

The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

Department of Political Science

**THE MYTH OF A DENSE CIVIL SOCIETY: BARRANQUILLA AS A CASE
STUDY**

A Thesis in

Political Science

By

Alexandra García

© 2004 Alexandra García

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

August 2004

Abstract

This work addresses the relationship between civil society and democracy. Neo-Tocquevillian scholars posit that a dense and vibrant civil society is positively correlated with the quality of democracy therefore, by increasing the number of groups and associations in a particular society, we will be fostering democratic consolidation. However, in some societies like Colombia, we find a negative correlation between number of groups and democracy. In this work I contend that scholars fail to consider the actual effect that groups and associations have on democracy, as many groups that exist are not able to participate in the process of policy-making. Using survey analysis, interviews, participatory observation and content analysis, I study this topic by centering the analysis on three main political actors: the political or ruling elite, civil associations, and the mass public. My findings indicate that an organized, strong and able civil society, together with an open and accessible local government are necessary – but not sufficient- conditions for democratic consolidation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures	v
List of Tables	vii
List of Abbreviations	viii
Acknowledgements.....	ix
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
Chapter 2 Theoretical Considerations	7
Chapter 3 Colombia	33
Chapter 4 Barranquilla	55
Chapter 5 Research Design	82
Chapter 6 The Elite In Barranquilla	95
Chapter 7 Groups In Barranquilla	125
Chapter 8 Mass Public In Barranquilla	167
Chapter 9 Conclusions.....	203
Bibliography	219
Appendix A Questionnaire for the Political and Ruling Elite	230
Appendix B Questionnaire for Non-profit Groups	233
Appendix C Questionnaire for the Mass Public	240

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1	NGO and Democracy in Colombia	3
Figure 3.1	NGOs and Non-Profit Organizations in Latin America	52
Figure 3.2	Civic Involvement in Latin America – Selected Countries	53
Figure 4.1	City Council Activity 1998 – 2002	66
Figure 4.2	Policy-Making Process in Colombia – Municipal Level.....	67
Figure 4.3	Specific News Coverage May 2002 – May 2003.....	81
Figure 7.1	Types of Non-Profits – Chamber of Commerce Registry.....	128
Figure 7.2	General Participation	131
Figure 7.3	Presented Proposals to the Government.....	137
Figure 7.4	Direct Participation	139
Figure 7.5	Type of Group Participation	142
Figure 7.6	Scope of Participation	143
Figure 7.7	Perception of Influence per Action	146
Figure 7.8	Proposals Presented for Government Consideration	151
Figure 7.9	Aftermath of Proposal Presentation	152
Figure 7.10	Group Contact Throughout the City	154
Figure 7.11	Scope of Contact with other Actors	156
Figure 7.12	Level of Response by Actor	157
Figure 7.13	Homicides per Month in Barranquilla	158
Figure 7.14	Fear Factor Effect	160

Figure 7.15	Levels of Engagement in Policy Making in Barranquilla.....	165
Figure 8.1	Level of Education	168
Figure 8.2	Economic Activity	168
Figure 8.3	Level of Trust	170
Figure 8.4	Majority Ignored	172
Figure 8.5	Influential Actors	173
Figure 8.6	Equal Treatment at Government Offices.....	175
Figure 8.7	Likelihood of Fair Treatment by Police.....	176
Figure 8.8	How to Solve City Problems.....	177
Figure 8.9	Some Participation Activities.....	179
Figure 8.10	Membership to Any of This Groups.....	182
Figure 8.11	Formal Group Membership.....	183
Figure 8.12	Level of Contact with the Media	184
Figure 8.13	Level of Contact with Private Sector.....	184
Figure 8.14	Level of Contact with Non-governmental Organizations	185
Figure 8.15	Level of Contact with Mayor's Office	186

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Summary of Changes to the 1886 Colombian Constitution	40
Table 3.2 Main Legislation for Social, Political, and Citizen Participation in Colombia	46
Table 3.3 Formal Participation Channels in Colombia	49
Table 4.1 Socio-economic Indicators Barranquilla 1990, 1997, 2000	61
Table 4.2 Number of Investment Projects Approved and Executed in Barranquilla	70
Table 5.1 Number of Households by Socioeconomic Groups and number of Surveys per group	90
Table 6.1 Elite Interviews	97
Table 7.1 Degrees of Influence	145
Table 7.2 Relationship Between Actions and Degree of Influence.....	149
Table 8.1 Main Problem in Barranquilla	171
Table 8.2 Model 1 – Electoral Participation.....	192
Table 8.3 Model 2 – Community Participation	194
Table 8.4 Model 3 – Political Participation.....	198
Table 8.5 Models for Electoral, Community and Political Participation	201

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANALTRA	Asociación Nacional de Transportadores (National Transporters Association)
ANDI	Asociación Nacional de Industrias (National Industries Association)
DANE Statistics	Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (National Administrative Department)
EDT	Empresa Distrital de Telefonía (District Phone Company)
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FENALCO	Federación Nacional de Comerciantes (National Commerce Federation)
FINDETER	Financiera de Desarrollo Territorial (National Financial Company for Territorial Development)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICFES	Instituto Colombiano para el Fomento de la Educación Superior (Colombian Institute for Higher Education)
JAL	Juntas Administradoras Locales (Local Administrative Boards)
M19	Movimiento 19 de Abril (April 19 Movement)
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OLS	Ordinary Least Square

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I dedicate this work to the memory of my mother Lilia who died a few days before I started my Ph.D program. Her love and deep faith in me were an enormous motivation when I had to face hardships and challenges during this process.

I dedicate this degree to my husband Jairo Parada.

Puchis: Words are not enough to express my gratitude for all your support, encouragement and insight. Late night talks, sometimes heated arguments, and day by day sharing by my side, were essential ingredients in this long and wonderful process of graduate school. You will always be my source of inspiration and the best gift life has given me.

I believe graduate school is a collective endeavor where friends and family members participate by giving not only their support, but also by making adjustments, sacrifices and enduring the constant lack of time graduate students experience. To my father, brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, and my two step-daughters I thank for their patience and words of stimulus; I will always keep them in my heart.

Several institutions made this effort possible; please kindly accept my gratitude: Colciencias (National Institute for the Development of Science and Technology in Colombia) awarded a full scholarship for graduate studies.

Universidad del Norte, through the Law School, the office of Professional Development and the Research Center granted an extended leave of absence and offered economic aid for dissertation research.

The Political Science Department at Penn State University awarded assistantship for most of the duration of the program. In addition, the College of The Liberal Arts through the office of Graduate Research (RGSO) and the Political Science Department granted funds for dissertation research.

As my advisor and dissertation chair, Dr. Gretchen Casper offered valuable guidance and advise during the difficult process of writing a proposal and developing a final document. Thanks for coming on board with enthusiasm and confidence in my work.

To the dissertation committee I want to express my appreciation for your counsel and willingness to accommodate your schedule to my work and research activities. I would not have been able to complete this process without your understanding.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The fundamental topic this study covers refers to the concept of how to deepen democracy, not only in those societies that appear -and are - vulnerable, but also within those countries that already have some degree of consolidation. There always are improvements and advances that consolidated democracies can make in order to reach higher levels of democratic life.

In this sense, numerous studies suggest that a dense and active civil society supports democracy (Putnam 1993; Chazan 1994; Gellner 1994; Diamond 1994; Foley and Edwards 1996; Tarrow 1996; Seligson 1999; Huntington 1968; Berman 1997; De Tocqueville 1840; Encarnacion 2000). This argument has influenced the expansion of new democracies in most of the developing world, leading to the creation of multiple types of groups and associations that range from neighborhood community boards to structured and organized aid institutions¹. Some of these groups formed spontaneously by the action and leadership of citizens, and others originated from government initiatives or with aid from international agencies. These agencies and government officials create and fund civil associations based, in part, on the idea that as more groups and associations there are, the more democratic the system will be.


¹As of 1993, the Directory of NGOs of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had 2970-registered development NGOs in the OECD countries. International NGOs increased from 176 in 1909 to 28,900 in 1993 and the OECD estimates that there are more than 50,000 NGOs in the developing world (Streeten 1997).

However, a correlation between the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and level of democracy in Colombia shows that, across time, Colombia's level of democracy has decreased while the number of NGOs has increased (Villar 2001). Apparently then, NGOs are negatively correlated with level of democracy, a finding that goes against most of the theoretical arguments present in the civil society/democracy debate. If, according to scholars, a vibrant and dense civil society is needed for democracy to deepen, then why is Colombia's democracy decaying as the number of its NGOs or civil society organizations is increasing? (Figure 1.1). I believe that the answer lies not in the number of NGOs, but in their behavior, specifically in their involvement or lack of it, in policy-making. What is the level of NGO or social group participation in the political process in Colombia? NGOs and groups are able to form and to exist, but can they take part on the decision-making process in the country? More generally even, is civil society able to participate? These are some of the questions my research answers.

Although researchers tend to see civil society as an institution that is necessary in a country for democracy to stand, there is a gap between the theoretical understanding of civil society's role in democratic processes and its actual functioning. While civil society is taken as a necessary condition for democratic consolidation, few studies have been done of the actual behavior of the groups, their role in the policy process and the factors that may hinder or foster their participation in such processes. How do we know that the presence of a great number of groups and associations is more than a statistical indicator of civil society's density as Miszlivetz and Jensen (1998) suggest? How do we know if these groups actually influence policy?

My research addresses these questions by studying the behavior of the political elite, social organizations, and the mass public in a Colombian city: Barranquilla. By understanding the behavior of these three actors in civil society and knowing their degree of participation in the policy process, this work seeks to bring to the forefront the need to address civil society's *ability* to influence democracy and not just to focus on its *density*. Knowing how, why, and when civil society participates in different policy issues at different levels of action, the obstacles they face, and what contributes to its effectiveness or failure, will help us understand the limits that organized groups and individuals may have when they attempt to influence the government (Norris 1999, 2002).

Figure 1.1
NGO and Democracy In Colombia
1980-1995



Source: Number of NGO: Directory of NGOs in Colombia. Fundación Social; Level of Democracy: Democracy Score Polity III

The main focus of the argument presented here lies in the idea that in order to comprehend and explain civil society's engagement in policy-making, it is necessary to perform an integrated analysis where the different spheres of power are considered (Migdal 1994, 2001; Katzenstein 1978). In this sense, it is not enough to identify the density of civil society, or the amount of individuals that participate in groups and associations; it is also necessary to assess the perceptions and behavior of the state, and most importantly, the local administration.

To be sure, it is my contention, that only when an in-depth analysis of the local dynamics of the city include the administration we will be able to identify causal mechanisms that might contribute to our understanding of the functioning of civil society and the factors that foster or hinder its development. Through interviews, survey application, active observation and participation in associational processes, and newspaper research, this study presents the views the political elite, civil associations, and the mass public.

Throughout this work I will establish how the character of the local administration constitutes an essential factor of the analysis and how its relationship with an organized civil society affects the quality of democracy in the city. In this sense, I argue that if we are confronted with a weak state, and a weak civil society, it is expected that the local administration will be strong and able to execute non-democratic behaviors. To be sure, the lack of counterbalance among the former actors, allows the administration to be closed to citizen and group participation, which at the end, has an impact on the intensity of local democracy (Migdal 2001, 64).

General findings indicate that although individual level participation is low throughout the city, there is an important degree of electoral participation as most of the population report to have voted at some point in time. However, at the citizen level it is clear that there is not a considerable degree of civic engagement or community participation, and even less regarding political involvement. Nonetheless, a comparison between the degree of individual participation and group participation shows that there are many ways groups and associations attempt to reach the government and participate in public venues.

The scope of group participation in public actions is wide as groups report to have used about 80% of the participatory tools and spaces provided by the National Constitution and legal framework of the country. However, it is important not to be deceived by this statistic as an indicator of the level of participation. To be sure, although most groups state that they have attempted to use different participatory tools, only 15% report to have used those tools that represent higher degrees of involvement. Thus, this work shows that it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the general use of participatory spaces, and the actual use of those spaces that constitute real participation in policy-making.

In addition, this work demonstrates how the type and characteristics of groups are important indicators of groups' success. From the data collected it is clear that older groups with a formal structure i.e. executive board, and secured headquarters are more likely to influence policy-making than groups with a weak internal organization. This is an important finding as it provides public officials with information that may serve as a guideline when deciding new programs and projects oriented toward

organizing and strengthening civil society. By knowing that traditional groups with an adequate internal organization are more prone to reach government officials and intervene in public affairs, officials will be able to redirect funds and efforts to strengthen existing groups while still allowing for new ones to form.

I have organized the discussion as follows. In Chapter 2 I present the theoretical considerations that guide the study, giving particular emphasis to the conceptualization of democracy and civil society. In addition to this, I also discuss participation and indicate how it is understood through this project. In Chapter 3, I offer a historical overview of Colombia and discuss how its historical legacies affect its political system today. Chapter 4 introduces Barranquilla and describes its socio-economic and political dynamics. Next, in Chapter 5, I introduce the research design used and explain the different procedures and techniques applied to select the survey sample and the groups to be studied. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 present the findings for each actor: the political elite, groups, and the mass public, respectively. Finally, in Chapter 9, I conclude by discussing how this study advances the discipline and identify new ideas for further research.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Considerations

Introduction

In this chapter I present the theoretical concepts and discussions that support my study. I start by addressing the relationship between democracy and civil society and do so by first offering a review of the evolution of the concept of democracy, its different meanings and what I consider needs to be included in a definition of the term. I argue that a working definition of democracy has to underscore political and not mere electoral participation as democracy entails more than having free and fair elections. In this project democracy is seen as system that allows for citizen participation beyond electoral processes; it includes being able to take part of decision-making processes that will affect their collective well-being.

I continue by discussing the difficulty in conceptualizing civil society, and present a series of arguments on the role that some authors attribute to it and its possible effects on democracy. In this section I contend that although some authors see civil society in opposition to the state, I believe that the analysis needs to be integrated; that in order to understand civil society's role we need to assess the political context from which it acts.

Next I include some remarks about public policy-making in Colombia, social group definition and their evolution in Latin America and close by discussing participation and how I will study the degree of civil society's participation in Colombia.

Democracy and Civil Society

The conceptualization of democracy has proven to be a complicated process as we find minimalist and maximalists views of democracy. Indeed, it is possible to find several definitions of democracy that range from minimal to comprehensive based on the components they stress, i.e. participation, civil and political liberties or social equity (Dahl 1971; Bollen 1993; Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997; Encarnación 2000). Minimalist definitions, those that identify few particular attributes required for a system to be democratic, are useful because they allow for more empirically based research; if the conceptualization of the term is not too demanding, it is easier to identify the presence of that concept in the real world. However, this minimalist conceptualization also prevents more precise definitions or characterizations of the system by omitting other relevant attributes in the definition of a concept; attributes that provide for a more accurate understanding of the issue to be defined (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 9).

This flux between minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy has scholars characterizing the type of democracy present in a particular country in so many different ways that it makes the reader wonder. For example, Colombia has been classified in various ways depending on the specific feature of the system that each author wants to highlight. Here are some examples of the different labels they offered: consociational democracy (Dix 1987, Hartlyn 1988); inclusionary authoritarianism (Bagley 1984); exclusionary democracy (Martz 1997), sectarian democracy (Kline 1995); near polyarchy (Dahl 1971); authoritarian (Huntington and Moore 1970), and perverse democracy (Bejarano 2000).

Contemporary definitions of democracy often refer to the work of Schumpeter (1950) who stated that democracy entails the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which the individual acquired the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the peoples' vote. In this definition the author places emphasis on the electoral component of democracy by arguing that a democracy requires for citizens to be able to transfer their decision-making power to those elected officials that were selected through a competitive process. Definitions offered around the 1970s convey a more broad view of democracy. In "Polyarchy" (1971) Robert Dahl suggests that democracy *per se* should be considered as an ideal system, not a system likely to be found in the contemporary political world. He uses a definition of democracy as an ideal type and offers polyarchy as a term that may reflect the type of regimes likely to be found around the world.

Polyarchy entails the existence of minimal conditions in a political system: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Dahl 1971, 3). For Dahl then, there exist two main components of polyarchy or democracy: liberalization (public contestation) and inclusiveness (participation). However, these components also stress electoral participation and are silent about a more direct participatory role of citizens in decision-making. When Dahl talks about participation or inclusiveness he is referring to the opportunity for all individuals to be allowed to

vote and to take part of the election process, he is not referring to a direct involvement in the process of policy making.

According to Taylor (1991), Diamond, Lipset, and Linz (1986), posit that democracy is a political system that incorporates three main features: a) meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups, b.) A highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, and c.) A level of civil and political liberties sufficient to insure the integrity of political competition and participation. This definition is more comprehensive than Dahl's as these authors state that the inclusive level of political participation is needed not only for the selection of leaders but also policies (Taylor 1991, 190).

In general, definitions of democracy could be labeled based on two main components: political liberties and democratic rules. Most of the definitions stress one, or both components². According to Bollen (1993), political liberties indicate that people of a country have the freedom to express political opinions in any media, and the freedom to form or participate in any political group. Democratic rule or political rights entails that the national government is accountable to the general population, and each individual is entitled to participate in the government directly or through representatives. Liberal democracy then, Bollen argues, is the extent to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic rule. For political liberties Bollen includes freedom of association, freedom of broadcast media, freedom of print

² Bollen (1993) offers a classification of authors based on the definitions they work with. Schumpeter (1954), Moore (1966), Lipset (1981) and Huntington (1984) belong to the democratic rule dimension; Lenski (1966), Therborn (1977), Casanova (1970) and Dahl (1971) use democratic rule and political rights as components for their definitions.

media and civil liberties. Under democratic rule he accounts for openness of nominating process, effectiveness of elected legislatures, political rights, and election of the chief executive. From this list we see that Bollen's components of democracy include freedom of association as part of political liberties, but there is no specific mention of the actual citizens' ability to participate in policy-making once they are associated.

Other scholars like Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (1996), assume a minimal definition of democracy and state that a democratic regime is that in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections where the opposition should be allowed to compete, win, and assume office. For them, democracy is where political parties are defeated during elections; alternation in power is necessary for a system to be considered democratic. Again, the emphasis here is on electoral democracy and no contention is made for additional attributes like actual involvement in the policy process.

A more comprehensive or maximalist view of democracy is found in Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens' work on the *Paradoxes of contemporary democracy* (1997). For them it is important to distinguish between formal, participatory, and social democracy. By formal democracy, the authors understand a political system that combines four main features: a.) Regular free and fair elections, b.) Universal suffrage, c.) Accountability of the state's administrative organs to the elected representatives, and d.) Effective guarantees for freedom of expression and association, together with protection against arbitrary state action. Participatory democracy entails the four features outlined above and high levels of participation

without systematic differences across social categories. Social democracy is the political system where the five features mentioned, together with an increasing equality of social and economic outcomes are present. To be sure, according to the authors, formal democracy is a requisite for participatory and social democracy.

In general, it is clear that there is no consensus among scholars as to which attributes define democracy. As Schmitter and Karl (1996) state, maybe what scholars need to accept is that there are many different types of democracy depending on the country's economic and social conditions together with its institutional arrangements. For the authors, "modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives" (Schmitter and Karl 1996, 50). This work follows Schmitter and Karl view of democracy as a concept that goes beyond regular and fair elections, it should also consider the space that citizens have to influence public policy through interest groups, associations, social movements and groups in general. In their words, "modern democracy ... offers a variety of competitive processes and channels for the expression of interests and values – associational as well as partisan, functional as well as territorial, collective as well as individual. All are integral to its practice" (Schmitter and Karl 1996, 52).

The importance of associational life and group participation in democracy is not a new theoretical feature. Since the times of Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* [1840] (2000), there has been a call for a view of democracy as something more than a competitive process for the peoples' vote. De Tocqueville insisted on the

importance of independent groups for democracy and argued that the dense associational life in America was one of the factors that made the system stronger by giving to society the capacity to check the powers of the state (de Tocqueville [1840] 1981, 103).

This takes us to civil society; a concept of elusive and, sometimes, contradictory definitions as it is identified with particularities that range from the rights of citizens, to voluntarism and the spirit of community (Seligman 1997, 5). Or as Foley and Edwards say:

At times the concept seems to take on the property of a gas, expanding or contracting to fit the analytic space afforded it by each historical or sociopolitical setting (1996, 42).

For some, civil society has been understood as the realm of private voluntary associations, ranging from neighborhood committees to interest groups to philanthropic institutions; as one of society's multiple arenas of domination and opposition (Foley and Edwards 1996; Migdal 1994); as "a realm of nonprivatized collective action that is voluntary rather than compulsory and persuasive rather than coercive" (Galston 2000, 64), and as "the realm of organized, social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules" (Diamond 1996, 228). Thus, civil society is composed of citizens that act collectively in the public sphere to achieve public goals. Some of these goals range from expressing their interests and ideas to making demands on the state or holding state officials accountable (Diamond 1996).

Other views of civil society are less optimistic of its aims. In a Hegelian tradition, civil society is an arena where the private person seeks to fulfill selfish interests. Hegel defines civil society as:

... an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system – the means to security of person and property – and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests (PR δ 157). ... Individuals in their capacity as burghers in this state are private persons whose end is their own interest. This end is mediated through the universal which thus appears as a means to its realization (PR δ 187).

Thus, in this tradition, civil society is the arena where free individuality searches for satisfaction of its desires and personal autonomy and not the realm of collective goals (Seligman 1992, 5). Civil society then, is more than an arena where public networks develop and citizens collaborate with each other; it could also be a space of mutual conflict of interests and self-determination (Olson 1982; Seligman 1992, 50; Garcia 1998).

I will use these two different views of civil society to elaborate on the current debate about civil society's role in democracy. Following the more optimistic and positive understanding of civil society, authors contend that a dense civil society – a great amount of groups and associations of different kind- is necessary for democracy to subsist (Putnam 1993, 89 and 175; Chazan 1994, 280; Gellner 1994; Diamond 1994). This neo-Tocquevillian view is supported by studies like Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993) where he followed the development of two regions in Italy and concluded that the main difference between their level of efficient governance (his

proxy for democracy) lay on the tradition of networking and associational interaction present in one of the regions. Although this study has been criticized for some of its measures and methods (Foley and Edwards 1996, footnote 8; Tarrow 1996; Seligson 1999), it constitutes an important attempt at building a link between associational life and democracy. In sum, for this tradition, the more groups and associations are present in a society the better it is for democracy. In Putnam's words: "The denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit ... Tocqueville was right: Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society" (Putnam 1993, 173 and 182).

Putnam's argument raised a series of responses within the discipline and gave way for a line of research that is still producing interesting proposals. In this respect, in their work, *The Paradoxes of Civil Society* (1996), Foley and Edwards address Putnam's findings by arguing that he underestimated the power of new organizations and political associations (which were excluded from Putnam's definition of civil society) as entities that could foster civil community and enhance democracy (1996, 40). Although they do not deny Putnam's conclusion that a network of associations are an important component for the advancement of democracy, these authors want to make clear that the political associations are the ones that "may well play the roles attributed to civil associations in the civil society argument, and may play them better." (Foley and Edwards 1996, 48). To be sure, Foley and Edwards argue that groups in civil society can play different roles according to the political setting where they function. If a civil society is strong enough to counterweight authoritarian regimes, the authors wonder, what prevents it from undermining democratic

governments? They find the answer at the center of the state-society debate. According to the authors, “a democratic civil society seems to require a democratic state, and a strong civil society seems to require a strong and responsive state. The strength and responsiveness of a democracy may depend upon the character of its civil society, as Putnam argues, reinforcing both the democratic functioning and the strength of the state. But such effects depend on the prior achievement of both democracy and a strong state.” (Foley and Edwards 1996, 48). Thus, for these authors, the type of collective action that civil society groups undertake vary according to the political system they confront; a weak or unresponsive system is likely to face increased militancy against the state or a high degree of apathy (1996, 49).

Using the case of the collapse of the Weimar Republic and based on Huntington’s fear that highly organized and mobilized populations might be a threat to developing states (1968), Sheri Berman (1997) offers a challenging perspective. She argues that although participation in civil associations in Germany brought individuals together as the neo-Tocquevilleans claim it would, this did not strengthen democracy, but on the contrary, it weakened it (Berman 1997, 408). According to Berman, in order to understand the role that civil society may play in democracy we need to focus on the internal and external conditions that affect the political institutions of the country because it is based on the performance of such institutions that civil society will react.

In her words:

[I]f we want to know when civil society activity will take on oppositional or even antidemocratic tendencies, we need to ground our analyses in concrete examinations of political reality. If a country’s political institutions and structures are capable of channeling and redressing grievances and the existing political regime enjoys public

support and legitimacy, then associationism will probably buttress political stability by placing its resources and beneficial effects in the service of the status quo. ... If, on the contrary, political institutions and structures are weak ... then civil society activity may become an alternative to politics... In such situations, associationism will probably undermine political stability.. Flourishing civil society activity in these circumstances signals governmental and party failure and may bode ill for the regime's future (1997, 426).

At this point a synthesis of the discussion is in order. I have shown how the debate about the relationship between civil society and democracy has evolved by addressing how Putnam's view that a dense network of civil associations is needed for democracy to advance, has been redefined by Foley and Edwards (1996). These authors contend that it is not the density of civil associations but the existence of political associations in an appropriate political setting the ones that might achieve the goals that Putnam attributes to civil networks. This optimistic view of civil society is clouded by the revisionists who posit that it is possible to expect that a vibrant or dense civil society might have a negative effect on democracy by threatening the states' ability to govern (Berman 1997; Encarnación 2000).

What seems to be unfolding from this discussion is that the focus has turned from the character of civil society to the character of the political setting. At the initial stages of the debate the discussion was centered on the values and norms that a network of horizontal civil associations can form in individuals and their effect on collaboration and understanding among citizens. The more citizens interact and participate, the more they will learn to trust each other and develop common goals and interests. Thus, the quality of civil society and the values it represented were a central aspect of this theory. Latter on, and also with a focus on the internal features of civil

society, authors stated that the type of associations present in society is important. At this point however, there is a contention that it is necessary to look outside of civil society and into the political context, in order to understand its potential effect on democracy (Foley and Edwards 1996; Berman 1997; Encarnación 2000). In addition, with some of these new perspectives, the character of the political context becomes even more important than the character of civil society, as Berman (1997) makes clear. The author states: “Perhaps, ... associationism should be considered a politically neutral multiplier- neither inherently good nor inherently bad, but rather dependent for its effects on the wider political context” (427).

In this project I argue that the study of civil society and democracy needs to consider not only the number of groups present in civil society, or the type of associations in a political context, but it also needs to focus on those groups’ *abilities* to participate and to influence the context of policy in democracy defined as a political decision-making process (Patterson 1999, 423). I argue that we need to consider both points of the debate and study the character and features of a particular civil society together with the openness and inclusiveness that its political system offers. The study of civil society needs to address the reality of its functioning, assess if its groups are able to affect public policy, verify if it is possible for civil society to penetrate the circles of power that surround it. I do this by studying the process of public policy-making in a Colombian city.

Public Policy Making

According to Kingdon (1995), policy-making is a set of processes that include at least: 1) the setting of the agenda, 2) the specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, 3) an authoritative choice among those specified alternatives, as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision, and 4) the implementation of the decision (2-3). Thus, the study of public policy-making, understood as the sum of government activities, whether pursued directly or through agents, that have an influence on the life of citizens, encompasses several levels: policy choices, policy outcomes, and policy impact. Although all three levels provide information about the process and content of policy-making in a particular setting, this project focuses on policy choices as the main instance where social groups could participate. Traditionally, when social groups have been actively involved in the process of policy-making in Latin America it has been in the area of policy outcomes as they implement part of the policy choices made by those in power. Although not all government policies are implemented by government employees and many are implemented by private organizations or individuals, it is important to avoid a narrow definition of public policy as concerning only those issues that are directly administered or handle by the administration or public agency.

Policy choices are decisions made by politicians, civil servants, or others granted authority and directed toward using public power to affect citizens. Congressmen, presidents, governors, administrations and pressure groups make such policy choices. To what degree do social groups, individuals, citizens or civil society in general participate of this process? Private sector providers are becoming

increasingly important actors in public policy. Few policies are decided and executed by a single organization or level of government. Instead, policies in terms of their effects on the public emerge from a large number of programs, legislative projects and organizational interactions (Peters 1999). Thus, policy is not constructed in a vacuum; it is the result of the interaction among a number of equally complex institutions, individuals and factors like laws, money, services, taxes and the desires and decisions of those who make policies. In addition to the interactions that occur within the public sector there are a number of interactions within society that might affect the process of policy choice.

Society and the leaders of civil society play an increasing important role in policymaking and implementation, with reforms in the public sector placing increasing emphasis on the capacity of the private sector to implement, if not make, public policy. Groups and organizations are attempting to become active not only by monitoring government activities but also by influencing the choice of activities and policies to be followed.

However, how can a problem be converted into an issue and brought to a public institution for formal consideration? How does an issue become the subject of policy choice? Some scholars have argued that agendas do not change unless there is an almost random confluence of events favoring the new policy initiative. The manner a problem is conceptualized and defined determines the remedies to be proposed, the organizations that will be given responsibility for the problem, and the final outcome of the public intervention.

The process of policy-making goes hand in hand with the manner in which political power is exercised. In general we can frame the exercise of power under two main approaches: pluralist and elitist. The pluralist approach assumes that policymaking is divided into a number of separate arenas and that those who have power in one arena do not necessarily have power in the others. It assumes that there are a number of interests and actors competing for access to institutions for decision-making and for the attention of central actors in the hope of producing their desired outcomes. These groups are assumed to be relatively equal in power. In addition, advocates of this approach see the government as an umpire in the struggle among competing group interests (Peters 1999, 50).

The elitist approach on the other hand, seeks to contradict the dominant pluralist approach. It assumes the existence of a 'power elite' who dominate public decision-making and whose interests are served in the policy-making process. In their analysis, the same interests in society consistently win, and these interests are usually those of business, upper and middle class and whites. According to this group, the supposed level of equality that those of the pluralist approach assume is not possible unless they all have equal levels of organization by all interests in society; and, relatively few interests of working and lower class individuals are effectively organized.

Although according to democratic theory all individuals have the right to organize, elitist theorists' point to the relative lack of resources in time money, preparation, and information, among members of the working class, making participation by this group of people minimal. The implication of this approach is

clear. If agenda formulation is crucial to the process of policymaking, then the ability of elites to keep certain issues off the agenda is crucial to their power.

Colombia and its political system it is better understood under the elitist approach; elite compromise and accommodation have characterized politics in the country. A look at Colombia's political development of the last 50 years indicates that public policy is usually made by those within the circle of power where common citizens and regular social groups are not traditionally allowed (See Chapter 3).

Before addressing these issues it is necessary to make some remarks about one of the main concepts used in this study: social groups.

Social Groups

The study of social groups or organizations is related to our understanding of the profusion of terms used to depict a series of institutions or associations that belong to the so-called third sector. The third sector occupies a distinctive social space away from the market and the state, a realm outside of government and different from private business where society organizes itself through associations, organizations and institutions. Terms like charitable sector, non-profit sector, voluntary sector, independent sector, nongovernmental organizations, and associational sector are all used across nations to refer to those organizations that help conform civil society³.

³ There is no agreement on how to call the sector that is different from the government and private business. Voluntary sector is criticized because it gives too much emphasis to the use of volunteers, third sector is also questioned because some do not know which are the first and second sector, and non-profit is not accurate because some cooperatives in the Third World promote projects that benefit the whole community and also seek to make profits for their members (Fisher 1997, 11). Fisher (1997) settles with the term independent sector but this term implies that the organizations are independent of the government or private business and this is not always true; part of the funding for NGO comes from

The most common type of group is the Nongovernmental Organization (NGO). This term has many different meanings. For some, NGO mean all organizations that are not part of the government but fulfill some government functions, for others it depends on the place where they are to be defined (Fisher 1997). For some part of the Third World for example, NGO are usually known as organizations involved in development, but different than voluntary or non-profit organizations. In the newly formed countries of Europe and the former Soviet Union, NGO are all charitable and nonprofit organizations and in Western Europe it generally means nonprofit organizations that are active in the international realm (Fisher 1997, 5).

Although different types of organizations can be present throughout societies, it is possible to identify certain features that all of them share as part of the sector.

According to Salamon and Anheier (1996, 14) organizations need to be:

- Formal - either by been legally constituted or by institutionalizing regular meetings or some degree of permanence.
- Private - separate from the government in matters of governance, but they can still receive governmental funding.
- Non-profit-distributing- although they may accumulate profits it must be reinvested into the organization and not distribute to the board or representatives of the group.
- Self-governing - able to control their structure and administrative procedures.
- Voluntary – at least some degree of voluntary participation is present, by the staff, the board or the management.

the government, and/or private businesses. In this project then I use third sector because it is the one used the most in the literature.

Thus, this project identifies a social group as a voluntary, non-profit association that is neither part of the government nor is dominated by government officials. The term encompasses a wide range of organizations from social movements and interest groups to sports clubs, because our interest is to be able to identify any type of group that participates in policy-making.

Throughout time, social groups like NGO have evolved and today are facing new challenges that force them to rethink their mission, strategy, and purpose. Traditionally NGO were seen as a hope that both government and market failure were to be compensated by the actions of those non-profit seeking, voluntary associations created around the 1960s and 1980s (Bebbington 1997; Streeten 1997). NGO were considered as sources of alternative ideas about development, as new actors that might contribute to the implementation of development alternatives, combat poverty, and foster political participation (Bebbington 1997). For example, many NGO advocated the idea of organizing groups within poor neighborhoods and work with them through self-help programs that would allow them to solve their social problems i.e. Inter-American Foundation, and Ford Foundation. These type of organizations, some church based, some secular, or academic, or Marxist's, fostered the ideology that due to the state's lack of response, it is was possible - and even desirable- for citizens to have a direct involvement in their social well-being (Villar 2001, 74).

From the 1960s to the 1980s NGO were those private, professionally staffed, non-membership, and intermediary development organizations that were founded on the commitment for a more democratized and inclusive development and as a response to bureaucratic authoritarian regimes (Bebbington 1997, 118; Petras 1997). At this

time NGO were primarily seen as concerned with offering alternatives to dominant conceptions of rural development that were to generate policies and programs that states will incorporate as permanent measures like the ones targeting the development of the small-farm sector in Latin America. The idea then, was that “NGO would have subsequently withered away once these new states were ushered and consolidated” (Bebbington 1997, 119).

However, the results of the NGO programs show that they did not gradually disappear. After public sector reforms and neoliberal programs were implemented in the region, the relationship between the state and NGO started to change. The state backed away from program implementation and concentrated on financing private actors or institutions to implement programs that provided support or services to the needed. For instance, in Colombia, Departmental Co-financing Units handle rural development that co-sponsor projects proposed by the municipalities but implemented by NGO (Bebbington 1997, 121). At certain level, NGO became highly involved in state funded programs, but their involvement was limited to program implementation and not design. According to scholars, NGO and social groups implemented activities that had been decided by other actors; NGO did not take part of the decision making process because the rules of the game that defined group action were fixed by the state.

As stated above, contemporary social groups face new problems. At their onset they were regarded as a helping hand, as organizations that attempted to foster development and social progress for those that were in need. Latter on, groups took a secondary role by implementing projects designed by the state and by other external organizations. Today, some social groups seek to have a greater role in policy-making

by participating in the decision-making process, by submitting their proposals and pilot studies for consideration, and by exercising their right to make state officials accountable for their actions. In other words, some organizations seek to be more representative of the group/sector they identify with and are designed to protect or give their support to. Think tanks, research centers, watchdog groups are flourishing in Latin America and are attempting to penetrate the decision-making circle. For example, in Barranquilla, a major city in the context of Colombia, the chapter of Transparency International has been able to become a member of several executive boards of public hospitals and health units and through this participation wants to be able not only to monitor state actions, but also give its input.

The central argument of this study is based on participation, particularly what influences social group participation in Colombia. I rest my contentions on the theoretical proposition that in order to understand the relationship between civil society and democracy it is necessary to study the degree of civil society's participation in the policy process. The next section discusses participation and presents a more detailed view of what I argue affects social group participation in Colombia.

Participation

In this work I give emphasis to democracy at the local level, in particular the level of citizen participation in political activities in the city or locality. Under this perspective a locality with higher levels of political participation is deemed to be

strongly democratic. Theories of democracy, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation all include some type of participation as a condition for democracy (Dahl 1971; Przeworski 1991; Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela 1992). Developmental theories of participation state that the purpose of participation is to allow individuals to have practical experience in decision making which is conducive to development of responsibility for political behavior (Parry 1972). Effective participation affects political and social goals as it represents the process by which those goals are defined and determine the means through which they can be reached; it is assumed that such goals represent the interests and needs of the general public (Verba and Nie 1972).

Milbrath's definition of political participation is widely accepted by the discipline as it offers a broad understanding of the different components of political participation. The author states:

Political participation may be defined as those actions of private citizens by which they seek to influence or to support government and politics. This definition is broader than most others are; it includes not only active roles that people pursue in order to influence political outcomes but also *ceremonial* and *support* activities (1965,.2) (Emphasis on the original).

According to Milbrath (1965), participation ranges from protest, community activity, party and campaign work, communication, contact, voting, patriotism, and inactivity (Milbrath and Goel 1982). As the study of the concept evolved, authors tended to disagree with some of the modes of participation previously mentioned. Some do not see voting as political participation because the act of voting is not directly related to the outcome. "The political participant must be someone who has a

reasonable expectation of influencing the policy decision or at the very least of making his voice heard in the deliberations leading up to it” (Parry 1972, 3).

Less demanding definitions of political participation refer to ‘those acts that aim to influence the government’ (Verba and Nie 1972), or those formal or informal ways of getting involved in activities that go from party membership to neighborhood networking (Dietz 1998). For example, constituents may chose to participate by donating time or money to a campaign, or forming youth groups within a neighborhood to ask the government for funding for after school programs.

Verba and Nie (1972) place particular importance to political participation and make clear that, although some scholars understand participation in a broader sense like in Dietz’ case, they want to concentrate on all those acts that are aimed at influencing the government, “either by affecting the *choice* of government personnel or by affecting the *choices made* by government personnel” (Verba and Nie 1972, 2)

Latter on, and in a similar sense, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) understand political participation as the ‘activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies’ (1995, 38). In this work I use this perspective. I identify participation with those acts that are directed towards affecting government action, particularly public policy.

During the 1980s, many Latin American countries implemented reforms directed toward strengthening local and state governments through increased citizen participation in political activities (Nickson 1995). Indeed, in 1986 Colombia started a

process of political and administrative decentralization. Decentralization processes entail more than a transfer of responsibility and accountability from the national level to the state or municipal level. It is also a process intended to make democracy stronger by allowing citizens' demands to be channeled to a lower level, by placing citizens closer to the administration and more aware of their right to self-determination (Tanzi 1995, 295). For example, as a consequence of the 1986 Constitutional reform, municipal officials (Mayors) were to be popularly elected, and education and health issues were to be decided at the state and local level. Thus, besides fostering citizen involvement in the decision-making process, decentralization regulations were also supposed to strengthen municipal autonomy (Wiesner 1995; Slater 1985; Ballon 1986; Boisier 1987; Castells and Borja 1988).

There are several studies in Colombia that assess the results of the decentralization process focusing on whether it made municipalities stronger, or if the central government fulfilled its promise of transferring competencies and functions to the local government (See Weisner 1995; Bell and Garcia 2000; Madrid Malo and Diaz 2002). This study goes on further by concentrating on the issue of the quality of democracy. As Verba and Nie state: "Where few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is" (1972, 1). Thus, through this research I assess the degree of mass public, elite, and social group participation in policy-making in Colombia. Has the decentralization process fostered citizen and group participation in the country? Are groups in Colombia able to draft legislation, serve on advisory boards, and affect the

government's agenda by having some of their issues included? These are the questions that my research will answer.

In order to study the level of social group participation in Colombia I have identified four different levels of participation. A group is said not to participate when there is no penetration of the political system at any level whether because the group has no intention to participate or because it is not able to participate. For example, the representative of a religious organization that offers shelter for street children reports to have almost no degree of participation because they support their actions through private and international donors. They have addressed the government to request permits and licenses, but their intention is not to affect policy (Personal interview NGO representative, July 2001).

In other instances groups may have a low level of participation. I define low level of participation as the case when groups' main action is to implement policy designed by the government, or when they have sporadic or informal contacts with government officials. In this case group representatives may have some degree of access to public officials but with no formal or constant channel. For example, group leaders might be able to talk to some officials during informal gatherings where officials, by being in the public eye, are more likely to be attentive. However, this same group leader might not be able to get the official on the phone for a more direct conversation. This represents low level of participation because some other group leaders might not even have that informal opportunity to talk to a public officer.

A medium level of participation indicates that the group has been able to consult with the government to plan legislation in formal and structured settings, even

if the government rejects their proposals. This is the case when the groups take part of workshops, working sessions and the like, whether called for by the government or by the group. What matters here is the assessment whether the group has a formal space to consult with the government. During these formal encounters the group may present proposals, give technical advice or attempt to influence appointments to public office.

Last, high levels of participation are present when groups help draft legislation, serve on advisory commissions and boards, or shape the government's agenda by raising new issues. In a country like Colombia that in its Constitution defines the political system as a 'participatory democracy', you would expect to find high levels of participation by social groups.

The factors I believe can hinder or foster social group participation in policy-making in Colombia are: Type of group, type of issues, type of funding, arena of action, and the fear factor. I discuss each of these factors when I explain the research designed used in this project (Chapter 5).

In this chapter I have discussed the theoretical bases of my study. I have argued that in order to understand civil society's role in strengthening democracy, it is necessary to focus not only on its density, or character, but also on its ability to take part of the political decision making process. A dense civil society like Colombia's only indicate the presence of a great amount of social groups but it gives no suggestion of the level of penetration that these groups have. Colombia's paradox of an increasing number of social groups and a decreasing level of democracy is a case in point.

In the next chapter I present Colombia as the focus of the study. A discussion of its political system and associational life will give some background to the reader as why this is an interesting and appropriate country for the current research.

Chapter 3

Colombia

Introduction

This chapter elaborates on Colombia by presenting an overview of its history, political system and associational life. I place some emphasis on the legacies that Colombia's historical developments have left on its political system and contend, as do other authors, that Colombia's National Front (*Frente Nacional*) –a bipartisan agreement that ended the most crude and violent period of the country called The Violence (*La Violencia*) - represented a turning point for the country as it created a set of rules that constrained and affected political and institutional development in the country.

The last section of the chapter discusses associational life in Colombia and elaborates on the paradox that the country presents. I show how, although the number of social groups has been constantly increasing in the country since the 1980s, its level of democracy has decreased during the last decade, a phenomena that goes against what the theory of civil society's density and democratic consolidation suggest.

In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of Colombia, I will give a general overview of four of the main political events that marked Colombia's transit to democracy and its process of democratic consolidation.

Historical Overview

Colombia has been labeled one of the oldest constitutional democracies of Latin America, yet it has experienced one of the bloodiest internal conflicts of the region⁴. Unlike the rest of the hemisphere, the country has not experienced a drastic change of its political regime and its democracy has endured for decades, notwithstanding violence, guerrilla insurgency, and narco-terrorism (Archer 1990; Dix 1987; Kline 1980, 1995; Leal Buitrago 1984; Martz 1997). Scholars have explained Colombian politics in different ways. For some, Colombia's political development is a product of its historical legacies and cultural heritage (Harrison 1997; Veliz 1994; Kline 1995). For others it is the product of the politics of coalition rule (Hartlyn 1988; Peeler 1985; Dix 1987; Kline 1995), and yet for a last group it is the clientelistic character of the system that explains its stability (Leal Buitrago 1984; Archer 1990; Martz 1997)⁵.

Four main historical events have shaped the country's path to development: The Violence (*La Violencia*) – from 1948 to 1953, the National Front from 1957 to 1974, the 1968 Constitutional Reform, and the 1991 Constitution.

⁴ Scholars have attempted to characterize the type of democracy present in Colombia by identifying particular features of the system. Here are some examples of the different labels they offered: consociational democracy (Dix 1987; Hartlyn 1988); inclusionary authoritarianism (Bagley 1984); exclusionary democracy (Martz 1997), sectarian democracy (Kline 1995); near polyarchy (Dahl 1971); authoritarian (Huntington and Moore 1970), and perverse democracy (Bejarano 2000).

⁵ While these works attempt to study Colombia's democracy through an institutional lens, seldom do we find pieces that address society's internal political development defined as a system where organized interests in civil society have a clear and open linkage with the state in order to make it more accessible and responsible to society's needs (Fisher 1997). I have identified few studies that touch upon the topic in a general way. See: Villar 2001; Hornsby 1991; and Velez 1981.

La Violencia

The struggle known as *La Violencia* was guided by political persecution between liberals and conservatives. Liberals had been in power since 1930 and lost the elections in 1946. Even though the elected president Mariano Ospina Perez offered a coalition rule, violent conflicts in rural areas between conservatives and liberals escalated (Bushnell 1997). The Conservative government created the political police (*policía política*), with the purpose of preventing liberals from winning the upcoming 1950 elections. Conservatives knew that for this elections the liberals were united toward a charismatic and popular leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán. In the 1930s Gaitán tried to establish a multi-class, anti-oligarchic coalition, first from outside and then from within the Liberal party. In 1946, due to a division within the Liberal party, Gaitán lost the elections, but for the upcoming presidential elections in 1950, he was to be the sole candidate for the party. However, on April 9, 1948, Gaitán was assassinated in the country's capital, Bogotá, an event that strengthened the dispute between parties, and started *La Violencia*, with a one week series of violent riots known as the *Bogotazo*. During the next years (1948 – 1953) a series of *matanzas* (killing episodes where more than 200,000 people died) took place mostly in the rural areas (Chernick 1998, 38-41). Through intimidation, liberals were prevented from voting; if a peasant was open about his/her identification with the liberal party, he /she was persecuted, expelled from their land, and most of the times, killed as a way of creating a precedent for those still interested in the liberal party.

The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia) the largest, most important guerrilla group in

Colombia started to form during this time. It originated in the Liberal peasant guerrilla movement of the 1940s, and subsequently developed deep roots in the peasant communities located in the areas of its settlement. For some, the FARC became a means of self-defense against both the large landowners and the military in areas of land colonization (Pizarro 1992, 180-182; Molano 1994).

As a result of *La Violencia*, a group of military, liberals, conservatives, and civilians pressured Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to take power through a *coup d'etat* in order to stop the killings and the internal war. This was to be Colombia's second *coup d'etat* since 1900 (Bushnell 1997, 284). Rojas was received with sense of hope and relieve by liberals and conservatives alike; it was the only option available to end the confrontation between parties. However, although Colombians did not want to have a permanent authoritarian regime, Rojas controlled the media, persecuted Protestants, and called for a National Assembly to legitimate his right to rule in Colombia. Liberals and conservatives started to be concerned with the idea of how to restore democracy in Colombia. Negotiations between both parties were held in and outside the country, and an agreement was signed in Benidorm, Spain in 1957.

The National Front

The Benidorm pact stated that liberals and conservatives would alternate in power every four years for the next 16 years (1958 – 1974), starting with the Liberal party in 1958 and ending with the Conservative party in the period from 1970 to 1974. Bureaucratic positions would be shared in equal proportions, only liberal or conservative representatives could run for office at the local or national level, and the

national cabinet should be 50 % liberal and 50% conservative. This was the period known as the National Front. Thus, both parties, supported by the elites, developed a common front to restore democracy in the country, and negotiated with the militaries to step down from power. At this point, forcing Gen. Rojas to leave power was possible, as he had lost the support of the Church, the students, and the military. At the end, a constitutional amendment was passed, and the Pact of the National Front became norm for the country for the next 16 years (Bushnell 1997, 308-320).

Scholars are divided when assessing the political consequences of the National Front, as some consider that instead of fostering democratic changes, the decisions made within the pact hindered the process of deepening democracy as it limited political participation in elections and public offices. For some, the National Front constitutes the main and most important political agreement the country has experienced and through which the democratic system was preserved and peace was reached in Colombia (Posada-Carbó 2001).

While both sides have valuable arguments, it is clear that through the pact signed by the two main political parties, the country was able to return to some degree of governance and economic progress. The effects of such pact are still present in the country's political dynamics and political parties, NGO and civil society in general are aware of the price the country paid in order to attain certain degree of peace.

The 1968 Reform

Initially the National Front established that all legislative bodies had to be equally divided between liberals and conservatives regardless of electoral results and

no new political parties could participate in elections. Different political parties would have to register their candidates as belonging either to the Liberal party or the Conservative party. These two provisions were changed with the 1968 political reform. After this reform, parity ended for the 1970 elections at the state and municipal assemblies. At the same time, new groups that participated in elections were allowed to do so by forming political parties; there was an openness of the system when parties different than the liberal and conservatives were authorized to participate in the elections.

Although this measure attempted to open the space for new groups and political parties, the country had faced more than 10 years of limited participation which led political parties and groups to weaken and disappear from the political realm. The new regulations provided space for other parties to take part of political competition for elected positions but there was still some degree of skepticism regarding the actual political spaces these groups might be able to attain.

The 1991 Constitutional Reform

After several attempts to reform the political regime, a Constitutional Assembly was elected to write a new constitution under the presidential term of liberal Cesar Gaviria Trujillo (1990 – 1994). This Constitutional Assembly represented a historical advancement in the state-civil society relationship as it had representatives from a variety of social and political actors. Indeed, for the first time an ex-guerrilla group – M19- was able to participate in the assembly after getting almost 27% of the

popular votes. In addition, union groups, natives' groups, social and religious groups were also able to take an active role within the assembly (Palacios 1995).

The 1991 Constitution changed the character of the state in Colombia. According to the new constitution, the state has a social and legal character and the system is defined as a participatory democracy (Art. 3, National Constitution 1991). Based on this participatory principle the constitution creates a series of mechanisms and tools intended to increase citizen participation at different levels, strengthens political and administrative decentralization process, and offers the opportunity for an increased popular representation of different social groups in official institutions. At the same time, the 1991 constitution provides for more specific mechanism of social and political accountability by creating different institutions like *Defensoría del Pueblo*, watchdog units and legal popular actions that citizens can undertake against government officials (Villar 2001).

Several articles in the constitutions address the importance of the development of civil organizations and social groups that would participate in the national and local policy process. For example, article 38 determines the right to associate, article 40 the right to free speech, article 103 recognizes civil society organizations as democratic mechanisms of citizen representation at different policy stages and grants to the state the obligation to promote their training, organization, adequate and independent functioning. Also, article 355 authorizes the state at the national, departmental and local level to provide public funding to different civil society organizations for the execution of programs and projects according to the appropriate development plan. Some of the changes to the 1886 constitution are summarized in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1

Summary of Changes to the 1886 Colombian Constitution

Feature	1886 Constitution	1991 Constitution
President - Election - Terms	Plurality, every 4 years Unlimited but not successive	Majority, every 4 years One
Vice- president	None, but with a designate elected by congress	Elected at the same time as president; does not have to be from same party; can be elected president but not during the following term.
Cabinet	Appointed and removed by president	Appointed and removed by president; can be censured by congress.
Governors	Appointed by president.	Elected
Congress	Each house by departmental constituency, proportional representation	House by departmental constituency, proportional representation; senate by national constituency, proportional representation.
Number of posts	Multiple candidacy possible Alternates for posts	One post only No alternates
New 'democratic' features		Recall elections; initiative and referendum for legislation and constitutional amendments; limits on relatives holding post; limits on travel; no regional funds from Congress; members of congress lose post if miss more than six votes during session; any official can be removed if does not follow campaign promises.
Judiciary	Traditional code-law system in which judges investigate as well as try cases	National Prosecutor's office separate from judiciary and charged with investigation of crimes and coordination of investigative bodies

Source: Kline, Harvey. 1996. "Colombia: the attempt to replace violence with democracy". In Wiarda Howard and Harvey F. Kline Ed. *Latin American Politics and Development*. 4th ed. Boulder: Westview. Page 193.

Political System

Colombia's political system can be seen as a result of a tradition of coalition rule present in the country since the 19th century (Kline 1980). The political elite and the two traditional parties have shown resilience in their survival by making alliances

with each other when external threats challenged their political power. Although there has been factional conflict within parties, any actual intervention to displace the two party system was eventually suppressed by successful interparty coalition like in the case of the military regimes of General Reyes (1904-1906) and General Rojas (1953-1957) when leaders of the political parties came together and developed strategies to end the military regimes (Cepeda Ulloa 1985; Dix 1987; Peeler 1985; Kline 1980, 1995; Hartlyn 1988; and Solaun 1980). The country's capacity for political compromise has been a factor that has periodically contributed to the maintenance of the Colombian political system. The country has shown a willingness to create alliances between enemies as pacts, accords, pardons, and amnesties have constituted the main strategy used to prevent or restore the violent rupture of the system (Cepeda Ulloa 1985, 10).

Scholars that characterize Colombia's democracy as the result of the politics of compromise argue that the country's consociational agreements are not only a way of ending violence, but also the only way possible. In other words, in countries like Colombia where regime breakdown occurred because of violent conflict between identifiable groups, consociational mechanisms are necessary. However, consociationalism has some inherent biases - like conservative redistribution policies, strong possibilities for immobilism and policy incoherence - that might hinder the process and affect the level of representation and party competition in the country. In Hartlyn's words:

Consociational practices in certain developing countries often provide a more humane politics than likely alternatives. Yet, their inevitable requirement of considerable elite autonomy and their fear of mass

mobilization may inhibit development of broader democratic practices. Regime elites and their allies may seek to use consociationalism not as a democratic solution but as a means of halting significant democratization by defending privilege (1988, 249).

Colombia's controlled political participation allowed the political parties to control the clientelistic system and the actions of the mass population. In this way, the National Front was a determined and successful effort to demobilize and control the citizenry without formally abandoning liberal democracy's commitment to universal suffrage and a liberal political system (Peeler 1985, 59). In addition, the character of elite accommodation of the political system generated an 'ideological and policy centered' party system which pressed the competing parties to avoid positions that would be threatening to established interests. In this way, policy is kept within an established mainstream and conflict is avoided (Peeler 1985, 130).

Although it is clear that Colombia's political system can be characterized by the domination of elite politics, there is no clear identification of the dynamics that the elite follow in the country. For some, the elites tend to accommodate and negotiate among themselves in ways that would guarantee that they remain in power, as the National Front agreement (Kline 1980, 1995; Dix 1987). For other, the elites tend to be exclusionary and closed (Martz 1997). For the latter, the determination of Colombian elites to maintain power and assure an orderly society necessarily required the identification and elaboration of new and modern forms of clientelism (Martz 1997, 38).

Clientelism has been part of the national history and of its bipartism (Leal Buitrago 1984). Clientelism is a historical form of social domination that has provided

the spine of the biparty political regime and the basis for an administrative system opposed to socioeconomic progress (Diaz Uribe 1986). Although clientelism can be seen under a political context just as a way for elites to maintain power, it also has a cultural component (Martz 1997; Dix 1987).

Clientelism, as a way for elites to maintain its position in power, has evolved from a traditional to a broker style therefore weakening the capacity of Colombian political elites to deal with increasingly serious problems of social conflict and political violence. For example, traditional clientelistic relations implied a sense of connection between the 'patron' or politician and the citizen; there was a personalistic relationship between the parts (Losada 1988). Thus, the erosion of traditional sources of authority and legitimacy and their replacement by a broker clientelism based on personal influence has led to political immobilism and has placed severe constraints on the actions of potential reformers and institution building (Archer 1990). For example, when a new administration takes power, new civil servants that have some degree of influence toward the new official or party, will be hired and ongoing programs and projects will likely be cancelled. In sum, the primary explanation for the co-existence of regime stability with social and political violence lies in the ways in which the traditional parties have mobilized and organized support through patron-client mechanism that have been relatively immune to social conflict and participation.

Citizen Participation and Associational Life

Colombia's National Front stated that power was to be shared by the liberal and conservative parties for sixteen years, a regulation that clearly limited party

competition in the country. By parties having a secured level of participation in the government they were less concerned with articulating or aggregating civil society's demands creating a crisis of representation and an increased distance between the public sphere and civil society (Pecaut 1989, 28; Villar 2001, 78).

In order to overcome this lack of representation, civil society looked to other spaces and started to form social groups and organizations that would attempt to channel the citizens' demands, an endeavor that continues to this day. However, governmental initiatives also led – although indirectly – to the development of important groups within civil society. As the National Front was in place the government needed to create venues that would strengthen its institutional presence and give some legitimacy to the state. In order to accomplish this, the government created the Community Action Boards (*Juntas de Acción Comunal*) in 1958, and the Peasant Association (*Asociación de Usuarios Campesinos*) in 1968, two of the main organizations that started the formation of the third sector in the country (Villar 2001, 66).

Although social groups and associations have existed in Colombia since the early 1900s, institutional provisions that granted participation were almost non-existent until 1986 and 1991 with the constitutional reforms that attempted to incorporate the citizen into the decision-making process. Several attempts to foster some degree of citizen participation took place previous to 1986 and 1991, although with limited success. For example, the 1968 constitutional reform contemplated the creation of some organs of territorial representation known as Local Administrative

Boards (*Juntas Administradoras Locales*) but these were only able to function by 1986 (Gonzalez 1996).

The spirit of the 1986 Constitutional reform was to strengthen municipal autonomy by fostering administrative and political decentralization. As part of the political decentralization process, the reform called for the first popular election of Mayors in 1988, a mechanism that led to more direct and stronger relationships between citizens and their local institutions (Villar 2001; Weisner 1995). This is exemplified not only by the increased percentage of citizen participation in local elections since the reform, but also by the fact that local participation has been higher than national participation (Maldonado 2001).

In addition to the election of Mayors, the reform also provided for:

- L. 11/86 – Creation of Local Administrative Boards,
- D. 3446/86 and 700/87 – Mandatory participation of utility clients/users in the executive boards of the public service companies (utility companies).
- L. 11/86 – community organizations were to be able to participate in contracts, pacts or agreements with the municipality.
- L.A. 1/86, L.42/89 – Allowed statutory provisions for referendums and plebiscites for the community to intervene and decide about issues at the local level.

In general, the country has in place legal provisions that protect, encourage and regulate political, social, and citizen participation at the national and local level (See Table 3.2). Within these norms there are clear dispositions of how, at least in a formal sense, citizen involvement is an important aspect of Colombia's democracy (See Table 3.3).

Table 3.2
Main Legislation for Social, Political, and Citizen Participation in Colombia

National Constitution	Law 134/ 1994 (Ley Estatutaria de Participación Ciudadana)	Law 142/1994 (Ley de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios)
Articles: 38, 39, 40, 45, 49, 57, 60, 64, 68, 78, 79, 103, 104, 105, 106, 112, 154, 155, 170, 242, 246, 318	Articles: 2-9, 64, 81, 86, 100, 258, 260, 270, 318, 329, 330, 340, 369, 374, 375, 376, 377.	Articles: 27, 53, 62, 63, 64, 84, 153

According to the Directory of NGOs in Latin America (Vargas 1993), as of 1993 Colombia had 5000 NGOs and 5346 non-profit organizations in 1992, more than any other country in Latin America (See Figure 3.1). In addition, state that the NGO universe in Colombia encompasses as many as 70,000 organizations (Ritchey-Vance 1991, 28; Castañeda et. al. 1989).

Social Groups in Colombia can be classified into three main categories:

- 1) Grassroots organizations, which are formed by individuals with a common interest and whose outcome will benefit their own membership, such as self-help and parents' associations, cooperatives, and community action boards. By 1989 a study found that the country had 40,000 communal action boards, and 5,000 cooperatives (Castaneda 1989; Ritchey- Vance 1991).
- 2) Popular movements tend to be more vocal and focused than grassroots organizations. However, they tend to be less organized by membership, which makes them difficult to count. According to the 1989 study there are hundreds of peasant associations and neighborhood committees that are not registered but that are part of a regional or national association.

- 3) Support Institutions are designed to work on behalf of the general society or a segment that seems in more need of help. They are organized by middle or upper class professionals, academics or entrepreneurs and include foundations, corporations and research centers. The idea is for these institutions to provide help and support for grassroots organizations and popular movements. According to the 1989 study there are 12,000 general support organizations in Colombia. Another study that focuses only on non-profit social support agencies established that there are 5,436 institutions that are not covered by special legislation such as cooperatives or communal boards.

Although Colombia seems to have a dense civil society, there is a lack of empirical studies concerning how these different groups and associations interact with the political system and to what degree they have been able to intervene in any of the different levels of policy-making. Villar (2001), who perhaps has written the most comprehensive study of the third sector in Colombia, contends that there is an increased involvement of the third sector in public issues that goes from collaboration and dialogue to “ample participation in deliberation about issues of public interest” (119).

However, besides mentioning the different constitutional and legal spaces provided for social groups to participate, he does not offer specific examples of how this participation takes place or how the constitutional and legal precepts are actually implemented; on the contrary, the author acknowledges the fact that there is no “comparative analysis concerning the actual degree of social group participation in the different realms of participation” provided by the system (Villar 2001, 87 - footnote

No. 67). However, recent studies show that in issues related to peace and human rights there has been an increased level of participation as civil society's mobilization and civic actions passed from less than 2% in the 1970s to almost 30% during the period 1994-98 (Romero 2000).

Table 3.3
FORMAL PARTICIPATION CHANNELS IN COLOMBIA

PARTICIPATION SPACE	PARTICIPATION MECHANISM	MAIN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	SINCE	MANDATORY	AMOUNT PER MUNICIPALITY	LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION
Community Action	Action Community Board	Law 19 of 1958. Decree 1930 of 1979. Decree 300 of 1987.	1958	No	Several	Neighborhood
	Board Association	Resolution 2070 of 1987	1987	No	1	Municipality
Black and Native Communities	Community Council of Black Communities	Law 70 of 1993	1993	Yes	1	Black Community
	Consultative Council for Planning of Native Territories	Law 152 of 1992	1994	Yes	1	Native Community
Social Control	Committee for Development and Social Control of Public Services	Law 142 of 1994 Decree 2517 of 1999	1994	Yes	1	Municipality
	Citizen Council of Management Control and Results of Public Investment	Decree 2517 of 1999	1999	Yes	1	Municipality
	Vigilance Board of Public Services	Law 142 of 1994	1994	Yes	Several	Per Service
	Citizen Supervisors	Law 134 of 1994, art. 100	1994	No	Several	Per work
Sports, Culture and Recreation	House of Culture	Law 397 of 1997	Since before	No	1	Municipality Neighborhood Town, Commune
	Municipal Council of Culture	Law 397 of 1997	1997	Yes	1	Municipality
	Communitarian Service of Resounding Radio (Community Radio)	Decree 1447 of 1995	Since before	no	1	Municipality
Sports, Culture and Recreation	Community Television	Law 182 of 1995, Legislative Act 006 of 1999	Since before	No	Several	Municipality, Commune, Neighborhood, Town
Rural Development	Municipal Council for Rural	Law 101 of 1993	1993	Yes	1	Municipality

	Development (CMDR)	Law 160 of 1994, Resolution 460 of 1997 of Min. Agriculture.				
Solidarity and Communal Economy	Community Companies	Law 454 of 1998	Since before	No	Several	Municipality Neighborhood Commune Town
Education	Family Parents' Association	Law 115 of 1994	Since before	Yes	Several	Per School
	Municipal Educative Forums	Law 115 of 1994	1994	Yes	Several	Municipality Commune
	School Governments	Law 115 of 1994	1994	Yes	Several	Per School
	Municipal Education Board (JUME)	Law 115 of 1994	1994	Yes	Several	Municipality
	Student Councils	Law 115 of 1994	1994	Yes	Several	Per School
Gender	None	-	-	-	-	-
Community Homes	Community Home of Wellbeing	Decree 0082 of 1993, Law 100 of 1993, Law 509 of 1999	Since before	no	Several	Depending on the Case
Youngsters	Municipal Council of Youngsters	Law 375 of 1997, Decree 089 of 2000	1995	Yes	1	Municipality
Natural Environment	Public Audience for the expedition of Environmental Licenses	Law 99 of 1993	1993	Yes	1	Municipality
	Environmental Municipal Council	Law 99 of 1993	1993	Yes	1	Municipality
Participation Coordination	Municipal Committee for Integration and Development of the Community	Decree 0646 of 1992	1992	Yes	1	Municipality
Urban and Public Planning	Consultative Ordainment Council	Law 388 of 1997, Law 768 of 2002	1997	Yes [♦]	1	Municipality
	Municipal Planning Council (CMP)	Law 152 of 1994	1994	Yes	1	Municipality

[♦] In municipalities with a population over 30.000.

Disaster Prevention	Local Committee of Disaster Prevention	Decree 93 of 1998	Since before	Yes	1	Municipality
Health	Health Users Alliances and Associations	Decree 1416 of 1990	Since before	no	Several	Depending on the Case
	Hospital Ethics Committees	Decree 1757 of 1994	1994	Yes	Several	Depending on the Area of Influence
	Citizen Committee for Community participation in Health Issues. (Comité de participación ciudadana comunitaria en salud (CPC ó COPACOS)	Decree 1216 de 1989, 1416 de 1990, Law 10 de 1990	1990	Yes	1	Municipality
	Health Subsidiary Companies	Law 454 of 1998	1998	Yes	Several	Municipality
Security, Togetherness, and Peace	Municipal Commission of Police and Citizen Participation	Law 62 of 1993	1993	no	1	Municipality
	Community Supervising Committee	Decree 356 of 1994	1994	Yes	Several	One per service and private security
	Municipal Peace Councils	Law 434 of 1998	1998	no	1	Municipality
	Local Security Fronts (FSL)	Law 62 of 1993	1993	no	Several	Per street, block, building, etc.
	Community Service of Vigilante and Private Security	Decree 365 of 1994	1994	no	Several	Depending on the Case
House	Community House Boards	Resolution 2070 of 1987	1987	No	Several	Neighborhood, Town

Source: Ceballos and Martin 2001.

Figure 3.1




Source: "A guide to NGO Directories" 1995. The Inter-American Foundation.

Each entry refers to a directory that contains the number of NGOs cited; information could overlap.

If Colombia has that many more NGOs and social groups than other Latin American countries, it is likely that more people are getting involved and active in the country. However, this is not the case. Using the World Values Survey (1995-1998), we can see that Colombia's level of civic involvement is very similar to that of other countries of the hemisphere i.e. Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Peru, or Uruguay (See Figure 3.2). Colombian's are likely to participate in voluntary organizations like church, unions, sports, professional groups, parties or charity in the same level that citizens from the countries mentioned above. What explains this paradox? How are social groups contributing to democratic development if citizens are not getting involved in their actions?

Figure 3.2

**Civic Involvement in Latin America
Selected Countries**



This paradox is even more evident when we compare this information with the level of democracy in the country. As the theory states, it would be expected that as the number of NGOs and social groups increases, there is more democratic interaction and social participation by these groups, thus the level of democracy of the country should improve. In other words, there should be a positive correlation between associational life and democracy. However, a correlation between the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social groups, and level of democracy in Colombia shows that, across time, Colombia's democracy has decreased while the number of groups has increased (Villar 2001). Thus, instead of democracy becoming stronger as the theories suggest, it is weakening.

In this chapter I have discussed Colombia's political system, its legacy and associational life in the country. Emphasis was given to the evolution of social groups and to the study of the legal and formal provisions that regulate their participation. From the discussion it was clear that, at least formally, Colombia's political system encourages citizen participation at different level of policy-making. Our job now is to determine if this assertion is also true in practice.

In the next chapter I introduce Barranquilla and elaborate on its political history. In addition, I provide a discussion of how to understand the internal political dynamic of the city by presenting a joint analysis of the strength of the state, the executive and the degree of civil society organization.

Chapter 4

Barranquilla

While in most Latin American countries industrialization led to development concentration in one major city, in Colombia, due to topographic difficulties we find several development centers throughout the country (Galvis and Meisel 2001, 68). In this sense, Colombia is a country of regions with central cities in each region: Central Region -Medellín, Pacific Region - Cali, Oriental Region – Bogotá and Caribbean Region – Barranquilla. Barranquilla as the central city for the Caribbean Region is located on the northern part of the country with shores to the Caribbean Sea.

The Caribbean region has experienced many changes throughout its history. During the first half of the 20th Century, the region had an acceptable economic growth and a GDP per capita that was 6.6% above the national average. During this same period, Barranquilla had the second highest GDP per capita, which was almost 80% higher than the national average. However, if we exclude Barranquilla from the analysis, we find that the region was actually 14.3% below the national GDP per capita (Meisel 1993, 35).

During this period the region was practically isolated from the rest of the country. Train and roads that communicated the internal regions of the country replaced the Magdalena River that was the main transportation means for the Caribbean region with the interior of Colombia. In fact, in 1950 the region only had 6.7% of the national train tracks and few unpaved roads that flooded during the raining

season that extended for almost 8 months of the year. Only until 1961 with the opening of the Atlantic Train service, the region was able to connect with the rest of the country (Meisel 1992, 7).

However, the general expectations that a new internal system of transportation within the country brings were not fulfilled. Because of the isolation, scholars and regional entrepreneurs were sure that the economic conditions of the region would improve leading to a higher GDP per capita and a better coverage of basic population needs. Instead, the region suffered a considerable slowdown. From 1950 to 1985 the GDP growth rate of the region was 1.0%, less than half the growth rate of the rest of the country (2.3%) (Meisel 1992, 14).

In addition, literacy rates and academic performance from 1985 and 1988 show how the region lagged behind compared to other regions in the country. In fact, the central, oriental and pacific region had between 10 and 13.4 % of illiteracy rate as opposed to 18.5 % in the Caribbean region (DANE 1987, 384). Concerning academic performance measured through national tests, in 1988 students from the region received the lowest average score in the country, ranking almost 4 points below the national level and 6 points below the highest score reached by students in the capital city (ICFES 1960; Meisel 1992, 32).

Barranquilla, the capital of the Atlantic department (*Departamento Del Atlántico*) and regional center was formed around 1629 as an spontaneous settlement but it was established as a Villa in 1813 by the Spanish government where import and export activities took place. Based on its development as an area of increased

population and commercial exchange, in 1857 the Villa was erected as a city (Gonzalez 2004).

Barranquilla became the center for immigrants, engineers, technicians and national and international businessmen that found in the city a cultural climate that encouraged commercial and industrial activities, which contributed with the city's industrial development in the 20th. According to scholars, no town in Colombia experienced a radical change as strong as the one Barranquilla faced thanks to the influence of immigrants and foreigners that brought with them expertise, know how and a positive attitude towards business and commerce in general (Parada 2000, 294-295).

Taking advantage of its position as a sea and river port, the city started to develop as an important business and industrial center during the first part of the 20th century. Accordingly, Barranquilla was one of the four main cities in the country with similar population and economic development than Medellín, Cali, and Bogotá (Galvis and Meisel 2001, 69). However, by the end of the 1940s, Barranquilla starts to lose its presence and dynamism due to the opening and competition of Buenaventura's Port on the pacific coast of Colombia (1935), the import substitution model adopted by the nation since the 1930s and the narrowing of the internal market in the Caribbean Region because of the agrarian pattern based on cattle large state owners. The winners of the nation-wide import-substitution model were the cities known as the "Golden Triangle" formed by Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali (Meisel 1993). According to many scholars in the region, the cities that were part of the Golden Triangle were always the focus of major efforts of public investment and projects that led to their development.

Indeed, Galvis and Meisel (2001) argues that today the most prosperous cities tend to be located around the Andes or center of the country, and the least dynamic on the periphery, especially along the northern coast (70-73).

Since the late 1960s Barranquilla received a strong rural migration that generated great pressures on the basic infrastructure of the city i.e. water, sewage, electric power, health, education, main roads, and the like that generated a change of the political structures fostering clientelism, and corrupt practices and deepening fiscal problems. At the same time, industrial growth began to falter being unable to absorb increasing labor surplus coming from the rural-urban migration process.

By 1995 the municipality was deeply in debt. According to a study- called the “Montenegro Report”- funded by the Chamber of Commerce and Fundesarrollo by 1996 there were signs of clear lack of expenditure for education, health and the coverage of basic needs. Findings of a follow-up of Montenegro’s study, determined that by 2000 the financial crisis of the city paralyzed the administration and prevented any further public expenditure on social welfare (Montenegro and Vargas 2000). To give an idea of where the city is, a recent study by the National Planning Office (*Planeación Nacional*) classified Barranquilla in the place 572 out of 1068 municipalities in the country. This ranking means that the city is well below other medium and small cities. The ranking was done based on the percentage of income used for government expenditure consumption, the amount of debt, the percentage of income that comes from national state grants, the percentage that comes from own income, the percentage used for investment and the saving capacity of the district.

In addition, during the last decade the majority of *Barranquilleros* earned less than the minimum wage as income. According to recent studies, by 2000, 84.7% of citizens earned less than the minimum wage compared to 73.6 % in 1990, and the population with earnings over six times the minimum wage decreased from 6.2% in 1990 to 2.6% in 2000 (Beltrán y Hernández 2002).

Other indicators show that the city, as many cities in Colombia and the hemisphere, continues to struggle for survival (See Table 4.1). For example, little more than 40% of the population with low or no income has health coverage in 2000. In 1997 the city had only about 50% of the population with health service. Regarding education things are not any different. By the beginning of 1990, Barranquilla had 60% coverage for pre-school compared to 57% in 2000, 89% for elementary compared to 81% in 2000, and 69% for high school in 1990 compared to 70% in 2000 (Beltrán and Hernández 2002).

As we may see, education, or the lack of it, is a major problem for the city. In 2001 the population between 3 and 16 years old was of 402,326 from which 34% had no education (136,790). According to Fundesarrollo, during the last six years the administration attempted to increase coverage by creating new places but was only able to create 48 places for every 100 students and 37 of them came from private schools that switched to public schools. In other words, at the end, out of the 48 new places, only 11 for every 100 students were available which translates into two places per year (2002).

In sum, the economic crisis that started by the end of the 1950s influenced Barranquilla's political development as the state and its institutions were not able to

face the social crisis that affected the city. Scholars claim that clientelistic behaviors had their origins during this time as people negotiated a roof or piece of land and materials for their votes and political support⁶ (Camacol 1990, Bell and Villalón 2000).

Table 4.1
Socio-Economic Indicators Barranquilla 1990, 1997, 2000

INCOME INEQUALITY	1990	2000
Income Less than minimum wage	73.6%	84.7%
Income higher than six times minimum wage	6.2%	2.6%
HEALTH COVERAGE	1997	2000
Percentage of covered citizens	50%	40%
EDUCATION	1990	2000
Pre-school coverage	60%	57%
Elementary	89%	81%
High School	69%	70%

SOURCE: Beltrán and Hernández 2002.

⁶ Indeed, by 1965, 15% of the population lived on subnormal areas with no public services or infrastructure; in 1990 16.3% of the population belongs to low-low income groups, and 27.5% belong to low-income bracket for a total of almost 44% of citizens earning less than two minimum wages (Bell y Villalón 2000, 270).

Some scholars contend that the weak economic and social development of the region is related to the process of transition from a traditional to a modern culture. Solano (1996) posits that the Caribbean region struggles and openly rejects the idea of shaping individuals from above, and forces its leaders to maintain traditional practices. In this sense, Parada (2000, 292) argues that it is possible to identify several characteristics in the region that make it difficult for modern patterns of behavior to take place. Thus, the author contends, it is possible to find:

- 1) Low degree of civil society organization and weak sense of civic, community and public issues.
- 2) Strong presence of an ethics system that does not give proper value to material and technological work, has low regards for the idea of working hard and does not value a strong respect for the law and common interest.
- 3) Authoritarianism and bureaucracy within private and public organizations and institutions.
- 4) Lack of trust among citizens, reliance of public favors and the desire to receive benefits without doing the work needed – depredatory tendencies.

In the following chapters I explore to what degree it is possible to make similar assessments for Barranquilla and its political, cultural and social structures. This work answers questions regarding civil society organization and participation in public issues, and identifies the attitudes and values that citizens of Barranquilla have towards the self, others, and the political system.

In order to reach a higher understanding of the city, in the next section I describe how power is formally organized and exercised together with a review of the political structure present in Barranquilla.

Political Structure

In order to have a clear understanding of politics in the city, it is important to know how power is organized and the political structure the city follows (Banfield 1961). According to the 1991 National Constitution Colombia is a democratic, participant and pluralist unitary Republic with decentralized territorial entities (Art. 1). The national territory is politically divided in 32 states, 4 districts, and 1097 municipalities (Hernández 2002). Within the limits imposed by the Constitution and the law, each territorial unit is autonomous to handle the issues that directly affect their interests. In this sense they are entitled to choose their government officials, administer resources and impose taxes when deemed necessary. State and local entities are also entitled to national rents (Art. 287).

At the local level, each municipality has a popularly elected Mayor who acts as city manager, political leader, and legal representative of the municipality. This public official is to be elected for 4 years with no immediate reelection. According to the National Constitution, it is the Mayor's responsibility to enforce the constitution, the law and other governmental decrees as well as state and local decisions. In addition, as the main police authority in the city, the Mayor shall guarantee public order within its territory. It is also within the Mayor's attributes to present proposals to the municipal council regarding economic and social development, public works, municipal budget and other issues directly related with the activities of a territorial entity.

Twenty-three (23) popularly elected individuals for a period of 4 years with possibility of immediate reelection form the municipal council. The council is considered as an administrative corporation with specific functions as to approve the

plan and programs proposed by the Mayor, authorize the Mayor to sign contracts and for a specific period of time to assume functions that are regularly performed by the council. It is also the council's function to discuss and approve the annual budget for the administration and to regulate the use of the territory within the limits of the law.

In accordance with the national commitment to foster community participation in public affairs, councils are allowed to divide the municipalities in communes (*comunas*) making it easier for individuals to relate with the political authority. Each commune has a Local Administrative Board (*JAL – Juntas Administradoras Locales*) composed by citizens popularly elected for that purpose for a 4 year period. Each JAL has as their function to participate in the process of elaboration of municipal plans and programs concerning local economic, and social development. They are also asked to monitor and control how public utility companies perform their services in the commune and to be vigilant concerning the type of public investment that takes place in their area. JALs are authorized to present a bill for the council's discussion if it is directly related to their regular activities.

Thus, in Colombia, the municipal level has at least 3 entities that are popularly elected: the Mayor, the municipal council, and the local administrative boards. The Mayor and the municipal council appoint all other government officials. Therefore, politics in the city is concentrated on the relationship between the Mayor and the council as both carry popular legitimation through their election. JALs are not considered an important political player as their members are elected with less than 5% of the votes required to elect a council member. In this sense, and as it will be discussed latter on, their role as political actors is weak.

The relationship between the Mayor's office and the city council is determined by the functions that the National Constitution and by-laws attribute to each. The initiative to present a bill for discussion within the council, lays on the Mayor, or any council member. The *personería*, comptroller or Local Administrative Boards are able to present a bill only for issues that specifically pertain to their functioning; in particular cases the mass public is allowed to file a bill for the council's consideration (Art. 71 Law 136/94).

In order for a bill to be approved as a 'municipal agreement' it has to be discussed in two debates in different days. The first debate shall take place in the commission assigned by the secretariat. The second debate will take place in plenary within 3 days of the commission's approval. If the commission rejects the bill it may be presented again. It will be filed if there is no approval for the second time. If a bill is approved by the plenary then it is sent within five days of its approval, to the Mayor for signature (Art 73 – 76 Law 136/94).

The Mayor is allowed to object or veto a bill based on inconvenience or because it goes against the constitution, the law or an ordinance. If the bill has less than 20 articles the Mayor is asked to decide in 5 days, if the bill has from 21-50 articles the Mayor is able to study the bill for 10 days, and if it has more than 50 articles will have up to 20 days to render a concept. If the council is not in sessions the Mayor is required to call for a special session within a week when the objections are made (Art. 78).

According to the law, the power of the Mayor's veto has different effects depending on the reasons that give support to the decision to veto the bill. If the veto is

based on inconveniences, and the plenary rejects the veto, the Mayor is forced to sign the bill within 8 days. In case the Mayor refuses to sign, the council's president will do it and order its publication (Art.79) (See Figure 4.2).

If, however, the Mayor's objections are based on legal arguments – the bill goes against the constitution, law or ordinance- and the council rejects the objections, the Mayor shall send the bill within 10 days to the Administrative Court. The Court will study the bill and if it finds that the Mayor's reasons are appropriate the bill will be filed. If the court believes that the reasons expressed by the Mayor are not appropriate the Mayor shall sign the bill within 3 days. In addition, if the Court finds the bill partially inappropriate then it will ask the council to reconsider. If the council reconsiders the bill will be sent back to the Court for final consideration. Once the bill is signed it shall be published within 10 days in a newspaper with ample circulation or radio station (Art. 80-81).

From 1998 to 2002 the City Council in Barranquilla received 252 bills for consideration, 87 were approved and 165 rejected which gives an average approval rate of 34%. However, during 2000 the approval rate went down to 15% as only 20 bills were presented and 3 approved as Figure 4.1 shows. This is important information as it relates to the dynamics played in the city. The year 2000 was an electoral year as the country was to elect governors, Mayors, council members and other local representatives. As an electoral period politics in the city are concentrated on electoral campaigns, alliances, agreements and issues directly related with the election; city officials and political actors avoid major commitments and decisions that would compromise resources and bureaucratic quotas.

During this period the bills that the council approved were mainly related to issues concerning the general administration of the city and few were directed towards basic services and needs as education or health. To be sure, 46 of the bills approved referred to projects related to taxes and budgeting, 12 to the central office and the rest were scatter around i.e. 5 for education, 3 for health, 1 for sports, 1 for public utilities, 1 for security, 1 for citizen participation and so on. Although this could be interpreted as a lack of attention to education or health, the reality is that the role of the council is to regulate and authorize especial programs or decisions on the part of the Mayor's office. What this information really indicates is that during this period the Mayor must have needed additional processes, authorizations or resources in order to accomplish what was planned in his program. In order to determine the degree of attention that the administration gives to those sectors in more need, it is necessary to direct our analysis to the District Investment Plan.

Figure 4.1





Figure 4.2: Policy-Making Process in Colombia – Municipal Level



The District Investment Plan includes all the projects presented by the administration, its representatives, the community or guilds that have been approved through the Development Plan for the District. In this sense, the Investment Plan offers a comprehensive view of the different investment activities to take place within the city. For example in 1998 there were, among others, 60 projects for education, 28 for health, 16 for citizen participation and 9 for security. This however, does not mean that all 60 projects for education were actually executed. In fact, out of these 60 projects, only 18 were completed (Table 4.2).

As we can see from Table 4.2, in order to know the real degree of investment and activity performed in a particular sector it is necessary to conduct a specific research identifying those projects that are executed in their totality. This however, is not an easy task. Many times I have found that it is not possible to conclude with a fair amount of certainty that a particular project was actually done because from one instrument to the other the names change or the degree of specificity varies. For example, in the investment plan it is possible to find funds allocated for education i.e. for new schools, physical plant renewal, remodeling and the like. However, when reporting the execution of the budget, there is no indication of how much resources were devoted to particular schools or type of activities, it mainly says that certain amount was spent in education with no specification of individual projects.

It is important to place some attention to the issue of citizen participation during this period. Until 2001, the office of citizen participation had cabinet status; this means, besides having an appointed officer with the status of Secretary of Citizen Participation, the office had its own budget and representation within the Mayor's

government council. With an administrative reform initiated in 2001, this office became a department within a new office called Social Secretariat. This office was to coordinate several programs related to social development like women issues, youth, senior citizens, and citizen participation. In other words, citizen participation went from being a Secretariat to being one more program.

Table 4.2

NUMBER OF INVESTMENT PROJECTS APPROVED AND EXECUTED IN BARRANQUILLA										
	1998		1999		2000		2001		2002	
Sector	Approved	Executed	Approved	Executed	Approved	Executed	Approved	Executed	Approved	Executed
Mayor's office	8	3	16	8	11	7	13	1	1	3
Treasury	5	4	5	2	4	1	2	1	1	1
Security	9	4	11	6	3	2	5	2	1	3
Public works	10	7	5	5	30	8	140	5	10	53
Education	60	18	22	11	34	7	43	5	39	50
Planning	20	8	21	6	7	1	15	9	7	10
Communication	3	3	9	5	12	3	12	2	0	0
Citizen Participation	16	7	20	7	20	12	18	6	4	12
Health	28	3	16	9	12	8	24	18	21	14
Acquisitions and supplies	8	4	15	6	10	4	10	3	0	0

SOURCE: Approved: District Planning Office, Investment Plans 1998-2002. Executed: District Treasury Office, Budget Unit, Executed investments 1998-2002.

What this reform means is that instead of giving more emphasis and resources for citizen involvement, the administration reduced the budget and personnel working for this issue. This is an example of how there tends to exist a divorce between legal norms and regulations and actual procedures as the 1991 National Constitution emphasizes the importance of offering participatory spaces for citizens to interact and get involved with issues that concern their well-being.

An additional indicator of the degree of attention that the administration gives to issues of citizen participation is the number of projects developed related directly to this topic. From 1998 to 2002, the administration presented 90 projects in the Investment Plan, executed 38, which is around 42% and only 10 projects were directly related to citizen participation (11% of all projects presented). A review of these projects show that most of the resources allocated for citizen participation are related to education and workshop activities where youth leaders, elected officials at neighborhood levels, and other interested citizens receive information of how to write proposals and present development projects. However, it is necessary to mention that in the year 2002, the project designed to consolidate and broaden youth organizations within the city, lost its funds for no apparent reason. In addition, programs that gave support and voice to citizen watchdog activities have been struggling during this period. Although the program was included in the Investment Plans of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001, only during 2000 it was able to execute 50% of the resources allocated to it, for all other years there were no resources, and in 2002 the program was not even included in the plan. Together with this, an additional project concerning support for

citizen/civil culture in the district was only funded for 1998; after this year it was taken out of the plan (Investment Plan 1998 to 2002).

Politics in the city

From 1950 to 1988 Barranquilla had an unstable political system with an average of one Mayor every two years. Considered as one of the most corrupted and clientelistic societies in the country, Barranquilla and the rest of the municipalities in the country entered into a new phase with the popular election of Mayors in 1988 (Bell G. y De La Espriella 1988). According to the 1986 Constitutional Reform, Mayors were to be elected for a three-year period. In the case of Barranquilla, the first election was questioned by the runner-up and after a prolonged period of legal procedures the Mayor (Gustavo Certain) was removed from power and the runner up (Jaime Pumarejo) was sworn in.

In 1991 the political history of the city was divided into before and after the election of the former priest Bernardo Hoyos. Hoyos, an immigrant from Medellín, was an active community leader working in one of the most deprived zones in the city, and with constant community works helped transform the surroundings of the southeastern part of Barranquilla. From an area full of served waters, it became a place of decent and adequate living for the community. Based on this work, Hoyos was asked to run for Mayor and with the increased support of low-low and low-income citizens, he won the election.

His leadership was different to say the least. During his first period in government (1991-1994), (he was reelected three years later) he concentrated on

creating infrastructure, roads and upgrading the living conditions of those more in need. However, this was done while attacking those from 'the north' as he called them; citizens from the northern part of the city were those who had better income and living conditions, to whom he attributed responsibility for allowing people from the south to live in such deplorable state. His political manners created a wide gap between people in the city and the degree of polarization made for guilds and politicians to form alliances in order to prevent his protégé from winning the next elections.

However, Hoyos' political position was so strong that he was able to elect Edgar George as his successor and both promised to work in tandem to continue Hoyos' political and social reforms. This did not last long; after less than one year in power, George and Hoyos split and Hoyos decided to run again for Mayor in order to gain back political power lost with George's administration. This dispute led to a continuous confrontation between local political forces where the main interest was to harm or hinder each other from direct benefits. The obvious outcome of this was that the city failed to be oriented with leadership towards its development and was faced with selfish and narrow-minded politicians that increased clientelistic and patronage policies (Parada 2000).

In 1997 Hoyos was reelected and this time his administration was faced with the challenge of recovering lost spaces and political strength. Although the first administration is considered good for Barranquilla and even better for those areas in real need, the second term is widely questioned. For many, Hoyos' last term was surrounded by corruption, personal benefits, disregard for institutional procedures

within the administration and signing of contracts that compromised the city's financial resources for more than 20 years i.e. Concesiones Los Angeles (Carbo 2002). However, Hoyos claims that those contracts were necessary for the city, as they were the only way out because the municipality had lost all credits and the national government was not willing to help (Hoyos 2002). He argues that thanks to signing those contracts he was able to pay salaries to the public employees that had not received payment for the last 8 months. It is also his impression that the second term was even better than the first and that it was due to envy and political jealousy that other groups criticized his administration.

Anyhow, after Hoyos' second term, the city elected Humberto Caiaffa who had the support of entrepreneurs, guilds and some social groups and was the clear opposite to Hoyos who had his own candidate. Although his administration was seen as the opportunity for Barranquilla to organize its finances and institutional procedures, many active political forces in the city are not happy. Constant confrontation between, in one side groups like the Chamber of Commerce, Fundesarrollo, Protransparencia and positioned individuals, and in the other the administration is palpable through newspaper news, editorials, official communications and the like. The situation was so critical that the aforementioned groups had to write to the President of the country (Alvaro Uribe) as a way of requesting his intervention. In one of Uribe's traditional community councils he called the Mayor's attention by saying that the city could not afford to be in between a childish confrontation, and that they needed to act as grownups (Televised community council; El Extra 2002).

Although the 1986 Constitutional Reform called for popular election of Mayors as a way of deepening democracy, it seems that for Barranquilla this has not been the case. Albeit the continuity that a fix term grants to any administration, popular election had led to question administrations, to procedures where hard drives disappear after one administration so that the new has no historical information or databases (personal interview, Government Official, Sept. 2002). In addition, there is the idea that regular individuals have no impact on the administration as the elections are most of the times tinted with fraud i.e. Mayor election Certain – Pumarejo 1988, Governor election Ventura – Char 2000, null council elections for three councilors 2000.

In sum, Barranquilla's current situation can be analyzed from several points of view. In the economic realm the city is in crisis, it filed for Law 550, which is a bankruptcy regulation that freezes all major accounts until the city comes to an agreement with its creditors. Thus, there are no funds for social expenditure or to develop new projects. Besides, the great amounts of unbalanced contracts that create a huge burden for the city make its financial future very uncertain. In the political realm, we find a questioned administration that lost its credibility over the private sector, the community, the media and to a certain point the national government. On the same venue, the city council also shows signs of failure as it is seen as permissive towards the Mayor's regulations. Only one or two council members attempt to bring some dignity to the office and try to bring to the forefront discussions and regulations that benefit the city as a whole instead of particular actors (Personal Interview, Group Representative, Sept. 2002). In the social arena we saw how the city is reaching

dangerous levels of poverty and facing difficult crises in education, health, housing, transportation, electricity and security.

The State in Barranquilla

In order to fully understand the way civil society and the state interact in the city, it is necessary to give special attention to the view of the state, its strength and role within the city. As it will be clear throughout this project, the task of the administration in opening the space for civil society participation in policy-making is not only determined by the capriciousness of the leader in place. The strength of the state is an important determinant for executive behavior (Wiarda 2001; Banfield 1961; Stone and Sanders 1987; Migdal 2001). To be sure, as long as the executive realizes that the actions performed during the administration are subject to accountability by the state and citizens, the official will be less prone to over step the boundaries of the job and more likely to act according to the law. If, like the case of Barranquilla, the state is not able to control public life, and make officials accountable for their actions, it is very likely for civil servants and elected officials to rule with particular interests in mind, and not collective ones. As Migdal posits:

Where,... effective supervision has all but disappeared, implementers can use their leverage for personal gain with little regard for the overall purpose of any given policy. ... [B]ureaucrats at the regional and local level remain key actors in determining who gets what and what they can do with it. The state bureaucracy, then cannot avoid but being a major factor in the local allocation of resources. The limitation on state power, of course, is that the allocation may deviate tremendously from

the prescriptions set out in law and policy statements in the capital city (2001, 90).

The weakness of the state in Barranquilla and the lack of organization of its civil society have generated a strong executive with no political, social or judicial mechanisms to control it. A weak state is unable to establish comprehensive political authority; citizens do not follow regulations and very likely avoid consequences (Migdal 2001; Smith 1973; Malloy 1977). An important reason for this is the inefficient judicial branch – national and local- together with a shortness of physical, human or economic resources (O'Donnell 1998). This lack of state power is not different than in many other Latin American contexts. Linn A. Hammergren states:

It is true that constitutions and legislation often accord enormous powers of control to central governments, but the question remains as to whether this control is actually exercised or exists only on paper. The limited success of Latin American governments in enforcing their own legislation suggests that the extent of this control is not great (1977, 449).

At the same time, the analysis shows that the executive in Barranquilla is strong, as it is able to make decisions in an independent way with disregard to the interests and petitions of the community. According to some of the actors of the study, the way things work in the city is through the Mayor; only those projects that have the Mayor's blessing will go forward. Thus, there is no balance of power between the Mayor's office and the council. What is more telling is that although council members and ediles are popularly elected, they are at an inferior position versus the Mayor's office.

Another issue that it is worth mentioning and contributes with the weakness of the state and the strength of the executive is the problem of institutionalality. The degree to which processes and actions within the administration are executed uniformly and equally towards different patrons is a sign of institutionalality. Thus, the failure or success of a citizen's request to the administration shall not depend on his/her income level, partisan orientation, or connections with the Mayor or members of the office. Having clear, uniform and efficient processes is not only a sign of a proper degree of formalization within the administration, but also a control mechanism for the Mayor's actions. To the extent that every action has a determined procedure to be followed by the official in place, it becomes harder for the administration or politicians to exercise clientelistic or partisan pressure over public officials. In other words, the lack of political institutionalality is an additional factor that helps consolidate the executive power by allowing improvised and arbitrary behavior by the Mayor and city officials.

In addition, institutionalality is also determined by the degree to which the administration is able to exercise its power over citizens and contractors. In this sense, the issue of the historical archives is a case in point. According to officials, it has become almost a tradition for administrations to destroy the hard copies of official documents – contracts, agreements and the like, together with extracting the hard drives from the computers before leaving office (Personal Interviews Nov. 2002, Feb. 2003). This behavior leaves the administration with no proof of its actions and very difficult ways to identify its major obligations with contractors and citizens in general. At the same time, it leaves citizens with the burden of proof towards the

administration as it argues that they have no real proof of a contract or communication that oblige them.

Conclusion

The study of local civil society's involvement in political processes and decision-making activities needs to be considered under a different light. Countrywide interests, national and international economic power and national politics, permeate the way civil society functions, organizes, and interacts at the national level. At the local level, civil society has to deal with more particular and minute details that range from the personality of public officials, to the underlying political dynamics present in the city as clientelism and patronage.

In addition, the autonomy and independence of the Mayor, as head of the executive branch, has the potential of being greater at the local level. The president, as head of the national government, is more exposed to scrutiny by the national media, watchdog groups, congress, international media, and the like. At the local level, Mayors usually deal with the local media as the only realm where their actions might be exposed. In this sense, the possibility to govern following their own criteria and agenda is higher at the local level.


In this regard, the lack of a common agenda in the city also contributes with the Mayor's possibility of imposing its own schema of action. According to responses given by the representative sample of individuals in the city, several groups and associations, and representatives of the ruling class, it is clear that there is no agreement about the overall direction the city should take. To be sure, for the mass

public the main problem Barranquilla faces, is unemployment, followed by security. Groups and associations, on the other hand, perceive poverty as the main problem and corruption as the second most crucial danger in town. For the ruling class, the main concern is the lack of economic resources, i.e. the fiscal situation of the municipality that faces a bankruptcy process.

The natural consequences of having so diverse view of the socio-economic situation in Barranquilla is for the city to be fragmented, divided, and in a sense, lost. Political actors, leaders, activists and the like are not clear as to where or how to consolidate a comprehensive program for the city as there is no agreement about its main problem. To make things worst, or even to confirm the previous statement, an analysis of the newspaper coverage of the last year shows this fragmentation, as no clear topic seems to be predominant in media discourse.

The following Figure 4.3 illustrates the case. During the period May 2002 to May 2003 every news heading of the front page, local and political sections was coded and classified including the size of the article, the display it had – photographs, tables, illustrations or the like. Then, based on the coded information, 22 topics were identified. More than 50% of the topics covered by the main newspaper in the region could be labeled as “other issues”. This means, publicity, general announcements, port action, and other unrelated issues. If we exclude this category, we find that the dispersion of the discourse and therefore the absence of a unified agenda are even more evident (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3
Specific News Coverage May 2002- May 2003



Until this point I have presented to the reader a view of the debate concerning the role of civil society's density, type and structure in strengthening democracy, stressing the different views and need to consider another aspect of the debate which is to include a more detailed analysis of this relationship by focusing on urban politics - the state and civil society at this level. I have also provided an overview of Colombia and particularly of Barranquilla as the city of this study. In the following chapter I present the research design used in this project and later discuss the findings based on the responses provided by the elite, groups and mass public in Barranquilla.

Chapter 5

Research Design

Introduction

In this chapter I describe the research process and methods used to gather and process the necessary data to answer the questions posed in the previous chapters. I start by reviewing the main purpose of this work and then comment on how the different actors were identified and selected for the study.

Throughout this project I argue that the study of civil society and democracy needs to consider not only the number of groups present in civil society, or the type of associations in a political context, but it also needs to focus on those groups' *abilities* to participate in democracy. I argue that we need to consider the character and features of a particular civil society together with the openness and inclusiveness that its political system offers. The study of civil society needs to address the reality of its functioning, assess if its groups are able to affect public policy, verify if it is possible for civil society to penetrate the circles of power that surrounds it.

In order to study civil society and its interaction in Colombia, I designed a multi-actor research strategy that allows for a comprehensive view of how citizens take part of the political process in a medium size city called Barranquilla. Through interviews and survey analysis supported with newspaper research and secondary sources, this work presents the experiences and perceptions of the most important actors in the city: the political elite, social groups and the mass public.

The Political Elite

Although Barranquilla is a city of more than 1.2 million inhabitants, there is a group of people that could be identified as the main political actors and leaders in the city. As such, it is possible to recognize traditional politicians who have dedicated their professional life to act as political leaders, competing in popular elections, and serving as senators, representatives, Mayors, council members or the like. There are also those that represent second-generation politicians – sons, daughters or in-laws of traditional politicians.

Within this group of influential actors we also find those individuals that are currently exercising power as members of the administration or as elected officials be it council members, or neighborhood/commune representatives. Although they might not have a long history as political actors, public officials have access to certain degree of power that makes them important for our research. It is through these officers that public policy is not only executed, but also many times made. Knowing their views and attitudes towards citizen and group participation is crucial in understanding the factors that hinder or foster such involvement.

Other key actors we need to consider within the political elite, are those individuals that although they do not have an elected position, are well respected within the city and regarded as thoughtful and influential because of their economic status or business activity. These individuals many times represent economic guilds, business associations, or industry. For example, comments or criticism made by the Chief Executive of the Chamber of Commerce or by the president of one of the main industries of the region, are always reported in the main newspaper of the region and

voiced through the radio too. For this project it is important to be able to interview and know the position and beliefs of these individuals.

In order to select the group of people to interview, I divided my attention in two different sectors: 1) the administration, and 2) all other influential individuals. Identifying those to interview within the administration was simple; I requested to interview each cabinet member (9) by sending them a letter presenting the project and asking them to kindly participate. I followed up with phone calls and e-mail messages. As I was able to interview some of the city officials, they helped me to contact some of their colleagues and asked them to give some of their time to see me. Within this group I included elected officials as council members and neighborhood/commune representatives.

As there are 23 Council members for Barranquilla I invited all of them to participate in the study by giving their views in an interview. For those that asked to have some questions in advance I send a protocol of topics and interests that I needed to cover during our talk (Casper 1995). Concerning neighborhood/commune representatives, I used a different method. As the city is divided in 21 communes and each commune has a Local Administrative Board (*Junta Administradora Local – JAL*) of 7 to 11 representatives, I asked to interview the president of each board. The district office of citizen participation provided the list of names and addresses.

For the second group of actors that exercise some influence in the city, I used a combination of methods to identify who they were. To start, through newspaper research I created a first list of individuals that appeared several times and seemed to be involved in issues concerning the city and its policies. Then, using the snowball

technique, as I interview some of them I asked them to indicate one or two individuals that they considered important for me to interview and learn about their experience and views (Casper 1995, Baumgartner 1989). In addition, I requested interviews from those individuals that were mentioned by more than one interviewee, even if they were not in the newspaper or were not apparently well known.

During more than a year I interviewed 58 members of the political elite in the city. Within the group I was able to include local cabinet members, city council members, Local Administrative Board members and positioned individuals –those that although not in power, exercise pressure at the local level i.e. former majors, or senators. The purpose of studying this group of actors is to know to what degree do their daily activities include interaction with social groups. If their job required social group participation, how was it handled; which is their perception of what makes social groups efficient and what hinders their participation, and if they believe participation is always positive.

Each interview lasted around one hour. I started by describing the purpose of the project and why it was important to know their views and made special emphasis on the degree of confidentiality and anonymity they will receive. If I was interviewing a city official I continue the interview by asking him/her to describe the issues that had their attention at the moment and then explore who they work with, and to what degree are they familiar with the participatory spaces provided for the community. In case the interview was with one of the elected officials, I asked them to give their views about their participatory experience, how would they describe the policy-making process in

the city and who do they perceive to be more powerful in Barranquilla (See Appendix A).

This set of interviews not only allowed me to know the views of political actors and leaders, but it also gave an insight into the political context of the city, the internal dynamics between members of the local government and the degree of legitimacy that local officials have among these actors. This information is also useful to compare with the one gather from the other actors of the study -mass public and social groups- as they were also asked to respond in similar terms.

Groups

As stated before, social groups were also surveyed to determine the degree of participation in the political process in Barranquilla and the factors that hinder or foster such participation. Accordingly, a series of questions were designed to identify the experience and perception that groups have concerning their level of involvement in public actions and to what degree are their actions effective (See Appendix B). In addition, it was also important to know not only the level of participation and perception of success, but also the scope of action groups have. This information provides a more in-depth view of the entire participatory process in the city.

According to the Chamber of Commerce where non-profit groups and associations need to be registered, there are 2676 groups registered with Barranquilla as their official address. Using the roster provided by the Chamber of Commerce, and based on the registration number and a list of random numbers I chose 94 groups to be

part of the study by matching the random number with the registration number assigned by the Chamber of Commerce during the registration process.

After selecting the 94 groups I proceeded to verify phone numbers and addresses. For those that did not match or were no longer in action, I replaced them by choosing the next group in the list, and if that one did not work, then I moved to the one before the first one selected. After the list of groups was finalized and verified each address and phone number, I called the representatives of the groups and explained the project and the importance of having the information that the survey asked. I requested their authorization to participate and gather their commitment to fill the questionnaire within two weeks. Once the two weeks passed I called again and advised them that the courier was going to pick-up the survey on a date convenient for them.

In order to understand the behavior and experience of groups within the process of policy-making, I identify some factors that might have a potential impact on their degree of involvement. These are:

- *Type of issues* - By focusing on the type of issues groups get involved with it is possible to identify if there are certain themes that make groups' participation more likely. For example, are groups that address issues related to education more able to participate than groups dealing with election fraud?
- *Type of group* – There are several types of groups in Colombia: Grassroots organizations, support organizations, civic groups, cooperatives, and watchdog

groups. Although each type is likely to have different goals and preferred course of action, they may not all have, need or desire the same kind of access to the political system.

- *Type of Funding* – Groups receive funding from multiple sources: government funds, private business, or international agencies⁷. Are international private NGOs more likely to be involved in some aspects of the policy process or use particular different strategies than national private NGOs? Are public NGOs more likely to be part of the policy process when it relates to specific issue areas, or do they seem to have the same access regardless of content? Is there a pattern of interest among internationally funded NGOs different than nationally funded NGOs?

- *Arena of action* – Groups that attempt to get involved in the policy process are likely to address policy-makers of one or more arenas of action. Organizations will be asked to indicate if their participation is different according to the realm of power or policy-maker they need to have access to, i.e. local vs. national, executive vs. legislative, councils vs. Mayor.

⁷ In this project a group will be private if more than 50% of its budget comes from private businesses or other sources. It will be public if more than 50% of its budget comes from the government and it will be mixed if there is no particular source that amounts to 50% of its budget. Within this classification we can also distinguish between international and national groups depending on the sources of their funding.

- *The fear factor* – When Colombia is the object of study it is necessary to include fear as a factor that might deter participation – electoral, political, communal, etc. Are some groups less involved because they fear retaliation by the government or any of the armed groups? Is the fear factor equally strong in each city? Are the types of actions or omissions they choose to use affected by the perception that negative consequences may come from their actions?

With the purpose of having a comprehensive understanding of group behavior I review the survey findings by describing their behavior and experience in Barranquilla; this is, what is their degree of participation, type of participation and scope of action. It is not enough to be able to identify how often a group participates, but also which techniques and participatory tools they tend to use, which are more effective for them, which do they tend to avoid, and which institution they address more often and effectively. I then move to present the generalized patterns of interaction and how structural factors influence group participation and behavior.

The Mass Public

In order to determine the degree of participation of the general citizenry, their awareness concerning the different participation mechanisms that the system offers, and how has their experience been regarding their contact with the Mayor's office or other official entities, a 36 question long mass public survey was applied to 600 households in the Barranquilla during September 6 and 7 of the year 2003 (See Appendix C). As mentioned before, the city has around 1,200,000 inhabitants divided

among six socioeconomic groups. Group 1 contains those citizens who live with high levels of poverty and earn less than one minimum salary per day and group 6 includes persons with the highest economic standards in the city. Using the household census performed by the Waste Management Company in 2002 it is possible to assess the socioeconomic distribution of the city (See Table 5.1).

Table 5.1

Number of Households by Socioeconomic Groups and Number Of Surveys Per Group

Group	Households	Percentage	Number of survey per group
1	60.146	30	180
2	39.268	20	120
3	50.423	25	152
4	22.668	11	66
5	15.448	8	48
6	10.539	6	34

Source: Aseo Técnico de Barranquilla

Using 22 maps provided by the National Statistic Department (DANE *Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística*) with the physical layout of the city, a random selection of neighborhoods was made. Based on the DANE's information it is possible to establish which neighborhoods belong to which group. This information was used to randomly select the name of the barrios representing the percentage of the population for each group. Thus, 30% of the neighborhoods chosen belong to group one, 20% to group two and so on. Next a random selection of sections and blocks was made in order to choose which households to visit. In case the

members of the households were not willing to respond the survey, we moved to the house next door to the right. If there was not a house to the right, then those applying the survey were asked to move to the house next door to the left.

Research using survey data has limitations that are hard to escape from (Salmon and Nichols 1983). There are places that may remain understudied. For example, in a city like Barranquilla it is possible to find neighborhoods that are dangerous or complicated to get access to, in this case we substituted and applied the survey in the areas closer to those neighborhoods but less dangerous. However, there were only around 8 neighborhoods that needed to be changed from the original list selected.

In addition to the questions that explore the main research topic, this is, the degree of participation and involvement in city politics, some questions were included to look at their level of trust towards fellow citizens, the degree of efficiency the local government has, their attitudes towards public affairs and which do they consider is the most important problem citizens face in Barranquilla. Thus, in general the questionnaire addressed issues like demographics, citizen values, city problems, views on political efficacy, attitudes toward politics, political power in the city, their role as citizens, degree and participatory experience and degrees of trust and confidence in the system.

In order to learn if the mass public behaved differently depending on the type of participation, using the statistical program SPSS, I ran four econometric models, one for electoral participation, another for political participation, other for civic or community participation and the last one for participation in general. With these

models I was able to identify factors that are statistically significant for one type of participation and not for other. At the same time it allowed me to detect that the theory on civic participation does not fully explain participation at the local level.

Within this work I identify four levels of participation in the policy process:

- *No participation* - when there is no penetration of the political system at any level whether because groups have no intention to participate or because they are not able to participate.
- *Low participation* - when groups' main action is to implement policy designed by the government, or when they engage in informal contact with government officials but have no reliable access to them.
- *Medium participation* - when one of their actions includes consulting with government officials to plan legislation, or when they present results or provide technical information, or when they attempt to influence appointments to public office.
- *High levels of participation* - when groups help draft legislation, serve on advisory commissions and boards, or shape the government's agenda by raising new issues.

Each group and mass public respondent was coded for the level of participation based on the actions they performed. In this way I created a four level ordinal

measure that allows for greater differentiation than a dichotomous type and at the same time avoids the need for a great amount of information that a detailed continuous measure entails (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñan 2001).

Media Analysis

After gathering information concerning the views of the local elite, social groups and the mass public, newspaper research was conducted to determine the type of issues that the media gave more coverage to. The purpose of this exercise was to determine the degree of synchronicity between the discourses present in the city and the issues that political actors and the public see as important (Cook, Tyler, et. al 1983; Dearing and Rogers 1996; Gonzenbach 1996). In this sense we will expect for the themes and issues that are constantly presented in the newspaper to become priorities for readers too (Iyengar 1991, 2). In order to determine this degree of correspondence between what the newspaper media portrays and the public perceives, several questions were included in the group and mass public surveys asking respondents to identify the two most important problems faced by the city today.

In addition, by focusing on media coverage it is possible to identify the degree of significance given by public officials to issues concerning political participation, citizen involvement, watchdog activities and the like. Media coverage and emphasis on specific materials “seems to have direct, sometimes strong, influence upon the policy agenda of elite decision makers” (Rogers and Dearing 1994, 91). During the coding process special attention was given to headlines and second tier news that dealt with

this type of activities, whether the news questioned, criticized or commends it; what was important for the study was the fact that the activity had media exposure.

During May 2002 – 2003 daily issues of El Heraldito – the main newspaper in the region- were studied to extract information from the first page, the political and local sections. The headlines that appeared in each section were recorded indicating the number of columns each report had, its length, and the number of photographs or tables included in the news. Next, this set of news was classified according to its topic, which allows for a global view of the dynamics of the city. In addition, a set of cases were chosen and given special attention by creating a summary of the main issues, as they represented those themes that seemed to be constantly in the press and present in everyday discussions in the city.

In the following three chapters I elaborate on the comparison of the view and experience that each political actor had towards the decision-making process in Barranquilla. In Chapter 6 I describe the perception of the elite, council members, guilds and local elected neighborhood/communes representatives by reviewing some of the most significant cases discussed during the last year in Barranquilla. I continue – in Chapter 7- with the study of groups and offer a discussion about the type of participation groups embark in, the degree of engagement reported and the scope of involvement. Chapter 8 presents the findings of the mass public survey and explores the factors that may affect individual level participation at the local realm.

Chapter 6

The Elite in Barranquilla

Introduction

The current chapter presents the view and perceptions of those individuals that represent the ruling class or elite in Barranquilla. Although there still are conceptual and theoretical ambiguities regarding the definition and scope of political elite or ruling class (Mosca [1923] 1939; Sartori 1970; Kaplan 1964; Zuckerman 1977), based on Dahl's definition, I identify the ruling elite in Barranquilla as "a small stratum of individuals [that] is much more highly involved in political thought, discussion, and action than the rest of the population" (1961,90). The importance of this particular definition is that it identifies the elite as a stratum and not necessarily as a cohesive and coherent group that acts uniformly and collectively (Meisel 1962; Roberts 1971; Bottomore 1964; Dahl 1970).

The elite in Barranquilla does not correspond to the idea of a group of actors that make decisions and manipulate the masses to reach their interests. The socioeconomic conditions at the local level, this is the lack of a strong economic class and industrial development prevents, the advance of a consolidated elite at the local level (Alarcon, et. al. 1992). Although there is a minority within the social collectivity that takes part in the higher levels of decision-making in the city, its power is more electoral than political. There are electoral powers in the city that are able to elect Mayor and council members, but their scope of action is not comprehensive as they do not influence other actors actions. In other words, through time, city-wide decisions

and policies do not reflect the interest of a particular set of actors, but the interest of a stratum: the political class (Weyland 1995).

However, like in many other societies, it is not easy to identify those individuals that are really exerting power in the political system (Banfield 1961; Lasswell 1961; Wright Mills 1959) and, as many times, they are good at not being noticed. In Dahl's words: "the 'real' political elite is so powerful as to be hidden from view" (1970, 269). Notwithstanding, as the purpose of this study is to identify the degree of civil society's participation in policy-making, the focus of the analysis lay on the views of those within the policy-making process; those within the administration as representatives of the electoral and bureaucratic forces (Mosca 1923; Schonwalder 2002). In order to offer a clear analysis of the different forces that interplay within the dynamics of the city, I interviewed public officials that acted as chief executives of different secretaries, members of city council belonging to different political parties, leaders or positioned individuals such as previous Mayors, senators, private sector representatives, and also talked to neighborhood/commune elected representatives (See Table 6.1). This group of people provided enough information to shape a comprehensive picture of the views that the elite and ruling individuals have in the city.

It needs to be said that through this work I do not seek to explain or portrait the way political influence takes place in the city, although it is important to be able to identify those actors that might exercise influence (Banfield 1961). What this work does is to assess the type of attitudes, beliefs and behaviors expressed by those individuals that seem to have some degree of influence. In this sense it is important to

uncover the dynamics that these influential actors play among each other and how do they relate to the state and civil society.

Table 6.1
Elite Interviews

Actor	<u>Number of Interviews</u>
Public Officials	8
City Council	10
Political actors and Positioned individuals	22
Elected Community Representatives - <i>Comuneros</i>	16
<i>Total Interviews</i>	58

Public Policy-Making in Barranquilla

Before we get into a detailed view of policy-making in Barranquilla, it is important to discuss some of the views and images that accompany policy-makers and public officials in the city. Among the public officials that participated in the study, I found individuals with high degrees of commitment with the city and the work they do. All of them state that working in Barranquilla is extremely complex and difficult due in part to the lack of resources not only of most of the population, but of the municipality as well.

Nonetheless, it was possible to sense in many of the respondents some degree of resignation, a feeling that politics in Barranquilla are played in certain way and that there is nothing to do about it. If you are lucky enough to have a public job, to be part

of an administration, it is almost expected for you to 'help your self, and help your family'. In other words, there is a perception by the general public that being in the government is an opportunity that the person has to better his/her personal finances. As one city employee told me:

When I was asked to join the administration and I accepted the position, not only my close friends but also acquaintances approached me and said: "way to go! Now all your problems are solved, you are going to be set for life." It is very sad to hear that. Even worse was that the incumbent said almost the same thing to me when I took office. He stressed how lucky I was to be able to be in such a position because although it is not one of the highest-ranking jobs, it offers plenty of "opportunities" for you know what (Personal Interview, City Official, July 2002).

This view of public officials and politics in general creates a sense of hopelessness from the part of those city officials that have honorable intentions or at least do not seek to get rich through the job. Besides, it makes many officials doubt whether or not to join the administration because doing so may harm their image as an honest person. Nonetheless, it is possible to find committed and valuable individuals within the administration that are trying to foster a better place for people in Barranquilla.

An overall look at policy-making in the city tells us that for most of those interviewed, politics are made at the executive level, more precisely at the Mayor's office. According to the elite, public policy is mainly the subject of the Mayor and the Planning Committee; groups and associations are not part of the decision-making process as they are most of the times seen as important actors for the process of implementation of public policy. Officers believe that the planning process is

concentrated on the planning office; this office writes the plan and presents it to the Mayor for his approval. Other offices may participate if the planning secretary asks them to, but the responsibility of local policy lay on the planning office. In other words, within the administration there is no clear sense that in each secretariat or office there is the potential for developing programs created by or with the community. Except for the planning office and the social secretariat that attempt to reach out and work with some groups through planning workshops, there are no clear demonstrations that open group participation takes place within the administration.

As the planning process goes, usually what we do is to create a draft of the plan and discuss it within the Planning office, then we present it to the Planning Committee for discussion and then to the Mayor for his comments. I realize that for some the process should be reversed; write the plan with the Committee previous recollection of information and projects with the community, and then present it to the Mayor. The fact is that the Committee seldom meets and when it does there is not much contribution. Besides, in other opportunities we have attempted to ask the community for projects but this process takes too much time and resources that we do not have (Personal Interview, City Official, August 2002).

The planning office is the center of policy-making in several ways. The main responsibility of this office is to design and seek the approval of the Action Plan for each term (3 to 4 years), as well as the coordination of the Planning Committee that serves as an advisory board to the secretary and to the Mayor. Representatives of different sectors like education, health, private business, community, and the like, form the Planning Committee. Once the planning office has a draft of the plan it is taken to the planning committee for their concept and then it is given to the Mayor for his

approval. If the Mayor agrees with the plan it will be sent to the City Council for final approval.

According to the Decree 1306/1980, Urban Development Plans shall be prepared with the participation of civic, professional, business, and cultural associations, together with the community in general (Art. 15). This means that the administration is required to seek the involvement of the community and social groups. However, according to officials, the law makes it appear more feasible than it is. Although they agree that citizen participation in the preparation of the plan is important and valuable, sometimes it is not manageable and in the most part, it is no guarantee for the end result. In other words, providing participatory spaces to the community has not always ended in having a workable plan because people have difficulty agreeing on what to approve or sometimes even on what to ask for:

For the community to be able to productively participate in the planning process, it needs to be prepared and formed for that purpose. Groups and individuals in the city do not have such degree of citizen competence to be able to participate in such processes. We are trying to give them the tools for that purpose, but meanwhile we have to go on and write the plan ourselves. Otherwise it is a waste of time (Personal Interview, City Official, August 2002).

Moreover, in attempting to explain why the administration is hesitant to use a broad participatory mechanism to write the plan, one of the officials mentioned that the previous Urban Plan was done with ample participation; workshops were conducted in multiple neighborhoods and communities, most of the sectors and interested parties were consulted and each particular article included in the plan was negotiated with the community. Apparently then, a valuable participatory process took place, the

community was able to express its ideas, and the administration fulfilled its promise of inclusion. The final outcome - the plan- however, was a disaster as it has created chaos in the city because it is filled with inconsistencies, and contradictions. According to the official:

A plan needs to be considered as a unit, not a sum of multiple units/articles. In negotiating each article with the community, the plan lost its coherence and in order to reach our final goal, we were forced to approve articles that were impossible to apply later on. Thus, when we talk about participation we may say: “in principle it is ideal, citizens should take part in as many decisions as possible, but in the practice it is another story, society is not ready for too much responsibility” (Personal Interview, City Official, October 2002).

In a similar sense, one of the officials also mentioned the idea that representation is not embedded as a concept in peoples' minds. Individuals that sit in particular committees like the Planning Committee are representatives of groups or sectors; their role in the board is to protect and defend the interest of the sector they represent. However, the official's experience shows that representatives do not act as such, they might have the interest of their group in mind, but there is no sense of going back to the group to discuss with them the options, report about the actions undertaken, and the like. Once a person is named into the committee, the representation stops. The administration contends that, even though as public officials they open the space for participation, it is the groups who do not behave as 'representatives' of other groups and interests therefore weakening the participatory character of the whole process (Schonwalder 2002, 52).

In addition, local officials argue that groups in the city work as factions making it difficult for the administration to deal with them. Groups in Barranquilla, they state,

not only compete with each other, but also try to undermine their possibility of action within the government. According to one official, the administration gets confused because there is no clear indication which group is the most representative of a particular sector i.e. women. She argues that when she finds two or three women group arguing with each other and trying to secure funds individually, she would rather switch the destination of those funds and work with other sectors like youth or the elderly.

It is not easy to work with groups. Usually I receive proposals and requests from different groups that deal with the same problems and target population. I ask them to join efforts or at least I explore if that is a possibility, but most of the times, they refuse to work together because each wants to secure funds for themselves. They think that if they join they will lose their position and be absorbed by the other. In such cases I rather fund other type of groups than those that will likely create more problems for me (Personal Interview, City Official, September 2002).

In addition to this, there is also a sense of consensus about the difficulties and risks involved when giving more space and autonomy to certain groups. The case of Local Administrative Boards (*Juntas Administradoras Locales – JAL*) serves to illustrate this statement. Created through Constitutional Amendment in 1968, but actually organized since 1986, JALs are organs of territorial representation whose members are popularly elected during the election process of municipal and state authorities. Law 136/94 defines the Local Administrative Boards as those groups that serve as liaisons between the administration and the community, designed as channels for discussion and interaction between these two actors. The city is divided in 21

territorial spaces called communes (*comunas*), citizens elect from 9 to 11 commune representatives for each territory depending on its population. Thus, there are 21 JALs in Barranquilla representing the same number of territories. JALs do not receive local funding *per se*; the administration is required to provide them with office supplies (official paper) and a place to meet. Board members receive no salary or funds to operate, make copies, buy equipment or the like.

According to administration officials it is not very useful to work with commune representatives in general. The overall view they have is that these officials tend to be aggressive, intolerant and demanding; at the same time, many believe that they do not facilitate but harm the process of policy-making:

The administration's experience is that it is better not to work with *ediles* [commune representatives] because they end up complicating everything. Working with *ediles* and council members is very complicated" (Personal Interview, City Official, Oct. 2002).

Many accuse commune representatives of using their character of public officials to earn personal benefits. In particular, one civil servant mentioned the case of *ediles* using their office to sell certificates that will allow individuals to receive free medical attention (SISBEN Certificates). However, the administration does not charge for these certificates, there is no cost in getting one. Other officials mentioned many similar cases where JALs take advantage of their position with no regard to the collective impact their actions might have. This type of actions, officials contend, leads to distrust and rejection of JAL initiatives by the administration.

It is very hard for the administration to control the actions of commune representatives, and some of them instead of serving as true liaisons between us and their community, they are only searching for opportunities to take advantage of their power, even if this means going against those they are supposed to represent. Those that sell SISBEN certificates may be a few of them, but they harm the image of all (Personal Interview, City Official, October 2002).

Although most city officials acknowledge that some commune representatives are hard working, devoted and honest individuals that are really committed to their communities, as an institution, JALs are seen as organs used by politicians to secure votes. Instead of having a participatory image, JALs are regarded as political tools for candidates to manipulate votes and political support. In order for individuals to run for a seat on the JAL board, they need to participate in public elections and receive about 5% of the votes that a city councilor receives. Consequently, council candidates usually sponsor the campaign of these representatives in order to secure their votes; for the administration, “*ediles* are not clear representatives of a particular community, but representatives of a particular council member” (Personal Interview, City Official, Nov. 2002).

Recent legislation changed the formation, functioning, and election process of JALs. Today instead of 21 communes, there are 3 localities, 3 local Mayors, and 3 JALs in the city. Based on the provisions included in the law, municipalities were required to design many of the by-laws that will bind JALs actions and functions. Accordingly, the administration initiated a process of discussion and preparation of the bill that was to be presented to the council for approval. The purpose of the bill was to determine whether commune representatives were to have a salary, which functions

will the local Mayors have, who and how will control them, and the like. In other words, the purpose of the new legislation was to deepen the decentralization process in the city, and transfer more functions to the organs with the lowest territorial level like JALs (Slater 1985; Ballon 1986; Boisier 1987; Castells and Borja 1988).

According to reports of some of the members of the committee that discussed the administration's bill, there was a great concern with the idea of having to transfer so much authority and decision-making power to the JALs. In particular, the source argues, the hesitation came not only from the Mayor's side, but also from guild representatives and many members of the planning committee. There is a general consensus that groups like JALs are not to be trusted with "so many resources and responsibilities" (Personal Interviews, Oct. 2002).

Even though the administration reports to be concerned with the effectiveness of working with commune representatives, they report to be open and accessible to them and their needs. Different officials I spoke with contend that their office is always attentive to JAL and other groups needs and interests, although most of their efforts are directed to serving the community in general, not particular groups or boards. Above all, officers whose main function is to work with the community state that the relationship with JAL and groups is good, that they tend to organize multiple seminars and workshops for the community and especially for commune representatives in order to form them and empower the community in general.

No, we really think that what we need to do is to provide enough tools for groups to participate effectively. People that are part of JALs sometimes lack basic education skills and it is important for us to help them understand what this is about. We try to offer workshops that deal with leadership and teamwork issues. In addition, now that we are

discussing the issue of localities we also organized seminars to discuss with them possible ways of organizing the new structure of the city. I think we did three of those seminars, but if we have to, we will do more (Personal Interview, City Official, September 2002).

However, commune representatives argue that when the administration has been faced with issues that directly affect them, it has not been as open as it claims. For example, during the process of writing the by-laws for their new functions, they state that it is true that the administration organized workshops and seminars and invited them in several occasions, but not to discuss the contents of the by-laws, but to socialize them with the bill. Commune representatives state that they were not able to question the decisions already made by the administration, that they feel they were invited to those meetings only to legitimize the process for the administration. As such, the administration was able to claim that multiple meetings with JALs took place, only to know that according to JAL members they were not participatory spaces.

Oh yes, we have been invited to several meetings and reunions in City Hall, but not to discuss things, but to hear what they are going to do. They brought us there to tell us that they are going to divide the city in 3 localities, north, central and south. They informed us how the localities would look like and when we tried to complaint about that division they said that it was the only possible one, that other divisions were not appropriate. They did not even hear our point (Personal Interview, Commune Representative, October 2004).

When we explore deeper, we find that groups and commune representatives are very limited in their actions towards the administration. Although JAL members are elected officials, they are not free to enter City Hall and visit public officials. In order to be authorized to enter the building, they need to have an appointment with an

official or the like. In other words, they receive the same treatment that any regular citizen does. In addition, if ediles want to propose projects for government consideration, they are expected to search for information to document their request and prepare the proposal to fulfill technical requirements. However, the administration will not provide this to them; if they need documents they have to pay for the copies from their own pocket, as they do not have official funds. Ediles also complain that they usually ask and fund outside help to prepare the proposal, even for something as basic as to have it typed, as they have no office space or resources. Thus, participatory spaces might be available, but according to the JAL members, this does not translate into participation, as the state does not provide the basic elements for their functioning.

We have nothing. The only thing they give us is the letterhead paper, besides that it is up to us. I wish you would see the “supposed” offices assigned to all 21 JALs. They are located on the old City Hall building on the 10th floor, in a building where the elevator is out of order since I do not know when. The windows are broken, no one dusts or cleans and there are no office equipments available, not even a phone. Do you consider this to have resources? (Personal Interview, Commune Representative, July 2002).

The relationship between the administration and other groups in the city is also worth discussing. In general, city officials comment that they work with some groups like non-governmental organizations or civic groups that they already know and trust. Officials tend to have around 2 or 3 groups or actors they associate with, mostly to implement policy, rarely to discuss it. Accordingly, they state that they know which groups are serious and deserve to be assigned resources for particular projects or others will be asked to act as allies for specific programs. It is important to note that the relationship between groups and the administration is limited to the degree of

association the official has with the group. Officials work with groups they know on personal levels, not in general. Thus, once the official leaves office, the relationship between the administration and the group is likely to end.

As I said, although I would like to work with as many groups as possible, I sometimes hesitate because you do not know how serious groups are and how long will they last. I rather work with groups that I know personally or other official recommends or at least I have heard of. It is risky to work with groups you have no reference of (Personal Interview, City Official, July 2002).

Another aspect worth mentioning concerns the type of relationship the administration has with groups. In general it is possible to argue that this relationship is rather characterized by conflict as groups and associations questioned most of the decisions made by the administration in the last months. By the time this research was conducted, there were several issues discussed in the public agenda like massive transportation system (*Transmetro*), parking zones (*Zonas Amarillas*), pedestrian bridges, Chapter 11 (*Ley 550*), privatization of the phone company (EDT) and creation of new decentralization structure - new localities.

In order to have a better understanding of the dynamics that take place between the power elite and other groups in the city, below I discuss three cases that provide insightful information. From the different issues that were discussed in the city during this study, some are still active and in the definition process or their content depends more on actions and directions performed by the national government as is the case of the phone company or the financial situation that a process of bankruptcy entails (*Ley 550*). I selected the case of the creation of a massive transportation system, the new

parking zones and the construction of pedestrian bridges in the metropolitan area. A discussion of the creation of new localities in Barranquilla was discussed previously so there is no need of presenting it again.

Transmetro

Barranquilla's public transportation system is inefficient, dangerous and inadequate for the city and its metropolitan area. During the last 20 years the city has experienced changes concerning the number of vehicles that transit moving from 60.000 to 160.000. In addition the accident rate has increased from 1621 in 1982 to 7604 in 1998 (Chamber of Commerce, Report on Transportation in Barranquilla, Feb. 2004).

In order to deal with the vehicular chaos and the limits of public transportation, the city has been discussing the idea of building a massive transportation system with funds from the national government and local resources. However, there is no agreement on the issue. Some consider that by changing the way current buses and transportation companies are organized it is possible to solve the problem of public transportation. This group believes that the problem lays on the way drivers are remunerated as they receive by the number of passengers they have and the trips they make in a day. If, this group argues, drives were compensated with a fix salary and benefits, they would be less prone to speeding and competing among them for passenger, putting at risk not only those using the system, but also the community in general. Other set of actors believes that a city like Barranquilla with 1.2 inhabitants and around 300,000 commuters needs to have a reliable transportation system even if

it entails demolition and re-building of most of the streets and areas where it should run.

The idea of a massive transportation system originated from a group of specialists whose intentions were to offer options regarding how to solve the problem of public transportation in Barranquilla. Coordinated by the Chamber of Commerce, the group included representatives of public and private entities like the District Planning Office, District Environmental Office, Transit Authority, Universidad del Norte and the Chamber of Commerce among others. During almost 8 months from August 2000 to April 2001 the group worked to design a project that was later on given to the administration. The Mayor included the project as part of his government program.

However, as the transportation guilds (ANALTRA) were not included in the process, they became concerned with the idea of having such a system, as it could be a very strong threat for their business. Based on this, the guild decided to hire a consulting firm called Pablo Bocarejo and Associates from the capital city – Bogotá to confront the initial proposal presented by the public and private entities.

According to the coordinator of the Urban Development Area of the Chamber of Commerce who led the process, the Bocarejo study reached the same conclusions as the one offered by the first group changing the view the transportation guild had towards the project. After this, in July 2002, the administration decided to ask The National Planning Office to formally order a series of studies to analyze the real possibility of developing a massive transportation system in Barranquilla (El Heraldo, Feb. 13, 2003, 6B).

The Planning Office assigned the contract to Bocarejo and Associates who presented the project in January 2003. However, for many people in the city, the report presented by this firm is not satisfactory. According to business guilds, NGO Protransparencia, Watchdog Civic Community Group, Commerce Association (Fenalco), Construction Guild (Camacol) and other NGO like Amor por Barranquilla, and Barranquillemos, the recommendations and projects presented by Bocarejo lack rigor and do not address issues like the space available in the city to build this system (El Heraldó, Feb 13, 2003, 6B).

In addition, the Associations for Professional Architects and Engineers publicly declared that the specifications for the transportation system presented by Bocarejo and accepted by the administration were inadequate, lacked design and functionality and will likely generate chaos in the city. The groups, together with the Chamber of Commerce, the NGO Protransparencia, and other actors, presented professional and technical studies explaining how it was not possible to build and fund a massive transportation system the way the administration claims. In addition, these groups state that the government did not consult the project with the community, or other entities that might contribute or be affected by the process, as is the case of the transportation companies currently running in the city.

Consequently, the discussion around the transportation system became a confrontation between the administration and groups and associations that disagree with the contents and implementation process assumed by the Mayor's office. From technical discussions related to whether or not the streets in the city were wide enough to handle the vehicles designed by the administration, to issues about the interest

behind the administration. As the process developed, the administration started to criticize and belittle the comments made by those opposed and at the same time, the other group doubted the administration's intentions and the community started to consider the idea that the Mayor's office has vested interests on assigning the contract to a company of their choosing (El Heraldó, Feb 20, 2003, 5A).

According to comments made by one council member that belongs to the minority coalition in the City council, those council members that belong to the ruling majority are pressuring the Mayor asking him for public jobs in exchange for a positive vote to approve the bill that deals with Transmetro.

There is a robotic majority. That tries to blackmail the Mayor asking for jobs to vote things, to behave and do not talk (El Heraldó, Feb. 5, 2003, 4B).

In other words, the issue of the massive transportation system for Barranquilla became one of negotiations between the administration and the council for approval. Although the council questions if the District has the economic resources required for the project, the bill was not discussed in terms of technical design, or pertinence. For a project of such magnitude it seems insufficient for the council to study and approve it in around 2 o 3 weeks.

Commenting on the discussion process surrounding the initiative, the chief executive of an NGO stated:

We have our eyes on the issue of the *Transmetro* day and night. We are trying to create an interdisciplinary association to be able to fulfill our duty more effectively. This thing started with such unclear intentions, that even before the City Council approved the project there was an appointed manager and president of the future company that was to own *Transmetro*. But the puppet was disarmed immediately, because they

need to realize that Barranquilla no longer stays put (El Herald, Feb. 13, 2003, 6B)

However, in spite of the criticisms, formal complaints and technical reports presented by those against the project, the administration was able to secure the votes in the council and got the bill approved. NGO and other groups are left with the feeling that there is no sense of spending time and money writing reports and proposals if the administration usually gets what they initially look for.

What happened was that we do not know what is behind all this. The negotiation process is so complex that we are not able to visualize all the different arrangements and ties that this might create. Our position has been a technical one; the administration's seems to be having a political one. How do we work with such different goals? (Personal Interview, NGO representative, April 2004).

Parking Zones

Based on the existence of a contract signed by the previous administration, the current Mayor decided to implement the project of creating parking zones within the city using paid meters. The Mayor's office has called the project "Yellow Zones" to indicate the color that will be placed in the authorized parking areas. According to the contract a private company will be able to charge for the time and space vehicles use to park on certain areas of the city and give back to the District 15% of the total income (El Herald, Sept. 5, 2002, Editorial). Most of the investment that the private company will have to execute is directed towards the arrangement of the areas to facilitate and control public parking (El Herald Sept. 29, 2002, 5A).

Associations, regular citizens and home and business owners of the areas where the parking zones will be habilitated complaint for several reasons. First they claim that there has been no discussion or formal presentation of the project by the administration to the community (El Heraldó, August 16, 2003, 4A; August 23, 2002, 7C). There is scarce information regarding how the process works, how were the tariffs decided, which zones in the city will be affected, and how is the commitment of the contracting company towards the city and the financial arrangements included in the contract. In addition, many of those affected by the works, argue that installing meters around the city is not the solution. There is concern that the administration did not consider other options like building vertical parking spaces in abandoned buildings (El Heraldó, Sept. 19, 2002, 4A).

Besides, groups and associations consider that there is a lack of planning on the administration's part and they believe the administration is improvising as it goes. When the project started the Chief Secretary of Public Works stated that for now they were going to implement the project in 2 or 3 blocks in the city and then they will decide the others. For the citizens this was a clear indication of how there is no serious plan and study that guides the project (El Heraldó, August 23, 2002, 7C; Sept. 3, 2002, 5A).

According to the administration the project has many benefits for the city as it organizes traffic and returns the sidewalks to pedestrians and at the same time creates more green areas for all. In addition, it provides more opportunities for people to have access to public spaces as drivers will not be able to use a public space as their private

parking when they go to work and leave their car for 8 hours or more in one spot (El Heraldo, Sept. 4, 2002, 4A; Feb. 5, 2003, 5A).

For those that question the project the main aspect they disagree with is the idea of giving to a private company the administration and management of a public good as it is the public space. According to this group, the project also lacks the environmental study to determine its impact and has no construction and environmental license. Based on this, a group of small business owners, and inhabitants of the areas affected, joined by the Association of Commerce (Fenalco) presented a popular action against the project to the Superior Court of Barranquilla asking to stop the job. More than 500 persons that felt affected by the measure undertaken by the Mayor signed the petition. In addition to this, the group stated that they would organize a silent march to protest by walking through the different zones where the project is to be implemented (El Heraldo Sep. 4, 2002, 4A).

After several months of discussions, protests, editorials and negotiations meetings between the administration and those opposed to the project some changes were made like a reduction on tariffs for the first 6 months. However, for those opposed to the project this is not enough. Guilds and groups wanted for the administration to discuss the project and make the appropriate changes like including more green areas and modifying the structural design for some of the areas included.

Although the most prominent economic groups and associations like the Association of Industries (ANDI), Commerce Association (Fenalco), and Construction Guild together with other groups and individuals questioned the project, the Mayor was able to continue to implement the program and proceed with minor changes. The

community organized protests, and more than one demonstration against the parking zones, used legal mechanisms to attempt to stop them and nothing they did was enough. The parking areas are operating in the city although many people willingly avoid using them.

During this process of discussion and negotiation between the community and the Mayor's office, the Mayor, arguing that they went against his moral integrity sued some of the more outspoken contradictors of the administration: one entrepreneur and one council member. For many this action by the Mayor only confirms the idea that there is no real possibility for citizens to participate in public affairs if those that attempt to voice their inconformity end up being prosecuted by the government. As the director of the NGO Protransparencia stated:

I think that the judicial suit has been the last resort the Mayor has used knowing that he has no other possible argument he could use to demerit the moral authority of these two contradictors whom it is not possible to say have a political interest. More so in the case of the council member who has been the only councilor that the city recognizes as exercising political control with no personal interest in mind (Acosta M. 2003).

The case of the parking zones show once more that politics in Barranquilla are concentrated on the Mayor in particular and the administration in general. NGO, associations, private entities, guilds and other groups attempted to modify a decision made by the Mayor and were unable to. Although in this case those opposed to the measures organized and joined in action to protest against the project, their combined actions were insufficient as the Mayor continued with the contract. This is an example of how NGO and other groups are not able to influence the content of a decision made

by the administration, their role seems to be limited to participate in the implementation process when the administration asks them to.

In Barranquilla the only thing that works is what the Mayor wants. To stop this contract it is enough for the Mayor to say so, but that will not happen during this administration because there is no political interest in doing so. As groups we may protest, but we know the decision is on the Mayor's hands (Personal Interview, Group Representative, October 2002).

Although the media presented the views of more than ten groups, chamber of commerce, universities, professional associations and the like, the projects of Transmetro and parking zones are currently being implemented in the city. The main newspaper in the region wrote:

“Against everything, for good or worst, the process to build the polemic Yellow Zones started” (*Contra viento y marea, para bien o para mal, ya arrancaron las obras para la implementacion de las polemicas “Zonas Amarillas”*)(El Heraldo, August 8, 2002).

Thus, there are important steps taken by groups and guilds in the city that do not translate into a change of policy on the administration's part.

Pedestrian Bridges

In January of the year 2002, the Metropolitan Area of Barranquilla signed an agreement with the National Financial Company for Territorial Development (FINDETER) to build 11 pedestrian bridges in Barranquilla and its metropolitan area. Findeter provided the funds and selected the company to design, and implement the project. The Metropolitan Area decided the places where the bridges were to be built

and communicated the information to the community in August of 2002. Around November of 2002 the works finally started through the excavation process in the areas selected. By this time some architects and engineers started to question the administration because they believe the process was ill designed and not consulted with the community (El Heraldo, Nov. 11, 2002, 4A).

By January 2 of the year 2003, members of NGO like *Barranquillemos* sent a letter to the Director of the Metropolitan Area expressing their concern and inviting them to answer a set of questions that several groups and individuals had express publicly. The community wanted to know the process behind the decision by the metropolitan area, how many studies there were concerning the viability, necessity and design of the bridges, how did they decide where to include one, did they consider other options? (El Heraldo, 6A).

Findeter and the administration invited the community to accept the bridges as an important and valuable addition to the metropolitan area and asked citizens not only to use them but also to be attentive and participant by exercising their right to monitor the installation and building process (El Heraldo, January 25, 2003, 4A).

According to the plan presented by the Metropolitan Area, Findeter, and the administration, the metallic bridges were to be assembled in 2 or 3 days. Consequently, on January 25th, 2003 the first bridge was installed, and 5 or 6 followed. The installation of other bridges demanded more preparation work, as some of them were to be located near high electricity lines that needed to be moved.

Meanwhile, the local newspaper published several articles discussing the design and gave space for architects and engineers to voice their doubts and concerns

regarding this project. For many, once again the administration was executing a decision made by them without asking or presenting the project to the community. The Metropolitan Area responded by saying that the idea of the bridges was part of the campaign program and of the governmental plan from the beginning; that the information has always been available in the metropolitan headquarters for those interested (El Heraldo, February 18, 2003, 5A).

In March 13, 2003 while crossing under the bridge a truck hit the bridge bringing it down in the middle of the street. According to newspaper information, several citizens that live in the surrounding area where the bridge was built had called the newspaper to inform that the bridge was too low and that trucks were hitting it as they go by. They also informed the reporter that they have given this information to one of the workers who passed it to one of the engineers who promised to go the site and check the height (El Heraldo, March 14, 2003, 6A).

After the accident the director of the Metropolitan Area stated that the height of the bridge was according to the specifications required by law and that it was the truck's height the one surpassing the limits established by the transportation code (El Heraldo, March 14, 2003, 6A). However, for the members of the Architects Association this information was not credible so together with the community they went to the site and made their own measurements and calculations stating that the road was not leveled so there were some areas with different measures and that what is even worse, that the bridge did not have the required measure, it was too low. After this action performed by the community, the metropolitan area informed that they would raise the height of all the bridges to avoid this problem again. They also state that they

never received the information about trucks hitting the bridge before (El Herald, March 15, 2003, 6A).

After this incident and based on the revisions made to the different structures a Technical Committee was created to supervise the project. Members of the Association of Architects, Universidad del Norte, NGO Protransparencia and the Chamber of Commerce formed this Committee with the purpose of offering technical advise but also with the mission of demanding several structural modifications to the bridges. According to the committee, the bridges had major problems of security and design that needed to be corrected before the city could accept them (El Herald, May 13, 2003, 4A).

In addition to the creation of the Technical Committee, the Architects Association also presented a popular action to the Administrative Court of the Department asking for the court to order that the administration, Findeter and the contracting company, perform the modifications and corrections demanded by the Technical Committee. In the suit they contend that although some changes have been made, they do not fulfill the degree of excellence that the committee and the city require (El Herald, May 12, 2003, 5A).

After several similar actions and meetings between the community, the technical committee, Findeter and the administration, the corrections and technical changes were performed. The participation of the University in all these discussions marked the difference as it became a crucial voice in the city and based on its credibility and status citizens believed that this was not a political confrontation

between some members of the elite, but that it was a technical discussion that affected the community as a whole.

Several things made this intervention a successful one: first, it was not an individual action, several organizations came together with the community and joined efforts to pressure changes; second, the technical support that Universidad del Norte provided was crucial because the university has the resources and knowledge needed for the tests and simulations to be done. People believe in the quality of the work the university does and that is why it was very important that it became not only involved in the process, but also exercised a clear leadership (Personal Interview, NGO representative, May 2003).

Although there were instances where the actions of the groups, organizations and associations led to changes admitted by the administration, there was one important case where the metropolitan area and those involved with the construction of the bridges were not willing to accept petitions. This is the case of the request made by the Police Chief in Barranquilla who considered that the location of one of the bridges by the public university (*Universidad del Atlántico*) could represent a danger for the area because it could be used during some of the riots the students make. It could serve as an advantageous position from where to act. For the director of the Metropolitan Area and the administration, this issue was not a concern and decided that because of previous agreements with the national government this location could not be changed (El Heraldo, February 20, 2003, 9B). This example shows also how this type of situations could be avoided if decisions in the city were made with the participation of those actors that will be affected by it.

Conclusion

The consensus among members of the ruling elite, particularly of positioned individuals, is that policy is made at the executive level. Society in general has seldom incidence in the process of policy-making and the Mayor is virtually free to act without regard to the community. They believe that the institutional development of the political system is weak and permissible with the Mayor's office. According to some of the actors I spoke with, in several instances they have initiated lawsuits against previous Mayors with no result to show for because the judicial process takes too long to complete if it ever does. By the time there is a ruling the Mayor is no longer in power and the effect of the possible measure is practically lost.

Thus, positioned individuals consider that the lack of effectiveness in civil society's participation in policy-making is not necessarily caused by the weakness or strength of the groups present in society. To them, the problem is political; as long as the Mayor is willing to allow participation and discussion with the community, then groups will be able to engage and have an impact in city politics, but if the Mayor is hesitant to open the space for involvement, he or she will be able to make decisions without considering the community in general. The case of the pedestrian bridges demonstrates that with the administration's interest it is possible to bring together community concerns and practical changes. However, it is not easy for the community to reach such levels of interaction with the administration. Even as one city official said:

It is very hard to penetrate the government; the state closes the door even to those that do things right (Personal Interview, Oct. 2002).

From the analysis of these cases we may argue that the relationship between the ruling elite and civil society is weak, as it is not possible to identify instances and real participatory spaces clearly defined and sustained within the administration. Participation is determined by the personal characteristics of the official in place and the specific relationship he/she has with a particular group; groups that do not reflect their interest or question too much their programs will not be invited to participate and sometimes will be ostracized like Protransparencia. Because of the constant media exposure and questioning of the administration's decisions, Protransparencia, and its leader, are regarded by the administration as biased, un-collaborative and unworthy of their attention (El Heraldo, August 16, 2002, 5A). As Kurt Weyland comments on a Latin American pattern:

The welter of social movements and the unorganized poor remain excluded, tilting the balance of influence heavily in favor of sociopolitical elites. ... Whereas equity-enhancing change may require mobilizing large numbers of poor people, the powers-that-be oppose mass pressure and demand recognition of their special power capabilities (1995,127).

Another important finding is that the view of the ruling class regarding citizen and group participation corresponds to a limited and restricted view of engagement. In many instances participation is seen as disruptive, complicated and unwanted; they argue that groups tend to complain about decisions already made, want to modify what is being done and do not present a collaborative front: "sometimes is better just to ignore them and inform them afterwards" (personal interview, City Official, August 2002). In addition, as many of the groups, *comuneros*, and associations that are active

belong to a lower socioeconomic stratum, local officials and council members demerit their actions saying that they are well intentioned but have no real information and capabilities to present valuable proposals, therefore, it is better just to receive them but not to adopt them.

However, when the groups that participate and attempt to engage in public action are well prepared, like professional associations that question the administration's programs, they will be rejected as representing the interest of private business or economic groups. In other words, group participation under the political elite is limited to those that offhand represent and favor the administration, like those groups with partisan representation. However, it is also important to note that there are instances when other actors are able to participate, as is the case of respected institutions like private universities as long as other groups and associations join them.

In this sense, it is likely that -in the next chapter- when we explore the results of the group surveys, we will find that groups in Barranquilla are able to reach certain level of involvement, but are not likely to ascertain higher degrees of interaction with the political elite. The ruling class is clear about the 'theoretical' value of participation and public engagement in policy-making but justify the lack of higher degrees of involvement in the idea that groups need to be better organized, prepared, and united in order to be suitable public actors.

Chapter 7

Groups in Barranquilla

Introduction

As the preceding chapter illustrates, the view of the political elite clashes with the perception of participation that some elected representatives have of the process of policy-making in Barranquilla. While the elite reports to offer important participatory spaces to groups, associations, and neighborhood/commune representatives, they argue that there is no real opportunity to engage in public activities directed to influence political outcomes. However, individuals are not the only actors we observe in the policy-making world. Besides traditional policy-makers like state officials and elected representatives, it is possible to find private actors that collectively attempt to reach public goals. Thus, through group activities individuals seek to find ways to mobilize their interest and increase their likelihood of success (Baumgartner and Leech 1998).

This chapter discusses group behavior in Barranquilla by exploring their level of engagement and identifying those factors that might influence their overall activities. Thus, it is of importance to determine not only the degree of group participation, but also the scope of their activity in the city. How likely it is for groups to be in contact with government officials? If so, are they active in different areas or is their action limited to certain issues? In this sense, it is important to note that the analysis is centered on the external features of the group, this is, group-state interaction and less on internal aspects of the groups (Schmidt 1996). Furthermore, group size,

character of their funding, years of functioning and other internal factors are included as important issues that influence group behavior, as the purpose here is not to study what makes people join or stay in a group or how can groups modify their funding portfolio (Olson 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Salisbury 1984; Cigler 1991, 1994)

One of the main difficulties we find when we attempt to study groups, is not only reaching a suitable definition, but once we do, being able to find appropriate sources from where to draw a sample of groups (Truman 1951; Knoke 1986; Morton 1991; Uhlaner 1989; Turner 1982; Baumgartner and Leech 1998). As mentioned before, this project defines a social group as a voluntary, non-profit association that is neither part of the government nor is dominated by government officials. The term includes a wide range of organizations from social movements and interest groups to sport clubs, as our interest is to learn about every type of group and their participation determinants.

After searching -unsuccessfully- for a list or directory with information about every association created in the city, I realized that it was possible to draw information from the local Chamber of Commerce. According to Colombian law (Decree 2150, 1995) non-profit organizations need to register their constitution and by-laws in the Chamber of Commerce and are required to update their registration every time they change board, legal representative or make modifications to the by-laws. According to the information provided by the Chamber of Commerce, there are 4,841 non-profit groups registered and active in the city and the metropolitan area; from those non-profits, 2,676 list Barranquilla as the official location.


According to the information available at the Chamber of Commerce, it is not clear how many non-profits deal directly with education, health, housing, transportation or the like. It is possible though, to have an idea of the type and character of the different organizations registered (See Figure 7.1).

Based on this information, a representative sample of 94 groups was drawn from the Barranquilla listing, with 95% degree of confidence and 6 % error. In order to do a random selection of groups, a computer list of random numbers was generated, and using the registration number of each of the 2,676 groups, 94 were selected. In case I came across a group with no valid address or phone number, I moved to the next valid one to include it in the list.

After calling each group to verify the address and request their consent to participate in the survey, a questionnaire was sent through special mail. For each group follow-up calls were made to make sure they received the survey and to schedule when they will be picked-up by the courier service. Out of 94 groups that received the survey, 42 responded (44% response rate), 9 of which had incomplete information. All in all, there are 33 valid questionnaires, 35% response rate.

In addition to the information provided by the mail survey, personal interviews were conducted with members of several groups, and direct participation in multiple group activities throughout the city also provided insight about this topic. Indeed, for almost a year and a half I was directly involved with several groups as an observer of their actions and meetings in some cases, and in a particular case as a founding member.

**Figure 7.1
Types of Non-Profits
Chamber of Commerce Registry**



The first section of the chapter presents a general description of group behavior in the city, the type of actions they tend to be involved with and their perception toward other actors. When appropriate, a description of a particular case will be introduced to illustrate the process of policy-making in the city and the role that certain groups and the administration have played.

Overview

Based on legal regulations, the Chamber of Commerce classifies non-profit groups in different ways. As such, we find that groups can be formed under diverse labels like Community Action Boards, groups of cooperative nature, employment funds, parent associations, homeowners associations, professional groups, civic organizations, local administrative boards, watchdog groups, corporations, and the like. According to the data, 27% of groups that answered the survey are foundations, 12% corporations, 9% social groups, and civic groups, and 6% community action boards, local administrative boards and cooperatives. The vast majority considers they have impact throughout their locality as opposed to their neighborhood, and 39% have more than 10 years of functioning. Almost fifty percent of the groups deal with education issues, around 30% with welfare, along with housing and utility services that account for 3% of their interest.

Groups in the city tend to be limited to less than 20 people per group, whether as total members or active members. Indeed, 58% of the groups have between 1 and 20 total members and 66% claim the same number of active members. Although 12% report to have more than 100 members, it is interesting to note that one of the groups


sampled claims to have 1,800 total and active members. From the sample, 85% have an executive board although only 33% has an official headquarter or physical space to meet. In addition, groups tend to be self-funded as 58% claim to have membership dues, 33% receive funds through services they perform, and more than 80% report not to receive international, national, or local resources.

In the following sections I will address group participation by first exploring the degree of participation groups express to have, this is, what are the sort of actions they embark in and how frequently they attempt them. Next, I discuss the degree of influence they perceive to have when they perform these actions. Knowing their perception of success will give us clues regarding their motivation for further participation. Then I continue with a review of the type of actors groups interact with, and which do they perceive to be more responsive to their interests and needs.

Participation

In order to have a comprehensive view of the degree and scope of group participation in the city, several questions were introduced in the survey covering particular and specific involvement means to more general ones. With the purpose of assessing the overall view of participation, groups were asked to indicate if they perceive that groups like theirs were able to participate in policy-making in the city, and if so, to what degree. In general, 48% of the groups state that there is no group participation in policy-making, 12% say there is a medium level of participation, and 39% believe participation is low; no group perceives participation to be high in Barranquilla (See Figure 7.2).

Figure 7.2
General Participation
N= 48



Although this is a general assessment of participation, it is important as it provides an overall view of how groups perceive the process and their role in the political world.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are more than a dozen formal spaces where groups and individuals can participate at the local level, some of them of mandatory formation by the local government. This means that according to the law, local governments are responsible for the creation and functioning of these committees where groups and representatives of civil society are formal members. From this list of participation channels, I selected four that cover diverse issues and have different dynamics (Planning Committees, Utility Boards, Advisory Councils, and Community Councils) and asked groups if they were members of any of them.

Before going into their answers, it is important to give an overview of these committees. The first space is the planning committee (*Consejos de Planeación*),

created through Law 152, 1994. Planning committees are of mandatory creation at the national, state and municipal level although there is no known sanction in case authorities do not organize them. Members of planning committees vary according to the municipal authority that creates them as each Mayor selects members from lists presented by representatives of each sector – education, health, women, youth, unions, community boards and the like. The purpose of this committee is to seek input concerning plans and programs proposed by the government, offer recommendations about the proposed plan and monitor the execution of the municipal development plan.

Another formal space is the Committee For Development And Social Control Of Public Utility Services (*Comité de Desarrollo y Control Social de los Servicios Públicos*). Created through Law 142, 1994 and Decree 2517, 1999, these mandatory spaces function at the municipal level and its members are representatives of utility services customers. The purpose of the committee is to participate in executive boards of public companies that provide utility services and monitor their activities.

An additional participatory space is the Advisory Council (*Consejo Consultivo de Ordenamiento*), created by law 388, 1997. These councils are formed by law with the purpose of offering advise to the local government and monitoring activities concerning urban planning and development. Its members are civil servants that work in the local administration, representatives of different guilds, and professional, ecologic, civic and community organizations that deal with urban development.

Community councils are open meetings that citizens can attend previous registration at the appropriate office that organizes them. Although these are natural spaces for local participation, it is the president who has organized most of them.

Indeed, since the beginning of his administration in August 2002, Alvaro Uribe has traveled the country to attend and lead community councils for more than 12 hours each. During these exercises, the president and the majority of state secretaries listen to interventions by community leaders, group representatives, city officials and regular citizens and proceed to instruct orders and bring about solutions to their complains.

From the information gathered throughout the survey, it is clear that formal participation is very low in the city. Only 18% of groups state that they are members or have taken part in any of the four formal spaces mentioned above. Furthermore, 97% of the groups have never been part of a planning committee, utility board or advisory council, and only 15% claim to have taken part of a community council. What these numbers indicate is that not only is the degree of formal participation low, but also the scope is limited as most of the participatory experience these groups have come from taking part of community councils.

There are, however, some other ways that groups might get involved in city activities. Formal participation might be too organized and structured for some groups and their interests; it could be possible to find that groups tend to engage in more spontaneous and basic participatory activities than formal mandatory groups. Remember that the purpose of this study is to determine not only the degree but also the type of participation in policy-making present in the city, and to do this it is vital to identify any possible means groups use to get involved, from contacting city officials to drafting legislation with the government. All these participatory activities provide valuable information as to how able civil society is to influence policy at the city level, in this case, in Barranquilla.

Previous discussion in chapters 4 and 6 describe the political dynamics present in the city and how it appears that major decisions are usually made by the Mayor's office with no consultation or interest to satisfy the general population. Decisions in the city tend to be influenced by the interests and needs of the groups closed to the Mayor and his coalition. In other words, from the news media coverage of the most important decisions implemented in the city during the last 18 months, one is likely to think that there is no citizen participation in Barranquilla at the individual or group level as the degree of complain and dissatisfaction with the current administration increases (El Heraldo, June 18, 2003, Editorial).

One wonders if this apparent lack of participation is the result of no interest or desire to participate, or if it is more the likely outcome of not being able to participate. In order to explore different venues of participation, a list of specific participatory actions was prepared so that each group would state whether they had attempted any of this and if so, how often.

According to legal provisions that regulate mandatory committees discussed above, the state, customer leagues, professional organizations, and the like, should make public announcements calling for those interested in being their representatives to register in order for each sector to choose their designated delegate. 76% of groups sampled state that they have never answered a public call to participate as committee members, 15% say they respond to those announcements once a year, 6% twice a year and 3% respond once a month. During some of the interviews done with several of these groups I wanted to know if they were aware of this 'call for committee participants', and more than two-thirds stated that they have not heard radio

announcements or public notices as the administration claims to have paid for. Furthermore, they state that although the law is clear about each committee having community participation, there is no clear provision regarding the selection process the administration needs to follow for each designation. This absence of appropriate regulation leaves open opportunities for the state to designate those individuals that are likely to defend or push the administration's interests as opposed to the community's. Thus, the idea behind the designation of a community representative is diminished by the weak institutional development of the norms that protect such representation.

One of the most important ways a group could participate in city activities is by making city officials accountable of their actions and omissions. In this sense, watchdog and monitor activities are vital when groups need to expose or request particular actions by the government (O'Donnell 1998; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000). Around 50% of the groups sampled state that they have never performed watchdog activities over the government, 24% have done it twice a year, 15% are likely to get involved in this type of actions each month and 9% every week. Thus, in general, 52% of the groups have engaged in activities intended to supervise or monitor government actions. So, here we find some degree of participation that was not evident when we assess the general degree of involvement.

One of the purposes of collective action is to be able to advance policy or decisions that are likely to benefit or better their reality, as such, the most likely endeavor they may try to undertake is to present proposals and projects to the government for their consideration (Escobar and Alvarez 1992). On this matter, 36% of groups have never presented proposals to the government although 27% argue they


have done it twice a year, 24% state they have done it every year and 12% presented proposals every month. It is interesting to note that 64% have had some type of experience presenting proposals for government discussion (See Figure 7.3). Later we will see what is their perception regarding the success of having embarked in those actions.

Another possible way groups might be part of the policy-making process is through the media as one of the most effective ways of exposing government wrongdoing, or to pressuring for government action over issues of their interest (Schumaker 1975; Long 1958; Tarrow 1994, 23). Thus, the degree to which groups are able to address the media is an important indicator of their possibility of reaching participatory spaces that could increase their chances of success. About 36% of the groups sampled stated they have never talked to the media, 21% has done it twice a year, 15% once a year and once a month, and 12% every week. It is important to note that almost the same number of groups that presented proposals for the government have talked to the media. Apparently then, there seems that groups in Barranquilla do have some degree of involvement, although we still need more information regarding other participatory venues.

One of these venues is to participate in public demonstrations although in a country like Colombia this could be seen as dangerous. In this regard, 33% state they have never taken part in public demonstrations in the city, 24% say they have taken part every year, 21% twice a year, 15% every month and 6% every week. This is an important finding as 67% of the groups have been able to take part of open demonstrations. Even though 36% state that their degree of influence in this type of

actions is zero, there have been important cases where public demonstrations and the pressure exerted by groups and associations made an impact on the final outcome. An example is the case of voter registration in Barranquilla for local elections on Oct. 26, 2003.

Figure 7.3
Presented Proposals to the Government
N=48



According to regulations, each citizen that wants to vote has to register within the area they live in; this is, in the registration table closer to their home. However, it has become standard practice for politicians and patrons to ‘ask’ their voters to register in particular zones in order for them to be able to count and verify if they voted as promised. This is one of the many ways clientelistic operations work in the city. The natural outcome is that it is possible to have double registration, registration from people that do not live in the city but in the surrounding areas, and the like. In sum, this is a clear violation of electoral procedures that directly affect democratic outcomes.


For this past election, non-profit groups like *Protransparencia*, *Iniciativa por Barranquilla*, *Corcaribe*, *Foro por Colombia*, together with political candidates and some representatives of political parties that question clientelistic practices, called for a public demonstration on the steps of the local office of the National Electoral Registry (*Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil*). During the demonstration some of the participants gave speeches and the different groups and citizens that attended chanted for about 3 hours. The media gave ample coverage to the event, and all the organizations present vowed to return every Friday until the registration for those elections was declared voided. At the end, some weeks later, after public demonstrations and other civil actions, the National Registry annulled the registrations. For the city, civil society was finally able to change the result of a decision that was likely to shape the election outcome and therefore influence the political reality for the next four years.

The next three participatory spaces are discussed together as they all refer to actions that require direct relationship with city officials at different levels. One of these actions refers to whether groups have ever consulted with government officials about a possible legislation, or talked with council members about a bill that is being discussed by council, or written legislation with government officials. Each of these actions requires higher degrees of influence and entrance in the political realm. According to the survey, as the level of importance increases, the participation rate of groups decreases. About 46% of groups have consulted with the government to plan future legislation, 42% have address council members to discuss a current bill, and only 9% has written legislation with the government (See Figure 7.4). As it was said

before, these actions represent a higher level of engagement and as such it is was not expected for many groups to be involved in these activities. It is interesting though, that at least 40% of groups have been able to reach government officials to consult or discuss policy.

Additional, less direct and demanding ways to attempt to influence government activity could be to use contacts – friends, relatives- or informal settings to reach officials and talk to them about the issues. According to the survey, about 46% of groups report to use informal contacts as a way of influencing government officials, and 54% state they have never used this tactic. In other words, it seems that there is no real difference between these participatory actions – consult government officials, address council, write legislation or use informal contacts - as groups tend to use them in equal proportion.

Figure 7.4
Direct participation
N=48



Almost in the same degree, 42% of groups report to have demanded particular government actions. Some of the measures that groups and regular citizens use to ask for government action range from sending letters requesting information – petition rights (*derechos de petición*) - to initiating legal procedures against the administration (*tutelas*). During some of the interviews many groups expressed their frustration over the government's lack of response to their inquiries and agreed that they have learned to use petition rights because this constitutional procedure forces the government to respond within a specific amount of time. This is an important tool for groups because it guarantees that they will be able to get the information needed for an adequate participation in other levels of policy-making. However, it is important to know that having the willingness of the government to provide the information needed might not be enough as groups and citizens will need to pay for the copies and materials that contain the data. Many groups argue that it is not within their means to be able to pay for all the information needed so they usually have to prioritize their efforts (Personal interviews May 2003).

As mentioned in other sections, clientelistic relationships characterize politics in the city. As such, it is argued that patronage practices are present throughout the city and its political realm. According to this view of politics, favor exchange is the most secure way to advance issues within the government; this is, administrations are more likely to favor those groups and citizens that worked on their behalf. In this sense, it is expected for groups to be permeable to this, to denote some degree of political participation by giving public support to a candidate and maybe securing possible entrance into the system later on. This, however, does not seem to be the case for


groups in Barranquilla. Almost 80% state they have never given public support for a political candidate. While doing research for this project I attended several events where groups and associations discussed ways to change the development path the city has taken in the last decade. During the last year or so, the city has experience a revival of civic involvement, new groups are being created, older groups seem to have rekindle and citizens in general appear to be more concerned with what happens in the city. As part of this process, some of the groups realized that the best way to counteract government actions was to join efforts and create a network of associations (Fals Borda 1992). Several meetings took place and agreements were reached concerning the idea of joining to present a united front and have more negotiating leverage with the administration (El Heraldó June 12, 2003). However, as the election time came closer, some of the groups wanted for the network to express its public support for a particular candidate and even launch his campaign as the candidate for civic groups. After many discussions and heated arguments, those that wanted for groups to participate actively in politics giving support to a candidate were outvoted by those convinced that in order for the network to remain strong and powerful in front of any administration, it had to be politically neutral. Today the network has lost many of its most valuable members – those with entrance into the private sector that was willing to fund some of the programs- and is now seeking ways to recapture the interest of those groups.

This section has presented the different participatory spaces groups might use in order to engage in policy-making in the city. In general, we have seen that there is an important degree of participation as many groups have used some of the techniques

or tactics mentioned above (See Figure 7.5). Indeed, 82% of the groups report to have used at least one of the participatory spaces discussed in this section. It is necessary to recall that when groups were asked about what they thought the degree of group participation in policy-making was in the city, 48% said there was no participation at all. However, when we explore this issue through questions that describe specific participatory spaces or tools groups might use, we find that there is some degree of engagement. So, what explains that if 82% of groups undertake some of the actions mentioned above, some 50% still report that there is no participation in policy-making in the city? To answer this we need more information, mostly, about the groups' scope of action and the perception of their degree of influence.

Figure 7.5
Type of Group Participation


N=48



Although we know that the vast majority of the groups have participated through one of the actions mentioned, it is also important to know the scope of actions undertaken by groups in the city. Are groups likely to concentrate in one or two actions or do they use most of the participatory spaces available in the city? In order to find out, a new variable was created by transforming each frequency response into actions taken and a value of 0 was assigned for those that responded “never” and 1 for “all other”, then these values were added to create a four-point scale. Based on this, we know that 18% of the groups have never used any of the participatory techniques or spaces, 30% has used from 1 to 4 spaces, another 30% from 5 to 8 spaces or techniques and 21% has used from 8 to 13. This information tells us that participation is not concentrated on a few areas but that groups that participate tend to use most of the tools and mechanisms available for them (See Figure 7.6).

Figure 7.6
Scope of Participation

N=48



Influence

According to the issues discussed above, there is an important question that remains to be answered: if groups report to be able to engage in many of the participatory spaces and activities listed, what explains that they do not perceive group participation in policy-making in Barranquilla to be high or even at a medium level? I believe part of the answer lies on their view of how likely it is for their actions to have an impact on decision-making in the city.

Altogether, through this work we have explored about seventeen participatory spaces and/or tools that groups have as means to be involved in policy making in Barranquilla. However, groups have different views regarding the likelihood of their actions making an impact on the final outcome. For example, out of the 17 actions they could use, 8 of them are perceived as spaces where at least 80% or more of the groups believe they have no influence at all, their actions are not likely to change the status quo. Moreover, only four actions are considered to have more than 50% of influence (See Figure 7.7).

Indeed, participating in watchdog activities, writing proposals for government consideration, talking to the media and participating in public demonstrations are regarded as the more influential actions for groups to undertake (See Table 7.1).


In this sense, 33% of groups believe for watchdog activities to have a medium degree of influence and 12% state for it to be high. At the same time, about 33% consider that writing proposals for the government has a low degree of influence and 21% regard it as medium degree, only 6% see it as a highly influential action for them. Talking to the media is the action with the highest degree of influence for groups; 30%

responded that addressing the media is the most significant action for them, 27% perceive it as medium influence and about 9% as low. Last, groups consider that participating in public demonstrations has 27% low impact, 21% medium and 15% high level of impact. Actions like participating in planning committees, being members of utility boards or advisory committees and writing legislation for the government are deemed to be highly ineffective as almost 90% say it has no influence.

Table 7.1
Degrees of Influence
N=48

Action / Tool	Degree of Influence			
	Percent			
	None	Low	Medium	High
Planning Committees	91	9	0	0
Utility Boards	97	0	3	0
Advisory Councils	88	12	0	0
Respond adds	85	12	3	0
Watchdog Act.	45	9	33	12
Community Councils	70	9	9	12
Proposals	39	33	21	6
Legislation	90	9	0	0
Media	33	9	27	30
Public demons.	36	27	21	15
Consultation	60	21	12	6
Address council	64	30	6	0
Informal C.	51	18	24	6
Demanded	67	6	15	12
Public Support	82	6	12	0
Public Hearing	85	6	6	3
Open Meeting	88	6	3	3

Figure 7.7
Perception of Influence per Action
N=48



A detailed analysis of Table 7.2 allows us to identify interesting findings regarding the relationship between the actions groups might take and their perceived degree of influence. As such, if we compare the percent of groups that undertake particular actions and the degree of influence they assign to each, we are able to see that those actions that they perceive to have at least more than 50% of influence are the same ones they engage in more than 50% of the time. For example, notice how participating in watchdog activities, writing proposals, talking to the media and participating in public demonstrations are not only the ones with higher degrees of influence, but the actions more taken by groups. In the same sense, activities perceived as having low degrees of influence like planning committees or utility boards, are hardly ever taken by groups.

In addition, it is essential to note that from all the different participatory spaces and tools discussed, the four that groups tend to use more and consider more effective, are also the ones that they are able to use by themselves. In other words, for many of the actions listed, groups need to be invited to participate or be selected as representatives, or require particular entrance into the system like being able to write legislation with the government.

It is also worth mentioning that nearly all of the most performed actions are related to one another. Watchdog or monitor activities are usually accompanied by media exposure and sometimes by public demonstrations. Moreover, presenting proposals for government consideration could be an important trigger or outcome for the other three actions. For example, as discussed in the previous chapter, during the last year a project to build 11 pedestrian bridges was implemented by the local and

metropolitan administration, together with *Findeter* (National Credit Agency). Many citizens did not agree with the location, quality, design and need of many of these bridges. After several groups like the professional association for architects and engineers performed technical and professional evaluations of the materials and building techniques used in the construction of the bridges, they went to the media with their findings. According to these groups, the entire construction process was to be stopped as the technical conditions of the bridges represented a risk for the individuals that were to use them. They argued that not only the design but also the quality of the materials was a cause of worry for the community. The Mayor and other authorities involved reassured the public that according to their studies the bridges were solid and safe for public use. As the government refused to stop and change the conditions of the bridges, more groups and associations expressed their concern. *Universidad del Norte*, through the School of Engineering, together with Chamber of Commerce, Inter-guild association (*Intergremial*), Association for Small Industries (ANDI), *Protransparencia*, and other groups, formed a coalition to make their own analysis of the technical specifications of the bridges. *Universidad del Norte* lead the team and concluded that the bridges were unsafe for public use. A list of modifications and repairs was handed to the administration for their immediate implementation. Thus, after several months of discussions, supervising, media exposure, demonstrations in front of the bridges, the administration was forced to change the design and accept some of the modifications presented by the coalition.

Table 7.2
Relationship Between Actions and Degree of Influence

Action / Tool	Action Taken		Degree of Influence	
	Percent		Percent	
	Yes	No	None	Some
Planning Committees	3	97	91	9
Utility Boards	3	97	97	3
Advisory Councils	3	97	88	12
Respond adds	24	76	85	15
Watchdog Act [*]	52	48	45	55
Community Councils	15	85	70	30
Proposals [*]	64	36	39	61
Legislation	9	91	90	10
Media ^{c*}	64	36	33	67
Public demons. [*]	67	33	36	64
Consultation	46	54	60	40
Address council	42	58	64	36
Informal C.	46	54	51	49
Demanded	42	58	67	33
Public Support	21	79	82	18
Public Hearing	9	91	85	15
Open Meeting	9	91	88	12

a, b, c, and d Pearson's r significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


Even if the coalition was able to force the administration to implement the technical changes they proposed, their intervention was not enough to make the government change some of the location of the bridges. The community of many areas where the bridges were built argued that they were not needed and that the construction will only generate more chaos and difficulties for them. At the same time, other communities that really need the bridges were not consulted or taken into account. In general, groups see the whole problem of the pedestrian bridges as one

more governmental decision they have to accept even if they think it is not in their benefit. At least they have the satisfaction that through collective action they were able to force the administration to adjust the bridges in order to meet the requirements made by the coalition.

In general then, it is clear that groups not only get involved in some participatory actions, but they are also – to some degree- confident to be able to change outcomes. Even if their perception of the degree of influence is not high, the idea that some of their actions have the potential to influence a particular outcome is likely to be an important predictor of group behavior. If groups believe that watchdog activities, media exposure, public demonstrations and presenting proposal are the actions that more likely have some impact on the administrations, it is safe to argue that those will be the ones they will use more. This, however, could only be tested through time. Further research needs to be done in order to determine if the behavior pattern uncovered above is present in the course of time.

In addition to finding out about the groups' tendency to participate in policy-making it is important to have an idea about their experience in at least one of these venues. Doing so, they were asked to comment on their experience after they presented a project to the administration – whether it is the council, the Mayor or the governor's office. According to their information, 67% of groups have at some point, presented proposal to the government (See Figure 7.8). Once a group hands in a proposal, several things may happen: a) be accepted, b) accepted and executed, c) accepted but never executed, d) officially denied, e) no response, f) partially executed, or g) in transit.


Figure 7.8
Proposals Presented For Government Consideration
N=48



From the groups that did present proposals for government consideration, 36% state that they never got a response from the government, 18% affirm that the proposal was accepted and executed, 14% say it was accepted but never executed, another 14% only state it was accepted, and 9% posit it was officially denied (See Figure 7.9). All together, between those proposals that were accepted but never executed, officially denied, or had no response we find almost 60% of the cases. In other words, in 6 out of 10 cases, groups that present proposals find that they actually waste their time, as they have no positive final result; in many cases, they do not even receive an official answer.

Figure 7.9
Aftermath of Proposal Presentation

N=48



Contact


Besides knowing the degree of group participation in the city, it is also vital to learn about the type of actors they interact with. Until now we know that groups tend to use many of the tools provided by the system and have a sense of which are more influential than others, but we are not clear if they mainly address the local administration or if they also attempt to influence government action at other levels. In

addition, we also ignore their perception about the degree of responsiveness these actors have towards groups' needs and interests.

There are many entities and actors groups can interact with, whether to seek support for their daily activities, request particular actions, join in coalitions to address government officials, or the like. In order to assess their degree and scope of contact we asked groups to mark if they had contact with a list of actors, and if they did, how often and with what degree of success. The list of actors was created in such a way that it covers not only state actors like the Mayor's office, state or national level agencies, but also private groups, other non-governmental organizations, and official control entities.

As Figure 7.10 shows, groups appear to have a somehow even degree of contact throughout the different sectors and groups included in the list, although there are some offices or institutions they tend to be closer with. Accordingly, about 73% of the groups state they have had contact with the Mayor's office, 67% with the media, 64% with the private sector and another 64% with other non-governmental organizations. At the same time, there is a clear indication that certain actions are hardly taken by groups throughout the city. One of the most telling is the lack of participation in Planning Committees as these are the natural participatory spaces for groups to be engaged with in order to be able to influence public policy. Around 76% of groups state they have never had contact with the Planning Committee, 12% reports to have annual contact, 9% say that sometimes they have address the committee and 3% seems to participate in it every month.

Figure 7.10
Group Contact Throughout the City



It is interesting to note that there is an important degree of contact between groups, the private sector, the media and other groups like NGOs. This finding mirrors the reality perceived through this research process. Indeed, throughout the period this research took place, media coverage and group meetings underlined the importance of gaining the support of the private sector in order to be able to increase the degree of effectiveness. Private sector involvement is important because it is expected to participate not only through statements and ideas, but it is also prone to contribute funds for the operation. In this sense, several groups report that they would not be able to function, or at least not to a degree of importance, if they did not have private funds. Groups are starting to develop formal plans of actions with appropriate timelines and detailed expected outcomes and using them as a main tool to request funds from


private business. Some private corporations have created special departments within the company to deal with actions and projects that will give back to the community they work in. As such, groups that have as their main purpose to contribute with social, political and economic development are likely to be the first to receive private funds (Personal Interviews August 2002 through May 2003).

While it is necessary to know how likely it is for groups to interact with other groups, organizations or public agencies, we still do not know the scope of this type of participation. I mean, we know groups are prone to contact many of the agencies and groups listed before, but there is no information regarding how spread the use of these tools is among groups. Figure 7.11 illustrate that the scope of group contact is medium which means that 30% of groups tend to be in touch with about 5 to 8 offices, agencies, groups or sectors; although 21% report to be in contact with 9 to 13 groups or agencies.

Before moving into other matters, there is an additional aspect to be discussed. At this point we have information about the degree and scope of contact groups have, but we are less clear about how effective these contacts are. To what degree do groups perceive for these agencies, or organizations to be responsive to their interests and needs? (Schumaker 1975, 494). In order to find out, groups were asked to grade the agency's level of response, values ranging from none to high in a four-point scale. Based on their responses we find that in general, 18% state there is no level of response, 51% believe it to be low and 30% to be medium; note that no group said it was high.

Figure 7.11
Scope of Contact with other Actors

N=48




Once we unwrap the information, we uncover that control agencies and the planning committee are regarded as the least responsive units for groups and associations. At the same time the private sector and the media appear as the actors with better response rate; 70% of groups report to perceive that there is some degree of response by private sector, 18% of these groups attribute a high degree of response to the private sector. On the same venue, 36% of groups perceive other groups or non-governmental organizations as highly responsive, and 33% consider the media as such too (See Figure 7.12).

Concerning the Mayor's office, it is important to mention that even though it is the institution more sought after, 48% of the groups perceive it to be non-responsive, although 36% report a low level of responsiveness and 9% see it as highly responsive. Due to the fact that this work is based on a cross-section analysis, it is not possible to claim that there is a clear trend between degree of contact and level of response

although it is likely that groups will be more prone to address those actors that they think will be more effective to their needs and interests. At the same time, it would not be accurate to argue that the perception of response is the only factor that influences group behavior; groups could also be guided by the real possibility of addressing some actors. In other words, groups may not have direct contact with the council for example, not because they perceive it to be non-responsive to their needs or interests, but because they have no access to it.

Figure 7.12
Level of Response by Actor
N=48




Fear Factor

An important aspect that needs to be taken into account when discussing politics and participation in Colombia is the risk that groups and individuals face when

they are active in public life. In many interviews and informal conversations with group members it was evident that fear is a factor that is always in their mind and influences their behavior. Some groups state that security matters are part of the daily life of Colombians and as such they have made proper adjustments to their actions and behaviors. Indeed, the majority of the activists I spoke with have faced threats, or known members or friends that have.

Barranquilla is a city with high levels of crime and insecurity, which might also influence groups' determination when deciding how and where to act. As Figure 7.13 shows, the rate of homicides per month in Barranquilla is about 30 persons per month, with an increase in 2001 to 35 and to 38 in 10 months of 2002.

Figure 7.13
Homicides Per Month in Barranquilla




Source: Dane and Chamber of Commerce – Barranquilla. 2000, 2001, October 2002.

There is no information regarding particular details of the population victim of homicide intents or even of those that are actually killed. It was not possible to find out how many of those killed in the last year were members of groups or associations that were active in watchdog activities or in similar venues. Among group members and leaders, there is the perception that many of those that work as teachers and community leaders are targeted and killed. Teachers' associations and community groups state that they are starting to gather statistics about this issue but they fear the information to be very sensitive and therefore are cautious about releasing it (Personal interviews, October 2002).

According to the data it is not clear if groups and associations have embarked in more or less activities because of the fear factor. Groups were asked separate questions regarding their behavior. To the questions if they have less activities now, 54% stated no and 46% said yes. However, when asked if they have more activities than before 61% said yes. At the same time, when asked if their activities remain the same 48% said yes and 51% said no. From this information it is really difficult to clearly state if groups have increased or not their activities, although 61% state that they have tried new venues as a response to the risk their regular activities might impose. In addition, 51% of the groups state that they have also tried to keep a low profile and 64% have decided to be more selective of the activities they decide to perform and choose some that they know would not be questioned by others. In addition, about 70% of groups report to seek other groups as partners to work as a network and avoid to be clearly targeted; they also report to rely more on the media than before as a way of securing some degree of protection (See Figure 7.14).

Figure 7.14
Fear Factor Effect

N=48



Generalized Patterns

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, one of the purposes of this work is to explore the relationships between certain structural factors and the degree of participation groups experience in the city. Accordingly, it is important to know if it is possible to uncover particular tendencies or patterns among groups in Barranquilla. In order to do this, through cross tabulation analysis we used the variables that contain information about participation and contact with other actors and crossed them with age of groups, total membership, having headquarters, and having an active board.

Regarding time or age of the group, the analysis shows that apparently groups with less than a year of operation are more likely to participate and be in contact with other actors, than older groups or associations. Indeed, a hundred percent of groups with less than a year of existence took part in some of the participatory spaces listed on

the survey or contacted some of the actors. This, however, is no surprise as new groups have enthusiasm and determination to act while they are still at the highest motivational point. Nonetheless, it is necessary to go beyond this information as younger groups might behave exceptionally. If we put aside the behavior of groups with less than one year, we find that older groups tend to participate more and to be in more contact with other actors than younger groups. In fact, 85% of groups with more than 10 years of age participate and have contact with similar actors, 80% of those with 5 to 10 years do the same and 73% of those between 1 and 5 years do as well. Hence, it is clear that as the age of the group increases, the likelihood of participation increases too.

The total number of members a group has also seems to be crucial. Groups with more than a hundred active and total members are likely to be more participant and in contact with other actors, than smaller groups. In fact, all groups with more than one hundred members report to engage in different participatory spaces and 80% of groups with membership that ranges from 51 to 100 behave in similar ways. However, when we focus on active membership there seems to be slight difference as groups with active members from 1 to 20 are more participants than groups with 21 to 50 or 51 to 100. In this sense, although common wisdom would say that the more active members the better, there is no clear indication that size of membership really influences the likelihood of participation; groups with few active members are equally likely to engage in activities of their interest than bigger groups (Schumaker 1975, 511).

Two additional factors may impact group participation. These are having an official place to meet and function –headquarters- and to count with an acting executive board. It is expected that group with a established board and a secured headquarter are going to be more likely involved in public affairs than groups that need to struggle to find a place to function or that have no visible leadership. In fact, based on the survey it is possible to agree with the previous statement. One hundred percent of groups that have secured headquarters report to participate in the different venues listed by the survey, as do 87% of those with an active executive board.

Having proper headquarters and leadership are some of the most valuable features in a group and are going to affect its degree of success. During some of the interviews, group members expressed their frustration with having to meet at some of the members' place of work or residence and not being able to operate with their own office space and material. At the same time, as groups do not have the resources to hire individuals to be part of their executive board with proper salary, they need to function under the leadership of those that are willing to dedicate some of their free time to organize activities and prepare proposals for their consideration. In addition, this also leads to groups having more than one member acting as leader, which in some instances it is a positive idea although in other moments it could create confusion and factions within the group.

In general then, those groups that are prone to participate and engage in policy-making in the city are older and have their own headquarter, even if rented, and an established executive board. There is no clear indication that the number of members of a group influences its degree of involvement in decision-making.

Conclusions

Traditional studies of group behavior are focused on the type of relationship groups are likely to have with the state, whether it is surrounded by conflict, or it is consensual or neutral, but seldom do we find studies that concentrate on the question that determines if groups even have a relationship with the state (Baumgartner 1989). In the case of Barranquilla, when it comes to penetrating the circles of power that the state and local officials create, groups are able to reach limited levels of engagement, as the administration continues to impose its policies without requiring civil society's input as the case of the parking zones '*zonas amarillas*' demonstrated. In this sense, it is possible to argue that there is no relationship yet; groups are making efforts to reach the administration and to take part on some of the decision-making process, but are still in the infant stages of development.

Using different approaches to the data provided by the survey and interviews conducted with some groups, a comprehensive view of the type, scope and degree of group participation in policy-making in Barranquilla was performed. According to the analysis, groups in the city use many of the participatory spaces provided and are also likely to be in contact with other groups or actors. In fact, 82% of groups and associations report to have engaged in one or many of the participatory activities listed throughout the survey.

A four-point scale (No participation to High participation) created with the different venues and tools groups have to choose from gives a more in-depth view of groups' participation in the decision-making process in Barranquilla. In this sense, groups that have as their main actions to use informal contacts as means to get closer


to city officials, or that offer public support to a candidate, are groups whose level of engagement is low. Actions like the ones mentioned have low impact in policy-making; groups are not really able to communicate their needs, views or interests in a systematic and structure way. According to the results of the survey, 12% of groups in Barranquilla have a low level of participation.

Groups that answer public adds calling for representatives for official committees, or perform watchdog and monitoring activities, or present proposals to the government or take part in public demonstrations, or have access to the media, or have demanded action from the government, are groups with medium level of engagement. These type of actions are important as they represent the desire of groups to intercede in the process of policy-making and in many cases may have positive results as mentioned with the case of elevated bridges and the adjustments the administration was forced to make (See Figure 7.15).

However, these are actions that are mainly directed at addressing the administration, like being able to knock on the door of the state, but not necessarily being able to step their foot inside the door. In order to do this, groups would have to be able to write legislation with the government, consult projects, participate in public hearings or open meetings as these spaces are more favorable to exchange views and discuss face to face the particulars of a specific bill or future policy. These actions will indicate higher levels of participation or engagement in policy-making by groups. In this respect, 55% of groups in Barranquilla are able to 'knock' the door, but only 15% report to be able to advance and have a more direct contact with the administration and policy-makers.

Although it is positive that some groups are able to reach higher levels of participation, the fact that the other 85% of the groups do not, clearly reflects what I have been arguing throughout this project. Groups and associations are able to exist, to form, and are even supported by the state and the national constitution, but this is no indication that groups are going to be able to influence their surroundings (Walker 1991, 49).

Figure 7.15
Levels of Engagement in Policy Making in Barranquilla
N=48



An additional point that results from this study of groups in Barranquilla, is that there appears to be a gap in the literature as it considers the study of groups to include mainly interest groups or social movements. Interest groups and social movements are very different than the groups we may find at the local level in a city

like Barranquilla. Interest groups are groups with the clear purpose of influencing the government to push forward legislation that will benefit those in their area; they have a particular agenda (Dryzek 1996, 481; Almond and Verba 1963)). In addition, many interest groups are not even groups; they are law firms, corporations or lobbying offices with more than adequate resources and funding (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 27).

Groups in Barranquilla are usually small, unstructured, lack funds, with no rosters or dues or mailing lists, and many times do not have as their purpose to influence the government but to foster better conditions for themselves and the city in general. In this sense, group membership in Barranquilla is more a result of realizing that it is through collective action that political and social outcomes can be changed; economic or material incentives or threatened interests do not appear to be the main motive to join a group (Clark and Wilson 1961; Olson 1965; Salisbury 1969; Wilson 1973; Hansen 1985).

In order to determine if group behavior and impact on policy-making is unique throughout the city or if it mirrors the reality of every citizen, in the subsequent chapter I discuss the views of the mass public by analyzing the data gathered through a mass survey applied to a representative sample of 600 randomly selected individuals.

Chapter 8

Mass Public in Barranquilla

Introduction

In this chapter I review the results of the mass public survey applied for Barranquilla. As the purpose of the study is to assess civil society's participation in policy-making in Barranquilla, it is important to know the experience of the general public, their views about the city, their degree of compromise as citizens, their level of involvement and the factors that influence their engagement.

During August 30 –31st and September 6 – 7 2003, two consecutive weekends, six hundred door to door surveys were applied throughout randomly selected homes and neighborhoods in Barranquilla. After requesting, and consequently receiving their consent, an interviewer read thirty-eight questions to the adult that answered the door.

General Characteristics of the sample

Characteristics of the sample show that 37% of the respondents were between 18 and 35 years old and 13% were more than 60 years old. The range between 36 to 60 years old represents the other 50% of the sample. Among those that answered the survey, 43% had completed high school education and 30% had attended the university (See Figure 8.1); at the same time, around 30% reported to be independent workers and 20% employed (See Figure 8.2) and almost 70% lived in the city for all their life.

Figure 8.1
Level of Education
 (N= 594)





Figure 8.2
Economic Activity
 N= 594




Before going into more detailed information about their experience with electoral, civic and political participation, it is important to identify some of the values and views these citizens have towards politics, the city and their fellow citizens. The discussion of values is relevant as it contributes with our understanding of their effect on developing a stable democracy. Some authors argue that the ideal democratic citizen should believe in the legitimacy, general competence, and good will of the political authorities, and they should also believe in their right, duty, and ability to exert influence on what they do (Almond and Verba 1963).

According to the sample, for 62% of the population the most important quality in a person is his/her honesty, followed by the sense of respectfulness (24%). However, when we assess their level of trust towards others, 11% stated that it is possible to trust most people and 55% said it was always good to be careful (See Figure 8.3). It is interesting to note this relationship because it seems that people in Barranquilla value honesty but do not feel free to trust others.

Although it is not our purpose to determine the reasons why people in Barranquilla do not trust each other, it could be argued that it is a reflection of what they perceive to be lacking in the city. In this sense, it will not be a surprise to find that for this same people corruption is a main problem. However, only 7% of the sample thought that corruption was the main problem for Barranquilla. According to the

findings, Barranquilla's unemployment constitutes the main problem for the city⁸ (See Table 8.1).

Figure 8.3
Level of Trust
N=594



It might not be a surprise that trust has such low marks when unemployment and crime and security are seen as the two main problems in the city. The lack of stable and adequate employment is an important factor for crime and security, as individuals may tend to use those sorts of actions as a way of survival. In this sense, *Barranquilleros* seem to be clear that low level of employment is more crucial as a problem than security and once corrections are made to increase employment there might be less reasons for crime (Lopez Caballero 2003, 2).

⁸ By September 2003, Barranquilla's unemployment rate was 17%, almost 4% higher than the national rate (13.9%) (Encuesta Hogares DANE 2003)


Table 8.1
Main Problem in Barranquilla

Problem	Percent
Unemployment	41
Crime and Security	20
Utility Services	12
Corruption	7
Poverty	5
Health	5
Cost of Life	4
Education	2
Other	2
Housing	1
Abandoned Children	1
Massive Transportation	1
Scarcity	0.2

N= 594

Another indicator of trust, this time not of others but towards the system, constitutes the response to the statement “some people think that there is a set of people or groups that tend to influence government actions in a way that the interest of the majority tend to be ignored” (Q14). About 80% of the respondents said they agree with the statement (See Figure 8.4), which indicates that there is a very low level of identification with the system, as people do not feel represented by it. In addition, this could also influence individuals’ behaviors towards politics as they perceive that only a few minority tends to be influential rendering the majority’s actions virtually ineffective.

Figure 8.4
Majority Ignored
N= 594




An additional set of questions are useful for developing a more comprehensive understanding of the view people in Barranquilla have towards the administration, and the degree of legitimacy and competence they attach to it.

After the question that determined whether they thought that the majority tends to be ignored and some few exert influence over the government, they were asked to identify two groups or actors that they thought had more influence in the city. The idea behind this question was to assess government strength and independence from political or economic actors. Thus, among the responses included in the survey we find the Catholic Church, big business or rich people, the community, guilds, political parties, politicians, labor unions, private enterprise, or the option that stated that no group has more influence, that the government is autonomous. Figure 8.5 indicates

that according to the people sampled, the most influential actors in the city are political parties and big business or rich people with 27.5 and 25.1 respectively. In third place with 13% we find politicians. Note that the option for government autonomy received less than 5% and community influence a mere 2%, which indicates that for people in Barranquilla the government do not respond to their interest or needs.

There is a clear indication that the government's degree of legitimacy is low as people do not see it as representative of their needs or interests and what is even more telling, they perceive that the government is not autonomous, it responds to the interest of those more powerful in the political and economic realm as are political parties and big business.


Figure 8.5
Influential Actors
N=594



In addition to knowing their views on the degree of legitimacy of local government, it is relevant to find more about the degree of competence and if people think that the government makes things better for them. Accordingly, they were asked to indicate if they thought that the actions of the local government were likely to make things better, worst, just about the same or sometimes better. About 33% of the people thought that government action tends to make things better, 29% said that sometimes things were better but sometimes they were not, 23% believe that there is no real difference if the government acts or not, and 14% thought they would be better off without the government. Although 33% thought the government made things better, there is still 67% that has mixed feelings about the degree of competence and response by their government.


An additional finding regarding the view that people have towards the administration relates to the question if they think that everyone in the city is likely to get equal treatment when addressing the administration, or if it is likely that some will receive better treatment. In order to get their views in two different angles, they were asked about their perception towards the administration and towards the police. Again, the degree of trust that things will be handle with equity and fairness is very low as Figures 8.6 and 8.7 show.

Figure 8.6
Equal Treatment at Government Offices
N=594



From the information discussed until now, it unfolds that people in the city are distrusting and detached from their government, that they do not feel represented, and that it is not through the government that they see their interests and needs taken care off. These findings are also supported by some other questions that explore citizens' views about who do they think should solve problems in the city, what is their role in those issues and which are their responsibilities as citizens.

Respondents were asked to identify with one (1) the actor they thought was mainly responsible for solving the problems faced by the city, and with two (2) the actor that followed in that responsibility. The president, the national government, and the Mayor received 26% each as most responsible for solving those problems, as second degree of responsibility with 31% citizens said it corresponds to the Mayor to solve the problems.


Figure 8.7**N=594**

Thus, although it appears that most people are not clear as to whom should they place responsibility for solving city problems, it seems it is more an issue of realizing that it is not through the government that solutions will be reached. To the question as “to what should people like you do to solve housing, health, education and unemployment problems in the city” more than 50% said that the best way to solve these problems was through work, and 20% said that they should do nothing, that the government should solve those problems. Among the possible options were collective actions like join a party, join an organization or group, or organize the community, to political actions like try to be part of the government, or vote, and last, ask the church for help (See Figure 8.8). Although not many thought that collective action was an option, it is positive that people did not see the government as the sole source of

solutions, and that they assumed most of the responsibility which is corroborated with their answer to the next question about their duties as citizens.

Respondents were asked to choose two obligations they thought every citizen had with the city. The options were no obligation, vote, take care of public space, pay taxes, obey the law and respect the authority, and be vigilant against corruption. More than 60% of the population sampled said to pay taxes. Although this response indicates the understanding or perception that paying taxes is a duty, we may not infer from this that people actually act upon this view⁹. Moreover, it is interesting to note that people see this as their main obligation when they have also expressed social and institutional distrust.

Figure 8.8
How to Solve City Problems
N=594



⁹ Indeed, on June 8, 2002 El Heraldo reported that there are around 17,000 people that evade local sale tax.

Participation


Several questions within the survey addressed the issue of participation and attempted to identify the different degrees or participation spaces that citizens use whether in an electoral, civic or political realm. Questions were designed to capture if an individual tends to be more involved with electoral, or political actions, or if they have more inclination for community and civic activities.

General responses to questions about participation activities indicate that people in the city have very low participation. To the specific question whether they had ever tried to influence city decisions, almost 80% said never and 11% said frequently. Thus, the general public in the city has no experience trying to change or bring about political decisions. Although attempting to influence city decisions could be seen as an indicator of higher degrees of participation as it requires proper information, knowledge of procedures and resources to be able to reach the formal spaces available for the mass public to interact with the government, there are other simpler ways that also received low marks.

In order to determine if there are other channels of participation used by individuals in Barranquilla, a set of questions were introduced. Not surprisingly, almost 100% of the people said they have never attempted any of these actions. For each activity, except to give public support to a political candidate, more than 95% of respondents said that they have never tried to participate in any of these actions. Some of the activities included entailed higher degrees of participation like writing legislation with the government or consulting with government officials to plan future legislation. It is clear that such levels of participation are not present in many societies,

and we were not expecting that people in Barranquilla had such degrees of involvement. However, it is still interesting to note that almost a 100% of the sample has never taken part of any of the actions included in the list (See Figure 8.9).

Figure 8.9
Some Participation Activities
N=594



Looking at some of the simpler ways to participate like taking part of public demonstrations, getting involved with a political campaign or as a member of a political party we see that none of these options are used by people in the sample. More than 95% stated they have never taken part of public demonstrations, 89% do not belong to a political party and only 13% have been involved in a political campaign. What remains as an interesting finding is that even though people do not seem to be

involved in partisan politics, they do show higher degrees of electoral participation as 86% said they voted in popular elections.

Barranquilla's reputation of having high degree of clientelistic politics might serve as an explanation of why people vote and do not participate as members of political parties or do not get involved in political campaigns (Losada 1988; Fox 1994; Villalon 2003). Even if clientilistic politics might explain high voter turnout despite poor partisan identification, the latter might be explained by the increased number of parties and political movements that function in the city. Indeed, in the last local election (Oct. 26, 2003) 15 political parties or movements were registered, some new, some traditional. Thus, people might have a hard time keeping track of the different political parties in the city, which makes it difficult for them to clearly identify with one or the other (Crotty 1986).

As mentioned before, Figure 8.9 shows different participation spaces available in the city and how these actions are almost never taken. For example, more than 95% of the people have never answered a public call to participate in public committees, or being part of a group or activity that monitors government action. According to the information provided in chapter 3, Colombia has almost thirty formal local level participation spaces from which at least fourteen of the mandatory ones require community participation. In other words, citizens have more than a dozen committees, boards, associations that the law contemplates as ways of bringing the citizen closer to the government and more involved with public actions (Velasquez and Gonzalez 2003). However, the fact that 95% or more have never taken part of these committees or boards does not mean that people are not interested, it could also mean that the

selection process for those committees is not open enough for people to learn about the public call. Several of these committees require community presence, delegates from each social sector (education, health, housing and others), representatives for patients or users, but the law is not clear about the selection process the government has to offer to organize the committee. Therefore, posting a public notice on the third floor of City Hall for one week or two might be enough for some of them, but it does nothing for the public that remains unaware of such opportunity.

Colombian law requires for non-profits (foundations, non governmental organizations and the like) to register at the Chamber of Commerce and to update their registry every time there is a change in their board of directors, purpose, or composition. According to the current records of the Chamber of Commerce, there are more than 3900 non-profit organizations in the city¹⁰. Included as non-profits we find Local Community Action Boards, professional associations, school boards, Local Administrative Boards, federations, confederations, youth and the like.


Based on the great amount of non-profits registered in Barranquilla, a city with around 750,000 adult population¹¹ it is safe to expect a lively civil society, this is, certain degree of citizen involvement in groups and associations of different kinds. However, less than 20% of the population has taken part in activities that could be recorded as community or civic oriented (See Figure 8.10).

¹⁰ For that same time Bogotá (7 million inhabitants) had 18,756 registered non-profits.

¹¹ According to the 2003 Electoral information provided by Registraduría Nacional, Barranquilla has 743,186 persons as potential voters (18 or older). www.registraduria.gov.co


Although group membership is an important indicator of citizen involvement in political or civic activities, there are many other ways that individuals could participate in the city. As mentioned before, in the chapter about Colombia it was discussed the number of formal spaces that the Colombian legislation has created in order to foster citizen participation. How many citizens are involved in these formal groups? Is group involvement higher when it deals with governmental issues like being part of administrative boards that are popularly elected or watchdog groups that do not require government approval?

Figure 8.10
General Group Membership
 N=594



According to the survey, people tend to behave in similar ways regarding group participation. It makes no real difference if the group is informal or civic or if the government organizes it. Around 80% of the people said they do not belong to an informal group and 90% do not belong to a formal group (Figure 8.11).

Figure 8.11
Formal Group Membership
N=549



In addition to almost no participation in specific activities, more than 80% of respondents state that they have never had any contact with the Mayor's office, the Territorial Planning Committee, the media, private sector, non-governmental organizations, national level, state level, municipal council, or any control office like local district attorney (See Figures 8.12 and 8.13).

Figure 8.12
Level of Contact with the Media
N=594






Figure 8.13
Level of Contact with Private Sector
N=594




In this sense, it is also interesting to note the percentage received by non-governmental organizations. In a city with so many groups and associations we would expect at least some degree of contact with them, a sense that those groups are there and that the public is able to address inquiries, or requests advise or help from them. However, 90% of the people sampled said they have never had any contact with non-governmental organizations (See Figure 8.14).

Figure 8.14
Level of Contact with Non-governmental Organizations
N=594



Another important point is the case of the Mayor's office. 15% of people claim that they have had some contact with the Mayor's office, 8.5% stated that they go every year and 1.3% said they attend every month (See Figure 8.15).

Figure 8.15
Level of Contact with Mayor's Office
N=594



Several readings could be made of this finding. First, it could be argued that it is surprising that in a city with so many problems and difficulties people do not demand more action by the government. In cases like this it is possible to expect for people to exert their right to complain, to ask for solutions to their problems. Another reading, and one that seems to be more in accordance to what is happening in the city, is that citizens do not believe that the Mayor's office or the state at the local level is able or willing to help them solve their problems. This finding is an indication of the lack of trust and identification with the local system. People see themselves as independent beings that need to solve their own problems, the state is not there for them.

This perception is supported by several of the answers given through the survey. As mentioned before, when asked about the best way to go about solving their problems of health, housing, education or the like, 51% responded that for them the best way was through their work, and only 20% thought that the government was responsible and would take care of those problems for them. In addition, when asked who has the main responsibility for solving problems in the city people were not clear as who they thought should be accountable for that, as the president, the national government and the Mayor all received 26% of the responses.

Macro, Meso and Micro Factors

After offering a comprehensive view of how the mass public relates to each other, their perception of city politics and their experience with political and civic participation, it is necessary to deepen the analysis by exploring how certain factors might influence citizens' involvement in Barranquilla.

Within the discipline several theories deal with the topic of citizen participation or engagement exploring the relationship between political involvement and macro, meso and micro factors (Norris 2002, 20). Among the macro factors presented by the works of scholars like Lipset (1959, 1960), Rustow (1970), Deutsch (1964) and Bell (1999), societal modernization i.e. wealth, education, urbanization, and industrialization influence mass participation. Accordingly, urban societies with higher levels of education and better socioeconomic status are likely to be more involved in political activities than rural uneducated and socioeconomic deprived ones (Norris 2002, 21).

An additional macro level theory refers to institutional conditions or structure of the state and how particular electoral and party system regulations might influence participation. Among these studies we find those that explore the relationship between parliamentary and presidential democracies, or between proportional representation and majority rules, or between open or close lists (Lijphart 1999, Powell 1980, Martinez and Hill 1999). Accordingly, if institutional design matters, then it is likely to find that the structure of the political system plays an important role in shaping mass participation which will be evident in levels of voter turnout, party membership or civic participation (Norris 2002).

At the meso level, theorists rely on the action of mobilization agents who contribute by engaging citizens in activities that will lead to more political awareness and involvement. Thus, the more groups and associations present in a society the more likely their members are of developing social trust that in turn will lead to more cooperative actions among citizens. According to Norris, if we are to follow Putnam's theory of social capital we should find that there is a strong relationship between the strength of party, church, unions, groups, associations, and the levels of electoral turnout, campaign activity and civic participation (2002, 28).

At the micro level, we find theories that place the argument on social resources and cultural motivations (Norris 2002). Scholars of this model focus on the individual level and identify those resources that predict participation. Studies by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), together with earlier works by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) and Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) show that education, income, and working status influence the likelihood of an individual becoming active in politics. At

the same time, since the seminal work of Almond and Verba (1963) other elements are said to affect individuals and their level of participation. In this sense, the perception of political efficacy or believing that their actions may make a difference, and the level of trust in the institution or system are elements that shape and individual's desire/willingness to participate.

Although by attempting to do macro, meso and micro analysis these theories present a comprehensive view of citizen participation and their motivations, it is still uncertain how these arguments play at the local level. Empirical studies of local participation and its determinants are necessary as it is in the city that individuals function, interact and exercise their citizenship (Castells 1985, Bulpitt 1972).

The following section presents a discussion of how these theories apply in Barranquilla¹². Using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis several relationships are explored. In order to perform a thorough study of participation in Barranquilla, three types of participation will be considered. Thus, separate analysis will be performed to determine the relationship between several independent variables and electoral, community and political participation.

Dependent Variables

Electoral Participation is the first level of participation explored in the study. A 3-point scale ranging from 1 to 3 indicate whether participants have voted, given public support to a candidate or both. By creating this variable it is possible to separate

¹² Due to the limited scope of this work, the arguments presented by the macro level theories like societal modernization remain for further study through comparison among different cities with different modernization levels.

electoral from partisan behavior as the latter indicates a more conscious degree of involvement (Norris 1999, 2002).

Community or civic participation is a 3-point scale that indicates low, medium or high community participation. Community or civic participation is represented by the degree of citizen involvement in groups, associations, watchdog activities, public demonstrations, contact with non-governmental organizations and to what extent do citizens view organizing groups as an option to solve city problems. The purpose with this type of participation is to include those actions that require voluntary participation as members of the community, as regular citizens (Putnam 1995, 1996). In this sense, it is possible to find individuals that are willing to take part of community groups but are not likely to try to influence policy-making at a higher level.

Political Participation is the highest level of participation included in the study. This 4-point scale gives marks to several questions that range from party membership and political activism to a direct attempt to influence city decisions (Norris 1999, 2002).

By using three different models it is possible to study the behavior of the different independent variables and see if their influence varies according to the type of participation. In other words, the idea of working with different models is not to create a comprehensive explanation of participation, but to identify possible consequences of considering some factors as independent variables. At the end of the analysis we will be able to determine how important each component is for participation, therefore offering more clarity to the process of understanding participation at the local level.

Model 1- Electoral Participation

According to the general data, citizens in Barranquilla show a high degree of electoral participation as almost 87% reported they have voted in popular elections and around 10% state they have given public support to a candidate. Based on the mainstream theories on participation, it is expected that factors such as education, socioeconomic status, employment conditions and age be positively related to electoral participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Norris 1999, 2002; Topf 1995; Tarrow 1999).

As Table 8.2 shows, some of the individual level predictors are statistically significant and with the right sign. In this sense, the higher the degree of education and the older the person is, the more likely it is for them to participate at the electoral level. In the same sense, it appears that as individuals have more time living in the city they are more likely to express their political views by voting or giving support to a political candidate. However, other factors as socioeconomic status turn not to be statistically significant although it has the correct sign. Thus in Barranquilla, electoral participation is not directly related to the level of income or living conditions, people tend to behave in similar ways across socioeconomic groups.

In this same venue, employment variables behave in an interesting way. According to the output, being unemployed, doing housework or being inactive affect individuals and their degree of participation in different ways. Only those that are inactive (retired or students) tend not to participate at the electoral level, thus the more inactive the population, the less participant it will be. Although unemployment is not a statistically significant factor, the predicted sign is also negative which indicates that

unemployment could turn out to be also a factor that might hinder electoral participation.

TABLE 8.2					
MODEL 1 - ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION					
	Unstandardized		Stand. B	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.			
(Constante)	1.199998	0.152708		7.858	0.000
Socioeconomic Group	0.006247	0.015749	0.018951	0.397	0.692
Time Living	0.042730	0.016607	0.111104	2,573**	0.010
Free Time	0.040660	0.070630	0.024698	0.576	0.565
Trust	0.003111	0.032280	0.004263	0.096	0.923
Age	0.068164	0.021992	0.145898	3,099**	0.002
Education	0.099395	0.022996	0.217439	4,322**	0.000
Politics Are Complicated	0.005393	0.051924	0.004560	0.104	0.917
Housework	0.008606	0.058002	0.006766	0.148	0.882
Inactive Work	-0.242835	0.056401	-0.190937	- 4,306**	0.000
Unemployed	-0.084637	0.076436	-0.048597	-1.107	0.269
Institucional Trust	0.044148	0.056424	0.033666	0.782	0.434
Political Discussions are Problematic	-0.035288	0.072391	-0.035197	-0.487	0.626
Political Discussions are Dangerous	0.128600	0.075044	0.127780	1.714	0.087
Political Interest	0.103036	0.050211	0.104331	2,052**	0.041

*Dependent Variable: Electoral Participation **significant at 0.1 $r^2 = .108$*

Among the three variables that measure political interest and the benefit or risks of political discussions, only political interest reports a statistically significant coefficient. While common sense might indicate that interest in politics is necessary for individuals to go out and vote or express their support for a candidate, it is still important to demonstrate that also at the local level there is a strong empirical support for this assertion.

Institutional trust, which was expected to be statistically significant, is not although it has a positive sign. Accordingly, it was expected that if individuals do not trust their political system and believe that it only serves a selected minority, like Barranquilleros do, there are not likely to be politically engaged, their level of participation is likely to decrease as their distrust increases. However, based on the results one could also argue that it is because of the nature of the participatory space that individuals get involved. In other words, citizens take part of electoral processes because it is the space where, according to the rules of the game, the majority is actually the one that wins.

Model 2 – Community or Civic Participation

As stated before, community participation includes group membership – formal and informal, contact with similar groups, monitor activities and participating in public demonstrations. Based on the data gathered through the survey, people in Barranquilla tend not to participate in groups or associations, therefore it is important to identify which factors have an impact on the degree of community participation. The OLS output for Model 2 is presented below (See Table 8.3).

As the results show, community or civic participation in Barranquilla remains a puzzle. First, only one variable is statistically significant but with an unexpected sign. According to the output, the more time a person lives in the city the less likely it is that they will join a group or engage in community actions. Is this because people get disenchanted with the moral qualities of other citizens? The more they know them the

less they want to be part of joint activities? From the data gathered it is not possible to offer a clear explanation.

In addition, variables like social trust that is commonly regarded as an important element for group participation, is not statistically significant although it has the correct sign indicating that if the degree of distrust increases, the likelihood to participate in groups and associations decreases. None of the other variables that the literature argues are likely to foster a denser civil society behave as expected. People that are more educated are not likely to participate more, nor those employed and with better socioeconomic status.

TABLE 8.3					
MODEL 2 - COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION					
	Unstandardized				
	B	Error típ.	Stand. B	t	Sig.
(Constante)	2.107982	0.071292		29.568	0.000
Socioeconomic Group	-0.008201	0.007353	-0.055682	-1.115	0.265
Time Living	-0.021221	0.007753	-0.123495	- 2,737*	0.006
Free Time	-0.003806	0.032974	-0.005175	-0.115	0.908
Trust	-0.000279	0.015070	-0.000855	-0.019	0.985
Age	0.007670	0.010267	0.036743	0.747	0.455
Education	0.002800	0.010736	0.013708	0.261	0.794
Politics Are Complicated	-0.022346	0.024241	-0.042288	-0.922	0.357
Housework	0.024251	0.027078	0.042674	0.896	0.371
Inactive Work	-0.015986	0.026331	-0.028133	-0.607	0.544
Unemployed	-0.029084	0.035685	-0.037377	-0.815	0.415
Institucional Trust	0.031271	0.026342	0.053373	1.187	0.236
Political Discussions are Problematic	-0.010896	0.033796	-0.024325	-0.322	0.747
Political Discussions are Dangerous	0.000259	0.035034	0.000576	0.007	0.994
Political Interest	-0.019568	0.023441	-0.044347	-0.835	0.404

Dependent Variable: Community Participation *significant at 0.5 $r^2 = .026$

As I said, this is a puzzle; moreover when Barranquilla has so many groups, voluntary associations and formal spaces for community participation. What explains this phenomenon? Perhaps the discipline needs to reframe the theory that attempts to explain civic engagement by including new factors applicable for the local level. While scholars from the institutional trend argue that particular electoral and party system design have an effect on political engagement, there are less clear as how these electoral rules might influence civic engagement. At the same time, there are particular issues at the local level that might have an impact on the willingness or possibility for people to participate and join groups. Some of these factors refer to institutional aspect present in the city, like the strength of the state, how it fosters or hinders participation by regulating formal group membership, or by making it hard for groups to meet and function and the like.

Model 3 – Political Participation

Political participation is treated as a higher level of involvement in politics and in political processes. Individuals that report to have taken part in several of the activities that attempt to influence policy-making and have a specific impact on decision-making are considered to have a different type of engagement, one that is targeted towards political outcomes *per se*.

In order to create this variable, 19 questions were recoded to follow the same pattern and then added to create a 4-point scale (Mainwaring, Brinks, Perez-Liñan 2001). Each individual received a participation score based on whether or not they had ever taken such action and if so how frequently. According to this value each

individual respondent was classified as follows: individuals that scored 0 show no political participation, from 1 to 7 have low levels of participation, from 8 to 15 medium and from 16 to 31 high.

The questions selected to form the variable address participatory opportunities that individuals have, whether because the state created those formal spaces, or because they are the ones traditionally used to influence the outcome of a political discussion or decision-making process. In this sense, they were asked to indicate if they have ever attempted to influence a decision made by city officials, are they likely to act upon a bill that is being discussed and they believe it to be negative for the city, or have they attempted to write proposals for the government to discuss, or even written legislation with the government? At the same time, they were asked about their partisan involvement by addressing the issue of party membership or political activism in a campaign. Another venue of inquiry referred to how likely it was for them to have any contact with public offices like the Mayor's office or municipal council, or offices at the state or national level.

Although the descriptive information presented at the beginning of this chapter indicates that people in Barranquilla do not get involved in this sort of actions, it is still important to attempt to identify possible interactions between variables or factors that have an impact or consequence for participation.

Based on the regression analysis four factors appear to have a statistical significance in their relationship with political participation. According to this, and in tune with the theoretical understanding of political engagement, education remains as an important predictor of political involvement. Individuals with better degrees of

education are more prone to interfere and take part of political processes that influence their daily life. At the same time, job status also behaves as the theory expected, as doing housework, being unemployed or inactive tend to decrease the desire or willingness to participate. Note however, that according to the OLS report, only inactive has a statistically significant value (See Table 8.4).

Another factor that has a positive effect on political participation is the amount of time a person has lived in the city. Indeed, the regression output shows that as the numbers of years spend in a city, the likelihood for political involvement increases. This result is also expected as people feel more connected with the city and its problems and at the same time have more historical and personal knowledge of the political, and socioeconomic dynamics of the city needed for this type of participation.

Once again political interest proves to be an important predictor of participation, this time at the political level. Individuals are not likely to get involved in issues they do not have a special interest in, or that they do not understand or care about. For political participation, having political interest as statistically significant is even more important as citizens' actions require a higher degree of commitment and dedication than electoral participation.

Several factors remain as not statistically significant. Age, although with the expected positive sign, seems not to be a major indicator of participation, as individuals of different age groups appear to exert same level of influence. Three more variables deserve some comment as they were expected to be statistically significant. Institutional trust, the idea that the majority tends to be ignored in favor of the minority reports a negative sign, which was expected. Accordingly, if individuals perceive that

the government serves those more influential and powerful there is no point for them to be active, it would not be rational to waste time and energy when the decisions are already tainted by the will and interest of the few.

TABLE 8.4					
MODEL 3 - POLITICAL PARTICIPATION					
	Unstandardized				
	B	Error típ.	Stand. B	t	Sig.
(Constante)	1.156068	0.159622		7.243	0.000
Socioeconomic Group	0.010986	0.016463	0.032070	0.667	0.505
Time Living	0.035732	0.017359	0.089398	2,058**	0.040
Free Time	0.138044	0.073828	0.080686	1.870	0.062
Trust	-0.003377	0.033741	-0.004453	-0.100	0.920
Age	0.043575	0.022988	0.089745	1.896	0.059
Education	0.065459	0.024037	0.137793	2,723**	0.007
Politics Are Complicated	0.039931	0.054275	0.032488	0.736	0.462
Housework	-0.083693	0.060628	-0.063315	-1.380	0.168
Inactive Work	-0.141702	0.058954	-0.107210	-2,404**	0.017
Unemployed	-0.094557	0.079897	-0.052243	-1.183	0.237
Institucional Trust	-0.029109	0.058979	-0.021360	-0.494	0.622
Political Discussions are Problematic	-0.029802	0.075669	-0.028603	-0.394	0.694
Political Discussions are Dangerous	0.024621	0.078441	0.023540	0.314	0.754
Political Interest	0.205708	0.052485	0.200429	3,919**	0.000

Dependent Variable: Political Participation *significant at 0.1 $r^2 = .097$

At the same time, the perception of political discussions as dangerous or problematic for their job or their relationship with the authorities, were not significant but carried the correct sign. It is likely that people that perceive politics as problematic will be fearful of participating, of getting involved. While these three variables remain

statistically not significant, they are still considered substantially significant and will require extra analysis in further studies.

Conclusions

This chapter has presented a comprehensive view of electoral, community and political participation in Barranquilla drawing from data collected through a mass public survey. Overall results show that citizens tend not to participate, except in electoral processes. Community and political participation are very weak indicating a lack of engagement with the political realm and among citizens *per se*.

In order to bring some clarity into the study of these three types of participation several factors were identified as potentially influential for participation. Thus, following a macro, meso and micro view of participation three different regression models were studied to determine if the factors previously identified as likely to influence participation, behaved in similar ways across the different types of citizen engagement. Results show that some factors have different impact on participation, while others seem to be good predictors for most of them.

As Table 8.5 shows, the coefficients of community participation are inconsistent with the theory of social capital or civic engagement. Only one factor seems to be relevant for community engagement though with a negative effect. Thus, it is clear that civic participation at the local level should not be studied with theories or factors that have proven useful for cross-national studies. Citizen participation in community activities appears to be driven by factors different to the ones included in this study. In order to expand the analysis of citizen involvement in civic activities, it

is necessary to explore the effect that structural and institutional conditions bring to citizens. Thus, comparison between cities and their internal political and socioeconomic dynamics are needed in order to have a broader and deeper picture of what determines citizen involvement in collective action that has direct effect on their well being and surroundings.

In addition to this, it is possible that people do not get involved in community groups and associations because they believe it is a waste of their time and energy, or they simply do not trust that with their time and effort they will be able to make a difference.

Last, community participation might also be weak because of the socioeconomic conditions of citizens. 75% of Barranquilla's population lives under hard socioeconomic conditions, with limited income and housing, which could be hindering elements when deciding to participate. Although socioeconomic status was not statistically significant, it cannot be overlooked that people might just be too involved in solving their own reality, their immediate survival instead of being concerned with fostering further cooperation and community interaction.

A word of notice should also be given concerning political participation. As stated before in this chapter, political participation is conceived as a higher degree of political involvement, one where individuals act mostly, independently trying to change a political outcome. This type of participation demands higher degrees of sophistication on the part of citizens as it requires knowledge, proper information, resources and particular skills for some of the activities listed as political participation. However, it was important to explore the relationship between this type of participation and the

factors that were included as independent variables in order to determine further course of action. In this model we were expecting for free time to report a statistically significant coefficient due to the character and time-consuming nature of those actions. Overall, having free time does not seem to be a determinant of citizen involvement at any level.

Table 8.5						
Models for Electoral, Community and Political Participation						
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Electoral Participation		Community / Civic Participation		Political Participation	
	$r^2 = .108$		$r^2 = .026$		$r^2 = .097$	
Independent Variables						
	t	Sig.	t	Sig.	t	Sig.
(Constante)	7.858	0	29.568	0	7.243	0
Socioeconomic Group	0.397	0.692	-1.115	0.265	0.667	0.505
Time Living	2.573**	0.01	-2.737*	0.006	2.058**	0.04
Free Time	0.576	0.565	-0.115	0.908	1.87	0.062
Trust	0.096	0.923	-0.019	0.985	-0.1	0.92
Age	3.099**	0.002	0.747	0.455	1.896	0.059
Education	4.322**	0	0.261	0.794	2.723**	0.007
Politics Are Complicated	0.104	0.917	-0.922	0.357	0.736	0.462
Housework	0.148	0.882	0.896	0.371	-1.38	0.168
Inactive Work	-4.306**	0	-0.607	0.544	-2.404**	0.017
Unemployed	-1.107	0.269	-0.815	0.415	-1.183	0.237
Institucional Trust	0.782	0.434	1.187	0.236	-0.494	0.622
Political Discussions are Problematic	-0.487	0.626	-0.322	0.747	-0.394	0.694
Political Discussions are Dangerous	1.714	0.087	0.007	0.994	0.314	0.754
Political Interest	2.052**	0.041	-0.835	0.404	3.919**	0

**significant at 0.1 *significant at 0.5

Last, although the three models presented report low r squares indicating that the factors included in each regression explain very little of participation, these results are valuable as they are the first that attempt to explain citizen involvement at the local

level. Based on this study we are now in a position where it is possible for the community to know how citizens like them participate within the city, and what are the factors that contribute or seem to hinder such participation.

At the same time, non-governmental organizations, international agencies, the administration, the national government and local universities have a starting point that will allow identification of future policies and programs that will address these issues. From the information provided, it is clear that it is not the lack of participatory spaces that prevents citizen involvement; there must be other individual level and structural factors in action. Further comparative research needs to be done in order to offer more detailed explanations of which and how new realities influence political and community behavior at the city level.

Chapter 9

Conclusions

In this work I have stressed the importance of identifying factors that help explain the paradox we find in Colombia when we explore the relationship between civil society and democracy. According to the theoretical developments concerning this relationship, as the number of groups and associations increases, it is likely that the level of democracy improves in the affected societies; this is, the density of a particular civil society is directly correlated to the quality of democracy. However, as discussed earlier, when we compare the number of non-governmental organizations, or non-profit groups registered in Colombia and the democratic score assigned by Polity III, it is clear that the correlation is negative. In Colombia, the increased number of NGO is not accompanied by a stronger and more solid democratic system.

In order to study this paradox, research was conducted in one major city in Colombia (Barranquilla) where the views and experiences of multiple actors were consulted and studied. Through interviews to main political actors as public officials, elected representatives, entrepreneurs, and academics, surveys to groups and associations and the mass public, and through newspaper content analysis I was able to develop a comprehensive view of the political dynamic present in the city and the factors that affect the behavior of groups and associations in Barranquilla.

The importance of centering the study on the local elite, groups and mass public attitudes and behavior over policy-making is based on the view that a modern political democracy has to be defined as the system where rulers are held accountable for their actions through citizen measures (Schmitter and Karl 1996, 50). In this sense, learning about the conditions and aspects that influence civil society's participation in policy-making and monitor activities, provide valuable information related to the quality of democracy at the local level (Diamond 1996).

In the following pages I review the findings of this research by discussing each actor separately and then move on to discuss the paradox identified at the beginning of this project.

Political and Ruling Elite

Members of the local administration manifest their agreement with the idea that it is important for civil society to take part of the policy-making process by getting involved in issues that affect their interests and goals. In this sense, some officials organize and create spaces for some groups of citizens so that they are closer to the administration and able to interact with some of the officials. However, this is not the general rule. According to group representatives and citizens, there is no real access to the power sphere, as the administration tends to work with those groups and actors that are related to their political group or represented by someone they know. Access to the state is not uniform and equal to all. Thus, the relationship between the elite and civil society is weak as there are no real participatory spaces clearly defined and sustained

within the administration for those groups and citizens interested in public actions. The type of participation or access to the system is based on the particularities of each case.

In addition, for some of the officials that participated in this study, although desirable, civil society's participation in policy-making is a risky activity. Officials argue that groups in Barranquilla are too weak and ill prepared to be able to effectively participate in policy-making. In some instances their involvement slows down some necessary and urgent processes that the administration solves with no external influence.

For those members of the ruling elite that do not belong to the current government, this weak relationship between the governing elite and civil society allows for the government to decide and implement policies designed within the administration, with no participation from other important sectors in the city. According to entrepreneurs, and guilds representatives, usually, it is at the Mayor's office where policy is made; there is no effort or need for the Mayor to consult or ask for consensus in order to rule. In this sense, the number or strength of groups or associations does not represent the quality of democracy in the city; this is more dependent on the role played by the Mayor and the political spaces the administration is willing to offer to those groups.

Groups and Associations

According to the analysis, groups in Barranquilla use many of the formal or informal participatory spaces provided and are also likely to be in contact with other groups or actors. In fact, 82% of groups and associations report to have engaged in one

or many of the participatory activities listed throughout the survey. However, it is necessary to mention that this percentage includes all types of participation, low, medium or high. When we explore deeper we find that only 15% of groups in the city contend to have a high degree of participation, this is, to be able to write legislation with the government, consult projects, participate in public hearings or open meetings as these spaces are more favorable to exchange views and discuss face to face the particulars of a specific bill or future policy.

Although it is positive that some groups are able to reach higher levels of participation, the fact that the other 85% of the groups do not, clearly reflects the central argument of this study: Groups and associations are able to exist, to form, and are even supported by the state and the national constitution, but this is no indication that groups are able to influence their surroundings (Walker 1991, 49).

With respect to those groups that participate and engage in policy-making in Barranquilla it is possible to assert that they tend to be older, have their own headquarter, even if rented, and have an established executive board. Thus, there is an indication that having a formal structure, resources, and functioning is an important ingredient for group success. There is no clear indication that the number of members of a group influences its degree of involvement in decision-making. In general though, groups in Barranquilla are small, unstructured, lack funds, with no rosters or dues or mailing lists, and many times do not have as their purpose to influence the government but to foster better conditions for themselves and the city in general. In this sense, group membership in Barranquilla is more a result of realizing that through collective action their political and social outcomes can be changed (Olson 1965).

There is an additional issue that deserves to be mentioned. After a review of the literature concerning group behavior and the importance of civil society's participation in policy-making, I was expecting for most of the groups to express their interest, success or frustrations in doing so. On the contrary, what I found was that most of the groups in Barranquilla are not centered on taking part of the policy process; they do not view their function as one that is directed towards decision-making. Groups are focused on creating and developing better living conditions for their people and the surrounding; they want to be able to secure funds or projects that benefit their neighborhood or area. I will come to this point later on the chapter.

Mass Public

In order to reach a comprehensive and in-depth view of the mass public behavior in Barranquilla, I use macro, meso and micro analysis to explore three different levels of involvement by assessing electoral, community, and political participation in the city. Based on the survey analysis, it is clear that citizens in Barranquilla participate at the electoral level but have no meaningful participation at the community or political sphere.

The analysis of electoral participation needs to be done in conjunction with a view of partisan membership. Although almost 80% of the mass public reports to have voted in public elections, only about 25% say they are members of a political party. This phenomenon shows the degree of clientelistic relations present in the city as most of the electoral outcomes reflect patronage politics. As discussed in Chapter 4, historical data demonstrates that electoral results are usually questioned and challenged

by the opposing group and in more than one occasion the 'winner' has been removed from office as a result of judicial processes demonstrating that the electoral results were manipulated.

Regarding civic or community participation at the local level it is possible to conclude that the factors that theories of national community participation identify as relevant and significant do not clearly explain civic participation in Barranquilla. Aspects like level of education, trust or socioeconomic status are not significant in the model discussed in this study. One interpretation for these results could be placed on the need to expand the analysis of citizen involvement to include the effect that structural and institutional conditions have on citizens and their behavior. It is desirable that scholars direct their studies to develop comparisons between cities and their internal political dynamics and structures to identify the degree of influence these factors have in the variation of citizen participation in public affairs.

Political participation is almost non-existent in Barranquilla. This type of participation entails a high degree of knowledge, information and access to resources. It is defined as those actions directed towards creating change or modifying a political outcome. In this sense, it was not expected to find that people in Barranquilla present high levels of political participation. The socio-economic level of the city is low, the population has a low level of education, and economic resources are scarce; people are concentrated on reaching decent levels of survival. In other words, the gap between what is needed for political participation to happen is too wide as citizens have other pressing concerns in mind.

Explaining the Paradox

As stated before, an application of the theoretical contentions presented by scholars that study democratic consolidation show that in the case of Colombia, we are faced with a paradox as the quality of democracy decreases as the density of civil society increases. According to the theory, the opposite should happen; the number of groups and associations present in a particular society positively affects the level of democracy. Through this work I have explored why this paradox occurs and if there are particular factors that contribute to its happening.

There are different ways we may approach this paradox. For one, it is possible to argue that there is no paradox; the increased amount of groups is not real, it is a product of how groups are counted and a result of not having clear mechanisms to determine if groups are still active. As groups are registered in the chamber of commerce of each city, some maintain their registration status but have no real activity because they are not required to demonstrate that they are still functioning. Thus, the premise that there is a dense civil society in Colombia might be false as the number of groups may not be representative of the real composition of civil society. Although this might be the case in Colombia, I believe this does not voids the fact that there are an important number of groups in the country that are active and attempting to participate in public activities. To say that there could be a data error does not eliminates the need to know how group behavior and conditions interfere with policy-making in democratic societies.

In previous chapters I have mentioned that in order to identify a real relationship between democracy and civil society it is important to center our attention

not on the number of groups, but on their *ability* to penetrate the circles of power, on their possibility to act and have a real impact on policy-making. There are two aspects we need to consider when discussing group ability. One factor relates to the characteristics of the groups, and the level of organization of a particular society, and the second factor refers to the political context and dynamics present in the city.

In this sense, to address the paradox it is possible to argue that groups and associations in the country are too weak, small, and unstructured to be able to be effective. Small groups might be able to have an impact on their members and their limited surroundings, but in order for them to be able to influence further and affect the process of policy-making, groups need to be stronger, consolidated and organized. As this work shows, some of those groups that are older, have adequate infrastructure like headquarters and an executive board, are able to reach higher levels of participation in Barranquilla.

Civil society in Barranquilla is dense as it has thousands of non-profit groups properly registered plus hundreds more that function informally. This research finds that groups and associations in the city, amidst their economic and budgetary limitations, attempt to be active and engage in several participatory actions at different levels. Many groups have tried to present proposals for governmental consideration and some others have been able to participate in public committees and talked to the media as ways to influence political outcomes. However, it is also evident that groups are feebly organized. There are very few networks in the city, and groups tend to be distrustful and intolerant of one another.

At the same time, groups and associations seem to be disappointed about their actions and the lack of results they have to show for. The majority report to have initiated at least one participatory action, but less than half report to be satisfied with their results. This shows how civil society, albeit dense, is not necessarily effective. Although groups in the city require more resources and personnel, it is also evident that even for most groups that have adequate resources, trained personnel and enough technical information, it is almost impossible to reach higher levels of involvement.

It is important to notice that although the scope of group participation might be wide, as groups may use multiple participation tools and spaces, it is necessary to focus on those activities that are more directly related to the deepening of democracy. In this sense, those groups that might have a narrow scope, might also have a high degree of participation as they are able to influence political decisions by discussing proposals and modifying outcomes with government officials. This indicates that in order to foster democratic consolidation, it is important to consider directing efforts to strengthen groups already in existence, and not necessarily to create new ones. Thus, once more, I posit that the base of the relationship between democracy and civil society is not its density; more groups do not pave the way to a consolidated democracy, better and stronger groups do.

The second aspect we need to consider when addressing the issue of the groups' ability to participate in policy-making refers to the political context and dynamics present in the realm of action of the groups. Based on the analysis of civil society in Barranquilla this research shows that it is not enough for civil society to have groups and associations, it is also essential for civil society to be organized and to

have the support and openness of the local administration. Although this finding stresses the importance of the state as previous scholars have, it goes further by arguing that more than the strength of the state *per se*, it is necessary to study the strength and behavior of the local government. It is through the office of the Mayor, at the city level, where democracy and participation takes place, and as such it is the most likely scenario to be studied if we want to discuss democratic consolidation (Migdal 2001, 88). In other words, in order to understand the behavior of civil society and its likely impact on democracy, it is necessary for scholars to disaggregate the state and attribute value to the actions of the executive. The idea of the state as “a dominant, integrated, autonomous entity that controls, in a given territory, all rule making, either directly through its own agencies or indirectly by sanctioning other authorized organizations – business, families, clubs, and the like” needs to be reconsidered (Migdal 2001, 16). The state is not a unitary actor; it is divided in many parts and spheres of action (Migdal 2001). Foucault expresses:

But the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor to speak frankly, this importance; maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. ..It is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on; thus the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality (Cited by Migdal 2001, 18) [1991, 103].

Thus, throughout this work it was demonstrated how the role of the administration is an important component when assessing civil society's engagement in public policy-making. The administration acknowledges the need for civil society's

participation and is able to interact with some representatives of several groups in society. However, this behavior is not institutionalized throughout the system; every group does not have the same opportunity and experience that groups protected by the administration have. Only when all groups, regardless of their political orientation, or membership, have the same chance to participate, then we will be able to state that the administration is open to public involvement.

In addition, the task of the administration in opening the space for civil society participation in policy-making is not only determined by the capriciousness of the leader in place. To be sure, as long as the executive realizes that the actions performed during the administration are subject to accountability by the state and citizens, the official will be less prone to over step the boundaries of the job and more likely to act according to the law (Myers and Dietz 2002; Myers 2002). If, like the case of Barranquilla, the state is not able to control public life, and make officials accountable for their actions, it is very likely for civil servants and elected officials to rule with particular interests in mind, and not collective ones. As Migdal posits:

Where,... effective supervision has all but disappeared, implementers can use their leverage for personal gain with little regard for the overall purpose of any given policy. ... [B]ureaucrats at the regional and local level remain key actors in determining who gets what and what they can do with it. The state bureaucracy, then cannot avoid but being a major factor in the local allocation of resources. The limitation on state power, of course, is that the allocation may deviate tremendously from the prescriptions set out in law and policy statements in the capital city (2001, 90).

Consequently, the weakness of the state in Barranquilla and the lack of organization of its civil society have generated a strong executive with no political,

social or judicial mechanisms to control it. A weak state is unable to establish comprehensive political authority; citizens do not follow regulations and very likely avoid consequences (Migdal 2001; Smith 1973; Malloy 1977). An important reason for this is the inefficient judicial branch – national and local- together with a shortness of physical, human or economic resources (O'Donnell 1998).

In sum, the *ability* argument presented throughout this project, states that the paradox could be explained by the weakness and lack of organization that civil society presents, together with the difficulties and obstacles that the local administration or the state imposes on groups and citizens when they attempt to participate in public affairs.

Another interpretation of the paradox in Colombia might say that it is not that as groups and associations increase in Colombia, the level of democracy decreases, but on the contrary, that because the level and quality of democracy is decreasing, there is more need for groups and associations to form. This reading of Colombia's situation is related to the degree of institutional trust present in the country. As we saw in the case of Barranquilla, the majority of the actors studied does not trust the government and feel they are not represented or protected by it. As such, many argue that they believe they need to form their own groups to provide for goods and services that the government is not granting. This is also clear as all groups I talked to state that their purpose is not to influence policy-making but to create the conditions to better their situation, to act collectively as self-help organizations that seek government support for their needs. These groups contend that there is no point in trying to access the government because government officials do not respond to them; the government tends to benefit a minority who has economic and political interests and power.

Therefore, in order to solve their problems, people decide to work and sometimes form or join groups to maximize their resources.

I believe this argument needs to be taken with caution. Although it might be possible that many groups formed because of the weakness of the government and the lack of services it provides, it is necessary to remember that for some percentage of groups in Barranquilla it has been possible to positively affect the level of democracy. To be sure, in the previous chapters we saw how some groups report to be able to penetrate the spheres of power and propose, discuss, and decide policy with the government. This is a way of advancing democracy, as some actors within civil society are able to reach important levels of participation. Even if it is a small percentage of groups, it is important to acknowledge that this happens in the country. So, it might be possible to say that there might be other factors that explain why the quality of democracy decreases as the density of groups increases. The argument of lack of institutional trust might provide some light into understanding why there are more groups in Colombia, but does not explain why we find instances when group action is able to reach higher levels of participation.

One last alternative hypothesis could be used to explain the paradox in Colombia. It is possible that the growth and activities of groups and associations present in the country have actually improved the level of democracy from what it would have been if they were not part of the country's civil society. As a Latin American country faced with increased levels of insecurity and violence, and in the middle of a 40 year long struggle with guerrilla movements, and recently with narcoterrorism and paramilitary groups, it is likely that these factors also influence the

quality of democracy in the country. In this sense, the existence and development of groups and associations allows for actors to join efforts and resources in order to create better conditions for their community as the government places much of the funds and attention to issues directed to security measures.

This view of the paradox brings together several of the arguments previously discussed in this chapter. I believe that groups and associations have a positive impact on the level of democracy as they compensate for other factors that tend to lower the quality of democracy and in some cases even threaten its existence. Although groups might not be able to fully influence policy-making and determine the content of a particular policy, they try, with some degree of success, to create better living conditions for the community and explore ways to support those activities that lead to a better government. Through watchdog activities groups attempt to control public actions and verify that public resources are properly handled in benefit of the general will.

I contend that groups in Barranquilla contribute to the consolidation of democracy by attempting to preserve the freedom citizens have to form and join organizations, the possibility of expressing their views in public, the right to vote and their eligibility for public office and as such, their ability to compete for public support and votes. In addition, there are groups that seek to make sure that there are alternative sources of information, and that there are institutions that make government policies dependent on votes and other expressions of public preference (Dahl 1971, 3).

Although, it is also likely that some groups form as an effort to replace the government when the latter proves to be inefficient or unable to provide solution to

their problems in a timely manner, it would not be appropriate to conclude that once the government becomes efficient, groups will disappear. Thus, in order to have a comprehensive view of the relationship between civil society and democracy, we need to be able to consider that most of the hypotheses here presented have a degree of truth; there is no sole explanation of what determines democratic consolidation.

What we may conclude is that an organized, strong and able civil society, together with an open and accessible local government are necessary – but not sufficient- conditions for democratic consolidation.

As it was discussed in the different sections of this study, there are still several areas and findings that need further research. To begin with, it is necessary to expand the study to more cities in order to determine if the pattern uncovered in Barranquilla is present elsewhere. Future studies need to incorporate a detailed analysis of the behavior of the administration and its interaction with different actors within civil society. The role of the administration might constitute the key to our understanding of the different particularities and levels of political and socio-economic development within a country. Societies with a unitary republic often present different stages of development throughout its territory; in order to distinguish the underlying causal mechanisms that influence such disparate development, it is vital to focus on the institutional and structural conditions of each, placing increased attention on the diverse spheres and arenas of action.

In addition, as one of the limitations of cross-section studies indicate, these findings are supported by one particular case in time. Further research needs to be done in order to follow-up on these findings and assess how the different relationships,

interactions and experiences change over time. It is possible for new patterns to be uncovered that will confirm or, why not, question my results.

Nevertheless, this work represents a significant effort and contribution to the discipline as it offers detailed, and at the same time, comprehensive analysis of a major issue within political science as is the idea of identifying factors that add to the consolidation of democratic processes and values throughout humanity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- A Guide to NGO Directories: How to find over 20,000 nongovernmental organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean.* 1995. Rosslyn: Inter-American Foundation.
- Acosta M., Deyana. 2003. "Gavilanes tirándole a las Escopetas." *El Heraldo*, Enero 23: 5A.
- Alarcon, Walter, Carlos Franco, and Manuel Montoya. 1992. *De que democracia hablamos?* Lima: CEDEP.
- Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. 1963. *The Civic Culture.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam, Mike Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 1996. "Classifying Political Regimes" *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31:3-36.
- Archer, Ronald P. 1990. *The Transition From Traditional To Broker Clientelism In Colombia: Political Stability And Social Unrest.* Working paper #140. Working papers Series, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame.
- Bagley, Bruce M. 1984. *The National Front And Beyond.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ballon, Edward C. 1986. *Movimientos Sociales y Democracia: La fundación de un Nuevo orden.* Lima: DESCO.
- Banfield, Edward. 1961. *Political Influence.* Toronto: Free Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank. 1989. *Conflict and Rhetoric in French Policy-Making.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank and Beth Leech. 1998. *Basic Interest.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bebbington, Anthony. 1997. "Reinventing NGOs and rethinking alternatives in the Andes." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Thousand Oaks 554: 117.
- Bejarano, Ana M. 2000. *Perverse democratization: Pacts, institutions, and problematic consolidation in Colombia and Venezuela.* Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University.
- Bell, Carlos and Jorge Villalón 2000. "El Periodo del Frente Nacional y la Crisis de los Años Sesenta (1957-58, 1974-75)." In *Historia de Barranquilla.* eds. Jorge Villalón, Jesús Ferro, Carlos Angulo, et. al. Barranquilla: Universidad del Norte.
- Bell, Daniel. 1999. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting.* New York: Basic Books.
- Bell, Gustavo and Maria M. De La Espriella. 1988. "13 de Marzo de 1988: Elección Popular de Alcalde en Barranquilla." *Documentos Ceres* No.4: Barranquilla: Universidad del Norte.

- Bell, Gustavo and Alexandra García. 2000. *Costos y Beneficios de Dos Modelos Diferentes de Organización Territorial Político-administrativa para la Costa Caribe Colombiana*. Barranquilla: Universidad del Norte.
- Beltrán, Antonio and Rubén Hernández. *Indicadores Económicos de Barranquilla y el Departamento del Atlántico 1997-2000*. Barranquilla: Fundesarrollo.
- Berman, Sheri. 1997. "Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic." *World Politics* 49:401-42.9
- Boisier, S. 1987. "Decentralization and Regional Development in Latin America Today." *CEPAL- Review* 31: 133-44.
- Bollen, Kenneth. 1993. "Liberal Democracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 1207-1230.
- Bottomore, T.B. 1964. *Elites and Society*. Middlesex, England: Pelican.
- Bulpitt, J.G. 1972. "Participation and Local Government: Territorial Democracy." In *Participation in Politics*, ed. Geraint Parry. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Bushnell, David. 1997. *Colombia: Una Nación a Pesar de si Misma*. Bogotá: Planeta Editores.
- Camacol. 1990. *Oferta y Demanda de Vivienda y otras edificaciones en el Area Metropolitana de Barranquilla*. Barranquilla: Camacol. Verify reference
- Carbo, Ramón I. 2002. "La Historia se repite: ¿Una nueva concesión?" *El Herald*, Agosto 30:Locales.
- Casanova, Pablo G. 1970. *Democracy in Mexico*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Casper, Gretchen. 1995. *Fragile Democracias: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Castañeda, Alberto, M. Lopez, and E. Puentes. 1989. *Los Oganismos No Gubernamentales en Colombia*. Draft –Informe Final Proyecto FES Universidad Javeriana. Bogotá, Colombia, Julio 25.
- Castells, Manuel. 1985. *Crisis Urbana y Cambio Social*. Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Castells, M. and Jordi Borja. 1988. "Urbanizacion y Democracia Local en América Latina." In *La Ciudad de la democracia*, eds. Manuel Castells, et. al. Santiago de Chile: Vector.
- Ceballos, Miguel and Martin Gerard. 2001. *Participación y Fortalecimiento Institucional a Nivel Local en Colombia*. Bogotá: Ceja.
- Cepeda Ulloa, Fernando (1985) *Factores Que Contribuyen Al Mantenimiento Del Sistema Politico Colombiano*. Work presented at the 45th International Congress of Americanists. Bogotá.
- Chazan, Naomi. 1994. "Engaging the State." In *State Power and Social Forces*, eds. Migdal, Joel S, Atul Kohli, Vivienne Shue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chernick, Mark. 1998. "Party Politics, Reformism and Political Violence in Colombia." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 31:38-41.
- Cigler, Allan. 1991. "Interest Groups: A Subfield in Search of an Identity." In *Political Science: Looking to the Future*, ed. William Crotty, vol. 4. Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press.

- Cigler, Allan. 1994. "Research Gaps in the Study of Interest Group Representation." In *Representing Interests and Interest Group Representation*, eds. William Crotty, et.al. Lanham, Md: University Press of America.
- Clark, Peter B. and James Q. Wilson. 1961. "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6:129-66.
- Cook, Fay Lomax, Tom R. Tyler, Edward G. Goetz, Margaret T. Gordon, David Protes, Donna R. Leff, and Harvey L. Molotch. "Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers, and Policy". *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 47:16-35.
- Crotty, William ed. 1986. *Political Parties in Local Areas*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Dahl, Robert. 1961. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- _____. 1970. "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model." In *The Logic of Social Hierarchies*, eds. Edward Laumann, Paul Siegel and Robert Hodge, Chicago: Markham.
- _____. 1971. *Polyarchy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- DANE. 1987. *Colombia Estadística*. 2:384-385.
- De Tocqueville, Alex. [1840] 1981. *Democracy in America*. New York : Modern Library.
- Dearing, James W. and Everett M. Rogers. 1996. *Agenda Setting*. Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Deutsch, Karl W. 1964. "Social Mobilization and Political Development." *American Political Science Review*, 55: 493 – 514.
- Diamond, Larry, ed. 1994. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- _____. 1996. "Toward Democratic Consolidation." In *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, eds. Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner. 2nd ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, Larry, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan Linz. 1986. *Developing and Sustaining Democratic Government in The Third World*. Paper presented at the 1986 APSA Annual Meeting, August 28-31. Washington D.C.
- Diaz Uribe, Eduardo. 1986. *El Clientelismo en Colombia: Un Estudio Exploratorio*. Bogotá: El Ancora Editores.
- Dietz, Henry. 1998. *Urban Poverty, Political Participation, and The State: Lima 1970-1990*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh university Press.
- Dix, Robert H. 1987. *The Politics of Colombia*. New York: Praeger.
- Dryzek, John S. 1996. "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization." *The American Political Science Review* 90: 475-487.
- Encarnacion Omar. 2000. 'Tocqueville's Missionaries: Civil Society Advocacy And The Promotion Of Democracy.'" *World Policy Journal* 17:9-18.
- Escobar, Arturo and Sonia E. Alvarez, ed. 1992. *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*. Boulder: Westview.
- Fals Borda, Orlando. 1992. "Social Movements and Political Power in Latin America." In *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*, eds. Arturo Escobar and Sonia E. Alvarez. Boulder: Westview.

- Fisher, Julie. 1997. *Nongovernments: Ngos And The Political Development of The 3rd World*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Foley, Michael, and Robert Edwards. 1996. "The Paradox of Civil Society." *Journal of Democracy* 7: 38-52.
- Fox, Jonathan. 1994. "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico." *World Politics* 46: 151-184.
- Galston, William A. 2000. "Civil Society and the 'Art of Association.'" *Journal of Democracy* 11: 64-70.
- Galvis, Armando and Adolfo Meisel. 2001. "El Crecimiento Económico de las Ciudades Colombianas y sus Determinantes, 1973-1998." In *Regiones, Ciudades y Crecimiento Económico en Colombia*. Barranquilla: Banco de la República.
- García, Alexandra. 1998. "Sociedad en Hobbes, Locke y Marx." *Revista de Derecho Universidad del Norte* 10: 3-24.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1994. *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals*. New York: Allen Lane/Penguin Press.
- González, Esperanza. 1996. *Manual sobre Participación y Organización para la Gestión Local*. Bogotá: Ediciones Foro Nacional por Colombia.
- González, Ever. 2004. "Barranquilla: Dos fechas que celebrar." *El Heraldo*, Revista Dominical, Abril 11:2.
- Gonzenbach, William. 1996. *The Media, The President, and Public Opinion: A Longitudinal Analysis Of The Drug Issue, 1984 – 1991*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Hammergren, Linn A. 1977. "Corporatism in Latin American Politics: A Re-examination of the 'Unique' Tradition." *Comparative Politics* 9:443-61
- Hansen, John M. 1985. "The Political Economy of Group Membership." *American Political Science Review* 79: 79-96.
- Harrison, L. 1997. *The Pan- American Dream: Do Latin American's Cultural Values Discourage True Partnership With The United States And Canada?* New York: Basic Books.
- Hartlyn, Jonathan. 1988. *The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hegel, Friedrich. [1821] 1952. *Philosophy of Right*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hernández B. Augusto. 2002. "Las Instituciones Municipales en Colombia: El Municipio, célula de descentralización y democracia." *Revista Credencial Historia* 147:1-5.
- Hornsby, Anne M. 1991. *Pushing for Democracy in Colombia: Nonprofit Challenges to Dependence on the State (Nonprofit Organizations, Social Movements)*. Ph.D. Dissertation Harvard University.
- Hoyos, Bernardo 2002. "Ex-alcalde Hoyos se pronuncia sobre la aplicación de la 550." *El Heraldo*, Septiembre 20: 4A.
- Huber Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John D. Stephens. 1997. "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions." *Comparative Politics* 3: 323-342.

- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- _____. 1984. "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99:193-218
- Huntington, Samuel and C. Moore. 1970. *Authoritarian Politics In Modern Society*. New York: Basic Books.
- ICFES. 1960. *El Nivel Académico de los Planteles de Educación Media del País*. Bogotá: Icfes.
- Iyengar, Shanto. 1991. *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kaplan, Abraham. 1964. *The Conduct of Inquiry*. Scranton: Chandler.
- Katzenstein, Peter. 1978. *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Kingdom, John W. 1995. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. 2nd. ed. New York: Harper-Collins.
- Kline, Harvey. 1980. "The National Front: Historical Perspective and Overview." In *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia*, eds. Albert Berry, Ronald G. Hellman and Maurico Solaun. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
- Kline, Harvey. 1995. *Colombia: Democracy Under Assault*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Kline, Harvey. 1996. "Colombia: The Attempt To Replace Violence With Democracy". In *Latin American Politics and Development*, eds. Wiarda Howard and Harvey F. Kline Ed. 4th ed. Boulder: Westview.
- Knoke, David. 1986. "Associations and Interest Groups." *Annual Review of Sociology* 12:1-21.
- Lasswell, Harold. 1961. "Agenda for the Study of Political Elites." In *Political Decision-Makers*, ed. Dwaine Marvick. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Leal Buitrago, Francisco. 1984. *Estado y Política en Colombia*. Bogotá: Siglo XXI Editores S.A.
- Lenski, Gerhard Emmanuel. 1966. *Power And Privilege: A Theory Of Social Stratification*. New York : McGraw-Hill.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53: 69-105.
- _____. 1960. *Political Man: the Social Basis of Politics*. New York: Doubleday.
- _____. 1981. *Political Man: The Social Bases Of Politics*. Expanded edition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lopez C. Juan M. 2003. "Lo que deja el Referendo." *El Herald*, Nov. 7:2.
- Losada, Rodrigo. 1988. *Clientelismo y Elecciones*. Bogotá: Universidad Javeriana.
- Long, Norton E. 1958. "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games." *American Journal of Sociology* 64: 259-260.

- Madrid-Malo, Martha and Luz H. Diaz, eds. 2002. *Resultados de la Descentralización Municipal en el Caribe Colombiano*. Bogotá: Observatorio del Caribe Colombiano.
- Mainwaring, Scott, Daniel Brinks, and Anibal Perez-Liñan. 2001. "Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36: 37-65.
- Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds. 1992. *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Maldonado, Alberto. 2001. *Evaluación de la Descentralización Municipal en Colombia: Avances y Resultados de la Descentralización Política en Colombia*. Working Paper. Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de Planeación.
- Malloy, James. 1977. "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern." In *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed. James Malloy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Martinez, M. and D. Hill. 1999. "Did motor voter work?" *American Politics Quarterly* 27: 296-315.
- Martz, John. 1997. *The Politics of Clientelism*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Meisel, Adolfo. 1993. "¿Por qué se disipó el dinamismo industrial de Barranquilla? In *¿Por qué se disipó el Dinamismo Industrial de Barranquilla? y otros ensayos de Historia Económica de la Costa Caribe*, eds. Adolfo Meisel and Eduardo Posada-Carbó. Barraquilla: Gobernación del Atlántico.
- _____. 2001. "Economía Regional y Pobreza: el caso del Caribe Colombiano 1950-1990. *Documentos Ceres* No.10 Barranquilla: Universidad Del Norte.
- Meisel, James. 1962. *The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the Elite*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Migdal, Joel S. 1994. "Society and the State." In *State Power And Social Forces*, eds. Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, Vivienne Shue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 2001. *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute one Another*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Milbrath, Lester W. 1965. *Political participation : how and why do people get involved in politics?* Chicago : Rand McNally.
- Milbrath, Lester W., and M.L. Goel. 1982. *Political participation: how and why do people get involved in politics?* 2nd edition. NY: University Press of America.
- Miszlivetz Ferenc and Jody Jensen. 1998. "An Emerging Paradox: Civil Society from Above?" In *Participation and Democracy East and West*, eds. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, et. al. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Molano, Alfredo. 1994. *Trochas y Fusiles*. Bogotá: El Áncora Editores.
- Montenegro, Armando and César Vargas. 1996. *Indicadores de Gestión sobre Finanzas Públicas del Distrito de Barranquilla*. Barranquilla: Fundesarrollo.
- Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in The Making of The Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Morton, Rebeca B. 1991. "Groups in Rational Turnout Models." *American Journal of Political Science* 35:758-76.

- Mosca, Gaetano. 1939 [1923]. *The Ruling Class*. In A. Livingston. ed. and rev. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Munck Gerardo L. and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices" *Comparative Political Studies* 35: 5-34.
- Myers, David. 2002. "The Dynamics of Local Empowerment: An Overview". In *Capital City Politics in Latin America: Democratization and Empowerment*, eds. David J. Myers and Henry Dietz. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Myers, David J. and Henry Dietz. eds. 2002. *Capital City Politics in Latin America: Democratization and Empowerment*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Nickson, Andrew R. 1995. *Local Government in Latin America*. Boulder: L. Rienner.
- Norris, Pippa. ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1998. "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies". *Journal of Democracy* 9:112-126.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Olson, Mancur. 1982. *The Rise And Decline Of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, And Social Rigidities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Palacios, Marco. 1995. *Entre la Legitimidad y la Violencia: Colombia 1875- 1994*. Bogotá: Norma.
- Parada, Jairo. 2000. Innovación y Cultura en las Organizaciones en la Región Caribe. In *Innovación y Cultura en las Organizaciones en Tres Regiones de Colombia*. eds. Fernando Urrea, Luz G. Arango, Carlos Dávila, et al. 2000. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, Corpocalidad y Colciencias
- Parry, Geraint. ed. 1972. *Participation in Politics*. Oxford: Manchester University Press.
- Patterson, Thomas. 1999. *The American Democracy*. Boston: MacGraw Hill.
- Pecaut, Daniel. 1989. *Crónicas De Dos Décadas De Política Colombiana: 1968-1988*. Bogota: Siglo XXI
- Peeler, John. 1985. *Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Peters, Guy. 1999. *American Public Policy: Promise and Performance*. 5th Ed. Chatham House.
- Petras, James. 1997. "Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America". *Monthly Review* 49:10.
- Pizarro, Eduardo. 1992. Colombia: ¿Hacia una salida democrática a la crisis nacional? *Análisis Político* 17:179-190.
- Posada-Carbó, Eduardo. 2001. *¿Guerra Civil? El Lenguaje del Conflicto en Colombia*. Bogotá: AlfaOmega – Colección Cambio.
- Powell, G. Bingham. 1980. "Voting Turnout in thirty democracies: Partisan, legal and socioeconomic influences." In *Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis*, ed. Richard Rose. London: Sage.

- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ritchey-Vance, Marion. 1991. *The Art of Association*. Rosslyn: Inter-American Foundation.
- Roberts, Geoffrey. 1971. *A Dictionary of Political Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Rogers, Everett M. and James w. Dearing. 1994. "Agenda-Setting Research: Where has it been, Where is it Going?" In *Media Power and Politics*, 3d ed., eds. Doris A. Garaber. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Romero, Mauricio. 2000. *Sociedad Civil, Cooperación y Movilización por la Paz en Colombia*. Documento de trabajo del proyecto Sociedad Civil y Gobernabilidad Democrática en el Andes y en el Cono Sur, Proyecto Regional Comparativo de la Fundación Ford y el Departamento de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad Católica del Perú.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy." *Comparative Politics* 2:337-63.
- Salamon L. and Helmut K. Anheier. 1996. *The Emerging Non profit Sector*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Salisbury, Robert. 1969. "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13:1-32.
- Salisbury, Robert. 1984. "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 78:64-76
- Salmon, Charles T. and John Spicer Nichols. 1983. "The Next-Birthday Method of Respondent Selection." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 47:270-276.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." *American Political Science Review* 64:1033-1053.
- Schmidt, Vivien. 1996. *From State to Market? The Transformations of French Business and Government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. and Terry Lynn Karl. 1996. Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy. In *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, eds. Larry Diamond, and Marc Palmer, 2nd ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Schonwalder, Gerd. 2002. *Linking Civil Society and the State: Urban Popular Movements, the Left, and Local Government in Peru, 1980-1992*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Schumaker, Paul D. 1975. "Policy Responsiveness to Protest-Group Demands." *The Journal of Politics* 37: 488-521.
- Schumpeter, Joseph. 1954. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Seligman, A. 1992. *The Idea of Civil Society*. New York : Free Press.
- _____. 1997. *The Problem Of Trust*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
- Seligson, Amber L. 1999. "Civic Association and Democratic Participation in Central America: A test of the Putnam Thesis." *Comparative Political Studies* 32: 342-362.

- Slater, D. ed. 1985. *New Social Movements and the State in Latin America*. Amsterdam: CEDLA.
- Smith, Thomas B. 1973 "The Policy Implementation Process." *Policy Sciences* 4: 172-98.
- Smulovitz, Catalina, and Enrique Peruzzotti. 2000. "Societal Accountability in Latin America." *Journal of Democracy* 11.4: 147-158.
- Solano, Sergio P. 1996. "Trabajo y Ocio en el Caribe Colombiano: 1880-1930." *Revista Historia y Cultura Universidad de Cartagena* 4:61-76.
- Solaun, Mauricio. 1980. "Colombian Politics: Historical Characteristics And Problems." In *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia*, eds. Albert Berry, Ronald G. Hellman and Mauricio Solaun. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
- Stone, Clarence N. and Heywood T. Sanders. 1987. *The Politics of Urban Development*. University Press of Kansas.
- Streeten, Paul. 1997. "Nongovernmental Organizations and Development." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Thousand Oaks. 554: 193.
- Tanzi, Vito. 1995. "Fiscal federalism and decentralization: A review of some efficiency and macroeconomic aspects." *The World Bank Research Observer Annual Conference Supplement*.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. "Making Social Science Work Across Space And Time: A Critical Reflection On Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work" *American Political Science Review* 90:389.
- Taylor, Charles L. 1991. "Measures of Government Change: Indicators of Democracy from Mass Media Reporting". In *On Measuring Democracy*, ed. Alex Inkeles. Brunswick: Transition.
- Therborn, Goran. 1977. "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy." *New Left Review* 103:3-41.
- Topf, Richard. 1995. "Electoral Participation." In *Citizen and the State*, eds. Hans Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Turner, John C. 1982. "Toward a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group." In *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, ed. Henri Tajfel. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Uhlener, Carole J. 1989. "Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups." *American Journal of Political Science* 33: 390-422.
- Vargas, Hernan A. 1993. *Directorio de Organismos No Gubernamentales –ONG- de Colombia: entidades sin Animo de Lucro de Beneficio Social*. Bogotá: Fundación Social.
- Velasquez, Fabio and Esperanza Gonzalez. 2003. *Que Ha Pasado Con La Participación Ciudadana En Colombia?* Bogotá: Fundación Corona.

- Velez, Carlos E., Elkin Castano, and Ruthanne Deutsch. 1998. *An Economic Interpretation Of Colombia's SISBEN: A Composite Welfare Index Derived From The Optimal Scaling Algorithm*. Working Paper: Interamerican Development Bank.
- Velez, Eduardo. 1981. *Political Participation in an Unstable Democracy: A study of two Regions in Colombia*. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
- Veliz, Claudio. 1994. *The New World of the Gothic Fox: Culture and Economy in English and Spanish America*. Berkeley: California University Press.
- Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. eds. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-on Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Verba, Sidney, Key L. Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Villalón, Jorge. 2003. "Crisis Urbana y Conflictos Políticos a Medios de los Años Ochenta en Barranquilla." In *Barranquilla: Lecturas Urbanas*, ed. Luis E. Sánchez B. Barranquilla: Observatorio del Caribe Colombiano Universidad del Atlántico.
- Villar, Rodrigo. 2001. *El Tercer Sector en Colombia*. Bogotá: Confederación Colombiana de Organizaciones no Gubernamentales.
- Walker, Jack L. 1991. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Wiesner D., Eduardo. 1995. *La Descentralización, El Gasto Social y La Gobernabilidad En Colombia*. Santa fe de Bogota: DNP-ANIF-FINDETER.
- Weyland, Kurt. 1995. "Latin America's Four Political Models." *Journal of Democracy* 6: 125-139.
- Wiarda, Howard J. 2001. *The Soul of Latin America*. Chelsea, MI: Yale University
- Wilson, James Q. 1973. *Political Organizations*. New York: Basic Books.
- Wolfinger, Ray and Steven Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Wright Mills, C. 1959. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Zuckerman, Alan. 1977. "The Concept of "Political Elite": Lessons from Mosca and Pareto." *Journal of Politics* 39: 324-344.

Newspapers

- El Heraldo. www.elheraldo.com.co
 El Extra. Barranquilla.

Legal Referentes

Acto Legislativo 1, 1986 (Legislative Act).
Constitución Nacional 1886 (National Constitution).
Constitución Nacional 1991 (National Constitution).
Decreto 3446, 1986 (Decree).
Decreto 700, 1987 (Decree).
Decreto 2150, 1995 (Decree).
Decreto 2517, 1999 (Decree).
Ley 11, 1986 (Law).
Ley 42, 1989 (Law).
Ley 134, 1994 (Law).
Ley 142, 1994 (Law).
Ley 388, 1997 (Law).

Appendix A

Questionnaire for the political and ruling elite (public officials, influential individuals, guilds, elected representatives).

1. Quisiera que me contara un poco sobre su trabajo, su día a día, por ejemplo en un día como hoy, en que focaliza su acción?
2. ¿Cuál diría usted es su prioridad en la agenda? En cuanto a asuntos a realizar, objetivos.
3. Es esta una prioridad desde el inicio de su gestión, o ha sido producto de su experiencia en el cargo?
4. En esta labor, quienes diría usted lo acompañan mas a menudo?
5. Que tipo de compañía es? En que forma lo ayudan?
6. Estas personas u organizaciones que lo ayudan lo hacen porque usted lo solicita, o ellos están pendientes para ofrecer su ayuda?
7. Cuales grupos ya sean nombres particulares o tipo de grupos, diría usted que dificultan la gestión pública? Piensa que hay momentos donde existe una excesiva participación por parte de organizaciones no gubernamentales o de otros actores?
8. Hay quienes dicen que a veces las ong o grupos sociales carecen de información o formación y pueden dificultar procesos, esta de acuerdo con esta afirmación?
9. En cuanto a actores sociales o políticos que se mueven en su mismo ámbito, existe alguno con quien usted considere debo entrevistarme? Grupos que se caractericen por su interés en las áreas en las cuales usted trabaja?

10. Cuales de los siguientes recursos considera usted son mas o menos efectivos para su labor?

RECURSO	Más efectivo	Menos efectivo	Mas Efectivo para oficinas similares	Menos efectivo para oficinas similares	Le gustaría Mejorar
Personal					
Presupuesto					
Experiencia					
Liderazgo reconocido en el medio de la oficina o del funcionario (aclarar)					
Reputación funcionario					
Contactos funcionario					
Financiación Internacional					
Información – oportuna, actualizada.					
Otro					

11. Colombia enfrenta tiempos difíciles. Ha afectado eso sus acciones? Si, sí, como? Ha sido usted o algún miembro de su grupo contactado por miembros de grupos extremos? De ser así, ha afectado eso sus acciones o ha influido en las actividades que realiza? Y que hay de presión de otros grupos? (Mide: Factor Miedo)

	Situación General del País			Contacto con otros grupos		
	Genera participación	Limita la participación	No afecta	Sí	No	Efecto
Situación General						
Contacto con grupos extremos						
Presión de otros grupos Otro						

12. De quien diría usted que depende la formación de políticas públicas en Barranquilla? Si alguien desea que una decisión se tome, cual considera usted es el mejor camino ha seguir?
13. Ha presentado usted propuestas de legislación al gobierno? De ser así, como fué el proceso de elaboración? Con quien trabajó, en que se apoyó? Si no lo hizo, existe alguna razón en particular?
14. Considera usted que su oficina tiene alguna incidencia en la formación de políticas públicas en Barranquilla? O es mas una incidencia en la aplicación o ejecución de las políticas?
15. Ha tratado usted de involucrar directamente a organizaciones sociales en su gestión? Si es así, de que manera y en que tipo de actividad?

Table A.1
Elite Interviews

Actors	Number of Interviews
Public Officials	8
City Council	10
Political actors and Positioned individuals	22
Elected Community Representatives - <i>Comuneros</i>	16
<i>Total Interviews</i>	58

Appendix B

Questionnaire for non-profit groups.

1. Tipo de grupo social. Por favor marque sólo uno:

- a. Junta de Acción Comunal _____ b. Grupo social _____ c. Grupo Cívico _____
 d. Grupo Comunitario _____ e. Grupo Veeduría _____ f. Fundación _____
 g. Junta Administradora Local _____ h. Corporación _____ i. Cooperativa _____
 j. Otro _____ k. no sabe/ no responde _____

2. Área de Influencia

- a. Barrio _____ b. comuna / localidad _____ c. NS/NR _____

3. Funcionamiento del Grupo

- a. Fecha de Constitución del grupo: _____
 b. Numero de miembros totales: _____
 c. Miembros activos _____
 d. Cuenta con Junta directiva? Si _____ No _____
 e. Cuenta con sede propia? Si _____ No _____
 f. Cuenta con NIT: Si _____ No _____

4. Fuentes de financiación. Por favor marque las que corresponda:

- a. Cuotas de los miembros _____ b. Ayuda entidades internacionales _____
 c. Financiación del gobierno Local _____ d. Departamental _____ e. Nacional _____
 f. Prestación de servicios _____ g. Otros _____ h. NS/NR _____

5. Objetivo principal del grupo social?

6. Áreas en las cuales se involucra. Por favor marque sólo dos:

- a. Educación _____ b. Salud _____
 c. Cultura Ciudadana _____ d. Bienestar social _____
 e. Participación comunitaria _____ f. Veedurías _____
 g. Transporte _____ h. Vivienda _____
 i. Servicios Públicos _____ j. Democracia _____
 k. Desarrollo Comunitario _____ l. Otro _____

7. Forma su grupo parte de alguno de los siguientes órganos?

- a. Consejo Territorial de Planeación _____
 b. Junta directiva de Entidades Públicas _____
 c. Comités de Asesoría del gobierno _____
 d. Consejos ciudadanos _____
 e. No sabe/ no responde _____

Por favor pase a la pregunta 9 si contesto NO a esta pregunta.

8. Si hace parte de uno de estos órganos, con que frecuencia es convocado a participar en ellos?

- a. Nunca _____ b. Anualmente _____ c. Dos veces al año _____
 d. Cada mes _____ e. Cada semana _____ f. NS/NR _____

9. Por favor indique con que frecuencia ha realizado alguna de las siguientes acciones:

Actividad	Frecuencia				
	a) Nunca	b) Anual	c) Dos veces al año	d) Cada mes	e) Cada Semana
9.1. Dado respuesta a un anuncio público solicitando participantes para consejos y comités de participación					
9.2. Realizado acciones de monitoreo o supervisión como denunciar, requerir, llamar a la acción.					
9.3. Elaborado propuestas o proyectos para el gobierno local					
9.4. Elaborado legislación junto con el gobierno - escribir a dos manos.					
9.5. Hablado a la prensa y los medios					
9.6. Participado en propuestas o demostraciones públicas					
9.7. Consultado con funcionarios del gobierno para planear posible legislación					
9.8. Abordado a los concejales sobre algún acuerdo que está siendo discutido por ellos.					
9.9. Utilizado contactos de manera informal como una forma de influir a los funcionarios					
9.10. Demandado alguna acción del gobierno local					
9.11. Otorgado apoyo público a algún candidato					
9.12. Audiencias Públicas					
9.13. Cabildos Abiertos					

10. Cuál considera usted ha sido su nivel de influencia en cada una de las siguientes actividades?

Actividad	Influencia			
	a) Alta	b) Media	c) Baja	d) Ninguna
10.1. Consejo Territorial de Planeación				
10.2. Juntas directivas de Entidades Públicas				
10.3. Comités de Asesoría al Gobierno				
10.4. Dado respuesta a un anuncio público solicitando participantes para consejos y comités de participación.				
10.5. Realizado acciones de monitoreo o supervisión como denunciar, requerir, llamar a la acción.				
10.6. Consejos Ciudadanos				
10.7. Elaborado propuestas y proyectos para el gobierno local				
10.8. Elaborado legislación junto con el gobierno – escribir a dos manos.				
10.9. Hablado a la prensa y los medios				
10.10. Participado en propuestas o demostraciones publicas				
10.11. Consultado con funcionarios del gobierno para planear posible legislación				
10.12. Abordado a los concejales alertándolos sobre alguna ordenanza que está siendo discutida por ellos.				
10.13. Utilizado contactos de manera informal como una forma de influir a los funcionarios				
10.14. Demandado alguna acción del gobierno local				
10.15. Otorgado apoyo público a algún candidato				
10.16. Audiencias públicas				
10.17. Cabildos abiertos				

11.- ¿Cuál diría usted es su área de acción como grupo social? ¿Le toca involucrarse con alguno o todos los asuntos siguientes? De ser así, ¿con que frecuencia?

Área Acción	a) Nunca	b) Anual	c) Algunas Veces	d) Mensual	e) A Diario
11.1. Educación					
11.2. Salud					
11.3. Corrupción					
11.4. Concesiones					
11.5. Transporte					
11.6. Veeduría					
11.7. Otro:					

12. ¿Tiene o ha tenido contacto con alguna de estas oficinas o entidades? Si lo tiene, que tan frecuente?

ACTOR	Frecuencia				
	a) Nunca	b) Anual	c) Algunas Veces	d) Mensual	e) Diario
12.1. Alcaldía					
12.2. Consejo Territorial de Planeación					
12.3. Medios					
12.4. Sector Privado					
12.5. ONGs					
12.6. Nivel nacional					
12.7. Nivel Departamental					
12.8. Concejo Municipal					
12.9. Personería					
12.10. Defensoría					
12.11. Fiscalía					
12.12. Contraloría					
12.13. Procuraduría					

13. En caso de contestar afirmativamente la pregunta anterior, ¿Cómo calificaría el nivel de respuesta de estas entidades?

ACTOR	Nivel de Respuesta			
	a) Alto	b) Medio	c) Bajo	d) Cero
13.1. Alcaldía				
13.2. Consejo de Planeación				
13.3. Medios				
13.4. Sector Privado				
13.5. Otras ONGs				
13.6. Nivel nacional				
13.7. Nivel Departamental				
13.8. Concejo Municipal				
13.9. Personería				
13.10. Defensoría				
13.11. Fiscalía				
13.12. Contraloría				
13.13. Procuraduría				

14. Considera que contactar a las siguientes entidades aumenta o disminuye las probabilidades de éxito en su labor?

ACTOR	a) Aumenta	b) Disminuye	c) No tiene impacto
14.1. Alcaldía			
14.2. Consejo de Planeación			
14.3. Medios			
14.4. Sector Privado			
14.5. Otras ONGs			
14.6. Nivel nacional			
14.7. Nivel Departamental			
14.8. Concejo Municipal			
14.9. Personería			
14.10. Defensoría			
14.11. Fiscalía			
14.12. Contraloría			
14.13. Procuraduría			

14. ¿Cuál(es) de estos recursos considera son más importantes para su organización? ¿Cuál(es) considera son los menos efectivos? ¿Cuales le gustaría mejorar? Marque todos los necesarios.

RECURSO	a) Mas importante	b) Más efectivo	c) Menos efectivo	d) Le gustaría Mejorar
15.1. Personal				
15.2. Presupuesto				
15.3. Experiencia				
15.4. Liderazgo reconocido				
15.5. Reputación del grupo				
15.6. Contactos				
15.7. Apoyo de los medios				
15.8. Financiación Internacional				
15.9. Financiación nacional				
15.10. Información técnica				
15.11. Personal capacitado				
15.12. Independencia económica				
15.13. Ser del grupo político del alcalde				
15.14. Tecnología Informática				
15.15 Organización Interna				
15.16. Otro				

16. Si usted fuese a asesorar a otro grupo social en momentos de sus inicios, cual le diría es el recurso más importante que un grupo social debe tener? ¿Cuál es el menos necesario, y cual – si lo hay- el mas dañino?

RECURSO	a) Más importante	b) Menos necesario	c) Dañino
16.1. Personal			
16.2. Presupuesto			
16.3. Experiencia			
16.4. Liderazgo reconocido			
16.5. Reputación del grupo			
16.6. Contactos			
16.7. Apoyo de los medios			
16.8. Financiación Internacional			
16.9. Financiación nacional			
16.10. Información técnica			
16.11. Personal capacitado			
16.12. Tecnología informática			
16.13. Organización Interna			
16.12 Otro			

17. Colombia enfrenta tiempos difíciles en términos de seguridad ciudadana y las organizaciones tienden a reaccionar de manera distinta. ¿Cuál ha sido la reacción de su grupo?

Reacciones	Si	No
17.1. Las actividades han disminuido		
17.2. Las actividades han aumentado		
17.3. Sólo actuamos en red con otros grupos sociales		
17.4. Algunos de nuestros temas son evitados		
17.5. Nos concentramos en actividades que sabemos no serán cuestionadas		
17.6. Procuramos no tener mucho protagonismo		
17.7. Las actividades continúan como siempre		
17.8. Nos apoyamos mas en los medios		
17.9. Hemos buscado nuevas actividades mientras pasa la crisis		
17.10. Otra reacción? Cual?		

18. Ha tratado su grupo de presentar propuestas o proyectos al:

a. Concejo _____ b. Alcaldía _____ c. Asamblea _____ d. Gobernación _____

19. Si lo hizo, por favor indique su experiencia:

a. Fue aceptado _____ b. Fue aceptado y ejecutado _____
 c. Aceptado pero nunca ejecutado _____ d. Negado Oficialmente _____
 e. Nunca obtuvo respuesta _____ f. Parcialmente aceptado _____
 g. Parcialmente ejecutado _____ h. En curso _____
 i. NS/NR _____

20. ¿Cómo presentó el proyecto?

- a. Solos _____
- b. En alianza con otros grupos similares _____
- c. Con apoyo de un concejal _____
- d. Con apoyo de la secretaria de Planeación _____
- e. Con apoyo técnico de la comunidad _____
- f. No sabe/ no responde _____

21. ¿Cuales son, en su opinión, los problemas locales más importantes del momento? Marque 1 para mas importante y 2 para el segundo mas importante.

- a. Costo de vida, de la comida _____
- b. Escasez de alimentos _____
- c. Desempleo _____
- d. Crimen, delincuencia, seguridad _____
- e. educación, falta de escuelas _____
- f. vivienda _____
- g. pobreza _____
- h. infancia abandonada _____
- i. atención médica _____
- j. Corrupción _____
- k. transporte _____
- l. servicios públicos _____
- m. No sabe/no responde _____
- n. Otro _____

22. ¿Quién o quienes cree usted que deben tener la mayor responsabilidad en la solución de esos problemas?

- a. El presidente _____
- b. El gobierno nacional _____
- c. El gobernador _____
- d. El alcalde _____
- e. El Concejo _____
- f. Empresa Privada _____
- g. La comunidad _____
- h. No sabe/ no responde _____

23. Supongamos que un proyecto de acuerdo está siendo discutido en el Concejo y su grupo considera que es perjudicial para sus intereses, que cree pueda hacer?

- a. Nada, eso lo resuelve el gobierno _____
- b. Nada, a uno no le paran bolas _____
- c. Acudiría a funcionarios del gobierno a quejarme _____
- d. Acudiría a los medios _____
- e. Organizaría una protesta pública _____
- f. Le pediría a mi partido que hiciera algo _____
- g. Le escribiría a los congresistas por los que voté _____
- h. Contactar a organizaciones como Protransparencia _____
- i. Otro _____
- j. No sabe/ No responde _____

24. ¿Cómo calificaría usted el nivel de participación de grupos como el suyo en la toma de decisiones locales?

- a. Alto _____
- b. Medio _____
- c. Bajo _____
- d. No hay participación _____
- e. NS/NR _____

Por favor utilice este espacio si desea hacer alguna observación o aclaración. Le agradecemos mucho su participación.

Appendix C

Questionnaire for the Mass Public.

1. Tiempo de vivir en la ciudad

- a. Menos de un año____ b. De 1 a 5 años____ c. De 6 a 10 años____ d. De 11 a 15 ____
e. mas de 15 años ____ f. "toda mi vida"____ g. Otro____ h. No sabe/ No responde____

2. Diría usted que con el tiempo que le dedica a su trabajo y familia, le queda tiempo libre?

- a. Sí____ b. No____

3. Si tiene o tuviese tiempo libre qué actividades le interesaría realizar? Marcar dos actividades.

- a. Ninguna_____ b. Actividades culturales_____
c. Viajar_____ d. Estar en grupos para influir en asuntos públicos _____
e. Actividades Económicas_____ f. Deportes, juegos, jardinería, trabajo casero_____
g. Actividades de Ayuda social _____ h. Otra actividad _____
i. No sabe/no responde _____

4. Por favor seleccione **dos** cualidades que usted más valora en una persona: Marcar 1 para las más importante.

- a. Hace su trabajo bien_____ b. No deja que nadie se aproveche de ella _____
c. Es honesta _____ d. Tiene claro lo que quiere _____
e. Ambiciosa, quiere progresar _____ f. Respetuosa, no sobrepasa su lugar _____
g. Generosa, atento con los otros _____ h. Ahorrativa _____
i. Otro _____ j. No sabe/No responde _____

5. Con respecto a la gente, piensa usted que:

- a. Se puede confiar en la mayoría de la gente _____
b. Siempre es bueno ser precavido _____
c. No siempre se puede confiar, depende de algunas cosas _____
d. No sabe/no responde _____

6. Cuales son, es su opinión, los problemas más importantes de Barranquilla en el momento? Marque uno (1) para el más importante y dos (2) para el segundo más importante.

- a. Costo de vida, de la comida _____ b. Escasez de alimentos _____
c. Desempleo _____ d. Crimen, inseguridad _____
e. Educación, falta de escuelas _____ f. Vivienda _____
g. Pobreza _____ h. Infancia abandonada _____
i. Salud _____ j. Corrupción _____
k. Transporte Masivo _____ l. Servicios públicos _____
m. Otro _____ n. No sabe/no responde _____

7. Quién o quienes cree usted que deben tener la mayor responsabilidad en la solución de esos problemas? Marcar dos opciones: 1 para mayor responsabilidad y 2 para quien le sigue.

- a. El presidente _____ b. El gobierno nacional _____ c. El gobernador _____
d. El alcalde _____ e. La Asamblea _____ f. El Concejo _____
g. Empresa Privada _____ h. La comunidad _____ i. Otro _____
j. No sabe/ no responde _____

8. Algunos dicen que la política y el gobierno son tan complicados que la persona promedio no puede realmente entender que es lo que está pasando. Dígame si está de acuerdo con esta afirmación:

- a. De acuerdo _____ b. En desacuerdo _____ c. No sabe/No responde _____ d. Otro _____

9. A su modo de ver, considera usted que entiende sobre los asuntos que enfrenta el país en el ámbito nacional e internacional?

- a. Entiendo muy bien _____ b. Depende del asunto _____ c. No entiendo nada _____
d. Entiendo moderadamente bien _____ e. No entiendo muy bien _____ f. Otro _____
g. No sabe/No responde _____

10. Ahora, en el ámbito local, de la ciudad, considera usted que entiende los asuntos que se discuten y que enfrenta la ciudad?:

- a. Entiendo muy bien _____ b. Depende del asunto _____ c. No entiendo nada _____
d. Entiendo moderadamente bien _____ e. No entiendo muy bien _____ f. Otro _____
g. No sabe/No responde _____

11. Cuál creería usted es la razón por la cual las personas tienen problemas para entender sobre asuntos de política y gobierno?

- a. Los problemas son muy complejos _____ b. a la gente no le importa y no intenta entender _____
c. No nos saben explicar las cosas _____ d. Otro _____
e. No sabe/No responde _____

12. Si se encontrara con que no entiende muy bien los asuntos públicos, realizaría alguna de estas acciones?

- | | | |
|--|----------|----------|
| a. Comentaría con las personas a mi alrededor | Si _____ | No _____ |
| b. Contactaría a un agente del gobierno para que me explicara | Si _____ | No _____ |
| c. Contactaría al partido político al que pertenezco para que me explicara | Si _____ | No _____ |
| d. Buscaría a un experto | Si _____ | No _____ |
| e. Leería acerca de eso | Si _____ | No _____ |
| f. Escucharía radio y/o televisión | Si _____ | No _____ |
| g. Hablaría con el líder del barrio o el Jefe de Acción Comunal | Si _____ | No _____ |
| h. No sabe/No responde _____ | | |

13. Por favor indique si está DE ACUERDO o EN DESACUERDO con lo siguiente:

- | Las discusiones políticas: | Acuerdo | Desacuerdo |
|---|----------------|-------------------|
| a. No son placenteras, dañan las relaciones personales | _____ | _____ |
| b. Ponen en peligro el trabajo | _____ | _____ |
| c. Puede generar problemas de información con autoridades, gobierno, policía. | _____ | _____ |
| d. No sirven para nada | _____ | _____ |
| e. No las entiendo, prefiero evitar el tema. | _____ | _____ |
| f. Las evito, la política no me interesa | _____ | _____ |
| g. Las entiendo, pero prefiero evitar el tema | _____ | _____ |
| h. Las tendría solo con quienes entiendan | _____ | _____ |

14. Algunos piensan que existe influencia de personas o grupos en la forma como el gobierno actúa, de manera que los intereses de la mayoría son ignorados. ¿Cuál es su opinión?

- a. De acuerdo _____ b. En desacuerdo _____ c. Parcialmente de acuerdo _____
d. parcialmente en desacuerdo _____ e. No sabe/No responde _____

15. Que grupos o actores considera usted tienen más influencia en la ciudad? Marcar los dos más influyentes, uno (1) para el más influyente, dos (2) para el que le sigue.

- a. La Iglesia Católica _____ b. Grandes Negocios, los ricos _____ c. Comunidad _____
 d. Gremios _____ e. Partidos políticos _____ f. Los políticos _____
 g. Sindicatos _____ h. Ningún grupo, el gobierno es autónomo _____ i. Empresa privada _____
 j. No sabe /No responde _____

16. Que considera debe hacer la gente como usted para solucionar sus problemas de vivienda, salud, educación, o empleo en la ciudad?

- a. Nada, es el gobierno el que debe solucionar mis problemas _____
 b. Buscar formar parte del gobierno local, _____
 c. Unirse a un partido político _____
 d. Unirse a organizaciones y grupos sociales _____
 e. Organizar a la comunidad para solucionar en conjunto _____
 f. Pedir el apoyo de la Iglesia _____
 g. Votar _____
 h. Trabajar _____
 i. Otro _____
 j. No sabe/No responde _____

17. Cuales son las obligaciones que toda persona le debe a su ciudad. Marcar solo dos por favor.

- a. Ninguna _____ b. Votar _____ c. cuidar el espacio público de la ciudad _____
 d. Pagar impuestos _____ e. Obedecer las leyes, respetar la autoridad _____
 f. Estar vigilantes, controlar la corrupción _____ g. Otro _____ h. No sabe/No responde _____

18. ¿Alguna vez ha hecho algo para tratar de influir en una decisión de la ciudad? Si marca a) o c) preguntar que ha hecho.

- a. A menudo _____ b. Nunca _____ c. Una o dos veces _____ d. Otro _____ e. No sabe /no responde _____
 Acción: _____

19. Si usted se entera de la posibilidad de aprobación de una norma que le parece injusta o dañina para la ciudad, que haría?

- a. Nada, eso lo resuelve el gobierno _____ b. Nada, a uno no le paran bolas _____
 c. Acudiría a funcionarios del gobierno a quejarme _____ d. Acudiría a los medios _____
 e. Organizaría una protesta pública _____ f. Le pediría a mi partido que hiciera algo _____
 g. Le escribiría a los congresistas por los que voté _____ h. Contactar a organizaciones como Protransparencia _____
 i. Otro _____ j. No sabe/ No responde _____

20. Si usted hiciera un intento por cambiar esa norma, ¿Qué tan probable sería que ese intento fuera exitoso?

- a. Muy probable _____ b. Muy poco probable _____ c. Probable sólo si otros se me unen _____
 d. Probable _____ e. Medianamente probable _____ f. Nada probable _____
 g. Otro _____ g. No sabe/No responde _____

21. Las actividades del Gobierno del Distrito de B/quilla tienden a mejorar, desmejorar o dejan igual las condiciones de la ciudad.

- a. Tienden a mejorar _____ b. Estaríamos mejor sin ellos _____ c. A veces mejora, a veces no _____
 d. Da igual _____ e. No sabe/No responde _____

22. Cree usted que al hacer algún trámite o solicitud al gobierno, lo tratarían a usted igual que a cualquier otra persona?

- a. Sí ___ b. No, a gente con influencia lo tratan mejor ___ c. Otro ___
d. No sabe/No responde ___

23. Si usted tuviera algún problema con la policía, ¿cree que recibiría un tratamiento justo?

- a. Sí ___ b. No, a gente con influencia lo tratan mejor ___ c. Otro ___
d. No sabe/No responde ___

24. ¿Es usted actualmente miembro de algún partido político o movimiento?

- a. Si ___ b. No ___ c. No sabe/No responde ___

25. ¿Ha sido usted alguna vez activista de una campaña política, es decir, ha trabajado alguna vez para un candidato o partido, contribuyendo dinero, tiempo, buscando votos, u otra actividad?

- a. Sí ___ b. No ___ c. Otro ___
d. No sabe/No responde ___

26. En qué trabaja o cómo se gana la vida?

- a. Empleado _____ b. Ama de casa _____ c. Profesional _____
d. Desempleado _____ e. Trabajador inexperto _____ f. Alto directivo _____
g. Pensionado _____ h. Propietario _____ i. Pequeños negocios _____
j. Estudiante _____ k. Servicio doméstico _____ l. Vendedor ambulante _____
m. Trabajador indep. _____ n. Oficios Varios _____ ñ. Otro __ ¿Cuál? _____
o. No sabe/No responde ___

27. ¿Es usted miembro de alguna de los siguientes grupos u organizaciones?

- a. Sindicatos _____ b. Organización Social _____ c. Caridad _____
d. Religiosas _____ e. Profesionales _____ f. Cívicas _____
g. Cooperativas _____ h. No pertenece a grupo alguno ___ i. Otro _____
j. No sabe/No responde ___

28. Si es miembro de alguna. ¿Ha sido usted alguna vez directivo en esta organización?

- a. Sí ___ b. No ___ c. Otro ___ d. No sabe/No responde ___

29. Pertenece o ha pertenecido a:

- a. Junta Administradora Local ___ b. Junta de Acción Comunal ___ c. Grupo Cívico _____
d. Grupo de Veeduría _____ e. Consejo de planeación Dptal ___ f. Junta Dir. Servicios Pcos ___
g. Comités Asesoría al Gobierno _____ h. No _____ i. No sabe/ no responde _____

30. Por favor indique con que frecuencia ha realizado alguna de las siguientes acciones: (si responde no a todo, pasar a la pregunta 32).

Actividad	Frecuencia				
	a) Nunca	b) Anual	c) Dos veces al año	d) Cada mes	e) Cada Semana
30.1. Dado respuesta a un anuncio público solicitando participantes para consejos y comités de participación					
30.2. Realizado acciones de veeduría o supervisión como denunciar, requerir, llamar a la acción.					
30.3. Elaborado propuestas o proyectos para el gobierno local					
30.4. Elaborado legislación junto con el gobierno					
30.5. Hablado a la prensa y los medios					
30.6. Participado en propuestas o demostraciones públicas					
30.7. Consultado con oficiales del gobierno para planear posible legislación					
30.8. Abordado a los concejales sobre algún acuerdo que está siendo discutido por ellos.					
30.9. Utilizado contactos de manera informal como una forma de influir a los funcionarios					
30.10. Demandó alguna acción del gobierno local					
30.11. Otorgado apoyo público a algún candidato					
30.12. Audiencias Publicas					
30.13. Cabildos Abiertos					

31. Según la respuesta anterior, preguntar: Cuál considera usted ha sido su nivel de influencia en cada una de las siguientes actividades que realizó?

Actividad	Influencia			
	a) Alta	b) Media	c) Baja	d) Ninguna
31.1. Dado respuesta a un anuncio público solicitando participantes para consejos y comités de participación				
31.2. Realizado acciones de veeduría o supervisión como denunciar, requerir, llamar a la acción.				
31.3. Elaborado propuestas o proyectos para el gobierno local				
31.4. Elaborado legislación junto con el gobierno				
31.5. Hablado a la prensa y los medios				
31.6. Participado en propuestas o demostraciones públicas				
31.7. Consultado con oficiales del gobierno para planear posible legislación				
31.8. Abordado a los concejales sobre algún acuerdo que está siendo discutido por ellos.				
31.9. Utilizado contactos de manera informal como una forma de influir a los funcionarios				
31.10. Demandó alguna acción del gobierno local				
31.11. Otorgado apoyo público a algún candidato				
31.12. Audiencias Publicas				
31.13. Cabildos Abiertos				

32. Tiene o ha tenido **contacto** con alguna de estas oficinas o entidades? Si lo tiene, que tan frecuente?

ACTOR	Frecuencia				
	a) Nunca	b) Anual	c) Algunas Veces	d) Mensual	e) Diario
32.1. Alcaldía					
32.2. Consejo Territorial de Planeación					
32.3. Medios					
32.4. Sector Privado					
32.5. Organizaciones No Gubernamentales					
32.6. Nivel nacional					
32.7. Nivel Departamental					
32.8. Concejo Municipal					

32.9. Personería					
32.10. Defensoría					
32.11. Fiscalía					
32.12. Contraloría					
32.13. Procuraduría					

33. *En caso de contestar afirmativamente la pregunta anterior, ¿Diría usted que estas entidades respondieron a sus necesidades? Es decir su nivel de satisfacción con ellas es?*

ACTOR	Nivel de Satisfacción			
	a) Alto	b) Medio	c) Bajo	d) Cero
33.1. Alcaldía				
33.2. Consejo de Planeación				
33.3. Medios				
33.4. Sector Privado				
33.5. Otras ONGs				
33.6. Nivel nacional				
33.7. Nivel Departamental				
33.8. Concejo Municipal				
33.9. Personería				
33.10. Defensoría				
33.11. Fiscalía				
33.12. Contraloría				
33.13. Procuraduría				

34. ¿Qué edad tiene usted?

a. 18-35 ____ b. 36-45 ____ c. 46 – 60 ____ d. 60 en adelante ____ e. No sabe/No responde ____

35. Nivel de Educación alcanzado?

a. Primaria b. Bachillerato c. Universidad d. Técnico e. NS/NR ____

36. Ha votado en alguna elección pública?

a. Si ____ b. No ____

Estas preguntas son solo para el encuestador:

37. Nivel de articulación del encuestado.

a. Bastante articulado ____ b. Relativamente articulado ____ c. Nada articulado ____

38. Actitud del encuestado acerca de la entrevista.

a. Amigoso, entusiasmado ____ b. Indiferente, aburrido ____ c. Cooperativo, pero no tan animado ____ d. Hostil ____ f. No sabe/No responde ____

Dependent Variables Mass Public Survey

Table C.1

Electoral participation (1)	Q N*	Community / civic Participation (2)	Q N	Political Participation (3)	Q N
Voted	36	Group membership	27	Attempted to influence city decisions?	18
Given public support to a candidate	30.11	Formal group membership	29	What would you do if you learn the likely approval of a damaging bill?	19
		Organizing groups as an option to solve problems?	16	Member of a political party?	24
		Answer public call for committee members	30.1	Political Activist?	25
		Watchdog activities	30.2	Written proposal for local government	30.3
		Public Demonstrations	30.6	Written legislation with the government	30.4
		Contact with NGOs	32.5	Talked to media	30.5
				Public Demonstrations	30.6
				Consulted with government possible legislation	30.7
				Spoken with councilors	30.8
				Use informal contacts to attempt to influence officers	30.9
				Demanded government action	30.10
				Public Hearings	30.12
				Town meetings	30.13
				Contact with public offices	32

* Survey Question number.

Independent Variables for Mass Public Survey

Several variables that address individual level information are included:

- *Age*: 4-point scale for ranges of years. 1= 18 to 35, 4=more than 60 years old.
- *Socioeconomic Status*: 6-point scale. 1= very low socioeconomic status, 6=high.
- *Education*: 4-point scale. 1=elementary, 4=University.
- *Job status*: Dummy variables for housework, inactive, active and unemployed.
- *Time living in the city*: 6-point scale. 1= less than a year, 6= all my life.
- *Free time*: 0= no, 1 = yes.

Variables that are mentioned in macro, meso and micro studies are:

- *Social trust*: 2-point scale. People were asked if they thought they could trust most people, or if it is better to be careful. 0=no trust, 1= sometimes, 2=trust people.
- *Politics are complicated*: 0=no, 1= yes. Individuals were asked if they agreed with the statement that politics are too complicated (polcomp).
- *Institutional trust*: respondents were asked if they agreed with the statement that the majority tends to be ignored in favor of those more powerful (majignor). 0= disagree, 1=agree.
- *Fear*: Two questions about their views towards political discussions are used as a proxy measure of fear to participate. One states that political discussions are dangerous because they may cause problems at work (disdang), the other

questions posits that political discussions are problematic because they could lead to problems with the authorities or the police (disprob).

- *Political interest*: 0= no interest in politics, 1= interest in politics.

Survey Sample – blocks per neighborhood.

Stratum 1

Encuestas Por Manzana / Survey Per Block					
Barrio	Sección	Manzana	Total manzanas a encuestar		
Carrizal	3	05-10-15	27		
	4	01-09-10			
	5	02-03-04			
	6	02-04-08			
	7	06-11-10			
	8	08-11-13			
	9	09-03-06			
	10	01-04-15			
	11	01-02			
	12	14			
	Santuario	1		07-02-03	9
		2		08-13-11	
3		04-13-12			
Las Américas	1	01-03	6		
	2	09-10			
	3	01-03			
Kennedy	1	09-10-11	5		
	3	01-03			
La Sierrita	1	01-03-10-15	11		
	2	07-10-09-11			
	4	01-02-04-15			
El Bosque			40		
La Paz	2	03-09-10-13	16		
	3	01-02-05-14			
	5	01-03-05-13			
Los Olivos	3	02-04-07-14	28		
	2	03-06-08-16			
	1	01-04-06-18			
	4	01-03-06-13			
	5	04-09-13-14			
	6	02-04-08-09			
	7	01-03-06-09			
Por Fin	1	06-08-09-10	12		
	2	01-02-03-08			
	3	07-12-14-15			
La Pradera	2	04-05-06-10-11-12-14	19		
	3	05-07-10-12-15-16			
	4	06-08-10-11-13-14			
El Pueblo	2	04-06-07-09-16	11		
	1	02-04-08-11-14			
Lipaya		01-02-03-21-04-08-14-15-18-22-09-06-10-11	16		
	1	01-02-03-04			
La Chinita	1	01-02-03-04	22		
	3	09-10-11-13			
	2	01-14-15-11			
	4	05-11-12-13			
	5	01-04-03-11			
	6	01-02-04-06			
Rebolo	2	01-04-05-08-12			
	3	02-04-05-06-08			
	4	04-06-05-08-02			
	1	05-08-09-10-11			
	5	06-04-03-01			
	6	06-08-09-11			
La Luz			22		
Don Bosco			27		

Stratum 2

Barrio	Sección	Manzana	Total manzanas a encuestar
Las Nieves	2	18-01-02	18
	11	13-22-03	
	3	07-10-04	
	6	09-07-11	
	4	13-4-	
	8	14-02	
	5	07-09	
San Roque	3	05-06	10
	5	03-09	
	6	11-01	
	8	03	
	1	05	
	7	03	
	4	04	
Monte	1	03-05	9
	2	01-03	
	3	07-06	
	4	01	
	5	04	
	6	12	
Alfonso López	1	13-11	4
	2	04	
	3	01	
La Ceiba	1	09-17	5
	2	16-10	
	3	4	
Villate	1	4	2
	2	1	
Ciudadela 20 de Julio	8	12-08-19-22-01	63
	16	16-13-05-08-11	
	5	20-10-14-07-22	
	13	19-13-08-10-05	
	2	12-22-09-03-16	
	15	21-19-07-11-16	
	6	24-07-18-23-27	
	10	16-21-19-06-02	
	1	03-02-01-04	
	23	09-04-13-06-01	
	25	02-07-14-10-17	
	29	04-01-05-13-06	
	27	24-11-08	
San Felipe	3	08-11	13
	5	09-03	
	1	15-16	
	8	07-02	
	2	04-01	
	6	02-20	
	5	13	
Montecristo	1	03-08	3
	2	05	
Abajo	1	05-16	9
	2	03-14	
	3	05-03	
	4	08	
	5	09	
	6	05	

Stratum 3

Barrio	Sección	Manzana	Total manzanas a encuestar
Chiquinquira	4	02-04-08	7
	1	03-02	
	3	13-11	
Lucero	1	10-12	4
	2	13-07	
San Isidro	3	04-01	5
	1	11-10	
	4	05	
San José	2	05-04-08	9
	4	17-15-16	
	3	21-22-23	
La Unión	3	10-04	4
	4	01	
	1	02-03	
El Campito	1	04-14	5
	2	12-02	
	3	05	
La Alboraya	1	14-12	6
	2	06-08	
	3	02-03	
El Limón	1	08-06	3
		03	
Cevillar	1	10-06	11
	2	04-13	
	3	14-11	
	4	08-11	
	5	10	
	6	09	
	7	10	
El Carmen	3	12-09-07	7
	1	10-01	
	4	02-04	
Las Palmas	1	10-07	9
	2	02-06	
	3	10-11	
	4	01	
	5	04	
	6	11	
La Magdalena	2	12-09	5
	3	03-04	
	4	07-06	
Los Pinos	1	19-21-22	3
San Nicolas	1	06-08-12	3
José Antonio Galán	1	04-12-01	9
	4	01-02-06	
	3	01-09-07	
La Victoria	1	05-10-11	11
	2	05-02	
	3	02-04	
	4	13	
	5	01	
	6	03	
	7	02	
Universal	1	05-07-16	3

Stratum 4

Barrio	Sección	Manzana	Total manzanas a encuestar
El Recreo	6	05-09	20
	4	10-04-02	
	1	09-11-12	
	5	05-06	
	3	09-07-05-06	
	7	03-01-02	
	2	01-07-04	
	Bostón	1	07-08-10-12
2		04-06-08-12	
3		04-09	
4		03-05	
5		04-06	
6		03-06	
7		05-07	
Olaya	3	10-06-01	12
	4	10-07-09	
	2	05-09-07	
Silencio	1	06-13-15	17
	2	03-05-08	
	3	03-04-05	
	4	11-08-05	
	5	01-03-06	
	6	06-14-15	
Nueva Granada	1	14-12-15	5
	2	01-04	
Las Mercedes	1	01	1
El Prado	3	05-01-10-12	12
	2	11-06-04-02	
	4	05-14-06-03	
Los Andes	1	14-11-09	7
	2	01-06-03	
	3	02-04	
Paraiso	4	15-17-18-09	12
	1	02-04-14-13	
	3	02-03-05-06	

Stratum 5

Barrio	Sección	Manzana	Total manzanas a encuestar
La Floresta	1	33-16-17-18-22- 21-20-19-23-24- 25-30-29-28-31- 32-26-27	36
	2	01-02-03-04-05- 06-22-21-20-07- 08-09-10-11-12- 16-18	
Los Nogales	1	02-04-06-03-05- 08-13-12-09	9
El Golf	1	01-02-04	3
Bellavista	1	10-01-05-04-03- 06-08	11
	2	02-01-10-09-03	
La Concepción	1	03-21-22-04-23- 05-06-07-08-09- 10-11-12-13-14- 15-16-17-18-19	26
	2	01-02-03-04-05- 06-07-08-09-10- 11-12-13-14	
Las tres Avemarías	1	17-15-14-11-07- 04-06-05-03-08- 09-10	12

ALEXANDRA GARCIA I.
algarcia@uninorte.edu.co
Cra. 55 No. 72-52 (4A)
Barranquilla, Colombia
(South America)

Education

Ph.D. 2004	The Pennsylvania State University. Political Science. Comparative Politics and International Relations.
M.A. 1993	Ohio University. Political Science. Major: Comparative Politics.
M.Ed. 1993	Ohio University. Counselor Education. Major: Community & Agency.
B.A. 1991	Universidad del Norte/ Barranquilla, Colombia. Law School. (Attorney at Law).

Professional Experience

1998 – present	Assistant Professor Universidad del Norte, Barranquilla.
1994 - 1997	Chair Master Program "Political -Economic Studies". Universidad Del Norte, Barranquilla - Colombia.
1988 - 1990	Assistant to the Governor. Atlantico, Colombia.
1987 - 1997	Civil attorney and political consultant. Barranquilla.

Honors and Awards

- ☞ Outstanding Graduate Leadership Award. Ohio University. 1993.
- ☞ Meritory thesis. "Los Consorcios en Colombia" Alexandra García & Juan Carlos Gloria. 1991. Law School, Uninorte.
- ☞ Honor Award for Undergraduate Academic Performance. 1991. Universidad del Norte.

Grants

Research

- ☞ Research Grant: Research Center Universidad del Norte. Project: *Political Culture in Barranquilla*. U\$2,000. July 2004.
- ☞ Research Grants: Penn State University (RGSO – U\$2000) and Political Science Department (U\$2,500). 2001.
- ☞ Research Grant: Colciencias Colombia. Research project on *Regionalization of the Caribbean Coast in Colombia 1995-1997*. Research completed in 1998, results published in 2000. Grant for U\$40.000.
- ☞ Research Grant Canadian Embassy: Faculty Enrichment Program. October 1995.

Fellowships

- ☞ Scholarship for Graduate School: Universidad del Norte 1998-2002.
- ☞ National Institute for the Advancement of Science and Technology in Colombia (Colciencias) Scholarship for Ph.D. Political Science. 1996-2002.
- ☞ Fulbright Scholarship for Graduate Education. 1991 (M.A & M.Ed. Ohio University).