The Pennsylvania State University
The Graduate School
College of Education

OIL, POWER, AND UNIVERSITIES: POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND ACADEMIC ADVANCEMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AND TEXAS A&M, 1876-1965

A Thesis in
Higher Education
by
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ABSTRACT

This study traced the development of the University of Texas (UT) and Texas A&M (A&M) from their establishment in the 1870s and 1880s to the gradual collapse of desegregation and oppressive governmental control in the early 1960s. UT and A&M did not begin to become competitive with public universities nationally until after the elimination of segregation and excessive government control in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Prior to these years, UT and Texas A&M were hampered by low state appropriations, hostility towards higher education within the state government, battles to gain control over the Permanent University Fund (PUF), segregation, and paranoia rooted in racism and anticommunism. These conditions inhibited research activity and the improvement of academic standards, limited access to higher education for Texans, and compromised academic freedom. In addition, debates at A&M regarding the legitimacy and practicality of an all-male student body (until 1963) and compulsory military training (abolished for the final time in 1965) overshadowed the institution's academic and research aspirations.

The thesis analyzed the impact of state government on higher education in Texas. To a lesser extent, the study described the development of UT and A&M in relation to higher education in the United States between the 1880s and 1960s. To investigate state government and university relations as well as academic development at UT and A&M, primary sources were consulted at the Texas State Library and Archives Commission (TSLAC) in Austin, the main repository of official executive and legislative records. Institutional information including regent’s papers, presidential papers, financial records, reports on research activity, faculty, and students, were analyzed at the University of Texas Center for American History (UTCAH) and the Cushing Archives at Texas A&M University. Conclusions related to Texas higher education
and the nation were ascertained through examination of secondary literature and statistical materials drawn from the *Report of the Commissioner of Education* (1870 -- 1916), *Biennial Survey of Educational Statistics* (1918 -- 1958) and additional federal and state statistical reports.
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<tr>
<td>A&amp;M</td>
<td>Texas A&amp;M University at College Station</td>
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<td>AAU</td>
<td>Association of American Universities</td>
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<td>AAUP</td>
<td>American Association of University Professors</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>American Council on Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMRF</td>
<td>Texas A&amp;M Research Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUF</td>
<td>Annual University Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBR</td>
<td>Bureau of Business Research</td>
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<td>BCNET</td>
<td>Bi-racial Conference on Negro Education in Texas</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSSR</td>
<td>Bureau of Social Science Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Citizens' Advisory Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Clayton Biochemical Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEHS</td>
<td>Committee on Education Beyond High School</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEB</td>
<td>General Education Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRSS</td>
<td>Institute for Research in Social Science (at the University of North Carolina)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLCOE</td>
<td>Joint Legislative Committee on Organization and Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSRM</td>
<td>Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAS</td>
<td>National Academy of Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
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<td>NDRC</td>
<td>National Defense Research Committee</td>
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<td>NIH</td>
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<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Science Foundation</td>
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<td>OSRD</td>
<td>Office of Scientific Research and Development</td>
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<td>PUF</td>
<td>Permanent University Fund</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Rockefeller Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
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<td>Southern Association of Colleges and Schools</td>
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<td>Southern Regional Education Board</td>
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<td>SREC</td>
<td>Southern Region Education Compact</td>
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<td>Texas Educational Survey Commission</td>
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<td>TLC</td>
<td>Texas Legislative Council</td>
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<td>TSUN</td>
<td>Texas State University for Negroes</td>
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<td>TSU</td>
<td>Texas Southern University</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill</td>
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<td>UT</td>
<td>University of Texas at Austin</td>
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<td>UTBD</td>
<td>University of Texas Development Board</td>
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<td>UVa</td>
<td>University of Virginia</td>
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Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit, but in humility consider others better than yourselves. Each of you should look not only to your interests, but also to the interests of others….Therefore, my dear friends, as you have always obeyed--not only n my presence, but now much more in my absence--continue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you to will and to act according to his good purpose….as you hold out the word of life--in order that I may boast on the day of Christ that I did not run or labor for nothing.

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In Memory of Perry Dean Richardson and Mae Perkins Johnston
Chapter One

Introduction

The author of the Texas entry in the 1889 edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica observed that the state suffered from the peculiar predicament of possessing the richest education fund and the poorest public education system in the United States. He went on to note that while the University of Texas (UT) owned an abundance of land, the college benefited from a small fraction of the revenue generated from it.¹ The same could have been said about Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College (later renamed Texas A&M University), the state’s land-grant college.

Between the years following the Civil War and the 1960s, Texas lawmakers debated the role that the state should play in educating students at all levels. Debate was especially fierce concerning the colleges. Many legislators and governors questioned the appropriateness of providing aid to institutions that could operate on tuition and fees. These deliberations resulted in inadequate and capricious funding at the University of Texas and Texas A&M.

In addition to whether Texas should fund higher education through regular legislative appropriations, legislators, governors, and institutional governing boards argued over the degree of academic freedom and organizational autonomy that the colleges should possess. Walter Buenger has argued that politicians began meddling into the affairs of state higher education in Texas after Reconstruction in the late 1870s and 1880s. Lewis Gould has noted that Texas lawmakers most egregiously manipulated state universities into political instruments in 1917 when demagogue Governor James E. Ferguson tried to close the University of Texas. The concept that state universities were political entities that should be controlled by state lawmakers
was at the foundation of Texas political ideology until the colleges were desegregated in the late 1950s and early 1960s at which time the ultra conservative faction that George Green described as “the Establishment” lost their stranglehold on the state government.  

As was the pattern in the rest of the former Confederacy, institutions in Texas offered few college-level courses and received paltry annual legislative appropriations during the last third of the nineteenth century. Many leaders opposed state-funded higher education because it diverted money away from elementary and secondary education. Others believed that state funds were better-spent building railroads, supporting farmers, and modernizing cities. Post-bellum Southern state universities became political battlegrounds -- places where anti-education industrialists and demagogues fought the handful of Southerners who believed that investment in higher education was a way out of regional poverty. These Southern reformers fought for improvements that could bring the region's state flagship universities and land-grant colleges to the same level as the most competitive research universities in the West and Midwest. Initiatives toward advancement included organized research, rigorous admissions and grading standards, academic freedom policies consistent with the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) guidelines, and desegregation.  

Lawrence Veysey chronicled the professionalization of academic disciplines and the rise of organized research in American universities from 1865-1910. During the years that Texans constructed the first buildings at UT and A&M, national academic leaders such as Charles Eliot of Harvard, Daniel Coit Gilman of the University of California and later Johns Hopkins, and Andrew Dixon White of the University of Michigan and later Cornell, were defining the purposes of American higher education. Should America's institutions be the leading centers of scientific research, training labs for graduate students, or colleges for undergraduates? Should
all undergraduates take a regimented set of courses rooted in the liberal arts or should they be free to pursue new and even practical subjects through an elective system? Eliot, Gilman, White, and a host of other college presidents explored these questions, but by the first decades of the twentieth century, American universities were an amalgamation of research centers, graduate training programs, and undergraduate colleges that offered both liberal and practical courses of study. By 1910, the twelve leading schools that Veysey included in his study conformed to a set of patterns. The majority of faculty at these institutions possessed Ph.D.s and involved themselves in discipline-based professional associations. This group of institutions fortified their endowments, created research budgets, solicited funds from philanthropic foundations to build observatories and labs, created presses, and published research findings in everything from chemistry to history. Not one of these nascent research universities resided in the former Confederacy.

Roger Geiger produced two volumes on the development of research in American universities. In *To Advance Knowledge*, Geiger demonstrated that between 1900 and 1940, eleven prestigious private and five public colleges (University of California, University of Illinois, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, and the University of Wisconsin) evolved into major research universities. These institutions commanded the greatest share of research funds, particularly from philanthropic foundations following World War I. Geiger's five state universities received greater state appropriations than the nation's other state flagship universities and possessed the largest faculties, the highest number of graduate students, and robust library holdings.

In his second volume, *Research and Relevant Knowledge*, Geiger depicted the condition of research universities between 1945 and the 1980s. Many new participants, including UT and
A&M, joined the community of research universities after World War II, however, the bulk of these funds were concentrated at the universities profiled in *To Advance Knowledge*. Federal agencies such as the Department of Defense (DoD), Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Aeronautical and Space Agency (NASA) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) funded numerous projects at virtually every flagship and land-grant state university during the twenty-five years following 1945. Graham and Diamond observed that while the institutions profiled in *To Advance Knowledge* continued to make significant research contributions, they also benefited from what Robert Merton described as the "Matthew effect." The top flight research universities had spent the first half of the twentieth century developing their physical plants and faculties and were able to use their reputations as collateral to obtain the lion's share of postwar accolades and grants. From reputational rankings to Nobel laureates, the accomplishments of the pre-war elite obscured the gains made by the second-tier post-war competitors. This second-tier was not a discrete set of institutions, but rather, a range of strong research universities just behind the virtually impenetrable top layer of Geiger's pre-war sixteen, plus UCLA. Second-tier is not meant to mean second-rate or second-class. This set of post-war competitors expanded their graduate programs, laboratories, and research centers and boasted faculty and graduate students capable of producing research that could meet national and regional needs. Faculty at these second-tier institutions possessed fellowships in prestigious organizations such as the National Academies and scored cyclotrons for their campuses. Second-tier research universities possessed many of the strengths that the top tier institutions did, merely on a smaller scale. UT joined the cadre of second-tier research universities, while A&M did not enter this category until the 1970s.
While a few Southern institutions including UT, the University of Virginia (UVa), and the University of North Carolina (UNC), improved their curricular quality and research productivity between World War II and the 1960s, no educational expert described any of the Southern universities, public or private, as distinguished institutions. Despite the appeals of college presidents to state legislators for aid to fortify graduate programs and research efforts, lawmakers in many Southern states denied such requests, especially as tensions mounted over desegregation. Clarence Mohr argues that one of the most important factors that lead to the improvement of Southern higher education was desegregation. The Civil Rights movement released Southern colleges and legislators from their preoccupation with race. In addition, desegregation led to a gradual end to stigmatization from federal funding agencies, foundations, and academic leaders outside of the region. UT and A&M dealt with a more moderate state government than the colleges in Alabama and Mississippi in the 1950s and 1960s. No Texas governor ever blocked a schoolhouse door or resisted federal marshals. In addition, the Texas colleges possessed the Permanent University Fund (PUF), which enabled them to expand their physical plants. UT, and to a lesser extent A&M, were able to outperform most Southern institutions, but could not compete with Berkeley, UCLA, University of Michigan, University of Illinois, or the rest of the best public research universities identified throughout this study.

**Research Questions**

This study traces the development of the University of Texas and Texas A&M from their establishment in the 1870s and 1880s to the gradual collapse of desegregation and oppressive governmental control in the early 1960s. I hypothesize that these two state universities did not begin to compete with public universities nationally until after the elimination of segregation and
excessive government control in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Prior to these years, UT and Texas A&M were hampered by low state appropriations, hostility towards higher education within the state government, segregation, and paranoia rooted in racism and anti-communism. These conditions inhibited research activity and the improvement of academic standards, limited access to higher education for Texans, and compromised academic freedom. In addition, debates at A&M regarding the legitimacy and practicality of an all-male student body (until 1963) and compulsory military training (abolished for the final time in 1965) overshadowed the institution's academic and research aspirations. The study addresses the following overarching research questions:

How did state government funding and legislative policies shape the University of Texas and Texas A&M between the 1880s and 1965? In what ways did state government policies and actions affect academic freedom, academic development and research, and racial integration at the University of Texas and Texas A&M during this period?

This study additionally explores two sub questions to varying degrees:

(1) How did internal changes at UT and A&M enable them to advance into the national cohort of second-tier research universities?

(2) How did the development of public higher education in Texas compare with the development of public higher education in the Southern region and the rest of the nation?

To answer these questions the study focuses on three major themes: proper government policy, political interference, and academic development. Proper government policy encompasses items that are generally accepted as normal functions of state government such as the allocation of funds, appointment of governing boards, and the coordination of statewide
campus planning to ensure that each state institution fulfills its established mission. Political interference consists of efforts by government officials and political leaders outside the formal structures of government to tamper with conditions at the colleges, including critiques of curriculum, challenges to academic freedom, resistance to desegregation, and punitive actions designed to limit state financial support. Academic development encompasses activities at UT and A&M that relate to graduate and undergraduate curriculum, competitiveness for research funding, and racial equity. The study does not assume that state policymakers were inherently wrong when they interfered in the affairs of the schools; nor does it accept university officials as innocent victims. To use a western cliché, there were no black hats or white hats; only gray hats trying to define the appropriate role that the state should assume in the governance of its colleges.

This is a broad study of institutions, and as such, many subjects and individuals are unfortunately given short shrift. Analysis is limited to occurrences at the flagship campuses in Austin and College Station. While each institution possesses several branch campuses, an analysis of these branches would necessitate a separate study. Chester Burns recently published a centennial history of the UT Medical Branch at Galveston and demonstrates, while part of UT, the medical school possesses a separate history. Many of the branch campuses allegedly suffered mistreatment and neglect at the hands of their Austin and College Station parents. The University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP, formerly the College of Mines and Metallurgy), for example, struggled for a number of years to obtain what they deemed adequate support from the main campus. One El Paso critic described UTEP as a stepchild, "forced to continually borrow - - to dress up in the more favorite children's made over clothes as it were."10
The issue of access is primarily limited to the admission of African Americans and white women in the 1950s and 1960s. The omission of Mexican Americans and other Hispanics is due to the dearth of information available, and in no way does this study seek to disregard the discrimination that these individuals encountered in the State's colleges. Part of the difficulty in studying the experiences of these individuals is due to the fact that Latinos were often categorized as white and were admitted to UT and A&M, even in limited numbers, from the beginning. According to an enrollment study released in 1948, Mexican Americans composed one-sixth of the State's population and 20.4% of the white school age population, however, only 1.6% attended college in Texas. The Hispanic struggle for equity in Texas higher education is an important subject and should be pursued as a separate study in the future. Asian Americans in Texas education deserve a detailed analysis as well.11

**Significance of Study and Policy Implications**

No one has produced a policy history of public education in Texas since C.E. Evans' 1955 follow-up to Frederick Eby's 1925 work.12 While it would be desirable to revise these dated studies, this project is limited to the two flagship research universities, since UT and A&M possessed the largest enrollments and budgets and have arguably made the largest impact on the people and economy of Texas. In addition, UT and A&M were the only two public colleges in the state that competed on any level with universities outside of the South. Of the studies that exist about UT and A&M, none fully analyzes the process by which the institutions grew into competitive research universities.

While a study of 85 years may seem unwieldy, the bulk of the investigation is devoted to the years between 1920 and 1965. I have selected a substantial amount of time because it took
the years between the creation of UT and A&M and the end of segregation as well as the mellowing of the Texas Establishment in the 1960s for the two institutions to enter the national community of research universities.

This study has important policy implications. Maris Vinovskis contends that historians possess a responsibility to provide educational policymakers with analyses of change across time. Policymakers can generate more effective and durable federal and state educational programs when they better understand the history of issues and conflicts. Lawrence Stone has decried the gulf that has grown between historians and social scientists since the beginning of the twentieth century. Social scientists frequently approach their research ahistorically, analyzing current problems and formulating recommendations for the future without understanding vital connections and causes between past and current issues.13

The arguments of Vinovskis and Stone are pertinent to the current practice of higher education policymaking in Texas. Over the past decade, legislators, Regents from UT and A&M, administrators, and faculty have debated the meaning of academic freedom, the appropriate course to achieving demographic equity, the proper level of state appropriations, the content of curriculum, and the universities’ status as research institutions. At the same time, individuals have no comprehensive source where they can gain insight into the history of the state’s flagship universities. No study exists that traces the development of UT and A&M from unstable and poor colleges into prestigious research universities. The history of higher education in Texas is not unique, however the themes of governmental interference, poor funding, and slow entry into the national system of higher education provide a distinctive history. While remnants of the past remain, the UT and Texas A&M have overcome many of the Southern and Texas-
specific challenges that prevented the schools from keeping pace with colleges outside of the former Confederacy over the last century.

Today, both UT and A&M boast top-ranked graduate and professional programs and possess membership in the prestigious Association of American Universities (AAU). UT was inducted into the AAU in 1929 and A&M only recently achieved this honor in 2001. The path to excellence for these institutions was neither simple nor preordained. A study that analyzes the process that UT and A&M endured to become top research universities should be an invaluable resource to both educational researchers and policymakers who work in Texas and the Southern region.

Methods

This inquiry aims to meet the standard set by Goodchild and Huk in their assessment of over 3,300 collegiate histories. These authors lament that institutional histories are often stilted grand narratives that do little more than make alumni feel good. Further, historians of higher education tend to depict colleges as functioning in a vacuum; isolated from, or worse, irrelevant to the societies they serve. Such an approach ignores the fact that a dynamic relationship exists between universities and the external structures and forces that act upon them. This study eschews that myopic approach and instead focuses upon the mutual relationship between the state and its institutions of higher education.¹⁴

The study analyzes the impact of state government on higher education in Texas. To a lesser extent, the study traces the development of UT and A&M in relation to higher education in the United States between the 1880s and 1960s. Conclusions related to Texas higher education and the nation were ascertained through examination of secondary literature and statistical

To investigate state government and university relations as well as academic development at UT and A&M, primary sources were consulted at the Texas State Library and Archives Commission (TSLAC) in Austin, the main repository of official executive and legislative records. Additional government resources are located in the Center for American History (UTCAH) at UT. The TSLAC contains personal papers of most of the state’s twentieth century governors and numerous influential legislators and powerbrokers active in state politics between the 1880s and 1960s. Institutional information including regent’s papers, presidential papers, financial records, reports on research activity, faculty, and students, were analyzed at the UTCAH and the Cushing Archives at Texas A&M University.

As is frequently the case when working with archival collections, limitations exist. The most serious problem involves the A&M archives. Texas A&M did not establish its archive until 1950. The Cushing Archives possesses Board of Directors' meeting minutes, but these rarely consisted of more than agendas, resolutions, votes concerning resolutions, partial budget requests, and lists of faculty and their salaries. It is difficult to gain a sense of the dynamics between board members and the president. As for presidents' papers, Cushing contains nothing but scrapbooks and newspaper clippings for presidents prior to James Earl Rudder (1959-1970). Even Rudder's files lack personal correspondence and detailed reports that provide insight into his vision for the institution. The dearth of material at A&M and a wealth of information at the UTCAH mean that the story is often uneven.
Overview of Chapters

The study proceeds with a review of pertinent works dealing with the history and politics of Texas and its colleges, as well as American higher education with an emphasis on the South and the West. Chapter Three condenses the first forty-five years of A&M and UT history to provide background and establish themes that persist throughout the thesis. These themes include constitutional constraints, political conflict, competition for resources, academic mediocrity, mission clashes, paranoia at UT and traditionalism at A&M. The colleges made several fruitless attempts to divide the Permanent University Fund (PUF) during the 1910s. Negotiations intensified after wildcatters discovered oil on the West Texas university lands in 1923. Chapter Four describes these negotiations that changed the relationship between the colleges and improved their financial health. Although newfound oil wealth helped UT replace its run-down shacks with durable classrooms and laboratories and A&M expand its relatively well-developed physical plant, faculty salaries suffered substantially during the Great Depression. Economic conditions of the 1930s are discussed in Chapter Five. As leading research universities made great strides in privately sponsored organized research in the 1920s and 1930s, UT made moderate progress, while A&M remained largely stagnant, with the exception of research activity at the agricultural experiment station. Chapter Six highlights the university research environment between 1920 and 1940 and describes the nature of organized research at UT and A&M. The years between 1939 and 1945 were tumultuous ones for UT and A&M. UT President Homer Rainey and A&M President T.O. Walton stepped down in scandal. The Rainey episode remains one of the most celebrated case studies of American academic freedom. Chapter Seven analyzes the role that the Texas Regulars, a reactionary political faction, played in Rainey and Walton departures. This lengthy chapter is following by a brief
portrayal of UT and A&M's participation in the war effort between 1942 and 1945 in Chapter Eight.

The immediate postwar era was one of transition and unrest. African Americans made serious attempts to dismantle segregation. The NAACP selected the UT law school as its test site to gain African American access to graduate and professional programs. Veterans attend college in record numbers and this dramatic influx of students placed considerable strain on old disciplinary codes as well as physical plants. A&M found itself embroiled in a fight between its Corps of Cadets, veterans, and President Gibb Gilchrist. All of the Texas colleges participated in a broad-based building campaign. This campaign revealed the bitter tension that existed between UT and A&M and their rivals such as Texas Tech. These events are included in Chapter Nine.

Herman Sweatt's U.S. Supreme Court victory signaled the beginning of a long struggle by African Americans to gain equal access to UT. Chapter Ten depicts the desegregation process at UT through the late 1950s. A&M did not admit African American students until 1963. The land-grant college spent this decade debating the role that compulsory membership in the Corps of Cadets and women should play in institution's future. This chapter also provides a general assessment of the state of higher education in 1950s Texas, anticommunism, and investment plans for the PUF.

Chapter Eleven describes the organized research environment at UT and A&M between 1945 and 1965. Mandatory military training, and coeducation at A&M, desegregation at both universities, and statewide efforts to improve higher education in Texas constitute the subjects of Chapter Twelve. The final chapter attempts to synthesize this long stream of events and themes.
Notes

7 Merton introduced the “Matthew Effect” in a 1968 article entitled, "The Matthew Effect in Science," Science 159 (January 5, 1968): 56 -- 63. The Oxford English Dictionary provides the clearest definition of Merton's term: "the tendency for an established cause, institution, etc., to receive continued or increased support, while less established counterparts remain overlooked." available online at http://dictionary.oed.com (accessed December 14, 2004).
Chapter Two

Review of the Literature

An understanding of higher education in Texas requires an understanding of politics and culture in the Lone Star State. In addition, facts regarding higher education in Texas are inadequate without knowledge of how colleges developed in other states. For these reasons, the literature review is divided into four sections: general political theory, Texas political history, Texas higher education history, and higher education in the Western and Southern United States.

General Political Theory

This study adopts two perspectives as a means for understanding two aspects of higher education in Texas: competition and university/state conflict. Ben-David postulated that American universities developed in an environment that was open and competitive. Individuals, at least European Americans, could move more easily between economic classes than their European counterparts. Communities established colleges to meet local demands and aspirations. Several states employed review teams throughout the 1910s and 1920s who recommended the creation of coordinating bodies to regulate the course offerings, building projects, and general expenditures at the collection of land-grant, flagship, regional state colleges, and normal/teachers' colleges. This idea that public higher education should be coordinated did not catch on until the seventh decade of the 20th century when legislators awoke and discovered that their states had too many colleges to support. In this highly decentralized system, with no national university or hard and fast rules regarding the mission and administration of public colleges, universities competed for students, faculty, finite
appropriations, and the production of knowledge. In the case of private institutions such as Johns Hopkins, MIT, and the University of Chicago and the best public institutions such as the University of California, competition pushed universities to acquire the most qualified researchers and produce the most promising graduate students who were capable of making the greatest scientific discoveries. For UT, A&M and other public universities, particularly those lacking the financial resources to build state-of-the-art labs, field the best scholars, and attract the most promising students, competition often bred bitter rivalries, inefficiency, and mediocrity.¹

Ladd and Lipset argued that conflict is inherent in university and government relationships. Universities are charged with three sometimes contradictory tasks: to inculcate youth with the prevailing traditions and knowledge that society deems important (teaching), to produce new knowledge (research), and to provide the community with solutions to practical problems (service). Society expects faculty to mold loyal citizens as well as discover truths that might challenge the wisdom of government policies. Simultaneously, lawmakers and citizens frequently view academics with suspicion. Faculty are either eccentrics who waste money on fringe esoterica or political radicals who want to overthrow the government. Academics, in turn, either adopt an extreme view that their critics are miserly, meddlesome simpletons, or accept a moderate view and work to reconcile their often-inconsistent teaching, research, and service responsibilities. For these reasons, academics and lawmakers exist in a permanently contentious environment. This study has already alluded to political tension between UT and A&M and the state government. Ladd and Lipset's arguments, as well as those of Ben-David will be explored in greater detail throughout the study.²
Texas Politics

Geopolitics and Texas

Scholars have placed Texas in both the South and the West in attempts to decipher the complex social, political, and economic systems of this enormous state. Patricia Limerick, one of the most prominent contemporary Western historians, considers Texas to be part of the West. Western states possess a "legacy of conquest." European Americans settled in the West in the early nineteenth century. These settlers fought Native American tribes, Mexicans, and a variety of other peoples for control of land and natural resources. Even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Western states such as California and Texas boast the most diverse populations in the nation, and many of the political conflicts in these states focus on issues of cultural and ethnic/racial diversity. In addition to conquest and cultural conflict, the West is distinguished by rugged individualism. Topographically speaking, Western lands are arid, and the region was and is rich in natural resources such as oil.³

Southern historians have included Texas in the region in part because Southerners constituted the largest portion of settlers in the Mexican colony beginning in the 1820s. Texas revolutionaries waged war against Mexico for a host of reasons, not the least of which was Mexico's ban on slavery. Once Texas gained independence from Mexico in 1836, the new republic permitted slavery. Texas politicians aligned themselves with political leaders in the Southern states from the time Texas achieved statehood in 1845 and continued to stand with the South when Southern Democrats bolted the party and formed the Dixiecrats in 1948. Following the Civil War, Texans created racially segregated schools and colleges, disfranchised African Americans, and instituted poll taxes.
While researchers can convincingly place Texas in both the West and the South, Walter Buenger identified three guidelines that individuals should follow when thinking about Texas. First, while Texas constitutes a sprawling 267,277 square miles, each region of the state is culturally, politically, and economically connected to one another and to the South. Second, the Alamo and all the trappings and ideology that accompanied the Texas Revolution were important to Texans from 1836 onward, but its citizens were Southerners first and Texans second until the centennial celebration of 1936. Finally, in any analysis of Texas, individuals must, "allow for complexity."  

Politically and culturally, Texas between 1836 and the slow dismantling of segregation, was Southern. The majority of Texans resided in the eastern portion of the state between 1830 and 1900. These transplanted Southerners moved gradually westward and planted the ingredients for racism, states rights ideology, anticommunism, and religious fundamentalism throughout the state.

Economically, the state began to separate itself from the former Confederacy at the turn of the twentieth century. The size of Texas and the availability of uncultivated land meant a lower farmer-to-acre ratio and higher wages for tenant farmers and sharecroppers. With fewer workers to till the soil, Texas farms relied on fewer skilled workers and more machines. Texas farms, therefore, achieved modernization that was comparable to states outside of the South. Unlike most of the South, Texas had a comparably more fluid economic system. Much of this openness could be attributed to the oil boom that began with the Spindletop discovery in 1900 and catapulted Texas to the top producer of oil in the nation by the 1930s. Texans enjoyed elephantine profits and almost nonexistent government control over petroleum in the 1910s and 1920s. V.O. Key noted that by 1950, 158 of the State's 254 counties were involved in
commercial petroleum production. Taxes and drilling procedures arrived with the New Deal, but Texans continued to profit in spite of what they described as socialist inspired federal intervention.\(^5\)

Texans began to see themselves more as Texans and less as Southerners beginning in 1910 and culminating with the centennial of the Texas Revolution in 1936. During these years, folklorists, historians, and songwriters began producing works that celebrated the events that led to Texas independence and de-emphasized the state's membership in the Confederacy.\(^6\)

In his study of race relations in Texas cotton culture, Neil Foley concluded that the best way to understand Texas social, political, and economic culture is to study the trapezoid space between the cities of Dallas, Corpus Christi, Houston, and San Antonio. This area serves as a microcosm. The cultural characteristics of the West, South, and Mexico collided in this space and gave birth to a cultural system that was unique. Large numbers of German, French, and Czech immigrants settled in Texas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and enhanced the dramatic heterogeneity of the state. Despite this diverse environment, racial discrimination extended to Mexican Americans as well as African Americans, although lighter skinned Mexicans and Latinos were able to blend in and escape mistreatment at the hands of Anglos.\(^7\)

**Texas Political Structure**

Similar to its culture, the Texas political structure possessed distinguishing features. Civil rights activist Virginia Durr declared to fellow iconoclast Maury Maverick Jr. that she could not "make head nor tail out of Texas politics." Her home state of Alabama was easy because power revolved around white supremacy. Texas was far more mysterious and complex.\(^8\)
Using Daniel Elazar’s three-category typology of state political culture, Nimmo and Oden, and later George Green, labeled Texas as traditionalist and individualist. Texas was traditionalist in that it was governed by a smug group of oligarchs committed to protecting the status quo. The state was individualistic in that those in power believed that the government’s role was to protect the interests of the most assertive groups and individuals. Because of the traditionalistic-individualistic qualities of Texas political culture, David Nevin observed that Texas politicos placed material self-interest above the common good. Therefore, the state boasted rapid growth in construction and oil fields while it was woefully deficient in its funding and development of public schools, social services, roads, and public utilities.  

No group, not even the Establishment or the Texas Regulars of the 1940s and 1950s, could be described as a machine, at least not of the Chicago or New York variety complete with a spoils system and elaborate bloc voting networks. Texas was too large for its powerbrokers to organize a cohesive machine. In addition, Texas lacked the rigid factional and regional loyalties found in South Carolina and Mississippi with upcountry and low country divisions.

As the most cohesive Texas power network, this informal group of men met in various cities and established the Texas Democratic Platform over poker games, whiskey, and cigars. The power elite would then handily gain the support of the small businessmen in real estate, oil, construction, and automotive firms who shared their fears of labor unions, federal regulations, and academic subversives. The Establishment was influential, but not exclusive. Before the state Democratic primary, there were as many as twelve gubernatorial candidates in some elections. Power could shift quickly since governors served two-year terms until the 1960s. A political outsider could easily enter the Establishment if he shared the interests of the power elite. This is precisely how W. Lee O'Daniel secured the governor's race in 1938. While O'Daniel
presented himself as one of the common-folk, he was encouraged to enter politics by some of the wealthiest corporate bigwigs in Texas.\textsuperscript{11}

**Studies of Texas Political History**

Few critical studies exist on Texas politics between 1876 and 1965 because scholars have devoted the bulk of their research to the Texas Revolution. Those who extend their research beyond mere reporting are discussed in the following paragraphs. These writers reference public higher education in varying degrees, but each one portrays the state government's involvement in the institutions as excessive. The majority of events at the colleges that are described by authors of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Texas political history are efforts by the legislature and/or governor to reduce appropriations, limit academic freedom, regulate the content of curriculum, and exclude African Americans and other minorities from admission.

Allyn Barr covered Texas politics from the end of Reconstruction to the beginning of Progressivism in *Reconstruction to Reform*. Barr made few references to the status of common or higher education, but he did note that once the Democrats recaptured control of the state from the Republicans, who dominated state government during Reconstruction, they slashed appropriations for common schools as well as the newly formed Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College and the University of Texas.\textsuperscript{12}

At the same time that Texas lawmakers diminished the role of public education, the state became increasingly urban and industrialized. There were dramatic disputes over land ownership and the beginnings of business monopoly. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a number of civic and professional groups initiated additional efforts to reform tax laws and regulate corporations. These groups helped elect Thomas Campbell governor in 1906. While
Campbell’s administration enacted many progressive measures that were introduced in other states, such as increased funding for education and commission-style government at the municipal level in Wisconsin under Robert La Folette, Campbell’s administration stopped short of enacting a state income tax.13

Barr provided few details on the politics of education at any level in his research, but his work serves as a starting point to answer a number of questions about the state and activities at UT and A&M between 1876 and the first decade of the twentieth century. What reasons did the state legislature, composed largely of Democrats, have for opposing state financing of higher education? How did industrialization impact the two colleges? In his history of Texas A&M, Dethloff stated that the Texas Grange and the Farmer’s Alliance criticized A&M for not offering the practical agricultural and engineering education the institution was obligated to provide to citizens under the federal Morrill Act. Were there additional challenges made to the two institutions for not providing education to meet the needs of students who were preparing to enter an increasingly industrialized work environment? Did increases in state and personal wealth change lawmaker’s attitudes towards funding higher education, particularly after the discovery of oil at Spindletop in 1900?

Walter Buenger’s 2001 study of economic development in East Texas between Reconstruction and the New Deal revealed that Texas conformed to many Southern patterns including legalized segregation and low aid to common schools. During the years between Reconstruction and the New Deal however, the economic and political systems in Texas became more open than the rest of the former Confederacy. The Texas political system was always split into multiple and constantly changing factions. Ever-changing factions meant that no group ever achieved long-term domination over state politics. A diverse economic system led the state to
greater integration with the nation. The open political system encouraged a diverse economy even before World War I. Farms were modernized, the lumber and cotton firms boomed, and oil companies sprouted up all over the eastern portion of the state after 1900. Planters and industrialists never exerted widespread control over Texas as they did in many other Southern states.  

Texans began to see themselves more as Texans and less as Southerners beginning in 1910 and culminating with the one-hundredth anniversary of the Texas Revolution in 1936. During these years folklorists, historians, and songwriters began producing works that celebrated the events that led to Texas independence from Mexico and de-emphasized the state’s participation in the tragic Civil War. Buenger’s contention that Texas became less Southern during the first third of the twentieth century warrants further investigation, especially in the area of higher education. How did the development of UT and Texas A&M compare with the experiences of flagship state universities and land-grant colleges in other Southern states? Following the discovery of oil on lands owned by UT and Texas A&M during the 1920s, the Texas universities possessed the largest endowments in the former Confederacy. While UT and A&M were wealthier, the institutions had limited access to their endowments until the 1950s and even then had to rely on insufficient and sporadic state appropriations. Both institutions remained segregated until the late 1950s and early 1960s. Neither institution was ranked among outstanding research universities. Both were burdened with state policymakers who threatened to eliminate academic freedom and attempted to control even the most minute campus policies.  

Lewis Gould analyzed Texas politics between 1911 and 1921, years that marked the entry of Texas into national politics. Texans assumed prominent positions in the Wilson administration with presidential advisor Colonel Edward M. House, Postmaster General Albert
S. Burleson, and Cone Johnson in the State Department. The Texas Democrats of this era controlled every aspect of state politics. These were years of bitter conflict between factions in the Democratic Party and Gould notes that no appropriations bill passed during regular legislative session from 1907 until the mid-1920s.  

Three governors served during this period. Progressive-minded Thomas Campbell and Oscar Colquitt worked for prison reform by ending the convict lease system. Colquitt also pushed for increased appropriations for higher education. Colquitt’s successor James Ferguson cared little for higher education, but worked to increase funding for rural common schools. Ferguson, despised by most of the ruling elite, was re-elected in 1916 by farmers who believed that he could eliminate farm tenancy.  

During his campaigns for governor, Ferguson stated that Texas should spend all it could afford on improving education in the state as long as additional state funds did not go to the University of Texas. Ferguson claimed that UT commanded a disproportionate amount of the state’s financial resources. After two years of bitter conflict, Governor Ferguson threatened to eliminate appropriations to the University of Texas and close the institution in 1917. The University escaped Ferguson’s wrath when he was impeached in September 1917 for mismanaging state funds and for accepting contributions from brewers.  

Gould devoted an entire chapter of his book and a 1982 article to James Ferguson and the University of Texas. He makes no mention of how Governor Ferguson treated Texas A&M other than to say that A&M escaped his wrath because it took care of the Governor’s cattle. Regardless of the initial impact that these events had on A&M and UT, Ferguson’s attacks set the tone for relations between the state and the universities for the next several decades.
Norman Brown analyzed the condition of Texas politics in the 1920s in his 1984 book *Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug*. During this decade, business progressives, the Ku Klux Klan, and former Governor James Ferguson and his wife Miriam fought for control of Texas. Business progressives included Governors Pat Neff (1920 – 1924) and Dan Moody (1924 – 1930). Neff and Moody worked to eliminate governmental waste and increase efficiency. Both of these men were UT graduates who favored advancement for institutions of higher education. Neff was especially interested in eliminating program duplication at the public colleges and appointed a taskforce chaired by noted academic Lotus Coffman to study the problem in 1923. Like Neff, Moody supported improvements in higher education funding, public health, highways, and prisons. Moody and the Legislature allocated special funds for construction at UT and A&M.¹⁸

While the Ku Klux Klan never elected a governor, they won a majority of the seats in the Texas Legislature and a United States Senate seat when Earle Mayfield defeated James Ferguson in 1922. Ferguson’s wife Miriam then defeated the Klan in the 1924 gubernatorial race. Miriam Ferguson was largely a puppet for her husband who masterminded her campaign and administration. Once in office, the Fergusons eliminated academic and administrative departments at UT and A&M and drastically reduced the higher education appropriations bill in 1925. The Ferguson administration of the 1920s lasted only one term due in part to allegations that that the couple had engaged in corruption with companies hired to build state highways.¹⁹

In *The Establishment in Texas Politics: The Primitive Years, 1938 – 1957*, George Green assessed the process by which the corporate elite of Texas gained almost complete control over the state. This corporate elite composed of oilmen, real estate tycoons, and other corporate leaders were anti-New Deal and anticommunist. In addition, the Establishment believed that
university faculty supported radical politics and racial equality. The political elite responded by attempting to abolish academic freedom in the colleges. Beginning with flour salesman and bluegrass musician Governor W. Lee “Pass the Biscuits Pappy” O’ Daniel and peaking with the vigorous segregationist Governor Allan Shivers, this group of politicians formed the Texas Regulars in 1944 in an effort to defeat Roosevelt. In Texas, the Regulars fired UT President Homer P. Rainey in 1944, tried to bar African American Herman Sweatt from entering the UT law school beginning in 1946, attempted to pass anti-strike bills in the Legislature at every turn, and conducted investigations at almost every educational institution in the state in search of communists between 1951 and 1955.20

Texas stood as one of the wealthiest states with the poorest educational conditions in the 1940s and 1950s. During these years, Texas led the nation in oil, gas, cotton, wool, cattle, and sulfur production. The state sat in the bottom quartile in aid to dependent children and expense per pupil in public schools. Texas was the only wealthy, industrialized state in this position. Politics became more open and moderate with the election of Price Daniel in 1956. According to Green, the Establishment began to lose its control over higher education when Price Daniel assumed office in January 1957. These years are examined in Chapters Ten and Twelve.

**Studies of the University of Texas and Texas A&M University**

Histories of Texas public higher education are sparse and overwhelmingly celebratory. Clarence Ousley’s, "History of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas,” (1935), George Sessions Perry’s *The Story of Texas A&M University* (1951), and Henry Dethloff’s *A Centennial History of Texas A&M University, 1876 -- 1976* (1975) affirm this claim. Margaret Catherine Berry’s *The University of Texas: A Pictorial Account of Its First Century* takes a
similar approach and is closer to a college yearbook or a coffee table volume than a scholarly history.21

Frederick Eby assembled the first comprehensive history of Texas education in 1925. Eby identified two overarching conflicts that affected the delivery of higher education in Texas. First, individuals split into camps of east and west when the legislature began discussing the location and the number of public colleges the state should establish in 1858. Regional conflicts persisted after the Civil War, but Eby never explained the stances of each region. Second, Eby noted that between 1909 and 1921, state institutions increased from three to nine. Legislative appropriations increased during this period, but not in proportion to the number of institutions in existence. The state colleges grew unregulated and by the early 1920s, the colleges duplicated programs and failed to coordinate efforts. In summing up higher education in Texas, Eby embraced the oft-repeated conclusion that Texas ranked as one of the wealthiest states in the nation with one of the poorest education systems at all levels. He attributed the miserable conditions to political conflict, lack of planning and coordination, and poor funding. Cecil Evans’ sequel to Eby’s work, The Story of Texas Schools, was little more than a set of college profiles and a record of legislation that was passed up to 1955.22

A&M commissioned Henry Dethloff to write a history commemorating the institution’s centennial in 1976. As is the case with many institutional histories, Dethloff wrote his two-volume history of A&M with an alumni audience in mind. This celebratory work contains little critical analysis of the college’s struggle to improve curricular quality or expand research activity in its first hundred years. The school did not desegregate or admit women until 1963, yet desegregation received one paragraph and the struggle for women to attend the college received a few pages of discussion. In most chapters Dethloff failed to meaningfully relate the
development of Texas A&M to the development of the University of Texas, higher education trends in the nation, or political forces at both the state and federal levels.

Dethloff, however, introduced a number of compelling issues that the institution faced over time that warrant further study. There were many who were opposed to the establishment of the college in 1876. In addition there was debate as to whether A&M should be a stand-alone institution delivering a classical as well as an agricultural and engineering curriculum or the agricultural and mechanical branch of the yet to be created University of Texas. Dethloff argued that debates over the mission of the institution hindered its development until the early 1930s. Even though A&M possessed its own governing board, state government regarded A&M as a branch of the University of Texas on paper. Over the next forty years, UT and A&M officials met repeatedly in an effort to propose a formal separation and a plan for the Permanent University Fund (PUF) that would be acceptable to both institutions. Dethloff mentioned several joint committees formed to address relations between the two institutions, but his discussion is superficial and does not fully account for the Legislature’s role in the process of separating the schools and securing funding for the two. One of the biggest factors in resolving the issue of access to the PUF was the discovery of oil at Santa Rita in 1923. The oil wells provided the PUF with more than five million dollars by 1926. Dethloff notes that this money provided UT and A&M with some of the largest public university endowments. However, A&M only received one-third of the funds while UT received two-thirds. He did not adequately address the conflict and rivalry that intensified prior to this agreement. Dethloff misleadingly ended his discussion of the battle for the PUF by stating, “Unquestionably, the outstanding factor that had made Texas higher education effective and competent, if not outstanding, has been the availability of vast and
essentially unrestricted sums of money for the exclusive use of Texas colleges and universities.”

Dethloff noted that A&M went through a difficult period from the 1930s through the mid-1960s. The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools denied accreditation to chemical engineering and issued scathing evaluations of several programs in 1937. The accrediting body deemed the library inadequate and stated that the institution had devoted too much money to building construction at the expense of hiring quality faculty. Dethloff writes that conditions improved little over the next twenty years, but his discussion is limited to the fact that A&M remained an all-male college steeped in military tradition. The University of Texas was at war with its Regents and the Legislature during these years, fighting for academic freedom and control of its operating budget. Did A&M encounter similar problems? Dethloff failed to describe the process by which the institution addressed problems so that it could become a competitive research university. Once again, he did not place A&M within the context of state politics or the development of higher education at the national level during this era.

Journalist and UT alumnus Ronnie Dugger published an account of excessive governmental control at the University of Texas in 1974. Our Invaded Universities is more journalistic inquiry and even personal political treatise than objective history. Joe Frantz's memoir, Forty Acre Follies adopted a similar approach. Dugger used legislative records, primary sources from university archives, newspapers, and secondary sources to demonstrate that politicians thwarted the advancement of the University of Texas from 1883 to the early 1970s. Dugger wrote from the perspective of the University of Texas and did not analyze the ways in which members of the state government formulated their policies towards the University. He did not compare the way that Texas lawmakers managed affairs at Texas A&M
or the other state institutions. Dugger failed to describe many details of the interplay between the university community, lawmakers, and the public. This study will elaborate on these matters.\textsuperscript{24}

John J. Lane's bold examination remains one of the best works on UT as well as A&M. Written in 1891, Lane tracked the establishment of the two institutions beginning with the 1840s. Lane predicted that low funding, factional politics, and UT/A&M rivalry would keep the institutions from becoming great. He posed questions that critics and college leaders would ponder for the next several decades. Why did the 1876 Constitutional Convention elect to establish A&M as a branch of UT with its own governing board and separate sources of income seven years before the UT held classes? The State financed building construction at A&M through general appropriations, yet UT was forced to operate out of hovels until the PUF grew larger. Finally, UT was supposed to be a "University of the first class" yet the Legislature repeatedly siphoned money away from it. His study is revisited in the next chapter.\textsuperscript{25}

The most recent work on UT came from Doug Rossinow. \textit{The Politics of Authenticity} (1998) depicts the antiwar, civil rights, and free speech movements on the UT-Austin campus. He presents a well-written account of how the New Left organized and functioned at what he describes as an archconservative campus. Rossinow, however, depends heavily on the work of UT graduates Ronnie Dugger, author of \textit{Our Invaded Universities} and editor of the far left \textit{Texas Observer}, sociologist C. Wright Mills, and the insightful yet frequently partisan Willie Morris, former editor of \textit{Harpers}. Armed with these secondary sources and interviews with UT alumni, Rossinow makes the claim that Austin was a unilaterally hostile place for liberals up to the 1960s. This politically stilted narrative portrays Governor John Connally and the UT Regents as one-dimensional anti-intellectuals who cared for little more than their political power. Connally's initiatives and the Regents minutes reveal a more complex picture of individuals who
cared deeply about UT's students and academic reputation. This study strives to portray both a positive commitment to improvement, as well as the agonizingly slow progress that UT and A&M made towards integration.  

Studies of State Higher Education

Since scholars have effectively argued that Texas is both Western and Southern, studies of higher education in states of both regions are included in this literature review. There is a dearth of material on Western higher education and a substantial supply of research on Southern higher education. For this reason, a review of Southern higher education is included following a discussion of studies of Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina, while the section on the West is limited to works on higher education in Colorado and California.

Regardless of geography, most state higher education systems in the Union adhered to a set of general patterns in their development. Virtually every flagship state university and/or land-grant college struggled and continues to struggle with the challenges of money, mission, organization, and access. Public universities are dependent upon their legislatures for a portion of their funding and compete with other colleges, primary/secondary schools, public works, prisons, and a host of other entities for this support. Even the University of California, long considered the nation's preeminent public university, has fought to gain adequate funding and been subjected to governors and legislators who have sought to cut programs and projects. While state flagship universities have largely been free to expand their degree programs, research units, and extension programs, they have spent at least the past eighty years fending off regional state colleges, many of them teachers colleges, which have moved beyond their undergraduate and master's level teaching missions, to create research labs and award doctorates.
Should states permit their public colleges to grow in size and scope without regard for cost or quality? This was a question posed by lawmakers and educational consultants most notably in the 1920s/1930s and again in the 1950s/1960s. Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas employed national experts to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of their public higher education systems, first in the 1920s when it became clear that colleges engaged in unnecessary program duplication and competition for state funds. Review teams, often consisting of Arthur J. Klein, George Works, George Zook, Fred Kelly, and Lotus Coffman, invariably urged colleges to consolidate their governing boards into single statewide coordinating bodies, discouraged regional state colleges from expanding their graduate programs, and pleaded with land-grant colleges and separate state flagships universities to coordinate the delivery of their engineering programs. Faced with enormous budget shortfalls during the Great Depression, these states hired another round of experts, this time to examine the financial efficiency of all state services. These teams also called for coordinating bodies to regulate the oft-unruly collection of public colleges. States across the nation returned to the problem of coordinating public higher education in the 1950s. The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the GI Bill, enabled thousands of veterans to attend college. This postwar enrollment surge necessitated massive building expansion on most campuses, from the flagship state universities to community colleges. As campuses added laboratories, classrooms, and residence halls, and expanded undergraduate and graduate programs, states searched for ways to increase financial and administrative efficiency. The University of Texas, the Consolidated University of North Carolina (University of North Carolina, North Carolina State, and North Carolina College for Women), and numerous other state universities, received grants from the Ford Foundation in the early 1950s and employed Cresap, McCormick, and Paget to
analyze their administrative structures. After decades of resisting coordination, states and their universities heeded the advice of external review teams and established statewide coordinating boards in the 1950s and 1960s. These boards would manage enrollments, budgets, and curriculum at what had become a complex set of land-grant colleges, state flagship universities, regional teachers' colleges, and community colleges.

In addition to questions relating to the size and scope of public universities, states and academic leaders grappled with who should attend these institutions. Colleges in the Southern and Border states barred African Americans from attending predominantly white institutions until ordered by courts ranging from the state level all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. A number of Southern land-grant institutions, including Texas A&M, North Carolina State, and Virginia Tech, denied access to women.

Land-grant colleges contended with a special set of competing interests for a century following the passage of the 1862 Morrill Act. The Morrill Act provided each state with an allotment of land to be sold, with the proceeds going to establish a college devoted to the study of agriculture, engineering, and military science, without the exclusion of liberal arts. During the 1880s, agricultural lobbies, most notably the Grange, criticized the land-grant colleges for giving scant attention to their agricultural departments and model farms. Various groups continued this criticism in the first half of the twentieth century. Land-grant universities struggled to maintain a curriculum that included engineering, agriculture, and liberal arts and remained faithful to the Morrill mandate. The curricular requirements of the Morrill Act were sufficiently vague to allow states to create institutions that would appropriately serve their needs. Roger Williams noted that it was the 'academic oxymora' of the land grant colleges that led to considerable internal and external conflicts over mission.²⁸
Southern land-grants, and to a lesser degree, all others, required military training for all able male students. The training usually consisted of little more than marching about the campus in lines until the federal government created the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in 1916. Most land-grant institutions maintained compulsory ROTC service for freshman and sophomore men until the 1960s, sometimes at the expense of academics.

Each state university possesses a distinctive history that has been shaped by individual campus personalities, and local political, economic, and social structures. Both these defining attributes and the general patterns highlighted above are briefly discussed in the next section.

**Higher Education in Colorado and California**

In his 1964 work, *The Higher Learning in Colorado*, Michael McGiffert followed the development of public as well as private higher education in the state from 1860 to 1940. McGiffert identified three major principles adopted by Colorado’s colleges: 1) service to the community; 2) relevant and practical curriculum; and 3) equal access to college. African Americans attended Colorado’s colleges even in the mid-1920s when the statehouse was under Klan rule. McGiffert described Colorado’s public colleges as political battlegrounds, but not in the same manner that scholars have depicted Southern colleges. Colorado public institutions fought with one another and with other state agencies such as mental institutions and prisons for funding, particularly in the nineteenth century. Colorado colleges, however, did not contend with hostile legislators. Unlike the South where education was an instrument for socializing the elite, McGiffert contended that Coloradans believed that collegiate education was essential for a democratized citizenry. All citizens were entitled to a college education and local colleges had a responsibility to their communities to offer courses that the public demanded. Most populated
areas had their own college and even the University of Colorado and Colorado State were composed of geographically homogeneous student populations.\textsuperscript{29}

Between 1880 and 1920, collegiate enrollments increased dramatically. By 1920, schools no longer catered to local communities. Since most colleges, from the University of Colorado to the state normal schools, offered a comprehensive curriculum, there was widespread program duplication in the state. The state colleges struggled with coordination and duplication until at least 1940. Despite these problems, Colorado colleges steadily improved in quality beginning in the early twentieth century. In 1906, the German yearbook \textit{Minerva} rated the University of Colorado as one of the foremost eleven American universities and among the top five state universities.

Writing nearly 40 years after McGiffert, John Aubrey Douglass published \textit{The California Idea and American Higher Education: 1850 to the 1960 Master Plan}. Douglass profiled the manner in which California created a system of research universities, state colleges, and community colleges. The Master Plan embodied the educational philosophy of a state that stressed not only the democratic aspects of public higher education, but also meritocracy and excellence in research. At the same time that regional teachers colleges expanded access and course offerings, the University of California at Berkeley fought to reserve research as a mission exclusively for its campus.\textsuperscript{30}

While the majority of states embraced universal access to higher education following the passage of the GI Bill in 1944 and release of the Truman Commission’s report in 1947, this principle was evident in California during the Progressive era of the early twentieth century. During the first twenty years of the twentieth century, California Progressives established and funded teachers colleges throughout the state and added teaching units as well as campuses to the
University of California. By 1920, California boasted the highest public collegiate enrollment in the nation. While the University of California had received a small but steady flow of state funds since the 1880s, the institution received a greater percentage of its budget from state appropriations after 1911 when the legislature passed a bill providing for funding based on current and future enrollments. The legislature also began to appropriate annual funds for research at the University of California.

Following World War II, academics, and lawmakers opened serious discussions on the future of coordination within the state’s tripartite system of higher education. Efforts to solidify the structure succeeded in 1960. The Master Plan did not create a tight, centralized coordinating board, but a weak body designed to direct state planning. The state gave the systems (the University of California, the California State colleges and universities, and the community colleges) the authority to govern themselves.

The cases of Colorado and California suggest that Western states placed a higher priority on efficiency, widespread access, and academic excellence in public higher education than the former Confederate states described in the next section. While comparisons to California and Colorado may seem inappropriate to a study of Texas, particularly during the years under analysis when Texas operated racially segregated schools, use of California in particular as a point of contrast and comparison is indeed useful. Always "the Great Exception," the University of California (Berkeley) was the foremost public research university and remains the standard against which most aspiring public flagships measure themselves. The Texas Constitution of 1876 called upon UT to become "a university of the first class." Its founders and subsequent UT leaders constantly compared their college to the University of California and even Harvard, Columbia, and MIT. The citizens of Texas held fast to many Southern values and
systems, including segregation, but they also wanted to lead the nation in every category from personal wealth, to power in Washington, to technological innovation. Neither UT Presidents Harry Benedict (1927-1937) and Harry Ransom (president 1960-1961, chancellor 1961-1963, president/chancellor 1963-1967) nor A&M Presidents Gibb Gilchrist (1944-1948) and James Earl Rudder (1959-1970) would have been satisfied with a study that only compared their institutions against their Southern counterparts. These men would have been insulted by conclusions that their schools improved to the point that they were as good as the institutions in North Carolina and Virginia. This would be like winning a race with a sizable head start. At the same time, Southern comparisons will also be made throughout this thesis.

**Higher Education in Mississippi, Georgia, & North Carolina**

While institutions of higher education in the West boast a legacy of democratic expansion and occasional political struggle, the story of public higher education in the South is one of delayed progress and dramatic political interference. David Sansing’s *Making Haste Slowly: The Troubled History of Higher Education in Mississippi* provides insight into the reasons why one of the South’s poorest states trailed behind the rest of the nation. While not a comprehensive analysis of higher education in Georgia, Thomas Dyer’s history of the University of Georgia provides information on the flagship state university in relation to the larger system of public colleges in the state of Georgia and their relations with the state government. Alice Reagan's study of North Carolina State University (NC State) and William Snider's history of the University of North Carolina (UNC) convey a portion of the collegiate saga in the Tar Heel state. These histories mirror observations made by other scholars of the South.33
Sansing described the development of higher education in Mississippi from the nineteenth century antebellum period to the 1980s and identified two themes across time. First, the state and its colleges fought to create a state higher education system that would be both efficient and accountable to the government. From the years following the Civil War until the 1960s, Mississippi’s state institutions had a difficult time coordinating their efforts and duplicated the majority of academic programs from school to school. Second, both the state government and the colleges worked to establish a state system of higher education governance that would protect the schools from political interference. Sansing concluded that program duplication, constant political interference, and a regressive state tax system kept the schools poorly funded.

Even though Mississippi created a single board of higher education in 1910, governors could appoint their allies to this body. The institutions also fell victim to demagogues such as Governor James Vardaman (1904-1908) who opposed public support of higher education and education at any level for African Americans. In addition to threats from Vardaman, Governor Theodore Bilbo (1916-1920, 1928-1932) purged the faculty at most of the public colleges in the 1930s. Bilbo’s actions resulted in the loss of accreditation by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. The state commissioned a number of external review teams to assess the condition of public higher education between the 1910s and the 1930s. Each of these review teams recommended that the state remove politics from the system, increase funding, and end academic program duplication. In 1943, Mississippi established a constitutional board of trustees. This board was more insulated from politics in the beginning, but board members became activists following the Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954. The state board resisted federal demands to desegregate higher education until James Meredith
entered the University of Mississippi in 1962. This governing body was unsuccessful in regulating the growth of colleges or halting program duplication.34

Dyer described similar challenges in Georgia. Following the Civil War, the University of Georgia failed to keep pace with growth in enrollments, faculty, and minimal research that occurred at state universities outside of the South. Advocates of the New South creed such as Henry Grady criticized the largely classical curriculum the University of Georgia in the 1880s and 1890s. Grady and others favored technical programs, agricultural education and experimentation, and teacher training.

Conditions for Georgia’s public colleges improved during the first two decades of the twentieth century. As part of a national movement to address social ills through education, health, prison, and social reform, progressives in Georgia pushed for greater efficiency and funding for all levels of public education. While the University of Georgia continued to receive small state appropriations, it benefited from financial support from philanthropist George Foster Peabody.

Enrollments at Georgia’s public colleges exploded in the 1920s. Burgeoning enrollments led to overcrowded classrooms and a shortage of faculty. Despite periodic improvements in relations between the University of Georgia and the legislature, the institution still worked against a hostile legislature that accused the college of atheism and intellectual snobbery.

As was the case with Mississippi, Georgia schools and their governing bodies tried to improve efficiency at state colleges by abolishing program duplication and bitter competition for funding between the 1910 and 1930. Georgia established a single board of regents to oversee all public colleges in the early 1930s, but this board failed to fix the problems of duplication and competition. Governor Eugene Talmadge pressured regents to remove liberals who supported
communism and racial equality. The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools stripped Georgia schools of their accreditation just as they did when Bilbo purged the state colleges in Mississippi.

Following World War II, the University of Georgia once again experienced a surge in enrollments due to large numbers of servicemen who took advantage of the G.I. Bill. University of Georgia’s President Harmon Caldwell appealed to the regents and the legislature for additional appropriations to build more facilities and purchase more library volumes and lab equipment to accommodate a record student population. Caldwell also requested an increase in faculty salaries in order to attract more research-oriented faculty. The regents and legislature did little to aid Caldwell in his quest to transform the University of Georgia into a modern research university.

Georgia’s colleges spent most of the 1950s and 1960s embroiled in the battle to desegregate. Conditions improved at the University of Georgia in 1962 with the election of pro-higher education Governor Carl Sanders. Beginning in 1963, the legislature increased funding for the University of Georgia each year throughout the 1960s. Sanders also supported expanded funds for research. Dyer argued that the University of Georgia was held back until the dismantling of segregation. Segregation had obscured all other higher education issues in the statehouse. Once the federal government settled the debate, Georgia colleges were ready to compete with state universities outside of the region.

While Mississippi and Georgia represented some of the worst conditions for state higher education in the region, North Carolina produced two of the best public colleges in the South. Like Texas, where Governor Sam Houston fought secession and resigned after the Legislature out voted him, North Carolina were not overwhelmingly in favor of secession. William Snider
agreed with British historian Alfred Toynbee's observation that North Carolina was poor and had less to lose in the Civil War than the big plantation states such as South Carolina and Virginia. North Carolina contributed far fewer generals and many more privates to the war effort than other states. After the defeat, North Carolinians were less invested in the "Lost Cause" - "less inclined than other southerners to indulge in dreams of what might have been." An interest in moving forward, albeit with segregated colleges, certainly helped the University of North Carolina and North Carolina State become modern research universities more quickly than their Southern counterparts.

The University of North Carolina (UNC) held its first classes in 1795. Although UNC remained open throughout the Civil War, it closed between 1870 and 1875. In many ways, UNC started over from scratch and spent the remainder of the nineteenth century rebuilding the campus while fighting for regular legislative appropriations. The private denominational colleges fought against UNC's efforts to gain state funding, arguing that UNC should increase its efficiency by only offering graduate and professional programs. In spite of this opposition, UNC received its first regular state appropriations of $20,000 per year in 1885. Even before the benefit of state financial support, UNC awarded its first Ph.D. to William Battle Phillips in 1883.

In spite of regular appropriations (still $20,000 per year), UNC President Edwin Alderman (1896-1900) proclaimed in his inaugural address that state support was insufficient. In comparison, Illinois provided $333,000 and Wisconsin gave $273,000 annually to their state universities. UNC finally received the building funds totaling $359,500 during President Francis Venable's tenure (1900-1914). President Henry Chase (1919-1930) initiated another building
campaign, and with the help of Governor Cameron Morrison, UNC garnered $6.6 million for construction for the 1921-1923 biennium.37

Chase also obtained a $50,000 grant from the GEB to raise faculty salaries in the early 1920s. The GEB grant, along with substantial private bequests, allowed Chase to develop the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences (IRSS). Chase recruited Howard Odum to direct the IRSS and head the sociology department. Odum launched the *Journal of Social Forces* in 1922, a highly influential publication that highlighted the educational and economic deficiencies that plagued the South. The IRSS also employed Rupert Vance and Arthur Raper, who joined Odum in creating one of the nation's top sociology programs. The UNC trustees established the first Southern university press in 1922. Under the direction of Louis Wilson (1922-1932) and William Couch (1932-1945), the UNC Press published Odum's landmark *Southern Regions in the United States* (1936), Vance's *Human Geography of the South* (1932), and Raper's *The Tragedy of Lynching* (1933). The press enabled IRSS researchers to reach a larger audience within and outside of the region. The IRSS helped distinguish UNC as a fledgling research university in the inter-war years.38

As UNC made strides in the social sciences, NC State advanced in engineering. After the Civil War, the state of North Carolina accepted the terms of the Morrill land-grant act39 and awarded the annual $7,500 interest from the land-grant fund to UNC. UNC operated an engineering school that would later compete with NC State for its survival, however, UNC never established an agriculture department. UNC relinquished the land-grant money in response to appeals by the Grange, so that the state could establish NC State as a stand-alone land-grant college in 1887. UNC President Kemp Plummer Battle was uneager to surrender the land-grant interest, but he was also relieved to be rid of any responsibility to offer vocational courses in
agriculture and engineering. UNC was free to develop like the ivy-league colleges that Battle wanted the university to become.\footnote{40}

NC State opened in 1889 and awarded its first graduate degree in 1894. As was the case at most land-grant colleges, NC State was embroiled in battles with the state Grange over the substance of agriculture curriculum in the late nineteenth century. NC State also encountered frequent conflicts with the state agricultural agency regarding who should control the agricultural extension program and the agricultural experiment station well into the twentieth century.\footnote{41}

Like most land-grant colleges, NC State required its male students to don uniforms and participate in a military training program. Once the United States War Department established the ROTC in 1916, NC State required all male freshman and sophomore students to enroll in this more formal military program. Students repeatedly appealed to the administration to make participation in ROTC optional, most notably between 1925 and 1930. Faculty joined in this fight in the 1960s. The faculty described the ROTC as an extracurricular activity that infringed on time students needed to learn math and physics. The trustees finally accepted the faculty's vote to make ROTC membership optional in 1964.\footnote{42}

The agricultural department at NC State remained mediocre at best in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Engineering programs, however, excelled. The successes in engineering encouraged President Eugene Clyde Brooks and his faculty to offer majors in the liberal arts in 1925. Journalists Josephus Daniels and Clarence Poe, both proponents of agricultural education reacted poorly to this suggestion. Brooks and the faculty abandoned their plan and pledged to further develop their agriculture program.\footnote{43}

In 1930, North Carolina Governor Max Gardner, Josephus Daniels, and Clarence Poe called for a statewide external review of public higher education to identify and eliminate
financial and administrative wastes. The Brookings Institution recommended the consolidation of UNC, NC State, and the North Carolina College for Women. The three colleges would retain their own endowments and presidents, although their titles would change to deans of administration (switched to the title of chancellor in 1945). A single board and president would govern the three institutions as the Consolidated University of North Carolina. The General Assembly approved the plan on March 27, 1931 against the wishes of President Brooks and the NC State faculty. Recently appointed UNC President Frank Porter Graham initially opposed the consolidation plan because NC State and the North Carolina College for Women were less established than his university. His opposition turned into ambivalence and then lukewarm acceptance when he realized that the General Assembly was committed to the consolidation plan. 

Graham became the first president of the Consolidated University in 1932. He was immediately faced with the question of what to do about the duplicate engineering programs at UNC and NC State. A second external review team composed of Fred Kelly, George Zook, and George Works recommended converting NC State to a junior college and placing the engineering program at UNC. After an extended and emotional debate, Graham's team decided to locate the primary engineering program at NC State in 1935.

In the years after World War II, UNC and NC State needed more buildings to meet their increased enrollments. The state General Assembly initially denied postwar construction requests, but soon approved a plan in 1947. With the help of Governor W. Kerr Scott (NC State Class of 1947), the land-grant college received $15.3 million in building funds. Snider did not elaborate on the buildings needs at the main UNC campus, but he noted that the General Assembly provided UNC with $3.79 million to expand the medical school.
Following Frank Porter Graham's departure in 1950, new Consolidated University President Gordon Gray solicited the services of outside experts to assess the effectiveness of the system's organization. Consultants from Cresap, McCormick, and Paget concluded that the campus chancellors at the three campuses lacked control over their academic deans who had routinely bypassed them in favor of President Graham. Graham never enjoyed the managerial aspects of his job and was content to enjoy collegial relationships with these deans. Gray, a UNC graduate who entered the army as a private in 1942 and rose to U.S. secretary of the army by 1949, embraced a more rigid chain of command. The consultants also recommended that the Consolidated University bestow NC State with greater control over its graduate programs. At the same time that the campuses studied their structure, they reacted to the growing challenges made by African Americans for access to the white institutions.47

UNC put up a degree of resistance to racial desegregation in the 1940s and early 1950s, but unlike Georgia and Mississippi, it relented and admitted African Americans to its law and medical schools in 1951. NC State followed suit and admitted two African American graduate students in 1953. The General Assembly had established a Black law school in 1939 and poured increasingly more money into the campus at Durham in hopes of avoiding court-ordered desegregation. In contrast, the General Assembly could not afford to establish a Black medical school. On April 4, 1951, the Consolidated University trustees voted to admit African Americans to the UNC medical school. The trustees then complied with the federal Fourth Circuit and subsequent Supreme Court mandate to admit African Americans to the UNC law school on June 6, 1951. President Gray opposed racial integration, but he supported the resolution introduced by former legislator, Thomas Pearsall. Pearsall believed that UNC should admit African American students to graduate and professional programs not available at North Carolina A&T,
the historically Black land-grant college. Snider described North Carolina as "reluctant" but willing to desegregate, first only at the graduate level. UNC was forced to admit three undergraduates in the fall of 1955, soon after a federal district court in North Carolina concluded that the 1954 Brown decision applied to higher education as well. UNC unsuccessfully appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1956. In the meantime, NC State quietly admitted two African American undergraduates in the summer of 1956.48

Concerned, once again, about unnecessary program duplication and inefficiency in its public higher education system, the North Carolina General Assembly appointed the Bryant Commission in 1955. The Commission concluded that the universities did not meet the needs of North Carolinians because they were inefficient entities that failed to coordinate their degree programs and their budgets. As a remedy, the General Assembly appointed the North Carolina Board of Education (BHE) to oversee the Consolidated University and the community colleges. The regional state colleges remained outside of this new structure and continued to increase their enrollments and course offerings. UNC and NC State had to submit their budget requests to the BHE, while the regional colleges retained the luxury of making their requests directly to the General Assembly. After more than a decade of political battles, the General Assembly approved a single higher education coordinating board in 1961.49

Although UNC and NC State revisited the coordination and duplication issues several times, the institutions made great advances in organized research in the post World War II era. NC State convinced Clifford Beck, a physicist who had worked on the Manhattan Project, to leave the Oakridge National Laboratory and lead its physics department. Under Beck's leadership, NC State established a nuclear engineering program in 1950 and activated a nuclear reactor in 1953. UNC and NC State improved their status as research universities when
Greensboro businessman and MIT graduate Romeo Guest and others created the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) in 1958. The Research Triangle was designed to attract national and international corporations and federal agencies to the Chapel Hill-Raleigh-Durham region. RTI fostered collaboration between corporations, government agencies, and scientists at UNC, NC State, and Duke.⁵⁰

Along with the University of Texas and Texas A&M, UNC and NC State exorcized many of their Southern demons and made great strides towards becoming strong research universities in the years between the Civil War and 1965. Most American state universities worked to reconcile the curricular and financial coordination issues previously described. Southern institutions additionally faced the political, social, and financial challenges outlined in the next section. Snider and Reagan demonstrated that the leaders at UNC and NC State, as well as the Consolidated University, wanted these institutions to compete with institutions outside of the South. They found ways to raise faculty salaries, establish research centers, and improved graduate and undergraduate standards within a state political system that supported segregation and fiscal restraint. Similarities between the North Carolina and Texas institutions are discussed in subsequent chapters.

Studies of Education in the South

No scholar has produced a comprehensive history of higher education in the South. Many general works of Southern history, however, contain excellent sections on the subject. Five of these general works and Wallenstein's recent scholarship on desegregation are discussed in the following paragraphs. Social commentators and researchers wrote provocative critiques
on the troubled conditions of higher education in the South between the 1920s and 1960s. This section highlights four of those leading critiques.

**Secondary Works**

As noted in the work of Sansing and Dyer, public funding of higher education was low in the South between Reconstruction and 1913. C. Vann Woodward argued that many Southern leaders branded public support of education as a carpetbagger initiative and eliminated educational funding in the late 1870s and early 1880s. Conditions were inferior, but colleges made small advances during the years leading up to World War I. Vanderbilt Chancellor James Kirkland organized the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools to increase educational standards and establish uniform admissions requirements. This organization had a secondary goal of establishing distinct boundaries between colleges and secondary schools. The Southern Association contained twenty-eight member institutions in 1913, but only seven of these members met the Association’s requirements for a four-year academic program at the bachelor’s level. Throughout the era covered by Woodward, most colleges offered preparatory programs alongside collegiate courses. Woodward noted that meager state funding and regressive tax programs meant that most colleges had to depend on tuition and fees to keep their doors open. Since elementary and secondary schools were weak, students entering college were not prepared for college-level work. At many schools, enrollment in preparatory departments exceeded enrollment in the collegiate programs.\(^5\)

Focusing exclusively on the Progressive era, Dewey Grantham wrote that opponents of funding for higher education cautioned against high taxes, Northern interference, and the possibility of unregulated expansion of education for African Americans. Echoing an argument posited by Woodward, Grantham stated that Southern progressives who fought for educational
reform believed it was their responsibility as men of privilege to both spread and preserve their bourgeois culture and values.  

As poor as the colleges were, Southern institutions adopted many of the innovations that other colleges introduced across the nation. Southern schools introduced electives and broader curricula. Like schools outside of the region, Southern colleges aspired to become universities as opposed to classical colleges. Grantham used Daniel Hollis’ 1956 history of the University of South Carolina, Earl Porter’s 1964 book *Trinity and Duke*, and James Montgomery’s 1966 work on the University of Tennessee to conclude that by 1914 Southern institutions, especially state institutions had made significant progress since the Civil War. Institutions increased enrollment and assembled faculty who were capable of teaching specialized subjects and conducting research. Improvement however did not extend to colleges for women and African Americans.  

In *Emergence of the New South*, George Tindall followed events in the South from 1915 to 1945. Tindall’s depiction of state higher education resembled Woodward and Grantham’s portrayals. Private institutions profited from benefactions and successful capital campaigns in the 1920s, but public institutions never matched the financial gains made by the private institutions. A select group of public colleges, however, could boast significant achievements. The University of North Carolina, under leadership of Harry Woodburn Chase from 1919 to 1930 increased their faculty more than threefold, added graduate programs and a university press. Scholars at the University of Virginia and the University of Texas stood as symbols of Southern progress as well. The University of Virginia gained membership in the prestigious Association of American Universities (AAU) in 1904 and the University of Texas was accepted into the AAU in 1929. While the gains made at the public universities were encouraging, Southern public higher education still lagged behind the rest of the nation. For the 1927-1928
academic year, the public universities of Illinois and Michigan separately spent more money on their libraries than nine of the Southern state universities combined. Southern faculty salaries remained a problem as well. The average salary range for full professors in the South was $3,131 - $4,370 compared to $3,841 - $6,421 in the North and West.53

Numan Bartley produced the most recent installation in the Louisiana State University Press’ Southern history series in 1995.54 Following World War II, Southern institutions still trailed behind institutions outside of the region. Realizing that they would need to become research universities in order to compete with institutions across the nation, Southern institutions strengthened their graduate programs and pursued federal research dollars.

While the South had operated a dual system of separate but unequal white and African American colleges since the end of Reconstruction, the inadequacies and injustices of the system became more obvious with the enactment of the GI Bill and a series of Supreme Court decisions that culminated with the Brown decision in 1954. African American veterans were entitled to the same federal benefits as white veterans, but African Americans did not have access to many of the undergraduate programs and virtually all of the graduate and professional programs in the region. Lack of equal access prompted individuals to file lawsuits against colleges. Bartley observed that during the 1950s and early 1960s, Southern institutions did not become competitive with schools outside the region, but many drastically improved their positions.

In his groundbreaking *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, C. Vann Woodward contended that segregation and disfranchisement were not inevitable, but rather a path chosen among many options in the late nineteenth century. Woodward also disputed the notion that all state universities of the former Confederacy violently barred African American students from enrolling after the landmark 1950s Supreme Court decisions. The Maryland Court of Appeals
outlawed the practice of awarding Black students out-of-state vouchers to attend academic programs unavailable in segregated state school and ordered a the University of Maryland to admit Donald Murray to its law school in 1936. The U.S. Supreme Court then decreed that states had to provide "separate but equal" educational facilities for African Americans within state borders in the 1938 *State of Missouri et. rel. Gaines v. Canada et. al.* decision. The 1950 cases of *Sweatt v. Painter*, Herman Sweatt and the NAACP's challenge to the all-white law school at the University of Texas, and *McLaurin v. Oklahoma*, encouraged numerous white, public universities to peacefully admit African Americans to graduate and professional programs. By September 1953, twenty-three institutions enrolled African Americans in graduate and professional programs and ten institutions possessed African American undergraduates. Violence occurred in four states: Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Alabama. North Carolina and Texas conformed to the more common pattern of agonizingly slow, yet bloodless desegregation at public colleges.\(^{55}\)

In addition, Woodward pointed out that desegregation was not an event, but a process. Writing with the benefit of four decades worth of hindsight, Peter Wallenstein co-opted, then extended Woodward's thesis and analyzed the desegregation process at twenty-five Southern and border state universities. Even at institutions that peacefully admitted African Americans, these students had to overcome additional hurdles and then negotiate yet another set of barricades. Even after African Americans could attend classes with whites, they could not live on campus or in white residence halls, participate in intercollegiate athletics, run for student government positions, or dine at lunch counters adjacent to the campus. In the spring of 1958, for example, the University of Texas Regents, stripped Barbara Smith of her lead in a production of *Dido and Aeneas* because the music department dared to cast her opposite a white male lead. Judicial
mandates did not change the hearts of Southerners or Americans. They also did not guarantee
dignity or equality for African American students at these supposed bastions of enlightenment.56

Commentaries and Surveys

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Edgar W. Knight wrote prolifically on the ills of
Southern education. In most of his writings, Knight made five major points. First, the dual
system of education stood as a major barrier to excellence in Southern education. While Knight
found a number of things wrong with operating a racially segregated education system, including
financial inefficiency, he was most alarmed by the widespread regional belief that segregation
was acceptable as a permanent structure. Secondly, Southern states needed to address their high
percentage of illiteracy as well as their high rate of farm tenancy. Third, with a few notable
exceptions such as Duke University, Southern colleges did not benefit from the major bequests
that philanthropists made to higher education during the first three decades of the twentieth
century. Fourth, the South boasted few graduate programs as a result of low financial support
from benefactors and state legislatures. Fifth, political involvement persisted as a major
impediment to educational improvement. Knight noted that most educational officials and
governing boards were composed of political appointees.57

H. Clarence Nixon also pointed to political interference as a serious problem, but he
partially blamed faculty and university presidents for folding in the face of conflict. University
officials adopted an apologetic stance because they desperately needed money and/or they had
been receiving comparatively healthy appropriations and feared that any disagreement with
legislators and regents would result in an end to support. Nixon also faulted the institutions for
their financial problems because they failed to coordinate course offerings and to manage
enrollment. State colleges had engaged in unregulated and irresponsible expansion during the
1920s and 1930s. State funds were limited and there was no “room at the legislative food trough for all and higher education is in danger of becoming logrolling scramble for pork.”

Writing around the same time as Knight and Nixon, Wilson Gee published *Research Barriers in the South*. Gee conducted a survey of fifty-one Northern/Western and forty-seven Southern institutions for the Social Science Research Council. Gee concluded that Southern institutions had substantially higher teaching loads and dispensed dramatically lower salaries than northern and western counterparts. Southern faculty taught 30% more on average and earned 30% less. Gee found that Southern faculty had scarce access to research funds in comparison to Northern and Western schools. Finally, Gee identified a poor “research atmosphere” at Southern colleges. By this, he meant that faculty research was not encouraged or rewarded with lower teaching loads and financial incentives for research.

In the mid-1960s, Allan Cartter published a number of articles on the state of higher education in the South. In an historical overview, Cartter identified three major eras of higher education in the South. From 1694 to 1830, state governments and communities represented and nurtured higher education. Between 1830 and 1920, Southerners withdrew from the nation’s collection of colleges. Many Southerners became wary of Northern influences and wanted their children, mostly sons, educated in the South. Education during this period was primarily for the elite. Education was a private affair, not for the masses and certainly not the responsibility of state legislatures. Southerners were less apt than individuals in other regions of the country to view colleges as instruments of public service.

Conditions improved at Southern schools after World War I due first to a series of strong presidents at the University of North Carolina who recruited strong, research-oriented faculty and benefited from a supportive state legislature. Flagship state universities in other states
followed suit. Following World War II, many Southern schools established or redesigned their graduate programs. Of the schools that offered a doctorate in 1965, half of these introduced Ph.D. programs after the war. While Southern schools made improvements during the post World War II period, Cartter noted that the South possessed numerous good schools, too many substandard colleges, and none with outstanding national reputations. As Gee had done more than thirty years prior, Cartter compared Southern schools to Western and Northern institutions and found that the South trailed in seven categories. In addition, per capita expenditures for higher education remained 45% below Western averages and 30% below Midwestern averages. While Cartter criticized the Southern institutions, he also cited a handful for making significant improvements in graduate education and research during the post-World War II era: among these stood UT and UNC.61

**Foundations for the Thesis**

The preceding body of research provides the roots for this dissertation. There will be times when the story seems stuck like a broken record. Texas could not completely escape its membership in the former Confederacy and continually suffered, albeit less severely, from Southern ills. A dual system of education kept entire state systems of education from competing financially or academically with the other states, particularly those in the far West and Midwest. The Texas decision to establish both a state university and a land-grant college invited unnecessary competition and curricular duplication. Furthermore, the Texas government and its colleges functioned in a contentious environment. Lawmakers wanted the schools to succeed, but neither fully trusted faculty nor appropriated adequate funds. UT and A&M struggled internally to build strong faculties and facilities worthy of their constitutional decree. Academic
and community leaders, and even some governors, aspired to mold UT and A&M into national research universities. The saga begins at the close of the Texas Revolution.

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Notes

11 Green, 17, 25; Gunther, 839; Key, 266.
13 Barr, *Reconstruction to Reform*. The Texas Legislature has never passed a personal income tax.
19 ibid.
23 Dethloff, 420.
27 Arthur J. Klein (Dean, College of Education, Ohio State University, later Chief of the Division of Higher Education in the U.S. Office of Education), George Works (U.S. Bureau of Education), George Zook (Dean of Administration, University of Minnesota, then professor at Columbia University and major author of the Truman Commission on Higher Education’s report *Higher Education for Democracy*, also President of the American Council on Education) Fred J. Kelly (President of State Teachers College, Springfield Missouri, later Chief of the Division of Higher Education in U.S. Office of Education), and Lotus Coffman (President, University of Minnesota).
34 Sansing, *Making Haste Slowly*.
36 Snider, 85-120.
37 ibid., 130, 147, 174-175.
38 ibid., 175-182.
39 The first Morrill Act provided each state with a section of land totaling 30,000 acres per senator and congressman. States were to sell this land and use the proceeds to establish a college that would offer instruction in agriculture, engineering, military science, and classical studies. Land-grant colleges are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.
40 Snider, 104.
42 ibid., 85, 193.
43 ibid., 72-75.
44 Reagan, 91-93, 141-142, Snider, 212-213.
45 Reagan, 94-96; Snider, 215-218.
46 Reagan, 140; Snider, 230-231.
49 Reagan, 199-200.
50 Reagan, 133; Snider 262-264.


61 Cartter, “Qualitative Aspects of Southern University Education”, seven categories included: 1) educational and general income; 2) annual library accusations; 3) number of volumes in library; 4) faculty compensation; 5) income from contract research; 6) percentage of faculty holding a doctorate; 7) baccalaureates who later earn the doctorate.
Chapter Three

Establishing Patterns: UT and A&M 1876-1920

The Beginnings of State Higher Education in Texas

Virtually every promotional piece written for Texas colleges identifies the quest for education as one of the major reasons that Texas colonists waged the war for independence against the Mexican government in 1835. While the colonists may have wanted greater access to education, it took over forty years for Texans to establish their first public college.

The educational conditions in the state were mediocre in comparison to other states when A&M and UT opened their doors in 1876 and 1883. The Report of the Commissioner of Education, a federal publication, noted that 14% of white Texans between the ages of fifteen and twenty were unable to write in 1880. This percentage was low compared to Georgia (22%) and North Carolina (29%) but alarmingly high when compared with California (2.2%), Ohio (2.7%), and Wisconsin (2.5%). Texas was a state devoid of a developed system of secondary education and many UT and A&M students were only suited for preparatory courses.¹

Sam Houston, war hero, Texas icon, and President of the Republic of Texas (1836-1838), believed that higher education was a private matter and opposed legislative efforts to designate land or funds for colleges. Specifically, Houston stated that public higher education met the exclusive desires of the rich and snubbed, even burdened, the poor. Mirabeau Lamar succeeded Houston as president in 1838 and supported an 1839 act that provided three leagues (13,284 acres) in each county for common schools, plus fifty leagues (221,400 acres) for the eventual establishment of two universities. Houston returned as president (1841-1844) and did little to
advance public education at any level, although he was instrumental in gaining the Republic annexation to the United States.  

Governor Elisha Marshall Pease (1853-1857) reintroduced conversations about public higher education, but the Legislature failed to pass any bills to establish a state university during these years. The Legislature engaged in a dramatic debate in November 1855 over whether to establish one or two colleges. As lawmakers debated this question, a third group fought against the establishment of any public college because such an institution would only serve the sons of the wealthy.  

On February 11, 1858, Governor Hardin Runnels signed a bill that allotted $100,000 in U.S. bonds for the establishment of the University of Texas. When Sam Houston returned as governor in 1859, he asked the Legislature to place the $100,000 back in the general treasury, but the Legislature refused. Lawmakers did, however, pass a bill in 1860 that permitted the state to borrow $130,000 from the university fund to cover military expenses. Texas entered the Confederacy in 1861 and replaced the U.S. bonds with Confederate bonds. By the close of the Civil War, the university fund was worth fifty-seven cents.  

Following the Civil War, the federal government set up Reconstruction governments in each of the twelve states of the defeated Confederacy. Historians have provided differing interpretations of the Reconstruction era. The ideas of William Dunning, the Columbia University historian, were prominent in the work of such Texas scholars as Charles Ramsdell, Frederick Eby, and William C. Nunn. Beginning with his landmark study in 1898, Dunning argued that Reconstruction did far more to hurt than help the former Confederacy recover from the Civil War. Between 1865 and 1877, Radical Republicans introduced programs supposedly designed to assist freed slaves and transform the economic and social systems of the Southern
states. These "corrupt" Yankee carpetbaggers, Southern scalawags, and uneducated freedmen created oppressively centralized government systems and gave African Americans rights they were not prepared to handle. UT historian Ramsdell essentially parroted Dunning's thesis. In his assessment of Texas, Frederick Eby argued that the state school system crumbled after Reconstruction because Republicans introduced a highly centralized system that commanded high taxes from citizens. When the Democrats regained control of the Texas, they had to disassemble the Republican system because white Texans opposed the concept of paying taxes for public education. In his 1962 book, *Texas Under the Carpetbaggers*, William C. Nunn accepted Eby's interpretation, but added that centralization contributed to the school system's failure. Centralization ran counter to the Texan value of individualism. Revisionist Carl Moneyhon rejected these Dunning-inspired arguments and concluded that the Democrats did not oppose the Republican-initiated school design in principle, or because they found corruption in the administration of it. Rather, the Democrats used the school system as an example to debunk the Republicans and regain power.  

Evidence exists to support Moneyhon's claims in higher education policy as well. In a region dominated by Democrats, little was accomplished during the Republican-dominated years (1865-1876) of Reconstruction to advance plans for the state university. In 1866, Governor James Throckmorton, a former Unionist turned Confederate, signed a bill that amended the 1858 university act that previously entitled the nonexistent university to one of every ten sections of land designated to motivate railroad construction. Throckmorton also reintroduced the idea of establishing two state universities. Critics have accused Throckmorton of undermining plans for the university. Although he signed the land bill that eliminated acres for colleges, he also approved an act to replace the education funds that were depleted during the Civil War. In
addition, Throckmorton and the Republican-dominated Legislature introduced resolutions to accept the terms of the federal Morrill Act of 1862\textsuperscript{7} within the nationally appointed time constraints and to establish a governing board to open the University of Texas. Joint Resolution 21, the two-university plan, was not meant to thwart plans for UT, but to establish an eastern branch, so Texas could extend college access to a larger portion of its people.\textsuperscript{8}

Governor Edmund J. Davis, a Republican and Unionist, signed the bill to establish Texas A&\textsuperscript{M} as the agricultural branch of the nonexistent state university, April 17, 1871, but it would take five more years before the institution opened its doors to students. The Davis administration (1870-1874) was characterized by contention between Democrats and Republicans as well as within the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{9} The Legislature designated $75,000 and a minimum of 1200 acres on which to build A&M. Governor Davis appointed three commissioners to identify a location for the agricultural school and to arrange for a building to be completed by July 23, 1871. The commissioners selected a section of land outside of Bryan in the Brazos Valley, due to its central location, land quality, and close proximity to a railroad line. Democrats criticized the commission for selecting Bryan since the town offered the lowest bid and featured some of the worst soil in Texas. These critics argued that the Radical Republicans struck a shady deal with business leaders in Bryan and then pocketed a substantial portion of the $75,000. Democratic opponents claimed that Davis' scrutiny of the A&M funds was simply a scheme he employed to siphon the funds over to himself. Henry Dethloff found no proof in surviving correspondence and state documents to support this allegation. Davis kept strict watch on the appropriated funds and even appointed an investigating committee to monitor the commissioners' spending. Nevertheless, Davis' men and Democratic leaders and journalists engaged in a long series of name-calling for several more months. Politics and money undoubtedly played a role in the
decision of where to locate A&M. There are even rumors that Bryan businessman Harvey
Mitchell won the location of the college in a poker game in Houston. In the end, the conflict was
part of a much larger clash between Democrats and Radical Republicans.10

In the midst of the turmoil in the Legislature, the commissioners spent an initial $38,000
for the building foundation and one cistern. These funds were wasted. Governor Davis sent a
team of inspectors to the site that deemed the construction unacceptable. Texas A&M was off to
a wobbly start. The Democrats regained control of the state with the election of Richard Coke
(1874-1876) in November 1873 and slashed appropriations for common schools, as well as for
the newly formed Agriculture and Mechanical College of Texas.11

The A&M Board of Directors met for the first time on June 1, 1875. The Directors
named Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy and ardent opponent of the 1862 Morrill
Act, as their top choice to head the College. Davis refused, but he recommended Thomas
Gathright in his place. Five faculty members joined Gathright when A&M opened its doors to
107 students. The College fared poorly in these early years. A&M lacked the faculty and the
funds to administer a model farm and were soon met by strong criticism by the state Grange.12

One year into Richard Coke's administration, the Legislature called a constitutional
convention that met between 1875 and 1876. Delegates introduced Article VII, to establish the
University of Texas on November 17, 1875. Article VII also designated Texas A&M as the
agricultural branch of the University and Prairie View as the African American branch.
Following the decision to place the University's location on a public ballot, Article VII passed
thirty-five to thirty.13 The Texas Constitution decreed that A&M was a branch of UT, but A&M
was never considered a part of UT. The A&M Board of Directors made all decisions regarding
the College without the approval of UT Regents. A&M submitted its budget directly to the
Legislature, who, in turn, appropriated funds to A&M. Constitutional provisions were not honored in practice and questions regarding how to finance the institutions or to manage their shared lands would not be settled until the 1930s.

While Texas had a constitutional amendment that provided for the University's creation, there was little effort to fund and design the institution until Oran Roberts became governor in January 1879. Roberts called together a group of private college leaders in his first month in office to discuss plans for opening the University. The private college presidents had their own interests in mind and suggested that Texas follow New York's lead and organize a board of regents to disperse money from the University Fund and from the federal Morrill Act of 1862 to the private institutions across the state. Governor Roberts promptly dismissed this idea. After a series of meetings of the Texas State Teachers Association and the Texas Democratic Party convention in 1880, the Legislature introduced a bill in January 1881, which laid out the specifics needed to open the University. Once Roberts signed the bill on March 30, 1881, citizens voted on the location of the University. Austin, Tyler, and Waco were among the top contenders for the main campus and Houston and Galveston campaigned to locate the medical branch in their cities. Austin and Galveston won out.14

During their first meetings, the University Regents discovered that the institution only had access to $37,025 of the $190,000 that the Legislature had set aside for the institution. The Regents appealed to Roberts in 1882, who requested the remainder of the University funds from the Legislature, two million additional acres of land to compensate for the land lost by the bill passed under Governor Throckmorton in 1866, and lease fees on the million acres already in the University's possession so that the institution could produce an income. The bill passed in the Senate and made little progress in the House when the session closed in the spring of 1882.
Land speculators, private college advocates, and Robert's political rivals were instrumental in stalling the University bill in the House. In 1883, the Legislature granted one million acres to the University, bringing the land holdings up to two million acres, and replaced the missing funds. 15

What took Texas so long to establish the two state universities? Prior to the Civil War, the supply of land far outstripped the demand for land and therefore the acres set aside for education were worth little. Texas also possessed a number of private colleges, and as weak as these colleges were, their leaders amassed enough power to thwart plans to establish public institutions. Finally, the people of Texas were preoccupied with winning the war with Mexico, achieving statehood, overcoming financial problems, and fighting the Civil War. Texans spent the Reconstruction years rebuilding the state economy and engaging in conflicts that split along Union and Confederate lines.16

Governor Roberts recounted the events that led up to the University of Texas’ establishment in an early issue of the Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association (now the Southwestern Historical Quarterly). He pondered what the framers of the Texas constitution meant by the term "university of the first class." Roberts interpreted this phrase to mean a college on par with Johns Hopkins and other Northern and European universities that awarded graduate degrees. Texas was not prepared to possess a "university of the first class" in the 1870s, but it could do so "perhaps in fifty years." The State, however, did not have the luxury to wait until it amassed the intellectual and technological fuel necessary to power a "first class" college. According to Roberts, he and other Texans proceeded in spite of the State's educational weaknesses.17
Banking on Land

Size distinguished Texas from all other states in the Union until Alaska became a state in 1959.\(^{18}\) Texas emerged from the fight for independence from Mexico in 1836 with 225,299,800 acres of land. At the time the Republic of Texas entered the Union in 1845 it possessed 186,658,883 acres. The State then sold 67,000,000 acres to the federal government in 1850 for $10 million dollars. The lands sold to the United States became portions of Wyoming, Kansas, New Mexico, and Colorado. By 1900, Texas had sold or donated the remainder of these unappropriated lands (acreage not otherwise committed for educational or public purposes). The State appropriated 51,921,519 acres to the public schools, the University of Texas and Texas A&M Systems, and eleemosynary institutions. This area constituted approximately one-third of the State.\(^{19}\)

Aldon Socrates Lane, an economics professor at Baylor University, published the provocative *Financial History of the Public Lands in Texas* in 1932. While Texas possessed more land than any other state in the nation, Lane questioned the wisdom of the State's land policies. By 1900, Texas had sold or given away the majority of its public lands without retaining mineral rights to these acres. If Texas had reserved a 10% royalty on oil discovered on its lands, in 1928 alone, the State could have earned $22,858,075. Instead, the State earned a mere $4,571,615 from the 2% state tax on petroleum.\(^{20}\)

Texas elected to use revenue derived from public lands as the primary source for funding education. In making this decision, it largely relieved its citizens of paying for education through taxation. In addition, the Legislature failed to appropriate adequate sums to support common schools or higher education. The Legislature reasoned that the educational institutions
had more than enough money in the Permanent School Fund (PSF) and the Permanent University Fund (PUF) to meet their needs.\textsuperscript{21}

UT and A&M currently boast some of the largest university endowments in the nation with approximately $8.6 billion and $3.7 billion respectively. These endowments constitute the PUF. UT is entitled to two-thirds and A&M receives one-third of the interest derived from this fund in the form of the Annual University Fund (AUF). From the time that Texas created the PUF in 1858 until 1884, it consisted of proceeds from land sales. Earnings from land leases were added to the PUF in 1884. The PUF expanded to include royalties received from mineral leases in 1920. These royalties became substantial after oil was discovered on the lands in West Texas in 1923. It is these lands that gave UT and A&M their reputation as wealthy institutions. The PUF is substantial now, but neither institution enjoyed appreciable benefits from this fund until oil was discovered on the lands in 1923.

The universities did not negotiate the distribution of the PUF between UT and A&M until 1931. To avoid potential battles before either school opened, State Senator William Saylor suggested in 1871 that the lands and bonds be divided between the institutions with A&M receiving two-fifths of the land and 40\% of the bonds. Instead, the PUF was contested. John G. James, the second president of A&M, berated UT for its unwillingness to share the PUF before the University even enrolled its first student. In 1887, a House committee proposed to give A&M one-fifth of the land, but the bill died with the close of the session. Constitutional amendments to divide the PUF were defeated in 1911 and 1919. The UT and A&M governing boards resumed negotiations after oil was discovered on the lands and the endowment skyrocketed in value. Bitterness akin to the most notorious of divorce battles accompanied each of these attempts.\textsuperscript{22}
Political Conflict

UT clashed with the state government and citizens over the issues of political interference and institutional autonomy from the beginning. Ashbel Smith, an influential board member and Yale graduate, stated to the *Austin American Statesman* in April 1881, that UT would only succeed if protected from political interference. As sound as this principle may have been; the state media was outraged when the Regents adopted a motion to make their meetings private. A writer for Austin's *Daily Democratic Statesman* wrote in November 1881 that the closed meetings were undemocratic, sinister, and denied citizens their rights to govern their own institutions.23

In 1911, Governor Colquitt accused Prairie View Principal E.L. Blackshear and Treasurer W.C. Rollins of disloyalty because they raised money for various candidates prior to the state Democratic primary.24 A&M Secretary James Quarles defended these men and Colquitt soon forgot the episode. Colquitt, however, later ordered Quarles' dismissal when he heard that Quarles and H.L. Knight were traveling throughout the state campaigning for Morris Sheppard and William Ramsey. Colquitt quipped to A&M Director Walton Peteet: "a man who cannot give his approval to an administration ought not to continue to receive his bread from it." When he was accused of politicizing Texas A&M, Governor Colquitt defended the appointments of his friends to various posts by saying he did not wish to hire and fire faculty. He was, however, entitled to appoint whomever he chose to non-faculty positions.25

A&M President Robert Milner (1908-1913) lashed out at Colquitt in June 1913 after the Governor vetoed items for the College in the appropriations bill. Milner demanded that Colquitt provide reasons for the veto. In the same letter, Milner took the opportunity to accuse Colquitt of ordering the Board of Directors to fire faculty members, meddling with the College's budget,
and running the Board as his own puppet show. Directors Walton Peteet, John Guion, L.J. Hart, Edward Cushing, and R.L. Bennett each wrote Colquitt a few days after Milner's attack to express their support for the governor, who the Directors believed, exercised the utmost integrity by keeping politics out of the College. The Directors were unable to stop Milner, who went public to the citizens of Texas on July 25, 1913 with his accusations against Colquitt. Milner stepped down as president three months later.26

In his 1935 history of Texas A&M, Clarence Ousley noted that A&M suffered the consequences of political interference from the beginning. The main reason was because governing board members and governors each served two-year terms. Governors commonly placed their political cronies on the board and pressured these men to follow the executive agenda. The situation improved in 1912 when citizens approved a constitutional amendment that extended board terms at both UT and A&M to staggered six-year stints. At least governors could only appoint one-third of the board at a time. Ousley argued that Texas liberated its public colleges from the tyranny of political control in 1912, but this was simply not the case.27

The best-known example of political conflict occurred between 1915 and 1917 when James Ferguson ordered the dismissal of several faculty members and attempted to close UT. These events have been described in a host of sources, but most completely by Lewis Gould.28 Ferguson had long distrusted the administrators and faculty at UT and labeled them as elitists who believed they were above the law. The trouble began when Ferguson reviewed the UT budget for the 1915-1917 biennia. UT had long submitted its budget request to the Legislature as a lump sum and Ferguson was not the first to find fault with this method. Governor Colquitt had called for state agencies to submit itemized budgets and was particularly annoyed after he reviewed UT's lump sum appropriation from the Legislature in 1913. The Legislature had
approved UT to receive $658,300 for 1913-1914 and $700,250 for 1914-1915. Colquitt had previously agreed to sign off on $548,000 each year. Frustrated with UT's failure to submit an itemized budget to the Legislature, Governor Colquitt lowered the 1914-1915 appropriation to $658,300. At the same time, Colquitt vetoed elements of A&M's partially itemized budget because it contained requests for construction expenses, discussed later in this chapter. There was a growing sentiment among leaders of the Texas Democratic Party, most noticeably from James Ferguson, that state agencies should submit their appropriations requests to the Legislature in itemized form. The 1914 state Democratic platform called for all state agencies to adhere to the itemized submission procedure and the 1916 platform included a specific call for all state colleges to do so.29

James Ferguson became governor in January 1915. UT President Sidney Mezes (1908-1914) had just departed UT to become president of the City College of New York and the Regents placed William Battle, the brash and somewhat contentious son of UNC President Kemp Plummer Battle (1876-1891), as interim president. Battle met with Governor Ferguson after the Legislature had approved the University's budget request. During this meeting, Ferguson looked through the line-item budget and asked Battle why he had requested funds for a vacant position in the sociology program. Battle replied that the Regents and the president had long possessed the discretion to shift funds as needs arose. Ferguson disagreed and took the line-item budget one step further and instructed the comptroller, Henry Berryman Terrell, to set up separate accounts for each item in the UT budget. Battle then requested an opinion from State Attorney General B.F. Looney. In his July 26, 1915 reply to Battle, Looney concluded that the UT Regents indeed possessed the authority to make substitutions in the budget approved by the Legislature. Comptroller Terrell accepted Looney's opinion and proposed a compromise with
Battle to maintain separate accounts for all non-salary items and to combine all salaries for the Main University into one account, medical branch salaries into one account, and so on. This compromise allowed Battle and the Regents to alter the salary budgets, but it also set a precedent that required all state colleges to submit their budget requests to the Legislature in detailed form until 1947.30

Battle believed that the University's relationship with Governor Ferguson would only deteriorate if he remained president and withdrew his candidacy for the permanent position on October 26, 1915. Ferguson did not want to deal with another president like Battle and quipped to Regent Will Hogg that he would make things miserable for UT if Battle or his ilk were permitted to remain. Undaunted by Ferguson's threats and his demand to be involved in the selection of the next president, the Regents selected Robert Vinson (1916 - 1923) to assume the UT presidency. Vinson, who had previously served as president of the Austin Theological Seminary, would prove less adroit in the political realm than he had in the pulpit.31

In the midst of his anger that the Regents did not consult him before they hired Vinson, Governor Ferguson met with new president in July 1916 and demanded the dismissal of several faculty members whom he deemed subversive. According to Ferguson, the UT faculty were 'butterfly chasers,' 'day dreamers,' and 'educated fools' who believed they were accountable to no one. Ferguson also found fault with academic programs such as journalism that were wasteful fluff, and faculty who traveled to out-of-state meetings and took advantage of the president's expense account. Exchanges between Ferguson, the Regents, and University officials grew increasingly harsh and the Governor vetoed the University's appropriation in 1916. The conflict ended when the Texas Senate voted to impeach Ferguson in the summer of 1917 and convicted
him of ten charges. These charges fell under the categories of bribery, mismanagement of public funds, and his actions against the University.\textsuperscript{32}

Governor Ferguson's philosophy of state/university relations is concisely described in his angry letter to Regent Rabbi M. Faber:

> Your bold statement that the Governor of the State has no right or authority to interfere or inquire into the management of the University proves conclusively the arrogance which has attained to a marked degree in the institution, and shows how far the idea has gained credence that the people are to have nothing to do with this institution except shoulder and pay high appropriations to be turned over to set of men to continue their unholy spree of establishing an educational hierarchy.\textsuperscript{33}

In spite of the fact that the Legislature, as well as most Texans, disapproved of Ferguson's handling of the University, this incident influenced relations between the state and UT officials for decades to come. Lawmakers, and even the Regents, believed that UT faculty thought themselves above the law and therefore insulated from criticism regarding the way they spent state funds, administered the institution, or expressed their political beliefs. From 1917 until at least the late 1960s, UT faculty believed that any questions posed by state officials were political attacks. Perhaps an overstatement, Gould contended that the University faculty became absorbed in paranoia at the expense of teaching and research. According to Gould, "allegations of dissent and mediocrity became self-fulfilling."\textsuperscript{34}

**Texas A&M and The Land-Grant Movement**

Land-grant colleges served as "a lightening rod for agrarian discontent" in the 1870s and Texas was no exception. By the 1870s, various state Grange organizations pushed for independent agricultural colleges that offered only the most limited classical curriculum. Farmers' organizations quickly became dissatisfied with the quantity and quality of agricultural education that the land-grant colleges offered. In response, the national Grange established an ad
hoc committee to investigate the curriculum at the land grant colleges in 1875. Dissatisfied over the absence of agricultural faculty, students, and model farms, the Grange recommended that the states place the land grant colleges under exclusive control of the nation's farmers. Texas farmers joined in this criticism and opposed efforts to strengthen classical studies at A&M. The Texas Grange issued a harsh critique of the institution in 1880 when its leaders bemoaned the absence of qualified agricultural faculty. In its fifth year, A&M possessed one agricultural instructor who was better versed in Shakespeare than the science of farming.

The Grange and other agricultural lobbies collaborated and battled with university leaders such as Penn State's George Atherton and Cornell's Andrew Dixon White throughout the 1880s. The land-grant colleges prevailed when Congress approved the Hatch Act (1887) and the Second Morrill Act (1890). The Hatch Act provided the financial support that states needed to create agricultural experiment stations so that the land-grant colleges could set its agricultural faculty to work on applied research. The Grange wanted control of the experiment stations, but the schools won out. The land-grant colleges did not receive regular appropriations from the federal government until Congress passed the Second Morrill Act in 1890. Along with guaranteed funding, the Second Morrill Act required states to provide land-grant education to Black citizens. Southern and border states could either create separate land-grant colleges for African Americans or admit them to white institutions. All states of the former Confederacy, plus Oklahoma, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, chose the former option. Congress permitted the states to decide how they would divide the federal funds between the black and white colleges. Few of the Jim Crow states distributed the funds in an equitable manner (Table 3-1).
Table 3-1  Land-Grant Funding Differences, 1905

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Predominantly White Land-Grant Institution</th>
<th>African American Land-Grant Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Funds from 1890 Morrill Act</td>
<td>Enrollment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>$16,667</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>$13,159</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
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<td>555</td>
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<td>673</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>$18,750</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>$16,667</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Land-Grant Colleges and Military Training

Justin Morrill's 1858 version of the land-grant act made no mention of military training. When Congress approved the revised 1862 version, which contained a clause directing these schools to provide courses in military tactics, the nation was immersed in the Civil War. In an address to the Senate, Morrill stated that graduates of fellow Vermonter Alden Partridge's Norwich Academy had performed valiantly in the Union Army. It would take more than enlisted men off the farms and officers trained at West Point, Norwich, and other existing military academies to win the War against the insurgent Southerners and future enemies. In his June 6, 1862 address to the House of Representatives, Senator Morrill declared: "The national school at West Point may suffice for the regular Army in ordinary years of peace, but it is wholly inadequate when a large army is to be suddenly put into service….With such a system here offered - nurseries in every State - an efficient force would at all times be ready to support the cause of the nation."39

The Morrill Act's vague mandate for the land-grant colleges to provide military training gave them great latitude in meeting this requirement. Most land-grant institutions outside of the
South merely expected male students to participate in a few drills each week. The Southern land-grants, all of whom accepted the terms of the Morrill Act after the Civil War, embraced the military requirement enthusiastically and turned to the Citadel and the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) for models. Able male students who attended Southern land-grants wore uniforms, lived in barracks, and participated in a demerit system. There were Northern leaders who fervently supported military training, but as was the case at Penn State, students, faculty, and administrators never consistently supported military drill. Military training might be popular one year, only to be opposed by individuals a few years later.⁴⁰

While most of the nation's land-grant colleges included military training to comply with the federal mandate, Southern land-grants used the military program as an instrument of "socialization." Military programs were a way to maintain order on campuses that often enrolled young, ill-prepared, farm boys. In his 1880 report to the Texas A&M Directors, President John James (1879-1883), a retired colonel and former superintendent of the Texas Military Institute, cited the important role the College's military program played in promoting self-discipline in building character in Aggie students. Military training also promoted equality. Poor boys did not have money for fancy clothes, but uniforms were cheap and no man could judge another on the basis on his suit if everyone wore the same thing. With the accoutrements of wealth or poverty banished from sight, a young man could prove himself in drills and move up in the ranks of a military unit.⁴¹

Despite Morrill's reason for adding the military component to his act, neither Union nor Confederate states saw the requirement as a way to prepare for future wars after 1865. The land-grants of the defeated South believed that military training helped to prepare young men to become honorable, patriotic, brave citizens. Southerners, particularly in the 1880s and 1890s,
drew inspiration from the genteel, courageous Confederate soldier described in Lost Cause rhetoric. Just as his forefathers so valiantly stood up to the British in 1776, the Confederate soldier fought his Northern oppressor, who had denied him his God-given freedom and threatened his agrarian way of life in 1861. Students at Southern land-grants routinely marched in Confederate celebrations. Cadets at Texas A&M participated in these events, but they also observed San Jacinto Day, a holiday honoring the battle that won Texas its independence from Mexico, with equal or even surpassed conviction.42

Student unrest was frequent at the Southern land-grant colleges between the 1870s and 1920s. Rod Andrew identified three general causes: (1) esprit de corps; (2) students' sense of entitlement to certain privileges; and (3) contradictions within the Southern military tradition. Men of the same class were extremely loyal to one another and banded together when one of their own was reprimanded. Aggie cadets chastised those who failed to support a man mistreated by the faculty and called this allegedly dishonorable student a 'piker.' Students were prone to rebel if faculty or the administration stripped them of a privilege. These privileges often meant the type of behavior that could be construed by parents or legislators as hazing. Junior and senior cadets at Texas A&M routinely ordered freshman and sophomores to perform chores or do complete extra drills. Upon receiving complaints, A&M administrators would attempt to abolish various hazing rituals. One such attempt in 1908 resulted in a mass protest by students and a legislative investigation.43

Following a few years of tension between A&M President Henry Hill Harrington (1905-1908) and the students, senior cadets submitted a petition in early 1908 to the Directors calling for the President's dismissal. Dethloff concluded that there was no single event that precipitated the conflict, but the cadets finally organized their protest against Harrington after he had
meddled into the travel plans for a series of Corps trips to Dallas and Austin. The Board rejected
the cadets' directive and announced that Harrington was a competent leader. The senior cadets
responded by organizing a strike. Not a single student attended class on the morning of February
8th. The cadets engaged in intermittent protests for the remainder of the semester and
demanded an opportunity to state their case in front of the Directors. After several months of
wrangling between the cadets, alumni, legislators, faculty, Harrington, and the Directors, the
Directors once again concluded that Harrington was doing a good job and that cadets had
engaged in unnecessarily defiant behavior. Harrington then resigned on August 7, 1908.44

The sort of student rebellion described above was common at A&M until at least the final
large-scale demonstration in 1947. The 1947 unrest was caused by postwar growing pains that
are discussed in Chapter Nine. The culture of rebellion persisted at A&M as long as the student
body remained male and between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two. Furthermore, cadets at
A&M and other Southern land-grants were subject to faculty and administrators who demanded
compliance in a region of the country that glorified rebellion. In addition to Thomas Jefferson
and Robert E. Lee, A&M students cited the acts of Texas revolutionaries Sam Houston, William
Travis, and James Bowie to justify any rebellion against A&M officials.45

While the military programs varied from region to region in the first five and a half
decades of the land-grant movement, the United States military standardized the training in 1916.
The federal government established the ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) as part of the
National Defense Act in 1916 to provide the nation's armed forces with a steady supply of
trained reserve officers in the event of a national or world crisis.46 Many congressmen voted in
favor of the National Defense Act following repeated raids by Mexican revolutionaries at the
Texas-Mexican and New Mexico-Mexican borders. Most notable were the raids at Columbus,
New Mexico on March 9, 1916 and Glenn Spring, Texas the night of May 5, 1916. The insurgents killed seven Americans in Columbus and three of the nine U.S. soldiers standing guard at Glenn Springs. Harkening back to Justin Morrill's call for well-prepared officers, congressmen argued that the nation needed to fortify its army, navy, and National Guard swiftly. The United States had yet to enter World War I, but American participation in the crisis was likely.\textsuperscript{47}

The land-grant institutions were obvious candidates to host the ROTC programs, but a number of private colleges and other state universities participated as well. The former Confederate land-grants, such as Clemson and Texas A&M, already functioned as virtual military academies and welcomed the federal ROTC program as a component of an already well developed course of study. The ROTC program did not replace, but rather supplemented, the Texas A&M Corps of Cadets. A&M required its male undergraduates to participate in four years of its Corps program. The College only required students to complete the first two years of the ROTC program, however, Aggie cadets typically enrolled in the second two years of advanced ROTC training. This double dose of military education was unique to A&M and is revisited in subsequent chapters.

Across the nation, ROTC programs had trained thousands of young men by the time the U.S. entered World War I in the spring of 1917. The War Department suspended the ROTC program and replaced it with the Students' Army Training Corps (SATC) during the war, but reverted to the ROTC program in 1919. One hundred thirty-five institutions possessed ROTC units by 1919 and most of the land-grant colleges made it compulsory for male freshmen and sophomores. The University of Wisconsin made ROTC membership optional in 1923 after the state legislature concluded that the Morrill Act only required land-grant colleges to offer military
training, not require it. Americans grew increasingly anti-war in the 1920s and many believed that the land-grant colleges should abandon the requirement. The YMCA, American Friends Service Committee, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom issued a protest against compulsory ROTC in 1925. While there are no documented calls to make ROTC training optional at Texas A&M, other Southern colleges such as NC State grappled with the request and opted to maintain mandatory ROTC membership.48

Twenty-one universities continued to require male membership in the ROTC through 1934. Two University of California students sued the Board of Regents for compelling them to participate in the ROTC even though they were conscientious objectors. The Regents contended that they were bound by the terms of the 1862 Morrill Act to enroll all able males in military training. After reviewing arguments and evidence, among them an amicus brief from fifteen land-grant colleges49 in favor of compulsory ROTC, the Court ruled that the Morrill Act in no way compelled states to require the training. Many institutions maintain the rule in spite of the Supreme Court decision until the early 1960s.50

All of the land-grant institutions abolished compulsory military training by 1969 (the University of Arkansas was the last to do so), but military culture has never disappeared at A&M. Henry Dethloff wrote that Aggie student life changed very little between 1876 and World War II: "Because of the basic continuity and identity of cadet life in one time with that of another time, custom and tradition have become powerful guidelines or mores in the life of the A&M cadet."51 Aggie culture would change briefly when older veterans arrived on campus to take advantage of the GI Bill in the late 1940s and then forever after women were admitted in 1963. The A&M Directors made Corps membership optional in 1965, but as previously stated, the military tradition continues to pervade the campus in the twenty-first century.
Efficiency, Duplication, and Conflict at UT and A&M

UT and Texas A&M began their institutional lives as adversaries. The framers of the 1876 Constitution intended for A&M to function as the agricultural component of UT, but this relationship was, in the words of A&M President William Bizzell (1914-1925), "legal fiction." Since A&M existed for seven years before UT convened for its first semester, the College had time to develop a distinct culture and traditions. The A&M Board of Directors, the UT Board of Regents, and the two sets of faculty prepared budgets and designed curricula independently of each other. As a result, the institutions competed for funds, duplicated programs, and engaged in a destructive rivalry.52

John J. Lane, the first historian of UT, argued that tension existed between the two colleges because A&M was an "abnormal branch" of UT. According to the Morrill Act, none of the federal land-grant funds could be used for construction or other permanent improvements to the campus. It is because of this stipulation that the Texas Legislature provided Texas A&M with funds from general revenue to finance permanent improvements. While A&M received these monies, the State barred UT from receiving legislative appropriations for permanent improvements. Instead, the hut-lined UT had to rely on the then inadequate AUF to finance buildings.53

In his January 27, 1881 message to the Legislature, Governor Oran Roberts called for the creation of one governing board to oversee the common schools, normal schools, UT, and A&M. It was his hope that such a board could prevent antagonism and encourage better planning at all levels of education. Governor Roberts' charge was the first of many calls for centralized control of the state education system over the next eighty years. In his address at the UT commencement
in 1888, Confederate General and Southern educator Daniel Hill agreed with Roberts when he said, 'One sun is better than a thousand stars.'\textsuperscript{54}

While the institutions had been at odds over the PUF and course offerings since the mid-1880s, the clashes became more pronounced after UT established an extension program in 1909. UT President Sidney Mezes was impressed by the University of Wisconsin's extension unit and sent School of Education Dean William Sutton to Madison on a fact-finding visit. The Regents approved Sutton and Mezes' plan a few months after Sutton's trip. Future president Harry Benedict was appointed director of extension and replaced by John A. Lomax in 1911 when Benedict became dean of arts and sciences. Tensions between the colleges grew as UT expanded its extension course offerings to include rural topics. Lomax even suggested in a July 1910 letter to Mezes that they lure A&M faculty to Austin. After A&M officials accused UT of infringing on their mission, Alexander Caswell Ellis, Lomax's successor, defended UT's ventures into rural extension in 1915. A&M taught farmers how to improve crop production, but it did not meet the social and economic needs of rural citizens. According to Ellis, UT fulfilled this need by offering courses and conducting research that explored the human side of farm life.\textsuperscript{55}

In addition to extension efforts, individuals at UT explored the idea of opening their own college of agriculture. In a report to Governor Oscar Colquitt in 1913, Ellis concluded that A&M graduated a meager three men per year who worked directly or even indirectly in agricultural fields. Texas needed expert farmers and UT could competently train these individuals. Colquitt agreed and suggested that UT allot $100,000 to construct an agricultural building in Austin.\textsuperscript{56}

The institutions and the state government embarked on what would become twenty-one years of negotiations to separate the schools and divide the PUF beginning in 1909. Governor
Thomas Campbell's January plea for greater efficiency in all state agencies and his May veto of construction appropriations for A&M, served as the catalysts for long separation process. On January 14, 1909, Campbell observed that the State possessed more colleges and course offerings than it could adequately support. The Legislature, UT, A&M, and the teachers' colleges, needed to administer higher education more efficiently through institutional consolidation or increased coordination of academic programs. Although the addition of new teachers colleges and regional state colleges placed a heavy financial burden upon the State, it was UT and A&M that posed the biggest problem. A&M had requested $95,500 from the Legislature to build one student residence hall, five faculty cottages, one central heating plant, and a small addition to the chemistry department. The Legislature approved A&M's budget, but Governor Campbell vetoed these construction items. Citing Section Thirteen, Article Seven of the Texas Constitution, Campbell declared that A&M was not entitled to general funds for the purposes of construction since it was a branch of UT. Outraged, A&M President Milner wrote Campbell in October and called for meetings to discuss a legal separation from UT. Milner argued that the majority of Texans favored an amendment that would separate the two colleges. The Farmers' Congress was decisively in favor A&M's independence and Milner was receiving letters in favor of the divorce every day.  

The UT Regents and the A&M Directors met to discuss plans to streamline their operations by way of separation or consolidation for the first time in November 1909 and appointed a joint committee. This committee recommended an amendment that would establish a special tax designed to generate revenue to supply A&M with a building and equipment fund. The tax would eliminate the College's need for a share of the PUF and legally separate the two institutions. UT could then prosper with interest from the PUF and periodic taxes enacted by the
legislature. The recommendation was forwarded to the Legislature in 1911 where the amendment died.  

A committee of UT, A&M, and the all-female College of Industrial Arts (CIA) representatives met during a UT Regents meeting in January 1911. The record does not show CIA taking an active part in the meeting. A&M representatives proposed a constitutional amendment that would separate the institutions, define the precise mission of each school, and equally divide the million acres allotted to UT in Article Seven, Section Fifteen of the Constitution. When the assembly reconvened the next day, the A&M Directors announced that they were willing to surrender their claim to 500,000 acres, but they still wanted to pursue a special permanent tax for the College. The group then decided that each governing board chair should appoint two legislators to draft a constitutional amendment that would legally separate the schools and provide each with a statutory tax for permanent improvements. Meanwhile, Governor Oscar Colquitt urged the Legislature to craft a constitutional amendment to separate UT and A&M and institute the proposed tax to support all of the state's public colleges. A group of eight introduced House Bill Seventy-Three during the Thirty-Second Legislature in 1911 to provide for this ad valorem tax, but the Senate defeated the measure.  

UT conducted an extensive national survey of opinions on land-grant/state university consolidation in 1913. The survey included recommendations from over twenty educational leaders. Illinois President Edmund James stated that the agricultural school at his university possessed a higher income, better equipment, and faculty because it was part of the main university. Alabama President George Denney argued that inefficiency always accompanied institutions in states with separate land-grants and state universities. Both Chancellor Samuel Avery at the University of Nebraska and President Benjamin Ide Wheeler at the University of
California cautioned against consolidation if the institutions ended up suffering at the hands of petty, regionally-motivated politicians. Wheeler also argued that a state should be able to rise above turf battles and make a decision that benefits the state. With the majority of respondents in favor of the single-institution design, UT faculty and Regents resolved to pursue consolidation.60

At the same time that Colquitt continued to advocate separation in 1913, twelve legislators issued a proposal to convert the A&M campus into an insane asylum and absorb the agricultural college into UT's Austin campus. The group used historical, environmental, and economic evidence to support their arguments. The statement included endorsements from former A&M Presidents David Houston (then U.S. Secretary of Agriculture) and H.H. Harrington. Houston cited A&M's location as its greatest obstacle both educationally and agriculturally. College Station was geographically and intellectually isolated. Poor soil in the Brazos Valley prevented adequate experimentation.61 The report also included statements from the State Cattle Raisers' Association and the Short-Horn Breeders' Association to show that A&M had failed to graduate enough practical farmers or to produce significant and useful agricultural research. States that possessed an institution that served as both the state university and the land-grant college, such as Illinois and Wisconsin, did the best job offering financially and academically efficient programs in agriculture and mechanical arts. Texas could better meet the agricultural needs of the state if the two institutions were consolidated.62

The group of twelve reasoned that A&M's location precipitated a number of behavioral problems with students and faculty. College Station was a small, isolated town with no place for individuals to express their frustrations in a healthy manner. As a result, faculty members and students over-dramatized their problems. Behavioral problems aside, Austin possessed superior
land, climate, water, and transportation. In conclusion, the report cited an article from the March 21, 1913 edition of the *Dallas Morning News*, which argued that all parties involved seemed to be in favor of the consolidation plan with the exception of A&M President Milner and a handful of former A&M students. W.A. Trenckmann, former president of the A&M Directors, issued a statement in favor of eventual consolidation. He hypothesized that the former students of A&M would wage a bitter fight against the merger regardless of the benefits such a move would hold for the College.

The two boards met again in January 1913 in Fort Worth. Governor Colquitt asked the members to review his proposed four-point constitutional amendment: (1) institutional separation, (2) transfer of state lands designated for asylums to A&M, (3) tax to support each school, plus a $50,000 disbursement from the PUF to A&M, and (4) a state tax for all public colleges not to exceed 10 cents on every $100 dollars of taxable property. The UT Regents rejected the $50,000 disbursement, but favored a measure that would bestow 400,000 acres of university lands or equivalent securities to A&M if consolidation was out of the question. The joint committee adopted this modified version of Colquitt's proposal.

The tedious saga continued into 1914. A&M Publicity Agent Ike Ashburn sent a resolution dated August 1, 1914 demanding separation, equal division of the PUF, and a plan to prevent program duplication between the two schools. The Regents declined to respond to the Directors after they read the resolution in October and the two institutions prepared to meet once again in December 1914. Mezes opposed separation and suggested to Will Hogg that UT approach the upcoming set of negotiations with an attitude of indifference: support separation as long as it cost UT nothing.
In his 1914 report to the Regents, Mezes stated that, regardless of the consolidation talks, UT needed to establish a school of agriculture as soon as possible. He reasoned that since Texas was an overwhelmingly agricultural state, no college had the right to monopolize such study. Twenty-three of the forty-four states housed the agricultural program in the state university. The stand-alone land-grants in the other twenty-one states were "deplorably low-classed institutions" because they had to administer classical courses at the expense of agriculture. In addition, the land-grants wasted time fighting with the other state university.67

The people then elected "Farmer Jim" Ferguson to his first term in 1914 after he promised to introduce laws to help the large population of tenant farmers in the state. During this campaign and the re-election campaign in 1916, Ferguson vowed to increase funding for common schools and cut waste at UT and A&M. In his address to the Legislature in January 1915, Ferguson assessed the merits of two proposals regarding UT and A&M. The first was a proposal to legally separate the two schools in order to remedy the conflicts between the rival schools and provide each with its own endowment. Governor Ferguson believed that this plan was financially unfeasible, especially when Texas failed to meet the educational needs of rural children. The second plan placed both institutions under a single governing board to be located in Austin, but Ferguson acknowledged that such a plan would place too much control in one place. Ferguson suggested a single board of six members. Three of the members would need to come from the agricultural community and none of the members could reside in Galveston, Travis, or Brazos counties, the homes of the institutions. The members would serve staggered terms to prevent the governor from gaining political control of the board.68

The House returned to the issue in 1915 with the Sackett Amendment (House Joint Resolution 34). The Sackett Amendment legally separated the two colleges, established a tax
similar to the one proposed in 1911, and received the support of UT and A&M camps. In the end, the bill carried but citizens defeated the constitutional proposition 81,658 to 50,398. Legislative and voter opposition concentrated in Houston, Fort Worth, San Antonio, and UT's home in Austin. In contrast, Brazos County, A&M's domicile, supported the measure (See Appendix, Maps #1 and #2).\textsuperscript{69}

The two governing boards joined forces with the Legislature in 1919 to draft another constitutional amendment. House Joint Resolution 29 gave A&M one-third and UT two-thirds of the PUF. Far fewer citizens participated, but the results were the same. The people voted 76,422 to 37,560 against this proposition. Opposition rested in the middle of the State, but the measure gained the support of major cities San Antonio, Houston, and Austin (Appendix, Map #3). At the close of 1920, discussions regarding consolidation and separation were right back where they began in 1909.\textsuperscript{70}

**Struggles to Compete at the National Level**

American colleges did not begin to compete for faculty, research funds, and students, particularly at the graduate level, until the close of the nineteenth century. The competition that Geiger and Veysey have described was limited to a few institutions in the Northeast, Midwest, and West.

Most reviews of higher education in the former Confederacy between Reconstruction and the dismantling of segregation described conditions as abysmal at worst and mediocre at best. Southern educators addressed these conditions through comparative study and reform programs. UT and A&M leaders expended enormous amounts of energy researching comparisons between their respective institutions and universities that were excelling outside of the former
Confederacy. Eager to build an institution that could compete with the finest colleges, UT Regent Ashbel Smith embarked on a fact-finding trip throughout the South and Northeast in May 1881 in hopes of fulfilling the constitutional mandate that UT function as a "university of the first class."71

A comparison of the three most competitive public Southern institutions (University of Texas, University of Virginia, and University of North Carolina) with the leading institutions outside of the South (University of California, University of Wisconsin, University of Illinois, University of Michigan, and University of Minnesota) reveals significant disparities (Table 3-2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Graduate Students</th>
<th>Ph.D.s Awarded</th>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>Library Volumes</th>
<th>Endowment</th>
<th>State Appropriation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>328,000</td>
<td>$5,532,606</td>
<td>$1,934,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>369,258</td>
<td>$649,012</td>
<td>$2,453,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>368,238</td>
<td>$1,013,290</td>
<td>$1,059,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>$1,647,059</td>
<td>$1,820,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74,750</td>
<td>$154,900</td>
<td>$125,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>129,878</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
<td>$711,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>$2,215,859</td>
<td>$109,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>$685,627</td>
<td>$1,664,602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the first twenty years of the twentieth century, A&M and UT leaders joined the ranks of Southern progressives in a quest to pull the South out of poverty through educational reform. Progressives were largely members of the bourgeoisie interested in addressing the ills of American society through social control, economic development, and efficiency. The broad national movement encompassed prison reform, temperance, literacy campaigns, and government regulation of everything from monopoly-prone corporations to agricultural production. While Northern reformers were not immune to the racism that existed in the South, Southern progressive endeavors were more distinctively designed to benefit whites. Southern
progressives worked to increase funding at African American colleges, but classical courses were given short-shrift in favor of vocational training.\textsuperscript{72}

William Hogg, the long-time UT Regent, the son of Governor James Hogg (1891-1895), and the brother of the great philanthropist and social reformer Ima Hogg, established the most active educational reform organization in Texas in the early teens. The Organization for the Enlargement by the State of Texas of Its Institutions of Higher Education established a subscription service to raise money for the colleges and published a series of reports. Most of the reports highlighted the differences between UT and the most competitive institutions in the nation. In one 1912 monograph, the author demonstrated that UT possessed 1/3 the faculty, 1/2 the income, and under 1/3 the equipment of the finest public universities in 13 states outside of the South (Table 3-3).\textsuperscript{73}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Item} & \textbf{Texas} & \textbf{Average of 13 States}^1 \\
\hline
Population & 3,897,000 & 2,500,000 \\
\hline
Income for Higher Education, 1911 & 541,000 & 1,110,000 \\
\hline
Income for Higher Education Per Inhabitant & 15 cents & 44 cents \\
\hline
Income for Higher Education Per $1,000 Actual Wealth & 16 cents & 23 cents \\
\hline
Income for Higher Education Per Student in Regular Session & 167 & 296 \\
\hline
Income for Higher Education from State Taxes & 595,000 & 858,000 \\
\hline
Income for Higher Education from State Taxes Per Inhabitant & 15 cents & 34 cents \\
\hline
Income for Higher Education for Endowment, Fees, Etc. & 296,000 & 441,000 \\
\hline
Number of Teachers Per 100 Students & 6.1 & 9.3 \\
\hline
Value of Higher Education Plants & 3,213,000 & 4,300,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Texas Versus Thirteen Midwestern and Western States, 1912}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{1} California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

\textsuperscript{72} Source: “The State Institutions of Higher Education in Texas: Their Past Services, Future Possibilities and Present Financial Condition”, by the Organization for the Enlargement by the State of Texas of Its Institutions of Higher Education, Austin, 5/1/12, table reproduced from page 6, TSLAC.
In a subsequent report, Arthur Lefevre concluded that the best state universities were located in states that possessed solid public support for higher education in the form of enthusiasm as well as money.\textsuperscript{74}

The Hogg Foundation was not alone in demonstrating the need for greater financial support for higher education through comparison. E.J. Kyle, Dean of the School of Agriculture at A&M, prepared the chart reproduced in Table 3-4 for President Milner in 1912.\textsuperscript{75}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Funds for Agricultural College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Texas 167,865,600</td>
<td>Illinois 5,629,000</td>
<td>Wisconsin $421,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kansas 52,288,000</td>
<td>Texas 3,897,000</td>
<td>Michigan $380,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nebraska 49,117,600</td>
<td>Missouri 3,293,000</td>
<td>Illinois $329,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Missouri 47,990,400</td>
<td>Michigan 2,810,000</td>
<td>Iowa $175,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Michigan 36,753,200</td>
<td>Wisconsin 2,334,000</td>
<td>Kansas $168,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Illinois 35,840,000</td>
<td>Iowa 2,225,000</td>
<td>Missouri $112,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Iowa 35,540,000</td>
<td>Kansas 1,691,000</td>
<td>Nebraska $105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Wisconsin 34,840,000</td>
<td>Nebraska 1,192,000</td>
<td>Texas $27,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Needs of The School of Agriculture of the A&M College of Texas", prepared by EJ Kyle (Dean of the School of Agriculture), Oscar Colquitt Papers, Box 301-352, folder 25.

In this thirteen-page report, Kyle noted that agricultural students constituted 17\% of the College's students in 1906 and that number increased sharply to 44\% by 1911. A&M was beginning to attract the agricultural students that the state so desperately needed, but the College lacked the faculty to teach them. Citing Illinois as the ideal, Kyle observed that while Illinois was 1/5 the size of Texas, the school of agriculture at the University of Illinois possessed a faculty of 75 and a total salary budget of $139,600. A&M possessed four faculty members in agriculture outside of the separate experiment station and compensated them from a salary budget of $18,100. While Kyle made a strong case for more agricultural faculty, his comparison of Texas to Illinois only demonstrated how much better compensated A&M faculty were to Illinois faculty.\textsuperscript{76} The Texas Bankers Committee on Agriculture assisted the College and distributed Kyle's pamphlet and a similar document highlighting the needs of the experiment
A. Caswell Ellis addressed the Farmers' Union Rally on behalf of the Hogg Foundation in 1911. Ellis cited two major obstacles that the state faced. First, like the rest of the former Confederacy, Texas was a colonial state, producing raw materials, but then relying on products and even ideas from other places to function. Michigan, Wisconsin, California, Illinois, and even the infant state of Washington spent more than one million dollars annually on higher education. Texas and the other Southern states averaged $150,000 annually. Texas could catch up to the states outside the South and easily increase spending by two or even four times. The best way to fortify physical plants would be to issue bonds as the state did for most other public building projects. The Legislature largely ignored Ellis' solution and Texas entered the 1920s with many of the same financial challenges that Ellis and other critics described.

Will Hogg, A. Caswell Ellis, and E.J. Kyle were all progressives. UT presidents David Houston (1905 - 1908), Sidney Mezes (1908 - 1914), William Battle (1915 - 1916), and Robert Vinson (1916 - 1923), and A&M presidents David Houston (1902-1905, the same Houston who led UT), Henry Hill Harrington (1905-1908), Robert Milner (1908 - 1913), and William Bizzell (1914 - 1925) were all committed to the tenets of progressivism. None of these men appear to have participated in the regional organizations that were designed to uplift the South and were led by the individuals profiled in Michael Dennis' *Lessons in Progress*. Dennis' study of Edwin Alderman (president of the University of Virginia), Walter Bernard Hill (chancellor of the University of Georgia), Samuel Mitchell (president of the University of South Carolina), and Charles Dabney (president of the University of Tennessee) depicts these men as champions of
higher education as the key to Southern prosperity. These men communicated with one another and participated in the same regional organizations such as the Southern Education Board (SEB). As an aside, UT and A&M leaders did not exhibit a strong presence in the SEB. Dennis’ subjects fought for state greater appropriations for their colleges, and favored modern, less classical training, for college students, and fancied themselves as social engineers who could transform the Confederacy into a modern South. The university leadership of Texas instead chose to work towards improving Texas colleges so that they could compete with institutions outside of the South. As previously demonstrated in this section and as revealed in available records, leaders at UT and A&M were a bit less interested in fixing the ills of poverty and farm tenancy and more engrossed in institution building. UT and A&M’s leaders did not want to transform the Southern social system; they wanted to compete with the nation's best public universities.

**Held Back by Paranoia and Militarism**

Paranoia and militarism served as formidable stumbling blocks to success for UT and A&M. Personal correspondence, faculty meeting minutes, and even Legislative journals demonstrate that UT faculty and administrators functioned in a constant state of paranoia in their dealings with the state government. At times, from at least the Ferguson episode on, individuals at UT allowed politics to distract them from the academic core mission. The most politically liberal students, frequently reporters for the *Daily Texan*, joined this campaign against prominent state leaders.

A&M constantly found itself embroiled in scandals related to the Corps of Cadets. The first occurred in 1879 when the faculty divided into opposing camps over the selection of the senior student captain. The incident exploded into several months of name-calling and the
eventual dismissal of the entire faculty. A&M produced as many war heroes as the national military academies, but there were times when hazing and Corps rituals dominated the campus at the expense of academics. The legislative committee established to study student demonstrations and hazing allegations in 1947 warned that if "it is allowed to become sectionalized or 'overtraditionalized', its full usefulness to its owners, the taxpayers of Texas, may become greatly impaired and its future as a great institution, instilling as it does and should the fundamentals of democracy and good citizenship in the youth of Texas, may be seriously hampered."\(^8\)

Both UT and A&M had a difficult time attracting the top faculty they desired because neither offered salaries that were competitive with the best state universities. In addition to low salaries, A&M did not offer tenure. Most faculty contracts were renewable on an annual basis. The UT Regents threatened to abolish its tenure system in the early 1940s and the campus erupted with protest. No such event occurred at A&M. The faculty remained relatively stable and no available records reveal any conflicts over the absence of tenure at the land-grant. No tenure, low salaries, and the geographic remoteness of College Station certainly did nothing to lure an MIT Ph.D. to A&M. The constant political clashes between the Capitol and its state university a few blocks away certainly discouraged promising scholars from working at UT.\(^8\)

**Die Cast**

While this chapter does not assume that UT and A&M established fixed behavior patterns in the first five decades and failed to evolve in subsequent years, the institutions first faced many of their long-term challenges during this time. These challenges included political interference at both schools, fights to gain adequate funding for salaries and buildings, and the constitutional provisions that seemed to only confuse budgeting procedures and access to the PUF. The
The succeeding chapter follows two prominent factors in the development of the colleges: oil and coordination.

**Conclusion, 1836-1920**

**Proper Government Policy**

It took Texans roughly forty years after victory at the Battle of San Jacinto in 1836 to establish a state college. Leaders disagreed over the role that the state should assume in higher education during the 1840s and 1850s. Sam Houston, perhaps the best-known Texas icon after Davy Crockett, served as a formidable opponent to publicly funded higher education. The Civil War then served as a distraction to debates until Reconstruction. Governors and legislators made little progress towards establishing a university during the Reconstruction era as Republicans and Democrats engaged in an emotionally charged power struggle. Soon after the Democrats regained control of the Texas government in 1873, leaders gathered in Austin to craft a new state constitution.

The Texas Constitution of 1876 provided for the University of Texas and decreed that it should be 'a university of the first class' with an agricultural branch. The state opened A&M first (1876) under the direction of its own governing board, which then had seven years to establish a unique campus culture and a strong military mission. UT opened in 1883 after fighting for years to gain adequate funding from the Legislature. As previously stated, UT and A&M began their institutional lives as adversaries with A&M, technically a branch campus, allowed to receive general appropriations to build and UT restricted to the then insufficient PUF to construct its classrooms.
From the beginning, the manner in which the Legislature allocated funds created resentment between the two colleges. By the 1910s, both institutions were required to submit their budgets to the Legislature as line items, thus removing autonomy from the governing boards and presidents to make their own financial decisions. There was little effort by the state to regulate the creation of teachers colleges that sprouted up in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nor was there a coordinating body to oversee the duplication of course offerings between institutions.

**Political Interference**

Political interference was most pronounced at UT, specifically between 1915 and 1917. Even though the Legislature impeached Ferguson, his actions towards UT had lasting consequences. As previously noted, all state colleges were required to submit line-item budgets to the Legislature until 1947. UT officials emerged from the conflict and headed into the 1920s in paranoid fear of repeat attacks by lawmakers.

**Academic Development**

UT and A&M spent a good deal of the time between 1880 and 1920 trying to negotiate the PUF and settling their separation/consolidation. At the same time, each built academic programs and extracurricular traditions that would define them for decades.

While disparities existed between the Texas colleges and the best state universities outside of the former Confederacy, UT joined UVa and UNC as the top Southern state universities. UT would be admitted into the prestigious AAU in 1929 as the result of its large library, its small but respected graduate programs, and nationally recognized faculty who built regional and sometimes national reputations during the first third of the twentieth century. The sixteen research universities profiled by Geiger in *To Advance Knowledge* certainly had robust
research budgets and graduate programs, but they were not the only universities who employed competent research faculty. UT, for example, attracted a number of scholars, many of them native Texans, who were educated at the nation's leading research universities and returned home to serve distinguished careers in Austin. Harry Benedict, an astronomer who is best known for his ability to negotiate with lawmakers and Regents during his tenure as president (1928-1938), received his bachelor's and first master's from UT, traveled to Harvard to pursue his Ph.D., and soon after returned to join the UT faculty in 1899. J. Frank Dobie, perhaps the best-known Texas folklorist, earned a master's degree at Columbia and then joined the UT faculty in 1914 where he attracted international attention for his studies of Southwestern folklore. Eugene Barker is an excellent example of homegrown talent. Barker received all of his degrees from UT, where he joined the faculty in 1899. This important Texas historian authored the definitive biography of Stephen F. Austin and helped found the Mississippi Valley Historical Association (now the Organization of American Historians). UT also recruited promising scholars S. Leroy Brown of Indiana (Ph.D., University of California, joined UT physics department in 1912), Theophilus Shickel Painter of Virginia (P.D., Yale, joined UT genetics department in 1916, appointed president in 1944), and John J. Patterson of Ohio (Ph.D., University of Chicago, joined UT genetics department in 1908). By 1920, UT had established at least a skeletal research faculty who would go on to make notable contributions to their fields in the 1920s and 1930s.83

Academic development at A&M between 1876 and 1920 is much harder to chart. The land-grant college would not award a doctorate until 1940. Between 1876 and 1920, A&M essentially remained an undergraduate military academy. The agricultural and engineering experiment stations conducted research, but these units remained separate from the academic units in College Station until after World War II.
As of 1920, both institutions were racially segregated and A&M remained all male.

There would be no recorded efforts by African Americans to challenge the state's Jim Crow policies related to education until the late 1930s.

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Notes


2 John J. Lane, History of the University of Texas Based on Facts and Records (Austin: Henry Hutchins State Printer, 1891), 4-5; Roger A. Griffin, "To Establish a University of the First Class," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 86, (October 1982), 136-137.

3 Griffin, 138. The opposition group had few Southern models for mass higher education. North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia were the first to charter state universities during the federalist period with the intent of educating planters' sons for life as political leaders. See Michael Sugrue, "We Desired Our Future Rulers to Be Educated Men, South Carolina College, the Defense of Slavery, and the Development of Secessionist Politics" In The American College in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Roger Geiger (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), 91-114.

4 Griffin, 139.


6 Griffin, 139; For a detailed treatment of Reconstruction in Texas, see Allwyn Barr, Reconstruction to Reform: Texas Politics, 1876-1906 (2000); reprint, Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1971).

7 Higher education for the masses evolved slowly. The Morrill Act of 1862 was one of many factors that helped transform American higher education in the second half of the nineteenth century. Better known as the land-grant act, it provided each state with an amount of land equal to 30,000 acres for each congressman and senator. Once a state accepted the land and terms of the Act, it was to sell the land and invest the proceeds in state or federal bonds. The permanent fund derived from the investment was to be used to establish and maintain at least one institution "where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies...to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanical arts." 37th Congress, 2d. session, Chapter 30, 504 (see also U.S.C.A. 301).

8 Barr notes that A.J. Hamilton, former U.S. Congressman and Union soldier, was appointed as provisional governor in 1865 and served only until Texas could complete a constitutional convention. During this convention, African American Texans were granted suffrage and minimal rights. In 1866, Throckmorton, a former Unionist and converted Confederate, defeated former Governor Elisha Pease, a converted Unionist, 49,277 to 12,168. General Philip Sheridan banished Throckmorton and deemed him an obstacle to Reconstruction in 1867 and placed Elisha Pease back in the statehouse. Pease served as governor until the close of 1869. This struggle illustrate the tension between Unionists and Confederates that would exist in Texas until at least the end of Reconstruction and the constitutional convention of 1875/76; Barr, 7-8; H.P.N. Gammel, comp., The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897. 10 vols. (Austin: Gammel Publishing Co., 1898), V, 1103-1105, 1126, 1185, 1189-1190.

9 Just as the South was far from monolithic with respect to politics, the Texas Democratic politics was characterized by internece conflicts. Griffin, 139; Barr, 79; R. Hal Williams, foreward to Barr, Reconstruction to Reform, xiv.

10 Clarence Ousley, "History of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas," 35-42; Henry Dethloff, Texas A&M University...16-23. Additional details prior to 1875 are unknown since any evidence was destroyed by fire in 1912

11 Ousley, 41.

12 Ousley, 47; David Brooks Cofer, Early History of Texas A&M College Through Letters and Papers (College Station: Association of Former Students of Texas A&M College, 1952), 13-14.

13 Griffin, 139.
The process went smoothly in the Senate, but the bill hit a snag in the House when a group of representatives stated that they preferred the University to be led by a faculty chair, as opposed to a president. Representative Joseph C. Hutcheson was a graduate of the University of Virginia, the only state university in the country that had this sort of organizational structure supported this plan, along with George P. Finlay, representative from Galveston. Finlay later said that he favored the faculty chairman plan because he was afraid Oran Robert, his political rival, would become president. Griffin, 143-147.

Board of Regents to Roberts, November 11, 1881, Oran Milo Roberts Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-117, folder 126; Message of Governor O.M. Roberts to the Seventeenth Leg., Called Session, April 6-May 5, 1882, in H.Y. Benedict, A Source Book Relating to the History of the University of Texas (Austin: University of Texas, 1917), 264 -- 269. Griffin, 151.

Griffin, 137; Barr 7-8.

Oran M. Roberts, "A History of the Establishment of the University of the State of Texas," The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, 1, (April 1898); 233 - 265, first quote 238, second quote 239.

Alaska's entry into the Union prompted Texas to change the lyrics of its state song. "Texas Our Texas" originally proclaimed, "biggest and grandest of all the mighty states." No longer true, the line was changed to "boldest and grandest."


Lane, History of the University of Texas, 117-123.

Dethloff, 83, 98.

Griffin, 150.

Quares to Colquitt, 1/31/11, Oscar Colquitt Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-352, folder 7.

Colquitt to Peteet, 7/30/12 (folder 23), Colquitt to Peteet, 9/18/11 (folder 8), Oscar Colquitt Papers TSLAC, Box 301-352. s

Letters from Robert Milner to Colquitt, June 16, 1913; Walton Peteet to Colquitt, June 19, 1913; John Guion to Colquitt, June 18, 1913; L.J. Hart to Colquitt, June 18, 1913; R.L. Bennett to Colquitt, June 18, 1913, Colquitt Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-353 folder 2; Cushing to Colquitt, June 18,1913; Milner "To the People of Texas", July 25, 1913, Colquitt papers, TSLAC, Box 301-353, folder 5.

Clarence Ousley, "History of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas," Bulletin of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas 6, no. 8, (1935).


Benedict, Source Book...UT, 500-501, 719-720. A quick clarification regarding A&M's partially itemized budget is necessary here. A&M listed a sum of its salaries and an itemized list of all remaining operating and building costs. In contrast, UT's budget was listed as two sums: one total for the Main University and the medical school and one total for the Bureau of Economic Geology.


UTBOR Minutes, October 26, 1915, 532; Gould, Progressives and Prohibitionists, 192-193.


Gould, "The University Becomes Politicized..." 276.


Ousley, 45, 54.

Williams, 89, 119.

Williams, 154; 7 U.S.C. 322 (1890 Land Grant Act).
41 Andrew, 37, 40, 44-45, 48, quote on 40.
42 ibid., 2, 6, 60, 73.
43 ibid., 67-68, 69-72, quote from 68.
44 Dethloff, 201-216.
45 Andrews, 72-73.
46 Andrews, 6; Neiberg, 24.
48 Neiberg, 26, 29; Reagan, *NC State University: A Narrative History*, 85.
49 University of Arizona, University of Arkansas, Connecticut State College, University of Florida, Purdue, Kansas State, University of Maryland, Michigan State College, University of Minnesota, Montana State College, Texas A&M, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and the University of Wyoming.
50 Neiberg, 30; Hamilton et. al. v. Regents of the University of California et. al., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
51 Dethloff, 199.
53 Lane, *History of the University of Texas* 6, 11, 18.
56 A. Caswell Ellis to Colquitt, July 2, 1913 (folder 11), Will Hogg to Colquitt, 11/27/14, (folder 12), Oscar Colquitt Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-353.
59 "History of Negotiations..."
60 "Opinions of Educators on Consolidation of A&M Colleges and Universities," Oscar Colquitt Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-352, folder 31.
61 Statement by David Houston, 3/12/13 in Oscar Colquitt Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-352, folder 31
62 "Statement by Members of the House of Representatives Concerning a Bill to Consolidate the Agricultural & Mechanical College and State University," 1913, pp. 6-12.
63 ibid., 6, 13, 29-30
64 "What is to Become of the A&M College?," W.A. Trenckmann, Oscar Colquitt Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-352, folder 25.
65 ibid., 6-9.
66 ibid., 10-15; Ike S. Ashburn to the UT Regents, August 1, 1914, Box 2J385, UT Regents Records, UTCAH, General Correspondence May 1913 -- December 1916 folder; Mezes to William Hogg, November 23, 1914, UT Regents Records, UTCAH, Box 2J384, 1913-1914 folder.
67 Sidney Mezes to the Board of Regents, December 16, 1914, UT Regents Records, UTCAH, Box 2J384, 1913-14 folder, pp. 5-15.
70 Texas Senate, *Journal of the Senate, State of Texas Being Regular Session Thirty-sixth Legislature, Convened in the City of Austin, January 12, 1919* (hereafter cited at *Texas Senate Journal*), 831, 883, 928, 957, 992-994, 1010, 1038.

71 Griffin, 150; Texas State Constitution, Article 7, sec. 10.


73 "Plans of Organization Proposed by Resolutions of the Alumni Association of the University of Texas, Adopted June 12, 1911," Harry Benedict Papers, UTCAH, Box 2B69, Hogg Organization 1911-1919 folder.

74 Arthur Lefevre, "A Study of the Financial Basis of the State Universities and Agricultural Colleges in Fourteen States," 1912. TSLAC.

75 "Needs of the School of Agriculture of the A&M College of Texas," prepared by E.J. Kyle, Dean of the School of Agriculture, November 25, 1912, TSLAC.

76 ibid., pp. 3-4.

77 Texas Bankers Committee on Agriculture letter, January 1, 1913, Oscar Colquitt Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-352, folder 26.

78 A. Caswell Ellis, "The Relation of Higher Education to the Economic Development of the State and the Financial Value of the Common Schools to the State," address delivered at the Farmers' Union Rally in Rusk County, July 4, 1911, sponsored by the Organization for the Enlargement by the State of Texas of Its Institutions of Higher Education, TSLAC.

79 Dennis, *Lessons in Progress*.

80 Dethloff, 58-69.

81 Statement to Allan Shivers and W.O. Reed (no date), Allan Shivers Papers, TSLAC, Box 1977/81-338, A&M folder.

82 Gould, "University Becomes Politicized," 257.

83 Details regarding these individuals can be found at http://www.utexas.edu/faculty/council/pages/memorials/html (accessed December 17, 2004).
Chapter Four
Oil and Coordination, 1920 -- 1931

The Texas Scene

Business progressivism, Fergusonism, curricular coordination, and battles over access to the PUF characterized the years between 1920 and 1931 for UT and A&M. Governors Pat Neff (1921-1925) and Dan Moody (1927-1931) were what George Tindall described as business progressives; fiscal conservatives who believed that economic development and efficiency were antidotes to Southern social problems. Neff and Moody were committed to streamlining the state budget, increasing the delivery of state services, improving the state's roads and other infrastructure, maintaining prohibition, and strengthening law enforcement. Business progressivism was not about social, political, and economic advancement for African and Mexican Americans. For example, the Legislature passed a white primary law in 1923, which barred African Americans from voting in Democratic Party primaries. The U.S. Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional in 1927, but the state legislature got around the ruling by empowering political parties to choose their own members.1

UT and A&M battled to receive adequate funds under the fiscally conservative Neff and Moody. In terms of reform, business progressives sponsored a statewide survey of education that was conducted by external reviewers in 1924. While the survey did not result in sweeping improvements for higher education, it validated a number of concerns related to institutional mission and state financial support for the colleges. Texas bid farewell to James Ferguson in 1917, but UT and A&M endured another round of political interference after his wife Miriam became governor in 1925. Essentially a figurehead, Miriam Ferguson allowed her husband to reintroduce graft and patronage into the executive office.
The colleges fought state government as well as each other for control over the PUF throughout the decade. At the end of the fight, the institutions entered the 1930s with greater control over the PUF and oil leases. In addition, each institution made modest improvements to curriculum and research programs.

**Business Progressivism Under Neff**

During his first address to the Legislature in 1921, Governor Neff proclaimed that he supported education 'from the little red-schoolhouse on the roadside to my Alma Mater on yonder hill'. The 'yonder hill' being the University of Texas, where Neff earned his law degree. While Neff was not an aggressive educational reformer, he supported increased financial support for both colleges and physical plant expansion for UT.

Long before 1920, the University of Texas had outgrown its campus. The University boasted few permanent buildings and numerous dilapidated wooden shanties. UT President Robert Vinson and the Regents wanted to move the campus to 500-acre plot donated to the institution by George Breckinridge. A lone regent, H.A. Wroe, opposed the move and stated that the University would be denied access to George Littlefield's $800,000 bequest if a move occurred. Vinson and the Regents sent a proposal requesting a move to the Breckinridge tract to out-going Governor William Hobby, Neff, and the Legislature in January 1921. Hobby issued his letter of support for the move to the Legislature the following week. The House and the Senate took up bills in favor of the move on January 25. Once it became apparent to Representative Lee Satterwhite of Panhandle that the House would defeat the bill, he persuaded President Vinson to draw up a map showing how to expand the physical plant within the confines or adjacent to the campus' forty acres. After a conference committee revised Senate Bill
111, Governor Neff signed the measure on April 1, 1921 and authorized the Regents to purchase an additional 135 acres adjacent to the campus for $1,350,000. The joint legislative conference committee concluded their report of the bill with an admission that the UT campus in its existing borders hindered the expansion and improvement of the college. The House approved Senate Bill 111 with ninety-six yeas, seventeen nays, and twenty-seven absent. Interestingly, most of the legislators who voted against the bill represented counties adjacent to Dallas in the Northeast section of the state. The reasons for this regional opposition are unclear. The bill received unanimous support from West Texas, but the governor would soon deny these citizens.

Neff vetoed a bill to establish an agricultural college in West Texas that would eventually become Texas Tech (See Appendix, Map #4). In response, West Texans assembled in Sweetwater and threatened to secede from the state. The secession movement was short-lived, but clarified the tensions that existed between West Texas and the remainder of the state. The western region had long felt mistreated and isolated from larger Texas and its citizens were outraged that the Governor would veto their efforts to bring higher education to their corner of the massive state. Neff responded to the secession threats with apathy and dismissed the movement. Conflicts between Texas and its western region would persist for decades to come as West Texas leaders fought for better funding for Texas Tech.  

It took three legislative sessions before Texas public colleges received their biennial appropriations for 1921-1923. A group of representatives formed the People's Club during the first session with the goal of reducing salaries at the Main University, the Medical Branch, and less dramatically at A&M. The two houses were unable to reconcile their differences on the higher education appropriations bill and proceeded to the second called session. In the end, the colleges received their appropriations with less drastic salary cuts than those proposed by the
People's Club. In his statement citing reasons for his vote, People's Club leader A.S. Curtis of Tarrant County (Fort Worth) said that the University of Texas had never attained first class status. Since 'a University of the first class' was merely a myth, the legislature should only support UT as an undergraduate institution and scale back its graduate programs.4

In addition to these measures, the Thirty-seventh Legislature appointed a committee of nine to study the state's system of higher education and make recommendations for improving efficiency and coordination between the colleges. The Legislature failed to provide the committee with funds to conduct this study, but it returned with an initial report in which it concluded that the colleges needed less course duplication and more coordination.5

Educational critic Frederick Eby echoed these conclusions in his 1925 history of education in Texas. Between 1909 and 1921, state institutions increased from three to nine. Legislative appropriations increased during this period as well, but not in proportion to the number of institutions in existence. College enrollment increased by 582% as the state population grew by 53% between 1900 and 1920. In contrast, American collegiate attendance and population grew by 370% and 39% respectively (Table 4-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Wealth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>110,912</td>
<td>3,048,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>14,663</td>
<td>521,756</td>
<td>4,663,228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Eby pointed out that during these same years, the Legislature increased its appropriations for higher education by 2,185%, but the State's wealth only rose by 265%. In contrast, national wealth increased by 323%. UT, A&M, teachers colleges, and the remaining Texas colleges had grown unregulated and by the early 1920s, the institutions duplicated programs and failed to
coordinate efforts. The state was in need of a comprehensive assessment of its educational system, but the project would have to wait until the next legislative session.

At the beginning of his second term and opening of the regular session of the Thirty-eighth Legislature in 1923, Neff called for a major overhaul of the state tax system. In a state where taxes were frequently considered communist and un-American, Neff boldly suggested a system that would equitably tax personal income, natural resources, property, and corporations. The Legislature resented this and a number of other messages that Neff sent out from the governor's mansion and failed to respond to his wishes. Neff once again took up his fight to reform the state tax system during the second called session that began in April 1923. In order to meet all the needs of the state, the Legislature would approach a six million dollar deficit. Neff stated that taxation was a necessary accompaniment to the maintenance of government. Taxes had to be derived from both property and income and Texas had relied much too heavily on property. Unable to pass an adequate tax bill to pay for expenditures, Neff called the legislature together for a third session in May 1923. After considerable wrangling between the House and Senate, the Governor approved the state budget with an estimated two million dollar deficit in June. The Legislature rejected the income tax bill that had been described by critics as 'inspired propaganda.' Texas would continue to derive the bulk of its income from property taxes.

The Legislature returned its attention to the comprehensive educational survey during the Thirty-eighth regular session. This time, the legislature appropriated $50,000 to appoint an external committee composed of nationally recognized scholars to conduct a survey. The Texas Educational Survey Committee (TESC) would publish its report in 1925.

The Thirty-eighth Legislature delivered both good and bad news to the state colleges. Neff signed House Bill 142, which provided A&M with $100,000 to construct a much needed
administration building for the extension department and $15,000 to renovate Gathright Hall. UT received permission to use interest from the PUF to construct buildings over the next fifteen years with the passage of House Bill 131. West Texas finally obtained its own college with funds provided by Senate Bill 103. The legislature did not pass the higher education appropriations bill for the 1924-1925 biennium until the third called session in the summer of 1923.8

Political tension erupted once again in February 1923 between the executive branch and UT when Vinson announced that he was leaving to accept the presidency at Western Reserve University in Ohio. The Regents discussed the appointment of long-time dean, Harry Benedict, as the interim president, but seemed to lean towards Governor Neff to replace Vinson. Regents H.J. Lutcher Stark and Fred Cook appeared to support Neff and additional supporters stated that a man of Neff's morals and fiscal conservatism could help build the people's trust in the University. The faculty, in contrast, was outraged by the suggested appointment because Neff was not an academic. Similarly, the Ex-Students Association issued a statement at its June 1923 meeting. In this letter, alumni argued that a former governor would lure political enemies within firing distance of the college. Neff's foes would use the institution as a target to attack the former governor. In the midst of controversy, the Regents extended the appointment of acting president William Sutton in August for the 1923-1924 academic year.9

Norman Brown presents a vivid description of these events in *Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug*. Drawing from correspondence, newspaper accounts, and interviews, Brown considers a popular 1924 rumor that Regent Stark offered the post to Neff as part of a deal between Stark, Neff, and Lieutenant Governor T. Whitfield Davidson. Davidson would succeed Neff as governor with the understanding that the Lieutenant Governor would not run for the
position in 1924, but pledge his support to Stark. James Ferguson highlighted this story in the *Ferguson Forum* in May 1923 as he laid plans for his wife Miriam's gubernatorial campaign.

Davidson denied these allegations in a confidential letter to Edward Crane of the UT Ex-Students' Association. The Regents met in July and failed to select a president. The Regents did, however, vote eight to one to adopt a resolution barring any atheist or agnostic from working for the University or serving on its governing board. While the resolution elicited few responses from the major city newspapers, alumnus Ralph "Railroad" Smith wrote a scathing criticism of the measure in the December issue of the *Alcalde*, the UT alumni magazine.10

The Regents met once again in May 1924 to select a president. A number of alumni including noted folklorist John Lomax and Houston businessman Will Hogg attended the meeting. After hearing an emotional message from Hogg, who pleaded with and allegedly cussed at the Regents to reject Neff, the Regents promised the former students that they would not select Neff. The Regents promptly turned around and elected Neff president of the University seven to two during their afternoon meeting. Dissenters Sam Cochran and Frank Jones resigned as Regents after the vote. Neff, in turn, declined the offer. After Guy Ford, graduate dean at the University of Minnesota, and Herbert Bolton, history professor at the University of California, declined the presidency, Texas Railroad Commissioner Walter M. Splawn accepted the job. The faculty were not pleased by Splawn's appointment, and at least a few believed that Neff pressured the Regents to appoint his political crony. The conflict provides more evidence that tensions were high between alumni, certain vocal faculty members such as Harry Benedict, Frank Dobie, Eugene Barker, and the more politically motivated Regents along the lines of Stark, who remained on the Board until 1945.11
The political interference that began with Ferguson in 1915 and continued with the Neff ordeal rendered the UT president virtually unable to advance organized research, improve graduate programs, or lobby for the funds to expand the physical plant until Harry Benedict became president in 1927. Acting President William Sutton confided to Lotus Coffman, of the TESC, that no recent UT president had occupied the position long enough to make academic improvements.12

Return of the Demagogue

The 1924 gubernatorial election heralded Jim Ferguson's return to state politics. The impeached governor could not run for office, but his wife Miriam was eligible. Miriam became the state's first female governor in January 1925, but she was little more than Jim's puppet during her two-year term. While stumping for his wife, Jim Ferguson reintroduced his 1914 criticisms of higher education. A&M claimed to train farmers, but Aggie farmers did not farm. UT criminally took the bulk of the educational appropriation and left the poor children of the state nothing. Despite these occasional but critical references to the state colleges, many supporters of higher education supported Miriam Ferguson's candidacy against her major opponent and Klansman Felix Robertson. Edward Crane asked his fellow alumni to consider how a Klan dominated Board of Regents would affect the University.13

Following her election, Fort Worth newsman and Ferguson ally Ben Ford wrote Jim Ferguson about some trouble at A&M. According to Ford, President Bizzell was dealing with some particularly egregious hazing incidents and had responded by expelling twenty-five students. Sensitive to harsh external criticism, Bizzell allegedly placed a tight gag on the A&M publicity department and refused to release any information regarding the hazing scandal. While
it is impossible to verify Jim and Miriam Ferguson's specific reasons for abolishing the A&M publicity department, Ford's letter certainly could have influenced the decision.¹⁴

Soon after her inauguration, Miriam and Jim Ferguson surprised the UT Ex-Student's Association by asking them to submit the names of twenty to twenty-five individuals as potential Regent appointees. Despite an ardent request to remove Lutcher Stark, Ferguson submitted his name to the Senate, who re-appointed him by a vote of twenty-four to six. This move left alumni feeling that their suggestions were moot.¹⁵

In an effort to likely placate Jim Ferguson, Splawn sent a smarmy message to the Governor's husband praising his plans for the schools and colleges of Texas. Splawn devoted a sizable paragraph to recounting Ferguson's hearty support for the University during his administration between 1915 and 1917. Governor Ferguson then signed the bill that granted UT its first million-dollar appropriation. The University had grown at a much faster rate than the increases in appropriations since Ferguson's departure. After hailing the Miriam Ferguson administration as the greatest in the history of Texas, Splawn expressed his confidence that "your wife will be able to sign the first $2 million appropriation for the University."¹⁶

Upon the convening of the Thirty-ninth Legislature, the Fergusons sent a message to the capitol urging fiscal restraint. The state projected $38 million in revenues and $43 million in appropriations requests for the coming biennium. The governor's office suggested that the legislature trim the budget down to a maximum of $35 million. While the legislature did not obey the Governor's directive to economize and appropriate $750,000 more than the Thirty-eighth Legislature, they managed to agree on the major appropriations bills within the sixty-six days of the regular session between January and March of 1925.¹⁷
James and Miriam Ferguson then trimmed the $14,410,728 educational appropriations bill by $1,243,560. Despite Splawn's praise of Ferguson in January, both UT and A&M suffered. The Fergusons eliminated programs in journalism, music, and library science at UT and the publicity department and numerous faculty positions at A&M when the budget arrived in the Governor's office for approval. Will Mayes, former lieutenant governor and bitter Ferguson enemy, was chair of the UT journalism department, and Ferguson critics believed that this and other higher education cuts were personal. The Fergusons also cut $200,000 for two sessions of summer school at UT and funds for a number of construction projects at A&M. The $2 million per year appropriation that Splawn hoped for totaled $1,458,273.50 for 1925-1926 and $1,406,547 for 1926-27. The Fergusons defended the cuts at UT, A&M, and other colleges across the state by executing cuts in other segments of the state budget.18

Response to these cuts was varied and even strange. A&M alumnus and publicity officer Ike Ashburn19 wrote James Ferguson on April 7 to clarify statements made by various Aggies who expressed their disappointment following the cuts. Alumni, faculty, and administrators understood the need for cuts and were not planning to protest the Governor's budget. President Bizzell wrote Miriam Ferguson on April 25 to assure her that an impending meeting of engineers was not a forum for individuals to criticize her administration.20 In contrast, Texas Ex President Julien Elfenbein sent Miriam a challenging, but courteous letter requesting specific reasons for the Governor's elimination of the journalism and music schools.21 The Miriam Ferguson administration was short-lived. State Attorney General Dan Moody defeated Ferguson in the 1926 Democratic primary and ushered in four additional years of business progressivism.
Business Progressivism Under Moody

In his first address to the Fortieth Legislature in 1927, Dan Moody appealed to the assembly to overhaul the state tax system. Moody wanted a tax system that would be scientific and equitable to all segments of the population. He also urged increased funding for common schools. As for higher education, Moody wanted greater coordination and efficiency between the state colleges.\textsuperscript{22}

The Legislature debated a number of tax measures and only managed to increase the gasoline tax from 1 cent to three cents per gallon, effective until 1928 when the tax would drop to 2 cents per gallon. The regular legislative session closed without the passage of any major appropriations bills, so Moody called a special session on May 9, 1927. Overall, the special session was a disaster. The House defeated a bill to establish the state coordinating board of higher education that was recommended by the Texas Education Survey Commission. While coordination would have to wait, UT and other the state colleges received a special appropriation for a large-scale building plan. In order to approve the four major appropriations bills, Moody concluded that he would need to recommend a seven cent increase in the ad valorem tax, which would increase the tax from twenty-three cents to thirty cents for 1928 and a twenty-seven cent tax for 1929. If the ad valorem tax remained at twenty-three cents, the state would face between $1.5 million and $2 million dollars in budget cuts. Moody compromised by vetoing $422,503 in state appropriations.\textsuperscript{23}

While they criticized the budget cuts, Governor Moody's appointments to the Board of Regents heartened UT supporters. After hounding Will Hogg, who declined an appointment to the board, Moody appointed Edward Crane and Robert Batts, both champions of advancement and autonomy for the University. After his appointment, Batts observed that Stark, Splawn, and
athletic director L. Theo Bellmont, all of who had tolerated Fergusonism, had dominated UT.

With Splawn's impending departure, matters could greatly improve for the institution, provided a good man replaced Splawn. Upon hearing of Splawn's resignation, new Regent Robert Holliday convinced Moody to offer the UT presidency to former U.S. Attorney General Thomas Watt Gregory of Houston. Gregory refused the position and the Regents appointed Harry Benedict. Benedict's appointment in 1927 signaled a new era of physical plant expansion and faculty cohesion at the University.  

With the new board members in place, the Regents readied themselves for the appropriations battle with the Forty-first Legislature in 1928. Robert Holliday contacted Tom Pollard, Moody's assumed appointment to chair the Senate finance committee. While he believed that the Regents were on good terms with men such as Pollard, Holliday feared that there were legislators who were out to hurt the University while grabbing more pork barrel for the teachers colleges, Texas Tech, and A&M. Holliday suggested a list of legislators who were friends of UT and urged Pollard to appoint these men to the finance committee in order to protect the institution's interests. At the same time, Holliday solicited advice from Will Hogg. According to Hogg, A&M employed a lobbyist to act on their behalf during the Fortieth Legislature, and, as a result, received the largest appropriation among the state colleges. Hogg's reply is not available, but the Regents decided against finding a lobbyist and heeded Moody's advice and worked through their allies within the Legislature instead.  

**Coordination, Duplication, Efficiency and the Survey**

Educational reformers in Texas had studied the problem of unregulated growth, program duplication, and quality at the state's assortment of colleges since the 1880s with little result
beyond published surveys. Educational efficiency and quality were becoming increasingly more important policy issues across the nation in the 1910s and the 1920s as critics lamented that most states supported more colleges than governments could finance.\textsuperscript{26}

A House committee of seven that was appointed to study the UT medical branch concluded that both the medical school and the Main University had been hindered by constraints of the state constitution. UT needed the freedom to invest the "dormant capital" in the PUF in ways that would create a substantial building fund. The University and its medical branch needed an adequate physical plant before they could compete with other institutions to attract the best faculty. In addition, this committee took the opportunity to critique the state's set of higher education institutions in its January 1921 report. The committee observed that:

…it is not an unjust criticism to say that the State has displayed less foresight and constructive organization in determining the policy for the development of its educational activities than perhaps may be witnessed in any other department of the State government. The committee feels that the State has temporized with its educational problems, both those that relate to the public schools and to the higher education institutions, and has indulged in legislative expedients, full long. The time has come for the adoption of something approaching a distinct State educational policy, in which the different units of the system will be intelligently coordinated.\textsuperscript{27}

During the first called session of the Thirty-seventh Legislature, a committee presented a brief survey of the various ways that other states coordinated their systems of higher education. The report did not include recommendations, simply an introduction to the problem. Through Senate Concurrent Resolution 5, the Thirty-seventh Legislature appointed a joint committee to study Texas education from elementary to graduate education, but this committee was not bestowed with funds to conduct a survey. This committee met several times during 1922 and identified three major issues that warranted study: (1) institutional governance, with attention to the creation of a state coordinating board; (2) institutional mission with specific reference to program duplication; and (3) financial support. The Thirty-eighth Legislature then agreed that a
comprehensive study was a worthy investment and passed Senate Bill 256, which provided the Texas Education Survey Committee (TESC) with $25,000 to assemble an external review team composed of nationally respected educational leaders. The higher education team included Lotus Coffman, George Zook, Clyde Hill, Fred Kelly, and George Works.28

The TESC produced an eight-volume report in 1925 that opened with several general observations about higher education in the state. First, the size and cultural variety of Texas made public higher education an intensely political affair. Public colleges had largely been established as a result of legislative deals and other political maneuvering. Each section of the state wanted its own comprehensive university and fought to obtain one without consideration for efficiency and cost of such an endeavor. The team cited the establishment of Texas Tech and several of the teachers colleges to illustrate this point29.

Second, constitutional provisions made problems between UT, A&M, and Prairie View vexingly complex. Article VII sections thirteen and fourteen were the main culprits. Section Fourteen established Prairie View as the 'colored branch' of UT, but stipulated that neither UT nor Prairie View could receive legislative appropriations from general revenue to construct buildings. The Legislature could appropriate such funds for permanent improvements at A&M, however, even though Prairie View fell under the purview of the A&M Board of Directors.30

Third, the committee found a great deal of harsh and unnecessary rivalry between the colleges and common schools as they competed for funds. Fourth, the colleges had failed to coordinate their funding requests and course offerings. Overall, Texas possessed a set of colleges that had been created piecemeal to fit the needs of certain regions or groups with no statewide plan. This lack of coordination had damaged the confidence that the public placed in the colleges. A coordinating board could remedy the issues of competition and eroded public
confidence. Despite the Commission's emphatic recommendation, this board would not materialize until 1954.

The final observation concerned presidential power and state funding. College presidents and governing boards submitted budgets to the State Board of Control, a recently formed body made up of three citizens appointed by the governor. In the Committee's view, the Board of Control adjusted the requests without knowing the needs of the colleges. Citing the situation at UT, President Vinson was permitted two hours with the Board of Control during the entire last legislative session.\textsuperscript{31}

A&M President William Bizzell sent a long letter to the review team, which it quoted in full. Bizzell's letter highlighted the issues that he saw as the greatest challenges confronting the land-grant college. At the top of the list stood the constitutional relationship between UT and A&M. Both institutions needed a legal separation and equitable division of the PUF so that they could flourish. A&M's position as a branch of UT was a 'legal fiction' and a formal separation was necessary. In reference to research, Bizzell believed that the A&M College of Arts and Sciences should expand the scope of its initiatives to include topics beyond agriculture. A&M faculty were capable of conducting more than agricultural experiments and those outside of the experiment station should be encouraged to do so. As for course offerings, A&M should establish a degree program in agricultural journalism to provided the rural committee with competent newsmen who understood the 'rural viewpoint.' On the topic of students, Bizzell recommended that A&M admit women. The Constitution did not restrict coeducation at A&M and the College was the sole provider of degrees in areas that would be beneficial to women such as cotton grading and classing, horticulture, dairy science, and poultry husbandry.\textsuperscript{32}
TESC agreed with Bizzell that the two institutions required a legal separation, but they criticized A&M's relationship with the state government, its emphasis on military training, and attraction to graduate study outside of agriculture. As was the case with land-grant colleges across the nation, the state had placed too many regulatory units under A&M's control such as the forestry service and the pure food office. Faculty could not carry out these state responsibilities and teach students. TESC praised the A&M Corp of Cadets and its rich traditions, but criticized the degree of control that the commandant maintained over student time. Specifically, the commandant controlled the lives of students to the point that faculty failed to command the proper respect and academics were secondary. The review team was most alarmed by A&M's desire to expand graduate course offerings to liberal arts and social sciences. The Commission did not express an opinion about co-education at the College beyond an acknowledgement that the issue would become more important in the future.33

Although not credited in the report, interim President William Sutton wrote a series of letters to Lotus Coffman in April 1924. Sutton cited political interference and irregular financial support as the University's greatest problems. The governor's office had generated most of the University's political turmoil since 1900. Sutton described the University's presidents and Regents as "birds of temporary passage." Governors appointed their friends to the Board of Regents and these men rarely remained more than two years. Regents were not around long enough to learn how the institution worked and what it needed. The president had to spend the bulk of his time educating this revolving door of Regents. Presidents left and or were encouraged to depart quickly following conflicts with the governing board. As for financial support, Sutton wrote of the need for buildings. UT, as well as the other public colleges, needed
building bonds. The state's bond debt was low and it was the method that every other state agency and school district used to finance construction.34

The Commission supported Sutton's concerns and additionally observed that the University had failed to progress in its research endeavors and graduate study because the liberal arts faculty controlled the University's academic agenda. The institution needed a more balanced collection of faculty to plan the institution's graduate course offerings and better funding for the hard sciences and professional programs.35

TESC concluded that the colleges needed more money, less political interference, and more focused missions. The institutions needed to refine their missions and stick to them. Each undergraduate in the state required a comprehensive education, but A&M and UT should be the exclusive agents of graduate education. The Commission's findings generated little more than short-term enthusiasm. The teachers colleges and regional state colleges introduced more graduate course and A&M continued to expand its graduate programs beyond agriculture. Institutions still lobbied for adequate financial support from the Legislature. Politics persisted. UT and A&M, however, ended the protracted battle for the PUF.

Oil, the PUF, and Legal Separation for UT and A&M

Santa Rita

In the beginning, the PUF consisted of modest proceeds derived from land and mineral leases. Prior to the massive oil discovery at Santa Rita, named for Saint Rita of Cascia (La Santa de los Impossible), the Spanish patron saint for hopeless causes, on May 28, 1923, the PUF produced a pittance in annual interest. Between 1921 and 1928, the PUF earned $11,892,029.
Table 4-1 University Fund Receipts, 1874 -- 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Total Annual Income</th>
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<td>$483,928.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>1884 -- 1920</td>
<td>$3,025,539.70</td>
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<td>$322,049.24</td>
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Source: Alden Lang, Financial History of the Public Lands in Texas, 217 -- 223

The Legislature enacted a series of acts in 1917, 1919, and 1925 to encourage oil, gas, and other mineral exploration on all state lands. These acts established a system by which individuals and companies could obtain permits from the General Land Office. The permit system encouraged exploration, but the laws proved damaging to the PUF. Former UT geologist, Berte Haigh, provided a painstakingly technical analysis of the drawbacks to the early lease laws for individuals who require details regarding drilling procedures and acre allocation.36

UT Regents still controlled the PUF and missed out on potentially thousands of dollars of earnings for two major reasons that were beyond their control. First, under Chapters 83 (1917) and 81 (1919), prospectors had to file a permit, pay a fee of one dollar, and an additional ten cents for each acre. The PUF could have accrued more with a competitive bidding process. Second, according to the 1917 act, if an individual discovered oil, he/she was required to obtain a production lease and pay a subsequent two dollars per acre annually as long as the lease area remained under production. Section 14 of the 1919 act stated that the land commissioner would issue production leases at no additional charge. The land commissioner concluded that since no oil or gas had been found on the university lands under the 1917 law, the two dollars per acre
was intended as a bonus payment and abolished with the passage of the 1919 act. UT oil and
gas auditor T.E. Allday appealed to the land commissioner and claimed that the two dollars per acre
was a basic part of the college's royalty, which already consisted of '1/8 the value of the gross
petroleum production' and '1/10 of the value of meter output of all gas disposed of off the
premises.' The Regents and the land commissioner continued to dispute this point for years, but
UT never collected the two dollars per acre.37

The Legislature clarified the profits for the PUF when they passed Chapter 71 in 1925.
This act replaced the permit process with a sealed bid procedure. Under the 1925 provisions, the
leaseholder paid ten cents per acre the first year, twenty-five cents per acre the second year, and
fifty cents per acre for the third and additional years. The acreage fee was lifted once the
prospector obtained a production lease. The PUF continued to receive 1/8 of the gross
production royalties and an increase from 1/10 to 1/8 for the gross production of gas produced
and sold off the leased premises. The acreage payments from the 1925 act increased funds
pouring into the PUF, but the land office extended 2,385 permits that covered 855,605 acres that
had been issued under the 1917/1919 acts.38

Soon after the initial discovery at Santa Rita, the University wells were pumping out 100
barrels per day at 3,038 feet. The Regents received the first royalty check in August, but the
funds went directly into the PUF where it would be cycled slowly into interest that took years to
flow into the AUF. By 1925, the University possessed $3,853,257.60 in oil royalties. Despite
new wealth, the University still operated out of crumbling shacks adjacent to the capitol building.
Miriam Ferguson signed House Bill 246 in April 1925 and authorized the state treasurer to
transfer $1,594,562.15 of the oil royalties into the AUF so that the University could finance its
badly needed building program. Upon signing the bill, Ferguson said, 'to the average man who
sees the miserable-looking buildings at the University, it would appear that the state is making an
effort to store up hay instead of to store knowledge."^{39}

The University's victory, however, was short-lived. State Treasurer Gregory Hatcher
refused to place the oil funds into the AUF. House Bill 246 co-author H.S. Bonham of Beeville,
wrote a forceful letter to Hatcher and implored him to deposit the funds in the AUF and allow the
court to declare the act unconstitutional if necessary. Attorney General Dan Moody supported
UT, and the Regents in turn took their case to the Texas Supreme Court.^{40} On March 10, 1926,
the court ruled against the University and declared the act unconstitutional. House Bill 254
clearly violated Article VII, Sections 10,11,12,and 15, which clearly stipulated that all proceeds
derived from university lands be placed in the PUF. University counsel argued that oil was not
part of the land and therefore not subject to constitutional guidelines. Citing a recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision, the state declared that oil was unequivocally part of the land. The
Court acknowledged the University's dire need of an adequate physical plant:

'A shackless campus is much to be desired. But, however desirable new buildings may be
at this time….the inconvenience of this partial delay may well be offset in the blessed
assurance that comes to those whose future rests at all times upon a safe and permanent
foundation.'^{41}

In Moody's view, adherence to the state constitution, which called for a conservative investment
plan, was the only appropriate course of action unless the Legislature called for a constitutional
amendment.

**Petroleum Neophytes**

Legislative and judicial actions affecting investments, profits, and drilling procedures,
were largely out of the Regents' control. Many of the challenges the Regents encountered,
however, could have been avoided if they had employed experts to represent their interests from the beginning.

The Regents hired royalty gaugers and attorneys to oversee their dealings in October 1924, but they suspected these men of under-reporting profits on the University lands in Texon and hired Ernst & Ernst to audit the companies in March 1926. The accounting firm confirmed these suspicions. UT sued Texon and RCPC for $2.7 million in September 1926 but settled for one million out of court.42

The Regents and Splawn continued to make questionable choices in their supervision of the oil lands. Splawn placed an instructor from the Blind Asylum over the lands. By 1931, the Regents developed a more efficient structure for overseeing oil operations with a five-member committee accompanied by a team of petroleum inspectors.43

Despite the increase in funds that the oil lands fed into the PUF, some of the Regents questioned the constitutionality of the oil and gas laws in 1925. S.C. Padelford cited Article VII, sec. 12:

The land herein set apart to the University fund shall be sold under such regulations, at such times, and on such terms as may be provided by law; and the Legislature shall provide for the prompt collection, at maturity, of all debts due on account of University lands, heretofore sold, or that may hereafter be sold, and shall in neither event have the power to grant relief to the purchasers.44

Padelford, a Miriam Ferguson appointee, argued that the framers of the 1876 constitution expected future legislatures to sell university lands, but they did not intend for UT and its branches to retain mineral rights. While the other Regents did not like the permit laws, they did not wish to pursue Padelford's argument for fear of losing both land and valuable minerals.45

Between 1927 and 1928, the Regents revisited the constitutionality question and pledged their support for George Theisen and S. Rosen Frank, citizens who contested the constitutionality of the 1925 act before the Texas Supreme Court. The Regents first asked Attorney General
Clyde Pollard to represent Theisen and Frank against Land Commissioner J.T. Robison. Pollard declined and deemed the act constitutional. Without Pollard to rely on, the five lawyers on the Board of Regents: Crane, Storey, Stark, Neathery, and Holliday formed a committee. The Regents committee established two goals: to nullify the 1925 act and to obtain exclusive control of the university lands and leases. The Regents did not stand unanimous. Marcellus Foster cautioned the other Regents against taking any action that might upset the oil brokers. The Regents were currently dealing with 'buccaneers', but a shake up might place the Board face to face with 'strange highwaymen.' These highwaymen that Foster named were the small-time wildcatters -- men who might be even less palatable than the more refined individuals at Humble and Standard Oil. To face anyone, the Regents needed expertise. Robert Holliday lamented to Governor Moody in December 1927 that the Regents on the institution's land committee were wholly unprepared for the suit pending in the Texas Supreme Court in January and had still not employed qualified counsel to represent the institution.46

In an effort to avoid a conflict with the Supreme Court, should it decide in favor of Theisen and Frank, the Legislature passed Chapter 249 (Senate Bill 474) during the regular session in early 1927. This bill law placed a moratorium on the sale of oil leases on University lands in the event that the court declared the 1925 act unconstitutional. The moratorium would stand until the legislature could enact another law. The Regents opposition to the 1925 act puzzled legislators, because Chapter 71 brought more money into the PUF than the previous acts. A moratorium on oil leases could cost the PUF millions in revenue. Chapter 249 became unnecessary when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Chapter 71 in June 1928.47

The Regents' support of Theisen and Frank hurt their already uneasy relationship with Land Commissioner Robison. Robison expressed his initial frustration with the Regents in his
1924-1926 report. The Regents were apathetic about the university lands until oil was discovered on them in 1923. Since 1923, the Regents had hired lawyers and demanded control over the lands. Robison had no problem delegating this responsibility to the Regents if they devised an adequate system for managing the lands. If the Regents would simply allow the land office to do its job, Robison believed that the PUF would reach fifty million dollars within ten years.48

The state land commissioner managed the university lands until 1929. There is nothing in letters, minutes, or legal cases to suggest that the land commissioner attempted to suppress production or profits on the university lands. Both state law and market forces constricted earnings. UT Regents knew virtually nothing about petroleum and the best way to garner profits from the leasers. The land commissioner and the Regents finally achieved a compromise with the passage of Chapter 282 (Senate Bill 82) in March 1929. Chapter 282 placed the university lands under a joint committee that consisted of the land commissioner and two Regents.49

The Regents possessed the control they wanted, but they faced the battle against A&M to retain full royalties. The Regents and A&M Directors took up the difficult task of negotiating the PUF once again in 1929.

**Battle for the PUF**

Oil did not become a major factor in the PUF and separation battle until the mid-1920s when A&M Dean Charles Puryear wrote President Bizzell and encouraged him to claim the land-grant college's rightful share. After years of fruitless meetings, the Directors and Regents reinitiated discussions to separate and to negotiate the PUF in 1925. These meetings assumed a different tone than the meetings of the teens when the institutions seemed more interested in
separation or consolidation for the benefits of efficiency and curricular coordination. With the promise of oil profits, UT seemed more determined to keep the PUF and A&M was equally determined to fight for it.⁵⁰

UT President Splawn enlisted the help of a faculty committee that included future president Harry Benedict, and historians Charles Ramsdell, and Eugene Barker. In their January 1925 report, this committee listed several reasons why A&M was not entitled to the PUF. The 1876 Constitution forbade the Legislature from designating general funds for permanent improvements at UT, while A&M received regular appropriations for such purposes. Given that A&M already received funds for permanent improvements, federal funds, and state dollars to administer the Pure Food Department, A&M did not require the financial support that UT so badly needed. Splawn also requested the legal assistance of UT law professor Ira Hildebrand. Hildebrand analyzed the state constitution and concluded that the framers intended for the schools to function separately and for the Legislature to fund them separately.⁵¹

UT representatives frequently made the case that A&M received greater state financial support. Between 1883 and 1927, Texas appropriated $14,991,742.87 to the UT-Main Campus and $15,192,595 to A&M. As of 1926, UT possessed an enrollment of 5,435, while A&M enrolled 2,170 students. The PUF stood at $6,116,276.36 in 1925, but UT only had access to a fraction of these funds in the AUF. Meanwhile, A&M had received $4,856,499 from the federal government since 1876.⁵²

The A&M Directors stepped up the fight and hired former Texas Supreme Court Judge Nelson Phillips as their strategist for a fee of $1,000 in September 1925. Phillips cautioned against litigation and urged the Directors to stick with negotiation. The Directors and Regents endured another round of meetings in 1926 with no resolution. The Directors announced their
intentions to claim their share of the PUF in April 1929 and threatened the Regents with litigation if they failed to comply. The Regents suggested another meeting.\textsuperscript{53}

The opposing boards met on January 21, 1930. Regent Lutcher Stark pointedly asked Director Byrd White if he believed that A&M should receive funds from general state revenue for building purposes in light of the fact that A&M remained a branch of the University of Texas. White said yes. Regent Robert Batts then stated that Regents' were ready to settle the matter and would avoid litigation.\textsuperscript{54}

The end of the long financial conflict was an important turning point for UT and A&M. In the future, the institutions would largely limit their rivalry to the gridiron. A&M gained the security of regular PUF disbursements and UT finally received the funds they needed for construction in 1930 with the passage of Senate Bill 283. This act placed $4 million in the AUF so that UT could construct ten new buildings. The Legislature would repeal the act in 1932, but it partially alleviated the University's stresses over money between 1930 and 1932. UT was now free to focus less on constructing buildings and more on pursuing academics. David Prindle argued that the Regents finally struck a deal with A&M because they needed an ally. Other public colleges would grab for pieces of the Fund and the two giants could wage a better fight together.\textsuperscript{55}

The Legislature codified the UT/A&M agreement on April 8, 1931. The assembly passed House Bill 368 (Chapter 42) easily with thirty yees and zero nays in the Senate and 102 yees and one nay in the House. Chapter 42 entitled A&M to receive $200,000 September 1, 1931 and $200,000 September 1, 1933 and left the funds remaining in the AUF to UT. Effective September 1, 1934, A&M would receive one-third of the AUF, excluding income from University grazing leases.\textsuperscript{56}
Even though the University relented to share the PUF with A&M, the Regents did not wish to share management responsibilities for the oil lands. This issue was resolved in 1937 after A&M Director F.M. Law approached his cousin, Regent J.R. Parten, and again requested a management role for A&M. Parten contacted President Benedict and the two told Law that such an arrangement would not work unless the two boards combined. This strategy silenced the A&M Directors.57

When UT and A&M entered the 1930s, they possessed the funds to fortify their physical plants. The PUF however, would not protect them from the enormous salary cuts following the stock market crash. The TESC report would remain on a shelf in the capitol building along with its suggestions for greater efficiency and coordination. The following chapter highlights the colleges' continuing financial and management struggles through the 1930s.

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Notes


2 Brown, 31; *Texas House Journal*, Regular sess., Thirty-seventh Legislature (1921), 1065 -- 1068; Series of letters between W.R. Brents and Robert Vinson: Brent to Vinson, January 7, 1921, March 8, 1921, April 5, 1921, Vinson to Brents March 3, 1921, University of Texas President's Office Records (hereafter cited as UTPOR), UTCAH, Box VF2/A.a, W.R. Brents 1920-1921 folder.

3 Brown, 33-34; Rhodes Baker to James Ferguson, January 30, 1925, Miriam Ferguson Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-425, UT October 4, 1924 -- February 24, 1925 folder.

4 Brown, 43-45.


6 Frederick Eby, *The Development of Education in Texas*, 312 -- 315; Brown, 140.

7 Brown, 131, 152-155, quote on 154.


9 Brown, 161; Eugene Barker to M.B. Porter, July 13, 1923, Eugene Barker Papers, UTCAH, Box 2B129, UT Faculty Records Correspondence, 1923-1954 folder.

10 Brown, 163-165.

11 Brown, 166-167;

12 William Sutton to Lotus Coffman, April 17, 1924 & April 24, 1924, UTPOR, UTCAH, Correspondence-Educational Survey Folder.

13 When asked about her qualifications, Miriam Ferguson said that while she could not discuss political philosophy or formulate a sophisticated analysis of the Texas lawmaking process, she knew how to trust in God, who would lead on along the right path, see Brown, 219.

14 Ben Ford to James Ferguson, December 14, 1924, Miriam Ferguson Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-423, December 1924 -- April 1925 folder.
Brown, 257.

Splawn to James Ferguson, January 8, 1925, Miriam Ferguson Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-425, UT October 4 1924 -- February 24, 1925 folder.

Brown, 263 - 264.

Ibid.

Ashburn previously served as the A&M publicity director and Corp of Cadets Commandant.

Ashburn to James Ferguson, April 7, 1925; Bizzell to Miriam Ferguson, April 25, 1925, Miriam Ferguson Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-423, December 24 -- April 1925 folder.

Julien Elfenbein to Miriam Ferguson, May 18, 1925, Miriam Ferguson Papers, TSLAC, Box 301-425, UT May 7 - August 1, 1925 folder.


Brown, 349, 351, 364.

Brown, 353 -- 354.

A&M received $2,398,986 for 1928 and $2,508,386 for 1929 for its campuses, extension, experiment stations, and state programs such as forestry. UT received $1,944,105 in 1928 and $1,912,855 in 1929 for its campuses. UT actually received more for its main campus than A&M with $3,091,220 to A&M's $1,985,630 for the biennium. General and Special Laws of the State of Texas, Regular sess. Fortieth Legislature (1927), 427: Robert Holliday to Tom Pollard, November 10, 1928; Holliday to A.J. Wirtz, November 12, 1928; Holliday to William Hogg, November 20, 1928; Holliday to Edward Crane, December 3, 1928; UTPOR, UTCAH, Box 2B62, 41st Legislature 1928-1930 folder.


TESC Report, vi, 3, 13,43

Ibid., 30 -- 31.

Ibid., 41 -- 42.

Ibid., 31 -- 33.

Ibid., 68.

William Sutton to Lotus Coffman, April 17, 1924 & April 24, 1924; UTPOR, UTCAH, Box 2B61, Correspondence, Educational Survey folder, quote from 4/17/24, p.2.

Ibid., 63.


Haigh, 158-159; Chapter 83, General Laws of the State of Texas, Regular sess., Thirty-Fifth Legislature (1917), 158-159.


Walter Splawn to H.S. Bonham, 11/23/25; Bonham to Splawn, 11/25/25; Bonham to Gregory Hatcher, 11/25/25, UTPOR, UTCAH, Box VF 15/B/b, 39th Legislature folder.


Solphur to Robertson, April 24, 1927, Dan Moody Papers, TSLAC, Box 36, UT Apr/May 1927 folder.


Theisen v. Robison, Frank v. Robison in The Texas Reports: Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court, June,1927 to June, 1928, vol. 117 (Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1929), 489 -- 515; Lang, Financial History...160 -- 163; Haigh, 165; Padelford only served from January 1925 to September 1926.

Haigh, 168; Holliday to Moody, 12/10/27, Dan Moody Papers, Box 36, UT, Oct./Dec.1927 folder.


Haigh, 171.
50 Prindle, 292.
51 "Report from University of Texas Committee on Relations Between UT and A&M, January 13, 1925"; letter from Hildebrand to Walter Splawn, January 19, 1926, William Hogg Papers, UTCAH, Box 2J387 UT/A&M January 1925 to June 3, 1929 folder.
53 Prindle, 292; A&M Board of Directors (hereafter cited as AMBOD) meeting minutes, September 21, 1925, February 23, 1926, April 22, 1929, August 23, 1929.
54 Dethloff, 418; AMBOD meeting minutes, January 21, 1936.
57 Prindle, 295.
Chapter Five

Depression Decade, 1931-1939

Like many state universities, UT and A&M did not feel the full sting of the stock market crash until 1931, since the Texas Legislature made biennial appropriations prior to October 1929. The budget cuts did not begin until 1932/1933. From the first blow through the close of the decade, UT, A&M, and most American colleges, fought to regain the budgets they possessed prior to the Depression. While UT and A&M reduced budgets for salaries and general operations, they were able to complete their ambitious building programs thanks to the steady flow of income into the Annual University Fund of the PUF (Table 5-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Permanent Fund (PUF)</th>
<th>Available Fund (AUF)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>$1,782,015.25</td>
<td>$27,833.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>$3,913,332.58</td>
<td>$437,629.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>$1,379,373.37</td>
<td>$579,419.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>$1,138,265.39</td>
<td>$245,067.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>$823,279.51</td>
<td>$323,474.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>$1,165,004.52</td>
<td>$337,768.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>$882,876.27</td>
<td>$63,313.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>$1,106,201.08</td>
<td>$52,583.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>$1,994,464.47</td>
<td>$102,358.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>$2,230,542.82</td>
<td>$102,900.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>$1,442,416.84</td>
<td>$61,269.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>$1,014,036.86</td>
<td>$121,336.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While the land and oil royalties did not inoculate UT and A&M from the ills of the Depression, they fared well in comparison to most of the nation's colleges.

UT's Harry Benedict (1927-1937) and A&M's Thomas Otto Walton (1926-1943) guided the Texas colleges through this decade. Benedict, a mathematician and astronomer with a Harvard Ph.D., and Walton, a product of Sam Houston State Normal and North Texas State
Teachers College, were vastly different. Walton left no records of his tenure at A&M beyond a note of his presence at board meetings. Therefore, his influence over the institution is hard to assess. Benedict's files show no evidence that these two communicated with one another outside of occasional joint board meetings to discuss the PUF. Little is known about Walton's relationship with the Directors, faculty, or students, but A&M's longest-serving president stepped down in 1943 in a storm of conflict that is described in Chapter Seven. Benedict, on the other hand, enjoyed an amiable relationship with the Regents and was beloved by faculty during the decade that he brought political stability and academic, as well as physical expansion to UT.² Governors Sterling, Ferguson, and Allred each left their stamp on the colleges as well.

**Depression Hits**

The bank-closing pandemic that began in 1930 and continued in 1931 and 1932 frightened collegiate governing boards across the country. The A&M Directors transferred much of the College's funds to larger and presumably more stable banks in Houston. Despite their own efforts to protect the College's money, the state comptroller tried to assume control over institution's funds in late 1932. A&M retained control over its finances, but drastic budget cuts were imminent.³

V.O. Key described Texas as one of the biggest opponents to the New Deal, but it is difficult to obtain records of how much Texas benefited from it. Neither the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* nor the *Financial Statistics of the States* published data on the amount that states received from each New Deal program. Data is available, though, on the total federal aid that states received. Texas received $1.19 per capita in federal support in 1930 and $4.14 in 1940. Texas ranked 20th in 1930 and 35th in 1940 in federal support. The national average
stood at $1.82 in 1930 and $7.28 per capita in 1940. All states received dramatically greater support following the first set of New Deal programs in 1933. Texas ranked higher in federal aid in 1930 in part because it accepted federal highway and educational funds on a per capita basis to meet basic needs: roads and schools that even the most anti big government state would not refuse. Texans had long distrusted federal control, but opposition to federal aid increased significantly following Roosevelt's second round of New Deal programs that emphasized social and economic reform as opposed to the initial programs designed to help the country recover from the Depression. Discussed in Chapter Seven, the New Deal split Texas Democrats into pro and anti camps that significantly affected the University of Texas.

As Texas state tax resources grew scarce, the state deficit expanded. The higher education budget is discussed in subsequent pages and summarized in Table 5-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-2 State Appropriations for UT and A&amp;M, 1929-1940</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A&amp;M System</strong></td>
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| | biennium | biennium | biennium | biennium | biennium |
| | -7.2%* | -37.63% | -6.9% | +45.16% | +17% |
| | -6.9% | +45.16% | +17% |
| | +45.16% | +17% |
| | +17% |
| | +17% |
| | +17% |
| | +17% |
| | +17% |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| UT System                   |                                  |                                     |                                     |                                   |                                   |                                     |
| UT Main Campus              | $3,058,120                       | $2,791,250                          | $1,862,146                          | $1,848,133.70                    | $3,316,448                       | $3,634,826                          |
|                             | -5.4%                            | -35.29%                             | +13.48%                             | +42.13%                          | +4.83%                            |                                      |
| UT Extramural Division      | $319,100                         | $291,700                            | $184,200                            | $204,200                         | $335,542                         | $378,694                            |
| UT Medical Branch           | $500,520                         | $498,560                            | $345,325                            | $415,000                         | $528,350                         | $610,000                            |
| College of Mines and Metallurgy | $439,320                        | $394,960                            | $218,071.50                        | $263,290                         | $399,663                         | $384,122                            |
| Total                       | $4,317,060                       | $3,976,470                          | $2,609,742.50                      | $2,730,623.70                   | $4,580,003                       | $5,007,642                          |
|                             | -7.9%                            | -34.4%                              | +4.63%                              | +67.73%                          | +9.33%                            |                                      |
| Total for all State Colleges| $16,451,282                      | $15,986,772                         | $9,219,967                          | $10,108,689                     | $16,657,000                     | $16,852,141                         |
|                             | -2.82%                           | -42.33%                             | -9.6%                               | +64.78%                          | +1.2%                            |                                      |


*Percentage change from previous biennium with no adjustments for inflation

**Governor Ross Sterling**

In his first address to the Legislature in 1931, Governor Ross Sterling provided a boilerplate plan for education. He defended the needs of rural children and urged equitable spending for rural and urban school districts. Texas needed to provide all students with a high school education and financial support to the colleges that was sufficient to place it at a competitive rank among the nation's institutions. The State was operating with an estimated deficit of $4.5 million that was expected to grow to $7.5 million by January 1933. With the tax capacity shrinking due to the devaluation of property and petroleum prices, Sterling believed that the only way for Texas to recover from the Depression was to cut costs. The Legislature cut the total higher education appropriation by a modest 2.82%. The main campuses in Austin and
College Station were cut by 7.2% and 8.7% respectively (Table 5-2). The percentages were small, but the institutions' nervous administrators braced for dramatic cuts.

President Benedict welcomed his faculty back for in the fall of 1931 with a message of guarded optimism about the institution's economic outlook. He blamed legislative appropriation cuts on both the State's taxing system and the absence of adequate coordination between the public colleges. He advocated fee increases and stricter admissions requirements as a way for the University to overcome its financial problems. Benedict also implored all of the State's colleges to push for appropriations based on cost per student for the 1933-1935 biennium. For years, the Legislature had arbitrarily assigned funds to schools without regard to enrollment or the real cost of certain curricula. Benedict looked forward to appropriations during the next Legislative session that might return support for UT back to pre-Depression levels.7

**Joint Committee on Organization and Economy**

To increase efficiency, the Legislature approved HCR 58 in May 1931. This resolution established the Joint Legislative Committee on Organization and Economy (JLCOE), who employed Griffenhagen & Associates to conduct a thorough audit of the State's agencies in 1932. JLCOE identified problems with the State's methods of taxation, as well the management of higher education. As number of states, including Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado, enlisted Griffenhagen's help in the 1930s as well. Other states, such as North Carolina, employed the Brookings Institution to help it identify waste and draw up efficiency plans. A number of states, including Texas, first employed external review teams to study these issues in the 1920s. Pressure to streamline the financial and organizational structures of state colleges increased during the Depression. TESC had studied the problem of curricular duplication and financial
waste in 1924-1925, but the State and its colleges did little to respond to the TESC recommendations.⁸

JLCOE concluded that Texas could save as much as $6 million per year with $3.5 million of these reductions coming from higher education.⁹ Much of the waste in higher education could be found at the seven teachers colleges. These institutions functioned primarily as junior colleges during the regular academic year, enrolling 67.1% to 73.9% freshmen and sophomores. Their governing boards had unwisely accepted the advice of their presidents and established graduate programs. These frivolous and substandard graduate programs served no other purpose than to place the teachers colleges in expensive and mismatched competition with UT and A&M. JLCOE suggested that the College of Industrial Arts (CIA) and North Texas State Teachers College consolidate, since they were located within a few blocks of each other. Sam Houston State needed to abolish its model farm and agriculture department. East Texas, West Texas, Sul Ross, and Stephen F. Austin should be converted into junior colleges and serve as feeder schools for UT. Southwest Texas State should close, due to its proximity to UT.¹⁰

The Committee praised A&M for its ability to retain its students, although the freshmen classes had declined since 1930. Just as the TESC had recommended, A&M needed to restrict degree offerings to agriculture, engineering, and veterinary science. Graduate study should be limited to agriculture and veterinary science, since UT was the only school equipped to support graduate courses in engineering. UT's mathematics, chemistry, and physics departments far outstripped A&M in laboratories and faculty expertise. In addition to the well-established problem of curricular duplication, A&M needed to overhaul its decentralized collection of auxiliary enterprises, such as its many inefficient and unwieldy farms, the forestry service, and miscellaneous programs that collected fees. While the State supported these initiatives through
appropriations, A&M failed to earmark its local fees and surplus appropriations and possessed no system for tracking these funds.\textsuperscript{11}

A&M was largely responsible for the maladies present at Prairie View, which possessed an inferior physical plant. Its business practices resembled those at the white land-grant, yet Prairie View employed double their required faculty and staff and paid them small wages. JLCOE suggested that Texas sever ties between A&M and Prairie View and place the African American land-grant under control of a state coordinating board.\textsuperscript{12}

The review team praised UT for its competent faculty. Given the institution's size and wealth, however, the quantity and significance of the publications produced by this faculty was lackluster. UT boasted an enrollment of 6,000 students, but only a small percentage of graduate students. JLCOE may have been unnecessarily harsh on this subject. Graduate students composed 7.4% of UT's population compared to Virginia (8.26%), Illinois (8.5%), Minnesota (8.97%), North Carolina (10.12%), Michigan (11.45%), Wisconsin (11.56%), and California (12.3%). More telling, UT awarded far fewer Ph.D.s than the schools it aspired to become like. The nineteen doctorates awarded at UT exceeded Virginia (16), but trailed behind North Carolina (27), their other public Southern peer. Meanwhile, Wisconsin led the public universities with 103 doctorates, followed by California (83), Michigan (81), Illinois (70), and Minnesota (67).\textsuperscript{13}

Financially speaking, UT managed its money well in the delivery of its courses. Waste, nevertheless, could be found in the library, extension, and business divisions. The greatest inefficiency rested with the University's organizational structure. The faculty senate's committees defined most academic procedures, as well as the pettiest administrative policies. Faculty members spent hours sitting on committees that did not coordinate their efforts.
Countless hours were potentially lost in these meetings that could have been spent pursuing teaching and research.\textsuperscript{14}

After analyzing the seventeen public colleges, JLCOE recommended that the State abolish the institutional governing boards and create of a department of education. The department would consist of a nine-member, unpaid, lay board, appointed by the governor for staggered six-year terms. The board would hire a chancellor for the higher education division and a commissioner for the public school division. JLCOE reasoned that such a design would bring clarity to fiscal policies, eliminate program duplication, and destroy competition between the colleges.\textsuperscript{15} The Brookings Institutions made a similar recommendation in North Carolina, although this team led by Fred J. Kelly only suggested a single governing board for UNC, NC State, and the North Carolina College for Women. The North Carolina General Assembly accepted the plan and these three institutions then became the North Consolidated University. UNC and NC State would engage in periodic disputes over program duplication in engineering and liberal arts in the succeeding decades, but the plan did streamline budgets and operations.\textsuperscript{16}

Texas, in contrast, rejected Griffenhagen's single board plan and chose to continue with its old arrangements.

In Henry Dethloff's opinion, the Directors would have destroyed A&M if they had enacted most of the JLCOE recommendations, particularly those related to graduate study and liberal arts course offerings. A&M eventually coordinated the extension, experiment station, and teaching efforts in agriculture after World War II. No efforts were made to cut programs. The A&M Directors and administrators reacted negatively to the JLCOE report, but they worried in vain since the recommendations did little more than collect dust in the legislative archives in Austin.\textsuperscript{17}
UT and A&M recognized that program duplication remained a problem prior to the release of the JLCOE study. The A&M Directors called for a joint meeting to discuss the issue and the colleges meet periodically in 1932 and 1933. Regent Beauford Jester, future governor of Texas, was particularly vocal and urged his fellow board members to take the lead in eliminating duplication and increasing cooperation between all state colleges. He believed that the University should begin with engineering. Benedict agreed and stated at the October 28, 1933 meeting that the Faculty Counsel had formed a committee to study the problem during their October 10th session. During the Regents' November meeting, Benedict suggested that the Board's legislative committee embark on a study to approach the curricular conflict with A&M as soon as possible. Joint meetings yielded little change, as evidenced by periodic returns to the topic into the 1960s.

**Last Act for Ma and Pa**

The Fergusons returned for a final stint in the governor's mansion in January 1933. In her January 18 address to the Legislature, Miriam announced that Texas now possessed a deficit of nearly $12 million. The deficit, combined with funds required to run the state, totaled $46 million. With employment rising and property values falling, Ferguson proposed that the Legislature lift the ad valorem property tax and replace it with a 3% sales tax. She estimated that the sales tax would raise $45 million, which, combined with existing gas, cigarette, and corporate taxes, would more than meet the needs of the State.

Soon after the election, she informed Benedict that UT would face a 25% cut for faculty salaries and decreases in other budget items in the 1933-35 biennium. The Regents and Benedict begrudgingly accepted this fact but also expressed their disapproval of the cuts. As to the
question of what to fill in the salary column of the budget request form, the Regents and Benedict decided to leave the space blank in hopes that the Governor would rethink the drastic cuts. Ferguson did not have second thoughts about the cuts and the Legislature agreed with her. The Legislature approved the University's budget with salary cuts ranging from 25% to 40%. In comparison, the median salary cut was approximately 15% for the nation's colleges. The total state higher education budget was trimmed by 42.33%, A&M's main campus 37.63%, the A&M system by 35.29%, UT main campus by 33.28%, and its system by 34.4%.20

Benedict circulated a lengthy and bleak memorandum to the faculty describing the financial conditions facing the University during the 1933-1935 biennium on October 10, 1933. He praised the Legislature for employing a rough formula of cost per student to calculate instruction and operations costs. This formula was of little help to the University, because the Legislature dramatically cut salaries. Benedict acknowledged that the Texas Legislature followed the National Democratic Party platform that called for a 25% reduction in public spending. He even proposed a budget whereby all UT faculty would receive only 75% of what they had earned in 1932-1933. According to Benedict, the second free conference committee instead looked at each salary and made cuts ranging from 25% to 35%. Benedict contended that salary reductions were based on personality. This unfortunate circumstance could have been avoided if the University had been permitted to submit lump sum requests. The itemized budget policy that began with James Ferguson's administration between 1915 and 1917 continued to plagued UT. Benedict also questioned the logic of the Graves Resolution, a proviso added to the final draft of the appropriations bill that seemed to benefit A&M. During the 1933-1934 year, institutions that received over $10,000 in federal support could increase salaries of individuals carrying out this federally sponsored work if their salaries were cut by more than 30% as a result
of the legislative reductions. While UT only received $6,000 in federal aid, A&M remained a branch of UT on paper. Benedict was outraged by the senselessness of the proviso and took it upon himself and the Regents to adjust salaries for UT faculty engaged in vocational work whose salaries had been cut by more than 30%.21

Benedict viewed the unfavorable outcome for UT during the session as evidence that the Legislature had usurped power and the Regents no longer possessed control of their own institution. In the coming years, UT, the other state colleges, and the State government would need to negotiate power so that each could assume a level of control over higher education that would insure financial efficiency, accountability to the public, and academic rigor.

As UT Regents attempted to reduce costs, Kenneth Aynesworth suggested restraint in compensating the incoming football coach: "pay no Coach more than you pay a Professor. Football does not mean that much in University life." This football coach turned out to be Jack Chevigny, former Notre Dame halfback and the man credited with uttering "win one for the Gipper" in honor of former star George Gipp, who lay on his deathbed at the age of twenty-five as the Fighting Irish played a 1928 championship game. Chevigny earned $5,000 for the 1934-1935 year; $450 more than John Patterson and $1100 more than Theophilus Painter, both of whom were "starred" zoologists in *American Men of Science*.22

**Governor James Allred**

James Allred called for an end to the corruption of past administrations: the "tricksters" and their "political sabotage" during his inaugural address in 1935.23 This Rice Institute graduate brought an improved level of professionalism, engagement with the federal government, and a hands-off approach to the colleges when he became governor. Allred was an ardent New Dealer
and served at a time when a number of Texans held prominent national positions, including Vice President John "Cactus Jack" Nance Garner, Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) head Jesse Jones, and future U.S. House Speaker Sam Rayburn.

As of August 31, 1934, Texas possessed a deficit of nearly $7 million and it was expected to rise to $14.6 million during the Forty-forth legislative session. In response to this shortfall, Allred supported increases in petroleum tax and additional mineral taxes. Allred also advocated tax reform. In 1935, ad valorem property taxes constituted the majority the Texas tax base. The tax system went back to the nineteenth century when 95% of citizens worked as farmers. In contrast to Miriam Ferguson, Allred opposed sales tax and called it a regressive poverty tax. Instead, Allred called for a personal income tax, an unpopular idea that has never caught on in Texas.24

The federal government provided states with direct relief bonds in 1933. By 1935, Texas had issued $16.5 of the $20 million allotment, yet the state needed to find new ways to rebuild the economy. Texas had only accepted a fraction of the funds made available through the New Deal work projects and needed to pursue more of this aid. Allred was one of the greatest Texas champions of the New Deal and therefore desired federal aid to support the struggling state economy, but he resisted federal control over the state's petroleum production.25

Allred supported an experiment proposed by the college governing boards to permit UT and A&M to request lump sum appropriations as they had so many years ago. The Legislature would designate a maximum sum and the Regents and Directors would have the authority to itemize their budgets. Texas, Arkansas, and Maryland were the only states that required itemized educational appropriations and this tedious process was time-consuming for both the colleges and legislative bodies. It was time to place greater trust in the collegiate governing
boards while remaining accountable to the State by producing detailed post-audits. The state colleges would have to wait until 1947 to enjoy this freedom.\textsuperscript{26} Although the colleges lacked freedom, the Forty-fourth Legislature increased the total higher education appropriation for the 1935-1937 biennium by 9.6%. UT's main campus fared better than A&M's, actually receiving .75% increase while A&M received 6.9% less. The A&M system held onto slightly more than the UT system (see Table 5-2).

Despite continued financial woes, Texans re-elected Allred in 1936. He informed the Legislature that the deficit stood at $14.8 million in August 1937 and had risen by over $5 million due to increased appropriations and no new taxes. Allred reiterated his recommendations for tax increases that he advocated in 1935. The Forty-fifth Legislature responded by passing major appropriation bills that exceeded those passed during the previous session, but provided no new sources of revenue to pay for these increases. Allred signed the appropriations bill, but called the body back for a second called session in September 1937 to pass appropriate tax laws. Allred estimated that the deficit would rise to $24 million by the close of the biennium if the Legislature did not find a way to pay for general expenses, as well as the new old-age assistance program approve by state citizens. Allred returned once again to his income tax proposal. Over thirty states collected income tax and Allred believed that this was the fairest and most dependable way to support the state.\textsuperscript{27} The Legislature did not agree and elected to depend largely on the old ad valorem system.

In spite of the deficit, higher education fared remarkably well in the 1937-1938 biennium. The Legislature approved a 64.78% increase for higher education. The UT main campus had 79.44% more to work with and A&M's main campus received 45.16% (Table 5-2). The colleges
were able to restore salaries to 1929-1930 levels, but faculty compensation was far from competitive with the nation's top universities.

**Conditions at A&M**

Under the direction of Ike Ashburn, now executive assistant to President Walton, A&M released a twelve-year progress report in 1937. The College was proud to note that it had graduated dramatically more students in the past twelve years than it had in the first seventy-five years of existence. Between 1876 and 1924, the College graduated 1836 students. In contrast, 5729 individuals earned degrees between 1925 and 1937. In addition, A&M possessed the largest percentage of juniors and seniors in the state with 34.3%. This compared with UT's 21%. The College fortified its graduate school enrollment in the twelve years under study. In 1924-1925, the College enrolled sixty-one students during regular sessions and thirtt-seven during summer sessions. By 1936-1937, these numbers had risen to 127 and 252 respectively. Individuals were first admitted as doctoral students in 1936-1937.28 Additional improvements are highlighted in Table 5-3.

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<th>Table 5-3 Conditions at A&amp;M, 1925 &amp; 1937</th>
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<td><strong>1925</strong></td>
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Source: *Progress Report for Twelve Years of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, 1925-1937, 5-7.*

Although a 1960s review team would describe the faculty as inbred, A&M boasted of its retention efforts in 1937. Healthier state appropriations and federal land-grant disbursements
enabled the College to raise salaries and hold onto faculty. A&M had improved compensation since 1925, but the institution had also been hurt by the Depression. The State per capita cost to operate A&M had fallen from $509 in 1926 to $165 in 1937. In spite of successes, A&M needed money to construct more classrooms to meet rising enrollments and to compensate faculty who could easily receive double their salary in the corporate sector.  

The progress report then turned to the College's mainline land-grant departments. Approximately 27% of the agricultural faculty held a Ph.D. in 1937. The report did not list comparisons, but it did claim that this was an exceptional record among land-grant colleges. In the past twelve years, A&M had become the nation's largest school of agriculture. Arthur J. Klein from the Bureau of Education declared, "that for work on agricultural curriculum your institution commanded more confidence than any other." A&M's engineering program ranked as the second largest in the nation. In 1928, A&M established a five-year program in petroleum engineering. A&M also boasted the largest veterinary science school in the nation with an enrollment of 340 in 1937. R.C. Dunn was instrumental in developing a pox vaccine for poultry, thus placing Texas at the forefront of animal husbandry. The vet school was flourishing, but the College needed more classrooms and laboratories to accommodate the rapid growth of the program. Beyond Dunn's vaccine work, it seemed that the best A&M could say about these units was that they were large.

The report then shifted to arts and sciences. A&M organized physics, biology, chemistry, modern languages, economics, history, English, geology, mathematics, military science, and physical education into the School of Arts and Sciences in 1924. With the exception of chemistry and geology, the remainder of the arts and sciences segment did not benefit from the PUF sponsored 1933 building plan and consequently needed new facilities. A mere 11% of Aggies
majored in courses within arts and sciences. Many of these young men did not select A&M because they wanted to study these subjects, but rather because they preferred a single-sex institution where they could obtain military training and a general education. Chapter Six notes that physics did not exist as a degree program until 1924. Many of the disciplines with arts and sciences merely existed as places where one went to get the distributive requirements out of the way.\textsuperscript{31} A&M officials were tentative in their goals for arts and sciences. Despite the 1933 JLCOE recommendation that the land-grant college stick to traditional land-grant subjects, the report's authors expressed hope that they could improve these liberal arts departments and offer an Aggie experience, complete with military training, to young men who lacked an interest in farming and engineering.

Ashburn and his associates were largely upbeat in their evaluation of Prairie View. The Legislature had provided generous support to Prairie for the past twenty years. The Black land-grant had transformed its physical plant in the last twelve years. As a result of an $884,739 appropriation, seven wooden structures in the center of campus had been replaced with modern, fireproof buildings. In 1937, five of 156 faculty members possessed Ph.D.s and thirty-seven had no degree. Between 1925 and 1937, enrollment had increased from 974 to 1348. The percentage of preparatory students had dropped from 50.6% in 1925 to 6.5 % in 1937. In 1925, Prairie View lacked any sort of accreditation. By 1937, the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools bestowed a class "A" rating upon it. The Legislature had recently appropriated funds for graduate study at Prairie View. Additionally, officials in charge of African American education in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma, had explored the idea of designating Prairie View as the regional graduate training center. The progress report neglected to note that graduate study would be restricted to agriculture and home economics.\textsuperscript{32}
The report offered a somewhat empty and cavalier assessment of Prairie View's overall accomplishments. The authors broadly declared it the only 1890 land-grant college to adhere to the Morrill Act mission and bragged that Prairie View's graduates were admitted to graduate programs "of the leading colleges in the country" without examination. Texas consulted Prairie View faculty on all matters involving African Americans in the state. The self-congratulatory conclusion seemed to state that Prairie View had improved as much as a Black school should.\(^{33}\) While Prairie View possessed a better physical plant than it had in 1925, it was still grossly under-funded in comparison to Texas A&M. It now had far fewer preparatory students, but Black students had no opportunity to pursue medicine, law, or any other sort of graduate study.

Walton, as alluded to in the opening paragraph of this chapter, was a strangely inactive president. The A&M archive possesses no artifacts from the Walton administration beyond a thin folder of newspaper clippings related to Walton's departure in 1943. Without evidence proving otherwise, T.O. Walton seemed to serve as little more than a benchwarmer during the 1930s. UT's Harry Benedict was another story.

**Conditions at UT**

During the March 1936 meeting of the Regents, President Benedict reflected on UT's past ten years. With the help of the Legislature in 1925, the University was able to begin the first phase of a massive building project. Since then, UT was able to build using a $4 million loan from the PUF, grants and loans from the federal Public Works Administration, and gifts from the Littlefield and Smith & Sealy Foundations. In the end, UT had completed $14 million in construction projects. While this was a great accomplishment, the oil royalties had created an illusion that the University was wealthy. With rapidly increasing enrollments, the recently
completed buildings could not support the institution for long. Compensation remained a problem, since UT did not offer pensions, faculty travel budgets, sabbatical leaves, and a host of other benefits. Turning to the 1936-37 budget, Benedict informed the Regents that salaries had been restored to the maximum amount allowed by the Legislature. These salaries needed to be protected, but the institution still faced a deficit. Benedict recommended cuts in the maintenance, physical plant, and tutor/assistant budgets first. These units had already been cut by 25% during the 1935-36 year.34

As previously noted, conditions improved with the passage of the appropriations bill for the 1937-39 biennium. The Legislature employed a unit cost per student formula to apportion much of the funds for instruction. The Legislature authorized $35,000 to purchase a sixteenth century collection of Mexican literature, a $15,000 increase to manage University lands and the PUF, and $1,658,224 for salaries and maintenance for each year, a $450,000 increase from 1936-37. The Legislature did not approve lump sum appropriations and the Regents blamed the other state colleges who failed to provide firm support to UT and A&M. In spite of this defeat, the Regents were pleased that the Legislature provided them with the freedom to adjust the salaries of those who were employed in 1932-33 from 90% to 100% of those salaries, depending on rank. This discretion would allow the Regents to retain faculty who might be searching for better compensation elsewhere.35

While the Regents had cause to celebrate, they also had reason to grieve. Sixty-seven year old Harry Benedict died unexpectedly following a stroke on May 10, 1937 at 4:45 p.m. He was on his way to the Capitol to meet with legislators to discuss the educational appropriations bill. The shocked Regents met two days later and named comptroller J.W. Calhoun as interim president. Calhoun requested time to consider the appointment and the Regents agreed to delay
any announcement until their next meeting on May 31. Calhoun agreed to serve as acting president, but he expressed no interest in applying for the permanent position. Regent Leslie Waggener wrote a tribute that was inserted into the Regents' minutes on May 31. In addition to praising Benedict for his intellect and leadership, Waggener described him as the last of the "great triumvirate of Texas-Exes." Along with T.W. Gregory and R.L. Batts, who died in 1933 and 1935 respectively, Benedict fought critical battles on behalf of the University. Waggener did not elaborate on the nature of these battles, but he referred to collaboration between these three men and seemed to suggest that a great era had ended.36

Graduate Work for African Americans

An African American citizen could not obtain a graduate or professional degree in subjects outside of home economics or agriculture at a public Texas institution until 1950. Black students participated in the General Education Board and Rosenwald fellowship programs in the 1920 and 1930, but these programs rarely covered even basic expenses at Northern and Midwestern schools. Less than 5% of the eighty-seven Black dentists, 187 doctors, and forty-three pharmacists were native Texans. A number of white and African American Texans solicited Governor Allred's support for a legislative bill that would create a fund to send Black students out-of-state to pursue graduate degrees. Just before the Legislature entered a 1937 special session to address old-age pensions, individuals from such organizations as the Fort Worth Commission on Interracial Cooperation, the American League Against War and Fascism (Houston chapter), and the Lone Star State Medical, Dental, and Pharmaceutical Association (African American organization), Houston's Magnolia Christian Church (a white church), and the Houston Negro Chamber of Commerce endorsed the scholarship program.37
One of the most passionate appeals came from Houstonian Carter W. Wesley, general manager of *The Informer*, a popular African American newspaper, when he asked that the State address: ‘the wrongs which wreak such a heavy toll upon a race so little fitted to bear it.’ In Wesley's view, the fastest way to solve the problem was to allot the same amount of money spent per white student to attend graduate school in Texas to each Black student to obtain a comparable education outside state lines. Wesley did not propose that Texas fund this graduate and professional education within its borders.\(^{38}\)

Before Wesley and others lobbied for out-of-state scholarships, a group of Methodist women sent a petition to the Regents in January 1937 calling for the creation of a separate graduate school for African Americans. The women suggested that the school might be housed at a Black college in Austin and stated that it should be part of UT. The Regents discussed the matter during their January 9th meeting, but they did not record their opinions in the minutes. The matter was delegated to Benedict, who was to reply to the petition.\(^{39}\) Benedict's response has not been located, but he likely stated that UT lacked the funds to establish such a graduate school, which should instead be located at Prairie View. The Directors of A&M, Prairie View's parent institution, did not record a discussion of graduate education beyond agriculture and home economics for Blacks during this time.

The 1937 bill did not pass and individuals took up a subsequent campaign in 1938. The Regents received a statement from Thomas W. Currie and additional members of the Texas Commission on Inter-Racial Cooperation in September. The Commission wanted the Regents to request a legislative appropriation of $80,000 for graduate study for Blacks. The Regents voted to make the request, but refused the Commission's request that the University assume responsibility for the management of these funds.\(^{40}\)
One month later, the Texas NAACP sent Austin insurance manager George Allen to UT to enroll in a business extension course. Allen and the NAACP were certain of Allen's rejection and hoped the action would lead to out-of-state scholarships for Blacks. Instead, a clerk mistakenly admitted Allen. Ten days passed before Professor C.P. Brewer contacted Allen and told him he would have to withdraw. Allen refused, but the University canceled his registration.41

The Legislature passed an out-of-state scholarship bill in 1939, but the measure defied the 1938 Supreme Court decision in *Missouri ex. re. Gaines v. Canada*. This case challenged Missouri's seventeen-year old policy of providing funds to Black graduate students in order to maintain segregation at the University of Missouri and additional white public colleges, and to avoid the expense of setting up graduate programs at Lincoln, the state's African American land-grant college. The Gaines decision required states to provide academic programs for African Americans within state-lines. Texas and the majority of Confederate and border states, however, continued to use the out-of-state scholarship strategy to maintain segregation and inferior facilities at Black institutions until the late 1940s.42

When he left office in January 1939, Allred noted that higher education appropriations had increased under his two administrations. In spite of these funding improvements, Allred criticized the facilities and course offerings available to African Americans. He praised the policy of providing state aid for African Americans to attend graduate programs out-of-state and noted that many Southern states had adopted this practice. Allred saw this as a temporary solution. African Americans needed programs within Texas when the economic situation improved.43 The issue would remain dormant until after World War II.
UT and A&M financially weathered the Depression somewhat better than most of America's public universities. Between 1929 and 1935, American colleges experienced an aggregated decrease of 35.6% in income. In contrast, UT and A&M dealt with income decreases of approximately 22.2% and 14.56%, respectively. The national financial situation began to improve in 1935, but the colleges did not return to comparable levels (after adjusting for the deflation unique to the thirties) of the income they received in 1929 during the 1930s. Building construction virtually ceased at most American colleges that did not benefit from W.P.A. disbursements. UT and A&M were rare exceptions since they went through the largest physical plant growth spurt to date during the 1930s. The oil royalties were the only factor that saved UT and A&M. As discussed in the next chapter, UT made solid advancements in organized research in the 1920s and 1930s.

Notes
1 Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 246.
2 UTBOR Minutes, May 20, 1937, 497 in resolution approved by Regents upon Benedict's unexpected death.
5 George Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 618-619, 648-649.
7 "To Members of the General Faculty, October 13, 1931," Harry Y. Benedict Papers, UTCAH, Box 2B59, Correspondence March 1931 -- March 1937 folder.
9 ibid., v.1, vii.
10 ibid., 33 -- 37.
11 ibid., 37 -- 38.
12 ibid., 41.
14 ibid., 41 -- 42.
15 ibid., 31 -- 39.
17 Dethloff, 435-437.
Chapter Six

Research at the Colleges in the 1920s and 1930s

The 1925 TESC team urged UT and A&M to fortify their research and graduate programs. Veysey, Geiger, and a host of other historians have traced the increase in organized research activities at the elite private and more prestigious public universities between 1890 and 1940. How did the Texas colleges compare?

The Nature of Organized Research in the 1920s and 1930s

Organized research falls into two categories: basic or pure research and applied or programmatic research. The 1945 Committee on Science and Public Welfare, part of the classic, *Science: The Endless Frontier* project, which is highlighted in Chapter Eleven, defined basic research as: "research without specific practical ends." An entity grants money to a scientist to experiment with the belief that the best results occur in an environment dedicated to scientific outcomes. Shortsighted political and economic motivations might lead to a quick way to distribute penicillin, but it is doubtful that a legislator or administrator would approve restricted funds for a physicist to identify the building blocks of matter. J.J. Thomson, for example, discovered the electron, the very particle that powers the world's computers and televisions, through basic research. The 1945 assembly of scientists concluded that: "Under pressure for immediate results, and unless deliberate policies are set up to guard against this, applied research invariably drives out pure."

Private organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the Carnegie Corporation sponsored the lion's share of organized university research between World War I
and World War II, when the federal government entered the fray. These funds were largely for basic research. The federal government, however, funded the bulk of applied agricultural research. The 1887 Hatch Act provided the land-grant colleges with regular appropriations to conduct agricultural research at experiment stations. This act, followed by the Adams Act (1906), the Purnell Act (1925), and the Bankhead-Jones Act (1935) funded nationally and regionally relevant projects on water conservation, crop rotation, and rural economics and sociology. The federal government also established a number of scientific bureaus including the Bureau of Mines (1910), the National Institute of Health (1877), and after entry into World War I, the Naval Research Laboratory, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. These bureaus largely employed their own staffs to conduct research.  

A small cadre of universities also designated line items in their budgets to use legislative and local funds for research. The state governments in the five public institutions profiled by Geiger were supportive and financially able to expand their flagship university physical plants. Between 1920 and 1930, California, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota increased legislative appropriations for current institutional expenses at their flagships by 130% (adjusting for inflation, the increase is 114%) while enrollments increased 40%. Enrollment increases at A&M were consistent to these colleges while UT's enrollment slowed, growing 17.7% at A&M and 38.7% at UT. The Texas Legislature, however, increased appropriations by a much lower rate than the leading state universities (49.23% at UT and 37.93% at A&M) between 1921 and 1931.  

In 1915, California became the first state university to have a line item in its budget for research. The University of California increased its already growing organized research program during the 1920s. Anxious to become a major contender in the competition to become the
premier research university, California wooed top scholars with generous compensation packages, but many established scholars turned these offers down. California then opted for a more successful strategy and hired young scholars who appeared to possess the greatest potential, particularly in physics. Two of these men, 1939 Nobel Prize winner E.O. Lawrence and Manhattan Project leader Robert Oppenheimer placed the institution's physics department among the top programs.⁶

Though less ambitious than California, the University of Michigan improved its financial and academic position during these two decades by amassing $44 million dollars in private donations and instituting a selective admissions program in order to regulate enrollment.⁷ One might see the progress made in Michigan and California and wonder what the Texas institutions were doing with their new oil wealth. As noted in Chapters Four and Five, monies from the PUF were used to complete badly needed construction. Texas had to provide its schools with adequate buildings before they could entice eminent or young research stars to Austin or College Station. UT and A&M were not devoid of research activity, but work occurred on a smaller scale.

Social Sciences

The Rockefeller Foundation and its various offshoots dispensed the most money for organized university research during the years prior to World War II. Beardsley Ruml, a young psychologist educated at the University of Chicago, became the first and sole director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) in 1922. The Memorial was established in 1918 to honor the life and charitable interests of John D. Rockefeller Sr.'s wife Laura. Ruml did not change the core mission of the Memorial, however, he refined the purposes by committing to the
exploration and eradication of social problems through scientific means. With the exception of psychology, Ruml believed that most fields and departments in the social sciences did not rely on fieldwork and rigorous empirical methods. Agreeing with the advice of his colleague Lawrence Frank, Ruml elected to financially support those universities that already possessed strong social science departments in psychology, sociology, and political science.8

The LSRM first funded programs at Harvard, Columbia, the Brookings Institution, and the University of Chicago. Although the LSRM did not specifically refer to the economic and racial ills of the South, the organization tapped the University of Virginia, the University of North Carolina, UT, and Vanderbilt University to study these issues. The social science research institutes achieved varying success. Between 1923 and 1928, the LSRM distributed $25.2 million to universities and institutes. The University of Chicago received $3.36 million, Columbia $1.39 million, Harvard $1.19 million, Vanderbilt $881,000, Brookings Institution $761,000, North Carolina $453,000, Texas $250,000, and Virginia commanded $137,500. Numerous institutions benefited as well, including the University of Minnesota with $965,000 and the University of Iowa with $879,000. After 1929, the Rockefeller Foundation assumed responsibility for the program and provided roughly $5.7 million by way of the Social Science Research Council.9

Amy Wells contrasted the research and management of the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences (IRSS) at the University of North Carolina with the Bureau of Research in the Social Sciences (BRSS) at UT. The IRSS was the vision of Howard Odum, who received an enthusiastic endorsement from UNC's President Harry Chase. Odum arrived at Chapel Hill in 1920 to direct the new sociology program. He soon generated plans for a social science building, recruited researchers who were committed to eliminating farm tenancy (such as Rupert Vance
and Arthur Raper) and a wide range of Southern racial, educational, and economic problems. Most notably, Odum launched *Social Forces*, a journal that remains a major sociological publication. The editors of *Social Forces* now devote their pages to more universal issues in sociology, but in Odum's day, the journal spotlighted Southern ills. Odum used the journal and the LSRM-funded IRSS to fight every imaginable economic and social challenge encountered in the former Confederacy. President Chase petitioned the LSRM, who rewarded the IRSS with a three-year grant of $97,500 in 1924. Pleased with the IRSS's productivity, the LSRM awarded a second grant, this time on a matching basis. The North Carolina General Assembly appropriated supplemental funds to the IRSS for the 1929-1931, but Governor Max Gardner then cut the entire UNC appropriation by 10% for the first year and 20% for the second. Additional budget reductions left the IRSS under-funded throughout the Depression. In spite of its financial woes, Wells concluded that the IRSS produced 162 publications in its first ten years. Further, the UNC sociology department was the only Southern program cited as "distinguished" in Raymond Hughes' 1934 national survey of graduate education. Between 1934 and 1937, the UNC sociology department awarded six doctorates.¹⁰

Whereas the UNC lobbied for financial support from Rockefeller to nurture an already thriving research center, Well's research indicates that the LSRM approached UT and encouraged its leadership to establish a similar center. Rockefeller identified UT as an ideal location for a social science research center since it possessed a strong faculty and a large library. In spite of differences in academic productivity, the loose and somewhat misdirected UT Bureau of Research in the Social Sciences (BRSS) received the same level of funding as the more focused IRSS at UNC between 1927 and 1940. The IRSS benefited from Odum's deliberate
mission, while President Walter Splawn, who quickly departed in 1927, first directed the BRSS and left no information regarding the LSRM's research goals.11

Available records for UT President Walter Splawn (1924-1927) support Wells' conclusion and do not reveal that UT expressed any interest in LSRM support for social science research prior to the foundation's announcement of interest. The Regents' minutes from April 18, 1927 contain a letter from Beardsley Ruml to Splawn dated March 24th, informing Splawn that the LSRM had passed a resolution to provide UT with the funds to cultivate a program in social sciences. The letter contained no details regarding the size, structure, or mission of the center.12 The Regents and President Splawn agreed that LSRM officials wanted to solve social problems through scientific means and accepted a five-year grant of $250,000 to UT for 1927-1931. One hundred eighty-five thousand was granted unconditionally and the remaining $65,000 was given in the form of matching funds. During the first five years, UT elected to divide the money between the Bureau of Research in the Social Sciences (BRSS) and the Bureau of Business Research (BBR). Rockefeller officials frowned on this action since the BBR had little to do with social science subjects. The Rockefeller Foundation absorbed the LSRM in 1929 and extended support with a five-year grant of $125,000. The RF agreed to give $25,000 each year provided that UT match the funds each year. UT would pay $5,000 the first year and increase the amount by $5,000 each year with the 1937 University contribution totaling $25,000. Unable to produce enough campus funds in the 1936 and 1937, the RF withheld $27,000 from UT. The Foundation then extended its financial commitment to UT with a three-year grant of $35,395 between 1937 and 1940. Between 1927 and 1940, Rockefeller provided UT with $382,895 for social science research. The Legislature and the Regents budgeted an additional $156,030 through 1943.13
Amy Wells describes the BRSS as out-of-sync and "isolated" from comparable centers at North Carolina and Virginia. LSRM officials such as Syndor Walker expressed concern over the type of projects that the BRSS funded. At times, the Bureau sponsored more business than social science research. It was the RF's hope that BSSR could address problems related to the racial diversity and uneven settlement in the vast State. Wells describes the results as modest, especially in comparison to the accomplishments at North Carolina's institute under Howard Odum. Sponsored by Rockefeller and the Social Sciences Research Council and published in 1936, Odum's massive *Southern Regions of the United States*, remains a seminal study of the social and economic conditions that plagued the South.14

The comparisons between UT and UNC are not completely fair. UNC possessed a sociology department and a social science research center by 1924. The UT Department of Economics and Sociology did not separate until the fall of 1928, after the BRSS was already in operation. UT did not appoint a full-time director to the BRSS until May 1931 when the Regents approved Warner Gettys, then head of the new sociology department. Gettys lacked Odum's fame and controversy, but he was a respected scholar who co-authored *An Introduction to Sociology* with Carl Dawson of McGill University, a popular textbook during the 1930s and 1940s. Gettys remained director of the BRSS until it was abolished in 1942, but Gettys' role was to administer funds rather than set a cohesive research agenda. The BRSS was less a research center and more a grant-making body for research-minded faculty in the College of Liberal Arts.15

Well's argues that money, as opposed to manpower, was the BRSS's greatest asset. President Benedict helped keep the BRSS running throughout the 1930s by securing legislative appropriations and local funds. Meanwhile, UNC's IRSS possessed a wealth of eminent scholars
and little money to fund their brilliant ideas. A quick review of the worked produced at UT, Virginia, and North Carolina reveals that projects were similar in subject matter although different in scope. North Carolina chose to study problems that affected the entire former Confederacy, Virginia focused partially on state-specific topics, and Texas devoted all but a few publications to topics specific to Texas. The BRSS projects included a study by economics professor Ruth Allen on living standards in Texas, research on Sam Houston and other Texas history that resulted in a book co-authored by Eugene Barker, German colonization in Texas by R.L. Biesole, and government and public administration in metropolitan Texas by R.C. Martin.16

It is difficult to objectively judge the quality of work produced at the three Southern universities. Wells concludes that UT did not perform as well as UVa and UNC, but the four books and thirty-nine bulletins published with the assistance of social science funds signified an increase in knowledge production at the University of Texas.

In addition to the RF-sponsored social science research, UT established, with the assistance of a General Education Board (GEB) grant of $35,000, the Latin American Collection. There had been a growing interest in Latin American history, language, and modern culture since the teens. Historians Eugene Barker and George Pierce Garrison taught courses in Latin American history and appealed for more library sources. The campaign to increase Latin American library holdings began in 1920 when government professor Charles Henry Cunningham and Regent H.J. Lutcher Stark were in Mexico City for President Alvaro Obregón's inauguration. Stark learned that Mexico senator Genaro García's substantial library was for sale and encouraged the Regents to purchase it. The García collection included 11,000 books, 15,000 pamphlets, and 200,000 manuscript pages and provided a strong foundation for Latin American research at UT. With an extensive library in place, UT was ready to establish a degree program
in Latin American studies and an accompanying research center in 1939. The Rockefeller Foundation issued a grant of $4,000 for activities at the Institute for the summer of 1940. One year later, the University received $37,500 from the Cultural Relations Program of the Council of National Defense. International in orientation, the academic program did not address the social, economic, and political issues facing Texas' substantial Mexican-American population.17

**Natural Sciences**

As with social science, the Rockefeller organizations served as the primary benefactor for research in the natural sciences in the 1920s and 1930s. Ruml's counterpart Wickliffe Rose was appointed to head the GEB in 1923. This was at the time that the GEB was winding down its endowment-building program at colleges across the nation. Rose believe that it was time for the GEB to halt its college endowment campaigns and concentrate funds at the best schools to 'make the peaks higher.' Between 1924 and 1929, the GEB dispensed $12 million dollars for the study of natural sciences at American universities. Most of these were matching grants to aid research projects and build laboratories. Six institutions (California Institute of Technology, Princeton, University of Chicago, Cornell, Stanford, and Harvard) received three-quarters of the money. Rockefeller also gave $20 million dollars to European scholars through the International Education Board (IEB).18

The Rockefeller Foundation reorganized in 1929 and established four divisions to handle humanities, medicine, social sciences, and natural sciences separately. Grants decreased in size as a result of the Great Depression, but funding picked up for biologists after Warren Weaver became director of the natural sciences division in 1934. In 1938, RF funded twenty-two experimental biology projects totaling one million dollars. Once again, the bulk of these funds
went to fifteen of the sixteen (MIT was excluded) institutions tracked by Geiger. UT received a few small grants for research in zoology ($10,000) and chemistry ($5,000) during the 1930s.19

Zoology stood as one of UT's strongest departments in the 1920s and 1930s. This genetics program joined UNC's sociology program as the South's other academic unit rated as distinguished by the American Council on Education's 1934 survey conducted by Raymond Hughes. The department benefited from the GEB gift, as well as $5,000 annually from the University's general budget throughout the 1930s. John T. Patterson, Theophilus Painter, and Herman J. Muller, all members of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), commanded the department. Muller arrived at UT in 1920 by way of Columbia University. During his twelve years in Austin, Muller conducted experiments on germ cells. He produced mutations using x-rays that allowed him to observe centuries of genetic change in a compressed space. This work earned him a Nobel Prize in 1946, after he left UT. His controversial departure in 1936 is highlighted later in this chapter. Painter mapped chromosomes in the salivary glands of vinegar flies and received the 1938 Daniel Giroud Elliot Medal from the NAS for this effort in 1938. Patterson conducted research that was similar to Muller's, but used somatic cells. Patterson's findings were significant to cancer research of the time.20

While physics thrived at California, A&M struggled, and UT made substantial advancements. A&M did not possess a physics department until 1911, and even though physics received its own building in 1920, no student majored in the discipline until 1924. UT constructed a building for advanced research in physics in 1932. S. Leroy Brown built an analog computer for the department by the end of the 1930s that proved valuable to the institution's War Research Laboratory in the early forties. Brown, Charles P. Boner, Arnold Romberg, and Malcolm Colby, each made solid contributions to the study of physics and to the department at
UT in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as beyond. Boner initiated research on architectural acoustics during the 1930s that would later earn him an international reputation. Colby, published *Sound Waves and Acoustics* in 1938, a widely used undergraduate textbook. Romberg developed a gravity meter with Lucien La-Coste that provided the model of what was used by the crew of Apollo 17 in 1972.  

At a time when Wilson Gee, and even UT President H.Y. Benedict bemoaned the high levels of faculty attrition, the UT physics and zoology departments remained largely stable.

**McDonald Observatory**

The McDonald Observatory did not place UT on the map as a viable research university, but the massive 82-inch telescope housed in the remote west Texas town of Fort Davis, the second largest telescope in the world in 1939, did attract serious astronomers throughout the nation. During the 1930s and 1940s, the Fort Davis facility provided Texas with a place to train professional astronomers.

Harvard built its observatory in 1844 and remained the sole facility until 1888 when the University of California opened the Lick Observatory. Ten years later, the University of Chicago established the Yerkes Observatory in Green Bay, Wisconsin. Like many benefactors, James Lick and Charles Yerkes possessed minimal interest in science, but their surface fascination with the stars led them to sponsor astronomy.

William Johnson McDonald did not fit into this category. An amateur astronomer and voracious reader of scholarly texts on natural history, botany, and physics, McDonald wanted to fund an observatory and a serious program of study in astronomy at UT. McDonald died in
1926, but the UT Regents engaged in a legal battle with his family until 1929. At this point, the observatory fund stood at $1.26 million.\textsuperscript{23}

Otto Struve, director of the Yerkes Observatory, saw an opportunity for the University of Chicago in Texas. Yerkes was located in Green Bay where dense clouds kept scientists from working much of the year. Since UT lacked the scientific expertise, his team at Yerkes could staff the McDonald Observatory in the dry West Texas climate with clear skies while Texas established an astronomy program. Robert Maynard Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, agreed with Struve and proposed a thirty-year partnership with UT.\textsuperscript{24}

The Regents approved a partnership with the University of Chicago in 1932. Under this plan, the two institutions would share staff and funds to operate the facilities. With the bequest left by W.J. McDonald, UT would erect a state-of-the-art observatory in West Texas to be completed by 1938 at the cost of $375,000. The director of the Yerkes Observatory would direct operations at both facilities and supervise an assistant director to manage on-site operations in Texas. Otto Struve assumed his responsibilities as director-elect of the observatory in December 1932 and wrote Benedict to inform him that he would pursue a construction contract with the Werner-Swasey Company.\textsuperscript{25}

Regent Lutcher Stark, a frequent dissenter, cautioned against the finalization of any contract until the summer. He had recently visited the Naval Observatory in Washington, D.C., and had inspected the 40-inch scope that the Ritchey-Cretien Company was constructing. Stark wanted to wait until the Naval Observatory tested their telescope in the summer so that UT could incorporate these advancements at McDonald. When the Regents returned to the subject of contracts in July, Stark stated that the telescope planned for UT was not the best one that could be purchased for the price. President Benedict responded that the University should hire two or
three leading astronomers to review plans before proceeding. At the same time, Benedict pointed out that the type of activity that individuals would engage in at McDonald already dictated the type of telescope required to pursue astrophysics. When the rest of the Regents agreed with Benedict's idea, Stark asked that the record show that he did not approve of the type of telescope that the UT and Chicago officials had proposed, although the minutes did not state what type Stark desired. Despite this and a subsequent vote of nay from Stark, the Regents approved the contract with Warner-Swasey of Ohio during their August 5, 1933 meeting.26

Stark once again cast the lone nay vote to allocate $30,000 for protective coating. Struve sent a letter to the Regents highlighting the protective benefits of applying an aluminum or chromium coating to the telescope's mirror. Individuals at the Ryerson Physical Laboratory and Cornell University had recently developed a method for applying aluminum or chromium in place of the traditional coating of silver. Silver coating had to be reapplied twice of year and tarnished easily, whereas the new coatings were virtually permanent. Stark changed his opinion of this and all other aspects of the Observatory project following a trip to the northeast in the spring. He returned from this trip with a new enthusiasm and finally signed the contract with Warner-Swasey. The minutes do not reveal the precise event that changed his mind, but face-to-face meetings with Struve and Waner-Swasey undoubtedly helped. Struve was now free to assume his role as director.27

Construction, planning, and inevitable glitches continued at a steady pace between 1934 and 1938. Struve reported his dissatisfaction with creation of the telescope's lens in April 1938 and suggested that the lens was best left in the hands of the Observatory staff and three astronomers from UT, as opposed to external staff. The Regents agreed and notified Warner-Swasey of this preference.28 The McDonald Observatory was finally dedicated on May 5, 1939.
Agriculture

Virtually all of the organized research conducted at A&M in the 1920s and 1930s occurred within the agricultural experiment station system. These individuals developed new crop varieties, including rust resistant wheat and disease resistant milo. Veterinarians at the experiment station created vaccines and treatments for bovine loin disease and sheep sore-mouth. Researchers interacted little, if at all, with teaching faculty. Experiment station research depended almost entirely on Morrill, Hatch, and additional federal funds to produce practical solutions for the farmers of Texas. A&M's organized research budget was large because the federal amounts were based on state population (see Table 6-4 for 1939-1940). It would take the research boom of the late 1940s and 1950s for A&M to extend activities into the academic departments.

Research and Academic Advancement at UT and A&M in the 1920s and 1930s

In 1892, UT chemistry professor Edgar Everhart (1884-1894) lamented that the State of Texas possessed 'no spirit of scientific research and scientific training.' The intellectual environment improved over the next fifty years as UT and A&M grew in size and stature. The Rice Institute (became Rice University in 1960), led by astronomer and educational visionary Edgar Odell Lovett (1912-1946), employed a band of eminent and promising physicists, chemists, and biologists, who did much to improve the scientific community in Texas. While Texas possessed a great deal of scientific talent at its colleges by the 1920s and 1930s, these individuals lacked the resources necessary to carry out research. Looking back on his work at UT in the 1930s, political scientist Emmette S. Redford complained that those inclined towards research were 'not given one penny of research assistance from the University.' While funds
were not forthcoming, UT's scientists did have access to a strong library. Math and zoology were among the strongest departments during these years since neither required extensive lab equipment beyond an abacus or microscope.\textsuperscript{30}

Applied research largely occurred in the bureaus at UT and the agricultural experiment station and its subunits at A&M. Faculty were largely impeded in their research efforts by the absence of sabbaticals, heavy teaching loads, and a system that treated research and teaching as discrete activities. Looking back on the State's research priorities prior to World War II, Richard McCaslin observed that Texans were interested in practical projects that could increase economic productivity. Legislators were less willing to approve funds for organized research if the University could not demonstrate practical results. Although less practical to the average citizen, there was a great deal of business, industrial chemistry, engineering, petroleum, and geological research in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1939-1940, UT budgeted $146,917 for research in these areas. It was the oil companies, however, not the colleges, which conducted the most of the geological and petroleum investigations through trial and error through 1940.\textsuperscript{31}

President Benedict did not oppose research, but his enthusiasm was measured. As an "ordinary American university", UT had to function as "a preparatory school, partly a college, partly a university, and partly a research institute." UT had to serve its current constituency. In 1928, for example, two-thirds of the UT student body consisted of freshman and sophomores. Until UT built up its graduate programs, it would remain a teaching institution. Benedict believed that UT could become a great research university in the future and declared, "Greater resources will come in time."\textsuperscript{32} A decade after Benedict's observations, graduate students only constituted 7.9% of UT's enrollment. This compared to 23.78% at the University of Michigan, 15.22% at the University of California, Berkeley, and 13.66% at UNC (Table 6-1).
It is hard to identify substantial research activity at A&M in the 1920s and 1930s. David Williams, animal husbandry professor and interim A&M president (1956-1957), recounted the difficulties he encountered as a young researcher in the years before World War II: "the college was purely just college and just teaching, with practically no opportunity for research." A faculty member could only pursue research if he first secured funds "someplace" and then received approval from the director of the agricultural experiment station. Williams described Walton as a likeable, articulate man who never felt qualified to set the academic agenda at A&M because he lacked even an undergraduate degree (although he earned a teaching certificate from the Sam Houston Teachers' College). Self-conscious of his educational credentials, Walton chose to expand the physical plant with the help of the PUF and establish a master plan for the campus.33 His lack of intellectual vision for the College would lead the Board to deem Walton obsolete when they fired him in 1943.34

The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools failed to accredit the chemical engineering program and turned in negative reviews of several departments in 1937. Dethloff described A&M as academically stagnant in the 1930s. The Directors approved a fund ranging between $40,000 and $50,000 to attract stars from elsewhere to assume distinguished professorships. The program proved unsuccessful and the Directors abandoned the project when the Second World War began. A&M did not award a Ph.D. until 1940 when Dorris David Giles completed his studies in animal physiology and nutrition.35 A&M indeed failed to develop academically in these years.
A Nobel Laureate for UT…Almost

UT President Homer Rainey would expend substantial effort trying to attract just one Nobel scientist to Austin (described in Chapter Seven). His fruitless venture would have been unnecessary if Hermann Muller never traveled to the Soviet Union and subsequently penned *Out in the Night: A Biologist's View of the Future*, a eugenicist's homage to communism. Muller joined the zoology department in 1920 and served without controversy until the early 1930s.

In early 1932, Muller suffered from a nervous breakdown, allegedly caused by his marital difficulties. Two UT students reportedly found a stupefied Muller wandering in the hills west of Austin. Muller's doctor diagnosed him with "melancholia" and concluded that Muller had attempted suicide. Soon after this strange episode, Muller was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship to conduct experiments in Germany, during the 1932-1933 academic year. Just before Muller left for Germany, the UT Regents learned that he had links to the Communist Party.36

According to his FBI file, Muller associated with a group of students who published a pamphlet called "The Hammer and Sickle." It is possible that the FBI investigator or an interviewee confused the 1930 pamphlet with *The Spark*, a newspaper issued in June 1932. The UT Regents recorded no discussion of "The Hammer and Sickle" in its minutes and no copies of the pamphlet can be located. *The Spark*, on the other hand, incensed the Regents. The UT chapter of the National Student League (NSL) published *The Spark* in response to the Regents' rejection of a petition issued by the League of Industrial Democracy (LID) on May 3, 1932.37 The LID petition contained 176 student signatures and demanded that the Regents improve working conditions and increase the wages of the workers who were engaged in the large-scale campus construction program. The contractors hired by the University had violated Texas labor
laws in a number of ways, but most particularly these contractors paid their workers below the "current wage." The Regents' refusal to enforce state labor laws led Texas Labor Commissioner Robert Gragg to declare that each new building should contain the inscription: 'This building was erected by the labor of men whose children were deprived not only of education and similar benefits, but of actual sustenance, and stands as a perpetual monument to industrial servitude.'

In addition to the campus labor problem, The Spark contained articles addressing the treatment of Austin's African American community and the extreme rightwing politics of Galveston financier Maco Stewart. The outraged Regents passed the following resolution during their June 27, 1932 meeting:

*The Spark,* undertaken secretly to inculcate lack of respect for and violent opposition to established government and antagonism to the principles upon which American civilization is based. The inevitable effect of the dissemination of the views expressed in the manner indicated and by secret organization will be discord and disorder and permanent injury to the University;

In view of the recitals, RESOLVED

(1) Members of secret political organizations shall be excluded from the University.

(2) Any student publishing or aiding in publishing or circulating or aiding in circulating any anonymous publication shall not be permitted to remain in the University.

Soon after the NSL distributed The Spark, an agent from the United States Immigration Service notified the Regents of a raid conducted in San Antonio where a letter penned by Muller had been confiscated. The letter was proof that Muller was not only engaged in the publishing of The Spark, he was also a member of the American Communist Party. President Benedict called for Muller's dismissal, but Robert Batts, chair of the Regents, worried that Muller might commit suicide if he was fired. The Regents agreed to let the matter go for the year that Muller was in Germany. At the end of his stay in Germany, Muller requested an additional year's leave from UT in order to complete his research. Benedict assumed that Muller was remaining in Germany,
but Muller intended to spend 1933-1934 at the Soviet Institute of Genetics. It is not known when Benedict and the Regents learned of Muller's whereabouts, but they granted an additional leave for 1934-1935 and 1935-1936, certainly knowing by this point that he was in the Soviet Union. The Regents and Benedict became troubled by Muller's location in late 1935 when *Out in the Night* appeared. It was bad enough that Muller wrote a book praising the promise that genetic engineering held for controlling human evolution. It was worse that he spoke admiringly of the Soviet system of governance, a system he would later denounce upon learning of Stalin's atrocities. The worst part of *Out in the Night* was the title page that included the University of Texas underneath Muller's name. The world now knew that the University of Texas employed a Communist. At least, Walter Elmer Pope knew. In early January, Pope, the State Representative from Corpus Christi alerted Texas newspapers to the presence of professors who were teaching "rank communism" at UT. Benedict dismissed Pope's charges and welcomed a legislative investigation. On January 30, 1936, the *Daily Texan* printed a matter-of-fact, non-inflammatory article on its front page that described *Out in the Night*. Muller's affiliation was becoming increasingly public. With support from the Regents, President Benedict informed Muller of his options. Muller could return to Austin and face a hearing regarding his involvement with *The Spark* and his membership in the Communist Party or he could resign. Muller defended his membership in the Communist Party, but he denied any involvement with *The Spark*. In addition, Muller told Benedict that he planned to resign anyway and did so on April 3, 1936.40

Recounting the Muller episode several decades later, Regent J.R. Parten said that Benedict and the Regents believed Muller's departure was necessary in order to avoid an ugly political ordeal. If the University defended Muller, it could risk losing its legislative appropriation. According to Parten, President Benedict believed Texans were too narrow-
minded to accept a communist on the UT faculty. UT, as well as Muller, would be better off. Ten years later, Muller won the Nobel Prize for medicine for work he conducted at UT. His institutional affiliation was listed as Indiana University.

Conclusion, 1920-1940

Proper Government Policy

In 1920, UT was still covered in dilapidated buildings with little hope of accruing enough in the AUF to finance physical improvements. UT and A&M were still engaged in a protracted conflict over how to divide the PUF. By the 1930s, the PUF was permanently divided with A&M receiving one-third of the annual interest and UT entitled to two-thirds. The Legislature easily approved this plan once the institutions settled their differences, and remarkably, stayed out of the discussions until it was asked to codify the arrangement. The Legislature also assisted UT by passing an act to add acreage to the Austin campus, introduced several bills designed to give UT more from oil leases granted after the Santa Rita discovery in 1923, and approved a large-scale building plan for both campuses in the midst of the Great Depression. By 1940, UT no longer looked like a shantytown and both campuses possessed adequately classroom and laboratory space.

In addition, the Legislature spent thousands of dollars to study financial and curricular efficiency at Texas public schools and colleges. Neither the 1925 nor the 1932 external reviews resulted in improved efficiency, but each demonstrated a governmental commitment to high quality public education. At the same time, a state commitment to high quality education for African Americans was absent at the close of the 1930s. Chapter Five noted George Allen's 1938 attempt to become the first African American to attend UT. Allen and the Texas NAACP
tried this strategy after the Legislature defeated a 1937 bill to establish out-of-state scholarships for Black graduate students (it should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled this practice unconstitutional in 1938). The Legislature, along with UT Regents, also refused to establish a "separate but equal" graduate school for African Americans in Texas. The issue of racial equity would remain virtually dormant within the halls of the state Capitol until after World War II.

**Political Interference**

Political interference did not disappear when the Legislature impeached James Ferguson in 1917. The Regents' near appointment of Pat Neff as president of UT in 1924, Miriam Ferguson's decision to abolish the A&M publicity department along with UT's journalism, music, and library science departments in 1925, are ample evidence that political interference was still a problem for the colleges in the 1920s. Ferguson easily made these cuts by simply drawing her blue pencil through these line items. Then there was Representative Pope's threat of Legislative investigation if Harry Benedict did not fire Hermann Muller in 1936. These are just a few examples that demonstrate that the threat of political interference remained. As will be seen in the next chapter, the 1920s and 1930s were a respite compared to the 1940s.

**Academic Development**

The University of Texas and the University of North Carolina led the Southern state universities in graduate education and research in the 1920s and 1930s. Each of these universities made impressive strides in organized research in the interwar period. Nevertheless, Geiger's five (California, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois) dwarfed these Southern accomplishments. A statistical snapshot from 1938-1940 reveals several ways in which the University of California and the University of Michigan outperformed UT and UNC. Similarly, Michigan State bested A&M and NC State. A number of variables have been used to evaluate
the quality of research universities and those who aspired to become so. Some of these available variables are included in Tables 6-1 through 6-4.

As previously mentioned in this chapter, UT and UNC enrolled smaller percentages of graduate students than California or Michigan. In addition, UT and UNC each awarded less than half of the doctorates dispensed by the University of Michigan in 1939-1940. As usual, the University of California stood in a class by itself. A&M's inability to graduate a Ph.D. has already been mentioned. NC State managed to graduate two Ph.D.s in 1939-1940, but this number quickly appears unimpressive when set beside Michigan State's thirteen (Tables 6-1 and 6-2).

UT and A&M possessed good space and equipment (although modest in comparison to the University of California and the University of Michigan) in which to conduct research, thanks to the extensive building program completed in the early 1930s. UT's results were most notable in the BSSR and the zoology and chemistry departments. President Walton's forte as a builder is evident in the comparison of A&M's physical plant with Michigan State and NC State. Even with adequate lab space and a healthy research budget, A&M's faculty did not work in an environment that was supportive of research outside of the experiment station. Money was not enough to propel UT and A&M into the exclusive club of leading research universities. What they needed were academic stars.

The 1938 edition of *American Men of Science* (renamed *American Men and Women of Science* in 1972), an oft-cited measure of academic prestige, listed eight "starred" individuals from UT. Geiger's leading five claimed the following: California fifty-four, Michigan forty-six, Illinois thirty-six, Wisconsin thirty-three, and Minnesota twenty-eight. Virginia and North
Carolina turned in eleven and twelve respectively. Texas A&M NC State employed no starred scientists, while its Midwestern counterpart, Michigan State, possessed two.\textsuperscript{42}

University of Virginia sociologist Wilson Gee was one of the most vocal critics of his region's standing among research universities. High teaching loads, particularly at the undergraduate level, limited funds, and "the damning inertia in the atmosphere with regard to the importance of research achievement," kept many Southern scholars from engaging in such activity. Low salaries and few fringe benefits discouraged the best scholars from joining the faculties of the South's top institutions. After a detailed study of \textit{Who's Who in America} and the 1927 edition of \textit{American Men of Science}, Gee concluded that the South had lost several of its great minds to other regions. The South had in turn gained outsiders, many of them even starred in \textit{American Men of Science}. These exceptions aside, most of the migrant scholars were second-rate. Southern universities had to create incentives for the best natives to remain in the region for both graduate training and professional employment. Gee took heart in the progress that had been made at the leading Southern universities in the 1920s and 1930s, although he did not mention any of these institutions by name. The best of the South still trailed behind the best in the nation.\textsuperscript{43}

<table>
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<th>Institution</th>
<th># of Graduate Students</th>
<th>Graduate Students as % of Total Enrollment</th>
<th>Ph.D.s Awarded</th>
<th>Total Full-Time Faculty\textsuperscript{1}</th>
<th>Faculty Starred in \textit{American Men of Science}</th>
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<td>California</td>
<td>4391</td>
<td>15.22%</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>3093</td>
<td>23.78%</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>13.66%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6-2 Enrollment and Faculty Data for Select Land-Grant Institutions, 1938-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th># of Graduate Students</th>
<th>Graduate Students as % of Total Enrollment</th>
<th>Ph.D.s Awarded</th>
<th>Total Full-Time Faculty¹</th>
<th>Faculty Listed in American Men of Science</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michigan State</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>6.42%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC State</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas A&amp;M</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>3.77%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-3 Property and Expenditures at Select State Flagship Universities, 1938-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Volumes in Library</th>
<th>Funds Spent on Organized Research</th>
<th>Funds Spent on Instruction Per Student</th>
<th>Total Value of Physical Plant, Grounds, &amp; Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>1,081,151</td>
<td>$2,037,441</td>
<td>$186.66</td>
<td>$52,499,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>1,098,197</td>
<td>$207,125</td>
<td>$355.02</td>
<td>$50,812,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>386,390</td>
<td>$75,183</td>
<td>$274.74</td>
<td>$10,816,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>639,732</td>
<td>$229,158</td>
<td>$175.27</td>
<td>$27,570,887</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-4 Property and Expenditures at Select Land-Grant Institutions, 1938-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Volumes in Library</th>
<th>Funds Spent on Organized Research</th>
<th>Funds Spent on Resident Instruction Per Student</th>
<th>Total Value of Physical Plant, Grounds, &amp; Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michigan State</td>
<td>152,263</td>
<td>$471,741</td>
<td>$227.50</td>
<td>$10,218,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC State</td>
<td>55,469</td>
<td>$324,605</td>
<td>$282.58</td>
<td>$5,432,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas A&amp;M</td>
<td>85,793</td>
<td>$1,046,129</td>
<td>$177.61</td>
<td>$11,674,271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources for Tables 6-1 through 6-4: Enrollment, number of faculty, and library volumes from the Biennial Survey of Education, 1938-40; Physical Plant, grounds, and equipment from Biennial Survey of Education, 1937-1938; American Men of Science: A Biographical Directory, 1938.

¹Faculty numbers are likely inflated. The Biennial Survey on required detailed data from the land-grant colleges and many non-land-grants reported all employees as faculty. UT, for example, had approximately 415 teaching and research faculty (not including the medical branch) listed in its 1939 budget. The faculty numbers at California, Michigan State, North Carolina State, Texas A&M only include those listed as teaching faculty, experiment station staff, and those working in other organized research.

Notes

2 ibid., italics in original text, 77.
The enrollment data was drawn from the Biennial Survey of Education, 1920-1922, 1930-1932 (Washington DC, Government Printing Office). Percentage increases in state appropriations between 1921 and 1931 were calculated in a convoluted manner. The 1921 appropriation for UT that are listed in the General Laws of the State of Texas (1919) is vastly lower than the figures listed in other sources and were discarded in favor of the total listed in a report prepared for the UT/A&M negotiations (see table entitled "Legislative Appropriations for the Support and Maintenance of the University of Texas, 1881-1927," in William Hogg Papers, UTCAH, Box 2J387, UT/A&M January 13, 1925-June 3, 1929 folder). The 1921 appropriation for A&M and the 1931 appropriations for both institutions are drawn from General Laws of the State of Texas, 2d called sess., Thirty-sixth Legislature (1919), 392; General Laws of the State of Texas, 3d called sess., Forty-first Legislature (1929), 397. The calculations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UT</th>
<th>A&amp;M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921-1922 (approved in 1919)</td>
<td>$1,321,575.13</td>
<td>$1,470,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adjusted for inflation, in 1929</td>
<td>$1,673,606.27</td>
<td>$1,504,382.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1932 (approved in 1929, prior to stock market crash)</td>
<td>$2,245,030</td>
<td>$2,308,437.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A&M includes: College Station, Prairie View, Tarleton, and North Texas Junior Agricultural College (1931) campuses, extension service, experiment station, forestry service, hog serum (1921) rodent control (1931). UT includes: Austin campus, College of Mines in El Paso, medical branch in Galveston, extramural divisions (1931).

Footnotes:
4 Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 207-208.
5 The enrollment data was drawn from the Biennial Survey of Education, 1920-1922, 1930-1932 (Washington DC, Government Printing Office). Percentage increases in state appropriations between 1921 and 1931 were calculated in a convoluted manner. The 1921 appropriation for UT that are listed in the General Laws of the State of Texas (1919) is vastly lower than the figures listed in other sources and were discarded in favor of the total listed in a report prepared for the UT/A&M negotiations (see table entitled "Legislative Appropriations for the Support and Maintenance of the University of Texas, 1881-1927," in William Hogg Papers, UTCAH, Box 2J387, UT/A&M January 13, 1925-June 3, 1929 folder). The 1921 appropriation for A&M and the 1931 appropriations for both institutions are drawn from General Laws of the State of Texas, 2d called sess., Thirty-sixth Legislature (1919), 392; General Laws of the State of Texas, 3d called sess., Forty-first Legislature (1929), 397. The calculations are as follows:

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6 ibid., 211 -- 212.
7 ibid., 208-211.
8 Geiger, To Advance, 149 -- 160.
9 Amy E. Wells "From Ideas to Institutions: Southern Scholars and Emerging Universities in the South Circa 1920 -- 1950," Ph.D. diss., University of Kentucky, 2001, 8-17; institutional figures provided by Geiger, To Advance, 153 and Wells, 46.
11 Wells, 53-55, 58.
12 UTBOR Minutes, April 18, 1927, 42-43.
13 "Past and Present Aids to the Social Sciences, The University of Texas," document not dated, but probably printed in 1954, Harry Ransom Papers, UTCAH, Box 3U352, folder 11.
16 Wells, 175 -- 177; "Past and Present Aids...University of Texas", 13 -- 16.
17 Nettie Lee Benson, "Latin American Collection," Discovery, Research and Scholarship at the University of Texas at Austin, 7 (3), 54 -- 61; UTBOR Minutes, March 25, 1939, 165 -- 171, December 7, 1940, 317-318.
18 Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 161.
19 Geiger, 164-166, UTBOR Minutes, August 20, 1929, 471; "University of Texas Budget for 1939-1940, adopted by the Board of Regents on July 29,1939," 1, UTCAH.
22 Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 80-81.
ibid., 108.
25 UTBOR Minutes, April, 23, 1932, 16; August 20, 1932, 144; November 23, 1932, 192-195; December 22, 1932, 214.
26 ibid., March 18, 1933, 238; July 7, 1933; August 5, 1932, 390-395.
27 ibid., January 5, 1934, 470-471; May 5, 1934, 56-57.
28 ibid., April 30, 1938, 328.
29 "Progress Report for Twelve Years of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, 1925-1937," 54, TSLAC.
30 McCaslin, "Science and Technology in Texas Before World War II," quote on 20; Leo J. Klosterman, "History of Sigma Xi in Texas," quote on 3, both in Klosterman, Swenson, & Silvia Rose, 100 Years of Science and Technology in Texas.
31 McCaslin, 19-36; "University of Texas Budget for 1939-1940, adopted by the Board of Regents on July 29, 1939," 45-49, UTCAH.
32 H.Y. Benedict, "A Communication to the Board of Regents of the University of Texas (Meeting of October 1, 1928)," University of Texas Bulletin, no. 2843, November 15, 1928, TSLAC, first quote from 13, second quote from 16.
34 Dethloff, Texas A&M University, 478.
35 Dethloff, 442-443.
37 For information regarding the National Student League and the League for Industrial Democracy, see Robert Cohen, When the Old Left Was Young: Student Radicals and America's First Mass Student Movement, 1929-1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
38 "Campus Petition Asks Regents to Give Labor Help," The Daily Texan, May 4, 1932, 1-2, Robert Gragg quote from 1. Current wage should not be construed as minimum wage. The federal minimum wage law was not passed until 1938.
39 UTBOR Meeting Minutes, June 27, 1932, 69, 86.
40 Pope quote from "Benedict Unopposed to Investigation," The Daily Texan, January 10, 1936, 1; Hermann J. Muller, Out in the Night (New York: Vanguard Press, 1935); "Muller Predicts Artificial Means for Parenthood," The Daily Texan, January 30, 1936, 1; Carleton, A Breed So Rare, 157-158.
41 Carleton, 158-159.
42 James McKeen Cattell, American Men of Science: A Biographical Directory (New York: The Science Press, 1938). Cattell, American Men of Science, 1906, vi -- vii. James Cattell first published American Men of Science in 1906. This volume contained biographical entries for over 4,000 individuals who had made significant contributions to the advancement of science. Approximately 1,000 of these scientists were then "starred" as a result of a scoring process. Cattell identified twelve scientific fields and asked ten leading scholars in each field to submit names of the individuals who had made the greatest contributions. After he compared and averaged the lists, Cattell calculated the total number of scholars in each field and selected a group of "starred" scientists that was roughly proportional to the total. Cattell edited subsequent editions in 1910, 1921, 1928, 1933, and 1938. The list grew dramatically with each edition with the 1938 edition containing 34,000 names. The number of "starred" individuals increased as well, but at a far slower rate than the total scholars listed. One-fourth of the scientists listed in 1906 received a star, while roughly 5% were honored in 1938.
Chapter Seven

The Worst Threat to Our State and Nation: New Dealers, Communists, Inter-racialists, and Garden Variety Troublemakers at the Colleges, 1939 -- 1945

"It is, of course, immediately apparent to any thoughtful person that what we do here today will necessarily be considered in the chancelleries of education throughout the academic world."

The years between 1939 and 1944 were some of the most tumultuous in UT's history. After four years of relative calm between the governor's office and the University under President Benedict and Governor Allred, the mood changed with the election of Homer P. Rainey as President of UT and Wilbert Lee O'Daniel as governor of Texas in 1939. After five excruciating years, the O'Daniel and later Coke Stevenson-packed Board of Regents fired Rainey and made national news. Much of the UT conflict was related to the growing discontent among Texas businessmen with the New Deal. A&M experienced its own scandal when the Board of Directors dismissed T.O. Walton.

Texas colleges were not the only ones to encounter friction with anti-communists zealots during this period. Ellen Schrecker and M.J. Heale described several instances in New York, Michigan, and California. State legislatures established committees patterned after the U.S. House of Representatives Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), established in 1938. New York's Rapp-Coudert Committee, created in 1940, and California's Tenney Committee, founded in 1941, searched for communists and subversives, but curbed their attacks against the colleges by 1942 and focused their energy on winning the war with our Soviet allies. Unlike Texas, New York, California, and Michigan did not direct their investigations at individuals who were suspected of promoting the New Deal and interracial cooperation. No state in the nation endured the brand of conflicts that Texas and its embattled colleges withstood during the war.
Texas Politics and the New Deal

As has been noted in previous chapters, political interference was not new to the University of Texas in 1939. Up to this point, the Ferguson episode between 1914 and 1917 stood as the worst incident. The Rainey ordeal, however, was far more egregious. UT faculty and Regents were unified during the Ferguson attacks and the Legislature impeached the Governor largely for his actions towards the University. When the Regents fired Rainey in 1944, the President and his faculty possessed two allies on the nine-member Board of Regents. Governor O'Daniel and his successor, Coke Stevenson packed the Board of Regents with men who went on to leave the Texas Democratic Party and form the Texas Regulars in 1944. The Texas Regulars and their most vocal supporters kicked off their campaign against the New Deal, communism, and the academics who allegedly stood for both in 1939. Many of the Regulars fell into the group that George Green dubbed "the Establishment," who monopolized Texas politics through the end of the fifties.

While the New Deal had many foes in Texas, Governor Allred (1935 -- 1939), warmly accepted these federal programs. In addition, Allred introduced initiatives for the elderly and children, but the legislature refused to fund them. Allred also attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to introduce a state income tax, raise crude oil taxes, and reduce public utility rates. Allred did not seek re-election in 1938, but had he entered the race, he would have faced a formidable opposition from the corporate lobby.³

Texans generally opposed federal intervention and the New Deal because they encouraged a belief that the fed wanted to destroy the Texas brand of minimally regulated capitalism and rugged individualism. Besides the aforementioned regulation of oil, the financially and politically powerful of Texas despised the New Deal programs designed to help
homeowners from losing their mortgages and small business owners from losing their livelihood by providing them with alternatives to dealing with banks. The Works Progress Administration (WPA) gave individuals jobs so that they did not have to rely on local charity. New labor standards particularly alarmed factory management and landowners because they tampered with management-labor and landlord-tenant relationships. It was easier for Texans to oppose the New Deal because it was less severely affected by the Depression. During the 1937-1938 recession, factory payrolls dropped 5% in Texas as compared 27% nationally. Texas farm income stood at 79% of the 1929 index as compared to the national figure of 69%.4

In his seminal 1949 study of Southern politics, V.O. Key argued that Texans not only opposed the New Deal, but waged “the most bitter intra-Democratic fight along New Deal and anti-New Deal lines in the South.”5 The liberal cadre of Texans such as Allred and U.S. Congressmen Maury Maverick experienced severe setbacks in 1937 and 1938 following debate over an antilynching law and protracted fight over a wages and hours bill. Maverick lost his congressional seat in 1938 after distinguishing himself as the only Southerner to vote for the anti-lynching bill. Both of these measures were extremely unpopular in Texas and led many who tolerated the New Deal to abandon it altogether.6

The majority of men who waged war on Texas colleges joined the Texas Regulars in 1944 and took advantage of the growing opposition to Roosevelt in the state.7 It galled many that Roosevelt had served three terms and was seeking a fourth. Under Roosevelt, Texas had to endure excessive wartime restrictions and federal regulation -- especially the price controls of oil. Gasoline rationing was highly unpopular in Texas where then Governor Coke Stevenson stated that gasoline was as important as ‘the saddle, the rifle, the ax, and the Bible that won Texas for the society we now have.’8 To make things worse, Roosevelt’s vice president was no
longer John Nance "Cactus Jack" Garner, the borderline New Dealer from Texas, but leftist Henry Wallace.

W. Lee O'Daniel served as the Regulars chief spokesperson as governor and later as U.S. senator. A number of businessmen including E.B. Germany, Hugh Roy Cullen, UT Regents John Bickett, Orville Bullington, Dan Harrison, H.H. Weinert, Scott Scheiner, and D.F. Strickland, Texas A&M Directors Neth Leachman and Robert Briggs, and Texas Tech trustee Karl Hoblitzelle, HUAC chairman Martin Dies and then Governor Coke Stevenson were active as well. Armed with a war chest and control of the major newspapers in Houston and Dallas and radio spots, the Regulars promoted their eight-point platform:

(1) Restoration of the Democratic Party to the integrity, which has been taken away by Hillman, Browder, and others.
(2) Protection of honest labor unions from foreign-born racketeers who have gained control by blackmail.
(3) Return of state rights which have been destroyed by the Communist-controlled New Deal.
(4) Restoration of the freedom of education.
(5) Restoration of the supremacy of the white race, which has been destroyed by the Communist-controlled New Deal.
(6) Restoration of the Bill of Rights instead of rule by regimentation.
(7) Restoration of government by laws instead of government by bureaus.
(8) Restoration of the individual appeal for justice, instead of a politically appointed bureau.

The Regulars lost the election in part because most voters wanted to support the Democratic Party in all posts below the presidential level. In spite of their loss, the Establishment endured. They could not manipulate presidential politics, but their ideas remained popular in Texas as evidenced by the firing of Homer Rainey just before the election, continued aggression towards labor unions, anti-communist witch hunts of the last 1940s and the 1950s, and alliance with the Dixiecrats in 1948.
Loyalty Oaths and Legislative Investigations

The Texas legislature introduced a number of measures designed to regulate education and political activity in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Senate Bill 359 became law in 1937 and compelled witnesses to testify before legislative bodies and committees under heavy penalty and a denial of privileges for any individual who refused. During the regular session of 1941, the House introduced a bill to make it legal for citizens to kill members of the Communist Party. This initiative died in committee, but the state did pass a law barring Communist candidates from appearing on the ballot.12

The Texas Senate passed a loyalty oath for educators in 1941. SB 38 mimicked the language used in the federal Smith Act passed in June 1940 and specified that any educator discovered advocating subversive principles would be promptly dismissed following a hearing. Senate Bill 38 was a reaffirmation of a clause printed in the 1939-1941 appropriations bill.13

The Texas House and Senate both formed un-American activities committees in 1941, the Senate during the regular session and the House during the first called session in September. Neither of these committees endured beyond a few months and fizzled in part because east Texas Congressman Martin Dies abandoned his investigations in Texas just as these committees were organized. The Legislature, however, did not give up on its search for subversive activities.14

The House expressed its outrage over an editorial entitled 'Russia is Wiping Out Seven Sins for a Bright Future' in the February 5, 1943 edition of The Daily Texan, the UT student newspaper. On behalf of fellow disgruntled legislators, L.H. Flewellen organized an investigation soon after the offensive article appeared. Addressing his colleagues in the House, Representative Flewellen declared that he was most upset that religion was included among the seven sins. The student author declared that the Soviets were winning the war in part because
they had eliminated the crutch of superstition. Following a brief discussion, the House enthusiastically adopted a resolution instructing the Regents and Rainey to determine whether faculty censors approved the article. The House further resolved to require the Texan's editor to dedicate a portion of the editorial page to articles that reinforced the ideals of God and democracy, and minimized the alleged accomplishments of the USSR.\textsuperscript{15}

In his May 1, 1943 response to the House, Rainey stated that the student author had selected ambiguous language and did not mean to disparage Christianity. He conceded that editorial policies were in need of repair. At the same time, the Daily Texan was a student-run paper that should be monitored, but never censored by the faculty. Rainey concluded: "We cannot conceive a better way of encouraging young people than that of permitting them much latitude in the expression of their thoughts." Legislators were likely troubled by Rainey's opinion, but the House abandoned its investigation after receiving his letter.\textsuperscript{16}

**The Issue of Race**

While Texas boasted a small African American population relative to the rest of the former Confederacy (14%), Jim Crow still thrived in the Lone Star State. As already noted, the Ku Klux Klan gained a number of state legislative seats and one U.S. Senate seat in the 1920s. Texas disfranchised its African American voters with the introduction of the poll tax in 1903 and was involved in two significant Supreme Court cases in the 1940s. In the first case, *Smith v. Allright*, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the Texas Democratic white primary. This decision reinforced Texan as well as Southern fears that the national Democratic Party had established links to the African American civil rights movement.\textsuperscript{17} The second case, *Sweatt v. Painter* was decided in 1950, but this case had its roots in the early 1940s. The Supreme Court ruled that the
makeshift law school established for Blacks in 1946 was inferior to the UT law school and ordered Hermann Sweatt's admission to the white college in Austin. This case is discussed in detail in Chapter Nine.

African Americans possessed few, even modest, educational opportunities in Texas circa 1940. Conditions at Prairie View, for example, had been dismal since it was established as a branch of Texas A&M in 1878. Rainey and T.O. Walton joined W.R. Banks, principal of Prairie View, and other educational leaders in late 1941 to form the Bi-racial Conference on Negro Education in Texas (BCNET). BCNET published a major report titled “Senior Colleges for Negroes in Texas” in April 1944 and concluded that Prairie View, the state’s only public college for African Americans, suffered from substandard funding and that graduate and professional education was woefully inadequate. BCNET did not support integration, but the committee’s report called for a dramatic plan to equalize opportunities and facilities so that Texans could begin a long journey towards addressing the race problem. The committee contended that desegregation was not a viable solution because the white citizens of Texas would resist. Even if Blacks were permitted to attend white schools, they would not feel comfortable attending these institutions.\(^{18}\) In the end, BCNET was more committed to improving quality at Prairie View than pumping money into the out-of-state scholarship program.

The BCNET report outraged UT Regent Orville Bullington, who declared that no African American would ever attend the University as long as he was part of the institution, “regardless of what Franklin D., Eleanor, or the Supreme Court says, so long as you have a Board of Regents with as much intestinal fortitude as the present one has.” Bullington also worked to nullify the anti-discrimination clause in the University’s Navy V-12 contract.\(^{19}\)
A number of white citizens favored greater opportunity for African Americans, but virtually none advocated integration during these years. For example, UT faculty member C.L. Cline wrote an article in the *Interracial Review* in support of greater educational opportunities for Blacks, but only in segregated classes. Specialized training, particularly at the UT medical school, would benefit African American individuals, as well as the nation, in wartime. These were cautious years when even the most liberal of Texans questioned the pace at which Blacks were moving towards desegregation. In a letter to his son, even the liberal-minded Maury Maverick Sr. worried that African Americans were stirring their communities up and offending whites to the point that they were risking their lives.

**Academic Freedom in the 1930s and 1940s**

No other state university governing board micromanaged teaching and research to the extent that the University of Texas Regents did, although politicians in other states investigated their state universities in search of communists and fascist subversives. These investigations violated the standards set by the AAUP (American Association of University Professors) in its 1940 statement on academic freedom and tenure.

At the time that the AAUP was founded in 1915, academic freedom meant three things. First, faculty members needed the freedom to research and teach absent government and public interference. Second, faculty members had the right to express their views as private citizens without the threat of dismissal. Finally, the academic community was entitled to corporate freedom -- meaning that the professorate should be treated as an autonomous entity where academics exclusively decided what should be taught, what should be researched, and what constituted good research.
According to Walter Metzger, the men who formed the AAUP did not fashion themselves as a labor union, but an organization whose job was to codify academic freedom and tenure. Despite the AAUP’s insistence that they were not a labor union, many governing boards viewed the AAUP as such. This was particularly true with the UT Regents who explicitly referred to the AAUP as a CIO union.23

Within a few years of forming, the AAUP was inundated with requests from academics who wanted the group to investigate their campuses. Even by the early 1940s, the AAUP did not have enough staff to conduct comprehensive investigations. In addition, AAUP censure had little or no impact on institutional governing boards and administrators. The University of Texas Regents ignored the AAUP’s censure and remained on the list from 1946 to 1953.

In October 1940, AAUP members expressed concern that the war in Europe might prompt governing boards and legislative committees to not only dismiss alleged communists, but also professors who might hold views that were merely deemed different.24 The AAUP’s alarm over growing threats to academic freedom came during a wave of government-initiated investigations of faculty members. The AAUP was also disturbed by the passage of the Smith Act, a statute passed in 1940 by the federal government that declared it illegal for individuals to ‘teach and advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence.’25

State legislatures and governing boards at public and private institutions began conducting investigations in search of communists, fascists, and others that could thwart the transmission of American values to students in the late 1930s. Many of these investigating committees were created following the formation of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1938. Organized by Texan Martin Dies, HUAC, also known as the Dies
Committee, began an investigation of schools by questioning John P. Frey, president of the metal trades division of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), in August 1938. Dies asked Frey to provide the Committee with names of Communists within the AFT in New York City. Frey claimed that the Communist Party had taken control of Local No. 5 of the AFT. When the Committee asked Frey for names, he only volunteered the name of an English woman who was the wife of a Communist party leader in England. The committee also questioned Homer Chaillaux, director of the National Americanism Commission of the American Legion. Chaillaux stated that a number of institutions including Columbia, Harvard, Northwestern, and George Washington University, had chapters of the Communist Party. These chapters were raising money to support the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, a left-leaning and partially communist group who broke with the American stance of non-intervention to fight against fascist Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War. In addition to educators, Dies pursued a number of people in the New Deal administration whom he believed were communists disguised as Democrats. In general, the individuals who provided testimony to the Dies Committee failed to provide any conclusive evidence of un-American activity in the colleges.26

Following the formation of the Dies Committee, several state legislatures established Little Dies committees, including New York, California, and briefly, Texas. New York established the Rapp-Coudert Committee in 1940 and conducted its most extensive investigation at the City College of New York (CCNY). This investigation lasted from June 1941 into 1942 and resulted in the dismissal of twenty faculty members and eleven resignations.27 California legislator Jack Tenney organized a committee in 1941, but it did not conduct a thorough investigation of the University of California until after the war. It is possible that Tenney saw no
need to pursue communists in the University of California at Berkeley because its regents made it the first university in the nation to restrict membership in the Communist Party in 1940.28

The Texas Legislature also formed a "Little Dies" committee, but the majority of the charges regarding subversive activities in Texas came from Martin Dies. While Dies found no evidence of subversive activities at UT, it was not for lack of trying. Dies believed that there was a communist cell containing one UT professor and twelve students and summoned these individuals to a hearing. Following their testimony, Dies announced that the campus harbored Stalinists and Trotskyites. Dies was unable to provide proof and, in response, Homer Rainey quipped that the Congressman should “put up or shut up.”29

Dies finally abandoned his claims regarding UT in April 1941, however, before this occurred, the Texas State Senate established the Fain Committee in January 1941. Headed by Clem Fain of the small East Texas town of Livingston, this Little Dies committee introduced a bill requiring the dismissal of any Texas educator whose teaching was “inimical” to the Texas Constitution. Fain Committee member Jesse Martin of Fort Worth claimed that UT was brimming with inimical teaching, but five days after Martin issued his claim, Dies declared that his committee had found no evidence of subversive activity at UT. Soon after, the Fain Committee disbanded.30

The Baseball Player-Turned-College President and the Biscuit Boy Assume Power

Texans welcome two ideologically opposed leaders in 1938. Texans elected W. Lee “Pass the Biscuits Pappy” O’Daniel, a former flour salesmen and bluegrass musician, as their governor in November. O’Daniel campaigned in favor of the Ten Commandments, the Golden Rule, old-age pensions, and tax cuts. Unlike James Ferguson, he made little mention of public
education in his campaign and communicated no concern about the UT faculty or the institution’s curriculum.  

Regents appointed by Governor Allred named Homer Rainey as president one month after O’Daniel’s election. Rainey, however, was not the Regents' first choice. After the beloved Harry Benedict (1927-1937) suffered a stroke and died in route to an appropriations meeting before the Legislature, the Regents launched a national search to find a new president. Regents Parten, Randall, Aynesworth, and Waggener picked Luther Gulick, a professor of public administration at Columbia University, as their top choice. Gulick never expressed enthusiasm for the position and dragged his feet for several months before he agreed to visit Texas for the first time to view the UT campus. Despite Gulick's hesitancy and subsequent refusal to accept the presidency, the Regents voted unanimously to hire him after his campus visit in early November 1938.

The Regents then turned to their second choice, Homer Rainey. Lotus Coffman, president of the University of Minnesota and national educational reformer, had suggested Rainey for the position upon hearing of Benedict's death. Coffman believed that Rainey, who had served as president of Franklin College (1927-1931) and Bucknell (1931-1935), possessed the administrative skills necessary for the job. Coffman also noted that the forty-one year old native Texan could provide the youth and regional perspective required to lead UT. By May 1938, Coffman had a change of heart. He confided to Regent J.R. Parten: "If there is need for a two-fisted fighter, I should doubt whether Rainey should be considered." Despite concerns from Coffman, as well as from Regents Randall, Stark, and Weinert, the Regents voted unanimously to hire Rainey. While Coffman worried about Rainey's leadership skills, particularly when compared to Gulick's abilities, the dissenting Regents possessed reservations about his political
beliefs. Contrary to these Regents' assessment, Rainey was not a radical liberal. As a moderate Democrat, Rainey supported the New Deal, interracial cooperation (not desegregation), and antitrust laws.

Born in 1896 in rural Northeast Texas, Rainey grew up poor. After graduating first in his class at Lovelady High School in 1913, Rainey attended Austin College, a small liberal arts college in nearby Sherman. Rainey was ordained as a Baptist minister in 1917, graduated from Austin College in 1919, and briefly pitched for the Houston Buffs baseball team. He left Texas for Illinois where he earned a master's degree in 1923 and a Ph.D. in 1924 at the University of Chicago. Following three years on the faculty at the University of Oregon, Rainey served as president of Franklin and then Bucknell. One biographical sketch of Rainey described him as "an innovative leader" while at Bucknell. Rainey centralized the fragmented faculty, increased admissions standards, divided the curriculum into lower and upper divisions, and introduced a large-scale building program. Bucknell then abandoned much of Rainey's expensive program after he abruptly left Bucknell in 1935 to assume a position in Washington as director of the American Youth Commission, part of the American Council on Education. The Rainey that the Regents hired in 1938 was neither a Robert Maynard Hutchins nor a Frank Porter Graham, but he was an experienced administrator with ambitious plans for the University of Texas.

Rainey's Plans for UT

Rainey addressed the Regents for the first time on February 4, 1939. He would officially assume the presidency in the summer, but Rainey seemed eager to begin once he completed his duties as head of the American Youth Commission. During this February meeting, Rainey declared that UT and the citizens of Texas failed to understand one another. The University
existed to serve the State through excellent teaching and research, but it did not do a good job conveying this mission to the people. Citizens, in turn, did not always acknowledge the ways in which UT's extension and degree programs served Texas. UT would not become a great research university until legislators and citizens deemed the institution to be a worthy investment. The Regents largely agreed.36

Rainey returned to Texas on May 5 to attend the dedication of the McDonald Observatory in Fort Davis. On the 468-mile trip back to Austin, he shared his strategy for improving UT's status as a research university with progressive-minded Regent J.R. Parten. Rainey was inspired by the progress that the University of California had made in the 1920s and 1930s by attracting young academic stars with the promise of extensive research facilities and healthy compensation packages, and he wanted to try a similar, albeit more ambitious, strategy at UT. Rainey wanted to convince an established scientist from a top research university to exchange their comparably more luxurious laboratory at a top-tier research university for a chance to lead an inchoate or even nonexistent program at UT. Parten appreciated Rainey's enthusiasm, but he believed that the plan would be difficult to pull off since the Legislature had approved a maximum salary of $6,500 for distinguished professors. The only position that paid more was the newly created vice presidency, which offered $14,000. Few leading scientists would consider a position with administrative responsibilities, so Rainey suggested that the Regents reduce these aspects of the position and provide this individual with large segments of research time and the best facilities that money could buy. Rainey suggested Arthur Compton, the Nobel Prize winning physicist (1927) from the University of Chicago. Parten agreed with Rainey's choice and promised to secure support from the other Regents. Not surprisingly, Arthur
Compton rejected Rainey’s offer. Rainey and Parten would wait until after the biennial budget process to contact their second choice.  

Rainey submitted his first budget recommendations to the Regents in July 1939. After a few adjustments, the Regents approved a budget that gave UT $255,000 of additional funds to work with in 1939-40 over 1938-39. Funds ($126,650) were dedicated for fifty new faculty and staff positions, as well as salary increases ($41,000) for sixty-one professors and associate professors. The Board allocated $207,867 to the Division of Research. The Regents also approved Rainey’s proposal to establish the University Research Council (URC). The URC, composed of the Dean of the Graduate School and representatives from the various departments and schools, would solicit research applications and award grants to the general faculty. UT requested $900,000 for this initiative, but the Legislature reduced the amount to $25,000. Despite the reduction, the $25,000 provided UT with its first state funds designated for research. The Legislature still approved salaries as line items, but the University would be able to allocate research dollars at its own discretion.

Encouraged by a stronger research budget, Rainey returned to his search for a star scientist in September 1939. Arthur Compton was unwilling to leave the University of Chicago, but he volunteered gossip that E.O. Lawrence was looking to leave the University of California. Berkeley physicist Leonard Loeb had wooed the twenty-seven year old Lawrence away from Yale in 1928 with the promise of a promotion to associate professor, state-of-the-art facilities, and the opportunity to teach graduate students. Lawrence invented the cyclotron in 1929, became director of the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory in 1936, and won the Nobel Prize for physics in 1939. Lawrence’s accomplishments placed him in a powerful bargaining position. According to Compton, Lawrence now wanted a bigger cyclotron, but the University of
California was unable to finance the $8 million machine. Rainey thanked Compton for the information and proceeded to Berkeley to tempt Lawrence.39

As Rainey and Lawrence toured the Radiation Laboratory, Lawrence mentioned that he was about to embark on a fundraising trip in search of private foundation support for the new cyclotron. The two went back to Lawrence's office where Rainey offered him the vice president's position and suggested that the UT Regents could match any amount of foundation support that Lawrence could obtain. Lawrence agreed to consider Rainey's offer and arranged to visit the UT campus on October 16, 1939. At the same time, Lawrence informed Berkeley president Robert Sproul of the Texas offer. Lawrence embellished upon the Texas deal by adding that Rainey 'could guarantee the necessary funds for such an undertaking immediately.' Sproul pledged to fight for Lawrence.40

According to J.R. Parten, the Regents agreed to build Lawrence's 184-inch cyclotron and purchase additional equipment with money in the AUF and the help of foundation support. Parten shared this information with Lawrence, who promised Parten that he would come to Texas and recruit four of his colleagues as well. Lawrence then returned home to the news that the Rockefeller Foundation would provide matching funds for the cyclotron. He immediately alerted Rainey and Sproul that they were free to fight over him.41

This fight never took place. James Elkins, co-founder of the Vinson and Elkins law firm in Houston, balked at the suggestion that the State of Texas needed a publicly funded "atom-smashing machine." Elkins warned Regent E.J. Blackert that the Legislature would kick the Regents across the state line if they dared to squander tax dollars in this manner. Upon hearing Elkins' judgment, the Regents agreed to withdraw their support for the Lawrence deal in the interest of upcoming legislative requests. Rainey and Parten refused to give in and appealed to
the recently formed M.D. Anderson Foundation in Houston. Once they received an answer of no from Anderson, Rainey reluctantly reneged on the deal with Lawrence.42

In the midst of his failed attempt to recruit Lawrence, Rainey prepared his inaugural address to the people of Texas. In this speech delivered in early December 1939, Rainey introduced his vision for UT. He proclaimed that UT had and should continue to embrace the AAUP's principles of academic freedom. This statement, and his declaration that UT faculty must commit more time to organized research and that the Legislature should increase appropriations for all Texas colleges and schools, were no different from Harry Benedict's inaugural address. What distinguished Rainey's speech, were the biting criticisms of the State's business elite. Rainey first took aim at the booming lumber and petroleum industries:

We have been a wasteful people. Our ancestors came from an old continent of meager holdings to the richest land in the world and the result was a Roman holiday. Three-fourths of our timber is gone...two-thirds of our known oil reserves...43

He proceeded to call for state corporate taxes:

The surest way for industry to limit its markets and goods in the future is to curtail the opportunities for education. Business leaders who advocate a reduction in educational expenditures are shortsighted and are committing a slow but sure economic suicide.44

Rainey ended his address with a call for institutional autonomy:

The regents and administrators of the University should be given full power to develop the institution...they should not be hampered in their movements by too close a control.45

While Rainey hoped for administrative autonomy accompanied by trust and support from the Regents, he would soon face Regents who would do everything they could to hamper his leadership.
Early Troubles, 1939-1940

Rainey made his final attempt to gain a world-class scientist in June 1940. The Regents and Rainey hosted the 1934 Nobel laureate in chemistry, Harold Urey. During his two-day visit to Austin, the Columbia University chemist inspected a number of the science departments and provided recommendations for improvement. The Regents were impressed by Urey and authorized Rainey to hire him as vice president and professor of chemistry. In spite of Rainey's assurance that the administrative duties would be minimal, Urey had no interest in taking such a post and declined the offer. Rainey abandoned his strategy after this stinging rejection.

In addition to his failed quest to acquire a big name scientist, Rainey handled a debacle brewing at the medical branch in Galveston. The Regents held a series of initial meetings to discuss academic deficiencies and other controversies in Galveston, October 7-9, 1939. After studying the issues presented in October 1939, Rainey submitted his report of the Medical School to the Regents at a special session, January 13, 1940. Rainey warned that conditions at the medical school were so poor that the program was on the verge of losing its Class "A" rating from the American Medical Schools Association (AMSA). The President listed thirteen deficiencies. The first eight dealt with the medical school's low ranking among sixty-four programs in a survey conducted by the AMSA. The areas cited by Rainey included organization and administration, faculty qualifications for teaching and research, faculty salaries, educational programs in pre-clinical and clinical studies, clinical facilities, and financial support.

Rainey also cited an inadequate physical plant and the lack of accreditation by numerous specialty boards as major problems. He believed that all of the medical school's problems were attributable in part to its disjointed organizational structure. Four separate boards managed the Medical School: the Regents, the Smith and Sealy Foundation, the Hospital Board of Managers,
and the Executive Committee of the Faculty. The Hospital Board consisted of officials from the city and University, so that UT did not possess direct control of its own hospital. For decades, the University leased the hospital to the City of Galveston, who determined the admission of patients and undermined the authority of doctors employed by the medical school. While the Smith and Sealy Foundation was charged with disbursing funds to promote teaching and research, it was not empowered to dictate policy or manage the medical school. The Foundation's role had been confused with that of the Regents over the years. The general faculty had little say in the administrative and curricular matters because a five-member Executive Committee made most of the decisions for the entire faculty, and this body remained largely unchanged from year to year. The Dean of the Medical School had little, if any, control over this body. The Regents made minor changes to Rainey's claims and appointed a committee to study the issues in greater detail.48

Rainey and Regent Fred Branson met with individuals from the Galveston Board of Commissioners, Smith and Sealy, and the Hospital Board of Managers on November 25, 1940. During this meeting, the Galveston officials agreed to place Sealy Hospital back in the hands of the University. Galveston would then pay $40,000 to UT to provide its citizens in need of charity of medical services.49 In spite of this victory, the medical school troubles would continue between 1940 and 1942 over the performance of its Dean, John Spies. Following a number of investigations into his effectiveness, his tact, and his Americanism, the Regents would fire Spies on August 1, 1942.

Despite his unsuccessful effort to nab a Nobel laureate and the evolving medical school conflict, Rainey's first year and a half were generally calm. The Regents who hired Rainey, particularly J.R. Parten, Leslie Waggener, and George Morgan, still possessed a good deal of
influence on the Board. Rainey and the Regents were unified in their goals of increasing faculty salaries and research funds. The Regents, however, would soon reintroduce politics into the day-to-day management of the University to a degree that would rival the Jim Ferguson era.

The Regent Packing Process

A nine-member board that was appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Texas Senate governed UT. Each Regent served a six-year, staggered term, which meant that three new Regents were appointed every two years. Governors served two-year terms, so each governor had an opportunity to appoint regents. If a governor served for two or more terms, he could appoint the entire board. This structure allowed Governor O’Daniel to gain political control of the University in 1941.50

Rainey’s relatively peaceful tenure ended in November 1940 when O’Daniel was re-elected governor. In his campaign, O’Daniel announced that he had alerted FDR to a possible 5th Column in Texas.51 It is widely believed, but impossible to prove, that O’Daniel marshaled Texas businessmen and lawmakers in January 1940 at what became known as the “Houston Gag Conference." Plans were allegedly formulated there to restrict academic freedom, eliminate faculty, and cut questionable curricula.52 Rainey, Parten, and J. Frank Dobie would later cite the "Gag Conference" as definitive evidence that the Regents calculated and plotted to eliminate Rainey and certain liberal faculty. Parten claimed that Fred Branson mentioned the "Gag Conference" casually during a golf game. Branson denied that the meeting with O'Daniel ever occurred and stated that he could not recall the golf course conversation with Parten. Even though the tale is impossible to verify, Parten, Rainey, and Dobie -- none of whom had firsthand evidence, took a mere rumor and added colorful description. A number of writers such as
Ronnie Dugger, Alice Cox, George Green, and of course, Homer Rainey, cited the "Gag Conference" as fact.

Around the same time as the supposed Houston meeting, O’Daniel appointed Fred Branson, employee of high-powered Galveston financier Maco Stewart and reappointed longtime Regents Kenneth Aynesworth, physician from Waco, and Marguerite Fairchild, civic volunteer from Lufkin. During Branson's first meeting in May 1940, he introduced a motion to fire Robert Montgomery, a full professor of economics and an advocate for public utilities, in order to hire several assistant professors. Long-time Regent Lutcher Stark seconded Branson's motion. Stark then moved to strike the salary of J. Frank Dobie, the Texas folklorist and frequent critic of Texas conservatism. Neither of these motions carried; however, both suggested to Chairman J. R. Parten, as an independent oilman and enthusiastic supporter of the New Deal, that Governor O'Daniel was fomenting a coup.53

In early 1941, O’Daniel announced the nomination of new Regents Orville Bullington, a railroad and banking tycoon, and Dan Harrison, an oil baron and cattleman. At the same time, O’Daniel removed Allred appointees J.R. Parten, and George Morgan, a Columbia University Ph.D. and president of Cardinal Oil. The Texas Senate immediately approved Fred Branson in 1940, but a number of members initially opposed Bullington and Harrison in 1941. Both men voted for Wendell Wilkie as president in November 1940 and Bullington had run as the Republican candidate for governor in 1932. The Texas Senate met in closed session for over two hours on January 30, 1941 and asked the two men if they were willing to “hire and fire a lot of new people and if they were against the Communists and other isms.” San Antonio banker D.K. Martin, who stated in his nomination letter that he was alarmed by the "unscrupulous, designing, subversive professors who have been diggin' in in our schools more than we dare to admit", 
endorsed Harrison. The Senate approved Bullington and Harrison once it was satisfied that the Wilkieites would not take control of the University.  

The Regent-packing program continued even after O'Daniel was elected to the U.S. Senate in a special election in August 1941. Lieutenant Governor Coke Stevenson became governor and was elected in his own right in November, 1942. Leslie Waggener, son of UT's first president and director of a Dallas bank that was in constant conflict with the major Dallas oil companies owned by Texas Regulars, stepped down from the Board in March 1942. That same year, Stevenson appointed additional regents D.F. Strickland, a movie theater lobbyist, John Bickett, general counsel for Southwestern Bell, and W. Scott Scheiner, a banker and rancher. With five O’Daniel and Stevenson appointees and H.J. Lutcher Stark, the prickly, twenty-three year member who often cast the dissenting vote, the Regents were poised to gain control of Rainey and his most liberal faculty. The inevitable conflict began at the medical branch.

**Medical Branch Dean John Spies**

The first investigation into Dean Spies' performance occurred on July 9, 1941. During this investigation, the Regents and Rainey examined Spies, "tact, diplomacy, and administrative ability in dealing with the Faculty in his charge." Despite concerns over his abilities, the Regents re-elected Spies to his post at the July 26 meeting. Spies would continue to lead the medical school, but Rainey remained dissatisfied with the administration and academic standing of the unit. In a resolution issued September 29, 1941, Rainey, identified the organizational reporting structure as a major culprit. Rainey lacked the proper authority to supervise the dean and oversee the medical school faculty. Instead, the Regents formed a committee to oversee the
Dean and medical faculty. Although Rainey did not state this, he insinuated that the Regents had overstepped their boundaries and asked for this committee to be abolished. The Board discussed Rainey’s resolution, but voted to postpone any decision until the next meeting.56

Members of the medical school faculty appeared before the Board on October 25, 1941 to present a recently drafted policy statement. This group called for a reorganization of the Executive Committee of the Faculty. The committee would consist of four members who could serve no more than two years in succession. They also recommended that the general faculty be given the ability to make recommendations directly to the Regents and the president if they disagreed with the actions taken by the Executive Committee and the dean. The Board elected to take this proposal under advisement. During this same meeting, Rainey asked for a final vote on his resolution presented at the September 29th meeting. After much discussion, the Board rejected Rainey’s request to eliminate their medical school committee, but accepted other parts of his resolution that affirmed the president’s authority over the dean and the medical school.57

Rainey and the Regents rejected the medical faculty’s proposal on the grounds that the new powers would circumvent the Dean and the Executive Committee. Term limits were a good step, but the other proposed rules seemed to highlight, not solve the conflicts that existed between the Dean, Executive Committee, and the general faculty at the Medical School.58

Problems at the medical school persisted in 1942. The recently formed Texas HUAC launched an investigation of activities at the medical school and presented its report on February 28, 1942. Aside from the medical school’s failure to train competent doctors to assist in the war effort, the House Committee found no evidence of un-American activities at the medical school. The little HUAC recommended that the Regents dismiss Dean Spies and any counterproductive faculty so that the rest of the faculty could commence with plans to make UT’s medical program
'first class.' The Committee blamed the Regents for allowing the situation to degenerate at the medical school and urged them to loosen their control and grant Rainey the authority he required to manage the unit.59

During this same meeting, the Regents reviewed a statement signed by fifty-one faculty members, and the associate and assistant Deans, calling for Spies' removal. The Regents agreed to hear further evidence in support of Spies' removal as well as his defense on March 16, 1942.60 The medical school faculty declared that they had already presented ample evidence calling for Spies' dismissal, so the Regents cancelled this meeting. In the midst of the controversy, Fred Zapffe of the Executive Council of the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) warned Rainey that a review team had recommended probation.61

The saga lingered on in May 1942, when a clearly frustrated Rainey presented an extensive list of recommendations concerning the medical school. As for Spies, Rainey urged the Regents to fire or affirm him immediately so that the faculty and Spies could move on and make peace. Rainey called for seven general actions to improve the academic quality of the medical program. These actions included the expansion of courses, introduction of fields not currently offered, and initiate research projects in the areas of biophysics and biochemistry. He suggested that the University establish a dentistry program and expand its nursing and pharmacy schools. After hearing Rainey's proposal, the Regents voted to proceed with a hearing regarding Spies and other problems related to the medical school.62

The Board fired Spies on August 1, 1942 and replaced him with Chauncey Leake on August 8. Leake quickly identified some quick solutions to the administrative and curricular problems at the Medical School. He suggested that the school limit its enrollment to better match facility and faculty size and that it subsequently develop an expansion program. Leake
provided the medical branch with stable leadership through 1955 and was largely responsible to improving the unit's reputation in the 1940s and 1950s.  

While problems at the medical branch may seem peripheral to the challenges to academic freedom that largely occurred at the Main University in Austin, the facts of this situation are important. An important example of the power struggle between Rainey and the Regents. Rainey would cite his lack of authority over the medical branch in his list of sixteen grievances to the Regents in 1944. Issues at the medical school were only a small part of the conflict.

Foil at Forty Acres

Rainey and the Regents experienced little conflict beyond the medical school issue between the winter 1941 meeting and January 1942. In early 1942, the Regents challenged a report from the University Bureau of Municipal Research titled *Municipal Utilities in Texas*. In this report, the Bureau of Municipal Research highlighted the benefits of municipally owned utilities. According to Rainey, the Regents were so outraged by this report that they threatened to abolish the Bureau. There is no record of this disagreement in the Regents' minutes, but it is certainly possible that such an exchange occurred in the unrecorded executive session.

Later in the summer, the Regents fired economics instructors J. Fagg Foster, Wendell C. Gordon, and W.N. Peach. These men made a statement to correct false claims that were made at an anti-labor rally in Dallas. Karl Hoblitzelle, a Dallas movie mogul, organized the meeting to protest the National Labor Relations Act (1935) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) in the decidedly anti-labor *Dallas Morning News*. The advertisement contained a picture of large Japanese soldiers aiming rifles at U.S. soldiers who were holding toy guns. The ad stated that American soldiers were dying because the union-controlled government would not permit
anyone to work over forty hours per week. Hoblitzelle sponsored a meeting that he claimed was organized by mothers of servicemen and invited all who wanted to express their opinions on the matter in an open forum.\textsuperscript{69} The three economics professors who attended the meeting intended to read the law that provided overtime to individuals who worked in excess of forty hours, but were forbidden time to speak and notified a reporter. Hoblitzelle witnessed the exchange and notified his friend D.F. Strickland, who brought the three in for interrogation. Six regents were present at this meeting with the faculty and Senator O’ Daniel called twice from his office in Washington.\textsuperscript{70} O’ Daniel’s successor, Coke Stevenson, chose to watch the proceedings from a distance. To Rainey's dismay, the men were fired in a vote of four to one.\textsuperscript{71} It was these dismissals that prompted an investigation by the AAUP in July 1942.\textsuperscript{72}

A number of organizations, including the Democratic Club of Tarrant County (Fort Worth area) and the Austin League of Women Voters sent letters of disapproval to Governor Stevenson after the Regents fired the economics instructors. The Tarrant County group argued that the three instructors did nothing but honorably represent an opposing viewpoint at a public meeting. Like wise, the League of Women Voters accused the Regents of denying the three their right of free speech. The League's president, Mrs. Alfred Taylor accused Stevenson and O'Daniel of packing the Board of Regents with opponents of academic freedom. Stevenson defended his appointee, D.F. Strickland, who the Governor appointed for his knowledge in law and medicine and his potential to resolve problems at the medical branch.\textsuperscript{73}

Following the Regents' dismissal of the three economics instructors, a group of faculty assembled to discuss what this action meant for academic freedom at UT. This faculty group contacted the Regents and requested a meeting. Representing this faculty assembly on September 25, 1942, Roy Bedichek, Frank Dobie, the noted and outspoken Texas folklorist, J.M.
Kuehne, and Frederic Duncalf expressed their disapproval of the Regents' actions and presented them with a petition containing fifty faculty signatures. The petition claimed that the Regents had failed to provide adequate reasons for why the instructors were dismissed. Since the Regents had provided them with limited information regarding their reasoning, the faculty had just enough information to believe that the penalty was too harsh. Lack of knowledge would only create distrust of the Regents from both the faculty and the public. Primary spokesman, Roy Bedichek, added that while the Board had infringed upon academic freedom, the faculty were largely concerned about the negative publicity that UT had incurred as a result of the Regents' dismissal of the instructors. The Regents discussed the petition, but the minutes contain no details.74

Faculty disgust over the Regents' behavior began to spread. H. Bailey Carroll of the Texas State Historical Association quipped to Roy Bedichek that an individual had to meet four requirements to gain a seat on the Board: "(1) Strike oil; (2) inherit lumber; 3) Marry rich; (4) and this may overlap the other three -- Buy an office for the governor."75

During the January 30, 1943 meeting, D.F. Strickland introduced a motion to amend Chapter I, Part II, Section 3 of the Regents' rules and regulations, which then stated that the Regents could not remove a professor or associate professor from his/her position until a five-member advisory committee composed of the General Faculty had conducted an investigation and submitted a recommendation to the Board's Complaint and Grievance Committee. Strickland reintroduced his proposal at the March 27, 1943 meeting. Strickland suggested that the Regents forward this rule to the State Attorney General and ask him to rule on the legality of such a provision. In addition, Strickland wanted the attorney general to rule on the legality of the rules pertaining to tenure and promotion. Strickland was quick to clarify that he was not
interested in changing the tenure guidelines, but he believed that the current rules violated state statutes. Rainey then requested that the Board permit J.W. Calhoun, Eugene Barker, and R.W. Slayton to meet with the Regents on behalf of the General Faculty to draft such a petition to the attorney general jointly with the Regents. The Regents granted Rainey's request.\(^7\)

The joint committee unanimously concluded that Section 3 was ambiguous and set about to revise the rule in its entirety. This new tenure rule stated that those who demonstrated competence:

\[\ldots\text{are given assurance that they may feel secure and independent in their positions and that they will be promoted upon the basis of merit as circumstances permit. Unless otherwise stipulated in advance in the letter of appointment, it is the intention of the Board that the term of service of a professor or associate professor will be continued during good behavior and satisfactory service, of an assistant professor will be two years, and an instructor or other member of the teaching staff will be one year. Three months' notice of intention not to reappoint an assistant professor or an instructor will ordinarily be given, but failure to give such notice will not constitute reappointment.}\]

As for termination, the Board would provide written justification for dismissing a faculty member and would provide that person with a hearing before a committee of five faculty members approved by the Board "in consultation" with the President. The Board could act on its own if an emergency existed. Strickland also pointed out that the Board included portions of Section 3 on the backside of the appointment forms sent to faculty. He believed that the Regents should discontinue this practice (although his reasons are not recorded in the minutes). The Regents approved the revised rules and Strickland's proposal to remove the guidelines from reappointment forms. Strickland then moved to deny a salary increase for economics professor E.E. Hale for the 1943-44 year. Scott Schreiner seconded Strickland's motion, but the action failed to carry.\(^8\)

T. Whitfield Davidson, U.S. District Judge from the Texas Northern District in Dallas, wrote Regent John Bickett in September with the warning that Rainey and the faculty had asked
the AAUP to intervene in the matter of tenure. Davidson reminded Bickett of an article in the *Daily Texan* where the author stated that professors were protected from dismissal. Given that the University had hosted Oscar Ameringer, a German socialist and opponent of the lend-lease policy, and allowed faculty to glorify Sacco and Vanzetti, providing faculty with unconditional tenure accompanied by unbridled academic freedom, which the AAUP would certainly demand, would damage the University and corrupt student minds.79

Ralph Himstead, General Secretary of the AAUP, sent a telegram to the Regents in the fall of 1943 and requested a meeting with the Board to discuss the 1942 dismissal of the three economics instructors. The Regents agreed to allow Himstead to attend a meeting. According to Orville Bullington, this meeting never materialized. Bullington concluded that the AAUP had decided to work through the Southern Education Conference. He believed that the various so-called radicals outside of UT had cooked up a conspiracy theory that the Regents were in cahoots with Karl Hoblitzelle. These "Roosevelt worshippers" believed that Hoblitzelle acted on behalf of the Regents when he denied the economics instructors the opportunity to speak at the Dallas rally in 1942. According to Bullington, he did not know Hoblitzelle and such accusations were ridiculous.80

The Regents then turned to the curriculum on January 1943 when they banned *The Big Money*, the third volume in John Dos Passos’ *U.S.A.* trilogy. The Regents had expressed concern over its use in English courses, so the faculty in that department elected to place the work on the sophomore supplementary reading list. Led by Regent Bickett, the Regents conducted a hearing with English department faculty and threatened to fire the person who placed the book on the supplementary reading list. When the English faculty insisted that the decision came from a
committee and not an individual, the Regents banned the book due to the author’s use of sexually explicit language and sympathetic stance towards labor unions.81

Rainey believed the Board was growing increasingly distrustful of him and the faculty. For example, the Regents insisted on reviewing all research proposals, especially those submitted by departments in the social sciences and humanities. The Regents began to scrutinize and postpone or reject several projects that the University Research Institute had already approved beginning in June 1942. Of the thirty projects that appeared on the June 27, 1942 docket, twenty were approved (seventeen in natural sciences, two in social sciences, and one in humanities). Of the three proposals that were postponed, two were previously approved.82 Although the Regents did not record their reasons for rejecting research proposals, none of the seven rejected proposals had obvious New Deal or socialist/communist elements (see notes for full description of proposals).83 Later, Rainey would accurately list the spurned proposals, but he failed to note that two of the postponed projects and two of the rejected programs were later approved.84

The Regents continued to read all faculty research proposals and rejected many that promoted the "wrong" ideas. The Regents zealously opposed a proposal submitted by English professor G.L. Joughlin to investigate the impact that the Sacco-Vanzetti case had made on American literature. Bullington stated that this case had already been glorified in the public and the Regents would not fund any project that promoted the “communist murderers.” The Board rejected Joughlin’s proposal on September 29, 1944.85

On October 1, 1944, D.F. Strickland allegedly called Vice President J. Alton Burdine and told him that the Regents were going to put a stop to Rainey's speaking engagements around the country. According to Burdine, Strickland believed that Rainey was making disparaging remarks about the Regents in churches. Burdine called Rainey immediately and within several
days, the supposed Strickland-Burdine conversation was leaked to the press. Strickland denied ever having this conversation with Burdine.⁸⁶

Rainey could not longer contain his frustration. On October 12, 1944, the beleaguered President called a faculty meeting where he issued a list of sixteen grievances directed at the Regents and called for a meeting with the Board to discuss his claims. According to Rainey, the sixteen wrongs were caused by the absence of academic freedom and the Regents' failure to acknowledge administrative authority. Most of Rainey's charges were taken directly from the Regents' meeting minutes and are summarized below:

Table 7-1 Rainey's Sixteen Grievances

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>On June 1, 1939, Regent Weinert asked Rainey not to re-nominate J.C. Dolley to the athletic committee. Weinert provided no reason for his request and Rainey believed Weinert simply did not like Dolley. Rainey stated that it was his privilege as president to hire his own staff and Weinert had interfered.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>On March 16, 1943, Regent Strickland responded to Rainey's request that he withdraw a resolution to change the tenure rule. In this letter, Strickland suggested that Rainey had overstepped his bounds as president of UT by challenging the actions of a Regent.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>A former Regent (Rainey did not provide the name) introduced a motion to eliminate economics professor Robert Montgomery during a 1940 budget meeting. The motion did not carry, but Rainey was upset that the Regents would have fired Montgomery without a hearing.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>During the same 1940 budget meeting, Regent Stark called for the dismissal of Dean Shelby, Roy Bedichek, and R.J. Kidd. Stark admitted that he blamed these men for changes in the University Interscholastic League (UIL) rules that kept his sons from playing football at Orange High School. Stark's motion failed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Regents voted to dismiss economics instructors J. Fagg Foster, Wendell Gordon, and W.N. Peach for speaking out at the anti-strike rally in Dallas during the summer of 1942.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>On January 8, 1943, the Regents voted to remove Dos Passos' <em>The Big Money</em> from the supplemental reading list for sophomore English.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Regent Strickland spent several months in 1942 complaining to Rainey about the un-American attitudes espoused by several UT faculty members. Strickland then presented a loyalty oath to the Regents in January 1943. Rainey pleaded with the Regents to defeat the resolution and they complied with the President.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Strickland also introduced a revised tenure rule at the January 1943 Board meeting.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>The Regents fired Arthur Brandon, director of public relations in 1943.</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Between 1941 and 1944, the Regents rejected funding for an array of social science research projects that they deemed politically offensive.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The Regents repeatedly denied a request to establish a school of social work at UT. According to Rainey, the Regents rejected the request because the school would nurture socialism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>In 1942, the Regents attacked the Bureau of Municipal Research after its staff published a report citing the merits of publicly owned utilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>On September 25, 1942, the Regents passed a rule to forbid the use of University funds for faculty travel.</td>
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The Regents reduced the University's state appropriation request for the 1944-1945 biennium by $230,000. Rainey and Regent Strickland presented the reduced budget to the Legislature during which time Strickland disparaged the University. One state senator asked Rainey if he thought that Strickland was even in favor of UT's success.

The Regents barred Rainey and other administrators from attending executive sessions.

The Regents handled the Dean Spies episode poorly. They failed to include Rainey in major decisions regarding Spies and the difficulties at the medical school.


One day after Rainey issued his statement, Strickland allegedly declared that Rainey had finally pushed too far and that the Regents would make haste in dealing with him. Between October 12 and October 27, the campus community mobilized in support of Rainey. A large group of faculty pledged their support for their embattled president and formed a committee consisting of Frederic Duncalf (history), Theophilus Painter (zoology), and Robert Stayton (law) to work with the Regents. The Ex-Students Association assembled a similar committee. None of this support would help Homer Rainey.

The Regents, the recently formed faculty committee, a student committee, representatives from the Ex-Students Association, the Texas Senate, and the AAUP assembled at the Rice Hotel in Houston on October 27. One hundred and fifty miles removed from the University, the Regents conducted routine business and heard testimony from Rainey supporters. Two days into the meeting, the assembly received word that Regent Kenneth Aynesworth had died in Waco. The Regents adjourned until October 31 in order to attend Aynesworth's funeral. Upon returning to the Rice Hotel, the Regents called the faculty and Ex-Students committees into an executive session. Rainey and Vice President John Alton Burdine were not invited to join the exchange. The Regents spent the majority of this executive session responding to Rainey's charges, perhaps as a way to win the faculty and alumni over to their side. Instead, the committees left the meeting with belief that Rainey could stay on if he tempered his grievance statement. The
faculty and alumni communicated this to Rainey, who sat down that night and composed a statement which is excerpted below:

It is a matter of sincere regret to me that a critical situation has developed between the Regents and myself….in referring to individual members of the Board I have done so in their official capacities only….I did not intend to reflect upon the motives of individual members or former members, living or dead, or to question their personal integrity, and anything in my statement which might be so construed I am glad to withdraw….I recognize the authority of this Board under the Constitution…and I shall be happy to work with this Board of Regents in accordance with these aforementioned laws, rules, and regulations.

Furthermore I heartily approve of the suggestions made by the Faculty Committee and endorsed by the Ex-Student Committee that the Board of Regents appoint a Committee from teaching faculty to serve in a liaison capacity for the purpose of considering future problems of Board and administrative relationships, and differences of policy or functions that may arise between us.88

On the morning of November 1, Rainey submitted his statement to the faculty and alumni, who then delivered it to the Regents. The committees expected the Regents to embrace Rainey's letter, but were shocked when the Regents stated that they would accept nothing less from Rainey than a total retraction of the sixteen-point grievance statement. The faculty and alumni left the meeting to inform Rainey of the Board's ultimatum. The weary president had run out of options. Rainey could write a groveling letter, but he could not withdraw his charges. After subsequent talks between the faculty/alumni group and the Regents, Rainey was summoned to the executive session. Lutcher Stark introduced a motion to fire Rainey without a hearing. Scott Schreiner seconded Stark's motion. Dan Harrison, D.F. Strickland, Orville Bullington, and Hilmer Weinert voted yea, John Bickett abstained, and Marguerite Fairchild cast the lone vote against the motion. As if they knew they had just taken part in something sinister, Bickett, Weinert, and Harrison resigned on the spot.89

The state and national press quickly published several articles in which they criticized the Regents, but Governor Stevenson refused to show public support to any side and simply stated that he had been taught to keep his lips away from a hot coffeepot.90 Prior to Rainey’s dismissal,
Stevenson privately told one of the Regents that he supported their decision to restrict Rainey’s freedom to govern because Rainey had forced the University to succumb to the ‘foreign…undemocratic…and totalitarian’ bureaucracies from the AAUP and the American Medical Association.91

Perhaps the most dramatic response came from the student body. On November 2, 1944, approximately 5,000 of the nearly 9,000 students on campus gathered in the streets of Austin and marched behind a coffin labeled "academic freedom" to Chopin's "Funeral March" performed by drummers and trombonists from the Longhorn band. The students paraded through the rotunda of the Capitol building and delivered the coffin to the steps of Governor Stevenson’s mansion. The next day, students gathered again and formed a mile-long parade. Led by a banner brigade clutching a sign that announced "Academic Freedom Is Dead" and a car sporting wounded veterans, hundreds of students and Austinites marched in support of Rainey.92 Student opposition to the Regents, Stevenson, and O’Daniel was not new. Following the appointment of Harrison, Bullington, and Branson in 1941, students circulated a handbill that included a picture of two cigar-smoking elephants clad in silk top hats. The elephants stood in a pool of oil next a derrick. Even in 1941, students worried that the new Regents would make the university into a political battleground.93

The scandal attracted national attention. In one of the most quoted articles on the subject, *New Republic* writer Bernard DeVoto observed that thousands of Texans believed that the Regents fired Rainey because they had to protect the state from a dangerous threat:

The communists were responsible for the New Deal and they intend to inflict a labor dictatorship on us. They want to debauch your daughters with free love and marry them to Negroes. They want to destroy private enterprise and white supremacy. They want to destroy initiative and profit, business and freedom, the individual and the United States. And for this the evil things they teach at the University are responsible. Get rid of the communist professors -- who are all homosexuals and New Dealers anyway -- and everything will be right once more.94
DeVoto exaggerated, but this was the manner in which Americans received the story -- the UT Regents were a group of fat cat, paranoid, racist, cowboys, who cared nothing about the education of its youth. The Regents, who dismissed the troublemaking Rainey to make their jobs easier, did nothing but damage the University's reputation. It was this national scorn and attention that would encourage future UT Regents to break the long, grand tradition of extreme political interference at UT.

The Hearing

The State Senate Education Committee initiated an investigation of the events in mid-November, but these hearings did not result in any action or recommendation. The hearings did however, reveal a great deal about the Regents' opposition to the New Deal, communism, and desegregation of the university.

Orville Bullington submitted a written statement to the committee in which he responded on behalf of the Regents to a number of Rainey’s charges against them. Stark, Strickland, and Scheiner pledged their support of Bullington’s statement with their signatures. According to Bullington, Rainey initiated the conflict between himself and the trustees in early 1941 by treating them with an air of condescension. He noted that the University did not even employ a president until 1895, twelve years after the institution opened. The Regents had been around since 1881 and were ultimately responsible for the University, not the president, and could manage the institution without one. Furthermore, Rainey had directed four of his charges at Regents who were no longer on the board, two of whom were dead. Many of Rainey’s claims were outright false, including the Regents' objections to the report produced by the Bureau of Municipal Research.95
Bullington directed the majority of his rebuttal to the incidents involving the economics faculty and the Dos Passos novel. Addressing the dismissal of the three economics professors in 1942, Bullington stated that the Regents granted a hearing to the three faculty members. During this hearing, the Regents informed them that they had violated Section 6 of the University Rules and Regulations authored by former President H.Y. Benedict. The section stated that a faculty member was free to communicate his opinions both in and out of the classroom, provided that opinion related to his field of expertise and that the faculty members exercised a ‘generous respect for the rights, feelings, and opinions of others.” The three economics professors had violated this rule and showed great disrespect to Southern Methodist University President Umphrey Lee and minister George W. Truett. On top of their rudeness, the three refused to apologize for their actions. The Regents did not infringe on the faculty members’ academic freedom, rather, the instructors violated the principles of propriety. The Regents did not oppose academic freedom, but they did oppose academic license. These faculty members assumed a license without accepting responsibility for their actions.96

In reference to The Big Money, Bullington stated that the Regents removed the book because parents complained that it was inappropriate. Once the Regents analyzed the book, they found a wealth of sex, profanity, and blasphemy. Bullington declared The Big Money to be obscenity, not literature and urged the “mothers and ministers” of Texas to review the novel.97

In addition to responding to Rainey’s charges, Bullington introduced two claims against Rainey, both of which related to Rainey’s inability to hire suitable faculty. Bullington contended that the U.S. military put officers through FBI background checks before approving them. Given the current state of the world, Rainey should have placed applicants through an equally rigorous inspection. Bullington referenced an article from the October 12, 1944 edition of the Dallas
Times Herald that stated that Arthur Goodwyn Billings, a former Socialist candidate for the U.S. Senate from Kansas and UT economics professor, was headed to prison to serve a sentence for his evasion of the draft following his induction. Rainey allegedly knew that Billings was a conscientious objector, but he kept this information from the Regents. Billings served as an instructor from 1941-1942, and Rainey suggested him as a replacement for one of the three dismissed economics professors. Billings was inducted in August 1942, and refused to comply stating he was a conscientious objector. A federal district court declared that he could not use the conscientious objection defense because he was an agnostic. In addition, he stated in court that the German and Japanese atrocities were exaggerated. Bullington cited to the Regent’s Rules, Sec. 1, Chapter 2, which stated that the president was responsible for keeping the Regents abreast of information concerning issues related to the administration and welfare of the University. Regents heard that there were subversive activities at UT, asked Rainey about it during the summer of 1942, and Rainey replied that such claims were false. All the while, Billings was engaged in subversive activities.

The second charge from the Regents involved a man for whom Rainey had requested approval for hire in October 1944. This man was later indicted for committing “an alleged unspeakable and unmentionable social crime.” Bullington elaborated on this episode during his testimony to the Senate Investigating Committee when he accused Rainey of tolerating a homosexual ring at the University.

In addition to Bullington, Regent Strickland volunteered his opinions about Rainey’s leadership to the Senate Investigating Committee. Rainey wanted to admit African Americans to the University. When asked his opinions about African Americans attending UT, Strickland stated, “We send them off to schools in other states….If I were going to criticize him (Rainey) I
think I'd criticize his being associated with Nigger-white groups -- I'd say he is a little ultra-liberal on the Nigger question." Strickland's language represents the Regents' racist attitudes. In spite of his failure to provide evidence, Strickland also claimed that the economics faculty were teaching communism. The Regents’ claim that the economics department was overrun with communists was an old canard from this group. The claim that Rainey supported desegregation at the University of Texas was new and false. Bullington later confided to his old friend John Lomax that Frank Dobie was on the verge of losing his mind and was "cultivating negroes and labor unions."  

"Era of Tranquility"

The AAUP and the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools would not complete investigations until the summer of 1945, but UT had to regain order immediately after the scandal unfolded in November 1944. The first step was to appoint a strong, but non-controversial, interim president and a well respected and politically connected businessman as chair of the Regents. The Regents met with interim President Theophilus Painter, a noted geneticist, in January 1945 to further critique the Rainey incident and plan for the immediate future. Marguerite Fairchild attended as the sole Rainey supporter. Dudley Woodward, the Dallas attorney appointed as chairman on November 15, 1944, began the meeting with an anti-Rainey diatribe. In a twenty-seven-and-a-half page statement, Woodward noted that the Regents had governed the University in a consistent manner from 1881 to 1939 when Rainey assumed his post. To support the claim that Rainey was a poor leader, Woodward presented an anonymous letter from a former Bucknell trustee who noted that Rainey encountered problems while president there between 1931 and 1935 because he aligned himself with a small faction of faculty at the expense of others.
Woodward deemed that the content of The Big Money was the medium of "sophisticates who find it necessary to follow the gutter into the sewer for an idea." Rainey claimed that the Regents' had inappropriately denied funds from the University Research Foundation. Since these funds came from the Legislature, the Board could not elect to support projects that could put the entire research budget at risk. The Board's discretion regarding these funds was not about academic freedom, but pragmatism. As for Rainey's charge that the Legislature had slashed appropriations, Woodward pointed out that the University possessed fewer students and faculty during this time of war. Rainey charged that the Regents had barred him and other administrators from attending executive session. While this action was unfortunate, Woodward wondered if the Regents' made this decision because they could no longer work effectively in Rainey's presence.103

Once Woodward delivered his tirade recounting Rainey's faults, he set out to repair the damage done to UT's reputation. During their meeting on February 16, 1945, the Regents issued a statement of nine principles. They declared their adherence to what they described as nationally regarded policies and procedures adopted by colleges and universities, although they did not provide specifics. The Regents then committed themselves to a plan to expand the physical plant and faculty in order to meet the demands of a post-war society. The statement went on to stress the importance of research and pledged their support to all faculty research endeavors. Once again, the Regents did not identify specific areas that they intended to support. The Board "unreservedly" defended academic freedom and defined it as "freedom in research, freedom to proclaim and teach the results of such research, freedom to teach what the teacher believes to be true, limited only by the recognized decencies and properties obtaining among normal human beings." Next, Regents affirmed their belief in tenure and invited amendments to
the current policies from the faculty, if needed. The University stood ready to accept whatever sanctions might be warranted from external agencies. The statement proclaimed that this was a new "era of tranquility," and that during this period, the Board was committed to selecting the best man available to serve as permanent president and valued the faculty's assistance in locating this individual.\textsuperscript{104}

Probation

The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools appointed a commission that conducted an investigation at UT in January 1945 and released its report on July 22, 1945. After meeting with pro- and anti-Rainey camps, the Southern Association officials determined that neither side had any interest in compromise. Destructive "bias and prejudice" existed between students, faculty, and staff and between the Regents, faculty, staff, and students. These elements had to be removed and replaced with "objective judgment and justice" in order for UT to adhere to the Southern Association's standards.\textsuperscript{105}

The commission went on to present their view of proper roles and responsibilities. According to the Texas Constitution, the elected state senators approved the executive-appointed Regents. The Regents' mandate was to represent Texas citizens by establishing and maintaining the "broad policies" of the University. The commission concluded that even if charged with the power, the Regents did not possess the right to micromanage the president or other administrators of the institution, just as the president and administrators did not possess the right to take over a professor's classroom. The Regents violated the principle of "proper sphere[s]" when they eliminated faculty members against the recommendation of faculty and administrators.\textsuperscript{106}
The commission noted that various UT groups believed that the new guidelines threatened the institution of tenure, but the accrediting body believed that the new guidelines could be viewed as simply a clarification of the previous tenure rule. With the exception of their treatment of John Spies, the Regents had not violated the principle of tenure. Tenure was not even an issue in the investigation.  

The commission determined that while the Regents had made poor choices in denying funding to certain research projects and the manner in which they dismissed the three economics instructors, no serious violation of academic freedom had occurred. The Regents cut the research funding in defiance of Rainey's recommendations. The Regents claimed that they did not dismiss the three for the expression of their views, but for refusing to apologize for their rude behavior in Dallas. The commission could not prove that the Regents had violated the instructors' right to express their beliefs. Herman Donovan, chair of the commission, went on record as disagreeing with the rest of the commission regarding both the funding and the dismissals. The Southern Association commission found fault with both Rainey and the Regents and placed the University of Texas on probation until it could demonstrate its "full observance of its principles and standards."  

Theophilus Painter wrote Woodward in July 1945 to warn him of the impending probation from the Southern Association. Ex officio commission chair and Tulane President Rufus Harris assured Painter that the report had portrayed Rainey, Strickland, and Bullington in a negative light. In spite of probation, Painter believed the Southern Association's report stood to help him and Woodward as they led UT into a new era because the report highlighted the institution's many past mistakes and challenges. Speaking for the Regents, Woodward issued a statement on August 5, 1945. He accepted the Southern Association's criticisms of the pre-
November 1944 state of affairs at UT, but he resented the probation ruling since much had been done in the subsequent months to rectify the situation at the University.¹¹⁰

Students organized and published anonymous literature in support and in opposition to the Southern Association's decision in the summer of 1945. One group published "The Lite: A Menu for Realistic Thought" and denounced Rainey for his failure to lead the University. These students maintained that academic freedom had been protected throughout Rainey's tenure. Another organization issued the "Probation News" and deemed Rainey's dismissal as part of a conspiracy by the Regents to root out liberals.¹¹¹ The Common Sense Organization, a student group formed to help remove UT from the Southern Association's probation list, issued a harsh statement on September 10, 1945. Led by future legislator and lieutenant governor Ben Ramsey, Common Sense criticized Painter for hurting the institution with his prostrated stance before the Regents, as well as his racial intolerance, anti-Semitism, and excessive nationalism.¹¹²

**Faculty Response to Rainey Crisis**

The General Faculty unanimously adopted a resolution on November 23, 1944 in which they urged the Regents to move slowly in hiring a new president. They believed that the Regents should delay at least until the legislative investigation concluded and the new Regents had an opportunity to settle in and meet with the faculty and alumni.¹¹³ A few weeks later, the faculty appointed economics Professor Ruth Allen to chair the Committee of Eleven. This body was asked to conduct a survey of faculty opinion regarding Rainey's dismissal. Allen and her colleagues distributed 435 questionnaires and received 364 returns and 358 usable surveys. Respondents were asked to place a check mark next to the statements that most closely resembled their feelings regarding Rainey's departure:
I believe that certain Regents have seriously injured the University and the faculty should record its desire that they resign.

I believe that Dr. Rainey's reinstatement is absolutely essential to the welfare of the University and that the faculty should strive continuously by every proper means to achieve this end.

I support Dr. Rainey but feel that the faculty should take no further action at this time.

I feel that Dr. Rainey's reinstatement is not likely to be achieved and should not govern the formulation of future plans.

I believe Dr. Rainey's ideals are sound, but I question the wisdom of his reinstatement.

I am against Dr. Rainey and his reinstatement.

My view, not expressed by any of the above; is as follows:  

The faculty responded in the following manner: 66% agreed with #1, 64.5% with #2, 14.8% with #3, 19.6% with #4, 10.3% checked #5, and 4.7% identified with #6.

While Ronnie Dugger depicted the faculty as solidly behind Rainey, not everyone saw him as a hero. Possibly speaking for the majority of the faculty, historian Walter Webb noted that Rainey was neither a "superman" nor the "real Moses." The faculty banded together in support of Rainey as a response to the Regents' outrageous actions, not because Rainey was a great president.

Scholars and journalists have depicted Rainey as a pristine hero who fought a cadre of evil men. While there is no doubt that the Regents behaved badly, Rainey was not without blame for the public nature of his dismissal. Rainey showed no respect for the Regents when he chose submit his sixteen grievances to the UT faculty and the state media before sitting down with them. Rainey's method of conflict resolution was bound to get him fired, since he backed the already hostile Regents into a corner. J.R. Parten suggested that Rainey publicized his conflict with the Board as part of a strategy to launch his gubernatorial campaign. Even though Rainey did not run until 1946, he made his conflict with the Regents his primary campaign issue. He endorsed the various issues the Regents objected to: publicly funded social and educational programs, interracial cooperation, and higher taxes. He even went as far as to falsely accuse his
opponent and former UT Regent, Beauford Jester, of being a member of the Ku Klux Klan. In the end, Rainey left Texas with a tarnished image and a failed gubernatorial campaign.117

Events at Texas A&M

In contrast to UT, Texas politicos never accused A&M faculty and students of political radicalism or even engaging in moderate liberal politics. The all-male A&M required its students to participate in the Corps of Cadets and sent nearly 20,000 of its graduates to fight in all branches of the service during World War II. Twenty-nine of these men were generals. Dwight Eisenhower declared that six former students had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor and that the A&M culture was largely responsible for the men’s heroics.118

Even if faculty and students had engaged in subversive activity during these years, it would have been difficult to mobilize groups to participate in un-American activities since enrollment was extremely low. Fall enrollment stood at 6,679 in 1941 and dropped to 2,205 students by September 1943. By December 1944, the student body consisted of an enrollment of 1,893, with 1,025 of these men under the age of eighteen, 356 in the reserves. At the same time, A&M faculty had left in large numbers to assume positions in the military and wartime industries.119

The minutes from the A&M Directors’ meetings do not reveal any concern over specific faculty members and their political ideology or activities. The Directors did, however, adopt an amendment under the heading “Duties, Rights, and Privileges as a Citizen and as a Teacher” during their meeting on October 12, 1942. This position was almost verbatim the UT Regents’ academic freedom clause. The amendment stated that employees should refrain issuing extreme political statements and forbade public criticism of institutional policies.120 A&M lacked such a
policy prior the UT Regent’s discharge of the three economics instructors. It is possible that the Directors placed this borrowed statement on the books in an effort to avoid their own scandal with dissident faculty.

Evidence of the diehard patriotism of A&M faculty and students is exemplified in Walter Wagner's 1943 film *We’ve Never Been Licked*. Aggies embraced the Hollywood production, which was filmed on location in College Station, and appeared as extras throughout the picture. The movie tells the story of Brad Craig, an A&M cadet who rejects many of the College's traditions and refuses to conform. Craig fraternizes with two Japanese students and a Japanese gardener who steal an important, secret formula from a campus lab. Craig and the two students are run out of the Corps and flee to Japan. While working in Japan as a Tokyo Rose, Craig intercepts a conversation between American fighter pilots and recognizes the voice of Cyanide Jones, his Aggie roommate. Craig repents and radios Jones with the whereabouts of a Japanese fleet. The American troops shoot him down and the movie ends as his father accepts Craig’s Congressional Medal of Honor on the A&M campus. The motion picture confirms what had been explicitly understood by Aggies since 1876: conformity to military values and conservative politics was essential to success as a student at A&M.

The only notable accusation of subversive activities at A&M came from D.H. Reeves, publisher of *The Bryan News*, who wrote Governor O’Daniel in August 1940. Reeves was troubled because A&M students had employed "communist" tactics when they picketed three Bryan movie theaters that did not show first-run movies.

Despite the relative calm in College Station, J.R. Parten, Homer Rainey, and Robert Bobbitt accused members of the Texas A&M Board of Directors of committing similar violations of academic freedom and administrative authority. During the November 1944 Senate
investigation, Bobbitt alleged out that the Directors dismissed A&M President T.O. Walton from his position in August 1943 as part of a statewide plot. While it would be difficult to verify Bobbitt’s charge, it is a fact that there was a struggle between Walton and the Directors for control of A&M that materialized in 1940 when the Board narrowly voted to keep him in office. Texas Regular supporters Robert Briggs and Neth Leachman became Directors in 1936 and 1941 respectively, but neither behaved any differently than their fellow Board members. Available evidence does not suggest that the A&M and UT Boards were engaged in a conspiracy to purge the colleges of those they deemed subversive.\textsuperscript{123}

It is not clear why the Directors fired Walton. Henry Dethloff writes that the Directors were upset by the 1942 conclusions of an external review team that A&M was an obsolete institution. Embarrassed by the notion that A&M remained a "Model-T" in an age of Hydra-matic Oldsmobiles, the Directors scapegoated Walton.\textsuperscript{124} Additional evidence described in subsequent paragraphs point to a power struggle that emerged between Walton and the Directors following the review team's report.

At any rate, the A&M Board of Directors voted to fire Walton in August 1943, although they gave him the option to resign. Walton, who had served as president of the college since 1925, agreed to step down and accept the appointment of president emeritus. All was quiet on campus until November 1943 when Walton asked the Directors to provide him with official responsibilities in his emeritus position. The Board refused, then realized that it was illegal for them to pay Walton a salary without requiring work, and subsequently refused to compensate him. In March 1944, Walton went to the press and claimed that the Directors had abused their powers as trustees. Walton charged that the Directors had routinely refused to renew annual faculty contracts. On the issue of faculty dismissals, Walton contended that job security was
nonexistent at A&M, since the school did not grant tenure. Employees had to be re-elected each year and were denied opportunity for a hearing following dismissal. Walton also alleged that it was impossible for A&M to retain the best faculty members since they invariably left to obtain jobs in colleges that offered tenure. In addition, the Directors had micromanaged the institution and had failed to release the results of an external review in 1942. Members of this study committee recommended that the Board delegate more power to the president and administrators.  

Following Walton’s attacks, long-time Director Francis Marion Law, stated that the Board desired ‘an absolute divorce’ from Walton. The Board was not interested in purging the faculty, but emphasized that it would continue to discharge any individual when there was ‘just cause.’ It is extremely difficult to ascertain the motivations or learn about the events that occurred at A&M during this era because Walton did not donate his papers to the institution and nothing remains of his administration beyond newspapers clippings and a thin biographical folder. None of the Directors left papers at A&M and the records of their meetings reveal little beyond concise agendas. A letter exists that Neth Leachman wrote to Francis Marion Law and forwarded to Governor Stevenson that reveals some insight into the conflicts between the Board and the College. In this October 27, 1942 letter, Leachman recounted a number of conversations and letters between the Directors. The Board members agreed that the recent external review of the College had the potential to assist the institution in its planning. Any reports, however, should go directly to the Directors, who would then make a decision about what information to share with Walton and the faculty. Leachman did not want the faculty to have the opportunity to use any positive observations about the institution to promote or defend themselves. With the report in hand, Leachman was troubled by the introductory chapter which praised Walton’s
membership on the executive committee of the Association of Land Grant Colleges. The Board had asked Walton to resign from this position and Leachman was suspicious of this section’s inclusion in the report. In the second chapter of the report, entitled “Organization and Control,” the study group stated that the Directors' policies and procedures were excessive and leaned towards micromanagement. Leachman was puzzled by this claim since the Directors possessed an eighteen-page statement of rules and regulations while the University of Texas used 134 pages worth of guidelines. The survey committee criticized the absence of tenure. Leachman responded that tenure was unnecessary at A&M since no one had been fired in at least twenty years. Furthermore, if someone needed to be fired, it would be the Board’s responsibility and not the job of a faculty committee to carry out this function.\textsuperscript{127}

While there were no recorded student protests following Walton's dismissal, the Association of Former Students implored Governor Stevenson to appoint a special committee to investigate the state of administrative leadership at the College that had been "needlessly harmed" by the conflicts between Walton and the Directors. Stevenson appointed a Senate investigating committee, although the Senate published no report. The investigation seemed to yield nothing, however, A&M would encounter additional upheaval after the war that would result in a significant investigation.\textsuperscript{128}

\textbf{Effect on the State's Institutions of Higher Education}

The most dramatic attacks on governance and academic freedom occurred at the University of Texas between 1938 and 1945. The actions initiated by the Regents were rooted in anti-New Deal, anti-communist, and racist beliefs. Though more subtle, the A&M Directors held similar beliefs to the UT Regents concerning the rules of administration and governance.
An analysis of other institutions, such as Texas Tech and the system of state teachers' colleges, might reveal a more cohesive strategy employed by O'Daniel, Stevenson, and other Texas Regulars to purge and control the colleges. In the absence of these possible findings, however, the cases at UT and A&M still provide alarming examples of the extent to which politicians can manipulate both broad policy and/or the minute operations of an institution.

Notes
1 UTBOR Minutes, January 26, 1945, 29, quote from Dudley Woodward.
5 V.O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, 255.
6 Green, 16.
7 Texas held two state conventions during election years. The first occurred in May to select delegates for the national convention and to appoint presidential electors. The second convention occurred in September during which officials announced the results from the primaries and adopted a platform. In 1944, delegates who opposed Roosevelt gained control of the May proceedings and pledged to vote against the Democratic nominees. A third of the convention marched out of the convention and named a new set of delegates to the national convention. By September, Roosevelt supporters regained control of the state party and named a pro-Roosevelt slate. Those in opposition named themselves the Regulars, as in those who still stood for the traditional Democratic values and appeared on the ballot as their own party. These events are described in a number of sources including Green, *The Establishment*, 45-57.
8 Green, 79.
10 *Austin American*, October 6, 1944.
11 Green, 57.
13 *Texas Senate Journal*, Regular sess., Forty-seventh Legislature (1941): SB 38 (loyalty oath for educators), 69, 124, 126, 131, 489,496, 2464-2465, 2481, 2500 and Senate Resolution 7 (establish little HUAC for Senate), 45-46, 163; Appropriations clause from *Subsection 17, Special Laws of the State of Texas, Forty-sixth Legislature* (1939), 448-449: “in order that the American people may be fully protected from all sources alien and un-American propaganda to the end that the American way of life shall be preserved and that war shall never again take the sons of American mothers overseas to alien soil and into a holocaust brewed of the hates of the nations; and to this end in order that the youth of America may be protected against unscrupulous or unwise and un-American doctrines and principles, it is hereby further provided that any member of any faculty of any State-supported institution who shall advocate, subscribe to or believe in Communism, or in any form of totalitarian state doctrine, that is, that the individual citizen exists for the benefit and glory of the state, which is the opposite and antithesis of the American ideal and theory that all governments should exist for the benefit and glory of the citizens thereof, shall be discharged from such faculty when found guilty of advocating or encouraging such theories of government by the governing board of such institution.” The Texas A&M Board of Directors printed this section in its entirety in its meeting minutes on April 30, 1940 and pledged to carry out their responsibility in controlling such teaching in their college, AMBOD Minutes, April 30, 1940, 4.
16 ibid., 2876-2889, Rainey's quote on 2877.
25 Smith Act as quoted in Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 6; Brinkley, End of Reform, 141.
26 William Gellermann, Martin Dies (New York: Da Capo Press, 1944) 116-119; Brinkley, End of Reform, 141.
27 Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, 76-83.
29 Dallas Morning News, July 31, 1941 August 4, 14.
30 Dallas Morning News, January 17, 1941.
31 Seth McKay, W. Lee O'Daniel and Texas Politics, 1938-1942 (Lubbock: Texas Technological College, 1944).
32 Carleton, 186-210.
33 Coffman quote in Carleton, 195; statements regarding Regents' concerns about Rainey on 195, 210.
36 University of Texas Board of Regents (hereafter cited as UTBOR) Minutes, February 4, 1939, 79.
37 Carleton, 219-220, 223.
38 UTBOR Minutes, July 29, 1939, 277 -- 279, 288 -- 289, 314 -- 317. The Division of Research contained the following: University of Research Institute ($25,000), Bureau of Municipal Research ($8,000), Bureau of Research in the Social Sciences ($17,550), Research in Zoology ($5,000), Research in Anthropology ($6,000), Research in Chemistry ($7,400), Bureau of Business Research ($33,850), Bureau of Economic Geology ($49,890), Bureau of Engineering Research ($14,977), and Bureau of Industrial Chemistry ($40,200); Carleton, 220.
40 Carleton, 223-224, Lawrence quoted on 224.
41 Carleton, 224.
42 Carleton, 224-225, quote from 225.
43 Homer P. Rainey, "The State and Public Education" in The State and Public Education, Inaugural Address of Homer P. Rainey as President of the University of Texas and the Papers and Discussion Presented at the Educational Conference, December 7-9, 1939, edited by Arthur Brandon (Austin: University of Texas, May 22, 1940), quote on 8.
44 ibid., quote 12.
45 ibid., 15.
46 Carleton, 226, UTBOR Minutes, June 15, 1940, 174.
47 UTBOR Minutes, October 7,8,9, 1939, 388-389; January 13, 1940, 445-453.
49 ibid., April 10, 1940, 49-50; November 25, 1940, 318.
51 Green, 29.
52 "The University of Texas Controversy," pamphlet from J.R. Parten’s statement to the Texas Senate Educational Committee, November, 28, 1944; "The Tragedy at the University of Texas, a statement before the Senate Investigating Committee," November 27, 1944, by Robert Lee Bobbitt, Alexander C. Ellis Papers, UTCAH, Box 2P45, Rainey Crisis-General folder. Bobbitt was the former state attorney general, former speaker of the Texas House, and then vice president of the UT Ex-Students Association.
53 UTBOR Minutes, May 31, 1940, 71-72.
55 UTBOR Minutes, July, 26, 1941, 18-19, quote on 18.
56 ibid., September 29-30, 1941, 88-90.
57 ibid., October 25, 1941, 112-117.
58 ibid., November 22, 1941, 123 -- 128
59 ibid., February, 28, 1942, 197.
60 ibid., 198-199.
61 ibid., March 11, 1942, 224-225.
63 ibid., August 8, 1942, 491 -- 492; September 25, 1942, 29.
64 Forty Acres was the amount of land originally designated as the University of Texas.
65 Rainey, Tower, 48- 49.
66 A fourth individual, Valdemar Carleson, a visiting lecturer on leave from Antioch, joined the UT economists.
67 The National Labor Relations Act, also known as the Wagner Act established the National Labor Relations Board and established workers’ right to collective bargaining. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 provided a national minimum wage and provided for over-time pay.
68 Texas had never been a place that was terribly receptive to labor unions. The American Federation (AFL) was certainly more palatable than its more radical counterpart, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). In 1941, the legislature passed an anti-union law that had been introduced by Governor O’Daniel. The O’Daniel law criminalized any use of force designed to prevent anyone from working and outlawed labor gatherings in the physical vicinity of any labor dispute. There were additional anti-labor rumblings, especially from the Texas State Manufactures Association, who accused the CIO of pledging its allegiance to the Soviet Union 1941 – described more fully in Green, 31-32.
69 Dallas Morning News, March 17, 1942.
70 Green, 61-62. O’Daniel supported the Christian Americans, Vance Muse’s anti-labor organization that had published a number of advertisements in the Dallas Morning News in which the group criticized unions for stifling war production with repeated strikes.
71 Rainey, Tower, 42-43.
72 George Green, Ronnie Dugger, and Homer Rainey each note that D.F. Strickland called for the dismissal of four economics professors during the January 1942 Regents' meeting. Rainey made this claim in his 1971 memoir and in a subsequent interview with Dugger. When Rainey asked him why, Strickland allegedly replied that the Regents did not approve of what these men were teaching. This story is impossible because Strickland was not even appointed until June 1942. Strickland initiated a discussion on regulations regarding faculty dismissal in January 1943, and it is possible that Rainey confused his facts over the almost thirty years between the events and the publication of his book. It is also possible that Rainey confused January and June. Carleton notes that Strickland passed Rainey a note during the June 1942 meeting calling for the elimination of four economics instructors. See Green, 84; Rainey, Tower, 7-8; Dugger, Our Invaded Universities, 42-43; Carleton, A Breed So Rare, 301..
73 James L. Nelson to Stevenson, July 20, 1942, July 7, 1942 resolution by Democratic Club of Tarrant County attached; Resolution by the Austin League of Women Voters, June 14, 1942, addressed to UT Regents and Rainey;
Mrs. Alfred Taylor to Stevenson (no date); Stevenson's reply to Taylor, July 14, 1942, Coke Stevenson Papers, TSLAC, Box 4/14-131, UT folder.

72 UTBOR, Minutes September, 25, 1942, 34-35.
73 H. Bailey Carroll to Roy Bedichek, February 13, 1943, Roy Bedichek Papers, Box 3Q28, Webb Correspondence folder.
74 UTBOR Minutes, January 30, 1943, 143; March 27, 1943, 216-217.
75 ibid., June 25, 1943, 288.
77 T. Whitfield Davidson to John H. Bickett, September 13, 1943, Stevenson Papers, Box 4/14-147.
79 Orville Bullington to John Lomax, April 24, 1944, John A. Lomax Papers, UTCAH, Box 3D154, Correspondence with Bullington folder; UT Regents' Minutes, October 1, 1943, 449.
80 Orville Bullington to John Lomax, April 24, 1944, John A. Lomax Papers, UTCAH, Box 3D154, Correspondence with Bullington folder; UT Regents' Minutes, October 1, 1943, 449.
81 Rainey, Tower, 43; Green, 86-87; Dugger, 44-47; Addendum to the General Faculty Minutes, April 1, 1946, Report of the Faculty Council, Ruth A. Allen Papers, UTCAH, Box 3G205, General Faculty Minutes folder, 1944 – 1946, 3396-4019.
82 UTBOR Minutes, June 27, 1942, 345, 357-359. Postponed projects are as follows: (1) Project # 66, first approved by the Regents on July 26, 1941, C.A. Timm of government department, for continuation of a social history project on the drainage basin of the Rio Grande (already funded, in part, by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); (2) Project #73, first approved by the Regents on November 22, 1941, Mody Boatahirt and Harry Ransom of English department, for continuation of a study of the impact of oil upon the folk culture of Texas; (3) #95, C.W. Reimuth of classics department, for preparation of a dictionary of technical terms derived from Greek and used in specialized fields of science.
83 UTBOR Minutes, June 27, 1942, 345, 357-359. The Regents' objections to these programs pose more questions than answers, as there is no unifying theme in these proposals: (1) Project # 92, submitted by D.L. Clark of the English department, to prepare a biography on the life of eighteenth century horror novelist Charles Brockton Brown; (2) Project #3, submitted by C.M. Rosenquist of the sociology department, supplemental funds to produce the next issue of a faculty journal entitled Southwestern Social Science Quarterly; (3) Project #40, submitted by G.W. Stumberg of the law school, to extend a project first approved by the Regents in August 1940 on the phases of criminal law or criminal proceedings which may be in need of reform; (4) Project #65, submitted by Charles McCormick, dean of the law school, to continue a program first approved by the Regents in July 1941, to produce additional issues of the Texas Law Review, so as to increase publication opportunities for law school faculty; (5) Project # 72, submitted by Robert Slayton of the law school, to extended a program first approved by the Regents in October 1941, to assess the Texas market for legal services; (6) Project #79, submitted by H.E. Moore of sociology, to continue a project first approved by the Regents in February 1942, to study war booms in three Texas towns; and (7) Project #93, submitted by J.H. Frederick of business administration school, to study the origins and current status of air transportation in Latin America.
84 Rainey, Tower, 47-48; Postponed projects #73 (see UTBOR Minutes October 23, 1942, 552-556) and #95 were later approved, as were rejected projects #72 and #92 renumbered #110 (see UTBOD Minutes October 1,2, 1943, 449, 457, 471-478).
85 "Communist murders" Orville Bullington's term. See Bullington's statement printed in UT General Faculty Meeting Minutes, November 14, 1944, 2851; Rainey, Tower, 48; Guenther, 856.
86 Dallas Morning News, October 10, 1944, Austin American, October 14, 1944.
88 Rainey, Tower, 47-48; Postponed projects #73 (see UTBOR Minutes October 23, 1942, 552-556) and #95 were later approved, as were rejected projects #72 and #92 renumbered #110 (see UTBOD Minutes October 1,2, 1943, 449, 457, 471-478).
89 Quote from Cox, 94-95, statement can be found in Rainey's testimony before the Senate Investigating Committee, Senate Proceedings, I, p. 114.
90 Cox, 92-98; Carleton, 306-307.
91 While W. Lee O’Daniel was flamboyant, John Gunther describes Coke Stevenson as a “cool customer” who avoided conflict and worked towards compromise. Stevenson could slither through any hole or wedge through any crack to escape controversy. (Gunther, Inside U.S.A., quote on 840) When possible, Stevenson would allow divisive bills to pass without his signature such as in 1943 when he abstained from signing the Manford bill that placed a set of strict regulations on labor unions. (Green, The Establishment, 81).
92 Quote appears on page 87 of Green's The Establishment, from a letter from Stevenson to Regent K.H. Aynesworth, March 23, 1943, full citation found on page 255, note 22.

Dallas Morning News, January 26, 1941, 12-1.


Orville Bullington's "Reasons for Vote," printed on pages 2848-2858 in the minutes of the UT General Faculty, November 14, 1944, Ruth Allen Papers, UTCAH, Box 3D154, General Faculty Minutes folder, 1944-1946.

Bullington, "Reasons for Vote," 2848-2858

ibid., in addition, Bullington’s opinions about The Big Money are revealed in a series of letters he wrote to his friend and folklorist John Lomax dated 12/17/42 and 1/25/43, in John A. Lomax Papers, UTCAH, Box 3D154, Correspondence with Orville Bullington folder.


Bullington, "Reasons for Vote," 2848-2858.

According to Rainey, the Regents interviewed this man after he had been arrested for engaging in homosexual activity. After two hours of questioning, Bullington and Regent Bickett concluded that the man was not a homosexual and innocent of the charges. Two weeks later, the man confessed before a grand jury in Austin. Rainey, Tower, 91.

An Educational Crisis: A Summary of Testimony Before a Senate Committee Investigating the University of Texas Controversy, November 15-28, 1944, Strickland quote on 2; Bullington to Lomax, September 2, 1945, John Lomax Papers, UTCAH, Box 3D154, Correspondence with Bullington folder.

UTBOR Minutes, January 25 -26, 1945, 31-34.

ibid., 43-46.

ibid., February 16, 1945, 107-108.

UTBOR Minutes, September 28, 1945, 404-405, Southern Association representatives: President Herman L. Donavan, University of Kentucky (chair), Dean M.C. Huntley, University of Alabama, President Theodore H. Jack, Randolph Macon Woman's College, Dean W.W. Pierson, University of North Carolina, President Rufus C. Harris, Tulane (ex officio, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Commission of Colleges and Secondary Schools).

ibid., 405.

ibid., 406.

ibid., 407-408.

Painter to Woodward, Dudley Woodward Papers, UTCAH, Box 2Q125, UT Southern Association folder.

UTBOR Minutes, August 5, 1949, 408-409.


"Resolution Adopted by Members of Common Sense Organization, Monday, September 10, 1945, Theophilus Painter Papers, UTCAH, Box 2.325/M88C, Speeches 1944 folder.

General Faculty Minutes, 11/23/44, Ruth Allen Papers, UTCAH, Box 3G205, General Faculty Meeting Minutes, 1944-1946.

Committee of Eleven Questionnaire, Ruth Allen Papers, UTCAH, Box 3G205, Committee of Eleven December 14, 1944 folder.

"Complete Report on Poll of Faculty Opinion," Ruth Allen Papers, UTCAH, Box 3G205, Committee of Eleven December 14, 1944 folder.

Walter Webb to Roy Bedichek, March 13, 1945, Roy Bedichek Papers, UTCAH, Box 3Q28, Webb Correspondence folder.

Carleton, 305; Cox, 135-136; Green, 96.

Henry Dethloff, A Centennial History of Texas A&M University, 450.

Dethloff, 459-460.

AMBOD Minutes, October 10, 1942.

We’ve Never Been Licked, directed by John Rawlins (Universal Studios, 1942); The Battalion, July 28 &30, December 3,5,12, 1942, January 4, 1943.

Letter from D.H. Reeves to W. Lee O’Daniel, August 17, 1940, W. Lee O’Daniel Papers, TSLAC, Box 2001/138-143, Texas A&M General Correspondence, 1940-41. Reeves stated that the Board of Directors should have disciplined the students just as Roosevelt should have put a stop to sit-down strikes.

"An Educational Crisis…A Summary of Testimony Before a Senate Committee Investigating the University of Texas Controversy, November 15-28, 1944,The Tragedy at the University of Texas, a statement before the Senate
Investigating Committee,” November 27, 1944, by Robert Lee Bobbitt, Alexander C. Ellis Papers, UTCAH, Box 2P45, Rainey-General folder; Dethloff, 478.

124 Dethloff, 478.

125 Bryan Daily Eagle, April 7, 1944, 1 and 4. Walton was not alone in his anger. A number of women who worked for the Texas Home Demonstration Association (THDA), part of the A&M Extension Service, sent letters to Governor Stevenson and requested that he remove the Directors from office. The Directors had eliminated several positions in the THDA without cause and these women believed that the Board was a collection of uninformed and power hungry businessmen who knew nothing about agriculture. See the series of letters in Coke Stevenson Papers, TSLAC, Box 4/14/147, A&M 1944 folder.

126 Bryan News, March 11, 1944 (page number unknown); Houston Post, 3/12/44, 11.

127 Letter from Neth L. Leachman to F.M. Law, 10/27/42, Coke Stevenson Papers, TSLAC, Box 4/14/152, A&M College folder.

128 Letter from E.E. McQuillen, Executive Secretary of the Association of Former Students to Coke Stevenson, 4/6/44, Coke Stevenson Papers, TSLAC, Box 4/14-147, A&M 1944 folder.
Chapter Eight
Federally Sponsored War Research and Training, 1940 -- 1945

After reading the preceding chapter, one might conclude that during World War II, the Rainey scandal dominated UT and A&M resembled a ghost town with many of its students engaged in active military duty. Despite these impressions, the institutions also focused on the war effort. How did UT and A&M participate in war activities compared to the nation's top research universities?

American Research Universities and the War

Prior to 1940, private foundations and corporations funded the overwhelming majority of organized research that was conducted by the sixteen leading institutions profiled by Geiger in To Advance Knowledge. World War II heralded the federal government's emergence as the largest financier of university research. The federal government drafted university scientists into the various military branches during World War I. Even accounting for the nation's late entry into the war, the contributions made by academic scientists between 1917 and 1919 were modest.

As America faced the inevitability of its participation in the Second World War, academic scientists and government leaders contemplated the best strategy for defeating the Axis. Vannevar Bush, eminent scientist and director of the Carnegie Institution of Washington (CIW), and a number of his like-minded colleagues such as James Bryant Conant and Karl Compton, Presidents of Harvard and MIT respectively, discussed ways to organize the scientific community in a manner that would serve the nation without succumbing to the damaging control
of the federal government. Bush's answer to the dilemma was the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC). The NDRC would coordinate federally sponsored scientific research, particularly the Manhattan Project, and serve as liaison between the military and civilian science. The nation's leading physicists could conduct nuclear research that was not feasible for technicians in the War and Navy Departments who were committed to improving existing weaponry. In addition to the atomic bomb, fruits of the wartime research effort included such innovations as radar and penicillin.¹

FDR approved of Bush's plan and established the NDRC in June 1940 with Bush as its director. Within the first six months, the NDRC awarded 132 research contracts to thirty-two universities and nineteen corporations. James Conant assumed responsibility for the NDRC and Bush became director of the newly formed Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) in June 1941. The OSRD reported directly to Roosevelt and made recommendations based on advice from the NDRC. By 1942, FDR placed the Manhattan Project under Bush's direction.²

Early nuclear research teams were located at Berkeley, Columbia, the University of Chicago, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Harvard, and Cornell before the atomic effort was moved to Los Alamos, New Mexico in 1943. At the same time, MIT housed the Radiation Laboratory where scientists from a number of universities and industry developed practical uses for radar. MIT housed the Rad Lab, but the institution was minimally involved in its operation. Johns Hopkins hosted the Applied Physics Laboratory where researchers developed the proximity fuse to increase weapon effectiveness. Caltech concentrated on jet engines and rockets. A number of smaller projects were housed at universities across the nation.³
War Research in Texas

A number of faculty members from UT and A&M left their home campuses in 1942 to join large war research projects. Charles Boner, left the UT physics department to work on acoustics at the Kruft Laboratory at Harvard. The Directors granted paid leave to F.E. Gieseke to conduct research on heat and ventilation at the University of Illinois on the condition that he shared his results with the A&M Engineering Experiment Station.4

The NDRC selected UT as a site to develop a tester for flight fire-control systems. Malcolm Y. Colby, chair of the physics department, then hired Lucien LaCoste to direct the War Research Laboratory. Then part of the Rad Lab at MIT, LaCoste had previously served as a physics professor at UT. The small team included Colby, S. Leroy Brown, and Arthur Lockenvitz on a part-time basis and LaCoste and Arthur Romberg as the only full-time staff. With a grant in excess of $1 million, the team designed the "Texas Target," a device to improve a gunner's ability to identify his target. Once LaCoste and his colleagues completed their design in October 1944, it was used in combat by B-29s.5

While the weapons projects were largely centralized at a few locations, medical research was largely decentralized. Even so, the usual suspects possessed the most grants for medical research.6

Table 8-1, Federal Grants Awarded to Universities for Medical Research, Largest Number of Grants, 1942-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johns Hopkins</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Pennsylvania</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Chicago</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornell</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern, University of Rochester</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford, New York University</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even the top Southern performers received significantly fewer military medical grants as noted in Table 8-2:

Table 8-2, Federal Grants Awarded to Southern Universities for Medical Research, 1942-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanderbilt, Duke</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulane, University of Tennessee</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Virginia, University of Texas</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emory</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of North Carolina, University of Georgia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Kentucky</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Fightin' Texas Aggies"

A&M faculty who remained on campus conducted small projects such as the construction of a wind tunnel for the Governor's Texas Defense and Development Program in the summer of 1943. Robert Karper improved the production of grain sorghum into starch that was sorely needed to meet food demands. A&M's greatest contribution was not in research, but in its graduates who led Allied forces and the men who came to A&M to participate in the various officer training programs between 1942 and 1945. Nearly 20,000 former students served in the military and twenty-nine of these men were generals. With more Aggies than West Point graduates fighting in World War II, George Patton declared, "Give me an army of West Point graduates, and I'll win a battle; give me a handful of Texas Aggies, and I'll win a war." General Earl Rudder, later president of A&M from 1959-1970 led the Second Ranger Battalion at the Battle of Normandy. Rudder insisted on leading his assault forces in, as opposed to following them in battle, and may have been the first American soldier to step ashore at Pointe du Hoc the morning of June 6, 1944.7

In addition to the countless acts of heroism demonstrated by Aggies in the European and Pacific theaters, A&M trained 2,050 airmen, 23,604 Army, 13,364 Navy midshipmen and
Marines in radar and radio operation through short-courses. Roughly 4,000 individuals went through preflight training for the Air Corps, 4,105 participated in Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) and 400-600 enrolled in the Navy's V-12 program. Each of these programs had a different emphasis. The Army Air Forces College Training Program put trainees through twenty-one weeks of study, some of it remedial. The ASTP was highly structured and put men through a sequence of engineering and math courses taught by A&M faculty and military drill. This program was supposed to prepare soldiers to assume commissions, but few of these men actually became officers before the Army terminated the program in March 1944. UT participated in the Navy's V-12 program along with A&M. As the Navy's tool to recruit educated officer, the V-12 program allowed students to remain in their chosen major while taking additional courses in physics, engineering, and math, as well as five hours of history, English, and foreign languages. The military culture was nothing new at A&M, but these trainees were generally not at A&M to take part in student activities. With most students away fighting, especially after the draft age was lowered to eighteen in 1942, these federally financed programs allowed A&M to remain in operation for the duration of the war.

While neither produced a Nobel laureate or sent a man to Los Alamos, UT and A&M made substantial contributions to the war effort. World War II, in turn, changed the relationship between the federal government and American colleges. Land-grant colleges had long received funds for vocational education and experiment station research, but this support was largely automatic. Institutions competed for war research projects and military training programs. As will be discussed in Chapter Eleven, federal sponsorship of research would continue to increase over the next twenty-five years. Aspiring research universities such as UT and A&M would join
the sixteen established research universities in a competition for federal research funds. This new national emphasis on research as well as graduate education pushed Southern universities, including UT and A&M, to take a hard look at themselves and how they ranked nationally. According to Clarence Mohr federal involvement during the war fostered "qualitative improvement in Southern higher learning." These improvements would not only include stronger graduate and research programs, but also an end to Southern isolationism and the gradual demise of racial segregation. The beginnings of this process are discussed in the next chapter.

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Notes

1 Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge, 3-6.
2 ibid., 6.
3 ibid., 6-11.
4 UTBORB Minutes, January 24, 1942, 174; AMBOD Minutes, October 10, 1942, 1.
5 James Phinney Baxter, Scientists Against Time (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947), 217; Allen Hutton, "War Research Laboratory," Discovery: Research and Scholarship at the University of Texas at Austin, 7 (3): 69 -- 73.
6 E.C. Andrus (ed.) Advances in Military Medicine, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948).
7 AMBOD Minutes, August 7-8, 1943, 1; Dethloff, 460-461, 465-466.
Chapter Nine

Revolt and Progress, 1946 -- 1950

Turmoil continued to plague UT and A&M during the second half of the 1940s. A&M's new president, Gibb Gilchrist, responded to student unrest from Corps members and veterans that stemmed from clashes between those who wanted A&M to remain a tradition-steeped military academy and those who wanted it to become a modern comprehensive university. Theophilus Painter found his name on the Supreme Court case that represented UT's opposition to desegregation. *Sweatt v. Painter* signaled an end to "separate but equal education" for African Americans at the graduate and professional level and foreshadowed the Court's wider ruling in *Brown* in 1954. The two schools also found themselves in a battle against Texas Tech and its West Texas supporters when the two beneficiaries of the PUF led a statewide building campaign. The college building amendment gave UT and A&M access to PUF funds and created what Tech considered to be an inferior source, the former Confederate Pension Fund, for the remainder of institutions. These three events posed serious questions: (1) Could A&M, the state's land-grant institution, compete with the nation's best land-grant colleges and retain its traditions? (2) Was Texas obligated to provide its Black citizens with graduate and professional education when such could be obtained out-of-state or eventually at segregated State and private colleges? (3) Did UT and A&M possess an exclusive right to the PUF? Excepting the second question, the answers were unclear.

Beyond these crises, all of the Texas colleges received good news, as well. In 1947, the Legislature approved institutions to submit their entire budgets in lump sum form, thereby freeing Boards and administrators from excessive micromanagement and the whims of blue-penciled politicians. Governor Jester introduced the measure during his first address to the
Legislature. As a former UT Regent (1929-1935), Jester certainly understood the limits that the line-item budget process had placed on the governing boards. Jester proclaimed that colleges needed a lump sum budget procedure "in order that their boards and administrators may spend the funds to the best advantage." At the same time, Boards would be required to submit itemized budgets to the state auditor within seventy-five days of the end of the fiscal year. After three decades of resistance, the Legislature approved the lump sum budget procedure with little argument during the regular session.  

While this was a good step towards eliminating Legislative interference, Texas had a long way to go. Budgetary control alone could not bring UT and A&M into a new era of excellence.

"Prostituted to the Accomplishment of Evil": Student Protests at A&M

Tens of thousands of World War II veterans arrived on the nation's campuses to take advantage of the G.I. Bill. Five thousand seven hundred seventy-one male and eighty-eight female veterans constituted 47.7% of the 12,282-member UT student body in the spring of 1946. Most of these students were freshman or sophomores and many chose to major in geology, history, romance languages, speech, and physics, where enrollment doubled. The Standing Committee of the General Faculty responded by studying the problem of planning for more students and managing class size.  

While UT required additional classrooms and residence halls, veterans who chose to attend A&M threatened the foundation of Aggie culture.  

A&M came closest to a crisis comparable to the Rainey affair during the immediate postwar years. Hazing allegations, a legislative investigation, and clashes between alumni, students, President Gilchrist, and the Bryan/College Station community were the result of "pride, tradition, an outstanding war record, and a false sense of security." The trouble began after the
war when the Corps of Cadets took many of the College's established, but less formal, customs such as yell practice and bonfire and converted them into sacred rituals. Students dubbed anyone who challenged these activities a villain who threatened the very mission of A&M. Many cadets cited outstanding alumni performances during World War II to justify their new commitment to tradition and militarism. According to Dethloff, Aggie students and alumni would grow increasingly resistant to any type of change at the College over the next two decades. Gilchrist boldly introduced the first changes and ignited a dramatic controversy.\textsuperscript{4}

The Directors appointed Gibb Gilchrist to replace T.O. Walton in May 1944. Gilchrist possessed a bachelor of science in civil engineering from UT but never pursued an advanced degree. Even so, the former dean of engineering initiated a number of plans to improve the College's standing as a land-grant and research institution. Gilchrist created the Texas A&M Research Foundation (discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eleven) and attempted to eliminate student hazing almost immediately after he took office. In addition, Gilchrist wanted A&M to reaffirm its land-grant mission by making agriculture and engineering the top disciplinary priorities. A&M was obligated to serve Texas by educating undergraduates and training working farmers and engineers to meet the needs of the State. The A&M Directors supported Gilchrist's initiatives.\textsuperscript{5}

Enrollment stood at roughly 2,000 in 1944 - 1945 and increased to 2,718 in January 1946. By September 1946, A&M was confronted with 8,200 students -- roughly 5,200 were married veterans. The College had to feed, house, and teach students on a campus that had never accommodated more than 5,000 students. Many of these veterans had no interest in donning the Corps uniform and certainly were not at the College to build bonfire, enjoy football games, or engage in undergraduate pranks that some might define as hazing.\textsuperscript{6}
Gilchrist and the A&M Directors responded to the changing student body by altering long-existent rules regarding student conduct. Veterans who had served at least one year in the armed services and all students over the age of twenty-one were exempt from service in the Corps of Cadets. Upperclassmen were prohibited from commandeering first-year students to perform chores, complete drills, and submit to physical abuse. Corps Commandant Colonel Guy Meloy distributed the new regulations to outraged cadets on January 21, 1947. Many cadets responded to Meloy by tearing their copies of the regulations in half. The next evening, all 2,100 cadets marched to Gilchrist's home and threatened to resign from their posts if the new regulations remained in effect. Expecting Gilchrist to cave in, the cadets were shocked when he responded, 'I accept [your resignations] with regret.'

A few days later, the cadets approached the State press with a list of eleven recommendations, although they essentially identified two primary conflicts. They called for the reinstatement of upperclassmen control over minor discipline cases and freshman activities (which essentially meant the previously mentioned chores and drills). The Corps members subsequently called for Gilchrist's dismissal. In spite of these demands, 143 cadet officers requested reinstatement by February 1. Gilchrist appeared undisturbed. In fact, he and the Directors received correspondence from across the state in support of their efforts to eliminate hazing.

Corpsmen continued to express their dissatisfaction with Gilchrist. The Class of 1948, for example, distributed an open letter on March 12, 1947. They disputed the claim made by administrators that the mass resignation was in response to the new regulations regarding hazing. These cadets argued that A&M had lost its strong academic and military reputation under Gilchrist's leadership. While Gilchrist had credited hazing as the reason that 48% of A&M
freshmen had left A&M, he failed to mention that many of these young men were failing academically or that they had to attend class with as many as 200 other students in courses taught by underpaid student instructors. The Class of 1948 described A&M as a secretive place where students and faculty were not permitted to speak their minds and stood the risk of dismissal for challenging Gilchrist and other leaders. Gilchrist's troubles were only beginning. By March, the Veterans' Student Association (VSA) joined the cadets in their call for Gilchrist's head. In contrast to the cadets, the VSA criticized Gilchrist for his failure to improve state appropriations and bolster academic programs.9

Alumni and citizens expressed varied opinions. Former student Dury Helm believed that the conflict stemmed from a clash in military training philosophies. A&M needed to resolve lingering differences on campus over the regimented Prussian style of West Point versus the more democratic orientation that A&M had adopted over time. UT Regent W. Scott Schreiner claimed that the A&M demonstrations were the "Raineyites" method for regaining power. The Port Arthur A&M Mother's Club placed blame with Gilchrist for his lack of leadership and possible communist sympathies. The Mothers believed that Gilchrist's inability to lead had forced senior cadets to assume responsibility for discipline, a role they were not prepared to take. An unidentified newspaper article quoted Gilchrist's claim that almost half of Aggie freshmen had dropped out due to the hazing they experienced at the institution. Former student Jack Yardley disputed this point in a letter to Lt. Governor Shivers and stated that most freshmen left due to legitimate personal deficiencies. The A&M Club of Van Zandt County issued a statement that the administration initiated the hazing investigation to divert attention away from the College's other deficiencies. Finally, Harvey Bayne, A&M Class of 1911 and Houston County official, expressed his concerns over the treatment of both cadets and veteran students by the
administration. According to Bayne, Colonel Meloy had unjustly declared that the senior class was a pack of communists. As for the VSA's claims, "5700 veterans cannot be wrong." Bayne called for Gilchrist's resignation and determined the hazing allegations to be nothing more than a "smoke screen" created by the administration.\textsuperscript{10}

A number of organizations, including chapters of the A&M alumni association called for a thorough, unbiased investigation of events at the College. In response, the Legislature formed a joint committee to determine the nature of the conflict and whether A&M students and administrators had violated any State laws or policies. Co-chairmen Fred R. Harris and Claude H. Gilmer were joined by Dorsey Hardeman, Ben Ramsey, Walter Tynan, Cecil Storey, and Jack Cox. Following 44 hours and 1500 pages of testimony, the Committee submitted their findings to House Speaker W.O. Reed and Lt. Governor Shivers on June 6, 1947.\textsuperscript{11}

The investigating committee believed that the conflict was primarily the result of postwar transition. A&M had yet to resettle into peacetime functioning and Gilchrist and his staff were partially to blame for the crisis because they failed to "command the full respect" of the Corps and VSA students. While there was no excuse for the "extremely cruel and inhuman" brand of hazing that had emerged on the campus in the past few years, students were justified in their complaint that the administration had usurped some of the autonomy that they were entitled to as responsible members of the College. In addition, the legislative committee found corruption outside of the College in the form of former President T.O. Walton, Bryan banker Travis Bryan, and Big Spring businessman Delbert V. Schultz. These men had "materially contributed to the present student uprising by fomenting, counseling, advising, and financing unrest and discontent among the student body." The Committee reminded the students and administrators that A&M belonged to the citizens of Texas -- not the Corps or any other disgruntled special interest group.
Roughly 75 students had left A&M in recent days, some with injuries, due to hazing episodes. This hazing and chaos could permanently mar A&M's military and academic reputations.

Legislators concluded that many of the VSA claims against the administration were groundless. The VSA accused the A&M administration of mismanaging funds, claiming that the Directors had allegedly purchased land at $78 per acre when $60 per acre land was available. A&M possessed a $100,000 wind tunnel that was still not operational. Gilchrist refused the federal government's donation of the Bryan Army Air Field for use by the Aeronautical Engineering Department. The VSA cited a number of other examples, but the Committee disputed each of these claims. In addition, VSA leaders claimed that the College had compromised its academic standards in recent years. The American Chemistry Society dropped A&M from its list of approved institutions in December 1946, but the legislators believed that the College was working to regain its accreditation. Contrary to student accusations, the vet school had not lost its accreditation with the American Veterinary Association. The Committee recommended that the College expand the clinical facilities at the vet school to accommodate increasing enrollment.

As for Gilchrist, the Committee believed that he was overwhelmed with the unreasonable responsibility of overseeing the five branches of the A&M system. To this end, the Committee recommended that Gilchrist be relieved of his responsibilities for the system so that he could concentrate on the College Station campus exclusively. The Directors would then hire a Chancellor to oversee the administrative aspects of A&M College Station, John Tarleton College, Prairie View, North Texas Junior Agricultural College, and the extension service. Each campus president would retain control over educational matters. The Directors heeded this
recommendation in 1948, but made Gilchrist chancellor and appointed Frank Bolton (1948-1950) as Gilchrist's successor in College Station.\textsuperscript{14}

Student demonstrations, combined with the College's decision to close an account at Travis Bryan's Bank, led to additional calls for Gilchrist's dismissal after the legislative committee released its report in June. Harry Knox, Bryan's nephew and Senator O' Daniels's secretary, requested that Governor Jester investigate the reasons why Gilchrist authorized the closing of the account. J. Webb Howell and Travis Bryan speculated that Gilchrist was bitter because the Masonic lodge had blackballed him. Details are not included in these letters, but there was certainly tension between Gilchrist and the local alumni who believed he was trying to eliminate A&M traditions and abolish the Corps. Governor Jester, a former UT Regent who had seen the damage that was possible when the statehouse micromanaged the schools, hesitated to involve himself in the College's affairs.\textsuperscript{15}

Upon conclusion of the investigation, the Directors redistributed copies of the new regulations and dismissed economics Professor F.B. Clark. Clark had been critical of the administration's response to both the Corps and the VSA and as well as the leadership's supposed efforts to intimidate dissident faculty members. He went quietly, while students engaged in a bitter exchange via the campus newspaper.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{Battalion} editor Charles Murray and anonymous members of the editorial staff suggested that A&M abandon its military school status and enter a new era as a civilian ROTC college. The group pointed out that A&M and Clemson were the only land-grant colleges that maintained all-male compulsory military programs. They did not criticize Clemson, but they argued that the single-sex policy no longer made sense. Students reacted negatively to these editorials and labeled the \textit{Battalion} staff as traitors. Any Aggie who did not support the single-sex military
model could mosey down the road to "t.u." (University of Texas). Don Durnel, class of 1946 wrote, "We have all heard--'When in Rome, do as the Romans.' Well, this is Aggieland--be an Aggie or get out." Other singled out Murphy by drenching him with buckets of water.\(^{17}\)

**Theophilus Painter**

When the UT Regents appointed Painter, a nationally respected geneticist, as interim president, he assured faculty that he had no interest in applying for the position and would only stay until the Regents found the right man. After several months on the job, Painter expressed his desire to continue working to increase organized research, particularly at the M.D. Anderson cancer hospital. At the same time, he admitted that many of the responsibilities placed upon the president, which he described as "rah-rah stuff" that "leaves me cold," deterred him from seeking the permanent job. In a letter to Board Chairman Dudley Woodward, Painter urged him to hire a bona fide scientist (Painter was a nationally recognized geneticist): "we have had enough broken-down philosophers, preachers and do-gooders."\(^{18}\)

After 18 months as interim president, Painter, the man who promised not to accept the position if offered, became the permanent president of UT on May 24, 1946. The Regents conducted a national search, but they were convinced that Painter was the best man to lead the University through the approaching challenges. In particular, UT was leading a massive statewide building campaign for all the public colleges. An intellectual statesman was also required to guide the institution and Texas to a solution to the problem of providing graduate and professional education to African Americans.\(^{19}\) Perhaps the most negative response to the Regents' announcement came from the Student Committee for Academic Freedom. In their May 25, 1946 newsletter, the students portrayed Painter as a turncoat and the Regents' puppet.\(^{20}\)
Indeed, Painter took a minimal leadership role in the matter of desegregation. He allowed State Attorney General Price Daniel and Dudley Woodward to handle Herman Sweatt's challenge to UT's Jim Crow policy as a legal matter and not one of academic leadership.

"If some say this undermines Plessy, then let it fall"\textsuperscript{21} -- Sweatt v. Painter

The idea that African Americans were entitled to publicly funded graduate and professional education began to gain credence in Texas in the 1930s, particularly after the BCNET was formed. Legislators and university administrators did not take action until 1946 when litigation seemed imminent in Texas.

The NAACP first challenged segregation at the college level, specifically legal education, in the early 1930s. The Maryland Court of Appeals issued the first major decision involving segregation in 1936 when it ordered the University of Maryland law school to admit Donald Murray and outlawed the popular practice of providing African American students with vouchers to attend graduate and professional programs out-of-state. Two years later, West Virginia University voluntarily admitted African American students into professional and graduate programs. This same year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states were obligated to provide equal educational facilities for Blacks within geographical borders in \textit{State of Missouri et. rel. Gaines v. Canada et. al.}. Similar to Maryland, Missouri provided scholarships for Blacks to pursue graduate and professional programs out-of-state. Missouri officials justified their policy because its legislature had codified the policy and contended that it was a temporary solution until Lincoln University could construct a law school. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states were unable to provide their citizens with equal protection under the law if citizens left its borders. Litigation then slowed for the duration of World War II.\textsuperscript{22}
In 1945, the NAACP quietly initiated plans to challenge segregation at Southern law schools. The University of Texas seemed like the ideal location for a test case. The Texas NAACP was organized and well funded, and with the absence of even a private Black law school, Texas would be forced to desegregate UT. African American leaders knew that Texas could not possibly construct and administer a segregated law school that would equal UT.23

Hermann Marion Sweatt, a former mailman who had already completed courses at the University of Michigan law school, volunteered to represent the NAACP in the test case. Sweatt applied to UT on February 26, 1946 and quickly received his rejection. As predicted by the NAACP, it was time to meet Theophilus Painter and the UT Regents in court. Judge Roy C. Archer heard Sweatt's case in the 126th District Court in Austin. Represented by Dallas attorney William J. Durham and joined in subsequent hearings by Thurgood Marshall and James Nabrit, Sweatt contended that the University conceded that he was qualified for admission and rejected him solely on the criteria of race. Archer gave the University six months to design a law school within state borders.24

The UT Regents and the A&M Directors formed a joint committee to study graduate and professional education for African Americans in July 1946. This assembly recommended three actions. The group voted to rejuvenate the land-grant program at Prairie View to bring it into compliance with the Land-Grant College Act standards. This meant that Prairie View needed to offer rigorous undergraduate and graduate programs in agriculture, engineering, teaching training, and other vocational areas. As an aside, A&M had described Prairie View as the only 1890 land-grant that conformed to federal standards in its 1937 evaluation. The State also needed a "university of the first class" for Blacks under the tutelage the UT Regents. This institution would offer all degrees not granted at Prairie View, including law and medical
degrees. Finally, the governor should appoint a biracial committee of qualified leaders to report the progress of these plans back to the Legislature.  

Governor Stevenson immediately appointed the Bi-racial Commission. Various white governing board members, presidents, faculty, and private citizens from across the State were invited to the first meeting on July 25, 1946. The second meeting, held August 6, 1946, included leaders, newspaper editors, and members of various organizations from the Black community. Following these meetings, the Bi-racial Commission submitted its findings. Written in 1867, Article VII, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution directed the State to establish an African American branch of UT. This branch, like its parent institution however, could not receive general revenue funds to finance buildings and would need to depend on the PUF. But if the PUF was stretched to cover the estimated $3,925,000 required just to build an African American branch, the initiative would leave UT and A&M "destitute."

Gilchrist agreed with this conclusion and maintained that the AUF was inadequate to accommodate A&M's current building needs due to the surge in postwar enrollments. Painter said that the same was true for UT. The Commission then concluded that the Legislature should establish an institution that could receive general revenue funds for building and maintenance. Dudley Woodward approved of the Commission's report and suggested that the board initially consist of five white and four black members, at least until, "there shall have been developed more of administrative ability among Negro citizens." Prairie View could serve as the agricultural branch of the new school, but the Commission wanted the main campus to be located in Houston, if possible, near the medical center to accommodate the increasing numbers of Blacks interested in medicine. W.R. Banks, former Prairie View president, advised against making Prairie View a part of the new institution and even questioned the wisdom of
establishing another Black college when the focus should be on improving Prairie View. Even
though he opposed a new college, Banks endorsed Houston as the best location, because it led
the South in racial tolerance. Whatever the State decided, Banks agreed that a bi-racial board
should govern the Black university.\textsuperscript{27}

The Texas Council of Negro Organizations (TCNO) issued a more pointed criticism to
the Bi-racial Commission plan. Even before the Commission released its report in December
1947, TCNO argued that the State had a constitutional responsibility to establish a Black branch
of UT that would receive a percentage of the PUF. UT, the State's premier public college, was
the only institution that could offer African Americans full access to the 'State's total program of
higher education.' A stand-alone, upstart college, which would be wholly dependent upon
support from the Legislature, would fail. The Texas Commission on Democracy and the Colored
Teachers' State Association's Commission on Democracy in Education agreed.\textsuperscript{28}

As various groups debated what sort of institution to establish and how to finance it,
Sweatt filed a second petition for admission to UT in Archer's court in December 1946. Archer
deprecated his request on the grounds that Prairie View A&M had agreed to administer a legal
education program for Blacks. Sweatt appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, who in March
1947 remanded the case to Archer's court for a full hearing.\textsuperscript{29}

At the same time, the Fiftieth Legislature passed Senate Bill 140 to establish the Texas
State University for Negroes (TSUN). Section two of this act provided for a Black law school in
Austin. At Dudley Woodward's urging, the Legislature earmarked $2,750,000 for construction
and salaries, an emergency appropriation of $100,000 for books, and the acquisition of land and
buildings located at the Houston College for Negroes.\textsuperscript{30}
Once appointed to its board, Banks committed himself to the success of TSUN, but he was equally invested in the health of Prairie View. In his address to the Legislature in February 1947, he warned the assembly of the impending storm of lawsuits that Texas would face if they did not strengthen Prairie View. The institution had lost at least thirty of its stronger faculty members to institutions who paid more. Full professors could earn $5,000 annually at a private institution such as Fisk and $4,500 at the public Black colleges in North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Prairie View professors earned a paltry $3303 per year. Since Prairie View lacked many of the programs that Texas Black citizens desired, the State was spending approximately $40,000 annually (even though the Supreme Court ruled this practice unconstitutional in 1938) to send these students out-of-state. Educational conditions had to improve if Texas was to escape a legal confrontation with the NAACP.31

On March 3, 1947, UT registrar E.J. Matthews notified Sweatt that the TSUN law school, would open on March 10 and hold classes until June 28, 1947. UT law Dean Charles McCormick would oversee the program and students would receive instruction "identical" to white students. Sweatt and other students could attend class in a building directly across from the Capitol building and would have access to the library located in the Capitol until the new library for Black students was completed. Three UT professors were assigned to the TSUN law school that was located in the basement of an Austin petroleum building. Registration commenced in March, but no one registered.32

Parties reconvened for the Sweatt case in May 1947. Sweatt's counsel contended that the TSUN law school would never equal UT, regardless of the quality of faculty or the number of legal volumes available, because the makeshift unit would never achieve prestige that was on par with UT. Separate was simply never going to be equal. This was one of the first times that the
NAACP abandoned efforts to merely improve segregated facilities and set the stage for the Supreme Court's ruling in *Brown*. Archer rejected the NAACP argument and once again denied Sweatt's admission to UT.33

Three African Americans, Heuallan E. Lott, Fornie Usséry Brown, and Henry E. Doyle enrolled in the basement law school in the fall of 1947. The three UT professors allegedly claimed that the makeshift school exceeded UT's because the students received superior individual attention. Even if this was the case, the program fell apart when the State relocated the law school to Houston in August 1948. The UT faculty returned to UT and the students contended with significantly larger classes.34 While the students attended the basement law school and then the TSUN program in Houston, Sweatt appealed Archer's ruling to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. The appellate court denied Sweatt's motion on March 17, 1948. Two years would pass before the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case. Strife ensued at TSUN during this waiting period.

Before TSUN opened in the fall of 1947, its board requested that Negro be dropped from the school name. They believed that the racial descriptor conveyed that the university was inferior. It would take more than a name change to help the institution during these years.35 Charles Murphy, a state representative from Harris County, was struck by the deplorable conditions of the TSUN physical plant as of March 1948. In addition, Murphy believed that TSUN had replaced UT as the choice recruiting target for the Communist Party. The CP had yet to succeed in their efforts at taking over, but this was only because Black Texans were a naturally conservative people.36 Murphy's observations were disturbing, yet hardly surprising. NAACP activities were frequently linked to the Communist Party. His description of Black Texans suggests that he viewed them as possibly docile and uninterested in desegregation.
Despite the physical condition of TSUN, Murphy's letter to Governor Jester did not include a request for more financial assistance for the school.

In February 1949, TSUN board member Ben Morgan reported that the institution was making progress, but an astounding number of individuals wanted to enroll in medical and dental programs. TSUN could not offer this training without a requested $1,250,000 that had been rejected by the Legislature. If the State wanted to avoid negative publicity and legal challenges, it would need to strengthen TSUN and expand educational opportunities for Blacks.37

Inadequate staff, curriculum, and facilities were barriers to TSUN's success, but personalities and politics hurt the institution as well. One notable conflict involved TSUN President R. O'Hara Lanier, Carter Wesley, and law school Dean Ozie Johnson, who provided a version of the story to Price Daniel. According to Johnson, Lanier instructed him to meet with Wesley since he was in touch with the needs of the community and Johnson was new to the city. Instead of offering advice, Wesley forcefully instructed Johnson to demand that the Legislature give the fledgling law school everything that the UT law school possessed -- right down to library volumes, faculty expertise, and salary level. Johnson knew that Wesley's demands were unrealistic, particularly since UT enrolled well over 600 law students compared TSUN's twenty-three. Wesley and Lanier then explained their strategy to Johnson. These men wanted to make TSUN so expensive that it would be impossible for the State to maintain it and consequently desegregate the white colleges. Johnson accused Lanier of arranging for a disparaging article about the TSUN law school to appear in the Chicago Defender. Lanier allegedly told Johnson that he did not want the American Bar Association to approve the law school. Lanier and Wesley each told to Johnson that question of segregation needed to run its course in the courts.
In spite of their wishes, the ABA approved the law school. Upon informing Johnson, ABA representative John G. Hervey told Johnson, 'your president will certainly be disappointed.'

Wesley responded to Johnson's claims in a letter to now Governor Allan Shivers in which Wesley reassured the Governor of his desire to see TSUN excel, regardless of the results of the *Sweatt* case. Wesley went on to highlight Johnson's prison record and problems with polygamy. In his rebuttal, Johnson explained that he was jailed as a ten-year old, and while he married several times, he remained monogamous. In Johnson's view, Wesley was part of the Marxist, Black press who sought to destroy him. Johnson faced a tough battle in Houston. The Citizens State Committee on the Affairs of the TSUN sent a message to the school's Board of Directors in March 1950 to get rid of Johnson. The law school dean departed soon afterward.

W.R. Banks wrote a warning letter to Governor Shivers in February 1950. TSUN was receiving increasingly more student applications for courses of study the fledgling college could not offer for years to come unless the State provided adequate funds for laboratories and buildings for the law school and a pharmacy program. Enrollment now exceeded 2,000 and inadequate facilities at TSUN would encourage "certain forces" to force their way into the white colleges. Banks' warning was moot.

The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments from Thurgood Marshall, William Durham, and Texas Attorney General Price Daniel on April 4, 1950 and reversed the Texas decisions two months later. Tom C. Clark, the only Texan to ever serve on the U.S. Supreme Court, urged his colleagues to rule in favor of Sweatt. Segregation at the elementary school level might still be acceptable since it was possible for children to learn arithmetic in this type of environment. Graduate school was a different matter. A Black college would never offer the facilities,
instruction, and alumni contacts that a white college could give students. It was perhaps time to overturn *Plessy v. Ferguson*: "let it fall, as have many Nineteenth Century oracles."  

The Court would not overturn *Plessy v. Ferguson* for four more years, but the *Sweatt* case did signal a major educational policy shift. Chief Justice Fred Vinson stated that Sweatt and the similar *McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents* posed a crucial question: "To what extent does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limit the power of a state to distinguish between students of different races in professional and graduate education in a state university?"

At least in the cases of Texas and Oklahoma, a state could not provide minority students with equal protection because segregated institutions did not adequately train them to succeed in a predominantly white legal profession in state that was 85% white.  

*Sweatt* was not the only African American who sought admission to UT during these years. W. Astor Kirk requested admission to a doctoral program in political science at the University in December 1947. Kirk's NAACP counsel and the Regents agreed to stall his case until after the Sweatt issue was resolved. Kirk then accepted an offer in late 1949 to attend one class at the YMCA building adjacent to the Austin campus and then abruptly withdrew in protest. Kirk joined an assembly of thirty-five African American college seniors who marched from UT to the State Capitol on April 27, 1949. Speaking on behalf of the group, Kirk announced to assistant university registrar Max Fichtenbaum that the group had come to be admitted to graduate school. NAACP officials Donald Jones and James Morton then submitted a petition to Governor Jester calling for the State to desegregate the University's graduate and professional programs. Jester replied that he would pass the statement on to the appropriate individuals.
Dudley Woodward alerted Jester to the news that several African American applicants had applied to the UT medical branch and were fully qualified for admission. UT would have no choice but to take these students unless the TSUN medical program mustered the resources to offer an equal program.\textsuperscript{44} Herman Barnett applied to the UT Medical Branch in Galveston in the summer of 1949. The Legislature appropriated $175,000 to provide for the medical training of African Americans at TSUN in July. After TSUN tried unsuccessfully to provide medical training for Barnett, the TSUN Directors contacted the Regents and requested that they accommodate Barnett as a contract student. The Regents agreed and instructed the TSUN Directors to pay UT $3,000, the same amount appropriated for each student at the Medical Branch in Galveston.\textsuperscript{45} Barnett remained at the medical school in 1950, although still enrolled as a contract student. Following the Sweatt v. Painter decision, UT medical school Dean Chauncey Leake reported that the federal Veterans Administration had denied him aid because he was not enrolled at an accredited institution. The Regents then decided to make Barnett, as well as additional African Americans, regular medical students.\textsuperscript{46}

The day after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Sweatt, Horace Lincoln Heath and John Saunders Chase were admitted to graduate programs in government and architecture, respectively, since these programs were not available at Prairie View or TSUN. An additional thirty-two African Americans applied for admission to UT between June 5 and October 2, 1950. Of these, twenty-four were men and eight were women. Twenty-two students were accepted: twelve in various doctoral programs, four in master's courses, and six in law. Of the ten rejected: three applied to undergraduate majors, five were told to seek training in the same fields at TSUN or Prairie View, and two failed to meet admissions requirements. Two additional Black students enrolled at the UT medical school. Upon admitting these students, UT officials stated that they
accepted the ruling in *McLaurin v. Oklahoma* that required them to treat Black students equal to white students. This meant that Black students could eat in the same cafeterias, exercise in the same gymnasiums, and attend the same University-sponsored events as white students.\(^{47}\)

Contrary to this claim, African American students would suffer discrimination for years to come.

**Regional and State Reaction to Desegregation**

The Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF), an arm of the progressive Southern Conference for Human Welfare established in the 1930s, approved "A Declaration of Civil Rights," during its Conference on Civil Rights at the University of Virginia on November 20, 1948. One hundred and fifty signatures accompanied the document, including eighteen Texans - four from UT. The declaration called for an end to racial discrimination and boasted three proposals concerning individual and group initiatives and legislation. The declaration implored individuals to speak up when faced with racist actions and to treat people as individuals and not as stereotypes. It urged organizations to remove any rules that barred individuals from participation. Finally, the declaration pushed for the repeal of laws that "force public distinction based on color, religion, or national origin."\(^{48}\) White citizens of the former Confederacy were not unanimously in favor of Jim Crow, but reformers were few in number prior to the Civil Rights movement.

The Southern Governors' Conference ignored the subject of desegregation all together until its annual meeting in 1951. Harry Ashmore, editor of Little Rock's *Arkansas Gazette*, declared that desegregation was now inevitable and it was time to accept this fate. Herman Talmadge walked out during the speech and only two governors, McMath of Arkansas and McKeldin of Maryland responded with applause.\(^{49}\)
Regardless of how Texas leaders felt about desegregating graduate programs, their opinion mattered little. Daniel, Shivers, Woodward, and Painter could make access difficult for Black students, but the law was no longer on their side. Price Daniel conceded that Texas had not provided its Black citizens with equal facilities, but desegregation would only worsen the situation since racial tension would overshadow any reform attempts. Daniel also contended that Sweatt was nothing but a pawn in a game run by opportunistic and money-hungry Black lawyers from out-of-state. In the months leading up to a review of the Sweatt case by the U.S. Supreme Court, Daniel mustered the support of seven Southern states. interestingly enough, Alabama was not among the brotherhood. An angry Eugene "Bull" Conner, commissioner of public safety in Birmingham, Alabama sent his apologies to Daniel and pleaded with the Alabama Bar Association to pledge their support for Texas in their fight to preserve segregation for the South in the name of peace between the races.

Segregationists complained to Governor Shivers that he had accepted the Sweatt decision without a fight and subsequently endorsed desegregation. Governor Shivers declared that he was only complying with an order to admit specific types of Black graduate students when separate but equal courses and facilities were not available. He upheld the Texas Constitution, which stipulated the separation of races in all remaining levels of education.

Nothing But a "Snare and a Delusion": The College Building Amendment

Institutions across the country were ill prepared to accommodate the record number of students who attended college on the GI Bill in the postwar era. Texas colleges were no exception. The UT Regents and A&M Directors launched a campaign to obtain $10 and $5 million respectively, borrowed against the PUF, in building bonds following a joint meeting on
January 13, 1946. The governing boards knew that they would have to include the fourteen other four-year public colleges in the campaign, but they refused to share the PUF. Legislators and institutional leaders supported a plan whereby the fourteen colleges would divide the five-cent Confederate Pension Tax, a fund that supported dwindling, if any, beneficiaries. Any building plan would require that the Legislature and Texas voters pass a constitutional amendment.

UT and A&M established the Central Committee composed of Gilchrist, Painter, A&M Director John W. Newton, UT Regent Dudley Woodward, and long-time UT supporter Ima Hogg in March 1946. The Central Committee assembled subcommittees in each state senatorial district. These subcommittees would convince legislators to adopt the bill and mobilize the public to vote for the measure in November 1946.53

There was opposition from West Texas politicians and businessmen from the beginning. West Texas State Representative Preston Smith, a staunch supporter of Texas Tech, described the building amendment as "a snare and a delusion." While he claimed that he did not believe that UT and A&M wanted to hurt the other fourteen colleges, their proposed amendment could only hamper them. The proposed amendment would appear on the ballot as two propositions and voters had the option of picking one or both. Even though citizens already paid a five-cent Confederate Pension tax, Smith argued that money for college building was a new task and would clearly violate Jester's promise of 'no new taxes.' The UT/A&M bond proposition had a chance, but the Confederate Pension fund would be shot down. Smith identified two acceptable actions. Institutional leaders could combine the two propositions into a single proposal. While Smith did not think that voters would accept the five-cent ad valorem tax in any form, if the combined proposition failed, it might force UT and A&M to cooperate with the other institutions. Less realistic, UT and A&M could either share the PUF or the proceeds from the
$15 million dollar bond issue with the other state colleges. Smith knew that UT and A&M would never go along with the latter plan, so he pursued the former.\textsuperscript{54}

By October 1946, the West Texas Chamber of Commerce, another forceful opponent of the amendment, adopted Plank Eight, also known as the Lubbock Plan, calling a redistribution of the PUF. UT and A&M would retain 40\% and the other state colleges would divide the remaining 60\%. Plank Eight also opposed the five-cent ad valorem tax. UT Regent Chairman Dudley Woodward received word of the platform and quickly directed the senatorial district committees to mobilize and discredit Plank Eight. Preston Smith endorsed the Lubbock Plan, but Texas Tech leadership remained committed to the College Building Amendment.\textsuperscript{55}

The Texas Ex-Students' Association formulated a strategy for defeating Plank Eight as well. The Association planned meetings and a dinner with newspaper press and radio commentators who might be sympathetic to the College Building Amendment. John McCurdy, Executive Secretary of the Texas Exes met with twenty of the twenty-eight legislators who were graduates of UT. While these events were modest, the Exes planned on securing 100 House and twenty-one Senate votes to adopt the amendment for placement on the State ballot. McCurdy had also instructed West Texas UT alumni to learn more about their opponents' strategy. In addition to Preston Smith, D.A. Bandeen and numerous members of the West Texas Chamber of Commerce endorsed the Lubbock Plan. The West Texas UT alumni hypothesized that Smith and his allies would work to defeat the proposed college building amendments during the upcoming regular session of the Fiftieth Legislature. Smith and company would then gather support for their plan to divide the PUF within the Fifty-first Legislature and introduce a formal measure in hopes of reaching a compromise with UT and A&M. If this measure failed, they would continue the fight for the PUF into the Fifty-second Legislature. McCurdy did not believe
that the West Texas coalition would succeed, but their strategy could cause a "stalemate that will retard higher education for generations." 56

The proposition did not appear on the ballot in November 1946, so the colleges set to work on a new plan. A&M and UT officials met with the group of fourteen college leaders on December 4, 1946 and agreed to present a single proposition that included the bond issue and five-cent tax to the Fiftieth Legislature in January 1947. Soon after, out-going Governor Stevenson advocated a plan to take the five-cent levy from the existing thirty-five-cent constitutional ad valorem tax instead. Governor-elect Jester supported this plan. A number of legislators, however, objected to the ad valorem tax because forty-two of the State's 254 counties benefited from tax remission, including the large, affluent counties of Harris (Houston), Bexar (San Antonio), Tarrant (Fort Worth), Austin (Travis), and Dallas. Only two of the exempted counties were located in West Texas, a region that allegedly paid over 45% of the ad valorem taxes in the State. The House Committee on Constitutional Amendments studied the problem for two weeks and decided to return to the Confederate Veteran Tax plan. 57

The College Amendment Bill failed to pass in the House on March 12, 1947 because it did not receive the required 100 yea votes. Governor Jester confided to his assistant William McGill that the measure failed to overcome the railroad lobby, which opposed additional ad valorem taxes. Even though the five-cent allocation would come from existing taxes, Jester stated that twenty-five of these legislators could not be swayed. Many of these legislators indeed voted nay in the final vote. The Senate adopted Senate Joint Resolution 4, sponsored by Keith Kelly of Tarrant County on April 17, 1947 with a twenty-three to two vote. The House approved the same measure, sponsored by Ottis Lock of Lufkin with a 110 to twenty-eight vote on April 22, 1947. 58 The opposition votes were concentrated in Lubbock and its fourteen neighboring
counties, a cluster of four counties on the Coahuila de Zaragoza border, seven counties southeast of Houston, eight counties adjacent to Abilene, seven surrounding Waco, and counties in the north central and northeast sections of the State. The House vote initially suggests that support for UT and A&M was regional. (See Map # 7 in Appendix)

The Central Committee, now consisting of nine members, met on June 21, 1947 to make plans for the final two-month push before the statewide building amendment vote. E.E. McQuillen, Secretary of the Texas A&M Association of Former Students, suggested that the Central Committee and its local contacts work quietly through various state college alumni in towns until two weeks before the vote. He worried that any big production would only encourage opponents and give them time to mobilize. Two weeks would be enough to urge people to head to the polls and not enough time for opponents to launch an attack. The College Station Development Association and Chamber of Commerce responded with a pledge to raise $1,000 to carry out its local campaign.

Opposition from the West Texas Chamber of Commerce (WTCC) never disappeared. After the group voted two to one against the building amendment, they elected to stay out of the debate by neither endorsing nor denouncing the measure. After Woodward publicly stated that the West Texas group had abandoned its campaign against the building amendment, WTCC President H.C. Custard wired a telegram to Woodward and vehemently protested this claim. The WTCC's "hands-off" policy was in no way a show of support for a measure they deemed "unfair to taxpayers and veterans…and discriminatory to the fourteen colleges." T.C. Root, Assistant to the President at Texas Tech and member of the Central Committee, reported to Woodward that there was active opposition to the amendment in Lubbock. Sweetwater Representative
Harvey Sadler, for example, planned a rally in Lubbock and the Lubbock Chamber of Commerce sent letters to Tech alumni, persuading them to vote against the proposition.  

UT and A&M had the support of UT alumni Governor Jester and Lieutenant Governor Shivers. Three days before the vote, Allan Shivers delivered a radio address to endorse the College Building Amendment on August 20, 1947. Shivers listed organizations that had endorsed the bill, including the Texas Bar, Texas State Teachers' Association, Texas League of Women Voters, Texas Police Association, South Texas Chamber of Commerce, and oddly, the Texas Association of Nurserymen.

Voters narrowly approved the amendment by just 5,213 ballots. The 51.3% of voters who supported the proposition provide strong evidence that Texas was sharply divided between pro and con camps when it came to funding higher education. It is impossible to verify how many citizens voted against the building amendment because it was expensive and how many opposed it because it seemed to only benefit UT and A&M. Lubbock and its surrounding counties south of Amarillo, west to Fort Worth, and southwest all the way to Austin suggest that this rather large segment of Texas did not support UT and A&M. Worse, these citizens did not believe that the flagship state university and the land-grant college served their needs (see Map #8 in Appendix).

Despite the close results, an enthusiastic Gilchrist and G. Rollie White, President of the A&M Directors, each sent a message to Governor Jester to proclaim the amendment the most promising effort ever made towards the advancement of Texas higher education. West Texas State Representative Sterling Williams admonished Jester for supporting the amendment and urged him to remember that he was no longer a UT Regent. Jester now had an allegiance to the State and its other colleges that enrolled 62% of the Texas student body.
Even though the amendment passed, the institutions faced an additional sixteen months of litigation. Clarence Whiteside, S.A. Wells, Homer Maxey, and H.E. Speer filed two related suits that became *Whiteside et. al. v. Brown et. al.* These citizens, three from Lubbock and one from Dallas, argued that Bexar, El Paso, Galveston, Hill, Moore, and Taylor counties had failed to post proper notice of the election after the Legislature adopted the amendment on April 22, 1947. The case was dismissed and the colleges were finally free to proceed with their building initiatives in January 1949.  

### Conclusion, 1938-1950

Between 1938 and 1950, Longhorns and Aggies endured two messy presidential dismissals, sent many of their students and recent graduates off to war, and survived the postwar enrollment surge. Along the way, the institutions benefited from legislative and gubernatorial support while simultaneously encountering some the worst political interference, most visibly at UT.

**Proper Government Involvement**

The Legislature enacted three important measures during the postwar era: (1) Senate Joint Resolution 4, the college building amendment; (2) a lump sum budget procedure; and (3) Senate Bill 140, the creation of TSUN.

Despite challenges from the West Texas lobby, the Legislature, followed by voters, approved the monumental building amendment. The college building amendment demonstrated the legislative, gubernatorial, and public support for the expansion of higher education in Texas. Gone were the nineteenth century and early twentieth century complaints à la Sam Houston and Jim Ferguson that public higher education was an elitist notion. At the same time, the
controversy surrounding the amendment highlighted the tension that existed between the various regions of this massive state, most particularly between the Lubbock region and the major metropolitan areas.

In addition to receiving badly needed construction funds, UT and A&M scored an important victory in self-governance when the Legislature agreed to return to a lump sum budgeting procedure. The lump sum policy would allow the institutions the flexibility they would require as they became more complex.

Finally, while the decision to establish TSUN was a feeble effort to obstruct desegregation, UT, A&M, and the state government worked in concert. There were plenty of biracial commissions, but in the end, it was the UT and A&M leadership who recommended the "separate but equal" strategy. The Legislature heartily agreed and chartered TSUN as a temporary solution.

**Political Interference**

The Rainey episode proved far more damaging than the Ferguson controversy twenty-seven years before. This time, the meddling resulted in the firing of a president, a censure from the AAUP, and probation from SACS. While the scandal may have looked like the demise of UT, it was, in retrospect, a turning point. Following the embarrassment of national scorn, the new UT Regents, Governor Beauford Jester (1947-1949), and Theophilus Painter made a commitment to make UT a nationally competitive research university. With the exception of some alarming anticommunist laws and periodic outcry or the admission of women to A&M, political interference would slowly decline in the post-Rainey era.
Academic Development

After World War II and the Rainey and Walton fiascos, UT and A&M reorganized, responded to dramatic enrollment increases, and readied themselves for participation in the new federal research economy. These topics are covered in greater detail in Chapter Eleven.

UT and A&M entered the 1950s with the funds they desperately needed to create the laboratory, classroom, and residence hall space required. Meanwhile, TSUN and Prairie View struggled to offer stripped down professional, graduate, and even undergraduate programs, to African American Texans. Even with the student demonstrations of 1947 behind them, A&M grappled with its identity as stand-alone land-grant colleges such as Purdue and Michigan State outperformed it in research and Ph.D. production. After fighting the Sweatt case until the U.S. Supreme Court denied an appeal, UT admitted twenty-two African American students in addition to Hermann Sweatt in 1950. The Supreme Court anointed UT as an early, although reluctant, participant in the desegregation process. After so much defiance between 1946 and 1950, UT officials did not make life easy for their first African American students, but these officials and white students did respond peacefully. The institutions would devote the next decade to racial and gender desegregation battles, greater control over the PUF, a new round of anticommunism, and the race to catch up to the nation's top public universities.

Notes

1 Texas House Journal, Regular sess., Fiftieth Legislature (1947); Jester quote on 83-84; 50th Leg. reg. sess. beginning January 14, 1947, Jester quote from 83-84; Chapter 339, General and Special Laws of the State of Texas, Regular sess., Fiftieth Legislature (1947), 649-675.
2 Statement by the A&M Investigating Committee to Lieutenant Governor Shivers and House Speaker W.O. Reed, no date, page 17; Allan Shivers Papers, TSLAC, Box 1977/81-338, A&M folder.
3 UTBOR Minutes, March 22, 1946, 88.
4 Dethloff, Centennial History of Texas A&M, 476 -- 478, quote on 478.
5 ibid., 483 -- 484.
6 ibid., 490 -- 491.
7 ibid., 491 -- 492.
8 ibid., 494.
9 Senior Class of 1948 A&M College of Texas, Open Letter, March 12, 1947, Beauford Jester Papers, TSLAC, Box 14/4-97, A&M Situation folder; Dethloff, 495 -- 496.


ibid., 15 -- 18, first quote from 16, second quote from 8.

ibid., 9 -- 14.

Dethloff, 500.


"Directors Dismiss Clark as Economics Head," Battalion, June 27, 1947, 1.

"Are We Blinded by Tradition?" Battalion, June 20, 1947, 2 & "Living in the Past is Not Enough…" June 24, 1947, 2; Letter to the Editor from Don Durnel, June 27, 1947, 2; Dethloff, 499.

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Matthews to Sweatt, March 3, 1947, Price Daniel Papers, Sam Houston Regional Library and Research Center, (hereafter referred to as SHRLRC), Box 59, University folder; Gillette, 327.

Gillette, 327.

ibid., 330.


Charles Murphy to Jester, March 8, 1948, Beauford Jester Papers, TSLAC, Box 4/14-67, Negro University folder.

Ben Morgan to Jester, February 18, 1949, Beauford Jester Papers, TSLAC, Box 4/14-67, Negro University folder.

Letter from Ozie Johnson to Attorney General Price Daniel with a copy sent to Shivers, November 15, 1949, Allan Shivers Papers, TSLAC, Box 1977/81-140, Texas State College for Negroes folder.

W.R. Banks to Shivers, February 16, 1950, Allan Shivers Papers, TSLAC, Box 1977/81-140, Texas State College for Negroes folder.


Gillette, 331 -- 333.


UTBOR Minutes, September 16, 1949, 1-2; Gillette 336.

UTBOR Minutes, September, 29, 1950, 3.

"Higher Education for Negroes in Texas" Prepared by the Staff of the Texas Legislative Council, April 1951, 17, TSLAC.

"A Declaration of Civil Rights," Southern Conference Educational Fund, November 20, 1948, Beauford Jester Papers, TSLAC, Box 4/14-67, Negro University folder. UT faculty signatures: Leo Hughes (Associate Professor of English), Alex D. Kreiger (Professor of Archaeology), E.A. Ripperger (Assistant Professor Engineering Mechanics), W.A. Smith (Secretary of UT YMCA).


Price Daniel to Reverend P.E. Womack, April 8, 1947, Price Daniel Papers, SHRLRC, Box 58, Sweatt Case folder.

Bull Conner to Price Daniel, January 10, 1950, Conner to Francis Hare, President, Alabama Bar Association, January 10, 1950, Price Daniel Papers, SHRLRC, Box 58, Sweatt Case folder.


Woodward to Ima Hogg, March 6, 1946; Senatorial District Committees of the University of Texas and the Agricultural & Mechanical College of Texas; "Copy of Resolution adopted by Joint Boards of the Agricultural & Mechanical College of Texas and the University of Texas January 13, 1946, Dudley Woodward Papers, UTCAH, Box 3R106, College Building Amendment, 1945 -- October 1946 folder.

Preston Smith to E.J. Howell, September 4, 1946, Dudley Woodward Papers, UTCAH, Box 3R106, College Building Amendment 1945 -- October 1946 folder.

Woodward to Presidents, Governing Boards, and Senatorial District Chairmen, October 11, 1946, Dudley Woodward Papers, Box 3R106, College Building Amendment 1945 -- October 1946 folder.

John A. McCurdy to Woodward, November 9, 1946, Dudley Woodward Papers, UTCAH, Box 3R106, College Building Amendment 1945 -- October 1946 folder.

Woodward to State Representative Carlton Moore, Sr., March 17, 1947; D.A. Bandeen, Manager of West Texas Chamber of Commerce to W.J. McConnell, President of North Texas State Teachers College, January 11, 1947, Dudley Woodward Papers, UTCAH, Box 3R106, State-Supported Schools January -- February 1947 folder.

"Meeting of the Steering Committee, the Senatorial District Chairman, et al, Interested in Proposed Constitutional Amendment Concerning Building Programs of State Supported Institutions," Dudley Woodward Papers, UTCAH, College Building Amendment General Correspondence 1947 folder. Ottis Lock received an A.B. from Stephen F. Austin State College in Nacodoches (far East Texas) and a law degree from UT. He served as president of an East Texas chapter of the Texas Exes, but he was equally loyal to Stephen F. Austin.


"Minutes of the Meeting of the Central Committee for College Building Amendment, held June 21, 1947, 4315 Glenwood Avenue, Dallas, Texas," Dudley Woodward Papers, UTCAH, Box 3R107, College Building Amendment June/July 1947 folder; Battalion, June 17, 1947, 1, June 24, 1947, 1.


T.C. Root to Woodward, August 12, 1947, Dudley Woodward Papers, UTCAH, Box 3R107, College Building Amendment August 1947 -- June 1949 folder.
Allan Shivers radio address delivered at WRR Dallas, 7:45 p.m., August 20, 1947, Allan Shivers Papers, TSLAC, Box 1977/81-338, Appropriations folder.

G. Rollie White to Jester, September 17, 1947; Sterling Williams to Jester, August 20, 1947, Beauford Jester Papers, TSLAC, Box 4/14-67, College Building Amendment folder.

UT installed its first Coca-Cola machine in the fall of 1949 and historian Walter Webb was upset. The beverage was interrupting his research and his classroom. The crowds that filled the hall and the sound of clinking glass bottles outside his office denied Webb the quiet he required to work. Furthermore, Coke was dangerous. Webb had known this since he narrowly avoided a car accident after he spotted a billboard that featured a beautiful woman drinking the soda many years before. Students were now bringing this distraction into his classroom. Only a "professor of Coca-Cola" would argue that the beverage promoted education. The University's decision to bring this moneymaking temptation into academic buildings sent the wrong message to the community. One, the University endorsed one type of soda and encouraged a monopoly. Two, individuals should be able to enjoy the convenience of a pleasurable beverage. Webb joked that perhaps the administration should install a vat of soda on the roof that connected copper tubes to every desk so that students could consume the cola whenever calculus or economics became dull. In spite of Webb's plea, the machines remained and increased. Soft drinks would prove to be a minor concern for Webb and his colleagues in 1950s Texas.

This chapter examines what may seem to be a disparate collection of topics including desegregation, anticommunism, financial investments, veterinarians, and opera singers. Ultimately, these subjects fall into three categories: institutional competition, political conflict, and of course, racial discrimination. Chapter Two included a discussion of Ben-David's theory that American universities developed in a largely unregulated environment that led them to engage in contentious battles that frequently produced inefficiency and mediocrity. Ladd and Lipset concluded that public universities and their state governments operated in a climate of
distrust and inherent conflict. Legislators and some governing board members, for example, perceived faculty members who supported desegregation at UT and coeducation at A&M as arrogant elitists who knew nothing about the true wishes of the State. This chapter also shows that racism and sexism drove many, although not all, decisions concerning the schools.  

Taking Stock: Texas Legislative Council

The Legislature established the Texas Legislative Council (TLC) in 1949 to provide it with research on everything from oil production to crime rates. TLC conducted a number of studies in the 1950s on the quality of higher education in the State. Four such reports were released in November 1950. The report on agricultural education evaluated eight criteria: (1) credit hours assigned to each course, (2) textbooks used in introductory courses, (3) nature of the courses offered as described in course catalogues, (4) level of courses offered, (5) library materials available on campus, (6) prerequisites, (7) faculty expertise, and (8) degree of faculty specialization. Researchers concluded that agricultural training offered at most Texas colleges was weak. While the TLC did not criticize A&M's program specifically, it did not offer words of praise. The report cited lack of coordination between institutions, inadequate libraries, and lack of faculty expertise and specialization as the chief culprits for the poor state of agricultural education.  

Two reports, the first on training for engineers and the second African American higher education, drew similar conclusions. There existed a huge disparity between all types of education for Blacks and whites:

This issue in engineering is only part of a much larger problem: the higher education of Negroes. Shall the State provide equal separate educational opportunities? If this is the approach -- then the subsidiary issue is whether the State is willing to implement this with adequate support.
The TLC stopped short of advocating desegregation.

The fourth report was a comprehensive quantitative study on the condition of public higher education. This document made extensive use of charts and graphs to conclude that Texas schools still lagged behind leading public colleges outside the South. While Texas fell behind the national average in many criteria, it exceeded the national average in the percentage of college-age citizens enrolled in higher education.⁵

Tables 10-1 illustrates a point that had long been made by UT and A&M leadership regarding their difficulty in retaining professors who could earn far more in other states. The TLC data assembled in Table 10-2 shows that long-time powerhouses Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin received a larger percentage of their budgets from state appropriations. Even Southern schools that UT did not consider to belong in their league such as Louisiana and Alabama lent greater support to their state flagship universities than Texas.

**Table 10-1 Average Faculty Salaries -- Texas Institutions in Comparison to 38 State Universities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Average for 38 Institutions</th>
<th>University of Texas</th>
<th>Texas A&amp;M</th>
<th>Prairie View A&amp;M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>$6899</td>
<td>$6138</td>
<td>$5400</td>
<td>$4288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assoc. Professor</td>
<td>$5189</td>
<td>$4535</td>
<td>$4316</td>
<td>$3425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. Professor</td>
<td>$4177</td>
<td>$3810</td>
<td>$3809</td>
<td>$2838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>$3568</td>
<td>$3090</td>
<td>$3127</td>
<td>$2453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 10-2 Appropriations of Various States for Higher Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appropriation for State University</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>Percent State Univ. is of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>$6,898,000</td>
<td>$22,500,000</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>$3,399,000</td>
<td>$6,730,000</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>$60,084,000</td>
<td>$69,803,000</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>$7,141,000</td>
<td>$11,981,000</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>$11,436,000</td>
<td>$27,352,000</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>$12,252,000</td>
<td>$14,470,000</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>$6,203,000</td>
<td>$8,836,000</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>$6,258,000</td>
<td>$11,147,000</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Public Higher Education in Texas*, Prepared by the Staff of the Texas Legislative Council, November, 1950, 48a, 48b.
While all of the public four-year colleges offered graduate degrees, only UT and A&M produced "significant" organized research. The Legislature needed to decide whether it was going to fund graduate programs at all of the schools or concentrate their resources in the places where research thrived. As of 1948, the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools accredited fourteen of the State's seventeen four-year colleges. Eleven colleges offered graduate courses in chemistry, but UT was the only program that was accredited. Similarly, seventeen offered courses in business administration and three in architecture, yet, once again, UT administered the only accredited programs.6

In real dollars, legislative appropriations for higher education had increased by 350% between 1935 ($5,262,000) and 1949 ($24,904,000). Personal income had increased by 286% during these fifteen years. With a larger segment of its population enrolled in college (1.83%) than the national average (1.62%), the State was paying more than it had in 1935, but its expenditures per student remained below the national average.7

TLC issued a report from the Citizens' Advisory Committee (CAC) in January 1951. Citing the 1925 and 1933 reports recommending a state higher education coordinating body, the CAC argued that the problems of the 1920s and 1930s had not vanished. Institutions were financially and academically inefficient and continued to engage in unnecessary competition for money and students. In most cases, the institutions had lowered their standards. The CAC urged the Legislature to establish a coordinating agency that would monitor budget requests and course offerings and take a degree of control away from the schools for the good of the State.

The CAC then addressed the problems related to African American education. In these pre-\textit{Brown} days, the team believed that segregation was not at the root of the poor quality of courses and facilities. The answer was in learning how to make the most of the funds that were
available for Blacks. At the same time, the Advisory Committee acknowledged that Texas could not finance the plant and faculty needed to offer Blacks an equal education at the professional and graduate level. The CAC had differing recommendations for graduate and undergraduate education. The State should end the practice of offering segregated graduate and professional programs. Once in place, the coordinating board should only permit racially separate programs in high-demand subjects that could be offered economically at Prairie View and TSU. Texas should work with the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB, discussed a bit later) to find space for Black medical students while arrangements were made for these students in Texas. Finally, the CAC recommended that a strong effort be made to raise the standards to an acceptable level for all African American students. 8

**Statewide Coordinating Board**

In response to Governor Shivers' statement that the Legislature would need to enact higher education budget cuts unless the institutions took action and made their own reductions, J. Evetts Haley, director of the Institute of Americanism at Texas Tech proposed a state-wide survey of the colleges to solicit ideas from faculty members. 9 The Charles E. Maedgen Foundation funded the Institute's survey that included six, somewhat leading, questions:

1) In what college fields do you think there is needless overlapping or duplication?
2) What departments are overly stressed or unduly extended?
3) Which of these might be cut or eliminated without seriously impairing your institution?
4) What other fields of activity might be cut without serious detriment to the cause of education?
5) What trends have you noticed constituting departure from sound educational policy?
6) What is your field? 10

The survey yielded a low return rate from UT. Haley, a frequent critic who became estranged from UT years before, attributed the response rate to administrative opposition. Thirty-two percent of the respondents "were critical" of the survey. Thirty-seven percent wrote
That too many state colleges offered graduate training and 33.3% agreed that the State had unnecessarily expanded programs at the junior colleges. Haley's study yielded similar results at A&M.\textsuperscript{11} His conclusions surprised few who had followed the State's educational problems at any point in the twentieth century.

Regardless of these findings, Shivers would have signed Senate Bill 341 to create the Texas Commission on Higher Education in 1953. The Commission was intended as a temporary body that would make recommendations in preparation for a permanent coordinating body. The bill had its critics, including A&M Chancellor Gibb Gilchrist and East Texas State President James G. Gee. Gilchrist stated to Shivers, that while Texas needed a detached committee to manage the overall higher education agenda, institutional heads needed the power to make recommendations. Gee was more pointed in his criticism. He feared that the coordinating board, appointed by the governor, would politicize the institutions. Shivers disagreed with Gee and pointed out that the structure established by SB 341 was close in design to the structure proposed by the advisory committee, of which Gee was a member.\textsuperscript{12} Shivers held his ground and the permanent coordinating board materialized in 1955. The Texas Commission existed as an impotent body until 1965 when the Legislature renamed it the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and bestowed it with the power to manage program duplication.

\textbf{Anti-communism in Texas}

Allan Shivers became governor after Jester's untimely death in July 1949. His seven and a half years in the governor's mansion were characterized by anti-communist and pro-segregation campaigns. Governor Shivers kept meticulous records of his years in office, including hundreds
of anonymous letters he received regarding anti-American activities. The less than eloquent letters quoted below are representative of what Shivers received:

Letter dated December 2, 1955: 'If this is true that atheists are teaching school girls' that 'the Bible is a pack of lies' then that must be a Communist organization and should be investigated…'

Letter dated December 30, 1955: 'Are you aware that the Communist Party has decreed that (Kremlin) all Public Libraries in these USA shall be utterly destroyed and replaced with Russian books. That most Jews are for communism…'\(^{13}\)

The majority of letter writers were wary of schoolteachers and college professors and the dangerous ideas they were passing on to the children of Texas. As Ellen Schrecker has noted, lawmakers at the federal and state level engaged in aggressive anti-American investigations after the war and events in Texas were part of a national movement.

Both Truman and Eisenhower issued executive orders calling for investigations of government employees. Truman's 1947 order, E.O. 9835, cited disloyalty as a national threat that justified background investigations. Eisenhower's 1953 order, E.O. 10450, was similar in structure to 9835, but it went further and claimed that communists and other subversives threatened the nation's security if they were allowed to seep through the cracks.\(^ {14}\) E.O. 9835 directed the U.S. Attorney General to compose a list of communist, totalitarian, and subversive organizations that had "adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution…or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."\(^ {15}\) U.S. Attorney General and UT alumnus, Thomas Campbell Clark issued the first list in 1947. The Justice Department added to this list over time and in October 1950, the list contained twenty-two groups categorized as totalitarian including the Peace Movement of Ethiopia, and twenty-three fascist organizations including the American National Socialist League. The American Youth
Congress, American Youth for Democracy, and Civil Rights Congress for Texas, were among the main and approximately twenty-six subsidiary communist groups. The remaining roughly nineteen and sometimes duplicate organizations fell into the subversive category and included the Communist Party USA, German-America Bund, Ku Klux Klan, and the Peoples' Educational and Press Association.  

Texas legislators responded to the national call and introduced approximately twelve bills and passed four designed to combat communism and subversive activities between 1945 and 1955. While the eight failed bills did not affect the schools or citizens, they say much about the prevailing attitudes and fear within the state government during these years. The regular session of the Fifty-first Legislature (1949) was particularly active in this regard. House Bill 19, introduced by Representative Marshall Bell of San Antonio, provided for a loyalty board similar to the one authorized by Truman with E.O. 9835. This measure passed with 129 yeas and twenty absent in the House. This bill did not progress in the Senate, but both houses approved House Bill 837, a loyalty oath, sponsored by Sam Hanna of Dallas and Preston Smith of Lubbock. During this same session, Hanna and Smith introduced House Concurrent Resolution 50, authorizing college presidents to investigate and expel communists from their campuses. The House adopted House Concurrent Resolution 50 with 140 yeas and eight absent. The Legislature also passed Senate Bill 221 barring Communist Party candidates from appearing on election ballots.  

The passage of House Concurrent Resolution 50 angered UT student Wendell G. Addington, the alleged youth director of the Communist Party of Texas. It also alarmed Paul Wheeler, Frank Green, Larry Larsen, H. Hughes, and James Nelson (President of Tarrant County Young Democratic Club), who telegraphed Governor Jester and warned, "If you expel students..."
for political beliefs we will question who determines what ideas are right! We say let individuals believe what they want." Fellow UT student Lee Ball, Jr., assured the Governor Jester that Addington posed no threat to other students who laughingly dismissed him. In Ball's mind, HCR 50 was unconstitutional and anti-democratic."^{18}

Lawmakers continued the anticommunist crusade during the next session. The Legislature had long suspected UT economics professor Clarence Ayres of being a communist and passed House Simple Resolution 136, calling for an investigation and possible dismissal of Ayres in March 1951. House Simple Resolution 136 cited three troubling items. The first, an article allegedly published in an October 1950 issue of the *Daily Texan* (the quote actually appeared on January 7, 1944), where Ayres was misquoted as arguing, "We might learn from the Russians." The second episode occurred in 1949 when Ayres attended a legislative hearing regarding loyalty oaths with self-professed communist Wendell G. Addington. Third, Ayres delivered a controversial address at the University Club on March 12, 1951 where he supported the right to free speech for faculty. Regent Claude Volyes, Chancellor James Hart, and President Painter wrote House Speaker Reuben Senterfitt following the passage of House Simple Resolution 136 and laid out a detailed argument in Ayres' defense. Ayres' defenders argued that both the *Daily Texan* article and the March 1951 speech that was later quoted out of context in *Daily Texan* misrepresented his loyalty and ideals. While Ayres did attend the 1949 hearing, he did not accompany Addington and he did not appear on behalf of the University. Woodward said that the Regents were willing to cooperate, but reminded Senterfitt of the University's commitment to Ayres' freedom to express his views as long as those views were not of a subversive nature."^{19}
The Legislature then abandoned the investigation. Ayres confided to his friend J.M. Clark of Columbia University, that legislators hostile to tax increases had initiated the probe. He was not the first or the last target. Members of the Legislature chastised North Texas State for building a golf course with tax dollars a number of years previously. Lawmakers were using any example they could find to defend budget cuts.

The Legislature finally abolished the line-item budget procedure in 1947 and the colleges hoped that they would have greater control over their funds. The institutions, however, faced a new challenge in 1951 when the Legislature passed the higher education appropriations bill with a loyalty oath rider. The oath required all employees to swear that they had not been members of any of the organizations deemed subversive by the U.S. Attorney General in the past ten years.

The UT Regents met in special session to discuss House Bill 426 and its rider on March 7, 1951. In the group's opinion, the Legislature had attached "unnecessarily restrictive and harmful" provisions to the appropriations bill that could threaten efficiency at the University. In addition, the Board discussed the drastic cuts proposed in the bill. Following a long discussion, the Board unanimously agreed to contact various legislators and point out the grave consequences to the University if the current bill passed.

After House Bill 426 passed, Dudley Woodward questioned the legality of the loyalty oath and suggested that the Regents request an opinion from the State Attorney General. The Regents cast a five-four vote in favor of Woodward's proposal with Woodward, Rockwell, Swenson, Tobin, and Darden voting yes and Oates, Sealy, Voyles, and Warren voting no. Sealy, the lead dissenter, felt that the university should quietly accept the loyalty oath rider. The people of Texas lacked confidence in the University and the loyalty oath was a way to reassure them. UT was not dominated by communists and was prepared to root out anyone who threatened
national security. Woodward suggested that the Legislature had passed loyalty oath rider to punish UT faculty. Sealy scoffed at the idea that the Legislature was out to get the University. No other school was complaining, and with losses in the Korean War threatening to extinguish yet another pro-Western nation, the Texas Legislature had just cause in demanding loyalty from state educational employees.23

An incensed Woodward distributed a stinging letter to leaders across the State on July 5, 1951 in which he accused the Legislature of abusing its powers by attempting to control UT. Chancellor Hart advised Woodward against the mass mail-out since the Legislature had treated UT in this manner many times before. Despite Hart's warning, Woodward asked citizens to analyze the situation and provide the Regents with solutions to reverse the damage of the appropriations bill. In Woodward's view, both lawmakers and citizens believed that the Legislature had a legal right to govern the University since it was indeed the State's college. Prior to mailing his letter, Woodward privately credited the Legislature's investigation of Clarence Ayres, which yielded nothing, as the precipitating cause for the loyalty oath rider. Woodward also believed that the Rainey scandal continued to hurt the University in its dealings with legislators, who refused to accept that the institution was not overrun with militant Raineyites. Woodward hinted at the need to eliminate the small group of political extremists who remained on the faculty in order to restore public and legislative trust in UT. He also blamed UT's inability to control its more liberal faculty. The entire faculty had failed to follow through in its commitment to instill students with a sense of national and institutional loyalty. He then publicly criticized the Legislature for abusing its powers over the University.24

Woodward's public tirade invited numerous responses. The forty-five responses recorded by the Chancellor's office shared common themes. Very few condemned the Legislature outright
for the budget cuts or the loyalty oath and most respondents reminded Woodward that UT was a public college that was accountable to its citizens. UT, along with the other public colleges, needed to work together to eliminate program duplication. The schools needed to promote themselves to the people and unequivocally prove that higher education was worth the price tag. The respondents suggested that UT alumni mobilize a lobby for the next legislative session. Diplomacy would advance the institutional agenda much further than attacks against the Legislature.²⁵

Woodward had requested that Attorney General Price Daniel review the loyalty oath rider in House Bill 426 and received that opinion on August 29, 1951. Price Daniel declared the loyalty oath rider to be constitutional as a condition of employment and compensation and reasoned that the Legislature could require such a pledge in the name of national and state security. Woodward accepted Daniel's ruling and pledged to carry out the loyalty oath requirement without a fight. Woodward, however, remained troubled by the probable existence of communists and other subversives at UT. He was unable to formulate a solution and refused to embark on a witch-hunt. In the end, he placed the blame for all of the troubles related to House Bill 426 with the radicals who had infested the University.²⁶

Painter had assured Woodward that the FBI declared the faculty to be communist-free in 1948. According to Painter, the local CP, however, was recruiting students, although not successfully. Students often attended one meeting out of curiosity, but few returned. Painter believed that the Faculty Council was not overrun with communists, but with "bleeding hearts" who were successful in controlling this governing body because they caucused and placed all of their support behind a few individuals who held leadership positions. He was pleased that the scientists were catching on and following suit. UT needed more apolitical scientists in policy
roles to shift the school away from politics and towards untainted research and teaching.27

Painter's prior assurance held little credence with Woodward, especially following this latest episode with the Legislature.

Legislators introduced the next wave of communist control bills during the regular session of the Fifty-third Legislature (1953). Marshall Bell introduced House Bills 30 and 21 and co-sponsored House Bill 566 with Guy Hazlett of Borger. House Bill 30 failed, but Bell achieved success with the passage of House Bill 21, denying compensation to state employees who refused to sign the loyalty oath. House Bill 566, a ban on communist-inspired textbooks in schools, colleges, and libraries, failed to receive the required four-fifth's vote but garnered ninety-seven yeas, thirty nays, and twenty-two absent in the House. Many who supported, as well as opposed, the measure recorded their reasons in the *House Journal*. Voting in favor of the bill, Dudley Dougherty of Beeville argued that while Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Marx's *Das Capital* were historical documents that should remain in circulation, there was much recent propaganda that served no other purpose than to banish democracy from the planet. One of the bill's many opponents, Truett Latimer, issued a concise but comprehensive statement that summarized the thoughts of many who opposed the measure:

> America is besought and besieged by a group of citizens who are willing to go to any means to combat an ideology that is threatening the freedom of the peace-loving people of the world. In our inertia we must not take drastic moves which would regiment our people in a manner that would be detrimental to the basic philosophy of freedom.\(^{28}\)

*Borger News-Herald* journalist J.C. Phillips wrote a series of columns in support of HB 566. In a March 29, 1953 article, he lambasted professors who supported UNESCO, an organization that included countries that supported the Communist Party. In his April 9th column, Phillips identified a Texas high school library that contained 202 books written by seventy-eight authors affiliated with the Communist Party.\(^{29}\)
The crusade against anti-Americanism continued into the first called session of the Fifty-third Legislature in March and April 1954. Senate Bill 4, the Suppression of the Communist Party Act, outlawed the Communist Party and made it a crime to possess books, musical recordings, photographs, letters, or mere scribblings that suggested involvement in subversive organizations. Police could search homes without a warrant and those found guilty could serve up to twenty years in prison. In its final form, the bill passed the Senate unanimously and the House approved it with only seven nays. Shivers then signed the Suppression Act on April 15, 1954. By July, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) had organized a new division of its academy in Austin. FBI agents, UT faculty, and DPS officers taught police how to identify subversive activity. The Suppression Act remained on the books until 1965 when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth amendments of the Constitution.30

UT and A&M Regents minutes and available presidential, faculty, and trustee correspondence do not reveal that the colleges fired individuals for supposed membership in subversive organizations. The 1950s however, were a sensitive time for red-fearing Texans and institutional records are full of allegations regarding un-American activities. A disgruntled woman from San Antonio complained to UT Chancellor James Hart after she read an article describing a musical performance at UT where a student played Czech folk songs on the campus chimes and concluded with "Old Black Joe." Surely, this was a tribute to Joseph Stalin, who had died a few weeks earlier. Hart tried to calm the woman's fears by explaining that the chime performance was intended to mark the end of Stalin's oppressive regime and express hope for better times in the Soviet Union.31
As for A&M, UT's Read Granberry, forwarded a letter to William L. McGill, Executive Secretary to Governor Shivers, alerting him to a meeting of high school vocational and agricultural teachers that occurred in College Station. During this meeting, the group decided to introduce a course on agricultural consumer cooperatives at the high school level. Granberry included a description of the meeting from *The Producer -- Consumer* and underlined the names of those who endorsed the idea including E.V. Walton, A&M Associate Professor, Robert A. Manire, State Director of Vocational Agricultural, J.B. Payne, Area Supervisor of Vocational Agriculture in Stephenville, and Lano Barron, State Supervisor of Vocational Agriculture. Available records do not indicate that an investigation occurred in response to this or any other alleged un-American activity on the campus where so many war heroes received their training.

**Desegregation**

The Southern Regional Education Compact (SREC) was established in September 1948 at the annual Southern Governor's Conference. This 14-state assembly pledged to raise educational standards in graduate, technical, and professional education by designating regional centers where students could enroll in highly specialized and expensive programs not offered in their home state. Former Florida Governor Millard G. Caldwell pointed out that the South constituted 30% of the nation's population and only 5% of the doctorates. According to Caldwell, the plan had nothing to do with segregation. While African Americans could attend white institutions outside of their home states, this was not a move to either promote or stall desegregation. The South needed to catch up and regional coordination was a good way to try. The Texas Legislative Council disagreed and conjectured that it was an attempt to stall
impending desegregation. The plan would certainly not provide Black Southerners with equal education.33

The Compact began with three programs: medicine, dentistry, and veterinary science. States that possessed these programs established quotas and accepted fees from participating states for their residents to attend these programs at in-state tuition rates. By 1951, 850 students had attended nineteen such programs. It took the Texas Legislature until May 1951 to approve the funding of $110,000 for 1951 and $120,000 for 1952.34

Although Millard Caldwell and others claimed that the SREC was not a desegregation stall, many of the students who enrolled at these regional centers did so because they were denied opportunities at home. The Texas Commission on Interracial Cooperation reported that since 1939, Texas had provided $280,000 in out-of-state aid to Black students. The Fifty-first Legislature appropriated $90,000 in this type of aid for the 1949 -- 1951 biennium.35

With the Sweatt victory on their side, African American students applied to UT graduate and professional programs, as well as those undergraduate programs not available at Prairie View and TSU (Texas Southern University, formerly TSUN). George McElroy, a journalism student at TSU, was a typical example. H.Y. McCown, UT Dean of Admissions, denied McElroy admission on June 16, 1950 on the grounds that TSU offered a program in journalism. McElroy appealed to the Regents to reconsider and explained that while TSU possessed a journalism program, it was dramatically inferior to UT in terms of facilities, faculty, reputation, and alumni influence. Nevertheless, the Regents upheld McCown's decision on October 3, 1950.36

A&M remained largely removed from desegregation with the exception of a brief discussion that occurred at the Director's meeting in September 1952. The Directors noted that
the U.S. Supreme Court required UT to admit African American students. A&M, however, remained subject to the Texas Constitution, which required A&M to educate white students and for Prairie View to instruct Black students. The Directors amended their rules and regulations, adding Chapter IV, section eight entitled "Separate Schools for White and Colored Students." According to the amendment, A&M and its branches were legally bound to remain segregated until further notice. Following this rare statement on desegregation, A&M retreated into the background until it accepted its first Black students in 1963. 37

Black undergraduates possessed little leverage until the historic U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Brown v. Board of Education on May 17, 1954 and May 31, 1955. In the first opinion, the Court struck down the separate but equal doctrine once and for all. The second opinion ordered states to desegregate their educational institutions "with all deliberate speed." Days after the Supreme Court handed down the first Brown decision in May 1954, H.Y. McCown informed Logan Wilson that UT needed to alter undergraduate admissions policies to either accommodate or deter African Americans from attending UT. McCown appeared in favor of discouragement. He suggested that UT require Black undergraduate applicants to take all courses offered at Prairie View or TSU in certain majors before coming to UT to take advanced courses. This would keep Black (he did not say male) students out of lower level courses where they would be most likely to encounter white females.38

In between the two Brown decisions, UT initially accepted seven African Americans as freshmen in the summer of 1954. Marion Ford, an honors students and talented football player from Houston, applied to study engineering. Initially rejected on June 29, Ford's case attracted national attention. McGown then mailed Ford an acceptance letter on July 23. On behalf of the University, McGown once again revoked Ford's admission and the admission of six additional
African Americans after rumors spread that Ford wanted to try out for the football or swim team. McGown reasoned that Prairie View and/or TSU offered their intended course of study. The students could transfer to UT if they wanted to enroll in courses not offered at the Black schools in the future. Ford and John W. Walker appealed. Ford abandoned his efforts and attended Wiley College, a Methodist institution in northeast Texas. Walker filed suit in the San Antonio district court where Judge Ben Rice promptly dismissed the case in September.\(^{39}\)

The Regents' Executive Committee released general admissions policy recommendations concerning both graduate and undergraduate students on July 8, 1955. The Executive Committee opened their report with a statement that UT had accepted several hundred African American students in certain graduate programs and would now welcome all qualified Black students to all graduate programs, regardless of existing programs at Prairie View and TSU. Qualified African American undergraduates could attend Texas Western College for the first time in the fall of 1955. Since the Austin campus had outgrown its physical limits and the Legislature failed to provide the University with sufficient funds to meet the needs of current students, Black undergraduates would not be considered for admission until at least the fall of 1956. UT first needed to establish a selective admissions policy. The report stated that UT would adopt "a policy of selective admissions, based on merit and applied equally to all regardless of racial origin," for the 1956-1957 school year. The Regents did not intend to cap enrollment, but rather wanted to "regulate the phenomenal yearly increase in enrollment" to maintain adequate staff and facilities. The full assembly of Regents unanimously accepted the new policy.\(^{40}\)

The Regents pledged to create a set of standards that would be based on merit, and eschew racial discrimination, at least on paper. UT would not establish enrollment caps, but
instead use the requirements as a way to better regulate enrollment increases. In his address to
the Southern Association, HY McGown announced that the new entrance exam would measure
both aptitude and achievement. Measuring aptitude was the primary goal, but a students'achievement would be evident -- even though McGown did not explain how. Like the SAT, the
entrance exam would contain verbal and math sections. The University would not include
chemistry and biology, subjects usually included in traditional achievement tests, because Texas
high schools lacked the uniformity needed to test everyone fairly. McGown noted that UT was
following the recommendations laid out by the College Board but the University stopped short of
requiring students to take the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) since the exam fee might
discourage some students. UT would assume the expense of the entrance exam.41

Despite the Regents' proclamation that undergraduate segregation would end in the fall of
1956, David Wallace, Herman Smith, and John Hargis, were accepted as transfer students from
in July 1955. Wallace and Smith left before the end of the session. Norcell Haywood and
Robert Norwood joined Hargis, a chemical engineering major in fall, but neither of these men
graduated. One hundred and ten Black transfer and first-year students arrived in September
1956, but UT denied these undergraduates on-campus housing and membership in the Longhorn
Band, as well as all intercollegiate athletic teams.42

Black students would not to play Longhorn varsity football until 1970. In the meantime,
the Regents made minimal concessions. Texas Western College, along with three other Texas
colleges and five out-of-state institutions belonged to the Border Football Conference. Some of
the out-of-state teams fielded African American players. Faced with the threat of other schools
boycotting Kidd Field at Texas Western, the football team, the City Council of El Paso, the
Chamber of Commerce, the Southwestern Sun Carnival, and other groups, petitioned the Regents
to allow African Americans to play. The Regents granted the request in October 1950, stating that such approval was necessary to avoid a conflict. UT did not allow Black players from visiting institutions to play in their stadium until Duke Washington of Washington State entered the field on October 3, 1954.43

While UT officials found ways to halt or slow the desegregation process, Texas leaders reacted with varying degrees of disapproval and compliance to the Brown decision. Attorney General John Ben Shepperd, stated that they would not defy the Court's decision. Shepperd then contacted the Texas Senate Finance Committee in April 1955 and requested $20,000 to pay for defense in two segregation cases involving UT that were pending in federal district court. He argued that the judgments might invalidate Article VII, section 7 of the Texas Constitution, which provided for separate black and white schools. Liberal State Representative Doug Crouch of Denton was among a minority who expressed his hearty support for the Brown ruling.44

Shivers addressed a number of organizations, including the Texas Conference on Education. In contrast to the more militant Southern governors, Shivers did not argue that immediate integration was the wrong policy for the region. Instead, Shivers made an argument in favor of states' rights. While accepting that the public schools needed help, they did not need federal control, “Various communities have tried various ways of solving the problem….Federal control in the field of education would be disastrous.” Since taxpayers financed the federal government through taxes, Washington defied the will of all citizens who resided in the former Confederacy. He echoed this sentiment one month later to the United Daughters of the Confederacy at their national convention in San Antonio.45

By Southern standards, Price Daniel, state attorney general (1946-1953), U.S. Senator (1953-1957), and later governor (1957 -- 1963), was moderate, but nowhere near progressive, on
racial issues. He believed in segregation and led the campaign to establish TSUN after Herman Sweatt filed suit against UT in 1947. Daniel, however, was never defiant in the manner of George Wallace, Hermann Talmadge, or Ross Barnett. In an impassioned speech before the U.S. Senate on May 17, 1954, Daniel defended the doctrine of separate but equal and contended that no one he knew had ever supported segregation out of prejudice. He believed that the majority of whites, as well as Blacks, preferred separate schools. Segregation was necessary for communities to maintain peace. According to Daniel, those who argued that Blacks could not succeed, even in equal facilities, with equal instruction as whites, had no faith in the capabilities of Blacks. Daniels failed to acknowledge the dramatic disparities in funding and facilities that were available to African American students. While Daniel was outraged by Eisenhower's decision to call in federal troops to enforce federal law in Little Rock, Arkansas, he reassured Texans that such action would never be necessary. He expected schools to desegregate gradually. If there were problems, the Texas Rangers would be more than able to step in.46

"Provocative of far-reaching consequences"47 -- The Barbara Smith Episode

A good test of how far UT had progressed in integrating African American students into its student body arrived in the spring of 1957. Barbara Smith, a talented soprano from Cass County (upper northeast Texas), auditioned and was chosen for the female lead in Henry Purcell's opera, *Dido and Aeneas*, in early 1957. Word spread across Texas that a Black woman would appear opposite a white man as romantic companions. Written threats and phone calls poured into Logan Wilson's office. The Regents, as well as the faculty Committee of Counsel on Academic Freedom and Responsibility, ordered the fine arts department to remove Smith from the production. In their statement, the seven-member faculty committee, which included noted
historian Walter Webb and Clarence Ayres, explained that regardless of Smith's ability, Texans were not ready to accept a Black woman playing a romantic lead opposite a white man. As part of the South, Texas had to progress gradually. The committee commended President Wilson for his decision and for leading UT at an acceptable rate towards eventual integration.48

A number of faculty and students responded passionately in condemning the administration's actions. Roger Shattuck, an assistant professor of romance languages, called for a faculty committee on integration to address the deeper, more disturbing, issues of discrimination on the campus. Charles R.H. Williams and R.C. Stephenson fired off a five-page criticism of the decision. In contrast, a number of faculty members praised Wilson and described his decision as appropriate, and, according to J.W. Reynolds, Glenn Barnett, and Clyde Colvert from the College of Education, "judicious."49

John Silber, assistant professor of philosophy, and future colorful and controversial president of Boston University, delivered a speech before the Faculty Council in which he highlighted flaws in the reasoning that Wilson used to arrive at the decision. UT was accountable to the courts, not to anonymous threats. Silber was even more troubled that the administration failed to inform Smith of their decision for another several weeks, even through they claimed they had received threats directed at Smith's safety. Wilson stated that UT answered to the voters of Texas. Silber argued that if it were up to the voters, UT would have remained segregated. Most reasonable citizens did not chose integration, but they did accept the law of the land and therefore would have peacefully allowed Smith to perform. In Silber's eyes, the University of Texas was created to enlighten citizens, not to support their ignorance: "It cannot be argued, I think, that the University shall lead on scientific questions, but shall follow on questions of social import."50
The University YMCA, Young Democrats, and Young Republicans demanded an investigation into the administration's handling of the episode. The Student Assembly released a statement urging the administration to allow all students in good standing access to campus activities. Unidentified individuals placed effigies of State Representative Joe Chapman and State Senator Jerry Sadler, on campus and at the Capitol. The anonymous individuals affixed the word demagogue to the images of these ardent segregationists.\(^{51}\) In spite of the opera scandal, Barbara Smith went on to become a successful opera singer and returned to campus numerous times in future to perform and to tell her story, which was remarkably free of resentment.

**Another PUF Battle, 1951-1956**

The UT Regents assumed full responsibility for investing the PUF on behalf of A&M. The Texas Constitution, however, dictated that the Regents could only invest the funds in state, federal, and municipal bonds. Both the Regents and A&M Directors believed that this conservative policy kept the PUF from reaching its full potential. In addition, the threat of losing their current portions of the PUF, based on the 1947 college building conflict with the West Texas lobby, brought UT and A&M together to protect their interests against the other public colleges. In his report to the A&M Directors in the summer of 1949, Chancellor Gilchrist predicted that officials and supporters of the other state colleges would launch an effort to disperse the fund in 1951. Dudley Woodward agreed with Gilchrist and enlisted the help of UT alumnus L.H. Cullum in formulating a strategy.\(^{52}\)

State Representative Jack Cox of Breckenridge introduced House Joint Resolution 37 in March 1951. This bill would allow the Regents and Directors to invest up to 50% of the PUF in corporate stocks. At the same time that the Regents endorsed Cox's bill, they appointed a special
committee to meet with the A&M Directors to hear their views and solicit their support. The House and Senate passed the bill (unanimous in Senate) and the governor assured the Regents that he would sign it. Since the action required a constitutional amendment, the Regents would have to wait until the November 13th election to clear the last hurdle.\textsuperscript{53}

Chancellor Hart contacted Chancellor Gilchrist on July 9 to let him know that the Regents would be meeting soon to formulate a campaign strategy. Gilchrist was put off by this letter in which Hart referred to the amendment as a plan to "enlarge the authority" of the Regents to invest in corporate securities. Hart wrote again on July 23 and stated that the Regents, the Ex-Students Association, and the UT Development Board had drafted a publication and wanted to include an endorsement from the comparable organizations at A&M. Gilchrist responded coldly to Hart on July 26 and expressed his disapproval of UT's "decision to go ahead more or less alone." Gilchrist did not believe that the amendment would succeed or that he could obtain an endorsement from the Directors unless A&M was brought in as an equal partner in the campaign. Hart apologized for giving Gilchrist this impression and urged a stronger partnership between the two schools on July 28. The chancellors seemed to resolve their misunderstanding on the surface by July 30, but Gilchrist was never able to gain the full support from the A&M Directors. In retrospect, UT officials believed that Gilchrist never mobilized the A&M forces in support and continued to attack UT for controlling the campaign. James Hart confided to Dudley Woodward that Gilchrist was unwilling to cooperate with UT officials because he had not introduced the investment idea: "I find it hard to get anything done unless the idea originates with and is proposed by Chancellor Gilchrist."\textsuperscript{54}

In addition to tension between the schools, critics such as former Governor Dan Moody announced that the investment plan was a risky gamble for institutions whose needs had been
met by the State under a conservative investment plan. Citizens defeated the proposition
100,000 to 124,547. The proposition carried in Austin, Bryan/College Station, Fort Worth,
Dallas, Houston, Waco, and the counties on the southeast Mexican border and lost in Lubbock,
Abilene, and their surrounding areas. The counties that voted against the 1947 building
amendment also opposed this proposition that would clearly only help UT and A&M. Despite
Gilchrist's misgivings, Bryan/College Station voted 64.4% in favor of the investment plan,
compared to 66% in Austin.\(^{55}\) (See Appendix, Map # 9)

Representatives Scott Sayers of Fort Worth and William Kugle of Galveston sponsored
House Bill 39 in March 1953. This proposed amendment allowed UT and A&M to invest a
maximum of 50% of the PUF in corporate stocks. While the previous proposition allowed the
institutions a broad, yet vague, amount of discretion, this one barred the institutions from
investing more than 1% of the PUF in any single corporation. Furthermore, the colleges could
not own more than 5% of the total voting stock in any company. Finally, the colleges could only
invest in American companies that had paid dividends for the last ten consecutive years. The
House failed to move this bill beyond the committee stage.\(^{56}\)

According to a memo from Thelma Lockwood, executive assistant to Chancellor-elect
Logan Wilson in 1954, Moody, Edward Crane, Robert Holliday, Angus Wynne, and Harold
Potash were highly influential in defeating the amendment in 1951. This old guard of UT alumni
and state leaders launched a campaign that portrayed the investment plan as a crazy scheme in
which the Regents could invest the PUF in anything from parking lots to "speculative" stocks.\(^{57}\)
Lockwood did not name Gilchrist as an impediment to the proposition. Gilchrist retired in 1953,
but there is no available evidence his successor Marion Harrington adopted a different stance.
Hoping that the old guard was ready to step aside, the Regents and Directors met once again on February 8, 1954 to discuss another proposed draft of the PUF amendment. The groups did not finalize the draft during this meeting, but instead committed to further study so that the proposal would convey consensus and coordination between UT and A&M before they submitted it to the Legislature and the Governor.58

It took the colleges two more years to move a successful bill through the Legislature. Max Smith of San Marcos sponsored House Joint Resolution 15, which was approved by both houses following a free conference committee on May 9, 1955. The UT Development Board then launched a campaign for the constitutional proposition. A promotional piece entitled "The Myth of UT's Millions" acknowledged that while the PUF was indeed large; it was not large enough to meet the buildings needs of UT and A&M. Even though the AUF currently contained $4,200,000, it was less than the regular appropriations that the California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Minnesota state universities received for capital outlay.59 While it certainly seems that UT conducted the investment campaign without A&M, the absence of adequate archives at A&M during this era make this question difficult to answer.

In anticipation of the election results on November 6, 1956, the Regents and Directors enlisted the help of Attorney General John Ben Shepperd in drafting an investment plan. Every county easily approved the amendment. Two months later, the Regents and Directors issued a statement opposing any attempts by legislators to divert portions of the PUF into other state budgets. The governing boards stated that the amendment was intended to take a financial burden off of the State. With the new investment flexibility provided by the amendment, UT and A&M would use interest derived from diversified, corporate PUF investments to finance permanent improvements. The institutions could not support themselves in this manner if the
State tried to place future investment restrictions on the PUF. The oil and gas royalties did not count as yield from the land like crops might be. If the State started counting these royalties as yield, the institutions could have lost as much as $6,000,000 in 1955-56. In closing, the Boards warned: "Even in times of adversity, we need to be cautious about eating our seed corn; during time of prosperity, the folly of such course of action should be apparent to all."^{60}

A&M in a Time of Uncertainty

Dethloff described the years between 1948 and 1958 as the "age of anxiety" during which A&M "confronted, and even courted change without really changing." Aggies were trapped on a ship that would inevitably collide with an enormous iceberg. Dethloff specifically named co-education, voluntary military service, large-scale research and graduate programs, and physical expansion as the causes for this anxiety attack. Many were afraid that their beloved "Old Army" might not survive. Big changes began when the Directors created the A&M System in 1948, placing Gilchrist as chancellor and Frank "Bear Tracks" Bolton as president in College Station. Bolton, former dean of the College of Engineering, served two years as a competent and non-controversial transition man. Marion Thomas Harrington, dean of the College of Arts and Sciences replaced Bolton and served until 1953 when he replaced Gilchrist as chancellor. These men, as well as the remaining deans and vice presidents had worked at the College for years and provided both the benefits and drawbacks of stable leadership. A&M completed $15.3 million in campus construction between 1948 and 1958. The College Building Amendment was more responsible for this feat than the College's group of stable leaders. Conflict arose when David Morgan, formerly of Colorado A&M (now Colorado State) became president in 1953.^{61}
Morgan wanted to solve A&M's problems all at once while the Directors and alumni desired a gradual approach. Within the first few months of his tenure, Morgan appointed a faculty committee to assess the effectiveness of a compulsory military training program, which included completion of the first two years of ROTC and four years of membership in the Corps of Cadets. This 1954 committee recommended a voluntary program with the hope that it would increase freshman retention as well as overall enrollment, which had dipped down to pre-war levels. The somewhat wary Directors accepted the military training recommendation, effective September 1954. The change outraged former students and Corps leaders. Morgan also supported coeducation for A&M; he did not attempt to introduce such a measure. Following a long series of petty conflicts with Chancellor Harrington and the Directors over everything from whether to blow a whistle to alert power plant workers, to the interior decorations at the president's home, Morgan gave his six months notice in December 1956. Upon receiving his resignation, the Directors instructed Morgan to leave immediately.62

**Women and Veterinary Education**

A woman's right to attend A&M was not a novel question in the fifties. This decade's female challengers were the first to substantively question the validity and the practicality of the College's status as a single-sex, land-grant institution. William Moore, State Senator from the Bryan/College Station area introduced a legislative resolution to admit women in September 1953, but this measure was initially adopted and soon stuck down.63

Jerry E. Kirk, Katherine Morrison, and Betty Self each applied to the School of Veterinary Science at A&M, the only veterinary program in the State. E.L. Angell, assistant chancellor at Texas A&M, had allegedly arranged for Morrison and Self to attend Oklahoma
A&M, but Oklahoma denied Kirk's petition in September 1955. Kirk applied to A&M in 1953 and 1955. She was accepted at Cornell, Kansas State, and the University of California but these schools were beyond her means. Upon her rejection at Texas A&M, Registrar H.L. Heaton informed Kirk that Texas had a contract with Oklahoma through the SREB and were waiting to hear back from the school. An official from the dean's office at Oklahoma A&M sent a refusal to Kirk and explained that Texas did not possess a contract with Oklahoma since it already provided veterinary training at Texas A&M. Kirk appealed to Shivers in October 1955 and argued that Texas had a constitutional obligation to provide her access to a vet school. Backing her up, veterinarian W.A. Lawrence stressed that "regardless of the whims of people in charge of those schools which offer highly specialized education. Denial should not be based on sex alone."64

News of these cases ignited an immediate and angry response from former students. The letters that Shivers received carried the same theme. One charged that Senator Moore and Gilchrist, both of whom had suggested that the campus go co-ed to combat failing enrollments, would destroy all the tradition and discipline that made A&M the "West Point of the South." Girls were not interested in attending A&M and opening the doors to them would not increase enrollment. Rod Gambrell pointed out that Aggie men were off fighting the war in Korea, while students at other schools had embraced the fad of draft-dodging. Admitting women would be the first step in transforming A&M into an ordinary school.65 The Kirk, Morrison, and Self episodes were simply a warm-up for the challenges that A&M would face in the approaching years.

 UT and A&M spent the 1950s entrenched in intra-campus and statewide battles for money, tradition, racial, and gender equity. The University of Texas endured a round of accusations that faculty were involved in un-American activities, but this period was easier than
the Rainey years. Painter and Wilson enjoyed positive relationships with the Regents, who served as a buffer between the faculty and the Legislature. Clarence Ayres proved to be an exception, but he never lost his job. A&M inched closer to a full-blown war between tradition and modernization. Outside of these internal episodes, American universities were competing for research dollars, scientists, and prestige. The Texas colleges’ role in the new research economy is profile in Chapter Eleven.

Notes

1 "Coca-Cola and Culture," Walter Webb, October 19, 1949, Harry Ransom Papers, UTCAH, Box 3U341, folder 1.
3 Texas Legislative Council, *Staff Monograph on Agricultural Education in State-Supported Institutions of Higher Education* (Austin, TX, November 1950). Research team consisted of D.D. Giles (Stephen F. Austin State College), H.B. Hampton (Texas A&M), and D.B. Harris (North Texas State College), TSLAC.
5 *Public Higher Education in Texas*, Prepared by the Staff of the Texas Legislative Council, November, 1950, 33, TSLAC.
6 ibid., 29, 32.
7 ibid., 105-106.
10 Questionnaire from the Institute on Americanism, Allan Shivers Papers, TSLAC, Box 1977/81-387, Special Session Business 1954 folder.
11 ibid.
13 Allan Shivers Papers, TSLAC, Box 1977/81-68, Anonymous Letters folder. The first letter is a response to a news article authored by the Reverend Merle E. Parker.
20 Clarence Ayres to J.M. Clark, April 11, 1951, Clarence Ayres Papers, UTCAH, Box 3F285, Correspondence C folder.
21 Public Higher Education in Texas, Prepared by the Staff of the Texas Legislative Council, November, 1950, p. 127, TSLAC.
22 UTBOR Minutes, March 7, 1951, 397. Texas was one of many states to pass a loyalty oath during this era. California passed one in 1949.
23 UTBOR Minutes, July 14, 1951, 663; Extract from UT Regents Meeting, July 14, 1951, UT Chancellors Office Records, Box 9, UTCAH, Loyalty Oath folder.
25 UT Chancellor's Office Records, UTCAH, Box 3, Excerpts from Woodward Letter Replies folder.
33 "An Emerging Regional Program in Higher Education," address by John E. Ivey, Director of the SREB in Educational Record, April 1952; "Why Regional Education?" address by Millard G. Caldwell, no date provided. Allan Shivers Papers, TSLAC, Box 1977/81-264, Regents folder. Caldwell also stated, "Of course, our people have not been too much interested in the matter of doctorates up to this point, but their interest is growing."
34 H.Y. McCown to Logan Wilson, May 26, 1954, UT Chancellor's Office, UTCAH, Box 9, Negroes folder.
35 Tom Sealy, Chairman of the UT Regents to the Board of Regents, September 2, 1954; Sealy to Leroy Jeffers, member of the Board of Regents, August 28, 1954, Dudley Woodward Papers, UTCAH Box 3R113, Board of Regents Executive Committee August -- October 1954 folder; William H. Jones, "Desegregation in Texas -- One Year Afterward," The Journal of Negro Education, vol. 24 (Summer 1955), 357; Richard B. McCaslin, "Steadfast in His Intent: John W. Hargis and the Integration of the University of Texas at Austin," Southwestern Historical Quarterly vol. 95 (July, 1991), 24 -- 27.
300

42 McCaslin, "Steadfast in His Intent..." 30-33.
46 Price Daniel, "Supreme Court Decisions on Separate Schools," Congressional Record, May 18, 1954, 1 -- 8; Daniels, handwritten statement with accompanying typed statement; Price Daniel Papers, SHRLRC, Box 388 in series of unnumbered Segregation folders.
47 Logan Wilson, "Statement to Faculty", May 14, 1957, UTPOR, UTCAH, Box VF30/B.b, College of Fine Arts/Opera Casting Incident.
49 "Faculty members Debate Smith Case," Cyrena Jo Norman, Daily Texan, June 18, 1957, 1, 8.
53 UTBOR Minutes, March 17, 1951, 408-409, May 25, 1951, 515.
56 UTBOR Minutes, March 21, 1953, 416-417.
57 Memorandum from Thelma Lockwood to Logan Wilson, February 5, 1954, UT Chancellor's Office Records, UTCAH, Box 5, Constitutional Amendment 1954 and Some History folder.
60 UTBOR Minutes, November 2, 1956, January 11, 1957, 448 -- 49, quote from 49.
61 Dethloff, Centennial History of Texas A&M, 528-531, 534.
62 ibid., 550-554, D.W. Williams, vice chancellor of agriculture, served as interim president until September 1957 when Harrington became president and chancellor. The two positions were split again when Earl Rudder became president in 1959.
63 John A. Adams, Keepers of the Spirit: The Corps of Cadets at Texas A&M University, 1876--2001, (College Station Texas: Association of Former Students, Texas A&M University, 2001), 205.
65 Harry R. Swan to Maurice Acres (Governor's Executive Assistant), no date on Swan letter but Acres responded March 7, 1953; Jack Gore (President of Beaumont A&M Club) to Shivers, March 4, 1953; Rod D. Gambrell (owned Dallas building company called Gambrell and Company) to Shivers, March 4, 1953; R.C. Allen (Class of 1938) to Shivers, March 3, 1953; telegram from Price Campbell (Class of 1913 and member of Executive Committee Aggie Club) to Shivers, March 4, 1953, Allan Shivers Papers, TSLAC, Box 1977/81-164, A&M 1953 folder.
Chapter Eleven
Research and Academic Quality: Cold War, the Cartter Rankings and Beyond
1946-1965

As noted in Chapter Seven, World War II brought the federal government into a permanent relationship with research universities. A handful of institutions produced the bulk of wartime research, but the postwar years brought unprecedented dollars and new players into the academic research community. The old guard and the "rising research universities" \(^1\) competed for funds primarily from the Department of Defense (DoD), National Institutes of Health (NIH), Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and later, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). UT became a bigger competitor and A&M became a competitor. This chapter highlights the challenges and the progress that UT and A&M made to bolster research activity and their reputations between 1946 and 1965.

Throughout this period, national policymakers criticized the concentration of federal grants at the handful of elite universities in the Northeast and California. Southern university presidents, including Gibb Gilchrist and Theophilus Painter searched for ways to increase their portion of the federal and private research budgets. In October 1950, three months after Communist-controlled North Korea crossed the thirty-eighth parallel to launch the Korean War and subsequent Cold War, Painter declared to the UT faculty: "battles are fought and won in the research laboratories of our universities just as truly as on Iwo Jima or in the skies over Germany, and today, more than ever before." The Northeastern institutions possessed 30% of government research contracts and Painter wanted UT to assume a bigger role in defense research. UT and A&M could not set the national research agenda, but they needed to get in the thick of the game. \(^2\)
National Research Agenda

In early 1945, the end of the war loomed near and FDR asked Vannevar Bush to draft a plan for how the federal government, universities, and private industry could continue to work together in the areas of national defense, medicine, and other technologies in peacetime. Bush assembled four committees to compose a blueprint for how this research should be conducted and identify strategies for recruiting and cultivating young scientists. The committees consisted of academic, corporate, government, and foundation leaders. Southern universities only contributed two members: Alton Ochsner of Tulane and Ernest Goodpasture of Vanderbilt.

Bush and his colleagues made many recommendations but the most important was that basic research had to take precedence. The Committee on Science and the Public Welfare, chaired by Johns Hopkins President Isaiah Bowman, argued that government should fund, but not dictate research agendas. Americans had always been wary of strong, centralized government, but the tragedies wrought by totalitarian systems such as those in Germany, Italy, Japan, as well as the Soviet Union, its communist ally, strengthened this fear.³

Most of the great discoveries of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries originated through basic research in Europe. Americans then took European technology and created their own versions of such devices as the automobile and radio. Europeans had deciphered various scientific laws related to matter and energy and Americans had succeeded in applying these laws to weaponry and electrically powered apparatus. Americans could no longer depend upon the now decimated European centers of research to provide them with basic knowledge. Now a superpower, the U.S. needed to lead and win the "world-wide battle against ignorance, want, and disease."⁴

Universities were ideal locations to conduct pure research, for they had devoted the bulk of their endeavors to this variety. College laboratories were places where both team initiatives
and individual projects took place in an environment that was largely protected from external political pressures. Universities had struggled for years to win academic freedom for faculty and could effectively maintain a buffer zone between scientists and a government that pushed for immediate practical results.\textsuperscript{5}

Bush and his colleagues called for a replacement for the OSRD, which would cease operation after the war. The proposed national research foundation would function as an independent body charged with dispensing federal aid to the most qualified scientists. President Truman supported the Bush report upon its release in July 1945 and Congress quickly initiated discussions regarding the formation of a national research body. Debates over the structure, purpose, and degree of accountability to Congress and the executive budget office, however, delayed the establishment of the National Science Foundation (NSF) until 1950. While Congress failed to establish the NSF during the initial attempt of 1946, it approved the AEC, the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the Public Health Service. Bush's national science foundation lost its chance to set the American research agenda and settled for filling the left over space.\textsuperscript{6} Table 11-1 reveals that DoD spending to universities decreased after the Korean War, while the NSF experienced a drastic increase in its budget as the 1950s progressed. Research funding was distributed in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1958 (est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
<td>$25,586,000</td>
<td>$20,705,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Navy</td>
<td>$45,164,000</td>
<td>$23,337,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Air Force</td>
<td>$30,412,000</td>
<td>$42,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
<td>$16,563,000</td>
<td>$35,536,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Health, Education, and Welfare</td>
<td>$19,157,000</td>
<td>$76,813,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Science Foundation</td>
<td>$1,441,000</td>
<td>$28,739,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$3,370,000</td>
<td>$38,383,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$141,693,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$265,813,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scientific Research and Development in Colleges and Universities: Expenditures and Manpower, 1953-54, National Science Foundation, 42; Government-University Relationships in Federally Sponsored Scientific Research and Development, 1958, National Science Foundation, 5.
Between 1945 and the Soviet launch of Sputnik I and II in 1957, with the exception of NIH grants, the bulk of federal research dollars were distributed to universities to conduct programmatic research. Geiger argues that Sputnik generated enough fear to convince Congress and various agencies to increase funding for basic research. Due to both Sputnik and Kennedy's 1961 pledge to land an American on the moon by the close of the decade, federal spending for university research increased from $456 million in 1958 to $1.3 billion in 1964. Incidentally, Time magazine named "The American Scientist" men of the year in December 1960. The annual cover featured fifteen men, twelve of who held professorships in the top research universities. More than ever, scientific research and widespread educational opportunity could strengthen America and enable its citizens to rescue the world from communism and a battery of other destructive isms.

**Gearing Up For Research at UT and A&M**

UT and A&M increased research spending and activities after World War II in part because there were dramatically greater federal and foundation funds available. Research dollars were no longer limited to Geiger's sixteen. UT, A&M, UNC, and even Florida State, previously a female teachers college, could play a major role in national knowledge production. Equally important, UT and A&M made internal changes that improved, albeit gradually, the commitment to research and the caliber of faculty. These internal changes included administrative reorganization, the establishment of internal fundraising units and faculty development programs, and strong presidential leadership.

**Administrative Reorganization**

A&M reorganized and appointed Gibb Gilchrist as chancellor following the student uprising in 1947. After years of stagnation under T.O. Walton, Gilchrist encouraged his deans
and department heads to streamline their respective units and to provide him with ideas for transforming the College into a viable research university. Incredibly open to debate and innovation, Gilchrist accepted David Williams' plan to place the agricultural experiment station, extension service, and the agricultural department under the same leadership in order to integrate teaching and research. A&M would likewise combine its vet school and the veterinary experiment program into a single unit in 1948. Williams first proposed this structure around 1920, but a senior administrator informed the young faculty member: "If you can't work for the organization like it is, you can leave it." Williams did not find himself in a position to propose improvements until 1946 when he was appointed vice president of the agriculture division. During this reorganization of the agriculture and veterinary science programs, Williams, Ide Trotter, director of agricultural extension, R.D. Lewis, director of the agricultural experiment station, R.C. Dunn, dean of veterinary science, and others began meeting in 1946 to discuss reorganization plans. The group concluded that A&M required "a big shake-up." As a first step, these leaders wanted to eliminate any department head who was not optimally qualified to lead a graduate and research program. Gilchrist endorsed this plan and William's team moved forward. According to H.O. Kunkel, A&M professor and later dean of the College of Agriculture (1967-1978), progress was immediate. A&M graduated six Ph.D.s between 1940 and 1948 and 150 from 1949-1958.

The UT Regents discussed plans for administrative reorganization in early 1950 and decided to hire a chancellor to oversee the whole system so that the president could be free to lead the Austin campus. This first reorganization plan was short-lived. Desperate to return to research and teaching, Theophilus Painter, whose accomplishments as president are discussed a little later, announced his resignation as president of UT in March 1952. The Regents had selected James P. Hart, associate justice of the Texas Supreme Court, as UT's first chancellor in
July 1950. But, Hart stayed a little over three years and announced his resignation in September 1953. He stated that it was time for him to return to his law practice. The Regents needed yet another administrative plan. They began by hiring Logan Wilson, provost of the Consolidated University of North Carolina, to replace Painter in 1953. A UT graduate, the Regents believed that Wilson fulfilled their qualifications: excellent administrative and leadership skills, a productive scholar, faith in God, a supporter of capitalism, and an opponent of all isms "except Americanism." Pleased with Wilson's administrative skills, the Regents approved another reorganization plan in September 1954 and placed him as head of both the Austin campus and the system. Perhaps more important to the advancement of research, the Regents appointed Paul Boner, Professor of Physics, as the first Vice President of Academic Affairs during this September 1954 meeting. Boner possessed a national reputation as a pioneer in acoustics and proved to be an effective motivator and role model for aspiring researchers at UT. In addition, the Regents appointed vice presidents for fiscal affairs, developmental affairs (not fundraising, but planning), and a dean of student services. The appointment of these vice presidents helped the burgeoning UT increase administrative efficiency and focus its various research goals.

**Internal Fundraising Units**

In addition to the funds awarded by the federal government and philanthropic foundations, each institution formed internal foundations. Gibb Gilchrist created the Texas A&M Research Foundation (AMRF) in 1944. The AMRF consisted of a fifteen-member governing board and totaled fifty individuals, largely alumni. This group awarded research grants in a variety of areas including meteorology, oceanography, and petroleum engineering. The AMRF dispensed $157,300 in the first year: $4800 sponsored by Owens-Corning for the desalting of crude petroleum, $112,500 with public utility companies in Texas to study electric
power transmission and distribution systems, $30,000 with Westinghouse for a mass spectrograph project, and $10,000 from Dow Chemical and Carbon and Carbide Chemical Corporation to improve hurricane tracking. By 1946, that figure had increased to $470,000. The Foundation went on to fund the Oceanography Department in 1950 with accompanying storm lab in 1954. By 1956, the AMFR gave out $800,000 for seventy projects.\textsuperscript{17}

UT established a similar organization in the mid-1930s under the direction of Hulon Black and an advisory council headed by Houston businessman Hines Baker. Over the years, the University of Texas Development Board (UTDB) raised money to fund important projects that could not be supported by state appropriations or University funds alone. The M.D. Anderson hospital, the Institute for Latin American Studies, and the Marine Science Institute were some of the more notable examples. The UTDB worked with the M.D. Anderson Foundation to provide the land and buildings for what would become a top cancer hospital.\textsuperscript{18} With the help of the UTDB and the Legislature, UT was able to add a number of units to its medical research program including M.D. Anderson (1941), as well as UT Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas (1943), UT Postgraduate School of Medicine at Houston (1948), South Texas Medical School (1959, now the UT Health Science Center at San Antonio), and UT Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences at Houston (1963).\textsuperscript{19}

Beginning in the 1940s, a number of UT departments established foundations in order to solicit greater support for research. Between 1947 and 1955, departmental foundations raised $279,490.22 for salary supplements, scholarships, and research grants. The zoology department created one of the most successful foundations in 1952 with the help of the UTDB. The Development Office managed and solicited these funds for research, fieldwork, travel, graduate study, and undergraduate education in genetics. By 1967, the Genetics Foundation boasted a budget of $902,471.\textsuperscript{20}
UT and A&M also combined their resources to engage in research. They jointly established the Texas Petroleum Research Committee in 1947 under the direction of R.L. Whiting. In 1952, the first year in operation, the Regents approved $17,500 for the secondary recovery of oil, with the understanding that the institutions would seek legislative appropriations to substitute AUF disbursements. This unit still possessed a modest budget of $120,000 in 1967, but it produced useful findings related to oil recovery.21

**Faculty Development**

In addition to these fundraising programs, UT and A&M introduced efforts to improve the quality of their faculty. Theophilus Painter asked the UT Faculty Council to formalize promotion and tenure policies for the first time in 1945. Under Dudley Woodward, the Regents were now committed to following AAUP guidelines regarding promotion and tenure in order to remove the scar inflicted by the 1945 censure. Instructors and assistant professors would be notified during their fourth year whether they would be promoted or dismissed and would be given time to seek other employment. Faculty reaction was mixed. Those in favor of the measure wanted to encourage research activities and those against believed that UT was not ready to function as a full-fledged research institution.22

After his initial effort in 1945, Painter asked the Faculty Council to revisit the promotion process in 1949. The Faculty Council concluded that individuals would need to produce a detailed statement of their research activity in order to be considered for a promotion from assistant to associate professor. The Regents quickly accepted the Council's recommendation. The 1949 promotion policy, combined with the 1945 codification of a tenure timeline, were important steps towards retaining the best faculty. Looking back on his tenure appointment in 1943, Archie Straiton stated that he received tenure based on nothing more than a minor publication and no evaluation of his research potential. UT would never become a "university of
the first class" with these lax rules. The Faculty Council also implored departments to apportion teaching loads and administrative duties to faculty while placing a high priority on research time. After several discussions between the faculty and the Regents, UT finally adopted the "up or out" rule in 1953 and extended the tenure clock from four to six years to give individuals adequate time to produce scholarship that would prove their worth to the institution.23

In contrast, A&M weathered these years without a formal tenure and promotion policy. Gilchrist certainly pushed to make research a greater priority at A&M, as did his successors. Available records, however, do not indicate that the faculty or the Directors adopted a formal policy until after the AAUP censured the institution in 1967, a story that extends beyond the constraints of the study.24 Nevertheless, President Gilchrist played a vital role in making research a primary mission at A&M. Finally, the previously mentioned doctoral training program, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, provided A&M with a way to train young faculty who possessed promise but lacked advanced research training and credentials. The sort of "housecleaning" and elimination of 'deadwood' that Gibb Gilchrist, David Williams, and others advocated at A&M was a crucial step towards making it a competitive research institution.25

**Leadership and Institutional Commitment**

Campus leaders certainly played an enormous role in increasing UT and A&M's participation in the national research economy during the Cold War era.26 At the same time, other factors such as segregation posed as distractions, even obstacles, towards UT's goal of becoming a top tier (second tier was never on the list of aspirations) research university and A&M's of becoming more of a land-grant university and less a of military academy with a few agricultural experiment stations. Nevertheless, there were palpable changes in the campus commitments to research with the arrival of Theophilus Painter and Gibb Gilchrist.
As for UT, Harry Benedict (1927-1937) and Homer Rainey (1938-1944) possessed a fervent desire for UT to become a top tier research university, however, they lacked the necessary enticements to build a research-oriented faculty. Low salaries, along with the threat of political interference from corporate and state government officials proved to be their greatest impediments in recruiting star researchers. The scarlet "C" bestowed upon UT by the AAUP, along with the probation sentence from the SACS, hindered Theophilus Painter's (1944-1952) efforts to woo researchers to UT. While Painter was not necessarily more committed to a research mission for UT, he was in a better position to push the goal through both rhetoric and action.

Dudley Woodward was in many ways Painter's greatest asset. As Chair of the Regents (1944-1952), he served as the chief spokesman for the 1947 College Building Amendment and spoke publicly and passionately about the need for more labs and research facilities. Woodward also cared about restoring UT's reputation with its benefactors. Concerned that UT might lose the Benjamin Clayton Biochemical Foundation's support following the Rainey episode, Woodward attempted a degree of damage control by writing Ben Clayton a letter of reassurance. Woodward proclaimed to Clayton that UT was already regaining respect in the academic world. The new group of Regents had strengthened their commitment to organized research with Theophilus Painter as president: "the attitude….is in fact one of genuine appreciation and enthusiasm…of investigations worthy of the name research….Much of the Board's attitude with reference to research is no doubt due to Dr. Painter's wholesome influence." Woodward rightly credited this new research commitment to Painter. The new president was not necessarily more fixed upon a research mission for UT than Rainey had been. Painter, however, possessed diplomatic skills that Rainey lacked. His correspondence with Woodward reveals that Painter could project himself as both a competent scientist and a good ole boy. Painter did not ooze the
intellectual elitism that Regents found so distasteful in Rainey. Theophilus Painter could hunt, tell off-color jokes, and introduce the Regents to his colleagues in the NAS or his research benefactors from the Rockefeller Foundation -- all in an afternoon. He was a geneticist (Rainey, in contrast, held degrees in education) who cared much for scientific inquiry and little for the politically liberal causes Rainey took up as president and soon after as a gubernatorial candidate.28

Painter's successor Logan Wilson (1953-1960) came to UT without any distinguishably different goals or methods for improving UT's status as a research university. He appeared before the Texas House Appropriations Committee and pleaded the same case that those before him had for adequate funds to compensate faculty, increase library holdings, and to raise appropriations per student.29 As will be seen in Chapter Twelve, Harry Ransom (1960-1971) did not stray from the course towards becoming a research university that could lead even beyond the South. Critics such as Ronnie Dugger have contended that Ransom devoted himself to amassing materials for the Humanities Research Center and perhaps ignored the needs of other disciplines. Ransom's influence on scientific research warrants additional study. Regardless of Ransom's potential shortcomings, Norman Hackerman, chemistry professor and UT's provost/vice chancellor of academic affairs (1961-1967), certainly compensated for Ransom's lack of enthusiasm for science.

The influence that administrative leaders had on research competitiveness at A&M is more difficult to analyze. Gilchrist made research a more important goal with the help of individuals such as David Williams. Various A&M publications hail Marion Thomas Harrington (president 1950-1953, 1957-1959 and chancellor of the A&M System 1953-1965) as one of its greatest leaders, but little evidence of his influence is available at the Cushing Archives. David Morgan (1953-1956) spent the lion's share of his presidency in conflict with the Directors and
left abruptly in December 1956. Earl Rudder was a military man, but he was firmly bound to advancing A&M past its outmoded traditions. A&M's true conversion into a second-tier research university, however, would not occur until the 1970s and 1980s.

As described earlier in this chapter, UT and A&M made admirable advancements as research institutions between 1945 and 1965. Part of each one's success can be attributed to strong presidential leadership, greater commitment towards research from the Regents and Directors, and regional philanthropic support. A gradual increase in gubernatorial and legislative appreciation for graduate education and organized research, and the level of funding that these endeavors required, initially from Beauford Jester, Allan Shivers, and the various legislators who supported the 1947 building amendment and most particularly from Governor John Connally (his efforts are detailed in Chapter Twelve), helped as well. As described in the following sections, the Texas institutions indeed became notable players in the national research economy between 1945 and 1965.

**Atomic Energy Commission**

Congress established the AEC in 1947, but the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 most clearly described the agency's purpose and structure. The Act called for civilian research on atomic energy that would advance the American standard of living as well as strengthen national defense. The AEC oversaw three research areas: high-energy physics, nuclear reactors, and weaponry. High-energy physics occurred largely at a set of national laboratories including Los Alamos (New Mexico), Oak Ridge (Tennessee), Argonne (Illinois), the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley, and the Brookhaven National Laboratory (operated by a university Consortium on Long Island) in the 1950s and 1960s. The AEC funded the Stanford Linear Electron Accelerator in 1962 at a cost of $100 million, but rejected a proposal by the Midwest
Universities Research Association to build a similar facility. Critics accused the AEC of regional favoritism, but the debate died down when the National Accelerator Lab was placed in Weston, Illinois.\textsuperscript{31}

Texas institutions did not boast a national laboratory, however UT, A&M, and the Rice Institute made substantial advances. As of 1946, Rice possessed the only nuclear accelerator in the former Confederacy outside of the Oakridge Lab. Rice graduate Emmett Hudspeth joined the UT faculty after the War and constructed a 4-MeV (Mega-electron Volts) Van de Graaff accelerator in 1950. Duke University and Rice Institute built facilities to house Van de Graaff accelerators in 1952 and 1953 respectively. In exchange, the AEC awarded a 4-MeV accelerator to Duke, and a 5.5-MeV to Rice. Oakridge possessed the most powerful conventional nuclear instrument in the world, a 23-MeV cyclotron in 1950 and an additional 27-MeV cyclotron in 1952. UT, Duke, Rice, and the Oakridge Lab led nuclear research in the South until Virginia, Florida State, and Texas A&M joined their ranks in 1960. Between 1946 and 1965, the AEC provided the most funds for equipment and maintenance to the following Southern universities:

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Institution & Operating Funds and Capital Equipment \\
\hline
1. University of Tennessee & $10,195,726 \\
2. University of Virginia & $5,109,684 \\
3. Duke & $4,764,388 \\
4. Florida State & $4,065,670 \\
5. Rice & $3,792,097 \\
6. University of Texas & $3,460,099 \\
7. University of Maryland & $3,076,792 \\
8. University of Arkansas & $2,646,228 \\
9. Georgia Tech & $2,235,394 \\
10. University of Florida & $2,151,801 \\
13. Texas A&M & $1,452,000 (prior to completion of cyclotron) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{AEC Disbursements to Southern/Border Universities}
\end{table}


Aside from these universities, Oakridge, and Los Alamos, large-scale AEC support was non-existent elsewhere in the South and Southwest.\textsuperscript{32}
Texas scientists and lawmakers desperately want to fill this gap by constructing a nuclear laboratory in Austin. The Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation (Convair) offered to direct a fundraising campaign for the construction of a nuclear reactor in October 1954. In addition, the Officers and Directors of the General Dynamics Corporation offered to support the reactor and a nuclear research and training program for at least five years. The Regents agreed to pursue this $1,000,000 project. UT, A&M, the Rice Institute, and the Robert Welch Foundation then joined forces in 1956 to submit a proposal to the AEC for the construction of a nuclear reactor with a price tag of $25,000,000. These institutions would form the Southwest Nuclear Research Corporation (SNRC) to be located in Austin. The union would last for fifty years under the supervision of an eight-member board made up of two representatives from each organization. The AEC rejected the proposal based on the excessive size and scope of the program submitted. The AEC, however, encouraged the SNRC to modify their proposal and build a smaller reactor and request funds to purchase teaching equipment. The institutions then dissolved their partnership and pursued separate, smaller-scale projects.33

A&M had already received a $300,000 NSF grant and the Directors had approved $550,000 from the AUF in 1959 to build and furnish its Nuclear Science Center that opened in 1961. A&M accepted the Welch Foundation's offer of assistance to build an 88-inch, high current variable energy cyclotron. Contingent on the AEC's approval, the Directors would issue $2,000,000 from the AUF, $1,000,000 from Welch, and $3,000,000 from the AEC. This contract was ratified on April 25, 1964. In the midst of the turmoil related to the decision to admit women, President Rudder named George Igo, a young scientist from Berkeley's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, as the first director of the Cyclotron Institute in May 1963. The Cyclotron Institute was the fourth such structure to be built on a college campus and the only one in the South when it opened in 1967.34
In January 1960, the UT Regents approved the $15 million Science Research Institute (SRI). Though not limited to nuclear physics, the SRI would begin with a $3 million tandem electrostatic accelerator (high energy accelerator) and accompanying low energy accelerators, under the leadership of Bernhard Kinsey, director of the UT Center for Nuclear Physics. It became the Fusion Research Center in 1966 in cooperation with the Texas Atomic Energy Foundation, a consortium of ten Texas utilities companies.35

Mission Control in Texas?

Senator Lyndon Johnson served as the chief sponsor of the 1958 bill that created NASA. LBJ then convinced Kennedy to place him over NASA when he became vice president in 1961. Frequently accused of scheming to secure a substantial portion of NASA resources for Texas, Johnson and his state commanded a bounty for its corporations but only modest grants for its universities in the early years. Johnson and Houston Congressman Olin Teague were rumored to have bullied a number of individuals in order to get the Manned Spacecraft Center (renamed the Johnson Space Center in 1972) for Houston in 1961.36 No matter how hard these politicians tried, Rice Institute, the University of Houston, A&M, and UT, the state's four largest educational beneficiaries of NASA grants, did not begin to garner figures close to MIT or Cal Tech. NASA eventually awarded A&M the Center for Space Power, but that story falls into another era.

While university research constituted a mere 2% of NASA's total budget in the mid-1960s, it supported 9.4% of federally sponsored research on campuses. NASA disbursed $30 million to universities in 1962, $87 million in 1963, and $108 million in 1964. Nearly 40% of these 1964 funds were earmarked for project research, 25% for specific applied projects, and 35% for the "Sustaining University Program" (SUP). The SUP funds supported graduate
research assistantships, building construction, and basic research and averaged $40 million annually between 1963 and 1967. Between 1959 and 1965, UT received $3,947,591, A&M $2,831,404, and the University of Houston $855,006. The tiny Rice University outperformed all three by bringing in $4,697,756 from NASA and awarding a Ph.D. in space science by 1966. The State's leader trailed MIT, the national leader, by approximately $18 million.37

National Private Foundations and Research at UT and A&M

The Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation continued to support university research during the Cold War era, but the Ford Foundation took over as the top private benefactor. Rockefeller and Carnegie had supported institutions outside the United States before 1941, but each increased their support and poured millions into cultural exchange, language, and area studies after the war. UT and A&M benefited most from Ford and Rockefeller and significantly less from Carnegie support. Between 1960 and 1964, Carnegie awarded UT $82,200 to fund graduate study and research on thought processes and $10,000 to send faculty to the Autonomous University of Guadalajara.38 A&M received no support from the Carnegie Corporation. Although they trailed behind the research powerhouses, Texas institutions enjoyed generous support from Houston's Robert Welch Foundation as well, particularly in chemistry and physics.

While UT's BSSR received the greatest support from the RF in the 1920s and 1930s, the Institute for Latin American Studies, the zoology department, and various international initiatives received the bulk of these grants in the Cold War era. The Institute for Latin American Studies received funds for travel and to bring Daniel Cosío from Colegio de México as a visiting lecturer. Another award ($38,000) went to bring Gunnar Mendoza, the national archivist and librarian of Bolivia, and an advisory group to Austin to compile bibliographical
sources on Latin American history. The Institute received its most generous grant from the RF, $100,000 between 1964 and 1968, to establish an Inter-American book center in Mexico City.

The RF congratulated the zoology department, with its enormous fruit fly collection, for its research accomplishments over the past twenty-three years in 1959 by dispensing a gift of $40,000 to continue this work with drosophila. This brought RF support for zoology, which began in 1936, to $310,520. Rockefeller funded a number of English as a second language programs (ESL) in the 1950s and 1960s including $71,000 to train instructors to work in Egypt (1957), $70,288 to send UT teachers to the University of Valle Cali in Colombia between 1962 and 1964, and a $45,000 extension of this grant in 1964. 39

Rockefeller aided A&M as well; first with doctoral scholarships for promising young faculty under the age of thirty-five and a decade later with project research grants. Gilchrist and his lieutenants knew that A&M would not become a major contender in the research world until a substantial portion of its faculty obtained Ph.D.s. In 1946, Gilchrist appealed to the RF to finance a doctoral training program for young A&M faculty. Over the next ten years, numerous men left the sweltering College Station summer to attend a variety of Ph.D. programs at Northeastern universities. Vice Chancellor of Agriculture (1946-1956) and Acting President (December 1956-September 1957) David Williams contended that this doctoral training program proved to be a major step in improving the faculty at A&M. 40 After a decade of efforts towards faculty development, the RF sponsored notable research at A&M for the first time. Between 1955 and 1957, the A&M Rice Pasture Experiment Station in Beaumont had hosted approximately 100 visitors from twenty-one countries. Impressed by this effort, the RF awarded A&M with a three-year $30,000 grant to administer a rice production program to foreign visitors. The rice program received an additional three-year grant of $28,500 in 1960. Additionally, the RF provided animal husbandry professor William Ellis with a five-year $62,850 award to study
nutrition problems in ruminant animals in 1962 and I.M. Atkins with $15,000 to conduct research on feral oats at the Agricultural Experiment Station in 1963. A&M was finally receiving financial support for agricultural research beyond the standard federal land-grant disbursements.41

The Ford Foundation assisted both institutions in international endeavors and engineering education. UT received $65,000 to administer ESL programs, including one in the United Arab Republic in 1963. Ford appropriated $100,000 to A&M in 1960 to prepare its faculty for overseas assignments. UT received $25,000 in 1961 for an exchange program with faculty from Yugoslavia. The UT Institution for Latin American Studies joined Berkley, UCLA, Harvard, Minnesota, and Columbia in a three-year $1 million program to send a minimum of twelve scholars per campus to Latin American nations to engage in research beginning in 1962. The Institute received an additional $575,000 in 1964, as part of a Latin American program that included the University of Chicago ($150,000), Cornell ($550,000), Columbia ($125,000), and the Library of Congress ($250,000). UT was now leading the nation in the study of Latin American history and culture. The largest humanities gift was earmarked for a national literary translation center. Harry Ransom lobbied hard for this $750,000 program that was established in 1965. As part of a program to extend the capacities of smaller foundations, Ford bestowed the Hogg Foundation, housed at UT, with $550,000 to administer matching grants for community initiatives in 1963.

The Ford Foundation funded A&M's participation in agricultural training programs in the Dominican Republic and Coahuila, Mexico. A&M received an initial $81,600 to provide training to Dominican farmers in 1963 and a subsequent $547,500 to set up a research center the following year. Under the direction of researchers at Iowa State, A&M used $65,000 from Ford
to send consultants to the University of Coahuila in 1965. These consultants prepared individuals to pursue agronomy at the college level or to assist agricultural extension agents.

In addition to these international programs, the Ford Foundation launched efforts to improve the nation's engineering departments. Similar to previous efforts to bolster the best programs, Ford launched its first effort in 1959 and gave Stanford $3.4 million and Princeton $2.5 million primarily for graduate education and organized research. The Foundation then provided UT, Georgia Tech, the University of Florida, and North Carolina State with $3.1 million for faculty recruitment and development. As the institutions that awarded virtually all of the doctorates in engineering in the South, these schools needed more support to lead the region in expanded engineering research. Faculty recruitment was a good first step and UT received $975,000 towards this effort. Three years later, Ford provided A&M engineering students with $100,000 in forgivable loans if they completed their doctorates and became faculty members.42

Regional Foundation Support for UT and A&M

National foundations and federal agencies did not claim exclusive control over the research budgets at UT and A&M. Texan organizations such as the Hogg Foundation for Mental Hygiene (changed to Mental Health in the late fifties), the Benjamin Clayton Foundation for Research, and the Welch Foundation contributed substantial funds. The Hogg Foundation, founded by Ima Hogg on behalf of her family in 1940, was quickly approved as an institutional unit by the UT Regents and spent its first fifteen years delivering lectures, radio programs, and pamphlets alerting citizens to the need for reform in mental health treatment and facilities. Beginning in 1955, the Hogg Foundation dispensed research and travel grants to UT faculty. As noted in previous chapters, the Hoggs were faithful advocates for UT, and, not surprisingly, wanted to assist the institution.43
Benjamin Clayton, provided UT with several grants beginning in 1935 to fund projects in cotton root rot and brucellosis (a bacterial disease). Clayton's greatest contribution, however, was funding for the biochemical institute that bears his name. The Regents established the Clayton Biochemical Institute (CBI) and appointed Roger J. Williams as director in 1940. Archival materials do not reveal why Clayton decided to bestow his riches from Clayton, Anderson & Company, the nation's largest cotton firm in the 1920s and 1930s, upon UT. In his historical sketch of the CBI, Roger Williams writes that he and Clayton shared an interest in cancer research and agreed that any discoveries pertaining to causes or treatment would take years and would hence require sustained financial support. Williams and Clayton developed an amiable relationship that lasted from the time Williams arrived at UT in 1939 until Clayton's death in 1978. The Clayton Foundation for Research provided the CBI with approximately $75,000 during the war. It was during these years that Esmond Snell, a recent graduate from the University of Wisconsin, discovered folic acid. During the postwar era, Clayton contributed between 61% and 80% of the budget for the Biochemical Institute (Table 11-3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Clayton Contribution</th>
<th>UT Contribution</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-1946</td>
<td>$27,500</td>
<td>$17,355.35</td>
<td>$44,855.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-1950</td>
<td>$67,500</td>
<td>$23,692</td>
<td>$91,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>$123,594.33</td>
<td>$30,552</td>
<td>$154,146.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Williams directed the CBI between 1940 and 1963 and was joined by a number of productive researchers who remained at UT for decades. Educated at the University of the Redlands (BA) and the University of Chicago (Ph.D.), Williams discovered and/or coined a number of substances including pantothenic acid in 1933 (pantothen is Greek for "from everywhere"), folic acid (extracted from spinach and named for folium, Latin for leaf), and genetotrophic disease in 1949, (referring to a disease that possesses both nutritional and genetic...
Lester Reed, who succeeded Williams as director in 1963, discovered lipoic acid, a compound that influences the body's metabolism of glucose, in 1950. These three men were members of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and Snell was nominated for a Nobel Prize in chemistry multiple times. Together with Robert Eakin, William Shive, and a host of additional researchers, the CBI faculty discovered more vitamins than any research entity in the world between 1940 and 1963. Williams (1939-1963), Shive (1944-1987), Snell (1939-1945, 1951-1956, & 1976-1980), Reed (1948-1996), and Eakin (1946-1976) turned in long terms of service to UT. It is hard to find a definitive reason as to why these talented men remained committed to the CBI. They were no better compensated than their counterparts in other departments at UT. With the exception of Snell, who left to head up the biochemistry department at Berkeley in 1956, although he returned to Austin upon reaching the mandatory retirement age in California in 1976, the Institute's faculty remained at UT. The Clayton Foundation partially relieved UT's burden for the labs, equipment, graduate student stipends, salaries, and travel funds required for these men to advance their research. Roger Williams attributed the Institute's ability to retain its faculty to the equally autonomous and collaborative work environment. Individuals possessed the freedom to define their own research agendas and access to relatively good material resources. In spite of the freedom to explore individual interests, the Institute faculty performed much of their work together and with researchers in related departments. Clayton dollars helped, but the organizational structure and the research ethos of the organization mattered as well.46

Chemistry and physics benefited enormously from the generosity of the Robert A. Welch Foundation, whose governing board included Glenn Seaborg from the AEC. Upon his death in 1952, Robert Welch established a fund valued at $25 million by 1954 to support chemical and other scientific research in Texas. The Welch foundation supported and continues to support the
A&M Cyclotron Institute. Every Texas four-year college received support from Welch, but UT, A&M, and Rice garnered the largest portion of its annual appropriations for research.

**Table 11-4 Robert A. Welch Awards, 1959 -- 1965**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;M</td>
<td>$944,077.40 (14 grants)</td>
<td>$1,899,533.66 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UT</td>
<td>$1,137,309 (16)</td>
<td>$3,168,841.14 (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>$842,988.11 (16)</td>
<td>$2,150,672.37 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Budget</td>
<td>$4,477,908.81</td>
<td>$18,609,564.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to research grants, Welch established lecture fellowships and endowed professorships to assist the colleges in bringing promising talent to Texas. UT, A&M, and Rice each received $650,000 from the endowed faculty program during its inaugural run in 1961-1962. Welch expanded the program to include the University of Houston, Texas Tech, and Baylor University in 1964-1965. The second set of schools each received $1 million annually for the program.

**Stratification and Federal Research**

UT, A&M, and the rest of the emerging research universities increased their share of the research economy during the Cold War era. Nevertheless, lawmakers questioned the awarding of federal grants to a handful of elite universities. Questions and criticisms continued in the fifties and sixties. Should the federal agencies support the best departments and research centers, many of which were located at private colleges? Or, should the wealth be spread to include any institution that possessed a faculty capable of conducting research within the nation? Graham and Diamond provided an excellent treatment of these questions in their 1997 study of rising research institutions in the post-War II era. Likewise, Geiger described the often lop-sided distribution of federal and foundation disbursements to approximately twenty institutions (UT among them in the in the second tier) during these years. Leaders such as Beardsley Ruml and
Wickcliffe Rose in the 1920s, Vannevar Bush and James Conant in the 1940s and 1950s, and Glenn Seaborg in the sixties believed in "making the peaks higher."49

Did Harvard and Columbia, Berkeley and Wisconsin command such a large share of the nation's research budget because they employed the best scientists, administered the best graduate programs, or graduated the nation's most competent undergraduates? These same institutions certainly ranked highest in virtually every study conducted to identify the best departments and colleges. And, why not? Five universities graduated 55.4% of American Nobel laureates. Sociologist Robert Merton pondered whether the presence of these Nobel winners at Harvard, Berkeley, Columbia, and the University of Chicago gave these colleges an edge and pushed institutions with lesser known scientists out of the competition for money and prestige. The Nobel Foundation could never recognize all deserving contributions, particularly during times of astounding scientific advancement. Once a scientist won a Nobel Prize, he/she belonged to the club and could attract financial support indefinitely. Merton concluded: "centers of demonstrated scientific excellence are allocated far larger resources for investigation than centers which have yet to make their mark."50

Merton merely pontificated, but members of Congress conducted hearings to investigate why a concentrated group of institutions in the Northeast, Midwest, and West received a disproportionate amount of federal funds. These same institutions also seemed to possess a monopoly on the most promising scholars. In 1963, the House Committee on Science concluded that government agencies should continue to support the top research centers and departments. At the same time, more needed to be done to improve those institutions, particularly in the South, that had yet to receive substantial federal research support. Most involved in the 1963 hearings agreed that efforts to redistribute the allocation of research dollars would be foolish.51
The U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare returned to the question of research dollar distribution in June and July of 1965. University presidents, representatives from NSF, AEC, and numerous other units testified over eight days. Producing 954 pages of letters, statistical tables, and testimony, the *Impact of Federal Research and Development Policies on Scientific and Technical Manpower* provided no clear-cut answer to the problem. Speaking for the NSF, Bowen Dees defended the organization's practice of awarding grants to the strongest institutions as "natural and logical." When asked how to attract more top scientists to second tier schools, one expert noted that research centers were sprouting up all over the country. Institutions could attract top scholars, even if they were located in less desirable locations such as Texas. Democrats Robert Duncan of Oregon and Weston Vivian of Michigan, continued to call for a more balanced distribution of federal grants. Lyndon Johnson agreed and released a statement on September 14, 1965 calling for broader institutional participation in this federal bounty.52

Texas Governor John Connally expressed grave concern for the deficiencies present within the State's borders. Highlighted in greater detail in Chapter Twelve, Connally urged the Texas Legislature to approve substantial salary increases and a more powerful state coordinating board. Texas colleges could catch up to the top performers, but not through federal pity grants. Once again, UT and A&M certainly ranked ahead of most Southern universities and the progress made by each should not be discounted. Neither, however, could be described as a "first class" research institution. Three years after LBJ issued his executive order, A&M garnered the most support from the USDA. UT turned in its strongest performance in support from the DoD, but A&M trailed the significantly smaller Duke University by more than $2 million. With NASA planted firmly in Houston, Rice commanded nearly eight times more than A&M, whose $509,000 constituted a mere 21.8% of New Mexico State's NASA budget. UT and A&M's
combined budget from NSF constituted 54.2% of Florida State's support, neither a flagship nor a land-grant college, from the NSF.

The funding totals compiled in Table 11-5 tell the observer nothing about how these figures translated into library resources, the quality of graduate programs and the actual research completed by faculty. Geiger contended that a lack of research dollars was not the chief problem for UT and other second tier institutions. The greatest challenge was in attracting qualified researchers and graduate students. Aggregated numbers also hide the entire landscape of research at the various institutions. An institution could have received the majority of federal funds to support a handful of special programs. Often less expensive, research in the social sciences and humanities are largely ignored here since most federal spending went for projects in engineering, biomedical and physical sciences, and agriculture.\textsuperscript{53} Research expenditures are a useful variable for measuring institutional success, but reputational rankings highlight a more provocative, if not uncontroversial, perspective.
Table 11-5 Federal Support for Research and Development by Rank, 1968 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>USDA</th>
<th>AEC</th>
<th>DoD</th>
<th>HEW</th>
<th>NASA</th>
<th>NSF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40. UT, Austin</td>
<td>40. Texas A&amp;M $10,309</td>
<td>40. Texas A&amp;M $740</td>
<td>40. Yale $1,076</td>
<td>40. Yale $11,560</td>
<td>40. Texas A&amp;M $509</td>
<td>40. UT, Austin $1,504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal Support of Research and Development at Universities and Colleges and Selected Nonprofit Institutions, Fiscal Year 1968, 15 -- 17.

*Includes Main Campus & Medical Branch $2,888, MD Anderson, $5,691, Southwestern Medical School $3,721
Academic Rankings: Hughes, Keniston, and Cartter Studies

The American obsession with collegiate rankings began decades before *U.S. News and World Report* launched its annual list for the first time in the 1980s. Kendric Babcock of the U.S. Bureau of Education released a classification guide for the AAU in 1910 in which he placed 344 colleges in four classes or tiers. Critics skewered Babcock for his highly subjective methodology. Among his critics was Syracuse President, James Day, who was alarmed to find his institution in the second class.54

Raymond Hughes (1925, 1934), Hayward Keniston (1957), and Allan Cartter (1963) conducted the most thorough assessments of academic quality. Like Babcock, these researchers were concerned with the quality of departments that offered graduate study and their faculty. Hughes asked graduate faculty in over 30 disciplines, who were deemed experts by their respective professional associations, to identify which departments met minimum standards to award the doctorate and subsequently star those they believed to rank in the top 20%. The faculty members who participated in the Hughes studies were a small group and they judged the small number of universities that even offered Ph.D.s. It was assumed that these individuals possessed adequate knowledge about every department in their chosen field. Although less comprehensive since the study was conducted for the University of Pennsylvania's own purposes, the Keniston study proceeded in the similar manner with 25 institutions and 24 disciplines represented.55 Allan Cartter's ACE (American Council on Education) survey included 107 institutions and thirty-one disciplines. While Cartter's study was methodologically superior to previous efforts, the rankings were similar to the earlier studies. Cartter limited his rankings to the disciplinary level, but H.W. Magoun calculated institutional scores soon after ACE released his findings.
### Table 11-6 Highest Ranking Institutions in Letters and Science, Hughes, Keniston, Cartter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hughes (1925)</th>
<th>Keniston (1957)</th>
<th>Cartter (1964)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty</td>
<td>Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Ohio State</td>
<td>15. Indiana</td>
<td>15. Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. New York U.</td>
<td>22. Ohio State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Duke</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


UT made a strong showing among public universities (tenth) in the lists compiled by Magoun, but Cartter's assessment of it and A&M is far more telling. Cartter asked respondents to rate both faculty and their departments by selecting one the following: distinguished, strong/extremely attractive, good/attractive, adequate plus/acceptable plus, adequate/acceptable, marginal, not sufficient to provide acceptable doctoral training, and insufficient information.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Distinguished</th>
<th>Extremely Attractive</th>
<th>Attractive</th>
<th>Acceptable Plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;M</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>Spanish (12), bacteriology/microbiology, zoology (20)</td>
<td>classics (16), English, philosophy, history, political science, sociology, biochemistry, pharmacology, physiology, psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UT</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>French, philosophy (18), history, political science, sociology, biochemistry, pharmacology, physiology, psychology</td>
<td>botany, entomology, civil engineering</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Distinguished</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Adequate Plus/Adequate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;M</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>botany (8), chemistry (23), civil engineering (12), English (23), Spanish (9), bacteriology/microbiology (14), zoology (18)</td>
<td>French, philosophy (18), history, political science, sociology, biochemistry, pharmacology, physiology, psychology</td>
<td>botany, entomology, civil engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UT</td>
<td>German (4),</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>economics, geography, pharmacology, physiology, psychology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cartter, 1966.

In addition, Cartter provided overall rankings for those classified as "leading departments." UT ranked overall in German (4), Romance Languages (15), philosophy (18), Spanish (15), sociology (18), and zoology (18). A&M possessed no leading departments.

Both institutions fell victim to Cartter's assessment of Southern higher education. Just before ACE published the study, Cartter, himself a Southerner, issued a painstakingly researched diatribe in the *Southern Economic Journal* against the Southern states and their colleges. In addition to releasing preliminary data on the region's poor performance in the ACE survey, Cartter identified problems with doctoral education, spending per student, faculty salaries, contract research dollars, the number of fellowships awarded to Southern students, and
legislative appropriations. In each case, the region performed abysmally. The Texas colleges were no exception.

Cartter's statistical summaries alone were a substantial contribution to understanding the gravity of the problem. His insights and recommendations communicated in prose were harsh and precise. Southern graduate programs were small in comparison to Keniston's top ten universities. Tenth-ranked Princeton, for example, awarded an average 227 Ph.D.s per year while Texas, the region's leader, awarded an average of 152 annually between 1953 and 1962. Texas A&M gave a mere thirty-five per year. As was the case with the remainder of the nation, the stand-alone land-grants produced far fewer doctorates than the flagship state universities. Average spending per student at all Southern universities stood at $1,199 while the institutions outside of the South that fell below the top group of colleges spent an average of $1,254 per student.56

Cartter addressed the criticisms that federal and foundation research dollars had been bestowed on far more Northeastern and Western universities, but he suggested that research productivity had been higher at these institutions than their Southern counterparts. He expressed hope for the best Southern research universities in the future, as federal agencies looked to them and beyond M.I.T., Cal Tech, Harvard, and Berkeley, each of whom would reach their maximum capacity in space and manpower, to complete projects.57

Cartter concluded that the colleges of the former Confederacy needed more money and citizen support for higher education, stronger graduate programs, and better leadership in the governor's mansion as well as the college president's office. The Southern states could quickly close part of the gap that existed with the rest of the nation by earmarking at least 13% of total state revenues for higher education. These funds should not be spent on expansion, but rather, improvement to existing programs and institutions. Without more money, for graduate education
in particular, the South would remain stuck behind in a "vicious circle" with "mediocre" 
colleges. By "vicious circle," Cartter meant that Southern schools could improve if they had 
superior graduate students, but few of the brightest scholars would want to attend one of these 
struggling schools.58

Despite their lackluster showing in Cartter's Southern survey, UT and A&M made 
laudable research gains between 1945 and 1965. These gains did not occur randomly. Cartter 
singled out UT for its strong presidential leadership between 1945 and 1965. He did not name 
Theophilus Painter, Logan Wilson, or Harry Ransom, but it was clear that he was referring to 
these men and UT faculty leaders. Cumulative improvements would take at least a generation to 
materialize. In the case of both schools, future improvement would require "brains, not 
bricks."59 As Chapter Twelve demonstrates, quality would also improve dramatically when the 
colleges abandoned their resistance to integration and increased statewide coordination.

Notes
2 "Report to the General Faculty by Theophilus S. Painter, October 10, 1950," Theophilus Painter Papers, UTCAH, 
Box 2.325/M88C, Speeches folder.
3 Vannevar Bush, Science -- The Endless Frontier, 1, 72
4 ibid., 73.
5 ibid., 73.
6 Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge, 15-19.
7 ibid., 157 -- 162, 173; Time, January 2, 1961, the twelve university researchers were affiliated with the following: 
Harvard 3, Cal Tech 2, Berkeley 2, UCLA 2, Lawrence Livermore Lab under auspices of the University of 
California 1, University of Iowa 1, University of Wisconsin 1.
8 Irwin Feller, "The Determinants of Research Competitiveness Among Universities," Competitiveness in Academic 
Research, Albert H. Teich ed. (Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1996), 35-72, 
especially 44-45.
9 David Willard Williams, interview by Henry Dethloff, September 15, 1971, Oral History Collection, Cushing 
Library, Williams' version of the statement from the former administrator on page 4 of transcript.
10 ibid., Williams quote on 5 of transcript.
11 ibid., 5-6.
Years of Science and Technology in Texas, 244.
16 UTBOR Minutes, September 12, 1953, 1-2, September 18, 1954, 1-3
18 UTBOR, January 11, 1957, 495-497.
19 http://utsystem.edu/news/UJTSystemHistory.htm
21 UTBOR Minutes, January 27, 1951; Catalogue of Research Facilities, 213.
22 UT BOR Minutes, September 28, 1945, 421-422.
25 Feller, "The Determinants of Research Competitiveness..." quoted words from 52.
27 Dudley Woodward to Benjamin Clayton, July 21, 1945, Theophilus Painter Papers, UTCAH, Box 2.325/M88C, Speeches 1944 folder.
28 See correspondence between Painter, Woodward, and additional Regents in the Theophilus Painter Papers, UTCAH, Box 2.325/M88C.
29 Logan Wilson, "Introductory Comments for the University of Texas Hearing Before House Appropriations Committee," Price Daniel Papers, SHRLRC, Box 357, UT Appropriations 56th Legislature folder.
30 For those rusty on their high school physics, such as myself, Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines high energy physics as "the study of the collision of particles accelerated to high energies."
31 Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge, 186-187.
33 UTBOR Minutes, October 29, 1954, 128-129, June 1, 1956, 743-745, September 1, 1956, 2.
34 AMBOD Minutes, September 19, 1959, 2, April 28, 1962, 7, April 25, 1964, 7; Battalion, May 7, 1963, 1.
35 UTBOR, January 22-23, 1960, 11-14; University of Texas News and Information Service News Bureau, January 23, 1960, Harry Ransom Papers, UTCAH, Box 3U374, folder 1; Claude W. Horton, "Physics," Discovery: Research and Scholarship at the University of Texas at Austin, vol. 7, no. 4, 23-25; Spencer R. Baen, "Other Energy Technologies," in 100 Years of Science and Technology in Texas, 189-191.
37 Geiger, 163, 189; NASA, Semiannual Report to Congress, 2nd through 13th reports.
40 David Willard Williams, interview by Henry Dethloff, September 15, 1971, Oral History Collection, Cushing Library, 30-31, 50 of transcript.
45 UTBOD Minutes, July 17, 1943, 358; Williams, "The Clayton Foundation…A Short History."
For a discussion about the importance of "soft" factors that can increase faculty retention, see Franklin Hoke, "Intangible Factors are Crucial in Research Universities' Quest for High Achievement in Science," *The Scientist*, 7 (March 22, 1993): 1.

Horton "Physics," in *100 Years of Science and Technology in Texas*, 155.


Graham and Diamond, 40-41.


ibid., 51.

ibid., 68.

ibid., 65; *UT Record*, Winter 1960, v. 6, no. 1, quote from 2.
Chapter Twelve

Shall We Be Moved? 1958-1965

The seven years covered in this chapter were days of great change at UT and A&M: new leadership, increased access for women and African Americans, and better salaries for faculty. Despite these changes, a number of well-worn problems remained such as racism and sexism, a lack of statewide coordination, and run-of-the-mill strife. This chapter does not end with the universities carrying the day, but it does leave the two riding towards the sunset in 1965.

The General and the Bookworm: Rudder and Ransom

By the late 1950s, A&M was in trouble. Enrollments were down, the overwhelming number of faculty were rumored to be searching for jobs elsewhere, and debate raged over the school's purpose. These conditions resulted in two divisive debates: the future of compulsory military training and the admission of women. Following a decade of short-term presidents, the Directors appointed war hero Earl Rudder, a bold and well-connected man who could make controversial decisions as well as command respect from "old army" Aggies. Rudder (1959-1970) served six years as president of the main campus and four with the added responsibility as chancellor following Marion Harrington's retirement in 1965. Rudder was not the sole architect of change at A&M, and there are those who contend that Haskell Monroe, a history professor who served as his right hand man, and Sterling Evans, chairman of the Directors, defined Rudder's agenda. It matters little who came up with the idea to finally admit women, Blacks, and white men who did not want to join the Corps. What is important is that the A&M leadership now consisted of enough individuals who wanted change and were willing to defend their actions to former students and Texas citizens. Rudder and Evans proved effective voices
for those who wanted A&M to enter the modern community of state research universities. Henry Dethloff gave substantial credit to Rudder, who "restructured, revitalized, and revolutionized the institution….built a university where a college had been" and "dispelled many of the anxieties built up during the decade between 1949 and 1958."1

Logan Wilson left UT in 1960 to lead the ACE in Washington. One year into Ransom's tenure as president, the Regents placed Harry Huntt Ransom over the system as chancellor. Joseph Smiley, president of Texas Western, served as president until 1963 when he departed to head the University of Colorado System. The Regents reorganized once again and bestowed Ransom with a dual appointment as system chancellor and president of the Austin campus.2

Ransom is best remembered for his library campaign, commitment to liberal arts, and work with Plan II, the undergraduate honors program. Ronnie Dugger suggests that Ransom's near-obsession with his quest to fortify the University's rare book collection was a prodigal exercise. Ransom's Humanities Research Center (renamed the Harry Ransom Center in 1974) included James Joyce's corrected proofs of *Ulysses* and eventually the Pforzheimer Gutenberg Bible (acquired in 1978). The Regents approved millions for some 290,000 acquisitions, but the general library lacked funds to order needed volumes.3 Dugger cites numerous ways that Ransom ignored the needs of librarians and professors, however, there is much evidence that Ransom was sensitive to UT's deficiencies. Ransom lobbied for higher salaries, more competitive admissions standards, and more funds for scientific research.

**The Chicago Tribune Survey and the Committee of Seventy**

The *Chicago Tribune* released the results of a survey conducted in 1957 entitled, "Greatest Schools in Nation." The *Tribune* asked thirty-three academic leaders, none from the
South, to identify the top ten universities, coed colleges, men's colleges, and women's colleges. Similar to the methods used by *U.S. News and World Report* beginning in the 1980s, the *Tribune* combined these subjective rankings with objective data to arrive at a final list. Leaders from the UT Ex-Students' Association were dismayed and a bit surprised to discover that UT did not rank among the top ten--not even an honorable mention. California, Michigan, and Wisconsin were the only public universities in the top ten and Illinois was recognized for its engineering program.⁴

After reviewing the *Tribune* survey and a series of articles by Richard Morehead of the *Dallas Morning News* in which he noted that UT employed an insufficient handful of preeminent faculty, Texas Exes President Sterling Holloway sent a letter to alumni alerting them to the omission in April 1958. Holloway asked alumni to ask themselves why UT had yet to become "a University of the first class." Agreeing with Morehead, Holloway proclaimed that money posed as the biggest barrier to excellence. UT could simply not afford to pay its faculty on a scale that could compete with the best universities. Only five UT professors earned $15,000 annually, compared with six faculty members at Indiana University who earned $25,000. Most UT assistant professors earned less than truck drivers.⁵

The following year, Logan Wilson addressed the House Appropriations Committee of the Fifty-sixth Legislature. He was brief and direct in his plea for adequate support. The Texas Commission on Higher Education had already cut the UT budget of much "lean meat" and the University needed every cent of the recommended $13 million. According to Wilson, Texas was a state fond of bragging about its accomplishments, but it had little to boast about when it came to faculty compensation, state spending per student, and library resources.⁶
UT used its seventy-fifth anniversary in 1959 as an opportunity to identify problems and to establish future goals. The Committee of Seventy-five, literally composed of seventy-five members, presented its report to the Regents, who reviewed and approved the seventeen-item document during their April 1959 meeting. Of particular note were the findings presented in the report related to academic competitiveness, enrollment, and, of course, money.

The Committee of Seventy-five recognized that while UT was outstanding in comparison to schools within the region, it had yet to stand among the top universities in the nation. In order to accomplish this goal, UT would need to increase enrollment, in order to meet the increased demand for higher education in Texas. In the Committee's opinion, admissions standards should not be raised so as to restrict average students. Academic quality could be achieved through better teaching, not stricter admissions. Expansion in enrollment could not lead to an unnecessary expansion in course offerings. While meeting the demands of the ordinary undergraduate, UT needed to fortify its graduate and research programs. The key to achieving greatness would lie with the faculty. The University needed to hire more eminent faculty and pay all faculty more.7

The Seventy-five pledged to raise $25 million over the next fifteen years. An annual $600,000 would finance endowed chairs, research assistants, sabbaticals, salary increases, and travel. UT needed to raise $15 million in library funds and $12 million in construction/physical plant funds by 1968. The Committee was less specific in its recommendations for increasing legislative appropriations and vaguely called for "adequate" public funds to support UT in a manner appropriate for a state's premier research university.8

L.D. Haskew, vice president for Developmental Services, extended these recommendations. In a 1960 memo to Regent W.W. Heath, Haskew noted that as the University
composed a ten-year master plan, it should use the bulk of the funds from the AUF to fortify academic programs and research as opposed to building construction in the coming decade. UT had completed a number of buildings in the past twenty years and it was now time to spend the bulk of funds on "brains, not bricks." The institution pledged $65 million between 1960 and 1970 on increasing its manpower and research output and only $52.5 million on construction. The construction would primarily support research units such as a new engineering building, tandem nuclear power accelerator, and additions to the chemistry and experimental science buildings. The brain funds would be used to: (1) bring faculty salaries to the mid-range of state universities in the AAU; (2) hire more faculty to reduce the student-faculty ratio; (3) award distinguished faculty with salary supplements; (4) expand conference travel opportunities for faculty; (5) recruit faculty research stars; and (6) fortify research and graduate programs in all areas, but particularly in engineering and nuclear physics.9

Ransom released a progress report and Chairman W.W. Heath enthusiastically presented the accomplishments included in the report to his fellow Regents in February 1964. The report's authors boasted of a number of accomplishments among University faculty in the past five years. The institution had hired 28 "eminent" scholars. Nineteen UT faculty members had received NIH career awards, although it the report does not specify if these individuals were part of the Austin campus or the medical branches. While UT had a long way to go, the institution had retained 80% of faculty who had received offers from other colleges. The average salary stood at $7,430 in 1959 and at $9,445 in 1964. The Regents would continue to close the gap between UT and its competitors by adding $500,000 to the faculty salary fund beginning in 1964-65. Since beginning an ambitious building project in 1959, UT had completed $27,756,082.34 in needed projects. An additional $18,209,002.08 worth was planned. Student enrollment had
increased from 17,759 in the fall of 1958 to 22,196 in the fall if 1963. The number of faculty had increased from 1,283 to 1,744 during the same span.\textsuperscript{10}

**A&M's Blueprint for Progress**

A&M commemorated its eighty-fifth anniversary in 1961 by commissioning *The Blueprint for Progress*. The Blueprint consisted of three reports published in 1962: the Century Council made up of 100 state educational and business leaders, the Committee on Aspirations consisting of twenty-four faculty and staff members, and a report by the Board of Directors. Rudder asked these three groups to answer four questions: "(1) What kind of student does Texas A&M seek to produce? (2) What is the mission of the College? (3) To what degree of academic excellence should the faculty and staff aspire? (4) What should be the scope and size of the A&M College by the centennial anniversary in 1976?"\textsuperscript{11}

The Century Council urged the College to be selective in its curricular expansion by affirming its land-grant mission of offering the finest engineering, agriculture, veterinary medicine, and core science programs. Any expansion in the social sciences and humanities should be limited to the study of modern social and economic problems. A&M should set the goal of becoming a "top national" university by 1976. The College could achieve this stature by expanding its physical plant and purchasing better equipment, increasing the number of faculty holding Ph.D.s, paying competitive salaries, and improving its graduate programs. The Century Council praised A&M for its new Nuclear Science Center, Radiation Biology Lab, Data Processing Center, and Activation Analysis Center. Beyond these facilities however, centers for research and graduate instruction were lacking. The group was most critical of the faculty and concluded that "excellence of academic qualifications, instructional capacity, intellectual
curiosity and interest in research and scholarly activity" is not "widespread" It was no wonder since A&M failed to offer a standard retirement program, competitive salaries, or formal promotion and tenure policies.12

The Century Council was split in its opinion on co-education and concluded that this decision rested solely with the Directors. They did, however, praise the mandatory two-year ROTC program through the Corps of Cadets for freshman and sophomores. Whether the school remained all male or all military, A&M needed to increase its admissions standards. Aggies scored below the national average on standardized tests such as the SAT. The College simply could not "be rated by recognized national and international educational standards as 'very superior to excellent'" until it strengthened its student body, faculty, library holdings, fundraising efforts, and physical plant.13

The Committee on Aspirations largely agreed with the Century Council's conclusions with exception of the Corps of Cadets. This faculty/staff body believed that Corps membership was more important to many students than obtaining a degree. They argued that mandatory Corps membership, reinstated in the fall of 1958, led to a high attrition rate and detracted from A&M's land-grant and research missions. The attrition argument was unconvincing to Corps supporters since enrollment was 8,100 in the fall of 1962 with approximately half of all students in the Corps. Even though the Committee on Aspirations made an unpopular argument, the Directors considered the recommendation and dropped the compulsory Corps membership in 1965.14 Rudder and the Directors elected to fight the co-education battle first.
"Sorry if we have upset your plans, but this is progress."\textsuperscript{15}

Women sought admission to A&M a number of times in the school's history, but the first major lawsuits occurred in 1958 and 1960. Lena Ann Bristol and Barbara Tittle of Bryan, College Station's twin city, applied to A&M to study biology and chemistry, respectively. Bristol and Tittle each stated that A&M was more convenient, more affordable, and more prestigious than Texas Woman's University, A&M's sister school. H.L. Heaton, the College's associate registrar, argued that the women could study biology and chemistry at a variety of other Texas colleges and rejected them on the grounds that their main reasons for wanting to attend A&M were geographical.\textsuperscript{16}

Bristol and Tittle filed suit in the Brazos County district court where Judge W.T. McDonald ordered the College to admit her. McDonald concluded that the A&M Directors lacked the constitutional authority to bar females from attending A&M, even though they had adopted this administrative policy officially in 1925 and had enforced the rule without challenge from the State. McDonald went on to declare the exclusionary policy to be "irrational." A&M was the only land-grant college in the nation that remained single-sex. In its defense, the institution clung to its land-grant mission but also cited the strong military tradition at the school as the primary reason for excluding women. While McDonald's data source is not unknown, he pointed out that less than half of the student body currently served in the Corps of Cadets, which had been voluntary since 1954 (compulsory membership was in the midst of these proceedings in 1958). The College and its students had changed radically since the end of World War II, but the Directors and administrators seemed frozen in the past. McDonald further stated that enrollment had plummeted by approximately 2000-2500 since 1947. There was adequate classroom space and military culture no longer pervaded the campus.\textsuperscript{17}
According to McDonald, the Texas Constitution did not explicitly designate A&M as a single-sex institution, and therefore, the A&M Directors did not have the discretion to bar women from attending. In addition, A&M had denied Bristol and Tuttle equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United State Constitution. Just as in matters of race, the separate but equal doctrine violated the rights of women. As not only a state college, but as a land-grant institution that received federal funding, A&M was obligated to admit qualified women. McDonald also took this opportunity to condemn the out-of-state tuition program adopted by A&M that sent women to other states to pursue veterinary medicine.18

A&M officials appealed and the State Court of Civil Appeals overturned McDonald's ruling. Justice J. Tirey concluded that the A&M Directors had the legal authority to decide who could attend the institution. Even though the Texas Constitution did not define A&M as an all-male college, Tirey argued that the customs and policies adopted by A&M officials and the Legislature made it a de facto single-sex institution. The Legislature authorized the establishment of the College of Industrial Arts (later Texas Woman's University) in 1901 to educate women who desired the type of education available to men at A&M and the Directors passed resolutions in 1915, 1923, and 1925 reaffirming the school's all-male status. Such actions proved that A&M was always intended to be a single-sex college, despite the absence of an explicit statement in the Texas constitution. No court could compel A&M to admit women unless the Legislature and the citizens of Texas approved a constitutional amendment that defined A&M as a co-educational college.19

In response to McDonald's argument that women should be able to attend A&M, particularly in light of the fact that Corps membership was now optional, Tirey pointed out that the Directors had reintroduced the military training requirement, effective September 1958.
A&M had never and could not currently accommodate female students, given the barracks-style nature of campus residence halls. Tirey dismissed Bristol and Tittle's claim that A&M was more prestigious than Texas Woman's. Finally, since the Morrill Act did not stipulate that the funds go exclusively to coeducational institutions, the A&M policy did not violate the women's rights to privileges and immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment. Bristol and Tittle appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court denied their request.

A few months after the Bristol decision, Bryan residents Margaret Allred, Sarah Hutto, and Mary Ann Parker filed a class action suit against A&M. In this case, one applicant, Allred, applied to the floriculture program that was only available at A&M. W.T. McDonald ruled that the case did not qualify as a class action suit because the plaintiffs did not prove that Texas women as a class wanted to attend A&M. Defendants from A&M stated that Allred had expressed a desire to pursue law and never communicated her interest in floriculture. As was the case with Bristol, Allred, Hutto, and Parker wanted to attend A&M primarily because it was close to home. John M. Barron, attorney for the women, used the decision in *State of Missouri v. Gaines v. Canada*, to claim that A&M had to admit Allred because she could not pursue floriculture elsewhere in Texas. The district court rejected this argument on two counts. Allred did not state that she wanted to study floriculture. Secondly, Gaines was about race, not gender. Following an appeal by Allred, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the ruling from the lower court. The women had little they could lean on in these pre-Title IX days. The Bristol case resulted in violence on campus. The editor of the *Battalion* took a stand in favor of coeducation and was promptly removed from his post. Another student received an ammonia bomb through his window.
Governor Daniel received numerous letters from alumni and other angry citizens following McDonald's ruling in Bristol. The ideas expressed in these letters were largely identical. It was constitutional to deny women admission to A&M. More importantly, the addition of women would destroy the very thing that made A&M great: its military focus.\textsuperscript{23}

As if the coeducation question was not controversial enough, A&M debated the future of mandatory Corps membership during these years. As noted in Chapter Ten, the Directors made Corps membership voluntary in 1954 and the faculty Academic Council voted to extend the option in 1957. The Board of Directors voted five to four in November 1957 to reinstate the Corps membership requirement, effective in September 1958 (Darby, Rideout, Zachry, Campbell, and Finney for and Heep, Dunn, Cudlipp, and Dougherty against). Surprisingly, the Directors' decision elicited a number of protests, including letters from former students. Irvin Lloyd, Class of 1936, and John Massey, Class of 1952, each argued that the Directors had ignored the wisdom of the College's academic leaders in an effort to return to what Aggies often referred to as "old army days." Massey wrote, "Presently we are engaged in a Technological War…and to require mandatory military training at the expense of higher quality education is a detriment to the defense of the nation." Lloyd added that while A&M graduates were rational men as individuals, their irrational yearning for the antiquated days seemed to take over when two or more assembled\textsuperscript{24}.

The Directors received numerous requests to study the benefits of co-education and voluntary military training following the Bristol ruling including recommendations from the Study of Aspirations, the Century Council, and Senate Resolution 557, passed in May 1959. The Board affirmed its commitment to compulsory military training, but agreed to discuss co-education during their February 1961 meeting. Debate raged until April 27, 1963 when the
Directors voted to admit all women as graduate students and spouses of employees and students as undergraduates. In the weeks leading up to the watershed decision, prominent Houstonian, T.I. Smith, Class of 1898, launched a statewide letter-writing campaign in opposition. State Senator William Moore, a long-time supporter of co-education and Class of 1940, responded to Smith on the front-page of the Battalion. Moore passionately argued that while an all-male A&M was acceptable in the past, A&M could not remain in the past and meet the demands of the space age when men and women required the type of education that the land-grant university could offer. Moore also criticized Smith and others who compared the presence of women to the presence of African Americans at Mississippi and Alabama where federal marshals were required to maintain peace. Citizens of Bryan had long wanted their daughters to attend nearby A&M and would maintain order in the community.25

Smith and Robert Rowland, Class of 1957, traveled to campus on April 26 with the mission of winning the Directors over to their side. Upon hearing the Board's decision to admit women on a limited basis, Rowland declared that he would turn in his Aggie ring. Smith, who had earlier stated that women would pose as a dangerous distraction to Aggie men, begrudgingly agreed to accept the Board's decision. Response from students was varied. Rudder encouraged students to meet with him, but stressed that the decision was final.26

Sterling Evans, Chairman of the Board and Class of 1921, and L.F. Peterson, President of the Association of Former Students, joined Rudder on May 1 as they met with civilian and Corps student leaders. A small number of students were invited to the meeting, but 400 arrived to watch Harlan Roberts, president-elect of the student body, present Evans with a protest petition containing 1,875 (2,462 were approached) student signatures. During this meeting, Evans clarified that the co-ed admissions policy was limited in scope. Even though twelve women had
expressed interest in attending A&M, only one, Mrs. Lewis Haupt, a sixth grade teacher and grandmother of four, had been accepted so far. Peterson joined Evans in assuring the students that the Corps would survive and remain exclusively male. Evans argued that the institution's survival depended on the admission of women since many of the eminent faculty the school so desperately needed would demand a place where their wives and daughters could pursue degrees. When asked if the Directors would reconsider, Evans firmly declared no, "You cannot run an institution such as A&M on the basis of student polls."^27

Looking back on his role in bringing women to A&M, Evans implied that he accepted his appointment to the Board of Directors with the intention of making the school coed. He promised Price Daniel that he would refrain from admitting women as long as Daniel remained governor. Evans was careful not to say he would never bring women to campus. A&M's survival depended on women: "Some people say it [admitting women] changed this place. If it did, then I'm really happy about it. The school was going out of existence. It needed girls. It was the best thing I ever did; damn right it was."^28 While Evans was confident in the wisdom of the decision, he faced a wide range of critics.

The House and Senate responded with vastly different resolutions. Although not adopted, House Concurrent Resolution 80 garnered numerous supporters. Will Smith of Beaumont and Jim Markgraf of Scurry (near Dallas) condemned the Board of Directors and President Rudder for causing "distress, apprehension and resentment among many thousands of students and former students of A&M College" where "great history had been written without the feminine hand of coed students and without classes in home economics, dressmaking, pincushion embroidery or hairdressing." Meanwhile, the Senate passed a resolution commending the A&M Directors for their decision to admit women. Senate Resolution 558, authored by
William Moore, who had been fighting to obtain access for the women of his home district of Bryan/College Station for more than a decade, the resolution congratulated the Directors for resisting political pressure.29

Still unwilling to accept the presence of women, John A. Traeger of Seguin (east of San Antonio) presented House Simple Resolution 555 on May 26, 1965. This resolution claimed that the women's presence had created divisions between citizens across the State and resulted in a decrease in enrollment since September 1963. Traeger called upon the A&M Directors to at least restrict female enrollment beyond the present level. The measure passed with 103 yeas and 33 nays in the House. Legislators in favor of coeducation were heavily concentrated in Houston, Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth, Waco, San Antonio, the upper Panhandle, and the far west (See Appendix Map #10).30 While more industrialized areas did not wish to limit A&M to male students, rural/urban divisions do not adequately explain regional voting patterns. Did A&M alumni tend to reside in more rural, eastern, or south-central sections of Texas? Was the opposite true? More information is required to explain the vote in favor of co-education.

As women and African American students attended classes in small, but gradually increasing numbers, angry alumnus Robert Rowland appealed to the Texas attorney general. Waggoner Carr issued his opinion in defense of the Directors on October 14, 1965. Carr concluded that women were not protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Directors certainly had the option to restrict their access. The Board also had the "unquestioned" right to admit women. Carr then criticized the Directors for limited female access to spouses and daughters of faculty and students and deemed this practice a "discriminatory and an unreasonable class distinction."31 All women were eligible for admission around the time Carr released his decision. With the coeducation question behind them, Rudder and the Directors also settled the
debate regarding compulsory Corps membership for good when they made it voluntary for all students, effective September 1965.  

**Name Change for A&M**

As if co-education and civilian status were not enough, Aggies faced a name change from the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas to Texas A&M University System in August 1963. The Century Council recommended the change as a way to reflect the institution's mission as a research and graduate institution and the Legislative agreed as it passed House Bill 755. Cadets worried about what the name change would mean for their uniform logos and the famous Aggie class ring. Student apprehension died down once students learned that they would be allowed to select college or university to appear on their class rings through 1967.

**Desegregation and Integration**

The Southern Education Reporting Service (SERS) drew a distinction between desegregation and integration. A desegregated institution had taken action to dismantle segregation "either in principle or practice." An integrated university had erased all racial distinctions in both principle and practice. One could easily argue that the latter university does not even exist at the beginning of the twenty-first century and is more a goal than reality. Regardless of how officials categorized the state of racial equity and access at UT in the 1950s and 1960s, and A&M after 1963, desegregation was the best even the most progressive educator could hope for.

In the January 8, 1959 edition of *The Dallas Morning News*, Richard Morehead of the SERS reported that there were white students attending many of the Black colleges. TSU
enrolled five white students and St. Philip's College in San Antonio boasted a white student population of 30%.

How did these numbers compare to UT and A&M? As of 1962, 200 African Americans were enrolled at the 21,390-student UT campus in Austin. Texas A&M, of course, did not desegregate until 1963.

At the same time that UT officials boasted of the progress that it had made in integrating the campus, the faculty and Regents approved construction of the Forty Acres Club. On January 31, 1961, the club's publicity committee announced that the Forty Acres would "serve the faculty and staff, alumni, and other friends" of the University. The publication did not state that the club would be racially segregated. As word spread that Forty Acres was closed to Blacks, several UT faculty and staff protested to President Ransom and D.M. "Buck" McCullough, the project coordinator. UT now counted African Americans among its alumni and to bar them was to reinforce the image of UT as racist. The Forty Acres scandal hurt UT in a number of aspects. The Peace Corps canceled a $157,513 program to prepare volunteers for Brazil. Students for Direct Action (SDA) staged a demonstration in front of Forty Acres in August 1962 and a number of faculty members resigned their memberships. Forty Acres finally relented and admitted its first Black member in 1965.

The Faculty Committee on Minority Groups did not cite the Forty Acres Club as a major issue, but it addressed a host of other problems. This group issued an interim report in February 1961 and identified discrimination in student housing and intercollegiate athletics, even though the Regents did not have a written policy mandating segregation. The Committee described campus residence halls as places where Black women were not permitted to live, dine, or even speak to white women. Black men were confined to non air-conditioned rooms. UT violated the federal *McLaurin v. Oklahoma* ruling that required institutions to provide all students with equal
treatment. The institution needed to eliminate these conditions, as well as the requirement that students disclose their race when completing a housing application.

In the matter of athletics, the group criticized the reasons used by officials to keep Blacks off various teams. Since segregation still existed in many of the cities that teams traveled, UT officials claimed that coaches would have to find separate transportation, lodging, and dining facilities for Black players. Even though the Southwest Conference did not officially bar African American athletes, Edwin Olle, director of athletics, believed that the Longhorns might miss out on top white recruits if Blacks were allowed to play. Olle did concede that UT hosted a game against Washington State in 1954 and managed to peacefully field and accommodate its Black player. The Committee on Minority Groups declared that the time for excuses had passed and UT needed to integrate its athletic teams.38

While dining and classrooms were supposedly integrated, de facto segregation remained throughout the UT campus. The majority of the voting faculty adopted a resolution calling for an end to the remaining vestiges of segregation on the campus in 1961.39 As of April 21, 1961, Ransom had not responded to the Committee on Minority Groups and spokesmen Roger Shattuck wanted to know why.40 Ransom and the Regents replied to Shattuck with the "Statement Regarding Integration" in July 1961. The document opened with the claim, that while they might not agree with the idea of integration, the Regents were willing to comply with the various Supreme Court decisions and proceed with 'all deliberate speed.' To their knowledge, African American students had not encountered discrimination in classrooms or about campus. The Regents believed that they had advanced further in the integration effort than other colleges and universities in Texas and the South. While some faculty and students did not believe that the University had done enough, many citizens and legislators believed that the
University was moving too fast. Given the delicate nature of the problem, the Regents pledged a conservative strategy for the foreseeable future. UT students were less interested in a gradual approach. Gwen Jordan became the first African American student in the UT student assembly in October 1961. Her election followed several months of peaceful demonstrations in an effort to desegregate residence halls and off-campus facilities. During the same election, students voted 5,312 to 3,293 in favor of desegregating varsity athletic teams. Just like its university, the city of Austin remained only partially open to Blacks. The movie theaters on Guadalupe, the main street on the periphery of the campus, finally opened their doors to Blacks following ten months of student protests. Most Austin restaurants continued to bar Blacks.

Students issued a petition to the Regents in September 1961, calling for immediate integration of the University's intercollegiate athletic teams and residence halls. Student critics were outraged that the Regents refused to integrate teams at the risk of offending the Southwest Conference. Leroy Sanders, Sherryl Griffin, and Maudie Ates filed a federal civil suit against the Regents regarding the residence halls on November 10, 1961. The Regents agreed to review these issues during their November 11, 1961 meeting.

Students organized numerous demonstrations and the description that follows is an example of a typical occurrence. Roughly 300 African American and white students gathered before the main administration building and chanted 'Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free,' -- the biblical verse inscribed on the building. The peaceful protest was part of a series of demonstrations where no one was arrested. Gwen Jordan and student body president Maurice "Moe" Olian urged their peers to take the high ground and maintain peace. Olian
declared: 'We don't want any martyrs.' Law school faculty member Ernest Goldstein added: 'The important thing to remember is that you are going to win in the long run.'

The battle for equal access continued for the next few years. The Campus Interracial Committee filed a petition with the Regents demanding that they desegregate campus housing and various student activities in September 1963. The Regents first declined the petition, stating that the organization should have followed the Regents' rule that stipulated that all agenda items be submitted at least three days prior to a meeting. The group appeared before the Board on September 27th and 28th and the Board finally relented and suspended their rules on the second day.

Several weeks later, the Regents announced a change in its regulations regarding student admissions and activities. With the exception of campus residence, students could not be barred from attending the University or participating in any campus activities on the basis of race, or religion. The decision to allow African Americans to live in residence halls with whites would be determined following the conclusion of the Sanders et. al. suit. The suit was dismissed in May 1964, when the Regents announced their decision to integrate residence halls. Chairman W.W. Heath claimed that desegregation had occurred at UT "without troops, marshals, violence, or bloodshed." He did not acknowledge the years of peaceful protest it took to reach at this point.

The Regents ordered complete integration of all units of the University on May 16, 1964 and added a policy against discrimination in admissions, employment, and on campus housing. Intercollegiate athletics was desegregated in 1961, but the Longhorn varsity football team did not field an African American player until 1970. A&M added its first Black players in 1967. While a few African Americans worked as instructors at UT in the early 1960s, the University hired
historian Henry Bullock as its first full Black professor in 1968. Biochemist and biophysicist Roscoe Lewis became the first African American faculty member at A&M in 1970.\textsuperscript{47}

As individuals at UT engaged in heated debate over the form and pace integration should take, the A&M community seemed to ignore the subject completely until the summer of 1963. Black students enrolled at A&M for the first time in the first summer session of 1963. Leroy Sterling became the first student. Sterling, a junior at TSU, was initially rejected when he applied in the spring of 1963. Graduate students Vernall Jackson of Bryan and George Douglas Sutton of Fort Worth did not apply to A&M, but arrived on campus to take part in the NSF-sponsored Institute in Earth Science. Eight additional Bryan/College Station residents (six undergraduates and two graduate students) signed up for the second summer session. Graduate student Clarence Dixon became the first African American alumnus of A&M in 1967. James Courtney and Leon Green became the first undergraduates to earn degrees in January 1968. Jessie Smith, Joe Lee Macheaux, and Samuel Williams became the first African Americans to don Corps uniforms in 1964. William Mahomes, class of 1969, became the first Black student to remain in the Corps for four years.\textsuperscript{48}

Following the work of C. Vann Woodward, Peter Wallenstein demonstrated that few Southern colleges experienced the violence found at the University of Mississippi, University of Alabama, and the University of Georgia. Wallenstein also noted that many states followed the Texas pattern. African Americans encountered the most resistance to their presence at the first desegregated college and a comparably calmer experience at colleges that followed suit.\textsuperscript{49} Regardless of the process that institutions followed, African American attendance at predominately white American universities remained profoundly low throughout the 1960s.
Tables 12-1 and 12-2 demonstrate that African American participation in undergraduate and graduate programs was embarrassingly low across the nation. Louisiana State University possessed the largest percentage of Black undergraduates (4.3%) and graduate students (4.2%), while Black citizens constituted nearly one-third of the state's population. If one assumed that states outside of the former Confederacy were dramatically more integrated in 1968, this hypothesis would quickly crumble. African American students constituted a mere 4.35% of the undergraduate student body and only 1.65% of the graduate student group at the University of Illinois. Heralded for its inclusiveness, the University of California system could only count 1,500 (2.3%) Black students among its 65,000 undergraduates. John Egerton concluded that the flagship state universities and land-grants in the Midwest boasted the largest percentages (2.98%) of African American students at the close of the 1960s. The population data in these tables is not included to advocate quotas or to suggest that colleges should have enrolled a minimum or maximum percentage of African American students. With the exception of graduate students attending the University of Wisconsin, none of the college possessed an African American enrollment that reflected the state population.

### Table 12-1  African American Population and Enrollment at Predominantly White Public Universities in Southern and Border States, 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>State Population 1970</th>
<th>Institutional Enrollment 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Texas</td>
<td>1,396,605</td>
<td>11,196,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas A&amp;M</td>
<td>12.47%</td>
<td>12,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Alabama</td>
<td>903,000</td>
<td>3,444,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>26.22%</td>
<td>11,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>State Population 1970</td>
<td>Institutional Enrollment 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Arkansas</td>
<td>352,539 18.33%</td>
<td>1,923,295 124 1.31% 1,810 22 1.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Delaware</td>
<td>78,305 14.29%</td>
<td>548,104 6,949 51 .73% 1,643 5 .3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Florida</td>
<td>1,041,966 15.35%</td>
<td>6,789,443 18,426 80 .43% 3,762 11 .29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Georgia</td>
<td>1,184,062 25.8%</td>
<td>4,589,575 14,360 72 .5% 3,292 38 1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Kentucky</td>
<td>230,363 7.16%</td>
<td>3,218,706 11,512 102 .89% 3,117 25 .8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana State University</td>
<td>1,085,227 29.8%</td>
<td>3,641,306 19,294 828 4.3% 4,151 174 4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Maryland</td>
<td>698,494 17.81%</td>
<td>3,922,399 26,391 546 2.06% 7,886 126 1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Mississippi</td>
<td>815,626 10.26%</td>
<td>2,216,912 5,575 59 1.05% 1,161 14 1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi State</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>7,462 73 .98% 909 61 6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Missouri</td>
<td>479,746 10.26%</td>
<td>4,676,501 28,794 750 2.6% 8,151 200 2.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of North Carolina</td>
<td>1,125,885 22.15%</td>
<td>5,082,059 17,444 302 1.73% 6,511 264 4.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina State</td>
<td>22.15%</td>
<td>8,350 150 1.8% 1,915 42 2.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Oklahoma</td>
<td>171,216 6.7%</td>
<td>2,559,229 15,639 176 1.12% 4,325 7 .16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma State</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>13,580 225 1.66% 2,346 53 2.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of South Carolina</td>
<td>788,455 30.44%</td>
<td>2,590,516 8,699 156 1.8% 1,854 18 .97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clemson</td>
<td>30.44%</td>
<td>6,035 59 .98% 674 7 1.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Tennessee</td>
<td>620,636 8.17%</td>
<td>3,923,687 18,545 316 1.7% 6,135 118 1.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Virginia</td>
<td>860,302 18.51%</td>
<td>4,648,494 9,301 30 .32% 2,763 65 2.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Tech</td>
<td>18.51%</td>
<td>9,213 61 .66% 1,022 8 .78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>66,804 3.83%</td>
<td>1,744,237 11,630 108 .93% 3,294 27 .82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12-2 African American Population and Enrollment at Selected Predominantly White Public Universities in Northeastern, Midwestern, and Western States, 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>State Population 1970</th>
<th>Institutional Enrollment 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Arizona</td>
<td>52,799</td>
<td>1,770,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California</td>
<td>1,398,498</td>
<td>19,953,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Illinois</td>
<td>1,422,353</td>
<td>11,113,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Massachusetts</td>
<td>173,697</td>
<td>5,689,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Michigan</td>
<td>990,663</td>
<td>8,875,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan State</td>
<td>11.16%</td>
<td>32,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State University of New York</td>
<td>2,164,560</td>
<td>18,236,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State</td>
<td>970,130</td>
<td>10,652,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>1,016,551</td>
<td>11,793,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Washington</td>
<td>70,859</td>
<td>3,409,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington State</td>
<td>2.08%</td>
<td>10,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Wisconsin</td>
<td>128,128</td>
<td>4,417,731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Connally's High School and Beyond Study

Racial segregation was only part of the colleges' problems. During his first address to the Legislature on January 16, 1963, Governor Connally declared that Texas was woefully behind comparable states in the number of Ph.D.s awarded, amount of defense contracts obtained, faculty salaries, and retention of student talent. Texas awarded 297 doctorates during the 1959-1960 academic year in contrast to 1,445 in New York, 949 in California, and 784 in
Massachusetts. Utah commanded more than three times the number of defense contracts than Texas. As for faculty salaries, UT faculty earned less than those at the University of South Florida and Chico State (California) and A&M less than Stout State College (Wisconsin) and New Mexico Highlands University. Few would categorize these schools as peer institutions. The Lone Star State could only keep 57% of its merit scholar finalists, as 43% elected to attend college out-of-state in 1962. Following these arguments, Governor Connally implored the Legislature to appoint the Committee on Education Beyond High School (CEBHS) to assess the public higher education system.⁵⁰

The twenty-five-member study group submitted its findings and recommendations on August 31, 1964. This document read like a remake of the TESC (1925) and Griffenhagen (1932) reports. There was the usual lament that competing schools spent excessive time and resources on duplicate programs. For example, six institutions offered master's degrees and ten awarded bachelor's degrees in agriculture. Unlike the previous reports, Education Beyond High School provided extensive statistical evidence of Texas' mediocre performance when compared with other states. New claims were made regarding the need to manage enrollment by raising admissions standards. These sorts of study committees had long recommended the creation of a state coordinating board, but the State had already created the Texas Commission on Higher Education in 1955. This innocuous body possessed little authority over the colleges. CEBHS heeded Connally's advice and called for a new, smaller coordinating board that would possess oversight over curricular offerings and budgets, but not over institutional governance. CEBHS ended its report with a call for more adequate funding for the colleges, but provided no plans on how to improve current legislative appropriations policies.⁵¹
Connally was the first Texas governor to serve a four-year term and this allowed him to focus more on educational policy and less on re-election. He promised to continue his fight for greater coordination and academic excellence as he addressed the Fifty-ninth Legislature in January 1965. He called for the most ambitious higher education appropriations bill the State had ever seen and for a strong coordinating board that would eliminate regional and institutional rivalry once and for all. The Legislature approved $91 million just to increase faculty salaries and bolster research. In addition, the two houses appointed committees to study the condition of faculty compensation. Connally also got his wish for a stronger coordinating board when the Legislature easily approved plans for the Texas College and University System Coordinating Board (renamed the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board in 1987) in the spring of 1965. In Connally's view, more money and coordination were an excellent beginning, however, Texas had a long way to go before its colleges caught up with the best states outside of the South.52 While Connally's caution is understandable, it cannot be denied that the Fifty-ninth Legislature did something remarkable in Texas history. The Legislature no only pledged to bring faculty salaries up to the national average; it enacted a plan to exceed it.

**The Big Appropriations Bill of 1965 (1965-67 biennium)**

The Regents announced that the Legislature had passed an appropriations bill that "for the first time furnish us with adequate funds to make whatever progress is possible within the two-year period." Chairman Heath then warned, "I sound a note of caution that further enrichments of our programs will be required." Nevertheless, UT would receive between $60 and $65 million during the first year. This budget would enable the Regents to expand programs and increase professor's average salaries from $14,003 to $15,960, associate professors from
$10,312 to $11,522, assistant professors from $8,502 to $9,443, and instructors from $6,562 to $7,097. The A&M Directors did not record the same level of enthusiasm in their minutes, but they too were beneficiaries of this dramatic increase.  

Table 12-3 State Appropriations, 1963 -- 1968 (in thousands of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UT</th>
<th>1963-64</th>
<th>1965-66</th>
<th>1967-68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main Campus</td>
<td>16,129</td>
<td>24,349</td>
<td>33,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total with Medical and Branch Campus</td>
<td>43,879</td>
<td>55,534</td>
<td>78,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A&amp;M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main Campus</td>
<td>7,020</td>
<td>11,089</td>
<td>17,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total with Branch Campuses</td>
<td>17,211</td>
<td>24,305</td>
<td>35,398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Chairman Heath proclaimed, "This finally is the big chance to achieve the Constitutional Mandate of our forefathers that the University of Texas be a University 'of the first class'. We will not fumble it." Could UT and A&M finally realize their potential? It would require more than a series of healthy state appropriations, but the institutions were certainly on their way.

Conclusion, 1950-1965

The years between 1950 and 1965 were ones of dramatic change for UT and A&M. In January 1950, segregated UT was still embroiled in the Sweatt case, possessed small, but productive research centers, and remained on the AAUP's censure list. By December 1965, UT had a small but growing African American student body composed of graduate, professional, and undergraduate students (though no full professors until 1968), a host of research units including the internationally recognized Humanities Research Center and the Science Research Institute, and no longer held a position on the AAUP's dreaded list. A&M, circa 1950, remained a segregated all-male military college, had few Ph.D. level faculty, and minimal organized
research beyond the experiment stations. As of 1965, women and African Americans enrolled in undergraduate and graduate programs, Corps membership was optional, and researchers busily labored in such multi-million dollar research facilities as the Cyclotron Institute and the Nuclear Science Center. Higher levels of proper and lower levels of improper political involvement, along with institutional leadership, enabled these advancements.

**Proper Government Involvement**

Over these fifteen years, governors and legislators gradually abandoned many of their meddlesome ways and demonstrated their desire to act in the best interest of UT and A&M. Evidence of this benevolence can be found in their commitments to rigorous study of education problems via the TLC, statewide coordination, and institutional autonomy over the PUF. The Legislature established the TLC in order to provide lawmakers with research, both quantitative and qualitative, which would aid them in making sound decisions for Texas. Unlike university lobbyists or presidents who would likely provide a sales pitch to gain the most money or power from the Legislature, this independent, supposedly disinterested, research body would supply lawmakers with the facts required to make uncomfortable decisions.

TLC data, along with a push from Governor Shivers led to the creation of the Texas Commission on Higher Education in 1955. Although it was virtually powerless, the 1955 body was a good first step towards the Texas College and University System Coordinating Board endorsed by Governor Connally and established by the Legislature in 1965. Unlike the 1955 Commission, the Coordinating Board was ordered to eliminate unnecessary program duplication, increase financial efficiency, and coordinate the efforts of each two- and four-year college in the state. There are numerous critics who contend that the Coordinating Board has never achieved real success. Even in 1965, Governor Connally admitted that the task would be difficult:
Neither I nor the Legislature can guarantee the success of your efforts. Only you can do that. Human beings, not laws, achieve progress….The greatest risk you face is an institutionalized system, with each college or university grasping for its own ends without regard to the needs of the people of the whole state….But over the years in Texas we have come to regard each college or university as a separate institution, striving independently for success….it struggles to be all things to all people, willing to do almost anything that will assure its getting larger -- larger in enrollment, larger in buildings, larger in the number and level of degrees offered.….Is every possible program at every level to be offered at each of the twenty-two colleges and universities? If this is done, obviously the quality would undoubtedly be poor and cost prohibitive.55

It would be tough for the new coordinating board to manage the activities of twenty-two colleges and universities who were used to their silos. After decades of mere contemplation, Connally and the Legislature's action in the direction of statewide coordination was a tremendous initiative.

Nine years prior to Connally's coordination act, the Legislature, and subsequently, citizens, granted UT and A&M greater latitude in their investment of the PUF. The fiscally conservative Legislature spent the first several decades after the Civil War guarding this fund like cash in a mattress. Thus, the Legislature's willingness to trust the governing boards with a potentially risky investment strategy was significant.

**Political Interference**

As of 1965, political interference was on the descent. It would be dangerous to underestimate the damage that House Bill 426, the loyalty oath passed in 1951, and Senate Bill 4, the Suppression of the Communist Party Act, passed in 1954, had on individuals whose beliefs differed with George Green's "Establishment." Yet, the anti-communist legislation was not an omen of things to come for UT and A&M, but rather the last gasp from the most reactionary powerbrokers.56
Academic Development

Allan Cartter was critical of all of the colleges of the former Confederacy. His harsh words should not be interpreted as a death knell, but merely a snapshot of where the Southern institutions had been, not where they were headed. UT and A&M had spent the Cold War era demanding more of their faculty and expanding their graduate and research programs. In 1965, the Legislature finally committed to a competitive compensation package for faculty, which, combined with external foundation support, federal research dollars, and internal fundraising, placed UT and A&M in a good position to compete with some of the best research universities in the nation. More importantly, the universities were prepared to meet the educational needs of Texas citizens.

Notes

1 Dethloff, *Texas A&M University, 1876-1976*, 554.
3 Dugger, *Our Invaded Universities*, 78-82.
4 Chesly Manly, "Greatest Schools in Nation: A Survey by the Chicago Tribune," reprinted from the *Chicago Tribune* April 21 -- June 9, 1957, Price Daniel Papers, SHRLRC, Box 411, UT 1958 folder.
5 Form letter from Sterling C. Holloway, April 28, 1958; Series of seven articles by Richard Morehead reprinted from the *Dallas Morning News*, not dated, Price Daniel Papers, SHRLRC, Box 411, UT 1958 folder.
6 Logan Wilson, "Introductory Comments for the University of Texas Hearing Before House Appropriations Committee," February 9, 1959, Price Daniel Papers, SHRLRC, Box 357, UT Appropriations folder, 56th Legislature folder.
7 UTBOR Minutes, April 16, 1959, 887--890.
8 ibid., 891--892.
9 L.D. Haskew to W.W. Heath, February 18, 1960, Harry Ransom Papers, UTCAH, Box 3U367, folder 12; *UT Record*, Winter 1960, v. 6, no. 1, quote from 2.
13 ibid., quote on 50.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
19 ibid.
20 ibid.
22 "Lawsuit by 3 Women Seeks A&M Enrollment" appears to be from Houston Post, Vick Lindley, February 1960, Richard Morehead Papers, UTCAH, Box 4Ze234, Texas A&M Women folder.
32 Adams, Keepers of the Spirit, 217.
35 "It's a 2-Way Street in Texas, Whites Go to Negro Colleges," The Dallas Morning News, January 8, 1959, sec. 1, 4.
36 Statistical Summary of School Segregation-Desegregation in the Southern and Border States, 46.
37 Elconan H. Saulson (Director of the UT Hillel Foundation) to D.M. McCullough, February 8, 1961; Richard J. Hill & Ivan Belknap (Sociology Department) to Harry Ransom, February 8, 1961; Reece McGee, (Sociology Department) to Ransom, February 8, 1961, Harry Ransom Papers, UTCAH, Box 3U365, folder 9; Martin Kuhlman, "Direct Action at the University of Texas During the Civil Rights Movement, 1960-1965," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 98 (April, 1995), 564.
40 Roger Shattuck to Harry Ransom, April 21, 1961, Harry Ransom Papers, UTCAH, Box 3U375, folder 2.
41 UTBOR Minutes, July 22, 1961, 1004-1005.
42 "UT's Desegregation Status is in Dispute," source unknown, October 61, Richard Morehead Papers, UTCAH, Box 3F281, Segregation, Colleges 1950-52 folder.
44 "White Houstonian Leader in Battle on Bias at U of Texas," Informer, November 4, 1961, 1,8.
45 UTBOR Minutes, September 28, 1963.

53 UTBOR Minutes, July 16, 1965, 1446, 1449, 1450, 1452, first quote on 1446, second on 1447.

54 UTBOR Minutes, July 16, 1965, quote on 1452.


56 UT and A&M were largely spared from the red scare witch-hunt in Texas. The public schools were the true victims and their plight is described in Don Carleton's *Red Scare: Rightwing Hysteria, Fifties Fanaticism, and Their Legacy in Texas* (Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1985).
Chapter Thirteen

Conclusion

As shown in the preceding chapters, the University of Texas and Texas A&M made great strides in the quality of their undergraduate and graduate programs, increased organized research output, and gained a degree of national recognition as strong state universities between 1876 and 1965. Both were still on their way to becoming universities "of the first class," a descriptor most commonly used to convey the state's constitutional mandate for UT. As of 1965, however, UT and A&M were the best institutions they had ever been and were finally in a position to fulfill the state mandate. Political interference had not completely vanished, but the likes of Ferguson and O'Daniel were unlikely to return. As public universities, UT and A&M could never escape the influence that state government, as well as state culture, had on their development. State gubernatorial/legislative policies and the Texas political climate touched virtually every aspect of these educational organizations; however, UT and A&M were not without control of their destinies. Internal dynamics and policies both advanced and impeded the colleges. While Texans fancy their state as unique, much of the UT and A&M narrative conforms to the patterns exhibited by public flagship and land-grant universities across the nation. While I have already answered the research questions posed in Chapter One, the study now returns to these queries in an attempt to summarize the material previously presented.
How did state government funding and legislative policies shape the University of Texas and Texas A&M between the 1880s and 1965?

At various times and to differing degrees, the financial relationships between the institutions and the state government were characterized by inefficiency, distrust, and rigid restrictions over the PUF.

In this case, inefficiency refers to design -- the number and type of schools, and coordination -- the manner in which curriculum and resources were managed at the state's institutions. Edgar W. Knight criticized Southern and border states for electing to establish separate white and African American land-grant colleges, as opposed to integrating. Obvious moral judgments aside, it simply took more money to administer separate schools. Not only did Texas establish white and African American land-grant colleges, it also chose to operate A&M separately from UT. The Texas Constitution of 1876 dictated that A&M was to function as UT's agricultural branch. Together, the two were supposed to receive proceeds from the federal land-grant sale and then each would receive interest from the PUF: UT for construction and A&M for additional expenses. This plan never materialized because A&M functioned as an independent college from the beginning. The A&M Directors did not collaborate with the later-created UT Board of Regents until the two began negotiations to divide the PUF during the first decade of the twentieth century.

As UT and A&M leaders were faced with the choice of either consolidating the institutions or dividing the PUF, they were advised by a number of leaders to merge. Edmund James, president of the University of Illinois, argued that his institution possessed better equipment, faculty, and compensation than other schools because the state chose to place the agricultural unit inside of the flagship university. Unlike Texas, the Universities of Illinois,
California, Wisconsin, and Minnesota never endured the process of absorbing a separate land-grant institution into the flagship state university. North Carolina placed UNC and NC State under the same umbrella and became the Consolidated University of North Carolina in 1932, but these two largely carried out their programs separately. In addition, the North Carolina colleges continued to argue over UNC's involvement with engineering courses and NC State's forays into the liberal arts. It is perhaps a pointless exercise to try to imagine how much money could have been saved had Texas established a single coeducational state/land-grant university that admitted all races. The decision to establish separate institutions undoubtedly created financial inefficiency, not to mention rivalries and resentment.

Distrust was most keenly felt between the state government and UT and manifested itself in the line-item budget process and legislative investigations. First hinted at by Governor Thomas Campbell in 1909, all state colleges were required to submit their budgets to the Legislature as line-item requests by the time Governor Ferguson unleashed his attack on UT. James Allred, perhaps one of the least meddlesome of the State's governors, called for the Legislature to grant the colleges the autonomy they deserved and required by adopting the lump sum procedure. The Legislature did not oblige until Beauford Jester, a former UT Regent made the same request in 1947. While the fiscally conservative Governors Thomas Campbell and Oscar Colquitt had supported the line-item process as a way to cut costs, James Ferguson demanded that UT justify all expenses as part of an attack strategy. President Harry Benedict accused the Legislature of lowering the salaries of certain faculty members because of their alleged political beliefs. Regardless of anyone's true motivations, the Legislature's move to restrict governing boards and presidents from making their own financial decisions sent a message that lawmakers did not trust the educators.
This study has not attempted to tally the number of legislative investigations of UT and A&M and then compare these with other states. There were probably more threats than actual investigations, but the number still seems high. From student behavior at A&M and T.O. Walton's dismissal, to the political leanings of Clarence Ayres and Homer Rainey, the Legislature frequently summoned college personnel and students to the Capitol to answer questions that could have been addressed internally on the campuses. Merely the threat of a legislative investigation led Harry Benedict to ask for future Nobel laureate Hermann Muller's resignation and for Rainey and the Regents to abandon employment negotiations with E.O. Lawrence. Legislative involvement could mean nothing but disaster in a state where lawmakers and educators distrusted one another. The damaging political environment in Texas even led Clark Kerr to conclude that UT had failed to live up to its potential as a great research university. Nevertheless, political interference peaked in 1944 and decreased, albeit subtly and slowly over the next twenty years.

Rigid restrictions over how UT and A&M could spend and invest the PUF resulted in frustration at best. At worst, legislative restrictions retarded UT, and to a lesser extent A&M's efforts to build adequate labs, libraries, and classrooms, compensate faculty, and increase the size of the PUF. UT could not use general state funds to construct buildings and remained covered in shacks until the PUF was fortified with oil royalties in the 1920s. After several years of campaigns, the state finally permitted UT and A&M to invest a portion of the PUF in publicly traded stocks in 1956. It is impossible to measure the amount of money the Regents and Directors could have earned for the PUF had they been able to control their investments earlier. There is no doubt that the PUF would have been larger if lawmakers and influential, but timid
citizens, such as former Governor Dan Moody, had supported a more aggressive, although risky, investment strategy. To be fair, few universities invested in stocks until this era.

**In what ways did state government policies and actions affect academic freedom, academic development and research, and racial integration at the University of Texas and Texas A&M during this period?**

It is inaccurate to only attribute government policies to those legislators and governors who composed, voted for, and signed the bills and resolutions. Oil barons, newspaper editors, all other individuals lumped into George Green's "Establishment," and the general voting public influenced policies as well. The UT Regents and A&M Directors fell into a unique category as both college stewards and political appointees. Governing board members were beholden to lawmakers, business associates, and influential alumni groups, sometimes for the good of the institutions and often to the detriment. This political structure was only a problem when public policy differed with the vision UT and A&M presidents and administrators had for their campuses.

**Academic Freedom**

In Chapter Seven, academic freedom was defined as (1) the freedom to research and teach absent government and public interference; (2) the right of faculty members to express their views as private citizens without the threat of dismissal; and (3) the freedom of the various academic disciplines to determine what should be taught, what should be researched, and what constituted good research in a particular field. Did state policymakers deny faculty their academic freedom? The evidence strongly suggests that they did. The various committees formed by the Legislature and the Regents to investigate the type of teaching that occurred at UT
and the activities of faculty beyond the campus certainly violated the principles of academic freedom. The various loyalty oaths passed in 1941 and 1951, and the Suppression of the Communist Party Act did not directly result in the dismissal of faculty and there were no purges, but these types of measures fostered, for the lack of a more precise description, an unhealthy teaching and research environment. While it is easy to find examples at UT, it is difficult to assess the impact that governmental policies had on academic freedom at A&M. This incomplete picture of A&M is due primarily to the lack of available documents, as well as the fact that the conservative nature of the campus tended to mirror the politics of the times.

**Academic Development, Research, and Desegregation**

The State government left its most significant mark on the institutions with its previously described financial policies and efforts to control academic freedom. Outside of these enormously important areas of money and ideology, the State exerted nominal influence on the colleges through external reviews and surveys conducted by the Texas Legislative Council (TLC). It was legislators who called for an extensive review of Texas education in 1925 and 1932. In 1950, the Legislature empowered the TLC to examine problems in Texas higher education including poor compensation for faculty and graduate students, inadequate state appropriations for undergraduate instruction, the lack of financial and curricular coordination between public colleges, and shameful disparities between Black and white institutions. Unfortunately, these documents did little more than collect dust. Commenting on the sluggish speed in which both policymakers and university officials responded to recommendations for improvement in Texas higher education, Harry Benedict declared: "Texas is another Jerusalem that killeth her prophets by inattention and stoneth those who would help her."³
When it came to desegregation, Texas was neither Mississippi nor an egalitarian utopia. As C. Vann Woodward and Peter Wallenstein have demonstrated, the majority of Southern and Border States did not engage in the violent defiance to court ordered desegregation that Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia did. At the same time, neither the Texas Legislature nor the UT Regents responded to calls from the African American community to provide professional and graduate programs until the NAACP enlisted Hermann Sweatt to file suit. Not even Homer Rainey, the very man who was fired in part for his support for civil rights, supported a desegregation plan for UT. When asked his opinion on the subject during the 1944 Senate investigation, Rainey said: "We are under obligation to give the Negro equal educational opportunities in their own schools."\(^4\) Texas finally allowed desegregation to begin at UT in 1950. The Legislature and Governors Shivers and Daniel did not make any formal attempts to subvert the court-ordered desegregation. Whenever stonewalling did occur, UT administrators and Regents initiated the action. In contrast, A&M appeared to avoid the entire subject of desegregation until African American graduate students first attended classes in 1963.

**How did internal changes at UT and A&M enable them to advance into the national cohort of second-tier research universities?**

Between 1925 and 1940, UT and the University of North Carolina were the most productive Southern public research universities. Neither school could compete with the sixteen schools profiled in Geiger's *To Advance Knowledge*, but each possessed faculty that the Rockefeller Foundation deemed worthy of support. Both the BRSS and the IRSS produced high quality scholarship in the social sciences and UT's zoology department conducted experiments that afforded one researcher with an eventual Nobel Prize.
The partnership forged between the federal government and the nation's colleges during wartime was extended and dramatically strengthened during the Cold War years. Federal funds were available for the taking and virtually every state flagship and land-grant institution took part in the new research economy. During this time, UT entered a new category of research universities known as second-tier or rising research institutions. While A&M certainly increased its share, it would not move into the second tier until the 1970s and 1980s.

Each school had to make internal changes in order to advance. It is impossible, however, to precisely measure how changes in funding, leadership, organizational structure, and a wide sweep of external events affected UT and A&M's performance as research institutions. The personnel shake-up that occurred under Gilchrist's leadership at A&M during the late 1940s and the Rockefeller-sponsored doctoral training program undoubtedly helped the land-grant college move past its designation as a "Model-T" school. Theophilus Painter's call for UT faculty and Regents to move past the Rainey scandal and to get serious about organized research as a prerequisite for promotion and tenure pushed UT into a more competitive mindset. During the late 1940s and 1950s, the schools grew increasingly earnest in their efforts to seek external support for research. In addition to federal funds, both institutions took advantage of various regional foundations, such as the Welch Foundation's support for chemical research. The fundraising bodies that each institution established in the 1940s also allowed UT and A&M to solicit local resources from alumni and businesses.

As previously stated, desegregation was not a change initiated by the leadership at UT. Nevertheless, the gradual dismantling of segregation begun at UT in 1950 freed the institution to concentrate more on the production of knowledge and less on exclusion and oppression. Since UT desegregated ahead of most Southern peers and did so without federal marshals, the
institution was able to escape much of the negative publicity and stigma that schools such as
Alabama and Mississippi encountered.

For A&M, the arrival of women and civilians was a watershed that dramatically
transformed the college. James Earl Rudder's status as a war hero and an Aggie gave him the
credibility required to stand up to outraged former students. Rudder and the A&M Directors
finally resolved the emotional debate over what kind of institution A&M should be: a major
coeducational land-grant university with a strong, but optional, military program. While the
decisions related to the admission of women and optional Corps service received considerable
publicity, those regarding the acceptance of Black students attracted little response. The muted
response by the white community to Blacks on the A&M campus could have been due in part to
timing. The white public reacted strongly and negatively to the presence of African Americans
at UT in the early 1950s. By 1963, white citizens accepted the fact that desegregation and
eventual integration was a permanent reality. This is, of course, mere conjecture.

How did the development of public higher education in Texas compare with the
development of public higher education in the Southern region and the rest of the nation?

In many respects, UT and A&M were no different than their counterparts across the
nation. As argued in Chapter Two, all public flagship and land-grant universities have grappled
with issues of money, mission, organization, and student access. Land-grant colleges have
struggled to adhere to Justin Morrill's charge to deliver extension programs and research in
agriculture, engineering, and liberal arts. Southern land-grants fervently embraced the military
science proviso and maintained these units into the 1960s, though none assembled a system quite
like the Aggie Corps of Cadets.
This study has periodically compared developments at UT and A&M with those in other states. Parallels have most frequently been drawn to California and North Carolina -- California because UT aspired to be the top public research university in the nation and North Carolina because UNC and NC State shared many commonalities with UT and A&M. Economically, the state of Texas had more in common with California than North Carolina. Culturally, Texas and California shared a belief that they were exceptional places. Texans demonstrated their uniqueness through their folklore while Californians did so through their sustained commitment to well-funded and well-coordinated public education. UNC and NC State are the more appropriate objects of comparison to UT and A&M. Texas and North Carolina endured Reconstruction in much the manner that other Southern states did, however, neither zealously subscribed to the rhetoric of the "Lost Cause." UNC, NC State, UT, and A&M wanted to be national beacons, not merely Southern ones. Just like the Texas colleges, the North Carolina institutions battled over curriculum and research agendas. None of these institutions were able to obtain the state appropriations they needed to recruit a critical mass of top researchers needed to place them in the top tier. An exhaustive comparative study of the four institutions might reveal stronger similarities.

Comparisons, some fair and others forced, can be made between the Texas colleges and their peers. The primary purpose of this study, however, has been to illustrate the distinctive features of UT and A&M. Harry Ransom contended that the saga of higher education in Texas was one of "social ambiguity, economic irony, and outrageous contradiction." The state's economic capacity and collegiate performance were often out of sync. Texas is a state of superlatives, yet the state government, UT, and A&M were unable to realize the goal of possessing the best public universities in the nation. There was no single stumbling block;
rather, politics, racism, sexism, and provincialism combined and conspired to impede these universities. In spite of these disadvantages, UT and A&M vastly improved their standing among American research universities between 1945 and 1965 and Texans should be proud of these accomplishments.

Both Edwin Slosson (1910) and James Cattell (1906) included the Universities of California, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota in their lists of great American universities. Clark Kerr observed that all of these institutions remained at the top of the National Academy of Sciences' rankings in 1982. These institutions established their reputations during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and it took more than a few fruitful legislative sessions or the acquisition of a few academic stars to reach this level. Although Texas wanted to compete with these states, it was part of the former Confederacy. The Lone Star State would first have to overcome its Confederate legacy. By 1965, they were far along in the fight.

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Notes

3 H.Y. Benedict, "A Communication to the Board of Regents of the University of Texas (Meeting of October 1, 1928)," University of Texas Bulletin, no. 2843, November 15, 1928, 47, TSLAC.
4 "An Educational Crisis: A Summary of Testimony Before a Senate Committee Investigating the University of Texas Controversy, November 15-28, 1944," Alexander Caswell Ellis Papers, UTCAH, Box 2P45, Rainey Fight General Folder, 3.
Our founding fathers set aside public lands to make sure we would have quality higher education, and we are not in the top tier of public colleges and universities in America. And we should be....I don't think we have made it a state priority. I don't think we've kept up with what it takes. If the University of Michigan can become a top tier public university, why can't the University of Texas? What can't Texas A&M…?1

Kay Bailey Hutchinson, the senior U.S. Senator from Texas, is contemplating a run for governor in 2006. While some of this is Hutchinson's campaign rhetoric, the fact remains that UT and A&M are still running to catch the up to the likes of the University of Michigan and the University of California.

*Texas Monthly* writer Paul Burka reviewed conditions at UT in October 2003 and then at A&M in May 2004. Many of his observations could have been mistaken for descriptions of conditions at the universities in 1965, 1950, and even 1915. The Texas schools have always had the potential to become great public universities, but money and politics, have traditionally blocked, and continue to block, their path. Burka applauds UT President Larry Faulker for daring to admit that UT would and should never compete with Harvard. Former CIA director and A&M President Robert Gates is searching for ways to bolster A&M's faculty, particularly in engineering, improve its ethnic diversity, and preserve the campus traditions that are worth saving. Both schools need more money, more preeminent faculty, less political interference, and admissions plans that balance prestige with inclusion.2 It should be noted that these needs are as old as Article VII of the 1876 Texas Constitution.

UT and A&M entered the 1965-1967 biennium with enough Legislative support to increase salaries and thereby improve the quality and quantity of their faculties. The institutions gained the investment control they needed over the PUF in 1956. Just as in the 1920s, UT and A&M now contend that the PUF is not sufficient to support the nine and ten campus systems, not including health science centers. This is not to say that the institutional endowments are small in
comparison to other public colleges. UT ranks fifth among public institutions with $52,566 of endowment per student. A&M is tenth with $49,983 per student. Both rank ahead of the University of California at Berkeley.³

At their core, the institutions' problems seem to have remained essentially the same that they were when TESC conducted its exhaustive survey in 1925. UT is perpetually on the verge of becoming a 'University of the first class.' Its current Commission of 125 is strikingly similar in structure and goals to the late fifties Committee of Seventy-five. Burka laments that citizens view UT as "an expensive, elitist idea in an anti-tax, anti-elitist age."⁴ Is this view any different than the one held by nineteenth century Texans?

Even as it ranked 16th in the nation in research and development dollars in 2001, A&M reformers continued to fend off threats from former students who accused them of destroying one of its greatest traditions. A&M officially recognized a coed cheerleading squad who needed the institution's sponsorship in order to compete at NCAA performances. Offended former students worried that the move might encourage women to try to become yell leaders -- the all-male squad that has led football fans in the traditional Aggie yells (never cheers) for decades. It was tradition, combined with poor risk management procedures that led to the Bonfire tragedy of 1999 that killed twelve students.

Segregation, inter-institutional competition, political interference, and insufficient resources all served as obstacles as UT and A&M worked to become competitive with universities outside of the South between the 1870s and the 1960s. There is no definitive answer as to why UT and A&M continue to struggle with the issues of the past. Questions, on the other hand, are plentiful.
(1) Did Texas err when it elected to establish a land-grant college and a separate state university?

It is unproductive to imagine how UT and A&M might have performed against the best public universities had they started out as a single institution. Inefficiency and academic mediocrity at the colleges had less to do with the existence of two colleges and more to do with a lack of state planning. If one accepts the largely subjective criteria that *U.S. News and World Report* uses in its college rankings, the University of Virginia, one of two flagship state universities in the commonwealth, stands at the top of public universities for undergraduate education.

UT, A&M, Texas Tech, the University of Houston (UH), and the Texas State System, all vie for state resources and programs. A&M decided it needed a law school and attempted to acquire the South Texas College of Law in 1998. UH and Tech have been seeking a percentage of the PUF for decades. As demonstrated in this study, the region that houses and largely attends Texas Tech has long felt slighted by the Legislature and the PUF beneficiaries.

A&M's effort to add a law school to its system when UT possessed a top law program poses an additional question. What does it mean to be a land-grant university? The Morrill Act called upon states to establish institutions that would produce research in agriculture and engineering, train farmers, and deliver a liberal arts curriculum. Land-grant colleges accepted a mission to serve the state, not its institutional ego. The land-grant mission is not limited to extension, research, and education to provide practical solutions to agricultural, business, and social problems. A stand-alone land-grant's decision to duplicate degrees and initiatives already offered at the flagship state university is, at best, a marginal adherence to the land-grant mission.
Only one stand-alone land-grant university, Michigan State, administers a law school and this venture has turned in mixed results for the state of Michigan in terms of cost and quality.

The author of the GEB's 1916 report decried the unregulated growth and duplication that had occurred at public colleges during the early twentieth century. Regional politics had prevented a number of states from cultivating "a strong and symmetrical university as the crown of a public school system." Kelly and McNeely echoed this sentiment in the 1930s. Allan Nevins and later Joseph Ben-David described the phenomenon as a uniquely American problem.\(^5\) David Tyack and Thomas James argued that the people generally distrust the government. Every regional, economic, and social faction wants the state to pay for their programs, but they do not want to pay taxes for it. Few state governments have ever adopted coherent plans and priorities. Consequently, states such as Texas have permitted their institutions to grow unregulated, as the Legislature has paid off the various special interest groups. These groups include the institutional governing boards, alumni associations, and local chambers of commerce.\(^6\)

Some states overcame the problem of unnecessary duplication, now popularly referred to as mission creep. The California Master Plan, while not perfect, is the best example of a coordinated system of higher education in the United States. Texas revamped its statewide coordinating board in 1965 with the hope that this body could regulate the growth, course offerings, and macro-management of the public colleges. Burka argues that UT missed its chance to design a master plan such as the one in California because the institution's leadership became consumed with student turmoil in the 1960s. The current Texas Coordinating Board possesses a degree of oversight over the state institutions, but every campus and every system wants to expand its physical plant and course offerings. It is only natural in a system that did not
begin as a centralized structure. Then there is the issue of Prairie View and Texas Southern University. Each was founded when the former Confederate states possessed dual systems of education. Neither is academically prestigious nor have they ever been financially stable institutions. UT and A&M continue to possess low African American enrollment, constituting a meager 3.2% and 2% respectively of the student body in 2003. Texas established its public colleges when virtually every aspect of its society was racially segregated. It then opted to establish a land-grant college that could never conceivably agree to be part of the state university. First, there was competition, and coordination never really emerged.

(2) **Did Texas politicize its universities more than other states?**

While Texas history is rich with tales of political interference in its colleges and universities, the state is not unique. Allan Nevin proclaimed that all public colleges, "In a large and healthy sense…have been political institutions." Education is an inherently political business, in part because Americans have yet to agree on what constitutes an educated person and who should pay for it. Texas may have had one of the most politicized systems of higher education in the nation, but no state and its institutions have been free of political conflict.

(3) **Did/do UT and A&M effectively meet the needs and wishes of Texas citizens?**

This is a difficult question to answer. One could tabulate, graph, and map the geographic distribution of UT and A&M students over time. This tedious exercise could suggest that UT was largely a big city school and A&M catered to students from the central and eastern farming communities. It is far easier to analyze the distribution of governing board membership. Maps #11 and #12 (see Appendix) show that the UT Regents and the A&M Directors largely represented the major and midsize cities. While the western and southern portions of the State were more sparsely populated, the concentration of governance is striking. A review of selected
votes in the Legislature and constitutional propositions in public elections suggest that many
decisions affecting the institutions were regional.

In his concluding chapter of *Depression, Recovery, and Higher Education*, Malcolm
Willey wrote that citizens had to trust the goals and outcomes of higher education before they
would pay for it. This was particularly true in times of social, political, and economic change
and crisis. Trust depended on how well colleges communicated their programs and successes to
the public.\(^8\)  Did the majority of Texas citizens, regardless of location and socio-economic
background accept the goals and outcomes of the two universities? Do they today? Forty percent
of Americans surveyed by the *Chronicle of Higher Education* in 2004 stated that they possessed
a great deal of confidence in four-year public universities. Twenty percent believed that the
public colleges in their state were of "very high" quality, 41% described their public colleges as
"high" quality, and 23% believed that they were "good."\(^9\) While there is no comparable survey
available for the years included in this dissertation, UT Regent D.F. Strickland expressed a
provocative view in 1951:

So far as the people of Texas are concerned, the University of Texas is almost as foreign as
is some university in another state. Very few people feel deeply that it is their institution.
As a matter of fact, probably not more than 5% of the people of Texas will ever benefit by
having their children attend the University of Texas. It is a good deal like a fellow feels
about going to Heaven. He thinks it is a good thing, but thinks of it in a secondary sense.
On the other hand, you could go right out here in the country and start a fight with a farmer,
who never reached the 6th grade, if you criticized the A&M College. A&M College,
through its Extension Department and other branches, has taken its school directly to the
people. The simplest people have learned what to plant and when to plant, how to raise
chickens and doctor a sick calf, and you could not convince anybody in Texas that A&M is
not a useful institution...\(^{10}\)

A&M is no longer a college for the farmer's son and has come to resemble its rival in
Austin. Both are caught between a covenant to serve Texas and a fierce desire to join the top tier
of American research universities.
Notes


3 Statistics are for 2002-2003 as printed in the Chronicle of Higher Education almanac, August 2003, A27.


7 Nevins, 1.

8 Willey, 482 -- 483.


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APPENDIX A

Presidents of UT and A&M

Texas A&M Presidents, 1876-1970

1876-1879  Thomas S. Gathright
1879-1883  John G. James
1883     James Reid Cole (acting)
1884-1887  Hardaway Hunt Dinwiddie (Chair of the Faculty)
1887-1890  Louis Lowry McInnis
1890-1891  William Lorraine Bringhurst (acting)
1890-1898  Lawrence Sullivan Ross
1898     Roger Haddock Whitlock (acting)
1899-1901  Lafayette Lumpkin Foster
1901-1902  Roger Haddock Whitlock (acting)
1902-1905  David Franklin Houston
1905-1908  Henry Hill Harrington
1908-1913  Robert Teague Milner
1913-1914  Charles Puryear (acting)
1914-1925  William Bennett Bizzell
1925-1943  Thomas Otto Walton
1943-1944  Frank Cleveland Bolton (acting)
1944-1948  Gibb Gilchrist
1948-1950  Frank Cleveland Bolton
1950-1953  Marion Thomas Harrington
1953-1956  David Hitchens Morgan
1956-1957  David Willard Williams (acting)
1957-1959  Marion Thomas Harrington
1959-1970  James Earl Rudder
University of Texas Presidents, 1895-1967

1895-1896  Leslie Waggener
1896-1899  George Tayloe Winston
1899-1905  William Lambdin Prather
1905-1908  David Franklin Houston
1908-1914  Sidney Edward Mezes
1914-1916  William James Battle (interim)
1916-1923  Robert Ernest Vinson
1923-1924  William Seneca Sutton (interim)
1924-1927  Walter Marshall William Splawn
1927-1937  Harry Yandell Benedict
1937-1939  John William Calhoun (interim)
1939-1944  Homer Rainey Price
1944-1946  Theophilus Shickel Painter (acting)
1946-1952  Theophilus Shickel Painter
1952      James Clay Dolley (acting)
1953-1960  Logan Wilson
1960-1961  Harry Huntt Ransom (appointed Chancellor in 1961)
1961-1963  Joseph Royall Smiley
1963-1967  Harry Huntt Ransom (Chancellor and President)
**APPENDIX B**

**Texas Presidents and Governors, 1836-1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidents</th>
<th>Governors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1835-1836 Henry Smith (provisional)</td>
<td>1846-1847 J. Pinckney Henderson</td>
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<tr>
<td>1836 David G. Burnet (ad interim)</td>
<td>1847-1849 George T. Wood</td>
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<td>1836-1838 Sam Houston</td>
<td>1849-1853 Peter Hansbrough Bell</td>
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<td>1838-1841 Mirabeau B. Lamar</td>
<td>1853 James W. Henderson</td>
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<tr>
<td>1841-1844 Sam Houston</td>
<td>1853-1857 Elisha M. Pease</td>
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<td>1844-1846 Anson Jones</td>
<td>1857-1859 Hardin R. Runnels</td>
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<td>1859-1861 Sam Houston</td>
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<td>1861 Edward Clark</td>
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<td>1861-1863 Francis R. Lubbock</td>
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<td>1863-1865 Pendleton Murrah</td>
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<td>1865-1866 Andrew J. Hamilton</td>
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<td>1866-1867 James W. Throckmorton</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1867-1869 Elisha M. Pease</td>
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<td>1870-1874 Edmund J. Davis</td>
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<td>1874-1876 Richard Coke</td>
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<td>1876-1879 Richard B. Hubbard</td>
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<td>1879-1883 Oran M. Roberts</td>
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<td>1883-1887 John Ireland</td>
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<td>1887-1891 Lawrence Sullivan Ross</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1891-1895 James Stephen Hogg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1895-1899  Charles A. Culberson
1899-1903  Joseph D. Sayers
1903-1907  S.W.T. Lanham
1907-1911  Thomas Mitchell Campbell
1911-1915  Oscar Branch Colquitt
1915-1917  James E. Ferguson
1917-1921  William Pettus Hobby
1921-1925  Pat Morris Neff
1925-1927  Miriam A. Ferguson
1927-1931  Dan Moody
1931-1933  Ross S. Sterling
1933-1935  Miriam A. Ferguson
1935-1939  James V. Allred
1939-1941  W. Lee O-Daniel
1941-1947  Coke R. Stevenson
1947-1949  Beauford H. Jester
1949-1957  Allan Shivers
1957-1963  Price Daniel
1963-1969  John Connally
APPENDIX C

Voting Maps

Map Sources

This data was entered in a spreadsheet using Microsoft Excel and plotted using Microsoft MapPoint.

Maps # 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10: Taken from roll call votes recorded in Texas House and Senate journals.

Maps # 2, 3, 8, 9: Created using the Texas Secretary of State's election registers housed at the Texas State Library and Archives Commission in Austin.

Maps # 11, 12: Drawn from the membership rosters available through the University of Texas Board of Regents website and Henry Dethloff's history of Texas A&M.
Map #1
House Joint Resolution 34, Regular Session, Thirty-fourth Legislature, 1915
“Proposing an amendment to Article VII, Sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, of the Constitution of the State of Texas, providing for the establishment and maintenance of the University of Texas and the Agricultural and Mechanical College as separate institutions and for an equitable division of the State permanent endowment fund of the University of Texas and the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, and making an appropriation to defray the expenses of advertising the Governor’s proclamation and submitting same to a vote of the people.”
Map #2
July 24, 1915, Constitutional Proposition to Separate UT and A&M and divide the PUF
Total For: 50,398
Total Against: 81,658

- Counties where measure carried
- Counties where measure was defeated
- Counties that did not participate or where ballots were deemed invalid
Map #3
May 24, 1919, Constitutional Proposition to Separate UT and A&M and divide the PUF

Total For: 37,560
Total Against: 76,422

Counties where measure carried

Counties where measure was defeated

Counties that did not participate or where ballots were deemed invalid
Map #4
House Bill 154, Regular Session, Thirty-Seventh Legislature, 1921
Bill to establish a western branch of Texas A&M (became Texas Tech), passed both houses, vetoed by Governor Neff.
Map #5
Senate Bill 80, First Called Session of the Forty-third Legislature, 1933
“An Act to authorize the Board of Regents of the University of Texas to execute bonds in a sum not in excess of one million two hundred thousand dollars, to obtain funds with which to complete the Main Building of the University of Texas, to pledge that part of the Available University Fund arising from grazing and other surface leases of University lands to secure the same; and to authorize said Board to make contracts for the construction of dormitories, and declaring an emergency.”

House members voting nay

House members voting in favor
Map #6
Senate Bill 140, Regular Session, 50th Legislature, 1947
“Preparing for the establishment, support, maintenance and direction of a university for the
colored people of this State to be located in Houston, Texas, and providing for an Agricultural
and Mechanical College for colored students, as same is now located at Prairie View; providing
for establishment of equivalent courses during the interim by the Agricultural and Mechanical
College and Texas University governing boards; making appropriation therefore; repealing laws
in conflict, and declaring an emergency.”
Map #7
Senate Joint Resolution 4, Regular Session, 50th Legislature, 1947
“Proposing an amendment to Article VII of the Constitution of the State of Texas by adding two new sections to be known as Sections 17 and 18 and providing a special fund for the payment of Confederate pensions and providing a method of payment for the construction and equipment of buildings and other improvements at state institutions of higher learning; providing for a five-cent reduction in the maximum allowable State tax on property; providing for an election and the issuance of a proclamation therefore.”

House members voting nay

House members voting in favor
Map #8
August 23, 1947, Constitutional Proposition to Approve College Building Amendment
Total For: 102,531
Total Against: 97,318

- Counties where measure carried
- Counties where measure was defeated
- Counties that did not participate or where ballots were deemed invalid
Map #9
November 13, 1951, Constitutional Proposition to allow UT and A&M to establish new investment policies for the PUF
Total For: 100,637
Total Against: 124,547

- Counties where measure carried
- Counties where measure was defeated
- Counties that did not participate or where ballots were deemed invalid
Map #10
House Simple Resolution 555, Regular Session, Fifty-ninth Legislature, 1965
“Recommending that Texas A&M University remain essentially an all male institution.”

[Map showing Texas with voting results indicated by color coding]

- Red: House members voting nay
- White: House members voting in favor
Map #11
Texas A&M Directors by County, 1876 – 1965

Directors by County

14
4
1
Map #12
University of Texas Regents by County, 1881-1965

Regents by County
VITA

Susan R. Richardson

Education

Doctor of Philosophy, Higher Education, Pennsylvania State University, 2005

Master of Science, Student Affairs Administration in Higher Education, Texas A&M University, 1994

Bachelor of Arts, Political Science and Law and Society, American University, 1992

Graduate Experience at the Doctoral Level

Graduate Research Assistant, Higher Education Program, Pennsylvania State University, 1998-2001

Professional Experience

Area Coordinator, Office of the Dean of Students, University of Virginia, 1997-1998

Residence Director, Office of Housing and Residence Life, Southern Methodist University, 1994-1997

Selected Presentations

- “Andrew Dickson White and Alexander Winchell: Competing Perspectives on Science and Religion in the Late Nineteenth Century Academy,” HES, October 2000.

Publications

