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INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ACCESS TO U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION SINCE WORLD WAR II: HOW NAFSA (ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATORS) HAS INFLUENCED FEDERAL POLICY

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Abstract

A long-standing political tension concerning international student access to U.S. higher education has become more obvious in recent years as an open conflict between the differing interests posed by a need for national security and a need for global competitiveness. On the one hand, some now argue that easier access of international students to U.S. higher education is likely to allow terrorists to enter the U.S. with foreign student visas to make physical attacks on U.S. soil and to smuggle out technologies on the production of weapons of massive destruction. On the other hand, bringing the world's best and brightest students to U.S. higher education is said to be indispensable for the U.S. for research and development, and for allowing the U.S. to continue to be a leader in the global knowledge economy, particularly given the ever-decreasing domestic students' enrollment in the STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) fields.

Given this current dilemma, this dissertation is a study of the policy process behind the legislation and regulation governing international student access to U.S. higher education since the immediate aftermath of World War II. It is as important to study the policy processes themselves, in addition to the policy content, causes, and impacts, as policies do not emerge in a vacuum. Instead, numerous political actors have been involved to various degrees in making public policy regarding international student access to U.S. higher education, each trying to reflect their own beliefs in and values of the policies.

My special interest is with the roles which have been played by international educators, as practitioners and professionals, in this policy process. There is no doubt that

international educators, many of whom often work as administrators and/or advisers in university international offices, have a variety of channels available to advocate policy changes on their own and on behalf of international students. They may work, for example, through individual contact with their senators and through the university's federal relations office. As a case study, however, the particular research focus of this dissertation is on NAFSA: Association of International Educators (originally established as the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers in 1948). It has been always the biggest professional association of these practitioners exclusively devoted to international education. NAFSA and its members, taking account of their day-to-day contacts with international students, have been in a unique position to speak about the need for federal policy changes and to articulate a practitioners' perspective on what works and does not work.

My general question in this dissertation is this. What roles have international educators played in the policy process behind the federal legislation and regulations affecting international student access to U.S. higher education since the end of World War II? My primary analytical tool is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Paul Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (see Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The ACF has become a major innovative framework in public policy studies over the past 20 years, but it has rarely been applied to the studies of higher education. The ACF regards policy as the result of competition and debate between the advocacy coalitions which coalesce around a shared set of values and beliefs. Therefore, this dissertation explores the process by which advocates jointly affect the public policy for international student access to U.S. higher education. When focusing on the history of NAFSA in terms of its engagement in the

policy process, I look at the continuities and changes in the particular policy subsystem concerning international student access, rather than trying to see through the entire system including the contexts to the subsystem such as stable parameters and external events.

Taking into account the key concepts of the ACF, I attempt to answer the following four specific questions in order to explore the general question described above. First, 'what relationships have NAFSA developed with other key actors in this policy process?' Second, 'what has characterized NAFSA's beliefs in the promotion of international student mobility into the U.S.?' Third, 'what resources has NAFSA, as a political actor, contributed to the coalition's advocacy for international student mobility?' Fourth, 'what strategies have NAFSA used for its attempt to influence the federal policy?'

My dissertation is based on an analysis of the documentary archives and interviews with key political actors. A primary group of the archival documents are the NAFSA Records, including the board minutes, executive minutes, annual reports, newsletters, and official magazines of NAFSA, many of which are kept in the library of the University of Arkansas. In addition, the Congressional Records such as hearings, bills, and acts, as well as the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations, most of which are available online, are analyzed. Also, I conducted 45 to 60-minute personal interviews with 20 key political actors who have been involved in the public policy process regarding international student access for at least 10 years. The interviewees included NAFSA staff, NAFSA members involved in its public policy formulation, staff in university presidential associations, officials of governmental agencies such as the

Department of State, legislators' staffers, and private organizations which promote international education. Through these interviews I attempted to understand the key players' perceptions of recent policy changes, influential political actors other than themselves, the strengths and weaknesses of NAFSA as a political actor, and the benefits and costs of the presence of international students in U.S. higher education.

This dissertation consists of eight parts, including an introduction and conclusion. After introducing the research question, defining major terms, and presenting the background and significance of this study, the conceptual framework for this dissertation is explained in Chapter Two. This chapter outlines the development of studies of policy process and the characteristics of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Chapter Three is a literature review on the issues concerning; the relationship between the federal government and higher education; values in enrolling international students – upsides and downsides; and U.S. federal policies governing international students in terms of regulating and promoting their access. Chapter Four explains the methodology of this dissertation. This chapter explains how a case study approach as a qualitative research method fits the purpose of this study and what data sources were used. Chapter Five briefly addresses the stable parameters and external events as the contexts to the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education. Chapter Six, the longest in this study, presents the documentary data about NAFSA's and its allies' public policy activities and their beliefs in promoting international student mobility into the U.S over the past 60 years. Apart from the document data, the interview results are summarized in Chapter Seven. Integrating the data presented in the previous two chapters, Chapter Eight attempts to answer the four specific research questions by analyzing the

data presented in the previous chapters, and discusses the additional findings from the investigation.

In summary, the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education and NAFSA, which has been involved in the subsystem, have had continuities and changes in their development as follows. The policy subsystem has had similar types of political actors with limited comings and goings since the late 1940s. With most of these actors, who have tended to advocate international student access to U.S. higher education, NAFSA has attempted to influence the federal policies governing those students. As for beliefs in bringing international students into the U.S., the foreign policy rationales have been dominant in the pro-international-student-access coalition, including NAFSA, and these rationale continuing to be influential. In recent years, economic rationales and the appreciation of intellectual contributions of international students are increasingly emphasized by many political actors, while these values were mentioned in the policy subsystem on a much smaller scale from the mid twentieth century. NAFSA has contributed to the pro-international-student-access coalition particularly by providing its steadily increased mobilizable troops as memberships, continually outstanding expertise knowledge on international student affairs, and recently enhanced efforts to take leadership both in regulatory and legislative policy advocacy. NAFSA has employed a number of strategies for its policy advocacy. Most of the strategies such as testimony in the congressional hearings, individual members' direct petitions to members of congress, and regular meetings with the governmental agencies are still in practical use. In addition to the regulatory areas, which have been NAFSA's traditional focus, NAFSA's advocacy activities have been expanded to the legislative

areas since the late 1990s.

The additional findings are three-fold as follows. First, international educators have had a dilemma between their phobia about government interference and their need for government support. Second, while most international educators are believers in various benefits which international students bring to the U.S., their belief may be too optimistic without serious empirical examinations. Third, the ACF is useful in understanding the policy changes in terms of the political actors' beliefs, and technological development, particularly in maintaining the information of individual international students. However, the 'on-again, off-again relationship' between NAFSA and the immigration service agencies over the 60 years is not well explained by the framework.

In conclusion, NAFSA, which represents a substantial ratio of international educators' voices in the federal policy arena concerning international student access to U.S. higher education, has continued to be a special interest group which regards international students as far more beneficial to the U.S. than risky, particularly from a longer term perspective. NAFSA has believed that having international students is mostly a solution to the potential risks (e.g., terrorism, and unemployment) which unorganized opponents may see in the presence of these students in the U.S. Although NAFSA has not been a dominant player in this policy subsystem, it has been has a key player who has continuously raised the agendas and provided the feedback useful for the alternative policy consideration.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AAU	Association of American Universities
ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
AIEA	Association of International Education Administrators
AILA	American Immigration Lawyers Association
ACE	American Council on Education
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CFRFS	Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign Students
CIPRIS	Coordinated Interagency Program Regulating International Students
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
FAIR	Federation of American Immigration Reform
GNYCFS	Greater New York Council for Foreign Students
IEA	International Education Act of 1966
IIE	Institute of International Education
IIRAIRA	Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
NAFSA	National Association of Foreign Student Advisers (till 1964)
	National Association for Foreign Student Affairs (till 1990)
	NAFSA: Association of International Educators (from 1990)
NASULGC	National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges

SEVIS	Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
SEVP	Student and Exchange Visitor Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
USICA	United States International Communication Agency
YMCA	Young Men’s Christian Association
YWCA	Young Women’s Christian Association

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I am very grateful, too, for the extraordinary cooperation from my 20 interviewees, although I cannot refer to individual names due to the confidentiality stated in the Informed Consent Form prepared for my interviews. These interviewees were not only the staff and members of NAFSA, but also the staff of a number of other non-governmental and governmental organizations, including two major international educational exchange organizations, the American Immigration Lawyers Association, one

of the six university presidents' associations (known as the *Big Six*), the U.S. Department of State, and a Senator's Office. People at all of these different organizations and offices kindly shared their comments and insights with me in the interviews that form such an important part of this dissertation.

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To a large degree I regard this dissertation as a product of my day-to-day conversations and interactions with friends and colleagues, and I am grateful to all of them for their help and encouragement. My friends with high academic profiles in their own individual fields of interest, particularly Dr. Dani Botsman, Dr. Akihiro Asonuma, and Mr. Yu-Wei Wu kindly gave me their frank opinions about my arguments for the dissertation from their various perspectives. In response to my conjectures about issues concerning international student access to U.S. higher education, I have been fortunate to

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Chapter One: Introduction

The broad purpose of this dissertation is to explore how the U.S. federal policies affecting international student mobility into the U.S. evolved the way they did since World War II. I carry out this exploration particularly through examining the involvement of international educators as a group of actors in the policy process, with special reference to a major professional association of these educators. My focused association is NAFSA: Association of International Educators. NAFSA, the world's largest professional association which devotes itself exclusively to international education, was originally established as the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers in 1948. By tracing the history of NAFSA's attempts to influence federal policy over the past 60 years, I have considered five research questions in this dissertation: a general one and four more specific ones. The general question is this. What roles have international educators played in the policy process behind the federal legislations and regulations affecting international student access to U.S. higher education since the end of World War II? The four specific questions are as follows. First, what relationships has NAFSA developed with other key actors in this policy process? Second, what has characterized NAFSA's beliefs in the promotion of international student mobility into the U.S.? Third, what resources has NAFSA, as a political actor, contributed to the coalition's advocacy for international student mobility? Fourth, what strategies has NAFSA used in its attempts to influence federal policy?

By international educators, as defined in detail later, this dissertation means those who are professionally engaged in the internationalization of higher education institutions. These professionals often work in international offices of colleges and

universities, and practically serve the international population as well as the internationally-active domestic population on campus, and/or take leadership roles in internationalization through student mobility, language and area studies, and curriculum development on/around campus. This dissertation assumes that, compared to their counterparts in other countries, these American international education professionals have been more active in their attempts to influence national policies governing international students. Generally speaking, in a very open and free society like the U.S., in upholding a pluralistic democracy, people tend to find it more common to express their political views and petition their government than in other countries. There is no wonder that some American international educators have been among those who are willing to pursue their own professional interests in the making of public policy.

Some of those in the vanguard among these practitioners of international education have been remarkably active in their attempts to influence federal policy on the issue of international student access to U.S. higher education. For more than half a century, these practitioners with the continual development of their professionalization in the field of international education have collectively advocated for international students, particularly through their professional association, NAFSA. Since the aftermath of World War II as well as the dawn of the Cold War, NAFSA's long history has seen the dramatic expansion of international student mobility in the world and the continual challenges to the practitioners in the environment affecting the policies and practices regarding international student mobility. In this dissertation, I will largely focus on NAFSA's attempts to influence the federal policies affecting international student access to U.S. higher education in order to examine the international educators' collective actions.

There are some key advantages to focusing on NAFSA when exploring the policy process governing international student access to U.S. higher education. First, NAFSA and its members, taking account of the members' day-to-day contacts with international students, have been in a unique position to speak about the need for policy change and to articulate a practitioners' perspective on what works and does not work. Second, NAFSA has accumulated rich information and connections in the field of international education by attempting to get involved in almost every opportunity to enhance international student access to U.S. higher education. Third, such information since its establishment in 1948 has been well-maintained in archives at University of Arkansas's Special Collection Library as well as available on line at its official website. Fourth, NAFSA's history is long enough for us to perceive the gradual transformation of values and beliefs of its allies and opponents. This transformation has eventually caused incremental changes in the policies regarding international student access.

Certainly, however, it should be noteworthy that NAFSA's actions and statements may not have been always formulated by the unanimous voices of all the international education practitioners in the U.S. NAFSA's membership, although it has grown 10,000, does not include all the professionals in the international education community in the U.S. Nor is NAFSA membership homogenous. Among NAFSA's members, there are varied ideas, preferences, and priorities. U.S. higher education, the community to which the vast majority of NAFSA's members belong, is quite diverse and includes community colleges and research universities. Also, each NAFSA member has different roles, responsibilities, and statuses in his/her own organizations (e.g., international student advisers, study abroad advisers, English as a second language

teachers, admission officers, outreach service officers, directors of international office, professors in area studies, and vice presidents/provosts for international education).

Further, there is no doubt that this particular policy domain regarding international student access to U.S. higher education has had much more influential and powerful political actors than NAFSA. These political actors include the following: legislators, executive branch officers such as those in the Department of State and Immigration and Naturalization Services, university presidential associations, philanthropic foundations, and business industries. Twenty-five years ago, Craufurd D. Goodwin and Michael Nacht (1983) pointed out that the administrators in the field of international education were among the least powerful political actors in higher education. Nonetheless, it is important to trace the history and current activities of NAFSA as a professional association. No other nation-wide organization can surpass NAFSA in terms of its devotion to international education. This examination will enable me to present a general picture of the international education professionals' collective actions as well as the other key political actors' involvement in the policy process regarding international student access to U.S. higher education.

By looking at these specific professionals' collective actions and their interaction with other key political actors, in this dissertation, I study the policy process rather than study the policy content or evaluate policy impacts. I will explore this policy process to assess the influence of different factors on the development of the issue of international student access to U.S. higher education. Policies are not created in vacuum. The legislation and regulations concerning international student access to U.S. higher education have been created by a various political actors with their values and beliefs in

their stakes with this issue. These various political actors have had different rationales and different priorities in these rationales in relation to international student access. Given the dilemma in the issues of international student access, which as described later has attracted increasing attentions in public policy in the U.S., it is important to understand how and why the U.S. environment for international students has involved the way it has.

As a study of policy process, this dissertation is guided by a public policy model, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF was initially devised by Paul A. Sabatier (1987 and 1988), and has been applied to many public policy analyses for the past 20 years. As explained in more detail in Chapter Two, the ACF is useful for my analysis of the policy domain regarding international student access, particularly of the collective actions of international education practitioners such as NAFSA's efforts to influence this policy domain.

First, the ACF's conceptualization that policy is the result of competition and debate between the advocacy coalitions appears adequate for the policy domain about international student access, as there always has been a potential grouping where some political actors want to regulate the access on the one hand, and others want to promote it. Second, since international education practitioners themselves may be weaker political actors but have special knowledge about international student affairs, it has been important how they form coalitions to advocate for their interests in promoting international student access, as explained in the ACF. Third, international education practitioners as my research focus are situated in the very right position to be involved in the implementation and feedback, whose influence on the policy process the ACF seriously encompasses. Fourth, the ACF's emphasis on policy impacts from other

subsystems is useful, as international student access has been debated, if ever, at the intersection of wider political discourses such as foreign relations, national security, and the labor market. Because the ACF centrally sees the shared set of core values and beliefs around which groups coalesce as bases for these policy debates, competitions, and compromises on solutions about the policy problems, this dissertation explores the archival documents and examines the interviews with key political actors for such values and beliefs.

Definition of Terms

At the outset of this dissertation, it is necessary to define several terminologies used throughout this dissertation. These terminologies include these: international/foreign students, international educators, international student access, and policy.

International/foreign students. This dissertation uses interchangeably the terms *international students* and *foreign students*. This dissertation defines *international/foreign students* as those who temporarily come to the U.S. to study, particularly with specific types of non-immigrant visas such as F, J, or M visas. F visas are for those who pursue a full-time academic education, and J visas for those who participate in a cultural exchange program designed by the U.S. government (e.g., Fulbright Program), and M visas for those who are enrolled in vocational training. A justification for this specification is that this dissertation focuses on the development of the policies on these non-immigrant visas and education exchange programs. Therefore, *international/foreign students* in this dissertation do not include refugees, immigrants, and permanent residents.

Unlike in this dissertation, a couple of studies distinguish between the terms *international students* and *foreign students*. For example, according to an online

education database compiled by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “foreign students are defined as non-citizens of the country in which they study, and international students are defined either as students who are not permanent or usual residents of their country of study or alternatively as students who obtained their prior education in a different country” (OECD, n.d.). This differentiation can be particularly convenient for analyses of student adaptation to or impact on different cultural and educational settings because U.S. citizens who have obtained their prior education in a different country tend to have similar characteristics as foreign citizens from the country. However, this kind of analysis is out of my focus, and I do not apply such a differentiation to this dissertation.

In general, the term *foreign students* is more traditionally used, while the recent documents and discussions, including those of NAFSA, tend to call this student group of foreign citizens in higher education *international students*. In fact, in the earlier days, the term *international students* was seldom used. Similar chronological changes in these terms appear to have existed in other countries. For example, in the U.K. context, “Those who were in the 1970s described as foreign students were the overseas students of the 1980s and the international students of the present [1990s] decade” (Humfrey, 1999, p. 154).

Open Doors, a well-known annual report of the Institute of International Education (IIE) on international academic mobility (including inbound and outbound student and scholars to and from the U.S.), used the term *foreign students* almost exclusively for a long time, but began mixing the terms *foreign students* and *international students* at the end of 1990s. The most recent issues of *Open Doors* usually have used the

term *international students*. According to *Open Doors* Frequent Asked Question online (IIE, n.d.a), their definition of an *international student* is "anyone who is enrolled at an institution of higher education in the United States who is not a U.S. citizen, an immigrant (permanent resident) or a refugee. These may include holders of F (student) visas, J (exchange visitor) visas, and M (vocational training) visas" (para. 4). In the earliest years of *Open Doors* publication, the definition of *foreign students* was not clear, but *Open Doors* for 1953-1954 indicated that "[a] foreign student, as defined for this census, is a citizen of a country other than the United States who is studying or training in an institution of higher education in the United States, and who plans to return to his borne country when his studies are completed. The term does not include Displaced Persons, immigrants, persons who have taken out first citizenship papers, or foreign citizens studying in the United States below the college level" (IIE, 1954, p. 4), seemingly following the definition of *foreign students* in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952.

According to *Open Doors* (IIE, 1949), the number of *foreign/international students* in the U.S. in 1948-49 was 25,464, and the number has been ever-increasing over the past 60 years, except for the academic years of 1971-72, 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06. *Open Doors* (IIE, 1972) explained that the decrease in 1971-72 was a result of allegedly inaccurate reports from a couple of institutions which had usually had a large number of *international students*. The decrease in the recent years was usually attributed by *Open Doors* (IIE, 2004, 2005 and 2006) to the stricter immigration regulations after the September 11 attacks. The number of *international students* in 2006-07 was 582,984, which was an increase by 3% from the previous year (IIE, 2007). This change in the

statistics of *Open Doors* is the first significant increase in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001 (see Appendix A).

International educators. International educators are defined as those who are practically and professionally engaged in the internationalization of education. Therefore, this dissertation sometimes interchangeably uses *international educational practitioners* and *international educational professionals* as international educators. Since international education has a great number of definitions and encompasses a great variety of programs and activities, practitioners and professionals in the international education community are engaged in a wide range of positions. These practitioners and professionals belong to not only academic institutions but also non-academic organizations. The majority of them are staff in higher education institutions, but some work for language or vocational schools or community organizations.

The categories of the members of NAFSA as the biggest association of international educators in the world concisely and comprehensively cover the major duties of these practitioners and professionals. On the NAFSA membership application form (as of January 2009), the following areas of responsibility are listed: administering/developing exchange agreements; admissions/recruitment/credentials evaluation/placement; chief international education leadership/English language training and administration; government relations; immigration/regulatory practice; institutional leadership and advancement; intercultural teaching; internationalizing the curriculum; programs or services development and administration; programs or services marketing; research and scholarship; scholar advising/programming; student advising/programming; and others. Although this dissertation focuses on the issue of international students in

colleges and universities in the U.S., *international educational practitioners/professionals* mentioned in this dissertation include those who do not belong to higher education institutions. As described later, these non-higher education people have also been playing important roles in the collective actions of *international educators*.

International student access. While, both for domestic and international students, *access to U.S. higher education* means these students' admitting, persisting and graduating from American colleges and universities, the major public concerns about the *access* of these two types of students are different. On the one hand, in terms of domestic students, *access* is usually associated with concerns about equity among the U.S. citizens. In this context, the financial dimension of *access* has been often highlighted, and the high cost of higher education and financial aid to keep affordability have been put on political agendas. In addition, some researchers argue that the non-financial dimension of *access* such as academic preparedness during K-12 education is also important as a factor affecting students' admitting, persisting and graduating from the U.S. higher education institutions. Since the vast majority of student population in U.S. higher education is domestic, the studies of higher education has dealt with *access* as study opportunities for the tax payers and their families. In this context, these opportunities are to be enhanced as much as possible, ultimately for universal higher education.

On the other hand, arguably, *access* in terms of international students is largely associated with concerns about efficiency for the U.S. society. *International student access* has been discussed as something serving the U.S. national interests such as foreign relations, security, labor markets, and competitiveness. Although some would argue that

international student access to U.S. higher education would help other countries develop, the promotion of *international student access* is unlikely to be aimed toward equity in the global knowledge economy at the expense of the U.S. national interests mentioned above. Therefore, *international student access* is something not only to promote but also to control. As far as the U.S. federal government's involvement is concerned, *international student access* has been a part of the issues such as visa/immigration, deemed exports, and employment permission, which are regulating *international student access*, while at the same time the access has been encouraged through financial aid such as Fulbright Program, and through recruitment support by providing information on U.S. higher education around the world.

In addition, the issue of *international student access* to U.S. higher education is closely related to former international student access to the U.S. labor market. That is student access relates to the question as to the issue of retaining international students after the completion of their study. Former international students significantly contribute to the intake of foreign highly skilled workers in the United States, despite the fact that no specific immigration measure (apart from H1-B visa as an important measure allowing U.S. employers to hire foreign workers on a temporary basis) to encourage these students to change their status from student to permanent worker in the U.S. has been implemented by the federal government (Tremblay, 2005). For individual international students, the possibility for them to gain a job to continue to live in the host countries can be one of the pull-factors of the host countries. Also, the major host countries, including the U.S., increasingly regard international students as future workers of their knowledge-intensive sectors, while the U.S., unlike its competing host countries, has not

reformed its immigration policies to facilitate the settlement of its international students (Tremblay, 2005). The relatively laissez-faire approach of the U.S. in retaining international student after their graduation appears to have conflicted with the recurring concerns over 'brain drain.' Therefore, this dissertation pays attention to this issue of retaining international students as a part of the rationale, traditionally hidden but recently explicit, behind the promotion of *international student access* to U.S. higher education.

At the same time, this dissertation focuses on *access*, on the actual study opportunities available for international students, while recognizing that there are also increasing virtual study opportunities in U.S. higher education (e.g. e-learning). There are several reasons to exclude e-learning. First, my dissertation's scope of study is 60 years after the end of World War II, and the proliferation of virtual study opportunities is a relatively recent phenomenon since the development of the Internet in the late 1990s. Second, the issue of virtual access to U.S. higher education has not significantly yet attracted the attention of international educators, compared to the actual mobility of international students. Third, the major debates over the benefits and costs among the international educators still derive from the perception of a benefit from the physical presence of international students on American campus, and from the interaction between international and domestic students for mutual understanding and expenditures on daily life.

Policy. While the term *policy* may be applicable to institutions, private organizations and groups, and individuals, this dissertation is interested in governments' policies as public policy. More specifically, this dissertation looks at the U.S. federal government policy, while recognizing that the federal policy affects and is affected by

other levels and types of policies such as state policy and university policy. Borrowing Thomas Dye's (1992) definition of public policy, this dissertation defines *federal policy* as 'whatever the federal government chooses to do or not to do.' As Michael Hill (1997) points out, this choice as *policy* involves "a web of decisions rather than one decision" (p. 7).

Also, the choice of a course of inaction is an important *policy* to study. Maintaining the status quo can be regarded as a *policy*. For example, as I will further discuss in Chapter Five, the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill introduced in the mid 1980s caused a debate over the introduction of the two-year foreign residence requirement for international students after their graduation before they are allowed to work in the U.S In the end, the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which came from the Smipson-Mazzoli Bill, did not include the two year foreign residence requirement. This example shows the governmental inaction as policy, and the process to the inaction involved active political activities and debates among the policy participants including NAFSA and other members of the higher education community.

Further, it is also important to note that *policy* is not only the written legislations and regulations. As Thomas A. Birkland (2005) argues, "once a law or rule is made, policies continue to be made as the people who implement policy–that is, those who put policies into effect–make decisions about who will benefit from policies and who will shoulder burdens as a result" (p. 18). Although *policies* are not always changing, experiences from the decision implementation may further affect the decision-making process. As discussed in Chapter Six, the implementation of stricter regulation on international student access in the mid 1980s and its revisions after NAFSA's continual

negotiation with the Immigration and Naturalization Services in the late 1980s were a good example of this dynamic rather than static nature of the policy process.

Significance of This Study

There are four major significant points which I will pursue through this dissertation. First, I will attempt to fill a research gap of international education studies; that is, the policy process regarding international students. My focus is a study as to who has been involved in this particular policy process and what their involvement has been for the past 60 years. One of my attempts with this dissertation is to shed light on the processes of the public policy dealing with international student affairs. Generally speaking, although international education has attracted growing research interests among the academics as well as practitioners, "[the] internationalization of higher education is still a long way from becoming the regular subject of substantial research-based academic studies" (de Wit, 2002, p. 231). This research gap is truer to the studies of the federal policy making processes regarding international student access. Areas with relatively abundant literature on international students include as follows: international students' transitional problems in adapting themselves to a foreign culture and education system; the impact of studying abroad on international students for their educational and/or career development; and international students' impact on a campus in cultural, educational, and economic terms. Even when national policies are studied, whether in terms of international education generally or international students specifically, researchers tend to analyze the contents and evaluation of the national policies of the major receiving countries. In my dissertation, neither the contents nor evaluations of the legislations and regulations will be its main focus, although I refer to these contents and evaluations in the

context of the policy process.

Second, I will borrow a sophisticated theoretical framework of public policy for my analysis of the policy process. My major analytical tool is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which has been developed by Paul Sabatier et al. as one of the major innovative frameworks in public policy studies since the late 1980s, but which has rarely been applied to the studies of higher education. Michael K. McLendon (2003) strongly recommends more systematic conceptualization in the studies about the politics of higher education in general. Given an argument that "[m]ost of higher education scholars do not yet recognize internationalization as a research theme" (de Wit, 2002, p. 232), political research about international student affairs should obviously have much more to be desired in the need for more systematic conceptualization. This dissertation will try to respond to these shortcomings both in research of higher education and the internationalization of higher education.

Third, I will highlight the interrelatedness of policies and practices between international student access and other surrounding areas at the national, sector, and institutional levels. Arguably, the previous literature has tended to analyze the issues of international students largely in terms of their peculiarity, but not sufficiently in the wider contexts at each level. In fact, debates over the regulations and promotions of international student access have been often associated with the major issues of higher education sectors of each period of history since the end of World War II. These issues include the following: GI Bills in the aftermath of World War II, Civil Right movement in the 1960s, the declining domestic population for higher education in the 1970s, and the decreasing domestic enrollment in the STEM fields.

Fourth, my intention with this dissertation includes the empowerment of international education practitioners in terms of their contributions to and potential for creating better policies. Regardless of their current involvement in the policy process at the national, sector, and institutional levels, these international education practitioners, not only in the U.S. but also in other countries, are in the position where their policy advocacy for international student access from a practical point of view is worthwhile considering for better policies. In-depth analyses of the involvement of international education practitioners in the U.S. national policy development will demonstrate some good and less good practices of policy advocacy in a context. These actual practices, whether leading to successes or failures, can be insightful to policymakers and international education practitioners in the U.S. for future policy development as well as for other major host countries. Like the U.S. these other host countries see the increasing internationalization of higher education and a number of similar political concerns related to international student mobility such as security, immigration, higher education funding, cultural diversity and diplomatic friendship. Even in the countries where national policies concerning international education have been more established, greater input from the practitioners' perspectives would help improve the policies in terms of practical feasibility on campus. I will attempt to illuminate the far under-researched contributions of international education practitioners as political actors. As far as the internationalization of higher education is concerned, the existing literature has tended to pay much attention to the students and faculty members at the institutional level analysis or the government agencies and regulations at the national level analysis. By demonstrating the international education practitioners' capability and significance in

their policy advocacy capabilities, this study could empower many international education practitioners.

U.S. Policies in Response to Growing International Student Mobility

Recent years have particularly seen an increasingly large number of students all over the world pursue their higher education outside of their home countries. This phenomenon can be regarded as both a process and result of globalization, which can be non-ideologically defined as "the flow of technology, economy, knowledge, people, values, and ideas . . . across borders" (Knight, 2003, para. 10). In fact, in this globalizing world, higher education has been (and will inevitably continue to be) trans-nationally supplied in several modes like other tradable services. The modes include the following: 'cross border supply' including e-learning, 'consumption abroad' as mobility of students, 'commercial presence' including satellite campuses, and 'presence of natural persons' as mobility of professionals (see, *The General Agreement on Trade in Services*, World Trade Organization, n.d.). Among the four modes, 'consumption abroad,' where students go to another country to study, "currently represents the largest share of the global market for education services" (Knight, 2002, p. 5). According to UNESCO's *Global Education Digest 2007* (UNESCO, 2007), the total number of internationally mobile students in countries having more than 1,000 mobile students amounted to approximately 2.7 million in 2005. Significantly, more than 20% of these internationally mobile students are studying in the U.S., which is the traditionally leading host country.

Given the large U.S. share of the mobile students, it is noteworthy that the U.S., unlike other major countries hosting international students in universities and colleges, lacks a comprehensive national policy on international education, in particular for

international student recruitment. Such competitors as the U.K. and Australia have changed their immigration and visa policies for easier access of international student to their higher education, and have developed recruitment strategies coordinated among the governmental agencies. The U.S. may not have had to make any special efforts to continue to be the far strongest and greatest magnet in international student mobility for more than a half of the past century, as its higher education has been at the center of higher learning since the end of World War II.

Of course, it is not that the U.S. has had no policies affecting international students. As the country which has had the greatest number of international students in the world, the U.S. has its immigration and visa policies regulating the flow of international students. Apparently, however, these immigration and visa policies have not been developed for the promotion of international student access to its higher education system. At the same time, the U.S. Congress has passed and funded a number of important legislations such as the Fulbright Act of 1946, the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, and the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 to promote the exchanges of persons. All of these promotional policies initiated under the Cold War paradigm have mostly focused on a limited number of elite students among several hundred thousands of international students in the U.S. In response to various kinds of threats from terrorism (e.g., World Trade Center bombing in 1993 as well as continual attacks on the U.S. diplomatic installations), the U.S. started adopting a number of more restrictive legislations and regulations in immigration and visas in the mid 1990s, while other countries were putting more strategic efforts to increase international students in their higher education systems. In this context, the U.S. gradual decline of the global

share of international student market has prompted suggestions from the U.S. international education community for the federal commitment to this field to a greater extent. For example, since 1999, NAFSA has been advocating for a U.S. international education policy to be established, but this attempt has not been successful yet.

In American politics, international education, including the issues of international students, has not been considered in terms of education. As de Wit (2002) argues, “the fact that by constitution the government’s role is limited in educational policy but extensive in foreign affairs, defense, trade and commerce suggests that federal policy on international education will be more linked to these areas than to education itself” (p. 20). While the U.S. Department of Education has not significantly been involved in the policy formation and implementation for international students, other countries give substantial responsibilities for international students to their education departments/ministries. In the U.K., the Prime Minister’s Initiatives (PMIs) for International Education since the late 1990s have been chaired by the Department for Education and Employment (later, Department for Education and Skills) EduFrance (now expanded to CampusFrance), the French governmental vehicle for the promotion of international student recruitment was co-established by the Department of Education and Foreign Affairs in the late 1990s. Australia’s governmental vehicle for international education, Australia Education International, was founded by the Australia’s Department of Education, Employment and Training in the mid 1990s. Japan’s policies on international education have been dominated by its Ministry of Education over past 20 years.

Generally speaking, international student affairs have not risen as a significant

subject of governmental agendas in the U.S. More broadly, since the failure in appropriating the International Education Act (IEA) of 1966 in the political turmoil caused by the U.S. increasing involvement in the Vietnam War, “proponents of international education programs have never succeeded in moving our concerns high enough up on the list of national priorities to obtain significant funding” (M. Johnson, 1999, para. 22). To lesser degrees, fields such as area studies, language studies, and study abroad have been discussed in the federal policy arena (e.g., National Defense Education Act of 1958, Higher Education Act of 1965, International Education Act of 1966, and National Security Education Act of 1991).

For example, as I will show later in Chapter Six, the IEA of 1966 was passed in the Congress under the administration of President Johnson calling for broad-based programs to internationalize U.S. education and to promote exchanges with other nations. Despite the constitutional silence of the role of the federal government in education, including higher education, this history shows that the U.S. once presented an opportunity in the public policy process for its substantial federal commitment to the internationalization of U.S. higher education in general. However, this IEA of 1966 did not pay much attention to international students in U.S. higher education, but rather focused on the education of American domestic students. At the national level, the U.S. public policy has chosen a course of inaction on the generic promotion of international student recruitment.

Even though other competitor hosting countries have developed relatively more comprehensive policies on the recruitment of international students, this does not necessarily mean that they have articulated their policies to educational objectives both

for international and domestic students. Often, the national governments' policy weighs the rationales for economic benefits without presenting concrete strategies of achieving the educational benefits on/around campus. The number of international students tends to be at the center of the debates about the evaluation of the policies regarding international students.

Dilemma Leading to a Policy Agenda

More recently, however, the issue of international student access to U.S. higher education has attracted increasing attention in the federal policy arena. This issue is now often discussed for better policies by various political actors taking account of a tension between the two major national interests of the U.S. in the context of globalization: national security against terrorism and international competitiveness in knowledge economy. The recent efforts to find the right balance in this tension have been often represented by a phrase *Secure Borders, Open Doors*, particularly since the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. In general, beyond the discourse of international education, it is much publicized that the Bush Administration has adopted a policy of 'Secure Borders, Open Doors'. While the former Secretary of State, Collin Powell was often regarded as championing the articulation of this policy ,the Bush Administration basically followed this direction (e.g., "Secure borders and open doors in the information age," jointly announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff [2006]).

The order of the words in this political phrase can be important since the order may implicate the priorities and/or emphases of those who mention the phrase. On the one hand, responding to the threats to the national security heightened by the September

11 attacks, the vast majority has used the phrase as it is; that is, *Secure Borders, Open Doors*. It appears that this order, intentionally or not, has placed the primary emphasis on securing borders, while opening doors is being pursued as long as the borders are secured. However, some advocates for international education, including those in NAFSA, call *Open Doors, Secure Borders*. (V. Johnson & Mulholland, 2006), as they feel that it is by opening its doors to the world that the U.S. could promote its national security. NAFSA has tried to keep and even increase the flow of international students into U.S. higher education after the September 11 attacks, even though the attacking groups included a few terrorists who had entered the U.S. with student visas. NAFSA has been politically active in changing the public perception about international students, emphasizing that having international students in U.S. higher education is one of the most effective ways of combating against terrorism since the mutual understanding friendship between international students and the domestic population will alleviate the hostility towards the U.S. Furthermore, NAFSA has formed an advocacy coalition which points out that the access of the best and brightest talents as international students to U.S. higher education should be increased because the U.S. economy cannot survive without the talent contribution of international students to research and development in the U.S.

The origins of many policies and political debates regarding international student access of today can be traced back far beyond the September 11 attacks in 2001. Although many legislations and regulations have been implemented in response to the shocking attacks, similar ideas and debates of these legislations and regulations are found decades ago.

On the one hand, tighter regulations on international students, particularly in

terms of tracking systems, directly date back to the late 1970s. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was not able to provide the information on the then Iranian students studying in the U.S., responding to President Carter's request at the time of the hostage crisis in the U.S. embassy in Iran in 1979. This inefficient manner prompted a new tracking system for international students. The 1980s saw the trial and error of its implementation, but the burdensome administrative work caused by the lack of advanced technology prevented the INS from implementing the tracking system. The World Trade Center was bombed in 1994, and the terrorist group included former international students. This was one of the earliest focal events that provoked some political concerns about international student access to U.S. higher education. Subsequently, this incident led the introduction of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996, which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, and which led to a pilot program of a computer data base system, the predecessor of SEVIS. Further, the terrorist attacks on September 11 of 2001 caused responses, tightening the regulations of international student access to U.S. higher education.

The other major interest which is being provoked by international student access to U.S. higher education is related to U.S. global competitiveness in the knowledge economy. Similarly, the questions about whether attempting to retain a certain population of international students as the best talents in the U.S. after their graduation were debated as early as the mid 1980s. In a sense, it can be argued that the debates over brain drain, which dates back to the 1960s, already contained the issue of skilled immigrant to the U.S.

As early as the mid 1980s, a congressional bill was introduced to attempt to

impose a two-year foreign residence requirement on all foreign students after their graduation from a U.S. higher education institution because of the tightened labor market. The higher education community including the American Council on Education (ACE) and NAFSA were successful in modifying the point with the support from some business and industry organizations. The discussion for the contribution of the international talents to research and development, which is crucial for the prosperity of the U.S. economy, gradually started.

As early as the beginning of the 1990s, the fact that the development of the knowledge-based economy has made higher education more important both for individual career development and national economic development than ever has motivated a large number of students around the world to pursue their higher education. Many hosting countries recognize higher education as a tradable service, which has given significant income generation to higher education institutions and surrounding industries.

At the same time, the knowledge-based economy has increased U.S. higher education's dependence on international students as teaching and research assistants in the STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) fields, where U.S. higher education has found it difficult to attract local students due to the cost-benefit consideration in the career development. Further, the most recent political debate has included the arguments for recruiting the world's best and brightest international students (in particularly in the STEM field) for the future workforce in the U.S., and trying to retain them after their graduation. Nations now compete with each other for international students now not only for the income they generate while they are studying, but also, perhaps more importantly, for the scientific development in the hosting countries to

which the international students could contribute.

Structure of This Dissertation

This dissertation consists of eight chapters, including this Introduction as Chapter One. The structure of this dissertation is as follows.

Chapter Two presents the conceptual framework for this research in detail. It begins with the dissertation's purpose of studying the policy process, distinguishing studies of the policy process from other types of policy studies. Then, this chapter gives a historical overview of studies of policy process. The overview leads to the brief explanation about the three major models in the recent studies of policy process (i.e., Multiple Streams Model of John Kingdon, Punctuated Equilibrium Model of Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, and Advocacy Coalition Framework of Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith). After demonstrating the advantages of the Advocacy Coalition Framework over the other two major models for the purpose of my study, this chapter continues to introduce the key concepts of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, and then to explain how I apply the concepts to the analysis of the roles of international educators in the policy process regarding the access of international students to U.S. higher education.

Chapter Three reviews the previous literature on three key issues directly related to international educators' advocacy for international student access to U.S. higher education. First, as most international educators belong to the higher education community, I will explore the general relationships between U.S. higher education and the federal government. Second, the literature on the benefits and costs of hosting international students, primarily in the context of U.S. higher education, but including

some perspectives of other host countries such as the U.K., will be examined. Since some literature discusses the rationales of 'international education,' not specifically hosting international students, I will extract issues relevant for international students. The third part of this chapter will look into the literature on the federal policies governing international students. The literature on two types of federal policies, regulating and promoting the international student mobility into the U.S., will be reviewed chronologically.

Chapter Four explains the methodology of this dissertation. This dissertation is a combination of analyses of archival documents and interviews with key political actors in the policy domain regarding international student access to U.S. higher education. This Chapter explains what kind of archival documents are mainly used, and what kind of political actors were interviewed. In addition, the access to the documents and the methods of sampling the interviewees are presented. Further, I explain how the data from these documents and interviews are analyzed with the guidance of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF).

Chapter Five briefly outlines the context of the policy subsystem concerning international student mobility into the U.S., following the ACF's concepts about the policy subsystem's environment over 60 years such as stable parameters and external events. While the discussions about this environment is not my main focus in this dissertation, this chapter will present a compressed overview of this environment which needs to be considered when analyzing the policy subsystem more substantially.

Chapters Six and Seven present the data on NAFSA's political activities which I collected for this dissertation. Chapter Six chronologically provides the results from my

archival document research. The main sources are as follows: the NAFSA Archives at the University of Arkansas, which collected a great number of documents from NAFSA's birth in 1948 through the early 1990s; the Congressional hearings; NAFSA's more recent publication such as its flagship magazine, *International Educator*; and the archival documents available on NAFSA's official website, particularly those produced after the September 11 attacks. Chapter Six summarizes the interview transcriptions. The transcriptions are summarized by showing the tendency of the interviewees' perceptions about the following issues: major policy changes in the recent years; NAFSA's successes and failures; influential political actors, both being allies and opponents of NAFSA; NAFSA's strengths and weaknesses; and benefits and costs of bringing international students into U.S. higher education.

Finally, Chapter Eight interprets the data presented in the previous two chapters. Using some of the key concepts of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, I will attempt to analyze the data in order to examine how international educators have influenced federal policy governing international student access to U.S. higher education. In particular, I will look at the changes and continuities over the 60 years in terms of the following elements of the ACF subsystem framework: political actors in the coalition, policy beliefs, resources, and strategies regarding guidance instruments.

Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework

Studies of Policy Process

This dissertation is a study of the policy process behind the legislations and regulations governing international student access to U.S. higher education. This kind of attempt to explore the issues regarding international students from a public policy perspective has been limited in the previous research literature. Even when policies on international students are analyzed, the researchers have tended to focus on the questions concerning what the policy contents are, why the policies were made, and how the policies impact the affected population. In the context of international student affairs, such questions as to who made the policies and how they were made tend to be ignored or discussed perfunctorily at best. However, it can be as important to study the policy processes themselves as to study the policy contents, causes and impacts since the policies do not come to existence out of the blue. In fact, a number of political actors have been involved to various degrees in the public policy making regarding international student access to U.S. higher education, by trying to reflect their own beliefs in and values on the policies. My main interest is in the roles played by international education practitioners as political actors in the policy process.

According to the typology proposed by Hogwood and Gunn (1981), a study of the policy process is one of the seven varieties of studies of public policy making. The other six types include the following: studies of policy content, studies of policy outputs, evaluation studies, information for policy making, process advocacy, and policy advocacy. Hogwood and Gunn argue that studies of policy process as well as studies of policy content and studies of policy outputs can be considered as policy studies, about the

knowledge of policy and the policy process. Information for policy making, process advocacy, and policy advocacy can be categorized as types of policy analysis, about knowledge in the policy process, while Hogwood and Gunn also regard evaluation studies as both policy studies and policy analysis.

These seven varieties of studies of public policy making are related to each other. As Hill explains, “Studies of the policy process invariably show some concern with policy content, but in the main they are interested in uncovering the various influences on policy formulation” (1997, p. 4). Consider, for example, an attempt to analyze how the international education practitioners were involved in the policy making of the Immigration of Nationality Act of 1952. This act has been the main legislation governing the access of international student access to U.S. higher education. Understanding the act requires me to understand what the legislation was originally intended to do. Without this understanding, I would not be able to explore how successfully or not the international education practitioners advocated the access of international students with their allies in the formulation of this particular legislation.

Also, given the circulative impacts of the policy outputs (e.g., expenditure or service provision) and policy evaluations on further policy formulation, a study of policy process cannot help paying attention to policy outputs and evaluation. For example, the years after the implementation of a periodic and comprehensive school reporting system on international students to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) in 1983 saw these circulative impacts. The policy process towards its suspension in 1988 would be better analyzed by looking at the cumbersome paperwork imposed upon colleges and universities as well as at the USCIS itself. The international education

practitioners in higher education were in the very positions dealing with this paperwork and pointing to the infeasibility of the system. In the end, the USCIS suspended the reporting system, admitting that such massive information provided by the colleges and universities simply prevented the USCIS from being able to manage the data efficiently and effectively.

Similarly, analyses *for* policy itself such as data information marshaled for policy making, advocacy for better policy-making systems, and policy advocacy activities of political actors can substantially and dynamically influence the process of policy formulation. For example, various political actors within and outside of the government have been analyzing the SEVIS (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System), which can be regarded as one of the major policy changes affecting both international students and international education practitioners in the recent years in order to advocate for a better system. While the purpose of this dissertation is neither presenting data for policy considerations nor making suggestions for the further SEVIS reform, this dissertation will try to understand the policy process behind the important changes in the SEVIS. Here, I will examine who has made these analyses for policy, and how these analyses have influenced the changes. Apparently, the most active political actors making these analyses have included NAFSA, representing the practical voices from its members as international education practitioners who are the main people managing the information on campus and reporting it to the government.

This dissertation inevitably needs to refer to the contents, outputs, and evaluations of policies governing international student access as well as political actors' analyses for policy. However, this dissertation primarily aims to describe the policy

process. As Hill (1997) asserts, in spite of the traditional dominance of prescription rather than description in policy studies (particularly until the 1980s), it is appropriate "to explore the nature of the policy process to help to ensure that proposals about policy content or about how to change policy should be grounded in the real world in which policy is made" (p. 5), and it is increasingly imperative to "try to understand the policy process – however irrational or uncontrollable it may seem to be – as a crucial first step towards trying to bring it under control" (p. 5).

The first sophisticated model of the policy process was developed by David Easton in the 1960s. In Easton's Systems Models, "public policy process is seen as the product of a system that processes inputs, such as issues pressures, information, thereby by producing outputs, such as laws, regulations or other statements of policy" (Birkland, 2005, p. 201). Easton and his followers argue that the system, which produces the public policy process, is influenced by and influences the structural, social, political, and economic environment in which it operates. Systems Models, however, see the interaction between the system and environment as the 'black box,' and do not explain how the interactions are made in the 'black box.' Although a Systems Model is useful in helping to make sure that all aspects of policy making are taken into account, researchers of policy studies gradually started trying to open the black box, and ask if the policy process can be considered as systematically as the Systems Model asserts.

Arguably, the studies about international student access to U.S. higher education have tended to take this black box for granted. The system of a black box is one where the transition from input to output is left vague, and has been outside the scope of the researchers' inspection. The frequently identified inputs include the following: the major

events (e.g., World War II, Cold War, the transformation of global economy, and terrorist attacks) affecting international student access; basic constitutional structure (e.g., lack of the federal responsibility for education in general); and political key political actors (e.g., the Departments of State and Homeland Security, Immigration and Naturalization Services, legislators, business industry and the higher education community). The implementation of legislation and regulation as the output from this black box has also been explored to some degrees. However, the slippery human interaction among the key political actors affecting and being affected by the policy formulation and implementation as well as their environments has seldom attracted the researchers' interests. Although the previous literature has sometimes mentioned NAFSA as a spearhead group in the international education community advocating for international student access, its roles in the policy process have not been fully examined, as the literature's interests are not in the interaction among the key political actors.

The Systems Model also compliments the heuristic of a classical Stages Model of policy making. The Stages Model is often employed by students of the policy process, as they are frequently taught in high school civic classes, and are depicted in most introductory public policy textbook. The Stages Model assumes that policy making proceeds in stages, from issue emergence, agenda setting, alternative selection, enactment, implementation, evaluation, and feedback. This model is helpful in structuring our thinking about the policy process. Major critiques of the Stages Model, however, are that many ideas may not get beyond the mere discussion or agenda setting stage, and that implementation and evaluation cannot be separated as policy implementation always entails policy evaluation. In response to the dissatisfaction with the Stages Model, a

number of more sophisticated models have been proposed by political scientists particularly since the early 1980s. Thomas A. Birkland (2005) explains that, among them, there are three most prominent models of policy process.

Birkland (2005) lists the three recent major approaches to the study of the policy process. The first is the Multiple Streams Model, which was devised by John Kingdon. Kingdon, in his *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* (originally published in 1984). This model argues that the likelihood of policy changes increases when the policy, politics and problem streams moves together. The second is the Punctuated Equilibrium Model, which was introduced by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. In their *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (1993), borrowing insights from evolutionary biology, Baumgartner and Jones suggest that policy making is characterized by long periods of stability followed by relatively sudden shifts in attention to problems, thereby leading to opportunities for policy change. The third is the Advocacy Coalition Framework, developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, which this dissertation uses as its main conceptual framework.

Contrary to political-systems perspectives (e.g., Easton, 1965), a traditionally popular framework to understand higher education policy making, the Multiple Streams Model sees the role of political actors as centrally important. This Multiple Streams Model is a revised model of the Garbage Can Theory (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) for political science research, which originally applied a systemic-anarchic perspective to the explanation of organizational decision making in higher education seemingly not in compliance with rationality. Like the four streams of the Garbage Can Theory (i.e., problems, solutions, choice opportunities, and participants), Kingdon (1984)

conceptualizes three independent streams in the governmental predecision process which help create or frame the policy window. The first stream is about ‘problems.’ This stream is composed of the recognition and definition of ‘conditions’ as ‘problems’ based on indicators, focusing events, or feedback. The second stream is about ‘policies.’ This stream is composed of the formulation and specification of alternatives or solutions through the imposition of a set of criteria developed by certain political actors. The third stream is about ‘politics.’ This stream is composed of the dynamics and shifts in national mood, administration, congressional distributions, and interest groups in terms of their pressure of their demands on government. According to Kingdon (1984), when these three streams with lives of their own are joined together, a ‘policy window’ temporarily opens, and the probability that a subject rises on governmental agendas is enhanced.

For the Punctuated Equilibrium Model, the key idea is the policy monopoly, which is a concentrated and closed system of the most important actors in policy making. The ‘iron triangle’ is composed of legislators, government agencies, and interest groups. This policy monopoly can remain closed and stable for a long time. However, due to either greater media attention to an issue or political actors’ venue shopping to find the best venue in which to press their interests, these policy monopolies break down. According to Baumgartner and Jones, policy change is not merely incremental and not in a state of constant flux.

These two models can be powerful tools to interpret the policy processes behind the recent changes affecting the access of international student access to U.S. higher education. Using the Multiple Streams Model, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, in which two international students were reported to be involved, can be regarded as a

focusing event as in the problem stream leading to the establishment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996. The IIRAIRA included the platform for the SEVIS, which was one of the solutions to cope with the possible terrorist encroachment. It could be explained that a computerized and on-line based student tracking system was presented as a specific alternative in the policy stream. Further, the historical change in the composition of the Congress with the majority of Republicans both in the Senate and House in the 104th Congress may be interpreted as a politics stream for the enactment of the IIRAIRA of 1996.

Similarly, the Punctuated Equilibrium Model would reasonably depict the policy process behind the full implementation of the SEVIS in 2003 as a direct result of the September 11 attacks in 2001. While the international student tracking system (i.e., the SEVIS and CIPRIS as its predecessor) had been postponed for its full implementation due to the strong oppositions from the international education community spearheaded by NAFSA in the late 1990s, this issue does not seem to have attracted media coverage enough to change the general public's positive perception about international students. In a sense, the issue had been discussed in the policy monopoly by the international education community and relatively limited government agency officials. It could be explained that this policy monopoly was broken due to the massive media coverage of the security holes of the U.S. immigration policies including regulations for international students just after the September 11 attacks. Then, a punctuated policy change in monitoring international students as the full implementation of the SEVIS came into existence.

However, there are some limitations of these two approaches. First, both the

Multiple Streams Model and the Punctuated Equilibrium Model are mainly designed to analyze particular parts of the policy process. The Multiple Streams Model was originally devised particularly for the agenda setting analysis. The Punctuated Equilibrium Model similarly places its focus on the agenda setting, even though it looks at some policy adoption segments. Compared to these two models, the ACF provides a more comprehensive framework from the agenda setting, policy adoption through implementation and evaluation. Second, these two approaches do not pay as much attention to collective actions as the ACF does. In the Multiple Streams Model, the critical roles are played by certain individuals or policy entrepreneurs. While the Punctuated Equilibrium Model pays some attention to the collective actions of political actors, "the Punctuated Equilibrium theory does not pay attention to how interests organize themselves. Rather, it pays attention to the consequence of such organization and activity" (Schlager, 2007, p. 303). On the contrary, the ACF pays very careful attention to collective actions due to its definition of a coalition, as explained later. Also, the Punctuated Equilibrium Model weighs the importance of the general public for policy changes, while the ACF pays more attention to specialists in the policy domain. Since my main focus is the collective actions of NAFSA as a specialist and professional association, the ACF will be more helpful in analyzing the issue as follows.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)

This dissertation utilizes some of the key insights provided by the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to explore the roles of international educators in the policy process regarding international student access to U.S. higher education. While, as explained below, the ACF has evolved with its new components over the years, this

dissertation specifically uses its 2005 version (see Appendix B) presented in the article of Sabatier & Weible (2007). Because the ACF is an encompassing framework, this dissertation will focus a segment of the framework; namely, the policy subsystem component. To provide a better understanding this policy subsystem, however, Chapter Five presents a brief overview of the context of this specific policy area regarding international students for the past six decades by discussing some of the ACF's other components that are external to the policy subsystem component.

The ACF was originally published by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith in 1988 (i.e., Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988). Sabatier (1991) explains that the original ACF views long-term policy change as a function of three sets of factors: "the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem/community," "changes external to the subsystem," and "the effects of stable system parameters" (pp. 151-153). In terms of the first set of factor, the ACF defines 'policy subsystems' as "the interaction of actors from different institutions interested in a policy area" (Sabatier, 1988, p. 131), and further assumes that "actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from various organizations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert" (Sabatier, 1988, p. 133). This dissertation argues that NAFSA has been one of these policy participants in the advocacy coalitions interested in the issue of international student access.

While there have been minor additions in their elements, the other two sets of factors mentioned above are still relevant to the most recent version of the ACF summarized by Sabatier & Weible (2007). According to the 2005 version of the ACF, external events as a set of factors affecting policy change include the following: changes

in socio-economic conditions, changes in public opinion, changes in systemic governing coalition, and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. In the context of international student access to U.S. higher education, these events may be the intensification and then the end of the Cold War, the expansion of global economy, and U.S. immigration policy and foreign policies. As far as stable system parameters are concerned, the 2005 version of the ACF includes these: basic attributes of the problem area (good), basic distributions of natural resources, fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure, and basic constitutional structure. Clearly, one of these stable parameters for the policy subsystem of international student access may be the fact that constitutionally the U.S. has no vested authority for education policy as a whole.

The original ACF of 1988 emphasizes its three basic premises. The first premise is that it requires at least a decade to study the process of policy change. The second premise is that a focus on policy subsystem as an aggregated unit, not any specific governmental institutions, is the best way to examine policy change over such a long time. The third premise is that public policies can be conceptualized in much the same way as belief systems. Here, 'belief system' means a "set of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them" (Sabatier, 1988, p. 131). In addition to these three original premises, the ACF has introduced other premises. Sabatier (1993) includes another premise that policy subsystems consist of a variety of political actors across multiple governmental levels. Further, the other assertion that technical information plays a crucial role in the public policy process is presented at the beginning of the list of the ACF's premises of the 1998 version. The most recent overview of the ACF by Sabatier & Weible (2007) does not provide an explicit list of these as the premises of the ACF, but all

of them are clearly explained as the key assumptions.

Since its first publication, the ACF has been used in many policy analyses, and has also been developed and modified significantly by both the original authors and other researchers. While the primary policy area of the ACF's early research was U.S. energy and environmental policy, the scope has been expanded with no less than ninety case studies using the ACF about not only the policies of the U.S. but also those of many other parts of the world (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). These case studies' policy areas include environmental or energy, taxation, public health, drugs, culture, education, sports, and domestic violence. One of the few studies about U.S. higher education undertaken through the lens of the ACF is a study by Christine Shakespeare (2008). Shakespeare examines the use of information in the budget process with special reference to New York State's higher education tuition assistance program, and concludes that the ACF is a useful framework for the analysis of higher education policy making, particularly in terms of the ACF's emphasis on the importance of the use of information in the policy process. My investigation so far has not identified any research on international education substantially using the ACF for its analysis.

In spite of the significant expansion of scope for the past twenty years, the ACF has continued to conceptualize a three-tiered belief system throughout its theoretical development. Relying on the recent overview of the ACF by Sabatier & Weible (2007), I explain the three-tiered belief system below (i.e., deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary beliefs), noting, however, that I cannot specifically study these three tiers due to the scope of this research.

Deep core beliefs operate at the broadest level, and across most policy

subsystems. Deep core beliefs encompass normative and ontological assumptions which are of great universality. These assumptions are about "human nature, the relative priority of fundamental values such as liberty and equality, the relative priority of the welfare of different groups, the proper role of government vs. markets in general, and about who should participate in governmental decisionmaking" (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 194). The conventional spectrum between conservatives and liberals lie at this deep core level. It is the most difficult to change deep core beliefs among the three-tier beliefs because these beliefs are formed for the most part during the childhood.

Policy core beliefs come at the next level. These beliefs are narrower in scope (i.e., subsystem-wide in scope), not operating across most policy subsystems as deep core beliefs. The ACF regards these policy core beliefs as the applications of deep core beliefs to a specific policy subsystem. The ACF generally assumes that the policy participants' wealth of knowledge about relationships within their subsystem may encourage them to endeavor for the application of certain deep core beliefs to the development of policy core beliefs in that system. However, a deep core belief does not always correspond to a certain policy core belief in any policy subsystems. For example, Sabatier & Weible (2007) point out that some conservatives who recognize market failure, such as externality in the problem of water pollution, could indicate significant support for government intervention, while conservatives usually tend to prefer market solutions. The eleven components of policy core beliefs defined by Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999) include these: "the priority of different policy-related values, whose welfare counts, the relative authority of governments and markets, the proper roles of the general public, elected officials, civil servants, experts, and the relative seriousness and causes of policy

problems in the subsystem as a whole" (p. 183). Given their scope as subsystem-wide and their operation for fundamental policy choices, policy core beliefs are also highly resistant to change.

Secondary beliefs make up the narrowest level. The secondary beliefs' scope is less than subsystem-wide. What these secondary beliefs address include these: "detailed rules and budgetary applications within a specific program, the seriousness and causes of problems in a specific locale, public participation guidelines within a specific stature" (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, pp. 196). Secondary beliefs are less resistant to change, compared to policy core beliefs. The ACF argues that the main reason for this relative variability is that due to secondary beliefs' narrower scope than policy core beliefs', less evidence and fewer agreements among the policy participants in the subsystem are needed for the change in secondary beliefs.

Within a policy subsystem policy, participants sharing a set of basic belief are engaged in non-trivial degree of coordinated activity in order to influence a policy with similar policy objectives. Under the ACF, an advocacy coalition is formed if policy participants who seek allies sharing a set of basic beliefs among the other policy participants are engaged in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity.

The ACF argues that a strategy for altering government behavior which reflects the belief system of the coalition is adopted by each coalition at any particular point of time. "Policy brokers," termed specifically by the ACF, usually mediate conflicting strategies from various coalitions. Policy brokers are more concerned with the stability of the policy subsystem than achieving policy goals, and try to find some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense conflict between the coalitions. The end result from

these interactions within the policy subsystem is governmental programs. These programs in turn produce policy outputs such as agency decisions. “These outputs–mediated by a number of other factors–result in a variety of impacts on targeted problem parameters … as well as in various side effects” (Sabatier, 1993, p. 19).

Until the 1999 version, the ACF argued that there are two paths for policy change over time: policy-oriented learning and external perturbations. First, major policy changes essentially resulted from the factors external to the subsystem such as socio-economic conditions, governing coalition, and other subsystem’s decisions. The ACF argues that perturbations in non-cognitive factors external to the policy subsystem (e.g., socio-economic conditions, turnover in key personnel, and realigning elections) are a necessary but not sufficient condition for major policy change within a subsystem. These external shocks can lead to shifts in agendas, attention of the general public, as well as key decisionmaking sovereigns. Most importantly in terms of its effect, an external shock can redistribute resources or open and close venues within a policy subsystem. As a result, the previously dominant coalition can be replaced by a minority coalition. It might be also possible that the component of the policy core beliefs of a dominant advocacy coalition can be transformed by these external shocks.

A second path of policy changes over time, although rather minor compared to the first path, is through policy-oriented learning, in which a coalition makes an effort to understand the world in order to its policy goals. “The ACF defines policy-oriented learning as relatively enduring alternations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experience and/or new information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, P. 123). In this sense,

researchers and journalists are very important policy participants for the ACF. The ACF asserts that secondary beliefs can be often altered by policy-oriented learning because secondary beliefs do not require much evidence and belief change among a great number of individuals, given that secondary beliefs are narrow in scope. However, deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs, as being more normative, are very resistant to change in response to new information through this kind of policy-oriented learning.

Sabatier & Weible (2007) explain three important additions to the 1988 version of the ACF. The first addition is coalition opportunity structures, which is a response to one of the most frequent criticism of the ACF as too much a product of its empirical origins in American pluralism. In order to apply the ACF to a less pluralistic society (e.g., Westminster, Corporatist and authoritarian styles) in other countries such as European and developing countries, the impact of coalition opportunity structures in terms of the openness of a political system and degree of consensus needed for major policy change is now taken into consideration. The second addition is a typology of coalition resources. “Much subsequent research has focused on the content of belief systems, but virtually none has focused on coalition resource” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 201). The typology includes the following: formal legal authority to make policy decisions, public opinion, information, mobilizable troops, financial resources, and skillful leadership. The third addition is ‘internal shocks’ as alternative paths to major policy change. The most recent version of ACF recognizes the redistribution of redistribute critical political resources resulted from both external and internal shocks. While the minority advocacy coalition may confirm policy core belief through such internal shocks (e.g., disaster from within policy subsystem), the dominant coalition may doubt its policy core beliefs. The ACF

now regards both internal and external shocks as important causes for policy change, while maintaining the distinction between these two types of shocks.

Chapter Three: Literature Review

The topic of international educators' roles in the federal policy process, which is my main interest, has seldom been examined as a major research question in the literature. Therefore, this chapter reviews the previous literature on three broader areas which are important to understand in order for later chapters to better examine directly my main topic. These broader areas to review in this section are as follows: the general relationship between U.S. higher education and the federal government, various views about enrolling international students in terms of their positive and negative impact, and U.S. federal policies governing international student access to U.S. higher education. These three areas which have attracted considerable attention in the previous literature will help me to further understand my focus in this dissertation.

This chapter first briefly explores how the U.S. higher education community, to which the majority of international educators belong, and the federal government are related to each other. The two main focuses of this exploration are the higher education community's contradicting struggles for autonomy and resources from the federal government, and the federal government's tendency to see higher education as the means not the ends of federal policy. With this peculiar relationship in mind, this chapter goes on to review the literature on American stakeholders' views about the upsides and downsides of enrolling international students. In doing so, therefore, this part of the literature review particularly attempts to differentiate the views about the upsides and downsides on two levels: institutional and national. Lastly, this chapter examines the literature on the federal policies with its two major roles governing international student access to U.S. higher education: regulatory and promotional. The literature concerning

both regulatory and promotional policies is reviewed, while taking into account the views of the international student impacts from the U.S. national and institutional perspectives reviewed earlier.

The Federal Government and Higher Education

While it is often said that the U.S. federal government has not developed any comprehensive policies regarding international students (e.g., de Wit, 2002), this is also the case with higher education in general. Constance E. Cook (1998) points out that "[federal] involvement in higher education policy making has always been piecemeal, and the role of the national government is ambiguous" (p. 5). The lack of a clear mandate for federal policy regarding education is a result of the U.S. Constitution's silence on the subject of education. This silence means that the primary responsibility for education is taken by states, according to the Tenth Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Also, even before the late-18th-century establishment of public higher education institutions largely funded by states (e.g., University of Georgia and University of North Carolina), a few private institutions (e.g., Harvard and Yale) had already been established in the 17th century. Nowadays, according to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (n.d.), among the 3,500 higher education institutions with an enrollment of 17 million in the U.S., public institutions are just less than 50%, while private institutions (not for-profit and for-profit) are slightly over 50%. While more than three quarters of the total enrollment (including international students) are at the public institutions, the rest at the private institutions. Due to the Constitutional rules, the development of both public (state-funded) and private institutions into this world's largest higher education system has been made not "under the aegis of the federal government" (Cook, 1998, p. 6). There

is a general agreement that U.S. higher education is regarded as one of the most decentralize systems in the world.

However, the absence of the Constitutional mandate for higher education does not necessarily mean that the federal government has not played any roles in the development and operation of U.S. higher education. Instead, in order to meet the national needs and demands at the moment, the Congress has passed a number of legislations which have enabled the federal government to be involved in the policies regarding higher education throughout the history of the U.S.. As early as 1787, the federal land grant, although on a small scale, was provided to the states for higher education with the Northwest Ordinance enacted by the Congress of the Confederation (Trow, 1993). Far larger-scale land grants to the states for the establishment of higher education institutions were provided by the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862. This act, as one of the epoch-making statutes, however, did not really prescribe the configurations and educational programs of the new institutions in detail (Thelin, 1994). According to Francis Keppel (1991), in spite of these earlier legislations along with the Hatch Act of 1887 (providing funds for agricultural experiment stations) and the second Morrill Act of 1890 (provoking the establishment of the Historically Black institutions), which no doubt played significant roles in the expansion of U.S. higher education, there has not been any strategic federal public policy on higher education.

Moreover, since the war time period of World War II, the federal government's involvement in higher education dramatically increased in two ways: funds for research and financial aid to individual students. First, while scientific and educational leaders had once opposed governmental intrusion into the domain of research during World War I,

the growing pressure from the wartime emergency resulted in a substantial flow of federal grants into the U.S. university research system during World War II (Geiger, 2004). After its boom in the 1950s and 1960s, the federal financial support has continued to be the primary source for the university based research system (Gladieux, Hauptman, & Knapp, 1994). Talking about the post war era, Cook points out that “many of [a large number of federal research initiatives] were tied to strategic national defense objectives” (1998, p. 6). Donald Heller (n.d.) points out that the federal support for university based research has been coupled with national priorities, whose changes can be demonstrated by the examinations about the shares of individual departments’ and agencies’ spending amount in the total federal support for university based research. According to Heller’s examples, the priorities were given to energy-related research at the time of the oil crises in the late 1970s, to military research along with the creation of new defense initiatives in the 1980s, and to health-related research prompted by the end of the Cold War as well as by the prospective arrival of the aging society in the U.S.

Second, there have been several major legislations which have substantially provided federal support to individual students since the end of World War II. The federal government started its massive support to individual students in higher education through the GI Bill of 1944, which drastically expanded U.S. higher education with the enrollments of millions of veterans who could not have attended colleges without the financial aid under the GI Bill. Thelin (1994) explained, however, that the GI Bill did not aim the expansion of higher education as its direct objective, but the GI Bill was primarily to reward the veterans and ease the anticipated unemployment problems in the transition to a peacetime economy from World War II. The National Defense Education

Act (NDEA) of 1958, in response to the Soviet Union's launch of the Sputnik satellite, promoted particularly the study opportunities of science, mathematics, and foreign languages by various federal financial supports including the student loan program. Michael D. Parsons (1997) explains the importance of the NDEA as an epoch-making legislation which demonstrated the possibility to legitimate federal financial aid to education over the conventional obstacles. However, "[education] continued to be an instrument for reaching other, primary policy objectives. In this case [i.e., NDEA], education was the means to reach an end, that is, national defense" (Parsons, 1997, p. 35).

Moreover, in the context of the civil rights movement, the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 was enacted to provide, in addition to some institutional aid, massive direct federal financial support to individual students both at undergraduate and graduate levels in a variety of forms such as grants, loans, and fellowships. Financial aid for individual students has become central to federal support for U.S. higher education. As Parsons (1997) emphasizes, the HEA of 1965 "was part of a larger plan to use education to fight poverty, to give the disenfranchised access to education, to create educational opportunities where none had existed, and to promote a peaceful transformation to a Great Society" (p. 37). By providing this financial support for students, the federal government has used the higher education system as an instrument for social reform. Subsequently, however, since the passage of the HEA of 1965, several amendments to the HEA (e.g., the liberalization of the income limits in the loan programs in particular) as well as the passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 have made the federal government primary aim for the financial support for students shift from "meeting the college access

needs of poor students to subsidizing college affordability for student from wealthier families" (Heller, n.d. para. 17). This shift appears to be aimed to meet the national needs for competitive human resources required in the knowledge-based global economy. As Gladieux et al. (1994) concluded, the federal support the U.S. higher education is anticipated to be aimed for economic competitiveness rather than at educational development per se.

Given these increasingly substantial federal funds, as Cook argues, "[while] American institutions have an unusual amount of independence and autonomy by comparison with institutions in most other countries, it is increasingly difficult to find a single aspect of college or university activity that remains unaffected by the federal government in one way" (1998, p. 8). On the one hand, the highly decentralized characteristics of U.S. higher education have allowed colleges and universities to enjoy a high-level of autonomy. Robert O. Berdahl and T. R. McConnell (1994) explain that because of the very nature of the complicated and unpredictable process of learning and research, higher education institutions find it necessary not to make their intellectual activities hampered by the external interference and controls so that colleges and universities can function effectively. Institutional autonomy is related to but not identical with academic freedom, which is the free search for truth and its free exposition essential to both teaching and research on campus. Meanwhile, some (e.g. Dressel, 1980) argue that academic freedom is not secured by institutional autonomy, and that regulations affecting the institutional autonomy have relatively little impacts on academic freedom.

On the other hand, as Gladieux et al. (1994) argue, there are two justifications for the federal regulations affecting the U.S. higher education institutions: responsible

requirements for the receptions of the federal support; and the mandates by the social related laws, including executive orders and legal judgments. For example, “Washington has used its financial aid, as provided in the Higher Education Act and its amendments, to enforce affirmative action objectives by threatening to cut off student financial aid at institutions that do not comply with federal mandates” (Cook, 1998, p.8). It is often argued by the higher education community that complying these federal regulations can impose significant burdens on colleges and universities in terms of their institutional finance and workforces.

Advocating for resources or autonomy from the federal government, the higher education community has been attempting to influence the federal policies which can affect higher education; for example, Cook (1998) provides a succinct overview of the community’s representatives in Washington D.C. as follows. In addition to some institutional representative offices, there are a great number of higher education related associations, each of which represents various aspects of higher education: associations of institutions of general types, those of people with the same institutional roles, those of people with the same general concerns (e.g., NAFSA is one of this kind), and those of people with the same type of task. Among these associations, there are six major associations which are presidentially based: the American Council on Education (ACE) as the national coordinating body for U.S. higher education, the American Association of Community Colleges (AACC), the Associations of American Universities (AAU), the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU), and the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC). These six

associations “have been the important players in the [policy] domain [of higher education] for several decades and are viewed as permanent fixtures” (Cook, 1998, p. 10).

As Hugh Hawkins (1992) explains, however, the higher education community in the U.S. was reluctant to have their representatives in Washington D.C. called ‘lobbyists” for a long time. In practice, Cook (1998) clarified the representative paradox facing the higher education community in general. While its aggressive approach like the ordinary lobbyists could make the higher education community take a risk of losing the conventional support from the people who regard higher education as ‘high-minded, above the fray,’ its gentler representation in Washington D.C. than those ordinary lobbyists could result in a weaker position of higher education in terms of public attention and agenda. “As a result, the higher education community historically lobbied in a somewhat half-hearted manner, if at all” (Cook, 1998, p. 4). However, Cook’s research points to a paradigm shift in higher education advocacy toward something more active in the recent years.

This dissertation assumes that most of these characteristics reviewed so far about the relationships between the federal government and higher education in general are either manifested or embedded in the issues concerning international education, more specifically, concerning international students in U.S. higher education. The characteristics of decentralized higher education in the U.S. appear to have largely shaped the policy making, not only at the institutional but also the national levels, about the issues concerning international students. Also, as demonstrated later in this dissertation, the federal government seems to have used the promotion of and control

over international student access as instruments to meet other national objectives (e.g., foreign policy, national security, economic competitiveness). The issues of international student access also appear to encompass the tension between the federal government and the U.S. higher education institutions in terms of the distribution of resources and regulations (e.g., the Fulbright Program and immigration policies). Moreover, as in the tendency of the higher education community in the U.S., American advocacy activities for international education, including the issues of international students, may have just recently become active long after being rather 'half-hearted.' In comparison with the top-down development of internationalization in Europe, however, de Wit (2002) explains that "[the] lack of an active national policy for postsecondary education and more autonomous character of American higher education are the main reasons for this active advocacy culture in international education in the United States" (p. 77). In this respect, international educators' involvement in the federal policy process is worth analyzing.

Values in Enrolling International Students: Upsides and Downsides

This dissertation pays special attention to the views about the upsides and downsides of enrolling international students in U.S. higher education, as this dissertation assumes that these views consist of an important part of beliefs among the U.S. stakeholders who are concerned with the issue. This special attention is guided by this dissertation's conceptual framework, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF regards policy as the result of competition and debate between the advocacy coalitions which coalesce around a shared set of beliefs. Political actors' views about these benefits and costs appear related to the reasons why certain actors advocate for

some policies governing international student access and against others.

There are various kinds of literature which includes discussions about the upsides and/or downsides of enrolling international students. For example, some of these discussions can be found in such documents as political statements and studies produced by the U.S. stakeholders, some of whom advocate for international student access to U.S. higher education, and others of whom advocate against. Depending on the stakeholders' attitude towards the issue, their documents tend to emphasize either the positive or negative impacts of promoting international students access. Meanwhile, there have been a number of cost-benefit analyses of enrolling international students in U.S. higher education. These analyses consider both the upsides and downsides, often largely from pecuniary perspectives, while some attempt to pay much attention to non-pecuniary impacts of enrolling international students. Closely related to the examinations of the impacts of enrolling international students, furthermore, researchers have academically explored various rationales for international education in general. These explorations are to analyze the motivations for the integration of an international dimension into higher education at large. The scope of such rationale literature tends to be broad geographically and thematically; that is, neither specifically in the U.S. context, nor particularly about international student affairs.

Among these discussions, the conventional categorization of rationales for the internationalization of higher education gives a helpful framework to this literature review as a whole on the upsides and downsides of enrolling international students. Since the second half of the 1990s, many researchers (e.g., Altbach, 2004; Callan, 2000; de Wit, 2002; Knight, 2006; Knight, & de Wit, 1997, 1999; and Van der Wende, 1997, 1998)

have used the four generic categories in analyzing the rationales: political, economic, cultural/social, and academic. It is also pointed out that there is an important linkage between rationales and stakeholders (Knight & de Wit, 1995). On the one hand, while the rationale literature often pays much more attention to the stakeholders' perceptions about the positive impacts in exploring the motivations for the internationalization of higher education, this literature review expands this framework of four categories to the examination of their perceived negative impacts to the same extent. On the other hand, this dissertation narrows the scope of the framework to the issue of international students. Some discussions in the rationale literature (e.g., foreign language learning and area studies) appear to be less relevant to the issue of international students.

There are other arguments in such rationale discussions which are also insightful to this literature review, too. For example, de Wit (2002) points out that these rationales are not mutually exclusive, and that the priorities in rationales are different between and within stakeholders, and that the priorities have shifted over the years. More recently, examining these now accepted four groups of rationales for internationalization of higher education, Knight (2006, p. 215) points out that "there seems to be more blurring or integration of the rationales across categories and thus perhaps less clarity on … what constitutes a political or economic rationale. The four categories of rationales do not distinguish between national and institutional level rationales." Nevertheless, as Knight (2006) continues to argue, the framework of the four groups of rationales is still very useful in examining the fundamental driving force of the various stakeholders who want to address and invest in the internationalization of higher education. This usefulness can be applied not only to the contemporary policy process regarding international student

access to U.S. higher education, but also to a retrospect analysis of the perceptions of benefits and costs of hosting international students over the years since the aftermath of World War II.

In addition, following Knight's (2006) argument for a revision in the rationale analysis, this literature review will also pay attention to the differentiation between the institutional and national levels when considering the views of the benefits and costs of enrolling international students. Knight (2006) points out that "[rationales] are the driving force for why a country, sector or institution wants to address and invest in internationalization" (p. 215). Because this dissertation is to examine the role of international educators, the majority of whom are working in higher education institutions, in the federal policy process, this literature review will attempt to outline the upsides and downsides both from the institutional and national perspectives.

Upsides. According to de Wit (2002), the U.S. has been more interested in political rationales than economic, social/cultural and academic rationales. He points out that political rationales' subcategories in general can include foreign policy, national security, technical assistance, peace and mutual understanding, national identity, and regional identity. Particularly in the U.S., in the wake of the Cold War just after World War II, the discourse about the benefits hardly included economic perspectives, but was highly political. "Although peace and mutual understanding continued to be a driving rationale in theory, national security and foreign policy were the real forces behind its expansion and with it came government funding and regulations" (de Wit, 2002, p. 25). Further, de Wit (2002) explains the peace-driven rationale, which has been dominant in the U.S., while he warns against the simple sympathy without consideration. On the one

hand, de Wit points out that there are a great number of examples of peace-driven rationales along with technical assistance rationales in American studies, documents, and political statements. On the other hand, he also states that “although it is quite tempting to sympathize with such a view of internationalization of higher education, one should be careful with such a purely political rationale for internationalization” (p. 88). He continues to ask, “was and is higher education in the rest of the world in the position to place its understanding on equal terms with that of the American … academic world?” (p. 88).

Whatever perception about the U.S. peace-driven rationale has the rest of the world had, this kind of foreign-policy-oriented views about the benefits of enrolling international students in the U.S. appear to have developed and maintained the State Department’s flagship Fulbright Program, which set the activities to promote the flow of international students into U.S. higher education for decades since the late 1940s. According to Senator Fulbright’s words presented at the celebration of the Fulbright Program’s fortieth anniversary, the primary goals of the Fulbright Program were “to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange … and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world” (quoted in Gayner, 1996, p. 1). In their historical over-all view of the Fulbright Program, published in the mid 1960s, Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan argued that “it became vital to the national security to understand the minds of people in other societies and to have American aspirations and problems understood by others” (W. Johnson & Colligan, 1965, p. 9).

Educating foreign nationals in the U.S. higher education institutions has become one of the important vehicles for the U.S. foreign policy and national security. Tsvetkova (2008) points out that the U.S. government during the Cold War used international exchange programs, such as the Fulbright Program, in order to reproduce the loyalty of the dominant groups in foreign country through educational experiences in the U.S. with the expectation that these foreign participants would become friends who are sympathetic with the American political system, culture, and values. Also, Joseph Nye Jr. (2004) argues that during the Cold War, the international students particularly contributed to the U.S. influences on the world in terms of soft power, which is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies." Even after the September 11 attacks in 2001, the then U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated during International Education Week in November, 2001, that "I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here" (2001). In the same vein, responding to the decrease in the number of international students in U.S. higher education reported in 2004, Nye (November 29, 2004) reconfirmed in the *New York Times* that the international students who return home with American ideas add to the U.S. soft power.

Next, according to de Wit (2002), the U.S. has just recently started to pay much attention to economic rationales, while continuing to regard the political rationales as very important. Among his four subcategories of economic rationales, de Wit argues that economic growth and competitiveness (i.e., international education's "positive effect on technological development and thus on economic growth") seem to have become the

most important rationales for many countries since the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, Joseph Johnston and Richard Edelstein (1993) pointed out the internationalization of U.S. higher education had started to be discussed mostly in the context of ensuring the nation's economic competitiveness. In discussing the State Department's Fulbright Program toward the twenty-first century, Groennings (1997) also pointed to the paradigm shift in American foreign policy from the Cold War to global knowledge economy. Groennings's discussion about this new foreign policy with economic consideration appears to demonstrate the increasingly blurring borders between political and economic rationales. As far as international students are concerned, de Wit's (2002) concrete example for the economic subcategory as 'economic growth and competitiveness' is future economic relations only, such as international trade and business. He points out that many host countries hope that international students will become decision makers with gratitude and sympathy toward their host countries after returning to their home countries.

Although not included by de Wit (2002), the rapidly growing competition for the best and brightest international students in the recent years appears to be related to the upsides of enrolling international students in terms of economic growth and competitiveness. For example, as discussed in a GAO (Government Accountability Office) forum convened by the Comptroller General of the U.S. in 2006, leaders from government, universities, research institutions, higher education organizations, and industry recognized the fact that international students bring needed skills to the increasingly knowledge-based U.S. economy. In this regard, international students are seen as contributors to the host countries, not only as the useful research and teaching

assistant during their studies in higher education, but also as the talented workforce after they graduate. Jane Knight (2006) identifies this brain power recruitment as being of emerging importance linked to economic and political rationales at the national level. According to a policy brief of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2004), this contribution of international students is sought by some North American and European countries with the skilled migration approach to cross-border education, which has a strong economic that drive emerged in the 1990s. This OECD policy brief points out that the U.S. takes this approach particularly at the graduate level education. In fact, de Wit (2002) refers to this contribution of international students in terms of 'institution-building,' one of his academic rationales, instead of part of economic rationales. He points to North American educators' long awareness of the resource value of international graduate students as research and teaching assistants. Further, de Wit warns that these roles of international students may cause the brain drain problem as the negative impact (see Knight, 2006, for the similar concern).

Another economic upside for the stakeholders in the host countries to promote international student access is income generation, particularly from high tuition fees for these students. "[Countries] are showing increased interest in the potential for exporting education for economic benefit" (Knight, 2006, p. 217). As de Wit (2002) argues, these benefits have become financial incentives not only for national governments, but also for institutions in some English-speaking countries such as the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand. The OECD policy brief (2004) mentioned above also discusses this trend which has resulted in substantial growth of fee-paying student mobility around the world, explaining the increasingly entrepreneurial approach of the institutions with support from

their governments and favorable trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Although this policy brief regards the United States (for undergraduates) as one of the examples taking this approach, de Wit points out that "[the] United State, the leading country in receiving international students, has until now been able to maintain that position without active investment in recruitment campaigns, based mainly on status and reputation, but more recently has become concerned by the competition" (2002, pp. 91-92).

Although the U.S. has been arguably less interested in the economic benefits than other host countries until very recently, there have been a number of cost-benefit analyses since the early 1980s which particularly raised the issues of economic impact, both in positive and negative terms, of enrolling international students in the U.S. higher education institutions. For example, Donald Winkler's (1984) study of international students, taking into account the impact on the U.S. society in pecuniary and non-pecuniary terms, was one of the earliest attempts of public policy analysis to apply the thorough cost-benefit model to international students in U.S. higher education. He attempted to analyze the costs and benefits from national, state-tax payer, and institutional perspectives. As Winkler explained, his predecessor researchers' application of the cost-benefit model to these international students had been rather limited. The study by Herbert Grubel and Anthony Scott (1966) was a cost analysis of international students, but did not examine the benefits. Mary Jean Bowman and Robert Myers (1967) did not specify the issues of international students, but they used a cost-benefit model to analyze migration as a whole.

Without an existing powerful model to compare the benefits and costs of hosting

international students in U.S. higher education at the time of his research, Winkler (1984) regarded Mark Blaug's (1981) study about the international students' impact on British society as a useful guide. With some modifications required to apply Blaug's model to the U.S. context, Winkler evaluated the economic benefits such as tuition payments, payment for living, market values of research and teaching conducted by international graduate students, taxes paid to government, the contribution of U.S.-trained foreign professionals to U.S. exports, the impact of direct purchases on U.S. aggregate demand, the brain drain of professionals to the U.S., and the impact on aggregate demand. In conclusion, he argued that hosting international students gives the U.S. net gains from a national perspective. While Winkler extended his discussions to political benefits such the effects of US-trained foreigners on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy as well as educational benefits, including positive impacts on the domestic students in classrooms, he did not include these non- pecuniary benefits in his balance sheet.

It is important to note that Winkler (1984) included brain drain issues as an economic benefit, which accounted for almost one third of the total benefits, although he admitted that "[there] is a reluctance on the part of some spokespersons for foreign students to regard the brain drain as a benefit" (p. 131). By contrary, as mentioned earlier, de Wit (2002) and Knight (2006) regard brain drain as a negative consequence of recruiting international students. It can be argued that brain drain issues can be regarded as a cost from a global point of view, and even from a U.S. long-term perspective. Keeping the developing countries underdeveloped by brain drain might keep those countries unstable, which may lead to world instability in the long run.

Similarly, Dresch's (1987) short research report, prepared for the Institute of

International Education, explored benefits and costs, mainly from an economic perspective. Dresch concluded that foreign students, both at undergraduate and graduate levels, were making significant positive contributions to the stabilization of the U.S. higher education system. Dresch pointed out that international undergraduate students were easing the existence of significant excess capacities with the declining domestic student population in the 1980s, given that the marginal costs of hosting international students at the undergraduate level would be relatively low. Further, Dresch argued that international graduate students "constituted a highly elastic source of talent to a sector relatively starved of domestic talent, contributing to the effectiveness of the research enterprise" (p. 23).

As far as the impacts of international students on the U.S. economy are concerned, NAFSA's annual *Economic Impact Statements* has shown that they are substantially positive. For years, this annual report has estimated the amount of money spent by international students in the U.S. to support their education. According to the most recent statement (NAFSA, 2008), international students and their dependents in the U.S. generated $15.5 billion into the U.S. economy during the 2007-08 academic year. For the calculation of this annual report, NAFSA uses two data sets from two sources: *Open Doors* of the Institute of International Education (IIE) and Peterson's. The number of international students has been provided by the former data set, while expenses such as tuition, living, and miscellaneous cost, by the latter. For NAFSA, these two sets of data have been analyzed by Jason Baumgartner at Indiana University–Bloomington's Office of International Services. The figures of *Economic Impact Statements* have been often quoted not only by advocates for international student access to U.S. higher education

when the benefits of hosting international students is being discussed, but also by the mass media.

However, David North (1999; 2008) argues that these substantially positive figures of *Economic Impact Statements* are false. North accuses IIE, instead of NAFSA, of the statistical flaws, by citing IIE's *Open Doors* which include the summary of *Economic Impact Statements*. The first alleged problem with the figures presented by *Economic Impact Statements* is its ignorance of the hidden subsidies to higher education which American tax money and endowments can make possible. Second, North explains that *Open Doors* is not using international students themselves as the primary data source, but international student advisers, who have understandable biases, about how these international students finance their study in the U.S. Third, North contends that a survey, funded by federal agencies, which directly asks doctoral recipients, both domestic and international, about their primary source of financial support, is a better approach. Then, North shows that the vast majority of international doctoral recipients (over 90%) received their primary source of support from U.S. higher education institutions, and that this ratio is much higher than the figure for the same question in *Open Doors* (just over 40%).

The cultural impact of enrolling international students is often considered to be related to the political impact, in particular that linked to foreign policy. As de Wit (2002) argues that "in French and American policy, this cultural function [of internationalization] constitutes a nationalist argument, one which emphasizes the export of national and cultural and moral values" (pp. 92-93). For example, Liping Bu (2003) vividly describes the process where the outbreak of the Cold War prompted the U.S. to incorporate

educational exchanges into the nation's mechanism for enabling the U.S. to take a stronger leadership in the 'free world' against the 'Communist world' led by the U.S.S.R. "Culture finally began to play an indispensable role of importance in the American power politics of international relations" (Bu, 2003, p. 7). In the 1960s, Philip Coombs (1964), a former Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs, called the cultural aspect of educational exchanges the fourth dimension of foreign policy, with the three conventional dimensions (i.e., political, economic and military). Similarly, in his article on American pressures over Japan through educational exchanges, Stanley Heginbotham (1997) does not deny the appropriateness of regarding American cultural and educational exchanges as the third sphere, with the other spheres being defense and trade.

In the years since the September 11 attacks of 2001, Knight (2006) argues, the significance of social and cultural rationales for international education still exists, but the significance is less than the political and economic rationales. She continues to point out that "[in] light of the pressing issues and challenges stemming from culturally based clashes within and between countries, it remains to be see whether there will be more interest and importance of the social/cultural and mutual understanding based rationales" (Knight, 2006, p. 218). However, the belief in these combined rationales may justify the promotion of international student access advocated by NAFSA, whose report published after the September 11 attacks states that "Continued–indeed, enhanced–U.S. openness to international students is integral to America's security in today's world. International student exchanges are part of the solution to terrorism, not part of the problem" (NAFSA, January, 2003, p. 3).

The academic upsides of enrolling international students have been mentioned

by many researchers and advocates for international student mobility. These upsides can be divided into two groups: one related to research, and the other related to learning and teaching. First, as discussed above, a host country like the U.S. (for graduate students) has "[aimed] to attract talented students to … render its higher education and research sectors more competitive" (OECD, 2004, p. 4). Debra Stewart, President of the Council of Graduate School, holds that "[as] research assistants, these international students are key players in producing the research and innovation on which a prosperous US economy and domestic job creation depend" (May 8, 2005, para. 6). Similarly, according to the empirical study by Gnanaraj Chellaraj, Keith E. Maskus, and Aaditya Mattoo (2005), on the contributions of international students and scholars to patenting, their results strongly favor the view that "foreign graduate students and immigrants under technical visas are significant inputs into developing new technologies in the American economy" (p. 25).

Second, it is argued that the presence of international students on campus potentially make positive effects on teaching and learning for the domestic students. For example, "[international] student enrollments and international teaching assistants enable universities to offer classes to American students that would not otherwise be available" (NAFSA, January, 2003, p. 6). Further, Winkler (1984) in his cost-benefit analysis briefly referred to three potential positive impacts of international students on the learning of domestic students. He argues that brighter international students can positively stimulate the learning of domestic students, and that the cosmopolitan flavor international students bring can broaden the domestic students' views, and that international students can contribute to the learning in international/comparative-oriented courses. Although all these impacts have been observed by many, there has been very little empirical research

on these impacts of international students on the host institutions in terms of learning and teaching (e.g., Altbach, 1991).

Indeed, Bu (2003) points out that "[American] foreign student education, which could contribute to international and area studies that were developing on many campuses in the 1950s and 1960s, was not integrated with these programs" (p. 215). In the early 1980s, one of the findings of a report of the ACE's Committee on Foreign Students and Institutional Policy was that "foreign students [in U.S. higher education] are all too often an unrealized, underutilized, and unintegrated resource for relieving the startling lack of knowledge among domestic students about international matters" (ACE, 1982, p. 4). Similarly, Knight (1994) points to "a common belief that [international students] potential as catalyst and agents for internationalization has not been fully realized" (p. 7).

Downsides. One of the perceived downsides of enrolling international students in political terms can be the possible impacts on national security. Borjas (2002) takes account of the context of post September 11, and concludes a negative evaluation of hosting international students. While Borjas admits some benefits, he emphasizes the enhanced potential threats from the presence of international students in U.S. higher education (e.g., physical attacks, deemed export of technological information on mass destruction weapons). From the same concerns about national security, Malkin (2002) warns against the cost of having international students under the existing system of international student access. As early as the beginning of the 1980s, Goodwin and Natch (1983), who later became authors of *Missing the Boat* (1991), an influential book on international education in the post Cold War period, mentioned a few people's argument that the training of military-related technologies should not be given to foreign nationals

who would be against the U.S. However, Goodwin and Natch explained that “most seemed to feel that openness was the great strength of U.S. higher education and that this should be preserved” (p. 20). Even earlier during the dawn of the Cold War, some opponents to the Smith-Mundt Bill, which was to expand educational exchanges worldwide, warned that such exchanges would expose American schools to Communists and agitators (Bu, 2003), although the bill eventually passed in 1948.

Some of the major economic costs of enrolling international students were listed in Winkler’s cost-benefit analysis (1984). First, educating international students can impose additional costs on institutions. The cost of providing instruction to international students is the long-run marginal cost of instruction, not an average cost, as the proportion of international students in the total enrollment is relatively low. Winkler pointed out that it is hard to calculate the marginal costs. Second, the use of living resources such as housing, food, entertainment, health care, and local transportation is a cost to society. The more resources used by foreigners, the fewer the resources available for use by US citizens. Third, “[foreign] students use a large number of publicly provided goods and services - libraries, parks, schools, streets, public transportation, police services, fire services, etc., most of which are provided by local and state governments but funded in part by federal grants-in-aid” (Winkler, 1984, p. 120).

Further, as the report of the American Council on Education (1982) argues, all the students in U.S. higher education, international or domestic, receive a “hidden scholarship” (p. 41). According to the ACE’s recent fact sheet (n.d.), on average only one third of the actual educational cost is paid by students. The rest of the cost is subsidized by governments, institutions, and foundations. Therefore, the ACE report (1982) pointed

out that “American institutions of higher education are ill-advised to think of foreign students mainly in terms of economic gain” (p. 38). Similarly, discussing international graduate students in particular, the National Academies (2005) criticizes NAFSA’s annual *Economic Impact Statements* of its hiding the intricacies of subsidies and taxpayer support. Also, the ACE report (1982) continued to explain that “[any] institution which admits foreign students should recognize that certain costs are incurred for essential services to that constituency, but are not required for domestic students” (p. 43). Moreover, although, as discussed earlier, many argue that their inexpensive but talented labor forces as assistants can be regarded as an economic and academic benefit, this same phenomenon can be interpreted by others as the cost to the U.S. society (Matthews, 2008). In fact, the U.S. higher education institutions provide substantial financial support for international students through research and/or teaching assistantship, often by discretionally using the federally funded research grants originally awarded to the host institutions (National Science Foundation, 2000; National Science Foundation et al., 2005).

There can be some social and cultural downsides associated with the presence of international students. One of the examples which Winkler (1984) presented was any possible decline in welfare of the public resulting from political demonstrations by foreigners within the USA. This argument seemed to be influenced by the Iranian students’ demonstration on and around campus in the early 1980s. The ACE report (1982) also pointed to the conflicts between international students and local communities in the U.S. around that time period. With not only political differences, but also customary, religious, and dietary differences of the concentrated international students, relatively

unsophisticated neighboring communities got irritated, said the ACE report. However, these arguments appear to have been supported by little empirical research, but prompted by the media sources. As Colleen Ward's (2001) literature review, it seems that the impact of international students on the larger community has not been explicitly analyzed yet.

The academic downsides include the potential negative impacts of international students to the classroom. For example, Winkler (1984) argued that a high proportion of foreign students in the classroom may result in changes in class content to be more appropriate for foreign students and less suitable to domestic students. However, some surveys (e.g., E. G. Barber and R. P. Morgan [1988]) concluded that most of the professors in the U.S. higher education institutions tend not to make any substantial changes to meet the needs of international students. Particularly, Smith's research revealed that American instructors tend to adopt an assimilationist attitude by which they expect international students to adapt themselves to the American educational system. Nonetheless, although there have been very limited empirical studies about the international students' exact impact on classroom, there are some negative perceptions about such impact (Ward, 2001). For example, some international students from non-English speaking backgrounds "may be seen, from the perspective of domestic students, to "waste" too much class time on peripheral issues. In addition, cross-cultural differences in teaching and learning expectations may precipitate awkwardness or discomfort amongst staff and students, both domestic and international" (Ward, 2001).

Winkler (1984) also discussed the possible effect where "the enrollment of foreign students may in some cases deny opportunities to domestic students to matriculate in programs or to obtain teaching or research assistantships" (p. 121). He

continued to argue that this denial of opportunity may impose real costs on society if shortages of skilled labor develops as a result (e.g., the supply of engineering researchers and teachers), taking into account the possibility of the return of international students to their home countries in the end. Similarly, Borjas (2004) concludes that “there is a strong negative correlation between increases in the number of foreign students enrolled at a particular university and the number of white native men in that university's graduate program” (p. 1). This crowed-out effect, particularly against domestic minority students, has been mentioned by some anti-immigrant advocators. However, others argue that there is no evidence that international students have crowded out minority students. Instead, the presence of internationals students can allow some department, which otherwise cannot continue to exist, to enroll domestic students (The National Academies, 2005).

From another point of view, Borjas (2000) questioned the cost of having international students on American campuses. As seen earlier, many international graduate students are used as teaching assistants for undergraduate education. Borjas (2000) concluded that foreign teaching assistants adversely affect undergraduate education due to the lack of English language proficiency. However, other researchers, such as Jacobs and Friedman (1988) and Fleisher et al. (2002), concluded that no clear correlation exists between foreign teaching assistants and the undergraduate students’ understanding of the learning materials.

U.S. Federal Policies Governing International Student Access

Although its higher education has been by far the greatest magnet of international students in the world for more than half a century, the U.S., unlike other major host countries, has not coordinated its national policies particularly for the

recruitment of international students (Guruz, 2008). It can be argued that other competing host countries are at an increasing advantage with the U.S. for the best talent in the world. Other host countries have substantially increased their shares in the international student market with their national governments' support for the recruitment of international students, such as the Prime Minister's Initiatives in the U.K. since 1999, the Australian International Education Foundation, and its successor, the Australia Education International, as an arm of the Australian Department of Education since the mid 1990s, and the EduFrance, and its successor Campus France formed by the French Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs in the late 1990s. Therefore, a comprehensive national policy on international education at large has been advocated in the U.S.

In this context, President Clinton (2000) issued an Executive memorandum on international education. This memorandum first mentioned the encouragement of students from other countries to study in the U.S. on the list of the government's commitment to international education. Even though several bipartisan resolutions calling for a comprehensive national policy on international education have been made by some Congressmen since Clinton's memorandum (e.g., House Concurrent Resolution 201 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 7, 107th Congress in 2001; and House Concurrent Resolution 100, 109th Congress in 2005), this kind of coordinated policy has not yet been enacted.

However, this situation does not necessarily mean that there have been no federal policies at all affecting international student access to U.S. high education. Instead, the government plays a significant role, in spite of the fact that non-governmental bodies such as educational institutions initiate most of the international educational activities

(Campbell, 2005), including a study in the U.S. by international students. Surely, the U.S. Constitution has no vested authority for education policy as a whole, but international student access to U.S. higher education has been affected by the federal government policies even though critically described as piece-meal and patch-work.

According to Campbell (2005), the federal government's role has been important particularly in two ways: one through the regulatory framework and the other in steering and leverage functions for non-governmental initiatives in international educational activities. In terms of these two important roles of the federal government, this section will review the literature on the policies. As far as international student access is concerned, the regulatory framework can be further divided into two major areas of federal policy: one controlling visas and immigration, and the other controlling 'deemed exports' of military-related technology.

Meanwhile, the government's roles in steering and leveraging non-governmental initiatives in international educational activities, particularly in relation to foreign student mobility, have been often demonstrated by some federal agencies' efforts to attract and bring international students to U.S. higher education. Such efforts include the following: the Department of State's administrating student exchange programs, offering grants to the facilitation of international exchanges, and providing promotional information on study opportunities in the U.S; the Department of Education's sponsoring initiatives to encourage international academic exchanges with foreign countries; and the Department of Commerce's helping U.S. educational institutions by offering activities to internationally market their programs (GAO, June 29, 2007). This literature review will mainly explore the government's posture and policy implemented by the Department of

State as the U.S. primary efforts to promote the flow of international students to U.S. higher education, while it briefly refers to far smaller scales of efforts by the Departments of Education and Commerce.

This literature review will only briefly cover the legislations which are usually regarded as important milestones in the development of international education in general such as the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, the International Education Act (IEA) of 1966, the Title VI of Higher Education Act in its amendments, and the National Security Education Act (NSEA) of 1991. The reason of this treatment is that the main foci of these legislations are area studies, foreign language learning, and study abroad rather than international students on campus, although not explicitly excluding this particular population from foreign countries.

Regulatory framework: Visa and immigration. While visa and immigration policies governing international student access to U.S. higher education have been one of the main concerns of international educators, the issues regarding international students have been just a small part of the immigration policies. Therefore, it used to often be the case that most literature did not much pay attention to the issues of international students when the literature dealt with the policy changes in the visa and immigration system. However, the September 11 attacks in 2001, which has caused substantial legislative and regulatory changes affecting international student access, prompted a number of articles, Congressional discussions, and policy analyses specifically about international student access in U.S. higher education. Although limited in publicity, the international education professionals have discussed the implications of these legislative and regulatory changes in their own community (e.g., *NAFSA Newsletters* and its magazine, *International*

Educator) from these professionals' perspectives for a long time.

When World War II ended, the primary body of laws governing the visa operations for foreign students studying in U.S. higher education was the Immigration Act of 1924 (Public Law 68-139 ; 43 Statutes-at-Large 153). It is with the introduction of the Immigration Act of 1924 that the U.S. started expressly authorizing foreign students to study in U.S. institutions (Haddal, 2008). Although the Immigration Act of 1924 is regarded as a legislation primarily seeking the preservation of the ideal of American homogeneity, with its limitation of the immigrant number through a quota of national origins, students as well as professors and ministers were exempted from this quota system. The act defined one of the non-quota immigrants as "[an] immigrant who is a bona fide student at least 15 years of age and who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose of study at an accredited school, college, academy, seminary, or university" (Immigration Act of 1924, Section 4 (e)). It is noteworthy that students were classified into a type of immigrants, unlike non-immigrants as in the immigration law of today.

The Immigration Act of 1924 was replaced with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 (Public Law 82-414; 66 Statutes-at-Large 123). Although the INA of 1952 has experienced a number of major amendments over the years, the INA of 1952 still remains the basic body of immigration law, including the issues affecting international students. E. P. Hutchinson (1981) presented a comprehensive legislative history of American immigration policy between 1798 and 1965, but pays very little attention to international students. Hutchinson analyzed the policy process and implications of the formulation of the INA of 1952 in general. He regards the INA of

1952 as the principal legislative accomplishment on immigration during the aftermath of World War II, and points out that "[the background of the INA of 1952 proposal] included some bills for liberalization of the immigration laws but also many others that were severely restrictive or even isolationist, and still others that sought to impose strict controls and disabilities on resident aliens" (Hutchinson, 1981, p. 312).

The debates over the revision of immigration law in the early 1950s were driven by the Cold War consideration, not by economy and labor issues which had been the focused arguments in the past (Department of State, n.d.). On the one hand, a group advocated for liberalizing the immigration system, mainly due to their interests in the relationship between immigration and foreign policy. On the other hand, another group led by Senator Pat McCarran (Democrat–Nevada) and Congressman Francis Walter (Democrat–Pennsylvania) argued that the U.S. could face communist infiltration through immigration, by linking immigration to national security concerns. In Congress, the latter group eventually gained ground, and the bills introduced by McCarran and Walter for limited and selective immigration were adopted.

After these bills were passed in the Congress with a Democrat majority both in the Senate and House of Representatives, President Truman used his veto against the McCarran-Walter Act on June 25, 1952. Truman held that "[these] are only a few examples of the absurdity, the cruelty of carrying over into this year of 1952 the isolationist limitations of our 1924 law" (Truman in Vialet, 1991, p. 15). Eventually, however, both the House and Senate overrode Truman's veto, and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 became a law. Although the INA of 1952 "ended Asian exclusion from immigrating to the United States and introduced a system of preferences based on

skill sets and family reunification" (Department of State, n.d., para. 1), this legislation with the continued practice of excluding countries in the Western Hemisphere in the quota system for the immigration into the U.S. was still discriminatory as Truman argued.

As far as international student access to U.S. higher education is concerned, the important part of the INA of 1952 was the creation of the new visa category specifically for foreign students; that is, F visas. The original version of the INA enacted on June 27, 1952, defines the term of nine types (categorized 'A' through 'I') of non-immigrant aliens, including foreign students, in Section 101 (a)(15). According to the definition, F visas are designed for a non-immigrant alien "who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course of study and who seeks to enter the United States temporally and solely for the purpose of pursuing such a course of study at an established institution of learning or other recognized place of study in the United States" (GPO, 1952, p. 11). The other visa types generally used by foreign students in the current system, such as J visas for exchange programs and M visas for non-academic vocational programs, were not established in 1952. The J visas were later included in the INA's Section 101 (a)(15) by Section 109 of the Mutual Educational Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-256; 75 Statutes at Large 527), known as Fulbright-Hays Act, and the M visas by Section 2 of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981 (Public Law 97-116; 95 Statute-at-Large 1611), popularly known as INS Efficiency Act (see Fragomen, 1982).

The definitions of F, J, and M visa holders in Section 101(a)(15) all include a phrase such as, "having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning." Given this phrase in Section 101(a)(15), there has recently been a debate

over the intent requirement set by the INA's Section 214 (b), which states:

> Every alien shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of application for admission, that he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15) ….

So, Section 214 (b), in conjunction with Section 101 (a)(15), requires student visa applicants to demonstrate their intent to leave the U.S. at the end of their stay in order to be eligible for nonimmigrant status as students in the U.S. This intent requirement has been taken for granted for a long time since the enactment of the INA of 1952. Today, however, increasing advocates for international student access to U.S. higher education strongly argue that this requirement is a serious barrier of entry to the U.S. by the best and brightest talents (e.g., Walfish, 2002; NAFSA, January, 2003). This issue will be further discussed in Chapter Six and Seven.

The next major change in the immigration policy after the INA of 1952 was the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (Public Law 89-236; 79 Statutes-at-Large 911). These 1965 Act Amendments abolished the discriminatory national-origins quota system set by the Immigration Act of 1924. The 1965 amendments are often viewed as an epoch-making legislation, representing the liberal attitude of the U.S. society toward race and nationality (e.g., Harper, 1975; and Vialet, 1991). Joyce C. Vialet (1991) pointed out that "the 1965 immigration legislation was as much a product of the mid-1960s and the heavily Democratic 89th Congress which also produced major civil rights legislation, as the 1952 Act had been a product of the Cold War period of the early 1950s" (1991, p. 17). However, perhaps because the Act Amendments of 1965 did not include significant changes directly affecting international

students, the recent literature on international students seldom analyzes the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 as the background history of immigration policies.

After the important shift by the Act Amendments of 1965 in general described above, the main issues affecting the U.S. immigration policy consideration in a bigger picture during the period through the 1970s through 1980s were two types of migrant flows outside of the restrictions under the basic immigration law (Vitalet, 1991). The first and legal type was refugees. Particularly, those from Indochina after the end of Vietnam War in 1975 flooded into the U.S., and they dominated congressional concerns. As a result, the Refugee Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-212; 94 Statutes at Large 102) was enacted. The second and illegal type of migrant flows was undocumented aliens. Vitalet (1991) pointed out that there was a general agreement that these undocumented aliens are drawn by the economic magnet with the prospect of employment at U.S. wage. Congressional response to this issue was the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 (Public Law 99-603; 100 Statutes-at-Large 3359). The legislators started to pay attention to the issues of controlling illegal immigrants in the early 1970s (Montwieler, 1987; Vitalet, 1991). The long legislative road to the passage of the IRCA of 1986 was initiated by the recommendations by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy in 1978 (Montwieler, 1987).

Although these two major statutes' impacts on international students as non-immigrant population may not have been substantial, the congressional debates leading to the passage of the IRCA, in particular, attracted international education professionals' considerable attention between the early and mid 1980s. The original bills

sponsored by Senator Alan K. Simpson (Republican–Wyoming) and Representative Romano L. Mazzoli (Democrat–Kentucky) had a small section which, although eventually omitted from the passed act as the IRCA of 1986, required international students with F and M visas to return home for two years following completion of their studies in the U.S. In their *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* on skilled immigration and international graduate students, Gnanaraj Chellaraj et al. (2005) refers to the Simpson-Mazzoli Bills introduced in 1982 and 1984 as examples of unsuccessful attempts by the U.S. Congress to limit employment in the U.S. of international graduates from U.S. higher education institutions. The Simpson-Mazzoli Bills argued that retaining international students after their graduation would adversely affect the employment of the U.S. citizens and would also cause a brain drain problem for the less-developed countries. The Simpson-Mazzoli Bills were introduced in the early 1980s, which saw the severest recession in the U.S. since the Great Depression. As Leslie Rowe (1983) argued that "[in] a period when unemployment rates have exceeded 10 percent, the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill reflects the national preoccupation with preserving jobs for Americans" (p. 111).

Rowe (1983) discussed the possible impact of the 1982 Simpson-Mazzoli Bill on international students, and concluded that this particular section "is not in the best interests of the United States or developing countries" (p. 118). Rowe noticed that the higher education community, including NAFSA, as well as employers of engineers opposed the restriction on international students propose by the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill. According to Rowe, the argument of NAFSA along with the American Council on Education was that the Bill would not make the international students return to their home countries, but to other industrialized countries, which would make the U.S. less

competitive in research and development. Rowe continued to explain that the U.S. companies would be damaged by the possible decrease in skilled workers particularly in science and engineering, by presenting the figures of the shortage of technically trained graduates in the STEM field. In addition, Rowe argued that forcing international students to their home countries would make the unemployment rate of the home countries worse.

Aside from these legislative reforms, the period from the late 1970s through the 1980s saw a series of important regulatory changes affecting international students in particular. The late 1970s saw a rapid growth of international student enrollments in U.S. higher education, particularly from the oil-producing countries in the midst of the oil crises (see *Open Doors* of the 1970s). In response to this rapid increase, it became effective on January 1, 1979, that the international students were admitted for 'duration of status,' not being required to apply for extension for stay each year under the previous regulations. Chad C. Haddal (2008) points out that the duration of status is one of the factors which have kept until recently it difficult to grasp overstayed students in the U.S., given the absence of a fixed termination date of study in the duration of status. The purposes of introducing this duration of status policy in the late 1970s were the facilitation of the admission of non immigrant students and the reduction of the Service adjudications workload as well as the provision of adequate immigration controls on international students on their F visas (*Federal Register*, November 22, 1978, p. 54618). Haddal (2008) briefly explains that "[the] former-INS then issued regulations in 1978 and 1981 allowing for visa validity periods longer than one year. In regulations in 1983 and 1987 that were aimed at "eliminating burdensome paperwork," the same agency reduced the reporting requirements and established the "duration of status" policy that remains in

practice currently" (pp. 4-5).

While this explanation of Haddal's sounds as though the 'duration of status' policy led straight to its development, this development process represented the regulatory changes concerning international students of the 1980s, which was full of twists and turns. In fact, the regulation change in 1981 (*Federal Register*, January 23, 1981, p. 7267), which Haddal (2008) mentioned as above, was to eliminate the duration of status policy which had been introduced by the 1978 regulation change, although it did not go back to the requirement for revalidation each year as in the pre-1978 period. Next, the 1983 regulation change (*Federal Register*, April 5, 1983, p. 14575) reinstituted the duration of status policy for F-1 students with some limitation. However, this reinstitution of the duration of status policy was accompanied with the introduction of a new recordkeeping system which monitored students in duration of status. As further explained shortly, this recordkeeping system can be regarded as the genesis of the SEVIS (Student and Exchange Visitors Information System), whose implementation was prompted by the extremely heightened security concerns after the September 11 attacks.

Indeed, this 1983 reintroduction of the duration of status policy was part of the sweeping, largely tightening, regulatory changes effective on August 1, 1983. The regulations implemented by the INS in 1983 "promulgated complex and burdensome regulations that sent most foreign student advisers reeling under a heavy new workload" (Marvin Baron cited in Desoff, July/August, 2008, p. 15). In the *NAFSA Newsletter*, Norman Peterson, the then NAFSA's Director of Government Relations, regarded the 1983 regulatory changes as a serious challenge to NAFSA as an association of those professionals who deal with international students (Peterson, October, 1983). Since then,

the *NAFSA Newsletter* in the mid 1980s often covered this challenge (e.g., Baron & Peterson, June, 1984; Downie & Herrin, October, 1986; and Smith, June, 1987). As discussed in depth later in Chapter Six, NAFSA responded to this major regulatory reform of August, 1983, by forming a task force team, and actively negotiated for further regulatory reform with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). As a result, the INS issued a set of relaxed regulations in April 1987, which NAFSA saw as a significant achievement from its continual negotiation with the INS (Smith, June, 1987). This new set of the regulation included the establishment of the duration of status policy in 1987, which Haddal (2008) mentions as above. According to the 1987 regulations, duration of status was redefined, in a relaxing way, from only one educational program (e.g., bachelor's degree or master's degree) to a series of educational programs (*Federal Register*, April 22, 1987, p. 13223).

Back to the time around 1980, strong arguments among some members of Congress for tighter controls over international students had been triggered by the Iranian students' demonstrations in the U.S. responding to the Iranian Revolution and the U.S. Embassy hostage in Teheran in 1979 (Desoff, July/August, 2008). As the origination of the tortuous history leading to the full implementation of the SEVIS in 2003, many refer to the Iranian demonstrations and the government's subsequent attempt to tighten the regulations on international students in the early 1980s (e.g., Becraft in *Tracking International Students in Higher Education*, 2001; Hedges & Wolfe, October 7, 2001; J. Johnson, 2002; Otto, 2002; Malkin, 2002; Arroyo, 2003; and Goodman, 2006). The then INS's inability to meet President Carter's request for locating Iranian students who were studying in the U.S. at the moment of this international tension made some in the

government start considering the ideas of tracking international students. According to Allan Goodman (2006), the CEO of the Institute of International Education, several years of this attempt stopped by 1988, when the INS asked the higher education institutions to keep the records just on campus and make them available for inspection as needed. An INS official revealed that “we had no place to store all that paper and, in any case, no one who could actually read it” (as cited in Goodman, 2006, p.3).

Even if not referring to this hostage crisis in Iran and its subordinate events around 1980, the discussions about the development of an international student tracking system usually look back to the World Trade Center (WTC) bombing in 1993 (e.g., Hurtle & Burns, 2002; Ingarfield, 2003/4; and Wong, 2006). The 1993 WTC bombing, one of whose perpetrators had entered the U.S. on his student visa and dropped out afterwards, triggered again and more strong call for an enhanced system of tracking international students. James H. Johnson Jr. (2002) points out that there are differences in the amendments of the U.S. immigration policy before and after the 1990s. According to J. Johnson, most of the amendments before the policy responses to the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombing were designed for the facilitation of commerce, the dissemination of democracy, and the promotion of knowledge and international education. On the other hand, J. Johnson regards the amendments responding to the 1993 WTC center bombing as “imposing substantial constraints on the movement of people (as well as capital, goods, and services) into and out of the United States” (p.420).

In 1994, prompted by this fact, a warning came from the then-FBI Director, Louis J. Freeh, who pointed to international students as one of the categories of foreigners who require thorough and continuing scrutiny (Freeh’s memo cited in

Appendix C of H. Mann, September, 1997; also see Ostrow, December 2, 1994 and Treyster, 2003). Freeh's warning as a memorandum of September 26, 1994, addressed to Jamie Gorelick, the then INS's Deputy Attorney General, led the INS to form the Task Force on Foreign Student Controls in 1995 (Mann, 1997). Subsequently, the task force's final report, 'Controls governing foreign students and schools that admit them,' came to form a strategy for reforming the INS student tracking, and eventually the Clinton Administration adopted many of its recommendations, and then Congress incorporated those recommendations into the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 (Public Law 104-208) (Wong, 2006). Its Section 641 "requires the INS to collect information on an ongoing basis from schools and exchange programs relating to nonimmigrant foreign students and exchange visitors during the course of their stay in the United States, using electronic reporting technology to the fullest extent practicable" (Cronin, July 20, 2001, p. 1). However, the full implementation of such a tracking system was not made before the September 11 attacks in 2001.

Julie Farnam (2005) explains that the IIRIRA of 1996 was the most drastic reorganization of American immigration system since the establishment of the INA of 1952. The IIRIRA of 1996 covers a wide range of issues both in illegal and legal immigration. In fact, the issues of international students are just small part of the IIRIRA of 1996, and its Section 641 requiring the INS to establish a computerized system for tracking international students is placed fourth among the five subtitles of the Act's very last section, Title VI–Miscellaneous Provisions. Yet, the IIRIRA of 1996 with this particular section about international student tracking has had significant implications for

international education professionals as well as the U.S. higher education community at large. The deficient funding from the federal government for the implementation and strong opponents from the international education community delayed the establishment of such a database.

However, the fact that a couple of the perpetrators in the September 11 attacks in 2001 had entered the U.S. on their student visas totally changed the situation. Section 641 of the IIRIRA of 1996 was reinstated by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56; 115 Statutes-at-Large 272) and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173; 116 Statutes-at-Large 543). Early 2003 eventually saw SEVIS fully implemented. As of 2009, SEVIS is working as a web-based technology designed to track and monitor schools, programs, departments, international students, and scholars for the entire period of approved participation in U.S. education. As Farnam (2005) continues to explain, SEVIS is one of the apparent examples of the IIRIRA's provisions where non-governmental entities are required to be responsible for the enforcement of immigration laws. It is international education professionals, working in the U.S. higher education institutions, who have been in charge of this enforcement on campus.

It is important to note that SEVIS is not the first concrete move to systematically track international students under the IIRIRA of 1996. Immediately responding to the requirement of the IIRIRIA of 1996, the INS conducted a pilot program, the Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS), in 1997. In his memorandum for the management team, Michael Cronin (July 20, 2001), the then Acting

Executive Associate Commissioner, Office of Programs of the INS, briefly describes the origin and development of CIPRIS. The partners of the INS for the development of the CIPRIS system project included these: the Department of State, the Department of Education, and experts from INS-authorized schools and exchange visitor programs. The pilot project involved the Atlanta Hartsfield Airport and District Office, the Texas Service Center and 21 higher education institutions in the four southeast states of Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Cronin explains that "based on lessons learned from the CIPRIS pilot, customer and stakeholder feedback, the needs of INS's partner federal agencies, the requirements outlined in section 641 of IIRIRA, and the INS mission and goals, system design work began on a new electronic information system" (July 20, 2001, p. 2). This new electronic reporting technology became SEVIS.

However, the transition from CIPRIS to SEVIS was not so smooth. After the completion of CIPRIS as a pilot program for a planned term in 1999, the development of international student tracking systems had been halted in effect until Cronin's memorandum above. It is often pointed out that the main reason for this halt was the objections, mainly from the higher education community. Some (e.d., Knezo, 2002; Otto, 2002) generally refer to the objections from higher education community or international education community, while others (e.g., Hedges & Wolfe, 2001; J. Johnson, 2002; Arroyo, 2003; and Farnam, 2005) specifically name NAFSA as the leading opponent to this tracking system before the September 11 attacks. However, NAFSA's opposition was not really monolithic. NAFSA included the international education professionals who were involved in the CIPRIS pilot program, and these CIPRIS participants supported keeping CIPRIS, and opposed the CIPRIS-repeal bill backed by NAFSA in 2000

(AACRAO, October 2, 2000). This divergence within NAFSA will be further discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.

The September 11 attacks in 2001, some whose perpetrators again turned out to have entered the U.S. on their student visas, totally changed the political situation regarding international student access in the U.S. The then existing controls over international student access became one of the examples of the lax immigration policy of the U.S. which may expose the U.S. to the threats from terrorists. Even legislation imposing a six-month moratorium on international student visas was suggested by Senator Dianne Feinstein (Democrat–California) at the end of September 2001, although strong oppositions from the higher education community persuaded her to eventually withdraw her plan (Curry, October 19, 2001). In order to combat against terrorism, the Congress has passed a number of major legislations affecting international student access (e.g., the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002). “The issue of student visas was identified explicitly and specifically by the President [of the U.S.] as an area of vulnerability for the United States” (B. Rowe, 2002, p. 140). As the reasons for this issue being targeted for scrutiny, Julie Farnam (2005) points to the already existing requirements, however lax they might have been, for educational institutions and sponsoring organizations to ‘keep some tabs’ on international students and to issue immigration documents to each of these students.

Since September 2001, a great number of articles, books, and studies have discussed the changes in the visa and immigration policies governing international students in U.S. higher education, including SEVIS. Some of them discuss the issues

related to international students as a part of the U.S. measures against terrorist threats; for example, J. Johnson (2002), Otto (2002), Lebowitz & Podheiser (2002), Farnam (2005) and Yale-Loehr, Papademetriou, & Cooper (2005). Others focus on international students in the context of visa and immigration policies; for example, B. Rowe (2002), Romero (2003), Treyster (2003), Arroyo (2003), V. Johnson (2004), National Academies (2005), Starobin (2006) and Wong (2006). Generally speaking, the literature in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001 tends to appreciate the federal government's tighter controls over international student access as an emergency resort, even though indicating some further recommendations. Later, the literature on this topic has gradually increased criticisms against the government measures, particularly as the international enrollments in U.S. higher education became looking stagnated or even decreasing.

The major criticisms have been about the operational feasibility of implementing new measures for the tighter controls over international students and the unintended consequences from those measures. As far as the feasibility in the implementation is concerned, the literature often discusses the increased administrative burden on the higher education institutions, particularly in relation to SEVIS, and slower procedures of visa issuing. For example, the rush to the implementation of SEVIS caused technical problems and frustration among the international education professionals, although the international education community agreed to support the international student tracking system after the September 11 attacks. Kam C. Wong (2006) analyzes SEVIS in particular, and provides an overview of its historical background, including the arguments of stakeholders such as NAFSA, and outlines various problems in the

implementation of SEVIS. The problems include the following: system errors, lack of training and technical support, and a long delay in data fixes. David Treyster's (2003) analysis also focuses on SEVIS which was then about to be implemented, and one of his major criticisms is that SEVIS could be contradicting against the basis of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974, which protects the privacy of student education records. Under Section 507 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, SEVIS allows the government access to student records. In this regard, Romero (2003) indicates some concerns about the way the government plans to use the information obtained through the SEVIS network.

In addition to SEVIS as a regulatory measure concerning the international students mainly after their arrival in the U.S., several screening controls over international students before issuing visas have been criticized for delayed procedures, too. The major screening controls over international students often examined in the literature include these: certain types of applicants for visas for travelling to the U.S.: the Visas Mantis (established in 1998) and Visas Condor (started in 2002) programs. The former program is a security check to protect against the transfer of sensitive technology in the Technology Alert List (TAL), while the latter is designed to ensure nationals of U.S. designated state sponsors of terrorism meeting certain criteria to be subject to a security review. Both the Visas Mantis and Condor programs require the visa applications which are flagged by these programs for special clearance in the Security Advisory Opinion (SAO), which involves several agencies for review. Under the heightened security, the processes often led to significant delays in visa issuances, while these delays have been dissolved in the later years (National Academies, 2005). Another example of tighter

screening control implemented in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks was the abolition of the personal appearance waiver at the consular offices abroad for visa applications. The Department of State issued an interim rule, by which the personal interviews at consular offices for non-immigrant applications basically became mandatory (*Federal Register*, July 7, 2003, pp. 40127-40129). Later, Section 5301 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 added the requirements for personal interviews to the Immigration Nationalization Act. All of these are time-consuming not only for the officers involved, but also for visa applicants.

A series of reposts by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) pointed to the adverse effects of the tightened controls, such as technical problems with SEVIS performance and the delayed procedures in the visa issuances. The reports' titles indicate the changing situation in the development of the visa and immigration policies governing international students as follows: *Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars* (February, 2004), *Homeland Security: Performance of Information System to Monitor Foreign Students and Exchange Visitors has Improved, but Issues Remain* (June, 2004), *Border Security: Streamlined Visa Mantis Program has Lowered Burden Science Students and Scholars, but Further Refinements Needed* (February, 2005).

All of these reports, like most of the literature discussing international student issues, point to the unintended consequences from these tighter controls over international student access for increased national security. Not only making the entry to the U.S. more difficult or impossible sometimes, these measures are regarded as the alleged perception change of the world about the U.S. higher education as an

unwelcoming study destination, which then weakens the U.S. position in the international market for internationalization. According to IIE's *Open Doors*, the number of international students in the U.S. higher education institutions decreased in 2004 for the first time in more than 30 years, and stagnated in the following years. Some criticisms focus on the disadvantages from economic perspectives, particularly referring to the STEM fields' dependency on international students (e.g., Arroyo, 2003), and many others point to the damages on the national interests from not only economic but also as longer-term foreign relations perspectives.

In response to these criticisms and the stagnated enrollments, the executive branches have declared their commitments to the right balance between securing borders and opening doors. In August of 2004, the then State Secretary, Colin Powel, (August 1, 2004) issued a cable, Non-Immigrant Travel Initiative, which was aimed to streamline the SAO process, and to respond to issues related to courtesy and processing at ports of entry, as well as a range of visa and security policy issues. More recently, in January of 2006, in their *Joint Vision for Secure Borders and Open Doors in the Information Age* (January 17, 2006), the then State Secretary, Condoleezza Rice, and the then Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff, presented the guidance for stronger security and facilitating travel with the best use of new technologies and the most efficient processes. Both of these policy statements did not solely concern international students; however, international students were mentioned as one of the prioritized types of travelers in Powell's initiative, while the Joint Vision in 2006 included the expansion of the length of time for the foreign student visa issuance and arrival in the U.S. prior to their studies.

Regulatory framework: Deemed exports. "An export of technology or source

code (except encryption source code) is “deemed” to take place when it is released to a foreign national within the United States” (Bureau of Industry and Security [BIS], n.d., Question 1). For decades, the U.S. has attempted to control such deemed exports which can be for military use or dual-use with both commercial and military applications. In higher education, international graduate students can be subject to the restrictions in their access to such technology or codes by the regulations for export controls since the laboratories of colleges and universities in the U.S often have many foreign graduate students staffed for cutting-edge research. As the National Academies (2005) points out, therefore, the issue of deemed exports is one of the factors affecting the flows of international graduate students.

The U.S. federal government has developed two major regulations for export controls under which deemed exports are managed. First, the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Control (DDTC) enforces the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITRA) (22 CFR, Chap. I, Subchapter M, 120-130), which implements the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (PL 94-329; 90 Stat. 729), as amended (22 USC 2778-2780). According to ITRA, export licenses are required before foreigners, whether abroad or in the U.S., receive the controlled technical data, as well as articles and services which are identified by the U.S. Munitions List (USML) (22 CFR 121). The USML includes 21 categories of military-related items such as weapon, chemical agents, missiles, and satellite. Although not using the term, deemed export, ITRA applies the same concept as in the Commerce Department regulations below.

Second, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) enforces the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 CFR, Chap. VII, Subchapter

C, 730-799), which implements the Export Administration Act of 1979 (PL 96-72; 93 Stat. 503), as amended (50 USC, App. 2401 et seq.). Unlike ITAR, EAR manages technology in dual use, commercial and military materials, or items covered by the Commerce Control List (CCL) (15 CFR 774, Suppl. 1), which has ten categories including items such as computers and electronics. Like ITAR, EAR requires licenses to be issued before exporting the materials or items identified in the CCL. Further, according to EAR, the restrictions vary from country to country, based on its Commerce Country Chart (15 CFR 738, Suppl. 1). In the definition of 'export of technology or software,' ERA specifically uses the term D*eemed Export* when describing the transfers of technology or software to foreign nationals' home countries if those persons are in the U.S.

Special exclusions from ITAR and EAR have allowed foreign students and scholars to take part in their research projects or course work involving such controlled technology on campus in the U.S. For higher education, fundamental research exclusions are permitted in ITAR (see 22 CFR 120.11(8)) and EAR (15 CFR 734.8(a)), while educational exclusions are permitted in ITAR (see 22 CFR 120.10(5)) and EAR (see 15 CFR 734.3(b)(3)(iii), 734.9). The primary source of fundamental research exclusions is the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189 issued under the Reagan Administration in 1985. NSDD 189, endorsed by the recent Administrations (Keith, May, 2006), manifests the policy that "to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain unrestricted." NSDD 189's definition of fundamental research is, "basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as

distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons" (1985, p. 1).

However, "[in] the post-September 11, 2001 world, our federal government regards export controls as a tool to guard against terrorism, and is devoting heightened focus on "deemed" exports in commercial as well as academic settings within the United States" (Keith, May, 2006, p. 1). For example, a report of the Department of Commerce's Office of Inspector General (March, 2004) suggested tighter controls specifically on deemed exports. This report suggested to widen the definitions of *use* technology and the criterion of the foreign national's affiliations with the countries of concern for deemed export license requirement, while to narrow the definition of fundamental research exclusions. Following the recommendations presented by this report (2004), the Commerce Department's BIS made advance notice of proposed rulemaking on revision and clarification of deemed export related regulatory requirements in March of 2005 (*Federal Register*, March 28, 2005), and sought public input on these recommendations. Strong oppositions to the proposed changes came from the higher education and research communities, arguing that the changes would disrupt vital research while recognizing the importance of securing national security (e.g., NUSULGC, June 15, 2005; National Academies, June 16, 2005; ACE, June 23, 2005; National Science Foundation, June 24, 2005; AAU, June 27, 2005). As a result, BIS withdrew the proposals, and announced its plan to create a Deemed Exports Advisory Committee (DEAC) for further investigation and discussions (*Federal Register*, May 31, 2006).

Later in 2007, the DEAC completed their investigation and discussions, and

publicized its report. The Committee's primary conclusion was that "the existing Deemed Export Regulatory Regime no longer effectively serves its intended purpose and should be replaced with an approach that better reflects the realities of today's national security needs and global economy" (DEAC, December 20, 2007, Cover letter). Responding to the Committee's report, the Commerce Secretary, Carlos Gutierrez, announced that "[we] intend to carefully review the Committee's findings as we move forward to strike the right balance of protecting national security while continuing to attract the world's best and brightest" (Department of Commerce, December 20, 2007, para. 2). Most of the higher education and research communities have agreed with the basic finding of the DEAC (e.g., AAU-COGR, 2008), particularly in that the unintended consequences from the export control rules for national security, which are too obsolete in the globalized world. There is a general agreement that leading knowledge in many scientific and engineering fields is not monopolized by the U.S. anymore, but is being created by the best and brightest talents spread around the world and in their global network. "[The] lack of access to much of the world's scientific and technologic knowledge reduces America's ability to maintain a modern defense establishment, and … a substantially weakened domestic economy diminishes the nation's ability to devote financial resources to national security" (DEAC, 2007, p. 14).

It appears that international students' access to U.S. higher education has not been affected simply by the rejection itself of deemed export license applications. The actual rate of the rejection among the deemed export license applications for EAR has been less than one per cent (see Table on *Deemed Export License Application, Fy02-FY07*, DEAC, 2007, p. 39). Instead, the time-consuming and cumbersome process

of the applications for export licenses may significantly affect the faculty's consideration in having foreign students conduct research (e.g., see AAU, June 27, 2005). Further, the potentially biggest impact from such tighter regulations regarding deemed exports might be making prospective foreign students perceive training in the U.S. as less attractive. The interrelated effects from the tightened controls over visa issuance and deemed export "contribute to the perception that the United States is a closed and unwelcoming country" (National Academies, June, 2005, p. 6).

Supporting international student access. According to the *Discussion Paper* (November 15, 2000), prepared by the Department of Education, responding to President Clinton's Memorandum of 2000 calling for the federal agencies' coordinated efforts to promote international education in general, the federal government has employed a number of measures for attracting international students. These measures can be divided into two types: the provision of information and advising for prospective students, and the funding for foreign students studying in the U.S. higher education institutions.

As the former type of measures, this *Discussion Paper* (November 15, 2000) points to the following: the advising services overseas run by the Department of State (i.e., the Education USA Advising Centers); the recruitment assistance overseas for the U.S. higher education institutions provided by the Department of State through its Advising Centers and the Department of Commerce through its Commercial Service; and web-based information provided by the Department of State (i.e., *educationUSA*) and the Department of Education (i.e., the U.S. Network for Education Information (USNEI)). A study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) about the challenges in attracting international students to the U.S. (GAO, June 29, 2007) also briefly names the

Commerce Department's activities available for the American educational institutions in their marketing overseas, while this study refers to the encouragement for international academic exchanges only as the Education Department's initiative, instead of the USNEI.

As the latter measures to support international students, the *Discussion Paper* (November 15, 2000) refers to the Fulbright and the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) programs, both of which have included the provision of financial aid for foreign nationals taking academic and training opportunities in the U.S., respectively. The Fulbright Scholarship Program and the USAID's development assistance are also mentioned by Burkart Holzner & Davydd Greenwood (1995), as two of their identified four different policy arenas for the federal program initiatives in international higher education. Since they discuss international education in general, however, what occurs to Holzner & Greenwood in their discussion seems to go beyond financial support for foreign students, and to include financial support for scholars as well as domestic students studying abroad in the Fulbright Scholarship Program, and the USAID's technical assistance through sending American faculty to less developed countries.

Holzner & Greenwood (1995) go on to refer to the other two federal policy arenas, both of which mostly focus on the promotion of area studies and foreign language learning in higher education. One of these policy arenas is related to defense consideration, and has been represented by the major statutes such as the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 (Public Law 85-864; 72 Statutes-at-Large 1572) and the National Security Education Act (NSEA) of 1991 (Public Law 102-183; 105 Statutes-at-Large 1271). The fourth policy arena in this discussion of Holzer &

Greenwood concerns the domain of the Department of Education, and the federal program initiatives in this regard are for the cultivation of the future experts through area studies and foreign language learning. According to Richard D. Scarfo's (1998) discussion about the history of the Higher Education Act, Title VI, and Fulbright-Hays Programs, the Education Department' initiatives for the promotion of area studies and foreign language learning originally started under the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in the early 1960s, and were promoted by the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-256; 75 Statutes-at-Large 527) and the ensuing executive order from President Kennedy.

Holzner & Greenwood (1995) regard the International Education Act (IEA) of 1966 (Public Law 89-698; 80 Statutes-at-Large 1073) as one of the attempts to integrate the initiatives in these four different policy arenas. The IEA's main foci were on area studies and foreign language, although the act had sections mentioning international student issues such as favoring foreign currency exchange rates for international students and conducting research on brain drain problems. The IEA was proposed as part of the creation of a Great Society under the leadership of the then President Lyndon B. Johnson, and it was enacted into law, but it has never been funded. This failure is often attributed to the Vietnam War, as "[the IEA] was passed but never funded, a victim of the Vietnam War and its political and fiscal consequences" (M. Johnson, November 10, 1999, para. 20). However, Nancy L. Ruther (2002)` points out that "[overstretching] the goals and other boundaries of the policy arena was one reason the IEA legislation failed to be funded" (p. 195). From a different perspective, Theodore Vestal's *International Education: Its History and Promise for Today* (1994), one of the most in depth analysis

of the IEA, concludes that the public consciousness of the need for programs of education in foreign languages and world affairs was not high enough.

Returning now back to the focus on international student issues, in the literature, the Fulbright and USAID scholarship programs have been often mentioned as the major federal support for international students. In discussing the value of education as trade, Evans (Winter, 1995) refers to these two particular scholarship programs as the federal promotion of student exchanges. Earlier in the 1980s, the report by the American Council on Education (ACE), too, explained the importance of the Fulbright and USAID programs in the federal support for international students. Recently, there are approximately 4,000 Fulbright foreign students studying in the U.S. higher education institutions (Department of State, 2008), and the official website of the Fulbright Program for Foreign Students indicates that there have been almost 150,000 foreign students studying under the Fulbright program since the program's establishment (IIE, n.d.b). The number of training participants as host country individuals in U.S. programs whom USAID supported in 2007 was approximately 4,500 (USAID, n.d.), while not all of these USAID training participants were studying in colleges and universities. In fact, the number of international students whose primary source of funding for their studying in the U.S. higher education institutions is the U.S. government, including the Fulbright and USAID-sponsored students, has been very limited (e.g., only 0.5% in the academic year of 2007/2008, according to *Open Doors*).

However, the significances of the Fulbright and USAID programs have been beyond the quantity of the international students brought into the U.S. by these programs. "[The Fulbright and USAID programs] contribute by setting standards and encouraging

new directions for this country's exchange efforts" (ACE, 1982, p. 28). The ACE report (1982) continued to explain that other exchange programs in general have regarded the Fulbright program as worthy of emulation as well as imitation in terms of academic standards, program characters, suitable disciplines, and support provisions, while the USAID participant training programs have more specifically established principles or patterns which are common in educating international students from less developed nations. Further, the findings from the research generated by these two principal programs of student exchanges are of great resources to the development of other exchange programs responding to the demands and circumstances of international students at large. Taking into account these educational spillover effects, the rest of this section goes on to review the literature related to the Fulbright and USAID programs for international students studying in the U.S.

The Fulbright program has been built up mainly on the three statutes: the Fulbright Act of 1946 (Public Law 79-584; 60 Statutes-at-Large 754), which is the Amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944; the U.S. Information and Education Exchange Act (Public Law 80-402; 62 Statutes-at-Large 6, popularly known as the Smith-Mundt Act) of 1948; and the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (Public Law 87-256; 75 Statutes-at-Large 527, popularly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act) of 1961.

First, very few would disagree that it is the Fulbright Act of 1946 that boosted the development of international educational and cultural exchange programs in U.S. higher education, while the U.S. higher education institutions had been involved in such exchanges before World War II. Gayner (1996) called the Fulbright Program "a

trailblazer and catalyst" (p. 6) for international academic exchanges, although he pointed to its diminishing roles as the total number of international students and scholars, regardless of being sponsored or not, to and from U.S. higher education as a whole had exploded by the 1990s. Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan (1965) provided an overview of the precedents in terms of the federal government commitments to educational and cultural exchanges, particularly those with Latin American countries initiated in the 1930s, and pointed out that the "[the Fulbright Program's] uniqueness lay in fusing them within a new organizational mold into a program of individual grants of unprecedented size and scope because of the available foreign currencies that were its characteristic means of support" (p. 21). As these substantial foreign currencies were acquired from the sales of surplus war property, the countries which the Fulbright Act of 1946 would cover for its exchange program were limited to those with such war property gained under the Lend-Lease program during World War II. According to Senator Fulbright's words presented at the celebration of the Fulbright Program's fortieth anniversary, the avowed and unchanged goals of the Fulbright Program were primarily "[to] increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange … and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world" (quoted in Gayner, 1996, p. 1).

Second, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 expanded the federal educational exchange programs, including the Fulbright program, to worldwide, and also authorized annual congressional appropriation for such educational exchange programs (W. Johnson & Colligan, 1965). Unlike the Fulbright Act of 1946 targeting exclusively educational

exchanges, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 encompassed a wider range of activities, such as the Voice of America, an international broadcaster for U.S. propaganda, which were designed to win the emerging Cold War. While Senator Fulbright's bill was passed without significant opposition in the Congress in 1946, the introduction of the Smith-Mundt bill encountered strong opposition (Bu, 2003). During the debate for two years before the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act, some strongly opposed the bill, saying that "the exchange of students and teachers would let down immigration bars and open American schools 'to Communists and agitators'" (Bu, 2003, pp. 155-156).

Bu (2003) also explained that the late 1940s saw efforts in the higher education community as well as the organizations with special interests in international students such as the Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign Students (CFRFS) and Institute of International Education (IIE) to keep educational exchange away from political propaganda. Talking about the similar time period through the early 1950s, Du Bois (1956) pointed to the prevailed criticism that "government leadership in the field of educational exchanges runs the risk of being interpreted abroad as subverting education to propaganda" (p. 23). In the Senate hearing discussing the prospective jurisdictions of the new independent agency mandated by the Smith-Mundt Act, Senator Fulbright argued that making the Board of Foreign Scholarships, which was ultimately responsible for the Fulbright program, subordinate or directing them as a part of a government propaganda agency would destroy the Board's primary usefulness and its incentive to function (*Overseas Information Programs,* 1953, p. 864). When this new agency was eventually created as the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in August, 1953, only the information activities which the State Department had administrated were transferred to

the USIA. While the Fulbright program was noted by the first USIA Director, Theodore Streibert, as ‘dear to Senator Fulbright’s heart,’ the administration of this U.S. flagship scholarship program along with other various exchange programs remained in the State Department until 1978 (USIA, 1999). Even from a foreign policy perspective, strong practical reasons for the separation between education and propagandas were identified as in the remarks of Dean Rusk, U.S. State Secretary in the 1960s, saying that “education exchange programs make the best propaganda when they have no propagandistic purpose” (as indirectly cited in Frankel, 1965, p. 89).

Third, the Fulbright-Hays Act, which was signed into law by President John F. Kennedy in September 1961, superseded the Fulbright Act of 1946, and endorsed the older act’s rationales for international exchange of persons. By legally consolidating various exchange programs which had been coordinated under several legislations, including the Fulbright Act of 1946 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, the Fulbright-Hays Act “aimed at giving added strength and mutual support to every program in this area of our international educational and cultural exchange relations” (W. Johnson & Colligan, 1965). The new visa category, ‘J,’ was a provision of the Fulbright-Hays Act, particularly to promote educational and cultural exchange programs designated by the State Department. However, what the Fulbright-Hays Act consolidated was not only the exchange component under the previous statutes, but also, as indicated earlier (e.g., Scarfo, 1998), the components of area studies and foreign language learning. Indeed, the Fulbright-Hays Act was designed to promote various aspects of international education. As Bu (2003) argues that “[the] significance of the [Fulbright-Hays Act] lay in the shift from emphasis on promoting “a better understanding of the United State in other

countries" (Smith-Mundt Act) to the new stress on increasing a "mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries" (p. 233).

Important for this dissertation, NAFSA was involved to a significant degree in the development of as well as the implementation of the Fulbright-Hays Act. Bu (2003) explains that some people from NAFSA had consisted of the key members of the then President-elect Kennedy's Task Force on International Educational Exchange, whose long-term recommendations were drawn on by the Fulbright-Hays Act eventually. As further discussed in Chapter Six, the then NAFSA President, James Davis, was first approached by Kennedy's staff to become the chair of the committee for the task force in November 1960. Then, Davis as the chairperson of the task force managed to complete the report for Kennedy with the generous supports from the stakeholders interested in international exchange of persons (Zeigler, 1988). Also, a State Department grant under the Fulbright-Hays Act enabled NAFSA to launch its Field Service program in 1963, which aimed to help U.S. higher education institutions enhance their programs for international students (e.g., advising and counseling) though publications, consultations, in-service training, and workshops. Bu (2003) points to the importance of this Field Service program as an output of the Fulbright-Hays Act, which for the first time expressed the federal commitments to the support for all the international students in U.S. higher education, not only the government-sponsored students.

Including such efforts to strengthen institutional services for international students on campus in the U.S., the ACE report (1982) listed several implications of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 to all international students, and gave longer explanation to educational advising services overseas among those implications. As mentioned earlier in

this section, these advising centers overseas for prospective students are now operated by the Department of State. While the ACE report explained that the U.S. International Communication Agency (USICA) was empowered by the Fulbright-Hays Act to operate such advising centers overseas, the USICA existed only between 1978 and 1982 as an agency which was independent of the State Department. As explained later, the federal authority in the primary charge of federal educational exchange of persons such as the Fulbright programs has been changing a number of times, which interestingly demonstrates the conflicting values about the relationship between political and educational interests.

Next, the creation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), whose participant training program in particular has enabled a significant number of nationals of less developed countries to study in the U.S. almost for a half a century, was prompted by an Executive Order of President Kennedy with the mandate of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 (Public Law 87-195; 75 Statutes-at-Large 424). The FAA has some similarity to the Fulbright-Hays Act. Both were enacted in September in 1961 under the strong leadership of Kennedy. Also, the FAA's original bill entitled "Act for International Development" had been introduced in the Senate by Senator Fulbright. Since its inception, the USAID has been the central vehicle of the U.S. foreign assistance as a whole. While the U.S. government had made a number of foreign assistance efforts around the world since the implementation of the Marshal Plan for the recovery of Europe in 1947, the aim of the FAA of 1961 was to unify such existing assistance efforts in terms of long-range economic and social development. No sooner was the USAID created in 1961, than it started administrating its participant training

programs, which were clearly assumed as an effective promotion of new knowledge, skills, and attitudes among potential leaders so that they could become capable of carrying on their business better (Keilson, 2001). From a perspective of global student mobility, de Wit (2002) explains that, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, which saw the developing world decolonized, higher education expanded with its emerging role as a generator of human resources, "internationalization was expressed predominantly in the growing one-way mobility of students from the South to the North" (p. 12). The USAID participant training program conducted in the U.S. can be regarded as one of the outstanding programs facilitating such unilateral student mobility.

As Todd Moss et al. (2005) argue that "[the] U.S. has always used foreign aid strategically" (p. 3). Certainly, the USIAD participant training programs have contributed to many developing countries' economic growth (e.g., Botswana as a good example mentioned by Keilson, 2001), but the motivations for American development assistance programs in general have been overshadowed by foreign policy considerations, particularly national security. Holzner & Greenwood (1995) point out that American foreign development assistance, administered by the USAID, "came to be seen almost exclusively in the light of Cold War conceptions of the national interest" (p. 39). Keilson (2001) accounts for the changes in the outcomes sought by the USAID participant training programs over years. He gives brief descriptions to the critical objectives of the USAID-sponsored training in the 1970s, 1980s, and the years towards the beginning of the twenty-first century, respectively: support for aided countries to boost their serious efforts to tackle poverty; confrontation against communist expansion; and assistance for countries in transition from totalitarianism and socialism to democracy and market

capitalism. As far as the post-911 era is concerned, Todd Moss et al. (2005) conclude that there appears not to have been a substantial shift from poverty to terrorism in the U.S. foreign aid's fighting target, by assessing changes in country allocation by USAID from 1998 to 2005. Nevertheless, Moss et al. also admit that the new enthusiasm for foreign aid is "partly justified by the belief that aid can be a powerful instrument in a broader campaign against global terrorism" (p. 2).

The Fulbright and USAID programs for international students have experienced a number of reorganizations of their administration. Among them, there were two major reorganizations for each of the programs at similar timings; that is, at the end of the 1970s as well as the 1990s. While, as mentioned above, the earlier years of the Fulbright program saw some argue the separation of exchange programs and information services, this issue has lingered in the history of the Fulbright program administration. After successfully making the Fulbright program remain in the State Department at the time of the USIA's creation in 1953, the administration of the Fulbright program was strengthened by some minor bureaucratic changes within the State Department around 1960: establishing the Bureau of International Cultural Relations in 1959, one of whose primary responsibilities was the exchange of persons programs such as the Fulbright program; renaming this bureau the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in 1960; and appointing Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs after the enactment of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961.

The first major reorganization came in the late 1970s. The Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 of the Carter Administration changed the USIA's name into USICA (United States International Communication Agency), and made the agency absorb the

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs from the Department of State. Before this merge, a presidential advisory panel suggested that serious considerations be given to the concerns from the academic community, which does “not want such [educational and cultural exchange] activities mixed with the agency’s propaganda functions” (Mcbee, August 9, 1977, para. 8). *NAFSA: Forty Years* also mentioned this situation, saying that “[expressions] of concern from within the academic community culminated in assurances from the White House that they were committed to ‘preserving the integrity of academic and cultural exchanges’” (Zeigler, 1988, p. 22). Later in 1982, the agency’s name returned to USIA again under the Reagan Administration, which appeared to demonstrate the agency’s re-emphasis on information services. Although there was no further reorganization in the late 1980s, the symposium (1987) celebrating the Fulbright program’s forty years anniversary presented conflicting ideas within the Board members for the Fulbright program: some suggested that the Fulbright program have more explicit linkage with foreign policy goals, while others argued that the non-political nature of the Fulbright program has been a key of its success and should be maintained. The second major reorganization was made under the Clinton Administration in the late 1990s. Under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the USIA was merged into the Department of State with the stated purpose of saving money through the consolidation of international operations (Desruisseaux, April 16, 1999). Desruisseaux continued to report that many educators, including NAFSA leadership, expressed their relief to know that the merge would make sure that the exchanges functions be placed in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs separately from the Office of International Information Programs.

Compared to its predecessors such as the Economic Cooperation Agency, Mutual Security Agency, Foreign Operations Administration, and International Cooperation Agency, the he USAID was created in 1961 as an independent agency with greater autonomy from the Department of State. However, the debates over the inefficiency of the USAID since early in the 1970s resulted in the bill, the International Development Cooperation Act, introduced on behalf of the late Senator Hubert Humphrey. This bill suggested the creation of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA), which would have strong authority for most bilateral and multilateral economic assistance programs. Although the bill's idea of abolishing the USAID was not taken and although the IDCA's authority became much weaker than envisaged in Humphrey's bill, the Carter Administration established IDCA, which supervised the USAID. The early 1980s saw the Reagan Administration give no fund to the IDCA, which made the IDCA dysfunctional (USAID, n.d.). Finally, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, which as mentioned above merged the USIA into the State Department, abolished IDCA, and made the USAID come under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. This was a response to the post-Cold War era, which needed to restructure the federal budget and foreign policy as a whole after losing the national security rationales under the Cold War.

Also, the federal support for the international student exchange programs, such as the Fulbright and USAID programs, have been fluctuating over years. The funding for international exchanges and training had not seen any significant boost since the mid 1960s through the 1970s. The financial threats to these programs came in the early 1980s. The Reagan Administration first proposed severe budget cut for the exchange programs

of persons. However, Charles Wick, Director of USIA, realized the importance of the exchange programs to combat the communist expansion, and then the budget for the exchange programs boosted towards the end of the Cold War (Snow, 2008). After the end of the Cold War, the budget dramatically decreased again. From the major rationale for exchanges as national security objectives, the State Department's budget has been increased since 2001. In the post-911 era, the funding for the international exchange and training programs has been increased again. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) recommends that "just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values. … The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope" (p. 377). However, "The difference is that Americans in general tended to be more uniformly committed to the objectives of the cold war than they are today toward the foreign policy goals of the Bush Administration, including the war in Iraq, thereby making the current administration's support of critical exchanges a harder pill to swallow than was an anti-Communist agenda (Pew Global Attitudes Project November 1, 2007).

Chapter Four: Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the methodology used for the main analysis of this dissertation. The chapter begins with the explanation about the design of this dissertation as qualitative research. The justifications of using qualitative research, more particularly a case study, for this dissertation as a study of policy processes are presented. Then this chapter goes on to outline two different forms of data used for this case study: documents and interviews. Following the specification of the major documents used for content analysis, this section accounts for what kind of people were interviewed, how these informants were selected and contacted, and what questions were asked to these informants. Next, this chapter shows how the data are presented and analyzed. From a public policy perspective as indicated earlier, the presentation and analysis is guided by the Advocacy Coalition Framework. The final section of this chapter ends with the validity and limitations of this research methodology.

A Case Study as Qualitative Research for Policy Process Studies

As explained in Chapter Two, this dissertation is a study of policy process. In particular, as an analytical lens borrowed from public policy studies, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is applied to the examination of how international education professionals have influenced and have attempted to influence the federal policy on international student access to U.S. higher education. According to Michael Hill (1997), "[policy] process studies are likely to be case studies, using qualitative methods" (p. 25). According to John W. Creswell (1998), experts in qualitative research methodology (e.g., Bogdan & Biklen, 1992; Eisner, 1991; and Merriam, 1988) appear to agree that "one undertakes qualitative research in a natural setting where the researcher is an instrument

of data collection who gathers words or pictures, analyzes them inductively, focuses on the meaning of participants, and describes a process that is expressive and persuasive in language" (p. 14).

Hill (1997) explains that since the study of policy processes normally examines a unique sequence of events, little scope is left for testing previous studies, and that policy experiments are unlikely to occur in practical and feasible ways. In comparison to qualitative approach, quantitative research is interested in outcomes rather than process (Merriam, 1988). Therefore, Hill (1997) also argues that it is ideal in studying policy processes to combine qualitative observation of process with quantitative work on impact. However, this dissertation uses a qualitative method only, partly because of the constraints of time and resources for this dissertation and partly because of my far greater emphasis on processes rather than impacts.

Generally speaking, *process*, which I am trying to study, can be better explored by qualitative methods. As one of the five intellectual goals of qualitative research, Joseph A. Maxwell (2005) specifically points to "understanding the *process* by which events and actions take place" (p. 23). Maxell further explains the differences in causal questions to ask between quantitative and qualitative researchers, saying that "[quantitative] researchers tend to be interested in whether and to what extent variance in *x* causes variance in *y*. Qualitative researchers, on the other hand, tend to ask how *x* plays a role in causing *y*, what the *process* is that connects *x* and *y*" (p. 23). Similarly, David R. Krathwohl (1998) lists 15 instances where qualitative procedures may be useful, and points to one of these instances that "[the] focus of study is on a process and its internal dynamics or its strengths and weaknesses more than on its product or effect" (p. 230).

Among various kinds of qualitative research designs such as biography, ethnography, phenomenology and ground theory (Creswell, 1998), this dissertation uses the design of a case study. As mentioned above, case studies are often used in studies of policy process. According to Creswell, “a case study is an exploration of a “bounded system” or a case (or multiple cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context” (1998, p. 61). In this dissertation, the bounded system to be explored is the policy domain in the U.S. federal policy arena concerning international student access to U.S. higher education over 60 years. Similar to my scope in terms of policy domain, David Urias & Carol Camp Yeakey (2009) demonstrate the appropriateness of using a case study method with multiple data sources to explore the impact of federal policies on the visa system for international students/scholars in the post-911 era.

Involving multiple sources of information for data collection is part of the triangulation strategy for confirming research findings by means of independent measures. A classical and basic typology of triangulation proposed by Norman Denzin (1978) include the following: by theory (multiple theoretical schemes to interpret the same phenomenon); by investigator (multiple observers in the field situation); by data source (multiple sampling strategies in terms of time, space, and persons); and by method (multiple methods to gather data). The methods to gather data can take forms such as observations, interviews, documents, and audio-visual materials (e.g., Creswell, 1998). As Maxwell (2005) argues, the triangulation of data collection, by using a variety of sources and methods, for qualitative research “reduces the risk that your conclusions will reflect only the systematic biases or limitations of a specific source or method, and allows

you to gain a broader and more secure understanding of the issues you are investigating" (pp. 93-94). Particularly talking about case study research, Robert Stake (1995) emphasizes the convergence of information through triangulation. Similarly, Yin (1994) defines case studies as a comprehensive research strategy which relies on the multiplicity of data sources requiring the mutual corroboration in a triangulation matter.

In fact, however, Weible et al. (2009) point out that a considerable number of the applications of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) are even unspecific or unclear about their data collection methods. By examining 80 ACF applications which have appeared as books, book chapters, and articles in peer-review journals between 1987 and 2006, Weible et al. show that 41% of the applications do not clearly specify any data collection methods, and that these applications seem to lean on collecting and analyzing existing documents and reports unsystematically. Apart from the 41%, according to Weible et al., the frequency of data collection methods used in these previous 80 ACF applications is as follows: interviews alone by 20%, documents alone by 9%, questionnaires alone by 6%, observations alone by 3%, the combination of interviews and documents by 10%, the combination of questionnaires and interviews by 10%, and the combination of questionnaires and documents by 1%.

Earlier in the development of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, those who had originally devised the framework recommended the content analysis of public documents for the study in their approach (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993). Particularly, they stressed the usefulness of analyzing the public hearings, in proposing a method for developing the data to measure longitudinal change in beliefs of policy elites for studies with an advocacy coalition approach. In addition to public hearings, Jenkins-Smith and

Sabatier (1993) also describe other government documents and interest-group publications as a gold mine for examining changes in elite beliefs over time. At the same time, they admit that interviews are good source of data for measuring the current policy elites' beliefs, although they mention it very briefly.

Taking into account the importance of the triangulation of data collection as well as the actual tendency of the previous ACF applications' data collection methodology, my method to gather information was the combination of documents and interviews. The documents for my content analysis included not only congressional hearings but also, the *Federal Register*, NAFSA-related documents. These various types of documents enabled me to explore the questions as to who are the political actors in the policy domain concerning international student access to U.S. higher education, what their beliefs are, and how these actors are related to each other. Also, I conducted open-ended and structured interviews with 20 people to triangulate the same questions, particularly in the most recent period; that is, in the 1990s and 2000s. This chapter now moves on to describe the documents and interviews.

Data–Documents

While the scope of my study in terms of time is over 60 years, I could hardly interview all those who could speak based on their real experience in the policy domain several decades ago. Therefore, my investigation needs to substantially rely on the documents, both historical and current. First, the congressional hearings allow researchers to look at various perspectives representing key political actors over time, including those of today. Partly in order to triangulate the data sources, and partly in order to fill the gap of the information the congressional hearings cannot provide, this

dissertation also uses the *Federal Register*, NAFSA's publications and records, and other documents including the books and documents which contain the secondary data.

In attempting to collect the document data from the history over 60 years, I focused on the following six periods with distinct policy changes in terms of legislations or regulations significantly affecting international student access to U.S. higher education. The first period is several years around the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, which has been the fundamental law governing international students for over half a century, and which created F visa for international students. The second period is around the passage of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, which contained several immigration related revisions, including the creation of the J visa for exchange programs, and whose creation NAFSA had been involved in. The third period is the late 1970s, which saw the regulation change in admission of international students for duration of status. The fourth period is the mid 1980s, which saw two immigration-related debates over international students: two-year home residence requirements proposed in the Immigration and Control Bills, and the regulation changes made through the continual negotiations between the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) and NAFSA. The fifth period is the second half in the 1990s, which saw the introduction of IIRIRA of 1996 and its mandated pilot program for a tracking system of which NAFSA was a leading opponent. The sixth period is the post-9/11 years, which saw the implementation of SEVIS and a streamline of the visa procedures tightened after the 911 attacks in 2001.

When looking at the documents, I paid particular attention to the major political actors, mainly representatives of organizations which participated in the hearings concerning international students. These political actors include the following: NAFSA,

university presidential associations (particularly the American Council on Education), the Institute of International Education (IIE), government agencies in primary charge of U.S. visas and immigration affairs (e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Services and the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs), government agencies in primary charge of U.S. public diplomacy (i.e., the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, USICA and USIA), and legislators such as Senator Fulbright.

Congressional hearings. As the main data source to examine the changes, if any, in the beliefs of advocacy coalitions' participants, this dissertation uses the congressional hearings for the past 60 years. As mentioned earlier, according to Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993), the public hearings are one of the best data sources for identifying and measuring beliefs of key political actors in the studies using the Advocacy Coalition Framework.

However, there are thousands of hearings during to which 'foreign students' or 'international students' are referred. Therefore, as below, I selected three to four hearing records for each of the six periods listed just above. The selection criteria were as follows: hearings particularly discussing the legislations and/or regulations mentioned in those six periods, hearings with the main focus on international students, and hearings including at least one of the major and recurring political players mentioned above. Therefore, the selected hearing documents for this dissertation's analysis were as follows: for the first period around 1950, *Immigration and Naturalization* (1948), *Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws* (1951), and *Overseas Information Programs of the U.S. Part 2* (1953); for the second period in the early 1960s, two hearings leading to the passage of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, *Mutual Educational*

and Cultural Exchange Act (1961) in the Senate, and *Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961* (1961) in the House, and *International Migration of Talent and Skills* (1967); for the third period in the late 1970s, *Review of Immigration Problems* (1975 & 1976), *and Nonimmigrant Visas Requirements Procedures* (1976), and *The Future of International Education* (1978); for the fourth period in the mid 1980s, *International Education, Foreign Exchange and Scholarships* (1983), House hearing (1983) and Senate hearing (1983) for the Immigration Reform and Control Bills; for the fifth period in the second half of 1990s, *Nonimmigrant Visa Issues* (1995), *Reform of Legal Immigration* (1995), and *Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center* (1998); and for the sixth period in the post-911 era, *Tracking International Students in Higher Education: Policy Options and Implications for Students* (2001), *Addressing the New Reality of Current Visa Policy on International Students and Researchers* (2004), *International Students and Visiting Scholars: Trends, Barriers, and Implications for American Universities and U.S. Foreign Policies* (2007), and *Status of Visas and Other Policies for Foreign Students and Scholars* (2008).

Federal Register. This daily official publication of the U.S. federal government includes rules, proposed rules, and notices of Federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and other presidential documents. Particularly as it relates to my investigation about the regulatory changes affecting international students, it is useful to look at *the Federal Register*. This publication provides the researchers with not only the contents of the rules and regulations, but also some reasons for the changes, which allow researchers to understand the perceptions of Federal agencies (e.g., the Immigration and Naturalization Service) of those changes, as well as some feedback from the stakeholders

about their proposed rules and regulations. In particular, *the Federal Register* is very helpful for this dissertation; for example, the regulation change of introducing the admission of non-immigrant F-1 students for their duration of status in the late 1970s and some turnarounds in regulations affecting the higher education institution's administration of international students in the mid 1980s. While these policy changes had significant implications to international students as well as to international educational professionals, almost no congressional hearing records mentioned these changes in depth.

NAFSA publications and records. NAFSA has produced and maintained a great number of documents on international education in general, including those with the particular reference to the federal policies affecting international student access to U.S. higher education. Because NAFSA has always paid substantial attentions to the policies affecting international students since its inception, the NAFSA-related documents explicitly or implicitly, illustrate the development of the federal policy in this field, the international education professionals' efforts to influence the policy, and the relationship between NAFSA and other political actors. The NAFSA-related documents which this dissertation extensively uses as important data sources can be categorized into three groups in terms of the location of their availability. First, NAFSA's official website, www.nafsa.org, has maintained a great number of digitalized documents on the issues concerning international student access for the past decade or so, particularly from 2003, as of May 2009. A special page on the website is devoted to the records related to NAFSA's legislative and regulatory activity advocating for international student and scholar access which has been even more intense than before since the establishment of its public policy department in 1998. The records include NAFSA's policy statements,

reports, and letters as well as the official documents produced by other political actors (e.g., statutes, regulations, and letters). These records provide the most recent information on the major political actors' beliefs and activities. In spite of the website's extensive coverage, it should be noted that the content presented in this data source as an interest group's web site are strategically selected to advocate for international student access from NAFSA's perspective. It may be required to look at other sources for the perspectives different from NAFSA's.

Second, an extraordinary important data source for this dissertation's historical investigation is the NAFSA Archives located in the Special Collections at University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, Arkansas. As the alma mater of Senator William J. Fulbright, one of the greatest figures in the U.S. promotion of international education, the University of Arkansas holds several special collections in the field of international education closely associated with Senator Fulbright. In addition to the NAFSA Archives, these collections house the archives of the Council for International Exchange of Scholars, and of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. This archival repository for NAFSA was created by agreement between the University Libraries and NAFSA in 1987. The documents listed in the catalogue of the NAFSA Archives include board minutes, files of committees (e.g., the Government Regulations Advisory Committee), publications, correspondence, reports, financial and legal documents, most of which come from the period between the late 1940s and the early 1990s.

Among the documents archived at the University of Arkansas, *NAFSA Newsletters* appears particularly useful to this dissertation because the regularity in its publication over years allows me to continually follow the events and changes which

international education professionals tended to find significant at the time. Its first issue was published in October of 1949. The earlier issues of the *Newsletters* were almost quarterly, but they became bimonthly in the mid-1950s. Since then, eight to ten issues of the *Newsletters* were published each year, as the *Newsletters* was not published during summer. The NAFSA Archives keeps almost all the *Newsletters* issues between 1949 and the early 1990s. Over years, its format became more complicated, and its topics came to be diversified, and its volume significantly increased over years. However, each issue of the *Newsletters* is one of the best sources for the beliefs and collaborative activities of key international education professionals who are active in policy advocacy for international student access, by presenting the policy statements, interpretations, and strategies towards legislative and regulatory changes at different times.

Third, *International Educator*, NAFSA's current flagship magazine, is another important data source for this dissertation. This magazine fills the gap between that documents available at the NAFSA Archives, whose catalogued resources are generally limited those up to the early 1990s, and the vast majority of the documents and information available at NAFSA's official website, www.nafsa.org., comes from the period after the September 11 attacks in 2001. *International Educator* was launched in 1990 "to raise awareness of international education issues that were becoming more prominent" (Dessoff, September/October, 2008, p. 13). Compared to the *NAFSA Newsletter*, the targeted readers of *International Educator* may arguably include the greater community beyond NAFSA members or even beyond international education professionals. From international education professionals' perspectives, however, no other documents have consistently paid specific attention to the contemporary issues of

international education, including international student access, at different times. The publication of *International Educator* in its early years was biannual. It became a quarterly magazine early in 1995, and then bimonthly at the start of 2005. As a result, there have been approximately 70 issues as of 2009. Fortunately, I have managed to locate nearly all the issues except for three issues: Fall 1992, Fall 1995, and Summer 1996. In addition to being a good source for the perceptions of the stakeholders in the policy domain concerning international student access in the 1990s and 2000s, *International Educator* includes retrospective articles featured for the fiftieth and sixtieth anniversaries, some of which supply the readers with comprehensible outlines about the history of the development of international education in the U.S. after World War II.

Other documents. In order to compliment the information obtained from the documents above, Chapter Six uses various other data sources related to international educational professionals. For example, *NAFSA: Forty Years* (1988), which was written in accordance with NAFSA's fortieth anniversary by Lee Zeigler, a former NAFSA president in the 1970s, is an invaluable source of information on the development not only of NAFSA but also of international education and international educational professionals. This booklet, any copies of which are not kept in the NAFSA Archives at the University of Arkansas, presents NAFSA's essential history between the late 1940s and 1980s. *NAFSA: Forty Years* extensively used the retrospective comments from a number of the past NAFSA presidents about their own terms. Another good source of information with the considerable reference to the early development of NAFSA, particularly up to the early 1960s, is Lipin Bu's *Making the World Like Us* (2003). For her analysis of the U.S. cultural diplomacy, including exchange programs in the aftermath of

World War II, Bu extensively uses the primary data from the publications and records of the then leading non-governmental political actors concerned with such exchange programs such as the IIE, the Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign Students (CFRFS), and the Ford Foundation, not to mention NAFSA. Although I use these works of Zeigler's and Bu's most frequently as a complimentary data source for Chapter Five, my use of other publications and records, whenever they are helpful in my application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, is not limited to these two works.

Data–Interviews

Interviews are an established method to gather information for qualitative research. "[An interview] goes beyond the spontaneous exchange of views in everyday conversations, and becomes a careful questioning and listening approach with the purpose of obtaining thoroughly tested knowledge" (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008, p. 3). Michael Quinn Patton (2002) explains that "[the] purpose of qualitative interviewing is to capture how those being interviewed view their world, to learn their terminology and judgments, and to capture the complexities of their individual perceptions and experiences" (p. 348). Patton regards this openness as making qualitative interviewing different from the closed questionnaire or test which quantitative research uses.

Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman (2006) point to the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative research interviews in general. On the one hand, interviews enable researchers to quickly obtain data in quantity. Also, it is possible for the researchers to follow up and clarify the comments with the interviewees. On the other hand, interviewees may be unwilling or uncomfortable to share all the information which interviewers want to explore. There may be some good reasons for an interviewee's not

being truthful about the information he or she gives to the interviewer. Also, an interviewer's lack of expertise or familiarity with the local language or her/his lack of skill may neither enable her/him to extract long narratives from her/his informants nor comprehend the response to her/his questions or conversation.

Further, Marshall & Rossman (2006) particularly explain the advantages and disadvantages concerning interviews with elites. The interviews conducted for this dissertation can be categorized into this specialized form of in-depth interviewing. As shown later, all my informants are at senior positions in their own organizations or the community with concerns about international students. These elites "are selected for interviews on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research" (Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 105). According to Marshall & Rossman, the advantages of interviewing with elites include these: the elites' ability to talk about their organizations' overall views or about the relationships between their organizations and others; and the elites' ability to account for their organizational policies, histories, and plans. However, Marshall and Rossman suggest that researchers understand that these comments from the elites are made from "their own limited and bounded perspectives" (2006, p. 105). One of the major disadvantages of interviewing with elites which Marshall and Rossman mention is the difficulties for researchers to access and contact the elites especially because they are very busy. Some assistance by means of scholarship, recommendations, and introductions may be necessary in making appointment with the elites. Also, Marshall & Rossman argue that "elite individuals who are used be being interviewed by the press and other media may well be quite sophisticated in managing the interview process" (2006, p. 106).

In terms of the interview structure set in advance and the latitude for the interviewees' response, Patton (2002) presents three basic approaches for qualitative research interviews: the informal conversational interview, the general interview guide approach, and the standardized open-ended interview. This dissertation followed Patton's argument that the three basic approaches are not mutually exclusive, and it, therefore, used two of the three approaches excluding the most flexible approach, the informal conversational interview, which is often used as part of ongoing participant observation field work. Therefore, this dissertation's strategy is the combination of the general interview guide approach and the standardized open-ended interview with some stronger emphases on the latter. "[The] standardized open-ended interview consists of a set of questions carefully worded and arranged with the intention of taking each respondent through the same sequence and asking each respondent the same questions with essentially the same words" (Patton, 2002, p. 342). This standardization particularly made me as a non-native English speaker find it easier to make my questions clear to the informants in English. At the same time, the general interview guide approach allows interviewers to remain free to build a conversation, to word questions, and to establish a conversation style, while the guide provides the informants in advance with a set of predetermined topics or subject areas to be explored. Patton suggest that it is possible for an interviewer to be required to use the exact way certain key questions are asked (i.e., as in the standardized open-ended interviews), and at the same time to be granted some discretion about other items as topics to be explored (i.e., as in the general interview guide approach). This combination "offers the interviewer flexibility in probing and in determining when it is appropriate to explore certain subjects in greater depth, or even to

pose questions about new areas of inquiry that were not originally anticipated in the interview instrument's development" (2002, p. 347).

Taking into account these methodological backgrounds of qualitative research interviews, this dissertation finds several reasons for conducting interviews with the current political actors. First, triangulating the information on the political actors' beliefs in the recent years both through documents and interviews is likely to increase the validity of the study. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) admit that interviews are effective in identifying and measuring the current policy elites' beliefs, while emphasizing the usefulness of public hearings for the data collection methodology for their advocacy coalition research approach. Second, some questions given to the informants are likely to evoke the information which cannot be presented on the public documents or other sources available. For example, the political actors' perception of other political actors' influence, including the strengths and weaknesses of NAFSA, can hardly be found in the documents available to public, while such information would be useful in examining how the political actors, including NAFSA, influence the federal policy governing international student access to U.S. higher education. Third, the open-ended nature of interviewing may lead some informants to present valuable information which cannot be anticipated by reading the documents only.

Next, as far as sampling the informants is concerned, "[the] purposeful selection of participants presents a key decision point in a qualitative study" (Creswell, 1998, p. 118). Creswell suggests that the qualitative researchers indicate their own sampling options, and specify their rationales for the options. Creswell particularly argues that case study investigators may consider any one of the options in the comprehensive list of

sampling strategies identified by Miles & Huberman (1994). My sampling strategy for this dissertation can be categorized under the category of ‘snowball or chain’ sampling of Miles & Huberman, which “identifies cases of interest form people who know people who know what cases are information-rich” (1994, p. 28).

In discussing methodologies for their advocacy coalition approach, Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier (1993) remind their readers that reputational sampling or snowball sampling techniques are appropriate for identifying the current political elites’ beliefs. Miles & Huberman (1994) refer to reputational case selection as one of those which are not mentioned in their list created from Patton (1990) and Kuzel (1992), and Miles & Huberman (1994) define reputational sampling as “instances chosen on the recommendation of an “expert” or “key informant”” (p. 28). However, as Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier (1993) argue, snowballing technique, which Kingdon (1984) used in his public policy study, is much like the reputational approach. Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier (1993) use the definition of reputational sampling by Hunter (1963) that “identified elites were asked to list other elites, who in turn were asked to identify still others” (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993, p. 241). In this respect, arguably these two sampling strategies are not mutually exclusive. My informants were selected since they were experts and key informants, and at the same time the information that they were so was given to me by other experts and key informants. Therefore, my sampling strategy is defined as the combination of snowball and reputational samplings.

As a result, my sampling procedure required gatekeepers. Creswell (1998) points out that it is important for a case study to gain access to the possible informants through a gatekeeper, “an individual who is a member of or has insider status with a cultural group”

(p. 117). I had several gatekeepers who helped me to access to the informants in the following distinct groups: NAFSA staff working in its headquarters in Washington D.C.; NAFSA members, most of whom are working in the university offices of international education; staff of university presidential associations whose offices are located in Washington D.C.; staff of international exchange organizations; staff of the governmental agencies such as the State Department; and staff of a legislator's office. More concrete description of the sampling and interviewing for my dissertation according to these six groups of informants is provided below. The description also includes another group of my informants, a member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), with whom I had already established business acquaintance through my work at Penn State's University Office of International Programs prior to the interviews.

As general procedures of my interviews, an informed consent from and a sheet with open-ended structured questions were given to all the interviewees a couple of days prior to the interviews. The interview length varied between 30 and 90 minutes, but the vast majority of the interviews were completed in 45-60 minutes. All the interviews were electronically recorded, and then transcribed into text in Microsoft Word format.

Below are presented the description of my access to and interviews with twenty informants in total divided into seven groups.

Interviewees: NAFSA staff. I had a group interview with three of NAFSA's senior full-time staff working at its headquarters located in Washington D.C. in March of 2008. Earlier, during NAFSA's Annual Conference in Minneapolis in May of 2007, I had introduced myself to one of these staff members (identified as Catherine for a pseudo name), working for NAFSA's policy department, after her conference presentation. I

explained to Catherine that I had just started my dissertation research on international education professionals' influence on the federal policy process. Leveraging this contact, I officially sent Catherine an interview request with a reference letter from a senior international education professional (identified as Nicole for a pseudo name) at a large land grant university, who knows many NAFSA staff and key members very well. Following Nicole's advice, this request also asked for interviews with two other senior staff members of NAFSA (identified as Susan and George for pseudo names), who are significantly involved in NAFSA's political activities. The request was soon accepted. The group interview with Catherine, Susan, and George was conducted in Susan's room in the NAFSA's headquarters office. None of these three dominated the interview, and I was able to have comments responding to each of my questions from all the three interviewees, although their comments were often complementary to each other.

Interviewees: NAFSA members. Between March and September of 2008, I had nine interview sessions with ten people who have been or used to be NAFSA members actively involved in NAFSA's political activities. Among these ten interviewees, two (identified as Thomas and Mary for pseudo names) had retired by the time of my interviews, while the others still worked in the university offices of international programs. Five interviewees represented (or had represented) five different private universities, while the others represented (or had represented) five different public universities. The selection of these interviewees was largely based on suggestions from Nicole, mentioned above, as well as from Laura, to whom I had introduced myself after her presentation at NAFSA's Annual Conference in Minneapolis. Laura was working for the international student services office at a private university, and was substantially

involved in NAFSA's committee about policy at the time of the conference. Nicole's and Laura's advice led me to send interview requests with Nicole's reference letter to eight possible interviewees. All of these eight people accepted my interview request. One of these eight interviewees kindly brought her colleague (i.e., the ninth interviewee) of her university's federal relations office to my interview with her. The tenth interviewee in this group (identified as Jack for a pseudo name) not only had been a NAFSA member but also had occupied an executive position of the Association of International Education Administrators (AIEA), which comprises the senior administrators of the U.S. higher education institutions. Jack was chosen because of his background with the AIEA. A reference letter from one of my dissertation committee members, who happened to be Jack's friend, helped me make the interview appointment with Jack. Four of the nine interviews were conducted in the interviewees' own offices in their universities (one in March, two in April, and one in September of 2008). Three interviews were conducted in quiet public places during the NAFSA's 60th Annual Conference in Washington D.C. in May of 2008. My interviews with two retired professionals were conducted over the telephone in July and September 2008, respectively.

Interviewees: Staff of university presidential associations. I interviewed a staff member of one of the major university presidents' associations so called the Big Six; i.e., the American Council on Education (ACE), the American Association of Community Colleges (AACC), the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), the Association of American Universities (AAU), APUL, and the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU), and the then NASULGC (National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, now the

Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities [APUL]). Although I first tried to interview with someone from each of these Big Six associations, I managed to interview only one of them in the end. I began with looking at the official websites of the Big Six associations, which listed the names of their staff members in charge of either international student affairs or federal government relations. Then, I consulted with an executive administrator (identified as Robert for a pseudo name) working in the university office of international programs at a large land grant university to see if my list of candidates for my interviewees was appropriate. After speaking with Robert, I revised the list and contacted the Big Six associations with interview requests including Robert's name as a reference. Generally speaking, the responses from the associations were not satisfactory to me. For example, an association's contact firmly declined my request, repeatedly suggesting that I simply interview the then NASULGC without bothering interviewing her association since the higher education association community works collaboratively for international student issues, and APUL (or the then NASULGC) tends to take the lead on the issues. However, a staff member in the primary charge of its active international engagement of one of the Big Six associations (identified as Stewart for a pseudo name) readily accepted my interview request in July of 2008, probably because Stewart is a good friend of Robert.

Interviewees: Staff of international exchange organizations. My preliminary investigation for other major organizations which commit themselves to the promotion of international student mobility had led me to two major international exchange organizations in the Northeastern United States. These two organizations are quite different both in the length of their histories, the size of their organizations, and the scope

of their missions. However, both have been very closely working with NAFSA, at least in the past decade or so, when my interviewees were actively advocating the promotion of international education. Some suggestions from Robert, mentioned above, made me confirm the importance of these two organizations in the policy process concerning international student access to U.S. higher education. Since Robert personally knows some staff in each organization, he allowed me to use his name as a reference in my interview request to these two organizations. Eventually, I managed to interview one for each organization (identified as Peter and Alex for pseudo names) in June of 2008 and October of 2008, respectively.

Interviewees: Staff of the government agencies. I interviewed two officers at the Department of State: one in October of 2008, and the other in November of 2008. The selection of these two people was guided by Peter of the international exchange organization as mentioned above, who had developed good connection in terms of the federal relations. It was very kind of Peter to send e-mail messages to the key people in the government agencies and a legislator's office to introduce me to them. Although these two State Department officials were introduced to me by Peter, but not by NAFSA, from whose staff I had not managed to have any indication about specific persons for my potential interviewees, these two people of the State Department had known NAFSA very well through their working with NAFSA. Both of the two interviews were conducted in their office buildings in Washington D.C. Due to one of these interviewees' request for higher confidentiality, I do neither use pseudonyms for them, nor direct quotes from their comments.

Interviewees: Staff of Congressional legislator offices. After the longest

negotiation among my contacts for the interview appointments with the major stakeholders in this policy domain, I managed to talk with one of the staffers (identified as Emily for a pseudo name) working for a legislator who had sponsored several bills which promote international student access to U.S. higher education. In relation to these bills, this legislator's office had substantial communication with NAFSA. Emily herself was the main contact between the legislator's office and NAFSA. It is in June of 2008 that Peter of the international exchange organization mentioned above directed me to Emily for the first time. However, the office's rules about accepting such interviews and the busy time of the federal election made it take a very long time to finalize the interview appointment with her. In February 2009, however, I managed to talk with Emily in a café just outside of Washington D.C.

Interviewees: Member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association. I interviewed a lawyer (identified as Fred for a pseudo name), who particularly practices immigration law. I chose him as one of my interviewees partly because he had been a committee member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, which has sometimes advocated with NAFSA for international student access to U.S. higher education. Moreover, Fred had been not only teaching immigration law at a university but also had been a frequent speaker on immigration topics for international students as well as international education professionals. I myself had been among the audience of his presentation about the immigration regulations for international students almost one year prior to my interview with him for this dissertation. I made an e-mail request for an interview and managed to interview him on campus of a university in the Northeastern United States in November of 2008.

Interview questions. The questions in my semi-structured interviews were designed to explore the interviewers' perceptions on the themes related to each of my specific research questions, which correspond to the four elements in the ACF's policy subsystem box: (1) strategies for influencing the federal policies, (2) political actors and the relationship among them, (3) resources as political actors, and (4) beliefs in international student mobility into the U.S. The connections between the interview questions and the research questions are summarized in a table in Appendix C.

I began all the interviews by asking an introductory question, "What do you see as the three most important policy changes affecting international student access to U.S. higher education since you started working in this field or 1990, whichever you find it easier to answer?" Not only did I try to facilitate the interview conversations with this concrete topic, but also I used this question to lead to another question about the key political actors' strategies in their attempt to influence the policy process. Therefore, after having the interviewees' comments on the policy changes, I asked how interviewees or their organizations had been involved in those policy changes. Additionally, I asked my interviewees to describe any successes or lack of success in NAFSA's attempts to encourage major policy changes in the past. By asking these questions, I sought their comments to help me answer one of this dissertation's research questions, "What strategies has NAFSA used for its attempt to influence the federal policy?"

Next, I asked all the interviewees, "Who do you see as the three most influential political actors (either individuals or organizations) shaping U.S. policy regarding international student access to U.S. higher education?" I further asked about interviewee's own allies, and their opponents, if any. Since the vast majority of my

interviewees are either NAFSA staff/members or those who have worked closely with NAFSA in the policy process, I had expected these interview questions to produce the interviewees' comments with important implications for one of the research questions, "What relationships has NAFSA developed with other key actors in this policy process?"

Further, because I am particularly interested in how the contributions of international education professionals were perceived as political actors in the coalition, I asked all the interviewees about their views on the strengths and weaknesses of international education professionals, particularly NAFSA as their association, in their efforts to influence policy regarding international student access. These questions are related to one of the research questions, "What resources has NAFSA, as a political actor, contributed to the coalition's advocacy for international student mobility?"

As the final question given to all the interviewees, I asked, "What do you see as the three most important benefits of promoting international student access to U.S. higher education? What costs, if any, do you see?" I additionally asked how the interviewee's views about these benefits (and costs, if any) had changed over the years. This interview question is designed to capture interviewees' values regarding the enrollment of international students to American colleges and universities. Therefore, these interview questions are connected most closely with my research question about beliefs of political actors; namely, "What has characterized NAFSA's beliefs in the promotion of international student mobility into the U.S.?"

In addition, I customized some questions for specific groups of informants. To NAFSA staff and NAFSA members only, I asked about the genesis and evolution of NAFSA's current public policy approach. This question was included in a set of written

questions provided only to NAFSA staff prior to the interviews. Although I had not informed my NAFSA member interviewees of this question prior to the interviews, I eventually asked most of these NAFSA members about these issues during the interviews. The purpose of this question about NAFSA's current approach was to grasp the strategies of NAFSA as a political actor. Meanwhile, my question given particularly to those who are neither NAFSA staff nor members was, "What do you see as the changes, if any, in the relationship between NAFSA and your organization (or yourself) in the policy process regarding international student access to U.S. higher education over the years?" This question is essentially aimed at understanding NAFSA's relationships with other key political actors.

Presentation and Analysis of Data Collected

Since my main focus in this dissertation is placed on the box of 'Policy Subsystem' of the Advocacy Coalition Framework's Diagram of 2007 (see Appendix B; excerpted from Weible et al., 2009, p. 123), the presentation of my collected data is substantially devoted to this specific box. However, the ACF sees other boxes of the diagram as important, too. In fact, a considerable number of previous researchers using the ACF have paid much attention to 'External Events' in discussing the policy changes. At the same time, Weible et al. (2009) criticize that many previous studies simply ignore the box of 'Relatively Stable Parameters' on the diagram. Therefore, the next chapter (i.e., Chapter Five) briefly discusses the ACF's other components as the context for the Policy Subsystem box in terms of international student mobility into the U.S. before substantially presenting my collected data for the discussion about the policy subsystem box in the following chapters.

Chapter Five first gives a brief summary of ‘Relatively Stable Parameters’ such as the basic constitutional structure (e.g., no federal mandate for education), and ‘Long-term Coalition Opportunity Structures’ (i.e., the U.S. as a highly pluralist society) in the context of the policies governing international students, assuming that these two environments have not been much changed over 60 years. Chapter Five then presents ‘External Events’ such as changes in socio-economic conditions (e.g., the Cold War, recessions, and the 911 attacks), changes in systemic governing coalition (e.g., changes in the administration and congressional composition), and impacts from other policy subsystems (e.g., foreign policy, illegal immigration, higher education), decade by decade since the end of World War II.

After this provision of the contextual explanation, Chapter Six beings with the pre-history of NAFSA’s birth in 1948. Then, Chapter Six continues to present my collected documentary data in the following six sections, each of which is corresponding to the six periods with distinct policy changes affecting international students over 60 years. As already mentioned, these six periods are as follows: first, several years around the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952; second, years around the passage of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961; third, years leading to the regulation change in admission of international students for duration of status in the late 1970s; fourth, the mid 1980s, seeing two immigration-related debates, both legislative and regulatory, over international students; fifth, the years leading to and subsequent from the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; and sixth, the post-9/11 years with the struggle with the implementation of SEVIS and streamlining the visa procedures tightened after the 911 attacks in 2001.

Each of these six sections presents the collected data in more depth in terms of the elements of the box of 'Policy Subsystem' of the 2007 ACF Flow Diagram. With a strong focus on the identification of the policy beliefs of the then political actors, this central part of the data presentation includes the following: highlighting the major political actors in the coalitions; and describing the coalitions' resources and strategies regarding guidance or instrument. It is assumed that decisions by governmental authorities are represented by the major changes in the legislations and regulations governing international student access in each period. Institutional rules, resource allocations, and appointments, as well as policy output and impacts are mentioned relatively in brief as the outcomes of these decisions.

Similarly, Chapter Seven pays special attention to the elements of the Policy Subsystem box in the 2007 ACF Flow diagram. Rather than exploring the past 60 years, however, this chapter mainly discusses the more recent years (i.e., the 1990s and 2000s, particularly after the September 11 attacks in 2001) by presenting a number of excerpts from the interviews. My justification for this shorter scope of Chapter Seven's discussions than Chapter Six's is that it is very hard to find any living interviewees who were active political actors more than half a century ago. Also, it is the history of the 1990s and 2000s that the majority of my interviewees remember well as their being among the most active political actors during those years.

Then, Chapter Eight further interprets the data presented in Chapters Six and Seven. Taking into account the context presented in Chapter Five, I attempt to examine the changes of the elements in the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education over 60 years. The changes in the political actors' beliefs,

the composition of the political actors, and the collaborative activities among these political actors during this period are highlighted. Bearing in mind the continuity and changes within the elements of this particular policy subsystem, I explain how international education professionals, particularly through NAFSA, have influenced the federal policies governing international students in the U.S.

Limitations

Although I tried to triangulate the data collection in terms of sources and methods, there is still much to be desired in terms of validity. For example, many of the comments from my interviewees may have been politically diplomatic, in particular to the other political actors. Regardless of my promise that the interview conversations would be kept confidential, these interviewees may have tried not to offend other political actors. In fact, the vast majority of the interviewees were not talkative about the conversion of international educational professionals from the active opponents to international student tracking system to the relatively obedient implementers of the tracking system after the 911 attacks. More interview time as well as better interview skills would have illuminated the situation.

Particularly, the collected data about NAFSA's political activities and statements require some caution for examination. It should be noted that the policy advocacy of a professional association does not always represent all of its members, but its politically active members may dominate the direction of the policy advocacy. Many professionals, even though they are members of these associations, may be too busy with their daily administrative/counseling services for international student mobility to be involved in policy advocacy. Also, due to the differences among the association members, not only in

terms of their own personal creed but also of the institutional context where they work, it is not reasonable to assume that a professional association has a unanimous policy advocacy on every single issue.

Another validity problem may have derived from the fact that I am "the *primary instrument* for data collection and data analysis" (Merriam & Associates, 2002, p. 5). Both researcher bias and informants' reactivity may have been affected because I, the researcher, am an international student. My questions prepared for the interviews may have been also subconsciously distorted by my personal ideals and expectations about international student mobility which had been formed by my own experiences as an international student. As a result, these questions may have lent themselves to a certain type of answers which I wanted. Responding to questions in person from me as an international student, my interviewees may have tended to try to demonstrate their own views toward international students as being more positive and considerate than they actually are. Or, in front of an international student, they might have been too optimistic or too defensive about their own roles in advocacy coalition for the national policy on international students. At the analysis stage, my interpretations of the collected data may be also substantially guided by my own 'international-student-centered' perspective.

To the contrary, of course, my own status and experiences as an international student may work positively on my research. The researcher's personal goals often profoundly influence the researcher's decisions on the topic, issue, or question selected for study (Maxwell, 2005). I feel strongly motivated with passion and a sense of mission of studying about international student mobility. Also, my knowledge about the needs and challenges which many international students share may enhance the quality of my data

collection and data analysis by making myself take into account the perspectives of international students as one of the important end beneficiaries and/or victims of the national policy on international students.

Chapter Five: Environments to the Policy Subsystem

Taking into account the 2005 Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) Flow Diagram (see Appendix B, from Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 202), this chapter provides a compressed overview of the context of the subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education over 60 years since the end of World War II. First, the 'Relatively Stable Parameters' in the 2005 ACF Flow Diagram are discussed. Next, the 'Long Term Coalition Opportunity Structures' as the context of my focused subsystem are briefly summarized. Note that this chapter does not refer to the 'Short Term Constrains and Resources of Subsystem Actors' of the 2005 ACF Flow Diagram. The main reason for not using this component of the framework in this dissertation is that it has been the least theorized among the ACF components. Then, this chapter finally goes on to discuss the box of 'External (System) Events' in terms of each decade since the late 1940s. This final section attempts to show how various external events over the 60 years have pushed any substantial changes in the policy subsystem affecting international student mobility to the U.S.

Relatively Stable Parameters

The ACF, from its original version in the 1980s through the most recent one in 2007, identifies four sets of relatively stable factors within which the political actors in each of policy subsystem operate. Due to these factors, the range of feasible alternatives is limited, or otherwise the resources and beliefs of those actors are affected (Sabatier, 1993). Below are discussed these four types in the context of international student access to U.S. higher education: basic attributes of the problems area; basic distribution of natural resources; fundamental sociocultural values and social structure; and basic

constitutional structure.

Basic attributes of the problem area. According to the ACF, the characteristics of the problem area or issue area influence policy options and the policy-oriented learning among political actors leading to policy changes (Sabatier, 1993). A distinct characteristic of the issue concerning international student access to U.S. higher education is its wide range of *externalities* (or *spillovers*), both positive and negative, which affect those who are not directly involved in the transaction of educating these international students on campus. Enrolling international students at American colleges and universities can go beyond the individual development of these students in terms of their skills and knowledge. Therefore, the federal government has played some significant roles, in terms of promotions and regulations, in this particular issue area, although it is still true that educating international students on American campus has been developed largely by non-governmental initiatives of the U.S. higher education institutions as well as other international educational exchange organizations.

There are both positive and negative externalities to bringing international students into the U.S. This juxtaposed nature of the externalities appears to be one of the reasons why the federal policies affecting international students have continued to prevent either promoting or regulating policies from completely dominating one another. On the one hand, positive externalities to the U.S. society from enrolling international students in U.S. higher education may include these: decreasing domestic students' and local communities' parochialism through their direct contacts with international students; contributing to the U.S. economy through the international students' aggregate expenditures during their stay in the U.S.; creating a pool of future skilled workers and

entrepreneurs for U.S. industries; assisting the human resource development in the friendly nations through U.S.-based training and education; and consolidating an amicable relationship between the U.S. and foreign countries by fostering those foreign countries' future leaders with goodwill toward and understanding of the U.S. Particularly in order to capture long-term positive externalities in foreign relations, the federal government has been involved in the promotion of international educational exchange programs such as the Fulbright and USAID programs.

On the other hand, the negative externalities can be perceived as impacts from the movement of persons entailed by having international students on the campuses of American colleges and universities. Generally speaking, the free movement of persons from foreign countries can possibly cause adverse effects on the receiving society: for example, foreign nationals may deprive local people of job openings; they may lower wage levels; they may use welfare services without paying taxes; they may force the receiving country to exceed its environmental carrying capacity; they may bring about conflicts about social capital such as culture, customs, norms, and languages; and they may threat on national security by conducting physical attacks. Even those who advocate a laissez-faire approach would not like to see their land intruded impudently by outsiders. Given these potentially negative externalities, therefore, it is natural that the flow of international students has continued to be regulated as part of the federal government's visa and immigration policy.

A paradoxical attribute argued by some of those who advocate international student mobility is that some positive externalities of bringing international students into the U.S. can have long-term alleviating effects on the root causes of some negative

externalities. For example, it can be argued that mutual understanding between international students and domestic peer students can gradually decrease the potential tensions between groups with different cultural backgrounds. Or, some former international students may establish companies which create a substantial number of job openings for American workers. Or, the contexts of national security may be arguably improved in the better foreign relations promoted by fostering friendly attitudes to the U.S. among millions of foreigners who have studied in the U.S. This perceived positive attribute appears to have helped stabilize the policy subsystem in that international educational exchanges have been maintained even in the times of heightened national security concerns.

Further, it appears hard to quantitatively measure many of these externalities, except for some short-term economic impacts of international students, such as income generation from their tuition and daily expenditures. As a result, it is not easy to develop useful causal models of the factors influencing the problems concerning international student access to U.S. higher education. From an ACF perspective, therefore, less policy-oriented learning on international student access could be expected than on air pollution problem, whose impacts can be rather easily quantified. In fact, with few quantitative studies, political discussions regarding both positive and negative externalities tend to rely on intuitions or non-empirical impressions of international students.

Another characteristic of the issue concerning international student access to U.S. higher education is the relative magnitude of the population of international students studying in the U.S. From an international perspective, the U.S. has been the greatest

magnet of international students in the world since the end of World War II. The U.S. dominance has been taken for granted for several decades until the 1990s, when the dominance started being challenged by other host countries such as the U.K. and Australia. In the meantime, within U.S. higher education, the fraction of international students in the entire enrollments at colleges and universities appears very small; for example, 1.4% and 3.5% in 1954/55 and 2007/08 respectively (see IIE's *Open Doors 2008*). Important, however, some fields of study such as Science, Engineering, Technology and Mathematics (STEM) have gradually depended on the international student enrollments to keep their academic departments since the late 1970s.

Basic distribution of natural resources. The national wealth of the U.S. has been growing enormously since the late nineteenth century. As Edward Barbier (2005) points out that "over 1870-1940, the United States coupled exploitation of its natural resource abundance with expansion of its large and relatively protected domestic market to develop successfully a resource-intensive manufacturing sector that eventually became dominant internationally" (p. 99). *The World Economy: Historical Statistics* (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2006) shows that the U.S. GDP in 1870 was $98,374 million (in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars), which accounted for just 8.8% of the world's total GDP, while the U.S. was almost about to surpass the U.K. in terms of the GDP size at that time. The U.S. share of world GDP became almost 20% just before World War I, and further reached 27.3% in 1950, and still continued to account for more than 20% (with $7,985,795 million of GDP in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) in 2001. Similarly, the per capita GDP of the U.S. increased rapidly, and caught up with the U.K.'s at the beginning of the twentieth century,

and the U.S. has been one of the world's top countries with the highest per capita GDP since then. Without such affluence, the U.S. would not have been able to develop its higher education with high quality. Arguably, the abundant natural resources in the U.S. is one of the indirect factors which have continually attracted millions of international students to American colleges and universities. Note that these GDP figures in this OECD publication are calculated with '1990 international Geary-Khmis dollars,' which is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time in 1990. The Geary-Khamis dollar is sometimes used by international organizations such as OECD and the World Bank.

Generally speaking, however, in the U.S., the governmental spending on the policies related to international student mobility into the U.S. higher education, has been smaller than that of other public policy areas. To begin with, it is worthwhile looking at the big picture of national spending. According to *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2009, Historical Tables* (GPO, 2008, p. 324), approximately a fifth to a third of the GDP has been used for various function categories of the federal, state, and local governments in the U.S. over the past 60 years, while two thirds of such total government spending has been usually covered by the federal government. Some of these public functions have received much greater chunks of the distributed national wealth than others have. The federal government's functions with outstanding spending proportion have been national defense as well as human resources, particularly for health, medicare, income security, and social security. As a percentage of the GDP since the immediate aftermath of World War II, national defense has shown a long-term decreasing tendency down to around 4% at the beginning of the twenty-first century with some exceptional periods of punctuated

increases, such as the early 1950s (e.g., 14.2% in 1953) and late 1960s (e.g., 9.5% in 1968), which appear to be related to the Korean War and Vietnam War, respectively. On the contrary, the combined proportion of social security and medicare in the GDP has steadily and substantially grown from 0.2% in 1948 to 7.4% in 2007. Education has not been a huge function in terms of the federal expenditures. However, according to the U.S. Census Bureau's *Statistical Abstract*, the state and local governments have spent the greatest amount on education, including elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education, among various functions of these types of governments (about 30% of the direct expenditures of these state and local governments in total) over years. Other areas on which the state and local governments have spent a greater amount include highways, public welfare, and hospitals.

Next, it is important to understand the basic distribution of the national wealth to three broad public policy areas directly related to international student access to American colleges and universities: higher education, foreign relations, and immigration service. First, the U.S. overall expenditure, both public and private, on higher educational institutions as a percentage of GDP has been higher than any other OECD countries, whose members are high-income economies with a high human development index. For example, investment in higher education institutions was 2.9% of GDP in the U.S., while the average figure was 1.5% among the OECD countries (OECD, 2006, p. 237). Note that these figures include service categories such as teaching, research, and other ancillary services (including transportation, meals, and housing provided by the institutions). Simply taking *Open Doors*' usual explanation for granted that the major source of funding for most international students studying in the U.S. has been personal

and family funds, it can be argued that international students make little use of the basic distribution of American natural resources. From different perspectives, however, international students can be regarded as hidden beneficiaries of the U.S. national wealth. Although international students are indeed not eligible for the federal government's financial aid to students such as the Pell Grant, many international students at the graduate level have received financial aid through assistantships from their institutions using the federal research grants provided to the institutions. In addition, given that only one-third of the actual educational costs are paid by students on average, and that the rest of the costs are subsidized by the government, institutions, and foundations (ACE, n.d.), even international students with personal funds only are enjoying a considerable amount of benefits from American national wealth.

Second, compared to the substantially prioritized areas such as defense, medicare, and social security, the federal government's expenditures on foreign relations, which include not only some scholarship programs for international students, such as the Fulbright and USAID-sponsored programs, but also all the international affairs activities, have remained much smaller. According to *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2009, Historical Table* (GPO, 2008), the total expenditure for foreign relations by the federal government was greater than 1% of the U.S. GDP in some years in the 1950s and 1960s, but the expenditures have become smaller than 0.5% of the GDP since the 1970s. Further, *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2009* shows that public diplomacy (i.e., foreign information and exchange activities) has been much smaller in the federal expenditures than any other sub-functions of international affairs such as 'International development and humanitarian assistance,' 'International security assistance,' and 'Conduct of foreign

affairs,' except for 'International financial programs,' which has sometimes accounted for minus figures. Even the combination of foreign information and exchange activities accounted for just 0.03% of GDP in the early 1960s, but recently less than 0.01%.

Third, regulating international student flows into the U.S. has also imposed administration costs, particularly related to visa and immigration, on the federal agencies, who use the national wealth for their operations. During most of the period after World War II, a central agency governing visa and immigration issues was the Justice Department's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which ceased to exist in 2003. Since then, visa and immigration issues concerning international students are governed mainly by two agencies within the Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). According to *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2009* (GPO, 2008), the Department of Justice's share in the percentage distribution of the federal outlays by agency was less than 1% until the late 1990s, and has continued to be around 1% since then. In the meantime, a variety of fees to be paid by 'users' (i.e., immigrants and visitors to the U.S.) had been already prescribed for certain visa and immigration services under earlier legislation, including the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. However, the transformation of the INS into a fee-reliant agency started in 1988 when a user fee account for the INS was created by Congress, and one of its successors, namely USCIS, continues to be fee-reliant (USCIS, 2007). In 2006, for example, only $114 million was directly discretionary appropriation, while the remaining $1.7 billion of appropriation was funded from collected fees.

In summary, although the U.S. affluence from the abundant natural resources

may have contributed to the development of U.S. higher education, whose high quality has attracted many international students over 60 years, the basic distribution of natural resources to the areas related to the public policies affecting international students has tended to be relatively small compared to other major public policy areas. Therefore, this tendency appears to indicate that the issues of international students in U.S. higher education have been one of the marginalized agendas.

Fundamental sociocultural values and social structure. An attempt to provide an overview of the fundamental sociocultural values and social structure of the U.S. would be far too ambitious for this section and even for this entire dissertation. Therefore, this section gives an example of the fundamental values which appear most likely to have affected the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education. This example is decentralization. The U.S. society has tended to value the importance of decentralizing powers more than have many other countries. As an example of the fundamental cultural values in the context of his ACF, Sabatier (1993) explained that it is not a viable policy option in the U.S. to have “large-scale nationalization of the means of production,” unlike in many European countries (p. 21). Although the U.S. has also seen the federal government’s power grow dramatically throughout the history of its independence, many policy areas have had a tension between centralization and decentralization. Higher education is one of the policy areas with a decentralization orientation. Not to mention the absence of any national colleges and universities, there has been a tendency to limit the federal government’s power over higher education in the U.S. Along with more sector-specific values such academic freedom, this tendency has been taken for granted. Since international student issues are

usually connected to higher education, the value accorded to decentralization appears to have been often taken into consideration for a policy option concerning international students. Seemingly, this sociocultural value may have been reflected in the tradition that the policies affecting international student mobility into U.S. higher education have been continually fragmented, and that any comprehensive national policies to coordinate the federal government efforts to govern the mobility has not been established yet.

Basic constitutional structure. Over 200 years, the U.S. federal Constitution has been generally stable, in spite of a number of amendments such as the Bill of Rights, and the Constitution has been reflected in all the public policy considerations to various degrees. As far as international student access to U.S. higher education is concerned, three broad areas in public policy can be involved: education, foreign relations, and immigration. First, however, education has not been under the federal mandate in general, as the U.S. Constitution is silent about education. According to the Tenth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, "[the] powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." In the U.S., his constitutional structure about education has resulted in the world's most decentralized higher education system. Nevertheless, the federal government has played significant roles in higher education mainly by providing financial aid to individual students and grants for research projects on campus. As indicated above, international students at colleges and universities in the U.S. are not eligible for federal financial aid, but a substantial number of international students (particularly at graduate level) are arguably supported through research or teaching assistantships funded by federal grants. While the state governments have been given the

responsibilities for higher education, these governments did not really take any significant actions for the promotion of international student enrollments until recently.

Second, unlike education, foreign relations are explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. In the Constitution, the federal government's responsibilities for foreign relations are divided by the three branches of federal government; namely, the Congress, Presidents, and the Courts. In the U.S., this federal government mandate for foreign relations justifies the governmental involvement in the promotion of international student enrollments in U.S. higher education, given the positive externalities of enrolling international students which can meet some foreign relations' goals. Although most of such promotion has been made by non-governmental initiatives, such as colleges and universities, the State Department or agencies of public diplomacy (e.g. USIA) have usually taken leadership in the promotion if it involves the federal government. One example is the Fulbright Scholarship program for foreign students.

Third, it was not clear as to who had the mandates for immigration issues until the late nineteenth century. Given the generally open immigration approach around the nation since its independence, some states established their own laws regulating immigration in the mid nineteenth century. However, the mid 1870s saw the Supreme Court declare that regulation of US immigration exclusively belongs to the Federal Government's mandate. By the Immigration Act of 1882 (22 Statues-at-Large, 214), a system of central control of immigration under the Secretary of the Treasury was established. Further, the Immigration Act of 1891 (26 Statutes-at-Large, 1084), the first comprehensive law for national control of immigration, created the Office of Superintendent of Immigration within the Treasury Department. Since then, the special

office in primary charge of the federal administration of immigration issues has been transferred to the following: the Labor and Commerce Department (1903 to 1906), the Labor Department (1906 to 1940), the Justice Department (1940 to 2003), and the Homeland Security Department (2003 to current). The Treasury Department's control over immigration in the earlier years was a result of its involvement in the collection of fees from each passenger into the U.S. As employment-related concerns about immigration increased, the control was moved to the Labor-related departments. Then, the approach of World War II caused fears of immigration because of its potential for the entry of spies and espionages from hostile countries. As a result, national security concerns resulted in an expedient shift of the administration of immigration policy from the Labor Department to the Justice Department in 1940 (Briggs, 1994). Even after World War II, this control under the Justice Department remained until the creation of the Homeland Security Department, which was designed to serve even more specifically national security after the 911 attacks in 2001.

As seen so far, the policy jurisdictions concerning international student mobility into the U.S. which have been largely formed by the constitutional structure have been not changed over 60 years. The foreign policy consideration has continually dominated this policy subsystem, while immigration policies have regulated the flow of international students into the U.S. without the benefits from international educational exchanges. At the same time, this constitutional structure has substantially kept educational consideration away from the federal policy debates over international student mobility.

Long-Term Coalition Opportunity Structures

The earlier versions of the ACF (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988, 1993) did not

pay particular attention to this respect. However, there were the criticisms that the ACF is only applicable to the U.S. specific context. As a result, Sabatier et al. devised the 1998 diagram of the ACF, which brought a variable of 'degree of consensus needed for major policy change' in order to better apply the ACF to other political context such as Westminster and European Corporatist structures.

Since this dissertation is focusing on the U.S. context, it is possible to follow the argument that "with multiple veto points that any major reform must go through, supermajorities are needed" (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 200). It is assumed that the degree of consensus needed for major policy change is relatively high. Also, as far as the openness of political system is concerned, this dissertation which discusses the U.S. federal policy can take the following argument. "Separation of power and very powerful state/regional governments create numerous decision making venues. Combined with strong traditions of accessible bureaucracies, legislatures, and courts, they create a very open system with many different actors involved in the policy process. Such complex systems lend themselves very well to the ACF as an analytical framework" (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 200).

External Events

This section provides an overview of external events which have pushed significant changes in the policy subsystem concerning international student mobility into U.S. higher education. The overview is presented in chronological order by the decade for about 60 years: beginning with the period from the late 1940s through the 1950s, followed by the periods of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Following the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), this section particularly looks at the external

events in terms of changes in socio-economic conditions, changes in public opinion, changes in systemic governing coalition, and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. Since external changes are not the main focus of my analysis using the ACF, I will refer to the events only that have evidently brought about major changes in the subsystem, not trying to cover all the external changes for each period.

The late 1940s through the 1950s. The aftermath of World War II saw the emergence of the U.S. as a superpower. Although, like other countries which had entered the war, the U.S. had devoted a great amount of its national wealth to the war, and although it had also took a heavy casualty toll (of soldiers in large part), its national economy was boosted afterwards. The GDP of the U.S. doubled from 1938 to 1945 (OECD, 2006). After the GDP temporarily bottomed out in 1947, the GDP continued to increase steadily into the 1950s. Relative to many other parts of the world battered by the war's devastation, the social infrastructure in the U.S., whose soil escaped substantial war damages, became at the very top level in the world, both in scale and quality. This relative upward shift was the case with U.S. higher education, which started attracting the greatest number of international students and scholars in the world. If the U.S. had not become a center of higher learning in the world, the policy subsystem concerning international student mobility into the U.S. would have continued to be very undeveloped.

Also, few would disagree that, for a decade or so after World War II, public opinion in many countries, including the U.S., continued to be overshadowed by the strong residual images of the disastrous war, and that the vast majority could not help feeling weary of the war. At the same time in the U.S., however, the fear of the

communist expansion increased. Indeed, the U.S.S.R. became another superpower in the aftermath. This bipolar world led to the emerging Cold War, which became increasingly intensified by the establishment of a number of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and East Asia, and by some collisions such as Berlin blockade in June 1948, and the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950. Post-war public opinion was a contributor to transformed rationales for international educational exchanges from essentially mutual understanding for peace making to the combination of mutual understanding and national security. It can be argued that in the ACF terms, this public opinion influenced the beliefs of political actors.

As the ACF would explain, the policy decisions and impacts from three other, larger, policy subsystems appear to have influenced the issues of international student access to U.S. higher education from the late 1940s and the mid 1950s. First, during this period, such dominant issues as a whole of higher education presented by the GI Bills appeared likely to mute the voices in higher education about other minor concerns such as international students. By working collaboratively, therefore, those who advocated for international students attempted to become more vocal both at the institutional and national levels. This move led to the birth of NAFSA, as shown in the next chapter.

Second, the increasing flow of international students into U.S. higher education after World War II was also drawn into the vortex of the immigration policy reform as the big picture. Facing a new and growing wave of immigrants after World War II, particularly from Europe, the Congress began to debate the repeal of the Immigration Act of 1924, which later led to the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952.

Third, just before NAFSA's birth in May of 1948, there had been a number of major foreign policy developments which had substantial and enduring impacts on the emerging policy subsystem of international student access to U.S. higher education. In March of 1947, about one year before NAFSA's birth, the Truman Doctrine to contain communism and to show the U.S. commitment to world affairs beyond American continents clearly paved the way for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. In this context, recognizing the international exchange of persons as an effective foreign policy tool to combat communism, the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act (popularly known as the Smith-Mundt Act) was enacted in January of 1948. Further, in order to reconstruct the countries of Western Europe as well as repel communism, the Marshall Plan began its operation in April of 1948. One component of this Plan was enrolling international students in U.S. higher education as a focus of development assistance.

The 1960s . Generally speaking, the 1960s, at least until the enactment of the International Education Act of 1966, saw a favorable atmosphere for international education in terms of strong leaderships both in the administrations and congress as well as eager support from private foundations. According to the ACF, it can be explained that changes in the systemic governing coalition substantially influenced the policy subsystem studied in this dissertation. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson paid much attention to the issue of international education. In the Kennedy administration, the Fulbright-Hayes Act of 1961 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 were enacted and consolidated the existing various programs of exchange of persons and development assistance, respectively. These laws were also created in increased legislative support for

international educational and cultural exchange activities which had been developed since the end of 1950s. Not only did Senator Fulbright become the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a number of young Democrats enthusiastic about shaping new American foreign policy joined the Committee; e.g., Hubert Humphrey, Michael Mansfield, and Wayne Morse.

Although only indirect impacts of international students were identified by those in the international educational exchange community, including NAFSA, the enactment of the International Education Act (IEA) of 1996 showed the culmination of atmosphere promoting international education in general. The Johnson Administration attempted to expand the idea of 'Great Society' internationally, and managed to pass the IEA. However, the IEA suffered from the repercussions of the U.S. government's increasing involvement in the Vietnam War, and was never appropriated. The promotion of international education has not attracted major legislative attention since then.

While the Civil Right movement was one of the most significant environments that influenced a number of public policy areas in the U.S. in the 1960s, this particular movement and public opinions for this movement seem not to have made direct and substantial impacts on the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education. As shown in the literature review in Chapter Three, the liberal attitude of the U.S. society toward race and nationality in the 1960s produced the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (Public Law 89-236; 79 Statutes-at-Large 911). The Act Amendments of 1965 abolished the discriminatory national-origins quota system set by the Immigration Act of 1924. Although the Amendments did not include significant changes directly affecting international students,

there may have been an indirect impact. For example, greater access for traditionally disadvantaged groups such as those from Asia and Africa in terms of immigration to the U.S. may have motivated the prospective students from those areas in the following years.

The 1970s. As far as the changes in systemic governing coalition are concerned, the 1970s saw the administrations under two Republican presidents (Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) and Jimmy Carter as a Democratic president. Arguably, these presidents were less active either positively or negatively in terms of their influence on the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education, compared to their predecessors in the 1960s.

As described in the next chapter, however, the changes in the federal administration had some impact on the policy subsystem under study in this research. For example, the congressional turmoil, including the impeachment proceedings, caused by the Watergate scandal, eventually hindered NAFSA's pursuit for the legislation of a comprehensive policy for international educational exchanges in the mid 1970s. Also, President Carter's reorganization of the government agencies included the merging the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) with the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the United States International Communication Agency (USICA), which provoked among the academic community, including NAFSA, some concerns over the integrity of educational exchanges. Nevertheless, it seems that the changes in the federal administration did not push any significant changes affecting the policy subsystem concerning international student mobility into the U.S.

One of the overarching characteristics of world politics in the early 1970s was

the détente that served to ease the tensions of the Cold War; for example, the rapprochement between the U.S. and China in 1972, arms the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in 1972, and the end of Vietnam War in 1973. It seems, however, that this détente did not facilitate any significant federal policies for either boosting or restricting international educational exchanges. For example, "Levels of State Department funding for exchange of persons in 1976 were equal to that of 1967" (Snow, 2008, p. 208). Not pushing the justification for more federal spending, these eased tensions appear to have simply maintained the status quo in the federal efforts to educate the future foreign leaders through international educational exchange programs.

Rather than détente, other contextual factors more significantly affected the policy subsystem concerning international student access in the 1970s, which saw the general trend of the number of international students in the U.S. continue to increase. According to *Open Doors* of the Institute of International Education (IIE), the number of international students accounted for 134,959 in 1970, and 286,343 in 1979. The context for this rapid growth was both 'push' and 'pull' factors. Particularly in the 1970s, the major 'push' factor was the exploded petro-dollar and lack of higher education in oil producing countries, particularly Iran and Nigeria. The international students from these countries occupied a large percentage of international enrollments in U.S. higher education in the late 1970s. One of the major 'pull' factors was the demands of U.S. higher education institutions for international enrollments compensating for the anticipated decrease in the domestic student population. As already explained in the literature review, in response to this rapid increase in the international student

enrollments, it became effective in 1979 that the international students were admitted for ‘duration of status,’ not being required to apply for extension for stay each year under the previous regulations. Without the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in the 1970s, this policy change in the immigration regulation would not have happened.

The 1980s. The period around 1980 saw some significant changes in socio-economic conditions which were inevitably going to affect the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education. First, national security concerns in the U.S. became stronger as a result of several major events in the world such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which was followed by the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, and the Soviet troop’s deployment into Afghanistan in 1979. The former particularly revealed the inefficiency of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in grasping the information on international students studying in the U.S., which led to the tighter regulations over these international students in the following years. The latter punctuated the era of détente, and the tension under the Cold War paradigm strongly revived. This background affected the Reagan Administration’s approach towards public diplomacy, including educational exchange programs, as a tool of combating against the Communism power.

Second, the U.S. economy was becoming worse with severer inflation and a higher unemployment rate towards the end of the Carter administration era. Just after his inauguration, President Reagan proposed “budget cuts in virtually every department of Government” (Reagan, February 5, 1981, p. 96).

One of the examples of the budget-cut proposals was the USICA’s (United States International Communication Agency) plan to substantially reduce its budget for

educational exchange programs for the fiscal year of 1982. As explained in the next chapter, however, this proposal provoked fierce oppositions not only in the academic community but also in the Congress. Eventually, the proposal was withdrawn. After this withdrawal, the Reagan administration even further increased the budget for international educational exchanges throughout the 1980s.

Third, the booming areas on the international economy map were changing. Although the second oil crisis, triggered by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, forced the price of oil to go up, the first half of the 1980s saw a continual and gradual decline of the price of oil. At the same time, the rapidly industrializing countries of the Pacific Rim started to boom in international economic circumstances in the 1980s. The subsiding OPEC boom and the Iranian Revolution led to decrease in the number of international students from the OPEC countries who had flooded U.S. higher in the late 1970s. However, the great increase of East Asian students contributed to the further increase in the total of international students studying in the U.S. higher education institutions in the 1980s.

Further, in accord with the Advocacy Coalition Framework, this period saw some major policy decisions and impacts from the other subsystems which affected the policy subsystem of international student access to U.S. higher education. Some of these subsystems were bigger subsystems which comprised the subsystem of international student access. For example, immigration policy in general attracted great public attention, and reform of immigration policy was one of the prioritized agendas in the Congress in the 1980s. At that time, the reform was mainly discussed in terms of illegal immigration. As indicated below, however, the bills for what became the Immigration

Reform and Control Act of 1986 contained a small provision which would affect international students.

The general prediction of a declining population of domestic students throughout the 1980s continued to be one of the factors which turned many U.S. higher education institutions' attention to the recruitment of international students to fill the empty classrooms. In particular, the education policy, not only for higher education but also elementary and secondary education, had been unable to encourage enough domestic students to study in the STEM field. In this context, the STEM field of U.S. higher education started to depend on international students in terms of student enrollment and source of faculty.

Another important context for the policy subsystem concerning international student mobility into the U.S. was the 1979 decision of the government of the U.K. to introduce a policy of full-cost fee program for international students studying in U.K. higher education institutions. This new policy required international students to pay the full-cost of education for admission at U.K. institutions, while the domestic students continued to be substantially subsidized for their studying at higher education level by the government. In the severe economic recession, the U.K. government could not afford to provide substantially subsidized higher education to international students, who were non-tax payers. This U.K. policy decision meant relative increases in the cost of studying at British universities in the international student market, and put U.S. higher education in a better position in the market until the late 1980s. However, this decision also removed the quota which had been previously set for international student enrollments in U.K. higher education until the late 1970s. As a result, the greater capacity for foreign

enrollments in the U.K. gradually started attracting the increasingly affluent population around the world, particularly in Asia. After the late 1980s,the U.K. full-cost fee programs became an effective tool to recruit international students. Higher education as an export service started being highlighted in the international student recruitment of some hosting countries.

The 1990s. The 1990s began with the end of the Cold War. A series of international events in the late 1980s quickened this end. In 1987, The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) eased the tension between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., which led to the determination of various proxy wars around the world in 1988 (e.g., Ogaden War, Angolan Civil War, and civil war in Chad; also, peace talks about the Cambodian Civil War started). The year of 1989 saw a series of revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, where communist governments were overthrown, and the fall of the Berlin Wall. In December of 1989, the end of the Cold War was declared at a summit in Malta between U.S. President George H.W. Bush and U.S.S.R. leader Mikhail Gorbachev. In December of 1991, the disbandment of the U.S.S.R. broke up into fifteen constituent parts.

Since the beliefs concerning international student mobility into the U.S. had been shaped overwhelmingly by the Cold War paradigm for more than 40 years, this external change, as the ACF would predict, forced the political actors in this policy subsystem to reconsider the rationales for the promotion of such exchanges in the aftermath of the Cold War. While the policy changes did not happen immediately after the end of Cold War, various policy changes gradually emerged. One of the significant policy changes in the 1990s as a result of the end of the Cold War was the merger of the

Unite States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999, which had been in charge of the federal government's efforts in international educational exchanges, into the Department of State. As explained in the next chapter, this merger was a part of the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies, which the Clinton administration as well as Congress considered the best way to tighten the foreign policy budget while maximizing the foreign affairs agencies' functions in the post Cold War era.

In 1992, Bill Clinton, a Democrat, won the presidential election. However, in the mid-term election in 1994, the Democrats lost their majority both in the Houses of Senate and Representatives, an event that is sometimes called Republican Revolution. This conservative majority in the Congress can be regarded as one of the factors which led to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996, which included a small part mandating a pilot program for an international student tracking system. Although the tracking system was not fully implemented until the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the IIRAIRA of 1996 had substantial policy implications for the political actors in the subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education, as demonstrated in the next chapter.

As explained both earlier in Chapter Three and later in Chapter Six, the inclusion of the international student tracking system in the IIRAIRA of 1996 was obviously prompted by another focal event, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. The fact that one of the perpetrators of the bombing had entered the U.S. on his student visa and dropped out afterwards triggered the call for an enhanced system of tracking international students. As James H. Johnson Jr. (2002) points out, the policy responses to the 1993 WTC center bombing initiated substantial constraints on the movement of people, capital,

goods, and services into and out of the U.S.

In the meanwhile, the 1990s saw some significant changes in international student mobility outside of the U.S. start impacting the international student flows into U.S. higher education. One of these changes was the regionalization of international student mobility, particularly through the ERASMUS program in Europe. Under the ERASMUS program, greater student mobility beyond the national borders but within Europe was promoted. Further, individual host countries started developing their national efforts to attract international students to their higher education institutions. These hosts included not only the Anglophone countries such as the U.K. and Australia, both of which emphasized the aspect of service export in bringing international students into their higher education, but also other hosts such as Japan and France, which appeared to focus on the public diplomacy side of international student mobility. According to *Open Doors 1997/98*, the U.S. share of internationally mobile students dropped to 30.2% in 1995 from 39.2% in 1982. Arguably, the sense of this erosion of the U.S. made many policy advocates for international student access to U.S. higher education express their strong opposition to policy alternatives which they considered as barriers in any possible way such as the student tracking system.

The 2000s. The September 11 attacks of 2001 significantly affected the vast majority of public policy areas in the U.S.. National security concerns suddenly became the first priority of most of the policy makers in the U.S. The policy subsystem concerning international student mobility into the U.S. was also significantly affected by this tragic event, particularly because it turned out that some perpetrators of these attacks had entered the U.S. on their student visas.

For example, immediately after the September 11, the strong oppositions to the international student tracking system were withdrawn by political actors, including NAFSA. In addition to the full implementation of the international student tracking system, called SEVIS, various controls over international student access to U.S. higher education were introduced to enhance the national security against terrorists.

Some perceived that these anti-terrorist measures had unintended consequences for U.S. society, including its higher education community. One of these perceived consequences was the difficulties that a number of U.S. higher education institutions had in securing the access of the best and brightest talents for their research and educational programs. As a result, the STEM community (i.e., Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics fields), which had developed their significant dependency on international graduate students and researchers, particularly felt adverse effects from the tightened immigration controls.

At the same time, other competitor countries started making even greater efforts to recruit international students, not only for the income generation from their tuitions and their living expenses, but also for scientific talent. To attract more of the best and brightest students around the world, countries such as Australia, Canada, and the U.K. changed their immigration policies. In fact, these competitors started eroding the share of the U.S. in the international student mobility market.

Since scientific research has become an important factor of national economic prosperity, the loss of talents to other countries has been perceived as a factor in the weakening of the U.S. competitiveness in the global knowledge economy. As a result, a better balance between securing borders against the possible terrorists and open doors for

the needed talents has recently become one of the significant agendas in the federal policy arena. A series of implementations of regulation changes for streamlining the visa and immigration procedures for students and scholars appear to have been prompted by this general atmosphere of the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education.

Further, the widespread use of personal computers and Internet access has been another important context for the policy subsystem concerning international student mobility into the U.S. Without the development and dissemination of this technology, the implementation of SEVIS as the internet-based tracking system of international students in the U.S. would not be a policy alternative. At the same time, the diffusion of these information technologies has been one of the factors for the greater international mobility of persons, not only of international students but also of terrorists. The computers and Internet have enabled both prospective students and possible terrorists to gain much better and a greater amount of information for physical access to the U.S., legally or illegally. As the ACF appreciates the important roles of the scientific and technological development, the irreversible diffusion of the information technologies around the world has provided significant contexts for the policy subsystem which I am studying in this dissertation.

Chapter Six: Documentary Data Over 60 Years

This chapter presents the documentary data which I collected for this dissertation. While the main focus is the six periods, each of whose length is about a decade since the birth of NAFSA in 1948, this section also presents the prehistory leading to the birth. The presentation of the documentary data for each period concludes discussions from a perspective of the Advocacy Coalition Framework.

Prologue to NAFSA's Birth in 1948

Several NAFSA former presidents have illustrated the roots and birth of NAFSA. For example, in *Governmental Policy and International Education* edited by Stewart Fraser (1964), Robert B. Klinger, the then president of NAFSA (incumbent between 1964 and 1965), who was also then at the University of Michigan, wrote about the development of NAFSA in its early years. Considering some pioneer efforts on behalf of foreign students leading to the birth of NAFSA since the early twentieth century, Klinger pointed to the importance of a number of non-governmental organizations; for example, the Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs of America (ACAA) organized by foreign students for international-related discussions among them and their peer domestic students (e.g. the first one established in 1903 in Wisconsin); the Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign Students (CFRFS) created by the Young Men's Christian Associations (YMCA) and the Young Women's Christian Associations (YWCA) in 1911; evangelical organizations such as the Fellowship of Christian University Students (FOCUS); the Institute of International Education founded in 1919; International Houses in New York (opened in 1924), Berkeley and Chicago sponsored by John D. Rockefeller, Jr.; and a number of private groups caring about world understanding and cooperation

such as the Lisle Fellowship. Further, after briefly summarizing the situation of foreign student advisers and foreign students as well as the governmental efforts for international student exchange at that time, Klinger laid out how "[all] of the major national groups … , with foreign student advisers, the teachers of English and local community groups were … joined in an endeavor devoted to service for the student from abroad" (p. 104).

Following Klinger's argument, Zeigler (1988) particularly mentioned ACCA, CFRFS, and IIE as roots of NAFSA. While Klinger (1964) discussed the IIE's earlier development at the greatest length among the pioneer efforts for international student exchange listed above, Zeigler contended that "the IIE connection leads us to the genesis of NAFSA" (p. 2). Similarly, in the article for the NAFSA's twentieth anniversary in *NAFSA Newsletter*, Linton (May, 1968) pointed out that credit for bringing NAFSA into existence belongs to the IIE and the Department of State. *A Brief History of IIE* (IIE, n.d.c) on its official website also says that "the [IIE] was instrumental in establishing what it now NAFSA: Association of International Educators" (para. 5).

The Institute of International Education (IIE), a nonprofit private organization with strong support from and cooperation with the Department of State from the beginning, had been created as a catalyst for international educational exchange in the aftermath of World War I. "The foundation of the Institute of International Education in 1919 was supposed to give the nation [i.e., the U.S.] a center to promote and coordinate international education" (de Wit, 2002, p. 24). Starting with organizing student exchanges with European countries, the IIE gradually expanded its geographic scope to Asia, the Soviet Union, and Latin America as well as its target to faculty and researchers. By the early 1940s, the IIE, substantially financed by the Carnegie Foundation, had come to play

significant roles in American educational exchange programs in conjunction with the Department of State; particularly, in the programs stimulating cultural relations between the U.S. and Latin America to counter the Axis propaganda threat (de Wit, 2002; IIE, n.d.).

Citing IIE's *Blueprint for Understanding: The Institute of International Education, Inc., a Thirty Year Review* (December, 1949), Klinger (1964) listed some IIE projects as path-breaking achievements in the field of international education for the three decades prior to the birth of NAFSA. These projects include these: publishing the first comprehensive scholarship list for international students studying in the U.S. and domestic students studying abroad; arranging scholar mobility between the U.S. and foreign countries; conducting extensive non-commercial lecture tours of eminent foreigners in the academic and business world on American campus; helping in securing visa policy changes in favor of foreign students in 1922; bringing the creation of 'student third class' for voyage by sea; making continual efforts for the establishment of a system which more uniformly evaluates academic credits gained around the world; working with the Department of State in establishing uniform selection standards for qualified international students studying in the U.S. and domestic students studying abroad; cooperating with the Department of the Army as well as other organizations after World War II to start hosting a large group of students from the former Axis countries on American campuses; helping establish educational programs in the U.S. for students and teachers from less developed areas which had not been conventional sources of international students and teachers before the end of World War II; and encouraging the U.S. higher education institutions to develop the office of foreign student advisers. In

addition, the IIE became “assigned responsibility for much of the implementation of Public Law 584 (19th Congress [sic]), known as the Fulbright Act, under contract to the Department of State” (Klinger, 1964, p. 97). Given such established contributions of the IIE to international education by the late 1940s, as explained later, there had been a debate over the possible relationship between the IIE and the proposed nation-wide organizations of professionals working in the field of international education, which came true when NAFSA came into being in 1948.

As already referred above, among the useful sources of information on the creation of NAFSA in *NAFSA Newsletter* are two recollective articles of Clarence Linton (April, 1958 and May, 1968), who was the first NAFSA President (incumbent between 1948 and 1950). When Linton was a leading figure of creating NAFSA in the aftermath of World War II, he was a professor of education at Teacher’s College of Columbia University, and was also adviser to foreign students at Columbia University. According to Bu (2003), Teacher’s College of Columbia University had been at the center of the ‘international activism of American educators’ since the 1920s. For three years during World War II, Linton was on leave from Teacher’s College, and as a Lieutenant Colonel established the off duty Army education program in the European Theatre of Operations, which was the U.S. military operations in the north of Italy and the Mediterranean region (*New York Times*, 1946). After returning to Columbia University, he became advisor to the veterans at Teacher’s College at the beginning of January. An interesting point here is that Linton simultaneously looked after two distinct types of the newly increasing populations in U.S. higher education, which are described below.

In these reminiscences, published in the 20th anniversary’s *NAFSA Newsletter*,

Linton (May, 1968) mentioned two major steps during World War II for the creation of NAFSA. The very first step for the creation of NAFSA was initiated in 1941 by the suggestion of the State Department's Advisory Committee on the Adjustment of Foreign Students. Edgar John Fisher, the Committee's chairman as well as the then vice-president of IIE organized a committee to assemble those involved in the services for international students in the U.S. In the following year, Fisher's committee convened a conference in Cleveland, which attracted those who worked in international student affairs, including 13 foreign student advisers as well as those representing government and private agencies. Indeed, before 1940, the U.S. had only 13 higher education institutions which officially appointed foreign student advisers (Klinger, May, 1962). This conference's agenda included issues such as Latin American students and foreign students stranded in the U.S. by the war, but not the discussion of creating an association of those engaged in international student affairs. Although both Klinger (1964) and Linton (1958; May, 1968) did not fully explain how this conference in Cleveland actually affected the creation of NAFSA, this conference was important in that a significant number of the then leading figures in educational exchange in the U.S. gathered and discussed their special concerns for the first time in the context of the burgeoning professionalization of international education administration. Following the first nation-wide conference of foreign student advising held in Cleveland in 1942, the number of foreign student advisors increased from 40 to 285 in 1943 (Bu, 2003).

After the end of World War II, the second step which became an important milestone for the creation of NAFSA occurred (Linton, May, 1968). Two consecutive conferences were convened and organized by the Department of State and the Institute of

International Education (IIE). In the first conference held in Chicago in 1946, the participants talked about what roles the government, IIE, the higher education institutions, and non-academic organizations should play in international student services (Linton, May, 1968). This Chicago conference saw 31 foreign student advisers or staff with a similar title represent their colleges and universities (Klinger, 1964). The concerns presented from these discussions highlighted "the sense of need for the coordination of policies and programs among those concerned with foreign student exchange" (Linton, May, 1968, p. 4). The main concern in this regard had been spread among those working in foreign student exchange by that time, and was whether the colleges and universities which had been already overcrowded by the unprecedented influx of World War veterans could further respond to increasing foreign enrollments with proper services.

This unprecedented influx of veterans was prompted by the GI Bill, officially titled the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944. The benefits from the GI Bill allowed a veteran to pursue an undergraduate or graduate degree at a higher education institution, and this policy permanently affected U.S. higher education. Before the war, going to a college or university had not been affordable for many average Americans, but the GI Bill enabled many veterans to pursue higher learning. Without flooding the job market, the veterans were channeled to higher education. By 1946, more than one million veterans enrolled in colleges and universities. Given the shortage of instructors, staff, and facilities form this trend, "many persons interested in foreign student were fearful that veterans and the American public might think it unwise to increase the number of foreign students" (Linton, 1958, p. 2). Given that Linton had devoted himself to the education of the military population, including veterans, his description of the atmosphere at the time is

compelling.

In spite of the pressure from the U.S. government, especially the Department of State, for the U.S. higher education institutions to accept more students from foreign countries for better foreign relations, these institutions faced difficulties in doing so (Bu, 2003). According to Bu, the argument of university representatives which participated in the Chicago conference in 1946 was that the imposition of any quota upon the admission of international students should be avoided, while each college or university should individually respond to their own specific situation. Some of them from state universities explained that they kept graduate courses available for international students, while they needed to decrease the foreign admission at undergraduate level in order to respond to the compelling domestic enrollments. Another example of Bu's in this regard is the case of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which was forced to set a quota of 100 for foreign students so that the MIT could meet a variety of demands domestically for training military officers. Similarly, by examining the situation of University of Florida at this particular era under the GI Bill, Terzian and Osborne (2006) vividly illustrate the difficulty which publicly funded universities had in enrolling foreign students. "By 1946, enrollment at UF reached 6,334, a figure nearly double that of any other year in the institution's history to that point. In response, the Board of Control announced in May of that year that foreign students, as well as out-of-state students, would no longer be admitted until the needs of returning veterans could be met. Such measures were not unique to Florida, as a great number of publicly supported universities throughout the nation imposed severe restrictions on nonresident applicants" (p. 291).

Under these circumstances, the Department of State and the IIE organized

another conference among those working with international students in Chicago in 1947. This year saw the peak of the influx of veterans, who consisted of almost half of college admissions. At this conference in Chicago, it became clearer that beyond "the sense of need for the coordination," and the participants had come to feel like creating a 'national association' (Linton, May, 1968; also see Klinger, 1964). As a result, this conference appointed Clarence Linton as a chairman of a Committee on By-Laws for the proposed association. Regarding this conference in Chicago, *New York Times* (1947) reported that "A committee headed by Prof. Clarence Linton of Teachers College, Columbia University, passed a motion to appoint a committee to make plans for the organization of an association of foreign student advisers." Also, the then president of the IIE, Laurence Duggan, a son of the IIE's first president, Stephen Duggan, became the head of a Conference Steering Committee to plan the next conference scheduled in May 1948.

Between the foreign student advisers' conference held in Chicago in 1947 and their next conference scheduled under Laurence Duggan's leadership in the ensuing year, further considerations for the creation of the new association were made along with the preparation of the association's by-laws. Linton (May, 1968), who was in charge of drafting by-laws, recalled that the issues in consideration included these: (1) the purposes and objectives of the proposed association, (2) the name of the proposed association, (3) the relative voice between academic and non-academic institutions/organizations in forming the proposed association's programs and policies, (4) the relationship between IIE and the proposed association, and (5) the financial support. Linton continued to explain that the resolutions or compromises over these issues in consideration were made by the time the Conference on International Student Exchange was held at the University

of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in May 1948. As below, Linton's (May, 1968) explanation about these resolutions and compromises was relatively clear with issues (1), (2), (4) and (5), while issue (3) was rather vague.

The response to issue (1) about the purposes and objectives was clearly spelled out in the new association's first by-laws. Over the year, Linton's drafts of by-laws were prepared and reviewed by other members of the committee for the creation of the proposed association. The further discussed and amended version was adopted by more than 200 participants in the Ann Arbor Conference. Forty eight of them had titles of foreign student advisers or something similar (Klinger, 1964). Article II of the first by-laws of this new association stated its purpose as below:

> The purpose of this association shall be to promote the professional preparation, appointment, and service of foreign student advisers in colleges and universities and in other agencies concerned with student interchange; to serve more effectively the interests and needs of exchange students; to coordinate plans for student interchange through comprehensive voluntary cooperation of all agencies and individuals concerned with exchange students; and in fulfillment of that purpose to initiate, promote, and execute such systematic studies, cooperative experiments, conferences and such other similar enterprises as may be required to that end. (NAFSA, May, 1948, p.1)

Responding to issue (2) about the association name, the Ann Arbor conference in 1948 officially launched the new organization as the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers (NAFSA). As indicated in its original name, the primary constituency of NAFSA was foreign student advisers. "There was general recognition on the part of

foreign student advisers themselves that the effectiveness of foreign student programs depended in a large degree upon the extent and quality of their services" (Linton, May, 1968, p.4). While other types of professionals in international education such as English language teachers, admission officers, and study abroad program advisers were still included in the membership, the main focus of the NAFSA's missions was set as foreign student advising. Later, NAFSA's purposes came to include these other fields of international education, as international education generally became more important in higher education and NAFSA became bigger in size. The total number of NAFSA's membership in September 1948 was 88 (60 academic institutions, 5 non-academic institutions and 23 individuals).

In order to know how the debate over the relative voice between academic and non-academic institutions/organizations, namely, issue (3), was resolved or compromised, it appears better to look at not only Linton's (May, 1968) article but also Klinger's (1964). Linton (May, 1968) implied an immediate agreement for the stronger voices of the academic institutions in the proposed association. He pointed out that "the accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of all potential members was generally believed to be largely dependent upon the services of these colleges and university officials" (Linton, May, 1968, p. 4). The composition of the first officers and members of the Board of Directors appears to indicate the actual resolution about the relative voice. According to Klinger (1964), under the new by-laws, the Ann Arbor conference in 1948 elected the four officers for the first time of NAFSA: President Clarence Linton, as president; Vice President Allen Blaisdell, Director, International House, University of California; Secretary Harry Pierson, Director of Programs, IIE; and Treasurer, Joel Neal,

Adviser, Foreign Students' Advisory Office, University of Texas. In addition, the same conference elected 24 members for the Board of Directors. Klinger (1964) provided the composition of the Board of Directors, including 11 foreign student advisers, three college presidents, three teachers of English as a second language, two from binational agencies, two directors of International House, one representative from a community program, and one representative from a religious organization as well as Laurence Duggan as the President of IIE and Benjamin Schmoker as the General Secretary of the Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign Students (CFRFS). Indeed, from this composition, the dominance of foreign student advisers in NAFSA at its birth was apparent. As Klinger continue to argue, however, at the same time some representatives from all the major groups who had worked for international students "joined in an endeavor devoted to service for the student from abroad" (1964, p. 104).

As far as the issue (4) about the relationship between the new association and IIE is concerned, there had been a couple of conflicting arguments. On the one hand, there had been an argument that a relatively small staff of the IIE had had too heavy a responsibility (Zeigler, 1988; Bu, 2003), and that the status of foreign student advisers in the academic institutions as well as the community would be professionally enhanced by a new national organization (Bu, 2003). Further, others, including Joel Neal, who became the first NAFSA Treasurer, and later became the NAFSA President between 1961 and 1962, had strongly advocated for a new national organization, believing that "a peer network, rather than a strong central agency, was the route to take in trying foreign student advisers and others together to educate each other and strengthen their own programs" (Zeigler, 1988, p. 4). On the other hand, however, there had been another

argument that the IIE should simply continue to do the job which the IIE had been already doing, without creating another nation-wide organization. Even at the beginning of the 1948 conference in Ann Arbor, in which the conference participants eventually gave birth to NAFSA, there were still questions like, “Was not IIE already providing the leadership and coordination needed? Would the proposed new association not duplicate efforts and interfere with the functioning of IIE?” (Linton, May, 1968, p. 4). The IIE officials’ prompt reply to these questions was that creating a new association under consideration could enable the association to more effectively accomplish its unique tasks, and to advocate for the interests of the institutions, organizations, and individuals who would become its members (Linton, May, 1968).

Although many of those working with international students celebrated the birth of NAFSA, the issue of financial support for the association appeared not to be promising. NAFSA in the beginning did not manage its financial health without external support such as the free rental office space offered by the IIE and the contribution of $12,900 given by the Carnegie Foundation (Desoff, January/February, 2008). Further, in 1951, NAFSA started receiving grants from the Ford Foundation. The first grant from the Ford Foundation was for a one-year period, and aimed to support the operation of NAFSA’s headquarters as well to the expansion of its services to foreign students (Bu, 2003). Not only did this situation indicate the financial difficulties of NAFSA, but also demonstrated the fact that these philanthropy organizations also supported the ideas of establishing and maintaining a professional association promoting international exchanges of persons.

The philanthropic foundations had been supporters of international student exchanges for decades, particularly towards IIE as a championing organization in this

field. A $30,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation gave birth to IIE (IIE, n.d.) in 1919. In fact, the genesis of IIE was a department of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Along with the Carnegie Foundation's support, IIE's funding in the first quarter century also partly came from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (Berman, 1983). As IIE expanded its administering function of student and professional exchange programs both for the government and private corporations since the late 1940s, the Ford Foundation, which started its overseas training programs in the early 1950s, rapidly increased its assistance to IIE. Soon, the Ford Foundation overwhelmed the activities of the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations in the field of overseas exchange programs.

From NAFSA's Birth Through the Implementation of INA of 1952

While, as described earlier, a number of non-governmental organizations with their primary missions to advocate for international students in U.S. higher education had existed even before World War II, it seems that the creation of NAFSA saw this policy subsystem still premature in terms of collective advocacy. In the second annual NAFSA conference in March, 1949, Allen Blaisdell, the then Vice President of NAFSA, who was also Director of the International House at the University of California, Berkley, called for collective voices to advocate for international education in which he would like to see this new-born organization play a leading role. After pointing to NAFSA's arguably primary task to provide opportunities for international educators to find assistance to meet the problems of their routine responsibilities, Blaisdell continued to say:

> Another task before this organization [i.e., NAFSA], or is it a phase of the first, is to assist the development of some instrument or instruments through which the dissociated institutions of American education can become vocal and influential

> on a national plane in this matter of international education. … At this point we discover that there is no established effective instrument of referral, no commonly recognized means of cooperation, no machinery that can promptly move into action when serious emergencies arise or significant and worthy opportunities are presented. (Blaisdell, 1949, p. 10)

Scarcely had NAFSA been created when it had opportunities to demonstrate its efforts to lead such collective moves for international students in the federal policy arena. Two major examples which provoked NAFSA's collective actions during this dawn of professionalization of international educators were these: financial crises of international students, particularly from China; and the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952.

In response to the increasing number of international students without adequate means of support for their study in the U.S., NAFSA had a meeting with a group of representatives from those organizations which had similar concerns about this issue in December, 1948 (Linton, 1949). This group included the Greater New York Council for Foreign Students (GNYCFS), the Institute of International Education (IIE), the Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students (CFRFS), the English-Speaking Union, China Institute in America, and the universities. Regarding this problem, particular attention had been paid to Chinese students who had been cut off from their financial sources in China due to the turmoil in the civil war in China, which later eventually led to the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949. This inter-organizational meeting produced a memorandum for emergency aid addressed to the Department of State, and "[copies] of this memorandum were sent to the President of the United States, the Chairman of the Advisory Commission on Educational

Exchange, a group of interested senators and Representatives, and all members of the Association for appropriation local action" (NAFSA, March 27, 1949, p. 7). The Department of State made a prompt reaction, and invited NAFSA for a review. This review prompted a joint survey of NAFSA and the IIE on the actual needs of international students at selected fifty colleges and universities.

Further, representatives from ACE, IIE, China Institute in America, and NAFSA formed the Advisory Committee on Emergency Aid to Chinese Students, whose chairman was George F. Zook, the then President of ACE (Linton, 1949). This joint Advisory Committee continued to communicate with the Department of State for help. The 1949-1950 annual report of NAFSA's Board of Directors indicated that "[the] situation of these [Chinese] students was greatly relieved by the assignment of $4,000,000 by the State Department to assist these students" (NAFSA, March 22-25, 1950, p. 6). Ben Schmoker, the then Director of CFRFS, who later became NAFSA's president (incumbent between 1954 and 1956), explained that "[there] were four outgrowths from the emergency: (1) financial aid was forthcoming; (2) NAFSA proved it could be counted on to act in an emergency; (3) the prestige of NAFSA with university administrators took an upward climb; (4) initial contacts were established with government and at a high level" (quoted in Zeigler, 1988, p. 6).

Also, in response to the introduction of the reform of the Immigration Act of 1924 in April 1950, NAFSA made a collective action to advocate for international student access to U.S. higher education. The minutes from the Board Meeting in October, 1950, explained that "[in] conformity with NAFSA policy to cooperate with all groups related to the program of International Exchange of Students, NAFSA is cooperating with a Joint

Committee representing the Institute of International Education, the Greater New York Council and the American Council on Education in studying the proposed bill, conferring with proper authority on those provisions related to the exchange of persons and such other actions as may be proper and necessary" (NAFSA, October 16 & 17, 1950, p. 4). Representing this joint committee (originally named as the Joint Committee on Proposed Immigration Bill, and later as the Joint Committee on Immigration Problems of Educational Personnel), the GNYCFS's executive secretary, Celestine Mott, gave a testimony before a joint subcommittee of for the Senate and House on March 12, 1951. This testimony was the earliest one in which NAFSA was represented in the congressional hearings.

Even after the passage of the Act over Truman's veto in June 1952, NAFSA and its allies continued to advocate for international students to be affected by the new Act. For example, responding to the Immigration and Naturalization Service's proposal of the regulation to implement the Act in November 1952, both NAFSA and its reactivated Joint Committee with the ACE, IIE, and GNYCFS separately sent the INS an official appeal for the revision of the proposed regulation (*NAFSA Newsletter*, December, 1952). At the same time, NAFSA's Board of Directors circulated among NAFSA members a *NAFSA Special Bulletin* with several recommendations for revisions in the regulation. The *NAFSA Special Bulletin* said:

> The suggested Regulation lay down a number of procedures which will affect students, other than exchange visitors, under the Smith Mundt Act, adversely. It is exceedingly important for educational institutions to make their views known immediately. Foreign student advisers are urged to ask the President of their

> institution, or someone else in authority, to write the Commissioner of Immigration protesting certain points. (NAFSA, November 19, 1952, Cover page)

NAFSA's government relations showed what the key government agencies were in this policy subsystem in the aftermath of World War II. In NAFSA's tenth anniversary issue of *NAFSA Newsletter*, Paul M. Chalmers, NAFSA's second President (incumbent between 1950 and 1952), explained NAFSA's government relations in its first ten years. Chalmers particularly highlighted two agencies: the Department of State, particularly its International Educational Exchange Services (IES), as an agency which operated its own exchange program and the Immigration and Naturalization Service which had a regulatory relationship with international students on campus. Chalmers described the collaboration between NAFSA and the State Department since NAFSA's formation for which the Department's IES had been largely responsible as close and cordial, but stressed the essential difference between NAFSA and the Department of State as follows:

> The I.E.S. is charged with carrying out a program which is essentially political. Its first loyalty is to the policy, domestic and foreign, of its government, representative of the interests of all its people, many of whom have no interest in foreign exchange of even strongly disapprove of it. The college adviser, on the other hand, is oriented to an educational program. His first loyalty is to his college, the educational principles in follows, and the students he has been charged with assisting. (Chalmers, April, 1958, p. 6)

Chalmers continued to explain the relationship between NAFSA and INS, which Chalmers described as the regulatory agency the most important to NAFSA and its

constituents, as follows:

> Collaboration with I.N.S. has been pleasant and effective. It was undertaken on the initiative of NAFSA, but is now so thoroughly accepted that frequently I.N.S. will make the first move. I think it is fair to say there is a widespread recognition on the pars of I.N.S. that an informed FSA [Foreign Student Adviser] can make its work easier and more effective. An important move of I.N.S. for NAFSA was its decentralization. (Chalmers, April, 1958, p. 6)

At the same time, this period already had other powerful actors such as elected representatives, including legislators and presidents of the U.S., who directly or indirectly played significant roles in this policy subsystem. For example, Senator William Fulbright became a legislative champion of promoting international educational exchange of persons when he introduced the Fulbright Act in 1946, and continued to be the champion throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Although not focusing on the issues of international students, other legislators such as Senator Patrick McCarran and Representative Francis Walter were important in introducing their bills of revising immigration law as a whole, a minor part of which affected the regulations of international student flow into U.S. higher education. Also, the congressional battles over the budget for exchange of persons highlighted some major overt opponents to such exchange programs. For example, Senator Joseph McCarthy stressed the programs' potential risks of bringing communists into the U.S., while Representative John J. Rooney, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, hardly regarded educational exchange as important to the U.S. foreign policy (Bu, 2003, pp. 222-225). Both Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower appeared to favor the international

educational exchanges of persons.

Arguably, one of the remarkable things reflecting this general atmosphere of being threatened by the communist expansion from the late 1940s to the mid 1950s was the Second Red Scare, particularly led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, who in 1950 started investigations and accused large numbers of people of being communists or communist-sympathizers. His targets varied from the bureaucrats, politicians, the Army, and individuals within and outside of the government, including those popular figures in Hollywood. Senator McCarthy rapidly won vast support from the public, but his popularity gradually faded after he was censured by the Senate in December 1954. Senator McCarthy regarded exchange programs of persons such as the Fulbright Program as one of the vicious channels which could bring communism into the U.S. As a result, Senators McCarthy and Fulbright clashed over a debate about the budget for student exchange programs at a hearing before the Senate Committee on Appropriations (*The Supplement Appropriation bill, 1954*, 1953).

In the major hearings of this period which included some discussions about the issues of international students, the vast majority of political actors expressed their positive views about the international exchange programs of persons. Even Senator Joseph McCarthy, who as shown later was a major opponent to the Fulbright Program, repeatedly (although sounding sarcastically) stressed that “I think the idea [of the Fulbright Program] is good” (*The Supplement Appropriation Bill, 1954*, 1953), although he also criticized that the way the programs were administrated in terms of security check made the U.S. vulnerable to the communist aggression.

Since international student access to U.S. higher education was a minor issue in

the immigration laws and regulations, the hearings on the immigration policy, even if including some international student matters, did not include any substantial discussion on the rationales for bringing international students into U.S. higher education. One of the few statements in the hearings which referred to the political actors' views of bringing international students into U.S. higher education was presented by Marcus Neelly, District Enforcement Officer, Chicago District of INS, who argued:

> It is to the interests of this country and to the interests of the world at large that we permit people to come here and do research. … I think most of us recognize that the center of world medicines and surgery is now in the United States. There was a time when a doctor wanted to become particularly adept or skillful, we would either go to Paris or Vienna to study. They don't do that any more. He goes to Hopkins or Mayos or Billings or some of the institutions around over the country to study the various things–procedures that we already know in this country. I think it would make our know-how in the field of medicine and science more available to the world generally than it is now, and I think certainly in the field of medicine it ought to be made more available. (*Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization*, 1948, p. 36)

In order to continue to permit international students studying in the U.S., Neelly suggested some revisions in the legal status of international students in the immigration law. "We think [international students] should be taken out of the immigrant status and put into the nonimmigrant status" (*Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization*, 1948, p. 33).

Also, in the hearing about the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952

(*Revision of Immigration*, 1951), the issues concerning international students were mentioned by a very few witnesses, but were substantially discussed only by Celestine G. Mott, representing the Joint Committee on Immigration Problems of Educational Personnel, formed by GNYCFS, her own organization, as well as ACE, IIE, and NAFSA. While Mott presented technical recommendations for revisions in the proposed bill, she did not largely spell out the rationales of international student enrollments in U.S. higher education in her statement. However, Celestine Mott stated that "[the] purpose of bringing foreign students here is to give them a specialized training which they cannot obtain frequently in their own countries" (*Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws*, 1951, p. 229). This statement was Mott's answer for a simple question from Representative Michael A. Feighan (Democrat–Ohio) at the end of her testimony; "What is the purpose of bringing foreign students here?"

By contrast, the hearings about the international exchange programs contained a number of various beliefs on international students. For example, the Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953) included the major political actors in this subsystem at that time, including legislators such as Senator William Fulbright, government agency officers from the State Department's International Information Administration (IIA), representatives from the non-governmental organizations such as ACE, CFRFS, GNYCFS, IIE, International House, and NAFSA.

In general, the witnesses and committee members expressed their support for the exchange programs, and rationales for bringing international students to U.S. higher education in terms of mutual understanding, peace making, development assistance, and

combating communism. Many of the expressed beliefs in the rationales were often overlapped. For example, John Mott, Director, International House, New York, concluded his statement with a sentence that " I would like to say that the student exchange program of the Government is one of the most effective and direct methods you can use to bring understanding in the world" (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, p. 518).

Following John Mott in the hearing, Benjamin Schmoker, representing both CFRFS and NAFSA, furnished his own observations about the ongoing situation of enrolling international students in the U.S. He was convinced that "American colleges and universities recognize that as educational institutions they have a role to fulfill in providing the trained leadership necessary in a divided and in a frustrated world" (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, p. 523). Schmoker continued to argued that "[the] students are a highly selected group. They are returning to their homelands. They have had a prolonged experience. They have had the opportunity to evaluate that experience. When they return to their homeland their experience here is multiplied into many, many dividends" (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, p. 528).

The views of Kenneth Holland, President of IIE, about exchange programs of persons also emphasize the importance of understanding, but clearly expressed his anti-communism sentiment: "the medium of exchange of persons is the most potent means to develop understanding between peoples and to counteract Communist propaganda" (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, p. 583). More directly expressing the peace-making rationale, Holland quoted President Dwight Eisenhower's letter to him in October of 1952 as follows:

I firmly believe that educational-exchange programs are an important stem

> toward world peace. Because of failures in human relationships, my generation has suffered through two world wars. The threat of another will not be removed until the peoples of the world come to know each other better, until they understand each other's problems and needs and hopes. Exchange-of-persons programs can contribute immeasurably to such understanding. (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, p. 583)

A testimony of Walter Johnson, Administrator, International Information Administration of the Department of State, was foreign policy oriented, and inferred the exchange programs' substantial contributions to the U.S. diplomacy. His written statement for the hearing concluded:

> Through such [educational exchange] programs people are talking to people. An understanding of the problems facing various nations and an appreciation of the aims and objectives of each nation is taking place through just such an exchange of people. … Since 1945, educational exchange and cultural activities have been added to political and economic activities to affect the basic attitudes of the free peoples of the world in the direction of greater understanding and solidarity. (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, pp. 502-503)

Similarly, one of Senator Fulbright's definitions about the purposes of exchange programs of persons was in the context of foreign policy, Fulbright said that "the objective is to encourage these people to have confidence in themselves and to establish a government, sufficiently stable so that it will not be subject to totalitarian ideas" (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, p. 573). In another hearing, in order to seek the sufficient appropriation for the Fulbright Program, Senator Fulbright referred to a 1953

report of the committee led by Senator Hickenlooper, which thoroughly studied the entire field of information and exchange programs. The report's recommendation was that the exchange program be expanded, as it rated the exchange program as "the most effective instruments for the creation of mutual understanding and good will" (*The Supplemental Appropriation Bill*, 1953, p. 616).

In this period, there were two major conflicting beliefs about international educational exchange of persons. The first was about the administrative and organizational separation between educational exchanges and propaganda activities of the federal government.

The debates took place between Senator Fulbright and Robert L. Johnson, Administrator, International Information Administration (IIA) of the State Department, which was in charge of both exchange of persons such as the Fulbright Program and the propaganda activities such as the Voice of America. R. Johnson wished to create a new organization separate from the State Department, by accommodating both exchange and information programs together in it, and contended:

> I consider the exchange program of great value and tremendously effective, and I would like very much to have it closely coordinated with our whole effort. We want to "explain America" and, I think, there is no better way than through the exchange program. (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, pp. 860-861)

Fulbright was not convinced by this argument of R. Johnson's, and stressed:

> We do not–I hope we do not, and it is my understanding that we do not – try to indoctrinate people who come here. All we do is give them a free opportunity to observe for themselves, and to me there is a very great difference between that

> and telling them about ourselves. I have never been impressed by the persuasiveness of self-adulation, and I think that is, in a way, the essence of the socalled propaganda activities. (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, pp. 863)

Similarly to Fulbright, the written statement of Walter Johnson, Chairman, Board of Foreign Scholarships, which was submitted to the same hearing, expressed:

> It is most unfortunate that the exchange program and the information program are in the same division of the Department of State. The long-range foreign-policy objectives of international understanding through educational exchange are different psychologically from the short-range objectives of day-to-day foreign policy persuasion as carried out by the mass media. The emphasis on the planning and implementation of educational exchange and the mass media are not the same. To have the two programs together as they now are weakens the effectiveness of the exchange program. (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, p. 500)

In the same hearing, others such as Martin McGuire, Member, United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, Robert M. Strozier, Dean of Students, University of Chicago, and Thomas A. Van Sant, representing the National Education Association and the Adult Education Association of the United States of America, advocated for the administrative and organizational separation between the educational exchange and propaganda activities of the federal government.

In this regard, Bu (2003) vividly explained the efforts of the higher education community to separate educational exchange political propaganda from the late 1940s to the mid 1950s. One of the typical and remarkable examples which Bu presented is the

1947 condemnation of a group of educators led by Ben M. Cherrington of the University of Denver and George Zook of the ACE that information and educational exchange would be mixed in the then proposed Smith-Mundt Act. Bu summarizes their arguments as follows:

> To those educators who had been involved in educational exchange long before the government stepped in to take the lead, information was for "international power politics"–an instrument "to implement diplomatic policies of the Department of State"–whereas educational and cultural exchanges were "nonpolitical" for the mutual benefits of exchange countries. They argued that the American tradition favored the divorce of educational activities from the control of the federal government. (Bu, 2003, p. 158)

Interesting, while the hearing on Overseas Information Programs attracted the arguments over the administrative separation between educational exchange and propaganda programs, Benjamin Schmoker, representing CFRFS and NAFSA, and Kenneth Holland, representing IIE, did not mention their opinions about this debate. However, Holland sounded that he perceived the exchange programs as part of propaganda programs, as he frequently used the phrase, 'counteracting Communist propaganda.' For example, Holland argued that "the medium of exchange of persons is … the most potent means to develop understanding between peoples, and to counteract Communist propaganda" (*Overseas Information Programs, 1953*, p. 570).

Second, the conflicting beliefs on international education exchange as to the exchange programs' impacts on national security were demonstrated in some hearings. Senator Fulbright believed that international educational exchange of persons helped the

U.S. enhance its national security against communist aggression. He pointed out that, however, “there are people in the Congress who have reservation about the [educational exchange] program. They say to me. “How do I know that the students who come here do not go back and use their technology or whatever they learn against us?” (*Overseas Information Program*, 1953, p. 519). Fulbright continued to ask one of the witnesses in the hearing, John Mott, Director, International House, New York, if Mott recognized any chance of this happening. From his own long and rich experience in working with international students, John Mott answered:

> I have no information on what you would call the negative side of people that have gone over to the other side. We have heard of our alumni that have been killed because they didn’t. … I do know some people come critical of our country and go back less critical, but there is n question that we don’t do a hundred percent job with all of them. (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, p. 520)

Fulbright’s immediate response to Mott’s comment was that “[it] may be that there are some conditions in this country that warrant some criticism. We don’t pretend that we are perfect in every respect” (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, p. 520).

On the other hand, the counter argument was represented by Senator Joseph McCarthy, for example. In the heated questions and answers between Senators Fulbright and McCarthy in *The Supplement Appropriation Bill, 1954* (1953), the latter repeatedly accused the Fulbright Program of allegedly sponsoring communists or communism-sympathizers. McCarthy presented his doubt about the security check over selecting Fulbright students and scholars. By keeping on expressing his own

anti-communist stance as well as his belief in the anti-communist nature of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, Fulbright tactfully blocked McCarthy's accusations. "Senator Fulbright's counteroffensive represented the first successful resistance to McCarthy within the government since his premier appearance on the national scene in 1950. McCarthy never again attacked the exchange program" (W. Johnson & Colligan, 1965, pp. 102-103). Bu (2003) pointed out that both these two senators were fighting against Communism, but in different approaches, and concluded:

> McCarthy represented the tradition of isolationism, reinforced by his paranoia of communist subversion in the country, whereas Fulbright represented the tradition of internationalism–confident in the final triumph of American democracy over Communism through international outreach. (p. 223)

Also, these hearing referred so far already presented some arguments about the economic implications of having international students in U.S. higher education, which have been recurring over the 60 years. As for the cost, Schmoker, representing CFRFS and NAFSA, pointed to the costs of enrolling international students in higher education institutions, although his main argument is that the federal government's international exchange programs of persons should be continued by all means. Schmoker simply reported the undesirable problems facing colleges and universities, mentioning that "[our] colleges and universities are concerned with the increased operational costs of the program on the local level" (*Overseas Information Programs*, 1953, p. 524). An economic upside was mentioned by Kenneth Holland, IIE. Holland argued that "by helping [the people living in foreign countries] to develop economically we are raising their standards of living, we are increasing their purchasing power, so they are a better

source of products and a better market for our goods" (*Overseas Information Program*, 1953, pp. 573-574).

Lastly, but not the least importantly, given the nature of these benefits, the vast majority of the arguments presented in the hearings took it for granted that international students should go back home after their study in the U.S., but NAFSA and its allies at this time showed their ambivalent arguments about this issue. At a meeting among GNYCFS, IIE, and NAFSA before forming their Joint Committee in May 1950, there was a unanimous agreement that "the regulations applying to the exchange visitor (Smith-Mundt) visa be applied to all students, - i.e., mandatory return home, and no change of status permitted" (Kerr, 1950b, p. 2). However, in the hearing on the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, this Joint Committee, which was represented by Celestine Mott, pointed to the potential contribution of international students to the U.S. as future skilled workers, and explained:

> The joint committee is of the opinion that nonimmigrant students who have obtained a specialized education in this country, and who in later years may apply for citizenship in the United States, form one of the best sources from which this country can draw its citizens, because their superior education would then be of direct benefit to the United States. (*Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws*, 1951, p. 229)

Indeed, Mott did stress in the hearing that "[we] agree that students from abroad definitely should come here for education and return to their countries" (*Revision of Immigration*, 1952, p. 230), However, the Joint Committee of ACE, GNYCFS, IIE and NAFSA, argued that "the United States might be the loser if an alien were automatically

refused citizenship solely because a number of years previously he had requested exemption from military service in the Armed Forces of the United States on the ground that he was a non-immigrant student admitted for a temporary period" (*Revision of Immigration*, 1952, p. 230).

As far as NAFSA's resource as a political actor is concerned since the profession of international education practitioners just began to grow after the end of World War II, NAFSA had a very limited number of mobilizable troops in its inception, too. In fact, there were fewer than 50 and 200 'foreign student adviser' positions appointed in U.S. higher education before 1945 and 1950, respectively (Higbee, 1961). The initial membership of NAFSA accounted for 88 only in 1949 (NAFSA, Spring, 1998, p. 22). However, though its efforts to increase the membership as well as to influence the federal policy, including resource allocations (e.g., emergency aid for Chinese students) and regulations governing international students (e.g., the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952), NAFSA gradually but steadily grew. The membership exceeded 500 by 1956, and the next five years saw the number almost doubled to over 1,000 (NAFSA, Spring, 1988, pp. 24-26).

Compared to NAFSA, which had just come into existence in this policy subsystem, other non-governmental pioneer organizations such as IIE and CFRFS had established more resources. IIE had had strong connections with the Department of State since many of its executive staff were former officers of the State Department, and since IIE administrated several government exchange programs on contract basis. CFRFS also had established a wide range of connections with people in the local communities. Also, these two organization had had a long history in studies and statistical services on

international students. The publication of *The* U*nofficial Ambassadors*, a formal census report on international students in the U.S. was initiated by CFRFS in 1919, and later was joined by IIE, and both started publishing *Open Doors* in 1948. These organizations had already had expertise information on international students when NAFSA was born. Since NAFSA's resources in terms of information was limited in the beginning, NAFSA had to seek help from IIE in conducting a nation-wide survey on the actual needs of financial aid on the occasion of the Chinese students' crisis as described above. Nevertheless, NAFSA rapidly established its roles in the field of international exchange. Bu (2003) pointed out:

> By the early 1950s, there was a clear "division of labor" among the three major national organizations, with NAFSA focusing on foreign students affairs, the IIE concentrating on government exchange programs (mostly Fulbright and other government-sponsored exchanges), and CFRFS offering the port-of-entry service and community programs. (p. 169)

In terms of financial resources, all of these three organizations were vulnerable, and substantially supported by the private foundations such as the Carnegie and Ford Foundations in the 1940s and 1950s. Particularly, NAFSA faced the lack of its financial resources at the beginning. A grant from the Ford Foundation came to NAFSA in 1951 to help fund its operations (Dessoff, January/February, 2008, p. 22). *NAFSA Newsletter* (NAFSA, May, 1952, p. 4) reported that its "budget, assisted by the $16,575 grant from the Ford Foundation, is in healthy condition at the year's end." This *Newsletter* continued to explain that:

> foreign students are a loss item on the financial side. … Scholarships,

> fellowships, and fees which represent only a fraction of the cost of education all represent the huge contributions to this movement on the part of educational institutions. There are some who doubt that NAFSA can ever be self-supporting, but none question the vital importance of international educational exchange. (NAFSA, May, 1952, p. 4)

With this financial assistance from the Ford Foundation, NAFSA transformed itself into a national organization representing higher education institutions with foreign enrollments in the U.S, and "Educational institutions increasingly relied on NAFSA for assistance and guidance in regard to their exchange programs and foreign student affairs" (Bu, 2003, p. 198).

As shown above, NAFSA was engaged in both petition to the governmental agencies and testimonies in the congressional hearings. In the case of the emergency aid for Chinese students, NAFSA with its allies made appeals primarily to the Department of State, not only in writing but also in person. NAFSA's survey conducted with IIE on the actual needs of the financially devastated students was important information to convince the Department of State. Also, NAFSA joined other various political actors in the testimonies of the congressional hearings; e.g., the hearing before the INA of 1952, and Overseas Information programs in 1953. Petitions were made by NAFSA and its allies to the governmental agencies.

In the meantime, regarding the introduction of the McCarran Bill (to revise immigration laws), as described above, NAFSA and its allies (i.e., ACE, GNYCFS, and IIE) managed to send a representative from their joint committee to make a testimony in the congressional hearings. Also, during the NAFSA Board's discussions about its

response to the introduction of the McCarran Bill, the question of NAFSA lobbying was raised (NAFSA, October 16-17, 1950). It was recorded in the Board Meeting Minutes that:

> The NAFSA Board stated that in its actions through the Joint Committee there is no intent of lobbying. NAFSA will state the opinion of its members. It affirms the right of its members of exert their personal influence. NAFSA will bring attention to those sections of the Bill as related to the exchange programs. (p. 5)

This strategy regarding NAFSA's and its members' legislative activities continued to be taken after the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 was enacted. The Board Meeting Minutes of November 1953 confirmed:

> The National Association of Foreign Student Advisers is a tax exempt organization and, therefore, is prohibited from exercising, as an organization, any semblance of pressure on legislative matters. This does not restrict individual members from exercising their rights as American citizens in urging legislative actions, but does call for caution in using the name or letterhead of NAFSA or any other organization in the tax exemption group. (NAFSA, November 13 & 14, 1953, p. 4)

Instead of exercising legislative 'lobbying', NAFSA made efforts to establish its liaison with the governmental agencies in its early years. NAFSA's first conference in Ann Arbor, which gave birth to NAFSA in 1948, voted for the establishment of a number of committees, including the Committee on Immigration, chaired by Donald C. Kerr, Counselor to Foreign Students at Cornell University (NAFSA, June 16, 1948). This Committee on Immigration gradually came to play the central role in NAFSA's federal

government relations through the 1950s. The fist issue of *NAFSA Newsletter* (October, 1949) had a list of the then standing NAFSA committees, which included the similar committee with a slightly different name of Committee on Immigration & Government Regulations, chaired by Kerr. This Committee soon changed its name into the Immigration Service Committee, and its duties further became a part of the Committee on Liaison with Government and Private Agencies by the structural reorganization of NAFSA committees in May of 1952 (NAFSA, May, 1952). *NAFSA Newsletter* (May/June, 1958, p. 11) indicated the detailed list of NAFSA Committees for 1958-59, and this list included the Committee on Liaison, which was made up of the chairmen of the different liaison committees of NAFSA: Government Liaison Committee, IIE Liaison Committee, CFR Liaison Committee, and Committee on NAFSA Relationships Abroad. This composition showed NAFSA's strong relationship with the then major international educational exchange organizations (i.e., IIE and CFRFS), while the Government Liaison Committee (GLC) continued to remain as its name until the mid 1970s.

Explaining the existing Immigration Act of 1924, which governed the visa and immigration operations for foreign students studying in U.S. higher education at that time, Donald Kerr authored *Immigration Without Tears* (Kerr, 1950a). This booklet was a popular introduction on immigration regulations concerning foreign students in the very first stage of the professionalization of international education practitioners such as foreign student advisers in U.S. higher education. At the beginning of this introductory booklet, Kerr (1950a, p.2) presented a rather obedient and passive attitude towards the laws and regulations about immigration and visas as follows:

The immigration law under which we are operating was written in 1924. A lot of

> water has gone over the dam since then. Why, then, hasn't the law been re-written to meet present conditions? The answer is that there is a feeling to the part of those most familiar with governmental procedure that, if this was attempted, we might end up with a worse code than we have at present, and therefore we'd better leave well enough alone. (Kerr, 1950a, p. 2)

Kerr continued to suggest that, for their better services to foreign students, the foreign student advisors contact and cooperate with the INS officers. Kerr (1950a, p. 13) pointed out:

> The personnel of the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service are human, and they appreciate and respond to co-operation, even as you and I. Therefore, anything you can do which will make their work easier and simpler, and indicate a helpful spirit on your part, will make the way smoother for you and your students as well as for the Service.

However, responding to the introduction of S.3455 of the 81st congress by Senator McCarran in April, 1950, Kerr published *Immigration With a Smile* (Kerr, 1950b) a supplement to *Immigration Without Tears*. In this supplement, Kerr informed the NAFSA members about the bill of S. 3455, and asked members for suggestions of what the NAFSA and its allies should present at the expected hearings held by the Senate.

Discussions from an ACF perspective. The period between the birth of NAFSA in 1948 and the mid 1950s was the dawn of a policy subsystem concerning international student mobility into the U.S. It was the very beginning of the rapid increase of international enrollments in U.S. higher education. However, there had been already a number of political actors in the U.S. in this policy subsystem. These existing political

actors included some governmental agencies such as the Department of State, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Congress members such as Senator Fulbright, and some non-governmental organizations such as the Institute of International Education and the American Council on Education. All of these have remained in this policy subsystem since then.

As a political actor new to this policy community, NAFSA's resources were limited in many ways. From an ACF perspective, its membership as mobilizable troops was very small in the beginning, although NAFSA' expertise information on international student affairs might have been already recognized by some of other political actors. In this situation, NAFSA tried to work closely with the existing political actors advocating international student access. Since then, NAFSA has been a part of the pro-international-student-access coalition. Also, NAFSA could not even have survived without receiving substantial support from the private foundations, which are now not as active in this subsystem as they were from the late 1940s to the 1960s.

The beliefs of these political actors, like the vast majority of the people in the U.S., were largely influenced by the grievous memories of World War II as well as by the fear of the emerging Cold War. Therefore, when talking about bringing international students into the U.S., mutual understanding for peace making was smoothly merged into foreign policy rationales as public diplomacy. As widely discussed in the literature, these beliefs have been dominant in this policy subsystem since then.

In the meantime, it is interesting that the testimony representing NAFSA and its allies in the hearings about the immigration reforms mentioned, although with great diffidence, the potential contributions of international students' talents to the U.S. society,

which may be based on the same logic for today's debates for retaining best and brightest talents from the world for the development of the U.S. STEM fields.

From an ACF perspective, it is argued that NAFSA's attempts to influence the federal policies in these early years of its long history demonstrated NAFSA's traditional 'strategies regarding guidance instruments' in the policy subsystem's box. For example, NAFSA successfully employed the strategies of regular liaisons and negotiations with governmental agencies such as the Department of State for the Chinese student emergency funds. NAFSA also encouraged its members, although still limited in number at the moment, to send letters to their Congress representatives for support for the emergency funds. Further, NAFSA was invited to make testimony in several hearings in these early years. All of these strategies are still substantially utilized today.

Kennedy's Taskforce Through Brain Drain Debates in the 1960s

For NAFSA itself, the 1960s started with its remarkable involvement in a task force of the then President-Elect John F. Kennedy. In the fall of 1960, James Davis, the then president of NAFSA, who was also Director of the International Center, University of Michigan, was approached by Ted Sorensen of Senator Kennedy's office, and asked to become the chairperson for Kennedy's Task Force on Exchange Persons (Zeigler, 1988). In his letter to the NAFSA Board at the end of November 1960, Davis informed the Board members of this good news, and explained that the task force was expected to produce a report on international educational exchange by fairly early in the new administration, and wrote that "I know that you realize the potential in this appointment. I earnestly solicit thoughtful letters expressing your views" (Davis, November 26, 1960, p. 1). Later, Katie Louchheim, Special Consultant to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural

Affairs, explained that "The selection of Dr. Davis as the chairman of the Task Force on International Exchange of Persons was simply recognition on the part of the incoming administration of the importance of NAFSA and the expression of a desire to listen to its views though its President" (as quoted in NAFSA, 1961, p. 7).

Later, in his reminiscence, Davis explained how the Task Force was initiated, and developed for its success as follows:

> There was no money for the costs of the force, especially non for my own expenses. [After many fruitless requests] in desperation I turned to George Gallo of the Creole Foundation. He made a small grant to the University Michigan to cover my expenses and I was able to function. Shortly after this the IIE had a large conference in San Francisco. There I suddenly discovered that I was being courted by the Bureau of Educational Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, by the International Cooperation Administration [now USAID], by the Pan American Union, IIE, and others. They all wanted to help and offered suggestions for emphasizing their own services in our report. When I went to Washington all doors were open. Proposals were volunteered. Bureaucrats whom I had known wanted me to meet their bosses. It was pretty heady stuff. (quoted in Zeigler, 1988, p. 11)

Chaired by James Davis, the Task Force members included the following: Calvin Plimpton, Amherst College; William Marvel, Carnegie Corp.; Champion Ward, The Ford Foundation; Walter Laves, Indiana University; and Frederick Patterson, Phelps-Stokes Fund (*Report of Task Force on "Exchange of Persons,"* 1961). *The Report*, which was presented to Kennedy early January of 1961, began with the sentence that "A unified and

purposeful effort in educational, cultural technical, scientific and informational cooperation programs is essential to our foreign policy objective of the achievement of peace through the extension of knowledge and understanding in the world" (p. 1). In the Task Force's feedback to President-Elect Kennedy in early January of 1961, Kennedy accepted the entire report (except for the Task Force's recommendation for the initiation of the exchange of persons between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China) with congratulations to the Task Force.

Among the suggestions was the creation of an undersecretary of state for Educational and Cultural Affairs, which was realized just after Kennedy's new administration started. Phillip Coombs became the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Just before this appointment was finalized, in *NAFSA Newsletter*, James D. Kline, who was the main writer of 'Washington Memo' in the *Newsletter* from the mid 1950s through the beginning of 1960s, pointed out that:

> It will be remembered that there has been a movement over several years to up-grade this key assignment to a point where it might carry considerable weight in international relationships and with the Congress. Many groups, including the American Council on Education and the Institute of International Education, as well as NAFSA, have urged that this be done not only as a means of achieving greater coordination between State and ICA, but also to create a more effective and unified operation in a broad sense. (Kline, February, 1961, p. 7)

As Davis (as cited in Zeigler, 1988) pointed out, not only did the Task Force prompt the creation of an Assistant Secretary position, but also it eventually led to the enactment of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961.

In his testimony before the Senate Committee, which discussed the proposed Fulbright-Hays Act, Philip Coombs, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, stated:

> In the late forties and fifties, two strong new arms were added to reinforce U.S. foreign policy–namely, economic assistance and military assistance to support the preservation and growth of free societies. As we embark upon the sixties we have the opportunity–and I would say the necessity–to build a third strong arm aimed at the development of people, at the fuller realization of their creative human potential, and at better understanding among them. (*Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act: Senate Hearing*, 1961, p. 113)

Coombs also stated:

> I have no doubt that historians of the future will proclaim these educational and cultural exchange programs of this period to have been an invention at least as powerful in the interest of peace and freedom as the splitting of the atom or the launching of missiles into outer space. (*Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act: Senate Hearing*, 1961, pp. 113-114)

This military-like metaphor of Coombs provoked negative reactions in the hearing.

For the hearings about the proposed Fulbright-Hays Act, James Davis, too, testified both in the Senate and House Committees, held in March through April of 1961 (as NAFSA's president) and May through June of 1961 (as NAFSA's ex-president), respectively. Davis started his testimonies by presenting the rationales of the exchange program in terms of a two-way understanding, but rather focused on the international students' roles in transmitting the ideals and culture of the U.S. to the world. "Having

experienced a free and orderly society here, thousands of leaders abroad can never again take the glib promises of international communism at face value" (*Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act: Senate Hearing*, 1961, p. 187). Davis emphasized the role of the exchange programs in transmitting a positive image of the U.S. to the people in the world.

Also, in order to demonstrate the financial difficulties of higher education institutions for the justification for the financial support from the federal government under the proposed Act, Davis presented an explanation about the complexity of the exchange program from an economic perspective. First, he pointed out that:

> Only about one-tenth of the 53,000 foreign students in the United States are here on funds provided by the U.S. Government. About half of them are private students supported entirely by their parents who buy dollars with their foreign currencies abroad and send those dollars here to be spent for tuition fees and maintenance. In this sense, this total program may be seen as a huge export product, bringing millions of dollars to our favorable balance of trade. (*Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961: House Hearing*, 1961, pp. 187-188)

Then, he explained the motivations of educating international students as follows:

> The universities which support the [exchange] programs are doing so primarily in the national interest. Secondarily perhaps in the interests of their own constituents. And so in recognition of the importance of the national interests, it seems to me that the national interest must be financed at the national level. …We have mentioned that the cost of instruction is much more than the fees

> paid. We could add that the cost of having foreign students is more than the cost of having other nonresident students from Connecticut or Ohio, if we are in Michigan. (*Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961: House Hearing*, 1961, pp. 195-196)

Davis also presented the issue of the potential contribution of international students after their completing of studying in the U.S. Although this argument did not convince many senators, James Davis explained and asked for some flexibility on the visa and immigration regulations as follows:

> [we] train some people to the point at which they are very useful to us and relatively useless in an underdeveloped country. Those people can be very useful to us if they stay. They can be frustrated and miserably unhappy if they go home. On the other hand, we want everybody who can function at home to go home. (*Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961: House Hearing*, 1961, p. 194)

Also, the American Council on Education sent representatives to the same hearings: Gaylord Harnwell, President of the ACE, in the Senate Committee, and Edward B. Bunn, President of Georgetown University. Both of them represented not only the ACE but also the American Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities, and the Association of American Colleges. In their statements, the earlier appointment of Coombs as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs was commended as a significant step in the promotion of international education. Also, both Harnwell and Bunn emphasized the importance of the mutuality which the proposed Fulbright-Hays Act would create in the exchange programs.

Regarding the relationship between the federal government and universities, Walter H. Laves, member of the President's Task Force on Exchange of Persons, who was also Chairman of the Department of Government Indiana University, said:

> Now, the university is not an agency of the U.S. Government, and the moment the U.S. Government directs a university on how it shall conduct its university business there is trouble. … I don't think there is anything in these bills that in any way constitutes a threat to the universities or the foundation. … When I said that I though it was for the Government of the United States to call the attention of the universities to the fact that they must treat the foreign student problem seriously, I don't think that involves tampering by the Government in the university's mechanisms. I think it is proper for the Government to say to the universities, "You cannot treat foreign students just like any other students. You have got to give them special attention. (*Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961: House Hearing*, 1961, pp. 168-169)

From a different point of view, a discussion about the relationship between the government and universities was made. In the House hearing about the proposed Fulbright-Hays Act, in responding to the issue of international students' allegedly crowding out domestic students, Davis said:

> Most of the major universities run between 3 and 5 or 6 percent foreign students. I think the universities feel this is a legitimate contribution that they make to international understanding and the support of our foreign policy. I think they also recognize that having these foreign students gives certain educational benefits to the American students through their informal associations and their

> class discussions and other means. (*Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961: House Hearing*, 1961, p. 203)

This debate further raised the issue of necessity of some organizations controlling this issue. However, Davis argued as follows (p. 204):

> Representative Farbstein: "Do you have any opinion with relation to there being some group, or individual who shall have authority to set policy in connection with this subject [of international students' crowding out domestic students]?"
>
> James Davis: "No, sir: I don't because university policies are not normally set at the national level and they don't operate on the basis of uniform national policies in any other area that I am familiar with"
>
> Representative Farbstein: "I understand they don't, but what is your opinion with relation to having someone do so, or some group?"
>
> James Davis: "I think this would be violently resisted by the universities as an infringement of their freedoms"

Lastly, Senator Hays points to the delicate jurisdiction problems which the proposed Fulbright-Hays Act had produced:

> The Judiciary Committee has interposed some objections to certain sections of [the proposed Fulbright-Hays Act] that deal with immigration matters. I am sure that we will want to work out an agreeable compromise with them so that we do not trespass on what they consider their prerogatives or do not incur the antagonism of that committee by their feeling that we might be doing something to immigration laws that shouldn't be done. But all of the mail has been generally … in support of this idea of trying to pull these various places of

> legislation together and have one act which more or less charts our course and makes this business of foreign exchange students and the whole idea of exchange of students an important part of our foreign policy. (*Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961: House Hearing*, 1961, p. 17)

Next, the mid 1960s saw one of the major legislative attempts to promote international education in the U.S. history: the passage of the International Education Act of 1966. However, the documents of NAFSA were relatively quiet about the Act. No representation of NAFSA appeared in the hearings for the proposed IEA. Instead, Hugh M. Jenkins, the then NAFSA president, sent a message to the Task Force on International Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, saying that:

> while we understand that the act would not specifically assist American institutions improve their educational programs for services to the 90,000 foreign students enrolled in American schools, we are glad to know that these important functions are being effected through Presidential directives designed to supplement the programs provided for in the act. … [we] look forward to the implementation of the President's broad program for those designed to promote foreign student program. (*International Education*, 1966, p. 439)

In NAFSA's Executive Meeting in May 1966, "Mr. Sims moved that Doctor Hamilton be informed that the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs takes the position that, rather than suggest that Senator [Wayne] Morse propose an amendment to the International Education Act seeking financial assistance for universities, attention should be given to the implementation of the Fulbright-Hays Act, which contains the necessary provisions for foreign students, and that NAFSA would prefer not to impair the

passage of the International Education Act by proposing an amendment. The motion was seconded and carried" (NAFSA, June 24, 1966, p. 3).

Senator Fulbright's reasoning for his decline to sponsor the IEA in response to the request from Douglass Cater, who was the White House specialist in education and special assistant to President Johnson was related to this matter. "Fulbright declined to sponsor the IEA reasoning that it would be better to treat it as domestic legislation because it provided only for grant to U.S. colleges and universities and would be mainly administered by HEW. … The administration then turned to Representatives John Brademas and Adam Clayton Powell … to sponsor the IEA in the House of Representatives and to Senator Wayne Morse … to introduce the act in the Senate" (Vestal, 1994, pp. 47-48).

Although NAFSA did not see the direct benefits of the IEA to international students, and the IEA has never been funded anyway, there were some international-student-related issues in which the IEA was going to take an interest, and which were discussed during the hearings about the proposed IEA. Two examples were brain drain and utilization of international students in the learning and research of the domestic population in U.S. higher education.

Brain drain was one of the major issues which emerged in the 1960s. Senator Michael Mondale proposed the revision to add the appropriation for the Office of Health, Welfare and Education to conduct research on the issue of 'brain drain', and this revision was accepted and enacted eventually. In the mid 1960s, *NAFSA Newsletter* also discussed this issue of brain drain. For example, it explained:

There is a division of opinion among university officials. Many believe that

> universities accept foreign students freely on the basis of a free individual in a free society with the exception, of course, of the sponsored students who comes for a specific program on the basis of a common understanding between the student and his government. (NAFSA, June 24, 1966, p. 2)

In the hearing about the proposed IEA, a number of views were presented. For instance, Mario T. Noto, Associate Commissioner, Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, explained that:

> Generally speaking, the provisions which went into effect on December 1, 1965, have had the effect of permitting the immigration into the United States of more professional people, or people with occupations and skills, required skills. (*International Migration of Talent and Skills*, 1967, p. 116)

Responding to a question about the feasibility of expanding the two-year requirement for returning home after completing study in the U.S. to more international students beyond J-visa exchange persons, Noto said, as a personal opinion, considering this is a policy question, “I don’t think it would be favorable, because I think the deterrent factor would outweigh the advantages that are occurring today by this free exchange of students” (*International Migration of Talent and Skills*, 1967, p. 118).

In the Senate Hearing, David D. Henry, Director, International Office, Harvard University, explained that “some of us question whether it is desirable for the U.S. Government to use its power to shape the careers of talented nationals of other countries” (*International Migration of Talent and Skills*, 1967, p. 128). His argument continued:

> All of these questions have implications beyond the problem of curbing the flow of talented and able people from the countries of their origin or adoption. They

> concern our concepts of social justice and human rights. In my judgment we cannot afford to jeopardize these larger values in our concern over the migration of talent from less developed to more developed countries. I think, in short, it is important not to overreact to the problem of the brain drain. … [We] believe that the best thing to do is to start in the developing countries themselves to tackle to the problem. (*International Migration of Talent and Skills,* 1967, p. 129)

According to *NAFSA Newsletter* (Bridgers, December 1966), Richard Humphrey, Director of the Commission on International Education of the ACE, described brain drain as a political issue, and said that higher education institutions should basically focus on education, but not on political matters. At the same time, however, Humphrey was reported to agree that higher education does not exist in a vacuum. Therefore, he contended that the university:

> is bound to respect explicit understandings that the student will return to his home country, and even in the absence of such understandings, it is obligated to weight most seriously both the international equities and comities if it in any way persuades him otherwise. (as cited in Bridgers, December, 1966, p. 2)

Next, in relation to the discussion about the proposed International Education Act, several people recommended the utilization of international students. In the House hearing of John Brademans's Task Force on International Education (1966), Mina Rees, Dean of Graduate Studies, the City University of New York, said that "The presence of increasingly large numbers of foreign students on our campuses holds out a useful resource. The features of the bill that would enable the Government to support work-study programs of faculty and students in foreign countries are also excellent"

(*International Education*, 1966, p. 292).

In the mid 1960s, there were some major organizational changes within NAFSA. First, in 1964, NAFSA changed its name from the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers to the National Association of Foreign Student Affairs. In his letter to presidents of American colleges and universities, Werner Warmbrunn, the then NAFSA President (incumbent between 1963 and 1964), who was then at Stanford University, explained this name change as "a reflection of the growing complexity of international educational exchange," saying that "[The problems of foreign students no longer are the exclusive concern of foreign student advisers, but also of teachers of English as a foreign language, admissions officers, deans and other administrative officers in educational institutions, community organizations and national and international agencies" (March 27, 1964, p. 1). It should be noted that the issues of 'study abroad' or 'foreign scholars' or 'area studies' were not mentioned by Warmbrunn at this time. Indeed, NAFSA continued to be concentrating mainly on international students at that time.

Indeed, the history of NAFSA's exploration for the best association name at least up to its final name change in 1990 shows NAFSA's struggle to identify the major constituencies and function of the association in the field of international education. "From the moment of its founding, NAFSA has agonized over its name" (Zeigler, 1988, p. 24). Clarence Linton, the first NAFSA president recalled that "[the] name, National Association of Foreign Student Advisers, was … a concession to necessity–a concession which was never wholly satisfactory, as the subsequent change in name demonstrated (May, 1968, p. 4). According to Zeigler (1988), the association as young as three years old in its annual conference in 1951 already created a committee to explore more

appropriate name and functions for the association than the original ones, but it was in 1964, as described just above, that the name was changed into the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs.

In 1966, further organizational changes were made in NAFSA which were to affect its federal government relationship. First, NAFSA's Executive Committee appointed Hugh Jenkins, the then Director of the Foreign Student Service Council, who was also NAFSA's retiring president, as NAFSA's first Executive Director after his presidential term ended. "With the creation of that position, NAFSA is increasing the efficiency of its administrative organization, expanding its possibility of service to the membership, and acquiring professional status" (Bridgers, June, 1966, p. 1). In conjunction with this new full-time position, NAFSA transferred its central office from New York City to Washington D.C. by the fall of 1966. *NAFSA Newsletter* had earlier explained:

> It was felt that it was essential that the new Executive Director be in a position to carry on constant and active liaison with the private and governmental agencies, domestic and foreign, which are largely centered in Washington. Some of the factors which persuaded the Committee that NAFSA should move to Washington were the ever-growing involvement of various branches of the Federal government in international educational exchange activities, the necessity for better liaison with the Educational and Cultural Officers of the foreign missions in Washington, and the need for closer relationships with such national associations as the NEA [National Education Association], ACE [American Council on Education], APGA [American Personnel & Guidance Association],

> USNSA [United States National Student Association], as well as many others which have their national headquarters in that city. (NAFSA, March, 1966, p. 3)

While the private foundation had played significant roles in financially supporting international education, including the exchange of persons and NAFSA's operation, for decades, the IEA was also a turning point. In the House Hearing for the Task Force on International Education, which discussed the proposed the IEA, J. C. Harrar, the then President of the Rockefeller Foundation, predicted the impacts of the IEA on the private foundations as follows:

> When foundation find the Government moving into areas in which they have been working for a long period of time, we feel this gives us freedom to move into new areas of experience; to have the flexibility to experiment; and to demonstrate the vitality and viability of new approaches to human problems. (*International Education*, 1966, p. 274)

In the same hearing, by contrast, Champion Ward, Deputy Vice President for International Programs, the Ford Foundation, which was the then greatest private contributor to international education of the U.S. in terms of financial support, argued that "Statistically, I think the size of the full problem is so great there is going to be room for a wide range of activity in both private and public agencies" (p. 274). However, the private foundations' support dramatically declined in the late 1960s. Douglass Cater, special assistant to President Johnson, later deplored: "I continue to bleed when I recognize that the private foundations reduced their funding devoted to international education projects in anticipation of federal government involvement which did not follow" (as quoted in Vestal, 1994, p. 138). In the early 1960s, *NAFSA Newsletter* in 1962

explained:

> The sixties have … been marked by increasingly better relations between the Government and the foreign student in numerous … respects. Some of these … stem from the new [Fulbright-Hays] Act; others are the result of the climate of improved government-private cooperation with regard to the foreign student. … In summary, Government interest in the foreign student is at an all-time high, and NAFSA is making a significant contribution. (Davis, April, 1962, p. 4)

Discussions from an ACF perspective. The policy subsystem concerning international student mobility into the U.S. in the 1960s was outstanding in terms of the strong leadership of the U.S. presidents as political actors who were interested in the promotion of international education in general. It can be argued that NAFSA was still rather passive in the policy process for the passage of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 since its participation in the Task Force on Exchange of Persons was initiated by the invitation from Kennedy's team. However, NAFSA managed to work closely with the Kennedy Administration. By contrast, NAFSA was not able to have any significant voice on the International Education Act of 1966. This appears to mean that NAFSA had not really established any continual relationship with the center of the Administration. For his part, Senator Fulbright seems to have continued to be one of the most influential political actors.

As far as the beliefs in the policy subsystem are concerned, the intensified Cold War continued to justify the foreign policy rationales of bringing international students into the U.S. in the 1960s. Interestingly, the testimony of James Davis, the then NAFSA president, included again the idea that international students' talents could be utilized

after their graduation in certain areas, including higher education. On the other hand, the documentary data mentioned above indicated that the concerns about the brain drain were also highlighted in many of the political actors' beliefs in the 1960s.

As far as NAFSA's resources of political actors are concerned, the appointment of James Davis to Kennedy's Task Force on Exchange Persons demonstrated the recognition of NAFSA's expertise in international student affairs. Indeed, as mentioned in the literature review, NAFSA started producing a number of important publications on advising and administering international students on campus. It seems that the policy subsystem's general perception of NAFSA's strength in information as resources of political actors had been established.

1970s Before the Iranian Revolution

In January of 1970, a small group of NAFSA members, mainly from universities located in the west coast, had a meeting to discuss NAFSA's role in transnational education, and made three broad resolutions for NAFSA's new directions. *NAFSA Newsletter* (March, 1970) presented a summary of these resolutions with their related suggestions to invite comments for further discussions and development in this regard. Along with the resolutions concerning membership expansion and professional development for educational efforts with global relevance, a new approach in NAFSA's government relations was presented as Resolution 2 as follows:

> NAFSA, through its Board and Secretariat, identify, with the assistance of its membership, those areas of government activity related to transnational education; advocate those activities in support of transnational educational and seek to have removed those which serve as barriers. (NAFSA, March, 1970, p.

5)

The basis for this resolution is the purpose of NAFSA explained in the then Constitution of NAFSA. Article II of the Constitution read as follows:

> The purpose of this Association is to assist educational institutions in the development of effective programs in the field of international education. To fulfill this purpose the Association: 1. provides information on meeting the needs of international students; 2. represents the views of the membership on matters affecting international student exchange; 3. cooperates with other private and public agencies concerned with international education; and 4. creates opportunities for members to broaden their professional training and development. (NAFSA, May 6, 1966, p. 1)

As suggestions for implementation of this resolution, this group from the West Coast argued:

> "Advocacy" should include lobbying, when necessary, with government agencies and persons having jurisdiction over matters of concern to foreign students specifically and to transnational education in general. (NAFSA, March, 1970, p. 5)

This group continued to list some examples of targets of this advocacy activity, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Congressional committees, and individual legislators.

Slightly, after the expression of these resolutions, another group was formed by several NAFSA individual members in the spring of 1970, when NAFSA's Annual Conference was held in Kansas City. This group formation was under the leadership of

Robert Klinger, former NAFSA president (incumbent between 1964 and 1965), who was also at the University of Michigan (Moore, November, 1973). This group within NAFSA was named the Council of Directors of Foreign and International Student Headquarters Offices (CODFISH). CODFISH played an important role in terms of the development of NAFSA's attempt to influence the federal policy affecting international students through the 1970s because the federal policy arena was one of those to which CODFISH members were keen to present their views. The majority of the CODFISH members were working full-time as managers of international programs in the institutions with sizeable number of international students. As CODFISH Chair, Forrest Moore, former NAFSA president (incumbent between 1958 and 1959), who was also at the University of Minnesota, summarized the group's purposes as follows:

> 1. To serve as a medium for and facilitator of communication among major institutions; 2. to provide means for the professional development of managers of international education programs; and 3. to formulate and present the views of international program managers in major institutions on international education policies and programs to national, state, and federal bodies and agencies with the purpose of providing a consensus of informed leadership in the field. (Moore, November, 1973, p. 2)

As shown below, CODFISH soon facilitated discussions on some proposals for changes in laws and regulations governing international students in the U.S. in early 1973.

Further, under the presidency of Lee Zeigler (incumbent between 1971 and 1972), who was also at Stanford University, NAFSA established the Task Force on Legislative Liaison. While not present at the meeting in the West Coast which produced

the 1970 resolutions mentioned above, Zeigler was among the supporters for the resolutions. This Task Force on Legislative Liaison, headed by Forrest Moore, University of Minnesota, was created to examine NAFSA's actual role and potential for further activity in the legislative liaison (Zeigler, June, 1971). The missions of this Task Force included these: "the gathering of information, the establishment of a communications network, the development of position papers on matters of concern to the Association, the presentation of appropriate background information and points of view to those directly involved in legislation relating to educational exchange at the state and federal level" (Jenkins, May, 1972, p. 4). Even after Zeigler's presidency finished, the Task Force continued to be active, and sometimes put analysis on prospective legislative changes at state and federal levels which were expected to affect international students in the U.S. For example, Moore as the Task Force Chairman analyzed and predicted stricter regulations on international students' part-time jobs during their study in the U.S., given the tightening labor market (Moore, October, 1972, p. 6).

In time of the 25th anniversary of NAFSA, Mary A. Thompson, the then NAFSA president (incumbent between 1972 and 1973), who was also at International Student Services, New York, took the lead in carrying out the substantial reorganization of NAFSA. Using a contracted consulting firm, the NAFSA Board of Directors developed a roadmap for change. By the time of the Detroit Conference in May 1973, while five sections of professional fields and twelve regions of geographic grouping continued to be maintained as the bone structure, five new commissions, by absorbing most of "sagging, age-lined committees" (Zeigler, 1988, p. 20), were created: Policy and Practices; Information Services; National and International Liaison; Professional Development; and

Commission on Representation. Among these commissions, the responsibilities for the government relations were placed in the Commission on Representation. At the same time, NAFSA's Government Liaison Committee (GLC), which had played a significant role in NAFSA's government relations for almost two decades, ceased its operation by May 1974, and soon a new group, the Government Regulatory Advisory Committee (GRAC), came into being under the jurisdiction of Commission on Representative.

During this reorganization process of NAFSA, as signposts on the way in the roadmap for the reorganization, Mary Thompson reported the summary of the interviews which the NAFSA Task Force on Mission and Activity had conducted for a few months in 1972 (Thompson, December, 1972). The interviewees included leaders in governments, educators and representatives for various organizations concerned with international education. They were asked, for example, "what trends or directions do you see in the development of international education in the next decade?" Her report on *NAFSA Newsletter* listed a number of trends of international education, both in world-wide and the U.S. context, which had been mentioned by those interviewees. This list presented the trends from various perspectives in individual, institutional, national and international terms. In general, recognizing the increasingly interdependent world, the interviewees argued that there would be further development of, diversity in, needs for international education, including exchange of persons, while there would be also greater obstacles against the anticipated development. While the list was in detail about the developing countries' national interests, American national interests were not concretely mentioned; therefore, foreign policy rationales were not directly spelled out. As a problem in the world-wide trends, "There is increasing concern over governmental monitoring of the

activities of foreign students and scholars in the host countries that accept them" (Thompson, December, 1972, p. 1). As shown in the vast part of this section, this problem was going to come true for international students and international education professionals in the U.S.

The 'brain drain' issue, which was one of the heated debates in the late 1960s, was mentioned in this list of trends. However, the listed trends concerning this issue looked rather contradicting, perhaps because this list was a summary of various people's views. While the world-wide trends see it that the brain drain would continued to be an issue in developing countries, the trends in the U.S. see it that "there will be fewer opportunities for employment of foreignness, and the "brain drain" will be less of a problem" (Thompson, December, 1972, p. 2). In fact, the congressional hearings concerning international education did not include much discussion about the 'brain drain' issue in the 1970s. *The NAFSA Newsletter* of the seventies was also rather silent about this issue itself. However, one of NAFSA's responses to this continued problem of the 'brain drain' was the creation of NAFSA Home Country Employment Registry in the fall of 1974, which was a service to help U.S. trained international students find the employment in their own countries.

In the midst of this NAFSA reorganization, CODFISH first created its proposals for legislative changes affecting international students in February 1973. Among the proposals' ten recommendations, the first of these proposals was the differentiation of visas between the students in higher education and those in non-higher education institutions, and the second proposal was 'duration of status' (Smith, April, 1973, p. 4). CODFISH's justification of these proposals was that:

> [implementation] of these proposals would free the Immigration and Naturalization Service from an enormous amount of useless paperwork and thus save needed government resources for other purposes. It would place the responsibility for academic decisions in the hands of educators, yet leave the enforcement of laws and regulations in the hands of government agencies. (Smith, April, 1973, p. 6)

These proposals published in *NAFSA Newsletter* were to stimulate thought in advance of the session of the Government Liaison Committee at the NAFSA Annual Conference in Detroit.

Shortly after the publication of these proposals, the State Department issued the Foreign Affairs Manual of July 25, 1973, which suddenly started requiring international students with F-visas to provide financial evidence of support for the entire period of their study in the U.S., not for the first year as in the previous rules. Leo Sweeny, a former NAFSA president (incumbent between 1973 and 1974), who was also at the University of Missouri, Kansas City, remembered the substantial fears among the NAFSA colleagues caused by this regulation change, and labeled it “Foreign Affairs Manual Flap” (quoted in Zeigler, 1988, p. 20).

In response to this trend of tightening regulations, NAFSA’s Board of Directors adopted the *Position Paper on Laws and Regulations Governing International Educational Interchange* in December 1973, which had been developed by the Commission on Representation and the Government Liaison Committee with the scrutiny of other groups in NAFSA. This position paper argued that:

> The Immigration and Nationality Act and its attendant regulations, including

> those governing foreign students, are being interpreted in the context of the problems of unemployment and the large number of aliens illegally in this country rather than in the context of encouraging international educational interchange. (NAFSA, December 4, 1973, p. 3)

Then this position paper contended that:

> It is essential to the national interest of the United States that there be a complete reappraisal of the regulations governing the admittance and the educational experience of foreign students in the colleges and universities of this country and that such regulations be recast in the context of promoting educational interchange rather than that of controlling aliens (NAFSA, December 4, 1973, p. 6)

Therefore, three major steps to improve this situation were recommended by the *Position Paper*. First, the Foreign Affairs Manual of the State Department should be suspended right away so that the INS should "return to the reasonable, flexible, and humane attitudes and practices of the 1960s in the administration and enforcement of regulations governing foreign students" (pp. 6-7). Second, the existing regulations should be revised, and a new legislation by which cumbersome and unnecessary administrative tasks would be eliminated, and by which the foreign students' ability to earn a part of their own support would be enhanced, should be enacted. Third:

> In conjunction with other organizations in higher education, and in cooperation with interested federal government agencies, NAFSA will propose broad new legislation which will reaffirm the position of the United States with respect to international education as expressed in the Mutual Education and Cultural

> Exchange Act to provide for the development and growth of international educational interchange. (NAFSA, December 4, 1973, p. 7)

NAFSA's concerns about the tightening regulations, articulated in the *Position Paper*, further led to a collective move to change the situation. In December of 1973, just after the adoption of the *Position Paper*, three of NAFSA's executive members (President, President-Elect, and Executive Director) met staff of the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and realized that these government officers did neither regard their recent changes as substantial, nor expect their new regulations to adversely affect international student enrollments (Sweeny, March, 1974). Subsequently, in January of 1974, the same three executive members of NAFSA had extensive meetings with representatives of higher education organizations whose headquarters are located in Washington D.C. *NAFSA Newsletter* (March, 1974) reported the key findings from the meetings as follows:

> We learned that several of those associations already had directed their staffs to give the immediate suspension of the revised visa issuance regulations top priority in their extensive legislation and governmental liaison efforts. We found an arsenal of liaison expertise and contacts all poised to attack the same objectives that we have – and eager to join forces in every way possible. (Sweeney, March, 1974, p. 1)

NAFSA sent the *Position Paper* to the major associations, including the American Council on Education (ACE), National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges (NUSLGC), Association of American Universities (AAU), American Association of Community and Junior Colleges (AACJC), and National

Liaison Committee on Foreign Student Admission (NLCFSA) (NAFSA, May 27, 1974). The cover letter of Leo Sweeney as the then NAFSA president attached to the *Position Paper* read:

> This Association has adopted the position that there is an urgent need to seek comprehensive legislation to place international educational interchange in the most appropriate milieu. … We wish to propose the formation of an inter-association task force to draft model legislation that could be proposed to Congress. (Sweeney, April 17, 1974, p. 1)

Before the summer of 1974, this action led to the creation of the Inter-Associational Task Force (IA/TF) with these higher education organizations mentioned above.

Just before the creation of the IA/TF, Eugene Smith, Chairman of NAFSA's Commission on Representation, summarized the situation of NAFSA's efforts to curb the increasing governmental controls over international students in the early 1974 as follows:

> Subsequent to the adoption of the position paper, the Commission [on Representation] Chairman continued a contact with the staff of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Naturalization and Citizenship which had originally been established by the Committee on Government Liaison. Through NAFSAns in California and New York, additional contacts were established with members of the House Subcommittee on Immigration. However, none of these contacts bore fruit, as the entire Committee on the Judiciary (of which the Subcommittee on Immigration is a part) was preoccupied with [Nixon's] impeachment hearings and similar matters. Advice from educational organizations in Washington skilled in Congressional relations was that NAFSA

> should not press its legislation proposals at the time, but should wait until the impeachment matter was settled, the elections were over, and Congress might be in a mood more supportive of international education. (Smith, June, 1974, p. 17)

Although having no success with NAFSA's efforts to change the situation, Eugene Smith continued to argue, anticipating the creation of the IA/TF with the higher education association which had experience and skill in Congressional and governmental relations:

> One of NAFSA's principal objectives and highest priority items must be effective education of government agencies and Congress regarding the needs of foreign students. NAFSA must develop much greater expertise in this area and must devote a greater share of its resources to this objective if international educational interchange is to survive its current crisis. (Smith, June, 1974, p. 22)

At the exact moment of such movement to the creation of the IA/TF, INS made a decision adverse to these hopes of NAFSA and its allies in the higher education community for the deregulation of laws and regulations governing international students. On April 19, 1974, INS Commissioner Leonard Chapman, who had been a four-star general, commandant of the Marines before he started heading INS in 1972, announced to withhold from colleges and universities the authority to authorize off-campus employment. Commissioner Chapman's explanation and justification for this change in work permit procedures were as follows:

> The [Immigration and Naturalization] Service, for a number of years prior to 1974, annually authorized school officials to grant nonimmigrant student permission to engage in summer employment under specified conditions. … In April 1974, as a result of strong representations by the Department of Labor

> regarding the high unemployment rate among American youth, including Vietnam veterans and members of minority groups, the Service decided to withhold such authorization for the summer of 1974. (*Federal Register*, November 15, 1974, p. 40311)

This rule change did not mean that all the international students would become ineligible for summer employment of 1974, while the decision on the work permit request would come to be made only by INS rather than by individual school officials. However, this INS rule change of April 1974 was perceived by many international education professionals as another addition to the tightening regulations possibly making negative impacts on international student access to U.S. higher education. Like the "Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) Flap," Sweeney labeled this change by Commissioner Chapman as the "INS Flap." The Minutes from the meeting of the NAFSA Board of Directors said that the NAFSA members' expression of opposition to this INS Flap was even more immediate and energetic than the that to FAM Flap (NAFSA, May 27, 1974).

Dixon Johnson, the then Chairman of NAFSA's Commission on Representation, who was also at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and who later held the NAFSA presidency between 1980 and 1981, pointed out that some media such as *New York Times* publicized their editorials favorably on the side of NAFSA and its allies, and summarized those editorials as follows:

> All editorials have mentioned the disastrous results of the INS policy in restricting the opportunity for a U.S. education to the wealthy, and/or sponsored students and thereby depriving U.S. students of the benefits of cross-cultural interaction. (D. Johnson, October, 1974, p. 4)

A bit later, in his article in the *NAFSA Newsletter* (November, 1974), August G. Benson, the then NAFSA president (incumbent between 1974 and 1975), who was also at Michigan State University, analyzed the tightened regulatory situation in the mid seventies, and wrote that "[many] members of NAFSA have used the term 'crisis' to describe the general situation arising out of questionable actions by governmental agencies over the past 18 months" (p. 1). He continued to list the major changes in the 'crisis' as follows:

> The requirement to demonstrate or document evidence of resources to cover full costs of the educational experience in the U.S. prior to issuance of a visa, the termination of the extension of visa service in the U.S. for foreign students currently enrolled in U.S. institutions, the application of additional restrictions in some countries in renewing visas for foreign students, and the limitations on summer work permission for foreign students. (Benson, November, 1974, p. 1)

In this 'crisis,' according to the *NAFSA Newsletter* (December, 1974), the IA/TF members met in Washington D.C. to discuss priorities and possible activities for the IA/TF at the end of October of 1974, which was followed by a series of meetings with the IA/TF representatives and the officials from the State Department, those from the INS, and some aides for Senator Hiram Fong (Democrat–Hawaii), Senator Edward Kennedy (Democrat–Massachusetts), and Senator Claiborne Pell (Democrat–Rhode Island). In several of these meetings, the importance of statistical data concerning international students was stressed. These October 1974 meetings of the IA/TF paid major attention specifically to the status of summer employment authorization, rather than to the proposal of new legislation on international educational interchange in general. Further, the

meetings within the IA/TF and with the Senatorial aides had considerable discussions on the House bills introduced earlier as below.

By the summer of 1974, in concert with the voices from those who advocated for international educational exchange, including NAFSA, several legislators such as Representative Tom Railsback (Republican–Illinois) and George E. Brown (Democrat–California) tried to remedy the restriction over international student summer employment procedures. The Second session of the 93rd Congress saw two bills for this remedy introduced: H.R. 15819 and H.R.16402. The consideration of these bills were delayed to no action in 1974, particularly because the issue of possible impeachment against Nixon and the prolonged confirmation of Vice President Nelson Rockefeller for the Ford Administration occupied the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Laws, to which H.R. 15819 and H.R. 16402 were referred.

In the meanwhile, INS proposed in November 1974 "to discontinue the policy under which school officials may be authorized to permit nonimmigrant students to engage in summer employment" (*Federal Register*, November 15, 1974, p. 40311). This proposal was the permanent version of the withholding of work permission authority from colleges and universities, as in the April 1974 rule change. In the end, in February 1975, Commissioner Chapman implemented the new rule as proposed in November 1974, explaining that "While the great majority of the representations [responding to the November 1974 proposal] were in opposition to the proposal, none responded directly to nor presented any overriding arguments against the basic premise set forth in the notice of November 15, 1974" (*Federal Register*, February 5, 1975, p. 5380).

As soon as the first Session of the 94th Congress started in 1975, H.R. 1787, which was similar to H.R. 15819 and H.R. 16402, was introduced by George Brown with some 20 co-sponsors. Dixon Johnson, Chairman of NAFSA's Commission on Representation, mentioned the availability of the list of the co-sponsors of the legislation, and subcommittee from NAFSA's central office, and wrote that "NAFSAns living in the legislative districts of the Subcommittee members will soon be urged to write their Representatives requesting hearing on this bill vital to our interests" (NAFSA, March, 1975, p. 5).

Such increasing efforts of NAFSA to influence the federal policy were almost interrupted by a damper from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In the spring of 1975, Mr. Lucas, auditor of IRS, visited NAFSA, investigated its correspondence documents, and pointed out that:

> The import of all the accumulated correspondence in the files is that NAFSA is engaged in a massive effort to influence legislation – both by direct approaches to State and Federal legislators and by indirect or "grass roots" approaches to obtain community action. (Jenkins, April 30, 1975, p. 2)

One of the examples which Mr. Lucas regarded problematic is a letter of November 1974 from August J. Benson, the then NAFSA president, who was also at Michigan State University. The letter said:

> I urge you to make your views known to your Representative in writing … I suggest you encourage other interested persons, groups, newspapers and other media to take a like position … I am enclosing a number of supporting ideas you may wish to draw on …. (as cited in Jenkins, April 30, 1975, p. 2)

Responding to this auditor's request for NAFSA's resolving these alleged problems, Jenkins argued that:

> I would suggest that this does not imply a restriction but rather a re-direction of our efforts. There are at this time many opportunities and many different forums in which NAFSA should be representing the views of its members. We need to make sure that international education interchange is given proper recognition on every occasion when the future of higher education in the United States is being discussed. We need to prepare and distribute information and position papers which will provide the bases upon which decisions will be made. This can be done, for example, by more active predication in such national groups as the Advisory Committee for the International Education Project of the American Council on Education, by increased efforts in our cooperative activities with other organizations and associations working in our field, by developing new contacts with related groups, such as the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators. (Jenkins, April 30, 1975, p. 3)

This claim of the auditor later led to the revisions of NAFSA Constitution in October 1975. One of the three revisions read:

> Except as may otherwise be permitted by section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or by the corresponding provision of any future Internal Revenue Law, the Association shall not: a. devote more than an insubstantial part of its activities to attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise; b. participate directly or indirectly in, intervene in (including the publication or distribution of statements), any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition

> to any candidate for public office; c. have objectives or engage in activities which characterize it as an "action organization" as defined in section 1.501 (c) (3) – 1 (c) (3) of the U.S. Treasury Department of any future Regulations. (NAFSA, 1975, p. 4)

While becoming more careful not to go beyond the tax-exempt organization's activity, NAFSA continued to develop their efforts to influence federal policies governing international students.

In June 1975, there was a session of hearings in the House of Representatives (*Review of Immigration Problems*), which focused on the immigration problems related to international students at that time; therefore, H.R. 1787, permitting nonimmigrant students to engage in summer employment with approval of individual schools authorized by INS, was substantially discussed.

Representative George Brown (Democrat–California), who introduced H.R. 1787, and who was well known for his involvement in the development of the U.S. science policy, said:

> As educational exchanges proved to be a positive force in international movements toward détente, foreign students were increasingly encouraged to utilize our universities. … After establishing such a defined course of support for educational exchange [under the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961], … I believe that we will seriously jeopardize our relationships with all countries that cannot afford to send their students here on Government grants if we continue to support Mr. Chapman's decision to restrict work permit distribution. (*Review of Immigration Problems*, 1975, pp. 11-12)

Similarly, another Representative, Tom Railsback, who like Brown had introduced a similar bill to H.R. 1787 in the previous year, submitted his written statement in support of H.R. 1787. His statement included his rationale for having international students:

> Foreign students enrolled in American colleges and universities can and do significantly enrich American life. The presence of nonimmigrant foreign students strengthens academic programs and enlivens cultural activities. And, at the completion of their educations, these students return to their homelands with a greater understanding and appreciation of our country. (*Review of Immigration Problems*, 1975, p. 50)

This hearing session in June 1975 also included several witnesses from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), such as Leonard Chapman, Commissioner, and Sam Bernsen, General Counsel. The questions and answers between these INS officers and the members of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, including Joshua Eilberg, (Democrat–Pennsylvania), and Christopher J. Dodd (Democrat–Connecticut), already demonstrated the recurring problem of the INS's inability to grasp the information on international students studying in the U.S. Some excerpts of the conversations from the hearing session (*Review of Immigration Problems*, 1975) were as follows:

> Representative Eilberg: "It seems to me, as the chairman of this committee, that you should certainly know the number of "F" students in the country. Now, I do not think this is unreasonable. Yet you beat around the bush indicating that you do not know, and it seems to me an important subject, why do you not know?" (p. 35)

> General Counsel Bernsen: “”I do not know whether our computer can possibly give us that information. We have not had that information. We have been trying to work up that information for years, and we simply have not had it.” (p. 35)

After a few minutes, the conversation moved to the one between Representative Dodd and Commissioner Chapman as follows:

> Representative Dodd: “… I do not understand why we do not have that statistical observation [i.e., how many international students currently studying in the U.S.] because I think it is really important in joint to determine whether Representative Brown’s bill, the merits of that bill, based on the number of objections or acceptances, which the INS has given, or the institutions gave prior to April 1974, in terms of trying to determine if they are being dealt with fairly, and, then of course, how that interfered with the employment and unemployment situation in this country today, vis-à-vis the amount of students, who are in this country in our educational institutions .” (P. 37)
>
> Commissioner Chapman: “ … A number of students entering each year we know; there were 109,000 last year. The total number in the country at any one time, we do not know. It is probably on the order of 200,000, and I have already agreed that we should know, but we do not.” (p. 37)
>
> Representative Dodd: “What would be practical reasons for not knowing? …” (p. 37)

In the end, H.R. 1787 was not enacted. However, as shown below, the next INS Commissioner brought a new regulation, effective in 1979, to permit international students to accept off-campus employment upon certification of the school officials

whom the INS has authorized.

Including the development of the IA/TC mentioned above, as Zeigler (1988) explained that “the mid-seventies were characterized by increased cooperation between NAFSA and other organizations” (p. 22). Around this time, the National Liaison Committee on Foreign Student Admissions, which had been formed by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO), the College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB), the Council on Graduate Schools, the Institution of International Education (IIE), and NAFSA since the late 1960s, was active in focusing on professional development for overseas advisers (Zeigler, 1988). There was also a formation of cooperation between NAFSA and a specific sector of higher education in 1977; namely, the Liaison Committee between the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges (AACJC) and NAFSA, as these types of institutions came to want to provide more and better services for the increased enrollment of international students (see Diener, May, 1977, p. 17).

Another example of an inter-associational working group with non-governmental organizations was the Joint Task Force on Data Collection, which brought together AACRAO and IIE with NAFSA in 1976. While IIE had annually published its annual census report about international students, *Open Doors*, since 1948, the early 1970s saw NAFSA and AACRAO start their active involvement in the census in an advisory capacity, and also saw the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) begin providing support for the activity (IIE, 1976). *Open Doors* (IIE, 1976) explained the problematic situation about the census report in the 1970s as follows:

> Early in the 1970s it became apparent that institutions were finding it too time consuming and expensive to report their foreign student in full detail. The usefulness of the "head count" system declined and, more importantly, demand increased for greater depth in reporting on the basic characteristics of the foreign student. (IIE, p. 1977, p. 1)

In order to devise a solution, the Joint Task Force on Data Collection of AACRAO/IIE/NAFSA was established. NAFSA similarly explained the reasons why this Joint Task Force was created as follows:

> The task force was created in response to what was considered an urgent need for more comprehensive information about international educational interchange. Both at the national and state levels, government authorities and educational administrators make significant policy decisions on the basis of available data. (NAFSA, February, 1978, p. 2)

The Joint Task Force made efforts to obtain and compile more and better information from the colleges and universities. For 1976/77, "An Optical Scanning (OPSCAN) form was introduced for speedier processing as well as for soliciting answers to an expanded group of questions" (IIE, 1977, p. 2). For 1977/78, the census forms were mailed to the networks of AACRAO and NAFSA as well as to IIE (NAFSA, February, 1978). At this time, the priority goals of the Joint Task Force were these: "(1) a complete response from all institutions where foreign students are enrolled and (2) the maximum use of the OPSCAN form" (NAFSA, February, 1978, p. 2). As a result, *Open Doors* (IIE, 1978) indicated that the percentage of responses from the surveyed institutions increased from 71.1% in 1970/71 to 89.7% in 1977/78.

It was noteworthy that the Joint Task Force was created not only for the improvement of *Open Doors*. The census forms which the Joint Task Force created and mailed to the schools had two types: the Biographic Data Form as a model to record basic information on each student for internal use by institutions, and the Foreign Student Activity Report about the information regarding the international student population of each school. The latter was to be used to provide information required off-campus (e.g., for *Open Doors*). In fact, before the creation of the Joint Task Force, *NAFSA Leadership Quarterly Report for January to March 1976* emphasized the importance of compiling the former type of data when NAFSA was considering to bring a group of representatives from the National Liaison Committee of Foreign Student Admissions, most particularly AACRAO and IIE, for data collection improvement for its own sake. *The Quarterly Report* read that:

> The major purpose of this grouping is, in short, to devise a basic instrument which with permit academic institutions large or small to collect uniform data on foreign students for use within their own institutions. Such data logically will be used in defense of budget for services to foreign students. (NAFSA, 1976, p. 4)

As for NAFSA's relationship with governmental agencies, in the academic year of 1975-1976, the NAFSA Commission on Representation managed to establish quarterly meetings between the NAFSA representatives and officers from the key government agencies. Dixon Johnson, the then Chairman of the Commission on Representation, who was also at University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and who later became the NAFSA president between 1981 and 1982, wrote in NAFSA Newsletter as follows:

> In the past NAFSAns have mainly learned of government actions concerning the

> welfare of foreign students and scholars only after they have occurred or when the proposed rulemakings appeared in the *Federal Register*. Now a regular channel exists for the exchange of information and ideas between these agencies [i.e., the Visa Office and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service] and our association. (D. Johnson, May, 1976, p. 17)

D. Johnson continued to explain that "the support of government agencies will be crucial and, accordingly, we are attempting to work with, and not against, the interest of both INS and CU" (May, 1976, p. 17).

One of such examples to regularly discuss matters of mutual concern and interest was a joint meeting held in October 1976 between the NAFSA Government Liaison Group and the representatives from the Visa Office and the CU, and the INS, but this joint meeting revealed somewhat incongruous arguments between NAFSA and the INS, in particular, at that time. As far as the issue of practical training, about which INS had announced its proposal for amendments (e.g., shorter length of practical training of international students), Sanford Jameson, the then NAFSA president (incumbent between 1976 and 1977), who was also at the College Entrance Examination Board, Washington, D.C., accused the INS of a lack of communication with NAFSA, and said that:

> Since NAFSA had understood that the Association would have an opportunity to review the regulations before they appeared in the *Federal Register*, the fact that NAFSA had not received an advance copy of the proposed amendments caused some dismay among the membership. (NAFSA, November, 1976, p. 5)

In response to this complaint:

> [Commissioner Chapman] insisted that no final decision had been made and that this meeting would provide the opportunity for the NAFSA delegation to present their views, which would be considered in any action taken by the Service on the proposed amendments. (NAFSA, November, 1976, p. 8)

Commissioner Chapman continued to explain the proposed amendments concerning international students' practical training as follows:

> The changes were proposed in response to Labor Department and public complaints. Practical training for foreign students, it was charged , results in the "disemployment" of U.S. citizens seeking the same opportunities. (NAFSA, November, 1976, p. 8)

NAFSA Newsletter summarized the discussion between NAFSA and INS as follows:

> While the proposed amendments to the regulations do not indicate an immediate intention by the INS to eliminate practical training, they do reflect a pressure from public and governmental sources to do precisely that. All that may have been accomplished at the meeting with INS, therefore, is to *diminish* the impact of this pressure. (NAFSA, November, 1976, p. 8)

NAFSA's conclusion from this particular join meeting was that:

> The only long-term solution to the problem of providing foreign students with an uninhibited and enhanced educational experience in the U.S. may well be found in the establishment of a new visa category which would distinguish between academic and nonacademic nonimmigrant students. A proposal to achieve this has been hander active consideration for some years both by the Visa Office and Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. It deserves much attention by the

> Association and has been deemed a priority concern of NAFSA's governmental liaison activity by the Commission on Representation. (NAFSA, November, 1976, p. 8)

In early 1977, the Carter Administration brought a new Presidential appointee as INS Commissioner, Leonel J. Castillo, who succeeded General Leonard Chapman. Castillo was the first Hispanic American to head the INS. NAFSA found Castillo favorable to the issue of international student access to U.S. higher education. Don Nelson, NAFSA president between 1977 and 1978, who was also at Miami University, was quoted in *NAFSA: Forty Years* (Zeigler, 1988) as follows:

> We did accomplish more effective with … the Immigration Service. Having met with the former commissioner [i.e., General Chapman] who had been commandant of the Marine Corps, our contacts with Commissioner Leonel Castillo were by contrast most cordial and productive. We made significant progress in our efforts to be more proactive rather than reactive to proposed rule-making. (p. 23)

On the other hand, some have criticized Castillo, too. In his blog, Counterterrorism Blog, Bill West (2008, April 25), who used to be a rookie agent in the Castillo-led INS in the late 1970s, explains his difficulties in working under Castillo as follows:

> The policy memo directed all INS personnel to no longer refer to illegal aliens as illegal aliens. Illegal aliens were to be called "undocumented" aliens or, better still, undocumented workers or persons. Never mind the fact that "alien" was a completely non-pejorative legal term codified in U.S. law. The point was not to offend illegal aliens. We were to be the kinder and gentler Immigration Police by

speaking with softer words. (para. 2)

Castillo's years in INS was rather short. His resignation in September 1979 was regarded as a result of having been caught in a dilemma (Briggs, 1980). On the one hand, Castillo tried to do his required duties as the INS Commissioner. On the other hand, some of his ethnic brothers tended to connive at the illegal flow of persons from the Sothern border as the flow's contributing to the increasing size of Hispanic community for greater political strength.

Let us look back to 1978. NAFSA submitted its proposal for changes in immigration regulations governing F-1 students, which included a recommendation to provide for distinction in regulations between academic and non-academic non-immigrant students, to the INS and the State Department, anticipating the proposal to be the major topic of discussion in the regularly scheduled meetings with these agencies in March 1978 (NAFSA, February, 1978). At the meeting with INS, Commissioner Leonel J. Castillo, in response to the NAFSA recommendation, made his own proposals concerning admission and employment. "The commissioner indicated that he would like NAFSA to have the opportunity to comment on the proposal before it is published as proposed rule-making in the *Federal Register*" (Wise, May/June, 1978, p. 22).

At this meeting, Castillo proposed that admission of a non-immigrant student be for the duration of status in the U.S. if the official document, I-20, indicates as a student for more than one year, not one-year only as in the previous rule. In a slightly different approach from the NAFSA recommendation, Castillo suggested that, "students who were engaged in study for more than one year were most likely to be enrolled in academic courses and thus would be admitted to the U.S. for the duration of their status" (Wise,

May/June, 1978, p. 22). In addition, Castillo proposed that an F-1 student be permitted to accept off-campus employment upon certification of the school officials whom the INS had authorized. The following meeting between NAFSA and the Department of State focused on the new proposals from Castillo. The reaction of State Department representatives to Castillo's proposal was favorable, and even more so to the NAFSA's proposal for differentiation between institutions (Wise, May/June, 1978).

As planned by Castillo, the INS announced its proposed rulemaking about the duration of status admission and employment in *Federal Register* of July 26, 1978. In this announcement, Castillo explained that "[these] amendments are needed to facilitate the admission of nonimmigrant students and intended to reduce the Service adjudications workload, while providing adequate immigration controls on persons here on student visas" (*Federal Register*, July 26, 1978, p. 32306). Not only waiting for the comments responding to the proposal, the INS had another meeting with the NAFSA Government Liaison Group for the direct feedback from NAFSA in September 1977. After considering the responses to the proposal, the INS then published the final rules in November 1978. In the NAFSA Board Meeting of December 1978, talking about the new regulations regarding duration of status and employment, it was recorded that:

> In their final form the changes reflected a number of the recommendations made by NAFSA. Don Nelson reported on the very productive meetings which had been held with the Commissioner and other officers of I&NS and commented on the sympathetic response given to the concerns raised by NAFSA. He suggested that members of the Board, as interested individuals, might with to write to Commissioner Castillo expressing their support and appreciation for his action in

> these matters and send copies of their letters to the appropriate Committees in the House and Senate. (NAFSA, December 10-11, 1978, p. 14)

The new, and deregulated, rules about admission and employment for international students eventually became effective on January 1, 1979.

In parallel to its efforts for such deregulation of visa rules regarding admission and employment, NAFSA also managed to express itself in the congressional discussions over the reorganization of agency responsibility for the international educational and cultural exchange. As shown below, a letter from the then NAFSA president which contained a statement expressing NAFSA's position to the proposed reorganization plan was included as additional statement for the records of a Senate hearing session. The earlier section of this chapter has already indicated that separation or integration of elements in public policy was the subject of considerable discussion for several years before the United States Information Agency (USIA) was created in 1953. Due to the strong oppositions, not only from the academic community, but also from several key legislators such as Senator William Fulbright, the responsibility for international educational and cultural exchange had remained with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) of the State Department since then.

In October 1977, President Jimmy Carter submitted to Congress his Reorganization Plan No. 2, which was to detach the CU from the State Department, and to integrate it with the USIA into a new agency; namely, the U.S. Agency for International Communication. In fact, President Carter expressed his enthusiasm about reorganizing the federal bureaucracy from the beginning. His letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate in February 1977 said that "One of the major goals

of my Administration will be to reorganize and streamline the Executive Branch to insure the effective management of the government programs" (Carter, February 4, 1977, para. 1). In the transmitting letter attached to Reorganization Plan No. 2, Carter argued that:

> As the world becomes more and more interdependent, such mutual understanding becomes increasingly vital. The aim of this reorganization, therefore, is a more effectively dialogue among peoples of the earth. … Thus the new will lay heavy emphasis on listening to others, so as to learn something of their motivations and aspirations, their histories and cultures. (as quoted in *Reorganization Plan No.2* of 1977, 1977, p.p 3-4)

The letter continued to present several principles which had guided President Carter in shaping his reorganization plan, and, among the most important, the letter began with the principle of "[maintaining] the integrity of the educational and cultural exchange program is imperative" (as quoted in *Reorganization Plan No.2 of 1977*, 1977, p. 4). Importantly, however, this imperative was not clearly declared in the original Reorganization Plan itself.

The idea of reorganizing the agency responsibilities of public diplomacy (e.g., educational exchanges, and information, including the Voice of America) had existed before the Carter Administration. A number of studies and reports on the U.S. public diplomacy had been produced; e.g., the report by the Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations (March, 1975), chaired by Frank Stanton, which had been established as an ad hoc non-governmental study group by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information and the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs in 1974; the report by the Commission on the

Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (June, 1975), chaired by Robert Murphy, which had been established by Congress in 1972; and a GAO report by the U.S. Comptroller General (May, 1977). Although each of these studies and reports were different in their approaches for the reorganization, each suggested that the State Department's programs of educational and cultural exchange be consolidated with some or all functions of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA).

Before President Carter transmitted his Plan to Congress, there had been a session of hearings before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Committee on International Relations in June of 1977 (*Public Diplomacy and the Future*, 1977). While no representatives from NAFSA were present in the hearings, the hearing appendices contains a letter from Don Nelson, the then NAFSA president (incumbent between 1977 and 1978), addressed to the Subcommittee's Chairman, as one of the additional statements for the record. In spite of the guideline indicated in President Carter's Plan mentioned above, this letter expressed NAFSA's concern about the federal reorganization in this field as follows:

> [NAFSA] sees the work of the Bureau [of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the State Department] in the context of the realities and opportunities of international educational interchange. In this context the critical element in the success of the Bureau as a part of the U.S. government has been the fact that it is independent of and transparently apart from the implementation of the short-term political interests of the Untied States. It is this quality which we believe must be preserved in whatever structural changes may b made in the total administration of our educational and cultural activities; but at the same

> time we believe that there should be a close relationship between international educational activities and foreign policy. We believe that the best solution might not be an independent organization but a strengthening of educational and cultural activities within the Department of State by having officers carrying out the program overseas report directly to the Department. We believe that the worst solution would be one which would run the risk of the compromising the work of the Bureau by any identification with activities of the government which might be considered of a propaganda nature. (*Public Diplomacy and the Future*, 1977, p.427)

NAFSA sent the same statement to "the corresponding Senate committee as well as to the secretary of state, urging that the integrity of educational and cultural programs be maintained in any reorganization involving [the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs]" (NAFSA, December, 1977, p. 2).

The American Council on Education (ACE), without being represented at the hearing, also had one of its directors, Rose Hayden, send a letter to the Congress. Like NAFSA's letter, the ACE letter was also put in the hearing record. On the one hand, the ACE emphasized the importance of separation between education and propaganda as below:

> Educational and cultural activities must be clearly separate from informational programs designed to explain American foreign policy to the world. In sum, they must be insulated against immediate political labels. While scholars and other cultural representatives must be generally responsive to overall foreign policy goals, they can never be subordinated to them, nor mouthpieces for them. It is

> one thing to be in sight of the flagpole, another to be tied to it, to the long-term detriment of all. (*Public Diplomacy and the Future*, 1977, p.429)

On the other hand, her letter was not clear about whether or not the CU should be merged with USIA into a new agency. Instead, Hayden sounded favorable for the reorganization itself as follows:

> Reorganization efforts can capitalize on this unique era in global affairs, and in a most positive fashion. This nation could indeed enter into an age of expanded educational and cultural contact in ways mutually beneficial. Exchange, in its very essence, is a two-way process. (*Public Diplomacy and the Future*, 1977, p.429)

After the transmission of Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 to Congress, both House and Senate separately had hearings to discuss this proposed Plan. In the Senate hearing, former Senator William Fulbright, who had retired from the Senate in 1974, was among a number of witnesses. His objection to the consolidation of educational and cultural programs with information activities remained as it had been a quarter century ago. Former Senator Fulbright first emphasized the existing mutuality which the CU's exchange programs had already had under the bilateral agreements between the U.S. and other countries for the programs. Further, as in the 1950s, former Senator Fulbright argued that:

> I am for telling the world about us [i.e., propaganda activity], but there is a big difference between telling about us and having them come and see themselves. … All countries tell others through information and propaganda about themselves. They all tell the best they can. It is natural, and I make no criticism

> about that. But that is not the purpose of the exchange program. Its purpose is over the long term to provide for international understanding through the experience of scholars and students, living, studying, and teaching in other cultures and countries. (*Reorganization Plan No. 2: The Senate Hearing*, 1977, p. 76)

Therefore, his plea was that "I would like exchange left in the State Department. This is what I have advocated" (*Reorganization Plan No. 2: The Senate Hearing*, 1977, p. 77).

However, most of the witnesses in these hearing sessions were generally in favor of the idea of consolidating educational and cultural programs with information activities in a new agency outside of the Department of State, while many of them also stressed that the non-political nature of the former programs must continue to be preserved in the new agency. Indeed, many commended President Carter's goals of increasing international mutual understanding spelled out in his transmittal letter. In this context, some suggested that President Carter's statements in the transmittal letter and the text of the Plan itself should be more incorporated. For example, J. W. Peltason, President of the American Council on Education, suggested that "We feel that the associate director, who will be responsible for the administration and supervision of educational and cultural functions, have the responsibilities of this office spelled out in the plan" (*Reorganization Plan No. 2: The Senate Hearing*, 1977, p. 124), and also pointed out that "we need to take the President's intention guaranteeing the integrity of the program in the statement and put it into the plan, and build in institutional safeguards to assure that" (*Reorganization Plan No. 2: The Senate Hearing*, 1977, p. 125).

An interesting thing to note was that this particular testimony of Peltason's did

not somehow represent some of the ACE's usual allies such as the NUSLGC and NAFSA. Peltason's testimony represented nine other higher education associations: the American Association of Colleges, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, the American Association of Higher Education, the Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, the Council of Graduate Schools, the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, the National Association of College and University Business Officers, and the National Catholic Education Association.

In November 1977, Congress passed the Reorganization Plan No. 2 with several amendments. One of the amendments was the clear statement that one Associate Director for Educational and Cultural Affairs and one Associate Director for Broadcasting shall be appointed. Another addition in the final version of November 1977 was Subsection (c) in the section about 'Transfer of Functions,' and the subsection read that "The Director shall insure that the scholarly integrity and nonpolitical character of educational and cultural exchange activities vested in the Director are maintained" (91 Stat. 1977, p. 1638). As shown, the idea was indicated in the message transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977 from President Carter, but not stated in the original Plan itself. Also, the new agency name was decided to be the United States International Communication Agency (USICA), revised from the Agency for International Communication as originally planned.

Discussions from an ACF perspective. The 1970s saw little differences in the composition of the types of political actors in this policy subsystem. However, the U.S. presidents in the 1970s were less active in the promotion of international educational exchanges than those of the previous decade. The Congress in the late 1970s lost two big players advocating international student mobility, Senators Fulbright and Humphrey, due

to retirement and demise, respectively.

In addition to the American Council on Education, other university presidential associations such as the NASULGC and AAU seemed to become more active in the policy subsystem concerning international student access. NAFSA appeared to regard the government regulations as unnecessarily increased in the visa and immigration areas. Therefore, negotiations between higher education community, in particular NAFSA, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were more highlighted in the archival documents than before. As shown in this chapter, the relationship between NAFSA and the two different INS Commissioners in the 1970s, Chapman and Castillo, demonstrated the importance of personal relationships in the outputs of the policy decisions.

As shown above, NAFSA intentionally started to become active in its policy advocacy. It is important that several NAFSA people started discussing more active advocacy in the legislative area. In addition, the mid 1970s saw a number of liaison groups established between NAFSA and several organizations in the higher education community as well as in the international exchange community. Although NAFSA did not really succeed in its attempt to pursue the enactment of a national policy on the international exchange of persons through the advocacy through such liaison groups, these movements were the signs of NAFSA's more proactive approach to the federal policy process.

In spite of the détente of the Cold War, the dominance of foreign policy rationales in this policy subsystem continued. These foreign policy rationales for bringing international students seem to be the basis of justifying the argument of NAFSA and its allies that the government should not interfere in the international student affairs too

much. Taking into account the possible benefits for the U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. higher education community, particularly NAFSA, claimed that international students had been unnecessarily over-regulated by the visa and immigration laws, which could adversely affect U.S. foreign policy. Further, the disputes over the Carter Administration's reorganization plan in the late 1970s also demonstrated the higher education community's values of autonomy from the government, by arguing for the separation between education and political propagandas.

Budget Cut Proposal and Tighter Regulations in the 1980s.

In the United States, as shown in the previous section, the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) decided to introduce liberalized regulations such as the admission of international students for the duration of status for the first time in the end of 1978. However, INS's ineffectiveness in controlling international students soon attracted the public concerns mainly as a result of INS's response to the problems caused by the Iranian Revolution of 1979. By the end of 1978, the political turbulence in Iran, which was leading to the Iranian Revolution, had adversely affected some Iranian students studying in the U.S. who constituted the biggest nationality group. In response to Iranian student concerns, NAFSA appointed a full-time coordinator dealing with those Iranian concerns.

The political instability around the Iranian Revolution of 1979 put many Iranian students in the United States into severe financial difficulties. In this regard, these Iranian students were first regarded as victims of the Revolution. As early as at the beginning of January of 1979, however, a violent confrontation between police and Iranian students studying in the U.S. who gathered in front of the Shah's sister's house to express their

opposition to the Shah's regime started, and this confrontation created national headlines (e.g., *New York Times*, January 29, 1979). Although public denouncement of Iranian students studying in the U.S. substantially started after the hostage crisis in the U.S. Embassy in Teheran in November 1979, this demonstration in January 1979 provoked public concerns with the Iranian students. Adam Green (1983), who was formerly an attorney with the Harvard University International Office, explained the atmosphere of general public at that time as follows:

> Americans, faced with a constricting domestic economy and deteriorating international image, found in these students an easy focus for their discontent. Who were these foreign activists but ungrateful guest taking advantage of the privileged freedoms of U.S. institutions to attack their hosts? The rhetoric of emotion took over as American asked questions concerning who had invited them and how they were able to support themselves when Americans increasingly could not afford the cost of a college education. Furthermore, foreign students were swept within the emerging anti-alien hostility directed at undocumented workers and others. Powerful emotions and lack of knowledge clouded any sympathy of the conditions of brutality and repression in the host countries involved. (p. 5)

Then, the hostage crisis in Teheran triggered some streets demonstration of Iranian students studying in the U.S., which caused even stronger concerns about the Iranian students studying in the U.S.

Subsequently, NAFSA with IIE made an official statement, saying that:

> Over the past 30 years, the flow of foreign students to the United States has

> greatly increased because they are convinced that the education offered here is the best available. Altogether, these students spend over $1 billion annually in order to obtain an education in the United States. At this time, when the relationship between the United States and Iran is particularly tense because of the action of a group in Iran which identifies themselves as students, it is essential that foreign students in the United States do not become the scapegoat for U.S. indignation and frustration. (NAFSA & IIE, 1979, pp. 1-2)

Recalling NAFSA's responses to this crisis, NAFSA president and its new Executive Vice President John Reichard pointed out that "… no crisis in the past has so caught the attention of a broad American public, leading to fears that there could be a damaging public/official reaction to the whole practice of international educational interchange" (Gay & Reichard, February, 1980, p. 107).

One day after the joint statement of NAFSA and IIE, in response to the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, the Carter administration made an announcement on actions to be taken by the Department of Justice as of November 10, 1979, as follows:

> The President has directed the Attorney General to identify any Iranian students in the United States who are not in compliance with the terms of their entry visas, and to take the necessary steps to commence deportation proceedings against those who have violated applicable immigration laws and regulations. As an initial measure, the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice will issue a notice requiring all Iranian students to report their present location and status immediately to the nearest INS office, and will take additional steps to locate and identify such students to determine legal status. For

> students found to be in illegal status, deportation proceedings will be conducted in accordance with constitutional due process requirements. (Carter, November 10, 1979)

Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti's order on November 13, in compliance with the Presidential directive, prompted two law suits against Attorney General Civiletti (Rosenbaum, December 5, 1979). One of the suits was supported by the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee and the Socialist Workers Party, and the other suit was filed by the Confederation of Iranian Students with the support of the American Civil Liberties Union. Attorneys for the plaintiffs argued that the Civiletti's "order infringed on the students' constitutional rights and violated established legal procedures. [The attorneys] sought a permanent injunction blocking the order" (Rosenbaum, December 5, 1979, p. A23). Although a lower court ordered an injunction against INS's crackdown on Iranian students, the Court of Appeals soon overruled the injunction in December 1979, holding that the crackdown directed by President Carter "was a legitimate exercise of the president's constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs without interference from the courts" (NAFSA, January, 1980, p. 81).

In the meantime, the GAO report (September, 1980) criticized INS's ineffectiveness as follows:

> INS' inability to monitor foreign students was pointedly demonstrated by the Attorney General's admission in early 1979 that the number of foreign students in the United States was unknown. Further, INS could not give a reliable accounting of the total number of authorized schools currently admitting foreign students. … The lack of accountability [of INS] became critical during the recent

> Iranian crisis when INS was required to undertake a massive, costly effort to determine the status an estimated 73,600 Iranian students in the United States. After spending more than 7 months and almost $3.3 million, this effort is still continuing. (p. 4)

Green (1983) explained the general perception on the ineffectiveness of INS operation at the time of as follows:

> The facts did not matter, not even later when it was apparent that the overwhelming majority of Iranian students were in status. Nor was the problem viewed as simply one of the bureaucratic ineptitude. INS's perceived ineffectualness was seen as a symptom of the very American weakness that had resulted in the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Iran. The symbolic content of the issue was strong: the foreign student program was out of control and the responsible U.S. agency, INS, had neither the will not the enforcement tools to manage the guest in our own home; while in our guest's home, Americans were literally held hostage. (Green, 1983, pp. 5-6)

Similarly, at the end of the Carter Administration, a columnist pointed out that "the attempted crackdown on illegal Iranians has hurt the INS more that it has Iran. A special "management review" by a team of experts from the President's Management Improvement Council confirmed that the immigration agency is–to put it bluntly–a bureaucratic nightmare" (Anderson, November 6, 1980, p. 4).

For INS, the first step in a series of regulatory changes being planned to more effectively monitor foreign students and the school which enrolled them was the elimination of the duration of status for all nonimmigrant students at the very beginning

of the Reagan Administration. The *Federal Register* of January 23, 1981, explained the reason for the elimination as follows:

> While the duration of status regulations eased the administrative workload for the Service and the educational institutions affected, this procedure resulted in questionable control over the foreign students and has contributed to problems in record keeping. Recent events have highlighted the problem of control of foreign students in the United States. To meet this obligation, the Service proposed eliminating duration of status for foreign students and imposing an annual reporting requirement. (*Federal Register*, January 23, 1981, p. 7267)

Obviously, the "Recent events" above referred to the problems with Iranian students. In response to this new rule, NAFSA argued that elimination of admission for duration of status could not improve the INS's effectiveness.

The Reagan administration came into office with strong concerns about national security and the economic downturn. As soon as President Reagan came into the White House, he appointed two persons in his old inner circle from California to head key agencies governing international students in the U.S. These were Charles Z. Wick, Director, the United States International Communication Agency (USICA, whose agency title later changed back to the United States Information Agency [USIA] in August 1982), and Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). These agency heads were two of the key political players in the policy subsystem of international student access to U.S. higher education.

Charles Z. Wick, who was one of the major fundraisers for Reagan's presidential campaign in 1980, and whose background was in the film, television, theater, and

publishing areas, entered on duty as USICA Director in June 1981. In order to combat against the ‘evil empire’, the U.S.S.R., Wick planned to concentrate his efforts on the information and propaganda activities. Wick’s response to the required budget cut was the substantial reduction of the budget for international educational programs of USICA.

Accordingly, the budget for educational exchange programs was going to experience a substantial cut.

Zeigler (1988) recalled:

> The fall of 1981 saw NAFSA fighting alongside its organizational family for the survival of international educational exchange after the new Reagan administration and USIA Director Charles Wick proposed severe funding reductions. A massive campaign to lobby for the restoration of cuts proved successful. Mr. Wick and his staff came to recognize the value of the Fulbright program, the international visitors program, and the other areas of federal support for international education. (p. 25)

NAFSA was indeed involved in this massive campaign, particularly among the organizations having major responsibilities for international educational exchange. These organizations were the International Educational Exchange Liaison Group (IEELG), which had been created with NAFSA’s leadership in the spring of 1981. In *NAFSA Newsletter*, NAFSA’s Executive Vice President, John Reichard reported:

> At the outset of the crisis in October, it was apparent that the fledging mechanism of the International Educational Exchange Liaison Group (IEELG) would provide a basis for intensified consultation and collaboration during the ensuring weeks. An informal meeting of organizational representatives came

> together every few days at NAFSA headquarters to compare the state of funding legislation and strategies for communication with Capitol Hill and organizational memberships. The increased international education commitment of the American Council on Education, represented by the appointment of Cassandra Pyle to direct ACE's international activities, provided another strong anchor for effective collaboration. (Reichard, December/January, 1982, p. 5 & 61)

Pyle was a former NAFSA president (incumbent between 1978 and 1979), who had been at the Institute of International Education. This triangle relationship among NAFSA, IIE, and ACE still strongly existed.

As for the IEELG, *NAFSA Newsletter* (December, 1981) reported as follows:

> In the spring of 1981, NAFSA took the initiative along with fifteen organizations having major responsibilities for international educational exchange to organize the ad hoc International Educational Exchange Liaison Group. … The Group's purpose is to initiate approaches to collective representation of the importance of exchange to the federal government and the general public and to halt the decline in official support of strategically useful exchange. Thus far the group has issued a position paper, "*Enhancing American Influence Abroad: Exchanges in the National Interest*," which has been distributed to all Members of Congress, presented to high level administration leaders, widely distributed through higher education associations and frequently commented upon in the press. (NAFSA, 1981, p. 1)

The members of the Group who published *Enhancing American Influence Abroad: Exchanges in the National Interest* represented the following organizations: Committee

on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, AACRAO, African-American Institute, IIE, Council on International Educational Exchange, National Council for Foreign Language and International Studies, CEEB, International Research and Exchanges Board, Experiment in International Living, AMIDEAST, Council of Graduate Schools, American Council on Education, NAFSA, Youth for Understanding, and Latin American Scholarship Program of American Universities (IEELG, May, 1981).

Reichard continued analyzed NAFSA's fight alongside its organizational family for the survival of the international educational exchange budget, and concluded that:

> Perhaps the most interesting aspect of fall 1981 was the discovery that almost no one professionally active in the field [of international educational exchange] understood the process of Congressional authorization, appropriation, conferences, reports and reconciliations. The IEELG has decided that it must develop some staff capability which will assure that in the next rounds we will have clearer and more informed lines to Congressional staff. … NAFSA has finally taken some important first steps in establishing working relations between its membership and Congress. (Reichard, December/January, 1982, p. 61)

Not only the academic community but also the mass media, including major newspapers such as the *New York Times*, opposed the reduction in the budget for exchange programs. Further, there was strong support for the exchange programs in Congress. In the hearing for the appropriation in October 1981, there was a long discussion about the appropriation between the legislators in support for the exchange

programs and USICA Director Wick. For example,

> Senate O'Brien: "If my math is correct, Mr. Wick, you cut Voice of America 1 percent and the exchange program by nearly 60 percent, the program that reaches foreign leaders, decisionmakers who have a direct impact on their country's policies, and I can't think of a more classic example than Anwar Sadat. How can you possibly not be impressed by the radiance that that particular program must have had on him?"
>
> Director Wick: "I am dramatically impressed by the program. … But there is a long leadtime in the exchange program there. Anwar Sadat was here 20 or 25 years ago. Right now we are faced with a massive Soviet propaganda program that is eroding the support for NATO. In the Western Alliance. In Asia and around the rest of the world, the Voice of America is the sole voice we have on a day-to-day basis to try to counter this propaganda" (*Department of Commerce, and Other Related Agencies Appropriation for 1982*, 1981, pp. 800-801).

In the Hearing about the appropriation for governmental agencies in the following year, Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (Republican-Connecticut), Chairman of Committee on Appropriations advocated for the importance of exchange programs, and stated that "As I went around the Senate floor, conservatives and liberals alike, there was tremendous support for the student exchange programs. I was really surprised as to the support. I would say 75 to 80 percent of the Senate is firm on that" (*Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983*, 1982, p. 935).

Along with the substantial support in Congress and the public opinion, the

budget for the exchange programs was restored in December of 1981. In talking about NAFSA's involvement in the public policy process, Norm Peterson, NAFSA's then Director of Public Policy Relations, explained that:

> Another [success story demonstrating NAFSA's potential of advocacy approach to bureaucracy] is the exchange community's major victory in turning a threatened slash in federal support for exchanges in 1981 into several years of dramatically increased funding for federal programs. (Peterson, 1988, p. 82)

Under the Reagan Administration, Alan C. Nelson was appointed as the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This position had been vacant since the former Commissioner Leonel J. Castillo resigned from INS in October of 1979, just before the Iranian crisis had started. Nelson was one of Reagan's California connections. He was a former member of the Reagan Administration in California, and had been a General Attorney with Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company in San Francisco. Originally, he started working for INS as a deputy commissioner in September 1981. However, due to the resignation of President Reagan's first choice for the position, Nelson was nominated for INS Commissioner by President Reagan in November 1981. His appointment was confirmed by the Senate in February 1982.

Nelson was the key political player when NAFSA was involved in its attempt to influence the regulatory policy change affecting international students studying in the U.S. in the 1980s. After gradually tightening regulations in the early 1980s, Nelson introduced sweeping changes in INS regulations, which became effective on August 1, 1983. These changes in the INS regulations were arguably the result of INS's three-year internal

self-examination, which was prompted by the great embarrassment of its part played in the Iranian crisis (Green, 1983). In addition, two GAO (General Accounting Office) reports (1980 and 1983) by the Comptroller of General recommended tighter controls over international students. For example, the GAO report criticized the lack of INS's ability to maintain the information on international students in the U.S. as follows:

> Reliable statistics on foreign students are difficult to obtain. INS does not have the capacity to generate meaningful statistics on the foreign students in the country or the schools they are attending. The best statistics available are those compiled by the Institute of International Education (IIE) which conducts an annual survey on foreign students. (GAO, 1983, p. ii)

The proposed rule for the sweeping change published in May 1982 was based partly on the report of July 1981 by the President's Management Improvement Council (PMIC) Report on Foreign Students in the United States. The proposal presented in the *Federal Register* of May 28 of 1982 used the exactly the same explanation on the benefits of having international students in the U.S. as follows:

> The student program has been deemed to serve U.S. foreign policy objectives by exposing citizens of other countries to the institutions and culture of the United States, by helping to cement alliances with other countries, and by transferring knowledge and skills to other countries, particularly those in the Third World. The student program also benefits the American economy and those academic and vocational schools which depend on foreign student enrollments as a major source of tuition revenue. This source becomes increasingly important to those institutions as the domestic student population shrinks. (*Federal Register*, May

> 28, 1982, p. 23463)

The INS's proposal continued to explain that:

> While adverse public attention was focused on the foreign student program in 1979-80, when American hostages were held by "students" in Iran, and political demonstrations were conducted by a smaller number of Iranian students in this country, there is little evidence that students violate the conditions of their entry and stay to a greater extent than other nonimmigrants. (*Federal Register*, May 28, 1982, p. 23463)

Eventually, the new regulations introduced in August of 1983 included many new procedures and rules, and the INS could increase control and enforcement.

The introduction of these sweeping changes provoked great concerns among the international educational professionals. A number of issues of the *NAFSA Newsletter* in the mid 1980s expressed its concerns over this change.

In this situation, Barbara B. Burn, former NAFSA president, testified in the House of Representatives in November of 1983. This hearing session discussed *International Education, Foreign Exchange and Scholarships* (1983), and it started with Representative Paul Simon's summary of his views about international students studying in the U.S. as follows:

> Opinions on what American Policy should be toward foreign students in the United Sates vary widely. One side of the issue argues that we should work on expanding the number of foreign student in this country. Advocates of this point of view note that a large foreign student population is a good way to internationalize our college campuses, and is good public diplomacy. … Others

> argue that foreign students in the United States are good business. They provide a source of revenue for colleges and state and local economy. On the other side of the issue, many people are concerned that foreign students are filling academic slots that should go to Americans. They are concerned that foreign students stay in the United States after graduation and thus take jobs from American workers. They may also constitute a "brain drain" away from the developing countries. Both sides of the issue, however, agree that there is currently a remarkable lack of national policy regarding foreign students. (*International Education, Foreign Exchange and Scholarships,* 1983, p. 1)

Paul Simon was one of many legislators who had supported the international educational exchange of persons. In this hearing, Simon argued that "If we took 1 percent of what we now spend on defense and put it into international exchange programs, my instinct is we would be in a much more secure world than we are right now" (*International Education, Foreign Exchange and Scholarships,* 1983, p. 2).

In the same hearing, David R. Smock, Vice President, IIE, also argued that "Investment in scholarships for foreign students to study here is a very cost-effective way to contribute to international understanding, to promote political and economic development of Third World countries, and to serve American diplomatic and economic progress" (*International Education, Foreign Exchange and Scholarships,* 1983, p. 5).

As the final witness of the hearing, Barbara Burn, NAFSA, explained the benefit of international students' presence in the U.S. higher education institutions. Her written statement submitted to the hearing argued that:

> To build American capability to comprehend and communicate with other

> cultures, to establish strong bonds with the future leadership of other nations, to maintain our economic competiveness in world markets, to further the advancement of science and technology – all of these and other pressing goals require our post secondary institutions to function as world centers of advanced learning. (*International Education, Foreign Exchange and Scholarships*, 1983, p.100)

Burn continued to explain the problems of INS regulations as follows:

> As the students have come under tighter control and scrutiny, their impressions of the United States as a free and open society have suffered. They have questions. Our foreign students and scholars are a needlessly overregulated group. It is not in the national interest that they be so regulated. … As I hope my testimony has indicated, NAFSA–and I personally and professionally–see exchange as vital to our national interests. There are roadblocks in the way to expanding international educational exchanges. Some of the road blocks can be removed with relatively minor changes in legislation and regulations. (*International Education, Foreign Exchange and Scholarships*, 1983, pp. 99-100)

Just after Burn's statement was over, Representative Simon said to Burn:

> If I may refer to your final point on the regulations on foreign students, I would like to suggest that if you could have some representatives of your association–NAFSA–just two or three of them, to come together and we will get the head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in my office and see if we can't work out something. (*International Education, Foreign Exchange and*

Scholarships, 1983, p. 103)

This arrangement did happen soon in February 1984, and "proved to be a critical development in a concerted drive for regulatory reform" (Downie & Herrin, October, 1986, p. 4). Marvin Baron, the then NAFSA president (incumbent between 1984 and 1985) recalled that:

> That one hour … tuned out to be very productive, since Nelson seemed to understand, to my surprise, that NAFSA had some very legitimate complaints. He instructed some of his key officials to work with us, and although it took the better part of three years to get the regulations changed, it is clear now that [they] had gotten NAFSA's message and were willing to be responsive. (quoted in Zeigler, 1988, pp. 28-29)

Similarly, Downie, a former NAFSA president, later pointed out:

> Simon was particularly interested in Burn's testimony on INS regulations and concerned that the immigration service appeared unaware of its regulation's impact on international educational exchange. Simon subsequently asked INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson to meet with him and NAFSA leaders in February 1984. This meeting proved to be a critical development in a concerted drive for regulatory reform. The meeting showed NAFSA leaders that public concerns about the regulations were important to Congress, that the association could speak with authority on the topic. That meeting led to an agreement, over a year later, that launched a cooperative INS-NAFSA regulatory review. (Downie & Herrin, October, 1986, p. 4)

NAFSA publications such as *NAFSA Government Affairs Bulletin* (August,

1986) and *NAFSA Newsletter* (Downie & Herrin, October, 1986; Smith, June, 1987) summarized the history behind the changes in the way the political wind blows. Immediately after the meeting among Senator Simon, Commissioner Nelson, and NAFSA representatives, the Task Force on Regulatory Reform was created by Robert B. Kaplan, the then NAFSA president, who was also at the University of Southern California. The Task Force's primary mission was to review INS regulations. Eugene H. Smith, University of Colorado-Boulder, was appointed as its chairman. It took about one year for the Task Force to release its white paper, *Regulatory Roadblocks to International Exchange*.

In *Federal Register* (August 4, 1986), INS indicated that:

> The proposed regulations were developed in part through a series of meetings between the Service and the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs (NAFSA). These meetings were held to discuss areas of difficulty and confusion with the current regulations as perceived within the academic community and were scheduled as the result of two documents published by NAFSA's Task Force on Regulatory Reform, "Regulatory Roadblocks to International Educational Exchange," and "Plan of Implementation for a New System of Students/Schools Regulations Governing Nonimmigrant Students." These documents provided a beginning point for the meetings. (pp. 27867-27868)

Regarding the three-year negotiations leading to the success, John F. Reichard, NAFSA's Executive Vice President, explained that:

> For the first time, the association got organized with respect to the total content and impact of INS regulations, made the public case effectively for the need for

> regulatory reform, and offered a comprehensive plan to implement that reform. This macro approach found the Immigration and Naturalization Service ready to listen and to work collaboratively with NAFSA in a systematic series of exploratory meetings seeking reform. (quoted in NAFSA, June, 1987, p. 1)

Also, Delaney, the then NAFSA president, commended this achievement of NAFSA's role in regulation reform as follows:

> NAFSA has been undergoing a great change in the last few years, described by one member as a transition from the role of "professional advisor" to an important player in developing national policies and regulations in international education. (Delaney, December/January, 1988, p. 10)

In the mid 1980s, in parallel with these efforts of NAFSA's to influence the INS regulatory policy change which affected international student access to U.S. higher education, NAFSA was also involved in an attempt to influence, although in minor part, the federal legislative activity for what became the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. Several versions of the bills for this legislative reform included small provisions which would affect international students: two-year home country residency requirement for all the foreign student visa (i.e., F and M) holders before becoming eligible for another non-immigrant visa or permanent residence. The academic community, including NAFSA, as well as manufactures in the U.S. strongly opposed the proposed inclusion of this student provision in the new law. NAFSA regularly monitored this legislative activity, and the *NAFSA Newsletter* in the mid 1980s often reported it (e.g., NAFSA, June, 1982; NAFSA, Summer, 1982; NAFSA, October, 1982; NAFSA, March, 1983; NAFSA, April/May, 1983; Robichaud, June, 1983; Robichaud, Summer, 1983;

Peterson, October, 1983; NAFSA, February, 1984; NAFSA, Summer, 1984; NAFSA, November, 1984; and Peterson, February, 1985).

As desired by NAFSA and its allies, the enacted bill (i.e., the IRCA of 1986) did not include the student provision in the end, while *NAFSA Newsletter* somehow did not overtly congratulate NAFSA on its contributions to the desired withdrawal of the student provision. Similarly, this withdrawal was not mentioned in Zeigler's booklet (1988) and Peterson's article (1988), both of which mentioned the restoration of the USICA budget and the INS regulation reform as the successful achievement of NAFSA's involvement in attempts to influence public policy. The summary of the passage of the immigration reform legislation in October appeared in the *NAFSA Government Affairs Bulletin* (October, 1986), but NAFSA's contributions, if any, to the dropping of the foreign student section from the final version of the legislation were not mentioned. Early in the following year of the enactment of the law, in *NAFSA Newsletter*, Norman Peterson simply explained without clearly attributing any credits of having the student provision dropped to NAFSA and its allies:

> NAFSA and others within the higher education community have consistently opposed the proposal which has been included in comprehensive immigration reform packages debated in the 97th, 98th, and 99th Congresses. The decision to leave the recruitment out of the final bill was a wise one. The proposal was technically flawed, and the serious issues involved never received the consideration they deserved because the major employer sanction, alien legalization, and agricultural worker provisions in the comprehensive bill commanded the spotlight. (Peterson, January, 1987, pp. 3 & 5)

Nevertheless, the reasons for NAFSA's opposition to part of the immigration reform legislation in the 1980s is important for this dissertation to examine. First, the collaboration for this opposition reveals the political actors around NAFSA and their political activities. The debate over whether this student provision be included in the immigration reform or not essentially demonstrated various perceptions about the implications of international student access to U.S. higher education. This importance is true even though the proposed student provision in the bills leading to the IRCA of 1986 was not aimed to govern international student *access* to U.S. higher education.

The immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 is "the first to deal primarily with the problem of illegal immigration, as well as the most comprehensive change in the country's immigration policy in 35 years [since the establishment of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952]" (Montwieler, 1987, p. 23). It tortuously took four years with a number of changes to enact the legislation since the first version of the bills were introduced jointly by Senator Alan Simpson (Republican–Wyoming) and by Representative Romano Mazzoli (Democratic–Kentucky) in March 1982. Both were the then chairmen of the Senate and House Subcommittees on immigration matters. Regarding the reasons for the two-year home residency requirement for all foreign student visa holders, Representative Dan Lungren (Republican–California) explained:

> One of the reasons for [2-year home residency requirements] is we don't want to be causing a brain drain from some of these other places. We also have a concern about jobs for our own graduates that are education in these areas. (*Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983*, 1983, p. 601)

In May of 1982, the American Council on Education sent a letter representing 13

organizations, including most of the university presidential associations and NAFSA, to Mazzoli (Chairman of Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of House Committee on the Judiciary) and Thurmond (Chairman of Senate Committee on the Judiciary). Particularly about the student provision, the letter said:

> We firmly support the principle that mutual benefit should be derived in the education of foreign students, and we believe that the majority of foreign students should return home to apply their educational achievements in their own lands. However, we feel that the process regarding the application for permanent residency status should be sufficiently flexible to encompass short- and long-range U.S. market considerations. … The impact of this proposed restriction would be severe on many university and college campuses. … Until measures to attract greater numbers of American students into these fields are successful, our institutions must rely on this pool of talent from abroad as an essential source of young faculty. (ACE, May 14, 1982, p. 2)

Even before these letters from the academic community to the congressional chairmen, a newly-formed Alliance for Immigration Reform, Inc., which represented a number of American multinational companies from the alliance's inception sent a letter to Senator Simpson (Brown, April 28, 1982) to express their concerns about the new bills as follows:

> The principal concern of the Alliance is with the intracompany transfer of foreign nationals to the U.S. and with the foreign recruitment of certain skills of vital need to U.S. industry and in short supply in the U.S. … Quite clearly, in order to develop and market "world class" products and services, American

> companies must have access to the best talent and experience around the world. … we understand and endorse the intent of the two year foreign residency requirement for students, but we believe that specific exemption from that requirement should be made for foreign students with skills in short supply in the U.S. and in critical demand by U.S. industry. (pp. 2-4)

Since the introduction of the first version, NAFSA started opposing the proposal of two-year home residency requirement for international students. However, then NAFSA President Dixon C. Johnson argued that "NAFSA's objection to the proposed Sec. 212. (a) and Sec 202. (b) (1) is not to make it easy for foreign students to remain in this country; rather, our concerns are so serious as to call for more careful analysis of the impact that there two provisions would have on American colleges and universities" (D. Johnson, June, 1982, p. 163).

NAFSA Newsletter reported, in relation to Simpson-Mazzoli, that "The issue of brain drain is reviving rapidly along with a clear need for more data on adjustments permanent status …" (NAFSA, October, 1982, p. 2). It continued to argue:

> While NAFSA is strongly committed to students returning to home countries, we are not convinced that this objective should be achieved through restrictive legislation which would not take into account of job opportunities in home countries, …. (NAFSA, October, 1982, pp. 3-4)

While the Senate with the majority of Republicans passed the bill (S. 2222) in August 1982, the bill (H.R. 5827) died without the final vote in the House of Representatives with the majority of Democrats due to the debated measure. However, the second Simpson-Mazzoli Bills were introduced in February 1983.

NAFSA had the opportunity to present testimony in February and March on the bills (*Immigration Reform and Control Act*, 1983; *Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983*, 1983). The higher education community, including NAFSA and AAU, as well as the manufactures argued that there was shortage of workforce in science and engineering fields. At the same time, in Washington D.C. in March 1983, NAFSA with the American Society for Engineering Education (ASEE) sponsored a seminar "Engineering education and the International Students in the United States" (Jenkins, Summer, 1983). Then NAFSA President Barbara Burn described the approaches of NAFSA about bill as follows:

> [The way NAFSA mobilized itself to respond to the Simpson-Mazzoli initiative] included extensive intra-NAFSA communication, enlisting the expertise of NAFSA members, especially through GRAC [Government Regulation Advisory Committee]. In thinking through and preparing NAFSA position paper, liaison with various higher education associations to seek wider support for our position, and the presentation of testimony on the Hill by NAFSAns. (Burn, June, 1983, p. 155)

The two bills were passed in both the Senate and House by June 1984. However, due to the extensive differences between the two bills, the bill died with end of the 98th Congress in September 1984.

In 1985, Senator Simpson introduced another similar bill (S. 1200), which dropped the student-related provision, while another bill for immigration law reform (H.R. 3080), which continued to contain the student-related provision, was co-sponsored in the House of Representative by Representatives Rodino and Mazzoli. At this time, in a

House hearing, the INS and the Department of State expressed their opposition to the student provision in the bills. For example, in the written statement of INS Commissioner Alan Nelson argued:

> We oppose this provision because we believe that it is in the national interest to allow these students to qualify as immigrants. …. (*Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments*, 1985, p. 36)

Joan M. Clark, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, said:

> The Department has reservation about section 312 of the bill which would drop the distinction between private students and sponsored exchange visitors. … We believe … that the inclusion of private students in the 2-year requirement will result in an increase in the number of complaints about the hardship generated and the arbitrariness of the requirement, thereby increasing the administrative burden of our consular personnel abroad. (*Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments*, 1985, p. 38)

Subsequently, although the Senate passed S. 1200 in September 1985, H.R. 3080 was not passed in the House of Representatives. Rodino declared the death of the H.R. 3080 by the end of September 1986. At this moment, NAFSA reported that "Once again the Rodino (nee Simpson)–Mazzoli bill–with two-year home country residency requirement provision–has apparently failed to make it through the legislative process. NAFSA, of course, had nothing to do with failure of the basic legislation" (NAFSA, October 7, 1986, p. 4).

On October 9, 1986, however, the bill was resurrected, and approved by the House. October 14 saw the House and Senate conferees agree to compromise legislation.

After both the House and Senate approved the conference bill in the middle of October, President Reagan signed the bill into law (Pub. L. 99-603). The final version of the act did not include the two-year home country residency requirement for F and M student visa holders. In spite of this outcome which NAFSA had wanted, NAFSA's regular publications, such as *NAFSA Newsletter* and *Government Affairs Bulletin*, were somehow quiet about this desired result.

Discussions from an ACF perspective. As shown in this section, the 1980s saw a number of significant developments in the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education. The pro-international-student-access coalition among the higher education and international exchange communities established the Liaison Group, which became official collective voices for international student mobility into the U.S.

Also, the visa and immigration regulation changes in the 1980s affecting international students forced NAFSA to become more proactive in its policy advocacy activities. The changes with significant deregulations in the end were produced by the continual negotiations between INS and NAFSA, which submitted constructive recommendations to INS. Again, NAFSA's resources of expertise knowledge contributed to the negotiation. However, the opportunities for such negotiation would not have come into existence without the assistance of the then Representative Paul Simon, who emerged a new leader for the promotion of international education in the Congress. His role was a very good example of *policy broker* explained in the ACF. Not only through this working relation between NAFSA and Representative Simon, but also through NAFSA's participation in the collective voices against the USICA's plan of reducing the

international educational exchange budgets in the early 1980s, NAFSA lay the foundation for its further active approach in the legislative policy advocacy introduced in the late 1990s, as shown in the next section.

The foreign policy rationales were still far dominant in this policy subsystem due to the intensified Cold War tensions in the 1980s. Without taking account of this belief in the foreign policy rationales at the time, it could not be possible to understand the increase of the federal budget for international educational exchanges from the mid 80s through the end of the 80s, when the Cold War was coming to end. Also, the difficult foreign relations with Iran around 1980 not only revealed the ineffective operation of INS, but also brought a new perception about international students and a new perspective in foreign policy consideration; that is, national security against the possible threats through international student mobility. It is important to bear in mind again that the strong fears of the national security risk from international student mobility did not emerge for the first time after the September 11 attacks.

At the same time, however, the beliefs in bringing international students to U.S. higher education made the political actors to start paying more attention to economic perspectives, too. Also, the debate over the two-year foreign residency requirements for F-1 students in the Congress when the bills for immigration reforms were discussed in the mid 1980s, demonstrated the increased recognition of international students' talents indispensable for scientific research. Since such talents particularly in the STEM field contribute to the U.S. business after international students graduate, the business industry started throwing in increasing political actors into this policy subsystem.

The 1990s Through the September 11 Attacks

In the beginning of the 1990s, the coalition of those who advocated international educational exchange continued to develop. In two congressional hearing in the early 1990s, NAFSA was represented as a member of the Liaison Group for International Education Exchange, whose official name had been slightly changed from the International Education Exchange Liaison Group. In 1992, this Liaison Group, as a group of those associations in higher education, became the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange, by merging with the International Exchange Association, as a group of those associations in lower level of education. Since then, the Alliance has been one of the closest allies of NAFSA in its attempt to influence the federal policies governing international students. For example, NAFSA and the Alliance jointly opposed the implementation of an international tracking system before the September 11 attacks in 2001, and advocated a U.S. national comprehensive policy on international education.

Since the late 1980s, the leaderships of the key government agencies had new faces. INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson, appointed under the Reagan Administration, was succeeded by Gene McNary under the Bush Administration, whose Attorney General was William Barr. Under the Clinton Administration from 1993 to 2000, Doris Meissner headed the INS as its Commissioner. According to Jenkins & Reichard (1998), she had been one of the key persons who conveyed NAFSA's plea to President Carter so that the Iranian students could continue to study in the U.S. As for the USIA, after the longest tenure of Charles Z. Wick, the USIA directors were Bruce Gelb (1989-1991), Henry Catto (1991-1993), and Joseph Duffey (1993-1999). As the Secretary of State under the

second Clinton Administration, Madeleine Albright played an important role in the reorganization of merging the USIA into the Department of State.

Following the end of the Cold War, the Congress in the 1990s appeared to be becoming less interested in international affairs in general, and in international educational exchanges in particular. Talking about such situation in the late 1990s, Andrew K. Semmel, Foreign Policy Assistant to Senator Richard G. Lugar (Republican–Indiana), pointed out:

> The past four national elections have brought a large number of new members to Congress who lack experience in foreign policy, who are less committed or interested in international programs, and who reflect the public's sentiment that priority attention be give to fiscal and domestic matters. Many of those who retired from the Congress in recent years were advocates of exchange programs and internationalism. More than half the members of the current House of Representatives have been elected since 1992, and nearly half of our senators are in their first term of have just completed it. Many have not traveled abroad and show little interest in international affairs. (Semmel, Spring, 1999, p. 60)

As far as NAFSA's organizational changes are concerned, in 1990, NAFSA changed its name again, in order to recognize the increasing numbers of members engaged in all aspects of international education and exchange, including study abroad as well as scholarly exchange programs for Americans, and studies about foreign areas and languages. With the retained acronym, which had well established as a leading professional association in the field of international education, the new name was NAFSA: Association of International Educators. In spite of the change of the name and

expansion of coverage and membership (including international members), NAFSA "continued to be in the first place an American professional association" (de Wit, 2002, p. 35).

The NAFSA leadership changed twice in the 1990s. In August 1992, Naomi Collins, then Executive Director or Maryland Humanities Council, succeeded John F. Reichard, who served as NAFSA's second Executive Vice President for 13 years (NAFSA, June/July, 1992). In February 1998, furthermore, after a relatively short period of Collins' leadership, compared with that of her two predecessors (i.e., 12 years of Hugh Jenkins and 13 years of Reichard), Marlene Johnson became the Executive Director of NAFSA. As will be seen later, Marlene Johnson brought a strong legislative advocacy approach into NAFSA, and established the Public Policy Department within it. The NAFSA leadership under Marlene Johnson, with Victor C. Johnson, a leader in this newly established Public Policy Department, initiated massive attempts to influence the public policy debate and legislation in the field of international education. Victor Johnson (2008, May/June) characterized NAFSA as relatively unknown in the late 1990s' legislative scene, and as consistently small in size and resources until the late 2000s. Victor Johnson felt that NAFSA has significantly improved its name recognition as a political actor by demonstrating credibility, reliability, and effectiveness in its specialized domain when contributing to the advocacy coalitions with larger and more-resourced political actors.

In order to appreciate the values and beliefs of these political actors, this section presents the views about international student mobility into U.S. higher education which were presented in the congressional hearings as well as some white papers and position papers.

As early as 1990, the Liaison Group for International Educational Exchange (formerly, the International Educational Exchange Liaison Group – IEELG), in which twenty-some international exchange and education organizations, such as NAFSA, in the U.S. were represented, made a testimony. In the hearing (*International Exchange Programs in the 1990s*, 1990), Richard W. Dye, representing the Liaison Group, highlighted five findings from their one and half a year research project, called *Exchange 2000*. The findings specifically presented in the hearing (*International Exchange Programs in the 1990s*, 1990) included these: first, "exchanges are a proven powerful tool for making friends, building ties, and extending influence internationally" (p. 35); second, "in spite of a certain amount of progress that has been made in increasing the nation's international literacy and our ability to deal with other systems and cultures, much remains to be done" (p. 35); third, "the United States has a very large economic stake in exchanges" (p. 35); fourth, "there is a continuing great need for the contribution exchange programs can make human resource development in the so-called less developed countries" (p. 36); and fifth, "international education can and must play a greater role in helping the world address the growing list of common world problems which can only be resolved successfully through global cooperation on a scale never before attempted" (p. 37).

Importantly, in relation to the economic stake in exchanges, Dye's written statement further presented the perception of the U.S. standing in international student market at the beginning of the 1990s. "… exchanges are a highly successful, multi-billion export industry for the United States. It is an industry … in which we are not only "competitive," to use the current buzz word, but unquestionably still preeminent"

(*International Exchange Programs in the 1990s*, 1990, p. 44). At the same time, however, Dye pointed out that "While the U.S. remains a dominant actor, today we are by no means the only one" (p. 46). As shown later, the perception about the U.S. stake in the international student market changed through the end of the 1990s.

The early 1990s saw another congressional hearing where the general views of those who had strong interests in international education were presented. In 1992, former Senator William Fulbright, representing the Liaison Group, advocated further development of international education for the Post-Cold War world. His primary suggestion was a careful rearticulation of the concept of public diplomacy, and he continued to advice for a separation between exchange programs with long-term mutual understanding and information activities with short-term propaganda. Fulbright said:

> Candidly, I must tell you that I was opposed to entrusting the Fulbright Program to USIA in 1978 and remain skeptical about the wisdom of that decision today. But my remarks today are aimed not at getting Subcommittee to rethink that decision but at helping you enable USIA to better fulfill its responsibilities. … [The USIA's working definition of public diplomacy] fails to recognize dialogue and reciprocity essential to educational exchange. … There needs to be a clear differentiation between educational exchanges, on the one hand, and the overt effort to control public opinion in other nations on the other. (*International exchange in a changing world*, 1992, p. 6)

As will be seen further below, this argument for the separation between education and politics later emerged among the academic community, including NAFSA, when the Clinton Administration presented its reorganization plan of merging the USIA into the

Department of State in 1998.

Also, in the same hearing, former Senator Fulbright explained the contributions of international educational exchange to the termination of the Cold War as follows:

> The power of exchanges has already been amply demonstrated. It is clear to me that our sponsorship of a young Russian named Aleksandr Yakovlev to attend Columbia University in the late 1950s has paid enormous dividends as he rose to become one of President Gorbachev's closest advisors in initiating the tremendous changes we now see unfolding in the former Soviet Bloc. (*International Exchanges in a Changing World*, 1992, p. 10)

This argument is related to political rationales in terms of foreign policy, particularly national security. Such continued advocacy for the promotion of international education did not really win the support from the Congress in the post Cold War era, however. The appropriation for international educational exchange showed steady declines in the 1990s.

The mid 1990s saw the issue of regulating international student mobility in the U.S. start attracting the attention of the government agencies and Congress, particularly after it was reported that the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 involved someone who had entered the U.S. on a student visa. In September 1994, after reviewing policies and practices on the people's flow into and out of the U.S., FBI Director Louis J. Freeh submitted a memo with a number of recommendations for immigration reform to Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick. In the memo, Freeh suggested that additional scrutiny be required for those who enter on students visas and do not stay by their terms.

NAFSA publicly expressed its opposition to such tightening controls on student

visas. In response to an editorial in the *Los Angeles Times* (December 3, 1994), which followed a report (Ostrow, December 2, 1994) about Freeh's proposal against potential threats posed by foreign nationals, Naomi Collins, then NAFSA's Executive Director, expressed her concerns in the *Los Angeles Times*:

> By publicly singling out not individual malefactors but international students as a whole for "additional scrutiny," Freeh encourages ill-will toward an extremely important group of people. Foreign students, who make up only one-tenth of 1% of the non-immigrant admissions to the U.S. each year, represent many of tomorrow's world leaders. International students increase diversity in the student body of our colleges and universities, helping our young people overcome insularity. Further, these ambassadors of the world contribute $7 billion to our local communities annually and represent geographical areas that will be important business partners of the U.S. in the future. (Collins, December 16, 1994, p. 6)

Here, Collins clearly referred to the academic benefits for the domestic students and short- and long-term economic benefits, while the phrase, 'tomorrow's world leaders,' seems to imply the rationales of international educational exchange in terms of future foreign diplomacy.

Freeh's memo of September 1994 further moved the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In order to reengineer the student/school processes, the INS, jointly with the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Department of State, formed the Task Force on Foreign Student Controls by summer of 1995 (Rubin, Summer, 1997). This Task Force team included not only INS staff, but also international education

professionals, such as Greg Leonard of the University of Alabama-Tuscaloosa, as consultants. From this Task Force, the idea of the Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS), as a new system of wholly electronic, real time, data sharing, emerged (Berez in interview conducted by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, so-called *the 911 Commission*, October 2, 2003).

In spite of these moves by the government agencies, the issues of tracking international students were not among the legislative agendas for the immigration law reform at the early stage. In 1995, the Republican-dominated Congress as a result of the 1994 mid-term election started the debates which would later lead to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. Representative Lamar Smith (Republican–Texas), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, first introduced the Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995 (H. R. 1915) in June 1995. *NAFSA Network* (quoted in CND-US, July 18, 1995) reported the introduction of H. R. 1915 in the House of Representatives as a major immigration law reform bill, but argued that only a small portion of H.R. 1915 would be of interest to NAFSA members. In fact, H. R. 1915 did include neither the provisions of a pilot program for tracking international students nor home residency requirement, both of which would later attract strong oppositions from the academic community as shown below.

Before a corresponding bill to H. R. 1915 (and its successor, H. R. 2022, introduced in August 1995) was introduced in the Senate, a hearing about nonimmigrant visa issues in September 1995 was presided by Senator Simpson Senator Alan K.

Simpson (Republican–Wyoming). In the beginning of the hearing, Senator Simpson explained the upsides and downsides of international student mobility into U.S. higher education as follows:

> Foreign students can benefit U.S. colleges and universities intellectually and though exciting cultural diversity that they add. It is a matter of controversy, though, whether the extent of their current presence is an unqualified good or an indicator of something gone wrong with our education system or the incentives that now exist in the U.S. labor markets partly as a result of immigration policy. … So, these … are the two important goals of an immigration policy in the national interest: First, to provide American business … with foreign workers who are truly, truly needed or are the very best at what they do; and second, to protect American workers … and also protect those your Americans just entering the workforce … from unfair competition with foreign workers. (*Nonimmigrant Visa Issues*, 1995, pp. 1-2)

It is noteworthy that Senator Simpson's summary, although very brief, of upsides and downsides of international student mobility into the U.S. refers neither to the foreign policy related rationales nor to the potential threats of international students to the security of the U.S. such as the World Trade Center bombing in 1993.

In response to the perceived controversy concerning employment mentioned by Senator Simpson, this hearing included some discussions of an immigration reform proposal of a new requirement of home residency for nonimmigrant workers, including former international students who completed their studies in the U.S. As shown earlier, Senator Simpson had attempted to introduce a similar requirement of home residency in

his bills which eventually became the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, although the requirement provision was deleted from the final version of the act. The revival of home residency requirement proposal was regarded as problematic by the academic community.

In this hearing, although not specifically talking about the issue of the home residency requirement, David Auston, Provost, Rice University, on behalf of the American Council on Education (ACE) as well as some of the higher education organizations such as the Association of American Universities (AAU), the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC), Council of Graduate Schools, and NAFSA, addressed the following two specific aspects:

> [first], with the role of foreign students, particularly graduate students, in science and engineering in U.S. colleges and universities, and second, the issue of the need to continue to be able to hire, as was pointed out by a number of individuals, the brightest and the best so that we can ensure that we are the most competitive possible. (*Nonimmigrant Visa Issues*, 1995, p. 60)

Auston's conclusion in the testimony was that "individuals of outstanding qualifications are creating new jobs. They are not necessarily displacing U.S. workers, but are also serving to advance our country and our Nation by creating new jobs" (*Nonimmigrant Visa Issues*, 1995, p. 61).

Interestingly, not only the academic community, but also INS opposed to the idea of home residency requirement. In her written statement submitted to the hearing, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner clearly expressed her opposition to the provision of home residency requirement, and argued:

> We believe that a residency requirement is inappropriate because it would disrupt the balance between facilitating employers in obtaining specialized, job-creating skilled workers and solidifying efforts to protect U.S. workers from unfair competition. The primary problem is that a blanket foreign residency requirement would apply in a similar fashion to all potential applicants for adjustment of status, regardless of their skills level. The result would be that the persons with a highly valued, specialized skill, which could keep a business competitive and, therefore, generate jobs for U.S. workers, would be treated the same as a person with more modest skills that provides only a short-term benefits. A home residency requirement may also increase incentives to manipulate or abuse the nonimmigrant system. (*Nonimmigrant Visa Issues*, 1995, p. 32)

In the same hearing, however, INS demonstrated its willingness and readiness to soon introduce a new international student tracking system, which would become one of the biggest controversies among the international educational exchange community in the late 1990s. In this regard, Commissioner Meissner explained as below:

> In terms of administering the foreign student program, our goal is to transform the process from one involving only rare contact with the nonimmigrant student at the time of adjudication to a registration system that involves ongoing monitoring and tracking through mandatory notification at the time of key events such as graduation, transfer to another school and other events with an impact on a foreign student's status. (*Nonimmigrant Visa Issues*, 1995, p. 32)

When Senator Simpson finally introduced his version of the immigration reform

bill (S. 1394) in November 1995, the bill included the provisions of the home residency requirement as well as a pilot program for tracking international students. Although NAFSA is often pointed to as a leading opponent against the development of an international student tracking system before the September 11 attacks in 2001, it seems that NAFSA did not make any immediate and substantial response to the proposal of the tracking system pilot program at this time. In the *NAFSA Network* (quoted in CND-US, November 13, 1995), the NAFSA Government Relations Department urged NAFSANet Users to contact their senators to ask them to stop Senator Simpson's Immigration Reform Act of 1995 (S. 1394). In the message, however, NAFSA presented a background summary highlighting the home residency requirement as below, but did not refer to the prospective problems about the pilot program of the international student tracking system:

> In short, international educators are concerned that the Immigration Reform Act of 1995 (S.1394) will curtail the ability of colleges and universities to attract the best and brightest international students, researchers, and scholars. Among the bill's provisions is a mandatory three year foreign residency requirement for any foreign student who has studied in the U.S. … it is likely that many of the best international students would choose to study in other countries that did not so limit a student's post-graduation options. (NAFSANet quoted in CND-US Special Issue, November 13, 1995)

Although in March of 1996 Senator Simpson withdrew almost all the provisions of his bill due to strong pressure particularly from the business industry, the discussions for the immigration reform continued. While the home residency requirement for international

students was not included in the enacted bill–the IIRAIRA of 1996, the Act mandated the development of the international student tracking system.

NAFSA's flagship magazine, *International Educator*, was silent about the discussions over the bills for what become the IIRIRA of 1996, which mandated such a tracking system, just after the passage of the act. It was not until early 1997 that *International Educator* started carrying substantial feature articles about the pilot program for the international student tracking system under the IIRIRA of 1996. *International Educator 6*(1) had an article explaining the possible impacts of the IIRIRA of 1996 on the academic community (Fall, 1996, Levey), but the explanation did not include anything about the pilot program for the international student tracking system. The next issue of *International Educator* (Winter, 1997) had an article of Philip G. Altbach, Professor of Higher Education at Boston College, who pointed to the potential chilling effects on international student numbers from the IIRIRA of 1996, and wrote that "Most damaging, perhaps, is that colleges and universities are being urged to police foreign students and scholars for immigration violations" (p. 9). Although this prediction appears to be about the international student tracking system, Altbach did not clearly explain it.

In the summer of 1997, when the CIPRIS as the pilot program was actually launched, *International Educator 6*(4) (Summer, 1997) publicized its first and substantial articles about the CIPRIS as the pilot program of the international student tracking system. These articles presented various views about the CIPRIS within NAFSA, although the majority of NAFSA, or at least the NAFSA leadership, appeared to oppose the idea of CIPRIS. On the one hand, as soon as the CIPRIS started as a pilot program of

the international student tracking system, Gary Althen, then NAFSA President (incumbent between 1997 and 1998), who was also Director of the Office of International Students and Scholars at the University of Iowa, argued that:

> The fundamental question about CIPRIS is not whether its technological approach to "regulating" students and scholars will work, but whether it ought even to be attempted. … International education practitioners who want to be educators rather than deputies, who view foreign students and scholars as contributors to the education of us all rather than as potential terrorists, have no choice, it seems to me, but to pursue the repeal of the that part of IIRAIRA that legitimizes CIPRIS. (Althen, Summer, 1997, p. 28 and 29)

On the other hand, in the same issue of *International Educator* (Summer, 1997), Catheryn Cotton, one of the CIPRIS volunteers, who was then Director of the international office at Duke University, explained the hopes and fears as follows:

> IIRAIRA, of which CIPRIS is a part, has a strong law-enforcement component that ignites my liberal streak. There is reason to fear that the same tendency will find its way into the regulations, which are due out soon in proposed form. Therefore, the universities and their associations will have to scrutinize all of the regulatory measures INS proposes, even those that do not seem at first to affect students and scholars. The balancing of personal freedom against personal and group security is a dilemma as old as human communities. In my little part of this global community I live and work with international students and scholars who, I believe, greatly benefit us and our country. I admit to–indeed I'm proud of–that belief, and I defend it vocally at every opportunity. But I also remind

> myself that there are reasonable, fair-minded people in law enforcement who deal with the unsavory element that uses front schools to import fraudulent students for activities unrelated to education. (Cotten, Summer, 1997, p. 24)

Therefore, Cotton argued that "If this system works it may become one of our best tools for protecting our students and scholars from themselves and their own inadvertent, wildly creative, or bonehead actions, or from circumstances beyond their control" (quoted in Rubin, Summer, 1997, p. 25).

Later on, NAFSA's Board of Directors approved a short position statement on CIPRIS in December 1997. The statement sounded rather neutral as follows:

> NAFSA is ready, willing, and able to cooperate with government agencies charged with collecting data regarding foreign students and scholars. In its efforts to cooperate with the government in this matter, NAFSA seeks to insure that the monitoring of such individuals takes place in the least intrusive and disruptive manner possible. (NAFSA, Fall, 1997/Winter, 1998, p. 15)

This statement also declared NAFSA had created its CIPRIS Working Group, which consisted of NAFSA members. This working group was to monitor the progress of CIPRIS. The group's goals included the following: keeping NAFSA members posted of the CIPRIS developments; communicating NAFSA's ideas to the government; raising issues which appear to need consideration; suggesting alternatives when warranted; and suggesting criteria for evaluating the CIPRIS (NAFSA, Fall, 1997/Winter, 1998).

In the late 1990s, it was not simply this government initiative towards the creation of international student tracking system that imposed challenges to international education professionals. As mentioned earlier, the federal appropriation for international

exchange programs had been decreasing throughout the 1990s. In addition, as early as January 1995, the Clinton Administration started working on the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies of the U.S. (Sciolino, January 11, 1995) The United States Information Agency (USIA), which had been in primarily in charge of the promotion of governmental exchange programs such as the Fulbright Program, was one of those to be merged into the State Department. As the reorganization plan was going to combine USIA's two functions (i.e., exchanges and information programs) under the authority of a single assistant secretary, this reorganization plan gave the academic community, including NAFSA, considerable concern for the separation between education and politics, which as shown earlier had been recurring since the early 1950s.

Further, the 1990s saw the gradual decline of the U.S. share in the international student market, while other competing countries had started their active recruitment of international students. The IIE's (Institute of International Education) census of international student mobility in U.S. higher education, *Open Doors 1994/1995*, started its analysis on the international student market. *Open Doors 1994/1995* (IIE, 1995) gave an overview of the trend of international enrollments in the U.S., saying that "This year's 0.6% rate of change is the weakest increase in ten years and continues a five-year trend of deceleration in foreign student enrollments" (p. 1). Edward B. Fiske's article on *International Herald Tribune* (February 11, 1997) described some of this troublesome situation in the late 1990s. Fiske questioned whether the U.S. may have been less hospitable to international students. He cited NAFSA's Executive Director Naomi Collins, who said that "There seems to be an increasing atmosphere of intolerance in this country … Congress has focused on foreign students as if they were all potential terrorists" (Fiske,

February 11, 1997, p. 14). In addition to the tendency that some countries which had traditionally sent their students abroad had become able to educate their nationals in their home institutions, a number of host countries such as the U.K., Australia and Japan had been very active in international student recruitment and had eroded the U.S. traditional share.

In this challenging situation for many international education professionals, NAFSA celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in May 1998. Earlier, in February 1998, NAFSA's leadership under its new Executive Director Marlene Johnson, who was the former Lieutenant Governor of Minnesota, started to streamline its organizational governance structure to respond effectively to the changing environment for the international educational professionals. The commitment which Marlene Johnson first highlighted in the 50th anniversary issue of *International Educator* was that "NAFSA will take an active part in public policy discussions about international education and the regulatory issues that affect students and institutions" (M. Johnson, Spring, 1998, p. 92). With such commitment, NAFSA created its Public Policy Department in 1998. The major areas of legislative and/or regulatory activities in which the new leadership of NAFSA actively participated towards the turn of the century include as follows: the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies for the United States; calling for a U.S. international education policy; and the development of a student tracking system.

First, the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies was considered by the Clinton administration as well as Congress at issue as to how best to tighten the foreign policy budget while maximizing the agencies' functions in the post Cold War era. This reorganization was a part of larger reorganization plan of the Clinton Administration. At

the beginning of 1995, then Vice President Al Gore issued a directive to all government agencies to “present him with various options for reorganizing themselves before the Republican-dominated Congress does it for them” (Sciolino, January 11 , 1995, p. A2). On December 30, 1998, President Clinton submitted his reorganization plan to the Congress, pursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. According to this plan:

> USIA will be abolished by October 1, 1999. Public diplomacy programs -- designed to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences -- will be under the direction of a new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs who will provide policy oversight over two bureaus. The Bureau of Information Programs and International Exchanges will be responsible for educational and cultural programs and will produce information programs and products tailored for foreign opinion-makers. (quoted in McCarry, Spring, 1999, p. 4)

This proposal of combining the academic-exchange and public-relations functions of USIA caused a big concern among the academic-exchange community, including NAFSA, since as seen so far this community had traditionally regarded the exchange and information mandates as fundamentally incompatible.

In NAFSA’s *International Educator*, Michael McCarry (Spring, 1999), Executive Director of the Alliance for International and Cultural Exchange, which was a merged organization of the Liaison Group (one of whose members was NAFSA) and the International Exchange Association, explained the dynamics of the merger of USIA with the Department of State. In fact, McCarry played a significant role in lobbying for a separate exchanges bureau. McCarry argued that there would be a number of benefits of

the reorganization (e.g., the State Department is more powerful than USIA both domestically and internationally), but that the plan to combine the USIA's two functions would be significantly troublesome. McCarry (Spring, 1999) argued that "Whereas the Fulbright-Hays Act demands that exchanges be nonpolitical and devoted to building long-tem mutual understanding, the entire purpose of the information program is political" (pp. 3-4).

According to McCarry, the Alliance, with NAFSA and its other members, frequently visited the Capitol Hill to advocate the separation between the academic-exchange and public-relation functions. This advocacy eventually moved several Congress members. A letter was sent to the Clinton Administration from Senators Jesse Helms (Republican–North Carolina) and Joseph Biden (Democrat–Delaware). The letter argued:

> If joined organizationally with our overseas public relations function, exchange programs may be perceived by foreign publics and students as little more than a propaganda exercise, rather than what they are intended to be: an investment in mutual understanding. (quoted in McCarry, Spring, 1999, p. 6)

Not only was a similar letter sent to the administration by Representatives Benjamin Gilman (Republican–New York), who then chaired the House International Relations Committee, and Christopher Smith (Republican–New Jersey), but also two congressional hearings saw the intention to introduce a bill calling for an exchanges bureau, if the plan to combine the two functions was not changed, presented separately by Representative Smith and Senator Rod Grams (Republican–Minnesota) (McCarry, Spring, 1999).

As a result, in March 1999, State Secretary Madeleine Albright announced the

change in her mind. According to *The Chronicle of Higher Education:*

> Albright told lawmakers that "after being apprised of your views and holding consultations with your staff, we have made some important changes in the plan." Most significantly, she continued, "we have decided to place the exchanges function in a Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the public diplomacy function in a separate Office of International Information Programs." (Desruisseaux, April 16, 1999, p. A52)

Second, the new leadership of NAFSA under Marlene Johnson started its advocacy for a U.S. national policy on international education. As early as April 1999, in response to Secretary Albright's decision to separate between the academic-exchange and public-relations functions in the reorganization plan mentioned just above, Marlene Johnson was reported to refer to NAFSA's strategy about the advocacy for such a national policy as follows:

> Ms. Johnson, whose organization is committed to achieving a national policy on international education within three years, said that the Assistant Secretary in charge of educational and cultural affairs would be "a person with whom we can now have the conversation about why such a policy is so important, and a person who will be able to take a leadership role in helping form that policy." (Desruisseaux, April 16, 1999, p. A52)

Indeed, between the end of 1998 and the September 11 attacks in 2001, a number of statements which advocated a U.S. international education policy or the promotion of international education, including international student recruitment, were issued either by NAFSA, or NAFSA's joint authorship with the Alliance, or as a result of NAFSA's efforts

to pursue the support from the administration and Congress.

Among those statements, the speech which Marlene Johnson delivered at CIEE Conference in Chicago in November 1999 was NAFSA's first official statement calling for a comprehensive national policy on international education (M. Johnson, November 10, 1999). She said that NAFSA was at the early stage of developing a draft of an international education policy for the U.S., but that people in the international education network had agreed about key elements of such a policy: international student recruitment, study abroad, foreign-language learning, exchange of citizens and scholars, the mobilization and coordination of international education efforts, and resources at various levels. This speech explained the background of and need for the creation of such a national policy while it did not clearly spell out the rationale for each element of international education.

Following this declaration of Marlene Johnson, NAFSA and the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange issued their co-authored statement, entitled *Toward an International Education Policy for the United States* in February 2000. While this statement covered various areas of international education (e.g., foreign language, area expertise, and study abroad of American students), international student recruitment was regarded as one of the elements of such an international education policy. Regarding international student recruitment, while this statement stressed the long-term foreign policy and economic benefits from international student mobility into the U.S., *Toward an International Education Policy for the United States* (NAFSA & Alliance, February, 2000) explained the reasons why the presence of international students in the U.S. was important as follows:

> In the 1998-99 academic year, nearly 500,000 international students studied in the United States at the post-secondary level. They and their dependents spent more than $11 billion on tuition, fees, and living expenses in U.S. higher education institutions and communities, making international education the fifth-largest U.S. service-sector export. But these students represent much more than an entry on the credit side of the U.S. current accounts ledger. To educate them is to have an opportunity to shape the future leaders who will guide the political and economic development of their countries. … They enrich American campuses and provide American students with their first-ever exposure to foreign friends and colleagues. The millions of people who have studied in the United States over the years constitute a remarkable reservoir of goodwill for our country, perhaps our most underrated foreign policy asset. (quoted in the hearing, *Exchange and the National Interest*, 2000, p. 49)

In this explanation, NAFSA and the Alliance appeared to place more significance on the longer-term benefits in political and economic terms than on the shorter-term impact of $11 billion on the U.S. economy.

Shortly after this co-authored statement, an April 2000 Executive Memorandum signed by President Clinton, which called for the federal agencies' coherent approach to international education, also adverted to the rationale for international student mobility into the U.S. NAFSA was involved in the development of the content of the Memorandum. In his article based on remarks made at NAFSA's 53rd Annual Conference in Philadelphia, Richard W. Riley, the longest-serving U.S. Secretary of Education (1992-2000), explained:

> President Clinton recognized [the importance of the U.S. relations with other countries in the education field] a year ago when – on my recommendation and that of Secretary Albright – he issued an executive memorandum on international education. NAFSA was of great help to us in crafting that memorandum, as well as with the follow-up. You can be proud of the role you played. (Riley, Summer, 2001, p. 3)

While this Memorandum covered various areas of international education, international student recruitment was mentioned at the top of the list. The rationale for the presence of international students in the U.S. to which this Memorandum referred were as follows:

> The nearly 500,000 international students now studying in the United States at the postsecondary level not only contribute some $9 billion annually to our economy, but also enrich our communities with their cultures, while developing a lifelong appreciation for ours. The goodwill these students bear for our country will in the future constitute one of our greatest foreign policy assets. (Clinton, 2000)

In December 2000, NAFSA updated its co-authored policy statement, *Toward an International Education Policy for the United States*, for the Bush transition team (M. Johnson, Winter, 2001). This statement was also sent to Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Education Rodercik Paige, and Secretary of Commerce, Donald Evans. As far as the explained rationale of the presence of international students in the U.S. is concerned, unlike the earlier February version, this December version foremost explained the long-term foreign policy benefits.

In 2001, before the September 11 attacks, the Senate and House Concurring

Resolutions (S. CON. RES. 7 and H. CON. RES. 201) were introduced. These Resolutions called for an international education policy for the United States were introduced, while only the Senate Resolution was passed. These almost identical resolutions explained the rationales for international student mobility into the U.S., particularly in mutual understanding, foreign policy, and economic impacts, while the resolutions pointed to the declining trends of international exchange programs as below:

> Whereas educating international students is an important way to impart cross-cultural understanding, to spread United States values and influence, and to create goodwill for the United States throughout the world; Whereas, based on studies by the College Board, the Institute for International Education, and Indiana University, more than 500,000 international students and their dependents contributed an estimated $12,300,000,000 to the United States economy in the academic year 1999-2000; Whereas, according to the Departments of State and Education, the proportion of international students choosing to study in the United States has declined from 40 to 30 percent since 1982; Whereas international exchange programs, which in the past have done much to extend United States influence in the world by educating the world's leaders, as well as educating United States citizens about other nations and their cultures, are suffering from decline. (S. Con. Res. 7, April 24, 2001)

It was at a breakfast meeting of members of NAFSA and the Alliance who participated in the Congressional Education Day in January 2001 that Senator Richard G. Lugar (Republican–Indiana), who would later co-sponsor the Senate Concurrent Resolution with Senator John F. Kerry (Democrat–Massachusetts), first publicly announced their

intention to introduce this Resolution calling for a U.S. international education policy. His speech at the breakfast concluded:

> I'm here to cheer you on, wish you good luck and to collaborate with you in an endeavor which is important to the quality of American education. But, your efforts are also important to the quality of our foreign policy, national security and the ability to compete effectively in an globalized economy. (Lugar, January 30, 2001)

The rationales which were highlighted in these statements at the time around the turn of the century include most of the rationales discussed in Chapter Three for literature review, and long-term foreign policy rationales were often prioritized. However, these statements, like the testimonies in the early 1990s, barely included or integrated international students' contribution to the research and development in the STEM field in the rationales of international student mobility into the U.S. As shown so far, NAFSA and its allies in the academic-exchange community had stressed such contribution in various occasions, particularly in opposing some immigration reform bills in the mid 1980s and 1990s. In fact, two versions of *Toward an International Education Policy for the United States* co-authored by NAFSA and the Alliance pointed out that "Foreign-born experts now pace America's scientific leadership" (February, 2000, pp. 48-49, quoted in the hearing of *Exchange Programs and the National Interest*; and December, 2000, para. 4). Nevertheless, this expression was not clear if 'foreign-born experts' included international students or those who had studied in the U.S. Further, this sentence was not integrated in the statements' section discussing all the other rationales of the presence of international students on American campuses.

All of these statements expressed substantial concerns that the U.S. share in international student markets has been eroded by other countries' aggressive efforts in recruiting international students. As far as the U.S. status in the international student mobility is concerned, such a perception was very different from the confidence expressed in the statements at the beginning of the 1990s, which were examined earlier in this section.

The third area of public policy in which the new leadership of NAFSA under Marlene Johnson actively participated was the regulatory framework governing international students; in particular, the international student tracking system in development. Before the September 11 attacks, NAFSA was part of a coalition with other academic organizations, such as ACE, which strongly opposed the student tracking system developed under the IIRIRA of 1996 (e.g., Hedges & Wolfe, October 7, 2001; Confessore, 2002; Otto, 2002; Malkin, 2002; Farnam, 2005; Urias & Yeakey, 2009).

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, some alleged that behind the scenes NAFSA pressured INS for the removal of an INS official, Maurice Berez, who had been in change of the development of CIPRIS as the pilot program. Nicholas Confessore wrote an article in *Washington Monthly* (May, 2002), presenting his explanation as to how NAFSA undermined the development of the student tracking system, including the removal of Berez as follows:

> When NAFSA officials in Washington found out about the computer system [i.e., CIPRIS], they sprang into action. Officially, the group claimed that such surveillance would be a slap in the face for foreign students. Unofficially, they worried that a system that clamped down on fraudulent or dubious student-visa

> applications could mean fewer foreign students, and hence perhaps fewer jobs for foreign-student advisers. … Flummoxed by the computer's success, the NAFSA lobbyists soon resorted to a new strategy: get Berez removed. NAFSA's new executive director Marlene Johnson was personal friends with INS policy chief Robert Bach. Bach, in turn, was the power behind the throne of the agency's commissioner Doris Meissner, with whom top NAFSA met privately in the fall of 1998 to discuss their concerns, according to Tom Fischer, the former INS official. A few weeks later, Meissner, Bach, and INS chief of staff Peter "Mike" Becraft abruptly removed Berez as program director. (pp. 45-46)

In the *Letters* section of a later issue of *Washington Monthly* (July/August, 2002), Bernard E. La Berge and William J. Paver, both of whom had been members of the original task force as well as former members of the NAFSA Board of Directors, generally affirmed Confessore's explanation as follows:

> With the exception of a few factual errors, the article is substantially correct. NAFSA as an association was diametrically opposed to the original tracking system that CIPRIS was creating, working hard to postpone it, derail it, and make it less accountable and therefore less effective. While a small core of leaders worked closely with Berez to develop a workable tracking system, most members and leaders of the association worked publicly against it, opposing the $95 fee and even the very concept of a tracking system. Finally, NAFSA members generally did not believe that there was a genuine threat that terrorists, using student visas, would attack the United States, officially United States of America. Their opposition provided a constant challenge to the original CIPRIS

> task force. In fact, a good deal of the task force's creative energy was spent trying to overcome the objections of the NAFSA membership. Unfortunately, NAFSA leadership remained unconvinced. Johnson took her cue from them and from the consensus of the association and did indeed lobby for Berez's removal from the project. It was an effective way of derailing the project. (p. 2)

In the same *Letters'* section of *Washington Monthly* (July/August, 2002), however, Marlene Johnson strongly countered Confessore's allegation as follows:

> If it weren't so slanderous, I would have found Nicholas Confessore's article a fascinating throwback to the McCarthy era. The notion that NAFSA "sprang into action" in response to the 1996 law is laughable. Many of our members did have serious reservations about the student tracking system. Some, including one you quoted, "loved it." But when I took this job in February 1998, we were so consumed by this debate that springing into action about anything was impossible. Never during the INS's Maurice Berez's tenure running the foreign-student monitoring program did NAFSA take an official position. I have never heard any member worry that a student tracking system would mean "fewer jobs for foreign student advisers," and I do not believe such fear exists. For the record, NAFSA never sought 2's removal, and I never met with Commissioner Meissner on this or any other matter. What united virtually every higher education group against the $95 fee was opposition to the government's attempt to enlist universities as fee collectors. Terrorists caused the events of September 11; universities and their "lobbyists" didn't. (p. 2)

In the interview of Maurice Berez conducted by the National Commission on

Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) in October 2003, he did not clearly testify that NAFSA's pressure made him removed from the development of CIPRIS. According to Berez, however, Marlene Johnson told him in the lunch during the NAFSA Annual Conference in Denver in May 1999 (where Berez made a speech asking for understanding of CIPRIS in front of approximately 1,000 NAFSA members) that "I wonder what would happen to CIPRIS if you weren't leading it" (quoted in the 9/11 Commission's interview with Berez, October 3, 2003, p. 7). The 9/11 Commission's interview with Berez continues to reveal that, in October 1999:

> Bob Back [then Executive Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning of INS] calls Berez's boss in and tells [Tom] Cook [then Acting Assistant Commissioner of INS] that the decision has been made to replace Berez now that going to a national program b/c Berez is considered to be too controversial by NAFSA. Back says Cook and Cook tells Berez that Back wanted Berez out of CIPRIS no matter what. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, October 2, 2003, p. 7)

Bob Bach, who had been a university professor with a PhD dissertation on immigration, answered in the 9/11 Commission's interview with him that he did not remember anyone asking him to replace Berez. Back said in the interview, "Did people tell me to replace [Berez]? – No" (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, May 14, 2004, p. 14).

In his interview with the 9/11 Commission's interview, Tom Cook did not say anything as to whether NAFSA had pressured INS for Berez's removal from the CIPRIS project (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, January 14, 2004). However, Cook understood that Bach was not sure the CIPRIS was the right approach to address the

problem, and that Bach and Marlene Johnson had known each other. Cook further explained in the interview that NAFSA and INS had close communication about the CIPRIS, and remembered several meetings between NAFSA leaders (e.g., Marlene Johnson and Victor Johnson) and INS senior officers (e.g., Bob Back and INS Commissioner Doris Meissner), in which NAFSA expressed their concerns that the CIPRIS would negatively impact international student mobility into the U.S., and on trade and industry. Cook also remembered that Terry Hartle, the American Council on Education, expressed strong opposition to the CIPRIS.

As Cook's interview mentioned, Bob Bach sometimes went to NAFSA meetings to explain the government positions. One of these meetings was the NAFSA's 51st Annual Conference in Denver in May 1999, and excerpts from his speech were publicized in *International Educator*. Bach (Summer, 1999) stated that "INS is unequivocally a supporter of international education: foreign students and foreign scholars working and participating legally in the life of American institutions and in our society" (p. 2). Bach continued to argue that in order to reap the benefits of international exchange, INS within its own limited mandates faces three challenges. After calling for the complete repair of the U.S. system of administering international mobility and strengthened public support for international exchange as the first and second challenge respectively, Bach explained the security aspects of international exchange in question as follows:

> The dark side of international mobility: people who use the openness of the U.S. system to come to engage in activities that threaten–or are perceived as threatening to–the security of the U.S. … We do not believe that foreign students

> are a greater risk than anyone else to the security of the U.S. We have no evidence that is the case … Some of our best allies in the world were trained in the U.S. … We also train people who use the information when they return home for things that we don't support. (Summer, 1999, p. 3)

No matter whether or no matter how NAFSA involved in the removal of Berez from the project, it seems that Berez's removal resulted in the deceleration in the development of a nation-wide international student tracking system before the September 11 attacks.

Almost at the same time as Berez's removal from the CIPRIS project team, Marlene Johnson referred to CIPRIS, still in a neutral manner, in NAFSA's first official statement to advocate the creation of an international education policy in November 1999, which was mentioned earlier in this section. In talking about the constraints U.S. higher education faced in the field of international education, she explained:

> External competition is not the only constraint we face, of course. Among internal threats, the CIPRIS program, if misconceived or mismanaged, could increase barriers to student flows. On the other hand, properly situated within a national framework for international education involving all of the CIPRIS agencies and more, CIPRIS presents clear opportunities to improve our national procedures for welcoming international students. To turn the threats into opportunities, we need a plan, a national plan, that builds on and extends the interagency partnership mentality. (M. Johnson, November 10, 1999, para. 31)

In September 2000, however, NAFSA expressed its support for the legislation offered by Representative Judd Gregg (Republican–New Hampshire) which would repeal the CIPRIS.

In responding to this support expressed under NAFSA's leadership, the CIPRIS participant institutions, who were also members of NAFSA, supported keeping CIPRIS, and opposed the repeal as follows:

> For the record, we continue our strong support for the removal of schools as collection agents, and for the removal of artificial deadlines in the law. Also, for the record, we continue our strong support for our reporting electronically … By supporting CIPRIS and opposing the repeal, have we abandoned the high mindedness of NAFSA for the low morals of INS? Some may think so, but our first duty is our institutions and our second is to our students and scholars. … Unlike the NAFSA leadership, we the CIPRIS schools have lived it and seen the wonderful benefits of CIPRIS for our students and for our institutions. (quoted by AACRAO, October 2, 2000, pares. 15, 27-28)

Further, in August 2001, just before the September 11 attacks, another bill (H. R. 2779) to repeal Section 641 about the student tracking system from the IIRAIRA of 1996 was introduced by Representative Betty McCollum (Democrat–Minnesota) and other co-sponsors in the House of Representatives, and was supported officially by NAFSA through its immediate press release. The press release (NAFSA, August 2, 2001) reported that Marlene Johnson, NAFSA's Executive Director, applauding McCollum's leadership concerning H. R. 2779, had stated that "American leadership in the world is substantially enhanced when we are able to educate and provide exchange experiences for the world's future leaders" (para. 3). While this press release pointed out that the higher education community recognized the need to streamline and improve the information gathering and reporting systems, it also explained that the higher education community did not regard

the current plan to implement section 641 as the solution for the following reasons:

> 1) it sends an unwelcoming message to international students and exchange visitors by singling them out for monitoring; 2) its reporting requirements involve costly overhauls of university information systems; and 3) its fee collection plan places an unacceptable burden on applicants, especially those from areas of the world where electronic application and payment are not possible. (NAFSA, August 1, 2001, para. 3)

H. R. 2779 was referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House of Representative on the previous day of the September 11 attacks in 2001. As shown in the next section, no further attempts to repeal Section 641 were made after the tragedy.

Discussions from an ACF perspective. The end of the Cold War significantly affected this policy subsystem; particularly, the beliefs of the political actors in the policy subsystem. As shown in the documentary data above, most of the political actors found it necessary to explore new rationale for the post Cold War era, since the dominant beliefs based on the foreign policy rationale for bringing international students into the U.S. had been shaped essentially by the Cold War paradigm. It seems that many political actors did not abandon the foreign policy rationale, but some additionally started advocating economic rationale emphasized by other competing host countries in the 1990s. At the same time, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 started to gradually worsen again the perception about international students, which was damaged by the Iranian students' demonstrations around the U.S. following the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

The 1990s saw a few new-comers among the political actors in the policy subsystem. The Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange, which was

born due to the merger between the Liaison Group for International Educational Exchange and the International Exchange Association in 1992, started being very active in the policy advocacy for international education, and became a regular and reliable partner with NAFSA. As appeared in a number of archived documents, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) played a significant role in introducing the idea of an international student tracking system, responding to the World Trade Center bombing of 1993. Further, several members of Congress became active in this policy subsystem; for example, Representative Smith in the enactment of the IIRIRA of 1996. As in the data above, former Senator Fulbright gave important testimonies for the promotion of international educational exchanges in the Congress just before he passed away in 1995.

Responding to the changing environment which started blowing against U.S. higher education in terms of international student recruitment due to a smaller federal budget for exchange programs, tightening immigration controls, and competition from other host countries, NAFSA changed its approach to the federal policy process in the late 1990s. NAFSA leadership expanded its political activities to the legislative area from the regulatory area, on which NAFSA had placed its primary emphasis. This approach appeared to be effective in NAFSA's 'lobbying' activities in the Capital Hill with the Alliance in several issues; for example, the independent Bureau for educational and cultural exchanges in the State Department's absorbing the U.S. Information Agency; jointly authored a paper calling for a comprehensive U.S. international policy; and the bill for repealing the section of mandatory international student tracking system in the IIRAIRA of 1996.

The division within NAFSA and its members over the CIPRIS in the late 1990s

did not lead to any organizational breakup, perhaps because the September 11 attacks of 2001 immediately changed the vast majority within the NAFSA community to support the introduction of an international student tracking system such as SEVIS. However, an ACF perspective can explain that the breakup did not happen because the differences between the two groups within NAFSA over the debate about CIPRIS are at a secondary belief level. In fact, both groups appeared to share the beliefs in the fundamental rationale for brining international students into the U.S. such as mutual understanding. Or, an ACF perspective can also explain that the division within NAFSA came from a deep core belief level; that is, the fundamental preferences for the government control or autonomy. If the latter explanation were the case, the division can lead to some breakup of NAFSA. An answer for which explanation is more accurate needs further research focusing on this debate over CIPRIS.

Post 9/11 Era

Regarding the most recent ten years of NAFSA's efforts to influence the federal government policies on international education, including the issue of international student access, Victor Johnson, Senior Adviser for NAFSA's Public Policy Department, provides a short historical overview of his ten-year-old department in NAFSA's flagship magazine, *International Educator* (May/June, 2008). His discussion included the years between 1998, when he started his leadership in the Public Policy Department of NAFSA, and the September 11 attacks, but this discussion provided a good review of the achievements and characteristics of NAFSA's public policy activities, which were largely applicable to the years in the post 911 era.

From NAFSA's leadership's point of view, Victor Johnson (May/June, 2008)

emphasized the following: NAFSA's innovativeness and far-sightedness in putting forward the agenda in this policy domain; a number of NAFSA's public policy successes with a particular example of its facilitating public policy conversation for international students after the September 11 attacks in 2001; and the main reasons for NAFSA's successes such as its expertise in international education, its able coalition allies, and its own organizational infrastructures.

V. Johnson (May/June, 2008) began by arguing that for the past ten years NAFSA has been often "ahead of where others are prepared to go, being aggressive, force the agenda" (p. 6). In addition to NAFSA's proactive engagement, which some in the higher education community have criticized, in the national debates on comprehensive immigration reform, V. Johnson argues that NAFSA has initiated a number of provident proposals for changes in legislations, regulations, and rules in the past decade. These proposals included the elimination of the student visa requirement for the applicant's proof of no intent to remain in the U.S. – Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. His examples in this article used to be all controversial proposals at first, but many other political actors are now comfortable with talking about these proposals, even if they are not being implemented yet. Jonson's explanation is that "[when] other are prepared to own issues that we [NAFSA's public policy department] have initiated, we can turn our attention to the next generation of cutting-edge issues" (p. 6).

Among these successes during the past ten years, V. Johnson (May/June, 2008) particularly explains how his department in NAFSA led the international education community in turning the public negative conversation on international students in the

aftermath of the September 11 attacks around. After 9/11, it was not long before NAFSA started challenging the prevailing tenets for national security at that moment. Its channel varied: publishing reports, writing op-eds, discoursing with journalists, and organizing forums with experts in the foreign policy and academic communities. These actions just after the September 11 attacks were criticized by many in the country. According to V. Johnson, however, NAFSA expected the voice of the U.S. to eventually come to the right position. He points out that the public conversation has gradually returned to a recognition that international students are part of the solution to national security challenges, rather than being part of the problem of terrorism.

V. Johnson (May/June, 2008) attributes NAFSA successes in its policy advocacy efforts for the past ten years to three characteristics of NAFSA. First, V. Johnson argues that NAFSA has used 'the power of the small' to become recognized by many other political actors. Particularly, in the immigration area, NAFSA is "able to play way about our weight" (V. Johnson, May/June, 2008, p. 10), by bringing value, regarding NAFSA's specialty in international education, to the collaboration with bigger players. Second, in turn, NAFSA has deliberately chosen allies in its coalitions, with a strategy that "[we] work with those who can help us–those who bring values to the table" (V. Johnson, May/June, 2008, p. 10). While working with traditional allies such as the partners in higher education community, NAFSA has strived to establish coalitions with new partners such as business associations, immigration associations, think tanks, and ethnic groups. Third, V. Johnson continues to argue that NAFSA's Board of Directors with bold vision, CEO with strong leadership, Public Policy Department staff with high professionalism have functioned very well in terms of NAFSA's operation for its public

policy success. In addition, Johnson argues that NAFSA's strategic media relations and grassroots advocacy capability have significantly contributed to the successes of NAFSA in its public policy activities.

In his article about a short history of NAFSA's policy advocacy in the last ten years, Victor Johnson (May/June, 2008) also mentions some major reports produced by NAFSA's task forces which aimed to produce reports to facilitate public policy conversations on international education. One of these reports was, as already discussed in the previous section, *Toward an International Education Policy for the United States*, which has been continuously revised in the past decade. Also, *In America's Interest: Welcoming International Students* (NAFSA, January, 2003) specifically discuss the issues of international student access to U.S. higher education which this dissertation is exploring. This report will be further examined later in this section.

Now, given such self reflection about NAFSA's public policy activities in the past decade, let us start looking at NAFSA's attempts to influence the federal policy governing international students in the post 9/11 era. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Marlene Johnson, NAFSA's Executive Director and CEO, declared that "[there] has been much debate over the tracking proposal, and my organization has been its leading opponent. That debate ended on September 11, 2001. The time for debate is over, and the time to devise a considered response to terrorism has arrived" (M. Johnson, September 20, 2001, para. 2). In the meanwhile, some Congress members decidedly reacted to the fact that the attacks' perpetrators included a man who had entered the U.S. on a student visa. One of the most controversial reactions at that moment was that Senator Dianne Feinstein (Democrat–California) proposed to introduce legislation

imposing a six-month moratorium on international student visas, while her proposal also included the federally full funding authorization for the INS international student electronic tracking system.

In response to Senator Feinstein's proposal, NAFSA immediately placed *Action Alert: Feinstein Proposal* on its official web (www.nafsa.org/). In this *Action Alert*, NAFSA urge its members to:

> Call or fax your Senators and Senator Feinstein and convey the following points: (1) You are strongly opposed to any blanket freeze on student visas because it will not make any difference in preventing terrorism, but instead it will undermine the nation's long term strategic and economic interests; (2) You strongly support the Senator's plan to revise the CIPRIS payment system in a way that will eliminate the administrative problems that have plagued this system from the beginning; (3) You strongly oppose new unrealistic administrative burdens that would unnecessarily slow down an already overburdened visa system and strongly support increased funding for consular posts to help fight terrorism. (NAFSA, October, 2001, paras. 2-4)

In order to justify the opposition to a blanket freeze on international student admissions, this *Action Alert* provided some talking points about foreign policy and economic rationale. As always, it was emphasized that the international students as future leader of other countries would become ambassadors for personal freedom and democracy, and that these ambassadors create a market for American goods and services, and that international students spend billions of dollars on their tuition and living expenses in the U.S.

On October 2 of 2001, a number of higher education institutions met with Senator Feinstein in order to discuss her proposals, and a representative from the University of California was reported to say, “We felt that Senator Feinstein was open to concerns and suggestions about alternatives to the moratorium” (Ray, October 10, 2001, para. 5). From my interview, I understand that some NAFSA members were in this meeting. On the same day, David Ward, President of the American Council on Education (ACE), sent a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding Feinstein proposal, on behalf of about 30 higher education associations, including NAFSA (Ward, October 2, 2001). Although the letter supported Senator Feinstien’s proposal for authorizing full federal funding for the international student tracking system, it vigorously opposed her proposal to impose a six-month moratorium on all international student visas. Ward argued Senator Feinstein’s proposal for the moratorium would accomplish little as student visas represented only two percent of the entire visas issued a year, while “The loss to the United States in terms of intellectual accomplishment, goodwill, and lost economic activity will be enormous” (para. 6).

Further, David Ward sent another letter to Senator Feinstien herself on October 5, on behalf of about 20 higher education institutions, in order to express the recognition that “higher education institutions must be vigilant and proactive in supporting all efforts to prevent potential acts of terrorism” (Ward, October 5, 2001, para. 1), and that “The single most important step to achieve the goal that we all seek is the full implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)” (Ward, October 5, 2001, para. 2). By suggesting a number of concrete steps for improving the issuance and tracking of international student visas, Ward argued that “By adopting such steps, we

believe it will be unnecessary to pursue more far-reaching actions that, at a minimum, would have serious consequences for international students and American students who wish to study abroad, our nation's colleges and universities, and our economy" (para. 8). However, Ward did not specifically mention Senator Feinstein's proposal of the six-month moratorium on student visas. Subsequently, on October 9, 2001, Senator Feinstein withdrew her proposal to place the six-month moratorium, but announced to continue her push for federal funding for the implementation of an electronic tracking system of international students (Ray, October 10, 2001).

Immediately after the enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56; 115 Statutes-at-Large 272), which reinstated Section 641 of the IIRIRA of 1996 calling for the establishment of an electronic tracking system of international students, there was a joint hearing before the Subcommittees on Select Education and 21st century competitiveness of the House Committee on Education and Workforce. In this hearing, *Tracking International Students in Higher Education: Policy Options and Implications for Students*, David Ward, President of American Council on Education, on behalf of approximately 40 higher education associations, including NAFSA, stated that:

> I want to make it clear that as far as higher education goes, there can be no doubt about our position with respect to the Federal Government's right and responsibility to protect America's safety and security by deciding who should receive a visa, any type of visa, to visit or to study in the United States. (*Tracking International Students in Higher Education*, 2001, p. 53)

In the same hearing, Becraft, Assistant Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service argued:

> Objections from the educational community as well as Congress have delayed implementation of the congressionally mandated student tracking fee necessary to complete the deployment of SEVIS. However, with the tragedies of September 11, there is renewed support for moving forward. … America must remain America, a symbol of freedom and a beacon of hope to those who seek a better life for themselves. We must increase our security and improve our systems, but in doing so we must not forget what has made this Nation great: our openness to new ideas and people, and a commitment to individual freedoms, shared values, innovation, and the free market. This includes providing international educational opportunities that benefit both the United States and the many nations around the world that send their citizens here to learn. (*Tracking International Students in Higher Education*, 2001, p. 12)

While NAFSA no doubt contributed to the implementation of SEVIS in 2003 by providing training to the administrators as well as playing a bridging role in the communication between the immigration service and international education professionals around the country, NAFSA's stance against the implementation process was sometimes regarded as harsh by its allies in the higher education community. In May 2002, when INS issued a proposal of the deadline of the SEVIS implementation as January 31 of 2003, NAFSA expressed its strong opposition to the proposal. Compared to NAFSA's tone, other major education associations were "more sanguine about the [SEVIS] system's potential" (*Academe Online*, 2002, para. 5). Admitting that the

academic community had many different views on the INS proposal, David Ward argued that "NAFSA: The Association of International Educators took what I believe was an unfortunately strident tone." Andy Cruz (October 3, 2002) reported the division among the higher education community over the INS's proposed deadline, and explained:

> Many lobbyists, including [Terry] Hartle [Senior Vice President for Government and Public Affairs, the American Council on Education]," have been critical of the stance NAFSA has taken. Not only has NAFSA spoken to defend international students' interests in the aftermath of 9/11, NAFSA has also stated in a letter that the "compulsory reporting deadline was chosen in an attempt to deflect political heat [onto colleges], and not because of any realistic expectation that could be met." (para. 23)

In January 2003, when the deadline of SEVIS implementation drew near, NAFSA published its major task force report, *In America's Interest: Welcoming International Students*. This report began with a succinct description of the dramatic change in general views on international students studying in the U.S. before and after the September 11 attacks as follows:

> For at least the second half of the twentieth century, it was an unquestioned verity of U.S. foreign policy that programs to promote international understanding advanced the national interest. It was almost universally accepted that educating successive generations of world leaders in the United States constituted an indispensable investment in America's international leadership. After September 11, 2001, these assumptions are being questioned to an unprecedented degree. Those who have recently argued against international

> exchange programs seem to see today's United States of America as a country so vulnerable in the face of the terrorist threat that it has no option but to close its borders. (NAFSA, January, 2003, p. 2)

As Victor Johnson (May/June, 2008) explained, one of the most important tasks for NAFSA in the post 911 was change this kind of atmosphere, and *In America's Interest* was created to serve this task.

Unlike NAFSA's earlier statement, *In America's Interest* (NAFSA, January 2003) integrated the international students' intellectual contribution to research and innovation for U.S. economy in the rationale of having international students enrolled in the U.S. higher education. This report listed three areas of benefits: foreign policy, economic, and educational. Regarding the educational benefits, which appeared the third in order among the three types of benefits, this report pointed out, although mentioned in the end of the section, that:

> On the job front, it is worth remembering that laws and regulations provide for visitors to adjust their status to remain in the United States and work precisely so that people with needed skills can work in the U.S. economy. The fact is that, although most students return home and contribute to their countries after studying in the United States, some remain legally in the United States and contribute to the U.S. economy. (p. 5)

As seen so far, NAFSA and its allies had sometimes admitted that retaining a limited number of the best and brightest students in the U.S. after their graduation contributed to the U.S. economy, while NAFSA explained that the vast majority of international students returned to their home countries to contribute to those countries' development.

In relation to this contribution to U.S. research integrated in the whole discussion, another importance of this report was its inclusion of the suggestion for the elimination of 214(b) in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Section 214(b) had been simply taken for granted, no opposition to the section had ever appeared on NAFSA's official statement. As Victor Johnson, who had led NAFSA's Public Policy Department for ten years since the department's inception, argued, NAFSA was the first association in our field to publicly propose the elimination of the student visa requirement for the applicant's proof of no intent to remain in the U.S. – Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (V. Johnson, May/June, 2008). It is noteworthy, however, that the 214(b) issue existed before the September 11 attacks, according to one of the task force members for the report (Rubin, Spring, 2003). *In America's Interest* (January, 2003) said that:

> If the policy of the United States were, in fact, as articulated by section 214(b), we might just have to live with these problems. But it is not—nor, in this day and age, can it be. As far as students are concerned, the United States does not, in fact, practice the policy that they must return to their home country; in practice, we do—and we should—permit graduates of our educational institutions to adjust their status legally and remain in the United States if they possess skills that we need. Demographic trends dictate this policy because the United States cannot fill all the skilled jobs in its economy from the native-born population. (NAFSA, January, 2003, p. 16)

While SEVIS was fully implemented in 2003, there had been other tightening controls on foreign student visas. Students and scholars found it difficult to get into the

U.S. In response to this situation, there was a hearing, *Addressing the New Reality of Current Visa Policy on International Students and Researchers* (2004). Matin C. Jischke, President of Purdue University, one of the witnesses of this hearing submitted a written statement, *Statement and Recommendations on Visa Problems Harming America's Science, Economic and Security Interests*, which represented the views of 24 higher education associations, including NAFSA, to this hearing for his recommendation. The contribution of international students and scholars to scientific research in the U.S. was emphasized by most of the witnesses, and the improvement of the visa policy to make it easy for these students and scholars to access to the U.S. was recommended. Further, Jischke concluded:

> The loss of these upstanding international scholars will not only be a major economic blow to our country, I believe it also will work against our long-term interest to promote national security and improve international relations, friendships, and understanding. It will result in a loss of academic quality. (*Addressing the New Reality of Current Visa Policy on International Students and Researchers*, 2004, p. 8)

Interestingly, another witness from the higher education community, Adam W. Herbert, President of Indiana University, expressed his dilemma as follows:

> we are clearly establishing very positive long-term friendships with potential leaders–business, education, others–in those countries from which the students come if they do decide to return. But we need some of that intellectual talent in this country. We cannot afford to lose it, it is of such vital importance, not only to our institutions, our higher education institutions, but other parts of our

> society as well. (*Addressing the New Reality of Current Visa Policy on International Students and Researchers*, 2004, p. 41)

In response to the perceived obstacles, particularly in terms of visa and immigration barriers, against international students and scholars, Senator Norm Coleman (Republican–Minnesota) introduced the International Student and Scholar Access (ISSA) Act of 2004 on July 21, which was later co-sponsored by Jeff Bingaman (Democrat–New Mexico). Subsequently, Senators Coleman and Bingaman co-sponsored bills, the American Competitiveness Through International Openness Now (ACTION) Act of 2005 and the ACTION Act of 2008. The ISSA Act of 2004 was one of the earliest bills which integrated the rationale of the contribution of international students to the innovation in scientific research. One of the consistent characteristics of these bills is that they called for an amendment of Section 204(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which requires foreign student visa applicants to demonstrate their intent to go back to home countries. For example, one of the proposed bill (S. 2653, 110th Congress, 2nd Session) read:

> Section 101(a)(15)(F)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8U.S.C. 1101 (a)(15)(F)(i)) is amended – (A) by striking "having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning" and inserting "having the intention, capability, and sufficient financial resources to complete a course of study in the United States"; and (B) by striking "and solely." (p. 9)

According to NAFSA's official website, NAFSA staff worked closely with the Senators' offices, and offered critical input to these bills. Also, some of my interviewees indicated the important role which NAFSA played in developing these bills. Also, the ACTION Act

of 2008 was supported not only by NAFSA, but also by the National Foreign Trade Council, the premier business organization advancing global commerce, and by USA*Engage, a coalition of small and large businesses, agriculture groups, and trade associations working to promote the benefits of U.S. engagement abroad.

Although the number of international students studying in the U.S. had not decreased immediately after the September 11 attacks, the number finally started decreasing in 2004, according to *Open Doors*. More criticisms about the eroded competitiveness of the U.S. for international students increased. In this situation, NAFSA issued its new statement, *Restoring U.S. Competitiveness for International Students and Scholars* (NAFSA, June, 2006). The statement explained why this competition matters for the U.S. as follows:

> Attracting international students and scholars is an important way that the United States grows its knowledge economy. In an era of competition for scarce global talent, the countries that draw the world's best and brightest to their universities are the countries that will have the best talent pool from which to fill their cutting-edge jobs. The countries that create the most attractive environment for the world's finest scientists will do the most to enhance their scientific leadership. Indeed, the very diversity that we gain through openness to international talent itself fuels innovation and creativity. (p. 3)

This rationale is mentioned secondly after the foreign policy rationale. Educational benefits to the domestic students are discussed thirdly, and economic contributions by the international students' spending money are explained fourthly. While this listing order of these rationales may express the order of the priorities which NAFSA gave at that time,

this statement continue to argue that “most importantly, in all of these ways, educational exchange enhances U.S. security” (p. 3).

Subsequently, in October 2007, just before IIE’s *Open Doors* announced that the number of international students studying in the U.S. in the academic year of 2006/2007 increased from the previous year for the first time since 2003, NAFSA together with the Alliance issued the revised version of their policy statement calling for a U.S. international education policy (NAFSA & Alliance, October, 2007). It started integrating the contribution of international students to research and innovation of the U.S. in the rationales for bringing foreign talents such as international students and scholars.

In February 2008, there was a hearing entitled, *Status of Visas and Other Policies for Foreign Students and Scholars*. This hearing before the House Committee on Science and Technology’s Subcommittee on Research and Science Education had four witnesses with NAFSA’s written statement. All the three witnesses from non-governmental organizations, except for a witness from the State Department, were requested to answer the question about the benefits of the presence of international students and scholars. While all the witnesses discussed various aspects of the federal policies governing international student and scholar access to U.S. higher education, and presented a number of concrete recommendations, I focus on their views on the rationales of having international students in U.S. higher education as below.

Harvey V. Finberg, President, Institute of Medicine, the National Academies, mentioned the economic benefit of international students in terms of their money brought into the U.S., but in his written statement submitted to this hearing Finberg stressed the intellectual contributions of international students to the U.S. as follows:

> International exchanges of students and skilled professionals can benefit both the sending and receiving countries. Certainly, the U.S. science and engineering research enterprise depends critically on international students and scholars. … International students now constitute more than a third of U.S. science and engineering (S&E) graduate school enrollment, up from less than a quarter in 1982. … Many of the international students educated in this country choose to remain here after receiving their degrees. More than 70 percent of the foreign-born S&E doctorates who received their degrees in 2001 remained in the United States for more than two years. These skilled migrants are an important source of innovation for the U.S. economy. (*Status of Visas and Other Policies for Foreign Students and Scholars*, 2008, p. 26)

Allan E. Goodman, President and CEO, Institute of International Education, made a short testimony calling for the improvement of the treatment which international students receive from the staff of the Department of Homeland Security at the U.S. borders. His written statement included the explanation of his views on the benefits of having international students as follows:

> These [international] students contributed $14.5 billion to the U.S. economy through their expenditures on tuition and living expenses. In fact, the U.S. Department of Commerce ranks international education at the U.S.'s 5th largest service sector export. But these students don't just benefit our national economy. Their presence diversifies our campuses. … International students help Americans gain a critical understanding of other cultures and languages such as Arabic, Korean, and Farsi. They help to develop long lasting relationships

> between the U.S. and other nations … Having tomorrow's leaders live and learn in the U.S. assists our long-term foreign policy goals and is indeed one of this country's strongest diplomatic assets. … The impact of international students and scholars on U.S. scientific enterprise is quite significant. … Today, more than one-third of U.S. engineering and computer science faculty are foreign-born, many of whom came to the U.S. first as an international student. (*Status of Visas and Other Policies for Foreign Students and Scholars*, 2008, p. 36)

Lastly, Catheryn Cotten, Director of the International Office for both Duke University and Duke Medical Center and Health System, explained the institutional benefits in her written statement submitted to the hearing:

> The very best U.S. and international students and scholars compete for admission to our degree programs and acceptance into our research projects. They bring not only superior knowledge, skills, and abilities, as do their U.S. colleagues, but they also offer new perspectives on ways of using disparate technologies to solve problems and identity new avenues of research. (*Status of Visas and Other Policies for Foreign Students and Scholars*, 2008, p. 58)

One of the highlighted discussions in this hearing was the problem of the non-immigrant intent issue – 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. As Cotten explained, "Every year we have people who are identified to come on research projects, and for whatever reason they cannot get their visa. Normally it is a 214(b), non-immigrant intent issue" (*Status of Visas and Other Policies for Foreign Students and Scholars*, p. 75). In the cover letter attached to the written statement submitted to this hearing, Marlene Johnson, NAFSA's Executive Director, discussed this 214(b) issue, and

argued:

> There is little doubt that we are in a heated global competition for international talent, yet the United States has yet to adapt effectively in order to seriously engage in this competition. Increasingly, today's international students are tomorrow's innovators, and it is a reality of our time that, at the high-skill level, the temporary immigration system has become a conveyor belt of talent into the permanent immigration system. Many foreign students do want to go home after graduation, but some of them want to stay here to use the knowledge they have acquired at our universities. Therefore, it is our view that the requirement that student visa applicants demonstrate intent not to immigrate to the United States should be eliminated, in order to better reflect the current reality of academic research and innovation. (M. Johnson, February 7, 2008, p. 2)

Further, in August 2008, NAFSA issued a policy proposal for the next administration, *International Education: Neglected Dimension of Public Diplomacy* (NAFSA, 2008). This is a revised and updated version of NAFSA's past statements calling for a U.S. international education policy. *International Education: Neglected Dimension of Public Diplomacy* called for coordination and visa reform. While this statement emphasized the importance of international education from a public diplomacy perspective, it discussed the promotion of each of the major elements of international education from an even wider perspective, including academic, intellectual, cultural, and economic rationales. Particularly discussing the benefits of international students, this policy proposal pointed out:

> Until this century, the United States enjoyed the status of destination of choice

> for the world's international students and scholars, and we reaped great benefits from this status: the opportunity to educate the world's future leaders; the ability to attract the world's best talent to our universities and research institutes; the educational benefits that our students derived from foreign professors and from having other cultures represented on campus; and billions of dollars of spending in our economy. (p. 4)

Here, international students' contributions to U.S. research was integrated in all the traditionally perceived benefits such as foreign policy, educational impacts, on the domestic students, and immediate economic.

Discussions from an ACF perspective. Although the September 11 attacks of 2001 were one of the greatest events which affected the vast majority of public policy areas of the U.S., some characteristics of the current policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education are not simply the products of the September 11 attacks.

For example, the beliefs in national security and global competitiveness in terms of international student access have been commonplace since the tragic attacks. However, neither national security nor global competitiveness in terms of international student mobility is new to the policy subsystem at all.

Of course, it is just recently that the political actors started explicitly discussing the elimination of the student visa requirement for the applicant's proof of no intent to remain in the U.S. – Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Further, even in NAFSA documents, the potential contributions of the best and brightest international students who continue to stay in the U.S. after their graduation was not

officially listed as one of the possible benefits before the September 11 attacks.

Nevertheless, as shown so far in this chapter, some political actors in the mid twentieth century argued that bringing international students to U.S. higher education could cause some risks in national security by bringing communists to the U.S. In the congressional hearings in the 1950s, some political actors suggested that immigration laws should be flexible to be able to retain some bright international students in the U.S. for its economic prosperity.

Similarly, NAFSA's current relations with other political actors in the pro-international-student-access coalition may not be the simple product of the September 11 attacks. The tragic event may have been a catalyst to the soured relations between strategies regarding guidance instrument. However, NAFSA appears to have become intentionally aggressive not after the 911 tragedy, but after its internal leadership changed the organization's political approach at the end of 1990s. It is important to note that external events are not only the factors to change the relationships between political actors.

Further, NAFSA's recent strategies of guidance instruments appear to include something new which is aimed at the general public, not only at the key political actors that are its traditional target, particularly those with legal authority. As Victor Johnson, NAFSA's Public Policy Department, describes (2008, May/June), NAFSA tried to change the public negative perceptions of international students in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks by writing op-eds, discoursing with journalists, and organizing forums with experts in the foreign policy and academic communities. However, it is not clear whether these strategies were NAFSA's responses to the environment after the

September 11 attacks, or had been already taken by NAFSA leadership before the attacks.

As seen in the documentary data presented above, NAFSA has continued to utilized its traditional strategies as well. Since the 911 attacks, NAFSA has had a number of opportunities to give testimony in Congressional hearings, and has produced policy papers to advocate international student mobility into the U.S., and has encouraged its members to contact directly members of Congress for support. Understanding why and when NAFSA expanded its strategies to reach the general public for the policy advocacy purpose, is an interesting questions that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Chapter Seven: Interview Summary

This chapter furnishes the results of my interviews with twenty political actors in the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education. The results not only present the tendency of the answers to the five questions in relation to this particular subsystem (i.e., 'what are the major policy changes in the recent years?', 'what have been NAFSA's successes and failures?', 'who are the influential political actors?', 'what are NAFSA's strengths and weaknesses?', and 'what are the benefits and costs of bringing international students to the U.S.?'), but also show a number of direct quotations to show the perceptions of the political actors in particular aspects of the questions. In addition, other related matters are also presented in this chapter.

Major Policy Changes in the Recent Years: Policy Outputs and Impacts

All but two of my interviewees included the SEVIS (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System) in their lists of the major policy changes in the recent years. Most of these answers also referred to other related legislation and regulation which brought tighter controls over international student access to U.S. higher education after the September 11 attacks. For example, Andrew, who has been involved as a NAFSA member in the development of NAFSA's public policy strategies, explained:

> the single most important policy, I believe, is the policy that brought the SEVIS system into place, and that would be the Patriot Act. And the Patriot Act and the tracking system that is used for students and scholars I think had the most impact on a negative perception overseas and a negative impact on students and scholars coming to the United States because I think it made students and scholars feel that they weren't welcome here. Because we were looking at everything they did,

> not necessarily just the academic aspects of it, and I think it gave them the impression they were going to be watched everywhere they went. (Andrew, NAFSA member)

In terms of the ACF diagram (see Appendix B), it can be explained that, in talking about the SEVIS and the PATRIOT Act of 2001, Andrew referred to the flows from the governmental authorities' decisions to the policy impacts.

Three of my interviewees (one NAFSA member, and two from non-NAFSA organizations) specifically referred to the new visa issuing rule in the post 9/11 era that virtually every non-immigrant visa applicant, including for a student visa, has to be interviewed at the U.S. All of these responses stressed its negative side of making the visa issuing procedure slower, and making some foreign students as well as scholars unable to arrive in the U.S. in time.

However, one of my interviewees working for the Department of State pointed to the positive side of the new rule, too. This State Department officer regarded the requirement of the interviews for almost any visa application, which started in 2002, as a big policy change. This officer's argument was, however, that this interview requirement in relation to visa applications enabled the State Department to make more informed decisions than looking at the application papers, although this requirement had certainly increased the workload and slowed down the process.

The other two interviewees who mentioned the personal interviews also appreciated the efforts of the Department of State and the improvement of the procedures in terms of the time taken for issuing visas in the following years. In a sense, this procedural improvement in later years can be regarded as a part of the policy changes

which were produced by the policy subsystem responding to the policy impacts depicted under the ACF diagram.

Among my interviewees, two mentioned the public diplomacy agency reorganization where the United States Information Agency (USIA) had been merged into the State Department in 1999. Other major changes mentioned by my interviewees include the following: introduction of admission for duration of status in the 1970s, more emphasis on gaining skilled workers, and more governmental efforts to recruit international students. One of my interviewees told me that there had not been specific major policy changes, as there had been no policies on international students in the U.S., but continued to tell me that what had changed is just the environment, including the end of the Cold War, globalization, and the September 11 attacks. The main argument of this particular interviewee was that the policy subsystem has had no significant changes recently, although many other interviewees would disagree with this argument. As presented above, most of my interviewees identified the tightened controls over international student access as major policy changes.

While many of those who regarded SEVIS as one of the major policy changes discussed the implementation and impacts of the student tracking system after the September 11 attacks, a few explained the development of the international student tracking system; i.e., CIPRIS as a pilot program mandated by the IIRAIRA of 1996. William, who had been involved as a NAFSA member in its public policy activities, described the NAFSA's reaction to the enactment of the IIRAIRA of 1996 as follows:

> IIRAIRA was a complete surprise to us. It was stuck in this omnibus bill, and I won't say sneaked in, but it certainly wasn't out in the open. Lot of members of

> NAFSA were quite angry that NAFSA hadn't done anything about this, and we had to explain, hey it wasn't only us. The American Liberation Lawyers was also surprised by it. They had nothing. They would have been opposed to it if they had been out in the open, but it came out of this bill and we had no idea it was there. (William, NAFSA member)

This feeling seems to explain partially why NAFSA's opposition to the idea of the new international student tracking system was weak before the enactment of the IIRAIRA of 1996. Such absence of any significant opposing actions made by the coalition advocating international student access, including NAFSA, in the process of this enactment of the IIRAIRA of 1996 can be regarded as "Decision by Governmental Authorities" without the coalition's deploying any strategies of guidance instruments in terms of the ACF diagram (see Appendix B). Given that the proposal for the pilot program was indicated in the bill, however, further investigation, including documentary analysis and interviews, would be needed to clarify the particular part of the policy process.

NAFSA's Successes and Unsuccesses: Strategies as Political Actor

Most of my interviewees gave me a variety of the achievements which NAFSA has made. From a NAFSA member perspective, Mary explained the successful development of NAFSA's leadership in helping NAFSA members involved in the public policy process since the late 1990s as follows:

> NAFSA opened the doors for us to be able to talk with the agencies that were creating the regulations as well as, and not creating, but also implementing and they also helped us then talk to policy makers that were over that had obviously impact on regulatory decision making. So we were going to congress and we

> were going to the agencies at the same time. We had less involvement in the congressional arena in the mid-nineties. … NAFSA I think really helped us hone in on a major issue say look, these are the things we need to get done on the regulatory side, and then what they did was they began to have us meet more and more with people in congress the staffers in congress to say, these are things that are causing our, you know, our problems and if we could if we could legislate a change to improve the situation, this would have a profound impact on the regulatory process. (Mary, NAFS member)

In this respect, Susan, NAFSA staff, explained the strategies of the NAFSA leadership in the late 1990s as follows:

> The board of directors … felt that NAFSA needed to do something in the advocacy arena that went beyond regulatory advocacy, simply talking to the INS about things that were affecting foreign students. We needed to get beyond the regulatory, and that we needed to do it in a way that built relationships that were positive because at the time … our relationship with the regulatory agencies had deteriorated quite a bit. … we needed to do something bigger ... and we started talking about the fact that there was a lack of understanding in society about why international education mattered to society, and that there hadn't been a policy discussion in the public arena since the establishment of the Fulbright program essentially, which had been fifty years before. So we set about to think through how we could change that. How we could contribute to a national conversation, or discussion and policy framework for why international education matters to society. (Susan, NAFSA staff)

Regarding the implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP), which acts as the bridge for varied governmental agencies, and which uses the SEVIS to track and monitor schools and programs, and students, Michelle, a NAFSA member, argued:

> I think NAFSA has been very successful in creating and maintaining a liaison with the SEVP. And so much of that has to do with the receptivity of the SEVP. There seems to have been in the early days, a recognition that we were in this together, and that we were both going to be much more successful if we talked to each other than if we didn't talk to each other. SEVP and the institutions' experience and NAFSA, so I think that is a great example of how liaison has worked. … we have seen in some of the conversations about particular aspects of this SEVP implementation that was legislative, I think NAFSA has some influence in moderating. Some of that wasn't a total success because there are pieces of it that are problematic, I also think that universities had got a lot of the credit for that. So I think NAFSA has in recent years, recently, in the last couple of years been pretty successful and dialog with the visa offices at the state department. (Michelle, NAFSA member)

These comments explained not only NAFSA's traditional strategies of continual liaison with the governmental agencies such as the immigration services and the Department of State for regulatory changes for greater international student access, but also NAFSA's new emphasis on the legislative side of its policy advocacy in the late 1990s. However, my interviews could not manage to draw out the comments on any specific instruments of NAFSA's new strategies in its policy advocacy.

Many of my interviewees did not mention any particular failures or something unsuccessful in what NAFSA had tried to achieve in its political activities. However, two of my interviewees bluntly told me that not being able to repeal the implementation of the international student tracking system could be one of NAFSA's failure, but that they also regarded it as inevitable given the September 11 attacks. These two seemed to have been among the strong opponents to the CIPRIS before the tragedy.

Regarding NAFSA's failures, another three interviewees referred to the fact that NAFSA has not been able to have its proposal of a U.S. international education policy. Mary, NAFSA member, explained that:

> I think NAFSA would admit that it has not been successful in advocating [its proposal of a U.S. international education policy]. I think they have worked very hard, but the outcome shows that their advocacy still hasn't gone the entire way it is supposed to go, and that is to establish a national policy on international education. Yeah, and they have been fighting that for a long time. They've really been trying to push it. (Mary, NAFSA member)

Andrew, a NAFSA member, also regarded this issue as one of what NAFSA has been unsuccessful about, and tried to explain the reasons as follows:

> Part of the reason that it is not successful is that some in congress are concerned that having such a policy would make it too easy for international students to come here, international scholars to come here, and if it is too easy for them to come here, maybe the wrong kind of people might come. Whatever that means in their mind. And so they might have problems with their constituents in making it too easy in encouraging international education too much. … The

> other is that it would almost require the creation of a new administration, or a new agency within the government and creating a new agency is always expensive, and I think it was the dollars that some legislators were afraid of. (Andrew, NAFSA member)

As shown in Chapter Six, the proposal for a U.S. international education policy has been authored jointly by NAFSA and the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange. Peter, staff of an international exchange organization, explained the history of the proposal as follows:

> One place where I would say we have been unsuccessful is, as I am sure, you are aware NAFSA's strong interest in getting an international education policy … And that policy succeeded, I mean the Clinton Administration adopted it, but only for about a year, and then there was a new administration. … Memorandum 18th or 19th, whatever, yeah, presidential memorandum, and we have not been successful in getting that adopted since. … [We] were pushing the idea that there needed to be an international education policy and there was a paper, there was a joint NAFSA/Alliance paper about that … It was [the] paper that started it, absolutely no doubt about it … So that was a big deal, but we have not been successful in promoting that idea since, and I think we have almost gotten to the point where I don't think a national policy on this is a bad idea, but I think we may have gotten to the point where people are just tired of hearing about it. I think maybe it is time to re-conceptualize that in some other way. (Peter, Staff of an international exchange organization)

This comment pointed to one of NAFSA's strategies as a guidance instrument; that is,

presenting policy recommendation paper to the then Administration. This co-authored paper of NAFSA and the Alliance appears to be *Toward an International Education Policy for the United States* issued in February 2000. As seen in the previous chapter, NAFSA has produced a number of policy statements, in addition to research reports. Perhaps, among these policy statements, the NAFSA/Alliance's co-authored paper was one of the most effective instruments which had the government take official actions.

Influential Political Actors: Coalitions in the Subsystem

All but one of my interviewees included NAFSA in their lists of influential political actors in this policy subsystem, by giving a number of reasons in terms of the successes and strengths of NAFSA presented in the next section of this chapter. Alex, a staff member of an international exchange organization, simply emphasized the importance of Senator William Fulbright as an influential political actor, without mentioning NAFSA as an influential political actor. My interview with Alex could not go further to the question of the other actors due to the time limitation.

Also, the vast majority of my interviewees included the Departments of State and Homeland Security and Congress in their list of the influential political actors in this policy subsystem. Specific Congress members mentioned include these: Senators William Fulbright, as mentioned above, Paul Simon, Richard Lugar, Edward Kennedy, and Norm Coleman. Only one specifically mentioned the White House, while another interviewee included U.S. Presidents in the list of influential political actors. However, the United States Agency for International Development was mentioned by one interviewee only.

Regarding non-governmental actors in this policy subsystem, the majority of my interviewees mentioned the university presidential associations, particularly the ACE,

NASULGC, and AAU. As influential political actors, at least one of the IIE, the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchanges, or the business industry (not really specified organizations) are included in their lists by most of my interviewees.

As the ACF can predict, the interviewees' comments indicated that this policy subsystem has a coalition with various political actors, including the governmental agencies, university presidential associations, and NAFSA. My interviewees, who are basically proponents for greater access of international students to U.S. higher education, tended to see the vast majority of these actors listed here forming a coalition of their own allies in favor of international student access to U.S. higher education.

Although not specifically expressed by most of my interviewees, the only exception seems to be the Department of Homeland Security. One of my interviewees, warningly telling me that "as long as you are not quoting me directly," confessed that he would call DHS a source of many problems, while he did not want to call the agency his opponent on the Hill. He regarded most of the problems that currently "get lumped" under the category of visas as DHS problems, pointing to the problems on port of entry, either from the DHS officials' rudeness or actual detaining of people in extreme cases. In the way of SEVIS rules, he saw some rhetoric about the balance between secure borders and open doors. However, he argued that DHS actually plays the role of securing borders only, particularly in attempt to catch "bad guys," while the international education and exchange community is playing the role of welcoming international students.

In the meantime, Stella, a NAFSA member, whose institution had been one of the participants in the CIPRIS as a pilot program eventually leading to the SEVIS, and who had supported the CIPRIS, provided her views about NAFSA's relationship with the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) over the CIPRIS program as follows:

> It was one of the first times ever that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had come to schools, and said, “Can you help us?” Most conversations in the past had been NAFSA going to INS and saying “Can we fix or change this or that?” In the preliminary work leading to CIPRIS, INS came to NAFSA and the schools and said, “These are the ideas we are thinking about. Can you help us make this better? We want to make this work for you.” INS provided NAFSA with an initial draft document as a starting point from which to work, and asked for NAFSA’s review, comments, and recommendations. In my opinion, it was here that NAFSA failed to recognize this exceptional opportunity. INS was going to move the school reporting process that already existed in the regulations from a cumbersome paper-based system to an interactive electronic data base management system. It was not a question of whether, but how INS did this. Instead of engaging in a positive dialogue, NAFSA seized on items in that first document that it didn’t like, and replied to INS in strong terms that the concepts were horrible, detrimental to international education, and unacceptable. NAFSA then organized its response to an electronic database and to CIPRIS as resistance rather dialogue and cooperation. I believe this approach showed a complete misapprehension by NAFSA about what the government was asking of us. INS then approached schools directly to get the help and school-based expertise they needed. Under the leadership of Maurice Berez at INS, they brought representatives of schools onto the early planning team and then selected “CIPRIS Schools” to be part of the development team to design and test

> the beta version of the data base. They knew that their own ideas were provincial in that their only experience was from the government side. They needed to understand the international student experience from the perspective of the schools and students. We, the CIPRIS schools, found INS very receptive and responsive to our concerns and recommendations. The CIPRIS school participants were NAFSA members, and, as NAFSA members, we continued to advocate to NAFSA for positive engagement with INS. With the events of 9/11 Congress mandated INS to implement the CIPRIS/SEVIS system on an accelerated schedule. NAFSA and the higher education community refocused efforts to help INS and the new Department of Homeland Security make that system work as well as possible on a very tight time line. (Stella, NAFSA member)

Also, Patrick, NAFSA member, explained how the relationship between NAFSA and the other political actors suffered from NAFSA's strong oppositions to CIPRIS and from the fact that the opposition by NAFSA and its allies had been publicly criticized after the September 11 attacks. Patrick said that some people in the government agencies, such as the Departments of State and Homeland Security, would still not speak to NAFSA, and also argued:

> NAFSA was leading the charge and I think ACE in particular, the American Council on Education really felt betrayed by NAFSA because NAFSA was taking an extreme position on this, instead of recognizing that maybe the government does have a legitimate interest in being able to have data … I think NAFSA really lost face with the government and lost face with other higher

> education associations as a result of that, and NAFSA has not had the influence or the entrée or the access that it has had in the past to government agencies and that is just about across the board. (Patrick, NAFSA member)

This damage, as well as NAFSA's characteristics leading to this damage, is closely connected to some of the views about NAFSA's weaknesses presented later in this chapter.

Patrick also gave me an insightful view on the international student tracking system as a whole as follows:

> I think that we have always objected to the government's conceptualization of this as a tracking system because it is not really a tracking system, it is really a data system. And it is just like, it is just like my driving record is a data system, it is not really a tracking system. Yes, my address is on my driver's license and I have to keep that up to date, but it is not like they use my driver's license to track when I go to the grocery store or when I go to Texas to visit relatives or something like that. (Patrick, NAFSA member)

According Patrick, some in NAFSA have taken this kind of conceptualization of the system, but others have not. If this conceptualization had been taken more seriously and largely by NAFSA as well as its allied associations in the higher education community, and if the INS had had more sensitivity in promoting the system in this direction suggested by Patrick, collaborations between NAFSA and the INS in this program would have been made more easily for a balanced system between open doors and secure borders.

Some of my interviews, as presented above, revealed that the relationship

between the government agencies dealing with immigration services (i.e., INS and USCIS at the DHS) and the coalition for international student access to U.S. higher education, including NAFSA, has been something which the ACF may not be able to explain very well. It is true that regulating international student flow into the U.S. has been one of the responsibilities of the agencies for immigration services. Therefore, it would be hard to regard INS and DHS as an ally in the same coalition with NAFSA. It seems, however, that these agencies did not attempt to form a coalition for regulating international student access with other political players. Instead, as mentioned in some of my interviewees' comments, these agencies intended to cooperate with NAFSA for better regulations responding to the changing environment.

Regarding more obvious opponent political actors, only 12 of my interviewees said something about their perceptions of their political opponents. Five of these 12 interviewees simply said either that there are not really any opponents, or that opponents, if any, are very limited and weak. However, the other seven interviewees referred to the anti-immigration groups as their opponents. Three of these seven specifically mentioned the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) as an opponent to the pro-international-student-access coalition. In this context, although not specifying FAIR as an opponent, one of the NAFSA staff whom I interviewed said that:

> I think it is clear that anti-immigration groups used 9/11 quite consciously to further their agenda. And they engaged in a lot of anti-student, anti-educational exchange rhetoric against us, so I think that has been, those were clearly opponents, of ours and still are. Although they have a little bit, their arguments resonate a little bit less now that we have some distance from 9/11 than they did

> afterwards. But, you know, putting that aside, nobody is really against educational exchanges in this country, the opposition comes more from apathy, from people who don't think we need or don't favor a vigorous advocacy agenda in this area, or from people who have tactical disagreements with us for one reason or another.

Similarly, Alex, a staff member of an international exchange organization, gave me a more optimistic view, in response to my question as to whether he finds any oppositional political actors:

> I don't normally, but there are for sure people who want to restrict immigration into the United States and argue that students actually want to immigrate and that they come here on a non-immigrant student visa. So the group that's opposed to immigration is probably going to be opposed to having foreign students here. But beyond that I don't find groups of Americans, organizations, or people who are saying this is a bad thing. I find the reverse; this is a really good thing. (Alex, Staff of an international exchange organization)

While some interviewees referred to anti-immigration groups (particularly the FAIR mentioned by three) as opponents to their coalition for international student access, my interviewees tended to argue that there has not been organized opponents against the promotion of international student access to U.S. higher education. This tendency seems to imply that this policy subsystem has had a dominant coalition advocating international student access, without any strong opposing coalition.

NAFSA's Resources as Political Actor

As far as NAFSA's strengths are concerned, more than a half of my interviewees,

both those within NAFSA, either as staff or members, and outside of NAFSA, mentioned NAFSA's large membership to mobilize. For example, in its own members' point of view, Andrew argued that:

> I think we represent, the organization represents almost every level of higher education in the United States. Ten thousand members at all of the institutions across the country, we have people all over and so we can, we can write to our congressmen, we can write to our senators and representatives and make a difference. So one of the strengths of the organization is the size and the enthusiasm that the members have. It is easy to get this group of people moving in a direction. (Andrew, NAFSA member)

A similar argument was made by a legislator's office staffer as follows:

> We … talked about them being a membership organization, which is very effective in terms of bringing their members to lobby on the different issues. … they used their members to ask the other members of congress to co-sponsor and be involved and to have and be educated about the issues, so they're very valuable that way. (Emily, Staffer at a Senator's office)

Although pointing to some limitation of NAFSA's strength, another outsider of NAFSA explained that:

> Their strength is they have large numbers, large organization, which they can mobilize. … NAFSA of course has a lot of numbers. They don't have presidential associations, so they don't have the benefit of a president, but they have their individual members writing letters and so forth and that is very helpful. (Stewart, staff of a university presidents' association)

This large membership of NAFSA can be identified as ‘mobilizable troops’ as one of the six types of the coalition resources which Sabatier and Weible (2007) see useful for the ACF analysis. As Sabatier and Weible (2007) explain, “Coalitions with minimal financial resources often rely very heavily upon mobilizable troops as an inexpensive resources” (p. 203). Given NAFSA’s scarcity of financial resources, expanding the membership has been a wise strategy for increasing its political voices in the coalition.

Also, more than a half of my interviewees commended NAFSA’s expertise in the issues concerning international students, and in international education in general. Emily, a staffer at a Senator’s office, told me that NAFSA’s technical expertise was really valuable when she was drafting bills related to the issues of international students and international education. Emily continued to summarize NAFSA’s strength in its expertise as follows:

> NAFSA certainly was not one of the biggest or most powerful lobbyists in Washington. They are the kind of group that what they bring to the table is their expertise, their technological expertise … They have background sheets that they always provide, also very helpful in terms of the expertise. (Emily, Staffer at a Senator’s office)

Although doubtful about the influence which NAFSA can exercise in the policy process, Fred, a member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, gave me his positive view on NAFSA’s expertise as follows:

> I think that they are just one player in the whole area of international education. I think that they have expertise. They know international education better than anybody else, but whether they can strongly influence the government when the

> government is trying to carry out its national security mission, I don't know that NAFSA can do much to resist that. (Fred, AILA)

Thomas, a representative at a university federal relations office, pointed out that this expertise is being effectively used to connect various higher education institutions and associations in policy advocacy as follows:

> I think strength number one is … they serve as an umbrella and they can help bring campuses around the country together in reaching a consensus and … the other higher education groups will often look to NAFSA to help sort out where the higher education community should be on particular issues that are clearly related to international students. And so I think they have been very effective in working in that bridge capacity. … And I think most of those associations see that this is NAFSA's area of expertise. (Thomas, University Federal Relations Representative)

In addition, several interviewees implied that NAFSA was not always simply approaching for support, or negotiation, to the political actors with legal authorities such as legislators and governmental agencies, but would sometimes be approached for their assistance by those more influential political actors. This occasional relationship does not result from NAFSA's passivity at all. On the contrary, NAFSA's continually proactive policy advocacy activities would plant seeds for future cooperation with the other political actors. As explained above, the expertise which NAFSA possesses in the field of international student access is often far richer than any other political actors, and the other political leaders, even legislators, would need such expertise from time to time. My impression throughout the interviews for my dissertation was that some pressing request

from the legislators' sides led to NAFSA's involvement in the development of some bills promoting international student access to U.S. higher education such as the ACTION Act of 2005 and 2008. Surely, NAFSA must have found the opportunity very rewarding.

As seen in the interview quotations above, NAFSA is generally perceived as providing the coalition with invaluable 'information' defined by the ACF as coalition resources. NAFSA has contributed to the coalition promoting international student access to U.S. higher education, by supplying its allies with "[information] regarding the problem severity and causes and the costs and benefits of policy alternatives" (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 203). Sabatier & Weible (2007) points to researchers as an important provider group of such expertise information. Although it seems that NAFSA has not developed its substantial research functions, its allies have relied upon NAFSA, as the largest professional association devoting international education, for special knowledge on the issues concerning international student access.

Also, not only the special knowledge on the issues of international students and international education, but also the professional skills of NAFSA's public policy staff in advocating in Washington are regarded as one of NAFSA's strengths; for example,

> [NAFSA has] an extremely talented public policy staff and that's been built in the last ten years. Ten years ago I would say they had a very weak and ineffective public policy staff and not a very high profile. And I think they sort of got a lot of talent, they have a lot of energy, they have a lot of expertise, they are able to, they have got the capacity that we don't have for example, to draft legislation, to present to members of Congress I think they have been effective in convening as a convener of task forces they have a report on study abroad, they

> report on foreign student access you know, they are good at pulling that kind of thing together and getting those documents out, which I think are useful. (an outsider of NAFSA)

A couple of NAFSA members argued that one of the strengths of NAFSA is its members' commitment to and enthusiasms toward international education. For example,

> I think international educators are believers. I think they are motivated by something that has nothing to do with money, it has nothing to do with progress in their careers, they are motivated because they really believe in s set of values that this profession works to achieve. (Patrick, NAFSA, member)

As far as weaknesses of NAFSA are concerned, some argued that the diverse members can be problematic for consensus. For example,

> I would say one of the weaknesses is that their constituency is so broad that it's a large challenge, a big challenge for them to really try to advocate for everybody and all of the different efforts. (Mary, NAFSA member)

Kate, a NAFSA member, does not see this diversity as a weakness but as a challenge for NAFSA, saying that:

> with a membership so diverse, NAFSA is really strategic about taking positions, but that doesn't mean that they have asked all 10,000 members and that they are all in agreement. As any member organization, there will be a lot of different opinions. So how do you meet the needs of the members, but speak clearly on its behalf when you have so many different opinions? It creates a natural but healthy tension between the membership's interests and the goal setting at the staff level. This challenge is going to be constantly something you have to watch.

(Kate, NAFSA member).

A similar argument was made by a State Department official, who sees potentially problematic diversity in NAFSA's large memberships. This official recognized the difficulties in reaching consensus about the priorities for most of the segments of the members as outstanding diversities in U.S. higher education such as the institutional sizes, from a small liberal arts college to a large land-grant university, and the institutional types, from English language schools to research universities. However, this official's conclusion was that NAFSA relatively well cope with such difficulties, compared to other interest groups.

Further, another weakness which a number of my interviewees mentioned was the way NAFSA acts in advocating the issue with its allies and to the government. Some typical comments are the following:

> I would say their weakness is sometimes they go off and do things without coordinating them with the larger community. … I would just say maybe impulsive. They may feel the need to go out and do something right now and it might have been better to wait and get more people on board or vary the issue. But they do what they think they need to do;
>
> I think NAFSA's weakness has been that they … are less inclined to partner or they would have more benefit if they partnered with other organizations. They would have more success if they worked with other organizations and not try and do it alone; and
>
> One is tone. If you read some of their advocacy pieces, the tone could come across as quite harsh. … I think having a more collegial tone would be more

> effective. And I have heard people comment on that. … [Also, NAFSA tends] to stake things out a little bit further than other people are comfortable with going, sometimes that is a good thing, sometimes it is not helpful.

However, these criticisms are exactly what the NAFSA staff know, and what they intentionally do, as one of the NAFSA staff members whom I interviewed said:

> We believe to a certain extent you have to change policy through political conflict; otherwise, it doesn't get changed. It is not that we like conflict, or deliberately set out to make conflict, but it is how you get change. And many of our colleague associations don't like political conflict, they don't like people in the government criticizing them. But you can't have change unless you make them mad at you to a certain extent. Even our best friends get mad at us.

This comment does correspond to what Victor Johnson, Senior Adviser for Public Policy at NAFSA, explains as NAFSA's public policy approach over the ten years in the 60th anniversary issue of *International Educator* (V. Jonson, May/June, 2008).

From an ACF perspective, it can be argued that NAFSA's resource of skillful leadership as a political actor has attracted skepticism among some of NAFSA's traditional allies, although the other allies as well as the people in the NAFSA leadership regard such 'aggressive,' but 'foresighted' and 'proactive' approach itself as the evidence of NAFSA's skillful leadership. More accurate evaluation of the NAFSA's strength and weakness in this regard in the past decade may need further research on the mid- and long-term effects from such approach on NAFSA's political contributions to the policy subsystem.

Benefits and Costs of Having International Students: Beliefs as Political Actors

Nobody failed to mention the foreign policy or public diplomacy benefits of having international students. Frequently, such rationales are emphasized as the most important. For example, George, NAFSA staff, explained the importance of foreign policy related rationales, particularly mutual understanding for peace making, as follows:

> I think we all, and I think our board and the representation of our membership still deeply believe that these educational exchange programs are part of building the kind of world that the United States at least ought to want to live in. And among all the foreign policy reasons for doing this in terms of promoting our own leadership and interests in the world, that is one that is still fundamentally the basis of exchange programs sixty years after Senator Fulbright sort of invented the idea. (George, NAFSA Staff)

Many of my interviewees started talking about these foreign policy benefits when asked for their opinion as to what the benefits of having international students in the U.S. were. Or, others mentioned the foreign policy benefits later in their interview, but they tended to emphasize that the foreign policy benefits is the most important. Using the ACF concept, it can be explained that the beliefs in the foreign policy benefits from bringing international students into the U.S. are very stable. The benefits have been taken for granted at the core of the pro-international-student coalition's belief system.

When talking about the benefits in terms of mutual understanding, it seems that most of my interviewees indicated the interaction between the international and domestic students. A few of my interviewees argued that having international students in the U.S. positively affects the domestic students. Although only a few of my interviewees clearly

mentioned the educational benefits, one of the typical descriptions of the educational benefits for the domestic students is as follows:

> I think there are significant benefits, as I said, to Americans for meeting people from abroad. … They benefit individual Americans who meet them, who are exposed to other societies, who learn to respect and interact with other people and therefore be better prepared to interact in a global society.

It is interesting that one of the two State Department officials whom I interviewed gave his first priority to the flow of foreign talents to the U.S. over the foreign policy rationales such as educating future leaders. He emphasized the importance of the talent the high level access of international students brings to the United States. He continued to explain the impacts of the talent on campus of American colleges and universities, by arguing that a source of talent replenishes the United States, enlivens the United States' academic community, increases scholarship, scholarly exchange, excitement, competition within the campus, and the chance for American students to engage with very talented people from abroad.

Similarly, Mary, a NAFSA member, argued that:

> I really believe that that is one of the most beneficial things, is to try to bring people in who actually can contribute to the work that we are doing, and if they can make breakthroughs in science and engineering and other fields, create patents and create business around that, again it goes into the business arena but it's more than just that, it really has a profound impact on world economics. (Mary, NAFSA, member)

Other economic benefits from the international students' expenditure were

mentioned by more than a half of my interviewees. Although many of my interviewees referred to the billions of dollars which international students bring, citing IIE/NAFSA's annual statistics, the income generation from the tuition fees was given lower priorities in terms of the importance of the benefits. While I brought the examples of other competing host countries such at the U.K. and Australia, which have been aggressive for such generation income for the institutions, many of my interviewees told me that the U.S.'s priority is different from these countries.

As far as costs or risks of having international students in the U.S. are concerned, almost half of my interviewees simply answered that "not really any" and "very few" without referring to any specific potential costs or risks. Further, most of the rest of the interviewees told me that they had been aware of the arguments about a number of types of costs or risks of having international students in the U.S., these interviews tended to feel themselves that such negative impacts were minimal or very limited, and argued that the benefits overweigh these costs or risks. The costs or risks mentioned by my interviewees include: national security risks; costs for services to administrate international students or meet international students' special needs, which are different from the domestic students; crowding-out the domestic students in enrollments; and brain drain. One of the state department officials I interviewed admitted such potential risks and costs, but emphasized the far greater benefits from having international students than the risks and/or costs, and argued that the State Departments goal certainly is trying to make sure that international students are welcome and are able to come.

From a institutional perspective, Stella, a NAFSA member, explained the institutional costs as follows:

> Of course it is costly to send staff out to recruit internationally, to maintain an international student office on the campus, to meet federal government requirements to hold authorization to issue immigration documents, and to offer specialized services to international students such as expanded orientation or focused instruction in writing in English. We use those resources to make sure that international students succeed at our institutions. Many institutions also provide financial aid to international students. Boards of trustees and senior administrators must be careful with institutional resources, so financial commitments at a level sufficient to support international students receive careful consideration. Institutional leadership understands that an international campus is an enriched campus, providing added value to the educational experience for all of its students, faculty, and staff, most of whom are U.S. citizens. Institutions see excellent value for the dollars spent on international education. (Stella, NAFSA member)

Regarding another type of possible costs, ‘crowding-out effects,’ Jack, a NAFSA member as well as a member of the Association of International Educational Administrators, who is at a senior administrative position in a public university with a large population of international students on its campus, explained the situation of the arguments about the crowding-out effects in his state as follows:

> In terms of cost … these are ones that I don’t worry about as much, but there are people who do, and that is particularly when you are at a public university, and you have the state government and citizens saying, well if you allow in so many international students what does that mean for the ability of students who are

> coming from families who are paying taxes to have their students get the benefit of that education? Will there be enough seats? … There is no citizen lobby or anything like that. But they talk to their representatives within the state and since some of our funds for state universities come from [the state government], so that is where it can hurt. Because the state, the governor still appoints people to the board of trustees at the university, and it becomes political that way. (Jack, NAFSA member as well as AIEA member)

In relation to this argument of crowding-out effects, Stewart, a staff member in charge of the international affairs of one of the major university presidents' associations, gave me another perspective as follows:

> one negative would be sometimes our institutions may you know, may miss opportunities to educate our own students in the physical sciences, they are not as aggressive because they have the market of foreign students coming in. If they didn't have that market they might have to work very, very hard to better educate the high school students to fill those positions. (Stewart, staff of a university presidents' association)

This may not be really the costs which international students have imposed on the institutions, but rather the costs as an institutional reaction to the presence of international students.

While the brain drain issue has attracted the attention of the international educators from time to time since the 1960s, my interviewees tended to regard the issue as not so important at this moment. The majority of my interviewees did not include the brain drain issue as a cost of having international students. Also, my additional question

about the issue during my interview did not lead most of these interviewees to their including the issue in their lists of existing costs or risks. Many of them simply told me that the issue is not much discussed these days. However, Jeffery, a NAFSA member, after admitting the importance of foreign talents' contributions to the U.S., gave me a different perception as follows:

> It is also very important that international students return to their home countries in significant numbers and contribute to the development of their countries, their economies. So it is a very complicated picture there. … Brain drain issues versus issues relating to contributions here in the United States, so that is a very complex issue that I think doesn't get as much attention as it should get. … I think that the issue continues to have a lot of attention. I think it deserves more attention and it deserves more careful study to really understand the modern world and the place of mobility of capital of human resources in the modern world and the realities of that so I think it is an issue that we don't pay enough attention to and we need to do more research and analysis of that issue.

Perhaps, the discussions about the brain drain issue may have continued among a fraction of international educators, but it has not been given by the majority of the international educators in the U.S. much priority as Jeffery hoped to see.

By asking the interviewees' perceptions about the benefits and costs of bringing international students into U.S. higher education, my interviews attempted to capture the shared beliefs among the political actors, including people related to NAFSA as staff and members, in the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education. According to the ACF, policy changes follow the changes in beliefs. As

indicated earlier in this chapter, my interviewees tended to perceive the tightened controls over international student access to U.S. higher education after the September 11 attacks as major policy changes. However, the interviewees also tended to emphasize that their beliefs in international student mobility had not been much changed by the September 11 attacks, although my interviewees admitted that national security had been a very important concern in the policy subsystem.

There can be two contrary interpretations about this variance between the ACF theory and my interview results, without throwing out the usefulness of the ACF. On the one hand, this discrepancy may be explained largely by the fact that I was not able to interview many of those who had actually made the final decisions with their legal authority for these policy changes. Indeed, most of my interviewees were administrators and/or advisers at universities. If most of my interviewees had been the Congress members with legal authority to make legislations and regulations, the interview results might have shown substantial changes in beliefs, too, as the ACF could predict.

On the other hand, it can be argued that the solid continuities in the pro-international-student coalition's beliefs in international student mobility may have played a significant role in gradually easing the tightened controls over the years. In this argument, the tightened controls over international student access after the terrorist attacks of 2001 would be regarded just as a punctuated and temporary response to the terrorist attacks, and from a very long-term perspective, the U.S. policy may be still stable in terms of welcoming international students into U.S. higher education.

Chapter Eight: Discussion and Conclusion

Based on the documentary and interview data presented in the previous chapters, this chapter overviews 60 years of change and continuity in each of the four elements in the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) subsystem (i.e., political actors in coalitions, policy belief, resources, and strategy regarding guidance instruments). The purpose of this overview is to answer the four specific research questions introduced at the outset of this dissertation: (1) what relationships have NAFSA developed with other key actors in this policy process?; (2) what has characterized NAFSA's beliefs in the promotion of international student mobility into the U.S.?; (3) what resources has NAFSA, as a political actor, contributed to the coalition's advocacy for international student mobility?; and (4) what strategies has NAFSA used for its attempt to influence the federal policy? In addition to the attempt to answer these questions, this chapter particularly discusses the two particular characteristics of the policy beliefs of international educators, which this dissertation sees have been largely represented by NAFSA. Also, before concluding this dissertation, I evaluate the usefulness of the ACF in explaining how NAFSA, as a professional association of international educators, has influenced the federal policy governing international student access to U.S. higher education. Lastly, the concluding part of this dissertation summarizes how NAFSA, as a professional association of international educators, has influenced the federal policy governing international student access to U.S. higher education, and discusses the major implications of this study for domestic and international contexts and for future research.

Continuities and Changes: Answers for the Four Specific Research Questions

This section attempts to answer the four specific research questions presented at

the outset of this dissertation by overviewing the continuities and changes in the policy process since the end of World War II in terms of the political actors, policy beliefs, resources, and strategies regarding guidance instruments in the policy subsystem regarding international student access to U.S. higher education. This overview below is based on the documentary and interview data presented in the previous chapters. Please see Appendix D for a table of the overview of the changes and continuities in the four terms.

Political actors. Many types of the key political actors, both governmental and non-governmental, in this policy subsystem have remained the same since the late 1940s, while a few of the key actors in the earlier years have left the scene, and other new actors have emerged in the subsystem. While the 60 years since the late 1940s have sometimes seen unorganized advocates for more limited access of international students, there has been a far more dominant coalition advocating greater international student mobility into the U.S. Over the 60 years, NAFSA in the dominant pro-international-student-access coalition has usually attempted to influence the federal policies governing international student access to U.S. higher education, cooperating with many of the political actors.

First, the government agencies in charge of regulating or promoting international student mobility into the U.S. have been among the most influential players in this subsystem over the past 60 years. These agencies include the following: the Department of State, both in its consular function abroad to issue visas and its public diplomacy function to promote international educational exchange programs; the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) until most of its functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security's three agencies in March 2003; and the United States

International Communication Agency (USICA) and its renamed agency, the United States Information Agency (USIA) as the main political actors in the area of public diplomacy between 1978 and 1999.

Second, the U.S. Congress has no doubt played very influential roles in governing international student access to U.S. higher education, although international student access has seldom been paramount in the congressional agenda until after the September 11 attacks. There have been some Congress members who, either continually or temporarily, devoted considerable effort to the making of legislation for either the promotion of or control of international student mobility into the U.S. My data show that these prominent members in terms of the issue of international students include these: Senators William Fulbright, Paul Simon, and Norm Coleman in favor of these students' greater mobility into the U.S.; and Senators Joseph McCarthy, Alan Simpson, and Dianne Feinstein, who favored more limited access. It can be also argued, however, that although the U.S. Congress has generally expressed its bipartisan support for international educational exchanges from foreign policy perspectives, many of the Congress members have not prioritized the issue of international student access.

Third, while the record shows that many U.S. Presidents, from Harry S. Truman through George W. Bush, have traditionally expressed their supportive sentiments to international educational exchanges, mainly from foreign policy perspectives, most of the Presidents, except for President John F. Kennedy with his leadership for the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, have not facilitated substantial policy changes positively affecting international student access. While President Lyndon B. Johnson managed to pass the International Education Act of 1966, the Act had only indirect implications to

international student access. President Bill Clinton's Executive Memorandum of 2000 specifically called for inter-agency coordination for international student recruitment, but the Memorandum has produced few substantial policy outputs, except for the International Education Week, which is annually held at many colleges and universities nation-wide with the support of the Departments of State and Education.

Next, as far as non-governmental political actors in this policy subsystem are concerned, NAFSA has been one of few organizations which have always and exclusively attended to the issue of international student access to U.S. higher education over the past 60 years. As demonstrated by its efforts for the Chinese student emergency financial aid in 1949, NAFSA started getting involved in the process of policy making affecting international students. Steadily through the past 60 years, its organization became bigger in its membership, and its expertise of international students became more articulated, and its relationship with its allies became more extensive and closer. As a result, NAFSA has become an important political actor, even if not one of the most influential.

Among other non-governmental actors in this subsystem, the American Council on Education (ACE) and the Institute of International Education (IIE) have been often included in NAFSA's collective efforts for policy changes. Throughout the 60 years, when the ACE and other university presidential associations such as NASULGC made congressional testimonies regarding the issue of international student access to U.S. higher education, NAFSA was often included in the organizations which those testimonies represented. Even when NAFSA and these university presidential associations made separate testimonies in a hearing, their arguments have usually

supplemented each other in terms of advocacy for international student access.

From time to time, the federal policy arena has seen some opponents against the free flow of international students into the U.S. According to some of my interviewees, these opponents have tended to be anti-immigration groups, or legislators who had some sympathy with anti-immigration sentiments in the public. It seems, however, that from my investigation in the documentary data and interviews, there have not been any substantially organized opponents against international educational exchanges.

At the same time, some actors which used to be prominent in a coalition with NAFSA for policy changes are seldom mentioned in the recent documents and in my interviews. Some examples are the Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign Students (CFRFS) and the Greater New York Council for Foreign Students. These organizations appear in the documents in the late 1940s and 1950s, but gradually faded out in the 1960s. Also, the documentary data indicate that some huge private foundations such as the Carnegie Foundations and Ford Foundations substantially provided financial support for NAFSA's operation and development through the late 1940 to the mid 1960s. Nowadays, instead of these private foundations, other type of business industries, such as those in computer or electronic industries, joined the coalition with NAFSA for policy changes in favor of the employment of foreign talents.

Policy beliefs: Benefits and costs of having international students. As explained in the literature review in Chapter Three, my data presented in the previous two chapters also indicate that the political actors in the policy subsystem concerning international student access to U.S. higher education have continued to give their priority to the foreign policy rationales. Political actors who have advocated international educational

exchanges have almost never failed to mention the benefits of having international students from public diplomacy perspectives. There is a general agreement that international education exchanges such as the Fulbright Programs were one of the important contributors to the U.S. victory over the Cold War. It is generally believed that educating foreigners on the U.S. higher education institutions fostered friendly attitudes in the foreign countries after these foreigners returned home with the appreciation of democracy and market economy. As seen in the strong congressional opposition to the budget reduction plan of the USICA Director Charles Wick's plan to reduce the appropriation for the government's international education exchange programs, there has been generally bipartisan support for the promotion of international educational exchanges. After the September 11 attacks, some Congress members were initially very opposed to the free flow of international students to the U.S. in the beginning. However, Congress soon authorized the increase in the appropriation for the international educational exchanges, particularly with the Muslim countries, believing that the foreign policy benefits of such exchange programs are valid.

Many of my interviewees stressed the importance of these foreign policy benefits, too, and argued that the importance has never been changed since the late 1940s. All my interviewees were active advocates for international student mobility to the U.S. with several different reasons. They agreed with NAFSA's argument in the aftermath of the September 11 that bringing international students to the U.S. is a solution to the potential risk of terrorism which unorganized opponents may see in the presence of these students in the U.S. Also, the political actors in the higher education community, including NAFSA, have also frequently mentioned the positive academic impact of

international students on the domestic counterparts. They believe that interaction between the international and domestic students can significantly help the domestic students develop their international skills with knowledge about other foreign languages and cultures.

Economic rationales for bringing international students into the U.S. are being given more significance in the discussion about the issue of international students in the U.S. Both long-term and short-term economic benefits are mentioned. However, most of my interviewees regarded the long-term benefits (such as trade and business relationships in the future) as important, while the short-term benefits (immediate impacts on U.S. economy through the payment of tuition, fees and living costs) was ranked relatively lower in the priority of the benefits.

The intellectual contributions of international students to research and development in the STEM field are one of the recently popular arguments among those who advocate for international student access to the U.S. This argument is now requiring some policy changes which could make it easier for the U.S. higher education institutions and business industry to retain talented international students in the U.S. after their completing of their study in the U.S. According to the congressional hearings mentioned in Chapter Five, this argument was made, although on a smaller scale, by NAFSA and the higher education community as early as the 1950s so that immigration law could be flexible in order to make bright foreign talents available for the U.S. higher education community. This argument and the brain drain issue are two sides of the same coin.

As shown in Chapter Five, this particular benefit has not been integrated in the general discussion of the importance of bringing international students into the U.S. until

recently. Separately, however, the intellectual contribution of international students to research in the STEM field was emphasized by the academic community, including NAFSA, as early as the mid 1980s, when the Simpson-Mazzoli bills proposed a two-year home residency requirement for international students.

Most of my interviewees recognized the issues of the actual and potential costs and risks of open access for international students to the U.S., as discussed in the previous literature. These downsides include: costs of extra services to meet international students' special needs (e.g., immigration consultation, language support, and cultural counseling), crowding-out effects on domestic students' admissions and domestic employment, brain drain problems, and physical or ideological threats on the U.S. soil. The documentary data presented in Chapter Five indicate that most of these arguments about the downsides have been expressed since the very early years such as the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, the vast majority of the interviewees pointed out that the benefits from bringing international students in the U.S. have been far greater than these costs and risks.

Lastly, it can be argued that the immigration service such as INS and the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services may share the beliefs in the benefits from international students with those who have advocate open access for international students to U.S. higher education. The immigration service agency officers would not deny the foreign policy rationales of bringing international students to the U.S. Like NAFSA and the higher education community, the INS was opposed to the proposal of a two-year home residency requirement, introduced in Congress in the 1980s and 1990s because the INS recognized the importance of foreign

talents for the U.S. prosperity. Therefore, it is unclear where the immigration service can be placed in the ACF diagram of policy subsystem. Unlike the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the INS seems not to be within the pro-international-student-access coalition. However, the immigration service has not formed a conflicting coalition against the pro-international-student-access coalition, either.

Resources. Below, I look at the resources of the pro-international-student-access coalition, in terms of the coalition resource typologies of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), explained by Sabatier & Weible (2007). The typologies are as follows: formal legal authority to make policy decisions, public opinions, information, mobilizable troops, financial resources, and skillful leadership. As far as NAFSA's own resources are concerned, NAFSA with no legal authority and little influence on public opinions, has contributed to the pro-international-student-access coalition by providing its steadily increased mobilizable troops as memberships, continually outstanding expertise knowledge on international student affairs, and recently enhanced efforts to take leadership both in regulatory and legislative policy advocacy.

First, given that the ACF regards those in the governmental administration and Congress as potential members of advocacy coalitions, it is assumed that the pro-international-student coalition has enjoyed having formal legal authority to make policy decisions as major resource to the coalition from time to time. Particularly, the governmental agencies such as the State Department, the USICA, and USIA have sought to use international educational exchange as a public diplomacy tool. These agencies have been integral to the pro-international-student coalition. At the same time, some

outstanding figures in Congress like Senator William Fulbright have used their authority to make legislative decisions (e.g., the Fulbright Act of 1946, the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961) in favor of the coalition which share the belief in the benefits of bringing international students to the U.S. Also, President Kennedy's initiatives leading to the enactment of the Fulbright-Hays Act was another example where formal legal authority was a key resource to the new policy to promote international education exchanges.

The issue of international student access to U.S. higher education has not frequently attracted attention from the general public. However, it is safe to say that the American public has been generally positive about the achievements of international educational exchanges such as the Fulbright Programs, at least until the September 11 attacks. This public opinion in favor of open access for international students to U.S. higher education has been an resource for pro-international-student-access coalition, including NAFSA. Conversely, therefore, NAFSA needed to change the general public opinions criticizing such open access due to fear of potential terrorist attacks.

Concerning information as a coalition resource, NAFSA is has been expected to contribute to the coalition by supplying its expertise on international students over the last 60 years. As early as the beginning of the 1960s, the invitation and contribution of then NAFSA President James Davis to Kennedy's task force on International Educational Exchange demonstrated the recognition of NAFSA's resource to offer as the expertise information for the coalition which sought for the promotion of international educational exchange. Also, as seen in Chapter Five, NAFSA has been working regularly and closely with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the INS has often sought for NAFSA's advice and suggestions for the policy changes in visa and immigration rules for

international students. Certainly, the intentions of the immigration service, as an enforcement agency, to improve its controls over international student access have often been contradictory to the beliefs of NAFSA and its allies that international student access to U.S. higher education should be as open as possible. However, NAFSA, as the most knowledgeable group about the administration of international students in the U.S. higher education institutions, can be regarded as a key actor in the policy subsystem.

Mobilizable troops as coalition resources are available in the pro-international-student-access coalition. Several non-governmental organizations in the pro-international-student-access coalition have mobilized their own members and affiliates with special strengths in advocating the coalition's interests. The ACE and other university presidential associations can mobilize the university presidents, who are likely to have considerable influence on society, including Congress members. Hundreds of thousands of the Fulbright alumni around the world can be mobilizable troops for the promotion of international student access to U.S., too. While NAFSA used to be very small in its membership (less than 100 at its inception), it now boasts of 10,000 members as international education professionals, most of whom work closely with international students in the U.S. higher education institutions. In recent years, NAFSA has been effectively able to mobilize its members for various political activities as grassroots advocacy.

Perhaps, financial resources may have been traditionally the weakest part of the pro-international-student-access coalition. The higher education community, including NAFSA, has not enjoyed abundant financial resources for its members' political activities for the promotion of international student access to U.S. higher education. Unlike profit

interest groups, the traditional members of this coalition (namely those in the higher education community) have advocated international student access for public interests. For example, Victor Johnson, NAFSA's senior Adviser for Public Policy, wrote that, "NAFSA doesn't have a PAC [Political Action Committee]; we don't give money to politicians, or buy them dinner, or take them on trips" (V. Johnson, May/June, 2008, p. 10). Recently, however, the pro-international-student-access coalition has included several affluent organizations representing business industry, as obtaining the best and brightest foreign talents is the common interest both for the higher education community and business people. In this context, arguably, the pro-international-student-access coalition may have increased its potential financial resources for its political activities.

Lastly, the pro-international-student-access coalition has seen some skilful leadership in the policy changes over the 60 years. As discussed so far, Senator William Fulbright and President Kennedy created an attractive vision for the coalition. Also, Representative Paul Simon's role in the regulation reforms in favor of those who advocate international student access was another example of skillful leadership. As seen in Chapter Five, Representative Simon played the role of *policy broker*, in the term of the ACF, in facilitating the communication between the INS and NAFSA by setting a joint meeting among them. This meeting led to the regulatory liberalization as a result of the joint working group between the INS and NAFSA. Without such leadership of these politicians, actual changes have not been brought about. Also, an example as non-governmental leadership is the efforts of the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange, in whose original formation NAFSA was also involved in the early 1980s, to coordinate the various voices of the higher education community as well

as the international exchange community for the promotion of international student access. Particularly since the late 1990s, it appears that joining such efforts of the Alliance, NAFSA, as an association, has tried to take active leadership in promoting the policy changes in favor of the pro-international-student-access coalition. The example joint actions of these two non-governmental organizations were the approach to Congress for a separate leadership for international educational exchange in the proposed merger of the USIA into the State Department, and the proposal for the creation of a U.S. international education policy, including the promotion of international student recruitment.

Strategies regarding guidance instruments. NAFSA has employed a number of strategies in its attempt to influence the federal policies governing international students. As its conventional strategies since its inception, NAFSA has used the opportunities of congressional hearings, representing either its members or a collation with other political actors, and also encouraged its members to send messages to the Congress members for their support for NAFSA's advocacy. Rather than trying to act alone in the advocacy, NAFSA has usually worked in the pro-international-student-access coalition. Another continual strategy of NAFSA has been its regular meeting with the governmental agencies, which used to be reactive in the beginning, but which have become more proactive by the 1980s. Further, in addition to the traditional strategy, which focused on the regulatory area, NAFSA has aggressively expanded its political activity to the legislative area since the late 90s.

As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) explained, one of the guidance instruments available coalitions which aim to make direct effects on agency rulemaking,

case specific, or budgetary decisions is persuading agency officials through testimony. As seen in Chapter Six, NAFSA and its allies advocating international student access to U.S. higher education have made a number of testimonies in Congress. In these hearings, NAFSA sometimes represented itself only, but often was represented by other university associations, such as the American Council on Education. Further, not only in these hearings, NAFSA as an association has often managed to include its name on its behalf in the letters of other major higher education associations advocating policy changes for better international student access. For policy advocacy, NAFSA has usually worked with its allies in a larger coalition.

As an association of a large membership, NAFSA has often urged its members to send letters to their Congress members to act on behalf of them. This approach started at the very first opportunity where NAFSA demonstrated its capacity and willingness to be involved in the federal policy process. This was seen in NAFSA's request for emergency financial aid for the Chinese students in the late 1940s. In addition, NAFSA has published and issued a number of white papers and position statement advocating international student access. With its strategic engagement in mass media, particularly in recent years, these publications have been used to change the policy preferences of not only Congress members, the government agency officials, and higher education community, but also of public opinions in favor of international student access to U.S. higher education.

While the past 60 years have seen the regular and continual communication with the key government agencies such as the State Department and INS as an important approach for NAFSA's relationship with the federal government, the relationship has evolved. As Marvin Baron (quoted in Zeigler, 1988), former NAFSA President, explained,

in the 1960s, NAFSA's primary role was to clarify the governmental regulations, not to modify them, while in the 1970s the government agencies such as the State Department and INS started consulting NAFSA before the formulation of certain regulations and procedures. Through its own more intensive and extensive involvement in the policy process in the 1980s, such as NAFSA's response to the threats, including the USIA Director Wick's proposal of the exchange budget cut, the proposal of a two-year home residency requirement in the Simpson-Mazzoli bills, and the tighter regulations of the INS, NAFSA further developed its capacity to work with the other coalition members, Congress, and the government agencies. NAFSA's approach was becoming more and more proactive rather than reactive.

Further, as emphasized several times earlier, NAFSA under Marlene Johnson's leadership became more aggressively involved in not only the regulatory activities but also in the legislative activities for policy changes. NAFSA has continued to work even more closely with governmental agencies such as the Departments of State and Homeland Security in relation to ever changing regulations. At the same time, NAFSA's recent activities in the legislative areas have been very visible and provocative: for example, it supported the bill which would remove the section mandating the international student tracking system from the IIRAIRA of 1996; or it actively called for the creation of a U.S. international education policy, and managed to have some Congress members lead to a resolution for such a U.S. international education policy.

Another example of a new way of NAFSA's involvement in the legislative process was its support for the bills such the ISSA Act of 2004 and ACTION Act of 2005 and 2008 as introduced by Senator Norm Coleman in response to the stagnation of the

number of international students studying in the U.S. after the September 11 attacks. As mentioned in Chapters Six and Seven, NAFSA appear to have been approached by the legislator's offices for help in crafting the bills. This development was not a result of NAFSA's being reactive in the policy process. Instead, the legislator's office approached NAFSA simply because the office had known previously NAFSA's expertise knowledge and capacity through NAFSA's active advocacy for the creation of a U.S. international education policy.

Next, before concluding this dissertation, this chapter goes on to present three additional findings from my investigation and analysis. The first two of these findings are about the particular characteristics of policy beliefs of international educators which this dissertation sees have been largely represented by NAFSA: recurring dilemma and alleged optimism. The third finding is about the usefulness of the ACF in explaining how NAFSA as a professional association of international educators has influenced the federal policy governing international student access to U.S. higher education.

Recurring Dilemma Between Government Interference and Support

Throughout the 60 years after World War II, many international educators have faced a dilemma emerging from their phobia about government interference and their need for government support. NAFSA and its allies, particularly in the academic community, have been reluctant to make international education exchange programs subordinate to political and economic rationales as national interests. However, both in Congress and the government agencies, there have been those who wanted to use international educational exchange primarily as means to U.S. foreign policy ends. This difference was most remarkably demonstrated in the points of the reorganization of

agencies which were in charge of the government promotions for international educational exchanges such as the Fulbright Program. As seen in earlier chapters, international educators as well as the academic community in general and some Congress members such as Senator Fulbright have repeatedly called for the separation between educational and political objectives in the operation of international educational exchanges.

At the same time, however, NAFSA and its allies have often used the foreign policy rationales of international student mobility into U.S. higher education in order to gain the governmental support for the programs for international students and to have the regulations over international students liberalized. For example, as in the hearing in the early 1960s, Jim Davis, then NAFSA President, justified higher education institutions' request for a greater appropriation for the international exchange programs because these institutions contributed to the national objectives in foreign policy by educating international students. Also, NAFSA has continued to call for the liberalization of visa and immigration regulations for international students, by pointing out that the federal government had agreed that the promotion of international educational exchanges is in the national interests of the U.S. foreign policy. In such arguments, NAFSA has emphasized the importance of the foreign policy rationales in justifying their requests.

Indeed, many international educators, including NAFSA leadership, have been strongly concerned about the government interference in the regulatory framework such as visa and immigration policy. NAFSA's prominent opposition against the international student tracking system in the late 1990s appeared to emerge partly from these fundamental fears of governmental interference. One of my interviewees summarized this

tendency in relation to NAFSA's responses to the CIPRIS project as follows:

> [within NAFSA] there were people who really felt that the federal government had no right to be collecting data on international units, they felt like the government should simply trust universities, universities were doing a good job, and they were people who some of them held leadership positions within NAFSA. (Patrick, NAFSA member)

Optimistic Beliefs?

Arguably, some reservations can be made about the causal relationship between open access for international students and the benefits seen by advocates. For example, why can most of the former foreign students studying in the U.S. be expected to take largely positive and friendly images of American society, values, and people with them home? They may have had negative experiences during their study in the U.S.

Many political actors' belief in foreign policy benefits of bringing international students into the U.S. may be too optimistic. Usually, international students' impact on foreign policy is indicated simply with a list of foreign countries' political leaders who have studied in the U.S. However, those leaders' foreign policy approaches to the U.S. have hardly been examined in depth. For example, Iran was one of the countries which sent the greatest number of their students to the U.S. around 1980. Many of those former students are now in their fifties, and some are in senior or executive positions in the government in Iran. Then, how positively have any of those Iranians who studied in the U.S. in those years contributed to diplomatic relationship between Iran and the U.S.? Haven't hundreds of thousands of these former students from Iran told their families, friends, and colleagues about any positive images of the U.S.? Or, did they take negative

images about the U.S. with them home after participating in any street demonstrations conflicting with local communities and authorities? How could the advocates for the promotion of international students simply believe in the foreign policy benefits without any serious and empirical examinations about the former international students' perceptions about the U.S.?

At the same time, the magnitude of the educational benefits of bringing international students can be questioned. The beliefs in the educational benefits that the presence of international students on campus gives the domestic students first-hand opportunities to understand different cultures and lean foreign languages can be again too optimistic. According to my documentary and interview data, many political actors, particularly in the academic community, including NAFSA's staff and members, believe in the positive impacts of international students on the domestic students' learning. Substantial interaction between the international and domestic students would produce such positive impacts in educational, cultural, and linguistic terms. However, as many ACE (1982) pointed out, such interaction does not frequently occur. It is often reported that one of the disappointments for international students is their inability to make friends with American students. Many international students tend to feel that their peer American students are not interested in foreign students. Indeed, as Arthur (2004) pointed out that "Solely relying on proximity and time together on the same campus to promote intercultural exchanges is most often insufficient" (p. 42). Given that many American institutions appear to have not been really successful in facilitating the real interaction between the international and domestic students, the frequently-mentioned educational benefits of bringing international student to the U.S. cannot justify policy alternatives to

promote international student access.

I am not arguing that there has been neither foreign policy nor educational benefits of bringing international students in the U.S. However, I am arguing that many political actors appear to tend to take it for granted that is very likely to have a large magnitude of foreign policy and educational benefits without any consideration and examination of the real situation. If political actors' priority is given to the economic benefits such as income generation through the payment of tuition, fees and living expenses, it would be reasonable for them simply to pursue the increase in the number of international students in the U.S. However, my study reveals that the majority of the U.S. political actors in this subsystem prioritized the educational or foreign policy benefits. In this sense, these political actors, including international educators, should seek, in addition to the quantitative improvement in international enrollments on campus, the qualitative improvement of interaction between the international and domestic population on campus.

The ACF's Usefulness

I have attempted to apply a public policy framework, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), to the examination of how NAFSA, as a case study of international educators' collective voice, have influenced the federal legislation and regulation over the 60 years after the end of World War II. I have found the ACF useful in various ways as follows.

In Chapter Two, I looked at some alternative models for studies of the policy process. These models were the following: David Easton's Systems Models, a classical Stages Model of policy making, John Kingdon's Multiple Streams Model, and Punctuated

Equilibrium Model devised by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. Unlike the Systems Model, which does not pay much attention to the human interaction among the key political actors, the ACF has enabled me to examine such actor's interaction as the policy process, by looking at these political actors' beliefs, resources, and guidance instruments. Also, one of the problematic characteristics of the Stages Model is its separation of stages, especially the implementation stage and evaluation stage. NAFSA as a professional association has represented those who are working at the end where the legislation and regulation (e.g., visa and immigration procedures, including SEVIS in the recent years) is being implemented, and NAFSA has been in regular communication with the governmental agencies to report the practical evaluation of the policy. Since the ACF requires the researchers to integrate the analyses of the implementation and evaluation in the policy process, I have been able to understand how NAFSA's roles in the implementation and evaluation have been reflected and integrated into the whole policy process.

Further, one of the problems with Kingdon's Multiple Streams Model in explaining how NAFSA have influenced the federal policy was that the Model focuses on the critical roles played by certain individuals or policy entrepreneurs. NAFSA has not been a group of such individuals or entrepreneurs, but as seen so far, NAFSA has been very frequently involved in a coalition with its allies such as higher education associations when it sought for policy changes. One of the main purposes of this dissertation was to examine how NAFSA interacted with these allies in the coalition. The ACF has been helpful in this regard, too. At the same time, the Punctuated Equilibrium Model tends to weigh the importance of general public for policy changes, while the ACF

pays more attention to specialists in the policy domain. Since the issue of international student access has been relatively marginalized, and has not attracted much of the general public's attention, the focused examination of beliefs of a group of specialists, including NAFSA and its allies, has helped me understand how NAFSA has influenced the federal policy process.

Indeed, the ACF has helped me systematically examine the policy process for changes in legislation and regulation governing international student access to U.S. higher education. At the beginning of my study for this dissertation, I assumed that there would be two major coalitions in this subsystem, one favoring open access of international students and the other favoring tightening access. There is a massive tension between secure borders for national security and open doors for global competitiveness, particularly after the September 11 attacks. However, the more I studied the history of NAFSA and its political activities since after the end of World War II, the more I realized that there has been only one dominant coalition in favor of open access of international student access to U.S. higher education with some unorganized opponents to the idea from time to time.

From the ACF perspective, this unorganized nature of those who have been opposed to international student access may have been a result of the lack of common policy beliefs among those opponents. In essence, international students have been defined as non-immigrants, and the fact has been that the vast majority of them have gone back to their home countries after their study. In this respect, anti-immigration groups have not formulated strong anti-immigration beliefs in relation to the international students. The dominant belief that international students go back home and contribute to

the friendly relationship between the U.S. and other countries can hardly be contested by other solid beliefs about international students. A recently increasing policy argument for retaining international students for their contribution to scientific research in the U.S. may have stimulated some opponents in the anti-immigration groups. However, the beliefs shared by those groups have been mainly about the problems caused by illegal immigrants. Arguably, since the beliefs in the natures of illegal and legal immigrants may not have been consolidated in the anti-immigration groups, the opponents to open access of international students are still relatively unorganized, and have virtually no solid coalitions in the U.S.

Although the ACF could be less powerful in explaining the policy subsystems which have a dominant coalition virtually without any minority (Stewart, 1991), Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1993) pointed to the usefulness in studying the policy subsystems which virtually have a single coalition, arguing that the ACF "forces the researcher to articulate and analyze the belief system of the dominant coalition–a belief system whose policy core value premises and causal assumptions generally remain implicit because they are never challenged" (p. 226).

The analysis of the changes and continuities in the elements (e.g., policy beliefs, resources, and strategies regarding guidance instruments) of the dominant coalition has helped me to understand the changes and continuities of NAFSA's approach to the federal policy process. Particularly, the persistence of the coalition's core belief in the foreign policy benefits explains well the strong continuity of the dominant coalition. At the same time, the different beliefs about the relationship between political and educational objectives of educating international students within the coalition, particularly between

the governmental agencies for public diplomacy and the academic community, have characterized NAFSA's approach to the coalition. Similarly, the autonomous orientation of NAFSA as a higher education association is crucial in the explanation of NAFSA's relationship with the immigration service and its regulations. Also, while I have mostly focused on the policy subsystem of the wider framework of the ACF, the attempt to describe the subsystem's environment such as relatively stable parameters and external events according to the ACF diagram has helped me understand why major policy changes have been put on the agendas for the political actors in response to these changing environments.

However, I have found a limitation of the ACF in its usefulness in explaining how international educators, particularly NAFSA as their professional association, have influenced the federal policy over the 60 years. The relationship between NAFSA and INS (and the units in the Department of Homeland Security as the INS's successor) is not really well explained by the ACF, while the relationship has been one of the most important elements in the subsystem. The relationship has produced a number of regulation changes. The INS did not really form a coalition conflicting with the coalition to which NAFSA belonged.

Conclusion

This dissertation has explored the policy process behind the legislation and regulation governing international student access to U.S. higher education over the 60 years since the immediate aftermath of World War II. Using a public policy framework, the Advocacy Coalition Framework, in this exploration, I have attempted primarily to examine the roles that have been played by international educators, as practitioners and

professionals, in this polity process. My primary focus of analysis as a case study was NAFSA: Association of International Educators.

From the documentary data and interviews, this dissertation has identified the four strengths and two weaknesses of NAFSA. First, NAFSA's large membership is regarded as its advantage, even though the absolute size may be smaller, compared to other professional groups and interest groups. However, NAFSA is the association with the greatest number of members that exclusively devotes itself to international education. When NAFSA was created, the number of members was less than 100. Recently, NAFSA had almost 10,000 members. With "cutting-edge grassroots advocacy capability under a full-time grassroots advocacy professional" (V. Johnson, May/June, 2008, p. 10), this huge number of memberships nation-wide appears to be a strong resource as 'mobilizable troops' described by Sabatier & Weible (2007).

Second, NAFSA can offer other political actors its special knowledge on international students. Particularly in regulatory policies, throughout the 60 years, NAFSA have been often consulted by the government agencies such as the Immigration Naturalization Service. Even after the policy implementation, NAFSA can continue to play a significant role in the policy process for the revision and improvement of the legislation and regulation by supplying Congress and government agencies with practical feedback which NAFSA compiles from its large membership nation-wide.

Third, some interviewees highly appreciated NAFSA's recent leadership with the skillful and knowledgeable staff in its public policy department in terms of policy advocacy. Indeed, NAFSA's activities to attempt to influence the federal policies have become significantly expanded and sophisticated since the late 1990s, when the current

leadership under its Executive Director Marlene Johnson started. Its approach for legislative and regulatory changes is now like that of a professional lobbyist.

Fourth, the comments from my interviewees have convinced me that another important strength of NAFSA is it members' commitment to and enthusiasm for international student exchange, and international education in general. As one of my interviewers describes, many international educators are 'believers.' Therefore, in general, the international educators who promote international student access to U.S. higher education believe in the benefits of having international students in the U.S. not for their own sakes. Such strong and personal belief has motivated international educators and NAFSA as their professional association to continue to seek policy changes for better conditions for international student access.

At the same time, one of the weaknesses is the diverse membership of NAFSA. Although the diversity can enable NAFSA to have a broader perspective on the issues related to international education, some interviewees argued that it is not easy to reach consensus among such diverse members. Its members represent various types of institutions of varying sizes, from English language schools and community colleges to research universities. Also, members' responsibilities at each institution are diverse. They are advisers for international students, advisers for domestic students about study abroad programs, admission officers, staff assistants, and executive administrators.

The other major weakness, as NAFSA staff admitted, is that their current approach for policy changes is too aggressive. Some interviewees suggested that NAFSA should be working more cooperatively with its allies. As seen in the documents about the differences in the approaches responding to the SEVIS implementation deadline in 2002,

other higher education associations have expressed their concerns about NAFSA's aggressive approach. Although NAFSA is still working closely within a coalition with many in the higher education community and international educational exchange community, it seems that there have recently been some strained relationships between NAFSA and its traditional allies.

Nevertheless, over the past 60 years after the end of World War II, NAFSA has represented a substantial fraction of international educators' voices in the federal policy arena concerning international student access to U.S. higher education. It has continued to be a special interest group which regards international students as far more beneficial to the U.S. than risky, particularly from a longer term perspective. NAFSA has believed that having international students is mostly a solution to the potential risks (e.g., terrorism, and unemployment) which unorganized opponents may see in the presence of these students in the U.S. Although NAFSA has not been a dominant player in this policy subsystem, it has been has a key player who has continuously raised the issues and provided the feedback useful for the alternative policy consideration.

In the meantime, one of the implications of this study is that the future research on the federal policies affecting international student access to U.S. higher education, and even international education in general, should pay more attention to international education practitioners working in the U.S. higher education institutions. Watching NAFSA as a key political actor would enable the researchers to take account of more complicated and dynamic process behind the policy making than watching only the political actors who have been traditionally regarded as the most influential in the policy subsystem. Also, tracing NAFSA's stream since its inception would lead the researchers

to the reservoir of rich information on the development and challenges of international education which U.S. higher education has experiences.

Also, the contributions which international educators of U.S. higher education have made and could potentially make to the federal policy development governing international student mobility should receive due recognition. The under-recognition of their own possible roles in the federal policy process may have kept some international educators away from their participation in the policy advocacy activities. In particular, many international educators tend to be too busy with their day-to-day administrative and/or advisory work with students to be active in the policy advocacy for international student access. However, the voices from those who are the busiest dealing with students could be the most valuable because the voices could contain the most practical insights for better policy alternatives in the future. These international education practitioners should understand that they have responsibilities for being heard for policy making by recognizing their potentials as key political actors.

The findings of my dissertation have international implications, too. In fact, some major host countries have similar associations of international education professionals as NAFSA. These associations include: UKCOSA: The Council for International Education in the U.K. (founded in 1968); JAFSA: Japan Network for International Education in Japan (founded in 1968); ISANA: International Education Association Inc. in Australia (founded in 1989); and the European Association for International Education in the European region (founded in 1989). Like NAFSA, the current acronyms of UKCOSA, JAFSA, and ISANA no longer stand for any particular meaning, while the acronyms originally indicated their specific focus; that is, on

international students. UKCOSA originally stood for the United Kingdom Council for Overseas Student Affairs, while JAFSA for the Japan Association for Foreign Student Affairs. Similarly, ISANA's origin was the Overseas Student Advisers' Network (OSAN), and OSAN was renamed to the International Student Advisers' Network of Australia. The inclusion of other aspects of international education in the associations' scope led to their name changes. All these professional associations, like NAFSA, now deal with international student affairs as part of the broader area of international education.

Certainly, it is necessary to recognize that, as the theoretical development of the Advocacy Coalition Framework has shown, some characteristics of the counterpart subsystem and its contexts of another country or region can be quite different from that of the U.S., which I studied in this dissertation. The higher education systems of the countries and region mentioned above are much more centralized than that of the U.S. The openness of the political system in general in these countries may be more limited than that in the U.S. As a result, along with their shorter history of professionalization of international educators than in the U.S., it appears that these professional associations in other countries, emphasizing their functions of networking for professional development, have not developed as significant an involvement in the national policy process as NAFSA has.

However, these associations have recently started to pay increasing attention to their roles of policy advocacy in addition to their functions of professional development. Also, globalization has led to the situation where the policy subsystems concerning international student mobility in major host countries, including the U.S., have shared some external events, affecting the subsystems, such as threats from international

terrorism and demands for the internationally competitive talents for national prosperities. Therefore, for international educators in other countries and regions, the achievements and challenges which NAFSA's policy advocacy for international student mobility has experienced over the past 60 years could be good and practical lessons in developing effective policy advocacy at the national level. For the political actors with legal authority in other countries and regions, it would be advisable to understand how American international education professionals have been engaged in the policy process. In order to seek better and more feasible policies on international student mobility to their higher education systems, these political actors need to utilize these professionals' practical perspectives and suggestions for the policy development.

Moreover, comparative studies about the international educators' involvement in the national policy processes in different countries should be encouraged for better theory and practice in future international student mobility. Such comparative studies would expand the research interests in the studies of both higher education and public policy. At the same time, such comparative studies would help develop transnational collaborations of international educators for better policy making, responding to the demands for greater quantity and better quality of international student mobility around the world. The legislations and regulations of a country would affect the international student mobility, not only that of the country itself but also that of the other countries involved in mobility. Also, international rule-making and negotiations affecting international student mobility are likely to increase. Proper understanding of the differences and similarities in the policy process between countries and regions would make it easy for international educators of different countries and regions to establish and maintain collaborative

relationships to further promote international student mobility.

Lastly, a number of questions have emerged from this dissertation research. Many of them have been left unanswered mainly because I have neither been able to find many archived documents related the issues nor asked my interviewees about the issues (largely due to time limitations). Some examples of these unanswered questions are as follows. Where did NAFSA's ambition for the creation of international educational exchange policy in the mid 1970s go? Why has NAFSA's involvement in the opposition to the provision of home residency requirement for international students in the bills which would become the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 been least mentioned in the literature, even in NAFSA's own recollection? Why did NAFSA only weakly oppose the proposed international student tracking system in the bill which would become Section 641 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ? Answers to these questions could emerge through interviews with those who were involved in the policy process in those days or documentary information might reveal the situation surrounding those issues. In fact, the NAFSA Archives at the University of Arkansas still has many volumes of documents that are un-cataloged and not open to public access. This is particularly true to NAFSA's internal documents such as meeting minutes after the early 1990s. Making these documents available to the public would help researchers seek the answers for similar questions in the development of policies governing international student access to the U.S.

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*All the interviewees' names below are pseudonyms.

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Catherine (2008, March 20). NAFSA senior staff, interviewed with Susan & George at NAFSA Headquarters' Office, Washington, D.C.

Emily (2009, February 3). Staffer of a Senator's office, interviewed at a café just outside of Washington, D.C.

Fred (2008, December 5). AILA (American Immigration Lawyers Association) member, interviewed at a university in the Northeastern States.

George (2008, March 20). NAFSA senior staff, interviewed with Susan & Catherine at NAFSA Headquarters' Office, Washington, DC.

Jack (2008, May 29). NAFSA member as well as AIEA (Association of International Education Administrators) member, interviewed at Washington Marriott at Metro Center, Washington, DC.

Jeffrey (2008, May 28). NAFSA member who has been significantly engaged in NAFSA's public policy activities, interviewed at Renaissance Washington DC Hotel, Washington, DC.

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*In addition, I interviewed two staff members working for the Department of State (interviewed on October 30 and November 18, 2008, respectively). Both interviews were conducted at their office buildings, Washington, DC. While I was finalizing this dissertation, one of these interviewees informed me that the State Department had said that my interview must be 'background only'. This notification means that I am not allowed to use exact quotations, although I can use the official's statements. Also, as I have been instructed to refer to the interviewee as a State Department official only, I have not given any pseudonyms to these two particular interviewees.

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Appendix A: Statistics of International Students in the U.S.

opendoors 20|08 **"Fast Facts"**

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS IN THE U.S.

A. NEW INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ENROLLMENT, 2007/08

New international enrollment – students enrolling for the first time at an institution in Fall 2008 – increased 10.1% over the previous year.

Year	Total	% Change
2004/05	131,946	-
2005/06	142,923	8.3
2006/07	157,178	10.0
2007/08	173,121	10.1

B. INTERNATIONAL STUDENT TRENDS

In 2007/08, the number of international students in the U.S. increased 7.0% over the previous year to 623,805 students.



Year	Total Int'l Students	% Change	Total U.S. Higher Education Enrollment*	% Int'l
1997/98	481,280	5.1	14,502,000	3.3
1998/99	490,933	2.0	14,507,000	3.4
1999/00	514,723	4.8	14,791,000	3.5
2000/01	547,867	6.4	15,312,000	3.6
2001/02	582,996	6.4	15,928,000	3.7
2002/03	586,323	0.6	16,612,000	3.5
2003/04	572,509	-2.4	16,911,000	3.4
2004/05	565,039	-1.3	17,272,000	3.3
2005/06	564,766	-0.05	17,487,000	3.2
2006/07	582,984	3.2	17,672,000	3.3
2007/08	623,805	7.0	17,958,000	3.5

* Data from the National Center for Education Statistics

C. LEADING PLACES OF ORIGIN of International Students, 2006/07 & 2007/08

Students from the top five places of origin - India, China, South Korea, Japan and Canada - comprise 49% of all international students in the U.S. The number of students from the top three places of origin showed large increases again this year, with India up 13%, China up 20%, and South Korea up 11% over the previous year.

Rank	Place of Origin	2006/07	2007/08	2007/08 % of Total	% Change
	WORLD TOTAL	**582,984**	**623,805**	**100.0**	**7.0**
1	India	83,833	94,563	15.2	12.8
2	China	67,723	81,127	13.0	19.8
3	South Korea	62,392	69,124	11.1	10.8
4	Japan	35,282	33,974	5.4	-3.7
5	Canada	28,280	29,051	4.7	2.7
6	Taiwan	29,094	29,001	4.6	-0.3
7	Mexico	13,826	14,837	2.4	7.3
8	Turkey	11,506	12,030	1.9	4.6
9	Saudi Arabia	7,886	9,873	1.6	25.2
10	Thailand	8,886	9,004	1.4	1.3
11	Nepal	7,754	8,936	1.4	15.2
12	Germany	8,656	8,907	1.4	2.9
13	Vietnam	6,036	8,769	1.4	45.3
14	United Kingdom	8,438	8,367	1.3	-0.8
15	Hong Kong	7,722	8,286	1.3	7.3
16	Indonesia	7,338	7,692	1.2	4.8
17	Brazil	7,126	7,578	1.2	6.3
18	France	6,704	7,050	1.1	5.2
19	Colombia	6,750	6,662	1.1	-1.3
20	Nigeria	5,943	6,222	1.0	4.7

D. ACADEMIC LEVEL TRENDS, 2000/01 – 2007/08

Year	Undergrad	% Change	Graduate	% Change	Non-degree	% Change
2000/01	254,429	7.3	238,497	9.3	33,883	-1.6
2001/02	261,079	2.6	264,749	11.0	34,423	1.6
2002/03	260,103	-0.4	267,876	1.2	30,551	-11.2
2003/04	248,200	-4.6	274,310	2.4	20,659	-32.4
2004/05	239,212	-3.6	264,410	-3.6	28,418	37.6
2005/06	236,342	-1.2	259,717	-1.8	30,611	7.7
2006/07	238,050	0.7	264,288	1.8	38,986	27.4
2007/08	243,360	2.2	276,842	4.8	46,837	20.1

E. U.S. INSTITUTIONS with the Largest Number of International Students, 2007/08

Rank	Institution	City	State	Total Int'l Students
1	University of Southern California	Los Angeles	CA	7,189
2	New York University	New York	NY	6,404
3	Columbia University	New York	NY	6,297
4	University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign	Champaign	IL	5,933
5	Purdue University - Main Campus	West Lafayette	IN	5,772
6	University of Michigan - Ann Arbor	Ann Arbor	MI	5,748
7	University of California - Los Angeles	Los Angeles	CA	5,557
8	University of Texas - Austin	Austin	TX	5,550
9	Harvard University	Cambridge	MA	4,948
10	Boston University	Boston	MA	4,789
11	University of Pennsylvania	Philadelphia	PA	4,610
12	SUNY University at Buffalo	Buffalo	NY	4,363
13	Indiana University - Bloomington	Bloomington	IN	4,287
14	Ohio State University - Main Campus	Columbus	OH	4,259
15	Michigan State University	East Lansing	MI	4,244
16	University of Florida	Gainesville	FL	4,228
17	Texas A&M University	College Station	TX	4,094
18	Arizona State University - Tempe	Tempe	AZ	3,979
19	Cornell University	Ithaca	NY	3,928
20	University of Wisconsin - Madison	Madison	WI	3,910

F. U. S. STATES with the Most Int'l Students, 2007/08

Rank	U. S. State	2006/07	2007/08	% Change
1	California	77,987	84,800	8.7
2	New York	65,884	69,844	6.0
3	Texas	49,081	51,824	5.6
4	Massachusetts	28,680	31,817	10.9
5	Illinois	25,594	28,804	12.5
6	Florida	26,875	26,739	-0.5
7	Pennsylvania	23,182	26,090	12.5
8	Michigan	21,143	22,857	8.1
9	Ohio	18,607	19,343	4.0
10	Indiana	14,450	15,548	7.6

The Institute of International Education (IIE) has conducted an annual census of international students in the U.S. since its founding in 1919. *Open Doors* has been published by the Institute since 1949, and began receiving support from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State in the 1970s. For complete data and more information, please visit *opendoors.iienetwork.org*. The *Open Doors 2008* print report can be ordered online at *www.iiebooks.org*.

<Source: http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/>

INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS IN THE U.S. (CONTINUED)

G. TOP FIELDS OF STUDY
of Currently Enrolled International Students, 2006/07 & 2007/08

Field of Study	2006/07	2007/08	2007/08 % of Total	% Change
Business & Management	103,641	110,906	19.6	7.0
Engineering	89,137	96,133	17.0	7.8
Physical & Life Sciences	51,863	52,867	9.3	1.9
Social Sciences	48,978	49,375	8.7	0.8
Math & Computer Science	46,019	46,314	8.2	0.6
Fine & Applied Arts	29,588	31,727	5.6	7.2
Health Professions	28,294	29,163	5.1	3.1
Intensive English Language	22,417	25,856	4.6	15.3
Education	16,825	17,775	3.1	5.6
Humanities	16,189	17,460	3.1	7.9
Agriculture	7,461	8,945	1.6	19.9

H. PRIMARY SOURCE OF FUNDING
of International Students, 2007/08

Primary Source of Funds	Int'l Students	% of Total
Personal/Family Funds	388,821	62.3
U.S. College/University Funds	161,633	25.9
Home Government/University Funds	21,085	3.4
U.S. Government Funds	3,282	0.5
U.S. Private Sponsor	6,013	1.0
Foreign Private Sponsor	6,522	1.0
International Organization	1,390	0.2
Current Employment	29,399	4.7
Other Sources	5,660	1.0
TOTAL	**623,805**	**100.0**

U.S. STUDENTS & STUDY ABROAD

I. U.S. STUDY ABROAD TRENDS
241,791 U.S. students studied abroad for academic credit in 2006/07, an increase of 8.2% over the previous year. U.S. student participation in study abroad has increased by almost 150% in the past decade.



J. LEADING DESTINATIONS, 2005/06 & 2006/07

Rank	Destination	2005/06	2006/07	2006/07 % of Total	% Change
	TOTAL	**223,534**	**241,791**	**100.0**	**8.2**
1	United Kingdom	32,109	32,705	14.6	1.9
2	Italy	26,078	27,831	12.5	6.7
3	Spain	21,881	24,005	10.7	9.7
4	France	15,602	17,233	7.7	10.5
5	China	8,830	11,064	4.9	25.3
6	Australia	10,980	10,747	4.8	-2.1
7	Mexico	10,022	9,461	4.2	-5.6
8	Germany	6,858	7,355	3.3	7.2
9	Ireland	5,499	5,785	2.6	5.2
10	Costa Rica	5,518	5,383	2.4	-2.4
11	Japan	4,411	5,012	2.2	13.6
12	Argentina	2,865	3,617	1.6	26.2
13	Greece	3,227	3,417	1.5	5.9
14	South Africa	2,512	3,216	1.4	28.0
15	Czech Republic	2,846	3,145	1.4	10.5
16	Chile	2,578	2,824	1.3	9.5
17	Ecuador	2,171	2,813	1.3	29.6
18	Austria	2,792	2,810	1.3	0.6
19	New Zealand	2,542	2,718	1.2	6.9
20	India	2,115	2,627	1.2	24.2

L. FIELDS OF STUDY of U.S. Study Abroad Students, 2005/06 & 2006/07

Field of Study	2005/06 Total	2005/06 % of total	2006/07 Total	2006/07 % of total	% Change
Social Sciences	48,537	21.7	51,673	21.4	6.5
Business & Mgmt.	39,478	17.7	46,061	19.1	16.7
Humanities	31,810	14.2	31,819	13.2	0.0
Fine or Applied Arts	16,829	7.5	18,576	7.7	10.4
Physical/Life Sciences	15,457	6.9	17,691	7.3	14.5
Foreign Languages	17,547	7.8	17,306	7.2	-1.4
Education	9,056	4.1	10,189	4.2	12.5
Health Sciences	8,540	3.8	9,917	4.1	16.1
Engineering	6,556	2.9	7,412	3.1	13.1
Math/Comp. Science	3,318	1.5	3,587	1.5	8.1
Agriculture	2,818	1.3	3,525	1.5	25.1
Undeclared	7,583	3.4	7,615	3.1	0.4
Other Fields of Study	16,005	7.2	16,419	6.6	2.6
Total	**223,534**	**100.0**	**241,791**	**100.0**	**8.2**

K. HOST REGIONS of U.S. Study Abroad Students, 2005/06 & 2006/07

Host Region*	2005/06 Total	2005/06 %	2006/07 Total	2006/07 %
Africa	8,459	3.8	10,066	4.2
Asia	20,811	9.3	24,969	10.3
Europe	130,274	58.3	138,871	57.4
Latin America	33,902	15.2	36,339	15.0
Middle East	2,585	1.2	2,764	1.2
North America	1,151	0.5	1,389	0.6
Oceania	14,033	6.3	13,820	5.7
Multiple Regions	12,319	5.5	13,573	5.6
Total	**223,534**	**100.0**	**241,791**	**100.0**

* Cyprus and Turkey are included in the Europe region; Mexico is included in Latin America; Antarctica is included in North America.

M. DURATION of Study Abroad, 2005/06 & 2006/07

Duration	2005/06 % of total	2006/07 % of total
Short-term (summer, January term, or 8 weeks or less during the academic year)	52.8	55.4
Mid-length (one or two quarters, or one semester)	41.7	40.2
Long-term (academic or calendar year)	5.5	4.4

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<Source: http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/>

Appendix B: 2005 Advocacy Coalition Framework Diagram



Appendix C: Interview Questions Related to Research Questions

Interview questions	Question themes	Actors asked	Related research questions
What do you see as the three most important policy changes affecting international student access to U.S. higher education since you started working in this field or 1990, whichever you find it easier to answer?	*Introductory**	All the interviewees	**This interview question is not directly connected to any of the research questions, but is aimed to facilitate the interview conversation.*
How were you involved in the policy making process?	Strategies	All the interviewees	What strategies have NAFSA used for its attempt to influence the federal policy?
When (if ever) do you see international education professionals (e.g., NAFSA as their association) have been particularly successful or unsuccessful in their efforts to advocate for international student access to U.S. higher education?	Strategies	All the interviewees	What strategies have NAFSA used for its attempt to influence the federal policy?
Who do you see as the three most influential political actors (either individuals, organizations) shaping U.S. policy regarding international student access to U.S. higher education? Who are your own allies, and the opponents, if any?	Political actors	All the interviewees	What relationships have NAFSA developed with other key actors in this policy process?
What do you see as the three most important benefits of promoting international student access to U.S. higher education? What costs, if any, do you see? How your own views about these benefits (and costs, if any) changed over the years?	Beliefs	All the interviewees	What has characterized NAFSA's beliefs in the promotion of international student mobility into the U.S.?
What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of international education professionals, particularly NAFSA as their association, in their efforts to shape policy regarding international student access?	Resources	All the interviewees	What resources has NAFSA, as a political actor, contributed to the coalition's advocacy for international student mobility?
What were the genesis and evolution of NAFSA's current public policy approach?	Strategies	Only NAFSA staff and its members	What strategies have NAFSA used for its attempt to influence the federal policy?
What do you see as the changes, if any, in the relationship between NAFSA and your organization (or yourself) in the policy process regarding international student access to U.S. higher education over the years?	Political actors	Only those who are neither NAFSA staff nor NAFSA members	What relationships have NAFSA developed with other key actors in this policy process?

Appendix D: Continuities and Changes of the Policy Subsystem Over the 60 Years

	Continued since the late 40s	Changed since the late 40s
Political actors	▪ The governmental agencies such as the State Department, the immigration service (INS, DHS) as dominant actors ▪ Congress relatively supportive for international educational exchanges ▪ Higher education community, including ACE, NAFSA ▪ Institute of International Education ▪ Dominant coalition for international student access ▪ Anti-Immigration groups – less organized against international student, rather intermittent	▪ CFRFS, GNYCFS used to be active, but ▪ The private foundations such as the Carnegie and Ford Foundations used to be financially very strong supporters until the late 60s ▪ University presidential associations such as NASULGC and AAU started more active since the 70s ▪ Liaison Group established in the 80s, and developed to the Alliance in the 90s ▪ FBI particularly since the 90s ▪ Growing voices from business industry (e.g., IT, engineering, and tourism)
Beliefs in bringing international students to U.S. higher education	▪ Dominance of foreign policy rationales as public diplomacy ▪ Strong support for mutual understanding for peace making ▪ Economic rationales and intellectual contributions mentioned by several political actors since the mid twentieth century, though much weaker than now ▪ National security concerns existed since the late 40s, though weaker than now	▪ Economic rationales and intellectual contributions (particularly to the STEM fields) more emphasized recently ▪ Growing national security concerns, particularly since the late 70s, and punctuated by the 911 attacks ▪ Brain drain concerns punctuated in the 60s, while still regarded as important by some actors
NAFSA's resources	▪ Financially not strong ▪ Expertise knowledge in international student affairs, which continuously	▪ Rapidly growing membership as mobilizable troops
NAFSA's strategies	▪ Testimony in the congressional hearings ▪ Encouraging its members to contact their constituencies' Congress people for their support ▪ Regular meetings with the governmental agencies such as the	▪ Expanded NAFSA's political activities from regulatory area to legislative area in the late 90s

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2000 – 2001, Project Coordinator, *Melbourne Enterprises International Limited (the Japan representative office of the University of Melbourne)*, Tokyo

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PRESENTATIONS

2008, March 21, *International educators in the federal policy process: NAFSA's policy advocacy for international student access to U.S. higher education*. Presented at the annual meeting of the Comparative & International Education Society, New York, NY.

2007, September 30, *National interests and international student access to U.S. higher education: Policy advocacy of international educators*. Presented (poster) at the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Council for International Education, Harrisburg, PA.

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

JAFSA (Japan Association for Foreign Student Affairs): Japan Networks for International Education

Comparative & International Education Society