HOME GROWING TEACHER QUALITY:
DISTRICT PARTNERSHIPS WITH URBAN TEACHER RESIDENCIES

A Thesis in
Educational Theory and Policy

by

Laurence B. Boggess

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The dissertation of Laurence B. Boggess was reviewed and approved* by the following:

Dana L. Mitra
Assistant Professor of Education
Dissertation Adviser
Chair of Committee

David Gamson
Associate Professor of Education

William Lowe Boyd
Batschelet Chair, Professor of Educational Leadership
Educational Leadership

Jacqueline Edmondson
Associate Dean for Teacher Education and Undergraduate Programs
Associate Professor of Education

Gerald K. LeTendre
Department Head, Educational Policy Studies
Professor of Education

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School.
ABSTRACT

This study examined how two urban school districts, Chicago and Boston, trained their own teachers through partnerships with urban teacher residencies—alternative teacher preparation and certification programs based on year-long, in-class apprenticeships with mentor teachers. This “home grown teacher” reform was implemented in response to high rates of new teacher turnover. District and residency leaders attributed this problem to the inadequate preparation new teachers received in traditional college and university teacher education programs. The study asked three questions: How do the districts in Chicago and Boston partner with urban teacher residencies? What do the reformers mean by “teacher quality”? and Why do the district-residency partnerships in Chicago and Boston construct dispositions of teacher quality differently? Proceeding from a conceptual framework that embedded the urban district in a mayorally-controlled urban regime, activated through civic capacity and motivated by resource dependence, the study used a two-site, holistic case study method (Yin, 2003). Qualitative data included interviews with 28 participants, district and residency documents, media reports, and researcher field notes and memos. Data analysis techniques were drawn from case study and grounded theory traditions and were assisted by NVivo7, a qualitative research software program. One set of findings described how the districts partnered with the residencies and identified contractual bridging and proxy control in Chicago and collaborative bridging and civic control in Boston. Another set of findings described how and why the district-residency partnerships constructed varying meanings of teacher quality. The study contributed findings to the research literature on district reform, urban regime analysis, and organizational theory.
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CHAPTER 1 THE PROBLEM

I begin this chapter with a profile of The Cardozo Project as a reminder that educational innovation is rare, as historians reminds us. The reform I examined in this study was not new; however, it was important and timely. I refer to the reform in several ways throughout the study: the home grown teacher reform, districts preparing their own teachers, and district teacher training.¹ I then discuss the problem that prompted this reform. I argue that identifying the problem is no simple task because the problem changes from different points of view. I describe the problem from the point of view of the two districts of interest in this study, Chicago and Boston. In doing so, I raise the question of evidence concerning the district’s framing of the problem. Following a presentation of data to establish the context for the problem, I highlight the key attributes of urban teacher residencies, the organizations with which Chicago and Boston partner in order to prepare their own new teachers to serve in their difficult-to-staff classrooms. I conclude the chapter with a statement of my three research questions which are more fully described in Chapter 3.

Before Chicago and Boston decided to take teacher education into their own hands in 2001 and 2003, Washington, D.C. had done so in the 1960’s. The following section describes a reform with striking similarities to today’s urban teacher residencies. I include more details about the Cardozo Project in Appendix A.

The Cardozo Project

The Washington, D.C. public school district in 1963 began an alternative teacher preparation program to serve a poor and predominantly Black neighborhood in the nation’s capital. Named

¹ To my own peril I interchangeably use “teacher training,” “teacher preparation,” and “teacher education.” They mean different things to different scholars and practitioners. Since I am not assessing the effectiveness or impact of this reform but limiting myself to its description, I make no distinction between a prepared teacher, a trained teacher, and an educated teacher. Those various meaning will be more useful in a follow up study, discussed at the end of Chapter 9. Also see Chapter 4 regarding limitations.
after the high school building that housed the program, the Cardozo Project attracted a variety of college graduates who lacked formal training in a college of education and state certification but wanted to teach in the inner city. Some apprentices came right from college; others came from the Peace Corps and VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America) seeking further opportunities to serve. Some were young men wanting draft deferment from the Vietnam War through community service. The founders of the Cardozo Project, including Larry Cuban, Professor of Education at Stanford University, believed bright and capable college graduates already possessed the intellectual skills needed for urban teaching and could learn the pedagogical skills through an apprenticeship with a master teacher. Cuban explains:

The aim (of the Project) was to develop a new role for urban teachers; teach kids, develop curriculum, and work in the community. It was a tripartite role that demanded a great deal from individuals. We believed that folks coming out of regular teacher ed. programs would be poor candidates for such a complex role (Aaronson, 1999, p. 336).

The first year of the Cardozo Project began with three staff and ten interns (Daly, 1975). Funded by the presidential Committee of Juvenile Delinquency, the Cardozo Project operated on the assumption that traditional university-based teaching had “failed conspicuously” to prepare teachers for the demands of urban teaching (Daly, 1975, p. 386). In 1965 the Cardozo Project received funding from the federal Office of Economic Development; a year later, President Lyndon Johnson signed the National Teacher Corps into existence, a federal program based on the Cardozo Project (Aaronson, 1999). With federal funds devoted to the National Teacher Corps, the Cardozo Project passed into the hands of the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS), where it became a district-funded and program until 1971. In 1968, DCPS made The Cardozo Project an annual budget item with an allocation of $909,000 and a goal of training 114
teachers for the DCPS (Daly, 1975). The Cardozo Project grew from a teacher preparation program in one high school to several schools; ultimately, it operated out of 19 high schools in DCPS. This expansion out of Cardozo High School led to the program’s name change to the Urban Teacher Corps (UTC).

As the program grew from the Cardozo Project to the UTC, it evolved into a 14-month teacher preparation program including summer and academic study in conjunction with Antioch College, Catholic University, Howard University, and Trinity College—D.C. Two years’ worth of seminars would comprise graduate credit towards an M.A.T degree. The program featured three components to its teacher preparation program: supervised internships with an emphasis on curriculum innovation, seminars for professional development, and community involvement. The supervised internships practiced immediate immersion into the urban classroom, learning by doing (under supervision) and encouraged new methods and curricula to spark the interest of and achieve relevance with disadvantaged, urban students. With several interns working in a master teacher’s classroom, synergy between experienced and novice educators created a climate of ongoing discussion and discovery, a “laboratory of experimentation” essential to the interns (Daly, 1975, p. 386). Interns at the elementary level taught a half day and at the junior high or secondary level taught two classes in the morning (Cuban, 1970). Interns attended seminars in the afternoon and after school. Team leaders observed interns teaching and interns observed master teachers teaching in order to learn about engaging students, managing classroom procedures and behavior, using instructional time efficiently, handling discipline problems, and accomplishing daily learning objectives (Aaronson, 1999, p. 336).

The staff of the UTC, former Cardozo staff, devoted considerable energy to finding the teacher interns and master teachers needed to make the program work for a predominantly Black
student population. The all-Black staff recruited teaching interns at Black colleges and universities. In 1969, 60% of the teaching interns were Black. In the late 1960’s, UTC received grant money to professionalize the administrative staff and expand program staff to supervise interns; however, the growth of the program and its legitimacy as a district program required UTC to forego its “free-wheeling” ways and decision-making independence (Daly, 1975, p. 388).

In UTC’s final years, 1969-1971, the program leaders and interns participated in then-Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) workshops and seminars with nationally known educators. As staff leaders became more knowledgeable through these professional development experiences, the program re-focused on teacher accountability and competency based training (Daly, 1975), while still maintaining community involvement as an essential component of the program’s original design. In 1971, a new superintendent eliminated the UTC because of its high cost and the belief, shared by some district administrators, that DCPS should hire only formally trained teachers (Aaronson, 1999 p. 338 citing Tunnell, 1971). Aaronson notes that by the end of the 1970’s, the DCPS preference for formally certified teachers and its decision to stop offering incentives to college graduates with arts and sciences backgrounds led to what Darling-Hammond (1997) identified as a teacher shortage in the 1980’s, a shortage compounded by a surging student enrollment (Aaronson, 1999). While exact figures on Cardozo/UTC graduates are difficult to find, Aaronson cites Tunnell’s 1971 estimation in the Washington Post that approximately 400 teachers had been trained by the programs (Aaronson, 1999). Cuban recalls that teacher attrition for the first three years of the Cardozo Project was similar to the general teaching population at the time (Aaronson, 1999, p. 338).²

² For more details on the Cardozo Project/Urban Teacher Corps, see the Appendix.
Home Growing Teachers in the 21st Century

The Cardozo Project reminds researchers studying home grown teacher training that there is nothing new under the sun, despite the reform rhetoric that touts new, innovative, and radical urban school polices. The reinventions by reformers, often naive of similar reforms which came before, offers lessons from which to learn, as long as reformers are mindful of their assumptions, the broader implications of their policies, and their history. This study examined a reform that looks strikingly similar in design, purpose, and context to the Cardozo Project from 45 years ago. Starting in 2001, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and later the Boston Public Schools (BPS) began experimenting with a district-level experiment in teacher education: training their own new teachers in partnerships with alternative teacher preparation programs called urban teacher residencies.

The purpose of this study was to understand how the districts in Chicago and Boston formed partnerships with urban teacher residencies and how and why the partners defined distinct and differing ideas of “teacher quality” for high-poverty schools and their disadvantaged students.\(^3\)

One challenge of this study was to recognize and then articulate the limits of my scope and purpose. It was a study about reform partnerships and their definitions of teacher quality. It was not a study first and foremost about teacher education reform, although the district-residency partnerships coalesced around teacher education. It was not a study about alternative teacher education and certification programs, although comparisons to Teach for America and the City Teaching Fellows of the New Teacher Project are natural but more appropriate to a separate study. Finally, this was not a study primarily about urban teacher residencies. I wanted to understand how the districts partnered with the residencies, so I learned much about the

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3 “High-poverty” means a majority of students in a district qualify for free or reduced lunch. In Chicago, 86% and in Boston 75% of students are considered low-income.
residencies; however, I did not intend to complete an extensive study of urban teacher residencies, a comprehensive examination of their programs, or an assessment of their outcomes.\(^4\)

The evidence from the study indicates that Chicago and Boston framed their reform problem in similar ways. While their problems may have been similar, their responses varied in important ways. Those variations are introduced in the case description chapters (5 and 6) and in the discussed in the findings chapters (7 and 8).

The Problem According To…

An educational reform responds to a problem, but it is no simple matter to identify that problem. Problem identification raises questions regarding who owns the problem, who gets to frame it, why \textit{this} problem and not \textit{that} problem, what evidence supports the problem’s claim, what purpose is served to identify this problem, and who are the intended beneficiaries of the problem’s solution. In this section, I discuss how the district-residency partnerships frame their instructional problem addressed by their reform, why that frame may have been chosen and with what evidence, and how that frame excludes other problems responsible for the instructional challenges faced by urban districts. I begin by discussing the broad issue of the achievement gap and narrow to focus to the districts’ problems, high teacher turnover.

Urban districts face a persistent problem: too many students, particularly those from disadvantaged circumstances and minority populations, fail to meet rising proficiency targets on math and reading state assessments. Although critics of the use of standardized testing as the sole indicator of student progress make strong arguments (Kornhaber, 2004; Nichols & Berliner, \(^4\)

\(^4\) For more information on limits to this study, see Chapter 4 on methodology. See Chapter 9 for suggestions for further study.
central office leaders rely on such testing as the primary evidence for student learning, school and district success in promoting student learning, and in the case of Chicago, for student promotion (Roderick & Nagaoka, 2005). In Chicago, nearly a third of the city’s approximately 650 schools have failed to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) for five consecutive years (Keller, 2006b). The majority of students in those schools, 92%, are African American and Hispanic. While the 2007 results on the K-8 Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) indicate incrementally improving scores for all students, the achievement gap between Black and White students in Chicago shows no meaningful indication of reduction over the last 10 years (Easton, Luppescu, & Rosenkranz, 2007).

BPS sees some improvement for Black and Hispanic students on the state’s Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS), considered one of the most rigorous state assessment systems. However, the achievement gap has closed little in nine years. Table 1.1 summarizes the proficiency scores for 4th graders in Boston. Despite a 24 point increase in Black students’ ELA score and a 14 point increase in math scores, Blacks have not kept pace with Whites regarding within-race increases or between-race increases. The Black-White achievement gap in 2007 is 30 points in ELA and 34 points in math. Scores for Hispanics\(^6\) reflect similar

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<td>White</td>
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Source: BPS (2008)

5 A consideration of alternative and perhaps more socially just and pedagogically sound assessments is beyond the scope of this study. For now, high-stakes standardized achievement tests are the accepted measures of student learning by states and districts.

6 BPS refers to Latino/Latina students as Hispanics. I will use the BPS term when referring to BPS students.
trends. Perhaps most discouraging is that, even with notable within-race gains in both subject areas, approximately three-fourths of Black and Hispanic students fail to make proficiency as measured by the test.

The primary reason for this gap, reformers in Chicago and Boston say, is the high rate of new teacher turnover (Sanford, 2007; Solomon, 2007). The home grown teacher reform in these cities follows a theory of action illustrated in Figure 1.1. The key actors claim high teacher turnover is the problem, low teacher quality is the effect, and the achievement gap is the resulting civic problem. 

![Figure 1.1 Theory of Action for the Home Grown Teacher Reform](image)

When framing the problem of high teacher turnover in their urban districts, district officials and residency leaders attribute high teacher turnover, low teacher quality, and the resulting problem of the achievement gap to the inadequate preparation of new teachers. The reformers place the blame for this component of low teacher quality on colleges of education and their traditional programs of teacher preparation. Findings in this study indicate that reformers complained that new, university-prepared teachers lacked…

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7 This set of relationships is not tested in this study. My purpose is to convey how the district-residency partners describe the issues, frame the problems, and design and implement the reform.
• realistic expectations for the challenges of urban teaching;
• preparation for classroom control and behavior management;
• specialized skills in special education;
• specialized skills for English Language Learners and understanding of diverse cultures;
• sufficient classroom experience in their student teaching;
• a working knowledge of a district’s curriculum, procedures, and professional culture, and
• a genuine commitment to urban teaching, instead, taking the only jobs available to inexperienced teachers who leave or move as soon a possible to better schools with better working conditions.

Jesse Solomon, Director of the Boston Teacher Residency (BTR), one of the two alternative teacher preparation programs called “urban teacher residencies” examined in this study, voiced the district’s dissatisfaction with university-prepared new teachers in written testimony to a 2007 Congressional hearing on the reauthorization of No Child Left Behind:

Four years ago, Boston Public Schools (BPS) superintendent Thomas Payzant made the critical decision that the BPS would begin to recruit and prepare its own teachers. Frustrated by the inability of local institutions of higher education to help the district fill openings in high-needs areas, and facing a 50% turnover rate for teachers in their first three years, Superintendent Payzant decided that the district would compete directly with higher education. Payzant was concerned that too many of the teachers coming through existing routes were under-prepared for the realities of urban teaching and not committed to Boston for the long term. Further, existing routes were not producing enough teachers in the high-
needs areas of math, science and special education, and too few of the program graduates were teachers of color (Solomon, 2007).

Solomon said the district wanted to “compete directly” with higher education. This meant that while there was no shortage of applications to BPS every year, there was a shortage of what district leaders would consider qualified teachers who were certified in the specialized content areas and possessed the skills most needed in BPS classrooms and the commitment to teach long-term in Boston.

Jarvis Sanford, a leader of the Academy for Urban School Leadership (AUSL) in Chicago and Principal of Dodge Renaissance Academy, an AUSL-run district school, testified before a U.S. House of Representatives committee on education: “The traditional approaches to teacher training are not providing the quantity or quality of teachers and principals we will need to transform American education” (Sanford, 2007). Both Solomon and Jarvis argued that the reform their programs implemented through a relationship between the district and the urban teacher residency, what I refer to throughout this study as the “district-residency partnership,” would reduce new teacher turnover in their cities.

Several reasons explain why the district-residency partners chose this problem frame. While other variables can contribute to low teacher quality in urban schools (see Figure 1.1), Chicago and Boston determined they wanted to control their own teacher pipeline by re-building it themselves. By training their own teachers, districts translated complex teacher education, workforce, and demographic issues into a clear reform agenda with a focused rhetoric: prepare our own teachers, improve teacher quality, and reduce the achievement gap. The main talking point claimed that “colleges of education had failed us (urban districts), so we took matters into our own hands.”
The district-residency partners in Chicago and Boston were not the only critics of university-based teacher education. Perhaps the most notable is Arthur Levine, former president of Teachers College at Columbia University. Levine’s report *Educating School Teachers* (2006) argues that traditional, university-based teacher preparation programs are not preparing teachers for the demands and realities of school teaching, especially in urban settings. In the often-heated debate regarding the merits of teacher certification and other credentials, critics of certification such as deregulationist Kate Walsh, president of the National Council on Teacher Quality, champion one blend of evidence. Walsh (2001) maintains that high-achieving graduates of liberal arts colleges can make effective classrooms teachers. This was Larry Cuban’s claim when he was a leader of the Cardozo Project. Alternative certification, claims Walsh, enables talented individuals to enter the classroom, avoiding the time-consuming and expensive hurdles and hoops associated with traditional methods of gaining state licensure. Walsh argues that alternative certification programs can be effective if infused with high standards of selectivity, academic rigor, and practical training (Walsh & Jacobs, 2007). The district-residency partners in Chicago and Boston belong to this camp. In contrast, professionals such as Linda Darling-Hammond maintain that traditionally trained and certified teachers outperform teachers from alternative teacher preparation programs such as Teach for America (Darling-Hammond, Holtzman, Gatlin, and Heilig, 2005).

Urban central office leaders frame the achievement gap as a problem of high teacher turnover. This claim, however, does not consistently track with the evidence. District leaders and residency reformers commonly cite the statistic that *half of the new teachers in urban schools leave their jobs within the first three to five years*. This figure proves difficult to confirm for specific districts with specific evidence from peer-reviewed journals or the districts’ own
publicly accessible information. For example, Harvard education professor Susan Moore
Johnson noted in *The Boston Globe*, “Nationwide, one-third of the new teachers leave within
three years, and 45 to 50 percent within five years. A 2004-2005 study done in the Boston public
schools showed that 57 percent of new teachers were leaving after three years” (Miller, 2006).
That internal district study, however, is not available to the public. Jesse Solomon, Director of
the BTR, referred to the 50% new teacher turnover statistic in his written testimony to Congress
in June 2007 but did not cite that source. The “half leave” statistic may be more conventional
wisdom than substantiated finding (Keller, 2007).

Recent research suggests the 50% turnover rate in urban districts and particularly in Chicago
may be exaggerated. DeAngelis and Presley (2007) conducted a study of new teacher turnover
and teacher mobility in Illinois and determined that teacher turnover in CPS is closer to 27%,
still a matter of concern but less alarming. Noting improvement in teacher retention in
Philadelphia, a 2006 report by the National Comprehensive Center for Teacher Quality found
that 90% of new teachers remain in their jobs during their first year compared to 73% in 2003.
Second year retention increased from 77% in 2003 to 81% in 2006. The researchers found that of
the new teachers hired in 1999 in Philadelphia, 30% remained in the district and 16% stayed in
their schools after six years (National Comprehensive Center for Teacher Quality, 2006). This
finding supports the “half leave” statistic but extends the time period to six years rather than
three to five years.

According to Ingersoll’s research, 16% of U.S. teachers leave their jobs annually, with about
20% turnover occurring in high poverty schools. Additionally, 33% of new teachers leave
teaching altogether in the first three years and 46% leave after the first five years (Ingersoll,
2002). Ingersoll’s findings seems to support the “half leave” statistic, particularly if those who
use that statistic round up, but they suggest that teacher turnover is widely variable on a school-
to-school basis depending on funding and organizational qualities such as effective recruitment,
induction, and professional development (Ingersoll, 2001). Ingersoll’s research, while not
shedding light particularly on Chicago or Boston, provides credible national turnover data. His
Countering the explanation that teacher turnover is due to waves of retirements, Ingersoll
identifies job satisfaction and job mobility, keenly relevant in urban districts, as primary factors
in teacher turnover. This suggests the CPS and BPS claim that teacher turnover is due to
inadequate teacher preparation may not account for other important job satisfaction factors more
likely to be within the district’s scope of responsibility.

Exact turnover figures for individual districts are difficult to examine for two reasons: some
districts do not publish this information and a wide variation of “turnover” categories
complicates the data. For example, a district’s turnover data can lump together teachers dropping
out of the profession permanently, teachers moving to a new school within a district or moving
between districts, and teachers leaving and returning to the profession. The DeAngelis and
Presley report (2007) disaggregates these “leaver” categories, providing a more realistic picture
of actual new teacher drop out. The issue of teacher turnover in urban districts, while difficult to
precisely measure, is nevertheless a concern to central office leadership. The oft-cited 50% new
teacher turnover rate, whether accurate or exaggerated, is central to the discourse used to frame
the problem in Chicago and Boston.

By blaming traditional teacher preparation programs for high teacher turnover, the districts
discount or avoid mention of other related workforce trends such as competition from more
affluent districts offering higher salaries, safer schools, and better working conditions. The
districts do not mention the possible impact on turnover from district and state financing formulas, reduced tax bases resulting from demographic changes in the central cities, and the fear of school closure (and job loss) due to low AYP proficiency performance. Other related problems include teacher sorting by district officials (Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002), the inequitable distribution of qualified, effective, and experienced teachers, and the systemic effects of social and economic policies that contribute to poverty and racial discrimination. These last two issues are particularly relevant to the discussion.

The blame, as framed by CPS and BPS district officials and residency leaders, may not completely fall on colleges of education; the district may share in the responsibility for perceived low teacher quality if the frame shifts from high teacher turnover to the *inequitable distribution of teachers* within a district. The National Comprehensive Center for Teacher Quality found that high poverty and high minority urban schools experience a disproportionate lack of teachers with classroom experience and full certification, making those schools more likely to experience an inequitable distribution of qualified teachers (NCCTQ, 2006). Akiba, LeTendre, and Scribner confirmed the inequitable distribution of teachers in America, what they call an “opportunity gap” in a student’s access to a qualified teacher (2007). Noting research suggesting that that certification, subject matter knowledge, pedagogical knowledge, and teaching experience are significantly associated with higher student achievement or greater achievement gains (Darling-Hammond & Youngs, 2003; Wayne & Youngs, 2003), and that high school math students had higher gains when teachers were certified in math (Goldhaber & Brewer, 1997), Akiba, et al. (2007) concluded that poor and minority students in the United States are significantly less likely than comparable students in other countries to be taught by a qualified teacher.
Underperforming schools not only have a disproportionate number of under-qualified teachers, these teachers are also more likely to lack the academic skills of their suburban counterparts (Wayne, 2002). These inequities pose serious implications for student learning. Citing evidence suggesting students learn better from teachers with better academic skills (Hanushek, 1997, Mayer, Mullens, & Moore, 2000), Wayne (2002) concludes that a large academic skills gap exists between teachers in high poverty schools compared to teachers in more affluent schools; this skills gap is as concerning as the gap in credentials. Useem, Farley, and Offenberg (2007) found that while Philadelphia was making some improvement in closing the teacher quality gap through increased site selection of teachers, reducing seniority-based school transfer of veteran teachers, and reducing the number of teachers with emergency certification, the district made little to no progress on improving the equity of teacher distribution.

An argument can be made that districts have little control over strong teachers unions and collective bargaining agreements that give senior faculty preferential treatment in classroom and school assignments. However, even when senior teachers lose some their preferences through language adjustments in union contracts, the inequitable distribution of teachers is not significantly reduced (Koski & Horng, 2007). This finding suggests that if districts wanted to reduce the inequitable distribution of teachers, they could progress toward this goal, although the financial and political costs would be considerable.

Understandably, urban districts are reluctant to implicate themselves in an instructional capacity problem such as inequitable distribution, yet they do hold special responsibilities with regard to students and achievement and compliance with No Child Left Behind. The legislation requires districts to report their equity plans, that is, the steps they are taking to make sure highly
qualified teachers are equitably distributed across district schools. Not all districts have complied. Education Trust—West (2006a) found half of all California “intern certified” teachers, similar to emergency or provisional certification, worked in schools serving 91%-100% minority students, with the greatest shortages in qualified science and math teachers The Education Trust (2006a) researchers also found that 42 of the state’s 50 largest districts spend significantly less on teacher salaries in schools serving the Latino and African-American students than schools with the fewest number of these students In a follow up study, Education Trust concluded that California’s state education office seems to lack the capacity to conduct meaningful analyses of teacher distribution; the state’s equity plan, required by NCLB, did not address how it will address the distribution issue (Education Trust—West, 2006b).

High teacher turnover and the inequitable distribution of teachers are problems for which the urban school district holds primary responsibility, regardless of the extent to which they claim ownership. Broader based problems, however, may play an equally if not more important role in the districts’ staffing problems. Figure 1.1 indicates that poverty and the institutionalized racism that sustains it are considerable contenders for the high turnover rate of new teachers in urban districts.

Urban students live in social and economic systems that create poverty, re-enforce racial discrimination, and exacerbate class stratification (Anyon, 1997, 2005; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Rothstein, 2004). Gang violence, wide-spread unemployment, discriminatory housing policies, drug addiction, and inadequate health care directly and indirectly impact student learning. Lionel Allen, principal of the Sherman School in Chicago, addresses these conditions of learning in the city’s South Side:
The reality is…very tough. I don’t care how many incentives you offer people…you still have to come to work every day. And when you are dealing with students who are raising themselves, whose families have been destroyed by drugs and violence, who many of them feel like nobody cares about them…when you are working with…kindergartners who come in and don’t know how to hold a book…and if you can’t see beyond all those social ills and look at the core of that student and believe that they can be successful…you’re going to run out of here…you’re going to run, and, they’re used to that.

Allen’s observation points to the profound and long-term impact that poverty has on urban schools and students. Districts can address problems of instructional capacity, but they are limited in the extent to which they can effect social change. Figure 1.2 serves as a reminder that the theory of action of home grown teachers must be studied in its social and economic context. In the case description chapters for Chicago and Boston, I provide data to place the home grown teacher reform in its social and economic context of poverty.

**Figure 1.2 The Problem in its Context of Poverty**

Data from this study indicated that the districts in Chicago and Boston frame the problem to suit their purposes. It makes good policy sense to frame a problem that can be solved. By identifying
the problem as high teacher turnover and the cause as inadequate teacher education at the college and university level, the districts constructed a policy problem they can address through partnerships with urban teacher residencies (UTRs), a reform rhetoric that can blame and praise as needed (Henig & Stone, 2008), and a political position from which to create and disseminate the intended benefits of the reform among students, district-trained teachers, reformers, and the private partners whose resources and capacities make the reform possible.

This study examines these partnerships and contributes the first empirical findings regarding the formation, function, and funding of urban teacher residencies. The following section provides an overview of the residencies, starting with the context of alternative teacher preparation and then describing their reform and resources they bring to their partnerships with CPS and BPS. In Chapters 5 and 6, I describe the residencies in detail, including the voices of residency leaders, staff, graduates who are now full-time teachers, and residents themselves.

An Overview of Urban Teacher Residencies

Urban districts such as Chicago and Boston are dramatically increasing the number of alternatively trained and certified new teachers they hire each year. Toni Hill, director of the Chicago Public School District’s Routes to Teaching Program, a district department that oversees alternative teaching pathways, estimates that half of the math and science teachers hired in the district for 2004-2005 school year came from alternative programs, a figure up 45% from the previous year (Williams, 2004). Between 2000 and 2004, the number of teachers from alternative programs in Chicago increased from 140 to 417 (Williams, 2004), about a fourth of the city’s total new hires each year. Boston, which hires 400 to 500 teachers a year, sees a substantial portion of these hires coming from alternative teacher training programs as Teach for
America and Boston Teaching Fellows, a regional unit of the New Teacher Project founded by the current chancellor Washington, DC public schools, Michelle Rhee.

State-level statistics provide a glimpse of the growth of alternative certification programs throughout the United States. For example, according to the National Center for Education Information for school year 2004-2005, California hired over 8,300 alternatively prepared teachers, an increase of more than 7,000 teachers since 1995. Massachusetts hired over 8,000, and Texas hired almost 10,000 teachers from alternative programs, more than triple the number in 1995 and about 42% of the state’s total new hires. Approximately 35,000 individuals a year enter teaching through alternative teacher certification routes (National Center for Education Information, 2007). In the District of Columbia, almost of quarter of the new teachers in 2004 and third of the new teachers in 2005 came from alternative routes to certification such as Teach for America and the DC Teaching Fellows, for the first time providing meaningful competition for district jobs (Rotherham & Sullivan, 2006).

The CPS ad BPS home grown teacher reform is one of many experiments designed to reduce new teacher turnover, increase retention, and make more equitable the distribution of qualified, effective, and committed teachers across all schools in an urban district. The evidence in this study indicated that urban teacher residencies (UTRs), as teacher training programs, replicate the classroom experience. A university professor and AUSL liaison in Chicago observes:

I think one of the things that the program stresses is that it's fast-paced. It's a huge time commitment. You’ve got to grind the stuff out. But I think it mimics the life of a first year teacher. In my experience [as a teacher], you stay up till one o'clock. You stay till 7:30 to get all your copies made. That's what happens. And that's sort of an eye-opening thing for people who thought, “Won't it be cool to have summers off? It can't be that bad, you
know? I was in advertising for ten years, and now I'm doing this, and it can't be as bad as advertising.” Well, yes it can!

UTRs are private or semi-private, non-profit, alternative teacher preparation programs that Linda Darling-Hammond calls “…perhaps the beginning of the most necessary reform in teacher education” (Keller, 2006a). Three urban teacher residencies currently operate in the United States: the Academy for Urban School Leadership (AUSL) in Chicago (founded in 2001), the Boston Teacher Residency (BTR) in Boston (founded in 2003), and the Boettcher Teacher Program in the Denver area (founded in 2003). UTRs attract college graduates and career-changers wanting a fast track into teaching and demonstrating a commitment to urban teaching as a long-term career. UTRs offer a full-time, one-year residency designed in part on the concept of the medical residency with an intensive cohort apprenticeship in a mentor teacher’ urban classroom and academic study outside of the school day. In AUSL and BTR, cohorts of 50 to 80 residents a year work in residency-approved classrooms or, in the case of Chicago, in residency-run training academies (district schools). In addition to mentor teachers, the residencies use a variety of building site managers and field coaches and residency staff to provide support to residents, mentors, and graduate residents who become teachers-of-record.

AUSL residents make a five-year commitment and BTR residents make a four year commitment including the one-year residency (with summer study on both ends) and the remaining years as fully-salaried teachers of record. In return for their multi-year commitment and their work in the classroom during the residency year, residents receive a variety of financial incentives including a cash stipend, loans to pay for a masters degree earned during the residency year, loan forgiveness, and federally-sourced grants upon completion of the multi-year commitment. Non-monetary incentives include field coaching for two to three years as teachers.

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8 The Boettcher UTR is excluded from this study. See Chapter 4 for more details.
of record, assignment in schools with other cohort members, highly qualified status upon graduation, and in Chicago, automatic membership in the Chicago Teachers Union. AUSL residents are guaranteed jobs in one of the several district schools AUSL independently operates. All of these schools have failed to make AYP for five consecutive years, are identified a high-poverty with majority non-White students whose scores on the state achievement test are consistently below the 25th percentile for proficiency for all grades K-8 in all subject areas. BTR residents are guaranteed jobs, but they must apply for openings throughout the district.

The curricular program of the residencies include classroom management, planning, and assessment, child psychology and human development, content area studies include math, social studies, science, language arts, reading, and special education training. Boston places special emphasis on diversity training, and all BTR residents are dual certified in subject area (middle and secondary) or elementary division as well as special education. Residents are regularly assessed and, in cases where a resident is not progressing as expected, may be counseled out of the program by mid-year. Attrition rates of residents are not available. According to anecdotal sources, overall teacher retention for residency-trained classroom teachers averages around 90%, although many residents are currently fulfilling their multi-year commitment with incentives.

AUSL and BTR are considered expensive programs by many study participants with annual budgets exceeding $3 million as of 2006. AUSL’s expenses in particular are high because they combine school reconstitution and management (re-staffing, refurbishing, and repairing) with alternative teacher preparation. Both AUSL and BTR receive some public money for operating expenses; AUSL receives some federal money while BTR receives half of its funding from the district. Both residencies rely heavily on financial support from individual and corporate donors.
One significant difference between AUSL and the other UTRs is that the residency combines two reform mission missions into one: it trains new teachers who are expected to remain in their jobs, and the residency independently manages reconstituted schools that CPS has declared “failed.” Chapter 5 describes this dual reform in detail while Chapter 6 describes BTR’s mission to increase retention by increasing the diversity of BPS and provide a third of the city’s new teachers each year.

Many of the features of today’s UTRs were evident the Cardozo Project and Urban Teacher Corps between 1963 and 1971. Most significant perhaps are the emphases on full-time apprenticeships, relations with mentors, cohort learning and teaching, and the commitment to underserved schools and disadvantaged students. Unlike the Cardozo Project, UTRs may be less vulnerable to the whims of changing superintendents and the fate of public budgets for two reasons. The UTRs in Chicago and Boston are embedded in long-term mayorally controlled urban school districts (see Chapter 3) and unlike the Cardozo Project, have secured seemingly reliable and diversified mix of private, corporate, a public revenue streams (see Chapter 7).

In the next section of this chapter, I state my three research questions. The first two are descriptive in nature; the third is explanatory. I discuss these differences in Chapter 4.

Research Questions

This study asks three research questions whose purposes are to describe how the districts partner with the urban teacher residencies in Chicago and Boston and to explain why the partners in each city define attributes of teacher quality differently. The questions are:
1. How do the districts partner with urban teacher residencies?
2. What do district and residency reformers and actors mean by “teacher quality”?
3. Why do the district-residency partnerships in Chicago and Boston construct dispositions of teacher quality differently?

Organization of the Study

This study is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the problem around which the reformers partnered in Chicago and Boston. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature, starting from a broad perspective and narrowing to this study. Chapter 3 presents my conceptual framework, based on urban regime analysis, and explains the purposes and meanings of the three research questions. Chapter 4 explains my methodology and design choices. Chapter 5 is a case description of Chicago, including a detailed profile of AUSL and its partnership with the district. Chapter 6 is a case description of Boston and describes BTR. Chapter 7 is the first of two findings chapters that describes how the districts partner, and Chapter 8 is the second findings chapter that explains variations in the definitions of teacher quality between cases. Chapter 9 concludes the study with a discussion of the significance of this study, the implications of its findings, suggestions for policymakers, and suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE

This study builds on four strands of research literature examining how districts behave when confronted with problems related to instructional capacity and student learning. Figure 2.1 depicts how these strands relate, starting from the most general literature at the top of the funnel and narrowing to this study. The figure places my work in the district reform literature; at the time of its completion, this was the only study to examine how districts partner with urban teacher residencies in order to train their own teachers and define unique constructions of teacher quality. The study contributes to the literature an initial set of descriptive findings and new theoretical concepts, presented in Chapter 9, upon which future research can build.

![Figure 2.1 The Narrowing Focus of the Research Literature](image)

Throughout this study, the term “district” encompasses two meanings. In the broadest organizational sense, the district is the geographical, legal, and political organization responsible for carrying out a state’s compulsory education policy and overseeing instruction and student performance (Anderson, 2003). This definition positions CPS and BPS as bureaucratic entities with thousands of employees and hundreds of schools. In the political sense, I am interested in
urban district decisions and strategies when confronting problems such as teacher turnover and the achievement gap. For this political level I use “district” to mean the central office leadership, the superintendent and administrators of departments such as human resources, teaching and learning, and in Chicago, administrators overseeing new schools. As “the district,” central office leaders are the legitimized representatives of the local public education system authorized who form relationships with member school leaders and teachers, students and families, teachers unions, private contractors, local civic and business organizations, special interests, and the media.

My use of the term district as central office leadership builds on the research literature strands discussed in this chapter, in particular on the work of Coburn, Honig, and Spillane who focus on the political level—central office leaders who, as representatives of large bureaucratic institutions, engage in learning, using and interpreting data and evidence, and whose instructional decisions are based in part on individuals’ abilities to understand the intricacies of curriculum (see the following sections for a specific discussion of these authors’ work).

Throughout the study, then, I use “district” most frequently in the political sense and interchangeably with “central office leadership” as the organizational representatives who frame problems, mobilize civic capacity, and enter into partnerships with urban teacher residencies in order to reduce teacher turnover, expand instructional capacity, and address the achievement gap.

The remainder of this chapter looks at the strands of district-related literature. I start from a broad, city-wide perspective of mayoral control of schools and the privatized relationships common to mayorally controlled districts such as the two cases in this study. I then discuss how Chicago and Boston are learning organizations that use data and evidence in decisions-making for the purpose of reform. The most specific strand of literature relevant to this study looks at the
robust research on districts as agents of change and innovators of instructional reform. I then show how my study, one example of district-driven teacher education reform, fits into the landscape of district reform research literature.

Mayoral Control of Schools

The story of Chicago and Boston training their own teachers is rooted mayoral control of public schools (Cuban and Usdan, 2003; Henig & Rich, 2003; Kirst & Bulkley, 2001; Useem, Christman, & Boyd, 2008; Wong & Shen, 2001, 2003). Boston and Chicago came under mayoral control in the early to mid 1990’s and were catalyzed by the 1994 mid-term elections that installed conservative Republican politicians into the federal and state legislatures. Like other urban districts in this wave of takeovers including Newark, NJ, Baltimore, Cleveland, and later Philadelphia and New York City, Chicago and Boston saw their state and local legislators re-write laws inoculating takeover mayors, their appointed school boards and superintendents, and their accompanying reforms from legal challenge. Legal challenges, however, were launched, most notably from citizen activist groups claiming takeovers violated their voting rights by removing elected school boards and replacing them with appointed boards.

Mid-1990’s reformers championed the standards movement crystallized in the President George Herbert Walker Bush’s 1989 Governors Education Summit in Charlottesville (Vinovskis, 1999). This gathering of governors cited benefits of mayoral control of schools that answered the fiscal insolvency, low student achievement, and lack of teacher, student, principal, and district accountability that frustrated groups of city officials, local and state legislators, and families and community and business organizations. For example, moving school district operation into the mayor’s office was thought to create “integrated governance” in which
mayoral politics synthesized with school district performance, resulting in a consolidation of power reducing district fragmentation and placing responsibility in one office (Wong & Shen, 2003). Takeovers allowed mayors to install system-wide standards and rely on those standards to hold schools and students accountable for performance while the mayors were themselves held accountable through elections. Mayoral control intended to bring capacity-building leverage to the problems of urban districts, such as high teacher turnover and low student achievement experienced by CPS and BPS.

Wong and Shen (2001, 2003) identify several organizing principles accompanying mayoral takeovers that directly apply to Chicago and Boston:

- Existing political structures such as school districts and teachers unions are not easily alterable. Chicago particularly experienced decades of teacher union unrest that ended through negotiation and deal-making with the mayor’s takeover. For example, the mayor met union demands for what became the shortest school day in any American urban district (just over five hours);

- District and state-level administration are empowered to intervene in failing schools. The takeovers in Chicago and Boston required state intervention to pass laws that allowed mayors discretion in addressing underperforming schools. The mechanics of AYP in No Child Left Behind (NCLB) reinforced mayors’ reform decisions regarding “failed schools, those schools failing to make AYP. Chicago ultimately decided to reconstitute and privatize public school management, allowing a variety of school designs to proliferate (see Chapter 5). Boston decided to create a tighter alignment between district goals, curriculum, and outcomes. Additionally, in 1995 BPS also started pilot
schools, existing schools allowed more site-based autonomy—an example of the district’s preference to work from within existing schools instead of starting over with restructured, redesigned, or reconstituted schools;

- City Hall manages conflicting interests and reduces fragmentary rules. The centralization of educational governance, policy, and rhetoric possible with mayoral control makes possible relatively uncontested reform implementation and unfettered dissemination of district mission and values. Chicago and Boston instituted their home grown teacher reform with relatively little resistance from the teachers unions or local universities. Chicago’s decision to combine district teacher training with school reconstitution, however, has not quelled controversy nor eliminated fragmentation (see Chapter 5);

- Mayors can integrate the district’s political accountability and educational performance standards at the system-wide level. Educational reforms, driven by mayors and appointed district leadership, and the new system actors needed for those reforms, such as urban teacher residencies, are protected from accountability threats through the office of the mayor (discussed further in Chapter 3). By making one person accountable for a city’s educational system, and by positioning that accountability mechanism into a four or six-year election cycle, mayoral control creates a condition conducive for reform experimentation and unilateral implementation.

These organizing principles bring into relief the advantages and disadvantages of mayoral takeover. Advantages include a single point of electoral accountability, a greater integration of city services, the potential for improved schools to spur city economic development and attract

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9 I visited Boston’s English High School, the national oldest high school, recently given pilot school status. I attended an evening work session on goal setting introduced by the new district superintendent Carol Johnson.
and retain more middle class residents, and a closer alliance between city government and business (Kirst, 2001). Mayoral takeovers potentially address prolonged district dysfunction characterized by leadership and management problems, the inability or unwillingness of school boards to respond to problems, the depoliticization of school governance through appointed boards, and greater decision-making efficiency (Green & Carl, 2000).

The advantages of mayoral control, however popular with frustrated state and city legislatures and community leaders, are counterbalanced by their disadvantages. Placing the control of an urban district in the office of the mayor changes the politics of elected school boards but does not remove politics from district governance. Placing accountability on one person in one office elected by the voters makes it clear who is responsible but creates a potentially greater barrier to citizens demanding a voice in school governance and change in school policies. While mayors may be better suited to run school districts like businesses, improving financial operations, streamlining decision-making, and elevating test scores over other outcomes as measures of success, mayoral control is vulnerable to two key but debatable assumptions: mayors are knowledgeable enough about schools to managed large districts and appoint superintendents and school board directors. The second assumption of mayoral control is that the management strategies that work for businesses work for schools. Unlike businesses, however, schools are notoriously loosely-coupled (Weik, 1976) with uncertain mechanisms of control over their core operation—classroom instruction. Further, some argue that schools should not be treated as businesses because citizens invest in their schools multiple purposes and aims, for example, to prepare future citizens for their role in a participatory democracy, to promote cultural unity, and to improve social conditions (Cuban, 2004).

Mayoral takeovers have potentially significant social disadvantages. Since there are no
established patterns to takeovers, each occurring a unique context with unique personalities, interest groups, and legalities of local governance (Kirst, 2002), mayoral control of urban districts raises questions concerning which institutions in a city should be the key decision makers and what authority should be invested in different institutional actors (Kirst & Bulkley, 2001). There are credible reasons why mayors should not be key decision-makers in urban districts. Mayoral takeovers occur most frequently in urban districts with a majority of poor and minority student populations. In light of this demographic, takeovers can be perceived as attempts by White political elites—the mayors and appointed superintendents in Chicago and Boston who partnered with urban teacher residencies—to deny minority self-governance of schools (Green & Carl, 2000). When mayors are in control of schools, they are also in control of the criteria used to determine school failure and low student achievement. Most often, this criterion is the high stakes test, subject to bias when used with poor minority populations and teacher and administrator cheating (Jacob, 2002). Mayoral control denies majority non-White populations in urban districts the right to elect their own school board members, a crucial mechanism, if not always functional, of local democratic participation in neighborhood schools. Kirst (2001) observes that appointed school boards result in less democracy and representation of underrepresented and disadvantaged regions of a city. Wong and Shen (2003) cite problems with mayoral control of schools such as the appointment of inexperienced people to school boards, confrontations among community groups, the legal and social implications of predominantly black school districts taken over by white legislators, mayors, and superintendents, the perception of infringement on educators’ professional autonomy, the mayor’s lack of educational expertise.
The two districts in this study have been under mayoral control for a decade and a half, with the same mayors and long-term superintendents. Over time, Chicago and Boston have partnered to varying degrees with private organizations. This study raises a question I address in Chapter 9: is the home grown teacher reform in Chicago and Boston dependent on those urban districts being controlled, long term, by mayors? Part of that answer involves the availability, legitimacy, and capacity of private organizations seeking to partner with districts for educational reform. The next section highlights the privatization literature related to urban districts.

District and Private Partners

Urban districts have increasingly privatized some of their functions throughout the last two decades. Of the issues associated with privatization—choice, charter schools, vouchers, contractual management of schools—this study recognizes two in Chicago and Boston: teacher preparation and school management. Specifically, Chicago privatizes teacher preparation and management of failed schools; Boston semi-privatizes teacher preparation. These reforms rely on the fundamental assumption that market forces such as choice, autonomy, and competition will lead to better student outcomes through better efficiency and innovation (Rhim, 2007). The evaluative message in privatization of public schools is that the educational professionals cannot successfully run billion-dollar school systems; instead, they have created systems of bureaucracy, waste, and resistance to accountability. By opening up district functions to leaner, efficient, and entrepreneurial actors and giving them autonomy to compete, the resulting climate of competition will improve district performance and student learning.

Privatization is a common response to a lack of district capacity. When districts experience strained resources and workforce problems such as high teacher turnover, believed by the
districts to result in low student achievement and school underperformance on state assessments, they sometimes respond by forming entrepreneurial partnerships with private organizations (Boyd, 2007; Bulkley, 2007; Burch, 2002; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 1997). These external organizations, often designed to provide solutions to district problems, extend a district’s capacity in a variety of areas. Considerable attention has been directed toward the Philadelphia school district as one of the country’s most prolific diverse provider models of contractual school management (Boyd, Christman, & Useem, Forthcoming; Christman, Gold, & Herrold, 2006). Philadelphia has privatized specific district functions such as school operation and professional development through for-profit and non-profit agencies, most notably, the private for-profit Edison Schools. Other entrepreneurial partners help districts comply with No Child Left Behind guidelines by providing supplemental educational services (Burch, Steinberg, & Donovan, 2007; MacIver & Stringfield, 2000).

Like Philadelphia, Chicago has recently created an extensive set of arrangements with private for-profit and non-profit school management organizations to reach Mayor Richard Daley’s goal of 100 new schools by 2010. Boston, in contrast, has chosen not to privatize the management of its schools although, as in Chicago, Philadelphia, and other urban districts, its charter schools, pilot schools, and school choice plan reflect the district’s belief that competition among schools, activated through choice, motivates efficiency and effectiveness and improves student learning.

AUSL and BTR exemplify two types of private partners. AUSL is an independent, private, non-profit organization governed by a Board of Directors charged with engaging in contractual agreements with CPS. In the context of the research literature, AUSL is a full-fledged private partner. Unlike Edison Schools, for example, which until recently was a for-profit organization

11 See Chapters 5 and 6 for descriptions of AUSL and BTR as private partners.
expected to earn money for the company, AUSL is non-profit, investing privately-raised funds into its own growth. BTR is semi-private, meaning it is a program conceived and run by the district yet its financial affairs are managed by a non-profit, the Boston Plan for Excellence (BPE). This hybrid status, what participants described as “one foot in and one foot out” of the district, is designed to compete on the free market with colleges and universities and qualifies BTR as a semi-privatized district partner.

The reform partners in this study coalesced around the functions of teacher education and school management. Their reform, to varying extents, links private money with the core of public education—the education, training, and development of the teacher in the classroom. In Chapters 3, 7 and 8 I examine the structure by which the districts and private partners related and the influence on definitions of teacher quality those structures made possible.

Districts as Users of Evidence

Chapter 1 discussed the belief held by district and residency leaders that half of the new teachers leave their jobs within the first three to five years. I argued this was a piece of data for which district-specific evidence was difficult to find but nevertheless essential to the district reformers. Chicago and Boston central office leaders are constantly required to work in learning situations in which evidence is presented or sought. As they interpret policies, attend or ignore information, and make decisions affecting instruction, central office leaders do so in political and social and contexts (Honig, 2007). For example, districts must learn to respond to a variety of learning demands including collecting and interpreting school information, district organizational information, and information about the district’s credibility in the public sphere. Specifically, this learning involves the search, encoding, and retrieval functions of information
management as well as interpretation and engagement in the meaning sharing of joint work (Honig, 2007). *Search* involves the identification of problems through practice, such as implementation of reforms; *encoding* incorporates new information learned in policies and rules while *retrieval* refers to the ongoing use of acquired information for new learning situation (Honig, 2007). Evidence in this study indicates that CPS placed greater emphasis on encoding than search and retrieval. For example, the district relied on a narrow range of information, student scores and attendance rates, to assess student learning, ignoring other sources of information such as teacher assessment or levels of student engagement. The district preferred to encode information acquired from initial experiments in privatized management of underperforming schools, creating policies and mechanisms such as the performance contract to routinize privatized management of schools (see Chapter 5). BPS, in contrast, balanced search, encoding, and retrieval functions. For example, based on search behaviors such as teacher and principle input and district-wide conversations, BPS encoded this information into a Whole School Improvement initiative and City Wide Learning Standards (BPS, 2008). These tools for aligning standards and practice were a central part of the district’s ongoing assessments and retrieval functions.

Central office leaders do not just use evidence to learn about problems and conditions within their district; they also experience learning situations when required to make decisions about unfamiliar curriculum. Research suggests that district leaders as makers and implementers of curricular reforms may be limited in their implementation and thus their effectiveness as instructional leaders by their ability to cognitively understand the theories and functioning of new curricula (Spillane, 2000). Other research indicates that central office leaders, when experiencing actual or imagined external accountability pressures, learn to use evidence in order
to justify the formation of authentic or symbolic capacity-building partnerships with external actors (Mitra & Boggess, in preparation).

Federal education policy, funding, and to an increasing extent educational research journals have grown increasingly focused on “scientific evidence,” defined as findings resulting from randomly assigned and controlled experiments as the most desirable and actionable data for policy, funding, and publication. Evidence, however, does not speak for itself. The notice, interpretation, understanding, and use of data are situational and social, relying on local knowledge frames which determine how central office leaders understand data and practice evidence-based decision-making (Honig & Coburn, 2008). Chicago and Boston, like other large urban districts, rely on student scores on high-stakes standardized tests as a primary source of data and evidence. Test scores are not the only evidence of student learning important to the effective administration of district responsibilities, but what constitutes valid evidence is a source of disagreement among district personnel (Coburn & Talbert, 2006). For example, a variety of factors are important to district leaders’ use of data for instructional decisions, including the accessibility and timeliness of data, the extent to which district personnel consider the data valid, the extent to which district teachers are trained to interpret and use data at the classroom level, and the alignment of data-driven strategies with other district-wide strategies (Kerr, et al., 2006). District personnel engage in a variety of behaviors regarding the validity of evidence and data use such as data interpretation, argumentation about interpretations, and persuasion regarding the efficacy of interpretations (Coburn, Toure, & Yamashita, 2009). These data use behaviors suggest that the district’s working knowledge and accepted practices frame how problems are understood and solutions are decided (Coburn, Toure, & Yamashita, 2009).
Chicago and Boston, as self-identified data-driven urban districts, made decisions about their own teacher preparation programs using a variety of evidence concerning teacher turnover and residency effectiveness. Each district had a comprehensive research department as well as relationships with intermediary organizations whose main function is to produce consumable research for the district (i.e., The Consortium of Chicago School Research and the Boston Plan for Excellence). In addition to the findings produced by these intermediary research partners, Chicago and Boston used local knowledge, anecdotal evidence, and short-term student test score data as supporting evidence to justify and expand their home grown teacher reform programs. The local knowledge was contextualized by the perceived high teacher turnover and the expressed dissatisfaction central office officials had for new teachers prepared by colleges of education. The anecdotal data were evidenced as the favorable reports from building principals and central office administrators regarding the quality of district-trained teachers. Despite the importance given “scientific” research data by the federal government, policymaker, and elected officials, the districts in this study used limited-information dashboards to monitor and assess the impact of their teacher training programs and, in Chicago’s case, school management contractors.

District as Agent of Instructional Reform

In light of the important role that teachers play in student achievement, CPS and BPS created an important reform through training their own teachers. As with the Cardozo Project, the districts affected the “core technology” (Scott & Davis, 2007) of public education—the classroom teacher. The literature concerning districts as agents of instructional reform is most
relevant to this study because it contextualizes the actions in Chicago and Boston and reveals the gap in research this study fills.

The literature establishes that districts have the capacity and will to create their own instructional reforms (McLaughlin, 1987; Firestone, 1989). They achieve capacity through their own expertise as well as building partnerships with other actors, as CPS and BPS did with urban teacher residencies. This capacity not only enables them to comply with reform mandates, it helps them anticipate and manage external reforms (Firestone, 1989) as well as create their own. Districts exercise will by mobilizing dominant coalitions of decision-makers, a key notion in the civic capacity literature discussed in Chapter 3.

Over the last 20 years, the district reform literature has chronicled how districts have expanded their behaviors from compliance of state-imposed mandates to the creation of their own instructional reform policies (in particular, see Marsh, 2005 and the collection of papers in Hightower, Knapp, Marsh, & McLaughlin, 2002). This expansion developed, in part, as a response to state education standards, curriculum systems, standardized assessments, experiments in governance such as site-based management, and an ongoing concern to improve educational equity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the 1970’s and 1980’s, strong central offices have proven capable of effective system-wide reform through implementing strategies and exercising leadership (McLaughlin & Talbert, 2003).

Several examples from the literature support the idea of districts as instructional innovators. Elmore and Burney (1997) described District 2 in New York City in which the superintendent (Anthony Alvarado) designed and implemented an effective professional development program. Cuban and Usdan (2003) and Hightower (2002) chronicled San Diego’s top-down implementation of new funding formulae intended to realign resources with student’s
educational needs in order to improve learning. Research has also looked at how districts induct new teachers with a special emphasis on creating programs for instructional quality (Grossman, Thompson, & Valencia, 2002; Kapadia, Coca, & Easton, 2007) while other studies have examined the district role in teacher recruitment through national “manpower” policies (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003). District research has looked at teacher learning as an element of instructional reform, for example, the district’s role in forming and maintaining communities of teacher practice for instructional improvement (McLaughlin & Talbert, 2001; Stein & Coburn, 2007).

Examples of how districts specifically implement instructional reform are reported in the RAND study by Marsh, et al. (2005) The researchers found district strategies for instructional improvement focused on four areas: improving leadership skills of building principals, supporting teacher professional development, improving the alignment between standards and curriculum, and using data for decision-making (p. xviii). Several studies consider the capacity-building aspects of district-driven instructional reform (Massel & Goetz, 2002; Spillane & Thompson, 1997) while Newman, Smith, Allensworth, and Bryce (2001) stress the importance of achieving sustained coherence of curriculum, instruction, assessment, and learning climate as a set of interrelated programs.

This body of district-directed instructional reform literature informs my study in several ways. Chicago and Boston took matters into their own hands by preparing their own new teachers through partnerships with urban teacher residencies. This reform was directed at the center of instructional reform—the teacher—and problems of teacher quality, particularly teacher turnover and the inequitable distribution of qualified teachers across an urban district. The home grown teacher reform in Chicago and Boston was not only an example of district
instructional reform, it was a comprehensive reform in which the district intended to dramatically impact its “instructional core” (Elmore, 1997) by recruiting, preparing, inducting, coaching, and incentivizing its own teachers for the specialized work of urban classroom instruction.

The district-residency partnerships at the heart of this study blended to varying degrees public, corporate, and civic interests. This blend is reflected in the conceptual framework described in the next chapter. Three ideas inform the framework. CPS and BPS are embedded in coalitional relationships of power and politics referred to as urban regimes. These regimes get things done and particularly solve problems through mobilizing the cities’ civic capacity. At the district level, this occurs when central office leaders form structured partnerships with urban teacher residencies in order to activate civic capacity and address high teacher turnover.
CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The strength of the case study approach is its ability to examine the context in which a naturally occurring phenomenon exists (Yin, 2003). The contexts in which CPS and BPS operate include political, historical, economic, and cultural components unique to each city. Within these contexts, two working relationships became the focus of this study: the partnership between CPS and AUSL and the partnership between BPS and BTR.

I begin this chapter by walking through the conceptual framework model in Figure 3.1. I explain how I have combined urban regime analysis, civic capacity, and bridging analysis in the framework to describe the complex relationships between the urban school district and the urban teacher residency. Within this discussion I examine two concepts central to the theory, bridging and control. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the three research questions that have structured the study, driven the design, guided the data collection, and informed the analysis.

My conceptual framework theorized how and why the district partnered with the residency. Urban regime analysis, defined and described in the following section, provided a lens through which to examine this partnership. I focused on one component of urban regime analysis, civic capacity, to theorize how and why the district was able to gain the resources it needed from regime actors in order to train their own teachers. Bridging analysis, a focus on the organization-to-organization level, proposed how partnerships were structured and authorized based on the exchange of resources.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the interrelatedness of urban regime analysis, civic capacity and bridging analysis. The concentric rings and the two-way arrow depict the components of the framework within the context of a city such as Chicago or Boston. In the following sections, I explain each ring of the model in Figure 3.1, starting from the outer ring and working inwards to
the center, the urban district. Following an explanation of each ring of the model and its significance to the study, I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the study’s research questions and an explanation of how they were designed to elicit data that I could test against this framework.

Urban Regime Analysis

The outer ring of Figure 3.1 depicts an urban regime, the political context in which the district is embedded. Urban regime analysis (Bulkley, 2007; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Shipps, 2003; Stone, 2005) describes coalitions of business, civic, and governmental organizations aligning in relationships, consolidating a city’s once-fragmented power, and maturing into a regime of governance relationships over time.

Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework for District-Residency Partnerships

This transformation of temporary coalitions into semi-permanent governing and political structures is catalyzed by a common purpose, for example, goals to achieve, problems to solve,
or threats to deflect. Urban regime analysis is a wide lens through which to examine Chicago and Boston, whose teacher turnover and achievement gap are catalyzing problems motivating strong mayors, their appointed school boards and superintendents, corporate and civic interest groups, and city lawmakers to remove legal and political obstacles and leverage influence in order to empower districts to home grow their own teachers.

Stone (1998), the pre-eminent scholar of urban regime analysis, argues that policy change comes about only if reformers establish a new set of political arrangements commensurate with the policy being advanced (p. 9). Urban regime analysis recognizes that community-wide issues such as education reform occur in a context of local politics and fluid, agenda-specific coalitions (Stone, 1989). Urban regime analysis clarifies who has power in a particular context and how those with power work together to further policy agendas (Bulkley, 2007). The literature distinguishes between electoral authority and actual governing power created through political structures referred to as “arrangements” (Shipps, 2003), which create coalitions of diverse groups in order to address unique problems (Stone, 1998). Because they are stable and can be long-lived across several city administrations, or in the cases of Chicago and Boston, across a decade-long administration of a single mayor, urban regimes synthesize previously fragmented power (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001) into lasting governing structures whose behaviors are influenced by the politics, history, economics, and culture of the regime. Chicago and Boston are urban regimes in which Mayors Richard Daley and Thomas Menino, exercising long-term mayoral control of the schools, have declared education as top priorities. Both mayors have consistently mobilized political leverage and financial support from public and private actors in order to further the district’s reform agenda.

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12 See Chapters 5 and 6 for case descriptions of each city and the role of the mayoral education agenda.
In addition to achieving stability and longevity, urban regimes have access to the resources needed to solve specific problems, bridging the boundaries between public and private, governmental and non-governmental (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). Urban regimes evidence a combination of factors necessary for viable reform-capable arrangements: specific agendas, appropriate resources, and some form of command system or scheme of cooperation (Bulkley, 2007; Stone, 2005). In both the Chicago and Boston mayoral takeover of the schools, state, city, and corporate actors created takeover laws, changed CPS policies to transfer failed schools into the control of private providers, and leveraged a deal with the Chicago Teachers Union to cease strikes and agree on policies and procedures for school closures and firings. The regime structures of both cities disseminated their districts’ agenda and streamlined reform implementation.

The urban regime analysis literature specifically concerned with school districts suggests that regimes highlight the relationship of school system governance to the political authority structure of the city and the resources of local civic groups (Shipps, 2003; Stone, 1989; Stone, Henig, Jones, & Pierannunzi, 2001). This focus on city-district relationships accounts for continuity in the capacity to govern (Stone, 2005, p. 330) and in the mayors’ long-term reform projects including Mayor Thomas Menino’s “Focus on Children II,” Boston’s tightly aligned educational standards, Mayor Richard Daley’s “Renaissance 2010” in Chicago, and the more recent home grown teacher reform in both cities.

Both mayors rely on actors external to the school system to accomplish these programs. Once partnered with the districts, these actors can become high profile participants in a reform, such as AUSL in Chicago and to a lesser extent BTR in Boston because the residency is not involved in

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13 “Ren10” is Daley’s educational centerpiece, the creation of 100 small schools, between 2005 and 2010, through reconstitution and new building projects.
high profile school reconstitutions. Urban regime analysis explains into how the intermediary organizations (Burch, 2002) and non-system actors (Coburn, 2005) involved in district-residency partnerships become legitimized regime members as they gain decision-making control and join the existing power structures and political arrangements.

The district-driven teacher preparation reforms in Chicago and Boston are led by a small group of people: mayors, superintendents, district officials, and private actors. Urban regime analysis “clarifies how a narrow coalition of civic actors with a strong shared identity can steer reform almost unilaterally when their goals are limited to areas in which they have sufficient experiences and resources to dominate” (Shipps, 2003, p. 843). A city’s regime relationships make possible the transmission of district values, goals, and mission through a common language of reform rhetoric and policy talk among actors. As evidenced in the case descriptions (Chapters 5 and 6) and the findings chapters (7 and 8), the partnerships for district teacher training formed quickly. They launched their urban teacher residency programs and soon expanded their capacity to meet the districts’ needs for more teachers.

Small groups of regime elites steer reforms with political motivation in highly charged political climates. Stone (2005) maintains urban regime analysis is not representative of any one political perspective but instead is grounded in a concern about the consequences of socioeconomic inequality. This, too, is (or should be) the fundamental concern of urban education and the reforms and policies designed to reduce inequities and increase social justice. Stone’s contention that urban regime analysis is value-free, however, overlooks the current political climate in which social justice is a political issue. For the purposes of this study, I considered urban regime analysis a sufficiently value free conceptual lens through which to examine politically charged issues such as social justice, race, social and economic inequities,
and district-driven teacher education. For example, both regimes in Boston and Chicago have
decided to train their own teachers in order to address teacher turnover and ultimately to reduce
the achievement gap, a looming issue of social justice as well as civic productivity. By virtue of
their resources, proximity to power, longevity as coalition members in city initiatives, and
legitimacy to participate in naming and framing agenda, CPS and BPS “meet the threshold” for
meaningful political influence in the urban regime (Stone, 2005, p. 313). The value-free urban
regime analysis is a particularly valuable framework for this study because the reforms and the
reformers in Chicago and Boston are inescapably political in their reliance on capacity and will
to function.

Urban regime analysis is a useful lens to gain a *city-wide perspective* on the politics, players,
and policy issues that make up the research fields in Chicago and Boston. It is too wide,
however, to examine the details of how and why CPS and BPS sought partnerships to train their
own teachers. One component of urban regime analysis, civic capacity, provides the *coalitional
perspective* needed to examine how groups of actors and organizations provide an urban district
the capital resources in needs to address city-wide civic problems such as teacher turnover and
the achievement gap.

Civic Capacity

The middle ring in Figure 3.1 indicates civic capacity is both reliant on the urban regime yet
essential to the district’s partnership with the urban teacher residency. Civic capacity is the
phenomenon of urban coalitions of private and public organizations aligning to increase their
human, social, or physical capital (Shipps, 2003; Stone, Henig, Jones, & Pierannunzi, 2001).
Civic capacity is a theoretical insight into the process of partnership formation and resource
coordination around educational issues like student achievement and school failure. Analysis aided by the theory of civic capacity sees coalitions as fluid, responsive to and directed by the nature of the problem around which they have coalesced. In the cases of Chicago and Boston, city coalitions such as mayor’s offices, district central offices, corporate and civic leaders, and educational reformers coalesced around high teacher turnover and the achievement gap. Civic capacity looks at the formation of relations between groups of government and non-government actors, including intermediary organizations depicted in Figure 3.1, for the purpose of mobilizing resources to solve local problems (Marsh, 2002; Stone, 1989, 2005).

The civic capacity literature concerning schools describes district partnerships that increase human capital such as teacher knowledge and skills-development (Massell & Goertz, 1999, 2001), social capital such as teacher relations and the normative culture of teacher professional communities (McLaughlin & Talbert, 2001), and physical capital, such as educational materials, resources, and spaces (Marsh, 2002). The civic capacity dimension of the study’s conceptual framework helps define the reform as an effort to mobilize resources to meet the districts’ capital needs. Human capital is addressed through recruiting district-appropriate teacher residents, training them for the academic and social realities of urban teaching, and providing them professional coaching in their first years as teachers of record. Social capital is addressed by assigning residents in cohorts in order to achieve what residency leaders refer to as a “critical mass” of likeminded and similarly trained urban teachers (AUSL, 2008). Physical capital is addressed particularly by AUSL’s involvement in reconstitutions in which the residency helps finance the repair, refurbishment, and resupply of turnaround schools Chicago.¹⁴

Capital needs can be categorized as capacities in the two cases. By design, the home grown teacher reform intends to build instructional capacity (derived from human and social capital)

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¹⁴ AUSL’s dual mission of teacher training and school reconstitution is examined in more detail in Chapter 5.
previously lost through inequitable teacher distribution, competition from affluent suburban districts, and district hiring practices. Urban regime leaders create financial capacity (derived from physical capital) for the districts to problem-solve with experimental reforms such as home growing teachers. The district reform partners need political capacity (derived from human, social, and physical capitals) to assure the viability and sustainability of their programs. The district-residency partnership theorized in Figure 3.1 receives all three capacities as a result of the mobilization of the regime’s coalitions around the urgent and frustrating achievement gap.

The Boston and Chicago districts, embedded in urban regimes, receive considerable support for capacity-building through appointed school boards and superintendents, local and state laws favorable to mayoral takeover of schools, financial management services provided through city offices, and through support from local businesses and philanthropic agencies. In the civic capacity literature concerning urban districts, the “master politician” builds coalitions and creates “institutional legacies that live beyond the moment” (Stone, Henig, Jones, & Pierannunzi, 2001, p. 1-2). In Chicago and Boston, the mayor is the master politician. His most important function in a school reform such as districts training their own teachers is to frame the problem which then drives the policy agenda, determines the players in the coalitions, and identifies the resources needed to address the problem. Because coalition participants as well as mayors share problem-framing and agenda setting, mobilization for civic capacity is a political action (Shipps, 2003, p. 846) in the context of political regimes.

The impetus for civic capacity in the middle ring of the conceptual framework relies on the urban regime’s ability to encourage long-term political coalitions to mobilize around city problems framed by the mayor and his reform partners. In the center of the framework, the urban
district relies on a regime’s civic capacity to meet its needs. This happens at the organizational residency.

Bridging Analysis

Regime actors form partnerships in order to gain resources they do not possess but need in order to solve problems and achieve goals. Resource dependence theory (Boyd, 1990; Johnson, 1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Scott, 2003; Scott & Davis, 2007; Selznick, 1949; and Ulrich & Barney, 1984) explains how civic capacity in an urban regime works at the organization-to-organization level. Several key concepts of resource dependence theory apply to the district’s relationships with the urban teacher residency. Seen through an open systems perspective, a district creates asymmetrical exchanges (Johnson, 1995) with the residencies, voluntarily establishing conditions of dependency and control to maintain its autonomy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Three conditions of this interdependent relationship are worth noting in relation to my study. One, the district’s power becomes relational, a product of social interaction and relationships design (Scott & Davis, 2007). Because the district’s exchanges with the residency are asymmetrical, mutually dependent, and requiring control mechanisms, the district’s resource problems become political problems, and its use of power to solve those problems contributes to the political context (Johnson, 1995) in which the district acts within the broader landscape of urban regime politics. Two, resource dependence creates organizational uncertainty (Paulraj & Chen, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) regarding the district’s autonomy, resource needs, and ability to solve problems and achieve goals. Resource dependency adds organizational uncertainty onto the district’s uncertainty already created by high teacher turnover and the achievement gap. Three, the district reduces uncertainty through legitimizing the residency through delegated authority to make decisions and ensure the supply of scarce resources.
Authority, defined as legitimate power (Scott & Davis, 2007), also legitimizes the residency and influences the conditions of control, asymmetrical power exchanges, and levels of uncertainty.

The result of new uncertainties, relationships build on power differentials, and politics created through partnerships with urban teacher residencies mean that the district has to manage its dependency (Johnson, 1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), allocating sufficient resources to match the extent of uncertainty (Paulraj & Chen, 2007). Districts manage dependency through adaptive strategies that become as important, if not more important, as its core functions (Johnson, 1995). One important example of a strategy used to manage dependence is bridging, the creation of a linked relationship with an organization that can provide the resources it lacks but needs to solve a problem and achieve a goal. Figure 3.1 illustrates a bridge, represented by the two-way arrow, between the district and the urban teacher residency. Through this bridge pass resources such as knowledge, talent, finances, facilities, as well as power in the form of district delegated decision-making control to the residency. The shape and structure of this bridge are determined, in part, by the demands pressures, and complexity (Boyd, 1990) of the district’s needs. For example, urban districts rely on colleges of education and alternative teacher training programs like Teach for America or the federal government’s program Troops to Teachers to provide them with adequately prepared new teachers. In order to acquire the resources they need through bridging with an urban teacher residency, districts delegate some measure of authority and control to the residency. Empowered with this control, the residency becomes capable of creating and delivering the needed resources to the district.

Resource dependence theory proposes the district’s lack of resources is not problematic; it is inevitable. Problems arise not only because organizations are dependent on their environment, but because their environment is undependable (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Districts, then, are
interdependent within their regimes in a permanent state of political contention and resource
deficit, which explains why plans fail, reforms are thwarted, capacity falls short, and political
will dissipates.

My framework theorizes that by acquiring needed resources through a partnership with the
residency, the district not only reduces its uncertainty and increases its autonomy through
reliance on the residency to train its teachers, it *increases* the residency’s dependence on the
district (Ulrich & Barney, 1984), enhancing the district’s autonomy in the context of
dependency. The district bridges with the residency, delegating decision-making control over
some aspects of the partnership residency program and reducing the district’s reliance on
external actors for a source of new teachers. However, the residency becomes reliant on the
district for continued legitimacy and a source of jobs for its residents. Another perspective on
dependency comes from Selznick (1949) who theorizes that organizations develop competencies
and central tasks and then co-opt external actors to provide resources to support these tasks.
Districts have highly developed bureaucracies to operate central tasks of instruction, school
management, and data keeping, for example. In the last two decades, urban districts have
partnered with private organizations and some public organizations to contract out some of these
tasks. The district-residency partnership is an example of a district combining several tasks—
teacher education, recruitment, induction, professional development, and in AUSL’s case school
management—through partnering for the resources to fulfill those tasks. Pfeffer and Salancik
(2003) further theorize that bridging is not just about acquiring resources but also about being
judged by external actors as effectively creating acceptable outcomes. CPS and BPS took
decisive action in bypassing traditional, university-based teacher education and starting their own
teacher preparation programs, in part to be perceived as engaged in the problem and initiating the solution.

With this discussion of bridging analysis informed by resource dependence theory setting the context of the organization-to-organization level of my conceptual framework, I return to Figure 3.1 in which the inner circle depicts the district, embedded in a city’s urban regime relationships, bridging with the urban teacher residency by altering its organizational boundary (indicated by the dashed line) in order to receive external resources from and delegate decision-making control to the urban teacher residency through the processes and structure of the two-way arrow depicting the bridge. Honig and Hatch (2004) suggest that districts choose bridging strategies in order to negotiate or “craft” coherence between imposed policies, external problems, and their internal goals. Those strategies include *blurring their boundaries* (also called pulling in their environment) by co-opting outsiders into the district, *shaping the terms of compliance* by altering environmental demands, and *adding peripheral structures* to carry out environmental demands. I theorize the districts in Chicago and Boston engage to various extents in all three of these bridging strategies. My theoretical contribution to the Honig and Hatch framework in particular and to organizational theory in general is an initial *typology of bridging mechanisms* and their related conditions of control. The two mechanisms evidenced in my data are *contractual bridging* activate through *proxy control* in Chicago and *collaborative bridging* activated by *civic control* in Boston. I discuss these distinct bridging mechanisms in Chapter 7. 15

The conceptual framework upon which this study is based is unique in its synthesis of urban regime analysis (and its civic capacity component) with an organizational theory limited to

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15 Also see the Mitra & Boggess (in preparation) study which contributes to the typology of bridging mechanisms by identifying two other bridging mechanisms relevant to districts responding to accountability pressure: *authentic bridging* in which a district genuinely opens its system for inspection and partnering and *symbolic bridging* in which a district feigns collaboration in order to buffer criticism and prevent encroachment.
bridging analysis. While urban regime analysis provides the broad vista of a city’s political actors and the capacities and resources they potentially direct toward city-wide problems, the level of analysis does not explain district actions on the ground. Bridging analysis, informed by resource dependence theory, provides the organization-to-organization perspective needed to understand how districts train their own teachers. Turning figure 3.1 on its side, it becomes a funnel, moving theoretical analysis from the broad considerations of regime politics to the narrow focus on a district’s need to train new teachers. Figure 3.2 illustrates this alternative perspective of my conceptual framework.

Figure 3.2 Another Perspective of the Conceptual Framework

My theoretical framework not only guided my study but provides utility for other district researchers who want to learn more about how urban districts frame and address problems, innovate reform, gain scarce resources, and build capacities through bridging partnerships with external actors. The framework proved especially effective in seeking answers to the study’s three research questions. Because of the lack of empirical research on districts training new
teachers through partnerships with urban teacher residencies, my questions were primarily descriptive. Their purpose was to describe and “map” the district-residency partnerships in Chicago and Boston and uncover what these reformers meant by the term “teacher quality.” Findings are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 while the implications of the findings are presented in Chapter 9.

Research Questions (Expanded)

With my conceptual framework in mind, I discuss the scope of my three research questions. The first research question asked, How do districts partner with urban teacher residencies? The word “partner” was intended to include bridging, delegation of control, funding and relationships with funding partners, and the design, implementation, and assumptions of the reform. The question connected to the conceptual framework by eliciting a description of the districts within their contexts of urban regimes partnering for instructional capacity.

Since the district reformers were partnering to reduce teacher turnover and improve the teacher quality in their classrooms where the achievement gap was most keenly evident, I wondered what the reformers meant by teacher quality. The second research question asked, What do district and residency reformers and actors mean by “teacher quality”? This question looked at the definitions and meanings of teacher quality operative in each district-residency partnership. I asked all participants, What does teacher quality mean to you? The question was designed to uncover and describe the kind of teacher the reformers believed would be most successful in urban settings.

The third research question emerged during the interview and data analysis phases of the study; it asked, Why do the district-residency partnerships in Chicago and Boston construct
dispositions of teacher quality differently? Given the remarkable similarities between the two residencies, founded independently of each other within two years apart, and in light of the similarity of problems compelling Chicago and Boston to decide the train their own new teachers, I expected both cases to produce similar lists of teacher qualities. Both sets of reformers did agree on a half dozen substantive teacher skills and behaviors indicating professional teacher practices. I was surprised, however, to discover that the two cases varied considerably in how they constructed professional teacher dispositions they held as ideals of urban teaching. I present the findings for the teacher quality research questions in Chapter 8.

Yin (2003) and Maxwell (2003) note that “why” questions in qualitative studies indicate the need to establish a causal relationship. The third research question, then, transformed my study from a purely descriptive study to an explanatory study. The conceptual framework, already in place when the third question emerged, took on greater significance because of the power of its theoretical propositions to explain why the reformers partnered as they did and why their definitions of teacher dispositions varied. In Chapter 4 I discuss the methodological challenges and analytical techniques that accompanied the explanatory dimension of this study.

In this chapter I have presented an illustration and description of my conceptual framework. I reviewed the supporting literature for urban regime analysis, civic capacity, and bridging analysis with a focus on resource dependence theory. I argued the framework explained how and why districts partner with urban teacher residencies and how the framework led me to discover in my data a typology of bridging and control mechanisms. I noted that this typology as well as the design of my framework contributed new knowledge to the theory of urban district partnerships. I concluded the chapter with a discussion of how the three research questions connected to the conceptual framework.
In the next chapter, I discuss the methodological decisions I made and techniques I used to conduct the case study in Chicago and Boston. I explain the features of case study and why it was an appropriate design for my research questions. Following a description of my procedures for implementing the study, including how I gained access to the reformers, I address data collection and analysis and defend the limitations I placed on the study’s scope and purpose.
CHAPTER 4 METHODS

This chapter explains the choices I made in methodological design, implementation, and analysis. Beginning with a description of how I came to be interested in the topic of urban districts preparing their own teachers, I then describe components of the study including sample selection, access, participant recruitment, data collection and analysis, validity threats, and limitations. Sample interview questions and archival documents appear as appendices.

Home Growing Teachers: A Rationale

Before beginning my study in the fall of 2007, I followed closely the media reports on urban teacher residencies, starting with two articles a November 2006 issue of Education Week (Keller, 2006a, 2006b). I was surprised at the concept of urban districts training their own new teachers and became interested in learning more about urban teacher residencies. This reform seemed like a related phenomenon with which I was professionally familiar in my experience as an independent school administrator. I was “brought up” as a fledgling administrator with a bias toward hiring high-performing college graduates, without a teaching credential, and providing them on-the-job training.16 As a result of my reading and ongoing research on urban districts, particularly regarding reconstitutions in Chicago,17 I formed potential research questions and developed a conceptual framework to describe how the districts and urban teacher residencies related. As I developed the conceptual framework, I conducted a modest pilot study with a

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16 This practice was common in independent schools in the 1980’s and 1990’s, primarily for middle and high school classrooms. I participated in this “home grown” approach even as I maintained my own teaching licenses in three states.

17 See my three related and unpublished papers: The Ethics of School Reconstitution, High-Stakes Testing in Chicago and Business of Turnaround Reconstitutions, and Turnaround: The First Years of the Sherman School of Excellence.
collection of two dozen media reports, a 45-minute telephone interview with a residency leader,\textsuperscript{18} and a working set of research questions.

Design

I chose a qualitative, two-site, holistic case study method (Yin, 2003) because it was the most appropriate approach for my “how” and “why” research questions (Yin, 2003, p. 5).\textsuperscript{19} Case study method was appropriate because I entered the field with a preconceived framework that guided my protocol and determined the majority of my data analysis techniques, as suggested by Yin (2003). The topic of study, district partnerships, was current, complex, and highly contextual, two design conditions that case studies effectively address (Yin, 2003, pp. 7-9). A two site approach was fitting because Chicago and Boston were partnering with urban teacher residencies, allowing for interesting cross case analyses.

Mine was the first empirical study of district partnerships with urban teacher residencies. With the exception of an unpublished policy brief (Howey, 2007), no research literature had been published on urban teacher residencies or districts partnerships with residencies. Since the reforms were relatively recent (the first starting in 2001) and lacked substantive, longitudinal data, I determined a descriptive case study would contribute the most useful set of initial findings to the literature.

The unit of analysis was the urban district because a rich and expanding body of research literature existed regarding urban districts and their central office leaders as reformers, organizational learners, consumers of data, and partners with private entrepreneurial

\textsuperscript{18} I did not seek IRB approval for this interview because, at the time, it was conducted for research on an unpublished paper written for a class assignment. The data from that interview were not used in this study.

\textsuperscript{19} How do districts partner with urban teacher residencies? What do district and residency reformers and actors mean by “teacher quality”? Why do the district-residency partnerships in Chicago and Boston construct dispositions of teacher quality differently?
My first research question was primarily aimed at understanding how districts solve problems, in these two cases, teacher turnover and the achievement gap, by forming partnerships for the development of a district-driven teacher education reform. My second and third research questions asked how and why these district-derived partnerships defined and idealize the successful urban teacher. In each question, the urban district was the focus.

My case study design combined on-site fieldwork with research “from the desk.” Yin (2003) suggests that, in contrast with ethnography or participant observation, the case study researcher need not spend extended periods of time in the field. Using proper methodology, Yin maintains a case study researcher need not leave the desk to do a credible descriptive case study (p. 11). My time, financial constraints, and graduate school commitments allowed me two on-site visits, one in Chicago for four consecutive days in November 2007 and one in Boston for five consecutive days in December 2007.

Sample Selection and Access

The purpose of this study was to examine how the urban district partnered with the urban teacher residency and other organizations in order to home grow its own new teachers. My conceptual framework, which remained mostly unchanged (with the addition of intermediary organizations), positioned the urban school district in the context of an urban regime poised to mobilize its civic capacity to address city-wide problems such as high new teacher turnover and the achievement gap. My sample selection reflected this purpose and was based on several requirements. The urban district had to belong to an urban regime as described by Mossberger & Stoker (2001), Shipps (2003), and Stone (2005). This requirement enabled me to study the impact of mayors on the district’s reform and the impact of the district’s reform on the mayors’

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20 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of these research areas.
educational agendas. The urban teacher residency with which the district was partnered had to have, as part of its mission, the creation of a pipeline of teachers specifically committed to teaching in that city. This requirement allowed me to discount the dozens of alternative teacher preparation program like Teach for America because these programs did not intend to train career teachers nor were necessarily taking direction from the districts regarding teacher subject area specialization, as did the urban teacher residencies. Another requirement for inclusion in the study was that the urban teacher residency could not partner with more than one urban district or with suburban districts. The requirement narrowed my focus to only residencies with a single relationship to an urban district. Since the urban district was my unit of analysis, its potential partnership with a residency with other multiple suburban partnerships would likely produce non-equivalent data. Since I was engaging in purposeful sampling for information-rich cases (Patton, 1990, p.169), I sought cases that qualified as critical and politically important. This was an important requirement because the home grown teacher reform was gaining national attention in the media and among lawmakers. In setting requirements for inclusion, I used critical case sampling which seeks cases that are important, meeting Patton’s (1990) criteria, “if it happens here it will happen anywhere,” or the opposite, “if it does not happen here, it won’t happen anywhere” (p. 174). I also sought politically important cases which, according to Patton (1990) are particularly influential regardless of their size; findings from these cases attract notice (p. 180) for their usefulness and applicability elsewhere. With these requirements articulated, I had three cases from which to choose.

Of the three urban teacher residencies in operation at the time of this study, two met all my requirements: the Academy for Urban School Leadership (AUSL) in Chicago and the Boston Teacher Residency (BTR) in Boston. The third urban teacher residency, the Boettcher Teacher
Program in the Denver, Colorado area, was excluded for several reasons. It did not maintain a one-to-one relationship with an urban district. Instead, the Boettcher program partners with multiple districts, urban and suburban, in the Denver area. Boettcher’s mission is not focused specifically on Denver to the exclusion of other districts. While the Boettcher Teachers Program was an interesting example of an urban teacher residency, I did not consider it a politically important case. Compared to AUSL and BTR, the Boettcher program attracted few media reports and trained fewer residents than either AUSL or BTR. While it was listed as one of the three residencies in the Coalition of Urban Teacher Residencies (Urban Teacher Residency Institute, 2008), the program was noticeably left out of reviews of urban teacher residencies (Berry & Norton, 2006, Rubenstein, 2008).

AUSL and BTR were critically and politically important cases. They have partnered with urban districts, each of whom has a well-documented research history regarding educational policy and reform (see publications from the Boston Plan for Excellence, 2008, Consortium of Chicago School Research, 2008, as well as Reville & Coggins, 2007; Shipps, 2003, 2006, and Cuban & Usdan, 2003) and districts who, in keeping with crucial case sampling, would be likely districts to launch such reform because of their history of innovation. Reforms in these urban districts gain attention of policymakers and researchers.

I gained access to Chicago and Boston through two officials in the teacher residencies. I previously interviewed one of them in November 2006 and had kept in touch throughout 2007, anticipating I might study AUSL for my dissertation. In the fall of 2007, this official responded to my request to visit AUSL and their turnaround schools by asking a member of the AUSL management team to arrange interviews and provide access to The Sherman School of

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21 AUSL has a dual mission to alternatively prepare teachers and operate reconstituted district schools staffed with their residents.
Excellence, the Harvard School of Excellence, and the Dodge Renaissance Academy, where the AUSL management team had one of its administrative centers. The AUSL officials helped me gain access to a CPS administrator. I gained access to Boston through a BTR official who arranged access to an official in the Boston Plan for Excellence and two BPS administrators.

Based on a discussion with several AUSL staff, I learned that while AUSL had many visitors in 2006 as a result of the media attention garnered by the re-opening of the Sherman School (see Chapter 5), I was among the last investigators allowed, and only the second empirical researcher to gain access to the residency at that time. AUSL set up my on-site interviews with staff and residents. I set up and conducted other interviews on my own. In Boston, the residency official helped me gain access to BTR staff and residents and the executive director of the Boston Plan for Excellence.

In both cases, I accepted the compromises of researcher control that come with gaining access. I do not know how my on-site research might have changed if I had more control over who I interviewed and what I saw; I can only note that my means of access both expanded and limited my study. I did not sense restriction in either case site and key residency actors were generous with their time. I determined that my compromise of control for access was appropriate.

Participant Selection and Recruitment

The study involved a total of 28 participants. I conducted 68% of my interviews in-person and on-site in Chicago and Boston between November and December of 2007. The remaining interviews (32%) were conducted by telephone either on-site or from State College, Pennsylvania between December 2007 and April 2008. Table 4.1 represents the distribution of
participants according to role and location. Since the purpose of my study was to describe the
district-residency partnerships and understand how the actors defined teacher quality, I selected
participants based on their roles and involvement in the district-residency partnerships. I learned
of these roles through media reports covering AUSL and BTR and residency websites. Because I
was not studying the impact or effectiveness of the home grown teacher reforms, I did not
interview those outside the partnerships affected by the reform such as parents, students,
community organizers, local school council members, teachers union representatives, non-
residency teachers, and others.\footnote{22}

Once on site, I used snowball sampling to gain access to seven residents and one district
official (8 out of 28 participants or 29\% of the total participant sample). I used snowball
sampling with residents because they were not accessible except through the residency
leadership. The compromises with snowball sampling are worth noting. While access is gained,
the potential for participants to “handle” the researcher are increased, particularly in this study
where residency leaders may have been motivate to connect me with residents thought to make
the best impression. This compromise limited the study because of the potential validity threats
through researcher bias and sampling bias. In contrast to snowball sampling, I directly recruited
the district and residency officials whose names had been identified through the media.

Participants included central office administrators in roles overseeing new schools, teaching
and learning, and human resources. I interviewed residency leaders and administrative staff,
current residents and graduates of residencies now teachers of record, university educators,
leaders of community intermediary organizations, experienced educators in the districts for

\footnote{22} I was unsuccessful at securing an interview with a union representative in each site. I set up three telephone
interviews with one, but the representative was a no show for all three. The other would not return emails.
\footnote{23} A follow up study examining the effectiveness and impact of urban teacher residencies on student learning and
teacher retention would expand the participants to include this wide range of voices in order to assess the impact of
the reform.
perspective on the partnership, educational researchers with expertise in district research and reform, and journalists who have covered urban teacher residencies.

I was unable to secure an interview with CPS CEO Arne Duncan; however, he arranged for another administrator to become a participant. I was also unsuccessful in arranging an interview with Thomas Payzant, former Superintendent of BPS who retired in 2006. I did not attempt to interview the interim BPS superintendent (2006-2007) or the new superintendent, Carol Johnson, because they had not been involved with BTR in a substantive way according to the assessments of some Boston participants. I did, however, attend a presentation Superintendent Johnson gave at Boston English High School for background; I was not able to speak personally with her.

Given the challenges of accessibility to high profile actors such as superintendents and mayors (who are relevant to this study because they are accountable for the school systems and initiators of city-wide educational reforms that involve the residencies), I decided to forgo attempts to secure interviews and rely on archival sources such as official press releases, websites, and media reports (see Data Collection for more details). This approach is in keeping with attending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Role</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Boston</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Office Admin.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency Leadership</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency Staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents (current &amp; graduates)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediary Org. Leaders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Educators</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Educators</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Researchers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to a public figure’s “policy talk” (Tyack & Cuban, 1995) in which the researcher relies on the how policy is framed and rhetoric is used by key actors “on the record.”

My design rationale for participant recruitment was partially determined by the university Institutional Review Board (IRB). IRB was concerned about my accessing names and email addresses for recruitment through publicly accessible websites, such as those maintained by AUSL, CPS, BTR, and BPS. These websites typically provide contact information for employees (but not residents or graduate residents). IRB required a letter of permission for access from the leadership of the two residencies in order for my study to gain approval. The residency leaders complied, and I determined not to ask the district leaders for similar permission to access their websites. Snowball sampling provided the majority of the study’s participant recruitment.

Data Collection and Protocol

I collected data from several sources: interviews, district and residency documents including information posted on websites, and media reports. I conducted 26 interviews lasting between 30-40 minutes each. Of the 28 participants, six were “off the record,” background conversations that were not digitally recorded or transcribed. For a variety of reasons, these participants agreed to talk with me as a researcher but did not sign an informed consent; I did not use their words in excerpts nor refer to them individually in the study. In the seven cases where participants were high profile actors previously named in media reports, such as directors of the residencies or leaders in the central office, I requested and received permission to quote with attribution. Four of those individuals requested to see their excerpts prior to publishing. In addition to the interviews completed for this study, I conducted a 45 minute interview with an AUSL official in

24 This study received university IRB approval (#26642) and approval from the CPS Research Review Board (Project ID #224). No approval was needed from BPS.
December 2006 as part of a class project. Data from that interview were not used in this study. Interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed by three individuals, two for payment, resulting in approximately 250 pages of single-spaced transcripts.

I used semi-structured interview protocols (see Appendix F) which varied with participant role and scope of authority, responsibility, and involvement with the district or the residency. All participants were asked questions about their knowledge of and involvement with the district-residency partnership and what teacher quality meant to them. Role-specific questions inquired about the nature of the district-residency partnerships, including funding, program design, implementation, assessment, residency scale, expected and unexpected discoveries regarding the residency, district oversight and coordination, and specific needs met by the residency.

To expand the data sources, I collected official district documents such as meeting minutes from Board of Education (called the School Committee in Boston), district press releases, contracts to operate schools in Chicago, sections from district policy manuals, letters of agreement between the district, residency, and intermediary organizations, Congressional testimony from residency leaders, and media reports from newspapers, educational periodicals, public radio, and commercial television. I also collected information from the district and residency websites. Radio and television data were collected digitally, and relevant sections were transcribed. A total of 97 documents related to both district-residency partnerships provided data in addition to researcher field notes and memos.

Data Analysis

Several data analysis techniques were employed in the study. As suggested by Yin (2003), I used pattern matching, explanation building, and cross case synthesis (pp. 116-136). Pattern
matching is a type of coding strategy which seeks patterns in the data (words, phrases, ideas) that match propositions salient in the conceptual framework. My conceptual framework included theoretical propositions:

- Districts bridge with urban teacher residencies to solve district-framed problems and achieve district goals;
- To accomplish these goals, districts delegate varying degrees of decision-making control to the residencies, given them authority and legitimacy;
- The district-residencies partnerships define teacher quality to fit their needs and worldview;
- Corporate and private interests gain varying degrees of proximity to the residencies based on their funding mechanisms.

Pattern matching as a case study data analysis technique constitutes a deductive approach to discovering matches between the data and the propositions. Pattern matching was the main technique I used to analyze data related to my first two research questions, *How do districts partner with urban teacher residencies* and *What do district and residency reformers and actors mean by teacher quality?*

When I discovered unanticipated findings regarding constructions of teacher distributions, findings for which I had no preconceived propositions to test, I worked inductively using general analytical techniques such as line-by-line microanalysis of portions of interview transcripts, open coding, and conceptual ordering, techniques commonly used in the initial stages of grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Portions of my coding scheme appear as Appendix E. In contrast to the deductive approach I used with my first two questions, this inductive approach helped me build theory in order to recognize that the reformers in each city were constructing
notions of urban teacher dispositions differently (see Chapter 8 for a discussion of these findings and Chapter 9 for implications). According to Yin (2003), the final explanation of a set of findings does not need to be fully stipulated at the beginning of a study (p. 122). This was the case with my study. However, in keeping with Yin’s (2003) methods, I continued a cycle of examining the evidence, generating new propositions, re-examining the evidence, and revising the propositions.

My discovery of a causal relationship explaining why constructions of teacher quality differed in Chicago and Boston required a context for data analysis that incorporated a broader understanding of causality in qualitative methodology. I turned to Joseph Maxwell. Maxwell (2004) suggests that causal links are bound to a unique context—time, culture, language, history, meanings, beliefs, and values—and vary across contexts and time. This would be so within and between cases in Chicago and Boston. Maxwell notes the Miles and Huberman (1994) argument that:

…qualitative analysis, with its close up look, can identify mechanisms, going beyond sheer associations. It is unrelentingly local and deals with the complex network of events and processes in a situation…If you’ve done it right, you will have respected the complexity of local causality as it has played out over time, and successfully combined “process” and “variable” analysis (Maxwell, 2004, emphasis theirs, p. 6).

Maxwell then cites the Pawson and Tilley argument that the “relationships between causal mechanisms and their effects is not fixed, but contingent…on the context within which the mechanism operates” (Maxwell, 2003, p. 6). These causal relationships, then, vary across contexts: “…the context within which a causal process occurs is, to a greater or lesser extent,
intrinsically involved in the process, and often cannot be “controlled for” in a variance-theory sense without misrepresenting the causal mechanism” (Maxwell, 2004, p. 6).

Maxwell was saying that because causal mechanisms occur in context, meanings are an important consideration in explaining causality. Maxwell (2004) notes that beliefs, values, and intentions are core aspects of causal mechanisms and contrast with traditional social science emphasis on behavior (p. 7). Maxwell’s thinking about causal relationships bound to contexts, varying within and between contexts, and dependent upon meaning as well a behavior makes a strong case for the efficacy of case study, with its emphasis on local context, to establish the causal links that explain why reformers in Chicago and Boston define key aspects of teacher quality differently. As Chapter 8 discusses, these reasons concern the historical and political contexts of the urban regime, the ideologies of system actors and the types of problems they are inclined to address through civic capacity, and the proximity of corporate interests to the residencies.

Maxwell’s treatise on causality in qualitative research resulted in two realizations regarding my study. One, by expanding my understanding of causality to include the importance context, instead of the impulse to remove context in randomly controlled experiment, I understood how case study was uniquely designed to investigate causality through “why” questions. Two, I realized the importance of meaning making to the discovery of causality. The reform partners in both cases were constructing varying meanings. These meanings could be the credible data sources for establishing causality.

Yin (2003) suggests two particularly relevant strategies for establishing causal links in case study methodology. One is explanation-building, an iterative process of data analysis that moves between looking at data, constructing an explanation, and then repeatedly returning to data for
revisions and testing against one or more cases (Yin, 2003, pp. 121-122). The second technique is testing rival explanations (Yin, 2003, pp.112-114 and pp.118-119). In this strategy, the researcher tests an explanation by generating as many rival theories as possible. Each of these rival theories are discounted or, in instances where they cannot be discounted, integrated into a revised explanation. This is what happened in my data analysis (see Chapter 8).

I used a qualitative research software program, NVivo7, to assist with data analysis. NVivo7 was particularly useful in coding and analyzing data inductively for my third research question explaining the variation of teacher quality definitions between cases. I used the software as an organizational and information storage tool for interview transcripts, media transcripts, archival documents, field notes, and memos.

Validity Threats

Case studies are particularly vulnerable to validity threats. Case studies do not claim the same kind of internal validity that come with random assignment and statistical power. However, the sampling procedures mentioned earlier (Patton, 1990) suffice to address internal validity. In addition, I used appropriate data analysis strategies for an explanatory study, such as explanation-building and testing rival theories, appropriately addressing internal validity for qualitative studies (Yin, 2003, p. 33). I strengthened construct validity by using multiple sources and asking key actors to check my concepts of bridging, control, and dispositions of teacher quality. This techniques was not the same as member checking because, with one exception, I did not conduct follow-up interviews. However, as the interviews went on and I was reaching saturation, I checked key concepts with new participants. Reliability was addressed through the use of semi-structured interview protocol.
Two particular threats were posed in this study: researcher bias and reactivity related to researcher positionality, especially in interviews. Regarding my bias, I selected the research topic out of interest and connection to my professional practice as an independent school teacher and administrator during an era in which the majority of high school middle school, and older elementary teachers with whom I worked and in dozens of independent schools with which I was familiar, intentionally hired college graduates without teaching licenses. I believe I was predisposed to favor the urban teacher residences from afar. Once my study began and I experienced the residencies as a researcher, I believe I held my biases in check.

Another aspect of my bias involved my feelings about and predisposition toward the concerns of race, class, and equity. I was keenly aware in Chicago and Boston that I was a White, middle class, professional elite interviewing Black and White people working on behalf of disadvantaged Black and Hispanic students. In Chicago, I was one of the few Whites in schools of 650 students. I cannot account for how this bias played out in my study except to say it played some part. My predisposition toward issues of race, class, and equity, what I call social justice, were particularly salient as the teacher quality data from Boston emerged (see Chapter 8). With this data, I made an extra effort to separate my own inclination toward valuing the importance of teaching for social justice from the data.

The other validity threat specific to my positionality as a researcher is reactivity in interviews (for relevant discussions, see Chapters 5, 9, and 11 in Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). I was aware that my presentation of self as a White doctoral student from Penn State University, an affiliation which appeared to carry great weight with participants in both case sites, created some level of reactivity in my interviewees. The reactivity was not one way, participants reacting to me. I reacted to my surroundings. Several of the Chicago interviews took place in two turnaround
schools in the South Side, schools with 99%-100% Black and Hispanic student populations and similarly high teacher and staff populations. I was aware that being one of the few Whites in the building would create a reactivity in me that would influence my on-site research.  

Limitations

Chicago’s and Boston’s home grown teacher reform raises several questions: “Does it work?” “Does it improve teacher quality?” “Does it improve student performance?” “How does the reform, particularly in Chicago, impact teachers, students, families, and neighborhoods?” These outcome questions are beyond the scope of my study for several reasons. I believe it is too soon to tell if the reform is responsible for measurable outcomes. The residencies have been in operation for five to six years at the writing of this paper. While retention data on AUSL and BTR-trained teachers is above 90% by residency accounts, most of these teachers are still working within their four-to-six year commitment with financial incentives still in play. We do not have retention figures yet for those who stay beyond their commitment.

It is problematic finding meaningful measures of effectiveness with small numbers of residents (150 a year combined) spread among city schools. Harvard educator and economist Thomas Kane is reportedly doing a value-added study of residency-trained teachers of record in classrooms in Boston and Chicago, but I have not been able to confirm that fact nor is that report published. With the concern for high stakes testing as the primary determinant of student learning and school success (Campbell, 1976; Kornhaber, 2004; Nichols and Berliner, 2005; Toch, 2006), particularly for disadvantaged minority students in urban schools, and considering Chicago’s turbulent testing history (Easton, Luppescu, & Rosenkrantz 2007; Jacob, 2002), more

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25 Saukko discusses alternative types of validity checks for qualitative researchers concerned about positionality. While I did not account for these types in this chapter, they did inform my thinking. See a brief discussion of Saukko’s contextual, dialogic, and self-reflexive validities in the Appendix.
meaningful measures of learning outcomes are necessary for a credible assessment of the reform’s impact and effectiveness.

I did not try to assess the effect of the reform on students and their families, on teachers, communities, or on school building culture because of limited time, finances, and capacity. This issue is particularly relevant in Chicago where district teacher preparation is combined with rapid school reconstitution. By limiting this study to a description of the partnerships, their definitions of teacher quality, and an explanation for the variation of definitions between cases, I provide a first set of descriptive empirical findings upon which I and others can build future studies (see Chapter 9 for suggestion for further research).

In the next two chapters, I present case descriptions of the cities and school districts in which the home grown teacher reforms operate. I describe details about the residencies including their founding, mission, admission, staff, funding, and program design. I present perspectives from district personnel, residency personnel, residents, and intermediary organization representatives in order to convey the richness of participants’ experience of these reform efforts. Following these two case descriptions, I devote Chapter 7 to the finding about bridging and control and Chapter 8 to the findings about professional teacher attributes and professional dispositions of character in Chicago and activism in Boston. I conclude the study in Chapter 9 with an extended discussion of policy implications, suggestions for policymakers, and suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER 5 CHICAGO

This case description of Chicago and the description of Boston in the next chapter follow a similar organization. I start from a broad perspective of the city and increasingly narrow my focus, moving toward one special feature of the district-residency partnership. First, I selectively highlight city details relevant to this study. I profile the urban district by providing demographic information and a brief historical background. I present a detailed description of the urban teacher residency and focus on several components: founding, program, funding, perceptions of the participants, and relevant interactions with the district. I conclude the chapter by selecting one example of a reform or program that captures the mission and meaning of the residency.26

Chicago, Illinois

According to Census 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008), Chicago is a city of nearly three million people. In the Midwest’s largest city by area (across 227 square miles) and the nation’s third largest city by population, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and the Academy for Urban School Leadership (AUSL) are implementing two interconnected reforms: the district is training its own new teachers through AUSL’s urban teacher residency program and moving them as full-fledged teacher of record into reconstituted schools staffed and operated by AUSL. This dual reform occurs in an extraordinary context of scale, race, and poverty.

26 Because my study is the first to present interview data from residents and other AUSL participants, I include numerous and extensive interview excerpts chosen for their value as evidence and power of description. I occasionally string excerpts together to build a description before commenting and transitioning. My convention for quoting removes the “ums” and other habits of speech that would detract from the quote. However, I remained true to participants’ words and my interpretation of their intention. In cases where the participant mumbles or omits a word, I insert a word [in brackets] to preserve meaning. In cases where meaningful phrases are omitted, I note that with an ellipsis.
The city’s non-white population, approximately 68%, is broken down as 37% Black, 26% Hispanic, and 4% Asian and Multiracial. Bruce Katz, Director of the Metropolitan Policy Program of the Brookings Institution, found in a 2004 report that:

- Chicago has one of the highest black poverty rates in the nation; on average, Blacks make $20,000 a year less than Whites ($29,000 compared to $49,000);
- While the number of poor people in all of the United States has increased from 19% to 26% between 1980 and 2000, the number of people living in high-poverty neighborhoods in Chicago has declined approximately 179,000 between 1990 and 2000; much of this decline is due to the mobile poor moving to nearby suburbs;
- With the exodus of the mobile poor, two thirds of Chicago’s low-income housing credits are in high-poverty neighborhoods, indicating one of the highest concentrations of poverty and immobility in the largest 100 metropolitan areas in the United States;
- Chicago has the second highest geographic mismatch between poor Blacks and job opportunities in the country; only Detroit’s disparity between its isolated Black neighborhoods and available jobs was greater;
- Chicago’s educational attainment rates vary greatly according to race, with 13% of the city’s Blacks having earned a college degree compared to 42% of Whites and 48% Asians; of the country’s 100 largest metropolitan areas, Chicago ranks 89th in high school completion for Hispanics and 64th for Blacks.

These statistics reflect disturbing economic, housing, and educational opportunity gaps between Chicagoans of color and their White counterparts.

Severe consequences of poverty impact child development and student achievement, including gang warfare, 70% unemployment in some areas, and health problems, particularly
asthma, with a hospitalization rate double that of the United States average (Mobile C.A.R.E. Foundation, 2008). Within these conditions, CPS is responsible for educating the city’s children.

Chicago Public Schools

CPS is the country’s third largest school district with 408,000 students and 655 schools. Only the districts in Los Angeles and New York City have larger enrollments. Under mayoral control since 1995, the current CEO Arne (pronounced “Arnie”) Duncan was appointed in 2002. Just under a third of the city’s schools have failed to make AYP for five consecutive years (Keller, 2006b; Parker, 2007). They are currently being closed, reconstituted, redesigned, or contracted out to private operators through a Request for Proposal (RFP) process. These underperforming schools are part of Mayor Richard Daley’s Renaissance 2010 initiative, referred to as “Ren10.”

Begun in 2005, Daley’s goal was to create 100 new schools in the district by the end of the decade. These new schools fall into three types:

- charter schools are independently operated and not obligated to follow district policies or union collective bargaining agreements;
- contract schools are CPS schools near-independently operated according to a five year renewable contract; they are run by non-profits or for-profits and all employees work for the agency;
- performance schools are CPS schools possessing increased autonomy and flexibility in school program and operation while remaining under the teacher union’s collective bargaining agreement.

A variety of “vendors,” private organizations and agencies who run CPS schools as educational management organizations (EMOs), comprise the partners involved with Ren10.
Among the striking variety of vendors are American Quality Schools, Catalyst Schools, Mozaica Education, Inc., Prologue, Inc., The United States Marines (JROTC division), Walt Disney Magnet Schools, Lighthouse Academies, the Noble Schools of Northwestern University, and the Academy for Urban School Leadership. AUSL currently operates six schools including one Professional Development School and two turnaround schools (with four more to be added in 2008-2009 for a total of 20 turnaround schools by 2012).

In addition to the district’s size and variety of vendors operating the districts’ underperforming schools, the district’s racial makeup has implications for this study. The demographic trends identified by Katz (2004) indicate that Chicago is rapidly becoming more diverse, particularly with immigrants from Mexico. One implication for the diversification of the district’s enrollment is that vendors such as AUSL must provide the capacities needed for English Language Learners, special education, and other services required by underserved minorities. Another implication for CPS is the growing disparity between students and teachers of color. Just over half of the district’s teachers are non-White while 93% of students are non-White. Table 5.1 summarizes the pertinent district demographic information.
Table 5.1 Chicago Public Schools Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>655</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>483 Elementary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116 High School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 Charter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student Enrollment</th>
<th>408,601</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21,388 Pre-School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27,901 kindergarten</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246,771 elementary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112,541 secondary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student Racial Breakdown</th>
<th>92% Non-White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46.5% African-American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.1% Latino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.4% Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teacher Racial Breakdown</th>
<th>24,664 Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52% Non-White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.8% African-American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.2% Latino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1% Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6% Native American</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Racial Breakdown</th>
<th>588 Principals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69% Non-White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54.1% African-American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.4% Latino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0% Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.2% Native American</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CPS Website (2008)

The diversity of the CPS educators is of particular relevance to this study because the key actors of the home grown reform, the mayor, the CEO, and the top leadership of AUSL (as well as many of their funders) are white. African American professor Charles Payne, Director of African and African American Studies at Duke University and graduate of Northwestern University (Ph.D.), explains the racial issues involved when Whites attempt to reform Black schools:

What does whiteness mean to black and brown people in schools? To a degree, it means a certain kind of arrogance, a certain kind of privilege, which need not be directly related to skin color. Being associated with an elite white institution is enough. If you’re black or Latino, but from Northwestern University or the University of Chicago, you should not be
surprised if school people receive you as if you were white, at least at first (Payne, 2005, p. 2).

Payne goes on to note the importance of placing people of color in outside expertise groups working with Black schools, particularly demoralized Black schools.

It is a longstanding staple of black humor that whiteness comes in degrees, that some people have more of it than others. There are jokes about “extra-white white people,” about people who were “unreasonably white” and the like. Among black educators, one often heard that kind of remark made about the Coalition for Essential Schools in its early years. At one time, one heard it about the Gates Foundation, although more recently people seem to be willing to give them some credit, albeit grudgingly, for having learned better behavior. And what did they mean when they say that Gates was “white”? Well, they meant that Gates was arrogant in the way it operated, coming into cities with a whole lot of money and a half of an idea… In this context, whiteness comes to mean sheer disregard for the thinking of others. It refers to a kind of preciousness about one’s own ideas, the kind of overweening self-confidence that is conferred only by general obtuseness or an Ivy League degree. In historical terms, it’s the basic colonialist belief that there is only one right model and your particular history and culture don’t matter (Payne, 2005, p. 5).

Payne exposes the problem of white reformers in minority districts such as CPS. AUSL’s dual reform in Chicago, consisting of district teacher training and school reconstitution, is a top down reform from the White mayor and White CEO. The active founder and lead executive of AUSL are White as are some residency staff members. With so many CPS students of color living in poverty and with so many reformers coming from the outside, race is an underlying theme in this reform.
One reflection of this theme is the district’s drop out and test score statistics. While the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) claims that nearly 70% of CPS students graduate high school, Allensworth (2005) notes that this number, calculated to put the best light on student persistence, is implausible. Her longitudinal study of actual, individual students in cohorts finds that the CPS graduation rate is close to 54%. Table 5.2 provides a breakdown of Allensworth’s findings by gender and ethnicity.

Table 5.2 Percent of 19 Year Old Graduates of CPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African Americans</th>
<th>Latino/Latina</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Allensworth (2005)

Allensworth (2005) concludes that drop out rates are declining for overall for the CPS student population; however, the decline is less for African American students compared to other groups over a seven year period ending in 2005. Further, Allensworth found that drop out rates improved more in North Side of Chicago than in the South Side, a traditionally poor area of the city, and she concluded that there are large differences among graduation rates across schools in the district (Allensworth, 2005).

According to the National Center for Education Statistics, CPS students’ scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP—also known as “The Nation’s Report Card”) were notable for their lack of improvement despite a near decade of entrepreneurial reform measures. Race and poverty in the district are reflected in Table 5.3. Over 90% of the students are Black or Hispanic and nearly 90% are low income.
Table 5.3 2007 NAEP Scores for CPS: Percent of Students Proficient (Trial Urban District Assessment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Math</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On most measures of the 2007 NAEP, Chicago ranked third from the bottom of the 11 largest urban school systems; only Cleveland and Washington D.C. scored lower (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2007). Critics of the district’s reform policies, such as Julie Woestehoff of the Chicago organization Parents United for Responsible Education (PURE), said the scores offered a “national reality check” and a “sobering counterpoint to the constant happy talk from Mayor Richard Daley and CPS” (Rossi, 2007).

John Easton, lead researcher at the Consortium of Chicago School Research at the University of Chicago examined the 2006 ISAT score for trends of CPS student performance. He observed some signs of progress in closing the gap between black students in CPS and the state, prompting him to suggest that CPS might do a better job educating poor, underserved students than the state (Easton, et al., 2007). Overall, however, the researchers conclude the Black-White achievement gap between CPS African-Americans and White students throughout the state remains considerable and is showing little indication of narrowing substantially (Easton, et al., 2007).

This summary of CPS demographics indicates several themes that shape the reform context of the district and any attempts to improve the city’s most underperforming schools. The vast

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27High stakes testing expert Robert Linn notes there is a weak relationship between performance on NAEP and a state AYP test due to variations of rigor in state assessments (Linn, 2005). However, the 2007 NAEP scores for CPS mirror the district’s performance on multiple years of ISAT, excluding the controversial 2006 scores which skyrocketed after the ISBE and CPS lowered the 8th grade math proficiency target, redesigned the test format to make it more student-friendly, and replaced open ended critical thinking questions with short answer questions. Given the demographic make-up of the district, Linn’s premise that geographic location is a factor in a district making AYP applies to Chicago.
majority of CPS students are Black and Latino. More than 85% of them are poor. They likely live in concentrated areas of poverty with extensive social, economic, and health problems. By measures accepted by the state and city, CPS students are entrenched in an achievement gap compared to their more affluent and White counterparts in the state. This gap is persistent and consequential; as students fail to meet proficiency targets, they are retained in gateways grades and their schools are closed or contracted out to vendors with a variety of plans, ideas, management approaches, and agendas. These themes are not new. They have been present and increasingly pervasive over the last decade. In the next section, I highlight the history of mayoral control of schools and the increasing privatization of CPS, two reforms intended to address student performance.

CPS Reform: An Overview of 1995-Present

Prior to 1995, CPS experience extensive decentralization characterized by local school governance through Local School Councils (LSC) empowered to make decisions for their neighborhood schools, including hiring and firing the principal without CPS approval. In response to an ongoing budget crisis in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, chronic teacher strikes and Chicago Teacher Union (CTU) unrest, and decades of low student achievement, the district came under mayoral control in 1995 when Democrat Mayor Richard Daley dissolved the existing school board (which he had a hand in appointing), appointed an all new board. Daley then appointed former city budget director Paul Vallas as district CEO. The Vallas administration was notable for several changes in CPS direction. He began the process of recentralizing the district

28 The first wave of mayoral control of urban districts came shortly after the 1994 mid-term elections during the Clinton administration. The Newt Gingrich Contract with America ushered in conservative Republican legislatures into Congress and state houses. This group of legislators carried on the work of the 1989 Education Summit in Charlottesville which gathered President George H.W. Bush, state governors including then-Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, and others to create a national educational agenda of standards and accountability.
governance after eight years of extensive decentralization. His effort to return some of the LSC power to the central office stirred the debate over who should make decisions for schools. While many LSC’s continue to operate today, the school reconstitution policy of Ren10 dissolves LSCs when a school is closed for the reason of underperformance.

Vallas also brought CPS under financial control. He slashed the budget and secured loans to cover the district’s operation until, within a year, it righted itself financially. Vallas also cut a deal with the Chicago Teachers Union (CTF) to cease years of unrest, strikes, and caustic contract negotiations in return for guaranteed salary increases and one of the shortest instructional school days (5 hours and 45 minutes) and school years (174 days) of any major American city (Myers, 2007).

In keeping with the “get tough” spirit of standards and accountability percolating in the Illinois state house and on high boil in the competitive, free-market and corporate culture of CPS, Vallas ended social promotion a year after his appointment as CEO. At the end of the first year of linking grade-level promotion to scores on the high stakes, norm-referenced Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS), 20% of CPS students were retained in grade level for the 1997-1998 school year (Roderick, Jacob, & Bryk, 2002). Despite the strong evidence that no positive, substantial learning effects are evident after two years of retention in a grade (Easton, Jacob, Luppescu, & Roderick, 1998; Roderick, Jacob, & Bryk, 2002; Roderick & Nagaoka, 2005) and strong anecdotal evidence that retention in elementary school increases high school drop out rate, the policy remains in effect today.

The entrepreneurial, “all comers welcome” approach of current CEO Arne Duncan, 29 evident in the variety of school operators involved with Ren10, has roots in the Vallas

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29 Duncan, Vallas’ chief deputy, was appointed CEO in July 2002 when Vallas left to head Philadelphia’s school district. A graduate of Chicago’s University Lab School and All-American basketball player at Harvard University,
administration. Vallas expanded the district’s relationship with private vendors, for-profit and non-profit organizations to whom he could contract out portions of the districts’ functions. The privatization of supplemental services, professional development, and curriculum development in the Vallas administration paved the way for Arne Duncan’s free-market RFP process to attract new school operators to relieve the district’s testing roll of dozens of failed schools.

One of the vendors attracted to the idea of school reform in Chicago was the Academy for Urban School Leadership (AUSL). AUS is one of three urban teacher residencies in the nation and the only residency to combine district teacher training with school reconstitution and operation. In the next section, I profile AUSL.

The Academy for Urban School Leadership

Almost since its founding, AUSL’s teacher preparation program has been integrated into its management of underperforming CPS schools. AUSL assumed operation of the Chicago Academy, the Chicago Academy High School, Dodge Renaissance Academy, and the Tarkington School of Excellence within the residency’s first five years of existence. Of the six AUSL schools, three are performance schools, one is a Professional Development School, and three are contract schools transferred to AUSL before Ren10. AUSL established its teacher

where he graduated cum laude in 1987, Duncan has been involved with the founding and expansion of the CPS-AUSL partnership.

AUSL’s leadership and staff include the executive director, three managing directors, field coaches who work throughout AUSL’s schools, mentors (CPS teachers), recruitment and admissions personnel, curriculum and assessment personnel who develop the academic and professional programs for the residents in elementary/middle and high school tracks, induction and turnaround field coaches who work with teachers of record, development personnel who work with fundraising and institutional advancement, and business operation staff (AUSL, 2008). As a 503(c)(1) private, non-profit, AUSL is governed by a board of directors who sets policies for the residency program and through the AUSL leadership and principals, governs AUSL schools. Board members include the founder, representatives from Chicago’s law, business, religious, banking, and academic communities as well as national corporations such as the Gates Foundation, MetLife Insurance, the Motorola Foundation, and the Boeing Foundation.

Dodge is in Representative Rahm Emanuel’s district. Emanuel and Barak Obama proposed legislation for national teacher residencies based, in part, on AUSL. The bill is summarized in Chapter 9.
training academies, based on the model of a teaching hospital, in Dodge near the South Side and the Chicago Academy in the North Side of the city. In 2006 and 2007, AUSL assumed responsibility for Sherman and Harvard schools, both rapidly reconstituted through the turnaround process.

Turnaround schools are declared “failed” by the district. As part of the CPS policy manual for school closing, section 401.4 “Closing Schools,” district officials are required to give the public three opportunities to comment through at least one public hearing, one forum, and appearance at a board of education meeting. After the procedures in 401.4 have been met and AUSL has been contracted to perform the turnaround, the district closes the school in June, dismisses all teachers and staff, and reopens it in September, avoiding the year-long student displacements common with tradition reconstitutions. In the summer months, AUSL hires all new teachers and staff, repairs and refurbishes the building, installs the district-determined curriculum (for example EveryDay Math), and establishes new rules, routines, and expectations for students. AUSL brings extensive capacities in teacher preparation and school management to CPS. AUSL, however, was not always in the turnaround business.

Martin “Mike” Koldyke, a Chicago businessman, former director of the Frontenac Group (a venture capital firm), and founder of the Golden Apple Foundation which annually awards and financially supports Chicago’s teachers, founded AUSL in 2001. As the chairman of the CPS School Finance Authority in 1992, Koldyke championed privatization of services and market incentives to reform the central office to a minimum of functions (Shipps, 2006, pp. 138-139). Koldyke reflected on his early work with teachers in Chicago:

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32 Dismissed staff can reapply for their jobs. In the first turnaround at Sherman School, one teacher reapplied but then withdrew the application.
Teachers for Chicago was my first attempt at teacher training. We were trying to capture mid-career people, bring them into schools and train them. It was a good idea at the time, but until it evolved into the Academy for Urban School Leadership (AUSL) of today, it was a weak sister, a mere shadow. But we didn’t know any better. Years ago, we talked to Arne Duncan and asked if he was willing to consider a conversion strategy. His leadership has given AUSL the opportunity to create turnaround schools in Chicago’s most disadvantaged situations…There’s a plan that says the bottom 100 schools in Chicago must not be allowed to prevail. We must attack those schools and see to it that life for those kids is simply better. That they are well educated. That they can read and compute. That they understand their history and are eager to go on to high school, not waiting to drop out (Koldyke, 2007).

Between 2001 and 2006, AUSL and Koldyke acquired several CPS schools as training sites for their residents: The Chicago Academy and Chicago Academy High School in the North Side, Dodge Renaissance Academy, and the Tarkington School of Excellence. In 2006 and 2007 respectively, AUSL opened the city’s first turnaround schools, The Sherman School of Excellence and the Harvard School of Excellence in the city’s South Side.

Koldyke and AUSL leaders appear to have close access to central office leaders. When I asked a CPS administrator about how the CPS-AUSL relation was formed, the administrator replied:

… And so, as I understand it…Mike Koldyke was interested in starting a school years ago and that was the Chicago Academy, and it literally just went from there…They [AUSL] basically were funded based on what their requests were. You know. "We want to do this,
we want to do this, and we want to do this. And this is why we want to do it." "Okay, we think that's great." CPS says, "We think that's great. Here are the funds."

Koldyke seemed to enjoy close access to Paul Vallas as well as Arne Duncan. Koldyke writes about an idea he shared with Vallas about helping local high school:

Here’s an example of misguided activity on my part. Not that many years ago, I had an idea to improve Englewood High School—one of the city’s worst—through a combination of curricular enhancement, such as athletics, music and so forth. I said to then-CEO Paul Vallas that if he found a good principal, I would raise the money for music, athletics and other after-school activities. Well that was an incredibly well meaning, but naïve idea. We did add some surface things, but the principal was not up to it, other leadership was not strong, and there were far too few teachers who were really devoted to change (Koldyke, 2007).

Koldyke articulates a vision for fixing the underperforming schools in Chicago, a vision that the CPS-AUSL partnership is implementing:

We have to consciously prepare literally hundreds of men and women for work in our most demanding schools. And frankly, what I’ve learned is that it takes a yearlong program like the Academy for Urban School Leadership to accomplish this, and this [Illinois] General Assembly has got to be prepared to raise more money for such quality programs…we must execute more school turnarounds. Whether they’re managed by AUSL or several other vendors, we must have a conscious effort to turn around those lowest-performing 75 elementaries and 20 high schools. For the next decade, that should be the highest priority for CPS (Koldyke, 2007).
Koldyke’s original idea of home grown teachers has evolved into the current AUSL residency program. In the 2007-2008 school year, 51 teaching residents enrolled in AUSL full-time residency. Residents are selected based on having a bachelors degree from an accredited college or university, passing scores on a variety of Illinois teacher credentialing tests, strong writing, verbal, and collegial skills. Candidates for the residency attend a day long interview session. AUSL emphasizes recruiting teachers of color. Studies start in the summer prior to the residency school year. AUSL staff and CPS teachers and administrators teach classes in methods. During the school year, one or two residents will apprentice with a mentor teacher in one of AUSL’s training academies. Residents’ responsibilities range from helping teachers in the beginning to planning and teaching lessons and eventually performing periods of solo teaching in the mentor teacher’s classroom. Residents also accompany mentor teachers to meetings and parent conferences. In the evening and on Fridays, AUSL residents attend classes at National-Louis University or the University of Illinois at Chicago where university education professors as well as AUSL staff teach content and human development classes.

Dr. Don Feinstein, Executive Director of AUSL and former CPS teacher and principal, commented on the changes in AUSL’s program:

It's [AUSL] changed-- I mean, some of the basic tenants can still be identified. It was our intent to build a strong foundation, academically, and prepare that first set of teachers for a new experience…that wasn't really done in this city. Where we changed their role not only to educate children but mentoring future teachers for the school district in a year-long, pre-service residency program…Obviously, the program has changed because we went from one training academy to six.
Dr. Jarvis Sanford, Principal of Dodge Renaissance Academy and AUSL’s Managing Director of Elementary Schools, reflected on the changing mission of AUSL from solely an urban teacher residency to an independent operator of turnaround schools:

*I'm surprised that we're actually in the turnaround business. We started out as a teacher training program, to ensure that CPS had quality teachers. And that was our initial mission. It evolved over time into a dual mission, in terms of, not only training the best teachers that we think are in Chicago Public Schools but to train them and then place them in those cohorts now going to our turnaround school. So, I'm really surprised that that has evolved into that. And equally surprised at the number of principals who come and who say, 'Your teachers are, by far, the best, you know, we've ever seen.' And, to that end, I want more.” And then, equally surprised at how we've been able to tweak this program over time, and to really create a top-notch program of urban teachers…how amazing to see those teachers at [Harvard School] this morning, who were just here [training at Dodge Renaissance Academy] a year ago, and to watch them work and learn their craft here and then go out and be their own teacher of record. It was just—it was very, very fulfilling.

In addition to summer study, the AUSL residency program gives residents approximately 800 hours of classroom experience with increasing responsibility. In exchange for a five year commitment (one residency year and four years as a CPS teacher of record), the program offers the residents recruitment and retention incentives. For their work during the residency year residents receive a $32,000 stipend. At the conclusion of the residency year, graduates of the program earn a masters degree in teaching from National Louis University or the University of Illinois—Chicago, an Illinois teaching license, highly qualified status fulfilling the No Child Left

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33 Until recently, AUSL required a total six year commitment with five years as a CPS teacher of record.
Behind teacher quality provisions, membership in the Chicago Teachers Union, and a guaranteed, fully-salaried job in an AUSL school.

Not all residents make it through the program. A university professor familiar with the AUSL program explained:

What we've done at AUSL is a spiral curriculum. So, we start a bunch of the coursework in the summer, and we're coming up on December 7th, which is our cut date for people who, if they're not going to make it through the program...they will have finished 24 semester hours of coursework and can roll into the regular program and finish up with I think twelve hours.

Intangible incentives, as marketed by AUSL, include field coaching by master teachers throughout the residency and three years as a teacher of record, cohort teaching assignments to keep the similarly trained residents together, early-to mid-career leadership opportunities in schools, newly-minted building principals, some from New Leaders for New Schools, a principal training program similar to AUSL, and repaired, refurbished, and re-supplied schools. AUSL Graduate A, now a teacher of record in one of the turnaround schools, commented on the availability of resources provided by AUSL:

It makes a difference basically, to be honest, it takes the burden off of me because I would still get those resources for my students but it would be by means where I would go out and spend my own money or I would sometimes have to say, well you know what, we can’t get to that certain project because it’s just too costly or the amount of resources that I need it’s just too much for me to purchase on my own. So the difference is still the dedication to wanting to teach the children and give them what they need...

AUSL Resident B considered the importance of the financial incentives built into the program:
When I was younger, I mean, I’m still young, but when I was younger I could have scraped by by struggling a little bit. But certainly, it [the $32,000 stipend] can attract a different type of person into this program. I just had a conversation with a friend of mine who… asked me how I felt about being in the program. Had I been an education minor in college would I be the same kind of teacher?...I wonder if educational programs in undergrad offer the same kind of quality. There’s only so much you can get, I feel, when you’re in school and in college. And it all goes back to the quality of teachers you’re getting, what text books, what kind of theoretical practices. I mean, I just feel that the best kind of model is having life experiences coupled with maturity coupled with doing…Essentially you’re paying to get the quality, the quality individuals who will come in and do that. I think it’s a must really.

The resident explains the two functions of the stipend and other financial incentives. The first is to attract enough people and keep them in the residency all year and cement their commitment to AUSL and working in CPS. The second function is to attract what the resident calls “quality” people. The incentives are designed to increase the selectivity of the candidate pool.

For some residents the personal relationships formed with the mentor teacher of resident cohorts provides significant incentives to remain in the program. AUSL Graduate A continued:

The premise of what AUSL is based on is the mentorship. That was the biggest plus for me. I had an absolutely excellent mentor. I learned a lot from her. I felt so supported and it was just a wonderful experience in the actual classroom with my mentor. I learned a lot and four years later I’m still implementing things that I learned from her in my classroom… The relationship that I had in my classroom with my resident partner and also being in that classroom for a whole year really made a huge impact, I think that makes the difference—
being able to go to the same classroom, build those relationships with kids—you definitely became prepared.

AUSL Graduate A identifies the intangibles, the relationships, the mentor’s role model, the teaching ideas that are designed into the program to incentivize AUSL teachers to stay in their careers.

Current and graduate residents experience AUSL’s program, their cohorts, and the commitment to long-term service in various ways. AUSL Resident A commented on coming to the residency with previous working and life experience as an adult:

When I look at our class, so many of us have so much to offer and we’ve had such different careers prior to this, but we all are people who have sustained a career, so that even when we change careers, we’re not going to be the college student who says, Oh I don’t want to teach anymore. We’re clear on how to sustain a career. We’re clear on how to task manage. We’re clear on how to be somewhere every day at 8:00 or 7:30 or before. So, I think you get these people who are learning to be teachers—you don’t do this program unless you want to be the best…I mean this is serious stuff. In my early 30’s, this is it. I took my time so that I knew. This is my commitment, this is where I’m going and I’m not changing my mind.

One design benefit of AUSL is attracting residents like this one who have had experiences in other jobs and who decide they want to teach in urban schools. They may be more ready to commit to five years and longer than a person right out of college and more in need of the financial incentives to help them transition from their previous job to teaching with AUSL and CPS.
Previous work experience may not prepare a person for teaching. I asked residents to reflect on what surprised them about their residency experience. This question was designed to get at what assumptions the residents may have had about the program. AUSL Resident B observed:

I think I underestimated the rigor of the program. Like I said, I had an inside scoop and I was ready for a challenge but I think just balancing everything—the NLU [National Louis University] coursework and the teaching demands and then just everything else that plays into life, so I think that was probably the biggest surprise. I consider myself to be sort of a tough cookie so now that it’s all coming to a crux, it’s busy time.

AUSL Resident A added:

In September this was a rude awakening because the demands really stepped up and your course work that you needed to do with the children stepped up. I was kind of under the impression that I would be finished with my coursework by the time school started and I was in the classroom. And I feel like my coursework stepped up and the demands of being a teacher stepped up 150 million times more than what they were this summer.

Residents A and B were surprised at the work load of the first year teacher. I did not sense from the four AUSL residents/teachers I interviewed that they were dissuaded by the work load. The surprise seemed to confirm their expectations that teaching is hard work and that they had reached the time in their personal lives when they were ready for the challenges.

Residents expressed opinions about what they would change in the program. AUSL Resident B commented:

I still feel that the summer needs to be re-designed because the way it is right now, I feel like a lot of what would be considered quote unquote our easier classes were in the summer and we have a lot of our research, data based classes now and I don’t know if you can get
around that because we have to be with the children for some of this research, but we could certainly have started some of that. Some of our coursework in the summer could have been knocked out. Even the pre-stuff, having our research design done, doing that more in the three hours of class that we set instead of listening to a lecture, how about a teacher going through a design with us, giving us time to complete that.

AUSL Resident A shared a comment about the residency’s intentional link between theory in the academic class and practice in the mentor’s classroom:

… I think theory—you need it, you always need it—but I’ve learned more by just doing and being in the classroom, that has been my best model and this is why I’m glad I’m learning so much…I still feel like our time in class over the summer could have been a little bit more effective. We were learning strategies, but we weren’t being able to practice them. And with teaching I think you need have both. You need to have the text, you need to have the theory, but you also need to then say I’m going to give you time to also practice it. Because it was like come September, it was sort of like I was starting anyway from scratch because to rewind, you just don’t have that time. It’s like, “let me think about that one class I had in June.” No, you have two seconds to make a decision! (laughs)…

AUSL has ongoing assessments for residents and, as a previous participant said, cut off dates for the AUSL staff to decide if a resident can continue with the program. I was curious know how the residents would know if they were successful teachers. AUSL Resident B considered the question:

For me, one of the ways that I will feel I’m a successful teacher in the area where we will be teaching, in the urban settings where a lot of these children are coming from very unstable homes, unsafe homes, and I’m a stranger in their lives the first day of school, the
first thing I want to do to be a quality teacher is develop a safe learning environment. … And I feel like once I build that culture and I am able to teach them the skills that will help develop some of the test scores, because yes, unfortunately, test scores are extremely important when you’re trying to marginalize a whole group of people into categories. And that’s the American way. And so while I know that’s important, my number one indicator that I’m a quality teacher is that my students are willing and able in the environment I create to learn.

Resident B addresses the tensions of teaching in an urban classroom. In CPS, ISAT test scores are the only measure of K-8 students’ academic progress. This resident acknowledges the tension between test performance and creating a safe environment in which to learn.

As a CPS school manager, AUSL relates with the district on several levels. One level is teacher recruitment. The residency collaborates with the district’s human resources department to screen applications and identify applicants. AUSL is one of several teacher preparation programs contracting with the district. Nancy Slavin, Officer of Recruitment and Workforce Planning for the Chicago Public Schools, in the Department of Human Resources, discussed changes in her portfolio of alternative teacher preparation programs, of which AUSL is one:

Well, actually, we've cut it down dramatically. We used to have 14; we're now down to six. We just decided there were too many to handle and some of them weren't effective. So we did data analysis and determined which programs we were going to keep and support and which ones we were going to drop. So, we did that. AUSL, it's the only program like it that we have. Where they do the residency… AUSL is very different because AUSL is actually running CPS schools. And so, that wasn't really a question of keeping, it was a question of changing our relationship with them…They have a
contractual relationship with the district…and we cooperate with them to get them the recruits that they need to fill the spots in their residency.

A CPS administrator discussed another level of collaboration between AUSL and the district.

I worked in a role that was… like a school support coordinator. Each of us had a portfolio of schools. I had what were considered the [AUSL] Professional Development Schools and also a turnaround school [Harvard School of Excellence] in my portfolio...And in the case of AUSL, as they were a management organization, really responsible for the management of their schools, I oftentimes worked directly more with them than I did [with] a principal in their schools. And again, it was largely around troubleshooting and support, with regard to everything from budgets to parent concerns to HR concerns. And really, just, in essence, filling a gap when they couldn't figure it out themselves.

Although AUSL and CPS relate through a contract (see Chapter 7), there is room for “muddling through” (Lindblom, 1950), particular as AUSL staff learn from the first turnaround schools.

The RPF process for awarding schools to EMOs is yet another level of interaction between the district and the residency. AUSL, along with other vendors such as the Chicago Teaching Fellows and Teach for America, submits RFPs to supply teachers to the district or consult or deliver programs and services. CPS administrators consider the applications and select vendors. In the case of school reconstitution, the district puts out RFPs for each turnaround schools and AUSL identifies the schools it wants to manage. I asked Don Feinstein, Executive Director of AUSL, how the process for selecting turnaround schools worked:

The district uses federal, state and local policy to identify the lowest performing schools. Obviously, AYP is part of it [as well as] growth [and] gain scores. And they do look at
other conditions such as attendance rate. And then, their research evaluation accountability makes the recommendation on which schools they feel should be restructured. We then put an RFP for the ones that we feel that we want to turnaround in the communities that they're in. They put the menu out there, the inventory, then we apply for the ones we want.

One of the schools that AUSL applied for was Sherman School. Sherman was the city’s first turnaround and AUSL’s first experiment with reconstituting a school over the summer months. Since the turnaround reform is tightly woven with AUSL’s new teacher training, and Sherman is the first and most notable for its extensive media coverage locally and nationally, I describe the reform at Sherman as an example of the AUSL-CPS partnership and summarize its first two years.

The Sherman School of Excellence

In the Englewood section of Chicago’s South Side, separated from the University of Chicago by the eight-lane Dan Ryan Expressway to the east, intersected in the north by Interstate 297, and four miles east of Midway Airport, The K-8 Sherman School of Excellence reopened in September of 2006 after being turned around by AUSL. The school’s enrollment was 600 students (now closer to 680), 100% of whom were African American and qualify for free or reduced lunch. In the years before the turnaround, 75% of the Sherman’s students failed to pass the state assessment tests in reading and math (Keller, 2006b).

Sherman’s entire teaching, administrative, and custodial staff was replaced through hires made by AUSL. Only the security guard was retained. CPS sought no input or final approval in the hiring or academic program beyond the contracted curricular agreements. AUSL offered lead
teachers a $30,000 stipend beyond salary over three years for their work on the leadership team (Duffrin, 2006). Of the 30 teachers hired at Sherman, four were new graduates of AUSL, 13 were graduates of AUSL with at least two years experience as teachers of record, five others were certified by the National Board of Professional Teaching Standards, two others were winners of the local Golden Apple award for distinguished teaching, three-quarters of the faculty held masters degrees, all were union members, and more than half were African-American (Keller, 2006b), including the principal, Lionel Allen.

Principal Allen and his administrative staff along with AUSL management began the turnaround process in March of 2006. During the summer months, Allen’s staff and teachers and AUSL moved into management and operation of Sherman. Lionel Allen recalls, “Oh my God! The school was just a mess, even a week before school started. We put in 12- to 14-hour days and still felt like we weren't getting much accomplished. But it all worked out in the end” (Keller, 2006b). In addition to cleaning, making repairs, painting, and reorganizing spaces, Allen and the Sherman staff set out to create a new rules and behaviors. Students wore uniforms—maroon polo shirt and slacks—and had to be quiet in the hallways, a new rule for Sherman students.

Stephanie Banchero, education reporter for the Chicago Tribune, spent a year in the classroom of one of Sherman’s eighth grade teachers, an experienced CPS teacher and winner of the city’s Golden Apple award for teaching excellence. Banchero’s three-part series portrays a demanding and charismatic teacher devoting her work and after school hours to teaching and preparing her students for the Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT), administered in March of 2007. At the end of Sherman’s first year, 8th graders saw an incremental improvement in reading and a 20 point improvement in math. Table 5.4 shows ISAT scores for Sherman
School. The 2007 scores reflect the school’s first year under AUSL’s management. The 2006 scores attracted city-wide controversy as a result of a re-designed test format, a reduction of critical thinking questions, and a reduced state math proficiency target for 8th grade. These changes were made in preparation for the NCLB provision that all grades 3 through grades 8 be tested annually.

Table 5.4 Sherman School ISAT Scores, % Meets or Exceeds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Math</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gr3</td>
<td>Gr4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006*</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2006 scores on the revised 2005-2006 ISAT
2007 Scores under AUSL management

Sherman School students on the whole scored moderate increases in 2007 and in some cases notable increases over 2006 scores. The surprising gain in the 2006 3rd grade reading scores vanished in 2007, but that could be explained by the impact of a group new to ISAT test taking. Sherman’s 4th graders lost some ground in reading as well. Fifth graders appeared to make a dramatic gain in reading not seen in the 6th through 8th grades. Sherman’s 8th grade reading scores increased slightly from 2006 but failed to reach the 2005 level. Apparent gains in 2007 math scores are evident in grades 3, 5, 7 and 8 compared to 2006 levels. Despite the apparent impact of the test’s revisions, the 2006 ISAT is a reasonable benchmark for assessing the 2007 scores because Sherman students across the board did not achieve the dramatic gains in 2006 ISAT scores that were seen district-wide.
Gains in some areas and grade levels were not enough to help the school make AYP on any measure, but the district was happy with the scores. Banchero wrote, quoting CEO Arne Duncan:

We could not be more pleased or more proud of the first-year results from Sherman. We are so hopeful and so convinced that this is the right way to do it -- find the best teachers and the best administrators—that we want to replicate this model quickly. We want to open ten Shermans every school year (Banchero, 2007).

The news about the school’s improved test scores was not enough to keep nine of the thirty teachers, one of them the subject of the Tribune story, from leaving Sherman in June. According to Allen, seven teachers left for better job opportunities and two were terminated.

When I interviewed Principal Allen in early November of 2007, he reflected on the second year of the Sherman School experiment:

This year is a lot easier to sit back and reflect because it’s not as crazy as last year. Every other day we had visitors coming in. It was two hours of my day taking people around and that kind of stuff, so that’s gone which is nice. So, I feel much more like a principal than an events planner or tour guide this year. Students have come back much more open to the expectations that we have. Last year, they didn’t understand why we have no talking in the hallways, they didn’t understand why we start the day the way we do, they didn’t understand why you have to wear uniforms, they had no academic stamina, they didn’t know what it meant to take part in a discussion, they were used to just getting worksheets and doing worksheets all day. They were used to chaos. This year, I think they understand after spending a year together, why we did some of the things we did.
Sherman garnered local and national media attention as the first turnaround school in the city. I asked Allen why he thought the school was attracting so many visitors and who was generating the media attention:

I think that … this model, this initiative, is tremendously radical in the sense that you release all the adults in the building and you come in with a new team, so to speak… but you are also tackling one of the most underperforming schools in the city of Chicago. I think at the time Sherman was second to last on the list of student performance. You have the political side, you have the labor relation side, you have the kids who are sort of becoming in this environment guinea pigs, we’re trying all these new initiatives on them to see now they respond to it. You got the parent community piece. And then you just have the unknown. People did not know what this really meant. What does it mean to initiate a turnaround transformational strategy at school? That was unheard of…there has never been a model where everybody goes. Principal, teachers, custodial staff, lunch room staff… So, everybody’s interested in that.

Allen highlights the experimental nature of Sherman’s turnaround even as AUSL had open the second turnaround school in the Fall of 2007 (the Harvard School of Excellence) and was making plans for another four in 2008 and a total of 20 by 2012. The school was trying new initiatives and seeing how students responded. He emphasized the importance of the unknown; “People did not know what this really meant.”

Some members in the community had an idea of what the turnaround reform meant to them. Critics of the CPS-AUSL reform have not received the amount of press coverage that the turnaround itself has. Julie Woestehoff, Executive Director of Parents United for Responsible Education (PURE) has been a vocal opponent of Ren10 and the AUSL turnarounds. Pointing to
the neighborhood disruption of school closings (not the turnarounds), the disbanding of LSCs and parent-governance, Woestehoff and 300 others protested the August 25, 2004 CPS school board meeting to protest the mayor’s then-proposed Renaissance 2010 plan to build or convert 100 of the city’s lowest performing schools, according to ISAT scores and AYP proficiency levels (Rethinking Schools, 2007). Woestehoff argues for stronger parent accountability, not weaker as is the case with Ren10 and NCLB. She argues that CPS has no plan to follow students who must change schools as a result of school closings. She has reason to argue. Rossi and Konkol (2006) observed that the reassignment of CPS students due to school closing caused unintended consequences. For example, some receiving schools whose enrollments increase without an increase in staff and who may be near closing themselves, experience increased school violence as measured by the number of school calls to the Chicago police. It is common for reassigned students to cross gangs turf boundaries and attend “enemy” schools. Receiving schools may not be able to handle the increased numbers of students with special needs.

The turnaround reform implemented in Sherman school in 2006 and Harvard School in 2007 address some of Woestehoff’s concerns for disruption. Students stay in their neighborhood school, avoiding the year-long disruptions common with reconstitution and the potentially long bus rides to receiving schools in other areas of the city. Because the turnaround policy requires that all teachers be pink-slipped, even high performing teacher or teachers whose evaluations have been satisfactory or whose importance to the school and local families has been considerable, the cultural, emotional, and instructional changes with turnarounds can be disruptive.
Chicago is a case of impressive size and entrepreneurial adventure in school reform. Despite the district’s substantial research office, central office leaders and their reform partners such as AUSL are bold, even cavalier in their willingness to experiment with reforms that have little if any empirical credibility. The district seems to institute reforms based on anecdote and political expediency to do something dramatic in order to address the urgency associated with chronically low test scores, a 54% drop out rate, and a student population living in astounding poverty and limited opportunity a few miles from the hotels, shopping, and world-renown architecture on Michigan Avenue.

In Chapter 9, I offer suggestions to policymakers considering creating new urban teacher residencies to partner with districts wanting to prepare their own new teachers. In that discussion, I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the AUSL and BTR models. Suggesting some modifications, I advise policymakers consider adopting one.
CHAPTER 6 BOSTON

As in Chapter 5, this chapter’s case description of Boston starts broad and narrows to feature a notable aspect of the BPS-BTR partnership. I begin by highlighting the relevant city and district details and the demographic information and historical background most appropriate to understanding the nature of importance of the achievement gap in Boston. I then describe the relationship among regime actors who conceived and founded BTR as a response, if indirect, to the achievement gap. Following a profile of BTR with extensive interview excerpts focusing on program, funding, perceptions of the participants, and relevant interactions with the district, I conclude the chapter by discussing the role of the mayor’s educational initiative in BTR’s mission and program.

Boston, Massachusetts

Boston’s near half million people live in the city’s 90 square miles. While the city’s population grew in the 1990’s, it slowed in between 2000 and 2005, due in part to the decline of Boston’s technology industries and increasing cost of housing (Frey, 2005). Boston’s residents are diverse and increasingly diversifying. Whites are now a minority in the city after two decades of out migration to the suburbs. Hispanics\(^{34}\) will soon be the largest population in Boston (Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metro Policy, 2003).

There are more 20 to 24 years olds in Boston than any other age group, a likely effect of the numerous colleges and universities in the metropolitan area (Brookings Institution, 2003). Forty-one percent of Boston’s residents have earned a bachelors degree; the majority of these degree holders are White (55%) compared to 25% of the city’s Black population (Boston Indicators, 2003).

\(^{34}\) BPS uses the term “Hispanics” to refer to its Latino/Latina population. I will use the district’s term throughout the chapter and when referring to Boston elsewhere in the study.
Despite downward economic trends in some parts of the country, Boston maintains a healthy economic profile due to high levels of education, low unemployment relative to the national average, and a specialization in education and health services (Brookings Institution, 2003). However, not all Boston residents share this prosperity. Poverty is highest among Hispanics, the second largest minority in the Boston Public School system next to Blacks.

Boston Public Schools

Boston is the 67th largest school district in the United States with over 56,500 students in 144 schools. Key to understanding the mission of the Boston Teacher Residency is the knowledge of the racial make up of the district’s students. Eighty-six percent of BPS students are non-white, predominantly Black and Hispanic. BPS follows the national trend of decline of white enrollment in public schools (Orfield & Lee, 2006). As the number of Black and Hispanic students has increased over the last 10 years, the number of White teachers has remained stable at 61%.

Almost to a participant in Boston, interviewees mention without provocation the city’s history of racial tension, integration through forced busing begun in 1974 (and phasing out currently), and the city’s reputation as being one of the most racist in the North. A comprehensive account of the history and impact of school desegregation in Boston is beyond the scope of this study and has been researched elsewhere (Nelson, 2005). The racial tensions and city-wide effects are evidenced in the data and are reflected in the disparity between teacher and student color and ethnicity in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.

35 As a bias check, I disclose that I lived in the Boston area and worked in Cambridge in the early 1990’s. My anecdotal experiences confirm the notion that the division between Blacks and Whites in the city is striking. I cannot account for the extent to which these experiences bias my perceptions and decisions as a researcher, but I admit bias is present regarding the topic of race in Boston.
Table 6.1 School, Student and Staff Information for Boston Public Schools (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>144</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student Enrollment:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>does not include 20,400 students in charter or private schools</td>
<td>56,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25,430 GR. K-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,890 in Gr. 6-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18,870 in Gr. 9-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Diversity Makeup (by percent)</td>
<td>41 Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 Hispanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Multiracial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Poverty Indicator (by percent)</td>
<td>75 eligible for free &amp; reduced meals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68 free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>4,979 teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>730 administrators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Boston Public Schools (2008)

Table 6.2 Comparison of Student and Staff Demographic Percentage Change Over Ten Years in Boston Public Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1995</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Boston Public Schools (2008)

In 2006, BPS won the Broad Prize for Urban Education after being a runner up for five consecutive years. The prize recognizes the urban school district with the greatest improvement in student scores and the most effective reduction of the achievement gaps among ethnic groups and between high- and low- income students (Broad Foundation, 2008). Broad’s reasons for awarding Boston the million dollar prize included:
• Academic gains for all students, especially African Americans;
• District performance exceeding other MA districts with similar low-income populations;
• Reduced achievement gaps for Hispanic students while closing achievement gap faster than the state in math.

Broad cited several influencing factors in the decision, including strong support from the mayor, the district’s status as a line item in city budget, appointed school committee (presumably meaning streamlined and goal-oriented decision-making), and the relationship between the district and the Boston Plan for Excellence and BPE’s press to examine the district’s policies and practices.

BPS recently achieved notable increases in scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) among American urban districts. In the 2007 Trial Urban District Assessment which highlights 4th and 8th grade reading and math scores from the 11 largest urban districts, 4th grade Boston students had the third highest scores in reading. Boston 8th grade reading scores ranked second, with Charlotte, NC and Austin, TX tied for first (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2008). The most notable gains on the 2007 NAEP were those of low-income students. Fourth grade math score gains were two-and-a-half times higher than the national average gains while 8th grade math score gains were nearly four times higher than gains nationally. Average 2007 scores for lower income students were higher than averages in 2003 and 2005 and higher than the average scores their counterparts nationally. Despite these gains of low-income students, the district saw no significant change in the achievement gap compared to 2003 and 2005. Table 6.3 shows Boston 2007 NAEP scores with state scores in parentheses. In light of the national recognition these scores drew in media reports and the attention of the Broad
Foundation, the complete scores appear in Table 6.3. In the table, the label “2007N” indicates the national average NAEP scores. Scores in parenthesis are state scores.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Below</th>
<th>Basic</th>
<th>Proficient</th>
<th>Advanced</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th grade math NAEP 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>50(41)</td>
<td>40(46)</td>
<td>9(11)</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>48(28)</td>
<td>38(50)</td>
<td>12(20)</td>
<td>1(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>42(23)</td>
<td>41(50)</td>
<td>15(24)</td>
<td>1(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>50(41)</td>
<td>40(46)</td>
<td>9(11)</td>
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<td>48(28)</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<th>Below</th>
<th>Basic</th>
<th>Proficient</th>
<th>Advanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th grade math NAEP 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>50(41)</td>
<td>40(46)</td>
<td>9(11)</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>48(28)</td>
<td>38(50)</td>
<td>12(20)</td>
<td>1(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>42(23)</td>
<td>41(50)</td>
<td>15(24)</td>
<td>1(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Below</th>
<th>Basic</th>
<th>Proficient</th>
<th>Advanced</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th grade reading NAEP 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>58(52)</td>
<td>33(31)</td>
<td>8(14)</td>
<td>1(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>55(42)</td>
<td>34(35)</td>
<td>9(16)</td>
<td>2(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>51(35)</td>
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<td>2(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007N</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
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Source: National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES, 2008)

Most notable in these 2007 NAEP scores is the disparity between state averages (in parentheses) and the national averages compared to the Boston averages for below basic performances over the four year period. While there are some indications of improvement between 2003 and 2007 in Boston’s 4th and 8th grade Basic and Proficient scores, the gap in Proficient and Advanced scores between Boston students in their counterparts in the state and the nation is considerable, persistent, and concerning.
The increase in NAEP scores, relative to 10 other urban districts, was not an indication that BPS was making substantive progress closing the achievement gap between students in the city and students in the state. The state’s Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) is the state’s annual assessment used to determine district and school Adequate Yearly Progress. Table 6.4 indicates scores from Spring 2006 MCAS. They reflect the similar disparity as do NAEP scores between Boston’s students and their counterparts in the state (scores in parentheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4th Grade</th>
<th></th>
<th>8th Grade</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>26(50)</td>
<td>Math</td>
<td>26(52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>54(74)</td>
<td>Math</td>
<td>23(40)</td>
<td></td>
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In both grade levels and both subject areas, the achievement gap between the 87% non-White BPS student population and the rest of the state’s student population (29% non-White) ranges from 17 to 26 points. As with the NAEP scores, there is incremental improvement in MCAS scores from year to year for poor and non-White students; however, the gaps remain resistant to educational reform.

In light of this data such as this and the indications that BPS students were significantly underperforming compared to their state counterparts, Boston’s regime partners mobilized key actors to address two problems: the disparities among teacher and student racial makeup and the achievement gap. The next section describes how coalition members including the mayor, BPS
leadership, and leaders of intermediary organizations envisioned the Boston Teacher Residency as one response to the district’s educational problems.

BPS Leadership and the Boston Plan for Excellence

Boston qualifies as an urban regime because its public and private organizations and their key actors have formed politically powerful and mutually beneficial relationships over the near decade-and-a-half administration of Democratic Mayor Thomas Menino. The city council, private businesses, local technology, knowledge, and service industries, banking, academic, and labor organizations have coalesced around the mayor’s administration and particularly his initiatives for the city’s school system. These coalitions were formed in and by, and continue to exist in, a context of city history, culture, and, particularly relevant to this study, civic problems such as the achievement gap. Boston’s semi-permanent set of political relationships consolidate power through the formal and informal relationships with state government, all made accessible by the walking-distance proximity of City Hall, the State House, the financial district, and Court Street (home to BPS).

According to the conceptual framework undergirding this study, urban regimes are poised to mobilize their civic capacity on high-priority civic problems. In the case of Boston, the coalition formed by the district, the mayor’s office, and the Boston Plan for Excellence (BPE) as well as BPE’s funding organizations such as Strategic Grant Partners, has financial resources and political will to bring to bear on the district’s teacher quality problems. Under the direct control of the mayor, BPS is legitimized by its important role to achieve the mayor’s Focus on Children initiative. The district’s privileged position in the regime streamlines the political channels
needed to disseminate it mission and catalyze civic capacity around alternatively preparing new teachers.

The regime partnership between the city and district was forged soon after Menino was elected mayor in 1993. Inheriting mayoral control of the schools, begun in 1992, Menino appointed Thomas Payzant (pronounced “Pay-zhant”) superintendent of BPS in 1995. Payzant’s 11-year administration, reviewed and assessed in detail in Reville and Coggins (2007), helped create the financial and political conditions necessary for BTR. Payzant was among those who envisioned BTR and presided over its design, early implementation starting in 2003, and its growth from training 15 residents teachers a year to 85 residents a year. A comprehensive history of BPS under Payzant is beyond the scope of this study, however, a discussion Payzant’s mobilization of the Boston Plan for Excellence and initial donors for BTR’s start up will exemplify Boston’s urban regime at work.

Three participants in this study, Jesse Solomon, Director of the Boston Teacher Residency (BTR) and Ellen Guiney, Executive Director of the Boston Plan for Excellence (BPE), and Timothy Knowles, former BPS Deputy Superintendent for Teaching and Learning, recall the discussions which launched the Boston Teacher Residency. Solomon discussed how BTR came to be “one foot in and one foot out” of the district:

The [BTR] program started when Strategic Grant Partners had a conversation with Superintendent [Thomas] Payzant, and [the] Deputy Superintendent [Timothy Knowles]…and asked this question, “What could we fund that you can't currently pay for, but would really like to pay for?” And they said, “We'd like to recruit and prepare our own teachers.” But one of the first things that Tom [Payzant] said is that he wanted the program to sit at the Boston Plan for Excellence. He didn't want the money going to BPS and its
coffers; he didn't want the program being kind of caught up in the bureaucracy there.

We've always described us as kind of one foot in, one foot out. BTR is a joint program with the Boston Public Schools and the Boston Plan for Excellence.

Ellen Guiney recalled why some functions of BTR’s management were placed under BPE’s supervision:

So, we had talked about it a lot… Tom [Payzant] even – right then, said at the time, and I want to bring the Boston Plan for Excellence in on this, because I don’t want this situated in the Central Office. I don’t want it to have to compete with other priorities. I want it to learn what it needs to learn to be strong…because this is going to be a very difficult thing to do.

Timothy Knowles, former BPS Deputy Superintendent for Teaching and Learning recalled how the coalition of the district and other politically aligned organizations coordinated in BTR’s design:

My involvement with Boston Teacher Residency was at the very front end as…I was invited to talk about a pressing problem with a group of potential funders…and basically put forward the concept of the Boston Teacher Residency as a new strategy for preparing teachers for urban, for Boston particularly, which would be well in line with the Boston agenda embedded in the schools as residencies are and create a competitive threat to higher education. And that was all intentional…at that point I’d been in Boston as the deputy superintendent for four years and had seen us make not only very, very limited progress in terms of teacher retention but also seeing the incredibly wide variation of quality coming out of higher education, mostly local because most of the Boston pipeline was a local pipeline…I worked with Tom Payzant to insure that the district was, and with Joanna [Jacobson, Director of Strategic Grant Partners] as a kind of key exogenous lever in this
situation, saying come on, the district needs to ante up. And so Tom and I worked out a plan where there would be an incremental increase of resources to support the thing. Then we found Jesse [Solomon, Director of BTR], I’d met Jesse previously and recruited Jesse and thought hard about the placement of the entity and decided that it would be both inside and outside as it were, so straddling the district rather than of the district entirely.

These excerpts reveal two important ideas about BTR. One is that the founding collaborators believed BTR’s work was going to be very difficult. Preparing effective teachers would provide its own challenges but doing so as a within-district program susceptible to political conflicts and funding uncertainties would present additional and perhaps greater challenges. Two, the collaborators carefully conceived of BTR’s position in the district and concluded it should be a hybrid public and private entity.

The Boston Plan for Excellence (BPE) and the Strategic Grant Partners (SGP) were essential to the founding of BTR and its sustainability through the present. Strategic Grant Partners (SGP) is a non-profit philanthropic group, a collection of donors interested in supporting the work of BPS. The Boston Plan for Excellence, often referred to as The Plan, is a non-profit organization that studies BPS, works with the central office to develop assessments and programs, publishes reports, and collects data on teachers, and receives charitable donations to fund district initiatives. SGP initiated the residency with a $2 million start up grant and the promise to fund BTR fully in the first year. This agreement was contingent upon another agreement that BPS would incrementally contribute to BTR’s operating expenses until it paid half annually. Knowles discussed why BPE was considered as likely partner to help BPS to establish BTR:

At the time, this was an incubation effort, it was start-up effort and at the time the Boston Plan for Excellence was in essence sort of the R & D enterprise connected to the district.
So, while it was a recipient of resources, it was also doing important work on the coaching front, it was working with a group of what we called Effective Practice Principals, so trying to surface great leadership in the schoolhouse and then make the knowledge across the school. The Annenberg investment focused on literacy, which I co-directed with Ellen Guiney, Director of the Boston plan for Excellence]…so it was sort of the R & D engine in addition to being a sort of financial agent so it seemed like a good place to incubate this thing [BTR].

According to the initial design by Payzant, SGP, and BPE, BPE would receive and manage the private and corporate donations to BTR. BPE would also provide office space to the residency. Currently, BTR staff share a floor with BPE in an office building on Beacon Street. Ellen Guiney talked about the contract between BPS, BPE, and SGP that articulated these funding arrangements on behalf of the residency:

There is a contract between Strategic Grant Partners and the Boston Public Schools that includes the fact that it [BTR] will be housed here at the Boston Plan for Excellence. And that we will manage it. And, our board committed to not charging any overhead to them. In other words, they're here, but, they don't pay rent…they have their own staff within here, which they fundraise and pay for. But, their overhead, which is probably 10% at least of their expenses, we give them. And, so, [pause] so it was a formal acknowledgment that it should be out-- Tom felt instantly it should be outside. And Joanna actually agreed with it. The decision to pass support money for BTR through BPE and not the district or the residency was a carefully considered one. Guiney explained the advantages of this arrangement:

And we [BPE] do very careful work, and get outside funding, too. And I think that's another struggle for the School Committee. Actually, not just with us, but with us
particularly, I would say. A lot of national foundations and local foundations don't want to
give the money directly to the district. They want another organization to have it, and with
that stance they thereby empower these outside organizations.

The flow of money in Boston was designed to achieve several purposes. It instilled confidence in
donors that their donations would not be lost or re-allocated into district’s other operating
expenses. This safeguard may have increased the amount of donors’ gifts to BTR knowing they
would directly benefit BTR through the better management by BPE. The district, intended to be
a beneficiary of BTR, might have greater ownership of the residency if was financially invested
in the residency’s success.

The effective implementation of BTR relied in part on the relationship between BPS and
BPE. During the Payzant superintendancy, BPE developed a working relationship with the
appointed BPS School Committee (Board of Education). That relationship, however, had built in
tensions as BPE was both supporter of BPS but also the district’s watchdog organization. Guiney
observed:

I think the School Committee thinks that sometimes we get into the realm of policy too
much. And we certainly do have -- I mean, we have, as an organization two main
strategies of working, and one is to do R&D with a set of schools on particular issues. So,
we're working right now with 10 schools on improving the progress of kids who've never
made progress in school before. Particularly students with disabilities. And, we've got a
whole model that we're testing out and documenting. We've got a formative assessment
tool that we work with 45 schools with. So we do on-the-ground school-based work. But
we also have a research and policy arm, you know, it's four people. It's not as if it's
huge…and we have a formal partnership with the district on a team that's called REACT:
Research Action Team. And we study policy issues, and we bring to this team...a real push on these policies that need to be changed. We're working on the [district] funding system, because the schools with the most challenging populations are not getting the most money. And so, how do you study that, document it, and present it in such a way that the School Committee acts on it? And, I think there are those on the School Committee who think, “That's our job. We should be picking out the issues, telling the school department to study them. And then, we'll make the decisions.” Payzant didn't operate that way. He felt that staff ought to be picking out the issues and then bringing options to the School Committee.

Guiney reveals the tensions in a collaborative system with formal and informal lines of authority and influence. The BPS School Committee has governance oversight, yet small informal groups such as central office leaders, BPE, and SGP envisioned and launched BTR, a BPS program, with BPE entrusted with substantial and official responsibilities for a district initiative. Unlike the simpler organizational arrangement between CPS and AUSL, based on RFPs and school management contracts, BTR was conceived in a complex and collaborative organizational structure. The residency has its own complexities especially salient as it begins to go to scale.

The Boston Teacher Residency

In this section I describe BTR’s teacher preparation program, administrative organization, and funding. I include perspectives on the program from current residents and BPS officials. Following this description, I highlight Boston’s educational agenda which I note is a particularly important contributing factor to the mission of BTR and the implementation of its program.
Unlike AUSL, BTR is not in the school reconstitution or management business. Its sole purpose is to prepare new teachers for long-term careers in the city’s schools. The BTR program takes its mission for the district, according to residency Director Jesse Solomon (personal communication). This mission includes training more teachers of color and teachers who are certified in areas of need, specifically math, science, and special education. BTR also want to prepare teachers committed to teaching and staying in Boston Public Schools. BTR is working on expanding its residency in order to eventually supply a third of the district’s 400 to 500 new teachers each year, although one district administrator told me this number was arrived at unscientifically and may vary according to teacher workforce trends and numbers of annual vacancies.

BTR considers potential residents in three admissions categories: recent, high-achieving college graduates wanting to teach in Boston, mid-life career-changers seeking to serve in an urban classroom as a next career, and community workers with ties to Boston and experience working with Boston’s youth. Residents are screened by BTR staff for academic strength, rapport with children (as observed through in-person interviews), representation from one of the admissions categories, and the extent to which they meet district goals for the teacher workforce. Once selected, residents enter the 13-month program (July to July), beginning with academic study in a two-month summer session. During the school year, academic study towards a masters degree is completed at night and on Fridays at the University of Massachusetts—Boston. While the university confers the masters of teaching degree and provides classroom space, classes are taught by residency staff (all of whom were classroom teachers), current BPS teachers and administrators, university instructors, and others who contract with BTR.
BTR’s recruitment efforts coordinate with the district’s efforts. A BPS administrator in the Human Resource department noted:

We always have high volume, 4000 applicants or more for 500 positions. So, we have plenty of people applying. We just don’t have the people in some of the areas that we need. So, for example, our two big shortage areas—two big areas the applicant pool, even though we have those high numbers, just don’t reflect what we need and one is in diversity and the other is in our shortage areas which for us are math, science, which are the usual but probably even more importantly more of a high need for us, are special education and teachers of English Language Learners. So, for instance, you know we have 4000 applicants but a third of our vacancies were for special education but only 7% of our applicant pool was qualified to teach special education. So, you’ve got these 4000 people and 7% of them are actually qualified for the program area that you need the most. We have the need for more and more ELL teachers and less than 4% of our applicant pool is qualified to teach our ELL students. Those are just two huge issues for us. And the math and science, there are always shortages but honestly they are less of shortages these days and we’ve tried to diagnose why and I think in a large part because of BTR. We’ve just got so many great math and science people coming out of BTR that we’re really able to meet that need in a way that we weren’t able to before.

Residents are placed in a mentor’s classroom in a BPS school. Mentor teachers are chosen for their experience and interest in being mentors and receive a stipend of $3,000 for the year. BTR schools volunteer to be training sites. BTR identifies a building administrator as the site-coordinator to work with the residents (usually two to a classroom), the mentor teacher, the principal, and the BTR staff. At the end of their residency year, residents may find a job at their
training site school or other BPS schools, based on vacancies. In the event that the resident and mentor experience conflicts or differences they cannot work through, even with help from the BTR field director, residents may be re-assigned to another mentor. Much of the theory of action behind BTR’s design relies on the quality and availability of high quality mentor teachers. In Chapter 9 I discuss the implications of this design in light of program expansion.

Like AUSL, BTR’s program is designed to bridge theory and practice as residents apprentice in classrooms Monday through Thursday for a full school year and attend academic classes on Fridays and weeknights. In addition to content and pedagogy classes in content areas, residents take classes in the history of Boston, particularly focusing on the period of school desegregation and forced busing, as well as classes in multicultural understanding. Residents are prepared to meet requirements of the district’s eight essentials for teacher quality (see following discussion). Residents take methods class and as well as content classes depending on their area of specializations. A BTR staff member described the residency’s relationship with a local university regarding instruction of the residents:

Friday they are at UMass because they are letting us use space, but we hire the instructors.

UMass is really the kind of agency that gives the residents their master’s degree, but we design the coursework and then we make sure that that coursework aligns to their program at UMass, though it is also different. But it has to meet the expectations for the UMass program, and then they just give the credits.

All residents receive dual certification in special education as well as their subject area and area focus—elementary or middle and high school teaching.

One question about any teacher preparation program is the extent to which teachers are trained to teach to the test, potentially disregarding other important educational goals such as
critical thinking, collaborative learning, and democratic participation. A BTR staff member commented on the pressure to raise students’ scores on the MCAS, the state’s assessment system for AYP:

The pressure’s there. I mean, I think I lot of the mentor teacher’s and residents are under a lot of pressure to raise the MCAS scores. I think it’s a both /and. So, we don’t say MCAS isn’t important because it absolutely is, absolutely. And the residents need to know that their responsibility is to support the students to be successful on the MCAS. But it can’t be the only measure.

As with AUSL, residents are afforded a variety of incentives. They receive an $11,400 stipend for the residency year. When they become teachers of record, they enter the BPS pay scale. The receive loans for their residency and masters degree and upon successful completion of the residency and three years of teaching in BPS, those loans are essentially forgiven, resulting in what some residents refer to as a free masters degree. Like AUSL, some incentives are non-monetary. Residents experience ongoing mentoring during the training year, although this aspect of the program is inconsistent according to some participants.

Like AUSL, BTR provides non-monetary incentives. When they become teachers of record, BTR provides a two-to-three year induction program with ongoing classes, seminars, and field coaching. Unlike AUSL, however, where resident graduates are guaranteed a job in an AUSL-run school, BTR graduates must compete with other candidates for a limited amount of BTR jobs. The evidence from my study indicated that the contingent nature of employment after the residency was not a disincentive to the residents. Since most residents are trained and certified in areas of needs a defined by the district, BTR graduates tend to be hired. A BTR staff member commented on why BPS principals want to hire BTR graduates:
My favorite piece of feedback this year was when a principal said to me, she said, she hired four of our residents and she said, you know they are fabulous, and what she loves about them is that they know what they know what they don’t know. And they are totally open to working with other people to learn what they don’t know. And she said they never blame the kids. Never. So, there are failures, which you have a lot your first year no matter how well prepared you are, they never blame the kids—they always think about what they can do.

Unlike AUSL residents who are directed into the city’s most underperforming schools (one of the requirements for AUSL’s operation and turnaround), BTR graduates may, by choice or chance, find jobs in schools that perform higher or have more affluence than the district’s high-poverty and high-needs schools.

By many accounts, one reason for the success of BTR, as determined by BPS, is the leadership of Jesse Solomon. A former BPS teacher, Solomon started a pilot teacher preparation program at a charter school in Boston prior to coming to BTR. He was appointed BTR’s founding Director in 2003. Ellen Guiney recalled how Solomon was recruited for BTR:

The person who should probably get the most credit of all is Jesse Solomon, you know, the one who runs it, who's just inspired…And at the second meeting, Joanna [Jacobsen of SGP], Tom [Payzant], myself, Tim [Knowles], and another woman, named Rachel Curtis said to us right away, and I knew this too, we’ve got to get this guy Jesse Solomon in because he started a program like this. And Jesse and Rachel already knew each other…So we hired Jesse right at that second meeting… It was interesting, at a board meeting of the Boston Plan for Excellence this September. Richard Elmore, who's on our board…Jesse
came to give my board an update and, he [Elmore] said, "Let's be frank. Nobody thought you were going to be able to pull this off."

Sonja Brookins Santelises, Deputy Superintendent for Teaching and Learning (the number two administrative role in the district), commented on Solomon’s leadership of BTR and work with the district:

BTR is a joint initiative between Boston Plan for Excellence and the Boston Public Schools. So Jesse, who heads it up, basically has two, three, probably four bosses in some respect but generally two bosses [laughter]. He would probably say seven in all honesty, and he’d probably be correct, but because it’s a collaborative effort. Under Jesse’s leadership and frankly because of the quality of the people he has working there, [they]… are some of the more innovative, forward-thinking, creative educators we have in the district. And because of that, they are always thinking I’d say at least 10 to 20 miles ahead of where the district is.

Solomon has a small staff of administrators who design and implement components of the residency’s program, including admissions, curriculum, mentoring, and new teacher induction. This staff shares a suite of offices with the Boston Plan for Excellence. The curriculum director, an experienced teacher in BPS, oversees the residency’s curriculum, keeping aligned with the district’s educational agenda for all BPS teachers as well as state requirements for licensure and an advanced degree. The BTR field director coordinates the placement of residents with mentors in BPS site schools and troubleshoots the relationships and logistics among residents, mentors, building site managers, principals, and BTR. The coordinator of teacher induction works with BTR graduates who have been hired as teachers of record in BPS.
BTR is funded from two main sources. One is foundation and private donations passed through the Boston Plan for Excellence. One of the main sources of BTR’s charitable support the Strategic Grant Partners (SGP) who provided BTR a start-up grant of $2.4 million in 2003 followed up with a second grant of $1.75 million several years later. According to the agreement between SGP, BPE, and BTR, the district would, by school year 2007-2008, provide half of BTR’s operating expenses. The new superintendent of BPS, Carol Johnson, has maintained current funding levels for BTR in the 2008-2009 school year budget, but a recent budget crises and resulting hiring freeze created some uncertainty as to future funding levels as well as resident hiring and the numbers of new residents BTR could admit to the program.

BTR residents provide an insider’s perspective on the program and what they are learning about teaching. BTR Resident A commented:

I'm learning a lot about the how the district works…So, the classes give me the background of—how does education work in Boston? So that's one component of these classes. But the other components are more general, in education, you know. Classroom management, behavior management, differentiated instruction, sped workshops…it's definitely Boston focused as well because Boston is looking for sped [special education] certified teachers. The makeup of BTR is so science and math heavy, that that shows that it's playing directly to Boston Public School needs…And then, we also do classes on issues of equity. So, race, power, democracy in the classroom…they're focused on making us compassionate and compassionate educators who are not going to let students down, and not going to judge students, and not going to take what students do as face value as, like-- and not hold them to low expectations…

Residents learn sometimes unexpected lessons about teaching. BTR Resident B shares:
… exciting curriculum isn’t everything. And what’s exciting to you and the sort of ideas and things that are going to get you going as a teacher and as a professional are not necessarily the ones that get your students pumped and excited, so that skill of constantly reworking the idea so that many students can access it is crucial.

BTR Resident B shared thoughts about the work load and responsibilities and the expectations about the level of difficulty of the program:

When I started the residency I knew it was going to be hard. I heard from a couple of people who’d done it before, it’s a lot of work. And I expected grad school to be a lot of work. But part of the thing is you’ve got your BTR classes which are not separate from what you’re doing during the day as an intern… you’ve got a number of responsibilities as far as papers and you’ve got a huge portfolio. And then you’ve also got the responsibilities that you carry as an intern and at this point pretty much everybody has taken over their classrooms. You’re actually the teacher in the classroom. So, that’s planning lessons for the four times a week depending on how many classes you’ve taken over, and then on top of that it’s doing your BTR work. And then, along with that it’s whatever else you’ve got going on in your life. So, I knew it was going to be hard. I didn’t expect it to be this hard. It’s a lot of work. It’s really, really, really challenging.

BTR Resident C continued the theme of the difficulty of teaching, comparing the BTR experience to a previous job as a classroom teacher:

Well, I think before, I put a lot of heart into my teaching and not necessarily a lot of thought. Now, it’s simple things like planning lessons, thinking about an objective, what am I trying to get across in this lesson, what do I expect students to know, and thinking about assessment and how do I know that they actually learned something, how do I know
that they actually understand what’s going on? I would say now I can’t actually plan a lesson—it’s just not possible for me, it doesn’t feel like a full lesson—if I’m not thinking about what is my objective, what is my point of teaching this, not just how much fun are the kids going to have tomorrow when we do this.

In addition to planning and assessment, BTR residents are taught to think about the importance of a future BPS teacher knowing the educational history of Boston. BTR Resident A commented:

Well, Boston has a very long, very complicated history about race relations also, as far as schools, so the way that the schools develop them and also race relations within the school so I think that as we think about student achievement and as we think about the kinds of particular problems there on in the Boston schools, it’s really important to have some knowledge of how things got to be where they are and why is this school district, in many ways segregated despite its fierce desegregation battle.

Researcher: *Are you coming up with any answers as to why?*

…it’s pretty clear that in a very racially divided city that likes to think of itself as non-racist but really very much was, that a lot of the desegregation battles pushed a lot of white families to the suburbs…the driving force behind the re-segregation of schools so that at this point we bus kids all over the city so that they can be in segregated classrooms essentially and that’s kind of deeply ironic. But it sort of seems to be where we are at right now.

Of all the components of the BTR program, the quality of the mentor teacher is essential to the program’s success. Residents comment on their experience with mentors and problems that emerged as BTR began to transition to scale. BTR Resident A observed:
My relationship with my mentor—it’s very good. I think it’s very reciprocal because I think we’ve learned a lot from each other and in looking at teaching we realize that we do things very differently. I’m a little more strict as far as classroom management, she’s a little bit more free-flow and I think that we’ve actually had an opportunity to learn from each other but she’s definitely a mentor in the sense that she helps to keep me grounded. I can go to her with questions or concerns I have about lessons. Having an opportunity to observe for the first couple of months in the program was really effective. Just to talk about things that I observed working or not working. One of the things that BTR pushes is that when you’re observing [you are] not judging but asking questions…But I know that there are other BTR folks who haven’t had the same experience. So, it’s one of those things that’s kind of a very delicate thing that you’re walking into somebody else’s classroom so they kind of have this sense of ownership of the classroom.

BTR Resident A described a reciprocal and mostly positive relationship with the mentor. Resident A’s role was apprentice, but the mentor values the resident as a near-peer. Resident C describes a different, more independent and pragmatic relationship with the mentor.

I have to learn what her style is, so that I can both take what she does and use it or consciously decide to do things a different way. They're models, but at the same time, I'm going be critical of them because I know they're not perfect. And so I have to decide what do I see that's good that I want to emulate, and what do I not want to do? All the while maintaining a relationship where, you know, I can respect them without agreeing with everything they're doing.

Resident B recognized other residents do not enjoy positive working relationships with their mentors:
The BTR mentors are a very mixed bunch. My mentor teacher is amazing and she’s very focused on making sure the students have access to things and can make it, and building relationships with students so that they feel comfortable…I have a lot of friends who have had dreadful experiences [with mentors] and whether the teacher is old school such that they just try to teach content or old school such that they just don’t care about their students very much, you know or that they’re just there to bring home a paycheck. There are some real personal clashes and some real philosophical clashes in that as well.

As in AUSL, BTR built in financial and non-financial incentives to attract and keep teachers in urban classrooms. Two BTR residents talk about the importance of incentives in their experience of the residency. Resident C discussed how incentives made it possible to join the program:

Oh, they are hugely important. I think for me, I recognize that I wanted to get into teaching and one of the things that stood out to me in BTR is the year-long program, the year-long masters. It’s not a two-year program. And so, the main thing is that I didn’t want to step into the classroom having had an opportunity to teach before and realizing that it didn’t always go well. Having an opportunity to mentor with somebody else, to be in a mentorship situation where you’re actually in the classroom and you see the year go along like that, that’s really appealing because it feels like when I do my first year, I’m not going to have one of those disaster first years. And then on top of that, you know, you have a free masters, which is unheard of nowadays. So that’s extremely appealing. It’s a free Masters and it’s a year long program, so you don’t end up having to take out an insane amount of time from your life.
Resident A shared a different perspective:

We'd all like more money, I think. I've never heard somebody say, “I shouldn't have done this program-- they don't give us enough money, you know?” I haven't talked to anybody who is feels that way. You couldn't get into this program unless you really cared about being a great teacher…anybody who made it into this program is not going to be too hung up on it. But, I definitely get the sense, from talking to other people, that the money is a big issue.

This resident evidences two ideas about incentives. One, residents attribute varying levels of importance to incentives depending on their situation. Two, while money is important, particularly living in Boston where high housing costs are the norm, the incentives are not a motivator to join BTR but may be the mechanism that makes the residency possible.

When residents enter BTR and learn to teach according to the BTR program, they are learning about and preparing to teach in an urban district whose educational agenda has been tuned for coherence. In the following section, the last of the chapter, I discuss the mayor’s educational plan, a multi-year educational initiative aimed at improving test scores by improving learning.

Boston’s Educational Agenda

Mayor Menino’s initiative for BPS was called Focus on Children II, a 2001 to 2006 initiative. When BPS won the Broad Prize for Urban Education, they were implementing Menino’s plan which articulated, among other goals, six essentials for whole school improvement with specific expectations for schools and the central office.\textsuperscript{36} Focus II also

\textsuperscript{36} The six essentials for whole school improvement were 1) focus on literacy and mathematics, 2) use student work and data to identify student needs, improve instruction and assess progress, 3) focus professional development to
 included articulated attributes for teaching, called the eight dimensions of effective teaching.\textsuperscript{37} A BTR staff member described the dimensions and discusses how residents are assessed on their competency in each:

So, there are eight dimensions…and they are demonstrate excellence, equity, and high expectations for all students, reflect and practice and collaborate with peers, model professional behavior, plan instruction and use strategies effectively, monitor student progress, partner with family and community, know content, and establish safe, respectful, and culturally sensitive learning communities. So, what the residents need to demonstrate at the end of the first year is, you know, they need to meet certain benchmarks along these competencies in order to graduate from the program. So, for each dimension there is a portfolio assignment that they have to complete…and they present aspects of that portfolio actually twice during the year. In January, they do a mini-presentation on a case study student to show how they supported the achievement of that students And, at the end of the year, they look at a whole class set of data, and they have to show what they did to, I mean, they have to analyze how students did on a particular assignment or end of unit assessment and then analyze what the instructional implications are for next steps.

This excerpt shows how the BTR program reflects the district’s educational goals. When BTR teachers become teachers of record, they are familiar with the district’s curriculum, its administrative practices, and its overarching goals through the eight essentials for teacher quality

\footnote{1) demonstrate excellence, equity, and high expectations for all students, 2) reflect on practice and collaborate with peers, 3) model professional behavior, 4) plan instruction and use strategies effectively, 5) monitor and assess student progress, 6) partner with family and community, 7) know content, 8) establish safe, respectful, and culturally sensitive learning communities.}
and the dimensions of school improvement. BTR also has to be flexible with BPS, particularly when the mayor’s initiative is compromised by financial crises.

A BPS administrator noted how the district and the residency work together guided by the district’s educational agenda:

We work very closely with [BPS] Human Resources to make sure the numbers of teachers they’re training meet the needs. We think programmatical about how we can match the residents’ training to what’s actually being expected in Boston public schools. So for instance, BTR residents all learn literacy within the context of Boston public schools. So really it’s to make sure in terms of alignment, philosophy, any kind of new direction. When we decided to add a, for lack of a better term, a track, that BTR residents could opt into around becoming dual certified as ESL teachers, a lot of that was driven by district needs, but it was also driven by district expectations in training.

This BPS administrator speaks to the alignment of BTR program and BPS guidelines and goals, suggesting the district and residency engage in an ongoing collaborative dialogue.

Another example of this district-residency engagement is the flexibility BTR can achieve in response to changing district needs. Deputy Superintendent for Teaching and Learning Sonja Brookins Santelises shared:

From the district’s stand point, they are very nimble. We said last year we should really think about dual-certifying people in ESL because we have a need and literally a year later it’s going to be put in place. You know we say we need this many graduates and they recruit. I mean Jesse has halted admissions we were in the middle of a budget crisis frankly, and I said to Jesse I’m not sure whether we can take the same number of residents that we have in the past. And he literally put a stop on sending out acceptance
letters, except to those in the most, you know, high need areas, and in the end it turned out we were ok, we could take more. But that’s, in my mind, from a public institution sense, they are far more nimble than 90% of the departments we have in BPS. From their perspective I don’t think they would say we’re probably as nimble as we need to be. And they’re probably right.

The partnership between BPS and BTR allowed the district to decide it wanted its new teachers double certified in their subject area and in special education. When BPS thought a hiring freeze was approaching, BTR temporarily halted admissions. If BPS says it needs more diversity among teachers, BTR improves its recruitment for teachers of color. This nimbleness of program and responsiveness to district need are indications of collaboration between BPS and BTR.

In the next chapter, I discuss my first set of findings regarding the collaborative and contractual partnerships in Boston and Chicago. I discuss a finding indicating the extent of access corporations have to the residencies, and I compare the similarities and differences between cases. The chapter also presents a figure that maps the district-residency partnerships and indicates how their differences in structure account for differences in meanings of teacher quality. Those findings are discussed in Chapter 8.
CHAPTER 7 FINDINGS: BRIDGING AND CONTROL

This chapter and the next present my findings from Chicago and Boston. I first summarize the Chapter 3 discussion of the terms “bridging” and “control” in the conceptual framework. I then review the research question that guided the collection of data, followed by a brief walk-through of Figure 7.1. This figure provides a side-by-side map of both districts’ bridging and control structures. I devote the remainder of the chapter to describing my findings for bridging, control, and corporate proximity, defined in the following section. Throughout the discussion of findings, I refer back to Figure 7.1 to highlight each area on the “map.”

A Summary of Bridging and Control

The conceptual framework in Chapter 3 theorized how an urban district bridges with an urban teacher residency in order to acquire the resources—knowledge, finances, and political support—it needs to fulfill its goals. In the cases in this study, the districts’ goal was to reduce new teacher turnover and, by improving this component of teacher quality, reduce the achievement gap. “Bridging” proved a useful concept for understanding how and why the district partners with an external organization. Likewise, “control” aptly described how the district delegates decision-making control to the residency, to what extent, and with what limits. The bridge, represented by the two-way arrow in Figure 3.1, theorized two actions. The district receives from the residency resources it does not possess while it delegates to the residency decision-making control over the residency’s operation. Control enables the residency to function as it needs in order to provide resources and increased capacities to the district. Bridging catalyzes mutual benefit. It serves the needs of the district to acquire scarce resources, such as
teacher preparation capacities. It also serves the needs of the residency for opportunity, job placement of residents, and legitimacy.

Throughout the study, my findings tracked with the conceptual framework, which remained unchanged. The findings revealed an important component of the bridging structure, what I call “corporate proximity” to the residency. This term represents the flow of private donations to the residency and the extent to which corporate and private donors had access to the core workings of the residency. Corporate proximity was important to the study in two ways: it illustrated the variations in the flow of money and approximated in visual terms the extent of access and influence private and corporate donors potentially exerted over the partnerships’ teacher education and construction of teacher quality, particularly urban teacher quality.

Research Question 1 and a Walk Through of Figure 7.1

My first research question inquired about bridging and control in each city. I asked, *How do districts partner with urban teacher residencies?* I defined the verb “partner” in broad terms to include how a district bridged with and delegated control to the residency, how that control legitimized the residency, how relationships were formed with intermediary organizations including private donors, how the partnership implemented the reform, and upon what assumptions that reform was based. The findings for this research question indicated two types of bridging and two types of delegated decision-making control in Chicago and Boston.

Figure 7.1 maps the specific bridging, control, and corporate proximity findings for the CPS-AUSL and BPS-BTR partnerships. I place the findings side-by-side for convenient reference throughout the chapter. The districts are represented by the large circles, indicating they have opened their organizational boundaries to partner with the residencies, represented by the smaller
circles which likewise have porous organizational boundaries. Shaded boxes with dollar signs represent corporate and private funders who support the residencies’ operating expenses. The un-shaded box with dollar signs represents district’s financial contribution public funds to the residency. The residency in Chicago reconstitutes and operates district schools; this function is represented by the rectangle depicting AUSL-run public schools. The key below explains the control aspects of the partnerships. In the next three sections, I describe bridging and control in Chicago, in Boston, and the corporate proximity to the residencies in each city.

Figure 7.1 Bridging, Control, and Corporate Proximity in Chicago and Boston

Contractual Bridging and Proxy Control in Chicago

In this section I contextualize the partnership between CPS and AUSL, illustrating the district’s needs and the residency’s capacities to meet those needs. I then define and describe the
district’s types of bridging and control and give examples. Following this, I analyze the ways in which bridging and control define and impact the district-residency partnership.

In a public statement regarding the district’s January 2008 decision to close eight schools and remove 200 teachers, District CEO Arne Duncan said, “We have a moral obligation to come in and do something dramatically better for those children now—we cannot wait” (CNN, 2008). CPS partnered with AUSL because the residency could provide services and resources the district lacked and expand the district’s instructional resources it required. The district had almost 200 underperforming schools and hundreds of new teachers leaving their schools within their first three years. Don, Executive Director of AUSL, explained:

There are, unfortunately, a significant number of schools in the third largest school district in America that are at the bottom tier, that are chronically underperforming. It's our goal to fix and turn around a significant percentage of those schools. In order to do that, you have to scale up, build your infrastructure, and be very aggressive in addressing those schools. I also think that if we don't do it, twenty years from now, those schools will look exactly like the way they look now.

Feinstein’s articulation of AUSL’s mission, to fix failed schools for the district, illustrates the key role AUSL plays in the district’s plan to improve student performance. Confirming the scope of this need, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley said, “We must face the reality that, for schools that have consistently underperformed, it’s time to start over” (Gewerzt, 2004). Mayor Daley announced the city must face reality, implying it had not previously, and rebuild the school system through his Renaissance 2010 initiative. The district embarked on this plan by partnering with AUSL through what I call contractual bridging with AUSL. I define contractual bridging as a district-directed agreement with an organization able to provide resources the
district does not possess. The agreement for resources is articulated through a contract and approved by a recognized authority, in this case the CPS Board of Education, in response to a regime-wide problem such as high teacher turnover. In contractual bridging, the contract is the mechanism that structures the bridge, requiring the district’s organizational boundary to become porous, enabling resources and influence to flow out to and in from another organization.

Contractual bridging is a variation on the theoretical bridging described in Chapter 3 and illustrated in Figure 3.1 Evidence for contractual bridging included descriptions of the partnerships through interviews and actual contracts between CPS and AUSL. An example of a contract between CPS and AUSL points to the extensive role AUSL plays as school operator and teacher training academy though its contractual bridging with the district. The School Management and Performance Agreement articulates the understandings between CPS and AUSL regarding the residency’s management of the Sherman School of Excellence.39 The following excerpted “Scope of Services” is taken from the March 22, 2006 CPS Board of Education meeting (Chicago Public Schools, 2008). I comment on key Services AUSL already performed through its residency program:

Scope of Services: AUSL will provide school management services at Sherman, including but not limited to, the following:

1. Implement a professional development teacher support model; AUSL already accomplished this through the residency program. Once resident graduates secure jobs as teachers of record, AUSL field coaches work with them for two to three years.

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39 AUSL signs such an agreement for each of the schools it operates for the district. See an example in Appendix B.
2. **Conduct staff recruitment and selection of CPS teachers to serve at Sherman:**
   AUSL uses its own staff recruitment along with the district’s HR personnel to recruit teachers.

3. **Implement a reading curriculum based on the Chicago Reading Initiative; the math and science programs will use EveryDay Math and Trailblazers and FOSS, respectively:** Since all AUSL residents are trained in AUSL training academies, one being classified as CPS Professional Development School, residents learn the district curriculum. As a private vendor, AUSL could choose another curriculum for reading, math and science as long as it meets districts goals, but the residency chooses to train its residents on the curriculum they will use as teachers of record.

4. **Implement data-driven instruction, utilizing interim assessments, both Learning First and local assessments, to inform pedagogy and professional development:**
   AUSL uses the extensive data from the ISAT as well as its multiple pre-test versions for diagnosis and test-taking practice.

The agreement notes two key financial arrangements. AUSL’s teachers and administrators are paid by the CPS Board of Education because they are employees of the district. AUSL receives per-pupil funding for the school’s operation. At the time of this agreement, the funding level was $3,120,000 for 2006-2007. AUSL’s operating budget for teacher training, an expense to which CPS does not contribute, was estimated at over $3 million in 2006 (Duffrin, 2006). These additional funds must be secured privately to cover operating costs of the residency and costs to turnaround Sherman (building repair, renovation, and equipment).

The bridge formed between CPS and AUSL, depicted on the left side of Figure 7.1, raises the residency’s importance and legitimacy as a fixer of schools. It also justifies the residency’s
urgency and aggressive pace condoned by CPS. According to Jarvis Sanford, AUSL leader and
principal of the AUSL-run Dodge Renaissance School, the district’s need is urgent and growing,
“…They're actually clamoring for us to do as many [turnaround schools] and to ramp up to
increase the number of graduates we are able to produce in a year, from 50 to 100 next year.”

CEO Arne Duncan talks about the district’s decision to close eight schools for reconstitution and
fire 200 teachers, a policy decision that will bring four more turnaround schools under AUSL’s
management: “You can’t do something this dramatically different with the same people. There
will be new teams and new leadership in place. It’s a clean slate. I feel a real sense of urgency. I
have a huge need to challenge the status quo (Chicago Tribune, 2008). Contractual bridging puts
into place the terms by which AUSL can help solve the district’s problems of failed schools and
teacher turnover. In return AUSL secures full-time, CPS salary-scale jobs for its residents, staff,
and leadership.

Contractual bridging in Chicago is structured by 5-year renewable agreements, such as the
one for Sherman School. Although the contracts are susceptible to non-renewal with a new
mayor or superintendent, AUSL leaders are not concerned about a disruption or discontinuation
of these agreements. Jarvis Sanford observes: “We don't have those concerns. They [CPS] said to
us, if you can do ten of these a year, you can have them. The school district, the communities are
thirsty for people to come and just give them a sense of normalcy.” Sanford notes an important
factor in the CPS-AUSL contractual bridge: the district’s need is extensive and expanding and
AUSL fills that need. He can be confident in AUSL’s security as a partner. The contractual
nature of the bridge provides added assurance that what AUSL has started will continue.

Contractual bridging provides political benefits to both sides. For example, AUSL’s
implementation of the city’s first turnaround school, the Sherman School of Excellence, attracted
considerable media attention to the district and the residency during the 2006-2007 school year. Principal Lionel Allen commented on the media attention and the political benefits and risks of the Sherman School experiment:

CPS is watching because they want to know if this model works. A lot of politicians were speaking out against it, thought students were being punished, but they really didn’t have a good sense of what it meant. You had labor leaders saying it was unfair, that we were blaming the teachers. So, the media loves scandal and you know [laughs] they love it. Because if it fails it’s a political nightmare. But if it does work, [Mayor Daley] looks like a genius.

Allen’s comment reveals several important ideas about contractual bridging. While the contract itself secure for 5 years at a time, the turnaround reform is experimental; “they want to know if this model works.” CPS is using the mechanism of a contract to structure a bridge with a reform partner even though it is uncertain about the viability of the reform. The district appears willing to risk contractual bridges with partners who might fail to meet the district’s needs. However, failure can be judged many ways. CPS and Mayor Daley stand to gain politically from contractually bridging with AUSL even if AUSL schools incrementally improve over five years: gains are gains. CPS has made its name in urban reform by dramatically raising test scores even if its student fall far below proficiency targets (Easton, 2006; Shipps, 2003).

Like CPS, AUSL stands to benefit politically from its contractual bridging partnership with the district. As AUSL continues to receive donations from Gates, Dell, Boeing, Motorola, and Met Life, foundations with a national and international reach, the residency’s legitimacy and political leverage within the regime increase. The success has been seen in the expansion of the program, the increased number of schools AUSL wins through RFPs, and large donations, such as
$10 million from the Gates Foundation. AUSL further benefits by welding itself into the power structures and coalitions in the city.

Contractual bridging impacts the nature of control the district transfers to the residency. Control is the delegated decision-making authority AUSL needs to fulfill its partnership agreement. CPS delegates control so it can complete the purpose of the bridge. The findings indicate that CPS delegates power to AUSL through what I call proxy control. Proxy control is delegated decision making authority, comprehensive and nearly-independent. It is structured and limited by a contractual bridging partnership and activated through the urban regime’s power arrangements and resulting in civic capacity. CPS delegated to AUSL decisions about the design, curriculum, admission requirements, and management of the teacher training component of AUSL’s operation in the district. CPS delegated proxy control to AUSL for the hiring and management decisions for AUSL-run district schools, within district policies and guidelines.

Proxy control was evident in the CPS policy manual (Chicago Public Schools, 2008). Section 302.7, titled “Autonomy for Contract Schools,” delegates the following responsibilities to AUSL as an operator of CPS schools:

- The procedures for recruiting, hiring, evaluating and dismissing Contract School teachers shall be governed by each school’s Performance Agreement and any applicable agreements between each Contract School and its teachers. All Contract School teachers must meet any applicable state and federal teacher qualification requirements.
- The third party provider shall retain the right to select, evaluate and terminate the school’s principal pursuant to the terms of the provider’s agreement with the principal. Each Performance Agreement shall state how a principal shall be held accountable to the
provider for the performance of the school. All Contract School principals must meet applicable state certification requirements.

- Contract Schools shall have the freedom to determine and implement their own curriculum, as set forth in the Performance Agreement. Contract Schools shall not be required to comply with CPS mandated course offerings, instructional materials or curricular initiatives…The curricula of Contract Schools shall at a minimum meet state and CPS learning standards.

- Contract Schools shall have the authority to set their own school day schedule and school year calendar, subject to the Illinois School Code. Contract Schools must comply with all applicable state requirements related to the length of the school year, holidays, and the required minutes of instruction, but shall not be required to follow the CPS calendar.

- Each Contract School shall receive funding on a per pupil basis and shall have the authority to develop its own annual budget. All Contract Schools shall utilize per pupil funding solely for educational purposes and shall have discretion to determine how per pupil funding is allocated to serve those purposes.

AUSL is given responsibilities for school management and the residency is also given a broad scope of authority to make decisions through proxy control. This is significant for two reasons: in order for CPS to meet its needs, it transfers its authority for each school to AUSL. In most matters, AUSL becomes the district authority for that school. CPS also experiences a change through proxy control: by delegating authority to organizations such as AUSL and other organizations to operate the districts most underperforming school, CPS can attend to the bubble schools and bubble students (Booher-Jennings, 2005), the one whose scores may meet
proficiency with a re-allotment of resources the district does not have to spend on chronically failing schools. In essence, proxy control allows CPS to specialize its oversight of schools.

Proxy control limits AUSL’s accountability. As the residency carries out its program, it is accountable only to the CPS central office leadership. AUSL is buffered from encroachment of parents, community members, grassroots organizations, and activist groups. Local School Councils, once formed to help govern individual schools during the district’s decentralization phase, are disbanded once AUSL reconstitutes a school. The Chicago Teachers Union can engage with CPS for firing its teachers, but they cannot engage with AUSL, whose teachers are union members. Proxy control simultaneously buffers AUSL from all but district accountability while it simultaneously authorizes and legitimizes the residency as a full-fledged, integral, and permanent regime actor.

AUSL uses proxy control in a variety of ways. It acts on the school management agreements. It trains teachers in its residency and hires non-residency teachers and principals for its turnaround schools. One example illustrates how AUSL uses proxy control to coordinate with a local university responsible for conferring the residents’ masters degree and state licensure. A university professor who works with AUSL’s academic program discussed how AUSL consults with the university about exceptions in the recruitment and admissions processes:

…at AUSL, if there are going to be exceptions made, we [the university] get a say in it, and I get to approve it, and then we figure out, how we're going to make it work and how we sell it to the [university] administration so that we can get people in and get them started while they finish up whatever they have to do. So, they're [AUSL] very good about that. I've been on a couple of the leadership retreats with them. You know [the program coordinator] has been very open about he wants all the parties at the table, and everybody

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40 Fired teachers have 10 months to find a new job before they are dropped from the employment roster.
who can be there to have a say in the way things are going to go. He'll listen, but he may not do what you want, but at least he's inviting opinions like that.

In the following section, I discuss my findings for the bridging and control strategies in Boston. These strategies differ considerably from those in Chicago. As with the discussion about Chicago, I contextualize Boston’s resources needs, BTR’s capacities, and introduce the BPS versions of bridging and control.

Collaborative Bridging and Civic Control in Boston

The district-residency partnership in Boston differs from its counterpart in Chicago in one significant way: BTR is not in the business of reconstituting and managing schools. This is significant because, in the absence of the school reconstitution and management functions, BTR can focus on its mission, directed by the district. This mission calls the residency to supply a third of its 400-500 new teachers a year, increase the number of teachers of color, particularly Black teachers, and equip new teachers with dual certification in their content area as well as special education.

In contrast to contractual bridging in Chicago, the data indicated that BPS chose a collaborative bridging strategy with BTR. I define collaborative bridging a district’s formal and informal capacity-increasing relationships. Collaborative bridging relies on a variety of agreements, some contractual, some forged through relationships among leaders, and some situational due to organizations’ intersections of purpose. One or more of these varied relationships can occur simultaneously in a collaborative bridge to mobilize a wide variety of

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41 CPS hires approximately 1,700 teachers a year; future scale up plans have AUSL providing 150 new teachers a year, 9% of the district’s new hires. BPS, then, is looking for BTR to have a proportionally significant impact on the district teacher workforce.
resources that benefit the district. The district’s partnerships with BTR, BPE, and SGP illustrate collaborative bridging.

Collaborative bridging not only creates new organizations with which regime actors and organizations can partner, such as BTR, collaborative bridging may also create new resource dependent relationships among existing coalition organizations in an urban regime, such as BPE which took on a financial management role for the residency. This idea seems to be contained in Mayor Thomas Menino’s announcement regarding the Boson Teacher Residency in a May 2003 BPS press release:

Who better to help prepare our incoming teachers than our current staff of veteran teachers who have been in classrooms across the city for many years? Through this collaboration, the BPS will build on the medical residency model and create a program that is designed and run by the district itself. This program is the first of its kind in Boston and the state (Boston Public Schools, 2008).

Timothy Knowles, former Deputy Director of Teaching and Learning in BPS described the problem around which the collaborative bridge focused its attention:

I was invited to talk about a pressing problem with a group of potential funders…and basically put forward the concept of the Boston Teacher Residency as a new strategy for preparing teachers for urban, for Boston particularly, which would be well in line with the Boston agenda embedded in the schools, as residencies are, and create a competitive threat to higher education. And that was all intentional…at that point I’d been in Boston as the deputy superintendent for four years and had seen us make not only very, very limited progress in terms of teacher retention but also seeing the incredibly wide variation of quality coming out of higher education, mostly local because most of the Boston pipeline
was a local pipeline. And having spent every month of my tenure in these meetings with all the deans of higher education felt incredibly short sighted so, the residency idea was born. The collaborative bridge in Boston delivered a broad spectrum of resources—expertise, research capabilities, finances—and interrelated relationships that together meet the district’s need to recruit teachers capable of long-term service to BPS. The collaborative nature of the bridge works, in part, because of the residency’s placement with one foot in the district and one foot in the Boston Plan for Excellence. Knowles continued, “[We] thought hard about the placement of the entity [BTR] and decided that it would be both inside and outside as it were, so straddling the district rather than of the district entirely.”

Among the collaborative relationships between the Boston Public schools (BPS), the Boston Plan for Excellence (BPE), and the Boston Teacher Residency (BTR) and the original funding organization, Strategic Grant Partners, channels of authority may be complex to navigate. Sonja Brookins Santelises, BPS Deputy Superintendent for Teaching and Learning, observed:

BTR is a joint initiative between Boston Plan for Excellence and the Boston Public Schools. So Jesse [Solomon], who heads it up, basically has two, three, probably four bosses in some respect but generally two bosses [laughter]. He would probably say seven in all honesty, and he’d probably be correct, but because it’s a collaborative effort, officially, both BPE and BPS manage the program.

Funding of the residency is a similarly complex collaboration. According to the letter of agreement which established BTR funding, the collaborative partners decided to fund the residency half through private donations which would pass through the Boston Plan of Excellence and half from BPS. The district portion would start as a small percentage in the first year and increase annually. In five years’ time, BPS would fund half of the residency’s expenses;
BPE would work with BTR to fund the other half through private and corporate donations as well as through a second gift from Strategic Grant Partners.\footnote{All together, SGP donated over $4 million to BTR as of 2007-2008.} BPE would manage all of the residency’s finances, including private donations, freeing BTR to concentrate on preparing teachers.

Organizational bridging strategies included a component of control. In Chicago, I found proxy control delegated to AUSL, giving the residency a wide scope of responsibility for decisions regarding program, school management, and fundraising. In contrast, I found in Boston evidence of civic control. I define civic control as the district’s delegation of selective decision-making authority among the collaborating organizations most suited to be in the know and make informed decisions about their areas of expertise. Decision-making in civic control is selective, but it is also shared. Influence and ideas are distributed through the collaborative relationships which the structure the bridge between BPS, BTR, and BPE. For example, BTR has decision-making control over recruitment and admissions, program curriculum, and instructional staffing of the residency’s program. The residency has input into its budget allocations but relies on BPS and BPE to ultimately determine the budget from year-to-year. BPS has decision-making control of the number of teachers it needs from BTR annually, the content areas in which they are trained, and the racial makeup of the residents in order to meet court-ordered diversity levels in the district’s teaching staff (specifically, 25% Black). Sonja Brookins Santelises gave an example of how the district’s needs drive BTR’s program:

We said last year we should really think about dual-certifying people in ESL because we have a need and literally a year later it’s going to be put in place. You know we say we need this many graduates and they [BTR] recruit. I mean Jesse [Solomon] has halted admissions when we were in the middle of a budget crisis frankly, and I said to Jesse, I’m
not sure whether we can take the same number of residents that we have in the past. And he literally put a stop on sending out acceptance letters, except to those in the most, you know, high need areas, and in the end it turned out we were ok we could take more. But that’s, in my mind, from a public institution sense, they are far more nimble than 90% of the departments we have in BPS.

Another example of shared civic control involves the hiring of residents once they graduate from BTR. Unlike Chicago where AUSL graduates are hired in AUSL-run schools, BTR has limited influence on where graduates are hired. This means BTR graduates do not necessarily find jobs in the district’s lowest-performing schools or even in their area of specialization. BTR brings graduates to the attention of district principals. A BTR resident discussed the limited role BTR plays in job placement:

BTR has definitely been helping us with [job] information…we're guaranteed a position. We're not guaranteed a certain position. We still have to apply for the job. So we have to get an ID in the BPS online system. We get jobs through principals. So, it's not like you go through central administration. BTR has definitely-- so far, they've provided face time with administrators who can explain how the job process works. They've given us information about teacher job fairs.-- they tell us, you know, as an English teacher, I'm not going to have as many options as, say, a math teacher. They've been honest about that. I think, in terms of -- figuring out what kind of school I want, it's kind of more-- my impression is that it's more through the site director of my school. That I can talk to her and say, I'm looking for this. And she can give me suggestions.

BTR admittedly wants a limited relationship with the local degree granting university, preferring to maintain extensive control over the academic curriculum. BTR creates its own
course of masters degree study, including study of content and pedagogy, taught by its own staff and selected district and university instructors. BTR uses classroom space from the university for Friday classes, and the university receives the residents’ tuition dollars in exchange. This lack of meaningful coordination between the residency and the university is a BTR decision in keeping with district philosophy to go into competition with higher education.

Like delegated proxy control, delegated civic control legitimizes BTR as permanent system actor. Timothy Knowles commented on the district’s educational agenda and the legitimizing selection of BTR to implement that agenda as they district’s key teacher education innovation:

Unlike Chicago which really doesn’t have a coherent educational kind of view in terms of the kind of instruction they are pursuing—I mean they do on a high level, on a rhetorical level—but in Boston we were very intent at the time on implementing certain kinds of instructional work in literacy and mathematics, certain kinds of assessments to help inform the teacher and provide evidence to the teacher about how kids were progressing over time, and a pretty intense professional development investment in terms of coaching in the schools on both the workshop instruction in literacy and the mathematics curricula that we adopted K through 12, so that really argued in my mind for…a pipeline that know[s] how to do that.

Proxy and civic control legitimize the residencies. Proxy control buffers the external organization from accountability. Civic control, in contrast, does not afford a powerful buffering strategy because the organizational relationships in collaborative control are spread widely among the public and across the city. BTR is more accountable to more constituencies, including students and their families, because it is a within district program. Nevertheless, like Chicago,
the district in Boston is mayorally controlled with an appointed board and superintendent that buffer BPS to some extent.

Corporate Proximity to the Residency

Corporate proximity represents the extent to which corporate and private donors have access to and potential influence on the core workings of the residency. Returning to Figure 7.1 again, the residency operations of AUSL and BTR are funded with public and private money. AUSL, as an educational management organization (EMO) and operator of a professional development schools, receives federal Title II-A (NCLB) funds designated for training highly qualified teachers (USDOE, 2008). AUSL also receives federal funds through the Troops to Teachers program sponsored by the United States Department of Defense (DOD, 2008). BTR resident graduates each receive a $4,725 grant from AmeriCorps, a federally sponsored program signed into law in the early 1990’s.

The majority of support for AUSL’s operations and at least half of BTR’s operational support come from corporate and private donations. Using Figure 7.1 as a map to follow the money, the dollar signs in the shaded boxes located outside the district circles indicate sources of corporate and private income. As described in Chapter 5, AUSL’s donors include national-level foundations as well local foundations and individual philanthropists, some of whom have representation on the AUSL Board of Directors. In this arrangement, corporate and private donations flow directly into AUSL. Corporate proximity to the residency is close in Chicago. Donors have access to the leadership and leverage on the residency to the extent AUSL relies on those donors. This arrangement is not new or unique for Chicago (Shipps, 2006), whose district history chronicles a century of intense corporate involvement in the city’s school system. Close
corporate proximity to the residency means donors can influence how teacher quality is defined and how teachers are trained. As I discuss in Chapter 8, close proximity also means that donors can contribute influence over the kinds of teacher dispositions the residencies value in their teachers.

Figure 7.1 depicts a very different money flow in Boston. Corporate proximity to BTR is buffered in two ways. One, donations to BTR are indirect, passing through BPE as the residency’s non-profit, philanthropic financial manager. Even if a corporate donor wanted to give directly to BTR through a donation given to the director, the money must pass through BPE before reaching BTR. Two, corporate donations to BTR are counterbalanced with public funds from the district, half and half. This mix of public and private funding buffers the core work of preparing new teachers from private interests and encroachment.

The findings regarding corporate proximity to the residency play an integral role in how the district-residency partnerships function as well as define teacher quality and construct teacher professional dispositions. The data regarding constructions of teacher quality come from my second and third research questions. I present the findings generated by those questions are in Chapter 8 where I consider the relationship between corporate proximity to the residency and the characteristics of teacher quality definitions salient in each case.
CHAPTER 8 FINDINGS: CONSTRUCTIONS OF TEACHER QUALITY

The findings regarding bridging, control, and corporate proximity in Chapter 7 indicated how districts partner to reduce teacher turnover. The districts in Chicago and Boston each established partnerships governed by bridging and control strategies that generated civic capacity, particularly knowledge, dollars, and political will. By design, the district-residency partners placed corporate donors in varying proximity to the residency. As I discuss later in this chapter, these varying proximities matter with regard to the reform because they influence how teacher quality is defined and how teachers are trained. The goal of these partnerships was to address the achievement gap by improving teacher quality through improved retention. I observed that how partnerships structured their relationship mattered and that the differences between the CPS-AUSL partnership and the BPS-BTR partnership were important regarding how bridging and the resulting mechanisms of control and corporate influence were implemented. The findings in this chapter indicate what the reformers meant by teacher quality and why the partnerships differed in their definitions of a quality urban teacher, particularly in their constructions of professional dispositions, the innate but teachable qualities, along with knowledge and skills, that are essential to effective urban instruction. While both partnerships commonly value the disposition of high expectations for poor and minority students, the partnerships valued different professional dispositions. Chicago emphasized personal accountability and perseverance while Boston emphasized race awareness and teaching for social justice. I argue that the structure of each partnership, specifically its bridging and control conditions and accompanying corporate proximity, influenced how reform partners constructed meanings of teacher dispositions.

The second and third research questions asked: What do district and residency reformers and actors mean by teacher quality? and Why do the district-residency partnerships in Chicago and
Boston construct dispositions of teacher quality differently? The data came in part from participants’ responses to the question, “What does teacher quality mean to you?” The evidence indicated that the partnerships in Chicago and Boston agreed on several qualities related to teacher professional practices but mostly differed on teacher professional dispositions. By categorizing the varying dispositions valued in Chicago and Boston, I clarify the muddy conceptions of teacher dispositions (Damon, 2007) and affirm that dispositions continue to be a valuable concept for teacher education, particularly teachers in urban schools. I highlight six of the most salient dispositions in the data and conclude the chapter by explaining why the partnerships construct teacher dispositions differently.

I emphasize the term “constructions” rather than “definitions” to indicate that definitions are socially constructed (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969). Constructions are not just buzz words thrown off in casual conversation; they are the common meanings shared through social interaction (Oja & Reiman, 2007) and evident in the data. They are the product of common experience, values, and beliefs about teaching in urban schools. The data indicated two categories of teacher quality constructions: professional practices and professional dispositions.

Professional Practices in Chicago and Boston

Professional practices are skills, behaviors, and habits of mind commonly associated with effective teaching. As evidenced by the participants in this study, professional practices are the ideal, teachable qualities necessary for effective urban teaching. Through formal and informal assessments, residents in both residencies are expected to learn, acquire, and demonstrate these practices as indicators of their professionalism. AUSL and BTR valued similar professional practices. The similarity of the program design, content, admission process, and overall
philosophy to bypass university-based teacher education suggested that they would likely share similar definitions of teacher quality and attributes of the ideal urban teacher. Those shared concepts of professional practices appear in Figure 8.1.

Figure 8.1: Constructions of Teacher Quality in Chicago and Boston

In response to the question, “What does teacher quality mean to you?” participants in Chicago and Boston mentioned classroom and behavior management (often interchangeably), content area knowledge in math, science, English Language Arts, history, relationships with students and their families, planning and assessment techniques such as rubrics and backwards planning, individualization—using a specific teaching method for a specific child’s learning needs, resourcefulness and creativity—trying alternative approaches with students for whom the planned approach did not succeed, collegiality—a school-wide practice of sharing ideas and
receiving, and commitment to students and to the profession. Boston’s participants specifically named commitment to teaching in Boston. Participants articulated the importance of these practices not only for successful teaching with poor and minority students but as nascent qualities they hoped to see during the admissions process and develop during the residency. One professional practice was particularly evident in the data: reflection, also called reflective practice. Participants indicated the practice of reflection was vitally connected to thinking about teacher quality, particularly teacher professional dispositions.

Reflection

Reflection is a professional practice and habit of looking back on one’s decisions and actions in the classroom for the purpose of self-assessment as well as student assessment. As is the case with decision-making strategies and professional development experiences, reflective practice is a “way into” examining and developing professional dispositions (Breese & Nawrocki-Chabin, 2007; Diez, 2007). While some scholars consider reflection a disposition itself (Burant, Chubbuck, & Whipp, 2007), the data in my study indicated reflection was considered a practice for assisting the individual teaching resident as well as groups of residents to consider their classroom performance and performances of students. Reflection was also an exercise to tap into the dispositional qualities that account for and explain teacher and students actions.

Reflective practice in AUSL and BTR was a method built into the programs to teach residents how to self-assess. Reflection focuses on a teacher’s planning, performance, and decisions, particularly educational or classroom management decisions. Reflection also assists a teacher’s assessment of a student’s performance, needs, and circumstances. The residents in
Chicago and Boston reflected on all of these areas of focus. A BTR resident talked about the reflective seminar, a class residents take:

I would say it’s one of those classes that if you walk in, you’re having a good day, it can be really helpful; if you’re not having a good day, it can feel like, I really don’t want to be there. Oh, gosh. I mean, it’s one of those things where, I would assume that the objective is for us to really sit down and think about, you know, you’re looking back on the past week or a lesson that you taught or something like that, and I think that that class has been helpful because I’m willing to be self-reflective as far as my teaching and figure out what actually worked, what didn’t work, as opposed to saying well, they just didn’t want to learn today.

An AUSL talked about the reflective practices required by residents:

I know that we’ve sort of tossed around reflection, now it’s sort of like amongst the residents, Oh, reflections! (laughs) We’ve been reflecting a lot. But in all seriousness, in order to be a great teacher, you need to have that quality. You need to be able to look at your day, at your lessons, at assessing how you’re reaching your students, how you’re teaching them, how they’re getting the learning, and be comfortable with saying That didn’t go according to plan.

Both residents talked about using reflection as a self-evaluation of instruction, lesson planning, and learning objectives. Reflection on practice achieves two purposes: to evaluate the implementation of one’s teaching practice and to assess student learning in relation to instruction.

Reflection is practiced both alone and in collegial relationships. The BTR resident talked about the reflective seminar. AUSL and BTR use mentoring and cohort apprenticeships as
primary methods of training teachers and sharing craft knowledge. The *public* nature of reflection is seen as a teacher quality, evidenced by this BTR graduate:

[A quality teacher is one] who knows their content well enough but also knows approaches to pedagogy that help students access that content… we’ve been talking a lot about being very resilient, being very resourceful and I think those are all pieces of teacher quality.

Someone who is open to reflecting on their practice with other people

Public and private reflective practice provided a mechanism to self-assess instruction and examine expectations for students and self. Reflection also tapped into a teacher’s professional dispositions, the intrinsic qualities of a teacher important for effective urban instruction. The reformers in Chicago and Boston shared, they value different profession disposition in common and valued two sets of varying dispositions. These similarities and differences are illustrated in Figure 8.1.

**Professional Dispositions in Chicago and Boston**

The second category of teacher quality constructions consists of *professional dispositions.* Despite the lack of a universally accepted definition of a professional is (Damon, 2007; Murray, 2007), the concept is nevertheless useful when considering the qualities teachers need to be effective. Talbert-Johnson (2006) noted that for too long colleges of education have admitted students academically capable but with unacceptable dispositions such as disliking children or avoiding professional collaboration. For the participants in this study, teacher dispositions appear to be meaningful and important to the preparation of a new urban teacher.

Several viable definitions of dispositions have been offered in the literature. Teacher dispositions are attributed characteristics that represent dominant and preferred trends in a
teacher’s interpretations, judgments, and actions in contexts without obvious solutions (Oja & Reiman, 2007). Informed by skills and knowledge, dispositions account for why teachers act in particular ways under particular circumstances (Villegas, 2007). Raths (2001) suggests dispositions are a more useful concept than beliefs because beliefs cannot be changed; however, dispositions, while related to beliefs, can be taught as well as changed and assessed because of their direct connections to skills and practices. Professional dispositions are the professional virtues, qualities, and habits of mind and behavior held and developed by teachers on the basis of their knowledge, understanding, and commitments to students, families, colleagues, and communities (Sockett, 2006). Intrinsic dispositions are made manifest through verbal and behavioral messages created during teaching (Breese & Nawrocki-Chabin, 2007). A simple but effective definition describes teacher dispositions as manifest actions and underlying judgments in a context in which there is more way to solve a dilemma (Johnson & Reiman, 2005). I use this last definition to frame my discussion and guide my categorization of dispositions evident in participant data.

The judgment and action qualities of dispositions are important to this study because the participants placed urban teaching in a moral and ethical domain. Burant, Chubbuck, and Whipp (2007) and Johnson & Reiman (2005) see moral and ethical aspects grounding a teacher’s decision-making in her or his role as a representative of public democracy. Teachers, particularly those working with disadvantaged students, need a moral compass to help them follow through on their commitments for all children (Darling-Hammond & Banks, 2005). In light of the inequities such as the achievement gap, the teacher quality gap, and the socioeconomic gap between urban and suburban students, district reformers in Chicago and Boston indicated that

effective urban teaching requires teachers to be working from activated ethical dispositions to teach all students equitably and fairly (Villegas, 2007).

*High Expectations*

Figure 8.1 indicates that the practice of reflection offers a way into the understanding and development of teacher professional dispositions. One disposition, the consistent having of high expectations, is common to both cases. In this section, I discuss the findings related to high expectations in Chicago and Boston and then, in the following section, contrast the varying dispositions salient in each case. I argue that the two cases seek to instill high expectations in their residents but that each district-residency partnership values varying sets of dispositions. Chicago stresses personal accountability and perseverance. Boston seeks to prepare teachers who exhibit race awareness and who will teach with an intention to achieve social justice.

Participants in both cases voiced the importance of having high expectations for disadvantaged students by associating the sub-standard performance of poor, minority urban children with their teachers’ low expectations for their students’ ability to learn. No Child Left Behind was designed, in part, to counteract what President George W. Bush repeatedly said was the “soft bigotry of low expectations,” a phrase implying that the predetermination that poor minority children cannot learn is racist. Jean Anyon (1997), in her account of the Marcy School in Newark, New Jersey suggested it was not low expectations that caused Black teachers to verbally abuse their Black students; it was teachers’ perceptions of students as victims and the students’ refusal to comply with school expectations. Referring to the idea that teachers have low expectations because they see poor children lacking essential qualities to learn, Sonja Brookins Santelises, Deputy Superintendent for Teaching and Learning in BPS, observed, “You
need people who can not only work with those children, but who can do so rejecting a deficit model.” Timothy Knowles, former BPS Deputy Superintendent for Teaching and Learning and now Director of the Urban Reform Institute in Chicago, put expectations in the context of teaching in urban schools:

I think there’s a great deal of evidence in the educational domain that expectations really matter…they’ve got to be backed up with pedagogical knowledge and content knowledge, but there are many people who can teach and know the content but have incredibly low expectations for the kids they serve and the kids don’t get very far.

The extent to which teaching with high expectations is a shared professional practice in Chicago and Boston is evident in the residents themselves. An AUSL resident differentiated between high expectations and teacher feelings for students, often confused by beginning teachers:

And you cannot be a quality teacher to me if you don’t really care about educating children. You’re not going to like all of your students. But [you can] care that they are educated. That’s what I would think of as quality.

A BTR resident connected high expectations for students with high expectations for educators:

[It takes a] belief system that-- not only a belief system that all kids are able to learn, but that it's really their fundamental job as a teacher to ensure that. And so, [it takes] people who aren't in the habit of blaming kids or blaming the principal…

Lionel Allen, Principal of Sherman School in Chicago, described his expectations for teacher quality in his school (staffed mostly with AUSL graduates):

I think about things when I walk into a classroom, is the classroom environment one that is exciting for students? Is the teacher doing all the talking? … Are you providing opportunities for students to engage in conversation, to have discussions, to question, to
question you, are you questioning them? What levels of questions are you asking? Are you just asking them to regurgitate factual information? Are you encouraging them to analyze and synthesize and do all those kinds of things? That’s what I look for in the classroom. I want to see all those kinds of things going on because again, sometimes you have situations where teachers have tremendously low expectations of their students.

Sometimes high expectations are not clear or shared. A BTR resident discussed a situation in which the residents debated how to handle a problem of expectations for work completion:

We had a big debate in class the other day about whether having students be able to do make-up work for as long as they wanted…that whenever they were ready and willing to show you that they had the content knowledge they could…or whether it was better in the end to really give firm clear deadlines… teach them the lesson of the real world [that] nobody is going to give you second chances.

Residents in both programs do not take classes in having high expectations. They are expected to have some degree of the disposition intrinsically and allow it to be developed during the residency year through the apprenticeship with their mentor teacher and through interactions with the residency coaches and staff members. High expectations are codified in BPS through the district’s Eight Dimensions of Quality Teaching, a rubric by which BTR residents are assessed through demonstration and the creation of portfolio (one for each dimension). Teaching poor, minority urban students with high expectations is a professional disposition that can be observed during a lesson, discussed after a lesson, and reflected upon through journaling or collaborative discussion.
Dispositions in Chicago: Personal Accountability

Professional dispositions are intrinsic attributes teachers bring to their work. They reflect a teacher’s judgment and actions, what they are disposed to do in real-world situations. The teacher quality data from participants in Chicago and Boston indicated that professional dispositions fit well into two categories based on the judgment and action components of dispositions: character and activism. They reflect both judgment and action, but not always in equal strengths. I argue that my interview data from Chicago indicated that the participants valued the judgment-heavy character dispositions of personal accountability and perseverance. The data indicated participants in Boston valued activist dispositions of race awareness and teaching for social justice. I argue that while character possesses both judgment and action, character dispositions are judgment-heavy, meaning teachers of character should act in certain ways consonant with a moral code of conduct and the shared values of the district residency partnership.

Participants in Chicago placed a special emphasis on the teacher’s personal accountability for each child’s success as an indicator of teacher quality. One indicator of personal accountability was the extent to which teachers blame. Lionel Allen, Principal of the Sherman School in Chicago, explained:

One of the interview questions that I ask is, what in your opinion is one of the predominant factors in the achievement gap? And if people start saying, oh it’s poverty, or it’s the parents…if they start saying all those things and they never come back to the quality of the adult in the classroom, then that’s not the kind of person I want to have here. Because, yeah, we have a billion reasons why students aren’t achieving but we can’t sit around and talk about it…We can’t help the fact that 70% of the people in this community are
unemployed…I believe that it starts with the person—because kids don’t know anything about funding…and many poor kids don’t realize that they’re poor.

Allen’s comment is significant. Given the near conventional wisdom that lower SES students perform less well than their affluent counterparts, and considering the social and economic conditions in Allen’s school’s neighborhood, he still holds the teacher accountable for learning. In these circumstances, teaching is not just a professional choice; it is an expression of character. Allen’s words imply that a teacher of character does not avoid responsibility but accepts the judgment placed on the situation: regardless of external circumstances, the teacher is ultimately responsible to improve students’ academic achievement.

An AUSL resident illustrated how the Chicago notion of accountability may not be experienced as threat from supervisors but an internalized mechanism to spur self-guided professional growth:

…teacher quality is someone who learns best practices, tries to implement best practices, and doesn’t stop even when it doesn’t go the way you think it’s going to go. So when you have a bad day, you always think, “Okay, how can I make this better?” You’re constantly trying to make it better, constantly reflecting on what you did as a teacher, what your students did, and what you need to change in order to adapt to what they need to learn, whatever there is that they need to learn.

This resident is not only holding self accountable for teaching most of the students in the room; the resident expresses a personal accountability for every student. This teacher is talking about character, the “constant” judgment that this level of commitment is necessary in high-poverty schools and the belief that all students are worth it the effort.
One component of the character disposition is personal accountability heavily influenced by judgment: this is how quality teachers should behave. Another character component is perseverance. While it sounds like an action, perseverance is a character disposition because it is the inclination to keep a commitment. Participants in Chicago recognize that, for the AUSL program to achieve its mission, teachers need to remain on the job in the most difficult classrooms and persist through a variety of challenging situations and conditions.

**Dispositions in Chicago: Perseverance**

Perseverance and accountability are interrelated character dispositions in Chicago. Perseverance reflects a moral judgment to persist in a challenging situation. It takes character, evidenced by a well-developed sense of personal accountability, to serve underperforming urban schools. AUSL leader and principal of Dodge Renaissance Academy Jarvis Sanford described teachers who lack perseverance:

> It takes a unique individual. [Before the turnaround at] Harvard, seventeen, in one day, seventeen teachers were absent. That tells you a number of different things. That tells you that those people just didn't give a damn about their students. And that they lack quality as educators. But it also tells you something else. It tells you that it's a hard community to work in, that seventeen folk woke up and said, "Oh my God, I can't do this." And so, when we're able to have a 95% attendance rate at that school, that's teacher quality. When those children looked at many of our teachers in the first week and said, “Are you going to stay?” And those teachers come day in and day out, working toward the same end of creating high student achievement? That's winning.
Sanford’s measure of perseverance in this situation is attendance, implying the teachers at Harvard School, before the AUSL reconstitution, lacked character to fulfill their professional responsibility and personal accountability to students.

Participants identified several related issues to perseverance, such as courage and stamina. A university professor who worked with AUSL talked about screening residency candidates for their courage; “When we're sitting around the table trying to look at [teaching residents], a common element is—and it's going to sound very obvious to say, but, [we look for] people who aren't afraid of the kids.” An AUSL resident commented on stamina and strength as dimensions of perseverance: “Teacher quality is being able to have the stamina and being able to be strong enough to say, this still isn’t good enough. I still want to improve. I still want to learn more, so that I can bring that to my kids.” Lionel Allen, Principal of Sherman, reflected on perseverance as dealing with the non-teaching issues particularly challenging in urban schools:

Coming to work everyday, dealing with all of the things you have to deal with that have nothing to do with teaching and learning and still being able to come back the next day. That’s so important. If you don’t have that, you’re not going to be able to make it.

Perseverance is not only a teacher quality valued in Chicago, it is a principal quality, too. Lionel Allen described his first year turning around Sherman School:

This school was just mired in chaos and underperformance for decades and that’s not something we can undo in one or two years. But, I can’t worry about that, I can’t worry about what the political climate dictates. All I can do is come to work everyday, give my all, do the very best that I can for these students, make sure that I put a quality adult in every classroom. Make sure that those adults have the support they need to be successful and to feel supported. We just take it from there. And, if they come and say, you know
what? We’re going to shut you down if it doesn’t work, what can I do? Because I can’t control that. There are just some things that are out of my control. What’s in my control is this school and I can do the very best I can to push this community and this school forward.

Here Allen blends dispositions. He is personally accountable for dealing with a chaotic school he did not create. He is persevering despite the fact that he has little control over significant social and economic factors affecting his school and students. The character disposition of personal accountability seems so strong that he forgoes concern about school politics, even to the point of his school being closed. This expression of altruism reflects character as a highly valued educator quality.

While Chicago uniquely constructs two character dispositions personal accountability and perseverance, the participants in Boston emphasize activist dispositions they believe are essential to effective urban teaching. These dispositions are race awareness and social justice. As action-heavy dispositions, race awareness and social justice exemplify activist teaching by engaging in equity and power issues present in urban education.

Dispositions in Boston: Race Awareness

The activist dispositions salient in the data from Boston possess both judgment and action. Unlike character dispositions, however, I consider activist dispositions to be action-heavy, placing greater emphasis on the teacher as social change agent rather than a role model of values for success. Race awareness is a disposition that reflects a teacher’s inclination to be attentive and sensitive to matters of racial differences and inequities. Boston has a mostly Black and Hispanic student population and majority white teaching staff. The city’s experience with forced busing is, by admission of its residents as well as the work of scholars (Nelson, 2005), a painful
chapter still felt today. BPS has not had success in reducing the Black-White achievement gap, and the district still struggles to maintain a 25% Black representation in its teaching staff. During my interviews in Chicago, I rarely heard race mentioned as an issue. In contrast, the topic of race was raised by most of the Boston participants without my asking. This is important to the findings of dispositions in Boston because the frequent and unprompted mention of race as an issue essential to for teachers occurs in a demographic context in which BPS students are 86% non-White while the teaching staff is 39% non-White.

Jesse Solomon, Director of the Boston Teacher Residency articulates the importance of a teacher’s race awareness in the Boston classroom: “…obviously we're a town with a complicated history of issues of race and class… I believe that you cannot be an effective teacher in Boston without really grappling with issues-- particularly of race and ethnicity.” For Solomon, successful Boston teacher must be “disposed” toward openly addressing their own race as well as the races of their students, acknowledging it is an issue that affects teaching and learning.

Timothy Knowles, former BPS Deputy Superintendent for Teaching and Learning, described the significance of race awareness to teaching in Boston:

…underneath this [subject of high expectations] is a narrative from the Boston Teacher Residency side about how do you teach teachers, aspiring teachers, what it means to have high expectations? And one way, one very clear way, to get at that is to attend carefully to issues of race, class, and culture.

Knowles connects high expectations to the racism responsible for traditionally low expectation of poor minority students. He implies that race awareness and expectations are part of the curriculum of the BTR program. For Knowles, the association between high expectations and
race awareness is critical to understanding the role of the urban teacher and the qualities that teacher needs to possess.

I argue race awareness is an intrinsic professional disposition, but it is also externally activated through compliance with judicial mandates. A BPS administrator explains why BPS and BTR personnel may be keenly race aware:

One of the key aspects of the court order was minimum diversity staff requirements, so we have technical requirements that 25% of our teaching staff needs to be Black, at least 25%, and then at least 10% of our teaching staff needs to be other minorities…the percentage of our Black teachers is hovering right around 25%, slightly below, so it’s actually been quite a big issue for us recently because it’s raised all sorts of attention from all sort of people that we’re not in compliance quote unquote with the court order.

This administrator refers to race awareness as externally motivating, unlike an intrinsic disposition. Of the 14 participants I interviewed in Boston, only one mentioned race awareness in relation to the court order. Others referred to it in the context of activism, considered by participants to be a necessary stance from which to effectively teach in BPS. Timothy Knowles explains why BPS, BPE, and BTR emphasized race awareness as an intentional component of the Boston Teacher Residency:

That sensitivity and that awareness—particularly whether you are a White teaching in an African American classroom or you’re Latino, you know it didn’t matter—particularly when you are teaching somebody other than yourself which is a great majority of the teachers, that sort of reflection about—I’m trying to get clear about this—that reflection about the realities of the school-based disadvantages for low income ethnic minority kids, is really important to undertake for a teacher. You can’t just leave that alone.
Here, Knowles blends the disposition of race awareness with the professional practice of reflection. He implies that being race aware enables the teacher to see the “realities” poor and minority students experience in BPS. Seeing the realities does not imply an opportunity for judgment; it is an opportunity for action.

A BTR staff member described the manifestations of race awareness the residency personnel look for in resident candidate:

…to come in being committed to really engaging and understanding the complexity of urban schools and being willing to grapple with issues of race and equity and to think about who they are in relation to the context that they are immersing themselves in.

Another BTR staff member added:

So we look at GPA, we look at what other things people have done in their life, we look at their answers to some of the questions on our application, which is all about, you know, "How have you dealt with issues of race before? When have you been in situations where you have not felt competent and what have you done? When have you been in conflict, and how did you overcome them or not? What would you do differently?"

These responses evidence the value BTR places on race awareness and demonstrate early on to residents the expectation that they will be activists concerning race, even if they first engage themselves. Jesse Solomon described how race is threaded through the curriculum, expectations, and philosophy of BTR.

We try to be very, very up front and explicit about that, so that people know that's what they're getting into when they come in the program. That we start talking about it on day one. So it's not like, we're going to do a piece on race, but those are issues that pervade everything you do, so we're talking about in your Math Methods course, it's not like you
can separate race from what it means to teach math…I think one of the things that I enjoy the most is—we always try to be a little more than 50% folks of color, you're in a group that truly is diverse. And for many people, this is one of the first times they've been in a group like that. Maybe ever or certainly in a kind of professional situation. So, for a lot of White people, they're used to always being in the majority, so what does it mean to not be in the majority in a situation? For a lot of folks of color, especially in Boston, they're used to always being in the minority in a room, in a professional situation. What does it mean to be in a professional situation where they're not? What does it mean to just have issues of race put on the table? And people—you know, that pushes some people out of their comfort zone. But [pause] if not, I don't know how they're going to deal with it in schools and it's all around us…teachers have to be comfortable thinking about it. Talking about it. Bringing it up, and dealing with it. And asking the questions about it.

Solomon talks about the experience of a White person being in a minority possibly for the first time. This indicates that residents do not need to have the disposition of race awareness fully activated before they start their residency. One purpose of the program is to ignite the disposition, if it is there in the person to begin with. Igniting experiences, such as the one Solomon refers to, is a prelude to engagement with race in self and the classroom.

Participants in Boston emphasized the fact the race awareness was an essential component of the program. BPS supported this emphasis as well, lending district personnel to BTR’s summer session. A BTR resident said:

We start off the summer, the first couple of days—last year we had the superintendent and different people in different levels of work in the district, so teachers, past residents—graduates, and, you know, deputy superintendents, coaches, just people across the spectrum
of different roles, to talk about issues of race and achievement. Both from their own personal story kind of perspective and from their role and the work of the district, what they see as the challenges…You know, you really have to understand those issues. And the first course, one of the first courses they have is a course that gets into the history of schooling in Boston.

This resident describes BTR’s intentionality of race awareness, not only as disposition residents bring to the programs but an informed disposition through teaching and mentorship. Residents learn that race awareness is not only essential to teaching but that is a shared emphasis throughout the district.

I argue that race in Boston is an activist disposition, action-heavy and not judgment-heavy. Race is central but it is nevertheless an awareness required for teacher engagement with the deep social and historical issues of the district. One type of engagement to which race awareness can lead is social justice.

_Dispositions in Boston: Teaching for Social Justice_

Participants in Boston not only insisted that teachers needed to be aware of racial issues in order to be effective, they also needed to teach with a sensitivity toward a cluster of issues comprising social justice including equality, equity, class and gender awareness, and power. These issues are not professional dispositions. I argue that teaching with an inclination for their improvement is a disposition because the evidence makes a strong case for thinking of social just as a person’s disposition to act on power, equality, social class, and wealth issues through teaching. This broader purpose of teaching concerned with social justice was included in the dispositions defined by NCATE prior its recent removal from the dispositions glossary. As a
disposition, social justice represents the belief system of action-oriented values. “Social justice” implies action on those aspects of society, particularly schools, that have not equalized opportunity for education, employment, or mobility through the legal system of justice alone. A natural complementarity exists between social justice and race awareness, two sides of the prism through which to view the work of teachers in urban settings. A BTR resident commented on the scope of race awareness and social justice on the city:

It's [BTR] allowed to be sort of progress-- yeah, like, revolutionary. So, it definitely has a very progressive spin to it. They’re-- it's sort of unapologetic. I mean, they're not to the point of, you know, supporting a certain presidential candidate, but the classes we have on race, power, inequity in the classroom-- distinctly progressive sort of class[es]…questioning whiteness and race and gender… We're learning about MCAS\textsuperscript{43} and test taking, but it is not the focus. The focus is to make us great teachers who stay in BPS.

The resident is saying that BTR believes engaging in the issues of social justice is necessary for successful teaching in BPS. A BTR teacher must be disposed to value social justice issues equally if not greater than MCAS scores. Working on race, power, inequity, gender, and whiteness from the classroom takes conviction, the strong disposition to engage in social issues.

Another BTR resident described the context in which a teacher’s disposition toward social justice and the residency’s encouragement of it can lead to social change:

I think about, one a teacher who is committed to understanding the students that they are working with. And you have to be committed—and I know people always say—to educate the whole child, but it can’t be a job, it can’t just be a job. It has to be an actual commitment. And so I think you think about a quality teacher is somebody who one loves what they are doing. Loves to teach. Also, loves to learn. But also wants to actually make a

\textsuperscript{43} The Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System, the state’s criterion-referenced assessment test.
difference...For me, it’s really a commitment to students, a commitment to social justice; it’s somebody who truly believes that. One of the things that we say is that teaching is an act of revolution. And it’s got to be somebody who is there to make a change. Not just because you want this person to graduate. It’s got to be somebody who believes that by teaching students, you are empowering them.

This resident connects the disposition toward working for social justice with change and revolution. My definition of professional disposition discussed earlier in this chapter included judgment and actions a teacher uses in situations when there is not one response. Engagement in race, gender, equity, power, and social class is such a situation. This work calls for teachers who are naturally disposed so see teaching not as a conservative enterprise, that is conserving routines, lessons, methods, and attitudes that have proven successful over time, but a revolutionary enterprise seeking a new social order.

The residency’s emphasis on social justice as a teacher disposition has a system-wide impact as residency graduates spread out into district schools. A BPS administrator observed:

It’s [BTR] heads and tails above what most university preparation programs can offer. Obviously, they are in our schools on more than just a short couple month’s practicum, but in our schools for a year. They are working with our best teachers. They are learning our curriculum. There’s a really strong social justice component to the BTR curriculum which I think comes through in their kind of commitment to urban education.

Another BPS administrator discussed how the former superintendent and current principals relate to the residency’s emphasis of social justice:

The achievement gap was Tom Payzant’s, our most recent long-time superintendent, was one of his most important issues, especially in his last few years...I think it’s a real selling
point of the [BTR] program to principals and I think principals have seen that reflected when they look at these candidates relative to other, more traditionally prepared candidates. The way that they [the residents] speak about urban education and urban students and their desire wanting to work with these students and their thoughtfulness about the importance of acknowledging cultural differences. It’s an ingrained, really important thing in Boston and I think BTR has actually responded to that.

One way BTR residents can engage the district in social justice issues is by creating a critical mass of like-minded and similarly disposed teachers spread throughout the district’s 144 schools. The district’s goal for BTR is to provide a third of the new teacher BPS hires annually (about 150-200). Within a decade, BTR teachers of record, gaining a critical mass in district schools, could exercise a collective activist approach to teaching.

Regime Influences on Teacher Dispositions

In this chapter so far I have described the findings from the research question What do district and residency reformers and actors mean by “teacher quality”? I identified teacher quality constructions starting with one professional practice—reflection—that emerged from the data in both cases. I then identified a set of teacher dispositions that differed between the partnerships. Chicago emphasized the character dispositions of personal accountability and perseverance. Boston emphasized the activist dispositions of race awareness and teaching for social justice. Using disposition theory from Johnson and Rein (2007) and Talbert-Johnson (2006), I argued that Chicago’s character dispositions were judgment-heavy and Boston’s activist dispositions were action-heavy. The significance of these findings become clearer in this
section of the study concerning the extent to which corporate donors to the residencies have access to influencing teacher quality constructions and teacher education.

The discovery of varying teacher dispositions led me to ask a third research question: Why do the district-residency partnerships in Chicago and Boston construct dispositions of teacher quality differently? Unlike the first two descriptive research questions, this question was explanatory, seeking to establish a causal link between the variations and the source(s) of influence. The evidence pointed to five explanations for the variation between cases. Using Yin’s (2003) suggested approaches, I tested each explanation as a rival theory and concluded three evidenced strong convergence with the data. Of the three contending explanations, none stood out as conclusive nor were my rebuttals convincing. Instead, I saw the three explanations as interconnected, ultimately providing a complex but convincing explanation to a question about a complicated phenomenon. In response to my third research question, I argue that the Chicago and Boston constructions of teacher dispositions differ due to three key reasons: the founders’ worldviews, corporate proximity to teacher education, and agenda coherence.

Worldviews of the Founders

Both partnerships in Chicago and Boston created the residencies from the worldviews of the founders, a set of ideals, values, and beliefs about the way the world works, in particular how districts, schools, teaching, and learning work. The teacher dispositions valued by AUSL and CPS participants sounded like qualities of an ideal business person: individualistic, accountable,

44 The two explanations I discounted were 1) Random chance. The evidence and previous research did not support this; 2) The non-comparability of the cases, what I called Apples and Oranges. The data indicated that, while the partnerships in Chicago and Boston differed in some ways, they were more similar than different regarding the context of this reform. For example, both had UTRs founded within 2 years; both addressed high teacher turnover and achievement gap by training their own teachers; both had been under mayoral control since mid-1990’s with the same mayor; and both had a student population of majority poor African Americans and Hispanics. I concluded their contexts were the similar, that is, apples and oranges may be different from each other, but they are both fruit.
persevering, strong, courageous, and self-reliant. A broad district goal is to prepare CPS students to compete in the global marketplace. The district mission says:

The Chicago Public Schools will be the premier urban school district in the country by providing all our students and their families with high quality instruction, outstanding academic programs, and comprehensive student development supports to prepare them for the challenges of the world of tomorrow (CPS, 2008).

The vision statement expands what the district means by “the world of tomorrow”:

Students today face a challenging and increasingly uncertain world. They face a world that demands high levels of literacy to be successful economically and to fully participate as citizens in a democracy. They face a world in which constant technological change is shaping the skills they will need to be successful in a global community. They face a diverse world of work that increasingly values collaboration, communication, interpersonal skills, literacy, problem solving, and creativity. Graduating from high school is no longer adequate preparation for employment. All students need post-secondary education or training if they are to get a job that can provide a future for themselves and their families.

These excerpts depict a worldview in which education serves the marketplace and students compete in order to provide for their families. Those who persevere and hold themselves accountable will succeed. Implied in the excerpt is blame for teachers and administrators who have not been held accountable for student learning and who have been resistant to new ideas and reform.

AUSL’s founder, Martin Koldyke, is a venture capitalist, personal donor to AUSL, and a member of AUSL’s board. According to his own essay in Catalyst Chicago, Koldyke established AUSL through a conversation with then CEO Paul Vallas (Koldyke, 2007). Vallas was a
business and finance professional, not an educator, and his tenure in Chicago saw an increasing amount of privatization of public education (Shipps, 2003). I argue that Koldyke, Vallas, Mayor Daley, and others involved in the founding and early days of AUSL operated from a corporate worldview. Kelleher (2003) provides evidence of the founder’s corporate world view. Referring to AUSL’s residency training program and quoting Koldyke, Kelleher writes:

“The private sector has been doing this for 40 years—paying [rookies] to go through extended training programs,” asserts Koldyke, who cites Procter & Gamble as an example. As corporations look to tap homegrown talent for leadership roles, AUSL is grooming its residents “in the hopes they will stay for many years and become master teachers, lead teachers and some, principals,” he adds.

Mayor Daley underscores the positive contribution free-market competition has infused into CPS:

[Chicago’s educational initiatives such as Renaissance 2010] are all part of an effort to think outside the box, because public schools never think outside the box. So, you have to have people who are willing to take the time and effort and even their money… We’re considered one of the best higher education systems in the world—we have competition. But we don’t have the best in elementary and high school because you have no competition. That’s the issue (Anderson, 2007).

In a September 2007 district press release, Chicago CEO Arne Duncan touts the corporate values he sees in the work of AUSL’s reconstituted Sherman School of Excellence, “Sherman is now all about high expectations, no excuses, steady progress, and the drive toward excellence” (CPS, 2008). These excerpts indicate corporate worldview values in words such as “excellence,” “no excuses,” “competition.” Koldyke cites private sector practice as a model for teacher training.
Mayor Daley indicates the reason CPS schools lack quality, compared to higher education institutions, is because the public school system is not yet fully privatized.

In contrast, the founders of BTR had an activist ideology intending to generate social improvement through public institutions such as BPS. Sonja Brookins Santelises, BPS Deputy Superintendent for Teaching and Learning, answered the question “Where do you think BTR’s emphasis on race comes from?” and discusses the importance of the personalities who founded BTR:

It’s the people who developed it…The other piece is that at the time you had a superintendent and a former deputy Tim Knowles…who were critically aware of the needs to prepare people to teach in urban centers to teach children from diverse racial, ethnic, linguistic backgrounds. Children…in definite large numbers, primarily from lower SES backgrounds, and you need people who can not only quote work with those children, but who can do so rejecting a deficit model. And it’s, so I, to be honest with you—if there had been different people here, if it had been a different superintendent who was touchy about that [race] and didn’t want that out there; if it had been a different director—if it had been someone other than Jesse [Solomon], who’s done work with efficacy who understands it deeply, if Jesse had identified different staff, if it weren’t…you know some of the other folks who work there.. That’s where it comes from.

This participant argues for the idiosyncratic attributes of the residencies. They take on the values and belief systems of their founders. If a different group founded BTR the residency might value a different set of dispositions. Teacher dispositions are not only influenced by the worldview of the founders, they are also influenced by the extent to which private and corporate donors have access to the residency.
Corporate Proximity to Teacher Education: Follow the Money

This explanation argues that the differences in teacher dispositions valued in each case city are due to the extent to which corporate and private donors have proximity to influence the residencies’ definitions of teacher quality and its daily operation of training teachers. The partnership “map” illustrated in Figure 7.2 indicates the flow of private money to the residencies. In Chicago, corporate and private interests enjoy close access to AUSL through direct donations and governance roles on the residency’s board of directors. Corporate and private support of AUSL, boosted in January 2008 by a $10 million gift by the Gates Foundation, is the residency’s main source of funding and thus a top residency priority to sustain and grow. Figure 7.2 indicates that the corporate proximity to BTR, in contrast to Chicago, is indirect and diminished; donations flow through the Boston Plan of Excellence as BTR’s financial manager. Because the district pays half of the residency’s expenses, corporate giving strength and potential influence are reduced.

Corporate proximity to the residency varies in each city and, as a result, so does its influence on the constructions of teacher dispositions. In Chicago with a strong business influences and history of corporate involvement in public education and the administration of the district, the reform partners, particularly influenced by the founders, construct teacher dispositions to fit their corporate values of personal accountability and perseverance. In Boston, with a strong history of racial tension and a buffered and relatively weak corporate influence on the residency, the reform partners construct activist teacher dispositions of race awareness and social justice.

The flow of money in the district-residency partnerships was created by design. Ellen Guiney, Director of the Boston Plan for Excellence, recalled BTR’s funding arrangement suggested by the director of the Strategic Grant Partners, the founding donor:
So, we'll [Strategic Grant Partners] fund this completely the first -- the first two years, and then, third, fourth and fifth years you [the district] have to increasingly pay a larger share of it. And also, fundraise with other private funders so that, in the end, in the end of five years, we want half public funding from the BPS and half other funders besides us.

The influences on teacher disposition are, in part by design. By virtue of their donations, corporate and private interests have close proximity and direct access to the ways AUSL defines teacher quality, constructs dispositions, and trains its teachers. I will discuss the implications of corporate proximity to private teacher education in Chapter 9.

*Agenda Coherence: Filling the Vacuum*

A third explanation for the variation in constructions of teacher dispositions between cases concerns the coherence and diffusion of a district’s educational agenda. In the absence of clear and coherent professional educational agenda emanating from the central office, the resulting vacuum of ideas and values will be filled by the regime default—free-market ideals of autonomy, choice, competition, entrepreneurialism, and diversification. Put another way, a coherent educational policy, backed by district and regime capacity, can stave off other influences and ideas naturally occurring a regime. Because the district is an embedded member of the regime, its educational agenda can be effectively diffused through the system and the city.

By coherent professional educational agenda, I mean coherence as the integration of district-wide standards and goals with curriculum and assessments. A coherent agenda is able to be implemented through the allotment of sufficient resources and will. By professional, I mean an educational agenda that has been designed in consultation with professional educators, as had Boston’s. By educational I mean the agenda is focused on teaching and learning through specific
details and procedures for implementation. Timothy Knowles was one of the BPS leaders who helped envision the Boston Teacher Residency and now works for the University of Chicago Center for Urban School Improvement. He has first-hand experience with CPS and BPS and comments on the nature of educational agendas in Chicago and Boston:

Unlike Chicago which really doesn’t have a coherent educational view in terms of the kind of instruction they are pursuing—I mean they do on a high level, on a rhetorical level—but in Boston we were very intent at the time on implementing certain kinds of instructional work in literacy and mathematics, certain kinds of assessments to help inform the teacher and provide evidence to the teacher about how kids were progressing over time, and a pretty intense professional development investment…Here in Chicago it’s a lot more, it’s like the wild west (laughs), so where…where you end up as a teacher in a school will dictate to a large degree the kind of curriculum you encounter and the pedagogical kind of ideas that you are asked to implement. And this is a product of 1988 reform in Chicago where schools were totally decentralized.

Knowles says that BPS has a coherent educational agenda; Chicago does not. The evidence supports this observation. The BPS “Focus on Children II” initiative codifies the district’s teacher quality objectives, school improvement objectives, and student learning objectives. For example, the district articulates Six Essentials for Whole-School Improvement: effective instruction, student work and data, professional development, shared leadership, allocation of resources, and partnerships with family and community (BPS, 2008). These essential are not just listed on a document. They are defined and followed in each section by the subheadings Expectations for Schools and Families, What You Should See and Hear in Classrooms and Around the School, and Expectations for Central Administrators. Similarly, the district has
articulated in detail eight Dimensions of Effective Teaching. Those dimensions start with one core: demonstrate excellence, equity, and high expectations for all students. The following seven dimensions include reflection on practice, modeling professional behavior, the effective use of planning strategies, assessing student progress, forming partnerships with families and community, knowing content, and establishing safe, respectful, and culturally sensitive learning communities.

Boston’s six essentials of school improvement and eight dimensions of quality teaching are integrated in the BTR program and philosophy. BTR residents are assessed according to the eight dimensions of quality teaching; each resident has eight notebooks as part of her or his professional portfolio. Since BTR is a BPS program and the residency is designed to implement the goals of the district, and since the district intends BTR to provide a third of its new teachers each year, I conclude that the BPS educational agenda is not window dressing but is backed by the district’s will and capacity. The district’s educational agenda creates a policy coherence that fills the district’s values vacuum, articulating a set of educational values, beliefs, goals, and standards.

In contrast to Boston Mayor Menino’s “Focus on Children II,” Chicago’s Mayor Daley’s initiative is Renaissance 2010, a school improvement plan based on school closure and reconstitution and new building construction. Daley’s plan, however, does not present a district-wide and specific learning and teaching agenda. The district leadership since Paul Vallas in the mid 1990’s and carried on by Arne Duncan since 2002 has been characterized by a “whatever works” philosophy, referred to by Timothy Knowles as the “Wild West” of educational reform. The absence of district-wide coherent educational policy, meaning a set of professional learning and teaching goals and standards, and the lack of will and perhaps capacity to create such a
policy, results in an incoherence of ideas and values, a vacuum which is filled by the regime’s
default set of values and ideas. In Chicago’s case, corporate influences, never far from the center
of decision-making power (Shipps, 2006), provide ideology, language, and talking points, all
reflecting the types of character dispositions reformers perceive as most essential to effective and
long-term urban teaching.

This “filling the vacuum” explanation argues that the reason the cases differ in their
constructions of teacher dispositions is because Boston has a coherent, district-wide teaching and
learning agenda. This agenda names equity and cultural sensitivity as district values. I argue
these values track with the activist dispositions of race awareness and social justice emerging
from the Boston data. Lacking a coherent professional education policy, I argue the vacuum is
filled in Chicago with character dispositions of individual accountability and perseverance that
track well with the regime default values of free-market choice, competition, and corporate
ideals of successful businesses and business people.

This chapter presented findings from research questions regarding participants’ meanings of
teacher quality. These meanings grouped according to type: professional practices and
professional dispositions. I argued that the partnerships valued different dispositions because of
the worldviews of the residency founders, the proximity of corporate and private interests to the
residency, and the coherence of districts’ educational agenda. Figure 8.2 illustrates how the
bridging and control findings in Chapter 7 connect conceptually with the teacher dispositions
findings presented in this chapter.
The final chapter discusses the significance of my study and the implications of these findings for districts training their own teachers. I then offer suggestions for policymakers considering future residencies. I conclude the chapter with a description of my next research project.
CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION

A district’s choice of bridging and control strategies has important implications for a partnership designed to deliver locally-trained teachers to difficult-to-staff urban classrooms. The private funding arrangements needed to support urban teacher residencies exert influence on the partnership and ultimately the implementation of the reform, particularly regarding the constructions of teacher quality and the kind of teachers the district-residency reformers deem essential to successful urban teaching. In this chapter, I discuss the significance of this study to theory as well as the district reform literature. I then identify the implications of my findings, assessing their significance for policy and urban educational reform. Following the implications, I present 10 suggestions for policymakers and elected officials such as Senator Barak Obama (D-IL) and Representative Rahm Emanuel (D-IL) who co-sponsored federal legislation to replicate urban teacher residencies based on AUSL and BTR throughout the United States. I conclude the chapter with suggestions for future study to broaden the examination of urban teacher residencies and district-driven, alternative teacher education.

The Significance of the Study

My study contributes to theory and adds to our knowledge of urban districts as agents of instructional reform. Regarding theory, my conceptual framework combines the broad political perspective of urban regime analysis with the organization-to-organization detail of resource dependence theory. While urban regime analysis contributes to our understanding of how mayors and other high-profile governmental and private power brokers mobilize a city’s resources to solve local problems, the framework does not tell us about how that mobilization works on the ground. By contextualizing resource dependence theory within the urban regime, I provide a
more detailed examination of the district as regime actor partnering with the urban teacher residency and linking with intermediary organizations in order to utilize civic capacity for a regime-wide need, to train new teachers who will stay in the district. In Chicago and Boston, we see districts intentionally designing partnerships *made possible* through the political and power arrangements of the urban regime and new regime actors *made legitimate* through the conditions of bridging and control established by the district.

The study contributes several ideas the neo-institutional and resource dependence theories related to bridging analysis. One is a *typology of bridging strategies*. In addition to cooptation, alliances and joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions articulated in neo-institutional theory (Scott & Davis, 2007), I contribute *contractual bridging* and *collaborative bridging* and their accompanying conditions of delegated decision-making authority, *proxy control* and *civic control*. I theorize that these strategies structure the bridge upon which the resource dependent partnership operates and influence the construction of highly valued concepts such as teacher quality and teacher dispositions. A second idea generated from this study concludes that partnerships designed according to *contractual* or *collaborative bridging* (and their accompanying conditions of control) create relationships that vary according to formality, public accountability, and clarity of authority lines. A third idea theorizes that that the placement of corporate proximity to the decision-making center of a reform matters to the functioning and outcome of the reform. Corporate funders self-select partnerships according to preferred conditions of bridging and control.

The findings indicated my conceptual framework was accurate across both cases. The districts bridged and delegated decision-making control for increased resources and did so in two unique ways that have yet to be described in the research literature. As the bridging and control
varied between cases so did the placement of corporate donors and their constructions of teacher quality that guided the reform implementation. My findings in Chicago contribute case study qualitative data describing the home grown teacher reform as a contractual strategy. *Contractual bridging* with *proxy control* created a bridge allowing the residency independence, autonomy, and clear lines of responsibility. Chicago was an example of a contracting regime (Bulkley, 2007). Essential to a contracting regime is the actor that extends the contract and the actor that receives as a process intended to implement policy, in this case a strategy for instructional improvement. My findings further contribute to the concept of contracting regime by building theory to explain how proxy control structures the partnership bridge, authorizes the provider to provide resources, legitimizes the provider as a regime actor, and buffers the provider from accountability threats. This finding adds the concept of *proxy control* to the contacting regime actors’ repertoire of strategies.

The findings from Boston indicated that *collaborative bridging* and *civic control* created a bridge allowing multiple private and public partners engaged in assigned decision-making and shared and informal responsibility. This was an informal relationship with multiple lines of authority established through *civic control*. The partnership was semi-privatized between the district and the residency, avoiding the need for a contract to frame the relationship and encouraging multiple partners in the design and implementation of the reform.

My study theorized that the proximity of private funding to teacher education was a contributing factor to definitions and teacher quality. I further theorized that the conditions of a district-residency’s bridging and control, along with the worldviews of key actors and the coherence of a district’s educational agenda, were contributing factors in determining the partnership’s preferred teacher dispositions. Due to the way I combined urban regime analysis
and its effective theorization of civic capacity with an organizational-level bridging analysis, the
my findings cut across two levels of theories, concluding that the partnership designs matter to
reform implementation and specifically to private teacher education.

In addition to these theoretical contributions, my study was the first to produce empirical and
qualitative data regarding how districts partner with urban teacher residencies in order to locally
train new teachers for urban classrooms. As the literature strands in Chapter 2 indicated, my
findings contributed most significantly to the research literature regarding districts as agents of
instructional reform. The most significant contribution of this study concerns the finding that
districts tailor teachers to fit their work force needs and regime values, as discussed in the
following section. The residency programs themselves are not new in light of the design and
functioning of Professional Development Schools. The academic curriculum and licensing
requirements are not unique in the realm of teacher education, nor do the residencies seek to
create a model of teaching that differs significantly from the traditional discourse of teaching and
the grammar of schooling (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). The Cardozo Project from the 1960’s
indicates that district teacher training is not a new idea. However, my study finds that through
designed partnerships with specific conditions of bridging, control, and corporate funding and
proximity to the core of teacher education, districts can train the kind of teachers they want.
They can filter and select candidates in ways colleges of education cannot. They can sort for
dispositions that reflect the values and beliefs of regime actors and reform partners. Districts can
attempt to discourage teacher turnover and increase teacher retentions and effectiveness by
enlisting public and private partners (and their funding sources) to create financial and
professional incentives, develop teacher qualities of character and activism to enhance their
chances of success in urban classrooms, and customize the kind of teachers they determine will
be most highly qualified and successful in their most difficult-to-staff classrooms. Districts as designers of tailored teachers is a new phenomenon of central office leaders innovating instructional reform. This study, then, contributes a significant finding to the district reform literature.

**Implications for Districts Training Their Own Teachers**

The findings related to bridging and control, corporate proximity, and constructions of teacher dispositions suggest four implications for districts training their own teachers. The first concerns how the district tailors new teachers to meet its needs. The second implication concerns the influence of private partners in public education. The third implication concerns the assumptions upon which the reform relies in order to be successful according to the district-residency partners. The fourth concerns the implementation dilemmas that accompany contractual and collaborative bridging and their related conditions of control.

**Tailoring New Teachers to District Needs**

The district-driven new teacher training examined in this study is not a new reform. In similar fashion to the district in Washington, DC during the 1960’s, Chicago and Boston “took matters into their own hands,” bypassing university-trained teachers. Like the Cardozo Project, urban teacher residencies are designed to reduce high teacher turnover and improve retention and overall teacher quality in urban districts. Today’s UTRs and the Cardozo Project relied on mentor teachers and year-long apprenticeships in classrooms to transmit knowledge, craft, and culture. The academic program provided by the residencies, a combination of academic study in subject area and pedagogical study in classroom management and reflective practice, as well as
the extended hands-on classroom hours that residents experience in the year of training are similar to the training and experience teaching candidates receive in Professional Development Schools and other university and privatized teacher education programs. The partnerships in Chicago and Boston are somewhat novel in that they connect districts with private and semi-private teaching academies whose programs seek similarly profiled candidates as Teach for America and the New Teacher Project—college graduates and career changers. However, the residencies as teacher education programs and their funding from public and private sources do not represent a totally new reform.

In light of these similarities to past reforms, I argue that the most significant finding about the district-residency partnerships in Chicago and Boston is the *custom tailoring of teachers* to meet district needs and fulfill district and regime values for teacher quality. The district’s choices of bridging and control strategies and its decision where to place corporate donors in proximity to the residency matters, meaning the structure and condition of the partnership bridge influences the kind of teachers the district trains and develops. These choices are not random. I theorize that the district chooses the reform and its reform partners according to the likelihood that the residency will provide the scarce resources (custom trained teachers) and function best under the kind of bridging strategy with which it feels most comfortable.

Through their home grown teacher programs, both partnerships sought to develop teachers who will stay on the job beyond the few years of their incentivized commitment. Chicago valued *personal accountability* and *perseverance* as qualities indicative of improved retention and effectiveness in urban classrooms. The CPS-AUSL partnership wanted teachers who could learn “the AUSL way” and find careers in AUSL schools. They needed teachers who could walk into reconstituted schools and teach reading and math to low-achieving, disadvantaged children.
They needed teachers who could withstand the stresses and challenges of not only teaching the city’s poorest children but doing so in schools that three months earlier had been closed for failure and now had all new teachers and administrators, new rules, new procedures, high expectations for success, yet the same social and economic problems affecting their students. Chicago wanted teachers of character who were personally accountable for their students’ learning and who would persevere through the most challenging working conditions. For reasons of worldviews of the founders, the influence of corporate donors on the residency, and the lack of a coherent professional education agenda, CPS needed teachers to be self-starting entrepreneurs, strong enough to withstand the pressures starting this new business of turnarounds, and committed enough to remain on the job when the incentives expired. This degree of filtering, selecting, and sorting is not possible in a traditional university-based teacher education program.

Boston sought to develop in their new teachers the qualities and dispositions needed to meet the district’s needs. BPS was not in the business of school reconstitution, but it was trying to attract and keep teachers of color or White teachers disposed to attend to issues of color in a district that had grown far more diverse than its teaching staff and whose achievement gap remained persistently wide. The bridging and control conditions as well as the residency funding enabled the district to keep control over the numbers and specializations of its new teacher yet rely on BTR to do the training and induction. BTR needed activist teachers who would realize that all their lessons ultimately included issues of race, class, power, and justice. BPS needed teachers predisposed to see teaching as an act of social justice for its own sake but who also believed that by attending to social justice, teachers would positively impact the achievement gap through more effective instruction, better teacher-student relationships, and a teacher’s keener understanding of her students’ learning needs.
The BPS-BTR partnership experienced one irony as a result of the district’s mission and the conditions partnership’s collaborative bridging and civic control: residents who graduate from the program do not necessarily get jobs in the most underserved schools in the district. In tight budget years, residents get jobs where they can and if they can. In years when they have choices, residents can choose more affluent schools. Contrast this with AUSL graduates who work in AUSL schools, all of which serve the least advantaged students in the city. This condition is by design because AUSL chose a dual mission to train teachers and manage failed schools. AUSL exercises this comprehensive independence through contractual bridging and proxy control, and it pays for this independence through direct corporate donations.

Because the conditions of bridging and control and the proximity of private money influence definitions of teacher quality, the implications for district-driven privatized teacher education are significant. Assuming all teachers should demonstrate a high level of knowledge, skills, and professional practices, the question changes from can we tailor teachers to meet our needs to what kind of teachers should we create? The implication here is that districts can custom design a local workforce that impacts a district’s instruction capacity. However, tailoring teachers may also limit districts to certain competencies in their locally trained teachers. For example, the most accomplished AUSL resident may not be prepared to teach in Boston; likewise, an outstanding BTR resident may not succeed in Chicago because the teacher’s dispositions, designed for one context, may not meet another district’s need or work in that district’s context. The findings indicate that teacher dispositions, in part a result of bridging and control conditions, are relative to context, particularly to the worldviews, placement of corporate interests, and agenda coherence in each city. Further, they are moldable, perceived by reformers to be teachable, and essential to reformers ideals of effective urban teaching.
In both cases, a small group of regime elites and high profile educators, such as mayors, superintendents, high level central office administrators, residency personnel, and private partners established control and influenced over the choice and construction of professional dispositions essential for urban teacher education. The size and authority of these reform partnerships helped the residencies be nimble as well as faithful to the worldviews, values, and belief systems of the founders. These partnerships that define teacher quality, however, may be disadvantaged. A broader representation of influences on teacher dispositions could produce even more effective teachers and articulate an ideal set of dispositions we should seek in and draw out from all our student teachers seeking to serve in urban classrooms. Race awareness and social justice are crucial dispositions for teachers in Chicago. Given the district’s supersized problems of underperforming schools and the poverty which limits so many students, teacher-led social justice activism might have a greater positive impact on the achievement gap than lessons aimed at raising reading scores from the 20th percentile to the 27th percentile over three years. Perhaps the personal accountability and perseverance of AUSL residents would prove useful in schools where the veteran teachers do not teach high expectations and or reflective practice and disdain those who do. If the dispositions that surface in residency teachers is, as I argue, influenced by the districts’ partners and the conditions with which they bridge and delegate control, then the choice of partners has implications for the kind of teachers a district will train.

The Influence of Private Partners on Public Education

A second implication of bridging and control, one with a special impact on definitions of teacher quality, concerns the kind of private partners with which a district form relationships. CPS worked through contracts and proxy control; these bridging conditions may attract some
partners and not others. For example, private partners who prefer clear lines of decision-making authority, codified expectations, and who may have their own agendas that could be served through the bridge will likely be attracted to the RFP process in Chicago. The dozens of private EMOs operating Renaissance 2010 schools, including AUSL, are organizations drawn to Chicago’s choice of bridging and control.

Private partners more attuned to collaborative partnerships and who are comfortable with shared, civic control may be more attracted to the BPS model of bridging and control. The lines of decision-making authority may be more complex and perhaps more situational in Boston. It may prove a bridge less conducive to a private partner with its own agenda. The Boston Plan for Excellence and the Strategic Group Partners are such private partners.

My study did not determine if some kinds of partners train better teachers than others, although that question will naturally arise. The findings suggest that the bridging and control conditions influence the private partners. The two models in Chicago and Boston attract varying but predictable partners and produce teachers with predictable dispositions. The findings also indicate that regime contexts of district teacher training are too complex for one ideal type of private partner to bridge through one ideal partnership to meet all the instructional needs of urban districts.

The choice of private partners also raises the question of mixing private money with public education. I have not problematized private money in this reform because I am not convinced it is a problem in and of itself, nor have I assessed the extent to which this private money is problematic in each case. Private money brings potential problems and raises concerns that I discuss in this chapter; however, I avoid passing judgment. I see in the evidence that the residencies are preparing teachers to do difficult work that many do not want to do or leave soon
after starting. The work of the residencies themselves is not easy. I see the schools AUSL reconstitutes and the 650 students in one and the 600 students in the other wear clean uniforms, are safe in their building, are taught by teachers who circle classes on the rug to read aloud, whose walls are filled with vocabulary words, whose school day seems orderly and whose schools are run by people who could easily make more money in another profession. These evidences and experiences are the result of private money from Boeing, Dell, Gates, MetLife and private donors. I believe for these schools they have not seen such investments in their lifetimes. I am aware of the cautions and influences and the threats to locally-controlled, participatory school governance, but I am not ready to judge private money in these contexts as a problem.

Making Assumptions about the Reform

All reforms rely on some assumptions for implementation and success. In the cases of AUSL and BTR, assumptions play a significant role in home growing teachers. Both partnerships operate in a “zone of wishful thinking” (Hill & Celio, 1998). This zone is the set of conditions beyond the reformers’ control which must be in place in order for the reform to succeed. Ignoring or avoiding this zone places the reform at risk of implementation and sustainability threats. The core assumptions made regarding home growing teachers, by definition, lack the support of empirical research and ultimately become matters of faith and hope. These assumptions, outlined in Table 9.1, include teacher recruitment, teacher retention, mentor recruitment and quality, the capacity to go scale, and political will.

The recruitment assumption is based on the expectation that a sufficient and increasing number of college graduates and career-changers want to be trained as teachers and make careers in inner city schools. Combined, both residencies will soon train 300 teachers a year, but many
more will need to apply if the residencies are to keep their currently levels of selectivity. Jesse Solomon, Director of BTR, said, “We had last year about 450 applications for 84 slots. Actually, we need to grow, we need to grow at a higher rate, it’s not even just keeping that rate steady, I think over the next 2 years we need to be between 800 and 1,000 applications [each year].” Lionel Allen, Principal of the Sherman School of Excellence, confirms that recruitment assumption is a matter of faith and not a matter of fact:

I hope they’re out there…I think there are people who are interested but hear so many bad things about schools and about kids that they just…I’m not going to take a pay cut and have to put up with that kind of drama…we need to do a better job of recruiting people because we give them a real sense of what’s going on. And that’s not all bad. It’s not all good either, but we need good people to come in who can help transform these schools.

Allen’s comment reveals the persuasive reasons that may dissuade people from becoming residents. Career changers take pay cuts, sometimes significant cuts, to be teachers, and there is drama in any classroom but drama is likely more frequent and more challenging in schools that serve predominantly poor minority populations. “It’s not all bad, and it’s not all good” is realistic but not persuasive.
### Table 9.1 Assumptions upon which Urban Teacher Residencies Implement Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>Implication</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recruiting teachers:</strong> There is an expanding supply of college graduates and career changers who want to become certified to teach in high-needs urban schools.</td>
<td>As residencies scale up in size, the supply of candidates will increase in order to maintain present selectivity levels. If numbers of applications do not follow scale, the level of selectivity and quality decreases.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Retaining Teachers:</strong> Once trained and experienced, teachers will remain in high needs classrooms beyond the multi-year, incentivized commitment.</td>
<td>The lure of financial incentives will be replaced by professional and natural incentives—loyalty, identity, and a sense of belonging to a school and a profession. If the transition to non-monetary incentives is not effective, high rates of teacher turnover may continue.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Recruiting and Retaining Mentor Teachers:</strong> A sufficient supply of qualified and approved mentor teachers will be willing to share their time, energy, classrooms, and curricula with residents for a school year on a continual basis.</td>
<td>As residencies scale up in size, the supply of qualified mentors will increase as will the residencies’ services to manage an increased number of mentor-resident relationships. If mentor quantity and quality cannot be maintained, the quality of teacher preparation will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity to Go to Scale:</strong> Residencies will be able to increase the size of their enrollments (cohorts) to meet expanding district need for specially trained teachers.</td>
<td>As enrollment increases, so must the residency’s organizational capacity to manage more data, relationships, placements, program components, instructors, and time for assessment. If a residency’s capacity does not expand with its scale, quality and effectiveness decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Will:</strong> Residencies receive private and public financial and political support through their relationship with regime actors such as superintendents, mayors, and corporate “movers and shakers.”</td>
<td>Political will can change with new elections or unexpected events which open or close policy windows.</td>
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</table>

An AUSL resident spoke more hopefully than Allen about the residency’s ability to attract the people it needs to keep pace with its expansion:

…a lot of times you don’t know where your path is…this program is so amazing because it doesn’t matter how old you are, it doesn’t matter your educational background, it doesn’t matter where you come from—they will prepare you to be a teacher. And I think that is what will draw people in. And what this program does is by paying you—if you want to
make this life change, you don’t have to do it being completely broke. So, I do believe there are people out there.

This comment echoes belief, “I believe there are people out there,” and the hope that those potential residency candidates will be drawn in by the mission and logistics of the program. As the resident observes, there may be others who are seeking their path, for whom that path leads to the urban classrooms. The hope that there are enough to meet current and future demands, to sustain the reform, lacks evidence and thus resides in the zone of wishful thinking.

The retention assumption, meaning that residents who successfully graduate from the residency and complete their three or four years of required teaching will remain in their schools, has yet to be supported with evidence because many residents are still working on their agreement for a multi-year commitment with incentives. Once residents are trained and transitioned into urban classrooms, and when their commitment is fulfilled, will they stay teaching in the city’s most difficult-to-staff classrooms? Are the professional and personal incentives, such as collegiality, professional development, and leadership opportunities enough to keep them teaching 10 and 20 years? An AUSL teacher and graduate of the residency program commented on the issues involved in deciding to make a career teaching in a turnaround school after the commitment to AUSL ends and incentives expire:

I think there are enough people, but I think the retention is where it really lies. I think so many people come into urban education knowing that they want to make a change, but when they realize what they’re up against, the change that has to be made is so huge, I think they get overwhelmed and the retention rate is what really needs to be addressed…because this is my fourth year with [the residency], and I think every teacher in their fourth year, fifth year…you always question why am I here? Is this still something
that I want to do? When you come into an urban setting and see the challenges that you face…there’s still that piece of me where teaching was truly never really my first calling and there are other things that I know I want to do, so…that’s something that I question every year. But there’s some reason every year that I’m coming back—I’m a Christian and I say, that’s God’s purpose, that’s His plan for my life, I’m supposed to be here, even on the days that I don’t want to come, there’s a reason, there’s a child, there’s something why I’m supposed to be here. I still struggle with that this is not really what I wanted, but now that I’m in it…right now, this is where I’m supposed to be.

This teacher gives voice to the key issues of retention. The job is harder than people first think. The challenges of teaching students living in poverty and arriving at school behind in their learning lead a teacher to question the decision to enter the urban classroom after four years. This teacher expresses doubts like many teachers, yet remains on the job through a commitment to AUSL and its incentives but perhaps more importantly to the idea of God’s plan for this teacher’s service to the students. This teacher said she was not the only AUSL teacher who was experiencing these powerful pushes and pulls. AUSL has significant work ahead addressing retention issues.

The first evidence of AUSL’s retention in a turnaround school came in June of 2007 after the Sherman School’s first year of reconstituted operation. By most measures, the faculty was accomplished if lacking experience. Of the completely new faculty, 17 of them AUSL graduate residents with up to two years experience, several other Nationally Board Certified and award winning teachers, Sherman lost nine of its 30 teachers through promotions, dismissal, and choices to leave. That this attrition occurred in a program that stresses the importance of its ongoing field coaching of teachers of record and its design to train career teachers for
underperforming schools did not bode well for retention. Nancy Slavin, CPS administrator for Human Resources, commented on the attrition from Sherman:

I think that would have to go to what kind of support was offered at this school, and I really can't speak to that. I think that that type of school—those folks need more support in order to make this happen. [I am] not sure that a big school district always does that correctly. There's a lot of push for teachers that go there to be experienced, and certainly master teachers. Sherman was the first to turn around. So, I think we need to give it more than one school. I mean, obviously, there will be lessons learned.

Retention is likely more of an issue in Chicago than Boston. AUSL places their teachers in challenging situations such as high pressure turnaround schools with expectations to dramatically improve student achievement. The reform designers assume that once teachers earn three to five years of experience, they will become competent and developed close collegiality with like-minded faculty, bond with the school and students, and establish identities as career urban teachers.

The reform partners make assumptions about the mentor teachers. They rely on the expectation that a sufficient number of high quality mentors exist to meet the increasing demands of scaling up. Mentors are a vital component of the program. They are the teacher educators responsible for passing on their craft knowledge, cultural traditions, and skills developed over years of practice. Mentors are intended to guide residents through their apprentice year and model the professionalism, competencies, and qualities the reform partners deem essential for effective urban teaching. The mentor spends more time with the resident than any other person in the program, yet the data in Boston, in particular, indicated problems with recruiting enough qualified and quality mentors, assessing their performance, and managing their personality
conflicts with residents (see Chapter 6). As the number of residents increase in both cities, so must the number of mentors; yet both residencies are still in the process of designing mentor selection and assessment criteria and examining the incentives needed to attract and retain effective mentor teachers.

In addition to assumptions about recruitment, retention, and mentors teachers, the central office leaders make assumptions about residencies’ capacities to go to scale, meaning doubling and tripling the size of their enrollments within a few years. A BTR resident commented on the residency’s capacity to go to scale:

… I personally feel that the program can’t expand until the office expands… it’s a huge commitment for a lot of people… you’re taking a year off and you’re living off of ten thousand dollars. And you kind of have to make things work with this ten thousand dollars. So, a number of people have experienced a lot of administrative mistakes or—I kind of feel like the office is overwhelmed. They are definitely stretched… I think that the idea behind BTR is really exciting but I think expanding the numbers without expanding the office will create some problems… I think what would be important is for BTR is to maybe stop taking the numbers that they are taking—keep the numbers, I think it’s like 85 at this point, keep those numbers for the next couple of years and really get a chance to perfect the program and really get a chance for the program to become embedded within the Boston Public School System.

Another BTR resident commented on the residency’s communication as an indicator of capacity:

Well, I imagine you're going to get a very similar answer as ones you've gotten. I think it's the best way I can be prepared to be an awesome public school teacher. And I feel very
much like I couldn't be prepared better. But it's very disorganized. A lot of times it feels like the communication is just lost somewhere because we've got our professors; we've got our administrators; we've got our site director; we've got our mentor teachers; we've got other residents. So, communication between all those parties? I mean, in my school it's often the principal doesn't communicate important stuff to their teachers. Let alone the administrator of this teacher training program getting information to our mentor teachers. So-- it's a sprawling sort of thing, and communication often breaks down…you can tell that they're trying…

These residents see the strengths and shortcomings of BTR up close. They and other residents are personally affected by the residency’s lack of organizational capacity. These comments raise question about at what level will the residency reach its tipping point beyond which its quality diminishes with increased enrollment.

Jesse Solomon talked about the issue of BTR expanding as he responded to a question asking how he knows when and how to scale up the residency:

Well, that's [pause] that's not entirely up to me. And, what I mean by that is, you're constantly trying to balance, what's the political message-- what do the stakeholders want? If it was up to me, and…there was nothing political at stake…I would stay the same size we're at. I'd probably go back down to about 60 and spend a couple years there, just trying to get a whole bunch of things right…It's sort of one of those “perfect is the enemy of the good” kind of things. So, yeah, we could probably train ten teachers, not perfectly, but, that's ten teachers. So, wouldn't you rather train 100 really well than 10 perfectly? And what's going to be better for the district?...And you know, [there are ] a lot of people with

45 Months after these interviews, BPS faced budget cuts that required BTR to reduce the number of its residents for 2008-2009, putting the issue of capacity to go to scale on hold. The district-residency partners in Boston are using this opportunity to examine BTR’s potential to grow.
expectations, and there's a lot of need, and if you can train some people well, then people
turn around and say to you, well, if you can train them well, what we need is more of them.
And we don't have time to wait for it. So, it's not really politically viable answer to say,
we're just going to stay the size we want to stay…until we tell you we're ready.

Solomon voices doubt about the wisdom to increase the residency’s scale when he feel it is
currently not functioning as smoothly as he’d like. Solomon implies the decision is not his. Other
Boston participants confirmed it is the district pressuring BTR to scale up faster than it wants.
This apparent conflict of goals in an otherwise collaborative relationship may be due to the
political pressures of the district funding half the residency and thus needing more bang for the
buck. It could be a signal from the new superintendent that the BPS-BTR collaborative
relationship may be changing.

AUSL has a similarly ambitious plan to double in size in a year and eventually triple its
current size soon after that. In addition, AUSL plans to be operating a total of 20 schools by
2012. Their scaling up is considerable more complex than BTR’s and calls for expansion of the
teacher residency as well as the school management functions of the organization. A CPS
administrator observed:

I don't think it's an unrealistic plan. I do think it's aggressive, but I don't think it's
unrealistic. I know that AUSL is taking a look at its organization and trying to figure out
what it needs to do, organizationally, to be able to support that level of schools. And I
think that that is where the most work for AUSL needs to be done, with regard to
understanding how the organization needs to grow to support their aggressive school plan.
And then also, to truly understand what is successful about what they do…with regard to
the process of what ultimately makes that school successful? They're not able to speak to
that. They're not able to say it works because we take this leader and we provide them with this training program that does this or does that. It's a lot of information that they don't have with regard to systems and processes for how they manage the change that they're doing.

While the BTR leadership seems unsure about the residency’s capacity to go to scale, AUSL continues to win RFPs for new schools and is confidently embarking on its expansion. In Boston, the district is assuming capacity to scale while in Chicago the residency is assuming it can maintain the funding and organizational demands needed to manage more schools and train more teachers. An educator connected with a local university in Chicago talked about AUSL’s growth in light of the district’s expressed need for the residency to implement more turnaround schools:

…if nothing they [AUSL] understand opportunity. You know? And that's probably a good thing? And maybe a bad thing. But I think that they're seeing a chance and they're seizing it, and they're going do what they can do. But, I think [they need] a little more careful deliberation on what does it mean to have a turnaround school? And how do you reconstitute a place where all the stuff that was going on there prior is still going on, that's not academic? You still have all the same kids, coming from all the same places, doing all the same things, and none of that is addressed. But now, suddenly, it's a little bit different building with all new adults and nobody knows anybody. I think that takes a more specialized set of skills. And I don't know that we have those. And I don't know that they do…I know that they're more reflective now than we have been in the past…but I don't know, just in terms of the pace of things, and the expectation and the turnover…Is it really going to be able to play itself out in the most efficacious manner or not?
This participant addresses AUSL’s entrepreneurial approach to working with the district. AUSL recognizes “opportunity” for itself and for the district, a good and bad thing simultaneously. The comment implies that AUSL may be expanding at too quick a pace because it is not attending to the fundamental issues of change, that is, reconstituting the school but not changing the people inside. AUSL has not been reflective in the past but is more so now; the participant is unsure if they are focusing on the specialized sets of skills teachers and principals need to succeed in turnaround schools.

The district-partnerships assume a constancy of the political will of a stable urban regime which supports their ability to make rapid and radical reform decisions. Currently, the residencies enjoy political support as evidenced through close coordination with governmental leaders, adequate public and private funding, and the encouragement from districts to expand their programs. This situation, however, can change with a future election or appointment of a new superintendent or school board. The residency leaders seem unworried about the sustainability of political will. Jarvis Sanford, Principal of Dodge Renaissance Academy and a member of the AUSL management, responded to a question asking if he was concerned that AUSL might be affected by a future mayoral election:

We don't have those concerns. They [the district] said to us, if you can do ten of these [turnarounds] a year, you can have them…the school district, the communities are thirsty for people to come and just give them a sense of normalcy. That's all. Now, I will say to you that, maybe three, four, five years from now, people are going to say, just how good is good?

The assumption that the regime politics and mobilized will toward the residencies will be sustained for the long-term is a hope more than a fact of evidence. Many educational reforms
disappear with a change of political will. If AUSL and BTR fail to meet expectations, they could be discontinued.

So far I have argued that the findings suggest three implications concerning urban teacher residencies: they enable the district to tailor its own teachers, their conditions of bridging and control attract self-selected private partners who potentially exert influence over the residencies, and they operate on several assumptions that amount to hope and faith. In light of these implications I offer 10 suggestions to district policymakers considering training their own teachers. These suggestions are specifically relevant to Senator Barak Obama’s candidacy for President of the United States, as explained in the following section.

Suggestions to Policymakers Considering the Founding of New UTRs

In the summer of 2007, Senator Barak Obama (IL) and Representative Rahm Emanuel (IL) co-sponsored legislation in Congress for seed money to start urban teacher residencies in other cities. The Teacher Residency Act and the Preparing Excellent Teachers Act were inspired by AUSL (in Obama’s state and Emanuel’s congressional district) and BTR. Obama writes in the press release concerning this legislation:

Even before new teachers enter our classrooms, we must provide them with the skills and support they need to serve children in high-needs school districts. Teaching Residency Programs would not only strengthen our teachers and schools, but would bolster our nation’s competitiveness by providing the best possible training to our next generation of leaders (Obama, 2008).

These proposed acts would provide grants to encourage new public-private partnerships to develop teacher residencies. The grants would be funded by Title II of NCLB and Title II of the
Higher Education Act. As urban teacher residencies gain national attention and as other mayors and central office leaders consider establishing partnerships with new urban teacher residencies, I suggest policymakers such as Senator Obama and Representative Emanuel and their staffs and policy consultants consider the following 10 suggestions regarding districts training their own teachers through partnerships with urban teacher residencies. Table 9.2 summarizes the 10 suggestions.

Table 9.2 Ten Suggestions for Policymakers Considering Future Urban Teacher Residencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggestion</th>
<th>Areas of Focus</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Consider local city politics and capacity; is an urban regime necessary for districts to train their own teachers?</td>
<td>the context of city and organizational politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Consider the design of the district-residency partnership: modify the AUSL and BTR models.</td>
<td>bridging and control, funding, standards for instructors, organizational stability, teacher pipeline, clarity of focus, teacher placement, use of data, insular thinking, aims of education</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Examine assumptions upon which the residencies operate.</td>
<td>regarding residents, mentor teachers, capacity to go to scale, the reliability of political will</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Consider the range of voices needed for effective design and implementation.</td>
<td>equity, diversity, local participation in democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Examine and address the mentor component.</td>
<td>recruitment, retention, communication, coordination, mentor quality and standards</td>
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<td>6. Use the expertise and resources of cooperative and philosophically aligned universities.</td>
<td>professional networks, increased capacities of expertise, knowledge, resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Consider linking new and existing teacher residency programs with other programs for synergy and synthesis.</td>
<td>a systemic approach to educational, housing, health, employment, economic, and social reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Create and disseminate a transparent assessment plan.</td>
<td>public accountability, credibility, and political leverage</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Expand the role and responsibility of the Coalition of Urban Teacher Residencies.</td>
<td>coordination among residencies: program and standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Consider who benefits from the reform.</td>
<td>assumptions about the reform, its intended beneficiaries, equity, fairness, power, social justice</td>
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1. Consider local city politics and capacity; is an urban regime necessary for districts to train their own teachers?

The two partnerships in the study were formed through the interpersonal relationships of an urban regime with mayorally controlled schools. Decision-making included the superintendents, central office administrators, and private corporate and civic leaders. These actors belong to the power elite of the districts and cities. Within this small group of district elites, the home grown teacher reform sprung from an internal idea that was later codified. Not every city, however, is an urban regime, mayoral control of schools, the willing and able actors and organizations to establish an urban teacher residency, or the civic capacity to invest knowledge, money, and political capital into a privatized teacher education program. Since AUSL’s founding in 2001, only Boston has established a one-on-one partnership between the district and a UTR. Perhaps this is an indication the political, social, and economic conditions must exist in specific ways, namely an urban regime with mayoral control of schools, in order to grow an urban teacher residency. This reform may not be easily replicated in cities without an urban regime to mobilize partners and their resources and integrate and legitimize the home grown reform into the mayors’ educational agendas.

AUSL and BTR were created from the ground up, and this may have been only possible in a mayorally controlled district in which informal elite relationships were encouraged to found the programs. Cities without strong regime structures and “education mayors” may find it more likely to partner with an existing alternative teacher training program that can adopt the year-long residency model. Since the purpose of AUSL and BTR is to create a pipeline of new teachers, presumably ones who will remain in their jobs beyond three to five years, then policymakers should also consider how that pipeline will work. AUSL’s pipeline is direct into

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46 The Boettcher Teachers Program in Denver serves several districts urban and suburban.
AUSL schools, assuring that the programs’ graduates serve in the city’s most important schools. BTR’s pipeline is more tenuous, vulnerable to hiring freezes and the annual variations of available positions. If Boston wants tailored teachers for specific schools, they need to rethink how their pipeline serves their mission.

2. Consider the design of the district-residency partnership: modify the AUSL and BTR models.

If policymakers responsible for urban school districts are given the green light by the Obama and Emanuel proposed legislation based on AUSL and BTR, then those models should be modified to integrate the most advantageous features of both residencies. BTR and AUSL exemplify both effective and problematic design features; neither possesses the all attributes for sustainability and independence from outside influences. Both residencies have a similar mission to send into their districts specialized teachers to fit niche conditions, specifically, to serve long-term in underserved schools with disadvantaged and minority students and reduce the achievement gap. The residencies’ missions further diverge: AUSL is the district’s answer to the problem of 200 failed schools and BTR is the district’s answer to increasing the numbers of Black and Hispanic teachers. Policymakers should consider the diversification of district faculty an important goal. If the residency must focus much of its capacity on reconstituting and then running schools, as in the case of AUSL, it risks losing sight of its original mission to prepare teachers in a specialized program for specialized service.

One critical consideration of future residencies is the method of funding. The source of funding, public or private, attaches strings, overlays expectations, and exerts influence regarding a worldview or a specific agenda. The residencies must be funded but they also must be free of the entanglements of influence and agenda. Districts are fully engaged in an era of using private
money for public education, and this trend will likely continue. Policymakers should consider mechanisms to reduce the influence and cut the strings attached to private and corporate funds for public education. One example is the indirect funding of BTR through BPE.

My purpose is not to take sides is the controversy surrounding who should prepare new teachers; however, the question of who teaches the residents is crucial. Both models enlist instructors from their residency staff, from their groups of mentor teachers, and from the district staff. While both programs utilize university professors to varying extents, they play a small role in the education of residents. This is intentional. Policymakers should consider articulating a set of teaching and learning standards, beyond those required for certification. Residency instructors should meet those standards, demonstrate those ideals (returning to a formerly used meaning of “standard”), and be assessed. These standards can be district-level or national but should be informed by practitioners, academics, and representatives of national accrediting organizations. The resulting discussions, conflicts, and final standards will make UTRs better.

Of the two models I studied in the cases, I recommend the organizational structure of the AUSL model for several reasons but with essential modifications embodied in the BTR program. AUSL is a more stable model because of the conditions of bridging and control. The fate of AUSL is tied to contractual performance and not so much to the changes of district leadership as is BTR as a within-district program. This is because BTR is half funded by the district and requires tremendous political clout to keep it on the budget when critics might claim it does not deliver the bang for the buck by training only 80-100 teachers a year. Bridging and control gives AUSL near independent control over its program, potentially insulating it from political pressures and influences.
As a 501(c)3, AUSL may have the capacity to scale up its organization through a governance model of independent board of trust and executive director. This ability to go to scale is essential if the residency’s mission remains to build and fill a teacher pipeline to the district. The findings from BTR indicate that the residency’s “one foot in and one foot out” status might ultimately prevent it from moving forward. Contractual bridging and proxy control give AUSL near independent authority to grow and develop its organization to meet the district’s need for more AUSL-trained teachers. The collaborative and interdependent nature of the BTR-BPS partnership and its accompanying multiple lines of authority make scaling up quickly a difficult assignment.

AUSL’s pipeline is direct. Resident graduates teach where they are most needed. They teach with other AUSL graduates, re-creating the cohort model as teachers of record and potentially developing communities of practice and collegiality that can positively influence retention. AUSL’s residency and school management model potentially affords coherence between teacher training, implementation of pedagogy, educational philosophy, and building leadership. BTR teachers may be one of a few BTR graduates or the only residency graduate in a school. The principal and faculty may not be familiar with BTR’s program or mission, and the lone BTR teacher who advocates for race awareness and social justice might find those topics too volatile for the faculty. BTR’s design permits no residency control over job openings or placement, so residents must work with the hiring system, even if they must initially take jobs in instructional areas different from their residency training.

The current AUSL model, however, requires critical modifications characteristic of the BTR residency. The first concerns funding. The UTR of the future will need robust and consistent funding sources that can expand along with the residency. The direct funding flow currently
designed into AUSL’s bridging and control structure makes it too susceptible to the potential and philosophical influences of corporate donors with expectations and agendas that might not be in the best interests of students. For example, one of BTR’s most important contributions is its emphasis on race awareness and social justice as key components of urban teaching. This emphasis on activist teacher dispositions may be dismissed by corporate donors who place greater value on production issues such as competent workers and more engineers to compete in the global marketplace. Future UTRs should adopt BTR’s indirect funding arrangement through an intermediary organization like BPE in Boston who may be better able to stave off corporate values and allow other values to disseminate.

The second modification involves school reconstitution and management. The model based on AUSL should not be in the business of training teachers and running schools because too much attention may be diverted to the tremendous challenges of school operation to the detriment of the residency. AUSL itself should consider splitting the organization into two entities as it expands, one focused on turning around schools and the other on preparing teachers for those schools. BTR and BPS were wise to focus only on teacher education. Despite BTR’s capacity problems which are being addressed, the leadership and staff can remain focused on its primary mission to train teachers for the challenging social justice work in urban classrooms.

Future UTRs need a reliable mechanism for placing their resident graduates in the highest needs classrooms without having to couple district teacher training with school reconstitution in order to have a place for their graduates to go. The ideal model has the pipeline designed to direct teachers where the district needs them most, and in many cases this will mean restricted choice for the residents. The pipeline should also consider the importance of retaining cohorts of residency teachers for collegial and retention purposes. Despite the disruptions and problems
with school reconstitution, AUSL’s pipeline is made easier through Daley’s Renaissance 2010 initiative. Future residencies should seriously consider whether they should be involved with reconstitution. The ethical issues of school reconstitution, a topic I address in another paper, are considerable as are the human costs of replacing the teachers in a school building (Rice & Malen, 2003). The data from Chicago indicates that the mayor, the district CEO, and the AUSL leadership consider school closure and reconstitution as acts of social justice, rescuing disadvantaged and ignored students from ineffective and entrenched faculties by sending in new teams of specially trained teachers who are personally accountable for each student’s success and who and have the perseverance to stick with the job. Future residencies should assure their pipeline is constructed in such away as to avoid relying on controversial reforms such as reconstitution.

The third modification concerns *scale*. Future residencies and the policymakers who create them should consider what it means to “go to scale.” CPS and BPS mean increasing the numbers of residents produces each year. This limits scale to increased size. Coburn (2003) proposes other factors are involved in going to scale, such as *depth*—reform ideas reaching the classroom, *spread*—the outward and crosswise diffusion of a reform idea throughout and across classrooms, *sustainability*—going to scale over time and maintaining the reform idea amid competing priorities, and *ownership*—the acceptance of the reform idea by internal actors on the street level. The UTR model demonstrates attributes of depth because its program directly affects the core of instruction such as planning, methodology, and assessment. The residency program impacts spread through its emphasis on collaboration and collegiality through a cohort of residents. The residencies, however, face challenges to sustainability through a series of untested assumptions, as previously discussed. BTR’s effort to scale back its enrollment to adjust to the
districts potential hiring freeze and budget concerns is an example of Coburn’s issue of maintaining the reform over time amid competing priorities. Further, the district and residency reformers have yet to demonstrate the ownership component at the street level. Ownership will become more evident when cohorts of teachers-of-record evidence the willingness to stay in their jobs after the financial incentives have been cashed in.

The fourth modification concerns the use of data and evidence. Policymakers considering UTRs should consider what is required of valid evidence for decision-making. Districts need valid evidence to determine if they need or want a UTR and how that residency will be assessed. BTR and UTR have been in operation for seven and five years and expansion mode in the recent two years; however, they are just now considering the evidence they need to assess the effectiveness of the programs beyond high stakes test scores and, in Chicago, student and teacher attendance in AUSL schools. Policymakers should attend to the studies cited in Chapter 2 concerning district use of evidence as they consider establishing future UTRs as district reform partners.

The fifth modification concerns insular thinking. AUSL exercises independence and control over what the residents learn, where they teach, how those schools operate, and who gets hired to teach in and lead its schools. This represents considerable coherence of program but risks insularity of thinking in which vision becomes narrowed, challenging voices become silenced, and new perspectives are discounted and rapidly assimilated. Policymakers should build into the AUSL model meaningful contact points of collaborations that enable the residency management to hear a variety of ideas and guard against parochialism and the rigidities that come with success. BTR’s preference for collaboration integrated with the district’s educational agenda designed by and for educators provides a good model for synergy of ideas and innovation.
necessary for sustained impact on problems such as teacher retention, student learning, and the achievement gap.

A sixth and final modification addresses the *purposes of urban teaching*. Poor and minority students are likely to lack the social and economic advantages of their suburban counterparts. Urban teachers need to focus not only on effective academic instruction but on the role in leveling the playing field through being aware of issues of equity, fairness, and disadvantages caused by racial and economic discrimination. The leadership of BTR insists that an awareness of race and social class is essential for teaching in Boston. I argue this insistence applies to all urban districts because disadvantaged students and disempowered families are particularly vulnerable to top-down, White-on-Black educational reforms that may be implemented less for educational reasons and more for political reasons lacking research-based evidence. Chicago’s dissolution of social promotion in the mid-1990’s is an example of such a politically popular policy lacking a research basis.

BTR’s emphasis on developing teacher dispositions of race awareness and teaching with social justice is a way into assuring teachers will have high expectations for all students, dismissing the deficit model of urban instruction which accepts students’ limitations based on race and social class. While the evidence from my study indicates that AUSL and BTR prefer varying dispositions, this does not mean that character and activist dispositions are mutually exclusive or that future UTR should choose race awareness over perseverance, for example. My study indicates that dispositions are important and variable. Future founders of UTRs have choices to make regarding the kinds of teachers they want to train and the range of dispositions they want to develop. I argue that character dispositions such as the ones found in Chicago can be enhanced and directed if complemented by the activist dispositions found in Boston,
particularly the inclination to the teach for social justice. The future UTR Senator Obama and Representative Emanuel want to seed through their proposed legislation should have at its core the commitment to teach disadvantaged students equitably and fairly. This commitment calls for the development of activist dispositions along with character dispositions and sound professional practices as standards informing all urban teaching and priorities of individuals seeking a first or a new career in the urban classroom.

3. Examine the assumptions.

Policymakers should examine the assumptions upon which the urban teacher residency is based. The previous section discussed the assumptions related to teacher recruitment and retention, mentor recruitment, retention, and quality, the capacity for scale, and political will. Policymakers should study the three existing residencies to learn first hand the strengths and weaknesses of program design and implementation and understand the decisions current residency partners make regarding the sustainability of the reform.

4. Consider the range of voices needed for effective design and implementation.

In the cases of AUSL and BTR, the residencies were designed through informal relationships of individuals who, by virtue of their positions, roles, and reputations in the regimes, had the ear of superintendents and mayors who could “get things done.” They were examples of top-down decision-making, meaning they did not seek a wide range of voices during their design and implementation phases, particularly the voices of those most affected by their reform—students, families, community members, and teachers considered ineffective or uncommitted to their urban classrooms. Inclusiveness is more of an issue in Chicago where district teacher training is
coupled with school closure, reconstitution, and the dissolution of local school governance. Future UTRs will benefit politically as well as substantively for the inclusion of teachers, students, parents, scholars, and others with an investment in public urban education and a personal stake in the outcome of the reform.

5. Examine and address the mentor component.

Mentors are critical to the residency concept, yet the policy mechanisms for recruiting, retaining, and assessing mentors are underdeveloped in the current residencies. Mentors currently volunteer and receive financial incentives to train residents. In Boston where incidences of fit, communication, and personality problems surfaced in the data, a residency staff member was required to devote time toward managing mentor-resident relations and problem-solving mentor quality issues. Improving the overall quality of mentors through improved selection, assessment, and incentives may prove challenging as a stand alone issue; however, when combined with the pressure to scale up quickly, the mentoring aspect of implementation becomes a significant obstacle. Future UTRs should design recruitment, selection, assessment, incentive, and management guideline to attract and keep the very best mentor teachers who carry so much responsibility for the success of the urban teacher residency reform.

6. Use the expertise and resources of cooperative and philosophically aligned universities.

Although BTR and AUSL are deigned to bypass university teacher education, they do so at their peril if they also bypass the resources of universities. University resources of knowledge, tools, and assistance are vast, helping new urban teacher residencies to build on university experience while customizing their programs to meet local district needs. Privatized teacher
education does not have to ignore collaborative partnerships with universities who may be supportive of the residency model and whose own programs could learn from UTRs. The data indicated that AUSL and its cooperating university engaged in a constructive relationship that directed expertise and resources to the residency’s program and remained consonant with the residency’s mission. Close cooperation with like-minded universities may provide resources and create a useful synergy beyond degree granting and state licensure functions.

7. Consider linking new and existing teacher residency programs with other programs for synergy and synthesis.

The district-residency partnership can be nimble at meeting district needs, and its potential effectiveness can also expand its pool of resources by seeking civic partners that complement the work and mission of UTRs. For example, the Annenberg Institute for School Reform is working with the city of Providence and other cities on a “smart education system” study. This is an encouraging approach that is synthetic and holistic, involving a sustainable network of schools, community organizations, homes, and services to encourage the academic and personal development of urban students. The Annenberg Institute writes:

To be "smart," the resulting system must be nimble, adaptive, and efficient. It must provide a broad range of differentiated supports to young people and families, depending on their needs. It must be able to attract new partners to augment its capacity when needed. And it must collect and use data to foster excellence, equity, and continuous improvement. Such a system requires a strategic alliance among the school district, other city agencies, cultural institutions, community groups, and businesses (Annenberg Institute, 2007).
While Annenberg’s smart education system does not directly address new teacher preparation, it is a good model with which urban teacher residencies and districts can partner for a whole-community impact, building on the conceptual framework of civic capacity to form broad-based coalitions to solve specific civic problems.

8. *Create and disseminate a transparent assessment plan.*

The conditions of bridging and control in Chicago and Boston created barriers, intentionally or unintentionally, to external assessment of the residency’s program or procedures. AUSL was only accountable to the district through its contracts and to its own board of trust through its governance structure. BTR was accountable to the district and, to an extent, the public through the public funds used to support its operating expenses. Future UTRs would benefit in quality of program and political leverage by creating and disseminating a transparent assessment plan so the public can know the residencies goals and standards even if it will have no role in their assessment. An assessment plan can be a useful tool to define and guide the collection of evidence, keep the residency functioning as designed, establish legitimacy, and to encourage support and collaboration.

9. *Expand the role and responsibility of the Coalition of Urban Teacher Residencies.*

Related to the development of an assessment plan is the coordination of standards of practice for urban teacher residencies, intended to improve practice, enhance legitimacy, and garner support. Because the number of UTRs within the next decade may remain relatively small, perhaps between 10 and 20, the residencies should create a steering organization for coordination and oversight. The current loose affiliation of the three UTRs is an organization called the
Coalition of Urban Teacher Residencies. The Coalition is a public relations effort whose office resides in the BTR/BPE offices. Residency governors and leaders should invest the Coalition with authority and capacity to create standards of performance, governance practices, and ethics. The relationship of an independent school to its regional accrediting association and the National Association of Independent Schools (NAIS) is a useful model for connecting semi-private, private, and independent residencies with the a broader coalition of standards, practice, and professionalism.

10. Consider who benefits.

One final suggestion for policymakers focuses on ethical and philosophical concerns at the heart of urban education. Reformers considering founding a new UTR, particularly through a top-down decision-making process evidenced in the cases in this study, should ask two questions throughout the creation and life of the residency: “Who benefits from this reform? and “What assumptions are we making about the people who are the intended beneficiaries of this reform?” Urban educational reform is designed to benefit students, yet because public education involves public financing, politics, and power, a reform can benefit other actors in addition to or instead of the intended beneficiaries. As implemented, the reform in Chicago and Boston benefits a variety of district and regime actors. Students are, by design and report of participants, intended to be the primary beneficiaries of districts training their own teachers. In cases where an under-qualified teacher is replaced by an AUSL or BTR resident, reformers can make a strong case that the credentialed and intensively prepared resident brings a wide array of knowledge and skills, a professional set of practices, and relevant professional dispositions unmatched by the emergency-certified, inexperienced teacher. In cases where resident graduates are replacing
experienced teachers who have retired, moved to better working conditions, or have been removed through the turnaround reconstitution in Chicago, the reformers’ case that students benefit from residency graduates is less strong on its face. Residency leaders as well as district officials might point to increased test scores in classrooms taught by a resident teacher or positive reviews by building principals as indications of “benefit.” However, the narrow assessment of student scores on the ISAT and MCAS, particularly single digit increases in averages well below proficiency and indicative of a persistent achievement gap, falls short of qualifying as beneficial. The benefit to students remains an unanswerable question at this point in time.

The reform partners should broaden their concept of “benefit” from improved test scores to include critical thinking, constructive social relationships, positive contributions to school and community, and the competencies students will need in the future, not only to secure employment for the sake for their families and the nation’s economic engine but to effectively participate in democracy, to choose good leaders and advocate for good laws which could help eradicate economic and social systems of poverty and preserve greater affordances of opportunity and equity. As of now, assessing the extent to which students benefit from this reform is difficult.

The residencies benefit in several ways from the reform. By virtue of their bridging and control and corporate connections, residencies become legitimized system actors in an urban regime. With success, as determined by the city and district leadership, comes expansion and increased funding. With increased funding comes legitimacy and political leverage, particularly in the highly charged and contentious arena of big city school politics. The residency leadership

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47 No research has been published on the extent to which students benefit from turnarounds or the AUSL teachers who work in these schools.
and staff can gain local, regional, and national recognition and credibility for their ideas and work with the residency, opening up employment opportunities and raising their public profile. The residents gain credibility as educators, making them more attractive to hire. Private and corporate donors can benefit from the association with the residencies by being associated with a high profile reform designed to improve teacher quality and positively impact the urban regime.

Superintendents, particularly ones actively involved with the residency such as Arne Duncan in Chicago, benefit from the reform in several ways. They are seen as taking action on persistent problems, such as teacher turnover, that may seem to some as beyond solution. The superintendent benefits by increasing the number and kinds of teachers most needed in the district, for example, teachers of color or math and science teachers. The superintendent gains increased instructional capacity through resource dependent bridging and the mobilization of coalition resources, potentially benefitting his or her work in other reform initiatives as well.

The mayors benefit from the reform because the residencies help fulfill their educational initiatives, drawing attention to the programs as entrepreneurial examples of public-private partnerships that improve teacher quality. The residencies supplement municipal funding of the urban school systems, allowing mayors to demonstrate they can create new revenue streams for their cities. When the residencies gain national attention, as they have in Chicago and Boston, the mayors’ public profile is raised, potentially increasing esteem, credibility, and electability.

The second question reformers should ask concerns the assumptions made about the people intended to benefit from the reform. The data in Chicago suggests CPS students in underperforming schools need to be rescued. The district frames them as victims of an uncaring system. CPS leaders have a moral obligation and an urgency to save the children because they and their families are helpless to save themselves. The reform fits the reform rhetoric.

\[\text{Nel Noddings contributed this question to the study.}\]
Reconstitutions rescue students. What is missing from this assumption is the fact that district policies dissolve local school councils once a reconstitution takes place. The activist role of local grassroots organizations of parents and teachers is effectively neutralized by a reform rhetoric of salvation and the streamlined power structures of an urban regime.

If, in contrast to the victim model, reformers assumed students served by this reform were powerful, capable of making decisions about their future, academically talented and able (if lacking skill development during early childhood), and motivated to learn in conducive environments, the reconstitution reform in Chicago might look different. Students, parents, and community members might sit at the same table as district personnel decide if a school has failed and should be closed. In both residencies, the having of high expectations for students is a priority, but the evidence indicates that the reform rhetoric in Boston suggests reformers have higher assumptions of what poor Black and Hispanic students are capable of compared to the reform rhetoric of Chicago, especially the CEO. Boston reformers want students to “deeply learn” and understand what it means to be a minority student in Boston and how that understanding can lead to greater achievement. Chicago reformers want students to be employable later in life so they can advantage their own agency; in the mean time, district and residency leaders must remove students from unhealthy schools and place them new schools. This reform can and does improve students’ lives, but it does not truly rescue them, if reformers want to keep with this image, unless they are likewise rescued from poverty.

These suggestions are not exhaustive, but they are a start for policymakers who, activated by the possible passage of the Obama-Emanuel bill, will begin to devise UTRs like AUSL and BTR in the nation’s cities. Two tasks remain in the chapter and study. One is to return to the conceptual framework and consider the significance of my findings for theory-building and the
research literature concerning the district as an agent of instructional reform. The final task is to offer suggestions for future study and describe where I take my next my research project.

Suggestions for Future Research

Policy makers, elected officials, and researchers need to know much more about districts training their own teachers. As the residencies in Chicago and Boston establish themselves as permanent system actors and as new residencies emerge through local and national policy, future research studies should examine critical questions:

- Are urban teacher residencies effective? What evidence is most useful to determine effectiveness? Measures could include teacher credentials, teacher turnover and retention, teacher attendance, student learning such as test scores, and student attendance and graduation.

- What incentives are most meaningful to encourage teachers to stay long-term in high-poverty district schools? The Sherman School experienced nearly 30% teacher turnover after its first year. What mechanisms have the residencies put into place since my initial research to encourage teachers to stay beyond their financial incentives? Is it realistic to think urban teachers in challenging schools can stay long-term, meaning 10, 20, and 30 years? If so, why? If not, why not?

- Should districts be in the teacher preparation business? How does being in the teacher education business change a district? What additional demands are placed on district personnel? How do district personnel see their role in this reform, and does that role change over time, particularly as the residency expands to scale?
• How should residencies and districts be held accountable for their program? To whom should they be accountable? What role do students, parents, and other community interests play in establishing, implementing, and assessing urban teacher residencies? Should these constituencies have a role?

My next research project will follow up on my field work in the two turnaround schools in Chicago, Sherman and Harvard. I will conduct a qualitative study that seeks to assess the effectiveness of turnaround reconstitutions as practiced in Chicago. I will move beyond the narrow purpose of this dissertation—to describe the partnership and definitions of teacher quality—and expand the range of participants to include students, their families, community activists, and teachers of record as well as the leaders and staff of AUSL, the district, the teachers union, local researchers, and the mayor’s office.
References


Keller, B. (2006a). Residencies set up to train urban teachers at school sites. *Education Week.* Retrieved November 6, 2006 from


Chapter 1 began with a description of the Cardozo Project, a late 1960’s reform in which the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) trained its own teachers in the nation’s capital. Appendix A builds on the information presented in Chapter 1, highlighting the Cardozo Project’s training components and similarities to today’s urban teacher residency programs.

The Urban Teacher Corps (UTC) featured three components to its teacher preparation program: supervised internships with an emphasis on curriculum innovation, seminars for professional development, and community involvement. The supervised internships practiced immediate immersion into the urban classroom, learning by doing (under supervision) and encouraged new methods and curricula to spark the interest and achieve relevance with disadvantaged, urban students. With several interns working in a master teacher’s classroom, synergy between experienced and novice educators created a climate of ongoing discussion and discovery, a “laboratory of experimentation” essential to the interns (Daly, 1976, p. 386). Interns at the elementary level taught a half day and at the junior high or secondary level taught two classes in the morning (Cuban, 1970). Interns attended seminars in the afternoon and after school. Team leaders observed interns teaching and interns observed master teachers teaching in order to learn about engaging students, managing classroom procedures and behavior, using instructional time efficiently, handling discipline problems, and accomplishing daily learning objectives (Aaronson, 1999, p. 336).

Cardozo Project and UTC leaders assumed traditional textbooks, work books, and materials had failed to engage and energize students (Cuban, 1970). Master teachers and interns were expected to create and experiment with new curricula and lessons and make their creations available to all program participants. In the second semester, interns created and taught extended
units and were given $100 to purchase required materials to implement their ideas (Cuban, 1970, p. 80). Throughout the year, intern and master teacher teams met after school to discuss the objectives of original curriculum units and create assignments based on “active student participation and engagement of higher order thinking skills” (Aaronson, 1999, p. 337).

The seminars for professional development attempted to unite educational theory and practice. For example, seminars in urban sociology focused on the relationships between the school and the community and a consideration of how political power in the city affected the school and curriculum. Psychological seminars explored the role of the teacher in urban schools and the behavior of disadvantaged students (Cuban, 1970; Daly, 1975). A seminar on teaching methods in social studies examined the art of teacher questioning. Team leaders would write down all questions asked by the interns; in follow-up review sessions, the questions were analyze for clarity, success of follow-up, and the extent to which the questions were open-ended (Aaronson, 1999). Seminars also focused on education perceived through the humanities. Interns read titles by Margaret Mead, Paul Goodman, Richard Wright, and John Holt (Cuban, 1970, p. 78). Cuban notes the three purposes of these seminars: 1) to reflect the experiences and needs of the interns, 2) to ground all discussions in the reality of the classroom, and 3) to hear the latest thinking and research from local and national educators, psychologists, community workers, and sociologists (Cuban, 1970, p. 79).

Community involvement was an essential third component of the Cardozo Project and Urban Teacher Corps. Based on the assumption that educators would not know what and how to teach unless they had a thorough understanding of the student’s community, master teachers and interns went into the community to meet students’ families, volunteer at neighborhood programs, and receive instruction and briefings from neighborhood organizers and activists working on
issues such as poverty, legal aid, housing, employment, and consumer information (Daly, 1975, p. 387).

The story of the Cardozo Project and Urban Teacher Corps is instructive to the current efforts in the Chicago and Boston school districts to prepare their own new teachers. The district-residency partnerships of today and the past DCPS-UTC partnership share remarkable similarities, including experiential instruction in urban classrooms, reliance on mentor and master teachers for critical supervision, a fusion of classroom practice complemented by university-level study, integration of theory and practice, the use of cohort apprenticeships to achieve a critical mass of like-minded educators in a school, stipends for interns and residents, a collaborative approach among teachers for support and professional development, seminar and academic study, and an emphasis on understanding the educational, psychological, and social needs of disadvantaged, urban children.

Differences between the Cardozo/UTC model of 40 years ago and the UTRs of today are pronounced. These include the role of private interests in the design, operation and funding of district new teacher preparation, the standardization of subject content (particularly math and science) in response to testing and accountability pressures, and the relative ease, speed, and funding of top-down reforms afforded by political relationships and power structures of urban regimes with mayoral control of schools. Unlike the late 1960’s, today’s national climate of educational politics is characterized by a combination of federal intervention combined with a free-market ideology friendly toward alternative teacher preparation and certification. Unlike the Cardozo Project, today’s urban teacher residencies lack the community involvement component Cuban found essential to effective and successful urban teaching.
APPROVE ENTERING INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH
THE ACADEMY FOR URBAN SCHOOL LEADERSHIP
TO PROVIDE SCHOOL TURNAROUND SERVICES
AT JOHN HARVARD ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, SCHOOL OF EXCELLENCE

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER RECOMMENDS:
That the Board approve entering into an Agreement with the Academy for Urban School Leadership ("AUSL") to provide school turnaround services at John Harvard Elementary School, School of Excellence ("Harvard") at a cost not to exceed $375,160 per year. A School Turnaround Services Agreement is currently being negotiated. No payment shall be made to AUSL prior to the execution of the written agreement. The authority granted herein shall automatically rescind in the event an agreement is not executed by the Board and AUSL within 120 days of the date of this Board Report. Information pertinent to this agreement is stated below.

PROVIDER:
Academy for Urban School Leadership, a non-profit corporation
3400 N. Austin Avenue
Chicago, IL 60634
Phone (773) 534-3885
Contact Person: Madeleine Maraldi and Dr. Donald Feinstein
Vendor Number: 39861

OVERSIGHT:
Office of New Schools
125 S. Clark, 5th Floor
Chicago, IL 60603
Phone: (773) 553-1530
Contact Person: Beatriz Rendon, Interim Executive Officer

PROPOSAL: In July 2006, AUSL responded to a request for proposals issued by the Office of New Schools for organizations interested in becoming pre-qualified to provide school turnaround services at reconstituted schools. AUSL's proposal was reviewed and evaluated by a CPS Comprehension Evaluation Team (CET) in August of 2006 and then again in October of 2006. In December 2006, the Board pre-approved AUSL to provide school turnaround services at reconstituted schools under Board Report 06-1220-EX4.

PUBLIC HEARINGS: On March 28, 2007 the Chief Executive Officer proposed the reconstitution of Harvard. A public hearing on the proposed reconstitution of Harvard was held on April 11, 2007. A Public Hearing was held on April 18, 2007 regarding the selection of AUSL to provide school turnaround services at Harvard in the event the Board approves the school's reconstitution. The hearing was recorded. A summary report of the hearing is available for review. If reconstitution of Harvard is approved, the full school name should then be referred to as the John Harvard Elementary School, School of Excellence.

TERM: The School Turnaround Services Agreement shall commence July 1, 2007 and shall end June 30, 2012, unless renewed or terminated early by the Board.

SCOPE OF SERVICES: AUSL will provide school turnaround services at Harvard which shall include the following:
1. Conduct principal recruitment and make recommendations to the CEO regarding principal selection and appointment
2. Conduct staff recruitment and make recommendations to the principal regarding selection of CPS teachers to serve at Harvard;
3. Provide curriculum development support services to implement a standards-based, assessment-aligned curriculum;
4. Provide principal with assistance and support to implement data-driven instruction, utilizing interim assessments, both Learning First and local assessments, to inform pedagogy and professional development;
5. Provide principal with assistance and support to implement various after-school and extracurricular activities for students;
6. Assist the principal in providing parental involvement initiatives;
7. Assist the principal and the Local School Council to annually develop and implement a School Improvement Plan;
8. Provide a full-time professional field coach at Harvard who will provide ongoing school management consulting and professional development;
9. Provide enhanced fundraising opportunities to support the implementation of school initiatives; and
10. Conduct a 2 week summer retreat for Harvard employees.

DELIVERABLES: AUSL will provide quarterly reports to the Office of New Schools regarding the implementation of school turnaround measures and school progress. AUSL will furnish such additional information and reports as necessary to evaluate AUSL’s turnaround services.

OUTCOMES: AUSL’s services will result in improved teaching and student learning and shall accelerate student achievement at Harvard. AUSL will be evaluated annually based on the specific outcomes, school progress goals and benchmarks identified in the Agreement.

COMPENSATION: AUSL shall be paid each year in two equal installments of $187,580 with total compensation not to exceed $375,160 per year. The amount listed reflects a total first year enrollment of 600 students and will be recalculated annually based on the total student enrollment.

AUTHORIZATION: Authorize the General Counsel to include relevant terms and conditions, including any indemnities to be provided to AUSL, in the written School Turnaround Services Agreement. Authorize the President and Secretary to execute the School Turnaround Services Agreement.

FINANCIAL: Charge to Office of New Schools: $375,160 Fiscal Year: 2008
Budget Classification: 0940-210-000-7078-5410 Source of Funds: General Education

GENERAL CONDITIONS:
Inspector General – Each Party to the agreement shall acknowledge that, in accordance with 105 ILCS 5/34-13.1, the Inspector General of the Board of Education has the authority to conduct certain investigations and that the Inspector General shall have access to all information and personnel necessary to conduct those investigations.

Conflicts – The agreement shall not be legally binding on the Board if entered into in violation of the Provisions of 105 ILCS 5/34-21.3, which restricts the employment of, or the letting of contracts to, former Board members during the one-year period following expiration or other termination of their terms of office.

Indebtedness – The Board’s indebtedness Policy adopted June 26, 2006 (96-0626-PO3), as amended from time to time, shall be incorporated into and made a part of the agreement.

Ethics – The Board’s Ethics Code adopted June 23, 2004 (04-0623-PO4), as amended from time to time shall be incorporated into and made a part of the agreement.
Contingent Liability – Since the School Code of Illinois prohibits the incurring of any liability unless an appropriation has been previously made, expenditures beyond FY07 are deemed to be contingent liabilities only, subject to appropriation in subsequent fiscal year budgets. The agreement shall contain the clause that any expenditure beyond the current Fiscal year is deemed a contingent liability, subject to appropriation in the subsequent fiscal year budget(s).

Approved:  

Barbara Eason-Watkins  
Chief Education Officer

Within Appropriation:  

John Malorca  
Chief Financial Officer

Respectfully Submitted:  

Arne Duncan  
Chief Executive Officer

Approved as to Legal Form  

Patrick J. Rocks  
General Counsel
APPENDIX C: NVIVO7 CODES

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE REFORM:
assumptions teachers out there
business support
chronic failure
consequences
continuity
culture change
district need
evidence
failure of traditional teacher training
financial incentives
framing
have enough time
hold adults accountable
incentives
mentor teachers
optimism, faith
parents
problems with traditional teacher prep
radical
rapid scale up
replicability
residency capacity
sherman attrition
surprises
sustainability
teachers as change agents
teaching urban children
urban children
will they stay teaching

CORPORATE PROXIMITY:
corporate proximity
democracy
follow the money
local school councils
mayoral control
Mike Koldyke
neoliberal ideology
privatization business influence

DISCOURSE
transformation
movement

IDEOLOGY
business and ed agenda
critical awareness
discourse rhetoric
district values and beliefs
entrepreneurialism

PARTNERSHIPS BRIDGE & CONTROL
collaboration
critics
one foot in
partnership
profiled partnerships
variance in partnerships

PROFESSIONAL ATTRIBUTES OF PRACTICE
accountability
assessment
assumptions about urban kids
classroom mgt
coaches
coaching
collegiality
camaraderie
credentials
high expectations
mentorship
professional teacher attributes
reflection of practice
relationships
resourcefulness
safety
skill set
teacher quality
test scores
PROFESSIONAL DISPOSITIONS

blame
CARE
commitment to city
commitment to teaching profession
disposition
empowerment
honesty
personal accountability
perseverance
race
resiliency
social justice

UTR PROGRAM
alt cert
cardoza project
narrowing the curriculum
narrowing the curriculum 1
recruitment
residency curriculum
resident evaluation
turnarounds

FREE NODES
UTR teacher skills & USA competition
union appeasement
teacher mission
race in Boston
pipeline
misrepresentation of student achievement
Legislation

IO collaboration in Boston
Investment
instructional core
hiring Black teachers
diversity in Boston
CA not an urban school
being convinced

DOCUMENTS
Archives
Field notes
Interviews
Learning Logs (see Memos)
Media Reports

MEMOS
A case of…
Case study with Yin
Encounter with Small Revelations
Follow the Money
Conversation with David Gamson
How do districts partner?
Implementation
LB refocus
Profiled Partnerships
Race Awareness in Boston
Variance

WEAK LINKS IN THE REFORM
What did I miss in Chicago?
Learning Logs (11)
APPENDIX D: INITIAL CONCEPTS

TEACHER QUALITY CONSTRUCTIONS
Created by reformers in each district-residency partnership

PROFESSIONAL ATTRIBUTES
“certifiable” qualities with exiting assessment measures

PERSONAL DISPOSITIONS
“intangible” qualities with no measures or policy language

QUALITIES IN BOTH CHICAGO AND BOSTON
REFLECTIVE TEACHING
COLLEGIALITY
CREATIVITY
INDIVIDUALIZATION

CHARACTER IN CHICAGO
PERSEVERANCE
RESILIENCE
COURAGE
COMMITMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY

CRITICIAL AWARENESS IN BOSTON
RACE
ETHNICITY
GENDER
POWER

QUALITIES OF BEING INFLUENCE BY CORPORATE INTERESTS WITH DIRECT ACCESS TO THE RESIDENCY

QUALITIES OF DOING INFLUENCE BY RESIDENCY FOUNDERS BUFFERED FROM CORPORATE INTERESTS
APPENDIX E: SAUKKO’S ALTERNATIVE VALIDITY CHECKS

Saukko (in Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, pp. 457-476) offers three alternative validity checks particularly essential for case study, and this one in particular, in which the researcher approaches data deductively as well as inductively. These validity checks are especially pertinent to legitimize case study, says Saukko, if the researcher has the predisposition to imagine how things are in their field before collecting data (conceptual framework), if the researcher occasionally forgets that things never objectively are but instead are socially constructed, and if the researcher comes from a place of privilege and dominant culture as I do.

*Contextual validity* suggests the researcher be mindful of the critical reality of the political nature and implications of the conceptual framework. *Dialogic validity* concerns the researcher’s understanding of local realities and capturing others’ constructions, a process that can be hindered or helped (or both at the same time) by a conceptual framework. *Self-reflexive validity* encourages the researcher to attend to the discourses rooted in belief systems that guide thinking, actions, by extension, the construction of our conceptual frameworks. These three validity checks informed my study by acting as a filter through which to pass data analysis, by providing a structure to self-check data selection, analysis, and interpretation, and by accepting and trying to compensate for the hidden limitations of my study.

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49 Moving in and out of deduction and induction and working both ends simultaneously is a technique suggested by Wolcott in his Descriptive-Analysis-Interpretation approach (1994). Wolcott advises the qualitative researcher to proceed with analysis and interpretation upon a solid foundation of description in which every detail considered for inclusion must be subject to a critical judgment about relevance (p.14). For Wolcott, data are already theory laden; the researcher’s role is to make the shift from implicit to explicit analyses (p. 16).
APPENDIX F: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

**Questions for ALL participants:**

What is your job and what do you do?

How did you become involved in the residency?

What has happened in the district-residency partnership that has been expected? Surprising?

What does teacher quality mean to you?

**Questions for District Personnel:**

What is the district doing about teacher recruitment and retention and how does the residency fit into the picture?

How does the residency compare to other teacher preparation programs? How do the resident compare to other new teachers?

How does the district work with the residency?

What is working well and what are the challenges?

What kind of partner works best with the district?

**Questions for Residency Personnel:**

How does the residency work?

What do residents learn?

How do you assess the residents? The program?

How are mentor teachers selected and by what criteria?

Describe the relationship between the residency and the college or university.

How is the residency funded?

How are graduates placed in the district?
Questions for Residents:

How did you find out about the residency?

What does your typical week look like?

What are you learning about teaching?

The residency is heading into growth mode: what do you think of that?

How will you know if you are a successful teacher?

Questions for Intermediary Organization Personnel:

How does your organization relate with the residency? The district?

How does the residency compare with other reforms with which your organization is or has been involved?

With what areas of the district-residency partnership is your organization most involved? Has this changed over time?

How is your organization funded? How do your funds support the residency? In what other ways do you support the residency?
Date: October 11, 2007
From: Dolores W. Maney, IRB Administrator
To: Laurence B. Boggess
Subject: Results of Review of Proposal - Expedited (IRB #26642) Approval Expiration Date: October 4, 2008
“Home Growing Teacher Quality: District Partnerships with Urban Teacher Residencies”

The Social Science Institutional Review Board (IRB) has reviewed and approved your proposal for use of human participants in your research. By accepting this decision, you agree to obtain prior approval from the IRB for any changes to your study. Unanticipated participant events that are encountered during the conduct of this research must be reported in a timely fashion.

Enclosed is/are the dated, IRB-approved informed consent(s) to be used when recruiting participants for this research. Participants must receive a copy of the approved informed consent form to keep for their records.

If signed consent is obtained, the principal investigator is expected to maintain the original signed consent forms along with the IRB research records for this research at least three (3) years after termination of IRB approval. For projects that involve protected health information (PHI) and are regulated by HIPAA, records are to be maintained for six (6) years. The principal investigator must determine and adhere to additional requirements established by the FDA and any outside sponsors.

If this study will extend beyond the above noted approval expiration date, the principal investigator must submit a completed Continuing Progress Report to the Office for Research Protections (ORP) to request renewed approval for this research.

On behalf of the IRB and the University, thank you for your efforts to conduct your research in compliance with the federal regulations that have been established for the protection of human participants.

Please Note: The ORP encourages you to subscribe to the ORP listserv for protocol and research-related information. Send a blank email to: L-ORP-Research-L-subscribe-request@lists.psu.edu

DWM/dwm
Enclosure
cc: Dana L. Mitra
APPENDIX H: IRB INFORMED CONSENT

Informed Consent Form for Social Science Research
The Pennsylvania State University

Title of Project: Home Growing Teacher Quality: District Partnerships with Urban Teacher Residencies

Principal Investigator: Laurence B. Boggess
Educational Theory and Policy
278 Chambers Building
University Park, PA 16802
814-865-5027 (office)
814-404-1482 (mobile)
lbb150@psu.edu

Advisor: Dr. Dana Mitra
Educational Theory and Policy
300 Rackley Building
University Park, PA 16802
814-863-7020 (office)
dmitra@psu.edu

1. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research is to learn more about how the school district works with the urban teacher residency to address the teacher quality gap in urban classrooms.

2. Procedures to be followed: You will be asked to participate in an interview with Laurence Boggess, principal investigator. Interviews will be digitally recorded. Telephone interviews will be conducted over a land-line phone (i.e., not cellular) to preserve confidentiality.

3. Discomforts and Risks: Interviewees will likely have different reactions when talking about their involvement with the district-residency relationship. While some may find such a conversation satisfying and rewarding, others may feel uncomfortable sharing comments. The likelihood of serious discomfort or risk, however, is minimal. Participants will be free to ask questions or discontinue the interview at any time.

4. Benefits: The benefits to you include the opportunity to reflect on your work and participation in a unique educational reform. The interview presents the possibility for ongoing learning.

   The benefits to society include a better understanding of how urban districts might improve instructional quality for disadvantaged children in low-achieving classrooms.

5. Duration/Time: Interviews will last between 30-45 minutes. Most participants will be interviewed one to two times between October and December 2007.
6. **Statement of Confidentiality:** Your participation in this research is confidential. To assure confidentiality, (a) The researcher will not name or otherwise reveal the identities of participants in any research reports stemming from this study; (b) The researcher will not play the digital recordings of interviews except for the transcriber; (c) The recording of the interview will be stored on a data stick and locked cabinet in the office of investigator’s advisor; digital transcriptions of interviews will be stored on the researcher’s password protected laptop during the study and on a flash drive stored on a data stick and locked cabinet in the office of investigator’s advisor after the study is completed (d) digital recordings of interviews will be destroyed in 2013; digital transcriptions of interviews will be destroyed in 2017. Penn State’s Office for Research Protections, the Social Science Institutional Review Board and the Office for Human Research Protections in the Department of Health and Human Services may review records related to this research study. In the event of a publication or presentation resulting from the research, no personally identifiable information will be shared. Code numbers will identify participants.

7. **Right to Ask Questions:** Please contact Dr. Dana Mitra at 814-863-7020 with questions, complaints or concerns about this research. You can also call this number if you feel this study has harmed you. Questions about your rights as a research participant may be directed to Penn State University’s Office for Research Protections at (814) 865-1775. You may also call this number if you cannot reach the research team or wish to talk to someone else. You may contact the principal researcher at any time at 814-404-1482 with questions about the research project.

8. **Voluntary Participation:** Your decision to be in this research is voluntary. You can stop at any time. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer. Refusal to take part in or withdrawing from this study will involve no penalty or loss of benefits you would receive otherwise.

You must be 18 years of age or older to consent to take part in this research study. If you agree to take part in this research study and the information outlined above, please sign your name and indicate the date below.

You will be given a copy of this consent form for your records.

________________________________________________________________________  ____________
Participant Signature      Date

________________________________________________________________________  ____________
Person Obtaining Consent     Date
APPENDIX I: PERMISSION TO QUOTE WITH ATTRIBUTION

Permission to Quote
The Pennsylvania State University

Title of Project: Home Growing Teacher Quality: District Partnerships with Urban Teacher Residencies

Principal Investigator: Laurence B. Boggess
Educational Theory and Policy
278 Chambers Building
University Park, PA 16802
814-865-5027 (office)
814-404-1482 (mobile)
LBB150@psu.edu

Advisor: Dr. Dana Mitra
Educational Theory and Policy
300 Rackley Building
University Park, PA 16802
814-863-7020 (office)
dmitra@psu.edu

I give the researcher permission to quote my words attributable to my name and title in the dissertation and any publication resulting from this study.

You will be given a copy of this consent form for your records.

Participant Signature __________________________ Date ________________

Person Obtaining Consent __________________________ Date ________________
APPENDIX J: RECRUITMENT LETTER

Recruitment Letter
The Pennsylvania State University

Title of Project: *Home Growing Teacher Quality: District Partnerships with Urban Teacher Residencies*

Principal Investigator: Laurence B. Boggess
Educational Theory and Policy
278 Chambers Building
University Park, PA 16802
814-865-5027 (office)
814-404-1482 (mobile)
LBB150@psu.edu

Advisor: Dr. Dana Mitra
Educational Theory and Policy
300 Rackley Building
University Park, PA 16802
814-863-7020 (office)
dmitra@psu.edu

Date: ________________

To Whom It May Concern:

I write to invite you to participate in a research study concerning the partnership between the Boston Public Schools and the Boston Teacher Residency. This research is part of my doctoral dissertation and is done in affiliation with the Pennsylvania State University.

The research study seeks 30-45 minute interviews in which participants are asked about their involvement with the urban teacher residency, their knowledge of various aspects of its history and functioning, and their assessment of the extent to which the district-residency partnership address teacher quality in urban classrooms.

Eligible participants in this study are those who have official capacity within or working knowledge of the district-residency partnership and may be district personnel, residency personnel, current or past teacher residents, and personnel of civic organizations, universities, teacher unions, or local school councils involved with the district-residency partnership. Minors under 18 years of age are excluded from this study.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please contact me at the numbers and addresses listed below.

Thank you.

Regards,

Laurence B. Boggess
Educational Theory and Policy
Penn State University
January 28, 2008

Laurence Boggess
Penn State University
278 Chambers
University Park, PA 16802

Dear Mr. Boggess:

Thank you for your interest in conducting research in The Chicago Public Schools. The Research Review Board of the Office of Research, Evaluation, and Accountability has reviewed your proposal for research entitled Home Growing Teacher Quality and has approved your request to conduct research. Although your study has been approved, school principals have final authority over activities that are allowed to take place in the school. If data collection continues beyond a year from this approval, please complete the Modification & Continuing Review Process Checklist.

Upon completion of the research study, a copy of the final report or summary of the results must be provided to the Research Review Board. The Board reserves the right to use the information in the research report or summary for planning, solicitation of grants and staff development.

Please note that your study has been assigned Project ID #224. If you have any questions, please contact Eilene Edejer at 773-553-2452.

Sincerely,

Bret Feranchak
Director of Program Evaluation and Applied Research
Office of Research, Evaluation, and Accountability
VITA

Laurence B. Boggess

Education
B.A., Rutgers University (1976)

Professional Experience
Penn State University—University Park, PA 2008-present
   Instructor and Coordinator, Education and Public Policy
State College Friends School, State College, PA 2001-2006
   Head of School
Oak Hill School, Nashville, TN 1997-2001
   Upper School Coordinator
Richmond Friends School, Richmond, IN 1993-1997
   Lead Teacher
Shady Hill School, Cambridge, MA 1990-1992
   Director of the Middle School
Chestnut Hill Academy, Philadelphia, PA 1987-1990
   Middle School Teacher
Atlantic City Friends School, Atlantic City and Northfield, NJ 1980-1986
   Middle School Teacher, Head of Middle School

Refereed Conference Papers

Professional Publications