now designated the 5th Maryland—to head to Fort Monroe. Dix knew that issuing such an order

70 Scharf, Chronicles of Baltimore, 617.
would upset the men, who expected to remain in Maryland as home guards. In April, he addressed the regiment, telling them that all those who wished to stay would receive an immediate discharge. Only three men stepped out of line and chose to leave the regiment. One soldier in the 5th Maryland gladly stated that all his comrades “express[ed] an earnest desire to be sent to Yorktown or some place where they will be put into active service.” This statement could not have been completely true, as fourteen soldiers from the 5th Maryland wrote to Governor Bradford shortly thereafter, telling him a different story. In their letter of complaint, they wrote, “we was ras[ed] to stay in Md to gard rail Roads[,] . . . that the ridgment has got more then 2 thirds of men of familys forsed to go from home contrary to thair especation and we beg of you as Governor of MD to interseed in our behalf[.] . . . we are forced out the state from home while other solders is doing what we whare raised to do[.] . . . our wifes is riting to us with a vengents against the the [sic] officers for Deceiven their husbans.” Bradford looked into the matter, but the officers of the 5th Maryland told him that the men had no right to complain. One officer affirmed, “[T]he whole Reg. before leaving Balto. were interrogated by Genl. Dix and all professed themselves willing to leave the State.” Some soldiers must have been unwilling to profess their dissatisfaction in front of the entire regiment when Dix called it into line. Thus, as the 5th Maryland prepared to leave, eight of them deserted.\(^7\)

The elections of 1861 generally avoided debate pertaining to the haphazard mobilization of urban America, but a few officials faced public censure. Although he did not face election, Secretary Cameron endured sharp criticism for the failure of the first year of mobilization. Many governors protested his leadership, but none so vociferously as Pennsylvania’s Andrew Curtin,

\(^7\) Undated letter to Augustus A. W. Bradford, Bradford papers, MDHS; *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 7 May 1862.
who had witnessed colossal problems inherent to Philadelphia’s mobilization. For his part, Curtin moved to alter the systems of political responsibility to enhance the process of raising regiments, albeit to suit his own political agenda. On August 19, Secretary Cameron requested an update on the status of mobilization from nine Union governors, ordering all “volunteer regiments or parts of regiments” to proceed to Washington immediately, “whether such volunteers are armed, equipped, uniformed, or not.” Curtin replied on August 20, attaching a letter from an aide sent to Philadelphia. The unnamed aide warned that the colonels of unfilled regiments would be ill-disposed to send forward parts of their regiments by companies. However, the aide suggested that if Cameron called all companies of sixty men or more, whole regiments might be sent forward. This would disperse “bogus regiments” and inspire higher morale, since, according to the aide, “very rapid demoralization is going on among the men, lying about in squads.”

Cameron agreed with the aide’s assessment, but not trusting one of Curtin’s men to act suitably, he sent Assistant Secretary Thomas A. Scott to Philadelphia to forward all filled and unfilled companies. This action angered Curtin, who voiced his disapproval that Philadelphia companies should be required to leave the city before properly armed. Cameron argued that weapons awaited the Philadelphians in Washington, but Curtin adamantly refused to approve their departure. On August 21, the governor drafted a letter to President Lincoln to air his grievances. His primary complaint focused on the War Department’s authorization of federal-appointed recruiters. Curtin stated, “Fifty-eight individuals received authority for this purpose in Pennsylvania. The direct authority of the Government of the United States having been thus set

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in competition with that of the State, acting under its requisition, the consequence has been much embar- rassment, delay, and confusion. . . . There remains the great evil of the unavoidable clashing of two authorities attempting at the same time to effect the same object among the same people through different and competing agencies.” To punctuate his point, Curtin claimed that although enough men volunteered to form thirty complete regiments, none had left the Commonwealth since the July 22 requisition.73

Next, Curtin’s letter blasted the unconstitutionality of Cameron’s orders. Curtin pointed out that the U.S. Congress’s military formation acts drafted on July 22 only allowed the Commander-In-Chief to call troops and set quotas; the authority to organize and provision troops still lay with the state governments. Curtin professed to ignoring the dual violation of the federal and commonwealth constitutions because of the present emergency, but he believed that where the “law is so clearly in accordance with true policy and expediency, it is hoped that the Government of the United States will adhere to it.” Curtin suggested that the War Department rely upon only one means of recruitment: individuals appointed by the War Department or the governments of the states. Predictably, Curtin requested that the state governors be made responsible for organizing and officering the regiments:

Some advantages to be derived from this course are—
First: That men enlist more readily when they know that they are to enter on active service without delay.
Second: That they would have the benefit of drill by officers of the United States and in their camps, in direct contact with troops already drilled, instead of being kept in temporary camps during the time requisite for filling a whole regiment.
Third: That company officers could be examined as they come in, and the incompetent ones replaced during the same interval, and thus time be saved and the effectiveness of the troops enhanced.74

73 OR., 435-41.
74 Ibid., 439-41.
Due to a clerical error, Curtin’s letter arrived at Cameron’s desk instead of Lincoln’s. Cameron sent a sharp reply, expressing annoyance that Curtin violated the proper chain of command. But, he promised to do all in his power to “allow the patriotic men of Pennsylvania who are generously offering their services to come at the earliest moment to the support of the Government in its hour of need.”

In Baltimore, political affairs went exceedingly well for the city’s blossoming Union Party. Back on August 15, the state Union convention had met at Baltimore’s Law Buildings and overwhelmingly nominated Augustus W. Bradford, a Harford County Democrat, for governor. The Union Party passed eight resolutions, several of which denounced secession as a “fatal heresy” and entreated all loyal Marylanders to come forward and suppress the rebellion. On August 21, Bradford announced that the “very salvation of our State” required Marylanders to commit themselves to the maintenance of the constitutional government and “to that Union of the States which it was its chief purpose to perpetuate.”

Then, in October, twenty members of the First Branch of the City Council stood reelection. Twenty Union candidates all ran unopposed, producing a decisive victory for the city’s loyalists. On November 6, the city voted for governor, giving Union Party candidate Bradford a 17,700 to 3,300 vote victory over his Peace Party opponent. Although many riots, arrests, and accusations of treason marred affairs at the polls, every city ward voted a Union Party majority for each contested election seat. This, combined with similar electoral victories elsewhere in Maryland, swept Bradford and his colleagues into office.

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75 Ibid., 491-2, 526-41.
76 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 16 and 23 August 1861.
Bradford’s election and his subsequent induction into office on January 8, 1862, signaled an important change for Baltimore, but the City Council elections produced a more pronounced—and unexpected—result. On January 6, the newly seated First Branch organized an overthrow of the mayor’s office. Since Brown’s arrest in September, Charles J. Baker, a member of the secessionist-controlled Second Branch and a close ally of Brown, had served as ex-officio mayor. However, the city charter decreed that only the First Branch could choose the ex-officio. Now dominated by Unionists, the First Branch selected this precise moment to put a Fourth Ward lawyer, John Lee Chapman, into office. Voting for immediate induction, the First Branch escorted Chapman to the mayor’s office, demanding that Baker vacate his office immediately. A crowd formed, expecting a fight, but Baker, to everyone’s surprise, quietly acquiesced.77

Boston’s city election passed on December 9. Although war fever had ruled during the past few months suggesting a Republican resurgence, the Democratic Party achieved a marginal victory. Mayor Wightman won a reelection against Edward S. Tobey, 6,700 votes to 5,700 votes, and the city council elected twenty-four members from each party. Despite the close election, the victorious Wightman used the opportunity to run down his Republican opponents. Speaking to a crowd at City Hall, Wightman’s victory speech declared, “Your suffrages have stamped the seal of disapprobation upon the vile slander and falsehoods of the Abolition press, which has tried to destroy, by poison and malice, that which they could not accomplish by other means.” Wightman believed that many “strong Union men and Democrats” had enlisted in the Union army or worked at the Navy yard in South Boston, and thus, could not vote in the election. But justice prevailed, so maintained Wightman. Republican patriotism, he said, “is only measured by their selfishness, and [they] have shown by their acts that they would sacrifice all the interests of the

77 Ibid., 7 January 1862.
city, or the country, for their own personal and party ends.” Such hubris barely explained the reality of the situation. Although the city’s conservatism remained strong, the rising pro-war opinion suggested that Boston’s commitment to the Union war machine was unflagging. Despite its feverish and awkward transition to war, the Bay City seemed prepared for whatever obstacles might intercede on the path to victory.\textsuperscript{78}

On December 3, New York City residents paused to elect their mayor and sheriff. The mayoral election became a three-way race, pitting Mozart Hall’s Fernando Wood, Tammany Hall’s C. Godfrey Gunther, and the Republican Party’s George C. Opdyke, against each other. As a former firefighter with a Germanic name, Gunther expected to appeal to foreign-born voters. Opdyke, a banker and inspector in the Brooks Brothers scandal, gained support from wealthy merchants, but many lower-class residents viewed him as a war profiteer, part of the “Shoddy Aristocracy.” Democrats made certain to smear his campaign with charges of “abolition fanaticism.” The eloquent incumbent, Wood, possessed a fair chance at winning; his hawkish speeches steadfastly supported the war throughout the autumn. However, Wood still suffered from suspicions of Confederate sympathy. Die-hard Unionists remembered his January proposal to lead New York City into secession. Further, Wood’s brother, Benjamin, editor of the \textit{New York Daily News}, loudly cried for peace and southern sympathy in his editorials. On September 11, Benjamin Wood proclaimed, “The issue is between a useless and destructive war and a prosperous enduring peace.” These affirmations ruined Wood’s campaign. On Election Day, George Opdyke carried thirty-four percent of New York City’s 74,314 votes, beating Wood by 1,213 and Gunther by 613. Mozart Hall successfully ran James Lynch for county sheriff. However, the mayoral defeat left Wood embittered, plunging him into the ranks of the

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Boston Daily Journal} and \textit{Boston Evening Transcript}, 10 December 1861.
Copperhead movement. Nevertheless, the election suggested that New Yorkers stood behind the administration; the Republican Party carried the mayoralty on a pro-war platform, even in New York City’s Democratic-dominated environs.79

The first eight months of the war had been a rough endeavor for the Union. Although they had put troops ashore on the North and South Carolina coast, the stinging defeats at Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff signaled that the North’s transition to war had been irregular and unproductive. In Washington, the members of the Thirty-Seventh Congress went into session to debate the recent events. As historian Howard Meneely later described, the assembled Congress convened in a “carping, cantankerous mood.” Eager to arrest control of the war from the executive branch, the Radicals sought to control the temper of the meeting by coaxing their colleagues into supporting a more aggressive approach. As Meneeley aptly described it, “they wanted a blood and thunder war upon the South and they meant to have it.”80

In addition, the members of the Thirty-Seventh Congress mourned one of their own—Senator Edward Baker—killed in action at Ball’s Bluff. They formed the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, designed to intervene in military affairs by subpoenaing officers from their commands to investigate dubious military decisions. The Joint Committee made General Charles Stone, the originator of the Ball’s Bluff incursion, its first target. The ensuing inquisition ruined Stone’s reputation and eventually led to his arrest for treason in February. Rising criticism from the Radicals led to increasing despair from the Lincoln administration. The Union armies had not made another major offensive, and with Lincoln’s new general-in-

80 Meneely, The War Department, 1861, 353.
chief, George McClellan, taken ill, no offensive appeared forthcoming. In mid-January 1862, Lincoln consulted with Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs, exclaiming, “General, what shall I do? The people are impatient: Chase has no money and he tells me he can raise no more; the General of the Army has typhoid fever. The bottom is out of the tub. What shall I do?”

Lincoln’s solution was to fire his Secretary of War, Cameron. Although several cabinet members took credit for making the suggestion—including Cameron himself, who claimed that he asked for his own removal—it appears that the maladministration of the War Department, with complaints coming from all quarters of the nation, induced Lincoln to make the change. Years later, Cameron defended his short administration by arguing that his challenging task, building an army from scratch, had been a thankless one. He wrote, “We were entirely unprepared for such a conflict, and for the moment, at least, absolutely without even the simplest instruments with which to engage in war. We had no guns, and even if we had, they would have been of but little use, for we had no ammunition to put in them—no powder, no saltpetre, no bullets, no anything.” Although Cameron exhibited many faults, including abuse of patronage, undoubtedly, the confused mobilization of the urban Northeast propelled his removal. The haphazard transition to war by Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City, which Cameron relied upon to meet the above demands—which any secretary of war would have relied upon—never met the fruition necessary to salvage his already tainted political career.

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Cameron’s successor, Edwin McMaster Stanton, assumed his duties on January 20, 1862. Immediately, he went to work drafting orders to resolve all the complaints against the war department. He closed the War Department four days a week to all business unrelated to the armies in the field, he ended all foreign military purchase contracts, and he held patronage applications in abeyance. Finally, he issued an order that all recruiting would cease on April 3. Only specially authorized regiments could continue recruiting in 1862, and Stanton only allowed one or two regiments per city to persist. Stanton’s goal was clear: mobilization should cease. The nation should focus on the army of three-year volunteers in the field: drill it, train it, and prepare it for battle. Further recruiting would only mean further chaos. Unfortunately, Stanton’s decision meant that the streets would be quiet in the spring. However, the war would prove his decision very ill-considered.  

The four cities of the northeast had faced a turbulent first year of war. Their manpower mobilization resulted in staggering statistics. In all, the four cities had put nearly 113,000 men into uniform since the beginning of the war. However, the cluttered, confused, chaotic

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84 The successive calls for three-year troops required Massachusetts to raise twenty-five infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment. Boston helped raise the following regiments: under the May 3 call it raised the 1st, 2nd, 9th, and 11th Massachusetts Infantry; under the special June 17 call just for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts it raised the 12th, 13th, 19th, and 20th Massachusetts Infantry; and under the July 22 call it raised the 22nd (with 2nd Sharpshooter Company and 3rd Light Artillery attached), 24th, 26th, 28th, 29th, and 30th Massachusetts Infantry, and the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry. The city of Boston filled all or part of fifteen of these regiments. In all, Boston raised approximately 6,866 soldiers for the three-year calls of 1861. From July 22 to mid-February 1862, New York City filled portions of thirty-eight infantry, cavalry, mounted rifle, and heavy artillery regiments and nine artillery batteries—about 29,000 men in all. Portions of nine other regiments—about 6,200 men—continued organizing until late May 1862. The last regiment, the 83rd New York Infantry, departed on May 27. By adding the three-month, two-year, and three-year men raised prior to Bull Run, The Empire City’s manpower mobilization numbered about 61,000, the most raised by any city during the turbulent opening months of the war. From the commencement of the conflict to May 10, 1862, Philadelphia sent approximately 39,950 men to war. This included 8,000 three-month soldiers; 3,600 three-year soldiers from the May 3 call for 42,000 volunteers; 26,250 three-year soldiers from the July 22 call for 500,000 volunteers (including 1,750 non-mutinous Pennsylvania Reserves); and 2,100 Home Guard soldiers. Finally, Baltimore filled the greater part of five regiments (about 3,250 officers and men), and they had filled six companies of another regiment—the 3rd Maryland (about 600 officers and men)—which had yet to leave.  

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mobilization of 1861 showed the pitfalls of raising armies in the cities. Certainly pluralism, federalism, and fierce partisan competition may have facilitated efforts to recruit, organize, arm, equip, and sustain soldiers and their families early on, but these same intrinsic urban characteristics disabled mobilization in potent ways, inaugurating a period of criminality, competition, and disunity, leaving city residents broken and divided when it came to meeting the demands of the national government. Contrary to the assertions of historians David Potter, Eric McKitrick, and Adam I. P. Smith, politics did not offer the North a decisive advantage. When it came to urban recruiting and organizing, the two-party political system complicated mobilization, creating venues for bickering, opportunities to the steal recruits, and reasons for mutiny. In 1861, the politics of urban manpower did not symbolize a solution to pesky problems, but a deepening of the turbulence and inefficiency that attended military mobilization in the North. With these problems uncorrected, the coming military failures of 1862 posed a severe test to the urban Northeast. During their second year as wartime societies, Boston, Baltimore, New York City, and Philadelphia stood unprepared to endure a host of new hardships.

Baltimore also contributed small portions to six other regiments and two artillery batteries (about 750 officers and men), making a grand total of 4,600 aggregate.

85 The traditional interpretation of the two-party system in the North argued that the Democratic Party’s “loyal opposition” moderated Republican policies in ways that benefited the war effort. By contrast, Confederate politics witnessed the rise of relentless, unchecked, and sometimes tyrannical executives and legislatures. Historians argued that his occurred because various state governments and the central government in Richmond lacked solid opposition parties. See David M. Potter, “Jefferson Davis and the Political Factors in Confederate Defeat,” in David Donald, ed., Why the North Won the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960); Eric McKitrick, “Party Politics and the Union and Confederate War Efforts,” in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds., The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); and Adam I. P. Smith, No Party Now: Politics In the Civil War North (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). Smith’s argument modified the interpretation of Potter and McKitrick by arguing that northern Republicans and Democrats attempted to suspend partisan rivalries for the good of the republic.
Chapter 6:
“Experience Should Guard Against Such a Blunder”:
The Call for “300,000 More,” May 1862—August 1862.

Edwin Stanton’s order closing down of the recruiting stations in April 1862 proved to be one of the most foolish mistakes of the Civil War. Undoubtedly, the new Secretary of War considered it his obligation to terminate the shocking corruption that attended mobilization under the rule of his predecessor by bringing an end to recruiting. However, by not providing an alternative method of enrollment, should the contingency of defeat arrive—which it did—Stanton subjected the Union to a repeat of the chaos of 1861 once the news of the Union defeats in the Shenandoah Valley and on the Yorktown Peninsula became national news.

In the Northeastern cities, the second phase of three-year recruitment unconsciously repeated all of the mistakes from the previous year. Urban Democrats and moderate Republicans increasingly criticized the war’s prosecution, seeing complacency in the War Department’s reactions to sudden military reverses. Urban proponents of unconditional victory, on the other hand, believed that another municipal asset could be tapped: money. Independently, Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City each adopted a bounty system to raise volunteers. However, by injecting benevolent donations into their equations, the cities opened yet another door to corruption and competition. The hysteria following the defeats of mid-1862 saw no regulations against these frauds. Finally, when city dwellers realized they would have to help fill another large quota of volunteers, they could not decide upon a coherent policy regarding the question of priority when it came to filling old regiments in the field or filling new regiments recently authorized. Multiple bounties and local politics complicated the urban recruiting process.
beyond repair. In essence, the four cities perpetrated many of the same mobilization blunders from the previous year in mid-1862.

It is important to recognize that when the shocking defeats of mid-1862 occurred, it was not the national government, but the state and metropolitan governments that overreacted. Although President Lincoln became infamous for issuing his call for “300,000 more” in July 1862, in actuality, in May and June, frantic northern newspaper editors and governors willfully encouraged citizens to violate Stanton’s directive to cease recruiting. New of the defeats produced a sensational panic in the eastern cities. Just prior to that time, Northern citizens looked optimistically toward an early victory. Two simultaneous advances—one up the Shenandoah Valley and the other up the Yorktown Peninsula—all but assured a Union triumph by the end of the year, or so it seemed. All of this changed suddenly on May 23, 1862, at Front Royal, Virginia. On that warm spring day, Confederate forces in the Shenandoah Valley stormed a 1,100-man garrison commanded by Colonel John R. Kenly. After a fierce battle, facing overwhelming numbers, a large portion of Colonel Kenly’s 1st Maryland Infantry surrendered. In all, Kenly’s regiment lost 592 men, including 535 prisoners. The skirmish may have been minor, but by the end of the week, Major General Nathaniel P. Banks’s army had virtually withdrawn north to the Potomac. In all, affairs in the Shenandoah Valley had produced an unmitigated disaster for the Union cause.

This bad news sparked an immediate emergency mobilization in New York City and Baltimore. On May 25, as New Yorkers were just sitting down to Sunday dinner, they heard the shrill cry of newsboys shouting, “The defeat of General Banks!” Bulletins describing the Union rout at Front Royal and Winchester swept through the city “as all bad news will,” remarked James Bennett, “on wings of lightning.” Another reporter for the Herald added, “The disaster,
coming so soon on the heels of so many glorious victories, caused the shock to be felt all the greater by the people, who were ill prepared for the reception of bad tidings.” Although New Yorkers did not have immediate cause to worry, Confederate control of the lower Shenandoah Valley made an invasion of the North a viable possibility.¹

Governor Edwin Morgan wasted no time meeting this emergency. First, he reopened all the recruiting stations closed by Secretary Stanton. He drafted General Orders 124, 125, and 130, ordering New York’s 1st Division (the all-New York City division) to mobilize for three-month service. Eight regiments—the 7th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 22nd, 37th, 69th, and 71st N.Y.S.M.—assembled for departure in a mere matter of hours. On May 27, the Herald reported, “No nation, like this, has ever exhibited such patriotism and military enthusiasm. . . . The excitement and bustle among the military here about yesterday brought back forcibly the early days of the rebellion, when there was such a tremendous uprising of our citizens.”² The “Dandy Seventh” left the city first; on May 25, marching to Cortland Street Ferry, 800 strong. A witness declared, “It looked as if the war had only suddenly burst upon us, and that we were only sending off our first draft of loyal men to put it down.” When the 8th, 37th, and 69th N.Y.S.M. departed four days later, the Herald reported that “the streets were completely blocked up” by spectators. At the armory of the Irish Legion, it “was worth one’s life owing to the terrific crushing, jamming, elbowing, tearing, pushing, and corn-smashing going on in the crowd.” For nine days, excited mobs applauded the militia as they boarded trains and ferries bound for Baltimore and Washington. By June 2, when the last regiment left, another 6,450 New Yorkers had gone into the service, and Stanton, bowing to the will of the New York City populace, asked Governor Morgan if the

¹ New York Herald, 26 May 1862.
² Ibid., 27 May 1862.
Empire State could spare more men. On June 4, Morgan drafted General Orders 162, granting Democratic State Senator Francis Barretto Spinola authority to raise a new city unit, dubbed the “Empire Brigade,” headquartered at East New York. 3

Baltimore experienced even more shock than New York City, largely because of personal connections to the Battle at Front Royal. Since no Baltimoreans fought at Bull Run or Ball’s Bluff, the city had not yet experienced the embarrassment of defeat, but at Front Royal, the city had lost its premiere Union regiment. Colonel Kenly’s 1st Maryland even suffered the added indignity of losing its regimental colors, the same flags so proudly presented to them by the ladies of West Baltimore in June 1861. Further adding insult to injury, the regiment surrendered to Colonel Bradley T. Johnson’s 1st Maryland (Confederate) Infantry. Gleeful in victory, Johnson’s men had pronounced, “The real 1st Maryland beat the bogus!”4

This appalling news reached Baltimore on May 25, filling the city’s Unionists with white-hot rage. Claimed a reporter, “The excitement and exasperation of feeling that has been smoldering in this city ever since the memorable scenes of April 1861 culminated . . . in acts of violence and serious breaches of the peace.” Confederate Baltimoreans reveled in the outcome. In West Baltimore, a butcher accosted a Union man, gloating, “Well, your great cock has fallen in the first pit.” The Unionist asked, “Who are you taking about?” The butcher replied, “Colonel John R. Kenly!” The Unionist immediately knocked the butcher to the sidewalk and left him wallowing in a puddle of blood. As word of this affray spread, Unionist gangs poured into the streets, chanting for retribution. Unfounded rumors that Colonel Kenly had been killed in the

3 Ibid., 27 and 30 May 1862.
fighting at Front Royal added to the cacophony. (Actually, he had been wounded and captured.)

Chanting crowds assembled at various newspaper offices. In one instance, a bloodthirsty Unionist gang pulled a man from his carriage at the mere suspicion of disloyalty; they would have beaten him ruthlessly had police not intervened. Another crowd of 500 to 600 people assaulted southern sympathizer Bolivar D. Daniels, Esq., until police rescued him by taking him into custody, as the crowd brandished pre-tied nooses and shouted, “Hang him! Hang him!”

Beatings of southern sympathizers continued for the next two days, the Unionist mobs traveling from office to office demanding that all proprietors display the Stars and Stripes to honor Kenly’s fallen soldiers. Not surprisingly, other northern cities applauded the violence. The New York Times commented, “Silently, lukewarm neutrality has given place to a positive, staunch, determined loyalty. It is very evident that Baltimore can now take care of herself, and though it has happened that the evidence has not come in the most pleasing form, it is, nevertheless, at bottom, a gratifying manifestation of the solid, heart-felt patriotism of her people.”

Maryland’s new governor, Augustus Bradford, saw the Front Royal disaster as an opportunity to resume recruiting. He consulted with Edwin Stanton, and gave Bradford special permission to resume Maryland’s manpower mobilization. The energetic governor ordered all survivors from the Front Royal engagement—about 250 in number—to make their way to Baltimore to help their officers refill the regiment. On May 28, Bradford also authorized the formation of two new three-year regiments, the 4th and 6th Maryland Infantry Regiments. At the same time, Bradford directed Colonel William Louis Schley, commander of the 5th Maryland, to return to Baltimore to superintend recruiting. Three days later, Schley established ten enrolling

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5 Scharf, Chronicles of Baltimore, 622-4; Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 26 and 27 May 1862.
6 This regiment, the 4th Maryland, was the “new” 4th Maryland, replacing the “old” 4th Maryland, or German Rifle Regiment that had been consolidated with the 3rd Maryland.
stations and a camp of rendezvous, “Camp Hoffman,” at Lafayette Square. Schley issued a statement reminding Baltimoreans of their obligations to their country and the recent sacrifice of Kenly’s men: “Marylanders! Recollect the brave men, under the gallant Colonel Kenly, who fell in the field of battle, and their duty to their State, and their memories, to avenge the cold bloody murder perpetrated.” Moved by this entreaty, volunteers began flocking to the 4th Maryland’s recruiting stations. By June 10, Companies A, B, C, and D, 4th Maryland, had enlisted 146 men.

By mid-June, Schley reported the camp “in full blast,” and he used his new recruits to parade and drum up support, proving to the public “that the thing is going ahead & working smooth.” Schley guessed he could raise both regiments at the cheap cost of $2,500 apiece. He wrote, “The 4th and 6th are well organized & in good shape, and I feel much encouraged in the chance of success.” The initial success of the 4th Maryland’s recruiting efforts prompted Schley to issue a proclamation on June 2, asking Baltimore’s German-American population to fill the ranks of the 6th Maryland. Schley wrote:

The FOURTH REGIMENT OF MARYLAND VOLUNTEERS, under Colonel JOS. P. WARNER, having been organized and its officers complete, the attention of the loyal men of this city and State is directed to the speedy organization of the Sixth. To the loyal adopted Germans of the city and State, an earnest appeal is made to take hold of the Sixth and testify their duty to the State and Union, and show that they are in all respects equal in loyalty to the support and maintenance of the integrity of our State and the support of the old flag.

At least four recruiting stations opened in the city to fill the 6th Maryland, and Schley enticed potential recruits by promising aid to their families, good weapons, and a fine encampment. Schley announced, “The regiments will be armed with the Austrian rifled musket, the best arm known in the service[.] . . . The camp is a most beautiful spot, high, healthy, in the

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7 William Schley proclamation, undated newspaper clipping, Bradford papers, 31 May 1862, MDHS; Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 11 June 1862.
8 William Schley to Augustus Bradford, 7 June 1862, Adjutant General’s papers, MDSA.
9 William Schley proclamation, undated newspaper clipping, probably 2 June 1862, Bradford papers, MDHS.
heart of the city, with good hydrant water, and with fine drill grounds around it.” Any enlistees for the 4th and 6th Maryland Regiments would receive groceries courtesy of the state—sugar, coffee, bacon, flour, bread—once every other week to feed their families until their regiment mustered in. Recruitment received another boost on June 5 when Colonel Kenly arrived in Baltimore on parole, his head still bandaged from a saber wound. Thousands of spectators greeted Kenly with applause. The fiery Mexican-American War veteran used this opportunity to endorse Bradford’s decision to refill his regiment and to raise the 4th and 6th Maryland. On June 25, the American commented, “The work of recruiting for the Fourth and Sixth Maryland Regiments . . . is progressing with considerable spirit. . . . The regiments are filling up pretty fast, and it is desirable that every Union man should exert himself to push forward the work of completing these two regiments, as also that of the gallant Col. Kenly, the First Maryland.”10 For the first time, it seemed, the fires of patriotism that had swept through the other cities in 1861 now affected Baltimore. However, quite slowly, the same confusion and competition of the previous summer began to creep in.11

Neither Boston nor Philadelphia responded to the Front Royal debacle with the ardor that Baltimore and New York City demonstrated, and in time, the crisis in the Shenandoah Valley abated. By mid-June, Confederate forces abandoned the valley, and on the Yorktown Peninsula, the Army of the Potomac crept steadily toward Richmond. However, by early July, the Army of the Potomac suffered a major defeat in the “Seven Days’ Battles,” sustaining 16,000 casualties—initiating a “change of base,” to use the parlance of its commander—and found itself bottled up at Harrison’s Landing on the James River.

11 H. W. Owings to Augustus Bradford, 15 July 1862; Isaac Boyd and Harrison Adreon to Augustus Bradford, n.d., William Schley to Augustus Bradford, 7 and 15 June and 15 and 16 July 1862; Adjutant General’s papers, MDSA.
President Lincoln now faced additional pressure from the state house in Boston. Governor John Andrew wrote a letter to the people of Massachusetts, telling them that he would authorize the creation of fifteen new infantry regiments, federal decree or not. Not wanting the War Department to appear complacent, on July 2, Lincoln called for 300,000 additional three-year volunteers. To prevent a “general panic or stampede” among the people, Secretary of State William Seward traveled to New York City to meet with eleven northern governors to have them sign a proclamation that urged the president to call additional troops to replace the army’s losses “resulting from the usual and unavoidable casualties of the service.” Cunningly, Seward backdated the proclamation to June 28, to make it appear as if the governors had spontaneously called for new troops prior to news of the defeat.\textsuperscript{12}

Northern editors responded to the announcement with praise tinged with criticism. New Yorker George Templeton Strong wrote in his diary, “Thank Heaven, the President has called for a few hundred thousand volunteers to reinforce the army, at last. Would he have invoked them three months ago!” New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley agreed. He wrote, “Hours are ages; a few weeks must now decide the fate of the Republic. Let each put his shoulder to the wheel.”\textsuperscript{13} A Republican reporter from Boston similarly declared, perhaps with some exaggeration, “The events of last week have thundered in the ears of the people in vain, if they are not already wide awake to the duties of the hour.”\textsuperscript{14} A more critical Bostonian opined, “It became evident that the southern white people were substantially united; and that they had a large territory, not easy to be overrun, and capable of subsisting and supporting for a long period, all the armies that the new

\textsuperscript{13} George T. Strong diary, 2 July 1862, in Nevins, ed. \textit{Diary of the Civil War}, 236; \textit{New York Tribune}, 9 July 1862
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Boston Daily Journal}, 3 July 1862.
Confederacy could put into the field. . . . And yet even as late as in 1862, the administration . . . did not seem fully to realize these facts.”

However, despite their criticism of the late arrival of the call for “300,000 more,” northern urbanites displayed a dreadful seriousness when they viewed the disaster on the Peninsula. In Philadelphia, Sidney George Fisher anxiously read accounts about the Battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines’ Mill, where his friends in the Pennsylvania Reserves were heavily engaged. Fisher noted, “Many Philadelphians were in the fight & of course much anxiety was felt by their friends.” To Fisher, news of the bloody fighting had changed Philadelphians’ perception of the war: “This war is getting to be a fearful thing and there is less confidence expressed as to its fortunate termination.” City residents increasingly understood that this call required of them a new mobilization, a new plan of action, a new set of volunteers, a new wave of production, and a new explosion of public involvement to support it.

Predictably, the Republican Party’s state leadership expressed support for the new mobilization. New York Governor Morgan congratulated the wisdom of Lincoln’s latest measure, declaring its brilliance “obvious to all.” He stated, “Our army in the field has been reduced by the ordinary casualties of service and must be recruited . . . [and] subjugated areas must be held. The people appreciate these facts.” Morgan made earnest appeals to New Yorkers to enlist with alacrity: “Let it come from every fireside. . . . Let each feel that the Commonwealth now counts upon his individual strength and influence to meet the demands of the government. The period has come when all must aid.” To ensure a rapid mobilization, on July 7, Morgan

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15 Albert W. Mann, History of the Forty-Fifth Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, “The Cadet Regiment” (Jamaica Plain, MA: Brookside Print, 1908), 55.
drafted an order requiring each of New York’s thirty-two senatorial districts to provide one regiment, and he appointed committees to superintend recruitment in each district. Morgan made the senatorial committees responsible for appointing recruiters, approving officers’ positions, establishing barracks, and raising bounties. Four committees—the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Senatorial District Regimental Committees—governed mobilization in New York City. On July 17, to prevent the burden of recruitment from “fall[ing] unequally upon localities,” Governor Morgan asked the legislature to approve a plan offering each recruit a state bounty of $50.00. Thus, with a $25.00 federal bounty, a $2.00 premium, and one month’s advance pay, any enlistee stood to receive at least $90.00 by enlisting in New York State.17

Philadelphia’s mobilization followed suit. Under the new call, Lincoln asked Pennsylvania to provide twenty-one new regiments and 40,000 additional men to refill the old regiments. After some deliberation, Governor Andrew Curtin announced his recruitment plan on July 21. He called upon Philadelphia to raise fifty companies—or five new regiments of infantry—to fill the new regiments and 12,000 men to fill the old regiments. Curtin also authorized county governments (or the incorporated city of Philadelphia) to recruit nine-month volunteers to fill the new regiments and one-year volunteers to fill the old regiments.18 Curtin’s plan also called for bounties. Characteristically optimistic in his appraisal of the situation, Curtin wrongly believed that “no bounties would be necessary to induce the men of Pennsylvania to enter the service of their country on such an occasion.” However, New York’s state bounty might induce Pennsylvanians along the northern border to travel into the Empire State to enlist.

Curtin thought it “not right to expose our citizens to the temptation thus afforded to them to enlist in regiments of other States.” Unfortunately, the Commonwealth’s legislature made no provision to allow Curtin to draw funds from the Treasury. Thus, he called upon local governments and local institutions to meet this demand. This meant that the counties and the city of Philadelphia would have to raise money using their own agencies.\textsuperscript{19}

Massachusetts Governor Andrew led the way in his state. A Republican editor in Boston confirmed that such a call for 300,000 additional volunteers “is none too great,” considering the needful circumstances of Union forces in the field and the current state of the “work to be done.” Stanton set Massachusetts’ quota at 15,000 men. Governor Andrew immediately determined that the commonwealth should send 5,000 of these men into new regiments—of which there would now be only six—and the remaining 10,000 should refill the depleted ranks of regiments already in the field. Of all of these, Boston’s quota would constitute 2,370.\textsuperscript{20}

Secretary Stanton set Maryland’s quota at 4,000 men, or four regiments of infantry. Both the 4\textsuperscript{th} and 6\textsuperscript{th} Maryland, already in the process of forming, counted toward this quota. Governor Bradford immediately authorized the recruitment of two new regiments, the 7\textsuperscript{th} and 8\textsuperscript{th} Maryland Infantry Regiments, and one new artillery battery, “Alexander’s Baltimore Light Artillery.” Also, on July 4, he issued a proclamation, urging Marylanders to respond with alacrity. Denouncing the “odious conscription” of the Confederacy, Bradford demanded that loyal Marylanders outshine the “champions of a pretended popular revolution” by meeting the national requisition with patriotic volunteering. He entreated, “Men of Maryland, I look to you with confidence to be among the foremost in responding to this call. There are reasons why you

\textsuperscript{19} William Egle, Andrew Curtin, 240-1.
\textsuperscript{20} Boston Daily Journal, 3 July 1862.
should be. You are, as it were, the natural body-guard of the capitol of the nation. If this diabolical rebellion ever makes another forward movement, its first step will be on your soil[.] . . . The crisis is at hand—one more effective blow and the rebellion must crumble.”

How would the cities respond to these calls from their federal and state executives? Cheerfully, it seemed initially. The Empire City’s Republican mayor, George Opdyke, did not wait long to stir his population. On July 7, with warlike conviction, he issued a proclamation calling for New Yorkers to “seek out, discover, and bring to punishment every disloyal person.” Such martial tones pleased radical Republicans. Horace Greeley believed that Opdyke “does not pretend that the man who wishes the cause of the rebellion [slavery] removed is therefore equally culpable with an upholder of the Rebellion. Nor could anything induce him to endeavor to stop enlistments in the Union armies until the personnel of the Administration be recast in accordance with his antipathies or his wishes; for this would be to play the part of a false traitor, not of a true patriot.” Opdyke also called for businesses to close their doors at 3:00 P.M. on July 15 so all patriotic New Yorkers could assemble for a meeting at Union Square.  

About 50,000 New Yorkers attended the meeting. The Democratic Herald declared it “something tremendous” and as “fully grand and imposing” as the patriotic rally of April 1861. The paper continued, “Now a second time the sons of New York are summoned to the rescue and again comes an outpouring of the stalwart masses of the Empire City fully spontaneous.” The Republican Tribune saw things differently. Horace Greeley believed the new meeting reflected “a graver, sterner, more inflexible resolution” than the first. In his opinion, the gathering was more than just “a fresh exhibition of . . . unanimity,” it was “an entreaty; an exhortation to the

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21 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 7 July 1862.
22 New York Tribune, 8 and 9 July 1862.
Government to employ every influence, every instrument, every energy, in putting down the Slaveholders’ Rebellion.” Some Republicans now eagerly awaited enactment of emancipation and conscription as swift means of ending the war.\textsuperscript{23} Opdyke’s opening address echoed Greeley’s thoughts; he warned conservatives not to oppose war measures ratified by the administration. Opdyke declared, “We have come to renew our vows on the altar of patriotism. . . . In a contest with such a foe, there can be no neutral or middle ground. All who are not earnestly opposed to the enemies of their country must be regarded as participators in their guilt; all who apologize for their crime must share in the infamy that awaits them.”\textsuperscript{24}

But such optimism proved fleeting. Boston’s large quota frightened the city’s conservatives. Rumors abounded that conscription might follow if the recent call went unfilled. The \textit{Evening Transcript} announced, “The towns are bestirring themselves to raise their compliment of volunteers, so that Massachusetts will not have to resort to a draft.” Like other community leaders, the \textit{Transcript} demanded prompt action from the mayor to “take the initiative in preparing measures,” so that “Boston shall not be behindhand in the patriotic work of filling up our decimated regiments and putting fresh ones in the field.”\textsuperscript{25} Under no circumstance, cried many pro-war Democrats, would New England’s leading city fall behind in meeting this new call to arms.

Mayor Wightman, who had participated only marginally in Boston’s mobilization of 1861, accepted a central role in meeting the new call for troops. Almost immediately, he determined that, whatever his role, the city needed to raise munificent bounties. On July 9, he

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\item \textit{New York Herald}, 14 and 16 July 1862.
\item \textit{Boston Evening Transcript}, 9 July 1862.
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addressed the city council, stating, “The number required of the city of Boston . . . is about twenty-four hundred. It is evident from present indications that the ordinary means used, and the inducements offered, are not sufficient to cause men to come forward and enlist as rapidly as is desirable or necessary for the reinforcement of our army, or the successful prosecution of the war.” Patriotism, he believed, had waned since the beginning of the conflict—there was no use denying it—but a healthy dose of monetary inducement would stabilize the declining support for the war and ensure a speedy mobilization.26

Members of the business community, especially those who profited from the rewarding of contracts, looked to the new call as an opportunity. Merchants had earlier guessed that the production of war materiel was on the decline, but now, the new call disproved that notion. Here was a chance for merchants to establish themselves as essential members of the city’s wartime community. Shortly after Wightman’s message to the city council, several businessmen asked the mayor to call a public meeting at Faneuil Hall for the purpose of raising money to fill a bounty fund. One plate-glass importing firm, Tuttle and Gaffield, guessed that Boston’s merchants could raise about $60,000, and if so, it promised to donate $1,250 to this cause. The merchants wrote to Wightman, stating, “We hope the city government and our citizens generally may approve the idea and second its accomplishment so that Boston may be the first to respond with full ranks to the Governor’s call and set a good example to the other cities and towns of the commonwealth.”27 Once again, Boston’s war-makers staked their reputations on making the Bay City the first to meet the President’s call for troops.

26 Ibid., 10 July 1862.
27 Ibid., 8 and 10 July 1862.
Wightman agreed with this plan and he approved the meeting at the appointed place, scheduling it for 11:00 A.M. on July 12. Mayor Wightman’s speech met mixed reaction, as it departed substantially from the optimistic tones of the previous year. First, he lambasted Congress for the recent military disasters, saying that Republican politicians had “utterly failed in the least degree to ally, conquer, or check” the causes of secession and the subsequent rebel military build-up. A diverse chorus of hisses and cheers followed this statement. However, Wightman vowed that he would not let a draft fall upon the city of Boston. He asked, “Must a system of drafting be inaugurated and the freemen of the North be compelled to submit to a conscription worthy of stern despotism of the Southern Confederacy, but degrading to our manhood and independence? No!” Instead, Wightman affirmed, “let us support the government by voluntary aid, and in this crisis of our country’s history let Faneuil Hall echo with the encouraging words of General McClellan to his soldiers after the battles before Richmond: ‘Boys, you may think that matters look dark, but be of good courage. All is right.’ ” Wightman’s speech girded popular support for the bounty fund campaign and Boston’s merchant elite passed resolutions pledging that the city of Boston would, “true to traditions of the past, lay upon the altar of our common country the lives of her sons and the treasure of her people without stint or limit.”

The great meeting of July 12 resulted in the formation of the Committee of 150, a bipartisan organization of community leaders committed to filling the bounty fund. It formed a five-person subcommittee headed by J. Thomas Stevenson, who suggested that the city should raise $300,000 for the purpose of paying a $100 bounty to each volunteer. Governor Andrew

28 Boston Daily Journal, 12 July 1862; Boston Evening Transcript, 12 July 1862.
29 Boston Evening Transcript, 12 and 14 July 1862.
took steps to centralize and streamline the new phase of recruiting. He directed Adjutant General Schouler draw up general orders establishing two new training camps, “Camp Wool,” at Worcester—a rendezvous for the western counties—and “Camp Stanton,” at Lynnfield, a rendezvous for Boston regiments and the eastern counties. Generally, Andrew’s efforts synchronized with the tone of the Faneuil Hall meetings. At one of the subsequent smaller meetings, Edward Tobey read a letter from Andrew denouncing the notion of a draft. It read, “Occasionally, someone suggests a draft. But never, for one instant, have I entertained the thought. No conscription is demanded in order to bring the people of Massachusetts up to the full standard of every duty they owe to their country.”

Meanwhile, Philadelphians went to work with even greater speed than the Bostonians. The day after Governor Curtin announced his recruitment plan, Philadelphia’s Committee of Defense and Protection of the City—an organization within the Select Council—formed the City Bounty Fund Committee. After four days of intense discussion, the Committee of Defense passed an allocation for $500,000—or $50.00 per recruit—with a $6.00 premium paid at enlistment and $5.00 per man paid to the captain of each company to reimburse recruiting expenses, provided that the bounty fund paid for no more than 4,000 men, or four regiments of infantry. The councils also staggered bounties, paying $25.00 per nine-month recruit with a $2.00 premium and $30.00 per one-year recruit with a $3.00 premium.

Baltimoreans also leaped into action. On July 14, the First Branch of the City Council drew up Ordinance Number 74, appropriating $300,000 to fund a city bounty. Under this provision, each Baltimore volunteer would receive $50.00 at enlistment and $10.00 each month.

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30 Ibid., 23 July 1862.
31 Philadelphia Inquirer, 22-25 July 1862.
for the next five months. The First Branch passed this ordinance the very next day. ³² Meanwhile, the Union Relief Association began recruiting more “Sisters of the Union” to aid in the distribution of relief to needy families and to care for sick and wounded soldiers. One woman called upon all “kind-hearted, Union-loving” women to take up their baskets “with any nicely cooked food, substantial or delicate, suitable for the sick, go to the different wards; the attending physician or nurse will assist you in the distribution of tid-bits to those who have lost all appetite for common food.” By that time, Baltimore possessed four federal hospitals—James Wests’s, John McKim’s, Steuart Mansion, and Camden Hall—capable of holding 1,725 patients, and nearly all of these were filled with sick and wounded from the Shenandoah Valley and Peninsula Campaigns. ³³

Even with all of Baltimore’s early success at mobilizing in the summer of 1862, Governor Bradford supposed that the city needed to undertake more aggressive measures. On July 17, he organized the Citizens’ Committee on Recruiting, a fifty-man organization that included such prominent Marylanders as Henry Winter Davis, John Lee Chapman (Baltimore’s new ex-officio mayor), John P. Kennedy, Enoch Pratt, Johns Hopkins, William Purnell, and Gerard T. Hopkins. Addressing them with a letter, Bradford stated, “These [four new] Regiments can undoubtedly be raised, but to enable us to do so with the utmost possible dispatch—a consideration at present so important—it is manifest that the work must be stimulated by something more than the ordinary efforts of the recruiting officer.” Bradford noted that in other states, where volunteers were liberally provided for by the state and municipal authorities, the “advantage and importance of individual exertion is everywhere recognized, and such exertion is

³² Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 15 and 17 July 1862.
³³ Sheads and Toomey, Baltimore During the Civil War, 176-177; Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 10 July 1862.
absolutely indispensable with us, where no public appropriation of any kind has been made.” Borrowing the rubric demonstrated by other productive northern cities—Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia—Bradford proposed that Baltimore’s patriotic organizations could initiate similar efforts to advertise and raise munificent private bounties.34

Certainly, Bradford mused, “much may be done by canvassing different neighborhoods, by persons appointed for the purpose and whose efforts should be directed to arousing the minds of our young and able-bodied men to the patriotic duties required of them,” but unless the wealthy classes effectively provided for the pecuniary necessities of potential volunteers, Baltimoreans would not enlist in great numbers. Liberal donations needed to rival other northern cities or else Baltimore would lose its volunteers to Philadelphia and New York City, where the discrepancy in bounties more than met the cost in travel expenses. Bradford reminded his fellow elites, “[W]e should remember that the most liberal contributions . . . [w]e can make are but light in comparison with the life-blood of the gallant men thus so freely shed.” The Governor continued, “Our efforts therefore, as it seems to me, should be particularly and zealously directed to stimulate by all available means the enrollment of the Volunteers now required, and to the provision of such a fund as may set at all rest fears for the families they leave behind.”35

The so-called “Committee of Fifty” read Bradford’s letter on July 21, but it expressed itself unmoved by his plea. John P. Kennedy believed that personal contributions would be of “little benefit”; he would gladly contribute to any fund, but Kennedy hoped the State Legislature or the City Council would take up the burden, “so that the disloyal as well as the loyal should be compelled to contribute, by way of taxation.” William Price agreed; he disliked individual

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34 Augustus Bradford to Citizens’ Committee on Recruiting, 17 July 1862, Bradford papers, MDHS.
35 Ibid.
contributions because “Union men only would contribute and the rebels would give nothing.”
The Committee of Fifty drafted a resolution urging the City Council to pass the bounty ordinance immediately. Only William Purnell, the wealthy postmaster who organized the Purnell Legion on his own funds the year before, protested this measure, considering the resolution disrespectful to the governor.\(^{36}\)

The next day, ex-officio Mayor Chapman convened both branches of the City Council, advising them to pass Ordinance Number 74. He stated, “Public sentiment imperatively demands passage of this ordinance, or one having the same object in view, and I beg your honorable body to give the subject an immediate and favorable consideration.” The Second Branch, the branch that had yet to approve the measure, immediately voted it down. Surprised by this decision, the First Branch called for a six-man joint committee to debate the matter, but it reached no agreement. Second Branch Councilman Decatur H. Miller argued that no bounty ordinance could be governed by local legislation; the State Legislature must sanction such an act first. Second Branch Councilman James B. George, Sr., retorted that, in April 1861, the Council had voted a $500,000 appropriation (the one that had been meant to arm and pay Baltimore’s Confederate militia) with no difficulty; why, he asked, was this moment any different? Of course, the reason for this obstruction came from the fact that southern sympathizers still controlled the Second Branch of the City Council. The *American* commented, “The result was not unexpected to those who understood the thoroughly disloyal sympathies of the majority of the branch. Elected two years ago, before the issues that now distract the country culminated, they were brought under

\(^{36}\) *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 22 July 1862.
the influence of the disloyal clique who then controlled the city and state through the Police 
Board and Legislature. This influence is still predominant with them.”37

The next day, the City Council held a re-vote, which was watched by many spectators. As 
the members of the Second Branch took their seats, a Scotsman shouted obscenities at Decatur 
Miller, calling him a traitor and threatening to hang him. Throughout the proceedings, the 
Scotsman continued to raise a disturbance, at one point calling out, “O, you traitors, we are the 
men who put you in office and we are the men who will put you out!” Eventually, a marshal 
escorted the unruly man outside. When the vote was tallied, of the Second Branch’s ten 
members, only two voted in favor of the ordinance. Meanwhile, the First Branch voted 
unanimously in favor of it.

When the proceedings ended, a large crowd gathered outside City Hall, with plans to 
lynch the Second Branch members as they exited. A marshal suggested that the councilmen wait 
inside his office and then slip out under the cover of night. Five of them—Councilmen William 
Dean, Asa Higgins, Jesse Marden, John W. Wilson, and Decatur Miller—accepted this offer. 
One member, Charles J. Baker, the former ex-officio mayor, boldly departed in broad daylight. 
The crowd, brandishing nooses, shouted “Traitor! Traitor! Hang him! Hang him!” and then 
chased his carriage around the block. Councilman George, one of the Unionist members, 
de parted next, receiving lusty cheers. George tried to disperse the crowd, but to no avail. By 
evening, the throng had grown to 400 people. At 7:00 P.M., Dean, Wilson, Higgins, and Marden 
 successfully escaped through the back door with a six-man police escort. Miller tried to flee an 
hour later. By then, the crowd had surrounded the building, preventing his escape from going

37 Ibid., 23 and 24 July 1862.
unnoticed. As Miller tried to reach his carriage, the multitude pushed and grappled with his police escort, desperately trying to lay a hand on him. “Come see the live rebel!” they screamed, “We’ll soon hang him from a lamppost!” Somehow, Miller managed to reach his carriage, which took off at a gallop toward his home at the corner of Monument and Cathedral Street. 38

This resentment caused by the Second Branch’s opposition to the bounty act forced its members to reevaluate their safety. Councilman Baker sought an audience with Major General John E. Wool to reach some kind of resolution. Wool, the oldest serving general in the Union army, had arrived in Baltimore on June 9 to assume command of the Middle Department, a military subdivision established on March 22 to comprise Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Wool staunchly supported the Democratic Party, and to a small degree, he expressed sympathy for the threatened councilmen. Rightly or wrongly, he viewed the bounty ordinance affair as symptomatic of a lingering partisan animosity. Writing to his wife, Wool stated, “We have [in this city] two parties the Democrats & Know nothings, their hatred towards each other is intense. To destroy each other is the determination of both parties. If the democrats had been for the Union, the know nothings would have joined the rebels.” This assessment might have been a bit obtuse, but Wool correctly gauged the threat of violence. Additionally, Wool understood that the Second Branch was, in his words, “composed of men who at least sympathized with the rebels of the South.” On July 25, he called the members of the Second Branch to his headquarters and warned them that, “[T]hey owed their protection to the United States Government, and therefore ought to contribute to support the government and to raise

38 Ibid., 24 July 1862.
their share of troops necessary to protect and defend it. If they could not do this consistently with
their own views on the subject they ought to resign.”

Nine members of the Second Branch took Wool’s advice and resigned en mass. Only
Councilman George, representing the Fifth and Sixth Wards, remained. In fact, George knew
nothing of the resignations or the secret meeting with Wool. He showed up at City Hall alone for
two successive days. At the end of the second day, he spoke to reporters, complaining that each
day his fellow councilmen chose not to appear, it cost the city $75.00 in incidental expenses to
run the hall. The reporters informed the surprised councilman that the other nine members had
resigned.

Frustrated by the inaction of the Committee of Fifty and the City Council, Bradford
organized a mass meeting to be held at Monument Square on July 28 to make clear to
Baltimoreans that drastic measures were needed to raise and support troops. Over 20,000 people
Hoffman all spoke, while a detachment from the 4th Maryland guarded the event. The meeting
produced a series of eight resolutions, all of which Bradford considered necessary to augment
Baltimore’s sinking mobilization effort. First, Mayor Chapman announced a special election to
be held on August 1 to replace the Second Branch. Then, Bradford vowed to reorganize the State
Militia, including the 1st Light Division, and enforce a series of loyalty oaths to ensure that no
secessionists held positions in it. In addition to several other requests, Bradford called upon
Baltimore’s ethnic minorities to meet the demands of the hour. He applauded the Germans who

39 John Wool to Sarah Wool, 26 July and 23 September 1862, Wool papers, New York State Library, Albany, New
York (hereafter NYSL).
40 *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 26 July 1862.
resolutely filled the ranks of the 6th Maryland, but he expressed disappointment that the city’s Irishmen had not come forward in equivalent numbers. He pointed out that New York City’s Michael Corcoran was currently recruiting an entire Irish-American brigade. Could not Baltimore provide one Irish regiment? Bradford stated, “I regret to say, as far as Baltimore is concerned, I have looked in vain [for the Irish].” As if on cue, a soldier in the 4th Maryland called out in a thick brogue, “Here is one of them!” Urging Baltimore’s Irishmen to follow this young man’s example, on behalf of Corcoran, Thomas Meagher, and the Emerald Banner, Bradford begged the Irish to come forward. Finally, Bradford promised to organize a “Maryland Brigade” to contain the 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Maryland Regiments and Alexander’s Battery, and to be commanded by Colonel Kenly once he received his parole. This announcement provoked an enthusiastic response from the crowd, and cheer after cheer greeted the governor.41

Inspired by the rally, Baltimoreans commenced meeting Bradford’s demands. On July 30, the Committee of Fifty met to reconsider the governor’s earlier request for private donations and began pledging money. Two days later, the city’s voters elected nine new members to the Second Branch, all of them Union Party members. On August 5, one day after Mayor Chapman inducted them into office, the new Second Branch passed a bounty ordinance, this time for $350,000. Two days later, the City Council passed an ordinance appropriating $30,000 for the reorganization of the Light Division. Now, all Baltimore enlistees stood to receive $90.00 on enlistment: $50.00 city bounty, $25.00 state bounty, $13.00 advance pay, and a $2.00 premium. All enlistees received an extra $50.00 city bounty paid out in installments over the next five months, and if they volunteered in a veteran unit, each recruit received an extra $2.00 veteran bounty, making a grand total of $142.00. When Captain Frederick W. Alexander opened his

41 Ibid., 29 July 1862.
headquarters at China Hall for his new light artillery battery on August 4, he received forty-five recruits on the first day.\textsuperscript{42}

By August, all four cities had erected their bounty systems and throughout the summer they carried on with the awkward task of raising the new levies. Once again, company recruiting stations sprouted across the cities. One Philadelphia newspaper remarked, “The progress of recruiting, though not remarkably brisk, is yet sufficient to give the city something of its appearance in the early days of the Rebellion. Recruiting parties patrol the streets and the air resounds with the fife and drum of old.”\textsuperscript{43}

Once again, however, competition ruled the hour. In addition to the City Bounty Fund, Philadelphia recruiters offered regimental bounties to attract volunteers. Many of the new regiments received support from wealthy individuals or financial institutions. One of those well-known financial institutions that rose to the occasion was the Corn Exchange Bank, which had passed a set of pro-administration resolutions back in April 1861. The Corn Exchange’s executive committee proposed to supply recruits with a sizable bounty as a token of appreciation for enlisting. Also, they wished to provide recruits with rubber blankets and other equipage necessary to sustain camp life before their regiment went to the front. Finally, any needy wives or relatives of enlistees who took the Corn Exchange bounty could ask for relief from the Exchange’s executive committee and receive a generous sum. John Smith, who enlisted in the “Corn Exchange Regiment” in early August, believed that none of this would have been possible had not the “shock of Gaines Mill and Mechanicsville” and the subsequent casualty reports stirred the population to frantic action. Smith later wrote, “An anxious people viewed the

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 4, 5, 6, and 7 August 1862.
\textsuperscript{43} Philadelphia Inquirer, 2 August 1862.
situation with alarm. The Government, stirred to renewed activities, called again upon the gallant North to recuperate the depleted ranks of her sorely pressed soldiers. Disaster had not abated enthusiasm, nor failure diminished zeal. Emergencies are the opportunities of heroes, and the patriotic freemen of the North, the East and the West again promptly responded with their sturdy volunteers. It was this condition of public sentiment that gave birth to the 118th Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{44}

Twenty-one heads of the Philadelphia Corn Exchange met on July 24 and passed a resolution offering bounties of $160.00 per recruit to Colonel Charles M. Prevost’s regiment, the 118\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania, provided that members of the Corn Exchange retained the authority to approve all of Prevost’s officers. Other Philadelphia organizations followed the Corn Exchange’s example. Colonel Peter C. Ellmaker’s regiment, the 119\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania, largely drawn from members of the old “Gray Reserves”—the 1\textsuperscript{st} Regiment, Philadelphia Reserve Militia—received munificent aid from a committee of thirteen patriotic citizens and could thus offer each recruit a $162.00 bounty. Colonel Chapman Biddle—lawyer, grandson of a famous revolutionary, and an officer in the 23\textsuperscript{rd} Philadelphia Light Infantry—raised a regiment eventually designated the 121\textsuperscript{st} Pennsylvania. Supported by wealthy members of the Democratic Party, Biddle’s regiment filled swiftly. According to the \textit{Philadelphia Inquirer}, “the bounties are large, and the regiment is being raised under the auspices of a number of influential gentlemen.”\textsuperscript{45}

In New York City, federalism and pluralism combined to create more needless competition. As Spinola’s Empire Brigade and the governor’s Senatorial Committees began the arduous task of raising men and money, two more competitors vied for recruits. On July 8,

\textsuperscript{44} John L. Smith, \textit{History of the 118\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania Volunteers, Corn Exchange Regiment, from their First Engagement at Antietam to Appomattox} (Philadelphia: J. L. Smith, 1905), 2-6.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Philadelphia Inquirer}, 5-6 August 1862.
Superintendent of the Board of Police John A. Kennedy ordered Police Captain Charles S. Turnbull, a member of the 7th N.Y.S.M., to open a recruiting station at Gouvernor Street Market to raise the “Metropolitan Guard,” a regiment funded by the Board of Police. Also, in fits and starts, furloughed officers from veteran two-year and three-year regiments began arriving in the city to establish recruiting stations to refill the ranks of units in the field. By the end of July, forty-nine separate recruiting stations actively sought volunteers. The *Herald* noted that although “war mania” was again “on the increase . . . it requires a little extra exertion on the part of the recruiting officers in order to fill up their ranks immediately to the requisite number.”46

Partisanship impeded the progress of New York City’s Senatorial regiments because Democrats feared the Republican administration in Albany had hatched this organizing scheme as a means to control officer appointments. When the Senatorial District Committees met to determine methods of raising new regiments, Democratic members believed they should disregard Morgan’s orders and just fill the old regiments. A member of the Fifth Senatorial Committee saw no reason to create new regiments “unless it was the object to create new officers.” New York City Democrats believed that cronyism existed between Morgan and the Republican committee members. This, in turn, sparked lively debates in the Fifth District’s Democratic wards. Eventually, at the insistence of the Fifth Senatorial Committee’s Chair, Senator Charles G. Connell, the members agreed to Morgan’s request and they commenced raising a new regiment, choosing Elias Peissner, a military instructor from Union College, to serve as the Fifth Senatorial Regiment’s colonel.47

Presumably, Governor Morgan formed the senatorial committees to cultivate

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46 *New York Herald*, 14 and 22 July 1862.
47 Ibid., 19 July 1862.
nonpartisanship, but Democrats viewed them with suspicion. Veteran Democratic officers derided them as tools of the Albany Military Board. When ten furloughed officers returned to New York City in July, they proposed to raise a new regiment and elect their colonel from among their number. This would-be-colonel reported to Albany to receive his commission, but the Military Board rejected him because he had not been approved by a senatorial committee. The ten officers angrily protested, “we are only soldiers; not politicians. We might, perhaps, join regiments in the field, but we have an idea (perhaps a foolish one) of all being together.”

Democratic officers from the Army of the Potomac viewed New York State’s effort to create new regiments as an undisguised attempt to fill the army’s ranks with Republican officers. In late July, Democratic officers began returning to New York City pleading for volunteers to fill the ranks of the veteran commands. On July 25, Brigadier General Thomas F. Meagher of the Irish Brigade spoke at the 7th N.Y.S.M. Armory, asking a crowd of Irishmen to join his brigade. “I ask for recruits . . . and I ask for them alone,” he declared, “We don’t want any more officers. We have enough of them in the Army of the Potomac. . . . Never mind new regiments until the old ones, that have proved their mettle and baptized their colors, shall have been sufficiently recruited.” Meagher reported that he needed at least 1,000 men to fill the ranks of New York City’s Irish regiments to a minimum of 750 men each; 2,000 to fill them to full strength.

True to form, Meagher appealed to Irish nationalism to lure recruits. The Friends of the Irish Brigade Committee adorned Meagher’s speaker’s platform with a sunburst of Erin, and while Meagher spoke, a band played “Exile of Erin,” “Garry Owen,” and “The Star Spangled Banner.” Meagher’s forceful entreaties met an enthusiastic response. The crowd cheered him as

\[48\] Ibid., 30 July 1862.
he regaled them with tales of the Battle of Fair Oaks. Near the end of his address, he stated, “Come, my countrymen, fling yourselves with a generous passion into the armed lines over which waves, with achieved and admitted honor, the flag that was once borne in wrath and triumph by O’Neill beyond the mountains and the fords of Ulster against the stateliest and most stalwart foes of the Irish race.”

Colonel Robert Nugent, commander of the battle-tested 69th New York, similarly blended Irish nationalism with the need to fill veteran regiments. He supported Meagher’s contention in a public letter addressed from Harrison’s Landing:

Camp and fatigue duty is such that every man of the brigade is more or less constantly employed; whereas, if there were more hands to do the work it would be much lighter for all... My past experience has convinced me that the Irish soldier, fighting in a national organization, and with all the stimulus and pride of race and national confidence, is as near invincibility as any man can well be. I trust, therefore, that those patriotic men who are laboring to raise soldiers for the defense of our government and laws will see the necessity of devoting their attention to the old regiments already in the field, and that while entirely new regiments should not be neglected, we should employ their earliest and most earnest efforts.

Other Democratic officers descended on New York City with like-minded purpose. Major General Ambrose Burnside—“the hero of North Carolina”—arrived on July 29 and delivered a short statement to a crowd: “This is the best advice I have to you—fill up the old regiments.” Brigadier General Daniel Sickles returned and delivered a speech to New York City firemen at the 7th N.Y.S.M. Armory, asking them to fill the ranks of the “2nd Fire Zouaves” (73rd New York Infantry). Sickles described the 2nd Fire Zouaves’ military successes at Williamsburg and Fair Oaks in alluring detail, entreating urban firemen to come forward. “I am sick and tired of these bounties,” he said, “and, as I have told you before, I have no respect for the man who holds back for these bounties.” Well aware that firemen had been agitating for an occupational

49 Ibid., 26 July 1862.
50 Ibid., 30 July 1862.
exemption clause to be added to the state militia law, Sickles made it clear that they should not drag their heels at this hour. He said:

I want volunteers (cheers) and if the Fire Department of New York do not appreciate sufficiently the honor of sustaining its noble Second Regiment now in the field—if it has not the chivalry, the manliness, the patriotism and brotherly affection to sustain your comrades, and to maintain the regiment in its high character and standing, neither the President, nor the government, nor the corporation can offer you inducements strong enough to do it. I appeal to you as firemen, as New Yorkers, as American citizens, whether native born or adopted (cheers). I appeal to you as men devoted to the country.

At this point, two men jumped on stage and embraced Sickles, pledging to enlist then and there. During his speech, Sickles recruited five men. Twenty more signed up the next day.51

Agitation from the veterans compelled New York City residents to fill old regiments whenever they could. Once it completed its first new regiment, the Sixth Senatorial Committee published a resolution listing reasons why recruits should not join any more new regiments. They argued that recruits “will learn more in one month in an old regiment than they will learn in four or six months in a new regiment.” They also believed that new recruits would escape diseases, because old regiments were more sanitary. They assumed that the mortality rate would be lower in old regiments, and they stated that new soldiers could share in the veterans’ glory. To further propel recruits into old regiments, Colonel William Bliss opened an office at 744 Broadway, festooning it with flowers, flags, patriotic drapery, and a large photograph of George McClellan.52

When recruits enlisted, Bliss allowed them to select their preferred regiment. Various factors—glory, safety, experience, commanders, and theater of war—influenced volunteers’ choices. Edward King Wightman, a bookkeeper educated at the New York Free Academy,

52 New York Herald, 30 July and 1 August 1862.
enlisted in a veteran regiment on August 30. He chose “Hawkins’s Zouaves,” officially the 9th New York Infantry. In a letter to his mother and sisters he stated, “This regiment was selected, 1st because it will take me at once where I can be useful; 2nd because its reputation and courage, based on actual test, assures me against being disgraced; 3rd because the class of men comprising it is much better than the average.” Wightman also explained why he enlisted now and not earlier in the war: “At the outbreak of the war my first impulse was to join the army, but a thousand obstacles interposed, not the least of which, aside from all family ties, were business engagements from which I could not honorably retire.” Echoing thoughts considered by thousands of other patriotic New Yorkers, Wightman stated what he thought had changed since 1861. He wrote, “But from the first I have determined to step forward if others should pause. They have paused, and I have accordingly entered the ranks—not rashly nor with the spirit of adventure, but with a cool head and under a strong sense of duty. No action of my life has been so well considered and so deliberately taken.”

Democratic protest against the recruitment of new regiments forced Mayor Opdyke to send a delegation from the Joint Committee on the War to Albany. The delegation left on July 26 under orders to pressure Morgan into assisting the old regiments with a special executive order. Morgan met the delegation cheerfully, but he declared that he had no right to interfere. However, he promised to agitate for higher bounties to new recruits for veteran regiments. Two days later, Opdyke sent another delegation from the Committee of the Common Council to Washington to urge higher federal bounties for old regiments.

54 New York Herald, 28 and 29 July 1862.
The cities displayed many of the same troubles that plagued them the previous summer. In Philadelphia, most obviously, twelve new regimental organizations commenced recruiting, although Curtin had asked for only five. William W. Harding, the editor of the *Inquirer*, foresaw a repeat performance of the sluggish mobilization of 1861. He wrote, “These [organizations] are all competing with each other. How badly this method worked in the past we all very well know. Last summer and fall we had half filled regiments lingering about the city or in their camps for half a year because of this absurd competition. Experience should guard against such a blunder.”

Partisan conflict marred the mobilization of Philadelphia’s 1862 regiments just as it had done a year earlier. Dissatisfied Republicans often complained or agitated, hoping to capture higher ranks through the intervention of their governor. As a result, Democratic-controlled regiments stood out as the focal points of these partisan conflicts. The 68th Pennsylvania, a new regiment, proved to be especially riddled with these types of altercations; promotions and officer appointments in this regiment came from undisguised political loyalties and familial connections. When the 68th Pennsylvania organized in August 1862, Captain George W. McLearn promised to recommend Republican Francis L. Morgan for a lieutenancy if he brought his recruits to the Scott Legion’s headquarters and joined Company D. After some consideration, Morgan assented to the request, but when the time came for the election of officers, the members of the Scott Legion controlled the final vote, and since Morgan had never been a Legion member, they refused to grant him a lieutenancy. Captain McLearn apologized to Morgan for not fulfilling his promise, but arranged it so that the enlisted men of Company D elected him to a position as orderly sergeant, the company’s highest-ranking non-commissioned officer.

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55 *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 26 July 1862.
Later, when Company D’s second lieutenant resigned shortly after the regiment moved to Washington, Fifth Sergeant Andrew Black, the lowest-ranking non-commissioned officer in the company, inexplicably received the lieutenancy. The announcement of his promotion during dress parade shocked the command, and all of Company D’s soldiers stared incredulously at Black. Understandably, Sergeant Morgan became angry. He immediately blamed this injustice on the unabashed favoritism displayed by the 68th Pennsylvania’s officer corps. Morgan complained to his father, “There is an old and true saying that ‘Kissing goes by favours.’ So it is in this regiment. There is too much partiality shown by some of the officers in this command.” Sergeant Morgan noted that Sergeant Black could always be found, along with another Democratic corporal, eating and sleeping in the company officers’ tents “concoct[ing] whatever scheme will answer their own purposes.” When Morgan attempted to linger around Captain McLearn’s tent to learn more information, he was “ordered out by the other officers and told that I had no business in it.” Morgan’s father, William H. Morgan, Jr., of 506 Arch Street, who later complained on his son’s behalf, noted that Sergeant Black was brother-in-law to the 68th Pennsylvania’s Lieutenant Colonel Anthony H. Reynolds, “a Hot Democrat & thus it is that they carry even politics in the way of promotion as the Regt. is commanded by Democrats & any one who is opposed to them in politics has no chance of doing or saying anything. It should not be so, but thus it is.”

This rampant favoritism for the Philadelphia Democrats in the 68th Pennsylvania induced Sergeant Morgan to complain to his father, instructing him to write to his friend, Republican Representative Joseph Moore, and ask him to appeal to Governor Curtin on his behalf so he

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56 William H. Morgan, Jr. to Joseph Moore, 10 February 1863; Francis L. Morgan to William H. Morgan, Jr., 29 January 1863; Andrew H. Tippen to Eli Slifer, 1 February 1863; Joseph Moore to Colonel Roberts, 6 February 1863, PSA.
could secure a lieutenancy.\textsuperscript{57} Although Curtin could have wielded his power as commander-in-chief of Pennsylvania’s militia to appoint or remove officers at will, he did nothing to alter the promotions in the 68\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania. Curtin well understood that the Democratic Party controlled the Scott Legion Regiment, and if he interfered on the behalf of his Republican constituents, he risked upsetting the majority of the regiment. Surely, the mutiny of the Democratic members of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Pennsylvania Reserve Infantry still lingered with him.

Actually, Curtin found it distressing to mediate conflicts within these new urban regiments. Many of Philadelphia’s new regiments had strong Democratic Party backers. This proved to be especially true in the case of the 116\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania, the new all-Irish regiment begun by Dennis Heenan. The 116\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania took a considerable time to fill. By late August, it had not reached full strength. To make matters worse, the two leading organizers of the regiment, Colonel Heenan and Captain Nathaniel R. Harris, had grown to despise each other. Once their feud reached a boiling point, city officials called upon Curtin to arbitrate the dispute.

A combination of personal and political quarrels caused both Harris and Heenan to order the arrest of the other; both demanded the rescinding of the other’s commission.\textsuperscript{58} When word of

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{58} Sometime in July, Heenan promised Harris the lieutenant colonelcy of the 116\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania, provided that Harris raised a company for it. Harris’s Company H began filling in early August, but, for some unknown reason, Heenan attempted to interfere with its progress. Heenan appointed a second lieutenant to the company who grated on Harris’s nerves. After constant bickering, Harris and the subaltern parted ways. In a display of dramas, the second lieutenant cut off his own shoulder straps in disgust and refused to serve under Harris any longer. According to Harris, the second lieutenant “used Traitorous Language against this government,” for which Harris had him arrested and sent to Washington under guard. When Heenan learned of this, he attempted to seize control of Harris’s company, prompting Harris to have Heenan arrested by a U.S. marshal. Heenan begged for release, which Harris graciously granted, but on Heenan’s honor that he would not again interfere with his company. Heenan, however, retaliated by placing Harris under arrest, claiming that Harris was guilty of “bad conduct.” Suffice it to say, Heenan retracted Harris’s unofficial rank of lieutenant colonel and then sought out the mustering officer, Colonel Charles Ruff, to remove Harris’s official commission as captain. After receiving an angry letter from Harris, Curtin asked Ruff for information concerning this heated dispute. Ruff had little knowledge of the incident, claiming to have never seen Captain Harris before the incident occurred. Ruff replied, “There had been some difficulty between Capt.
the altercation spread around Philadelphia, supporters of the two men sent letters to Curtin asking him to pick a side. Interestingly, Republican Mayor Alexander Henry rallied to support the well-known Democrat, Heenan. Henry wrote:

Col. Heenan commenced recruiting for his Regiment about the middle of June—and has at this date 725 mustered in and 100 additional enlisted. He has devoted his efforts time and means freely and unsparingly to accomplish his purpose of returning to the war—I believe that he possesses the confidence and attachment of his officers and men—Of his military attainments I can express no opinion, having neither the opportunity or knowledge that are needed to form any judgment thereof—but as the Lt. Col. of the 24th Regiment P.V. during the three months service—he is reputed to have been efficient and fully competent. I am confident that his retention as Colonel of the Regiment would give general satisfaction and I am very sure that it would be well merited on his part.

Harris, however, had his own devotees. One of Curtin’s friends insisted that Harris was “an intelligent officer, a true soldier, and a good patriot.” This colleague demanded that the governor write an order mustering Harris as lieutenant colonel. He continued, “I tell you that as a true friend of yours if not incompatible with your Duty, grant the order.” Republican state senator Jeremiah Nichols also wrote to Curtin stating, “I think he [Harris] has been badly used. Knowing you will right any wrong that has been done him.”

Curtin eventually sided with Heenan, for he was well-known to the citizens of Philadelphia and expected to draw many Irish-American recruits, and he ousted Harris from his company. Of course, Curtin’s decision did not suit everyone in the 116th Pennsylvania, nor did it help the regiment fill quickly. Apparently, Heenan exaggerated many of his reports, incorrectly indicating that he had filled his companies to a minimum standard. After the regiment left for

Harris and the Col. of the 116th Regt. of the exact nature of which I am not informed, terminating in a written protest by Col. Heenan against the muster of Harris, & this I think prior to the time when Harris had sufficient number of men on his roll to entitle him to be mustered into service.”
Washington on September 1, forty-six out of only fifty-two enlisted men in Company I sent a protest to Governor Curtin reading, “Our so-called Regt. is not over 400 strong & if some means are not shortly adopted to relieve us from our miserable situation there will be a still greater reduction. The men will not fight under the present Col. as he is deficient in every quality requisite for his position & this is the general opinion of all with whom he is connected.”59

When undertaking the project of filling the veteran regiments, Philadelphia struggled greatly. A needlessly complex system hampered their recruitment. Governor Curtin had to appoint new officers to fill positions vacated by combat casualties and disease. This was a difficult challenge for the overworked governor because obvious replacements did not always reveal themselves. A year’s worth of service had given Philadelphia’s officer corps a chance to work with each other on a professional level, and, predictably, gave them an equal chance to despise each other.

One of the bitterest struggles occurred over the colonelcy of the 95th Pennsylvania, a regiment that fought its first major combat on June 27, 1862, at Gaines’ Mill, Virginia. During this battle, the regiment lost 169 men, including its Colonel John M. Gosline and Major William B. Hubbs, both mortally wounded. Command of the regiment fell upon the shoulders of twenty-three-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Gustavus W. Town, the unit’s second-in-command, who seemed the obvious successor Colonel Gosline. Unfortunately, being a Republican, Town had not earned the respect of his brigade commander, Brigadier General John Newton, nor of his corps commander, Major General William B. Franklin. Both generals were devoted Democrats.

59 Nathaniel R. Harris to Andrew Curtin, 25 August 1862; Charles Ruff to Andrew Curtin, 26 August 1862; Alexander Henry to Andrew Curtin, 20 August 1862; D. Blair to Andrew Curtin, 25 August 1862; Jeremiah Nichols to Andrew Curtin, 25 August 1862; Enlisted men of Company I, 116th Pennsylvania, to Andrew Curtin, 15 September 1862, PSA.
Although partisan politics undoubtedly influenced their decisions, both Newton and Franklin lobbied to deny Town the colonelcy of the 95th Pennsylvania based on his age. Franklin wrote to Governor Curtin, stating, “Col. Town is entirely too young and inexperienced to take care of the regiment under the difficult circumstances that now surround us.” Franklin recommended that Curtin fill the 95th Pennsylvania’s colonelcy with loyal Democrat John Baillie McIntosh, a thirty-three-year-old second lieutenant in the 5th U.S. Cavalry Regiment. Even Major General George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, interested himself in this case, endorsing Franklin’s and Newton’s statements, stating that he “would regard it as my gift to the 95th to have McIntosh made its colonel.”

When word of the Democratic conspiracy to unseat Town reached Philadelphia, the city’s Republican state representatives and state senators wrote to Governor Curtin, warning him not to let this injustice continue. Republican soldiers from the 95th Pennsylvania also sent letters to Curtin’s office, as did other officers in Newton’s brigade. Finally, Curtin received a letter from his state treasurer, Philadelphia Republican Henry Dunning Moore, demanding that Town be commissioned colonel.

60 William B. Franklin to Andrew Curtin, 16 July 1862; John Newton to Andrew Curtin, 16 July 1862, PSA.
61 George McClellan to Andrew Curtin, 16 July 1862, PSA.
62 Gustavus Town to Andrew Russell, 14 July 1862; Officers of the 95th Pennsylvania Infantry to Andrew Curtin, 18 July 1862. The officers included six captains, nine first lieutenants, five second lieutenants, one surgeon, and one assistant surgeon; Officers of the 18th, 31st, and 32nd New York Infantries, undated; Abel Thomas to Henry Moore, 22 July 1862; see also Thomas Noble to Jeremiah Nichols, 15 July 1862; Jeremiah Nichols, to Andrew Curtin, undated; Joseph Moore, Jr. to Andrew Curtin, 23 July 1862, PSA. Town learned of the plot hatched by the Democratic army officers to supplant him. He wrote to Curtin, declaring the scheme against him was an undisguised attempt by Major General Franklin to place a friend into a higher position. Town warned that if Curtin caved in to this pressure he would bring the 95th Pennsylvania to total and permanent disruption. Town ominously predicted that “the dissatisfaction produced would tend to much disorganize what has been considered one of the finest and best disciplined Regiments from Penna., or in the service.” It did not take long for Town’s warnings to appear true. Curtin read many angry letters that came to his adjutant general’s office. First, eighteen line officers of the 95th Pennsylvania sent a petition endorsing Town’s leadership. Next, forty-two officers in three New York regiments in Newton’s brigade sent a similar petition, reading, “We have been associated with him [Town] for eight months,
The Philadelphia Inquirer, a Republican Party organ, reported the incident, stating that, “Considerable dissatisfaction exists among the officers of the Ninety-Fifth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers (late Colonel Gosline’s), in consequence of a rumor that Governor Curtin intends appointing officers to the command not at present connected with the regiment. . . . The appointment of any other person to the command of the regiment would be greatly detrimental to its interests.”63 Luckily, Curtin did not have to make a decision in this case or risk angering the interested parties. After McIntosh read the article in the Inquirer, he realized that the soldiers of the 95th Pennsylvania would not welcome him as their new commander. He subsequently withdrew his nomination.64

Once Philadelphia’s soldiers, citizens, and politicians muddled through prickly altercations over officers’ promotions, the Quaker City next had to focus on raising men to fill the vacancies in the enlisted ranks. Old regiments recruited through elaborate means. Typically, Governor Curtin asked permission from the War Department to detach veteran officers for recruiting duty. Once accomplished, he then selected officers for that purpose. Naturally, his decisions sometimes provoked anger and resentment from other officers, but Curtin usually took

have seen him in all the varying scenes of a soldier’s life, and bear willing tribute to the commendable manner in which he conducted himself in all of them.” Then, the 95th Pennsylvania’s enlisted men went into election to vote for their new commander, unanimously approving Town. Almost immediately, the soldiers began writing to local Republican politicians, including Pennsylvania State Treasurer Henry Dunning Moore, State Senator Jeremiah Nichols, and State Representative Joseph Moore, Jr., asking them to place pressure on Curtin to influence the promotion. Private Abel Thomas of Company C complained to Treasurer Moore, “I have . . . learned that efforts are being made by certain politicians to set at naught the choice of the Regiment and put in an ‘outsider’ as Colonel. I am not a politician, and can only express my hope that you will use your influence with our worthy Governor to confirm the election of the Regt. Surely it is both wise and just to encourage regular promotions in the Army of the Republic, especially when approved by our brave soldiers.” After Representative Moore received letters from several soldiers in the 95th Pennsylvania, he scratched off a note to Curtin expressing disgust that Curtin would dare to place politics above courage and military leadership. Moore subtly chastised Curtin, stating, “I have heard from a number of my friends in the 95 Regt. that it is your intention to appoint a Lieut. of the 5th Regular Cavalry Col. of that (95) Regt., against the unanimous wish of the whole Regt. to have the gallant Lieut. Col. Town of the Regt. receive, as he ought, the command. I know you will not do such an act of injustice.”

63 Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 July 1862.
64 John McIntosh to Andrew Curtin, 24 July 1862, PSA.
his cues from the recommendations of regimental commanders. Once he selected the recruiting
detail—usually consisting of two line officers and one private—they were immediately
furloughed and paid $4.00 per month for advertising purposes and $8.00 per month for rent of
their recruiting office. Although they continued to receive regular pay from the federal
government—provided they could find a U.S. Army paymaster in Philadelphia—recruiting
details had precious little cash on which to subsist. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* noted, “These
officers have no other means at their disposal, except contributions from private purses to obtain
recruits, and they are entirely unable to compete with the superior advantages offered by those
recruiting for new regiments.”\(^{65}\)

Naturally, the veteran recruiters could not compete against the lucrative bounties offered
by the new regiments. By late August, twenty-six veteran regiments erected recruiting stations in
the city, but all fared poorly. Because of dismal numbers, city and Commonwealth officials took
steps to aid them. Mayor Henry made a public declaration reprinted in various newspapers:

> Men are imperatively needed. The wasted ranks of our glorious regiments—the heroes of
Drainesville, Winchester, Fair Oaks, of the Chickahominy, Malvern Hill, and Cedar Mountain
MUST BE REINFORCED. Our Country calls for succor as she never called before. The crisis is
upon us and we should be equal to it. Generals of Brigades, of Divisions, and the Commander-in-
Chief all declare that one recruit for a regiment in the field is worth to his country, at the present
time, several new organizations. They urge, and the War Department urge the instantaneous
reinforcement of the brave regiments now before the enemy to their original full fighting
complement. Our fathers, our brothers, and our sons say ‘COME AND JOIN US.’\(^{66}\)

On August 28, Curtin ordered all new regiments to cease recruiting. Any incomplete
regiments proceeded to Camp Curtin for consolidation. This controversial order disbanded four

\(^{65}\) *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 5 August 1862.
\(^{66}\) Ibid., 21 August 1862.
incomplete regiments—those at the time called the 120th, 144th, 145th, and 146th Pennsylvania
Infantries—and forced Curtin to mollify four furious ex-colonels.67

The process of paying bounties to the urban volunteers fell short of success. By late July,
New York City recruits discovered that recruiting officers could not pay the entire state bounty.
State regulations allowed recruiters to pay $25.00 up front and hold the other $25.00 until the
regiment mustered in. Recruiting officers faced financial dilemmas too; many had to spend $6.00
per man without reimbursement to raise their companies. In mid-July, a band of officers from
Spinola’s Empire Brigade met at 41 Astor Lane to draft a resolution asking the Military Board to
authorize the full payment of state bounties. This, the officers argued, would “place in the hands
of volunteers sufficient available funds to enable them to leave their families.”68 A reporter for
the Herald believed that delays in the payment of bounties “greatly retard[ed] the process of
enlisting, and recruiting officers are becoming quite disheartened. . . . Several officers, it appears,
have abandoned their efforts at recruiting as a hopeless cause.”69

To meet the crisis, local organizations tried to sustain recruiting officers by providing
extra bounties. On July 21, the Ninth Ward formed a committee to raise bounties for old
regiments, urging every Ninth Ward citizen to “make this a personal matter.” Private and public
charity managed to raise regimental bounties for the “Phoenix Regiment” (164th New York
Infantry) at $50.00 per recruit. On August 6, the Police Commissioners, pleased with the success
of the “Metropolitan Guard” (131st New York Infantry), vowed to raise a second regiment, the
“2nd Metropolitan” (133rd New York Infantry) to be filled with policemen. If any police officer

67 The “145th Pennsylvania” mentioned here does not refer to the three-year regiment of the same designation
recruited in northwest Pennsylvania.
68 New York Herald, 20 July 1862.
69 Ibid., 25 July 1862.
refused to volunteer, each month they had to donate a portion of their paycheck to the regiment’s recruitment fund. Monthly contributions usually reached $25,000.\textsuperscript{70}

Still, some city regiments complained that they never received aid. Colonel P. J. Claassen, commander of the “2\textsuperscript{nd} Empire Regiment” (132\textsuperscript{nd} New York Infantry), angrily noted that no one offered his men private bounties. “Why is this?” he asked. “Is not one regularly recognized organization as good as another?” Claassen argued that a central committee should be held responsible for the distribution of military funds, and he further vowed not to accept any aid unless it came from a central committee.\textsuperscript{71} Officers in the Fifth Senatorial Regiment (119\textsuperscript{th} New York Infantry) complained that “few [recruits] (comparatively speaking) have been added to our ranks by the funds or influence of the Committee of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Senatorial District,” even though raising funds was supposed to be a senatorial committee’s primary task. The Fifth Senatorial Committee adhered to its task of placing officers, but when they tried to appoint a lieutenant colonel and adjutant to the regiment, twelve company officers protested. Because the committee had not offered the recruiters any guidance, the 119\textsuperscript{th} New York had become a German regiment, so about 800 of the regiment’s 944 soldiers did not speak English. The appointment of American-born field officers, the company officers argued, “will result disastrously to the Regiment and the Service.”\textsuperscript{72}

On July 21, the Board of Alderman passed an appropriation to fund a city bounty of $50.00 per recruit. Opdyke approved the measure and ordered the Union Defense Committee to

\textsuperscript{70} New York Herald, 8 August 1862; New York Tribune, 22 July and 21 August 1862. Police Captains donated $20.00, sergeants donated $15.00, patrolmen donated $10.00, doormen donated $8.00, and the president donated $500.00.
\textsuperscript{71} New York Herald, 16 August 1862.
\textsuperscript{72} Twelve officers to Franz Sigel, 23 September 1862, NYSA.
resume payment of relief funds to families of volunteers. He declared, “[T]he moral effect of such promptitude, as well as the material aid, will ensure the speedy suppression of this rebellion.” Defense Committee agents began disbursing funds on the last week of July, but like the previous summer, chaos and criminality marred these efforts. Upon witnessing the distribution of aid to the Sixth and Seventh Wards at City Hall Park, one reporter remarked, “It was a pitiable, and in some cases, comical sight to see the various devices which were being used by the applicants to obtain relief.” One woman borrowed a boy from a neighbor to claim him as a dependent. When agents questioned the lad, he truthfully told them that the woman was not his mother, and she received no aid from the Fourth Ward office. Undaunted, the dishonest woman went to City Hall Park to receive money from the Seventh Ward paymaster, but the officer recognized the scam and turned her away. Another woman named Davis claimed to be Mrs. Murray, wife of James Murray of the 9th New York. Agents eventually discovered that James Murray had died at the Battle of South Mills, North Carolina. A reporter for the Tribune wrote, “Every species of duplicity has been practiced by the women about this city to obtain the amount ordered to be paid by the Common Council.”

Competition among new regiments grew fierce. The Metropolitan police gained a reputation for having the most cutthroat recruiters. Not only did they offer the highest bounties in the city, but they thoroughly canvassed the wards, coercing recruits or monetary donations. The Tribune remarked, “The facilities for recruiting are such as are enjoyed by no other organization. Every Station-House in the city is a recruiting office; the 1,800-2,000 members of the department are recruiting officers of a class superior to many of those engaged in the service.” However, the Metropolitan police perpetrated a host of unscrupulous measures. On July 31, Superintendent

Kennedy authorized his policemen to arrest veteran recruiting officers—ostensibly those whose furloughs had expired—promising a $5.00 reward for each arrest. In seven days, patrolmen arrested sixty recruiting officers and sent them to the front. Seven days later, they arrested another one hundred.74

Perhaps the most notorious affair occurred on July 28, when a squad of thirty-two Thirteenth Ward policemen armed with clubs abducted thirty-two recruits from Colonel Francis X. Braulik’s “3rd Empire Regiment” (163rd New York Infantry). The affair occurred when a vengeful officer, Captain George Nise, approached Superintendent Kennedy, telling him where patrolmen might find a batch of Empire Brigade soldiers. At 6:00 A.M., the policemen barged into the 3rd Empire’s barracks at 75 Norfolk Street and clubbed the sleeping recruits out into the street, leaving behind only a stunned German captain. The police took the Empire Brigade volunteers and all their equipment to the Metropolitan Brigade’s encampment on Riker’s Island. When General Spinola learned about this, he sent his adjutant to Kennedy’s office to demand the release of the kidnapped soldiers. Kennedy told the adjutant that he did not care for General Spinola one bit and said that he had Nise’s muster roll, and that was enough. One of the hijacked recruits, Private Edward Bochmann, who was too afraid to remain with the Metropolitan Regiment, ran the guard and began swimming to the city. He floated for about two hours until a fisherman picked him up and returned him to the 3rd Empire Regiment.75

Recruiting everywhere during the month of July progressed sluggishly. Boston, with its comparatively lower bounties, tried to raise its six new regiments—the 32nd through 37th Massachusetts Infantry Regiments—but by the end of the month all of them still required at least

74 New York Tribune, 22 July 1862.
75 New York Herald, 2, 3, 7, and 14 August 1862.
200 volunteers apiece. Soon, Governor Andrew approved three more regiments, the 38\textsuperscript{th}, 39\textsuperscript{th}, and 40\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts, hoping that these new regiments might acquire private sponsors with deep pockets. Bostonians filled the ranks of three companies in these regiments and portions of companies in the other six. The veteran recruiters in the city experienced even less success. By the end of the month, only 238 volunteers had joined veteran regiments.\footnote{Boston Daily Journal, 31 July 1862.}

In addition to fostering needless competition, urban bounties bred confusion and deceit. Although all four cities demonstrated problems of this nature, the city with the most benevolence experience, Philadelphia, faced the worst problems. On July 24, a group of concerned Philadelphians formed the Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee, a private organization pledged to offer bounties only to veteran regiments. Colonel Ruff, the city mustering officer, informed the committee that Philadelphia had approximately thirty regiments in the field with about 450 men each. They would have to provide enough money to fund 16,500 recruits. Two days later, the Committee collected $15,150.00 worth of subscriptions from donors including Mayor Henry, State Treasurer Moore, and District Attorney Mann. On August 4, the Committee decided that they could effectively disburse $50.00 to each recruit provided that they raised bounties for no more than 4,000 volunteers. Between July 28 and August 30, the Committee raised another $105,776.75.\footnote{Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Minutes, 24 July—30 August 1862, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP.}

The Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee did well in advertising subscriptions and boldly requested donations from large companies. After the Reading Railroad Company donated $25,000.00, the Committee asked the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for twice the amount, adding a pinch of guilt to their request, “As it cannot be denied the business of your road has
been much benefited by the extra business forced upon it by the disastrous situation of our Country.”

Subscribers represented a wide spectrum of Philadelphia society. For instance, on August 7 and 8, the Committee raised $32,180.00. The Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee faced a few serious challenges during the disbursement of its funds. Often, wily officers attempted to obtain bounties for their soldiers under questionable conditions. One case involved the recruitment of the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry. This unit had been raised in early 1862 as a single squadron under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Gallagher. Dubbed the “Irish Dragoons,” Gallagher’s men were supposed to attach to Brigadier General Thomas Meagher’s Irish Brigade, but upon arriving at Washington, they received arms as infantry. During the summer, Gallagher received permission from the War Department to re-arm his men as cavalry and continue recruiting in Philadelphia. One of his officers, Captain Nathaniel S. Sneyd, returned to the city in August to raise Company D. Because Sneyd maintained that the War Department authorized him to recruit for the “old battalion,” his men were entitled to the Citizens’ Bounty. Disbursing agent Michael V. Baker doubted this logic. Certainly, the two companies of the original squadron—A and B—were part of the “old unit,” but Sneyd’s men constituted a “new unit.”

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78 Michael V. Baker to President of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 27 August 1862, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP.
79 Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Minutes, 7-8 August 1862, and Cash Book, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP. Subscribers included the Philadelphia Savings and Fund Society ($5,000), the Human Hose Company Number Four ($100.00), Reverend James M. Wilson ($10.00), the employees of Schuykill Arsenal ($1,200.00), eight-year-old John S. T. Atlee ($1.00), Miss Maria Bretz ($50.00), the Phoenix Iron Company ($1,000), District Attorney William Mann ($200.00), the employees of William Mann ($50.00), William F. Cooper ($5.00), the Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Company ($2,500.00), and Annie, Julia, Unetta, Clara, and William, the daughters and son of William J. Carlin, Thirty-Fourth and Bridge Streets ($25.00). Later in the year, in an incredible display of efficiency, wards began forming smaller committees to collect donations, each sending their collection to the care of the Committee. Unquestionably, all levels of Philadelphia responded liberally. During 1862, the Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee collected $277,557.97 and by March 10, 1863, they had supplied bounties to 5,792 soldiers.
Upon investigation, disbursing agent Baker discovered that Captain Sneyd kept two copies of Company D’s muster roll, one of which indicated that his men had been mustered-in by Captain R. I. Dodge at Harrisburg as a new unit and the other by Colonel Charles Ruff at Philadelphia as a veteran unit. “There looks something out of order in it,” Baker wrote regarding the suspicious documents. Writing to Adjutant General Russell at Harrisburg, Baker requested information to clarify the confusing history of the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry. It seemed to Baker that Captain Sneyd, “considers I think he is working both under your authority and making up what he calls Company D in the old Battalion. Certainly, he cannot act well under both at the same time, his having his men mustered in here by Col Ruff and going to Harrisburg to be mustered in shows one to me as if there was some double game going on.”

Dishonest Philadelphians took advantage of the Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee in other ways. Some volunteers managed to secure bounties while hiding their physical deficiencies. Upon reaching their assigned regiment, surgeons discovered these defects and discharged them. When a disbursing agent discovered that a large number of Philadelphia recruits sent to the 74th Pennsylvania had defrauded the Committee this way, he demanded more strict attention paid by medical examiners in Philadelphia. At first, the Committee resolved not to pay bounties until their soldiers arrived at the front, but the possibility of sending disbursing agents to all of the scattered regiments was too Herculean a task. Additionally, soldiers’ families demanded bounties immediately, and disbursing agent Michael V. Baker noted, “Almost hourly I am called upon by a wife, mother, or some other interested in a recruit for payment of the

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80 Michael V. Baker to Andrew Russell, 28-29 August and 1 September 1862, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP.
bounty.” Starting in late August, the Committee began paying bounties at the disbursing office, but this, as it turned out, only opened the door to more fraud.81

Most seriously, the Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee had to worry about bounty jumpers—volunteers who enlisted, took the bounty, and deserted before reaching the front. Bounty jumping persisted because the complicated system used to get recruits to the front allowed room for exploitation. When a recruiting officer enrolled a soldier for a veteran regiment, he sent him with a detachment of new recruits—usually under the care of a sergeant—to the Committee’s disbursing office at 425 Chestnut Street. When the detachment arrived, the disbursing agent doled out the Citizens’ bounty of $50.00. Next, the sergeant escorted the recruits to a barracks near the train depot. Once there, the recruits waited until the mustering officer arrived to administer the Oath of Allegiance and pay the $25.00 U.S. bounty. The barracks’ commander guarded them in the meantime and then placed them on an appropriate train to take them to their regiments.

Naturally, this elaborate system allowed deceitful men to take the money and run. A recruit could desert at four different places: as he traveled from the Citizens’ Bounty Fund disbursing office to the barracks, while he was kept under guard at the barracks, while on the train that took him to the front, or as soon as he arrived at the front. Of these, the trek from the disbursing office to the barracks proved the most tempting moment because that was when the bounty jumper had his largest sum, $50.00. Throughout September, bounty jumping steadily increased. Between September 24 and September 29, twenty-five men deserted after leaving the disbursing office.

81 Michael V. Baker to John A. Smull, 21 August 1862; Michael V. Baker to F. Leidske, 23 and 27 August 1862, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP.
Michael V. Baker took notice of the corruption and attempted to stamp it out. Baker informed the mustering officer, Colonel Ruff, “I have found from examination the way we formerly paid the Bounty often times the $50 was worse than thrown away.” Baker uncovered the reality of the problem on September 25 after arriving at the barracks during a casual inspection of the recruits. Over the two previous days, Baker had sent sixty-three men to the barracks, all of whom he expected to see there. Upon arriving, he discovered that twenty men had never turned up, including all five he had sent for the 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry. This struck Baker as odd; so, when a sergeant brought six more recruits for the 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry that afternoon, Baker told him that he would not pay them until after they reached the barracks, and also not until after he spoke with Captain Christopher Kleintz, the 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry’s recruiting officer. Eventually, Baker sent an agent to pay the six recruits at the barracks, but at first, two men demurred from receiving the bounty. It struck Baker that the sergeants who escorted the recruits were complicit in the bounty jumping: “I think we have been the victims of much deception and I think it not improbable some of the Sergeants may have been connected with it. . . . Could there have been any understanding between them and the sergeants to let them off after they should receive their money and share proceeds?” Clearly, the sergeants had an arrangement to let the bounty jumpers go in exchange for a cut of the bounty.  

Baker discussed the situation with the Committee, who immediately resolved to suspend all bounty payments to any of Captain Kleintz’s men. Baker wrote to Ruff, “I have been much surprised at what I have considered the indifference of some of the recruiting officers in regard to their responsibilities as I should construe them, I should suppose a recruiting officer after he enlisted a recruit and taken him to you to receive the U.S. Bounty was in duty bound to see the

82 Michael V. Baker to Charles Ruff, 30 September 1862, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP.
said recruit delivered to the officer at the Barracks with a descriptive roll. . . . I have some business to settle with a few of the officers on what I consider culpable negligence as far as we are concerned.” Further, Baker discussed matters with the barracks commander, First Lieutenant Samuel Reihle, who remarked that it was just as well that bounty jumpers deserted in Philadelphia and not elsewhere, because they could be caught easily. Baker considered this a plausible assumption, but upon further contemplation, he decided that the situation indicated a monumental failure in the system. He remonstrated, “if they cheat us here and escape, they may put others on the same track to play the same trick.” Lieutenant Reihle suggested that the Citizens’ Bounty should always be paid at the barracks; however, this required Colonel Ruff to draft orders to keep recruits at the barracks after muster-in. This would necessarily delay some recruits’ departure to the front. What should happen to the out-of-towners, the rural Pennsylvanians and New Jerseyans who came to the city for the bounty who expected to leave immediately? Baker had no answer for this.83

These questions mattered little, because even if Baker discovered methods to prevent bounty jumpers from deserting in Philadelphia, unscrupulous men could still desert from the barracks, from the train, or immediately after they arrived at the front. On October 13, Baker received a concerned letter from Captain William Moore of the 73rd Pennsylvania, who informed him that of four recruits sent from Philadelphia, none had arrived at his camp. All of them, it seemed, had taken their federal bounty and de-trained. In early November, another officer complained to Baker that of thirteen men sent forward, only two arrived. Later, one barracks commander complained to Baker that he could not compel his recruits to stay inside until their train arrived. If his men wished to go out, this lieutenant demanded that they deposit most of

83 Michael V. Baker to Charles Ruff, 25 and 30 September 1862, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP.
their bounty money with him. He told Baker a disturbing story involving two recruits. The lieutenant demanded $225.00 each from the two men, both of whom had received $250.00 for their services. After the lieutenant made the demand, the two men suddenly did not wish to go out. Later that night, they ran the barracks’ guard and escaped.  

Concerns such as these prompted Baker to ask Secretary Stanton for a complete overhaul of the system. Baker declared bluntly, “I am inclined to think the enlistments for the old regiments is somewhat a failure. A great many I believe never reach the regiments they enlisted for and in many instances it is not only throwing away the money, but encouraging rascality.” Baker suggested that recruits not receive a single cent of their bounty—private, local, or federal—until they reached the front. Baker proposed an elaborate system by which recruiting officers, escorting sergeants, barracks officers, depot officers, railroad conductors, and regimental officers sign for recruits like packages to ensure that none escaped. Stanton’s response to Baker is unknown, but the secretary probably dismissed his plan. The implementation of such a system would have caused delays and decreased enlistments. Honest volunteers would not take kindly to being herded and signed-off like slaves.

By the end of September, the Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee had paid over 2,100 volunteers, a little more than half their goal. They continued recruiting well into November, but without military aid to prevent bounty jumping, they continued to face exploitation. Baker was more careful about disbursing the bounty funds, but he could do little to protect the U.S. bounty. By October 23, 628 Philadelphians had absconded with the federal bounty. In discussing the

84 Michael V. Baker to Edwin Stanton, 7 and 18 November 1862, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP.  
85 Michael V. Baker to Edwin Stanton, 15 October, 7 and 18 November 1862, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP.
matter of pilfered bounties with Baker, Adjutant General Andrew Russell declared succinctly: “There has been more trouble with the pieces of companies and regiments raising in Philada than with all the regiments raised elsewhere.” In many ways, he was not far from the truth.\textsuperscript{86} Scholars who have generally applauded the successes of northern benevolence might reevaluate their interpretation. Even those who experienced benevolence at the time saw how charity opened the door to fraud in a time of war.

Recruiting for the July call for “300,000 more” resulted in a repeat performance of the problematic concerns of 1861. Desperation, following on the heels of several unexpected defeats, induced a similarly wild craze of recruiting and regimental organizing. Now, however, additional complicating factors arose. Cities could not negotiate the perils of recruiting new regiments alongside popular veteran regiments. The cities’ officer corps had a high percentage of Democrats, who now chose this period to confront the machinations of Republican state executives who, by constitutional authority, had the power to appoint company and regimental officers. Both parties schemed and connived to deprive their opponents of promotion or recruiting authority. Finally, cities raised large bounties. At first, it seemed like local benevolence would support urban recruiting in a time of crisis, but maladministration led to criminality. Bounty jumpers took the charitable funds and disappeared into the cityscape. Local law enforcement revealed little success in tracking down these fugitives. Even after more than a year of mastering wartime, the cities of the Northeast had yet to prove that they could efficiently marshal their manpower and economic resources. The cities’ second year of failure ushered in a dreaded, experimental alternative to volunteer recruiting: conscription.

\textsuperscript{86} Michael V. Baker to Andrew Russell, 1 September 1862; Michael V. Baker to John Cassels, 30 September 1862; list of bounty jumpers, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP.
Chapter 7:
“Our Community Has Done Everything in its Power to Avoid the Draft”:
The State Drafts of 1862, August 1862—January 1863.

The continuing failures of urban mobilization produced considerable distress in the cities of the Northeast; however, few residents were unaware of the problems. The signs that confirmed a stalled mobilization became increasingly evident as the summer of 1862 reached its conclusion. Recruiting posters covering city walls were not removed, recruiting stations remained open longer hours, uniformed recruits roamed the city streets without jobs or income as they waited for their regiments to fill, factories buzzed with activity, and newspaper editors bemoaned the senseless competition.

For most urban residents, successful contribution to the war effort became a matter of pride. Would their city pass the test? Until August 1862, the cities had no benchmark to judge success. However, the state drafts of 1862 changed all that. If a city had to conscript to meet its quota, residents viewed it as a sign of their community’s failure. Thus, the threat of a draft fostered a new atmosphere of community activism. Now, the cities competed with each other to avoid the ignominy of conscription. Two of them—Boston and Baltimore—could not escape this dishonor. In September 1862, an additional test surfaced when the Army of Northern Virginia invaded Maryland. This new exigency required one city, Philadelphia, to raise emergency forces to repel the invaders.

As of early July 1862, the federal government possessed no legal means to conscript men into military service. No section of the U.S. Constitution delineated the precise method for raising federal armies. Although Democratic critics asserted their beliefs that drafting was a state privilege, Lincoln argued that the federal government possessed the authority to determine
proper procedure, and if that procedure happened to involve drafting, the states had no right to
disparage it. Later, in September 1863, when anti-draft sentiment began to soar, Lincoln told his
cabinet, “It is not a power to raise armies if State authorities consent; nor if the men to compose
the armies are entirely willing; but it is a power to raise and support armies given to congress by
the constitution, without an if.”¹ Radical Republicans in Congress would likely have agreed with
Lincoln in September 1863. By then, federal power stood firmly entrenched. However, in the
summer of 1862, while enduring the agony of defeat, the Republicans proved less willing to test
Lincoln’s philosophy. Nevertheless, Lincoln’s congressional supporters wanted more troops, and
thanks to overtures from several northern governors, they outlined legislation granting the
Commander-in-Chief greater control over state conscription. In mid-July, Massachusetts Senator
Henry Wilson proposed Senate Bill Number 394, commonly known as the “Militia Act,”
granting the President the right to demand conscription from the various states if they failed to
meet their quotas. Lincoln signed the Militia Bill into law on July 17, 1862. According to the
act’s various provisions, the execution of conscription still rested with the states, but the
President now had the authority to call a draft if he so desired.

Lincoln wasted little time putting the Militia Act into effect. By early August, it became
obvious that cities across the North were failing to meet his goal for “300,000 more” three-year
volunteers. Previously optimistic newspaper editors admitted that recruiting in New York City
had slowed to a crawl. James Bennett wrote, “There is no mincing the matter, however, that the
city is not doing its whole duty in furnishing volunteers, but the rural districts are fully alive with
the necessity of hurrying reinforcements into the field.”² Mayor Opdyke’s previously mentioned
dlegation to the War Department agitated for draft enactment. Although the men ostensibly had

¹ Abraham Lincoln, 14 September 1863, Basler, ed., Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 6, 446.
² New York Herald, 2 August 1862.
gone to Washington to agitate for higher bounties, when they spoke with Stanton and Lincoln, they suggested that Lincoln put the new act to use. While Lincoln seemed lukewarm to the idea, Stanton strongly endorsed the proposition, assuring the committee that he already considered this measure necessary to fill deficient regional quotas. Pleased with Stanton’s response, Opdyke’s committee left Washington and informed the newspapers about the coming proclamation. Four days later, now with the apparent consent of New York City’s mayor, Lincoln made a call for an additional 300,000 nine-month troops, directing governors to commence a draft in their states if they did not reach their quota by August 15. To complicate matters, the new call proposed to fill the preexisting deficiencies under the July call for three-year troops. Using complicated arithmetic, the War Department determined that four nine-month volunteers equaled one three-year volunteer. Thus, under the two combined calls, Stanton demanded the equivalent of 375,000 three-year men, but he accepted the mathematical equivalent in any combination of three-year and nine-month men. But, if a draft became necessary, the Militia Act obliged the states to draft their “militia”—their fencible population—for nine months, not three years.3

In theory, the Militia Act of 1862 did little to regulate state militia laws. If any state possessed a statute that allowed its governor to conscript men into federal service, the federal act granted him authority to exercise it. Boston, Baltimore, New York City, and Philadelphia all operated under preexisting state militia statutes similar to the provisions suggested by the federal act. Each of the four states—Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania—mandated universal enrollment of white male citizens ages eighteen to forty-five, granting exemptions based on occupation, mental stability, religious affiliation, and physical disability. New York State’s militia law, revised on April 23, 1862, allowed for a host of exemptions. These

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3 James Geary, *We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), 35.
included—but were not limited to—state officers, Shakers, Quakers, ministers, professors, teachers, wounded men, men with venereal or heart disease, aliens, lunatics, and alcoholics. The other state militia laws followed a similar rubric. Maryland’s law provided for a number of exemptions, mostly based on occupation, including clerks, postmasters, ferrymen, stage drivers, state officers, teachers, physicians, ministers, marines, and pilots. Physical disability, alienage, and conscientious objection could also warrant exemption. Pennsylvania’s 1858 militia law provided twenty-four avenues of exemption including “conscientious scruples,” physical disability, and employment in various occupations: telegraph operator, railroad engineer, custom house worker, postal employee, ferrymen, steam boat operator, minister of the gospel, college professor, and school director. Finally, each of the four state militia statutes granted drafted persons the option to purchase a substitute. This meant that any conscripted person could pay an un-drafted man a privately negotiated fee to serve in his place.

The militia laws of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York each possessed a lengthy list of exceptions, complicated details, and confusing jargon. Charles Fulton, a Baltimore newspaperman, declared that, on the whole, Maryland’s militia law stood in “such a confused state” that no reasonable person could accurately interpret it. New York’s recently revised militia law consisted of 320 intricate sections. For instance, in regards to a federal conscription, Sections 301 to 303 determined that if the President drafted New York’s State Militia, the state adjutant general was required to divide the quota between each individual volunteer militia company. Then, each brigade commandant had to draft the requisite number of men, company by company. However, if the President required a force larger than a single

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4 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 2 August 1862.
5 Ibid., 2 August 1862.
brigade of state militia, “such additional draft shall be made of the requisite number, to supply the deficiency, from the military roll of the reserve militia of each town or ward.” This passage meant that the governor had to fill the federal quota by selecting draftees from an additional list of all military-age men in the state. In the case of the latter option, New York’s state governor appointed commissioners to conduct the draft, each operating within a series of intricately defined regions that conformed to the state’s senatorial districts. Four districts constituted New York City. The other three cities operated under similar administrative mechanisms. Baltimore possessed three draft districts with commissioners, Philadelphia possessed two, and Boston possessed only one. On draft day, the commissioners determined the draftees by lottery, pouring the names of all fencible individuals from their district into a hollow contraption—a rotating wheel or a barrel with a spinning propeller—and a blindfolded person drew out the names one-by-one. Commissioners read each name and residence aloud while a clerk recorded. Once drafted, individuals possessed a stated period of time—about five days—to have any exemptions approved, to purchase a substitute, or to report for service at the stated rendezvous.

Despite Mayor Opdyke’s optimism, New Yorkers did not meet the announcement to draft with much enthusiasm. The Herald reported, “Young and middle aged men began to philosophize with themselves as to the best method to be adopted in steering clear of the proposed force to be used in providing human material to carry on the war. The barrooms of the

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7 In a practical sense, Philadelphia’s draft districts served no purpose after mid-September 1862, when Governor Curtin added a dozen assistant draft commissioners to administer the draft by wards. As Curtin wrote, “There ought to be twelve commissioners and surgeons in Philadelphia, giving 50,000 population to each. Unless the number is increased, the draft cannot be made there in season.” OR, Series III, Volume 2, 508.
city, where ‘draughting’ is carried on daily and nightly, were scenes of excited discussion in the
matter.”

Other cities exhibited more cheerfulness. At first, Philadelphia’s Republican leaders
displayed unbridled confidence that their city easily could meet the new demand. The Inquirer
stated, “There can be no doubt that Philadelphia will furnish not only the first but the second
requisition, if allowed to do so voluntarily, . . . and, from present indications the Old Keystone
will follow the example of its chief city, and, as far as the war is concerned, the banners of the
Union.” The Inquirer’s editor, William W. Harding, guessed that Philadelphia’s military-eligible
population stood at 71,000 men, 25,000 of whom were already in the field. This meant that
46,000 fencibles remained at home. The new calls of July 2 and August 4 placed Philadelphia’s
quota at 15,000. The city, he guessed, had already raised 8,000 men for the three-year regiments,
new and old, leaving 7,000 men yet to be supplied. Thus, one of every five fencible
Philadelphians would have to serve.

Although they had earlier derided the possibility of a draft, Boston’s Republicans now
applauded the new call. Even the conservative Republican Evening Transcript announced,
“Thank Heaven that the Government has responded to the call and pressure of the noble nation
who must fight the war and pay for it.” Democrats, of course, looked at the additional quota with
skepticism. Would the city be able to meet the new federal requisition by the proposed draft date
in August? Optimistic Bostonians guessed they had recruited only 1,400 new volunteers, about
half of the July requisition. Now, announced many Republicans, “It is not improbable that a draft
for our quota of the 300,000 men recently called for will soon be made.” Knowing that the draft

8 New York Herald, 1 August 1862.
9 Philadelphia Inquirer, 8, 13, and 15 August 1862.
quota would be apportioned by ward as per the antebellum militia law, local neighborhood leaders called for meetings to help raise troops so their wards could avoid the draft.  

Governor John Andrew stood among those who faced re-election in November. Under growing pressure to meet the national requisition without drafting, he announced that he would authorize as many nine-month regiments as necessary to beat the draft, presuming that nine-month regiments would fill quicker than three-year regiments. Naturally, Andrew’s announcement angered veteran recruiters from the three-year regiments. They had spent the past month refilling their ranks steadily, renting their recruiting offices with money from their own pockets. The sudden explosion of nine-month recruiters threatened to halt completely recruitment for the veteran regiments. Captain David K. Wardwell, a recruiting officer for the 22nd Massachusetts, became so angry that he held a press conference on the grounds of Boston Common, announcing, “I would rather have the 22nd with 300 men than a new regiment with a 1,000 men who have never been under fire!” Wardwell turned to a cluster of ladies present and, according to a reporter, he appealed to the ladies to use their feminine influences “to use the great influence they had to aid in recruiting, and not recognize those who were able and declined to go.”

The appeals of veteran officers did little to halt the actions of recruiters for the nine-month volunteers. In Boston, three regiments (the 42nd through 44th Massachusetts Infantry) commenced recruiting, and in the next month, two more regiments, the 47th and 48th Massachusetts Infantry, also joined the race to fill the ranks. The city was not short on nine-month volunteers. On August 8, the Daily Journal reported, “Yesterday was a busy season

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11 Ibid., 4 August 1862.
among the recruiting offices in Boston and vicinity. From all points came men in squads of four, ten, and often twenty, marching to the different stations, and enrolling their names in various companies for the defense of their common liberties.” The new batch of recruits included Samuel Storrow, a Cambridge student who had spent the past year in the Azores. Storrow returned home in mid-August expecting to find the rebellion crushed, but upon landing, he found himself sadly mistaken. Writing to his father, Storrow remarked:

You who witnessed the gradual change from victory to defeat can scarcely imagine the sudden revulsion of our feelings on hearing from the pilot who boarded us that the scene of active operations had been shifted from before the enemy’s capital to within a few miles of our own, that our troops were being beaten back upon Washington, that 600,000 new levies had been called for by Proclamation of the President, and that now, 14 months after the commencement of the war, thousands of armed men were rushing to the defence of the national capital.\textsuperscript{12}

Storrow learned that his brother had already joined a regiment and that Governor Andrew had called up nine-month volunteers. He wished to enlist then and there, but his mother and brother protested. For weeks, Storrow agonized over his indecision, writing, “What shame what mortification would it cause me years hence to be obliged to confess that in the great struggle for national existence I stood aloof, an idle spectator, without any peculiar ties to retain me at home, and yet not caring or not daring to do anything in the defence of my country.” He returned to Cambridge, but found no joy in his studies. He continued, “I would read in Tacitus of the destruction and dismemberment of the mighty empire of Rome by internal feuds and civil dissensions, and my mind would be brought to the thought of another nation equal in magnitude and power to that which issued its decrees from the seven hilled city, which was to be saved from a like fate only by the timely aid and support of every one.” Finally, Storrow admitted that he could sit still no longer, and he determined to enlist. He wrote to his father, who disapproved

\textsuperscript{12} Samuel Storrow to father, 12 October 1862, MAHS.
of his decision: “It seems to me the part of a coward to stay at home and allow others to fight my battles and incur dangers for me.”

On August 9, over on Tremont Street, the Boston Corps of Cadets, a prewar militia whose lineage dated back to 1741, held a meeting. The organization had watched its ranks dwindle the previous year, as the eager souls among them had enlisted or accepted commissions in the three-year regiments. Since then, the remaining one hundred had served as guards around Fort Warren or the State House, dressed in their regulation gray jackets, black chapeaus, and red plumes. The Cadets’ adjutant, Charles R. Codman, called the remaining members together and asked them to help raise the 45th Massachusetts Militia, a nine-month regiment. According to a member, Codman seemed “equal to the emergency,” and although not all of the cadets could become officers in his regiment, he exhorted all to join him. Codman called upon all of those who would willingly go as privates to step forward. Several hardy souls came forward and Codman declared that these men, for their selfless act, would become his officers. Among this band was Lewis H. Tappan, Jr., son of the renowned abolitionist. The officers and their friends soon fanned out across the city and across Massachusetts, placing posters and broadsides and drumming up support. Alpheus H. Hardy remembered, “The forms of advertisements were made to attract men to the various companies. One designated itself as ‘Sharpshooters;’ another as ‘the best in the Regiment;’ another urged men to volunteer to avoid being drafted.”

Fervid determination and clever advertising propelled many young Bostonians into the ranks, but Mayor Wightman continued to believe that patriotism needed a monetary boost. On August 18, he addressed the city council, asking for a bounty for the nine-month troops.

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13 Ibid.
14 Mann, History of the Forty-Fifth, 36-7, 44-5.
Wightman stated that it might be a poor decision to raise a general fund for the nine-month men, since many smaller communities had experienced trouble regarding such matters. However, the mayor believed that a small “regimental fund” might boost the city’s nine-month regiments. Alderman Samuel R. Spinney agreed, but went further, declaring that the success of the nine-month regiments was “not a matter of doubt.” Since these recruits counted against the draft, Spinney said, they should be remunerated with a large bounty. He proposed a $300,000 fund to be paid to the four regiments then in a state of organization. The commanders, Spinney announced, could use the money as they saw fit, for bounties, recruiting expenses, food, or equipage. The council debated but did not act upon this matter, many preferring to wait until hearing news from the Committee of 150.15

This delay proved crucial. As the month of August drew to a close, volunteers began to leave the city, heading to other towns that offered bounties to nine-month men. The sudden decrease in enlistments prompted Mayor Wightman on August 27 to issue an executive order, punishing “all persons interfering with enlistments in this city.” Anyone who erected a recruiting station or tent without authority from the mayor, anyone who advertised the sale of substitutes prior to the draft, or anyone who printed or distributed literature discouraging enlistments in the city could be charged with a crime and face a stiff fine or incarceration. This did not deter illicit recruiters or those who wished to enlist elsewhere, and they simply continued business in defiance of the mayor’s warning. Eventually, the Committee of 150 returned with its pronouncement, that the city should raise its bounties to $200 per volunteer with at least $50 offered to each nine-month recruit. Most newspapers agreed: bounties needed to be increased. An editor for the *Evening Transcript* declared that Boston’s bounties had “not made their offers

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15 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 19 August 1862.
upon the same liberal scale as others.” Other towns, this writer believed, dragged off Boston’s volunteers, “and thus,” he wrote, “Boston, which is today furnishing her full supply, to say the least, for the army, is anxiously inquiring how she shall next proceed to fill the requisition made upon herself.”

The August call produced even more tumult in Baltimore. The War Department set Maryland’s quota at 8,532 men. Of these, Baltimore City had to provide 2,646. Rather than propelling recruitment, this announcement nearly stifled it. The American observed, “The work of recruiting in Baltimore in response to the call of the President of the United States continues rather dull, when contrasted with the spirit which is evinced in the northern cities.” By that time, the 4th and 6th Maryland each required 600 men to reach their minimum complements. A reporter guessed, perhaps incorrectly, that many residents refused to enlist so they could hold out and receive substitute pay. Some men eager to serve knew that when the draft occurred, panicked residents would pay handsomely to avoid service, much more than a typical Baltimore recruit would get by volunteering and taking a bounty.

Additionally, the August 4 call initiated a mass exodus of Irish draft dodgers from the city. Far from responding positively to Governor Bradford’s call for a regiment of Irish volunteers, Baltimore’s Celtic population feared the machinations of the Union Party. Believing that Know-Nothings still controlled it, they wanted nothing to do with the party that now controlled Baltimore’s metropolitan government. On August 7, at 7:00 P.M., about 200 Irishmen assembled at President Street Station to take the next train to Philadelphia. A disgusted Unionist conductor telegraphed ahead to the City of Brotherly Love, warning it of the Irish emigration.

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16 Ibid., 28 August and 5 September 1862; Boston Daily Journal, 5 September 1862.
17 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 9 August 1862.
gang of Philadelphia nativists waited at the depot and assaulted the Irishmen as they detrained. Sixteen battered Irishmen required hospitalization. The next day, 100 draft dodgers, chiefly Irish and German, attempted to flee from Baltimore, but Deputy Marshal George Lyons had them arrested at the railroad station. As the week dragged on, draft dodgers fled via other rail lines. Twelve men departed on the Northern Central Railroad on their way to Canada—so authorities guessed—only to be detained by the mayor of Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvanians returned these draft dodgers to General Wool, who imprisoned them at Fort McHenry for “skedaddling.”

Despite limited enthusiasm from Baltimore’s ethnic population, as the month of August drew on, the Maryland Brigade continued to fill. Companies F, G, and H, 4th Maryland, filled with Baltimoreans. These companies soon joined the four other Baltimore companies—A, B, C, and D—and Carroll County’s Company E at Camp Schley at the outskirts of the city. The entire regiment was now 480 strong. Baltimore’s Germans filled Companies F and I, 6th Maryland, while a class of “respectable young men,” so wrote the American, filled portions of eight companies of the 8th Maryland, headquartered at the Maryland Institute. These recent successes, along with the quick organization of Captain Frederick W. Alexander’s “Baltimore Battery,” prompted the American to conclude, “The excitement with respect to the anticipated draft in this city has been measurably lulled.”

Still, many Baltimoreans worried that their city would not be able to avoid resorting to a draft to fill is quota. Compared to bounties in other cities, Baltimore stood sadly deficient. One

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18 Ibid., 9 and 11 August 1862.
19 Nearly all of the 4th Maryland’s companies were under-strength.
20 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 14 and 16 August 1862.
concerned citizen lamented, “Hundreds who would have preferred a Maryland regiment have been induced to go elsewhere in order to secure the draft money.” Also, a problem arose concerning the new city bounty ordinance (Ordinance Number 60) because it did not make clear that each volunteer who received a bounty had to be credited against the city quota. Several surrounding counties took advantage of this nebulous provision, sending their men to the city to collect the bounty but then crediting them to their county quotas. The American opined, “It is obviously unjust for the counties to expect that the city bounty will be paid to any except those who volunteer as part of the city quota.” If they complained about this interpretation, urban residents argued, the county governments should raise their own bounties. 21

Chapman put a stop to this county contravention by asking the City Council to draw up yet another ordinance, making the credit provision clear. The county governments fumed at this change; now it seemed as if Baltimore City meant to use its fiscal resources to steal recruits away from the countryside. Neighboring Carroll County passed its own bounty ordinance, castigating Baltimore City in the process. The local government affirmed, “[I]t was generally believed here that it [the city bounty] was intended for the common benefit, and to raise the four regiments of volunteers in the shortest time, without waiting the slow process of legislative action.” Now, with dashed hopes, Carroll County residents wailed, “the City of Baltimore [is] in the offensive attitude of using its abundant means to grant heavier bounties than the counties have the ability or the legal right to do, in order to coax citizens of the counties into the city, for the purpose of

21 Ibid., 12 and 19 August 1862.
filling the city’s quota with volunteers and leave the burden of the draft to fall on the counties alone.”

The cities did not quarrel only with neighboring counties; they also challenged their state governments. On September 5, Pennsylvania’s draft assessors determined that Philadelphia’s quota—counting every call for volunteers from April 1861 to the present moment—stood at 33,414, but they also determined that the Quaker City had sent only 19,223 soldiers to the front. This meant that that Philadelphia had to supply the equivalent of 14,191 three-year men or face a draft in ten days. This assessment provoked instant outrage. Editor William Harding commented:

The returns of the assessors crediting Philadelphia with furnishing only nineteen thousand two hundred and twenty-eight men for the war has not only created great dissatisfaction and annoyance, but has induced the public to protest against such returns being accepted as the basis upon which the draft in this city shall be made. The number of Philadelphians who have enrolled themselves in defense of their country certainly far exceeds the aggregate given by the officers appointed to procure a correct statement. Our city has acted well her part in the prosecution of the war against the Unholy Rebellion, and while she should receive all the credit deserved for her patriotism, those of her citizens who still remain in our midst liable to be drafted into the public service should be entitled to such immunity from coercion as accurate statements would afford.

New York City’s aggregate quota for the two summer calls stood at 25,160. But one month after the first call had gone out, not one recruit had left the city. On August 4, over 5,000 New Yorkers swarmed the office of the County Clerk ready to swear to a physical disability requisite for draft exemption. Numerous “exemption agents” also sprang up, men who promised to grant an affidavit of exemption for fifty cents. These men crowded City Hall in such large numbers that a reporter for the Tribune noted that anyone on business there had to “run the gauntlet of these individuals in the same manner that he would have to run the gauntlet of a

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22 Ibid., 21 August 1862.
23 Philadelphia Inquirer, 5 September 1862.
crowd of bawling hack drivers at a railway depot or a steamboat landing.”

Also, about 3,000 immigrants thronged the office of the British Consul each day to apply for alien status. The Tribune noted that “nine-parts” of the applicants were Irish: “This is a matter of surprise, since, in the language of Bishop [John] Hughes, in a recent speech, so many Irish have joined the American army because they love American institutions, and because they wish to learn how to use their implements.” German cabinetmaker Julius Wesslau might have considered this means of escape too; upon learning about the draft, he explained why some immigrants despised it. He wrote to his parents in Germany that even a $200.00 bounty—the new high in New York City—“isn’t enough . . . and if I was unwilling to be treated like a piece of government property in Prussia, I am just as unwilling to do so here, at any rate there’ll be a riot when they try it [a draft] here in New York.”

By September 1, at least 66,000 men had acquired exemption affidavits. The Republican Tribune raged against this turn of events, believing that most of these men had obtained their affidavits fraudulently. A reporter mused, “He who skulks behind false papers at a time like the present is like the ostrich endeavoring to evade her pursuers by hiding her silly head in the sand. We cannot die but once, and it is better to die fighting for the Union and liberty than to live an aimless, useless life.” Horace Greeley suggested that policemen investigate each exemption to “remedy this evil . . . Justice to all parties demands some such course as this.”

The inability of draft commissioners to complete New York City’s rolls in a timely manner caused Governor Morgan to postpone the draft from August 15 to September 1. Given a

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24 New York Tribune, 7 August 1862.
25 Ibid., 13 August 1862; Julius Wesslau to parents, 26 October 1862, in Kamphoefner and Helbich, Germans in the Civil War, 63.
26 New York Tribune, 9 and 12 August 1862.
stay of execution, private and public organizations in the city continued to raise bounties desperately. On August 19, the policemen of the Twentieth Ward collected a hard-won $378. When approached by a police officer, one wealthy man flew into a “high passion” and slammed a door in the officer’s face. In late August, an organization of grocers and traders met to raise money; in one month they collected over $16,000. Citizens also crafted elaborate schemes to fund bounties. Clarkson N. Potter, a Wall Street lawyer, whose brother, Robert, commanded the veteran 51st New York, forwarded $1,000 to Major Charles LeGendre, the regimental recruiting officer, telling him to pay the entire state bounty to each volunteer. As total bounties neared $200.00, the Herald remarked, “The amounts offered recruits in bounty, both from private individuals and public departments, certainly far exceed anything that has yet been forthcoming from any country or any government under the sun.”

This multiplicity of bounties sometimes exacerbated already volatile conditions. On August 23, bounty-related trouble caused a riot in the camp of the Empire Brigade quartered at East New York. General Spinola already faced trouble keeping his men under good behavior since many of them idled about town frequenting grogshops. The Empire Brigade volunteers grew increasingly irritated when new recruits entered the camp with complete state bounties or munificent private bounties. When nine new recruits arrived on the morning of the 23rd loaded with cash, an eloquent private in Company A, 2nd Empire Regiment, “well drugged with rotgut,” mounted a barrel and commenced haranguing his comrades about the injustice, blaming the officers for keeping their bounties from them. Since 400 men in the encampment had not received a cent of state bounty, a large drunken crowd surrounded the zealot and cheered him on. An officer arrived with a nine-man guard to escort the unruly private to his quarters. When he

resisted, the guard seized him, but his company intervened. The disorderly soldiers seized the guards’ muskets and commenced a general revolt. The Tribune reported, “The few officers were completely powerless, and the men, many of whom were frenzied by liquor, commenced to make their way out of the enclosure by tearing down the boarding.”

Afterwards, the riotous soldiers—who numbered about 200—assaulted the Howard House, a nearby liquor establishment, where the Empire Brigade officers had erected a temporary command post. The rioters bombarded the officers with bricks and bottles and shot Sergeant Major Martin Van Buren in the neck. After forcing the officers to retreat, the unruly soldiers sacked the Howard House and consumed its alcohol. The Herald reported, “Riot and confusion was the order of the day. . . [T]he rioters had everything their own way.” In the afternoon, Spinola reluctantly called upon the Metropolitan police, and a contingent of club-wielding patrolmen arrived on the scene. Forty inebriated rioters marched out of camp with muskets, bayonets, fife, and drum, ready to battle the hated police, but the patrolmen, being sober, quickly routed them. They bludgeoned twenty recruits and scattered the rest. During the evening, the police made ninety-three arrests, and they charged eighteen Empire Brigade soldiers with rioting. At the end of the day, although the camp had once numbered 1,300 men, only 200 recruits remained. The next day, 600 more returned, but the riot cost the Empire Brigade one-third of its men. The Herald blamed the riot on the “foolish display of money” by the new recruits and on volunteers’ easy access to liquor.\(^28\)

Baltimoreans negotiated their draft through a lens of Know-Nothingism. On August 27, Governor Bradford announced that the state draft would commence on September 15. On August

25, Baltimore’s three draft commissioners began the task of enrolling the city’s eligible citizens, expecting to complete their assignment by September 9. As a result, hundreds of citizens arrived at the commissioners’ headquarters to apply for exemptions. On the first day, Commissioner John B. Seidenstricker adjudicated fifty cases in the First Ward. Most applicants in this ward claimed physical disability, but, noted a reporter, “Unseemly as it would appear, they each evidenced the possession of considerable muscle, as they eagerly pressed forward to get into the room in which the commissioner was seated, in order to procure the desired exemption.” In five days, the First Ward received 400 applicants, and Seidenstricker granted 294 exemptions, 154 of them for disability. It took equally long for Commissioner Frederick Fickey, Jr. to adjudicate 262 applicants in the Eighth Ward, where he granted 150 exemptions. In the next ward in his district, the Ninth, Fickey granted 130 exemptions, but only thirty-eight came from disability claims; most came from alienage. Commissioner Henry Stockbridge experienced the same in the Seventeenth Ward, where he granted 112 exemptions, forty-five of them based on alienage.29

Exemptions based on non-citizenship ruffled the feathers of nativists, and some did their best to stop Germans and Irishmen from applying. On August 26, a gang of young men attacked a German from the Fifteenth Ward who attempted to apply. The commissioners did not express much sympathy for foreigners either. In the Third Ward, Commissioner Seidenstricker encountered a forty-year-old Irishman who applied for exemption. “So,” the commissioner asked, “you prefer to remain a subject of Queen Victoria?” Indignantly, the Irishman answered, “No,” stating that he preferred the government of the United States. Later, Seidenstricker faced a twenty-four-year-old un-naturalized Prussian, who had immigrated to Baltimore ten years ago. The commissioner asked him if he still considered himself a subject of the King of Prussia. The

29 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 1, 2, and 3 September 1862.
German answered, “No.” Based on their answers, Seidenstricker laid over both cases for further contemplation.30

In early September, an unexpected military campaign disrupted the process already underway. On September 4-5, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, 60,000 strong, crossed the Potomac River. Greatly alarmed, Pennsylvania’s Governor Curtin postponed the state draft to September 20, and on September 11, he called for 50,000 “Emergency Militia” to mobilize in defense of the Commonwealth. He telegraphed Mayor Henry to call upon Philadelphia to provide 20,000 soldiers. “Stir up your population tonight,” Curtin wrote. “Form them into companies and send us 20,000 men tomorrow. No time can be lost in massing a force along the Susquehanna to defend the State and your City. Arouse every man possible and send them here.” Mayor Henry called for meetings at precinct houses to raise the emergency militia. Local papers advertised the call, stressing the imminent danger: “To Arms! To Arms! The occasion is one of the utmost importance—the summons one of immediate necessity. Let no man who is capable of bearing arms absent himself from his post. . . . The safety of our city, the happiness of our families and the security of our firesides may depend upon their promptness.” Although Peace Democrats opposed the measure vehemently, the City Council voted a sum of $500,000 so Mayor Henry could arm Curtin’s 20,000 emergency troops. In any event, Philadelphia could no longer consider the possibility of drafting men from its militia in order to fill the July and August quota because Curtin had called the entirety of the Pennsylvania Militia to arms.31

30 Ibid., 27 August and 9 September 1862.
31 Philadelphia Inquirer, 12 September 1862.
Over the course of the week, 6,000 Philadelphians mobilized into sixty-seven understrength infantry companies and artillery batteries. In addition to the converted Home Guard companies, a few corporate organizations contributed to the call. Baldwin’s Locomotive works sent about two-hundred employees into a five-company battalion, “Baldwin’s Light Infantry Battalion.” The Philadelphia Corn Exchange raised three small companies for the 20th Militia Regiment, and Whitney’s Car Works contributed employees to a militia company. As soon as they were able, the Emergency militiamen boarded trains to Harrisburg for deployment.

Getting weapons and equipment to these men defied practical control. Some companies left Philadelphia with privately purchased arms, all owned by their militia organizations. Once they reached Harrisburg and swore into state service, the states Chief of Ordnance, James Reynolds, required them to swap their weapons for those provided by the state armory. Thus, Philadelphia’s emergency mobilization required constant packing and repacking of arms. This, in turn, created a flow of indecipherable paperwork for the city militia and the state military offices. For instance, one Philadelphia unit, Company A, 1st Artillery, Philadelphia Home Guard, left the city with seventy-seven muskets, but deposited them in the state arsenal in exchange for rifles. After its brief service in Chambersburg, the 1st Artillery returned directly to Philadelphia with their state-issued weapons. The company commander, Captain Henry D. Landis, sent a message to General Reynolds asking him to return the militia’s muskets to the local armory while he would send the state arms. Adjutant General Andrew Russell examined the case and determined that this request could not be accomplished. No one had bothered to catalog the city militia weapons before boxing them in the state arsenal. He replied, “Under these circumstances it would be difficult to select the arms formerly belonging to your Company, particularly as the arms when cleaned are again promiscuously repacked into boxes of twenty each, and would most
likely require the opening and unpacking [of] twelve or fifteen hundred boxes to enable us to select your guns, even if there was a distinguishing mark upon them.” Although it was hardly a bureaucratic solution, Russell suggested that Landis keep the state arms permanently.  

When they arrived at Harrisburg, the Philadelphians camped outside the Governor’s quarters, naming their company streets after regions of Philadelphia. While in the state capitol, Philadelphia soldiers endured poor sanitation, diarrhea, inadequate food, and a throng of constant spectators, but no battle. None of these regiments fought at the Battle of Antietam. Within another week, the Emergency Militiamen returned to the city. Although Curtin’s demand for 20,000 men was an unreasonable call for the over-burdened city, 6,000 emergency defenders would not have been enough to protect Philadelphia from an invasion by the Army of Northern Virginia. Had the Battle of Antietam not ended in a Confederate retreat, the situation might have ended gravely for the Quaker City.  

The Confederate invasion provoked Baltimore too, but unlike Philadelphia, it never sent emergency troops to the front. On September 7, the startling news reached the Monumental City. Excitement prevailed everywhere, and many Unionists expected a fight. Confederate sympathizers kept indoors; the constant flow of newly-recruited troops from the Northeast through the city made it especially unsafe for them to start an uprising. On September 8, five regiments totaling 5,169 officers and men, passed through Baltimore. The next day, four more regiments came through, and throughout September, the city saw more of the same. On September 9, Mayor Chapman called upon the citizens to reestablish “The Maryland Line,” that

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32 Henry D. Landis to Andrew Russell, 31 January 1863; Andrew Russell to Henry D. Landis, 10 February 1863, PASA.
33 Philadelphia Inquirer, 16 and 24 September 1862; Frank Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 215-8; Matthew Gallman, Mastering Wartime, 21.
is, to reorganize the city militia for emergency service. William Purnell established a rendezvous at the post office, asking loyal members of the old Light Division to come forward and offer their services. The City Council passed an ordinance arming and equipping each new soldier at $12.00 per head. In one week, the Baltimore City Guard had reconstructed five companies for emergency defense. While this transpired, affairs in Baltimore proceeded quickly. First, Governor Bradford postponed the draft to October 1. Next, ex-officio Mayor Chapman received a nomination at the Union Party’s mayoral nominating convention held at Temperance Temple. Finally, Kenly’s Maryland Brigade reached completion and rushed to the front, joining the Army of the Potomac two days after the Battle of Antietam.

The Emergency Militia call succeeded in postponing Pennsylvania’s draft twice. By the time the Battle of Antietam occurred, Curtin set the new draft for September 25. On September 17, the wards and precincts began assessing their fencible population, enrolling men on their militia rosters. Philadelphia’s new “assistant draft commissioners”—twelve recently appointed ward leaders—began determining the wards’ deficiencies. Only twenty-nine precincts had met their quota and only three wards out of twenty-five were safe from the draft. Finally, on September 19, the City Councils met to discuss the actual number of Philadelphia soldiers then serving in the army. Predictably, they concluded that the Commonwealth’s assessment of 19,414 was incorrect. The City Councils determined that Philadelphia had raised 38,812 men, 5,398 in excess of their quota. Mayor Henry immediately sent a delegation to Harrisburg to dispute the Commonwealth’s Bureau of Military Statistics. According to a Harrisburg correspondent, the city’s delegation “certainly performed their whole duty to their constituency.” Through their

34 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 18 September 1862.
representations, they convinced the Bureau to reassess Philadelphia’s contribution, and for that purpose, Governor Curtin postponed the city’s draft for another three weeks. He made this decision on September 24, one day before the scheduled draft. The postponement probably suited Curtin, for he postponed the city’s draft until October 16, two days after the local elections.36

Although far away from the fighting, Boston harnessed the distress of the Maryland Campaign. On September 9, the city council finally passed a measure increasing bounties for volunteers. It raised a $350,000 fund to supply $200 to each three-year volunteer and $100 to each nine-month volunteer. With this news, Mayor Wightman conferred with Governor Andrew and both agreed that, probably for the sake of their re-elections, they should postpone the draft—then set for September 15—to October 1. Wightman announced, “[E]very effort must be made to induce men to enlist in the regiments now forming in the city.”37 The news from the Battle of Antietam emboldened Bostonians and propelled more recruits into the ranks. Samuel Storrow, who had agonized over enlisting for four weeks, finally signed his name to the roster of the 44th Massachusetts several days after the battle, regardless of his father’s wishes. He wrote, “I feel well satisfied that I have done what upon careful deliberation has seemed to me most in accordance with all my duties.” Almost regretfully, he apologized to his father for his decision: “I have looked at the matter from every point of view, and if I shall seem to you to have arrived at a wrong conclusion, believe me, it was not from any hasty impulse of the moment, but from the sober dictates of my best judgment. If I have unwittingly made the wrong choice, God

36 Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 and 25 September 1862.
37 Boston Evening Transcript, 17 September 1862.
forgive me, I did what I thought was for the best.”

By the end of September, nearly 1,200 Bostonians had gone into the ranks of the new nine-month regiments.\(^{39}\)

The Maryland invasion caused problems for New York City in that it unexpectedly extracted its stockpile of equipment. Back in July, Governor Morgan had restructured the state’s quartermaster department, asking Quartermaster General Van Vechten to trade places with Inspector General Chester Arthur.\(^{40}\) When Arthur asked New York City’s new Clothing and Equipage Depot commander, John F. Rodgers, for a stock update, Rodgers reported favorably. On September 1, Rodgers accounted for 20,000 trousers, 14,000 caps, 25,000 drawers, 30,000 shirts, 8,000 canteens, 15,000 shoes, 10,000 overcoats, 20,000 uniform jackets, as well as various other camp articles. However, this stockpile disappeared quickly due to the arrival and interference of Colonel David H. Vinton, the U.S. Army’s appointed quartermaster who oversaw the same clothing and equipage depot. While Rodgers received his orders from Arthur, Vinton took his orders from federal Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs in Washington. The Confederate invasion of Maryland prompted Vinton to disperse of New York City’s stockpile during the first two weeks of September. When Arthur finally asked Rodgers to forward certain articles from the New York City Depot, Rodgers reported them absent, most articles having gone

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38 Samuel Storrow to father, 12 October 1862, MAHS.
39 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 7 October 1862; Henry Austin Clapp, newspaper clipping, in John R. Barden, ed., *Letters to the Home Circle: The North Carolina Service of Private Henry A. Clapp, Company F, Forty-Fourth Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, 1862-1863* (Raleigh, NC: North Carolina Division of Archives and Resources, 1998), xxii; Zenas T. Haines, 11 October 1862, in William C. Harris, ed., “*In the County of the Enemy*”: *The Civil War Reports of a Massachusetts Corporal* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1999), 63. Young men and Republicans tended to represent the rank-and-file of the new units. Company F, 44th Massachusetts, a company drawn exclusively from Boston, had an average age of twenty-two years, seven days. Of ninety-eight officers and men, only nine were married. The company contained sixty-five mainstream Republicans, fourteen conservative Republicans, three radical Republicans, one abolitionist, eleven “Union men,” three Democrats, and one undecided. Company D, another Boston Company, counted sixty-one mainstream Republicans, one conservative Republican, seven abolitionists, thirteen “Union men,” four Douglas Democrats, nine mainstream Democrats, and two undecided. Soldiers often sent reports claiming that very few members of their companies drank or smoked, but such letters probably strayed far from the truth.
40 *New York Herald*, 14 July 1862.
to Connecticut and New Jersey under Vinton’s directive. “[T]he Depot is almost as bare as the back of your hand—,” Rodgers wrote on September 13, “and we are entirely out of most of the substantials.” Arthur angrily blamed Rodgers for not managing affairs better, but the new appointee defended himself by stating that “Col. Vinton’s orders have cleared us out entirely. . . . I sympathize with you cordially—but it is all I can do—. . . if I had the ability your Depot would never need supplies—as I would send them as fast as you required.”

The collision between state and federal authority smoothed as the months dragged on, but the initial clash in September revealed the nebulous condition of federal-state relations. On September 27, when Arthur tried to order Vinton to issue equipment to a city regiment about to leave the next day, Vinton replied condescendingly that he would do his best, but, since all the depot employees had left for the day, such a request would prove difficult. “Permit me,” Vinton chided, “I am sure, to ask if you cannot anticipate such requisitions insofar that we may have our means in readiness for your Department as well as those of several other States whose requisitions are pressing upon me.”

Although exciting news of the Battle of Antietam prompted a renewed interest in recruiting, it did not allay fears of the draft. By the end of the September, Massachusetts Adjutant General Schouler concluded that Boston stood 11,750 men short of its quota. It still needed 7,466 three-year volunteers and 4,284 nine-month volunteers, or some equivalent combination of the two. Some citizens became desperate. The editor of the Evening Transcript announced, “Let the citizens one and all resolve that there shall be no draft in Boston and put

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41 John F. Rodgers to Chester A. Arthur, 1, 13, and 17 September 1862, Quartermaster General’s Papers, NYSA.
42 Charles Van Wyck to Chester A. Arthur, 5 September 1862; David H. Vinton to Chester A. Arthur, 18, 19, and 27 September, 1862, Quartermasters General’s Papers, NYSA.
forth their energies to prevent it and October 1 will find us out of the draft. But whatever is done must be done immediately. We have no time to lose.” Adding to this feverish state of emotion, the Committee of 150 dissolved itself and refused to work any further, despite pleas from Mayor Wightman to continue. Some citizens complained that Schouler had set the city quota too high. One concerned citizen wrote to a newspaper asking, “How comes it that the quota of Boston is so large and so out of proportion to the rest of the state?” In towns, he observed, recruiting had dwindled to a trickle, while recruiting in Boston “has been done wholesale.” This citizen guessed that Schouler took his cues from faulty enrollment lists. He supposed state enrolling agents went to hotels and boarding houses and copied the names of people there. “It is safe to say,” wrote the citizen, “that from fifty to seventy-five percent of these are not citizens.”

This agitation found its way to the State House, and in mid-October—after Andrew had postponed the draft yet again—Adjutant Schouler reworked Boston’s numbers. Using a host of shaky reasoning—including the addition of a 424-man surplus from other towns—Schouler reduced Boston’s quota to 1,900. This provided Boston some respite, but not enough, it seemed. At 2:00 P.M. on October 15, Draft Commissioner Thomas Russell and Sheriff John M. Clark put the draft into effect at Faneuil Hall. An unruly man in the crowd called, “It is not necessary!” Unconvinced, Russell and Clark poured the draft ballots into a large octagonal box fitted with a revolving shaft to mix the ballots. A blindfolded man, Dr. N. B. Shurtleff, drew the first name, Thomas Shorty. Throughout the afternoon, Shurtleff drew 379 other names. According to reporters, the crowd acted with propriety and some of those drafted even cried out, “here!” The draft continued the next day, drawing another 600 names. On this day, the city council voted an increase of the city bounty to $200 to all Boston volunteers, regardless of duration of service. But

43 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 24 September and 1, 2, and 11 October 1862.
it was too late. Boston had become the first major northern city to draft its residents into military service. An editor believed it would take a long time for Boston to recover from this “negligence which can be made to appear like deficient patriotism.” He lamented, “Boston certainly occupies an unfortunate position at the present time. Our community has done everything in its power to avoid the draft—private subscriptions, amounting in aggregate to a munificent sum, have been raised, but patriotic efforts have not sufficed to save the city from drafting, because no fitting response was made by the city government.”

Anger rose against the mayor and city council for their apparent lethargy in raising large bounties. This public resentment did not go unnoticed and a number of councilmen replied with an open letter, informing the citizens of Boston of their efforts to promote enlistment. The councilmen offered a two-part defense of their actions. First, they argued that large bounties did not help urban areas. Recruiting officers in small towns had the advantage of knowing which residents were likely to try to enlist outside of their districts. The councilmen argued, by knowing this, rural recruiters simply stalked these men and paid the additional bounty. “The officers of the city of Boston,” they countered, “on the other hand, cannot know the men who enlist here or enlist elsewhere in search of pecuniary inducements.” Thus, by refraining from supplying large bounties, the city government had avoided the “reckless example of smaller communities” as it would have been the “height of folly to plunge the city into almost endless expenditures of money for the mere gratification of a sentiment, when the example would no doubt have been contagious, and the whole Commonwealth would have witnessed a ruinous struggle by immense pecuniary offers to induce early enlistments in particular localities.”

44 Ibid., 14, 15, 16, and 17 October 1862.
This first argument did not assuage the angry populace, but the councilmen’s other contention may have placated them a bit more. They recalculated Schouler’s numbers and identified additional men not previously credited to the city quota. Now, they argued, Boston fell deficient by only 386 men. Given a week or two, they expected to meet that requirement. To do this, the council authorized Mayor Wightman to purchase a surplus from neighboring towns—that meant transferring credits belonging to other towns to Boston via a monetary transaction—giving him $100 for each volunteer bought and re-credited.45

Schouler did not accept Boston’s reworking of his numbers, but in conversation with several city councilmen, he discovered that the Bay City had not stricken the names of all aliens and foreigners from the draft rolls, thus accounting for the high quota. On November 1, Schouler drafted General Orders Number 58, to aid “several other towns and cities” that also had not recorded such exemptions. Although Schouler’s order made no statement as to which towns had made the complaint, everyone knew that this order was meant to appease the people of Boston, who, it seemed, had suffered from their indolent mayor and city council.46 On November 5, Commissioner Russell declared Boston’s draft annulled, as the time gained by the councils’ contestation, he supposed, had allowed the city to meet and even exceed its quota. Sheriff Clark disassembled Boston’s state-of-the-art draft wheel for future contingency, of which, an editor incorrectly supposed, “there need be little fear.”47

Massachusetts state officials debated Boston’s quota into the New Year. Andrew ordered a reevaluation of the city’s quota, as it appeared that it had been merely dictated by cunning

45 Ibid., 18 October 1862.
46 Ibid., 1 November 1862.
47 Ibid., 5 and 12 November 1862.
members of the city council. According to Andrew’s and Schouler’s new, more accurate numbers, Boston had raised 8,943 three-year men (more than its quota) and it had raised 2,522 nine-month men of its required 2,957, leaving a deficiency of 435. Worse, although the city of Boston had not beaten the draft under the new numbers, many rural towns felt that the commonwealth had pandered to the metropolis. A reporter for the Transcript wrote, “Several of the country towns entertain the erroneous idea that the new apportionment for the draft was made entirely for the benefit of Boston[.] . . . A good deal of feeling has been excited in the rural districts in consequence of this idea.” A series of postponements pushed the draft date back to January 8, 1863, but when that final date appeared, no draft commissioner showed. By that point, commonwealth officials assumed that the city had met its requirement.48 State officials probably saw little reason to continue the discussion of Boston’s quota, especially since the Republican Party stood a chance at capturing the mayor’s office. On November 4, Governor Andrew stood his re-election, and won handily, state-wide, over his opponent, General Charles Devens. However, he lost the city of Boston, 6,300 to 7,900. In general, though, the city elections went unexpectedly well for the Republicans. Several weeks later, the voters of the Bay City expressed their lack of faith in Mayor Wightman, who had grown increasingly critical of President Lincoln’s conduct of the war. The mayoral election focused on the national issues of the war; Boston voters removed Wightman in favor of Frederic W. Lincoln, Jr., a staunch pro-administration candidate (5,300 to 6,400) and carried offices in six contested wards.49

Like Boston, the other cities had to balance their gubernatorial and mayoral elections with draft day. Election Day, October 14, passed quietly in Philadelphia, the Republican Party

48 Ibid., 1 December 1862.
49 Ibid., 8 December 1862.
carrying every contested seat, including the mayoralty. Running on the so-called “Union ticket,” Alexander Henry won reelection by 4,000 votes. That same day, the Bureau of Military Statistics determined that it had overestimated Philadelphia’s quota. Curtin postponed the draft for a fourth time so the commissioners could make corrections, setting October 28 as the new date. Although the Commonwealth’s draft commissioners believed that the city’s quota was more than full, because they could not determine the residences of a portion of those who had recently enlisted in the city and therefore could not credit them, they decided that about 3,600 Philadelphians should be drafted. Naturally, city residents felt outraged at this slight. William Harding of the Inquirer maintained, “Philadelphia should not suffer for the errors of others.”

On October 23, the City Council met to consider a means of avoiding the draft. They voted to offer new bounties of $200.00 per volunteer to induce men to enlist. To fill this fund, they asked Philadelphia’s “loyal and liberal citizens” to make donations equal to $100,000. With characteristic overconfidence, the Republican presses believed that this fund would be filled quickly. The Inquirer maintained, “Not only will the contributors to the fund acquiesce in any arrangement their representations may deem best to make which will tend to obviate the necessity of the draft, but every resident of Philadelphia, male and female, old and young, rich and poor, has a direct interest in the matter and will endorse this renewed evidence of patriotism and liberality of the committee.”

The City Council never raised the proposed fund in time, but many citizens did not require financial aid. Cunning individuals managed to dodge the draft themselves by acquiring exemptions. The most common excuse was physical disability. As draft assessors surveyed the

50 Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 October 1862.
51 Ibid., 24 October 1862.
wards, they found numerous individuals bearing medical affidavits. A correspondent to the *Inquirer* mused, “If a plague had stricken the city, more entirely disabled men could not be met with than we are at present. . . . [and] the assessors have found a great number who have become prematurely old.” One individual declared himself unfit “on account of his head being split open, and his left leg being fractured, and also by losing the sight of his right eye, and by being caught in the rope walk machinery, and injured *eternally.*”

Confusion and deceit mounted as the draft loomed near. Some rural Pennsylvanians and New Jerseyans journeyed to Philadelphia to obtain the lucrative bounties, yet adding to the turmoil. Desperate recruiters sometimes enrolled these men, not understanding that if these men had already taken a bounty at a different residence, they might not be counted against Philadelphia’s quota. On October 28, Michael Baker of the Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee saw a squad of twenty recruits from rural Pennsylvania marching down Market Street under charge of an officer. Baker assumed these men were being taken to Major Herman Segabarth’s 3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery stationed at Fort Delaware. Having earlier informed one of Segabarth’s recruiting officers that the Citizens’ Bounty Fund would not pay for any non-Philadelphians, Baker became concerned. He sent a firm warning to the officers in Fort Delaware: “Now if these men were promised Bounty from our fund they will find themselves much mistaken—as no one had any such authority. Our fund was raised for Philadelphia and it is intended when we pay it out it shall count from Philadelphia and not give it to drafted men from interior Counties who do not count for us of this City, consequently, your muster rolls from the

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52 Ibid., 16 August 1862.
first draft will be closely scrutinized and it will have to be made very clear that none as described are on them.”

By October 25, only three wards had met their quota; the other twenty-two were collectively deficient by 3,202 men. At the behest of Mayor Henry, Governor Curtin postponed Philadelphia’s draft a fifth time, giving the city until the first week of November to raise the requisite number of volunteers. Then, suddenly, on November 2, the draft commissioners declared the city’s quota filled. Evidence does not clearly explain what happened. Perhaps, as some newspapers believed, 4,482 men enlisted in just four days. More likely, the draft commissioners distorted the numbers. Civil War veteran Frank Taylor later surmised that the draft commissioners made a random guess that more than 6,000 Philadelphians currently served in regiments raised outside the state and had yet to be credited to the city. Taylor admitted, “This calculation was probably excessive.” The next day, November 3, the city newspapers declared that Philadelphia had surpassed its quota by over 1,000 men. State officials let the matter drop.

Baltimore followed Philadelphia’s example, postponing the draft until after its election; however, this tactic did not save the city from the ignominy of conscription. On October 8, Baltimore held its city election, pitting the Union Party against a splinter party, the “Independent Democrats,” a conglomerate of disgruntled Union men, who bolted from the party to offer voters an alternative at the polls. Union candidate John Lee Chapman carried the mayoralty, beating Independent Democrat Frederick Fickey, Jr., 9,077 to 1,231. Union Party candidates carried every contested office except the Eleventh Ward, First Branch, won by Sebastian Streeter. An estimated 15,000 voters abstained from the polls. Although the refusal of Confederate

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53 Michael Baker to Lieutenant E. W. Paul, 28 October 1862, Citizens’ Bounty Fund Committee Papers, HSP.
54 Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 November 1862; Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 268.
sympathizers to vote may have caused this low turnout, General Wool’s posting of three northeastern regiments at the polling places may have dissuaded many of Baltimore’s dissidents from coming outdoors.\textsuperscript{55}

On October 15, the Superintendent of Enrollment in Baltimore, Colonel John Angel James Creswell, declared the city’s nine-month quota deficient by only forty-six men. At 3:20 P.M., at his Fayette Street office, Creswell ordered the draft to proceed. His clerks poured 20,621 names into a large box, three feet wide and two feet deep. For over an hour, his clerks stirred the names, and then, at 4:45 P.M., a clerk, James H. McBride, while blindfolded, drew them out and read them off. The selection took exactly one half-hour. The \textit{American} reported, “The drawing was witnessed by a large number of citizens, who were exceedingly delighted that their names were not called out.” Creswell declared that the forty-six unlucky men now had five days to provide a substitute or rendezvous at the draft encampment, the Cattle Show Grounds, called “Camp Bradford.”\textsuperscript{56}

On the appointed day, only nineteen of the drafted men arrived. Of the absentees, five reported themselves ill, one had died since the draft, and the rest simply failed to show. A reporter announced, “Of those present, a large number looked quite healthy, and seemed as if they were fully capable of enduring the fatigue and hardships attendant on a soldier’s life.” However, a few of the draftees appeared malnourished. One, Henry Osterhaus, according to a reporter, possessed an appearance that “indicated disease . . . would carry him out of this world previous to the time that the drafted men would be ready for service.” Of those drafted men who showed at the rendezvous, ten never served: the War Department exempted five of them based

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 11 and 20 September and 8, 9, and 22 October 1862.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 16 October 1862.
on occupation, three bought substitutes, one received exemption because he had been enrolled in
the wrong ward, and another—Osterhaus—received a discharge on physical disability.

Baltimore served as one of the state’s two draft rendezvous. Of Maryland’s twenty-one
counties, eighteen held drafts. Within days, 460 drafted men from Baltimore County, Harford
County, and Prince George’s County arrived in the city, swelling Camp Bradford’s numbers.
General Wool posted Company C, Purnell Legion Cavalry—a Baltimore City unit—as guards
around the camp. On November 7, fifty conscripts from Carroll County arrived in an icy
blizzard. Nearly all of the arriving conscripts were substitutes, paid by draftees to serve in their
place. Their darting eyeballs and furtive glances suggested that they would try to run at the first
opportunity. It appeared that money, not patriotism, had induced them to go to war. One
Maryland colonel who later had to discipline substitutes sent from Camp Bradford wrote,
“Devoid alike of patriotic sentiment, religious faith, or manliness, these scoundrels entered the
service only in order to make money; they made it and deserted. The example is demoralizing in
the extreme. For our soldiers who have enlisted eighteen months since (for 3 years) no bounty
was required to stimulate their patriotism.” Another Maryland officer commented, “A part of
those substitutes being apparently men, . . . [their] intention is not to serve the country, but
merely to obtain a certain sum of money.”

During the snowstorm, several substitutes attempted to flee Camp Bradford. A Carroll
County substitute even scaled the fence surrounding the show grounds and took off through the
snow. Two guards called on him to halt, but he failed to heed their request. One guard fired,
missing him. The escapee turned his head to look over his shoulder when the second sentry fired,

57 J. M. Sudsburg to A. W. Bradford, 10 February 1863; E. Kielmansegge to A. W. Bradford, 26 January 1863,
Adjutant General’s Papers, MDSA.
hitting him in the left cheek. The bullet came out the back of the man’s neck, splattering the snow-covered ground with his blood. The fugitive had been in camp less than four hours, so no one knew his name. The guards buried him in an unmarked grave.\textsuperscript{58}

On November 10, forty additional Carroll County substitutes for drafted men arrived. Thanks to frequent desertions, camp numbers hovered at 484. The next day, forty-one substitutes from various companies escaped. Later, authorities found three of them—Abraham Cronk, James Jones, and Charles Woodruff—at the Maltby House, using their substitute pay to buy new clothes and change their appearance. Upon arrest, the men revealed that they had escaped by bribing the sergeant of the guard with $20.00. Upon learning this news, Brigadier General Edward Shriver, commandant of the Draft Rendezvous of the Western Shore of Maryland, took steps to deprive future substitutes of their monetary assets. Shriver ordered all substitute bounties to be paid directly to him. He placed the money in a bank and held it until muster. If the principal owed his substitute more than $200, he gave him a discharge and “assumed the risk of the substitute’s desertion.” But, when the principal owed less than $200, Shriver held him in camp until the substitute mustered in. This change enraged the growing class of substitute brokers because they could no longer seize their usual cut (about half of the bounty). Shriver declared that he would offer brokers no more than $25.00 per substitute. Of the 421 desertions from Camp Bradford, 352 took place before Shriver put his rules into effect. He lamented, “It is to be regretted that this rule was not adopted at an earlier period as it would in all probability have

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 29 and 30 October and 10 November 1862.
checked to a great extent the losses incurred by desertion or at all events left the Government funds nearly or quite sufficient to meet the expenses of the Draft.”

New York City should have faced a draft but did not. On September 30, Governor Morgan brought an end to the state bounty and in mid-October, he ordered the state draft to commence on November 10. This gave the draft commissioners about three weeks to approve exemptions and complete draft rolls. On October 21, the commissioners began hearing applications for exemptions. Between thirty and 300 men in each ward arrived each day to apply. Commissioners tended to grant exemptions with liberality. On the first day in the Third Ward, thirty-four people applied and commissioners granted ten exemptions. On the second day in the Fifth Ward, sixty-five people applied and sixty of them received exemptions. In the Second Ward, one man claimed exemption on account of stuttering. Commissioner Wetmore replied, “That does not prevent your firing straight.” After stammering uncontrollably, the man said, “But the Rebels would kill me if I should fall into their hands because I could not cry for quarter.” Satisfied with this answer, Wetmore exempted the man on a “head wound” clause in the state’s enrollment act.

The last weeks of October grew tense for the city’s firemen, who still demanded that Morgan approve an occupational exemption clause. As the firemen’s agitation festered, Union officers tried to stir their patriotism with a second recruiting drive. On October 9, Colonel William R. Brewster, commander of the 2nd Fire Zouaves, returned to the city, spoke at Fireman’s Hall, and appealed for 500 men to bring his regiment up to strength at 850. Brewster

60 New York Tribune, 21 and 22 October 1862.
believed the effort “needed but the kind hand of friendship and a united support.” A reporter remarked, “He hoped they would all feel it their duty to aid the cause.” Chief Engineer John Decker told the firemen that if enough of them stepped forward, Morgan promised to add a firemen’s exemption clause for those who remained. This pleased the firemen, but Decker then told them that each fire company should offer its rolls so Brewster could determine the number each company should furnish to the Zouaves. A representative from Hook and Ladder Number 9 objected to this and “considerable debate” erupted. Ultimately, the fire companies elected to decide for themselves whether or not they would send volunteers. Although the meeting came to a disappointing end for Brewster, nine hook and ladder, engine, and hose companies offered $1,275 to fund a private bounty. Nine days later, this fund grew to $3,000. Brewster never received his 500 volunteers, but Morgan, in order to aid the Republican Party on Election Day, approved the exemption clause.  

As New York City residents counted down days to the draft, they paused for state elections. The November 4 gubernatorial election pitted Republican James S. Wadsworth, a wealthy Union general, against Democrat Horatio Seymour, a former governor who served from 1853 to 1854. Seymour’s candidacy posed a serious challenge to the Republican administration. An ardent conservative, Seymour opposed the draft and the Emancipation Proclamation, and he openly criticized Lincoln’s prosecution of the war. Ever exaggerating the nature of the Democratic opposition, Horace Greeley called Seymour and his followers “Democratic traitors now in open Rebellion.”

New York City’s Democrats confounded the Republicans by displaying unprecedented

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unity during the election. Unexpectedly, Mozart and Tammany Halls formed a temporary alliance, nominating Copperheads Benjamin Wood and Fernando Wood to represent the Fourth and Fifth Districts in Congress. While the Wood brothers did not yet declare the war an abject failure, they certainly questioned its course. In a late October speech, Fernando Wood hinted at his peace advocacy by declaring that Lincoln’s “judgment has been at fault. . . . These facts,” he said, “have created a want of confidence in the patriotism or in the wisdom” of the President and those around him.63

City Republicans defiantly battled the Democratic challenge. On November 2, two days before the election, Superintendent Kennedy issued General Orders Number 324, advising his patrolmen to check all voters against the draft rolls. Kennedy viewed this as a necessary measure to prevent aliens and other non-residents from voting, but Democrats viewed it as a means of intimidating immigrant voters or voters politically opposed to the draft.64 Nevertheless, the Democratic Party swept the polls on November 4. Seymour carried the city by 32,000 votes and the Wood brothers won their districts with majorities over 3,000 votes each. Additionally, city voters ejected all four Republican representatives from the State Assembly. The Herald declared the election results a “revolution,” a triumph of Democratic conservatism. In his victory speech, Fernando Wood told a crowd, “I believe he [Seymour] will . . . say to the federal government that to impose its illegal and unconstitutional assumed authorities within the borders of this State is a violation of the power which the state delegated to the federal government, and one to which the State of New York will never submit.”65

63 New York Herald, 31 October 1862.
64 Ibid., 2 November 1862.
65 Ibid., 5 and 11 November 1862.
As the draft date neared, Morgan sent the city’s completed regiments to the front. In October and early November, seven regiments left the city (with about 6,200 city-dwellers).\textsuperscript{66} To assuage their supporters after their loss, Republicans blamed their defeat on the absence of voters in these regiments; they believed “two-thirds” of these men were “ardent Republicans.”\textsuperscript{67} The results of the election might have forced Morgan to rethink the enforcement of the draft. On November 7, two days after the election, Adjutant General Hillhouse directed New York City’s commissioners to pack up their rolls and ship them to Albany, regardless of their state of readiness. Citizens believed that Morgan had suspended the draft indefinitely. Ten days later, Morgan announced he would not hold a draft until he had assurance that state authorities could provide the necessary cold weather gear. Morgan never called a draft; he merely left this task to his successor, Seymour. However, the new governor had no intention of enforcing conscription. Shortly after he assumed office in January 1863, Seymour questioned the accuracy of the state’s quota—120,000—arguing that the War Department had set it too high. The War Department let the matter drop, since Congress had now begun to debate the creation of a federal draft law. At least fifteen New York counties had met their quota, and at first glance, it appeared that New York City had too. However, the \textit{Tribune} pointed out that the city met its quota only if one examined the bounty distribution rolls. But, in fact, thousands of bounty jumpers had absconded with the cash and never reached the front.

The second year of war in the cities had produced another tortuous period of mobilization. From the summer of 1862 to the spring of 1863, Boston raised 2,080 new three-

\textsuperscript{66} These troops included ten companies of the “3\textsuperscript{rd} Empire Regiment” (163\textsuperscript{rd} New York Infantry), eight companies of the “2\textsuperscript{nd} Metropolitan Regiment” (133\textsuperscript{rd} New York Infantry), ten companies of the “4\textsuperscript{th} Corcoran Legion” (170\textsuperscript{th} New York Infantry), ten companies of the “3\textsuperscript{rd} Metropolitan Regiment” (162\textsuperscript{nd} New York Infantry), six companies of the “3\textsuperscript{rd} Corcoran Legion” (164\textsuperscript{th} New York Infantry), eight companies of the “2\textsuperscript{nd} Corcoran Legion” (155\textsuperscript{th} New York Infantry), and ten companies of the “1\textsuperscript{st} Corcoran Legion” (182\textsuperscript{nd} New York Infantry).

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{New York Tribune}, 5 November 1862.
year men and 2,300 nine-month men. Meanwhile, New York City raised about 18,300 men in new regiments and about 9,800 men in old regiments, an aggregate of 28,100. Philadelphia raised about 9,000 men in its new regiments and about 5,700 men in its veteran regiments. Additionally, 6,000 Philadelphians served for two weeks in response to the Emergency Militia call. Thus, Philadelphia put another 20,700 men into uniform. Baltimore raised about 1,900 men, nearly all three-year recruits for the 1st, 4th, 6th and 8th Maryland Infantry Regiments and for Alexander’s Battery.

However, in reference to the state drafts, the cities of the Northeast had performed dismally. Although the invasion of Maryland sparked renewed energy in regard to the raising of regiments, all four cities fell far short of the mark, each unwilling or unable to coerce its citizens into military service. The shame that attended conscription caused city officials to resort to duplicitous means to alter their quotas, to steal recruits from the countryside, or to contravene state authority. Each city postponed its draft at least twice, and none of them provided troops to the federal army. Baltimore’s ineffective state draft held a scant nine men to service. Philadelphia’s draft commissioners declared the city’s quota filled under suspicious circumstances. Boston halted and nullified its draft in the midst of its operation. Under the leadership of its new governor, New York City utterly refused to hold a draft. The elections of 1862 complicated the process, causing local politicians to ask state officials for postponement or clemency. Faced with elections of their own, state-level politicians exhibited reluctance when it came to enforcing compliance to state militia laws. They would not demand more than urbanites

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68 Philadelphia Inquirer, 27 October 1862.
69 In addition to 250 new recruits added to the 1st Maryland, Baltimore filled Companies A-H, 4th Maryland; Companies F and I, 6th Maryland; and Companies A-H, 8th Maryland. Muster rolls, 4th, 6th, and 8th Maryland, Adjutant General’s Papers. Finally, in March 1863, two companies of nine-month men bolstered the ranks of the 8th Maryland, MDSA.
seemed willing to give. Individually, urban residents did all in their power to nullify the effects of the draft. They demanded reassessment of the quotas, they removed their names from the draft rolls, and they insisted on exemptions based on foreign nativity, occupation, and even spurious physical deficiencies. The next year, 1863, would witness an attempt by the federal government to wrest draft regulation from the cities. That year, the power to enforce the draft rested with the federal government and its provost marshals.
Chapter 8: “Mourn For the Young! Mourn For the Brave!”: Building Loyalty and Coping with Loss, September 1862—June 1863.

News of the Confederate retreat across the Potomac River following the Battle of Antietam filled northern cities with exhilaration. Although the Army of the Potomac had suffered over 12,400 casualties, urbanites applauded it as a great victory. Still, the death toll—over 2,400—came as a great shock. The loss of many popular figures in recent months—now lauded by the bereaved populations as “fallen heroes”—nearly pushed the cities to their emotional breaking points. But, in the end, urbanites’ faith in the war remained firm; grief did not overcome them. Although talented Copperheads cried for peace, some for “peace at any price,” the dreadfully long casualty lists and the influx of wounded did not slow the mobilization efforts of the cities. Cities of the Northeast employed their traditional displays of mourning to assuage the anguish and sufferings of residents who had lost loved ones and to ease the sufferings of wounded soldiers sent to convalesce in hospitals newly established in urban centers.

In this time of misery and woe, Republican politicians and ministers made necessary adaptations to cope with the increased scale of loss, teaching the lessons of war to that portion of the population that questioned the worth of the war’s growing cost. Urban Republicans had their work cut out for them. Not only did the party of Lincoln hold the mayoralities only tenuously, but the president’s announcement sanctioning emancipation aggravated the still powerful Democratic enclaves in Boston, Baltimore, New York City, and Philadelphia. This seeming betrayal of the public trust by the President, combined with the rapidly increasing sentiment of loss and failure and the need to care for the rising numbers of sick and wounded soldiers, diminished urban Democratic support for the war and placed city Republicans on the defensive. In a sense, combining coping with loss with the building of loyalty became as important to urban
mobilization in the winter of 1862-3 and the spring that followed as posting recruiting broadsides and sewing uniforms.

Although the reports of battlefield deaths came as a shock to city dwellers, they were not inexperienced to receiving news of violent or premature death. Well before the war, urbanites witnessed the high lethality of disease epidemics, crime, or industrial accidents, and pages regularly ran lists of mortality statistics. In Philadelphia, for instance, between 1845 and 1852, dysentery killed 300 to 600 residents each year. During 1852 alone, over 2,600 Philadelphians died of tuberculosis, dysentery, smallpox, and scarlet fever. In Violent Death in the City, Roger Lane convincingly suggested that the rate of urban crime, accidents, and suicide in Philadelphia actually continued to increase until the 1870s. But, he argued, the high death rate seldom disordered cities as they developed. Instead, metropolitan efforts to combat death and to cope with the feeling of loss demonstrated increasing self-discipline and advanced expectations of order among leaders. The frequency of premature death in antebellum urban American caused city folk to prepare for the worst.¹

However, the war added a new dimension to death, spreading alarm and grief when the bad news arrived. The butcher’s bill from the battles of the spring and summer of 1862 produced despair and misery as word of combat deaths reached the cities. The bad news hit the hardest in a few specific subsets rather than across the entire metropolis, reflecting the compartmentalized recruitment by ethnicity, occupation, neighborhood, or class. Early on, probably no community appeared harder hit than Philadelphia’s German community. On April 15, 1862, the German-speaking 75th Pennsylvania experienced a heartbreaking accident at Berry’s Ferry, Virginia. On

that unfortunate day, the regiment had been making its way across the Shenandoah River on small rafts when Colonel Heinrich Bohlen ordered Companies I and K to use a partially-burned canal boat to expedite the crossing. When this canal boat reached mid-stream, a strong current forced the soldiers inside to release their hold on the guide-cable. The vessel capsized, pouring fifty-eight men—including two officers—into the river, drowning all. Sergeant Hermann Nachtigall watched in horror from the shoreline. He later wrote: “The terror of the victims was indescribable—a cry of fear, unforgettable by all who heard it, pierced the air—an instant, and the rapidly moving waves swallowed the unfortunate victims. Several packs drifting on the surface for a few moments were all that remained of the unfortunate men.” The mass drowning struck the neighborhoods of Northern Liberties and Kensington with a bitter emotional blow. These fifty-eight soldiers had not died in battle, and their bodies could not be recovered by their families. The German neighborhoods—and they alone—wailed in grief and sorrow upon hearing news of the “unfortunate disaster.”

Colonel Bohlen recognized the necessity of assuaging the anguish in Northern Liberties, Philadelphia’s German neighborhood, so he sent back one of its respected sons. On April 19, the 75th Pennsylvania’s twenty-two-year-old adjutant, Lieutenant Frederick Tiedemann, returned to Philadelphia and held public hours inside a donated office at 341 North Fourth Street. Tiedmann’s younger brother, twenty-year-old Sergeant Joseph A. Tiedemann, had perished in the drowning. So, the young adjutant felt that he could offer grieving families some consolation. Further, Tiedmann was the son of Dr. Heinrich Tiedmann, a respected German anatomist who had participated in the Baden Revolution of 1848 and once held a legislative position in

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Germany until banished by the Grand Duke. Few Philadelphia Germans could doubt the sincerity of the Tiedemann family in fighting for the universal cause of liberty and democracy. The Philadelphia Press invited persons “desirous of further information concerning the regiment” and the lamentable fate of the drowned to call at Tiedemann’s office between ten and one o’clock. Such impromptu solutions to cope with urban loss during the war underscores the primitive state—that is, uninfluenced by the social sciences—of the Union army’s approach to grief counseling. Incidentally, Lieutenant Tiedemann never made peace with the loss of his brother. Actually, he had lost another sibling earlier in the war, and as one biographer described, “on account of the violent death of two of his brothers,” he resigned his commission on May 2. Tiedemann spent four weeks at home and then attempted to rejoin the conflict in June, serving as an aide-de-camp for Major General Carl Schurz. Finally, in September 1863, he resigned permanently, even though the Army of the Potomac’s commander, Major General George Meade, begged him to stay.³

The battles of the spring and summer spread the same feeling of grief and sorrow throughout the cities of the Northeast. Philadelphian Sidney Fisher intently read news reports concerning the Battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines’s Mill, the first major engagements that involved the Pennsylvania Reserves. Fisher noted “many Philadelphians were in the fight & of course much anxiety was felt by their friends.”⁴ Sadly, news reports of recent battles oscillated between exaggerations and outright falsehood. Newspapers published casualty reports, but these listings contained numerous spelling errors and incorrect information. Sometimes, the papers simply reported casualties without first names, complicating the gathering of accurate

information. For instance, a New York City newspaper listed eighteen privates from the 37th New York who had been killed in action on the Peninsula by printing its report this way:

“PRIVATES.—Killed—P. Mangan, B. Egan, W. Stevenson, W. Ryan, M. Grogan, T. Burke, W. Russell, J. Hickey, T. Martin, J. Gaffney, P. McArdle, J. Green, W. Martinfield, P. Turner, G. P. Rich, L. Morrill, J. O’Neill, J. Maguire.” Undoubtedly, this list would have worried or confused dozens of Irish families. The 37th New York possessed four soldiers named William Ryan, five soldiers named Thomas or Timothy Burke, and three soldiers named John or James Maguire. Worse, the 37th New York carried three soldiers on its roster named Egan or Eagan, but in fact, the real casualty was thirty-one-year-old Private Bernard Hagen of Company B. Because newspapers could not be relied upon to deliver accurate information concerning casualties, urban families often learned of the death of loved ones the same way all northerners did: they waited until another soldier from the regiment wrote to them. Given the hiatus in correspondence that occurred during a military campaign, it took weeks—even months—for families to learn the news that a loved one had died. Some never learned of the fate of their loved ones, since newspapers often listed casualties imprecisely as “missing.” By the time the city dwelling families accepted the grim reality, that their relatives had in fact died, any opportunity to recover the body had long since passed.

Very few urban families recovered corpses immediately, if at all. Battlefield burials operated under no formalized system and due to a string of defeats in the Eastern Theater, Union armies rarely held the field of battle. If they could manage it, Union soldiers called for temporary truces and recovered their comrades’ remains from the scenes of carnage, burying them on the

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5 Undated New York newspaper clipping, unit history project, NYSA, http://www.dmna.state.ny.us/historic/reghist/civil/infantry/37thInf/37thInfCWN.htm. The soldiers killed were Private Thomas Burke, Company F, age twenty-five; Private James Maguire, Company k, age thirty-four; and Private William Ryan, Company C, age twenty-three.
field without delay. Quite often, the necessity of continuing military campaigns prevented soldiers from procuring caskets to ship the bodies home. Moreover, for soldiers in the field, it was easier and perhaps more meaningful to them to bury their comrades on the spots upon which they had fallen. On May 5, 1862, First Lieutenant Patrick H. Hayes of the “Irish Rifles”—the 37th New York—fell dead at the Battle of Fort Magruder. According to an obituary published in a New York newspaper, the soldiers in his company buried him modestly with a “little pine cross placed at the head of the grave, near a dense forest of pine close by Williamsburg, [Virginia,] bears the following brief record of his death: ‘Lieutenant P. H. Hayes, Company G, Thirty-seventh regiment New York Volunteers, shot May 5, 1862, at Williamsburg’.”

In some cases, the peculiar circumstances of war precluded the possibility of future recovery. For instance, after being captured at Front Royal, Union soldiers of Baltimore’s 1st Maryland endured several months inside prisoner of war camps at Lynchburg, Virginia, and later at Belle Isle, an island in the James River. As his comrades succumbed to starvation, typhoid fever, and diphtheria, Private Thomas O. Lucas of Company A recorded the circumstances of death in his diary. By August 1862, as fatalities became increasingly frequent, Lucas admitted that he lost track of who had died, fretting that he could no longer effectively tally Baltimore’s sacrifice. Five or six Belle Isle captives died each day in August. The Confederates gave the prisoners crude boxes to serve as coffins and ordered the bodies to be buried along the shoreline. Of course, when the water level rose, the “coffins” floated to the surface and drifted downstream, never to be seen again. On August 16, Lucas wrote, “It is awful to see so many poor men dead

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6 Undated New York newspaper clipping, unit history project, NYSA, http://www.dmna.state.ny.us/historic/regarhist/civil/infantry/37thInf/37thInfCWN.htm. 361
and dying for want of proper treatment.” Knowing that these bodies could never be reclaimed by their families made these deaths especially agonizing.7

Because the cities could not recover the majority of their dead, they made especial efforts to eulogize and bury with great public ceremony the few bodies that did come home. If the fallen bodies happened to be officers, urban communities invited all families affiliated with the regiment to appear at the funeral. In August, two popular Philadelphia Germans—Brigadier General (formerly colonel) Heinrich Bohlen and Colonel John A. Koltes—fell dead in battle at Freeman’s Ford and Second Manassas. The German communities in Kensington and Northern Liberties turned out to mourn both officers when their bodies arrived in early September. On September 3, the Philadelphia Turners’ Association and a detachment from Koltes’s 73rd Pennsylvania held a ceremony at Independence Hall. Of course, the venue held symbolic importance; it reminded German-born residents of the magnitude of upholding the government that now considered them adopted citizens. Five days later, on September 8, mourners laid to rest General Bohlen’s remains on at St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church at the corner of Race and Sixth Streets. Bohlen’s eulogizer, Reverend Joseph A. Seiss, wielded his sermon like an unapologetic recruiting tool. He said, “The deceased was eminently a man of the class which the country most needs in these lowering times. And he was just in that position in which he was rendering the services most demanded by the emergencies which have arisen. . . . It is patriotism, quite as much as sorrowing personal affection that seeks to utter its grief, and to express its sense of bereavement, by this solemn pageant. And when we bethink ourselves how sorely our country is pressed at this dark hour—how in need of disciplined soldiers and brave and experienced commanders—how the calls and cries from all sides are appealing to us for men to defend our

7 Thomas O. Lucas diary, 16 August 1862, in Kirkley and Camper, Historical Record of the First Regiment Maryland Infantry, 72-3.
own firesides and how the dark thunder-clouds of rebel invasion are threatening to break upon us with all the dreadful doings of rampant ruin.” Although Seiss spoke of the impending Maryland Campaign and the danger it posed to Philadelphia, he also used his eulogy to calm his listeners. He concluded, “[We] find ourselves appointed by Providence to the sad work of committing our Generals to their graves. Our faith would stagger were we not otherwise so unmistakably assured of the wisdom and righteousness of that Almighty God, who taketh away, and none can hinder.” Death, it seemed, could not be insulated from the ongoing military necessities of mobilization.  

The cities responded to their losses with a mix of fury and solemn dignity, but they had to adapt their traditions of mourning to meet the rising death toll. Funerals became a cathartic experience for urban residents. To make sense of the sacrifice and reinforce the waning patriotism, politicians and community leaders used funerals to rationalize death and remind city folk of their continuing obligation to the Union cause. Boston attempted to connect its entire populace emotionally to the loss of one of its favorite sons. On August 30, at the Battle of Second Manassas, Colonel Fletcher Webster fell, struck by two bullets to the arm and chest, just as his regiment, the 12th Massachusetts, retired from the field. Webster’s body remained inside Confederate lines for several hours. Then after enormous difficulty, Lieutenant Arthur Dehon of Webster’s regiment passed into enemy lines under a flag of truce, packed the colonel’s corpse upon the back of his horse, and conveyed the body to Alexandria. A State Department official accompanied Webster’s body back to Boston, where it lay in state in Faneuil Hall for twenty-four hours on September 8-9, guarded by Boston’s Corps of Cadets and viewed by thousands.

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Fletcher Webster’s funeral illustrated the pageantry and formality reserved for local fallen heroes of high military standing. The city of Boston organized a tremendous spectacle. After services at 11:20 A.M. on September 9, the body paraded through the streets in a rosewood coffin with a glass top so that “a view of nearly the whole body was had [by all].” Webster’s corpse sported a brand new uniform, with a battle flag his grandfather’s regiment had borne at the Battle of Bennington during the American Revolution draped over part of the casket. A witness remembered, “The process of embalming had preserved the freshness of life and the swarthiness of complexion which exposure to a Southern sun had given to the face. As there was no wasting sickness, there was but a slight change from the features as they were in life.” The procession consisted of a detachment of city police, four militia companies, two bands, nine officers from the 12th Massachusetts, four pall bearers from other Massachusetts regiments, six funeral marshals—including the future mayor, Frederic Lincoln—a carriage of clergymen, and Webster’s horse, led by its groom. For an hour the procession passed through the major thoroughfares of the city—west on Merchants Row to State, Court, Tremont, and Beacon Streets; southeast on Park Street; south on Tremont again; east on Boylston; north on Washington; and then east on Summer—until finally reaching Church Green at the corner of Summer and Bedford Streets. Tens of thousands of mourners and gawkers lined the route to get a glimpse of the coffin as it passed. The marshals, it seems, had picked out the route so that Webster’s procession could be seen by as many Bostonians as possible. Reverend Chandler Robbins delivered the “burial service” to an audience of thousands. He reminded listeners that Webster’s life had been an ideal one, sacrificed willfully and for a noble cause: “We cannot forget, while that body lies lifeless before us, that the last throbs of the warm heart which animated it, and the last struggles and sufferings which it endured, were for our native land. He knew the peril which awaited him as he
went down into that disastrous battle, and solemnly registered his vow, ‘I am determined not to spare myself.’ Faithfully and nobly has he redeemed that pledge. He gave himself a willing sacrifice for the defense of that country which both the impressive precepts and illustrious example of him whose name he bore had taught him to serve with unselfish devotion, and to love better than life.” Indeed, implied Chandler, Boston could take inspiration from Webster, even in death.

Webster’s body did not sleep beneath the sod that night. After the public service, the “Webster Committee”—the same group of wealthy benefactors that funded the 12th Massachusetts in 1861—took it from the church to his mansion, where Governor Andrew, Mayor Wightman, Boston’s aldermen, and the Harvard Class of 1833 could pay their respects privately as the body lay in state for another night in the mansion library. Finally, on September 11—twelve days after Webster had fallen in battle—gravediggers laid the body to rest in the family tomb adjacent to the body of his famous father. Suffice to say, Webster’s death had been an experience that involved the participation of a wide array of Bay City citizens.9

Antietam’s massive casualty lists dealt Boston and the rest of the urban North another tremendous blow. In that battle, Boston’s “Harvard Regiment”—the 20th Massachusetts—suffered acutely, losing 137 officers and men. Harvard University seemed especially hard hit. Captain Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., son of the famous author, had received a gunshot wound through the neck and lay in agony in a Maryland farmhouse. Lieutenant Colonel Wilder Dwight, the youthful commander of the 2nd Massachusetts, received two gunshot wounds—one in the forearm and one in the hip—and he died two days after the battle in a house in Boonsboro,

9 Cook, History of the Twelfth Massachusetts Volunteers, 161-4.
Maryland. Lieutenant William D. Sedgwick, a staff officer and a graduate from the Harvard Class of 1851, had been mortally wounded, dying on September 29, leaving a wife and three children, one of whom he had never seen. Caught between the lines during the battle, he scribbled a touching final note in his pocket diary, which several newspapers later reprinted.

While trying to rally our men, a musket ball struck me in the small of my back, and I fell from my horse. As I write this I have been lying here more than an hour, powerless to move my right leg. I think that the wound must be mortal. I have been praying to God to forgive my sins, to bless and comfort my darling wife and children, my dearest mother and sisters. As I have been lying here in very great pain, shells have been bursting close to me, almost constantly. I wish my friends to know that I have fallen while doing my duty as well as is possible, which I can truly assert, and that I have not uttered groan as of yet, lying alone on the hard ground in the hot sun, with no friend near.¹⁰

One of the largest and most well-publicized funerals after Antietam was that of the burial of Lieutenant Colonel Dwight, the esteemed commander of Boston’s beloved 2nd Massachusetts. Dwight’s death struck a nerve because he had been a pillar of the community. Not only had he been a respected member of his church, but he had been a successful attorney and an active member of the Harvard alumni association. To Bostonians, his death symbolized the destructive power of the war, demonstrating its ability to subtract from a community.

Dwight’s funeral became a community affair largely because he demanded a stately memorial service. On his deathbed, Dwight asked the regimental chaplain, Alonzo Quint, to make sure he received a proper military burial. This struck Quint as odd, since Dwight never stood on ceremony. However, Dwight insisted on it, and as his life ebbed, the dutiful chaplain promised to comply. Quint accompanied the body to Boston. There, he met Dwight’s parents, who had planned to bury their son’s body quietly, without ceremony, near their home outside Boston in Brookline. When Quint explained their son’s dying request, however, they relented and asked Governor Andrew to provide a military escort. Andrew sent six companies of the 44th

¹⁰ William Dwight Sedgwick journal, 17 September 1862, reprinted in undated clipping, William Sedgwick papers, MAHS.
Massachusetts to the church to pay their respects. Andrew came too, as he been responsible for promoting Dwight to lieutenant colonel over the protests of several line officers. All the major newspapers in Boston announced the funeral, inviting the population of Boston to attend. The Suffolk County bar and the Harvard Class of 1853 mobilized their members, both organizations passing public resolutions mourning Dwight’s loss. The first Harvard resolution explained, “Resolved, That in the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Dwight the University has lost a graduate who, in his life and services, and still more by the promise of future usefulness and distinction (so prematurely disappointed), has reflected new honor on the places of his birth and education.”

Months later, at commencement, a student who had seen Dwight’s funeral read a short poem in honor of all fallen soldiers:

Mourn for the young!
Mourn for the brave!
The slow vine creeps around the soldier’s grave.
Long be votive garlands flung
Upon the sacred mound!
And when a hundred years
Lose record of our tears
Still will the voice of fame
Exult to name his name;
And every spring the clover and the sorrel
Make haste to bloom for crown and laurel!

On September 25, 1862, a sunny autumn day, a tearful procession of thousands—including many school children—followed Dwight’s casket to Brookline Cemetery. Chaplain Quint delivered the eulogy and spoke of Dwight’s life and sacrifice in as heroic a manner has possible. However, at the end of his address, he reminded mourners of the duty yet to be done. The 2nd Massachusetts still served in Maryland, ready to continue the fight. He concluded: “[F]ive hundred miles away, near the battle-ground stained with their and with his blood, where, before I left in charge of this sacred trust, the dead faces lay upturned to the sky, the wounded lay helpless, the dying lay gasping, do they weep, who, in the roughest shock of battle, were like
iron. From them have I come these many miles, to them shall I instantly return when the work they have given me to do is ended.” The last line made it all clear: the city of Boston still had work left to do, and to leave that work unfinished would be disrespectful to the life of the departed.  

Other cities experienced the same sense of loss after Antietam. Philadelphia’s 28th, 88th, 90th, and 109th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments all suffered heavy casualties at that battle, as did the Philadelphia Brigade and the Philadelphia companies of the Pennsylvania Reserve Division. Most embarrassingly, one of its green regiments, the 118th Pennsylvania—the maligned “$200 Boys of Philadelphia”—suffered a tragic loss when it engaged a Confederate rearguard unit at Shepherdstown Ford at the end of the campaign on September 20. The 118th Pennsylvania led the advance across the Potomac River and then ascended a high bluff, recreating almost exactly the unfortunate predicament experienced by the 71st Pennsylvania at Ball’s Bluff less than a year earlier. The same sad fate befell the 118th Pennsylvania. A Confederate brigade attacked the rookies from the Corn Exchange Regiment, who discovered to their unmitigated horror that their rifles would not fire. For some unaccountable reason, the 118th Pennsylvania had received a bad batch of Enfield Rifles. The springs inside the lock-plates proved too weak to explode their caps. Unable to return fire, the surprised Philadelphians slid down the banks of the bluff and reached the ford, while those with working weapons held off the Confederate counterattack as long as possible. Then, the Corn Exchange soldiers gingerly picked their way across a dam that spanned the river. Some of the wounded men rolled into the raging current and drowned, adding to the dreadfulness of the defeat. A veteran later called the fight a “sad purposeless affair, with a most disastrous and fatal termination.” On the brighter side, the regiment proved its honor to a host of

doubting veteran units, who thought that a bounty-regiment would not fight well. After it had incurred 270 casualties in its desperate stand atop the bluff with non-functional weapons, few regiments seemed willing to call them, “bounty boys.”

The Shepherdstown affair produced a potential public relations disaster that drew the attention of Governor Andrew Curtin. He immediately sent a letter of condolence to the Corn Exchange Bank, confirming his “deep sympathy and painful regrets at the occurrence of the recent terrible disaster which befell the [118th Pennsylvania] regiment.” Curtin did not want to lose the support of the city’s most important bounty-raising organization, and the military absurdity that had sent the Corn Exchange Regiment into enemy territory with defective rifles needed to be addressed.

It is painful, indeed, that brave men, who are ever willing to risk life in the field in defence of our State and the safety of our people, when threatened by a numerous army of the enemies of their country, should meet a fate so melancholy as this which has cast a gloom over our entire community at a time when they would have been hopeful and exultant. Please express my sympathy to the injured, and my condolence with families and friends of the dead. I avail myself of this opportunity to express to you my acknowledgment for your patriotic liberality in assisting to place in the field the 118th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, and of offering you my congratulations on the courage and gallantry of the officers and men in the recent battle. . . . With the earnest hope, gentlemen, that you may continue to work with the same dutifulness in the future, and contribute from your means with the same liberality that you have in the past, until this unnatural and insane rebellion has been suppressed and the supremacy of the law and order fully re-established, I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. G. Curtin.

Baltimore’s 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Maryland Infantry Regiments also suffered heavily at Antietam. The 2nd Maryland lost sixty-seven men in a desperate but unsuccessful charge over “Burnside’s Bridge,” but its disliked New York-born commander, Colonel Eugene Duryée, proved his valor to the skeptical Baltimore rank-and-file. At the Sunken Road, New York City’s famed Irish Brigade advanced against a strong Confederate position, only to be blunted by a

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13 Ibid., 7.
withering fire from two brigades of infantry. In all, the brigade lost 540 officers and men. The local newspapers tended to applaud the Irish Brigade’s gallantry, but Democrats began to criticize the senseless slaughter. Fernando Wood, New York City’s Copperhead ex-mayor, then running for a congressional seat, told an audience of Democratic listeners that he would go to Washington and have a conference with President Lincoln. Becoming angry as he spoke, Wood proclaimed, “I will tell him that without we have a change of measures, that so help me God! We will have a change of men!”

It is possible that city-dwellers experienced the sense of loss caused by the war more acutely than residents in the surrounding countryside. The compactness of urban space compressed community emotions. Most city-dwellers knew a friend or neighbor who had lost a loved one in the Civil War, and everyday encounters served as constant reminders of the depth community sacrifice. Katherine Wharton, a Philadelphia resident, took notice when she read about the death of an old boyfriend. On August 1, 1862, in a bit of a reverie, she confided in her journal, “How long it is since I have thought of those times. I got bored with him at the time & did not keep him in mind, but today I have thought of him a good deal.”

On the other hand, cities lacked the visual reminders of the price of war. Unlike rural areas, urban centers did not bury their dead in one central place. Families dispersed them through a web of cemeteries and churches inside each metropolis. For instance, Philadelphia lost 10,000 sons from wounds or disease during the war, yet because of its plethora of churches and cemeteries and the insignificant number of returned bodies, it found no need to establish a soldiers’ national cemetery until the year 1885. Families did not collect bodies from the

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14 Brummer, Political History of New York State During the Period of the Civil War, 243.
15 Katherine Brinley Wharton diary, 1 August 1862, HSP; see also, Gallman, Mastering Wartime, 57.
battlefields until well after Reconstruction. During the war, nearly twenty major cemeteries dispersed across the Philadelphia housed the illustrious dead from the Civil War. For New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, the collection of the dead was a postwar endeavor.

Baltimore, however, broke from the norm. Its nearness to the scene of battle and its growing importance a depot for sick and wounded soldiers from the Northeast turned it into the hub of death. Unlike the other three cities, Baltimore made the ghastly numbers clear in a visual way. Baltimoreans had to stare at the “Government Plot” in Loudon Park Cemetery if they lived at southwest edge of the city, where, by the end of the war, 1,785 Union Marylanders were laid to rest. A lone sentry always stood guard outside the cemetery cottage, keeping watch so that southern sympathizers would not deface the graves of the fallen bluecoats.

The months of heavy combat in 1862 caused yet another dilemma for the urban centers of the Northeast: caring for the wounded. This problem fell primarily upon the two cities nearest the lines of battle, Baltimore and Philadelphia. During the harried days following the Peninsula and Second Manassas campaigns, the number of patients sent to those cities increased noticeably. Neither Baltimore nor Philadelphia was completely ready to meet the burdens of caring for the wounded. However, each city had a strong relief association movement upon which it could build.

Back in 1861, Philadelphia’s refreshment saloon workers established twenty-four small-scale, supplemental military hospitals, meant for short-term care only. Philadelphians expected

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that the city would have to treat only the soldiers from regiments that passed through the city or became sick during the voyage to Washington. Many supposed that sick and injured soldiers would stay in the Quaker City for no more than a few weeks. Consequently, Philadelphia benevolent volunteers established their first hospitals in abandoned buildings, ill-suited for long-term sufferers.

The change came in August and September 1862 when the massive ring of hospitals encircling Washington overflowed its capacity, and Baltimore and Philadelphia quickly prepared to care for the excess. Baltimore had been the first of the four northeastern cities to start receiving wounded men in large numbers. By July 1862, four military hospitals operated in the city. By the beginning of 1863, the city added two more, its two largest—the U.S. General Hospitals at Newton University and Patterson Park—capable of holding 2,500 patients between them. Baltimore’s women became central to the success of these hospitals. Many soldiers admitted to Baltimore’s general hospitals exhibited great distress, as rumors abounded among the rank-and-file that the women of the city were secessionists and might poison injured bluecoats while they convalesced. Baltimore’s Union Party leaders viewed this as an excellent opportunity to change the collective opinion of the nation. The Union Relief Association took up the task, recruiting tender-hearted Unionist ladies—particularly physically attractive ones—to serve as volunteer nurses in Baltimore’s expanding hospital system. Sending kind-hearted, good-looking women to treat the sick and wounded became a matter of propaganda, because, as one anonymous nurse-recruiter stated, “Some of the poor fellows come here fearing everything from the reports of a year ago.” Still, getting friendly girls to face the horrible aftermath of combat—mangled and decaying flesh, wounded and dying men—was not an easy task. The Union Relief Association made special arrangements so that nurses would not be inside the hospitals during
the hours of surgery. Entreating her fellow Baltimore sisters, one nurse told female volunteers to come by Steuart’s Mansion hospital (renamed Jarvis Hospital) from 1:00-6:00 P.M. or to McKim’s Hospital from 11:00 A.M. to noon, or 3:00-5:00 P.M., because that would “prevent you from seeing anything in the least offensive, as the dressing of wounds or any other surgical operations, as that business is all ‘done up’ by that time, and any little kind act, such as the mending of their clothes, writing to their friends for them, or bathing the faces of those very feeble, will be received with deep gratitude.”

Farther from the battlegrounds in Virginia, Philadelphia exhibited less preparation than Baltimore to care for the surge of wounded. On September 3, 1862, 1,700 sick and wounded soldiers arrived in Philadelphia by train. Attendants lacked space at the twenty-four benevolent hospitals and found it impossible to admit them all. To meet the demand, the National Guards Militia offered their headquarters as a hospital, and the Weccacoe Engine Company opened up its engine house. Sadly, even with this assistance, 400 soldiers had to be turned away and put on another train south to nearby Chester, Pennsylvania.

The appalling numbers of wounded men arriving daily in the cities spurred the federal government to action. The War Department appointed a team of U.S. medical directors and inspectors—including a luminary in battlefield medicine, Dr. Jonathan Letterman—to Philadelphia to establish an organized hospital system there. Quickly, the benevolent hospitals closed, and for the first time, federal, state, and local authorities uniformly agreed on a plan of action: they would centralize medical resources and admit patients into large institutions capable

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18 Sheads and Toomey, Baltimore During the Civil War, 176-177; Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 10 July 1862.
19 Scharf, History of Philadelphia, 802.
of handling all kinds of injuries, wounds, and illnesses. The new infirmaries sprouted quickly, and by the end of the war, Philadelphia had twenty-two fully operational military hospitals.\footnote{Although the autumn of 1862 witnessed the increase of federal control of military hospitals, the Quaker City’s benevolent movement did not cease. Benevolent citizens sustained one large military hospital entirely of their own account—the Citizen’s Volunteer Hospital—at the corner of Broad Street and Washington Avenue. This hospital opened on September 5, 1862, with 400 beds. Cash receipts from contributors topped $43,000.}

Federal officials opened the first major hospital, Satterlee U.S. General Hospital, a thirty-four-ward complex with 2,860 beds on June 9, 1862. The number increased to 3,124 beds after a November expansion and sprawled across Osage and Larchwood Avenues in West Philadelphia’s Twenty-Seventh Ward. In addition, hundreds of hospital tents surrounded the main wards covering the hilly countryside. It employed ten resident surgeons, seventeen visiting surgeons, and up to forty-two Sisters of Charity. Three benevolent organizations—the Ladies’ Aid Society, the Penn Relief Society, and the Ladies’ Association for Soldiers’ Relief—donated materials for the establishment of a hospital library, reading, and writing room to improve the minds of convalescing soldiers.\footnote{Taylor, \textit{Philadelphia in the Civil War}, 231-4.}

The twenty-seven acre Mower U.S. General Hospital, which opened for business on January 17, 1863, became the largest hospital structure in Philadelphia. At first, it held 2,800 patients, but additional building increased capacity to 4,000. The staff included twenty-six surgeons, one steward, forty-seven ward masters, 141 nurses, and two firemen. Philadelphia’s hospital system demonstrated the brilliance of medical efficiency. For instance, Mower had a symmetrical design, with fifty single-story wards all radiating outward from a central building. That way, an emergency in one ward quickly sent a dispatch of attendants from the hospital’s “nerve center,” its three-story administration building, to the problematic ward. Because they radiated outward, the wards stood at least twenty feet apart, cutting down on the possibility of
infection spreading between the structures. Rails ran down each 174-foot ward, and these facilitated the feeding of patients in the mess-rooms by running speedy carts down the central halls. Mower had ridge ventilation, 1,050 gas burners capable of running all day, a chapel, a surgeon’s lecture room, a library, a printing press, a stage for plays, and an isolated card-playing and smoking room where recovering patients could relax. An astonished observer wrote that Mower had no “hospital smell” and that none could “compare with this Skrymir of hospitals.” The observer described Mower’s success glowingly: “Hospital-life [in Mower] is woven in a different pattern from our own, the shades deeper, the gold brighter, and we find it in very much of heroism in plain colors, and self-sacrifice of rough texture.”

New York City and Boston were not entirely spared the flood of wounded soldiers; however, unlike Baltimore and Philadelphia, their hospitalization efforts remained decentralized and relatively free from federal control. In New York City, benevolent groups such as the Women’s Central Relief Association, the Ladies’ Home for Sick and Wounded Soldiers, the Y.M.C.A., and the U.S. Sanitary Commission—which headquartered in New York—performed the lion’s share of the hospital labor. A few federal hospitals remained, but these were located at the various military posts in the harbor. The largest of these was Fort Schuyler Hospital on Throg’s Neck, which accommodated about 2,500 patients and employed 130 nurses. The other military hospitals proved to be adaptations of existing city structures and institutions already erected for medical practice. Bellevue Hospital, City Park Barracks, Northeastern Dispensary, and St. Vincent’s Convent all became military hospitals in 1862. The first sufferers, about 800, arrived by steamer on May 20, and throughout the next four months, that number rose steadily.


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until New York City housed, as one historian has guessed, over 30,000 wounded men spread throughout its environs.23

Efficient hospitalization served tremendous importance in improving Union morale. Because Union soldiers knew that capable medical care awaited them in the cities, their spirits boosted after the depressing bloodbaths of 1862. Word reached the soldiers in their Virginia encampments about the comfort of the hospitals and the transportation to them. Philadelphia, for instance, had chartered a special steamer, the W. Whildin, to transfer men from Virginia to the Philadelphia docks. Surgeon R. S. Kenderdine, Philadelphia’s Medical Director of Transportation, designed special railroad cars equipped with shock-absorbing mattresses to travel with a train that ran from Washington to Philadelphia three times weekly. Speedy transportation and care to ease the sufferings of men with broken limbs and gunshot wounds offered incalculable emotional improvement for the men in the ranks. Most especially, soldiers enjoyed the presence of women in the hospitals to care for them and write to their loved ones. A chaplain at Satterlee described the work of the Sisters of Charity. He wrote, “Better nurses, better attendants, more noiseless, ceaseless performers of services in the hospital could not be found. There is probably not a hospital in the public service that would not be glad to have them.”24 A Union soldier from the 7th Pennsylvania Reserves wrote to a female friend, Mary Brady, who volunteered at Satterlee Hospital. He asked her to check on an injured friend, Private Andrew Henry Griffin. The soldier wrote:

Dear Friend:

There is one of my comrades in the West Philadelphia Hospital (Ward H) by the name of Harry Griffin. I wish you would be so kind as to call and see him as you make your daily rounds. You are engaged in a good work in visiting the afflicted, and by contributing to their wants; and surely you will reap your reward in good season, and God will bless you. Every true soldier you have helped shall remember you with respect and gratitude. I shall always remember you myself with deep feelings of gratitude, and I shall never forget the kindness bestowed on me by the ladies. ‘A friend in need is a friend indeed.’

Burial of the dead and caring for the wounded became full-time necessities of the Northeastern cities’ transition to war. However, building loyalty became another important requirement in the aftermath of Antietam. City Republicans saw a flagging spirit in the winter of 1862-3 and considered it their solemn duty to arouse a new sense of national loyalty. George Henry Boker, a poet and son of a wealthy Philadelphia banker, remembered, “At no period of the struggle was the patriotic spirit so low, and the spirit of the traitors so insultingly hopeful. . . . [To them,] the President was vulgar, the administration was vulgar, the war was vulgar, and the people who waged it were of the common sort.” In late November 1862, Boker organized a small meeting with other wealthy Philadelphians—Morton McMichael, Judge J. I. C. Hare, Horace Binney, Jr., Charles Gibbon, and Benjamin Gerhard—and proposed the formation of a “Union League Club.” In December, the Union League Club drew up a set of “Articles of Association” aimed at the “discontinuance and rebuke by moral and social influences, [of] all disloyalty to the Federal Government.” Although the club operated under the unstated assumption of Republican partisanship, 135 of the first 250 “associators” held Democratic loyalties.

The Union League Club’s first efforts focused on the publishing of patriotic pamphlets; however, the club soon found its true calling in money-raising efforts to support mobilizing

regiments. Still, it would take the emergency of the Pennsylvania invasion to provide the necessary opportunity to prove their vital importance. Boston and New York City followed with their own pro-Republican Union League Clubs in February and May 1863. The men who comprised these clubs saw themselves as undertaking a duty as solemn and important as the soldiers themselves. To them, the Copperhead critiques of the war had grown unacceptably seditious. Being a Copperhead amounted to treason, they concurred, and if no one answered their admonitions, mobilization would dwindle, and the war would be lost. A self-serving postwar history of Philadelphia’s Union League Club captured the sense of duty that the club members believed they held: “It was seen at once that The Union League meant business. The very fact that such a group of men, headed by the brilliant and able [William Morris] Meredith [the first president of the club], came out boldly for a war to the finish made the Union cause infinitely more fashionable than it had been. What was fully as desirable, it made the cause of the Copperheads less fashionable.” George Boker claimed simply, the Union League Club “took treason by the throat.”

Baltimore lacked a Union League Club, but not for want of effort. Union Party members in the city of monuments could do little organizing because the Middle Department’s suspicious Democratic commander, General John Ellis Wool, kept watchful eyes on all Union Party meetings. At the end of the year, an attempt to create a Union club resulted in the arrest of a few ringleaders and triggered an extraordinary drama that resulted in Wool’s dismissal.

Following the well-attended July 28 rally, Governor Augustus Bradford appointed a special committee of five men to investigate the loyalty of Baltimoreans holding government

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jobs. For several weeks, the committee collected ninety-six depositions, each of them swearing
to the disloyalty of several prominent businessmen, among them John W. Garrett, president of
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and Moore N. Falls, president of Bay Line Steamers.
Bradford’s committee demanded that President Lincoln have these men arrested, as “disloyal”
men should not be allowed to transport Union troops. Bradford’s committee also agitated for the
removal of General Wool, who kept intimate company with Garrett and Falls while he stayed in
Baltimore.28

Since July, Wool’s relationship with the Union Party had grown worse by the day. Wool
firmly believed he had saved the city from disaster when he resolved the bounty ordinance
fracas. He also took it as his sworn duty to protect local Confederate sympathizers. In August, he
wrote his wife, “[M]y absence might induce the Jacobins to attempt insurrection in the City of
Baltimore. Many are very anxious for an opportunity to attack the sympathizers and destroy
them and their property. The rebels at least in feeling think they owe their safety to my discipline
and energy.” When Bradford’s committee held a meeting at Temperance Temple to pass
resolutions calling for Wool’s removal, the old general lashed out by sending two of his staff
officers to arrest the ring leaders. With pistols drawn, Wool’s officers stormed into the meeting
hall, seized the depositions, and arrested four of the committee leaders. Mayor Chapman and
Nicholas Wood, president of the Board of Police, called at Wool’s headquarters to demand the
release of the detainees, but Wool would not hear of it. Wool sent the four men to Fort Delaware,
but the commandant released them shortly after they arrived.29

28 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 18 November 1862.
29 John Wool to Sarah Wool, 9 August 1862, Wool papers, NYSL; Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 18 November 1862.
Bradford complained to President Lincoln about this draconian move, and on December 22, Stanton ordered Wool to relinquish his post to Major General Robert Schenck. Wool took Stanton’s decision personally, blaming the “traitors in disguise, . . . [the] remnant of the know nothings & plug uglies[,] . . . who would destroy the City of Baltimore to gratify a revengeful and vindictive spirit.” In complaining to Secretary Stanton, Wool waxed into and out of lines from Shakespeare, and then listed a litany of his accomplishments:

Mr. Secretary, of what do the persons who ask my removal complain; or what do they charge me with? Is it because I have preserved the peace and quiet of this city as well as of the State? I believe I can truly say that Baltimore is the most quiet, if not the most peaceable city in the Union. Is it because I induced the second branch of the Common Council, who refused to vote for an appropriation of three hundred thousand dollars to recruit four regiments under your proclamation, without coercive measures to resign their places, in order that Union men might be elected in their stead, and the money might be obtained? . . . Is it because John W. Garrett, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and Colonel Falls, President of the Bay Line Steamers, calls occasionally to see me? Although they are agents of the government and occupy high and important positions, they are called secessionists, and because of business transactions with them, it is asserted that I favor these Secessionists and associate with no others.30

Wool’s plea fell on deaf ears, so, wielding a vindictive pen, he made sure to make the City of Baltimore pay for his ousting. On November 20, he wrote a public letter, taking full credit for the resolution of the bounty ordinance affair and denouncing the people of the Monumental City as “a population . . . divided, intensely hating each other, with a civil war, that never fails to call forth the baser passions of the human heart.” Predictably, Wool’s letter infuriated Baltimore’s Unionists. Charles Fulton gasped, “Every leading Unionist in the city and state is embraced in his sweeping denunciation.”31

Most Baltimoreans could see correctly that Wool’s childish arrogance had led to his removal. However, in some sense, Wool was right: Baltimore’s Union Party, forged by an

30 John Wool to Sarah Wool, 29 October and 6 November 1862; John Wool to Edwin Stanton, 20 October 1862, Wool papers, NYSL. In his personal writings, Wool admitted to ordering the arrest of Bradford’s men solely because of their attempt to denounce him.
31 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 24 November 1862.
unusual alliance of Know-Nothings, Republicans, and War Democrats, bred a rancorous political atmosphere in Baltimore. In a time of war, when parties overestimated the depth of treason and opposition, any debate pertaining to the nature of wartime politics appeared to come from the city’s traitorous element, whether or not it actually did. Wool’s resignation and the earlier Second Branch fiasco symbolized that the Union Party controlled Baltimore. In this sense, Baltimore demonstrated an anomalous political system. In the city, only one party contributed to the mobilization of troops. Political parties never competed in the Monumental City, at least not in a healthy sense. In Baltimore, they fought each other, and they did so with a vicious resolve.

Political dissent did not limit itself to Baltimore; the high casualty rates at Antietam caused New York City to lose the support of one of its strongest ethnic communities. As historian Susannah Ural has argued, the heavy loss of life in the North’s urban Irish units, particularly New York City’s Irish Brigade regiments, “tested Irish-American’s willingness to sacrifice for abstract goals of duty and honor and American union.” Irish Captain James B. Turner of the 88th New York warned his father in New York City not to enlist. If he did, wrote Turner, he would enter “perfect hell.” Turner lamented, “[W]hen I see young strong men about me, who hold commissions, sinking daily and fast under the mingled fatigue, exposure and want of proper nourishment it makes one wish that never a friend of his should be placed in like predicament.” This change in sentiment had the potential of spoiling the recruiting of Corcoran’s “Irish Legion” a new Irish brigade that recruited in the city.32 Other New York ethnicities exhibited signs of flagging spirit. Although still generally supportive of the Union, New York City’s Germans demonstrated growing disenchantment with the Union’s belligerent effort. On

32 James B. Turner to father, 29 July 1862, James B. Turner Papers, New York State Library, Albany, New York (NYSL); see also, Bruce, The Harp and the Eagle, 82, 106-7.
September 27, Emile Dupré wrote his mother in Braunschweig, “Our government is unfortunately in the hands of incompetent men, and I would not be at all surprised if the rebellion didn’t force the North to recognize the South.”

The four northeastern cities experienced varying degrees of turmoil when the Emancipation Proclamation went into effect on January 1, 1863. Although urbanites had anticipated the enforcement of this Presidential decree since September 22, because its enactment came on the heels of the controversial state drafts and the lamentable Union defeat at Fredericksburg, Virginia, city Democrats began to see the proclamation as evidence of Republican tyranny and mismanagement. Newly elected New York City Congressman Fernando Wood considered emancipation a sign that a military solution to the war had failed. On October 31, he told a crowd of onlookers, “I do not impeach the motives of the President, but I cannot avoid the conviction that his judgment has been at fault.” He said that Lincoln did not need “firmness,” but “consistency of purpose . . . essential in the conduct of public affairs.” In mid-December, after his electoral victory, Wood went further, drafting a letter to President Lincoln, calling for an end to hostilities. He wrote, “You know that since the establishment of christian civilization negociation and compromise have sooner or later determined every military contest. It cannot be otherwise now. Has not the time arrived when to quote your own language we should ‘cease fighting’ at least long enough to ascertain whether the ‘identical questions’ about which we began the fight may not be amicably & honourably adjusted, and ‘the terms of intercourse’ be once more peaceably established?”

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33 Emile Dupré to mother, 27 September 1862, in Kamphoefner and Helbich, eds., *Germans in the Civil War*, 54.
34 *New York Herald*, 31 October 1862.
Philadelphia’s Peace Democrats followed Wood’s lead. On January 8, 1863, Copperheads founded the Central Democratic Club, with Charles Ingersoll as its president. An anti-administration, anti-draft lawyer, William B. Reed, delivered the club’s commencement address: “I deplore and condemn the war and believe coercion to have been a mistake from the beginning, and pray, and hope and urge the necessity of Peace, and, if possible, ‘Reconciliation’; but Peace, even if the bond of sympathy be, as I fear it is, irreparably broken.”36

In all four cities, conservative Democratic newspapers complained that by freeing slaves held in rebellious territory, the Emancipation Proclamation threatened to overturn, as the New York Herald opined, the “condition assigned to [African Americans] by God.”37 Many Democrats guessed that a nefarious cabal of “ultra” abolitionists controlled the federal government. In the wake of the Emancipation, city Democrats pledged a solemn vow to resist the anti-slave conspiracy at any price. Criticism from urban Democrats caused Irish residents to convert to peace activism. Staunch partisanship and Irish paranoia against presumed state-level Know-Nothings made Boston one of the first arenas of political confrontation. Republican victory at the polls in November and December induced an unusual situation in the Bay City, one that caused Governor Andrew to turn his back on the city’s Irish volunteers and call upon its sable arm to meet the last of the summer quotas. During the preceding months, Andrew had faced severe criticism from Boston’s Irish population for not commissioning enough Irish officers. One Irish lawyer wrote to Andrew that, “It is generally understood among our Irish citizens that you have refused to commission any more Irish officers, and that they, therefore, are disinclined to enlist, feeling quite naturally, that their services are not fully appreciated.” Andrew

37 New York Herald, 7 and 17 August 1862; Spann, Gotham at War, 126.
denied such charges, arguing that he signed commissions based on applicants’ skill. Still, Andrew acknowledged that the city needed a new Irish regiment and he authorized the recruitment of an all-Irish nine-month regiment to be dubbed the “55th Massachusetts.” Recruiting advertisements filled the city papers, promising Irish recruits that they could select their own officers and receive a Roman Catholic chaplain and surgeon.38

Sadly, Andrew and Adjutant Schouler did not manage affairs well. Several Irish societies in Boston vied for the chance to raise the regiment, causing much confusion among the recruits. John Leahy, a leader of one of these efforts, expressed himself “doubtful whether two Irish Regt’s can be formed at present.” He warned Andrew that, “The fact of two parties in the field confuses to a certain extent our people so that many who are eager to enlist become indifferent and will not join either.” Consequently, not enough Irishmen joined to form a single complete regiment. Only six companies organized and these, according to the orders of Adjutant Schouler, needed to be consolidated with another partially completed nine-month regiment, the 48th Massachusetts.39

This merger almost failed. When the Irish companies reached Camp Hooker, dozens of Irish soldiers deserted. Despite welcoming acclamations from the men of the 48th Massachusetts, the Irishmen refused to serve in an ethnically diverse unit. Brigadier General R. A. Pierce, commander of all the commonwealth’s militia camps, proceeded to Camp Hooker on December 13 to effect the consolidation, but he found the Irishmen in a sour mood. He maintained, the officers’ conduct “was such as to produce complete demoralization among their men.” Pierce informed them that he must disband two undersized Irish companies and consolidate the rest.

38 Boston Evening Transcript, 28 July 1862.
39 John Leahy to John Andrew, 1 September 1862, MASA.
The officers remonstrated, but Pierce warned them that as officers, their services belonged to the governor. He recounted, “While I think that all admitted the justice of my reasoning, nothing could be done to change their determination, which appeared to be to have their resignation accepted.”

Reluctantly, Schouler accepted the resignations of the Irish officers and consolidated the enlisted men with the 48th Massachusetts. Although a number of Irish soldiers deserted, eventually, the 48th Massachusetts went to war with 838 aggregate, about half of them Irish.

Pierce reflected, “I believe that every advantage was given the Irish companies that could be, but their officers determined to go as an Irish regiment or not at all, and in my judgment in no way could the 55th Regt., so called, have completed its organization.”

The disbanding of the Irish regiment did not go unnoticed by the city’s Irish leaders. Patrick Donohoe, the famed Irish newspaper editor, told Andrew that the 55th Massachusetts must remain an all Irish regiment, no matter the cost. He commented, “I would sooner see the regt. go off as others have, even if there were not the full complement of men. You are well aware that our people like to go together—they fight better together—and agree better together.” The dispossessed Irish officers complained along the same lines. They wrote, “[It] is well known from the public prints and other sources we commenced organizing the 55th Regt. with the assurance that it would be recognized and exist officially as an Irish American regiment; to be lead [sic] to fight the battles of the Union by Irish American officers; to bear with us the ‘Green Flag’ of Old Ireland, as well as the ‘Stars and Stripes.’” Thus, they concluded, the 55th Massachusetts was a “special organization and not capable of being consolidated with the same

40 R. A. Pierce to Albert G. Browne, 24 March 1863, MASA.
41 Ibid.
show of justice to its officers and men as would appear in the case of regiments recruited under different auspices.” The disbanding of the regiment, they maintained, only served to validate the existence of “religious bigotry and political intolerance [of] years gone by.”

Adjutant Schouler did not agree. He argued to Andrew that the officers of the 55th Massachusetts had “no proper grounds of complaint.” He continued:

They were favored to the utmost of our power by myself and staff in the attempt to raise an Irish Regiment to go with Gen’l Corcoran, or otherwise as the War Department might order. They did not succeed. . . . It became needful to consolidate and their refusal to yield obedience to necessary careful and reasonable orders and arrangements even to the dangerous conduct described by Gen’l Price is the source of all their trouble. Had they all adhered to their duty and not abandoned it, I would have adhered to them.

This fiasco made two things abundantly clear: Andrew and his administration wanted nothing more to do with the city’s Irishmen, and Boston’s Irish wanted nothing to do with him.

Andrew’s frustration with Irish remonstrations and accusations of Know-Nothingism led him to initiate an idea he had long advocated, the enlistment of African American troops. Congress had authorized the creation of black regiments as far back as July 1862, having added it as a provision of the controversial Militia Act. To uphold the popularity of Lincoln’s proclamation, the moment seemed perfect to Andrew to advocate recruitment of black Bostonians. However, the commonwealth’s constitution posed a curious dilemma: it allowed only white men to serve in the state militia. How, then, could black troops be raised in Massachusetts if all U.S. volunteers needed to muster into state service first? Robert Morris, a black attorney from Boston, had offered Andrew his services in raising a black regiment during the summer, but the governor, fearful of the reprisals of violating the constitution during election

42 Patrick Donohoe to John Andrew, 2 December 1862; J. B. Horan, et. al., to John Andrew, 2 December 1862, MASA.
43 William Schouler to John Andrew, n.d., MASA.
season, regretfully dismissed his aid. On February 3, 1863, after much agitation, Andrew finally convinced Secretary Stanton to authorize the commonwealth of Massachusetts to recruit a black regiment to be sworn into federal service directly, thereby circumventing the curious constitutional obstacle.\textsuperscript{44}

Boston seemed the likely place to recruit the black regiment, but it had only recently overturned the conservative administration of Mayor Wightman and half of the city’s wards still possessed Democratic leaders. Lacking faith in the metropolitan government, Governor Andrew took the lead. He organized a committee—commonly known as the “Black Committee”—to superintend recruiting of the new regiment. George L. Stearns—one of the notorious “Secret Six” who aided John Brown—headed the committee, and other prominent abolitionists filled its ranks. Adjutant Schouler considered it a bold move for the governor. “It was a new thing,” he reminisced, “Few men in the State had ever seen a colored man in uniform. They were not allowed to form part of the militia; or to be enlisted in the regular service. By many it was regarded as an experiment of doubtful utility; and there were those, even here in Massachusetts, who secretly hoped the experiment would prove a failure.”\textsuperscript{45}

Andrew did not wait long to explain his plan. On January 30, he wrote, “This I cannot but regard as perhaps the most important Corps to be organized during the whole war.” He continued, “I am desirous to have for its officers . . . young men of military experience, of firm Anti-Slavery principles, ambitions, superior to a vulgar attempt for color, and having faith in the capacity of Colored men for military service. . . . I shall look for them in those circles of

\textsuperscript{44} O’Connor, \textit{Civil War Boston}, 128; Schouler, \textit{Massachusetts in the Civil War}, 407-8.

\textsuperscript{45} Schouler, \textit{Massachusetts in the Civil War}, 408.
educated Anti Slavery society, which next to the colored men itself have the greatest interest in
the success of this experiment."\textsuperscript{46}

The Black Committee selected a number of respected Bostonians—most of them
veterans—to serve as officers. Andrew handpicked the regimental commander, selecting Captain
Robert Gould Shaw, a veteran from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Massachusetts and the son of a prominent abolitionist
couple, Francis G. Shaw and Sarah Blake Sturgis Shaw. The same day that Stanton authorized
the recruitment of the new black regiment, Francis Shaw traveled to the Army of the Potomac’s
winter quarters at Stafford Court House, Virginia, and delivered Andrew’s offer to command the
new regiment to his son. The twenty-four-year-old Harvard graduate expressed himself
somewhat surprised, and he bluntly rejected it. Writing to his fiancée, Shaw wrote, “The
Governor considers it a most important command; and I could not help feeling, from the tone of
his letter, that he did me great honor in offering it to me.” Feeling moderately guilty, he added, “I
am afraid Mother will think I am shirking my duty; but I had good practical reasons for it.”\textsuperscript{47}

Shaw was correct. His mother took his refusal personally. Writing to Governor Andrew,
Sarah Shaw lamented, “I have just received a telegram from Mr. Shaw saying ‘Rob declines—I
think rightly’—this decision has caused me the bitterest disappointment I have ever experienced.
. . . In your description of what you desired in the officers for the regiment, flattering as it was, I
recognized the portrait of my son . . . [Y]ou will believe that I have shed bitter tears over his
refusal[.] . . . Excuse my troubling you with my grief but I wished you to know what a crushing
trial it has been on my maternal pride.” Sarah Shaw sent her son a telegram, battering him with

\textsuperscript{46} John Andrew to Francis Shaw, 30 January 1863, MASA.
an incredible guilt-complex. Four days after he rejected the offer, Shaw reconsidered. He admitted to his fiancée that he “made a mistake.” He now vowed to accept command, and, he wrote, “after I have undertaken this work I shall feel that what I have to do is to prove the negro can be made a good soldier[.]. . . . There is great prejudice against it; but now that it has become a government matter, that will probably wear away. At any rate, I shan’t be frightened out of it by its unpopularity; and I hope you won’t care if it is made fun of.”48

Shaw returned to Boston on February 16 and he discussed recruiting plans with Governor Andrew and with two of his recruiting officers, two Philadelphia-born brothers and fellow Harvard graduates: Captain Norwood P. Hallowell and Lieutenant Edward N. Hallowell. They selected Readville as a rendezvous and then disbursed to various buildings rented as recruiting centers. On February 20, Shaw met the Black Committee and they discussed the prospect of raising money to support the mobilization of the regiment—now dubbed the 54th Massachusetts. Because the 54th Massachusetts could not receive state funds, the burden of recruitment would be born by private donations. Shaw noted that the committee contained not a single black person, and several of the members indulged in racist jokes. Governor Andrew did not seem amused; Shaw wrote, “I didn’t see the Governor’s mouth twitch, and I like him more every day. He is not only a liberal minded philanthropist, but a man of real practical good-sense, I think—and as kind-hearted as he can be.” The ten-man committee soon agreed it would need the aid of the city’s black population if the 54th Massachusetts were to reach completion.49

48 Sarah B. Shaw to John Andrew, 4 February 1863, MASA; Robert Shaw to Annie Haggerty, 8 February 1863, in Duncan, ed., Blue-Eyed Child of Fortune, 285-6.
In fact, several black organizations in the city had already begun the process of stirring up patriotism among residents of “Nigger Hill,” the slang term that white Bostonians called the black section of town. On February 9, black citizens met at the Joy Street Church. A reporter for the *Boston Liberator* remembered, “The church was crowded, and the object being somewhat novel to this class of our inhabitants and of peculiar interest to them at this time considerable enthusiasm was gotten up and the exercises were continued until a late hour.” The black gatherers expressed their disapproval that the federal government would not allow them to serve as line officers, as per the July 1862 Militia Act. Some suggested that they should refuse enlistment until the government removed this racial injustice. The keynote speaker, Charles T. Russell, attempted to calm the assembly. He agreed that the act disbarring them from officers’ commissions was unfair. “You desire to be line officers yourselves,” Russell said, “If you want commissions go earn and get them. Never let it be said that when the country called this reason kept back a single man from the army—but go cheerfully into the ranks, and the day that dawns upon a great battlefield in which your blood is mingled with that of other regiments fighting side by side with you, that same day will see sorry prejudice against your race washed out and obliterated.” This provoked lusty cheers. Famed abolitionist Wendell Phillips spoke next, declaring, “If the Union lives, it will live with equal races. If divided and you have done your duty, then you will stand upon the same platform with the white race. Then make use of the offer government has made you, for if you are not willing to fight your way up to officer you are not worthy of it. Put yourselves under the stars and stripes and fight yourself to the marquee of a general, and you shall come out with a sword.”

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50 Luis Emilio, Manuscript Records of the 54th Massachusetts, MAHS.
This rally at the Joy Street Church induced the first black volunteers from Boston to enlist. The next day, February 10, William Henry Jones, a forty-four-year-old clothing dealer, described as “a stout built, wide-mouthed fellow,” signed his name to the 54th Massachusetts at the recruiting office on Cambridge Street. Later on that day, seven more black Bostonians enlisted: Elias Horne, Burrill Smith, Arthur B. Lee, William Miller, Eli J. Biddle, Henry F. Burghardt, and Samuel Smith. Getting the men to their barracks posed a problem. Each squad had to be mustered by a federal officer. Lieutenant John Appleton remembered, “Taking the men from our recruiting office to that of the mustering officer on Court Street was at times a trying march, as the roughs who voted the Democratic ticket and kept out of the war seemed to have a spite against ‘niggers’ fighting in the army. I had several little encounters with them. One day on court street one fellow kicked one of the recruits as we passed and I promptly smashed the rough’s face for him.” Appleton and his black recruits received little respect from the mustering officers. One man, named Captain Collins, once pulled a trick on a subordinate, named Marsh, by asking him to muster Appleton’s recruits when he saw them coming up the street. Appleton recounted, “Marsh followed me into the next room and when he saw the line of black faces, he said, ‘Jesus Christ!’ and turned on his heels. Collins, who had quietly followed us, burst out laughing and came forward and mustered the men.” Angrily, Appleton remarked later, “All the regular officers were not genial.”

As the recruits came forward, monetary donations increased. The Black Committee soon encompassed over 100 members and included prominent black leaders among its ranks, including Frederick Douglass, Henry Highland Garnet, Martin Delaney, and William Wells Brown. Other groups sprang up to support the 54th Massachusetts, including many female members.

51 Ibid.
organizations. Colonel Robert Shaw recalled a “frightful scrape,” when he went to visit a committee of ladies at 44 Bowdoin Street, “who wished to do something to assist the 54th Mass.” Shaw proceeded with “light heart and jaunty step,” and rang the bell, expecting to find only four women. “[S]tepping into the parlour,” he wrote, “a fearful sight met my terrified gaze. There sat what seemed to me, about 17,000 ladies & two men. . . . I was brought forward, as to the slaughter, in a terrible perspiration, and if I had not been able to recover myself, while I was being introduced to the audience, I don’t know that I should have pulled through.” Shaw informed the large committee of the needs of his men, and he left expecting a munificent donation from them. However, the shy colonel remarked, “If I am ever caught in that way again, I shall hope I shall [sic] at least know it beforehand.”

As February and March passed, the recruits assembled at Readville. In truth, only a small number came from Boston—forty-five, in fact. A black recruit from New Bedford lamented, “I must confess, it is enough to discourage real well wishers of the cause to know that the ‘hub of the Universe’ contributed only the small number of 80 [sic] men to a whole regiment.” Massachusetts contributed less than 200 volunteers to the project, while other states—Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio—filled out the bulk. The Hallowell brothers brought a whole company from Philadelphia—secreted out of the Quaker City under the cover of darkness.

Like Massachusetts, Pennsylvania’s and New York’s Militia Laws limited military service to “white male citizens.” Republicans in both states argued that the racial restrictions of state militia laws posed no hindrance to black recruiting because the federal Militia Act of 1862

superseded them. However, some state officeholders did not wish to anger their constituencies by arming black men. Governor Curtin watched helplessly as forty-four Republican-held seats in the state legislature disappeared to conservative Democrats and Copperhead candidates in 1862. In early 1863, when he briefly considered himself a “lame duck,” Curtin embarked upon no effort to upset the delicate balance of power. New York’s new chief executive, Horatio Seymour, harbored racist sentiments, and thus refused to swear black soldiers in service of his state. Oliver T. Beard, the ex-lieutenant colonel of the 48th New York, wanted to raise several hundred black New Yorkers for Boston’s regiment. He complained, “Unfortunately for the nation, we are cursed with a governor in this state [Horatio Seymour] averse to such action and who would not commission regiments of this character hence colored men in this state must go to more enlightened ones [meaning Massachusetts] for recognition.”

In Baltimore, where southern sympathy persisted, the idea of recruiting black soldiers never entered public discourse.

The failure of Philadelphia, New York City, and Baltimore to recruit black soldiers caused Boston to benefit. During the opening months of 1863, it attracted black recruits from across the North. Franklin Devereaux, an abolitionist in New Jersey, promised to bring black citizens from the southern counties of New Jersey to Boston. He wrote, “there are settlements of Blacks, originally fugitives from the States of Maryland & Delaware, from the descendent of whom I think two or three companies could be raised[.] . . . I am prepared to say they would make excellent soldiers.” The 54th Massachusetts filled its ranks by mid-May 1863, but the recruits kept coming. Speaking tours by Frederick Douglass and George Stearns had attracted

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54 Luis Emilio, Manuscript Records of the 54th Massachusetts, MAHS; Oliver Beard to John Andrew, 28 January 1863, MASA.
55 Franklin Devereaux to John Andrew, 2 February 1863; and P. B. Randolph to John Andrew, 16 January 1863, MASA.
national attention. Soon, the spill-over caused Andrew to form a second regiment, the 55th Massachusetts, to be commanded by Norwood Hallowell. The regiment organized at Readville, but of the entire roster, only twenty-two came from Massachusetts.56

Altogether, the Black Committee of Boston raised over $100,000 to support the two black regiments, providing recruits with $100 bounties and plenty of necessary camp articles and recruiting expenses. Strangely, Boston’s black community provided less than fifty volunteers to the project, barely two percent of its population. Boston’s low turnout of volunteers is a curious thing, and it is difficult to surmise the reasons why so many black Bostonians refused to enlist. Certainly, racial prejudice probably had much to do with it. The limited bounties, the impossibility of black men serving as commissioned officers, and the $3.00 difference in pay between white and black privates (and an $11.00 difference between white and black sergeants), might have kept many proud black Bostonians from joining.

In any event, the 54th and 55th Massachusetts reached completion, the first two black regiments raised in any northern state, a feat that took no small amount of courage. When the 54th Massachusetts made its formal parade to the State House on May 18 to receive its colors from the governor, a great multitude of Bostonians, white and black, cheered its passage. Even Colonel Shaw, who had always expressed a lukewarm devotion to the “experiment,” now seemed changed by it. He wrote his fiancée, Annie, “The more I think of the passage of the Fifty-Fourth through Boston, the more wonderful it seems to me. Just remember our own doubts

56 Charles B. Fox, Record of the Service of the Fifty-Fifth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry (Cambridge, MA: Press of John Wilson and Son, July 1868), 1-6, 110, MAHS. The 55th Massachusetts contained 222 black soldiers from Ohio, 139 from Pennsylvania, 106 from Virginia, sixty-six from Missouri, fifty-six from Illinois, ninety-seven from Indiana, nineteen from Maryland, thirteen from Delaware, twenty-three from New York, thirty from North Carolina, sixty-eight from Kentucky, twenty-four from Tennessee, ten from Washington D.C., and eighty-four from unknown origins.
and fears, and other people’s sneering and pitying remarks, when we began last winter, and then
look at the perfect triumph of last Thursday. . . . I shall thank God a thousand times that I was led
to take my share in it.”

The glorious departure of the 54th Massachusetts did little to counterbalance the growing
sentiment among urban Democrats that the Republican Party could not conduct the war
favorably. In May, newspapers reported another defeat in the Eastern Theater, this one at
Chancellorsville, Virginia. The battle produced 17,000 Union casualties, and Democrats blamed
the seemingly idiotic generalship for this catastrophe. A writer for the New York Herald
acerbically reviewed the list of failed generals in the East:

“Fighting Joe” [Hooker] was the subject more abuse and cutting sarcasm than was the famous
general who boasted that his headquarters were always “in the saddle” and professed to despise
such trifling matters as “lines of retreat” [John Pope], or the self-sacrificing [Ambrose] Burnside
who sank into insignificance after his inglorious assaults on the heights of Fredericksburg. . . .
Inquire in whatever part of the city you might choose—down in Wall Street among the merchants,
off in the Democratic districts of the Sixth and Fourth Wards, among the aristocratic denizens of
the Sixteenth or Twenty-First Wards, in hotels, country homes, public offices, or in short, in any
other quarter—and the feeling manifested was contempt, the most bitter and unmeasured, for
General Hooker.”

Philadelphia, Boston, and New York City all suffered severe losses from
Chancellorsville, while Baltimore suffered heavily from a subsequent engagement in June, the
Battle of Second Winchester. After both engagements, Union forces had to relinquish control of
the battlefields, once again leaving the dead in enemy hands. Religious figures—particularly
those with Republican sentiments—tried to stem the tide of anguish. On May 15, 1863, Boston’s
famous battlefield chaplain, Warren Cudworth of the 1st Massachusetts, wrote to John Emerson,
whose brother, Stephen—a Harvard graduate—had died at Chancellorsville. On May 3, Private

57 Robert Shaw to Annie Haggerty, 1 June 1863, in Duncan, ed., Blue-Eyed Child of Fortune, 335.
58 New York Herald, 30 June 1863.
Stephen Goodhue Emerson had occupied a rifle pit with a comrade, but he failed to hear a retreat order issued by his regimental commander. Just as they realized their error, a ball passed through Emerson’s head killing him instantly. After the fight, no one from the 1st Massachusetts knew the private’s fate, so Cudworth informed John Emerson that “the impression prevails that he [Stephen] was captured unharmed and is now a prisoner of war in Richmond. Arrangements will soon be made to exchange all our prisoners of war, so that I hope soon to see Stephen again alive and well. I wish it were in my power to tell you a better story, but such are the plain facts.”

Later, when it became obvious that Stephen Emerson had died and that no body would be recovered, Cudworth had to assuage his far off family of what his death meant:

> When he went forth to battle as he did twice during the period of his service, it was easy to see that he leaned wholly upon God. He cherished no bitterness towards his enemies nor ever used malicious or vindictive language concerning them, but as they would be the destroyers of a great and prosperous nation he considered it a duty, solemn, imperative and personal to take up arms against them. He has left us no last words, but I am sure he was prepared to die. He loved God, and all things have worked together for his good. He will not return to us. May we be ever ready to go to him.

In his modest effort to eulogize Private Emerson, Chaplain Cudworth spoke of love, duty, and cherishing no bitterness. As the summer of 1863 commenced and the federal draft neared, the tumultuous emotional and political sentiment churned up during the winter and spring of 1862-3 by burial of the dead, the care for the wounded, and the need to support national efforts such as the Emancipation Proclamation and black recruitment, caused the urban Northeast to drift from the ideals espoused by the compassionate Boston minister. Unless a victory emerged soon, mobilization might cease.

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60 Undated fragment, Warren Cudworth, MAHS.
Chapter 9: 
“Draft and Be Damned!”:
Emergency and Conscription, June 1863—October 1863.

The summer of 1863 added two new burdens to urban mobilization, the start of federal control of conscription and an unanticipated Emergency Militia call in response to the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania. Both of these challenges tested the cities’ efficiency and willingness to meet new manpower demands on short notice. The northeastern cities answered these simultaneous crises with mixed results. The draft announcement of July 9 sparked shameful rioting in Boston and New York City, but Philadelphia and Baltimore remained obediently peaceful. The mobilization of the Emergency Militia duplicated the confusion and inefficiency of the previous year, and none of the urban emergency troops participated in any combat. However, the combined threats fully convinced the cities to make an important compromise, one that vitally aided the Union cause: the recruitment of African American troops.

The spring of 1863 inaugurated notable changes to the urban Northeast’s manpower mobilization process, when Congress—unimpressed with the states’ control of the militia draft—passed a federal statute that allowed the President to control conscription. Passed on March 3, 1863, by the lame duck Thirty-Seventh Congress, the Enrollment Bill, or Senate Bill Number 511, represented a major departure for Union mobilization. The federal government no longer needed the help of states to organize regiments; during the first two years of the war the states had raised hundreds of regiments and the Union army had maintained them well. Now, the federal government proposed to fill existing units with conscripted men. The dismal failure of the Militia Act of 1862, which left control of the draft to state authorities, convinced the Republican Congress that Lincoln and Stanton required a more effective mechanism to put men
into the ranks. One day before the Thirty-Seventh Congress planned to adjourn, Boston’s Senator Henry Wilson, the bill’s primary architect, brought the bill to its final roll call vote, passing it successfully. Lincoln signed Bill 511 into law that very day. Had the Republicans of the Thirty-Seventh Congress delayed any longer, the bill would have been held over until December and placed in the hands of a Congress with a less powerful Republican majority.¹

The Enrollment Act operated similarly to the state conscription acts that attempted to draft men in 1862. The federal law allowed the Secretary of War to appoint a provost marshal general who then appointed a single federal provost marshal officer to each state, except to Pennsylvania and New York, which, because of their size, required two and three provost marshals respectively. In turn, these provost marshals appointed assistant provost marshals, one per congressional district.² As provost marshal general, Brigadier General James Barnett Fry held the top of the hierarchy. Appointed to his position on March 17, 1863, Fry had the power to set the quota for each state and district. He held a thankless job, one that required him to sort through numerous census records and muster rolls in order to distribute each quota fairly. The provost marshals had the responsibility of providing Fry with accurate muster rolls and draft enrollment lists and then calling the draft into operation when they deemed it appropriate. Finally, the assistant provost marshals, who usually held the rank of lieutenant or captain,

¹ Geary, We Need Men, 49-64. The Thirty-Seventh Congress consisted of twenty-nine Republican Senators, fourteen Democratic Senators, seven Unionist Senators, 104 Republican Representatives, forty-six Democratic Representatives and thirty-two Unionists and Independent Representatives. The Thirty-Eighth Congress consisted of thirty-three Republican Senators, ten Democratic Senators, nine Unionist and Independent Senators, eighty-five Republican Representatives, seventy-two Democratic Representatives and twenty-six Unionists and Independent Representatives. Obviously, the composition did not necessarily preclude Republicans from passing the same bill in the Thirty-Eighth Congress.

² One senior provost marshal administrated each state, except in New York and Pennsylvania. New York consisted of three “divisions,” the Northern, Southern, and Western Divisions, each with its own senior provost marshal. New York City was part of the Southern Division until 1865 when the city became its own separate division. Similarly, Pennsylvania consisted of two divisions, the Eastern and Western Divisions. Philadelphia was part of the Eastern Division.
executed the draft and ensured that it proceeded fairly. Each assistant provost marshal worked alongside a state-level operative, a draft commissioner, whose job was to ensure compliance from local authorities when serving draft notices or catching draft dodgers. In essence, the offices of the assistant provost marshals became the fixtures of the federal draft in each city. Baltimore and Boston each had two assistant provost marshals, Philadelphia had five, and New York City had six.  

After receiving the order to commence the draft, the assistant provost marshals poured slips of paper with the names and addresses of fencible males into a revolving wheel, drew out the requisite number, and one-by-one, read the names aloud. The provisions of the federal act followed the standards set by state militia laws. They exempted men based on age (younger than twenty-one or older than forty-five), physical disability, alienage, occupation, conscientious objection, or indigent familial circumstances. The federal Enrollment Act provided for substitution, but unlike most state militia laws, it allowed for commutation. Under this provision, any unwilling conscript could pay $300 to avoid service. Congressional Republicans had insisted on this addendum in order to cap the price of substitutes. Although the commutation fee meant to aid working-class citizens in draft evasion, unintentionally, it sowed the seeds of city-wide discontent.

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3 Boston consisted of two districts, the Third and Fourth. The Third District encompassed Wards Four, Seven, Eight, Ten, Eleven, and Twelve, as well as several wards from Roxbury and Brookline. The Fourth District encompassed Wards One, Two, Three, Five, Six, and Nine, as well as the towns of Chelsea and Cambridge. Philadelphia had five districts. The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Districts encompassed twenty-two city wards, while the Fifth District included three wards and part of Bucks County. New York City consisted of six drafting districts, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eight, and Ninth. Baltimore’s twenty wards were broken among two districts, the Second and Third. The Second contained the first seven wards of the city and Baltimore County, and the Third District contained the last thirteen wards.
By May 25, the War Department had established its nation-wide administrative apparatus. That day, the assistant provost marshals began placing names of eligible citizens onto draft rolls. Ideally, supporters hoped, the threat of a draft would force communities to urge volunteering with greater vigor. By late June, most—but not all—of the assistant provost marshals reported that they had completed their pre-draft administrative duties. The President could call a draft as soon as he wanted one. However, by that time, the opinion on the war had steadily soured in some of the northeastern cities.

The costly military failures at Fredericksburg, Chickasaw Bayou, Stones River, and Chancellorsville induced city dwellers to curse the Lincoln administration for its perceived ineptitude. This bitterness emerged principally in New York City because, in late spring, that city’s two-year regiments began returning, their thinned ranks showing the grim effects of war. Back in 1861, none of the other cities had raised two-year regiments, so by spring 1863, they avoided this somber homecoming. Between May and July, eighteen regiments arrived in the city to muster out. On May 8, George Strong witnessed the return of Duryée’s Zouaves, “or, rather, of its debris, less than three hundred.” Strong called it a “touching sight,” its sentiment reminiscent of Beethoven’s *Eroica*. Confiding to his diary, Strong noted, “I have always thought [of] the meaning of the finale of the *Eroica* and now I’m sure of it.”

On May 5, another regiment, the 9th New York, known as “Hawkins’s Zouaves,” returned to New York City with only 250 of its original 1,000 soldiers. Observers who watched the regiment disembark the steamer *Kennebec* at the battery remembered how the boyish “Zoo-Zoos” had left Gotham two years earlier full of gusto. Now, the veterans looked haggard and disheveled. A reporter believed,

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4 George T. Strong diary, 8 May 1863, in Nevins, ed., *Diary of the Civil War*, 320. Beethoven’s “Eroica,” or “heroic symphony,” has a long finale that oscillates between emotions of sadness and grandeur. This probably explains the reference by Strong.
“Their steady step and bronzed visage portrayed clearly the years of service which they had executed on the sands of Hatteras, on the Peninsula, and in the field.” The Zouaves’ commander, Colonel Rush Hawkins, delivered a sour farewell address to the men, bewailing the continuance of the war. He lamented, “Many scores of our friends and companions have fallen around us; and to what purpose? Is the war any nearer its end now than it was two years ago? Individual bravery and courage has all gone for naught. The imbecility of many high commanding officers in the field has cast a damning blight and disgrace over the graves of our brave countrymen.”

To make matters worse, Gotham’s Republican minority misread the feelings of these returning soldiers. The new federal draft threatened to return the veterans to the front immediately, and some Republican leaders expected them to answer their country’s call once more. On June 8, the newly returned “Irish Rifles” and the “2nd Scott Life Guard” (37th and 38th New York Infantry Regiments) sat in the City Assembly room, ostensibly to receive public thanks from Mayor Opdyke. Instead, Opdyke lectured them, reminding them that their service should have made their “hatred of treason intensified.” He continued, “Thus imbued, you cannot fail to exert a salutary influence on public sentiment. And if, in any contingency, the sympathy with the rebellion, which to some extent exists in your midst, should crop out into overt treason, you will stand in instant readiness and with willing hands to aid in crushing it.”

Opdyke received polite applause, but the next speaker, Judge John H. McCunn, the ex-colonel of the Irish Rifles and now one of New York City’s leading Copperheads, revealed the true feelings of the soldiers. McCunn declared, “I am for peace, with all its hallowed blessings, and I trust the hour will soon come when peace and prosperity will again dawn upon the land.”

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5 Undated newspaper clippings, New York State Archives unit history project, http://www.dmna.state.ny.us/historic/reghist/civil/infantry/9thInf/9thInfCWN.htm.
Great applause followed McCunn’s pronouncement. Aghast, Opdyke rose and asked McCunn why he was crying, “peace, peace,” when he should be crying, “war, war, to the bitter end.” Opdyke’s interruption sparked a heated argument among the soldiers and, according to a reporter, “the utmost confusion prevailed.” The soldiers booed Opdyke off the stage and then carried McCunn triumphantly on their shoulders. Opdyke left in disgust; it was indeed clear that New York City’s martial spirit was on the decline. Worse still, these men who once led New York City’s patriotic mobilization in 1861 now stood poised to lead the residents in armed protest against new impositions of federal authority to support the war. Opdyke and his fellow Republicans did not have much time to deal with soured public opinion. On June 15, Lincoln called for 100,000 six-month Emergency Militia from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio, and West Virginia to repel the Army of Northern Virginia’s second invasion of the North.

After some contemplation, Lincoln issued a second call that same day, asking New York to provide 20,000 additional emergency troops to serve for the same length of time. These men would count against the draft, but they would not serve with bounties. For the third time during the war, General Sandford called Gotham’s 1st Division into a state of readiness. For a brief time, it seemed that the war weariness had abated. The Herald reported, “New York is again called to arms. . . . Drums beat to arms, colors flaunt gaily in the breeze, bayonets glisten in the midday sun, and martial ardor, somewhat recumbent in this city the past few months, again starts up with

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6 New York Herald, 9 June 1863.
its original enthusiasm.” By June 25, all thirteen regiments of the 1st Division had reached Maryland or Pennsylvania, accounting for about 7,882 city-dwellers.8

Of course, the Emergency of 1863 required Baltimore and Philadelphia to respond even more quickly, since both cities possibly stood in the path of the Confederate invasion. A mix of feverish anxiety and lethargic apathy collided in the streets of both cities. Baltimore’s tranquil summer evaporated when residents discovered their unpreparedness. Twenty-four hours after Lincoln’s June 15 call, only four small city battalions—the Light Division’s Unionist remnant after the Confederate exodus of 1861—came forward to offer their services. Frantic in his efforts to spur concern in Baltimore, Governor Bradford proclaimed, “When our own territory is threatened by an invader, let it never be said that we lacked the spirit to meet the emergency or looked to others to provide our defense.”9 Induced by Bradford’s message, Mayor Chapman informed the City Council he would “give a hearty sanction to any measure that you may desire looking distinctly to” protecting the city. The City Council then passed a $400,000 ordinance offering a $50.00 bounty to each six-month volunteer, with an additional $50.00 paid out in installments over the next five months.10 Inspired by the leadership of the city fathers, Baltimoreans responded with more alacrity. The Independent Grays, an old Unionist command from the defunct 53rd Maryland Militia, raised 200 men by June 18, and the Baltimore City Guard, numbering 250 men, raised an additional 128 volunteers in two days.11

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7 Ibid., 17 June 1863.
8 The militia regiments included the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 22nd, 37th, 55th, 69th, 71st, and 84th N.Y.S.M. The two three-year regiments were the 178th New York Infantry and the 13th New York Cavalry. New York Herald, 18 June 1863.
9 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 17 June 1863.
10 Ibid., 17 June 1863.
11 Ibid., 16, 18, 19, and 20 June 1863.
Excitement in the Monumental City rose each day, largely due to newspapers’ imperfect knowledge of enemy movements. “Extravagant rumors,” wrote Editor Fulton, proved “so various in form and fast succeeding each other in number that it would be fruitless to expose or contradict any particular one.” However, recruiting received a sudden boost when word reached the city that the 5th and 6th Maryland Regiments and Alexander’s Battery had been routed at the Battle of Winchester on June 14, inspiring loyal Baltimoreans to demand revenge for the defeat. The American commented, “Recruiting at the armory and several stations in this city is going on briskly. The young men of our city now have a splendid chance to show their devotion to the country.”

Governor Bradford did not agree with the American’s optimistic assessment. On June 21, he reprimanded Baltimoreans for not coming forward fast enough. He admonished, “Are you willing to leave the metropolis of the state undefended because they may fold their arms and offer no assistance? God forbid! . . . Let me, then, once more appeal to you, my fellow citizens, and remind you that the invader is once more upon the soil of Maryland. . . . And, you, I trust, will show the world that the blood of the Old Defenders still courses through your veins.”

While Bradford pleaded, General Schenck took action. On June 19, he ordered the police to go from door to door, dragooning free black people into the street and forcing them to erect barricades around the city. The sight of a large congregation of black workers caused considerable excitement among the white population. One gang of white youths chased a college-educated black man, Christian Fleetwood, down Lexington and Saratoga streets, “rais[ing] promiscuous Cain.” Fleetwood managed to elude this street gang and Schenck’s press

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12 Ibid., 20 June 1863.
13 Ibid., 22 June 1863.
gangs, but scores of his friends did not. Using logs, dirt, and furniture, over 2,000 African American workers erected a barricade in about forty-eight hours. The American commented, “It was a novel sight in an American city[.] . . . Should an attempt be made to take the city by occupation of the houses in the vicinity of the line of barricades by riflemen is also the prospect of many who have longed for the arrival of these traitors in our midst.”  

On June 19, the City Council passed a $100,000 ordinance to pay the barricade laborers, and this put the impressed black Baltimoreans into better spirits. While many white Baltimoreans looked at this measure with disgust, a few racist Unionists experienced a change of heart. A reporter wrote, “A month ago the presence of a negro regiment in Baltimore would have occasioned a popular outbreak, but we doubt very much if the arrival of two or three such regiments at the present moment would not be hailed with the great satisfaction by the loyal portion of the population.” Although they were never used in action, the barricades proved their worth. At 11:00 P.M. on June 29, a detachment from the U.S. Signal Corps raised a false alarm, sending 7,000 Baltimoreans to the barricades—all of them armed by local vigilante committees called “Union Leagues,” informal gangs that proposed the curb local dissent, and entirely unaffiliated with the organizations of the same name in Philadelphia, Boston, and New York City. The Union League riflemen held the makeshift fortifications throughout the night, but no panic prevailed in the city. If the Confederate army had ever attempted to invade Baltimore, it likely would have faced considerable, if inexperienced, resistance.  

15 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 22 and 30 June 1863.
In addition to Lincoln’s call for 100,000 six-month men, Philadelphia had to answer Governor Curtin’s called for 50,000 state-level Emergency Militia to serve for ninety days. On June 16, Mayor Henry called for city businesses to close their doors, turn out their employees, and arm for state defense. He declared, “Close your manufactories, workshops, and stores before the stern necessity for common safety makes it obligatory. Assemble yourselves forthwith for organization and drill. . . . Spurn from you those who would delude you to inactivity or disaffection.”¹⁶ Not every Philadelphian took Henry’s proclamation seriously, however. According to one chronicler, the call interrupted a “very good” business climate in the summer of 1863, when “a large number of establishments were humming with Government contracts. . . . To literally cease from these activities meant heavy loss or ruin to many.”¹⁷

Indeed, Philadelphia’s Democratic element dismissed the urgency of the crisis. The city’s sole Democratic paper, the Age, focused more attention on the Democratic Convention currently meeting in Harrisburg than on Lee’s invasion. “The Convention was full,” reported the Age, “and the presence of so large a number of delegates in the midst of the excitement existing on account of the threatened invasion of our State, is an indication of the intense interest manifested by the Democratic masses.” Spurred by the Democratic Party’s national success in 1862, Philadelphia’s Copperheads held several high-profile public rallies in June 1863—one in Independence Square—denouncing the Lincoln administration. When, the next day, an anti-slavery speaker attempted to applaud Lincoln’s conduct of the war, Copperhead leader Charles Ingersoll openly advocated mob law to end all Republican free speech. Ingersoll implored his listeners to “vote Democratic if they wanted the war ended.” Generally, few Philadelphians followed these

¹⁷ Ibid., 243-4.
Copperhead cues for disorder. Sidney Fisher commented, “the people who have sons & brothers & friends in the army are indignant at the abominable clique who persistently denounce the war, abuse the soldiers & the government, attempt to create discord among the people, & to divide opinion & thus encourage the enemy.”  

Despite Democratic indifference or outright appeals for resistance to the federal government, many Quaker City employers complied with Mayor Henry’s request. Employees of Albert Jenks and Sons formed the “Bridesburg Guard,” commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Barton H. Jenks. This battalion made its own rifles and Jenks provided the uniforms. The Washington Navy Yard formed two independent companies, as did the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The Schuylkill Arsenal, the Arch Street Gymnasium, Merrick and Sons Machine Works, the First Presbyterian Church, and the Polytechnic College all turned out their employees, students, and congregations to form Emergency Militia companies. On June 16, the same day as Henry’s proclamation, eight companies of the 20th Pennsylvania Militia under Colonel William B. Thomas, the Republican Collector of the Port of Philadelphia, and two independent companies under Captains William B. Mann and John Spear—two other prominent Republicans—left for Harrisburg. Philadelphia put 1,167 men inside the state capitol within forty-eight hours of Lincoln’s and Curtin’s calls.

The various city bounties, private bounties, and special bounties led to confusion and misrepresentation. William Harding argued that too many bounties served “to mystify the volunteer and make him undecided.” Volunteers shifted from one recruiting station to another,
seeking out the highest bounties because, Harding pointed out, “poor men who are about to leave their families for three months, naturally desire to leave behind them the largest amount of ready money they can command.” Instead of getting men into the ranks, the bounties only kept volunteers “puzzled which to choose, and finally postponing any choice at all until further inquiry is made.”21 Margaret Carre concurred. She wrote her son that “a good many [volunteers] are putting their names down to go away, but a good many are hesitating about the bounty. Some are offering more than others. Charlie Neilers gets 60 dollars, some not as much.”22

Not everyone from Philadelphia’s working-class rushed to the Emergency Militia’s recruiting stations. On June 28, Margaret Carre observed, “There is very little excitement in the city to what you would suppose if the rebels are really so near.” Sidney Fisher related, “There was no excitement. The same street presented a very different scene in April 1861 when the war broke out. Then it was fluttering with flags & filled by a crowd of agitated, earnest men. War was a novelty then; it is an old story now.”23 This confusion and apathy nearly halted Philadelphia’s Emergency Militia mobilization. On July 1, Curtin went to Philadelphia to see to the recruiting matters. At a speech given on the steps of the Continental Hotel, he fired up a large crowd. He said, “I ask for 7,800 men from the city of Philadelphia to fill up the army of 60,000 Pennsylvanians. How soon am I to get them?” A newly enthusiastic crowd cried, “Tomorrow!” and “We’ll go now!”24

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21 Philadelphia Inquirer, 2 July 1863.
22 Margaret Carre to De Angeli Carre, 3 July 1863, HSP.
23 Ibid., 28 June 1863, HSP; Sidney George Fisher diary, 29 June 1863, in Wainwright, ed., A Philadelphia Perspective, 455.
24 Philadelphia Inquirer, 2 July 1863.
Between June 17 and July 1, Philadelphia sent eighty-four companies to Harrisburg, totaling 7,449 men. However, Couch turned away one company, the one commanded by Captain A. M. Babe, a white officer who led a company of eighty black men. Babe’s men were armed and outfitted at the City Arsenal, but when they arrived at Harrisburg on June 18, Major General Couch told them they had to disband because the Militia Act would not allow black troops to serve for less than three years. Their rejection angered many Republicans. One newspaper argued, “God seems to have placed these people at our disposal, and it would be madness on our part any longer to reject their aid.”

On July 4, the Army of Northern Virginia retreated after suffering a defeat at Gettysburg. Combined with news of the capture of Vicksburg, this victory caused enthusiasm to soar throughout the urban Northeast. “[T]here never has been a Fourth of July kept so grandly by the nation . . .” wrote New Yorker Maria Daly, “This last battle has never been surpassed by any in

25 Several patriotic organizations in Philadelphia did their best to spur enlistments in July. The most successful organization of the summer proved to be the Union League Club. This organization raised three regiments in June and July 1863, totaling 2,180 men. The Union League’s Military Committee raised $108,000 and provided bounties between $35 and $300 to each recruit. To induce its members to make liberal donations, the Union League’s military committee appealed to Republican Party loyalists: “The Democratic Presses have upbraided the League with lack of earnestness and efficiency in raising troops for the present State and National exigency. The honor of the League is at stake, to disprove any calumny; and it can only be done by the contribution of a large sum of money.” By July 9, all three “Union League Regiments” reached Harrisburg and swore into service of the Commonwealth. Thirty-two additional Philadelphia companies reached Harrisburg after Curtin’s visit. In all, Philadelphia provided over 10,300 men to the Emergency Militia. However, none of these Philadelphians fought at the Battle of Gettysburg, and only two regiments and three independent companies engaged Confederate forces at all during the invasion. Had the Army of Northern Virginia attempted to seize Philadelphia, the Emergency Militia would have been unable to stop it. The Corn Exchange Bank—the institution that raised the 118th Pennsylvania the previous summer—offered liberal bounties to recruits in the 49th Pennsylvania Militia. On July 14, this regiment mustered-into service of the Commonwealth at Harrisburg. The Philadelphia Coal Trade provided uniforms, weapons, and $25.00 bounties to 700 members of the 40th Pennsylvania Militia and sent them to Harrisburg in late June. After Curtin’s visit, the Coal Trade completed a second regiment, the 51st Pennsylvania Militia, 783 men strong. This regiment eventually arrived at the battlefield of Gettysburg to assist in the work of removing the wounded and burying the dead. Joseph Boggs Beale diary, 21 June 1863, HSP; Frank Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 247-51; Union League Club Military Committee, 6 July 1863, Union League Club Library, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, (hereafter ULCL); see also, Maxwell Whiteman, Gentlemen in Crisis: The First Century of the Union League of Philadelphia, 1862-1962 (Philadelphia, PA: The Union League of Philadelphia, 1975), 18-20, 43-6; Philadelphia Press, 13 June 1863.
Others used the news of the costly victory as an opportunity to impart a sentiment of solemn determination upon their listeners. In Boston, which had not been required to send forth Emergency troops, Governor John Andrew proclaimed to a city crowd, “The voices of our brothers’ blood cry to us from the ground; from a hundred battlefields, and from fair valleys now trampled and torn by the hoofs of invading foes. The cannon thunders the inexorable call; the flames of burning dwellings of our loyal brethren on the banks of the Susquehanna light the way to duty.” News of the Union victory at Gettysburg increased the morale of loyal Baltimoreans. Emboldened, General Schenck stifled disloyalty and dissent, holding Baltimore under martial law: no dealers could sell arms, no person could leave the city without a written pass, no person could cross the barricades without the proper countersign, and all taverns and liquor dealers had to close their doors. Schenck also expunged and dispersed the elite “Maryland Club,” an infamous den of secessionism. Generally, Unionists approved such measures, so long as their city government continued to function. “Let every man . . . show his colors,” announced Charles Fulton. On July 5, a seriously wounded Pennsylvania-born corps commander, Major General Winfield S. Hancock, arrived at a Philadelphia hospital along with 500 wounded soldiers. Because his corps had repulsed the last Confederate attack at Gettysburg, Hancock confidently told a crowd of well-wishers that a great victory had been achieved. Three days later, when the news of the surrender at Vicksburg became known, the Public Ledger proclaimed, “Never since

28 Boston Evening Transcript, 3 July 1863.
the commencement of the Rebellion were the people of Philadelphia so excited and filled with joy.”29

The aftermath of the bloody fighting at Gettysburg fell most heavily upon Baltimore and Philadelphia. Wounded soldiers from both armies and prisoners of war flooded into Baltimore’s environs via trains from the nearby battlefield. The first arrivals came on July 5, including 3,155 Confederate prisoners and 600 wounded Union soldiers. The prisoners entered confinement at Fort McHenry, except for 683 wounded graycoats who were sent to West’s Hospital at Union Dock. Meanwhile, a large assortment of patriotic women from the Union Relief Association met wounded men at Camden Station. The omnipresent relief ladies passed out thousands of sandwiches and glasses of tea, ice water, and coffee to the incoming sufferers. From there, those soldiers not too seriously wounded to journey farther traveled on to Philadelphia, where larger hospitals with more room and better sanitation awaited them; the seriously wounded, too weak to travel more, received admission to Newton University and Susquehanna Hotel.30

Wounded soldiers continued to pour into the two cities as the month of July progressed. On July 6, 560 more wounded arrived in Baltimore, and three days later, 750 more came by train. By the end of the month, all ten of Baltimore’s federal hospitals—encompassing 4,000 beds—reached full capacity. Eventually, Baltimore housed slightly less than 6,000 wounded and unwounded Confederate prisoners as well. For many patients, the humid summer in the Monumental City became excruciating. One Confederate soldier housed in West’s hospital, a former cotton mill, complained that the building was “dark, gloomy, without adequate

29 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 3 July 1863; Philadelphia Public Ledger, 8 July 1863; Scharf, History of Philadelphia, 809.
30 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 6 July 1863.
ventilation, devoid of sanitary or hygienic appliances or conveyances, and pervaded at all times by the pestilential exhalations which arose from the neighboring docks.” Still, Baltimoreans did their best to spur benevolence contributions to ease the sufferings of the wounded. In two days, the Union Relief Association raised over $2,400; the City Council appropriated $3,000 for relief; and various parties directly contributed over $600 to the Provost Marshal’s office during the same period. Each day throughout the month of July, proportional contributions came in steadily.31 One wounded soldier, Sergeant P. G. Gottman of the 74th New York, became the focus of special relief measures in Baltimore. The fighting at Gettysburg cost Gottman both his eyes, both his arms, and both his legs. The American noted, that he was “visited by many citizens” and represented a “spectacle of the horrors of war seldom witnessed.” However, “what is left of him is now in healthy condition and he is about to be sent home to his friends, who are not in circumstances to receive him unprovided for.” In about one week, the “Gottman Relief Fund” raised over $400 to support the family of the wounded man.32

Even New York City received 2,537 wounded and unwounded Confederate prisoners, who went into confinement at DeCamp Hospital and Prison, a facility located on David’s Island in New York Harbor, as well as an equivalent number of wounded Union soldiers. Altogether, the two armies left more than 29,700 wounded men on the fields of Gettysburg. The Army of Northern Virginia took less than 7,000 wounded Confederates with it on its retreat back to Virginia. By the end of July, over 16,000 patients had been sent away from Gettysburg, distributed to other hospitals. Undoubtedly, four east coast cities bore the brunt of this tide of anguish: New York City, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington. An accurate estimate of the

31 Toomey and Sheds, Baltimore During the Civil War, 59; Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 7 July 1863.
32 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 12, 13, and 14 October and 2 November 1863.
dispersal of the wounded to each city is impossible to determine, but somewhere in the vicinity of 9,000 to 10,000 Gettysburg casualties went to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York City during the summer of 1863.33

In addition to wounded men and prisoners of war, bodies of the slain also arrived in the metropolises. Although more than 3,500 of the Army of the Potomac’s 5,191 killed and mortally wounded received final interment at the Soldiers’ National Cemetery at Gettysburg, because this battle occurred on northern soil, a few more sets of remains returned home than usual. Much as they had throughout the war, the northeastern cities’ post-Gettysburg funerals meant to assuage the grief of whole neighborhoods, and as a result, they incorporated whole communities and public spaces within the burial rites. Homes, churches, and thoroughfares served to host the viewing, procession, eulogy, and internment of fallen soldiers. On July 9, Philadelphia witnessed the funeral procession of Colonel Dennis O’Kane, commander of the city’s Irish 69th Pennsylvania. Sixteen officers from Philadelphia’s 1st Division of Militia and from the Philadelphia Brigade assembled at O’Kane’s residence at 575 Florida Street with a “large concourse of [his] friends.” The sixteen officers acted as pall bearers, while Beck’s Brass Band played the funeral march. The cortege marched slowly to St. James Catholic Church in West Philadelphia. There, Father Michael Martin celebrated a high mass, and according to an observer, delivered an “appropriate discourse” of the life and sacrifice of Colonel O’Kane. At the end of the mass, a baritone soloist sang a beautiful rendition of Ecce! Deus, Salvator Mues (Behold! God, My Savior). After burying the remains in the Cathedral cemetery, bereaved attendants departed, but showed signs of acceptance. One week later, as the first federal draft

progressed, Philadelphia newspapers announced the funeral of another recently deceased Philadelphia native, the “young, gallant, and brave” Colonel Louis R. Francine, who had received a mortal wound while commanding a New Jersey regiment on July 2. Like O’Kane’s memorial, Francine’s funeral occurred without incident. Despite the shocking carnage produced by the Battle of Gettysburg, the interment rites in cities continued their traditional displays of mourning without noticeable interruption.34

Simultaneous with the influx of prisoners of war, wounded soldiers, and fallen heroes occurred an outpouring of relief and medical aid from the cities to Gettysburg. Even as the summer lingered on, about 4,000 soldiers too grievously wounded to be moved remained in Gettysburg’s scattered field hospitals. Eventually, Union surgeons established a general hospital called “Camp Letterman,” consisting of 150 tents to house these remaining sufferers. Since Gettysburg did not possess local medical facilities necessary to provide these wounded men with daily aid, the cities had to send provisions and personnel to it. Two national organizations, the U.S. Sanitary Commission headquartered in Washington and the U.S. Christian Commission headquartered in New York City, took the lead. As soon as news of the battle arrived, agents in the all the city branch offices begged for donations in the form of money and provisions. The cities responded with a staggering amount of contributions. The first cart-loads of Sanitary Commission provisions arrived on July 2, even as the battle still raged. On July 1-3, the Sanitary Commission sent 10,000 towels, 7,000 tubs and cups, 110 barrels of bandages, 4,000 shoes and slippers, 6,100 pounds of butter, 10,300 loaves of bread, 12,500 pounds of concentrated milk, 11,000 pounds of fresh poultry, 2,300 sponges, 1,500 combs, 3,500 fans, 1,200 pairs of crutches, 8,500 eggs, 20,000 pounds of ice, 2,000 jars of jelly, and other provisions of sizable quantities

34 Philadelphia Press, 10 and 17 July 1863.
too numerous to mention. The flow of provisions occurred throughout the month, and although these statistics represented donated goods from across the Northeast, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, and New York City sent the majority. Philadelphia’s Sanitary Commission branch alone expended more than $75,000 in connection with the Gettysburg Campaign, a number that, to put in perspective, equaled the cost of sending supplies on those first three days of July.⁵

Despite the continuous traffic of supplies and Sanitary and Christian Commission workers to Gettysburg, the eastern cities considered augmenting the relief force with a supplemental army of volunteer nurses and physicians. In Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, newspapers issued calls for volunteer medical personnel to rush to pre-established urban rendezvous to receive U.S. Army medical passes to go to Gettysburg. On July 5, a twenty-three-year-old New Jersey Quaker, Cornelia Hancock, crossed at the Delaware River ferry, entering Philadelphia with a city acquaintance, Dr. Henry Child, a noted abolitionist, to answer the summons. At the foot of Washington Avenue, Hancock and Child met a cluster of ladies and physicians organized by Congressman William Kelley and Eliza Farnham, a novelist and prison reformer. On the train to Baltimore, Dorothea Dix, the stern superintendent of army nurses, trooped the line of ladies—most of them middle-aged—but then stopped at Hancock and registered an immediate objection to her “youth and rosy cheeks.” As the Quaker girl remembered, “In those days, it was considered indecorous for angels of mercy to appear otherwise than gray-haired and spectacled. Such a thing as a hospital corps of comely young maiden nurses, possessing grace and good looks, was then unknown.” Farnham and Dix quarreled over whether or not Hancock could go, but after an exhaustive debate, Dix retracted her objection. During the Gettysburg aftermath, city agencies provided immediate aid so quickly

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⁵ Coco, Strange and Blighted Land, 243-4; Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 263.
that few willing hearts got turned away. One final urban relief band entered Gettysburg in early August, the 783-man 51st Pennsylvania Militia, also known as Philadelphia’s 2nd Coal Trade Regiment. Armed with shovels, this ninety-day Philadelphia regiment went to Gettysburg with orders to bury the dead, remove the wounded, and protect abandoned army property.

Just as the Emergency of 1863 encouraged wider acceptance of women’s services, so too did it break down the barriers that had obstructed the recruitment of African American troops in northern cities. Until July 1863, only Boston had taken advantage of the federal government’s 1862 Militia Act authorizing black recruiting. Although the Union’s few remaining Democratic governors exhibited little initiative to raise black troops, Republican governors who had faced resistance to black recruiting in 1862 considered the Gettysburg campaign evidence as to the foolishness of leaving the sable arm untapped.

Pennsylvania’s Governor Andrew Curtin fretted because 300 black Philadelphians already had crossed state boundaries to enlist in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 200 in the famed 54th Massachusetts alone. He feared that Philadelphia’s free black population—22,000 strong, and the second largest city-based aggregate in the country—would be wasted. At first, Curtin appeared unwilling to risk his re-election campaign against a Copperhead by bringing up the contentious issue of black recruitment, but the Emergency of 1863 changed his mind. Spurred by the exigency of the invasion, Curtin lifted the ban on enlisting colored troops during the last week of June, sidestepping the Commonwealth’s constitution by arguing that federal recruiters—not state agents—would perform all the work and would not expend a cent of state

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36 Cornelia Hancock and Henrietta Stratton Jaquette, ed., Letters of a Civil War Nurse: Cornelia Hancock, 1863-1865 (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 4-5.
37 Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 250.
money. That week, seventy-five Philadelphians, all of whom had called for black recruiting in 1862, organized themselves into the “Supervisory Committee for Recruiting Colored Regiments.”

On June 26, the Supervisory Committee established Camp William Penn, a training camp designed exclusively for black soldiers, located eight miles north of Philadelphia at Chelten Hills on a farm donated by famed abolitionist and feminist, Lucretia Mott. The first squad of eighty men, volunteers from Captain Babe’s rejected company, arrived that same day. Lieutenant Colonel Louis Wagner—a wounded officer from the 88th Pennsylvania—served as the camp’s first commandant. Meanwhile, the Executive Committee headed by Thomas Webster established the Free Military School at 1210 Chestnut Street to begin training the white officers who would lead the black regiments.

The Military School’s importance cannot be overstated. Under the Second Militia Act, the War Department alone retained the sole authority to appoint officers for the U.S. Colored Troops. All applicants were required to stand before the “Casey Board,” a board of six examiners that included Major General Silas Casey, the author of a premiere tactics manual. During the first year of operation, the Casey Board rejected forty-seven percent of its applicants for inferior military knowledge. The Supervisory Committee reported, “every candidate stands upon his merits—the most obscure corporal or private stands an equal chance with the most favored influential citizen. . . . No talents, no zeal, no sympathy for the colored race, unless attended with military knowledge and power to command men in battle, can avail.” The Free Military School hoped to increase the quality of officers sent before the Casey Board. The school hired John H.

40 Ibid.
Taggart, late colonel of the 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, as preceptor, and eight professors, including Albert L. Magilton, ex-lieutenant colonel of the 2nd and 4th Pennsylvania Reserves; Levi Fetters, a captain from the 175th Pennsylvania; and Daniel W. Herr, a first lieutenant from the 122nd Pennsylvania.41

Meanwhile, the Supervisory Committee hoped that the dual threats of the Confederate invasion and the federal draft might impel Philadelphians to alter their conservative racial views and contribute money to their fund. On June 27, they published a circular:

All thinking men have at last been convinced that the mortal struggle in which we are engaged requires us to use all the legitimate means within our power to crush a rebellion which else will crush us. It has been recognized that the severest blow which can be inflicted upon the slave oligarchy must come from the institution of slavery itself; and that while we were thus turning upon rebels the arms which they had been using against us, it would be folly longer to deny to the free colored men of the North the opportunity which they had so earnestly desired of offering themselves as a sacrifice, not only for their race but for the country. Since volunteering can no longer fill the ranks of our armies, and recourse to conscription becomes necessary, unreasoning prejudice only can be blind to the fact that every colored recruit acts as an unpurchased substitute for a white man.42

However, even with money to support bounties and relief funds, recruiting black men was a difficult chore. Although some free black Philadelphians eagerly wished to serve, economic inducements proved deficient. Under the 1862 Militia Act, black soldiers could not receive a federal bounty, nor could they receive the same pay as white soldiers. The Supervisory Committee judged that Boston had spent over $60,000 to pay recruiting expenses and private bounties while raising the 54th and 55th Massachusetts Infantry Regiments. But committee members optimistically guessed that Philadelphia, so steeped in its benevolent traditions, would

42 Head Quarters, Supervisory Committee on Colored Enlistments, 27 June 1863, Records of the Free Military School, HSP.
answer the call: “We must rely upon private liberality. The same machinery which was so successfully employed for Massachusetts is at our command, and the extent of our operations is only to be limited by the amount of funds placed at our disposal. If large, we can make this the centre of recruitment for the colored population of all the States where such enlistments are not permitted by State authorities.” Within days, they had raised several thousand dollars in private donations. By October, they had collected over $55,000. Although it commenced six months later, Philadelphia now matched Boston in the effort to raise black regiments.43

Perhaps most notably, victory at Gettysburg also spurred Baltimoreans to recruit regiments for the United States Colored Troops. Pleased with the success of the black laborers who built the barricades, General Schenck now requested authority to offer African American residents a chance to serve in the federal army. A timely letter written to Lincoln on July 4 facilitated the matter, and the next day, Secretary Stanton directed Brigadier General William Birney, the son of the famed abolitionist Free-Soil presidential candidate James G. Birney, to proceed to Baltimore and organize the first regiment. Birney arrived in Baltimore on July 6 and he opened a recruiting station at East Baltimore. Many black Baltimoreans still resented Schenck for authorizing press gangs, so very few of the initial 2,000 laborers flocked to enlist. But on July 9, thirty-four black men followed policeman George A. Spicer to Birney’s office. A reporter noted, “The sight was a novel one for our citizens, some of whom, of secessionist proclivities, were quite indignant thereat, while others, unconditional Union men, observed that it is just the thing.” Encouraged by this example, other black Baltimoreans soon followed.44

43 Ibid.
44 Longacre, Regiment of Slaves, 11-3; Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 10 July 1863.
The enlistment of Baltimore’s first black recruits exacerbated the friction that still existed between the City Council and the federal government. Understandably, black recruits wanted to receive the city bounty. The recent city ordinance made no mention of color; and after a lively discussion, the City Council agreed to pay Baltimore’s black volunteers a portion equal to their white counterparts, but only after they had assurance that each colored soldier would be credited against the city quota. Mayor Chapman asked General Birney for clarification on this matter. Birney might have looked upon Baltimore’s plan to claim these black recruits with some disdain. After all, Stanton had given him authority to draw recruits from anywhere in Maryland. However, he had received no help from the state government or any of the counties, so Birney, believing that Maryland’s patriotic African Americans deserved the bounty, supported Baltimore’s project, and he readily approved the idea that Baltimore should receive credit based on its ability to provide black troops with money.

Birney took his cue from the example set in Philadelphia, where the 3rd U.S.C.T. had already drawn expensive bounties from the Supervisory Committee on Colored Recruits. Birney replied, “Each man accepted and mustered into the service of the United States as a soldier receives at Philadelphia a bounty without distinction of color. I risk nothing by affirming that any colored men now going from Baltimore to Philadelphia and enlisting there will promptly receive the bounty.” Thus, he concluded, “I think I am safe in expressing the opinion that if the citizens of Baltimore, acting through the City Councils, or a special committee, will expedite the enlistment of colored troops by paying a bounty. . . . [T]here is no reason the rule applied to Philadelphia shall not hold good in Baltimore.” Although Birney had essentially decided this
crediting matter on his own, Stanton, the true authority, approved the measure a few days later, saying, “Colored troops will be credited to the state [and town] the same as any other troops.”

However, because Baltimore’s free black residents refused to come forward in large numbers, Birney’s recruiting agents had to leave the city and scour the surrounding countryside for potential volunteers, free and slave alike. Birney even ordered some of his officers to release inmates from a Baltimore’s dingy slave prison, where District of Columbia slave owners apparently had stored unfortunate slaves for safe-keeping. Colonel J. P. Creager managed to recruit thirty men from the Colored Bethel Church in Frederick, but local authorities arrested him for violating laws that forbade men from enticing slaves away from their owners. Although Baltimore and Philadelphia had once exhibited reluctance to raise black volunteers in 1862, the invasion of Pennsylvania during the summer of 1863 applied pressure, causing residents to forget their earlier distaste for African American soldiers. Only New York City, far from the scene of battle and still dominated by a conservative, negrophobic spirit, remained un-swayed.

Although the success of black recruiting in mid-1863 made it seem as if the cities had rejuvenated their war spirit, the threat of the first federal draft loomed large, sapping some of the energy the victory at Gettysburg had produced. New York Democrats in particular saw only the lengthy casualty lists, and they used the opportunity to criticize their political opponents. On July 4, Governor Seymour delivered a speech to the Young Men’s Democratic Association in New York City. Failing to mention the victory, which had only become news by that evening, Seymour delivered a harsh warning to Republicans. Referring to the high death toll, he chided, “You have the results of [our] unheeded warnings and unheeded prayers.” The Republicans,

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45 *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 20 and 28 July 1863.
Seymour asserted, “have stained our soil with blood; they have carried mourning into thousands of homes; and today they have brought our country to the very verge of destruction.”

Seymour’s speech contributed to an already acerbic mood. For months, New York City Democrats had been arguing for a suspension of the draft. Seymour and the Wood brothers had made several complaints, calling the draft unconstitutional. Also, a committee from Mozart Hall had drawn up resolutions to the same effect. In June, 3,000 longshoremen, many of them Irish, commenced a strike, asking for a twenty-five percent raise. The city could ill-afford to suspend its transportation measures during the height of the recruiting season, and many businesses responded by enlisting black strikebreakers. This infuriated the longshoremen, not only because black men took their jobs, but because the Metropolitan police—always seen as the tyrannical arm of the Republican Party—protected the scabs from abuse. Copperheads, anti-emancipationists, racists, and Democratic partisans grew increasingly frustrated as the hot month of July wore on.

The desperate condition was not lost to the federal commander in New York City, Major General John E. Wool, senior officer in the Department of the East, now removed from the Middle Department for angering Baltimore’s Unionists. Shortly after assuming his new post in December 1862, Wool noted New York City’s vulnerable state and wrote prolifically to Stanton, Seymour, and Opdyke for reinforcements. In January, he had written Seymour that, “The City of New York is the great emporium of the United States, and from which the government in a great measure relies for money and the materials for war. She should at all times in peace as well as war be able to defend herself.” Mostly, Wool demanded strengthening the coastal defenses; he

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believed a seaborne attack to be eminent. However, he also noted the inherent danger posed by internal dissent. In February, he wrote Stanton, “We have a large population in this city in favor of the South. . . . They are doing all they can to make the administration odious in the hope of compelling the members of the cabinet to resign. It is not uncommon to have to hear it said that they would prefer Jefferson Davis as President than President Lincoln.”

Then in June, New York City’s militia division, the 1st Division, left the city to join Pennsylvania’s Emergency Militia at Harrisburg. The deployment of the 1st Division increased Wool’s trepidation. In mid-June, he reported having only 923 men on hand, most of them new volunteers who guarded forts outside the city. On June 27, Wool wrote Opdyke that, “We ought to have at least 10,000 men for the defence of this City.” Wool asked the War Department for 3,000 men and an ironclad steamer, but, he wailed, “Instead of three thousand I cannot get 1,000. I trust if any serious disaster should befall your City, it will not be attributed to myself.” Despite his misgivings, Wool took no measures to protect the city from internal disorder, focusing most of his attention on the seacoast fortifications. On July 1, a veteran recruiting officer warned Wool that “no provision has yet been made” in the city to prevent or guard against violations of the draft law or avert “impending dangers.” The officer continued, “A spirit of discontent and disaffection prevails to a great extent among certain classes of the population, which the enforcement of the Conscription Act may intensify and excite to dangerous manifestations.”

Despite Wool’s misgivings—which he made clear to numerous state, local, and federal authorities—the War Department planned to enforce the four-month-old federal Conscription

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49 John E. Wool to E. D. Townsend, 14 June 1863; John E. Wool to George Opdyke, 27 June 1863; Samuel Glaskey to John E. Wool, 1 July 1863, Wool Papers, NYSL.
Act. Since the passage of the Enrollment Act in March, city residents had expected Lincoln to announce a new quota of 300,000 three-year men. However, they did not expect that he would do so immediately after Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Indeed, city dwellers expected that Lincoln would grant them a deadline of several months to fill the quota with volunteers and then fill the deficiency by conscription, just as their state governors had done in 1862. When Lincoln issued his call during the first week of July, however, he authorized the provost marshals to draft immediately. The provost marshal in Massachusetts gave his assistant provost marshals an order to go ahead, and consequently, of the four northeastern cities, the federally mandated draft began first in Boston, only five days after the Battle of Gettysburg. Under the new call, Boston had to fill a quota of 6,702 soldiers.\(^5^0\) On July 8, at 10:00 A.M., Provost Marshal Captain George A. Shaw called the draft into effect at the city’s Third District headquarters, 22 Summer Street. A blindfolded man, J. F. Stevens, drew 572 names, all from the Fourth Ward. According to a reporter, “the most perfect order and decorum were maintained in the room during the entire proceedings.”\(^5^1\) Over at his Fourth District headquarters at 106 Sudbury Street, Provost Marshal Captain W. Greene Howe ordered 494 names to be drawn from a large copper globe, setting the draft into effect in the rest of the city. The news of the draft’s enforcement shocked the populace, and throughout the evening, defiant citizens began expressing their disgust at this unfortunate turn of events, muttering under their breath or shouting rebellious proclamations in the streets.

The next day, at the Third District office, as the employees prepared to draw for the Seventh and Eighth Wards, Captain Shaw, having detected the city’s sour mood, issued an order to warn

\(^{50}\) *Boston Evening Transcript*, 8 July 1863. According to the new draft act, two federal provost marshals directed the draft in the city’s two districts. The Third District encompassed Wards Four, Seven, Eight, Ten, Eleven, and Twelve, as well as several wards from Roxbury and Brookline. The Fourth District encompassed Wards One, Two, Three, Five, Six, and Nine, as well as the towns of Chelsea and Cambridge.

\(^{51}\) *Boston Evening Transcript*, 8 July 1863.
spectators against uttering any expressions of “approbation or disapprobation.” He would arrest anyone who cheered or booed.52

Despite dire warnings from generals and objections from Governor Seymour and the Democrats, Lincoln and Stanton also proceeded with the draft in New York City. Colonel Robert Nugent, commander of New York’s Southern Division—one of the three unique draft partitions in New York State—received instructions from General James Fry on July 10, and he ordered the provost marshals in New York City’s six drafting districts—the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth—to turn the wheels the next day, July 11.

At 9:00 A.M., Captain Charles E. Jenkins, provost marshal for the Ninth District Draft Office, read an order from the Secretary of War, commencing the draft in the Twenty-Second Ward. An assistant spun the draft wheel and a blindfolded clerk, Charles Carpenter, pulled the names. Jenkins shouted the first name, “William Jones of Forty-Ninth Street, near Tenth Avenue!” A tense crowd let out a “suppressed murmur,” disbelieving what had befallen their city. Jenkins had orders to draw 2,641 names, but only managed to draw 1,236 before 4:00 P.M. At that time, he ordered the draft office to shut down, but he announced to the crowd that the draft would continue in two days.53

News of the draft shocked Gotham’s populace. According to the Herald, “a greater portion of them did not imagine that the government would really determine upon pushing the matter forward in such a manner as to bring out the great mass of citizens of the Empire City.” Many of the lower-classes grumbled about the draft’s commutation fee. In order to prevent

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52 Ibid., 10 July 1863.
53 New York Herald, 12 July 1863.
substitute prices from sky-rocketing, Congress allowed a commutation payment of $300. Although Lincoln hoped this would aid lower-classes, in New York City, the commutation fee sparked only resentment. Because $300 resembled a typical New York City factory worker’s annual wages, it smacked of class bias. In a Twentieth Ward barroom, twenty Irishmen debated the draft’s social justice. One Irishman grumbled, “If Lincoln attempts to enforce the draft in New York, in violation of state authority, there will be black eyes and bloody noses.” “Aye,” said another, “bad luck to him!”

On July 13, the Ninth District Office recommenced its drawing at 10:00 A.M. Captain Jenkins had begun reading Stanton’s proclamation when a stone flew through the window. Outside, members of the Black Joke Engine Company Number 33 had hauled a cart of stones into the street and commenced a barrage. The Black Joke’s captain had been drafted on the 11th, and the firemen, furious that the federal draft law did not include a firemen’s exemption, decided to vent their anger. As citizens fled the office, the firemen poured turpentine on the floor and set the building on fire.

When Benjamin F. Manierre, provost marshal at the Eighth District Office, heard news of the sacking of the Ninth District Office, he suspended the draft before the wheels could be turned. Reports of draft resistance brought various Empire City denizens out of their doors. Hordes of anti-draft men and women began roaming the streets taking out their frustrations on all symbols of Republican power. Rioters attacked policemen, beating them severely. One mob pounced on Superintendent Kennedy, bashed his skull, and dragged him through mud-gutters by his hair, stopping only when they thought he was dead. Rioters burned the Eighth District Draft

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54 Ibid., 13 July 1863.
Office, then abandoned by Manierre and his agents, and they set adjacent buildings on fire. Another mob surrounded the Tribune office, howling for Horace Greeley to show himself. Greeley never emerged, and rioters began smashing the windows, only to be stopped when workers from the rival Times rushed to the aid of the Tribune. Finally, near dusk, a mob sacked and burned the Colored Orphanage Asylum on Fifth Avenue, assaulting any firemen who attempted to quell the blaze.\textsuperscript{55}

Opdyke called on General Wool to help put down the uprising. Wool dutifully deployed men from the seacoast forts. Although an initial disagreement between Wool’s militia commander, General Sandford, and the regular officer, Brigadier General Harvey Brown, slowed the pace of law enforcement, generally, the combined forces of the soldiers and the metropolitan police helped quell disorder. Unfortunately, the taskforce assembled by Wool and Opdyke was, in Wool’s opinion, too “deficient in force” to face the overwhelming masses of rioters. Strangely, neither Wool nor Opdyke declared martial law.\textsuperscript{56}

On July 14, the rioting became more general and more influenced by Irish street gangs. Mobs attacked draft officers and other military officials. One crowd beat and shot to death Lieutenant Colonel Henry O’Brien, an officer in the 11\textsuperscript{th} New York, a two-year regiment that had officially mustered out and planned to reorganize. Rioters burned the gun factory owned by Mayor Opdyke’s son-in-law and sacked the Brooks Brothers Clothing Manufactory. Rioters also commenced random attacks on black families, lynching at least eleven black men in the streets. An Irish mob beat and hanged Abraham Franklin, a black coachman, from a light post, shouting,


\textsuperscript{56} John Wool to Edwin Stanton, 20 July 1863, Wool papers, NYSL.
“Cheers to Jeff Davis!” Later, a young Irish butcher cut down the body and dragged it through the streets by its genitals, while a blood-thirsty crowd roared with applause. One woman saw a three-year-old black child tossed out of a four-story window, and she also watched as a mob roasted several black men to death “by slow fires.”

One day after New York City exploded with violence, in a far less known incident, Boston succumbed to the anti-draft fervor. On July 14, David Howe, an agent sent to deliver draft notices, became involved in an argument with an Irish woman in the North End, the city’s notorious ethnic slum. Upon receiving a notice for a family member, the Irish woman slapped Howe in the face. Angrily, Howe threatened her with arrest. Word of this altercation spread quickly, and soon, hundreds of Irish residents—including many women and children—poured into the streets searching for Howe or any policemen who offered him protection. Howe wisely retreated, but rumors abounded that the woman had actually been arrested or even abused. Now riotous, the Irish residents attacked several policemen in the area and caused some damage to the North End, but by evening, they moved on to the Cooper Street Armory. Word of the initial disturbance reached Governor Andrew, then attending Harvard’s commencement. News from New York City, where the other riot had started, put him on alert for any signs of potential trouble, so he ordered three companies from the 1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery—then stationed at Fort Warren—and Captain E. J. Jones’s 11th Militia Battery, to defend the armory against any civilian threats.

A crowd of several hundred persons reached the armory at 7:30 P.M., taunting the soldiers and pelting them with stones. Major Stephen Cabot, commander of the detachment,

ordered the crowd to disperse. His soldiers fired over the heads of the crowd, but this did little to deter them. Several women even held up their babies and taunted the soldiers to fire into them directly. At 8:00 P.M., the crowd began to tear panels from one of the armory doors, revealing a loaded cannon belonging to Jones’s militia battery. Major Cabot ordered the gun to fire. An artilleryman yanked the lanyard and sprayed the crowd with double-shotted canister. One rioter at the muzzle of the gun was blown to shreds. In all, eight persons fell dead, including three boys and one girl all under the age of fourteen.  

The shocked rioters retreated from the armory. Some continued their havoc by looting several gun stores in the region of Faneuil Market and absconding with several hundred firearms; however, by evening, the draft riot subsided.

Republicans, generally, praised the military for its speedy effort to end the disturbance. The editor of the *Evening Transcript* declared, “It is gratifying, and especially so in the present general aspect of affairs, to record the complete triumph of law and order in the fearful scenes of yesterday, and the unhesitating and stern display of military power to accomplish that end. To Captain Jones’s battery be all the honor.” Still, the city’s antiwar minority held the troops in contempt. They realized, however, that mob law could not rule in the Bay City. Farther south, New York City’s draft riot was then in full swing and destined to see three more days of mayhem. Boston’s half-day fracas paled in comparison.

Although Boston’s military authorities managed to quell its civil disorder in a few hours, New York City did not. The angry populace continued to pour out its frustration without pause.

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60 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 15 and 24 July 1863; Hanna, “The Boston Draft Riot,” 271. Mayor Lincoln agreed with the *Evening Transcript*. On July 23, he issued a public thanks to the heavy artillerymen and the militia cadets, exonerating them from any wrongdoing in the public eye by his unofficial decree. Even Irish leader Patrick Donohoe concurred. “Great credit is due the State and city authorities,” he declared, for their energy in quelling the riot. “Mobs,” he said, “should be nipped in the bud.”
This should come as no surprise. Gotham’s larger immigrant population, its deeper legacy of anti-black sentiment, and the fact that it was the only one of the four cities to witness the return of shattered two-year regiments all combined to create an embittered emotion that could not assuaged until destruction had run its course. On July 15, the day after Boston’s draft riot, more looting and attacks on African Americans occurred in New York, but finally, the first troops began arriving in the city. More soldiers arrived the next day, including the “Dandy Seventh” and three other rural and out-of-state regiments. On July 17, the rioting began to sputter out, partly due to the influence of Archbishop Hughes, who addressed an Irish crowd, claiming “not [to be] a rioter, for I am a man of peace.” Hughes’s entreaties for order were half-hearted, for he implicitly acquitted his fellow Irishmen of wrong-doing, justifying their protest against the Republican-orchestrated oppression as a righteous cause. Naturally, the Times and Tribune castigated Hughes for his imperceptive remarks. On the evening of July 17, Union regiments belonging to the Army of the Potomac fresh from the Battle of Gettysburg arrived, and this veteran military force quelled the last vestiges of disorder. In the end, the riots brought a reign of devastation on New York City. About 120 people perished, mostly rioters, and residents eventually claimed $2,500,000 in damages.\textsuperscript{61}

Historians of the New York City draft riots have analyzed this momentous disturbance various ways. Scholars of ethnic history, including Susannah Ural Bruce, have shown how the draft riots reflected long-standing confrontations between Irish-Americans and Know-Nothings. Although wedded to the cause of preserving the Union in 1861 and 1862, Irish-Americans in 1863, so Bruce claimed, organized to “resist [the draft] and demonstrate dissatisfaction with the war. They no longer saw the goals of the war as having any benefit for them.” Irish attacks

\textsuperscript{61} New York Times, 18 July 1863.
against black New Yorkers suggested that the city’s immigrant community saw the riots as a chance to battle their hated rivals at the bottom of the city’s complex social and economic hierarchy; however, historian William F. Hanna noted that Boston’s draft riot demonstrated a stark counterpoint, because no anti-black violence occurred in the Bay City. Iver Bernstein’s *The New York City Draft Riots*—the best known analysis of the event—considered New York’s ethnic tensions less important than its social class confrontations. In his opinion, “an ongoing process of urban change” forged a “new complex of social, cultural, and political relations [that] made the new antagonisms of July 1863 possible.” In essence, social class anxiety—not race or ethnicity—made all the difference. Still others, including Paul Gilje, saw a political justification, viewing the draft riots as the endpoint of a long “road to mobocracy,” a process whereby urbanites exhibited a growing predilection for street-level democracy—Gilje called it “a Revolutionary republicanism”—through violence and public dissent. Perhaps baffled by this multiplicity of explanations, New York City historian Edward Spann explained the draft riots as being “like the eruption of some great volcano that releases great natural tensions . . . not to be repeated during the remainder of the war.”

The intricate context of urban mobilization adds another dimension to this kaleidoscope of explanations. The seeming injudiciousness of the burden that descended upon New York City and Boston in July 1863—meaning the size of the quotas and the sudden divergence from the 1862 draft practices—helps explain why the riot occurred. Neither city opposed the draft in principle. After all, when their state governments had initiated conscription in the fall of 1862,

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the cities saw no violent protest. What had changed in 1863 was the timetable to supply the necessary manpower. Under the state authority, the governors had offered the cities a reasonable deadline to fill the draft quota with volunteers. Only those cities that failed had to bear the ignominy of conscription. Under the federal system, the draft went into effect immediately without an opportunity to raise troops through volunteering or bounty schemes. This betrayal of trust made it appear as if the War Department had spurned local efforts to meet the call. In operation, the federal conscription plan bypassed local efforts, wresting control of mobilization from people who once directed it, the duly authorized authorities of the northeastern cities. It is no surprise that anti-draft protest emerged so explosively in New York City, as that city had recently discharged eighteen disgruntled two-year regiments, and now those men had to return to the ranks, not as volunteers, but as conscripts. It is impossible to prove conclusively that those ex-soldiers led the riots, but it should be noted that Judge John McCunn, the ex-colonel of the 37th New York—one of the discharged regiments—made himself conspicuous during the disturbance by attempting to halt Union regiments sent to quell the riots and by releasing arrested persons without questioning them. In sum, the changing process of mobilization helped create the “volcano under the city.”

Baltimore and Philadelphia experienced no riotous outbreak, probably because the Emergency Militia mobilization in both cities prevented the provost marshals from completing their draft rolls on time. As a consequence, both cities began conscription after the New York and Boston riots had sputtered out. Philadelphians and Baltimoreans expressed shock when they heard the draft announcement, but because the assistant provost marshals’ offices remained silent, other important affairs—such as sending relief to Gettysburg and caring for the influx of

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wounded—capturing the greatest part of local attention. In fact, Philadelphia’s inefficient Board of Enrollers, admitted that they had not even double-checked the city’s rolls.⁶⁴

Thus, before the district provost marshals could set the draft wheels into motion in Philadelphia on July 15, news of the Boston and New York City riots reached the Quaker City. The city’s Republican presses printed sensational stories recounting New York City’s week-long reign of terror. Appalled, Philadelphians demonstrated no inclination to duplicate New York City’s deplorable mayhem. The Philadelphia Inquirer predicted, “The patriotism and intelligence of Philadelphia will carry the necessary measure though, however without subjecting us to such disgraceful scenes as have been prevalent in New York during the present week.”⁶⁵ Still, Mayor Henry worried about the safety of his city, and he asked General William Whipple to delay the draft for one additional week. Whipple expressed confidence in his ability to quell any violent resistance, however, and merely asked General Couch to send him two regiments of infantry and one troop of cavalry, “those not from this city preferred.” When the draft began on July 15, Whipple wired Washington, “Draft going on. All quiet.”⁶⁶

The War Department did not share Whipple’s optimism, however. Secretary of War Stanton suspended drafting in areas where it was not already in progress and sent Major General Napoleon J. T. Dana to Philadelphia on July 16 with two batteries of artillery and one regiment of infantry to ensure the maintenance of law and order. The next day, Adjutant General Lorenzo

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⁶⁴ The draft was supposed to begin in the Quaker City’s Third District on July 13—the same day New York City’s riot began—but the unprepared assistant provost marshals begged for more time. Brigadier General William Dennison Whipple, commander of the Post of Philadelphia, granted this postponement, decreeing the draft would begin at 8:00 A.M. on July 15 in the Fourteenth Ward, Fourth District. OR, Series 3, Volume 3, 491; William A. Itter, “Conscription in Pennsylvania during the Civil War,” (Dissertation: University of Southern California, 1941), 121.

⁶⁵ Philadelphia Inquirer, 17 July 1863.

⁶⁶ Itter, “Conscription in Pennsylvania,” 121.
Thomas arrived in person to assume full command of federal troops in Philadelphia, and on July 18, the War Department authorized him to continue the draft.\textsuperscript{67} The draft in the Fourteenth Ward was drawn by a blind man, Michael Williams, who picked 862 names. Over the next nine days, the draft continued throughout the Fourth District’s other five wards, drawing 3,313 more names. No violence accompanied these drawings.\textsuperscript{68} Likewise, Baltimore experienced no drafting and no rioting. As had happened in Philadelphia, the procrastination of the assistant provost marshals held the draft in abeyance. Captains Robert Cathart and Leopold Blumenburg had not completed their district draft rolls in a timely manner, so Provost Marshal General Fry allowed Baltimore to delay its conscription as long as it needed.

The situation in New York City required immediate attention. For the next few weeks, New Yorkers tried to rebuild their city. Stanton removed General Wool from command of the Department of the East and replaced him with an Empire City native, Major General John A. Dix. Mayor Opdyke issued a proclamation offering a $500 reward for any information leading to the arrest and conviction of rioters who committed murder. Citizens organized a private charity to collect relief for black residents affected by the riot. By July 27, this fund reached $30,334. Another fund, this one aiding injured soldiers, firemen, and policemen, reached $24,728 at about the same time. Several days later, the members of the Common Council proposed a $50,000 appropriation to rebuild the Colored Orphan Asylum.\textsuperscript{69}

In the weeks following the riot, a collective shame passed over the city. A. F. Warburton, an Irishman, pleaded with the Council not to rebuild the Colored Orphanage. Instead, he argued,

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 122-4.
\textsuperscript{68} Philadelphia Inquirer, 16 July 1863.
\textsuperscript{69} New York Herald, 23, 24, 27, and 30 July 1863.
Irishmen should do it to atone for their misbehavior. The work, he said, “should be left for them alone . . . so that from the smoking ruins of passion, prejudice, and crime may be converted by Ireland’s sons into a noble monument of liberal reparation and justice.” Lurid tales of the riot abounded in the nation’s newspapers. Cities that held peaceful drafts—especially Philadelphia—reprimanded New Yorkers for their violent activities. New York City Democrats tried to obfuscate the sensationalism, accusing the other cities of “invent[ing] marvelous stories in regard to the excess of criminals in our population,” and abusing “these imaginary wretches with all the ardor of Don Quixote fighting a mythical giant.” But these efforts came to little avail. After all, many other cities peacefully submitted to the draft, and New York City stood out like a beacon of treason.  

The Democratic Common Council responded to the riot by approving a $2,500,000 ordinance to relieve drafted men. In the event that any drafted man could not pay his commutation fee, the Council proposed to allot him a $300 relief certificate. The measure appeared to run counter to the previous years of patriotism, for it essentially promised to keep drafted men out of the war. Opdyke immediately vetoed the measure, for he did not want to award the mischief of antiwar men. He declared, “It is impossible to believe that the riot was anything else than the outbreak of traitors.” Democrats seethed over the veto. James Bennett wrote, “Mayor Opdyke’s incompetency [sic] is proverbial. . . . None but monomaniacs and

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70 Ibid., 30 July and 1 August 1863. Editor Bennett of the Herald fumed when Philadelphia presses reveled in the destruction. He wrote, “It is remarkable how delighted the country papers are because we have had a great riot in New York. The editors of that right-angled and wrong-minded village, paradoxically called Philadelphia, are especially jubilant over this interesting fact.”
frightened men could have watched the progress of the riot and believe that it was in any way an outbreak of traitors. It originated simply in opposition to the draft.”

Governor Seymour used the riots as yet another cue to protest the abuse of power by the Lincoln administration. In early August, he sent a letter to Lincoln arguing that the draft unfairly punished New York City Democrats. Using voting statistics to prove his point, he claimed that numbers of men drafted in New York State’s first nine districts—including Brooklyn and New York City—were disproportionately high when compared to the state’s nineteen rural districts. Seymour believed that any casual observer found “the partisan character of the enrollment” unmistakable. He wrote, “Each of the nine districts gave majorities in favor of one political party, and each of the [other] nineteen districts gave majorities in favor of the other party.” New York’s Judge Advocate General, Nelson Waterbury, concurred. By his estimates, New York City had already surpassed its quota by 1,600 men. Further, he argued, the call of July 9 asked for 15.6 percent of New York City’s fencible population, while it only asked for 9.6 percent of Philadelphia’s fencible population, supporting his argument by comparing the two cities’ enrollment lists against the 1860 census records. Waterbury argued, “There has been a manifest design to take out of that city [New York City], by conscription, the greater part of its large democratic majority. This is evident not only from the character of the enrollment, but also from the fact that, as far as the draft proceeded, the names drawn were mainly those of democrats.”

71 Ibid., 29 July 1863.
72 Waterbury provided accurate numbers. This statistics indicate that Philadelphia’s assistant provost marshals lackadaisically fashioned their draft rolls, leaving off too many fencible individuals. However, Waterbury did not recognize this as the source of the disparity. Instead, he blamed Stanton and Fry for intentionally inflating New York City’s numbers.
73 New York Herald, 11 and 13 August 1863.
Lincoln and Provost Marshal General Fry rightly dismissed such claims. Fry wrote Stanton that, “There is nothing on file in the War Department to show ‘that New York and Brooklyn has furnished more than their proportion’ of troops from the State of New York.” On August 10, Lincoln ordered the draft to resume in New York City. On August 17, General Dix announced that the draft would begin again two days later. He announced, “Whatever objections there may be to the law authorizing the draft, whatever defects it may have, it is the law of the land, and resistance to it is revolt against the constituted authorities of the country. If one law can be set at defiance, any other may be, and the foundations of all government may be broken up.”

The draft resumed on August 19 at the Sixth District Office, and agents drew 1,100 names from the Ninth Ward. This time no trouble broke out. A newly assembled army of militia and volunteers guarded the event. Dix placed the entirety of the 1st Division—thirteen regiments—at key sectors of the city, ready to meet any emergency. On the second day, drafting continued in the Fifteenth Ward, drawing 794 names. Events transpired with levity and restrained frivolity. A reporter noted, “Huge satisfaction was expressed whenever some denizen of Fifth Avenue, or some other aristocratic locality, was drawn, and countenances seemed to round up at names of merchants doing business in such streets as Broadway being announced.”

The drawing in the Fifteenth Ward included such names as Townsend Harris, Minister to Japan; John B. Holmes, excise commissioner; John Morrissey, noted pugilist; William H. Fry, editor of the Tribune; and John Clancey, editor of the Leader. The draft also appeared to fall evenly upon Democrats and Republicans. On August 25, in the Eighteenth Ward draft, agents drew the name of Mayor Opdyke’s son, and the next day, Supervisor William M. “Boss” Tweed, the noted ring-leader of Tammany Hall, was drafted in the Seventh Ward. That same day, Captain Charles

74 Ibid., 17 August 1863.
Jenkins re-started the draft in the Twenty-Second Ward. He commenced by resuming the reading of Stanton’s proclamation from the very point he had been interrupted on July 13. This time, the Twenty-Second Ward’s draft proceeded peacefully. When the day ended, the laboring classes in the upper wards sauntered off mumbling to themselves. Some Twentieth Ward denizens who escaped conscription griped, “Abe Lincoln hasn’t got us yet!” and “Draft and be damned!”

Republicans leaders in New York City upheld the decrees of the Lincoln administration, but because Governor Seymour and General Waterbury had thrown down the proverbial gauntlet, accusing the administration of assigning New York City an unfair quota, the task of rebuilding the party’s tarnished reputation proved especially difficult. Mayor Opdyke’s behavior did nothing to improve matters. Just days before the draft recommenced, the Common Council passed a new $3,000,000 appropriation to fund a city bounty and pay commutation fees of drafted men. The new appropriation specifically promised to relieve firemen, militiamen, policemen, and men of indigent circumstances. As the week progressed, Opdyke refused to sign the bill, causing many Democrats to characterize his conduct as “foolishly unscrupulous and stubborn.” Apparently sensing the growing resentment, Opdyke placed soldiers from the 12th N.Y.S.M. as guards around City Hall and at the doorway of his office. On August 25, Opdyke vetoed the bill, arguing that the bill’s various provisions afforded “great opportunity for abuse.” Expressly, Opdyke disliked the opportunity this bill offered to immigrants and New Englanders, allowing them to arrive in New York City with no money or prospects, hoping to get rich, and being handed $300 after a short residency. Opdyke regretted not being able to exempt the city’s

75 Ibid., 20, 21, 26, and 27 August 1863.
firemen, policemen, and militiamen, but he charged the council with the task of drawing up a separate ordinance to do so.⁷⁶

Various urban elements protested Opdyke’s veto. On August 26, frustrated fire fighters held a meeting at Firemen’s Hall to pressure city insurance companies into supplying a $500,000 loan to exempt them from service. The metropolitan police made a similar entreaty, asking the mayor and police commissioners to donate their salaries to fund their exemptions. Citing their hard work recruiting the Metropolitan Brigade in 1862 and their efforts to preserve law and order during the riots, the police believed they had earned the right to be exempt. “These remarks may appear,” their resolution stated, “coming from us, to be rather egotistical; but we conceived it necessary to call your attention to these facts in order to prove that we are more entitled to come under the head of exempts than a great many.” Occupational exemptions represented only one way to avoid service. Germans in the Tenth, Eleventh, and Seventeenth Wards met at Harmonie Gardens on August 29 to raise commutation funds and to form a community watch program to prevent any conscripts from their community from being seized by draft officials.⁷⁷

The County Board of Supervisors broke the deadlock by passing a $2,000,000 ordinance similar to one proposed by the Council, but without the disagreeable clauses. To appease Opdyke, the Board of Supervisors created the County Volunteer Substitute and Relief Committee, headed by Republican Orison J. Blunt. The Board of Supervisors gave Blunt’s committee the task of doling out commutation fees to approved applicants and ensuring that

⁷⁶ Ibid., 21 and 26 August 1863.
⁷⁷ Ibid., 27 and 30 August 1863.
Democrats did not mishandle New York City’s quota. Within the first week of operation, 717 drafted firemen appealed to the Substitute and Relief Committee, and all received exemptions.\textsuperscript{78}

On August 28, the draft concluded in the Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Wards. After dealing exemptions to firemen, policemen, and militiamen, Blunt’s Committee began aiding “indigent drafted persons,” that is, impoverished workingmen responsible for dependents. If any drafted man of indigent circumstances could not find a substitute, by presenting himself to the Committee and providing satisfactory evidence that he had “used his best endeavors to procure a substitute,” the Committee signed a certificate of exemption, promising to pay his commutation. Of course, the drafted person had to prove that his relative would become a burden to the city if he went to war, and Blunt vowed not to be tricked by fraud.\textsuperscript{79}

Farther North, Bostonians took pride in the fact that their city’s draft resistance did not descend into the murderous bedlam of New York. In its camp at Readville, the nearly complete 55\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts, a black regiment, prepared to march through Boston and then the Empire City. In preparation, the officers drilled the men in street fighting. Still, although no anti-black violence occurred during Boston’s draft riot, when it left on July 21 amid a driving shower, the regiment marched through Boston with loaded muskets and fixed bayonets. This moment appeared to be a turning point for the Bay City. Peacefulness and acclamation marked the parade. Perhaps correctly, Major Charles Fox considered this the true crossroads of Boston’s commitment to the war. “It would not be fair to say that ball cartridges had secured for the Fifty-fifth a quiet passage through its streets,” he remarked. “ . . . [T]he general satisfaction in this ‘new policy,’ or at least the absence of opposition, was clear, from the fact that no signs of

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 September 1863.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 2 September 1863.
disapprobation were made by the spectators who thronged the streets on the route of the regiment, and that frequent cheers and applause greeted them, especially on Tremont, Cambridge, Court, and State Streets.” According to one of its officers, the black regiment spoiled for a fight against Gotham’s roughs to exact retribution for the dozens of murdered African Americans killed by New York City rioters. To forestall this, Governor Andrew arranged for a steamship to take the regiment to North Carolina directly. Major Fox of the 55th Massachusetts still wished that the parade through New York City could have happened; he lamented, “Certainly it could not have been necessary to run away from that besotted canaille; and a bolder course would have brought out the old, and made new, friends of freedom.” Nevertheless, the failure of anti-black hostility to arise in the wake of Boston’s draft riot showcased the impotence of conservative Democracy in the Bay City. Boston’s drafting of white and black residents continued uninterrupted and the city’s provost marshals finished the drawing by the end of the month.80

Philadelphia resumed its drafting after only a brief postponement. On July 20, over 2,000 names were drawn in the Twelfth, Twentieth, Twenty-Third, and Twenty-Fifth Wards. The assistant provost marshals expected that this day might produce the most excitement because they planned to enforce the draft in Frankford, where many arsenal workers and mariners resided. Five companies of infantry and a battery of artillery were on hand to meet any resistance, but “the whole affair passed off pleasantly.” As a blindfolded man cranked the wheel at Frankford, a large crowd watched quietly. A few wags shouted, “Churn away you old fellows,” and “three cheers for the draft.” The draft at Frankford drew 854 names, including sixty-one employees of Jenks and Sons, thirty-one independent gunsmiths, and three members of

80 Fox, Record of the Service of the Fifty-Fifth Regiment, 7-8, MAHS.
one family. When the name Morris Healy was drawn, the crowd chuckled at its resemblance to Horace Greeley, editor of the *New York Tribune*, then still an earnest supporter of Emancipation. One man shouted, “Now you’ve got him, hold onto him!” When the first black man was drawn, the crowd replied “with much applause.” The drawing in these four wards yielded the selection of fourteen prominent Democrats including Daniel M. Fox, and eleven prominent Republicans, including Lieutenant Colonel Barton Jenks, recently of the Emergency Militia. No one, it seemed, accused the draft of falling unequally on the different social and political strata of the city.\(^1\) The draft concluded on the morning of August 4 in the Tenth Ward. Republicans in the city noticed Philadelphians’ calm acceptance of the Enrollment Act. To them, it stood out as an exemplar of urban patriotism. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* applauded, “The utmost order and quiet have characterized the different drafts, and the Quaker City may congratulate itself that the proud name which it has earned as a law-abiding people received new distinction.”\(^2\)

Philadelphia’s peaceful acceptance of the draft may have resulted, in part, from the multiplicity of ways its citizens could avoid service. Some workingmen applied a city program that offered to pay commutation fees. The day after the commencement of the draft in the Fourteenth Ward, the City Council passed an ordinance for relief of drafted men and their families, appropriating $1,000,000 for use by “certain drafted men,” and to be disbursed by the City Bounty Fund. This ordinance also allowed the City Bounty Fund Committee to pay a drafted man’s $300 commutation fee if his family or dependents were “likely to become anyway chargeable to the public.” In exchange, the mayor could draw a warrant for an equal sum on the

\(^1\) *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 21 July 1863.

\(^2\) Ibid., 27 July 1863.
collector of internal revenue in the district of the drafted man. In fact, all cities possessed multiple means of draft avoidance. If a drafted man could not pay the commutation fee out of his own pocket, or if he could not draw money from Philadelphia’s relief fund, the Enrollment Act allowed him to purchase a substitute to go in his place. Although Philadelphians could hire substitutes directly—and some did by placing advertisements in local papers—most preferred to acquire their substitutes through brokers.

Substitute brokers operated businesses that sold substitutes to needy drafted men out of convenient locations. They asked volunteers to rendezvous at makeshift offices prior to the commencement of the draft in their particular ward. Under regulations, these individuals had to be ineligible for the draft based on alienage, age, non-residence, or occupation. After the draft, any man not called up by the assistant provost marshals could become a substitute. Drafted men interested in acquiring a substitute could then inquire at the broker’s office and procure one at a fair price. The substitute received the bulk of the sum—usually slightly less than $300—and the broker skimmed off a small profit. Ideally, this arrangement worked to keep drafted men from going to the front, while offering lucrative pay to substitutes in lieu of a volunteer bounty. Volunteers who went as substitutes received no special benefits, except that their brokers usually paid them in cash immediately. For the principles seeking substitutes, the advantage of having brokers collect substitutes in an easily accessible office made it easier for drafted men to seek them out and purchase them. Indeed, prominent patriotic institutions and newspapers often sponsored substitute brokers, donating sums to pay the rent for their offices.

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83 Ibid., 17 July 1863.
84 Ibid., 23 July 1863.
Although the apparatus to acquire substitutes functioned well, it quickly became apparent that the men acquired this way could not be relied upon to report to their assigned regiments. Soon after receiving their pay, many tried to flee the city where they entered military service. To combat this, the assistant provost marshals in all the big cities kept substitutes in temporary rendezvous with guards at all the entranceways. Once a recruiting officer showed up, the officer in charge of the rendezvous signed off on a squad, allowing him to march the new soldiers down to the train station, place them on cars, and send them to the front. To prevent substitutes from fleeing their rendezvous, draft officials rented space in high rise buildings too high above street level for an easy escape. But this did not stop the machinations of the most stalwart shirkers. In Philadelphia, one such rendezvous was on the second floor of a building at Twenty-Second and Wood Streets. Over the course of several days, one enterprising substitute used a pen knife to cut a hole through the wood floor while concealing his tunneling with bed clothing. When the draft officers learned of his scheme, they sent three guards to the abandoned apartment below to wait for him. After the would-be-escapist slid through his hole, he came face-to-face with the angry guards and their bayonets.\textsuperscript{85}

The substitute brokers participated in shameless deception to earn money. Brokers functioned well in Philadelphia—at least initially—but in the other cities they became a veritable menace. In Boston, Baltimore, and New York City, they bought substitutes’ services and sold them to drafted men at inflated prices. Although technically legal, many substitute brokers dabbled in illegal acts that fleeced taxpayers, benevolent persons, and federal recruiters. Quite often, brokers aided in a substitute’s escape. When substitutes reported to the draft rendezvous, their brokers facilitated in their desertion, usually by bribing the guard. This allowed the

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 30 July 1863.
substitute to go back into circulation, be sold again, and run up a huge sum in bounties for both substitute and broker. Michael O’Neill, an Irish broker, ran a successful business in Boston, aiding in the escape of his substitutes from the draft rendezvous at Long Island. Provost guards eventually arrested him, but a great many of his compatriots escaped prosecution. Boston’s recruiters also had to be on the lookout for swindlers who “ran,” or kidnapped, recruits to other cities—New York City and Providence, especially. Detectives hired by both cities entered Boston each day looking for substitute deserters and their accomplices.86

Baltimore’s substitute brokers dealt their city a serious disservice, since many of them kidnapped unwilling recruits—not merely to steal a portion of their bounty—but to run them to other cities where the bounties proved more lucrative, clearing high profits for themselves but denying Baltimore these much-needed credits. In late August, Thomas Green, a substitute broker on Thames Street, sent one of his agents, George Garlin, to capture Gerhardt Schloss, an illiterate German, and then ship him to Philadelphia to get the Quaker City’s higher bounty. After sobering up to Green’s scheme—Garlin presumably got him drunk—Schloss jumped from the train at President Street Station. Garlin gave chase, recaptured his prey, beat him severely, and took his bloodied captive back to Green’s house. There, he tore off Schloss’s clothes, and dressed him in a stolen sailor’s uniform so that he might be dragooned into the U.S. Navy instead. Policemen, who had been alerted by Schloss’s cries for help, eventually arrived on the scene and arrested both Green and Garlin.87

General Schenck quickly drafted several punitive orders. One made it illegal to entice recruits out of their congressional districts. Another made it illegal for alcohol dealers to sell

86 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 15 August 1863.
87 *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 31 August 1863.
liquor to potential recruits. Schenck placed guards at the depots to watch for potential law
breakers. On September 14, guards arrested two substitutes, Henry Brune and August Busman,
each of whom attempted to flee Baltimore to get a chance at Philadelphia’s bounty. The guards
arrested them for bribery, as both men offered them money to look the other way and let them
board an outbound train. A summary interrogation led a corporal’s guard to a substitute
brokerage business run by Jacob Faber and his chief kidnapper, Herman Heien. Guards
summarily arrested both men.⁸⁸

New York City exhibited the worst behavior among its brokers because the $300 bounty
offered by Blunt’s Committee attracted the most reprehensible individuals. Frequently, Gotham’s
brokers forged enlistment papers by bribing clerks at the provost marshals’ offices. Then, after
placing the names of legitimately enlisted soldiers on their certificates and getting them
notarized, they paraded them about town, getting drafted men or recruiting officers to buy them
up for exorbitant prices. Other brokers, according to the New York Herald, preyed upon the
“most verdant individuals as victims,” coercing them into signing agreements to give them
healthy cuts of the $300 bounty. To make this grift work, agents paid the substitute in cash—
usually $100 or $200—and then had the substitute sign a voucher allowing the broker to collect
the full bounty after presenting him to the provost marshal. One broker brought five substitutes
to the Fourth District office in mid-September, taking $650 for himself. Captain Joel Erhardt
complained in disgust, “He may have pocketed the difference, which, if allowed, would be a
great fraud on the taxpayers.”⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Ibid., 15 September 1863.
(September, 1966), 261-2; New York Herald, 12 September 1863.
One favorite scam of urban substitute brokers included hiring a dishonest woman to pose as a substitute’s mother to vouch for the enlistment of men under the age of twenty-one. In one case, a Rhode Island broker offered ten New York City minors a chance to make $300 apiece if they traveled with him to Providence for a day trip to perform some random chore. The minors accepted his request, and the broker forced each one to sign “contract papers.” But instead of paying them $300 for the errand, these papers formally enlisted them in a Rhode Island regiment. The broker absconded with $50 from each of their bounties, and the men were shipped off before their parents knew of the deceitful transaction. Other times, brokers forced German immigrants to sign papers unknowingly enlisting them in the Union army. Ferdinand Schaefer, a medical student from the University of Breslau, arrived in New York City in the fall, but within days, his landlord—a broker—took him to a recruiting office. Breslau thought he was signing papers getting him a job as a doctor; in reality, he had just joined the 41st New York. 90

Although substitutes and their brokers caused havoc in the cities, substitution was not the most popular method of avoiding the draft. Draftees could also evade service by receiving a physical exemption. Once called up, a drafted man reported to the district surgeon’s office and stripped for an examination. Thirteen different deficiencies could result in exemption, including insufficiently arched feet, insufficient number of teeth, weak arms, lack of fingers, insufficient chest size, testicular diseases, impaired vision or speech, and insanity. As they had done the previous year, drafted men complained of fraudulent ailments or faked their deficiencies. Substitutes, on the other hand, did their best to conceal their defects. If they mustered properly, they stood to receive a substantial sum. Many planned to reach the front and then apply for a medical discharge. Thereby, they would receive their cash and not have to be put into harm’s

way. When a group of thirty-seven Philadelphia substitutes arrived at the encampment of the 28th Pennsylvania at Raccoon Ford, Virginia, one of them had to be discharged because he possessed no left foot. The orderly sergeant who discovered the substitute’s infirmity lamented, “[It] is surprising to see how the government is imposed upon by the men who pass these cripples.”

Occupation, non-residence, age, and indigent familial relations also permitted draftees to procure exemptions. As historian Tyler Anbinder has shown, in cities, the percentage of exemption claims greatly outranked the nation as a whole. In six wards in Boston in the summer of 1863, eighty-seven percent of all drafted men avoided service through exemption. Among the immigrant population in those same wards, ninety-five percent avoided service through exemptio. The anonymity of city life ensured that faking a disability or falsely claiming alienage, indigence, age, or non-residence remained a viable means of acquiring an exemption. New York City’s 1863 mirrored the statistics of Boston. The assistant provost marshals for the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Districts—encompassing twelve city wards—adjudicated 8,485 cases during that six-week period after the draft, about half of their total cases. They held only 1,728 men to service, or twenty percent. Another 1,180 draftees—fourteen percent—purchased substitutes and 6,069—seventy-one percent—received exemptions. Up to October, the Fourth District office—encompassing the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Wards—drew 3,035 names. In about six weeks, Captain Joel Erhardt adjudicated 1,445 cases, amounting to about half of those called by the federal draft in his district. Of that number, 203 purchased substitutes, 274 men claimed non-residence, 261 claimed physical disability, 170 claimed alienage, 107 claimed being over age, thirty-four claimed being under age, fifty-seven claimed being the only son of a widowed mother, twelve claimed being the only support for a motherless child, two

91 Philadelphia Inquirer, 20 July 1863; Ambrose Henry Hayward to Cora Hayward, 24 September 1863, GCSCA.
claimed to be the only support for two siblings, and two claimed that their names had been drawn twice. Like the other district provost marshals in Gotham, Erhardt held only twenty percent—293 men—to duty. Unfortunately for New York City, the assistant provost marshals adjudicated only half of their cases. They laid over the remaining cases for review by the office of the Southern Division of New York State. Most of those held over for review resulted in exemption, eventually reducing New York City’s “held to service” statistic to less than ten percent.92

Exemptions comprised the bulk of draftees in the northeastern cities, but sizable numbers of city residents paid commutation. Prominent religious figures used their prestige or rapport with congregations to secure the necessary funds. The Philadelphia Inquirer noted that church congregations were “in most cases paying the amount under the conscript act and are thus relieving them [the pastors] from the necessity of entering the field and taking up arms against the enemy.” The prominent Reverend Morris Sutphen of the Spring Garden Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia avoided service this way.93

Finally, draftees could simply refuse to report for duty at the district provost office as required. In six wards in Boston, over eighteen percent of those drafted avoided service this way.94 The casual screening process provided opportunities for deceit, enabling this kind of evasion. In one case at New York’s Fourth District Office, a man named John Sullivan showed up with two draft notices, one for himself and one for another man, also named John Sullivan, who lived in the same building. Sullivan told Captain Joel B. Erhardt, the assistant provost marshal, that “a score of strong minded Celtic women had surrounded him and threatened him

93 Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 July 1863.
94 Anbinder, “Which Poor Man’s Fight?” 349.
with death” if he did not consent to represent both himself and the other John Sullivan. Pleased
by the man’s honesty, Erhardt ordered a corporal’s guard to arrest the other John Sullivan for
failing to report.95

Altogether, these easy forms of evasion and deceit blunted the efficiency of the first
federal draft in the cities.96 Thus, of those called, New York City’s first draft held a mere 8.6
percent to service.97 Meanwhile, the draft called 18,481 Philadelphians to service, but only 343
were actually held to service, or 1.85 percent of the quota.98 In Boston, only 831 conscripts
served, or 12.4 percent of the city quota.99

While Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City struggled with their draft processes, the
inefficiencies of Baltimore’s assistant provost marshals prevented the Monumental City from
commencing its draft until late November. As a consequence, Baltimore benefited from extra
time to meet its quota, and the first federal draft did not fall as heavily on its residents. By that
time, however, Lincoln had announced a mid-October for an additional 300,000 three-
year men, so Baltimoreans worried about their ability to meet two successive calls for troops. As in the
other cities, uncertainty affected the city’s civilian workforce. James L. Baylies pessimistically
wrote his employer that, “I am unable to say whether I will have to enter Uncle Sam’s service or
no—the quota being about two in every thirteen. I guess my chances are about as good as any for

95 New York Herald, 6 September 1863.
96 For instance, in New York City, on September 5 alone, eighty-two men reported to the Fourth District Office, and
fifty received exemptions. In Gotham, the process of exempting drafted men continued into October, each district
adjudicating an average of twenty-five cases each day. Altogether, draft officials drew 20,265 names from New
York City. Of these, all but 2,623 procured exemptions or paid the commutation fee. Of those held to service, 875
procured substitutes. Thirteen by non-residence, seven by old age, one by young age, two by already being in
service, thirteen by alienage, ten by physical disability, three with certificates from Blunt’s Committee, and one by
paying commutation.
97 Spann, Gotham at War, 104.
98 Most of these men received medical exemptions, 1,162 paid the commutation fee, and 2,667 hired substitutes.
99 Boston Evening Transcript, 4 January and 2 May 1864.
a prize, but should I fail in this one, I will have another and perhaps better chance in the Draft of January 16/64. It looks very much like I will have to shoulder a musket some time within the next three months.”

After significant haggling between city and federal authorities, Baltimore’s enrollment for the first federal draft finally stood at 21,652 and its quota stood at 3,097. Learning from the inefficiency of conscription demonstrated in Philadelphia and New York City, the provost marshals in Baltimore planned to draw 4,645 names so they could cover the predictable host of exemptions certain to surface after the drawing. The draft began simultaneously at the Second and Third Congressional District offices at 10:00 A.M. on November 23. At 3 South Exeter Street, Provost Marshal Cathart began drawing names from the First Ward. He poured 871 names—all written on strips of heavy cardboard, one inch wide and two inches long—into a large revolving wheel. Commissioner L. M. Haverstick gave the wheel five to six turns. Then, while blindfolded, Captain W. P. Brightman drew the first name: Joseph Smith. The drawing took sixty-five minutes. According to a reporter, “everything passed off harmoniously, the only interruption being the occasional laughter and jocose remarks of some of the drafted ones who were present in the room.” The draft proceeded quietly in the Third District office at 26 Holliday Street, where Mr. Samuel Stewart, a graduate of the Maryland Institute for the Blind, who, notwithstanding his loss of sight, wore a blindfold while he drew the names from the Eighth Ward. The next day, the provost marshals drew names from the Second and Ninth Wards. Unlike New York City and Boston, Baltimore experienced no unrest, and reporters noted this uncharacteristic quietude. A writer for the American commented, “So far the draft has progressed

100 James L. Baylies to Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, 1 December 1863, J. N. Bonaparte papers, MDHS.  
101 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 24 November 1863.
quietly and in good order. No apprehensions are entertained that it will hereafter prove otherwise.”

The draft finally ended on December 5 in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Wards, where Samuel Stewart drew, among other names, an officer in the Army of Northern Virginia.

Once the draft ended, those citizens who expressed themselves unwilling to serve in the Union army commenced the shockingly easy task of securing an exemption. Some, such as William Pennington, chose to flee the country. One of his friends noted, “This expedient for maintaining the war has been in progress all week in this city.” While others gathered $300 to pay the commutation fee, members of Baltimore’s large working-class struggled to find the resources to pay their way out of the draft. S. W. Smith noted, “The poor negroes who have been drafted are in a state of abject horror. The Mechanics & other labourers are flying from a service odious to them as Marylanders.” James Baylies wrote to his employer that “according to my usual luck,” he had been drafted on the last day in the Nineteenth Ward. “As I am very certain that the hardships of a soldier’s life will not agree with my delicate constitution,” he wrote, “I have no desire whatever to become one, and will endeavor to Commute by paying the three hundred dollars.” But, he continued, “In thus relieving myself, I will take all the money that I can scrape together and reduce me to a very small compass indeed.” Baylie asked for an advance in his salary, since “all the necessities of life are at least double their former prices, and I assure you it is a hard matter for me to get along.” Unfortunately, by the summer of 1864, Baylie’s employer still had not met his request.

102 Ibid., 25 November 1863.
103 S. W. Smith to Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, 28 November 1863; and James L. Baylies to Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, 8 December 1863 and 2 January and 7 May 1864, J. N. Bonaparte papers, MDHS.
As in New York City, occupational specialties worked to protect their own. Twenty-nine of Baltimore’s 400 policemen found themselves conscripted during the first federal draft. As a consequence, the city’s police founded a club for the purpose of relieving those drafted or those who might be drafted in January. The policemen calculated it would cost at least $7,800 to protect the entire force, and they hoped to raise this money through policemen’s balls. Groups of families from seven city wards met at Temperance Temple to set up a similar draft protection fund that would pay commutation fees for anyone drafted in their particular neighborhoods. As these events transpired, citizens thronged the provost marshals’ offices with proof of their ailments, commutation fees, and doctors’ affidavits. The efficiency of Baltimore’s draft mirrored those of its urban neighbors farther north. The two federal offices in Baltimore each adjudicated roughly fifty cases per day. On December 14, Blumenburg dispensed with fifty-one individuals: twenty-two paid commutation fees, five bought substitutes (four of these substitutes were black), ten claimed alienage, five claimed disability, three claimed to be in the service already, and six claimed exemptions based on other circumstances. By the end of the month, the Third District—that which comprised thirteen of the city’s twenty wards—issued 2,720 exemptions, most of them based on physical disability. Of the remaining men drafted in this district, 108 purchased substitutes, 719 paid commutation, and 561 failed to report. Only fifty-five made it to the draft rendezvous at Mason’s Island.\textsuperscript{104} Despite its lateness, Baltimore’s first federal draft followed the same path as the other cities.

Traditionally, historians have seen the summer of 1863 as the nadir of northern urban morale. Certainly, the uninspiring statistics of the urban military drafts might confirm this. However, it must be remembered that northeastern city-dwellers adhered to traditional forms of

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 9, 10, 11, 15, and 16 December 1863 and 17 February 1864.
army avoidance—substitution, brokerage, commutation, exemptions—forms that had been established and supported by their state governments the previous year. To urban residents, these forms of draft avoidance did not signal a failure of patriotism. On the contrary, urban residents viewed them as legal means of continuing their non-military wartime pursuits. Although northeastern cities had their fair share of draft dodgers, some residents knew that they could better serve the war effort at home acting as contractors, factory operatives, policemen, firemen, and local militia. The politics of draft evasion became controversial, but it did not necessarily symbolize the depths of urban morale. That period arrived in the summer in 1864.

Nevertheless, the cities of the Northeast responded maladroitly, even disobediently, to the Lincoln administration’s call for troops. Two failures stood out from the summer of 1863. First, the cities did not initiate a comprehensive law enforcement program to curtail the rising class of substitute brokers or the substitutes who deserted. The dishonest businessmen who became brokers sought to make a profit from a highly demanded commodity—substitutes—and used the loopholes in the commerce of manpower to fleece principles and substitutes of their cash. Law enforcement officials apprehended criminals, but police efforts failed to terminate the influence of greedy capitalism which corrupted a system of mobilization that required selfless patriotism to operate effectively. The draft rioting in Boston and New York City illustrated the second failure. Heavily racist—at least in New York City—politically partisan, and even class-conscious, these two draft riots demonstrated urban pluralism at its worst, with competing interest groups looking out for their own social and economic betterment. However, Baltimore and Philadelphia remained un tarnished by draft rioting, and in fact, these two cities made significant leaps in the recruitment of African American troops to assist the Union cause. Since both cities had been notorious for their antebellum racism, such a prospect would have been unthinkable to Baltimore.
and Philadelphia residents in 1861. Undoubtedly, the shock of the Pennsylvania invasion, the awkward effort to raise Emergency Militia in each city, and the patriotic actions of the black populations—organizing a military company in Philadelphia and manning the barricades in Baltimore—convinced city leaders the time was right to tap the sable arm. In some ways, the crises of 1863 propelled innovations, helping transform the cities war into a fight for black freedom. However, when military crises subsided, as it did in the coming winter, urban areas had to look to new ways to sustain the Union war effort.
Chapter 10:
“Back to the Good Old System”:
Cities and the Sharing of Sacrifice, July 1863—April 1864.

In November 1863, Anna Dickinson, a twenty-one-year-old Philadelphia abolitionist, spoke at Chicago’s Great Northwestern Fair. Already, Dickinson had received extensive national recognition for her cunning oratorical skills. Earlier that year, she had stumped for Republican gubernatorial candidates in New Hampshire and Connecticut, aiding both politicians in their electoral victories, and Philadelphia charity workers knew Dickinson from her volunteer efforts at the city’s military hospitals. Speaking to her Chicago audience, Dickinson explained how the forces of war developed citizens’ “noble, self-sacrificing courage and honor.” Pleased with the success of the Sanitary Fair and its commitment to sustaining the Union’s mobilization, she affirmed, “This element of self-sacrifice is a great thing in us as a people.” Back East, Philadelphia’s newspapers reprinted Dickinson’s speech in their columns, conveying her message to hometown residents. To convince city-dwellers of the need to sacrifice their personal fortunes to the war effort, Dickinson measured sacrifice by setting the accomplishments of Union soldiers as the highest standard to which any citizens could aspire. She continued:

There he comes in faded blue! . . . If you smile and nod to him he cannot return the salute for want of a right hand; or perhaps a stray ball has made his face beautiful by a ghastly scar. He endured the hardships of the Southwest campaign, . . . or perhaps remembers Antietam, where for hours he stood while the fiery rain of shot and shell fell around him. . . . He carries with him Wagner, and as we turn to look at him we know that he did not flinch or shrink on that slippery slope. . . . The nation honors him living, and mourns him, the private soldier, dead. Where he sleeps is sacred ground, and the people will pile his monuments on the blood-stained turf where he fell, dying that a great cause might live.

According to historian Melinda Lawson, Dickinson commonly stressed the “nation’s education in sacrifice.” To the young abolitionist, Union soldiers represented “a model of
patriotism defined by sacrifice.”¹ In the winter of 1864-1864, this kind of rhetoric espoused by Dickinson saturated the cities. To sustain wartime commitment as Dickinson did in Chicago and Philadelphia, city leaders, newspapers, and intellectuals used the trope of sacrifice to reinforce citizens’ selfless dedication in the wake of the draft riots that occurred in Boston and New York City. If residents could compare their own meager sacrifices to those of the soldiers, they might willingly endure the burdensome inconveniences caused by the war.

During the autumn and winter of 1863-1864, Philadelphia, New York City, Boston, and Baltimore attempted to retake control of manpower mobilization from the federal government. The shocking news of the July 1863 draft announcement had induced urban residents into desperate or violent reactions, most notably the draft riots, and the previously unthinkable recruitment of black troops. The federal draft of 1863 had relied, not upon a “carrot and stick” method as the state drafts of 1862 had done, but merely upon a “stick.” In July 1863, President Lincoln had called for troops and then Secretary Stanton ordered his provost marshals to conscript without offering the cities a chance to meet the quota with volunteers. After the riots, the provost marshals allowed communities to return to the old system of recruiting volunteers. When the War Department made its next calls for troops—and two new calls came in October 1863 and February 1864—it granted the states a stated period of time to raise their men through volunteering. Only at the end of that period, if a “deficiency” remained, the provost marshals would initiate a draft.

This revised policy made an immediate impact on the ways the urban North supplied troops for army service. Indeed, the aftermath of the draft riots resulted in more than just a retrenchment of local control over the institutional machinery of mobilization; it forced northeastern cities to question or refine the rhetoric of sacrifice that underpinned their whole system of wartime voluntarism. Back in 1861, city-dwellers tacitly believed that every person, regardless of age, gender, or social class, would contribute to the cause. Infamously, an angry crowd in Boston almost killed a produce dealer who refused to contribute a few dollars to a soldiers’ relief fund. When the stingy merchant declared, “I wish every damned Massachusetts volunteer would starve to death,” the mob hung him in effigy, blasted him with water from a nearby fire hose, and then chased him from his store, sparing him only when he vowed to contribute $100 to the relief endowment. By autumn 1863, that powerful notion—that an entire community shared in sacrifice—had waned significantly. In particular, the federal draft law’s provisions allowing substitution and commutation challenged the conviction that the sacrifice of service could spread evenly across an urban landscape. For instance, New York City’s first federal draft called the names of “Boss” William M. Tweed and Mayor George Opdyke’s son, but both men—political scions of oppositional parties—easily paid their way out of draft. Personal wealth, not political objection to the war, appeared more likely to moderate or diminish an urbanite’s level of commitment. With moneyed elites most able to use their economic power to blunt the demand for personal sacrifice, urban residents of all segments of society began to reconfigure their definitions of what constituted acceptable contribution to the Union war effort. That effort required them to accept black citizens as soldiers, to pay bounties through taxation, to

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welcome veteran volunteers with open arms, and to refrain from striking when the nation needed dedicated laborers.

Even if money shaped individual choices, the public debate more often relied on political foundation. Still riding the euphoria of the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Republican newspapers dutifully reminded city-dwellers of their obligation to the fallen. Those at home needed to honor the sacrifices of the heroic dead by staying the course. Meanwhile, Democratic Copperheads saw a chance to rail about the injustices of the federal draft, increasing their cries to bring the war to an immediate end. Finally, in the cities, the question of shared sacrifice faced additional complication when political rhetoric collided with two other pivotal events over the winter of 1863-1864: the re-enlistment of the veteran volunteers and labor strikes orchestrated by wartime workers. The former event showcased the deepest depths of urban commitment to the war effort, while the latter event underscored the complaints of those who believed the administration demanded too much from them. New York historian Edward Spann called this contrast “wealth and its exceptions,” but in reality, this phenomenon demonstrated the uneven nature of urban residents’ perceptions of sacrifice.³

In mid-1863, even as the assistant provost marshals adjudicated the draft in the cities, state-level and city officials tried to raise new regiments of volunteers, and in New York City, they encouraged the recently demobilized two-year regiments to reconstitute their commands and return to the field. These new sequences, politicians of both parties hoped, would offset the unpopularity of the draft and save their political careers at election time. Of the four cities, New York City held fastest to the idea it could raise a new levy of white volunteers. Undoubtedly, this

³ Spann, Gotham at War, 145.
stubbornness emerged because Gotham still had not supported efforts to raise black troops to meet its quota.

New York City’s effort to get white veterans of two-year regiments to reconstitute their old commands terminated in a dismal failure, but at the same time, Boston undertook a similar effort which yielded success. Massachusetts had not recruited two-year regiments, but Governor Andrew expected the returning volunteers from the state’s nine-month regiments—many of whom were set to muster out in July and August 1863—would decide to return to the ranks. Unlike New York City’s two-year regiments which had endured hardship with the Army of the Potomac—Boston’s nine-month regiments had experienced relatively easy service in North Carolina and Louisiana, generally free from combat. Together, Boston’s six nine-month regiments had lost only 212 men among them, mostly from disease. Union generals in both theaters of war advertised the commonwealth’s inducement to re-enlist: an immediate return home, a thirty-day furlough, $100 state bounty, and $50 federal bounty.

Each nine-month Massachusetts regiment came home to loud, boisterous receptions in Boston, and either Governor Andrew or Mayor Lincoln personally greeted each unit. The soldiers enjoyed lavish feasts, cheering crowds, and laudatory speeches. When Mayor Lincoln welcomed the 44th Massachusetts back to Boston he acclaimed, “It has been said that a nation could not rely for its defence, in time of danger, upon the young men brought up in a city. The habits and associations of a metropolitan life it was feared unfitted them for those stern duties

Colonel Henry L. Lansing took command of “Sprague Barracks,” a recruitment depot on Staten Island, and tried to raise fifteen reconstituted two-year infantry regiments there. After a series of administrative blunders and a wave of crime and arson, New York’s adjutant general, John T. Sprague, dissolved seven of the fifteen regiments.
and personal physical labors which they must endure in a soldier’s career[.] . . . But the experience of the past two years has conquered that prejudice.”

Boston’s success in re-enlisting its nine-month volunteers served as an important counterexample to New York City’s failure. For the first time, it proved that urban veterans who had reached the end of their service might be willing re-enlist, so long as the civilian populations held a fanfare upon their return, and they had a chance to mingle with their friends and families in their old neighborhoods. In essence, Boston’s success with nine-month veterans suggested that the depths of urban residents’ willingness to sacrifice could run deep. The return of one nine-month veteran, Colonel William F. Bartlett, inspired Herman Melville to craft an intricate poem about sacrifice, “The College Colonel.” Missing a leg, with his arm in a sling, yet ready to re-enlist, the Harvard-educated Bartlett and his devoted troops appeared the perfect picture of soldierly dedication:

He rides at their head;
A crutch by his saddle just slants in view,
One slung arm is in splints, you see,
Yet he guides his strong steed—how coldly too.
He brings his regiment home—
Not as they files two years [sic] before,
But a remnant half-tattered, and battered, and worn,
Like castaway sailors, who—stunned
By the surf’s load roar,
Their mates dragged back and seen no more—
Again and again breast the surge,
And at last crawl, spent, to shore.6

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5 Boston’s Republican dignitaries reminded the nine-month soldiers that Colonel Charles E. Griswold had opened a recruiting station for the 56th Massachusetts at 102 Washington Street, and if they should want to fight on and help Boston beat the federal draft, they should join that regiment immediately. Further, Governor Andrew declared that the federal government—thanks to his insistence—now paid a bounty of $402, not $50. Spurred by money, a desire to return to the front, or the love of being soldier, Boston’s 56th Massachusetts filled with little difficulty. Even Samuel Storrow—although he did not join Griswold’s regiment—re-enlisted later that year. Zenas Haines, 9 June 1863, in Harris, ed., “In the Enemy’s Country,” 189; Samuel Storrow to mother, 29 May 1863, MAHS; Boston Evening Transcript, 17 and 27 October 1863.

6 Sauers, William Francis Bartlett, 172-3.
Because they had no returning veterans in the summer of 1863, Philadelphia and Baltimore hastened their recruiting of black troops. Recent news of the first combat actions involving African American soldiers—the battles at Port Hudson, Milliken’s Bend, and Battery Wagner—proclaimed the bravery of African American volunteers and spurred local recruiting efforts. It became increasingly apparent that black male city residents had a role to play in the new culture of sacrifice. Speaking of the 54th Massachusetts, an abolitionist journal in Boston eulogized the spirits of “those who have ascended as free will offerings from the altar of the country.” Ralph Waldo Emerson dedicated a poem, “The Voluntaries,” to commemorate the sacrifice of Colonel Robert Shaw and his men at Battery Wagner:

In an age of fops and toys,
Wanting wisdom, void of right,
Who shall nerve heroic boys
To hazard all in Freedom’s fight,—
Break sharply off their jolly games,
Forsake their comrades gay
And quit proud homes and youthful dames
For famine, toil, and fray?
Yet on the nimble air benign,
Speed nimbler messages,
That waft the breath of grace divine
To hearts of sloth and ease,
So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
So near is God to man,
When Duty whispers low, ‘Thou Must,’
The youth replies, ‘I can.’

The July 18 storming of Battery Wagner held especial importance for Philadelphia, since local black residents filled the ranks of about one-third of the 54th Massachusetts, six times the number of recruits that Boston had provided for that Massachusetts regiment. “In these glorious deeds we have reason for especial pride,” reminded one Philadelphia newspaper, “for at least

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three hundred of the men of the 54th were recruited in Philadelphia or Pennsylvania. . . If in the mind of any loyal man there remains doubt of the courage of the negro soldier, let these facts remove it; and with it, let the wretched prejudice perish, that it is in the least degree of condescension to for a white man to become an officer in a colored regiment.”

With this public relations impetus, the Quaker City’s Supervisory Committee for the Recruitment of Colored Troops wasted no time in printing circulars to free black people in Philadelphia, calling them to volunteer in large numbers, and pasting the walls of the city with placards calling, “MEN OF COLOR TO ARMS!” One pamphlet read:

The world will look with interest upon the mighty experiment in which we are engaged, in which a down trodden race is invited to prove its manhood. . . Your officers will be tried and experienced men, selected for the purpose by a special board of examiners, that you may not be carried into battle by incompetent leaders. Every opportunity will be afforded you that skill and science can suggest, and the destinies of your race will be left in your hands, to rise or to fall as you may approve yourselves. An opportunity which has no parallel in history is now before you. Shrink from it now, and you justify the taunts and sneers of your enemies and oppressors. Take advantage of it; show yourselves to be men and patriots, and a grateful country watching the flags of your regiments emerging triumphantly from the smoke of battle, cannot refuse the applause which is the due of valor contending for the right.

Initially, recruitment went well. Black churches throughout the cities held meetings, encouraging monetary donations and recruitment. Throughout July and August, black citizens gathered at Philadelphia’s renowned “Mother Bethel,” the African Methodist Episcopal Church started by Richard Allen in 1794, and masses of congregants filled the pews with hopes of contributing financial support to Philadelphia’s first black regiment. However, the church leaders faced a difficult task in getting black men to volunteer. They remembered how Harrisburg politicians had rebuffed the services of black volunteers as early as May 1861, doing so again

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8 Philadelphia Press, 5 August 1863.
9 Supervisory Committee on Colored Enlistments to “Men of Color,” 27 June 1863, Records of the Free Military School, HSP.
during the Emergency Militia call of 1863. Now, news arrived that the War Department would not pay black troops the same amount as white soldiers. Under the 1862 Militia Act, Congress capped payment for black soldiers at a maximum of $10 per month, less $3 deducted for uniform expenses. To serve under such a disparity insulted urban black residents, who considered themselves equal to white men in both courage and capability. Others worried if the city’s first black regiments would enlist slaves who had fled to Philadelphia. At one of the first Bethel meetings, Frederick Douglass dismissed that fear as irrelevant, grabbing hold of a flag and proselytizing on the virtues of immediate action. If black Philadelphians wanted to prove that they were able citizens, he declared, those in the church should volunteer right away, while he would go to Washington to advocate for equal pay. According to a white observer, “A number of persons then signed the roll.” The church leaders passed a series of resolutions designed to spread Douglass’s message to other black congregations in the city:

Resolved, That we earnestly request all ministers of the Gospel, preaching to colored congregations, to teach their several charges that the days of our bondage in this land are at an end, and that God is saying to us, in the most emphatic manner, Be free, and take our place on the broad platform of equal rights.

Resolved, That we deeply feel for, and sincerely sympathize with, those of our race who are flying from the chains and slavery of a rebellious horde, and, forced before the march of a conscript army of marauders, have sought a refuge in our midst; and that we hereby pledge to them the protection of our homes and firesides, a part of our personal property, and a share of our daily bread, even to a portion of our last crumb. 10

Within weeks, Philadelphia’s first black regiment, the 3rd U.S. Colored Troops (U.S.C.T.), filled, completing its organization on July 24. That week, Frederick Douglass visited the camp. Ever cognizant of Philadelphia’s invidious racism, he warned the men of the 3rd U.S.C.T: “On entering the camp this afternoon it was said in my hearing, ‘We can never make

soldiers of these men’: It is for you to reply—which I certainly believe you will do, but in order to do this you will have to prove that you cannot only parade and drill, but equal the white soldiers in deportment, neatness of person, and scrupulous obedience of orders.”

However, Philadelphia officials feared that an armed body of black men might cause white Philadelphians to riot. Just days before Douglass’s speech, a black sentry at Camp William Penn named Private Charles Ridley killed a white man, William Fox. The incident occurred at Camp William Penn’s fence line. A small party of swimmers had stopped to gawk at the black soldiers. After asking Private Ridley a few derogatory questions, the gang departed, but Fox lingered at the fence. Ridley told him to move along, but Fox refused, stating that he had a right to remain where he was. The soldier called for a corporal of the guard, and some anonymous soldier at the guard post told him to shoot the intruder if he refused to depart. Ridley then calmly asked Fox, “Are you going to leave? If you don’t, I’ll shoot you.” Fox replied, “I guess you won’t.” Ridley shot him, and Fox died an hour later, leaving a wife and four children. White Philadelphians exploded with indignation at this killing. Thus, because of this unstable atmosphere, Mayor Henry refused to permit the 3rd U.S.C.T. to parade through the streets. Filled with Douglass’s words of advice, the regiment quietly left for the front on August 13 with 808 enlisted men. Following this disappointment, black recruitment dramatically decreased.

11 Philadelphia Inquirer, 20 July 1863.
12 Ibid., 10 August 1863.
13 The next regiment, the 6th U.S.C.T., began recruiting on July 7, but did not reach full capacity until September 12. Even then, not every member of the 6th regiment came from Philadelphia; 301 soldiers came from outside the city, mostly from Smyrna, Delaware. The 6th U.S.C.T. received permission to march through Philadelphia when it departed on October 14. During the parade, a white thug bolted from the crowd and snatched the flag from the color-bearer. The burly color sergeant knocked down the thief and regained the flag, much to the amusement of the cheering crowd. No other incidents marred the parade; however, recruitment for the city’s black regiments continued to shrink. Fewer than two hundred Philadelphians joined the 8th U.S.C.T.; the regiment took six months to fill, and the remaining six hundred men came from Delaware. Most of these men were substitutes, ex-slaves manumitted under a special provision allowing northern slaveholders to avoid the draft by sending their slaves into the service in
Altogether, Philadelphia raised about 1,600 men for the U.S.C.T., or 7.27 percent of its black population. However, it should be noted that, although local black residents did not turn out as volunteers in great numbers, they contributed funds to the Supervisory Committee enough to sustain eleven U.S.C.T. regiments—or over 11,000 men—at Camp William Penn. By October, Philadelphia residents, white and black alike, had contributed over $55,000 to Camp William Penn’s bounty fund. This was a remarkable achievement because, as the Supervisory Committee guessed, Pennsylvania possessed no more than 7,000 fencible black residents. Philadelphia’s monetary contributions—which also enticed slaves and free African Americans from other states—enabled the commonwealth to surpass its maximum expectations, meaning 7,000, by over sixty-three percent. In essence, Philadelphia’s black population showed its support in ways that did not involve shouldering a rifle.14

The U.S.C.T. regiments in Philadelphia and elsewhere required a full complement of white officers, of course, and the Free Military School—the recently established military institution endowed by the treasury of Philadelphia’s Supervisory Committee—commenced its curriculum in late-summer 1863. The military school advertised for “Young men having a fair common-school education, and physically sound, and especially privates and non commissioned officers in the army, who desire to command colored troops.” Between July 1863 to April 1864, exchange for granting them their freedom. This, in turn, crippled the willingness of free black men to enlist freely; few of them wanted to serve alongside ex-slaves. Alphabetical rolls, 3rd United States Colored Troops; Alphabetical rolls, 6th United States Colored Troops, PSA; Frederick Binder, “Pennsylvania Negro Regiments,” 398. 14 Alphabetical rolls, 8th United States Colored Troops, PSA; Report of the Supervisory Committee for Recruiting Colored Regiments (Philadelphia: King and Baird Printers,1864), and meeting notes, Supervisory Committee on Colored Enlistments, 27 June 1863, Records of the Free Military School, HSP.
843 men submitted complete applications and all were admitted to the Free Military School. Of those, 422 formally accepted entrance.\textsuperscript{15}

Students served in one of four companies and attended three one-and-one-half hour classroom sessions per day, morning and evening battalion drill, and dress parade at noon. Classes and drills were held six days a week, and more than three absences in a week resulted in expulsion. Free Military School students did better than untrained applicants who stood before the Casey Board, the War Department’s stringent six-man panel that determined the aptitude of applicant for positions in the U.S.C.T. By March 29, 1864, the Casey Board examined 1,773 non-Military School applicants, rejecting 844 of them. Of the first 422 Military School students, fifty-six were dropped, seventy-two withdrew, and ninety-four went before the Casey Board, (The remaining two hundred still attended the school.) Of these ninety-four Military School students, only four were rejected by the board. Four of those who passed never received placements, but the other eighty-six men received commissions as follows: two colonels, four lieutenant colonels, six majors, twenty-eight captains, twenty-four first lieutenants, and twenty-six second lieutenants. Interestingly, one of the colonels, George W. Baird, had once served only as a private in the volunteer service.\textsuperscript{16}

Baltimore followed Philadelphia’s example, recruiting and training local African Americans at Camp Belger or recommending white residents to the military school in Philadelphia. Baltimore’s Bethel Church on Saratoga Street aided the organization of Baltimore’s first black regiment, the 4\textsuperscript{th} U.S.C.T. In addition to encouraging free black

\textsuperscript{15} Free Military School Application letter, n.d.; Supervisory Committee, \textit{Free Military School}, 27-31, Records of the Free Military School, HSP.
\textsuperscript{16} Supervisory Committee, \textit{Free Military School}, 27-31, Records of the Free Military School, HSP.
Baltimoreans to join, the Bethel Church leaders hosted slaves from the Eastern Shore who journeyed to Baltimore to enlist. In early August, an enterprising Union army captain took a steamship across the Chesapeake Bay to Talbot County, where he enticed forty slaves from a single plantation to come with him. On August 4, when the steamship returned to Baltimore, Reverend A. W. Wayman and others from the Bethel Church met the new recruits at the docks and saw to their immediate care, feeding and quartering them until they could be examined by a federal surgeon and mustered in at Camp Belger. The nutritional aid rendered by the Bethel Church may have helped along the mobilization, since all but two of the Talbot County cohort passed their physical inspection.¹⁷

Unhappily, Baltimore created a potential problem for the maintenance of law and order in the city, when recruiters introduced a new source of volunteers certain to clash with the black recruits: liberated Confederate prisoners of war. After some lively debate, the War Department had authorized Colonel Charles Carroll Tevis, a graduate of West Point, to raise the 3rd Maryland Cavalry from Union volunteers and prisoners of war who had taken loyalty oaths. On September 8, the first shipment of 125 ex-Confederates, many of whom had been captured at Gettysburg and incarcerated at Fort Delaware, arrived in Baltimore, “evidently enthusiastic in their devotion to the cause of the Union,” wrote a reporter. By the end of the month, this number grew to 422, and best of all for Baltimore, the city received a credit of 135 against their quota.

The arrival of the ex-Confederates unleashed a wave of crime in the city. Many of the ex-prisoners, it seemed, viewed Baltimore as a “safe city,” a place sympathetic to their southern proclivities, where residents might willingly accept their antics. Upon finding General Birney’s

first black regiment quartered at Camp Belger, the 3rd Maryland Cavalrymen became infuriated, spurring altercations between the two regiments. One afternoon, two ex-Confederates, Privates James Kelly and Henry Hall, accosted two black soldiers with the intent of intimidating them into desertion. Eventually, this affair grew violent and the cavalrymen shot and wounded Corporal Isaac Freeman, one of the black soldiers. Dutifully, and probably much to the ex-Confederates’ surprise, city police arrested them for assault. In October, two other ex-Confederates became drunk and began attacking pedestrians on the sidewalk with their sabers for no apparent reason. Later on, John Carnes, a 3rd Maryland cavalryman, grabbed a young boy, William Hamilton, and ordered him to cheer for Jeff Davis. Hamilton refused, trying to fight loose from Carnes’s grip. Eventually, the lad grabbed a brick and smashed Carnes in the face, knocking out several teeth. As in all the other cases, police arrested Carnes and dragged him before a judge. Carnes believed that no one in Baltimore’s would speak out against him in court, but when a witness came forward to testify on Hamilton’s behalf, Carnes flew into a rage. The moment the witness put his hand on the Bible, Carnes drew a pocket knife and stabbed him in the hip in front of a stunned assembly. This action temporarily ended the trial, but it added another indictment to Carnes’s growing list of battery charges.  

However, the arrival of a few incorrigible ex-Confederates did not halt Baltimore’s black recruiting, and the indefatigable General Birney continued to bring new soldiers into the city. On September 17, the 4th U.S.C.T., now commanded by Colonel Samuel A. Duncan, a twenty-seven-year-old New Hampshire abolitionist from Dartmouth College, made its formal parade through Baltimore. Escorted by police and a white military band, the 4th U.S.C.T., in the words of one reporter, “made a very fine appearance.” Colonel Duncan wrote, “It was on the whole a

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18 *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 8, 9, 15, and 25 September, 19 October, and 30 November 1863.
very satisfactory exhibition, and did much, as I have good reason to think from the many remarks reported, to soften the prejudices against the colored troops—nowhere stronger, perhaps, than here.” Another Baltimore citizen who watched the 4th U.S.C.T.’s parade agreed, but perhaps based his support for the U.S.C.T. on more practical grounds. He wrote, “The South has in its midst a mass of people who are its enemies; the government has in the midst of its enemy’s country a vast mass of friends. This practical fact must now strike everyone. . . . This war is much a matter of exhaustion of forces between the two sides, and we must soon measure more economically our strength.” The recruitment of black Marylanders did not end with the departure of the 4th U.S.C.T. By October 1, Birney reported that he had mustered-in 1,738 black soldiers, 632 of whom resided in Baltimore.19

As Colonel Duncan had implied, Philadelphia’s and Baltimore’s white populations had to make sacrifices and soften their racial prejudices for the good of the cause. New York City residents followed the example of these two cities, but the exertions of those who supported black recruitment fell tragically short when Governor Seymour intervened. Since early May, New York City had possessed an organization called the Association for Promoting Colored Volunteers (A.P.C.V.) headed by Edward Gilbert, Dexter Fairbanks, James Fairman, and Lewis Francis. This organization included Horace Greeley, William Cullen Bryant, and Peter Cooper among its subscribers. Shortly after its formation, the Association sent a memorial to Lincoln asking him to authorize the recruitment of black volunteers in New York City. Seymour, it seems, had so intimidated Lincoln with his strong opinions against black recruiting that the President rejected the A.P.C.V.’s plea. To give his announcement some sense of legitimacy,

Seymour declared a state-wide ban on black recruiting. In the fall, angered by Seymour’s meddling, Smith Requa of the A.P.C.V. wrote a letter to the *Evening Post*, informing Empire City-dwellers that 1,000 of the city’s 12,500 black residents had already joined regiments in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, states that allowed black recruiting. Requa complained that Seymour intended to “prevent [colored] volunteering and make another draft necessary.”

New York City may have stumbled when it came to supporting black recruitment, but importantly, the fact that Baltimoreans and Philadelphians did not riot by suppressing their personal feelings on race, especially when black soldiers came into their midst, signaled to urban Republicans throughout the North that the tide had turned in their political favor. On October 13, gubernatorial Election Day in Pennsylvania, the Republican Party witnessed surprising success by carrying Philadelphia for Pennsylvania’s incumbent, Governor Andrew Curtin. Since his own nomination in June, Democratic candidate George Woodward had run a viciously racist campaign, condemning Republicans’ for supporting the Emancipation Proclamation. To increase fears among poor white residents and thus win over more Democratic votes, Woodward claimed that the Republicans supported a Presidential act that encouraged slaves to cross Pennsylvania’s borders. Although racist discourse had often swayed white Philadelphia voters in the past, Woodward muted the power of his rhetoric by running a confusing campaign. Although Woodward had always demonstrated ardent Copperheadism, demanding peace at any price, he upheld a seemingly pro-war platform, proclaiming “status quo antebellum.” Unable to determine Woodward’s true feelings on the war caused many undecided voters to abstain or seek leadership elsewhere. City Republicans, meanwhile, portrayed Woodward as the rankest of Copperheads,

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making reference to his controversial 1862 decision as a state Supreme Court justice, which denied Pennsylvania soldiers the right to vote in this election. A meeting of Thirteenth Ward Republicans resolved that, “George W. Woodward decided the soldiers could not vote at the coming election because they would decide by ballot what they have been trying to do by bullet. . . . A Copperhead is worse than a traitor in the South because they are afraid to face the music. . . . The Copperheads kiss traitors in the dark, and they come before us pretending to be national men.” The soldier-voting issue buried Woodward’s chance for governor, but other national issues, notably emancipation and President Lincoln’s reputation, helped carry the day for the Republicans. Andrew Curtin, the incumbent, told a Philadelphia crowd, “Let us stand by our President, let us be faithful to all the covenants and compromises of our Constitution.” Apparently listening to him, Philadelphians, by a vote of 44,274 to 37,193, helped re-elect him to a second term as governor.21

The successful triumph of a Republican over a Copperhead in Pennsylvania—combined with news of a similar Republican victory in Ohio—buoyed the spirits of the Lincoln administration. So, on October 17, Lincoln made another call for troops: 300,000 three-year men. New York editor James Bennett took the gubernatorial elections as a “vote of confidence,” and with those critical decisions past, Lincoln could safely issue this call and give the states several months to fill their quota. Bennett believed this was a wise course of action, because unlike the July call, Lincoln chose to fall “back to the good old system of voluntary enlistments.”22 Humbled by the Republican victories at the polls, New York Democrats now seemed more willing to cooperate. Governor Seymour entreated all New Yorkers “to listen to the appeal put

22 New York Herald, 18 October 1863.
forth by the President, and to give efficient and cheerful aid in filling up the thinned ranks of our armies.” Without delay, on October 26, New York City’s Board of Supervisors voted a $2,000,000 appropriation, delivered to the County Substitute and Relief Committee, to aid the new call.23

The new call enticed New York City’s A.P.C.V. to take another stab at promoting black recruitment. On November 16, 1863, sixty-six concerned citizens, including Daniel Sickles, John Cochrane, Henry Raymond, P. T. Barnum, Hiram Barney, and David Dudley Field met at 5 Clinton Hall to sign a petition asking Lincoln to override Seymour’s state-wide ban on black troops. The petition appealed to “fellow citizens,” pointing out that, without black troops, the new draft “will fall heavily upon those who are left.” If New Yorkers sacrificed their racial hatred, the A.P.C.V. members implied, the city could avoid the embarrassment of another draft. The A.P.C.V. sent a letter to Stanton on November 21, stating that Lincoln’s recent call for troops made no mention of color. Additionally, they expressed themselves baffled as to why black New Yorkers could be subject to the draft, but none could volunteer. The committee wrote, “Justice and patriotism alike require that all men who are subject to a draft shall have equal privilege in volunteering. . . . Our white fellow citizens shall be measurably relieved from drafting by allowing colored citizens to volunteer for the war.”24

Stanton replied that nothing stood in the way of black recruiting; however, Congress had not made any provision allowing bounties to be paid to new regiments. Stanton, in his response to the A.P.C.V., promised to request a change. Governor Seymour, who received another letter from the A.P.C.V., replied that he could not raise any new regiments, because he “had no power

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23 Ibid., 21 and 27 October 1863.
24 Ibid., 17 and 26 November 1863.
to authorize any, either for blacks or whites, which will be entitled to the benefit of the bounty given by the general government. The object at Washington is to fill up the ranks of the regiments in the field. If any new organizations, for either white or black troops are made, they must be authorized by the War Department” to receive bounties. Hoping that the bounty issue would silence the matter, Seymour refused to comment further.25

Seymour’s letter of rebuttal to the A.P.C.V. underscored the central policy of Lincoln’s new call, to fill up regiments in the field. Partly because of Boston’s success with veteran re-enlistment, Lincoln and Stanton hoped the October quota might be filled by “veteran volunteers,” enlees from 1861 who would re-enlist for another three years or until the end of the war. In November and December 1863, orders reached the camps of all the three-year units raised at war’s commencement, asking the “boys of 1861” to continue serving their country. If they did so, they would receive a thirty-day furlough and a $402 bounty, in addition to any city and state bounties that awaited them on their return home. If a majority re-enlisted, their regiment would retain its original number in the state line and be given the title of “Veteran Volunteer Infantry, Cavalry, or Artillery.” In effect, the process of veteran re-enlistment functioned as a social transaction, but one that required each member of an urban community to share in the sacrifice. The veterans made a sacrifice by extending their terms of service beyond three years, and citizens at home sacrificed by donating their hard-earned cash to pay for veteran bounties and for celebrations to welcome home furloughed volunteers.

For the urban veterans, the decision to re-enlist did not come easily. More than two years of service and tragic losses incurred on battlefields caused soldiers to ponder their decision,

25 Ibid., 26 November 1863.
sometimes for weeks. At the regimental encampments, officers inveigled their men to ensure a high number of re-enlistees, threatening to transfer to other units those who did not re-enlist. Philadelphian Private William T. Jones of the 61st Pennsylvania griped to his parents about this unprincipled cajoling: “The boys in the Regiment are in a good deal of excitement about their re-enlisting. I think it is too bad that men who came to their Country’s rescue at the time she needed men the worse who have served faithfully for the last two years are to be transferred to another regiment because they will not re-enlist for three more years. They may put me in a nigger regiment, but I will not re-enlist.” Jones’s regiment—which contained three Philadelphia companies—re-enlisted only 125 men, including seventeen Philadelphians. This was enough to keep the regiment in the field for another three years, but Jones did not fold under the pressure. He wrote eight days later, “They do not intend to transfer those that did not re-enlist, it was only intended as a threat, but it did not take.”26 The situation was far worse in the 13th Massachusetts, a regiment with four Boston companies. Four times Lieutenant Colonel N. Walter Batchelder addressed his regiment, asking them to re-enlist, but each time, the men refused. On three of these occasions, the officers passed out grog, so wrote the regimental historian, to put “a halo of attractiveness on the service that didn’t seem to fit.” The men simply became disorderly, and only eleven men, yielding “to the influence of oratory or rum, though some of them afterwards said it was the rum,” signed their names. When a soldier in another regiment learned that his wife had died, the adjutant of the Army of the Potomac, Brigadier General Seth Williams, told

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26 William Thomas Jones to family, 17 and 25 December 1863, HSP.
him he could receive the necessary furlough if he re-enlisted. Word of this incident added to the 13th Massachusetts’ cantankerous mood. Needless to say, it did not veteranize.27

Philadelphia’s 29th Pennsylvania was the first urban regiment to become a “veteran volunteer” unit. On December 8, 1863, over 290 men re-enlisted at Wauhatchie, Tennessee. On December 23, the veterans returned to Philadelphia, where city resident welcomed them with great reception, including a public thanks at National Guards Hall and a Christmas dinner at the Cooper Shop Saloon. The 28th Pennsylvania’s four Philadelphia companies re-enlisted ninety-nine men at the same location on December 24. This regiment returned on January 10, meeting a similar reception with personal thanks from Mayor Henry. One reporter described the veterans’ arrival by stating that, “Everywhere along the line of march, the quiet Sabbath day was broken by the cheers of those assembled on the sidewalks; at numerous points the ladies waved the brave veterans a welcome home with handkerchiefs from windows and doorsteps.”28

Not all urban regiments made the decision to re-enlist so easily. Because of their longer distance from home, many Boston regiments exhibited homesickness or indifference at the prospect of re-enlistment. Lieutenant John A. Fox of the 2nd Massachusetts wrote to his father that, “Our men will not reenlist here if paid $1000 apiece. They didn’t come out for money and money won’t keep them except in connection with liberal furloughs and going home this winter, and the reorganization of the old regiment.” The 2nd Massachusetts, then stationed in Tennessee, had suffered severely at Cedar Mountain, Antietam, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. Fox, the regimental adjutant, could sense their desire to return home and determine their futures in

27 Charles E. Davis, Three Years in the Army: The Story of the Thirteenth Massachusetts Volunteers from July 16, 1861, to August 1, 1864 (Boston: Estes and Lauriat, 1894), 303.
28 Philadelphia Inquirer, 11 January 1864.
Boston. Writing on December 11, he declared, “Our men will not reenlist here under the present orders. It is no object to them because their time is so short they had rather wait and then go home free, have as much rest as they want and then go into any service they happen to fancy.” All the inducements offered, it seemed to him, only served to enrage the men. “As for the money,” he continued, “they jeer at it. I have no doubt they like money as well as others, but the lives that they have risked in three years’ service for nothing they are not disposed to sell at this late day for money. If the Government wishes to keep these old men they must treat them like men and not like substitutes and bounty men.”

Politics caused an additional problem for Boston’s veterans since many of the city’s first three-year regiments had been filled by pro-war Democrats. They resented Governor Andrew for his abolitionism and his political interference, most notably his power to remove Democratic officers. Adjutant Fox claimed that Andrew had an “old prejudice against the organization.” For a time, it seemed that the crack 2nd Massachusetts would disband permanently before the end of the war, and all its experience would be wasted. Fox’s father, Reverend Thomas B. Fox, Sr., changed the regiment’s mind. At his son’s insistence, he arrived at the regimental encampment at Elk River Bridge on December 28, and the next day, spoke to the men. Chaplain Alonzo Quint remembered, “In an address of wonderful beauty, completeness and eloquence, he brought the assurance of remembrance at home.” Reverend Fox reminded the men of the 2nd Massachusetts that he had sent three sons into the army, one of whom had been killed at Gettysburg, and he

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29 John Fox to father, 28 November and 4 and 11 December 1863, MAHS.
encouraged them to fight on to preserve his memory. The speech induced many to tears and, in consequence, 147 men re-enlisted, enough to veteranize the regiment.30

Despite entreaties, speeches, and bribery with alcohol, any decision to re-enlist was intensely personal for each volunteer and could only be achieved through soul-searching and introspection. For instance, Sergeant Henry Hayward of Philadelphia’s 28th Pennsylvania pondered his decision with extreme care. When he decided to veteranize, he announced to his father, “They tell me I am a Veteran for I have sworn to stand by the Old Flag for 3 years more which means until the end of the War. I think I can hear you say ‘well done’ if so then I am satisfied. I have not been hasty in taking upon myself renewed trials and privations, but have thought long and deliberately upon it until I am convinced that come what will I never will be sorry for it.”31

In this sense, urban regiments’ experience with veteran re-enlistment did not differ markedly from those of rural regiments. However, urban units’ return to their place of origin held significant importance. Each city-raised regiment expected a celebration equal to the one they had received upon their departure in 1861. City officials realized that their communities had an important role to play in convincing the veteran volunteers to re-enlist. As additional incentive, urbanites realized that veteran volunteers served as the best possible means of filling the city’s deficiency. A Philadelphia reporter reminded city residents of their obligation to entice veterans to re-enlist. They should all contribute by preparing a great reception for them, for it was the soldiers, not the stay-at-home patriots, who demonstrated the supreme definition of sacrifice:

31 Ambrose Henry Hayward to father, 14 January 1864, GCSCA.
The veterans of the Virginia campaigns are soldiers who have no living superiors in courage, in patience, in physical endurance, and in devotion to their flag. They are men who have lost in suffering that romantic courage and craving for adventure that first hurried them into the ranks. But they have gained far more than they have lost. . . . What an example have they shown to young men who have thus far taken no part in the grand struggle! Justly might these battle-worn veterans say, ‘We have done our share; now it is your turn to fight for your homes while we return to our own;’ but from the army comes a nobler message. It is only this—’come and help us.’ . . . The draft will supply many, volunteering will largely contribute, and the re-enlistment of our tried and gallant veterans will convince the enemy that the rebellion has nothing to hope from the fact that so many terms are about to expire.  

Unfortunately, such pronouncements carried little potency among the veterans unless generous “veteran bounties” supported them. Although the liberal federal bounty proved a great inducement to many Baltimoreans, they expressed a reluctance to re-enlist unless the city and state governments passed veteran bounties too. By this time, most of the private bounty agencies from 1862 had exhausted their funds or gone out of business. To raise local bounties quickly required city and state governments to pass legislation, forcing the population to bear the burden through taxation. Such legislation might have passed without debate if it had been proposed back in 1862, but in 1863, as the economy spiraled into recession, protests arose from several quarters. Representing less fortunate communities, rural Democrats in Maryland stymied bounty legislation in Annapolis for weeks, drawing the ire of Baltimore soldiers, who did not believe the citizens of Maryland had sacrificed enough. A soldier in the 1st Maryland Potomac Home Brigade wrote, “I should dislike very much if this regiment would be disbanded before the war is over. If there is a state bounty offered there is no doubt that at least two-thirds of them will re-enlist.” A soldier in the 1st Maryland Infantry echoed these statements. He wrote, “Our regiment, or a majority of them, whose service expires in two or three months from now, have not reenlisted as veterans. What is the reason? will be asked. It can be summed up in a few words. The men do not care to reenlist in Maryland, because they can go to other states and get a large

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32 Philadelphia Press, 30 December 1863.
state bounty. . . [W]e do not care to fight for the state if our services are not considered as much as that of other states.” A soldier from the 1st Maryland Eastern Shore, a regiment with a small number of Baltimoreans, wrote, “[L]et the draft come and the quota of Maryland be filled by conscription, and probably the Honorable Body [State Legislature] now assembled at Annapolis will regret not having paid some attention to Maryland’s best interests.”33

Baltimoreans looked to the State Legislature to meet the veterans’ demands. Union Party men in that body supported bounty legislation, but rural Democrats bogged down the debate by questioning the proposed bounty’s application to slaves recruited for the U.S.C.T. Many state lawmakers wondered if slaves should receive a state bounty. Governor Bradford had already established a “Board of Claims” that would pay any loyal slaveholder a sum of $300 if he chose to enlist one of his slaves in the Union army, provided the slave owner established proof of ownership, proof of enlistment, swore a loyalty oath, and signed a deed of manumission granting freedom to the slave upon his muster. Bradford hoped the state bounty might pay this claim and offer all slave recruits a modest reward. Nine of Baltimore’s ten delegates approved Bradford’s plan and they demanded that the state bounty be offered to all slaves who enlisted. Black enlistments, they said, allowed the draft to fall lightly on the white population in Baltimore City and, because of Board of Claims, upon the slave holding counties as well. The American commented, “The non-slaveholders of the Eastern and Western shores of the Bay are well satisfied to see the negro—‘the poor man’s substitute’—taken instead of themselves, and all

33 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 25 January and 2 and 5 February 1864.
rejoice that their counties are [to be] saved from the draft.” For a time, the Legislature deadlocked on this issue, and after considerable debate, no state bounty passed.\textsuperscript{34}

When one region tried to raise a local bounty, neighboring regions had to follow suit or risk losing potential volunteers by appearing negligent. In December, Orison Blunt’s Committee reorganized itself as the “New York County Volunteer Committee” and began advertising its new county bounty of $300. Combined with the recently passed state bounty of $75.00, and the federal bounty of $402, any new recruit enlisting in New York City stood to receive $677 at enlistment. To veteran three-year regiments in the field, the War Department offered an additional $100 bonus and a thirty-day furlough to all soldiers who chose to re-enlist for an additional three years, bringing the total bounty up to $777. Although seen as a great inducement, the sudden profusion of veteran bounties brought unexpected burdens any new regiments that attempted to organize. Colonel Henry F. Liebenau, Jr., commander of “Sickles’s Cavalry” (25\textsuperscript{th} New York Cavalry), began to lose recruits after the city passed its new ordinance.

In a letter to Governor Seymour, Liebenau’s father noted:

\begin{quote}
The city having offered a Bounty of $300 cash in hand to fill up by volunteers, the old Regiments now in the field exclusively virtually kills my son’s organization (the Sickles Cavalry) in the County as well as in the City: The immense inducements of $777 with the $300, cash in hand will inevitably draw to this city and county every volunteer for enlistment: such an arrangement is undoubtedly intended to drain the other counties of the State, for the benefit of this City and County and by completing its quota, relieve this City from the dangers of another Draft Riot at the expense of the other counties.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

Only days after Lincoln set the new draft date, New York City faced a potentially serious problem when the senate at Albany refused to confirm the Board of Supervisors’ bounty

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 14 January 1864.  
\textsuperscript{35} Henry F. Liebenau, Sr. to Horatio Seymour, 19 November 1863, NYSA.
ordinance of October 26. Just like their Baltimore counterparts, New York City’s Republicans expressed themselves shocked because their rural brethren had betrayed them. A reporter for the *Times* wrote, “This news fell like a huge thunderclap or a much saturated blanket on the feelings and hopes” of all in the city intent on avoiding the draft. This decision came from a host of reasons. Some Republican senators wanted to punish Democratic districts by forcing them to hold a draft; others simply wanted to take bounty control away from the cities and give it to the state; and others wanted to end the lucrative city bounty, confusingly known as the “county bounty,” that drew recruits away from rural districts.\(^{36}\)

As the northeastern cities struggled to pass bounties and have their populations bear some burden of the sacrifice through taxation, a massive labor uprising challenged the sentiment requiring citizens to mimic the level of commitment of veteran volunteers. This wave of protest emerged because the cities unthinkingly increased economic demands on wartime workers without any accompanying reward for their labors. Of course, the new surge in military manpower required an equivalent surge in the production of arms and equipment, but unlike the rising veteran bounties, few companies provided inducements to keep wartime workers at their jobs and few urban governments pushed for such support. While veteran volunteers and substitutes received liberal remuneration for their services, workers received no similar compensation.

While the cities and companies congratulated themselves on their increased output, workers grew increasingly restive at the burdens they carried. At times, industrialists drove their workers from the shops, encouraging them to enlist. An interesting speech of this nature occurred

\(^{36}\) *New York Times*, 4, 5, and 14 February 1864.
on July 29, 1863, when Philadelphia bolstered its industrial mobilization with the grand opening
of the Bridesburg Armory, the new weapons store of Barton Jenks and Company. Two thousand
spectators gathered to witness the occasion. The building had once been used to make cotton gins
and wool cloth, but a 1,300,000 brick conversion opened up additional space for Enfield rifle
manufacturing and provided for the employment of 1,700 hands. One of the keynote speakers, J.
Price Wetherill, used the moment to applaud Philadelphia’s industrial fortitude while at the same
time encouraging enlistment. He noted that Philadelphia—a city whose prosperity rose and fell
with the success and failure of textile manufacture—had once been built upon “King Cotton.”
Now, the “machine shops would furnish the men and material that would dethrone the tyrannical
monarch,” for the “very power that cotton built up in the North would furnish the very strength
that would break it forever.” However, Wetherill did not equate gun manufacture to sacrifice. He
explained the difference between industrial production and army service when he said that
workers should not sit idly, because “any man who could make a gun could [also] shoulder a
musket.”

Although the increase of rifle production at Bridesburg signaled an important step in
Philadelphia’s wartime production, over at the Schuylkill Arsenal, considerable trouble brewed.
In mid-July, Congressman William D. Kelley surveyed the female seamstresses and determined
that a large number of them were not near relatives of the soldiers, and a few of them, based on
Kelley’s opinion after overhearing their mutterings, were “opposed to the war.” Kelley viewed
military tailoring not as a valid occupation, but as a temporary privilege granted to those patriotic
families that needed supplemental incomes. Kelley complained to Colonel George H. Crosman,
the federal commander of the Army Clothing and Equipage Office posted at Philadelphia,

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*Philadelphia Inquirer, 30 July 1863.*
ordering him to take appropriate action. On July 20, Crosman directed Charles Thomas, the superintendent of Schuylkill Arsenal’s clothing manufactory, to provide satisfactory evidence, in writing, of each female employee’s military relatives. He intended that only those who were “wives, mothers, and sisters, or near relatives” of soldiers or sailors would be retained. Crosman continued, “My orders have always been to give preference to persons of this class [relatives of soldiers] as vacancies occur; but I am informed . . . that a great many of the old hands of the description first given [non-relatives] are retained. . . . I am satisfied the class of females indicated, who certainly have their claims upon the Government, are so numerous that they will absorb all the work required at the Arsenal and even more.”38 After the ensuing review, over two hundred women were purged from the arsenal.

In retaliation, the recently unemployed met at Jefferson Hall on August 8 and drafted a series of resolutions denouncing Crosman and demanding his removal. Crosman, they claimed, did not understand the plight of poor sewing women. Their troubles, they claimed, were “more urgent” than those of soldiers’ families because wives, mothers, and sisters received munificent bounties and relief funds from the city government and local benevolent organizations. A few women complained that Crosman harbored an anti-female bias, for his directive did not apply to male employees. Although they sent a copy of their resolutions to Stanton, he did nothing to remove or censure Crosman.39

Although calm soon returned to Philadelphia, in November and December, rising inflation propelled a series of strikes in the four northeastern cities. The price of labor had not

38 Ibid., 27 July 1863.
changed since 1861, but the cost of living in the cities rose steadily. For instance, in New York City, the price of coal doubled from $5 per ton in 1861 to over $10 per ton in 1863. Other commodities, including meat, eggs, bread, butter, ice, experienced similar inflation.\textsuperscript{40} As historian Phillip Paludan later described, “A New York City newspaper . . . estimated that a family of six in the city needed $16 per week for necessities and that the average wage was just at the $16 figure. This left no money for clothing, medicine and doctors, transportation to and from work, or luxuries of any kind.”\textsuperscript{41} The rampant circulation of paper money to pay for the war during the first two years of conflict, no doubt seen as a temporary expedient at the time, made its terrible consequences felt inside metropolitan environs, communities that relied upon cash to sustain family life. Undoubtedly, the urban working-class, who felt that they had, since the beginning of the war, carried the burden of the cities’ economic mobilizations, now made their displeasure known.

The wave of labor protest began most noticeably in New York City in early November when 7,000 machinists struck, demanding a twenty-five percent increase in wages to meet or exceed the rate of inflation. Eventually, this agitation spread to a variety of wartime industries, as female sewers and German tailors working in uniform manufactories struck too. It came as no surprise that New Yorkers led the charge. Throughout the war, Gotham’s wartime workers had suffered acutely since, unlike other major cities, New York City lacked a federal-run uniform production center to set fair prices. Since the beginning of the war, military tailors remained at the mercy of deceitful contractors. The seamstresses commenced their campaign on November 18, when fifty-three delegates from various clothing factories met at 187 Bowery to set demands

\textsuperscript{40} Spann, \textit{Gotham at War}, 149.
\textsuperscript{41} Phillip Shaw Paludan, “\textit{A People’s Contest}”: \textit{The Union and Civil War, 1861-1865}, Second ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 182
to be delivered to the leading firms engaged in the uniform production business. Unlike women’s movements from the beginning of the war, this interest group did not feature any wealthy leadership. By now, working women had grown tired of elite women’s patrician values. As soon as the sewing women’s meeting got underway, noted feminist Susan B. Anthony ascended the stage to take charge. After she had mentioned her twelve-year record fighting for women’s rights, a young seamstress stood up and told her to be quiet. The meeting, she testily stated, “was one of delegates from the different working establishments in the city and not one for philanthropists to parade their abilities and make fame in.” The other women shouted their approbation, and Anthony, “somewhat piqued,” fled the stage. Although a minor incident, the ejection of Anthony from the meeting demonstrated an interesting shift in the rhetoric of women’s social protest. Anthony had wrongly believed that the meeting proposed to address the problem based on the participants’ gender, their plight as women. Instead, the ladies at 187 Bowery wanted to focus their agenda on the troubles affecting the laboring class. In a city where occupation, ethnicity, politics, and gender kept workers perpetually divided, labor activists usually found it impossible to unite working-class New Yorkers around a sentiment based on class-consciousness. By redefining urban work in terms of its relationship to the Union cause, the war had unintentionally forced female sewers to consider their relationship with other striking workers. Although the Bowery organization did, in fact, mention the disparity in wages between tailors and seamstresses, they principally wanted their organization to add to the growing chorus of working-class protest. The seamstresses’ meeting resulted in the formation of the Working Women’s Union, a labor organization that proposed to fight for the rights of women exploited by private army contractors.42

42 New York Herald, 19 November 1863.
Meanwhile, over at 42 Avenue A, thousands of German tailors organized the Central Organization of Tailors Association. Conducting the meeting in German, the tailors discovered that most of them received anywhere between $1.00 and 2.00 per completed sack coat and $3.00 to 4.00 per completed frock coat, a preposterously low wage compared to the average rate of textile labor in peacetime.\(^{43}\) Still, despite this new unity, New York City’s wartime workers possessed precious little bargaining power. Public newspapers promised to rally behind them to prevent managerial exploitation, for most citizens generally agreed that the contracting system led to the maltreatment of labor. A Philadelphia newspaper affirmed, “There seems to be a general desire . . . to have their [workingmen’s] wages advanced, and we are glad to see a disposition on the part of those employing workingmen to accede to this desire.”\(^{44}\) However, living in a wartime city meant incurring sacrifices. Even when squaring off against criminal contractors, workers’ unions needed to tread softly. The *New York Times* believed that protective efforts should be “legitimate and judiciously conducted,” and should “at no time assume the shape of compulsion.” If strikes were “made under the management of professional agitators, they will be recognized as mischievous and certainly fail.” Indeed, the wave of strikes begun in late autumn 1863 continued only sporadically as unions tried to make their demands permanent. Karl Wesslau told his parents in Germany that, “Work stoppages on the part of laborers have become so common that there’s almost always one group of workers on strike.” Wesslau believed that the times favored scabs, and he added, “These are very good times for people in Germany who want to come over here, it’s easy enough to find well-paid employment.”\(^{45}\)

\(^{44}\) *Philadelphia Press*, 16 November 1863.  
Of course, Wesslau could encourage his German brethren to participate in strike-breaking activities because he implicitly knew the Union army would protect him. The constant movement of troops into and out of cities made it difficult for urban labor unions to organize their protests. Labor leaders could hazard little violence for fear that Union troops, thinking that a strike might be a pro-southern conspiracy or draft resistance, would, without hesitation, involve themselves in a dispute between frustrated employees and management. After all, in New York City, Republican Party leaders had blamed the draft riots on the short tempers of working-class Irishmen. During this period of apprehension, any disturbance, even those meant to protect the rights of labor, could be easily misconstrued as treasonous behavior; thus, the presence of troops squelched any possible progress. By comparison, years later, during the Great Strike of 1877, militias sympathized with labor unions. In Reading, Pennsylvania, for instance, local militiamen even gave railroad strikers their weapons so strikers could intimidate scabs. In a time of peace, labor violence could lead to recognition, reform, and working-class unity. During the Civil War, the threat posed by the presence of soldiers limited what strikers could do. As one Philadelphia editor claimed, “As yet, no public action has been taken [to deal with the strikes], and the question is simply between employer and the persons employed.” Decades later, historian Phillip Paludan agreed with that conclusion when he described the North as a whole: “The war taught labor the need and efficacy of organizing to achieve its goals. It did little to bring those goals much closer.”

Nevertheless, for three months, strikers succeeded in stopping work in a number of important urban industries: car-driving, sail-making, shoemaking, umbrella-making, hack-

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driving, and boy’s clothing manufacture, among others. By the end of 1863, New York City had experienced twenty-nine strikes. Eventually, President Lincoln recognized the potential danger of allowing the strikes to continue. Even strikes in businesses not directly related to wartime production, such as car-driving and hack-driving, could stifle urban mobilization. After all, soldiers, workers, and recruits had to travel through the city to reach their rendezvous, recruiting offices, or places of work. Just days after returning from his famous cemetery dedication at Gettysburg, Lincoln met a delegation of New York City’s workingmen at Washington. Lincoln affirmed his sympathy with the strikers. As one of the delegation reported, “[H]e told us he could do nothing as President, but as Abraham Lincoln his sympathies were with us. . . . As to the present strike he considered the employers the first strikers, as they refused to accept the terms first offered by the men, and thereby compelled the latter to cease work, or, as they term it, to go on strike; and now that both were on strike, ‘the best blood would win.’” Lincoln’s opinion induced a number of businesses to raise their salaries to meet wartime inflation. However, in some cities, notably Philadelphia, labor activists faced less managerial resistance, not from Lincoln’s informal announcement, but due to the shortage of labor. The military production facility at Schuylkill Arsenal attracted many workers, decreasing the pool of potential factory operatives in the private sector. With little choice, private contractors had to acquiesce to labor unions’ demands. One newspaper correspondent noted that by January 1864, Philadelphia’s wave of strikes had died out. The city, he declared, “is quite placid,” since nothing presently “disturb[ed] the harmony which should always exist the employer and the employee.” The writer opined, “The scarcity of labor in all departments renders it quite easy for the employee to enforce

47 Philadelphia Press, 2 December 1863.
his claims and prices, and the employer pays high in many cases because he cannot help it. It is not exactly the ‘Union,’ which he at all times fears, but the scarcity of labor.”

Of course, wartime workers experienced economic burdens differently, dependent upon their city of residence. In New York City and Boston, both of which lacked a massive federal arsenal to set the standards for wartime work, managerial oppression persisted more intensely because a diverse array of private contractors controlled the price of labor. Unhappily, despite Lincoln’s declaration of sympathy for striking workers, the War Department did nothing to change the piece rates of military manufacturing in those cities. Although the federal government had grafted a massive administrative apparatus onto each city, replete with quartermasters, equipage officers, and depot commanders, Edwin Stanton issued no comprehensive order to deal with the strikes in any of the North’s urban environs. He left the adjudication of strikes to the employees and their employers, who in the absence of the threat of violence, offered few concessions. Even Lincoln did not retain his sympathy for labor for very long. In 1864, he signed into law the Emigrant Aid Act, a statute that allowed private businesses to recruit workers abroad. Ostensibly a means of finding skilled foreign labor, this law enabled wartime businesses in New York City to transport scabs with greater ease, further ruining labor unions’ chance for success.

As the strikes reached their zenith in late November and December 1863, labor activists rallied on the hope that local politics might hear their cries of distress. The labor protests came closest to taking political shape in Boston, where labor activism forged a fleeting political party. Boston’s uniform sewers suffered terribly because the city’s recurrent problems with housing

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48 Ibid., 9 January 1864.
49 Paludan, A People’s Contest, 181.
induced massive disparities between urban and rural renters. Over the summer, rising prices in Boston had damaged severely the economic vitality of the city’s 5,000 female sewers, then scattered across some fifty establishments. The price gouge also affected some 500 other women who worked for the city’s six major tent manufacturers. Boston’s military seamstresses had labored throughout the conflict with little complaint, yet they worked long hours—from 7:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M.—receiving only five cents for each fifty yards of stitching. First-class hands earned as much as $3.00 each week, but lower level operators earned only $1.00 a week. Worse, the price of board for young sewing girls in the city had doubled to between $2.50 and $3.00 per week, while piece rates failed to increase correspondingly. Fortunately, room and board remained cheaper outside the city, but by late 1863, wartime workers in Boston discovered they could not afford to live close to their workplace. By late November, impromptu meetings sprang up, and female sewers organized labor unions to set demands for higher wages.  

Short-lived strikes occurred in Boston, as they did in the other three cities, but more importantly, a third political party accompanied this movement, the Workingmen’s Party. Hoping that the female workers would have a salutary influence on their husbands, the workingmen of Boston used the adverse conditions to ask for legislative changes to regulate wages and hours and combat runaway inflation. The Workingmen made it clear that they did not wish to derail wartime production; they affirmed that all workers—men and women alike—supported the Union war effort. The party nominated Samuel R. Spinney, a renowned councilman from the Twelfth Ward known for his efforts to raise bounties, as their mayoral candidate. Accepting this nomination, Spinney declared, “Sympathizing strongly with the just efforts which are being made to equalize the apparent difference that exists between labor and

50 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 18 November 1863.
capital, which the conditions of the country and the currency have produced, . . . [I] have a
determination to do all in my power to have workman and his employer—labor and capital—go
hand and hand and not hostile to each other." Unfortunately, Boston’s Workingmen’s Party did
not exhibit wide appeal. During the mayoral election in December, Spinney gained only 613
votes. He carried only one ward, his own, and after its dismal showing, his party disintegrated.

In Philadelphia, the working-women’s movement made one last gasp in the spring of
1864. Since the purges at Schuylkill Arsenal, seamstresses’ conditions worsened. Those who
persisted in finding employment found themselves at the mercy of “soulless subcontractors” who
paid unfair prices for piecework. Even those still employed at the arsenal faced increasing
inflation with no corresponding increase in pay. In April, a committee of sewing women
organized the Working Women’s Relief Association and held public meetings to air their
grievances. They sent a petition to Secretary Stanton asking him to end the government
contracting system in Philadelphia and, in its place, employ upwards of 20,000 female workers at
the arsenal to meet the demands of wartime production. More explicitly, the seamstresses
focused on the inflation crisis: “What we need is IMMEDIATE AID. You can give it; the power
is lodged in you; issue an order to the Quartermaster General, authorizing or ordering him to
increase the price of female labor until it shall approximate the price of living.”

District Attorney Mann advised the women to fix their wages and strike, while even Crosman and
Congressman Kelley—the two figures behind the August 1863 purge—wrote Stanton supporting
the wage increase. A delegation from the Working Women’s Relief Association met with

51 Ibid., 11 December 1863.  
52 Fincher’s Trade Review, 23 April 1864; See Gallman, Mastering Wartime, p. 245; Mark R. Wilson, The Business
of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861-1865 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2006), 97; Rachael Filene Seidman, “A Monstrous Doctrine?” in Cimbala and Miller, eds., An Uncommon Time,
181-2.
Lincoln and Stanton in August 1864, and although this resulted in an increase in sewing women’s wages, it could not realistically force army contractors to increase their own wages in tandem.

Although the Workingmen’s (and women’s) movement of the winter of 1863-1864 exerted a strong influence, because it occurred concurrently with the re-enlistment drive and the return of the veteran regiments, it could not overcome the rhetoric of sacrifice that saturated the four cities. Few residents wanted to hear the complaints of wartime workers, especially when they stood starkly disconnected from the devotion of the veteran volunteers. No evidence exists to prove that soldiers criticized striking workers for their apparent want of a self-sacrificing philosophy. A scarcity of sources from labor unions and evidentiary silence from Union veterans themselves suggests that no major confrontations, either physical or ideological, transpired. However, it should be noted that no permanent changes occurred in the daily lives of wartime workers. So, while the veterans prepared to see grand feasts, the workers continued to suffer. Still, it was no small feat that, for approximately three months, strikers in Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York City briefly held the Union’s mobilization in check. Historians of mid-nineteenth century urban labor disagree as to whether or not a working-class consciousness emerged prior to the Great Uprising of 1877. Most likely, little, if any, class-consciousness bonded urban workers with a sense of shared oppression. As historian Steven J. Ross argued in *Workers on the Edge*, a century-long history of employees in Cincinnati, industrialization’s uneven pace kept workers divided, limiting their chance to catch early the threat posed by unrestricted capitalism. Yet, as Sean Wilentz suggested in *Chants Democratic*, workers did often understand their plight in a class-conscious terms, and New York City’s recurrent economic crises proved the mother of invention, often propelling short-lived working-class political action.
Wilentz stopped short his analysis of working-class life in New York City at the year 1850, but it seems clear that the crisis of the Civil War similarly crystallized urban working-class solidarity ever so briefly in the northeastern cities in late 1863.\textsuperscript{53}

Despite the labor discord and the impending return of the three-year regiments, the autumn and winter elections produced little political change in the cities. Philadelphia and Baltimore did not hold major city elections, as their critical mayoral contests had been decided the previous year. Instead, in November, Baltimore muddled through a confusing set of state elections to determine state senator, comptroller, and several minor electoral positions. Two pro-war parties emerged, the Union Party and the Independent Union Party, but both shared many of the same candidates. In fact, the election remained largely a single-party affair; the Independent Union Party operated as a token opposition to give the appearance of partisanship. Still reeling from the Second Branch purge from the previous year, the true opposition party, the Democrats, nominated only a few candidates. Those few Democrats who chose to run, including S. S. Maffett, the candidate for comptroller, faced an impossible challenge. The Union Party organs labeled the remaining Democrats the “Slave Holding Party,” accusing them of standing in the way of the progress of Lincoln’s emancipation. Baltimore’s voters—those who had sworn loyalty oaths and could vote under military supervision—upheld this anti-slavery sentiment. In Baltimore, Maffett received about 360 votes, while his Union Party opponent received over 10,500.\textsuperscript{54}


\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 4 November 1864.
Still, Union Party members fretted that Confederate sympathizers voted illegally. Thomas Swann, head of Maryland’s Union Party Committee, complained that a “suspicion” had “taken possession of the minds of many loyal Union voters . . . that the election about to take place . . . will be attended with undue interference on the part of persons claiming to represent the wishes of the Government,” meaning Baltimoreans in league with the Confederacy. Swann asked President Lincoln what could be done. Apparently less concerned about the city election, Lincoln replied, “I trust there is no just ground for the suspicion you mention, and I am somewhat mortified that there could be a doubt of my views upon this point of your inquiry. I wish all loyal, qualified voters in Maryland and elsewhere, to have the undisturbed privilege of voting at elections.”  

In Boston, the Democrats organized better campaigns, but there, pro-war rhetoric ruled the day. Typical Democratic hobby-horses, “Union and constitution,” emerged as the leading planks. Josiah G. Abbott, a Boston judge who had already lost one son in battle and had two others still serving in the Union army, declared at the State Convention that, “I mean to be true to the Union, by, through, and under the Constitution,—nothing more or less.” The Democrats tapped into a national issue, Lincoln’s “arbitrary” arrests across the nation, making criticism of the President the pivotal issue in the city. Boston’s elections resulted in a sweeping Republican victory. In Boston, Governor Andrew won re-election over Democrat Henry W. Paine, a former Whig, 6,400 to 4,000, easily taking Massachusetts state-wide. When the mayoral election followed one month later, many Democrats expected defeat, and several thousand stayed home. Thus, Mayor Lincoln won easy re-election over his Democratic opponent, 6,300 to 2,200.  

56 Boston Evening Transcript, 29 October and 17 November 1863; Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, 498.
Only in New York City did the Democrats see resurgence. At the end of autumn, Gotham paused for its third major election of the war, this one for mayor. In October, Tammany and Mozart Halls attempted to unite behind a single Democratic candidate, but the Copperheads in Mozart Hall refused to abide by Tammany’s pro-war platform. A complicated series of back-door deals and attempts to block certain delegates at the Democratic state convention resulted in a three-way splintering of the party. In the end, however, only two Democratic candidates ran for mayor. The Mozart Hall faction led by Fernando Wood dissolved after it failed to agree upon a candidate. Tammany Hall nominated Francis I. A. Boole, city inspector and ex-alderman. Meanwhile, an anti-Tammany, anti-Mozart wing of the Democratic Party called the “McKeon Democrats” nominated a fur merchant and fireman, Charles Godfrey Gunther. Although Gunther had run as Tammany’s pro-war mayoral candidate in 1861, by 1863 he had converted to wholesale peace activism. James Bennett correctly dubbed him “the representative of the revolutionary element in this city. . . . In other words, his course during the past nine months places him as a candidate of the Copperhead Party.” Although this three-way split in the Democratic Party had emerged from intraparty accusations based on corruption, when the New York City mayoral campaign commenced, the two remaining Democratic factions gravitated toward extremism, one noticeably pro-war, the other noticeably antiwar.

The Republican Party—temporarily re-designated as the People’s Party—got caught in the middle. It nominated Orison Blunt, the popular county supervisor. Even the conservative Herald liked Blunt—Bennett believed he “would make a most excellent mayor”—however, city residents could not easily support a Republican candidate. Indeed, Bennett called the Republican Party the “greatest of all pharisaical, hypocritical, humbug organizations.” Although they identified themselves the People’s Party during this election, Bennett wryly noted that the
political entity really represented the “shoddy party.” The critical difference between Blunt and Boole—the Tammany candidate—centered on their opinion of Lincoln. In essence, Blunt supported Lincoln and the federal draft, while Boole and his Tammany faction questioned Lincoln’s conduct of the war and the judiciousness of the draft. The People’s Party scrupulously tried to avoid discussing conscription, but because Blunt served as the head of the Supervisory Committee on Recruitment, he stood out as a symbol of the constant burdens heaped upon New York City by the federal government. When Election Day came on December 1, Gunther swept the race with 29,000 votes, putting Boole second (22,500 votes) and Blunt at a close third (19,400 votes). It is entirely possible that had Tammany not insisted on running Boole, the pro-war votes might have combined to overwhelm Gunther and the McKeon Democrats. However, it is impossible to say whether or not voting behavior in New York City relied more on political issues or simple voter fidelity. Historian Tyler Anbinder guessed that Gunther’s candidacy attracted many working-class Democrats merely because he ran without the aid of a political machine. As an Irish newspaper explained it, “the people . . . had not been content with the manner in which the political ‘machines’ had been run for the exclusive profit of a score or two of political dictators.” In fact, if Gunther had been the only Democratic candidate, he might still have carried the day. His German-sounding name (he was really French Alsatian) and his association with the fire department attracted voters despite any reservations about his opinions on the war. In any case, it is fair to argue that the results of the mayoral election suggested that many Empire City residents wanted peace. The violence of the summer had left a sour taste in their mouths, and now, they simply wanted the war to end. 

57 New York Herald, 8 November 1863; McKay, The Civil War and New York City, 230-3; Tyler Anbinder, Five Points: the 19th-century New York City Neighborhood that Invented Tap Dance, Stole Elections, and became the
The Copperhead victory in New York City in December 1863 did little to shake the confidence of the Lincoln administration. The Republican gubernatorial victories of 1863 suggested a decline in antiwar activism across the country. The successful veteran recruitment drive and peaceful resolution of the labor strikes suggested that the cities had finally acquiesced to the notion that one last push in recruiting would end the terrible war. In January, Provost Marshal General Fry wrote to Secretary Stanton encouragingly, stating that, “After great labor the volunteer recruiting service under the President's call of October 17th is fairly in progress. . . . [T]he Superintendents of Recruiting Service in Sixteen states are in the main very encouraging as to the prospect of getting a large number of recruits by volunteer enlistments.”58 Thus, before any of the cities had even filled their quotas under the October call, the Lincoln administration issued another call on February 1, this time for 200,000 three-year men. On February 4, General Fry set Philadelphia’s quota at 19,649 for the two successive calls. (Of the four cities, Philadelphia faced the highest quota because the July 1863 call had held to service less than two percent of those called.) New York City received a quota of 15,979. Boston’s quota stood at 7,631 (its October quota had been 3,450 men). Baltimore, still in the process of hearing exemptions from its belated July 1863 draft, did not receive its official quota until May 1864.59 Under the new February call, if the other three cities did not fill their quotas by March 14, another draft would take place. It fell to Republican journalists to justify this unexpected requisition. The Philadelphia Inquirer wrote, “It may be fairly presumed, from the acknowledged condition of affairs in the South, that the call of February 1st will be the last one

59 That quota, when issued, stood at 1,874, but resulted in the drawing out of 2,811 names to account for exemptions.
which will be required to finish this war.” Henry Raymond of the *New York Times* called this new draft “a wise measure,” stating that, although the “new burden is not an agreeable one, . . . every man who desires a speedy termination of the war ought to welcome it.” Showcasing characteristic optimism in the war effort, Raymond believed, “This call for half a million is designed to make sure an early close of the war by a decisive finishing victory.”

Not wanting to be caught flat-footed, the re-elected city administrations pressed for a new wave of bounties to meet the combined calls with volunteers. On February 8, Maryland’s state legislature led the way, finally passing a state bounty ordinance, providing $300 to all free volunteers, $25 additional to all re-enlisted veterans, and $100 to all slaves-turned-soldiers (with an additional $100 going to slave owners). One week later, Baltimore’s City Council followed suit, passing an ordinance that paid $200 to each volunteer. State Senator Grayson Eichelberger of Frederick County tried to amend the bill to prohibit any county or city from raising such a local bounty, so to prevent Baltimore City from enticing recruits from the countryside with its lucrative bounties, but Senator Archibald Stirling, Jr., however, reinterpreted section three of the state’s bounty bill in such a way that any recruit who took the state bounty had to be credited to the county in which he resided. After another lengthy discussion, the city bounty remained untouched.

New York City experienced similar success in subverting the earlier contravention by the state’s rural districts, and legalized its local bounty ordinance. Stymied by the State Legislature back in October, Mayor Gunther and Supervisor Blunt put aside their political differences and

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60 *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 5 February 1864.
held an emergency meeting of the Supervisors’ Volunteer Committee. The members
unanimously approved sending a sub-committee to Albany to remonstrate before the state
senators. Meanwhile, Gunther, in an uncharacteristically nonpartisan move, began canvassing
local bankers and insurance companies to refill the Volunteer Committee’s bounty fund. In mid-
February 1864, the sub-committee delegation left for Albany and returned, having convinced the
state senate to legalize the county ordinance and leave “the matter of bounties . . . somewhat
discretionary with the local governments.” The Volunteer Committee proposed another
appropriation, as well, this time for $3,000,000, to refill the fund.63

Unwilling to let New York City and Baltimore outdo them, Philadelphians saw to it that
the city’s bounties flourished. Ever the leader of antebellum benevolent action, Philadelphia used
its experience wisely, and private and public bounties abounded. The City Coal Trade offered a
$50.00 bounty to every new recruit signed to any Philadelphia regiment in the Army of the
Potomac’s 2nd Corps: the 69th, 71st, 72nd, 81st, 106th, and 116th Pennsylvania Infantry
Regiments—and this was in addition to the federal bounty of $302 for new recruits. The Coal
Trade set a goal of 2,500 men. It also offered a “finder’s fee” of $15.00 paid to anyone who
brought a willing recruit to the 2nd Corps recruiting station at Broad and Cherry Street Hospital,
$25.00 if that finder was a veteran himself. On February 4, the City Council voted for
$2,000,000 appropriation to refill the City Bounty Fund. The City Bounty now stood to offer
each recruit $250.64

Initially, the Quaker City’s wards sprang to life. John M. Riley of the Twentieth Ward led
meetings at Green Hill Presbyterian Church and North Baptist Church on February 4 and 8. The

64 Philadelphia Inquirer, 2 February 1864.
Twentieth Ward needed 800 men, and no less than $30,000 of the bounty money from volunteers would get the ward out of the draft. During those two evenings, subscribers donated only $1,919. The Thirteenth Ward pledged to raise another $9,000 to meet this new call. By mid-February, the city had raised only 1,665 men to meet the quota of over 19,000 for the two combined calls. The Tenth Ward Committee suspended enlistments on February 12 for “want of funds.” Attorney William B. Mann tried to spur donations in the Fifteenth Ward by warning its citizens about the consequences of frugality: “Many who hesitate now about giving five or ten dollars which a little economy would in a few weeks make up to them bitterly regret their parsimony . . . when it is too late.”65 Clearly, this renewed patriotism was short-lived.

Republican editor Harding blasted the “slothful citizens” from apparently indolent wards for keeping tight pocket books. Again, he made clear, persons who could not serve or refused to needed to share the burden of sacrifice by donating money:

Come up laggards! Don’t excuse yourselves as many do, with paltry excuses ‘that nobody has asked you to contribute’; ‘that the committee has not called upon you,’ etc. You can find out in five minutes from any intelligent man in the neighborhood where you can take your contribution. Unclasp your portemonnaies, untie your old stockings, get out your spare cash, and contribute at once, and that liberally!66

In Boston, the effort to raise bounties also met serious snags. The Commonwealth’s legislature increased its state bounty to $300 for all volunteers. Mayor Lincoln tried to induce a similar movement in the city, urging the ward leaders to hold meetings to raise neighborhood bounties; however, this decree set Boston at odds with the Commonwealth’s military administration. In the wake of Mayor Lincoln’s announcement, Adjutant Schouler issued a general order (Number 32) declaring all local or private bounties illegal. Local bounties, he

65 Ibid., 19 February 1864.
66 Ibid., 18 February 1864.
argued, produced competition between towns that would “breed injustice, . . . [and] delay recruitment, encouraging men to hold back for larger bids.” Thus shorn of its monetary power, Boston realized it would have to recruit the traditional way, with patriotic announcements and advertisements. Samuel R. Spinney, the Twelfth Ward’s recruiting liaison, cleverly circumvented Schouler’s order by offering a “finder’s fee” of $20.00 to anyone who brought a recruit to the Twelfth Ward’s recruiting office at 258 Broadway. Unfortunately, his advertisement smacked of desperation: “Do you know someone who will enlist? If so, seek him out at once and bring him to headquarters.”

Complicating matters, neighboring towns tried to steal recruits from Boston by paying huge sums to “agents”—most likely substitute brokers—to fill their town quotas in defiance of Schouler’s order. With impunity, these agents absconded with Boston residents each week, leading many city inhabitants to complain that it violated the spirit of Schouler’s order. Schouler sided with Boston’s complaints this time, by issuing another general order (Number 40), this one depriving any recruit of his state bounty if he received a private or local bounty. This decree produced very little effect. By February, one citizen, who lost hope entirely, announced, “The truth is, and it seems that the time has come to say it, and say it boldly, that the recruiting system adopted by our city is a dreary farce.”

To fill their quotas, two committees formed in Boston with the intent of compelling volunteers to join one of eight veteran regiments of the 2nd and 9th Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, a popular Democrat and West Point graduate, entreated the people of Boston, not “at the eleventh hour to be behindhand in furnishing her

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67 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 23 November and 3 December 1863.
68 Ibid., 4 and 7 December 1863 and 4 February 1864.
quota of men deemed necessary to end the rebellion.” Unfortunately, Boston’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 9\textsuperscript{th} Corps Committees made little progress. Unlike in New York City and Philadelphia—both of which had 2\textsuperscript{nd} Corps Committees—Boston’s inability to raise private bounties worked against success.\textsuperscript{69}

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Corps Committee did far better in Philadelphia—where it allied with the Coal Exchange—and in New York City, where it allied with the Produce Exchange, a consortium of bankers. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Corps contained nineteen New York regiments, thirteen of which had been recruited all or partially in the city, including several Irish and German regiments. By appealing to urban residents’ political background—Hancock was a Democrat—to their ethnicity, and also to the notion of upholding the splendid name of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Corps, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Corps Committee sought to appeal to the Irish Democrats of New York City and those of Boston and Philadelphia, as well. On February 15, Hancock even came to Gotham and spoke to a large audience at the Produce Exchange building, proclaiming, “The spring campaign promises to be the greatest and, to all appearances, the last campaign of the war.” Hancock pointed out that the Coal Exchange of Philadelphia had subscribed a munificent fund to aid his Pennsylvania regiments, but he knew that, even without the challenge of inter-city competition—although mentioning it certainly helped—the merchants of the Empire City “would promptly avail themselves of the opportunity to render additional and most imperative service to their country.” When Hancock finished, the crowd applauded him “lustily.”\textsuperscript{70}

With such expansive monetary inducements now flourishing, Maryland’s veterans, once lukewarm to the idea of extended service, began to re-enlist in greater proportions. For instance,

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 5 February 1864.
\textsuperscript{70} New York Times, 16, 17, and 27 February 1864; Francis Barlow to mother, 9 April 1864, in Samito, ed., “Fear Was Not in Him,” 175.
the soldiers of the 1st Maryland Cavalry, veterans of nineteen battles, returned to the city on February 3, 1864, 300 strong, with 280 re-enlistees. The storied 1st Maryland re-enlisted 300 of 380 who were eligible and the 2nd Maryland, fresh from victories near Knoxville, Tennessee, re-enlisted 197 veterans, 157 from Baltimore. When this regiment returned to Baltimore in early April, it carried two worn-out battle flags, each bearing the names of several severe engagements: Second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam, and Fredericksburg.\textsuperscript{71} The 3rd Maryland, the first infantry regiment to return to Baltimore, met a band and an elaborate reception at the Baltimore City Guards Hall, replete with flags, music, dancing, speeches, and a buffet, all organized by the German Turners’ Association. The 1st Maryland met “enthusiastic cheering” upon its return, and likewise dined upon a sumptuous feast held at the City Guards Hall. Sebastian Streeter, a Baltimore City councilman known for his bounty-raising efforts, thanked the 1st Maryland veterans for their decision to re-enlist and one soldier remembered that, “The occasion was a happy one,affording pleasure to all who were present.”\textsuperscript{72}

In most cases, the cities spared no expense in acknowledging the homecoming of the veteran volunteers. City-dwellers realized the veteran volunteers would be tired, train-sick, or weary from recent campaigns. The 32nd Massachusetts, a regiment with a mix of city and country volunteers, was the first to return to Boston. Great celebration accompanied its arrival on January 17. Mayor Lincoln applauded the 286 re-enlistees, telling them that the city government, under his direction, proposed to continue “the hearty and generous reception . . . towards the other veteran corps as . . . they pass through Boston.”\textsuperscript{73} The \textit{Evening Transcript} reminded readers that

\textsuperscript{71} Veteran Volunteer muster rolls, 2nd Maryland Infantry, N. T. Dushane to J. S. Berry, 14 February 1864, Adjutant Generals Papers, MDSA; \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 4 April 1864.
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 22 and 23 February 1864; Kirkley and Camper, \textit{Historical Record of the First Regiment Maryland Infantry}, 124.
\textsuperscript{73} Schouler, \textit{Massachusetts in the Civil War}, 536.
the regiment had left Boston in 1861 with thirty-six officers and now it returned with five. The regiment had produced three generals and had fought at countless battles. "All honor, then, to the Second Regiment," it wrote. "... Let the citizens of Boston give them [a] hearty greeting. Let us have banners and cheers, and every other manifestation of our appreciation of their worth."

When Governor Andrew spoke to the veterans on January 20, he used the opportunity as a recruiting speech. Turning to the citizen spectators, he declared, "Now fellow citizens of Massachusetts, thank this noble regiment by recruiting its ranks and marching by its side. Fill up the original ten hundred forty-six during this brief furlough of the Second Regiment." Still, this occasion and others like it proved rife with gratitude and poignant sentiment. Andrew’s speech touched the hearts of the men who earlier professed indifference to returning to the ranks. He declared, "How inadequate... is all human speech for an occasion like this! A hundred thousand voices speaking from the hearts of millions of people have already welcomed these veteran soldiers of the Union cause. How little there is to say... to the soldier who for three years has daily periled his life for his country, that we thank him for his sacrifice." Visibly affected, Colonel William Cogswell reciprocated, "No poor power of speech is adequate to express the gratitude and thankfulness of the regiment for the kind reception." 74

If in the event the populace did not welcome a regiment with open arms, the veterans quickly revealed their displeasure. For instance, the 102nd New York, a regiment that had fought in nine major battles, re-enlisted 218 men. On January 24, 1864, fresh from victories at Chattanooga, Tennessee, it returned to the city only to discover no one waiting for them. The regiment disembarked at an abandoned dock and marched to the Park Barracks in silence. This came as a great disappointment, since the 102nd New York had received a great reception in

74 Boston Evening Transcript, 18 and 20 January 1864.
every other city on its way home. Colonel Thomas B. Van Buren, a member of one of city’s elite families and the regiment’s former commander, viewed this as a wasted opportunity. Writing to the Republican *Times*, he chided, “This treatment disheartens and exasperates the men, and is doing more to prevent enlisting in New York than any other one cause. Soldiers can encourage or discourage recruiting more than any other class of men. If motives of patriotism will not induce the citizens of New York to treat their returning soldiers differently, self-interest should.” Van Buren’s admonition seemed to have a desired effect. When 300 veterans from the 45th New York returned on February 15, Mayor Gunther, the Common Council, Dodsworth’s Band, and the 5th N.Y.S.M. turned out to receive them at City Hall Park. A *Times* correspondent noted that the whole affair was “to partially atone for past coldness to veteran volunteers.”

Still, certain events within the cities held influence. It is no surprise that the city that held the most acclaimed public celebrations for its volunteers—Philadelphia—did the best in terms of re-enlistment. By most accounts, Philadelphia’s Washington’s Birthday celebration of 1864, which meant to honor the veteran volunteers, immeasurably swelled the veterans’ pride in calling Philadelphia their home. The mammoth parade constituted 6,000 participants, not only the 1st Division City Militia and veterans from the War of 1812, but also Philadelphia’s first eight veteran infantry regiments. “Every nook and corner of Philadelphia was yesterday literally alive,” remembered a reporter who wrote on February 23. “Patriotism was at home. The celebration of the hour was full of newer meaning from the fact that war worn veterans . . . marched in company to honor to the father of [t]his country. . . . The veteran regiments carried their bullet-riddled and torn flags, which were enthusiastically cheered on different parts of the

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It would be unfair to say that any of the four cities failed to acknowledge the worth of their veteran volunteers, but Philadelphia, steeped in its traditions of parades, pageantry, and public benevolence, easily took the celebration of veteran volunteering to a higher level than the others. The degree to which city residents exhibited their appreciation for their returning veterans, and thus applauded the veteran’s sacrifice, reflected their community’s commitment to the war, at least to a small degree. More simply, those cities with more spectacular celebrations did better with veteran volunteering.

When it came to re-enlisting veteran volunteers, it is impossible to say what factors caused some cities to do better than others. Probably, the most important factors in determining veteran re-enlistment came from experiences on the battlefield. Philadelphia, for instance veteranized twenty-seven of a possible thirty-eight infantry and cavalry regiments. Some regiments re-enlisted a high percentage, including the all-German 98th Pennsylvania which re-enlisted 229 out of 329; the battle-damaged 95th Pennsylvania re-enlisted 245 men—over three-quarters of its number—and the 91st Pennsylvania re-enlisted so many that its officers decided to transfer the small squad of those who did not re-enlist to another regiment. A few prominent Philadelphia regiments failed to “veteranize.” These included the 26th and 27th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments—the city’s first two three-year regiments—and the 71st and 72nd Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments—two units in the Philadelphia Brigade. The greatest disappointment occurred in the Pennsylvania Reserve Division; it re-enlisted fewer than two hundred Philadelphians. Altogether, about 4,500 Philadelphians became veteran volunteers, about twenty-five percent of all possible veteran volunteers from Pennsylvania.  

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76 Philadelphia Press, 23 February 1864.
77 Frank Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 70, 111-2, 114, 116-7, 158, 163.
Boston’s popular regiments of 1861 failed to veteranize, including the “Irish 9th,” the “Webster Regiment,” and “Henry Wilson’s Regiment.” However, eleven others did veteranize, and of Massachusetts’ 3,791 re-enlisted three-year veterans, 531, or fourteen percent, came from Boston.78

However, once the veterans returned home, city residents had to endure them as they made the most of their thirty-day furlough. To keep veterans off Philadelphia’s streets, the city opened a series of barracks on the periphery as permanent points of assembly. These new camps were enclosed and guarded by members of the Invalid Corps. The veterans found them excruciatingly inhospitable. A soldier in Camp Coleman believed that the soldiers were treated “more like hogs than like men.” More than 4,000 men were kept at Camp Coleman with 150 soldiers crowded into each cold, leaky barracks; the sick intermixed with the healthy. Sergeant Henry Hayward called nearby Chester Barracks a “Coop of misery.” Soldiers in his regiment often ran the guard after dark even though the sentries had orders to shoot anyone who left. Hayward wrote, “[We] see the People promanading on the walks and only wish we were Chickens that we might gain our Liberty for a few hours.”79

The worst of these camps was Camp Cadwalader located along Islington Lane. One soldier complained that the veterans were “caged like so many beasts,” while another lamented that they were “kept here like runaways or drafted men.” The guards at Camp Cadwalader—many of whom prided themselves on killing bounty jumpers—treated the veterans, in one inmate’s words, “like so many brutes.” The soldiers’ friends and families were often refused

78 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 29 February 1864.
79 Unknown to Andrew Curtin, 14 March 1864, PSA, RG-26; Ambrose Henry Hayward to Father, 28 February 1864, GCSCA.
visitation or were made to stand for hours outside on the walks without seeing their loved ones. On some occasions, the veterans were punished for attempted breaches of camp regulations, the guards tying them to the ceiling by their thumbs. The guards also robbed the veterans or tricked them out of their bounty money. One soldier believed that this inhumane system was maintained so the officers and clerks could share the spoils: “The officers have been guilty of a breach of confidence and trust. They have connived at and assisted in a system of robbery of the soldiers. . . The men are kept back from their respective Regts where their presence is actually needed all by and through the neglect and slothful laziness of the clerks and officials in the employment of the government whose delight appears to be in dividing plans how they may spend the government money.”80 Although more than a few soldiers complained to Governor Curtin, he took no steps to correct these evils. It is strange that Philadelphia, the city with the strongest reputation for honoring its veterans upon their return, was the only one of the four to cage its veterans like hogs, but it seems that the threat of criminality among the soldier population remained as high there as it did in all urban areas.

No doubt, the effort to enforce strict discipline came from the explosion of bounty jumpers during the late winter. “Bounty jumping,” that is, the crime of collecting a bounty and absconding with the cash before mustering in, had emerged during the state drafts of 1862; however, during the winter of 1863-1864, they became a fixture of urban mobilization. This occurred for several reasons. First, since the payment of bounties came from multiple sources—state, local, federal, and private—bounty jumpers possessed multiple targets, that is, multiple bounty agencies from which to steal. What was more, although officials did not yet realize it,

80 Unknown to Andrew G. Curtin, 14 March 1864; “Pennsylvania Volunteer” to Andrew Curtin, 15 March 1864, PSA, RG-26.
bounty jumpers gained considerable aid from substitute brokers who aided their escape from the barracks in exchange for a cut of these multiple bounties. Indeed, most of the bounty jumpers had help from accomplices; the Philadelphia Inquirer noted that a number of these were female visitors who secretly offered confined men the means of escape. One woman was arrested by the detectives after they discovered she had given one bounty jumper a clothesline so he could climb out of a high window. No less than one hundred bounty jumpers escaped from the Twenty-Third and Filbert Street Barracks in Philadelphia during the last week of March. Guards increased their patrols around the barracks, which helped to control matters; on March 26, a sentry fired upon three escapees who jumped from the second story window onto a nearby shed, killing Thomas Mehen, much to the applause of bounty agency workers who hated to see their funds go to waste. Two government detectives named Jenkins and Hartnach arrived in Philadelphia the following week to seek out all the others, finally finding one man secreted in his home, having wallpapered himself into a closet to avoid detection.\textsuperscript{81}

New York City launched an aggressive campaign to arrest bounty jumpers, but even so, its effects resulted in little change. By spring 1864, bounty jumping had risen to an all-time high, with some regiments losing men at a rate of two per day. Citizens demanded a complete overhaul of the system, as one said, to catch these “soulless villains,” who should not be allowed to “insult our soldiers and at the same time swindle the City and County of New York and the United States Government.” In April, Major General John A. Dix, commander of the Department of the East, guessed that some connection between bounty jumping and substitute brokerage must exist. His efforts resulted in the destruction of the Lafayette Hall Bounty Broker ring. There, he arrested Hawley D. Clapp and several others who had defrauded soldiers out of $400,000. Dix’s

\textsuperscript{81} Philadelphia Inquirer, 29 March and 2 April 1864.
arrests sparked some dissatisfaction from Democrats because he arrested them under military, not civil authority. Dix justified his action by stating that, “it is only by the summary process of a military arrest that these fraudulent transactions can be reached. If they are brought into the civil courts, all remedy is hopeless. The recruits are the only witnesses, and exigencies of the country will not permit them to be kept from the field.” Dix made Republican enemies as well because he forthrightly blamed the Board of Supervisors’ Committee for encouraging this “entirely unnecessary” class of individuals.

Dix also arrested several army officers, including a general. Lafayette Hall had become a recruiting center for the Empire Brigade, and General Francis B. Spinola, who enlisted about 2,000 men, had to account for his recruiting irregularities. The bounties issued to Spinola’s men could account for only $200,000 of support, leaving $400,000 unaccounted for. At first, Dix questioned Spinola, who claimed not to know where the money went. Then after an investigation, Dix discovered that many of Spinola’s officers had accepted kidnapped men in exchange for bribes. One officer, Surgeon Joseph Kerrigan, allowed a host of intoxicated men to pass medical inspection, including two substitutes who died of alcohol poisoning. When Dix later accused Spinola of collusion with substitute brokers, Spinola suddenly revealed his wholesale support of the brokerage system. Without it, he said, “the government would get no recruits!” Dix declared it “the most stupendous frauds ever committed in this country,” and he ordered Spinola arrested to stand a trial by court martial.\(^82\) Dix’s arrests helped, but they did not reform the system. Recruits went to the front under guard by train still escaped.

\(^{82}\) *New York Times*, 7 and 16 April 1864.
The rise in bounty jumping and its wasting of time and money did, in fact, result in one positive outcome, as it eventually convinced New York City to accept recruits from its black population. Since the autumn of 1863, a healthy mix of Republicans and Democrats had begun to advocate black recruitment, but Governor Seymour still stood in the way. As the winter quotas looked increasingly hard to fill by veteran volunteers and new recruits, another organization stepped in to join the A.P.C.V., the Union League Club. Representing 500 of the wealthiest men in New York City, the Union League Club—which had formed in March 1863 to bolster support for the Lincoln administration—wrote to Secretary Stanton, asking him to override Seymour’s ban on black troops. Stanton assented, and Seymour, unwilling to anger the powerful club members, finally acquiesced. On December 2, Stanton formally approved the recruitment of a black regiment in New York City. Stanton, however, made no promises about awarding bounties to black soldiers. In response, the Union League Club proposed to handle that matter on its own. On December 10, white officers approved by the Silas Casey Board arrived at Riker’s Island to establish a camp for the 20th U.S. Colored Troops. Two additional U.S.C.T. regiments followed. In reply, patriotic black men from across the northeast began assembling at Riker’s Island to receive their uniforms and equipment.

The most exciting days came in March 1864 when the first of New York City’s three black regiments left for the front. Throughout February, Republicans touted the discipline and efficiency of black troops to the skeptical Democratic majority. After visiting the camp of the 26th U.S.C.T. on Riker’s Island, a reporter for the Times told doubtful Democrats, “You have read of Negro soldiers, but the idea seemed so ridiculous you could not scarcely frame a picture in your mind embodying the highly colored idea of a ‘nigger’ in regimentals. You are forced to

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83 *New York Herald*, 6 December 1863.
acknowledge that the clothes fit him quite well and he bears his juvenescent military honors as creditable as white soldiers have done.” In a mere sixty days, the Union League Club had raised bounties enough to fill all three regiments.84

Still, some New Yorkers expressed trepidation. When the 20th U.S.C.T. prepared to leave, concerned citizens believed a body of armed black men might trigger a riot reminiscent of the July 1863 fiasco that claimed the lives of innocent black bystanders. The commander of the 20th U.S.C.T., Colonel Nelson Bartram, a veteran officer from the 17th New York, “felt that the bold course was the wiser one,” and ordered his regiment to parade, no matter the consequence. On March 5, 1864, the regiment marched to Union League clubhouse to receive its colors. The Times described the scene as “one which marks an era of progress in the political and social history of New York.” As the black soldiers paraded, citizens cheered their passage. Some Republicans could not help point out the great revolution that had transpired. One reporter noted that, in July 1863, “an infuriated political mob” had torched black homes and murdered innocent African Americans in the street. Now, “seven months have passed and a thousand of these despised and persecuted men march through the city in the honorable garb of United States soldiers, in vindication of their own manhood, with the approval of a countless multitude.”85

The other two black regiments departed amid similar fanfare. The 26th U.S.C.T. left on Easter Sunday, receiving its stand of colors from the Union League Club with an accompanying address by John Jay. Hundreds of wives and daughters of Union League Club members pinned a rosette and white satin badge to the uniform of each soldier. The badge read: “Unconditional Loyalty to God and Country.” After receiving the colors, Colonel William Silliman, a veteran of

84 New York Times, 28 February 1864.
85 Ibid., 6 and 7 March 1864 and 27 December 1886.
the 124th New York, exuberantly told his audience, “it will be the proudest day of my life when I can show their battle line to the traitor foe and tell them: There are they that hunt for fugitive slaves, let them each find his man.” The 31st U.S.C.T. left the city in May.

Altogether, about 3,700 black men went to war in New York City’s three U.S.C.T. regiments. However, only 1,628 claimed New York as their home, and many of these did not come from the city. At most, the city might have sent eight percent of its black population into these three regiments; however, hundreds, perhaps thousands of black New Yorkers had already enlisted in regiments from other states. Numbers might have been a moot point; the very notion of successful black recruiting in the city, always fraught with tension, demonstrated clear evidence of support of Lincoln’s goals. As a reporter remarked, “How astonishingly has all this been changed!”

The other three cities continued to mobilize black regiments as a way of filling the February 1864 quota. By the end of the spring, Philadelphia’s Supervisory Committee completed four more regiments at Camp William Penn, while Baltimore’s Camp Belger—now renamed Camp Birney—completed another five. So successful were Philadelphia’s Supervisory Committee’s efforts that they opened a branch office in Baltimore. The Committee appointed Colonel Samuel Bowman, late of the 84th Pennsylvania, to rent a large building on Holliday Street and distribute handbills and rent music to encourage enlistments in Baltimore. The War Department was also thrilled with the success of the Philadelphia’s Free Military School, and, on March 29, Secretary Stanton issued General Orders Number 125, granting any soldier a thirty-

86 Ibid., 7 and 23 March 1864.
day furlough to accept entrance in it. Between April 20 and August 29, 1864, 1,009 aspiring white officers applied to the institution.  

Additionally, in February 1864, the Free Military School began instructing properly mustered black sergeants who wanted to increase their military knowledge. In Baltimore, Colonel Bowman received authority to select the brightest African American volunteers from Maryland to be sent to the school, where they would receive cursory training preparing them for their duties as non-commissioned officers. Secretary Thomas Webster reported, “The free, educated blacks of Baltimore ought to be mixed up in Regiments raised in the rural districts chiefly from the uneducated slaves. In no other way can competent non commissioned officers be secured for such regiments. . . . We have . . . intelligent, educated free blacks for sergeants and corporals, which we pledge ourselves to send to the military academy at Phila. to be taught and trained—this is for the further purpose of creating a furore in Baltimore in favor of enlisting among free blacks.”

The novelty of all this was not lost on observers in Baltimore and Philadelphia. Three years earlier, the notion that black soldiers could train near the cities and parade through them without insult had been unthinkable. Now, it occurred as a matter of course. One Baltimore reporter commented on the sight of the last three regiments at Camp Birney:

To see black men in uniform, bearing arms, is quite common of late. There are now two full regiments at Birney Barracks, and the third is rapidly filling up. Detachments pass and repass through the city every day. No more orderly troops can be found in the service. They all appear to move about quietly—never drink, never noisy, or troublesome in any way. The officers commanding them have the appearance of men of more than ordinary culture and refinement.

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87 List of Applicants to Free Military School; Supervisory Committee, Free Military School, 9, Records of the Free Military School, HSP.
88 Thomas Webster to Edwin Stanton, 22 February 1864, Records of the Free Military School, HSP.
They are never seen lounging about drinking saloons; and seldom visit the city except on business. Under these circumstances the prejudices against colored troops is fast giving way.\textsuperscript{89}

The tacit acceptance of black recruitment stemmed from some white urban residents’ willingness to endure personal frustration and annoyance for the sake of the Union war effort. However, not all sacrificial efforts during this period created inconvenience for city-dwellers; some affairs that supported the war effort offered residents a chance to engage in mirth and frivolity. During the winter and spring of 1863-1864, the northeastern cities held a series of “Sanitary Fairs,” massive bazaars designed to raise money in support of the U.S. Sanitary Commission. This idea emerged in the autumn of 1863, when the female directors of the Chicago branch of the U.S. Sanitary Commission complained of their inability to meet expenses. To boost morale, two of the female associate directors planned a grand money-raising event, Chicago’s “Great Northwestern Fair.” This fair lasted several weeks in October and November 1863, raising about $78,000.

According to Mary Livermore—one of fair’s principal organizers—the unexpected success of the endeavor induced a “fair mania.” Boston followed Chicago’s example with a Sanitary Fair held in December. This popular event raised over $146,000. On the first day, the fair became so overcrowded with attendees that the administrators raised admission prices to lower turnout.\textsuperscript{90} New York City and Baltimore held fairs in April 1864. New York City’s “Metropolitan Fair” commenced on April 4 and lasted for three weeks, raising over $1,183,000. From April 18 to April 30, Baltimore’s “Maryland Institute Fair” raised $80,000, split evenly between the U.S. Sanitary and U.S. Christian Commissions. Finally, from June 7 to 28, 1864,

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 28 March 1864.
Philadelphia held its “Great Central Fair,” which raised over $1,035,000. Although the male and female committee members sometimes squabbled over leadership—as they did in New York City—undoubtedly, all four city fairs yielded great success. They drew a wide array of visitors—10,000 each, minimum—and they displayed various booths, kitchens, sales, games, and novelties. One of the Metropolitan Fair’s organizers, George Templeton Strong, noted that, despite all of New York City’s anti-administration resistance, “[W]e must reconcile ourselves to the fact that New York is a grand, commercial, money-making centre of the universe.” Indeed, in spite of themselves, New Yorkers could support the war in significant ways.  

The fairs contributed immeasurably to boosting the rhetoric of personal sacrifice and patriotic duty. In one sense, the fairs offered an incredible venue for female benevolent leaders to showcase their talents and devotion to the cause. As Jeanie Attie described, they “offered women ways of expressing not only national patriotism but also local civic pride.” Also, the fairs offered ordinary city folk a chance to contribute to the support of all elements of wartime mobilization and have fun while doing it. Just prior to the Philadelphia Fair, when it appeared that poor workingmen would have to buy $5.00 season passes, one laborer wrote to a Philadelphia newspaper, criticizing the policy that might render impossible his chance to contribute: “I understood that the Great Fair . . . was to be the spontaneous offering of all our citizens, rich and poor, to those brave men who are now engaged in upholding our Government. .

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91 New York Times, 17 April 1864; McKay, The Civil War and New York City, 241-4; Spann, Gotham at War, 80-1; George T. Strong diary, 18 April 1864, in Nevins, ed., Diary of the Civil War, 430.
. . With this understanding, I and thousands more such as I, gave my mite cheerfully.”

In the end, the workingmen did not have to pay that fee.

So, throughout all the singing birds, arboretums, and bust galleries displayed at these enormous wartime pageants, visitors faced constant reminders of their solemn duties at the gathering, to support sick and wounded soldiers. At the opening ceremonies of the Philadelphia Sanitary Fair, Mayor Henry announced, “[W]e may rejoice at the rich promise of . . . [the fair’s] success, . . . [but] we are yet mindful of the sad urgency that called it forth. . . . No claims more sacred, no appeals more powerful were ever addressed to a loyal people than come to us at this hour from the maimed and suffering defenders of our Union. . . . The eye will wander with pleasure over each attractive scene and brilliant group, the ear will drink in the surging melody of joyous voices with which these arches will reverberate while each passing moment may add new claimants of your benefactions.”

The message was simple: for all their showiness, the bazaars could never be entirely detached from the sobering message of sacrifice.

A message of solemnity fell most heavily upon Baltimore’s and Philadelphia’s fairs. President Lincoln delivered addresses at each, reminding fair-goers of the importance of continuing the strife until victory could be achieved, even warning attendees to expect more bloodshed. Lincoln’s speech in Baltimore was especially stern, particularly because of the timing and presence of troops at the venue. Lincoln spoke on April 18, just one day shy of the three-year anniversary of the Baltimore Riot. Moreover, a sizable military presence guarded the event. In addition to several New York regiments under General Lew Wallace, three U.S.C.T. regiments


stood watch. Elizabeth Bradford, the head of the fair committee and the wife of Maryland’s governor, escorted Lincoln to the speaker’s platform. After graciously thanking her, he looked to the black soldiers and pointed out, “Ladies and Gentlemen—Calling to mind that we are in Baltimore, we can not fail to note that the world moves. Looking upon these many people, assembled here, to serve, as they best may, the soldiers of the Union, it occurs at once that three years ago, the same soldiers could not so much as pass through Baltimore. The change from then till now, is both great, and gratifying. Blessings on the brave men who have wrought the change, and the fair women who strive to reward them for it.” However, as his speech came a few days after news broke of the Fort Pillow Massacre in western Tennessee, Lincoln thought it best to remind Baltimoreans of the importance of emancipation and then comment on what the massacre meant for the greater course of the war. Lincoln declared, “If there has been the massacre of three hundred there [at Fort Pillow], or even the tenth part of three hundred, it will be conclusively proved; and being so proved, the retribution shall as surely come. It will be matter of grave consideration in what exact course to apply the retribution; but in the supposed case, it must come.”95 Lincoln’s heavy remarks shocked some Baltimoreans in the crowd. Undoubtedly, some of the black soldiers in the 19th, 30th, and 39th U.S.C.T. probably liked what they heard. In a few days, these men expected to go to the front to join the Army of the Potomac’s 9th Corps, and it seemed as if the Commander-in-Chief had given them fair course to exact vengeance for their fallen comrades. No, the urban sanitary fairs were hardly light-hearted excursions.

The period from the late summer of 1863 to the spring of 1864 became one of the most challenging phases of mobilization for the cities of the Northeast. Yet, despite the difficulties, they responded with clever means of meeting their quotas: continuing the mobilization of black

troops, re-enlisting veterans in the field and supporting them at home, and raising enormous local bounties. All of these tactics met with some controversy or resistance, but generally, they served the cities well, wiping away the tarnish of the draft riots. However, serious glaring errors remained. Unrestrained substitute brokers and bounty jumpers ran amok, making a mockery of recruitment and charitable bounty funds. Wartime workers received scant attention for their grievances, and returning veterans did not always experience a warm welcome from the cities that received them. In April 1864, New York lawyer George Strong morosely believed “the country seems drifting leeward.”96 Similar to 1861, Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City stumbled through another challenging period of mobilization, undertaking few comprehensive methods to correct the conspicuous faults of their transition to war. Guiding this ambivalence was the implicit belief that each successive phase of mobilization would be the last, and that the next summer, that of 1864, would see the end of the rebellion. The incorrectness of this assumption would sap the final shreds of life from the overburdened populace.

96 George T. Strong diary, 16 April 1864, in Nevins, ed., Diary of the Civil War, 429.
Mobilization could not be divorced from politics, and the looming Election of 1864 threatened to alter or derail the work that Baltimore, Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia had accomplished for the past three years. However, before that scheduled Presidential Election could even begin to suggest alternative leadership, the four cities of the Northeast braced for another grim recruiting season over the summer of 1864. As the electoral campaign season progressed, so too did the aftershocks of manpower and economic mobilization reverberate through the overstrained metropolises. That year, a series of events, both unforeseen and expected, burdened the cities with new dilemmas: a steady influx of dead and wounded men from the 1864 campaigns, the permanent return of three-year veterans, an Emergency Militia mobilization, and a dramatic increase in the number of bounty jumpers, caused by their unexpected alliance with the substitute brokers. However, despite these encumbrances, war did not seriously impair urban politics, suggesting that, as had happened in all previous periods of mobilization, urbanism stood firm against the disruptive character of war.

Declining morale induced city leaders to bargain with the War Department in order to lessen the demands heaped upon them. Since the beginning of the war, quotas had been the centerpiece of urban mobilization. Not only did they determine the manpower requirements of each community, but the consequent domestic sacrifice and economic mobilization followed them proportionally. As previous chapters have demonstrated, in multiple ways, the reduction of quotas dramatically lessened the demand on cities. Undoubtedly, the Election of 1864 became the pivotal event in determining how the cities answered the War Department’s latest requests. With morale shockingly low, urban politicians hoped they could reduce wartime pressures prior
to the election. Republicans hoped that quota reduction would ease the burden and give Lincoln a chance for victory. Democrats hoped quota reduction would stall the draft long enough to keep loyal voters inside city boundaries, and if their party carried the White House on Election Day, they might then nullify the hated conscription law. Unfortunately for the Democrats, they faced a great challenge. Their disorganized party could not agree on a central message: would they critique the Lincoln administration from a pro-war standpoint or advocate antiwar activism? Unable to mount a coherent opposition, the Democratic Party, the party that had dominated urban politics since the age of Andrew Jackson, finally floundered. In three cities—Baltimore, Boston, and Philadelphia—Democratic disunity paved the way for easy Republican victories, a political change that would have been unthinkable in 1861. Because of its unique wartime history, only New York City remained fiercely anti-Republican. In any event, as the Election of 1864 drew near, urban mobilization slowed down to await its results.

That season, five Union armies planned to move simultaneously into the Confederate interior and comprehensively squelch further resistance. Major General Nathaniel Banks’s Army of the Gulf, planned to advance up the Red River; Major General Franz’s Sigel’s Army of the Shenandoah, proposed to move up the Shenandoah Valley; Major General Benjamin Butler’s Army of the James, planned to land on the Bermuda Hundred Peninsula at take Richmond from the south; Major General William T. Sherman’s three cooperating armies, planned to drive southeast from Chattanooga along the Western and Atlantic Railroad toward Atlanta; and Major General George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac, with Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant superintending, planned to march toward Richmond from the north, smashing the Army of Northern Virginia along the way. Baltimore, Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia supplied troops to all of five of these armies, and though news from Virginia tended to dominate, city
newspapers kept watchful eyes on all aspects of this nation-wide offensive. Unfortunately, by the end of the third week in May, three of the five advancing columns had bogged down or retreated, while fourth—the Army of the Potomac—was sixteen days into a forty-four day bloodbath, one that eventually produced 55,000 Union losses. The last column, Sherman’s, advanced steadily, engaging in smaller battles, but victorious ones, but Sherman’s Yankees did not take Atlanta until the late summer, by which time the election season had commenced.

For the cities, the first month of the May 1864 grand offensive may have appeared like a shocking waste of valor. George T. Strong expressed sadness when he learned that a classmate of his had been killed leading a company of New York troops in the Battle of the Wilderness. “Poor Tom Cooper!” he wrote, “From my recollection of his college ways, I can well believe that he was doing his work with courage and reckless audacity.”¹ Just as they had after countless battles before, newspapers printed casualty lists and rosters of sick and wounded soldiers who arrived in the city by train or steamship. Usually the mournful process lasted a week and anxiety eased for weeks or months until the next big battle. But now, such lists became a daily fixture of urban life. Each day added more and more names to the record of casualties; and until late June, when the Union armies in the East stalemated into a siege around Petersburg and Richmond, bad news showed no sign of abatement. Illustratively, a month of combat during the Overland Campaign claimed 189 casualties from Philadelphia’s 72nd Pennsylvania alone. The newspaper casualty report for Company B sent in by one the regiment’s few surviving officers accurately listed the casualties at four killed, fifteen wounded, and eight missing, all between the days of May 5 and June 22.

¹ George T. Strong, 19 May 1864, in Nevins, ed., Diary of the Civil War, 449.
But although the final figures rose to dramatic heights, the new casualties did not noticeably alter wartime life in the metropolises. The cities had to expand their hospitals, naturally, but they accommodated only those sent from the Army of the Potomac or the Army of the James, and even then, they treated only those wounded who were well enough to be transported and who, for logistical reasons, could not be cared for at nearer hospital sites at White House Landing, Fredericksburg, City Point, or Washington D.C., well-guarded supply depots along the Union line of advance. Nevertheless, residents noticed the dramatic influx of wounded. In May 1864, New York City opened a new 2,000-bed hospital at Willett’s Point—the scene of the unfortunate New York Rifles fiasco of 1861—and named it, probably disdainfully, “Grant’s Hospital.”

Now fully engaged as combat troops, wounded African American troops arrived, requiring medical care. This caused a potential problem, because some white soldiers did not wish to be treated at integrated hospitals, or at least the medical personnel thought it best to segregate black and white patients. In Philadelphia, residents might even have rebelled, since integrated military hospitals violated the segregationist traditions of that city which required blacks and whites to be treated in separate buildings. When the first detachment of black sufferers arrived by hospital ship in August 1864, the surgeons at Summit Hill Hospital on the Darby Road transferred all white patients to Satterlee Hospital to make room for the black patients. This segregation went smoothly, however, and no protest occurred. Baltimore also segregated its military hospitals. The medical director there sent all black patients to McKim’s Hospital near Greenmount Cemetery. In addition to easing the discomforts of white patients, this hospital offered protection to its black sufferers. Since the hospital had once been a training

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camp, it still possessed ample fortifications. These helped deter southern sympathizers from assaulting incapacitated U.S.C.T. in their beds. Thus, for all the positive acceptance of black urbanites as soldiers, when their mangled bodies came back to the cities, soldiers, surgeons, and city residents could not consent to treat them without regard to race.³

Segregation of city hospitals reflected white residents’ long-standing commitment to keeping the races separate in day-to-day activities. Even though black soldiers fought and died for the Union, city businesses refused to treat them equally. Of Philadelphia’s nineteen streetcar companies, eleven did not allow black riders. The other eight companies required black passengers to ride on a platform next to the driver, uncomfortably exposed to the elements. The black soldiers in Philadelphia’s hospitals who lost their limbs in battle protested against this kind of segregation, because they could not easily traverse the city on crutches. Because hoopskirts and corsets precluded lengthy foot travel, black women who lived on the opposite side of Philadelphia could not visit their husbands at Camp William Penn or their wounded friends at Summit Hill, so they protested as well. Eventually, Philadelphia’s Board of Railway Presidents circulated a questionnaire, asking travelers if they would not mind allowing African Americans, particularly soldiers and their wives, to board streetcars. Overwhelmingly, White Philadelphians responded negatively. Daniel Fox, a prominent Democrat and Philadelphia’s future mayor, considered it disrespectful to let “the ladies of his family to ride in the cars with colored people.” Eventually, a state senator from Erie, Pennsylvania, Morrow B. Lowry, introduced legislation at

³ Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 227; Toomey and Sheads, Baltimore During the Civil War, 147.
Harrisburg, requiring all public railways in Pennsylvania to admit passengers regardless of color. Lowry’s bill did not pass until 1867.⁴

Bodies of the slain returned to the cities too, much as they had in 1862 and 1863, although not in great numbers. The peripatetic campaigning of 1864—unlike the vacillating operations of 1862 and 1863, which terminated in periods of rest and recuperation—forced soldiers to fight without pause, rendered it exceedingly difficult for survivors to make arrangements to send remains back home. Information regarding the fate of loved ones grew increasingly inaccurate. State adjutant generals endured a deluge of correspondence, asking for information that might relieve the worries of uninformed family members. One Irishman, Cornelius Scully, wrote to New York’s General John T. Sprague, asking for information about his brother Robert, who had enlisted in New York City’s “Corcoran Legion.” “Sir,” wrote Scully, “I beg to be excused for sending you this note. I would not trespass on your valuable time could I find out the information I want elsewhere. I wish to know, Sir, whether my Brother is dead or alive. He enlisted in the 170th Regt. N.Y.S.V. Corcoran’s Irish Legion. He enlisted about one year and a half ago in the city of New York. There is a rumour afloat that he is dead. I wish to know something certain about it. His name is Robert Skelly. I would feel for ever grateful if you would ascertain for me some positive information on the matter. I am his brother and, of course, I feel troubled about him. . . . Hoping that you will comply with my wishes.” ⁵

Irish Bostonians especially suffered greatly for want of information. Back in 1861, 4,000 Irishmen had gone to New York City to enlist, so local newspapers could not be relied upon to provide accurate information about their regiments. Catherine Moutray, a young Irish woman

⁵ Cornelius Scully, to John T. Sprague, 5 September 1864, NYSA.
from Boston, wrote to Adjutant General Sprague after several months’ silence from her boyfriend—Sergeant John Monahan—compelled her to seek help from officials at Albany. She asked, “would please to let me know what has happened to him or if he is still alive as I have not heard from him this four months. . . . by doing so you will relieve an unhappy friend of his from much trouble.”⁶ Although Moutray did not know it, Sergeant Monahan had been captured at the Battle of Po River, on May 8, 1864, and later died in Andersonville Prison on August 14.

Even the remains of well-known regimental officers rarely came home. On May 12, Major Henry P. Truefitt, Jr. died leading Philadelphia’s 119th Pennsylvania at the Battle of Spotsylvania. Lacking sufficient time for a decent burial, Truefitt’s men shoveled his corpse under an apple tree along the Willis Landrum lane on the battlefield. Captain Charles Noble, Jr. faced the glum task of informing Truefitt’s sister, Emmy: “Yesterday morning 10 A.M. I had the melancholy duty of burying Major Henry P. Truefitt of my Regt. He was killed an hour after the Regt went into action yesterday morning and some of the men of the Regt. carried his body to where I was when I took charge of it and gave it a decent burial. I would send it to his family but I cannot find any opportunity of doing so. I have his watch. a rebel took all the little things he had on him which I will send to his family as early as possible.”⁷

Those bodies that did return home were usually those who died in field hospitals well behind the lines of battle. As usual, grand funerals accompanied the burials of mortally wounded officers. On May 15, 1864, the parishioners at Boston’s Emmanuel Church paused to remember the life of Major Henry L. Abbott, a young Harvard student who had enlisted as second lieutenant in the 20th Massachusetts in the autumn of 1861. Abbott rose to command the

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⁶ Catherine Moutray to John T. Sprague, 8 September 1864, NYSA.
⁷ Charles Noble to Emmy Truefitt, 13 May 1864, HSP.
regiment, leading it into action at the Battle of the Wilderness, where he received his mortal injury. Abbott’s old Professor of Christian Morals, Frederick D. Huntington, delivered the eulogy, and after the service, the pallbearers transported Abbott’s casket to Lowell where his body was laid aside that of his brother, Captain Edward G. Abbott, who had been killed in August 1862 while serving with the 2nd Massachusetts at the Battle of Cedar Mountain. Like many other parents, Henry’s and Edward’s father, Judge Josiah G. Abbott, filled with anger and despair. Judge Abbott had always been conservative War Democrat critical of the Lincoln administration and the goals of emancipation. As Abbott brooded, he yearned for the opportunity to help unseat Lincoln, the man he blamed for his sons’ early demise.  

Although the arrival of corpses caused city residents to turn out in sizable numbers, starting at the end of May, urbanites more often prepared for the return of living bodies. Throughout the summer, those volunteers from 1861 who did not re-enlist during the winter came home at the expiration of their three-year enlistment contracts. Without fail, the cities spared no expense in welcoming home these veterans of the recent campaigns. These new urban homecoming celebrations mirrored those that honored the veteran volunteers. Cheering throngs, sumptuous feasts, and speeches delivered by local dignitaries marked the occasions. When two Pennsylvania Reserve Corps regiments, the 3rd and 4th Reserves, with eight Quaker City companies between them, returned to Philadelphia on June 8, they met a committee of City Councils at American Mechanics Hall. They paraded past cheering crowds, meeting a lunch reception at the hall, followed by a word of congratulation from one of the councilmen, who described, at length, the storied history of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps. As a reporter described, “On the upper part of the [parade] route, the people turned out en masse, bonfires were

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made, steam fire engines and hose carriages were stationed in the streets, intersecting the route, steam whistles, bells ringing, people cheering, and a general rushing of the multitude to see the veterans, made a scene at once grand, patriotic and thrilling. . . . The reception was grand in every aspect."  

Even the discharged veterans of the 1st Massachusetts, a regiment that had once been castigated by Bostonians for failing to veteranize, met a fantastic reception. The regimental chaplain marveled, “Rounds of cheers repeatedly rose far above the other noises of the street. No corps that returned to Boston received a warmer welcome.” When the Bostonians of the 13th Massachusetts returned on July 21, they found Boylston Hall and Faneuil Hall both draped with the words, “WELCOME, THIRTEENTH REGIMENT.” One reporter wrote, “One half of the galleries was densely filled with ladies, who threw numerous bouquets and kisses and waved their delicate kerchiefs at the noble veterans as they filed into the hall and took their places around the [banquet] tables.”

Usually, the organizations that helped raise each regiment in 1861—fire companies, city militia units, Turner’s associations, Irish community organizations—turned out to welcome home their favorite soldiers, often donating money to fund the homecoming receptions. The city councils in Baltimore, New York City, Philadelphia, and Boston also contributed money from their treasuries to meet the costs. Mayor Henry of Philadelphia insisted on a grand parade for each contingent of discharged veterans. Once, when a detachment of discharged soldiers from the 58th Pennsylvania arrived in the Quaker City several days ahead of schedule, Henry insisted on reassembling them on their scheduled day of arrival so he could offer them a proper thank

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9 Philadelphia Press, 9 June 1864.
10 Cudworth, History of the First Regiment, Massachusetts Infantry, 481; Davis, The Story of the Thirteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, 386.
you. Politicians, especially Governors Bradford and Andrew from Maryland and Massachusetts, and Mayors Chapman, Henry, and Lincoln, of Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Boston, glad-handed the discharged volunteers, making it a part of their daily routines. Governor Andrew and Mayor Lincoln personally thanked each regiment that returned to Boston, even Democratic regiments such as the 1st and 9th Massachusetts not likely to include many Republican voters.

Although city politicians made a public spectacle at these events, the particular sectors of the urban communities that had involved themselves in the soldiers’ welfare since 1861 took center stage. When Boston’s “Irish 9th” came home on June 15, it marched along a packed route from the Albany train station to Faneuil Hall, which, due to the efforts of Patrick Donohoe’s Irish committee, had been draped in Emerald Green banners. Inside the edifice, the Irish veterans partook of a “bountiful collation,” hearing speeches from Irish leaders and from their former commander, Colonel Patrick Guiney. When Philadelphia’s 72nd Pennsylvania returned on August 11, the entire city fire department turned out, marching alongside the renowned “Fire Zouaves,” loudly clanging bells and blowing whistles as the disorganized assortment winded its way to city hall.\footnote{Macnamara, The History of the Ninth Regiment, 408; Samito, ed., Commanding Boston’s Irish Ninth, 250-1}

Truly, city residents exhibited pride in their discharged veterans. Although these units had not committed themselves to fighting on until the end of the war, they had all served valiantly for three years and had survived the awful struggle. When the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves returned to Philadelphia in mid-June, the Hibernia Engine Company, an Irish fire company that had supplied recruits to the regiment in 1861, held a public ceremony at the engine house, offering a double-plated silver medallion—a “medal of honor,” the Irish called it—as testament to the regiment’s three years of arduous service. James Page, a city militia officer, told
the veterans, “Many have been left behind. Some are sick and wounded, while others are dead and rest beneath the soil of Virginia. . . . The brighter view of the scene is that you have survived the shock of battle, and have been permitted to return again to your families and friends. These testimonials are the evidences of the gratitude which the donors beat towards you. They feel the obligations which there are under to you. Look upon it as a gift from them—as a badge of honor.”

In some ways, the homecomings proved solemn occasions, since, for the first time, some families had to face the sad fact that loved ones killed in the recent battles were not among the returning ranks. Lieutenant Daniel Macnamara of the 9th Massachusetts remembered the crestfallen faces of those Bostonians who lined the route of his regiment’s march: “Alas! for the first time they learned that the loved ones they were looking for were but lately slain or died of wounds, or were absent in some hospital, wounded or sick, or missing, never to be heard from.” Perhaps the most shocking moment came when a scant contingent of eighty men under Captain Samuel King arrived in Philadelphia on June 16, the remnant of the 7th Pennsylvania Reserves, a unit that contained a large number of Philadelphia metal workers. On May 5, at the Battle of the Wilderness, the rest of the regiment—303 officers and men—had been surrounded by Confederate forces and taken prisoner. As their more fortunate comrades enjoyed a welcome home, the enlisted men of that regiment became inmates of the notorious Andersonville Prison.

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Despite the somberness of the occasion, city residents expressed gladness and optimism to have the soldiers back again. Many supposed that army life had made them better people, and that by re-acclimating them to peacetime pursuits, they might have a salutary influence on the antiwar population. Reverend Noah Gaylord, the ex-chaplain of the 13th Massachusetts,

12 Philadelphia Press, 14 June 1864.
13 Macnamara, 407.
instructed his former comrades at their final meeting to “Go back and become, each of you, a healthy moral influence in society. Frown down anything that looks like treason. Whenever you meet a sleepy, squalling half-patriot, shake him up, and make him to see things as they are. Tell them that your brave general has his grasp upon the throat of the rebel scoundrel, Lee, and that he will throttle him before many months.”

The reintegration of the veterans back into the urban landscape proceeded smoothly. This occurred because many discharged soldiers organized “veterans groups,” to keep in touch. Undoubtedly, these soldiers had to confront the emotional issues upon leaving the army—which had been their life for the past three years—with the contest unfinished. Some associations formed at the very moment of discharge. For instance, a group of eight officers from the 22nd Massachusetts formed the “Wilson’s Regimental Association” during their train ride home, vowing to meet annually at Boston’s Parker House on the anniversary of their muster out date.

Cities relied heavily upon pre-existing organizations, the soldiers’ family relief associations that had spawned back in 1861, to aid veterans’ readjustment. Philadelphia, for instance, possessed three such organizations: “The Ladies Union Relief Association,” “The Ladies’ Association for Soldiers’ Relief,” and “The Penn Relief Association.” By 1864, urban soldiers’ aid societies possessed three years’ worth of experience, thus, they operated with greater efficiency and improved knowledge of how to disperse funds and identify fakers. It helped that the numbers of returning soldiers were comparatively small. Each regiment mustered out fewer than 300 men apiece. The protracted return of the urban volunteers and the smaller numbers they discharged shrunk the number of claimants and reduced the complexities of the aid

14 Boston Herald, 22 July 1864; Charles E. Davis, Three Years in the Army: The Story of the Thirteenth Massachusetts Volunteers from July 16, 1861, to August 1, 1864 (Boston: Estes and Lauriat, 1894), 387-8.
15 Parker, History of the Twenty-Second Massachusetts, 538.
organizations, at least when compared to the daunting task they had faced back in 1861. Back then, they had funded thousands of impoverished soldiers’ families. Comparatively, demobilization revealed a smoother process. Some cities supported “Soldiers Homes,” establishments that cared for sick and injured soldiers, even discharged ones. Even New York Copperhead Fernando Wood donated his personal fortune to these institutions. Public institutions could not aid unemployed soldiers comprehensively or help them find work, but they could provide, as they had done in 1861, temporary relief while the soldiers restarted their peacetime lives.\footnote{Taylor, \textit{Philadelphia in the Civil War}, 306-9.}

Not all soldiers could readjust to urban life, and predictably, misbehavior occurred. War broke family ties and offered no means for reassembling them. For instance, a lieutenant from New York City, who had recently been released from captivity in a Confederate prison, refused to return home to his wife and family. For reasons unknown, he fled Gotham with another woman, went to Albany to claim a state pension for him and this woman representing to be his wife, and never returned. It took several months for Mary Caldwell, the abandoned wife, to discover what had happened. After hiring a lawyer, she wrote to the adjutant general of New York to explain the truth of the matter, that she deserved her share of the state pension. “My life is sad,” she wailed. “I am unable to say more of my Husband to my feelings overcomes me now this is four years of grief that I have had with him.” Due to the absence of official documents, it is not known how the executive office at Albany handled this case.\footnote{Mary Parker to Thomas Hillhouse, 17 March 1865, NYSA.}

Indeed, if the returning veterans posed any threat to law and order, they went largely ignored by the city police. Amid the never-ending demands for new troops, police focused their attention on a more invidious menace, the continuing machinations of bounty jumpers and their
partners in crime, the substitute brokers. By the summer of 1864, substitute brokers had become veritable kidnappers, constantly running recruits out of the cities. Urban brokers committed these acts at their own peril, particularly in New York, where a new statute made it illegal for any recruiter to “persuade, induce, or attempt to persuade or induce” any New York resident to enlist in a regiment not credited to the state. Punishment included imprisonment and a $1,000 fine.\textsuperscript{18}

Over the summer of 1864, bounty jumpers and substitute brokers began to join forces to ensure maximum profit, although authorities did not often realize that an alliance between the two groups existed. Dishonest substitute brokers hired expert bounty jumpers to work for them. After enlisting them in a specific city regiment, the brokers facilitated the bounty jumpers’ desertion in exchange for a small cut of the bounty. Edward R. Hubbard, for instance, owned a restaurant on Baltimore Street from which he ran a brokerage business. One of his accomplices, Abel Tyson, received $550 for going as a substitute, a sum from which Hubbard received $100. On August 30, 1864, Tyson reported to Lafayette Square Barracks, one of Baltimore’s centralized recruiting depots, from which he escaped that same day. Tyson returned to Hubbard’s restaurant, and received a new set of clothes to disguise him for his next assignment. Then, Hubbard paid for a ticket to another city, where Tyson could enlist again, take a new bounty and escape, with Tyson receiving yet another cut of the funds paid to a fraudulent recruit. Unhappily for both of them, Union guards arrested Tyson at President Street Station and arrested Hubbard shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{19} Another successful bounty jumper, Samuel Downey, enlisted and then deserted no less than twelve times, earning for himself over $18,000 in bounties in less than a year. Downey originally had enlisted as a substitute to the 4\textsuperscript{th} Maryland in July 1863, and

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{New York Times}, 22 January 1865.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 16 September 1864.
between then and July 1864, he had traveled across the nation, taking bounties from Philadelphia; New York City; Cincinnati; Columbus, Ohio; and Columbus, Indiana—entering these cities often multiple times—until provost marshals finally arrested him when he returned home to Baltimore to take another substitute fee of $500.²⁰

Each city refined its methods for stopping this criminal activity, Baltimore’s City Council employed a “representative recruit system.” Through this scheme, the Bounty Board paid its city bounty to any patriotic citizen who purchased a reliable substitute prior to the draft date. As long as their substitute did not flee with the bounty, a purchaser could have his name scratched from the draft rolls. The councilmen hoped this system of assurance might keep money out of the hands of crooked substitute brokers and their bounty-jumping accomplices. However, substitute brokers merely adapted their businesses to entice purchasers to buy substitutes from them only. With shameless commercialism, brokers advertised their stock of substitutes with boundless enthusiasm, posting advertisements in local newspapers and public broadsides on city walls. For instance, J. N. Foster’s recruiting advertisement read:

SUBSTITUTES! SUBSTITUTES!! SUBSTITUTES!!! We invite enrolled men who desire to furnish substitutes, and thus avoid the inconvenience of the draft to give us a call. Now is the time to procure them. Do not delay until you are drafted. There is a danger in so doing. The demand for substitutes after the draft will be so great that you may not be able to procure one and your only alternative will be personal service. LOOK AT IT! CONSIDER IT! REFLECT UPON IT! SLEEP ON IT! And then run to us and be saved. We not only guarantee our substitutes, but we guarantee the fulfillment of our contracts, and we have never yet failed our guarantee. Come prove us.²¹

The allure of the substitute brokers’ words proved so tempting that few purchasers could pass them up. As the summer drew on, ward organizations in Baltimore began to offer neighborhood bounties for representative recruits, but even these localized committees could not

²⁰ Ibid., 3 and 21 July 1864.
²¹ Ibid., 12 September 1864.
end the brazen criminality perpetrated by brokers and bounty-jumpers. Charles Fulton concluded that Baltimore stood at the mercy of a cast of “burglars, black legs, and professional bounty jumpers.” He wrote, “That the efforts made to secure bona fide recruits should be thus fruitlessly exerted, it is exceedingly discouraging to ward and district committees, and to those patriotic gentlemen, who though secure from the draft themselves, are anxious to be represented in the field.”

Once they comprehended that brokers could not be purged from the city’s environs, some recruiting officers attempted to work with them. Colonel William Schley of the 5th Maryland announced that “no interference will be made or attempted with the substitute agents or brokers, but on the contrary, all facilities will be afforded and extended to them by me. I respectfully solicit a call of all, and will do all in my power to assist them.”

Chasing down criminal substitutes and brokers also became a way of life in New York City during the summer of 1864. Despite the new state law, out-of-state recruiters continued to run New York City’s fencible men to other districts. Many erected small, collapsible tents or booths at City Park, where they illegally signed men to the rosters of New England regiments. When suspicions arose about their legitimacy, these out-of-towners quickly tore down their shanties and disappeared into the cityscape. One city resident who visited New Hampshire claimed that every town he stopped at boasted of its ability to fill its quota with New York City dwellers. Another New Yorker complained, “The occupants of these places are daily robbing the city of New York of its war materiel. . . . [T]hey actually prevent us from filling our quota, and are doing what they can to enforce a draft upon us.”

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22 Ibid., 30 August 1864.
23 Ibid., 22 and 29 August 1864.
Orison Blunt, head of the New York County Volunteer Committee, addressed Mayor Gunther about the problem, writing, “New York has at last become a sort of general rendezvous where every county, city, town, or village not only of our own state, but of other states, seems to have congregated its agents to fill their respective quotas.” Since appeals to the Department of the East and to Governor Seymour had no effect, Blunt suggested that Gunther “invoke the aid of the Common Council in the matter” and draft a new law to punish all out-of-town agents.

Gunther went to work on August 20, and two days later, the Common Council passed a helpful ordinance. This edict made it illegal for anyone to open a recruiting office or hire a substitute in the city unless the County of New York received credit for those substitutes and volunteers recruited under such auspices. This ordinance also made it illegal to “induce or endeavor to induce” any New Yorker to enlist as a volunteer or substitute in another state or county. Punishment included a $1,000 to $6,000 fine and no less than six months in prison.25

As in Baltimore, New York City’s Council passed another new statute governing incorrigible bounty brokers. In mid-August, the Board of Supervisors finally gave up trying to fight the bounty brokers for supremacy, so they passed an ordinance fostering better relations with them. The Board promised to give any bounty broker $100 cash-in-hand if he brought his recruit to the Volunteer Committee’s office. This act, many hoped, would prevent brokers from kidnapping recruits or stealing their money. The act summarily breathed life back into the city’s moribund brokerage business, which, for the past three months, had been reeling from General Dix’s aggressive detective work. Wrote one reporter, “One hundred dollars is a large amount of money, and it has set great numbers to work who have heretofore been idle or earning little.”

Blunt received mixed opinions about his decision. Some applauded him, but many believed he

had reinvigorated an evil class of men. One citizen wrote, “Twice as much recruiting might have been done [without them].” Many also noted that the results of brokers’ recruiting efforts failed to improve the quality of Union volunteers. One citizen wrote, “It is, after all, those who can be influenced through their appetite for drink that fall chiefly into the hands of the brokers. Sober, intelligent, and really valuable men do not fall into the traps that are laid by the unscrupulous broker.”

By now, U.S. Army detectives had descended on New York City in droves and commenced a campaign designed to arrest the most notorious bounty jumping fugitives. On August 10, two agents, William Kingley and George Wright, tracked down and arrested George Coffin, an infamous bounty jumper who had already pilfered at least three known bounties. As Kingley and Wright escorted their captive to the provost marshal’s office, the fleet-footed Coffin escaped twice. The first time, Kingley and Wright managed to run him down and recapture him. Then, on Beekman Street, between Gold and William Streets, Coffin bolted again. Unwilling to let him get away, Kingley drew his revolver and shot Coffin three times in the left shoulder. In general, provost guards in the cities became bolder, but this rarely effected positive change. Late in the year, fifty substitutes—all from Maine—bolted from their railroad car when the train carrying them paused in Boston. The guards on the train platform chased them down, apprehending a few. One of them fired at his quarry and missed, shooting a small boy in the leg. Thankfully, the ball missed the young lad’s flesh, grazing only the fabric on his trousers. A large

crowd formed to console the panic-stricken youngster and “loudly denounced” the sentry for firing his weapon in a busy street.  

The apprehending of bounty jumpers spread violence about the cities, but declining conditions in the cities’ camps of instruction became a source of mortification as well. This problem plagued Philadelphia more than the other cities, since it persisted in raising new regiments of volunteers, as opposed to shipping small cohorts of substitutes and volunteers to fill the veteran regiments at the front. During the summer, Philadelphia managed to raise three new infantry regiments. All of them went into temporary quarters at Camp Cadwalader. Sadly, this camp had now become the bane of the city. Poor sanitation and frequent abuse of soldiers led one Philadelphia volunteer to claim, “No military rendezvous of any kind established in this city since the breaking out of the war has been the cause of so much complaint or the source of so many communications of disparaging character as Camp Cadwalader. . . . Filthy quarters, miserable diet, embezzlement of money belonging to soldiers, an utter disregard for the welfare and comfort of the men, constitute a portion of the evils.”  

A small prostitution community consisting of hastily-erected shanties sprouted up across Islington Lane in early August. Every afternoon and twice a week during the evenings, these shanties hosted dance parties with “low dancing and disorderly drinking.” After three soldiers died of alcohol poisoning during the last week of August, a posse of police and a sergeant’s guard consisting of two full companies of recruits raided the community, arresting fifty-three individuals, including twenty soldiers and fourteen prostitutes. Four men were arraigned on charges of keeping disorderly houses, and

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28 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 20 December 1864.
29 Frank Taylor, *Philadelphia in the Civil War*, 144.
newspapers applauded the raid: “These dens were the source of much annoyance to the officers in charge of Camp Cadwalader who were unable to keep the soldiers from frequenting them.”

While law and order issues stilted the mobilization of the cities, so too did their increasing confusion regarding their quotas. Perhaps no aspect of the turbulent summer limited what the cities could do to support the Union war effort more than the disagreements over quotas and deficiencies. Even as late as May 1864, the four cities failed to comprehend the War Department’s expectations for providing soldiers. Partly, this confusion derived from Provost Marshal General Fry’s contradictory orders, suspending the draft in the cities, then restarting them, revoking the federal bounty by a certain deadline, and then bringing it back. Fry had hoped that the threat of draft, not an actual draft, would promote recruitment. Applying regulations inconsistently, Fry postponed the second federal draft first scheduled for March 1 as many as five times in some cities, so that by early May, no city had yet enforced its belated conscription. Worse yet, Baltimore had not received a quota from Fry’s office. Because it had been so dilatory in enforcing its July 1863 draft, throughout the spring, Baltimoreans recruited their men and raised bounties blindly, with no discernible goal or benchmark to mark its progress. In sum, each city periodically estimated its deficiency, but never with any certainty.

The confusion over quotas created abuse, and New York City suffered needlessly from the unscrupulous behavior of a newspaper editor and his reporting team when they announced a counterfeit call for troops for the sole purpose of monetary gain. On May 18, the editor of the *Brooklyn Eagle*, Joseph Howard, Jr., forged an associated press release announcing a presidential call for 400,000 additional volunteers. Without confirming the press release’s validity, two New

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30 *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 31 August 1864.
York City papers, the *World* and the *Journal of Commerce*, ran Howard’s proclamation in their own columns, causing an economic panic and a dramatic increase in the value of gold. Fiscally, this panic benefited Howard, who had invested in gold the day before. For at least three days, people wandered about the city in a baffled daze, wondering who had authority to recruit and whose orders they should follow to meet this latest demand. When President Lincoln learned the truth of Howard’s scheme, tabbed the “New York City Gold Hoax,” he ordered him arrested and also ordered troops in the city to close the two newspapers that had circulated the false report. None of the conspirators remained long in custody and neither did the newspapers remain long silenced, because by June, when it became obvious that Grant’s army needed more men, Lincoln decided he would have to issue a new troop requisition anyway. Thus, he chose to pardon all of the gold hoax conspirators before issuing his call for troops in mid-July.  

Whenever the cities received information from General Fry, councilmen immediately scrutinized it and invariably questioned the authenticity of Fry’s calculations. For instance, Philadelphia’s City Council accused Fry of “random guess-work,” complaining that Philadelphia—which had a population one-fifth the size the rest of Pennsylvania—should have to provide only 12,500 men to the second federal draft, not 19,000 as Fry demanded. Boston complained too. Its city council asked the federal government if it had accounted for the city’s often-ignored naval credits when determining its quota. After a significant amount of haggling, the War Department offered Boston a special reprieve to consider the matter.

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32 *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 2 and 17 March 1864.

33 *Boston Evening Transcript*, 13 May 1864.
Amid the confusion and the continual transmission of orders, it sometimes fell to the assistant provost marshals to determine when or if a city needed to hold a draft. In the case of Boston and Baltimore, both cities faced conscription in the late spring because the four assistant provost marshals in those cities, not having received any specific notification from Fry to delay the draft, determined to enforce conscription.\(^{34}\) Adding to bewilderment of all, Baltimore also faced a state draft that followed closely on the heels of the federal draft. Amid the turmoil produced by the federal draft, with Baltimoreans desperately seeking exemptions and substitutes, the Monumental City fell short of meeting the state quota. So, on June 6, Adjutant General J. Summerfield Berry’s 100-day militia draft drew out 721 names from Baltimore City.\(^{35}\)

Complaints from New York City and Philadelphia induced General Fry to postpone the second federal draft in those two cities, and he pushed back the deadline two weeks to June 1 so

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\(^{34}\) Boston held its draft on May 12 to fill a deficiency of 1,431, and Baltimore held its draft on May 13 to fill a deficiency of 1,879. On May 12, Boston’s second federal draft began at the Fourth District office on Sudsbury Street. In addition to giving the Bay City more time to raise volunteers, the War Department eventually determined that Boston deserved almost 4,000 in naval credits. At this announcement, five wards reevaluated their quotas and declared them full. The other seven wards still possessed deficiencies, but only 1,431 altogether. Captain Howe ordered 432 names drawn from the First Ward, or 150 percent of that ward’s deficiency. Over at the Third District office, the new provost marshal, Captain J. W. LeBarnes, ordered 216 names drawn from the Seventh Ward. Over the next few days, drawings occurred in the Second, Third, Eighth, Tenth, and Twelfth Wards. No rioting or disturbances accompanied this process and it completed quietly on May 14. General Fry announced Baltimore’s deficiency at 1,879 men at the beginning of May. His announcement produced few complaints because it was very close to newspaper editors’ predictions. If the various wards did not meet this demand by the scheduled draft date of May 13, Provost Marshals Cathart and Blumenburg would draw out 2,811 names. (As in Boston, this increased number was designed to bear the brunt of the usual post-draft exemptions.) Fry’s announcement prompted renewed vigor in city recruitment, but only one ward, the Fourth, met its quota. On the scheduled date, Cathart and Blumenburg turned the draft wheels and drew out 535 names from the First, Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Wards. Over the next five days, the provost marshals drew 1,230 names in the other thirteen wards. Generally, the draft passed off quietly, and no major disturbances occurred. On May 23, Cathart and Blumenburg began hearing exemptions. True to form, both men granted large numbers of them. On the first day, Cathart granted forty-eight exemptions out of fifty-three cases, while Blumenburg granted thirty-seven exemptions. *Boston Evening Transcript*, 12, 13, and 14 May 1864; *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 4, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 24 May 1864.

\(^{35}\) The harsh fighting during the Overland Campaign encouraged Governor Bradford to prepare his state’s local defense forces. He vowed Maryland would not be caught flat-footed if the Confederates invaded the state a third time. On May 4, Maryland’s new adjutant general, John Summerfield Berry, prepared rolls for a 100-days’ militia draft. Baltimore had to fill its quota for two state regiments, the 11th and 12th Maryland, by volunteering; but after one month’s time, if those regiments had not filled, Berry planned to enforce a state-wide draft. *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 7, 8, 10, 14, and 15 June 1864.
he could reevaluate his calculations. After considerable protest, the Philadelphia City Council convinced the assistant provost marshals in Philadelphia to revise the city quota to 13,500 without Fry’s consent. Once this happened, Philadelphia discovered that it overfilled its quota by 4,110. Fry put up no resistance to this contravention of his authority, for it appeared that he greatly muddled his numbers when calculating Philadelphia’s quota, or at least the evidence supplied by Philadelphia’s City Council made it appear so. Fry’s postponement enabled New York City to beat its draft, and on June 1, he stated that New York City probably had a surplus of about 3,000 men.

Thus, the second federal draft struck Baltimore, Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia mildly. Three of these cities drafted comparatively few men, and the fourth, New York City, held no draft at all. However, an unexpected demand fell upon all four cities during the first week of July, when a Confederate army in the Shenandoah Valley led by Lieutenant General Jubal Early crossed the Potomac River and advanced on Washington. In response, on July 6, President Lincoln called for the states to provide Emergency Militia to serve for one hundred days “in the vicinity of Washington.” The War Department expected Governor Bradford to send forward his two regiments, the 11th and 12th Maryland. Meanwhile, Pennsylvania had to provide 12,000 Emergency militiamen, and Governor Curtin decreed that 5,000 of these would come from Philadelphia. Finally, Governor Seymour determined that New York City had to provide 12,000 militiamen to fill his state’s requisition. Lincoln and Stanton had no intention of asking Massachusetts for Emergency Militia, but Governor Andrew was visiting Washington on

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36 Only the Twenty-Fifth Ward did not escape the draft, but this ward was forced to draft only thirty men.
37 New York Times, 1, 4, and 18 March and 20 July 1864.
business when early crossed the Potomac. Seeing the panic of local citizens firsthand, he called up 5,000 militiamen, demanding they assemble in a mere four days.\textsuperscript{38}

Undoubtedly, the greatest alarm spread throughout Baltimore, the closet city to the scene of the invasion. Editor Charles Fulton believed the “excitement on the 19\textsuperscript{th} of April, 1861, or that caused by Lee’s invasion of the state last summer was nothing in comparison” to what he witnessed in Baltimore in July 1864. Still, even with all the commotion, only precious few Baltimoreans joined the 100-days’ regiments. One citizen admitted, “I would have volunteered a week ago, but I did not like the idea of leaving my business and going on duty, while my able-bodied Secesh friends profited from my absence and laughed at my falstaffian first appearance in military ranks.” Other citizens disliked going into the ranks because the state militia draft promised to put secessionists into uniform—a dangerous gamble, some supposed. In any case, these two competing views conspired to limit the amount of volunteering during this time of crisis. Opined one citizen, “One horn or another of this dilemma is always at hand to excuse or palliate our defenceless position, and together are fatal to all efforts at protection.”\textsuperscript{39}

Armed loyalists roamed the streets, called for volunteers, drummed up support, and placed broadsides on the walls of the city. A placard jointly written by Mayor Chapman and Governor Bradford read, “The invading enemy is by the last accounts approaching this city. Men—all the men that can be raised—are wanted[.] . . . It is not important how you should come, \textit{but most important that you should come at once}; come in your leagues, or come in your militia companies, but come in crowds, and come quickly.” Chapman’s and Bradford’s announcement had some effect at least, since Baltimore’s Union Leagues sent forth thousands of

\textsuperscript{38} Schouler, \textit{Massachusetts in the Civil War}, 560.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 13 and 18 July 1864.
armed volunteers to the barricades. Although disorganized, the Union League volunteers went to 34 North Street, headquarters of Brigadier General Henry Lockwood, commander of the post of Baltimore, who then organized them into ad-hoc companies. Although probably overestimating the actual number, the *Baltimore American* calculated that 7,209 volunteers served in these Union League Companies or directly on the city barricades. Two companies of black volunteers held positions at Forts 6 and 7 at the city’s vital northwest corner, and some 200 German volunteers formed from Baltimore’s sharpshooter club held a nearby post.40

Farther north, Philadelphia exhibited less alarm. Four days after Lincoln’s call for Emergency troops, an aide who had just been to Philadelphia informed Governor Curtin in Harrisburg that “there were no military organizations in Phila.,” and that Mayor Henry believed he had “no authority from the state or national government to raise troops.” Further, reported the aide, Henry seemed unwilling—even if he possessed authority—to call troops except for the duration of the emergency only. The aide guessed that, “Many citizens of Phila. are unable to leave their homes for a time so long as 100 days unless imperatively compelled to do so.” When Curtin queried Henry about this, the mayor argued that he made “every effort” to raise a new batch of emergency troops, but he admitted that he “apprehended the difficulty of last year would recur in the unwillingness of citizens to enlist for a definite period instead of the emergency.”41

Undoubtedly, the employment situation in Philadelphia may have had plenty to do with residents’ reluctance to send forward Emergency Militia regiments. With many recently discharged veterans hunting for jobs, militiamen drawn from the workforce proved unwilling to leave the city, even for a period of one hundred days. Only those businesses that promised to

40 Ibid., 11 and 14 July 1864.
41 H. F. Young to Andrew Curtin, 9 July 1864; Alexander Henry to Andrew Curtin, 9 July 1864, PSA, RG-26.
hold militiamen’s jobs vacant and pay them in their absence did well with recruiting. Colonel William B. Thomas, Philadelphia’s Customs House collector, promised his employees that he would not let their state jobs fall to competitors if they served their country. A soldier who joined Thomas’s regiment remarked in his diary, “It is gratifying to the state that the [state] employers [in Philadelphia] without an exception, kept their places open for them on their return, and in hundreds of instances, continued their wages and salaries in their absence. This is a grand feature of the war.” The Customs House raised $4,400 to provide for the families of its workers while they were away.

Curtin did not consider the hazards of losing one’s peacetime occupation as sufficient cause for refusal to serve. On July 10, he admonished the people of Philadelphia: “You are not responding freely. . . . Recollect that the mode of enlisting men is at the discretion of the Government, and it is the duty of all to obey its requisitions. It would be disgraceful of you to waste time in objecting to matters of form and detail, or to profess that you would go if called in some different way. Those who want an excuse for skulking may do so, but all those who desire to do their duty to their country will scorn such subterfuges.”

Moneyed institutions followed the example of the Customs House, raising money to support Philadelphians who joined the Emergency Militia. A banking firm, the Coal Exchange, funded its third regiment of the war, the 197th Pennsylvania, mustered-into service on July 29 with 932 men. On July 11, the Union League Club called an emergency meeting and began raising funds for the formation of its new regiment, the 5th Union League (196th Pennsylvania).

43 Taylor, Philadelphia in the Civil War, 276-7.
44 Ibid., 277-9.
The Union League filled ten companies in nine days, expending about $7,000 in recruiting expenses. Curtin saved his only applause for the League, telegraphing its members, “I am much gratified to find the League as usual prompt & liberal, we need men quickly if we are to save the government.” Commanded by Colonel Harmanus Neff, the 5th Union League left for Baltimore on July 28 with 958 men. All total, Philadelphia sent 3,736 men into one hundred-days’ service. This mobilization was not terribly efficient. As had occurred at the start of the war, competition ruled the hour. The Inquirer noted, “We want five . . . regiments, and twenty would-be colonels are each trying to raise a regiment . . . the rival recruiting parties are obstructing each other, and injuring Government interests. . . . The present ridiculous system [should be] brought to a speedy end.”

Still, with wartime inflation rising mid summer, just as it had done the previous year, few Philadelphians rushed to answer the call. Those who did, it seems, left their families in dire straits. Harriet Hutt, the wife of an Emergency Militiaman, had to beg the Union League for more money while her husband was away. She pleaded, “It was a hard struggle for me to beg but I do not wish to do that if I could get assisted without. But unless I find someone to befriend me in my helpless case my children must beg.” Hutt’s letter explained:

I am a very delicate woman and crushed with trouble. Now gentlemen I have a chance of renting a Boarding House but cannot get money that is due me from the Government cannot you befriend me to Lend me and take the amount from this money or give me orders or some place to get what is needed until the claims are settled. I owe a large sum for feed for my children but I will have about one hundred and fifty Doll to get in some way of making a living but if I eat it away I will have nothing by the time it is paid me. I hope you will not blame me nor think me impudent but a mother will sacrifice her feelings very much for her children.

45 Union League Club meeting minutes, 11 July 1864, ULCL.
46 Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 July 1864.
47 Harriet Hutt to Union League Club, 18 July 1864, ULCL.
Initially, it seemed that New York City would efficiently meet Lincoln’s requisition for Emergency Militia simply by sending forth the 1st Division for the fourth time during the war. On July 11, Governor Seymour ordered seven fully-equipped regiments under marching orders, and that same day, General Sandford declared that he had 10,000 men standing ready to leave at a moment’s notice. Everything seemed to be ready, until Mayor Gunther protested against the militia’s removal from the state. The bloody fighting in northern Virginia and Georgia, concurrent with the recent discharge of the three-year volunteers who enlisted in 1861, made another draft highly likely. Gunther feared that if the militia left the city, “riot and popular outbreak” would surely ensue. As it was, the depreciation of currency and the scarcity of provisions already aggravated the sufferings of the working-class people, a circumstance eerily reminiscent of the previous July. If the economic situation continued to deteriorate, the urban poor, Gunther guessed, would take out their frustrations on the military establishments in the city. Local law enforcement had already proven its ineffectiveness during the draft riot of 1863; Gunther viewed it unwise to strip away the city’s one layer of protection, its well-disciplined local militia. On July 11, Gunther addressed a letter to Sandford arguing that, “We should not, by any action of our own, place these great interests in jeopardy by withdrawing our legitimate military protection.” Naturally, city Republicans derided Gunther’s reservations as the lamentations of a shameless Copperhead. The Times mused, “To ply this class [of workingmen], then, with arguments to justify tumult and insurrection is to play the part of a dangerous and unscrupulous demagogue, is to asperse the character of a vast industrial community, and is to give official sanction and countenance to the rebellion.”

In a show of patriotism, the working-people protested Gunther’s message, calling it an unfair characterization of their collective opinions. On July 18, a committee of workingmen went to Gunther’s office to encourage him to rescind his proclamation. They argued that Gunther’s announcement stood upon a faulty premise. The city’s industrial workers, they affirmed, did not represent a class of people inclined toward lawlessness. “The workingmen of New York are not rioters,” they declared. Affirming their allegiance to the city’s military mobilization, they continued, “In the effort to restore the national jurisdiction, the voice of New York should be heard loudest in response.” In the absence of the militia, the industrial workers promised to guard “against the first attempts to precipitate a recurrence of the events of last July.”

New York City raised and armed six more 100-days regiments, and all of these served in forts surrounding New York Harbor or at Elmira Prison Camp. In all, 3,586 city-dwellers went into the 1864 militia.

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49 Although they eagerly waited committal to the fray, only a few New Yorkers actually went to the front during the emergency. On July 11, one regiment, the 84th N.Y.S.M.—634 men strong—left for Baltimore, and another, the 93rd N.Y.S.M.—360 men—departed a few days later. On July 16, after these two regiments left, Seymour suspended any additional troop departures, wishing first to hear Lincoln’s announcement of a new call for volunteers. As predicted, Lincoln’s proclamation came two days later. *New York Herald*, 20 July 1864.

50 Still, Seymour had to explain why he suspended mobilization of the emergency militia. Principally, he wanted the War Department to clarify the new draft’s authority over New York State’s National Guard. Seymour vowed not to forward any more militiamen until he had assurance of their draft-exempt status. On July 21, Provost Marshal General Fry answered Seymour’s question, but not in the way the governor hoped. Indeed, Fry declared that all New York emergency troops could be drafted under the new call. Unsurprisingly, General Sandford, commander of the city militia, disagreed with Fry’s verdict, informing Seymour that the “language of the law appears to be in conflict with this decision.” Sandford confirmed that the federal draft law of 1863 did not apply to “all persons actually in the military or naval service at the time of the draft.” City Democrats derided Fry’s decision, too. Editor James Bennett noted that once Jubal Early’s invaders retreated into Virginia, the War Department no longer needed emergency militiamen so hurriedly, so “out comes the Provost Marshal with an order containing one of his peculiar decisions that are certainly wonderful models of arbitrary stupidity.” *New York Times*, 23 July 1864; *New York Herald*, 26 July 1864.

51 At Seymour’s request, Sandford traveled to Washington to plead the state’s case to the War Department. After Sandford’s remonstration, Fry exempted the 100-days men. However, by the time Fry adjudicated this dispute, the emergency had all but passed. Rather than give Seymour an unnecessary means of exempting thousands of New Yorkers, Fry urged Lincoln simply to withdraw the request for emergency troops from New York. Seymour eventually restarted the emergency militia mobilization in late July, but he raised only a limited force to augment fortifications in the Department of the East. *New York Times*, 23 and 28 July 1864; *New York Herald*, 26 July 1864. The six regiments included the 37th, 69th, 77th, 98th, 99th, and 102nd N.Y.S.M.
In Boston, the Massachusetts militia responded to Governor Andrew’s entreaty, although nearly all the regiments and companies called into service had to recruit from scratch. Boston provided fifteen companies, but of these, three never deployed. Boston’s emergency troops had little influence on the outcome of the Confederate invasion, as they reached the front no earlier than July 20, long after Early’s command had retreated. In fact, few Emergency Militia regiments, urban or rural, made any real difference during the campaign. On July 9, Early’s Confederates brushed aside federal forces at Monocacy, Maryland, and two days later, they reached Silver Spring, just outside of Washington. By that time, Union soldiers from the Army of the Potomac manned the defensive fortifications encircling Washington, and Early considered it foolish to press home his attack. On July 13, he retraced his steps, retiring across the Potomac.

For the northeastern cities, the frightening specter caused by Early’s invasion revealed the glaring evils of the state-wide militia system. After three Confederate invasions, none of the four cities had demonstrated any progress in getting Emergency Militia mobilized with sufficient speed. Baltimoreans and Philadelphians viewed this as a fault of the militia laws, state and federal. Baltimore representatives to the state legislature began drafting a new law to restructure Maryland’s chaotic militia system. Of course, due to legislative scheduling, the vote would not come until the winter session, nearly six months away. Philadelphia’s Union League Club sought a sweeping national law. Having already raised six regiments during the war, and now commencing its seventh, the club sent a letter to Senator Henry Wilson, chair of the Senate’s military committee conveying disgust at the poor emergency mobilization in Philadelphia. The gentlemen of the club wrote Wilson that, “The business of raising and organizing these troops has proved the occasion of making the committee practically acquainted with the working of our

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52 Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, 560; Boston Evening Transcript, 7, 15, 18, July and 24 August 1864.
system of citizen soldiers, and has led to a careful consideration of the General & State laws under which the military force of the country has thus far been raised and organized.” The gentlemen got right to the point, opining that the “want of centralization and unity has become to[o] apparent that every interested observer acknowledges this as the cause of the delays, expense, unpopularity, and inefficiency of the means hitherto employed, either to induce volunteers or to enforce drafts” Ultimately, the club guessed, after having seen and experienced the chaos of urban military mobilization in the summer of 1864, some change in the state militia laws needed to be made to “equalize the obligations of military service, and ensure at all times an active and a Reserve force adequate to the demands of the War Department.”

Believing that Pennsylvania’s state politics were too weak to the task, the Union League Club’s military committee proposed a law—which they apparently drafted—one that could be implemented by the federal congress, to “correct the evils of imperfect and inharmonious State Militia Laws by the ‘organizing, arming, & disciplining’ the militia of the United States.” Some law needed to ensure an active emergency force in the states. The committee declared, “No importance to the country is probably second to no measure now engaging your legislative attention.” Of course, no federal law came as the result of the Union League Club’s letter, but it revealed, finally, that some city organizations could finally understand the problems caused by the awkward sharing of state and federal power.53

The question of revising the state militia laws hung in suspension until the winter, but this did not matter much to city dwellers, since, no sooner had the Emergency of 1864 crisis disappeared when, on July 18, the War Department made another call for 500,000 men, who

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53 Union League Club to Henry Wilson, n.d. [1864], ULCL.
could enlist for one-, two-, or three-year terms of service. With the 1861 veterans returned to society, Lincoln and Stanton hoped they might tire of peacetime life and answer this summons, and if any did not want to commit for three years, they could choose one of the short-term alternatives. This new call came as a bit of a shock to urban residents. New Yorker Henry Raymond remarked, “Th[is] draft is a severe measure. . . . Probably never since this Government was instituted has it imposed so hard a requirement.” Then, with little respite, the provost marshals announced that they would fill Lincoln’s new quota by the assigned date of September 5. Under no circumstances would they postpone the draft again. Provost Marshal General Fry placed Baltimore’s new quota at 3,718, Boston’s at 3,746.

As they had done previously, the larger cities protested their quota. General Fry set Philadelphia’s quota at 13,778. Quaker City residents were appalled by this demand. Their quota was slightly higher than the preceding call, and this was also considering the city’s credit of 4,110. William Harding of the Inquirer guessed that Philadelphia should have to raise only 7,500 men: their quota should have been less than 12,000. Angered at Fry’s excessive demand, a committee from the Select Council launched an investigation.

New York City, with its Democratic mayor and governor, responded dyspeptically to the new call. Many residents guessed it would stand at 15,000, including a 3,000-man credit from

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54 A two-year recruit counted as two one-year men and a three-year recruit counted as three one-year men.
55 New York Herald, 29 August 1864; New York Times, 25 August 1864. Drafting went into effect almost immediately in Baltimore, not for this new call, but for the last one. Unhappy with the numbers conscripted during the May draft—that is, the combined calls of October 1863 and February 1864 for 500,000—Assistant Provost Marshals Cathart and Blumenburg initiated a “deficiency draft,” an impromptu drawing to make up for the liberal exemptions they had granted two months earlier. On July 23, Cathart and Blumenburg drew 956 names—or twice the total deficiency of the city—from fifteen of the city’s wards. Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 23, 25, and 26 July 1864. Only the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Wards had filled their quotas. Boston Evening Transcript, 23 and 25 July and 23 August 1864.
56 Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 July 1864.
the June draft. However, the new commander of the Southern Division, Brigadier General William Hays, announced the city’s quota at 23,370. The *Times* declared, “The above estimate is larger than it was anticipated would be required from this city. There are evidently many defects in the last enrollment.” Many noted that the new quota was “a full third more than it was nine months ago” during the earlier call for 500,000. “What movement of the population justifies this astounding difference?” asked a reporter.⁵⁷

As he had done the previous summer, Governor Seymour sent letters to Lincoln and Stanton, complaining that the War Department had set the quota of the city districts too high. Seymour claimed that these “oppressive enrollments” in New York City and Brooklyn assured the removal of twenty-six percent of the fencible population, while the enrollment in Boston, a Republican city, would withdraw only twelve percent. Seymour declared that the draft put a heavy burden upon all parts of the country, but, “in our cities,” he wrote, “it is a terrible affliction.” He continued, “A great proportion of the inhabitants live upon daily wages, which they must receive with regularity to give food, fuel, and shelter to their families.” Because of this, urban families needed money, and since soldiers’ pay came so irregularly, “in cities like New York and Brooklyn . . . [families] are frequently broken up and ruined. Every consideration of justice and humanity demands that unequal burdens should not be thrown upon them.”⁵⁸ Supervisor Blunt echoed Seymour’s thoughts in a letter to General Fry. Blunt claimed that the quota was “far beyond anything we had a right to expect,” and the burden “has fallen like a pall”

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⁵⁸ *New York Herald*, 7 August 1864.
over the city. Blunt stated that the government’s demands represented an absolute impossibility that “has well nigh crushed out all effort or desire on the part of our citizens to fill the quota.”

Presently, however, all the cities faced a more ominous dilemma. Over the spring, Congress had repealed the commutation clause of the Enrollment Act. Rather than sustain the belief that any man with $300 could pay his way out of the draft, Congress thought it best to remove the offensive clause. Unfortunately, this produced a negative effect in the cities. Amid the competitive capitalism that reigned there, the price of substitutes began to rise without stopping. By the end of July, prices reached nearly $1,000. To combat this in Philadelphia, a band of citizens formed the “Volunteer Substitute Committee,” an organization designed to cap the cost of substitutes at $650 while simultaneously providing “Representative Recruits,” that is, substitutes who would not desert after receiving their cash. Each representative recruit would have to apply at the Volunteer Substitute office at 422 Walnut Street and have his character screened. This was a difficult chore; to get volunteer substitutes, the committee required un-enrolled Philadelphians—aliens, foreigners, rural Pennsylvanians, veterans, or Southerners—to serve for three years. Unlike other substitutes, these men were entitled to the U.S. bounty of $300 and the city bounty of $250. Interestingly, they would also receive a $100 donation from

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59 Ibid., 10 August 1864. General Fry crafted an intricate response, questioning the accuracy of Seymour’s numbers. He argued that the new draft would draw 16.92 percent from New York’s city districts, not twenty-six percent. Further, he stated, the draft was not overly oppressive to New York City. In fact, he stated, the city had an advantage over other cities in that it had a large immigrant population that could be used for substitutes and volunteers while not appearing on any enrollment lists. The only reason the quota appeared so high, Fry stated, was because the “population of these districts is more dense.” However, Fry never satisfactorily explained why the city’s quota stood 5,000 men higher than the previous call. Citing questionable numbers, he claimed that the new quota somehow equaled call under the second federal draft. Fry’s response temporarily settled matters. This forced Gotham’s city agencies to work around the problem. The New York County Volunteer Committee reopened its office and began filling a new bounty fund. They now promised $300 to all volunteers, $20 cash-in-hand, and $35 cash-in-hand to all veterans. In addition, the federal government promised $100 bounties to all one-year recruits, $200 bounties to all two-year recruits, and $300 to all three-year recruits. New York Times, 20 July and 15 August 1864.
individual sponsors. The city papers asked the “patriotic of both sexes” to make donations and thus “have themselves represented in the armies of the Union.”

Despite lucrative bounties—a new recruit could easily expect $575 combined of federal, city, and ward bounties—Philadelphia was still deficient by 5,500 men by the last week of August. Republicans could not explain why so few men volunteered, especially when the bounties were so high. One editor wrote, “Never within the history of any country, or during any war, were soldiers paid so liberally.” Yet, some organizations did very well. The women of Philadelphia’s Eighth Ward received significant praise for their abilities to support representative recruits, thus relieving “some poor mechanics whose families would suffer by their absence.” However, others received censure for their lethargy. On August 18, the Twentieth Ward still needed 350 men. Republicans blamed this deficiency on the inherent lassitude of the poor, stating that only the “richer portion of the ward” had contributed funds, while the “poorer classes” had yet to assist. Class animosities emerged as pro-administration citizens attributed Philadelphia’s continual successes to the patriotism of only “a few gentlemen.” Ever leading the coverage of wartime benevolence, the Inquirer thanked its moneyed elite for their many sacrifices:

The inhabitants of the wards are greatly indebted to them for their arduous and self-sacrificing labors. . . . They have a very unpleasant duty to perform, particularly in their collection trips, and

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60 Philadelphia Inquirer, 22 and 26 July 1864. However, this new option did not curtail dishonest substitute brokerage. William Harding noted that there were “some excellent and honest men” involved in the business, but “a great many more who are utterly unscrupulous, so that they can rake down the cash from their dupes. All grades of premium are offered, each of the unprincipled operators striving to outbid or outwit the other in the magnitude of the sums held out to the unwary as tempting baits.” Harding, like many others, called for some form of government regulation, but none came.

61 Ibid., 22 and 29 August 1864.

62 Ibid., 18, 22, 25, and 29 August 1864.
they have experienced, in many instances, the unthankfulness, the insults; perhaps, and frequently the rudeness of some of those persons whom it was their benevolent desire to help.\textsuperscript{63}

In New York City, the bounty-raising for the third federal draft had a negative effect in that it brought about an untimely end to black recruitment. In August, some city Republicans began debating the merit of sending agents to the southern states to recruit slaves to meet the quota. After months of arguing with the A.P.C.V., Governor Seymour had grown weary of the U.S.C.T. experiment, so he adamantly refused to sanction any more efforts to credit African American soldiers to the state, citing state budgetary problems caused by too much bounty-raising as his reason. However, so as not to appear obstructionist, he allowed county and city governments to raise regiments in slave states if they so desired, but he told them they should not expect a cent of state aid. On August 9, the County Board of Supervisors met to decide the merits of crediting slaves to the city quota, but news from Petersburg, Virginia, dampened this proposal. On July 30, at the Battle of the Crater, Confederates had routed a black division belonging to the 9\textsuperscript{th} Corps. One of the A.P.C.V.’s regiments, the 31\textsuperscript{st} U.S.C.T., participated in this disastrous assault, losing 135 officers and men. In response, the Democratic supervisors questioned the combat skill of slaves-turned-soldiers, arguing that black men made worthless combatants. Republicans, who had worked hard to raise the three black regiments in the winter, commenced a vicious shouting match with them, but in the end, the Board of Supervisors chose not to pursue the matter. A reporter for the New York Times expressed himself displeased with the result: “The disaster suffered by the Ninth Corps . . . is not a pertinent argument against the policy of

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 28 September 1864. Baltimoreans did the same as the Philadelphians, raising bounties and trying to attract “representative recruits.” Mayor Chapman and the City Council wasted no time passing a new bounty ordinance promising $150 to all one-year volunteers, $225 to all two-year volunteers, and $300 to all three-year volunteers. In addition, the Council established the “Bounty Board,” a special committee consisting of the comptroller and two citizens appointed by Chapman to dole out these new bounties to their version of “representative recruits,” that is, reliable substitutes or volunteers who enlisted and could be relied upon not to abscond with the cash. Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 3 and 21 July 1864.
employing black troops. . . . The majority of the supervisors seem to think otherwise.” In fact, the Republican *Times* disapproved of recruiting slaves because the reporters believed that it would cost too much money, take too much time, and provide only a mere fraction of the necessary troops. However, like other Republicans, these reporters fumed over the Democrats’ tactics, for they had effectively wrecked New York City’s black mobilization for the rest of the war.64

Raising black troops dried up in Philadelphia, too. On August 31, the Supervisory Committee—the leading agency of African American recruitment in the North—announced that it would close the Free Military School on September 15 when funds ran out. This was not entirely surprising, as there were more applicants than officers’ positions in the U.S.C.T. regiments. Nevertheless, the announcement disheartened many of Philadelphia’s racial progressives who believed that the school’s presence had changed the city’s attitude toward black soldiers. Colonel Samuel Bowman, the agent sent to Baltimore, wrote to Thomas Webster, one of the committee leaders, “The idea of colored troops was exceedingly unpopular in the army—you made it popular. Negro troops could only be proved to be valuable by being well officered—the officers were not to be had until after you established a school for their proper military instruction. . . . By all means keep up the military school. The winter season while the army is in winter quarters our experienced young men in the army can be shared. . . . It looks as though the people are growing weary—like a relaxation of effort, and if such sterling men, such patriots as compose your organization back down it must be regarded as a bad omen.”65

Bowman’s pleas did not alter the course of the Supervisory Committee. Up until late-September,

64 *New York Times*, 22 July and 10 August 1864.
65 Samuel Bowman to Thomas Webster, 1 December 1864, Records of the Free Military School, HSP.
it raised eight more U.S. C.T. Regiments at Camp William Penn, although few native Philadelphians served in these units. The last regiment—the 127th U.S.C.T.—left before the end of the month. On December 31, when funds reached their end, the Supervisory Committee dissolved itself and Philadelphia’s black mobilization—and Baltimore’s with it—drew to an end. 66

As this transpired, the cities tried to stall the onset of the third federal draft until after the Presidential Election in November. They stuck to the tactic that worked during the midsummer, questioning General Fry’s numbers or adding suspicious credits. Orison Blunt of New York’s County Volunteer Committee sent General Fry a list of un-credited New York City sailors. According to Blunt’s records, between April 12, 1861, and April 4, 1864, New York City had put 25,451 sailors into uniform, representing 48,254 years of service. Under Blunt’s logic, these men should be credited immediately, thus filling the city’s quota. Fry received Blunt’s message in early September and, after reviewing his data, on September 5, he instructed General Hays, commander of New York’s Southern Division, to credit 18,448 sailors to the city. On September 28, Hays announced that the city had surpassed its quota, as if by magic, by twenty-eight men. 67

New York City’s successful—and perceptibly duplicitous—reworking of its own quota unintentionally saved Boston from the third federal draft. Of course, Governor Seymour had long complained of the “oppressive enrollments” in New York City and Brooklyn, stating that the quota of Boston did not fall near as heavily as it did in New York’s leading Democratic enclave. Boston’s newspapers derided Seymour’s complaint as mere nonsense. The editor of the *Evening Transcript* declared, “Massachusetts has sent more of her representative men into the Union

67 *New York Times*, 1, 6, and 29 September 1864.
army than any other state. . . . We make these statements as a sufficient answer at this time to the groundless complaint of the New York World, that the ten populous, democratic, stay-at-home districts in New York have just been called upon for several thousand more men than the whole state of Massachusetts.\textsuperscript{68} However, Orison Blunt’s demand that all three-year naval volunteers be counted three times to distinguish their service from one-year men eventually applied to Boston. Governor Andrew had been arguing the same thing as Blunt since July, but had made little progress. Quite suddenly, thanks to Blunt’s insistence, all of Boston’s wards found themselves with surpluses, over 4,400 altogether.\textsuperscript{69} Philadelphia avoided the draft because it also reworked the numbers in its favor. In early October, city leaders unofficially announced that Philadelphia had met its quota. The city’s Select Council made this claim after its members reviewed the official records of the provost marshals of Philadelphia and compared them to those held by General Fry. When they did this, they discovered numerous discrepancies.\textsuperscript{70} When Select Councils asked to see the official records in Fry’s office, he refused to open his books. Infuriated by the general’s suspicious behavior, the committee complained to Stanton who, in turn, directed Fry to revise Philadelphia’s quota. Fry never admitted any deceit in the matter.\textsuperscript{71} Hampered by delays and clerical errors, Baltimore’s third draft did not commence until after the election season.

As the summer waned, city dwellers became less concerned with the continuous calls for troops and more interested in the outcome of the presidential election. For years, presidential

\textsuperscript{68} Boston Evening Transcript, 27 July 1864.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 15 September 1864; Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, 562.
\textsuperscript{70} Not only did Fry’s records show a significantly smaller credit for Philadelphia following the June draft, but they also showed the First and Third Districts with deficiencies. The Select Council determined that this discrepancy added 3,000 men to Philadelphia’s July 18 quota. Fry explained the difference by stating that there were deficiencies in the sub-districts, an argument that did not make sense to anyone in Philadelphia.
\textsuperscript{71} Henry C. Lea to Andrew Curtin, 20 February 1865, PSA, RG-26.
campaigns had been large events, filled with pageantry, parades, excitement, and high passions. This election, held during wartime, amid densely packed, greatly divided urban people promised to be a thrilling contest. Without a doubt, urban residents knew that the election of 1864 would be a referendum on the war. If Lincoln lost, it would alter the demands placed upon the cities, particularly the quotas, which by the autumn had emerged as the single most controversial issue pertaining to wartime mobilization. The excitement of the campaign arose first in Baltimore, since it hosted the Union Party Convention, the alliance of Republicans and pro-war Democrats that nominated Lincoln and loyalist Tennessee Governor Andrew Johnson. The convention passed by quickly. Delegates lingered in Baltimore only one day, June 7, and Lincoln himself did not attend. After a near unanimous re-nomination—only a few Missouri delegates objected to Lincoln—the convention-goers went their separate ways.

More than the presidential election in November, Baltimoreans looked anxiously to the city and constitutional elections in October. Throughout the first half of 1864, the State of Maryland underwent a tumultuous debate involving a newly proposed constitution. This new governing document offered several controversial provisions: one permanently disfranchised disloyal residents, another allowed Maryland soldiers to vote in the field, and a third abolished slavery. Naturally, the emancipation clause attracted the most attention. The emancipationist provision had been added by the Baltimore delegation, which, by most accounts, strong-armed reluctant rural delegates to accept it. City Councilman Archibald Stirling—a lawmaker known for his support of city bounties—led the Baltimore delegation in the effort to end slavery in Maryland. As one historian confirmed, Stirling “frequently closed the debate with brilliant and forceful arguments among the best of those given in the Convention rather ‘cutting’ at times, but always clear and logical.” Undoubtedly, Stirling’s decision to support emancipation came from a
moral impulse, but probably Baltimore’s Union Party also saw the abolitionist provision as a means of supporting the president at election time. If Maryland upheld state-wide emancipation, it would set into motion an easier victory in November.\(^\text{72}\)

The October vote to approve or reject the new state constitution became the pivotal moment of Baltimore’s election season. The Union Party favored the new constitution, and Mayor Chapman, who stood re-election in the city, openly declared his support for it. Thomas Swann, Baltimore’s Union Party candidate for governor, although a conservative Republican at best, also confirmed his support for emancipation in Maryland. As the campaign for the new constitution got under way, the Baltimore American, the paper that supported Chapman’s re-election bid, proclaimed, “The night of bondage is fading away in the dawning mist of the morning star of Freedom. The oppression of which Pinkney and other sagacious statesmen complained is no longer to find an abiding place in Maryland.”\(^\text{73}\) President Lincoln also involved himself in the debate. Writing to Henry Hoffman, the Baltimore delegate who had seconded his re-nomination in June, Lincoln applauded news of a recent Baltimore meeting that meant to encourage citizens to vote in favor of constitution. Lincoln declared, “It needs not to be a secret, and I presume it is no secret, that I wish success to this provision. I desire it on every consideration. I wish all men to be free. I wish the material prosperity of the already free which I feel sure the extinction of slavery would bring. I wish to see, in process of disappearing, that only thing which ever could bring this nation to civil war. I attempt no argument.”\(^\text{74}\)

Baltimoreans offered little opposition to the new constitution. For the second year in a row, the city’s Democratic Party, broken and disorganized, failed to mount an opposition.


\(^{73}\) *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 8 April 1864.

Nevertheless, those few Baltimoreans who disapproved of the emancipation clause joined forces with rural Democrats, publishing a memorial that castigated the delegates who supported abolition. The pro-slavery memorial complained, “Not only is this [the emancipation clause] most wanton violation of your rights aggravated by a contemptuous refusal to allow the least shadow of compensation, but every possible means have been used to extend and perpetuate the injury.” Specifically, the minority report argued, “no future Legislature shall have power to make compensation. . . . Other people have manumitted negro slaves. Most of the states north of us have manumitted negro slaves. Did any one of these do this thing as the Convention has done it? Most certainly not.” In sum, the dissenters called the new constitution a perpetration of “wholesale robbery and [the] destruction . . . of property and the . . . inalienable rights of all the citizens of the state.”

On October 12, Baltimoreans voted in their annual city election and in the special referendum election. Although thousands of disgruntled Baltimoreans stayed away from the polls, 9,779 city residents voted in favor of the new constitution, while only 2,053 voted against it. Also, Mayor Chapman won an easy re-election—11,335 to 3,783—over his opponent, Archibald Stirling, Jr., who it should be recalled, had also favored the new constitution, in fact, had authored the emancipation clause. News of state-wide approval of the constitutional referendum induced exultations of joy from the Union Party. “This is a proud day for Maryland,” proclaimed Charles Fulton. “It is the day of her regeneration. It is the dawn of a new regime and a healthier existence.” The October election convinced Baltimore Democrats that the state and national elections in November would a lost cause. Fewer Democrats went to the polls that month, and again, the city expressed its commitment to the Union Party by casting 14,800 ballots

76 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 1 November 1864.
for Abraham Lincoln and 14,400 ballots for gubernatorial candidate Thomas Swann. Both candidates beat their opponents by over 11,000 votes, and they each carried all of the city’s wards.

Democrats in Philadelphia and Boston mounted a much stronger opposition that those in Baltimore, but they still fell short of victory. Part of the Democratic Party’s impotence in the northeastern cities came from the confusing National Convention held in Chicago at the end of August. The feuding wings of the Democratic Party, the War Democrats and the Copperheads, faced a difficult challenge in agreeing to a definite stance about the conflict. Some desired Union at any price; others desired peace at any price. Eventually, the Copperheads prevailed, adding a “peace plank” to the national platform, demanding “that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, . . . [so that] peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union.” Although hardly an affirmation of “peace at any price,” the plank implied that the Democratic candidate would seek an armistice if elected. After the Democratic convention-goers crafted their platform, news broke that Sherman’s troops had taken Atlanta. Now that the war seemed winnable, War Democrats scrambled to mute the peace plank’s message. They nominated George McClellan, the former commander of the Army of the Potomac, who, upon accepting the nomination, spoke on behalf of Union, not peace. McClellan told his listeners, “The Union is the one condition of peace—we ask no more.” Yet adding to the confusion, the Copperheads added George Pendleton to the ticket, a well known Peace Democrat. In sum, the McClellan-Pendleton ticket oddly blended antiwar and pro-war rhetoric; it placed a War Democrat on a Copperhead platform.77

What united the Democrats behind McClellan, though, was his refusal to support emancipation. As historian Arnold Shankman aptly described it, “McClellan was smart enough not to say anything that would cost him the racist vote.” For the northeastern cities, the McClellan nomination posed a severe challenge. In Philadelphia, the most talented Democrats—Francis W. Hughes, William B. Reed, and Charles Ingersoll—were Copperheads. Ingersoll continued speaking out against Lincoln after his re-nomination in 1864, but found it exceedingly difficult to formulate opinions that kept his party distinctive from the opposition. Ingersoll favored a negotiated peace, but with slavery intact. However, by the summer of 1864, with emancipation under way and practically irreversible, Ingersoll changed his focus to argue for the supremacy of states’ rights. In 1864, he published a radical tract that argued in favor of abolishing the office of the President and confirming the constitutional legality of secession. Had Ingersoll published his name to this pamphlet, Republicans might certainly have believed that he favored “peace at any price.”

Copperheads dutifully supported their party’s standard bearer, but their assistance made McClellan vulnerable to Republican accusations of cowardice. The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin remarked, “Alas! Alas! McClellan / A craven crew you lead / ‘Peace’ glistens on their banners / While yet our soldiers bleed.” At the same time, Philadelphia’s War Democrats did their best to mute the Copperhead wing. Over the summer, they abolished the Central Democratic Club, the Copperhead equivalent of the Union League, and replaced it with moderate organization, the Keystone Club. The club elected to president a discharged Union officer,

78 Shankman, Pennsylvania’s Antiwar Movement, 190.
Colonel William McCandless, an experienced soldier known for his disapproval of emancipation. Nevertheless, as Philadelphia’s Democrats tried to unite, they could come up with little else than blanket denunciations of their opponents. Appealing only to party loyalty, Ingersoll told an audience, “It is the duty of the Democratic party to step in and rescue an almost ruined country.”

When the elections came in October and November, Philadelphia experienced a Republican surge. Residents elected four Republican and one Democratic congressmen, sixteen Republican and two Democratic state representatives, and twenty-eight Republican and nine Democratic Select and Common Councilmen. Even though Democratic Presidential Candidate George McClellan had been born in Philadelphia, Lincoln overwhelmed him there, 51,500 to 42,000.

Copperheads exerted no influence in Boston. The Democratic nominating conventions exhibited greater unity than in Philadelphia, because pro-war rhetoric dominated political discourse in the Bay City. However, to distinguish themselves from their Republican opponents, Boston’s Democrats made opposition to emancipation and opposition to black political rights their central issues. During a speech at Faneuil Hall in September, Judge Josiah Abbott—the bereaved father who had lost two sons in the war—delivered a bitter denunciation of the Lincoln administration. Abbott said the Republicans “are the men that are constantly talking about war, and that we are to fight it out always who are getting so many of your children and my children

under false pretenses to sacrifice, not for the Union, not for the Constitution, but for the Negro.”

Unable to label their opponents as traitors as their Quaker City brethren had done, Boston’s Republicans focused on the success of the incumbent administration, particularly Governor Andrew, who had guided the state through the entire war, and also upon the recent success of the Union armies. When the state convention met in Worcester, Bostonian Alexander H. Rice declared, “The platform of the Union Party has some illustrious persons just now carrying it out, and illustrating the great truth of the doctrines which it now embodies.”

Mentioning Sherman’s capture of Atlanta and the fall of Confederate forts at Mobile Bay, Alabama, Rice confirmed that “the shouts of the soldiers of the army, and the sailors of the navy . . . have come rolling down in thunder tones . . . roaring like the winds of . . . mighty forests.” Rice expected Massachusetts to honor these victories by voting in favor of Lincoln, Andrew, and Mayor Lincoln of Boston. When the election came in November, the Republicans triumphed in Boston. Lincoln soundly beat McClellan, 13,000 to 7,900, and John Andrew beat out Henry Paine, an ex-Whig, 12,800 to 8,000. The city election followed in December, but was anticlimactic. The preceding elections set into motion an easy Republican victory, allowing Mayor Frederic Lincoln win re-election too, causing a Republican sweep.

The political campaigns in Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York City perpetuated the rowdy behavior of peacetime politics. Parades, torchlight processions, massive broadsides, and other political eyesores flooded public spaces in 1864, bombarding residents with jingoistic, partisan rhetoric. All aspects of city life willingly engaged in this carnival of

83 Miller, Harvard’s Civil War, 343.
84 Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, 587-8.
democracy. City-dwellers attended church services to hear their ministers preach about political topics dear to them, they purchased likenesses of their favorite politicians to adorn their parlors, and they attached party medallions to their clothes. One September evening, after he sojourned through New York City’s East Side, Walt Whitman wrote a friend that, “We are full of politics here, the dispute runs high & hot everywhere—I think the Republicans are going to make a stout fight after all, . . . [but] I shall think nine tenths, of all classes, are copperheads, I never heard before such things as I hear now whenever I go out.” At a beer saloon, Whitman met a “poor blear[y]-eyed girl” with a McClellan medal on her chest. Whitman asked if the other barmaids, all twenty of them, also favored McClellan. “Yes,” replied the lady, “every one of them.” The lady added that she and her coworkers could not tolerate a barmaid who stood against “Little Mac.”

In his book, *The Boundaries of Political Culture in the Civil War Era*, Mark Neely confirmed that, in the North, “politics came close to the lives of the people” and that Civil War era politics “broadened political engagement” among ordinary citizens. War, it seems, heightened concerns for national issues, especially slavery and the constitution, but according to Neely, “the usual lures of ritual, emotional exhortation, and group activities exerted their forces as well.” People came out of their homes to march in evening lamplight parades, to pass out handbills and pamphlets, and to listen to unrehearsed stump speeches. On November 5, in New York City, residents witnessed a spectacular lamplight parade for McClellan. In Philadelphia and Boston, the Union Leagues papered the walls and alleyways with pro-Lincoln broadsides. On October 29, a torchlight parade seven miles long, consisting of tens of thousands of Democrats,

marched through the streets of Philadelphia. Midway into the march, Republicans hecklers
antagonized the marchers, and a short affray ended with one bystander killed. 86

Although traditional electoral practices persisted in wartime, city residents considered the
election of 1864 like none other. For the first time in national history, an election threatened to
alter the course of a protracted war. Philadelphian Sidney Fisher confided, “The election of
Lincoln will be a great blow to the rebels. They count largely on the success of McClellan & are
virtually in league with his party. . . . The success of the Democrats would be a great gain to the
South. Some efforts for peace would be made, our troops would be discouraged, the rebel hopes
revived, perhaps there would be an armistice which would give them time to recover strength &
invite European intervention in their favor.” If McClellan won, Fisher worried, the Confederacy
might ask for “degrading terms of peace” and direct the progress of reconstruction “almost on
their own terms, slavery & the right of secession included.” Meanwhile, urban Democrats
worried that the re-election of Lincoln would bring more drafting, irreversible economic
depression, arbitrary arrests, and death. Fernando Wood told fellow Democrats, “God help the
tyrant [Lincoln] when the people are arraying against him.” 87

Although partisan loyalties often predetermined voting behavior, city residents focused
on national issues to determine their allegiance. George Strong noticed when two of his friends
refused to support McClellan because of they disagreed with the Chicago Platform’s anti-war
plank. “Blake and Charley Lawrence expected to stump the state for McClellan. But the Chicago

86 Mark Neely, Jr., The Boundaries of Political Culture in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
87 Sidney George Fisher diary, 25 October 1864, in Wainwright, ed., A Philadelphia Perspective, 487; Mushkat,
Fernando Wood, 149.
Platform has changed their views. They cannot support McClellan, no matter what he says in his letter of acceptance.”

In October, each party accused the other of corruption, of preparing an army of “philistines” to intoxicate voters at the polls, so as to slip them the wrong tickets just before they cast their ballots, or of “colonizing” undecided wards with immigrant voters. Republicans in New York City feared that Tammany Hall, the Democratic political machine, had “naturalized” 25,000 Irish voters during the month of October, just in time to carry the election. Democrats in Philadelphia also cried foul when the Republicans in the Union League Club hired several well known German-Americans, among them Francis Lieber and Carl Schurz, to tell Philadelphia’s Germans how to vote. Schurz published a German-language pamphlet, *Lincoln odor McClellan*, eliciting consternation from Democrats who accused the Union League of misleading German voters. George Templeton Strong, an unswerving Republican in New York City, argued the much the same thing when he heard that McClellan planned to address, as he put it, “hordes of Celts and rebel sympathizers” from his balcony at the Fifth Avenue Hotel. Strong thought the Democratic Party had persuaded the masses, including McClellan himself, with their garish lights and “noises,” opining, “I have still respect enough for him left to believe that he must feel himself in a horribly false position. A general who commanded at Malvern Hill and Antietam in 1862 must be tempted to doubt his own identity when he hears Governor Seymour’s ‘friends’ hurrahing for him in 1864.”

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88 George T. Strong diary, 8 September 1864, in Nevins, ed., *Diary of the Civil War*, 483.
Lincoln carried Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore, but New York City held onto its Democratic allegiance. The city’s history during the war had set it into conflict with Lincoln time and time again. Now, with an openly disobedient governor and a Copperhead mayor leading it, New York City seemed destined to help spoil Lincoln’s chances at re-election. In fact, in late August, several prominent Republican New Yorkers met to discuss the possibility of removing Lincoln from the ticket, despite the decision of the Baltimore Convention. Horace Greeley, who had parted ways with Lincoln after the President had thwarted an unauthorized peace negotiation that Greeley had organized with Confederate agents at Niagara Falls, wrote to former mayor George Opdyke, bewailing the hopelessness of the Republican cause in New York City. “Mr. Lincoln is already beaten,” Greeley maintained, “he cannot be elected. We must have another ticket to save us from utter overthrow.” No doubt, the abortive Radical Republican splinter party held some sway during this tumultuous period. Back in May, a set of disgruntled radicals and abolitionists nominated John C. Frémont for president, adding New York City Congressman John Cochrane as his running mate. When early fears surfaced that the weak Republican vote in the city would split, the August conspirators proposed nominating Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, or Benjamin Butler instead. Eventually, the Frémont-Cochrane ticket folded, and the threat dissolved, but the Republicans in New York City had come to the conclusion that they had serious work ahead.90

The Democratic Party demonstrated equal division. Samuel Tilden and August Belmont, two wealthy Democrats, upheld the nomination of McClellan, but the influential Wood brothers complained that McClellan’s acceptance speech betrayed the cause of the party. However, as in Philadelphia, New York Democrats united behind McClellan’s apparent opposition to the

emancipation proclamation. Even Fernando Wood, an unrelenting advocate of immediate armistice, vowed to stick to McClellan and his plan to put Union first, hoping that, perhaps under misguided assumptions, if McClellan had the opportunity, he would restore the Union through peaceful “conciliation and compromise.”

In 1864, New York City held no mayoral election, but it did have to hold a state election simultaneous with its national one. Knowing that he would likely carry the urban districts, the Democratic Party re-nominated Horatio Seymour. Throughout his campaign, Seymour continued to claim that he was the true guardian of states’ rights, constitutionalism, and personal liberty. Seymour need not have done much to appeal to New York City residents. His earlier efforts to shrink the city quota, embodied by his careful correspondence with Abraham Lincoln, had been reprinted widely. At the state convention, Seymour’s speedy re-nomination reminded New Yorkers, urban and rural alike, that “They can never forget that it was he [Seymour], who, in the midst of our disasters and in the face of an overbearing adversary, was foremost in uplifting the banner of constitutional liberty, which he has since borne unsullied through every battle.”

The Republican Party nominated Reuben E. Fenton, a Congressman from Chautauqua County in the western part of the state, who ran a moderate campaign, asking only for “peace without dishonor.” Fenton appealed to War Democrats by vowing to continue the war until the North subdued every seceding state. During a speech at Jamestown, Fenton promised that, under his leadership, “The loyal people will have no peace which is produced by shaking hands with rebels in arms over the bodies of our brave defenders who have fallen in the service, but upon

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91 Mushkat, *Fernando Wood*, 150.
92 Brummer, *Political History of New York State During the Period of the Civil War*, 418.
honorable terms it would be hailed with delight.”

Although a number of respected Democratic generals—including John Dix, Daniel Sickles, and John Wool—spoke out against McClellan, the election largely hinged on New York City’s voter fidelity. Seymour and McClellan each carried more than 73,000 votes while Fenton and Lincoln each carried less than 37,000. Frustrated Republicans blamed the outcome on the ignorance of the urban masses. In true patrician fashion, the Times noted that the poorest wards voted Democratic in large numbers. In the First Ward, for instance—“where [there] are nearly as many rum-holes as houses, and where in a small space is gathered a fearful amount of wretchedness and poverty”—McClellan carried a ten to one majority. The Times blamed the “immense multitude of ignorant Germans, . . . the rag-pickers and bone-gatherers of New York” in the Eleventh Ward for the three to one Democratic victory there. Only the Fifteenth Ward offered Lincoln and Fenton majorities. This ward, “unquestionably the most intelligent and orderly ward in the city,” the Times mused, owed its Union Party victory to its wealth and nativism. In many ways, the factious state of urban politics had driven the Republican Party far from the sympathies of the working-people.

Election results may have been influenced by another unusual factor, a terrorist conspiracy to burn the major hotels in the city on Election Day. Confederate Colonel Robert Martin planned to send secret agents into at least twelve hotels, and using “Greek Fire”—that is pouring chemicals onto hotel beds then igniting them—set the edifices ablaze, unleashing pandemonium. Martin’s band never completed its mission. When they arrived in New York City, they encountered a tight security system. Only days before, Lincoln had dispatched General Benjamin Butler to New York City with troops to guard the polls and prevent election riots.

94 Ibid., 12 November 1864.
Considering it too dangerous to light their fires, Martin ordered his agents to hold off. Still, rumor abounded that Confederate terrorists had infiltrated the city, and when Martin discovered that his cover might have been blown—and in fact, it was—he ordered his men to light their fires and flee. It is unknown how many agents Martin had at his command, but on November 25, they started conflagrations in dozen hotels and at Barnum’s museum. Apparently, an unnamed double agent reported the scheme to Butler, and after a flurry of orders, New York City firefighters subdued the infernos. Union authorities captured only one of the Confederate terrorists, but only after he had escaped to Canada. During the alarm, few citizens had any notion of what had happened. George Strong wrote in his diary that some “scoundrels tried to burn the city last night. I heard the melancholy bell of Calvary Church tolling the alarm again and again in short interval . . . but I did not know what it meant.” Newspapers of both parties made wild guesses about the size of the conspiracy, but it took weeks before the true details became known. The hotel-keepers of the city offered a $20,000 reward for information, but this simply led to numerous false accusations. The military tribunal that presided over the one captured agent, Robert Kennedy, and sentenced him to death, may have captured the emotions of New Yorkers when it declared, “The attempt to set fire to the city of New York is one of the greatest atrocities of the age. There is nothing in the annals of barbarism which evinces greater vindictiveness. . . . In all the buildings fired, not only non-combatant men, but women and children, were congregated in large numbers, and nothing but the most diabolical spirit of revenge could have impelled the incendiaries to act so revoltingly.”

95 George T. Strong diary, 26 November 1864, in Nevins, ed., Diary of the Civil War, 521-2; David H. Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military Telegraph Corps During the Civil War (New York: Century Company, 1907), 304.
The fire-bombing conspiracy occurred after Election Day, so other than rumor and innuendo, it had little effect on voting behavior. New York City voters voted as they always had. Democrats came out to cast their ballots because of their unswerving loyalty to their party and because of their hatred against anyone who sought to offer aid to African Americans. In essence, the war barely affected voting behavior in Gotham. Despite the horrible Republican loss in the city, Lincoln and Fenton carried the state.

Lincoln’s re-election resulted in three changes to the northeastern cities; although, each of these changes perpetuated pre-existing trends already set into motion by the war. First, the electoral victory prompted Lincoln to issue another call for volunteers on December 19—the last federal requisition for the war—this time for 300,000 one-, two-, or three-year troops. Second, the election touched off a debate in New York City and Baltimore regarding the state militia laws. Now that the states had to provide more troops, urban and rural residents demanded new laws to streamline mobilization. In both cases, the cities came into conflict with their state governments. In December 1864, the Maryland’s legislature finally drafted its new state militia law, the one that Baltimoreans had proposed earlier in the year. In a sweeping move, this revision recommended supplementing the volunteer militia divisions with a refined system of state-level drafting. In essence, the new law proposed to graft onto Maryland a system that mirrored the Federal Conscription Act of 1863. This way, Maryland would not be caught off guard in the event of an invasion. Even before this new law passed, Governor Bradford issued General Order Number 35, dividing Maryland into fifty-five state drafting districts. Districts Eighteen through Thirty-Seven comprised the city of Baltimore. Beginning in late December, Bradford appointed “district commanders,” specially appointed state agents—usually discharged veterans who knew the populace well—and ordered them to erect headquarters in Baltimore.
Then, in March 1865, the state legislature inexplicably voted down the law. Rural Democrats, it seems, did not want to put a powerful state agency in the hands of their political opponent, Governor-elect Thomas Swann. Furious at this seeming betrayal of trust, Adjutant General John Berry lamented, “The General Assembly [has] failed to provide a militia system for this state, . . . or to make any appropriation by which the one proposed can be carried into operation.” Baltimore’s postmaster, William Purnell, one of the draft agents, complained of losing funds thanks to the sudden revocation of General Order 35. Berry could offer Purnell no satisfactory explanation for the failure to pass the law. “Why the state should have been subjected to such mortification after the labor expended and the calls, continued calls of her citizens for a Militia system, is beyond my comprehension,” he wrote. “Perhaps the easiest and quickest way for you to find out in part is through the representatives of Cecil County [where Purnell had a home] in the late House of Delegates, three of them Messrs. McCantry, McCullough, and Pennington voted against the Bill and Mr. Kirk was either not present or declined to vote.” Then, adding with thinly-veiled vitriol, Berry continued, “I can appreciate your condition in that you ‘left a somewhat lucrative situation and have been at considerable expense in reaching Elkton and attending to the duties devolved upon you.’ . . . I am sorry to say that I know of no way by which you can be reimbursed; perhaps your Delegates to the late House of Delegates can inform you.”96

New York City’s confrontation involved an unsolicited state law that prohibited local bounties. Section Four of New York’s law authorizing the payment of state bounties, which passed on February 10, declared that “no city, county, or town” could hereafter raise bounties by

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96 John S. Berry to William Purnell, 3 April 1865; and General Orders Number 1, 25 March 1865; Adjutant General’s papers, MDSA.
borrowing or raising taxes. The law effectively nullified the New York County Supervisors’ $4,000,000 bounty ordinance passed back in July 1864. Several months earlier, this city ordinance had passed the state senate only to become stalemated in the house. Suddenly, because of the February statute, New York City’s ability to raise large bounties had been rendered impotent. The news unleashed a fury in Gotham.\textsuperscript{97} The Supervisors’ Committee sent a delegation to Albany to force the State Assembly to approve the county ordinance, but the Assembly only passed half the appropriation. However, while in Albany, the new adjutant general, William Irving, informed the delegation that the new law did not prevent local areas from raising bounties on their own. Irving interpreted the new law’s awkwardly-worded Section Seven as providing for local bounties, just not over $600. Even so, this announcement did not please urban New Yorkers, who universally viewed the whole affair as an Albany-led conspiracy to pander to rural Republican districts. One correspondent wrote to the \textit{Herald}, arguing, “because some men in republican districts, [meaning rural districts,] from dilatoriness or want of liberality, or for want of proper infusion of patriotism, have not filled their respective quotas, it is now proposed to make the whole [bounty] matter a state affair.” The ceiling on bounties displeased many urban New Yorkers. As one Democrat complained, “the price for volunteers is fixed beyond the possibility to change it for a year at least, all surrounding states will offer a price larger . . . than that fixed by this state and thus entice away every man from one end of the state to the other.”\textsuperscript{98}

The third change to occur in the wake of the Election of 1864 involved the “busting” of bounty broker rings in New York City. New Yorkers had hoped that the July 18 call would be


\textsuperscript{98} \textit{New York Herald}, 21 January 1865.
the last call of the war, and that when bounty funds ran out, the dishonest broker rings would disappear. Now with a new state bounty in play, which threatened to prolong the existence of these organizations, the city accelerated its effort to wipe them out by force. To direct the operation, Colonel Lafayette C. Baker arrived in January 1865, inserting secret operatives within bounty brokers’ underground rings. Baker’s first successful “bust” came in late January 1865, when he disguised himself as an agent sent from a rural town who had come to New York City to fill that town’s quota. Two Astor House brokers, John Devlin and James Cahill, approached him and offered to sell four enlistment papers at $500 apiece. Baker purchased these papers, obviously forged, but he asked the brokers if they could provide him with 126 more, promising to pay $525 for each. The next day, Devlin and Cahill delivered a load of ninety-two forged papers. Baker asked for a receipt, and the brokers signed their names as James Cole and James Higgins. At this point, Baker arrested them. Caught unaware, Devlin and Cahill bargained for leniency, naming twenty-seven individuals from their organization. From these first two arrests, Baker learned the intricacies of the bounty brokers’ scams. Much to Baker’s surprise, he learned that New York City’s bounty jumpers worked closely with the brokers. Up to that point in the war, many officials still considered bounty jumpers and bounty brokers as two discrete groups with disconnected goals. Now, Baker understood the depth of their swindling tactics.99

Baker learned that, typically, a broker “hired” a cabal of fleet-footed bounty jumpers, to enlist and flee the substitute rendezvous at their first opportunity. Once they returned to the brokers’ hideout with the cash, they re-enlisted under a different identity and repeated the cycle. To make the scam work, Devlin and Cahill had paid off two dishonest sergeants from the 20th New York Independent Battery stationed at the Governor’s Island rendezvous. These sergeants

99 Ibid., 8 February 1865.
allowed the bounty jumpers’ escape to go unnoticed. Devlin and Cahill then paid a man to transport the bounty jumpers back to the city from the island, and they also bribed several clerks to notarize phony enlistment papers to allow the bounty jumpers to go back into circulation. Once finished, all the members of this complicated scheme split the bounty. At first glance, such a complex plot seemed like it would not pay-off; however, if bounty jumpers performed this operation multiple times, the profits could be enormous. Many of them ran the guard more than thirty times, so Devlin and Cahill claimed.

Also, bounty jumpers returned with additional funds by robbing new recruits at the Hart’s and Governor’s Islands rendezvous. Bounty jumpers assaulted sleeping volunteers, using chloroform to subdue them. Sometimes, bounty jumpers organized gangs, assaulted recruits, and split the loot. A popular ploy included picking a fight with a man, and while he and one bounty jumper engaged in fisticuffs, the other bounty jumpers picked his pocket. One of Baker’s agents who infiltrated a gang of bounty jumpers at Governor’s Island witnessed “unmeasured terms of abuse” perpetrated on recruits. He reported, the place was “briefly, . . . Hades on Earth.”

Baker continued his infiltration tactics throughout February, but as word of his operations spread, the brokers grew cautious. Finally, in early March, Baker launched his most daring plan, a mass raid on several bounty jumper gangs. He and his agents rented Odd Fellows’ Hall in Hoboken, New Jersey, and then spread word that this “recruiting office” offered fabulous bounties. On March 11, seventeen brokers and about 500 bounty jumpers arrived at the hall, expecting to reap the treasure of one last swindle. Baker’s men brought the bounty jumpers, one-by-one, into a large room and then clapped them in irons. Unsuspecting, the brokers outside kept

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feeding Baker’s fake recruiting officers with all their best crooks. When the brokers suddenly realized that none of their bounty jumpers had returned, they nervously pondered what to do. As they debated, a squad of U.S. regulars pounced on them, taking all into custody.

Baker paraded his catch through the streets of New York City before taking them to Governor’s Island. This caravan of criminals included a known murderer, an escaped convict from Sing Sing, and half of an uptown fire company. A reporter for the Times wrote, “The prisoners, generally speaking, are, in point of physique, excellent material for soldiers, but the majority of them are as hard a looking crowd as could have been picked out of this city.” Baker’s men seized their paraphernalia: watches, rings, breast pins, jewelry, diamonds, dirks, jimmies, skeleton keys, revolvers, and poniards, “briefly,” wrote a reporter, “everything that might be expected to be found in possession of a sporting man, housebreaker, or footpad.” Overnight, Baker became New York City’s newest hero, universally applauded for his aggressive tactics. One evening, Baker went to arrest a broker at New Chambers Street. When the broker refused to go quietly, Baker smashed the hilt of his pistol over the man’s skull, putting him in the hospital. All the city papers claimed that the broker, because of his occupation, deserved it.101

Truly, the Election of 1864 had been a referendum on the war, and surprisingly, despite the continuing pains of raising troops and keeping up the production of materiel of war, the urban Northeast gave the Lincoln administration a vote of confidence. Certainly, the return of the three-year veterans played an important role, boosting Republican chances for victory. The taint of Copperheadism that still followed urban Democrats likely convinced many discharged soldiers to vote with the Republican Party that year. For instance, compared to the gubernatorial

election of 1863, Philadelphia experienced an increase of 7,000 Republican voters, while the Democratic Party witnessed an increase of only 5,000.\textsuperscript{102} However, military victories in the field exhibited greater influence. Because Republican and Democratic politicians focused their electoral campaigns upon the North’s war—and not the cities’ war—Union victories at Atlanta and in the Shenandoah Valley gave urban Republicans much-needed assistance during this period of electoral doubt. Also, the Democrats’ inability to mount strong opposition Boston, Baltimore, and Philadelphia virtually handed the victory to the followers of Lincoln. Of course, New York City did not follow the path of the other three. There, the city’s Democratic Party made political capital out of its legacy of opposition to the Lincoln administration, and it continued to inspire constancy in its voters.

Nevertheless, too much should not be made out of the urban vote in the Northeast. The vote in Boston had no effect on Massachusetts as a whole, since Lincoln won by a landslide in the rural areas. Despite New York City’s opposition, Lincoln still carried the Empire State. Had Baltimore and Philadelphia both gone entirely to the Democrats, McClellan would have carried Pennsylvania and Maryland, but Democratic victory in those states would have done little to offset the ninety-one percent of the electoral vote seized by Lincoln. In any event, Lincoln’s re-election made it clear that the cities would have to swallow another bitter pill, the President’s call on December 19 for 300,000 more troops. As 1865 dawned, the cities could think of nothing but the horrifying prospect of meeting a fourth federal draft unprepared. Yet, another thought emerged during these waning days of civil war. For four years, urban mobilization had resulted

\textsuperscript{102} Shankman, \textit{Pennsylvania’s Antiwar Movement}, 135 and 200. It should be noted that these statistic do not count the 6,226 Philadelphia soldiers who voted in the field. In 1863, they could not vote in the gubernatorial election. Then in 1864, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania passed an amendment allowing soldiers to vote in the field. During the presidential election, Philadelphia soldiers cast 4,240 Republican and 1,986 Democratic ballots.
in a grim embarrassment. Who should pay the price for this incompetence? As peace returned,
city dwellers began to place the blame.
Traditionally, scholars have assumed that, by this period, the last winter of secession, northerners considered victory inevitable. Indeed, Bostonians, Philadelphians, New Yorkers, and Baltimoreans believed that a corner had been turned. But, although they considered victory imminent, city dwellers myopically focused their attentions on near term issues, including efforts to beat the last call for troops. Nevertheless, during these last months, some city dwellers did have peace on their minds, but the first step in restoring tranquility involved settling accounts and seeking justice and efficiency in the execution of their wartime obligations. In essence, this period became a time of reflection and exploration to correct, at last, the most unproductive aspects of entire wartime urban mobilization process. Then, when news of Union victory in the East arrived in early April, it came suddenly and without warning, producing an explosion of joy.

Lincoln’s final call for troops, issued on December 19, 1864, shocked urban residents because of its size, the requirement to fill quotas in less than two-months, and because it arrived on the heels of news of recent military victories in Virginia and Georgia. New York Times editor Henry J. Raymond complained, “A requisition of this magnitude, at just this time, was hardly anticipated. The half million draft in the summer, it was hoped, would finish the war.”¹ Despite this grumbling, some Republican newspapers gamely supported the President with rhetoric reminiscent of early the war years. William Harding of the Philadelphia Inquirer proclaimed to his fellow citizens: “Let every means be used to increase enlistments, and let every laggard be hurried to the front. Men are wanted to take the places of those who are disabled in action and

marching, and, if they are immediately sent forward the recent brilliant victories . . . will prove those substantial triumphs which shall aid materially in bringing the war to a speedy termination.”2 Baltimore editor Fulton agreed: “It requires no prophet’s vision to foresee the end of the great conflict. The grasp of Grant and Sherman around the throat of the monster of rebellion is steady and unyielding.” A few more troops, he guessed, would do the trick.3

While Boston did not need to provide any troops for the fourth federal draft, Baltimoreans, Philadelphians, and New Yorkers felt certain the fourth federal draft would strike hard.4 Worse, the communities seemed less likely than ever to support pleas to answer the call to arms. Over the winter of 1864-1865, Baltimore and Philadelphia both exhibited an uncharacteristic wave of anti-benevolence. Since 1862, charitable donations and public expenditures had topped the list of tactical solutions to mobilization in both cities, as they had helped raise bounties and beat the draft. Now, as peace approached, fiscal conservatives viewed these efforts as wasteful and counterproductive. As the anticipated draft date approached, Baltimore’s City Council proposed an ordinance, paying $200 to all drafted men to support their families. Mayor Chapman, who had become a leader among the anti-charity men, promptly vetoed the measure. By adding together the army’s wage, the state relief bounty, and other funds, Chapman calculated that each draftee from the city stood to make the equivalent of $1.60 for each working day. “This amount,” he argued, “is more than our laboring men can earn independent of their own support.”5

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2 Philadelphia Inquirer, 20 December 1864.
3 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 20 December 1864.
4 Boston Evening Transcript, 2 January 1865.
5 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 29 and 31 March 1865.
Like Baltimore, Philadelphia questioned its bounty-related benevolence, but it did so more openly. On December 22, 1864, the City Council met to pass a bill to refill the City Bounty Fund. The Common Council easily passed the measure, but when the bill reached the newly seated Republican Select Council, it suddenly halted. A memorial addressed by members of the Union League arrived, suggesting that the city should discontinue its bounties entirely. For the past two years, the Union League believed that it had frittered away countless dollars to bounty jumpers, deserters, and scam artists. Now, the League members wanted the draft to fall upon the ungrateful masses and teach them a lesson in sacrifice. Republican Select Councilmen followed the will of the League members, refusing to answer to roll call, thereby avoiding quorum. Even the Republican *Inquirer* considered this “unscrupulous” move a veritable outrage. It considered the League’s actions without merit because those “memorialists will very soon begin to discover that such a measure would create as much dissatisfaction as Jeff. Davis’ conscription.” As word spread, the city responded with an uproar. On December 28, the Select Council reconvened and passed the measure fifteen to two.⁶

Additionally, in Baltimore, a committee of five citizens coerced the mayor to aid the assistant provost marshals in adjudicating the draft, proposing that any body of citizens in Baltimore that organized and enlisted a group of volunteers proportional to the city’s quota as their organization stood in relation to the city’s overall population, the members of that body could be exempted from the draft. In an official sense, the Committee of Five’s proposal had no legal force, since only the assistant provost marshals could declare groups of citizens—that is, wards and precincts—exempt from the draft. However, neither of the two assistant provost marshals in Baltimore registered any major objections, and as this proposal gained support

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⁶ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 23 December 1864.
among wealthy citizens, it fostered class and political antagonism. Democrats and workingmen thought the Committee of Five’s proposal meant to reward a select few upper-class patrons of the Union Party while simultaneously punishing the city’s poor and its Democratic dissidents who could no longer offer funds or who simply refused to do so. The committee argued, “Nearly all the labor in procuring volunteers has fallen on a few active and zealous men, whilst contributions of money . . . have been far from general.”

Believing it imperative for citizens to protect private, not public, interest, Baltimoreans allowed the Committee of Five’s proposition to take hold. Across the city, small clubs formed—they often called themselves “draft protection clubs”—allowing members who paid a moderate fee to receive exemption from conscription. For instance, in the Nineteenth Ward, a $30.00 membership provided a “written guarantee of exemption” from the new provost marshal, Captain Henry Clayton, assuming that the club’s funds resulted in a proportional enlistment of volunteers from that ward. Essentially, these clubs sought to re-institutionalize the commutation fee, now declared null and void by Congress. Mayor Chapman suggested that it was time for Baltimoreans to consider the transition to peace; at this time, Baltimore’s City Council needed to cut back on wartime expenditures. Chapman argued:

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7 *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 30 and 31 December 1864.
8 Ibid., 31 March 1865.
9 In January 1865, the City Council proposed an expensive $1,500,000 ordinance to fund local bounties. Characteristically, the council’s Union Party members wished to pass a large tax based on assessable property because, wrote a reporter, “the *onus* would bear heavily on the secession sympathizers, and more lightly on the loyal classes.” However, other Union Party members—those more in league with the Republicans—now began to argue that the city should dole out less charity and let the burden of the draft fall on the ungrateful public. A week’s worth of debate finally resulted in the passage of a $750,000 ordinance, half of that originally proposed by the council. *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 4 January 1865. The City Council originally proposed the new bounty ordinance to grant bounties at the usual graduated scale—$150 for one-year men, $225 for two-year men, and $350 for three-year men—but a timely amendment forced the city’s Bounty Board to pay out $300 to all volunteers, regardless of their length of service. *Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser*, 7 and 11 January 1865.
The city has up to this time paid over two millions of dollars for bounties. Her finances were in the best condition at the beginning of these levies, or our taxes would have been burdensome in the extreme. It must be remembered that extravagant taxes weigh heavily upon the poor and middling classes of society and will drive away the energetic class who desire to take their place among us. It must also be remembered that a continuance of these levies impairs the city’s credit, and make it impossible to obtain loans except at advanced rates of interest.

The City Council did not heed the mayor’s warning, and in a nearly unanimous decision, overrode his veto. A reporter for the American believed the “not over rich drafted men” would rejoice at this measure, as it would relieve them from all expenses once conscripted.10

Across the urban Northeast, residents considered the various aspects of mobilization—recruitment, labor, and economics—and finally admitted that their wasteful techniques of waging war required redress. In Albany, when Republican Governor Reuben Fenton commenced his military administration, he asked New York State to raise five new regiments and fifty new companies. New York City Democrats and Republicans openly criticized the plan, wondering how Fenton could have failed to learn from the mistakes of his predecessors. A reporter for the Times wrote, “Past experience has taught that entirely new regiments are comparatively useless the first few months.”11 One recruiting officer denounced the governor’s plan as folly. Showing how he understood the inner-workings of the city’s manpower mobilization, he stated:

[There is an] enormous demoralizing delay inseparable from the organization of new regiments. When a man is enlisted, the country needs him immediately. It is better, too, for himself that he go promptly, before his family and friends have changed their minds—before other recruiting officers or substitute brokers come to tempt or corrupt him—before he quarrels with his officers and wishes he had gone into some other captain’s company. But instead of going, he is kept until his company is full. Then his company is kept until nine other companies are full. When half the regiment is complete, it waits for the other half. When six companies are full, they wait for the other four. When nine are full, they wait for the tenth. When the tenth is full, it waits for some of

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10 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 29 and 31 March 1865.
the nine to fill up the places of men who have deserted, so that the field and staff can be mustered.
And for this nonsense, the government pays and the war stands still.\(^{12}\)

City residents also comprehended how the “war stood still” in other ways. Over the years, wartime labor had been stifled by unregulated capitalism. By December 1864, the economic strain caused by wartime inflation and the abuse perpetrated by unscrupulous contractors upon their employees had forced sewing women to their breaking point. On December 28, 1864, in the company of Philadelphia’s congressmen, a committee from the Working Women’s Relief Association—the same labor union organized after the Schuylkill Arsenal terminations of August 1863—met with President Lincoln to set fair wages for government work and to set a high minimum roster for the employment roll at Schuylkill Arsenal. Lincoln assured the ladies that he would see to it that Schuylkill Arsenal “worked to its fullest capacity.” Although Martha Yaeger, the head of the Relief Association, reported her mission “a complete success,” Lincoln insisted that he would not interfere with existing contracts in the private sector. The committee protested this decision, but to no avail. The women resolved, “That we are unequivocally and utterly opposed to giving out at the Arsenal small contracts to women and men, who simply farm

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 26 January 1865. Fenton did not pay attention to such criticism. Naturally, he wanted to appoint his own officers, and he stuck boldly to the course of raising new companies and regiments, even if it meant adding to the chaos in the city. Colonels Frank and Von Gilsa asked for permission to send agents to Castle Garden so they could dragoon German immigrants into their regiments as they arrived. They wrote, “The continued arrival of veteran soldiers of the Danish and Schleswig-Holstein Armies (both at present disbanded) would fill, when secured, our organizations in a comparative short time.” Undoubtedly, this policy amounted to shrewd immigration scheme, but for these German officers, they believed that it was better than leaving immigrants to the machinations of bounty brokers. They continued, “Almost every one of those men come to this country with the intention of entering our armies and by their perfect ignorance of the English language are generally subject to gross deceptions. Our organizations, almost entirely German, would offer those immigrants a better prospect and the full justice in regard to bounties as well as treatment and would induce many of our countrymen to follow the example of those so enlisted and mustered by us.” Paul Frank and Leopold Von Gilsa to Reuben Fenton, 20 February 1865, NYSA.
out the work to needy women at starvation prices, while the petty contractors receive full pay at Government prices.”

Although female cutters and sewers who labored in federal arsenals benefited from the meeting between the members of the Working Women’s Relief Association and Lincoln, those in the private sector continued to suffer. Working women complained that the “soulless set of sub-contractors” who took government contracts abused their laborers with near impunity. Seamstresses complained that their bosses “rent a cheap room in the suburbs, procure a lot of sewing machines, and employ young girls from 12 to 18 years of age, at such prices as they choose to pay.”

Over the winter 1864-1865, labor unions began cracking down on managerial exploitation. In Philadelphia, the Working Women’s Relief Association convinced a group of thirty seamstresses to prefer charges of “obtaining money by fraudulent means” against James Mooney, an army contractor who made cavalry jackets at 505 Chestnut Street. On December 19, 1864, seamstresses congested the office of a local alderman, “clamorous for the money due them.” Evidence proved that these women had been in Mooney’s employ for over a month and each had received less than one dollar per week. A newspaper reported, “In one case the female had to borrow money to pay her mother’s grocery bill. In another case the victim was nearly barefooted, having no money to purchase shoes.” Legally, the alderman knew that he could not prosecute the contractor under these charges because he had no authority to enforce a minimum

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13 Philadelphia Inquirer, 4 February 1865.
14 Wilson, The Business of Civil War, 96.
wage, but he instructed Mooney to pay the women a more respectable salary before he released him from jail.\textsuperscript{15}

Concerned city leaders followed the example set by the labor unions, and in some places, reformation of military contracting took shape in local courtrooms. Baltimore already had experienced a landmark trial back in July 1863, when a Congressional committee brought charges against Major James Belger for war profiteering. Although a court-martial found Belger innocent, President Lincoln overturned its ruling. The importance of the Baltimore case, meant to send a message to deceitful army officers and dishonest contractors everywhere, became lost in the euphoria the Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.\textsuperscript{16}

However, over the winter of 1864-1865, the entire nation awaited the outcome of highly publicized case, \textit{Opdyke v. Weed}. Earlier in the war, Thurlow Weed, an Albany newspaper editor, had printed several derogatory articles, accusing New York City’s former mayor, George Opdyke, of providing the Union army with shoddy blankets, known as Spaulding cloth, although it had been rejected by federal inspectors. Weed’s scathing censure contended that Opdyke “has made more money by secret partnership in army cloth, blankets, clothing, and gun contracts than any fifty sharpers, Jew or Gentile, in the city of New York.” Unwilling to accept this contempt, Opdyke sued Weed for libel, asking for $50,000 in damages.\textsuperscript{17}

Opdyke’s plan to elicit public sympathy backfired. The resultant testimony revealed that he had indeed taken kickbacks from clothing contracts issued back in 1862. Although his lawyer dismissed the Spaulding cloth scandal as mere journalistic exaggeration, he could not convince

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Philadelphia Inquirer}, 20 December 1864.  
\textsuperscript{16} Wilson, \textit{The Business of Civil War}, 170-3.  
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{New York Herald}, 11 January 1865.
the jury that Weed had committed libel with his statements about Opdyke’s greed. Indeed, the jury learned the sordid details about Opdyke’s silent partnerships, causing Weed’s attorney to lament that New Yorkers “had reached a state of corruption in the public administration in this city to that degree that it could be borne no longer.” In his closing argument, Opdyke’s attorney retorted, “Here is a public man, mayor of a city, interested in contracts for the supply of the army. Is that a fault? The army must be supplied. . . . Parrott and Ames, and Ericsson, and Stewart and Sturges are helpers of their country as truly as he who leads battalions, or digs in the trench, or mounts the parapet in a storm of fire and leaden hail.”18 After three weeks of sordid testimony, on January 11, 1865, the jury hung. Most people considered it a victory for Weed, who only paid minor court fees. Others dubbed the case a general victory over greedy contractors. The court proceedings exposed Opdyke’s avarice, and all his power and influence did not save him from public censure. He did not receive a cent in damages, only contempt from a war weary population.

Unfortunately, as an agent of reform, the trial amounted to little. Despite the occasional work stoppages and labor protests, New Yorkers had done nothing to alter the injudicious system of exploitation that undergirded the contracting business. The New York Sun guessed that the garments in question were “doubtless manufactured at low prices by poor sewing women, who have recently appealed against the rich contractors, who realized enormous fortunes and refuse to pay living wages to those whom they employ.”19

18 Ibid., 11 and 12 January 1865; Spann, Gotham at War, 48-9; McKay, The Civil War and New York City, 292-4; Wilson, The Business of Civil War, 180-1.
19 Ibid.
Boston’s City Council, too, began to consider the efficiency of its wartime mobilization activities. With no draft to worry about, Boston’s primary concern differed from that of other major cities. During the war, the Bay City had exhausted over $960,000 in aid to soldiers’ families. Each year, the City Relief Fund sustained between 3,200 and 3,500 families. Although city councilmen considered public relief a necessary recourse to sustain the war, some believed that a significant, if incalculable, quantity of this amount had been pilfered by frauds of designing women and out-of-town thieves. Equally disappointing, city officials realized that bounty jumpers had fleeced the taxpayers out of tens of thousands more. Finally, army contracting wasted another untold sum. In estimating the city’s losses, fiscal conservatives wondered if the Bay City’s transition to war could have been more efficient. “Now that the war is virtually over,” mused the editor of the *Evening Transcript* in early April 1865, “one of the first things to care for will be the settling up of accounts between the people and the men in public office. Things that were overlooked or tolerated in the height of our bloody struggle will be overhauled and closely scrutinized.”

Of course, said the editor, both parties had spoken out against these outrages at various times throughout the war, especially if they had been perpetrated by their political opponents. Each party had accused the other of favoritism and mismanagement, but no one—neither Republican nor Democrat—had cured the host of monetary irregularities. Writing with hindsight, the editor grumbled:

No one rose in his place to recite the long catalogue of outrageous schemes for plundering the treasury and exhausting the financial strength of the government in its moment of peril. There was no one to say how our brave sons and brothers have been sent to the field in rotten clothing, to sleep under flimsy tents, roll themselves into shoddy blankets, mount on worthless, diseased horses, eat decayed provisions, and even go into battle with arms that would not shoot. There was no one to say how the Government has been made to take, by the hundred thousand pairs, shoes
for its soldiers with soles filled with chips or glued to the “uppers”; no one of all these overzealous legislators to say who was accountable for the lives of soldiers shipped on rotten transports, to find death in the midst of flames, or to make their last bed at the bottom of the sea; none to point the finger of scorn at men high in place, rolling in the wealth wrung from their gasping country. 20

Truly, the harmful effects of capitalism and insular politics had forged a rancorous atmosphere of peculation and intrigue. Only in 1865, as victory neared, did urbanites begin to comprehend the gravity of their failures.

Daily, the impending fourth federal draft captured people’s attention. Even more than settling accounts, urban residents fretted and fussed over their quotas. No event—not even the hope of victory—eclipsed the anxiety harbored by urban residents, that the last federal draft would put unwilling soldiers into uniform, empty industrial facilities of workingmen, and herald the failure of volunteer recruitment. A writer to the Philadelphia Inquirer admitted, “It is no disguising the fact that the volunteer enlistments have not been as numerous as they should have been. . . . Recruiting in this city appears to be on the drag.” 21 Throughout the winter, the cities employed traditional strategies to beat conscription, including voicing objections to the War Department quotas, but these tactics no longer worked.

The assistant provost marshals commenced the fourth and final federal draft in Philadelphia, New York City, and Baltimore, but none of these drafts reached completion. Confusion mired these proceedings as usual and residents showed signs of impertinence. Humorously, a few insolent individuals even slipped bogus names into the wheel. The assistant provost marshal of New York City’s Ninth District read off one name: “Mutton Peas, Tenth Avenue, between Fifty-Sixth and Fifty-Seventh Streets!” The audience snickered and officer

20 Boston Evening Transcript, 8 April 1865.
21 Philadelphia Inquirer, 17, 21, 24 January 1865.
blurted out, “How did this come here?” The civilian commissioner snarled angrily, “Just put it down.” Later, the provost marshal read off: “Soda Water, 557 West Forty-Eighth Street!” More laughter followed, but no mayhem ensued.\textsuperscript{22}

Although conscription exhibited a style of provincialism characteristic to urban areas, the external events that transpired in April 1865 dramatically reshaped the cities’ war; indeed, those events brought wartime mobilization to an abrupt end. However, news of the final collapse of the Confederacy came unexpectedly, and residents found themselves unprepared for the victory when it finally arrived. On Monday, April 3, 1865, even as the draft wheels still turned in Baltimore and New York City, newspapers recounted the stunning news that the Army of the Potomac had broken Confederate lines outside of Petersburg. While walking along Wall Street at midday, George T. Strong discovered a crowd gathering outside the office of the \textit{Commercial Advertiser}, watching a man behind the counter painting a sign that read, “Richmond is—.” Strong blurted, “What’s that about Richmond?” The man ignored him and kept painting, and soon the letters “C,” “A,” “P,” “T,” “U,” “R,” “E,” and “D” appeared. Ecstatic, Strong hurried down the street, “shaking hands with everybody, congratulating and being congratulated by scores of men I hardly knew by sight. Men embraced and hugged each other, kissed each other, retreated into doorways to dry their eyes and came out again to flourish their hats and hurrah.”\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{22} In late January, Colonel Browne, the assistant provost marshal general of Maryland, announced that Baltimore would have to supply 3,303 men, but by February 14, the day before the scheduled draft date, only one ward—the Fourth—had met its quota. For unexplained reasons, Browne postponed the draft another month, but during this period, the city managed to decrease its deficiency by only 1,027 men. A writer for the \textit{Baltimore American} guessed that for those residents in areas not exhibiting any effort, the draft would “fall like a thunderclap very soon.” On March 15, Browne ordered Provost Marshals Cathart and Clayton to delay no longer. That morning, they dutifully drew 676 names out of First, Second, and Ninth Wards—twice the combined deficiency of each neighborhood. Over the next three weeks, drawings continued in the Third, Fifth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Eighteenth Wards. \textit{Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser}, 26 and 28 January, 15 February, 15 March, and 14 and 15 April 1865.

\textsuperscript{23} George T. Strong diary, 3 April 1865, in Nevins, ed., \textit{Diary of the Civil War}, 574-5.
While Empire City residents celebrated the news of the fall of Richmond, Major Richard L. Dodge, the specially-appointed sub-district provost marshal in command of all of New York City, made it clear that he meant to hold drafted men to service, no matter the changed circumstances. The Board of Alderman demanded that Dodge suspend the draft indefinitely, but he vowed not to be intimidated by city authorities, declaring, “I shall exact of New York City every man of her quota, and the sooner the people will make up their minds that men must be furnished, the better it will be for all concerned.” Interestingly, Dodge never continued the draft; he only threatened to continue it. Henry Raymond castigated Dodge for his demagoguery, complaining, “New York is not a military satrapy.”

With news of Lee’s surrender, Boston residents indulged in “the most extravagant displays of feeling.” One reporter wrote, “[S]taid, quiet citizens forgot their equanimity for the moment and found themselves cheering in the streets for Gen. Grant and the Potomac Army; workman in the shops gave voice to a joyous outburst of patriotic exultation and everywhere the same accordant strains of heartfelt rejoicing were heard.” Bells rang, bands played, rockets fired. Troops at Fort Warren delivered a 100-gun salute at noon on April 10, and Mayor Lincoln ordered a grand illumination of the city with thousands of candles and lanterns to honor the great victory. He pronounced, “Let the city be a blaze of light tonight.”

The surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on April 9 brought the drawings in Baltimore and New York City to an abrupt termination. On April 13, orders from Secretary of War Stanton reached both cities, announcing that the draft should cease everywhere and that all draftees held at military rendezvous, or those having yet failed to report, should go home.

25 Boston Evening Transcript, 10 and 14 April 1864.
Further, Stanton ordered, all federal military equipage officers everywhere should cease purchasing. With one hastily scribbled order, urban mobilization in all four cities came to an abrupt and unexpected resolution.

With the news that wartime mobilization had come to an end, Adjutant Schouler in Boston happily wrote out General Orders Number 7. With the stroke of his pen, he suspended recruiting, dismissed the soldiers for the yet incomplete 62nd Massachusetts and closed Camp Meigs. Boston’s war was over.26 Baltimore’s last official acts of mobilization came on April 14, when Captain Henry Clayton, a new assistant provost marshal assigned to the city, formally dismissed drafted men from the Eighteenth Ward, who had shown at his office to seek exemptions. Later that evening, Colonel Browne, Maryland’s senior provost marshal, went to the city draft rendezvous and dismissed a mix of drafted men and volunteers organized to form the 13th Maryland. No longer needed, these men happily sauntered home.27

When news of Stanton’s order reached New York City, residents broke into furious celebration. Indeed, Stanton’s order may have produced a greater spectacle than news of the surrender of Lee’s Army. The Herald announced, “The great bugbear of the wheel of conscription was wheeled into ‘that undiscovered county from whose bourne’ it is to be supposed it will never again return. The poor man sang, ‘Laus Deo,’ and the rich man sang praise to Stanton, with a feeling almost approaching to religious gratitude.” Over on Hart’s Island, three companies of volunteers—all that Gotham had managed to raise under Governor Fenton’s order—shouted in celebration.28

26 Ibid., 10 and 14 April 1864.
27 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 14 and 15 April 1865.
28 New York Herald, 15 April 1865.
Only New York City’s bounty brokers accepted the news with dismay. Many hoped to continue capitalizing on the fear produced by the draft, but Stanton’s order ended their hopes. One man had brought sixteen recruits to the city on April 14, having paid their traveling expenses, buying them copious amounts of alcohol, boarding them, and purchasing them new clothes. The *Herald* commented, “at the instant when his labors were about to be crowned with success, Mr. Stanton’s proclamation, like Aluaschar’s foot, came down upon the crockery basket and scattered his vision to the wind.” The *Herald* reveled in the brokers’ misery. An editor happily opined, “No more recruits, no more substitutes, no more jumpers, no more greenbacks. Alas, poor broker! Thy day has come at last. Weep, with none to comfort, and weep on, weep on, until Doomsday.” 29

Meanwhile, over at the Seventh District Draft Office on Third Avenue, a lone sentinel fell asleep in the stairway, there being no draft-anxious crowd for him to watch. All the while, “the sound of merriment could be heard from the room where but a few days since the click of the draft wheel and the calling of the conscripted were the only sounds heard.” Thus, New York City’s mobilization ended much as it began, amid shouting and fanfare.

Little did the fickle populace realize that tomorrow’s papers would announce Lincoln’s assassination, and the city, much like its neighbors to the North and South, would thereby commence its long trek into the turbulent years of Reconstruction and the Gilded Age. More immediately, however, the cities would have to prepare for the great social upheaval of demobilization. How would cities transition back to peace? 30

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
Before they could plan for the future, news of Lincoln’s assassination brought a speedy end to all excitement. Philadelphian Sidney Fisher remarked, “The national exultation at the prospects of peace & union has been suddenly converted into alarm & grief.” The shock of the appalling tragedy awakened a vengeance among Unionists and Republican Party men. George Strong of New York City snarled, “Up with the Black Flag now! . . . Tone of feeling very like that of four years ago when the news came of Sumter. This atrocity has invigorated feeling in the same way, almost in the same degree. People who pitied our misguided brethren yesterday, and thought they had been punished enough already, and hoped there would be general amnesty, including J. Davis himself, talk approvingly of judges, juries, gaolers, and hangmen among the dramatis personae.” The cities had to balance desires for retribution with the need to preserve law and order. In Baltimore, Mayor Chapman ordered all taverns to close, and each home had to display a mourning drape outside its window or its owners faced military arrest. In all four cities, Copperheads and southern sympathizers stayed off the streets, for police arrested any who unwisely shouted “hurrahs for Jeff Davis.” Baltimore’s archbishop warned the city’s Catholic community—no doubt speaking to Unionists and Confederates alike—that in this time of grief, “Silence is, perhaps, the best and most appropriate expression for a sorrow so great for utterance.” Throughout this week of anguish, Union men had possession of the streets and public spaces, and little violence occurred. Remembered Philadelphia veteran Frank Taylor, “[T]he people crowded to the heart of the old town. But those who were prone to covert abuse of the great President and the cause of which he was the leader (and there were some, as every soldier knew) such men stayed indoors, for vengeance was a broad and waiting hungrily to find action.” One Baltimore man confirmed, “There was much excitement on that day [when we learned the news of the assassination] and for awhile I feared that violence would prevail, but everything
quieted down and all were occupied in draping their residences and places of Businesses in the habiliments of woe.”  

Lincoln’s funeral cortege marked the last of the Civil War’s major solemnities in the cities. The Presidential funeral train left Washington D. C. on April 20. It arrived in Baltimore on April 21, in Philadelphia on April 22, and in New York City on April 24. The train went as far north as Albany, but then it turned west toward Buffalo, and thus, it missed Boston. Nevertheless, all four cities participated in massive displays of public mourning. Citizens wore black armbands, newspapers draped their pages with thick columns of black ink, and all businesses closed their doors. As the body of the murdered president made his last passage through the city streets of Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York City, large numbers of mourners reverently paid their respects.

Four years and two days after the infamous riot on Pratt Street, Lincoln’s body arrived in Baltimore, a city that had failed to support his candidacy in 1860. At 10:00 A.M., April 21, on a drizzly, overcast day, Lincoln’s corpse arrived at Camden Station. As they had done all week, the city’s secessionists stayed indoors. Previous experience had taught them that any provocation against their loyal neighbors would result in riots and outrages leveled against them. Major General Lew Wallace, the commander of the Middle Department, made certain no one would inflame their emotions when he issued an order disbarring all “offensive” clergymen from making provocative statements from their pulpits on Easter Sunday. If these preachers could not control “evil-disposed members” of their flock, the military would close their chapels.  


32 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 21 and 22 April 1865.
reporter described the somber procession, remarking, “No gleam of cheerful sunlight broke through the heavy clouds which hung like a leaden pall over the city. The gloom in the atmosphere accorded with the gloom of our citizens. It was a funeral day in every sense.”

Another Baltimorean remembered, “[T]he various bells of the City, including those of the different churches, were all dismally tolling, and nature herself seemed to mourn, for a drearier day, rainy, cold and disagreeable could not be well imagined. Yesterday, the day of the funeral, was a holiday here;—business was suspended and all the churches had service, sermons being delivered and prayers offered with reference to the late calamity.”

A host of dignitaries received the body of the deceased president. Baltimore’s entourage comprised a rich cross-section of those who had supported all home front mobilization efforts: Augustus W. Bradford, John Lee Chapman, J. Summerfield Berry, John Reese Kenly, the members of the City Council, the members of the Union Leagues, women from the Union Relief Association, and the loyal members of the Independent Grays. As the procession escorted the Presidential casket to the Exchange, where it would lie in state for the next four hours, Baltimore’s free black leaders, all wearing mourning badges, brought up the rear of the column.

A furious southern sympathizer, William Glenn, watched the procession from his house. He complained, “The Negro Masons joined the procession. The negroes in town were all wild. It was utterly impossible to keep the servants in the house or get any work out of them. . . . Our people [meaning Confederate Baltimoreans] are like whipped hounds[.] . . . I draped one window sill, from 10 to 3 o’c—during the time prescribed by Military orders for mourning. All the family were opposed to this[.] . . . Today [April 21] we are almost the only house without some symbol of mourning.” Indeed, the streets—now draped in black mourning crape from

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33 Mitchell, *Maryland Voices of the Civil War*, 464-5.
house to house—and the solemn procession within them looked remarkably different from the tumultuous day of April 19, 1861. There were no angry white mobs, no George W. Brown, no George P. Kane, no Bradley Johnson, and no Maryland Guard Zouaves. In sum, the Civil War had swept Baltimore with the fires of social and political revolution.34

Lincoln’s casket met similarly mournful receptions at Philadelphia and New York City. On April 22, from 10:00 A.M. to midnight, Lincoln’s corpse lied in state inside Independence Hall, in the very the room where the Declaration of Independence had been signed. Only persons with special tickets issued by the City Council could get in to see the body, but even so, remembered a chronicler, “there was no cessation in the vast crowd of applicants.” During those eighteen hours, over 85,000 Philadelphians came to view Lincoln’s earthly remains.35 Two days later, 150,000 New Yorkers viewed Lincoln’s body inside City Hall, and even Mayor Gunther, who had earlier urged that residents make no celebration to honor the Union victory at Appomattox, now reverently declared that all businesses should shut down out of respect for President Lincoln’s years of political service.36 A massive procession led by General John Dix and the 7th New York State Militia escorted the cortege through the city streets. The next day, Lincoln’s funeral train roared out of the Hudson River Railway Depot, bound for six more large cities in the Midwest before coming to rest at Springfield, Illinois, on May 3, 1865.

On April 26, the day after Lincoln’s body left New York City, Philadelphia’s final regiment of the Civil War, the 215th Pennsylvania (9th Union League)—the last regiment raised by any of the four cities—left for Fort Delaware to superintend the parole of Confederate

34 Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 21 and 22 April 1865; Mitchell, Maryland Voices of the Civil War, 460.
36 Spann, Gotham at War, 187-8.
prisoners still held there. According to one witness, the regiment made a “fine appearance” and “attract[ed] universal attention.” For a brief moment, at least, the novelty of sending soldiers off to the front reemerged as these latecomers bid good-bye to their friends and family.  

How did the cities fare during the Civil War? In some respects, it can be said that all four major metropolises of the Northeast did very well, if numbers are any indicator of success. New York City, for instance, answered seven separate calls for federal volunteers. From 1861 to 1865, the Empire City provided 110,132 men to the Union armies. This number included nine-month, one-year, two-year, and three-year volunteers. It also included veteran volunteers—counted twice—and all substitutes and draftees conscripted under three federal draft calls. This number did not include, however, the suspicious naval credits counted under the July 1864 call. New York City’s militia, the 1st Division, responded to major emergencies four times during the war, representing, in all, 23,868 soldiers. Thus, the grand total of New York City’s mobilization stood at about 134,000 soldiers, or 16.46 percent of its 1860 population. In raw numbers, this was the largest manpower contribution of any city, North or South.

Farther south, Philadelphia placed over 100,000 men into uniform, 17.70 percent of its 1860 population, the highest percentage rate of the four cities examined here. This was above and beyond quotas for both federal and state troops; the Quaker City provided thirty percent of the Keystone State’s soldiers, yet it only comprised twenty percent of the Commonwealth’s population. The city of Boston fared well too; it placed about 26,000 men into uniform between 1861 and 1865, or about 12.42 percent of its 1860 population. Like New York City and Philadelphia, this number included three-month volunteers, three-year men raised at various

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37 Philadelphia Inquirer, 27 April 1865.
times during the war, nine-month men, one-year men raised at the end of the war, veteran
volunteers counted twice, black enlistees, draftees and substitutes, 100-days emergency militia,
and a small number of sailors and marines (but not the Irishmen who fled to New York).\textsuperscript{38}

Baltimore, of course, had the lowest turnout. The Monumental City placed an estimated
17,300 men into uniform at various times during the war, or 8.16 percent of its 1860 population.
However, it might be unfair to compare Baltimore’s raw data to that of other northeastern cities,
since Baltimore’s population contained almost as many secessionists as it did Unionists. If we
assume that half of the city’s population harbored feelings of outright disloyalty, then
approximately 16.32 percent of Baltimore’s loyal population went to battle, a rate nearly equal to
other metropolises in the Northeast. Of course, it is purely speculative to guess the percentage of
Baltimore’s “loyalty,” but even with the low rate of 8.16 percent, the urban Northeast still
mobilized a higher percent than the North as a whole. The North mobilized slightly more than
ten percentage of its total population. The total furnished by Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia,
and New York City came to 277,300, or 15.67 percent of their combined 1860 populations.
Thus, the urban Northeast outstripped the nation by five percent.

Of course, the cities offered other contributions to the Union war effort. They raised
uncountable sums of money and they led the way in the production of necessary equipage. For
instance, Philadelphia’s businesses produced over $5,000,000 worth of federal ordnance supplies
and millions more in quartermaster and commissary supplies. The cities also provided countless
sums of money for bounties, relief efforts, commutation fees, and substitute purchases. In August

\textsuperscript{38} Schouler, Massachusetts in the Civil War, Volume 2, (1871), 590. Schouler calculated that Boston provided
26,175 men for the war. This number included the city’s sailors and marines, but it did not distinguish between
three-year, nine-month, veteran volunteers, substitutes, or other such categories. By my own calculations, Boston’s
contribution from all categories amounted to slightly less than 22,000. The additional 4,000 can be assumed to
include the sailors and marines.
1864, one newspaper estimated that New York City had doled out $7,000,000 in bounties and $11,000,000 in voluntary donations. Generally, the cities owed their outpourings of assistance to their antebellum social and political associations, their industrialism, their benevolent traditions, their martial spirit, and their persistent—if imperfect—Unionism.

However, it might be too hasty to dub military mobilization in the urban Northeast a true success by relying on numbers only. Immense upheaval and tribulation attended the process of supplying men and equipment to the armies of the North. Contrary to Allan Nevins’s assertions, from 1861 to 1865, Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City resisted the “sweep of organization,” continuing their traditions of finding local solutions to national crises. These cities did not dramatically reconfigure their social and economic lives under the “forcing-blast of necessity and opportunity,” to use Nevins’s terminology. In fact, a study of the mobilization in all four cities confirms what Matt Gallman proclaimed about Philadelphia in 1990, that Union cities “functioned much as [they] had for the previous decades.”

Historians might also consider another question: did the northeastern cities achieve success or did they face failure in their effort to mobilize? Did they, in the words of Ernest McKay, “answer the Union reveille,” or did they, as Edward Spann contends, fall short of their wartime obligations? Depending upon perspective, they did both. The cities’ principle resources—their manpower, their money, their workers, their benevolence, their diversity, and their corporate pluralism—all facilitated their transition to war. However, wartime mobilization was not merely an outcome, but a process. If viewed in that way, cities’ wartime mobilizations

appear more disordered than statistics suggest. In many respects, cities provided less an advantage to the North than historians have admitted. At various times, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, and New York City exhibited serious, even debilitating difficulties meeting demands set by the federal government. In fact, disorganization and chaos increased new burdens heaped upon unanswered stress. In no way did the cities of the Northeast represent, as Nevins described it, “an organized war.” Neither did, as Richard Current suggested, God stand on the side of the largest battalions. In fact, events revealed the increased difficulties attending the extraction of resources from regions in the urban Northeast. That the citizens of Baltimore, Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia produced so much equipage, organized so many regiments, and supported so many families is testament to the diligent efforts of those citizens who invested their lives, fortunes, and muscle into the complex, laborious, and never-ending process of raising armies to support the Union cause.

The study of Union cities during the war forces scholars to rethink the importance of mobilization when explaining the causes of Union victory. Military strategy alone did not bring about victory, but the complicated removal of men and resources from urban communities played a significant role in it as well. In his bibliographic essay on Union strategy, Gary Gallagher explained the outmoded “Lost Cause” argument for Union victory this way: “Northern manpower and industrial might, goes a common argument, represented obstacles too great for the Confederates to overcome.” Gallagher rightly dismissed the “Lost Cause” interpretation as nonsense, proving that Union strategy—not a sum of northern men and materiel—won the war. Gallagher’s argument is essentially correct, but historians must also consider that the source of
“Northern manpower and industrial might”—the cities—nearly represented an obstacle too great for the Union, not the Confederacy, to overcome.43

Although minor details shaped their individual mobilizations, all four cities followed the same untidy transition to war. Three important factors—all related to urbanism—placed the cities at tremendous disadvantage to the countryside: federalism, pluralism, and capitalism. How did these three features thwart urban mobilization? Federalism—the sharing of power between federal, state, and local governments—caused the cities great trouble. The imprecision of the U.S. Constitution and various state constitutions, combined with the formless wording of the 1795 Militia Act, made the task of dividing the responsibilities of mobilization nearly impossible. Which level of government was responsible for appointing recruiters? Which for supplying weapons and uniforms? Which for supplying contracts? Which for appointing officers? Which for replacing them? Which for initializing a draft? Which for raising money? America’s limited experience with raising large volunteer armies had left these questions largely unanswered. When the four cities went to war, they shared the responsibility of raising troops with their state and federal governments. As seen in various instances in 1861, the collision between different levels of government created needless burdens for urban mobilization.

Admittedly, this argument is not a new one; two scholars of the twentieth-century, William Hesseltine and Fred Shannon, both interpreted federalism as a hindrance to Union military progress, but due to the influence of Frank Owsley’s State Rights in the Confederacy,

which examined conflict between the Confederacy’s central government and the states, the impediments of federalism became a centerpiece for Confederate studies of the twentieth century and non-issue among northern ones.\textsuperscript{44} During the late twentieth century, scholars of Northern history argued quite the opposite of Hesseltine and Shannon, that the Civil War created a powerful central authority, a “Yankee Leviathan,” as Richard Bensel termed it. This dissertation suggests that the “central authority model” runs into trouble when dealing with northeastern cities, and that Hesseltine’s and Shannon’s thesis, when cast against a comparative model of urban history during the Civil War, does not appear so terribly archaic.\textsuperscript{45}

Of course, federalism negatively influenced the course of rural mobilization as well, but as the federal government’s conduct of the war grew more organized and expansive, local governments in the rural North acquiesced to federal control of mobilization. In his study of two New Hampshire towns during the Civil War, Thomas Kemp confirmed, “The Enrollment Act marked the final wresting of control of the war away from Northern states and communities to the federal government. Decisions concerning enlistment and mobilization were not being made in Claremont or Newport but elsewhere—in 1862 by the state and in later years by the national government.”\textsuperscript{46} In the cities, however, the opposite occurred. After recognizing the inherent danger of relying on unprepared national bureaucracy, city governments organized local committees which intentionally or unintentionally competed with higher levels of government. Partisanship complicated federalism’s uneven hand. Partisan loyalties infused the process of appointing officers and recruiters with corruption, intrigue, and needless accusations of

\textsuperscript{44} Frank L. Owsley, \textit{States Rights in the Confederacy} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925).
\textsuperscript{45} William B. Hesseltine, \textit{Lincoln and the War Governors} (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1948); Shannon, \textit{The Organization and Administration of the Union Army}; Bensel, \textit{Yankee Leviathan}.
disloyalty, favoritism, or nepotism. Certainly, Philadelphia benefited from partisanship because it had the same Republican mayor, governor, and president throughout the war, but New York City experienced three different mayors and three different governors. New York City had a Democratic mayor and a Republican governor in 1861, a Republican mayor and a Republican governor in 1862, a Republican mayor and a Democratic governor in 1863, a Democratic mayor and a Democratic governor in 1864, and a Democratic mayor and a Republican governor in 1865. With this electoral turn-over, competing agencies rarely synchronized their efforts. Whenever the mayor and governors represented different parties, the two executives used local and state agencies to frustrate each other’s control of mobilization.

Pluralism represented the second trait that negatively affected urban mobilization. At first, cities’ diversity, represented by their plurality of social classes, occupations, political parties, religions, races, and ethnicities, appeared to favor a successful transition to war. In 1861, having regiments composed exclusively of Irish, German, Poles, native-born, Republicans, Democrats, watermen, firemen, police, gymnasts, carpenters, metalworkers, gentlemen, rowdies, Protestants, or Catholics compartmentalized urban men into military units in a sensible way. However, urban pluralism soon ran counter to efficiency. Not only did antagonistic groups willfully confront each other, but by having too many groups recruiting at the same time, they stalled the process of raising regiments and batteries. Partially-filled units competed with each other for the same men and resources and brought the war to a standstill.

Finally, capitalism, another hallmark of urban life, eroded the success of mobilization in the metropolitan Northeast. Again, at first, it seemed that urban capitalism might meet the demands of a poorly prepared War Department. Wealthy industrialists and benevolent agencies donated money in great sums to provide for neighborhood units and their families. The massive
conglomerations of wealth forged during the antebellum era appeared ready to meet the crisis. But, this optimism faded away. The profusion of benevolence opened a door for fraud and abuse that never went corrected. Not only did unscrupulous contractors fleece all levels of government leaving Union soldiers in a state of destitution with poor clothing and weapons, but they kept an army of wartime arsenal workers—mostly women and immigrants—in a state of everlasting poverty.

However, more damning than the incompetence of uniform production, capitalism corrupted the process of volunteering and recruiting. When the threat of drafting became a concern in late 1862, money played a vital role in of the mobilization process. It filled bounty funds, it provided for substitutes, and it endowed anti-draft clubs. Unscrupulous individuals saw the war as a money-making scheme. The bounty-jumpers came on the scene first, stealing well-intentioned bounty donations by the tens of thousands. Bounty brokers arrived next, commoditizing substitutes, selling them like chattel, and even resorting to kidnapping, assault, and robbery to make their profits. Even ordinary recruiters participated in the action, selling their volunteers to other regiments if it seemed that they would not reach full capacity. Despite efforts to arrest these men, infiltrate their criminal rings, or even work with them, the four cities could not end the collusion that sapped the dividends of patriotism.

Undeniably, the four cities fought a war against the worst aspects of their own urbanism. During the four years of the Civil War, the antebellum virtues of Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, and New York City became their vices. The cities’ war, it must be recognized, was not fought only on far-away battlefields. Those who resided in the metropolitan environs, those who pasted placards on walls, those who opened recruiting stations, those who donated money to
soldiers’ aid, those who raised bounties, those who advocated the recruitment of black troops, those who trained and disciplined soldiers and officers, those who toiled endlessly in weapons and uniform manufactories, those who welcomed home re-enlistees and veterans, and those who sustained waning commitment, all fought significant—and unforgettable—wars on the home front. But other city residents participated in a different war: those who smuggled alcohol into the camps, those who defrauded the city governments of their charity, those who ran substitutes to other towns and cities, those who kept seamstresses impoverished, those who rioted against the draft, and those who squabbled for officers’ commissions. Those people fought a war too.

The question remains, which side emerged victorious?

Thomas O’Connor, the author of Boston’s only Civil War history, suggested that the war produced a “lifetime of changes” in the Bay City. He concluded, “This is true not only because the broad and sweeping changes the war produced in the social, political, and industrial institutions of the United States, but also of the intimate and personal effects it had upon the everyday lives of so many ordinary people. This was certainly true for Boston.” Given an analysis of urban mobilization in the Northeast, this statement appears only partially correct.

Undoubtedly, the war produced many “intimate and personal effects,” but historians must tread carefully when discussing “broad and sweeping changes” in the North. When it came to military commitment, city governments and urban facilities adapted conservatively to the need to mobilize, and they never transformed. As they adapted to the war, the cities functioned much as they had in previous decades. Only their reluctance to transmute their civil, political, and economic life completely accounts for their terrible inefficiencies in raising troops and equipage. Although this conclusion does not refute the erstwhile impressiveness of the Civil War’s violence, it does suggest that the powerful forces of urbanism could stand resolutely against the
tide of war. More broadly, it proves that the people of the urban Northeast fought the war on their own terms.

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