A RETURN TO THEIR SOCIAL MOVEMENT ROOTS:
UNION ORGANIZING EFFORTS IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

A Thesis in Sociology
by Andrew W. Martin

© 2004 Andrew W. Martin

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 2004
The thesis of Andrew W. Martin was reviewed and approved* by the following:

John D. McCarthy  
Professor of Sociology  
Thesis Advisor  
Chair of Committee

Frank Baumgartner  
Professor of Political Science

Roger Finke  
Professor of Sociology

Glenn Firebaugh  
Professor of Sociology and  
Head of the Department of Sociology

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School.
ABSTRACT

The objective of the following thesis is to explore organizing efforts in the 1990s by drawing upon social movement and organizational theory to analyze the organizing activities of a sample of local labor unions from 1990-2001. I begin by placing the 1990s in historical context, demonstrating that recent efforts to revitalize the movement are similar to other periods of debate in the history of the movement. It appears that certain processes, notably existing leadership’s desire to remain in control of the movement, have prevented significant change in organizing. I then explore the mechanisms unions have at their disposal to recruit new members in the 1990s, which include the National Labor Relations Board certification election and the corporate campaign. As unions move towards an increasingly conflictual relationship with firms, they have adopted the corporate campaign to overcome the weaknesses of the certification election. Data from the 70 unions indicates that although the NLRB is used much more frequently by unions, nearly as many workers are organized through corporate campaigns. The reason for this is twofold: 1) corporate campaigns have a much higher success rate, and 2) the typical corporate campaign involves significantly more workers than the average NLRB election. To examine various organizing processes, including repertoire choice and success, I first draw upon resource mobilization theory, using the unique circumstances surrounding union organizing to expand this perspective. I find that the sources of endogenous resources, including the parent organization, and, to a lesser extent, membership, affect the type of tactic used, but not the outcomes. Human resources devoted to organizing have a strong effect on the rate of corporate campaigns and their outcomes, but no effect on NLRB elections, except for unions that use both tactics. Leadership indicators were also employed to analyze resources devoted to organizing, repertoire use, and outcomes. In general, bureaucratic structures had lower rates of organizing, as did unions with large staff. The results indicate the importance of the local union in the organizing process.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables........................................................................................................v
List of Figures.......................................................................................................vii
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................viii

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................1

Chapter 2. WHY DOES THE NEW LABOR MOVEMENT LOOK SO MUCH LIKE
THE OLD ONE? PUTTING THE 1990S REVITALIZATION PROJECT IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT.......................................................................................5

Chapter 3. REPERTOIRE CHOICE AND MEMBERSHIP RECRUITMENT: UNION
ORGANIZING EFFORTS IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY AS A SOCIAL
MOVEMENT ACTIVITY.........................................................................................49

Chapter 4. A CRITICAL EVALUATION AND EXPANSION OF THE RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION PERSPECTIVE: U.S. UNION ORGANIZING EFFORTS IN THE
1990S..................................................................................................................102

Chapter 5. AUTHORITY STRUCTURE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: LEADERSHIP
AS INSTITUTIONALIZED POWER IN U.S. UNION ORGANIZING OUTCOMES IN
THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY.................................................................155

Chapter 6. CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................218

Bibliography.........................................................................................................227
### LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1. Important Dimensions of Organizing Repertoires ..........................89

Table 3.2. Rate and Success of Organizing Among Sample of 70 Unions From 1990-2001.............................................................90

Table 3.3. Breakdown of Organizing by National Union From 1990-2001.................................................................91

Table 3.4. Distribution of New Membership Gains Across Repertoires From 1990-2001.............................................................92

Table 3.5. Correlation between NLRB Elections and Corporate Campaigns (1990-2001).............................................................93

Table 4.1. Rate and Success of Organizing Among Sample of 70 Unions From 1990-2001.............................................................149

Table 4.2. Distribution of New Membership Gains Across Repertoires From 1990-2001.............................................................149

Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Various Union Characteristics (annual measures unless noted).............................................................150

Table 4.4. Overdispersed Poisson HLM multivariate result of revenue source and organizing resource disbursements on annual NLRB and corporate campaign organizing rates (1990-2001).............................................................151

Table 4.5. Overdispersed Binomial multivariate HLM results of revenue sources and resources on the probability of annual organizing success (1990-2001)........... ......152

Table 4.6. Overdispersed Binomial multivariate HLM results of revenue sources and resources on the probability of annual successful worker organization (1990-2001).............................................................153

Table 5.1. Rate and Success of Organizing Among Sample of 70 Unions From 1990-2001.............................................................211

Table 5.2. Distribution of New Membership Gains Across Repertoires From 1990-2001.............................................................211

Table 5.3. Descriptive Statistics for Various Union Characteristics (annual measures unless noted).............................................................212
Table 5.4. Ordinary Least Squares HLM multivariate effects of authority structure on disbursements for organizing (1990-2001) …………………………………………213

Table 5.5. Overdispersed Poisson HLM multivariate result of authority structure on annual NLRB and corporate campaign organizing rates (1990-2001)…… ………215

Table 5.6. Overdispersed Binomial multivariate HLM results of authority structure on the probability of annual organizing success (1990-2001)…………………………216

Table 5.7. Summary of relationships between authority indicators and organizing outcomes ……………………………………………………………………………………………217
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1. Strike Activity in the U.S. ................................................................. 94
Figure 3.2a. Number of NLRB Elections ......................................................... 95
Figure 3.2b. Union Victory Rate in NLRB Elections ....................................... 96
Figure 3.2c. Percentage of Employed Nonunion Population Participating in NLRB Elections ................................................................. 97
Figure 3.3. Union Membership Rate .............................................................. 98
Figure 3.4. Organizing Corporate Campaigns ............................................... 99
Figure 3.5a. Distribution of NLRB Organizing Among Local Unions, 1990-2001... 100
Figure 3.5b. Distribution of Corporate Campaigns Among Local Unions, 1990-2001 ........................................................ ...................... 101
Figure 4.1. Effect of Annual Size of Union Organizing Staff on the Odds of NLRB Success ................................................................. 154
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank John McCarthy, the advisor of this thesis, who carefully guided this project from beginning to end. Also, thanks to Glenn Firebaugh, Frank Baumgartner, Roger Finke, and David Westby for their careful readings of this thesis. This project is dedicated to my entire family: Lynette, Reid, Mom and Dad, Emma, and Peter.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Scholarship on the American labor movement has recently begun to take seriously the important role that union organizing efforts play in explaining the proportion of American workers that belong to labor unions. Many of these studies are in direct response to current efforts in the labor movement to reverse the near fifty-year trend in membership decline. Efforts by reformers such as AFL-CIO president John Sweeney have resulted not only a movement rededicated to expanding it membership base, but also an increase of studies that have examined new organizing efforts by an increasingly militant labor movement. This renewal of labor studies is reflected in titles such as *Rekindling the Movement, Unions at the Crossroads, The Transformation of US Unions*, and *A New Labor Movement for the New Century*, among others (Brecher and Costello 1998; Bronfenbreener et al. 1998; Clawson and Clawson 1999; Jenson and Mahon 1993; Mantsios 1998; Masters 1997 Rothstein 1996; Sweeney 1997; Tillman and Cummings 1999; Turner et al. 2001; Welsh 1997).

Many of these studies implicitly or explicitly conceive of union and the labor movement as a whole as a social movement. While the “framing” of organized labor as a social movement is an important contribution of this literature, this research makes little or no effort to draw upon social movement theory to provide a systemic understanding of recent union organizing efforts (for notable exceptions see Ganz 2000; Lopez; Voss and Sherman 1999). In addition to the lack of theory, most of the prior research relies on the case study approach, which, while certainly valuable, cannot begin to address important questions such as: what is the extent of organizing in America today, is organizing different in certain industries, what strategies are available to unions to expand their
membership, and most importantly, what role do unions themselves play in these new organizing efforts?

The objective of the current research is to provide a coherent theoretical and methodological framework to examine these issues. Specifically, I draw upon established social movement theory to examine union organizing among a sample of local labor unions throughout the 1990s. In the course of the dissertation I address important issues such as: recent efforts among reformists to make organizing a central focus of the movement, a description of the repertoires unions currently have available to expand their membership, and the importance of union characteristics, specifically resources in leadership, in determining the rate, outcome and number of workers organized annually. By bringing social movement theory to bear on the labor movement, I demonstrate that union organizing remains both a contentious and collective form of social change, and that labor unions indeed behave similarly to other social movement actors.

While social movement research can inform our understanding of various labor movement processes (here organizing), the reverse is also true. In this dissertation a number of issues are raised that are of central interest to social movement scholars. For example, recently there has been increased attention to the broader consequences of social movements. Often the focus is on movement-state dynamics. Unfortunately, because the state is targeted by so many actors, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to identify the causal connection between SMO actions and state reaction. Here the outcome examined is organizing, a goal that, unlike state action, it is simply an impossible one to achieve without the actions of a labor union. It is inconceivable that a
firm would recognize a particular union as the legitimate representative of the firm’s employees without some prior action from the union. In addition to a more thorough understanding of movement outcomes, another contribution to social movement literature is the analysis of the link between organizational characteristics and repertoire choice.

Labor unions have multiple repertoires available to organize new workers, ranging from highly institutionalized National Labor Relations Board certification elections to more confrontational corporate campaigns. Little research has explicitly examined how organizational characteristics lead to more or less contentious tactics. Finally, the relationship between leadership structure and organizing begins to fill a void in the social movements literature on this particular subject.

In order to address these issues, I draw upon social movement theory to examine labor union organizing in the 1990s. Specifically, I employ the resource mobilization perspective to explore the link between the organizational structure of labor unions and new organizing efforts (McCarthy and Zald 1977). This paradigm is especially useful for studying social movement activity by established SMOs, which I argue includes labor unions. To study the impact of leadership on organizing on draw upon the iron law of oligarchy perspective developed by Robert Michels and by other scholars to examine labor movement decline. However, based on recent efforts by scholars such as Judith Stepan-Norris and Maurice Zeitlin (2003), I recognize that leadership can often have a positive impact on labor movement processes.

To answer the questions raised by these theoretical paradigms, I examine organizing among a sample of 70 local labor unions during the 1990s. Using annual disclosure reports filed with the Department of Labor I am able to gather detailed
information on the organizational characteristics of these unions, including where they get their resources from, how they spend their money, and their leadership structure. Data on conventional NLRB organizing is drawn directly from the National Labor Relations Board, while more innovative corporate campaign data are collected using newspaper archives. More information on my data collection can be found the dissertation and in Appendix A.

The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 seeks to set the current period of analysis, 1990-2000, in a broader historical context. The debates that are occurring today in the labor movement, over such issues as who should be the targets of organizing and the best organizing strategy are not new. By examining past debates within the movement to the current period, I am able to demonstrate the importance of studying organizing at the end of the Twentieth Century. The goal of chapter three is to describe the dependent variable, organizing. I first recount the two major forms of organizing, NLRB elections and corporate campaigns, as well as recognizing that these two strategies represent polar ends of an organizing continuum. I then describe the rate and success of organizing among my sample of unions. Chapter 4 focuses on the resources of the union and how they relate to different organizing strategies-for example: are human resources (organizing officers and employees) more important in nonNLRB organizing than NLRB organizing. In chapter 5 the effect of the leadership structure on both the level and type of organizing is examined, as is the relationship between the resources devotes to the union and its leadership structure. I conclude by recounting the major findings of this research and proposing some important directions for future research in this area.
CHAPTER 2: WHY DOES THE NEW LABOR MOVEMENT LOOK SO MUCH LIKE THE OLD ONE? PUTTING THE 1990S REVITALIZATION PROJECT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In the 1990s the American labor movement underwent a major conflict around how to revitalize itself. Faced with rapidly declining membership, increased political and business opposition, and the departure of the traditional stronghold of widespread union membership in the manufacturing sector, many within the movement have pressed for serious internal change. Perhaps no event signals the success of these reformers more than the election of the insurgent candidate John Sweeney to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1995, which was this organization’s first contested election in since the merger of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1955. Not surprisingly, this revitalization process that has received a great deal of attention both by the leadership of labor organizations (Benson 1999; Mort 1998; Sweeney 1997; Welsh 1997) and in current research and commentaries on the movement (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Mantsios 1998a; Tillman and Cummings 1999; Turner et al. 2001).

While most progressive unionists support the changes brought about by the reformers, as Zald and Berger (1978) note, change within formal organizations and institutions is often a contentious process, and research such as Cornfield’s (1989) account of the United Furniture Workers of America illustrates that the labor movement is certainly not immune to such internal conflict. One of the central issues of the labor movement today is the monumental task of reversing the nearly 50 year trend of declining membership by developing and implementing a successful organizing strategy.
And while many reformers now occupy positions of power within organized labor, especially since the election of John Sweeney, they have struggled against a retrenched group of leaders who became accustomed working closely with capital after WW II, a relationship that has led to an institutionalized movement that made no real efforts to create new membership gains and ensure participatory democracy among its membership (Fantasia 1988). In addition, external factors, including the increasing importance of international trade, an antilabor political climate, and most importantly, management hostility to new union organizing efforts, including the use of illegal tactics to break unions, has threatened the very survival of the movement (Clawson and Clawson 1999; Cooke 1985; Dickens 1983; Goldfield 1987). Given these obstacles, many of the reformers have advocated new organizing strategies for revitalizing the movement, hoping to make it, in the words of John Sweeney, the “Civil Rights Movement of the 1990s”.

The two primary aims of this paper, then, are to provide a careful account of internal conflict within the movement over the introduction of a new organizing program, and, perhaps more importantly, identify potential reasons why changes sought by reformers has been so contentious. While the current labor movement presents an interesting case study for examining the dynamics of internal change in a social movement, the main lines of present struggles are reminiscent of earlier ones that took place during particularly turbulent periods in the movement. By comparing the present

---

1 Some militant unionists have been wary of the changes the movement has undergone, not because they oppose a broader organizing program, but because they are suspicious of top down efforts to reform the movement (Eisenscher 1999; Slaughter 1999).
with the past we not only deepen our understanding of the nature of these debates, but also highlight the historical significance of the 1990s, which is of central importance to those scholars that examine organizing processes at the end of the 20th Century (Isaac and Griffin 1989). In addition, since historic debates have concluded, potential implications of their present manifestations for the outcome of struggles among unionists today can be explored.

Unfortunately, describing all debates that have occurred over organizing throughout entire history of the labor movement would be a difficult, if not impossible task to accomplish given the space here. Therefore, the present discussion is limited on a number of dimensions. First, I only describe debates around two central organizing topics: 1) Which groups are the appropriate target of organizing (Goals), and 2) Among available organizing strategies, which are the most likely to be successful in increasing membership (Tactics)? Not only do these two issues generate a great deal of debate among unionists, but as will be demonstrated throughout the paper, the manner in which they are resolved can have major implications for the future of the movement.

The second limitation of this paper is the periods analyzed. Rather than examining the enter historical spectrum of the movement, along with the 1990s, I focus on three particularly contentious periods: 1) The late 19th Century, where the first broad

---

2 It is not my argument that the labor movement of the 1990s and the debates that are occurring today are identical to those of the past. The current labor movement operates in an environment that is in many ways fundamentally different from the labor movement of the past. Trade is increasingly global, neoliberal economic policies have been adopted by the state, labor conflict is highly institutionalized, and the economy has shifted from a mass production to service orientation, to name a few differences. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in the past multiple unions struggled with each other for dominance, while today, most unionists are embedded in one dominant organization-the AFL-CIO. While this present circumstance still leads to conflict, as the reader will see, it tends to be much more muted than the debates of the past as the AFL-CIO still attempts to maintain a united front to the world. Despite these dissimilarities, I believe it is crucial to understand the parallels between the past and present, which is the goal of this chapter.
based labor organization, the Knights of Labor (KOL), struggle for survival against the newly formed craft association, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), 2) The early Twentieth Century, which was marked by conflict between the radical Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the conservative AFL, and 3) The Great Depression, when the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) first split from the AFL, and then struggled against its craft dominated forbearer. These three watershed periods, which represent higher than normal levels of debate from which to draw evidence from, also serve to illustrate the importance of the 1990s as a potential turning point for the weakening labor movement.

The final limitation is the evidence employed to compare the present in the past. Rather than any systematic analysis, such as interviews with important union leaders and prominent rank-and-file, I draw heavily upon prior scholarly research on the movement, such as case studies of specific unions and general histories of the movement. These sources are employed in two ways, the comments and findings of the authors, and quotes from people within the movement, such as union leaders and rank-and-file. While this approach is certainly not the most systematic way to compare current debates within the labor movement to those of the past, they serve the other central purpose of this paper-to offer initial explanations for the reasons why organizing goals and tactics have been such a source of controversy within the movement. These initial explanations are union-centric, focusing on internal processes of organizational stability, such as the oligarchic tendencies of leaders.3 By employing both commentary from observers, as well as quotes

3 Because of my focus on the internal processes of unions, I necessarily ignore environmental reasons for internal conflict, which, as Balser (1997) illustrates, are also important for explaining factionalism in social movement organizations.
from those within the movement, I am able to map out possible reasons why change in a social movement is such a contentious process.

I begin by describing conflict over which social groups are appropriate union members. The current debate occurs over unskilled workers of the late 20th Century. These are primarily marginalized laborers—janitors, sweatshop workers, and health care workers, large proportions of whom are immigrants, minorities, and women. A similar debate marked historical struggles between the KOL, IWW, and CIO, all of which sought to organize all workers, regardless of skill level, and the more exclusive AFL, which attempt to preserve an “aristocracy of labor”. I turn then to the debate about appropriate strategies employed to organize the unrepresented. Today’s controversy revolves around the use of the corporate campaign, a broad based approach designed to circumvent traditional methods of organizing that have been deemed ineffective. In the earlier periods similar debate surrounded the use of the strike, often a controversial tactic, which was only compounded by innovations such as sit-down strike employed by various CIO unions, notably the autoworkers. Again, for each of these topics I offer some possible reasons for these debates and then draw on evidence to support my initial hypotheses.

**Conflict over Organizing Goals**

While the general goal of any union organizing strategy is to expand the base of the movement, deciding whom to recruit is often of central importance before a systematic strategy can be implemented. Given the origins of the labor movement among skilled artisans who created organizations to protect their craft from the encroachment of unskilled elements within the workforce (Foner 1947), this debate has often centered on the importance of organizing workers will few occupational skills. Today marginalized
workers; groups such as temps, janitors, and sweatshop workers are at the center of the controversy (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000). In the past, comparable workers consisted of unskilled laborers working in the expanding industrial sector. I explore two possible explanations why the recruitment of these workers has been such a contentious issue within the movement. The first reason is based on Michel’s iron law of oligarchy—union leaders, who tend to be white, male, and middle-class, will often resist the mobilization of marginalized groups (immigrants, women, minorities), whose entrance into the organization can destabilize the structure and have negative political ramifications for existing leaders. Second, even when unions decide to organize these workers they must devote a great deal of resources to this task. Often they are unwilling to do this, not only because of the uncertain payoffs, but also because devoting resources to organizing means shifting them away from their existing members, which can also cause political problems within the organization (Block 1980; Fletcher and Hurd 1998).

In order to explore these explanations for controversy over organizing goals, I begin first by recounting debates among union officials on the potentially destabilizing effect of recruiting large numbers of marginalized and nontraditional workers.

**Oligarchy and organizing goals** Since Michels’ ([1902] 1959) observations of the German socialist party, scholars have carefully examined the oligarchic nature of labor union leadership (Leier 1995; Mills 1948; Piven and Cloward 1977). While Zald and Ash (1966) indicate that oligarchy is not inevitable in social movements, as Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) note in their study of union democracy in the International

---

4 The low skilled occupations created by the service economy are not the only potential targets for unions. More skilled occupations, ranging from doctors to informational technology specialists, could also provide fertile ground for membership expansion. However, with few exceptions (such as the aggressive
Typographical Union, thriving rank-and-file political participation tends to be the exception rather than the norm in most unions. Given the importance of organizational stability in perpetuating entrenched leadership in labor unions (Voss and Sherman 2000), it is not surprising that existing leaders may resist any changes that would threatened their position within the organization. In this section I recount struggles between those that seek to broaden the membership base of the union and unionists, often existing leaders, who feel threatened by the mobilization of marginalized groups.

**Current period** At first glance the official rhetoric of today’s union leaders appears to be one of diversity and full inclusion of all workers. The Full Participation Conference, held in October 1995, immediately before the AFL-CIO annual convention, stated, “We are gathered today to pledge our support to build a labor movement that embraces diversity as its strength”. John Sweeney (1997) claimed that in order for the labor movement to survive, it must form coalitions with women and minority groups, and begin to confront declining working conditions in the U.S. This stance has been applauded by many within the movement who believe that only through a broad based organizing strategy will unions survive and flourish in the 21st Century (Adams 1998; Needleman 1998; Chen and Wong 1999). Milkman (2000:1) frames the issue starkly, “…recruiting immigrants is an increasingly urgent imperative for the besieged labor movement.” However, when one examines the actions of some unionists, evidence exists of their uncertainty, if not animosity, towards these marginalized workers.

This fear of organizing nontraditional union members manifested itself in one of the most striking examples of labor movement revitalization, the Justice for Janitors organizing of nurses by unions such as the California Nurses Association and the Service Employees International Union), little effort has been made to organize highly skilled, professionalized workers.
campaigns initiated by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in many major cities to organize immigrant janitors that clean office buildings (Fisk et al. 2000; Waldinger et al. 1998).\(^5\) This broad based organizing strategy, the brainchild of the SEIU national leadership, including John Sweeney, was often heavily resisted by the local unions that were required to participate, in part, I believe, because of the number of low paid immigrant workers that would be mobilized by such a strategy. Waldinger et al. (1998:113) identifies a central reason why the international union has often implemented many campaigns over the objections of the local leadership, “…an incumbent leadership will opt for the status quo, especially in light of the political ramifications of a sudden infusion of new, possibly ethnically distinctive members.” They go on to document that while the Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles may have revitalized Local 399 of the SEIU, not all within the union supported the campaign, as many of the local leaders who supported the campaign were ousted from office in 1995. Within the same union, SEIU Local 399, Acuña (1996) chronicles the efforts of reformistas to force an entrenched leadership to expand its efforts to include new types of workers, workers who were brought into the union over the objections of these leaders. The strife that has plagued Local 399 is just one example of the internal conflict that can occur when entrenched leaders resist the influx of new, often previously marginalized, members.

In many cases the entrenched leaderships’ fears of organizing immigrant workers are not unfounded. For example, the President of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees (HERE) Local 2 in San Francisco, who had held this position since the late 1940s was voted out of office in 1978 due to the increased number of women and immigrant

\(^5\) The Justice for Janitors campaign is a corporate campaign (described in more detail in the discussion of organizing strategies) that employs a variety of tactics-ranging from street theater to lawsuits-to pressure
members who demanded a stronger commitment to organize marginalized groups. In the case of a 1992 drywallers’ strike in Southern California, led primarily by Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, union leaders were willing to ignore the strikers, even after many began an organizing campaign with little union assistance. As one business agent said (quoted by a union staffer), “No, you can never organize those guys [Mexican carpenters]. You’re beating your head against the concrete…” (Milkman and Wong 2000: 182). In Voss and Sherman’s (2000) study of union revitalization, an informant in a local that was trying to broaden its organizing program identified the reason for the difficulty in recruiting new members, “In these small locals, you get elected to this job, and it’s every three years, and after a while you don’t feel like going back and tending bar anymore” (Voss and Sherman 2000: 182). Even when leaders are committed to mobilizing marginalized workers, if they face resistance within the rest of the leadership structure, they are likely to drop their progressive stance. In their study of local union organizing, Fletcher and Hurd (2001: 192) note, “…a leader’s commitment to organizing and organizational change may falter if there is a legitimate political threat in the form of a respected officer or staff members committed to traditional servicing…” In all of these examples, militant unionists often must struggle with entrenched leadership to implement a broad based organizing strategy.

**Historical struggles** In today’s movement the support among AFL-CIO officials for a more inclusive organizing program has prompted resistance by some local leaders to the increase in new members. This opposition tends to be rather muted in part because of the power differentials between the local union and the international, evidenced by the willingness of some internationals, such as the SEIU, to put building owners to recognize the union.
uncooperative locals in trusteeship. In the past, however, supporters of a far-reaching organizing agenda, including the mobilization of the growing number of unskilled industrial workers, formed their own unions in opposition to more traditional, craft based, labor organizations, notably the AFL. This rival unionism lead to conflict more vicious than we see today in part because each union saw the organizing goals of the opposition as a threat to its very existence.

The Knights of Labor was first organization to institute a broad based effort to organize unskilled factory workers that had been growing during the Industrial Revolution. According to the union’s declaration of principles, “We have formed the order of the Knights of Labor with a view of securing the organization and direction, by cooperative effort with the power of the industrial classes” (Voss 1993: 83). Said one Knight delegate at the conference that led to the formation of the Federation of Organized Traded and Labor Unions, an organization that eventually came to oppose the Knights “We recognize neither creed, color, nor nationality but want to take into the field of this organization the whole labor element of the country.” (Ware 1964: 247). The Knights, and especially leaders such as Terrance Powderly, believed that only through the organization of all workers would the labor movement truly flourish. He claimed, “isolated trade unions can accomplish nothing. One grand universal brotherhood of labor is needed.” (Kaufman 1973: 109).

At the same time the Knights were fighting for a far-reaching labor movement, the dominant craft element in the movement, which was slowly uniting under the banner of American Federation of Labor, saw the industrial unionism espoused by the Knights as a threat to its long-standing dominance of the movement. The most prominent critic of
the Knights was Samuel Gompers, who expressed his opposition to the Knights even before ascending to the presidency of the AFL. While Gompers was chair of the Committee on Organizing of the Federation of Trade and Labor Unions, the precursor to the AFL, he recommended that this organization be composed solely of trade unions, not broader industrial unions such as the Knights. While his proposal was eventually defeated, the structure of the Federation was such to grant trade unions considerable power over their industrial counterparts (Foner 1947), a trend that was to continue within the AFL.

Although both craft and industrial unions fought for the well-being of laborers, Gompers saw little common interest between the craft unions that composed the AFL and the Knights, claiming that the Knights of Labor “fight labor unions with much more vigor and bitterness than they do unscrupulous employers.” (Kaufman 1973: 176). Later, in his autobiography, Gompers went so far as to accuse the Knights of collaborating with capitalists to ensure the downfall of the AFL, writing, “the struggle which the trade unions had to make in order to defend themselves against attacks of employers all too often aided by the K. of L. [Knights of Labor]” (Gompers 1984: 83). Gompers clearly believed that mass based industrial organizations would lead to a decline of the AFL, claiming, “to attempt to institute what some are pleased to call industrial organizations with the avowed purpose of destroying existing trade unions is not only foolhardy, but it is ruinous, nay criminal.” (Reed 1930: 133).

Despite the initial success of the Knights, it was the AFL and its emphasis on narrowly defined craft unionism that managed to survive in the 20th Century. The next organization to actively challenge the narrow organizing goals of the AFL was the
Industrial Workers of the World, a union that took a much more radical stand against the AFL in particular and capitalism in general than the Knights ever did. Bill Haywood expressed this sentiment in his address to the Continental Congress of the Working Class, which lead to the formation of the IWW “The aims and objects of this organization should be to put the working class in possession of the economic power, the means of life, in control of the machinery of production and distribution, without regard to capitalist masters.” (Dubofsky 1969: 81). At the same convention Haywood also expressed his disdain for the AFL, stating, “The American Federation of Labor…is not a working class movement. It does not represent the working class…” (Dubofsky 1969: 81). The IWW’s views on the unskilled proletariat were made perfectly clear by D.C. Coats, another IWW founder, who argued “We find there is no need of aristocratic unions standing aloof from the common laborer as the craftsman is fast passing away…” (Dubofsky 1969: 72). This latter quote makes it clear that many on the left of the labor movement regarded craft unionism and the AFL as an anarchism, and the leaders of these unions a group of reactionaries holding on to a period that has long since passed away.

This emphasis on class conflict, industrial unionism, and especially the opposition to the AFL naturally drew the opposition of those who adhered to a craft union vision of the movement. Gompers viewed the revolutionary goals of the organization as “an industrial crime against which the trade unions of America will contend to the end” (Dubofsky 1969:94). In his autobiography, he had nothing but contempt for the radical IWW, writing, “the ‘wobbly’ movement has never been more than a radical fungus on the labor movement…” (Gompers 1984: 126). As in the case of the Knights of Labor, the IWW and its emphasis on working class unity, regardless of skill level, clearly
represented a threat to the leaders of the AFL, who promoted their rather narrow brand of craft unionism.

Despite the initial success of the IWW, it was doomed to the same fate as the Knights. The rapidly growing mass of industrial workers was again left waiting for another organization to meet their union demands, which would be answered with the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1936. Unlike the Knights and the IWW, which were formed independently of the AFL, the CIO was arose out of internal conflict in union, indicating that not all within the AFL were supportive of its craft based organizing program. One such leader was Charles Howard, president of the International Typographical Union, who claimed “the greatest obstacle at this time is the refusal of the American Federation of Labor to adopt more modern organization policies to meet modern conditions.” (Zeiger 1995: 27). The creation of the Committee of Industrial Organizations was intended to address this problem. At its formation, the CIO’s program stated, “The purpose of the Committee is to be encouragement and promotion of organization of the unorganized workers in mass production and other industries upon an industrial basis…” (Galenson 1960: 5). These unorganized workers were not limited to native-born whites, the skilled craftsmen of the AFL, but rather, according to the CIO constitution, the organization sought “to bring about the effective organization of the working men and women of American without regard to race, color, creed or nationality” (Chen and Wong 1998: 216).

Despite the fact that the AFL birthed the CIO, the strong support for industrial unionism expressed by CIO supporters was met with swift opposition from the entrenched craft leaders of the AFL. As the CIO moved further from its forbearer, the
executive committee of the AFL, in a letter sent to all leaders of the CIO unions, claimed
that the CIO “…advocates the pursuit of organizing policies in opposition to those
formulated and adopted at conventions of the American Federation of Labor…”
(Galenson 1960: 15). AFL President William Green, a strong proponent of labor unity,
warned the insurgents that many within the AFL “… regard separate movements formed
within the main structure as dual in character and as decidedly menacing to its success
and welfare.” (Phelan 1989: 131). Green regarded the split of the AFL and the CIO as
potentially fatal, writing, “…it is a question of rivalry, whether the American Federation
of Labor is supreme or whether we can have a divided house and expect to live…”
(Galenson 1960: 16). Clearly Green and other craft leaders of the AFL regarded the
formation of a viable industrial organization as an immediate threat to their power in the
movement.

In all three struggles described above, the entrenched AFL leadership made no
effort to disguise its opposition to the mobilization of industrial workers sought by the
Knights, the IWW, and the CIO. The reason for these bitter struggles between these
unions and the American Federation of Labor is best summarized by Irving Bernstein
(1970: 353), who writes, “…the dominant leadership of the AFL had no interest in the
unionization of low-skilled workers in the mass production industries, and, in fact,
considered such a prospect a threat to its continued control of the Federation.”. Livesay
(1978: 95) makes a similar argument, claiming, “Industrial unions not only would have
threatened the dominance of the crafts in the AF of L affairs but also would have
involved the organization of thousands of people whom craft unions despised, for
organizing industrial unions would have required enrolling blacks, women, foreigners,
and the unskilled.” Reed (1930: 139) adds, “Oftentimes these [craft] leaders are averse to admitting new groups into the union for fear that by so doing their political regime may be overthrown.” It is apparent that regardless of historical period, those in a position of power within the movement are unlikely to support organizing goals that would mobilize workers who could potentially destabilize the political structure of the organization. While oligarchic tendencies of existing leaders have often inhibited broad based organizing programs, the amount of resources necessary to mobilize these workers is another, more mundane explanation for conflicts over organizing goals in the labor movement.

Resources and organizing goals The resource mobilization perspective, first developed by McCarthy and Zald (1977) claims that resources are necessary for social movements to engage in collective behavior and protest activity, and union organizing efforts are little different from other social movement activities. Indeed, as studies of unionization among farmworkers makes clear, resources are even more crucial when organizing particularly marginalized groups (Ganz 2000; Jenkins and Perrow 1983). Because the resources available to a union at any particular time are finite, debates are likely to occur among those that believe that all slack resources should be devoted to the recruitment of marginalized workers and others who believe that the first priority of available resources are existing members and/or leaders. While the previous section describes the opposition of entrenched leadership to the recruitment of new classes of workers, this discussion of resources indicates that existing rank-and-file may also oppose new organizing efforts because of the resources these drives divert from services they demand, such as contract negotiations.
Today, with the creation of new organizing strategies such as the corporate campaign (discussed below) designed specifically to recruit marginalized workers, unions have recognized the need of devoting significant resources to new organizing efforts. John Sweeney has advocated a massive increase in the amount of resources, both financial and human, that the AFL-CIO allocates to organizing (Dark 1999). Individual internationals have also pushed for an increase in resources devoted to organizing. For example, the SEIU devotes over 30% of its resources to organizing and mandates that local unions do the same or face trusteeship (Slaughter 1999; Voss and Sherman 2000). Despite this support, the expansion of organizing budgets has been controversial, even among those that advocate a broader organizing model. For example, Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000) applaud organizing among immigrants, but claim that because these workers are not as “uniformly proletariat” as immigrants of the past, organizing may be more difficult and costly than many believe, as illustrated by numerous studies of current organizing efforts.

Numerous examples exist of labor unions that are committed to organizing marginalized workers, but are hamstrung by the lack of resources that can be committed to such efforts. Needleman (1998b) finds that the relationship between unions and community-based organizations (CBOs) that unions often ally with to gain legitimacy among marginalized workers is often strained because although unions may theoretically be committed to organizing all workers, including the sweatshop workers she studies, unions often conclude that the resources necessary to organize these groups are too great and the payoff too small. Delgado (2000) argues that the Los Angeles Manufacturing Action Project, a joint organization funded by a number of unions, failed because of the
lack of resources devoted by unions necessary to organize L.A.’s marginalized workers, as well as the uncertainty of the rewards the project would yield. He writes, “The project failed to secure, let alone retain or increase, the long-term financial commitment of the unions and the AFL-CIO.” (Delgado 2000: 237). Finances are not the only resources necessary to organize marginalized groups. La Luz and Finn (1998) claim that the lack of linguistic and cultural capital among existing unions can also cripple organizing efforts.

The argument that increased resources and uncertain outcomes may prevent further organizing inroads into traditionally nonunionized employees is substantiated by cases when such groups successfully initiated organizing drives without outside support, thus reducing existing unions’ cost of organizing. I briefly describe two such examples that occurred recently in Southern California. The first is the case of the 1990 wildcat strike by employees of American Racing Equipment (ARE) in Los Angeles (Zabin 2000). These workers, mostly first or second generation Latinos, had created an indigenous organizational structure capable of ensuring nearly full participation in the strike. When such an opportunity presents itself to organized labor, they are quick to take advantage. Said one AFL-CIO official, “So it’s [the wildcat strike] kind of like having big chunks of gold pop up at cave you walk into…We embarrassed ourselves. About four or five international reps all went out there shoulder to shoulder with their handbills trying to convince the workers [to join their union]” (Zabin 2000: 156). Unfortunately, the union that eventually organized the workers, the Machinists (IAM), made little effort to use the momentum created by this victory to organize other factories in the industry, which would have required a significant investment of effort and resources (Zabin 2000).
The second example is the drywallers’ strike in Southern California, which was again led by many Latino and Mexican immigrants with no initial support from organized labor. In this case, many current leaders within the Carpenters Union blamed the previous leaders for failing to organize the influx of immigrants into the industry that occurred in the 1980s (Milkman and Wong 2000). Referring to the decline in membership, one leader said, “These Mexicans didn’t do it to us. We did it to ourselves.” (Milkman and Wong 2000: 180). Many officials within the union reacted to the bottom up organizing in a manner similar to the ARE strike, calling it “…an incredible opportunity that was granted to us, and we didn’t’ seize the moment.” (Milkman and Wong 2000: 197, quote by an immigrant union organizer). As in the case of the wheel industry, the initial success of the Carpenters in the drywall industry soon deteriorated because, according to one building trade official, “The fact is that they don’t bring the hammer down on every developer that uses nonunion drywall, in the same way they did during the drywall strike.” (Milkman and Wong 2000: 196). Even drywall executives chastised the union for “…a really poor job of organizing” (2000: 196). As both these examples illustrate, when the cost of organizing marginalized workers declines, existing unions broaden their organizing programs to include these workers, but when costs rise, marginalized groups often drop off the union’s radar screen.

While the uncertain outcomes and increased resources may prevent unions from organizing marginalized groups, demands from the existing membership for services may also reduce the resource devoted to new organizing efforts (Block 1980; Fletcher and Hurd 1998). Members may resist new organizing ventures if significant staff and resources are required. As one staff member put it, “…They [the membership] have this
culture that ‘we pay our dues, the local union hires representation staff, and therefore they take care of my needs.’” (Sherman and Voss 2000: 321). As Fletcher and Hurd (1998: 49) note, “Members have difficulty understanding why they should support unless there is a direct link to their own situations.” While the oligarchic tendencies discussed earlier is a possible reason why unions make little effort to organized marginalized workers, the opposition to these programs by the rank-and-file indicates that entrenched leaders may be representing the wishes of their membership by defining organizing goals rather narrowly. Regardless of the reasons why existing leaders are reticent to mobilize new groups, the high costs and uncertain outcomes that come with organizing among marginalized groups can make it quite difficult for leaders to develop a sustained broad based organizing agenda.

_Historical struggles_ Like today, in the past organizing also required increased resources for the mobilization of marginalized workers, which were concentrated primarily in the growing factory system. Often the AFL opposed organizing industrial laborers, not only because craft leaders felt these workers could threaten their leadership of the movement, but also because they believed unskilled workers were impossible to organize, which would mean that any organizing drive would have committed resources to a very uncertain outcome. As Livesay (1978: 95) notes, “Even after the passage of New Deal laws eliminating many of the practical obstacles to industrial unions, the AF of L leaders refused to venture into uncharted waters…” This attitude led to the AFL to struggle with militant unions who were willing to devote significant resources to a goal that conservative craft leaders viewed as unobtainable.
While Gompers’ attitude towards the IWW was often very harsh, as we have seen above, he also regarded this organization as chasing after impossible goals, claiming that the IWW was “fanciful and chimerical and absolutely impossible” (Dubofsky 1969:94). He regarded the IWW as a group of impractical dreamers, arguing that their goals were “too chimerical [for] an intelligent man or woman confronted with the practical problems of securing a better home, better food and clothing, and a better life” and its followers “unorganized and exploited workers were misled into chasing a will-o’-the-wisp” (Livesay 1978:94). Others in the AFL shared Gompers’ view of the futility of organizing industrial workers. Matthew Woll, president of the craft Photo Engravers union, who, when commenting on the debate over how best to bring in industrial workers into the AFL referred to these workers as “unorganized, and perhaps unorganizable.” (Bernstein 1970: 366). Despite this attitude, groups like the IWW demonstrated that industrial organizing was indeed possible. Livesay (1978: 161) claims, “the IWW’s history offered a hard, practical lesson: Gompers was wrong about industrial unionism’s possibilities. It could have been done despite injunctions, militia, and the whole arsenal of weapons in the hands of business.”

However, it was not until the formation of the Committee on Industrial Organizations that a viable organization was created to organize unskilled laborers. An important reason for the creation of the CIO and its eventual split with the American Federation of Labor was due to the failure of the AFL to devote significant resources to the mobilization of industrial workers. While still Vice-President within the AFL (later to become president of the CIO), John L. Lewis complained, “there still remains the fact that there has been no administration of that policy [to grant industrial unions charters],
no execution of the promissory note that the Federation held out to the millions of workers in the mass production industry…” (Galenson 1960: 6). Lewis recognized that without significant resources devoted to industrial unions, the growing number of factory workers would remain unorganized.

The steel industry represented perhaps the clearest proof of Lewis’s sentiment. Steelworkers had long been under the jurisdiction of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers (the Amalgamated). By the time of the AFL CIO split during the Great Depression, any gains this union had made were completely gone-it was essentially a failure. In fact, the poor record of the AFL in general and the Amalgamated in particular in regards to steelworkers was one of the major reasons for Lewis’s attack on the AFL, “If we do not take some action the public and steel workers are going to take it that we have given up hope of organizing the steel industry…We [must] have the resolution to carry on a campaign without the authority of the Amalgamated.” (Bernstein 1970: 371-372). The CIO was well prepared to devote the resources to undertake what was at the time an organizing program of unprecedented magnitude. While still operating within the AFL, the CIO offered to contribute one-half million dollars to a steelworkers organizing fund, to which the AFL would contribute the remaining one million dollars. The AFL’s response to this offer was pathetic. President Green’s effort to raise funds among AFL affiliates to revive the dying Amalgamated netted only about $8,000 (Lages 1967).

Due to the shortcomings of the AFL, the CIO was finally compelled to create its own organization, the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC). David McDonald, one of the early leaders of SWOC, recounts the support given by the CIO, including a
$500,000 check from John L. Lewis (McDonald 1969). In part because of the resources SWOC was able to garner from the CIO, this industrial union clearly surpassed the best efforts of the Amalgamated. While membership figures for both unions, especially SWOC, are difficult to obtain, it appears that SWOC was able to organize close to 200,000 members in its first year (Lages 1967), while, at its high point in 1920 the Amalgamated could claim only 31,500 workers (Lorwin 1970). The successful organizing engaged in by SWOC indicates that when resources were devoted to organizing, membership gains could be made.

Despite the differences between marginalized workers today and their industrial counterparts of one hundred years ago, the debate within the union over the importance of organizing them is remarkably similar. The interests of entrenched leadership are a major stumbling block for those that seek to develop an organizing model specifically designed to mobilize nonunion workers. In addition, even when unions are willing to make the commitment to these workers, as appears to be the case today, the resources necessary to conduct successful organizing drives often prove prohibitive. In the past this was a major criticism of the AFL by those who formed the CIO-the lack of effort made to create viable industrial unions. In addition, rank-and-file opposition may dissuade progressive leaders from imitating expensive and uncertain organizing efforts. It is clear that oligarchic leadership and resources are two key reasons why the mobilization of marginalized workers is so controversial. As the comparison of the Amalgamated and SWOC indicate, if current efforts are not made to recruit these workers, the labor movement is unlikely to grow during the 21st Century. Given the positive rhetoric of many union leaders, it appears that the level of resources devoted to this goal is likely to
determine the level of success unions have mobilizing these workers. I now turn to controversial strategies of organizing, often those that are used to organize these marginalized groups.

**Conflicts over Organizing Strategies**

Having described debates over organizing goals, in this section I outline the struggles within the movement over the types of organizing strategies that are most appropriate for increasing the membership of unions. Both current and historical debate has centered on the use of disruptive tactics, including strikes, marches demonstrations, and rallies, tactics that have been used by more militant sections of the movement. As Tarrow (1998: 98) notes, “disruptive tactics give weak actors leverage against powerful opponents…” Often, in the past the use of such tactics led to violence, and labor history is filled with numerous bloody conflicts, such as the Homestead strike of 1892. Today, as protest becomes more institutionalized (McCarthy and McPhail 1998), labor organizations must be innovative in their use of organizing tactics, constantly expanding their repertoires of contention. As Tilly (1978) makes clear, these actors are not free to choose their protest tactics, but are rather constrained by the historical period in which they exist. However, in order to maintain disruption, actors must constantly create new forms of protest to counter control mechanisms of repressive agents (McAdam 1983). The choice of disruptive tactics is often a contentious one as well, as some groups within the movement prefer to rely on institutionalized means to achieve their goals; while others argue that only through disruption will their demands be met (della Porta and Diani 1999; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1995).
I identify three reasons why the choice of tactics has often been one of such contention in the labor movement. First, disruptive tactics tend to be highly innovative, as unions engage in activities that are unfamiliar to businesses and authorities. Today many unions are relying on the corporate campaign, a broad based organizing strategy designed to avoid the institutional NLRB process. In the past innovations such as the sit-down strike were often initiated by the rank-and-file. Given the existing leadership’s unfamiliarity with these tactics, the use of these tactics often threatens the “institutional knowledge” of existing leaders, and hence, their position of power within the organization. Second, disruptive tactics are often very effective at mobilizing the rank-and-file, especially the marginalized workers discussed above, which can be threatening to an entrenched leadership, as we have seen earlier. Finally, disruptive tactics tend to offend business interest, which conservative labor leaders often seek ties with. Because of these reasons, the use of disruptive tactics is often debated extensively within the movement. I begin by focusing on controversy over innovative tactics due to their threat to the institutional knowledge of the existing leadership.

Institutional knowledge and innovative tactics As Weber (1946) first noted, bureaucratic authority in rational-legal organizations, which most, if not all labor unions are, is based on skills and knowledge required by a particular position. The authority of the leadership rests in part on the claim the individual has on the expertise about the functioning of the organization. By threatening this knowledge, the individual’s position within the organization is also threatened. In Lipset’s ([1950] 1968) study of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) of Saskatchewan, the reforms of the

---

6 In 1935 Congress passed the Wagner Act, which created the National Labor Relations Board. This Board regulates union organizing efforts through the certification election process, a highly institutionalized
elected socialist party were often nullified by a civil service who opposed change based, “on a desire to maintain the stability of their departments and their own positions.” (Lipset 1968:316). In the case of the labor movement, the development of innovative strategies reduces the institutional knowledge of existing leaders, thus making these organizing strategies potentially threatening to their position within the movement. As we have seen, these leaders are unlikely to engage in activities that will threaten their position of power within the organization.

*Current period* Since the passage of the Wagner Act unions have had access to a relatively institutionalized mechanism through which to recruit new members. Increasingly, however, this process has come under attack due to the opportunities afforded employers to resist unionization (Clawson and Clawson 1999; Crump 1995; Freeman 1988; Goldfield 1987), to the point where many militant unionists have called for organizing tactics that bypass the elections process (Crump 1991; Lerner 1991). The development of the corporate campaign has been one method that labor unions have addressed the problems inherent in the NLRB organizing model. Through the corporate campaign, a union seeks to force the targeted corporation into recognizing the union without going through the NLRB election process. In the corporate campaign, unions rely on a variety of outsider/disruptive (marches, sit-ins, civil disobedience) and insider (shareholders’ meetings, lobbying) tactics to mobilize public pressure against an employee (Jarley and Maranto 1990; Lerner 1998; Manheim 2001; Perry 1987). In addition to these tactics, unions also attempt to mobilize outside allies, ranging from community groups to the state, to pressure the firm to recognize the union as the authorized bargaining agent of the employees. Unlike the institutionalized NLRB procedure that allows the employees of a firm to vote for or against union representation.
certification election process, which is highly regulated by the federal government, the
corporate campaign lacks a procedure that is straightforward and familiar. Jarley and
Maranto (1990: 506) write, “…corporate campaigns lack a unique identifying feature that
distinguishes them from other forms of union action.” Perry (1987: 16) adds, “…the
corporate campaign game lacks well-defined rules and requirements…”

However, despite its increasing popularity within the movement during the 1990s
(see Manheim 2001 for trends), some unionists are hesitant to rely on this innovative
tactic as an alternative to the NLRB method of organizing. In describing the Justice for
Janitors campaign, one of the most successful corporate campaigns of recent years,
Waldinger et al. (1998: 110) identify a commonly held belief among the rank-and-file
about the differences between the corporate campaign and the NLRB certification
election process, “[Certification] elections are controlled by the [union] bosses and set up
for them. It’s an alienating process for workers… and separates the union from the
workers.” According to Brecher and Costello (1998), an official in John Sweeney’s
administration that strongly supported labor militancy, told Jobs for Justice activists (an
organizing program similar to Justice for Janitors that involves the creation of labor-
community coalitions) that they should concentrate their efforts on regular union
channels, rather than outside them, which they had been previously doing. In his account
of the creation and development of the corporate campaign by the labor movement in the
1970s, Manheim (2001) notes that although some within the movement are quick to
adopt this strategy, many leaders are more wary of this unfamiliar organizing tactic.
Robert Harbrant, former president of the AFL-CIO’s Food and Allied Service Trades
Department, who supports the corporate campaign, refers to some of the ideas of Ray
Rogers, the primary architect of the modern campaign, as “suicidal” (Manheim 2001:57).

As these examples illustrate, the adoption of the corporate campaign is controversial in part because of the threat to the leadership’s knowledge of traditional organizing strategies, specifically the NLRB election. These entrenched leaders see the use of the corporate campaign as a tool for more militant elements to gain control of the movement. However, if organized labor is to make a long term commitment to the corporate campaign—which has been shown to be highly effective—it is possible that experts of this strategy, such as maverick Roy Rogers, may become increasingly powerful, something existing leaders wish to avoid. Because of this, tension has grown within the movement over this innovative organizing strategy. Although the strategies used to organize workers today are innovative, the debates are not, as similar conflicts arose in the past due to the resistance of existing leaders to new strategies of organizing.

**Historical struggles** In the past the strike was the primary strategy used to organize new workers, and even conservative groups, such as the AFL, were quite willing to use it to bolster their membership. Gompers, when responding to the Commissioner of Labor on the possibility of reducing strikes, relied on the rhetoric of justice to defend the most basic weapon of organized labor, “So long as the present industrial and commercial system will last, so long will strikes continue…I regard the strike as the sign that the people are not yet willing to surrender every spark of the manhood and their honor and their independent. It is the protest of the worker against unjust conditions…” (Mandel 1963: 68). Despite Gompers claim that the strike was a vehicle of improvement for the common laborer, he clearly believed that only a select few within the movement had the
knowledge necessary to conduct a successful strike. In commenting on an early strike by
tenement house cigarmakers in New York City, he writes, “We union men saw our hard-
earned achievements likely to vanish because of this reckless precipitate action without
consultation with our union.” (Gompers 1984: 48). While still in the Cigarmakers’
Union, he reported that “…is it to the best interests of our organization and trade to at all
times strike, even when the employer possess the vantage ground, or is it not better to act
like a wall-drilled and disciplined army that is directed to reach a certain position, under
the very fire of the enemy, with orders not to shoot, even admits the greatest
provocation…It is not wise nor practical, to at all times strike, even against the reduction
of wages [Italics in original].” (Mandel 1963: 40). Of a cloakmakers strike in New York
City, where Gompers was brought in by the union leadership over the objections of the
rank-and-file to end the work stoppage, Gompers later recalled, “Strong, resourceful
leaders were instilling into these mutinous, undisciplined minds the fundamental theories
of unionism. They were held steadily in line, taught to curb their fighting spirit…-in a
word the cloakmakers were taught unionism.” (Mandel 1963: 305-306). Gompers
clearly did not believe that the strike was a tactic to be wielded by the rank-and-file
without careful the careful supervision of existing leaders.

Despite the AFL’s rather conservative use of the strike, others within the
movement were willing to use it in unique ways. Probably the most important innovation
of the strike was the development of the sit-down strike of the 1930s, shaped through the
autoworkers struggles with General Motors (Fine 1969; Kraus 1947). The sit-down
strike developed as a response both to employer resistance to unionization efforts after
the passage of the National Recover Act of 1933, a precursor to the National Labor
Relations Act, and the lack of militancy among many union officials. In 1935 the United Rubber Council, an AFL affiliate that represented workers at the Goodyear tire factor in Akron Ohio, signed a no-strike agreement with the company shortly after the membership voted to strike. The response of the rank-and-file was one of outrage. Said one member, “I’d see myself in hell before I ever belong to another dirty stinking union.” (Brecher 1972: 180). Workers tore up their union cards and membership in the union dropped from 40,000 to 5,000. Most importantly, however, workers responded to union betrayal by resorting to a new organizing strategy, the sit-down strike—one that had no connection with the existing union (Brecher 1972).

Because the sit-down strike was developed and controlled almost entirely by the rank-and-file, not existing leaders, the widespread use of this tactics\(^7\) threatened the knowledge existing leaders had about how strikes should be conducted to recruit new members (Brecher 1972; Krause 1947). Not surprising, responses to the sit-down strike by existing leaders were often vicious. William Green, the president of the AFL at the time of the sit-down strikes (most of which were conducted by CIO unions), called the strategy “sabotage beyond the wildest dreams of the I.W.W.” and that the sit-down “connotes a desire to bargain by violence, to use force in the taking of public and private property, to take the law into one’s own hands.” (Phelan 1989: 145). Not only was the sit-down opposed by the leaders of the AFL, some unions, such as the United Rubber Workers, saw the worker militancy that the sit-down expressed as a threat to its power. Often, as in the case of the Goodyear strike, the union attempted to force the sit-down strikers to leave and engage in a convention work stoppage, a tactic these leaders were

\(^7\) According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were only 48 sit-down strikes in 1936, compared to 477 the following year (Anonymous 1938).
more familiar with (Bernstein 1969). As these examples illustrate, existing leaders of the labor movement sought to carefully regulate the activities of their membership in an effort to protect their monopoly of expertise.

**Mobilization of the rank-and-file and disruptive tactics** Disruptive tactics such as the corporate campaign and sit-down strike are threatening to existing leaders not only because of their innovativeness, but also because these types of organizing strategies are particularly well-suited at mobilizing the marginalized groups described earlier. By forging a larger role for these members in union affairs, the power of existing leaders is likely to decline. This sentiment is expressed by Dave Beck, Teamsters president in the 1950s, who said, “Unions are big business. Why should truck drives and bottle washers be allowed to make big decisions affecting union policy? Would any corporation allow it?” (Moody 1988:57). Given this oligarchic sentiment among many union leaders, the use of more innovative tactics that mobilize the rank-and-file have often been resisted by entrenched leaders.

**Current period** The corporate campaign is a strategy well suited to mobilize marginalized workers described above, including immigrants and janitors (Milkman and Wong 2001). Examples abound of the success unions achieve when using this strategy. Through boycotts, mobilization of immigrant community organizations, public awareness campaigns, and support from the Department of Labor, UNITE was able to successfully organize immigrant workers employed by contractors that supplied fashion designer Jessica McClintock (Needleman 1998). In evaluating UNITE’s efforts to organize garment workers in LA, which includes extensive use of the corporate campaign, Bonacich (2000) concludes that traditional NLRB organizing is a completely
ineffective approach, and the use of the corporate campaign is crucial if UNITE is to make any progress. CWA Local 9410 turned to the corporate campaign to mobilized public and international pressure against Sprint when the company closed down a plant that was on the verge of an NLRB election (Early 1998). While the corporate campaign has increased in popularity, some unions have combined it with older methods of organizing-the drywallers of Southern California employed a successful strike, along with a Fair Labor Standards Act lawsuit to win representation without an election (Milkman and Wong 2000) and a immigrant truckers employed the strike to organize in a difficult legal environment (Early 1998).

In addition to the strength of the corporate campaign in organizing marginalized groups, others concerned about the lack of democracy in the labor movement have praised the effectiveness of the corporate campaign in mobilizing the rank-and-file and creating a more democratic union. Rathke (1999) argues that the alternative to the corporate campaign, the NLRB certification election, limits the tactical options available to unions and also fails to create an organization with significant rank and file participation. Lerner (1991) claims that through broad based organizing outside the NLRB labor unions are able to build a movement necessary not only to organize a group of workers, but also to create the viable organizational structure necessary for long term growth. Joe Crump (1991: 42), an organizer for the United Food and Commercial Workers, claims that one of the reasons why this union relies heavily on the corporate campaign is because, “It’s [the corporate campaign] an opportunity to build membership participation in the local union.” In addition, the corporate campaign uses a variety of strategies that requires increased rank-and-file participation. For example, the LA Justice
for Janitors campaign relied on tactics such as marches and civil disobedience, all of which required extensive participation by the membership (Waldinger et al. 1998), and, according to one informant, has been so successful because, “we’ve had the highest percentage of workers participation.” (Waldinger et al. 1998: 116). While the NLRB election process can be conducted with little rank-and-file support, this tactic too is most successful when it involves broad based support from the membership (Bronfenbrenner 1997).

Because the corporate campaign increases rank-and-file participation in the activities of the union and is effective in mobilizing marginalized groups, it is not surprising that the leadership of some unions is resistant to this organizing strategy. Many staff resist increase membership involvement, “For most field reps, it [rank-and-file organizing] scares them ‘cause it means they have to give up a little power.” (Voss and Sherman 2000: 321, quote from a staff organizer). Often existing staff will resist efforts to shift to an organizing model that involves more membership participation. One organizer notes, “The field reps don’t block organizing, they just don’t get it. Many staff have a hard time letting go and letting members run things” (Fletcher and Hurd 1998: 42). “They’re scared…on a power trip” (Fletcher and Hurd 1998: 48). The leadership of SEIU local 399, the union responsible for the L.A. Justice for Janitors campaign was never completely supportive of the organizing drive and eventually stopped funding it. This prompted the international to place the union in trusteeship (Waldinger et al. 1998).

Given the mobilizing potential of the corporate campaign, it is not surprising that many leaders view this strategy with at least some degree of suspicion and are often unlikely to welcome its implementation.
Historical struggles  Like the corporate campaign, historically disruptive organizing tactics have often been opposed by union leadership both because of their potential to mobilize industrial workers and the strong leadership role of the rank-and-file that these strategies encourage. In both industrial strikes and sit-down strikes labor leaders expressed opposition at least in part because of the mobilizing potential of these tactics.

Despite the AFL’s view that the strike was a necessity under current labor-management relations, we have seen that the AFL was quick to oppose “irresponsible” work stoppages. Given its resistance to the organization of industrial workers the AFL was often opposed to strikes among unskilled workers as well. For example, the Pullman strike of 1894 was hamstrung in part because leaders of the AFL refused to support a strike by a large industrial union that was outside the AFL (Brecher 1972). Brecher goes on to argue that even in the early Twentieth Century, which experienced a major increase in labor militancy and strike activity, “It [the AFL] was safe, sane and conservative, and as hostile to industrial unionism and the mass strike processes as it had been in the days of the Pullman strike.” (Brecher 1972: 102).

The opposition of the AFL to the industrial strike is dramatically illustrated by the steelworkers’ strike of 1919. Mandel (1963) documents the lack of support given by the AFL leadership to the strikers, including the undercutting of the strike by the Amalgamated, which signed a contract before the strike was over. According to Mandel, this opposition was due to the fact that a successful outcome would “lead to similar organizing in other basic industries and that this would change the character of the A.F. of L. by shifting the center of gravity to the unskilled workers, lay the basis of industrial
unionism, make the labor movement more militant, and threaten the position of the old
conservative leadership.” (Mandel 1963: 471). Eventually, however, Gompers and the
AFL were forced to support the strike because, “…postponement was impossible and that
to attempt it would mean…a loss of confidence in the leadership of the AF of L, with the
possibility that radical leaders might get control.” (Mandel 1963: 470). The AFL’s
opposition to the steel workers strike was so strong that Attorney General J. Mitchell
Palmer told a House committee that “through the actions of the Department of
Justice…this strike was terminated with, in reality, a complete victory for the American
Federation of Labor.” (Mandel 1963: 471). It was in this strike that the AFL clearly
demonstrated its opposition to an organizing strategy that would mobilize the masses of
industrial workers, those union members the AFL sought to avoid.

While the AFL often opposed industrial unions and the organizing strikes they
conducted, even militant unions joined the AFL in opposing innovative organizing
tactics, such as the sit-down strike which was viewed as dangerous because of its
potential to mobilize the rank-and-file. Brecher (1972), who draws on Admic’s (1938)
account of the strike, cites a major reason why the sit-down strike was an effective
strategy: it is a democratic process in the sense that control of the strike comes from the
men involved, not union leaders. Because of this, existing leaders, as we saw earlier,
strongly opposed sit-down strikes. In his attack on this strategy, William Green made it
quite clear that the use of this strategy would not be tolerated in the AFL, saying, “The
sit-down strike has never been approved or supported by the American Federation of
Labor because there is involved in its application grave implications detrimental to
labor’s interests. It must be disavowed by the thinking men and women of labor.”
Even unions that realized heightened success from the sit-down strike, notably the CIO and especially the UAW, sought to curb this rank-and-file militancy. John L. Lewis, president of the CIO at the time of these strikes, was quick to use this militancy to benefit the union and even quicker to ensure that this rank-and-file mobilization would not threaten his leadership. Zeiger (1988: 98) claims, “Even as he bargained with corporate leaders and government officials on behalf of auto and rubber workers engaged in sit-downs, he toughened the language of UMW contract to penalize and sort of spontaneous or unauthorized work stoppage.” The reason for Lewis’s opposition to this strike tactic was obvious, “Nor was the grass-roots democratic unionism that surfaced in key CIO affiliates [during the sit-downs] in tune with Lewis’s bedrock values as a union leader.” (Zeiger 1988: 98).

The autoworkers, the group that made the most use of the sit-down, often received the most criticism from union leadership, especially their own. As one CIO autoworker representative remarked, “They [autoworkers] want things done right now, and they are too impatient to wait for the orderly procedure involved in collective bargaining.” (Brecher 1972: 193). Some UAW leaders, such as President Homer Martin, saw the increase in sit-down strikes as an attempt to promote factionalism within the union (Fine 1937). In a wave of layoffs at a Pontiac plant in 1937, many autoworkers staged a sit-down strike, an action that was denounced by many in the leadership, including Martin, who blamed the matter on Communists, claiming, “there is every reason to believe that professional provocateurs were mixed up in the calling of the Pontiac strike and its continuation.” (Galenson 1960: 158). The militancy of this organizing tactic, and the
broad participation it encouraged, was at one time both supported and feared by the leadership of craft and industrial unions alike.

The labor-management accord and disruptive tactics The use of disruptive and violent tactics, as Tarrow (1998) and dell Porta and Diani (1999) note, is common among resource-deprived groups, as these tactics can be initiated with little external support. This is also true in the labor movement, as employees with little institutionalized power turn to disruptive tactics as leverage against capital. As Tarrow (1998) notes, the use of disruptive tactics often intensifies the conflict between groups, which, in the case of the labor movement, elevates struggle between labor and management. This polarization of conflict is the third reason for the debate surrounding the use of disruptive tactics.
Specifically, given the close ties between many conservative union leaders and business interests, it is not surprising that these leaders will resist tactics that are more disruptive and threatening to big business. Observers of the labor movement (Aronowitz 1973; Fantasia 1988) have criticized the post WW II labor-management accord as a major reason for the continual decline in union membership since the 1950s. Very simply, this accord, which was more of a tacit understanding than a formal contract, was based on an agreement where labor would grant management its right to manage, including avoiding strikes whenever possible, not challenging the shop floor authority of management, and management would grant labor the right to represent its employees. While the increase in opposition to the labor movement among many businesses in recent years has signaled a breaking of this accord, many union leaders, even progressives, still seek approval from business interests. For example, John Sweeney, in speaking to a Businesses for Social Responsibility event, stated that “We [the AFL-CIO] want to increase productivity. We
want to help American business compete in the world…” (Mantios 1998: 61). If even the most ardent reforms in the movement speak of cooperation with capital, it should not be surprising that more conservative leaders oppose disruptive organizing tactics, even those that, as we have seen above, can bring great success. I begin first by describing current opposition to the corporate campaign, and then turn to historical resistance to disruptive organizing strategies due to their threat to business interests.

**Current period** The corporate campaign was developed out recognition that the traditional form of organizing, the NLRB certification election, was affording employer too many opportunities to resist unionization. As such, this strategy was explicitly designed to be a more confrontation method of organizing, one that seeks to inflict very real economic, political, and social damage on a corporation (Manheim 2001). Because of this, it is not surprising that those that seek a cooperative relationship with capital should oppose this strategy. While not framing their criticisms in terms of support for capital, many of today’s leaders often exhibit trepidation towards the corporate campaign the militant tactics it brings to industrial relations. As Manheim (2001: 58) notes, “Part of the controversy [around the corporate campaign] is also at some level ideological. The top labor leadership of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s was…very mainstream in its politics.” Being mainstream includes being careful not to offend powerful business interests.

Often union leaders have explicitly expressed trepidation towards the corporate campaign and the tactics that have made it so successful. During the 1995 campaign for AFL-CIO president, Tom Donahue, the candidate more representative of the old guard, attacked Sweeney’s SEIU for shutting down a bridge in New York, claiming it was too
confrontation and would hurt public opinion (Meyerson 1998). In response to Sweeney’s support for labor civil disobedience, Donahue argued, “We have to worry less about blocking bridges and worry more about building bridges” (Dark 1999: 239). Other disruptive campaigns had to deal with lack of support from a leadership that is fearful of conflict. During the LA Justice for Janitors campaign, the union relied on a variety of tactics, including street theater, blocking traffic and disrupting the targeted owner’s country club (Waldinger et al. 1998; Williams 1999). These types of actions often instigated repression by the authorities, such as an attack by LAPD police on a peaceful march in 1990. This type of confrontation caused one leader to worry that “they [the local leadership] would bail when things got hot.” (Waldinger et al. 1998: 113). By polarizing industrial conflict with the corporate campaign, militant unionists often offend the interests of those that seek a more cooperative relationship with capital.

**Historical struggles** Support for capital has always been a reason for the unwillingness of conservative unions to engage in disruptive organizing strategies. While opposition to capital in general and large corporations in particular has always been a common theme among unionists, Galambos (1971) finds that during the first 20 years of the Twentieth Century, the previously hostile attitudes towards business expressed in the *American Federationalist*, the official organ of the AFL, gradually shifted to neutral or even positive. Gompers, even early in his career in 1883, granted employers the legitimate claim to a return on their investment to the labor process, provided that they pay a living wage (Livesay 1978). This attitude was in stark contrast to the growing number of socialists committed to the end of industrial capitalism. Gompers viewed the radical goals of socialists as dangerous not only to capital, but to labor organizations that
sought cooperation, writing, “I saw how professions of radicalism and sensationalism concentrated all the forces of organized society against a labor movement and nullified in advance normal necessary activity.” (Gompers 1984: 34). He believed that cooperation between labor and management was the ultimate goal of class struggle, “The organization of management, finance, and producing workmen is the way to develop discipline and information within those groups. The next step, to my mind is cooperation of all the groups with the pooling of information to determine control of the industry.” (Gompers 1984: 132). Given this increasingly comfortable relationship between conservative elements in the labor movement and capital, it is not surprising that the AFL often denounced radical tactics and the unions responsible in order to bolster their position in the existing sphere of industrial relations.

In its struggles with the militant IWW, an organization quick to use the strike to achieve new benefits, the AFL often supported the employer to gain favorable treatment. In the 1912 Lawrence, MA textile strike led by the IWW, John Golden, leader of the United Textile Workers, an AFL union, attacked the work stoppage, promising, in return for union recognition, to use his organization to break the strike. This blatant support for owners led writer Lincoln Steffens to comment, “The IWW makes the mill men sigh for the AFL.” (Dubofsky 1959: 259). When the IWW attempted to organize Butte miners during WW I, which resulted in increased union membership and crippling strikes, federal authorities attempted to woo the AFL. Labor Department conciliator Hywel Davies claimed, “An outlaw organization camouflaging under another name [the IWW] can be eliminated only when the opportunity for a more decent relationship is provide,

---

8 This unwavering support for capitalism did not end with Samuel Gompers. According to AFL-CIO president George Meaney, “We think that the American economic system, with its potential for progress,
and it is in this particular case the joint duty of the Employers to join hands with the A.F. of L.” (Dubofsky 1969: 421). In other conflicts the AFL were willing partners with owners struck by the IWW. In a Portland lumber mill strike the local AFL Central Labor Council supplied the mills with strikebreakers. Said one mill manager, “Federated Trades have taken a very decided stand against the Industrial Workers, and undoubtedly they have greatly hurt the cause of the strikers.” (Dubofsky 1969: 130). The AFL was able to capitalize on the militancy of the IWW to enhance their position among the captains of industry.⁹

In the post-WW steelworker strike of 1919 described above, Gompers cited the wishes of business as a justification for his lack of support, claiming, “the big financial and industrial interests of the country had declared that they were ‘tired of the domination of labor’ and that they planned a campaign to strike a blow at the labor movement.” (Mandel 1963: 469). This is an interesting justification for Gompers’ attempt to dissuade a strike in an industry that had never been an organizing priority for the AFL. While the AFL has traditionally sided with business interests in the face of radical unionism, industrial organizations like the CIO have also sought business support when dealing with disruptive tactics. John L. Lewis, while largely responsible for the first viable industrial organization, the CIO, had expressed more support for the owners his union was struggling against than the radicals in his union. In imploring owners to cooperate with the CIO, Lewis argued “A CIO contract is adequate protection for any employer works quite well.” (Mantsios 1998b: 54).

⁹ Besides cooperation with capital, conservative unions opposed more radical organizing tactics because they saw an opportunity to strengthen own their bargaining position. Essentially, they used the radical flank effect of groups such as the IWW to appeal to the leaders of corporations they were bargaining with (Haines 1988). Therefore, even in cases when the AFL felt no sympathy for business, it was able to use the threat of more militant group to achieve new benefits for its membership.
against sit-downs, lie-downs, or any other kind of strikes.” (Zeiger 1988: 98). In both the case of the AFL and CIO, the codependence of many conservative labor unions on business interests often led to resistance by the old guard to more radical forms of organizing.

As in the case of organizing goals, organizing tactics have been and continue to be a source of controversy within the movement. Whether these more disruptive tactics threaten the institutional knowledge of existing leaders, mobilize the rank-and-file, especially marginalized workers, or hurt labor’s image in the eyes of business, more conservative elements of the movement have consistently resisted innovative and disruptive tactics, even when they are successful. Because of the similarities of present debates to those of the past, the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the corporate campaign will have long-term implications for the growth of the movement. When unions such as the UAW, notably the rank-and-file, embraced innovative tactics such as the sit-down strike, they were able to experience real growth and build a democratic union. It is not surprising that unions today who rely on innovative tactics like the corporate campaign have been able to begin to increase their membership and play a key role in revitalizing democracy in the movement. Clearly, however, if strategies such as the corporate campaign are to be fully utilized by the movement, the entrenched leadership’s desire for stability must be overcome.

**Conclusions**

The main objective of this paper was to place the current American labor revitalization project in historic context by drawing parallels between current debates over organizing to those that took place during important periods in labor’s past.
Through such a comparison, I illustrate that the 1990s is indeed an important period of examination, a crucial time in the lifecourse of the movement. In many ways the 1990s is similar to the late 1800s when the KOL struggled with AFL, the turn of the Century, when the radical IWW threatened to wrest control of the movement from the AFL, and the 1930s, a period that witnessed the rise of the longest lasting industrial organization, the CIO. Clearly, the similarities between the present and the past indicate that the rise in scholarship on the current movement is justified—it is an important time in the history of organized labor. However, the 1990s is in many ways different from the past—organizing processes have changed, potential members are different, industries have shifted, and political philosophies have been reconstructed. Along with the similarities to important periods in the past, the uniqueness of the current period also justifies the volume of research on the present movement.

In addition, I offer some initial explanations of why such debates take place at all. While social movements and their organizational manifestations often seek broader societal transformation, they themselves are not immune to change. In this paper I explore some possible reasons why the labor movement has experienced such conflict over organizing goals and tactics. One obvious reason is the oligarchic nature of the movement’s leadership. The recruitment of marginalized groups and the use of unconventional organizing tactics can threaten the existing power arrangement of the movement in a variety of ways. Union leaders are mindful of this, and hence are often unenthusiastic about instituting change. More mundane factors also prevent organizational change. For example, the recruitment of marginalized workers is often an uncertain task that requires significant effort and resources to accomplish such a project.
Therefore, it is not surprising that even militant unionists are hesitant to devote the level of resources necessary to undertake these organizing drives, especially when existing rank-and-file may oppose such efforts.

While evidence presented in this paper indicates support for explanations of internal movement conflict, it is also important to realize that these hypotheses are exploratory in nature. Systematic research is needed to examine the reasons why the labor movement has often been resistant to change. One important question raised here is are existing leaders resistant to the mobilization of marginalized workers because of the threat these groups pose to leaders position within the organization, or are they merely responding to the demands of the rank-and-file? The quotes and commentaries given as evidence here merely provide initial support for the validity of my explanations, and do not provide evidence to the extent to which these processes operate in the movement.

While scholarship on the labor movement has been revitalized in part because of the increasing use of social movement scholarship, it is important that those who study other social movements are aware of the lessons that can be drawn from the labor movement. For example, in the case of the current research, it is likely that leaders of many social movements may be resistant to new, disruptive forms of collective behavior that can alienate those in positions of power in the environment. Many organizations in other movements (environment, civil rights) have gone “mainstream” in order to appeal to the broader public. By doing so, they hope to achieve important organizational goals. However, as the conclusion of past debates in the labor movement have illustrated, narrow goals and conservative tactics, which can led to success in the short-run, are often a recipe for long term failure, especially if the movement is committed to democratic
principles. Scholars should be aware that the labor movement does not have a monopoly on entrenched leadership.

Given the important struggles described above, it is also evident that the organizational structure of labor unions plays an important role in determining how successful unions are in recruiting new members. While scholars interested in the present state of the labor movement have examined unions, many attribute the fate of the movement to a variety of structural factors, including employer resistance, the apathy (at best) of the state, and a changing economy. While I do not discount other dimensions of organizing, I believe the unions themselves should play a central role in accounting for organizing success and failures. As scholars such as Ganz (2000) have noted, labor unions can develop successful organizing strategies even in the face of fierce employer opposition and workers that have little legal protection or experience with unions. Obstacles such as firm resistance and state repression are not new to labor unions. In fact, the labor movement grew at a faster rate before the Great Depression, a period marked by bloody state and employer repression, no legal protection for organizing, and a common belief that unions were un-American. In sum, the concept of agency is one of central importance in the study of the American labor movement.
CHAPTER: 3 REPERTOIRE CHOICE AND MEMBERSHIP RECRUITMENT: UNION ORGANIZING EFFORTS IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ACTIVITY

With the expansion of democracy that occurred in Western Europe during the 17th and 18th Century, the nation state became an increasingly important target of collective action (Tilly 1993, 1995). As social movements began to seek change through the state, they adopted a “logic of numbers” (DeNardo 1985) when engaging in protest activity. By employing tactics such as the mass demonstration, movements display their numerical strength in order to send signals to insiders of their position of power in the electoral sphere (Etzioni 1970; Tilly 1978). However, in contrast to most “state-centric” social movements, which include the working class organizations of many European countries (Bartolini 2000), organized labor in American has concentrated on the economic sphere to win new benefits, including increased wages and improved working conditions, for its membership (Rubin 1986). While not ignoring the political sphere (Greene 1998; Marks 1989), the American labor movement adopted a particular form of industrial syndicalism, preferring to force gains at the point of production through collective bargaining rather than targeting the state (Kimeldorf 1999).10 While there are numerous explanations for this “American Exceptionalism” (Lipset and Marks 2000), the fact remains that organized labor has mobilized its members in their role as workers, not citizens, to attain its goals.

Because of the differences between the state, the target of most movements, and the business enterprise, the target of labor unions, organized labor faces a unique set of challenges. Perhaps the most important is that, unlike the state, businesses are not formal

---

10 Today, through organizations like the Committee on Political Education (the PAC arm of the AFL-CIO), contributions to political campaigns, and efforts to mobilize its membership during elections, the labor movement does target the political sphere. However, given the weakness of the labor movement in politics,
democracies. The authority of management over employers in the workplace is “contested terrain” (Edwards 1979) where workers struggle with management for control of the political regime of production (Burawoy 1985), a concept modified by (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1991: 1152) to include, “the ensemble of political relations through which the immediate capital/labor relation is defined, regulated, and enforced”. Given the authoritarian nature of corporate governance, in nonunionized settings employees have no formal mechanisms, besides exiting, for addressing workplace concerns independent of the discretion of management.11 In other words, workers, unlike citizens, have no “inherent rights” in corporate governance.

Because of the differences between the state and organized capital, the logic underlying labor activism varies dramatically from that of other social movements. In particular, social movement actors that target the state often garner considerable political clout by mobilizing only a small proportion of the electorate. For example, two recent events, the Million Man March and the Promise Keepers’ “Stand in the Gap” rally, both of which had major social and political ramifications, yet mobilized less than one percent of all eligible voters (though in terms of sheer numbers, were quite large). The contrast for labor organizations is succinctly identified by Wallerstein (1989: 484) who writes, “Without a capacity to disrupt the supply of labor to employers, unions would be powerless participants in collective bargaining.” Quite simply, unions achieve legitimation in industrial relations solely by their claim that they represent the majority of

---

11 A growing trend in American companies to grant workers formalized access to the decision-making process through strategies such as quality control circles, joint union management programs, and stock ownership plans (Bradley, Estrin, and Taylor 1990; Cooke 1990; Hodson 2002). However, despite increased participation by the workforce, management does not cede its authority in the workplace (Rinehart, Huxley, and Robertson 2002).
the firm or industry’s employees. 12 In order to participate the modern industrial relations system, which codifies both union and management rights in formally binding contracts, unions must seek recognition first and new benefits for membership second. This reality has not been lost on American workers who, despite their desires for better wages and working conditions, have recognized that a collective bargaining relationship is the most important gain to be won from hostile employees, and have often been willing to engage in violent and bloody protests to achieve this rather abstract goal (Bernstein 1970; Dobbs 1972; Kraus 1947; Ware 1964). In fact, granting benefits to employees that are unionizing without recognizing the union as a legitimate organization is perhaps one of the most popular ways that firms resist unionization efforts (Leicht 1989).

In addition to the strengthened bargaining position that comes with broad worker representation (Block 1980; Rosen 1969; Voos 1983; Western 1997), unions also rely almost entirely on the rank-and-file for resources, staffing, and leadership (Masters 1997; Sheflin and Troy 1983; Troy 1975). Given the substantial decline in membership since the 1950s, which currently stands at a post Great Depression low, it is not surprising that recent debates within the movement have centered around the topic of revitalizing the movement by making organizing a top priority (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Mantsios 1998; Tillman and Cummings 1999; Turner et al. 2001). Indeed, with the rise of John Sweeney to President of the AFL-CIO in 1995, this has become one of the movement’s most important goals in the 21st Century (Sweeney 1997), resulting in a particularly dynamic period for understanding union organizing efforts.

12 This is starkly illustrated by the fact that although organized labor today represents over 13 million workers, making it one of the largest social movements in America, the fact that it only includes about 12% of all employees has sparked commentaries on the “weakened” position of organized labor in America.
Despite the critical role that membership growth plays in maintaining a strong labor movement, as well as the decidedly unique circumstances that surround union organizing drives, there has been virtually no effort to provide a systematic framework for understanding the organizing process as a whole. Instead, past research has emphasized the unique characteristics of a particular organizing effort or category of organizing drives, ignoring both the common threads that all organizing drives have in common and the potential range of variation across organizing mechanisms. Because of the narrow focus of previous research on organizing, the development of modern organizing strategies used in American industrial relations today is not fully understood. This paper seeks to address this deficiency by offering a detailed account of the possibilities unions currently have at their disposal to expand their membership base.\footnote{This research specifically examines organizing, one of the many activities that fall under the rubric of “worker insurgency”, strikes and bargaining being two other prominent examples. It is also important to note that organizing is merely the first step in the process of achieving the goals of the worker (better}

Organizing as a Form of Collective Action. The ability to organize nonunion employees, like many other forms of labor activism, ultimately depends on the union’s ability to develop a “culture of solidarity” among workers of a targeted firm (Fantasia 1988). Solidarity, the sense of collective identity among workers that links the fate of one to the fate of the group, has always been particularly important in the labor movement, especially during periods of intense conflict. For example, the sit-down strike of the 1930s was so effective primarily because of the strong sense of community and
shared identity it instilled in the workers who participated (Brecher 1972; Kraus 1947). While much has changed since the Great Depression, many still recognize that the true measure of organizing success is the emergence of solidarity among a group of workers. Kistler (1984: 105) writes, “The individuals decision whether or not to support unionization is not made it isolation. It is influenced by the experience of collective action during the organizing campaign itself…” Lerner (1991: 6) notes, “Workers won’t organize in large numbers in isolation. Workers will organize…when they see themselves as part of a movement…” Fantasia (1988:11) adds, “Solidarity is created and expressed by the process of mutual association.” Because of the importance of building solidarity during an organizing drive, I argue that like all union actions (strikes, pickets), organizing is a form of collective action, and as such, can be achieved only through a limited set of possible repertoires.

A repertoire is the “whole set of means” a social movement organization (SMO) has at its disposal for making claims on an opponent (Tilly 1986:4). Despite the differences between the target of the labor movement and other social movements outlined earlier, a similar logic holds just as true for union organizing efforts as it does for other forms of social movement activism. The union is making a claim to management that the firm’s employees desire to be represented by the union in matters of employment. Because organizing is a form of recruitment, it also involves the union’s claim to the individual employees that it is suited in meeting their particular needs and that only through collective, rather than individual, action, can new advantages by

__________________________

working conditions, higher wages). Pressuring the firm after organizing is the next step in the process—for a detailed discussion of this, see Markowitz (2000).
achieved. As such, union organizing repertoires are designed to develop the bond of solidarity among workers that is necessary to bring management to the bargaining table.

Like all social movement repertoires, the organizing strategies unions have at their disposal are historically and culturally limited (Tilly 1978). In the 1990s, there are two such repertoires available for unions in the private sector\textsuperscript{14} seeking to build their membership: 1) the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certification elections and 2) the innovative corporate campaign, which is explicitly designed to avoid the NLRB election process. It is the purpose of this paper to carefully describe these two types of organizing repertoires, noting both their historical and cultural development and the important differences between the two. Initially these two organizing strategies are described as dichotomous “ideal-types”. In reality, however, these two strategies are actually represent “bundles” of potential tactics that lie on polar ends of the organizing spectrum. Hence, most actual organizing drives lie somewhere in between, though, because all organizing efforts can be divided into whether or not they go through the NLRB election, the differences between the two strategies remains meaningful.

Before turning to the description of union organizing, it is necessary to draw attention to an important reality of collective behavior. Like all social movements, the capacity of a union to engage in social change (organize) is finite, and will vary in the amount of resources the union is willing to expend for a collective good (Tilly 1978). Some unions may attach a very high value to organizing nonunion employees (Tilly refers to these actors as zealots) while others are willing only to expand organizing resources when the return is very high (miser). However, at one point in time, with X
available resources devoted to organizing, unions must decide what type, if any, of organizing strategy to undertake, given the constraints of the organization. This point is often overlooked by research on the labor movement, which is hampered by two deficiencies: 1) as mentioned above, the scope of analysis is usually limited to one particular type of organizing effort, ignoring the possibility of tactical choice, and 2) the focus is on predicting the outcomes of these organizing drives, not the rate at which unions engage in organizing (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Hatfield and Murmann 1999). This research tradition has limited our knowledge of organizing by ignoring issues central to this process. These include, to list just a few: 1) the union’s initial decision to engage in an organizing effort, 2) the factors that lead to the choice of one strategy over another, such as the union organizational structure and external factors, including the hostility of the targeted firm, and 3) how the effect of important variables on organizing, including union characteristics, firm resistance, and the political and economic climate, vary over time and across organizing strategies.

To explore repertoire choice in union membership recruitment, I couple the theoretical account of organizing with an empirical description of organizing among a sample of unions during the 1990s, which, as mentioned above, is a period when organizing new members became an increasingly important goal of the movement. Though this analysis is solely to describe various organizing outcomes among a sample of unions and is not intended to address all of the issues raised earlier, it does yield some very important findings, notably the potential range in repertoire use that exists in the labor movement today; as well as the variation in success across the two repertoires,

Note that a third repertoire exists-organizing among public servants. However, in many respects, public employees represent an entirely unique industry outside of the “normal” corporate governance described
including both the victory rate and the number of workers organized. Additionally, by examining organizing among a sample of unions, rather than the entire population of organizing efforts, as previous research has done, I am able to determine the rate at which individual unions engage in organizing, the extent to which unions concentrate on one organizing strategy at the expense of the other, and the degree to which success in one repertoire translates into success for the other. The utility of this “union centric” approach has been demonstrated by scholars such as Lopez (2004) and Ganz (2000), who, through individual case studies of labor unions, provide a much more complete picture of the dynamics of organizing than does research on individual organizing efforts. This analysis also demonstrates the possibility that detailed information on organizing strategies is available to scholars who are willing to engage in multidimensional data collection project.

In order to illustrate the range of repertoires unions have available to organize new workers during the 1990s, I begin with a careful description of the NLRB election and corporate campaign including both their historical development and their underlying logic. Again, I start by conceiving these two types of organizing strategies as opposite poles of an organizing continuum, which is followed by an explicit comparison of the two repertoires on some key dimensions along which they vary. I turn next to an empirical examination of organization among a sample of 70 unions during the 1990s, illustrating the range of repertoire use in the labor movement today. While the current research is meant to expand our understanding of the dynamics of union organizing, I conclude by offering some possible benefits to social movement scholars about the

above. For an excellent description of unionism in the public sector, see Johnston (1994).
unexplored parallels between union organizing drives and the repertoires of other social movement actors.

**NLRB Certification Elections**

The certification election as it is known today was formed in 1935 with the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Also known as the Wagner Act, after its chief sponsor, Senator Robert Wagner, the NLRA created the National Labor Relations Board, the federal agency responsible for the regulation of labor relations in the private sector. The crux of the act is Section 7a, which guarantees the rights of workers to organize:

> Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.

The passage of the Wagner Act, which granted legitimacy to organized labor, represented a major shift in the state’s stance towards organized labor, which had manifested itself both in violence against worker insurgency (Hacker 1969; McCammon 1993a) and court injunctions against striking unions (McCammon 1993b; Tomlins 1985a). The explanations why the state chose to finally support collective bargaining are varied. While some (Finegold and Skocpol 1984; Skocpol 1980) claim that the strength of the liberal Democrats in Congress was key in the passage of the Wagner Act, Goldfield (1989) offers an alternative explanation. He argues that the Wagner Act was created in response to the rise of worker insurgency that had plagued businesses during the Great Depression. The state reacted to militant demands for unionism by creating an institution that would channel working-class protest, which often took the form of violent and bloody strikes, into a more acceptable form of activity, the NLRB certification election.
This process was explicitly designed to institutionalize labor militancy by reducing the use of more contentious organizing strategies such as the strike (McCammon 1993a), which, as Figure 3.1 illustrates, did indeed lead to a precipitous decline in strikes for union recognition.¹⁵

**Figure 3.1 about here**

When compared to the strike, it is clear that the process of organizing under the Wagner Act was intended to be much more legalistic, institutionalized, and routinized. In a “typical” NLRB organizing drive a union is able to file for a certification election with the NLRB when 30% of the eligible workforce of an establishment sign authorization cards expressing a desire to have the union represent them in collective bargaining negotiations with their employer. Because the authorization cards are a measure of union support, most unions strive for the maximum number of cards, and many will not file with the NLRB until a majority of the workers sign cards. After the cards are filed the NLRB conducts a secret-ballot election where workers are allowed to vote for or against the union. A simple majority of yes votes is required to certify the union. If the union wins the election the firm is required to “bargain in good faith” with union representatives.¹⁶ The entire procedure is based on the narrow version of “industrial democracy” (Tomlins 1985b), which grants workers the right to choose the agent that represents them in the workplace, an alternative to the socialist ideal of industrial democracy, where workers control the means of production.

¹⁵ The initial spike in recognition strikes after the passage of the Wagner Act was due to a large number of employers who refused to recognize the authority of the National Labor Relations Board.

¹⁶ If the union and firm are unable to agree to a contract within a year, the union no longer represents the employees, a trend that has been increasing as firms seek to avoid unionization (Cooke 1985b).
While the motivations for the creation of the NLRB election process can be questioned, there is no doubt that most unionists welcomed an organizing process that was both enforced, and, they claimed, endorsed by the federal government. The Act created a “political opportunity” (McAdam 1982) for unions to organize new workers, and, not surprisingly, had a strong positive effect on the rate of union membership in the United States (Wallace, Rubin, and Smith 1988). The long lasting popularity among labor unions of this institutionalize repertoire is illustrated in Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c, which document the number of elections, the victory rate, and the proportion of the employed nonunionized population that has participated in these elections since the formation of the NLRB in 1935. All three figures clearly indicate that soon after the creation of the NLRB unions took full advantage of this institutionalized organizing strategy to recruit new members. During the high water mark of the NLRB process (1940s-1960s) unions relied on the election procedure to organize approximately a half million workers annually.

**Figures 3.2a, 3.2b, and 3.2c about here**

However, despite the massive gains in labor union membership that the NLRB election process produced during and after WW II, Figures 3.2a-c also indicate that the effectiveness of this strategy began to erode as unions have become less effective in organizing workers through the NLRB process in recent years. During the same period of diminishing NLRB election success, the proportion of workers represented by unions also declined (Figure 3.3), indicating that there is a strong link between organizing success and membership size.
Although there are a number of explanations for this decline, I identify two major possibilities here. First, since the 1950s, unions have been making less and less effort to expand their membership base. Both internal factors, including the purging of Communists from the leadership ranks of most major unions (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003) and the merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955, and external factors, notably the tacit post-war accord between labor and management (Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1984; Nissen 1990) and a booming postwar economy created a less threatening environment for organized labor, which precluded the need to take aggressive steps to expand its membership base. For example, Operation Dixie, which targeted the largely nonunion South, was dropped because of controversy surrounding the Civil Rights issues (Goldfield 1994). The result of this moderation, writes Nissen (1990: 201), was that, “labor’s retreat on the management’s rights issue…has left it defenseless in the wake of the corporate assault on unions…” Coupled with a moderate labor movement, this shift towards an increasingly hostile organizing climate is the second reason for the declining success of unions in NLRB elections.

The context of organizing, which had been favorable to unions immediately after WW II, turned increasingly anti-union as two key actors, the state and corporate America, began to resist new organizing efforts and erode the gains made by existing union. First the state, which modified the Wagner Act twice, with the Taft-Harley Act of 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, reduced the rights of labor while at the same time expanding the rights of employers, especially their right to “free speech”, or antiunion rhetoric (see Friedman et al. 1994 and Gould 2000 for a critical discussion of American
labor law). The Taft-Hartley Act required union leaders to sign anticommmunist affidavits, made secondary boycotts illegal, made it easier for employees to remove unions as their authorized bargaining agent, and granted states the right to pass “right-to-work” laws, statutes that prohibit union membership as a requirement for employment at a unionized firm, making normal union activities, such as dues payments, much more difficult. The Landrum-Griffin Act limited the legality of picketing and increased government monitoring of labor unions by requiring these organizations to file annual financial disclosure reports.

While both acts curtailed the acceptable activities of labor unions, they also reversed the political opportunity climate of the New Deal by granting employers new methods of resisting unionizing efforts of their workforce. As Fantasia (1988: 26) notes, “…[employer] strategies have progressively narrowed the scope of industrial action for workers since WW II, resulting in an increasingly limited range of possibilities for working-class activism today.” Many scholars have pointed to the increased levels of employer resistance to unionization as a major reason for the dramatic decline in union membership since the 1960s (Clawson and Clawson 1999; Cooke 1985a; Davis 1986; Dickens 1983; Goldfield 1987). Given the growing level of employer hostility manifested in NLRB organizing drives, it was inevitable that some militant unions would turn to alternative strategies to mobilize new members. It is to this innovation in organizing that I now turn.
Corporate Campaigns

In the previous section we saw that despite the initial gains in membership unions were able to achieve through the NLRB, the complacency of unions after WW II left them unprepared to deal with the rise of firm hostility towards unions afford by a state increasingly unwilling to protect union rights. I turn now to a description of the innovative organizing repertoire that has become increasingly popular among unionists who recognize that the NLRB election process is ill-suited for organizing workers in the current climate of industrial relations. Here I group all union actions that specifically seek to organize nonunion workers outside the NLRB process under the rubric “corporate campaign”, which is the most common name given to any concerted organizing effort that seeks to bypass the NLRB. Although this rather broad conceptualization includes an eclectic group of events, below I will demonstrate that they all overlap on a key set of characteristics. I begin first by describing this organizing repertoire in detail, and then discuss the reasons why the dynamics of this organizing strategy makes it preferable to the NLRB election for many unions. Again, as in the case of the previous discussion of the NLRB election process, this description is an ideal type, or a representation of the potential that exists in this organizing strategy.

The corporate campaign, due to its innovative and often confrontational nature, is not nearly as institutionalized as the NLRB certification election, making it difficult to define the “typical” campaign. In reality each campaign is different from the next,

17 Some refer to these actions as “voluntary recognitions organizing drives”, insofar as the firm voluntarily recognizes the union without an NLRB election. However, in most corporate campaigns, there is nothing done voluntarily on the part of the firm, as these organizing drives are often used because the firm is so antiunion that a traditional NLRB election will almost certainly be unsuccessful.
18 As Manheim (2001), who provides the most detailed research on this strategy to date notes, corporate campaigns can be used in conjunction with other union activities, including strikes and bargaining. In this
depending on the initiating union and targeted firm.\textsuperscript{19} Jarley and Maranto (1990: 506) write, “…corporate campaigns lack a unique identifying feature that distinguishes them from other forms of union action.” Perry (1987: 16) adds, “…the corporate campaign game lacks well-defined rules and requirements…”. I adopt a rather broad definition to encompass all campaigns: it is a coordinated set of tactics, which may vary from campaign to campaign, carried out by a labor union to mobilize outside pressure, that also may vary by campaign, on the management of the company in an effort to force the target to recognize the union as the authorized bargaining agent of the employees without relying on the NLRB election process. Often the ultimate goal of the union is to have the firm recognize the union if a majority of its employees sign a card indicating support for the union, a procedure commonly referred to as a card-check agreement.\textsuperscript{20}

This definition includes two key characteristics that all campaigns share: 1) the union enlists external support to pressure the corporation, and 2) the union bypasses the traditional NLRB process. Unions often seek to mobilize actors based on their ability to exert pressure on the firm in the union’s favor. Potential allies can include other unions, social movement organizations (SMOs), religious and civic groups, consumers, government agencies, and other firms (Manheim 2001). Government agencies, such as OSHA have often been the targets of mobilization when organizing manufacturing firms (DiLorenzo 1996; Northrup 1996) as have lending partners of the firm (Manheim 2001).

\textsuperscript{19} Ray Rogers, the primary architect of the corporate campaign, claims that since every company has different weaknesses, every corporate campaign must be unique to achieve success.

\textsuperscript{20} A related, though distinct form of the corporate campaign is the neutrality agreement studied by Eaton and Kriesky (2001). In this form of the corporate campaign a firm signs a contract with the union that represents its existing employees granting the union the right to represent employees at new locations if a majority of the workers sign a card indicating their support for the union. Essentially, this form of organizing embodies the spirit of the “voluntary recognition”.
Consumers may be mobilized if the target is retail firm (Bonacich 2000; Crump 1991) and the media is usually at least an implicit target as the union attempts to turn public sentiment in its favor (DiLorenzo 1996; Manheim 2001). Among my sample of unions, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees (HERE) locals were often successful in forcing the local government to sell land to a developer under the stipulation that the hotel’s future employees would be union members. Ultimately, while the choice of allies may vary depending on the campaign, the objective is always to marshal pressure against the firm.

Just as potential allies vary by campaign, so to do the tactics employed by unions, which often include traditional forms of protest. For example, in the case of the Justice for Janitors campaigns that have taken place across the country, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) employed marches and civil disobedience to raise public awareness of the working conditions of the janitors (Fisk et al. 2000; Waldinger et al. 1998). Boycotts of particular brands or stores are effective strategies when targeting consumer goods, a strategy that was used in an attempt to organize Guess! garment workers in California (Milkman and Wong 2001). Occasionally unions will release technical “white papers”, which cite corporate wrongdoing, in an effort to draw regulatory agencies into the struggle, a tactic that has been employed successfully by unions organizing nursing home workers (Manheim 2001). Finally, when stockholders are the target, shareholders resolutions are used to disrupt the normal board of directors meetings (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999). Although the specific strategies employed by the union vary by the target, often multiple tactics are used to build a broad based campaign to mobilize support.
Before discussing the particular features of the corporate campaign that make it preferable to the NLRB election, I describe the process by which the corporate campaign became a culturally legitimate repertoire (Tilly 1978). According to Manheim (2001), the corporate campaign has its roots in the uprising of social movement activity in the 1960s, specifically the *Port Huron Statement* crafted by the fledging Students for a Democratic Society. This document, which defined the politics of the New Left, identified corporations as one of the centers of power in society, and as such, represented a challenge to developing a truly democratic way of life. With the recognition of the central role of corporate power in America, and the subsequent development of strategies designed to attack corporations that wielded enormous influence in political and social life (such as Dow Chemicals and Chase Manhattan Bank), the blueprint of the modern corporate campaign was developed. It is no coincidence then, that as an increasing number of labor leaders are drawn from the student movement of the 1960s, labor has embraced a wide range of strategies to battle corporate power (Voss and Sherman 2000).

Labor first made use of the corporate campaign in the 1970s when the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) employed a multi-tactic approach, including boycotts, strikes, media events, and demonstrations, to organize the workers a large antiunion firm, Farah Manufacturing (Manheim 2001). Not surprisingly, the key architect of this campaign, Ray Rogers, was an individual steeped in social movement unionism, working with organizations such as VISTA and Miners for Democracy. It was in this campaign that Rogers developed his overarching organizing philosophy-identify the weakness of the target and apply pressure, a logic that continues to be applied today (Crump 1991). In the case of the Farah campaign, the mobilization of
a consumer boycott of the company’s clothing line was used to pressure the firm into cooperating with the union. Although the Farah campaign was eventually resolved through the traditional NLRB certification election, the stage had been set for a new type of organizing.

While there are any number of reasons why a number of unions have turned to the corporate campaign as an alterative to the NLRB process, including flexibility, the use of widely recognizable social movement actions, and coalition-building, I identify two central explanations. The first tactical advantage of the corporate campaign is that it can have real economic consequences for the targeted firm, as some of the most effective corporate campaigns have inflicted serious economic damage on the targeted firm. During the Farah campaign, the company stock dropped from $49 all the way to $5 and the company lost over eight million dollars, not counting shareholder loses (Manheim 2001: 51). The J.P Stevens’ campaign of the 1970s, also organized by ACTWU, was effective in part because the union threatened to pull its $1 billion pension from Manufacturers Hanover, a corporation on whose board the chairperson of Stevens sat. In an organizing campaign in Southern California, drywallers of mostly Mexican descent were able to successfully organize outside of the NLRB when a Carpenter Union attorney filed a lawsuit that documented employer violations of the overtime pay provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Faced with a potential multimillion-dollar settlement, the contractors agreed to negotiate with the drywallers (Milkman and Wong 2000). In all of these examples, by negatively affecting the bottom line of the target, the union was able to successfully achieve formal representation of the workers.
Because of its potential for economic damage, the logic of the corporate campaign resembles that of the pre-NLRB preferred method of organizing, the strike. While the two repertoires employ very different tactics to achieve success, both rely at least in part on the threat of economic hardship to force the company to recognize the union: the strike through the disruption of the production process and the corporate campaign through the disruption of a company’s ability to engage in “business as usual”. In contrast, the strength of the NLRB election is through the legal backing and subsequent enforcement provided by the state. What this ignores is that companies are driven by a logic of profit, and that relying on illegal activities to resist unionization, which actually cost an employer very little, assuming wrongdoing is even detected by the NLRB, is often a much more cost effective strategy than bargaining collectively with its employees (Freeman and Kleiner 1990; Kleiner 1994; Weiler 1983). The corporate campaign, then, is effective because it imposes economic pressure on a company to recognize a union.21

The second reason for the popularity of the corporate campaign is its vast potential for building a movement with strong membership involvement. While this repertoire often involves top-down organizing as large internationals engage in sophisticated tactics such as lawsuits and shareholder resolutions to organize antiunion firms (Manheim 2001), many unionists have embraced the corporate campaign as an opportunity to build a grass roots organization (Crump 1991; Lerner 1991). Waldinger and his colleagues (1998) find that the success of the Justice for Janitor’s campaign in L.A. was due in no small part to the participation of the immigrant janitors in a variety of activities, from strikes and civil disobedience to coalition building with other progressive

---

21 This advantage of the corporate campaign has not been lost on management, as there has been a growing
organizations. One reason why this campaign was so successful, according to one informant, was, “we’ve had the highest percentage of workers participation.” (Waldinger et al. 1998: 116). As Crump (1991: 42) notes, “It’s [the pressure campaign] an opportunity to build membership participation in the local union-through handbilling, rallies, picketing,…contacting…community groups…” Lerner (1991) describes how labor unions must use “mini-movements” to organize, a strategy which involve membership participation both in protest activity, such as marches, and forming networks with other groups.

While the corporate campaign has captured the imagination of many scholars, there is virtually no systematic research on the trends in this activity in recent years, as most studies focus on specific instances when unions relied on the corporate campaign to achieve their goals (DiLorenzo 1996; Northrup 1996; Perry 1987; Waldinger et al. 1998). The most comprehensive study of this repertoire was conducted by Manheim (2001), who attempted to study all labor corporate campaigns from 1974-1999. Figure 3.4, which is based on data collected by Manheim, clearly illustrates that this organizing repertoire is growing in popularity since it was first introduced in the 1970s. Unfortunately, Manheim often fails to differentiate between corporate campaigns that supplement the NLRB election process and those that are initiated specifically to avoid it. However, of the 23 with a clear objective, half of the eleven NLRB corporate campaigns occurred before 1990 while three-quarters of the twelve nonNLRB campaigns occurred after 1990, indicating that this strategy is becoming an increasingly popular way avoid the NLRB election process altogether.

body of literature in human resources and management journals that decry the threat the corporate
Despite the increase in organizing corporate campaigns, when compared to the number of NLRB elections, the corporate campaigns enumerated by Manheim (2001) appear to be merely a drop in the organizing ocean; only 54 initiated since the 1970s compared to over 150,000 NLRB elections during the same period. While it is certainly likely that many unions have been reticent to adopt this innovation, I argue that the main reason for the apparent disparity between the NLRB elections and corporate campaigns is the general perception among scholars (not just Manheim) that these campaigns are large, dramatic events that can dominate the news. Because Manheim adopts this preconceived notion of corporate campaigns, his subsequent methodology has two weaknesses. First, he limits his study to those campaigns where the union directly targets the stockholders of the corporation, ignoring campaigns that target unincorporated firms and those that do not directly pressure stockholders. Second, beyond the sources used for data on campaigns (websites, various media outlets), he fails to identify the methodology employed to create his population of events. Because he focuses only a few major media sources for traces of corporate campaigns, he it most likely captures on the largest and most visible campaigns. While all corporate campaigns strive for media attention, the selection bias of mass media coverage of collective behavior (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996) results in only a few major campaigns receiving media attention by any one particular media source. Below I employ a more systematic methodology to create the most complete population of events. Before turning to the empirical description of campaign represents to the “democracy” of the NLRB process (Northrup 1994; Yager and LoBue 1999).
organizing among a sample of unions, I draw a comparison between the two repertoires, focusing both on the inherent differences between them and their potential overlap.

**A Continuum of Organizing**

In the previous sections I emphasized the many ways in which these two organizing repertoires represent very different logic for achieving the same goal: membership recruitment. These differences are explicitly codified in Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1 about here**

Because a central argument underlining this paper is that union organizing is a unique form of social movement activity, all of these potential sources of variation refer either to the social movement roots of organized labor, such as conflict with employers, development of solidarity; or characteristics that most social movement repertoires exhibit, including coalition formation, innovativeness, and flexibility. While this typology is certainly not exhaustive, it does provide a useful framework for thinking about the differences between the NLRB election and the corporate campaign. Specifically, the corporate campaign’s potential for broad rank-and-file participation, confrontation with employers, economic damage, and development of collective identity represents a significant move away from the institutionalized NLRB process towards a model of social movement unionism, a shift that could potentially have implications as far reaching as the NLRB election did when it was first introduced.

However, despite the numerous differences between the NLRB election and the corporate campaign, the description of the two repertoires so far has been an idealized one, which is reflected in Table 3.1. In reality, rather than two totally unique organizing strategies,
these two repertoires represent polar ends of a spectrum of organizing, as most organizing efforts fall somewhere in-between these two extremes. For example, while corporate campaigns are particularly well-suited for developing solidarity among workers, analyses of NLRB elections have indicated that in many successful NLRB elections union have been able to involve the rank-and-file to a degree that builds a strong sense of collective identity among the workers (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1999; Fantasia 1988). In addition, almost half of the organizing drives identified by Manheim (2001) as corporate campaigns involved the NLRB election process. Just as many NLRB elections may resemble corporate campaigns, so to do some corporate campaigns fall short of the goals of building a mass movement. Often these campaigns involve implementation from the top-down, with little rank-and-file involvement, thus virtually eliminating the grass-roots dimension of the tactic, resulting in a much more institutionalized union action. However, despite these overlaps, I believe it is useful to conceive of these two forms of organizing as distinct tactical bundles that unions can choose from to expand their membership base. In the next section, which includes an account of repertoire choice among a sample of unions during the 1990s, one issue that is addressed is the degree of overlap between the two repertoires among a sample of local unions

Data Collection

The previous sections have been spent describing the range of repertoires available to unions engaging in private sector organizing during the 1990s. The important question now becomes: what is the extent to which these two organizing strategies are actually being used by labor unions today, and subsequently, how
successfully have they been implemented? These questions and others are addressed by analyzing a sample of 70 local labor unions whose organizing efforts were observed annually from 1990-2001. I begin first by describing my sampling strategy and the methodology employed to collect annual data on union organizing efforts.

**Sampling of Unions** The current research is part of a larger study which seeks to understand the relationship between SMO characteristics and repertoire use by matching the organizational characteristics of local unions to their organizing efforts during the 1990s. Unfortunately, because NLRB elections and especially corporate campaigns are relatively rare events, a very large sample of unions would be required to ensure enough events for standard data analysis techniques. Due to a limited research budget, I followed the logic of analyzing rare events proposed by King and Zeng (2001) by limiting the sample to a small number of unions deemed most “at-risk” of engaging in frequent organizing efforts during the 1990s. Simultaneously, I sought to ensure a representative sample of the labor movement as a whole, one that did not draw disproportionately from one particular industry or national affiliate, which may decrease generalizability. To ensure both objectives, I employed a two-stage sample design, with a sample frame of all active local unions provided by the Office of Labor and Management Standards (OLMS), a subagency of the Department of Labor that collects annual data on all labor unions in the United States.

---

22 The 1990s was chosen as the period of analysis because, as mentioned at the beginning of the paper, it is a time when organizing has become an increasingly important part of the movement. In addition, Figure 4 indicates that most corporate campaigns are concentrated in this period, which allows me to examine repertoire choice within my sample of unions

23 Note that unions were not selected on their actual rate of organizing, only on characteristics that put them most at risk for this event. The strategy of drawing a sample of observations that are considered most at risk for an event is common in sociology. For example, life course analyses of retirement patterns often survey those most at risk for this event, older males (Hayward, Friedman, and Chen 1996).
In stage one I selected seven national unions that represented both workers in a wide range of industries and had been noted for their aggressive and innovative organizing platform. Additionally, because these unions are some of the largest national bodies in the United States, they often have a great deal of influence over the labor movement as a whole. They included: the Communication Workers of America (CWA), the Service Employees International (SEIU), the Hotel and Restaurant Employees (HERE), the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), the United Auto Workers (UAW), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), and the United Steelworkers of America (USW). Limiting my sample to a group of locals affiliated with these particular national unions accomplishes three important goals: 1) it ensures that my local unions are likely to engage in high levels of organizing because of their affiliation with a progressive national union, 2) each national union represents workers in a distinct industry, and 3) I am able to compare the variation in organizing across distinct national organizations, which often play an active role in the organizing activities of their local affiliates (Voss and Sherman 2000).

In the second stage I selected a sample of ten local unions from each national union. Only locals that were at high risk for organizing were included, which was accomplished by randomly selecting unions that filed an LM-2 report with the OLMS. This report is filed by large and relatively resource-rich unions, those with annual receipts over $200,000, while unions with fewer receipts file the LM-3 or 4 report. Filing status is strongly linked to organizing: only 20% of all unions file the LM-2, yet they account
for approximately 70% of all NLRB elections. In addition, only the LM-2 report provides detailed information on the organizational structure of labor unions, a necessity for my larger project. While this strategy captured a sample of industrially diverse unions that are likely to engage in significant levels of organizing, an unavoidable consequence is that the results presented below that are not representative of the organizing activities of all local unions in America during the 1990s, only those that meet the particular criteria of this study. Therefore, the implications of this sampling strategy will be discussed throughout the findings and in the conclusion.

Organizing Data Collection Data on NLRB organizing for each union was available directly from the National Labor Relations Board, which collects extensive information on elections that fall under its jurisdiction. Following the example of numerous research on protest activity (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kriesi et al. 1995, McAdam 1982; Olzak 1992; Soule 1997), newspaper data, specifically two newspaper archives, LEXIS-NEXIS, and NEWSLIBRARY, were employed to identify traces of union organizing activity that sought explicitly to avoid the NLRB process. Despite issues of bias when using the media sources to study various forms of collective behavior (Franzosi 1987; McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000; Smith et al. 2001; Snyder and Kelly 1977), there are three reasons to expect near complete coverage of corporate campaigns by the print media: 1) A major target of many corporate campaigns is the media itself, 2) the primary newspaper(s) in each local union’s locale was searched, which yields greater probability of coverage than national

24 Unfortunately, unlike the NLRB, there is no population of corporate campaign data, so I cannot make a similar estimate for this organizing repertoire.
25 In particular, these forms are used to measure the resource and leadership structure of local unions, which I predict will be strongly correlated to their success in membership recruitment.
newspapers (Oliver and Maney 2000), and 3) some rather small corporate campaigns, those that target fewer than 20 employees, were covered by one or both of the newspaper archives, indicating that size is not the only factor in determining coverage.

The culmination of this project is a unique dataset that captures both rate and subsequent success of NLRB and corporate campaign organizing among a sample of 70 labor unions during the 1990s. Although, as I acknowledged earlier, there often exists overlap between the NLRB election and the corporate campaign, in order to collect time-series data on the organizing efforts of a sample of labor unions, I was unable to tease out the particular nuances of each organizing effort. Therefore, each organizing drive is identified as either a corporate campaign or an NLRB election, despite the possibility that some have traits of both repertoires. Despite this limitation, the results presented below are a unique contribution to research both on union organizing activities during a critical period in the life-course of the movement and more generally on issues of social movement repertoire choice and tactical deployment.

**An Empirical Examination of Organizing Repertoire Use**

I begin first by exploring the rate and success of repertoire use among the sample of 70 unions during the entire 1990-2001 period, which is illustrated in Table 3.2. Immediately apparent is the enormous discrepancy between the use of NLRB elections and corporate campaigns. Not only do NLRB elections comprise almost 90% of all organizing efforts, virtually every union in the sample made use of this organizing strategy at one point during the 1990s, and most that did not use the NLRB process did not engage in any organizing at all, as only one union used the corporate campaign exclusively to recruit new members. This wide gap in repertoire employment makes it
quite clear advocates of the corporate campaign have thus far been unsuccessful in pressuring unions to abandon the NLRB election process for an alternative repertoire. Though the certification election may be more institutionalized, and hence perceived by unions as less risky than the corporate campaign, this does not mean that they have more successful when implementing the NLRB election. In fact, just the opposite is true: unions in this sample had a nearly 30% higher victory rate in corporate campaigns than NLRB elections. The 55% win rate for the NLRB election is only slightly higher than that of the population average during this time period, 48%. This large disparity in success between the two repertoires supports the general argument of those who claim the corporate campaign is more suitable for recruiting new workers during the hostile 1990s. Along with the possibility that the corporate campaign has certain advantages that will lead to a higher rate of success than the NLRB election, it is likely that unions that engage in this form of organizing are, in general, more dedicated to membership recruitment, resulting in a higher rate of success.\(^{26}\) Whatever the reasons for the higher levels of success in corporate campaigns, most unions continue to focus most of their organizing energy into the NLRB election process.

### Table 3.2 about here

After examining Table 3.2 an initial conclusion is that NLRB election use remains relatively common in the labor movement today, at least among unions similar to the sample of 70 large, aggressive local unions, which, on average, engaged in nearly nine elections from 1990-2001. However, this summative perspective is somewhat

---

\(^{26}\) For example, SEIU, which organizes the Justice for Janitors corporate campaigns across the country, in terms of organizing is one of the most aggressive unions, willing to expend the resources necessary for membership recruitment (Slaughter 1999).
misleading, if we disaggregate the frequency of repertoire use during the 1990s for each local union, a very different picture emerges. Figures 3.5a and 3.5b plot the frequency of organizing for each of the 70 local unions during the 1990s as well as the normal distribution of organizing for each repertoire. While we would expect that only a few unions made use of the corporate campaign (Figure 3.5b), what is particularly striking is that most unions rarely use the NLRB election as well, indicated in Figure 3.5a both by the positively skewed distribution and the concentration of unions on the left hand side of the scatterplot distribution. Although, overall NLRB elections occur much more frequently than corporate campaigns, their unequal distribution across unions is quite similar. To put it in concrete terms, NLRB organizing is so rare that in this sample of 70 large local, relatively aggressive labor unions, just seven are responsible for 50% of all elections, and 95% of elections are carried out by 23 unions, less than a third of the sample. Quite simply, while most unions make some use of the NLRB election, very few engaged in more than a couple of elections from 1990-2001.

This finding calls into question the claim by many observers and unionists alike that the 1990s was a period of revitalization for much of the labor movement, a time when an increasing number of unions were taking steps to expand their membership base. While we may expect that the innovative corporate campaign has not yet gained sufficient popularly to be employed at any significant level, if institutionalized organizing remains rare among a sample of large, well-financed, aggressive unions, then it is highly doubtful that unions in the broader labor movement are making any effort at all to initiate new organizing efforts. From Figures 3.5a and b, it appears that if there is a renewed urgency in organizing it is not equally distributed across all organizations but rather is
concentrated among a few active, militant locals willing to invest resources into expanding their membership base and engage in relatively risky forms of organizing.

**Figures 3.5a and 3.5b about here**

The rarity of organizing is further illustrated in Table 3.3, which aggregates organizing during the 1990s to the seven national unions selected in this sample. Just as repertoire use is unequally distributed among local unions, so do national organizations vary with respect to the organizing activities of their local affiliates. For NLRB elections, three unions, the Service Employees, Food and Commercial Workers, and Teamsters, accounted for the majority of NLRB elections, approximately 77%. With the exception of one corporate campaign by a CWA local, affiliates of two national unions, HERE and SEIU conducted every corporate campaign in this analysis. The picture that emerges from the distribution of corporate campaign use, both across national bodies (Table 3.3) and local unions (Table 3.2 and Figure 3.5b), is that of a standard pattern of innovation diffusion (Coleman, Katz and Menzel 1966). It appears that during the 1990s a few unions were quick to adopt the innovation, playing the role of what Rogers (1995) refers to as the “venturesome innovator” while many others remain more cautious, preferring to take a wait-and-see approach to decide if this new tactic will become part of the accepted organizing landscape. The fact that the corporate campaign has been used quite successfully may increase the probability of new acceptance, though its substantial break with the previous model of organizing, the NLRB election, could slow the process (Rogers 1995).

As mentioned earlier, the seven national unions were selected not only because of their aggressive stance on organizing, but also in part to determine the variation in
organizing across distinct industries. This dimension of union organizing is especially salient as some scholars have attributed the declining fortunes of organized labor to major structural changes after WW II, notably the economy’s shift away from the manufacturing sector, the long-time stronghold of organized labor (Farber and Western 2000; Troy 1990). At first glance Table 3.3 appears to support this argument, as the two major manufacturing unions in the sample, the UAW and the USW, have had virtually no success in organizing workers through either repertoire. However, I believe that the relationship between industry and unionization is more complex than a simple correlation between sector growth and organizing success. In particular, I argue that the important industrial characteristic is not whether it is in decline or not, but the degree to which firms in a particular industry have the potential for geographical mobility within and across political borders. This framework of capital flight is outlined by Jefferson Cowie (1999), who claims that an existing workforce’s growing sense of entitlement, including union representation, often drives the firm to seek new locales with a more acquiescent workforce.

Although the negative consequences of the expansion of free trade through treaties such as NAFTA were initially thought to be concentrated among blue-collar workers as manufacturing jobs moved to the global South, many industries in the service sector also have the potential for capital flight, a notable example of which is the relocation of many high-tech support positions to India (Chanda 2002). If the threat of firm relocation is in response to increase unionized efforts (Bonacich 2000; Early 1998), then we would expect that unions in industries where the production of goods or services cannot be decoupled from their delivery to the consumer have clear strategic advantages
over those attempting to organize firms that are not “trapped” in a particular location. If we deconstruct Table 3.3 for a moment, this is precisely the picture we see. In particular, the most successful unions are SEIU, which targets janitors and health care professionals, HERE, which organizes hotel and restaurant workers, UFCW, which represents mainly supermarket workers, and the Teamsters, which organizes a diverse group of workers, mainly concentrated among truckers and warehouse operators. The common thread of all these occupations is that their potential for offshore relocation is very low—if a firm wishes to conduct business in a particular location, its employees must be located on-site. Although this attribute of an industry does not automatically lead to higher rates of organizing or increased success, it does create a structural opportunity for unions who are less vulnerable to threats of relocation, and thus able to bring greater pressure to bear on a firm than a union that is targeting a capital “flight risk”. As predicted by this logic, corporate campaigns, the more contentious form of organizing, are almost exclusively used to target janitors and hotel workers, two occupations that are completely bound to a particular locale. Although the data presented here provide initial support for this argument, greater information on both unions and the individual firms they target is needed to demonstrate if capital flight is indeed an important factor in organizing success.

Table 3.3 about here

While the previous findings document the variation of repertoire use and success in the 1990s, we should keep in mind that the ultimate objective of an organizing drive is not to win an election or campaign, but to expand the boundaries of organized labor. To that end, Table 3.4 records the number of workers organized through each of the two repertoires during the 1990s. What is most striking is that while corporate campaigns
comprise only one in ten organizing drives among unions in my sample, as indicated in Table 3.2, almost half of all workers targeted were in corporate campaigns and over half of all new members recruited were brought in through this repertoire. There are two likely reasons for this: 1) unions are more successful in corporate campaigns than NLRB elections, as illustrated in Table 2, and 2) corporate campaigns tend to target larger firms-the average NLRB election included 83 workers, while the average corporate campaign was much larger, over 380 workers, resulting in a substantially larger membership gain per victory.

Given this sizeable difference in success, both in terms of victory rate and number of workers organized, we must revisit a question raised earlier: why do most unions continue to prefer the NLRB election? While one explanation is the diffusion process, another is that corporate campaign exhausts more resources than NLRB elections. Jarley and Maranto (1990) estimate that the average corporate campaign costs over $1 million dollars annually, a figure that may outweigh any benefits from an expanded membership base. Additionally, in my sample, the average corporate campaign was nearly two years longer than the typical NLRB election, thus depleting even more of the unions’ scarce resources. However, to reverse the declining membership, unions may have no choice but to devote significant levels of resources to corporate campaigns, a proposition that many unions may find unpalatable.

Table 3.4 about here

Previously I described the rate and success of NLRB elections and corporate campaigns separately, rather than as two elements of one activity, organizing. The final topic I turn to is the possibility that these two repertoires are not necessarily completely
unique, but rather represent polar ends of an organizing continuum, an issue discussed above. If there is indeed a degree of overlap between the two then we would expect that the use of one tactic would “spill-over” to the other. Specifically, it seems likely that unions could meld the two repertoires to reap the benefits of each. For example, if a corporate campaign is well-suited for building solidarity among members, then the unions that use this tactic could potentially draw upon lessons learned from the campaign when engaging in an NLRB election, resulting in a higher level of success for such unions. An alternative possibility is that each strategy is completely unique; being successful at one does not necessarily lead to higher success in the other, rather the tactics used and subsequent knowledge gained are not transferable to the other repertoire.

To determine what type of relationship exists, I calculated the correlations between the two forms of organizing (both the rate and success), for each union during the entire period of analysis (1990-2001). The findings, which are reported in Table 3.5, clearly indicate that there is very little tactical overlap between the two strategies; the only significant relationships are the positive correlations within each repertoire, which is certainly not surprising. This lack of association between the NLRB election and corporate campaign casts doubt on the claim that most organizing drives are an “amalgamation” of the two forms of organizing, falling somewhere between the ideal-types described above. This distinctiveness is further illustrated by the negative correlations between both corporate campaign frequency and success on the one hand, and the rate of NLRB activity on the other. Although both are insignificant, they call into question the possibility that the lessons learned during a corporate campaign can be easily transferred to the NLRB election process. In fact, this indicate that once a union begins
to employ the corporate campaign with any frequency, both the lack of institutional constraints and increased success that come with this strategy makes the prospect of reverting back to NLRB organizing even less appealing. In sum, the findings presented here lend credence to the argument that the two repertoires are indeed distinct forms of organizing. However, more data on how unions choose and implement these organizing strategies are needed before the uniqueness of each repertoire can be fully determined.

Table 3.5 about here

Conclusion

The explicit goal of this paper has been to employ the concept of repertoires developed by social movement theorists to describe strategies unions have at their disposal to increase their membership base. Given the precipitous decline in union membership since 1954, organizing nonunion employees has become an increasingly important focus of the movement. Like all social movement organizations, labor union activists have only a limited set of repertoires available to achieve their goals, and two such strategies have been identified and described in this paper, the NLRB election process and the corporate campaign. Table 3.1 codifies the differences between these two strategies by identifying a number of dimensions along which these repertoires vary. In addition, through a sample of 70 unions organizing during the 1990s I present a number of interesting findings, including: a) significant tactical choice exists among unions today, b) while most organizing is through the NLRB, almost half of all workers are organized by the corporate campaign, and c) a union’s use of one strategy has no effect on the successful implementation of the other.
Despite the insight offered by the current data collection project, it does have a number of limitations. First, the sampling strategy employed limits analysis of organizing only to those large local unions affiliated with a select group of national organizations. Because of this, the true rate of organizing and repertoire use in the entire population of unions cannot be estimated. It is likely that the rate and success of organizing in the general population is much lower for both forms of organizing, especially corporate campaigns, primarily because the current study focused on resourceful unions with a higher risk of organizing than those in the general population. Secondly, here I have focused only on organizing in the private sector, ignoring a major area of union activity, the public sector. As of 1992, public sector workers comprised only 16% of the entire workforce, but were over a third of the members of the AFL-CIO (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995). In addition to playing such a pivotal part of the movement, unionism in the public sector is quite unique and requires its own repertoire of organizing (Johnston 1994). Although this research contributes to our understanding of union organizing activities in the 1990s, further work is needed to complete the picture.

The analyses presented here have demonstrated that there exists a great deal of variation in organizing repertoires across local labor unions. However, prior research has failed to examine the disparity in the rate at which these two repertoires have been employed by unions in recent decades to expand their membership. By examining only one organizing strategy at a time, scholars have ignored the fact that unions, like all other social movement actors, choose among different available repertoires based on a number of factors, including the target (firm), organizational characteristics of the initiating
group, and the political and economic climate within which the organizing takes place. A useful way to fully understand the dynamic process of membership recruitment is by taking a union-centric approach to comprehending organizing. If scholars began first with a sample of unions and examine all the various organizing efforts they undertake, the relative importance of the aforementioned factors, including firm hostility, characteristics of labor unions, and context, in determining repertoire choice could be fully understood. In addition, because organizing is a dynamic process, only by examining it over time will we be able to fully understand the shifting choices among organizing strategies that surely must occur in the population of local labor unions, especially with the introduction of new organizing forms like the corporate campaign.

Though labor researchers have ignored the process of repertoire selection, they are not the only scholars that have failed to fully explore the mechanisms that determine which among the range of available repertoires will be adopted by an organization. In the social movement literature more generally there has been a lack of systematic analysis of repertoire choice across social movement organizations. Some scholars (McAdam 1983; McCarthy and McPhail 1998; Morris 1993) have examined the shifts in protest strategies in response to actions by authorities, yet less is known about the factors internal to the social movement organization that shapes tactical choice. For example, Staggenborg (1988) has found that a shift towards more formal organizational forms has an “institutionalizing” affect on protest strategies. Research has also matched group information about sponsorship to samples of protest events, both in the United States (Van Dyke, Soule, McCarthy 2003) and in Europe (Titarenko et al. 2001). In general, this research indicates that the strength of sponsoring group affects a number of strategic
outcomes, especially the use of confrontational tactics. While these studies begin to
explore the link between organizational characteristics and reportorial choice, what is still
needed is study of decision-making processes within social movement organizations that
determine repertoire choice during particular historical eras. Not only does this require
longitudinal data on SMOs, but also their targets, claims, and the repressiveness of
authorities, to name a few of the theoretically important factors. By pursuing in such
research we can expand our knowledge of repertoire choice within and across social
movement boundaries.

By drawing on the concept of repertoires this paper has demonstrated how social
movement theory and research can inform our understanding of organizing strategies
employed by labor unions at the end of the Twentieth Century. However, it is also clear
that social movement scholars can benefit from a more thorough understanding of labor
movement research as well. In particular, labor scholars have long recognized the
importance of collective action in the development of solidarity and worker participation
(Brecher 1972; Fantasia 1988, 1995; Kimeldorf 1988; Kraus 1947; Lynd and Lynd 1981;
(1988: 19) writes, “‘cultures of solidarity’ will thus tend to emerge only when workers or
employers circumvent routine channels and workers seek, or are forced, to rely on their
mutual solidarity as a basis of their power.” As I have noted throughout, repertoires such
as the corporate campaign and the sit-down strikes of the 1930s are effective organizing
strategies primarily because of the sense of community that they tend to create among
participants.
Unfortunately, social movement scholars have tended to ignore the creation of solidarity among participants through collective action. For example, while protest demonstrations are usually carried out primarily to make a claim on a particular target (usually the state), SMOs also use these collective events as ways of bringing in people into participation on the movement. As Klandermans (1997:51) correctly notes, “participation in collective action seems to be accompanied by an ‘explosion of consciousness’.” However, most studies of mobilization continue to focus on how individuals are drawn into the movement through network ties (Gould 1993; Granovetter 1973; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Marwell, Oliver and Prahl 1988; Snow et al. 1980). This research is especially valuable for explaining how people first encounter social movements, but does not fully explore the processes by which people develop a strong commitment to the movement through their participation in collective behavior.

Recently scholars have come to recognize the importance of solidarity in social movement participation, although solidarity is often conceived as “collective identity” in this literature (Melucci 1988; Freidman and McAdam 1992; Polletta and Jasper 2001). Like the networks literature, this research also explores the necessity of collective identity in making collective behavior possible. However, some have also recognized that the collective identity/collective behavior relationship operates both ways (Hirsch 1990). Polletta and Jasper (2001: 283) ask, “To what extent are collective identities constructed in and through protest rather than preceding it?” Increasingly, with the importance of emotions in social movement research (Amizade and McAdam 2002; Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001) the link between participation and the development of ties to movements has become more fully understood. For example, Polletta (1998)
documents how the student participation in the sit-ins of the 1960s forged strong ties to
the movement and developed the collective identity of “student activist”.

As social movement scholars begin to recognize that solidarity is often born out of
participation in contentious protest activity, the extensive scholarship on this subject by
labor movement researchers will become an increasingly valuable reference point to
understanding how commitment to a movement is created and fostered. Here I believe
that my description of organizing repertoires, especially the logic on which they are
founded, can offer a fruitful way of thinking about the mechanisms through which
participants are mobilized and integrated into broader social movements.
Table 3.1. Important Dimensions of Organizing Repertoires

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Organizing Repertoire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NLRB election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Participation of the Rank-and-File</td>
<td>Low to Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Legitimacy</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovativeness</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Collective Identity among Workers</td>
<td>Low to Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation with Employer</td>
<td>Low to Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of Economic Hardship Inflicted on Employer</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalitions across Class</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalitions with nonLabor Actors</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2. Rate and Success of Organizing Among Sample of 70 Unions From 1990-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage of all organizing</th>
<th>Proportion of unions using</th>
<th>Victory rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Election</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaign</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3. Breakdown of Organizing by National Union From 1990-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Number of NLRB Elections</th>
<th>Percentage of all NLRB Elections</th>
<th>NLRB Election Victory Rate</th>
<th>Number of Corporate Campaigns</th>
<th>Percentage of all Corporate Campaigns</th>
<th>Corporate Campaign Victory Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CWA</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEIU</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERE</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFWC</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAW</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBT</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USWA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.4. Distribution of New Membership Gains Across Repertoires From 1990-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Workers Targeted</th>
<th>Percentage of Workers Targeted</th>
<th>Number of Workers Successfully Organized</th>
<th>Percentage of Workers Successfully Organized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Election</td>
<td>51,528</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>23,670</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaign</td>
<td>30,777</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>17,222</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82,305</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>40,892</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.5. Correlation between NLRB Elections and Corporate Campaigns (1990-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NLRB Rate</th>
<th>NLRB Success</th>
<th>Corporate Campaign Rate</th>
<th>Corporate Campaign Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.97*</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Success</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaign Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.99*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaign Success</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * p<.05
N=70
Figure 3.1. Strike Activity in the U.S.

Figure 3.2a. Number of NLRB elections
Figure 3.2b. Union Victory Rate in NLRB elections
Figure 3.2c. Percentage of employed nonunion population participating in NLRB elections

![Graph showing the percentage of employed nonunion population participating in NLRB elections from 1936 to 1996. The graph indicates a peak in participation around 1948, followed by a gradual decline over the subsequent years.](image-url)
Figure 3.3. Union membership rate

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Hirsch and Addison (1986); Reder 1988
Figure 3.4. Organizing Corporate Campaigns

Source: Manheim (2001)
Figure 3.5a. Distribution of NLRB Organizing Among Local Unions, 1990-2001

Frequency of NLRB Elections

Number of Unions

Probability

Normal Distribution
Figure 3.5b. Distribution of Corporate Campaigns Among Local Unions, 1990-2001

Since its introduction in the 1970s (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977, 2003), the resource mobilization perspective has gained currency among scholars for its success in explaining a number of important social movement dynamics, ranging from Social Movement Organization (SMO) viability (Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 2004; McCammon 2001) to increased levels of protest activity (Cress and Snow 1996; Khawaja 1994; McLaughlin and Khawaja 2000). This research has provided strong support for the major assumption of the paradigm: externally derived resources are necessary for most forms of social movement activity. While this tenant remains the foundation of resource mobilization, recent studies have begun to flesh out other important themes, including the attributes of resources necessary for movement activities (Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 2003; McCarthy and Zald 2003) and the mechanisms through which movements mobilize exogenous resources (Edwards and McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996).

Despite both the empirical and theoretical advances made by previous research, resource mobilization remains a “partial” theory, as many of the realities of social movement dynamics continue to be underdeveloped in the literature.27 One of the objectives of the current research is an attempt to expand resource mobilization to encompass these important processes, two of which are of particular interest here. First, while there is significant support for resource mobilization’s central proposition that social movement organizations (SMOs) often depend on exogenous support for
resources, there continues to be evidence indicating that during the life-course of most movements internally-mobilized resources have played a critical role both for the survival of SMOs and their ability to engage in contentious political activity. Because of prior focus on external resources, little is known about the consequences of endogenous resource mobilization. Secondly, while prior research has paid particular attention to the flow of resources into SMOs (Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 2003; Oliver and Marwell 1992), outflows of resources for purposes of social change are less well understood. In particular, because SMOs often have a typology of potential resource forms to disburse, the question becomes: are certain resource types more “strategic” and hence more effective, than others and do their effects vary by the type of activity undertaken?

While a central goal of this research is to attend to previous deficiencies of resource mobilization, I also recognize that this paradigm can be a powerful tool for exploring broader issues raised by social movement scholars. First, despite the goal-oriented nature of most SMO activities, researchers have only recently begun to assign agency to movement actions, recognizing that SMOs can be an important engine of social change, including both the explicit goals of the movement and more indirect effects, such as the biographical effects of activism (Giugni 1998). Yet despite this growth in research, there has been little effort to systematically examine the role that resources play in the ability of an SMO to achieve success. Secondly, with the recognition that SMOs often have a range of repertoires to achieve their goals (Tilly 1979), there has been increasing attention paid to the variation in tactical use over time. A central focus of

27 See McCarthy and Zald (2003) for a discussion of the possible links between resource mobilization and other important social movement theoretical perspectives, including political opportunity structure and
interest is the process of “institutionalization”, whereby a movement (presumably) shifts from the use of contentious repertoires to more convention forms of social change.\(^\text{28}\) Unfortunately, most research in this area is speculative in nature, with little evidence that this process indeed occurs in movements. Here provide a basis for understanding repertoire choice by focusing specifically on how resources predict they type of tactics used by a sample of SMOs. Because both of these broader issues, SMO outcomes and repertoire choice, are closely tied the organizational functioning of SMOs, I will argue that the resource mobilization perspective is particularly well-suited point of reference for understanding these dynamics.

To evaluate and extend the resource mobilization paradigm, I examine a particularly interesting recent social movement activity, union organizing efforts in the 1990s. Though the labor movement, which is firmly embedded within the peculiarities of American industrial relations, may not be seen by many movement scholars as an obvious choice for testing social movement theory, in the next section I will demonstrate that not only is current union organizing an “emerging” social movement activity, but that general characteristics of the labor movement itself lends some distinct advantages to those interested in the resource mobilization paradigm. To answer the various questions posed above, I have assembled a unique dataset of union organizing efforts during the 1990s that will not only benefit social movement scholars, but also provide those interested in union organizing efforts a thorough understanding of this process. Using Hierarchical Linear Modeling, I find that external support, particularly from certain framing.

\(^{28}\) Note that institutionalization has been used to represent a number of topics, including cultural acceptance of confrontational tactics, movement cooptation by the state, muted police response to protest, and the
national unions, had a strong effect on organizing outcomes. In addition, human resources played a strong role in determining the rate and success of more contentious organizing tactics, but had little effect on institutional outcomes, except for those unions that used both tactics, indicating the possible importance of using contentious activities to develop the social capital of organizers.

**Union Organizing Efforts in the 1990s: A Resurgent Social Movement**

During the 1990s, the American labor movement underwent an intense period of internal restructuring. Led by reformers such as John Sweeney, who was elected to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1995, organized labor began to make a serious effort to reverse the nearly 50-year decline in membership, which, in 1990, stood at a post-Great Depression low. The changes that Sweeney and other reformers undertook were numerous and far reaching: unions began expanding their organizing budget, new organizations such as the AFL-CIO’s Organizing Institute and Union Summer were created to train organizers and assist member unions in organizing drives, and sophisticated legal maneuverings were coupled with old-fashioned social movement activism in corporate campaigns designed to pressure corporations and bolster outside support, including alliances with other social movements. All of these changes were instituted to make the labor movement, in the words of John Sweeney (1997), the “Civil Rights movement of the 1990s.”

Many of these changes were in direct response to a fundamental transformation of postwar American industrial relations. Immediately following World War II, the economic boom in the United States gave way to an uneasy accord between labor and

---

focus of this paper, repertoire choice. See Meyer and Tarrow (1998) for a general theoretical discussion of institutionalization.
management (Davis 1986; Nissen 1990); a détente which granted labor significant freedom to expand its membership and press for economic benefits while limiting unions’ ability to challenge capital’s authority in the workplace, or the “political regime of production” (Burawoy 1985). This informal treaty was to be short-lived, as recent changes, such as the expansion of global trade, a shift towards a service-dominated industry, and the willingness of the federal government to break the air traffic controller’s strike, have all led to a breaking of this “labor-manage accord” as firms sought to undermine the legitimacy of unions in the workplace (Edsall 1984; Goldfield 1987; Rosenblum 1995). This shift back to overtly hostile labor-management relations has transformed union organizing from a relatively bureaucratic organizational function to a contentious social movement activity (Clawson 2003; Fantasia 1988; Johnston 1994) and has spurred labor unionists and scholars alike to remark on the increasingly social movement-like nature of union organizing in the 1990s (Aronowitz 1998; Brecher and Costello 1998; Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Clawson and Clawson 1999; Clawson 2003; Jenson and Mahon 1993; Mantsios 1998; Masters 1997 Rothstein 1996; Sweeney 1997; Tillman and Cummings 1999; Turner et al. 2001; Welsh 1997).

The Advantages of Labor Movement Research

While the contentious nature of current industrial relations alone makes examining union organizing through a social movement lens an interesting research focus, there are a number of specific advantages of employing labor union organizing as a case study in which to expand the resource mobilization perspective. First, there is the composition of the organizational population of the movement, which is dominated
almost entirely the formally organized local labor union.\textsuperscript{29} Not only is the movement centered around a single organizational type, the federal government has been collecting detailed organizational measures on all labor unions in existence since 1959 under the Landrum-Griffin Act, which provides a wealth of information on the organizational structure of these unions. Second, in the 1990s many unions have been making a concentrated effort to expand their organizing budget in hopes of winning new members. Following the example of one of the most successful unions, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) John Sweeney (SEIU’s former president) has mandated that all AFL-CIO affiliates devote at least 30\% of their operating budget for organizing or face trusteeship, which involves the national body taking over the affairs of the local union (Slaughter 1999). The result is a particularly unique period to examine how resources are mobilized and disbursed for a specific social movement activity. Third, because the American labor movement operates primarily in the economic sphere, especially at the local level, many of its goals, including increased wages, better working conditions, and organizing, are relatively concrete outcomes, and hence, lend themselves to a straightforward measure of success, which has been a major challenge for understanding movement outcomes. Finally, in the 1990s some labor unions have begun to turn away from the traditional method of organizing, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certification election, to the corporate campaign, an innovative method of organizing designed explicitly to avoid the drawbacks of the NLRB. Because of these two possible repertoires of organizing, I am able to explore the ways in which resources

\textsuperscript{29} While other organizational entities, including international labor unions, joint councils, working class parties, and labor research centers can be thought of as part of the movement, almost all contact of the rank-and-file is with their local labor organization. The strategy employed here is to examine one particular social movement industry (McCarthy and Zald 2003).
vary across these two organizing tactics. In the next section I bring these advantages to bear on the resource mobilization perspective, raising important issues that have to this point been overlooked in the literature.

**Resource Mobilization and the Labor Movement**

The resource mobilization theory, developed by McCarthy and Zald (1977), represented a major shift in social movement thinking, which, prior to this paradigm, explained social movement activity as an irrational response to structural upheaval in society (Smelser 1963). As an alternative, they proposed a “bounded rationality” view of movements, where protest activity crests and falls not with particular grievances, which they argue are relatively stable, but with mobilization of external resources necessary to make collective behavior possible. In particular, they claim that resources have become an integral part of social protest in large part due to the domination of the public landscape by formal organizations (Zald and McCarthy 1987). And while the resource mobilization has been used successfully to study movements ranging from the antidrunk driving movement (McCarthy and Wolfson 1996) to the suffrage movement (McCammon 2001) to homeless protest activity (Cress and Snow 1996) to Palestinian protest (Khawaja 1994), many important issues remain unaddressed, specifically: 1) the important consequences of mobilizing resources from endogenous, rather than exogenous sources, which has been the primary focus of previous research, and 2) the process of disbursing resources for specific social change activities.

**Movements and Endogenous Resources** One of the most important tenants of the resource mobilization perspective is that the fate of an SMO is often fundamentally linked to its ability to mobilize resources from external actors, what McCarthy and Zald
(2003: 546) refer to as “institutional sources, such as foundations, governmental agencies, and other citizens’ groups.” The increasing importance of externally mobilized resources in social movement activity grew out of Mancur Olson’s (1965) free-rider problem, which recognizes that movements have struggled to win new gains for individuals or groups with no guarantees that these benefactors would contribute to the movement. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied to all blacks (and women as well), not just those who often risked life and limb supporting the movement; the Eighteenth Amendment granted all women the right to vote, not just suffragists. As Gamson (1975) notes, such universalistic groups have difficulty in securing resources from their constituency and must seek these resources from elites sponsors, such as foundations and wealthy patrons.

While I do not deny the importance of external support, what of movements that are successful in restricting benefits to certain well-defined populations? These groups should be able to “tax” their constituents for the benefits provided, reducing their reliance on external sources. Such is the case of the labor movement in post-WW II America, a movement that has sought broad social change, yet has been quite successful in limiting benefits to a membership clearly defined by formally-binding contracts. Masters (1997) provides the best estimate of membership-dependence of labor unions: between 1979 and 1993 unions in America secured about 72% of their operating budget from membership

30 This is not to say that the labor movement was never assisted by other organizations, or that its successes only were limited to its membership. Historically, unions were very dependent on other groups such as the Communists and Socialists, for a variety of resources, including leadership (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). Even today, organized labor has benefits from the experience of activists from other movements (Voss and Sherman 2000). In addition, unions, besides winning new benefits for members, have sought broad reform, such as opposition to child-labor, the eight-hour day, and other political reforms. However, when compared to other movements, labor has been much more successful in its ability to define its beneficiaries.
sources, primarily from regular dues payments. This rather unique characteristic of the American labor movement provides an opportunity to examine how dependence on constituents shapes movement activity.

Though the link between membership dependence on social movement activity is certainly one distinctive feature of the American labor movement, as mentioned earlier, I seek to generalize the findings presented here to the broader population of SMOs. Therefore, I would argue that too often scholars have ignored the numerous instances when a particular movement has been successful at mobilizing resources internally. For example, after initially relying quite heavily on the League for Industrial Democracy for funding, the Students for a Democratic Society experienced massive organizational growth across college campuses, which allowed this organization to move closer to self-sufficiency (Sale 1973). The civil rights movement, while often dependent on external resources, also benefited greatly from the participation of black churches and young black college students (McAdam 1982; Morris 1981). Given the realities of movement resource dependence, I propose here that scholars begin to think of all the potential sources of mobilized resources, not just external elites, a point I expand upon in the next section.

Critics of the resource mobilization paradigm have bemoaned its de-emphasis of members as a source of resources necessary for collective action. While, as I have just demonstrated, members can provide resources necessary for SMO functioning, by conceptualizing endogenous resources so narrowly, these critics have conceptualized endogenous resources too narrowly, focusing only on members as potential contributors. McCarthy (2003), who provides the most systematic analysis of the increasing number of
local-national/regional affiliations, estimates that nearly one-quarter of all local SMOs are affiliated with a national organization. Other research (McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; Oliver and Furman 1989; Weed 1991) have found that affiliation with a larger organization can have both positive and negative consequences for local SMOs. Even labor movement scholarship (Voss and Sherman 2000) has demonstrated that national unions often become involved in the affairs of their local members, which they argue can revitalize the local structure. Because national unions, and likely all national organizations, support their local affiliates, to understand the range of internal resources, contributions mobilized from these actors must be measured as well. Given this federated structure, I am able to assess the importance of resources flows from parent organizations (hereafter referred to as “internationals” because of their representation of Canadian workers) to local unions. In particular, I am interested in how a local’s resource dependence on its international affiliate shapes various organizing processes, including the rate of organizing, the tactics chosen, and the success enjoyed.

Resource Deployment and Strategic Capacity Underlying much of the resource mobilization literature is the assumption that resources mobilized are directly transferable to tasks that make collective action possible. However, as Edwards and McCarthy (2003: 115) note, “…the simple availability of resources is not sufficient: coordination and strategic effort is typically required in order to convert available pools of individually held resources into collective resources in order that they can help enable collective action.” Simply stated, it is not the mobilization of resources that ultimately makes social change a reality, but the coordinated disbursements of them for some specified task. Recently, scholars have begun to develop detailed typologies of resource characteristics,
recognizing that resources vary on a number of important dimensions (Cress and Snow 1996; McCarthy and Edwards 2003; McCarthy and Zald 2003). If there are indeed different forms of resources, and movement have a choice in how to disburse of mobilized resources, the question then becomes: do certain resource types have a higher degree of “strategic capacity” necessary for engaging in collective action? In other words, if an SMO has a choice of resources formats to disburse for a specific goal, is it possible that one form is preferable over another?31

While research on union organizing efforts has failed to take advantage of the resource mobilization perspective, scholars have documented the important role of certain types of resources in successful organizing efforts (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Jarley and Maranto 1990; Reed 1989; Voos 1982). In particular, two resource types are central to membership recruitment: the union’s financial investments in organizing and human labor employed by the union for specifically for organizing. Paula Voos (1982) finds that unions devoted over $1,000 for each worker organized through the National Labor Relations Board, while other research (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998; Reed 1989) has documented the positive role of organizers employed by union in organizing success. While these two resource types have played a prominent role in union organizing, their useful is not limited to the labor movement, for they play a crucial role in the functioning of most social movements (Cress and Snow 1996; Oliver and Marwell 1992). Since financial resources mobilized by an SMO can be channeled

---

31 This discussion assumes that the SMO has the ability to transform mobilized resources into new forms. As scholars have indicated, resources vary in their degree of fungibility. Certain assets, mainly human labor, are very difficult to convert into other formats. Oliver and Marwell (1992: 257) write, “There really is no such thing as abstract time. It always matters who is participating, and a time contribution can never be physically removed from the giver.” Money, on the other hand, is highly fungible, and can be used for a variety of purposes. Therefore, the current analysis only examines resource outputs that can be derived from financial assets, including financial investments for organizing and the purchase of labor power.
directly in social change or through the purchase of labor power, the question I address here is: what is the most effective route of resource allocation for social movement activities: direct financial investments or the conversion of financial assets in human labor power?

**Resources and Social Movement Dynamics**

Previously I discussed how analysis of labor union organizing could correct some important shortcomings of the resource mobilization perspective. I now describe how, in the context of studying union organizing, resource mobilization can address issues important in the broader analysis of social movement research, including social movement outcomes and repertoire choice.

**Resource Mobilization and Successful Social Movement Outcomes** While early research on collective action explored the internal dynamics of movements, such as organizational viability and societal upswings in the social movement sector, recently scholars have turned their attention to the consequences of movement activities, both with respect to their stated goals, such as policy implementation, and indirectly, through cultural change and the effects of activism on an individual’s life course trajectory (see Giugni 1998a for a review of this literature). Although much of this research points at least implicitly to the important role of movement resources in achieving success (Andrews 2001; Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon et al. 2001), the resource mobilization perspective has been surprisingly underutilized.

The major drawback of previous research on social movement outcomes is not necessarily its failure to employ the resource mobilization perspective, but its nearly total focus on movement/state dynamics. This has created two challenges for studying
outcomes, the first of which is identified by Giugni (1998a: 373), who writes, “The principle difficulty [in movement outcomes research] is how to establish a causal relationship between a series of events that we can reasonably classify as social movement actions and an observed change in society…”. The development and expansion of the nation-state into almost every sphere of public and private life (Chodak 1989) has resulted in fierce competition among actors for state attention, rendering identification of the causal connection between movement action and state reaction is a difficult task at best. Secondly, by focusing only on the state, this research ignores the fact that other institutions, such as religious organizations, can be targets of contentious politics as well (Binder 2002; Katzenstein 1998).

The labor movement in America is one such movement that has targeted actors other than the state to undertake fundamental social change. Although organized labor has a long history of political activism (Marks 1989), it has primarily adopted a unique form of industrial syndicalism, preferring to win new membership benefits at the point of production rather than ballot box (Kimeldorf 1999). This unique situation presents two advantages when examining the relationship between resources and outcomes. First, unlike the porousness and shifting interests of the nation-state, which often implements policy to satisfy an entire range of actors, the fundamental contradictions of interests between labor and capitals necessitates that any benefits corporations grant to labor are likely to be the result of action or threatened action on the part of organized labor (Fantasia 1988; Marx [19439-41] 1978: 247-250). Indeed, the mere possibility of union representation, the outcome of the current research, has been perhaps more strongly resisted by capital than any other labor outcome because of the wide-ranging effects it
has on the entire scheme of industrial relations (Cowie 1999; Goldfield 1987; Rosenblum 1995; Yellen 1936). Secondly, the concrete nature of many economic goals sought by organized labor, including the right to represent the workers of a targeted firm, are much more quantifiable in nature than the goals of other movements, such as broad political restructuring or the shifts in particular beliefs and values held by a society.

While prior research on union activities, from new organizing efforts (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Jarley and Maranto 1990; Reed 1989; Voos 1982) to strikes (Brecher 1972; Franzosi 1995; Rubin 1986; Rubin, Griffin, and Wallace 1983; Shorter and Tilly 1975) has not been explicitly linked to the outcomes literature, it does indicate that various union characteristics, including resources play a key role in determining success. In the current study, resources of local labor unions are hypothesized to influence three organizing outcomes: 1) the ability of a union to engage in an organizing drive, 2) its successful completion, and 3) the number of workers successfully organized by a union.

Resource Mobilization and Repertoire Choice While there has been increasing attention given to the outcomes of social movements, there has been little systematic effort to another important social movement dynamic, repertoire choice. Here repertoire choice refers to the active selection of a specific repertoire by an SMO from the entire population of existing repertoires developed to achieve some social change goal. Although institutionalization, an oft-cited but little researched concept in the movements literature, may refer to the process by which previously contentious repertoires become institutionalized as part of the existing social order, repertoire choice refers to specific active choices made by an SMO. 

32 As Cress and Snow (2000) note in their analysis of homeless movement outcomes, there are varying degrees of success. The definition of success for labor can range from the achievement of bread and butter issues to the establishment of a worker state. The outcome examined here, organizing, is only an initial
part of the mainstream cultural landscape, another dimension is repertoire choice, when an initially confrontational movement shifts towards more conventional tactics, or vies a versa. Some scholars (McAdam 1983; McCarthy and McPhail 1998; Morris 1993) have examined the shifts in protest strategies in response to actions by authorities, yet less is known about the factors internal to the social movement organization that shapes tactical choice. In one such study, Staggenborg (1988) found that a shift towards more formal organizational forms has a moderating affect on movement protest strategies.

Additionally, research has also matched organizational sponsorship data to populations of protest events, both in the United States (Van Dyke, Soule, McCarthy 2003) and in Europe (Titarenko et al. 2001). In general, this research indicates that the strength of sponsoring group affects a number of strategic outcomes, especially the use of confrontational tactics.

In order to assess how leadership influences repertoire choice, it is necessary to begin first with a sample of SMOs and examine their choice of social movement tactics, which ideally would range from the contentious to the conventional. Fortunately, union organizing efforts in the 1990s represents just such an opportunity, as unions currently have two tactics to choose from when pursing workers representation. First, since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1934, unions have had a highly institutionalized and regulated method of organizing, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certification election. Under the NLRB process a union wins the right to represent a group of employees when it first files a petition that includes the signatures of at least 30% of the workers indicating that they would like an opportunity to vote for

indicator of success, and does not even guarantee that other goals of the union will be met (Markowitz 2000).
union representation and then garners more than half of the votes of a subsequent secret ballot elections where all eligible employees are able to vote for or against the union.

Recently, the NLRB election process, which has been the preferred method of organizing since the Great Depression, has come under attack from a number of quarters for the drawbacks inherent in this repertoire. Specifically, these critics claim that the NLRB election allows ample opportunities for firms to resist unionization efforts with little benefits for unions to build a strong movement in the workplace (Crump 1991; Lerner 1991). As an alternative, some militant unions are turning away from the NLRB election to an innovative and much more overtly confrontation form of organizing, which I title “corporate campaign”. The basic definition of a corporate campaign that I adopt here is any union activity that explicitly seeks to organize the workers of a targeted firm without relying on the NLRB election process. While there are no institutionalized “rules” governing the corporate campaign, most involve the union’s mobilization of outside support, ranging from other unions, government agencies, to other firms, all in an effort to pressure the corporation into meeting the demands of the union (Manhiem 2001). In addition, the tactics deployed by unions are diverse, ranging from sophisticated legal maneuvering to traditional social movement tactics, such as disobedience (Waldinger et al. 1998).

The fact that unions today have two alternatives when seeking to expand their membership allows me to determine if organizational characteristics play a role in repertoire choice. I am particularly interested if certain resources are more important for the institutionalized NLRB election process than the more confrontational and innovative
corporate campaign. Table 4.1 illustrates the rate of repertoire use during the 1990s among my sample of 70 unions. Clearly, most unions continue to prefer the traditional method of organizing, yet it is obvious why some unions have turned to the corporate campaign, the victory rate is substantially higher. This point is driven home by Table 4.2—unions targeted slightly more workers in NLRB elections, but organized substantially more in the corporate campaigns, due both to the higher success rate of corporate campaigns, and because the firm targeted in a corporate campaign tends to be much larger than the NLRB firm: the average corporate campaign involved 380 workers, while the average NLRB election included just 83. This diversity in the use of organizing tactics allows me to get at the heart of the organizational structure—repertoire choice link. In particular, it seems quite likely that unions engaging in NLRB elections would have a substantially different resource allocation process than those involved in corporate campaigns.

Table 4.1 and 4.2 about here

Data Collection and Methodology

Data Collection To analyze the mobilization and disbursement of resources for a specific social movement activity by a sample of SMOs requires time-series data both on structured characteristics of the SMOs and the particular activity in question. For union organizing, there is no one single source that provides all of this information. Therefore, I employed a wide-ranging data collection strategy that drew upon numerous data sources

---

According to Manheim (2001), corporate campaigns can be used by unions under a number of situations, including organizing, strikes, and bargaining. For the purposes of the current study, I examine only those corporate campaigns explicitly conducted to recruit new members to the union.
to examine a sample of local labor unions and their organizing efforts annually from 1990-2001.

Union Resource Structure  The primary source of information on union organizational characteristics is provided by the Department of Labor. Since the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, all labor unions currently active in the United States are required to file an annual disclosure report with the Office of Labor and Management Standards (OLMS), an agency of the Department of Labor. These reports provide a wealth of information on a variety of union characteristics, including membership size, dues, the union’s leadership structure, disbursements to employees of the union, and charitable contributions, to name only a few. Despite the information provided by these forms, only one study (Fiorito, Jarley, and Delaney 1995) has made any effort to match these data to union organizing efforts, though other researchers have successfully employed these records to examine the internal structure of unions (Allison 1975; Clark 1992; Masters 1997; Sheflin and Troy 1983).

While these forms represent an invaluable source of data on the structure of unions, they pose two particular methodological challenges. First, although the form explicitly measures many important union characteristics, the broader purpose of the OLMS is to collect general data on labor unions, not union organizing. Therefore, various laundry lists throughout the form were used to construct the allocation of human and financial resources devoted to organizing.34 Second, because the forms were not available electronically, a group of research assistants was hired to enter the measures into a

---

34 Although the level of detail included in these schedules was solely left to the discretion of the labor organization, almost every union in my sample provided very detailed information on important disbursements, including organizing budget, the functional title of officers and staff, and the sources of receipts, providing me with highly valid measurements of union resources.
The result of the data assembly project was detailed annual organizational data on a sample of 70 local unions from 1989-2001.

**Sampling Strategy** By matching union measures to their organizing efforts during the 1990s, the current research seeks to explore the relationship between SMO characteristics, specifically resource structure, and repertoire use. However, because NLRB elections and especially corporate campaigns are relatively rare events, a very large sample of unions would be required to ensure enough events for standard data analysis techniques. Because of limited resources, I followed the logic proposed by King and Zeng (2001) by selecting a small number of unions most “at-risk” to engaging in organizing during the 1990s. Simultaneously, I sought to ensure a representative sample of the labor movement as a whole, one that did not draw disproportionately from one particular industry or national affiliate, which may decrease generalizability. To ensure both objectives, I employed a two-stage sample design, with a sample frame of local unions provided by the OLMS.

In stage one I selected seven national unions that represented both a wide range of industries and had been noted for their aggressive position on new organizing efforts. They included: the Communication Workers of America (CWA), the Service Employees International (SEIU), the Hotel and Restaurant Employees (HERE), the United Food and

---

35 To ensure the highest level of intercoder reliability, which for the project exceeded .9, I instituted a number of common quality checks. First, the coders underwent a series of training sessions to familiarize themselves with the forms, important union characteristics, and database software. After they successfully completed a supervised coding of one union, they were allowed to code independently. Another research assistant recoded each set of forms, and the coding of everyone on the project was subject to periodic review by the primary investigator to ensure accurate and reliable coding.

36 I collected data on the organizational characteristics of local labor unions in 1989 so that lag variables could be constructed for my first year of analysis, 1990.

37 Note that unions were not selected on their actual rate of organizing, only on characteristics that put them most at risk for this event. The strategy of drawing a sample of observations that are considered most at
Commercial Workers (UFCW), the United Auto Workers (UAW), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), and the United Steelworkers of America (USW).

Limiting my sample to a group of locals affiliated with these particular national unions accomplishes three important goals: 1) it ensures that my local unions are more at risk for organizing because of their affiliation with a progressive national union, 2) each national union represents workers in a distinct industry, and 3) I am able to compare the variation in organizing across distinct national structures, which play an important role in the organizing activities of their local affiliates (Voss and Sherman 2000).

In the second stage I selected a sample of ten local unions from each national union. To limit the sample to those unions most at risk for an event I randomly selected only those locals that filed an LM-2 report with the OLMS. Only large and relatively resource rich unions, those with annual receipts over $200,000, file this report, while unions with fewer receipts file the LM-3 or 4 report. Filing status was chosen for a risk predictor because although only 20% of all unions file the LM-2, they account for approximately 70% of all NLRB elections.\(^{38}\) In addition, only the LM-2 report provides detailed information on the organizational structure of labor unions, an essential element of the current project. While this strategy identified a sample of industrially diverse unions that are likely to engage in significant levels of organizing, an unavoidable consequence is that the results presented below that are not representative of the organizing activities of all local unions in America during the 1990s, only those that meet

\(^{38}\) Unfortunately, unlike the NLRB, there is no population of corporate campaign data, so I cannot make a similar estimate for this organizing repertoire.
the particular criteria of this study. Because of this, I will discuss the implications of my sampling strategy when interpreting my results below.

**Union Organizing Efforts** Data on NLRB organizing for each union were available directly from the National Labor Relations Board, which records extensive information on organizing efforts that fall under its jurisdiction. Following the example of prior research on protest activity (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kriesi et al. 1995, McAdam 1982; Olzak 1992; Soule 1997), newspaper archives, specifically LEXIS-NEXIS, and NEWSLIBRARY, were searched for any traces of organizing by each union in the sample that sought explicitly to avoid the NLRB process. Despite issues of bias when using the media sources to study various forms of collective behavior (Franzosi 1987; McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000; Smith et al. 2001; Snyder and Kelly 1977), there are three reasons to expect a nearly complete record of corporate campaigns by the print media: 1) Because unions seek to win public sympathy for their cause, a major target for virtually all campaigns is the media (Manheim 2001), 2) the two newspaper databases employed provide full-text archives for hundreds of local daily newspapers, and 3) some known rather small corporate campaigns, those that targeted fewer than 20 employees, were covered, indicating that size is not a primary factor in determining coverage.

**Measurement**

Table 4.3 includes the descriptive statistics for each measures included in the analysis. Unless otherwise specified, the measures included here are annual statistics, but because I am employing time-series data, I will include lags and moving averages in my models.
Sources of Resources  In this analysis I have two major endogenous revenue sources, *Membership Fees*, which includes all dues, fees, and other receipts from the union’s membership and *International Union*, financial resources derived directly from the parent organization.

*Disbursements for Organizing*39  Here I include three types of resources disbursed explicitly for union organizing efforts: *General Organizing Budget* includes all financial resources that are allocated for organizing, *Organizing Staff Size*, the union officers and employees that have the title of organizer, and *Staff Organizing Budget*, the salary and expenses of the union’s organizing staff. Although this third category is financial, I differentiate it from the General Organizing Budget because staff salary is so closely linked to the staff themselves.

*Union Organizing Indicators*  I have three measures of organizing activities for both the NLRB and corporate campaign-the *Rate of Organizing*, measured by the number of new organizing efforts initiated by each union annually. For NLRB elections this is measured as the year that the union files a petition with the NLRB. New corporate campaigns are identified as beginning when the union makes any activity that explicitly seeks to organize the workers of a particular firm by avoiding the NLRB election process. *Organizing Victories* is the number of all organizing efforts the union was currently engaged in that were successfully completed in a particular year-victory is determined for NLRB elections if the union won the elections, while unions were victorious in corporate campaigns if the firm agreed to recognize the union as the authorized bargaining agent of
its employees. Finally, *Successful Worker Mobilization* is the number of members added annually through all the union’s organizing drives.

**Control Variables** I include two sets of control variables, a category of measures that captures important characteristics of the union, and another set that measures the context within which the union operates. Control variables that measure union characteristics include: *Age, Membership Size, Total Disbursements,* and *Affiliation,* coded 1 if the union is affiliated with a particular national body, 0 if not. Contextual variables include *Industry,* the industrial sector within which the union is most actively engaged in and *State Unionization Rate,* the percentage of workers represented by unions in the home state of the union.

**Data Analysis**

Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) techniques are used to model various union organizing outcomes during the 1990s. HLM is generalization of multiple regression for nested or repeated-measures data (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). While HLM is commonly used to examine individuals nested in larger contexts (schools, organizations, or communities), it is also well-suited for examining multiple observations for each unit of analysis (see Bryk and Raudenbush 1987; 1992 for a methodological discussion and Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995 for a practical application of this approach). In the current study, each labor union is observed annually from 1990-2001. Therefore, the unit of analysis is not the union but rather the union-year, a series of annual measurements for

---

39 Given the highly skewed nature of these three organizing resource measures, in the models below (1-6), I rerun the analysis using the natural log of each measure. Because the results did not differ substantively, I used the untransformed coefficients for ease of interpretation.

40 Here, because of the small number of cases, I include only two large industry categories, manufacturing and service. Unions were assigned a score of 1 for each category if they targeted workers in the particular industry.
each union, which are nested within the local union structure. While there are a number of reasons for choosing HLM over conventional Multivariate Repeated Measures (MRM) Methods (see Bryk and Raudenbush 1992: 133-4 for a complete discussion), a major challenge when analyzing repeated-observation data is the correlations among observations for a particular unit of analysis (Allison 1984). HLM provides the ability to adjust for serially autocorrelated error structures that can occur in repeated measures for the same unit of analysis (i.e. unions) by partitioning variance in the outcome variable into different levels, here time (Level 1) and unions (Level 2).\footnote{I should note that there is a third potential level of analysis, local unions nested within their national affiliate, of which there are seven. However, there are three reasons why I chose not to include this third level: 1) the small number of observations (7) limits the number of predictors I can potentially employ, 2) the most important measure of national affiliation-resources derived from the parent body-is actually a local union measure, and 3) the current version of HLM software is unable to estimate three-Level nonlinear models. As an alternative, I include a dummy variable for national affiliation at Level 2 (essentially a fixed-effects model), which controls for all variation due to national affiliation.}

The basic Level 1 model used throughout this project is represented in Equation 4.1:\footnote{This model represents the basic model employed to analyze the link between the organizational structure of unions and various organizing outcomes. Depending on the outcome variable of interest, the models will be altered slightly. For example, to examine the rate of organizing, a Poisson regression model will be employed. However, the basic logic of HLM hold true regardless of the variation employed.}

Equation 4.1 Level 1 (Time):

\[ Y_{it} = \pi_{0i} + \pi_{1i} T_{it} + \pi_{2i} X_{it} + e_{it} \]

Where:
- \( i \) is the index for unions,
- \( t \) is the index for time (1990-2001),
- \( T \) is the measure of time\footnote{In the models below the underlying time trend is modeled with two coefficients, a main (linear) effect, and a polynomial (squared) term. This baseline control of time is common in longitudinal studies that employ HLM (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995)}, and
- \( X \) is a vector of time-varying covariates

In the above equation, \( \pi_{0i} \) is the intercept for each union and represents the predicted value of the dependent variable for union \( i \), \( \pi_{1i} \) represents the baseline time trend, \( \pi_{2i} \) is
the effect of a vector of time varying covariates $X$ on the outcome variable, and finally, $e_i$ represents the unexplained variance for this observation and is assumed to have a mean of zero and a constant variance, $\sigma^2$. The important element in this model is that time-varying covariates, such as the union’s organizing budget in a particular year, are used to predict a particular annual union measures, such as the number of organizing drives initiated that year.

In HLM, the Level 1 model determines the structure of the Level 2 model because the Level 1 parameters $\pi_{0i}…\pi_{2i}$ are now the outcomes to be predicted with Level 2 covariates. Specifically:

Equation 4.2 Level 2 (Unions): 

$$\begin{align*}
\pi_{0i} &= \beta_{00} + u_{0i} \\
\pi_{1i} &= \beta_{10} \\
\pi_{2i} &= \beta_{20}
\end{align*}$$

In this model, each Level 1 parameter ($\pi_{0i}…\pi_{2i}$) is now predicted by a population level parameter, $\beta_{00}…\beta_{20}$. So, for example, $\beta_{00}$, which predicts the Level 1 intercept $\pi_{0i}$, represents the predicted population value for the outcome variable of interest, controlling for all other variables in the model. Of special note here is the residual term $u_{0i}$. This allows the outcome variable, $\beta_{00}$, to vary across union and is assumed to have a mean of zero and a variance $\tau_{00}$. By including this parameter, the problems of autocorrelation typical in longitudinal analyses are now resolved because the unique variance associated with each context (here union) is now captured by the Level 2 variance component $u_{0i}$.

Although there are no Level predictors in Equation 4.2 (Null model), they play two very important roles in explaining variation in union organizing outcomes over time, assessing

---

44 In the models below virtually all of the time-varying measures are captured with two-year moving averages $X_{(t+(t-1)/2)}$. This is because the outcome of interest is an annual measure, which can take place at
Assessing Within and Between Union Change  In Equation 4.2, the effect of union characteristic $X_i$ captured by $\beta_{20}$ represents the effect of the independent variable on both within-union change over time and between union-mean differences in the outcome of interest. However, it is important to separate the effect of a particular coefficient into both within and between effects since I am interested in not only union variation over time, but also across unions, since local unions, as discussed earlier, are relatively autonomous SMOs. For example, if I am examining the relationship between human resources allocated for organizing and the rate of new corporate campaigns, I would like to determine how a change in the size of the union’s organizing staff affects the rate of organizing, as well as how the rate of organizing varies across unions depending on their mean organizing staff size. In order to examine both types of variation, I include both the Level 1 measure for a particular time-varying covariate ($X_i$) and the mean value of the measure of the particular union at Level 2 to predict overall differences in the outcome of interest (represented by Equation 4.3):

Equation 4.3:

$$\pi_{oi} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{01} \bar{X}_i + u_{0i}$$

In the expanded model the Level 1 coefficient indicates the effect of within union change over time while the Level 2 coefficient ($\beta_{01}$) captures the effect of variation in the characteristics of interest across unions. Because of the importance of separating within

---

45 There are two basic types of Level 2 coefficients, stable characteristics of unions that do not change over time (such as national affiliation), and aggregates of Level 1 (time-varying) measures. Because nearly all of the measures included vary over time, most of the Level 2 coefficients employed below fall in the later category.
and between effects, unless otherwise specified, all substantive union characteristics that vary over time will be included at both levels.

Variation of Level 1 Coefficients Across Contexts  Along with explaining mean differences in particular organizing outcomes across unions, Level 2 can also be used to determine if the effect of time-varying covariates (Level 1 variables) differ depending on the particular union characteristic. For example, below I examine how the effects of certain Level 1 coefficients vary depending on the national affiliate (a Level 2 measure). Commonly referred to as cross-level interactions, Level 2 coefficients, rather than used to explain the outcome of interest ($\pi_{0i}$) as in Equation 4.2, are used to predict the Level 1 parameters, as illustrated by Equation 4.4:

\[
\pi_{2i} = \beta_{20} + \beta_{21}Z_i + u_{1i}
\]

where $\beta_{20}$ represents the main effect of the Level 1 time-varying covariate while $\beta_{21}$ represents the interaction between the coefficient and the Level 2 variable $Z_i$. The addition of the error term $u_{1i}$ allows the Level 1 coefficient to vary across unions.

Results

Here I examine how the resource structure of unions affects two important processes: the rate at which unions engage in various organizing repertoires, and the outcomes of the organizing drives, both in terms of the probability of actually winning the organizing drive and the number of workers organized. In all the models, the control variables, which vary slightly depending on the outcome of interest, are not explicitly included in the tables (results available from the author). Additionally, unless otherwise
specified, all covariates are grand-mean centered.\textsuperscript{46} I begin first by examining the relationship between the union’s resource structure and the rate at which the union engages in new organizing.

**Rate of Organizing** Using organizational characteristics to examine organizing rate is important for at least two reasons. First, despite the growing interest in organizing among labor scholars, virtually all effort has been concentrated on explaining organizing success, rather than the propensity of unions to engage in this behavior. By employing revenue sources and the allocation of resources to predict the rate at which unions engage in new organizing drives, I am able to begin to offer an outline of what type of unions are most at risk for this particular activity. Secondly, because unions have two distinct repertoires available to recruit new members (NLRB elections and corporate campaigns) examining the rate of organizing allows me to examine an important, yet overlooked topic in social movement research: repertoire choice. Specifically I model the importance of both revenue source and organizing disbursements on tactical deployment.

Poisson regression is employed to model the annual rate at which unions engage in both forms of organizing. Poisson regression is especially appropriate when modeling rare, nonnegative events that take on the characteristics of a Poisson distribution (relatively rare events that are highly skewed to the right/positive). The Poisson distribution identifies the probability of a discrete event count, given an underlying rate of events (Osgood 2000). Poisson regression addresses the issue of skew in the data by using a link function, typically a log transfer of the outcome, so in Equation 4.1 the

\begin{footnote}{46 The purpose of centering is to produce an intercept that is meaningful. In general, the sources of revenue measures are centered since all unions depend on a myriad of sources for revenue. Organizing disbursements (both financial and human) are always uncentered since many unions do not have an organizing budget.}

129
outcome is $\ln (Y_i)$. Therefore, in the model, the untransformed coefficients represent a log increase in the number of organizing events initiated by a union in a given year. Alternatively, we may compute $\exp (\beta_k)$ to determine the multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in an explanatory variable on the rate of organizing. The multiplicative form means that a “one-unit increase in $x_{ij}$ multiplies the expected incidents by a factor of $\exp(\beta_k)$, and a one-unit decrease divides the expected incidents by the same amount” (Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw 1995: 396). The second method is similar to the interpretation of the effect of an odds (Liao 1994) and is the preferred method of interpretation here.

One advantage of HLM is that it allows the researcher to assess the concentration of variation in the outcome of interest—for example, in the current case, I am interested in determining if there is more variation in the rate of organizing across union or over time. Unfortunately, in HLM Poisson regression is unable to estimate the distribution of variance across levels because the model is inherently probabilistic (essentially, there is no error term at Level 1). Despite this, when we take a closer look at the data, it is clear that for both organizing forms most of the variance is across unions rather than over time. Table 4.1 indicates that corporate campaigns are relatively rare events—in the sample only eight unions engaged in corporate campaigns (and one of the eight initiated only one corporate campaign). Conversely, while it initially appears that NLRB elections occur much more frequently, and therefore are much more common among unions, these events too are concentrated among only a few organizations—in this sample of 70 large local, relatively aggressive labor unions, just seven are responsible for 50% of all elections, and 95% of elections are carried out by 23 unions, which is less than a third of the entire
sample of unions.\textsuperscript{47} Therefore, although I include all coefficients at both Levels, their effects on variation in organizing across unions will be the focus of the following discussion.

**Table 4.4 about here**

Table 4.4 presents the effects of revenue source and organizing disbursements on the annual rate of NLRB organizing (Model 1) and corporate campaigns (Model 2). Again, I include the transformed beta, which represents the coefficients multiplicative effect on the baseline rate of organizing. I begin first by examining the importance of revenue source on the rate at which unions engage in organizing. As I have argued above, the labor movement provides a unique opportunity to assess the importance of endogenously mobilized resources on important outcomes. Specifically, here I focus on two actors that fall within the boundaries of the labor movement: the union’s membership and its international affiliate.

**Membership Effects** One of the particular advantages of examining union activities is that unions are some of the most membership dependent SMOs in existence (Masters 1997), allowing researchers to explore the importance of mobilizing resources directly from the rank-and-file, which is rarely examined by movement scholars today. In Model 1, the NRLB rate of organizing, average membership dependence has a small positive effect on the rate of organizing. One possible reason for this relationship is that unions that dependent on their members for revenue may engage in increased organizing

\textsuperscript{47} This finding calls into question the claim by many observers and unionists alike that the 1990s was a period of revitalization for much of the labor movement, a time when an increasing number of unions were taking steps to expand their membership base. While we may expect that the innovative corporate campaign has not yet gained sufficient popularity to be employed at any significant level, if institutionalized organizing remains rare among a sample of large, well-financed, aggressive unions, then it is highly doubtful that unions in the broader labor movement are making any effort at all to initiate new organizing efforts.
activities to expand their pool of resources. For corporate campaigns, however, a one percent increase in annual membership revenue dependence decreases the rate of organizing by about 15%. This findings supports prior research that indicates that often members are unwilling to support organizing efforts, especially those that expend significant union resources (below I demonstrate that corporate campaigns are such activities) and reduce resources necessary for servicing existing membership demands (Voss and Sherman 2000). However, despite the potentially conservative effect of membership dependence on union activities, because membership revenue disbursements is only a rough approximation of membership control, further research is needed to fully understand the dynamic between membership control and contentious organizing tactics (see Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003 for such an analysis).

*International Affiliation Effects* As I argued above, equating endogenous resources solely with membership, for federated SMO structures, ignores resources (for local groups) mobilized from parent organizations (here the local union’s international affiliate). As McCarthy (2003) demonstrates, the federated SMO structure is an increasing common one and can have important consequences for both local affiliates and national organizations. Although both the rank-and-file and international fall within the boundaries of the labor movement, there are some key differences between these two actors that may make one, the national union, more effective at implementing its goals on the local union. In particular, unlike the membership, who, due to the sheer number of actors involve, often have great difficulty developing a unified political agenda, the international is a single actor seeking to implement its objectives.\(^4^8\) Therefore, in this

\(^{48}\) Of course, no organization is ever completely unified in its goals and objectives. Yet, when compared to the membership, the international’s relationship with its local unions is much more cohesive.
respect, the international, while located within the boundaries of the labor movement, is operating much as an elite actor, able to use their resources in a political manner to provide inducements for local unions to behave in certain ways.

The question I seek to address in Table 4.4 is: does the local’s dependence on its international have any implications for the rate of organizing and the type of strategy employed? Initially, it appears that there is little effect on either form of organizing, as this coefficient is insignificant for NLRB organizing and actually has a negative effect (significant at Level 1) on the rate of corporate campaigns. A possible reason for this is that although some national unions, such as SEIU, use their local unions to engage in corporate campaigns (Waldinger et al. 1999), other national bodies are reluctant to initiate this strategy, given its contentious nature and use of non-traditional labor tactics (Manheim 2001). Perhaps the most dramatic conflict between a local affiliate and a parent body over the use of a corporate campaign was the Hormel strike of the early 1980s conducted by local P-9 of the United Food and Commercial Workers union (Green 1990). The bitter dispute over this action eventually resulted in the national union taking over the local organizing and ending the campaign. This opposition to the corporate campaign by the national UFCW is not the only time labor leaders have opposed this organizing tactic (Manheim 2001).

To determine if the effect of national revenue on corporate campaign organizing rate depends on who is giving the money, I created a cross level interaction between the Level 1 coefficient of percentage of revenues received from international affiliate and
SEIU affiliation (Level 2). Although in the new model (not shown) the interaction term was insignificant, it was positive, indicating that increased dependence on the SEIU national organization may increase the likelihood of initiating a corporate campaign. This finding has two significant implications for the link between sponsoring group and activities of SMOs. First, it provides initial support for the argument that outside sponsorship can have an impact on the activities of beneficiaries (Jenkins and Eckert 1986). Secondly, and in contradiction to those who argue that elite sponsorship has a uniformly conservative effect on movement actions, the fact that revenue derived from a single population of sponsoring organizations (national unions) can lead to such contradictory results on the use of contentious social change activities indicates that scholars cannot make assumptions about the motivations of sponsoring groups. Instead, researchers should focus their attention on the motivations behind patronage to fully understand how dependence on certain actors shapes the SMO’s agenda.

Organizing Resources Effects Given the importance of resources in collective action, above I hypothesized that although most research has examined the mobilization of resources, the disbursement of resources specifically for organizing should have a positive effect on the rate at which a union engages in organizing. In addition, I expect that certain resources (human vs. financial) may play a more prominent role in one of the two forms of organizing, allowing me to examine the relationship between resource allocation and repertoire choice. Turning first to the effect of resources on the rate of NLRB organizing (Model 1), it is apparent that neither human nor financial resources dispersed for organizing has an effect on the annual rate at of NLRB elections, though the

\[ I \text{ should note that in Model 2 the main effect of the SEIU dummy (Level 2) was insignificant-affiliation with the SEIU, controlling for all other measures, does not automatically lead to higher rates of corporate} \]
size of the union’s staff, at both levels did have a positive, though insignificant, effect. In contrast to NLRB organizing, as evidenced in Model 2 resources allocated for corporate campaigns have important effects on the rate at which unions engage in this type of organizing. Perhaps most striking is the large effect of average staff size (Level 2) on the rate of organizing. At first glance the coefficient for this variable appears extremely large. However, this is not surprising since the baseline rate of corporate campaign organizing is so low (recall that in Poisson regression the transformed coefficient indicates the multiplicative effect on the baseline). To give an empirical example of this relationship, controlling for all other variables, with an average organizing staff of five (which only three unions had), a union’s annual rate of corporate campaign organizing would be less than 0.5. The fact that the majority (39) of unions did not have any organizing staff explains why corporate campaigns are so rare. Additionally, the significant negative effect of organizing staff budget across unions makes it clear that it is the organizers themselves, not the resources they control, that positively affects the rate of corporate campaigns. In fact, paying organizers more money may lead them to become complacent and make fewer efforts to mobilize potential members.

In contrast to the organizing staff size coefficient, the effect of organizing disbursements on the rate of corporate campaigns, though positive and significant, is rather minor—a one thousand dollar increase in the union’s average annual organizing budget (Level 2) has a 15% increase on the baseline rate of organizing. This difference between human and financial resources indicates that, for union organizing efforts, human resources are especially important especially for those that are particularly contentious (corporate campaigns). This finding also provides support for critics of campaign organizing.
“checkbook” SMOs that rely on their membership for money, not labor, and rarely engage in any unconventional activities.

Organizing Success In the previous model, I examined the effect of resources and revenue sources on the rate of organizing. Although from Table 4.4 it appears that resources disbursed for organizing have a strong effect on the rate at which unions engage in new organizing efforts, at least for corporate campaigns, because both are part of the internal decision-making process of the union, we should be cautious about claiming a causal link between resources and organizing rate. It is much more likely that a nonrecursive causal relationship exists, where organizing disbursements are adjusted based on the number of organizing drives a union engages in, and the rate of organizing in turn depends on the level of resources available for this particular task.50

In contrast to the rate of organizing rate, unions cannot completely ensure a successful outcome to the organizing drive, as it must struggle with the firm for the loyalties of the employees, making resources allocated for organizing particularly important in determining success. Because of this particular dynamic, in the next section I am able to explore how resources strategically allocated for organizing lead to success. Additionally, by linking resource disbursements to a quantifiable measure of success, I am able to speak to the broader literature on the ability of SMOs to achieve their goals, an important topic that has often been overlooked in the outcomes literature.

To examine both the union’s ability to win organizing drives and organize new workers, I will employ Binomial regression, another Generalized Linear Model.

---

50 One way to at least begin to address this causal ordering issue is to include a lagged dependent variable predictor, which I have done. This ensures that the coefficients are predicing new organizing efforts.
Binomial regression is useful for predicting the probability of a successful event, given a specified number of trials. The basic Binomial sampling model is as follows:

Equation 4.5: \( Y_{it} | \phi_{it} \sim B(m_{it}, \phi_{it}) \)

where \( Y_{it} \), which has a binomial distribution, represents the number of successes in \( m_{it} \) trials and the probability of success per trial is \( \phi_{it} \). Substantively, this model allows me to predict the probability of a successful outcome, given that the union is currently engaged in \( m_{it} \) organizing efforts. Again, because this is a Generalized Linear Model, it is in many respects similar to the Poisson model discussed above. First, because the outcome variable is a dichotomy (success or failure), a link function is employed, specifically the logit link, where the outcome variable is the log of the odds of success. This link function ensures that the predicted outcome cannot be greater than one or less than zero. As in the Poisson model described above, in order to ease interpretations, I will compute the \( \exp(\beta_k) \) to determine the multiplicative effect of a variable on the odds of a successful outcome (in Poisson regression, the outcome variable of interest is the rate of organizing, a count variable, while in binomial regression the outcome is a probability). Therefore, the interpretation of \( \exp(\beta_k) \) is identical to an odds in logistic regression.

The use of binomial regression is relatively straightforward for the union’s success rate—it allows us to assess the effect of a particular coefficient on the odds of a successful victory. However, at first the choice of binomial regression to model the number of workers successfully organized annual is less clear, a linear model seems more appropriate. Despite this, I prefer to use binomial regression because in a linear model, even controlling for the number of workers targeted, the effect of a particular independent variable is constrained by the number of employees currently targeted. Binomial
regression, on the other hand, can tell us how a change in a particular coefficient affects the probability of successfully organizing an individual worker. Since most organizing drives are all or nothing affairs, meaning if the union loses, it organizes zero workers, binomial regression coefficients provides a more meaningful interpretation than a linear model, which tells us how many additional workers can be organized by increasing the value of a particular independent variable.\textsuperscript{51}

As in the previous models, I am especially interested in determining if variation in organizing outcomes is concentrated primarily across unions or over time. Here the question is: during the 1990s among my sample of unions, is the organizing victory rate fairly static over time (more variation is concentrated at Level 2), or is victory rate fairly stable across unions, but varying over time within organizations (more variation at Level 1)? However, like Poisson, binomial regression is an inherently probabilistic model where the variance is assumed to equal the mean. In the previous model, I argued that the rate of organizing varied most dramatically across unions, rather than over time, as only a few unions engaged in either form. In binomial regression only those organizations that experience a trial (an organizing drive) can be at risk for success. Therefore, the analyses are limited to those unions that engage in organizing, which is a smaller subsample of the 70 unions, resulting in less variation in organizing success across union and more over time. The results of revenue source and resource disbursement on victory rate and worker success are presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, respectively.

\textsuperscript{51} Rerunning the models with the number of workers organized annually (a linear outcome) did not change the coefficients substantially (of course, the outcome metric was quite different).
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 about here

The first issue I explore is the effect of revenue dependence on both successful organizing outcomes. Although in the previous models revenue dependence was important because it allowed the sponsoring group to control an internal decision of the dependent union (the decision to engage in a particular form of organizing), for success the relationship may be less straightforward, because, as mentioned above, success is an outcome not totally controlled by the union. For sponsoring groups, this means that they can use their revenues to compel a union to disburse resources for organizing and/or engage in increased levels of organizing, but they cannot ensure that the union wins the organizing drive. I begin by examining how this process works with respect to membership.

Membership Dependence and Organizing Success  In Table 4.4 we saw that the effects of membership dependence varied with the outcome of interest—a union’s reliance on its members for resources increased the rate of NLRB organizing, but decreased the probability of initiating a corporate campaign. In Table 4.5 membership dependence now has no effect on the probability of a successful NLRB election result, yet it continues to negatively impact corporate campaign activity (note that membership dependence has no effect on successfully organizing individual workers through either tactic, as indicated by Table 4.6). A possible explanation for this negative relationship is that, as indicated in Model 2, members may be opposed to the use of corporate campaigns, yet, prior research (Crump 1991; Waldinger et al. 1999) demonstrates that membership involvement is often crucial for corporate campaign success. Therefore, for those unions interested in exploring the corporate campaign as an alternative to the NLRB election, they may have to
overcome the initial opposition of their membership in order to ensure that they are able to generate maximum rank-and-file involvement in the campaign. Unfortunately, because I do not have indicators of membership attitudes towards the corporate campaign, I cannot test this explanation here.

*International Affiliate and Organizing Success* Earlier I hypothesized that because the international union is a single entity, unlike the membership, it should be able to use resource disbursements to force its locals act in what it sees as an appropriate manner. Because this sample of unions is limited to national organizations that are committed to new organizing efforts, we would expect that their goals include increased organizing efforts. Despite this, in Table 4.4 we saw that dependence on the national union did not increase the local’s rate of NLRB organizing, and actually *decreased* the frequency of corporate campaigns, except for SEIU affiliates that were dependent on the national union. Here, despite the difference in outcomes, the effect of international dependence is quite similar—no effect for NLRB elections and a negative effect for the outcomes of corporate campaigns.

Like the negative effect of membership dependence outcomes, the question here is: why does increased international revenue support decrease corporate campaign success, especially since the outcome is somewhat beyond the control of the parent organization. Like membership, I argue that it is due to the role of the international in the corporate campaign. In particular, international support is often crucial in assisting local unions that engage in corporate campaigns (see Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999 for a description of the Ravenswood corporate campaign successfully organized by a United Steelworkers local, which depended heavily on the international for support). However,
like the membership, many international unions oppose the use of the corporate campaign (Manheim 2001). Therefore, in general these organizations would be unwilling to support their affiliates, leading to generally lower levels of success. Fortunately, although above I did not have a way to measure membership support or opposition for corporate campaigns, here I do know that at least one international, the SEIU, strongly supports this tactic. Not surprisingly then, in Model 4, the SEIU main effect dummy (not shown), had a positive, significant relationship to corporate campaign success—SEIU locals were more successful in their corporate campaigns, controlling for all other measures, than other unions.\textsuperscript{52} This finding provides additional support for the argument that ultimately the corporate campaign is most successful when it involves the coordinated actions of both the local union and the international.

\textit{Organizing Resources Effects} Turning finally to the effect of resources, we see that again, for NLRB elections, resources allocated to organizing have no effect on the ability of a union to win an election. In contrast, resources, specifically human resources devoted to organizing, have a significant effect on both corporate campaign measures of success. For victory rate, a one-person increase in the size of the union’s organizing staff increased the odds of success by more than three times, and, for successful worker mobilization, a one-unit increase in staff size more than doubled the probability that a worker targeted in a corporate campaign would be successfully mobilized. Conversely, neither general organizing budget nor staff organizing budget had any effect on the

\textsuperscript{52} Interestingly, when Model 4 was rerun with an interaction between international revenue dependence and SEIU affiliation—similar to the interaction in Model 2—the effect was actually negative—as dependency on the national SEIU increases, the likelihood of a corporate campaign victory decreases. This may be due to the SEIU’s willingness to use locals, often over the objections of the local’s leadership, to engage in corporate campaigns (Waldinger et al 1999). These locals may then either fail to fully support the campaign, leading to lower levels of success (this assumes that the SEIU is more willing to use locals that are financial dependent on the international.
union’s ability to achieve corporate campaign success, further validating the argument that human resources, not money, is the primary resources that determines successful organizing. Although the focus is on a specific union activity, I believe that this finding has implications for broader social movements research: human resources are an essential element of contentious social change activity, but financial resources play a significantly smaller role. Of course, this is not to say that financial resources are unimportant in social movement events. For example, give the large number of international participants at protest events targeting various globalization organizations, such as the World Bank, financial resources are clearly necessary for activists to travel to the diverse locations where these events are held (Canada, the United States, Europe).

The Contrast of Organizational Structure in NLRB Elections and Corporate Campaigns. As the previous analyses made clear, resources disbursed for organizing, especially human resources, have a clear positive effect both on the rate at which unions engage in corporate campaigns and their ability to achieve success, which is contrasted their total lack of effect on the rate and outcomes of NLRB elections. The reasons why this difference exists is important not only for those interested in current union organizing, but also for social movement scholarship more broadly, especially research on the important link between resources and collective action. Based on the differences between the two forms of organizing described above (NLRB elections-bureaucratic and institutionalized vs. corporate campaigns-innovative and contentious), there are two possible explanations for the differences in resource effects.

First, it is quite possible that because NLRB organizing is such an institutionalized process, resources devoted specifically to organizing are less important
than other organizational characteristics is determining both the rate of organizing and success. Instead, based on the work of Susan Staggenborg (1988), who finds that highly formalized pro-choice groups tend to engage in institutionalized forms of social change, it is possible that the NLRB election process is preferred by bureaucratic labor unions, those whose internal structure more closely resembles the particular organizing repertoire. To determine if unions that are more bureaucratic are more prone to engage in NLRB elections, I created a natural log scale of the amount of resources controlled by the union officers. The inclusion of this variable in Model 1 (not shown) indicate that more bureaucratic unions to tend to engage in higher levels of NLRB organizing, as a one-unit increase in the standard deviation of this measure increased the annual rate of organizing by nearly one-third. However, though these bureaucratic unions tend to engage in more frequent NLRB organizing, this does not necessarily translate into success, as bureaucratic staff size was actually negatively related to the probability of a successful outcome. This finding provides support for the research of Maranto and Fiorito (1987), who find that democratic and decentralized labor unions tend to fair better in NLRB elections than their bureaucratic counterparts. I should also note that this measure of bureaucracy was not related to any corporate campaign measure.

Along with the propensity of bureaucratic unions favoring NLRB elections, a second possible explanation is that unions that engage in NLRB organizing are simply less effective at utilizing the resources for organizing than are unions that engage in corporate campaign. In other words, organizers may be important for NLRB elections, but most unions who engage in this form of organizing are not utilizing them effectively. To assess this possibility, I created an interaction between organizing staff size (Level 1)
and a Level 2 dummy variable measuring if the union ever engaged in a corporate campaign, to predict NLRB success. Since virtually all unions that use the corporate campaign also engage in NLRB organizing, this interaction will determine if this group of unions (which I will call “mixed-repertoire” union) utilizes their staff more effectively in conventional forms of organizing. Figure 4.1 documents the log odds effect of organizing staff size on the victory rate in NLRB elections for both the mixed-repertoire unions and those that engage solely in NLRB elections. This figure illustrates quite strikingly the great disparity in staff effectiveness for the two types of unions. The staff of NLRB-only unions has, as expected, no effect ensuring a victorious election, which is contrasted with the positive effect of the mixed repertoire union staff.

One possibility for this finding is that mixed-repertoire unions have developed their “strategic decision-making” (McCarthy and Zald 2003) to a greater degree than NLRB only unions, which allows them to identify how to best use organizers in NLRB elections. A second possible explanation is that organizers build experience and social capital in corporate campaigns which both can be drawn upon during the NLRB election process to ensure success. Prior research (Bronfenbrenner 1997) has demonstrated that NLRB elections with a strong grassroots dimension, an element of many corporate campaigns, are much more likely to be decided in the union’s favor than more top down organizing efforts. While the outcome here is successful union organizing, this finding has implications for social movements more broadly, indicating that experience in contentious activity can “spill-over” into more routinized forms of social change, leading to a movement that has more strategic options and a better-trained staff.
Conclusions

Drawing on the particular advantages of labor union organizing, the objectives of this paper were twofold: address important issues in the resources mobilization perspective, and expand the boundaries of this theory to encompass other important issues in social movement research. One major goal was to assess how dependence on endogenous resources shaped SMO activities. The effect of membership dependence was of particular interest since some scholars (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003; Ganz 200) have extolled the militancy of union membership, others have demonstrated that members are often quite reticent about risky union activities such as organizing, especially when it funnels resources away from existing member services (Voss and Sherman 2000). The findings provide a degree of support for the later argument, as unions heavily dependent on their members are likely to use NLRB organizing, rather than more risky and costly corporate campaigns to recruit new members.

In addition to members, unions are often dependent on their parent organization for financial support. Prior research both within the labor movement research and in social movement analysis more generally has illustrated the potentially vital role that national organizations play in the affairs of their local affiliates. Here the findings indicate that dependence on national unions for financial resources appeared to be negatively related to the use of the corporate campaign. However, this was not true for local unions affiliated with the SEIU, a union know for encouraging its locals to engage in this form of organizing. If we think of national unions as outside elites for a moment,
this finding calls into question prior research that assumes the motivation of particular groups are uniformly similar.

The final topic examined was the role of resources in organizing rate and success. The results indicate that human resources are essential for the rate at which unions engage in corporate campaigns and their ability to succeed with this tactic. In contrast, neither human nor financial resources played any role in either the rate of NLRB organizing or the outcome of the election. While these results may signify that human resources are more important in contentious, versus conventional organizing tactics, the results in Figure 4.1 indicate that organizers play an integral role in NLRB elections, but that their effectiveness may depend on either how strategically they are deployed by their union, their organizing savvy developed in corporate campaigns, or some combination of both.

Along with a systematic evaluation of the resource mobilization perspective, I also sought to broaden the boundaries of this paradigm to explore other issues raised by movement scholars, specifically repertoire choice and outcomes. First, I was particularly interested in the importance of resources (again, human vs. financial) in predicting successful outcomes to organizing. Recent scholarship has demonstrated the importance of movements in achieving broad social change, but less is known about the relationship between resources allocated for social change and success. Here I found that human resources play an important role in achieving a successful conclusion to corporate campaign organizing. The fact that the size of the union’s organizing staff had no effect on NLRB success appears to point to the heightened importance of human resources in contentious forms of collective behavior. However, again the findings presented in
Figure 4.1 make it clear that this is not necessarily the case, it is not merely the dispersal of certain resources that leads to success, but using these resources strategically, and, in the case of human resources, ensuring that they have the knowledge necessary to bring about effective social change.

Secondly, among movement scholars there is a tendency to discuss the “institutionalization” of protest by a single movement, in a particular society, or during a certain period in history. Here I examine one dimension of institutionalization, the choice of contentious vs. conventional tactics that a social movement actors uses. For labor unions, this entails selecting either the corporate campaign or NLRB elections to increase the membership. While human resources devoted to organizing had a strong effect on the rate at which unions employed the corporate campaign, neither human nor financial resources played a role in NLRB elections. However, drawing on the work of Staggenborg (1988), I hypothesized that highly formalized unions would be more willing to make use of this tactic. Using the amount of resources controlled by the union’s officer structure as an indicator of bureaucracy, I found that unions that are more bureaucratic engaged in higher rates of NLRB organizing than other unions, though they were not more successful. The conclusions that can be drawn from these findings are that both the resource structure of the SMO and its degree of bureaucratic formalization shape the types of tactics employed to achieve specific goals.

Although a major objective of this paper was to employ labor union organizing as a case study to systematically expand our understanding of the resource mobilization perspective, the findings presented above have implications for research on labor union processes as well. Beyond the importance of revenue sources and resource
disbursements for organizing, the fact that resource mobilization can be used to explain union organizing demonstrates the potential of drawing upon social movement theory to explain various union processes, not just organizing. For example, one can imagine the importance of framing and collective identity in union events such as strikes, organizing, or even the process of collective bargaining. Given the regulatory structure that has developed around working-class actions, the role of political opportunities cannot be discounted in determining the health of the labor movement. Quite simply, because of the richness of social movement scholarship, it is absolutely essentially for scholars to draw upon these theories when examining labor outcomes of interest.
Table 4.1. Rate and Success of Organizing Among Sample of 70 Unions From 1990-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage of all organizing</th>
<th>Proportion of unions using</th>
<th>Victory rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Election</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaign</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2. Distribution of New Membership Gains Across Repertoires From 1990-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Number of Workers Targeted</th>
<th>Percentage of Workers Targeted</th>
<th>Number of Workers Successfully Organized</th>
<th>Percentage of Workers Successfully Organized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Election</td>
<td>51,528</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>23,670</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaign</td>
<td>30,777</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>17,222</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82,305</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>40,892</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Various Union Characteristics (annual measures unless noted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue Source</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership Fees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In thousands</td>
<td>1162.312</td>
<td>1390.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of revenue</td>
<td>87.761</td>
<td>29.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In thousands</td>
<td>70.424</td>
<td>332.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of revenue</td>
<td>3.381</td>
<td>7.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizing Resource Allocation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Organizing Disbursements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In thousands</td>
<td>7.335</td>
<td>25.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Organizing Staff</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>2.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing Staff Disbursements (in thousands)</td>
<td>34.556</td>
<td>92.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizing Outcomes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Organizing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Elections</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td>1.574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaigns</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Victories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Elections</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>1.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaigns</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Workers Successfully Organized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Elections</td>
<td>19.660</td>
<td>161.747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaigns</td>
<td>27.020</td>
<td>113.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership Size</td>
<td>3831.130</td>
<td>4628.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (in 1990)</td>
<td>16.530</td>
<td>6.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Disbursements (in thousands)</td>
<td>1349.360</td>
<td>1611.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Unionization Rate (in 1995)</td>
<td>15.140</td>
<td>5.030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.4. Overdispersed Poisson HLM multivariate result of revenue source and organizing resource disbursements on annual NLRB and corporate campaign organizing rates (1990-2001)+

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1. NLRB Organizing Rate</th>
<th>Model 2. Corporate Campaign Organizing Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1</strong> (N=812)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue Source</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of revenue from Membership (two-year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of revenue from International Affiliate (two-year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0091</td>
<td>0.0084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizing Disbursements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements for Organizing in thousands (two-year moving average) ++</td>
<td>-0.0041</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Union’s Organizing Staff (two-year moving average) ++</td>
<td>0.0396</td>
<td>0.0823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements for Organizing Staff in thousands (two-year moving average) ++</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2</strong> (N=70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.4387**</td>
<td>0.4856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue Source</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of revenue from Membership</td>
<td>0.0301**</td>
<td>0.0153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of revenue from International Affiliate</td>
<td>0.0041</td>
<td>0.0415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizing Disbursements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements for Organizing in thousands ++</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
<td>0.0153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Union’s Organizing Staff ++</td>
<td>0.4059</td>
<td>0.2919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements for Organizing Staff in thousands ++</td>
<td>-0.0093</td>
<td>0.0085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>V.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 (Time)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 (Union)</td>
<td>1.07243</td>
<td>1.15010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X²</td>
<td>509.52**</td>
<td>121.248**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1 **p<0.05

+Controls include one-year dependent variable lag, membership size, total budget (in thousands), age, national affiliation, industry, state unionization rate, and time.
++Variables are uncentered
Table 4.5. Overdispersed Binomial multivariate HLM results of revenue sources and resources on the probability of annual organizing success (1990-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 3. NLRB Victory Rate (N=299)</th>
<th>Model 4. Corporate Campaign Victory Rate (N=71)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.2551**</td>
<td>0.1144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue Source</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of revenue from Membership (two-year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.0018</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of revenue from International Affiliate (two-year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
<td>0.0146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizing Disbursements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements for Organizing in thousands (two-year moving average) ++</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
<td>0.0056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Union’s Organizing Staff (two-year moving average) ++</td>
<td>0.0305</td>
<td>0.0958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements for Organizing Staff in thousands (two-year moving average) ++</td>
<td>-0.0016</td>
<td>0.0024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 (Time)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 (Union)</td>
<td>.04165</td>
<td>.00173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X²</td>
<td>16.759*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1 **p<0.05

†Controls include one-year dependent variable lag, membership size, total budget (in thousands), age, national affiliation, industry, state unionization rate, and time.

++Variables are uncentered
Table 4.6. Overdispersed Binomial multivariate HLM results of revenue sources and resources on the probability of annual successful worker organization (1990-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 5. NLRB Worker Success Rate (N=299)</th>
<th>Model 6. Corporate Campaign Worker Success Rate (N=71)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.6340</td>
<td>0.5756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of revenue from Membership (two-year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0313</td>
<td>0.0736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of revenue from International Affiliate (two-year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0536</td>
<td>0.1049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing Disbursements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements for Organizing in thousands (two-year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0125</td>
<td>0.0348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Union’s Organizing Staff (two-year moving average)</td>
<td>0.1478</td>
<td>0.5692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements for Organizing Staff in thousands (two-year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.0054</td>
<td>0.0143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 (Time)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 (Union)</td>
<td>.12011</td>
<td>.01443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2$</td>
<td>14.956*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1 **p<0.05

Controls include one-year dependent variable lag, membership size, total budget (in thousands), age, national affiliation, industry, state unionization rate, and time.

++Variables are uncentered
Figure 4.1. Effect of annual size of union organizing staff on the odds of NLRB success

Log odds

Size of organizing staff

NLRB-Only Union

Mixed-Repertoire Unions
Leadership has long intrigued scholars of formal organizations, and nowhere has this topic received more attention than research on SMOs, specifically labor unions. When Robert Michels wrote his famous “iron law of oligarchy” dictum in 1915 (Michels 1915 [1959]), leadership became one of the first internal dynamics of social movement organizations (SMOs) to be taken seriously by those interested in organized forms of collective action. Since then, scholars working in the Michelsian tradition have used the American labor movement as the primary evidence to further his original thesis of the inevitable negative consequences of formalized leadership within bureaucratic social change organizations. Essentially, these critics argue that despite the initially progressive, or even radical objectives of an organization, a stable leadership cadre will emerge, subjugating the original goals of the movement to further their own self-centered ambitions (Buhle 1999; Leier 1995; Magrath 1959; Mills 1948; Piven and Cloward 1977). For much of the post-war period, the “iron law” was so dominant in leadership studies that even those that examined organizations able to maintain a thriving democratic structure, such as Lipset, Trow, and Coleman’s (1956) study of the International Typographical Union, would conclude that the institutionalized democratic ethos of this organization was the exception to the oligarchic norm rather than a viable alternative.

Despite this long tradition, a growing body of scholarship has begun to systematically expose the weaknesses of the arguments proposed by Michels. As events contradictory to the inevitability of oligarchy unfolded within the labor movement,
including the contested election of reform candidate John Sweeny to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1995, these scholars attacked the numerous assumptions of the iron law thesis, including the inevitably of oligarchic, the intractability of bureaucratic leadership, and the solely negative consequences of leaders (Ganz 1999; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003; Voss and Sherman 2000). In their analysis of Communist leadership control over the Congress of Industrial Unions (CIO) of the interwar period, Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003: 56) argue, “…oligarchy in organized labor is no more immanent than democracy…both are the product of determinate…political struggles among rival workers’ factions and parties…” The culmination of this research was to re-emphasize a point made nearly forty years ago: oligarchy represents but one possible outcome of leadership in SMOs, one that may be rarer than most believe (Zald and Ash 1966).

While this research has clearly demonstrated the shortcomings of the iron law, its greater contribution may be its recognition that leadership is a dynamic element of social movement activity and should be taken as seriously as any other process. For years movement scholars have debated a number of important issues, such as resource mobilization, political opportunity, and framing, yet despite the vast research generated by analysis of the labor movement, the issue of leadership in movements has been virtually ignored (see Edwards and McCarthy 2004; Gusfield 1966; Robnett 1996; Staggenborg 1998 for exceptions). I suggest that this lack of research on leadership is due in no small part to Michels and his intellectual heirs, whose perspective provides scholars virtually no leeway for thinking about leadership as an important organizational dynamic that can have a myriad of consequences, both positive and negative. While the current crop of leadership research remains within the substantive boundaries of labor
unions, its recognition of leadership as dynamic, rather than deterministic, creates opportunities for scholars interested in other SMO populations.

Yet, in spite of the advances made by recent scholarship, a number of issues in the field of leadership remain overlooked, two of which I seek to address in the current analysis. First, the conceptualization of leadership remains less than systematic. Scholars rarely define what leadership encompasses and tend to focus on the characteristics and motivations of individuals who occupy positions of power within an organization. Using Weber’s writings on power within organizations as a reference point, I argue that we must expand our understanding beyond individual power holders and examine the structure of authority within the SMO. This expanded conceptualization of leadership, which entails identifying both the important nodes of authority within the organization as well as the actors who exercise authority, will not only provide a systematic analysis of the decision-making process as a whole (why leadership is so important), but allow scholars to move beyond the characteristics of individuals in order to more thoroughly understand the structural opportunities and constraints for leadership action.

The second shortcoming of is that the dynamics by which leadership shapes the course of an SMO have been poorly specified. Previous research, for instance, has mainly examined the correlation between leadership measures and some generalized indicator of movement vitality (i.e., is the movement sufficiently radical). Attributing all organizational successes and failures solely to leadership assumes that leaders have total agency within the organization, an assumption that ignores the constraints, both internal and external, placed on leaders (Powell and DiMaggio1991). This is not to say,
however, that leaders exert no influence within the organizational boundaries, but rather that the extent of their control may be limited to specific organizational dynamics, which consequently could have significant ramifications for the overall functioning of the SMO. Here I examine how leadership affects two SMO processes: 1) the allocation of resources for social change activities, and 2) the selection of a particular tactic to achieve social change, given the entire spectrum of action forms available, which range from contentious to institutional. By influencing these processes, leaders can shape the course of the organization and potentially the movement as a whole.

The agenda of this research paper, to first provide a serious conceptualization of leadership and then test its influences within SMO structures, requires the matching of longitudinal data on the authority structure of a sample of SMOs to their allocation of resources to a particular social change activity, which should includes sufficient variation in the possible repertoires used to carry out the task. To accomplish this, I examine the organizing efforts of a sample of local labor unions in the U.S. during the 1990s. An initial reaction by many scholars within the mainstream social movements research tradition may be that, like past research on union leadership, organizing is constrained by the peculiarities of American industrial relations, and any important findings cannot be generalized to movement processes more generally. However, below I illustrate that not only is organizing in the 1990s an “emerging” social movement activity, but that the labor movement in general has numerous characteristics that make it an ideal case study of SMO leadership.

Following a description of union organizing in the 1990s, I provide a contrast of prior research, which focuses of on individual leaders to Weber’s concept of authority-

53 For excellent exceptions, see Edwards and McCarthy (2004) and Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (1991)
types within formal organizations. Although most research has individual leaders as the center of analysis, there are scholars that build upon Weber’s insights and explore the relationship between leadership structure and collective action, indicating that the structure of authority within SMOs does indeed have important consequences. Because the goal of the paper is to examine the entire authority structure of the union, in addition to the obvious analysis of the union’s political administration, I include a discussion of the role of the national affiliate, rank-and-file, and professional staff in the internal functioning of the local union, all of whom also may exercise authority. I then describe the ways in which leaders can affect social movement activity, including the disbursement of resources for social change and tactical choice. To address these various issues, I have assembled a unique dataset of union organizing efforts during the 1990s that first provides a more systematic understanding of SMO leadership but also explores the importance of authority structure within the labor movement. Using Hierarchical Linear Modeling, I find that, in general, that administrative and staff authority generally reduces organizing activity, that national union authority increases it (though in limited ways), and that membership indicators of authority have small, thought generally positive effects on outcomes.

**Union Organizing Efforts in the 1990s: A Resurgent Social Movement**

During the 1990s, the American labor movement underwent an intense period of restructuring. Lead by reformers such as John Sweeney, who was elected to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 1995, organized labor began to make a serious effort to reverse the nearly 50-year decline in membership, which, in 1990 stood at a post-Great Depression low. The changes that Sweeney and other reformers undertook were
numerous and far reaching: unions began expanding their organizing budget, new organizations such as the AFL-CIO’s Organizing Institute and Union Summer were created to train organizers and assist member unions in organizing drives, and sophisticated legal maneuverings were coupled with old-fashioned social movement activism in corporate campaigns designed to pressure corporations and bolster outside support, including alliances with other social movements. All of these changes were instituted to make the labor movement, in the words of John Sweeney (1997), the “Civil Rights movement of the 1990s.”

Much of the reorganization that the labor movement underwent was in direct response to a fundamental transformation of postwar American industrial relations. Immediately following World War II, the economic boom in the United States gave way to an uneasy accord between labor and management (Davis 1986; Nissen 1990); a détente which granted labor significant freedom to expand its membership and press for economic benefits while limiting unions’ ability to challenge capital’s authority in the workplace, or the “political regime of production” (Burawoy 1985). Despite gains made during this period, recent changes, such as the expansion of global trade and a shift towards a service-dominated industry, have led to a breaking of this “labor-manage accord” as firms have sought to undermine the legitimacy of unions in the workplace (Edsall 1984; Goldfield 1987; Rosenblum 1995). This shift back to overtly hostile labor-management relations has transformed union organizing from a relatively bureaucratic organizational function to a contentious social movement activity (Clawson 2003; Fantasia 1988; Johnston 1994) and has spurred labor unionists and scholars alike to remark on the increasingly social movement-like nature of union organizing in the 1990s.

The Advantages of Labor Movement Research

While the contentious nature of current industrial relations alone makes an analysis of the role of leadership in union organizing an interesting research project, there are a number of specific advantages of employing labor union organizing as a case study in which to examine the role of leadership in SMOs. First, since the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, the federal government has been collecting detailed organizational measures on the primary actor in organizing, the local union. This data collection project provides a wealth of information on the organizational structure of these unions, including leadership dynamics. Second, in the 1990s many unions have been making a concentrated effort to expand their organizing budget in hopes of winning new members. Some unions, such as the highly effective SEIU, have even gone so far as to mandate that all local affiliates devote at least 30% of their operating budget for organizing or face trusteeship (Slaughter 1999). Consequently, the 1990s is a particularly appropriate period to examine the role of leadership in the disbursal of resources explicitly for social change activity. Finally, during this same period some labor unions have begun to turn away from the traditional method of organizing, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certification election, adopting instead the corporate campaign, an innovative method of organizing designed explicitly to avoid the drawbacks of the NLRB. The potentially large difference between these two repertoires, described in detail below, allows me to examine the link between leadership structure and tactical
Individual Leadership vs. Authority Structure

As argued above, much of what we know about leadership in SMOs is based upon the analysis of individuals who occupy positions of power within labor unions. Early work in the Michelsian tradition attempted to uncover the social-psychological undercurrents that led leaders to become more interested in organizational viability than social change (Craft 1991; Herberg 1943; Magrath 1959; Mills 1948). Current research, despite its break with the iron law, has continued the tradition by analyzing the important positive effects of certain leadership processes in union outcomes. For example, in their groundbreaking work on the subject, Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003) demonstrate the effectiveness of Communist leadership within CIO unions in achieving a wide-range of important outcomes, from improved working conditions to gender and racial equality. Ganz (2000) analyzes the United Farm Worker’s leadership in the 1960s and 70s and describes their ability to develop the “strategic capacity” to overcome their lack of conventional resources and mobilize workers that other unions had failed to organize.

This growing body of research has provided an important basis for understanding leadership processes within organizations, particularly the potentially positive role of individual leaders in various SMO outcomes. However, both the new crop of research and older analyses of leadership that are a part of the iron law tradition share one important shortcoming: leadership as a concept remains poorly specified. It is the contention of the current research that before we can seriously explore the consequences of leadership within SMOs we must begin with an adequate conceptualization of the notion of leadership. To accomplish this, I begin with one of the only systematic efforts
to define SMO leadership that I am aware of. Gusfield (1966: 137) defines leadership as, “the head of a hierarchy of authority and decision-making within the movement.” Two key elements of this definition are particularly useful for empirically analyzing leadership in SMOs. First, Gusfield identifies why leadership is important: it is the central element of the internal decision-making mechanism of an organization. Second, Gusfield makes it explicit that what we think of as leadership is actually the manifestation of authority within an organization. It is this second point that provides a basis for the current conceptualization of leadership (I will come back to the first point in the next section when discussing the consequences of leadership in SMOs).

If leadership is important because it is the representation of authority within organizations, including SMOs, we must begin with the work of Max Weber (1958). Though Weber examined a number of organizational processes in his writings on the rise of the bureaucratic organizational form, he was particularly interested in how power was legitimated within these formalized organizations. Specifically, he argued that as organizations become more formalized and bureaucratic, they move away from “irrational” forms of authority, for which he creates two categories, traditional and charismatic, and shift towards rational-legal authority, which is legitimated through transparent formalized mechanisms, such as claims of expertise or democratic selection by a bounded membership. In institutions with such authority structures, power is invested not in the individual, but in a particular position within the organization which the individual occupies. It is my contention that Weber’s main argument, organizations are increasingly adopting a bureaucratic form, with a rational-legal authority structure, has been largely ignored by prior research on SMO leadership. In particular, the
emphasis on individual leaders rather than authority structure has led researchers to examine the charismatic elements of authority (authority linked to a particular individual in power), and, consequently, has largely overlooked the importance of authority structure as a whole.\textsuperscript{54} Given the increasing importance of bureaucratic organizational structure in SMOs (Edwards 1994; McCarthy and Zald 1977), it seems reasonable that scholars interested in the decision-making process of SMOs should draw upon Weber’s emphasis on rational-legal authority.\textsuperscript{55}

Before discussing an appropriate method of reconceptualizing leadership, I should note that the widening framework proposed here is not to claim that the characteristics and motivations of individual leaders are unimportant. One need only look at Jimmy Hoffa (the charismatic, troubled leader of the Teamsters), Harry Bridges (the long-time president of the radical West Coast Longshoremen’s Union), or the Communist leaders of the CIO, individual leaders who were able to have enormous influence over their respective organizations. However, by focusing primarily upon these leaders it ignores the fact that these individuals occupy positions of rational-legal authority within formally structure bureaucratic organizations and are subject to a set of institutional opportunities and constraints. Therefore, any analysis of individual leaders should be couched in a broader understanding of the authority structure of which they are a part.

A major consequence of my proposed understanding of leadership is to introduce a number of actors into the authority structure, from staff to the organization’s

\textsuperscript{54} This, of course, is not to say that organizational dynamics are ignored. Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003) examine a myriad of organization processes related to leadership. However, their outcome of interest is to predict how Communists, individual leaders with particular motivations, achieve power within the organization.

\textsuperscript{55} Throughout the rest of the paper, unless otherwise specified, leadership and authority are used interchangeably.
constituency, which renders any effort to understand the motivations of all individuals within the authority structure very difficult. While an expanded analysis of individuals may be possible for a small group of unions at a particular point in time, below I analyze 70 distinct local unions over a 12-year period, which severely limits the collection of data on individuals within the organization. Therefore, instead of attempting to uncover motivations of individual actors, I examine only the characteristics of this authority structure, including the locations of power within the union and the sources of authority’s legitimation. Throughout this discussion I make no assumptions about the motivations of individuals occupying positions within the authority structure, though I do not deny its importance. It is my hope that the current research will provide a framework for more comprehensive projects that can match individual characteristics to structural data. Before turning to a description of such a framework, it is useful to offer the reader an overview of the relatively sparse research that has attempted to take authority within SMOs seriously.

**Consequences of Authority Structure within SMOs** Just as individual leaders can shape various SMO processes, so too can the structure of authority within SMOs. While most research generally ignores the bureaucratic dimension of leadership that is separated from the individual(s) in power, some scholars have attempted to link general indicators of authority structure to movement dynamics. Gamson’s (1975) seminal research on SMO structure and outcomes indicates that “combat ready” organizations, those with a highly developed bureaucratic structure and centralization of power, have generally higher levels of success than less formalized organizations. In her analysis of the pro-choice movement, Staggenborg (1988) finds that formalization and profesionalization in
the pro-life movement was related to the institutionalizing of movement goals and tactics, supporting the widely held belief that bureaucratic SMOs are less likely than their informal counterparts to engage in confrontational forms of collective action. Although these studies provide rather broad measures of authority, because I am examining a specific population of organizations, labor unions, I am able to develop more nuanced indicators of the authority structure of unions. Given the democratic structure of local labor unions, much of my focus on authority is on the elected administrators of the union and the power granted to these officers. However, to fully understand the distribution of power within an organization, we must examine the role of other actors who may potentially wield authority. In labor unions, these include the national affiliate (much like a parent organization in a federated SMO structure), the membership, and the bureaucratic (nonelected) union staff.

The Role of the National Affiliate in Local Union Affairs In the United States, virtually all labor unions have adopted a federated structure, where local unions are affiliated (loosely or tightly, depending on the union in question) with a national parent organization. Not surprisingly, these national organizations can potentially wield significant influence in the affairs of the local union. For labor unions, this influence can be manifested through two processes: 1) assuming political control of the local affiliate (referred to as trusteeship), and 2) disbursing resources to the local unions. Recent studies of local-national relations have found that many parent organizations are becoming increasingly involved in the organization affairs of their local affiliates,

---

56 With the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 the federal government imposed a number of requirements on labor unions to maintain a democratic political structure. For example, the leaders of the union are chosen at least every three years (for local unions, four for national bodies) by the membership or representatives of the membership.
especially to encourage their locals to become more active in organizing (Fine 1998). In their analysis of the Justice for Janitors campaign in Los Angeles, Waldinger and his colleagues (1998) find that the local SEIU affiliate in Los Angeles participated in the campaign in response to pressure from the national SEIU. In a more systematic analysis of the relationship between local labor unions and their parent organizations, Voss and Sherman (2000) find that progressive national unions, such as SEIU, have been willing to place locals in trusteeship and withhold resources unless they devote a significant portion of their resources to organizing, a requirement that an increasing number of national organizations, including the AFL-CIO, are placing on their affiliated unions (Slaughter 1999). The findings presented below have implications beyond labor movement research in part because a larger proportion of SMOs also exhibit a hierarchical structure similar to labor unions (McCarthy 2003).

**Membership Influence and Union Organizing**  One of the defining elements of labor movement research has been the central role accorded to the rank-and-file in advancing the cause of the movement. Whether the movement seeks to challenge the hegemony of capital during early to mid-20th Century or organize workers at the end of the 20th Century, scholars have argued that the vitality of the labor movement often hinges on the participation of the rank-and-file in union affairs (Cornfield 1989; Early 1998; Fletcher 1998; Fletcher and Hurd 1998; Kimeldorf 1988; 1999; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003; Voss and Sherman 2000). However, despite the perception among many that increased rank-and-file participation will enhance the viability of the movement, some of these same scholars find evidence that members are often unwilling to take the burden of additional responsibility to ensure that the movement achieves some larger

---

57 See McCarthy (2003) for other mechanisms of national SMO influence.
goal. Says one union organizer about efforts to move union staff from servicing existing members to organizing new members (quoted in Voss and Sherman 2000: 321), “There’s also a lot of pressure from the membership to do things the old way. They don’t want to get involved, in large part, they don’t want to have to responsibility…” Another union official put it more bluntly, “Members don’t recognize the need to organize.” (quoted in Fletcher and Hurd 1998: 49-50). This contradictory evidence indicates that the support of the membership for progressive union goals cannot be taken as a give. Therefore, the purpose of the current research is to explore how authority exercised by the rank-and-file influences various organizing outcomes.

The Importance of Staff (Nonpolitical) Authority in Labor Unions Most studies of leadership and authority within SMOs focus on political administration, yet there is growing evidence indicating that professionalized staff is becoming an increasingly common element of not only the labor movement (Clark 1992), but most SMOs (McCarthy and Zald 1973; Staggenborg 1988). Although the importance of professionals that are not elected by members has been ignored in most leadership research, two important studies have demonstrated the considerable power staff wield in formalized organizations. In her research on challenges to U.S. education curricula, Amy Binder (2004) finds that groups with a creationist agenda were able to win political power in the educational system by being elected to school board seats, yet were unable to implement their objectives. The reason, she claims, is the countervailing efforts of another form of authority, what she calls “institutional authority”, which, in her case, included embedded educational officials, superintendents, principals, and teachers, who were able to successfully block the agenda of the school board through a variety of tactics, such as
legal challenges and general foot-dragging. A similar phenomenon is described by
Seymour Martin Lipset, who, in his analysis of the socialist government of the
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in Saskatchewan, finds that efforts among
CCF leaders to use the state apparatus to bring about significant social and political
reform was hampered by the presence of a preexisting bureaucratic staff structure that
had a significant stake in maintaining the status quo established by previous
governments. Because many of the labor unions included in my sample have large
bureaucratic staff structures, I am able to assess how “institutional authority” affects on
particular social movement activity, union organizing efforts.

The Influence of Authority on SMO Dynamics

Many theoretical frameworks employed to understand the general functioning of
organizations view their activities as constrained by the environment within which they
operate (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). In contrast, research
on labor unions has tended to argue that leadership is a powerful determinant of various
union outcomes, both positive and negative (Piven and Cloward 1977; Stepan-Norris and
Zeitlin 2003). In the current analysis I adopt a position that falls somewhere in between
these two arguments: while organizations certainly are constrained by their environment,
the structure of authority within organizations can have important consequences on
internal organizational dynamics, which subsequently can have broader implications for
general organizational functioning. For SMOs, leaders influence both the amount of
resources allocated for social change activities and the repertoire(s) employed by the
organization to achieve these goals. In this analysis, I will examine the effect of
leadership within one “social movement industry” within a particular historical context, thus allowing me to hold environmental factors relatively constant.58

Leadership and Resource Allocation  The importance of authority in the allocation of resources for collective action is made particularly salient by the resource mobilization perspective, which represented an important shift in thinking about social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977). In particular, resource mobilization theorists argue that collective behavior is made possible not by shifting grievances, as previous scholars had argued (Gurr 1970), but rather the availability of increased levels of resources necessary to support the activities of SMOs. Since these claims were made, scholars have recognized the crucial role that resources play in various organizational processes across diverse social movements (Cress and Snow 1996; Khawaja 1994), including the importance of leadership characteristics in the mobilization of resources necessary for collective action (McCarthy and Wolfson 1996). Despite these advances, in their review of this paradigm, McCarthy and Edwards (2003: 1) note, “…the simple availability of resources is not sufficient: coordination and strategic effort is typically required in order to convert available pools of individually held resources into collective resources in order that they can help enable collective action.” Simply put, it is not the mobilization of resources that ultimately makes activities necessary for social change possible but the coordinated disbursements of resources for contentious activity. Because the allocation of resources is determined by the decision-making structure of the SMO, it seems reasonable that measures of authority should be related to this outcome.

Beyond just determining how authority structure affects resources disbursed for organizing, given the recent literature on the types of resources necessary for collective

58 I will also control for important contextual variables, such as the industry the union is embedded in.
action (Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 2003; McCarthy and Zald 2003; Oliver and Marwell 1992), we should expect that the formats of resources disbursed for collective action may depend on the structure of authority within unions. In the labor movement, new organizing efforts, like many social movement activities, require that the union disburse certain types of resources for this goal. Specifically, two important resources, financial and human, have found to play a crucial role in determining the successful mobilization of new members (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Jarley and Maranto 1990; Reed 1989; Voos 1982). Because the resources of the union are at any given point finite, and because the leadership ultimately decides the level of resources that will be allocated for any particular organizational purpose, the questions I ask include 1) to borrow from Tilly (1978), are some union leaders organizing “misers” attaching little value to membership recruitment, and hence devoting few resources to this task and others “zealots”, expending a high proportion of resources to this task, and 2) does the type of resource allocated for organizing (financial or human) vary depending on the authority structure of unions?

Leadership and Repertoire Choice Just as leaders determine the level of resources allocated to a particular organizational function, so do they play an important role in determining the repertoire used to achieve a particular goal. Here repertoire choice refers to the active selection of a specific repertoire by an SMO from the entire population of existing repertoires developed to achieve some social change goal (McAdam 1983). Although the type of repertoire employed can have important consequences for the success of the movement, virtually no research has examined the internal dynamics that lead to the choice of a particular repertoire (see Minkoff 1999 for a discussion of shifting
organizational strategies among two populations of SMOs). Rather, scholars often speak of an “institutionalizing” process whereby either movements apparently shift from contentious to conventional tactics, or contentious tactics become routinized.\(^{59}\) One way to understand this process empirically is to link authority structure to repertoire choice. As mentioned above, Staggenborg (1988) found that a shift towards more formal organizational forms has a moderating affect on movement protest strategies. Additionally, research has also matched organizational sponsorship data to populations of protest events, both in the United States (Van Dyke, Soule, McCarthy 2003) and in Europe (Titarenko et al. 2001). This research, however, does not provide a direct examination of the effect of leadership on tactical deployment.

In order to assess how leadership influences repertoire choice, it is necessary to begin first with a sample of SMOs and examine their choice of social movement tactics, which ideally would range from the contentious to the conventional. Fortunately, union organizing efforts in the 1990s represents just such an opportunity, as unions currently have two repertoires to choose from when pursing workers representation, National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certification elections and corporate campaigns. Since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1934, unions have had a highly institutionalized and regulated method of organizing, the NLRB certification election. Under the NLRB a union wins the right to represent a group of employees when it first files a petition that includes the signatures of at least 30% of the workers indicating that they would like an opportunity to vote for union representation and then garners more than half of the votes of a subsequent secret ballot elections where all eligible employees are able to vote for or against the union.

\(^{59}\) See Meyer and Tarrow (1998) for a theoretical discussion of institutionalization.
Recently, the NLRB election process, which has been the preferred method of organizing since the Great Depression, has come under attack from a number of quarters for the drawbacks inherent in this repertoire (Manheim 2001). Specifically, the NLRB election allows ample opportunities for firms to resist unionization efforts with little benefits for unions to build a strong movement in the workplace (Crump 1991; Lerner 1991). To combat this, some militant unions are turning away from the NLRB election to an innovative and much more overtly confrontation form of organizing, which I call “corporate campaign”. The basic definition of a corporate campaign that I adopt here is any union activity that explicitly seeks to organize the workers of a targeted firm without relying on the NLRB election process. While there are no institutionalized “rules” governing the corporate campaign, most involve the union’s mobilization of outside support, ranging from other unions, government agencies, to other firms, all in an effort to pressure the corporation into meeting the demands of the union (Manheim 2001). In addition, the tactics deployed by unions are diverse, ranging from sophisticated legal maneuvering to traditional social movement tactics, such as civil disobedience (Waldinger et al. 1998). The fact that unions today have two alternative tactical “bundles” when seeking to expand their membership allows me to determine if organizational characteristics play a role in repertoire choice.

Table 5.1 illustrates the rate of repertoire use during the 1990s among my sample of 70 unions. Clearly, most unions continue to prefer the traditional method of organizing, yet it is obvious why some unions have turned to the corporate campaign, the victory rate for this repertoire is substantially higher. This point is driven home by the results presented

---

60 According to Manheim (2001), corporate campaigns can be used by unions under a number of situations, including organizing, strikes, and bargaining. For the purposes of the current study, I examine only those
in Table 5.2-unions targeted slightly more workers in NLRB elections, but organized substantially more workers in the corporate campaigns. This is a result of two characteristics of corporate campaigns: 1) the higher success rate of corporate campaigns, and 2) the firm targeted in a corporate campaign was much larger: the average corporate campaign involved 380 workers, while the average NLRB election included just 83. This variation in repertoire choice allows me to get at the heart of the leadership -repertoire choice link. In particular, it seems quite likely that unions engaging in NLRB elections may have a substantially different authority structure than those that engage in corporate campaigns.

Table 5.1 and 5.2 about here

Data Collection and Methodology

Data Collection To analyze the effect of authority structure on a specific social movement activity by a sample of SMOs requires time-series data both on structure characteristics of the SMOs and the particular activity in question. Unfortunately, for union organizing, there is no one single source that provides all of this information. Therefore, I employed a wide-ranging data collection strategy that drew upon numerous data sources to examine a sample of local labor unions and their organizing efforts annually from 1990-2001.

Union Authority Structure Since the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, all labor unions currently active in the United States are required to file an annual disclosure report with the Office of Labor and Management Standards (OLMS), an agency of the Department of Labor. These reports provide a wealth of information on a corporate campaigns explicitly conducted to recruit new members to the union.
variety of union characteristics, including membership size, dues, the union’s leadership structure, disbursements to employees of the union, and charitable contributions, to name only a few. Despite the information provided by these forms, only one study (Fiorito, Jarley, and Delaney 1995) has made any effort to match these data to union organizing efforts, though other researchers have successfully employed these records to examine the internal structure of unions (Allison 1975; Clark 1992; Masters 1997; Sheflin and Troy 1983).

While these forms represent an invaluable source of data on the structure of unions, they pose two particular methodological challenges. First, although the form explicitly measures many important union characteristics, the broader purpose of the OLMS is to collect general data on labor unions, not union organizing measures employed in this project. Therefore, although leadership and staff structures were clearly detailed, various laundry lists throughout the form were used to construct the allocation human and financial resources devoted to organizing. Second, because the forms were not available electronically, a group of research assistants was hired to enter the measures into a database management system. The result of the project was detailed annual organizational data on a sample of 70 local unions from 1989-2001.

**Sampling Strategy** By matching union measures to their organizing efforts during

---

61 Although the level of detail included in these schedules was solely left to the discretion of the labor organization, almost every union in my sample provided very detailed information on important disbursements, including organizing budget, the functional title of officers and staff, and the sources of receipts, providing me with highly valid measurements of union resources.

62 To ensure the highest level of intercoder reliability, which for the project exceeded .9, I instituted a number of common quality checks. First, the coders underwent a series of training sessions to familiarize themselves with the forms, important union characteristics, and database software. After they successfully completed a supervised coding of one union, they were allowed to code independently. Another research assistant recoded each set of forms, and the coding of everyone on the project was subject to periodical review by the primary investigator to ensure accurate and reliable coding.
the 1990s, the current research seeks to explore the relationship between SMO characteristics, specifically authority structure, and repertoire use. However, because NLRB elections and especially corporate campaigns are relatively rare events, a very large sample of unions would be required to ensure enough events for standard data analysis techniques. Because of limited resources, I followed the logic proposed by King and Zeng (2001) by selecting a small number of unions most “at-risk” to engaging in organizing during the 1990s.64 Simultaneously, I sought to ensure a representative sample of the labor movement as a whole, one that did not draw disproportionately from one particular industry or national affiliate, which may decrease generalizability. To ensure both objectives, I employed a two-stage sample design, with a sample frame of local unions provided by the OLMS.

In stage one I selected seven national unions that represented both a wide range of industries and had been noted for their progressive leanings on the issue of organizing. They included: the Communication Workers of America (CWA), the Service Employees International (SEIU), the Hotel and Restaurant Employees (HERE), the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), the United Auto Workers (UAW), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), and the United Steelworkers of America (USW). Limiting my sample to a group of locals affiliated with these particular national unions accomplishes three important goals: 1) it ensures that my local unions are more at risk for organizing because of their affiliation with a progressive national union, 2) each national

63 I collected data on the organizational characteristics of local labor unions in 1989 so that lag variables could be constructed for my first year of analysis, 1990.
64 Note that unions were not selected on their actual rate of organizing, only on characteristics that put them most at risk for this event. The strategy of drawing a sample of observations that are considered most at risk for an event is common in sociology. For example, life course analyses of retirement patterns often survey those most at risk for this event, older males.
union represents workers in a distinct industry, and 3) I am able to compare the variation in organizing across distinct national structures, which play an important role in the organizing activities of their local affiliates (Voss and Sherman 2000).

In the second stage I selected a sample of ten local unions from each national union. To limit the sample to those unions most at risk for an event I randomly selected only those locals that filed an LM-2 report with the OLMS. Only large and relatively resource rich unions, those with annual receipts over $200,000, file this report, while unions with less receipts file the LM-3 or 4 report. Filing status was chosen for a risk predictor because although only 20% of all unions file the LM-2, they account for approximately 70% of all NLRB elections. In addition, only the LM-2 report provides detailed information on the organizational structure of labor unions, an essential element of the current project.

While this strategy identified a sample of industrially diverse unions that are likely to engage in significant levels of organizing, an unavoidable consequence is that the results presented below that are not representative of the organizing activities of all local unions in America during the 1990s, only those that meet the particular criteria of this study. Because of this, I will discuss the implications of my sampling strategy when interpreting my results below.

*Union Organizing Efforts* Data on NLRB organizing for each union were available directly from the National Labor Relations Board, which records extensive information on organizing efforts that fall under its jurisdiction. Following the example

---

65 Unfortunately, unlike the NLRB, there is no population of corporate campaign data, so I cannot make a similar estimate for this organizing repertoire.
of prior research on protest activity (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kriesi et al. 1995, McAdam 1982; Olzak 1992; Soule 1997), newspaper archives, specifically LEXIS-NEXIS, and NEWSLIBRARY, were searched for any traces of organizing by each union in the sample that sought explicitly to avoid the NLRB process. Despite issues of bias when using the media sources to study various forms of collective behavior (Franzosi 1987; McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000; Smith et al. 2001; Snyder and Kelly 1977), there are three reasons to expect near comprehensive coverage of corporate campaigns by the print media: 1) A major target of many corporate campaigns is the media itself, 2) the local newspapers for each labor union were searched, which provides more detail than national newspapers, and 3) some known rather small corporate campaigns, those that targeted fewer than 20 employees, were covered, indicating that size is not the only factor in determining coverage.

**Measurement** Table 5.3 includes the descriptive statistics for each measures included in the analysis. Unless otherwise specified, the measures included here are annual statistics, but because I am employing time-series data, I will include lags and moving averages in my models.

**Table 5.3 about here**

*Administrative Authority* To identify the degree of authority concentrated among the elected administrative officers\(^{66}\) of the union I include three measures: 1)

*Administrative Officer Size* measures the number of officers, 2) *Administrative Officer*

---

\(^{66}\) These officers include the president or chief executive officer, assistant to the president, all vice-presidents, secretaries, treasurers and other financial officers, and, if present, members of the union’s executive council. Other union officials whose titles do not explicitly designate them a part of the administrative structure (such as agents), are not included, and they comprise, on average, only about 15% of the total number of union officers.
Budget includes all financial resources (salaries, allowances, disbursements for official business) controlled by the administrative officers (given the skewed nature of the data the natural log will be used in the analysis below), and 3) Proportion of Union Resources Controlled by the Administrative Officers, the portion of total union expenses controlled by the administration. This third variable captures how far-reaching the authority of the administration extends within the union. In the analysis below it is recoded into a threshold variable, where unions whose administrative officers control more then .25 of the unions resources are coded 1, those that control less than .25 are coded 0. This threshold was created to capture the differences between unions whose officers control a “substantial” portion of the unions overall budget.

Staff Authority Like my authority indicators for the administrative officers, I constructed three variables for staff authority: 1) Staff Size, 2) Staff Budget, which includes all disbursements and salaries to the staff (again, the natural log is used), and 3) Proportion of Union Resources Controlled by Staff, the total proportion of the union’s budget controlled by the staff. Again, a threshold variable is used, coded 1 if the staff control more than .10 of the union’s total budget.

International Authority Here two indicators are included to measure the degree of power the national union has in the affairs of the local. The first, Percentage of Operating Budget from National Union, is the percentage of the union’s operating budget derived from the parent body. This measure provides us an indicator of the financial

67 Like political officer indicators, these measures are limited to the administrative staff of the union, such as secretaries and administrative assistants, which, on average, comprise more than half of all union staff members.
68 This threshold is lower than the .25 used for the administrative officers since staff generally control fewer resources in the organization.
power of the national union. The second is **Trusteeship**, coded one if the national union placed the local union in trusteeship during a particular year, indicating the control over the local’s political structure by the national union.

**Membership Authority** Like the influence of the national union, financial control grants membership control over the affairs of the union, which is measured here by **Percentage of Operating Budget from Membership**, the percentage of the union’s budget contributed by the rank-and-file. Another measure of membership control that is directly tied to the administrative officers is the distance between the two groups. In particular, in many labor unions, the elected officials are not chosen by the membership but rather by an executive committee composed of a group of union officials, and **Executive Committee** is coded 1 for unions with such an arrangement. Because this variable remains fairly stable over time, it is only included at Level 2.

Before turning from my discussion of membership authority within unions, it is necessary to review the importance of democracy as an integral element of membership control within unions. Echoing the sentiments of early trade unionists, Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003: 159) write, “‘rank-and-file democracy’ and effectiveness in class struggle have always been inseparable.” Therefore, we would expect that the level of rank-and-file participation in the affairs of the local union would have important consequences for organizing outcomes (again, as indicated above, the outcomes may be positive or negative). Unfortunately, I cannot claim that the two indicators of membership control capture the “lived democracy” of the rank-and-file (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1996). This is because collecting valid measure of rank-and-file participation in local affairs is extremely difficult, witnessed by the rarity of this research and its use of the case study

Given the number of unions examined over a 12 year period, I cannot include such
detailed information on democracy. Therefore, below my analysis is essentially limited
to the influence of membership in these unions, not necessary the democratic nature of
these organizations.

Disbursements for Organizing  Here I include two types of resources disbursed
explicitly for union organizing efforts: General Organizing Budget includes all financial
resources that are allocated for organizing, while Organizing Staff Size, the union officers
and employees that have the title of organizer. While these two measures are outcomes
of interest initially, they will also be used as controls when examining the rate and
outcome of organizing.69

Union Organizing Indicators  My primary interest in organizing is the Rate of
organizing, measured by the number of new organizing efforts initiated by each union
annually. For NLRB elections this is measured as the year that the union files a petition
with the NLRB. New corporate campaigns are identified as beginning when the union
makes any activity that explicitly seeks to organize the workers of a particular firm by
avoiding the NLRB election process. Although I am primarily interested in the
relationship between authority and the rate of organizing, because I have valid indicators
of success, below I also examine the effect of authority structure on Organizing Victories,
the number of all organizing efforts the union was currently engaged in that were
successfully completed in a particular year-victory is determined for NLRB elections if

69 As evident in Table 5.3, both of these variables are positively skewed. I reran Models 1 and 2 below
(organizing disbursements as outcomes) using a natural log transfer to correct the skewness. The results
did not vary substantially.
the union won the elections, while unions were victorious in corporate campaigns if the
firm agreed to recognize the union as the authorized bargaining agent of its employees.

*Control Variables* I include two sets of control variables, a category of measures
that captures important characteristics of the union, and another set that measures the
context within which the union operates. Control variables that measure union
characteristics include: *Age, Membership Size, Total Disbursements*, and *Affiliation*,
coded 1 if the union is affiliated with a particular national body, 0 if not. Contextual
variables include *Industry*, the industrial sector within which the union is most activity
engaged in\(^70\) and *State Unionization Rate*, the percentage of workers represented by
unions in the home state of the union.

*Data Analysis*

Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) techniques are used to model various union
organizing outcomes during the 1990s. HLM is generalization of multiple regression for
nested or repeated-measures data (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). While HLM is
commonly used to examine individuals nested in larger contexts (schools, organizations,
or communities), it is also well-suited for examining multiple observations for each unit
of analysis (see Bryk and Raudenbush 1987; 1992 for a methodological discussion and
Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995 for a practical application of this approach). In the
current study, each labor union is observed annually from 1990-2001. Therefore, the unit
of analysis is not the union but rather the union-year, a series of annual measurements for
each union, which are nested within the local union structure. While there are a number

---

\(^{70}\) Here, because of the small number of cases, I include only two large industry categories, manufacturing
and service. Unions were assigned a score of 1 for each category if they targeted workers in the particular
industry.
of reasons for choosing HLM over conventional Multivariate Repeated Measures (MRM) Methods (see Bryk and Raudenbush 1992: 133-4 for a complete discussion), a major challenge when analyzing repeated-observation data is the correlations among observations for a particular unit of analysis (Allison 1984). HLM provides the ability to adjust for serially autocorrelated error structures that can occur in repeated measures for the same unit of analysis (i.e. unions) by partitioning variance in the outcome variable into different levels, here time (Level 1) and unions (Level 2). The basic Level 1 model used throughout this project is represented in Equation 5.1:

**Equation 5.1 Level 1 (Time):**

$$Y_{it} = \pi_{0i} + \pi_{1i} T_{it} + \pi_{2i} X_{it} + e_{it}$$

Where:
- $i$ is the index for unions,
- $t$ is the index for time (1990-2001),
- $T$ is the measure of time, and
- $X$ is a vector of time-varying covariates.

In the above equation, $\pi_{0i}$ is the intercept for each union and represents the predicted value of the dependent variable for union $i$, $\pi_{1i}$ represents the baseline time trend, $\pi_{2i}$ is the effect of a vector of time varying covariates $X$ on the outcome variable, and finally, $e_{it}$ is the error term.

---

71 I should note that there is a third potential level of analysis, local unions nested within their national affiliate, of which there are seven. However, there are three reasons why I chose not to include this third level: 1) the small number of observations (7) limits the number of predictors I can potentially employ, 2) the most important measure of national affiliation-resources derived from the parent body-is actually a local union measure, and 3) the current version of HLM software is unable to estimate three-Level nonlinear models. As an alternative, I include a dummy variable for national affiliation at Level 2 (essentially a fixed-effects model), which controls for all variation due to national affiliation.

72 This model represents the basic model employed to analyze the link between the organizational structure of unions and various organizing outcomes. Depending on the outcome variable of interest, the models will be altered slightly. For example, to examine the rate of organizing, a Poisson regression model will be employed. However, the basic logic of HLM hold true regardless of the variation employed.

73 In the models below the underlying time trend is modeled with two coefficients, a main (linear) effect, and a polynomial (squared) term. This baseline control of time is common in longitudinal studies that employ HLM (Horney, Osgood, and Marshall 1995).

74 In the models below virtually all of the time-varying measures are captured with two-year moving averages $X_{(t+(t-1))/2}$. This is because the outcome of interest is an annual measure, which can take place at any point within time $t$. Therefore, a lag ignores the possibility that $X_t$ can have a causal effect on $Y_t$.  

---
\( e_\nu \) represents the unexplained variance for this observation and is assumed to have a mean of zero and a constant variance, \( \sigma^2 \). The important element in this model is that time-varying covariates, such as the union’s organizing budget in a particular year, are used to predict a particular annual union measures, such as the number of organizing drives initiated that year.

In HLM, the Level 1 model determines the structure of the Level 2 model because the Level 1 parameters \( \pi_{0i} \ldots \pi_{2i} \) are now the outcomes to be predicted with Level 2 covariates. Specifically:

**Equation 5.2  Level 2 (Unions):**

\[
\pi_{0i} = \beta_{00} + u_{0i} \\
\pi_{1i} = \beta_{10} \\
\pi_{2i} = \beta_{20}
\]

In this model, each Level 1 parameter (\( \pi_{0i} \ldots \pi_{2i} \)) is now predicted by a population level parameter, \( \beta_{00} \ldots \beta_{20} \). So, for example, \( \beta_{00} \), which predicts the Level 1 intercept \( \pi_{0i} \), represents the predicted population value for the outcome variable of interest, controlling for all other variables in the model. Of special note here is the residual term \( u_{0i} \). This allows the outcome variable, \( \beta_{00} \), to vary across union and is assumed to have a mean of zero and a variance \( \tau_{00} \). By including this parameter, the problems of autocorrelation typical in longitudinal analyses are now resolved because the unique variance associated with each context (here union) is now captured by the Level 2 variance component \( u_{0i} \).

Although there are no Level predictors in Equation 5.2 (Null model), they play two very important roles in explaining variation in union organizing outcomes over time, assessing
Assessing Within and Between Union Change  In Equation 5.2, the effect of union characteristic \( X_i \) captured by \( \beta_{20} \) represents the effect of the independent variable on both within-union change over time and between union-mean differences in the outcome of interest. However, it is important to separate the effect of a particular coefficient into both within and between effects since I am interested in not only union variation over time, but also across unions, since local unions, as discussed earlier, are relatively autonomous SMOs. For example, if I am examining the relationship the authority of the union’s political administration and the rate of new corporate campaigns, I would like to determine how a change in the union’s political administration authority affects the rate of organizing, as well as how the rate of organizing varies across unions depending on their mean political authority. In order to examine both types of variation, I include both the Level 1 measure for a particular time-varying covariate (\( X_i \)) and the mean value of the measure of the particular union at Level 2 to predict overall differences in the outcome of interest:

\[
\pi_{ai} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{01} X_i + u_{0i}
\]

In the expanded model the Level 1 coefficient indicates the effect of within union change over time while the Level 2 coefficient (\( \beta_{01} \)) captures the effect of variation in the characteristics of interest across unions. Because of the importance of separating within

\[75\] There are two basic types of Level 2 coefficients, stable characteristics of unions that do not change over time (such as national affiliation), and aggregates of Level 1 (time-varying) measures. Because nearly all of the measures included vary over time, most of the Level 2 coefficients employed below fall in the later category.

185
and between effects, unless otherwise specified, all substantive union characteristics that vary over time will be included at both levels.

*Variation of Level 1 Coefficients Across Contexts* Along with explaining mean differences in particular organizing outcomes across unions, Level 2 can also be used to determine if the effect of time-varying covariates (Level 1 variables) differ depending on the particular union characteristic. For example, below I examine how the effects of certain Level 1 coefficients vary depending on the national affiliate (a Level 2 measure). Commonly referred to as cross-level interactions, Level 2 coefficients, rather than used to explain the outcome of interest ($\pi_{0i}$) as in Equation 5.2, are used to predict the Level 1 parameters:

Equation 5.4:
$$\pi_{2i} = \beta_{20} + \beta_{21}Z_i + u_{1i}$$

where $\beta_{20}$ represents the main effect of the Level 1 time-varying covariate while $\beta_{21}$ represents the interaction between the coefficient and the Level 2 variable $Z_i$. The addition of the error term $u_{1i}$ allows the Level 1 coefficient to vary across unions.

**Results**

Here I examine the relationship between the authority structure of local labor unions and various organizing outcomes, primarily resources allocated for organizing and the types of tactics used by unions. In all the models, the control variables, which vary slightly depending on the outcome of interest, are not explicitly included in the tables (results available from the author). Additionally, unless otherwise specified, all
covariates are grand-mean centered.\textsuperscript{76} I begin first by examining the relationship between the source of union revenues and the allocation of resources for organizing.

**Disbursement of Resources for Organizing**

Table 5.4 presents the unstandardized effects of authority measures on the two types of organizing resources. Before turning to the substantive results, it is interesting to note the distribution of variance across levels in the null model (no predictors) for both outcomes of interest. For resources devoted to organizing, most of the variation in budget is over time, but the majority of variation in human resources devoted to organizing is across unions. This is most likely due to the different properties of the two resource forms—organizing budget can be easily adjusted depending on the particular demands of the union, but if the union institutionalizes an organizing staff composed of individuals, it may be much more difficult to remove.

**Table 5.4 about here**

*Political Administration Authority*  Beginning first with the effect of the union’s political administration on organizing disbursements, the only characteristic that is related to either organizing disbursement is the negative effect of the annual size of the union’s administrative structure on financial resources disbursed for organizing (Model 1). The addition of one officer reduces the annual disbursements for organizing by nearly $700. The fact that the Level 2 coefficient is positive, though insignificant, indicates that it is not that unions with larger administrative structures have generally lower levels of resources disbursed for organizing, but that the *increase* in officer size reduces financial

\textsuperscript{76} The only variables that are uncentered (besides dummy-coded variables) are disbursements (both financial and human) for organizing, since many unions have no organizing budget or staff, which means
organizing resources. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that as unions become more bureaucratic, as indicated by a larger administrative structure, they see themselves less as insurgent organizations and rather as organizations where stability is a more important goal than potentially risky activities such as membership recruitment. The lack of relationship between this variable and the number of staff devoted to organizing (in the model organizing staff disbursements, such as salary, are controlled for) indicates that if such a process is occurring, it is limited to financial resources.

**Staff Authority** Along with the administrative officers, the union’s staff also can wield considerable influence in the day-to-day functioning of the organization—prior research on institutional change (Binder 2002; Lipset 1968) has demonstrated the ability of staff to prevent the ability of challenger from imposing their particular agenda on the organization. However, both Models 1 and 2 indicate that the extensiveness of the union’s staff, measured both in terms of size and resource control, has no effect on the disbursements of resources for organizing (though the effect of proportion of resources controlled at Level 2 for Model 1 is quite large). While this initially casts doubt on the staff authority-stagnation relationship, there are two potential reasons for why no relationship exists between staff authority and organizing disbursements in the two models.

First, the authority of bureaucratic (unelected) administrators is often contingent not on claims of political legitimation, but on their organizational expertise, essentially their control over institutional knowledge. Therefore, staff authority (and hence agency) is enhanced in organizations where there are opportunities for monopolizing knowledge.

that the intercepts in the models remain meaningful.
To test this argument, I created a series of separate models for each cross-level interaction possibility for all three Level 1 staff variables (staff size, proportion of union disbursements controlled by staff, staff disbursements), and two alternative ways of measuring opportunities for staff to hoard institutional knowledge (membership size and total budget, measured at Level 2), hypothesizing that staff control over knowledge will be greater in larger organizations. For financial disbursements, none of the interactions was significant, but for Model 2, all three measures of staff authority significantly decreased the number of organizers in large (both in terms of members and budget) unions. While the interaction effects were all rather small, they do provide some justification for the claims that staff may seek to block efforts for social change, and that their efforts may be successful in local unions where they enjoy more power.

A second possible explanation for the lack of significance in Table 5.4 is that the staff may only exercise its institutional authority to counteract change sought by another actor, as was the case in both Binder’s and Lipset’s research. In the case of labor unions, the impetus for change, particularly for organizing disbursements, has often come from the national affiliates, as these parent organizations have become increasingly willing to force local unions to devote more resources for organizing (Voss and Sherman 2000). One national that has been particularly active in this respect is the Service Employees International Union. To determine if heightened staff authority reduces the ability of the SEIU to force their locals into allocating more resources for organizing, for both models I ran a cross level interaction between all three measures of staff and affiliation with SEIU. Interestingly, staff size and total disbursements (ln) were

---

77 In Binder’s study, educational staff reacted negatively to claims by advocates of Afrocentric and
positively related to both forms of organizing disbursements, though only significant for Model 1 (financial disbursements). In contrast, the threshold variable measure of proportion of the union’s budget controlled by the staff was negative and significant for both models. The three (out of ten) SEIU local unions that met this threshold of staff size had significantly lower levels of resources (both financial and human) devoted to organizing.

While the effects of staff size on the one hand and staff control over union resources on the other appear contradictory, a possible explanation is that the portion of budget controlled by the staff captures the extent of staff authority in an organization, while staff size and total disbursements is less a measure of staff influence than a measure of overall formalization of the organizational structure, which may be co-opted by the national union in efforts to expand organizing disbursements. Whatever the explanation, both institutional knowledge and resistance to the agenda of the national union provide a measure of support for the claim that staff authority in unions may be an anathema to efforts to expand resources for organizing.

National Affiliate Authority I turn now to a discussion of the influence of the national union on the local’s organizing budget and staff. As argued above, national unions are increasingly forcing their locals to allocate resources for organizing, and I expect that their influence works through two processes: 1) the local’s dependent on the parent organization for operating costs, and 2) the national organization’s willingness to exercise political authority, namely placing the local in trusteeship, to force recalcitrant locals into increasing their organizing budget. First, both models support the hypothesis

creationist curricula. In the case of the CCF (Lipset 1968), the bureaucratic staff of the Saskatchewan
that as the national union increases its financial control over the local, more resources will be devoted to organizing. In Model 1, variation in national disbursements over time (Level 1) is positively related to organizing financial disbursements, while in Model 2 unions that are more dependent on the national union for resources (Level 2) have larger organizing staffs. The fact that the location of the significant coefficient (Level 1 or 2) matches the concentration of variation (over time in Model 1, across unions in Model 2) furthers the argument that revenues from national unions do indeed have a significant positive impact on the allocation of resources for organizing.

Turning to the effect of placing locals in trusteeship, Model 1 indicates that unions that have been placed in trusteeship have, on average, significantly larger (over $6,000) organizing budgets than locals that have not been placed in trusteeship. The negative effect of the Level 1 lag trusteeship measure probably captures the political crisis that the union undergoes immediately during and after trusteeship, where internal, rather than external functions, become priorities. Interestingly, the effect on staff disbursements is completely opposite; unions that have ever experienced a trusteeship have generally smaller organizing staffs, though organizing staff size increases immediately following trusteeship. A possible explanation for this difference is that it may be easier to force national unions to make a long term commitment to increasing their organizing budget, but less successful at convincing them to retain a permanent organizing staff (the positive effect of trusteeship on staff size at Level 1 could indicate the national union’s creation of an organizing staff, which is then subsequently abandoned). Regardless of the possible differences between budget and staff, the overall government impeded the implication of socialist programs and laws.
results from both models support previous research that indicates that national unions have been effective at using both carrot and stick strategies to force local unions to significantly expand their organizing disbursements.

Membership Authority The final collective actor that wields authority in local unions is the rank-and-file. While, as I acknowledge above, I do not have valid measures of democratic participation, I do have two measures of potential membership influence: 1) financial control of the union and 2) the existence of an intermediary body between the membership and their selection of union officials, measured by the presence of an executive committee. While these measures may be somewhat crude indicators of membership authority, they do allow me to speak recent debates about the relationship between membership influence and labor militancy. Some (Voss and Sherman 2000) have found that members often resist the allocation of resources for organizing, while others (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003) claim that membership control has a generally positive effect on militant tactics, which often includes organizing drives.

Turning first to the effect of membership financial disbursements, unlike national control over the local’s revenue, none of the coefficients has any effect on either financial or human resources disbursed for organizing. In contrast to the lack of effect of financial control, we see that, in Model 1, a more direct measure of membership control, the presence of an executive committee, has a major negative effect on organizing disbursements, as unions with an executive committee had an organizing budget that was, on average, over $7,000 less than their non-executive committee counterparts. In

78 A possible reason for the relatively small effect of membership measures, as compared to indicators of international authority, is that the national union is a single actor and can readily use disbursements in a
addition, unions with an executive committee had an organizing staff that was nearly a half a person smaller than non-executive committee unions, though the effect failed to reach significance. These results indicate that unions with lower levels of membership control over their elected officials will likely also have lower levels of resources allocated for social change activities. While I would again caution over interpreting these results to indicate that unions with more democratic structures are likely to be more militant, as some have claimed, it does point out the effect of membership control (or lack thereof) on an internal organization dynamic that can have serious ramifications for SMO processes.

Rate of Organizing

Employing authority measures to examine the rate at which unions engage in organizing is important for at least two reasons. First, despite renewed interest in organizing, most scholars continue to focus on the outcomes of organizing, rather than decision to engage in organizing in the first place. Second, because unions have two distinct repertoires to choose from to recruit new members, the NLRB election and the corporate campaign, by examining the rate of organizing I am able to model the importance of authority structure on tactical choice, an important social movement phenomenon that has yet to be systematically explored to any extent.

Poisson regression is employed to model the annual rate at which unions engage in both forms of organizing. Poisson regression is especially appropriate when modeling rare, nonnegative events that take on the characteristics of a Poisson distribution (relatively rare events that are highly skewed to the right/positive). The Poisson
distribution identifies the probability of a discrete event count, given an underlying rate of events (Osgood 2000). Poisson regression addresses the issue of skew in the data by using a link function, typically a log transfer of the outcome, so in Equation 5.1 the outcome is \( \ln(Y_{it}) \). Therefore, in the model, the untransformed coefficients represent a log increase in the number of organizing events initiated by a union in a given year. Alternatively, we may compute \( \exp(\beta_k) \) to determine the multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in an explanatory variable on the rate of organizing. The multiplicative form means that a “one-unit increase in \( x_{ij} \) multiplies the expected incidents by a factor of \( \exp(\beta_k) \), and a one-unit decrease divides the expected incidents by the same amount” (Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw 1995: 396). The second method is similar to the interpretation of the effect of an odds (Liao 1994) and is the preferred method of interpretation here.

One advantage of HLM is that it allows the researcher to assess the concentration of variation in the outcome of interest—for example, in the current case, I am interested in determining if there is more variation in the rate of organizing across union or over time. Unfortunately, in HLM Poisson regression is unable to estimate the distribution of variance across levels because the model is inherently probabilistic (essentially, there is no error term at Level 1). Despite this, when we take a closer look at the data, it is clear that for both organizing forms most of the variance is across unions rather than over time. Table 5.1 indicates that corporate campaigns are relatively rare events—in the sample only eight unions engaged in corporate campaigns (and one of the eight initiated only one corporate campaign). Conversely, while it initially appears that NLRB elections occur much more frequently, and therefore are much more common among unions, these events
too are concentrated among only a few organizations—in this sample of 70 large local, relatively aggressive labor unions, just seven are responsible for 50% of all elections, and 95% of elections are carried out by 23 unions, which is less than a third of the entire sample of unions. Therefore, although I include all coefficients at both Levels, their effects on variation in organizing across unions rather than over time will be the focus of the following discussion. Table 5.5 presents the effects of authority structure on the annual rate of NLRB organizing (Model 3) and corporate campaigns (Model 4). Again, I include the transformed betas, which represents the coefficients’ multiplicative effect on the baseline rate of organizing.

**Table 5.5 about here**

*Political Administration Authority*  
I begin first by discussing the effects of political administration authority on both forms of organizing. Given the institutionalized nature of NLRB elections vs. the more confrontational elements of the corporate campaign, we might expect, assuming that bureaucratic structure leads to bureaucratic tactics, that increases in political authority measures would either increase NLRB organizing, decrease the rate of corporate campaigns, or some combination of both. In fact, the results from Models 3 and 4 indicate that the proportion of resources controlled by the political leaders (Level 2) significantly reduces the rate of both forms of organizing, though the effect is much greater for corporate campaigns. However, the Level 1 coefficient for Model 4 is positive and significant, indicating that as political

---

79 This finding calls into question the claim by many observers and unionists alike that the 1990s was a period of revitalization for much of the labor movement, a time when an increasing number of unions were taking steps to expand their membership base. While we may expect that the innovative corporate campaign has not yet gained sufficient appeal to be employed at any significant level, if institutionalized organizing remains rare among a sample of large, well-financed, aggressive unions, then it is highly doubtful that unions in the broader labor movement are making any effort at all to initiate new organizing efforts.
administrators expand their control over the finances of the union the rate of corporate campaigns increases. Although this may indicate a mixed effect of political administrative authority on the use of the corporate campaign, when we examine the types of unions that are using this strategy, it is clear that these unions actually have a rather limited political administration structure. To put it starkly, only three of the 86 campaigns were conducted by a union that met the threshold of political administration control employed here. This, along with the argument that most variation in corporate campaign (and NLRB) organizing is across unions, rather than over time, provides strong support that administrative control over the union reduces all forms of organizing, especially contentious tactics. In addition, for corporate campaigns, the overall total disbursements (ln) controlled by the administrative officers (Level 2) and the Level 1 effect of administrative officer size are also negative, further supporting the argument that extensive administrative leadership is incompatible with contentious forms of organizing (and possibly other forms of contentious social movement activity).

**Staff Authority** Turning to the effects of staff institutional authority, we see that, like the disbursements for organizing, the union’s staff appears to have little influence on the rate of either form of organizing, except that unions where staff expand their authority (Level 1) have slightly higher rates of NLRB organizing. Again, I am particularly interested in determining if staff authority varies depending on their control of institutional knowledge, especially for the more risky form of organizing, corporate campaigns. To that end, I reran Model 4 with the cross level interactions between the three Level 1 staff measures and the Level 2 indicators of organizational size (membership and budget). The interactions between all three measures of staff authority
and union size (human and financial) were both negative and significant. While, as I argue above, staff size may be less a measure of staff power than the degree of organizational formalization, the negative effect of staff control over union resources in large (financial) organizations on the rate of corporate campaign organizing again indicates that as staff monopoly over knowledge increases in an organization, the tendency for that organization to engage in social change activities decreases.  

_National Affiliate Authority_ In Models 1 and 2 above it was clear that the national unions are using their financial and political authority over their local affiliates to force them to expend more resources for organizing. The questions now become: 1) are national unions able to pressure unions to actually engage in organizing, controlling for the amount of resources a union devotes to this task, and 2) if they are successful, is one strategy preferred over the other. From Models 3 and 4, the answers to both questions are yes, as financial dependence (at both levels) and trusteeship increased the rate at which unions engaged in NLRB organizing, but had no effect on the rate of corporate campaign organizing. For corporate campaigns, annual dependence on the national union actually reduced this activity. To determine if national unions are using their revenue to dissuade locals from engaging in more contentious forms of organizing, I reran Model 4 with a cross level interaction between annual national union revenue dependence and SEIU affiliation, one union that has used its local to engage in corporate campaigns (Waldinger et al. 1998). While the interaction term, though positive, was not significant, the main

---

80 I reran Model 3 (NLRB organizing) with an interaction between the proportion of union disbursements controlled by the staff and both measures of organizational size. The results for the interaction terms were insignificant, indicating that staff authority does not reduce NLRB organizing as it does corporate campaigns.

81 In these models, and in the next, trusteeship is measured only at Level 2 because it varies little over time, but rather mainly across unions.
effect not only remains significant but its negative effect on the rate of corporate campaign organizing increased in magnitude, indicating that national unions other than the SEIU may use their financial disbursements to dissuade participation in corporate campaigns, though, as indicated in Model 3, the more moderate NLRB election is encouraged by many national unions.

Membership Authority The final important source of authority to be discussed is the role of the rank-and-file in organizing rates. Model 3 indicates that dependence on members for revenue (at both levels) has a positive effect on the rate of NLRB organizing. While this may be due to membership pressure for organizing, a more likely reason is that unions that have to rely on their members for resources may be more willing to make an effort to expand their membership base, and hence their resources. Conversely, membership dependence has no effect on the rate of corporate campaign organizing. The other measure of membership control, presence of an executive committee, appears to reduce new NLRB organizing but bolster corporate campaign organizing, though the results are not significant. If the results were significant, however, it may indicate that members are less willing to have the union engage in more confrontational, versus more conventional, forms of organizing. However, given the overall results, it appears that all we can say is that membership influence may increase NLRB elections, and has little or no effect on corporate campaign organizing.

Organizing Outcomes

The objective of the prior analyses was to examine the relationship between authority structure and two specific internal union organizing processes, resources devoted to this task and the rate of organizing across two very distinct tactics. Before
providing an overview of the findings, I examine a third important outcome, one not discussed above, yet vital for the vitality of the labor movement: the successful completion of an organizing drive. Among social movement scholars there has been an increasing awareness that movements, as agents of social change, can have important consequences beyond their boundaries (see Giugni 1998 for a review of this literature). While scholars have demonstrated the importance of general organizational characteristics, such as resources (Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon et al. 2001) on outcomes, less is know about the effect of authority structure on success. Additionally, the types of outcomes being examined are often quite broad, leading Guigni (1998) to write, “the principle difficulty [in movement outcomes research] is how to establish a causal relationship between a series of events that we can reasonably classify as social movement actions and an observed change in society…”. Examining the outcome of an organizing drive presents a unique opportunity to match leadership measures to a highly quantifiable movement outcome.82

To examine both the union’s ability to successfully complete an organizing, I will employ Binomial regression, another Generalized Linear Model. Binomial regression is useful for predicting the probability of a successful event, given a specified number of trials. The basic Binomial sampling model is as follows:

\[ Y_{it} \mid \phi_{it} \sim B(m_{it}, \phi_{it}) \]

where \( Y_{it} \), which has a binomial distribution, represents the number of successes in \( m_{it} \) trials and the probability of success per trial is \( \phi_{it} \). Substantively, this model allows me to

---

82 As Cress and Snow (2000) note in their analysis of homeless movement outcomes, there are varying degrees of success. The definition of success for labor can range from the achievement of bread and butter issues to the establishment of a worker state. The outcome examined here, organizing, is only an initial
predict the probability of a successful outcome, given that the union is currently engaged in organizing efforts. Again, because this is a Generalized Linear Model, it is in many respects similar to the Poisson model discussed above. First, because the outcome variable is a dichotomy (success or failure), a link function is employed, specifically the logit link, where the outcome variable is the log of the odds of success. This link function ensures that the predicted outcome cannot be greater than one or less than zero. As in the Poisson model described above, in order to ease interpretations, I will compute the \( \exp(\beta_k) \) to determine the multiplicative effect of a variable on the odds of a successful outcome (in Poisson regression, the outcome variable of interest is the rate of organizing, a count variable, while in binomial regression the outcome is a probability). Therefore, the interpretation of \( \exp(\beta_k) \) is identical to an odds in logistic regression.

Table 5.6 includes the effects of authority structure on the probability of successful union organizing. As in the previous models, I am particularly interested in determining if variation exists across unions or over time. However, like Poisson, binomial regression is an inherently probabilistic model where the variance is assumed to equal the mean. In the previous model, I argued that the rate of organizing varied most dramatically across unions, rather than over time, as only a few unions engaged in either form. In binomial regression only those organizations that experience a trial (an organizing drive) can be at risk for success. Therefore, the analyses are limited to those unions that engage in organizing, which is a smaller subsample of the 70 unions, resulting in less variation in organizing success across union and more over time. In addition, the small number of unions that engage in corporate campaigns (eight) prevents me from including but a few indicator of success, and does not even guarantee that other goals of the union will be met (Markowitz...
Level 2 coefficients. Therefore, the only Level 2 variables are the controls (union affiliation, state unionization rate) and those predictors that vary little over time, which include the presence of an executive board and trusteeship.

**Table 5.6 about here**

*Political Administrative Authority*  Turning first to the effects of administrative authority, we see that, for the most part, union political administration measures have no effect on the success of either type of organizing repertoire. The one exception is the positive effect of total administration disbursements (Level 1) on the probability of corporate campaign success, which, in the previous model was actually negatively related to the rate at which unions engage in organizing. A possible explanation for this shifting of effect is that in this model, only those unions that have made a decision to engage in the corporate campaign are included. Therefore, although an extensive political administration may, in general, reduce the rate of this activity, once the decision is made to engage in a corporate campaign, having a strong administrative structure could lead to increased success. This finding calls attention to the possible divergence in explaining the type of activities an SMO will engage in versus the success the SMO has—certain characteristics may reduce a specific type of activity among a population of SMOs, but may increase the successful completion of such an activity among those SMOs that make the commitment to initiate the repertoire. Although insignificant, the strong positive effect of proportion of resources controlled by the administrative officers only strengthens this argument.
Staff Authority  In Model 5 it appears that staff authority have no effect on NLRB success, but in Model 6 the main effect of one staff measure, total disbursements, is negatively related to an organizing outcome, specifically the union’s probability of completing a successful corporate campaign. Because, as we saw in the Model 4, staff can only reduce the rate of corporate campaign organizing in large organizations, the negative effect in Model 6 may indicate that staff may use their power to reduce the chance of success in a tactic they may have opposed, but had little voice in choosing. To test the effect of heightened staff authority in larger organizations, I reran the model with an interaction between the proportion of resources controlled by the staff and size (membership and budget). Similar to Model 4, I found that in larger unions, staff control over resources further reduces the probability of corporate campaign success, providing significant evidence that staff authority reduces contentious activity, but only in organizations where there is opportunity for significant staff control over organizational knowledge.

National Affiliate Authority  Table 5.5 illustrated how international unions were able to use their authority to encourage their locals to both increase their rate of NLRB organizing, and, with the exception of SEIU, avoid the corporate campaign as an organizing model. The findings presented here indicate that for NLRB elections, the ability of the international to influence organizing is limited to internal organizational dynamics—they can convince/force their local affiliated to increase their level of organizing, but they appear to have little influence on the ultimate outcome of the actual organizing drive. For corporate campaigns, dependence on national unions reduces success. However, although the coefficient is not included in the Table, the SEIU
dummy was positive-locals affiliated with the SEIU have a higher probability of success than other locals. This makes sense if we understand that corporate campaigns require an incredible amount of coordination, including national support (Manheim 2001). It is not surprising that unions dependent on national unions less than enthusiastic about this tactic would have lower rates of success than unions dependent on supportive nationals.

Membership Authority The final center of authority discussed in this analysis is membership control. In both models, for both measures (revenue dependence and executive committee), membership authority has no significant effect on success. This lack of significance may be more a result of the type of measures employed than the lack of agency among union members in influencing the success of organizing. Research has demonstrated that success in both NLRB elections and corporate campaigns (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999; Waldinger et al. 1998) depends heavily on the activities of the membership with respect to the actual organizing drive itself. Because I do not have such measures, I cannot determine the direct contribution that the rank-and-file makes to the actual efforts made by unions to expand their membership.

Conclusions

Summary

The major objective of this paper was to provide a systematic framework for understanding the implications of leadership, expanded here to include the entire authority structure of an organization, on a specific social movement process. Specifically, I argued that authority is most likely limited to processes internal to the SMO, because the influence of those who occupy positions of power is likely limited by
a variety of internal and external constraints. To this end, I matched measures of authority structure among a sample of 70 local unions during the 1990s to important organizing outcomes, specifically the allocation of resources to this process, the type of repertoire employed, and the outcome of the organizing drive. Table 5.7 provides a summary of the effects of authority among various actors within the union’s structure on the organizing outcomes.

**Table 5.7 about here**

The results provide both confirmation of existing theses on leadership and raise new questions about the importance of authority. First, the findings generally indicate that organizations with a highly formalized political administration are less likely to allocate resources for organizing, and, consequently, less likely to make efforts to recruit new members, especially through highly conformational tactics such as the corporate campaign. However, the results do indicate that success in this strategy may depend on a large administrative structure (in terms of resources controlled).

Based on prior research on the ability of activists to bring about curricula change in the U.S. school system (Binder 2003), as well as the obstacles faced by the leaders of the CCF government in Saskatchewan (Lipset 1968), the effect of staff (nonpolitical) authority is expected to reduce the union’s progressive activities, including organizing. It initially appeared that this was not the case, as staff measures of authority were unrelated to nearly all of the outcomes. However, when the effects of staff authority were examined within organizations that afforded opportunities for heightened staff control over institutional knowledge, primarily larger organizations, the findings supported prior research-staff authority has a chilling effect on organizing resource disbursements,
efforts, and success.

The other two actors examined here were the national affiliate and the membership. In his partial census of SMO federated structures, McCarthy (2003) finds that this form of power distribution, typical in labor unions, is actually quite common in the broader SMO population, especially in the modern era of professionalized SMOs. The findings presented here indicate that, in general, national influence has a positive effect on both the allocation of resources for organizing and the likelihood of engaging in an NLRB election. However, the results also point to the possibility that parental organizations use their influence to oppose the use of the corporate campaign, a relationship that is heightened when SEIU affiliation is accounted for, the one national organization that has encouraged its locals to engage in this form of organizing.

In contrast to the important role of national authority, the results generally provide little support for the effects of membership influence. The few results that are significant, however, do indicate that membership influence may lead to higher levels of resources devoted to organizing. However, as I have acknowledged throughout, the measures used to capture membership influence fail to capture the essence of rank-and-file participation in the decision-making process of the labor union. Besides the incomplete measures of membership influence, another possible reason why the national union has more effect than the membership on union organizing processes is that, unlike the membership, who, due to the sheer number of actors involved, often have great difficulty developing a unified political agenda, the international is a single actor seeking to implement its objectives.83

Implications for Leadership Research
As I have argued throughout, prior research has tended to focus too heavily on the individual leader and has not spent enough time examining the characteristics of the authority structure within which these leaders operate. In addition, the entire concept of authority structure requires the inclusion of numerous other actors, which, depending on the organizational population of interest, can include members, professional staff, national affiliates, constituents, coalition partners, and so on. Despite the critic of earlier research offered here, I believe that ultimately scholars interested in the decision-making process with SMOs, and indeed all organizations, should examine both the authority structure and the actors that occupy these positions at specific temporal points. As prior research has demonstrated, individual leaders can make an important difference in the overall health of an organization or movement (Ganz 2000; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). While in this paper I have focused solely on structural measures, a balanced analysis would include the motivations of individuals who occupy positions of authority. However, as I just pointed out, this would necessitate data both on the organizational authority structure and on all the actors that are within that structure.

Another goal of this paper is to delineate the boundaries of influence that the authority structure has in an SMO. Earlier work sympathetic to the iron law tradition (Piven and Cloward 1977) tended to place all of a movement’s shortcomings squarely on the shoulders of the leadership. This analysis, by examining the effects of authority structure on a very limited set of outcomes, including a highly useful measure of success, provides a much more reliable method of understanding the scope of leadership influence within SMOs. In particular, as seen in Table 5.7, the influence of the authority structure

83 Of course, no organization is ever completely unified in its goals and objectives. Yet, when compared to
is almost entirely limited to internal, rather than external, processes. The results
demonstrate the political administration’s strong effects on both resource allocation and
repertoire choice, but little influence over success. I believe that this supports the
argument that if leaders have an effect on the overall health of a movement, it is through
specific internal mechanisms, which subsequently may have much broader consequences.
For example, although not shown, the effect of human resources disbursed for
organizing, a process controlled by the leadership, had a strong positive effect on the
probability of success in al corporate campaign.

Implications for Social Movement Research

A major motivation for this paper was to attempt to bring leadership and authority
back into social movement research as a topic that has important consequences for
movements in general and SMOs in particular. Prior research has generally failed to
account for the importance of leadership when studying important social movement
processes. The findings presented above indicate that the structure of authority within
SMOs can have important consequences for both the allocation of resources for a
particular activity and the type of repertoires employed to achieve social change. Though
the current study was focused only on a limited number of outcomes, one could imagine
the role of leadership in issues of framing, creating political opportunities, and
membership recruitment, to name a few important topics in social movement research.
However, despite the limited outcomes examined, the research does speak to important
social movement dynamics.

First, the results demonstrate that professional staff can be a significant obstacle
to instituting activities designed to bring about social change. Given the increasing professional nature of SMOs, first identified by McCarthy and Zald (1977), the potential consequences of these professionals within SMOs can be great. This may be especially true in membersless organizations, where no political administration is in place to counteract the effect of staff. Instead, staff are de facto leaders and may have carte blanche control over much of the organization and its activities, which could potentially enormous consequences on SMO processes. The current research indicates that in labor unions staff authority is negatively related to the allocation of resources for organizing and the use of particularly contentious organizing repertoires. How this translates to SMOs with no countervailing elected administration is a topic that needs to be addressed. In addition, the reasons why staff may be predisposed to more conservative forms of social action is an interesting research question with significant implications for SMOs who must increase their formalization to achieve the tasks necessary for survival, such as fundraising, lobbying, and negotiating the tax laws required of nonprofit groups.

Second, as mentioned above, many SMOs have adopted a federated structure in the United States, due in no small part to the corresponding structure of the U.S. government. Here the findings indicate that the national (or regional) parent organization can have significant consequences for the functioning of local groups, supporting prior research on this subject (McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; Oliver and Furman 1989; Weed 1991). Though the mechanisms of influence examined here were limited to financial control and the political administration of local unions (trusteeship), national groups can use a variety of tactics to wield control over their local groups, from supporting particular
individuals for political leadership to determining which prospective organizations can use the national’s “brand name” (McCarthy 2003).

Also, the outcomes of national involvement are much broader than the allocation of resources for social change and the types of tactics employed. For example, McCarthy and Wolfson (1996) find that local groups affiliated with Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) enjoy significant advantages in fundraising compared to affiliates of Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID) because of the wider brand appeal of MADD. In addition, the question of the consequences of national involvement is also being explored. Voss and Sherman (2000) argue that the involvement of national unions in the affairs of their local affiliates can potentially “break” the iron law of oligarchy. However, others, such as Slaughter (1999) remain much more wary of national involvement, arguing it will stifle grass roots democratic change.

Although this research provides strong support for the role of national unions in local organizing processes, it also casts doubt on assertions that elite sponsorship has wholly negative consequences for SMO activities (Piven and Cloward 1977). The finding that national union influence on the use of the corporate campaign varies by the particular organization (SEIU vs. all others) demonstrates that the motivations of a single population of organizations is not uniform and cannot assumed to be so. To that end, I argue that scholars should collect systematic data on elite sponsors to determining precisely the motivations for funding SMOs rather than making blanket statements about sponsorship. In addition, even if we assume that the motivations of elites are inherently conservative, by making beneficiary groups the unwilling pawns of powerful interests removes any agency these SMOs possess. For example, Sale (1973) finds that the
Students for a Democratic Society were in constant conflict with their sponsoring organization, the League of Industrial Democracy, yet were able to manipulate the League long enough to ensure support while building an independent membership base.

The final, and perhaps most important actor examined within the milieu of rational-legal authority was the membership. Issues of union democracy and rank-and-file militancy have long been central to the understanding of working class organizations. In contrast, most social movement research has largely overlooked the potential agency of SMO members. The results here suggest that variation in membership control over SMOs may have important internal consequences for the overall functioning of the movement, though, as I have acknowledged, the measures of membership control need to be significantly improved, primarily with more detailed data on rank-and-file participation in the decision-making process within SMOs. However, it is possible that thinking about membership participation as a pathway to potential success may be less useful than examining membership participation and influence as a successful outcome in and of itself. If we assume that participation in voluntary organizations such as SMOs builds social capital (as prior research indicates, Minkoff 1997; Smith 1998), and that social capital is an important outcome for the functioning of democratic societies (Putnam 2000), then increased membership participation, regardless of the consequences for movement goals, is an important outcome in and of itself.
Table 5.1. Rate and Success of Organizing Among Sample of 70 Unions From 1990-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage of all organizing</th>
<th>Proportion of unions using</th>
<th>Victory rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Election</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaign</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2. Distribution of New Membership Gains Across Repertoires From 1990-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Workers Targeted</th>
<th>Percentage of Workers Targeted</th>
<th>Number of Workers Successfully Organized</th>
<th>Percentage of Workers Successfully Organized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Election</td>
<td>51,528</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>23,670</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaign</td>
<td>30,777</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>17,222</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82,305</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>40,892</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.3. Descriptive Statistics for Various Union Characteristics (annual measures unless noted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Administration Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Size</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Budget (ln)</td>
<td>11.04</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.25)</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Size</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Budget (ln)</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.10)</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Union Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Operating Budget from National Union</td>
<td>3.381</td>
<td>7.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusteeship</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Operating Budget from Membership</td>
<td>87.761</td>
<td>29.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Committee (any)</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizing Resource Allocation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Organizing Disbursements in Thousands</td>
<td>7.335</td>
<td>25.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing Staff Size</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>2.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizing Outcomes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Organizing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Elections</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td>1.574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaigns</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Victories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLRB Elections</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>1.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Campaigns</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership Size</td>
<td>3831.130</td>
<td>4628.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (in 1990)</td>
<td>16.530</td>
<td>6.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Disbursements (in thousands)</td>
<td>1349.360</td>
<td>1611.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Unionization Rate (in 1995)</td>
<td>15.140</td>
<td>5.030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.4. Ordinary Least Squares HLM multivariate effects of authority structure on disbursements for organizing (1990-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1. Annual Organizing Disbursements (in thousands)</th>
<th>Model 2. Annual Size of Organizing Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1 (N=812)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Size (two year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.6904*</td>
<td>0.4367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Budget (ln) (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.1856</td>
<td>0.5655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.25) (two year moving average)**</td>
<td>-1.4642</td>
<td>2.8507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Size (two year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.0851</td>
<td>0.4007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Budget (ln) (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0127</td>
<td>0.3932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.10) (two year moving average)**</td>
<td>0.7471</td>
<td>2.6319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Union</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Operating Budget from National Union (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.2131*</td>
<td>0.1405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusteeship (one-year lag)**</td>
<td>-14.1614**</td>
<td>6.0876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Operating Budget from Membership (two year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.0027</td>
<td>0.0354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2 (N=70)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>7.3066**</td>
<td>6.9126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Size</td>
<td>0.0951</td>
<td>0.5920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Budget (ln)</td>
<td>0.5811</td>
<td>0.7823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.25)**</td>
<td>-1.6961</td>
<td>3.1316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Size (two year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.1752</td>
<td>1.0257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Budget (ln)</td>
<td>0.1524</td>
<td>0.4447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.10)**</td>
<td>-2.4892</td>
<td>2.8667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Union</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Operating Budget from National Union</td>
<td>0.1393</td>
<td>0.2678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusteeship**</td>
<td>6.3411**</td>
<td>2.8973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Operating Budget from Membership</td>
<td>0.0550</td>
<td>0.0952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Committee**</td>
<td>-7.7150*</td>
<td>4.6748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance Distribution in Null Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random Effects</th>
<th>V.</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>V.</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 (Time)</td>
<td>384.76</td>
<td>19.62</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 (Union)</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportion of Variance Explained</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

213
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X²</th>
<th>238.86**</th>
<th>1474.56**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*p<0.1 **p<0.05

Controls include one-year dependent variable lag, membership size, total budget (in thousands), age, national affiliation, industry, state unionization rate, and time. In addition, in Model 2 total staff size and total disbursements to organizing staff is controlled.

++Variables are uncentered.
Table 5.5. Overdispersed Poisson HLM multivariate result of authority structure on annual NLRB and corporate campaign organizing rates (1990-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 3. NLRB Organizing Rate</th>
<th>Model 4. Corporate Campaign Organizing Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1 (N=812)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Size (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0402</td>
<td>0.0311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Size (ln) (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.2070**</td>
<td>0.0887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.25) (two year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.3611</td>
<td>0.2606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Size (two year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.0012</td>
<td>0.0168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Budget (ln) (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.0525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.10) (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.3845**</td>
<td>0.1485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Union</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Operating Budget from National Union (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0159*</td>
<td>0.0103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Operating Budget from Membership (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0122*</td>
<td>0.0075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2 (N=70)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.5149</td>
<td>0.7876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Size</td>
<td>-0.0285</td>
<td>0.0569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Budget (ln)</td>
<td>0.0070</td>
<td>0.1324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.25) **</td>
<td>-0.7081*</td>
<td>0.4211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Size (two year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.1104</td>
<td>0.0817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Budget (ln)</td>
<td>-0.0071</td>
<td>0.0674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.10) **</td>
<td>-0.4199</td>
<td>0.2932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Union</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Operating Budget from National Union</td>
<td>0.0589*</td>
<td>0.0312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusteeship **</td>
<td>0.8738**</td>
<td>0.3565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Operating Budget from Membership</td>
<td>0.0201*</td>
<td>0.0118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Committee **</td>
<td>-0.7182</td>
<td>0.6111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random Effects</th>
<th>V.</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>V.</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 (Time)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 (Union)</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.544</td>
<td>6.501</td>
<td>2.549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X² = 595.79**, 129.46**-

*p<0.1 **p<0.05

+Controls include one-year dependent variable lag, membership size, total budget (in thousands), age, national affiliation, industry, state unionization rate, time, total organizing disbursements (both levels), and total organizing staff (both levels).

++Variables are uncentered
Table 5.6. Overdispersed Binomial multivariate HLM results of authority structure on the probability of annual organizing success (1990-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Random Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>exp(beta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Size (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0166</td>
<td>0.0291</td>
<td>1.0168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer Budget (ln) (two year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.0161</td>
<td>0.0851</td>
<td>0.9841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.25) (two year moving average)++</td>
<td>-0.4734</td>
<td>0.3840</td>
<td>0.6229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Authority</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Size (two year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.0050</td>
<td>0.0203</td>
<td>0.9950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Budget (ln) (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0303</td>
<td>0.0481</td>
<td>1.0308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Union Resources Controlled (&gt;0.10) (two year moving average)++</td>
<td>-0.2815</td>
<td>0.2414</td>
<td>0.7547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Union</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Operating Budget from National Union (two year moving average)</td>
<td>0.0069</td>
<td>0.0153</td>
<td>1.0069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Operating Budget from Membership (two year moving average)</td>
<td>-0.0005</td>
<td>0.0041</td>
<td>0.9995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.1462</td>
<td>0.3007</td>
<td>0.8640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusteeship++</td>
<td>0.1739</td>
<td>0.3473</td>
<td>1.1899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Committee++</td>
<td>-0.1970</td>
<td>0.3481</td>
<td>0.8212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 (Time)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 (Union)</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>X^2</strong></td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>36.03**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1 **p<0.05

'Controls include one-year dependent variable lag, membership size, total budget (in thousands), age, national affiliation, industry, state unionization rate, time, and disbursements for organizing.

++Variables are uncentered
Table 5.7. Summary of relationships between authority indicators and organizing outcomes *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority Source</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Rate of Organizing</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Human</td>
<td>NLRB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Administration</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Administration</td>
<td>Mixed(^a)</td>
<td>Mixed(^ab)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Affiliate</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Effects in bold indicate that more than one indicator of the authority characteristic was significantly related to the outcome.

\(^a\) Effect contingent on SEIU affiliation

\(^b\) Staff control over union financial resources was negatively related to organizing staff size in larger (both in terms of members and budget) unions

\(^c\) This does not include Level 1 coefficients, which were positive

\(^d\) Effect only in larger organizations
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this dissertation was to provide a systematic analysis of labor union organizing in the United States during a historical period when organized labor was confronting a crisis in membership and a period that has seen recent efforts, especially within the established labor movement, to address this dilemma. Much of the attention given to this topic by scholars is on efforts by labor unions to recruit members through new organizing drives. A particularly important thread of this research examines how unions behave like social movements to expand their membership base. Unfortunately, despite this reconceptualization of unions, there is little effort among labor scholars to draw upon well-established social movement theories to explain variations in organizing success. Because of this, prior research on union organizing has also ignored important questions, such as determinants of resource allocation for organizing and the importance of tactical choice. The primary objective of the current research is to provide both a strong theoretical backbone to our understanding of union organizing and apply many of the methods used in social movement research to explore the important relationship between union organizational characteristics and organizing outcomes. Although labor scholarship can clearly benefit from social movement research, the benefits of melding labor into the broader social movements literature flows both ways. In the dissertation I have demonstrated that a systematic understanding of union organizing can address issues ranging from repertoire choice to resource disbursements for collective action to the important of leadership structure in movement activities. In this conclusion I begin here by briefly summarizing the findings from my four substantive chapters. I then identify the implications of this research for scholars...
interested in both the labor movement and social movements more generally. I conclude by discussing future directions for understanding labor union organizing, and indeed organized labor activities as an entire category of collective action.

Summary of Results

In the dissertation a number of important topics central to labor movement research and indeed social movement analysis more generally were covered, ranging from a detailed discussion of the importance of placing current movement processes in historical context to the relationship between sources of resources and repertoire choice. Here I briefly summarize all of the major issues covered, which are more or less aligned with the four major substantive chapters.

The Historical Context of Current Union Organizing In chapter two of the dissertation I explored the similarities between the 1990s and other important periods in the life course of the labor movement, particularly with respect to the mobilization of unorganized workers. There is a growing body of research on labor activity during the 1990s (see Brecher and Costello 1998; Bronfenbreener et al. 1998; Clawson and Clawson 1999; Jenson and Mahon 1993; Mantsios 1998; Masters 1997 Rothstein 1996; Sweeney 1997; Tillman and Cummings 1999; Turner et al. 2001; Welsh 1997), which implicitly assumes that this is an “exceptional” period for organized labor, a break from the business unionism of the past in many regards. By drawing on secondary sources, including writings by those involved in the movement and scholarship on organized labor, I demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the labor movement of the 1990s did not represent a fundamental break from earlier periods of intense internal and external change. In particular, by examining two important organizing processes: 1) who to
organize (target), and 2) what strategies to use (strategic choice), I demonstrate that the mechanisms for change within institutions may remain remarkably stable across distinct historical periods. In particular, the desire for union leaders to remain in control of their organization has led both to reduced efforts to recruit members that could potentially destabilize the existing political structure of the union and the avoidance of particularly contentious tactics that involve the rank-and-file and give them greater voice in how the union should be run. These findings demonstrate that organizational processes, both historically and today, play an important role in determining change within the labor movement, and indeed, I would argue, social movements and organizations more generally.

*Development of Organizing Repertoires and Strategic Choice* The next topic explored in Chapter 3 is the mechanisms unions have at their disposal for expanding their membership base in the 1990s. While organizing is an activity that in some respects is unique to the sphere of industrial relations, by drawing upon the social movement concept of repertoires I sought to draw parallels between union organizing tactics and other social movement actions. Unions today have two repertoires for recruiting new members: 1) the institutionalized National Labor Relations Board Certification election and, 2) the innovative and contentious corporate campaign. In this chapter I trace the tactical and cultural development of these two distinct repertoires in order to identify the important dimensions across which these two strategies vary. The major argument is that the corporate campaign, born out of the student movement of the 1960s, has become increasingly population among militant unions who have become frustrated with the limitations of the NLRB election process, specifically its lack of leverage in forcing the
targeted firm into recognizing the union, and the inability to involve workers in the
election. A description of the rate and success of repertoire use among my sample of 70
unions clearly indicates how dramatically different these two strategies are (NLRB
elections continue to be far more popular, yet, in terms both of victory rate and number of
workers organized, are much less effective than the corporate campaign). The
importance of repertoire choice, while relatively ignored in labor movement research,
especially on a macro scale, is central to research in the social movements literature,
specifically the ways in which SMOs choose particular repertoires from the entire range
of tactics available to them. Unfortunately, with the exception on research pointing to the
general trend of movement institutionalization, virtually no attention has been paid to this
important movement process. The research presented here begins to address this issue.

Resource Mobilization and Organizing Outcomes In Chapter 4 the major
objective was to employ labor union organizing efforts as a case study in which to
systematically test and expand the resource mobilization perspective, on of the dominant
paradigms in movement research today. I begin by examining the importance of
endogenously mobilized resources on the rate of organizing and the type of tactics
employed. In general, dependence on the national union appears to increase organizing
outcomes, though for most unions, except those affiliated with the SEIU, greater
dependence equals the use of the more conventional organizing tactic, rather than the
increasingly popular corporate campaign. Secondly, in response to resource mobilization
scholars’ efforts to develop typologies of resources that must be mobilized by
movements, I examined the disbursal of resources for organizing, specifically human and
financial resources. I find that for the rate and outcome of NLRB elections, neither plays
any significant role, but that human resources (organizers) are vital for successful corporate campaigns. In addition, these staff are importantly related to NLRB success in unions that make use of both tactics, indicating that experience in more contentious corporate campaigns may be a key to improving the performance of organizers.

Leadership and Organizing  Previous research on labor unions has drawn heavily upon Michel’s iron law of oligarchy to explain the failures of leadership in the labor movement. Recently, however, scholars such as Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003) have challenged many of the assumptions of Michelsian logic. While this new crop of leadership research provides a more dynamic analysis of leadership, it fails to both specify what leadership entails and how it affects movement processes. In Chapter 5 I attend to these deficiencies by drawing upon Weber’s concept of rational-legal authority to develop a systematic conceptualization of leadership, which includes the political administration, the union staff, the national affiliate, and the membership. Because leadership influence may be limited to internal, rather than eternal, SMO dynamics, I link my authority measures to the allocation of resources for organizing and the types of tactics employed. In general, the findings indicate that both political administration and staff authority are negatively related to all organizing outcomes, while parent organization authority increases resources allocated for organizing and NLRB elections, but not corporate campaigns (as discussed above). Membership authority has surprisingly little influence on union dynamics, but, as I acknowledge, my measures of membership influence are somewhat crude.

In general, then, these findings, taken in their entirety, provide both labor scholar a new way to examining labor movement processes and also raise a number of important
issues for social movement scholars, such as the role of authority in SMOs, repertoire choice, and the allocation of resources for social change activities. It is to these broader implications to which I now turn.

Implications

I begin first with the contributions of this dissertation for other scholars interested in union organizing efforts, and indeed all labor movement activities. One objective of this dissertation was the recognition that scholars interested in organized labor, even during the “height” of labor militancy, had confined the influences and activities of the labor movement to the sphere of industrial relations (Commons 1950). This scholarship fails to recognize that unions behave much like other SMOs, and while recent scholarship has begun to recognize this reality (Ganz 2000), there has been little effort to draw upon established social movement theory and methodology to examine organized labor. In this dissertation, I demonstrate how the “tool kit” of movement scholars, from concepts such as repertoires to the resource mobilization perspective, is readily available to explain the mobilization of workers. Additionally, employing newspapers as a systematic source of data, common in much of the broader movements research, allowed me to expand the concept of organizing to include noninstitutionalized corporate campaigns, which, while relatively rare, contributed about half of the all new workers organized by my sample of 70 unions.

While the use of social movement theory and methodology clearly benefited this analysis, it is just as apparent that for too long social movement scholars have ignored the labor movement and its potential implications for social movement theory. Labor scholars, especially historians, have long argued that to understand current labor
phenomena, we must pay close attention to the historical record (Kimeldorf 1999; Voss 1993). In Chapter 2 I demonstrated that in fact the 1990s as a period of analysis is not particularly unique in the broader life-course of the movement. Another contribution of labor scholars is that they have long been interested in the development of solidarity among workers (Fantasia 1988). In chapter 3 I argued that, based on the example of union organizing, the development of solidarity, or collective identity as it is commonly referred to in the social movements literature, is not only a cause of collective behavior, but a consequence as well. Finally, in Chapters 4 and 5 I was able to use union organizing processes to address issues of resource mobilization and the importance of authority within SMOs.

**Directions for Further Research**

The overarching purpose of this dissertation was to systematically examine the relationship between the union organizational structure and their ability to recruit new workers. With this eye on the internal dynamics of organizing, the importance of considering the broader context within which membership mobilization takes place was often overlooked in my analysis. Contextual and external (to the labor union) factors are particularly important for labor movement scholars, many of whom examine the firm as the primary actor in this process. Adopting the political mediation model proposed by Amenta et al. (1992) would bring the firm into the process while continuing to recognize the importance of unions as important actors. The “de-agency” effect is often found in the political opportunity model, which often views movements as passive actors, responding only to changes in the political milieu within which the operate. An alternative, I propose, is to examine the shifting activities of unions in response to their
changing contextual milieu. For example, Lopez (2004) argues that the rise of “new social movement unionism” is due in part to the decline of organized labor’s stronghold, the manufacturing sector, while Cornfield (1989) traces shifts in the internal structure of the United Furniture Workers of America in relation to the trends in the industry as a whole. In both research by Marshall Ganz (2000) and Voss and Sherman (2000), the importance of contextual factors in the internal dynamics of unions, especially leadership, is clearly demonstrated. All of this research demonstrates that changes in the environment affect some labor outcome of interest only by causing shifts in the internal dynamics of labor unions. As soon as we recognize how the process of contextual changes affects SMOs (or indeed any organization) we will have a fuller understanding of internal SMOS processes.

In the 1990s there has been no shortage of contextual “challenges” that unions have had to respond to. Increased immigration from Latin American countries, the continuing decline of manufacturing, the rise of low wage service occupations, and the expansion of global trade all have forced unions to make serious changes or risk a heightened probability of mortality. The research presented here, while overlooking contextual variables, provides scholars with a strong basis for thinking about the relationship between the actor (here the labor union) and the social structure by systematically uncovering the internal dynamics of labor unions. So, for example, if one were interested in the reasons why some unions, such as SEIU and HERE, have been relatively successful in the global economy, while others, including the United Steelworkers, have adopted a protectionist strategy, one should examine the distribution of authority within these organizations, the structure of resources available for change,
and the available options to avoid membership decline. By doing so, we will have continued one of sociology’s central objectives, linking the micro to the macro.

In the 1990s there are not shortages of contextual factors that unions must respond to. Increasing immigration, decline of manufacturing, rise of low wage service occupations, not to mention recent changes in the political structure, all have forced unions to adapt or die. Some, such as the SEIU, have been remarkably successful in organizing the lowest paid workers. Others, including the United Steelworkers, have turned to protectionist strategies to shore up their membership base in the steel industry. One general questions that comes out of these changes in the response of organized labor, both domestically and abroad, to the increasingly global nature of commerce. Some unions, such as SEIU and HERE have successfully adapted to the domestic side of globalization, making strong inroads into immigrant communities. Unions, such as the Autoworkers and Steelworkers, who operate in industries that are losing jobs overseas, have to this point been unable to deal with the increasingly global nature of trade. Globalization is just one challenge that faces labor unions, and to fully understand processes like organizing, we must place the activities of the union within its larger environment.
Bibliography


Downs, Steve and Tim Schermerhorn. 1999. “*Hell on Wheels*: Organizing Among New York City’s Subway and Bus Workers.” Pp. 167-190 in *The Transformation of


McLaughlin, Paul and Marwan Khawaja. 2000. “The Organizational Dynamics of the
U.S. Environmental Movement: Legitimation, Resource Mobilization, and


Revival of American Labor.” Pp. 1-26 in *Not Your Father’s Union Movement*,


Personal Histories by Working-Class Organizers*, edited by Alice Lynd and


Southern California Drywall Strike.” Pp. 169-198 in *Organizing Immigrants*,


During the Transition from Communism in Minks, Belarus, 1990-1995.”
*Mobilization 6:* 129-150.


Curriculum Vitae
Andrew W. Martin

Department of Sociology
The Pennsylvania State University
211 Oswald Tower
University Park, PA 16802
Email: awm127@psu.edu
Web: http://www.personal.psu.edu/awm127
Phone: (814) 863-8868 Fax: (814) 863-7216

Education

Ph.D. 2004 (anticipated) Sociology, The Pennsylvania State University
B.A. 1998 Sociology, University of Minnesota, Duluth, summa cum laude

Dissertation Title
A Return to Their Social Movement Roots: Union Organizing Efforts in the Late Twentieth Century.

Committee: John D. McCarthy (chair), Glenn Firebaugh, Roger Finke, Frank Baumgartner (political science)

Research and Teaching Interests
Social movements; the U.S. Labor movement, both current and historical; Organizational theory; Political sociology; Work and occupations; Quantitative methods and statistics.

Forthcoming Publications
