

The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

College of the Liberal Arts

**EROTIC ONTOLOGIES:
ENACTING THINKING WITH PLATO AND HEIDEGGER**

A Thesis in

Philosophy

by

Omar Rivera

© 2007 Omar Rivera

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
May 2007

The thesis of Omar Rivera was reviewed and approved* by the following:

Dennis Schmidt
Professor of Philosophy
Thesis Adviser
Co-Chair of Committee

John Sallis
Professor of Philosophy
Special member
Co-Chair of Committee
Boston College

Vincent Colapietro
Professor of Philosophy

Christopher Long
Assistant Professor of Philosophy

Jeffrey Nealon
Professor of English

Shannon Sullivan
Professor of Philosophy
Chair of the Philosophy Department

* Signatures are on file in the Graduate School

Abstract:

Erotic Ontologies: Enacting Thinking with Plato and Heidegger investigates Heidegger's interpretation of Plato in the 1930's. Heidegger's Text *Contributions to Philosophy* provides the basis from which to understand Heidegger's relation to Plato in a different way than it is usually understood. This dissertation shows that Heidegger's critical stance with regard to Plato as a 'metaphysical thinker' is only part of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato. *In Contributions* Heidegger presents the possibility to interpret Plato non-metaphysically. This dissertation pursues this possibility by focusing on the erotic dimension of the Platonic dialogues. It also shows that *Contributions* in many ways can be interpreted as a recovery of these dialogues when understood erotically.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	v
Introduction	1
Part I Sketching a Philosophical Program of Study	8
First Study.....	8
Part II Two Studies on Erotic Thinking.....	74
Second Study.....	74
Third Study.....	114
Part III The Ascending/Descending Journey (Erfahrung) with Being.....	139
Fourth Study.....	139
Fifth Study.....	185
Part IV Sketching the Enactment of Contributions	198
Sixth Study.....	198
Endnotes.....	223
Bibliography.....	232

Acknowledgements

It would have been impossible to write this dissertation without the guidance and scholarship of John Sallis. I also want to thank Charles Scott in particular for being an inspiring interlocutor and reader of my work. The people who have influenced this work are innumerable, but I want to make special mention of Alejandro Vallega, Daniela Vallega-Neu, Will Roberts, Günter Figal and my students at Penn State University and Washington and Jefferson College. Most of the research for this project was conducted in Freiburg, Germany, with the support of the DAAD and Penn State University.

“Because all ontologies—whether developed as such or only prepared for development, like the history of the first beginning— inquire into beings as beings and in this respect and only in this respect also inquire into being, they move unto the domain of the grounding-question: How does being hold sway? What is the truth of being?—without intimating this grounding question as such and without ever being able to admit being in its utmost questionability, uniqueness, finitude, and strangeness.”ⁱ

“As soon as man lets himself be bound by Being in his view upon it, he is cast beyond himself, so that he is stretched, as it were, between himself and Being and is outside himself. Such elevation beyond oneself and such being drawn toward Being itself is ἔρωϛ. Only to the extent that being is able to elicit “erotic” power in its relation to man, is man capable of thinking about Being and overcoming oblivion of Being.”ⁱⁱ

Introduction

I.

The title “Erotic Ontologies” bespeaks a transformation in thinking that challenges the tenability of the stance of ontology by bringing this stance to its inceptive—though forgotten—domain of questioning. In this sense, it is a transitional titleⁱⁱⁱ that says the passing of ontology, even if this passing is a transition to the birthing of ontology, an inceptive event that ontology does not intimate^{iv}. My task is to carry out this passing of ontological questioning as a transformation *of* thinking that happens *in* thinking, as a thinking enactment that I find in both Plato and Heidegger.

I note here the restrictive frame of ontology: it remains within the *Platonic* question “what is?” (τί ἔστιν), a question that is oriented toward beings as grounded in constant determinations of meaning. According to Heidegger’s analysis, this kind of questioning conceals the inceptive event [*Ereignis*] of the appearing of beings, an event that is (i) irreducible to beings or a being and (ii) that appropriates humans to come to ask “what is?”—to engage in ontology—in the first place. Drawn to this inceptive event, out of which the ontological stance is constituted, Heidegger’s thinking is released from the lineage of Platonism that ontology defines, a lineage that is now exhausted.^v In the following series of studies, I show that, twisting free from Platonism and ontology by being drawn to their inceptive eventuation, Heidegger’s thinking is enraptured by Eros as the need that drives philosophical thinking. In his thinking, Heidegger recovers the erotic need that is covered up by Platonism but first uncovered by Plato. The challenge to ontology is erotic^{vi} and the passing of ontology is an erotic thinking enactment.

In these studies, Eros comes to name the necessity to ground the inceptive event of the appearing of beings. This necessity exceeds the history of Platonism and ontology. It enables the

inception of Platonism but is covered over by it, and re-emerges in its ending. Heidegger's and Plato's thinking, enacting the end and beginning of Platonism respectively, are both erotically drawn toward the inceptive event of the appearing of beings. I will bring forth the erotic draw of their thinking, provoking an encounter [*Auseinandersetzung*] between them in this draw. Out of this encounter, the possibility of twisting free from Platonism comes forth with a force that is not overpowered by the frame of Platonism. In this encounter, thinking is transformatively given to possibilities beyond those that have come to compose its definitive history.

The draw of Eros is the draw toward the event of the appearing of beings as beautiful. The shine of beauty will have to be reconsidered here beyond the particular beings that come to shine in its shining. A sense of imaging will be at play here, an inceptive imaging that twists free from the determination of mimesis as effective in the history of Platonism, an imaging that gives us to the shine of beauty *in* this twisting free. It is not arbitrary, then, that Heidegger encounters an image, the image of the cave, at the beginning and end of Platonism. This image, when interpreted in the passing of ontology, releases itself from the very sense of mimesis that it inaugurates within Platonism, and thus belongs to the transformative release of thinking from Platonism. In this release, thinking becomes erotically imaginative rather than ontological.

I emphasize in the transformation of thinking studied here the release of thought from the priority of beings for thinking. This is a release to the inceptive appearing of beings. This release does not coincide with a shift in terms of the beings that are 'thought about.' The release is an *enactment*^{vii} (Vollzug) or carrying out of thinking that re-structures thought away from Platonism and ontology as a mode of engagement with beings. At the same time, thinking here cannot simply be held in abstraction from beings, it is out of the appearing of beings that the necessity^{viii} for this transformative enactment issues forth. The enactment in thinking that is

studied here challenges, then, any simple differentiation between thinking and beings. It, rather, attempts to think this very differentiation—which belongs to ontology—as being rooted in the inceptive event of the appearing of beings.

Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), is Heidegger's thinking enactment of the twisting free from Platonism, of the passing of ontology, which he calls the 'crossing to an other beginning.'^{xix} The following studies show that the 'crossing' in *Contributions* is an enactment of thought that encounters Plato's dialogues in twisting free from Platonism.^x

II.

I will sketch here the 'crossing' in terms of Plato's thinking.^{xi}

Platonism is enforced by the question "what is?," which plays a fundamental role in Plato's dialogues, particularly in reference to the determination of the εἶδη ("looks"). When we ask "what is?," we inquire into a being in its look, which here stands for 'Being.' In this way, Plato brings forth the difference between beings and Being, the circulation^{xii} between beings and looks, as the definitive way of thinking 'what' beings are.

Heidegger sets into play Plato's eidetic thinking in three levels:

- a) *Craftsmanship*.^{xiii} In the same way that a craftsman sets up in advance a plan that directs the making of an artifact, in this mode of eidetic thought a look is set in advance as the fixed determination of the meaning of a being, and the being comes to be measured against the look. A being is in this sense a limited, particular manifestation of the look—an image of an original.
- b) *ὑπόθεσις* ('Being' as hypothesis).^{xiv} In this second level of eidetic thinking a look is set up in advance in language as a basis that gathers a horizon of meaning for the

understanding of a being, and a being comes to be understood from this horizon. As opposed to craftsmanship, here the “look” (Being) set up in advance shows certain openness in meaning. Nevertheless, the look provides, as ‘υπόθετον (as placed underneath beings so as to hold them in place), constancy of meaning for beings, and beings appear lighted by Being within the horizons of a look. In this horizontal operation of the look, what is given to be thought about is what is constantly lighted. The limits that mark the horizontal boundaries of this lighting become secondary for thinking. Thinking strives for the constancy of meaning given to beings in this lighting, which is provided by the look set up in advance as ‘υπόθετον.^{xv}

Heidegger finds affinity between levels (a) and (b) in that they are modes of thought that respond to a need for constancy in thinking. In Heidegger’s terms, these modes of thought are grounded in Being as constant presence [*beständige Anwesenheit*]. In both cases, the ground from which beings are understood holds them in constancy as set in advance to beings. For these modes of thinking, the constancy of beings has priority rather than their appearing. This need for presence in thinking defines the lineage of Platonism. Heidegger calls the necessity enforced by this need in the Greek inception, τέχνη.^{xvi} The crossing, then, is release from τέχνη and from the modes of eidetic thinking that correspond to it and grow out of it^{xvii}.

- c) Ἀλήθεια.^{xviii} The third level of thought engages the open determination of meaning in (b) and let’s go of the need for Being as presence—it engages the boundaries of the lighting that (b) did not engage. These boundaries are horizons that hold open determinations of meaning for beings, and are taken up *here*—in releasement from presence—as attesting resistance in beings to be delimited in advance, a resistance

that points to a different phenomenality. *Beings transgress in their appearing the horizons from which they are understood but, at the same time, these horizons become operative only when transgressed. We must shift our thinking toward these transgressions as inceptive to both beings and Being. The difference between a being and Being, between image and original, is birthed in these uncanny transgressions. In these phenomenal transgressions beings first open up the contexts of meaning from which they are always already understood as what they are—a complex phenomenality to say the least, one that ecstatically unsettles constancy in meaning but which, according to Plato and Heidegger, shines in beauty.* Heidegger's insight here is that these transgressions are given to thought as events of meaning that are more originary than the beings which appear in them and than the difference between beings and Being that guides τέχνη. Heidegger shifts thinking toward these transgressions as events of Da for the appearing of beings, *events that cannot be set up in advance and are, hence, inceptive.* Heidegger finds in the events of Da a transgression of and withdrawing from constant determinations of meaning that is more originary than any determination, a withdrawing movement that comes to ground the appearing of beings carrying out a different necessity in thinking than that of Platonism. Da becomes, in this sense, the expanse of un-concealment (᾿αλήθεια)^{xix}.

Abiding in ᾿αλήθεια, our comportment to beings in their appearing is fundamentally transformed. It is not anymore the setting up of Being in advance as constant ground, but a grounding of beings in withdrawal from determination. Heidegger calls this mode of abiding in ᾿αλήθεια, Da-sein. The compelling necessity that draws us toward Da-sein is not the necessity of Being as presence, it is the necessity of be-ing—Heidegger's term that marks a more originary

sense of be-ing as appearing/withdrawing.^{xx} Abiding in ᾿αλήθεια, Da-sein enacts the necessity of be-ing in a grounding event of beings in their appearing that Heidegger calls ‘Ereignis.’ The ‘crossing,’ then, is toward Ereignis in release from τέχνη.

Ereignis is covered up by τέχνη and Platonism. The question is whether this event is at play in Plato’s dialogues, so that there would be already in Plato’s thinking a trace of the ‘crossing.’ I will interpret Plato from Ereignis, and find in his thought moments of enactment in thinking that trace out the ‘crossing’ that Heidegger calls for at the end of Platonism. I will show that Eros names the necessity to engage the ‘Da,’ and that it constitutes thinking enactments in the dialogues that abide in ᾿αλήθεια (Da-sein). In my interpretation of Plato, this abiding comes to the fore when we attend to the dialogical character of Plato’s thinking, and when we let the definitive force of the looks recede in dialogical thinking.

III.

Abiding with beings in their inceptive event of appearing (᾿αλήθεια) fills us with wonder.^{xxi} That beings as a whole are, that a being is what it is, strikes us as an impenetrable event—beings are without reason or justification, they encircle us and leave no way out. But we are in their midst, we are the “between” for them so that their being *as* something necessarily implicates us in their appearing. We are owned by the open site for their appearing (*Da*), and in this site we ourselves appear with them. We are distressed by their need that offers us nothing but rapture in wonderment.

The distress that overwhelms us turns into a will to stand upon beings (᾿επιστήμη), to know them. We struggle with them in their abyssal appearing in order to find a stable ground in their midst. Wonder is lost through the sense of empowerment that constancy of ground gives us

in the midst of beings, a constancy of ground that we take up in our knowing, technical comportment.

In the exhaustion of the destiny birthed in τέχνη, Heidegger perceives that we are thrown back into wonder, which now attunes us as amazement (*Schrecken*).^{xxii} But now, in the awareness of our history, we find ourselves compelled to sustain wonderment rather than to lose it, we are given to an affirmation of wonder that holds us back from τέχνη in *reserve*. We join the holding back of beings in their abyssal appearing and find in their refusal the gift of our belonging to their appearing. They now compel us not to stand-upon them in masterful knowing, but they instead attune us with awe (*Scheu*), an awe in which we find ourselves caring for them in their withdrawing appearing, and we come to ourselves in this care.

Such is the configuration of attunement that compels us to enact the ‘crossing’ at the end of Platonism, a configuration that retrieves the wonder that Socrates calls the beginning of philosophy.^{xxiii}

PART ONE: Sketching a Philosophical Program of Study.

“...in the end every manner of scholastic worldview stands outside philosophy, because it can only persist on the basis of the denial of the question-worthiness of be-ing. In appreciating this question-worthiness, philosophy has its own non-deducible and incalculable dignity. All decisions about philosophy’s activity are made by preserving this dignity and *as* preservations of this dignity. In the realm of what is most question-worthy, however, philosophy’s activity can enact only one single question. If at any of philosophy’s hidden times it has to have decided what is its ownmost in the light of its knowing, then certainly in the crossing to another beginning.”^{xxiv}

First Study: The Task of Philosophy in the Crossing and the Centrality of Plato and Platonism for this Task

The Aims of the First Study:

The aim here is (i) to understand the character of the *Auseinandersetzung*, the encounter, between Heidegger and Plato on the basis of *Contributions*, (ii) to show that this encounter belongs to what Heidegger calls ‘the crossing’ in *Contributions*, and (iii) to develop the sketch of a program to interpret Plato in the crossing as enabling this crossing.

A) Preliminary consideration of Heidegger's turn to Plato and the Greeks:

1. The distinction Classical / Classicism^{xxv}

“In contrast to classicism, the classical is...a basic structure of Dasein...”^{xxvi}

Heidegger's way of thinking undermines any scholarly assessment of the correctness of his interpretation of Plato and any attempt to assimilate this interpretation into 'classicism.' Such critical work does not pertain to the kind of historical (*Geschichtliche*) reflection that Heidegger sets into play when he engages Plato's thinking.

In this respect, I note a remark in *Contributions* about the interpretation of works of thinking. This remark is found in the joining 'the Pass':

“Historically mindful deliberations can be used—and even quite advantageously—merely as historical [historisch] observations that are immediately correctable and perhaps as discoveries, without there ever breaking forth from them the hint of *that* history [Geschichte] that is of be-ing itself and that bears in itself the decisions of all decisions.”^{xxvii}

Historical reflections can be used as treatises to be criticized and improved, and even as discoveries—they can be used as scholarly materials. The use of scholarly materials, and the institutional and professional needs satisfied by them, involves a kind of effort and purpose that are different from Heidegger's thinking.

What does it mean to ask about the 'correctness' of an interpretation of a philosophical work within Heidegger's thinking? It is to submit Heidegger's thought to the order of truth as correctness that Heidegger destroys. In other words, it would mean to assume that philosophy is a work craftsmanship in the Platonic sense: that philosophy views pre-established 'true determinations of beings' which it tries to accurately portray. Within this narrow mimetic order

of truth, the work of interpretation of philosophical texts—that kind of work that could be called ‘classicism,’ for example—takes for granted philosophy as craftsmanship and finds purpose in measuring whether an author correctly approximates the pre-established truths that she holds in view or whether interpreters themselves are correct in these measurements. In this way, the interpretation of philosophical texts as scholarly materials can become technical appreciations that appear as decisions only by forgetting the kind of truth that grounds this practice, a truth of mimesis and correctness that remains unquestioned, and which is destroyed in Heidegger’s way of thinking. To this extent “classicism” does not bear in itself “the decisions of all decisions.” Its decisiveness does not belong to the decision between truth as correctness and truth as ἀλήθεια, which is the originary emerging/withdrawing of beings outside the circulation between beings and a fore-grasped Being (i.e. that of craftsmanship and hypothesis).

Heidegger distances himself as an interpreter of texts from that kind of interpretation that lives parasitically on truth as correctness. This is why Heidegger’s interpretations are not ‘immediately correctable.’ This does not mean, however, that Heidegger distances himself from rigor in interpretation. In *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art*, Heidegger praises Nietzsche’s interpretation of Plato as superior to that of Schopenhauer’s. How can he do that outside of truth as correctness? By a superior interpretation Heidegger means not only the disciplined study of the thought of a philosopher. He also means an engagement with this thought that brings to the fore its decisive character: that is, the way in which this thought challenges the sense of truth that frames it. This challenge to the sense of truth that sustains a particular philosophical discourse and that occurs within this discourse—in its enactment—opens possibilities of decision that are outside philosophical craftsmanship. In this sense, Nietzsche’s interpretation of Plato is superior because it identifies within Plato a sense of being and truth as non-sensual and sets into play out

of Plato's thinking a decision that enables an overturning of Platonism, a re-interpretation of sensuality. Heidegger writes about this:

“...the overturning of Platonism and the ultimate twist out of it imply a metamorphosis of man. At the end of Platonism stands a decision concerning the transformation of man... a decision as to whether with the end of Platonism man as he has been hitherto is to come to an end, whether he is to become that kind of man that Nietzsche characterized as the ‘last man,’ or whether that type of man can be overcome and the overman can begin...”^{xxviii}

There is no common measure between ‘classicism’ and the decisive thinking that Heidegger finds as a possibility in the interpretation of philosophical texts, those of Plato in particular. In the case of Nietzsche's interpretation of Plato (a *way* of interpreting Plato that is definitive for Heidegger) what is to be decided is Dasein in its basic structure as giving historical meaning to man. It is not the case, then, that Nietzsche writes ‘about’ Plato. He—as I noted above—joins the movement of Plato's thought and challenges a sense of truth that has come to be established on the basis of this thought, and which has come to define the human relation to Da-sein.

Nietzsche's interpretation of Plato, just like Heidegger's, is historical (*Geschichtliche*) in a very different sense than classicism (as *Historie*).

I emphasize here the lack of depth of “classicism” in relation to Heidegger's historical thinking. “Classicism” as a way of interpretation is framed in its possibilities by the lineage of Platonism, which is itself an interpretation of Plato. Thus, “classicism” can only operate at a derivative level of interpretation when it turns to Plato in particular. Heidegger recognizes the limited stance of “classicism” and interprets Plato beyond Platonism, in a way that cannot be framed within ideals of correctness.

This is not all, however, that Heidegger finds in Nietzsche's interpretation. When Heidegger attends to Nietzsche's interpretation of Plato in its challenging force, he finds that Plato's writings are not 'texts' anymore but disclosures of a sense of truth that carries necessity and historical destiny in the West, a sense of truth that reaches in these texts a degree of exposure and vulnerability unparalleled in the lineage that is born out of them, the lineage of Platonism. Turning to Nietzsche's interpretation of Plato, Heidegger finds in it a mode of discourse that is set into play between Plato and Nietzsche, a discourse that is neither Plato's nor Nietzsche's, and that engages and challenges the determining structures of the appearing of beings in their being. This 'other' discourse is motivated by a different necessity and historical destiny than the one that motivates 'Platonism.' It is not a representational or conceptual discourse but, rather, an event of language that transforms the core of human care and which Heidegger would call "classical" in distinction to "classicism."

2. *Contributions*' debt to Nietzsche's interpretation of Plato and Platonism (first elucidation)^{xxix}

Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy is a "classical" work in this new determination of the word. It is a discourse that joins the appearing of beings in their being outside the structures of difference between being and beings, between sensuous and super-sensuous, and that disrupts the enforcement of truth as correctness that accompanies them. It unsettles the lineage of Platonism. At the same time, *Contributions* is a work in which Plato's thought is most present as a constant motivating source for the unsettling of Platonism. In this respect, the debt to Nietzsche's interpretation of Plato and Platonism is central to *Contributions*. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger engages Plato in order to overturn Platonism. Unlike Nietzsche, Heidegger finds this

overturning of Platonism as a possibility opened up in the very appearing of beings in their being that gives birth to Platonism. He turns to an originary mode of truth (ἀλήθεια) that is operative in Plato's thinking but which Platonism leaves unsaid and which Heidegger attempts to recover. In this way, Heidegger, through Nietzsche rather than with him, finds in Plato an other necessity at work which is implicit even in Nietzsche's overturning of Platonism; he finds a way of reading Plato in and as the passage of Platonism. I will show that *Contributions* is the classical discourse that articulates such a reading of Plato that involves a decisive transformation of human care.

Heidegger departs from Nietzsche's overturning of Platonism in the sense that Heidegger's interpretation of Plato does not set itself in opposition to Platonism. It, rather, articulates the necessity of a discourse other to Platonism by engaging the beginning of Platonism. In Heidegger's interpretation of the inceptive phenomenal ground of Platonism, Platonism appears as passing, it loses its definitive influence and gives options for thought that are outside of its reign. The inceptual character of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato is of a different order than Nietzsche's, even though it grows from it. By thinking inceptually, by turning to the beginning of Platonism, that is, to the basic relation to the appearing of beings in which Platonism begins, Heidegger grounds even the overturning of Platonism within its inceptive ground. In this turn to the beginning, the beginning appears as radically fissured: on the one hand it is the beginning of Platonism, on the other hand it appears as setting into play an other destiny. The beginning of Platonism recedes from Platonism, bastardizing it. This receding of the beginning appears only in the passing of Platonism. Heidegger's original insight is the recognition of this passing, the receding of the origin, already as a fissure in the appearing of beings in their Being, in the inceptual phenomenology of Plato's thinking.

In *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art*, Heidegger recognizes a moment in which Nietzsche is closest to Heidegger's own project, in which Nietzsche goes beyond the overturning of Platonism in order to think a realm of the appearing of beings that is not dominated by the distinction "sensuous" and "supersensuous," and by the mimetic sense of truth that enables this distinction. Heidegger writes about the sixth division of "How the 'True World' became a Fable":

"In spite of the fact that the supersensuous world as the true world has been cast aside, the vacant niche of the higher world remains, and so does the blueprint of an above and below, which is to say, so does Platonism. The inquiry must go one step further:

'6. The True World we abolished: which world was left, the apparent one perhaps?...But no! along with the true world we have also abolished the apparent one!'

That Nietzsche appends a sixth division here shows that, and how, he must advance beyond himself and beyond sheer abolition of the supersensuous."^{xxx}

Heidegger sees here that Nietzsche calls for a space of sensibility, of the appearing of beings that is outside of the difference between Being / beings, sensuous / supersensuous. *This is precisely the task that Heidegger sets for himself in Contributions*. Heidegger takes this task up in the following ways:

- a) by finding this new sensuousness by engaging Plato's thinking as a movement of passage of the necessity of Platonism.
- b) by inquiring into the originary structure of appearing that yields Platonism and finding in it an open phenomenality ('αλήθεια) that cannot be grounded by the positing of a stable, supersensuous realm of 'Being' as opposed to 'beings.'

- c) by developing a mode of discourse that is different from the operation of ‘hypothesis’ and ‘definitions’ that stabilizes the meaning of the Being of beings and thus grounds the appearing of beings in a supersensible realm. This other, non-hypothetical mode of discourse is attempted in *Contributions* as a “poietic saying.”
- d) and by writing *Contributions* as a preparatory, inceptual discourse, that opens up the space/time in which a sensuousness and truth that is other to Platonism, but which belongs to its inceptual ground, may eventuate as transformative of human care.

Following Nietzsche, but at the same time taking a different path, Heidegger finds in the interpretation of Plato the possibility of a transformation of human beings in their relation to Dasein. Such are the stakes in the attempt that Heidegger calls ‘the crossing’ in *Contributions*.

B) The Crossing (Über-gang) of *Contributions*.

1. The Crossing of *Contributions*

At the beginning of *Contributions*, Heidegger writes:

“...in the age of the crossing from metaphysics into being-historical-thinking, one can only attempt to think according to a more originary basic stance within the question of the truth of be-ing.”^{xxxix}

Contributions is an ‘attempt’ to think from a more originary stance than that of the appearing of beings in their Being enforced by Platonism. This stance occurs not within Platonism, but is a sensuousness, an openness to beings, within the truth of be-ing (Wahrheit des Seyns) that Platonism covers up. This attempt is a ‘crossing’ from Platonism/metaphysics into “be-ing-historical-thinking” (seynsgeschichtliche Denken).

One could gather the following moments as implied in this articulation of the attempt of the crossing: (a) Platonism/ metaphysics grounded in the circulation between beings and Being, (b) be-ing historical thinking grounded in the unconcealment (truth) of be-ing that is more originary than this circulation and (c) *Contributions* as the bridge that crosses from the first to the second, or at least ‘attempts’ such a crossing. Under such a schema (a) and (b) appear pre-established as definite origin and destiny. *Contributions* (c) is then a tool, a bridge joining one to the other, and a tool to be discarded as useless once the crossing is complete. This, however, is *precisely not* what Heidegger means. This stance misses the *enactment* of *Contributions*. He continues:

“Even the successful attempt must—in accordance with the grounding-event [Grundereignis] of what is to be thought [erdenken]—remain distant from the claim of being a ‘work’ of the style heretofore.”^{xxxii}

Contributions is not a ‘work.’ It does not set up in advance its ‘goal’ and then direct itself toward it. That to which *Contributions* is directed cannot be set up in advance, it is no hypothesis, because it is a mode of the appearing of beings, or grounding event, which is outside of any appearing in the Platonic lineage, where Being is set up in advance to beings. The very sense of ‘work’ is dominated by the Platonism which *Contributions* challenges. We must, then, abandon the schema above in which *Contributions* appears as a bridge between an origin and a destiny. More specifically, we need to reconsider the way in which *Contributions* is an ‘attempt’. An ‘attempt’ here cannot mean one that is measured against an end, that which hits the mark or falls short of it—one that is correct or incorrect.^{xxxiii} How are we to understand the attempt of *Contributions*, how can we even know whether it is a ‘successful’ attempt at ‘crossing’? Heidegger explains:

“Future thinking is a thinking-in-passing (*Gedanken-gang*) through which the—until now completely hidden—realm of the Essencing of Be-ing [*Wesung des Seyns*] is:

[a] passed through [*durchgangen wird*]

[b] first cleared [*gelichtet wird*]

[c] reached in its ownmost enowning-character [*in seinem eigensten Ereignischarakter erreicht wird*].^{»xxxiv}

Heidegger here is risking a determination of future thinking, that is, of be-ing-historical-thinking that is grounded in the truth of be-ing rather than in Platonism. This is a risk because it is not the case that he has a hold of this thinking, as if this thinking were already there and his task were to transmit it to us, to teach it. Heidegger is simply tentatively laying out the character of a thinking that would be outside the domination of Platonism. He intimates that this thinking would have a ‘passing’ character (it is a *Gedanken-gang*), which means, it is not determined in advance, it does not work hypothetically.

‘Passing’ here has two senses:

1. be-ing-historical-thinking is ‘passing’ in the sense that it does not aim at a full determination of beings, at ‘defining’ them for the sake of a totalizing project of knowledge; that is, this thinking does not aim at an ‘end’ but it ‘passes.’ ‘Passing’ here means that beings are encountered as possibilities rather than grounded in stable meanings, and that thinking is more concerned here with the openness in which beings appear as meaningful.
2. in be-ing-historical-thinking beings appear as passing. In other words, beings are not ‘passed’ by future thinking. They are rather passing themselves, emerging with meaning while passing in their meaning: they are not hypothetically, supersensually

anchored in language. Beings ‘pass’ in the sense that they both transgress and withdraw from fixed determinations of meaning, that they are elusive to a narrow eidetic gaze, that they shelter open events of meaning that are not set up in advance, events of ᾽αλήθεια.

These two senses of passing speak both of a thinking that opens possibilities of meaning rather than closing them, and of beings whose relationship to this openness is to appear as emerging/passing in their meanings, in truth as unconcealment (᾽αλήθεια). This relationship between thinking and beings as passing is not that of the hypothetical use of language but calls for a force of language that engages and gathers an irreducible dimensionality or perspectival character in the appearing of being in their meanings. In this gathering, thinking ‘clears up’ the space [Da] in which beings appear with perspectival meanings, being ‘cleared’ in the sense of shining and shading, appearing and concealment. As ‘passing,’ be-ing-historical-thinking engages the clearing of lighting/shading in the inceptive appearing of beings, an appearing of beings with meanings that are not anchored in ‘Being’ and in the ontological difference between ‘beings’ and ‘Being.’

This futural thinking as the lighting relationship between language and beings in passing must have compelling force, must have a necessity of its own—one that Heidegger cannot yet elucidate. This compelling force must be an event of ‘owning’ between beings and language, between the essencing of be-ing and human beings—it must be Da-sein in the openness of events of meanings. This compelling necessity in be-ing-historical-thinking is perhaps the most tentative moment in Heidegger’s words above, one that is the core of the word ‘Ereignis.’

Heidegger took the risk of a tentative presentation of be-ing-historical-thinking because he needed to elucidate the character of the *enactment of Contributions* as an “attempt.” The

attempt of the crossing is one in which there is no goal set in advance, no determined measure for the success or failure of the attempt. Precisely because the attempt of *Contributions* is so determined can it be a ‘crossing’ (Uber-gang) to be-ing-historical-thinking. The word ‘crossing’ here means ‘passing-over,’ it means a kind of passing, an absence of endings and fulfillments. “Passing over” is the way of crossing into be-ing-historical-thinking which is itself passing. *Heidegger here brings out the affinity of the passing character of Contributions and that of be-ing-historical-thinking. He risks Contributions, in its passing, in its absence of a guiding goal, letting it be enraptured by the necessity of thinking in ’αλήθεια that is other to that of Platonism. This un-intended rapture is the core of the enactment of Contributions.* Heidegger writes:

“It is no longer a case of talking “about” something and representing something objective, but rather of being owned over into enowning. Thus the proper title says: *From Enowning*. And that is not saying that a report is being given on or about enowning. Rather, the proper title indicates a thinking-saying which is enowned by enowning and belongs to be-ing and to be-ing’s word.”^{xxxv}

The question is whether the attempt at crossing will be owned, claimed by the necessity of be-ing-historical thinking. The claim of this necessity is a transformation of the way we are claimed by be-ing, a transformation that is a twisting free of Platonism reminiscent of Nietzsche’s transformation into the over-man. As we have seen, it is a transformation that affects the core of our Dasein: it transforms language away from its hypothetical force and sensuousness beyond the distinction sensuous/super-sensuous—that is, it is a transformation of/in thinking toward a thinking-passing (Gedanken-gang).

We cannot hold on to *Contributions* as a tool to achieve a work. If there is an achievement, it is that *Contributions* enacts a way of thinking which is open to the compelling

necessity of ἀλήθεια. This moment of appropriation (*Ereignis*) is a thinking enactment in which thinking is not a tool because it belongs to what it attempts; as the stroke of the brush comes to belong to a painting or the physicality of the piano belongs to the sounding of music. It is not a coincidence that the thinking enactments in the crossing are “fugues” in Heidegger’s terminology, thinking enactments which articulate *Contributions*.

Everything is at stake, then, if we remain in the ‘crossing’ of *Contributions* in its passing, and if we let the necessity of a futural thinking claim us to Da-sein. Everything is at stake if we understand *Contributions* as a transformative enactment of thinking twisting free of Platonism, rather than as a work ‘about’ something.

2. The task of Philosophy in the Crossing.

In *Contributions* ‘philosophy’ names the thinking enactment of the crossing:

“In between, in the crossing to an other beginning, Philosophy must have achieved an essential thing: the open throw [den Entwurf], the grounding opening of the play of time/space of the truth of be-ing.”^{xxxvi}

The task of philosophy in the crossing is to risk itself, that is, to expose itself to being owned by the necessity of the other beginning of thinking. The task, as we have seen above, does not have this being-claimed by be-ing as its goal. All that philosophy can do in this task is to release itself from the necessity of Platonism, to become ‘passing.’^{xxxvii} On the basis of the quote above I will note three aspects of the release of philosophy into another beginning:

- 1) The most important determination of Heidegger’s words above is their *tense*: present perfect. He says that the task of philosophy in the crossing is to “have achieved” an essential thing. This past perfect carries also the force of necessity: “philosophy must

have achieved.” How are we to interpret this necessity in the past perfect in the context of the crossing? In the crossing philosophy must encounter itself as already having been enowned by a necessity other than Platonism. *In the crossing, philosophy encounters itself as enacting a different necessity than the one that has dominated its history, and as having already enacted such a necessity.*^{xxxviii} Thinking beyond Platonism, in this way, does not appear as a goal set in advance for philosophy, but as coming from its past. This arrival from the past is what gives the release from Platonism its character as necessity, it is necessary because it has always been enforced. The other beginning strikes philosophy from its past, as already involving it. At the same time, this other beginning, this other claim of be-ing over Dasein, is utterly other, unfamiliar to philosophy: it is the hint of a memory that philosophy has of itself but in which it does not recognize itself. This shock is the sudden awareness that the effective history of philosophy as Platonism appears as optional in relation to another possible history that has remained silenced. *A schism opens in the lineage of philosophy, and its definitive origin in Plato becomes estranged, and Plato’s text themselves are given to philosophy out of this schism as acting out a different destiny for thinking.* Even the claim of philosophy having a beginning in the sense of Platonism seems optional, and Plato’s texts appear as indefinite, as passing, and decisive not because they are definitive but because they challenge the history of Platonism.

- 2) In this loss of origin in which philosophy finds itself, philosophy throws itself open or sketches itself. The word here is ‘der Entwurf,’ which literally means open throw. A sketch is an “open throw” in the sense that it is not a copy, but a creative attempt to

bring something forth, it says the way in which beings appear as if for the first time with tentative openness and lack of determination, in possibilities. This why in Being and Time 'Entwurf' primarily means 'projection upon possibilities.' The sketch is oriented to what is to be brought forth, but this orientation is not toward something held in view in advance. Rather, the sketch sees what it is bringing forth in the very drawing and sketching, the sketched figure first brings forth what it sketches in its refusal to appear, in its lack of determination, in its possibilities, in a similar way that a trace brings what it traces forth in the trace and not by pointing to some definitive appearing of what it traces. In the crossing 'der Entwurf' is a sketch that philosophy makes of itself when it remembers itself a other to itself, when its Platonic lineage appears to philosophy as a trace of something other, of the occurrence of truth as 'ἀλήθεια. The lines that determine the sketch of philosophy correspond here to the basic structures that determine thought within Platonism. Now, however, these structures appear as traces of a different thought. Philosophy thus returns to the first marking out of these structures, namely, to the texts of Plato, and releases these decisive and definite moments to other destinies by taking them up as traces. These moments to be released are, following Nietzsche's insight into Platonism, the distinctions sensuous/supersensuous and Being/beings, language as hypothetical, the domination of 'reason' over other dispositions of soul, truth as the correspondence of a being with its Being (image with its original), art as an image of an image.

- 3) These decisive moments in the structure of Platonism are not random philosophical ideas. They become ways in which Da-sein is claimed by Be-ing in an originary articulation of its structure. They express the necessity out of which a configuration of

the human in relation to be-ing is constituted. The definitive structures of Platonism are not conceptual structures but events that take precedence among others in the lineage of those who belong to the history of Platonism. *In other words, to release these structures to a different destiny is not to write a scholarly critique of Plato's texts, but to set into play the possibility of a different openness to the appearing of beings with meanings, an openness that would yield a new configuration of Da-sein, an essential transformation (Wesenswandel) of the human in its care, in its relation to be-ing.* The task of philosophy is the transformation of the human, the establishment of an other relation to the appearing of beings, in order to join the compelling force of an other necessity for human history.

At the same time, this task is not owned by philosophy as a goal set up in advance. This is why Heidegger refers to the *sketch* as the “grounding opening of the space/time of the essence of be-ing.” Philosophy is what is always already was, the enactment of the ‘crossing.’

3. What is Philosophy? The preliminary distinction philosophy/worldview.

The task of philosophy is fundamental to the crossing. In view of this, Heidegger includes in *Contributions* a determination of philosophy that would show why philosophy has this fundamental role. In sections 14-19 of *Contributions*, Heidegger shows that the task of philosophy in the crossing is not an imposition upon philosophy, as if philosophy were something different from this task that then gets applied to it. *Philosophy, rather, is this task and this task reveals what philosophy has always already been.* I will interpret here sections 14-19 of *Contributions* to shed light on this.

Heidegger begins his determination of philosophy by distinguishing it from ‘worldview’ (*Weltanschauung*). Heidegger marks this distinction out in two moments.

1) *In relation to experience [Erfahrung]:*

“The ‘worldview’ arranges [einrichten] experience in a certain definite path and into its range, always in so far as the worldview is never put into question. Thus worldview constricts and thwarts ownmost experience [eigentliche Erfahrung]. Seen from the standpoint of worldview, that is its strength.”^{xxxix}

Worldview configures experience. Experience here simply means being with beings in their meaningful appearing. Under *Weltanschauung*, experience is configured as having a center around which it is arranged—it is arranged as one, it is unified [einrichten]. Experience is unified because the meanings of beings encountered in it are dictated in advance. This arrangement around a pre-determined determination of meaning is the configuration of experience under worldview. Playing on the literal meaning of *Erfahrung* as a journeying [fahren], we can say with Heidegger that the path of the journey here is determined in advance, it is ‘definite.’

In worldview one finds beings in the meanings that one is set in advance to find in them. This is not a claim about the meanings found in beings, but about the human relation to meaning as such, *worldview is a configuration of Da-sein*.

Heidegger finds that the hold worldview has as a configuration of experience depends on the exclusion of the possibility of questioning the determination of the meanings of beings set up in advance. In so far as these meanings are not questioned, in so far as they are taken as unchallenged hypotheses, the whole of the configuration of experience in worldview remains intact—even if this configuration is more than the specific meanings set in advance. Worldview

is a configuration of experience in which experience is subordinated to a relation with pre-established meanings, and experience cannot encounter meanings beyond this subordination—it is thus constricted in the way in which it encounters beings in their meanings, *in its very relation to meaning*. This constriction, this subordinating relation to pre-determinations of meaning appears as strength: the gathering of strength from ideals and the resulting glorification of martyrdom attest to the kind of strength that Heidegger has in mind here.

Heidegger writes about philosophy:

“Philosophy opens up experience, but because of that philosophy is precisely not capable of grounding history in an immediate way.”^{x1}

Philosophy is the opening up of experience, of journeying (*erfahren*) with beings in their meaningful appearing. As opposed to worldview, philosophy does not arrange experience around one pre-established center. Philosophy, rather, undermines any pre-determination of meaning and opens up the possibility of encountering beings with meanings that are given in the very encountering of them, in open events of meaning. In these events beings appear as meaningful in the spacing of the transgressions of the determination of meaning set in advance to them. It is not the case here that we encounter beings with completely ‘new’ meanings but, rather, that we allow our pre-determined meanings mark boundaries that we twist free from when encountering beings in ‘experience.’ As opposed to worldview, the mode of experience configured in philosophy is not a guided experience but one that engages meanings as possibility, one that finds meaning in the way appearing beings transgress the boundaries that define our preconceptions of them. The encounter of meaning in moments of release from fixed determinations of meaning characterizes philosophy in distinction to the constricted experience of world view.

Philosophy does not pre-determine ideas in advance to guide experience. For this reason the mode of experience configured in philosophy offers no immediate ground from which to understand what we experience and it rather cultivates a disciplined engagement with the indeterminacy of the meaning of beings. In this sense, philosophy does not ground history immediately, that is, it does not find purpose in delivering ideals to peoples from which to understand their past and future. In other words, philosophy completely lacks the strength that characterizes worldview. Philosophy is neither enlivened by the confirmation and defense of ideals nor by martyrdom. Philosophy's task, then, is to enable an openness to the inceptive appearing of beings that is not subordinated to the experience configured by worldview

2) *In relation to the totality of beings:*

“...there arises here an unsurpassable difficulty, one that can never be removed either by adjustment or by excuse. The total worldview must close itself off from the opening of its ground and from engrounding the domain of its ‘creating’; that is, its creating can never arrive at what is its ownmost way of being and become creating beyond itself, because thereby the total worldview would have to put itself into question.”^{xli}

Worldview has a totalizing tendency: it strives toward having a pre-determined view of the meaning of the *totality* of beings. Worldview finds strength in the confirmation and working out of pre-conceived meanings for beings and has no ability to assimilate into its disposition meanings as open possibilities, as held in indeterminacy. It strives to include all beings under its view, and this striving comes to determine human care as dictated by ideals and valuations, it structures our care. This totalization *also* becomes the total claim of worldview over experience as such, a totalizing force that results in what Heidegger calls ‘lived experience.’ The double

operation of totalization is the core of the ‘closing off’ in which Heidegger finds an “unsurpassable difficulty,” *it is being closed off in a willful relation to beings that we cannot will to overcome*. Worldview covers over the optionality of configurations of experience of which it is a singular instance, and it cannot challenge its own ground or necessity, it does not know how to ask the question of the origin of its strength. Its range of creativity occurs only within the constricted configuration of experience that it enforces.

Philosophy has a different disposition to the totality of beings:

“But does philosophy not also and even above all and altogether lay claim to the ‘total,’ especially when we define philosophy as the knowing awareness of beings as such and in the whole? The answer is yes, as long as we think in the mode of philosophy up to now (metaphysics)...But it is precisely here that modern philosophy is already on the way to ‘worldview’...however and insofar and as soon as philosophy finds its way back into its inept way of being (in the other beginning) and the question of the truth of being becomes the grounding midpoint, the abyssal character of philosophy reveals itself.”^{xlii}

With regard to claiming knowledge of the totality of beings, it seems that philosophy and worldview are the same. This determination of philosophy as seeking knowledge of the totality of beings, however, is the result of the slow transformation of philosophy into worldview, which coincides with the enforcement of philosophy as Platonism and metaphysics. Platonism and worldview share the same disposition toward the totality of beings, but philosophy, insofar as it can twist itself free from Platonism, doesn’t. The distinction between Platonism and worldview lies only in the degree of explicit acknowledgement of the knowledge of the totality of beings as its driving goal. While Platonism and metaphysics value this force, worldview lets this goal operate tacitly through it. None of them, however, question the origin of this goal.

The distinction between philosophy and worldview will only appear with clarity once philosophy engages in the rapture of the ‘crossing’ that *Contributions* sketches. Heidegger here makes the claim that philosophy is not clear about itself, especially through its involvement with worldview. At the same time, we have distinguished the way in which philosophy and worldview are different configurations of experience. The task of philosophy in the crossing is to root itself in the uniqueness of experience and sensuousness as it is configured in philosophy in distinction to worldview. Heidegger affirms that if philosophy would do this it would find itself, while at the same time releasing itself from the constrictions of Platonism and worldview that have shaped its effective history. At the same time, when philosophy enforces its mode of experience with awareness, it will distance itself from the confirmation of pre-determined meanings for beings as a source of strength. Heidegger expresses this by saying that philosophy would reveal its character as “abyssal.” In this revealing of the abyssal character of philosophy, philosophy will explicitly start asking the question of the truth of be-ing, as ἀλήθεια.

4. What is Philosophy? The preliminary study of the reversal from “philosophy of a people” to “people of a philosophy”

After marking out the distinction between philosophy and worldview, Heidegger asks the question about philosophy in relation to “a people.” He writes:

“Mindfulness of what belongs to ‘being a people’ constitutes an essential passage-way...Philosophy of a people is that which makes a people into a people of a philosophy, which historically founds the people in its Da-sein, and which prevails upon a people to become guardians of the truth of be-ing.”^{xliii}

Just as in the case of worldview, inquiring into the relation between philosophy and what constitutes a people as a people is a way of understanding philosophy in the ‘crossing.’ Heidegger finds that the configuration of experience that belongs to philosophy in its difference from worldview is also that which “makes a people into a people of a philosophy.” Heidegger is playing here with the reversal of the phrases “philosophy of a people” and “people of a philosophy.” He finds in this reversal an indication of a decisive transformation of Da-sein, the motivation of a depth of awareness within experience which constitutes peoples in their relation to the truth of be-ing and in their openness to history. What is at stake in this reversal?

When we speak of the philosophy of a people we understand a ‘people’ to be already constituted and philosophy as being something secondary to a ‘people’: one of their accomplishments. Heidegger writes:

“...such a characterization of philosophy levels it off and makes it into an indifferent ‘accomplishment,’ a ‘fulfillment,’ a manner of comportment similar to the one that can also exemplify the style of clothing and food preparation and the like.”^{xliv}

For Heidegger, when we speak of the philosophy of a people, we cover over what philosophy is. Purging his thinking from any nostalgia or romanticism for the Greeks as a people, Heidegger points to the non-philosophical tendency in glorifying philosophy as the accomplishment of the Greek people. The ‘beginning’ of philosophy is not the accomplishment of the Greeks, and studying them is not an attempt to reach the ‘truth’ of the Greeks as a people. In such scholarly efforts “we do not say anything about what is ownmost to philosophy itself.”^{xlv} What is then the relationship between philosophy and “a people” and how are we to understand Heidegger’s directive to turn necessarily toward the Greek beginning as the first beginning in the crossing?

When we undergo the reversal and say “a people of a philosophy” we understand that “a people” belongs to a “philosophy.” Heidegger is careful about how to understand this:

“Here all Platonizing manner of thinking fails when it prescribes for the health of a people an idea, a meaning, and a value in accord with which that people is to “become.”

From where does such a prescription come and how does it happen?”^{xlvi}

A “people of a philosophy” does not mean that philosophy sets up values that determine the identity of a people and against which they are to be measured. This would be understanding “a people” within Platonism and, particularly, within the interpretation of Plato’s *Republic* enforced by Platonism. I note here the parallel between Heidegger’s determination of “a people” and his previous discussion of experience. Heidegger warns against understanding both ‘experience’ and ‘a people’ in terms of pre-determined meanings and values that constrict the possibilities and configurations of the eventuation of beings in their meanings. Just as we can think of ‘experience’ released from worldview and inquire decisively about its ground outside of the strength of the determination and confirmation of meanings, ‘a people’ can be understood as released from determinations such as values and ideas, and as formed out of a different kind of necessity.

The convergence in Heidegger’s discussions of ‘experience’ and ‘a people’ can be taken a step further. In the same way that there is in experience a dimension of it that has a free relationship to meanings rather than taking them as guiding forces, in the lives of peoples there is a dimension that escapes the grasp of political or religious valuations and that has a compelling force that is different from that of the constricted constitution of ‘identities.’ In other words, there is affinity between Heidegger’s project of bringing forth a dimension of experience outside of the totalizing force of worldview and that of bringing a dimension of ‘a people’ that is outside

totalization and totalitarianism. *Contributions* attempts to think the unity of this affinity. This dimension is the enactment of philosophical questioning.

Heidegger begins to work out an alternative way of understanding ‘what makes a people’:

“A people first becomes a people when its most unique ones arrive and begin to intimate [ahnen]. In this way a people first becomes free for its law-through-struggle [erkämpfendes Gesetz], which is the necessity of its noblest decisive moment. The philosophy of a people is [in this way] what makes a people into a people of a philosophy, what grounds a people historically in its Dasein and what determines a people as guardians of the truth of Be-ing.”^{xlvi}

In the analysis of ‘experience’ Heidegger laid out a way in which experience through philosophy released itself from worldview and reached its ownmost freedom. In the analysis of ‘a people’ Heidegger finds that philosophy is necessary for a people to be constituted as a people in freedom from political and religious valuations, as well as from pre-determined identities. Just like in the case of ‘experience,’ Heidegger is far from claiming that ‘a people’ is always so constituted through philosophy. He is, rather, proposing to shift to a philosophical dimension within the lives of peoples in which he finds their historical formations outside of ‘ideals’ or ‘valuations.’ When the unique ones among a people, the poets and thinkers, intimate, that is, risk to think creatively about options for a people’s identity that challenge its pre-conceived understanding of itself (a mode of creativity analogous to the one at work in experience, using pre-conceived notions as boundaries to be transgressed), they open up free spaces of self-determination for ‘a people.’ The ‘people’ do not act in concordance with laws and ideals, but rather, find their directives always in struggle, they find their ‘law’ in spaces of contestation of

the law. The strength of ‘a people’ resides here in their capacity for self-transformation, in the transgression of the familiar, in the hesitancy in the face of determinations of identity, in making decisions that enforce openness to creative options for self-assessment outside of valuation. This openness is constituted by the necessity of the “noblest decisive moment.” Here ‘decisive moment’ [Augenblick] is thought in terms of ‘Entschlossenheit’ in *Being and Time*, which is, in turn, an interpretation of προαίρεσις in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Heidegger emphasizes here the openness [Ent-] of this moment, in which there is disclosure of beings in meanings that appear beyond the values of recognition and confirmation. When a people reaches this noblest moment, they become as a people the guardians of the ‘truth of be-ing.’

5. The program of an interpretation of Plato suggested by Heidegger’s two preliminary studies of ‘what is philosophy?’ in *Contributions*.

In *Contributions*, Heidegger begins to determine philosophy in relation to what it is not: ‘worldview’ and ‘philosophy of a people.’ These preliminary distinctions are only preparatory for the direct encounter with the question of ‘what is philosophy in the crossing?’ which he tackles next in the Pre-view. Before we move to this direct analysis, I would like to propose that in the distinctions above Heidegger is setting up a program for an engagement with Plato beyond Platonism. The distinction between philosophy and ‘worldview’ can come to pass as an interpretation of Plato’s *Theaetetus*. In this dialogue what is at issue is precisely understanding the relationship between sensibility and λόγος as constitutive of experience. The *Theaetetus* presents different configurations of experience as modes of δόξα or ‘opinion.’ Among these, the configuration of ‘worldview’ appears as different from that which corresponds to philosophy. In the *Theaetetus* we can find the possibility of releasing philosophy from ‘worldview’ at the very

site in which the very determination of ‘worldview’ is marked out in its first possibility as a mode of ‘δόξα.’

The reversal from ‘philosophy of a people’ to ‘people of a philosophy’ is a reversal attained when ‘experience’ released from ‘worldview’ is guarded by a people in the struggle for their law. Heidegger finds the possibility of this reversal in an interpretation of the image of the cave in Plato’s *Republic* outside of Platonism. In the *Republic*, Plato investigates the possibility of founding a city—‘a people’—in speech. This means, founding a city on the basis of speech’s capacity to proffer meanings, to guide any kind of creation within the narrow frame of τέχνη as the setting up of the looks of beings in advance and building copies that correspond to them. In other words, Plato’s *Republic* is the first marking out of a politics and the basis of the kind of δόξα that is the originary form of ‘worldview’—the *Republic* investigates politics prior to the reversal, when philosophy is ‘of a people.’ The *Republic* is the first marking out of the possibility of a politics of δόξα in its narrowly technical and totalizing mode (as ‘worldview’). At the same time, the *Republic* demonstrates the necessary instability of this politics (particularly in the image of the cave).

The program suggested here is clear: to read the *Theaetetus* and the *Republic* as setting up the loss of philosophy while showing the conditions for this loss, and therefore as inaugurating the guardianship of an other sense of philosophy, in resistance to this loss. The task, then, is to read the *Theaetetus* and the *Republic* as works of philosophy that ground a sense of truth that departs from philosophy, and which then unground this ground. The worth of these texts (and of Plato’s thought) in the crossing is their grounding/ungrounding *enactment* of thinking—this is their *contribution to philosophy* in the crossing, and the task of philosophy is to

think this movement as a challenge to Platonism, and to join, through them, a thinking enactment of the other beginning.

This program seems to coincide with the lectures that Heidegger gave on both the *Theaetetus* and the *Republic* in the early thirties. These lectures, however, do not carry out this program because they precede Heidegger's re-envisioning of the role of Plato in the crossing in his *Nietzsche Lectures: The Will to Power as Art* and in *Contributions*. The lectures on Plato in the early thirties need to be re-considered on the basis of this re-envisioning. Heidegger recognized this need but did not re-work his lectures. Instead, he published in the early forties an essay based on his lectures on the *Republic* called *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* which, given the lack of understanding of *Contributions*, is often misunderstood as Heidegger's final word on Plato.^{xlviii} This essay does not carry out the program above, but deepens the understanding of Platonism as dependent on a particular occurrence of truth. That *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* is Heidegger's account of Plato from within Platonism, rather than the Plato that appears in the crossing, is evident from the title of the essay. Heidegger understands 'doctrine' (*Lehre*) as one of the cornerstones of Platonism—as if philosophy were a detached 'idea' or 'valuation' that could be a teaching. The title is not only a tacit directive for the correct reading of the essay (that is, as an interpretation of Plato's text *within* Platonism, taking Platonism to its limit) but it also points to the possibility of a different reading of the image of the cave by putting the essay as a whole into question. This ungrounding movement of Heidegger's essay becomes obvious in that Plato's 'doctrine' is the truth as correctness out of which any understanding of 'doctrine' is possible. Can an account of the possibility of doctrine be itself a doctrine or doesn't it precisely undermine the rule of doctrines in thinking?^{xlix}

I put forth these kinds of considerations to point out that the program sketched above is left unaccomplished by Heidegger. He only points to a path for the interpretation of Plato in the crossing. The program sketched above, however, is not complete. We are in need of a starting point, an account of philosophy that would set into play the readings of *Theaetetus* and *Republic* in their grounding/ungrounding movement. This is why we need to turn to Heidegger's direct engagement with the question 'what is philosophy?' in *Contributions*.

6. What is Philosophy? The 'failure' of *Being and Time*.

After the section on "Philosophy as 'philosophy of a people,'" Heidegger finally turns to a section entitled "Philosophy." It begins:

"Philosophy is the immediately useless but at the same time masterful knowledge out of mindfulness [Besinnung]."¹

Philosophy is immediately useless because it does not provide guidance, it is no teaching, and it does not pre-arrange experience nor define identities and values for a people to uphold. In other words, it cannot be *made* useful. It is no 'worldview' it is not 'of a people.' Heidegger says, however, that it is a masterful knowledge that begins in mindfulness. What is this mindfulness?

"Mindfulness is to ask about [nach] the meaning [Sinn] (as in *Being and Time*), about the truth of be-ing"^{li}

Mindfulness is a mode of questioning. We must attend here first of all to the particular mode of questioning involved here. This mode of questioning asks about meaning. It seems to have the form "What is be-ing?" in the same way that we could ask "What is a horse?," it seems to be an ontological mode of questioning. This is precisely the step that Heidegger does not take in his determination of mindfulness. Why? When we ask about the meaning of a horse we are asking

about the Being ('look') of a horse, about that which it must be in order to be what it is. By meaning we understand (from *Being and Time*) that upon which we project a being and that which returns to us this being in a context of relations to other beings which determine 'what' this being is^{lii}. Da-sein as care, in *Being and Time*, is the structure of the event of meaningfulness, of this working out of the Being of beings.

Heidegger shows that to ask about the meaning of Being—not of 'a being' like a horse—is to ask about that Da-sein as the event of meaning, to ask about the ground of Da-sein as care. This ground is time in *Being and Time*. The question about the meaning of Being, even in *Being and Time*, escapes the form 'what is x?' because it does not ask about the being of a particular being, but about the configuration of appearing in which beings appear meaningfully in their Being.

Being and Time enacts the transition from the question 'what is?' to the question of Being, in an enactment that transforms the very structure of questioning. Turning to Being, the ontology of *Being and Time* does not take Being as one more being, but enters a domain of questioning in which what is at stake is our inceptive engagement with the appearing of beings as Da-sein, a domain of questioning that opens up at the limits of the ontological frame of the question "what is?." According to Heidegger, philosophy is the transgression of this limit, it is the disciplined thinking effort to twist free from the ontological frame and to engage the appearing of beings inceptively, without the mediation of τέχνη and of the setting up in advance of the meaning of beings. Precisely for this reason, ontology has priority in philosophical thinking: ontology is the necessary thinking dimension that must be thought through, enacted, passed in order for thinking to become philosophical, to prepare the inceptive encounter with being and to transform "experience" and a "people" in the ways developed in *Contributions*.

Heidegger writes in *Contributions*:

“*Being and Time* is therefore not an ‘ideal’ or a ‘program’ but rather the self-preparing beginning of the essencing of be-ing itself—not what we think up but—granted that we are ripe for it—what compels us into a thinking that neither offers a doctrine nor brings about a ‘moral’ action nor ‘secures’ existence; instead ‘only’ grounds truth as the free play of time-space, in which a being can again become “a being,” i.e., come to preserve be-ing.”^{liii}

Both *Being and Time* and *Contributions* attempt the crossing. In this sense they are both works of philosophy: they attempt a shift of experience toward establishing a relationship with beings in their Being that escapes the domain of worldview, the subordination of experience to predetermined ideals and values, pre-determinations of the meaning in which beings appear. This shift is not a shift toward a different ideal or meaning, but a shift in the very configuration of the way in which we engage beings in their appearing as meaningful. Given the proximity between Heidegger’s two major works, we need to be very careful about their difference, decide whether there is one, and whether *Contributions* is simply a ‘clarification’ of the task of *Being and Time* or whether their difference is fundamental. *For Heidegger working out the relationship between Being and Time and Contributions is at the core of any enactment of philosophy in the crossing.*

From the quote above it would seem that *Contributions* is just a clarification of *Being and Time*, an addressing of a problem with this work’s public reception that could be solved with remarks like “*Being and Time* is not an ideal or a program.” The problem seems to be one of style, of words, rather than content. Isn’t this account of the failure of *Being and Time*, however, precisely within the mode of thinking that this work challenges? Isn’t making a distinction between style and content precisely relying on the distinction between a work and its pre-

determined meaning that is somehow outside of the work, guiding it in advance? How can *Being and Time* fail in *this respect* if it is a work out of a different kind of truth? Also, can we even blame not the work but its ‘reception’ as if the work failed to persuade us of its ‘teaching,’ as if it were ever a matter of persuasion and the correct transmission of ‘ideas’ or ‘values’? With *Being and Time* it is never a question of whether it fails, but of whether we have the resources in thinking within metaphysics and Platonism to even assess its failure.

Heidegger must have become aware of this difficulty—especially because the language in *Being and Time* enacts this difficulty. Just by setting up the problem of this work as an investigation of the ‘meaning of being,’ Heidegger remains within the structure of questioning that corresponds to the question ‘what is x?,’ even if applying it to Being challenges the very structure of such questioning. *Being and Time* is a work within the limitations of the ‘guiding’ character of questioning or, in the language of *Contributions*, within the limitations of the ‘guiding question’ (which is the *Platonic* question, $\tau\iota\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$). This manner of questioning corresponds to that mode of experience that gathers around ‘worldview,’ to the experience of actively thinking out a pre-established meaning that has yet to be uncovered, but which is ‘there’ beforehand, already anticipated by questioning into it. The achievement of *Being and Time* is not that of a ‘questioner’ in any ordinary sense of the word nor of a ‘question’ whose structure remains unchallenged by ‘what’ it questions. This entrenchment in questioning as ‘guided-questioning’ restrains the most fundamental moves that *Being and Time* attempts, those moves in which the shift in the mode of experience discussed above is at stake in its twisting free of Platonism.

I list here the structural difficulties in *Being and Time* due to its stance within the ‘guiding question,’ that is, due to its *Platonic* lineage:

- a) That the ‘meaning of being’ is an objective to be worked out, set up in advance by a questioner as a ‘goal.’ Not challenging this modality of the experiencing of questioning as still within ‘worldview’ leads to:
- b) The difficulty in understanding the difference between Da-sein and human being, as if Dasein were the same as human awareness, and resoluteness a human accomplishment to be sought after.
- c) That the break between Division I and Division II remains covered over, in the sense that the analysis of Division II involves an engagement with being that challenges the very language and stance of Division I. This in turn leads to:
- d) The facile identification of Da-sein with Being and with the meaning of being, the temptation of thinking temporality as the condition for the possibility of being, that is itself something *set up in advance* that belongs to Da-sein or is attached to it as an addendum, as Being is attached to beings in metaphysics.
- e) That the unclear distinction and possible identification of human, Dasein and Being, and understanding Da-sein as the ‘accomplishment’ of a subject, can lead to the interpretation of *Being and Time* as an anthropocentric work, a work about ‘human experience’, as an anthropological work (hence Husserl’s criticism). Heidegger in *Contributions* thinks the difference between humans/Da-sein/be-ing in the enactment ‘Grounding.’ The task there is to bring forth the compelling necessity that holds these three together in their difference and belonging to one another, and to understand this necessity as ‘Ereignis’ outside of Platonism and the guiding question. Heidegger brings forth this necessity as coming from be-ing rather than as the fulfillment of a human project.^{liv} Otherwise we end up with:

f) An underestimation of the challenge that *Being and Time* poses to experience from within experience—rather than from a scientific stance outside of experience (the difference from anthropology is here fundamental). This challenge demands the temporal re-configuration of experience and the exploration of the possibility and necessity of such a reconfiguration. This challenge can be experienced in reading *Being and Time* in its enactment as a work that breaks-- that challenges its own stance as the stance of the ‘guiding question’—as a work in the crossing. This is a work whose worth is not the establishment of ideals but the *enactment* of its own rupture and crossing.

If one reads *Being and Time* attentively, then Heidegger appears to have worked carefully through the difficulties above. But his efforts are undermined by the problem of the general stance of this work within guided-questioning. Heidegger in *Contributions* asks the same question of *Being and Time* but explicitly understands this work in its crossing, and tries to release himself from the hold of the guiding question of Platonism. In *Contributions* Heidegger writes:

“ In *Being and Time* Da-sein still stands in the shadow of the ‘anthropological,’ the ‘subjectivistic,’ and the ‘individualistic,’ etc.—and yet the opposite of all this is what we have in view—of course, not as what was initially and solely intended, but rather this opposite, everywhere only the necessary consequence of the deciding transformation of ‘the question of being’ from guiding-question into the grounding question.”^{lv}

Much is at stake, then, in marking out the difference between the guiding-question and the grounding question: namely, the very possibility of the shift within experience toward an inceptive experience in which meanings are not pre-given, in which the temporal structure of Da-sein undergoes a radical transformation in its releasement from Platonism and worldview.

Contributions must be a work in the crossing—and a work that enacts with self-awareness the rupture that *Being and Time* undergoes, the loss of the stance of the guiding question. Due to this self-awareness, *Contributions* must embrace the failure of *Being and Time* and carry out this failure in its attempt to enact the crossing. For Heidegger this rupture, the crossing, the shift in the temporal configuration of experience, is a decisive moment that characterizes philosophical thinking and which has never been explicitly studied in its disruptive character and temporal grounds, not even in *Being and Time* insofar as this work does not explicitly study its own ‘failure’.

How does Heidegger embrace the failure of *Being and Time* through the self-awareness of *Contributions* in the crossing? The first step is to mark the distinction guiding question/grounding question. This is done by:

“...overcoming the guiding question, i.e., unfolding the guiding question.”^{lvi}

The question of being maintains the rigor of the grounding question--that is, it releases itself from the structure of ‘what is x?’—by enacting and remaining as a movement of overcoming of the guiding question. The overcoming of the question ‘what is x?’ is the unfolding of the guiding question. This means, it is the study of how the necessity of the guiding question expresses itself in philosophical works, thus constituting the history of metaphysics as Platonism. Overcoming the guiding question is to study the history of metaphysics and Platonism as permutations of the guiding-question and to see the exhaustion of the possibilities of the guiding question (from Plato to Nietzsche). This is the task of Heidegger’s history of metaphysics mainly laid out in *Contributions* in the jointure ‘The Pass’ [Zuspiel]. But unfolding the guiding-question is more than this: it is also to see in the exhaustion of the guiding question the possibility of an other necessity of thinking, a possibility explored by seeing the works of philosophy as larger than the

Platonic lineage that they constitute and as themselves enacting the rupture from this lineage— here *Being and Time* would be included as one of these philosophical works. This possibility of interpretation of the history of metaphysics becomes an ‘enabling pass’ for an other thinking— and the texts of Plato have a decisive role in this enabling moment as constituting a kind of beginning of Platonism and metaphysics.

On the basis of ‘the pass’ the failure of *Being and Time* is embraced in *Contributions*, and the possibility of thinking beyond its restrictions is opened up. Particularly, the exhaustion of the grounding force of Platonism destabilizes the force of the ontological difference, of the distinction Being/a being which is reinforced by the structure of the guiding question as ‘what is x?’ Heidegger says about this:

“This distinction [between be-ing and a being] is grasped since *Being and Time* as ‘ontological difference’—with the intention of safeguarding the question of the truth of be-ing from all confusion. But this distinction is immediately pushed in the direction from which it comes [from the guiding-question]...Hence the tormenting and discording character of this distinction. For as necessary as this distinction is...in order to provide at all a preliminary perspective for the question of be-ing, just as disastrous does this distinction continue to be. For this distinction does arise from a questioning of beings as such (of beingness). But in this way one never arrives directly at the question of be-ing. In other words, this distinction itself becomes the real barrier which misplaces the inquiry into the question of be-ing.”^{lvii}

Twisting free from the guiding question by re-engaging the history of philosophy allows us to see the limitations of the ontological difference that comes out of this distinction, and it releases us from its “tormenting” grasp. When *Being and Time* asks about the meaning of being, it asks

about the temporal grounds of the ontological difference (the ground of Da-sein), of the inceptive opening of the difference between beings and Being, rather than about the meaning of one side of the distinction (i.e., Being). This confusion is at the core of the limitations of the ontological difference, and this is why it can only be a preparatory distinction in the crossing. The ontological difference is entrenched in the perspective of the guiding question which, when overcome, must recede for a proper and direct attempt to articulate neither a being nor Being, but the origin of their distinction which Heidegger calls the essence of be-ing. This direct engagement with be-ing is the task of the grounding question rather than the guiding question.

Prepared by “the Pass,” thinking-- in releasement from Platonism-- can then attempt to avoid the difficulties of *Being and Time* discussed above. Beyond the guiding-question and the ontological difference, the shift in experience that *Contributions* attempts is figured in the difference and belonging between human/Da-sein/Be-ing that articulates the uniqueness of experience outside of Platonism and in the ‘other’ beginning. Only then does the task of philosophy become explicit in a way different from its metaphysical determinations. In this way do we finally understand the title of Heidegger’s work: “Contributions to Philosophy” of which he says:

“The public title must now necessarily sound bland, ordinary, and saying nothing and must give the impression that it is dealing with “scholarly contributions” aimed at some “progress in philosophy”....However, the public title does correspond to the ‘matter’ ...”^{lviii}

7. What is Philosophy? Enacting the necessity of be-ing, that appropriates (*Ereignet*) humans into Da-sein.

Philosophy is the enactment of a shift in the configuration of experience: an enactment that is a modification of the temporal ground of Da-sein. In the movement of this modification, the apparent detachment of us from beings in their presence cannot remain unquestioned. This detachment becomes overturned into the enowning event of ἁλήθεια as we find ourselves implicated along with beings in their very appearing in their meanings. The taut stability of presence is unstrung in this releasement to possibilities of meaning that come to pass: an inceptual releasement expressed within a temporal horizon that opens outside of any enclosure of predeterminations of meaning. Experience is thus constituted as an engagement with beings in their meanings in the very appearing of these meanings so that they appear as owned rather than as pre-articulated and received, it is an inceptual experience of meaning. Philosophy is in this sense the release from the stance of questioning as ‘what is x?’ insofar as this stance enforces a guided relation to beings in their meaning as ‘Being’ or ‘Beingness.’ The owning of beings in ἁλήθεια is, rather, the enactment of a necessity that enraptures us, coming forth from be-ing rather than standing as ‘our’ project. Put in Platonic terms, we discover that philosophy is precisely not ἐπιστήμη: a standing ‘upon’ beings. Philosophy is the disavowal of this questioning stance: a disavowal which is a necessary moment of the shift of the configuration of experience that philosophy enacts.

The difficulty now is to understand the necessity that compels this shift. The problem with this necessity is that it does not compel us in the way that a goal or ideal compels us but it operates, as it were, ‘under’ any configuration of experience that is subordinated to ‘ideals’ and

‘goals’ and that seeks to represent them beforehand. The necessity operative here, then, must have a different origin than that of the need for the presentation of meaning. Heidegger says:

“the essence of be-ing^{lix}...needs us—needs us not as beings that happen to be extant, but insofar as we sustain and inabide—by preserving in Da-sein, and ground Da-sein as the truth of be-ing. Hence mindfulness is necessarily... self-mindfulness. That does not mean an observation turned back upon us as ‘given’.”^{lx}

The compelling necessity comes then not from ‘us’ and our projects, but from be-ing. We are compelled by be-ing, but not used as a tool for it and its purposes: this would merely reverse the relation between human and be-ing as it is experienced within worldview (can be-ing have a purpose?). This compelling need is rather to own ourselves, it is ‘self-mindfulness.’ But here we must be most careful because this self-mindfulness is closer to a kind of madness than to a reflection on ourselves and our purposes. It joins states of awareness that let our senses of definite purpose fade and pass and become suspended for the sake of engaging the openness of meanings in which beings appear, an openness that appears together with the appearing of beings rather than preceding them. Philosophy grows out of this necessity that overtakes us with indifference to any sense of a determinate ‘us’ and ‘self’ that actively embraces purpose and meaning. For Heidegger:

“Philosophy never builds immediately upon beings; it prepares the truth of be-ing and stands ready with the view points and perspectives that hereby open up.”^{lxi}

Philosophy, then, does not experience beings by turning them toward imposed purposes, but engages a dimension in their appearing in which beings are not fully determined but are illuminated by a non-reducible manifestation of a multiplicity of meanings that encircles them. Philosophy is the sustaining of the openness of such appearing and the preparatory work that

allows for such sustaining. In this determination, the necessity of philosophy cannot come from ‘us’ but, rather from a force of manifestation that eventuates as Da-sein that is not our accomplishment.

One of Heidegger’s greatest challenges is to bring to the fore a way of developing an awareness of the necessity of philosophy as understood above, the necessity that corresponds not to ‘our’ need but is the need of be-ing. He begins section 17 of *Contributions*, ‘The Necessity of Philosophy [Die Notwendigkeit der Philosophie]’ with:

“All necessity is rooted in distress [Alle Notwendigkeit wurzet in einer Not]” (B, p.45)

We need to bring to the fore, then, what is the ‘distress’ [*Not*] of the ‘necessity’ [*Notwendigkeit*] of philosophy. ‘Not’ means here distress in the sense of lack, being distressed due to an awareness of absence. This explains the close relationship between ‘distress’ and ‘need’ in Heidegger’s thinking: all need involves first of all the complex manifestation of absence, an appearing that cannot be the appearing of ‘a being’ but which provides a way precisely to engage a dimension of appearing of be-ing in its releasement from appearing as restricted to beings. For Heidegger, then, any sense of necessity is rooted in the possibility of absence in appearing, and the compelling power of necessity, its necessary force, is nothing but a way of responding to the eventuation of such appearing. In other words, to say that “all necessity is rooted in distress” means that distress must not to be understood as a ‘subjective emotion’ but, rather (in the same way that *Angst* is worked out in *Being and Time*), distress must here be understood in terms of a decisive engagement with a dimension of the appearing of beings that reveals appearing in its difference from ‘a being,’ inceptive appearing as a passing, withdrawing event in which beings are not held in constancy of meaning. This will shed light on what Heidegger says next:

“This distress is what drives man round among beings and brings him first of all in front of beings in the whole and into the midpoint of beings, thus bringing man to himself.”^{lxii}

According to Heidegger ‘a being’ never has compelling force over us by itself, it gains that force because we are first engaged with their inceptive appearing that escapes any definitive grasp and that, as an awareness of need, then turns us toward beings. This awareness is an engagement with be-ing in its appearing and in its difference from beings that first places us ‘in front of beings.’ But it is an awareness that operates beneath any stable sense of self because we first come to ourselves out of it. In order to elucidate this thought Heidegger returns to *Being and Time*:

“What drives man around is his thrownness into beings, a thrownness that determines him as the thrower of being (of the truth of be-ing).”^{lxiii}

Distress, and the awareness of need that constitutes it, is finding oneself amidst beings in their possibilities of meaning without any overarching determination of these possibilities, possibilities that appear as emerging/withdrawing. So thrownness is an attunement (not a conceptual grasping) to this lack of determination as absence in appearing: an attunement that draws us into engagement with this absence, that compels us to ‘throw open’ [Entwurf] its openness of determination as something to be owned up as meaningful. In this response to the compelling force of be-ing, the thrownness of man determines him as the thrower of be-ing by engaging the truth of be-ing in its necessary force. Heidegger finds in the constitution of the human as the thrown thrower a moment of decision-again, not ‘our’ decision, but a decision that is more originary than ‘us’:

“Distress is that driving round that first brings about the decision and severance of man as a being from beings—and in the midst of beings brings that decision back again to beings. This distress belongs to the truth of be-ing itself.”^{lxiv}

As thrown thrower we must recognize that humans are necessarily severed from beings and motivated by a necessity that does not come from beings, but that compels us to engage the opening of their appearing as beings. At the same time, in this opening throw or sketching [Entwurf] the severance of humans from beings comes to be understood from the beings that humans have let appear. In other words, humans come to understand themselves from beings, and understand beings as beings that could be purposively re-presented by them—in Heidegger's words, the decision is brought back to beings. Beings seem to have been there with stable meanings determined beforehand and our involvement with the need of be-ing which first opens up beings in their appearing gets covered over. The originary moment of engagement with be-ing is thus forgotten in our representative comportment toward beings.

In this forgottenness the ground is ready for the configuration of experience which occurs within the structure of anticipation in which the meanings of beings are given in advance, a structure in which what is decisive is the subordination of beings to our purposes on the basis of their pre-given stable meanings. Experience as corresponding to metaphysics and worldview is prepared out of the very event of the truth of be-ing in its being covered over. In this covering over we can mark two senses of 'ground' that result from it. One is the sense of ground that originates in the compelling force of be-ing in the dimension of absence that belongs to its appearing, a force that first throws us in front of beings in order to throw open that space of their meaningful appearing. This first and originary sense of ground is outside operations of re-presentation and attends to the withdrawing of the meanings of beings as the possibility of their appearing at all. The second sense of ground arises out of the covering over of the first sense of ground, and is the stable ground provided by the re-presentation of beings in their stable

meanings, that opens up possibilities of human comportment like that of τέχνη. This second sense of ground becomes dominant in Platonism and metaphysics.

Heidegger writes about the first beginning:

“In the first beginning, where man first of all takes a stand in front of beings, the throwing open itself and its necessity and distress [the first sense of ground] are still obscured and covered over and nevertheless powerful...”^{lxv}

The first beginning marks for Heidegger the first coming to a stand in front of beings, the constitution of humans as thrown throwers, as enacting the necessity of be-ing that Contributions attempts to recover in its thinking enactment. It also marks the covering over of the necessity behind this moment. This covering over is not ‘presented’ by Plato, rather it is a necessity that emerges through the movement of the Platonic text. Heidegger marks the ways to inquire into the Platonic texts in order to find in them the expression of the originary sense of ground, of the originary necessity that gets covered over. He mentions words that open Plato’s texts in this respect:

“φύσις-’αλήθεια-’εν-πάν-λόγος-νους-πόλεμος-μή ’όν-δίκη-’αδικία.”^{lxvi}

These words are the central words of Plato’s *Republic* and *Theaetetus*. The reference to *Theaetetus* is explicit in this section on the necessity of philosophy in the following quote:

“The grounding-attunement of the first beginning is *deep wonder* that beings are, that man himself is extant, extant in that which he is not.”^{lxvii}

Here Heidegger points to the attunement of wonder that Socrates identifies in the *Theaetetus* as the beginning of philosophy, he points to it as a way of engaging the Platonic text that avoids being completely guided by the standpoint of the first beginning but, rather, is compelled by the enactment of wonder that is more originary than Platonism. *Contributions*, as philosophy, will

return to this attunement and engage it in such a way that it is allowed to sustain a thought and experience that proceed out of the originary necessity of the need of be-ing. This kind of thought which engages wonder in this way would be an originary or inceptual thinking.

8. Inceptual Thinking^{lxviii}--the uncanny determination of 'beginning' in the 'crossing'

Heidegger's direct attempt to elucidate philosophy in the crossing culminates in the Pre-view to *Contributions* in his discussion of 'inceptual thinking.' Inceptual thinking [Das anfängliche Denken] is philosophy, and it is the be-ing-historical-thinking that *Contributions* attempts as a whole. In view of Heidegger's working out of the task of philosophy in the crossing up to this point, we must recognize the centrality of a retrieval of the first beginning within the inceptive necessity of the truth of be-ing. In other words, the distinction between Plato and Platonism becomes central to the task of inceptual thinking, and particularly insofar as this distinction allows us to think the beginning of thought, the grounding of the truth of be-ing and the covering up of this truth by metaphysics. This beginning (which belongs to wonder) will be enacted by inceptual thinking, and inceptual thinking is nothing but this enactment. Thus Heidegger's question becomes:

“But what is the beginning of thinking—in the sense of mindfulness of beings as such and of the truth of be-ing?”^{lxix}

The beginning of thinking at issue here is neither a 'factual' beginning nor a nostalgic remembrance of the Greeks and Plato, rather it is an attempt to re-engage wonder in its compelling force and in releasement from metaphysical destiny. Heidegger proceeds carefully in his introduction to inceptual thinking, and begins by simply thinking through 'beginning' as such:

“The beginning is what grounds itself as it reaches ahead: it grounds itself in the ground that is engounded by the beginning; it reaches ahead as grounding and thus is unsurpassable. Because every beginning is unsurpassable, in being encountered it must be placed again and again into the uniqueness of its inceptuality and thus into its unsurpassable fore-grasping. When this encountering is inceptual, then it is originary—but this necessarily as *other* beginning.”^{lxx}

Heidegger starts here by acknowledging Nietzsche’s understanding of Platonism and metaphysics. The kind of force that metaphysics exerts over us is the force of a beginning. Not only does metaphysics claim us into a lineage, but it defines the very understanding of beginning that we unquestioningly endorse: the beginning is that which is present, is the ἀρχή in the sense of that which is not justified and is in no need of justification, that which is presented in advance as a guide, that which has a commanding force over us as an ‘ideal.’ Platonism and metaphysics define thought within this sense of beginning: the beginning of thought is also the surrendering to beginnings as ἀρχαί. Heidegger must think through what is at stake in beginning as a way of providing thought with a greater awareness of itself and of the metaphysical restrictions that have come to define thinking.

Heidegger turns to the beginning of thinking not out of a thoughtless endorsement of the priority of beginnings, but out of the recognition of the constitutive force that beginnings and principles have had in metaphysics. He turns to the beginning of thinking in order to release thought from the force of beginnings, which is part of the shift in the configuration of experience that Heidegger understands as philosophy.

Heidegger challenges the force of beginnings by thinking beginnings in their claim to be unsurpassable or necessarily unjustified. What is really at issue when we take a beginning as

unsurpassable, when we desire the force of an ἀρχή or a principle? Heidegger's insight here is that our endorsement of beginnings in thinking betrays our being compelled by beginnings insofar as we can get guidance from them, that is, insofar as the beginning "reaches ahead." In other words, the force of beginnings in thinking corresponds to the force of having a pre-established ground (that is a metaphysical ground) that we seek to confirm by seeking it out in thought and experience. Beginnings reach out ahead with metaphysical force, not directly in response to the force of the need of be-ing but rather in response to the covering over of this force in Platonism.

Heidegger calls for a twisting free of the orientation toward beginnings as 'reaching ahead' and demands that we meditate on the 'inceptuality' of beginnings, namely the necessity that compels the setting up of beginnings in first place. *Turned toward this inceptuality, which is the inceptive appearing of beings, we discover that beginnings not only reach ahead but that they recede and withdraw: the necessity of beginning is constituted by their having already reached ahead, and this always-having-already-reached-ahead is not graspable as a stable ground but as a ground that withdraws from the stance of ontology and Platonism even though it enables this stance.* In other words, beginnings never begin, they ground themselves in a projective movement^{lxxi}: a movement that metaphysics distorts by presenting it as relying on a stable, pre-given ground, and which is, rather, the event of ἀλήθεια. In the 'crossing', beginnings are unsurpassable not because they determine fully paths of thought and experience, but because they enable thought in events of meaning that withdraw from constant determinations. When we engage the open-endedness of beginnings, we are not under the sway of beginnings anymore, we are under the sway of an 'other' beginning—a beginning compelled out of a different necessity that remains even in the withdrawal of metaphysical beginnings.

Inceptual thinking undergoes this opening up of thought in the release of beginnings, and develops a rigor that endorses this openness, an openness which now joins the necessity of the openness of the lack of pre-determination, of the absence in appearing that belongs to the truth of be-ing. The inceptive event of the appearing of beings to which we turn in the ‘crossing’ is not ‘inceptive’ because it is ‘prior’ to ontology (i.e. as a definitive cause of it), but because it is outside of the ontological determination of beginnings, although its necessity is at play in our being given to the appearing of beings. In this sense, Heidegger writes:

“En-thinking the truth of be-ing is essentially a projecting-open [Ent-wurf]. What is ownmost to that projecting open is that in enactment and unfolding, it must place itself back into what it opens up...the projecting open comes precisely to the ground and transforms itself into a necessity to which it is related from the ground up –even though prior to this enactment the ground is still hidden.”^{lxxii}

The openness of inceptual thinking is the moment of ‘Entwurf,’ of the ‘open-throw’ or the ‘sketching’ that is enacted in the shifted temporality in which beings appear with meanings opened up in their very appearing, that is, revealing the absence of full determination as the productive, transgressive opening that enables them to meaningfully appear. Instead of being covered over, this absence of determination that cannot be reduced to ‘a being’ is, in inceptual thinking, taken up: the thrown thrower places itself up in what is opened up. Heidegger finds that enacting thinking in this way is the discovery of a different necessity and rigor in thinking that compels us to think in the openness of its throw rather than in the reliance on stability and total determination. This necessity is not oriented toward ‘incomplete determinations’ but creatively sustains openness outside of any disposition toward stable projects of meaning, this is why it can risk reliance on a ground that withdraws and which is not given prior to the enactment of the

open-throw. Only in the discovery of this other necessity can the shift in experience find itself grounded in the ‘other’ beginning, and philosophy come to its originary ground compelled by the need of be-ing, as in wonder.

Heidegger names the compelling need of be-ing that enables us to join the necessity of the other beginning ‘the call.’ The open-throw is a response to the call. The call attests to a severance between be-ing and humans that is never closed or bridged, but that sustains an irreconcilable difference that is necessary for sustaining the openness of the throw. Across this gap between humans and be-ing, Da-sein, as the spacing for the originary eventuation of beings eventuates as Enowning (*Ereignis*). Heidegger detects that the human comportment here is not one of owning up in the sense of dominating beings, but rather one of a loss of self-empowerment. This loss of self-empowerment coincides with a seizure of the thrown thrower by beings and be-ing, a seizure that Heidegger calls the ‘grounding’ of Da-sein. In this grounding, the twisting free from Platonism that defines philosophy is enacted as inceptual thinking.

In the Pre-view to *Contributions*, Heidegger gives a preliminary analysis of inceptual thinking. This analysis is rigorously expanded in most of *Contributions*:

“Inceptual thinking is the originary enactment of the onefold of intimation, the pass, leap and grounding.”^{lxxiii}

My discussion at the end of these studies will cover all of these with the assistance of an interpretation of Plato from within the other beginning. I believe that Plato will assist us in understanding the ‘crossing’ that *Contributions* attempts. Heidegger finds the twisting free from Platonism to be the task of philosophy, but he also finds that twisting free is the hardest to think through. He is jealous of poets for example:

“What good fortune here is preserved for the poet! Markings and images are what is most inner for him, and the overseeable shape of the ‘poem’ is at any given time able of putting into itself what is most essential to it.”^{lxxiv}

Heidegger finds in art already an operation of grounding that shares in that more originary necessity of thinking in that the work of art opens a space for the appearing of a being while preserving the openness of determinations, and this forces us to engage this openness as openness. This is the work of beauty and images that Heidegger finds beyond metaphysics. *At the same time he differentiates philosophy from this insofar as philosophy must engage this kind of grounding while twisting free from the dominating structures of metaphysics, and Heidegger does not find the poet to be necessarily engaged with awareness in this twisting free or ‘crossing.’* For Heidegger *Contributions* is no work of art. It is philosophy in its originary sense. Without conflating art and philosophy, I would like to suggest that when Plato is read from within the other beginning his use of images can be taken as essential to the twisting free that determines philosophy. Images will be operative in philosophy in its crossing, even though they will not be understood only through the standpoint of art but also through that of thinking as erotically determined. I find that the non-platonic Plato shows a way of engaging the twisting free of philosophy from Platonism, precisely through a meditation on the power of images and beauty, through a meditation on Eros.^{lxxv}

C. *Contributions*’ Debt to Nietzsche (Second Elucidation) and the final sketch of a Program to read Plato in the Crossing.

On the basis of Heidegger’s two preliminary analyses of philosophy (in relation to experience and worldview, and in relation to ‘a people’) we sketched out a program to read Plato

in the enactment of *Contributions*, focusing on the *Theaetetus* and the *Republic*. The issue in these two studies was to engage Platonism and the First Beginning in a way that we could recover their inceptive phenomenal ground, ἀλήθεια. This retrieval is an attempt to read *Theaetetus* and *The Republic* in the enactment of the crossing laid out in *Contributions*, reading them not to learn *what* they say but whether they enable us to *enact* the crossing to an other beginning.

Heidegger's direct attempt to bring forth philosophy reveals it as the enactment of the crossing, as inceptual thinking. The hardest moment to understand in inceptual thinking is that the crossing that inceptual thinking attempts is not a goal that it sets for itself, but is rather its being appropriated (*ereignet*) by a necessity that comes from be-ing. Heidegger's analysis of philosophy is not complete until he shows that philosophy involves the discovery of this necessity as the compelling force of thinking. Philosophy, then, occurs as a turning in thinking in which we twist free from the purposiveness of the stance of the guiding question in its determination of thinking as the accomplishment of a fore-grasping of the meanings of beings. This twisting free is the appropriation of thinking by be-ing, in which thinking carries out the necessity of engaging be-ing as the emerging/withdrawal of meanings rather than as the representation of guiding constant meanings. This twisting free or 'crossing' is the retrieval of the inceptual phenomenality of beings which gets covered over in Platonism and the guiding question. If Plato can be taken up as a motivating force of the turning of inceptual thinking, of the crossing, then we should be able to find through him the necessity operative in this turning. This reading of Plato would 'complete' the analyses of the *Theaetetus* and the *Republic* sketched out above, in the same way that Heidegger's analysis of philosophy as inceptual thinking completes his preliminary analyses of philosophy in *Contributions*. I suggest that a meditation on

Eros in Plato's dialogues provides this completion, and so in Part Two I will complement the readings of *Theaetetus* and the *Republic* with a reading of *Phaedrus*, in order to find in Plato an enabling enactment of inceptual thinking. Reading *Phaedrus* is, then, the final engagement with Plato as the enactment of the other beginning.

My suggestion comes from Heidegger himself. While writing *Contributions*, he was engaged with the *Phaedrus* in his lectures *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art*. I maintain that this interpretation of Plato is much closer to reading Plato in the crossing of *Contributions* than his earlier lectures on *Theaetetus* and the *Republic*. My aim in this section is to show that this is the case. I want to note in this respect two aspects in Heidegger's interpretation of *Phaedrus* here that we must keep in mind:

- i) This interpretation is opened up by a meditation on Nietzsche, not in order to align Plato with Platonism but to engage Plato in certain resistance to Platonism.
- ii) We have to keep in mind the rigor of Heidegger's differentiation of thinking from art, even though they are both modes of appropriation (Ereignis).

1. Nietzschean Rapture

Heidegger finds in Beauty an attunement in which we are appropriated by a necessity to engage the appearing of beings outside of the guiding question. In this sense, Kant's analysis of Beauty provides a starting point:

“Precisely by means of the “devoid of interest” the essential relation to the object itself comes into play. The misinterpretation fails to see that now for the first time the object comes to the fore as pure object and that such coming forward into appearance is the

beautiful. The ‘beautiful’ means appearing in the radiance of such coming to the fore.^{»lxxvi}

Heidegger finds that the appearing of the beautiful as an attunement devoid of interest speaks precisely about being appropriated by the necessity of the appearing of beings outside Platonism. He criticizes the interpretation (which is Nietzsche’s interpretation) that assigns to this attunement as it operates in Kant’s thinking a ‘passivity’ or objectifying distance. According to Heidegger, Kant is close to Nietzsche’s understanding of rapture, of the creative aesthetic state that affirms life.

Heidegger endorses Nietzsche’s understanding of creative rapture as being drawn to the becoming of form, as being appropriated by the necessity to bring beings forth in their form.

Heidegger explains what form means here:

“...form, *forma*, corresponds to the Greek μορφή. It is the enclosing limit and boundary, what brings and stations a being into that which it is, so that it stands in itself: its configuration. Whatever stands in this way is what the particular being shows itself to be, its outward appearance, εἶδος, through which and in which it emerges...^{»lxxvii}

It is decisive here that Heidegger understands Nietzschean rapture as engaged in the appearing of form, which is not the appearing of a being in its ‘whatness’ or stable determination of meaning. In art we are enraptured, rather, by the marking out of limits and boundaries that allows for a being to appear in first place, we are enraptured by the configuration of appearing rather than by a being that appears. This marking out of limits is the event of emerging/withdrawal, ἁλήθεια that the crossing attempts to join—*Contributions* debt to Nietzsche in this respect is enrapturement in beauty. It is remarkable here that Heidegger thinks of the event of the beautiful in terms of εἶδος (that is, in Plato’s language), and finds in εἶδος both the marking out of limits as

the spacing of appearing (Da) and the appearing of a specific being (Sein). This statement might be the most thought provoking as pointing to a path of thinking that thinks the relationship between Plato's beauty and Eros, and *Contributions*.

At the same time that Heidegger brings his thinking and Nietzsche's into close proximity, he shows that Nietzsche's enrapturement is still framed within Platonism insofar as it is the affirmation of a subject that sets goals for himself:

“It is certain that Nietzsche never achieved conceptual clarity here...Rapture as a state of feeling explodes the very subjectivity of the subject. By having a feeling for beauty the subject has come out of himself; he is no longer subjective...”^{lxxviii}

We have to be careful here in not dismissing Heidegger's point insofar as it is clear that Nietzsche criticizes the stance of subjectivity in his thinking. Heidegger's insight occurs at a different level here. His point is that Nietzsche remains framed by subjectivity insofar as he does not engage rapture as enforced by a necessity coming from the appearing of beings in the work of art, that he does not bring forth the necessity of be-ing. It is to this extent that Nietzsche, for Heidegger, remains within Platonism. Heidegger offers an alternative to Nietzsche's understanding of rapture:

“...the essence of creation for its part remains dependent upon the essence of the work; therefore it can be grasped only from the Being of the work...If we ask how Nietzsche defines the work, we receive no answer.”^{lxxix}

In Heidegger's view, Nietzsche does not come to think 'αλήθεια in its compelling necessity, he does not enact the crossing, even though he comes close to it in his rapture. What holds Nietzsche back from the crossing? In Heidegger's view, the lack of a proper determination of philosophy in its turning to the necessity of be-ing. I think that in his struggle with Nietzsche,

Heidegger found the relevance of distinguishing inceptual thinking from art. Art is an appropriation (Ereignis) but it can be easily covered over as such from within the stance of Platonism. Thinking is an appropriation, but thinking enacts the turning into the necessity of being in a way that art does not necessarily enforce. In Heidegger's view, thinking enacted inceptually safeguards the moment of entering rapture, it opens us up to it and, hence, to beauty. This opening up to rapture, to letting ourselves be appropriated by being with awareness of the enactment of this appropriation as a twisting free from Platonism, is primarily a thinking enactment in its difference from art. *This does not mean that thinking has 'priority' over art. It means that thinking is an 'Ereignis' in the enactment of which our turning to beauty as the appearing of being is necessarily involved in twisting free from Platonism.* Inceptual thinking, and philosophy, occurs as the guardianship of the beautiful. The question, then, is whether this guardianship can be thought from Eros as it appears in Plato's dialogues. This is a question that Heidegger does not explicitly pursue, but that I will pursue through him.

2. Heidegger's interpretation of Eros and Beauty in *Phaedrus*.

a) Setting up the interpretation of *Phaedrus*

Heidegger prepares for his interpretation of the *Phaedrus* as a culmination of Nietzschean rapture in three steps: (i) he lays out the complexity of the Greek understanding of art, (ii) he shows how this complexity takes a particular 'Platonic' character under the 'looks' and (iii) he locates art in respect to the mimetic sense of truth in Platonism.

The running question through these three steps is whether in Platonism there is a discordance between art and truth.

(i) The scope of meanings from which to understand ‘art’ for the Greeks.

The Greeks have an elusive determination of art that can only be gathered through a series of basic words. The first one of these is τέχνη:

“If man tries to win a foothold and establish himself among the beings (φύσις) to which he is exposed, if he proceeds to master beings in this or that way, then his advance against beings is borne and guided by a knowledge of them. Such knowledge is called τέχνη. From the very outset the word is not, and never is, the designation of a ‘making’ and a producing; rather it designates that knowledge which supports and conducts every human irruption into the midst of beings.”^{lxxx}

Τέχνη can only be understood in relation to φύσις, which is not ‘a being’ but the coming forth of beings and their passing away. φύσις is not simply the same as ἀλήθεια, in that ἀλήθεια involves Da-sein, the opening of a there [Da] and a being [Sein] in the there, that sustains appearing in the coming forth/passing of φύσις. In other words, φύσις does not itself appear, it is gathered in its coming/passing in the event (Ereignis) in which humans and be-ing come together in the grounding of Da-sein. The correct understanding of the difference and sameness of φύσις/ἀλήθεια provides the context from which to understand τέχνη.

In its most originary (and forgotten) meaning, τέχνη is exposure to φύσις, is opening up space from within beings for human abiding. Τέχνη, in this sense, belongs to φύσις/ἀλήθεια in that it is concerned with the opening of a ‘there’ [Da] in which appearing of beings can be sustained in the coming/passing of φύσις. But τέχνη is not oriented toward the sustaining of the opening of the there for the appearing of a being. It rather sets up the task of mastering beings, of advancing toward them with guiding-knowledge. This guiding knowledge sets up the structure of

thinking as fore-grasping, as the setting in advance of the meanings of beings in order to assimilate them to our projects, the mode of experience that is consolidated in ‘worldview’ and the Platonism that accompanies it. Τέχνη names a transformative event in experience, it is the ‘leap out’ of Da-sein, the reverse of the task of philosophy in the crossing.

Heidegger wants to capture the specificity of this ‘turning away from’ Da-sein, and distinguish it from making and producing. His point is that producing first appears out of the orientation of τέχνη, but it does not have to be understood as the same as τέχνη. In other words, Heidegger is marking out the possibility of a kind of making that could be engaged in the reverse leaping movement of τέχνη, a making that would have an affinity to philosophy—art. One could say that from Heidegger’s interpretation of τέχνη, art appears as a making that is to be understood from the leaping of τέχνη but as having a certain freedom from and in this leap, even as the possibility of engaging its reversal. Such is the ambiguity of art in the horizon of τέχνη.

The second basic word from which to understand art is μελέτη or ἐπιμέλεια, care:

“Such carefulness is more than practiced diligence; it is the mastery of a composed resolute openness to beings; it is ‘care’. We must conceive of the innermost essence of τέχνη too as such care...”^{lxxxix}

The human open spacing amidst φύσις is a comportment in which we are given to beings within the space that we open up for their appearing. Being in this openness takes the form of finding ourselves within care. Again, care here contains the ambiguity of an openness that on the one hand relates to beings in a mastery of them by submitting them to our guided purposes, yet on the other hand can be a care that is not directed toward beings but toward the very opening in which they appear, a care for their appearing. This ambiguity in care provides again the context

from which to think artistic making in its ambiguity, in its freedom from guided purposes that Kant brings about.

The third basic word from which to understand art is ποιήσις:

“...what is brought forward in a process of bringing forth, what is produced in production, and the producing itself...”^{lxxxii}

While the first two basic words were oriented toward the ‘openness in appearing’ (Da), the third word is oriented toward the being that appears within this openness. Again, the ambiguity in relation to the guiding orientation that τέχνη assumes is operative here. The produced being can be the result of copying a guiding schema set in advance (through mimesis) or it can be a being that in its appearing resists any subordination to such schemas and retains in this way the openness in which it stands.

Understanding of τέχνη from the turn away from Da-sein is the basis from which to understand the Greek meaning of art. This leap embraces the three basic words discussed above. At the same time, Heidegger is emphatic in pointing out that these three words cannot be conflated, and that we find in them a kind of freedom with respect to the necessity of the turn away from Da-sein. ‘Art’ names for the Greeks this ambiguity in human comportment toward beings that is opened up in the turn away from Da-sein. Insofar as the ambiguity of art in this determination shelters the possibility of sustaining Da-sein, the affinity between art and philosophy as the reversal of the turn away from Da-sein becomes clear.

(ii) The Look and Eros

Heidegger turns now to understanding how the ambiguity of art is located within Platonism’s thinking of ‘looks’ :

“The idea [look], the envisioned outward appearance, characterizes Being precisely for that kind of vision which recognizes in the visible as such pure presence. ‘Being’ stands in essential relation to, and in a certain way means as much as, self-showing and appearing, the φαίνεσθαι of what is ἑκφανής. One’s grasp of the Ideas, with regard to the possible accomplishment of that grasp, though not to its established goal, is grounded upon Eros, which in Nietzsche’s aesthetics corresponds to rapture. What is most loved and longed for in Eros, and therefore the idea that is brought into fundamental relation, is what at the same time appears and radiates most brilliantly. The ερασιμώτατον, which at the same time is ἑκφανήστατον, proves to be the idea of the beautiful, beauty.”^{lxxxiii}

‘The vision which recognizes in the visible as such pure presence’ is the vision that endorses the turn away from Da-sein, the vision that understands beings from pre-determined meanings which give stability and presence to beings. This vision disengages the appearing of beings in the sustaining of the joint φύσις/ἀλήθεια. For this vision, Being stands as a fore-grasped look in constant presence. At the same time, the look is involved in the appearing of beings through meaning; it cannot fully disengage appearing because even within fore-grasped looks beings appear differently when we learn about them. There is, then, a trace of the sustaining of φύσις/ἀλήθεια in the looks when we attend to them as appearing. In this respect, Being comes to name appearing and self-showing, even if it is an appearing in view of the goal of the subordination of a being to a pre-determined meaning. Eros is attracted to appearing and self-showing, to the remnant joint φύσις/ἀλήθεια even within the force of looks as constant presence. Heidegger is clear: *Eros is attracted to such appearing with a certain indifference to the goal of the appearing (the goal enforced by the turn away from Da-sein), that is, Eros operates within the turn away from Da-sein as a force that operates with a certain freedom from the orientation*

of the leap. In other words, Eros opens up the ambiguity in which art sustains itself in freedom from guiding knowledge; Eros guards, then, the possibility of reversing the orientation that overwhelms τέχνη. We can see already the deep connection between Eros and philosophy insofar as philosophy is the reversal of the turn away from Da-sein. At the same time we can see that Eros is not necessarily the same as art in the Greek determination, but it is a draw toward ἀλήθεια that can be taken up as art.

Within the force of the turn away from Da-sein, Eros can be understood as itself being directed toward a look rather than toward the appearing still at play in looks. This understanding of Eros within Platonism sets up beauty as an idea. But whether Eros can be so easily framed remains a question for Heidegger—especially in relation to the *Phaedrus* in which Eros is interrogated without being restricted to its possible instantiation in artistic rapture.

(iii) Reversing Mimesis

Heidegger continues his preparation for an interpretation of *Phaedrus* by inquiring into the relation between the work of art and truth as it appears in the *Republic*. Considering the way in which the *Republic* is silent about Eros, this assessment of art is done on the basis of the complete domination of Eros by the stance of guiding knowledge in τέχνη. ‘Truth’ in this analysis does not correspond to the joint φύσις/ἀλήθεια, brought forth above. It is, rather, a truth that corresponds to the turn away from Da-sein, to appearing as guided or measured against by a predetermined sense of the meaning of a being.

Heidegger points to three levels of truth at play under guiding knowledge in terms of the appearing of a being. The highest level of truth is:

“...the bedframe ‘which is in nature [φύσις],’ means that what is essential in pure Being, as present of itself, in other words, what emerges by itself, stands in opposition to what is produced only by something else...”^{lxxxiv}

The highest level of truth coincides with nature, but here this coincidence is not the joint φύσις/’αλήθεια. Φύσις is here not the coming forth/passing of beings as a whole, but it is here the force of determination in a being that allows it to fit into its proper, pre-determined meaning. Φύσις is here thought from within the structure of guided production, it is the highest mode of production, one that always coincides with the guiding meaning that is set in advance. Φύσις is accomplished Being. This is the highest level of truth because there is no departure or falling short from Being, here signifying the ‘what’ of a being. This absence of distortion is the stability of the full presence of Being.

The second level of truth is that of the bedframe that the craftsman produces. This bedframe is an image of the bedframe by nature. Image here means copy in the sense of falling short from the presence of the original. This falling short in presence means that the image does not accomplish the guiding Being, it is a distortion of it insofar as the original is that in terms of which all bedframes are made, while the image or copy only manifests an aspect of the guiding presence of the original—it is only ‘a being’ and not Being.

The third level of truth is that of artworks. The artwork, the painting of a bedframe, for example, is an image of an image, insofar as it manifests only an aspect of a being. The artwork is the most distorted manifestation, it stands at the greatest distance from the original. The artwork is an εἶδολον, a little εἶδος of diminished presence in relation to the total presence of the original that includes all beings and copies of them as aspects of itself.

Heidegger turns to the discussion of mimesis or imitation on the basis of these three levels of truth. He finds that the basic determination of imitation is exemplified by the example of the artist:

“What he produces is consequently but one aspect, one way in which the table appears. If he depicts the table from the front, he cannot paint the rear of it. He produces the table in only one view or φάντασμα (598b). What defines the character of the painter as μιμητής is not only that he cannot at all produce any particular usable table, but also that he cannot even bring that one particular table to the fore.”^{lxxxv}

According to Heidegger, mimesis names the loss of scope in the bringing to the fore of aspects of the original Being. This loss of scope sets the artwork at the greatest distance from being. It is also the less true, insofar as truth means here the approximation to the total scope of the aspects of the original Being. The question is here: what is the basis for these determinations of truth and mimesis?

Heidegger gives us a clue for this question when he points out that even the original Being is here understood as the product of the guided knowledge of a craftsman, a God. If we keep in mind the pervasiveness of craftsmanship in the understanding of truth operative here, we come to see that the original Being is thought as ‘a being’ in its full presence rather than as appearing, as ‘a being’ that exposes the totality of the aspects of ‘bedframes,’ for example. This presenting of Being as a produced being reveals what is at stake in this determination of truth: the priority of full presence and accessibility, where even Being is taken up as a being ready at hand for us, totally exposed. This marks the moment of the culminating domination of the turn away from Da-sein, it is the comportment toward Being itself as submitted to our projects, it is

the mastery of τέχνη as defined by our fore-grasping of the meanings of beings in advance, it is the disengagement from the appearing of beings in the joint φύσις/᾿αλήθεια.

What if we resist the strange effort the *Republic* makes to silence Eros? What if we were to think mimesis erotically? Eros is drawn toward the joint φύσις/᾿αλήθεια, that is, not toward beings in presence but to their appearing. Φύσις as the coming/passing of beings as a whole is gathered in a there [Da] so that a being [Sein] appears only through a marking out of its determination of meaning, a marking out that is never complete, that is always transgressed, that involves always an element of concealment. This marking out is ᾿αλήθεια as the sustaining gathering of φύσις, as letting a being break into appearing out of the coming/passing of beings as a whole. The orientation of Eros, then, seems to have no place within mimesis. For mimesis as loss of scope is oriented toward the goal of the turn away from Da-sein: mimesis lacks the freedom in indifference to the goal of appearing that characterizes the orientation of Eros. Mimesis is subjugated to the enforcement of guiding knowledge; in its non-erotic orientation mimesis is a comportment toward beauty set up as an idea. But what of the image (᾿εἰδολα)? Taken up erotically, ‘images’ in their limited scope (precisely what made them most untrue in the structure of mimesis) share in an openness of determination and a sustaining of concealment that can enjoin the withdrawing movement that belongs to ᾿αλήθεια. In this respect the images are precisely what can come to sustain the [Da] and in imaging come to constitute a mode of being for beings [Seiende] in which they open the [Da]. This would be a strange reversal of mimesis, engaging it from the bottom and finding that through this other beginning we trace a path that runs parallel to the one from original to image, a path in which the limit in the scope of images takes us to engagement with the withdrawing operation of limits that eventuates as the

truth of be-ing (not of Being). In this sense, images shelter the ambiguity with respect to τέχνη that characterizes ‘art’ and which philosophy enacts in the ‘crossing.’

b) Heidegger’s interpretation of *Phaedrus*

Heidegger’s concern is to find out whether there is discordance between art and truth in Platonism. He understands discordance in two ways. First (this would be in Nietzsche) there is a dreadful discordance in which art and truth are in strife. Second, there is a discordance which occurs on the basis of a concordance. It is the latter that he will bring forth in Platonism, a discordance in which art and truth are severed from one another but nevertheless one in which art and truth relate to one another within a more basic concordance. We must note that what he means by truth here is truth within Platonism, truth within the appearing of Being as a guiding determination of the meaning of beings.

The first difficulty that Heidegger faces is that in the *Republic* there is not even a severance between art and truth, because art disengaged from Eros is simply assimilated within the structure of mimesis, it is subordinate to Eros. Discordance, however, obtains only if art and truth are seen as having the same rank. If there is a discordance between art and truth, it is not to be found in the *Republic*. This is why we must turn to the *Phaedrus*.

The second difficulty is that the *Phaedrus* does not investigate art in particular. Instead it determines the Beautiful and studies Eros in relationship to the beautiful in the “range of the original question of man’s relation to beings as such.”^{lxxxvi} It is only on the basis of this larger determination of Eros that we could then turn to an analysis of art beyond the frame of the *Republic*, an analysis that would be similar to Nietzsche’s in its focus on rapture.

(i) Two senses of Being within Platonism.

Heidegger acknowledges a fundamental difference in the relation between art and truth as it occurs in *The Republic* and in the *Phaedrus*. In view of this discrepancy, Heidegger reminds us of the dialogical character of Plato's writings, that is, their plurality of voices and their lack of systematicity. And this lack of systematicity occurs even within the interpretation of the dialogues according to Platonism, under the sway of the turn away from *Da-sein*. This lack of systematicity reflects the way Platonism never exhausts Plato's texts, even when it is taken as the only way to engage the dialogues.

The two modes of relation between art and truth within Platonism correspond to two modes of Being that can become dominant within Platonism. Heidegger first tackles Being as it mainly occurs in the *Republic*, as the original for a mimetic structure. As we saw, this mode of Being is here understood on the basis of a produced being, as a being of the highest rank, but as a being nevertheless as present at hand. We saw above how Being here is completely uprooted from appearing, how we take it as always present for us, ready to be manipulated. This is the way in which most of us relate to Being when, according to Heidegger, we sink in the oblivion of Being. In this oblivion there is no severance between art and truth, no discordance.

The second sense of Being is already at play in the phrase "the oblivion of Being." 'Being' in this phrase is different from 'Being' as simply present. How can we understand this second sense of Being? We discussed it above already: this sense of Being is not uprooted from appearing, it can even come to mean appearing: it demands the recognition that when we learn or recollect beings by asking what they are they appear to us differently, even within thinking as fore-grasping—when one is devoted to learning, one must love appearing even within Platonism. In this second sense of Being, one that comes out of the experience of learning rather than

manipulating, Beauty is operative as the enchanting shining of appearing that motivates us to learn rather than manipulate. Heidegger writes:

“The beautiful is an element which is disparate within itself; it grants entry into immediate sensuous appearances and yet at the same time it soars toward Being; it is both captivating and liberating.”^{lxxxvii}

Beauty enraptures us in Eros, and through Eros we are drawn to beings in order to engage their Being not as a being, but as the horizon of meaning from which beings appear. Beauty in its ‘disparity’ opens up the difference between Being and beings, the ontological difference. Even though appearing is preserved and acknowledged in this sense of Being, Being is taken as hovering above appearing, as present perhaps not as a being but as an horizon of meaning, yet a horizon that nevertheless remains unquestioned concerning its original marking out in the joint φύσις/ἀλήθεια.^{lxxxviii} This Being as horizon still operates as a goal to Eros, as given in advance, as structuring thinking as fore-grasping. Beauty and Eros are a means toward the grasping of Being:

“Since the beautiful allows Being to scintillate, and since the beautiful itself is what is most attractive, it draws man through and beyond itself to Being as such.”^{lxxxix}

Beauty here operates together with truth in the safeguarding of Being as such as guiding. Truth here preserves the fore-grasping structure of thinking, it is the mode of unconcealment in which Being as horizon for appearing is given as having been always already there. So both Beauty and Truth work together, Beauty as the draw from sensuousness to Being and Truth as the sustaining of Being as hovering above sensuousness in presence. Heidegger finds here discordance between art and truth based on the equality of rank of Beauty and Truth, and it is a discordance that is

based on a more originary concordance, that of being subordinated to Being still understood within fore-grasping and Platonism:

“Truth and Beauty are in essence related to the selfsame, to Being; they belong together in one, the one thing that is decisive: to open Being and to keep it open.”^{xc}

(ii) Heidegger’s Provocation

Heidegger finishes his interpretation of *Phaedrus* with a provocation that unsettles everything he has said so far, and which opens up a whole new engagement with Plato:

“Viewed more discerningly, a discordance in the strict sense lies here as well. But it belongs to the essence of Platonism that it efface that discordance...”^{xc1}

Beyond Platonism, as if out of an other necessity and beginning, there is a discordance to be discerned here, one that would even destroy the basis of the concordance of art and truth under Being as presence and Platonism. How are we to take this, in the crossing? There is a discordance in which Eros liberates itself-- compelled by the Beautiful-- from the guiding structure of Platonism, a discordance in which Being becomes challenged by Eros because Eros is drawn toward appearing in a way that engages Being not as presence but as marked out in a movement of emerging/concealing. Eros goes ‘under’ Being and Platonism and engages its hidden ground. The discordance here would not be discordance between art and truth, but one between Eros and Platonism out of which engagement with the necessity of the joint φύσις/ἀλήθεια comes to pass. Insofar as Eros enacts this discordance, which it enacts compelled by the Beautiful, Eros opens up the possibility of the reversal of mimesis, of a different engagement with appearing beings as images outside of mimetic structures. *The suggestion here is not that Eros simply could follow the reversal of mimesis, but that Eros enacts this reversal,*

that it enacts the twisting free of Platonism, that it enacts the crossing that constitutes philosophy in its specificity and distinction from art—philosophy and Eros here become the same.

The sketch of a program to read Heidegger and Plato in the crossing is laid out in Heidegger's provocation: to read Plato erotically, in the enactment of the twisting free from Platonism—that is, philosophically. This is, more specifically here, to determine with precision how Eros enacts the challenge to Platonism, how it opens up within Platonism and beyond it (i.e. as inceptual thinking) an engagement with the appearing of beings in the joint φύσις/ἀλήθεια, and to bring this enactment to bear upon the *Theaetetus* and the image of the cave in the *Republic*, so as to enact the shift in experience that Heidegger explores at the beginning of *Contributions*. So we turn now to the *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus* and the Image of the Cave as erotic enactments of the crossing.

PART TWO: Two Studies on Erotic Thinking in Plato's Dialogues.

“...One can think of a striving wherein the object is held fast *as such*, but also thereby held fast to oneself, so that one finds oneself in this holding fast to the object, indeed such that one finds oneself not just as a point and thing and subject, but in the sense of the soul's essence, which is essentially a *relationship*—thus finding oneself precisely as this striving relationship to the object. This kind of striving...does not strive to possess the object, but strives for it to *remain* as striven for, as held in the striving, in order that the striver finds himself *from* that for which he strives. Such striving would be authentic in so far as the striving self does not strive away from itself but rather back toward itself, i.e. in order that, in this striving, it may gain its own self...Plato says nothing else but that Being belongs to that which stands in authentic striving...the striving wherein we allow to prevail, as measure and law, what from the ground up and as such, makes possible and carries our Da-sein, Plato calls this striving ἔρωϝ.”^{xcii}

Second Study: Erolgy—an interpretation of *Phaedrus*

Here I consider the relation between Eros and λόγος in the *Phaedrus*. If we attend to the erotic attraction between Socrates and Phaedrus, this text is not a text ‘about’ Eros and ‘about’ λόγος. It is an exemplary ‘erotic λόγος,’ a seductive speech that enacts the very relation between Eros and λόγος that it explores. The enactment in *Phaedrus* is the way in which it folds upon itself: by investigating Eros and λόγος it attends to the possibility of its own eventuation as an

erotic dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus. I call this recoil to its own dialogical possibility ‘erology’.

I emphasize in this study the relevance of Phaedrus’ character. Phaedrus is erotically driven toward speeches, he embodies the relationship between Eros and λόγος that the dialogue named after him explores. This dialogue simply attempts to understand Phaedrus’ erotic drive, which necessarily sets into play the exposure of Socrates’ own Eros.^{xciii}

The plan of this analysis of erology is organized around Socrates’ two speeches about Eros. His first failed speech on Eros corresponds to the mode of λόγος as rhetoric, which also presents dialectic as a kind of τέχνη. His second speech on Eros corresponds to a different sense of dialectic that turns not so much to ‘definitions’ as to the necessity at work in the inception of speech, speech in dialogue rather than in rhetorical persuasion. The second speech constitutes erology proper in its enactment.

A) Preparatory Analysis.

1. Φιλία, Socrates’ Provocation.

The dialogue begins:

‘From where and to where, Phaedrus, my *friend*?’ (Italics mine).^{xciv}

‘From where and to where?’ is not an innocent question, it is even a provocation: it seeks a whole—and the boundaries that determine the whole—of Phaedrus’ care (ἐπιμέλεια).^{xcv} In this appeal to the whole of Phaedrus’ care, Socrates must call him a ‘friend’. Phaedrus is provoked and Socrates, as usual, has indulged in a transgression. This transgression is erotic and relies on friendship. It echoes Socrates’ admission in the Lysis “[I] am myself erotically oriented toward

the acquisition of friends.^{»xcvi} This is an erotic orientation that Phaedrus recognizes and brings into the open: “In fact, Socrates, you are just the right person to hear the speech that occupied us...It is aimed at seducing a beautiful boy.”^{»xcvii} Phaedrus knows Socrates’ care. Phaedrus is not that interested in answering Socrates’ question, he rather provokes Socrates back by exposing him in his care. Does Phaedrus’ response remain within the friendship that Socrates appeals to at the beginning? Or is Phaedrus yet to understand this friendship?

What about the exposure of Phaedrus’ care? When is Socrates’ original question to Phaedrus answered? Right away, it seems. Phaedrus spent the morning with Lysias and is going beyond the city walls. More importantly, he is doing all of this because of his own erotic orientation that determines his care, his love of speeches. I note here that the *Phaedrus* is a dialogue that precisely explores the way in which Eros and speeches belong to one another: *it is a careful attempt to expose Phaedrus’ care*. Looking back to the beginning, then, we should realize that Phaedrus’ self-understanding at the beginning of the dialogue, the way in which he lives Eros, will have to be questioned. At the beginning, Phaedrus does not quite see his erotic care and his exposure in the dialogue will also be self-discovery.

This self-discovery happens together with Socrates’ own exposure, the one inaugurated by Phaedrus’ provocation. Phaedrus’ discovery of his erotic core is tied up with his discovery of Socratic Eros. *Phaedrus will come to learn about his care as erotic attraction to λόγος by discovering the nature of Socrates’ care as erotic attraction to friends. Socratic Eros for friendship will come to encompass and enable the love of speeches that defines Phaedrus’ character*. Insofar as φιλία is the possibility of λόγος as dialogue, Socrates seems to be oriented toward the possibility of λόγος in a way that Phaedrus is not. For Phaedrus λόγοι are speeches that can be written down and memorized in solitude, like Lysias’ speech that he has under his

robe—they are completed things standing by. In this respect, I note here that the difference between Socrates' and Phaedrus' Eros is that Socrates' is oriented to the *possibility* of speech, that he shows a propensity to erology. This propensity will come through in Socrates' second speech on Eros as a speech that engages the possibility of speech.

2. Φιλία, Agreement and Disagreement

In what sense does friendship constitute the possibility of speech, the site for the inception of λόγος as gathering the appearing of beings?

At the beginning of a discourse about rhetoric^{xcviii}, Socrates introduces agreement and disagreement as two originary discursive events. These events are dialogical, *events that happen by chance (τέχνη) when in dialogue with friends*. In these events we discover, through others, that we happen to be in agreement and disagreement with them. This discovery can only^{xcix} happen through friends, we cannot bring it about—it is chanced.

Socrates says about disagreement and agreement respectively:

“...standing against each other or standing with others so as to share in insight (νοῦς).”

Agreement and disagreement have to be understood from νοῦς, as events of mind, sense or intention. These events are engagements with beings in their appearing as what they are, finding them with sense, as disclosed with particular sense in spaces of meaning. *Novς is the event in which beings appear with sense that reveals us within a certain intention in respect to them*. In agreement and disagreement we discover not only beings as what they are, but ourselves as also engaged in the open spaces of meaning out of which beings come to be understood.

In agreement and disagreement we are oriented not only to the beings that appear, but more so, to the boundaries that define the meanings from which we come to understand beings.

These boundaries appear as transgressed, either because they are directly challenged (as in disagreement) or because we re-draw them with others (as in agreement). In either case, we are given to the excess of these boundaries, to the open spacing of meaning in this excess. *The most important point is this: in these two events beings appear as what they are out of the very transgressions of the boundaries of our understanding of them.* In Heidegger's terms, in agreement and disagreement, we are given to the 'Da' with freedom from eidetic pre-determination.

In these discursive events beings are given to us in λόγος. Λόγος does not simply delimit boundaries of meaning. When a being appears it comes to be understood from such delimitations of λόγος but, at the same time, transgresses these delimitations and opens spaces of meaning: *a being opens the space of meaning from which it has always already been understood.* This strange opening is the inceptive operation of λόγος—an operation in which we are given to the arrival of words with disclosive force—that Socrates calls ἀναμνήσις (recollection), and that is not delimitation but the gathering of the appearing of beings in the openness of the Da. Such operation of λόγος comes to pass in dialogical events in which we encounter others as friends.

Let us turn to each of these events:

i) *Agreement.* There are two modes of agreement. The first one is:

“Whenever someone says the word silver or iron, don't we find ourselves intending the *same* being through mind?”^c

In this first mode we are in agreement without explicitly engaging the Da. Here we simply take for granted a certain shared understanding of what a being is. This is a shallow sense of

agreement which the multitudes experience. Here there is no appeal to others in their particularity and friendship.

The second mode of agreement is agreement proper. Rather than immersed in a multitude, we start a dialogue with another taking this other as a friend. In this kind of agreement the difference between our engagement with a being and the other's engagement is creatively assimilated into an expansion of the limits of meaning that defines our pre-understanding of the being. The friend allows us to transgress the limits of our understanding of beings with joy, the friend reveals those limits and releases our investment in them because through our friendship we find ourselves as having already transgressed those limits.^{ci} This excess of our understanding that is only possible through *φιλία*, at the same time reveals others as our friends. Friendship occurs in the transgression of horizons of meanings and in the free space manifest in those transgressions. Friendship is the event of the joyful transgression of our understanding in which we are given to the *Da*. I emphasize here that the point of agreement is not to eliminate differences between us and others, but to allow these differences to have disclosive power.

ii) *Disagreement*. Let's turn now to disagreement. Socrates says: "What about when the words justice and good are said, aren't we carried differently with respect to place and stand apart in quarrel with each other and ourselves?"^{cii} In disagreement a name does not eventuate as a bringing us together with others in place with respect to a being in its look. In this discursive event, discourse "carries us" to no place, it doesn't implicate us in appearing but, to the contrary, shrouds us in obscurity so that we are concealed from others and even from ourselves. Socrates calls this being carried by discourse in concealment 'wondering' or 'errancy' (*πλανώμεθα*). There are important hints given in the text about this discursive event: it is akin to war

(πόλεμος), and to the deception, ignorance, errancy that seal the fates of tragic heroes—to events of concealment and loss that cannot be assimilated into projects of understanding. With disagreement Socrates points to a deception and ignorance given in speech not as a step toward knowledge, not as transitory, but with a force and insistence of its own. In disagreement the whole of our care can be at stake, it reveals an abyss beyond the limits of our understanding, this abyss turns in agreement into a joyful release from delimitations of meaning.

This analysis of disagreement seems to be at odds with Socrates' characterization of it as “standing in opposition to others.” The reason is that now we are looking at ‘standing in opposition’ with respect to φιλία. In this respect, when we are given to others so that we come to be revealed in our Da, standing in opposition becomes loss and disorientation. It is a war because we are at stake in the loss of φιλία. Others do not appear to us as supporting our openness to beings, our abiding within spaces of open determinations of meaning.

At the same time, disagreement reveals something about φιλία. In the insistence of disagreement, we are always already at risk of not engaging the Da. Awareness of this risk keeps us from falling into the neutralization of agreement in the multitude, it reminds us of the joy of turning the abyss of disagreement into the release of agreement, and that φιλία is not so much a matter of eliminating disagreement as turning our differences with others into creative options for the expansion of our understanding as Da-sein.

Disagreement reveals to us φιλία in its absence and thus in its compelling force. This compelling force is the necessity to engage the Da, it is Eros in its orientation to friendship and to the spacing of the appearing of beings. It is in this respect, in the awareness of the loss of φιλία, the Socrates can say that he is erotically drawn toward friends. We are drawn from disagreement to agreement with erotic force, a necessity that compels us to dialogue with friends.

3. The transition between Socrates' two speeches

In order to read both of Socrates' speeches on Eros, I will begin by understanding their difference and then use this difference as a guide through them. The difference between them, and the necessity of a second speech, is explained in a short interlude which consists of a dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus. I will concentrate on a few of the main points in this interlude.

a) 'Fittingness'

After Socrates first speech, Phaedrus wants Socrates to go on, he desires more from him. This first kind of desire, the 'desire for more,' motivates Socrates' second speech. These are Phaedrus' words:

“But I thought you were right in the middle—I thought you were about to speak at the *same* length about the non-lover, to list his good points and argue that it is better to give one's favors to him. So why are you stopping now, Socrates?” (Italics mine).^{ciii}

Phaedrus' complaint is about the length of Socrates' speech: it is fitting that his speech should go on. It should be exactly double of what it was; Socrates has only reached the middle. Phaedrus is paying attention to the laws of symmetry that apply to well constructed speeches. Now the other side of the argument has to be provided, one that would prove Socrates' speech to be a whole. In other words, Phaedrus has in advance a sense of what speeches should be, how they are to be composed as wholes. For Phaedrus, speeches are a work of skill and the rules for their composition determine them in advance, rules that hold in general. Speeches are the result of skill (τέχνη).

Socrates' response to Phaedrus is twofold. First, he declares that he is already under the influence of the nymphs and that if he were to go on, he might be completely taken by them, that is, in a kind of madness.^{civ} He can't go on. He also says that his divine inspiration has led him to an excess, a violation of the proper technique: he wrote an epic poem—that is, a poem that glorifies a hero—in order to attack the lover; in other words, he reversed the purpose of the epic meter.

Second, contradicting Phaedrus' position, Socrates argues that the technique of speechwriting itself would justify Socrates' ending his speech where he did. Phaedrus is right, Socrates stopped right at the middle. However, symmetry allows us to already know the rest of the speech: "...I say instead, in a word, that every shortcoming for which we blamed the lover has its contrary advantage, and the non-lover possesses it".^{cv} It is a matter of adding the missing half which would be a mirror image of the first one, and the whole speech would be there, for us—the whole of the speech is given in advance, hence Socrates says that reaching its exact middle is also to reach its "fitting" ending.^{cvi} This would be, then, another speech that Phaedrus could hide under his robe.

At first, Socrates' response re-enforces Phaedrus' stance: speech writing is a technique, a skill that sets forth the speech in advance and that should not be violated. Speech writing is guided, then, by a sense of fittingness, by a sense of the proper determined by a pre-given standard. We can also detect in Socrates' response the beginning of an overturning of speech writing simply as technique. In order to begin his speech, Socrates appealed to the divine help of the Muses.^{cvii} It is as if, without divine inspiration, Socrates could not have started his speech: the ἄρχή is divine. The shift suggested here is clear: with Phaedrus, we need to recognize rhetoric as a technique, so much so, that inspiration could be seen as a threat to the propriety of the

technique. On the other hand, in terms of the inception of the speech, divine inspiration seems to originate and sustain the power of speech.

Rhetoric is twofold. First of all, rhetoric is a technique with rules of propriety, with standards set in advance. Second, rhetoric is birthed out of inspiration, out of a kind of madness, a birthing that cannot be manipulated in advance. This twofoldness means that rhetoric *in its possibility* as a λόγος is not itself something that can be understood in advance, it is not accessible to the technical gaze. The birth of the word, its arrival, cannot itself be set in advance. The possibility of a technique presupposes this arrival, it is anticipated by it. Setting the whole of the speech in advance is secondary to the arrival of the word, to the rapture of its birth, which finds in dialogue its proper site. Rhetoric is secondary to agreement and disagreement, to dialogue with friends, and cannot assimilate dialogue nor have technical mastery over it.

b) ‘Phaedrus Divine’

Phaedrus wants Socrates to continue speaking and Socrates detects something divine in his relentlessness. Phaedrus says:

“Not yet, Socrates, not until the heat is over. Don’t you see that it is almost exactly noon, “straight up,” as they say? Let’s wait and discuss the speeches, and go as soon as it turns cooler (᾿αποψύχη).”^{cviii}

If we hear the Greek words, we may get a sense of the impact that these words have on Socrates. “Until the heat is over,” taking the metaphorical use of heat, can say “until the burning love is over.” In other words, Phaedrus may be detecting a kind of love, particularly erotic love, as being present along with Socrates in his speech making. There is something erotic about the madness that is enrapturing Socrates, that is sustaining his speech to the extent that he even violated the

technique of speech writing. Phaedrus reveals that he has at least a sense that Eros and λόγος are entangled in one another. And this sense captures Socrates, it enraptures him. The conversation must go on, Phaedrus says, at least until it “turns cooler” (ἄποψύχη)—or, literally, until the “soul, breath, departs.” The heat of erotic love is the life, the soul of this moment of speech making. Phaedrus is, thus, revealing fundamental relations between Eros, λόγος and soul, and this triad has the effect of keeping Socrates with him. Socrates, in his second speech, will appropriate this triad, and offer it back to Phaedrus in the form of a speech, now the proper speech about love, in an erology.

Phaedrus words provoke a shift in Socrates, they make him stay, because they reveal something divine in Phaedrus. Socrates responds:

“You are divine when it comes to speeches, Phaedrus; you are simply (ἄτεχνός) amazing (θαυμασίος). I am sure you have brought into being (γεγόνωτων) more of the speeches that have been given during your lifetime than anyone else, whether you composed them yourself or in one way or another forced (προσαναγκάζοντα) others to make them; with the single exception of Simmias the Theban, you are far ahead of the rest. Even as we speak, I think, you are managing to cause me to bring to being (γεγένησθαι) yet another one.”^{cix}

Socrates calls Phaedrus divine, bringing Phaedrus closer to him, to his own divine inspiration. Socrates divine inspiration is the source of origination of speeches, it is the birthing of speeches, the arrival of words, which exceeds the technical gaze by engaging the inception of λόγος. Phaedrus himself is not foreign to this madness: Phaedrus divinity consists in birthing speeches or in forcing the birth of speeches as if from necessity.

In his birthing of speeches, Phaedrus is divine and ‘simply’ (᾿ατέχνως) —literally, without technique—“amazing” or “wondrous.” With these words, Socrates shows that Phaedrus’ love of speeches needs to be re-visited, adequately determined. At first it seems that Phaedrus is in love with the technique of writing speeches, his attention is directed toward the wholeness and symmetry of speeches. Socrates is shifting this desire, and suggesting a different orientation for it. Socrates reveals Phaedrus’ love of speeches in their exceeding the technical gaze, in their divine inception— attuned to madness. And, to this extent, Phaedrus is wondrous, as if he desired philosophy—which is birthed in wonder, as if philosophy were an engagement with the arrival of the word, with the madness that gives birth to rhetoric rather than with rhetoric’s technical dimension. Between his two speeches on Eros, Socrates reveals Phaedrus’ Eros as oriented to the origination of speech, and brings Phaedrus’ Eros closer to Socrates’ own Eros for friends.

c) ‘Divine Seeing’

In the interlude Socrates says:

“I recognize my offense (ἄμαρτήματα) clearly now. In fact, the soul too, my friend, is itself a sort of seer (μάντικον); that is why almost from the beginning (πάλαι) of my speech, I was disturbed by a very uneasy (᾿εθράξει) feeling...”^{cx}

Socrates, during his first speech, was in a state of confusion, of disarray (᾿εθράξει from ταραάσσο). This may seem surprising (especially after we study Socrates’ first speech) because his speech is ordered, correctly fabricated. The disarray seems to indicate not a failure in technique, but, rather, a failure in orientation, literally, a missing the mark: his speech is in disarray because he spoke without seeing. And the failure occurred, then, at the beginning, early

on, prior to the technical unfolding of the speech. The failure occurred within the seeing that happens in the inception of the speech, in the first showing of that with which the speech is concerned, a showing that precedes any kind of technical ordering of the structure of the speech, any kind of speech fabrication. This first showing is simple, without technique (᾿ατέχνως), it reveals itself to a gaze that is not technical.

What is this simple gaze? The word that concerns us here is μάντικος from μαντεύομαι. The range of meanings of this word is important: to divine, to prophesy, to presage, to consult an oracle and (in animals) to get scent of something. Just as in the technical stance, where a whole is presented in advance, the inception of speech occurs as a kind of anticipation or presentiment of what is to come. Inceptive anticipation, which is the first showing of that about which speech is concerned, is a mode of revealing in which that which is revealed is not fully gathered and accessible, it is revealed as a sign, an oracle or a trace: a foreign character to be dialogically interpreted. In dialogue we join friends in mantic seeing.

We started by saying that rhetoric was a technique that had two aspects that were not in harmony with one another. One was the strictly hypothetical character of τέχνη that which is constituted by an anticipatory presentation of the whole which has yet to be unfolded through speech. The other involves a mode of revealing and presentation of that about which the speech is concerned, a mode which is non-hypothetical but mantic. We can say, then, that when we consider rhetoric as a technique we learn about the instability of τέχνη, of its being disjointed on account of two modes of manifestation. We find here the complexity of τέχνη that Heidegger notes in his Nietzsche lectures, the inception of τέχνη in the joint φύσις/ἀλήθεια—in the Da in which beings first come to be determined—and its leap out of this joint toward the fore-grasping of the meaning of beings.

d) The Power (δύναμις) of Λόγος as the inception of Λόγος

One of the problems with Socrates' first speech is that it does not reveal the power (δύναμις) of Eros. I take this realization on Socrates' part as a provocation that gives insight into what is at issue in the interlude. Especially considering that δύναμις, just like Eros, is involved with the inceptuality of λόγος. Δύναμις comes from the verb δύναμαι which has two meanings and our first task is to understand their relation.

i) First Meaning:

The most common meaning is to be able, capable or strong enough to bring something about. The emphasis here is the power to do something rather than the actual accomplishment of the task at hand. Even when power is exercised, power is manifest not only in its exercise, but as a kind of reserve that is not exhausted in particular tasks, a reserve that points to further possible tasks. Even if we recognize power in something or someone in a particular task, when we recognize power we mean not only this task but also possible ones. Both Plato and Aristotle find in δύναμις a force that belongs to beings appearing as what they are. Taking this insight we could say that δύναμις is attested to in a dimension of the manifestation of beings that reveals them in possibilities. There are two ways in which δύναμις can be said to belong to the appearing of beings as what they are:

- a) Beings appear as possibilities that are subtended by an overarching determination of meaning, by their Being which is set in advance. In this sense, beings are possibilities as images of an original Being. This sense of δύναμις belongs to the frame of τέχνη, and to Being as presence.

b) Δύναμις belongs to the appearing of beings when this appearing challenges any determinate meaning that we hold in advance to understand them. In this sense, δύναμις is manifest *within* the difference between beings and Being.^{cx1} This difference is the spacing (Da) of the appearing of beings that reveals resistance in beings to be subordinated to a constant overarching meaning. An unbridgeable difference is operative here between beings and Being, a difference that gives beings to open determinations, open possibilities—they appear in possibilities as possibilities, without closure.

ii) *The Second Meaning:*

The second meaning of δύναμις is ‘to pass for’ something else. This sense of δύναμις is operative in the ‘δύναμις of λόγος’, the power of speech. To ‘pass for’ as the power of speech does not refer to ‘a word passing for a being,’ as if words were beings as well, as if they were not always already implicated in the manifestation of beings as what they are. Words are not ‘outside’ of beings. The power of speech is precisely the involvement of words and beings, an involvement that is fundamental to the moments of manifestation of beings in their meanings that we just discussed.

Λόγος as the power of ‘passing for’ something is to be thought from the difference between beings and Being. The δύναμις of λόγος, then, is also twofold:

a) it sets up Being in advance hypothetically as a ‘definition’ which comes to encompass the meaning of a being. This is the δύναμις of λόγος operative in rhetoric.

- b) it brings forth a being inceptively, in a moment of disclosure of meaning that is not subordinated to a hypothesis, but transgresses any hypothesis. The δύναμις of λόγος here holds open the difference between beings and Being as the site for the inceptive appearing of beings, it shelters the Da beyond τέχνη.

In the interlude Socrates turns Phaedrus' erotic comportment from the first to the second δύναμις of λόγος.

B) Socrates' First Speech, its Failure and its essential relation to Rhetoric

1. 'Hypotheses'

There are two hypotheses that determine Socrates' first speech in advance. By hypothesis I mean an anticipatory positing of the speech as whole so that it is framed in terms that are not themselves subject to questioning. The hypothetical character of Socrates' speech is what characterizes the profoundly technical mode of the speech.

- a) The first hypothesis is:

“There once was a boy, a youth rather, and he was very beautiful, and had very many lovers. One of them was wily and had persuaded him that he was not in love, though he loved the lad no less than the other. And once in pressing his suit to him, he tried to persuade him that he ought to give his favours to a man who did not love him rather than to one who did.”^{xii}

The speech is framed, then, in advance, as a deception. The speaker is concealed from the one to whom he speaks. In other words, the speaker, through deception, does not want to appear as

being implicated in the words he utters: by speaking about the lover he wants to appear as if he were not a lover. The deception occurs at two levels: first, in the misrepresentation of himself as a non-lover and, second, in the detachment that he seems to have in relation to what he says. It is important to note that persuasion appears here as completely severed from truth: persuasion is indifferent to truth or falsehood, its standard belongs to a different realm. At the same time, the apparent detachment of the speaker gives persuasive force to his speech. Since the speaker does not appear to be implicated in his speech, since he presents love in detachment from himself, the speech is disengaged from his particular situation and acquires the appearance of generality, of revealing something about love in general. The result of this hypothesis is to create the appearance of non-implication in one's own words, and this might be the core of the deception, a core which may not even be understood by the speaker himself.

The question to note here is whether the speaker not only is deceptive, but is he *also* concealed from himself? It is also important to note that the deception in this speech does not occur at the level of what is said (the speaker might well believe what he says about Eros). The deception occurs, rather, in the way in which the speaker lives his relation to his speech—in that he relates to speech as a tool.

b) The second hypothesis says (the precision of the Greek here is most important, and so the following is a very literal translation):

“Since the speech (λόγος) lies in advance in front of us (πρόκειται) as to whether one must go into friendship with someone who loves him or with someone who doesn't, we must keep in sight (ὄρον) that which has already been posited (θέμενοι) in agreement in speech (ὁμολόγια), namely, what sort of being love is (περι' ἔρώτος ὅτιον τ' ἐστι)

and what are the capacities (δύναμιν) that it has. In this way we can produce for ourselves an inquiry (σκέψις)—by looking away from everything else and looking steadfastly at what is posited in advance (᾿αποβλέποντες), by returning to it (᾿αναφέροντες)—into whether love yields harm or benefit. It is evident to everybody that love is a kind of desire (᾿επιθυμία).^{»cxiii}

This second, more explicit hypothesis has several moments that reveal the character of hypothesis as such. I will consider each moment one by one.

i) To begin with, a speech as a whole (the one that Socrates is about to make) already lies in front (πρόκειμαι) of Socrates and Phaedrus. Πρόκειμαι has a variety of senses. It means to lie in front, to be exposed, the προκείμενος refers to a corpse laid out for burial; it can also refer to the way a prize is set before all in a contest, and it also means to propose and put an opinion forth. The speech that Socrates is about to make is conceived as already there and fully accessible like a corpse is to a clinical gaze. The speech is also already there as a prize, as a pre-set resolution of a conflict or contest, as something to be accomplished. All of this carries implications as to what λόγος, language, speech is conceived of here. The words that one is to utter and voice are, from this stance, already there for us, as beings that we encounter laying there, as beings at hand. These words/beings are found by us when we speak, and our speech is nothing more than an echo, a repetition of the speech that is already there. The point here is that speech and beings are not essentially different, no matter if one is ‘general’ and the other ‘particular,’ what I want to stress from this stance is that they are both beings at hand laying before us. Here there is no ontological difference between words and beings. At the beginning of Socrates first speech the possibility that words and beings have a different mode of being is precluded in advance.

ii) Having determined the mode of being of speech, Socrates needs to narrow his focus and find the way in which the theme of his speech, that is, Eros, is laid out in advance. In speaking, Socrates has to always keep in sight that which will be always already agreed upon by the multitude, as if Eros were fully exposed to it like a corpse. In other words, Socrates and Phaedrus must make explicit in the beginning the agreement that everybody else shares with respect to what Eros is. Agreement here means then to say the same as everybody would say with respect to Eros, to make explicit what is already evident, to draw out the agreement in which everybody already is. To speak, then, is an exercise in the preservation of the agreement of the multitude—this is the constraint, the sacred limit that speech cannot transgress. All disagreement or difference of opinion can be reduced to agreement, all differences of opinion are distortions to be corrected, they are grounded in the identity preserved in speech of what everybody would say about something, and identity that is a prize, a resolution that we always see in advance as the prize for speaking. The point of speaking, then, is to steadfastly look at what everybody would agree upon, to always remain within agreement, to always secure our return to the agreement that holds between everybody. At the beginning of Socrates speech, then, we agree to agree with everybody and we preclude the possibility of a disagreement that is irreducible to agreement. *But 'agreement' here is rather the agreement of the multitudes than that agreement proper that we find through φιλία.*

iii) Socrates states that he and Phaedrus need to make explicit what kind of being Eros is and what its capacities are. Let's turn to the former. Socrates says that is clear to everybody that Eros is a desire (ἔπιθυμία). Ἐπιθυμία means literally putting your θύμος upon something. Θύμος

has a range of meanings. It means heart and spirit. It is the site for anger, joy and sadness. It is what makes us go to war, to protect what is ours or to appropriate what is of somebody else. We are angry when somebody takes away what is properly ours, we are joyful when we get what we deserve, we are sad when we do not have something that we want to have. Θύμος determines the way in which we relate to beings that are present at hand that we can possess fully. To desire is to take up something present at hand as if it ought to belong to us, as if it had to be in our possession. Θύμος motivates us to desire beings as if they were before us, fully accessible, exposed as prizes. *I note here a correspondence between the way in which speech was determined in advance as a being at hand and the way in which θύμος reveals beings in the world for us.* We can say, then, that the way the speech began was already determined by θύμος and ἔπιθυμία, that there is desire operative in the hypothetical character of Socrates first speech, and that hypothetical speech as such is permeated by ἔπιθυμία. There is, then, a strange coherence set up from the beginning between speaking and desire, as if speaking were a mode of desire.

2. The Disempowerment of Eros

To begin with, the powers of Eros have to be constrained, localized. Human beings are split between two ruling principles and beginnings, one is the principle of λόγος and the other that of desire for pleasures, the latter is the principle that rules over the powers of Eros. This constraint has the effect of dissociating erotic powers from λόγος, as if there were a δύναμις that does not implicate λόγος. This questionable dissociation leads to two kinds of life, the life of hubris which is erotic life and the life of σοφροσύνη, which is the life lived in accordance with λόγος. Eros would then be an unreasoned desire for beauty, a desire detached from the

manifestation of beings, a power that, hence, cannot be a power anymore but sheer force (238c). The result, then, is that Beauty is posited from the beginning as not belonging to the way in which beings appear as what they are and desire is thus placed in a hypothetical place, a place where beings draw us to them without λόγος, without appearing as what they are. From now on, then, Socrates' speech will be spoken out of that hypothetical realm without λόγος—how long can this hypothesis be sustained, *this implicit third hypothesis?*

This realm without λόγος is taken to be—though unstated—the realm of θύμος, of possession. So the erotic man “who is ruled by desire and is a slave to pleasure will turn his boy into whatever is most pleasing to himself.”^{cxiv} In other words, by splitting reason from desire we end up not in the realm of either of these but in the realm of θύμος. Thus, here, we are rigorously unveiling the understanding of desire as ἐπιθυμία of the second hypothesis. The attentive listener needs to note, then, that there is no such desire “by itself” and that, at least for now, desire has to be seen through another, namely, θύμος. Further, the realm of θύμος turns out not to be deprived of λόγος, its is rather full of it in the form of measuring and strategizing, which is grounded in the hypothetical operation of speech. The lover sets up in advance a plan to conquer the boy. The boy himself will have to be seen in advance: “His first wish will be for a boy who has lost his dearest, kindest and godliest possessions.”^{cxv} In other words, θύμος wants to possess someone with no θύμος, with nowhere to put his heart on, because only such a person can be possessed. θύμος is, then, oriented to its opposite, it is a stance of unchallenged identity and of simple ruling. This stance is however, paradoxical because in order to secure such a rule and possession, θύμος seeks that no one else would want to possess his beloved and is, then, invested in turning his possession ugly. The paradox consists here in that through θύμος beauty is annihilated and the first attraction to anyone is not sustained. θύμος detaches itself from

beauty and, through this detachment, it loses the desire that first motivates it.^{cxvi} Eros is here disempowered.

Socrates first speech reveals, then, that *θύμος* cannot be that through which desire is understood, that there is an inherent tension between desire and *θύμος*. As Socrates will come to recognize later, his first speech is not about the desire for the beautiful at all. On the other hand, Socrates first speech is the preparation for a more accurate understanding of Eros. Mainly because the hypothetical moments reveal that desire and beauty cannot be detached from *λόγος*, and particularly, from the inceptive *λόγος* operative in the manifestation of beings as they are, which does not belong to *θύμος*. What is set up here is an affinity between *θύμος* and hypothetical speech and between Eros and inceptive, disclosive speech. Just as hypothetical speech covers inceptual speech, *θύμος* covers Eros. The second speech has as its first task to abandon the hypotheses of the first speech and then to bring to the fore the belonging between Eros, *λόγος* and the manifestation of speech as they are, or between Eros and the *δύναμις* of *λόγος*, inceptively understood.

3. Rhetoric

Before we begin to explore the relation between Eros and the inceptive *δύναμις* of *λόγος*, we will turn to rhetoric as a mode of speech that does not correspond to this *δύναμις*. It, rather, corresponds to *ἔπιθυμία* as described above. We will also see that in rhetoric there is no element of *φιλία*, in the sense in which *φιλία* is involved in agreement and disagreement, in dialogue.

a) Rhetoric as holding the constancy of looks in detachment from appearing.

Socrates explains the adequate way of beginning and constructing a rhetorical speech:

“At the beginning [αρχόμενος] of the speech about love, did Lysias make it necessary for us to take up Love by getting under it [‘υπολαμβάνω] as some definite being among beings, some being that he himself wished? And did he carry this through by arranging all discourse until the very end, beginning with the definite being that he wished?”^{cxvii}

To persuade is to make a specific kind of beginning in discourse: the end of the discourse and all of its parts must be presented already at the beginning. This is achieved by presenting a being in a definition. A definition is a constant look that limits from *the outset* the possibilities of engagement that determine a being. These pre-determined, constant possibilities come to order the parts and end of a rhetorical discourse. This ordering is attained because developing a rhetorical discourse means that a definition is constantly held in view throughout the discourse. The discourse of rhetoric is possible because a look offers itself and is held so that one can always return to it, because the look has always already been seen. Such a holding of a look does not attend to the appearing of beings in their looks, it is a holding of a look in detachment from appearing.

Let's turn now to the event of persuasion. According to Socrates, to be persuaded is to hold a definition 'from underneath.' The word here is 'υπολαμβάνω, which literally means to hold from underneath, to carry, to accept or receive, to assume—but it also means to take secretly and to seduce. All these meanings are at play in Socrates discourse about persuasion. What exactly is at issue in this 'holding from underneath' that constitutes being persuaded? To be persuaded is to hold a definition always already in view and to carry it willingly. This means, to take the possibilities of engagement with beings presented in this definition as mainly our

own, as submitted to our purposes. In other words, we hold the definition of a being ‘from underneath’ insofar as we project ends in order to manipulate beings—this is expressed in senses of ‘υπολαμβάνω like seduce, or to take secretly.

There is a further moment in persuasion that is another ‘υπολαμβάνω. When we become persuaded, when we relate to something in its possibility for us, in our projected interests, we ourselves become a manipulable, predictable being. This is why the rhetorician imposes a definition on us. We are to the rhetorician something that he holds, we become a being that is held from underneath by the rhetorician and his interests. Holding a definition from underneath while being held from underneath is the discursive event of persuasion. As opposed to agreement and disagreement, persuasion, as manipulated by the rhetorician, is not a dialogical, chanced event. Moreover, in this discursive event our soul and discourse as such become something defined and are themselves detached from appearing.

In persuasion we do not seek agreement in the proper sense. We attain, rather, a reduced sense for the possibilities of beings in their meanings, which we value in its stability. This reduction can only occur within a multitude rather than in dialogue between friends. Such φιλία, as we have seen, is not the erasure of difference even in agreement, but a preservation of differences in dialogue that expands our Da-sein, the spacing in which beings appear for us. Under the manipulative gaze of the rhetorician we are detached from Da-sein and from φιλία. Persuasion is, rather, an exercise of ἔπιθυμία, of possession, in the sense of Socrates’ first speech.

b) Rhetoric as a discourse of similarities: the disempowerment of deception.^{cxviii}

In our discussion of disagreement we encountered a deep self-concealment in which we were ‘carried’ by discourse in errancy. We can already see that the deception which belongs to the discourse of rhetoric, one in which we see ourselves as ‘carrying’ rather than ‘carried,’ must be different from this self-concealment.

Socrates characterizes deception in persuasion as a knowledge about the use of similarities:

“Can anyone be artful (τέχνικος) in bringing someone to a different place (μεταβιβάζειν) little by little through similarities, that is, leading someone away so as to bring him home (’απάγων) from some definite being among beings into its opposite, and do this without knowledge of what this definite being is among beings?”^{cxix}

To be deceived, self-concealed, in persuasion is to be led by similarities to understand a being’s meaning to be other to what it is. This leading through similarities is simply a particular way of engaging a definition: engaging it through a discourse that erases differences, that withdraws from the specific meanings of looks while retaining their constancy. Constancy is here retained as something that we can always return to, even as a ‘home.’ Anchoring deception in a home covers up the experience of self-deception in disagreement. The power of discourse to erase differences and lead through similarities reinforces the detachment from the appearing of beings that belongs to the discourse of rhetoric: there is no event of appearing in the constant home with which we are presented here.

The way rhetoric deceives covers over the sense of loss and untruth of disagreement. As we saw, it is this sense of loss of φιλία that compels us erotically to seek the acquisition of friends through dialogue. Immersing us in the agreement of the multitude and giving us a home

even when deceived, rhetoric is not erotic. Socrates proceeds to give an account of dialectic within the narrow frame in which rhetoric operates.

4. The dialectic of the rhetorician.

Socrates begins to unfold the relation between rhetoric and dialectic:

“Won’t someone who is to speak well and nobly have to have in mind the *truth* about the subject he is going to discuss?”^{cxx}

In other words, truth matters, not only the argumentative method of rhetoric. What could Socrates mean by this? He explains:

“[SO] But if I were seriously trying to convince you, having composed a speech in praise of the donkey in which I called it a horse and claimed that having such an animal is of immense value both at home and in military service, that it is good for fighting and for carrying your baggage and that it is useful for much else besides—

[PH] Well, that would be totally ridiculous.”^{cxxxi}

If one wants to persuade somebody and not be ridiculous, it is better if one knows the truth of what one is talking about. What is this ‘truth’? It seems to be to know what something is, what a ‘horse’ is, for example. Who are the one’s who know these kinds of truths? The experts the ones who know how to *use* beings. A horse rider, for example, knows what a horse is because he uses a horse. Such is his expert truth.

We, however, ran into a problem here. The experts only know beings in perspective. The use they want to make of something determines what they understand this something to be. The horse of the horse rider, for example, *is* a different horse than that of the veterinarian. They know

different beings about horses, they look at them from different perspectives. Can this perspectival truth persuade us?

Experts never persuade us of anything only on the basis of their expertise. When we are persuaded we are invested on what we know, we claim to have a stable knowledge about it that goes beyond what this or that expert says.

So what is this stability of knowledge that makes *all* of the difference? Isn't this what Socrates really means by 'truth' when he challenges Phaedrus? Socrates almost threw us off track: *this stability, this truth, is rhetoric*. Of course, we have to make sure that when we are talking about horses we don't say that they have the longest ears. That is, we must remain within the understanding of the multitude. But the persuasive moment depends on our method, on our clarity of exposition, on having a definition and arguments in steps that you can enumerate, on having a result that we can hold in advance in front of us with stability. It is the method of rhetoric that provides its truth.

Socrates leaves the experts behind, at least the traditional ones, and returns to the method of rhetoric. He proposes a new kind of expert, *one that studies method as such*. These new experts will be the best at persuasion because they will know the method of method: *how* to define, categorize, argue—the method and rules for all of these.

Socrates identifies two parts of this method of method. He says:

“[SO] The first consists in seeing together beings that are scattered about everywhere and collecting them into one kind, so that by defining each being we can make clear the subject of any instruction.”^{cxxii}

The first part of the method involves stating a definition that would unify meanings scattered around into one meaning. For example, “a horse is...” This is the moment when we present a definition as a thesis. But no one is ever persuaded by a thesis. We need the second part:

“[SO] ...to be able to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.”^{cxiii}

Once we have a definition, we have to chop it up while respecting categories of meaning (species) that will eventually become obvious to everyone. Finally we need to add all the chopped parts that we distinctly understand back together and apprehend our thesis set up in advance with perfect clarity through this enumeration. Once we have done this, we will have persuaded someone. Who are the new experts of rhetorical method? They are the dialecticians, those who supplement the τέχνη of rhetoric and persuasion.

C) Socrates' Second Speech on Eros

Through an awareness of erology, of the way in which a discourse about love folds back into an analysis of discourse as such with respect to its inception—an inception that grows out of the Da toward which Eros is drawn—I will read Socrates' second speech on Eros as an enactment of erology.

I will not provide an exhaustive interpretation of this speech. I will note, rather, pivotal moments that will allow us to understand Eros in relation to philosophy as a counterforce to τέχνη or—in Heidegger's terms—as tracing out an enactment of the crossing.

1. Beginning with Madness

Socrates' second speech on Eros begins with madness. First, he associates madness with mantic powers. These mantic powers are the powers of encountering beings as signs or characters, as not present at hand, but as opening a future, beings appearing with open determinations, as possibilities with uncertain horizons. Socrates finds mantic powers to be fundamental to thinking:

“...the clearheaded study of the future, which uses birds and other signs, was originally called oionistic, since it uses reasoning to bring intelligence and learning to human thought.”^{cxxiv}

The mantic power in thinking, the relation to beings appearing beyond the frame of fore grasping thought that belongs to Platonism, is here presented as an inceptive moment in which thought comes to be what it is, becomes grounded as itself, through a reception of intelligence and learning. Madness in thinking speaks of thinking inceptually, it forces us to recognize in thinking a dimension that is not ours, that is not willed, but takes over us as a gift from the gods. It is as such a gift that we must now understand Eros:

“And we, for our part, must prove...that this sort of madness is given us by the gods to ensure our greatest good fortune.”^{cxv}

Beginning with madness, then, is to begin within an experience of thinking and λόγος in their relation to the appearing of beings that is very different from the dimension of ἔπιθυμία and rhetoric. We speak as if from another kind of beginning than the one that rules them.

2. The Soul as Source

After madness, Socrates turns to the soul, but to an account of it that preserves what we have learned about thinking from madness. If thinking is to become itself, to receive itself and originate, if it is drawn by a divine necessity, then the soul must be divine *by nature*:

“Every soul is immortal. That is because whatever is always in motion is immortal.”^{cxv}

Socrates is clear that here he is showing (᾿αποδείξις) the belonging of soul to nature (φύσις).^{cxvii} This belonging to nature of soul will provide the basis to understand soul in its madness. The clue here is that by nature the soul is immortal because it is always in motion. We need first to understand what immortal means here:

“...a source [᾿αρχή] that has no beginning [᾿αγένετον]. That is because everything that has a beginning comes from some source, but there is no source for this, since a source that got its start from something else would no longer be the source.”^{cxviii}

Socrates is here differentiating between ᾿αρχή and γένεσις. An ᾿αρχή is a ruling principle, that from which a fundamental necessity issues. This passage makes sense only if we remember that we are speaking of soul in its belonging to φύσις which, as we have seen before, is the emerging/passing of beings as a whole. This emerging/passing does not itself appear, there is no being that could present it. Another way of saying this is that it never begins as coming to be (γένεσις), because what comes to be, comes to ‘there’ [Da]. At the same time, all beginnings come from this source. This means that for all appearing φύσις must exceed itself, to be jointed with ᾿αλήθεια. In this joint ᾿αλήθεια does not ‘present’ a being (that would be a Platonic, technical understanding of coming to be). ᾿Αλήθεια eventuates as the openness of the Da in which beings appear and begin out of nature, not as posited but with open determinations, that is, in un-concealment gathered in inceptive λόγος. *Φύσις needs the Da, even if it exceeds itself in*

this need, and the Da needs φύσις to gather it—the carrying out of this double need is the event of the appearing of beings in be-ing.

Now we can see why soul in its belonging to nature is always in motion. Soul here has no τέλος, no sense of accomplishment. Even when φύσις is gathered in Da-sein, it does not itself appear, it remains only as a trace in the openness and withdrawal of determination in the appearing of beings. Φύσις eludes all determination, it is never held in view, it does not strive to become any ‘being’ even if beings begin out of it—in an Aristotelian determination of motion, it is possibility as possibility (δύναμεις κατα δύναμεις), but in a way that disrupts Aristotle’s thinking because this motion is completely disengaged from any sense of ἐνεργεία.

To say that soul belongs to nature is to say that a dimension of soul participates in the emerging/passing of nature. It also means that soul must be involved in Da-sein, in the opening in which beings come to be, originate as striving to be what they are. The soul participates in the moment in which φύσις exceeds itself.

3. The shining-looking of the Soul.

Socrates moves to describe the soul’s involvement in the appearing of beings, in Da-sein, as compelled by φύσις. He puts this in a strange way:

“Now we must say something about its [the soul’s] shining-looking [ἴδεα].”^{cxxix}

The soul cannot have a look because of its belonging to φύσις. The soul cannot simply appear as a being does. At the same time, the soul is not the same as φύσις because it is Da-sein, because it belongs to the joint φύσις/ἀλήθεια in which φύσις exceeds itself. The soul is involved in appearing in providing the spacing for beings to come to be. So it does not have a look but occurs as a shining-looking (ἴδεα). The soul is not a being but opens up the space in which

beings shine and can be looked at: shining-looking here expresses this double moment in the spacing of appearing.

Of course, Socrates cannot simply present the soul in its shining-looking, because it cannot be presentable. Instead, he can only provide an image. In this case this image is not of an original, but an image of the spacing that is anterior to the very distinction image/original:

“Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer... To begin with, our driver is in charge of a pair of horses; second one of his horses is beautiful and good and from stock of the same sort, while the other is the opposite and has the opposite sort of bloodline.”^{CXXX}

The two horses are opposites: one is beautiful and good and the other is its opposite. How this opposition is played out, what these words mean in this context, will only become clear later in the speech. Here we must note, however, that the horses do not have self-awareness, they do not see themselves, they are oriented toward beings outside of them—they do not open the Da.

There are three important dimensions to the charioteer:

a) First, he is the seer. In other words, he sees the space in which the horses move, he is not so much directed toward beings as toward the opening in which beings stand.

Only because the charioteer is such a seer, can we speak of the shining-looking of the soul, the way in which the soul engages the opening in which beings shine and are looked at.

b) As the seer, the characteristics of the horses and the extent of their opposition is apparent only to the charioteer. The beautiful horse appears as beautiful to the charioteer, for example.

- c) This means that the charioteer is erotically disposed toward the horses, even if he avoids one and pursues the other. The soul, then, is figured here as held together and *already determined by Eros*. In other words, if the soul as a whole is erotically drawn toward a being, in this very draw, it will learn about itself, about its own constitution.
- d) These three dimensions of the charioteer strongly suggest that with this image Socrates' alludes to Anacreon's *Fragment 360*:
- e) "Your face, boy, like a girl's— / I follow you, you've no idea, / You'll never know my soul is the team / And you the chariot driver."^{cxvxi}
- f) The strange thing about this poem is that here the beloved is the charioteer, as if his beauty resided in the charioteer. In terms of Socrates' image, this poem would work very well with the idea that the charioteer learns about the soul in which it partakes, it learns about its beauty, through the beauty of the beloved. In other words, this suggests that in Socrates' image the charioteer is not an 'I' as much as a disposition and receptiveness to others, a community of friendship, and that his seeing is not an individual seeing but a seeing worked out through others. The charioteer is the site of *φιλία*, which eventuates as shining-looking, as the spacing of the appearing of beings in the joint *φύσις/ἀλήθεια*.

Φιλία is the guide of the soul.

The charioteer is the site of φιλία that has an erotic orientation toward its own structure as a soul and toward others. The erotic enactment toward Da-sein, that enactment that coincides with philosophy, has the character of the charioteer returning to himself, a return that is an enactment of soul as a whole. This enactment is the return to the originary site of friendship and dialogue which is not the willed enactment of a 'subject' at all.

4. Beauty

“...Beauty alone has this privilege, to be the most shining and the most loved.”^{xxxii}

For Socrates, Beauty is twofold:

- i) As the most shining, Beauty is not a being presented to us, but the shining, the appearing of a being. At the same time, this shining does not take over a being from the outside, it, rather, shines out of the being. The experience of beauty is the experience of a being opening up the spacing for its own appearing. In beauty, this spacing is not determined in advance, it is not complete, but, rather it shines through any attempt to set limits to it. This is why even though the shining comes through the being, the being is not the limit of the shining but it itself appears within the shining. A double moment of Da-sein is at play here: a being (Sein) opens the Da while at the same time it appears within it. *This is precisely the opening of the excess of space of meaning that is offered when a being has always already transgressed the limits that Being imposes on it, the spacing that allows for that transgression, and that opens the difference between beings and Being.* We could say here that the being is an image in this double moment, but an image outside of the structure original/copy, an image that holds openness of determination in its very appearing, that twists free of mimesis. This double moment belongs to the shining of Beauty, it sets it apart as the most shining.
- ii) Beauty is also the most loved. It is the most loved because in its shining it gives the opening of Da-sein, it enacts that which we are called to enact, it provokes the charioteer to come to himself. In Beauty beings develop intimacy with human

beings. This is why for Socrates another human being is exemplary in Beauty.

Even in the case of another human being, it is the double moment of shining that draws us toward another, seeking their friendship, compelling us to participate in the shining.

Before turning to the enactment of Eros, Socrates warns us against the followers of Ares, the god of war. These followers, full of θύμος, of sense of possession and the protection of possessions, cannot join the compelling force of Eros because they turn murderous and can sacrifice themselves and the beloved. Θύμος, the basic drive that corresponds to ἐπιθυμία, is not open to the shining of Beauty and remains oriented toward beings. Θύμος belongs to the horses, not to the charioteer.

5. The Enactment of Eros

We return here to the soul as a charioteer with a black and a white horse. The white horse is now presented as the drive to self-control, to the protection of limits set up in advance. This drive is that of θύμος, of propriety. It belongs to the necessity of τέχνη of adhering to pre-determined meanings and values. In Heidegger's terms, θύμος is the necessity of Platonism and metaphysics. This horse is not given to Eros and beauty, even though to the charioteer it appears as beautiful. Why?

The white horse is not given to beauty but appears beautiful because of its relation to the black horse. The black horse is a force of transgression of limits and lack of propriety. *When the two horses act together, the transgression of limits brings to the fore the endorsement of limits by the white horse, and it is in this gaping tension, only when the limits are transgressed, that the white horse appears as beautiful, it shines in the spacing that enables the transgression and is*

now offered in beauty. This tension, the appearing of limits in their transgression, is the event of soul in the rapture of Eros. Before this rapture the white horse subordinates the black one. This subordination is challenged by Eros and an essential transformation of the soul takes place. Now the soul is in tension, and the charioteer in love with Beauty holds the tension of the soul *as tension*, it does not resolve it but engages its openness as openness to the Beautiful. This transformation is Eros proper, and it is a twisting free from the force of the white horse, that is, from the force that adheres to determinations of meanings set up in advance. This transformation, then, is a countermovement to τέχνη, it is a philosophical enactment in Heidegger's sense, of philosophy as determined in the crossing of *Contributions*. Eros enacts the crossing.

What is the relation between this transformation and the double movement of the shine of Beauty? In this double movement a being is limited within its Da but also transgresses those limits and opens the Da. This is precisely the movement that the soul enacts when it holds the two horses in tension, the soul in tension is beautiful, it shines. As beautiful, the charioteer returns to itself as φιλία, as the encounter with others beyond θύμος and possessiveness, as enjoying the transgression of limits set in advance as open moments of growth in Da-sein shared with others. This transformative return to itself of the charioteer is a kind of madness, it is not willed by the charioteer, who only responds to the compelling force of beauty by holding the erotic tension of the soul.

The charioteer in this way engages in dialogue with friends, a dialogue that presupposes the essential transformation that Eros names, and which is philosophy. Eros is fulfilled in dialogue. We have, then, traced out in Socrates' second speech the enactment of erology—an enactment in which we return to the possibility of dialogue, to Socrates calling Phaedrus, from the beginning, a 'friend.' Socrates' erotic attraction toward friends is revealed to be more

originary than Phaedrus' love of speeches, philosophy has come to appear as prior to rhetoric, as engaging the appearing of beings in their shine that must have always already taken place in its erotic necessity.

The question now is whether there is in *Phaedrus* a hint of dialectic that is erotic, that is not a supplement to rhetoric, but that engages the power of discourse, engaging the appearing of beings twisting free of the setting up of meaning in advance.

6. Erotic Dialectic or Characterology.

At the beginning of Socrates' discourse on rhetoric, he disrupts this beginning by marking a moment prior to this beginning that cannot be incorporated into rhetoric but is presupposed by it. This is a moment of dialectic beyond rhetoric:

“The intending student of rhetoric must ...grasp [’ειλήφηναι] some character [χαρακτήρ] of each of the looks, namely, of the look of the words about which we necessarily disagree and of the look of the words about which we agree.”^{cxxxiii}

After grasping such characters, the student of rhetoric goes ahead to define the words about which we disagree. Where is the interruption here? Prior to the definition which constitutes the beginning of a discourse of rhetoric, there must have been another attempt at grasping the words about which we *disagree* and *agree* as if they were sorted in two constant looks. By pointing to this prior attempt at definition, Socrates interrupts the proper beginning of rhetoric—a beginning that will dominate his entire discourse—by stepping back from it. The uncritical student of rhetoric—like Phaedrus at the beginning—will have always overlooked this stepping back.

As we have already seen, agreement and disagreement with others have the power of disclosing our discursive involvement with the appearing of beings as what they are. To try to

grasp the power of these moments in looks through definitions, to try to define them, means to dispossess them of their disclosive power so that they come to be subjected to the purposes of rhetoric. Socrates, however, quickly leaves behind any simple attempt to gather the words about which we agree and disagree in looks in the sense of definitions. Another sense of ‘look’ must be operative here because these words mark the inception of dialogue and speech, they are erotic. Now the power of λόγος must be at issue, the power of λόγος to hold beings as detached from the stable meanings that we set in advance for them. A power of λόγος in which beings appear in spaces of meaning but at the same time open these spaces up, holding a tension between determinate meanings and their transgressions—an erotic appearing.

According to Socrates the words about which we agree and disagree give themselves as *characters*—in the sense that they resist being gathered under a common sense, in the sense that they hold themselves apart, as distinct—and are, thus, grasped differently from the way definitions are grasped. In 253c5 Socrates is explicit about this difference: these words are sensed (᾿αισθάνομαι). In our restraint from the stance of rhetoric, we can ask whether words, by giving themselves as characters refer to dimensions of appearing that are not submitted to eidetic constancy.

Before we answer this question, let’s pause at Socrates’ use of ᾿αισθάνομαι in this context. This ‘sensing’ is a discursive sense for events of agreement and disagreement. This means: *it is a sensing of events of dialogue in friendship*. I will now show that this sensing occurs concretely as sheltering distinctiveness in the events of the appearing of beings as what they are in specific dialogical contexts.

Everything hinges on the Greek word ‘χαρακτήρ,’ which generally means a distinctive mark or writing. This word, however, has an array of meanings which are operative in Socrates’ speech. I will list and discuss the most relevant meanings:

- (i) A χαρακτήρ is a distinctive writing or inscription—it is a discursive event. It is distinctive in that it allows us to recognize something not because of its relation of similarity to other beings or to its Being, but because of an irreducible difference. A χαρακτήρ is precisely not a look set up in advance, even though it distinguishes beings from one another. χαρακτήρ cannot be assimilated in relations of similarity and commonality, nor in the discourse of constancy that reinforces this commonality. Instead, a χαρακτήρ is distinguished through a kind of indeterminacy. It is suggested here, then, that together with eidetic appearing, there is also an event of implication between discourse and appearing that is not stably eidetic, that allows for indeterminacy. Turning away from the force of constancy in the appearing of beings in their looks, we could say that a χαρακτήρ here names a sense of distinctiveness that differentiates between events of appearing of beings in open determinations of meaning. A χαρακτήρ would be then a discursive sense for events of appearing of beings as what they are. Given that Socrates binds the word χαρακτήρ to agreement and disagreement, we can say that this discursive sense is concretely a sense for the distinctiveness of dialogue, *for the appearing of beings as what they are in dialogue with friends—in a dialogue in which the difference between agreement and disagreement is creatively held in tension in Da-sein.*

- (ii) A χαρακτήρ is the result of the use of tools for engraving. But there are also natural characters that do not presuppose τέχνη: physical characters. We can think for example of a mole in someone's body. This Greek word, then, hovers in the difference between φύσις and τέχνη. Φύσις means here the holding sway of the emerging passing of beings as a whole, a dimension of appearing that is indeterminate insofar as it eludes the eidetic force of discourse because it cannot be simply gathered in a constant look. The event of χαρακτήρ names this deviation and stretching out of φύσις toward λόγος, without ever being identical to eidetic λόγος because it gives λόγος to its inception.
- (iii) A χαρακτήρ is something cut, engraved, impressed or even plowed, like a furrow. In this sense, like an impression, it is held and received but remains always foreign to what it is received in. This touching that never gets to grasp, that is always resisted, points to an event that is both a coming together while being drawn apart at the same time. It relies in an opening that cannot be bridged, an abyssal cleft. Such is the strife between beings and Being, a strife that is fundamental for eidetic appearing as well as for the inceptive, discursive sense for the indeterminacy in events of appearing. Through this double movement, the gathering of a look by discourse and the noetic insight that it allows are always set off balance by indeterminacy in appearing, an indeterminacy that is not fore-grasped eidetically but is still discursive, in a kind of event of inscription, in an event of the inceptive δύναμις of λόγος; like the event of coming to speak among friends in dialogue that Socrates is erotically drawn to.

. As it is the case in the appearing of beings as what they are in specific philosophical dialogues like the one between Phaedrus and Socrates, dialogues which are far from rhetorical discourse, but which are preserved in the writings of Plato, in a writing without persuasion, that enacts erotic dialectic—in erology.

Third Study: The Comedy of Patricide (Or: A Passing Sense of Manliness)^{cxxxiv}: Socrates' Overcoming of Ἄνδρεία

I want to note the philosophical relevance of hilarity. This relevance is evident in Socrates' bizarre character in Plato's dialogues. There, Socrates' mockery transgresses all limits—even that of his own death.^{cxxxv} In his 'defense,' for example, Socrates mocks the Athenian court: "...if I must make a just assessment of what I deserve as punishment," he says, "I assess it as this: free meals in the Prytaneum."^{cxxxvi} The whole Socratic endeavor is hilarious: picture the bum turned into a satyr confronting and shaming the famous citizens of Athens with, as Alcibiades puts it, "...speeches that at first strike you as completely hilarious...He's always going on about pack asses, or blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners; he is always making the same tired old points in the same tired old words."^{cxxxvii} Socrates' mockery is not only directed at the people and the 'experts' of Athens. He also mocks those who are closest to him: he loves to mock the 'lovers of wisdom,' in a mockery that is not far off from that put forth by the 'οἱ πολλοί.' In the *Phaedo*, Socrates presents the "true born philosophers" as 'preparing to die,'^{cxxxviii} as distracted from the path to 'Being' by growling bellies and other desires, as well as by sights, smells and sounds—they forget their own bodies, as if philosophy had nothing to do with desire, as if we were not open to being precisely through the senses. And, of course,

Socrates' mocks himself in front of others, especially with regard to his famous unattractiveness. In the *Symposium* he presents himself as an 'expert in erotics' and models Eros, the god of love, after his own image. In this self-mockery, Socrates follows a dangerous path, especially if we recall that in the cave, before the philosopher is killed, he is laughed at. Mocking the people of Athens, mocking philosophers, mocking the 'experts' and authorities of the city, and mocking himself—it is clear that there is no bottom to Socrates' hilarity, and to the extent that it is blasphemous, Socratic blasphemy seems absolute. We are touching here on an aspect of that suspicion of philosophy as such on the basis of which Socrates was condemned to death and which Socrates' himself shares when he compares himself to Typhon—a beast with a hundred heads—in the *Phaedrus*. What does philosophy learn about itself when it confronts its own Typhonic nature and Socrates' hilarity in particular?

There are two ways to tackle the relation of Socratic hilarity to philosophy. The first one would be to take this hilarity as one of Socrates' idiosyncracies and, at its best, as a rhetorical accessory to philosophy's seriousness. This first way cannot be meaningfully taken, considering the relevance of attending to comedy in the dialogues in order to liberate Plato from its dogmatic, academic reception.^{cxxxix} The second way is one that has not been decisively explored. It entails investigating comedy as inherent to philosophy's dialectical disclosure of beings as what they are (in their 'looks') while revealing *at the same time* the possibility of such a disclosure in speech (namely, investigating the appearing of 'being' as such). This double character determines philosophy as not 'hypothetical' or 'technical' (namely, as not relying on already established 'definitions' from which to build an inquiry) but, rather, as investigating the possibility of the disclosure of the fragile stability of the meaning of beings in language. Plato's philosophical reflection, in its turn toward ἀγαθόν as the ground of the 'looks,' is engaged in understanding

the possibility of meaning outside of the directives of always already pre-established ideals (on the basis of which the meaning of beings would be ‘evaluated’). Part One of this essay investigates comedy following the second way, and it seeks to determine a mode of hilarity that is distinctly and inherently philosophical in its freedom from pre-established ‘ideals’ as they are operative in technical and hypothetical modes of knowledge.

The first part of this essay is only preparatory to grasping the import of philosophical comedy in Plato’s dialogues. If it stood by itself, it might appear as a ‘theory’ of philosophical comedy, the very character of which—as should be evident in what follows—is contrary to philosophy as presented by Plato. After the preparatory analysis, Part Two of this essay is a proper study of comedy in the dialogues, that is, a study of comedy in a particular dialogue as revealing a fundamental dimension of the character of philosophical questioning.

In order to pursue this proper interpretation of comedy in the dialogues I will follow a hint offered by Plato himself. I will begin by turning to Socrates’ lover, Alcibiades, in his blasphemous hilarity as a way to frame a specific analysis of Socrates’ hilarity. It is no surprise that Plato presents Alcibiades as most attuned to Socrates’ hilarity: aside from loving him, Alcibiades is hilarious like Socrates and they both end up condemned in court because of their blasphemies. Plato provokes the question: are these lovers alike in their hilarious blasphemies? Plutarch tells us that Alcibiades was charged with defacing statues of the god of limits and boundaries^{cx1}, an action that expressed Alcibiades’ disgust with Athenian cowardice and resistance to go to war. This defacement symbolizes Alcibiades’ sense that manliness had fled Athens, and rumor says that Alcibiades own unrestrained, typhonic, mockery went so far as cutting phalluses off Greek sculptures. In his mockery and crime Alcibiades’ reflected what everyone knew by the time of Socrates’ trial: that ἀνδρεία had left the city, that Athens

remained haunted by a passing sense of manliness. *I question here whether Alcibiades and Socrates were ultimately condemned for the same crime, whether Socrates' philosophical practice also reflects the passing of Athenian manliness, whether—and in what sense—Socrates is an emasculator.*

I do not engage this line of questioning because I want to say that Socrates and Alcibiades are the same in their mockery (I would become, then, one of Socrates' accusers). I am pursuing, rather, the distinctness of philosophical comedy. In this pursuit, I am intrigued by whether Socratic comedy shows philosophy at odds with the Athenian virtue of manliness. More generally, I am intrigued by whether working through this tension between comedic philosophical practice and manliness reveals something essential about philosophical inquiry in its Platonic determination: namely, that it is not only a re-determination of knowledge and its grounds outside of hypothetical and technical knowledge, but that it is also, and necessarily so, a challenge to the order of virtue that characterized the Athenian *πολις*, specifically in its reliance on pre-established 'ideals' of virtue. This double character of philosophical reflection thinks politics and ontology in their sameness—without prioritizing 'thought' as directing 'practice,' nor 'practice' as guiding 'thought'—which opens a philosophical and political alternative to the organization of cities on the basis of pre-established hierarchies of knowledge and virtue (i.e., the organization of cities explored in the *Republic*).^{cxli}

In part II of this essay I will turn our attention to the way in which philosophical reflection involves a comedic overcoming of the priority of the Athenian virtue of manliness (*ἄνδρεία*). I will turn to the *Laches*, a dialogue that is explicitly connected to Alcibiades' speech in the *Symposium* and which shows Socrates' own comedic engagement with Athenian manliness. But I can already hear the rattling of the "true born philosophers": "if anything," they

say, “Socrates was condemned because he was a manly man among emasculated Athenians, he was the statue that escaped from Alcibiades’ hands, and his mockery of the court was nothing but a show of manliness—a phallic show—in the face of death.” I am inclined, however, not to hear these words. After all, what do these body-deniers know about phallic privileges? I listen rather to another voice—a daimonic voice perhaps—which rings out: “Socrates’ hilarious philosophical practice expresses and re-enforces the passing of manliness”

I. Preparatory Analysis of Philosophical Comedy

A. Comedy and the Disclosure of Being

In the *Republic*, after great dialectical exertion, Socrates draws the limit between man and woman, and ultimately shows sexual difference as it appears in the city to be like a matter of hair—men have short and women long, hair—or one of position: women bear and men mount.^{cxlii} The joke is evident, but why is it hilarious? It is hilarious because Socrates completely missed the mark. Lost in the steps of dialectic he forgot what he was invested in doing—the goal of his endeavor: to show what man and woman are in their difference. *Socrates is hilarious because of his self-forgetfulness*. Through this example of comedy in dialectic, and of the meaning of self-forgetfulness in Platonic comedy, I want to bring comedy to bear upon a discussion of how beings are disclosed in their looks or in their being (ἑίδη, that which shows the limits of a being, in its being what it is in distinction to other beings). I will show that comedy belongs to such a disclosure.

When beings show themselves as what they are, this showing does not correspond to the way beings appear by being put together in production through technical knowledge. In

production or τέχνη, beings are produced in relation to an already established model or paradigm (παράδειγμα), which the craftsman contemplates beforehand—as a kind of hypothesis—and imitates. In the manifestation of beings in their being, on the other hand, a particular being is not a copy of its being (its being is not a paradigm for the particular being). The being of a being does not precede the being like the original paradigm precedes a copy in the order of production. The appearing of beings as what they are is, rather, a unified phenomenon. There is no ‘being’ on the one hand, and ‘being,’ on the other. Being has no precedence over a specific being, like a pre-established paradigm has precedence over a copy. Being (the ‘what it is’ of a being) simply names the perspectival gathering of the limits¹ that distinguish one being from others, a perspectival gathering that (1) Plato properly calls a ‘look’, (2) occurs as a gathering in speech² (i.e., dialectic), and (3) appears always together with beings. By Being always appearing ‘together with beings,’ I mean that the speech that discloses the looks of beings does not intend a ‘general concept’ to talk about the ‘particular being.’ It, rather, always intends beings themselves as they come to appear in particular and definite dialogical situations. The rootedness in dialogical situations of the disclosure of beings in their looks is the first way in which we can understand the perspectival character of the disclosure of a being in its being.

This interpretation of the disclosive power of dialectic seems at odds with any stability in the meaning of beings and, thus, at odds with Socratic thinking. However the relevance of the specificity of dialogue is evident in the dialogues. In *The Sophist*, the stranger attests to this relevance:

“...as of now you and I have only a name in common about him [the sophist], but we might perhaps have by ourselves in private the work for which we severally call him.

And one must always in regard to anything have gained together an agreement about the matter (πράγμα) itself through speeches rather than only about the name apart from speech.^{»^{cxliii}}

Dialectic, if anything, moves from the empty generality of a name to the specific meaning of beings disclosed through dialogue. Only in this dialogical engagement can we talk about the ‘matter itself’—a being in its being. In fact, the generality of names is ‘apart from speech.’ Dialectic, then, does not intend a general concept; in fact, it moves away from such pre-established general significations. The issue is, then, how to explain the stability and sameness in which beings are gathered up in their Being without appealing to conceptual structures (like technical paradigms) while remaining rooted in the specificity of dialogue. This issue is illuminated through comedy in philosophy.

From the example at the beginning of this section, comedy as self-forgetfulness consists in having transgressed limits and becoming aware of this transgression a little too late, showing that we forgot the limits that determine what we were doing. The crucial point is this: it is only after this transgression and forgetfulness that the transgressed limits appear as limits, only in the retrospective turn marked by laughter do the already transgressed limits become manifest in the first place.

We could think of this forgetfulness in terms of the appearing of ‘looks.’ When discussing beings in their being, only after we have forgotten and transgressed the limits gathered by looks, do the looks show themselves—through a turning back or recollection (ἀνάμνησις). Perhaps there is a philosophic, palintropic laughter. Socrates forgets the looks of man and woman in the very attempt to find them—and we laugh. Our laughter means that while Socrates has overdone dialectic (forgotten and transgressed the limits of what he was trying to

find by imposing further unnecessary limits) we, on the other hand, must have somehow seen the looks that Socrates forgot about. Otherwise we wouldn't recognize Socrates' excess and laugh. The looks of man and woman must have been given to the ones who laugh and they are given in laughter, not directly but retrospectively, through recollection. This comedic phenomenality is the key to Socrates' dialectic: in specific dialogical situations he inquires into other people's opinions by questioning the looks of beings. In doing this, he makes them realize that in their speech they have always already forgotten the limits that determine their opinions about the meanings of beings and, thus, Socrates makes them recollect these limits as gathered by looks.

Since the limits of the looks of beings appear as somehow being remembered, we assign precedence to looks, as if looks always belonged to the past, being prior to specific beings. But this precedence has nothing to do with the precedence that a paradigm has over a copy. It is, rather, rooted in the comedic phenomenality of looks. This comedic precedence, by presenting 'looks' as having always already been there, provides the being appearing in its look with stability and sameness in meaning, despite the specificity of the dialogical situation. The sameness of beings in their being is not rooted in pre-established definite concepts but, rather, in the temporality of the comedic manifestation of beings in their looks.

The comedic dimension in the manifestation of beings as what they are also sheds further light on why looks are perspectival gatherings. The stability of the 'looks' rooted in comedic temporality is nevertheless threatened by a lack of ground, it is a fragile stability. In Plato's terms, in the disclosure of the 'looks' of beings, the intended beings appear as images ('εἶδολα), an imaging that does not refer to the stability of pre-established paradigms (c.f. the discussion of images in the discourse on *χώρα* in the *Timaeus*) In comedic disclosure, the 'look' appears indirectly, retrospectively. When a look appears out of forgetfulness, its always having been

forgotten appears with it. In other words, the temporal precedence of the ‘look’ is characterized by incompleteness and loss of determination, which undermines the definitive force of the stability of looks (c.f. the discussion of non-being in *The Sophist*). The disclosive occurrences of beings in their looks are non-definite, open occurrences of fragile stabilities in the meanings of beings. Thus, the look is never in our grasp as a present being, it is fundamentally elusive, as if an aspect of it were always out of reach. Looks always have blind spots, they appear always in perspective. This blind spots and perspectives in the determinations of looks mean that looks always appear together with possibilities of further dialogue and investigation, a furthering of dialogue which constitutes in its indeterminacy the effective stability provided by the looks. In other words, the fragile stability of looks remains true to the specificity of dialogue while at the same time pointing beyond a specific dialogue to the necessity of further dialogue about the *same* matter. What the look gives is only a stable way of access into a being in its meaning, a limited way to understand how a being is fundamentally different from other beings, a limited way to understand how a being is limited in its meaning—therefore looks are perspectival gatherings of *limits* and not of present beings. This is the deeper sense of the disclosure of beings in their looks as perspectival gatherings of limits, gatherings that are grounded in comedic temporality.

Paying attention to comedy in dialectic gives us insight into a disrupted temporality that characterizes the disclosure of beings in their looks: the precedence of what is always already there is an ‘open’ precedence, a ‘possible’ precedence that points beyond itself. In such a strange temporality, the phenomenal unity of the disclosure of beings in their looks is threatened. The looks are both stable and fragile, and the task of dialectic is to preserve the togetherness of this duplicity. Comedy sheds light on how this preservation is possible. Let’s focus on the fact that in

recollection we ‘turn back’ toward the look of beings. This means, as we have seen from Socrates’ comedic practice, that we have always transgressed the limits of what we are looking for before noticing them. There is, then, a strange excess of space that allows for our transgression, that makes room for it, prior to the showing of looks. In comedy a space beyond being is suggested—a spacing that first allows for the strange, palintropic show of the looks of beings. The challenge of philosophy is to inhabit this space—which is the space of language—so as to gather the conflicted unity of the disclosure of looks without resorting to the determinacy of technical projections of meaning. This inhabiting of language is a mode of erotic life, that is, of the life that seeks Beauty.

B. Erotic life as Philosophy (or: Philosophy’s retrieval of the mythical)

Mythology says the way in which gods and mortals belong together, it is the discourse of the daimonic realm between them, where they both come to appear. Eros is the daimon that opens this realm of the in-between. Eros enables mortality, which is the limit between humans and gods, to point to a space for beautiful ἔργα (deeds, accomplishments) through which humans and gods are tangled up in sexual attractions that yield alliances and lineages of procreation and birth. In the *Symposium*,² Diotima shows that philosophy, as erotic practice, is the highest mode of inhabiting this daimonic realm that exceeds mortality. Here I can only begin to show the implications of this statement by focusing on the relation between Eros and the disclosure of the looks of beings.

Diotima’s insight is: Eros is the desire to give birth *in* Beauty. About birthing she says: “Pregnancy, reproduction—this is an immortal being for a mortal animal to do.”^{cxliv} I draw four implications from this:

1. In distinction to other modes of desire, Eros is not the desire for a present being. It is, rather, to enter the site of birthing (Beauty), where mortals, deeds and beings are given to be in a way that they participate in immortality. According to Diotima, in this site beings are birthed in their looks.

2. Birth means: transgressing death, so that death shows itself as the limit of something alive. Only by living do we know death. For mortals, death is not ‘in the future.’ Through its certainty it is, rather, something that has already happened and death surrounds us all the time as the most what is most certain. To be erotic, following Diotima, is to find in birth already a transgression of death. In Eros, we face death as our furthestmost limit by having already transgressed it—we find death palintropically, comedically. Erotically seeking beauty, we are fugitives from death which is a limit that we have always already transgressed and violated. When we recognize ourselves palintropically as mortals, as violators, as fugitives from death, we can gain a sense of freedom that allows us to play, we have free space and free time, and we can be given to a life of excess *in* Beauty. Here ‘Beauty’ names the free space that enables this comedic encounter with death, an encounter which is life itself as beautiful.

3. Relying on my previous discussion of comedy in philosophy, I will turn to how philosophy is erotic and participates in Beauty. Presenting philosophy as erotic desire means that the disclosure of beings in their looks belongs to birthing in Beauty. As we have seen, beings are disclosed in their looks in the fragile stability of their meanings, as only perspectively gathered. This fragile stability of meaning is the way in which

beings in their looks participate in mortality and, more precisely, in life as the transgression of death. Diotima's insight is that by engaging beings dialectically beings appear in their looks so as to present certainty as openness, finitude as possibility. In other words, by dialectically attending to the disclosure of looks, mortals encounter in beings themselves mortality as already transgressed, and mortals are drawn to preserve this intimacy with beings themselves by preserving their fragile and stable disclosure in language. When beings claim us in this way, they appear as participating in Beauty and we are erotically drawn to them in their stability and openness of meaning. We are drawn to them so as to preserve them as sites for birthing, as sites for further transgressions of mortality that occur as philosophical dialogues with others. Erotic longing is necessarily an attraction to other mortals. These dialogues with others are engagements with language in which we strive to preserve the possibility to learn from beings that we also participate in immortality, that through dialectic we transgress our own death. To preserve in language beings in their looks as sites for birthing is to inhabit them through that excess of place (an excess that is given by beings themselves) that we found operative in the comedy of philosophy. Such is the character of erotic philosophical discourse as rooted in the comedy of the disclosure of beings in their looks. And the preservation of beings themselves as sites of birthing is, of course, philosophical midwifery.

4. Diotima's claim is that philosophy, as the speech that discloses the beings in their looks, is what most participates in Beauty. How can it be that speech can be beautiful to a greater extent than a glorious deed—than a glorious manly deed, for example? Ἄνδρεία, manliness, names deeds which participate in Beauty. Its very name

belongs to sexual difference and to order of birth. By translating it as manliness—and not as ‘courage’—, I bring out the following question: to what extent is ἄνδρεία, or manliness, erotic and daimonic? And if it is, why would philosophy surpass it in its claim to Beauty?

II. Comedy in *Laches*

I don’t attempt here an exhaustive interpretation of this dialogue. I simply ask the following question: “How does manliness participate in the daimonic realm of birthing?” “What is the relationship between manliness and philosophy?” I explore these questions through two interrelated ones: “what is manliness’ relation to the technical stance?” and “to what extent is manliness erotic?”

A. Patriarchy

Lysimachus and Melesias are burdened by their birth and paternal lineage. They are burdened by their father’s *names*: ‘Aristides’ and ‘Thrasymachus.’ These names mean manliness in war, among other glorious, beautiful beings. Lysimachus’ and Melesias’ aim, now, is to be restored to their paternal lineage via their sons—whom they have already *named* ‘Aristides’ and ‘Thrasymachus.’ Lysimachus and Melesias want to return to their lineage of birth and they are concerned about the kind of education that would bring in their sons *deeds* that would correspond to their paternally inherited *names*. Lysimachus and Melesias express their concern as to whether the skill of fighting in armor is worthy to learn. Socrates takes this as a starting point and reformulates their question as: “what is manliness?” But, through this latter question, Socrates challenges Lysimachus’ and Melesias’ actual starting point—the one they seem to forget-

their allegiance to their fathers, to patriarchy. Through the question of manliness he leads them to patricide.

Let's unfold this dialogical context:

1. The concern with paternal lineage belongs to naming. This is no surprise: the father has no organic participation in the event of birth; he can only claim to be the father through speech, through the imposition of a name. The name, by itself, establishes the lineage—and the event of birth is forgotten. Patriarchy is constituted by naming. It is important to note that the accomplishment of a pre-established name by the meaning of a being or deed excludes the movement from names to beings themselves that characterizes philosophy in *The Sophist*.
2. A particular kind of speech is, thus, constituted by patriarchy. The *Eumenides* shows that the transferal of power to patriarchy is achieved through a delimitation of speech: speech is here the speech of the courts, the justification of speech by further speech. Through this justification, what speech talks about is presented as fully there, completely exposed to inspecting eyes—without blind spots and perspectival showings—like the defendant is present in court.^{cxlv} The young Aristides and Thrasymachus are expected by their fathers to be 'present' to, to be accountable for, their names. This speech corresponds to the technical stance in which paradigms are set before beings so as to evaluate and justify them. What is at the heart of patriarchal/technical speech in its claim to full presence and justification? The force of this speech is a circulation between technicity and patriarchy that occurs *only* in speech. No matter how much technical speech justifies itself, its power depends on submitting to the rule of the imposition of names, on accepting patriarchy. But

patriarchy is already the unquestioned subjection of the meaning of beings to their pre-established names as their justifications. In other words, in his *trial*, Orestes had always already been *judged* innocent.

3. Patriarchy and the technical stance are, thus, essentially related and are mutually reinforcing. This is clear if we reflect on the relation between paradigm and copy that structures the technical stance. The father never leaves the courthouse—nor do we. He is the one to whom we justify our presence, the Jury, the inspecting eyes. And he is also the one who gives us recognition, who ultimately justifies us to ourselves—the one whose standards we need to match. He is not only the Jury, but also the Paradigm. He is who we want to be but always already precedes us in full presence and without comedy. He is the original in relationship to which we are only copies. Through patriarchy birth is transformed into an event of recognition, affirmation, of living up to the name that precedes us and dictates what is our own, of imitating the father. Consequently, ‘birth’, our coming to presence, becomes a matter of technical production and it requires us, in deed, to re-produce the *name* of the father. In this way, language does not preserve birthing. It, rather, reduces it to the inheritance of names.
4. This reproduction is achieved through deeds and their namings. What is important is that a deed is named, recognized, for example, as manly. Under patriarchy in its entanglement with the technical stance, immortality is glory in speech, rather than giving birth, as Diotima argues. This detachment from birth and establishment of patriarchy through speech explains the abandonment by their fathers that Lysimachus and Melesias experienced. They were nothing outside of their names (their silence in

the dialogue is haunting). The father only recognizes those who appear glorious in speech, the others have no presence, even his own children. The detachment of the father is the same as the detachment of the paradigm from the copy, the detachment that characterizes the technical gaze that observes a fully present, repeatable and manipulable object. So Aristides is named as a copy of his grandfather, the same Aristides that is named in Socrates' self-presentation as a midwife in *Theaetetus*, which we will now re-visit.

B. Midwifery

Aristides will eventually become an embarrassing follower of Socrates, and he is explicitly named in *Theaetetus* 148e-151e. Let us recall the beginning of this passage:

“SOCRATES: Then, do you mean to say you’ve never heard about my being the son of a good hefty midwife, Phaenarete?

THEAETETUS: Oh, yes, I have heard that before.

SOCRATES: And haven’t you ever been told that I practice the same art myself?...I do, believe me. Only don’t give me away to the rest of the world, will you? You see, my friend, it is a secret that I have this art.”^{xlvi}

Socrates is a midwife: he attends birth but he himself cannot give birth. At odds with Greek custom, Socrates denies his parental lineage by claiming the occupation of his mother. At the same time, however, he distances himself from maternity as such by being not a mother, but a midwife. In effect, Socrates turns to birth and, by so doing, introduces a third to the sexual difference man/woman. For the mother the child never leaves the womb, her attachment to the child is tacit, unquestionable, and silent. To recognize it as her own, the child does not need to

make an appearance, to claim its own presence. For the father, the child needs to come to presence, to produce and re-produce, to claim a name, to enter into patriarchy—his connection to the child relies on the participation of the child in what has always been there, recognized in relation to inherited paradigms preserved in speech. The mother conceals, the father exposes—and the midwife comes in-between. Only she recognizes through the detachment of being a stranger—the detachment that she ultimately shares with the newborn—the child as birthed, as being claimed by life into mortality. What is involved in this recognition?

Socrates calls midwifery a technical art only to undermine this claim. Socrates produces nothing. His technique remains hidden from everyone. Most importantly for us, midwives are not able to apply their ‘skill’ on themselves—they cannot be their own object. Nor can they evaluate their object from a pre-established stance foreign to the object. Properly speaking, midwives have no ‘objects.’ At least in this respect, the midwife shares with philosophy. On the other hand, the stance of technical skill detaches itself from its fully present object (the detachment rooted in that of the paradigm, of the father, a detachment that permits full inspection). Through this detachment the same person can be, at the same time, for example, a doctor who judges a patient from a paradigm and a patient that lives up or falls short of the paradigm. This is the extreme of technical detachment: to turn oneself into one’s ‘object.’ In this respect, Socrates is emphatic: technical detachment does not belong to midwifery. How are we to understand, then, the detachment of the midwife? Can this detachment provide a clue to the way in which the philosopher preserves beings in their looks as sites of birthing?

We need to attend to why midwives are barren only because of age and are not virgins like Artemis: “This is because human nature is too weak to acquire skill (τέχνη) where it has no experience (᾿απειράω).”^{cxlvii} According to Socrates, only because we are mortals do we need

experience (πειράω) to attain technical skill. In other words, experience does not belong to the essence of the technical stance. The technical stance only requires experience incidentally, that is, when tainted by mortality. The ‘ideal’ of simply dictating from the ‘outside’ (i.e. without actual engagement with beings) how beings should be belongs to the technical stance.

Experience does, however, I will argue, essentially belong to midwifery. Πειράω means to attempt, to risk, to try one’s fortune. It is to give oneself to the incalculable. For the stance of technical production, which is grounded in the contemplation of fully present, reproducible paradigms, this sense of ‘risk’ makes no sense. There is only falling short of the paradigm. The technical gaze is directed to stability without a threat. “Risk,” on the other hand, belongs to the daimonic realm of birthing: it is the incalculable, the threat of oblivion that death names, it names mortality in humans, deeds and beings—the blind spot in the appearing of beings in their looks. The midwife’s gaze recognizes mortality, that is, it recognizes whether a newborn is able to enter the possibility of risk or whether it is too weak for it. In this recognition of risk, the midwife’s gaze is utterly other to the technical gaze. But, how then can we characterize the midwife’s detachment?

The midwife does not herself face a risk; she simply recognizes risk as such by being attuned to the very appearing of risk, of mortal life. In attunement to the appearing of risk, to the appearing of mortality—and to the showing of looks that belongs to mortality—no determinate being is risked because this appearing is phenomenally prior to any “being.” The midwife does not risk the newborn, nor does she evaluate through technical application whether the new born should live or die. She engages the newborn freely in its possibility of mortal life. The midwife is not detached because she is outside—or wants to be outside—mortal time (that would be technical detachment). She is detached, rather, because she is too close to life and attuned to the

very appearing of life as mortality, an appearing which is also the appearing of risk and hence prior to any particular risk. Risk and mortality appear simply, with indifference to risk. The detachment of the midwife simply lets the newborn be the strife of life and death, the appearing of risk and mortality—the detachment of the midwife simply spaces the event for the incalculable decision for mortal life with a kind of indifference. This spacing is that space “in which” beings birth and which, as we have seen, Diotima calls Beauty in the *Symposium*. Neither the father, nor the mother, nor the craftsman can offer the spacing proper to the detachment of the midwife.

Socrates is, without metaphor, a midwife. In the speeches he attends to, the birth of beings in their looks is at issue, he lets the decision concerning the life and mortality of philosophical speeches come to pass. In his own words, Socrates discerns whether the speeches are phantoms (ἑιδώλα) and false (ψευδος) or fertile (γόνιμον) and true (ἀλήθεια). The important word on this statement is γόνιμον, which means womblike, coming from the womb, fruitful, fertile, and able to birth. The opposition is between that which is living and, thus, able to procreate further, and that which is dead, a mere phantom. The former means truth, the latter is the false. So the true, here, does not mean a speech that is ‘correct,’ but, rather one that is alive—a speech that preserves the fragility in the stability of the meanings of beings, that preserves their appearing in looks. ‘Correct’ and ‘incorrect’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ are not at all what is ultimately at stake in Socrates’ discernment. What is at stake is, rather, whether the speech is limited, whether it has a “blind spot,” whether it *risks* the showing of a look. Only such a speech that risks is alive, and it will indeed give birth to further speech—that is, to further dialogue about the *same* being. Let us be clear, Socrates is the midwife here: he does not mother or father such speeches (that is the job, he says, of those who are wise). He only makes room, through a kind of

detachment, for the speech to show its limits, its blind spots, limits that were perhaps not obvious to begin with but come to appear through recollection in Socrates' spacing. He makes room for the lives and deaths of beings in speech. He attends birth in speech as the transgression of death by life that allows for death to show itself, in first place, as mortality—both in us and in beings as always implicated in each other's birthing. He does all this in a profoundly comedic fashion. He shows palintropically the blind spots which appear together with the fundamental limits of our own speeches, limits which we do not consider, which we transgress with self-forgetfulness and which Socrates forces us to recollect as looks. And by doing this, he allows for beings in their looks to be preserved as birthing sites, in their beauty.

C. The Role of Comedy in *Laches*

The key to understanding this dialogue is a hilarious story told by Laches. An expert in the technique of fighting in armor, who gives popular shows in Athens, finds himself in actual war. He had constructed a special weapon: a mixture of scythe and spear that nobody had seen before but which betrayed the soldier's great expertise. In the middle of battle this sophisticated weapon got stuck in the walls of the enemy's ship, and the expert was not able to release it. He tried and tried, until he finally broke it and was left with a stick. Both enemies and companions witnessed this scene, stopped and laughed at the expert technician. Then they threw something at him and the expert got very scared. They laughed even more. They laughed because the expert had tried so hard to be technical that he had forgotten that what he really wanted to be is manly, and that no sophisticated weapon makes people manly. By being a technical expert in fighting, he had forgotten the manliness that is essential in war and this self-forgetfulness caused laughter. Throughout the dialogue Laches remains true to his appreciation of this story: for him manliness

has nothing to do with technical mastery, and is even at odds with it. Manliness appears for him, in our terms, also at odds with patriarchy. This is evident later as well, when Laches states that if manly acts were actually fully exposed (as to the gaze of the father, as by comparing them to a paradigm) they would not appear manly. Laches was aware at some level that manly acts participate in beauty, and that means, that they show themselves only perspectively. In fact, Laches shows throughout a tacit allegiance to the daimonic realm that Diotima points to. Let us look more closely at this tacit allegiance.

Laches definition of manliness runs: "...if a man is willing to remain at his post and to defend himself against the enemy without running away, then you must rest assured that he is a manly man."^{cxlviii} Laches places the site for the showing of manliness as war. From the *Republic*, we know that war is the result of the technical stance, only when a city is technically developed, and politically ordered as such, does it need to transgress the limits of other cities. The very topography of war is technical: war occurs because there are given pre-established limits, limits that all recognize as such, that define cities and that are threatened by transgression. These physical limits—which are pre-established limits that define families, cities, friendships—define also the familiar and repeatable, they define indeed inherited paradigms which constitute people's identities and for the sake of which the worth of mortals is tested. In the *Republic*, Socrates' critique of poetry assumes that education is the transferal of these paradigms and, thus, all of poetry must be judged as tool for such transferal. Manliness must protect the recognizable paradigms that hold cities together without running away—that is, by risking death. In such a risk, Laches maintains, manliness shows itself. Even though Laches presents at first a non technical understanding of manliness, he seems to have forgotten the technical lineage to which war belongs, and which allows for the showing of manliness as he presents it.

Laches' understanding of manliness with regard to technicity is split. On the one hand, manliness is rooted in technicity and is understandable in the context of war. On the other hand—this is Laches' explicit point—, manliness requires one to overcome the technical stance because there is no inherited paradigm from which we could evaluate the incalculable risk of death. As philosophers, we can see that manliness in its look shows itself in a 'fragile stability of meaning', namely, its meaning is in tension with itself. A midwife would say: 'it's alive!' I would like to note here that this is the starting point for an investigation that this paper does not attempt. Namely, one that finds in manliness a way to understand technicity in its ultimate non-viability as a political ordering principle. This would call for a critical interpretation of The Republic.

Socrates, the midwife, brings forth the fragile stability of Laches' position: if he is willing to face a risk coming from outside of a pre-established limit with manliness, he should also be willing to face a risk coming from 'inside'—namely, one that threatens the absolute precedence of limits. The latter is the risk that threatens the authority of the technical order of the city, the stability of the inherited paradigms which sustain cities, families, friendships. How does this 'internal risk' come to the fore—a risk that ultimately erases the difference between 'inside' and 'outside'? Through speech. It is a risk inherent in all speech as philosophical, as showing the perspectival gathering of beings in their looks, showing the blind spots that also threaten the stability of cities and of the pre-established limits that define them. In this way, philosophical speech is blasphemy in its comedic showing of mortality at the very core of the appearing of beings. Philosophy is, also, a way of being that appears as a concrete possibility through understanding the fragility of the stance of manliness.

Socrates' insight is this: not only is 'manliness' in its look in a fragile-stability of meaning. It is also the case that engaging manliness dialectically, by showing its tension with itself on the basis of technicity, a way of being beyond technicity is opened up, namely, philosophy. In other words, to preserve the fragile stability of manliness is to encounter philosophy as a concrete possibility. To inquire dialectically into manliness is not one 'application' of philosophy as a 'method' or detached 'technique'. Rather, by such engagement, philosophy learns about its own possibility it is, as it were, born. This birthing of philosophy is the core not only of *Laches*, but of Plato's dialogues. Let's see how Socrates proceeds toward this strange birth.

Laches was in trouble when he acknowledged that there is beauty in speech. In doing this, he moved from technical, polemic space to a philosophical or daimonic space in language. Nicias was sensitive to this, so he defined manliness as a kind of knowledge: knowing what one should fear and hope. Laches complained because Nicias' position was too calculative, forgetting manliness' facing of risk and the incalculable. Socrates' refutation of Nicias' position, on the other hand, was rooted in the very character of the technical stance. Technical knowledge is not temporal, it is ever present, so it is the same for future beings (those which are feared and hoped), present beings and past beings. Manliness would be the knowledge of everything, which is laughable—we seem to have missed precisely what we are looking for, the manifestation of the look of manliness.

Socrates, in his comedic interaction with Nicias, re-visits another way in which to gather in speech the fragile stability of manliness. In Nicias' terms, manliness involves evaluative and calculative knowledge, so it seems to be defined by technicity, by the precedence of a fixed standard from which to calculate a manly action. On the other hand the knowledge that

manliness claims cannot be accounted for technically. The tension proper to manliness in its look points to philosophy again: as a non-technical, non-evaluative mode of knowledge—a knowledge that is not guided by the anticipatory projection of paradigms or ‘ideals’.

There is also comedy in Laches’ own position—it is as if his mockery of the expert in fighting circled right back at him. Laches was looking to define manliness from risk, but he looked for risk within war, which ultimately relies on the protection of pre-established limits, limits which show themselves to the technical and polemic gaze as allowing for no intrinsic risk, showing evident transparent paradigms that are worth risking and fighting for. Laches, then, also forgot what he was looking for—that is, risk, but in its appearing as what it is, in its showing that is prior to any determinate risk. And he forgets his own stance. He made fun of technical skill only to show, later, how entrenched he himself was in the technical stance. He was able to make a comedy out of the expert’s allegiance to technical skill—and as we have seen, to patriarchy. But he was not able to be comedic enough to laugh at himself, to see the depths of his own allegiance to the technical stance and to patriarchy, to engage in a comedy of patricide. He saw comedy in others but not in himself—is there anything more laughable than that?

We should, however, pause at Laches’ suspicion of the beauty that belongs to philosophical speech. When he followed Socrates into philosophy, he was forced to engage risk as it permeates everything, the lives of humans and beings, both familiar and strange. In this recognition of risk, he could not sustain the stance of polemics, because he was taken to a space in speech in which risk was seen at the bottom of all beings in their very appearing. By engaging philosophical speech, he was taken into the domain of the midwife, to gaze at the appearing of risk, without facing a risk. In the philosophical stance, we are detached from risk. Let’s pause to recognize the core of Laches’ suspicion of philosophy: What is manliness without risk—without

something to risk our lives for? By philosophically speaking about manliness, we seem to have lost it. What to do now? Laugh—with a Socratic laughter in attunement to the passing of manliness at the threshold of philosophy.

Laches and Nicias indeed risked the looks of manliness and Socrates showed the fragile stabilities in these looks. The Socratic practice of midwifery consisted here in showing that these fragile stabilities betrayed the life in Nicias' and Laches' speeches. Through dialogue, Socrates never reached an all encompassing definition of what manliness is. But we were never looking for that in the first place: we are philosophers (even if bastard ones) not technicians, midwives not fathers. *What we are left with is, rather, an attunement to how manliness both belongs to and exceeds the technical stance and to how, at the same time, in this excess—which is patricide—manliness enacts its own passing by forgetting the limits that determine it in first place. Manliness ends with a laugh which is, at the same time, the possibility of philosophy.* This is what is shown about manliness when we speak philosophically about it: we experience its passing, its mortality, its life. And we experience it without risk, as a midwife, beyond manliness, in a comedic, daimonic experience that is proper only to philosophical speech and which shares the most with Beauty. In this daimonic experience of language, philosophy recalls itself as not being a method, a technique. And in this remembrance of itself through the dialectical investigation of manliness, it encounters itself in its possibility, in its birth...erotically alive beyond technicity.

PART THREE: The Ascending/Descending Journey (Erfahrung) with Be-ing

“The name [metaphysics] is meant to say that thinking of Being takes beings in the sense of what is present and extant as its starting point and goal for ascending to Being, an ascending which immediately and at once turns again into descending into beings.”^{cxlix}

Fourth Study: The Passing of Knowledge in *Theaetetus*^{cl}

It is widely accepted that the *Theaetetus* is ‘about’ knowledge (ἔπιστήμη), it asks “what is knowledge?” This guiding question is, however, preceded by another question:

“Socrates: So knowledge and wisdom are the same?

Theaetetus: Yes.”^{cli}

This question is one that Theaetetus feels sure about. It is not clear, however, whether Socrates shares Theaetetus’ confidence. Socrates’ concern is with the appearing of knowledge, particularly, with how knowledge itself appears as what it is in distinction to wisdom. Socrates’ original stance, that knowledge itself appears, is a difficult one, to say the least. Isn’t it the case that beings appear as they are *in* knowledge? Isn’t knowledge itself a way of appearing of beings? If knowledge is a way of appearing, how can this way (rather than simply the beings that appear in it) itself appear? What is that *in* which knowledge appears? Couldn’t we say that that in which knowledge appears is, listening to here to Socrates’ uncertainty rather than to Theaetetus’ certainty, wisdom (σοφία)? After all, Socrates wisdom is that he can perceive his own ignorance, that is, his lack of knowledge—in other words, that he can recognize how knowledge and non-knowledge appear in others and in himself.

With respect to beings, knowledge and wisdom cannot be differentiated:

“Socrates: Or isn’t in just those beings in which they (the wise) are knowledgeable that they are wise?”^{clii}

In other words, knowledge and wisdom are concerned with the same beings. This is enough for Theaetetus to conclude that knowledge and wisdom are the same. However, what if the difference between knowledge and wisdom resides in the way in which the difference between beings and Being gives itself to thought? Wisdom, oriented to the opening of this difference and sustaining it, would open the site for the appearing of beings in their Being, opening the very difference between beings and Being that knowledge relies upon. The question is whether from the stance of wisdom, knowledge appears to wisdom and comes to pass in its inability to sustain the opening of the difference between beings and Being that first gives knowledge to be.

I note two difficulties here:

- i) Since knowledge is not a being it cannot be framed in the question “what is knowledge” in which a being appears in reference to its Being. In fact, knowledge is the stance that sustains the frame of this ‘guiding question’ (in Heidegger’s sense), and that which sustains this frame cannot be captured within it. Knowledge appears, then, not as a being but as that which escapes the guiding question, opening up a dimension of thinking beyond it. Knowledge appears as the enactment of the twisting free from the guiding question. In this enactment, however, knowledge is revealed as unable to sustain itself, it appears through its own overcoming. In order to perceive the self-overcoming of knowledge, we must understand knowledge in relation to τέχνη in Heidegger’s determination, as the departure from φύσις toward the absolute

reign of the fore-grasping structure of thinking. Knowledge appears then as a counter movement to this departure, but as a counter movement that exhausts itself.

- ii) The self-overcoming of knowledge is experienced rather than conceptually grasped. It is enacted. Experience here is a thinking-experience in the sense that it occurs as a movement of thought which is outside of the distinction between ‘thought’ and ‘sensitivity’. It is not abstract or sensual but concrete in its hold of the self-overcoming of knowledge. The *Theaetetus* gives us to this experience which eludes the grasp of the mode of experience that corresponds to what Heidegger calls ‘world view.’ In Socrates’ terms, this is the experience of wisdom, wisdom being not something ‘outside’ the self-overcoming of knowledge, but an open receptivity to this self-overcoming that grows out of it.

These two difficulties structure the following study of the nature of knowledge.

A) Preparatory discussion of knowledge.

1. The meaning of the word.

The word translated as ‘knowledge’ is ‘ἐπιστήμη’. This word means ‘to take a stance toward beings’. It refers to the stance in which a being is there for us, to be taken up as what it is. We stand upon beings when we take them as meaningful. The connection between ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη is clear: τέχνη is the necessity to present beings within this stance as having been already there within a pre-determined meaning—a necessity that can come to direct knowledge. When we ask about knowledge as such, however, we ask about the appearing of this stance together with beings, an appearing that cannot be set in advance since it is our originary being

among beings. The *Theaetetus* engages the appearing of the very spacing in which beings come to be presented to us, and liberates this spacing from thinking in its fore-grasping, technical disposition.

2. Theaetetus' first answer to the question 'what is knowledge?' and the identification of knowledge with τέχνη.

Socrates formulates the question directly: “What ever is knowledge?” or “What thing happens to be knowledge? (ἑπιστήμη ὅτι ποτε ἔτυγχανει ὄν).”^{cliii} This formulation betrays an element of uncertainty through τύχη (i.e., chance happening), as if this question could not be simply answered, as if knowledge were not a ‘what’. Socrates’ next question emphasizes the uncertainty here: “Are we able to say it? (ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό).”^{cliv} Is it even possible to say ‘what’ knowledge is? What would it mean to have knowledge about knowledge? Can knowledge ever present itself as a ‘what’ to knowledge?

Theaetetus gives a preliminary answer that is quickly discarded:

“Well, then, it is my opinion that whatever one might learn from Theodorus are sciences (knowledges)—geometry and those that you just now went through and, in turn, shoemaking and the arts of the rest of the craftsmen—all and each of them, are nothing else than knowledge.”^{clv}

Theaetetus gives a list of examples of knowledge. Let’s pay attention first at the contents of the list, which will shed light on Socrates’ challenge to Theaetetus’ answer. Theaetetus first refers to that which Theodorus can teach, geometry in particular and the others that Socrates has already mentioned. These others are astronomy, calculation (λογιστικός), music and everything connected with education.^{clvi} These ‘paideic’ sciences (gathered around the figure of Theodorus)

constitute the first grouping of sciences or ‘knowledges’ in Theaetetus’ list. The second grouping is constituted by shoemaking and the arts (τέχναι) of the rest of the craftsmen (δημιουργός). In Theaetetus’ list, then, the knowledges are in two subsets one gathered around Theodorus and education, the other around the craftsmen and the arts. We could tentatively call these two subsets ‘mathematical’ and ‘technical.’ Theaetetus has no problem ignoring the difference between these two subsets. On the other hand, it would seem not quite right to take Theodorus, the mathematician, to be a demiourge or handicraftsman, someone who makes beings for the use of the people. Is mathematics a ‘making’ and is it concerned with making useful beings? This question is not explicitly asked, but we should work it out and see whether it is tacitly operative in the discussion between Theaetetus and Socrates about ἐπιστήμη.

Theaetetus puts both the mathematical and the technical together because they both have the same relation to the beings they are concerned with. This stance takes Theaetetus to simply turn to beings in order to identify a science or knowledge. He categorizes them in respect to ‘what’ they study, not in terms of how they engage ‘what’ they study—he thinks this engagement to be the same. Socrates points this out: “Isn’t it the case that...of whatever...is a knowledge, this is what you are determining?”^{clvii} In other words, for Theaetetus, the difference between the mathematical and the technical can be reduced to a difference between the particular beings that concern them, but in themselves, they are the same. Theaetetus assumes that the mode of being of knowledge remains the same throughout, it is only the beings that concern it change. From this stance, there is no possibility of knowledge itself coming to pass. It is this self-sameness that Theaetetus assigns to knowledge—the sameness that would even collapse any apparent distinction between knowledge and τέχνη--that is most questionable here.

Turning to ‘what’ knowledge is ‘about,’ Theaetetus’ shows a lack of awareness of the complexity of Socrates’ question. Theaetetus is not even inclined to understand knowledge in its specificity, in its difference from τέχνη. Socrates reminds Theaetetus:

“Yes, but the question, Theaetetus was not this, of what beings there’s knowledge...”^{clviii}

B) The struggle to twist free from the necessity of τέχνη

1. The Insufficiency of Counting and the rule of the Demiourge.

Socrates does not directly question Theaetetus’ list, and whether knowledge is the same as τέχνη. He does challenge Theaetetus in terms of the appropriateness of his answer:

“...for we didn’t ask because we wanted to count (ἀριθμήσαι) them [knowledges] but to get to know knowledge whatever it itself is (αὐτοὸ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν).”^{clix}

Theaetetus’ answer did not hit the mark. He thought that by ‘counting’ the kinds of knowledge he would gather together a totality that would answer what knowledge is. Socrates is emphatic here: answering the question what knowledge is, a question about the ‘what’ (‘τί’) of something, cannot be a matter of counting (ἀριθμήσαι). To put it simply, the ‘what’ of something, and of knowledge in particular, is not a number (παραριθμός), is not an enumeration.

Theaetetus’ instinct, though, makes sense. Αριθμός means to ‘count off’, it is counting beings of the same kind, to determine how many beings of the same kind there are. In other words, counting depends on a prior recognition of that which is counted. Theaetetus recognized that counting is related to knowing what the beings counted are, only because we recognize their kind can we count them off.

Theaetetus, however, makes two interrelated mistakes:

First, he reverses the order of number and the ‘what’ of beings. He thinks that by counting he will get to the ‘what’ while it is the other way around, one counts because one has *already* recognized the ‘what.’ Counting, and number, presuppose the recognition of something as belonging to a kind, as a ‘what.’

Second, Theaetetus thinks of the ‘what’ of beings as something made up of the sum of its parts. This is why the list (if it were to include all the knowledges) would add up to the ‘what.’ In other words, he thinks of the what as a number. But, more importantly, by conceiving of the ‘what’ numerically he is at the same time conceiving of it technically: as something that can be made by putting its parts together, as something which is simply the *result* of an activity akin to making.

It is important here to bring out the relation between Theaetetus’ two mistakes. What brings these two mistakes together is their neglect of the way in which the ‘what’ precedes number. It is because the what is understood as a ‘result’ that it is taken to be both posterior to counting and the product of a sum of its members. The ‘what’ as result, rather than as a beginning or source (ἀρχή) is also at the core of the stance of τέχνη. Even if in τέχνη the resulting product is set up in advance so that it guides the making, it is set up as something that can be put together, as something that is composed of parts and as a result: when the shoemaker sets up in advance the design of a pair of shoes, the design is precisely a design only insofar as it anticipates the shoes as the product of a making. Herein resides the affinity between τέχνη and counting: in counting, what is counted is taken in advance to be the result of a counting, to be a number as the composite of a multiplicity. In Heidegger’s sense, number and τέχνη set beings in advance as results of a making, they comport to beings as simply present rather than in their appearing.

Number and τέχνη share their orientation toward results planned in advance, they have a productive orientation. What determines this kind of orientation is not intrinsic to either τέχνη or numbers, rather their ‘result’ is determined in advance by the way it contributes to other results, by the way it fits in the realm of human deliberate purposes, in the realm of utility. *Utility is the horizon in which numbers and τέχνη are brought together in their productive orientation.*

Numbers are, thus, useful. This was Theaetetus position that has now come to the fore:

Theodurus and the craftsmen, mathematics and τέχνη, are the same, they are both determined as what they are within the horizon of utility. Even if counting presupposes a ‘what’, Theaetetus could respond that this presupposition could itself be technical, and that the ‘what’ that enables counting could itself be set in advance by the interests of utility. *But this is not a response to Socrates’ question which asks about knowledge as determined from itself, not by something outside of it.*

2. The Provocation of Mathematics^{clx}

At the moment in which Theaetetus seems not to be up to the challenge, he compares Socrates’ question to a mathematical problem that he solves by categorizing numbers as rational and irrational. The categorization does not interest Socrates as much as Theaetetus’ familiarity with irrational numbers. Irrational numbers show that there is no unit that can measure all lengths. This means that (against the traditional Pythagorean teachings) numbers are not ‘out there’ in the world as its constitutive elements. *Numbers, rather, now appear to be modes of intending beings or, more precisely, a way in which beings give themselves to us in their appearing.* This promises an advance for Theaetetus because:

- i) A turn is suggested here, within mathematics itself, to engage beings in their appearing, that is, to engage the event of appearing of beings that τέχνη covers up.
- ii) This new way of engaging numbers suggests the possibility that numbers are only one way of engaging the appearing of beings, or that numbers need to be re-thought on the basis of the appearing of beings (which is precisely what Theaetetus did not do) as a larger event than numbers.
- iii) Numbers are understood as monads which are not differentiated except in their discreteness, that is, except in relation to other monads. Numbers, then, enforce an understanding of determination that is external to that which is determined. This externality of determination corresponds to the externality of determination that we have seen operative in τέχνη.
- iv) To re-think numbers as modes of appearing would mean to engage the possibility that the showing of beings as what they are is not numerical in that it is not simply externally determined, or even determined in a way that there is a clear distinction inside/outside in the appearing of beings.
- v) The possibility is open to interpret numbers as a secondary mode of appearing, secondary to that in which there is no simple inside/outside of determination.

Socrates is motivated, then, to continue his dialogue with Theaetetus, and to engage the appearing of beings out of the mathematical provocation, one that begins to mark the difference between mathematical knowledge (those of Theodorus) and the crafts, a distinction that Theaetetus does not make at the beginning. It is as if in mathematics there is already a twisting free from the necessity of τέχνη.

3. Toward Φύσις

a) The Duplicity of appearing.

Theaetetus gives a response to Socrates of the right kind. Perception (᾿αισθήσις), he says, is knowledge (᾿επιστήμη).^{clxi} He reaches this position because:

“It seems to me that the one who knows, while knowing something (᾿επιστάμενος τι), perceives that which he knows.”^{clxii}

Theaetetus detects that when knowing something there is a perception of that which is known. It is not clear that we should then say that knowledge is perception. We could say, though, that knowledge involves perception. What exactly is this involvement? Only after we have uncovered this involvement can we then see if Theaetetus' statement that perception is knowledge is justified. Theaetetus' reasoning seems to go this way: when I know something I perceive it. Since what I know and perceive are the same, then knowledge and perception are the same. Just as earlier, Theaetetus is focusing on 'what' is known in order to understand knowledge: he is not yet understanding knowledge from itself. The first step toward understanding knowledge from itself will be to differentiate it from perception.

There is a second aspect to Theaetetus' words. He locates perception *within* knowing, it is *while* we know that we perceive. This is fundamental for Socrates' response to Theaetetus, because Socrates does not challenge this aspect of Theaetetus' insight. Neither of them is positing perception 'in itself', as if it could occur 'outside' of knowing—no such 'outside' will be posited even after they both discover that knowledge is not perception. This will come to mean, rather, that knowledge exceeds or grows out of perception.

Socrates' response to Theaetetus is to recall a statement of Protagoras' that says the same:

“Of all beings a human being is the measure, of the beings which are, that they are, and of the beings that are not, that they are not.”^{clxiii}

In what sense this statement is the same as Theaetetus’ is unclear. We can note, however, an affinity between Theaetetus and Protagoras, one which may have driven Socrates to recall this particular statement. In Protagoras’ statement, a human being is the measure of beings, and it measures whether they are or are not, and through this measuring it determines beings as being or not being. In this stance, there is a collapse between beings and that which measures them—beings are not outside of their being measured or, in other words, to be is to be measured. The numerical perspective appears here again. At the same time, since there is no outside to the measure, the measure is not measuring the being against something other, it has no determination outside of itself that would direct its measuring—it is no measure at all, it simply is with beings. This is what is missed in numbers as discrete monads, as only externally differentiated. Protagoras’ statement collapses on itself inasmuch as it does not point to a measure of beings appearing outside the distinction internal/external—because on its basis there is no possibility of talking about beings or measure, one can not say anything, not even that beings are not. The affinity with Theaetetus is evident: Protagoras is also unable to see a difference between knowledge (i.e. the measure) and that which it knows (or measures). He also shuts off the question of understanding knowledge from itself and, unwittingly, reveals a meaningless abyss. Regardless of the affinity between him and Protagoras, Theaetetus fails to see the abyss of his own position. This is evident from what follows.

Socrates proceeds to re-articulate once more Theaetetus’ position, this time by providing a new statement that supposedly says “more or less” the same as those of Theaetetus and Protagoras.

“Isn’t it more or less the sense of what he says, that of whatever sort beings severally appear to me, that’s the sort they are for me, and of whatever sort to you, they’re of that sort in turn for you, and you and I are human beings?”^{clxiv}

What has happened between the meaningless abyss of Protagoras’ words and this re-articulation of these same words? If we go back to Protagoras’ words, he thought that even through the collapsing of measure and beings, the determination of ‘being’ or ‘not being’ could still be issued. But ‘being’ is said of beings ‘being’ as ‘something,’ saying that something ‘is’ already implies the determination of ‘being as.’ Even when we say that ‘a table is’ we mean that this ‘being is as table.’ But this structure of beings in their Being precisely involves a comparison, or at least a double seeing, between a being and its Being. For beings to appear at all, they must appear so doubled. And it is only because of this doubling in appearing that anything like a measure can be possible, that is, the comparison between a being and its being, the determination of the space between beings and their Being. *The spacing between a being and its Being cannot be captured within any simple dichotomy of an inside/outside of beings.* So any possibility of ‘measuring’ is already given in the appearing of beings, an appearing that, hence, cannot simply collapse with the measuring—as in Protagoras—but must appear for the measuring. This double appearing is also why there can be a determination of ‘not-being,’ that is, as in an image, when something appears in divergence from its Being, appearing as what it is not. It is precisely because beings in their appearing do not collapse with their measure that anything like ‘being’ and ‘not-being’ can be said. The difference between Protagoras’ statement and Socrates’ re-formulation of it is vast: in the re-formulation Socrates is concerned with beings appearing (φαίνομαι), and with their appearing in a ‘sort’, that is, as something, in their doubling in their

being. Tacitly, the re-formulation forgoes the Protagorean collapse of being and measure. Theaetetus does not detect any of this, however.

Why did Socrates re-formulate Protagoras' words? Socrates' re-formulation introduces beings as appearing and in this way he is going further with Theaetetus' tendency to find perception in knowing. *Prior to establishing knowledge as perception or knowledge as different from perception, we must attend to how beings appear in their Being and find within the appearing both perception and knowledge as modes of this appearing.* In other words, Socrates, by turning to phenomenality, provides the proper ground for their inquiry of knowledge as perception.

Socrates has refined the path of inquiry. The main point is to preserve the duplicity in the appearing of beings in their Being because that is the basis from which to inquire into both knowledge and perception as modes of this appearing.

b) “Local Motion” (φύρα) and Wonder.

We have to hold fast to the duplicity in appearing and understand the relationship between a being and its Being as it takes place in this appearing. This ‘relationship’ is motion (κίνησις). Neither the being nor its being ‘appear’ by themselves, but they appear through motion. The question here is whether we can conceive of motion beyond the distinction of an inside/outside of beings. This will prove very difficult.

Socrates brings motion into the discussion by one more re-formulation of Theaetetus' and Protagoras' position, which is a statement about which all the ancients converge except for Parmenides^{clxv}:

“After all nothing is alone by itself, and you would not address anything correctly or of any sort whatsoever, but if you address it as big, it will also appear small, and if heavy, light, and all beings in this way, on the grounds that nothing is one, neither something nor of any sort whatsoever. But all beings—it’s those we say are the beings which are (not addressing them correctly)—come to be (γίγνομαι) from locomotion (φόρα) and motion (κίνησις) and mutual mixing (κράσις); for nothing ever is but everything always becomes.”^{clxvi}

We are attending to the appearing of beings as what they are, an appearing that is motion (κίνησις) as the distancing between beings and Being. More precisely, motion is the appearing of a being and its being *in their difference from one another*. In motion, beings are never ‘alone by themselves’ or ‘themselves by themselves.’ Motion is the opening of the space in which beings come to be determined as what they are. At first, this means that in motion beings appear in terms of other beings, their source of determination is not intrinsic to them. Due to this external determination, whenever we say what they are, when we say that they are ‘as’ something (that is, when we try to capture what they are, their being) we fail. The external determination of beings is arbitrary (it presents beings as externally determined in their Being by the sum total of other beings, an impossible sum) and eludes the very possibility of beings simply appearing ‘as’ something. That is, if we address a being as big, it can also appear small. This elusiveness of beings, their failure to be captured in language, is what motion means here. This motion means the coming to be (γίγνομαι) of beings as possibilities, with open meanings. But there is no horizon for this openness here—beings disseminate in it.

From this stance, motion is a phenomenon outside of λόγος. But λόγος is that which characterizes beings ‘as’ something, in terms of their being. In other words, this stance separates

appearing from beings. At the same time, motion here is external to beings, it only happens in terms of the relations between beings. In other words, this stance separates beings from their appearing. To put it simply, this stance separates appearing from both beings and their Being: it separates appearing from appearing and thus collapses on itself. Why does this collapse happen, and why doesn't Theaetetus' notice it? We have to understand the openness of determinations as issuing from beings, beings as transgressing/opening the site from which they come to be interpreted and this site held open by an inceptual λόγος that belongs to it. This complex mode of appearing cannot be captured within the distinction inside/outside of beings. Motion as for a cannot provide the basis from which to understand beings appearing in their Being.

The first thing that Theaetetus does not notice is the introduction of λόγος into the discussion. As soon as we turn toward beings in their appearing, in the double appearing of beings in their Being, λόγος is at issue. The appearing of beings is with λόγος. Even the elusiveness of motion is in respect to λόγος, so λόγος must be manifest with it. This appearing of λόγος is, however not yet taken up.

Theaetetus' blindness is rooted in his arithmetic background. He is willing to posit motion as extrinsic to beings, in the same way that numbers are extrinsic to one another. Socrates senses this and pursues a numerical example:

“We say that six dice, if you apply four to them, are more than four and one and a half times as much, and if you apply twelve, they are less and a half times as much, and it is insupportable to speak in a different way.”^{clxvii}

The same number appears big and small, it moves, when taken in relation to other numbers. Theaetetus agrees. He thinks of beings in their appearing as numbers, as holding only external, relational differences from other beings and as determined in this way externally. Theaetetus is

thus thinking of both numbers and beings as monads, as undifferentiated indivisibles which are discrete, that is, which establish only external relations of difference with others like themselves.

Socrates' last reformulation gives three pointers to consider in this discussion:

- a) Motion is the way in which the difference between beings and their Being appears, it is the appearing that we are trying to attend to. Motion cannot be conceived of externally to beings, however. Because the latest re-formulation thought of motion as external to beings, it took local motion (φόρα) as the paradigm of motion. Φόρα literally means 'to be carried' it generally speaks of motion as external to the being moved. We need, now, to understand motion as not simply external to beings.
- b) To understand motion as not external to beings in their appearing, means that we must understand the differentiation of a being from other beings as a self-differentiation. In other words, in the appearing of beings in their Being two differences are being drawn, first the difference between beings and their Being and, second, that between beings with one another. These two moments need to be thought together in an event that is neither external nor internal to beings, but that is prior to this difference. The event of these two differentiations is properly the coming to be (γυνομαι) of beings that we have previously seen as 'power.' Power is also the name Socrates uses in the middle of his discussion with Theaetetus to refer to the relations between beings, but in this case he thought of power as external to beings.^{clxviii} Now we have to turn to δυναμις in the appearing of beings as what they are, prior to externality/externality.
- c) Finally, we see here the impossibility of understanding the appearing of beings in their being arithmetically: the distinction internal/external is rooted in a monadic

understanding of beings. Beings are not numbers because they are ontologically distinct, that is, they show self-differentiation in their appearing as what they are, they are not indivisible, discrete monads. The non-arithmetic character of beings in their appearing is suggested repeatedly by Socrates, when he asks whether beings are to be considered as being ‘one.’ The answer to this question is complex because beings are not ‘ones’ if by that we mean monads. On the other hand, since the term ‘one’ is ambiguous and can mean not a monad but the beginning of counting, the source out of which indivisibility and differentiation first appear as monadic determinations, such source seems to be a principle of self-differentiation prior to externality/internality. In this second sense of one, we can see a similarity between ‘one’ and beings in their appearing. When we turn to appearing we need to understand self-sameness as self-differentiation prior to the distinction internal/external. We have reached, then, the limit of the arithmetic stance and this makes Theaetetus wonder.

Before we turn to the appearing of beings as what they are following the pointers above, we find Theaetetus in wonder, which, according to Socrates is the beginning of philosophy. It is as if only now we are ready to do philosophy. If we recall the essential affinity between counting and τέχνη, Socrates’ and Heidegger would agree in that philosophy is the twisting free of τέχνη.

Let’s look closely at the steps that lead to Theaetetus’ wonder.

Socrates proposes to re-examine their discussion and summarizes what they have accomplished in three statements.

- a) “Nothing would ever become greater or less, either in bulk or in number, as long as it is equal to itself.”^{clxix}

That is, we need to think in accordance with an “equality” or self-sameness that is prior to the determinations of either bulk or number. We need to find self-sameness in beings in their appearing, and this more fundamental self-sameness is the source for any kind of recognition of increase or decrease, even though the self-sameness does not itself become greater or less.

- b) “To whatever there should be neither addition nor subtraction, this never either increases or decreases but is always equal.”^{clxx}

Self-sameness is of a different order than any occurrence of addition or subtraction, of increase and decrease, it is what remains without them in an original phenomenal realm, in the realm of the appearing of beings in their being.

- c) “Whatever was not before, this is incapable (᾿αδύνατον) of being later without having come to be (γένεσθαι) and becoming (γίγνεσθαι).”^{clxxi}

The only way of being is coming to be (γίγνομαι), but this has to be adequately thought from power (δύναμις) as coming to be. There is no ‘before’ to power (δύναμις), rather power means that all becoming has always already come to be as becoming; before and after, being and not being, must be thought from power and becoming in their sameness.

The correct interpretation of these three statements explains the wonder that Theaetetus feels. In these three statements, Theaetetus finally realizes where he and Socrates are in the λόγος; they have rid their inquiry from any kind of arithmetic prejudice, as well as refined their understanding of the doubleness of the appearing of beings in their Being, toward which they can now turn. Theaetetus’ wonder is effected by the passing of the arithmetic stance and by turning

to φύσις as the proper beginning for an inquiry into the appearing of knowledge *This appearing is now to be thought from itself.*

C) The Experience of the Passing of Knowledge

1. Φύσις/Κίνησις

The passage following Theaetetus' wonder^{clxxii} is perhaps the most important in the whole dialogue. It speaks of nature as a beginning. We will study it almost line by line.

“[The]... beginning (ἀρχή) from which everything is attached (ἠρτήται)...is this: the all was motion (κίνησις) and there is nothing beyond this.”

We turn now to the beginning (ἀρχή), the ruling principle of everything (πάντα), that next (πάρρα) to which there is nothing. But this is not the “start” of everything, a beginning that is then left behind. As ἀρχη, this beginning is precisely not left behind because it continues to rule throughout that which proceeds from it. In Socrates' words, everything is attached to it, or, literally, everything “hangs from it” (ἀρτάω). This beginning is motion (κίνησις). The beginning is not a being, it is not the ‘what’ of beings, it is the opening of the difference between them, the divergence and convergence of beings with their being. The appearing of difference and sameness across beings and their ‘what’ is that from which everything hangs, is the pervasive ruling beginning. It is clear, now, why there is nothing beyond or under this. First because we are engaging a phenomenality that is prior to any ‘being,’ second, because all differentiation, all ‘beyonds,’ are birthed in this phenomenality.

“There are two looks of motion, and each of the two unlimited (᾿απείρον) in extent (πλήθει), and one having power (δύναμις) in making (ποιέω) and the other in suffering (πάσχει).”

We have to attend to the opening of the difference between beings and their being, that is, to originary motion.^{clxxxiii} Motion is split, it appears in two ‘looks.’ What is meant here by ‘looks’ has nothing to do with a pre-determined paradigm (there is nothing prior to this appearing). They are, instead, without limit, they are originary looks. They are instead the very drawing of limits that come to determine beings in their Being, a drawing that is not limited in itself. These looks are, therefore, unlimited, their extent is one that is not yet determined as number or magnitude, which makes sense since we are not talking about ‘beings’.

These two ephemeral looks are powers, or the duality of power (δύναμις). We have seen before that power means the appearing of the difference between a being and its Being that can be understood in terms of a double differentiation: the difference between a being and its Being and the difference between a being and other beings. The duality of power (making/suffering) that we are now investigating is a further attempt to think these two differentiating moments as one event.

To make, ποίειν, is to bring something forth, to bring to light, to produce. We could call this event ‘exposure’ because such a bringing forth is not simply a ‘positing,’ but an ex-positing, a positing outside so as to be received, taken up. This reception does not occur necessarily in the exposure, it is there for it, belonging to it but not from it, hanging to it as if by chance (τύχη). This moment of reception is the other to ποίειν that belongs to it, it is what the word suffering or πάσχειν means here. In Greek this word has the sense of receiving an impression from without, it can even mean to be lucky in the sense that that which is received is unexpected, not necessary.

This duality expresses that appearing belongs to reception, that it has to be received as something, and in this blend of appearing/reception, a limit is drawn around beings as what they are. *The duality ποίειν/πάσχειν speaks more originarily of the demarcation of beings in their Being, and takes this demarcation to be enabled by a prior spacing of receptivity, which is the opening of the space of manifestation that the Da names. The reception envelopes the coming forth, delimits it, but without closure. It is a δύναμις, a power that holds itself in reserve: the envelopment of coming forth in reception is a holding back of reception that issues in beings coming to appear in their Being as something or other.*

This holding back of reception in its delimiting power issues forth determinations of beings in two ways. First it delimits them in terms of their specific differences with other beings and, then, it delimits them as self-relating as being a ‘what’—the latter delimitation exceeds the sum of all the specific differences with other beings. This envelopment, this double determination recedes and beings issue forth out of a play of difference and sameness without presenting themselves fully, they appear as ‘looks.’ *In other words the reception of what is brought forth, the envelopment of beings which marks them out, is lost, ungraspable as a chance event. The receding of the envelopment is originary motion, the single event that enables the interplay between a being and its Being and between beings. Another name for this receding motion is φυσίς in its emerging passing.*

2. Ἀισθήσις

We are however, ahead of ourselves. As we have seen, the envelopment of reception brings to pass, as one event, the determination of the difference between beings and that between beings and their Being. These two moments are not the same but also are not prior to one

another, and—as we will soon see—they correspond to perception and knowledge. Now Socrates turns to only the first of these modes of determination, that which corresponds to perception (ᾠσθήσις).

“And out of the association (ᾠμιλία) and rubbing (τρίψεως) of these against one another, there come to be offspring, unlimited in extent but twins—that which is perceived (ᾠσθέτον) and that which is perception (ᾠσθήσις)—which the latter is always falling out together (συνεκπίπτουσα) with and is getting generated (γεννώμενη) with that which is perceived.”

Socrates calls the coming together of bringing forth and reception a ᾠμιλία, which means intercourse, gathering, but also sexual encounter. This coming together, in their chance occurrence, betrays a dimension of desire and particularly, that of erotic desire. Only such a desire (one that is not directed to beings, but to their appearing) makes sense here. Eros is the force that gathers the duality of δύναμις, Eros in its desire for the openness of appearing and beauty, for the shining of appearing is the principle of this originary δύναμις. Socrates infuses his words with erotic sense: this encounter is a rubbing and yields offspring, it is a desire for birthing.

What is birthed out of this erotic coming together? Twins, an offspring that preserves the duality implicit in power, that of coming forth and reception, but which also covers it up. But these twins come forth out of the receding receptivity of δύναμις, they emerge out of this passing, as bastard offspring. These offspring appear as if out of banishment, they are encountered by chance, they come and disappear together, they are wondering offspring (all these senses are captured in the word συνεκπίπτω).

These bastard twins are the perceived and perception which reproduce the duality of bringing forth and reception respectively. The perceived comes forth, it is there, produced but always enveloped in the perception of it that takes it as something. And this encounter occurs as if by chance, ungrounded.

“Now the perceptions have for us the following sorts of names: sights and hearings and smellings and freezings and burnings and, yes, pleasures certainly and pains and desires and fears are their designations and different ones as well, the nameless of which are without limit, and the named very many. And the perceived genus in turn is cogenerated with each of these, omnifarious colours and omnifarious sights, and likewise sounds with hearings, and all the rest of the beings perceived which come to be congeners with all the rest of perceptions.”

We run into smells, noises, tastes, they appear to us but we are always already involved in them, enveloping them, dispersed in them, through them. At the same time, in this very envelopment, we do not fully assimilate them, they are fleeting, indifferent to our taken them up: such is perception (ᾠσθήσις)—random, indifferent, involved, dispersed, sudden, unexpected, transitory. The element of perception is chance (τύχη), and it is errant, disordered. There is λόγος in this element, but it is the λόγος of arbitrary names: names that also just happen, that are insufficient to grasp the unlimited character of the perceptions we run into. The difference between named and nameless perceptions does not amount to much: perceptions, perceivings, names—they are all external to each other, bastard playmates.

What is the relation between this element of perception and beings? In perceptions we detect the ways in which beings are different from each other. The smells and noises are all in relation to other smells and noises, each perception and perceiving is taking not as it is but as it is

in relation to others: they are rather like the monads of numbers^{clxxiv}, we cannot quite divide them (how to “divide” an odor) and the way we take them in is in relation to others. Perception is the power that finds itself in the sway of the difference established between beings, a strangely arithmetic sway, which is why, perhaps, Theaetetus said that knowledge is perception.

Socrates continues by stating that he will bring his discussion of perception to completion (᾿αποτελέσθη). What would it mean to bring this discussion of perception to completion?

Perception is precisely incomplete, without an ordering τέλος. The continuation of the discussion will bring something to play, a sort of limit, which will need to be traced back to the very occurrence of motion and perception. This appearance of a τέλος will provide the clue to understanding in what sense perception (᾿αισθήσις) is nature (φύσις). Socrates proceeds:

“...all these are in motion, as we’re just saying, and speed (τάχος) and slowness (βράδυτης) are in their motion. Now everything slow holds back (᾿ίσχει) its motion in itself and relative to the beings drawn near (πλησιάζοντα) with it and precisely in this way generates, and the beings precisely so generated (γέννα) are faster, for they are born (φέρεται) and their motion is by nature in moving locally (φόρα)”

Perceptions/perceivings are bastard twins, the result of the duality of power ‘bringing forth/reception’ and, as twins, reproduce these dual structures amongst themselves. The passage above speaks with more precision of the re-production of the structure bringing forth/reception *now in the element of perception*. We have seen that motion is the appearing of the difference between a being and its Being that appears with the difference between beings with one another. Perception is motion in its appearance in reference to the difference between beings, to differences that become apparent in colors, odors and noises that come to be out of relations of difference among beings. In perception we move away from the originary motion of φύσις and

are given to motion as external, and this externality covers over the very event of perception in its inception.

In the nearness of beings, a nearness here determined by differences and affinities in terms of what is perceived (e.g. colors)—a nearness that does not depend on beings appearing as such prior to the nearness, but the nearness in which beings can come to appear with one another—there is motion as relations that constitute themselves as perceptions. In these relations—like shades of colors, for example—Socrates detects a slowness, which is expressed as a holding back in reserve. The shades of colors out of which colors are constituted, the difference out of which coloring is issued, takes place as colors superseding one another, as shades offering the receptivity for the bringing forth of color—a dual structure that holds for other perceptions as well. Perceptions are births, they are born from coming forth and recession, from insinuations or shadings of colors, for example—births that take place in the nearness of beings that is anterior to them. Socrates calls the birthing of perceptions the slow motion that issues forth in holding back.

This slow motion of birthing becomes fast. This becoming fast is a turn that Socrates detects from the motion of birthing to the motion of carrying or local motion ($\phi\acute{o}\rho\alpha$). When the perception is birthed in the nearness of beings, the dual structure bringing forth/reception is constituted once more. This time, what is brought forth appears out of the receding draw of shading and appears again as a color to which we attach names. These are the perceptions that strike as if by chance, the impenetrable colors, odors, smells that we identify as such. Since these are detached from their birthing, they seem to be carried along, simply happening, moved externally without definite lineages. They are moved without reserve, there is no holding back in

them: they are fast and move locally as being carried (φόρα). Now we are disseminated in this motion, in perception.

Where do we find the other side of the duality, that of reception?

“Whenever, then, an eye and something else of the beings commensurate with it are near, they generate whiteness and perception that grows with it, which would never have come to be if each of the two of them had come to anything else, it’s precisely at that time that they are borne between—the sight from the side of the eyes and the whiteness from the side of that which is giving birth along with sight to the color—that the eye, lo and behold, becomes full of sight and precisely at that time sees and becomes not sight but an eye seeing”

We are engaged with a second birth as the result of the structure bringing forth/reception in the element of perception. The first birth (the slow one) corresponds to the emergence of perceptions out of the relations of difference between beings, such as the receding shades that yield colors. The second birth, which overlaps with the first one, which is itself blended with it, involves not the nearness between beings but the nearness between beings and perceptive bodies, such as eyes. In this nearness the eyes are receptive, what subsides in the envelopment of colors; their receptivity vanishes, and eyes are lost in color: they are not eyes but an eye seeing.

Just like the birthing in the nearness of beings, the birthing in the nearness of eyes and beings is a chance occurrence. The difference here is that the bond that is formed between bringing forth/reception in this second perceptual birthing is a bond according to measure, it is a ‘commensurate’ bond. Where does this measure come from? Are we finding here an indication of that completion of perception that Socrates announced?

“And that which cogenerated the color gets filled all round with whiteness and becomes in turn not whiteness but white, whether it is wood or stone or whatever being turns out to get colored with a color of this sort.”

When the eye gets lost in seeing, in the color, the color itself recedes. Perception passes its lineage of births and exhausts itself and what is left out of this receding of perception are not colors, but colored beings recognizable as beings. Λόγος emerges out of the passing of perception, as if it were always already there, submerged under the chaos of perception. In the passing of perception beings emerge: wooden or stone beings, and colors are taken to belong to them: beings^{clxxv} are ‘white.’ The power of perception yields to that of λόγος, a λόγος that is not simply names anymore, but the recognition of beings as what they are. In the passing of perception we move from the difference that obtains between beings to that which obtains between beings and their Being. This is the completion that Socrates suggested: the emergence of λόγος out of the passing of perception. But this emergence is not necessary, it is itself a chance event, therefore the stance of perception is one that holds itself back from the oneness suggested by the Being of beings. The stance of perception states:

“...there is to be nothing that is one itself by itself, but always to become for something, and ‘be’ must be removed from everywhere...one must make utterances in accordance with nature...”

From the stance of perception and its passing, the births that determine perception not only show that nothing holds itself as one, but the births themselves pass in their exhaustion. Perception appears as passing and this passing belongs to nature, which is at the margins of perception, which is passage and flow that does not itself appear—the holding in reserve that has made perception a history of birth and passage. Nature is not perception, it is its passing/ emerging

which exceeds perception and in this excess enables the emergence of λόγος—nature is excess and flow that reaches out to λογος and recedes from it. It is according to this sense of nature that we are brought to speak, to make utterances.

3. Ἐπιστήμη

a) Two kinds of motion

The discussion goes from ἄισθήσις to ἔπιστήμη by bringing out a second kind of motion. Ἄισθήσις is permeated by the motion that is determined as carrying (φόρα), this is a motion that appears as external to that which is moved, a motion that corresponds to the differences among beings that are seen through their external relations. *Having rooted φόρα in the appearing of beings as different from one another, we have come to understand φόρα in its appearing, and advanced beyond how it was understood at the beginning of the dialogue.* This motion appears with a second motion, the motion that determines the possibility of knowledge. Socrates says:

“Do you call it motion whenever something changes from place to place or even when it is revolving in the same?...let this be one species...But whenever it is in the same but grows old, or becomes black from white or stiff from soft, or alters in any different alteration, isn't it worthwhile to declare it another species of motion...I mean then by the two species of motion this pair, alteration (αλλοιώσις) and locomotion (φόρα).”^{clxxvi}

The distinction between these two kinds of motion is one of the source of motion. These two kinds are not reducible to one another because one appears as the spacing between beings while the other find its beginning in the moved being itself, it is self-motion, the spacing between

beings and Being. This motion is called alteration (αλλοιώσις) and appears in growth (φύω). In this motion, a being moves toward itself, it works toward accomplishing itself as what it is. This work never ceases, that is, the being is never ‘completed.’ Rather, this motion holds itself as power (δύναμις) in that by never accomplishing itself, it discloses its what it is as an end that always recedes, an ‘end’ that appears in the withdrawing movement of growth and decay, of coming to be/passing away.

The movement of growth and decay does not ‘present’ what something is, but offers in its coming forth and withdrawing, an open look of the ‘what’ of beings. We could say that in this second kind of motion there is also a birthing at issue, a self-birthing. The duality bringing forth/reception is still at play: the coming forth of the look appears in the withdrawing of the movement of coming to be/passing away. The offered look is the offspring of this movement, and this movement arises from that which is moved. This movement corresponds to the appearing of the difference between a being and its Being, the second appearing that we have traced to the power in beings. While locomotion corresponds to the external differentiation and births in ᾠσθήσις, alteration opens up a new realm of manifestive power in which looks are birthed as gathering the ‘what’ of beings (rather than noises, smells, tastes, etc.), a gathering that occurs in λόγος. I emphasize here the irreducibility between these two motions that corresponds to the irreducibility of ᾠσθήσις to ἐπιστήμη.

We are tracing the difference between two kinds of motion that are irreducible to one another. They are irreducible because they are determined by the way in which limits are drawn around beings in their what they are, in their appearing as a what among other beings, in their appearing difference from others and from their Being. These limits are not drawn in one stroke: they rather seem to have a double component, one that appears as coming from an external

source (movement of φόρα) and one coming from the moved being itself (alteration). The irreducibility of these two movements brings to the fore that they are to be distinguished on the basis of a determination of place, or the happening of place, χώρα. This is the place that is at issue in manifestation, the place where the lines of delimitation are drawn around beings from both outside/inside. This χώρα, this spacing of manifestation, is the spacing that Eros desires—again, the erotic intervenes but this time in the split between the two kinds of motion, between ἄισθήσις and (as we shall soon see) knowledge.

b) Ἄισθήσις as non-knowledge

We are turning to the appearing of beings in their looks, in their self-sameness. But this self-sameness, this self-relation as the movement of self-generation in beings, appears together with the difference between beings and their Being, that is, with a difference that allows for errancy, for knowledge as well as non-knowledge. The question of the appearing of knowledge becomes the question of the distinction between perception and knowledge as well as that of knowledge in distinction from non-knowledge. At first the distinction between knowledge and non-knowledge is conflated with that between knowledge and perception: perception is non-knowledge.

Socrates begins this distinction:

“By which we see, this is eyes, or through (δίᾳ) which we see; and by which we hear, ears, or through which we hear?”^{clxxvii}

The eyes are born as eyes in the reception of the appearing of colors. This birth, however, is not enough here: the eyes are not that which receives the motion of alteration, they cannot receive or join in the birth of looks out of the movement of self generation. The eyes, then, appear as only a

realm, a medium, which in their limits, in their passing, reveal another kind of appearing: it is through them that we ‘see’ beings as they are in their looks. Socrates continues:

“That’s because it’s surely dreadful, my boy, if many kinds of perceptions sit in us as if in wooden horses, but all these do not strain together (ξυντείνει) toward one single look (idea), regardless whether it is soul or whatever one must call it, by which we perceive through these as if they are tools (ὄργανον) all the perceived and perceptible beings.”^{clxxviii}

The perceptions have to be understood in relation to the motion of alteration and the appearing of the look. The perceptions are now secondary to this appearing, perception subsides and through perceptions the look is manifest in the withdrawal of perception, in the passing of external motion and the emergence of alteration. The look manifests itself through the motion of growth as that which ‘strains’ perceptions together. The word here is *ξυντείνει*, to stretch to its full, to extend. What manifests itself are not colors and smells anymore. Something is manifest through them as that which stretches them to their fullest. The stretch is what is manifest through them and this stretch is the manifestation of the motion of alteration. The stretch here expresses a motion that is a self-motion, an attempt to reach out which in growing beings is a reaching out to their being. But this stretch is held as a stretch, as a reaching out that is not completed, and in its incompleteness the stretch manifests the motion of alteration.

The stretch aims at a look, and it shows this look to be ‘one.’ One means here “self-sameness.” The problem here is that the stretching out shows itself in two ways: it shows itself as guided by the unity of the look as a *τέλος* or it shows itself as simply directed toward it, somewhat indifferent to its *τέλος*, as being itself self-same, one, in its very tending toward the look. This duplicity of the manifestation of the look, as the self-sameness anchored in the look as

τέλος or as expressed in the motion itself as a stretch, is an ambiguity that will determine the rest of the discussion. Both of them, however, mark a departure from perception, a way of allowing perception pass. Socrates calls this passing “body.”

“Hot beings, stiff beings, light beings, and sweet beings—those through which you perceive them, do you set them down severally as belonging to the body? Or is it something else? (Theaetetus) Nothing else?”^{clxxix}

The body is the site of perception. It appears together with the appearance of the difference between perceptions and looks. In other words, the body appears as determined by external, local motion (φόρα). It is that which separates the inside/outside as understood through motion imparted by something other than what is moved. The body is where the births of perceptions are found and it permeates the field of motion as φόρα, as local motion, it is the opening of that field. It is the passing of this field that marks the appearing and births of looks, the passing body, thus, discloses another power. Socrates proceeds to describe how this other power appears, the power that is directed toward the reception of looks.

“So: So about sound and about color, first, do you think (δίανοια) this very being about both, that both of the pair are (ἑστόν)?

Th: Yes I do.

So: And each of the two is other than each of the two, but the same as itself?

Th: Why certainly.

So: And that both of the pair are two (δύο), and each of the two one (ἓν)?

Th: This too.

So: And you are further capable of examining whether as a pair they are similar or disimilar to one another?

Th: Perhaps.

So: So through what do you think (διάνοια) all these beings about the pair? For it's possible neither through hearing nor through sight to grasp the common (τοῦ κοινού) being about them.^{»clxxx}

We are looking for that which receives the appearing looks, that which corresponds to the sense organs in perception. As we have seen the reception of the looks allows for the looks to appear through perceptions, so it cannot happen in the sense organs. This reception is “thinking” or διάνοια. Διάνοια is made of δία and νοῦς. ‘Δία’ means ‘through’ and here it indicates that the reception occurs through something else, namely, perceptions. In other words, ‘thinking’ goes ‘through’ perception. Νοῦς means: ‘mind,’ ‘heed,’ ‘sense,’ ‘purpose,’ ‘intention’ and ‘heart.’ Νοῦς receives looks and the reception allows looks to appear with intention and sense, the sense of the look as being a what. When Socrates asks why we say that sound and color ‘are,’ we do so because νοῦς receives the perceptions in a way that it stretches them toward a purpose, and this purpose or intention appears as coming from the being itself, and this stretch (as we have seen) is nothing but the motion of growth. Perceptions ‘are’ because they belong to the purposiveness of beings in their growing motion. Looks appear, through perception, as that toward which they tend, as their overriding sense. And they only appear that way because they are received by νοῦς.

At this point, with the appearing of the purposiveness of looks, knowledge as episteme appears as well. With νοῦς we are able to engage beings as within a context of purposes, we come ‘to stand upon them,’ that is, with care. The question, however, is how does knowledge appear: does it appear as imposing a τέλος upon beings or does it attend to the receptive moment

of νοῦς that constitutes it as receiving a purpose originating in the appearing looks themselves. The decision for this appearing is made in the next step of Socrates' discussion.

Νοῦς first tries to get a hold of the perceptions which, as we have seen, are determined by their relations to one another, externally, while they do not move themselves. Because νοῦς turns toward perceptions, νοῦς must count them, treat them like monads, as indivisibles that are discrete, differentiated from one another. So each perception is the same as itself but different from the others: this time the differentiation is not between types of odors as much as it is between types of perceptions, like odors, colors, tastes, etc. Perceptions appear to νοῦς arithmetically. Knowledge first appears as a matter of counting, it is born out of counting.

The counting activity of νοῦς in its counting of perceptions determines the way in which νοῦς intends the look that strains these perceptions: at first νοῦς intends the look as if the look were a number compounded from these perceptions, it intends it as a kind of arithmetic community (κοινωνία). Here we have witnessed a reversal to locomotion and the continuation of the influence of perception in thinking. The arithmetic tendency of νοῦς presents the look as a number, as something 'put together' as indifferent to its parts, as if it belonged an externally defined motion rather than growth. At the same time, the look appears as something put together, even put together by νοῦς itself which has a hypothetical power: the look appears as the product of a kind of τέχνη.

We need to turn now to the power that receives looks. Socrates asks:

“But the power through what exactly makes clear to you that which is common in all beings as well as that which is common in these, and by which you apply the name ‘is’ and ‘is not,’ and what we were just asking about them?”^{clxxxi}

We need to understand the power (δύναμις) which is involved in the appearing of looks as ‘community,’ as the community that strains perceptions toward looks and that which compares and sets perceptions apart from other perceptions. It is this power that allows us to say ‘being’ or ‘not being.’ When we can sense a perception as belonging to a ‘look,’ we can say that it ‘is,’ as in ‘the flower is yellow.’ When we set a perception apart from a look, we can say that it ‘is not,’ as in ‘the flower is not green.’ Theaetetus reveals this power:

“...the soul itself through itself...examines the common beings about all of them.”^{clxxxii}

Theaetetus realizes that he is looking for a power that would strain perceptions toward a look, a power that allows for the motion of growth, that is, a self-relating power. He finds this power in soul. The soul examines (ἐπίσκοπειν). The Greek also says preserves, guards, to watch for something. The soul ‘looks’ but its look is a looking through that preserves the self-relatedness of the looks of beings. In this looking/preserving the soul relates to itself. This self-relation enables the looks preserved and examined by soul to be gathered with sense, with intention. More precisely, it allows looks to appear as the ‘toward which’ for the growing movement that strains perceptions together. According to Theaetetus, the soul is engaged in a self-relation which appears as the gathering of perceptions toward looks. Socrates asks further:

“So: In which of the two [body or soul] do you place being?

Th: Well, I place it in those beings which the soul by itself desires (ἐπορέψεται).”^{clxxxiii}

The soul in its ἐπισκόπειν, by bestowing sense on beings in their being, allows for the difference between beings and Being to appear in the excess of the look over the being namely, in growth. Sense appears through this difference. This appearing of sense also allows the proper stance of knowledge to emerge: knowledge as ἐπιστήμη, as taking a stance toward beings, that is, with an orientation toward beings as having sense. Theaetetus goes further than placing being

in the self-relation of the soul. Being is that which the self –relation of the soul strives for, it is the core ἄρχή movement, the core intention that drives this self-relation that, in turn, enables the movement of growth. Being, according to Theaetetus, is the ἄρχή of desire, of the desire of the soul to be self-related. He does not qualify this desire—are we seeing a re-emergence of Eros here in the birth of knowledge as well? But wouldn't Eros precisely bring about a counter-force to the soul as it appears here?

Theaetetus explains the ἐπισκόπειν of the soul further:

“Theaetetus: It's my opinion that it is the Being of these beings in their mutual relations which the soul most especially examines, calculating in itself the past and the present beings relative to the future.”^{clxxxiv}

We have separated the soul from the body, knowledge from perception, and reached the point in which the soul appears by itself with itself, desiring itself. According to Theaetetus, this desiring of itself takes the form of a calculation, of a kind of enumeration in which the soul is able to gather all beings under Being, to gather all beings even as they appear in time under the stasis of Being. The soul desires itself, but it desires the cessation of its calculative life in the stasis of Being. *At this moment we reach the climax of thinking under the stance of τέχνη, but this time we have reached it not from the point of view of utility, but from the sense of Being that motivates this stance. We have seen the emergence of this stance rather than assuming it as Theaetetus does at the beginning. In Heidegger's terms, the Being that sustains this stance is Presence (Anwesenheit).*

We have reached, also, an understanding of experience as dominated by calculation, as if all experience were directed by the stasis of Being. This is the configuration of experience that at the end of Platonism shows itself as the experience under worldview. We have culminated here

the ascent of the *Theaetetus*, the overcoming of φύσις and ἄισθήσις. But the dialogue does not end here. This is only a fleeting moment in the *Theaetetus* because from now on we will have to begin a descent back into φύσις and begin the countermovement to τέχνη.

4. The Descent back into Φύσις

Socrates wonders about the name of the calculative activity of the soul:

“Socrates: But still and all, we’ve advanced so far at least, so altogether not to seek it in perception but in that name, whatever the soul has, whenever it alone by itself deals with the beings which are.

Theaetetus: Well, this is called, Socrates, I believe, to opine.”^{clxxxv}

Socrates takes Theaetetus’ words to begin a new interpretation of what knowledge is, one that begins with the problem of opinion, δόξα.

Socrates begins this investigation:

“It’s something that in a sense disquiets me now and often at different times has done so, so as to have got me into a lot of perplexity before myself and before everyone else, when I am not able to say whatever is this experience we have and in what manner it comes to be in us...The fact of someone opining false beings.”^{clxxxvi}

Socrates here appeals to an experience that we all have, the experience of being wrong, and he finds in this experience a challenge to the account of thinking as calculation that he and Theaetetus have just put forth. Socrates’ insight is this: if the soul calculates beings by itself as a kind of enumeration of beings under Being, how can the soul be ever wrong about anything. If the soul is alone by itself, where would the measure come from that would be at play in identifying a calculation as wrong? The soul cannot be alone by itself desiring itself.

The soul is not, however, all that is to be reconsidered here. The question of the possibility of opining false beings is the question of the possibility of non-being, and so the stasis of Being will be challenged as well:

“Socrates: Are we then not to examine what we are looking for along these lines by proceeding in terms of knowing and not knowing, but in terms of being and not?”

This turn toward non-being is necessary here because our meditation on knowledge concerns knowledge as determined from within itself, that is, the origin of the measure of knowledge must come from within the experience of knowledge. Being is in this experience that in which beings are enumerated in the calculation of the soul. Socrates’ point is that sometimes we calculate and believe our calculation, and nevertheless we are opining falsely. We must then have enumerated not Being but non-being, there must be non-being as the outcome of the calculations of the soul.

Socrates says:

“...whoever is opining the beings which are not about anything whatsoever cannot possibly not opine false beings...”^{clxxxvii}

Socrates is here facing a dilemma that Theaetetus does not detect. In their account of the soul calculating by itself, Being was not only the result of an enumeration but also ‘presence,’ the constancy that held the enumerations even outside of time. Now that non-being is at play, Socrates shies away from positing an all encompassing non-being, non-presence. He rather opts to posit several non-beings, several false calculations, and thus leaves unanswered the mode of Being that sustains them. He must, therefore, account for this mode of being of non-being:

“Soul thinking looks to me as nothing else than conversing, itself asking and answering itself, and affirming and denying. But whenever it has come to a determination, regardless of whether its sally was on the slow or keen side, and the soul asserts the same

being and does not stand apart in doubt, we set this down as opinion. Consequently, I for one call opining speaking, and opinion a stated speech; it is not, however before someone else anymore than it is with sound, but in silence before oneself.”^{clxxxviii}

In other words, we must acknowledge that the calculations of the soul are bounded by time, that these calculations must issue an affirmation or denial in a particular moment. The mode of being of non-being is temporality as opposed to the Presence of Being. We must, then, reconsider the soul which cannot be simply alone by itself, but must participate in time, we must allow the soul to descend. In this descent of the soul in which it is in touch with presence and temporality. At the same time, Socrates has managed to let the Presence of Being go unchallenged. Time is taken here to be a “falling short” of presence, a failed imitation of it that strives towards it.

Opining falsely names the event in time in which our calculation has been cut short, so that its resulting enumeration does not correspond to Being. The basis of falsity here is *correspondence*: our enumerations are true only if they happen to correspond to Being, which is present in advance as a stable determination of meaning that we strive for. From here there issues the understanding of opinion as an image that falls short of an original.

The account of truth as correspondence runs into a problem here. Those beings that the soul enumerates in time are of two kinds: beings that are temporal and beings that are always the same, like numbers. Socrates finds that his account of truth as correspondence works for those beings that are always the same, but opinions about particular beings (like the recognition of who that particular individual is that approaches from a distance, or even sounds and smells) cannot belong to the Presence of Being. Socrates solves this problem with an image:

“Well, then, let’s say that it is a gift of Memory, the mother of the muses, and whatever we want to remember of the beings we see, hear, or we ourselves think of, by submitting

them to our perceptions and thoughts, we strike off into this as if we were putting in the seals of signet-rings.^{»clxxxix}

In relation to temporal beings, the correspondence is here to be understood as an event of memory, and whether what we happen to run into in a moment in time corresponds to the memory of it, as if engraved in wax. The nature of this impression, how this impossible connection between the temporal and the a-temporal happens, is here left unsaid. This hints simply at the fact that this image will be a fleeting moment in the discussion, that the very sense of Being as presence will have to be challenged, despite the effort to save it.

The challenge happens because, according to Socrates' account, we can only be mistaken about those beings that are temporal, and that being mistaken about a-temporal beings would only be a matter of time: only in the case of mistaking someone for someone else are we opining falsely, only when all that is at stake is the correspondence between perception and thought (195 D). Socrates' stance here works for questions about the Being of Justice, for example, where it is clear that we do not have a hold of the constancy of its Being. The challenge for this stance happens, rather, with the case of numbers, which as discrete monads seem to be the exemplary case of Being as Presence:

“Socrates: The eleven which one only thinks of and does nothing about, would one ever come to believe on the basis of this speech, to be twelve...

Theaetetus: ...he would never on this condition come to opine this about it.^{»exc}

This challenge marks the full destruction of Being as Presence in the Theaetetus, and the passing of the stance of τέχνη. It marks, too, the liberation of knowledge from this stance. We have descended, then, back to φύσις because the gap between Being and φύσις has proven untenable insofar as it depended on Being as Presence. But one cannot simply erase the gap, situate

knowledge among the emerging/passing of beings, because that would not capture the experience of knowledge. This is what Socrates shows when he turns knowledge itself into a being, when he wants simply to erase the gap between knowledge and φύσις. This happens in the image of the caged birds:

“But it is as if someone should hunt down wild birds, doves or anything else, and having arranged a dovecote for them bringing them up at home—we would surely say that though in some way he always has them, and precisely because he possesses them...”^{exci}

Here Socrates is comparing knowledge as such, that is the jointure being-Being as corresponding to one another, to wild birds. He has reduced knowledge as such to a being that we possess in the sense of having access to it. Theaetetus quickly points out that there should be wild birds that stand out for not-knowing, for the jointure being-Being as not corresponding to one another. The question, however, remains: on the basis of what to we measure knowing and not-knowing to recognize them as such? By getting rid of Being and, thus, by turning Knowledge into a being we have lost all sense of measure in knowing and, thus, *the very stance of knowledge passes with the passing of Being as presence. This marks the core of the Theaetetus in its enactment. Knowledge is never presented here, it can never be grasped, it appears only in its passing enactment. Theaetetus is remarkable in that it shows that knowledge as constituted by τέχνη is but a fleeting moment in its coming to pass.*

We have traced the passing of knowledge as ἐπιστήμη together with the passing of the stance of τέχνη. But we have also seen that we cannot simply turn knowledge into a being, that its demand for measure exceeds that which both φύσις and αἰσθήσις provide. We must then develop another stance which is none other than the stance that we have been enacting, one in which the passing of knowledge appears and reveals its originary need for measure, one that

knowledge cannot provide for itself. There must be a stance that exceeds knowledge, that recognizes its passing, and engages originally the possibility of knowledge—the stance of the experience of wisdom. Neither knowledge nor perception can reveal the necessity that compels us to engage the world meaningfully, we have to turn, then, to a necessity that exceeds both of them.

d) Λόγος and the experience of Wisdom.

The question now is about the compelling power of Being, the necessity that drives us to know that must be the appearing of a measure for our knowing. The enactment of the *Theaetetus* has revealed this necessity as the most thought provoking, so much so that in its search we have come to see the passing of knowledge as opening the possibility of engaging this necessity directly. This cannot be, however, a completely new beginning. What we need is to cover the territory already thought through from a different stance and take up what we have learned about φύσις, αἰσθήσις and ἐπιστήμη from a new perspective that is now liberated from the stance of τέχνη. We are engaged now with the originary experience of the necessity to think that cannot come from knowledge itself, nor from utility, but from Being thought in a radically different way, as be-ing in Heidegger's sense.

Socrates finally turns to the emergence of a measure from which to determine false speech in the context of rhetoric and λόγος. He says:

“It's the art of the greatest people in point of wisdom. It's those they call public speakers and advocates. They surely persuade and don't teach by their own art, but they make one opine whatever they want.”^{xcii}

The measure and the compelling force of Being must now be looked for within λόγος, because it is in the act of speaking that false opinions come to be, especially in the form of persuasion.

Socrates' points out that persuasion is precisely an event in which knowledge is absent:

“...don't they [the persuaded] decide without knowledge, though they have been persuaded rightly if they judged well?”^{exciii}

Theaetetus acknowledges that the simple event of persuasion does not amount to knowledge, even if what one is persuaded about is a true-opinion, where truth is still judged as correspondence: if one opines what is the case. So Theaetetus says: true opinion with speech is knowledge. He is making two points: (i) He remains within truth as correspondence but now he wants to add speech to correspondence, he does not, however, inquire into what this addition of speech amounts to; (ii) He thinks that the difference between the rhetorician and the persuaded is that the rhetorician has speech while the persuaded doesn't.

Socrates welcomes Theaetetus' appeal to speech. He does not, however, follow Theaetetus in his adherence to truth as correspondence nor in his high regard to the rhetorician. Socrates' instead begins a careful analysis of speech, tacitly suggesting that it is in λόγος that the necessity of Being comes to pass.

He begins by examining the relation between names and letters:

“...names, once they are plaited together, become a speech. For the plaiting of names is the Being of speech—that it is exactly in this way that the elements, though they are without speech and unknowable are still perceptible, but the syllables are knowable...”

^{exciv}

For Socrates letters are like the elements of beings that constitute what they are. Just like beings are put together so do names, or, more precisely, syllables. The turn from names to syllables as

that which is knowable is important here. Socrates by moving away from names is moving away from the stability of definitions, and anchors knowledge in a more originary ground than definitions, namely in the very event of the inception of speech which is not yet a definitive event of meaning. This event is a gathering together of letters that are, according to Socrates, perceptible but without knowledge. Socrates returns here to the very event of speaking and finds in this event the appearance of measure beyond definitive meaning. This event, according to Socrates, is plaited, weaved, but there is nothing beyond this weaving, this weaving happens as if by chance, without a more originary ground. The syllable does not strive to reach a determinate meaning set in advance, in its enactment measure is issued as well with it, it is not set up in advance.

Socrates wants to gather syllables under a genus, but this attempt fails quite quickly. The syllables are not a gathering of individual components. In fact they are made of incommensurables (here Socrates goes back to the insight of mathematics brought out at the beginning of the dialogue). The incommensurables are those letters that are voiceless and those which have voice.^{cxv} By bringing both of them together, voicelessness and voice, speech issues forth. Speech, then, is not a genus in the proper sense, but it comes to be in a play of voice and voicelessness, which is an event of sounding, an event within the realm of perception. Socrates' points out of how a perceptive event of difference, of non-assimilation issues a gathering of meaning without a fixed determination as a syllable. The syllable in turn issues forth meaning in the way of names, but this issuing forth is also a leap toward meaning as that which issues from letters. *Meaning is an originary event without ground, which leaps into itself, opening itself out of itself. This is what the stance of τέχνη cannot comprehend.* And this originary event continues happening through speech, now as sentences that are plaited of words, without a guiding

meaning set up in advance that determines the event of meaning. *Such is the Being of speech in its inceptive character, as when we find ourselves speaking with friends.*

Socrates' does his best to restore the Being of speech under τέχνη (that is where we began, the speech of the rhetorician) but he fails because we would end up saying that even letters as such have meaning—when we must face the inception of meaning, its groundless origination in inceptive λόγος, *which is the compelling necessity of be-ing*. Once we attend to the origination of meaning, we must recognize it in the dialogical event of speaking with others, that is, we must recognize a limit to meaning, a limit to the Being of beings *in the moment of speaking*. Here non-being arises again, but non-being not as the negation of Being, but as the recognition of the ungrounded origination from which Being issues forth.

Socrates and Theaetetus try to assimilate non-being into Being, they try to mark non-being in the appearing of beings. There must be a sign that we can recognize that would hold the limit of the meaning of beings, a mark that allows the stability of a being in its Being. This must be a sign:

“...by means of which that which is asked about differs from all beings.”^{xcvi}

Socrates wants to interpret non-being as the accumulation of all the ways in which a being differs from other beings, that is, to posit non-being as an external determination of beings. Strangely enough, in order to save the stability of knowledge we turn to external determination, which is what we are given to in perception. By trying to find the stability of a measure for the Being of beings, we end up sacrificing the integrity of knowledge and of the self-determination of beings.

Socrates quickly shows the impossibility of this stance:

“Of those beings of which we have right opinion...it urges us to take in addition a right opinion of these beings by which they differ from everything else.”^{xcvii}

Non-being cannot be captured by adding all of the differences between beings (an impossible enumeration that does not correspond to our experience of knowledge) nor can it be captured in the self-determination of beings in their Being understood as Presence, through the calculation of the soul itself by itself. That is, non-being hovers in the difference between ᾠσθήσις and knowledge, it does not belong to either. Non-being is the spacing of origination of the appearing of beings, and in its hovering, it holds open the Da. Non-being splits beings from beings, perception from knowledge and reveals a compelling necessity prior to them that draws us into Da-sein. It is the event of be-ing in Heidegger's sense.

We must recognize, then in ᾠσθήσις and knowledge the impossibility to ground the originary event of Being, the necessity that compels us to think. We must attend, then, to the ungrounded event of speech in its inceptive character as providing the measure for knowledge, that is, as an ungrounded event of be-ing. Socrates ends by pointing out that it is this event that his maieutic attends to, simply as providing the space for the origination of speech, that is the experience of wisdom:

“...my mother and I have obtained from a god as our lot this midwifery, she of women and I of the young, noble and all the beautiful.”^{xcviii}

The beautiful, then, hovers over the unbridgeable gap between ᾠσθήσις and knowledge a gap that is given to us in the passing of knowledge that the *Theaetetus* enacts. The spacing between αἰσθησις and knowledge is the originary spacing for the appearing of beings with meaning, a beautiful appearing, and this spacing is cleaved by an ungrounded necessity that compels us toward be-ing, twisting free from the mastery of τέχνη.

Fifth Study: The Image of the Cave on the Basis of the Enactment of *Theaetetus*

I.

I will read the image of the cave out of the enactment of the *Theaetetus* that I just developed. On the basis of this enactment that twists free from Platonism, the image of the cave will have to be displaced from its essential place within Platonism,^{cxcix} as the image that grounds Platonism in its basic orientation toward Being as Presence. We do not have to go outside of this image to displace it. The displacement occurs, rather at the beginning of the image, in its very determination as an ‘image’ Socrates begins:

“...make an image (ᾠπείκασον) of our nature (φύσιν) in its education and want of education.”^{cc}

‘Make an image’ here translates ᾠπείκασον. This Greek word has a double meaning. First, it means to make a likeness or a copy of something else, to represent, for example, in a statue. This first meaning belongs to mimesis and the structure image/original that is at the core of Platonism, of the setting in advance of Being over beings. The question here is, what would it mean that Platonism is gathered here in an image in this sense? Doesn’t the very Platonic determination of images take them to be a diminished, deceptive mode of disclosure? Isn’t the image of the cave, as understood from within Platonism, a condemnation of images? Why then the imperative to ‘make an image’?

The second meaning of ᾠπείκασον is to ‘sketch.’ This word, in this sense, echoes the pivotal word of the crossing in its determination of philosophical enactment: ‘Entwurf’. As in ‘Entwurf,’ which means projection upon possibilities, ᾠπείκασον is precisely not to set something present in advance. It is not envisioning within τέχνη, but to discover that which is

sketched in the very sketching of it, it is to be at stake in the moment of conjecture as a moment of discovery. It is to engage the appearing of beings inceptively, to be there with beings in their coming to pass. Ἀπείκασον, then, can say rapture in the event of Be-ing, implication in ἁλήθεια. The sense of image here is, then, not framed within mimesis but the image occurs as a provocation to engage Be-ing, the image holds us in rapture. The imperative is, then, a demand to be in rapture, and—if we hear the imperative from the other beginning—to enact philosophy as twisting free of Platonism.

This reading is supported by ‘what’ the image is of: our nature (φύσιν). That is, our emerging-passing, that which avoids the technical gaze but which determines us in our involvement in the appearing of beings. Nature will be important throughout this image, as what is unsaid in it, as that lack of determination that holds us in rapture rather than as an original that determines us in advance. Our ‘nature’ bears upon us as that which launches us into conjecture, it is the unutterable moment of determination that exceeds itself and opens us to determination originally rather than technically—nature in its excess as it eventuates in the enactment of *Theaetetus*.

The imperative says ‘be enraptured by your essential openness to rapture in Be-ing.’ The imperative commands to come to ourselves in a way that avoids any pre-determined sense of purpose, to come to ourselves as letting go of the determinations that have come to constitute ‘ourselves’. The imperative commands a kind of abyssal self-knowledge that only an oracle could command.

“Make an image of our nature in its education and want of education.” The reference to education here must be heard from the other beginning as well. If we take Heidegger’s analysis of παιδεία at the end of *Plato’s Doctrine of Truth* as a basis, παιδεία means the involvement in

a political community on the basis of ‘ideals’ set up in advance, it means the forced conformity to those ‘ideals’. Παιδεία is taken here as a τέχνη of shaping human beings into political beings. Want of education, ᾠ παιδεία, names not necessarily the absence of political involvement, but a resistance to παιδεία, to forced political conformity. Heidegger’s reversal of ‘philosophy of a people’ to ‘people of a philosophy’ is echoed in this analysis. ‘Want of education’ can be taken here as the acknowledgement of a dimension of humanity that is at odds with the technical setting up of a people (a project that the *Republic* unfolds), where philosophy is a tool for this setting up. The duality παιδεία/ᾠ παιδεία has to be taken as a determination of the ambivalence of human beings within the technical stance, as the possibility of ungrounding this stance and to find a determination of the polis and the political outside of the technical frame of the *Republic*. The technical political program can never be totalizing, it is eluded by the dimension in human experience that twists free from τέχνη by our nature, which is precisely what this image of the cave evokes. This image, then, unsettles the main thrust of The *Republic*.

^{cci}The image itself is only a few lines long. ^{ccii} It images a cave and cave dwellers of two kinds: the prisoners and the bearers of artifacts. That is all that the image images. The rest of what Socrates says is not the image proper. The liberation of the prisoners, the ascension out of the cave, the return to the cave—all of this is not imaged in the image. We will turn to the character of this discourse later. Now, let us turn to the image, one that at the end of its presentation is called “without a place,” (ᾠ ατοπόν).

The characterization of the image as ‘without a place’ is the clue that unleashes the power of this image, the way in which it enraptures us. I will mark here the main aspects of this image.

- i) *The prisoners*. Human beings as cave dwellers are bound so that they can only see the inner wall of the cave. The binding of the prisoners is the elimination of their body,

the impossibility of movement. The prisoners don't know that they have bodies as the possibility of movement. The elimination of bodily dwelling frames the prisoners to be attached to a narrow sense of vision, a vision without peripheral dimensions—they can only see “in front of them.” They are given, then, only to the shadows on the wall of the cave, they adhere to these shadows as fully present for them, fully present to a framed vision. The image here, images the stance of knowledge within the frame of τέχνη, the positing of beings as present, ‘in front of us.’ The prisoners are detached from the shadows, they are not implicated in their appearing. They receive the shadows as if from the outside, as impositions upon them.

- ii) *The bearers of artifacts.* The other cave dwellers are hidden behind a wall which is at the back of the prisoners. The prisoners are never engaged with the other cave dwellers, they never appear. They project, however, artifacts upon the inner wall of the cave. They are invisible puppeteers. For the prisoners, however, the shadows of the artifacts is all there is. That they only see the shadows of this artifacts means that the prisoners do not understand the artifacts as artifacts, that is, as products of τέχνη. *In the image, the origin of τέχνη is invisible from within the frame of τέχνη.* Τέχνη is taken as absolute, the shadows sustain the enforcement of the frame of the technical stance. The presence of the determination of the shadows is never questioned.
- iii) *The difference in light.*^{cciii} There are two sources of light in the image. One is the light coming through the entrance of the cave that the prisoners never see. The other, is a fire that provides the light that project the shadows on the cave wall. Socrates is explicit in that the only light operative for the prisoners is that of the fire. The light of

the fire covers over the light of the outside. What is the difference between these two lights? The light of the fire sustains the framed vision of the prisoner, it keeps the puppeteers in hiding, it enforces the presence of shadows. The fire sustains τέχνη (we can note here its Promethean lineage) and the concealment of its own origin. The light coming through the entrance that the prisoners do not sense, on the other hand, lights up the whole cave, it clears it, it offers it originally to vision, but a to a vision that is other than the prisoners', one with periphery. By lighting up the whole cave, this second light illuminates even the puppeteers, it discloses the origination of τέχνη, its absolute artificiality. This light is that which the stance of τέχνη stands upon and covers up, a light that if envisioned points to a dimension in appearing outside of the technical frame. In terms of the *Theaetetus*, it is the light of the originary moment of meaning that recedes when the imposing light of τέχνη holds sway, but a light that is recovered in the enactment of the passing of knowledge, in the experience of wisdom.

The image is of τέχνη, if we take 'image' to mean a 'presentation' or 'copy'. And we have to take it this way, at least to begin with. Otherwise we would miss the power of this image, namely its power to unsettle that which it copies, twisting free from τέχνη. The image presents τέχνη but also presents τέχνη in its lack of ground, in its instability. It enraptures us insofar as what is not presented in the image is precisely our nature, or predisposition for conjecturing and sketching, our philosophical essence. Ἀπείκασον is a command that the prisoners cannot follow. The image is of nature in the sense that it presents nature through its absence but without referring to it as an original. Our nature is, here, more of a trace than a copy. This trace enraptures us. Now we can recall the imperative: 'be enraptured by your essential openness to

rapture.’ This is exactly what the image enacts, it enraptures us by tracing our nature in its absence, and, thus, it enraptures us by reminding us of our essential openness to rapture. Only out of this experience of rapture, can one say that the image is ‘ἄτοπος’, it has no place within experience—within the experience of wisdom.

Education and want of education appear in the image.^{cciv} Education, in the sense of conformity to ‘ideals’, is precisely the position in which the prisoners find themselves in relation to the puppeteers, who are the teachers. The lack of education appears in the image doubly. Within the frame of τέχνη, the want of education is something to be overcome—if, for example, the prisoners were to become puppeteers. In terms of our nature, on the other hand, want of education appears as the lack of awareness of the light that comes through the entrance, a lack of awareness of the ground that τέχνη covers up. This want of education, however, is not something to be overcome, but it is an engagement with an essential ignorance that reveals the event of lighting as not determined by us in projects set up in advance, as elusive, as sustaining our nature in its conjectural disposition beyond mimesis. This is an engagement with ignorance in Socrates’ sense of ignorance, in his wisdom. This wisdom is at odds with any political τέχνη, with ideals of education, with conformity to the polis. Philosophy in this conformity appears as tool of the people. In the Socratic sense, philosophy enacts the unfolding of our nature beyond the interests of the polis, as engaging the non-technical appearing of beings that displaces us away from the sway of techniques and politics—the sway that defines the *Republic* in its metaphysical destiny.

II.

The image has been traced out, sketched. What follows is a μύθος, a story about the possible fate of those prisoners within the image. This μύθος is outside the image: this is fundamental. If one does not note this, the force of the image is lost. Socrates marks the end of the image and the passage to μύθος in his speech: now what is at issue is a conditional speech:

“Now consider...what their release would be like if something of this sort were by nature to happen to them.”^{ccv}

The imperative is not operative here anymore. We do not *have* to consider this conditional. The μύθος, is hesitant, tentative. If we attend to what the conditional says, the hesitancy becomes clear. We need to consider the μύθος of the liberation of the prisoners as *if it happened to them by nature* (φύσει). Considering the power of the image of the cave, its double imaging, its presenting of the rule of τέχνη and its holding us in the rapture of our nature outside of this rule—considering that precisely our nature came to be a stake in the image—the conditional here is most perplexing. The μύθος calls for a translation, what it says will have to be re-written in a different μύθος, one that is of nature rather than τέχνη. This other μύθος is not said, it is held in reserve—at least in the *Republic*. If we do not recognize that now we are letting the power of the image unleash in its double imaging, namely, that the force of the image is already at play, the decisive character of the conditional here would be completely missed. We have to recognize where the image begins to unleash its power in order to be able to listen to what Socrates has to say about the possible fate of the prisoners.

We can say this much. There are two μύθος, one of nature which is unsaid. The one that is said, however, has no clear determination at the beginning. The provocation of the image is that the said μύθος is about the liberation of the prisoners within the stance of τέχνη—but this

will have to be worked out. Translating the said μύθος into a μύθος about nature means that we determine precisely what it is that needs to be translated here.

I will mark the pivotal moments in the said μύθος.

- i) The prisoner is forced into his liberation. It is compelled to stand up, to turn his neck around, and to look up toward the light. It is as if the prisoner is not given a chance to reenter his own body and a movement that would originate from himself. Force is necessary as coming from the outside. The stance of τέχνη is preserved here insofar as the prisoner remains at the mercy of someone else in the same way as he was at the mercy of the puppeteer. Even though now he can see the puppeteer, this seeing did not originate out of himself so the puppeteer remains presented to him, given to him. We could say then that the prisoner is allowed to see the artificiality of the technical stance, but nevertheless he sees it from within the frame of τέχνη.
- ii) The prisoner is forced to see the light that comes from the outside. He moves beyond the light of the fire and can see the source of the illumination of the cave. This illumination allows him to see the puppets and the puppeteer. The question here is how he engages this new light. Since he was forced this light strikes him all of a sudden. It strikes him as a light that is only different from that of the fire as a matter of degree. He does not learn to envision peripherally but looks instead directly at the source of the light. He is, notwithstanding the passage from fire to the light of the outside, oriented toward light in the same way as before. This is why at first he cannot recognize any priority between the shadows on the wall and the artificial beings that project those shadows. He needs to be forced into understanding the priority. Since he engages the external light directly, his eyes hurt and he continues to experience his

turning movement as externally determined. Even though the light of the outside should have enabled him to turn, because he is forced to turn this light appears as a challenge rather than as an enabling force. The prisoner remains imprisoned.

- iii) If he were forced to the outside of the cave, Socrates says that he would have to get accustomed to sunlight. Once he is outside, there is a change in the conditions for his turning toward the light. That compelling force that violently released him is not there anymore—at least not as coming from someone else. Outside of the cave there are no other human beings that accompany him in his turning. Strangely enough, the now liberated prisoner repeats his experience of imprisonment outside of the cave. He encounters other beings as shadows, including other human beings. But now he has learned from his experience in the cave and he imposes the same violence that he suffered in his liberation again upon himself. He turns slowly but *directly* toward the sun. It is as if now the external violent force that liberated him has been incorporated by the prisoner without transforming the external character of this force.
- iv) The prisoner repeats the stance of τέχνη insofar as he does not develop any other relation to light and to beings than the one he was subjected to within the cave. It is as if he never learned about how light not only strikes you directly but opens up peripheries that enable the turning, that it clears spaces. He never engages light as the opening of the space in which beings appear. He continues, rather, to engage light simply as that which presents an image from an original, as directed light.
- v) What the prisoner has learned then is that the cave is an image of the outside of the cave – that is, that τέχνη is grounded τέχνη. This is clear from his relation to the cave once he is outside of the cave. He thinks of the outside of the cave as the

original, in which beings themselves are what they are. The inside of the cave seems to him as full of images that fall short of the clarity with which beings are outside. We need to ask now “What is this clarity?” This clarity is nothing other than the one that we found in the *Theaetetus* at the point in which we reached the highest peak of τέχνη. The clarity that he enjoys outside of the cave is that in which he finds himself in relation to beings as present. The sun would be that which is most present.

vi) That the *Theaetetus* needs to be brought to bear at this point is clear by the way Socrates speaks about the relation between beings outside and inside the cave. Inside the cave it is a matter of beings that go by, that pass, that are temporal. It is a matter of those temporal truths that in the *Theaetetus* had to be compared to an original presence. The prisoner now is a soul all by itself, desiring itself, that does not want to engage with images.

vii) Socrates says:

“Now reflect on this too...if such a man were to come down again and sit in the same seat.”^{cevi}

There is no need for the prisoner in his solitude to go back into the cave. But if he were to be back in the cave, he would find himself in a competition among prisoners that never left the cave. There would be a clear difference between the one who left the cave and the ones who remained. The difference lies in that the one who left the cave is able to see behind the shadows about which the prisoners speak stable, determinate meanings. But he would not only do that; he would try to force those who only see shadows into freedom and lead them toward understanding beings in the stability of presence. This would provoke the others to kill him. Why would they kill

him? The reason is that the prisoner that returns freely into the cave was nevertheless unable to not compete with the others. His commitment to Being as presence, to that which can always be relied upon, appeared to the others as just one more stance within a competition of opinions. But this time the liberated prisoner was not only a competitor but he becomes violent, repeating toward others the violence that he suffered himself and that he incorporated into his own life.

What would it mean to translate this μύθος into a μύθος of nature? It would mean nothing less than writing the *Theaetetus*. It would be a matter of understanding how, out of our own nature, we come to free ourselves from the external violence in which we find ourselves under the rule of τέχνη. It would mean to articulate again the stance of τέχνη as it comes from within our own nature and reach its peak in Being as presence. But to find this mode of Being to be only a fleeting moment in our thinking experience. It will not be then simply a matter of chance that leads us into a descent from the peak of τέχνη back into an inquiry of the possibility of falsehood. We would have to descend in an inquiry that does not dismiss falsehood as that which is an image of Being, but rather as a necessary dimension of our experience of it. Our nature compels us to descend and, even if we were to compete in speech with others, we would envision the limits of rhetoric and keep away from the abstract satisfaction of persuasion. Even if following our nature we are led to being killed by competitors, this death would be very different from the death that we saw in the said μύθος. It would be a death among friends—like Socrates' own death in which others did not laugh at him, but laughed with him, sharing in the experience of wisdom.

III.

Let us turn to this image in its enactment, as an image that unsettles Platonism and the mimetic structure from which images are determined in Platonism. Presenting τεχνη, the image reveals the absence of our nature. It conceals the way in which we are constituted in the moment in which nature exceeds itself and enters the Da. The image sets into play the absence of the openness of the Da, it holds it back from us, it severs us from the return to ourselves that Eros names. At the same time, the image enraptures us in erotic need.

The image sets into play precisely that which it does not present, in turns absence into need, lack into necessity. This turning is the enactment of the image, it enables us to engage the absence of our nature through our nature, it grounds us in our nature precisely by withholding it from us—it gives us to the Da by holding it in reserve. In this moment, when we engage the Da—in an erotic engagement—we become Da-sein. Only an image in its double manifestation, in its offering of absence, can bring us to Da-sein. This is the power that images can have outside of mimesis, in the passing of Platonism.

Images can eventuate in the crossing. Not all images, however. Heidegger is clear in that works of art can be events of be-ing, for example, but do not necessarily enact the crossing, the twisting free of Platonism. But images can nevertheless eventuate in the crossing, these are thinking or philosophical images that come to pass at the edge of thinking within τέχνη, turning thinking to another necessity than that that defines Platonism. The image of the cave, then, is an exemplary philosophical image in the crossing. Thus Heidegger writes that the interpretation of the image of the cave is “historically essential.”^{ccvii} Heidegger himself, then, re-inscribes images into philosophy recovering a Platonic legacy. He re-inscribes them even if with certain

specification, preserving the distinction between poet and thinker. After this re-inscription, we encounter Plato in the other beginning in his imagination.^{ccviii}

PART FOUR: Sketching The Enactment of *Contributions*

Sixth Study: Inceptual Thinking as the Enactment of Intimation, The Pass, Leap and Grounding.^{ccix}

A) Intimation (Anklang), through the Forgottenness of Be-ing, out of the Abandonment of Being

“Intimation of the essencing of be-ing [der Wesung des Seyns]
out of the abandonment of being
through the distressing withdrawing lack [nötigende Not]
of the forgottenness of be-ing.”^{cccX}

Inceptual thinking is constituted in awareness of the need that compels thought, but grows out of the exhaustion of the possibilities of thinking in the history of Platonism and metaphysics. In intimation Heidegger is particularly interested in bringing to the fore and making questionable the necessity and compelling force that sustains Platonism and metaphysics since their beginning and to re-engage this necessity of thinking in the passing of Platonism.

What is at stake in Heidegger’s thinking in intimation is the possibility of engaging a dimension of the appearing of beings at the end of metaphysics that opens up thought to creatively ground beings in their withdrawing appearing. In intimation we join the compelling necessity of be-ing out of the experience of the exhaustion of Platonism. The intimation is of the essencing of be-ing out of two moments in the appearing of beings in metaphysics that

Heidegger identifies as 1) abandonment of being [Seinsverlassenheit] and 2) forgottenness of be-ing [Seinsvergessenheit].

Heidegger's attempt in intimation is to bring forth the withdrawing of be-ing as a necessity or distress. Heidegger's task is to develop insight into the appearing of beings in the exhaustion of Platonism, so that attentiveness to this appearing attunes us to the necessity of be-ing. He calls the appearing of beings that we are concerned with here 'abandonment of being.' Intimation comes out of [aus] this abandonment but through [durch] the forgottenness of be-ing. Most of the jointure 'Intimation' in *Contributions* is a study of the abandonment of be-ing.

i) *Abandonment of Being [Seinsverlassenheit]*

Heidegger's analysis of the abandonment of being is a deep analysis of the experience configured in the exhaustion of Platonism, the kind of experience that we encountered earlier as 'worldview.'^{ccxi} This time, however, Heidegger looks at this same configuration of experience, but with a different orientation with attentiveness to whether in this mode of experience there are traces of the necessity of be-ing. He begins with;

"How is this to be experienced? What is this abandonment? It is itself arisen... from machination [Machenschaft]."^{ccxii}

With the word 'Machenschaft' Heidegger points to an overriding force in the configuration of experience in metaphysics. Machen is simply 'to make something.' Heidegger notes, then, that experience can come to be constituted within the stance of making. But this stance is not something we choose, but is a response to the way beings appear to us, that is, that beings appear as made and makeable. How could we capture this mode of appearing? Heidegger notes:

"Machination and constant presence [beständige Anwesenheit]."^{ccxiii}

Beings appear as made or as makeable: this means, they always already stand-with us (constancy) and we encounter them always in such standing-with, which constitutes their mode of presence, which is their mode of being. Together with beings, we find ourselves always already standing-with, with other beings around us, extant like us. The difference between humans and other beings appears not as a difference in the ways of beings, is that humans subordinate other beings to their interests, that humans takes the standing-with of beings as a standing for them: within a horizon of makeability, we make beings into what we want them to be. Heidegger's point here is that even though the stance of machination presents humans as the origin and dominating force in this stance, this stance is first enabled by the mode of appearing of beings as constant presence. So constant presence does not refer to 'a being' but to a configuration of appearing, to the way meanings appear, to Being rather than beings.

Heidegger's intention here is to attend to the appearing of beings within machination and to develop a discourse that has access to this appearing rather than to the beings that appear in this mode of appearing. 'Constant presence' does not primarily refer to beings, but to the mode of their meaningful appearing. When beings appear within constant presence, that is, as makeable, our primary comportment toward them is one that Heidegger characterizes as "ποιήσις—τέχνη."^{ccxiv} This means that in the horizon of makeability beings give themselves to us by compelling us to present them in advance with stable meanings so that we can project them within the stability of our interests: the pre-given determination of the meanings of beings corresponds to the appearing of beings in constant presence, in machination. This mode of appearing yields, then, the experience configured by 'worldview'. In intimation Heidegger not only provides us with the analysis of the configuration of the appearing of beings that enables

worldview, but develops a way of thought in which we can begin to think be-ing out of the experience of worldview.

Heidegger's task here is very difficult, and he constantly warns us against using empty words rather than undergoing the thinking path that he is opening up. The difficulty here lies in that even though pointing to constant presence allows us to think through machination beyond the appearing of specific beings, constant presence puts beings forth in a way that they appear as made, that is as seen in advance, as having been always already there. In other words, constant presence enables beings to appear covering over the event of their appearing, they are always there as extant as pre-determined projects. In machination beings appear as if by themselves, as subject to our whims and interests, as dislocated from events of appearing that exceed them in their appearing: they do not appear in the openness of meanings but rather as placeholders for pre-determined meanings that 'we' impose on them. In other words, beings are all that is, they do not appear as much as they simply stand by. Machination is the most difficult obstacle to thinking in the crossing. This simply standing by of beings in machination is the abandonment of beings by being. Heidegger says of this abandonment:

“In this epoch nothing is any longer impossible and inaccessible. Everything is ‘made’ and ‘can be made’ if one only masters the ‘will’ for it. But, that “this” will is precisely what has already placed and in advance reduced what might be possible and above all necessary-this is already mistaken ahead of time and left outside any questioning. For this will, which makes everything, has already subscribed to machination, that interpretation of beings as representable and represented. In one respect, representable means “accessible to intention and calculation”; In another respect it means “advanceable through production and execution.” But thought in a fundamental manner, all of this

means, that beings as such are representable, and that only the representable is. For machination, what apparently offers resistance and a limit to machination is only the material for further elaboration and the impulse for progress and an occasion for extension and enlargement.^{»CCXV}

There is no direct experience of this abandonment. It rather manifests itself through the constitution of a 'will.' The experience of this will involves the absence of impossibility and inaccessibility. By this Heidegger does not mean that we do not consider certain things to be 'impossible.' He means, rather, that the impossible is different from the possible only with respect to degree, that the impossible is a variation on the possible, it is the possible except not yet calculated properly. For Heidegger, that impossibility is understood from possibility means that possibility is the experience of the absence of limits. Everything is possible for the will, the will can posit everything in advance, the totality of beings can be willed to be subordinate to our interests. In the absence of limits, limitation is not a moment in the appearing of the possible, so that the possible is not an appearing of limit, it is what is posited in advance but not yet accomplished. We do not experience the possible as possible, we only experience modes of 'actuality.' This means that beings are always already actual, standing by and our taking them up is only a representation of their actuality which appears as something to be calculated, intended, executed, produced—all modalities of appearing that are determined in advance by the stance of machination and representability. Our will, which is our basic comportment to beings in machination, is itself uprooted from the originary appearing of beings. We live in abstraction from ὀλιγόθεια. Where are the resources to turn to be-ing—even to think constant presence? A thinking enactment that would reveal our imprisonment in machination and challenge the infinite experience of our will? The complete lack of resources to think is the forgottenness of be-ing.

In machination limits appear as ‘not yet transgressed,’ they appear as set in advance, anticipated, assimilated within the projects of representations. In other words, lack of determination or ambiguity in meaning are taken up as external to the actuality of beings which we represent. In machination, a will is constituted that is blind to the involvement of limits and lack of determination with the truth of be-ing, it is not oriented to appearing but to beings. Thus Heidegger says: “Abandonment of beings by being means that be-ing has withdrawn from beings.”^{ccxvi} The difficulty in writing ‘intimation’ for Heidegger is clear: in this section he wants to turn our attention to the truth of be-ing as a dimension in the appearing of beings. At the same time, he unfolds how thinking is in machination constituted so as not to turn to engaged the truth of be-ing. In intimation Heidegger is at the moment in *Contributions* in which his words are most empty, as if they had no ears to listen to them, without sound [Anklang]. The danger is clear: we might simply follow ‘what’ Heidegger says in intimations, represent it to ourselves as some kind of teaching, take Heidegger to be writing a ‘critique’ of our epoch. But all of this would mean precisely to fall into machination. In intimations, Heidegger’s words are not only most empty, but also are most in danger to implement machination. We are stuck, thoughtless. We could say that Heidegger fails in intimation, he does not give us resources to think in the liberating awareness of constant presence. And we cannot imitate him because that would be machinational. At the same time, Heidegger brings us to the moment of this failure, of this limit and impossibility. This failure does not give us anything, but it is a failure that cannot be understood within machination because it is a failure that reveals to thought the limits of the machinational stance as such. The failure of intimation is the power of its thinking enactment, it is a provocation to think beyond machination, to take the limit of machination as a possibility that cannot be planned in advance.

‘Being stuck,’ having no way out, is not something accidental to thought, but could be the intimation of a compelling necessity to think. But this thought could not be machinational because the resistance here, the impossibility that arises in this intimation, is not one to be ‘overcome’ but one that invigorates thinking throughout. There is no saving guiding idea that will solve this impossibility, there is nothing to think ‘about’ but there is still a thought to be enacted, a moment of thought that happens in the impossibility of machinational thought. Far from being a critique of our epoch, intimations is the enactment of thought at this limit. Only through this enactment of thinking, can we experience the abandonment of being, since we are open up to thinking and to beings in their appearing in a decisive moment in which being does not give itself as guiding option, as something pre-given that we represent—machination has no mastery at this limit. But in this passing of machination, beings in their appearing become most questionable, we turn to appearing and we find it as withdrawn—can we think this withdrawal? Can we remain in the attunements of shock that belong to intimations? Or do we remain enchanted by machinational beings, with a deep sense of empowerment in the promise of an infinite will?^{ccxvii}

Having run out of resources, attuned to the impossibility of thinking, we can join another thinking enactment, one that re-enacts the beginning of Platonism in awareness of its end.

B) The Pass [Das Zuspiel].

In intimation Heidegger works out the specificity of the attunement of inceptual thinking as situated at the end of Platonism and metaphysics, and as engaged with an impossibility in thinking that elicits shock. Intimation brings forth in inceptual thinking the possibility of a distant hint of the truth of be-ing, but it does not specify the kind of thinking enactment that

belongs to inceptual thinking, in particular in the sense in which inceptual thinking is a transformative re-enactment of the first beginning. At the beginning of ‘The Pass’ Heidegger writes:

“[The Pass is]...the encounter with the necessity of the other beginning out of the originary positioning of the first beginning.

The guiding attunement: delight in alternately surpassing the beginnings in questioning. Here belongs everything about the differentiation between the guiding question and the grounding question; responding to the guiding-question and actually unfolding it; the crossing to the grounding-question (Being and Time)

All lectures about the “History” of philosophy. The decision about all ‘ontology’.”^{ccxviii}

The way in which inceptual thinking is a re-enactment of the first beginning is as a ‘pass’ [Zuspiel]. Heidegger refers here to a pass in soccer, for example, in which a player enables another player through a pass. In terms of the quote above, a pass out of the originary positioning of the first beginning enables—or ‘passes’—an encounter with the necessity of the other beginning. The use of the word pass here brings forth the complexity of the relation between the beginnings. It is not the case that the position of the first beginning is set in advance, ‘before’ the pass is made. In fact, like in soccer, the pass responds to that to which it passes, the positioning of the ‘passer’ is determined by the one who receives the ‘pass.’ The originary positioning of the first beginning only appears as such because the other beginning is already in play. At the same time, the other beginning is not set in advance as a telos of the first beginning. It, rather, first comes to its own when enabled by the pass coming from the first beginning—only this pass reveals the possibilities that belong to the other beginning. Just like in soccer, the pass names a moment of mutual enablement in which any order or linearity is destabilized, and in which there

is a moment of determination that cannot be reduced to either the passer or the receiver, but a determination that happens in the very eventuation of the pass, and that happens as an opening of possibilities, that is, as inclusive of openness of determination.

The openness of determination in the pass sheds light on the guiding attunement operative here. In ‘intimation,’ the end of Platonism an metaphysics attunes us through shock and deep awe at the impossibility of thinking. In this impossibility there is no way out. The pass responds to the attunement of intimation by showing a ‘way through,’ by engaging the impossibility of intimation and revealing it as possibility for thought. ‘The pass’ raises thought to a different level of attunement, it reveals to thinking that this impossibility can be engaged through a re-enactment of its originary eventuation, and that through this re-enactment a path for thinking is opened up not as a τέλος for thought but as a necessity that claims thought from its own past and that surpasses it beyond its first beginning. This surpassing is not something that thinking ‘wills’ at all. It takes over thinking as a sense of delight [Lust]. The delight here takes over thinking in the moment in which thought let’s go of the necessity that has taken it to the point of impossibility, and in which it discovers another destiny. This is the moment in which the ‘pass’ reveals itself as a ‘surpassing,’ that is, as a enabling necessity that surpasses the restrictions for thought set up in the first beginning.

To join the surpassing movement of the pass is to release oneself from the necessity of the first beginning by owning it in its first originary positioning. In this surpassing enactment of thought, the first beginning is revealed as determined by the guiding question ‘what is x?’ that is inaugurated in the Platonic dialogues, and the impossibility of thought at the end of Platonism is the exhaustion of this question as sustained by the appearing of beings as presence. In ‘the Pass’ the crossing from the guiding question to the grounding question is enacted by turning the

impossibility of thinking revealed in intimation into a ‘passing’ event that enables an engagement with the withdrawal of be-ing that allows for the necessity of the guiding question in first place, and which counters it. The surpassing of beginnings in the pass is this mutual illumination of the first and other beginning.

Heidegger studies ‘the pass’ in two ways. First, he describes the way of the thinking enactment of the pass. Second, he lays out the pivotal moments of interpretation of the first beginning that need to be re-enacted, so that he puts into the context of ‘the pass’ all of his lectures in the history of philosophy. I will unfold these two moments in ‘the Pass’ and show in what way they belong to one another by constituting a single thinking enactment.

i) Sketching the Pass

I will follow Heidegger in his attempt to sketch out the kind of movements of thought that characterize inceptual thinking in ‘the pass.’ The first step here is to shed light into ‘the pass’ as a mode of questioning:

“The first beginning’s coming originally into its own (and that means into its history) means gaining a foothold in the other beginning. This is accomplished in crossing from the guiding question (what is a being? The question of beingness, Being) to the grounding-question: What is the truth of be-ing? (Being and be-ing are the same and yet fundamentally [grundverschieden] different.)”^{ccxix}

In the pass, thinking engages the interplay between beginnings for thinking (the first and other beginnings) in which the first beginning only appears as the first by being already challenged, enabled and surpassed by the other beginning. This surpassing in which the first beginning appears as enabled by the other beginning coincides with a transformative enactment of thinking.

In the Pass, the impossibility of thinking enacted in intimation challenges the first beginning and sets it into play with the other beginning. Heidegger understands this enactment as the crossing between the guiding question and the grounding question. At first this crossing seems to be a matter of changing ‘what’ is asked about, the theme of the question. The difference between ‘what is a being’ and ‘what is the truth of be-ing’ seems to be a matter of defining ‘being’ and ‘truth of be-ing,’ and then distinguishing them. This is, however, not the task at hand. The complexity of the crossing lies in that the turn from asking about a being to asking about the truth of be-ing involves a transformation of the questioning stance that is a transformation of thinking in thinking. I will sketch this transformation following Heidegger’s words above:

- a) The guiding question is ‘what is a being?’ By this question Heidegger understands the question of delimiting the meaning of a being so that we understand what something is. This is the traditionally platonic question: ‘what is courage?’, ‘what is knowledge?’, ‘what is justice?’, etc. Heidegger’s insight here is to understand that the structure of this question betrays a particular mode of engaging beings in their appearing. One would be tempted to say that Heidegger is interested in the ‘form’ of the question, rather than the ‘content.’ This is precisely not the case. The abstract stance that would distinguish between ‘form’ and ‘content’ is precisely that of the guiding question. This is clear from Heidegger’s own words above: the guiding question is the question of beingness. This question asks what a being is in order to subordinate a being under a pre-given ‘general’ or ‘universal’ delimitation of meaning that includes the being—it is a matter of categorization. Here belongs the distinction between general/particular, and that of abstraction which enables the distinction between ‘form’ and ‘content.’ It also determines thought as different from

what it thinks, as abstract, as concerned with universals and their determination.

Beingness betrays not only an orientation in thinking but also a way in which thinking occurs, a way in which it is compelled by be-ing—of course, this is an insight that exceeds the stance of the guiding question and that of machination.

- b) Within the guiding question ‘Being’ can be a problematic word. The guiding question does not address itself directly to Being, it asks about the Being of a being, or about its meaning. When the guiding question addresses itself to Being, then it runs into an aporia: there is not pre-given determination of ‘Being’ because ‘Being’ as ‘beingness’ stands for the appearing of beings within pre-given general determinations. When the guiding question asks about Being or the ‘meaning of Being’, as in *Being and Time*, it is disruptive because it is forced to turn to how beings appear in their Being and about the grounds of this appearing, and this means that is forced to inquire about the engagement of thought and Being outside of the delimitations set up for them within the guiding question. Thinking is not anymore an abstraction, or formal, or disengaged from that about which it asks. And Being is not beingness but the appearing of beings that enables the stance of the guiding question. Being, then, can become for the guiding question an enactment of it that transforms it from the ground up.
- c) This transformative enactment of the guiding question occurs as the setting up of a new questioning stance, one that we find as being already at play when we ask the question of the meaning of Being from within the guiding question. This new questioning stance is oriented not toward beingness but toward Being insofar as it is the open site from which beings first appear to be meaningfully taken up, insofar as it

inquires about the originary belonging between being and thinking in the mutual grounding of this space that Heidegger calls Da-sein, and that eventuates as Enowning (Ereignis). Heidegger marks the difference between the guiding-question and the grounding question by saying that the grounding question is about the truth of be-ing [Seyn] rather than Being [Sein]. At the same time, he emphasizes the crossing into the grounding question from within the guiding question by saying that Being and be-ing are the same, yet fundamentally different.

We have sketched above the movement of the pass in terms of the crossing between the guiding question and the grounding question. We need to understand exactly how this crossing corresponds to the pass as the interplay of beginnings that we discussed in the previous section, especially in terms of how this crossing occurs as the surpassing of the first and other beginnings. Heidegger writes:

“When the question of beings as such, the inquiry into beingness, occurs, there is in that occurrence a definite opening up of beings as such, so that man thereby receives his essential determination, which stems from this opening (*homo animal rationale*). But what opens up this opening of beings to beingness and thus to be-ing? There is a need for a history and that means for a beginning and its derivations and advancements, in order to allow for the experience (for the beginners who question) that refusal belongs to the essencing of be-ing.”^{ccxx}

Heidegger’s writing here is enabled already by the other beginning. He perceives that even in the inquiry into beingness, when we search for the ‘what’ of a being, there is a sense in which beings appear as if for the ‘first time,’ that they betray an uniqueness in their appearing, in the way in which they appear all of a sudden with meaning. Heidegger wants to hold on to this sudden

meaningful appearing of a being that irrupts even in thought as fore-grasping, as setting of meaning in advance. This sudden appearing of beings with meaning is what Plato captures in ἀνάμνησις: it is a recollecting as fore-grasping but it is also a unique appearing (we need only to recall the amazement of the slave boy when he finally understood the truth of the geometrical construction in Meno). Heidegger now wants to hold on to this unique event of appearing within thinking in the guiding question, which he calls a ‘definite opening up of beings as such.’ Heidegger wants to hold at bay the compelling necessity to subsume this event of appearing as a moment of ‘categorization’ and remain within the uniqueness of this event. Thus he asks: ‘what opens up this openness of beings to beingness and to be-ing?’ With this question Heidegger points to ambivalence at play in this moment of appearing, a kind of freedom in which both the stance of beingness and the engagement with be-ing are given to us as compelling options. How do we hold on to this freedom, to this decisive moment, to these options? That is, how do we remain attentive to be-ing and at the same time twist ourselves free from the compelling necessity to remain subsumed under the structure of the guiding question?

Heidegger’s answer here is definite: only a historical study of the first beginning as a beginning, that is, in its compelling necessity yields an understanding of the range and depth of that necessity that compels us not to hold on to the openness of the appearing of beings in their meanings and to, instead, subsume them in thinking as fore-grasping. In this historical study the first beginning appears as first only because we have already surpassed it and can question it from a stance that is not that of the guiding question. In this historical study of the first beginning in particular we learn to let the appearing of beings in its excess to the force of the subordination of it under pre-given universals, and we learn that appearing as such cannot be fore-grasped (that is, cannot be grounded in advance) and that this refusal can itself compel a different mode of

thinking, one that questions the truth of be-ing. The crossing from the guiding question to the grounding question, the leap into the originary openness of the appearing of beings, involves, then, the development of historical awareness that at once sets up the first beginning as beginning and surpasses it.

The enactment of thinking in the Pass happens when the first Beginning is released from τέχνη. In other words, the constraint at the core of machination loses its force when it is thought through as passing at the very moment when it is established as τέχνη. The Pass is the enactment that releases thinking to an other necessity out of its history, which frees it to the unset history of be-ing. This freedom does not present anything, but simply holds itself in the delight in having surpassed the first Beginning.

ii) Passing over the first beginning.

The delight of the Pass attunes us, for example, when Heidegger gives an account of the empowerment of τέχνη in the first beginning.^{ccxxi} Here Heidegger shows that τέχνη: "...must retreat from beings...must set itself before them and put them forth." Τέχνη in the first beginning occurs with a necessity that is forced upon us by the very inceptive event of be-ing: "...φύσις indeed first makes τέχνη experienceable." The truth of be-ing, ἀλήθεια, withdraws with the withdrawal of φύσις and we are abandoned within the frame of τέχνη.

We hear these words of the first Beginning with delight because they are surpassed when they are uttered. The delight comes because the account of the first Beginning draws us into it in order to surpass it. In the *Theaetetus*, for example, where this very empowerment of τέχνη is presented to us, we find a release from this empowerment in the enactment of the dialogue. Φύσις indeed recedes, τέχνη comes to the fore, but then τέχνη itself recedes, passes, and we are

given back to ᾠλήθεια. Since we are given back to it, we engage it with the light in a moment in which we surpass Platonism while thinking with Plato. Thrown back to ᾠλήθεια, we now engage it with necessity. We shelter its openness and turn to ourselves as Da-sein.

“The Pass” is full of such provocations of accounts of the first Beginning, which cannot be taken as “absolute,” as Heidegger’s last word on the history of philosophy. These provocations, rather, draw us in so that we experience the delight of our freedom from the necessity that they present, they seduce us into the enactment of the crossing.

C) Leap [Der Sprung]

The leap is the moment in the crossing that:

“...abandons and throws aside everything familiar and expects nothing immediately from beings. Rather it releases the belongingness to be-ing in its full essencing as enowning.”^{ccxxii}

The leap enacts the decision between the first and the other beginning, a decision prepared in the freedom gained by ‘the Pass’ in inceptual thinking. The leap is the most daring moment in thinking because it responds to the abandonment of Being^{ccxxiii} by not holding fast to beings but by letting them withdraw, by abandoning them. The leap expects nothing from beings immediately—it joins the draw toward be-ing in its withdrawing. The leap leaps into belongingness to be-ing out of the abandonment of being. The leap is, then, the leap into the grounding of Da-sein. In Heidegger’s words:

“The Leap is to dare an initial foray into the domain of being-history.”^{ccxxiv}

In its resistance to hold on to beings, to ground them by continuing to subsume them into technical projects, the leap appears as most reckless:

“The Leap appears in a way that it seems to be most reckless [Rücksichtslosesten] but it is, rather, attuned by awe, in which the will of reservedness exceeds itself into abiding and sustaining [Ausstehens] into the most distant nearness of the hesitating refusal.”^{ccxxv}

The word ‘most reckless’ (Rücksichtslosesten) literally means ‘not looking back.’ The leap appears this way because it does not consider anything familiar in its leaping—it is reckless in its disregard to beings in their stable meaningful appearing that metaphysics and Platonism. From the stance of the other beginning, however, the leap is not reckless but, rather, most disciplined: it holds fast to the rigor in thinking that does not simply join the compelling necessity of the first beginning. The Leap is attuned by awe, it is that moment of attunement that engages the wonder of the first beginning by resisting its dispersal into beings within the view of the guiding question, it is the preserving of wonder in its inceptive form of openness to beings in their appearing. At the same time, in its discipline, the leap stands in--or inabides--and stands out--or sustains in its comportment of joining be-ing in its lack of stable ground and determination, as the withdrawal of meaning that first opens up the possibility of the meaningful appearing of beings. “Standing in and out” is the mode in which the leap remains within the withdrawal of be-ing and at the same time refuses simply to give a stable ground to this withdrawal—it joins the refusal of be-ing.

i) Being as ‘υπόθετον’^{ccxxvi}

From within the leap, the determination of Being as ‘υπόθετον in the first beginning becomes most thought provoking. The ‘υπόθετον within the guiding question allows for a mode of leaping, that is for a leaping within production that is guided-in-advance by Being, seeking the understandability of beings. In this leaping there is no questioning of the hypothesizing moment

of thinking: even non-beings are those beings which do not correspond with their pre-determined meaning, they fail only in that they do not correspond with the hypothesized Being. Non-being, then, posits no challenge to the configuration of appearing on the basis of the *υποθετον*. There is always a basis from which to leap.

The Leap in inceptual thinking, on the other hand, leaps precisely in the awareness of the abandonment of being, that is, in the loss of Being as that from which to understand the meaningful appearing of a being. In this abandonment the originary sense of the *‘υπόθετον* is lost, and meaning recedes overtaken by beings only as quantifiably standing by. For inceptual thinking, the abandonment of being is the loss of the whole configuration of appearing of beings that relies on the *‘υπόθετον*. The Leap, then, within this loss, both cannot rely on Being as *‘υπόθετον* and has an experience of non-being that is not subsumed within the guiding question, but as a withdrawing of the configuration of Being that sustains the guiding question, In the loss of the *‘υπόθετον* the leap turns to a different sense of non-being, beyond Platonism. Hence, it must leave behind everything familiar.

ii) Non-being^{ccxxvii}

“Seen from the perspective of beings, be-ing is not a being: it is the not-being and thus, following the ordinary concept, the nothing.”^{ccxxviii}

Within the guiding question and the fore-grasping of beingness, what is not ‘a being,’ what fails to correspond to a determination of beingness, is not ‘a being’—that is, is ‘non-being’ or ‘nothing.’ The frame of the guiding question does not allow for a ‘non-being’ in any other way than a falling short of beingness, as a non-correspondence to beingness. Be-ing, the dimension of appearing as withdrawal of determination that first allows for the appearing of ‘a being’, this

withdrawing movement in appearing that first allows for any enclosure or marking out of meaning, is also not a being. But its ‘no’ character is not of the same kind of that of the non-beings within the stance of the guiding question. Metaphysics and Platonism, thus, cannot think the non-being of be-ing. Heidegger asks:

“And is it even above all by virtue of this not-character [of be-ing] itself that the ‘nothing’ is full of that allotting ‘power’ whose steadfastness gives rise to all ‘creating’ ...?”^{ccxxix}

For the leap, be-ing as non-being is not a falling short of beingness, but the first compelling draw in which humans are drawn toward meaning, toward engaging the meaningful appearing of beings through ‘creating.’ Creating here is distinguished from the production of machination that is structured by the fore-grasping of beingness. Creating is a more originary experience of ποιήσις in which we are not drawn toward producing a being as much as we are drawn toward grounding the appearing of meaning in a being. This draw is not the will of a ‘subject’ toward following a ‘plan’ set in advance. It is, rather, the most basic occurrence of humans in which they become the ‘there’ in which beings appear, in which they leap into Da-sein.

The leap in this sense coincides with the enactment of *Theaetetus*. In this enactment, we moved from non-being as that which falls short of Being as presence, to non-being as marking the ungrounded origin of the appearing of beings. In this transformation of our comportment to non-being, the *Theaetetus* enacts the moment of “creation” that belongs to the leap: creation as the inceptive event of meaning in the voice, in the coming to speak.

iii) Affirmative thinking

For inceptual thinking, non-being enables the leap by revealing the possibility of an affirmation of thought beyond the reliance on Being as hypothetical ground. Heidegger perceives that by inquiring into non-being inceptual thinking attains:

“...an originality in affirming power which essentially goes beyond all optimistic manipulation of power and all programmatic heroism in order to be strong enough to experience the nihilating in be-ing and its truth as the most sheltered gift.”^{ccxxx}

The affirmation of thought and its empowerment happens for inceptual thinking beyond the frame of the guiding question, as an experience in which the withdrawal of be-ing from foregrounding thought shelters the gift of being compelled to engage the event of appearing as the occurring of determination out of non-determination, as un-concealment, as ἀλήθεια. Inceptual thinking affirms concealment as necessary for the first marking out of beings in their meanings and as the dis-closure of the determination that opens up the spacing for the appearing of beings, the ‘Da.’

iv) The enactment of the Leap as the decision for the other beginning out of the Pass

The affirmative power of the leap joins in inceptual thinking the moment of decision revealed in ‘the pass’, the decision between the first and the other beginning:

“...be-ing holds sway as what has the character of a not...Holding sway in terms of the not, it [be-ing] makes possible and enforces otherness at the same time...The uniqueness of the not that belongs to be-ing and thereby the uniqueness of the other follows from the uniqueness of be-ing...the one and the other enforce for themselves the either-or as primary.”^{ccxxxi}

With these words, Heidegger brings to the fore the core of ‘the leap’ as an enactment in *Contributions*: it provokes the enactment of the leap by engaging the enactment of inceptual thinking. Up to this point we have seen the central role of non-being for the leap and how non-being can reveal to the leap a source of affirmation and empowerment for creation that belongs to the ‘other beginning.’ Now, Heidegger shows that inquiring into non-being is not a ‘thematic’ inquiry as much as it is a transformative enactment of thinking that joins the enactment of the pass. In the enactment of the pass the decision between the first and the other beginning gives itself to us with delight. In the enactment of the leap, the character of either-or that belongs to this decision owns us insofar as inquiry into non-being enforces a compelling sense of otherness. That is, the leap by thinking non-being finds at the same time the compelling force of the other beginning as an other that calls us from beyond metaphysics. To put it somewhat simply, what the leap attempts to think (non-being) resonates with the decisive character of the thinking enactment of the leap as the crossing from the first to the other beginning. The leap does not think about ‘non-being,’ but it enacts it as the fulfillment of the decision in the crossing.

By thinking non-being beyond metaphysics, inceptual thinking finds itself enacting the decision for the other beginning—of throwing open the site or ‘Da’ for the appearing of beings—not as a thematic moment of thought, but as an enactment in which non-being is taken up as constitutive of thinking. Non-being determines inceptual thinking as thrown: there is no leaping from the ‘υπόθετον but, rather, the leap leaps out of an abyss (Abgrund), which is the ‘not’ that belongs to be-ing, the withdrawing but compelling movement of appearing. Thus in leaping inceptual thinking experiences itself as thrown while it throws open the ‘Da’. *The crucial moment in this thrown enactment is the blending of loss of ground for the leap with the withdrawal of be-ing as the necessary openness of determination that first marks out the*

possibility of any meaningful appearing of beings. In this enactment of thinking, inceptual thinking joins being in the sudden awareness that its lack of ground is appropriated or enowned by the withdrawal of be-ing.

v) *Cleft [Die Zerklüftung]*

The enactment of inceptual thinking occurs as ‘cleft.’ As thrown thrower, inceptual thinking cannot sustain any distance from being that would allow to set up be-ing as what is ‘representable.’ This is the case because the withdrawal of be-ing and the indeterminacy of the leap blend and resonate in a way that a compelling necessity draws thinking and being together as appropriated or enowned in the enactment of a ‘not’ that is outside the abstract ‘not’ as ‘falling short of beingness’ within metaphysics. The difference and belongingness between inceptual thinking and be-ing occurs as ‘cleft.’ ‘Cleft’ means here both setting apart and coming together at the same time, and inceptual thinking must remain within the cleft rather than taking up the stance of representative distance with respect to be-ing. Heidegger says of the cleft:

“The cleft is the unfolding-remaining-in-itself of the intimacy [Innigkeit] of Be-ing, insofar as we “experience” it as the refusal and turning-in-refusal.”^{ccxxxii}

As thrown thrower, inceptual thinking in the leap already finds itself within the compelling force of be-ing. The rigor of the leap as this enactment is to remain in the intimacy of be-ing while remaining steadfast in its difference from be-ing. This remaining steadfast occurs as an experience (as a being with beings) in which thought is not oriented toward a being and its grounding in beingness, but, rather, toward the withdrawing marking out of meanings around a being in its very appearing. This remaining steadfast, then, is the discipline of creating in which the cleft is enacted and carried out, as in the creating of an artwork. In the leap thinking enjoins

be-ing by opening the open site for creation and by abiding in the setting apart and coming together of the cleft.

vi) The erotic enactment of the Leap

Be-ing is the withdrawing of meaning that occurs in the origination of the appearing of beings beyond τέχνη. It is non-being as it is a play in *Theaetetus*. The Leap in the ‘cleft’ holds itself in reserve as sheltering this withdrawing movement. One can trace the word ‘leap’ (Sprung) in Heidegger’s thought back to *Being and Time*; particularly in the account of friendship. In friendship we leap into Da-sein by not telling a friend what to do (that would be setting an idea in advance for them) but by keeping certain reserve with respect for our friend. This reserve opens the Da from which our friends understand themselves, it preserves the withdrawing horizon for this understanding. In such events of friendship that occur in dialogue, we can say that we are enowned by the ‘cleft.’

In the *Phaedrus* when the beloved is sighted by the charioteer, the charioteer holds himself back. He gathers the horses in erotic tension and leaps back to himself as finding himself in friendship. The erotic enactment of the *Phaedrus* coincides in this sense, in the reserve of the charioteer, with the leap in which we preserve the withdrawal of be-ing in our care.

D) Grounding

Grounding is the longest fugue in *Contributions*. Rather than engaging in a close textual analysis of it, I will simply point to the enactment that characterizes it. This is clear from section 242.

In the Leap, we have encountered non-being as withdrawing from the operation of ground that Being provided in Platonism. Non-being appears then as an abyss (Abgrund) when seen from the perspective of τέχνη. In this sense, in the Leap we find the absence of ground, or “the staying away of ground.” But Heidegger writes:

“And what is ground? It is the self-concealing-receiving, because it is a sustaining – and this as towering-through of what is to be grounded. Ground is self-sheltering-concealing in sustaining that towers-through.”

Heidegger points out here that ground does not have to be thought of as Being as presence, as ‘υπόθετον. Rather, we can be given to recognize that the very withdrawing of the abyss is that which sets into play the appearing of beings, what we learned in reading *Theaetetus*. In Heidegger’s words this withdrawing may not ground as a basis grounds, but nevertheless “towers-through.” What is the character of this “towering-through?” Heidegger writes:

“Abyss^{ccxxxiii}, staying-away, as ground in self-sheltering-concealing, it is a self-sheltering-concealing in the manner of not-granting the ground. However, not-granting is not nothing but rather an outstanding originary manner of letting *be* unfulfilled, of letting *be* empty – thus an outstanding manner of opening.”

Heidegger finds that the abyss is not-granting, but in this not-granting it is also a letting be of the appearing of beings inceptively, that is, beyond τέχνη. This letting be is precisely what we found in Socrates’ laughter as the recognition of an opening that cannot be reduced to closure but that is a stake in the appearing of beings. Socrates’ laughter enacts the abyss and finds in it openness for events of be-ing. Socrates’ laughter then recognizes the towering-through of the abyss but at the same time engages it as the clearing in which beings are inceptively given to be. In this laughter, Socrates then is enraptured by a necessity that does not come from him, but comes from

be-ing. He gives himself to the necessity in which he is called upon to come to speak. In this coming to speak, we experience the transformation of the abyss into an ur-ground – that is a ground in which we are engaged in the inceptive appearing of beings. In this moment of coming to speak we ground Da-sein and we are grounded by it. The enactment of grounding in *Contributions* is the enactment of the shift from abyss to ur-ground.

Isn't this enactment precisely what Socrates leaves behind for us as a tantalizing image of τέχνη: the image of the cave. Through this image, as we have seen, the absence of our nature is given to us as a ground from which to leap into philosophy. And this image shows that that which appears as an abyss to the stance of τέχνη is precisely that which allows us to overcome that stance in a twisting free that grounds itself. This is the power of images that belong to the crossing and in this image, the enactment of grounding can come to pass. We find here a grounding that is imaginative and we must recall, then, Heidegger's own words in *Contributions*:
“As thrown projecting-open-grounding, Da-sein is the highest actuality in the domain of imagination.”^{ccxxxiv}

That is, erotic imagination.

Endnotes

Introduction

- i. Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, 144. See also the text in the original German, *Beiträge zur Philosophie*.
- ii. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Vol. 1, The Will to Power as Art*, 194
- iii. In this sense, “Erotic Ontologies” correspond to that transition in thinking that Heidegger names ‘fundamental ontology’ in *Being and Time*.
- iv. See the opening quote by Heidegger.
- v. Heidegger presents this exhaustion in sections 107/108 of *Contributions*.
- vi. Eros is not a ‘theme’ that will be here investigated, but names the very character of thinking.
- vii. The word ‘enactment’ translates ‘Vollzug’ in *Contributions*. C.f. p. 4.
- viii. Which will be shown to be the draw of Er
- ix. C.f. *Contributions*, 4.
- x. Heidegger himself recognizes the relevance of Plato for the crossing in the ‘the Pass’ in *Contributions*, where a tacit distinction between Plato and Platonism is operative.
- xi. A parallel discussion to this one is John Sallis’ essay “Grounders of the Abyss” in *Platonic Legacies*. There Sallis, following Heidegger, calls for a re-appropriation of Plato’s ‘looks’—which have come to determine metaphysics: “And yet Heidegger insists that it is only in the crossing that an originary appropriation of metaphysics and of its history becomes possible...” (p. 85).
- xii. See Sallis’ use of this term in the essay “Grounders of the Abyss” in *Platonic Legacies*, p.84..
- xiii. The pertinent discussion here is the *Republic*, Bk. 10.
- xiv. The pertinent discussion is the ‘second sailing’ in *Phaedo*. In particular, we must pay attention to the way in which Socrates turns away from the physicists and towards λόγος, discovering λόγος in its power to hold the meaning of beings. The question will remain, however, whether this turn also enables a new understanding of φύσις.
- xv. See *Contributions*, section 209, for a fuller account of this lighting, as well as “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth.” The issue in this essay is precisely one of ‘lighting’: the sun shines upon beings illuminating them in stable meanings. The question is whether this means that in Plato there is only a discussion of ‘light’ in this sense, or whether there is also at play a sense of ‘clearing’ that speaks of openness of determination in the Being of beings. I will tackle this issue below, in my interpretation of the image of the cave.
- xvi. See section 97 of *Contributions*. In this section Heidegger traces the emergence of τέχνη, and how it involves a covering over of an originary sense of φύσις.
- xvii. Even modernity, and the truth as certainty that governs it, is, according to Heidegger, in the lineage of eidetic thinking.
- xviii. The pertinent reading here is the discussion of χώρα in *Timaeus*. At issue there is a ground of phenomenality, a ‘spacing,’ that disturbs the structure of setting the looks in advance (τέχνη).

-
- xix.** Un-concealment reflects the play between transgression/withdrawal.
xx. In German Heidegger opts for the old spelling of ‘Sein’: ‘Seyn.’
xxi. The pertinent readings here are Heidegger’s discussion of wonder in *Basic Questions of Philosophy* and section 5 of *Contributions*. Heidegger links the attunement of wonder with ‘having no-way-out.’
xxii. See *Contributions* 11-12
xxiii. In *Theaetetus*.

Part I

- xxiv.** Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy* 1.
xxv. The distinction between classical/classicism corresponds to that between ‘history’ and ‘historiography.’ Alejandro Vallega explains: “Geschichtliches [History] refers not to the measurable and factual time of objective presence and its historiography [Historie]. Rather, the word attempts to sound out the occurrence (Ereignis) of appearing as such, the essencing of be-ing as such [die Wesung des Seyns selbst].” (*Companion*, 52).
xxvi. Heidegger, *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art*, 128.
xxvii. *Das Zuspiel* 119.
xxviii. *NWPA*, 209.
xxix. John Sallis brings out this debt in *Platonic Legacies*: “What Nietzsche calls Platonism corresponds to what Heidegger calls the First Beginning, though Heidegger’s analysis goes well beyond any that Nietzsche ventured—except, in a very different register, in *The Birth of Tragedy*.” (p. 82)
xxx. *NWPA* 207-208.
xxxi. *Contributions* 3.
xxxii. *Beiträge zur Philosophie* 3.
xxxiii. Like “classicism.”
xxxiv. *Beiträge* 3.
xxxv. *Contributions* 3. *Italics mine*.
xxxvi. *Beiträge* 5.
xxxvii. The passing of the ontological frame that “*Erotic Ontologies*” names.
xxxviii. Charles Scott captures this very well: “This moment sets philosophy apart from itself—is like *Auseinandersetzung*—and as philosophy sets its course by canons, rules and laws, it is also moved by ‘something’ that sets it apart from itself—by an urgency that escapes the manner in which it sets itself and that is also within its own self-enactment.” (*Philosophy Today*, vol. 41, p. 162)
xxxix. *Beiträge* 37.
xl. *Contributions* 26)
xli. *Contributions* 29).
xlii. *Contributions* 29)
xliii. *Contributions* 30).
xliv. *Contributions* 30)

-
- xliv.** *Contributions* 30.
- xlvi.** *Contributions* 30.
- xlvii.** *Beiträge* 43.
- xlviiii.** See, for example, Drew Hyland's discussion of Heidegger in *Questioning Platonism*. In this discussion the way in which Heidegger engages Plato beyond the hypothetical force of τέχνη is missed.
- xliv.** note Heidegger's own treatment of education in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," and how his analysis undermines any stance of a "doctrine" [Lehre], and what are the interpretative possibilities of letting this analysis fall back upon Heidegger's essay.
- l.** "Philosophy as 'philosophy of a people,'" (*Beiträge* 43).
- li.** *Beiträge* 43.
- lii.** Heidegger finds this determination of 'whatness' in Plato. See Heidegger's *Sophist Lectures*.
- liiii.** *Contributions* 171.
- liv.** Walter Brogan expresses the difference between *Being and Time* and *Contributions*: "...it becomes evident that the meaning of Da-sein has dramatically shifted in comparison to Being and Time...modes of Da-sein are now shown as belonging co-primordially to be-ing and as occurring not only on the basis of Da-sein's being but in the interplay, the between."
(*Companion*, 176.)
- lv.** *Contributions*. 208.
- lvi.** *Contributions* 215.
- lvii.** *Contributions* 176-177.
- lviii.** *Contributions* 3.
- lix.** The translation of Wesung as essence is mine. I depart from the Maly/Emad translation: "essential sway."
- lx.** *Contributions* 31.
- lxi.** *Contributions* 32.
- lxii.** *Contributions* 32.
- lxiii.** *Contributions* 32.
- lxiv.** *Contributions* 32.
- lxv.** *Beiträge* 46.
- lxvi.** *Contributions* 32.
- lxvii.** *Contributions* 32.
- lxviii.** Be-ing-historical-thinking, philosophy and inceptual thinking are the same, and they articulate the enactment of the crossing.
- lxix.** *Contributions* 39.
- lxx.** *Contributions* 39.
- lxxi.** This is the event of φύσις
- lxxii.** *Contributions* 39.
- lxxiii.** *Contributions* 44.
- lxxiv.** *Contributions* 42.
- lxxv.** Veronique Foti brings out the distinction between thinking and poetry in Heidegger's thinking in this respect, and (in a path similar to mine) wants to show that art could engage the crossing: "The artwork...demands encounter, repudiating the neutralization that permits nothing to be encountered or genuinely seen. It shocks one into an awareness of the event character of manifestation, the Ereignis." (*Visions Invisibles* 89). The question here is

whether Foti might have gone to far in its repudiation of neutralization, and thus missed the task of thinking in its difference from art.

lxxvi. *Nietzsche Vol. 1: Will to Power as Art* (NWPA) 110.

lxxvii. *NWPA* 119.

lxxviii. *NWPA* 123.

lxxix. *NWPA* 115.

lxxx. *NWPA* 81.

lxxxii. *NWPA* 164.

lxxxiii. *NWPA* 165.

lxxxiiii. *NWPA* 167.

lxxxv. *NWPA* 181.

lxxxvi. *NWPA* 186.

lxxxvii. p. 192.

lxxxviii. *NWPA* 196.

lxxxix. See section 2 of the introduction above.

xc. *NWPA* 197.

xc. *NWPA* 198.

xc. *NWPA* 198.

Part II

xcii. Heidegger, *On the Essence of Truth*, 154-155.

xciii. Peter Warnek brings out the affinity between Socrates' and Phaedrus' Eros: "...the erotic madness of Socrates, an erotic madness that cannot be separated from an unyielding attachment or devotion to the disclosive power of speech." (*The Descent of Socrates*, p. 169)

xciv. *Theaetetus* 227a.

xcv. See the discussion of care in section C of part one.

xcvi. *Theaetetus* 211d-e.

xcvii. *Theaetetus* 227 b.

xcviii. *Theaetetus* 263a.

xcix. Here I am anticipating the discussion of agreement and disagreement at the end of this section.

c. *Theaetetus* 263a.

ci. I note here Peter Warnek's account of transgression as betrayal in friendship: "What is especially worth noting here is how the transmission or preservation of this truth, its very opening, demands both the friendship and the betrayal of the friend, the betrayal of the very friend who also grounds and grants that transmission and opening: as if the friend as friend is the very one who demands such betrayal..." (*The Descent of Socrates*, p.184). Friendship, then, opens up to possibilities that include even betrayal, friendship is not a matter of sharing the same opinions.

cii. *Theaetetus* 263b.

ciii. *Theaetetus* 241d-241e.

-
- civ.** *Theaetetus* 241e 3-5.
cv. *Theaetetus* 241e 6-7.
cvi. *Theaetetus* 241e 3-5.
cvii. *Theaetetus* 237a-b.
cviii. *Theaetetus* 242a-b.
cix. *Theaetetus* 242b-c.
cx. *Theaetetus* 242c-d.
cx. In the *Physics*, Aristotle calls the manifestation of δύναμις as δύνάμις, motion.
cxii. *Theaetetus* 237b-c.
cxiii. *Theaetetus* 237d-e.
cxiv. *Theaetetus* 238e-239a.
cxv. *Theaetetus* 239e-240a.
cxvi. *Theaetetus* 241a-241b.
cxvii. *Theaetetus* 263 e.
cxviii. Peter Warnek points out the way rhetoric is blind—tragically so—to the deep self-concealment at the basis of communal life: “Rhetoric can be said to live only in this tragic necessity, that a basic ignorance defines human community, that what is common to all the arts remains elusive because it must remain something that cannot be rendered transparent in any particular art.” (*Descent of Socrates*, 73)
cxix. *Theaetetus* 262b-c.
cxx. *Theaetetus* 259e-260a.
cxxi. *Theaetetus* 260c-d.
cxxii. *Theaetetus* 265d-e.
cxxiii. *Theaetetus* 265e-266a.
cxxiv. *Theaetetus* 244c-d.
cxxv. *Theaetetus* 245b-c.
cxxvi. *Theaetetus* 245c-d.
cxxvii. Peter Warnek brings the relevance of nature in the *Phaedrus*: “The dialogue can be read as it establishes, but also as it transgresses, the boundaries between the human and the natural or divine, as it both insists upon and undermines the rigor of those boundaries, as it thus puts into question the place of human life in nature: nature out of place in nature.” (*The Descent of Socrates*, 141).
cxxviii. *Theaetetus* 245d-e.
cxxix. *Theaetetus* 246a, my translation.
cxx. *Theaetetus* 246b-c.
cxxxi. *Ibid.* p. 91.
cxxxi. *Theaetetus* 250e.
cxxxi. *Theaetetus* 263b-c.
cxxxi. Forthcoming in *Epoché*.
cxxxi. Phaedo characterizes the mood of Socrates last conversation as follows: “...all who were present were pretty much in this condition, sometimes laughing, sometimes weeping...” (59 B 1-3). It goes without saying that any interpretation of the *Phaedo* must ask the question of: when during the conversation did they all laugh?
cxxxi. For the translations I use Plato: Complete Works; edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company, Indiana, 1997. (*Apology*, 36d-e)

-
- cxxxvii.** Plato, the *Symposium*, 221c-d.
- cxxxviii.** This portrait of philosophers makes Cebes laugh (cf. *Phaedo*, 62a-b).
- cxxxix.** Here I have in mind John Sallis' interpretation of comedy in *The Republic* in *Being and Logos*, for example. In this interpretation, comedy shows the limits of Socrates' technical presentation of politics.
- cxl.** Statues of Hermes
- cxli.** It is, of course, not only a challenge to the organization of cities in *The Republic*, but to the entirety of political philosophy which develops out of a limited—i.e. too serious—interpretation of that text.
- cxlii.** The passage in question is 454c-455a. See Sallis' discussion of this comedy in *Being and Logos*, p.378. (John Sallis, *Being and Logos*; Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1996).
- cxliii.** *Theaetetus* 218 c-d.
- cxliv.** *Theaetetus* 206d.
- cxlv.** Except, perhaps, for Socrates in his mockery.
- cxlvi.** *Theaetetus* 149a 1-5.
- cxlvii.** *Theaetetus* 149c, 3-5.
- cxlviii.** *Theaetetus* 190e-191.

Part III

- cxlix.** *Contributions to Philosophy* 258.
- cl.** The passing of knowledge at stake in the *Theaetetus* bears resemblance to the section "Consciousness" in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where the understanding passes into self-consciousness by investigating the necessity of its own development. In the *Theaetetus*, however, the starting point is very different than that of the *Phenomenology*, because this dialogue does not begin with the distinction in-itself/for-itself—and, in fact, shows the genesis of this distinction. These paths, then, are fundamentally different.
- cli.** *Theaetetus* 146e.
- clii.** *Theaetetus* 146e.
- cliii.** *Theaetetus* 146a.
- cliv.** *Theaetetus* 146a 1.
- clv.** *Theaetetus* 146d-e.
- clvi.** *Theaetetus* 145a.
- clvii.** *Theaetetus* 146e.
- clviii.** *Theaetetus* 146e.
- clix.** *Theaetetus* 146e-147a.
- clx.** See Jacob Klein's discussion of Platonic Mathematics in *Greek Mathematics and the Origin of Algebra*. In my reading of this text, Klein demonstrates that for Plato number names a way of engaging beings in the world, a kind of intentional structure.
- clxi.** *Theaetetus* 151e.
- clxii.** *Theaetetus* 151e.

-
- clxiii.** *Theaetetus* 152a.
clxiv. *Theaetetus* 152a.
clxv. *Theaetetus* cf. 152e.
clxvi. *Theaetetus* 152d-e.
clxvii. *Theaetetus* 154c.
clxviii. *Theaetetus* cf. 154b-c.
clxix. *Theaetetus* 155a.
clxx. *Theaetetus* 155a.
clxxi. *Theaetetus* 155b.
clxxii. *Theaetetus* 156a-158c.
clxxiii. This originary motion is not motion as such, but allows for other kinds of motion that will be discussed soon.
clxxiv. Here Plato anticipates an insight into the sensual roots of mathematical thinking that is re-discovered by Kant (see especially Kant's *Prolegomena*, the section "How is pure mathematics possible?") The opening of the distinction between sense and understanding becomes an issue for both Plato and Kant given their insight into the sensual roots of mathematics, they are both oriented to the problem of what Kant calls the "imagination." See also Sallis' *The Gathering of Reason*.
clxxv. To use the word 'beings' is difficult here and it attests to the fact that logos is must be already operative in sense.
clxxvi. *Theaetetus* 181c-e.
clxxvii. *Theaetetus* 184c-d.
clxxviii. *Theaetetus* 184d-e.
clxxix. *Theaetetus* 184e.
clxxx. *Theaetetus* 185a-c.
clxxxi. *Theaetetus* 185c-d.
clxxxii. *Theaetetus* 185e-186.
clxxxiii. *Theaetetus* 186a-b.
clxxxiv. *Theaetetus* 186b.
clxxxv. *Theaetetus* 187a.
clxxxvi. *Theaetetus* 187d-e.
clxxxvii. *Theaetetus* 188d.
clxxxviii. *Theaetetus* 189e-190a.
clxxxix. *Theaetetus* 191d.
cxc. *Theaetetus* 195e-196a.
cxci. *Theaetetus* 197c-d.
cxcii. *Theaetetus* 201b.
cxciii. *Theaetetus* 201b.
cxciiv. *Theaetetus* 202b-c.
cxcv. *Theaetetus* 203b-c.
cxcvi. *Theaetetus* 208c.
cxcvii. *Theaetetus* 209d-e.
cxcviii. *Theaetetus* 210d.

-
- ccix.** The double operation of the image of the cave is suggested in the joint ‘grounding’ in *Contributions*. This double operation might be the reason why for Heidegger this image must be engaged in the crossing.
- cc.** *Theaetetus* 514a.
- cci.** Compare this interpretation to Sallis’ in *Being and Logos*. I attempt to respond here to Sallis’ statement: “...there is a sense in which every man, even the philosopher, remains in the cave and continues to see the images on the wall of the cave...” (p. 449).
- ccii.** *Theaetetus* 514a 2-515a 3.
- cciii.** Heidegger engages the difference in light in his essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth.”
- cciv.** Here I depart from Heidegger’s overly paideic reading of the image.
- ccv.** *Theaetetus* 515, c-d.
- ccvi.** *Theaetetus* 516 e.
- ccvii.** *Contributions* 251
- ccviii.** I propose here a re-interpretation of Plato’s other images in this same sense, like those of the $\chi\acute{o}\rho\alpha$ in particular.

Part IV

- ccix.** I depart with the Emad/Maly translation here: ‘Anklang’ is ‘Intimation’ rather than ‘Echo’ and ‘Zuspiel’ is ‘The Pass’ rather than ‘Playing-forth.’
- ccx.** *Beiträge zur Philosophie* 107.
- ccxi.** See the interpretation of *Theaetetus* above to see in what sense worldview was already anticipated in ‘opinion.’
- ccxii.** *Beiträge* 107.
- ccxiii.** *Beiträge* 107.
- ccxiv.** These Greek words are used here in Plato’s determination of them. (*Contributions* 75.)
- ccxv.** *Contributions* 76.
- ccxvi.** *Contributions* 77.
- ccxvii.** This inability to speak takes us to the inceptive coming to speech worked out in *Theaetetus*.
- ccxviii.** *Beiträge* 170.
- ccxix.** *Contributions* 120.
- ccxx.** *Contributions* 123.
- ccxxi.** *Contributions* 97.
- ccxxii.** *Beiträge* 227.
- ccxxiii.** C.f. intimation.
- ccxxiv.** *Contributions* 161.
- ccxxv.** *Beiträge* 227.
- ccxxvi.** We find this determination of Being in Socrates’ second sailing in *Phaedo*.
- ccxxvii.** We must note that the issue of non-being is fundamental for the preparatory work to *Being and Time*, namely, the *Plato’s Sophist*.
- ccxxviii.** *Contributions* 173.
- ccxxix.** *Contributions* 174.

ccxxx. *Contributions* 188.

ccxxxi. *Contributions* 189.

ccxxxii. *Beiträge* 244.

ccxxxiii. I depart here from the Maly/Emad translation ‘Ab-ground.’

ccxxxiv. *Contributions* section 192.

Bibliography

Heidegger's German Texts

Heidegger, Martin. "Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache: zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden." *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Verlag Gunther Neske Pfullingen, 1959.

---. "Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)." *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 65. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989.

---. "Beisinnung." *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 66. Frankfurt am main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997.

---. *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (1935-1936). Stuttgart: Reclam, 1960.

---. *Die Frage nach dem Ding*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1962.

---. "Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit." *Gesamtausgabe* Vol. 29/30. Frankfurt am Main: Vitorrio Klostermann, 1983.

---. "Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie." *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 24. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979.

---. *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. 1935. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953.

---. *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*. 1936-44. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1944.

---. *Gelassenheit*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1959.

---. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992.

---. "Hölderlin's Hymnen," "Germanien" und "Der Rhein." *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 24. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980.

---. *Holzwege*. 1936-46. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1950.

---. *Identität und Differenz*. Stuttgart: Günther Neske, 1957.

---. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. 1927. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951.

-
- . "Metaphysik und Nihilismus." *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 67. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999.
- . *Nietzsche*. Vol. I, 1936-39; Vol. II, 1939-46. Pfullingen: Neske, 1961.
- . "Nietzsche I." *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 6.1. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996.
- . *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*. 1942. Bern: Francke, 1947.
- . *Sein und Zeit*. 1927. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927.
- . *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1959.
- . *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. 1928. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1955.
- . *Vom Wessen der Wahrheit*. 1930-43. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1943.
- . *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. 1936-53. Pfullingen: Neske, 1961.
- . *Was heisst Denken?* 1951-52. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1954.
- . *Was ist das – die Philosophie?* 1955. Pfullingen: Neske, 1956.
- . *Was ist Metaphysik?* 1929. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1955.
- . *Wegmarken*. 1967. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967.
- . "Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit." *Gelassenheit*. Pfullingen: Verlag Gunther Neske, 1959.
- . *Zur Seinsfrage*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1956.

Translations of Heidegger

- Heidegger, Martin. "A Dialogue on Language." *On the Way to Language*. Translated by Peter Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
- . *Basic Concepts*. Translated by Gary E. Aylesworth. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.

-
- . "Building Dwelling Thinking." *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
- . *Being and Time*. Translated by Macquarrie and Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- . "Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking." *Discourse on Thinking*. Translated by John Anderson and Hans Freund. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
- . *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy*. Translated by David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1984.
- . *The Essence of Truth*. Translated by Ted Stadler. New York: Continuum Books, 2002.
- . *Four Seminars*. Translated by Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.
- . *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*. Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.
- . *Off the Beaten Track*. Edited by and Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- . "The Origin of a Work of Art." *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
- . "Parmenides." *Gesamtausgabe 54*. Translated by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- . *Pathmarks*. Edited by William McNeil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- . *Plato's Sophist*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- . *On Time and Being*. Edited by Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

---. *Vortrage Und Aufsatze: Early Greek Thinking*. Translated by David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

---. *What is Philosophy?* Translated by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde. London: Vision Press Limited, 1956.

Heidegger, Martin and Eugen Fink. *Heraclitus Seminar*. Translated by Charles H. Siebert. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993.

Greek Texts

Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Translations of the Dialogues of Plato and Aristotle

Bernardete, Seth, trans. *Plato's Theaetetus*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Bloom, Allan, trans. *The Republic of Plato*. New York: Basic Books, 1968.

Brann, Eva T.H., Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem, trans. *Plato's Sophist*. Newburyport: Focus Classical Library, 1996.

Brann, Eva T.H., Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem, trans. *Plato's Phaedo*. Newburyport: Focus Classical Library, 1998.

Sachs, J, trans. *Aristotle's Physics: A Guided Study*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998.

Sachs, J, trans. *Aristotle's Metaphysics*. Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 1999.

Sachs, J, trans. *Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle*. Newburyport: Focus Publishing, 2002.

Secondary Materials

- Bernardete, S. *Herodotean Inquiries*. South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 1999.
- . *The Argument of the Action*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
- Bolotin, David. "The Life of Philosophy and the Immortality of the Soul." *Ancient Philosophy* 7: 39-56, 1987.
- Brague, Remi. "History of Philosophy as Freedom." *Epoché* 7.1:39-50, 2002.
- Brann, Eva. *The Music of the Republic*. Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2004.
- Brisson, Luc. *Plato the Myth Maker*. Translated by Gerard Naddaf. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
- Brogan, Walter. "Is Aristotle a Metaphysician?" *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology* 15:249-61, 1984.
- . "Socrates' Tragic Speech." *Retracing the Platonic Text*. Edited by John Russon and John Sallis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Burger, Ronna. *Plato's Phaedrus: A Defense of a Philosophic Art of Writing*. University: University of Alabama Press, 1980.
- . *The Phaedo: A Platonic Labyrinth*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.
- Calasso, Roberto. *The Marriage of Cadmus and Harmony*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
- de Beistegui, Miguel. *Truth & Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *The Logic of Sense*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

-
- Detienne, Marcel. *The Creation of Mythology*. Trans. Margaret Cook. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
- Derrida, Jacques. *Dissemination*. Translated by Barbara Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
- . *Margins of Philosophy*. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.
- . *On the Name*. Translated by David Wood. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
- . *Politiques de l'amitié*. Paris: Galilée, 1994.
- . *La voix et le phénomène*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.
- Emad, Parvis. *Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Values: His Critique Of Intentionality*. Glen Ellyn: Torey Press, 1981.
- Ferrari, G. R. F. *Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Figal, Günter. *Sokrates*. München: Beck, 1998.
- Foucault, Michel. *Foucault Reader*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.
- Friedländer, Paul. "Callicles' Examples of νόμος της φύσεως in Plato's *Gorgias*." *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 19: 119-49, 1969.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Platos dialektische Ethic*, 2nd edition. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1931.
- . *Truth and Method*. New York: Continuum Books, 1975.
- . 1980. *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*. Translated by P.Christopher Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press.

-
- . *Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles* (1978). Translated by P. Christopher Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
- . *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*. Translated by P.C. Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
- . "Dialektik ist nicht Sophistik." *Griechische Philosophie III: Plato im Dialog*, 338-69. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1991.
- . "Plato als Porträtist." *Griechische Philosophie III: Plato im Dialog*, 228-57. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1991.
- . *Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus*. Translated by Robert Wallace. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
- . *Heidegger's Ways*. Translated by John W. Stanley. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
- . *The Beginning of Philosophy*. Translated by Rod Coltman. New York: Continuum, 1998.
- . "Heraclitus Studies." In *The Presocratics after Heidegger*. Edited by David Jacobs. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Gonzalez, Francisco J. *The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, Ed. 1995.
- . "On the Way to *Sophia*: Heidegger on Plato's Dialectic, Ethics and *Sophist*." *Research in Phenomenology*, vol. XXVII, 1997.
- Griswold, Charles L., Jr. *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986.
- . *Platonic Writings: Platonic Readings*. New York: Routledge, Ed. 1988.

-
- Heath, Sir Thomas. *A History of Greek Mathematics*. Vol. I, From Thales to Euclid. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1981.
- Hegel, G. W. F. *Werke*. 20 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Hyland, Drew. *Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic Dialogues*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- . *Questioning Platonism: Continental Interpretations of Plato*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004.
- . *The Virtue of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato's Charmides*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981.
- Jaeger, W. *Aristotle*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Edited by R. Schmidt. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1956.
- Klein, Jacob. *A Commentary on Plato's Meno*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965.
- . *Plato's Trilogy: Theaetetus, The Sophist and The Statesman*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
- . *Lectures and Essays*. Annapolis: Saint John's College Press, 1985.
- . "On the Platonic Meno in Particular and Platonic Dialogues in General." *New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, no. 1 (2001): 357-67, 2001.
- Kockelmans, Joseph J. *Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to His Philosophy*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965.
- . *On Heidegger and Language*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972.

-
- Krell, David Farrell. *Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- . *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991.
- . "Socrates' Body." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 10: 443-51, 1972.
- Marx, Werner. *Heidegger und die Tradition*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1961.
- Mitchell, Robert Lloyd. *The Hymn to Eros: A Reading of Plato's Symposium*. Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1993.
- Muth, Robert. "Zum Physis-Begriff bei Platon." *Wiener Studien* 64: 53-70, 1949.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. Vol. I of the Kritische Studienausgabe. München: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.
- . *The Birth of Tragedy*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin Books, 1967.
- . *The Case of Wagner*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1967.
- Polt, Richard and Gregory Fried. *A Companion to Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.
- Richardson, William J. *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963.
- Roochnik, David. *Of Art and Wisdom: Plato's Understanding of the Techne*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.
- . "The Deathbed Dream of Reason: Socrates Dream in the *Phaedo*." *Arethusa* 34: 239-58, 2001.
- . "Self-Recognition in Plato's *Theaetetus*." *Ancient Philosophy* 22: 37-50, 2002.

---. *Beautiful City: The Dialectical Character of Plato's Republic*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.

Rosen, Stanley. *Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.

Sallis, John. *Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.

---. *Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Timaeus*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

---. *Double Truth*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.

---. *Echoes. After Heidegger*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.

---. *Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.

Schmidt, Dennis J. *On Germans and other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

Strauss, Leo. *The City and Man*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964.

---. *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.

---. *Socrates and Aristophanes*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

---. *What Is Political Philosophy?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Vernant, Jean Pierre. "The Reason of Myth." In *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*. New York: Zone Books, 1990.

Warnek, P. "Reading Plato before Platonism (after Heidegger)." *Research in Phenomenology* 27: 61-89, 1997.

---. "Saving the Last Word: Heidegger and the Concluding Myth of Plato's *Republic*." *Philosophy Today* 46.3 255-73, 2002.

---. "Teiresias in Athens: Socrates as Educator and the Kinship of Physis in Plato's *Meno*."

Epoché 7.2: 261-89, 2003.

---. "Once More for the First Time . . . : Aristotle and Hegel in the Logic of History." *Research*

in Phenomenology 34: 160-80, 2004.

Zuckert, Catherine. *Postmodern Platos*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Curriculum Vitae

Omar E. Rivera
1725 State Street
La Crosse WI
54601

Education:

2007 Ph.D. in Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University (conferral May 2007).
2006 M.A. in Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University.
1999 B.A. in Philosophy and Mathematics, St. John's College, Annapolis.

Academic Positions:

2007 Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Wisconsin—La Crosse.
2006 Graduate Assistant, The Pennsylvania State University (Fall)
2005-2006 Visiting Lecturer in Philosophy, Washington and Jefferson College.

Academic Awards:

2004-2005 DAAD Fellowship in University of Freiburg, Germany.