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IMAGINED CITIZENS: ETHNIC NATIONALISMS AND CRISES OF CULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1816-1856

A Dissertation in

English

by

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ABSTRACT

This project focuses on the formation of ethnic and racial nationalisms in nineteenth-century America. I argue that a specific rhetoric of *imperium in imperio* (frequently translated as “nation within a nation”) was used by disparate peoples to describe the collective identities of African Americans, American Indians, and certain immigrant groups. For white Americans, this rhetorical construction functioned during the antebellum period as a way to project sectional tensions onto the presence of a racial or ethnic “other” nation and to bring these groups more fully under U.S. jurisdiction. People of color and several immigrant groups engaged discourses of *imperium in imperio* to exert pressure on the political hegemony of the United States nation by expressing alternative ethnic and racial nationalities. Taking up moments that I call “crises of culture,” my dissertation examines several major political and cultural crises of the nineteenth century: African Colonization (1816-1817), Cherokee Removal (1831), and the Kansas-Nebraska Act and Dred Scott Decision (1854 and 1856).
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................... vi

Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................. 1

Transnationalisms and Internationalisms: The Future of American Studies ..... 6
Civic, Territorial, and Ethnic Nations: Group Identity and the Formation of
the Modern Nation ...................................................................................... 13
The Rhetorical Formation of Ethnic and Racial Nationhood in America ....... 18
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 22

Chapter 2 America’s Two-Headed Monster: Imperium in Imperio and the
Problem of Sovereignty ........................................................................... 24

Race, Ethnicity, and Nation: Competing Visions of Community in
Nineteenth-Century America ....................................................................... 25
Civic, Territorial, and Ethnic Nations in Nineteenth-Century America ....... 31
Imperium in Imperio .................................................................................. 49
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 55

Chapter 3 “And Ethiopia Shall Stretch Forth Her Hands:” Racial Nationhood,
Religious Discourse, and the Formation of a Transnational People ........... 56

“The Boisterous Sea of Liberty:” National Disunion and the Creation of the
African Colonization Society ...................................................................... 60
Race, Nation, and Discussions of African American Collectivity ................. 65
“A Chosen People Within a Chosen People:” African American Jeremiads
and the Formation of Transnational Citizenship ........................................ 74
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 87

Chapter 4 “In the Heart of So Powerful a Nation:” Cherokee Nationhood,
Sectional Tensions, and the Regulation of American National Space .......... 89

“Our Lamentable Fate:” A Brief History of the Cherokee in Georgia .......... 93
“An Interesting Commonwealth:” Competing Visions of Cherokee
Nationhood .................................................................................................. 101
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Chapter 1

Introduction

“If what Jean-François Lyotard has called the postmodern condition entailed the dismantling of the Enlightenment's grand narratives, the nation, as the surface on which those master narratives were inscribed, also names the space in which that condition has become pervasive. The metanarratives nations fashioned out of them constituted the historically effective mechanisms whereby the Enlightenment's ideals of freedom and equality were transmuted into universal "rights" rather than local demands. But in the era of postcolonialism and globalization, the once hegemonic narrative of the nation has been unseated. These asymmetrical but interdependent socio-economic formations share responsibility for the demotion of the nation-state to the status of a residual unit of economic exchange in the global economy. Once believed crucial for membership in the world system, the nation-state has been recast as a tolerated anachronism in a global economy requiring a borderless world for its effective operation.” Donald Pease, “National Narratives, Postnational Narration” (1997)

American literary studies can be characterized in recent years by an increasing attention to the transnational or the postnational. In an era marked by postcolonialism and globalization, the idea of the nation-state is seen by some as an increasingly obsolete way of understanding the political and economic situations in which people are living. While this scholarship seems a valuable way to describe our own historical moment, there are dangers in forgetting about the importance of the nation as a key component of how many nineteenth-century Americans thought about themselves and their relation to others. Also it is important to remember that thinking “transnationally” does not necessarily require looking outside of the putative borders of the United States nation. We might instead look to Indian Country or to the various ethnic and racial nations that
existed during the nineteenth century (many of which continue to be a presence in American culture).²

Rather than thinking “beyond the nation,” many writers of the antebellum period, particularly those who were positioned outside of the dominant political culture, were deeply invested in thinking within and about the nation. White writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries might look beyond the nation as a means of identifying themselves and William Lloyd Garrison could write of renouncing his U.S. citizenship. Yet for African Americans, American Indians, and particular immigrant groups, framing their communal identity in *national* terms and discussing their individual rights as citizens—although not always U.S. citizens—had important political implications that remain somewhat undertheorized in discussions of transnationalism and American nationalism alike.

This project contends that a specific rhetoric of ethnic and racial nationhood—*imperium in imperio* (nation within a nation)—was used during the nineteenth century as a way of regulating non-dominant populations and solidifying the hegemony of the U.S. nation, and also as a way to articulate alternatives to the dominant political culture.³ Rhetoric here is used to refer to the purposeful use of discourse as a form of public argument rather than to an emphasis on the formation of specific political institutions. People excluded from nineteenth-century American political culture worked to discover and foster a consolidated ideological position outside the dominant community’s system. I argue that people of color and several immigrant groups were able to exert pressure on the political hegemony of the United States nation by forming ethnic and racial “nationalities” so as to renegotiate the geopolitical positions which they were forced to
occupy by members of the dominant culture. This dissertation suggests that the
“American nation” was not merely an ideology that was imposed on non-dominant group
people; rather in the nineteenth century dominant discourses of nationhood developed
alongside and at times in response to the presence of other race- and ethnic-based nations
that existed within and around it.

Such a project is complicated by the slippages in terms such as *ethnicity*, *race* and
*nation*, both in our own time and in the antebellum period. Competing constructions of
nationhood constitute the focus of this study, but the other two terms warrant a brief
explication. Today the terms *ethnicity* and *race* are often used interchangeably in U.S.
popular discourse. For the purposes of this project I am differentiating between historical
constructions of *ethnicity* as internal and potentially changeable over time, and *race*,
which to many nineteenth-century Americans suggested fixed external and internal
characteristics, that were immutable and unassimilable. Moreover, as a social
construction (albeit one with significant material effects), the meaning of *race* changed
throughout the nineteenth century as new historical and political exigencies arose. As
Dana Nelson has argued in *The Word in Black and White* (1993), “[t]aken variously to
stand for cultural, evolutionary, moral, metaphysical, and biological difference, ‘race’ has
never been a stable idea of a fixed concept.”

Generally speaking, however, as race
became an object of “scientific” study during the 1830s and 40s, ideas of race became
increasingly concerned with biology, skin color, and “blood.” Yet, there were still
numerous instances in which *race* was used to refer to what we would today consider an
ethnic group, peoples such as the Irish or the Chinese. In 1837, for example, a writer
who went by the name “An American Pat-Riot,” referred to the Irish as a “thick headed
race” and as an imperium in imperio, a nation threatening to rise up from within the United States and subvert federal authority.⁶

In referring to the Irish as an imperium in imperio, this writer employed what was by the 1830s an established topos in discussions of United States political and social culture. Derived from readings of English Common Law and the political structure of the Roman imperium, the rhetoric of imperium in imperio was more than just a figure of speech or a sign of classical education. Debates over the ratification of the Constitution and the separation of power between the federal government and state governments abounded with warnings that divided sovereignty would constitute an imperium in imperio, a political impossibility. As part of his argument for a strong federal government in The Federalist Papers (1787), Alexander Hamilton wrote that those who argued for states’ rights “cherished with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio.”⁷ Similarly, James Madison wrote to Jefferson that the Constitution “involve[d] the evil of imperium in imperio.”⁸ John Adams, however, took a much more optimistic stance regarding the Constitution. Upon assuming the post of Vice President, he noted that the United States government constituted a “fresh essay at imperium in imperio.”⁹ In his book States’ Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 1776-1876 (2000), Forrest McDonald noted the overall significance of ideas of divided sovereignty to American political thought. It was, he asserted, “generally regarded as impossible until Americans devised a way of doing it,” but remained a contested idea through much of the nineteenth century.¹⁰

Notions of imperium in imperio became associated with divided sovereignty between state and federal power, but, as this project suggests, also began to circulate
more generally as a way to identify threats to the sovereignty of the U.S. federal government or that of individual states. This rhetorical device was deployed at particular historical moments as a means of figuring the political struggles of non-dominant peoples—African Americans, American Indians, immigrant groups such as the Irish and the Chinese, and certain religious communities—as attempts to subvert U.S. political authority. The spatial image that this rhetoric evoked in the general public (that of nations of outsiders enclosed within or even trapped by the United States) threatened to destabilize the very definitions of nationhood that circulated in nineteenth-century American culture. Yet, the idea of an imperium also informed nineteenth-century ideas of nationhood. The formation of racial- and ethnic-based nations allowed people of color and immigrant groups such as the Chinese to imagine transcendent citizenships that allowed them to rhetorically locate their communities somewhere other than the geopolitical spaces in which they were positioned by the dominant culture.

What distinguishes this project from current scholarship is that instead of placing the U.S. nation within the larger context of other (mainly white European) nations of the nineteenth century, it takes as its focus the non-white nations that were understood by many in the nineteenth century to exist within the borders of the United States. After examining the development of discourses of imperium in imperio, this project traces the circulation of this particular rhetoric through several historical moments often considered central to American political and social formation. Taking up moments that I call “crises of citizenship,” my dissertation examines several major political and cultural crises of the nineteenth century: African Colonization (1816-1817), Cherokee Removal (1831), and the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854) and Dred Scott Decision (1856). The following sections
will trace the intellectual genealogy of this project and position it more carefully at the intersection of transnational American studies and earlier studies of nationalism and nation formation.

**TRANSNATIONALISMS AND INTERNATIONALISMS: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN STUDIES?**

Transnationalism, internationalism, multinationalism, postnationalism—all of these terms circulate freely in contemporary critical discourse, sometimes without clear distinctions between concepts. The idea of transnationalism emerged in the early part of the twentieth century as a way to think about the various European immigrant groups who were living in the United States, but whose cultural and political allegiances to their native nations were tested by World War I. Within the last twenty years, academics of various disciplines have taken up transnationalism as a way to refute earlier nationalist stands of American literary study, which seemed limited in scope and even jingoistic. Organizations such as the American Studies Association (ASA) and the International American Studies Association (IASA) have tried to reorient the field of American literary studies to include discussions of the Americas, hemispheric American studies, and Atlantic world studies. Numerous scholars have taken up these calls for new approaches, yet there are still new avenues of inquiry that can be explored. This section will trace the emergence of transnationalism, survey the current state of the field, and propose an alternative way for engaging in transnational American studies.

The term “transnationalism,” which refers to the formation of relationships between entities and individuals regardless of political and national borders, is not unique
to our own historical and critical moment. This term emerged almost a century ago to
describe the condition of Western European economic systems and to challenge the
American “melting pot” ideology. In contemporary scholarly conversations,
transnationalism is often discussed in conjunction with internationalism, which is used to
describe economic, social, and political dealings between nation-states. Following a long
period of intense interest in American nationalism and the formation of American
national identity, literary scholars, historians, and social scientists began to look beyond
the imagined borders of the American nation and challenge the notion of America as a
discrete cultural system. Turning to the construction of the Americas, the Atlantic world,
and the Western hemisphere, scholars of transnationalism have adopted “the vocabulary
of postmodernism” and focused not on fictions of national unity, but on ideas of
“hybridity, hyperspace, displacement, disjuncture, decentering, and diaspora.”
Nationalism and internationalism began to be seen as mutually constitutive and the
American nation emerged as a contested space where versions of transnationalism,
internationalism, and nationalism were in constant dialogue with one another.

As early as 1918, Randolph Bourne described the U.S. not as an imagined
community with shared cultural values, but as a nationally and ethnically heterogeneous
place. He used the term “transnational” to refer to the presence of ethnic nationalities
within the larger framework of the US nation, a situation which World War I had thrown
into sharp relief. In his essay entitled “Trans-National America,” Bourne argued that
immigrant populations had not accepted the dominant Anglo Saxon culture, but instead
had maintained their own ethnic national identities. World War I, he argued, had
activated the ethnic nationalisms of German, Polish, Russian and other Western European
groups living in the United States. For Bourne, America represented the “intellectual battleground” where European ideas of nationhood were being tested and challenged. Michelle Stevens, a scholar of West Indian culture and black (trans)nationalism, has explored the ways in which Bourne’s work borrowed heavily from the international language of the Russian Revolution to argue that American nationalism would emerge as something fundamentally different from forms of European nationalism. European immigrants resisted the adoption of a hegemonic “American” identity and the challenge to the American nation was, for Bourne, to create a trans-national nationalism, an American nationalism that could coexist with the presence of various forms of ethnic nationalities.¹²

Despite, or perhaps because of, the presence of these various nationalities, early twentieth century scholarship on the founding of the American nation focused heavily on the role that particular interest groups played in precipitating the American Revolution. The so-called Progressive historians, Vernon Parrington, Charles Beard and Frederick Jackson Turner, argued that competing class interests and conflicts, rather than elite group political rhetoric, precipitated the American Revolution.¹³ The work of the Progressives was challenged by that of “consensus” historians such as Richard Hofstadter, Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., and Louis Hartz, who, in the words of Philip Gould, “maintained that the Revolution exemplified a unified, national political culture bereft of any ideological impetus other than a half-conscious, consensual faith in individual property rights derived virtually exclusively from John Locke.”¹⁴ Intellectual historians of the 1950s and 1960s drew on Marxist phraseology, particularly the concept of ideology, to analyze the emergence of the American nation and its national values. In
particular, historians and literary scholars alike emphasized the importance of liberal and republican ideologies to the formation of the American nation.

This focus on liberalism and republicanism suggests that in addition to scholarship that championed “American exceptionalism,” critics from the 1950s onward were concerned with the international or transnational circulation of authors, texts, and ideas. With the growing interest in liberal ideology, signaled by the publication of works such as Louis Hartz’s *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955), and the rise of the so-called “republican synthesis” came an interest in how European political philosophies came to inform the creation of the American nation. Drawing on the influence of British Whig and Commonwealth traditions, the Scottish Enlightenment, and Florentine republican thought, Caroline Robbins, Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J.G.A. Pocock introduced literary and historical scholars to a republican lexicon of “virtue,” “disinterested benevolence,” and “industry.”15 Citizenship and national identity was, in the works of the republican synthesis, tied to the capacity of its citizens for moral virtue and the preservation of the public good. Concerned with the creation of Anglo-American national culture, these works nonetheless suggested the transatlantic community that contributed to the formation of the American republic. The American nation was thus shown to be a product of a kind of internationalism, the circulation of individuals, texts, and ideas from Europe to America and, in some cases, back to Europe.16 It is important to note, however, that these versions of internationalism were almost exclusively focused on the development of white, European nationalities and their interactions with one another. American Indian and African nations were left out of these studies.
It is important to note, however, that alongside these narratives of white American nationalism developed parallel traditions that challenged American exceptionalism and its racist underpinnings. From the writers of the Harlem Renaissance and American Indian activists like Carlos Montezuma through Toni Morrison and Julia Kristeva, alternative readings of American national culture have reconsidered America’s Puritan origins, Revolutionary heritage, and cherished democratic ideals. Scholars such as Wilson Moses, Shirley Wilson Logan, and David Howard-Pitney have focused new attention on Black Nationalism as expressed through genres such as the African American jeremiad. In American Indian studies, Gerald Vizenor, Donald Grinde, Vine Deloria, Lucy Maddox, and Maureen Konkle have examined issues of sovereignty and nation formation. As George Lipsitz and others have noted, there has been a tradition in American Studies and American literary studies to use the study of American literature and culture as a way to interrogate race-, class-, and gender-based hierarchies and the underside of Enlightenment ideologies of liberty and equality. In her 1998 presidential address to the American Studies Association, Janice Radway credited the study of “the popular,” a phrase she borrowed from Stuart Hall, with focusing scholarly attention on the social histories and literary productions of “subordinated populations.” Focusing on these populations, Radway asserted, allowed for the study of units of analysis other than the “nation.” These subordinated groups, while they sometimes spanned national borders, were linked by “practices and structures of feeling” rather than a shared sense of national identity.

Broadly speaking, in American Studies there has been a movement away from the “nation” as “the basic unit of, and frame for, analysis.” The work of the New
Americanists, along with other literary and historical scholarship of the 1990s, critiqued the ways in which the study of the United States nation has dominated American studies. Taking a hemispheric approach to the study of the Americas and focusing as Amy Kaplan did on the “cultures of U.S. Imperialism,” scholars have highlighted the competing nationalisms that exist within an American context. Paul Gilroy’s foundational work *The Black Atlantic* (1993) proposed the study of the Atlantic world as an “explicitly transnational and intercultural” approach to literary studies. Gilroy questioned the validity of distinguishing between African American, Afro-British, and Afro-Caribbean traditions because African diasporic experiences frequently transcended national boundaries, as evidenced by his attention to African mariners, activists, and authors. Gloria Anzaldúa’s *Borderlands/La Frontera* (1987) offered a similarly transnational approach in her emphasis on the border spaces between the U.S. and Mexico and the formation of a mestiza consciousness. The idea of the border space or “contact zone” (to use Mary Louise Pratt’s term) has been taken up by scholars such as John Carlos Rowe as a unit of analysis that will allow for an “integrated comparative study of U.S. literatures and cultures that would avoid the traps of multicultural pluralism and melting-pot assimilation.”

Two groups that have been instrumental in reorienting the field of American Studies and emphasizing a more global perspective are the ASA and the IASA. For the ASA, the movement toward transnationalism was formalized in a 1996 call for work that explored the “historical and contemporary significance of transnational and intranational migrations for American society [and its] forms of expressive, material, and popular culture.” Since that time, many of the presidential addresses for the Society’s annual
conference have dealt, to some extent, with the “transnational turn” in American Studies. Shelly Fisher Fishkin’s 2004 address “Crossroads of Culture: the Transnational Turn in American Studies” laid out the numerous avenues for scholarly inquiry that would be possible under the rubric of transnational American Studies. Working from a transnational perspective, Fishkin wrote, “we will welcome opportunities to understand how visions of American democracy and American citizenship shape and are shaped by conversations outside of the United States.”

The IASA, convened in 2000 by Djelal Kadir in Bellagio, Italy, is “committed to the study of America—regionally, hemispherically, nationally, and transnationally.” The IASA encourages interdisciplinary work on the Americas and the points of intersection between various nations in the Western hemisphere.

With its reference to regionalism, the IASA highlighted an important dimension of American studies in the twenty-first century. That is to say, adopting a transnational approach does not necessarily require looking beyond the “borders” of the United States nation. Historically and in our own time, there exist within the geopolitical space of the American nation numerous ethnic and racial nations, many with their own languages, customs, histories, political and cultural institutions, and variously located “homelands.” Understanding the political effects of these nations on those who belong to them and on the American nation requires blending a transnational approach with studies of nationhood and nation formation.
CIVIC, TERRITORIAL, AND ETHNIC NATIONS: GROUP IDENTITY AND THE FORMATION OF THE MODERN NATION

It would be impossible to summarize all of the scholarship that has been produced on the idea of the nation. Generally speaking, the scholarship on nation formation has focused largely on Western Europe and America and has taken a top down approach, examining the creation of nations by the political and social elite of Great Britain, Germany, France, and the American colonies. As Bernard Bailyn, one of the most famous scholars of nationhood, has pointed out, the term nation has proven notoriously difficult to define, with scholars often lamenting the lack of a “scientific definition.” In addition to questioning what a nation is, those who study nation formation have also asked when the nation emerged as a political and social institution and how were these institutions created. Some studies have argued that nations have always existed, in some form or another, while others have pointed to the forces of capitalization and the rise of print culture as instrumental in the emergence of the modern nation-state. Anthony Smith, Professor of Ethnicity and Nationalism at the London School of Economics, traced the emergence of the nation from ethnic populations or “ethnie.” This section briefly will survey the major arguments about what the nation is and how it emerged, and suggest how Smith’s work in particular informs this project. It will end with a discussion of how the synthesis of transnational and national study can provide a new way to study the interplay between the various and often competing nations that existed within the geopolitical borders of nineteenth-century America.

Although the term nation is difficult to define, contemporary scholars tend to discuss nations as political institutions, group identifications, or particular geographical
spaces.\textsuperscript{27} Those who emphasize the nation as a political institution tend to look to the
nations of Western Europe, particularly France, for evidence of this claim and tend to
approach the study of the \textit{nation} from the top down, focusing on the cultural and literary
productions of elite group people. Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as an
“imagined community” is one of the most commonly cited in literary studies, but there
are other discussions of the nation that similarly connect the idea of the nation with the
creation of a sense of group affiliation.\textsuperscript{28} These affiliations may be based on ethnic ties,
as Anthony D. Smith has argued, or they may be based on geographic proximity,
religious similarities, or as a result of a perceived external threat. Many scholars have
proposed that nations are not founded as a result of a sense of shared community between
the members, but because of a sense of opposition with a foreign other.\textsuperscript{29} And finally,
scholars have also discussed “territorial nations,” which emphasizes the connection
between the socio-political institutions and particular geographic locations.\textsuperscript{30}

Among academics across a range of disciplines, various theories of when the
\textit{nation} as a social and political institution appeared can be divided into four main
categories: (1) nationalists, (2) perennialists, (3) modernizationists, and (4)
postmodernists.\textsuperscript{31} Nationalists have argued that nations have always existed and their
origins cannot be traced back to any one particular point. While perennialists also
implied that the nation has always existed, they emphasized the fact that nations have
changed and evolved over time and that the institution of “the nation” is different at
various points in history. Modernizationists, such as philosopher and social
anthropologist Ernest Gellner, have viewed the nation as a modern development that is
socially and historically constructed. Postmodernists have been critical of discourses of
the nation as an organic outgrowth of a body of people, and have sought to uncover the networks of power relations that produce nation-states and national citizens.

Given these various theories of when nations emerged, there is also disagreement among scholars as to how nations were formed. Nationalists and perennialists, generally speaking, do not believe that there was one particular moment of national genesis, but instead argue that nations have always existed in some form or another. Other scholars have proposed that nations emerged out of nationalism, which is “primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.”

In other words, when a group of people recognized themselves as a nation and felt the impulse to form a corresponding political institution, a nation was formed. Modernizationists such as Gellner have asserted that nations developed because of the specific scientific and technological forces that arose during the seventeenth century in Western Europe. These developments led to changes in the mobility and organization of human populations, which, ultimately resulted in the formation of the nation state. In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson linked the emergence of nations and national languages to the rise of print culture. The dissemination of printed text, he argued, allowed people across space and time to imagine themselves as part of the same national group. Smith, Gellner’s student and one of the leading scholars of nationalism, has argued that nations emerged from ethnic communities. Thus, they are not timeless or produced solely by technological innovations, but in some instances nations developed from what he called ethnie, “named human populations with shared ancestry, myths, histories, and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity.”

*Ethnic* nations,
according to Smith, are a primarily non-Western form of nationhood that developed separately from *civic* and *territorial* nations.

Smith argued that *civic nations*, which were greatly influenced by Enlightenment ideas of the social contract, are those that equate the nation with an abstract political institution. Following the ideas of Rousseau and Locke, the *civic nation* derives its power and authority from the consent of the governed, who, in turn, are afforded particular rights and responsibilities. In this type of nation, members are presumably animated by feelings of enthusiasm for the state (commonly called patriotism) and because of their active participation in the political process. Citizenship in a *civic nation* is predicated on this active participation in government, which as many scholars have noted, presupposed particular attributes such as whiteness, maleness, and property ownership. Thus, while citizenship in a *civic nation* has been characterized as voluntary, it was not equally afforded to all residents of a particular geo-political space.

The *territorial nation*, in contrast, is one that is fundamentally concerned with and linked to a particular geographic space. This type of nation has been defined by Anthony Smith as a “territorial entity with a jurisdiction that, although sovereign, is also strictly bounded; and the sense of boundedness, of inclusion and exclusion, is vital to the definition of the community of citizens.”* Territorial nations* emphasize group membership, or citizenship, based on place of residence rather than civic participation or genealogy. As Smith has suggested, “‘Living together’ and being ‘rooted’ in a particular terrain and soil become the criteria for citizenship and political community.”* Such nations are generally associated with a more agrarian economy, which like the citizens themselves, is linked explicitly with the land.
Ethnic nations, noted Smith, are those that equate membership with descent and family lineage. Although they share certain features with territorial nations, ethnic nations are characterized by “an emphasis on descent, populism, vernacular culture and nativism” rather than by an emphasis on political and legal institutions. Often characterized by a kind of “territorial mobility” rather than fixity, these nations, according to Smith, developed out of pre-existing ethnic communities. This development occurred through a series of three processes: (1) mobilization, (2) territorialization, and (3) politicization. Put simply, in the transformation from ethnic group to nation, the political and intellectual elite recognized the need for national status and attempted to inculcate that need in the general population. In some cases, this “mobilization” amounted to mere rhetorical positioning of “the people” as desirous of becoming a nation. The second step was to associate the “nation-to-be” with a “homeland.” Smith noted that ethnic communities often reference a historicized or mythologized “homeland,” but nations need to be locatable, to have correspondence between their imagined political community and a bounded geographical area. And finally, to become a nation, an ethnic group must become political and must develop conceptions of citizenship. As Smith wrote:

No ‘nation-to-be’ can survive without a homeland or a myth of common origins and descent. Conversely, no ‘ethnie-aspiring-to-become-a-nation’ can achieve its goals without a common division of labour and territorial mobility, or the legal equality and common rights and duties for each member, that is, citizenship.

This suggests that civic, territorial and ethnic nations need to borrow certain features from one another to be truly successful: civic and territorial nations need to
foster a sense of communal identity and shared culture and *ethnic nations* must develop some kind of politico-juridical structure and constructions of citizenship.

### THE RHETORICAL FORMATION OF ETHNIC AND RACIAL NATIONHOOD IN AMERICA

In an era of high nationalism and territorial expansion following the War of 1812, the U.S. nation was engaged in the process of solidifying its own national status by expanding the geographic borders of its “homeland” and cultivating in its citizens a sense of shared cultural origins. The cultivation of communal identity among members of the dominant culture was complicated, however, but the competing origin stories promoted by the North and South and the presence of various ethnic and racial groups whose very presence belied fictions of common descent.\(^{39}\) Examining the rhetoric of *imperium in imperio* reveals the ways in which the presence of ethnies within the borders of the American nation became a way to resolve internal tensions and project conflict among the dominant culture onto an ethnic or racial “other” nation.\(^{40}\) Yet the presence of ethnic and racial nations was also a source of anxiety because these nations, which existed within the borders of the U.S. state, highlighted the lack of ethnic solidarity on the part of white Americans and often challenged American claims to a national homeland. As such, they were figured as threats to U.S. sovereignty.

For people of color and ethnic communities who were denied U.S. citizenship, presenting themselves as *nations* provided a way to parlay their (often involuntary) “territorial mobility” into an alternative version of citizenship that might allow them to transcend the geopolitical spaces in which they were placed by the dominant culture.
African Americans, American Indian communities such as the Cherokees, and other ethnic communities seized upon moments of division among the dominant culture as a chance to exert pressure on what was, throughout much of the antebellum period, a rather fractured U.S. hegemony. They frequently invoked the same rights discourses and ideas of nationhood used by members of the dominant culture, but infused those discourses with religious rhetoric and geographic discourses that allowed them to relocate themselves and their relation to the U.S. nation.

Taking up moments that I call “crises of citizenship,” my dissertation examines several major political and cultural crises of the nineteenth century that emerged around issues of racial and ethnic nationhood. Several religious groups, most notably Catholics and Mormons, were accused of forming imperia within the United States. However, the Zionist dimension of the Mormons and the fears of theocracy that both religious groups invoked for members of the dominant culture were quite different from the anxieties that surrounded racial and ethnic nationhood. This project takes as its primary focus racial and ethnic populations who, at various points during the nineteenth century, were afforded the status of “domestic foreigners,” people living within the borders of the American nation who were not citizens of that nation: African American, American Indian peoples, and certain immigrant groups such as the Chinese. The situations of people living in annexed territories—French Creole people in Louisiana, Californios, citizens of the Republic of Texas, Mexicans, and native Hawaiians—all challenged the sovereignty of the U.S. nation in one way or another. However, each of these populations and corresponding geographic locations were acknowledged to have been added to the United States. The “nations” of African Americans, American Indians, and
particular immigrant peoples were described in mainstream political discourses as arising from within the U.S. nation, and thus these groups were charged with the formation of racial or ethnic imperia.

The first chapter sketches out the important theoretical and historical concepts that inform the project. It traces the concept of imperium in imperio from the Roman republic through its later uses in British and American legal, political, and social contexts. This chapter also explores ideas of nationhood and citizenship as they were understood by nineteenth-century Americans.

Chapter Two, entitled “‘And Ethiopia Shall Stretch Forth Her Hands’: Racial Nationhood, Religious Discourse, and the Formation of a Transnational People,” traces the emergence of discourses regarding racial nationhood as a threat to U.S. sovereignty. After the War of 1812, there was a greater sense of national independence, but also increased tension between the Slave Power in the South and those whom they considered their primary ideological opponents: the New England States. This chapter contends that within this context, Southern politicians and partisan papers generated fears of a “nation of blacks” that threatened national unity and the institution of slavery, fears that were intensified by reports of actual slave revolts. African colonization was proposed by the American Colonization Society as a way to mediate between New England Federalists and the Southern interests and contain the threat of a black imperium. It provided a way to transform free blacks into “African American citizen-subjects” in a space safely removed from the American body politic and also worked to regulate the political behavior of its white supporters. Early opponents of African Colonization such as David Walker, Maria Stewart, and Robert Alexander Young engaged rhetorics of a threatening
Black nation, but also tried to leverage this threat in order to transform images of containment into ones of belonging. In so doing, they challenged dominant group constructions of nationhood and envisioned a transcendent vision of transnational African American citizenship.

The third chapter, “‘In the Heart of So Powerful a Nation’: Cherokee Nationhood, Sectional Tensions, and the Regulation of American National Space,” argues that within the context of the legal battles between the Cherokee nation and the state of Georgia, the discourse of *imperium in imperio* inculcated white and Indian populations alike with a particular conception of the relationship between a sovereign power and geographic space: any community or territory existing within the putative borders of a nation is subject to the laws of that nation and any attempts to exercise self-government within that space is an affront to the larger nation. The circulation of this discourse normalized the hegemony of the U.S. nation while representing the Cherokees as enemies of federal and state sovereignty. *Imperium in imperio* provided members of the dominant culture a temporary means for negotiating between doctrines of states’ rights and the preservation of the Union by projecting dissent between the Northern and Southern states onto a racialized “other” nation, which, it was argued, should be quarantined and managed in the Western territories. For the Cherokees themselves, while they were divided on other political and cultural issues, the rhetoric of *imperium in imperio*, combined with discourses of sentimentality and ethnic nationhood, provided a way to frame the Cherokee Nation as outside of Georgia’s authority, but under the protection and governance of the United States. The Cherokee Nation itself was framed as a transnational American citizen.
The final chapter, “‘A Space for Action’: Ethnic Nationalism and Transnational Citizenship in 1850s America,” focuses on the discussions of African American nationalism within the context of the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854) and earlier legislation such as the Compromise of 1850. After the Mexican War, the United States claimed authority over new territories in the West and debates about whether Kansas and Nebraska should be organized as free states or slave states threatened the stability of the Union. The language of *imperium in imperio* was employed by Northern and Southern writers alike to describe the position of their sectional rivals and the perceived threats posed by the mobility of the African American population. Colonizationists tried to regulate the movement of African Americans and promote Liberia as the ideal space for Black citizenship and a solution to growing sectional tensions. African American opponents of colonization such as Frederick Douglass, Francis Ellen Watkins Harper, and Henry Highland Garnet drew on languages of African American nationhood as a way to claim a place in U.S. political culture. Martin Delany strategically adopted the language of *imperium in imperio* as a way to raise the specter of internal revolution and exploit the fractures in the U.S. nation. Through his use of this discourse, Delany redefined what it meant to be American and called for the creation of a transnational American citizenship that would be uniquely available to African Americans and American Indians.

**CONCLUSION**

Discussions of *imperium in imperio* constitute a valuable and much understudied archive of nineteenth-century American culture. Previous discussions of this topos have focused largely on the cultural productions of elite group people and the ways in which American political thought was shaped by conceptions of divided sovereignty. As this project will
show, *imperium in imperio* became used as a way of articulating sectional, ethnic, and racial divides as well as political conflicts. During the antebellum period, this rhetoric was used as a way to conceive of disfranchised people as under U.S. jurisdiction, but separate from the dominant political culture. For African Americans, American Indian peoples, and certain immigrant groups, conceptions of divided sovereignty provided opportunities for the expression of race- and ethnic-based nationalisms and ways to speak back to U.S. political culture.

Scholarship on the antebellum period has tended to consider the political position of non-white peoples and immigrant populations in terms of a paradigm of exclusion. A great deal of important work has been produced about the ways in which nineteenth-century institutions denied certain people access to U.S. political life. However, the rhetoric of *imperium in imperio* provides one way to think about how discursive practices served to position non-white and immigrant peoples within the political sphere and shaped national and individual identity formation. That disparate peoples strategically adopted these rhetorics to their own purposes suggests the ways which the U.S. nation was formed through a series of contestations between various nations that existed within its putative borders.
Chapter 2

America’s Two-Headed Monster: Imperium in Imperio and the Problem of Sovereignty

As part of the larger dissertation project, this chapter establishes historical foundations for later case studies of particular uses of imperium in imperio and situates the critical vocabulary from the previous chapter within the context of nineteenth-century American culture. It provides definitions that will, in later chapters, advance the argument that discourses of imperium in imperio functioned to recognize and manage non-dominant group populations within the United States and instilling particular ideas of civic and territorial nationalism in dominant group people. Yet these same discourses also served as vehicles for the assertion of ethnic nationhood and challenges to the hegemony of the U.S. state. Ultimately, an examination of discourses of nations within a nation reveals the struggles between different visions of nationhood that occurred in nineteenth-century America—ethnic and racial nationhood, predicated on a sense of shared history, culture, religion, physical makeup, and “homeland” (real or imagined) and ideas of civic and territorial nationhood, which were predicated on the formation of a political institution and a bounded geopolitical space. After defining nineteenth-century American ideas of race and nation, this chapter explores the varied uses of the concept of imperium in imperio and surveys the history of alternative nations within the United States.

Drawn from Americans’ reading of Blackstone’s legal commentaries (1765-69), imperium in imperio was used to define a paradoxical subject position vis-à-vis the American nation: that of a nation of outsiders located within America’s national borders. Divided
sovereignty, or *imperium in imperio*, was both integral to the formation of the American nation (in that sovereignty was divided between the “general government” and the state governments) and deemed by Alexander Hamilton and later opponents of racial and ethnic nations to be a political impossibility. Divided sovereignty was presented as a political monstrosity and when applied to non-dominant group people—African Americans, American Indians, Chinese immigrants, Creoles, Irish Catholics, or Mormons—there was often slippage between political deformity and what was framed as an inherent, race- or religiously-based monstrosity.

Discourses of *imperium in imperio* functioned in various ways: as a way to describe a kind of management of the body politic in which the *imperium* represented a threat to be contained or rooted out; as an articulation of racial or religious segregation, in which non-dominant groups could form separate but equal institutions; and finally a way for non-dominant groups to claim a kind of political personality through which to exert pressure on the hegemony of the U.S. nation.

**RACE, ETHNICITY, AND NATION: COMPETING IDEAS OF COMMUNITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA**

From the Renaissance through the nineteenth century, Anglo-Europeans often used the terms *race* and *nation* interchangeably as a means of classifying human populations. Although some differentiations were made by individual authors, the meanings of these terms generally were much more fluid than they are in contemporary culture. “Scientific racism” and the equation of race with skin color and other physiological features emerged alongside the study of natural history in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The use of *nation* to denote a political institution rather than a social or cultural group did not become standard until the twentieth century. Generally speaking, during the nineteenth century discourses of both “race”
and “nation” were used by members of the dominant culture to categorize non-white people and transform them from unknown populations into organizations that were more easily quantifiable. For members of non-dominant groups, identifying themselves as either a race or a nation was a politically charged act that challenged the social and political institutions of the U.S. nation. As the larger dissertation project focuses on the construction of race-based nations, this section will explore the development of American ideas of race as a historically and socially constructed marker of difference that was seen as distinct from, although often related to, ideas of nation, tribe, and ethnic community.

Some of the earliest Anglo-European definitions of “race” and “nation” associated both terms with lineage, stock, and genealogy. In the eighteenth century, Samuel Johnson’s dictionary and the French Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française both defined this term in terms of familial lines, either of people or livestock. Johnson’s 1755 edition of the Dictionary defined “race” as "A family ascendancy," "A family descendancy," "A generation; a collective family," and "A particular breed." Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary suggested that early uses of nation also evoked familial relations or descent, in addition to referencing a particular political institution. Johnson’s Dictionary of 1755 drew on a definition by Sir William Temple, and argued that: "A nation properly signifies a great number of families, derived from the same blood, born in the same country, and living under the same government and civil constitution." Although literary and scientific discourses were, by the eighteenth century, using race to invoke physical and mental distinctions between people, the distinctions between race and nation were not codified.

The development of natural history in the 1770s gave rise to equations of physical features—skin color, eye color, physical build, hair texture—with mental and emotional
capabilities and further differentiated bodily notions of race from more abstract and intellectual conceptions of nation.\textsuperscript{46} The writings of Thomas Jefferson show that while climatological ideas still held sway in discussions of human difference, innate racial characteristics were emerging as a topic of discussion. Invested as he was in studying Linnaean systems of classification and responding to the Compte de Buffon’s charges of American degeneration, Jefferson drew distinctions between the physical and mental abilities of the American Indian, African, and Anglo-European residents of the American continent.\textsuperscript{47} Yet he also considered the effects of culture. He lamented that African Americans and American Indians had not been made the subjects of natural history and “advance[d] it therefore as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites in the endowments of body and mind.”\textsuperscript{48} Although he posited the inferiority of Africans and African-descended people, Jefferson did not argue definitively as to whether such inferiority was innate or socially produced. However, his thoughts on African colonization suggest that, when educated and removed beyond the borders of the United States, African Americans might be able to form their own successful nation. According to Jefferson, race was physiological and cultural, while nation was a political construct.

Thus, for Jefferson and for succeeding generations of racial theorists, a race could be comprised of various nations. The white race, for example, was made up of the British, American, and French nations. Christians who interpreted the Bible’s account of monogenesis literally often discussed the human race as made up of various nations as a way to mediate between their belief in the account of creation given in Genesis and the obvious differences that they observed among human populations. Samuel Morton, who founded the “American School” of ethnology, often associated with the beginning of “scientific racism,” also drew on this
understanding of nations as subdivisions of a race. In *Crania Americana* (1839) and *Crania Aegyptiaca* (1844), he published the results of his studies of the skulls of various racial groups and divided humanity into four racial groups: Caucasian, Asian, Native American, and African. The Caucasian race could be further broken down into nations (British, American, and so forth) as could the African race: “The Negro is joyous, flexible, and indolent; the many nations that make up this race present a singular diversity of intellectual character, of which the far extreme is the lowest grade of humanity.”

Here Morton began to consolidate what had before been merely assumptions—i.e., that different races not only possessed different physical traits, but also inherent mental and emotional characteristics. In fact, an argument for polygenesis—the idea that the races were so different as to be members of different species—emerged out of the “American School” and the “data” published by Morton and others.

Critics of chattel slavery and other forms of institutionalized racism charged that ideologies of race, like those codified by the “American School,” emerged as a justification for slavery, colonial expansion, and economic domination. Novelist and activist Martin Delany wrote in *The Condition...of the Colored People of the United States* (1852):

In taking a glance at Europe, they [who sought to improve the situation of African Americans] discovered there, however unjustly, as we have shown in another part of this pamphlet, that there are and have been numerous classes proscribed and oppressed, and it was not for them to cut short their wise deliberations, and arrest the proceedings in contention, as to the cause, whether on account of language, the color of eyes, hair, skin, or their origin of country—because all of this is contrary to reason, a contradiction to common sense, at war with nature herself, and at variance with facts as they stare us every day in the face, among all nations, in every country—this being made the pretext as a
matter of policy alone—a fact worthy of observation, that wherever the objects of oppression are the most easily distinguishable by any peculiar or general characteristics, these people are the more easily oppressed, because the war of oppression is the more easily waged against them. This is the case with the modern Jews and many other people who have strongly-marked, peculiar, or distinguishing characteristics. This arises in this wise. The policy of all those who proscribe any people, induces them to select as the objects of proscription, those who differed as much as possible, in some particulars, from themselves.51

As early as 1852, Delany wrote about notions of race as a “pretext” for institutional policies of violence and subjugation. African people, he argued, provided a convenient target for such practices, because like Jewish people, they had recognizable physical features that marked them as not Anglo Saxon. Thus race was not the cause of slavery, but in fact an effect, a discourse that emerged to justify the enslavement of a people.

Even as he tried to resist racial discourses, Delany employed them to argue for African Americans’ unique ability to thrive anywhere in the world.52 Later in the same work, he argued that “[t]here is one great physiological fact in regard to the colored race—which, while it may not apply to all colored persons, is true of those having black skins—that they can bear more different climates than the white race.”53 Here, Delany tried to transform the negative connotations associated with blackness into a positive value—a kind of transnationalism that uniquely enabled a person of the African race to be a “denizen of every soil, and a lord of terrestrial creation.”54 The African race, he argued, had the right of dominion and the ability to inhabit any climate. They just needed to form a “nation” in order to take their place on the world stage. Delany here implied a temporal relationship between race and nation; races are groups of
people with shared physiological and cultural features, who, through a process of claiming land and establishing a government, could form themselves into a nation.

Delany’s understanding of the distinction between *race* and *nation* resonates with the work of recent scholars of nationalism and nation formation such as Anthony Smith. Smith’s *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1988) argued that the formation of nations was not due to the forces of capitalism, nor were nations timeless entities; instead, he traces the emergence of nations to the historical presence of ethnic populations, an argument which is similar to Delany’s understanding that races predate the formation of nations. As was discussed in the previous chapter, Smith defined these ethnic groups as “named human populations with shared myths, histories, and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity.”

In a more recent work entitled *Nationalism* (2001), Smith synthesized and expanded upon his previous works on nations and nationalisms. While in earlier works he differentiated between two types of nations—*territorial* (Western) and *ethnic*—in *Nationalism*, Smith discussed three types of nationalisms or national sentiments. *Ethnic nationalism*, according to Smith is the desire to create a nation for an ethnic population, whereas *civic nationalism*, commonly referred to as patriotism, associates the nation with the state as a political institution. *Territorial nationalism* is that which equates a nation’s identity with the land it occupies. As the subsequent sections will suggest, all three ideas of the nation circulated in nineteenth-century America, but sectional conflicts and the diverse population of America continually undercut a sense of monolithic “ethnic” culture among members of the dominant culture. The discourse of *imperium in imperio* became a way of describing threats to the American nation that were posed by alternative models of *ethnic nationhood* that arose within the borders of the American state.
CIVIC, TERRITORIAL, AND ETHNIC NATIONS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

Among members of the dominant culture in nineteenth-century America, the nation was understood in civic, territorial, and ethnic terms. A nation was viewed as an imagined political entity, as a territory with discrete boundaries, and as a group of people with shared sense of language, culture, religion, and genealogy. Americans’ sense of themselves as a nation, and moreover a unique nation, however, largely was predicated on the democratic nature of the republic and the political ideals for which the Revolution supposedly was fought. Political leaders like George Washington, John Jay, and Benjamin Rush saw the need to instill in the American population the sense that they were a homogenous and unified people. Yet the very fact that this sense of “ethnic” nationalism had to be cultivated suggests that the multinational and multiracial nature of American society, even in its early years, mediated against the existence of a unified “ethnic” culture. This section will review these conceptions of the nation in order to better understand the way the concept of divided sovereignty both shaped and challenged American ideas of nationhood and were used to define and position the political subjectivities of non-dominant group people in nineteenth-century America.

America as Civic Nation:

Dominant discourses of nationhood in nineteenth-century America often focused on three criteria that a political community must meet to be considered a nation: (1) this community must be recognized as a nation by other nations, (2) it must have a foundational moment in which the community could be seen to transition from a lower political order to the status of nation, and (3) the community must share a set of common characteristics with other nations. Such discourses
of nationhood drew on relational (particularly familial) language; nations were understood to exist within the context of the so-called “family of nations” and it should be left to members of the “family” to decide which political communities could join their number. As a self-created and newly recognized member of the “family of nations” the United States had a particular investment in the determination of nationhood. In the hands of a variety of writers, the criteria mentioned above were adopted and adapted so as to cement the legitimacy of U.S. nationhood and call into question any factions that threatened U.S. sovereignty.

American political and legal theorists constructed recognition as a crucial component of nationhood. In his response to *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*, Justice William Johnson disputed the Cherokee claim to nationhood on the basis that “as a state, they are known to nobody on earth, but ourselves, if to us.” The United States was not recognized as a nation when it broke away from Great Britain and “was not admitted [into the family of nations] until we had declared ourselves no longer provinces but states, and shown some earnestness and capacity in asserting our claim to be enfranchised.” He went on to argue that a political community could not merely declare itself to be a nation, “others have a right to be consulted on the admission of new states into the national family.” Johnson imagined the relationship between nations and the abstract governing body he called the “family of nations” to be very much like that of individual citizen and sovereign. The individual assumes a political personality when he is recognized as a citizen by the sovereign. In a similar way, political organizations become nations through having their claim to nationhood recognized by the wider community of other nations. Presidential addresses, speeches to Congress, and newspaper articles throughout the nineteenth century made similar reference to the family of nations and shared Johnson’s sense that this community decided the fate of emergent nations. As one writer for *The American Farmer* mused in 1819, “what is a
nation but a great family,” one that existed within the context of a larger, extended family of other nations.60 But according to many Americans both before and after the Revolution, this national/familial recognition could also be revoked, as when the colonies ceased to recognize Great Britain as their nation. The Revolutionary war and subsequent debates over the formation of the American government were held up by later generations of Americans as the nation’s natal moments, marking the transition from colonies to independent nation and ensuring their national recognition.

In nineteenth-century America, claims to nationhood were often evaluated by whether or not the claimant could offer proof of a similar transition. In this way, members of the dominant culture in the United States judged other nations by the standards that they themselves had established just decades ago and continually sought to have their own national history replicated by others. Poems, plays, novels, short stories, songs, and visual art hailed the American Revolution as a watershed moment, not only for Americans, but for the international community as well. The “shot heard round the world” was remembered as a signal to other nations that the American colonies would soon be joining their ranks. The Haitian Revolution, although it raised fears of slave revolt in the United States, was understood by some Federalists in much the same way as the American Revolution: an oppressed colony broke away from a corrupt European power to establish its national independence. Despite obvious racism and Jefferson’s embargo against Haiti, Federalists recognized Haiti’s nationhood in part because Haitians could point to the founding moments of their republic.61 After struggles with Great Britain over the sovereignty of the American Colonization Society and the Liberian colonists, the United States recognized Liberia as a republic. Governor Joseph Jenkins Roberts declared its independence on July 26, 1847 and that date was pointed to as the moment of transition from colony to nation. For other
nations seeking the recognition of the United States—Mormons, Cherokee, Choctaw—the perceived lack of such natal moments was used as grounds for exclusion from the “family of nations.” The Cherokees, however, pointed to their written constitution—which they claimed was modeled on the U.S. constitution—as well as their adoption of Christianity, agriculture, and Western models of education as proof of their transition from a lower order of civilization to the status of nation-state. The proof that the Cherokees offered of their nationhood was designed to appeal to a third conception of the nation that circulated in nineteenth-century American culture.

Nations could be distinguished from other kinds of political organizations because they shared with one another a set of common characteristics—social, economic, political, legal, and territorial. As opposed to tribal communities, nations were thought to have stable communities (as opposed to nomadic) and developed agricultural systems. They had systems of currency and established commercial relations with other nations. In addition, nations were recognized as such when they could demonstrate sovereignty—political and legislative—and have that sovereignty recognized by other nation-states. Writing under the name “William Penn” in his defense of the Cherokee Nation, Jeremiah Evarts explicitly linked sovereignty with nationhood. He wrote that the “best” definition of a nation is a “community living under its own laws.” Nations could be strong or weak, he argued, and could rely on other nations almost totally for their support, but nations must be able to “manage their own concerns” in a legal sense. The Cherokees, he claimed, met this requirement and should thus be considered an independent nation. The case of the Cherokees highlighted another important aspect of nineteenth-century nationhood. As argued by the opponents of the Cherokees and other American Indian nations, political communities needed to demonstrate the possession of territory, a national space in
which individual citizens held allotments. Land held in common or land that could be claimed by other nations could not be used as part of a persuasive argument for nationhood. In his denial of Cherokee nationhood, Supreme Court Justice William Johnson wrote, “Their condition is something like that of the Israelites, when inhabiting the deserts.” Without property, he argued, the Cherokees could not be considered a nation.

Property not only ensured national recognition, but also determined the recognition of individuals as political entities or citizens. Derived from their understandings of classical republicanism and Lockean liberalism, particularly as incorporated into the British Commonwealth system, the creators of the American nation linked citizenship explicitly to the possession of land. It was thought by the framers of the Constitution that owning property gave one the “personal independence” necessary to promote the common good and participate fully and actively in the political concerns of the nation. Because land ownership was predicated on certain physical characteristics of whiteness and maleness, only certain kinds of people were able to participate in the civic culture of the nation. During the first half of the nineteenth century, discourses that staked the political identity of both nations and individuals on land ownership also highlighted the growing sense of America as a territorial nation, a bounded geographical space in which citizenship was linked more completely to place.

**America as Territorial Nation:**

In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner famously argued for the centrality of the American landscape, or “the frontier,” in shaping American national character and national destiny. With the assertion of his “Frontier Thesis,” Jackson made explicit what many Americans
had thought for some time: territory, particularly the land to the west of the Mississippi, was central to ideas of American nationhood. These late nineteenth-century ideas of territorial American nationhood hearkened back to eighteenth-century environmental theories in which climatological elements were thought to determine individual and national characters. America was described explicitly as a territorial nation in the writings of Thomas Jefferson. His agrarian ideal of the yeoman farmer linked American citizenship not only to ownership of the land, but also to cultivation and agricultural production. Notions of America as a territorial nation were reinforced by the rise of geographical discourses and geography as a field of study for American students and by ideologies of “Manifest Destiny” that equated the future of the nation with its movement across the continent.

By the 1890s, Frederick Jackson Turner felt the need to look back at the previous century and analyze the function that the continent played in creating “America.” Turner’s “Frontier Thesis,” was predicated on the notion that the geographic space of America—characterized by the abundance of apparently “empty” land with fluid borders—was instrumental in shaping the political institution and social community known as the American nation. “The peculiarity of American institutions is,” Turner wrote, “the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people—to the changes involved in crossing a continent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economic and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life.” For Turner, this expansion led to a continual cycle of rebirth—as the nation expanded into new land it was forced to return to a kind of “primitive” condition and develop anew.
American nation thus could be equated with the paradoxical notion of a bounded state that was continually extending into a boundless state.

Over a century before Turner’s thesis, environmental theories that emerged out of the Enlightenment posited that climate and geography had a variety of effects on human beings. Those who lived in warmer climates with more fertile soil were thought to be more sensuous and indolent because less labor was required to meet their basic needs. Interestingly enough, northern European climates, in which the Enlightenment-era environmental theorists were writing, were thought to produce hardy, industrious, and above all, rational beings. Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia (1781-82) contains several refutations of the environmental theories of the French theorist, Compte de Buffon, who alleged that the environment of North America produced small, weak creatures with very little “ardor…for his female.”68 The logical extension of Buffon’s argument was that Anglo-Americans would, as a result of their life in the North American environment, degenerate into weaker beings, physically and intellectually. Thus, Jefferson had a vested interest in asserting the habitability of the North American continent and the positive effects that the climate and material space had on indigenous peoples. For Jefferson, the fate of the American nation was, in part, predicated on the forces exerted by the continent itself.

And the ideal American citizen, Jefferson contended, was one who was deeply connected to the continent. In a famous passage from Notes on the State of Virginia, he articulated the idea of the yeoman citizen-farmer: “Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue.”69 The virtues necessary for the
preservation of a healthy republic could be cultivated not only by working the land, but by owning individual property. American citizens could escape the plight of impoverished and landless Europeans, wrote Jefferson to James Madison, because the American nation would be characterized by a more equitable distribution of land.\textsuperscript{70} Drawn from British constructions of liberal citizenship, individual landownership could be achieved more completely in America because of the amount of “available” land.

Americans, particularly American children, were encouraged by figures such as Noah Webster, Jedidiah Morse, Benjamin Rush, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin, not just to work the land, but to learn about it and understand the nation as a geographic space. Martin Brückner has argued persuasively that geographic discourses were employed by Americans to give themselves “the official imprimatur of a national identity” and helped fuse abstract ideas of the nation and national spirit to a material form.\textsuperscript{71} Brückner noted the proliferation of geography textbooks and materials and the widespread incorporation of geography into school curriculums in the early Republic. People from a variety of economic backgrounds had their portraits taken with maps or geography books in the background and wrote in their diaries about their study of geography. Following Brückner’s argument, it seems that throughout the nineteenth century, geographic materials and discourses helped Americans envision the nation as something fixed, concrete, and unified—despite fluid boundaries, regional differences, and sectional strife—and helped them plot their place in the developing nation.

Throughout the 1830s and 40s, white Americans imagined their national “place” as expanding ever further across the continent. The ideology of “Manifest Destiny,” which attributed the spread of the American nation across the continent to providential
design and divine right, underscored the widespread conflation of the American nation with the land it encompassed. In his writings on America and its “Manifest Destiny,” John L. O’Sullivan wrote:

In its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles; to establish on earth the noblest temple ever dedicated to the worship of the Most High – the Sacred and the True. Its floor shall be a hemisphere – its roof the firmament of the star-studded heavens, and its congregation an Union of many Republics, comprising hundreds of happy millions, calling, owning no man master, but governed by God's natural and moral law of equality, the law of brotherhood – of peace and good will amongst men.72

Here O’Sullivan explicitly discusses the American nation (which he imagines to be a confederation of many Republics) as both a spatial and temporal entity. The national space stretches horizontally across the North American continent, but also vertically from the land upwards to the heavens.

The circulation of this type of expansionist rhetoric and the annexation of western lands allowed Anglo-Americans to imagine their nation as an ever increasing space. As part of the construction of nation as territory, American citizenship was tied not only to land ownership in general, but also to particulars such as birthplace and the location of one’s current residence. Historically, Article IV of the Constitution denoted state citizenship, determined by owning land and residing in a particular state, as that which entitled an individual to the privileges of citizenship in all of the states. Before the creation of a “national citizenship,” state citizenship and place of residence functioned to
guarantee the recognition of white male citizens’ legal rights in all parts of the Union. Moreover, dominant group people and those of certain western territories could claim American citizenship based on *jus soli* or “right of the soil.”73 Like citizenship in a particular state, citizenship based on *jus soli* was linked to one’s place of birth. Some African Americans, American Indians, and immigrant populations claimed the right of *jus soli* or, as Martin Delany called it, “birthright citizenship” as part of their argument for political recognition and enfranchisement. Such an argument allowed members of ethnic nations to articulate a relationship to the American landscape that was not based on ownership, but rather on historical and even sentimental ties.

*America as Ethnic Nation?:*

For many non-elite group people in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America, the nation was imagined first and foremost as a community of people, not as a political institution or a geographic space.74 If the political leaders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the nation in Lockean terms as the compact formed between the “people” and some kind of sovereign power, popular imagery of the nation in nineteenth-century America tended to emphasize the human element. Newspapers, broadsides, and literary texts discussed the people as the essence of the nation. During public festivals and national celebrations, Americans were surrounded by music, visual art, and rhetorical performances, but most of all, by other *people*; the rhetorical spaces of national holiday were constructed in such a way as to offer visual reinforcement that as a group, the American people comprised the nation. As David Waldstreicher has argued in his *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes* (1997) printed materials and
“festive culture” worked hand in hand to create among the working people of America a sense of national unity and the idea of the nation as a “public.” He wrote, “by fostering an idea of the nation as an extralocal community and by giving ordinary people the opportunity for local expression of national feeling, this reciprocal influence of celebrations and print literally and figuratively papered over the disturbing class resentments (expressed in the anti-aristocratic language of the Revolution) that had energized much of the populace in the first place.”

Mason Locke Weems, Jared Sparks, William Gilmore Simms and other popular writers and booksellers also advanced the idea that the nation was embodied by particular individuals such as Washington, Franklin, Revolutionary General Francis Marion, and the fictional “Uncle Sam.” Yet the multiethnic and multiracial nature of American society, as well as the growing divide between North and South, challenged the formation of an American ethnic nationalism.

Members of the dominant group often sought to ameliorate these national fractures by projecting threats outward on to the presence of racially and ethnically “other” nations. For those ethnic and racial communities within the United States who claimed national status, the task was to articulate a vision of citizenship that would allow them to renegotiate the terms of their relation to the American nation.

The conception of a nation as first and foremost a political organization was more commonly held by elite group people in nineteenth-century America than by working people, who were considered to be “the people” by whose authority the political organization was created. Washington Irving dramatized this point in his short story “Rip Van Winkle” (1819) and suggested that “the nation” as political institution had very little effect on people’s material conditions. In the story, Rip went from being a subject of King George to being a citizen of the United States and the only change that he noticed was that the local tavern had replaced the
king’s picture with that of Washington. He is much more concerned with local issues, particularly the end of the domestic “tyranny” of Dame Van Winkle. Those Americans who were concerned with political institutions were generally more interested in state and local politics, often considering themselves to be citizens of a particular state rather than of the American nation. As Lighthorse Henry Lee famously asserted, “Virginia is my country.” This sense of state, rather than federal allegiance, and a strong distrust of centralized government undercut attempts to create a shared sense of a homogenous American population.

The states, as existing sovereign powers, were understood by many to have existed before the formation of the federal government. By banding together and entering into a voluntary social contract, the states gave the federal government its sovereign power. During moments of national crisis, Abraham Lincoln and later nationalists would later try to refigure the nation’s beginning, arguing that the nation predated the states. In an 1861 message to Congress, Lincoln described his version of the nation’s founding:

Originally some dependent colonies made the Union, and, in turn, the Union threw off their old dependence for them, and made them States…The Union, and not themselves separately, produced their independence and liberty… The Union is older than any of the States, and, in fact, it created them as States.76

Lincoln’s presentation of history, which insisted that the federal government predated, and thus trumped, state governments, was a difficult position to argue and never caught on as a widely held interpretation of America’s founding. In fact, most Americans did not glean their understanding of what the nation was and how it came into being from the mouths of its political elite. Songs, poems, novels, textbooks, artwork, the speeches of local politicians, and
community events inculcated Americans with what it meant to be an American citizen and shaped their ideas of nationhood.

Those politicians and theorists who sought to court popular support for national political institutions echoed popular discourses of the nation as body of people. John Jay employed this definition of nationhood when he appealed to the people of New York in *Federalist 2*:

With equal pleasure I have often taken notice, that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence.\(^{77}\)

Jay’s claims to a kind of shared American *ethnicity*—based on shared descent, language, religion, political formation, and customs—were echoed by a later writer for the *Mercersburg Quarterly Review*. The anonymous author of “American Nationality” also discussed the American nation in terms of *ethnic nationhood*, as a community of people forged by their common “origin and language, but also the community of rights and duties, of laws and institutions, of deeds and sufferings, of freedom and oppression, of literature and art, of virtue and religion…”\(^{78}\) Nationality, or a sense of enthusiasm for the nation, argued this anonymous writer in 1856, grew along with the nation and bound the people together. Nations, in other words, were thought to be created by the shared sense of history and culture held by individuals. Jay’s earlier assertion that Americans were “one united people” can thus be read as part of this constitutive rhetoric, designed to create a kind of ethnic nationalism among what was, in actuality, a multiethnic and multiracial society.
While written texts played a key role in the formation of American national identity as a community of people, that identity was also constituted, performed, and reinforced in public spaces through the commemoration of particular national events. Nineteenth-century political leaders seemed to intuit what twentieth-century spatial theorists would say explicitly: public spaces are sites in which knowledges are produced. In the case of parades, July 4th celebrations, Election Day festivities, and fast days, the knowledges that were produced were those of particular kind of national character. During the administration of James Madison, public celebrations of American independence sought to minimize partisan divisions and social stratifications, and promote the idea of national unity. During his tour, Madison emphasized the image of the nation as a community bound together by common sentiments: “Nor can I ever regret that I have thus afforded myself so many opportunities of seeing and feeling how much we are one people; how strongly the ties by which we are united, do in fact bind us together; how much we possess in reality, a country not of interest, but of sympathy and affection.” The abstract notion of the nation as a group of people bound together by common sentiment was physically represented by the crowds who gathered to see Madison as he toured the nation and who participated in similar patriotic demonstrations. The rhetoric and visual imagery of such events, which emphasized republican virtues of civic participation and the more generalized power of the crowd, mirrored the spectators’ own images back to them, promulgating the idea that they as a social body comprised the nation. In the words of rhetorical theorist Greg Clark, public experiences function to “enable… [participants] to transcend their own separate conceptions of self and nation” and share in collective, socially produced relationships between the people and the state.
Yet African American and American Indian activists frequently asserted in writings and public orations that dominant group celebrations of the “American” nation effaced the very real presence of non-white people and presented a false image of a homogenous population.

Frederick Douglass offered one of the most famous challenges to dominant group presentations of national unity during an 1852 oration entitled “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro.” Douglass had been asked to deliver a Fourth of July oration at Corinthian Hall in Rochester, New York. He pointed out that such celebrations were meaningless for African Americans who did not enjoy the freedoms celebrated during July 4th festivities:

> Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in common.—The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought light and healing to you, has brought stripes and death to me. This Fourth July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn. To drag a man in fetters into the grand illuminated temple of liberty, and call upon him to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious irony.\(^{83}\)

Here Douglass drew on a tradition of July 5th orations in which African Americans refused to celebrate July 4th, as this celebration of American freedom and independence only highlighted the “immeasurable distance” between whites and blacks. Many African Americans instead set aside July 5th as a day in which to argue for abolition and enfranchisement.\(^{84}\) This kind of protest was not limited to African Americans; Henry David Thoreau pointedly asserted that he began his experiment on Walden Pond on July 4, 1846. He also made an anti-slavery speech on the Fourth of July in 1856.\(^{85}\)
American Indian activists such as William Apess also used national holidays to challenge the presentation of a monolithic American identity and call into question the very tenets of American nationalism that were being celebrated. In an attempt to write American Indians into historical narratives, he offered his Bostonian listeners a new perspective on holidays such as Pilgrim Forefather’s Day and the Fourth of July: “Let every man of color wrap himself in mourning for the 22nd of December and the 4th of July are days of mourning and not of joy.”

Cherokee peoples and Ojibwa writer George Copway also used the Fourth of July as an opportunity to remind Americans of the presence of American Indian people and argue for greater political freedom.

While the very presence of non-white people and rising numbers of immigrants challenged dominant presentations of a homogenous community of Americans, another strand of national imagery conflated the nation with particular individuals, rather than “the people” as a whole. In part because of the early efforts of booksellers like Mason Locke Weems to canonize American figures like George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, for many non-elite group people, the “cultural memory” of America’s founding and ideas of the nation’s future were bound up in the lives of particular men. The values associated with these men—honesty, frugality, benevolence, bravery, industry—were held up as national values and the admiration of these men became, in and of itself, a patriotic act. As Michael Kammen and Carla Mulford have noted, along with the conflation of particular founders with the nation came the regional dominance of New England values and history. Multiple factors, wrote Mulford, worked to “imprint New Englishness upon American history making.” Later popular texts personified the nation as “Uncle Sam,” the older and wiser relative who in one song spanked the young and effeminate upstart “Jeff [Davis] in Petticoats.” An 1850 song appealed to new immigrants and
claimed that Uncle Sam would give all who came to America a farm. The song ends with the lines, “For the nations must remember/ That Uncle Sam is not a fool/ For the people do the voting/ And the children go to school.” Here, Uncle Sam is held up as the symbol of the nation, but it the larger community of voters and educated children that empowers him.

Another important component of the rhetorical fashioning of ethnic nationalism—the sense that Americans were a people with a shared history and culture—was the religious notion that America was to be a second Eden, from which the regeneration of the world would begin. Early written descriptions and artistic renderings of Virginia presented it as a “paradise” and New England ministers frequently framed their project as that of founding a New Eden, the “City on the Hill” alluded to by John Winthrop. As Sacvan Bercovitch wrote in his landmark work *The American Jeremiad* (1979), eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American ministers conveyed this sense of spiritual and political exceptionalism in their American listeners through the genre of the political sermon, or jeremiad. They “incorporated Bible history into the American experience—they substituted a regional for a biblical past, consecrated the American present as a movement from promise to fulfillment, and translated fulfillment from its meaning within the closed system of sacred history into a metaphor for limitless secular improvement.”

National heroes like Washington and Franklin, the latter of whom was a deist, were turned into models of Christian piety to further connect American politics with Christian mission. America was to be a republic, like that of the ancient Greeks, but it was to be a “Christian Sparta,” a kind of second Eden from which the third age of man would begin.

Yet the rhetoric of a unified republic, of a homogenous “people,” was sorely tested by political, economic, and social issues in the years leading up to the Civil War. After the Revolution, Americans tried to fulfill Thomas Paine’s call to “begin the world over again” and
create a new society distinct from that of Great Britain. Songs, pamphlets, school texts, and public celebrations functioned to inculcate the American citizenry with the idea that they were a homogenous people, but the presence of multiracial and multiethnic populations called that assumption into question. Among the white population, there were fractures between the Democrats and the Whigs and between representatives in the North and South.\textsuperscript{93} Class-based resentment and economic hardships caused further breaks in national unity. In the South, attempts to forge a Confederate nationalism, predicated on the interests of the slaveholding elite, ultimately failed because the issues of the common people, the non-slaveholding white population who represented a majority of the population, were not represented adequately.\textsuperscript{94} Throughout the nineteenth century, various “crises of citizenship” revealed the fractures in American national unity and the lack of unified ethnic sentiment among members of the dominant culture. The tensions that resulted often were projected onto the presence of ethnically and racially “other” nations who were asserting their presence within the borders of the American nation.

For those populations who articulated their political identity in terms of \textit{ethnic} or \textit{racial nationhood}, or who were designated as such by the dominant culture, the challenge became how to create alternative visions of citizenship that were not predicated on individual property ownership or the possession of state citizenship. Some writers, like David Walker and Cherokee Chief John Ross, used the rhetoric of \textit{ethnic} and \textit{racial nationhood} and transnational citizenship to argue for inclusion within American civic culture, while others worked to forge entirely separate states. Writers and speakers from a variety of non-dominant groups worked with discourses of \textit{jus soli} (right to the land) or “birthright citizenship” to stake their claims to American citizenship or developed alternative ways to express their political identity as part of
both an ethnic or racial nation and the U.S. state. In so doing, they described the geographic position of their group as that of a nation within a nation, and drew on a variety of discursive traditions to articulate a more transcendent sense of political being.

**IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO**

Given the growing emphasis on the spatial aspects of American nationhood, it is not surprising that the concept of *imperium in imperio*, or nation within a nation, transformed from an abstract notion of divided sovereignty to more concrete and locatable images of internal division. Derived from readings of British Common Law, ideas of divided sovereignty both characterized the relationship between the federal (or “General”) government and state governments and highlighted potential weaknesses in the emergent republic. Throughout the nineteenth century, the charge of forming an *imperium* was levied by the dominant culture against a variety of groups, including African Americans, American Indians, several immigrant groups, religious communities, and even certain facets of the military. Such alternative nations can loosely be broken down into three primary types, the first of which is the focus of this dissertation project: racial/ethnic nations, religious nations, and, for lack of a better term, interest group nations like the Masons, the military, or some nineteenth-century utopian communities. Membership in one or more of these alternative nations, combined with an individual’s relationship to a particular state and the General government, complicated issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction and had profound implications on questions of national citizenship and individual rights. The charge of *imperium in imperio* was resisted by some non-dominant peoples as a justification of racial and religious segregation, but at times was also taken up as a form of constitutive rhetoric and an
expression of political identity. The following section will trace the circulation of *imperium in imperio* as a political concept and briefly survey its effects on racial and religious nationhood.

Americans gained their understanding of *imperium in imperio* from the commentaries of William Blackstone, among other sources. Blackstone’s legal commentaries, responding primarily to the idea of a Catholic *imperium* in Protestant Britain, drew from ancient Roman law the idea that a republic must have a supreme authority. There had to be, as Blackstone put it, “a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority in which the *jura summa imperii*, or the rights of sovereignty, resides.” In his own particular historical moment, Blackstone feared the introduction of a “foreign power” into England and asserted that Roman Catholics would create an *imperium* by “by paying that obedience to papal process, which constitutionally belonged to the king alone.” Catholics, in other words, could not be good citizens because their loyalty would always been divided between the king and the pope. For Blackstone and many of his American readers, truly divided sovereignty was thought to be a political impossibility. Multiple sovereign powers would be like a two-headed monster, constantly fighting itself for power and authority.

From its beginnings, American government constituted an example of divided sovereignty, with certain powers allocated to the federal government and the rest reserved for the individual states. This system was not without its detractors, as divided sovereignty was connected with the concept of *imperium in imperio*. Writing as Publius in *Federalist 15*, Alexander Hamilton expressed concern about the nature of America’s *imperium in imperio*, while John Adams took a much more optimistic view and claimed that America would be the first successful example of divided sovereignty. A letter published in *The Atlantic Monthly* in 1825 argued that the relationship between the state and federal governments constituted a
“qualified imperium in imperio.” The author, purportedly a visitor from France who was relaying his observations of the American political system to his father, claimed that “abstractly, this plan [divided sovereignty] is extremely difficult to comprehend,” but that the American example of imperium in imperio has been “stripped of all of the fancied terrors it once possessed for rational lovers of freedom.”98 These contrasting views reveal that imperium in imperio was both a central feature of American government and a cause for great suspicion. In addition to particular state governments, secret societies, labor unions, railroads, and other groups were often discussed as imperia in terms that borrowed from U.S. political discourse.99

Charges of imperium in imperio also reflected widely held cultural anxieties about non-white peoples and certain immigrant groups, who were represented in novels, speeches, and throughout the popular press as threats to the sovereignty of the United States. American Indian nations were among the most frequently cited imperia, but, as will be discussed further in subsequent chapters, free African Americans also were presented as a nation that sought to subvert the authority of the American nation. As the United States wrested control of Florida from Spain, Andrew Jackson wrote an open letter to the citizens of Florida that used the rhetoric of imperium in imperio as a way to demonize the Spanish and transfer the loyalty of Floridians to the United States. He accused the Spanish officers who remained in Florida of forming an imperium in imperio, a “great indiscretion and impropriety” that could harm the inhabitants of Florida.100 Similar arguments had been made after the Louisiana Purchase in an attempt to transform French Creoles into American citizens.

Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, American newspapers frequently featured nativist arguments that warned of an Irish imperium. One anonymous author who wrote for the Cincinnati Gazette began his letter with the statement: “I am opposed to all foreigners, and
especially the Irish.” After thus stating his position, he presented a somewhat unorthodox view of American genealogy in order to explain why he is opposed to the Irish:

In the first place, it is manifest, that we the native Americans have been in possession of the water, fire, earth, and air of these United States from time immemorial. Our remote fathers, not long after Noah’s flood, crossed over in flat boats from Southern Asia, and, after having stopped at the Sandwitch [sic] Islands to take in water, finally reached this continent, and took possession of it, exclusively for themselves and us, their beloved descendents in aeternum et ultra. It is in this way that Pocahontas was uncle to our great-grandfathers and that our dear brothers are the Cherokees and the Winnebagoes.101

After claiming “remote” ancestry from American Indian people and appropriating a “native” American voice, the author claims that foreigners, particularly the Irish, cannot come to America without “appropriating to themselves what belongs to us. If they stand still, do they not occupy our space? If they move do they not transport their foreign carcasses from place to place, treading our soil beneath their feet?” Here the American nation is conflated with its national territory and the threat posed by the Irish is expressed in explicitly spatial terms, as an encroachment on American soil.

In addition to circulating more general fears about the Irish, Protestant Americans envisioned religious “nations” of Catholics and Mormons plotting to subvert the Republic and replacing it with theocracies. Articles with titles such as “The Case of the Roman Catholics” (1843) circulated in religious and secular periodicals and warned of the formation of a Catholic state.102 One example of anti-Mormon rhetoric was published in The Independent on Christmas Eve 1885. The anonymous author wrote, “The practical meaning of all this [Mormon government in Utah], is the establishment of an imperium in imperio in the United States, or, in
other words, an authority vested in the Mormon priesthood and the leaders and managers of the Mormon system superior to that of the United States.” Lyman Beecher and Jedediah Morse argued that the West had to be safeguarded against Catholic influence and newspapers throughout the East discussed the “Utah question.” The Mexican-American war and the acquisition of additional territories in the West drew the attention of white Americans to the Californios and the citizens of the former Republic of Texas, other nations that had to be incorporated into the U.S. nation.

Other immigrant groups were also discussed as imperia and presented as threats to the health of the U.S. body politic. Warning of the growth of the “Sicilian Mafia” in New Orleans, Robert H. Marr asserted: “These people [Sicilians] are among us, but not of us; they in truth constitute an imperium in imperio; the localities infested by ‘Dagos’ are faithful reproductions, in inhabitants and in surroundings, of the most squalid quarters of Naples.” Prompted in part by the creation of “Chinatowns,” white Americans also charged the Chinese with forming ethnic imperia. An article that appeared in Littell’s Living Age argued that “the Chinaman, impatient of freedom, sets up an imperium in imperio of the most relentless kind” in the United States. Using the discourse of imperium in imperio allowed members of the dominant culture to position these varied as threats to national security that could alternately be contained or rooted out and transferred to some other space.

Certain groups rejected the notion that their community constituted an imperium or warned their members against pursing this kind of separatism. In the Cherokees’ struggles with the state of Georgia, Cherokees and their advocates claimed that the charge of imperium in imperio was chimerical and merely distracted from Georgia’s denial of the Cherokees’ sovereignty. Later in the nineteenth century, some African American leaders warned their
members to stand united and not to form an *imperium*, which they denounced as a “further huddling of the colored people together” at a time when African Americans were “already huddled nigh unto death.” To form an *imperium* would be to continue in a state of bondage. Mirroring the language used by Blackstone and Hamilton, such writers portrayed the idea of a nation within a nation as a political monster, an “absurdity” that could not be supported. They resisted the notion that they were somehow outside of the larger American religious and political institutions and instead argued for acknowledgement of their civil rights.

Yet, at various points writers from non-dominant groups claimed race- and ethnic-based nationhood as a way to constitute a sense of community among their readers and imbue those communities with a sense of political purpose. From David Walker and John Rolling Ridge in the 1830s to Dr. Benjamin Tanner and Sutton Griggs in the 1880s and 90s, non-dominant group writers took up the discourse of *imperium in imperio* as a way to resist U.S. hegemony and to carve out a separate political space within the geographic borders of the United States. For the Cherokees in Georgia, the discourse of racial nationalism was also deployed in order to separate themselves from other non-white people. To combat the charges of miscegenation with African Americans levied against them by Georgia elite, the Cherokees asserted their own national and racial purity. For American Indian communities, ideas of *nationhood* were problematic in that they often did not reflect traditional Native political structures and were used as tribal elite as a way to engage with white culture. As such, the use of rhetorics of *nation* and *imperium in imperio* can be read both as forms of “survivance”—Gerald Vizenor’s term for tactics of survival and resistance—and as an erasure of traditional practices. Furthermore, ideas of Indian nationhood, while they may have been integral to community formation within American Indian
populations, also served to reaffirm dominant constructions of American Indians as outside of American civic life.

CONCLUSION

The following chapters will explore in more detail the various ways in which discourses of imperium in imperio both upheld and challenged the various definitions of the U.S. nation. These discussions will show that the ideas of racial and ethnic imperia emerging from within the borders of the nation revealed the growing association between the nation and its civic institution and national space, a national space that must be regulated and defended, it was argued, from non-white expressions of multinationalism. Given the larger context of the Civil War and the sectional conflicts that occurred both before and after the assertion of Southern nationhood, discourses of threatening racial nationhood may have served as a way for white Americans to explore, promote, and/or reject expressions of alternative nationhood within the dominant political culture. For non-white people, discourses of racial nationhood functioned as both a further extension of state power into their material lives and a more complete regulation of their behavior. These discourses were both the means by which their political personhood was recognized and their enfranchisement was effected.
Chapter 3

“And Ethiopia Shall Stretch Forth Her Hands”: Racial Nationhood, Religious Discourse, and the Formation of a Transnational People

During and after the War of 1812, the sectional tensions between the Northern and Southern states gained new intensity. New England Federalists blamed the Republican party, largely comprised of Southerners, for the war that threatened Northern economic interests and civil rights. They resurrected debates about the so-called “three-fifths” clause that had been enacted in the 1780s in order to mollify Southern slaveholding interests. Along with the war, the addition of western states was seen by Northern Federalists as an indication that Southern interests were threatening to dominate the political future of the nation. In 1803-04, these same issues had caused some Federalists to consider secession from the Union. The movement to secede was rather limited, but by 1812 there was widespread discussion of the growing Slave Power and its effects on the rest of the Union. In questioning the “three-fifths” clause, Federalists were challenging the inviolableness of the Constitution itself, the document that held the Union together. Writing under the pseudonym of a “Citizen of Connecticut,” one author questioned why Northern Revolutionaries would have seen fit to enter into a union with Southern slaveholders at all.109

The twenty years following the War of 1812, sometimes called America’s second War for Independence, constitute an important moment in the ideological formation of nationhood in America. The increasing strife between Northern and Southern politicians and the debate about personhood and political representation engendered by discussions
of the “three-fifths” clause precipitated a larger “crisis of citizenship” for the relatively young American nation. Divisions among political parties highlighted larger regional, cultural, and economic differences that existed among members of the dominant culture. Weaknesses in the fiction of a unified American people—with common ethnic characteristics of culture, religion, traditions, descent, and attitudes—emerged. Citizenship, the imagined and voluntary relationship between individuals and a government that protected their interests and rights, as threatened in the eyes of both Northern and Southern politicians. These ideas of divided allegiance and threats to individual and regional rights circulated in the popular press. The political questions raised by the addition of new states in the West would be resolved, at least temporarily, by the Missouri Compromise in 1820. However, definitional arguments concerning race, citizenship, and nation that had begun to solidify during this period persisted well into the nineteenth century.

For African American people, the twenty year period following the War of 1812 was significant to their quest for citizenship because it marked the beginning of a discursive shift both in the way that they saw themselves and in the way they were presented by members of the dominant culture. Earlier advocates of African American rights such as Lemuel Haynes, Prince Hall, Phillis Wheatley, and Absolom Jones had used religious rhetoric as a primary tool to constitute a collective African American identity. Discourses of nationhood and African American citizenship began to emerge during the period in question and would reach even greater expression in the 1840s and 50s in the hands of writers such as Martin Delany. Among members of the dominant culture, discussions of African Americans shifted from discussing them as individuals,
members of an inferior race, or as property, to referencing African Americans as a racial nation. This discursive shift toward discussions of African American nationhood was an important step toward the mobilization of African American collective identity and the later recognition, on the part of the dominant culture, of African American political subjectivity.

This chapter contends that in the years between the War of 1812 and the Missouri Compromise of 1820, these fractures in the American nation and the lack of ethnic and political unity on the part of the dominant culture were projected onto the presence of a racialized “other” nation—that of free Black people who were beginning to articulate their communal identity in national terms. Imagined as a racial “nation” living within the United States, free Black people were constructed by the dominant culture as a threat to the political structures and overall safety of the American nation. During this time African colonization emerged as a solution to the “problem” of a free Black imperium. Transporting free Black people to Africa would provide them a space in which to formulate their own nation. In discourses of colonization, Africa could serve as a vehicle for African American citizenship not only because it was figured as empty land to be “owned” and cultivated, but also because it was rhetorically constructed as “home.” Only in Africa then, could African Americans become a civic and territorial nation, as well as a racial or ethnic one. The imagined geopolitical space of Africa was thus seen by advocates of Jeffersonian democracy, members of the American Colonization Society [ACS], and some African American supporters of colonization as a mirror for the United States, a mirror that reflected back a unified vision of the nation rather than one divided into various states vying for economic and social control.
Against this backdrop of the colonization movement and its rhetorical positioning of African Americans as a nation within a nation, this chapter focuses on the ways in which African Americans adopted and adapted ideas of African American nationhood and its relation to the U.S. nation. There is a significant body of scholarship that has exposed the oppressive function of Anglo-European discourses and institutions, which, it has been argued, kept African Americans out of political culture. This chapter contends that the rhetorics of *imperium in imperio* and African American nationhood, as they circulated in discourses of African colonization, positioned African Americans very much within the sphere of American politics and envisioned them as key components to the extension of American political values across the Atlantic. African American writers and speakers of the early nineteenth century consistently argued that America was and could be the site of multiple nations: the white nation and the African American nation, with the latter a “nation in bondage” that should be freed. Figures such as Richard Allen, David Walker, Maria Stewart, and Robert Alexander Young drew on Biblical presentations of the Hebrew nation to demand that the dominant culture recognize their status as a “people,” a word often used to suggest the idea of the *nation* as a social body. Discourses of African Americans as a *people* or *nation* functioned within the African American community to foster a sense of collective identity and erase perceived divisions between free and enslaved individuals and between African and African-descended peoples. To members of the dominant culture, this was meant to suggest that African American people, as a people, were a collective body and not merely moveable individuals. As such, they would not be so easily “governed” by slavery and colonization.
What this chapter contributes to existing scholarship is that it posits colonization rhetoric not as purely exclusionary, but a discourse that (largely unintentionally) provided African Americans with an entrée into American political culture. In addition to agitating against African colonization, using the rhetoric of imperium in imperio had a variety of political effects for African Americans and the dominant culture that they sought to challenge. Not all of these effects were positive. Likening their situation to that of a “political monster” at times served to further the exclusion of free African Americans from the American political landscape and build support for colonization. Discourses of African Americans as a separate nation also confirmed commonly held notions of racial and cultural difference, which lent support to those who opposed an integrated America. However, one of the significant results of an African American imperium was the formation of a new vision of African American citizenship, a transnational citizenship that transcended the geographic borders of the nation-state, but also incorporated liberal ideologies of the labor theory of value to claim a place in the American nation.

“THE BOISTEROUS SEA OF LIBERTY”: NATIONAL DISUNION AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN COLONIZATION SOCIETY

The twenty-year period following the War of 1812, which was the highpoint of colonization efforts, was also a time of great division among members of the dominant culture. In an 1820 letter to Lafayette, Thomas Jefferson contended that “the boisterous sea of liberty is never without a wave.”113 External threats from European nations such as Spain and France and American Indian nations such as the Cherokees threatened American expansion. Even when these threats were resolved, as in the Adams-Onís
Treaty of 1819, problems arose over how to best incorporate new populations into the American nation. Internal debates over the institution of slavery had prompted some Northern Federalists to consider secession in the early years of the century and arguments over the growth of the slave power in Congress did little to rekindle a sense of national unity. Despite the Missouri Compromise in 1820, tensions between Northern and Southern political and social elites increased. The following section will suggest that the development of the African colonization movement emerged, in part, as a way to resolve some of these tensions threatening the Union.

Among members of the white population, African colonization functioned as a way to mediate between Northern and Southern interests and concerns about the presence of free Black people. The Western United States, Haiti, and various parts of Africa were proposed as possible destinations for African Americans. One of the earliest mentions of colonization occurred in 1714, when an unnamed resident of New Jersey proposed that African slaves should be “set free…[and] sent to their own Country.” Thomas Jefferson has been widely credited with presenting colonization as a political solution to the issues of slavery and racially motivated violence in America. It was not until the publication of his *Notes on the State of Virginia* in 1781-82 that the idea of colonization began to enjoy wider appeal. In his chapter on laws, Jefferson describes an amendment of “a Bill Concerning Slaves,” which he wrote as a member of a committee responsible for revising the laws of Virginia in 1777. This amendment detailed a colonization program in which African American children should live with their parents until a certain age, and then be educated at the public expense in agriculture or the arts and sciences. When Black women reached the age of eighteen and men twenty-one, they should be
“colonized to such place as the circumstances of the time should render most proper, sending them out with arms, implements of household and of the handicraft arts, seeds, pairs of the useful domestic animals, &c. to declare them a free and independent people.” Proponents of colonization argued that if African Americans could be provided with land, a national territory, members of this racial nation could realize the Jeffersonian ideal of the farmer-citizen. However, because the American landscape was constitutive of the white American nation and white citizenship, the realization of African American nationhood could not occur within the geographic borders of the United States.

In addition to the desire to resolve racial and regional concerns, several factors motivated the project of colonization. As in the case of the General Allotment Act (1887), which provided finite limits for Indian nationhood, colonization schemes often rested on the liberal assumption that giving people land would enact dramatic social, political, and personal transformations. Pro-colonizationist rhetoric asserted that African Americans would thus be able to replicate American agrarianism and, not incidentally, provide a valuable trading partner for the United States. Missionary zeal also informed colonization movements. Sarah Josepha Hale, an ardent supporter of colonization, ended her 1827 novel *Northwood: a Tale of New England*—later reprinted in 1852 as *Northwood; or, Life North and South: Showing the True Character of Both*—with the statement that “the mission of American slavery is to Christianize Africa.” Funds were collected for educating African American missionaries and for the building of schools and churches. Despite these efforts, the Liberian colony was plagued with disease, lack of resources, and hostilities with the indigenous populations. The colonists did not
integrate themselves with the native Africans, but instead continued to refer to themselves as Americans.

The American Colonization Society (ACS) was the first formal organization created to promote the emigration of African Americans. It was first conceived in 1816, allegedly over drinks, by a group of men in Washington who were discussing Jefferson’s ideas. Led in large part by the efforts of Robert Finley, a Presbyterian minister and school teacher, the group also included Charles Mercer, Henry Clay, Stephen Foster, and Bushrod Washington (nephew of George Washington). One of the major vehicles for colonizationist thought was the ACS monthly, *The African Repository and Colonial Journal*, which was published from 1825 until 1892, when its title changed to *Liberia*. In addition to the ACS, there were also numerous colonization societies formed on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line by both white and African American supporters. To spread their message to the general public, colonization supporters often gave July 4th speeches that contrasted American national independence with the condition of free African Americans. Members of the Southern Slave Power critiqued colonization with growing stridency during the 1840s and 1850s. It was thought that the emigration of free blacks was a precursor to emancipation and that colonizationists were trying to subvert the entire system of slavery. Henry Clay and other Southern colonizationists made speeches at colonization meetings in Kentucky and the Carolinas to ensure slaveholders that colonization was not a threat to their “property,” but was actually beneficial to their interests in that it removed a threatening social element.

But what was the impact on all of these colonization efforts on the actions of African American people? Tracing the number of people who emigrated to Liberia
suggests that while participation was initially limited, events like the Nat Turner Rebellion and the anti-Black violence that erupted afterwards prompted more people to consider emigration. Between 1820 and 1830, the first decade of work by the ACS, only 154 African Americans from the North and 720 free persons from the South emigrated to Liberia. For Southern emigrants, fears regarding their socio-political status and personal safety in the U.S. contributed to their desire to go to Liberia. Those that emigrated from the South tended to be from the more literate and economically advantaged class of free Blacks.\textsuperscript{121} Emigration numbers increased dramatically in the wake of the Nat Turner Rebellion, as many free Black people sought to evade white violence and ACS emancipation of enslaved Africans increased. More than 300 free African Americans left the country on the \textit{James Perkins}, which sailed from Southampton County, Virginia just three months after the Nat Turner Rebellion. The following year saw another 392 free persons from the South leave for Liberia. The combined total of free Blacks and emancipated slaves who traveled to Liberia between 1831 and 1833 reached over 1300. Emigration numbers dropped dramatically throughout the rest of the 1830s and 1840s, but began to surge in the late 1840s and early 1850s. The years 1849-1854, which saw the passage of the Compromise of 1850 (which included the Fugitive Slave Law) and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, saw emigration numbers that began to rival those of the early 1830s. These numbers suggest that it was the overall political, social, and legal situation facing African American people, rather than the efforts of colonizationists, that sparked increases in Liberian emigration.\textsuperscript{122} 

African American communities were very much divided on the idea of forming a separate nation in Africa. The founding of the ACS provoked immediate opposition from
African American communities, with 3,000 African American people in Philadelphia voicing their disapproval of the colonization plan. At this 1817 meeting, Richard Allen, James Forten, Absalom Jones, and Robert Douglas gave speeches in support of colonization, but the group ultimately voted to oppose the ACS. Yet there were also numerous supporters of emigration to Africa. One of the earliest African American proponents of colonization was Paul Cuffee, who first traveled to Sierra Leone in 1811 and later returned to the United States to recruit free Black emigrants from New York and Boston. John Brown Russwurm, a graduate of Bowdoin (the second African-descended person to graduate from an American college), was the first Black person to advocate on a national scale for the colonization movement. Russwurm founded *Freedom’s Journal*, the first African American newspaper in 1827, and published extensively in the ACS journal, *The African Repository*. While Russwurm initially scoffed at the idea of moving to Africa, the “foolish idea, that we are longing to emigrate to their land of milk and honey,” he later changed his mind and became an ardent supporter of colonization. Russwurm, who traveled to Liberia to oversee the school system, later declared in *The African Repository* “Before God, we know of no other home for the man of color, of republican principles, than Africa.”

**RACE, NATION, AND DISCUSSIONS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN COLLECTIVITY**

Anglo-Europeans did not initially describe Africans and African-descended people in *national* terms because they were loath to credit African people with political capacity. In *White Over Black* (1968), Winthrop Jordan has suggested that the ability to form
nations was something that Anglo-Europeans valued in themselves and so they used discourses of nationhood to distinguish themselves from ethnic populations whom they encountered. American Indian populations were an exception to this trend because they were initially viewed as more removed from Anglo-European life than were African slaves, and because forming treaty relations with American Indian peoples presupposed an understanding of Native peoples as sovereign nations. Furthermore, the justification of Christian missionary efforts among American Indian people to European audiences was predicated on Indian peoples being able subjects for conversion, and their “nationhood” was held up as proof of compatibility between Native and European cultures. When justifying the enslavement of African peoples, however, it was seen as advantageous to emphasize their difference from Anglo-Europeans and their apparent lack of national identity. There was the sense among white Europeans that conceiving of Africans and African-descended people as anonymous individuals made them easier to “manage” and live in close proximity with.

When eighteenth-century Anglo-Europeans and Anglo-Americans did discuss African collectivity, they generally discussed them as a “race,” rather than as a “nation.” In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when hierarchies based on race began to be codified, and race increasingly was associated with inherent rather than cultural features, discussions of Africans as a “race” did nothing to improve the political status of Africans in the colonies or the emergent American nation. Maintaining fictions of an ethnically and racially homogenous American nation required that those marked as physically different from the white population be envisioned as outside of the nation although they lived within its borders. Thomas Jefferson asserted in *Notes on the State of*
Virginia that Black and white people could never coexist in the same country and forecasted race war if something was not done to create a separation between the races:

Deep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained; new provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made; and many other circumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce convulsions which will probably never end but in the extermination of the one or the other race.¹²⁸

A variety of writers, both Black and white, echoed these sentiments. Attempts by enslaved people to take their freedom by force—most notably the Gabriel Plot of 1800, Denmark Vesey’s Uprising in 1822, and the Nat Turner Rebellion in 1831—only highlighted for many white Americans the dangers of sharing their country with African Americans.¹²⁹ Enslaved people, it was thought, were susceptible to the influence of the free Black population; even the knowledge that such a population existed was enough to foment slave rebellion. The idea that the white race and the Black race were fundamentally different and could not occupy the same national territory persisted throughout the nineteenth century.

Constructions of African peoples as property, rather than as individuals or as nations, was another discursive practice that worked to position African and African-descended people outside of American national culture. Southern slaveholders decried attempts to limit slavery in the West as an attack on their rights to transport their slave “property.”¹³⁰ In Notes on the State of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson classified enslaved Africans as “moveables,” property that was not tied to a particular location.¹³¹ Jefferson’s presentation of enslaved people as divorced from the land functioned as an
implicit argument against African American nationhood. Ideas of the nation as both a *civic* institution and a *territorial* entity were contingent on its members’ relationship to land, either as owners or as those who had a birthright claim to a particular place. Separating African people from the American land undercut presentations of African American nationhood and justified their exclusion from the American nation.

How then, did African Americans and African descended peoples come to be defined as a separate, race-based nation by some members of the dominant culture? There were two related discourses of African American nationhood that emerged from within the dominant culture. The first framed free Black people as a *racial* nation that was trapped within the United States and the second described African Americans as a “nation-to-be” that only lacked the proper space to become a nation in the civic and territorial senses. Discourses of colonization emerged as a way not only to rid the American landscape of a potentially threatening population thought to incite slave revolts, but also as a way to justify the removal of the free Black population. Removal to Africa was, according to colonizationists, the only way to further the process of African American nation formation.

Concurrent with the widespread circulation of African colonization rhetoric among the dominant culture, there emerged references to free Blacks in America as a “nation” within the larger U.S. nation. Samuel Knapp reflected on the formation of the American Colonization Society in a later speech, attributing its origins to the fact that “We wanted no nation of blacks here.” Another article that purported to be a work of natural history made reference to the “black nations” of America and contrasted them with the “white tribes” and other ethnic and racial nations living in North America.
During an address to the Female African Society in Hartford, Connecticut, Lydia Huntley Sigourney exhorted her listeners that “Africa, by her present wretchedness, both at home and abroad” called out for assistance. Her wording in this speech suggested that “Africa” existed both within the geographical space of the African continent and within the American nation, an idea that drew on the spatial imagery of imperium in imperio.

The idea of an African American imperium was articulated much more explicitly by a writer for the Christian Watchman who claimed that if colonization was unsuccessful in its mission “we shall have an imperium in imperio, a nation within a nation, in the worst sense of the term.” The author further asserted that there would be more than half a million people “not only distinguished by their complexion, but bound together by a feeling of nationality among themselves.” They can never be American citizens, this writer maintained, because if given political power, they will always act “as Africans in America.” These statements implied that not only was an African American nation threatening, but it could never be assimilated into U.S. political culture because physical differences and sentimental attachments would prevent African Americans from being seen as and seeing themselves as Americans. Their racial and ethnic attachments to their own nation would always trump their allegiance to America.

In these examples, African American nationhood is discussed in specifically ethnic and racial terms. Free Black people could be considered a nation, argued supporters of colonization, because they shared common physical, religious, and cultural characteristics and are presumed to have common origins. What they lacked, however, was land in which to enact the features of civic and territorial nations—the social contract, liberal citizenship, and territorial possession. Within the space of the American
nation, an African American *imperium* was threatening; it was in direct competition for the very land that comprised the U.S. national space and disrupted fictions of an ethnically and racially homogenous American nation. Thus, transporting African Americans to Africa, their ethnic and racial “homeland,” would allow both the African American nation and the American nation to realize *ethnic, civic, and territorial* forms of nationhood.

What was necessary for African Americans to found a civic nation, argued many pro-colonizationists, was merely the right place and land they could possess. In a speech before the Grand Lodge of Washington, D.C., Mr. Knapp of Boston reflected on the founding of the ACS and the as yet to be formed African American nation:

They looked around them with the humane endeavor to find a place where the liberty of the African might be real—where it might be no longer the emptiest of mockeries: for what is freedom without the emancipation of intellect? What land should give freedom to this degraded race? They could not hope to fix a colony in America.¹³⁴

Elsewhere, advocates of colonization mused about where the “holy spot” for an African American nation might be, returning always to Africa. References to the search for a “holy spot” for African American nationhood suggest the sacralization of place as part of larger definitions of nationhood. This shows a growing emphasis on the transformation of African Americans from an *ethnic* nation in the United States, to a nation in Africa that, like the United States, also would possess a distinct national territory and civic institutions.
It was only within the space of Africa, argued colonizationists, that African Americans could participate in the social contract and voluntarily submit to a government that would recognize their subjectivity. Liberty of conscience, personal liberty, freedom of the press, freedom of labor, and the freedom to own personal property were all emphasized as benefits of Liberian colonization. Numerous writers drew distinctions between the rhetorical, and as they argued, empty liberty that free African Americans had in America, and the actual liberty that they could have in Liberia. Actual liberty presupposed, for supporters of the ACS, the liberal state of the social contract. African Americans must have a place where they could “voluntarily” submit to government and they must have a role in the operation of that government. The creation of the social contract would generate the economic, social, and intellectual institutions that undergird liberal society: mercantile networks, churches, schools, newspapers, and government offices. America was not a fit place for Black citizenship because they could never exercise this paradoxical voluntary submission and would always be governed by the “superiority” of white citizens. Free African Americans were constructed as living in a state of “captivity,” somewhere between black and white, slave and free.135

The exclusion of African American people in the United States was naturalized and constructed as a universal truth rather than a contingent historical condition. As Charles Carol Harper told the voters of Baltimore, African Americans were:

Shut out from the privileges of citizens, separated from us by the insurmountable barrier of colour; they can never amalgamate with us, but must remain forever a distinct and inferior race, repugnant to our republican feelings, and dangerous to our republican institutions.136
Stephen Foster echoed this sentiment, describing the free Black population as “insulated from the world; without a home of his own, without a community of his own, without a country of his own, without a government of his own, without any system, intellectual or moral, in which his own individual existence forms a part of the machinery.”  

Through the use of words like “shut out” and “insulated,” Harper and Foster created a visual image of African Americans as trapped within an American nation that does not recognize their political subjectivity. Geographically they were insiders, but free African Americans were positioned as non-citizens, forever outside of the “machinery” of American civic life. Yet, colonization offered the promise of creating “a republic in miniature,” another version of American civic machinery that the African American could call his or her own.

In the rhetoric of African nation building, the imperialist aim of replicating American nationhood abroad was made quite explicit. The 1825 Annual Meeting of the American Colonization Society included the following statement:

Who knows but what this Society may yet behold a great and flourishing republic rise on the shores of Africa? Who knows but what the Society may hear that Republic saying to the world, “It was America that founded me?—In me, the New World taught the old.—The chains that once bound my children are now broken in sunder, and from a feeble colony, behold I have become a great empire!”

In a reversal of Bishop Berkeley’s famous statement about the “westward course” of empire, the “New World” now had the opportunity to extend its influence eastward. Institutional power, operating through organizations like the ACS and missionary organizations that support colonization, worked to inculcate potential colonists with the
American liberal values that underscored ideas of the nation as political institution and territorial space: the benefits of the social contract, private property, and free enterprise. African Americans’ efforts at self-government were said to be educational opportunities, managed and mediated by what one colonizationist deemed the “instrumentality” of their white benefactors.

The “instrumentality” of white colonizationists did not impact only the African Americans they sought to transport to Africa. That discourses of black nationhood and colonization began during a time of sectional divide between the Northern and Southern states and persisted through debates over American Indian nationhood and the Nullification crisis suggests that the sudden emergence of discourses of African nationhood served an important function within the dominant culture. The circulation of colonizationist discourses reveals that ideas of nationhood among the white population were increasingly tied to the idea of the nation as a bounded geographical space. Many of the arguments for African colonization drew on implicit arguments that there was no space for an African American nation within the borders of America. This reinforced the idea of the American nation as a racially and ethnically homogenous entity with exclusive claims to the land that it occupied. The fiction of unified American nationhood that was presented in these arguments, and would be reinforced by the creation of an African American “sister republic,” worked to resolve sectional divisions and threats of secession among the dominant culture. If the threatening Black nation within their midst could be transported somewhere else, the Northern and Southern states could put aside their differences.
In the hands of the dominant culture, rhetorics of African American nationhood were used to justify the colonization of free Black people to Africa. The removal of this “nation of blacks” from within the midst of the U.S. nation may have also functioned to ameliorate sectional divisions within the dominant culture itself, tensions that were implicitly linked to the presence of an “other” nation. What also emerged during this period, however, was the construction of Africans, who differed from one another in terms of their tribal, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds as well as their experiences in bondage, as a people. By selectively adopting and adapting dominant discourses of Black nationhood, African Americans could address both their historical contemporaries and an imagined people who spanned geographic and cultural boundaries. Inviting their audience to participate in a “collective fantasy” of an African America nation both within and without the U.S. nation allowed opponents of African colonization to theorize different ways of negotiating their relationship with the U.S. nation and arguing for greater political and personal freedom. This section will examine how a variety of writers from within the African American community articulated ideas of racial nationhood to challenge colonization schemes and argue for American citizenship and the recognition of African American rights.

One of the most important vehicles for these arguments was the African American jeremiad, a political sermon that sought to promulgate ideas of racial nationhood among its American audiences. Historian Wilson Moses has defined the “black jeremiad” as “the constant warnings issued by blacks to whites, concerning the judgment that was to
come from the sin of slavery.” In the varied uses of this genre, argued Moses, African American jeremiahs presented themselves as a “chosen people” within the larger context of America as a “chosen nation with a covenantal duty to deal justly with the blacks.”

Howard-Pitney expanded on this argument, claiming that the:

dominant black American jeremiad tradition conceives of blacks as a chosen people within a chosen people. The Afro-American jeremiad tradition then characteristically addresses two American peoples—black and white—whose millennial destinies, while distinct, are also inexorably intertwined.

Not only was the jeremiad intended to circulate across racial lines, but it was also uniquely positioned to address both enslaved and free African Americans, as the circulation of Walker’s *Appeal* suggests. In so doing, the jeremiad functioned as a way to codify an African American position, or what Dexter Gordon dubbed a “collective subject.”

African Americans had begun to refer to themselves collectively as a racial “nation” in the late eighteenth century. Recent scholars have pointed to the nation-building efforts of eighteenth-century African American writers and activists, such as Phillis Wheatley, Lemuel Haynes, Cyrus Bustill, Prince Hall, John Murrant, George Liele, Andrew Bryan, Absalom Jones, and Richard Allen. In “A Winter Piece” (1782), Jupiter Hammon wrote that the institution of slavery was an example of God’s mercy in that it introduced African people to the gospel. Echoing sentiments expressed by Phillis Wheatley in “On Being Brought from Africa to America,” Hammon wrote, “for we are a poor despised nation, whom God in his wise providence has permitted to be brought from their native place to a christian land, and many thousands more born in what are called
christian families, and brought up to years of understanding.” Later in the same piece, he referred to his audience as “Africans by nation.”

By “nation,” Hammon here referred not to a political institution or a specific geographic space, but to a group of people who could trace their descent from common ancestry and share common cultural features.

Constructions of African Americans as a nation continued throughout the early nineteenth century, although these presentations, like Hammons, often asserted the inferiority of this nation when compared to the United States. In 1817, Jacob Oson, “a descendent of Africa,” published an address entitled “A Search for Truth, or, An Inquiry for the Origin of the African Nation” which was addressed to his “people and nation.” Oson took up the claims that the African nation was descended from Cain or Noah’s son Ham and sought to exonerate the African people by presenting historical examples of African greatness. He referred specifically to African Americans as a “nation…enslaved” within the American nation and predicted that the African nation would be “raised to their former dignity” without having to leave Egypt “borrowing gold” like the Israelites. Throughout this address, Oson was explicitly concerned with questions of origins and descent, features of ethnic or racial nationhood. To determine the nature of the African nation and argue for its significance, it was important not to describe its geographic location or political culture, but to trace its genealogy. Moreover, this enslaved nation, Oson implied, would not have to leave to find their Promised Land. Unlike the Israelites, the African nation could find freedom within the nation that had previously held them in bondage.

With this argument, Oson foreshadowed the arguments of later opponents of the African Colonization movement such as David Walker and Maria Stewart and offered an
important revision of dominant discourses of nationhood. He asserted the validity of ethnic or racial nationhood—with membership based on descent—rather than civic or territorial ideas of the nation that based membership on land ownership. Within this definitional framework, African American nationhood could be realized within the space of America, or anywhere else where African American people formed communities. America emerged from his writings not as the sole province of the United States nation, but as the site of multiple nations, each defined by different criteria.

Through the formation of independent societies, churches, and educational institutions, African Americans began to create institutions that mirrored those of the dominant culture, but which were designed to meet the needs of the African American nation that writers like Oson worked to call into being. For example, in 1816, the same year that saw the formation of the American Colonization Society, the first African American church was formed in America: the African Methodist Episcopal Church. In the years leading up to and immediately following the Nat Turner Rebellion in 1831, there were intensified efforts on the part of the American Colonization Society and there also emerged some of the most sustained and widespread arguments for African Americans as a people within the “the people” of the United States.150 This period saw the widespread circulation of the African American jeremiad and arguments for African American nationhood reached larger audiences. David Walker’s Appeal received the most attention, but the literary productions of Robert Alexander Young and Maria Stewart also advanced the idea of African Americans as a nation within a nation, or a people within a people.
Defining African Americans as a “people” was an important part of the rhetorical fashioning of ethnic and racial nationhood as an alternative to dominant discourses of U.S. nationhood. By using this language, writers evoked images of two ethnic nations mentioned in the Bible and suggested a kind of transcendent citizenship. In the nineteenth century, “people” was often used interchangeably with the word “nation” to indicate “the whole body of citizens of a country, regarded as the source of political power or as the basis of society; esp. those qualified to vote in a democratic state, the electorate.”

David Walker’s assertion that African Americans were a “people” (“We are a people, notwithstanding many of you doubt it”) constitutes a utopian move, a writing into existence of a political entity was not yet possible, but might be in some future time. Yet this word—“people”—registered on other levels as well. The term “people” for Walker not only suggested the basic humanity of African Americans, but also the sense that they, like the Hebrew people, had a shared origin, history, and a shared destiny. Given this definition, a people could thus be culturally, racially, and religiously unified even if they were not geographically located within the same political and physical space. The “coloured citizens of the world,” separated as they were by geographic, political, and economic obstacles, could thus be considered an ethnic nation in the same way that the Hebrew people were: a kind of transnational nation. That is to say, they could be a nation who either did not or had yet to occupy a nation-state.

Through his construction of African Americans as a “people,” Walker challenged dominant discourses of nationhood that predicated a nation’s existence on its possession of a national territory.
Maria Stewart, the first African American woman to deliver public orations, also represented African Americans as a “people” within the United States nation. She referenced Psalm 68 (“Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God”) explicitly in works such as her “Cause for Encouragement,” a piece published in *The Liberator* in 1832. According to Wilson Moses, Stewart’s 1833 “Address at the African Masonic Hall” can be considered nationalistic “only in the sense that it contains a biblically inspired perception of African Americans as a people with a special God-given mission and destiny.” This characterization seems to downplay the importance of Stewart’s conceptions of racial nationalism and religious mission, an opinion that is emphasized by Stewart’s frequent exclusion from scholarly discussions of Black Nationalism. Throughout her orations, Stewart employed the idea of African Americans as a people, and more specifically Psalm 68, as “a rallying cry in joining the black past and present, religious and secular.” Moreover, in her essay “Religion and the Sure Principles of Morality” (1831), Stewart described Africa not only as a people, but as a nation, engaged with many other nations in the fight for “liberty and equality.” In so doing, Stewart emphasized another transnational dimension of the African American people: they were connected to other nations in the struggle against political oppression.

One of the most explicit references to African Americans as a racial nation was made by Robert Alexander Young, who also referenced the Ethiopian prophesy contained in Psalm 68. Young, of whom almost nothing is known, published *The Ethiopian Manifesto* in February 1829, the same year as Walker’s *Appeal* appeared. The *Manifesto*
addressed African Americans as the Ethiopian nation mentioned in the Bible and suggested that they occupied the position of a nation within a nation, even in Africa:

Know, then, in your present state or standing, in your sphere of government in any nation within you reside, we hold and contend you enjoy but few of your rights of government within them. We here speak of the whole of the Ethiopian people, as we admit not even those in their state of native simplicity, to be in an enjoyment of their rights, as bestowed to them of the great bequest of God to man.\(^{156}\)

Here Young asserted that the Ethiopian people reside in a separate “sphere of government” within the nations that they inhabit and that their ethnic or racial nationhood does not gain them political rights. They “reside” in particular nations, but are not a part of the civic culture and are not granted the right to self-government, as individuals or as a people. Young specifically referred to Ethiopians as a “body politic,” thus strengthening the connection between African Americans and nationhood. They are resolved, he claimed, to “establish to ourselves a people framed unto the likeness of that order, which from our mind’s eye we do evidently discern governs the universal creation.”\(^{157}\) The sovereign power of this people will be God and it is from him that the Ethiopians believe their rights proceed. Like Walker, Young forecasted divine retribution for those who held the Africans in bondage, the “vain bloated upstart worldling of a slaveholder.”\(^{158}\)

In a move that differentiated his thinking from that of Walker and Stewart, Young foretold of the coming of an African messiah who would lead the people to freedom. Due to his specific description of the prophet—“in appearance, a white man, although having been born of a white mother”—scholars have speculated that Young had a
particular person in mind. However, no record of such a person, who apparently would also have middle toes that were “webbed” and “bearded,” has yet been found.\textsuperscript{159} Young claims that his \textit{Manifesto} functioned as John the Baptist did, announcing the coming of the savior and preparing his way. The African prophet promises political, rather than spiritual salvation. He will come, Young argued, to “prove thy liberator from the infernal state of bondage” and will work for “justice” and the rights of African Americans.\textsuperscript{160} Yet, in the interim, Young preached self-government and submission to the conditions of slavery. He did not, at any point, address the issue of African colonization or the establishment of a nation-state anywhere other than the United States. Rather, Young was concerned with improving the condition of the African or Ethiopian “body politic” within the nation that they inhabit.

Drawing on biblical discussions of the Hebrew nation was also important to the formation of African American racial nationhood. Walker and Stewart likened African Americans in America to the ancient Israelites to argue that African Americans may have been “a nation in bondage,” but they were a nation nonetheless.\textsuperscript{161} Comparing themselves to the captive Israelites was a way not only to establish a national identity, but also served to link the millennial destiny of African Americans with that of the Anglo-American colonists.\textsuperscript{162} Although he drew comparisons between enslaved African Americans and the ancient Israelites, David Walker also asserted that the “condition of the Israelites was better under the Egyptians than ours is under the whites.”\textsuperscript{163} This argument was positioned largely in opposition of Thomas Jefferson’s comparisons between the artistic and educational achievements of African Americans under the system of slavery, and those of slaves in other historical eras (Egyptian captivity, Greek
and Roman Empires, etc). Thus, while Walker was invested in constructing the image of African Americans as a *people*, as the term is used in the Bible, he was also concerned with emphasizing the uniqueness of chattel slavery in America.

In adopting this religious and political rhetoric, advocates of African American nationhood also argued against rhetorics that presented African colonization as the liberation and realization of the African American nation. Like proponents of the ACS, Walker claimed that African Americans were a nation existing within the United States. However, Walker drew very different conclusions than those who favored colonization. Railing against what he called “the colonizing trick,” Walker wondered:

> What our brethren could have been thinking about, who have left their native land and home and gone away to Africa, I am unable to say. This country is as much ours as it is the whites, whether they will admit it now or not, they will see and believe it by and by.¹⁶⁴

Here and elsewhere, Walker refuted both strands of colonization rhetoric—Africa as nation and Africa as home. The United States, for all of its problems, is the “native land” and “home” of African Americans despite the fact they formally cannot claim ownership of it as a national space.

Claiming a place for the African American nation within the United States required opponents of colonization to refute the arguments of the dominant culture that they were essentially “moveable” or divorced from the land. Since African Americans could not own property in most states, writers like Walker and Stewart worked to articulate a relationship to land that was not based on liberal notions of property.
ownership. Drawing on labor theories of value, Walker wrote that because of their labor, African Americans have as much claim on the U.S. landscape as the whites. He wrote:

American is more our country, than it is the whites—we have enriched it with our blood and tears. The greatest riches in all America have arisen from our blood and tears:--and will they drive us from our property and homes, which we have earned with our blood?

Walker also quoted a letter from Richard Allen, who argued, “This land which we have watered with our tears and our blood, is now our mother country, and we are well satisfied to stay where wisdom abounds and the gospel is free.”

Three years later, Maria Stewart, who had been a friend of David Walker, would use almost the same wording to discuss the “benighted sons and daughters of Africa, who have enriched the soils of America with their tears and blood.”

By invoking the labor theory of value, associated with Lockean liberalism, Walker, Allen, and Stewart refuted the depiction of African Americans as trapped within a strange land where they could not flourish. In her “Address Delivered at the African Masonic Hall” (1833), after enumerating the cruelties that white Americans had committed toward Native Americans and African Americans, Stewart declared that “now that we have enriched their soil, and filled their coffers, they say we are not capable of becoming like white men, and that we can never rise to respectability in this country.”

It is African American labor, these writers and speakers argued, that has given U.S. land economic value. The blood and tears of enslaved African Americans has fertilized the land and formed an inseparable bond between the worker and the land. As a result, argued opponents of colonization, African Americans should claim America as their
country and should resist all inducements to immigrate. Stewart took a confrontational position with regard to colonization in her speech to the Masonic Hall and claimed she would have to be forced from America. Here she echoed sentiments made by Walker in his *Appeal*: “Let them commence their attack upon us as they did on our brethren in Ohio, driving and beating us from our country, and my soul for theirs, they will have enough of it. Let no man of us budge one step, and let slave-holders come to beat us from our country.”

Claiming America as the national space of African Americans not only meant asserting a relationship with the American landscape, but also distancing African Americans from the space of Africa. Stewart asserted in her Masonic address:

> They would drive us to a strange land. But before I go the bayonet shall pierce me through. African rights and liberty is a subject that ought to fire the breast of every free man of color in these United States, and excite in his bosom a lively, deep, decided, and heartfelt interest.

Both Walker and Stewart claimed the United States as their country, a country they would not voluntarily leave. Stewart explicitly distanced African American people from Africa itself, referring to it as a “strange land.” Like Richard Allen and Phillis Wheatley, Steward challenged the notion of Africa as the home of African Americans. Its “strangeness” suggests Stewart’s awareness of the linguistic and cultural differences that would hinder African colonization. But more importantly for Stewart, and for other opponents of colonization, Africa is “strange” because it is not a Christian society.

More than natural rights or civic contributions, African American Christianity
was the most frequently invoked argument that linked the African *people* to the American nation. Like those of Richard Allen, Walker’s ideas of nation were inextricably linked to religion, thus he did not endorse going to Africa, a place devoid of the gospel. This is not to say that Walker did not openly and vehemently enumerate the wrongs done to African Americans by so-called Christians. He claimed that white Americans were in open violation of biblical injunctions against cruelty and violence, and, in true jeremiad fashion, warned of divine retribution for the use of religion as a tool of oppression. Nevertheless, he did not place the blame on Christianity itself. Rather he argued that it was the duty of white Americans to spread the gospel and “teach all nations,” including the African American nation, about the Christian faith. Through this assertion, Walker engaged a discourse that can be traced back to Phillis Wheatley and her poem “On Being Brought from Africa to America”: Christian conversion as a benefit of the slave system. Walker did not go so far as to assert that it was “mercy” that brought Africans to America. He stated that white Americans “brought us among you, in chains and handcuffs, like brutes, and treated us with all the cruelties and rigour your ingenuity could invent.”170 However, because of Walker’s belief in the millennial destiny of the African American people, leaving America is not an option. His *Appeal* ends with his hopeful statement that Black and white Americans might become a “united and happy people,” an idea predicated on the idea of African American freedom and enfranchisement.171

American citizenship was one of the main goals of these early articulations of African American nationhood. Their references to biblical nations allowed them to imagine a kind of transcendent, transnational citizenship in which they could be citizens of both a racial nation (“colored citizens of the world”) and American citizens.
for ideas of racial nationhood allowed African Americans to present themselves as political subjects, rather than as apolitical individuals, property, or citizens of a nation yet to be in Africa. Membership in this racial nation was predicated on African descent and common cultural and religious features, but to claim American citizenship, writers had to assert some kind of relationship to American land. The writings of Walker and Stewart reveal arguments based on *jus soli* or the “right of the land.” Not only were African Americans related to the American landscape by birth, but by working the land and increasing its value with their labor they could claim it as their “country.” Richard Allen, Walker, and Stewart also revised traditional ideas of *jus soli* to validate sentimental claims to the land as well as genealogical or economic. African Americans were born in America and improved the land’s value by their labor, and they also forged an emotional bond with the land through their tears and suffering. Though this line of argument, African Americans used discourses of racial nationhood to both establish themselves as political agents and to stake a claim to American citizenship rather than citizenship in the colony of Liberia. They also presented alternative views of nationhood and citizenship with definitions not predicated on the possession of territory, something by which the American nation was increasingly defined by members of the dominant culture. In the face of these new definitions, attempts were made to shore up visions of the American nationhood as a unified whole and identify racial and ethnic nations as potential threats to its health.
CONCLUSION

Examining the colonization movement with an eye toward discourses of racial nationhood suggests the way discourses shift and change to accommodate changing social and material conditions and the way that power operates differently on various populations. Discourses of African “nationhood” emerged in order to render free Black populations governable, to better position them within the political institutions of the United States and reconcile the tensions between the emancipatory promise of the Revolution and the fettered realities of the slave system. Yet, as African Americans’ sense of themselves were informed by notions of African nationhood, and also by white assertions of their own divinely sanctioned national status, many Black people adapted the idea of African Americans as a nation within a nation in order to challenge, quite explicitly, the sovereign power of the United States. While writers and orators like David Walker, Maria Stewart, and Robert Alexander Young likened the African American nation to that of the Hebrews, their allusion to a Black *imperium* evoked images of the violence and monstrosity of two sovereign powers trying to share the same national space.

The results of these threats to American sovereignty were both juridical—stricter legal measures meant to limit the mobility and freedom of free African Americans—and also discursive. No longer were discourses of racial and ethnic nationhood employed as a way of rendering non-white populations more governable, but were instead circulated as a means to identify and contain threats to the U.S. state. The example of the Eastern Cherokees provides a contiguous example of this phenomenon. The Cherokees were
encouraged by American political leaders to adopt republican ideas of nationhood in order to transform themselves from a “savage” tribe to a civilized nation. This process served to inculcate particular precepts of citizenship in Cherokee peoples that, according to Elias Boudinot, made the Cherokees more “docile” and more easily managed by state power. Once the Cherokees declared themselves to be a nation and drafted their own constitution, the presence of this nation was described by state and federal authorities as an affront to the sovereignty of Georgia and the United States. Discussions of a threatening Cherokee imperium were used to justify Removal policies. To counter this discursive shift, the Cherokees and their advocates sought to relocate the Cherokee Nation in order to resist the forces of American governance.
Chapter 4

“In the Heart of So Powerful a Nation”: Cherokee Nationhood, Sectional Tensions, and the Regulation of American National Space

In the first three decades of the United States, dominant group discourses of American Indian nationhood circulated concurrently with discussions of a free Black nation within the United States. While African Americans historically had been figured as individuals rather than a collective body, American Indian peoples’ national identity historically had been acknowledged by white Americans as part of treaty negotiations. References to American Indian nationhood functioned, according to Washington’s secretary of war, Henry Knox, to pacify American Indian peoples and prevent warfare in the East. As Georgia Governor George Gilmer later reflected, “Treaties were expedients by which ignorant, intractable, and savage people were induced without bloodshed to yield up what civilized people had the right to possess by virtue of that command of the Creator delivered to man upon his formation—be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it.” Through treaty negotiations, the United States both could hope to obtain American Indian lands without resorting to potentially costly military means. Maintaining existing structures of treaty negotiations also constituted an attempt to regulate American Indian behavior by subverting Native ethnic-based affiliations based on kinship and linguistic ties. Requiring American Indian peoples to frame their identity
in terms of civic and territorial (rather than ethnic) nationhood also suggested the breakdown of intertribal affiliations and the acceptance of Western forms of knowledge.

Yet, as the case of the Georgia Cherokees demonstrates, expressions of American Indian national identity were also viewed by members of the dominant culture as a threat to state and federal sovereignty and the rights of individual citizens. While Georgia leaders had been agitating for the removal of the Cherokees since the Jefferson administration, their efforts were given new urgency by the creation of a Cherokee constitution in 1827. This articulation of civic nationhood and independent sovereignty on the part of the Cherokees was discussed by many white Georgians as an imperium, a political monster rising up from within their own state. Within the bounded space of the Cherokee Nation, three sovereign powers were fighting for control: the Cherokee Nation, the state of Georgia, and the U.S. government. The occupation of this space by American Indian people, contended Georgia Congressman Wilson Lumpkin, kept some residents of Georgia from owning property, and, by extension, from becoming citizens. Lumpkin and others saw this expression of Cherokee sovereignty as only one part in more elaborate scheme to restrict the rights of Georgia citizens, and, more broadly, to curtail the powers of the states.

Discussions of a Cherokee imperium revealed important differences in how white Americans understood the nation. Supporters of Indian Removal, particularly those in the South, articulated the nation in explicitly spatial terms of territory and property. A nation within a nation was understood as two competing claims on the same space, which created a crisis for the citizens of that space. Advocates for the Cherokees defined the nation in civil terms, and claimed that Southerners were deliberately misrepresenting the
idea of an *imperium* and in order to manipulate Northern audiences. During his presidency, Andrew Jackson avoided discussions of American Indians as civic or territorial states. Furthermore, he resisted dealing with American Indian nations individually and hoped to consolidate Indian peoples into one race-based nation in the West. Such definitional arguments over the nature of nationhood would continue to circulate among the white population with increasing frequency in subsequent decades over issues of slavery and the westward extension of the American nation. But, in the 1820s and 30s, it was hoped by many, including Wilson Lumpkin of Georgia, that nullification could be avoided and the Union could be saved by the removal of non-white “nations” from within its midst. The rhetoric of *imperium in imperio* was referenced by both Northerners and Southerners alike as a way to challenge the political power of their sectional rivals while still promoting a vision of national unity.

This chapter argues that discussions of a Cherokee *imperium* by Georgia’s leaders and the Cherokees’ white Northern supporters reflected broader fears about the growing fractures in the U.S. nation. These fears were projected onto the situation of the Cherokees, with Southerners claiming that the Cherokees were pawns of the “New England nation” and Northerners claiming that the denial of Cherokee rights reflected the growing influence of the Slave Power over the federal government. Policies of Indian Removal emerged as one way of “consolidating” (to use a word popular in newspaper accounts of this case) Indian peoples in the West and bringing them under U.S. jurisdiction. It was implied by supporters of Removal that like the colonization of free Black people, this policy would create two racially and ethnically homogenous nations—Indian and white—and would resolve tensions between the North and South by
eliminating a cause of disagreement. The competing discourses of Indian nationhood (civic, territorial, and racial) were combined into one in which Indians were discussed as one racial nation that was territorially outside of, but politically within, the United States. This rhetoric marked a departure from treaty discourses that sought to divide American Indian communities, as various nations of American Indians would become one nation of Indians in the West.

In describing their nation, the Cherokees themselves adopted various rhetorical strategies to resist removal. This chapter contends that presenting themselves as an ethnic nation, whose claims to the American landscape predated the United States, allowed the Cherokees to counter challenges that they did not have valid claims on Georgia land. The Cherokees were not an imperium, they suggested in memorials to Congress, because they occupied their lands first; the state of Georgia developed around them. Moreover, Cherokees who resisted Removal fused Native ideas of ancestral land claims (a feature of ethnic nationhood) with discourses of sentimentality to rival liberal discourses of nationhood and citizenship based on property ownership. However, the Cherokee also resisted dominant group presentations of ethnic and racial nationhood that connected them with African Americans and suggested that white and Indian peoples were incapable of living side by side. To appeal to white interests, Cherokees strategically adopted discourses of civic and territorial nationhood, which they felt demonstrated their political capability. Eventually, these fractures within the Eastern Cherokees would lead to the formation of the Treaty party and the Anti-Treaty party, a division that was exploited by federal officials in the events surrounding the Treaty of New Echota (1835).
By focusing on competing discourses of nationhood, this chapter functions to highlight the internal conflicts within both the U.S. and the Cherokee Nation that have been obfuscated by the focus on the role racism played in Indian Removal. The situation of the Cherokees, and indeed those of all nineteenth-century American Indian nations, has been interpreted by literary scholars and historians of the last fifty years as an example of the racist operations of nineteenth-century American political and social institutions. Whether as part of a complex “metaphysics of Indian hating” or a project of “forced assimilation,” Anglo-American policies toward American Indians have been viewed as part of a nationalizing move to codify associations between whiteness, citizenship, and American identity. Yet, as this chapter will show, discussions of race circulated alongside discourses of imperium in imperio, which produced particular understandings of the nation that worked to regulate the behavior of white Americans and American Indians alike.

“OUR LAMENTABLE FATE:” A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE IN GEORGIA

While the history of Cherokee Removal has been recounted in numerous sources, understanding how the events leading up to Cherokee Nation v. Georgia highlighted contesting views of nationhood (territorial versus ethnic) requires a brief summary of the history of the complex relationship between the Eastern Cherokees, the state of Georgia, and the federal government. When Europeans first arrived on the American continent, the Cherokees inhabited a space that encompassed more than 124,000 square miles, an area that would eventually become eight U.S. states. Over time, the Cherokees ceded
significant portions of their land to the United States and by 1819, the Cherokees claimed only about 17,000 square miles of land. In the state of Georgia, the Cherokees ancestral homelands were in the northwest, spanning three geographic regions: the ridge and valley, piedmont, and blue ridge areas. Yet the events leading up to *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* and Indian Removal (referred to in a Cherokee memorial as “our lamentable fate”) can be traced to a series of land deals made between the state of Georgia and the federal government that resulted in the sale of Georgia’s western lands.¹⁷⁵

In the years after the Revolution, Georgia’s territory extended to the Mississippi River, but it was unable to settle and defend the western part of its landholdings. After several speculative attempts to promote the formation of counties in the west, in 1795 governor George Matthews signed the Yazoo Act. This land transfer, which would come to be known as the Yazoo Land Fraud or Yazoo Land Scandal, included the sale of 35 million acres in present-day Alabama and Mississippi to four companies for $500,000. U.S. Senator James Gunn, one of the leading voices in the Yazoo sale, had orchestrated the distribution of land and money to government officials, prominent businessmen, and other influential insiders, which prompted accusations of corruption. There were protests and petitions circulated against the sale; however, despite the controversy, the sale went through. James Jackson, a Senator from Georgia, learned of the sale and resigned his office in order to challenge the Yazooists. He gained allies in the legislature and agitated for hearings to expose the corruption of the sale. Jackson was a central player in the 1796 Rescinding Act, which nullified the sale, and destroyed the documents associated with the Yazoo scandal. He and fellow Republicans blocked the sale of Yazoo lands until Republicans controlled Congress, and in 1802, Yazoo lands were ceded to the federal
government for 1.25 million dollars. As part of the 1802 sale, the federal government also promised the state of Georgia that it would remove Creek and Cherokee Indians from the state and extinguish their land titles, despite guarantees made in treaties with the American Indians.176

Gaining land for agriculture and settlement was not the only force motivating Georgia’s pressure on the federal government to remove American Indian peoples. The premium lands for cotton cultivation had been relinquished by the Creek Nation in 1826-27. There were fertile valleys and farmland in the Cherokee section of the Appalachians, but as Mary Young noted, most Cherokee and their white neighbors were “self-sufficient” farmers, not plantation elite. The land that they held was not workable as plantation land, but offered key transportation routes between the Georgia Coast and the Tennessee River system. As part of Georgia’s plan for internal improvements, canals were first proposed as the way to connect the two water systems, but railroads were eventually settled on as the ideal way to transport goods overland. Wary of further attempts to encroach on their lands, the Cherokees ignored overtures from state officials that were intended to convince them to allow the building of either canals or railroads on tribal land. This, in turn, caused Georgia to exert further pressure on the federal government to honor their promise to extinguish Cherokee claims on the land. As the decade of the 1820s began, however, the Cherokee became more than economic obstacles; they increasingly were seen as a threat to the system of slavery and the sovereignty of Georgia.177

The Cherokee elite were primarily made up of racially and culturally mixed (Cherokee and white) individuals who were descended from Cherokee women and
British men. During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, the Cherokees defined membership in their group in ethnic terms of matrilineal descent rather than according to racial standards of blood quantum. Thus, they made no distinction between “full blood” and “mixed blood” peoples. White Americans, however, were quick to distinguish between the racially mixed Cherokee elite and the “real” full blooded Cherokees. As a Congressman from Georgia during the years 1827-1831, Wilson Lumpkin argued that the real Cherokee were “dupes” of “half-breeds” and “mixed-bloods,” men such as Chief John Ross, who were opposing emigration to the West for their own political and financial benefit. Modern historian Mary Young has explored the racial dimensions of the arguments against Cherokee sovereignty. She argued that although some of the Cherokee owned African slaves and became largely acculturated into white Southern society, they represented a threat to the racial hierarchy of Georgia society. In her article on the exercise of Georgia sovereignty in Cherokee country, she wrote:

…the Indians were free people of color, and, as such, unacceptable neighbors for the race-proud Georgians. If the national government could intervene to protect the rights of the Indian minority to land, it could equally well intervene to protect the personal liberty of Georgia’s substantial and growing slave population.

Moreover, the presence of successful mixed-race Cherokees challenged commonly held ideas about the threat of “miscegenation.” Like the presence of free African Americans, the Cherokees were perceived as a living reminder of an alternative to the slave system, who perhaps might sow the seeds of discontent among enslaved people.
Removal efforts began in earnest after the War of 1812 and continued throughout that decade, although the federal government generally relied on persuasion and offers of land in the West rather than legislation or military force. Presidents James Monroe and John Quincy Adams were in favor of voluntary removal only and preferred not to enact formal removal policies. The Cherokees, however, were approached with two removal proposals during this time, the first by federal Indian Agent Return J. Meigs and the second by federal commissioners, led by Andrew Jackson. The first proposal offered the Cherokee Nation lands in present-day Arkansas in exchange for their homeland in Georgia. While the proposal was officially declined, 1,000 individuals were persuaded to remove to Arkansas in 1809. In 1817, Andrew Jackson and federal commissioners approached the Cherokee with a removal treaty. This treaty proposed that Cherokees give up land in what is now Tennessee and Georgia in exchange for American citizenship and individual property allotments. Once again, this treaty was rejected by the National Council of the Cherokee, but a group of chiefs accepted the terms and another 1,000 Cherokees people left Georgia for western lands.¹⁸⁰

Cherokees responded to increasing pressure on the part of state government by intensifying their efforts to demonstrate their capacity for “civilization” and republican citizenship. Agriculture and education were promoted by tribal leaders and delegations were sent to Washington, D.C. to bring Cherokee issues before the federal government. By the late 1820s, the Cherokee had schools, churches, plantations (many of which were worked by African slaves), an alphabet, a newspaper, and a written constitution.¹⁸¹ Cherokee Principal Chief Wilma Mankiller argued in 1993 that the Cherokee had a written alphabet before Sequoyah’s syllabary, but she also noted that this alphabet had
been lost by the time Sequoyah began work on his written syllabary in 1809.\textsuperscript{182} Sequoyah’s writing system was in widespread use by 1823 and the \textit{Cherokee Phoenix}, first published in 1828 under the editorship of Elias Boudinot, was published in both English and Cherokee. By those sympathetic to the American Indian cause, the Cherokees were often held up as proof of Indians’ capacity for civilization and acculturation. The Cherokee constitution of 1827 more closely resembled those of many southern states—particularly Georgia—than it did the federal constitution, but its framers claimed their constitution was created with the federal document in mind.\textsuperscript{183} As Brian Dippie has noted, this constitution made the Cherokees “an independent nation with sovereignty over territory in Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama.”\textsuperscript{184}

The state of Georgia responded to Cherokee opposition to removal and their constitution, which have been read as cementing the Cherokees’ “sense of national identity,” with a series of legislative measures intended to extend Georgia’s sovereignty over Cherokee lands.\textsuperscript{185} Beginning in 1827, the state annexed portions of lands and extended jurisdiction over Cherokee country. Heartened by the election of Andrew Jackson, the state of Georgia threatened the Cherokees that if there was no removal treaty by the next legislative session, the state would assume legislative control over all Cherokee land in 1830. Rumors of the discovery of gold on Cherokee lands only fueled the fire of removal. The legislative measures imposed by the state of Georgia’s were intended to revoke Cherokee rights and coerce them into ceding their territory to the state. Andrew Jackson’s first annual message declared that the Cherokees would be given “ample” lands west of the Mississippi where they would be educated and assisted by the government. In these new lands, Jackson asserted, the Cherokees could form “an
interesting commonwealth, destined to perpetuate the race and to attest the humanity and justice of this Government.“\textsuperscript{186}

The Cherokees made several attempts to check the extension of Georgia sovereignty into their territory. In 1829, a delegation led by Chief John Ross went to Washington and wrote a memorial to Congress. Although the Cherokees met with some support in Congress, the removal bill was ultimately passed. Subsequently the Cherokees filed an injunction against the state of Georgia and appointed “the royalty of the American bar to represent them: William Wirt, attorney general for Madison and Quincy Adams, and John Sergeant, congressman, vice presidential candidate in 1832, and advisor to the Second National Bank of the United States.\textsuperscript{187} The injunction claimed that Georgia’s actions “go directly to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society.” Furthermore, it designated the Cherokees a “foreign nation in the sense of our constitution and law” and as such, was not subject to the state laws of Georgia.\textsuperscript{188} Georgia did not appoint an attorney and was confident that the Court and President Jackson would support Indian Removal. Instead of focusing on the legal proceedings, the state went ahead with its plans to exert control over Cherokee lands. The Cherokees eventually brought their case to the United States Supreme Court, and the Marshall court’s decision in \textit{Cherokee Nation v. Georgia} (1831) demonstrated how contested ideas of nationhood were in the early nineteenth century, even among members of the U.S. nation’s highest court. In a subsequent case, \textit{Worcester v. Georgia} (1832), the Marshall court sided with the Cherokees in the case of a white minister arrested by Georgia on Cherokee lands, but the state and the executive branch of government did not enforce the court’s decision. Elias Boudinot and a small minority of Cherokees signed the Treaty of
New Echota in 1835, believing that Removal to what is now Oklahoma was the best chance to preserve the Cherokee Nation. Chief John Ross, fearful that existing Cherokee political structures in the West would threaten the current organization of the Cherokee Nation, opposed the Treaty and Removal in general. ¹⁸⁹

In the years leading up to the Supreme Court cases between the Cherokees and the state of Georgia, state and federal officials misrepresented and manipulated ideas of Cherokee nationhood so as to disrupt Native kinship networks and deny Cherokees’ claims to lands within the state of Georgia. Wilson Lumpkin and other Georgia politicians read the position of Cherokee elite within the nation in terms of Western discourses of race, and presented leaders such as Ross and Boudinot as rabble-rousing demagogues who were not fully Cherokee. Moreover, Lumpkin and others denied the historical and ethnic ties that Cherokee people expressed with regard to Georgia lands and instead employed the language of *imperium in imperio* to suggest that the Cherokees presented a threat that overrode any claims they might have to lands in the East. During the case of *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*, arguments over whether or not the Cherokee Nation constituted a foreign state hinged on how a nation was defined (as a physical space, a political institution, or a group of people) and where the Cherokee nation was located vís a vís the state of Georgia. As the next section will show, these definitional arguments and debates over a Cherokee *imperium* can be seen as an attempt on the part of white Americans to work out growing sectional tensions between North and South.
“AN INTERESTING COMMONWEALTH”: COMPETING VISIONS OF CHEROKEE NATIONHOOD AMONG WHITE AMERICANS

The administrations of Washington, Adams, and Jefferson promoted ideas of civic and territorial nationhood among the Eastern Cherokees so as to make them more easily governable and assimilate them into white American culture. Converting the Cherokees to Western ideas of territorial nationhood and individual property ownership, it was argued, would decrease the amount of land they needed for subsistence. Henry Knox and his successors believed that these surplus lands would then be available for purchase by white Americans. Additionally, federal Indian agents argued that incorporating the Cherokees into the United States would add to the strength of the American nation.

However, as Georgians’ desires for Cherokee lands intensified and the Cherokees made more explicit claims for self-government, Georgia’s political and intellectual elite framed the Cherokees’ expression of nationhood as an imperium in imperio. Lumpkin argued that the Cherokees were a threat to the sovereignty of the state of Georgia and the Union incited by Northern fanaticism. In response to such discourses, the Cherokees’ Northern advocates discussed Georgia’s claims against the Cherokee as the workings of the Southern Slave Power. This section will survey these competing discourses of Cherokee nationhood and suggest the ways in which such arguments were, in large part, a vehicle for expressing internal tensions between the North and South.

Some of the earliest opposition to Removal was utilitarian and implied that the presence of the Cherokee Nation was beneficial to the United States, particularly if the Cherokees eventually could be assimilated into the white population. In an article published by The National Register, Indian Agent Return J. Meigs asserted that God
himself had placed the Cherokees within the limits of the United States in order to test the virtue of the nation. This anachronistic argument—which implied that the United States somehow preceded the existence of the Cherokees—helped Meigs to make a utilitarian argument against Removal. Rather fostering a separate Cherokees nation and sending it elsewhere, Meigs argued, Americans should work to incorporate the Cherokees into American society. Transforming the Cherokees from a collective body into individual American citizens will “add strength to the republic” and provide a solution to so-called “Indian problem.” Meigs envisioned the Cherokee people as valuable commodities in the emergent American nation: “These people bear the appellation of intruders but they are Americans...in our new country every man is an acquisition—we ought not to lose a single man for lack of land to work on.” Here the Cherokee are presented not as a foreign element, but as “Americans.” By asserting that “every man is an acquisition,” Meigs rhetorically erased racial and ethnic difference between Indians and whites and argued that everyone’s capacity for labor would be important to the republic.

Georgia’s political leaders, however, saw the Cherokees as an explicit threat to their state sovereignty and to their place in the Union. As a territorial nation, the Cherokees were seen by advocates of Removal to be limiting the rights of individual citizens and the state as a whole. In his arguments for the removal of the Cherokees from Georgia, Congressman Wilson Lumpkin claimed that their presence was curtailing the rights of Georgia’s citizens. By taking up valuable land, he argued, the Cherokees were keeping would-be citizens from owning property and claiming their place in the national culture. Moreover, the Cherokees were taking up some of the “best land” in Georgia and
preventing the state from making important internal improvements.\textsuperscript{194} Being unable to build new roads, canals, and other forms of infrastructure, Georgia could not connect itself with the territories to the west and was becoming isolated from the rest of the nation. Lumpkin made a direct connection between the rights of property-owning citizens and a system of internal improvements. In discussing the presence of Cherokees in the northwestern part of the state of Georgia, Lumpkin wrote:

This state of things rendered it obvious to all well informed discerning men that the resources of Georgia could never be extensively developed by a well devised system of internal improvements, and commercial and social intercourse with other portions of the Union, especially the great West, until this portion of the state was settled by an industrious, enlightened, free-hold population—entitled to, and meriting, all the privileges of citizenship.\textsuperscript{195}

Here Lumpkin connected the physical presence of the Cherokee Nation and its occupation of space within the state of Georgia as a threat to the Union as a whole. Drawing on earlier discussions of infrastructure and “internal improvements” as the way to preserve the health and virtue of a large republic by linking citizens on the periphery to the commercial, social, and political center of the nation, Lumpkin implied that the Cherokees’ possession of land in the East threatened western expansion and national unity. Until these lands in northwest Georgia were possessed by an “industrious, enlightened, free-hold population,” he argued, the U.S. nation would not be secure.

The creation of the Cherokee constitution in 1827 was seen by Georgia’s leaders as the creation of a political “anomaly,” a case of divided sovereignty in which three sovereign powers (the U.S., the state of Georgia, and the Cherokees) claimed jurisdiction
over the same space. By presenting the Cherokees as an *imperium*—a threat to Georgia sovereignty and, by extension, the sovereignty of the federal government—Lumpkin asserted that their continued residence in the state was dangerous to the body politic. Moreover, he suggested that the creation of this *imperium* was not the work of the Cherokees themselves, but the result of outside agitation by mixed race Cherokees and “Northern fanatics.” Such efforts, Lumpkin implied, were further examples of the ways in which the rights of Southern citizens were being trampled by what was elsewhere referred to as the New England nation.

Reframing the debate between Cherokee leaders and the state of Georgia as one between New England and the Southern slave-holding states, Lumpkin portrayed the Cherokee nation as the “dupes” of persuasive demagogues whose real objective was not the assistance of the Cherokee, but the usurpation of Southern rights. While Lumpkin presented the Cherokee *imperium* as merely a pawn in a larger struggle between the state of Georgia, the federal government, and the New England “nation” of abolitionists and missionaries, his rhetoric and that of other pro-Georgia figures worked to translate anxieties about the growing fractures in the union into concerns about the Cherokee nation. Lumpkin was ardently against secession and nullification and argued in favor of the preservation of the union. It was not some flaw in the design of the union, he argued, that caused Georgia and the federal government to be at odds. Rather it was the agitation of these “other” nations—led by New England abolitionists and pro-Indian missionaries—who sowed seeds of dissent among the general population and worked to destroy the relationships between the Southern states and the federal government.
In the late 1820s, these sectional tensions and charges that the Cherokee claims to self-government constituted an *imperium in imperio* surfaced in the periodical press. Accounts of these charges appeared in publications such as the *North American Review* and the *Western Recorder*. These accounts describe how opponents of the Cherokee nation drew on the perception of an *imperium* as a political monstrosity and a threat to national sovereignty. Georgia politicians drew on commonly-held fears regarding the subversion of the republic in order to garner support for Georgia’s position. One writer for the *Western Review* summed up recent conversations: “Again, it is supposed, that the existence of a little separate community of Indians, living under their own laws, and surrounded by a community of whites, will be fraught with some great and undefined mischief. It is called *an anomaly*, an imperium in imperio, and by various other pedantic epithets.”

Another author reported hearing from Georgia politicians that “it is contrary to all principle, and cannot be permitted, to allow a government to exist within the territory, and be independent of another government, an *imperium in imperio* it is termed.”

Ideas of a Cherokee *imperium* were also circulated in religious newspapers thanks to the efforts of Georgia editors such as W.T. Brantly, who became editor of the Baptist publication *The Columbian Star and Christian Index* in 1827. In an anonymously written article published in *The Columbian Star* on September 12, 1829, the author argued:

Removal to some distant point, and concentration, as far as possible, into one body, appears to be the only means which can guard the Indian name and interest against total extinction. Experience has demonstrated, that for them to remain under the jurisdiction, and within the limits of any of the States, is inevitable
annihilation of their name and specific character. At the same time, their location within the States, as a separate, distinct, independent nation, would form a solecism in politics. What would result from the existence of two or more separate, sovereign bodies, contiguous to each other, and resident upon the same soil? The destruction of one or the other, would be the ultimate consequence.\textsuperscript{202}

While this passage purports to merely describe the situation of the Cherokees in Georgia, it actually makes an implied argument about their relationship to that state. To assimilate, would be destructive for the Cherokees, but for them to maintain their sovereignty would be a “solecism” or a mistake. In a somewhat paradoxical move, the author represented the Cherokees and the state of Georgia as both “contiguous” (neighboring) and “resident upon the same soil.” The Cherokees are thus both separate from and competing with the state of Georgia for land and resources.

While this anonymous author claimed to be concerned with preventing the “annihilation” of the Cherokees, his statements also suggest an interest in making the Cherokees more easily governable. Lumpkin had complained that the Cherokees’ assertion of their nationhood had rendered them less easily “govern[ed] and restrain[ed].”\textsuperscript{203} In order to better regulate the behavior of the Cherokees, the anonymous writer for \textit{The Columbian Star} argued that they should be removed somewhere beyond the jurisdiction of any U.S. state and “concentrate[ed]…into one body” Here we see the presentation of a collective identity not as emancipatory, but as a way to better bring the Cherokee under federal control. Many Indians, in this case, become one Indian, a body whose behavior can be managed and regulated. This was not an argument for the destruction of the Cherokee, the author noted, but an argument for the creation and
maintenance of a particular kind of Indian subject, who was no longer a threat to Georgia sovereignty.\(^{204}\)

While the Cherokees had often been held up as an example of American Indian potential by U.S. authorities, fears about regulating their behavior led to widespread criticism of their efforts at self-government. Federal authorities were quick to blame the Cherokee for drafting a written constitution and forming a republican government, acts which, according to Secretary of War John Eaton and other members of the Jackson administration, revealed their intent to create an *imperium in imperio*. In a letter to the Cherokee Delegation to Washington, comprised of John Ross, Richard Taylor, Edward Gunter, and William S. Coody, Eaton criticized the Cherokee for threatening the sovereign rights of the state of Georgia:

> The course you have pursued of establishing an independent, substantive, government, within the territorial limits of the state of Georgia, adverse to her will, and contrary to her consent, has been the immediate cause, which has so induced her, to depart from the forbearance she has so long practiced; and in virtue of her authority, as a sovereign, independent, state to extend over your country, her legislative enactments…\(^{205}\)

Eaton went on to say that the federal government could not intervene on behalf of any group who attempted to form a “separate government within the limits of a state.”\(^{206}\) Such actions constituted a threat to the individual state and to the nation as a whole. Thus, Georgia’s attempts to align itself with the federal government, even as it disregarded federal treaties, proved successful (in no small part, perhaps, because of the executive power of Andrew Jackson).
The Cherokees’ (primarily Northern) white advocates saw the use of the rhetoric of *imperium in imperio* as an attempt by an elite group of Southerners (including Jackson and his cadre) to manipulate the general public. State and federal arguments regarding a Cherokee *imperium* were, according to John Sergeant, the attorney for the Cherokees in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*, nothing more than an attempt to manipulate popular opinion through the use of high-flown rhetoric. Rather than using more familiar English phrases such as “nation within a nation” or “divided sovereignty,” state and federal authorities employed Latin, the language traditionally associated with institutional powers—law, medicine, religion—in order to impress upon the general population the gravity of the situation in Georgia. Sergeant contended that the use of Latin was intended to dupe the public and obscure the real facts of the case:

> Half enlightened persons, who see men as only trees walking, seem to consider this [*imperium in imperio*] as an unanswerable objection: for no other reason than I can imagine, than it is expressed in a foreign and learned language which they do not understand, and that men always fancy that there is something unfathomably deep in what lies beyond the reach of their own land. Those, who understand the objection in its true meaning, see that it has no manner of application to the case.  

The unenlightened, Sergeant claimed, could not answer this charge because they did not readily understand it and were merely impressed by the “foreign and learned” quality of the phase. The use of Latin and the allusions to British Common Law and the *Imperium Romanum* allowed the state of Georgia, Sergeant asserted, to “bewilder twilight intellects” and convince the people that the Cherokees had no legal right to their lands.
Reversing the charges of demagoguery levied against the Cherokees’ lawyers and Northern missionaries, Sergeant claimed that it was state officials who were trying to manipulate popular opinion. Sergeant’s statements about the “half enlightened” and the “twilight intellects” also served to belittle his political and legal opposition and assert his own, more intellectually informed, position.

Sergeant offered his own definition of an *imperium* in his opinion given before the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831). He argued that the charge of *imperium in imperio* did not apply to the Cherokees:

> A *government* within a *government* does not mean a *state* surrounded by the territories of another state, and yet retaining its separate political character: for in this there is nothing more incongruous than in the everyday occurrence of a small land-holder having his estate surrounded by the lands of his more wealthy neighbour, and yet retaining his separate independence and sovereign right of property…The *imperium in imperio* has no application to two distinct governments operating at the same time on separate territories; for the one *government* is not within the other *government* even though the *territory* over which one acts, may be encircled by the larger *territories* of the other. It is the conflict of two sovereignties on the same territory at the same time, which is meant by the *imperium in imperio*. Even in this sense, it is no longer a paradox in the United States, for every state exhibits an example of it. But in this sense, it has no application to the state of Georgia and the Cherokee nation, for they are separate sovereignties exerted over separate territories; and there is therefore no *imperium in imperio* in the case.\(^{208}\)
In this passage, Sergeant worked to correct the perception that two governments existing in geographic proximity—specifically a situation where one government existed within the chartered territory of the other—constituted an *imperium in imperio*. Such a condition occurs, he claimed, when there is a contest between sovereignties who occupy the same space (such as a military coup), not merely the geographic proximity of one independent government to another. Those national spaces could still be considered separate, Sergeant asserted, even if one space was contained within the borders of another. He reminded his audience that the United States itself was an example of smaller, weaker powers (states) encircled by a larger national government, a point echoed by many pro-Cherokee journalists.

The arguments made by John Sergeant and William Wirt in the injunction filed against the state of Georgia also disputed the notion of a Cherokee *imperium* by renegotiating the placement of the Cherokee Nation and comparing them to foreign nations like Mexico and Canada. They argued that according to the terms of the U.S. Constitution, the Cherokees constituted a “foreign state, not owing allegiance to the United States, nor to any state in this union, nor to any other prince, potentate, or state, other than their own.”

They cited the eleventh article of the Treaty of Hopewell (1785), which stated that “the territory of the Cherokee nation is not within the jurisdiction of either of the states or territorial districts of the United States.” Furthermore, Sergeant claimed that since the Cherokees were located within the geographic borders of the United States, but were not a state in the Union, “what else can they be but a foreign state.” Arguments as to the “foreign” nature of the Cherokees were predicated on their political autonomy and spatial understandings of their position.
vis a vis the United States: they were not one of the twenty four states that comprised the Union, but were a separate nation existing within America’s borders. Interestingly, Sergeant presented the Cherokee Nation as existing within the borders of the United States, but not within the borders of the state of Georgia. Such a move suggested that the Cherokee were equal to, rather than subordinate to or enclosed by, the state of Georgia.

Other defenders of the Cherokee concurred that the label of *imperium* was merely a manipulation of language, a use of what one writer for the *Western Recorder* called “learned and hard names” to obscure the benign nature of the Cherokee Nation. This anonymous author went on to reference other “pedantic epithets” used to describe the Cherokees. These reoccurring references to academic knowledge and its extreme form, pedantry, suggest that Cherokees’ advocates sought to persuade the general American population by distinguishing their own beliefs, informed by both common sense and benevolent feelings, to the harsh, and often manipulative intellectualism of Removal advocates. Debates about the use of Latin reveal that supporters of the Cherokees attempted to characterize the opponents in this case not merely in racial terms as a non-white group pitted against the dominant white culture, but also in class-based terms as ordinary people versus the classically educated elite. This characterization, which had populist leanings, also was informed by sectional conflicts over issues of slavery and economics. Discourses of a Cherokee *imperium* were used by Southern (primarily Georgian) politicians and journalists, and were presented by white Northern supporters of the Cherokees as another way in which the Southern elite sought to exert their will on a national level.
One such writer was Jeremiah Evarts, who asserted that arguments of a threatening Cherokee presence merely covered up the greed of Georgia and its attempts to manipulate federal laws. Evarts, editor and member of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, wrote a series of essays defending the Cherokees under the pseudonym “William Penn.” The twenty four William Penn essays—originally published in the *National Intelligencer* from August 5 through December 19, 1829, and reprinted in a variety of other venues and in pamphlet form—expressed Evarts’s opposition to the Removal Bill and the Jackson administration’s treatment of the Cherokees. He also tried to convince the general public that arguments about a Cherokee *imperium* were merely a ploy to cheat the Cherokees out of their lands. In essay 13, which appeared in the *National Intelligencer* and was reprinted in other national magazines throughout the 1830s, Evarts dubbed the charges of *imperium in imperio* “altogether chimerical:”

It has been alleged that great inconveniences will be experienced, by having an *imperium imperio*;—a separate, independent community surrounded by our own citizens. But in what do these frightful inconveniences consist? A little pacific community of Indians, living among the mountains, attending to their own concerns, and treating all who pass through their borders with kindness and hospitality, is surely no cause for alarm. If there were a territory in the possession of a great and hostile nation and in the immediate vicinity of our white settlements, where our rivals and enemies might shelter themselves, while plotting against our peace, and where fugitives from justice could find a refuge, there might be some reason for apprehension; though even these circumstances
would never excuse a violation of treaties. But the Cherokees can never have any interest adverse to our national prosperity. They have solemnly agreed to live under our protection and to deliver up fugitives from justice. We have by treaty a free navigation of their waters, and a free passage through their country. What more can we reasonably desire?²¹²

Evarts did not dispute the argument that the Cherokee Nation constituted an imperium, but rather argued that this situation did not present an “inconveniences” for the state of Georgia.²¹³ Here, as in an earlier essay where he described the Cherokees’ land as “remote,” Evarts emphasized that the Cherokees were not taking up valuable land in the center of Georgia, but live “among the mountains” and keep to themselves. Evarts further asserted that while the Cherokees did not interfere in the affairs of Georgia, they also did not limit travel within their borders and assist the state in capturing fugitives. All of which supported his claim that the Cherokees “can never have any interest adverse to our national prosperity” and, in fact, historically have worked to promote it.

While Sergeant had tried to argue against the idea of a Cherokee imperium by arguing that politically speaking the Cherokee Nation existed outside of the state of Georgia, Evarts attempted to speak to Southern concerns about territoriality. He represented the Cherokee Nation as occupying a “remote” corner of Georgia that was not, as Lumpkin had asserted, among the “best land” in the state. Evarts noted that the land in this portion of Georgia was far less valuable and fertile than in the territories claimed by white settlers. He emphasized that the Cherokees’ lands were made up of “mountains and barren tracts” and would be considered “worthless” by all who were familiar with Georgia geography. Thus, although he acknowledged that this land was a “healthful” and
desirable place of residence for the Cherokees, it would not be an ideal place for Georgia farmers. While Governor Wilson Lumpkin and other proponents of Indian Removal figured the Cherokees as living in the veritable center of the state of Georgia, blocking Georgians’ access to the coast and taking up valuable farmland, Evarts presented the Cherokees’ national space as wholly outside of the state. In letter XV, he wrote, “It has never been admitted that the Cherokee are now, or ever were, in the State of Georgia.” Evarts’ attempts to locate the Cherokees on the margins (rather than in the center) of the state of Georgia and his efforts to devalue Cherokee lands functioned to present the Cherokee Nation as outside of, and thus not a threat to, Georgia sovereignty.

The distinction between civic and territorial nationhood was also made by Evarts in a letter that quoted directly from Justice Story’s edition of United States Laws. He wrote:

> It is said that the United States can make no treaty with Indians living within the borders of a State; that is, within the limits of what appears, by the map, to be one of the United States. I beg leave to make a distinction between a State, and the map of a State; not yet having seen it proved that an engraver of a map has the power of disinheriting a whole people and delivering their property into the hands of another.

Evarts drew attention to the fact that maps represent not reality, but a particular vision of reality created by the cartographer. He implied that while the map’s creator has the power to visually create the boundaries of a state, that person does not yet possess the power to translate that visual image into a political reality. Through this line of argument, Evarts subjected the state of Georgia to the same line of questioning that had
been applied to the Cherokee Nation: what is the state? Is it a political institution, a group of people, or lines on a map?

Despite all of the attempts by the Cherokees’ Northern advocates to rhetorically relocate the Cherokee Nation outside of the state of Georgia and the United States, Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* placed the Cherokees (and all American Indian nations) firmly within U.S. jurisdiction. In his opinion on the case, he wrote:

> The Indian Territory is admitted to compose part of the United States. In all our maps, geographical treatises, histories, and laws, it is so considered. In all our intercourse with foreign nations, in our commercial regulations, in any attempt at intercourse between Indians and foreign nations, they are considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, subject to many of those restraints which are imposed upon our own citizens. They acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be under the protection of the United States; they admit that the United States shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them and managing all their affairs as they think proper; and the Cherokees in particular were allowed by the Treaty of Hopewell, which preceded the Constitution, *to send a deputy of their choice, whenever they think fit, to Congress*. Treaties were made with some tribes by the state of New York under a then unsettled construction of the Confederation, by which they ceded all their lands to that state, taking back a limited grant to themselves in which they admit their dependence. 217

To support his argument that the Cherokees were a “domestic dependent nation” rather than a foreign state, Marshall explicitly defined *nationhood* in territorial terms. He
contended that the Cherokees’ territory existed within the boundaries of the United States and “is admitted to compose part of the United States.” Marshall alluded to a variety of documentary evidence—maps, treatises, histories, legal writings—to evoke visual images of the containment of the Cherokee. And, as Pricilla Wald has noted, Marshall used the passive form (“is admitted” and “they are considered”) to imply an already formed consensus on the status of American Indian people.  

Marshall’s argument that the Cherokee Nation existed within the jurisdiction of the United States and/or the state of Georgia because there were maps that represented it as such was contested in both legal and popular venues. The dissenting opinion by Justices Thompson and Story challenged Marshall’s definition of territorial nationhood and argued for the Cherokee’s foreignness on the basis of their separate political structure. Thompson argued:

it is their [Cherokees’] political condition that constitutes their foreign character, and in that sense must the term foreign, be understood as used in the constitution. It can have no relation to local, geographical, or territorial position. It cannot mean a country beyond the sea. Mexico or Canada is certainly to be considered a foreign country, in reference to the United States. It is the political relation in which one government or country stands to another, which constitutes it foreign to the other. The Cherokee territory being within the chartered limits of Georgia, does not affect the question. When Georgia is spoken of as a state, reference is had to its political character, and not the boundary; and it is not perceived that any absurdity or inconsistency grows out of the circumstance, that the jurisdiction and
territory of the state of Georgia surround or extend on every side of the Cherokee territory.\textsuperscript{220}

Here foreign versus domestic is not presented as a set of spatial relationships, but on political and cultural similarities. Nations with contiguous borders, as in the case of the U.S. and Mexico, still constitute foreign sovereignties despite their close proximity. Thompson draws a clear distinction between the state of Georgia as a political entity, which is separate from that of the Cherokees, and its geographic boundaries, which do in fact surround the Cherokee Nation.

Not all members of the Supreme Court, however, acknowledged Cherokee nationhood. Justices Johnson and Baldwin claimed that the Cherokees fit none of the definitions of nationhood and their sovereignty was not recognized by any nation other than the United States. Johnson argued vehemently that the Cherokees could not be a nation because they were not assumed to be such by the “family of nations” and that the Cherokees could not simply declare themselves to be a nation. The Cherokees, claimed Johnson, “as a state…are known to nobody on earth, but ourselves, if to us” and it would be wrong of the United States to admit the Cherokees into the “family of nations” without first consulting the other family members (who are never specifically named). Affording the Cherokees national status could lead to a series of other demands: “Must every petty kraal of Indians, designating themselves a tribe or nation, and having a few hundred acres of land to hunt on exclusively, be recognized as a state? We should indeed force into the family of nations, a very numerous and heterogeneous progeny.” Johnson insisted that the United States was not considered a nation immediately upon separating from Great Britain, but gained that status only after Great Britain and other nations acknowledged
them as such. Taking a similar line of argument, Baldwin asserted that “mere phraseology cannot make Indians nations, or Indian tribes foreign states.” Baldwin and Johnson present the Cherokees as an ethnic group rather than a nation, a group with connections to, rather than possession of, a homeland.

This was made more explicit when Johnson likened the situation of the Cherokee to that of the Israelites and presented them as totally divorced from the American landscape. While African American speakers and writers had compared Black people to the Hebrews in order to claim a kind of national identity, Johnson used this comparison to dispute Cherokees’ claims. Johnson compared the situation of the Cherokees in Georgia to the desert wanderings of the Israelites:

[t]hough without land they call theirs in the sense of property, their right of personal self government has never been taken from them; and such a form of government may exist though the land be in fact that of another. The right to expel them may exist in that other, but the alternative of departing and retaining the right of self government may exist in them.221

Johnson subverted the emancipatory potential of this comparison by hinging nationhood on property ownership, rather than any other form of “possession” (in the form of affective or historical connections).

Johnson instead focused on the immediate situation of the Cherokee, whom he presented as having two choices: they can be forcibly expelled from Georgia or they can exercise their “right” to leave. Johnson’s use of Hebrew imagery worked to divorce the Cherokee from the landscape and present them as migratory—destined to settle in some other, unspecified place—and, implicitly, as part of some already historicized past.
Paradoxically, only through leaving their land—the ownership of which would cement their national status—can they exercise any political rights. Through this line of reasoning, Justice Johnson employed what current scholars refer to as the “Vanishing Indian” trope, i.e. that it is in “vanishing” from the American landscape that American Indian people could demonstrate their virtue, nobility, and, in this case, sovereignty. Cherokee nationhood, for Johnson, was something that could only be exercised within the borders of the United States through an act of departure.

Johnson’s theme of Cherokee departure echoed an important literary theme of the previous decade, that of the Vanishing Indian. James Fenimore Cooper’s Last of the Mohicans (1826), Lydia Maria Child’s Hobomok (1824), Catharine Maria Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie (1827), and John Augustus Stone’s play Metamora (1829) dramatized the figure of the solitary Indian, the last of his tribe. These works served as what scholar Jeffrey Mason called a “political instrument,” which served to appropriate the figure of the American Indian into white fictions of inevitable expansion and obscure the material realities of forced removal. Such works also functioned to rhetorically manage Indian populations by implicitly subverting claims of American Indian nationhood and collective identity. Many of the works mentioned focused on the actions (and often the demise) of one or two American Indian figures. These figures—Chingachgook and Uncus, Hobomok, Magawisca, Metamora (King Philip)—are shown to be cut off from their tribal communities, which constitutes a denial of native collective identity. This denial is reinforced by the titles of many works of the 1820s, which feature “the last of” some particular American Indian community. Thus, the figure of the American Indian—particularly the American Indian man—was both figuratively and literally displaced from
the American national landscape and his own national/tribal community and relocated in a safely historicized past, or as in the case of Hobomok, in some unnamed western space. Yet other political discourses advocated not a movement toward American Indian individualization—as represented by literary figures like Metamora—but the concentration and management of American Indian nations in the lands west of the Mississippi.

One of the more prominent spokesmen for the consolidation of American Indian nations into a single, race-based nation (known as “Indian Territory”) in the West was Andrew Jackson. In his first message to Congress on December 28, 1830, Jackson dismissed Cherokee claims to self-government within the state of Georgia and asked Congress to set aside lands west of the Mississippi for the formation of an Indian state.\(^\text{223}\) Jackson’s ideas of racial nationhood and American Indians were clearly expressed in a letter that he wrote to the Creek Nation (neighbors of the Cherokees) dated March 23, 1829:

> Friends and brothers, listen: Where you are now, you and my white children are too near to each other to live in harmony and peace...Beyond the great river Mississippi, where a part of your nation has already gone, your father has provided a country large enough for all of you, and he advises you to remove to it. There your white brothers will not trouble you; they will have no claim to the land, and you can live upon it, you and all of your children, as long as the grass grows, or the water runs, in peace and plenty. It will be yours forever.\(^\text{224}\)

This letter, written while tensions between the Cherokees and the state of Georgia were escalating, articulated the problems between Indians and white Americans in explicitly
ethnic/racial terms. It was not that American Indian sovereignty threatened the rights of white citizens, argued Jackson, but that the inherent ethnic and racial features of these two groups made it impossible for them to live in close proximity to one another.

Jackson’s first annual message to Congress suggested that the Cherokees and other American Indian nations should remove west so as to form “an interesting commonwealth” that would preserve the Indian “race” and, it was implied, bring American Indians more firmly under white governance.225

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, discourses of American Indian nationhood attempted to both regulate the behavior of American Indian peoples and promote particular ideas of national unity among the white population of the United States. Under the administrations of Washington, Adams, and Jefferson, American Indian peoples were dealt with as individual nations and encouraged to adopt Western ideas of civic and territorial nationhood. This constituted an attempt on the part of the United States government to avert warfare in the East and gain control of American Indian lands. Yet the articulation of Cherokee nationhood was presented by many Georgians as an imperium in imperio, a threat to individual citizens, the state of Georgia, and the federal government. Arguments between Georgians and the Cherokees’ Northern supporters as to whether the Cherokee were an imperium reveal growing distinctions between Northern and Southern ideas of nationhood and an attempt by both sides to work out these sectional tensions by projecting them on to the presence of a non-white nation within the United States. Adopting the right course of action with regard to the Cherokee, it was implied, had the potential to avert a larger crisis of culture among the white population. Ultimately, the policy of Indian Removal combined elements of civic,
territorial, and ethnic/racial nationhood and constituted a new form of governmentality. American Indian nations were to be consolidated in the West and brought more firmly under U.S. jurisdiction, even as they were geographically removed from within the putative borders of the U.S. nation. The forced removal of the Eastern Cherokees worked to subvert the expression of alternative nationalisms within the United States and promote ideas of ethnic and sectional unity, at least temporarily.

“TO SAVE THE NATION”: APPROPRIATION, RESISTANCE, AND THE PRESENTATION OF CHEROKEE NATIONHOOD

Just as the white American population engaged in definitional arguments about the meaning of nationhood, so too did the Eastern Cherokees. Elias Boudinot and other Eastern Cherokees expressed an awareness of the operations of the United States government and the state of Georgia to render them “dutiful ‘children’” by promoting among the Cherokees Western ideas of civic and territorial nationalism. They observed that once the Cherokees created political institutions and made formal claims on their national territory, state and federal authorities decried this as an affront to their sovereignty and justification for the seizure of Cherokee lands. In their attempts to assert their claims over their ancestral homelands and renegotiate their political relationship with the federal government and the state of Georgia, the Cherokees situated their state as an imperium within the borders and jurisdiction of the U.S. government. They fused this articulation of civic nationalism with liberal ideologies, sentimental discourses, and elements of ethnic and racial nationalism to create a vision of Cherokee citizenship that
transcended the claims of the state of Georgia and allowed them to claim a place in the United States.

Analyses of Cherokee nationhood must take into account that discussing Native sovereignty in national terms was a product of interaction with Anglo-Americans and that the Cherokees were not a unified group in the 1820s and 30s. One group of Cherokees had already removed to the West and the Eastern Cherokee eventually split into the Treaty Party, which included Elias Boudinot, and the Anti Treaty party, led by Chief John Ross. Regarding the political organization of the Cherokees, words like “people” and “tribe,” as well as “nation,” were used in treaty discourse to refer to the Cherokees. As Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, Eric Cheyfitz, and Mark Rifkin have noted, the representation of American Indian populations as “nations” was largely an act of “translation” (a term used by Cheyfitz), an erasure of Native understandings of collectivity, sovereignty, and kinship ties that has been replicated by modern scholarship that discusses Anglo-Indian relations as “nation-to-nation” interactions.227 Non-elite group Cherokees, scholars maintain, did not predicate their collective identity on ideas of nationhood, but rather retained an emphasis on clan relationships. Yet to ignore the rhetorics of nationhood that were employed by Cherokee leaders such as John Ross and Elias Boudinot and their white advocates is to overlook an important instance of what Gerald Vizenor has dubbed “survivance,” a technique of survival and resistance employed by native peoples. Figuring the Cherokees as a nation rather than as a community bound by kinship ties and common cultural features allowed Cherokee leaders to exert a kind of political pressure on U.S. hegemony and forced representatives of the United States to deal with them as a legitimate (if, in the eyes of some, inferior) political institution.
The beginnings of the Cherokee Nation have been linked by historians and American Indian scholars to 1817 when a Cherokee council established a republic with a bicameral legislature in order to make their political organization reflect Western ideas of civic nationhood. However, historian William McLoughlin has traced the roots of Cherokee nationhood back to the 1794 reunification of the tribe and their political organization during the first removal crisis of 1806-1809. In particular, he pointed to the redefinition of Cherokee citizenship in 1809 as a key moment in the development of the Cherokee Nation. Before this, membership in the “Cherokee nation” had been linked to cultural identification and involvement in treaty negotiations. After the year 1809, Cherokee citizenship was linked to place of residence; to be a member of the Cherokee Nation, individuals had to reside within the established limits of the Cherokees’ traditional homelands. This shift coincided with dominant discourses of American nationhood, which were increasingly imbricated with geographic concerns and an emphasis on the nation as a territory with discrete borders.

In framing the Cherokee constitution of 1827, elite group Cherokees positioned their nation as an imperium in imperio within the larger U.S. nation, but outside of the state of Georgia, in order to explicitly resist Georgia’s attempts to secure their removal and court the protection of the United States. In the first article, the constitution established the physical boundaries of the Cherokee nation in relation to the United States: “The boundaries of this nation embracing the lands solemnly guaranteed and reserved forever to the Cherokee Nation by the treaties concluded with the United States is as follows, and which shall forever hereafter remain unalterably the same.” As the founders of the U.S. nation had acknowledged, the relationship between the individual
states and the federal government was that of an *imperium in imperio*. Not long after assuming the position of Vice President, John Adams wrote that “[o]ur new government is an attempt to divide a sovereignty; a fresh essay at imperium in imperio.” The writings of Elias Boudinot and John Ross, although they would come to disagree on issues of Removal, demonstrate the ways in which Cherokee leaders manipulated ideas of *imperium in imperio* in an attempt to renegotiate their relationship with the U.S. government and create a new vision of transnational Cherokee citizenship.

To temper the threatening nature of a Cherokee *imperium*, Cherokee leaders drew on liberal, sentimental, and religious discourses to describe the relationship between the Cherokee Nation and the United States. In his annual message to the Cherokee people, given October 24, 1831, Ross described the political condition of the Cherokee nation as very much like those of individual states and the U.S. nation and between individual citizens and the sovereign power. Knowing that this message would be reprinted and circulated among white readers, Ross played to Anglo-American ideas of the Cherokee Nation as subordinate to, but also closely aligned with, the United States:

> A weak and defenseless community we are, forming an alliance with, and placed in the heart of so powerful a Nation as the United States, and having surrendered a portion of our sovereignty, as a security for our protection, and our intercourse being confined exclusively without protector, must necessarily produce the identity of interest and bond of friendship so natural to the ties of such an alliance.  

Here Ross drew on the language of the social contract to present the entire Cherokee Nation as a citizen of the United States. According to Ross, the Cherokees “surrendered
a portion of our sovereignty, as a security for our protection,\textsuperscript{233} a move which placed the Cherokees in a subordinate, but politically significant position with regard to the United States. Ross created a direct transnational connect between the Cherokees and the U.S. and bypassed issues of Georgia sovereignty.

In this same passage Ross drew on sentimental language to link the Cherokee Nation to a particular space and transform the notion of a Cherokee \emph{imperium} from a threatening element to a cherished part of the United States. Using a passive construction—“placed in the heart of so powerful a Nation”—Ross worked to naturalize the presence of the Cherokee Nation within the borders of the state of Georgia. Here he reworked the language of \emph{imperium in imperio} used by Georgia politicians, who characterized the Cherokees as a nation lurking in the bosom of an unwitting U.S., to that of the Cherokee peacefully residing in the “heart” of the nation. By locating the Cherokees in the “heart” of the U.S. nation, Ross implies a sentimental as well as a geographical relationship. To be in someone’s heart meant to have ties to their affections, while the phrase “in the heart of’ also had been used since the fourteenth century to describe a geographic location: the middle.\textsuperscript{234} Through his allusion to the social contract and his location of the Cherokee Nation in the “heart” of the U.S., Ross asserted that the Cherokees were in a position equal to that of the state of Georgia and thus, have equal claim on the protection of the federal government.\textsuperscript{235}

To assert their claim to their ancestral lands in Georgia, the Cherokees fused these discourses of a civic \emph{imperium} with elements of ethnic nationhood. In messages addressed to members of the Cherokee Nation and in memorials to Congress, Cherokees collectively expressed a sense of themselves as an ethnic nation with ancestral ties to
lands now within the state of Georgia. In an address before the General Council in 1827, Cherokee Chiefs William Hicks and Ross asserted, “Our ancestors from time to time immemorial possessed this country, not by a ‘charter’ from the hand of a mortal king, who has no right to grant it, but by the will of the king of kings.” Fusing Christian rhetorics with ethnic claims, Hicks and Ross asserted that their claims to lands in Georgia were more valid than those of white Americans and attempted to redefine ideas of property ownership and territorial possession. In a memorial to Congress from December 1829, Cherokees claimed ownership of their lands “by inheritance, and immemorial peaceable possession.” The authors cited their “love” of the land and their historical relationship to it. The memorialists also noted that their ancestors’ bones were interred in the lands they possessed, which gave the Cherokees further right of possession. Thus, while these memorialists emphasized their connection to a specific territory, it was on the basis of historical and ancestral connections, not because of Western forms of property ownership. They referred to the state of Georgia as their “neighbor,” which was another attempt to frame themselves as a nation within the United States, not within the state of Georgia.

The Cherokees also drew on explicitly racial constructions of nationhood to argue for the presence of a distinctly Cherokee nation and refute claims that they had lost their national character through mixing with African Americans and whites. Their exclusion of people of African descent and their attempts to rhetorically distance themselves from other American Indian groups were an attempt to shore up their own ethnic and racial identity as Cherokees and speak to growing concerns among the white population regarding racial purity. The Cherokee constitution of 1827 limited citizenship to free
men of Cherokee descent. It explicitly stated that “No person who is of negro or mulatto
[sic] parentage either by the father or mother side, shall be eligible to hold any office of
profit, honor, or trust under this Government.” 238 In a move that reflected growing
concerns with race and purity of “blood” throughout the white population, the Cherokees
sought to define their nation in both civic and racial terms. This was to counter claims
like those of Congressman Lumpkin, that the Cherokee nation was not made up of full-
blood Cherokees but of “mixed breeds” and “white bloods.” 239 Such arguments implied
that the Cherokees had lost their “real” national character when they tried to become
white. Discourses of racial and ethnic nationhood functioned to associate the Cherokee
Nation with Cherokee peoples.

Throughout their responses to Georgia’s incursions, the Cherokees also worked to
distinguish themselves from other “savage” tribes, who they often refused to credit with
national capacity. Boudinot claimed that “the comparison between the Cherokees and the
Indians of New York is…unjust” and resisted comparisons with the Plains nations as
well, styling them “American Arabs.” He made pejorative remarks about the
Commanches and the “atrocities” they committed, and suggested that the Cherokees
would be the victims of similar attacks if they were forced to relocate to the West. 240
Elite group Cherokees touted their exceptionalism and resisted white discourses of Pan-
Indianism that were often used to refute Cherokee claims to eastern lands. Unlike
African American writers such as David Walker and Maria Stewart, who worked to unite
Africans of various national and tribal groups, many Cherokee peoples saw the
imposition of collective racial identity as a tool of white governance and were resistant,
during the era of Removal, to claim such an identity. Rather, they were careful to employ
specific rhetorics of ethnic nationalism that allowed them to claim their ancestral lands in the East and refute discussions of a Cherokee *imperium*.

Cherokee discourses of nationhood strategically adopted rhetorics of *imperium in imperio*, yet adapted the notion of divided sovereignty to argue for a specific political and affective relationship with the United States. Within the Cherokee Nation, as within the white population of the United States, there were struggles between traditional associations of the nation with the tribal homeland and kinship groups, and those that equated the nation with its republican political institutions. But in response to outside claims that Cherokee nationhood was compromised by mixed race demagogues and miscegenation, elite group Cherokees devised visions of a uniquely Cherokee citizenship that formed transnational associations with the United States and worked against notions of consolidated Indian identity. John Ross drew on explicitly liberal discourses to figure the entire Cherokee nation as a U.S. citizen in order to claim the protection of the federal government and refute the authority of the state of Georgia. This was not a final vision of Cherokee citizenship, which was recreated in the West after the Trail of Tears, but a working out of some of the initial ways Cherokees could articulate a vision of transcendent Cherokee political identity.

**CONCLUSION**

In their dealings with the Cherokee Nation, federal and state authorities drew on the familiar rhetoric of *imperium in imperio*, which in its description of the Cherokees, worked to position them as threatening, monstrous, and, above all, a political
impossibility. The presence of the Cherokees, it was asserted, directly impacted the rights of would-be citizens in Georgia. For Unionists in the South, like Governor Lumpkin, discussions of a Cherokee *imperium* provided a way to address fractures between the Northern and Southern states without resorting to nullification. The Cherokees’ case provided a vehicle for the state of Georgia to challenge not only the Cherokee Nation, but the “New England nation” that also threatened Georgia sovereignty. Northern whites also sought to project class and regional issues onto the struggles of the Cherokees, and characterized the language of *imperium in imperio* as the machinations of Southern elites who sought to influence the general public. The terms of this debate revealed the ways in which white Americans on both sides of the issue attempted to use rhetorics of a Cherokee *imperium* as a way to address divisions in the Union by projecting them onto some “other nation.”

Discussions of the Eastern Cherokees also suggest larger definitional arguments about the nature of nationhood in general. Southern supporters of removal linked citizenship and nationhood directly to property ownership, while the Cherokees’ Northern supporters maintained a link between the nation and its civic institutions. Andrew Jackson’s views on nationhood suggest the growing importance of race and more explicit connections between whiteness and U.S. citizenship. As sectional tensions increased throughout the 1840s and 50s, these definitional arguments would continue to divide the United States into two rival nations, which as the next chapter will show, were increasingly difficult to reconcile.

The Cherokees themselves were similarly divided as to how to define their nation and employed rhetorics of civic, territorial, and ethnic nationhood in order to claim a
place in the southeastern United States. Employing affective imagery of the Cherokees as nestled in the “heart” of the U.S. nation, Cherokee writers such as Chief John Ross sought to refashion the rhetoric of *imperium in imperio* into a more positive presentation of the Cherokee Nation. He also sought to reframe the relationship between the Cherokee Nation and the United States as one between citizen and sovereign so as to appeal to the protection of the federal government. While the Cherokees differed somewhat in their visions of citizenship, they generally resisted notions of a consolidated Indian citizenship and sought to resist discourses of racial nationhood which would have linked them with other non-citizens.

For white Americans and American Indians alike, the discourse of *imperium in imperio* served an edifying purpose. It promoted a particular vision of the relationship between nations and geographic locations: anything within the putative borders of a nation is subject to the laws of that nation and any attempts to exercise self-government within that space is an affront to the larger nation. Furthermore, the circulation of this discourse normalized the hegemony of the U.S. nation while representing other presence of other national identities as monstrous anomalies. *Imperium in imperio* provided members of the dominant culture a temporary means for negotiating between doctrines of states’ rights and the preservation of the Union by projecting dissent between the Northern and Southern states onto a racialized “other” nation. For American Indian people this discourse was part of a larger operation of state power that first transformed them into docile bodies—the “dutiful children” that Boudinot referenced—by promoting “civilization” and the formation of republican government, and then constituted their efforts as a threat to white sovereignty and a justification for Removal. Yet for the
Cherokee and for other non-dominant groups, the discourse of *imperium in imperio* and ideas of divided sovereignty revealed significant anxieties among members of the dominant culture and provided a language for speaking back to white American political culture and exerting pressure on the hegemony of the U.S. nation.

Chapter 5

“A Space for Action”: Ethnic Nationalism and Transnational Citizenship in 1850s America

After the Mexican War (1846-48), the United States seized vast territories in the West. The acquisition of these territories generated fierce debates between supporters of slavery and its opponents. On August 8, 1846, the Wilmot Proviso was brought before the House of Representatives by Pennsylvania Congressman Daniel Wilmot. The Proviso, included as a rider on an appropriations bill, would have prohibited slavery in the Western territories obtained from Mexico. When California petitioned for admission to the Union as a free state in 1849, the Congressional debates over the extension of slavery grew more heated. Henry Clay, referred to as the “Great Compromiser,” proposed what would become the Compromise of 1850. This legislation allowed California to enter the Union as a free state and organized the other Western territories according to the principle of “popular sovereignty.” This meant that individual states could decide whether they would be slave or free when they drafted their state constitutions. While Stephen A. Douglas and other supporters of popular sovereignty touted it as an exercise in citizens’ powers of self government, others revealed the ways in which this policy could be
manipulated so as to deprive citizen residents of a state their freedom of choice. Popular sovereignty was again invoked during Douglas’s campaign for the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), which organized the territories of Kansas and Nebraska for white settlement with the provision that state residents would decide whether they would be slave states or free states.\textsuperscript{241}

The period surrounding Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854) and “Bleeding Kansas” in the summer of 1856 was characterized by at times violent clashes over the nature of citizenship in America. Scholars rightly consider the Dred Scott case, and Justice Taney’s famous assertion that African Americans had “no rights which the white man was bound to respect,” as one of the crucial moments in the history of African American citizenship.\textsuperscript{242} Less frequently discussed, however, are the ways in which earlier legislation such as the Compromise of 1850, which included the Fugitive Slave Law, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act created and reflected crises of citizenship among the white population and among African Americans. Northern whites and supporters of the free-state movement claimed that their rights as citizens were being curtailed by the Slave Power, who essentially had made slavery a national institution. Southern slaveholders, in opposing the restriction of slavery in Kansas, claimed that their citizenship, which they understood as their right to property (including “property in slaves”), was being attacked by free-state supporters. For African Americans, the outrages of the Fugitive Slave Law gave their arguments for enfranchisement and emancipation new urgency throughout the decade leading up to the Civil War.

As in the debates over Cherokee sovereignty in the 1820s and 30s, Northerners and Southerners articulated competing notions of citizenship. Although both Northern
and Southern thinkers emphasized definitions of the U.S. nation as a bounded space, Northerners conceived of citizenship primarily in terms of autonomy and self-government, while Southerners generally understood citizenship as based on property ownership. They saw the restriction of slavery in Western free states as an attack on their ability to transport their “property” from one state to another. The caning of Charles Sumner, abolitionist Senator from Massachusetts, by South Carolina Senator Preston Brooks in May 1856 and the violent skirmishes between “residents” of Kansas and Missouri testified to how dangerous and volatile these debates over nationhood and citizenship had become by 1856. To many people of the time, it seemed clear that these competing notions of citizenship were threatening the Union itself. Thus, while the Dred Scott decision was a landmark moment in the quest for African American citizenship, the years leading up to that decision were marked by intense debates over both white and Black citizenship and the nature of the American nation.

There were attempts during this period to mediate between the competing ideas of American nationhood and resolve the expressed tensions between North and South. Southern apologists tried to justify slavery to Northern audiences by talking about it as a form of “government” and asserting that slavery provided African Americans with a place in American society. Novels such as Caroline Lee Hentz’s The Planter’s Northern Bride (1854) suggested that since African Americans could not own land, slavery provided them with connection to the American landscape and curtailed what was perceived to be a dangerous African American mobility. William Wirt had described the position of the free African American in Virginia as that of a “sojourning stranger” in 1821, and later proslavery arguments contended that the institution of slavery ameliorated
this condition by linking African Americans to a particular place. This constituted a significant departure from Thomas Jefferson’s characterization of African Americans as “moveable” property with no relationship to American land. Given anxieties over runaway slaves, slave uprisings, and the movement of slavery as an institution across the Western territories, African American mobility was a much more fraught subject in the 1850s than it was in the 1780s.

While some writers presented slavery as a way to curb the threatening mobility of African Americans, colonizationists sought to regulate that movement and direct it outward from the United States. As in previous decades, colonization rhetoric functioned to resolve sectional tensions between North and South through the removal of Black people from within the United States. These discourses foreclosed the expression of Black ethnic nationhood and promoted the vision of a racially and culturally homogenous American nation among white audiences. Writers such as Sarah Josepha Hale equated nationhood with the possession of national and individual property, and presented Africa as the space in which the dormant African American nation could be actualized. Hale reframed her 1827 work *Northwood* as a tale of North and South in 1852 (rather than just a story of New England life) and ended it with the idea that slavery functioned to advance the missionary work of Christianizing Africa, a theme she dramatized in her 1853 novel, *Liberia*. Hale’s work suggested that reconciliation between the North and South could be effected by finding the right place for the African American nation.

Extending the arguments of the previous chapters, this chapter contends that expressions of African American nationalism during the 1850s expanded on earlier articulations of ethnic and racial nationalism, with citizenship based on “blood” and
common descent, and emphasized affective and “birthright” connections to the American landscape. Discussions of African Americans as a nation within the larger U.S. nation was, in the hands of writers such as Martin Delany, a form of rhetorical brinksmanship meant to raise the specter of revolution from within. Yet there was division among the African American community over what such arguments hoped to accomplish. Francis Ellen Watkins Harper, Frederick Douglass, and Henry Highland Garnet argued that African Americans were in fact American citizens and should be recognized as such. Martin Delany also claimed “birthright citizenship” for African Americans in America, but he expanded the definition of America to include what we would today consider Central and South Americas. He contrasted *emigration*, the southern movement of African Americans, with *colonization*, the removal of African Americans from the Western hemisphere. Reworking environmental theories and racial essentialisms, Delany argued that African Americans were “denizen[s] of every soil” and could form a nation based on blood ties and experiences of oppression with indigenous Americans. In so doing, Delany attempted to parlay African American *mobility* and *placelessness*, which was for white Americans a key feature of African American identity, into a transnational vision of citizenship that would be a source of power and national possibility.

**CRIMES AGAINST CITIZENSHIP: WHITE AMERICANS AND AFRICAN AMERICAN MOBILITY**

For many white Americans, debates over the extension of slavery in the West had little to do with African American rights. Rather, discussions of popular sovereignty and property rights revealed fractures in the U.S. nation and provided a vehicle for the
assertion of Northern and Southern understandings of white citizenship. Frederick Douglass claimed that the Compromise of 1820 created the South by drawing a dividing line between slave and free states. This section contends that the legislation of the 1850s solidified that divide and revealed competing views of nationalism among the dominant group. It also will explore the ways in which writers from both the North and South attempted to mediate these differences by refocusing attention on issues of slavery and African American nationhood.

During the 1850s, the debates over the extension of slavery in the Western territories often highlighted white Americans’ fears that their own citizenship was at stake. Those who supported the Compromises of 1820 and 1850 and the free-state movement felt that their liberty was being trampled by the Slave Power. As Dr. Charles Robinson, a physician and emigrant who settled in Kansas, asserted on July 4, 1855: “We must not only see black slavery…planted in our midst, and against our wishes, but we must become slaves ourselves.” Other writers claimed that the extension of slavery would make the position of Northern workers akin to “white niggers.” Among its supporters, the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was touted as an extension of white political power, as it promoted the idea of “popular sovereignty.” Stephen A. Douglass, the leading voice of popular sovereignty, explained that it put power in the hands of individuals and communities and allowed white citizens to decide for themselves whether their state would allow slavery. Yet the perceived abuses of white liberty and citizenship by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise were perceived as an affront to Northern rights and, according to historian Nicole Etcheson, persuaded many in the North to join with abolitionists.
The Congressional debates that focused on whether slavery would be allowed in Kansas highlighted fears about the growing strength of a Southern *imperium* (variously referred to as the “Slave Power” or the more explicitly national “slave oligarchy”). In the landmark speech, “The Crime Against Kansas,” delivered in the Senate on May 19-20, 1856, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner vehemently opposed the efforts of the “slave oligarchy” to extend the practice of slavery into the territories and western states:

To overthrow this Usurpation is now the special, importunate duty of Congress, admitting of no hesitation or postponement. To this end it must lift itself from the cabals of candidates, the machinations of party, and the low level of vulgar strife. It must turn from that Slave Oligarchy which now controls the Republic, and refuse to be its tool. Let its power be stretched forth toward this distant Territory, not to bind, but to unbind; not for the oppression of the weak, but for the subversion of the tyrannical; not for the prop and maintenance of a revolting Usurpation, but for the confirmation of Liberty. Sumner here indicted not only factionalism (“the cabals of candidates” and the “machinations of party”), but also warned of the growth of a pro-slavery *imperium*, a government by the wealthy elite that had emerged within the American republic and threatened to subvert the sovereignty of that republic.

This Southern *imperium*, which developed from within the political center of the United States threatened to overtake the geographic center of the country: Kansas Territory. Drawing on familiar language that figured the American landscape as a virginal female body, Sumner contended that this alternative government, made up of the
Southern planter elite, threatened to “rape the virgin Territory of Kansas.” Kansas’s geographic position vis á vis the rest of the nation made it, according to Sumner, an important battleground for issues regarding the political fate of the U.S. nation. He argued:

Take down your map, sir, and you will find that the Territory of Kansas, more than any other region, occupies the middle spot of North America, equally distant from the Atlantic on the east, and the Pacific on the west; from the frozen waters of Hudson’s Bay on the north, and the tepid Gulf Stream on the south, constituting the precise territorial centre of the whole vast continent. To such advantages of situation, on the very highway between two oceans, are added a soil of unsurpassed richness, and a fascinating, undulating beauty of surface, with a healthgiving climate, calculated to nurture a powerful and generous people, worthy to be a central pivot of American institutions.\textsuperscript{252}

Here Kansas’s political importance is described in explicitly spatial terms; it exists in the “middle spot” of North America and “constitut[es] the centre of the whole vast continent.” As such, it is to be a “central pivot of American institutions, and thus if slavery were to be allowed in Kansas, the rest of the country would presumably follow.”\textsuperscript{253}

The kind of geographic discourse that Sumner used to describe threats posed by the Southern elite had been used two years earlier in “Appeal of the Independent Democrats” (1854), which appeared the day after Stephen Douglas presented the Kansas-Nebraska bill to the Senate. This appeal, signed by Senators Samuel Chase, Charles
Sumner, J. R. Giddings, Edward Wade, Gerrit Smith, and Alexander De Witt, highlighted the importance of the specific area that was to be added to the Union as a slave state:

Take your maps, fellow citizens, we entreat you, and see what country it is which this bill gratuitously and recklessly proposes to open to slavery? This immense region, occupying the very heart of the North American Continent, and larger, by thirty-three thousand square miles, than all the existing free States --- including California --- this immense region the bill now before the Senate, without reason and without excuse, but in flagrant disregard of sound policy and sacred faith, purposes to open to slavery.  

The authors appealed to their “fellow citizens” who are presumably versed in the kind of geographic discourse they have employed and entreated them to look at their maps and examine exactly what part of the continent is under debate. Like Sumner’s speech, the “Appeal” implied that the very centrality of Kansas, the fact that it existed in “the very heart of the North American Continent,” makes the possibility of slavery in that territory particularly threatening. The authors drew on the imagery of a slave imperium growing up from within the “heart of the North American Continent.”

While Sumner and others condemned the presence of a Southern imperium, some proslavery writers used this language to defend the enslavement of African Americans by likening slavery to a form of government similar to that of the U.S. states. The enslavement of Black people, they argued, was not oppression, but rather a variation on the social contract that brought African American people into the American political structure (although they occupied the lowest level of the political hierarchy). William Andrew Smith, president of Randolph-Macon College and professor of Philosophy
likened the condition of American slaves to that of an *imperium* in order to counter discussions of a threatening Southern presence in Kansas. In a series of lectures entitled "Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery as Exhibited in the Institution of Domestic Slavery in the United States, with the Duties of Masters to Slaves" (1856), Smith argued:

Domestic slavery is one of the subordinate forms of civil government. It may be defined an *imperium in imperio*—a government within a government: one in which the subject of the inferior government is under the control of a master, up to a certain limit defined by the superior government, and beyond which both the master and the slave are alike subject to control by the superior government. 255

Here an *imperium in imperio* is shown to be a preservation of order, not a threat. Smith described slavery as a “government within a government” in which the government of the slaves is subject to the government of their master, who in turn is subject to the superior state and federal powers. For Smith, this functioned as a defense of slavery, a counter to those who argued that the system was antithetical to the democratic principles of the United States. He argued that the slaves constitute the lowest rung on the democratic ladder, but are nonetheless part of the American political system. They, like their master, are always subject to higher authorities.

Other Southern apologists tried to justify the institution of slavery by claiming that it functioned to connect African Americans to the United States landscape and by limiting their mobility, worked to protect the body politic. George Fitzhugh argued that Africans required the governance of white masters and that allegiance to a master connected people to a particular space. In *Sociology for the South* (1854), Fitzhugh
presented slavery as model of Socialism that “Fourier might envy.”

He argued that free labor divorces individuals from one another and from the land itself, whereas in a feudal society or a slave state, the laborer occupies the home of his master. Free labor, Fitzhugh contended in Cannibals All! (1858), created a situation in which only a few could flourish economically and created classes of people who were totally disconnected from the land because they could not own property: nomads, beggars, gypsies, and banditti. These “nomadic races” were threats to the security of the nation because they were not under the governance of any one community and often characterized by “immorality” and “profligacy.”

By linking people with a particular space and bringing them under the governance of a master, slavery would provide a solution to Europe’s wandering classes, Fitzhugh suggested, just as it provided a way of managing African Americans in the Southern States. His argument represents a departure from Jefferson’s characterization of African Americans as essentially moveable property. In the era of the Underground Railroad, debates over the extension of slavery into the western territories, and the assertion that transporting enslaved people into free states made them free (as was argued in the Dred Scott case), African American mobility was a more complicated issue. Fitzhugh saw African American’s detachment from the American landscape as threatening to the white U.S. nation. The implication of Fitzhugh’s argument is that because African Americans cannot own property, there needs to be some other way to connect them to the American landscape and prevent them from being profligate and dangerous wanderers. Slavery provided this alternative link between African American people and U.S. land by presenting enslaved peoples as an extension of the plantation.
Novelistic discourse of the 1850s also took up this idea that slavery gave African Americans a “place” in the American nation, albeit one that was subordinate to that of white Americans. Caroline Lee Hentz’s proslavery novel *The Planter’s Northern Bride* (1854) offered readers the story of Nat the Giant, a runaway slave who is described as rootless and wandering. The reader first learns of Nat through a conversation between Mr. Moreland, the novel’s Southern protagonist, and one of the residents of the Northern village he is visiting. This acquaintance recounts that the local abolitionist, Mr. Hastings, found Nat when traveling in another state and brought him home to stay with his family. Eulalia Hastings, the abolitionists’ daughter, became ill immediately after Nat arrived. Thus, runaway slaves were presented as a threat to the “health” of individuals and communities. Divorced from their proper “place,” they were implicitly linked with pestilence and disease, circulating unchecked among the American populace. Later in the novel, Nat drowned because he believed his master to be pursuing him. The narrator remarked that, “Nat the Giant had indeed finished his wanderings, and was destined for a gloomier home than the Dismal Swamp of Virginia.” Death provided the end of Nat’s “wanderings,” but the novel implied that he will be condemned in the afterlife as a result of his (apparently) sinful attempts to free himself from bondage. Hentz’s work suggested that there is no place in the United States for free African Americans; home can only be found in slavery or in death.

Colonizationist rhetoric provided an alternative to enslavement, but reinforced the notion that the United States was to be an ethnically and racially homogenous (i.e. white) nation. While some members of the dominant culture such as Gerrit Smith could envision a multiracial American society, some of the most popular novels of the 1850s
advocated the removal of Black people from the American landscape. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* (1852) and Sarah Josepha Hale’s *Liberia; or, Mr. Peyton’s Experiments* (1853) proposed that an effective African American “government,” one that fostered national autonomy among African Americans and preserved the American Union, was only possible within the space of Liberia. *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* ends with George Harris and his family leaving for Liberia, an endorsement of African colonization that garnered Stowe a lot of criticism from Garrisonian abolitionists and African American opponents of colonization. Frederick Douglass simultaneously denounced the move and asserted African American nationhood. In a letter written to Stowe in 1853, but later published in *Frederick Douglass’s Paper*, he wrote “The truth is, dear madam, we are here, and we are likely to remain. Individuals emigrate—nations never.” The African American nation, he argued, was inextricably linked to the American nation and could not just be transplanted to a foreign land.

Hale’s novel *Liberia* argued that, in fact, the formation of an African American nation was dependent on emigration, and emphasized Africa as the only appropriate place for the creation of black citizenship. The “experiments” alluded to in the novel’s title are the various places Mr. Peyton, a Southern slaveholder, tried to relocate his slaves. He wanted to see what location would be most suitable for their emancipation and sent them to a nearby farm, the city of Philadelphia, and Canada. In each of these locations, he determined that his slaves could not be productive members of American society. The novel suggested that, when surrounded by white society, but not governed by it, African American people would not work. Peyton finally decided to send them to Liberia, and
once Junius, Kezhiah and the others arrived in Africa, a dramatic transformation took place.

_Liberia_ suggested that African American slaves could become African American citizen-subjects within the space of Africa. They set up political and social institutions and established a system of individual property ownership. The nation that they formed, one predicated on civil government and territorial possession, echoed the definition of nationhood that circulated among members of the dominant culture in America. Moreover, the apparent ethnic homogeneity of this Liberian nation mirrored back to the American nation what it _should_ be: a nation containing one ethnically and racially unified people. In this way, Hale’s novel can be read not only as an attempt to rhetorically manage the African American population, but also as a way to inculcate particular ideas of nationhood in the white American population. American citizenship and national identity, like that of the Liberians, must be predicated on members’ participation in civil government and on property ownership. It also depended on the idea of a unified _people_ with common origins, language, religion, cultural practices, and so forth. For white Americans, such a fiction of ethnic unity was only possible with the removal of non-white people and the suppression of any other forms of alternative nationalism. This was particularly important at a historical moment when the Mormons were asserting their own version of American nationalism, fears circulated of Irish and Catholic nations emerging from within the United States, and calls for secession envisioned the Northern and Southern states as separate American nations.

The publication history of Hale’s work suggests the ways in which her texts sought to reconcile internal tensions among white Americans. Her first novel _Northwood_
was originally published in 1827 with the subtitle “a Tale of New England.” Hale added material to the end of the novel, including the infamous line that the “mission” of American slavery is to spread Christianity and civilization, and republished it in 1852 under the title *Northwood; or, Life North and South: Showing the True Character of Both.* The title change to one that referenced both halves of the Union and the addition of content that justifies slavery as part of a larger Christian project worked to mediate between arguments for African American enfranchisement and nationhood and those that claimed African Americans could never really be *free* in America. During the 1840s and 50s, Hale was also instrumental in the establishment of Thanksgiving as a national holiday for the purpose of uniting “our great nation, by its states and families from the St. John to the Rio Grande, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.” Hale’s campaign gained new intensity in the years before the Civil War as the threat of secession threatened the Union.

*Liberia*, which was published during the height of Hale’s agitation for Thanksgiving, functioned to offer a vision of national unity and attempted to rhetorically resolve sectional tensions by the removal of the African American “nation” from the American landscape. Doing this, the novel suggests, would allow African American people to enact an idealized version of liberal citizenship and would remove what Hale perceived to be the primary obstacle to the solidification of the white U.S. nation. As Susan Ryan has argued, Hale:

…promotes colonization as a way of not only preserving the Union as she conceives of it (that is, as Protestant and Anglo-Saxon) but also of replicating,
among ex-slaves in a ‘new’ country, American-style nation building, national identity, and citizenship, as she defines them.”

“American-style nation building” here suggests an emphasis on territorial nationalism through which Black people could occupy a national space (something Hale’s novel suggested would never be possible in America) and become property owning citizens. Colonization thus inculcated particular ideas of territorial nationhood in two populations—Black and white Americans—and, like the Thanksgiving campaign, worked to foreclose the expression of other national identities within the space of the United States. The American nation was, as Ryan noted, presented as one Protestant and Anglo-Saxon entity, not a multinational space that included Southern, Mexican, and Black peoples.

The idea that America was a nation of white people (and Africa as a parallel nation of Black people) continued to be expressed by prominent literary figures. In 1858, Walt Whitman asserted that African Americans and white Americans could never “amalgamate,” but that “we believe there is enough material in the colored race, if they were in some secure and ample part of the earth, where they would have a chance to develop themselves, to gradually form a race, a nation that would take no mean rank among the peoples of the world.” Here Whitman tapped into the common parlance of describing African Americans as a nation to be, a race-based nation that had enough “material” to advance, but that could not flourish within the American national space. For the American continent was, Whitman claimed, “for the whites.” Like Hale, Whitman created an image of America and Africa as two ethnically and racially pure nations, each with their own distinct territory.
During the 1850s, dominant group discourses about African Americans and the U.S. national space closely resembled those of earlier decades. Colonization advocates continued to assert that there was no “place” for African Americans within the United States and that the Black nation could only be actualized within the space of Africa. The idea that the U.S. nation and the land it occupied were, as Whitman argued, “for the whites” attempted to inculcate in white readers the idea that “America,” as a nation was paradoxically a bounded, yet ever expanding space possessed by a racially and ethnically homogenous people. Yet the exigencies of the 1850s and the debates over the extension of slavery and the movement of African American people complicated colonizationist discourses, which argued for the mobility of the African Americans. Pro-slavery arguments offered various presentations of African Americans as moveable property and as deeply rooted to the Southern land. Writers like George Fitzhugh defended the institution of slavery by saying that it connected African Americans to the landscape and prevented them from becoming like the “wandering” classes of Europe who were displaced by the break-up of feudal society.

Discussions of African American nationhood that emerged from the dominant culture, were, as they had been in earlier decades, focused on the formation of a Black nation in Africa; the removal of the Black presence from the United States, Hale and others suggested, would further the creation of two racially and ethnically homogenous republics. However, definitions of nationhood in these texts still emphasized property ownership by individuals and nations over ethnic features such as common descent, religion, and language.
AFRICAN AMERICAN NATIONALISM IN 1850s AMERICA

As part of their continued opposition to the institution of slavery and its extension into the Western territories, African American writers of the 1850s worked to present African Americans as a nation. Working against definitions of nationhood that emphasized the possession of a national territory, writers like Francis Ellen Watkins Harper, Harriet Jacobs, and Martin Delany discussed the African American nation in ethnic and racial terms. Africans, they argued, were one nation descended from common origins and sharing the same “blood.” Reworking discourses of racial inferiority, writers such as Delany suggested that all Africans were of the same nation and such was the source of their power. His novel *Blake; or, the Huts of America* which may have been begun as early as 1852, based its revolutionary message on the racial and ethnic unity of African people. Blake is able to spread his plans for revolt by word of mouth because of the relational networks that are already in place among African American people. In *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States* (1852), Delany deemed these relationships to be a form of nationhood. He drew on the rhetoric of *imperium in imperio* to argue that African Americans were a nation within the larger U.S. nation. Given the rhetorical history of this phrase in America, from Alexander Hamilton’s comments on the monstrosity of divided sovereignty to warnings of a threatening Cherokee *imperium*, Delany’s reference to an African American nation functioned as a kind of brinksmanship and warned of possible retaliation.
In “The Colored People of America” (1854), an essay published at the end of Poems on Miscellaneous Subjects, Francis Harper discussed African American nationalism in terms of blood and descent. She wrote:

Place any nation in the same condition which has been our hapless lot, fetter their limbs and degrade their souls…and tell me, reviler of our race! censurer of our people! if there is a nation in whose veins runs the purest Caucasian blood, upon whom the same causes would not produce the same effects; whose social condition, intellectual and moral character, would present a more favorable aspect than ours? 271

Here Harper argued against the idea of inherent racial inferiority and instead claimed that African Americans were products of the oppressive forces that shaped them as a nation. But she defined a “nation” as something based on inherent qualities, specifically “blood” or lineage, rather than political organization or the ownership of a particular territory. Referring to a “nation in whose veins runs…Caucasian blood,” she also likened the nation to the human body. Presenting the nation as a single human body, characterized by its “blood,” emphasized the ethnic and social dimensions of Harper’s definition of nationhood. And although her definition of nationhood is based on inherent features, the differences between the African American nation and the Caucasian nation, Harper argued, were socially constructed. She pointed to the growth of African American institutions (churches, schools, newspapers) as a means of solidifying national unity and affecting social and political changes.

Other writers of the period engaged discourses that presented Africans and African Americans as a single group, and argued that this ethnic and racial unity could be
a source of power and revolution. Martin Delany’s *Blake* considered by Robert Levine to be “a Pan-African vision of black nationalism that means to combat and expose the limits of the U.S. nationalism espoused by blacks aligned with [Frederick] Douglass” constitutes one of the clearest endorsements of race-based nationalism produced during the 1850s. In the novel, the character of Royer, also referred to as simply “the American,” gave voice to the idea that Africans and African-descended peoples share common origins. In “The Middle Passage,” Royer and Captain Paul discuss the fact that two of the slaves aboard ship seemed to recognize Blake. Royer asserts that it was entirely possible that the three knew each other or were related:

“Negroes all know each other, you know; all uncles and aunts, brothers and sisters, and cousins,” replied the American. “I never saw a Negro yet that wasn’t acquainted with another Negro you could name; Negroes are all the same everywhere.”

While on the surface this statement resonated with racist discourses that presented Africans and African Americans as sub-human and interchangeable, the novel suggested that there is an element of truth to the idea that African-descended peoples “all know each other.” Abyssa, one of the slaves aboard the ship, who is from Sudan but has lived among the Ebo, does recognize Blake as a “civilized man” and whispers the watch words he created to him. Thus, the novel implied that Africans and African-descended people do all know one another in a way that white people cannot understand or control.

In *Blake*, the interrelationships between people, whether genealogical or social, are the source of African power and form the basis of a race-based nationalism. Whereas Harper can be seen to articulate an African American nationalism, Delany’s work
suggests a transnational *African* nationalism. Blake goes to Havana to reconnect with his wife, Maggie, but while he is there he also meets his cousin Placido, the Cuban poet and revolutionary. While *Blake*, like other anti-slavery narratives, dramatizes the separation of families by the institution of slavery, it is also a novel about the formation and reformation of families and communities. Blake’s plan for revolution relies on the spread of information through the informal networks already in place among Africans living within the United States. The readers of *Blake*, who may be white, are never told of the specifics of Blake’s plans, but witness only scenes of the information being passed from one person to another. It is only Africans and African Americans, particularly those who are not of mixed race, who can fully participate in Blake’s plan.

Like Harper’s essay, *Blake* presented African national identity as predicated on “blood” and common descent, and claimed that whites have used differences in “blood” to divide the African American community. It suggests that the Messianic leader of the resistance must be a “pure” African, not someone of mixed race. Robert Levine has interpreted *Blake*’s focus on the need for a “pure” black leader to be an attempt by Delany to argue that he, rather than Frederick Douglass (who was the son of his white master), should represent the African American community. Yet, the novel’s emphasis on “pure” blood can also be viewed in terms of its arguments for the empowerment of all people of African descent. Placido remarked, “I hold that colored persons, whatever the complexion, can only obtain an equality with whites by the descendents of Africa of unmixed blood.” The equality of biracial people will be achieved, he argued, only after Black people have been admitted to be the equals of whites; because once Black and white people are considered equal to one another, mixed race people will be deemed the
equals of both groups. He explained this to Madam Cordora, a wealthy woman of mixed race, who responded:

I certainly see it, Señor Placido, as I never saw it before, and you have given me a greater idea of the relation we sustain to the African race, than I ever had before; and the same certainly obtains to Africa as a country, and her people as a nation or nations.²⁷⁶

Here Cordora distinguishes between Africa as “country” and her “people” who comprise the nation, a distinction that suggests an ethnic rather than territorial sense of nationalism. Elsewhere in the novel Madam Cordora noted that Blake helped her feel as proud of her “black” blood as she did of her “white blood.” While Delany could be seen as using the same kind of essentialist discourses used to justify black slavery based on racial inferiority, he can also be seen to be constructing a vision of African nationalism that transcends the national borders of America and Cuba.²⁷⁷ Madam Cordora’s notion of Africans as a “nation” is one that is divorced from the physical space of Africa and is not predicated on the ownership of a national space nor on the creation of civic institutions. African nationhood is defined in ethnic terms and membership is open to those with African “blood,” although whites have worked to alienate “full-blooded” Africans from those of mixed race, just as they have divided slaves from free men and women.

The social status of mixed race people, Blake suggested, has been manipulated by whites so as to create divisions among African and African descended people. Before his trip to Cuba, Blake goes to Charleston, South Carolina, home of the “Brown Society,” whose biracial members are said to prefer the slavery of Black people because it cements their own social standing. Blake described the Brown Society as:
the bane and dread of blacks in the state, an organization formed through the instrumentality of whites to keep the blacks and the mulattos at variance. To such an extent is the error carried, that the members of the association, rather than their freedom would prefer to see the blacks remain in bondage. But many most excellent mulattoes and quadroons condemn with execration this auxiliary of oppression.278

According to Blake, white Americans promoted discourses of racial hierarchy and the formation of institutions that work to inculcate race-based divisions among African Americans. Organizations like the Brown Society, the novel suggested, functioned as a way to manage the African American population and prevent the formation of a coherent national identity.

The circulation of a race-based African American nationalism, while it must be performed by a “full-blooded” leader, functions in Blake to overcome these divisions among African American people. But, unlike Harriet Jacobs, who wrote in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861) that “God made of one blood all the nations of the world,” Delany’s novel suggested that there are essential differences between the African and white American nations. In his prose writings, Delany suggested that Africans ability to adopt to different climates, a feature that whites did not seem to possess, made the African nation more mobile and cosmopolitan, in the sense that Africans really could be, as David Walker’s Appeal suggested, “citizens of the world.” His writings on African American nationalism were not only about the mobilization of racial consciousness, but also the territorialization (to use Anthony Smith’s terminology) of a transnational
“colored” people (by “colored” he meant African descended people and indigenous Americans).

As part of his argument for transnational citizenship, Delany employed the rhetoric of *imperium in imperio*. In *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States* (1852), Delany employed this language to link the condition of African Americans with that of oppressed groups in other nations and suggest that the only way for African Americans to become a whole people, whose rights are recognized by other political communities, is for them to assert their status as a *nation* and obtain a *national space*. While Delany already viewed Africans and those of African descent as a racial nation, he argued that they needed to articulate their claims in the terms of civic and territorial nationhood in order to gain the recognition of other nations. He wrote:

> That there have in all ages, in almost every nation, existed a nation within a nation—a people who although forming a part and parcel of the population, yet were from force of circumstances, known by the peculiar position they occupied, forming in fact, by the deprivation of political equality with others, no part, and if any, but a restricted part of the body politic of such nations, is also true.  

Her Delany drew on the concept of *imperium in imperio* but used the English translation to make it more accessible for his readers. This rhetoric allows him to convey the visual image of Africans and African-descended people as a nation “restricted” and even constricted by the American nation. By using this image, Delany avoided the language of vertical hierarchy that was often employed in discussions of African Americans political
position within the United States. He argued that while the African American nation was “depriv[ed] of political equality,” they were nonetheless a nation.

And as a nation within a nation, African Americans’ position was similar to many white ethnic populations, an argument that challenged discourses of racial inferiority. Delany compared the African American imperium to the conditions of “the Poles in Russia, the Hungarians in Austria, the Scotch, Irish, and Welsh in the United Kingdom, and ….the Jews.” These groups, he argued, are able to maintain their distinct ethnic nationhoods, even without a direct connection to a specific territory. They are, he wrote:

scattered throughout not only the length and breadth of Europe, but almost the habitable globe, maintaining their national characteristics, and looking forward in high hopes of seeing the day when they may return to their former national position of self-government and independence, let that be in whatever part of the habitable world it may.280

Here Delany foreshadowed his argument for emigration by suggesting that the national identities of these groups, like that of Africans, can be recreated. Delany himself used the word “colored” so as not to distinguish between Africans in America and those who lived elsewhere. As opposed to dominant discourses of African Americans as a nation in the making, a nation that can only be actualized in Africa, Delany suggested that African nationhood constitutes a return rather than a creation and would be possible in any space of the “habitable world.”

Building on the idea of the reformation of an African nation, Delany noted that years of slavery and oppression have threatened the unity and “purity” of the African nation. He wrote, “we have been, by our oppressors, despoiled of our purity, and
corrupted in our native characteristics, so that we have inherited their vices, and but few of their virtues, leaving us in character, really a broken people.”

Despite the cultural and national assimilation of Africans into American society, Delany argued that their physical attributes, particularly skin color, continued to mark them as a separate nation. Reconstituting Africans as a people would require them to claim their national status, for “[t]he claims of no people, according to established policy and usage, are respected by any nation; until they are presented in a national capacity.” Here and elsewhere Delany seemed to suggest that Africans’ struggle for recognition within the United States will require transforming arguments for racial equality into arguments for “national capacity.” He appealed to his readers, “It is time we had become politicians, we mean, to understand the political economy and domestic policy of nations; that we had become as well as moral theorists, also the practical demonstrators of equal rights and self-government.” So in addition to arguments about the immorality of slavery and the inherent humanity of the African race, Delany challenged his readers to think politically and transform themselves into political subjects, “practical demonstrators of equal rights and self-government.” He called for the creation of a convention that will be attended by those of the highest intelligence, not a gathering of the masses. The formation of such a convention, Delany implied, would further the politicization of the African American nation.

Throughout the 1850s, dominant group discourses frequently defined nationhood as the possession of territory as the U.S. nation pursued policies of territorial expansion and annexation. African American writers and speakers worked to expand understandings of nationhood to include a Black nation characterized by ethnic features
of “blood” ties and common cultural features. They sought to renegotiate the relationship between African American people and the American landscape. An important part of this project was the creation of an alternative vision of citizenship, one that was not predicated on individual property ownership. Yet, the issue of citizenship was a divisive one for the African American community, as some writers like Frederick Douglass agitated for American citizenship while Martin Delany argued for a transcendent “colored” citizenship. Delany critiqued the constitutive rhetoric practiced by Douglass, who frequently referred to his audiences, Black and white, as “fellow citizens.” According to Delany, merely calling his listeners citizens would not effect political change. African Americans had to look beyond the borders of the United States to achieve any kind of real political power.

CONTESTED CITIZENSHIPS: AMERICANS BY BIRTH OR AFRICANS BY RACE

In making his call for the politicization of African American people, Delany gestured toward a major concern for non-dominant group people in the 1850s: the creation of an alternative vision of African or African American citizenship, one not predicated on whiteness, liberal notions of property ownership, or prior recognition as citizens of a particular state. Against the backdrop of dominant group rhetorics that proposed slavery as the only way to connect African Americans to the U.S. landscape or denied that there was any “place” for Black people in America at all, African American writers worked to articulate alternative links to the U.S. space. They drew on earlier discourses that highlighted African Americans’ affective, economic, and birthright relationships to the
land. In so doing, they were able to challenge definitions of citizenship which were based solely on whiteness or property ownership.

Yet among the African American community, there was also great division as to where Black citizenship was possible (or desirable), how it should be affected, and how the current status of African and African descended people in America could be characterized. Frederick Douglass was one of the leading proponents of African American citizenship and consistently referred to his Black and white audiences as “fellow citizens.” Douglass’s arguments relied, in part, on constitutive rhetoric and the calling into being of an African American political body. When speaking before a gathering of African Americans who convened in Chicago in 1853, Chicago abolitionist John Jones expressed similar sentiments, asserting that African Americans would “plant our trees in American soil.” An avowed emigrationist, Delany was an outspoken critic of the practice of referring to African Americans as “citizens” and the assimilationist discourses of Frederick Douglass. Yet, as this section will show, Delany’s own views on Black citizenship were somewhat conflicted and his attempts to forge a vision of transnational African citizenship was predicated on essentialist discourses and climatalogical theories not unlike those promoted by apologists of slavery.

**Birthright Citizenship**

In the 1840s and early 1850s, some members of the African American community continued to draw on rhetorics of “birthright citizenship” and the labor theory of value to argue for the presence of an African American nation that was entitled to American
citizenship. Previous arguments for African American citizenship had claimed that their American birth and/or contributions to the political and economic stability of the United States qualified African Americans to be citizens. During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, David Walker, Absalom Jones, Richard Allen, and Maria Stewart contested the emergent discourses of African colonization and created a vision of transcendent citizenship that allowed them to imagine themselves as an African people and as American citizens. This section surveys the ways in which African American writers of the 1850s referenced their places of birth and their affective and economic contributions to the nation as proof of their positions as citizens and their place within the American nation. Frederick Douglass and Henry Highland Garnet referred to their Black and white audiences as “fellow citizens,” an attempt to mobilize and politicize their African American audiences.

Drawing on discourses of birthright citizenship advanced by earlier opponents of colonization, Henry Highland Garnet and Frederick Douglass worked against arguments that denied African American rights and divorced them from the American landscape. In his 1843 “Address to the Slaves of the United States of America,” which was reprinted in 1848, Garnet reminded his audience to:

…forget not that you are native-born American citizens, and as such you are justly entitled to all the rights that are granted to the freest. Think how many tears you have poured out upon the soil which you have cultivated with unrequited toil, and enriched with your blood…
Here Garnet drew on arguments similar to those used by David Walker: African Americans physical and emotional contributions to the American landscape and claims of *jus soli* (right of birth) allow them to claim their rights as Americans.

Frederick Douglass echoed these sentiments in an 1851 speech entitled “The Free Negro’s Place is in America.” Douglass stated:

> We have grown up with you; we have watered your soil with our tears; nourished it with our blood, tilled it with our hard hands. Why should we not stay here? We came when it was a wilderness, and were the pioneers of civilization on this continent. We leveled your forests; our hands removed the stumps from your fields and raised the first crops and brought the first produce to your tables.”

Drawing on celebratory discourses of Americans’ conquest of the land, Douglass claimed that African Americans, not whites, were the true “pioneers” who tamed the American wilderness. African Americans’ place is in America, he argued, because they made America from the ground up.

After establishing African Americans’ affective ties to the land and the impact that their labor had on the formation of the United States, Garnet and Douglass refuted the idea that Black citizenship was only possible somewhere other than America. Although he would later come to endorse colonization, Garnet claimed in his 1843 “Address” that there could be no exodus from America for Black people. They must claim their political right in the United States because “THE PHARAOHS ARE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BLOOD-RED WATERS.” Garnet invoked the oft-cited link between the African people and the Hebrew people as examples of nations in bondage, but argued against the search for a Promised Land. Wherever Africans go, he suggested,
they will have to combat the oppressive conditions fostered by racist ideologies and the institution of slavery. Instead of the biblical model of the Mosaic patriarch, who would lead the people on a physical journey out of bondage, Garnet set up the secular patriots Nat Turner and Denmark Vesey as the kind of leaders that were needed. A “patriot” is defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as a “person who loves his or her country, *esp.* one who is ready to support its freedoms and rights and to defend it against enemies or detractors.” Garnet’s statements suggest that Turner and Vesey were fighting for the African American nation, not the United States of America. His rhetoric was constitutive in that although he alluded to the African American nation, his reminders to readers suggested that he was writing to a community that was not yet fully mobilized. Garnet reminded African Americans that they are American citizens so as to encourage them to claim this right and call into being a community of African American citizens.

Like Garnet, Frederick Douglass was vehemently opposed to colonization and employed constitutive rhetoric in many of his speeches and written texts of the 1850s to argue for African American citizenship based on right of birth. He encouraged African Americans to remember that “home, a country, a nationality, are all attainable this side of Liberia. But for the present, the colored people should just stay where they are, unless they are compelled to leave.” Although they are “aliens” in their native land, Douglass suggested that a kind of race-based nationalism is possible without leaving the United States. He worked toward the creation of this African American nation, whose object was American citizenship, through his repeated references to both his Black and white audiences as his “fellow citizens” and his discussions of African Americans as already American citizens. In speeches such as “The Meaning of the Fourth of July for the
Negro” (1852), he referred to his largely white audience as “fellow citizens,” thus asserting his own political subjectivity as the equal of his listeners.

Douglass’s writings of the 1850s made explicit arguments for African American citizenship based on the notion of birthright or *jus soli*. In “The Claims of Our Common Cause” (1853), Douglass stated emphatically that African Americans were citizens despite the oppression and deprivations that they have suffered. He said, “We would, first of all, be understood to range ourselves no lower among our fellow-countrymen than is implied in the high appellation of ‘citizen.’” As a speech delivered at the National Convention, Douglass’s message functioned to instruct both white Americans and African Americans as to the nature of the African American claim to citizenship. He based his arguments on the notion of *jus soli* or birthright citizenship as well as on the foundational documents of American politics:

By birth, we are American citizens; by the principles of the Declaration of Independence, we are American citizens; within the meaning of the United States Constitution, we are American citizens; by the facts of history, and the admissions of American statesmen, we are American citizens; by the hardships and trials endured; by the courage and fidelity displayed by our ancestors in defending the liberties and in achieving the independence of our land; we are American citizens.

Here Douglass drew on the rhetorical tradition employed by activists such as Walker and Garnet, that which based African American citizenship on their economic, political, and emotional contributions to the United States landscape.
In his response to the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, Douglass continued to mobilize the African American community and inculcate them with the principles of ethnic nationhood. The U.S. Constitution, he argued in 1854, established only two classes of people in America: “citizens” and “aliens.” Whether one was a citizen or not, Douglass asserted, was based on where one was born, not on the color of one’s skin. Citizens were those individuals born within the United States, while “aliens” were those who were born elsewhere. Because he was not an alien, Douglass claimed that he was, by default, a U.S. citizen. Moreover, his residence in the state of New York, which recognized his political rights, made him a federal citizen according to the U.S. constitution. Throughout this speech, Douglass implicitly denied claims of African American rootlessness by asserting his own stake in the commonwealth and his concern for the nation’s fate. He is thus tied to a locality (his home in New York) and to the nation as a whole.

While he sometimes disagreed with Douglass, Martin Delany also claimed birthright citizenship for African Americans. In *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States Politically Considered* (1852), he wrote:

> Our common country is this United States. Here we were born, here raised and educated; here are the scenes of childhood; the pleasant associations of our school going days; the loved enjoyments of our domestic and fireside relations, and the sacred graves of our departed fathers and mothers, and from here we will not be driven by any policy that may be schemed against us.²⁹²

Delany, like Douglass and Garnet, argued for the affective connections between African American people and the United States land. Their births, education, childhood
memories, domestic relationships, and the graves of their ancestors bound them to the land and gave them the right to claim it for their “country.”

Delany continued his argument for birthright citizenship in more explicit terms and drew on liberal notions of natural rights to present African Americans as “fixed” rather than mobile. He wrote:

We are Americans, having a birthright citizenship—natural claims upon the country—claims common to all others of our fellow citizens—natural rights, which may, by virtue of unjust laws, be obstructed, but never can be annulled. Upon these do we place ourselves, as immovably fixed as the decrees of the living God. But according to the economy that regulates the policy of nations, upon which rests the basis of justifiable claims to all freemen’s rights, it may be necessary to take another point of view, and enquire into the political claims of colored men.293

Delany explicitly claimed citizenship based on “birthright” and argued that the natural rights of African American people “never can be annulled.” Moreover, in the context of dominant group discourses that demonized African American mobility, Delany presented Black people as “immovably fixed.” Yet, despite these valid claims on the United States, Delany suggested that African American people may have to look elsewhere to achieve the political rights they are due and develop a vision of citizenship other than that based on birthright claims to the United States. To do this, he redefined the notion of “America” to include the area that we would now consider the Americas.

But Delany did not think merely calling African America people citizens would garner them political rights within the United States. Delany was critical of the kinds of
constitutive rhetoric employed by Douglass, Garnet, and Harper. He critiqued the tendency among African American speakers and writers to refer to themselves and their audiences as “citizens.” In “Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent” (1854), Delany wrote:

We have not addressed you as citizens—a term desired and ever cherished by us,—because such you have never been. We have not addressed you as freemen, because such privileges have never been enjoyed by any colored man in the United States. Why then should we flatter your credulity, by inducing you to believe that which neither has now, nor never before had, an existence? Our oppressors are ever gratified at our manifest satisfaction, especially when that satisfaction is founded upon false premises; an assumption on our part of the enjoyment of rights and privileges which have never been conceded, and which, according to the present system of the United States policy, we can never enjoy.  

Delany here asserted that merely calling his audience “citizens” will not affect their political position and would actually participate in their oppression at the hands of whites. Referring to African American people as “citizens” would only breed a kind of “false” satisfaction and mask the absence of actual rights and privileges. It was necessary, he suggested, to develop a new definition of citizenship and a new language for talking about Black political life.
Transnational Citizenship:

While he frequently has been discussed as “the first black nationalist,” this section will consider Robert Levine’s discussion of Martin Delany as a transnationalist and explore Delany’s attempts to create a transnational citizenship that included both African Americans and American Indian peoples. Delany’s alternative to the “birthright” American citizenship proposed by Harper, Douglass, and others was a vision of transnational American citizenship that he claimed was uniquely available to “colored” people. Delany used the word “colored” to refer to people of both African and indigenous American descent. Responding to dominant discourses that sought to demonize African American mobility, or regulate it through the process of colonization, Delany attempted to show how African Americans could be both mobile and connected to particular places. He drew on spatial languages associated with territorial nationalism, but infused those rhetorics with ideas of ethnic nationalism based on inherent physical features and common descent. Through these efforts, Delany, like the title character of his novel *Blake; or, The Huts of America* tried to create a “space for action,” in which a new form of “American” nationalism could flourish. Ultimately, Delany called not for the creation of a new, African American nation, but for the melding together of two oppressed groups—African Americans and indigenous peoples of America—to form a consolidated position within a contained and defensible national space.

Scholars who have considered Delany’s views on citizenship generally have focused on his desire to emigrate to a place where “colored people” outnumbered whites. Glenn Hendler has characterized Delany’s views as an endorsement of “statistical
citizenship” because Delany claimed that Black people must go to a place where they could represent the statistical majority. To found a successful nation, Delany claimed, “our attention must be turned in a direction towards those places where the black and colored man comprise, by population, and constitute by necessity of numbers, the ruling element of the body politic…” This section will suggest, however, that place or national territory was more crucial to Delany’s views on Black citizenship than his desire for a Black majority, which explains the distinction he drew between emigration from the United States and colonization (in which Black people left the Western hemisphere).

The formation of a new “American” nation, was, for Delany as it had been for proponents of colonization, largely about finding the right place. Throughout his writings, Delany rejected several locations for the founding of this new nation. For Delany, Canada is not a workable location for an African American nation because Black people can never outnumber the white population. Although Black people would make up a statistical majority in Africa, Delany found Liberia to be geographically “objectionable.” He concluded this based on the fact that Liberia was located “in the sixth degree of latitude North of the equator, in a district signally [sic] unhealthy.” In addition to its geographic problems, Delany asserted that “Liberia is not an Independent Republic: in fact, it is not an independent nation at all; but a poor miserable mockery—a burlesque on a government—a pitiful dependency on the American Colonizationists.”

He turned his attention to Cuba, the Caribbean, and South America, places where he claimed the climate was more hospitable for Black people, as possible national territories for African Americans.
Delany’s understandings of these locations as part of the continent of “America” accounts for his apparently paradoxical position that African Americans should emigrate, but “must not leave this continent; America is our home.” This broad understanding of the American continent as encompassing what we would today consider North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, informed Delany’s distinction between emigration and colonization. He considered emigration to be a movement north or south, while colonization entailed leaving the Western hemisphere entirely. To support his argument for emigration, Delany drew on ideological and climatological readings of the “American” landscape to show that the Western hemisphere is the only fit place for a Black nation. Race does play a part in his argument, but he cited the places where “colored” people were already present as proof of his environmental theories. Even more than a statistical citizenship, Delany argued for a transnational race-based citizenship based on his belief that African people and American Indian people were descended from common origins. Because of their inherent physical features, he argued, these groups were better able to live in a variety of climates than whites and could thus claim a variety of national spaces.

Expanding rhetorics of American exceptionalism, Delany argued that “America” is the only fit place for a Black nation because it has been “designed by Providence as an asylum for all the various nations of the earth.” He noted that since its beginnings, “America” has been a heterogeneous space, populated by people of various professions, classes, and races. Rather than arguing that God intended “America” for one specific people, as the Puritans did, Delany argued that the “Finger of God” singled out the “American” continent for a place of refuge and as a distinctly multinational place. Thus,
“America” is exceptional for its variety, according to Delany, not for its singularity or uniformity. As a location that has ever been a place of asylum and refuge, whose very land has been marked for this purpose, it is the most appropriate place for the formation of a new nation of African descended peoples and indigenous Americans.

Delany’s second argument for emigration, rather than colonization is that the climate of “America” is more suitable for African American people than that of other places. He wrote that “[t]he advantages of this continent are superior, because it presents every variety of climate, soil, and production of the earth.” Delany specifically pointed to the geographic locations of Central and South America as particularly hospitable to people of African descent. These locations have warm climates in which white people did not flourish, but were fertile places for cultivation.

Regardless of the precise climate, Delany argued that “colored” people have the ability to adapt to various environments. Reworking racially essentialist arguments, Delany proposed that “colored” people had a distinct advantage over whites:

There is one great physiological fact in regard to the colored race—which, while it may not apply to all colored persons, is true of those having black skins—that they can bear more different climates than the white race. They bear all the temperates and extremes, while the other can only bear the temperates and one of the extremes. The black race is endowed with natural properties, that adapt and fit them for temperate, cold, and hot climates; while the white race is only endowed with properties that adapt them to temperate and cold climates; being unable to stand the warm climates; in them, the white race cannot work, but become
perfectly indolent, requiring somebody to work for them—and these, are always people of the black race.\textsuperscript{302}

Here Delany reversed racist depictions of African-descended peoples as “indolent” and unwilling to work (employed in novels such as Hale’s \textit{Liberia}) and instead applied this language to whites. Moreover, he drew on languages of African American hardiness, often used to justify their enslavement, and instead made this a qualification for their freedom. They are fit to live anywhere and so should not stay in the United States where they will continue to be oppressed.

Countering discourses that presented African Americans as \textit{placeless}, Delany presented the “black race” as citizens of the world. They are linked with particular places, but they are not bound to them. He wrote that “[t]he black race may be found, inhabiting in healthful improvement, every part of the globe where the white race resides; while there are parts of the globe where the black race reside, that the white race cannot live in health.”\textsuperscript{303} Here Delany’s work served to counter association between African mobility and the spread of disease (as presented in Caroline Lee Hentz’s novel \textit{The Planter’s Northern Bride}) by emphasizing that African-descended peoples live “in healthful improvement” wherever they go. He discussed African Americans as “denizen[s] of the world” and suggested they should “unite and make common cause in elevation, with our similarly oppressed brother, the Indian.”\textsuperscript{304} Here Delany argued not just for a Pan-African nationhood, but a kind of transnational “American” nationhood in which African-descended people and indigenous Americans would, by virtue of their common ancestry and their social position, form one nation.
Delany’s views of what this nation would be were influenced by ideas of both ethnic and territorial nationhood. African- and Indian-descended peoples, he contended, were linked by blood ties. “The aborigine of the continent,” Delany wrote, “is more closely allied to us in consanguinity, than to the European—being descended from the Asiatic, whose alliance in matrimony with the African is very common—therefore, we have even greater claims to this continent on that account.”

In a somewhat problematic move, Delany touted African Americans connection with the American Indian as proof of a valid connection to the land. His language here is not unlike that of white Europeans as they celebrated the marriage of Pocahontas and John Rolfe as proof of English dominion over Powhatan lands. However, he does offer a vision of nationhood in which “colored” people, rather than white Europeans, occupy a superior position and have a more legitimate claim to the “American” landscape. For Delany, the nation he envisioned was one comprised of “colored” citizens with blood ties to one another, who nonetheless occupied a specific and discrete national space.

Delany acknowledged in The Condition…of the Colored People of the United States (1853) that African Americans would not be going to an unoccupied country. He presented emigration not as the conquest of virgin land, but as a movement to a welcoming country. He wrote:

No—go when we will, and where we may, we shall hold ourselves amenable to defend and protect any country that embraces us. We are fully able to defend ourselves, once concentrated, against any odds—and by the help of God, we will do it. We do not go, without counting the cost, cost what it may; all that it may cost, it is worth to be free.
This passage reflects Delany’s understandings of a nation as a bounded territory, in which a people can be “concentrated” and which they can defend against outside invaders. This statement linked Delany’s writings to earlier discourses of African American nationalism that likened Black people to the Israelites, an ethnic nation with a common culture and ties to an as yet to be realized homeland. For Delany, the African American imperium, which has been consolidated through conditions of oppression within the United States, must go to a more “welcoming” environment where his vision of a colored nation could be realized.

**CONCLUSION**

In previous decades, white Americans had employed the rhetoric of imperium in imperio as a way to resolve sectional conflicts between North and South by projecting these internal problems onto the presence of non-white nations of African Americans or American Indians. The 1850s saw an increase in tensions between slave and free states and outbreaks of violence in the western territories and on the senate floor. Within this political context, the rhetorical projection made possible by discourses of imperium in imperio could no longer resolve the crisis of culture faced by white Americans in the 1850s. Because this language was such an important part of American political culture and had been used to identify a variety of threats to national security, Northern and Southern writers levied charges against one another of forming an imperium within the larger U.S. nation. Northerners who opposed the spread of slavery warned of the growing power of a “slave oligarchy” that would emerge from within Kansas—the very
heart of the United States—if left unchecked. In response to these claims, Southerners not only charged that the nation of New England was threatening to usurp their rights, but also tried to reposition the slave system as an important safeguard for national order. The plantation was an *imperium*, claimed writers such as William A. Smith, but it cemented national unity and reduced the threat of African American mobility.

The colonization of free Black people to Africa continued to be championed as another way of curtailing African American mobility, which was figured as a threat to the American body politic. Employing rhetorics of territorial nationalism, writers such as Sarah Josepha Hale asserted that African Americans were a nation in the making, which could only be actualized in Africa. Such discourses emphasized the connection between citizenship and property ownership and suggested that nationhood was also about racial and ethnic homogeneity. In this way, colonization rhetoric attempted to foreclose the expression of alternative nationalisms within the white population, and prevent the formation of racial and ethnic *imperia*.

Despite dominant group efforts to subvert the formation of ethnic and racial nationalisms, African American writers of the 1850s situated African Americans as a race-based nation within the larger nation of the United States. As an African American nation which had made economic, sentimental, and political contributions to the United States, argued Frederick Douglass, Henry Highland Garnet, and others, African Americans could claim birthright citizenship. These writers and speakers employed constitutive rhetorics of citizenship—referring to themselves and their African American audiences as American citizens—so as to mobilize African Americans into exerting pressure on the United States to grant them their rights. As part of these arguments,
African Americans attempted to renegotiate U.S. discourses of nationhood that equated citizenship solely with property ownership and assert their own claims to the American landscape.

Drawing perhaps on his background as a Mason (a group who had been charged with forming an alternative government), Martin Delany employed the rhetoric of *imperium in imperio* to play on white fears of internal revolution and make transnational connections between African Americans and other oppressed groups throughout the world. He, like Douglass and Garnet, argued that African Americans must present themselves as a nation to be recognized by white culture as political subjects. But, unlike other opponents of colonization, Delany drew an important distinction between the United States and America. He redefined America as what would today be considered the Americas and articulated new possibilities for transcendent race-based citizenship in Central or South America. Delany subverted the disciplinary function of discourses of racial consolidation. He instead offered images of a unified “colored” nation as a way to mobilize African Americans within the U.S. not to be satisfied with merely being called citizens, but to work toward the creation of a new vision of “American” citizenship.
Conclusion

This project has traced the development and circulation of a particular topos, *imperium in imperio*, within antebellum American public argument. I contend that this rhetorical construction, which was once confined to the cultural productions of the British and Anglo-American political elite, began to filter into popular discourse during the early decades of the nineteenth century. As a result, discussions of *imperium in imperio* served as a bridge between juridicopolitical discourses and popular culture, a channel of communication through which disparate peoples attempted to articulate (often contesting) visions of U.S. nationhood. Drawing on its historical uses, derived from white Americans’ readings of Blackstone’s legal commentaries, the idea of a nation within a nation provided a way to identify threats to the dominant political culture.

To fit their own political and cultural exigencies, white Americans put this discourse to new uses, employing it as part of a larger process of displacing sectional tensions onto the presence of race- or ethnic-based nations existing within the larger U.S. nation. As an expression of political ideology, this rhetorical construction was employed at key moments of sectional strife in an attempt to shore up national unity by regulating the behavior and subjectivity of white and non-white peoples alike. To manage the threat implied by divided sovereignty, *imperium in imperio* was strategically adapted by white Americans so as to position non-white peoples as under the jurisdiction of the United States, but separate from the dominant political culture. Yet despite attempts to displace
sectional tensions and resolve them through dealings with “other” nations, the U.S. became increasingly divided and a new nation, the Confederacy, emerged from within the heart of the United States.

In the hands of African American and American Indian writers and speakers, *imperium in imperio* became an organizing principle for the expression of ethnic and racial nationalisms, which were articulated as challenges to the civic/territorial nationalisms of white United States culture. Expressions of ethnic and racial nationalism worked to mobilize and politicize non-white peoples and create a sense of collectivity identity that could be used as leverage against the U.S. nation. The articulation of alternative nationalisms allowed writers from a variety of backgrounds to envision transcendent citizeenships that provided conceptual alternatives to U.S. citizenship, which was explicitly linked with property ownership, and in the mid nineteenth century, with whiteness. These rhetorical strategies employed by African Americans and American Indian groups influenced later presentations of U.S. nationalism by the dominant culture and informed later discussions of *imperium in imperio*.

My approach in this project was to draw from recent studies in nationalism and transnationalism (scholarship that may seem antithetical) within a loosely Foucauldian paradigm to explore the unique processes of nation-formation that occurred in antebellum America. Each field of study has something to offer the other. Theories of nationalism (particularly those by Anthony Smith) offer a critical vocabulary and way to think in broad terms about how nations evolve from particular ethnic groups. Such a methodology is suggested by the historical record, as so many writers of the nineteenth century were concerned with the nation as an object of study and a means of asserting
collective and individual identities. Yet this approach has led to studies of particular nations in isolation, and has been applied most frequently to the nations of Europe and South Asia. Transnationalism, on the other hand, has lead to exciting hemispheric studies of the Americas and the ways in which the United States was informed by its dealings with other nations. What my project contributes to both fields of study—nationalism and transnationalism—is a more rigorous discussion of ethnic and racial nationalism in the United States and the ways in which transnational American studies does not always have to look outside of the United States for points of comparison. There is a great deal of valuable work to be done on the ways in which the United States shaped and was shaped by “the nations within.”
Epilogue

Dred Scott, Divided Sovereignty, and Divided Citizenship

While the Dred Scott decision has been read as a foreclosure of African American citizenships (as proposed by David Walker, Maria Stewart, Frederick Douglass, Martin Delany, and others), it can also be read as proof of the effects that expressions of racial and ethnic nationhood had on the political institutions of the United States. Scholars have viewed Chief Justice Taney’s decision in the case of *Dred Scott v. Sanford* (1856) as an explicitly racial articulation of U.S. nationalism that connected national citizenship with whiteness and foreclosed the possibility for African American citizenship. As an extension of the interpretive work of my dissertation, I will briefly sketch out some ways in which the Dred Scott decision demonstrates that conceptions of the U.S. nation and national citizenship were informed by expressions of ethnic and racial nationhood by non-white peoples. Because of the way this case resonated with rhetorics of divided sovereignty (*imperium in imperio*), it constituted a major step toward the actual emergence of another nation—the Confederacy—from within the United States, and took up rhetorics of racial and ethnic nationhood. As such, it provides an interesting extension of the arguments made in this study.

The Dred Scott case highlighted the political and legal ambiguities that emerged from the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the debates over the extension of slavery in the West. Priscilla Wald has suggested that the case of *Cherokee v. Georgia* (1831) and *Dred Scott v. Sanford* (1856) revealed the vulnerability of all persons residing within the United States and the fragility of the Union itself. The denial of American Indian and
African American rights, for Wald, was an attempt to shore up national unity. Her reading of the Dred Scott case as an attempt by the judicial system to clarify these ambiguities and reaffirm notions of white citizenship and property ownership are supported by the facts of the case. Dred Scott was owned by Major John Emerson, who took Scott to Illinois in 1834 and later moved his household to Wisconsin territory, two places in which slavery was prohibited. After the Emerson household relocated to Missouri, Scott brought a suit against Emerson’s widow, based on the assertion that his residence in Illinois and Wisconsin negated his status as a slave. A Missouri circuit court ruled in Scott’s favor, but this decision was later overturned on appeal to the state supreme court. According to Forrest McDonald, Emerson’s widow “transferred ownership in a fictitious sale to her brother, John F.A. Sanford of New York, establishing the ground of diverse citizenship” so as to have the case heard in federal court. While ostensibly about African American rights, the case became increasingly invested in delineating the divisions between state and federal power and mediating between sectional conflicts about the extension of slavery in the West. Through the decision rendered by the Supreme Court, white citizenship was defined through the repudiation of Black citizenship.

In his reading of the Constitution’s construction of national citizenship, Taney’s decision can be seen to respond to many of the claims for ethnic and racial nationhood made by African Americans and American Indian nations such as the Cherokees. Reversing earlier arguments about African American nationhood made by David Walker, Maria Stewart and others, Taney asserted that the “words ‘people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing.” Omitting the religious
connotations associated with the word “people” (as in the Hebrew people), Taney asserted that any references to “the people” in the Constitution applied only to white people, those people who were already considered citizens because of their race. African Americans, whose “ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves” are not, by virtue of their race “a people,” argued Taney. While many African writers of the nineteenth century cited their ancestral connections to the U.S. and noted the economic, social, and military contributions made by their ancestors, Taney here ignored such relationships to the U.S. landscape and noted only the importation and sale of Africans. As a result of these earliest moments of slavery, he argued neither African Americans nor their descendents could be considered a part of “the people of the United States” or achieve national citizenship. Moreover, through his explicit linkage of “people” with sovereignty and citizenship, Taney denied that African Americans were a people at all. Thus, his decision did more than just deny African American citizenship—it challenged articulations of African American collective identity.

But Taney’s understandings of national citizenship were not predicated on race alone. American Indians, who were considered non-white, could still become U.S. citizens if they abandoned what Taney considered their foreign status and became naturalized. In his opinion, Taney discussed the situation of American Indians, which he noted was “altogether unlike” that of African Americans. He acknowledged that American Indians remained largely outside of American political and social culture and “never amalgamated” with white people. But yet, because they had always been free, Taney asserted that American Indians could, like “subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized by the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State,
To achieve U.S. citizenship, an American Indian (male) person would have to abandon his own nation and assimilate into white society.

Taney’s allusion to the possibility of American Indian citizenship was predicated on his belief in their national capacity and collective identity, as shown through their existence as nations within the larger U.S. nation. Reworking Marshall’s construction of American Indians as “domestic dependent nations,” Taney upheld the argument made by the Cherokees and their advocates: American Indians constitute foreign nations. He wrote:

Treaties have been negotiated with them [Indian governments], and their alliance sought for in war; and the people who compose these Indian political communities have always been treated as foreigners not living under our Government. It is true that the course of events has brought the Indian tribes within the limits of the United States under subjection to the white race; and it has been found necessary, for their sake as well as our own, to regard them as in a state of pupilage, and to legislate to a certain extent over them and the territory they occupy. But they may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized by the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the United States; and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.

These statements resonated strongly with the arguments made on the part of the Cherokees in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) and asserted that although they may be considered dependent on the United States in certain ways, they were nonetheless foreign
states. Taney’s understanding of American Indians as an *imperia* (or foreign states) translated into his assertion that they could, like any other foreign people, be naturalized. Rather than being a threat to U.S. sovereignty, American Indian nationhood offered proof of Indian peoples’ political promise. Thus, the Dred Scott decision at once denies African American nationhood and holds out hope for the absorption of American Indian nations into the United States, suggesting both the distancing and containing functions of rhetorics of *imperium in imperio*.

In the wake of the Dred Scott decision, the immediate threat posed to the U.S. nation was not the emergence of ethnic or racial nations, but the fracture of white American culture and the emergence of a Confederate *imperium*. By drawing an even starker line between federal and state citizenship, McDonald has argued that Taney “extended the concept of divided sovereignty to include divided citizenship.”315 This presentation of divided citizenship, along with a host of other factors, contributed to the division of the Union. Northerners claimed that Taney’s decision proved that even the judicial branch was not immune to the machinations of the Slave Power and as McDonald noted, the Court lost the credibility that was needed to intervene in the growing sectional crisis.316

The concept of divided sovereignty (*imperium in imperio*) would retain its place in U.S. political culture as a way to express the relationship between federal and state powers and to articulate challenges to the United States nation. It was put to a variety of uses during the antebellum period, which had positive and negative effects on the material lives of disparate peoples living within the putative borders of the United States. This brief reading of the Dred Scott decision suggests the diverse ways in which
dominant group discourses responded to the articulations of *imperium in imperio* by African Americans, American Indians, and their supporters. Yet it also demonstrates that in the late 1850s, rhetorics of divided sovereignty, which had previously been used as an attempt to resolve the sectional differences between North and South, contributed to the fracture of U.S. national unity.
NOTES


Levander also cited the 2002 founding of the journal *Comparative American Studies*, the 2003 issue of *PMLA* edited by Djelal Kadir on "America, the Idea, the Literature"; the 2003 special issue of *Modern Fiction Studies* edited by Paula Moya and Ramón Saldivar on "Fictions of the Trans-American Imaginary"; the 2004 special issue of *Radical History Review* edited by Sandhya Shukla and Heidi Tinsman on "Our Americas: Political and Cultural Imaginings"; and the 2005 special issue of *Comparative American Studies* edited by Claire F. Fox on "Critical Perspectives and Emerging Models of Inter-American Studies" as proof of growing scholarly and institutional interest in transnationalism.

While I came to this conclusion independently, similar sentiments are expressed in Mark Rifkin, *Manifesting America: Imperialism and National Space, 1776-1861* (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2003. 1-2. This project focuses on expressions of ethnic nationalism and a particular rhetorical construction (*imperium in imperio*) and Rifkin’s work maintains a focus on discourses of imperialism, both in the hands of the members of the dominant culture and by African Americans, American Indians, Native Hawaiians, and Californios. Thus, they share some similar assumptions, but differ in their arguments and in the materials studied.

By using the word “hegemony,” I reference the work of Antonio Gramsci, who used the word to refer to the attempted revolutions in Western Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For more on Gramsci’s use of the term, see Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, vol. 1 and 2, ed. Joseph Buttigieg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). One of the most frequently cited critical discussions of Gramsci’s work on
hegemony is Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," *New Left Review* 100 (1976): 5-78. Raymond Williams, *Keywords: a Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (1976; New York: Oxford UP, 1983), 145, defined hegemony as “extend[ing] the notion of political predominance from relations between states to relations between social classes, as in *bourgeois hegemony*…That is to say, it [hegemony] is not limited to matters of direct political control but seeks to describe a more general predominance which includes, as one of its key features, a particular way of seeing the world and human nature and relationships.”


and Wood, Robbins work on the Commonwealth tradition had significant impact on the study of republican ideology in America.

Several important articles and review essays have traced the “career” of republicanism as a twentieth-century interpretive framework. These include Robert E. Shalhope’s “Toward a Republican Synthesis: the Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 29.1 (1972): 49-80, in which the phrase “republican synthesis” was first used; Joyce Appleby’s “Republicanism and Ideology” *American Quarterly* 37.4, *Republicanism in the History of the United States* (1985): 461-473; Daniel T. Rodgers’s “Republicanism: the Career of a Concept” *The Journal of American History* 79.1 (1992): 11-38; and Philip J. Gould’s “Virtue, Ideology, and the American Revolution: the Legacy of the Republican Synthesis.” As Rodgers explained, “[t]he republican synthesis can only be understood in a series of paradigms: Beardian, Hartzian, and republican. The Beardian paradigm organized American history around a restless sea of conflicting material interests; the Hartzian around a stable liberal consensus; the republican around the importance of liberalism’s precedents and rivals” (12). In Joyce Appleby’s *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992), she offered a coherent definition of liberalism as expressed in America between 1776 and the presidency of Thomas Jefferson. She highlights the Lockean influence and the importance of concepts like rational self-interest, free inquiry, and electoral politics. Appleby examined the interplay between liberalism and republicanism and argued that the United States was “born liberal” and it was not until twentieth-century scholarship on republicanism that scholars appreciated the “vitality of a classical political tradition within the colonial societies that sought independence” (31).

Intellectuals and the Politics of Historiography, 1827-1863 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004) examined the rhetorical strategies employed by Native American writers such as William Apess, Elias Boudinot, and Peter Jones in discourses surrounding treaty making and U.S. removal policies. Lucy Maddox, Citizen Indians: Native American Intellectuals, Race, and Reform (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005) took up the subject of Anglo-Indian relations in the Reform Era (1890-1934) when both groups sought to promote the “uplift” of Native people through legislative and educational projects.


20 Carolyn Porter, "What We Know that We Don't Know: Remapping American Literary Studies." American Literary History 6.3 (1994): 470.


22 American Studies Association Newspaper 18 (December 1995).


25 Bailyn himself famously defined the nation as an “imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” Members of a nation, he claimed, do not know all of the other members, but they exist as a communal entity in the mind of each citizen. Bailyn, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (London: Verso, 1983), 6.

26 The application of Smith’s work to an American context is an innovation because although he mentions America in passing in The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1986), his primary focus throughout his works is on Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.


Ernest Renan, a nineteenth-century French theorist wrote, “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle.” Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?,” in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley, and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 52. Ernest Gellner offers the following definitions as providing some insight into the nature of what a nation is, but ultimately resists the idea of a single definition: (1) "Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating [and] (2) Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artifacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared
membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members.” Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 6-7. Miroslav Hroch, a Czech political theorists, has defined the nation in this way: “For our purposes, let us define it at the outset as a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness.” Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in Europe," in Mapping the Nation, ed. by Gopal Balakrishnan (New York and London: Verso, 1996), 79.


30 The term “territorial nation” is drawn from Anthony Smith’s work The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 135.

31 Another way to characterize this split is to see it as a divide between primordialists, who see the nation as having always existed, and constructivists, who see the nation as a product of particular forces and conditions such as modernity, industrialization, or the rise of print culture.


Drawing on the work of Jürgen Habermas, Michael Warner, Lauren Berlant, and Karen Sanchez-Eppler, Burgett suggested that “citizens, in other words, gained political power only insofar as they were able to represent their local and embodied experience as universal and disinterested through the medium of print” (13). For more on the ways in which citizenship was constructed in opposition to the condition of slavery, see Elizabeth Regosin, Freedom’s Promise: Ex-Slave Families and Citizenship in the Age of Emancipation (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002).

38 Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 149.

Several scholars have noted that the Northern states celebrated the Puritans as the forbearers of the American nation, thus asserting New England’s centrality to the nation’s history. Robert Tilton has traced a series of cultural moments in which the Southern states countered this mythos with that of the Virginia Company and the purported love story between Pocahontas and John Smith. In this account, Virginia, not Massachusetts, is at the center of the national founding. See Tilton, Pocahontas: The Evolution of an American Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

40 References to the rhetorical formation of nationhood highlight the fact that this project is focusing on the purposeful uses of language as part of identity formation, rather than on the construction of formal political institutions.

41 My thinking on this was informed by Elizabeth Maddock Dillon’s discussion of how liberal ideology functioned to position African Americans and women within American political culture in The Gender of Freedom: Fictions of Liberalism and the Literary Public Sphere (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).

Dana Nelson, introduction, *The Word in Black and White*, viii, discussed race as an “apparatus” of power that changes over time: “As an apparatus that circulates through culture, through the ‘discourse,’ institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropical propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid, ‘race’ must be flexible to maintain its currency.” She noted, however, that talking about race in this way does not diminish the actual, material effects that ideas of race have on peoples’ material lives. Foucault himself wrote about race and racism explicitly in his “Society Must be Defended” lectures given in 1975-76. He wrote “What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die … The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.” Foucault, Michel. *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-6*, Edited by Arnold Davidson (Picador: New York, 2003), 254-5. Discourses of race then, for Foucault, became a way of managing populations and ensuring the “health” of the body politic by quarantining “inferior” races.

These definitions remained the same in later editions of the dictionary. Nicholas Hudson, “From ‘Nation’ to ‘Race,’” n. 1, stated that contemporary British dictionaries such as Randle Cotgrave's *Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (1611) and Nathan Bailey's *The Universal Etymological Dictionary* (1721) contained definitions similar to those of Johnson.

For more, see Roxanne Wheeler, *The Complexion of Race*, 9, where she argued that “skin color emerges as the most important component of racial identity in Britain during the third quarter of the eighteenth century.”

Linnaeus’s *General System of Nature* was published in 1735 and Buffon’s *Natural History* appeared from 1749-88. Jefferson’s *Notes* demonstrates his familiarity with both works.


Frederick Douglass, “The Nation’s Problem,” Speech Delivered Before the Bethel Literary and Historical Society, Washington D.C., April 16, 1889, In *Frederick Douglass, Selected Speeches and Writings*, Ed. Philip S. Foner (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1950), 730-31, considered the sort of “race pride” to be part of the “problem” facing the Nation. He stated, “For my part, I see no superiority or inferiority in race or color. Neither the one nor the other is a proper source of pride or complacency. Our race and color are not of our own choosing. We have no volition in the case one way or another. The only excuse for pride in individuals is the fact of their own accomplishments” (731). He claimed that the development of race pride was not the proper way for African Americans to counter the racism and pride of white Americans.


Martin Delany, 214.


In his decision on the case of *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831), Justice William Johnson used these criteria to argue that the Cherokee were not a nation.


Newspapers of the nineteenth century contain frequent references to the “family of nations” which often includes Britain, France, and the United States. A complete listing of texts that use this phrase would be impossible. See, for example, “A Sketch of the Military System of France” *The American Review of History and Politics, and General Repository of Literature* 3.1 (January 1812): 138 APS Online; “Mr. Morris’ Oration, &c.” *Niles Weekly Register* 6.152 (July 30, 1814): 364; “Speech of Mr. Clay: In the House of Representatives” *Niles Weekly Register* 14. 346 (1818): 128; “Turkey and Russia” *The Museum of Foreign Literature, Science, and Art* 14.80 (1829); “New Jersey” *Niles Weekly Register* 43.1104 (1832); “Texas,: From the Emancipator. Texas!—Texas!” *Philanthropist* 2.29 (1837); “Mr. Adams and the Colored People” *The Cincinnati Weekly Herald and Philanthropist* 8.10 (1843). All of these articles suggest that there exists a body or “family” of nations, to whom new political bodies must apply for membership. Questions such as should Texas be added to the family of nations as a sovereign power or whether Turkey was a member of the family of nations were posed. In the twentieth century, the term “family of nations” predated the League of Nations and the United Nations and was used to describe the relationship of member nations to one another.


62 Although the Cherokee pointed to their Constitution’s reliance on the U.S. constitution, later scholars have shown the similarities between this document and those of surrounding states and military outposts. For more on this, see Andrew Denison, Demanding the Cherokee Nation: Indian Autonomy and American Culture, 1830-1900 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 20;


64 William Johnson qtd in The Case of the Cherokee Nation Against the State of Georgia, By Richard Peters (Philadelphia: J. Grigg, 1831), 171.

65 Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 68. In The Machiavellian Moment, J.G.A. Pocock wrote that Whig Country ideology, which informed America’s political formation, was “founded on a presumption of real property and an ethos of the civic life, in which the ego knew and loved itself in its relation to a patria, res publica or common good, organized as a polity, but was perpetually threatened by corruption operating through private appetites and false consciousness” (486).


69 Jefferson, “Manners” In Notes on the State of Virginia, 217.

70 For a discussion of Jefferson and Madison’s correspondence on this issue, see McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 126.
74 Melinda Lawson, introduction, Patriot Fires: Forging a New American Nationalism in the Civil War North (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 5, wrote of antebellum political culture: “With the exception of national elections and trips to the post office, most Americans had almost no contact or interaction with their national government.” The sense of the nation as a group of people is shared by modern political scientists. Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Press, 1991), 14, defined a nation as a “named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all mankind.” Yael Tamir, a critic of Smith, posed an alternative definition in “The Enigma of Nationalism” World Politics 47.3 (1995): 425. For Tamir, a nation is a “community whose members share feelings of fraternity, substantial distinctiveness, and exclusivity, as well as beliefs in a common ancestry and continuous genealogy.” Ghia Nodia, “Nationalism and Democracy,” In Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy, Ed Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 11, argued that nation can be defined as a “community of people organized around the idea of self-determination.” Ernst Haas, “What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?” International Organization 40.3 (1986): 726, presented a nation as “a socially mobilized body of individuals, believing themselves to be united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them (in their own minds) from outsiders, striving to create or maintain their own state.” Definitions of “nation,” according to Lowell Barrington, commonly assert that the nation is a community of people. It is a misuse of the term, he argued, to apply it to a political organization or a state. For more,


79 For more, see Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes*, in which he talks about the “constitution of Federal feeling” and the creation of a “new public called the ‘nation’” (53).

80 Waldstreicher, 297-308.

81 Madison qtd in Waldstreicher 301.

82 Gregory Clark, *Rhetorical Landscapes in America: Variations on a Theme from Kenneth Burke* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 134.


85 Thoreau’s countercultural efforts are detailed in Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes*, 350.


of Kah-Ge-Ba-Gah-Bowh; or G. Copway, Chief, Ojibway Nation (New York, 1850), 189-190. For a critical discussion of “countercelebrations” see Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes, 349-352.

88 Benedict Anderson, Michael Warner, and Carol Smith-Rosenberg have shown the importance of print in fashioning American nationalism.


91 See, for example, Theodore Bry’s painting “The New World as Paradise” (1558) and Michael Drayton’s poem “Ode to the Virginian Voyage” (1606). Perhaps the most famous New England expression of the millennial purpose is John Winthrop’s “A Modell of Christian Charity” (1630).


93 For a quick survey of antebellum political culture, see Lawson, introduction, Patriot Fires, 4-6.


96 <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone/bk4ch8.htm>


“The Emigration of Chinamen to India and America,” *Littell’s Living Age* 1321 (1869):821. APS Online.


11 Delany’s novel *Blake* (1859-61) and his non-fictional work *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States* (1852) are often cited as foundational to the development of Black Nationalism. For more, see Robert S. Levine, *Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass, and the Politics of Representative Identity* (Chapel Hill; London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

12 The process of promoting African American emigration was viewed by many of its supporters as a process of self-reproduction for the infant United States. According to historian Peter Onuf, Jefferson viewed both the United States and the African American nation trapped within its borders as “the product[s] of British despotism.” Onuf continued that “[t]he ultimate independence of the black nation would replicate and complete American independence.” Peter Onuf, “‘To Declare them a Free and Independent People’: Race, Slavery, and National Identity in Jefferson’s Thought” *Journal of the Early Republic* 18.1 (1998): 7. Moreover, the instruction of African American people and the cultivation of Black citizenship was a way to solidify white American values and national citizenship. Literary scholars Christopher Castiglia and David Kazanjian have explored the ways in which colonization functioned as both “racial

113 Qtd. in Kazanjian, The Colonizing Trick, 111.
115 For more on Jefferson’s early thoughts on colonization, see Peter Onuf, “Every Generation Is an "Independent Nation": Colonization, Miscegenation, and the Fate of Jefferson’s Children,” The William and Mary Quarterly 57.1 (2000): 153-54. Winthrop Jordan dates the revisal as occurring in 1777, while Onuf and others cite 1779, the date it was published.
118 The change in the publication’s title reflected a broader shift in the mission of the ACS, from aiding emigration to strengthening the colony of Liberia. Other publications included The Colonization Herald (Philadelphia) 1835-1840; Colonizationist and Journal of Freedom (Boston) 1833-34; The African Intelligencer (Washington) 1820; and the African Observer (Philadelphia) 1827-28;
119 For the history of colonization, see P.J. Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (New York: Columbia, 1961). It appears that there is no exhaustive list of colonization societies. Readings of the African Repository can also provide some sense of the number of colonization societies, including the Colonization Society of Brooklyn, NY; African Colonization Society; Young Men’s Colonization Society (Philadelphia); Philadelphia Colonization Society; Colonization Society of Kentucky; State Colonization Society, New Hampshire; State Colonization Society, New York; State Colonization Society, Pennsylvania; State Colonization Society, North Carolina; Caldwell Colonization Society, Kentucky; Meadville Colonization Society,
Pennsylvania; State Colonization Society, Vermont; Auxiliary Society, Delaware; State Colonization Society, Ohio. From the Canfield Colonization Society, Ohio; Newark Colonization Society, New Jersey; State Colonization Society, Connecticut; Springfield Colonization Society, Massachusetts; Auxiliary Society, Alexandria, D. C.; Auxiliary Society, Georgetown, D. C.; Hartford Female African Society; Juvenile Colonization Society; Cincinnati Colonization Society; and the Maryland State Colonization Society.

As Eric Burin noted, “Politically wise and economically astute, southern free black emigrants would go on to dominate Liberian society (17).

The total number of emigrants between 1820 and 1899 was 15,386. Burin 17-33, offered an overview of the ACS activities and emigration numbers from its inception through 1860. Table 1 provided a graph of emigrations by year.

Although Russwurm is often described as “African American,” he was actually born in Jamaica in 1799 and did not move to the United States until 181.

Russwurm qtd in “The Black Man’s Paradise,” 27.

Russwurm, African Repository XV, 324.

See Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black, 90, and Karen Ordahl Kupperman, “Presentment of Civility: English Reading of American Self-Presentation in the Early Years of Colonization.” William and Mary Quarterly 54.1 (1997): 193-228. Robert Tilton, Pocahontas, has argued that emphasizing American Indian communities as monarchies like that of the English nation-state and highlighting European relations with this royalty (as in discussions of the marriage of “Princess” Pocahontas and John Rolfe) worked to legitimate European claims to American Indian land. Intermarriage between American Indian royals and Europeans furthered the “eventual absorption of the native cultures and their lands” (13).

In White Over Black, Jordan talked about the ways in which “Negroes had to be dealt with as individuals—with supremely impartial anonymity, to be sure---rather than as nations” (90).

News of the Gabriel Plot prompted the Virginia Assembly to suggest that James Madison, then governor of Virginia, communicate secretly with Thomas Jefferson as to whether or not “persons obnoxious to the laws or dangerous to the peace of society may be removed.” This led to a series of closed-door communications about the possibility of colonizing free African Americans. Not long after the Nat Turner Rebellion, the state of Maryland authorized the acquisition of land in Africa for the colonization of free blacks.


“Annual Meeting of the Colonization Society” 11.


The prospectus to *Freedom’s Journal*, the pro-colonization newspaper edited by Russwurm and Cornish, articulated the political link between Liberia and America: “We shall ever regard the constitution of the United States as our polar star. “Prospectus” *Freedom’s Journal* 1.3 (1827): 12.

This point has been noted by Susan M. Ryan, Amy Kaplan, and Etsuko Taketani with regard to women’s colonizationist rhetoric.

As David Kazanjian has argued in The Colonizing Trick, such discourse suggested the workings of a “racial governmentality,” an attempt to regulate populations that “renders the very idea of a racially and nationally codified population as that which it seeks to address.” He wrote that “colonized black Americans are to be objects of an experiment in Enlightenment governmentality; they are to be rendered, represented, and maintained “free” by the United States (125).


By using the term “collective fantasy,” I draw on Michael McGee “In Search of ‘the People’: a Rhetorical Alternative” Quarterly Journal of Speech 61 (1975): 235-49. McGee wrote “‘The people’ therefore are not objectively real in the sense that they exist as a collective entity in nature; rather, they are a fiction dreamed up by an advocate and infused with an artificial, rhetorical reality by the agreement of an audience to participate in a collective fantasy” (240).


See Joanna Brooks, “Prince Hall, Freemasonry, and Genealogy” African American Review 34.2 (2000): 197-216. Brooks focused explicitly on what she viewed as an earlier chapter in the history of Black Nationalism: the work of Prince Hall and John Marrant. She examined how these ideas of African American nationalism flourished within the context of Masonic orders. For more on the early history of Black Nationalism, see Gordon 73. Bustill was a formerly enslaved African who became Philadelphia’s first African American schoolteacher and was a member of the Free
African Society, which was the first African American Society. John Marrant can be considered the first ordained African American to preach in the US. Prince Hall founded Boston’s African Masonic Order. Leile founded the first Black Baptist churches in Georgia, and was succeeded in his efforts by Bryan. Absalom Jones and Richard Allen were leaders of Philadelphia’s African American community and founders of Bethel African American Methodist Episcopal Church. Wilson Moses, introduction, Classical Black Nationalism: from the American Revolution to Marcus Garvey, ed. Wilson Moses (New York: New York University Press, 1996) defined “classical black nationalism” as “the effort of African Americans to create a sovereign nation-state and formulate an ideological basis for the concept of a national culture” (2). He dated classical Black Nationalism as flourishing between 1850 and 1925. Although he credits Robert Alexander Young, David Walker, and Maria Stewart with attempting to forge an image of African Americans as a people (or nation), the fact that they do not advocate the formation of a separate nation prevents them from being classified as classical black nationalists.

148 “A Winter Piece: Being a Serious Exhortation, with a Call to the Unconverted: and a Short Contemplation on the Death of Jesus Christ. Written by Jupiter Hammon, a Negro man belonging to Mr. John Lloyd, of Queen's Village, on Long Island, now in Hartford. Published by the author with the assistance of his friends.” (Hartford: published by the author, 1782). Early American Imprints, 1st series, no. 17554 (filmed).


150 For more, see Gordon, 33.


Moses, *Classical Black Nationalism*, 90.


Maria Stewart, “Religion and the Pure Principles of Morality, The Sure Foundation On Which We Must Build,” 29.


Young, 61.

Young, 64.

Young, 65-66.

Young, 66.

The idea of the Israelites as a nation within a nation was described in the book of Deuteronomy: “Or hath God assayed to go and take him a nation from the midst of another nation, by temptation, by signs, and by wonders, and by war, and by a mighty hand, and by a stretched out arm, and by great terrors, according to all that the Lord your God did for you in Egypt before your eyes.” Deuteronomy 4:34.

As Wilson Moses has argued, David Walker’s *Appeal* “began with the assumption that African Americans are a distinct people, with a special God-given historical identity resembling that of the Israelites in Egypt.” Moses, introduction, *Classical Black Nationalism*, 15.


Walker, 62.

Walker, 64-65.

Maria Stewart, “Religion and the Pure Principles of Morality, The Sure Foundation On Which We Must Build,” 34-5.
For more on Knox’s policy, dubbed “expansion with honor,” see Andrew Denison, *Demanding the Cherokee Nation*, 16. On the function of treaties, Robert Berkhofer Jr. wrote that early negotiations between the U.S. and American Indian peoples had two concerns: “the extension of native titles in favor of White exploitation of native lands and resources and the transformation of native lifestyles into copies of approved White models.” Berkhofer, Jr., *The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 135.

Qtd in Berkhofer, Jr., *The White Man’s Indian*, 161.


For more on the Cherokees’ land claims, see William Anderson, introduction, *Cherokee Removal: Before and After* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), vii-


177 The discovery of gold on Cherokee land in 1829 only served to intensify Georgia pressure on the Cherokee Nation and revived earlier economic issues.

178 Denison, *Demanding the Cherokee Nation*, 19. Denison noted that because Cherokee were a matrilineal people, the children of these marriages were considered Cherokee. However, he also contended that having a white father meant that these mixed-race children such as John Ross had greater exposure to white culture and moved easily between the two societies. Denison also cited the comments of Theda Purdue, who claimed that these individuals probably thought of themselves as Cherokee, not as mixed.

179 Young, ““The Exercise of Sovereignty in Cherokee Georgia,” 44.

180 Denison, 22-23. To prevent further treaty-making without tribal approval, the Cherokee announced that they would not give up any more land and refused to meet with anyone on the subject of treaties. They also made negotiating for the sale of land by individuals punishable by death.
For more on the ways in which Cherokee culture mirrored that of the American nation, see Mary Young, “The Cherokee Nation: Mirror of the Republic” *American Quarterly* 33.5 (1981): 502-524.


Mary Young, “The Cherokee Nation, Mirror of the Republic,” 507-511 offered a detailed summary of the Cherokee constitution and comparisons of that document with the constitutions of North Carolina and Georgia and the legal systems in place at neighboring military forts; Rennard Strickland, *Fire and the Spirits: Cherokee Law from Clan to Court* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), 227-36 includes a reprint of the first Cherokee constitution. See also *Constitution and the Laws of the Cherokee Nation, 1830-51* (1893; reprint Oklahoma City, 1969) for the second constitution.


Jill Norgren, “Lawyers and the Legal Business of the Cherokee Republic in the Courts of the United States, 1829-1835” *Law and History Review* 10.2 (1992): 253-314. However, as Forrest McDonald argued, Wirt was the worst possible choice of representation as he was a known enemy of Andrew Jackson and his presence seemed to confirm the partisan nature of the case. See McDonald, *Imperium in Imperio*, 101.

For a brief summary of these events, see Theda Purdue, introduction, *Cherokee Editor: the Writings of Elias Boudinot* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press), 10-33.

For more, see Berkhofer, *The White Man’s Indian*, 134-145.

As an Indian Agent, Meigs garnered mixed reviews from the Cherokee he interacted with, yet he publicly expressed sympathy with the plight of the Cherokee.

William Byrd makes a similar argument in his *History of the Dividing Line* in which he laments that white settlers have not intermarried with Indian women so as to assimilate the Indians into white society and make legitimate claims on Indian lands.


Wilson Lumpkin, *The Removal of the Cherokee Indians from Georgia*, vol.1 (reprint; New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1971), 42. While published after the Cherokee Removal had been affected, this work constituted a collection of many of Lumpkin’s speeches, correspondence, and public discourse on the Cherokee in Georgia, much of which was published during his tenure as Congressman.


Lumpkin, 54.

Lumpkin, 43.


Georgia’s legal battles with the federal government and the Cherokee Nation coincided with the so-called “Nullification Crisis” during which South Carolina sought to nullify the “Tariff of Abominations” (1828), which was passed by the U.S. Congress. Lumpkin, despite his belief in “states’ rights” did not agree with South Carolina’s actions.
200 “Indian Claims,” *Western Recorder* 15 December 1829, 6.

201 Robert Campbell, “Memorial, Robert Campbell to the President and Members of the Senate of the State of Georgia” *The Friend; a Religious and Literary Journal* 2.36 (20 June 1829): 281. APS Online.

202 “Indian Colonization,” *The Columbian Star and Christian Index*, 1.11 (12 September 1829), 171. APS Online.

203 Lumpkin, 42.

204 Here I am referencing Foucault’s ideas of the “subject” as articulated in his later works such as “Governmentality” (1979), “The Subject and Power” (1982), and *Power/Knowledge* (1980). As Neve Gordon has argued, Foucault’s later works (those from the mid 1970’s onward) constitute an “attempt to develop account of the subject that would avoid both regarding the subject as merely the passive product of power relations and regarding it as entirely self-creating” (395). For more, see Neve Gordon, “Foucault’s Subject: an Ontological Reading” *Polity* 31.3 (1999): 395-414.


206 Eaton, “The Secretary of War to the Cherokee Delegation,” 257.


210 “Opinion of Mr. Sergeant,” 43.


A writer for the *American Monthly Magazine* (2 May 1830) likewise referred to arguments regarding the “inconveniences” of a Cherokee *imperium*, suggesting this was part of a broader discourse.


Evarts, “No. XV,” 128.

Evarts, “No. XIII,” in *Cherokee Removal*, 118.


The dissenting opinion was attributed to Thompson, while a note at the end indicated that Justice Story concurred with this opinion. Subsequent references will be made to Thompson’s opinion with the understanding that said opinion also represents the thoughts of Justice Story.

Thompson, “Dissenting Opinion,” in *The Case of the Cherokee Nation Against the State of Georgia*, 199.

Johnson in *The Case of the Cherokee Nation Against the State of Georgia*, 171.


For more, see Berkhofer, *The White Man’s Indian*, 160.

Andrew Jackson to the Creek Nation, 23 March 1829, qtd in Brian Dippie, *The Vanishing American*, 45.

Jackson qtd. in Dippie, 59.


235 Although most Cherokees opposed the plan, John Rollin Ridge (a Treaty Party member) proposed in the 1850s that the Cherokees should become a state in the Union.

236 Qtd. in Gary Moulton, John Ross, Cherokee Chief (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1978), 35.

237 Qtd. in “Cherokee Memorial to Congress” The Christian Workman 11.7 (12 February 1830), 27. APS Online.


239 Lumpkin, The Removal of the Cherokee, 42.


Douglass reflected on the causes of the Civil War in an 1862 speech in Himrod’s Corners, NY. He asserted that “The date of the Missouri Compromise forms the beginning of that political current which has swept us on to this rebellion, and made the conflict unavoidable. From this dark date in our nation’s history, there started forth a new political and social power. Until now, slavery had been on its knees, only asking time to die in peace. But the Missouri Compromise gave it a new lease of life. It became at once a tremendous power. The line of thirty-six degrees, thirty minutes, at once stamped itself upon our national politics, our morals, manners, character, and religion.—
From this time there was a south side to everything American, and the country was at once subjected to the slave power, a power as restless and vigilant as the eye of an escaping murderer.” Douglass, “The Slaveholder’s Rebellion.” In *Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings*, Ed. by Philip Foner (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1950), 499.


248 Qtd in Etcheson 24.

249 Etcheson, introduction, *Bleeding Kansas*, 2-3. Here she noted that abolitionists were previously considered too radical by many in the North. The events surrounding the Kansas-Nebraska Act and “Bleeding Kansas” attracted many Northerners to abolitionist thinking.

250 It was this speech that precipitated Preston Brooks’s caning of Sumner.


252 Sumner, “The Crime Against Kansas.”

253 Sumner, “The Crime Against Kansas.”


256 George Fitzhugh, *Sociology for the South; or, The Failure of Free Society* (Richmond, VA: A. Morris, 1854), 45.

George Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All! or, Slaves Without Masters* (Richmond: A. Morris, 1858)


Susan M. Ryan, “Errand into Africa: Colonization and Nation Building in Sarah J. Hale’s Liberia” *New England Quarterly* 68.4 (1995): 558. Of Hale’s novel, Ryan argued, “she [Hale] promotes colonization as a way of not only preserving the Union as she conceives of it (that is, as Protestant and Anglo-Saxon) but also of replicating, among ex-slaves in a ‘new’ country, American-style nation building, national identity, and citizenship, as she defines them. Liberian colonization in Hale’s novel becomes an unusual incarnation of colonialism, in that the departure of blacks from the United States results in two strong nations on the (white) American model rather than a racially and regionally divided (and possibly disintegrating) United States, on the one hand, and a heathen non-nation in Africa on the other” (565-6).

Frederick Douglass, “To Harriet Beecher Stowe,” 8 March 1853, In *Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings*, 216-17. Douglass’s letter to Stowe is also
discussed in Robert S. Levine, “Uncle Tom’s Cabin in Frederick Douglass’s Paper: an Analysis of Reception” American Literature 64 (1992): 82.

Amy Kaplan, “Manifest Domesticity,” American Literature 70.3 (1998): 592, discussed Sarah Josepha Hale’s campaign for the establishment of Thanksgiving as a national holiday within the context of the Mexican American war and the project of national unification.

Ryan has noted that “Hale also implies, though, that it is the very experience of superiority that effects the emigrants’ transformation. By the end of the novel it becomes clear that the absence of whites is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for black actualization; the emigrants must also have a group of people whom they can dominate” (574-5).

In the 1853 version of Northwood, Hale added: "Yes, that is the greatest mission of our Republic, to train here the black man for his duties as a Christian, then free him and send him to Africa, there to plant Free States and organize Christian civilization.”

Sarah J. Hale, Godey’s Ladies’ Book, November 1852, 303. In “Manifest Domesticity,” Amy Kaplan wrote, “If the celebration of Thanksgiving unites families and individuals across regions and brings them together in an imagined collective space, Thanksgiving’s continental scope endows each individual family gathering with national meaning. Furthermore, the Thanksgiving story commemorating the founding of New England—which in Hale’s version makes no mention of Indians—could create a common history by nationalizing a regional myth of origins and imposing it on the territories most recently wrested from Indians and Mexicans” (592-93).

Kaplan, “Manifest Domesticity,” 593.

Ryan, “The Errand into Africa” 565.

Walt Whitman, “Prohibition of Colored People,” 1858.


Robert S. Levine, Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass, and the Politics of Representative Identity, 190. In terms of its publication history, Blake was partially
serialized in 1859 and reprinted in 1861-62. Floyd Miller, in his introduction to the first book-length edition (printed in 1970), suggested that Delany might have begun the novel as early as 1852, although we can only speculate about the precise chronology of Delany’s composition (xix). Levine noted that Miller’s edition, the only book-length reprint, shortened the novel’s original title, *Blake; or the Huts of America: A Tale of the Mississippi Valley, the Southern United States, and Cuba*, which more fully demonstrates its transnational concerns (Levine 191, 290). For more on *Blake* and transnationalism, see Jeffrey Clymer, “Martin Delany’s *Blake* and the Transnational Politics of Property,” 709-731.

273 Martin Delany, *Blake; or, the Huts of America*, Ed. Floyd Miller (Boston: Beacon, 1970), 225.


277 Clymer argued that Delany used “aggressive racial essentialism…to reimagine Cuban power relations” (717) and challenge pro-slavery uses of essentialist arguments.


284 John Jones qtd in Christopher Robert Reed, *Black Chicago’s First Century* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 103.


Garnet, “Address.”


Douglass, “The Present Condition and Future Prospects of the Negro People,” speech at the annual meeting of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, New York City, May 11, 1853, In Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings, 258.

Douglass, “The Claims of Our Common Cause,” address of the Colored Convention held in Rochester, July 6-8, 1851, to the People of the United States, in Frederick Douglass, 264.


Delany, The Condition… of the Colored People of the United States, 49.

Delany, “Political Destiny” qtd in F.A. Rollin, Life and Services of Martin R. Delany (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1858), 327.

Wilson Moses has defined “classical black nationalism” as that which flourished in the period between 1850 and 1925. “Classical black nationalism” for Moses, suggested “the effort of African Americans to create a sovereign nation-state and formulate an ideological basis for a concept of national culture.” Furthermore, he noted that “[t]he essential feature of classical black nationalism is its goal of creating a black nation-state or empire with absolute control over a specific geographic territory, and sufficient economic and military power to defend it.” Moses, introduction, Classical Black Nationalism, 2. Robert Levine has used the word “transnational” to describe Delany’s antislavery work and his involvement with the Masons. He wrote that Delany’s “transnational vision…speaks not only to a Masonic sense of the ways in which fraternal and civilized ideals can cross national ideologies and boundaries, but also a pragmatic sense that only by putting such ideals into practice in a particular place can blacks mount an effective challenge to U.S. slave culture.” Levine, Martin Delany, 96.


Delany, The Condition…of the Colored People of the United States, 169.
Delany, *The Condition...of the Colored People of the United States*, 169.

Delany, 171. I will use “America” here as Delany did, to refer to the land of the Western hemisphere.

Delany, 171.

Ibid., 173.

Ibid., 214.

Ibid., 214.

Ibid., 173.

Ibid., 173.

Ibid., 173.

Ibid., 187.

I am using this term to refer to a variety of nations, but it is used specifically to refer to American Indian nations in *The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty*, Ed. Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984).


Wald, “The Terms of Assimilation,” 77-78.

McDonald, *States’ Rights*, 177.


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