The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

Department of Sociology

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS:

ORGANIZATIONAL OBSTACLES TO PRISON—
NON-PROFILE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE PROVISION OF
INMATE TREATMENT PROGRAMS

A Thesis in

Administration of Justice

by

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Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

May 2002
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Abstract

This dissertation presents a case study of a partnership between a women's prison and a not-for-profit social services agency in the establishment of a therapeutic community inside a prison for women inmates reporting a history of domestic violence and sexual abuse. The dissertation develops a typology of organizational structures and behaviors based on the work of Dilulio and McGregor that predicts that prisons characterized by an orientation toward hierarchy, formality and security will be less well equipped to interact with and manage the work of external agencies characterized by flat structure, informality and openness. This typology is used to analyze the prison and agency as organizations and to analyze their interactions in the course of setting up the program. The study shows how program implementation was affected by the respective organizations' failure to recognize and harmonize their differences in structure, mission, and approach to dealing with inmates, and discusses the organizational lessons learned. The study makes recommendations regarding organizational issues that should be addressed when prisons outsource internal functions to outside organizations.
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This dissertation is dedicated to my children, Todd, Robin, Julie, Matthew and Chad, who, second to faith, are my most precious riches.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

One of the primary goals of prison management is the incapacitation of inmates so as to render certain outcomes (i.e., violence against staff, riots, and escapes) less likely. Accordingly, prisons are structured to ensure the control of inmates while they are in prison, and as a consequence of this priority, other organizational goals, such as rehabilitation and associated programming, become secondary in terms of their importance in the day to day operation of the prison (Sykes, 1958).

Also, the persistence of the total institution (Goffman, 1961) concept of the prison serves to render rehabilitation secondary to the goal of dismantling the individual and making him or her into an inmate. The goal of turning people into inmates may serve the institution’s goal of achieving control and security but most prisoners eventually are released and therefore ultimately must deal with the world outside the institution. The prison’s very success as an agent of control is counterproductive to the treatment needs of offenders who have suffered from drug addiction and/or domestic violence and must re-enter society. Finally, the prison’s success in control may also be counter to the requirements of society, which needs members capable of self-regulation and of functioning productively.
Although prison administrations have increasingly shown interest in offering treatment programs related to domestic violence and other issues such as drug addiction, the priority on incapacitation of inmates leads one to ask whether this "interest" means that prisons are willing to set aside the traditional organizational measures of effectiveness in the interests of allowing such programs to function. What are the forces at work, both within and outside of prisons, that militate toward the maintenance of such traditional measures of prison effectiveness?

**Prison Organizational Structure**

It is worth noting that the prison as it has been known in the United States was originally conceived as a more humane alternative to other punishments such as flogging, public humiliation, exile and torture, all of which were considered by early reformers to be cruel and unusual punishments unworthy of a republic (Sykes, 1958). By the early 19th century, improving the conditions of jails was also seen by some, such as the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons, as an opportunity to rehabilitate rather than simply punish offenders. The group’s preamble stated:

[W]hen we reflect upon the miseries [seen in prisons] . . . it becomes us to extend our compassion to that part of mankind, who are the subjects of these miseries. By the aids of humanity, their undue and illegal sufferings may be prevented; . . . and such
degrees and modes of punishment may be discovered and suggested, as may, instead of continuing habits of vice, become the means of restoring our fellow creatures to virtue and happiness. (Vaux, 1826, p. 11, qtd. in Gutterman, 1992, p. 859)

The twin ideas that imprisonment should serve as a more humane form of punishment and should also rehabilitate the offender have thus been a part of the concept of the American penal system since its inception.

What was perhaps unforeseen, however, was that concerns for security would overshadow those for rehabilitation, owing in part to the logistical difficulties inherent in incarcerating growing numbers of people instead of simply punishing, executing, or exiling them (Sykes, 1958). A case in point is that of Pennsylvania. In 1790, Philadelphia became the site of the first American penitentiary, an experiment in the rehabilitation of felons that illustrates the problems inherent in implementing a rehabilitative program inside a prison. In response to pressure by Quaker reformers, the Pennsylvania General Assembly mandated that part of Philadelphia's Walnut Street Jail become a penitentiary to keep the most serious offenders in solitary confinement relieved only by visits from spiritual advisors. The latter was conceived not as a punishment or means of control but as an environment in which the guilty could contemplate his crime in silent solitude and come to repentance (Friedman, 1993). Despite the intent of reformers that the penitentiary be a place where humane
treatment and spiritual direction would enable prisoners to achieve rehabilitation, the experiment failed, partly because the burgeoning prison population made solitary confinement impossible to preserve (Friedman, 1993; Gutterman, 1992).

The Pennsylvania model gave way to the model used in New York’s Auburn State Prison, in which inmates worked at hard labor and slept and ate together (Gutterman, 1992). However, congregate living presented issues of inmate control not raised by the solitary confinement model. That is, if prisons were to house large numbers of inmates in common areas, means had to be found to ensure that the small number of prison staff could effectively prevent breakdowns in security, all of which became more likely when numbers of inmates were able to have communication and contact with one another (Sykes, 1958).

In response to this pressing need for incapacitation of inmates, it would not be surprising if the objective of controlling prisoners had not taken precedence over that of rehabilitating them. Indeed, it could even be said that early 19th-century reformers tacitly recognized this and thus presented their reforms as a means of rendering inmates harmless while incarcerated, advertising this as a stepping stone to the greater goal of rendering them harmless upon their release. Thus the Philadelphia Society’s preamble quoted above offered amelioration of prisoners’ “undue and illegal” suffering as a better means of “restoring our fellow creatures to virtue and happiness” (Vaux, 1826; Gutterman, 1992, p. 859),
that is, of rehabilitating them. Similarly, in April 1817, when the Association for the Improvement of Female Prisoners in Newgate (England) produced a mission statement, its goal was the following:

To provide for the clothing, the instruction and the employment of the women; to introduce them to a knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, and to form in them, as much as possible, those habits of order, sobriety and industry which may render them peaceable, whilst in prison, and respectable when they leave it. (Ryder, 1884, p. 127, emphasis mine)

This ambiguity has persisted to the present. Contemporary researchers have noted that “well run” prisons (i.e., those that experience the fewest security lapses) are not really “total institutions” but, in fact, use programming which, by keeping prisoners occupied, “renders them peaceable” during their incarceration (Gaes & McGuire, 1985; McCorkle, Miethe & Drass, 1995) in the hope that they will remain so upon their release. In fact, in a study of prison wardens’ attitudes toward the reduction of programming and amenities, Johnson and Bennett (1997) found that wardens were decidedly less enthusiastic about such reductions than were politicians or the general public. The authors pointed out that, in contrast free persons, for whom time is at a premium, prisoners have nothing but time, and programs and amenities such as hobby work help both prisoners and staff to “manage boredom and tedium in the prison environment.” Also, the authors wrote, “programs and amenities
serve a critical control function within prisons. To the extent that amenities are prized by prisoners, correctional officials can grant access to them in exchange for obedience to prison rules and can restrict that access as punishment for rule violations. Indeed, the entire prison disciplinary structure is founded on punishments that amount to restriction of privileges” (p. 35).

Thus the crux of prison management is to balance the goals of punishment, rehabilitation, and overall safety and control (Cressey, 1961; Dilulio, 1987; Sykes, 1958). Noting that prisons have multiple tasks (i.e., ensuring custody, maintaining decent conditions, economic production, maintaining internal order, and rehabilitation), Sykes (1958) pointed out that the problem of maintaining internal order raises the question of the specific measures which must be taken to insure [it]; and . . . the question of the value or priority to be attached to the maintenance of order as opposed to possibly competing objectives. If extensive regulations, constant surveillance, and swift reprisals are used, prison officials are likely to run headlong into the supporters of reform who argue that such procedures are basically inimical to the doctor-patient relationship which should serve as the model for therapy (p. 17).
Statement of the Problem

Underlying the conflict described by Sykes, then, is the presumption that the type of social relationships that foster internal order in a prison are inimical to the type of social relationships that foster rehabilitation. It is therefore of some interest to explore the social relationships and organizational consequences that characterize these two competing goals of incarceration.

The problem of this study, then, is to explore the social relationships and organizational management structures both within the prison and the agency. Further, this study will describe the organizational issues raised by the partnership between a human service agency and a women’s prison.

Significance of the Study

Although studies regarding prison therapeutic programs have proliferated in recent years, most have been concerned with the course and outcomes of such programs (Dorman & Cowles, 2002; Toch, 1980) not with the process of their establishment and implementation or with the organizational dynamics of such a partnership. Further, most of the available literature on public-private corrections partnerships relates to the issues involved in contracting out entire facilities (Schneider, 1999), rather than the use of an outside agency to establish a program destined to be
run by the facility itself. This study offers an in-depth look at such a situation.
CHAPTER TWO
CONTROL VERSUS REHABILITATION

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze prisons in terms of their goals, organizational structure, and measures of effectiveness so as to identify potential internal and external factors influencing the functioning of rehabilitative programs, particularly those designed and run by outside agencies. Rather than focus on what forms of control work best, or what forms of treatment work best (as is typical of most of the literature), this chapter attempts to look at the conditions that make both control and treatment of prisoners possible.

Controlling Prisoners

Because most prisoners do not spend all of their time alone in a cell, but are frequently occupied by various forms of work, prison management is also personnel management, albeit the management of less-than-willing inmate workers: “the custodians cannot remain simply custodians, content to search a cell for contraband or to censor the mail; now they must manage men as well” (Sykes, 1958, p. 28). In her study of a women’s prison, Giallombardo (1966) found that, unlike the men’s prison studied by Sykes (1958), the women’s facility was characterized by “full employment”; however, Giallombardo noted, much of this work was busy-
work designed to keep inmates occupied, consisted of home-making tasks for which there was no “real market,” and was essentially for the economic support of the institution, not the prisoners’ economic rehabilitation (p. 61).

Thus, along with the need to prevent assaults, escapes, etc. is the need to manage prisoners who are also workers who, for numerous reasons, may have little motivation to work. These dual needs have given rise to one of the most enduring characteristics of prison administration, namely, its bureaucracy. If the organizational structure of a prison is taken to include prisoners as the “lowest” rung on the organizational ladder, the type of management historically employed in prisons becomes identifiable as McGregor’s (1960) Theory X management philosophy.

**Theory X**

Theory X, or Classical Management Theory, is an American product that began in the early 1900s with the capitalist economic system. Workers are viewed as essentially lazy and motivated primarily by money (Starling, 1986). Taylor (1947), whose name is most closely associated with Theory X, advocated a mixture of detailed task specifications and selection of the person most suited for the job, a practice that has given rise to organizations based on functional specialization, the presence of rigid departmental boundaries, and bureaucratic hierarchies designed to prevent the exercise of employee initiative. He also advocated premium payments as a way to reward the most effective workers (Starling, 1986), since workers were considered inherently unmotivated. The hallmark of
Theory X is the use of centralized control strategies in order to manage inherently untrustworthy workers.

Theory X fits the traditional management style of the American prison in several important ways. First is the assumption that those under management’s control are inherently untrustworthy. Certainly it is an assumption of corrections that prisoners have been incarcerated because they have proven themselves to be untrustworthy in free society. What is perhaps less clear is that similar assumptions exist regarding the trustworthiness of their custodians, particularly those on the lowest level of the administrative chain. This is the guard or corrections officer (CO), who, as Sykes (1958) noted, is “frequently reluctant to enforce the full range of the institution’s regulations . . . . often transmits forbidden information to inmates, . . . neglects elementary security requirements and on numerous occasions he will be found joining his prisoners in outspoken criticisms of the Warden and his assistants” (p. 54). Sykes accounted for this tendency in terms of the fluctuating social distance between COs and prisoners, who coexist in an uneasy symbiosis in which order is not so much imposed by COs as co-produced by COs and inmates; in such a complex environment, Sykes argued, the balance of power between administration and inmates shifts constantly, with COs in a compromised and compromising position—little wonder that, from a Theory X viewpoint, COs are seen as potential risks. A second way in which traditional prison organizations adhere to the Theory X management philosophy is the
presence of numerous and detailed specifications of prison procedure, the existence of which do as much to promote adequate job performance among guards as to keep prisoners in line. A third characteristic of Theory X organizations is a chain of command combined with task specificity, which leads to rigid functional distinctions. Thus, in a prison, the tasks of custody and therapy are performed by different people who often report up different chains of command. Although the correctional officers may spend more time with prisoners than anyone in the organization, and may come to know them better than their superiors, assessing or counseling prisoners is usually not part of the correctional officer’s job description. Fourth, Theory X organizations tend to assume that the formal organization is the totality of the organization, and thus overlook the (inevitable) existence of informal relationships that materially affect the culture and performance of the organization (Bennis, 1970).

In many ways, Sykes’ (1958) study of social relationships in prison was a demonstration of the failure of Theory X management philosophy, for in arguing that the 1952 riots at New Jersey’s Trenton facility arose not so much because of a breakdown of classical technologies of control as because that control had never really existed in the first place. Sykes pointed directly to the dilemma of corrections management: that the cooperation of the prisoners is fundamental to the control which the administration attempts to exercise, and that prison administrators are inclined to turn a blind eye to the extent to which prisoners are in control of
the prison as long as major breaches of security do not occur. Riots, Sykes (1958) argued, occur because prison officials for one reason or another have attempted to redress a perceived imbalance in the internal power structure of the prison which the officials fear has gone too far in the direction of prisoner control; a riot is thus a reaction to that attempt, a forcible effort to re-take control over the institution so as to reduce the deprivations experienced under imprisonment. Over time, the pendulum then swings back and forth between the imposition of classical (prison) management, with the reassertion of rules, procedures, and repressive tactics, and regulation by the prisoners themselves.

The persistence of this oscillation may be due in part to the presumption that Theory X-style management is the only effective (or possible) way to manage a prison, especially since the goal of control over prisoners remains central to the concept of corrections. For example, Dilulio's (1987) comparison of prison systems in Texas, California, and Michigan has been important in maintaining this belief. Based on his studies of the Texas control model, Dilulio (1987) concluded that prisons that use highly formalized managerial practices (which he termed the control model) were most effective at preventing disorder.

Dilulio’s Typology of Prison Management

Dilulio (1987) posited a three-fold typology of prison management approaches: the control, the responsibility, and the consensual models. The control model concentrates authority in the prison administration; the
responsibility model devolves some aspects of control to inmates themselves; and the consensual model is a hybrid in which some aspects of the other two models are present. The differences among the approaches were seen as reflective of assumptions prison administrators make about the appropriate use of power to control inmates and encourage cooperation among prison staff and inmates. In the control model, administrators believe that inflexible, strict controls should permeate all aspects of prison life. This perspective is recognizable as the total institution model described by Goffman (1961) and which was seen by Sykes (1958) as the ideal, if not the reality, of the typical prison administration. However, as Reisig (1998) showed, this hypothesis has not only gone untested empirically but was not supported by Reisig's (1998) data. In an empirical study designed to test Dilulio’s (1987) hypotheses, Reisig (1998) surveyed 306 individuals sampled from 11 different state correctional institutions and correlated their responses regarding prison management practices with rates of prison disorder at the institutions. The most significant finding of the study was that control model prisons did not, as predicted by Dilulio’s (1987) model, experience significantly lower rates of disorder than prisons using the other models. In fact, responsibility model and consensual model prisons “reported lower levels of serious and less serious disorder than did control model facilities” (1998, p. 235, emphasis mine). Reisig (1998) also pointed out that these results supported the work of researchers “who have noted some of the
negative features associated with highly formalized organizations” (1998, p. 235), such as Merton (1940), who argued that rigid bureaucratic structures increase the probability that organizational rules will become internalized to such an extent that adherence to them will supersede the fulfillment of organizational goals; Bennis (1970), who pointed out that highly formalized organizations overlook the importance of informal networks; McGregor (1960), who criticized rigid organizations for making simple (and uncomplimentary) assumptions about human nature; and Stohr, Lovrich, Menke, and Zupan (1994), who showed that highly formalized structures have an adverse impact on job attitudes in correctional settings (Reisig, 1998).

If the control model is in fact less effective at maintaining internal order within prisons than less restrictive models, it would be worthwhile to consider the characteristics of the other two models in Dilulio’s (1987) typology. For if the control model is not only, as has been argued by many, counterproductive to inmate rehabilitation, but also counterproductive to the very control it seeks, it is possible that the long-standing conflict between control and rehabilitation has been taking place on shaky conceptual ground.

In contrast to the control model, responsibility model administrators think that order can be maintained by limiting institutional controls and by allowing inmates to have opportunities for self-government. The control model and the responsibility model represent mutually contradictory
management strategies, so that in most prisons administrators embrace one set of procedures and policies or the other (Dilulio, 1987). The third, or consensual model, represents compromise and uses characteristics of the control and the responsibility models. Dilulio (1987) wrote that consensual model administrators generally believe both the control and responsibility models will inevitably fail, and that "somehow prison workers must realize both models" (p.130). However, he argued that the consensual strategy does not provide a sufficiently consistent body of principles by which administrators can determine and implement policy (Dilulio, 1987).

Dilulio (1987) argued that the three approaches differ in terms of variance in eight related administrative factors, and that such differences account for different levels of prison disorder. The eight factors are communication, personnel relationships, inmate-staff relationships, staff latitude, regimentation, sanctions, response to disruptive behavior, and inmate input into decision-making. The factors relevant to the control model and the responsibility model are described below, followed by a discussion of the consensual model.

**Communication**

Communication in control model prisons is usually restricted to official channels, with information flowing upward through the chain of command and directives flowing downward. In contrast, communication in
responsibility model prisons is usually informal and often crosses levels of authority (DiIulio, 1987, p. 105).

**Personal Relationships**

The ways in which prison personnel address one another is a second factor. Whereas staff in the responsibility model often speak to each other in an informal manner more typical of social etiquette, under the control model, superiors and subordinates commonly address one another in a formal manner as “Mr.,” “Ms.,” etc.

**Inmate-Staff Relations**

Regarding inmate-staff relations, inmates in control model prisons are generally expected to call prison staff "sir," "ma’am" or "boss," while in responsibility model institutions, inmates are permitted to speak to prison staff in a less formal manner (DiIulio, 1987, p. 101).

**Staff Latitude**

The level of latitude in the exercise of judgment allowed prison personnel is another factor in the typology. Whereas prison staff in responsibility model prisons are encouraged to use their judgment or discretion when carrying out their jobs, control model staff enjoy little latitude and are expected to adhere to the rules. For example, staff in the former might differentially enforce rules against smoking marijuana and drinking “pruno” because marijuana, while prohibited, is more likely to make inmates “mellow,” whereas “pruno,” being alcohol, may increase
their combativeness. Control model staff would be more likely to crack down on both with equal severity.

**Regimentation**

A fifth aspect is the degree of regimentation of inmate routines. In control model prisons, staff follow a "carefully orchestrated routine of numbering, counting, checking, locking, and monitoring" (DiIulio, 1987, p. 105) inmates and their activities. In contrast, in responsibility model prisons, inmates are allowed the "greatest measure of freedom consistent with basic security requirements" (Diulio, 1987, p. 119).

**Sanctions**

The ways in which inmate violations of rules are dealt with constitute another dimension in the typology. In the responsibility model prison, staff do not stringently "deal out formal sanctions for every rule violation" (Diulio 1987, p.120). In control model facilities, infractions meet with stern reprisals.

**Response to Disruptive Behavior**

The administration's response to disruptive behavior on the part of inmates differs significantly between the control and responsibility models also. Whereas control model prison administrations usually react to disruptive behavior with "swift official counterforce" (Diulio, 1987, p. 178), responsibility model personnel often react by negotiating with inmates (Diulio, 1987, p. 87).
Inmate Input Into Decision-Making

The degree to which inmates are allowed to participate in decision-making is the eighth dimension of the typology. Including inmates in decision-making processes is typical in responsibility model prisons (DiIulio 1987, p. 120). However, in control model prisons, inmates are viewed as having "demonstrated an inability to be self-governing" (DiIulio 1987, p.178) and are treated as such.

Finally, the consensual model represents a hybrid of administrative practices typical of the other two managerial models. Such a mixture suggests the varying (some might say conflicting) assumptions administrators make about the need for formalizing each of the different factors. Thus, prison administrators in the consensual model may employ strict procedures to control inmate activity and use heavy-handed methods for dealing with disruptive behavior. At the same time, they may believe that prison personnel should not be subjected to similarly strict control. In this case, administrative factors may be very formalized with regard to inmate affairs but be more flexible with regard to employee matters.

Procedures and practices comprising Dilulio’s (1987) model can be said to reflect assumptions about human nature that underlie management practices. Such assumptions are not unique to prisons, but are to be found in organizations in general: far from being unique to prison management, Dilulio’s (1987) three models bear strong correspondences with general management theories, commonly known as Theories X, Y and Z.
DiIulio’s control model strongly echoes McGregor’s (1960) account of “Theory X”; DiIulio’s responsibility model bears a close resemblance to “Theory Y” (McGregor, 1960); and DiIulio’s consensual model seems to resemble “Theory Z” (Ouchi & Price, 1993). The correspondence among the models is discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.

### Figure 2-1 Synopsis of DiIulio’s Prison Management Models

**Associated with General Management Theories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DiIulio’s Management Models</th>
<th>General Management Models</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Model</td>
<td>Theory X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility Model</td>
<td>Theory Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensual Models</td>
<td>Theory Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control Model/Theory X**

In DiIulio’s (1987) typology of administrative factors, the managerial assumptions of the control model most closely match that of Theory X (McGregor, 1960) and of total institutions (Goffman, 1961). In the former, not only inmates but also workers are considered untrustworthy and in need of close supervision. Thus, prison staff, though considered more trustworthy than inmates, are nevertheless objects of suspicion and must, like inmates, be subject to certain controls, manifested as social formality, the observance of a chain of command, and the limited exercise of
personal discretion in the performance of tasks (Dilulio, 1987). Further, in such an organization the presence and maintenance of a hierarchy may be reinforced by such controls and serves to articulate declensions in status as one moves down the organizational totem pole. Such organizations are also likely to show a reliance on bureaucratic forms and procedures (doing it “by the book”).

Responsibility Model/Theory Y

McGregor (1960) labeled the various classical assumptions as Theory X and went on to develop those of a more magnanimous management system, which he called “Theory Y,” which views subordinates as willing to work, willing to accept responsibility, capable of self-direction and self-control, and capable of creativity. Moreover, Theory Y approaches generally hold that people are motivated by and respond effectively to responsibility, take satisfaction in the work itself, seek participation, and operate with imagination and creativity (Collins, 1996).

Consensual Model/Theory Z

“In Z organizations decision making is typically a consensual, participative one (Ouchi & Price, 1993). Type Z organizations show “broad concern for the welfare of subordinates and of co-workers as a natural part of a working relationship” (qtd. in Peters, 1982, p. 79). Further, egalitarianism is central to type Z organizations; because they are to be trusted, people can use discretion and work autonomously without close supervision (Ouchi & Price, 1993). Ouchi stated: “. . . trust underscores
the belief that goals correspond, that neither person is out to harm the other. This feature, perhaps more than any other, accounts for the high levels of commitment, of loyalty, and of productivity in . . . type Z organizations” (1993, p. 81).

Diulio’s (1987) responsibility and consensual models, like Theories Y and Z, give both staff and prisoners the benefit of the doubt: social distance is less strictly maintained, communication networks across organizational and hierarchical boundaries are not only tolerated but encouraged, and some discretion is allowed for both staff and prisoners, whether in the performance of tasks (such as rule enforcement) or in governance (in the case of inmates). Such organizations, as argued by Reisig (1998) and others (Merton, 1940; Stohr, et al., 1994) are more likely to be less bureaucratic than control/Theory X organizations. They also seem to be more effective in meeting the organizational goal of maintaining internal order.

However, having reviewed the characteristics of Diulio’s (1987) typology, one is still faced with the need to explain the disconnect between organizational rigidity and security. A possible explanation is suggested by a study by McCorkle, Miethe and Drass (1995), which examined the structural, managerial and environmental determinants of prison violence and found that, contrary to the hypotheses of both Sykes’ (1958) deprivation model and Diulio’s (1987) managerial model, the factors most predictive of internal disorder (measured as incidents of inmate-inmate
and inmate-staff violence) were a low proportion of African-Americans in the guard population and low unemployment rates in the free economy. The authors conclude, rather superficially, that the main policy implication of their findings was that prison administrators should recruit more African-Americans into the ranks of prison guards if they wish to keep the peace. However, in concluding this, they overlook the possibility that increased racial similarity between guards and prisoners—to use Sykes’ term, to reduce the “social distance” (1958, p. 54) between them—serves to promote a social cohesion which contemporary prisons appear to lack. In their discussion, the authors pointed out that their results showed no support for the "social disordered" effects of heightened security: this "social disordering" hypothesis, they noted, presumes the existence of a cohesive inmate society such as the one described by Sykes in the 1950’s that would be disturbed by increased restrictions or deprivations. But this picture of inmate social structure, they wrote, no longer obtains:

Whereas the notion of a "society of captives" may have once been an accurate conceptualization of inmate relations, there has been little that resembles a "community" behind the walls for more than two decades. The growing concentration of lower-class, antisocial, and violent prisoners who value "toughness," individuality, and violent solutions to conflicts and dilemmas makes a "society of captives" impossible (Clear and Cole 1990). Indeed, Irwin (1980) has concluded that the contemporary prison is composed of
nothing more than a collection of hostile, racial groups, violent gangs, and cliques. The potential for violence remains constant in this environment, although a tenuous social order is maintained through strict segmentation and avoidance behaviors. Unlike the past, there is no longer a single inmate subculture and no uniform inmate code that is adhered to by all prisoners. Consequently, the absence of a link between increased security and order was to be expected. (McCorkle, Miethe & Drass, 1995, p. 325)

The picture of prison social organization that emerges here is one of barely organized chaos, in which individual well being is best ensured by membership in a gang rather than by “doing your own time.” Why, then, would having the racial composition of the keepers more closely reflect that of the kept serve to mitigate violence? Because, as Sykes put it so well, the guard “can remain aloof only with great difficulty, for he possesses few of those devices which normally serve to maintain social distance between the rulers and the ruled” (1958, p. 54). Yet what, besides race, more surely guarantees social distance in the United States? The greater presence of African-American guards in a prison system that disproportionately imprisons African-Americans is one way to decrease the social distance between correctional officers and prisoners and promote peace within the walls.

The picture presented by McCorkel et al. (1995) above is also in opposition to the findings of Reisig (1998), in that rates of disorder in
Reisig’s study were found to be lower in less restrictive environments, which, if McCorkle et al. are correct, should be impossible. That is, if some form of uniform inmate social cohesion did not exist, prison management models allowing a degree of latitude to staff and prisoners would produce more, not less, violence. A possible resolution to this conflicting picture may be that more permissive prison administrations, like the presence of African-American guards, allow the development of more cohesive social relationships as well as the exercise of staff discretion, thereby producing greater levels of peace and order within the institution.

If such were the case, it would point toward the existence of social cohesion as a necessary ingredient in prison security. This is a crucial point not only for control but for rehabilitation as well, for social cohesion is considered to be a “necessary precondition for effective therapy” based on a group modality (Yalom, 1985, p. 50). It is this possible point of overlap which the control vs. rehabilitation debate has overlooked and which may form the basis of an organizational theory of prisons that could encompass both the maintenance of internal order and the reform of prisoners.

Another point to consider is that much of the research on prison management, violence, and programming has focused on men’s prisons, not women’s prisons. In general, contemporary women offenders do not resemble their male counterparts in the extent of their violence and sociopathy (Austin & Irwin, 2001; Chesney-Lind, 1991; Chesney-Lind & Immarigeon, 1995; Immarigeon & Chesney-Lind, 1992) and require less
supervision by posing lower institutional risks (Austin & Irwin, 2001). Also, Austin and Irwin (2001) report that "women inmates have more severe social, educational and economic risk factors than male inmates" (p. 61). Consistent with theories of women’s psychosocial development, it is also likely that women prisoners are more likely than men to want programming that helps them learn healthy social relationships, as Belknap (1996) found in her survey of women inmates’ programming needs. Further, as Giallombardo (1966) found in her study of social relationships in a women’s prison, female prisoners developed social relations along “kinship” lines, with various prisoners taking the roles of mother, daughter, wife, husband, etc., a finding that would suggest that social cohesion may be more likely in women’s prisons than in men's prisons.

Thus, the next question is, what are the social relationships relevant to social cohesion, and, following that, are these relationships characteristic of either the responsibility or the consensual models of prison management?

Rehabilitating Prisoners

Much research has been devoted to designing and testing treatment programs for prisoners. However, the focus of this literature is most typically on the characteristics of the study population and/or outcomes (see Palmer, 1983, for a review) rather than on social factors (i.e., prison social structure, TC social structure, etc.) that may also
influence outcome, and, equally important for the purposes of this study, that may influence the social processes among inmates and staff. The focus of this section is to examine the social relationships considered most conducive to the rehabilitation of prisoners.

Yalom (1985) wrote of group therapy, which is a major treatment modality in inmate rehabilitation, that “a sine qua non in effective therapy outcome is a proper therapeutic relationship. . . . successful therapy is mediated by a relationship between therapist and patient that is characterized by trust, warmth, empathic understanding, and acceptance” (pp. 48-49). In group therapies, cohesiveness, defined as the “attractiveness of a group for its members” (Yalom, 1985, p. 49), is analogous to the relationship between the therapist and patient in individual therapy (Yalom, 1985, p. 48). Thus in group treatment formats, considerable effort is put forth to enable the members of the group to develop trust, feelings of warmth, understanding, and acceptance towards one another.

This framework underlies the workings of a TC as well, as a TC can be conveniently thought of as residential group therapy, or, as Filstead and Rossi (1973) defined it, as a "method of organizing the social structure of a treatment setting to cultivate and take advantage of natural social relationships" (p. 10).

An example of a therapeutically successful TC for drug-addicted offenders is the Cornerstone program. Lurigio (2000) noted that in an
evaluation of Cornerstone that followed graduates for 3 years following release from parole supervision, it was found that those who graduated were significantly less likely than non-graduates to be arrested, convicted, or incarcerated (Field, 1989, cited in Lurigio, 2000). Field (1989) found that compared to a re-arrest rate of 63% for non-graduates with up to 6 months of participation and an 85% re-arrest rate for non-graduates with less than 2 months of participation, only 26% of Cornerstone graduates were re-arrested.

Administered by the Oregon Department of Mental Health through a cooperative agreement with the State Department of Corrections, Cornerstone separates TC participants from the general prison population for one year and utilizes peer pressure and support as part of its program. The program employs a highly structured routine of daily activities, encourages inmates to take responsibility and ownership of treatment by granting them authority to run the program, permits them to earn their freedom by obeying program rules, and gives 6 months of transition and aftercare services (Field, 1989, cited in Lurigio, 2000). It is interesting to note that the program appears to follow a mixed, or consensual, model of prison administration: routines are highly structured (control model); inmates are encouraged to take responsibility (responsibility model); and uses a reward system for good behavior (responsibility model). It is also important to note the importance of social or group cohesion in this program: participants are separated from the main prison population, peer
pressure and group support are used to gain compliance, and aftercare to provide transitional support is provided.

A similar model is used by Stay ‘N Out, a long-lived TC operated in New York State that can be considered successful in terms of preventing recidivism (Wexler, Falkin, & Lipton, 1990, cited in Lurigio, 2000). Set up in 1974 in the New York State Correctional System, (Falkin, Wayson, Wexler, & Lipton, 1992; Frohling, 1989, cited in Lurigio, 2000) it requires that participants be at least 18 years of age, have histories of drug abuse and dependence, and a track record of successful participation in other programs in prison. Run by recovering addicts, Stay n’ Out is located in a separate unit. Again, the use of a less restrictive management model as well as separation from the main prison population appears to be distinguishing features of the program.

In a discussion of the role of democratic process in prison administration, Toch (1994) wrote that three forms of direct prisoner participation in the management of prisons are possible: involvement of inmates in the day-to-day functioning of small institutions and small subdivisions of large institutions (such as TCs); involvement of inmates in focused groups devoted to some facet of prison administration (i.e., inmate-staff task forces); and individual participation of prisoners in their own management.

Despite these successes, however, the cause of rehabilitation of inmates continues to be an uphill battle. Frequently, the failures of the
prison system, especially recidivism, are blamed on prisoners themselves—after all, are they not, as one of the Associate Wardens at Alderson, put it, “the failures[?] These people are unintelligent, emotionally unstable, and insecure” (Giallombardo, 1966, p. 71). However plausible it may seem to blame the prisoner for his or her failures, the foregoing discussion should suggest that considerable institutional forces are at work in these failures, and it would therefore be reasonable to analyze the causes of organizational failure and effectiveness.

Organizational Change

In her study of the forces at work inside a women’s prison, Giallombardo (1966) argued that the prison was organized so as to balance the competing claims of custody, economic support (maintenance) of the prison, and rehabilitation, and that, when faced with the expansion of the treatment function, the custodial and maintenance mobilized to “resist changes that will in any way jeopardize the successful performance of their functions” (p. 73). She went on to argue that to lay the blame for this on the custodial and maintenance functions as groups would be to overlook the main point, which is that “the basic conflict between the competing goals of self-maintenance and custody on the one hand, and treatment on the other, is a structural weakness of prisons: Any disturbance in the equilibrium of the system results in reconciliation of competing purposes at the treatment level” (1966, p. 73): that is, treatment
priorities will give way to those of custody and maintenance. Consequently, when change was introduced in the form of an educational program for inmates, the maintenance and custody functions undermined its ability to function by setting conditions upon its times of operation: inmates would have to attend classes in such a way as to not interfere with the custodial and maintenance functions, which inmates were needed to staff.

Trenchant as this critique is, close inspection of the transcript presented by Giallombardo (pp. 68-72) reveals another problem characteristic of organizations in which effectiveness is compromised because change is resisted. At several points in the transcript of the meeting in which the establishment of the education program was announced, several participants protested that they were not included in the decision (p. 70) or that inmates had not been informed (p. 71). As Nutt (1999) noted in a study of why half of decisions in organizations are never implemented, a major problem is a failure to involve major stakeholders and make adjustments as the decision unfolds. Instead, as in the case described by Giallombardo, “edicts” are issued instead:

Some managers use their power to issue a directive that announces a decision. A memorandum is written, job training conducted, or an administrator hired to carry out actions called for by the decision. This is done without consulting with people who have stakes in the changes the decision would bring. . . . Edicts
were observed in 40 percent of the cases and had the highest failure rate. When implementation was attempted by edict, 53 percent of the decisions were sustained for two years, and only 35 percent were fully used. (Nutt, 1999, p. 83)

It is perhaps remarkable that managerial edicts, so characteristic of Theory X organizations, remain so popular, even in the above sample of senior managers in medium to large organizations in the United States and Canada—managers who, presumably, have had some exposure to theories of management and who therefore might be presumed to be aware of the perils of Theory X management practices.

Another way that organizations can fail to implement decisions or fail to change is, as Toch (1994) noted in his discussion of the Norfolk (Massachusetts) Prison Colony (founded in 1931), to attempt to implement a more permissive rehabilitative model within the confines of control/Theory X practices. At Norfolk, the use of two cadres of corrections officers—one group living, eating, and working with the inmates in the process of rehabilitating them; the other group counting, checking, and watching the inmates—led to serious dissension between the two groups. Also, the facility used functionally and physically separated classification personnel to assess prisoners, which led to the opinions of corrections officers being ignored (Toch, 1994). While this would seem to support Dilulio’s (1987) point that putting the fox in charge of the hen-house leads
inevitably to disaster, it is probably more to the point to note that the internal rifts in the organization led to its sabotage by the more control-oriented group of guards, who, it seems, leaked scandalous tales of “licentiousness” to politicians and the press (Toch, 1994, p. 68). As Toch’s narrative of the Norfolk Colony showed, organizational failures can occur because of the presence of competing management models within the same organization.

The case of the Norfolk Colony raises yet another issue relating to the ability of a prison organization to countenance change. The correctional officers assigned to rehabilitation functions in that case were, in effect, identified as outsiders by the guards assigned to perform control functions. How, then, does the presence of real outsiders (whether agencies or individuals) affect the prison organization?

Virtually all of the literature on public/private partnerships in corrections that was found dealt with the history, feasibility, costs and benefits, political implications and/or outcomes of contracting out all of the prison’s functions to an outside provider (Ogle, 1999; see Schneider, 1999 for a review), which means that limited conclusions about the dynamics of outsourcing a single function can be drawn from the literature. However, a clue can be found in a study by Shichor (1999), who noted that “with the entrance of private corporations into the operation of prisons, the role of corrections officials changes from program administrators to contract monitors” (p. 252). Given their tradition of control/Theory X management,
this is a role which corrections officials may be ill-prepared to fulfill, whether their responsibility is oversight of a corporation running an entire facility or oversight of an agency providing a single service, for the control/Theory X model predicts that prison officials will tend to view outside contractors as a species of worker: untrustworthy, unmotivated, and in need of close supervision. If, in addition, the single service provided by an outside vendor is rehabilitative services, the kinds of organizational issues revealed in previous sections of this chapter may be heightened. That is, the rehabilitative services provided by the vendor are likely to be seen as in some way competing with or undermining the institution’s goals, just as, in the case of the Norfolk Colony cited by Toch (1994), personnel who worked closely and formed emotional bonds with inmates were defined as outsiders by those assigned to watch both them and the prisoners. If the rehabilitative personnel are also outside contractors, it would seem predictable that they would almost certainly be defined as outsiders (and thus potential or actual allies of the prisoners) and be held in a certain amount of suspicion, at least until they proved themselves capable of conforming to institutional norms (see Marquart, 1986, for a description). Thus it is likely when a prison contracts or partners with an outside service provider (i.e., outsourcing therapeutic services) the presence of outsiders will exacerbate existing tensions between control and rehabilitative functions. As was the case in Giallombardo’s (1966)
Alderson, the function most likely to lose out will be the provider of the rehabilitative service—in this case, the outside vendor.

**Conclusions**

The competing goals of control and rehabilitation have been part of the American penitentiary since its inception. A review of prison management models revealed that the focus of work such as Dilulio's (1987) and Reisig’s (1998) has been the factors leading to the maintenance of control inside prisons, **not the factors leading to the rehabilitation of prisoners**. Dilulio’s (1987) contention, which, according to Reisig (1998), has been influential despite its lack of empirical verification, was that it is the control model prison that is safer and less prone to outbreaks of violence. Thus, because organizational effectiveness of prisons has been measured primarily in terms of control of inmates, the control/Theory X model has been presumed to be the most effective organizational model. This untested assumption, it can be argued, has had a chilling effect on the performance of other organizational goals of prisons, particularly rehabilitation. That less restrictive models akin to more modern management theories have been presumed less effective than the control model in the maintenance of order is ironic in view of the findings of this chapter, which point to the possibility that security and rehabilitation might be feasible if more permissive organizational models were used, and that social cohesion, which control models specifically
attempt to undermine, is a necessary precondition not only to an orderly prison but to one that fulfills its rehabilitative goals as well. In addition, the use of bureaucratic and autocratic management strategies such as managerial edicts, as well as the failure to consider the implications of pitting two organizational models against one another, have been seen to undermine social cohesion, order, and rehabilitation.

The management theories X, Y and Z each have characteristic outcomes in terms of organizational structure and culture which, when combined with Dilulio’s (1987) typology of administrative factors, have yielded a typology of prison organizational models that may be useful for analyzing a prison’s ability to successfully pursue rehabilitative goals. This model predicts that the more the prison employs the control/Theory X management model, the less hospitable it will be to both staff autonomy and inmate social cohesion. Further, the prison will tend to define outside service providers as threats to stability and, lacking the managerial tools to engage in contract oversight, will resort to its usual means of gaining the compliance of the provider: the imposition of rules, reliance on a chain of command, strict reliance on departmental functions, etc.

The next chapter of this study describes the case study methodology used to examine, in the light of the above model, the interactions between the administration and staff of a maximum security state prison for women and the staff of a non-profit social services agency
that was contracted by the prison to set up a therapeutic community for inmates who were survivors of domestic violence.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The first chapter of this study described the problem, which is the disconnect between correctional institutions’ need to control inmates and their charter to rehabilitate them. The second chapter developed a typology of prison organizations that predicts that this disconnect will grow more problematic the more the prison administration is invested in a control/Theory X model of organization. The model predicts also that to the degree that subcontracting human service agencies such as providers of rehabilitative programs do not subscribe to control/Theory X, tensions will arise in the relationship between prison and agency in which the prison will attempt to relate to members of the agency in ways that are consistent with control/Theory X assumptions. Prior to presenting a narrative examining the hypothesis generated by the typology presented in chapter two, it is necessary to describe the method used to obtain the primary data of the study, data collection and analysis methods, and methods of controlling for researcher bias. This is the purpose of the present chapter.
Case Studies and Participant Observation

Classical case studies typically depend on ethnographic and participant observer methods (Fetterman, 1989). They are largely descriptive examinations, usually of a small number of sites (small towns, hospitals, schools) where the principal investigator is immersed in the life of the community or institution and searches available documents, holds formal and informal conversations with informants, observes ongoing activities, and develops an analysis of both individual and “cross-case” findings (Yin, 1993).

There are a number of characteristics associated with the case study (Yin, 1993). A case study usually includes an explanation of a problem that is the occasion of the study; a thorough description of the context or setting within the inquiry takes place and with which the inquiry is concerned; and a discussion of outcomes of the investigation, which may most usefully be thought of as the ‘lesson to be learned’ from the study. (Yin, 1993)

In general, observational techniques are methods by which an individual or individuals gather first-hand data on programs, processes, or behaviors of interest. These techniques provide an opportunity to collect data on a wide range of behaviors, to capture a great variety of interactions, and to openly explore the topic. By directly observing operations and activities, the investigator can develop an understanding of the context within which the program, process or behavior operates. This
may be especially important where it is not a particular event that is of interest, but rather how that event may fit into, or be impacted by, a sequence or network of events. Observational approaches also allow the researcher to learn about things the subjects may be unaware of or that they are unwilling or unable to discuss in an interview or focus group.

Participant observation is a data collection method “characterized by a prolonged period of intense social interaction between the researcher and the subjects, in the milieu of the latter, during which time data, in the form of field notes, are unobtrusively and systematically collected” (Bodgan, 1972). It is an acceptable basic anthropological method of obtaining information for research (Wolf, 1956), as well as a viable and common social and behavioral science procedure referred to as “special network design” by Wasserman and Faust (1994).

Studying any institution is a complex undertaking because of outside forces impinging on it. According to Wolf (1956), an anthropologist who studied and wrote about peasant communities and their integration into society over the last 50 years, “anthropologists have hesitated to commit themselves to” studying institutions (p. 1065), such as correctional institutions. He emphasized that it is important to recognize the whole picture when studying a specialized unit of the whole. It would be “methodologically incorrect to treat each part as though it were an independent whole in itself” (Wolf, 1956, p. 1065). Thus, following the model of Wolf and especially of Sykes (1958) and Giallombardo (1966),
who pioneered the use of participant observation in prison studies, the author chose to study the interactions of organizational components rather than a specific program in and of itself.

Bodgan (1972) stated that the primary purpose of participant observation was to understand the organization to be studied. Most prisons of necessity are very protective about their environment and disclose to the public only what they choose, often through the media. To overcome these protective, and somewhat defensive, obstacles and to truly understand the internal activity of a prison, one either must live in it, or “be there” for a sufficient amount of time. The participant observer method offered such a means of first-hand data collection, the specific procedures of which are discussed next.

Data Collection and Analysis Procedures

The present section describes the specific data collection procedures and hypotheses employed in the study. Following Bogdan's (1972) method for successful participation observation, which requires flexibility and timing and involves three stages: (1) pre-field work, (2) field work and (3) analysis, the author took observational notes over a three-year period while working inside the Prison.

The pre-field work, during which the author worked as a volunteer inside the Prison, lasted 18 months. The author visited the Prison approximately one day per month as a volunteer helping a group of
inmates publish a newsletter. This experience allowed her to learn her way around the physical and social environment of the Prison and to ease into the setting. It also enabled staff to become accustomed to the presence of the author as an individual and for the author to earn the confidence of staff, factors which are important to blending into a setting, as discussed by Marquart (1986). During the field work, the author observed how the staff members interacted with the inmates, how the inmates interacted with the staff, how the staff interacted with each other and how the inmates interacted with each other. During the analysis phase, the author reviewed field notes and reflected on the overall patterns of behavior observed.

Data Collection

Primary data were collected over a period of one year, beginning with the application for and award of a contract to the Agency which employed the author, and ending when the author’s relationship with the Prison ended. The author was present at the Prison a minimum of 20 hours per week (frequently more) for 45 weeks, beginning the first week in January 1996.

Data consisted of the author’s notes, contained in a research diary. Note-taking was completed at the end of each day of prison activity in order to accurately log the observations in a timely manner. Observations that were not clear were clarified through the prison personnel or the
inmates. Additional information was also confirmed through prison records and outside sources, such as the director of a half-way house, news articles and court records.

Observations were carried out using a carefully developed protocol that included:

- Describing the setting of the research, i.e., where the observations took place and what the physical setting was like;
- Identifying the people who participated in the observed activities, i.e., characteristics of those who were present;
- Describing the content of the interactions, i.e., actual activities and messages that were delivered;
- Describing the interactions between the researcher and subjects;
- Describing and assessing the quality of the delivery of the program that was the occasion of the observations; and
- Being alert to unanticipated events that might require refocusing one or more research questions. (Lofland & Lofland, 1995)

Field notes were used to provide more in-depth background and to help the investigator remember salient events. The field notes contained a description of what was observed and were recorded daily, with the date and time of the observation recorded, as well as other details that the researcher believed to be worth noting. Because technological tools, such as battery-operated tape recorder or dictaphone, laptop computers,
cameras, and video cameras, were not permitted in the Prison, daily recording of field notes was a necessity and formed the sole method of data collection.

The Role of the Observer

There are various methods for gathering observational data, depending on the nature of a given project. The most fundamental distinction between various observational strategies concerns the extent to which the observer will be a participant in the setting being studied. The extent of participation is a continuum that varies from complete involvement in the setting as a full participant to complete separation from the setting as an outside observer or spectator. On one hand, the participant observer is fully engaged in experiencing the setting while at the same time trying to understand that setting through personal experience, observations, and interactions and discussions with other participants (Gold, 1969). On the other hand, the outside observer stands apart from the setting, attempts to be non-intrusive, and assumes the role of a “fly-on-the-wall.” The goal is to use the degree of participation that can produce the most meaningful data about the setting in view of the characteristics of the subjects, the nature of researcher-subject interactions, and the sociopolitical context of the setting (Patton, 1990).

Somewhat like Marquart (1986), who described a participant observer experience equivalent to working “under cover,” the author’s identity as a researcher and provider of therapeutic services to inmates was known to
all participants; however, what was not known was the extent to which the author observed prison staff as well as inmates. The author’s role as a researcher was also somewhat like that of Sykes (1956), who was identified as a researcher within the New Jersey State Prison system.

One issue that must be addressed regarding the author’s participation in the project is that of, for want of a better term, experimenter bias. Because the author (serving as Supervising Counselor for the Therapeutic Community), participated in many of the interactions described in this study, it could be argued that she influenced the processes and outcomes and thereby biased the results. However, it should be remembered that, first, the demand characteristics that produce experimenter bias are usually considered to pull for overly positive responses on the part of informants (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1975 for the classic account of sources of such bias). Positive response bias, however, is more of a risk in laboratory and interview settings, where the researcher is identified as a researcher, than in naturalistic settings such as characterized the present study. Second, the circumstances of the present study were probably little different from many ethnographic studies in which a researcher spends a significant amount of time with the group that is the focus of study. Third, at the time the observations were made, the author, like the other project participants, was simply a participant with no particular observational agenda. The case study
presented in this dissertation is the result of an effort to step back from an experience and make sense of it in the tranquility of hindsight.

**Controlling Researcher Bias in Participant Observation**

Hammersley (1995) viewed truth in ethnography as the degree to which an ethnographic account accurately depicts the phenomenon to which it refers. This is essentially the same concept as validity. Just as validity in quantitative research is considered to be the extent to which an instrument measures what it says it measures and the effectiveness with which it does so (Anastasi, 1988), so also could one say that in the case of field data derived from observation, validity is the extent to which the data (and the account derived from them) accurately depict what they purport to depict—the phenomenon to which they refer. To ensure accuracy, two problems need to be avoided: the tendency to select field data to fit an ideal conception or preconception of the phenomenon and the tendency to select conspicuous or exotic field data at the expense of less dramatic (and possibly indicative) data (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper & Allen, 1993; Fetterman, 1989).

Specifically, two methods have been proposed to address issues of validity in field methods: respondent validation and triangulation (Hammersly & Atkinson, 1995; Moustakas, 1990; Westbrook, 1994). Respondent validation consists of soliciting commentary from respondents
subjects) regarding the accuracy of the researcher’s account of the phenomenon.

Owing to problems that arose in the relationship between the Prison and the Agency employing the author (explained in chapter five), respondent validation in the usual sense was not possible in this study. The Prison terminated its relationship with the Agency that employed the investigator and forbade further contact with the inmates and staff as well as use of the quantitative data collected about the program. Consequently, the full-scale use of respondent validation was not available to the author, although some informal follow-up with former inmates and staff did take place and has been used where appropriate. Also, during the pre-fieldwork period, the author was able to develop an understanding of the context by informally checking perceptions with staff and inmates at the Prison.

The inability to submit the author’s accounts to direct evaluation by respondents necessitated the use of triangulation, or the search for confirmation among multiple sources such as interview, observation, and documentary data. This therefore became the chief method of ensuring the validity of the study. Essentially, triangulation is the search for correspondences among varying sources of information. While useful, triangulation is limited in that the accuracy of one method does not necessarily show the inaccuracy of the other. Also, each account may be valid in its own sense (Seidman, 1991; Weiss, 1994; Westbrook, 1994),
which means that it can be difficult to select among competing accounts of the phenomenon under study.

Lack of access to primary data other than field notes rendered secondary data even more important to the triangulation process than it otherwise would be. Consequently it was vital to this study to develop an understanding not only of the more recent literature on prisons as organizations and but also to delve into classic prison case studies such as those of Sykes (1958) and Giallombardo (1966) so as to develop an historic sense of behavior in and the organizational structure of prisons. In effect, the data derived from the literature review was needed not only to develop a framework with which to approach the observational data but also to form a check in the absence of other methods of validating the author’s observations.

Interpretation of Data

Another important aspect of controlling bias arose in the interpretation of observational data. While there is no single way to approach field data, the following steps were used in arriving at conclusions:

- The field notes, or whatever data has been gathered, were read several times.
- The data were marked, and notes taken on any patterns, connections, similarities, or contradictory points in the data (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).
• What was noticed was pursued by looking for “local categories of meaning” in the data. What terms did the informants have for things? What could one as a researcher identify as themes? In these “native points of view,” these “local categories” are its components (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).

• The categories and explanations that began to emerge from the data were compared to the evidence of previous prison studies. Were there alternative explanations for what could be seen so far? What could be learned from looking at the data from a variety of perspectives? (Fetterman, 1989; Yin, 1993)

• Triangulation among the available forms of data was used. That is, if a point or an explanation held across several sources—if, for example, it could be supported by field notes, interviews, site documents, and/or the literature, then it was more likely that something integral to understanding the case had been found (Hammersly & Atkinson, 1995; Westbrook, 1994).

• When available, respondent validation, or explaining one’s developing conclusions to one’s informants, was used. The informants were viewed as being in a position to share additional things which helped to confirm or
complicate what had been learned. The informants’ comments could be further incorporated into the researcher’s emerging depiction of the data (Moustakas, 1990; Westbrook, 1994). Of course, this approach was limited in that few informants were available to the author, and those who were available were still socially positioned, and might or might not have agreed with the analysis in part based on their positions or perspectives within the social network under investigation. Agreement or disagreement from informants does not, by itself, confirm or dis-confirm the researcher’s conclusions.

Once some conclusions regarding the data have been reached, it was necessary to consider how to focus on the guiding question that drove the research, and to consider whether that question could be answered from what was learned, or if another question was more appropriate. What other questions did the research provoke? It became important to work back and forth between emerging conclusions and guiding question to produce a cohesive interpretation (Ballenger, 1997).

Summary

It has been the purpose of this chapter to explain the method used to produce and validate the primary data of the project. It has been especially important to discuss the ways in which bias was controlled in a
qualitative study in which the strongest method of such control, respondent validation, was not available. The process of reviewing literature on the organization of prisons as well as important case studies, as discussed in chapter two, together with the search for themes in the author’s field notes, has served to distance the author from the immediacy of the field experience and to enable her to seek wider patterns of significance in the data.

In order for the reader to understand the field data, it is necessary to develop an account of the situation in which the data were collected (Yin, 1993). The succeeding chapter describes the setting and context of the field work.
Chapter Four

Context of the Study

Introduction

Previous chapters of this thesis have introduced the problem and situated the study in a conceptual and methodological context. The purpose of the present chapter is to provide an overview of the origins of the program and the geographic, physical and organizational contexts in which the fieldwork took place. The chapter begins with an account of the program’s origins and continues with a description of the site and its general geographic location. Subsequent sections describe the organizational structures of the prison and agency and the physical layout of the TC.

How the Program Started

The TC described in this study began in response to a Request for Proposal (RFP) by the Prison as the contracting agency. The State Legislature had mandated the regulations under the Omnibus Crime Bill in response to the Federal Government's Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Title IV Violence Against Women (H.R. 3355). Under this legislation, federal funding was available to the states to provide education and prevention programming to victims of domestic
violence and sexual assault. In the spring of 1995, an RFP was released for bids from the State Department of Corrections requesting a proposal for Consulting Services to Develop a Domestic Violence Counseling Program for the incarcerated females at a State Correctional Institution (State Document, 1995). More specifically, the RFP sought services to establish a Domestic Violence Program as a pilot project for women in prison, a program that could then be continued in the prison. It was to be a milestone in the rehabilitation of female prisoners since most incarcerated women are victims of some form of violence and abuse (American Correctional Association Task Force on the Female Offender, 1990; Sargent, Marcus-Mendoza & Yu, 1993; United States Department of Justice, 1994b; Widom, 1992).

In response to the RFP, the author collaborated with a colleague who served as director of the outside Agency that was responsible for an active and growing program for female offenders located within the state. Rather than identify the outside agency, henceforth, it will be referred to as the Agency. As a privately funded program for women offenders, the Agency offered counseling, job skills training, employment placement, alternatives to incarceration, after-release programs and programs for offenders’ children. It was an active organization with several satellite sites located throughout the state. The Agency’s goals were to strengthen the power of women and reduce re-offending. The Domestic Violence Proposal included two main components to be delivered within a treatment
environment: (1) educational training and (2) therapeutic individual and groups sessions. The Agency Director provided sections on the technical responses, rationale for the program, and the budget. The author contributed by writing the educational and counseling portions of the proposal. The proposal was submitted June 1995.

The submission led to an invitation from the Prison to verbally present the proposal, and in September 1995, the proposal was presented to the prison staff. Two other competing agencies also presented their proposals. The Agency’s reputation and the author’s experience as a two-year volunteer at the Prison is believed to have contributed to the Agency’s receipt of the grant award in October 1995.

The Prison and Agency concluded that the most practical approach to the Domestic Violence Program would be a Therapeutic Community for victims of domestic violence based on the belief that Drug and Alcohol Treatment Therapeutic Communities were successful. The term therapeutic community also sounded more supportive than a Domestic Violence Program; thus the term TC began to be used to refer to the program. The grant documents were modified and the paperwork sent to the State Department of Corrections’ Grant Office to be finalized.

The grant start date was tentatively listed in the proposal as the beginning of June 1996. However, even though the project was not scheduled to begin for six months, and the State Department of Corrections had not yet signed the contract, the Prison determined that
the project was to start on January 1, 1996, six months ahead of the proposed date. The apparent arbitrary nature of this decision is typical of prison administrations, which used its authority to start on its own time schedule, regardless of the unsigned contract or preparedness of the Agency, reflecting Goffman’s (1961) total institution model. As a result, the Agency had to race to start the program in accordance with the Prison’s imposed start date. The task of implementing the program started with establishing the organizational structure of the program within the existing organizational structures of the Agency and the Prison.

Site Location and Description

The Prison, which was the site of this study, housed approximately 900 incarcerated women and covered a total of several hundred acres, with approximately 20 acres inside its perimeter. Located outside a small, rural town, it was built in the early part of the 20th century and was opened as an “Industrial Home” to train women offenders.

This particular prison was also the Diagnostic and Classification Center for women offenders committed to the jurisdiction of the State. From this Center, the offenders were diagnosed as to their "risk" level and given a classification rating from one to five. The classification rating is an assessment process to determine a prisoner’s security and/or custody level. It is a measurement of the risk level of the prisoner as far as “dangerousness of the offender to the public” (Mays & Winfree, 1998). The
process has been used for years in prisons but has become “more objective and rational than those employed even 20 years ago” (Mays & Winfree, 1998, p. 148) using standardized psychological tests and standardized state requirements. The higher the number, the higher the risk, and the classification rating determined which prison in the state the inmates would be housed. Most of the offenders taken to this prison remained there since it held those with a classification rank of three, four or five. The actual classification system was a standardized point system developed by the state. The more numbers an inmate was given, the higher her risk level. The points started at one and seldom went higher than 25. The classification system for the state was different for male and female inmates. The classification was written so that it was more difficult for women to achieve the lower minimum classification than for the men. The following point scale reflects this policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level One</td>
<td>&lt; 9</td>
<td>&lt; 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Two</td>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>5 - 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level Three</td>
<td>13 - 15</td>
<td>9 - 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level Four</td>
<td>16 - 19</td>
<td>13 - 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Five</td>
<td>19 and higher</td>
<td>15 and higher</td>
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</table>
Criteria used to determine an inmate’s risk level included:

1. Marital status (married is better, less points)
2. Age (older is better, less points)
3. Offense (seriousness of offense, more points)
4. Repeat Offender (points added)
5. Sentence (longer sentence, more points)
6. Education Level (more education, less points)
7. Number of skills learned in prison (reduces points)
8. Number of programs participated in prison (reduces points)
9. Behavior in prison, i.e. number of infractions or write ups. (increases points).

The inmates were identified by their dress in faded “greens,” as they were called. Newcomers were dressed in “blues” to distinguish them as new prisoners in training. The “greens” were forbidden to talk to the “blues.” Those classified as risk level one or two were often transferred to another state correctional institution, depending on availability of bed space. The prison was, therefore, primarily a medium- to maximum-security institution housed in an aging physical facility that relied on geographical isolation for some of its security. It was a challenging environment in which to establish a therapeutic community, because of the high-risk level and aging facility with restricted space for education and therapy.
Overcrowding was and continues to be a problem in correctional institutions nationwide (Stinchcomb & Fox, 1999), and this prison was no different. The Prison had an inmate capacity of 650, yet the total committed daily count averaged 150-200 in excess of that. The overcrowding meant that space was limited and precious for both the inmates and their activities, as well as the TC. Inmate projects, such as a meeting for the Inmate Newsletter Committee, were canceled if the room was not available. Cell mates could not be switched easily and there were constant requests to replace one cell mate for another, not only in the TC but prison-wide. The close quarters increased the risk that conflicts would erupt into physical confrontation: one inmate was housed alone after attacking and almost killing her cell mate while she slept. For the TC project, the grant allowed for office space for the outside counselors, but was never provided due to lack of space. Temporary housing units stood on the grounds and were jokingly referred to by the COs as the 10-year temporary housing buildings that were still there after 15 years.

The Prison

The routine of bringing a new prisoner into a prison has not changed significantly over the years. Clemmer (1940) documented a procedure similar to the one described below in his study inside a prison in 1936, and Mays and Wintree (1998) discussed a comparable process today. Goffman (1961), showed how this “stripping” process takes away
more than the inmate’s physical possessions, but also the person’s identity, and the ability to make decisions for oneself. Prisoners at the present facility were indoctrinated into life behind bars by being presented with, among other things, a list of rules they were responsible for reading and understanding. Those unable to read received an explanation from a CO.

The system of processing inmates bore a close resemblance to Goffman’s (1961) account of identity-stripping in total institutions:

The admission procedure can be characterized as a leaving off and a taking on, with the midpoint marked by physical nakedness. Leaving off of course entails a dispossession of property, important because persons invest self feelings in their possessions. Perhaps the most significant of these possessions is not physical at all, one’s full name; whatever one is thereafter called, loss of one’s name can be a great curtailment of the self (p. 18).

At the prison described here, all inmates were brought into the facility by car and were escorted by a police officer, probation and parole officer, correctional officer or another official assigned to the transport from their jurisdiction. The car went through the ritual of pulling into the sally port and the gate behind the car was closed. A CO was assigned to checking the paperwork before allowing the offender to be taken further into the prison. Once the paperwork was approved at the gate, the front
gate was opened and the inmate was driven to the prison infirmary where she would stay for a minimum of a week during her admittance and processing procedure. Stripped of her clothing and all possessions, she was asked to shower and was provided with prison issue--new shoes, bed linens and the "new" blue prison outfit, which would eventually be stamped with her new prison number and would be her new identity: “substitute possessions . . . clearly marked as really belonging to the institution and in some cases . . . recalled at regular intervals to be, as it were, disinfected of identifications” (Goffman, 1961, p. 19). The blue uniform marked her as a new member of the community. She was fingerprinted and photographed, and during her stay in the infirmary, she received a complete physical and mental examination. She was tested for pregnancy, TB and HIV. The prison’s total institution orientation did not hold up, however, regarding its HIV policy, because of privacy rules regarding this affliction that were imposed from outside the prison system. Thus, if the HIV results were positive, the inmate had the choice to accept or decline treatment. Often they did not want other inmates to know about their condition, so they refused the daily medication. And there was no policy to notify other prisoners or staff of HIV infected inmates. After a complete history was taken from the inmate, as well as a review of additional paperwork from previous prisons or facilities, the inmate was classified as to risk level from one to five. After a week of processing, and cleared of most if not all infectious diseases, the inmate was moved to a special unit
that would further prepare her for living within the confines of a state prison. She spent another 2-6 months in this unit, locked in a metal cell with a cell mate whom she met for the first time when the metal door closed behind her. Those classified at level one or two were transferred to another prison as soon as possible because of lack of space at this prison. Those classified at levels three, four or five were kept in the Diagnostic and Classification Unit until a bed became available in the general population. The goal was to move the inmates from the Diagnostic and Classification within six weeks; however, it was not uncommon for space to remain unavailable for up to six months. The time the women spent in the Diagnostic and Classification unit was more controlled than in the rest of the units. Women in the classification unit were marched to mealtime and recreation separately from the general prison population and were not allowed to have any contact with other prisoners. This separation and regimentation, a characteristic of total institutions, served to demarcate the space between the new inmates’ former lives and identities “on the outside,” thereby marking “the first curtailment of self” (Goffman, 1961, p. 14), and to further strip the inmate of her identity by, as Goffman put it, imposing on her “a daily round of life that [s]he considers alien to [her]—to take on a disidentifying role” (1961, p. 23).

Architecturally, the prison was built in the old Reformatory style. The tree-lined entrance road framed the dome of the administration building as a symbol of authority at the end of the path. The beautiful
brownstone two-story units, once called cottages, looked rather charming from the outside. But their interiors were dimly lighted, with gray cement floors, old radiators and yellow and white painted plaster walls. As part of their daily work detail, the inmates mopped the floors in the hallways, releasing the stench of cleanser.

The typical population of cells per unit was 12 on each floor, among the one- and two-story units. The average cells were similar to those of many prisons, being approximately 6 feet wide and 14 feet long. Each had a toilet and small sink, which meant that “contaminative exposure” of the self, in which the boundary one places between self and environment is violated (Goffman, 1961, p. 23), occurred every time one of the inmates used the toilet. Despite the process of identity stripping that occurred upon admission and that persisted in their housing arrangements, inmates would find a way to acquire and use personal possessions to display to themselves and others the identities they had had on the outside: a colorful crocheted afghan hung at the end of a bed, pictures of family adorned a wall, a drawing from a child was taped to a metal cabinet. And just as frequently, these tokens of selfhood would be removed by COs in their regular security checks, when cells would be searched and personal items confiscated in a routine display of the institution’s power to control and shape the identities of its residents.

As in most maximum security prisons, a regular schedule of security checks was maintained. This regimentation served not only to
ensure the safety of staff and inmates but also, as Goffman (1961) showed, to remind the inmate of her status “as an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery of the establishment” (p. 16). Times that on the outside would have been free personal time—sleeping, lunch time, the hour before dinner—became, on the inside, times of regular and predictable lock-down, for it was before these in-between times, when inmates moved from cafeteria to work, class, or cells, that escapes and unsanctioned contacts were most likely. Lock down was also a permanent reminder to the inmates of their lack of personal freedom, their status as inmates. During lock-down times, which were between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m.; 12:30 p.m. and 1:30 p.m.; 4:30 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., the women remained in their cells unless they had permission to be working in another part of the prison. No inmate was allowed to be outside a building. During lock down, the count was taken, and all inmates had to be accounted for. The inmates were counted by the CO on duty in each unit, and the number was reported by telephone or radio unit to the officer on duty in the Control Room, located in the Administration Building. The count had to clear before prison activity could resume. It was not uncommon for the count not to clear. In other words, if the count was not accurate, it was retaken until the number was reconciled.

Restrictive Housing Unit

The prison also contained a Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU) for the control of the unruly. The RHU was a dreaded unit where lock-down was
23 hours a day in a single cell and privileges were minimal. One hour a day was allotted to time in the yard outside. Showers were limited to 3 times per week on a rotating basis. All personal items were taken away and prisoners were given a smock, sheets, a pillow, a Bible, and several items of necessity. If they continued to misbehave, even these items were taken from them. The RHU was located outside the perimeter of the prison fence, a mile from the rest of the buildings, and isolated deep in the woods. The women sent there wailed and cried out when they sensed the presence of visitors in the building. This was also where those sentenced with capital punishment awaited their fate. About half of the 48 women in the RHU would remain there for their total sentence due to behavior problems. This was the strictest area of control in the prison. No time was spent on rehabilitation, and the goal was simply to contain the inmates with a bare minimum of supplies. At the time the study was conducted, six inmates sentenced to death awaited execution in the RHU. The remainder—about 42 at any one time—were sent there for infractions, such as attempted escape, and more commonly, testing positive for drugs or being found in bed with another inmate. Positive drug results and sexual encounters were weekly infractions throughout the prison population. It was up to the staff member to determine the punishment for infractions, as there were two other levels of punishment that a CO could use: complete lock-down in the inmate’s cell for a week or partial lock-down which eliminated the inmate’s activities and/or work schedule.
Physical Layout of the TC

Each of the buildings at the prison was named after a person. The unit selected for the TC was the “Martin Building” (name changed). As an existing building was selected to house the TC, the current residents were relocated to make room for the program. Martin (Figure 4.1) had 11 rooms on the first floor, most for double bunking, with the exception of one cell that held six inmates and was referred to as the dormitory. The second floor housed the Mental Health Unit, but that group of women was transferred to the Medical Building within two months of the beginning of the project. Though there were plans to extend the TC to the second floor, this space remained unoccupied during the author’s association with the program. The enclosed stairwell remained locked by the Prison administration between the first and the second floors, and declared it off limits for use, even though there was a shortage of appropriate counseling rooms.
Inside the front door was an eight-foot wide corridor. A hallway to the right led to the CO’s Office and half of the cells on the first floor. The wing to the left held the remaining cells and the Activity Room that stretched the width of the building at the end of the hall.
The numbers inside the cells in Figure 4.1 represent the number of inmates held in the cell. Martin was similar in layout and accommodations to other housing units in the prison complex.

The CO’s Office in Martin was similar to many of the office spaces in the units, with both a private bathroom and a large storage room attached to it. All cleaning supplies and personal supplies were stored in the locked storage room. Not only was the storage room kept locked, but the CO’s Office was kept locked at all times, whether the CO was in or out of the room. To enable central control of scheduled and unscheduled lock-downs, the large master-locking control switchboard for the building was in the CO’s office. With a flip of a switch, all cells could be locked or unlocked from the CO’s office.

Organizational Structures

This section presents a survey of the organizational structures of the Prison, Agency, and the Domestic Violence Program, which was formally a part of the Prison’s organizational structure but which contained Agency personnel in a matrixed relationship to both Prison and Agency.

Organizational Structure of the Prison

The organizational structure of the Prison (Figure 4-2) consisted of eight hierarchical layers divided into four functional areas. Deputy of Services, Deputy of Facilities, Business Director and Human Resources Director reported directly to the Superintendent. The remaining layers of
the organization were to be found in Services and Facilities, with Services having a broader span of control versus Facilities that consisted of a vertical group. The functional areas reporting to the Deputy of Services consisted of Laundry, Maintenance, Programs, Correctional Industries and Food Service. The functional areas reporting to the Deputy of Facilities were approximately 17 Unit Managers to whom counselors reported to each, and a Security Manager with the rank of Major to whom a Captain in charge of all CO's reported.
Figure 4-2 Organization Chart of the Prison
Organizational Structure of the Agency

The organizational structure at the Agency was quintessentially “flat” and consisted of the Director and eight full-time employees. The Agency was involved in numerous projects throughout the state, and the prison program was only one of many under the Agency Director’s guidance. The Agency Director reported to a Board of Directors. The Agency was funded by state funds and grants and had an excellent track record of acquiring grants. Other programs under the Agency’s guidance were: (1) a mother and child program in which they assisted incarcerated mothers by providing after-school programs for their children and parenting skills training to the mothers in jail; (2) a skills training program for released female offenders, which included computer training, typing, interview skills and resume preparation; (3) contracts with local companies and services, such as hotels, to hire newly released women prisoners while the women served out their parole; (4) various programs for the local county jail inmates, including domestic violence and sexual abuse programs; (5) an alternative sentencing program that allowed women the opportunity to remain at home with their children while serving their punishment rather than doing jail time; and (6) public service programs throughout the community and state. These and other services were provided by the Director and her staff.
Figure 4.3: Family Violence Program

**Therapeutic Community Relationships**

Key: The Counselors who worked in pairs are indicated with dotted lines. The thicker the line, the stronger the interaction between individuals.
Organizational Structure of the Domestic Violence Program

The Domestic Violence Program fell under the direction of the Deputy of Services. From that position, authority was passed to a Program Manager (a prison staff member), who was responsible for overseeing the Director of the Domestic Violence Program/Therapeutic Community (DVP/TC), also a prison staff member. The Domestic Violence Program was staffed with counselors from both the Prison and the Agency. Whereas the prison staff who served as counselors reported solely to the Director of the DVP/TC, the Agency staff who served as counselors reported both to the Director of the DVP/TC and to the Director of the Agency, who was the Principal Investigator as well. The web of relationships among Prison, Agency, and staff of the Domestic Violence Program is shown in Figure 4-3. The Agency (represented by the circles on the right side of the chart) was a simple direct line of command between the Director of the Agency, the Supervising Counselor and the Assistant Counselor. The prison personnel (represented by the squares on the left side of the chart) had more individuals involved in the project, but there was also a direct line of command from the Superintendent down to the Director of the DVP/TC. Between the Prison and the Agency, the lines of command became complex. The lines going to the DVP/TC represent those who worked directly with the women inmates—the two counselors from the Agency and the two counselors from the Prison. The
long-dashed dotted lines represent the two sets of two counselors who were paired by the Director of the TC and administered the groups. Thus, the two organizations each supplied two counselors who were to interact with one another on a daily basis, yet who did not report up the same chain of command.

The author’s position was that of an employee of the Agency (the horizontal organizational structure) working in a matrixed capacity within the Prison (vertical structure). Consequently, although the author was relatively low on the organizational chain of the prison, her role as de facto on-site representative of the Agency and as an investigator put her in a more prominent position, one with much responsibility but little real power.

In addition to this paradoxical situation, there were other factors in the Prison’s organization that complicated the author’s position and that of the Agency. As the Supervising Counselor of the Domestic Violence Program/Therapeutic Community (DVP/TC), the author signed a contract to work directly for the Agency, not for the State Prison.

Thus it can be seen that two very different organizational structures—one, on-site, vertical and multi-layered; the other, at a remote site, very simple and flat—were attempting to interact. The two facilities were 100 miles apart, making them as much geographically as organizationally distinct. The two organizations were held together by their common interest in producing a landmark experiment in corrections.
Conclusion

As can be seen from the foregoing description, the Prison discussed here was in many ways typical of state-run maximum-security prisons. Possessed of an aging physical plant situated in a rural area, the Prison was necessarily insular and security-conscious, especially because its function as a diagnostic and classification center meant that many inmates came and went, therefore requiring more surveillance than if the Prison had been a final destination. Also, the overcrowded conditions of the Prison, which extended the processing period from 6 weeks to as much as 6 months, no doubt contributed to a certain amount of tension and stress on the part of inmates and staff. Finally, the isolated setting of the Prison meant that whereas a ready supply of lower-echelon staff was available to fulfill the control and oversight goals of the institution, a supply of more highly trained and specialized professionals, such as are needed to staff rehabilitative positions, was more difficult to access.

What is evident from this description is that, however geographically isolated the Prison, however much it attempted to maintain the form, fit and function of a self-sufficient, total institution, it was in fact far from being a closed system. Prisoners came and went as they were classified and moved on to other destinations in the correctional system; COs lived in neighboring towns and arrived and departed daily; professional staff, most of whom lived at some distance, also came and went on a daily basis. All of these comings and goings, as well as the
inmates’ large and small acts of resistance to having their identities reshaped, offered opportunities for compromised security and undermined the intended totality of the institution. And finally, the Agency which was contracted to set up the TC, arrived in the midst of this rigid order. The ways in which Agency-Prison relations both reflected and challenged this order is explored in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 5

DYNAMICS OF THE ORGANIZATION(S)

Introduction

According to Goffman’s (1961) definition, a prison can be considered a “total institution”,

a place of residence... where a large number of like-situated individuals cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life. (p. xiii)

Total institutions include places of residence for persons who are unable to take care of themselves and/or who constitute a threat to the community (i.e., mental hospitals) as well as those, such as jails and prisons, that are established to "protect the community against what are felt to be intentional dangers to it" (Goffman, 1961, pp. 4-5). Goffman's (1961) main thesis was that the chief aim of institutional culture is to bring about the control of its clients, a control that must be perpetuated regardless of the client's welfare (p. 84). It has been observed that the notion of the prison as a total institution leads to the elevation of security over other correctional goals; for example, McShane and Williams (1989) pointed out that, "once [correctional] administrators achieve minimal
compliance with constitutional requirements, they are chiefly concerned with maintaining secure custody of inmates" (p. 572). While understandable, such a preoccupation frequently leads prison administrators to "operate . . . in semisecrecy to protect themselves and their organizations" (Cohn 1973, p. 331), and to manifest a defensiveness when challenged or confronted by outside parties that Stojkovic (1990) referred to as a "circle the wagons" (p. 762) mentality.

On the other hand, both TCs and human service agencies such as the one contracted by the prison in this study are likely to have a different orientation toward their mission, one that may challenge the total institution orientation of the prison. For example, Hasenfeld and English (1974), in their discussion of human service organizations, distinguished between “people-processing” and “people-changing” institutions, defining a human service organization as a people-changing agency “whose primary function is to define or alter the person’s behavior, attributes, and social status in order to maintain or enhance his well-being” (1974, p. 1). This definition is consistent with Vigdal’s (1995) definition of TCs, which have as their goal the alteration of the client so as to enable productive independent living. Although Hasenfeld and English considered prisons to be the same as, for example, a mental hospital in having the goal of changing dysfunctional people (1974, p. 5), the persistence of the total institution point of view may serve to turn the prison primarily into a “people-processing” organization, one that “attempt[s] to change [its]
clients not by altering basic personal attributes, but by conferring upon them a public status and relocating them in a new set of social circumstances" (Hasenfeld & English, 1974, p. 5)—that is, by labeling them as offenders and cutting them “off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, [where] together [they] lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (Goffman, 1961, p. xiii). Thus, while it can be said that prisons, TCs, and human service organizations share characteristics of a “people-changing” organization, the total institution mind-set of prisons may tend to contradict the more focused people-changing goals of TCs and human service organizations.

It will be recalled from chapter two that Dilulio (1987) proposed eight dimensions along which prison organizations vary: communication flows, staff interactions, staff-inmate interactions, degree of latitude afforded staff, regimentation of inmate life, discipline for infractions, response to disruptive behavior, and degree of inmate participation in prison governance. In addition, a review of Theories X, Y and Z yielded a ninth dimension, assumptions about human nature. Further, a review of prison management models in chapter two showed how most such work has focused on the factors supporting the goals of security and control, not the factors supporting the rehabilitation of prisoners. It will be remembered that Dilulio’s (1987) thesis was that it is the control model prison that is safer and less prone to outbreaks of violence. But according to Reisig (1998), this thesis has been influential despite its lack of
empirical verification, perhaps, one speculates, because of an unexamined assumption that control over prisoners is the *sine qua non* of organizational effectiveness. Consequently, the organizational effectiveness of prisons has been measured primarily in terms of control of inmates, leading to the presumption that the control/Theory X model is the organizational model most congruent with goal attainment.

This thesis, however, may undermine the performance of other organizational goals of prisons, particularly rehabilitation. A major conclusion of chapter two, it will be recalled, was that less restrictive prison organization models resembling modern management theories may make attainable the dual goals of security and rehabilitation. Further, the argument was advanced in chapter two that social cohesion, which control models specifically attempt to undermine, is a necessary precondition not only to the goal of security but to the fulfillment of rehabilitative goals as well. Moreover, it was shown that the reliance on bureaucratic and autocratic management strategies such as managerial edicts, along with a lack of consideration for the implications of pitting two organizational models against one another, may serve to undermine social cohesion, order, and rehabilitation.

In chapter two it was also argued that Theories X, Y and Z each had predictable outcomes in terms of organizational structure and culture. These, when combined with Dilulio’s (1987) typology of administrative factors, yielded a typology of prison organizational models that was
argued could be helpful in analyzing a prison’s ability to attain rehabilitative goals.

This model predicted that the more the prison employed the control/Theory X management model, the less hospitable it would be to both staff autonomy and inmate social cohesion. Further, the prison would tend to define outside service providers as potential threats to stability, particularly if, as argued by Hasenfeld and English (1974), the outside agency could be characterized as primarily a people-changing organization. Further, lacking the managerial tools to engage in contract oversight, such a prison would tend to use organizationally typical means of gaining compliance: the imposition of rules, reliance on a chain of command, strict reliance on departmental functions, etc.

The purpose of the present chapter is to show how the overlapping but different organizational goals of the Prison and Agency played themselves out in terms of interactions among various groups and individuals. The chapter consists, first, of an analysis of the organizational dynamics in terms of the eight dimensions advanced by Dilulio (1987) and reviewed in chapter two as well as a ninth dimension, assumptions about human nature. This is followed by an analysis of Prison-Agency interactions.
Organizational Dimensions

Communication Flows

In control model prisons, communication is usually restricted to official channels, with information flowing upward through the chain of command and directives flowing downward. Communication in responsibility model prisons is usually informal and often crosses levels of authority (DiIulio, 1987, p. 105).

Prison

The Program Manager was the TC Director’s immediate supervisor in the chain of command at the prison. Above the Program Manager was a Deputy of Services, who was invisible to the TC and functioned behind the scenes. For example, messages and responses came to the author from the Deputy, through the Program Manager, and through the TC Director. When the author requested that we sit outside on the grass with an inmate for privacy during a counseling session, the message that trickled down the chain of command was, “No, they’re still inmates, they don’t get special privileges.”

Another example of the trickle-down theory of administration at work in the Prison was that paperwork often did not arrive in a timely manner, thereby creating delays in ordering supplies for the TC. Other paperwork allowing guest speakers to come into the prison was caught in the chain for weeks, so that the TC sometimes received replies too late or
not at all. This made planning for special opportunities and speakers for the inmates very difficult. On three separate occasions guest speakers who had been scheduled to travel to the prison and talk to the women were canceled because gate clearance had not been received in time.

Adherence to a chain of command also meant that staff had to communicate through channels. It was considered a breach of protocol to “go over the head” of one’s immediate superior and attempt to communicate directly with that person’s superior. For example, the Director of the TC could not talk directly to the Deputy, but was required to go through the Program Manager. Likewise, the author and other counselors were to talk to the Director of the TC, not the Program Manager, not the Deputy, and certainly not the Superintendent. For example, any requests the author had went through Ms. M, TC Director, who functioned as the author’s supervisor at the prison. This slowed the communication process and created conflicts, frustrations, and reduced effectiveness. For example, the author twice attempted to talk to the Superintendent, and was told both times by her secretary that she “wasn’t available” when she was in fact at the prison. The counselors were also required to run everything past the TC Director. This reliance on the chain of command, typical of the hierarchically structured control/Theory X organization, was frustrating to Agency staff accustomed to a relatively flat organization in which access to the top was easier.
Agency/TC

The structured environment of the prison was at odds with the humanistic approach that was part of the culture that Agency staff was trying to inculcate at the TC and believed by the Agency to be an important aspect in the effectiveness of the TC program. As was seen above, the prison frowned on going directly to the source or person in charge to talk about a concern, ask a question, or even to give positive feedback. Because the messages were often distorted when passed through several others, the Prison’s communication system was uncomfortable from a mental health point of view because it made it difficult to resolve issues directly with the person or persons concerned.

One consequence of the tendency for directives to flow down from the top while complaints, etc., percolated (albeit slowly) upward was illustrated by the Prison’s way of dealing with the dismissal of the Assistant Counselor employed by the Agency to work in the TC. This individual was denied permission to return to the Prison following a rule infraction. The author was told the decision was made by the Deputy of Services, with the Superintendent’s blessing. The order was then given to the Program Manager, who notified the TC Director, who called the author at home, who was then to tell the Assistant Counselor that she was not to return to the prison. The administration did not go through the Agency Director at all, even though, according to the contract, the Agency, not the Prison, was responsible for hiring and firing its own staff.
This incident illustrates several of the factors discussed previously. First, the Prison, having relatively little experience at subcontractor management, simply absorbed the Agency personnel into its organization. That is, rather than adhere to a subcontract management protocol, in which a ranking member of the Prison (the Superintendent or Program Manager, for example) contacted the Agency Director in her capacity as Principal Investigator in order to request that she remove the assistant counselor from the program, the Prison did what it was accustomed to doing: it followed its own chain of command downward to the author, who, from this point of view, supervised the assistant counselor who was to be dismissed. Another point is worth making about this incident. From the point of view of security, the assistant counselor had come to be seen as a risk owing to her repeated violations of rules; to sanction her through the Prison’s own chain of command, rather than going through the Agency’s chain, served the purpose of reasserting the Prison’s authority over a perceived threat associated with the presence of outsiders within its organization.

Word came down from the administration that TC staff were not to talk about this departure, especially to the inmates. Instead, the term “voluntary” departure was to be used. Having to lie to the inmates made it impossible to have an authentic discussion of feelings about what had happened, because what had happened was being fabricated by the Prison administration. The groups which had been led by the Assistant
Counselor were informed that she would not be returning and that they could not write to or contact her. Any letters that they attempted to write would be confiscated in the mailroom. In addition, a letter was sent to the Assistant Counselor from the Superintendent forbidding her to write or try to contact the inmates in any way. This was upsetting to the inmates in the TC, many of whom had formed a trusting relationship with the Assistant Counselor, who was perceived as “one of them” in being a recovering addict and convicted felon. Finally, the dilemma posed by the Assistant Counselor, whose history, while helpful from a therapeutic point of view, was problematic from a security point of view, was resolved (from the Prison’s perspective) by removing her from the organization.

The Assistant Counselor was not replaced for several months, which led to stress among the remaining TC staff because of both the subterfuge and the overwork caused by being understaffed. As a result, tensions among the TC Staff increased, with the Director spending more time in the TC unit talking to staff and inmates, calling more meetings with all of the counselors, calling the Agency to complain about lack of staff, reporting to her supervisor about the shortage of staff and the negativity in the unit. Additionally, the one prison counselor asked to be released from her duties in the TC unit to focus on other projects and the Director granted her release. That reduced the prison counselor staff by one, which in turn, reduced the number of hours that could be given to the TC unit.
One of the biggest issues with the inmates was that of abandonment, so the administration’s decision to not permit the inmates to contact the departed counselor was one of the worst things that could have happened for the morale of the women in the TC. Inmates reacted to this state of affairs with a wave of regression, in which they increased their “acting out” coping strategies such as stealing. Stealing is a classic act of hostile dependency and a hallmark of people with severe abandonment issues (Bowlby, 1973, 1988; Kohut, 1971, 1977; Wolf, 1988). A case in point is that two of the inmates were caught stealing within the TC and were removed from the program. Both were members of the Assistant Counselor’s group and were actively involved in individual therapy with the Assistant Counselor when she was told not to return to the prison. Clemmer’s (1940) study documented the rule “that one prisoner shall not rob another, and this (rule) is seldom violated” (p. 155) and still stands true today in prisons. The women in the TC had become an entity and when one of them violated that rule, she was immediately cast out by the other inmates and the administration. The response of the Administration was to deal with these thefts as a disciplinary matter that required punishment rather than as (or in addition to being) a therapeutic matter that required the marshaling of therapeutic community resources (such as a group meeting or other intervention). Again the struggle between the security of the prison and the humanistic approach from the Agency were in conflict, but security was primary and stealing among the inmates was sanctioned,
not as an expression of TC goals and values, but as a prison “rule” that had been broken.

What do these communication issues reveal about the respective organizational approaches of the Prison and Agency? Perhaps it could be summarized thus. If we posit that knowledge (information) is power, it follows that in a control/Theory X organization, the purpose of communication is to regulate the flow of information (power) so that those at the top of the hierarchy possess the most information and are in the best position to determine who else shall have access to it. Second, communication is part of the apparatus of control over those who lack information and therefore power (i.e., staff lower on the chain of command and especially prisoners, who for security reasons must be kept relatively powerless). In short, in a people-processing organization, communication serves the purpose of facilitating whatever processing goal(s) the organization holds dear, which in this case was primarily control of inmates. It also follows that in a flatter, less restrictive organizational structure, particularly in an organization whose primary goal is people-changing, information (power) is to be shared—not simply titrated up and down the chain but created, exchanged and transformed, network fashion, among members of the organization. Communication is still part of the apparatus of control, but in this type of organizational perspective, control is not so much an end as a means—a means of changing (rehabilitating) inmates. That is, the purpose of communication in a people-changing
organization is less authoritarian than hortatory; rather than rely on “telling,” people-changing in a less restrictive organizational set involves persuasion, encouragement, discussion—communication is thus a means of exchange with the goal of developing social cohesion so that individuals regulate their behavior according to norms rather than simply following “the rules.”

Staff-Staff Relations

The ways in which prison personnel address one another is a second dimension of the typology. Staff in the responsibility model often speak to each other in an informal manner more typical of social etiquette, but under the control model, superiors and subordinates commonly address one another in a formal manner as “Mr.,” “Ms.,” etc.

Prison

Prison Staff addressed each other formally, as Captain Smith, Lieutenant Craig, Sergeant Jones, Superintendent Johnson (name changed), Deputy Starling, never by first names. Correctional officers were addressed by their rank or as Mr. or Ms. All of this was done in front of the inmates or out on the prison grounds among the inmates. In an informal setting, such as the lunch room or in the parking lot, staff used each others first names. So it became natural to be formal in front of the inmates and informal at staff meetings.
The atmosphere in the TC was notably less formal. Most of the time, especially during therapy, a “warm and fuzzy” atmosphere was needed. TC staff addressed each other and the inmates informally during group and counseling. Formal speech was used occasionally, especially if the topic were something serious, such as, if you want to do that, you will need to work with Ms. Jones in getting the proper permission. Finally, it was very common and very much accepted for the inmates to use the term Ms. Sue in place of Ms. Craig. The key was, the prison was encouraging respect by the use of Ms. The author gave the inmates permission to use her first name if they wanted to and sometimes they did, without the Ms. (Of course the author got permission from Ms. M first), but it was most common for them to call the author Ms. Sue. They just seemed conditioned and more comfortable with the “Ms.”

**Agency/TC**

TC staff used first names among themselves. While in the TC, staff were much more casual with names. During group, when referring to other staff in the prison, such as the COs, staff used the formal title of Officer Martini or Ms. Martini.

Within the Agency, staff used first names when meeting outside of the prison and while on prison grounds, agency staff also called each other by their first names.

All of the inmates had nicknames and used the nicknames among themselves. It was so common to hear them that the author occasionally
used them too. Staff were told not to cater to their nicknames, to use real names, but what was amusing was that the staff would refer to the prisoners with their nickname behind their backs, because everyone knew who was being talked about.

Inmate-Staff Relations

Inmates in control model prisons are usually expected to call prison staff "sir," "ma’am" or "boss," while in responsibility model institutions, inmates are permitted to speak to prison staff in a less formal manner (Dilulio, 1987, p. 101).

Prison

It was common practice for the staff to address the inmates using a title and their last name (for example, as Ms. Smith). The inmates, in turn, deferentially referred to all staff members with a title preceding their last names, such as Ms. Jones, or Lt. Jones, or Superintendent Johnson (name changed). In the daily activities of the prison, formality prevailed in the way staff and inmates addressed one another. Inmates did not say sir or ma’am on a regular basis, only to be polite and respectful as needed. They were not required to use these terms in all interactions. It was common to hear, “Yes, Officer Madden, I won’t forget to sign out.”

Agency/TC

In the TC, the communications between the inmates and counselors was more relaxed and informal. During group sessions, the
inmates used first names among themselves and the counselors. But this was only during the therapeutic sessions, and once the inmates returned to the floor of the unit or their cells, or interacted with the CO on duty, formality returned.

These differences in terms of address exemplify the differences in organizational structure between the agencies and the goals of the agencies. That is, to the extent that communication in the more control-oriented Prison organization was considered a means of controlling inmates, terms such as “Sir” and “Ma’am” served to remind everyone of the power staff had over inmates. Such terms, as Sykes (1955) observed, also served to increase the social distance between staff and inmates and to preserve the distinction, common in total institutions, that there is a fundamental distinction between the two groups (Goffman, 1961). On the other hand, the less formal patterns of address that obtained between counselors and inmates in the TC reflected a different organizational set, one in which social cohesion rather than social distance was sought.

Staff Latitude

The level of latitude in the exercise of judgment allowed prison personnel is another factor in the typology. Whereas prison staff in responsibility model prisons are encouraged to use their judgment when carrying out their jobs, control model staff enjoy little latitude and are expected to adhere to the rules.
Prison

In general, rules about possessions of any kind were enforced quite stringently. No one, staff as well as inmates, was permitted to bring personal items (even facial tissue or snacks) into the prison. Staff were routinely searched upon coming to work, and personal items could be confiscated and the employee written up by the CO on gate duty. Inmates commonly returned to their cells to find personal items missing. A small stuffed animal from a family member, pictures of children, a child’s crayoned drawing, a favorite poem—any and all could be and were removed with no explanation. The COs were not required to justify their actions. The inmates experienced this behavior as arbitrary and unreasonable, as essentially a “power play” on the part of CO’s intent on reinforcing their power over inmates. This was especially true after a cell search, because a different “crew” of COs came into the unit and took the inmates’ things. The regular CO on duty usually knew the women well enough that they were less likely to do this or take things from them. In other words, an “outside” CO, whose job it was to maintain safety, could get away with more in the searches and the inmates could not take it out on the “local” COs. This practice served to police both the “local” COs as well as the inmates, consistent with a Control/Theory X organization, an additional layer of security ensured that the relationships between “local” COs and inmates did not get too comfortable owing to the inherent untrustworthiness not only of inmates but of prison staff.
Another important rule was the one forbidding physical contact between the inmates. The reason for this, as in prisons in general, was to protect weaker inmates from the harassment of stronger ones, including sexual harassment. It was also to prevent the exchange of contraband, though the inmates were clever and creative in their ability to share items without the COs' knowledge. Even consensual touching was forbidden, presumably to prevent inmates from attempting to dodge sanctions by claiming (and coercing partners into supporting claims) that the touch was not unwelcome and to discourage sexual relationships between the inmates. If they were observed physically touching each other, in the Activity Room, in their cells, or outside, the CO had the prerogative to ignore it or issue them a "write up" for an infraction. The infraction could inflict different levels of punishment ranging from minor, early lock-down in their cell to a stay in the RHU (Restrictive Housing Unit).

**Agency/TC**

Staff in the TC did not have the same room for interpretation as CO's. Indeed, TC staff, especially Agency staff, were subject to additional scrutiny rather than accorded professional discretion. Entering and exiting the prison, which involved walking through a series of three locked doors, often involved delays, searches and questioning. That is, the Agency staff, as outsiders and newcomers to the organization, were considered more of a security risk than Prison staff, and were therefore accorded a greater degree of scrutiny and therefore less latitude for judgment.
Regimentation of Inmate Routines

In control model prisons, staff follow a "carefully orchestrated routine of numbering, counting, checking, locking, and monitoring" (DiIulio, 1987, p. 105) inmates and their activities. In contrast, in responsibility model prisons, inmates are allowed the "greatest measure of freedom consistent with basic security requirements" (DiIulio, 1987, p. 119).

Prison

Consistent with the control model and as mentioned previously, the Prison followed a clear routine. The facility was locked down four times a day while a count was taken. Usually a count would take approximately one half-hour. Other hours in the daily routine found inmates walking around the prison grounds on their way to work, an activity or back to their units. A visitor might view this activity as the freedom of the inmates to walk around the prison but there was a formal set of rules: the inmates had to be dressed in their prison garb; they had to remain on the inner walkway only, which was wide enough for two people to walk side-by-side, not on the grass or roadway; and they were never allowed to stop and talk to each other in passing, but could walk side-by-side if going in the same direction. The inmates generally walked very slowly, as if delaying their return to their units—as they probably were because they would be required to go directly to their cells.
This careful orchestration of routine extended to the TC as well. The lock-down and count was also performed in the TC, so that the half-hour (or more) required had to be factored into the TC schedule every day and imposed itself on the therapeutic agenda. Once the author waited for two hours for the count to clear before meeting with one of the inmates.

Despite the physical separation of the TC from the other units in the Prison, the regimented atmosphere permeated the air of the therapy rooms. Though a count was necessary as a first alert of an escape, the intrusion of the general maximum-security atmosphere and approach prevented both TC staff and inmates from assuming greater responsibility for an important aspect of the way the TC was run.

Also, periodically and unexpectedly, the administration could call for a cell or unit search in any of the units on the grounds, a practice that also served to place responsibility for rule enforcement outside the TC. The TC unit was not exempt from this practice, nor were inmates delegated any responsibility for enforcing the rules. The women were required to leave their cells while officers searched their cells. While the cell search was taking place, the inmates were escorted to another room and strip-searched. As in all of the facilities, all items in the cell were fair game for confiscation. All magazines, colored markers, unauthorized paper, mementos from family members, certain food items (such as those that could be used for fermentation or making pruno), and items used to make
sexual devices were considered contraband and removed. Such searches could and did take place during therapy group meetings and other times, a practice which was not only disruptive of the therapeutic atmosphere but also demonstrated the primacy of security concerns over therapeutic goals.

**Discipline for Infractions**

The ways in which inmate violations of rules are dealt with are another dimension in the typology. In the responsibility model prison, staff do not stringently "deal out formal sanctions for every rule violation" (Dilulio 1987, p.120). In control model facilities, infractions meet with stern reprisals.

**Prison**

Although staff had room to exercise their own judgment in dealing with infractions, in general, CO's went "by the book" in terms of disciplining inmates who broke even minor rules. One illustrative incident involved a new inmate returning from lunch to her cell with a lemon in her pocket. Although inmates were allowed to carry one piece of fruit back to their cells from the cafeteria, the list was limited to oranges, apples and bananas; lemons and limes were forbidden fruit. The inmate in question was new to the prison and claimed she was not aware that lemons were not allowed. Upon the inmate's return to her unit, the CO on duty immediately confiscated the lemon and sanctioned the inmate with early
lock down in her cell for two weeks starting at 6 p.m. in the evenings. She disputed the detention, but completed one week of her two-week lock-down time before winning her case at a hearing. The remainder of her detention was purged.

This instance, and ones similar to it, is interesting because technically, the CO’s had discretion in the way they could mete out reprisals for infractions. However, they appeared to err on the side of strictness, choosing to go by the book even when they did not need to. For example, the CO in this particular instance could have simply confiscated the lemon and informed the inmate of the rule. Instead, the rules regarding fruit, which themselves were arbitrary, were enforced very strictly and, as the reversal of the CO’s decision suggests, this particular interpretation of the rules was also arbitrary.

Agency/TC

Agency staff working in the TC lacked the discretion to deal with infractions that was accorded COs and Prison staff working in the TC, and as such were not responsible for discipline or for dealing with inmate infractions. Prison staff continued to be responsible for dealing with the inappropriate behavior of the inmates and had the choice to ignore the activity, talk to the inmates about the behavior, report it to the CO on duty or write up a disciplinary action themselves. The prison counselor who had no counseling training adhered more to the control tactics with which she had been trained in the prison, and used to threaten the inmates during
group that she would tell the Superintendent if they misbehaved. She was serious and would tell them, “Remember, I have the power to remove you from this unit,” and would shake her keys at them showing her authority. Contrary to the usual practice in TCs in the outside world, in which therapeutic staff enforce rules in conjunction with senior members of the patient community and security is called on only as a last resort, the case was reversed in the TC of the Prison as the prison counselor sustained her authority. Since dealing with infractions and rule enforcement were generally the business of CO’s, the ability of TC staff to foster a therapeutic milieu in which inmates learned to assume responsibility for their own behavior was limited. As TC staff were clearly not allowed to assume that sort of responsibility themselves, they were unable to model its use to inmates. Again, the goal of control took precedence over that of rehabilitation.

Response to Disruptive Behavior

Inmates' disruptive behavior meets with different responses in the control and responsibility models also. Whereas control model prison administrations usually react to disruptive behavior with "swift official counterforce" (DiIulio, 1987, p. 178), responsibility model personnel often react by negotiating with inmates (DiIulio, 1987, p. 87).
Prison

Disruptive behavior on the part of inmates was dealt with swiftly and without negotiating among the total prison population. Verbal arguments between inmates were quickly dispensed with by the COs. Because women form close relationships while incarcerated, most of the arguing and fighting that takes place is centered around these relationships.

The women were locked in their cells to cool down and if they continued the battle, they would be written up. The CO could delay their going to an evening activity or going to work, which would then make their boss angry, so they abided by the rules, but often grudgingly. As they were not allowed to blatantly swear at the COs, they mumbled under their breath. Consistent with a control mentality, the inmates were not encouraged to learn to resolve their differences. It was required only that they desist from overt hostility.

Agency/TC

Disruptive behavior within the TC was treated somewhat more leniently, though not consistently so. Whereas in the general population, COs had unlimited discretion regarding discipline, in the TC, the staff requested that COs not summarily expel inmates from the program but clear it with the TC Director first.

However, COs did not extend this policy to other forms of discipline. For example, one inmate was given detention for dressing provocatively at
the talent show, even though it had been part of her costume and approved by the Talent Show’s Director. A higher ranking CO thought it was inappropriate and ordered the unit CO to give her a week detention in her cell. Consequently, she was not allowed to attend group that week.

The ban on sexual activity between inmates was strictly enforced within the TC. The first month of actively running the TC, two of the inmates were caught in bed together by a CO. The incident was immediately reported to the TC Director, and the inmates were immediately removed from the program and sent to the RHU for several weeks. This behavior was forbidden and it was not up for negotiation. A more therapeutic approach would have been to separate the inmates; to have a full community meeting regarding the impropriety of such a relationship, from security, community and therapeutic points of view; and to use the community meeting as a means of arriving at an appropriate sanction for the offenders. The end result may have been the same—expulsion and confinement in the RHU—but the process by which this result would have been reached would have reinforced social cohesion within the TC and given all inmates an opportunity to act as responsible members of a community.

Women inmates seldom fight physically, maybe once every six months, as opposed to male inmates. Women in prison verbalize more than men in prison, arguing and questioning authority constantly—they want to talk about it and negotiate, but it is discouraged by the COs.
Another incident involved one of the original TC participants and a new inmate who joined the unit when a space opened up. They shared a cell and that meant sharing bunk beds. The newcomer was given the lower bunk. The inmate in the upper bunk snored loudly and shook and rattled the metal bed at night as she tossed and turned. The upper bunk inmate also was twice the size of the inmate in the lower bunk, and the lower bunk inmate was scared to death of this big woman. After one particularly difficult night, the two got into a shouting match and were promptly called to the TC Director’s office. The author was also asked to talk to both of them to help resolve the issue. They could have been asked to leave the unit, but both promised cooperation. After several more weeks, it wasn’t working between them, yet they were both good participants in the program, so they were switched with another pair of cell mates. As can be seen from this example, problems that did not involve “forbidden” behavior were more open to problem-solving.

Since a space in the unit was so coveted, the inmates were very careful to not talk back to the COs because they did not want to be expelled from the unit. Instead, they engaged in passive-aggressive behaviors. They did non-verbal things behind their the COs’ backs to get back at them, such as passing notes between themselves and outsiders, making sexual items and passing them around the unit, making pruno, and hoarding magic markers and magazines.
Theft, which is both common and forbidden in prisons, represents a serious breach of trust in a TC. Although in the general population it is common for such behavior to meet with stern sanctions, the argument can be made that in a TC, it is an issue for the entire community because it is an affront to the entire community. However, such incidents were not subject to community discussion or sanctions within the TC, either. For example, the inmates who were caught stealing from other inmates in the unit after the Assistant Counselor was dismissed were, like those caught in bed together, immediately expelled from the unit. Although their behavior was at least in part a regressive response to the departure of the Assistant counselor (and thus a therapeutic issue), it could not be dealt with as such, especially as the Administration had promulgated an untrue explanation for the Assistant Counselor’s departure. Another belligerent inmate who desperately needed therapy was warned repeatedly to keep her mouth under control, as she would go on binges of swearing at the other inmates. She also refused to participate in group sessions after the Assistant Counselor left, a clear indication of therapeutic regression. She was dismissed after several warnings.

Inmate Participation in Decision-Making

The degree to which inmates are allowed to participate in decision-making is the eighth dimension of the typology. Including inmates in decision-making processes is typical in responsibility model prisons
(Diulio 1987, p. 120). However, in control model prisons, inmates are viewed as having "demonstrated an inability to be self-governing" (Diulio 1987, p.178) and are treated as such.

**Prison**

Inmates in the general prison population were not involved in their own governance. There were no population-wide inmate committees specifically for making or changing policies and inmates had little input into how general prison issues were dealt with.

**Agency/TC**

Inmates in the TC had slightly more latitude, but not in ways that materially affected their lives, as the cases of sexual involvement and theft (above) illustrate. As was seen above, inmates did not function as a community when it came to dealing with infractions of community rules. Instead, Prison staff decided how infractions would be dealt with, which meant that group pressure, one of the major sources of therapeutic and behavioral leverage in a TC, was not available.

Further, TC inmates did not materially participate in treatment planning. Whereas in the outside world, patients are routinely involved in their own treatment planning, beginning with needs assessment and extending to treatment goals, etc., inmates in the TC did not participate in many aspects of planning or managing their treatment. Instead, the inmates were given discretion over minor choices that were considered “additional privileges” that went with living on the TC unit.
For example, each unit in the general population was allowed to check out two movies of their choice from the library for the weekend, which were then shown in the recreation room available in each unit. The inmates in the TC were granted two additional movies each weekend. The problem that was encountered with the extra movies was who would choose the movies. The women elected one person in the unit to choose the movies each week, and suggestions were offered, but typical of many groups, there were always some who were not happy with the choice of movies. Although it can be argued that such group decision making, even over trifles, allowed inmates some exercise of democratic process, from a therapeutic point of view the inmates would have been better served if they had had input into something meaningful, such as treatment goals.

Assumptions About Human Nature

The assumptions about human nature that underlay these different organizations differed notably, as can be seen from the forgoing. Consistent with Theory X, inmates were considered untrustworthy and in need of constant demonstrations of their powerlessness with respect to the system—hence the random searches and strict enforcement of rules. There was also a distinct pecking order among Prison staff, with greater trustworthiness being assumed as an individual moved up the hierarchy and with CO’s occupying a position of greater trust (that is, being able to exercise more power) than other staff. This was demonstrated by their
right to search other staff’s belongings upon entrance to and exit from the prison.

Prison-Agency-TC Interactions

As a volunteer at the Prison for the previous two years, the author was accepted within the Prison environment. However, as an employee of an outside organization, that perception changed. As the Supervising Counselor, the author was not only responsible for writing and preparing the educational component and therapeutic plan appropriate for women in prison, but now became identified as an outsider. The author’s prison identification card now read "Outside Consultant,” which often drew attention and comments from the COs.

As noted earlier, another issue arose regarding the background of the Assistant Counselor originally hired by the Agency to staff the contract. It is a common practice in TC’s for counselors to be in recovery themselves. This often has the effect of disarming patients’ suspicions of staff and making them feel that staff understands their issues based on personal experience (Knight & Simpson, 1999). The Assistant Counselor was an adult student completing her bachelor's degree in criminal justice. She had not only worked in therapeutic communities, but had also been a resident at one while conquering her own addiction. A bright and energetic student, she was in the University Honors Program.
However, the Assistant Counselor’s background as a recovering heroin addict was a controversial issue between the Agency Director and the Director of the TC. The Agency Director believed the Assistant Counselor would be able to relate to the inmates and, in turn, that the inmates would be able to relate to her. In addition, she would serve as a positive role model. The Agency Director believed the Assistant Counselor offered the skills needed in an Assistant Counselor and would make a good partner for the author, whose background was more professional.

Because of the Assistant Counselor’s background as a convicted felon, the Agency Director had cleared hiring her through the Prison Superintendent before her employment was finalized. In fact, the Superintendent had met the Assistant Counselor a year earlier at a University function, and the Superintendent had given her blessing for employment on the project.

Nevertheless, hiring the Assistant Counselor did not sit well with the Director of the TC, because of her past criminal record and free-spirited attitude. Nevertheless, as was seen in chapter two regarding organizations that administer by managerial “edict,” (Nutt, 1999) the wishes of the Superintendent won out over the reservations of the person ostensibly responsible for running the TC. The TC Director’s dissatisfaction with the Assistant Counselor was apparent and was one of the first problems between the Prison and the Agency, as the TC Director doubtless viewed the Agency Director as invading her turf by pushing its
favored candidate. Consequently, the Assistant Counselor was scrutinized unmercifully—in the TC Director’s eyes, the Assistant Counselor could do nothing right, and eventually was barred from returning to the Prison (described above).

Another difficulty was encountered when the Agency Director was replaced by a new Director who had no knowledge of or interest in the program. Because of the distance separating the Prison from the Agency headquarters, it was easy for Prison personnel such as the TC Director or the Superintendent to view the author, as the senior Agency staff member present, as the person to whom to take complaints about the slowness with which the Agency proceeded to find a replacement for the Assistant Counselor. The prison staff member, who was serving as the TC Director, had no experience running a TC and certainly had no experience in subcontractor management, which meant that her ability to perform in these capacities was tenuous at best. She habitually complained to the author about the Agency Director’s failures to communicate with her or to replace the Assistant Counselor, and over time came to view the author as being somehow to blame. One consequence of this misperception (probably exacerbated by the author’s status as an outsider) was the author’s being barred, eleven months into the project, from working at the Prison.

An incident that illustrates the complexity of relationships within the Prison was the rivalry between the TC and the Drug and Alcohol Program.
The latter, which was also located within the Prison grounds, had been successfully established five years prior and maintained an excellent reputation. In the interests of learning from their experience, the author, with the permission of the TC Director, visited the Drug and Alcohol Unit early in the project and met with the Director of the Unit to gain a better understanding of that program’s success. Returning from that meeting with enthusiasm, the author was informed that working with the Drug and Alcohol Unit would not be allowed, even though their system appeared to be successful. The TC would stand alone and not interact with that program. It appears that the author had offended the TC Director by seeming to transfer loyalty to the director of the competing program. This soon led to serious repercussions.

The Agency was instructed to remove any mention of the word alcohol, or alcohol-related abuse, throughout the program's educational material. This rather Orwellian solution to interdepartmental rivalry was impractical, as if not saying something would make it go away. Discussion of alcohol and drugs had been included as a component to the educational material because a majority of women are in prison for drug and alcohol related crimes (Bloom & Steinhart, 1993; Chesney-Lind & Immarigeon, 1995; USDJ, 1994a; USDJ, 1994b), and it was one of the Agency’s areas of expertise. However, the educational and therapeutic material had to be revised to abide by this order. It was frustrating because all of the educational material had been reviewed and approved
when the program started. Then a month later, the material became problematic.

This incident illustrates some of the same things as does general communication patterns within the Prison. That is, from a control perspective, information-sharing, particularly across the hierarchy, threatens the existence of the chain of command, which is why functional distinctions are carefully maintained in hierarchical organizations. The control perspective also means that those who receive information/power from someone higher up are implicitly part of that person’s chain of command and thus dependent on it. For the TC to receive information from the Drug and Alcohol Program would have been to undermine the TC’s (and TC Director’s) place in the chain of command; to coordinate with the other program would have been, by implication, to be subordinate to it, a situation that would have undermined the TC Director’s independence. What in a flatter, information-sharing organization seems like a rational synergy between groups and a way of avoiding the reinvention of wheels that don’t work seems, in a hierarchical organization, to be a way of making one’s position and organization captive to another.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

As discussed in chapter two, Dilulio (1987) argued that the three approaches to prison organization differ in terms of variance in eight related administrative factors, and that such differences account for different levels of prison disorder. In addition, Dilulio’s typology was related to general organizational theories known as Theories X, Y and Z, which make explicit certain important assumptions about human nature and behavior that underlie them.

As the analysis presented in chapter five should make clear, the Prison described in this study was primarily a control-based organization with some characteristics of a responsibility organization in terms of the amount of discretion invested in COs. The organization of the Prison, and of the TC within it, was deep and hierarchical; directives flowed from the top down and the chain of command was observed such that communication did not take place across organizational ranks; relationships among staff and between staff and inmates were decidedly formal; and inmates had little input into their governance. COs enjoyed a certain amount of discretion in the exercise of discipline, but generally went “by the book,” and the level of regimentation was high. Although this might seem like a responsibility model prison, the amount of discretion allowed Prison staff working in the TC was less than that of CO’s—they
were seldom involved in determining disciplinary action within the TC, and the general control culture of the Prison found its way into the TC in the form of random searches and strict enforcement of rules without reference to therapeutic community norms.

In this environment, the humanistic psychology-based Theory Y assumptions of Agency employees staffing the TC were rather out of place. Accustomed to considerable professional autonomy as well as informality, the two Agency staff members were a poor fit with the prevailing culture of the Prison and were viewed as outsiders in need of the sort of surveillance more commonly visited on inmates' visitors than on professionals capable of self-governance. The fact that the Assistant Counselor proved unable to adhere to the many rules of the Prison only served to reinforce this perception and to undermine the relationship between the remaining Agency staff and the Prison staff. One might venture to guess that, at least for the TC Director, the Assistant Counselor, rehabilitated or not, was still an inmate and therefore not to be trusted.

In Chapter Two it was predicted that the more a prison embraced the control/Theory X management model, the less hospitable it would be to both staff autonomy and inmate social cohesion. This prediction was supported by the analysis presented here, for it can be seen that COs enjoyed much more discretion than did other Prison staff. Because the TC was not an autonomous, self-governing entity but was instead a virtual
captive of the Prison, inmates experienced themselves as out of control of their destinies and tended to act out (of control). Further, it was predicted that such a prison would tend to define outside service providers as threats to stability and, lacking the managerial tools to engage in contract oversight, will resort to its usual means of gaining the compliance of the provider: the imposition of rules, reliance on a chain of command, strict reliance on departmental functions, etc. This too was supported by the analysis presented above. Confronted with an ineffectual new Agency Director, Prison TC staff persisted in trying to get results by going through the author as the closest representative of the Agency. A prison administrator with more experience in subcontractor management would have realized the impossibility of such a quest and would have directed her inquiries to the Agency Director herself.

Much can be learned from this study about the pitfalls that await prisons and outside vendors attempting to collaborate in providing therapeutic services in correctional settings. These reflections make up the remainder of this chapter.

In the first chapter of this study, it was noted that Sykes (1958) had stated that the problem of maintaining internal order within a prison raises the question of the specific measures which must be taken to insure [it]; and . . . the question of the value or priority to be attached to the maintenance of order as opposed to possibly competing objectives. If extensive regulations, constant
surveillance, and swift reprisals are used, prison officials are likely to run headlong into the supporters of reform who argue that such procedures are basically inimical to the doctor-patient relationship which should serve as the model for therapy (p. 17).

Forty years have passed since these words were written, and yet they remain as true today as they were in the mid-20th century or the mid-19th century. Sadly, as society’s acceptance of psychotherapy has grown and as the influence and prestige of psychotherapy has increased, a corresponding growth in its use as an agent of social control can also be observed (Szasz, 1961). Nowhere is the ambiguous role of psychotherapy as healing art and coercive technology more apparent than in corrections and, as this study has shown, nowhere is the conflict between the goals of control and rehabilitation more likely to surface than in a partnership between a maximum security prison and a human services agency.

To put it that way, however, is to conclude that the present study has merely succeeded in proving what has been known for a long time, and despite the value of confirming previous findings, such a result would be unremarkable. But some things have changed since 1958; one of them is the tendency to out-source certain functions that were once provided by the prison, if they were provided at all. In the case of the present study, this function was treatment for survivors of domestic violence. This consequently raised the question, what would be the outcome of a partnership between a prison and a human services agency? And further,
given that the agency would, by definition, exist outside the traditional, total institution concept of the prison that obtained in Sykes’ day and that still prevails as an ideal, what would be the organizational issues raised by such a partnership? That is, what would the problems encountered in such a partnership reveal about the organizational styles and assumptions regarding human nature of the prison and the agency, and what could an analysis of organizational style and fit reveal about how to make such partnerships productive?

The problems encountered in the Prison-Agency partnership described in this study can be categorized as having to do with, first, issues particular to setting up treatment programs in a correctional setting, and second, broader organizational issues having to do with structure, culture and goals. These are discussed below, followed by recommendations for policy and future research.

Implementing Treatment Programs in Correctional Settings

Three years after the field work for this study was completed, Farabee, Prendergast, Cartier, Wexler, Knight and Anglin (1999) noted six barriers to implementing effective correctional drug treatment programs that readily apply to the implementation of domestic violence programs as well. Since these barriers were not directly considered when the program was implemented, the argument can be made that it would have run more
smoothly if these barriers had been known, acknowledged and dealt with. Specifically, Farabee et al. (1999) listed the following issues:

1. **Client identification, assessment and referral.** Carefully and strategically choose the inmates who will participant in the program based on research of those who are successful. Treatment should be matched with the needs of the clients, though not much literature provides guidance.

   Client selection was based on prison counselors’ recommendations, good behavior and reported abuse. The Agency had no input. The inmate’s offense was not taken into consideration; rather, inmates were considered based on their own reports of abuse. Although a history of abuse should have been a major determinant of eligibility, the literature supports the idea that more serious offenders make the greatest progress in corrections-based treatment programs (Griffith, Hiller, Knight & Simpson, 1999). This issue, however, did not specifically contribute to the difficulties between the Prison and the Agency.

2. **Recruitment and Training of Treatment Staff.** Hire qualified and experienced staff.

   This was a major weakness on the Prison’s part. The Prison staff “promoted from within” had no experience or degrees related to counseling. One did not have any higher education degree and another had a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice. Staff recruited by the Agency
were better qualified but difficult to find in the limited applicant pool of the rural area surrounding the Prison.

3. **Re-deployment of Correctional Staff.** Turnover of staff undermines programs in prison and lack of interest from COs affects the programs. COs need to be made a part of the program.

As was seen in Chapter Five, the instability in the TC staff that occurred when the Assistant Counselor was dismissed and not replaced for five months took a toll on inmate morale. There was also considerable institutionalized turnover in terms of the deployment of COs. Every two to three months, some of the COs were rotated to other units. The prison administration reserved the right to move COs around the prison to different duty posts at any time, with no prior warning. This was done in the interests of security. COs were informed when they showed up at work each day for their shift exactly which set of keys they would be issued. This determined the unit in which they would be working. The COs were used to and expected this kind of duty. Although this practice served the interests of inmate control in that COs could not form long-term relationships with inmates that could compromise security, it undermined the possibility of a therapeutic relationship between inmates and COs and also rendered the inmates more emotionally bonded with and dependent on the TC staff, who were not rotated.

The TC made a minimal effort to bring the COs into the Community Meetings and encourage an interest in the program. A training session for
COs was held before the TC started, with about 10 COs taking part in that training. Toward the end of the program, another workshop, taught by the same person, was scheduled for the COs to learn about domestic violence issues, but very few signed up and the session was cancelled. The TC invited the CO on duty to all of the Community Meetings and asked to always have the same COs on duty in the unit to bring continuity to the project. The same COs were generally on duty, but as was mentioned above, they were rotated to other posts on a regular basis, but irregular schedule.

4. Over-reliance on Institutional versus Therapeutic Sanctions. The emphasis for change and rehabilitation in a treatment program needs to be on peer influence and the overall treatment culture, not on the needs of the prison.

This was one of the most difficult issues encountered during the project. Inmates who violated the rules were generally sanctioned in accordance with the Prison rules, with little input from the group as to how violations would be dealt with.

One of the ways that the Agency staff attempted to inculcate ideas of peer group and individual responsibility was to teach a class on communication skills designed to enable inmates to work out conflicts among themselves. More inmates signed up than could be accommodated. The group began in September (month nine) of the grant year and was conducted on Monday evenings as part of the Agency's
effort to recoup lost hours on the contract. Because it was an evening group, the inmates were more relaxed, as they did not have to deal with their daily chores or work schedules. However, the TC Director was not present in the evenings, and the prison administration became suspicious, apparently fearing some imminent lapse of protocol or breach of security.

5. Aftercare. Follow-up treatment is imperative for all programs studied.

There was no follow-up treatment in place for the inmates in this program. All prisoners did go through an “exit program” in preparation for release, but without follow-up treatment, the literature has shown that this preparation has only a temporary effect (Griffith, et al, 1999). During the study period, four inmates were released from the prison to the outside with no follow-up. In fact, one was given the money she had earned in the prison and put on a bus to her home town, a large city three hours away. She had completed her time and was released. The prisoners are so glad to get out that they generally do not want to be “followed” on the outside by researchers and want no reminders of what they have left behind. However, those released on probation are required to check in with a parole officer.

Ironically, the best follow-up appeared to have been done by the inmates themselves. The author was surprised to learn how much the women who remained in prison knew about what happened to those on the outside. They generally knew where the person was going, and often
the released prisoners corresponded by choice with those still in prison. The prison, too, kept records on where the person was going, but again, if she had served her full sentence, the prison had no control after she was out.

6. Coercion. The strategy of getting inmates to participate in prison programs needs to be understood by the administration on both the prison and agency levels before proceeding with the implementation of the program, selecting participants and establishing the rules for the program.

As was mentioned previously, neither the individual in charge of the TC nor the prison counselors had any background in mental health; nevertheless, one of the prison counselors was responsible for selecting individuals for the program. She was never able to articulate her selection criteria, beyond choosing equal numbers of Black, white and Latina inmates.

The major coercion issue in corrections-based treatment programs is whether the inmates who requested to participate in the program were truly interested in the program because they really wanted help, or for extraneous reasons, such as that they wanted to score “points” for good behavior that would later benefit their attempts to receive parole. There are several reasons that inmates may be, in effect, coerced by their situation as inmates into participating in such programs. First, as was noted in Chapter Two, inmates have a great deal of time on their hands and often sign up for programs out of boredom and to have something to
do. Second, inmates know that the participants in treatment programs will get special privileges, such as an extra movie on weekends, an opportunity to order from a fast food restaurant, and more lenient unit rules. Third, it was a known fact and written into the classification policy that the more “educational or self-help programs” in which the inmates participated, the more likely they were to receive a lower classification (minimum, medium and maximum). Fourth, inmates are well aware that having many programs on their records looks good when they go before the parole board asking for an early release.

The inmates were mindful of these four issues and often talked about them. For example, many commented to the effect that “when I go before the parole board it will look good that I participated in this program.” Thus, although inmates were not overtly coerced into participating, it would be naïve to think that their status as inmates did not influence their request to join the program.

It would be inaccurate to say that these issues were not considered at all. Rather, they were considered and raised by the Agency but failed to win the support of the Prison administration. To understand why this support was not forthcoming, broader organizational issues must be examined. These are the topic of the next section.
Organizational Lessons Learned

This study raises several issues regarding the provision of therapeutic services in prisons by outside agencies. These organizational issues should be addressed early in the development of agency-prison partnerships. Issues that surfaced during the start-up and early implementation phases of the TC program described in this study included the need to reconcile differences in organizational structure, culture, and goals. Lack of awareness of potential discrepancies between the prison and agency can, and in this case did, lead to conflict and implementation problems.

First, the organizational structures of the prison and agency were very different: the former, reflecting its greater size and complexity, was characterized by numerous layers and functional areas, whereas the latter, reflecting its smaller size and more focused functions, had few layers and a less complex hierarchy. The organizational structure of the prison was set up along functional lines that reflected the multiple functions of the institution: financial, services, facilities, and human resources served as the major functional divisions under which all activities were organized. In contrast, the agency, being much smaller and focused as it was upon the provision of social services, had a simpler structure consisting of the agency’s director, who was required to wear many organizational “hats,” and agency employees, whose primary task it was to deliver the social services promised by the agency.
The lack of organizational “depth” on the agency’s side, coupled with the fact that agency employees contracted to work at the prison effectively reported to not one but two supervisors (the Agency Director and the prison Director of the TC Program) sowed the seeds of organizational conflict in several ways. First, the change of leadership at the agency meant that the new director, knowing nothing of the project and lacking anyone at the agency’s main office to whom to delegate the prison contract, was immediately and continuously at a disadvantage in understanding or administering the contract. That job, by default, fell on the author, who nevertheless was, as an agency employee contracted to the prison, required also to play the role of subordinate to those responsible for running the TC at the Prison. The resulting organizational role confusion made it difficult for the TC Director to know which role the author was playing at any given time: that of counselor, subordinate, or representative of the agency.

A second problematic area was that of organizational culture. In addition to being highly structured, the prison, like many other prisons, could be characterized as a Control/Theory X organization: formal, bureaucratic, and rule-bound, its two-legged organizational chart effectively enshrined the distinction between security and every other function of the Prison. In contrast, the therapeutic orientation of the agency employees, characterized by a preoccupation with encouraging personal growth, could be labeled a Consensual/Theory Y organization. In
such a partnership, in which the Consensual organization was the “minority,” the subordination of therapeutic to control goals was, in hindsight, almost inevitable.

In an article on barriers to implementing prison-based drug treatment programs, Farabee et al. (1999) noted that the treatment programs, particularly therapeutic communities, rely more on peer pressure and the general treatment milieu to alter participants’ behavior, rewarding compliance with the right to advance through the program, whereas within the prison itself, non-compliant behavior is generally met with more coercive or punitive sanctions. This distinction is consistent with the model developed in the present study. For example, inmates (as well as counselors) who failed to comply with rules were simply ejected from the program (or, in the case of the counselor, from the job) rather than sanctioned in a way consistent with the program’s stated values. This is not to say that inmates and staff who violated fundamental rules of the institution should not have been removed or sanctioned. Rather, the failure of the prison and the agency to come to grips with such disciplinary issues and to set policy in advance set the stage for conflicts among prison staff, agency employees, and inmates and rendered the TC captive to the security preoccupation of the Prison culture.

Third, the two organizations, though they shared the overlapping goal of establishing a therapeutic community for survivors of domestic violence, differed considerably as to their overall goals and mission. In
Hazenfeld and English’s (1974) formulation, the Prison was closer to being a people-processing organization, whereas the Agency was a people-changing organization. As Shichor (1999) noted, prisons have several goals, among which are incapacitation of prisoners, deterrence, and retribution for crimes committed (all essentially control or processing goals), as well as rehabilitation (a people-changing goal). On the other hand, Shichor argued that private business organizations have profitability as their chief goal. Although Shichor’s discussion focused mainly on the distinction between public institutions and private, for-profit businesses, the distinction applies to non-profit human services agencies in that such agencies, though not primarily profit-motivated, may have as their goals their own financial survival and image in the community as well as the provision of human services. Thus, while prisons and non-profit agencies may make common cause in that both may want to establish a successful therapeutic community, the potential for conflict between two different sets of organizational goals always exists.

In the case of the therapeutic community studied here, that conflict emerged around issues of security, which for the prison remained the bedrock on which all other goals rested. Also, not all prison and agency staff were equally supportive of either the Prison’s or the TC’s goals, which meant that conflicts between agency staff and COs became almost inevitable. The failure of the prison and agency to consider in advance
how to communicate a consistent set of organizational goals was the underlying cause of this problem.

The difficulties encountered in establishing and implementing the therapeutic community in the prison studied here have to do with a general lack of understanding on the part of both prison and agency regarding the complexity of developing such partnerships. The lesson to be learned here is to invest time early, in the pre-implementation phase, in a searching discussion of

- how organizational liaison will take place,
- to whom agency employees will report and how they will be evaluated,
- differences and similarities in organizational goals and methods, and
- how authority and order will be maintained within the TC while at the same time fostering the participants’ growth in self-regulation.

Shichor (1999) makes a distinction between “steering versus rowing.” Shichor (1999) uses the term “steering versus rowing” to show how the government can successfully guide outside agencies to manage and operate inside prisons and other public agencies. “This approach turns government agencies into buyers and monitors of services rather than the actual providers of services” (Shichor, 1999, p. 9). Shichor states, “many public services that were traditionally provided by government
agencies can be supplied more efficiently and cost effectively by private companies” (1999, p. 8). If indeed this is true, then it behooves us to take a closer look at paving the way for outside agencies to implement programs inside prisons.

One of the points made by Shichor (1999) regarding the privatization of prisons that is relevant to the present discussion is his observation that in a traditional corrections arrangement, the relationship between inmate and prison is clear: the inmate is the client (albeit an unwilling one) who receives services of various kinds from the prison, which is the sole provider. However, when prison functions are contracted out to third parties, the traditional client-provider and customer-seller relationships are altered. Usually, payers are the ones who received the goods and services, but in the case of privatization, buyers of services are not recipients of said services. In this case, there is an additional relationship in effect between service recipients (inmates) and payers for the services (government agency). Thus, a three-way relationship emerges (1) between customer (prison) and provider, (2) between provider and client (inmates), and (3) between customer and client. Customers usually have considerable power over the providers because they are the main source of income for them. . . . On the other hand, clients of human service organizations are dependent on the services provided to them, and they are less powerful than the organizations serving them . . . . It is very likely that the services provided in private
correctional institutions will be tailored to the needs and wishes of the customers (i.e., government agencies), rather than to the needs and wishes of the clients (inmates) (Shichor, 1999, p. 233), who in some way are the raw materials.

In hindsight, it seems that a major source of difficulty in the Prison-Agency partnership was a failure to appreciate and articulate the altered relationship dynamics created by the presence of a contract between the two organizations. The Prison administration, accustomed as it was to having complete control of and oversight over its programs and staff, only partly understood that Agency staff were not its employees and persisted in managing and disciplining them as if they were Prison staff (as in the case of the Assistant Counselor who was “fired” by the Prison although technically she was an employee of the Agency). On the other hand, Prison administrators appeared to be aware that the Agency was responsible for staffing and contract performance, but because the role of contract liaison had been assigned to the departed Agency Director and had not been taken up by her replacement, the author was thrust willy-nilly into this role even though she had no real authority to hire new staff. For her own part, the author, coming as she did from a traditional, two-way corrections orientation, did not appreciate the client-customer distinction made by Shichor (above) and persisted in thinking of her relationship as primarily between herself as provider and the inmates as client. Although she attempted to fill the role of customer liaison abdicated by the new
Agency director, she was not in a position to do so, and it was as a customer liaison, not as a service provider, that her performance was eventually found lacking. Thus, the author’s redoubled efforts to make up lost contract time, sometimes at her own expense, was virtually ignored by the Prison administration and her failure as a customer liaison became the focus of the administration’s discontent.

Although it would be convenient to lay the blame for this state of affairs at the feet of the new Agency Director, who admittedly did little to manage the contract and effectively relinquished this responsibility to the author, the explanation for this breakdown in roles lies elsewhere. Rather, the Agency’s lack of organizational depth—it had less than 10 employees, and the Agency director wore the contract liaison “hat,” however unbecomingly—was a major factor. The Agency simply lacked the manpower to oversee its contracts and perform staffing at a site remote from its own headquarters. Moreover, neither the outgoing Agency Director nor anyone in the Prison Administration foresaw the implications of contracting out a service which had traditionally been the purview of the Prison and which was, for all intents and purposes, intended to remain so. In other words, the Agency had contracted to set up a pilot TC program within one year, not to run it indefinitely. By definition, the Agency was both an outsider and temporary, as ultimately the ongoing management of the TC was to be taken over by the Prison. This was not a “marriage”; it was a “one-night-stand.”
Recommendations

Based on what was learned from this study, successful rehabilitation programs for inmates may be possible, but there are specific components that need to be considered. First, warehousing inmates is counterproductive and not conducive to promoting a healthy environment for rehabilitation (Austin & Irwin, 2001; McShane & Williams, 1989), and, as this study shows, the typical Control/Theory X organizational philosophy prevalent in prisons is similarly counterproductive. Simply put, an environment in which all—staff as well as inmates—are considered inherently untrustworthy and therefore in need of repression is not the sort of environment in which rehabilitation can be pursued, nor is such an environment necessarily the most secure, despite the elaborate technologies of control which they implement. It seems clear that new approaches to sentencing, assessment, incarceration and rehabilitation are needed. Finding out what works will require well designed studies to measure their outcomes. But given the entrenched nature of Control/Theory X thinking in the corrections system as well as the demonstrated tendency of that thinking to overwhelm other types of thinking, the virtual isolation of experimental programs from the existing correctional system is also necessary. Admittedly this is a tall order as well as the topic of another dissertation, and so in deference to the constraints imposed by reality, some further, and more pragmatic, recommendations are offered below.
Secondly, in partnerships between prisons and outside providers, use what we do know. It would be prudent to recognize the different organizational structures and cultures of prisons and human service agencies, and negotiate these differences at the outset. The experience of this study shows that a major danger to small pilot programs such as the one undertaken at this prison is that, unless insulated from the general prison culture, it will be overwhelmed by the culture of the overall institution. Whereas the putative goal of this project was to help the Prison set up a TC for domestic violence, which implies that the Agency would provide therapeutic expertise and training to Prison personnel, who would then assume responsibility for continuing the program, in reality the Prison took the bit in its teeth at the starting bell and bolted for the barn and its familiar accouterments of repression and control.

How could this have been avoided? The model proposed in Chapter Two of this study suggests that therapeutic milieus have more in common with Consensual/Theory Y than with Control/Theory X organizations. It would thus be logical to propose that prisons of the former organizational type would have more success, not only with developing rehabilitative programs, but also with partnering with social service agencies, which tend to be closer to the former than the latter. Thus, a simple answer might be, “don’t try.” However, this dodges the issue, which is that as long as correctional institutions persist in seeing themselves as total institutions whose goal begins and ends with security,
treatment programs for inmates will continue to come and go, sometimes succeeding for a time, sometimes failing, and nothing, prisons least of all, will change for the better.

A more complex answer to the above question might be, “pick your partners carefully.” One possible conclusion of this study is that there is an organizational goodness-of-fit that must exist if prison-agency partnerships are to succeed. Indeed, it would be an interesting study to compare the existence, structure, organizational dimensions, persistence, and outcomes of treatment programs in Control/Theory X and Consensual/Theory Y prisons. Based on the model proposed here, one would be inclined to hypothesize that the former have less positive outcomes than the latter.

This leads to a third recommendation: implement evaluations of the program at the onset. Set goals, learn what measurements are useful, and provide valid outcomes for prison programs. Do not just assume the inmates are “getting it” and continue on the current path. This is an important one in this writer’s opinion. We need to be doing a better job at measuring outcomes and determining what those outcomes are going to be. Will the measurement be recidivism, functioning in society, holding a job, or something else? But this study shows it is equally important to measure not just inmate outcomes but to more broadly examine the characteristics of the prisons and programs that produce these outcomes. In other words, it is meaningless to measure recidivism without taking into
account the organizational contexts that influence the conduct of the treatment program that affects (or does not affect) recidivism. In this respect, organizational characteristics represent a large, and largely unrecognized, compound in the measurement of inmate treatment outcomes.

Fourth, consider Farabee’s et al. (1999) six barriers to implementing prison-based drug treatment programs and apply them to programs for victims of domestic violence based on the support of research. These barriers were:

1. Client identification, assessment and referral
2. Recruitment and Training of Treatment Staff
3. Re-deployment of Correctional Staff
4. Over-reliance on Institutional versus Therapeutic Sanctions
5. Aftercare

In response to number one, choose participants based on what is already known about successful participants (Griffith, Hiller, Knight & Simpson, 1999) rather than allow the programs to be a free for all. This not only will provide more successful outcomes, but also is economically wise. Determine the evaluation of the outcome before implementing the program.

Regarding item two, bring in credentialed personnel approved by both the prison and provider who are familiar with both the traditional
therapeutic community and the prison organizational structure. Train staff about the process and outcomes of the program. The fact that the Prison in this study failed to use credentialed staff is, by most therapeutic standards, unethical in that these individuals were practicing outside the boundaries of their competence (APA, 1992; NFSCSW, 1985/1988).

Regarding number three, engage correctional staff to participate in the program to help to enhance adequate services to the inmates. This means scrutinizing staff and professionals who will be involved with the program. More broadly, it means thoroughly educating COs in the philosophy, goals and processes of the treatment program. Such education should be required and on-going, and calls for the job of CO be professionalized to a greater extent than it presently is.

As regards number four, this observational study has showed the importance of understanding the different management styles of a prison and outside human services organization. A poor fit between prison and agency styles makes achieving a balance between therapeutic and institutional sanctions even more difficult than it already is.

Aftercare (number five) is imperative, especially to prevent recidivism (Griffith, Hiller, Knight & Simpson, 1999; Prendergast, Wellisch, & Wong, 1996).

To address number six, it is recommended that coercion of inmates be taken into account when establishing or implementing such a program to contribute to a valid outcome measurement. But more broadly
speaking, it must be recognized that as long as there are prisons there will be coercion; in Control/Theory X prisons, coercion is the sine qua non of the entire establishment.

This is because, at bottom, such Tayloristic (Theory X management) institutions take a dim view of human nature. Rather than take the opposite position and say that human nature is unqualifiedly good, or that it is good if given the right opportunities, it is perhaps most realistic to say that human nature has the potential to be good if given an appropriate context in which to develop—and that in this, the organization—its assumptions, structure, and culture—is the substrate from which all individual outcomes derive. To the extent that Control/Theory X prisons, like their non-correctional cousins in the outside world (certain corporations and even the US Postal Service come to mind), get as good as they give. The ultimate question raised by this study is not, “how can two unlike organizations overcome their inherent differences and produce a marriage made in heaven?” but “how can traditional correctional institutions be reformed so that they are capable of partnering with human service agencies to provide a context in which inmate rehabilitation can take place?” Unless this question can be answered, such partnerships, like the dual goals of security and rehabilitation, will remain uneasy and ultimately unproductive bedfellows.
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1984 Guest speaker on WPSX-TV program titled Taking Note.
1983 Guest speaker on Morning Break, WJAC-TV with PSU Extension Service.

WORKSHOPS AND CONFERENCES
2001 Attended the National Sheriff’s Association Conference, Ft Lauderdale, FL
2001 Attended the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Conference, Washington, D.C.
Attended the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Conference, Orlando, FL
Certified for Ethnicity Communication Training, Ft Lauderdale, FL
1997 Training for Psychodrama Counselor, Hudson Valley Psychodrama Institute, NY
1996 Attended the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Conference, Phoenix, AZ
1995 Attended the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Conference, Boston
1995 Certified Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse Training, PA
1993 Study Abroad of the Netherlands Criminal Justice System.
1991 Completed Stephen Minister Training through local church.
1990 Completed Leadership Training for College of Education, PSU
Completed Mediation & Conflict Resolution Training

AWARDS
Received PEO Scholarship - Spring 1994
Received Keller Memorial Scholarship - Spring 1986
Received Professional Women's Scholarship – 1977

PROFESSIONAL AND COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
Member of the American Jail Association
Member of the American Society of Criminologists
Member of the American Correctional Association
Member of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences
Member of the National Sheriff’s Association
Life Member of the Penn State Alumni Association
Life Member of Honorary Sorority Phi Upsilon Omicron
Past Co-Chair of the PA State Parenting Educators in Corrections