CORE AND PERIPHERAL ACTORS IN THE KOREAN POLICYMAKING PROCESS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLICY ISSUES AND DOMAINS

A Dissertation in
Political Science
by
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ABSTRACT

Comparative policymaking research usually makes aggregate level generalizations about distinct patterns of participation in the national policymaking process depending on the relations between government and groups, or interactions between the state and society. Instead, my dissertation proposes to shift the focus from countries as a whole to a range of policy issues, in order to assess the types and diversity of participation in overall policymaking across political systems.

Specifically, I compare the actors involved in a sample of policy issues in Korea, the EU, and the US. The three political systems offer interesting comparisons given the distinct features each represents—the state has traditionally dominated policymaking in Korea whereas the nongovernmental sector remained weak, the US is an opposite case where well organized groups are central to the policy process rather than the state, and finally the EU where both the policymaking bodies and outside groups are weakly organized. I hypothesize that the types and diversity of participation in the overall policymaking process varies across three political systems depending on the different levels of government-group dominance. To test this claim, I collected original data on Korean policymaking, by drawing a representative set of 43 policy issues in Korea, relying on face-to-face interviews with over 100 (collected between June 2009-May 2010 during fieldwork in Seoul, Korea) policy actors, as well as in-depth case studies of each policy issue based on publicly available sources. The data were collected using similar methodologies as previous studies of policymaking in the US and EU, making direct comparisons possible across the three political systems. The findings confirm my hypothesis—descriptive statistics of the participants show that overall participation is more diverse in the pluralist US than in the EU, and Korea. Similarly, state actors—the executive and bureaucracy—are frequent participants in the policy process in Korea in comparison to the US and EU.

Additionally, my dissertation examines the strengths and limits of nongovernmental groups in relation to the state in the Korean policymaking process. The statist perspective has largely shaped our understandings of policymaking in East Asian countries, but scholars of civil society have recently highlighted the growing prominence of outside interests in policymaking. Analyzing the types of actors participating in a sample of 43 issue debates in Korea, I find that nongovernmental groups, diverse in terms of the interests they represent, frequently participate in today’s policy process in Korea. Furthermore, outside groups successfully prevent or slow the pace of policy changes sought by the state by shopping for other institutional venues (e.g., another bureaucratic agency or legislative members).

My dissertation contributes to scholarly debates in the following ways. First, my research provides one of the few explorations of policymaking across political systems based on a representative set of policy issues, confirming the long held belief that the structure of government-group relations has important implications for whose views are represented in overall policymaking. Additionally, my dissertation demonstrates the dynamic interactions between government insiders and outside interests in countries where the policymaking process has traditionally been dominated by the state—outside groups are actively mobilized to promote their interests, and they attain policy success by taking advantage of multiple institutional venues.
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Finally, I would like to express gratitude to my family members. I can always count on their love and companionship in times of hardness, for which I am truly thankful.
Chapter 1
Introduction

“In most of the East Asian countries, in one form or another, the government intervened systematically and through multiple channels…”
(The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, World Bank, 1993)

“Concerted and conscious efforts on the part of the public and private sector, working together, to discover and upgrade a comparative advantage: I believe that was key to Korea’s development experience”
(Wonhyuk Lim, Director, Korea Development Institute, New York Times 2010)

The East Asian model of policymaking, which originally developed to explain development policies of Asian economies in the 1970’s, refers to the state’s involvement and close partnership with the business sector in the policymaking process. Both academic and public attention was captured by Japan’s economic miracle, when its annual GDP between 1971 and 1973 was 10 times larger than in the early post-war period (Johnson 1982). Interest in Asia’s rapid growth increased in the following period, as other countries in the region—South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong—also underwent dramatic economic development. Research emerged, which attempted to reveal the efficient and effective policy strategies of the Asian Tigers (i.e., export oriented growth), and the actors—both inside and outside the state—central to designing such policy measures (Krugman 1997; Wade 2000).

Yet, as the recent quote (above) from the director of Korea Development Institute (KDI) that appeared in the New York Times suggests, the East Asian model—concerted efforts by state actors and business leaders to agree on policies of economic growth—does not just summarize policymaking in the past, it continues to shape elite and public understandings of policy formulations in East Asia. The core idea behind the East Asian model of policymaking can be summarized in the following ways. First, policymaking
involves a narrow set of actors inside the government and a few business leaders, though state 
actors primarily take the lead in directing policy changes (Woo-Cumings 1999; Kohli 2004, 
but for evidence of business leaders influencing policy changes, see E Kim 1997; Kang 2002). 
Second, the policy process lacked involvement of nongovernmental groups in general 
(Armstrong 2002). Third, the limited participation in policymaking distinguishes the East 
Asian model from the policy process of other industrialized countries with pluralist or 
corporatist policymaking traditions (Lijphart 1999; Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Siaroff 
1999). However, recent changes taking place—the expansion of the nongovernmental sector 
and increasing pressures exerted by societal interests in policymaking—uniformly across 
countries from which the East Asian model originated, suggest that the relevance of the 
model for current day policymaking needs to be reexamined (Alagappa 2004).

Does the East Asian model accurately explain who participates and influences in 
today’s policy process? My dissertation analyzes how well the East Asian model of 
policymaking is supported, first by examining participation patterns in contemporary 
policymaking in Korea, and also by comparing the Korean case to the US and EU—political 
systems typically argued to represent distinct policymaking typologies in comparative politics 
research. The wide application of the East Asian model of policymaking to political systems 
in East Asia, Southeast Asia and even Latin America, suggests that the findings have 
implications that reach beyond a specific country or a region. Mainly, the dissertation argues 
that though state actors are central to the policy process in Korea, the policy process is not at 
all exclusive to government insiders, and that Korea currently has a vibrant nongovernmental 
sector similar to policy communities of the US and EU.

Previous Approaches to Analyzing the Policymaking Process
Researchers in public policymaking have frequently analyzed the actors and groups involved in the policy process, because participation greatly determines how policy debates progress, and ultimately the outcome. As Schattschneider (1960) would argue, the losing side of the debate has incentives to expand the conflict, because the outcome is more likely to be unknown once neutral bystanders become interested in the debate and take sides.

Using Schattschneider’s idea of participation and policymaking, the East Asian model can be identified as typically having a narrow set of participants. That is, the model argues that public and private sector leaders—the president, the bureaucracy, and large-sized corporations—are the key players in policymaking. Whereas policymaking involved frequent engagement of state actors in directing policy changes, interests outside the government (apart from a few powerful business interests appearing as partners of the state which shared the common goal of economic growth) were rarely found in policy debates. In this regard, the East Asian model is also referred to as the statist policymaking—the state determining the direction of important policy changes, while all other societal interests follow. Though originally developed to explain the interactions of state actors and business interests in economic policymaking, the model has also been used to understand the overall policy process in a country (i.e., policies related to aging society in Japan, see Campbell 1992). Furthermore, the theme has widely been explored outside Asia—interactions among a limited number of actors have typically been referred to as the factor explaining rapid economic development in Latin America (i.e., in Brazil, see Schneider 1991; Kohli 2004). Schneider, for instance, notes that the ubiquitous and visible hand of the Brazilian state (by which he means appointed elite bureaucrats) was behind Brazil’s successful industrialization, with a growth rate of 7% between 1945 to 1980, expanding Brazil’s economy from the 40th to the 8th largest in the world in this period (Schneider 1991, 4).
Commonly across East Asian policymaking systems, however, policymaking once dominated largely by state actors now seems to involve a much wider array of actors and groups. The changes are taking place uniformly across countries, though to different extents. For instance, the Asian Tigers experienced growth in civil society, where the state has previously been the dominant force in policymaking (Alagappa 2004). The original model of the economic miracle—Japan—is no exception. Since the passage of the Non-Profit Organization law in 1998, more groups have become legalized and work closely with the state in the policy process (Tsujinaka 1999; Pekkanen 2004). Similarly in Korea, the number of groups operating in the civil society sector has grown dramatically in the past two decades (E Kim 2009). This picture stands in contrast to the pre-democratization period when organizations were severely restricted by the state (S Kim 2004). Additionally, the legislative branch of government (rather than the bureaucracy) is becoming more active in policymaking, which explains increasing scholarly attention to the lawmaking activities of legislative members in countries like Japan and Korea (Nemoto et al. 2009; Kwon 2005). This evidence suggests that the participants in policymaking are much more diverse than the East Asian model would find.

Table 1.1 provides some expectations emerging from previous studies on the Korean policymaking process regarding participation and influence. As table 1.1 shows, research on Korean policymaking can largely be divided into two groups. The first group of studies can be identified as the East Asian model of policymaking. Scholars generally agree that the executive, the bureaucracy and large corporations are the key players. However, there is disagreement over the direction of policy influence. That is, the state-centered approach would argue that the state leads, and business interests follow. On the other hand, the business-centered approach, analyzing the evolution of state-business relations from the
1970’s to 1990’s states that since democratization, influence runs in the opposite direction—it is business group leaders that determine the direction of policy changes by providing campaign finances to politicians who run for office. To summarize, both the state-centered and business-centered approaches commonly argue that the state is a unitary actor, and similarly business a united group. Additionally, these studies assume that the direction of influence is one way, whether state or business. Most importantly, these studies all focus on a single policy area—economic policymaking.

(Table 1.1 about here)

Alternatively, another group of studies focusing on the emerging nongovernmental groups in the Korean policy process finds that NGOs are key players, leading policy changes in the areas of political and social reform. These findings, then, largely stand in contrast to earlier research that viewed participation in the Korean policy process to be narrowly restricted to government insiders and business corporations. However, the research on Korean civil society and NGOs primarily analyze non-economic policy areas. In this regard, the findings are difficult to put into context with earlier research that mostly looked into policy activities of state actors in economic policymaking.

The aforementioned review of research on Korean policymaking highlights a common problem found in studies of policymaking. That is, the overarching goal of much of this research is to generalize about policymaking in a political system—whether participation or influence. The narrow focus of the studies, however, prevents us from drawing broad implications from the findings. Does the rising influence of NGOs in policymaking suggest that the role played by government insiders (the dominant actor in policymaking throughout
history) is in decline? As I will talk more in chapters 3 and 4, concluding about the roles of the state and NGOs in policymaking in relation to one another is difficult, because studies either focus on policymaking activities of either state actors or nongovernmental groups.

In addition to analyzing the role of state and nongovernmental groups in today’s policy process in Korea, whether policymaking in East Asia is distinct from policymaking elsewhere (i.e., pluralist systems like the US) remains an important question to be explored. Previous research in comparative policymaking offers two dimensions that are important in understanding the *variance of participation* across policymaking communities. The first categorizes countries into distinct typologies based on interactions of government and groups in economic policymaking: pluralist (multiple groups and actors competing for greater influence in the policy process, see Truman 1950), statist (the state taking the lead in policy formulation, see Amsden 1989) and corporatist systems (peak interest associations working with the government in policy decision-making and implementation, see Lehmbruch 1979)—. In this regard, participation patterns found in East Asian countries—the statist systems—would certainly look different from that of the pluralist US, where a large number of outside interests constantly compete for greater influence in policymaking, and the European corporatist model, where large interest groups representing business as well as labor cooperate with the state in public policymaking.

The second important dimension in explaining participation across policy communities is state-society relations. For instance, group involvement in the policy process is restricted by the presence of a strong state in some countries (in Japan, see Schwartz and Pharr 2003), whereas societal interests are actively engaged in the policy process in other political systems where the state remains weak in comparison to vibrant and independent civil society (in the US, see Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). Similar to comparative policymaking
research that categorizes countries into different typologies based on patterns of interaction between government and groups, research on state and civil society also aim to highlight differences in participation patterns found across political systems. However, unlike the former group of research that mainly focused on the involvement of actors and groups in economic policymaking (i.e., the role of state actors and business leaders in rapid development), the latter was more broadly interested in the general involvement of state actors and outside groups regardless of policy area.

At the same time, other studies point to the difficulty in generalizing about participation at the country level. Specifically, growing coordination among government and peak associations (thus, the corporatist form of policymaking) is evidenced in Korea where coordinated interest representation between groups, or between groups and government, has traditionally been weak (Kim et al. 2011). Additionally, applying distinct typologies of policymaking to policy areas other than economics, such as environment, has been puzzling at times, because studies found a prominent role played by previously disregarded types of actors in the policy process, such as public interest groups (e.g., environmental NGOs in Korea see, Lim and Tang 2007).

In addition, comparative studies of the civil society sector show that the population of groups—the diversity in interests represented—looks similar across political systems. Commonly across political systems representing different policymaking types and varying degrees of state and society relations, studies find the dominance of economic interests (for evidence in the US, see Walker 1991; Schlozman 1984, in EU, Coen 1998; Eising 2009), as well as growing prominence of non-economic interests such as public interest groups (in the US see, Berry 1999; in EU, Kohler-Koch 1994; 2007, and in Japan, Tsujinaka and Pekkanen 2007). As will be discussed extensively in chapter 5, this evidence suggests that comparative
studies highlighting only the differences in participation across policymaking types, fail to notice underlying similarities in nongovernmental sectors.

In sum, studies of public policymaking are growing dramatically—both in terms of analyzing the role of state actors versus outside interests within a country, and highlighting distinct types of participation in policymaking in a comparative context. Yet, the narrow focus of studies to specific actors, policy issues, and areas prevents us from drawing generalizable implications about participation in overall policymaking. Furthermore, research on typologies of policymaking stress the distinctness of policymaking across political systems, but to what extent the distinctness finds empirical support across representative sets of policy issues is rarely examined.

**Explaining Participation and Influence in the Korean Policymaking Process**

My dissertation explores the actors participating in the contemporary policymaking process in Korea. South Korea is regarded as one of the best examples of the East Asian model of policymaking, establishing a precedent of growth policies for other developing countries to follow. At the same time, it underwent dramatic changes in the NGO sector following democratization in 1987. Given that the expansion of the nongovernmental sector is a common trend among the East Asian Tigers, analyzing the case of Korea is adequate for examining the relevance of the East Asian model in today’s policymaking. Next, the dissertation makes a direct comparison of the Korean policy process with participation found in the policymaking of the US and EU. The three political systems offer valid comparisons, given the distinct features of policymaking typologies and state-society relations each represents. As Table 1.2 shows, Korea represents a case of strong state and weak (yet dramatically expanding) civil society, as well as statist policymaking traditions. In that regard,
the Korean case contrasts with both the US (strong society and weak state, with pluralist form of policymaking), and EU (both weak society and state, representing corporatist policymaking traditions). Direct comparisons across the three political systems are made possible by data sets made available by two separate research projects in the US (Baumgartner et al. 2009) and EU (Mahoney 2008) using identical research methodology.

(Table 1.2 about here)

Following the research method employed by two previous studies on public policymaking in the US and EU, my data on Korean policymaking considers a range of issues across policy areas in Korea, analyzing participation occurring at the issue level. The goal of the research design is to draw a set of issues representative of the entire policy community, including issues of different characteristics, discussed at different stages of the policy process. That is, analyzing a representative set of policy issues allows us to generalize about participation and influence in overall policymaking, because participation varies depending on the issues and policy areas within a single political system (see Baumgartner and Leech 2001 for a review).

Additionally, the dissertation relies on concrete measures of participation that allow us to investigate policy communities uniformly across political systems. Two distinct measures of participation—the number and type of those involved in issue debates—are examined. Whereas the number of participants is a clear indicator of the broadness or narrowness of participation (Baumgartner 1989), the type of participation indicates the diversity of actors and interests mobilized in policymaking (Danielien and Page 1994; Golden 1998; Wonka et al. 2010). Using such clear measures of participation offers the benefit of
analyzing the role of government insiders in relation to nongovernmental actors, and also what type of interests within the nongovernmental sector dominates in each policy community.

The overarching goal of the research is to examine the relevance of the East Asian model to today’s policymaking using the case of Korea. Specifically, three distinct sets of questions are analyzed in the dissertation. First, what is the role of civil society in relation to the state in the current policymaking process in Korea? Second, who wins in the Korean policymaking process—the state or business? Finally, is the participation pattern found in Korea distinct from the US and EU, which represent different typologies of policymaking and varying degrees of state and society dominance? The next section provides a short description of chapters to follow.

**Chapter Layout**

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the research design. First, I introduce the literature on political institutions and party systems to explain different bodies involved in the policymaking process in Korea. Based on descriptions of the Korean political system, I describe how the sampling frame was constructed in order to draw a representative set of policy issues. Finally, I elaborate on the research methodology such as details of interviews, small-sized case studies using publicly available sources, and coding procedure.

In chapter 3, I analyze the roles of the state and civil society in the contemporary policy process in Korea. The statist perspective has prevailed in explaining the policy process in East Asian countries, offering a deterministic view of participation and influence in policymaking—the dominance of the executive and the bureaucracy, and their insulation from contending political and social interests. Yet, the policymaking environment that policy
actors operate in is changing dynamically. I examine the participation of different types of actors across 43 representative set of policy issues. The goals are twofold. First, I want to detect the average pattern of participation across issues to assess the strength of the civil society in the overall policymaking process. Second, I wish to observe the interaction of state and society at the issue level, further analyzing the implications of such relations on democratic governance. I find that participation of nongovernmental groups in the contemporary policy process in Korea is diverse, including public interest groups as well as trade associations and business corporations. On the other hand, prominent public interest groups’ close alignment with opposition parties shows a clear conflict structure, illustrating how confrontational history shapes state-society relations in the contemporary policymaking process.

Chapter 4 examines whose policy perspectives are successfully reflected in the outcomes of policy debates in Korea. I conduct in-depth case studies of seven economic policy issues associated with economic policymaking, to which most attention has been paid by previous scholars of the East Asian model, to assess who wins in the current day policymaking process. Thus, the goal of the chapter is to examine how much of the East Asian model finds support in today’s policy process. I find that despite the diversity in participation, state bureaucracy remains central to the policy process as policy advocates, often proposing changes to the existing policy and getting the policy outcomes they support. However, outside groups standing in opposition constantly try to influence policy outcomes by looking for allies in other institutional venues (i.e., other government agencies or legislative members), who help outside groups to have policy perspectives reflected in the policy outcomes.
Chapter 5 systematically compares actors involved in a sample of policy issues in Korea, the EU, and the US. Research in comparative policymaking categorizes political systems into different types, such as pluralist, corporatist, statist and also by the relative strength or weakness of state and society depending on the varying participation of government insiders and outside groups. These policymaking types have been applied to explaining who gets involved in the policy process in numerous countries, across policy areas. Yet, empirical evidence also suggests the difficulties in making national level generalizations, because patterns of interaction vary across issues and policy areas within a political system. In this chapter, I test whether different typologies of policymaking find support across political systems when looking across issues and policy areas by comparing actors involved in a representative set of 43 issues in Korea, 98 issues in the US (Baumgartner et al. 2009), and 26 issues in the EU (Mahoney 2008). Participation in overall policymaking is most diverse in the pluralist US, whereas actors inside the government frequently dominate in the statist Korea. However, data also shows some common features found across three political systems, such as a wide range of nongovernmental actors active in the policy community. The findings highlight growing similarities across political systems previously regarded as having drastically dissimilar policymaking processes.

Finally, chapter 6 summarizes conclusions of previous chapters and develops implications for future studies of comparative policymaking. Previous approaches to studying the policy process in Korea focusing on a single or a number of policy issues, not only prevent us from making valid comparisons across studies, but also across political systems. I conclude by stressing the merits of the research methodology used in this project, advocating that studying a sample of policy issues would greatly contribute to our knowledge of cross-country comparative studies of policymaking.
Table 1.1: Summary of Different Groups of Research on the Korean Policymaking Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Actor</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Research Focus</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Asian Model of Policymaking</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The President</td>
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<td>The Bureaucracy</td>
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<td>Conglomerates</td>
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<td>The President</td>
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<td>Conglomerates</td>
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<td><strong>Other Approach</strong></td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case Selection</td>
<td>Weak State</td>
<td>Strong State</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Weak Society</strong></td>
<td>Corporatist EU</td>
<td>Statist Korea</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 issues, 82 interviews</td>
<td>43 issues, 107 interviews</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Mahoney 2008)</td>
<td>(Collected by author)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strong Society</strong></td>
<td>Pluralist US</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98 issues, approximately 300</td>
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<td></td>
<td>interviews</td>
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Chapter 2
The Policy Process in Korea:
Research Design and Data Collection

In this chapter, I review the workings of the policy process in Korea and discuss how a set of policy issues were drawn for the project on the Korean policymaking process. In order to draw a representative sample of policy issues, I first selected as sampling units 33 policy divisions from executive ministries and 10 opposition party members in the National Assembly weighted roughly by their frequency of involvement in policymaking. Then, I conducted interviews with the bureaucrats and the legislative staff in the selected units, asking about their current policy activities. These 43 issues as described by the respondents form the basis of this project.

The issues included in the study are diverse, not only in terms of overall importance, but also where the issue stands in the policy process. Sometimes policymakers are working on implementing a new policy that has implications for the entire political system. Other times they are working on a small issue, barely receiving any attention by other actors in the policy community. Similarly, the list of issues included in my data set ranged from an idea being considered for a draft of a bill to a policy proposal that was put into effect following months of deliberation process inside and outside the government. The diversity of the issues sampled is what truly represents the policy community in Korea.

The project employed two distinct methods in gathering data—personal interviews with the policymakers and examination of publicly available records. Face-to-face interviews with a total of 107 people from inside and outside the government involved in 43 policy issues were the primary sources of data. All the interviews were conducted during my
dissertation fieldwork in Korea between June 2009 and May 2010. In order to supplement interviews, I relied on publicly available records to learn more about each issue, using online newspaper archives, government information databases, and organizational statements and press releases posted on the websites of nongovernmental groups. In the sections to follow, I provide background of the policymaking process in Korea and then discuss the methods of sampling, interviews, supplementary research, and coding.

**The Policymaking Process in Korea**

The executive branch remains central to the Korean policymaking process (Hahn and Kim 1976; Park 1998). The president in Korea dominates the entire policy process as the key lawmaker and the chief administrator (Bark 2001; Ahn 2003). For the most part, however, the president participates in policymaking indirectly through the ruling party and executive ministries. For instance, evidence shows that policy agendas of the president’s party are directly incorporated into the guidelines of executive ministries soon after the new administration is put into place (Horiuchi and Lee 2008). It is the bureaucratic officials who are involved in virtually every activity of importance in the policy community, taking a much larger role than simply executing and implementing agreed policies (Kim and Woo 1976; Kil and Moon 2001; Mo 2001). The strength of the bureaucracy is exemplified in their involvement in both the lawmaking process (as bill proposers) as well as in the rulemaking process.

(Figure 2.1 about here)
Figure 2.1 summarizes the process of policymaking in Korea. As figure 2.1 shows in
detail, a bill proposal can take two distinct forms: individual legislative members can propose
bills with co-sponsorship of at least 10 other members, or bills can be proposed by executive
ministries.\(^1\) When proposing bills, executive ministries work in close consultation with the
governing party—(the party of the president), which typically wins a majority of seats in the
legislature in the general elections immediately following the presidential elections (Kwon
2005). In this regard, policy agendas of the ruling party and the majority party in the
legislature are reflected in the activities of executive ministries, suggesting agenda overlap in
the executive and legislative branches.

Additionally, as indicated on table 2.1, since the democratic transition in 1988 until
2000, more laws originated from executive ministries than legislative members, although
there is a clear reversal of that trend beginning in the 16\(^{th}\) National Assembly. Generally,
however, the evidence shows that executive ministries in Korea engage a great deal in the
lawmaking process.

(Table 2.1 about here)

\(^1\) The bill can be voted on during plenary, regular or special sessions. The plenary is the
highest decision-making body of the National Assembly, composed of the entire membership
of the National Assembly. Plenary sessions can last for a maximum of 45 days, during which
the National Assembly deliberates on agenda items. Regular sessions are held on September
1st every year and last no more than 100 days. Finally, special sessions can begin with the
request made by the President or more than a quarter of National Assembly members and can
last no more than 30 days.
Furthermore, it is important to note that a significant portion of policymaking occurs independently of the legislature through orders of the president, the prime minister, and executive ministries to fully facilitate the implementation of policies. As shown on figure 2.2, a comparison of laws and orders as a percentage of a sum of both indicates that the number of orders issued—president, prime minister and executive ministries combined—is generally much larger than laws.² Pempel (1974), referring to similar evidence in Japan, argued for the bureaucracy-dominant model of policymaking, where ministry bureaucrats are explicitly given a lot of general power. That is, orders, unlike bills, are “highly authoritative devices for overtly or covertly bypassing the more public policymaking forum (Pempel 1974, 654).” Similarly, a large amount of bureaucratic involvement in policymaking in Korea takes place 

² The fact that orders do not require legislative approval, however, does not mean that the rulemaking process is entirely exclusive to actors inside the executive branch. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires executive agencies to offer some form of public participation. According to the APA, for instance, ministries must announce proposed rules within the fixed period of notice and comment period. During this time, ministries must allow interested parties to comment on the proposed rules. The Korean APA differs from that of the US in that the APA in Korea entails a greater amount of coordination. For instance, Korean ministries must gather opinions by holding public hearings and conducting a regulatory impact analysis (such as cost–benefit assessment). After major differences and disagreements have been resolved among interested parties, the Regulatory Review Committee (RRC)—a twenty-member committee that includes the prime minister—reviews all regulations (see Baum 2007a; 2007b).
outside the boundaries of the National Assembly. Given such broad and frequent involvement of executive ministries in overall policymaking, capturing a representative set of policy issues discussed in the policy community requires mainly looking into the activities of executive ministries.

(Figure 2.2 about here)

By contrast, the National Assembly remained a weaker policymaking body throughout the history of the republic, particularly under successive authoritarian governments (Kihl 2005). In addition, weak party systems also hindered the development of the National Assembly as a strong policymaking body. Starting in the first republic under President Rhee, parties have often served as organizations to meet the electoral needs of political leaders in Korea (Kim 1998). This trend continued up until recently—political parties emerged to meet the funding needs of and serve as the popular support base for individual politicians. Finally, regionalism—stemming from geographically unequal economic growth between Jeonla (southwest) and Gyeongsang (southeast)—has been the main political cleavage in Korea, affecting voters’ electoral decisions and party agendas (Horiuchi and Lee 2008).

Despite the executive-centered and bureaucracy-dominant policymaking in Korea, it is important to note the growing significance of the National Assembly in the policymaking process. On the one hand, as table 1 indicates, the proportion of member sponsored bills relative to ministry proposed bills have grown over time. Similarly, political parties in Korea have become stronger over the years. For instance, evidence shows that political parties evolved to take diversifying social interests into account in the post-democratization period
(Heo and Stockton 2005). The establishment of ideology-based parties like the Democratic Labor Party in the year 2000, which has worked closely with civil society groups in leading political changes is a good example (S Kim 2004). Furthermore, the research on labor and social policies finds that partisan differences in Korea became salient after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Kang 2002).

We could infer from the growing lawmaking activities of legislative members, and increasing party ideologies which affect the policymaking process, that simply looking at the activities of the executive branch might fail to capture all policymaking activities in the political system, particularly the activities of opposition parties. Next, I describe the sampling procedure for my research—drawing a generalizable set of policy issues from the current policy community in Korea.

Overview of Sampling Procedures and Case Selection

In order to draw a representative set of issues from the unknown universe of policy issues in the policymaking community, I selected individuals from a broad sample of policymakers at all levels of government weighted by their degree of involvement in the process, and asked them to discuss the most recent policy issue they have been working on. This process allows me to identify a truly representative set of policy issues at all levels and at all stages of the policy process, including issues going through all institutions and their subunits, even those not fully active in the political agenda.

I drew 33 cases from executive ministries/majority party and 10 cases from opposition parties, constructing separate sampling frames for each. I am drawing my cases primarily from executive ministries, because bureaucratic officials are widely involved in all important activities in the Korean policymaking process, drafting laws, orders, and
regulations that govern society. Furthermore, I am treating executive ministries and the legislative majority as part of the same sampling frame because as previously noted, policy agendas of the majority party overlap with those of executive ministries. Nevertheless, it is important to sample issues from the opposition parties in the legislature, because the explosion in the lawmaking activities of the National Assembly members, and strengthening party systems suggest that focusing only on the policy activities of executive ministries would fail to note some important policy activities in the legislature.

The number of issues to be drawn (33 from executive ministries and the majority party combined, and 10 issues from opposition parties) roughly corresponds with the level of policymaking activities of the executive and legislative branches as shown on figure 2. Furthermore, my goal is to have representative sets of issues drawn from both policymaking institutions, so that a comparison could be made between the policy process of the two branches.

It is important to further add that though similar projects on policymaking relied on nongovernmental actors weighted by the frequency of their involvement in lobbying activities to draw a random sample of policy issues (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney 2008), I relied on government insiders to identify a random sample of policy issues for the case of Korea, because there is no good way to identify the universe of nongovernmental groups operating in the policy community or their frequency of involvement in policymaking. However, I implemented a strategy in my research to check whether important policy activities of nongovernmental groups are left out from my sample of issues because I rely only on government insiders to draw issues. I asked every nongovernmental group/actor I interviewed to talk about what other policy issue—other than the one we had spent time discussing—they have most recently worked on (see question 7 on Figure 2.3). The responses
I gathered show that the governmental agenda dominates the agenda of nongovernmental groups. The policy issues that groups were working on (that has to do with national level policy) already involved executive ministries or major political parties.\(^3\)

The specific method of sampling looks as follows. The Korean executive branch has fifteen ministries that have oversight over distinct policy areas. The organizational chart is almost identical for all ministries with a single minister at the top of the hierarchy, supported by vice ministers (which can be single or multiple) and deputy ministers (present in some ministries and not in others). Below these top level bureaucrats in every ministry lie bureaus and offices (approximately 10 in each ministry) with distinct jurisdictions. Each bureau or office is headed by a number of directors general, whose job is to oversee multiple divisions that have responsibility for distinct policy projects. Each ministry on average has approximately 60 divisions in total. I selected these policy divisions at the bottom of the hierarchy as the sampling units.

Taking into account that some ministries have more policymaking responsibilities than others, I drew 33 cases from 15 executive ministries weighted by their involvement in the policy process. The more active ministries are given greater weight so that the initial sample of issues is representative of the issues in the Korean policymaking community in a given period. Using the Official Gazette (Gwan-bo), I took the number of ministerial orders as an indicator of policymaking activities and weighted the sample by the number of ministerial orders coming from each ministry between March 2008 and February 2009. This process generated a table that shows the number of cases to be drawn from each ministry (see

\(^3\) Of the 33 nongovernmental groups interviewed, 29 groups (88%) listed an issue being part of the governmental agenda.
The largest share of cases were drawn from the Ministry of Land, Transportation and Maritime Affairs, and the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family (6 cases each). On the other hand, no cases were drawn from the Ministry of Unification.\(^4\)

(Table 2.2 about here)

After deciding how many cases to select from each ministry according to the weights, I searched for policy divisions most actively engaged in policymaking in each ministry, again using the number of ministerial orders as an indicator of policymaking activities. Policy divisions having purely administrative or oversight functions were excluded from selection. The next step involved moving from policy divisions to policymakers inside the division who could identify policy issues. To find out which bureaucrat to interview in the selected division, I browsed through each ministry’s website to learn about the personnel information of the division—the names of the bureaucrats, their ranks, contact numbers, and job descriptions. I tried to uniformly interview bureaucrats of the same rank across ministries and divisions to become issue identifiers. Typically, deputy directors were contacted for the initial interview.\(^5\) Sometimes I was referred to talk to a person of a lower (assistant deputy director)...

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\(^4\) According to the weights, two issues should be drawn from the Ministry of Defense and one issue from the Ministry of Justice. However, my personal contacts with the ministries confirmed that none of the issues debated in the ministry could be made public for security reasons.

\(^5\) Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family was an exception. I made contacts with deputy directors in 14 policy divisions, but none of the deputy directors were willing to interview.
directors) rank having direct authority in the ongoing policy issue in the division. In such instances, my issue identifiers became assistant deputy directors of the division. The average response rate was 51%. Because I treat executive ministries and the majority party as part of the same sampling frame, in instances where I had difficulties with setting up interviews with ministry bureaucrats due to a very low response rate (such as the Ministry of Health), I alternatively made an attempt to reach majority party members serving in the respective National Assembly committees (such as the Committee of Health).

On the other hand, the sampling frame for the legislators includes a total of 127 representatives from 5 opposition parties in the National Assembly. Similar to the sampling procedure in the executive ministries, selection is weighted toward parties holding larger share of seats. This process generates a table that reports the number of cases to be selected from 4 major opposition parties (see table 2.2). The next step involves deciding which member(s) to select from the opposition parties. I weighted each opposition party member, according to the number of bills proposed (as primary sponsor) by the members between May 2008 and April 2009. The number of bills sponsored was taken as an indicator of policymaking activities of each member. After selecting the members, interviews were scheduled with the members’ key legislative staff. The average response rate was 80%.

I was able to get access to the respondents using the following method. I wrote brief letters to the respondents explaining the purpose of my project. I repeated a similar

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For all the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Health, reasons of refusal were associated with confidentiality.

6 The response rate ranged from 0 to 100, depending on the ministry.

7 Ten unaffiliated members are excluded from selection.
introduction about the project when I followed up by telephone and requested the interview. If I could not reach the respondent after 3 phone calls, I regarded it as a refusal to participate. Typical reasons for refusal included working on an issue that cannot be made public, or being too busy.

**Interviews**

All interviews were done in-person in the interviewees’ offices.\(^8\) The interviews usually lasted approximately 45 minutes, sometimes more than an hour, rarely under a half hour. Interviews were conducted using open-ended questions. Such a method allowed the interviewees, who are knowledgeable in the details of the issue debate, to freely discuss the important aspects about the issue without having to follow a fixed set of questions and answers.\(^9\)

Figure 2.3 contains the wording of the questions. I always asked question 1 A (B or C), at the beginning of the interview as it appears in Figure 3. Generally, the answer to the question provided the kind of information I wanted to address later in the interview (questions 2 through 8). Therefore, I would present the other questions only when necessary, depending on the interviewees’ responses to the previous question.

(Figure 2.3 about here)

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\(^8\) Occasionally, there were exceptions. For instance, an interview with a local government bureaucrat was conducted over the phone.

The first question I asked in the interviews with issue identifiers was to discuss the most recent policy issue they have been working on.\textsuperscript{10} I would follow up by asking about the background of the issue debate, such as the history (when the government started paying attention to the issue or why the debate occurred in the first place) and the nature of the policy issue (the associated budget, the degree of policy change sought, and the number of people affected). Sometimes, the respondents would talk about a range of different activities that they had been working on “because the issue is worth an entire dissertation.” I tried to turn the conversation back to “the most recent issue,” even when my respondent showed preference in talking about another issue. Policy issues as defined by the respondents are included in this project. As table 2.3 shows, a total of 43 issues are included in the project—the largest number of issues came from the health policy area (a total of 8 issues), followed by government operations (6 issues).

\textit{(Table 2.3 about here)}

After hearing about the background of the issue debate, I then asked who else plays a major role in the issue debate, and what the actors are trying to accomplish. The answer to

\textsuperscript{10} It is possible that the interviewee refrained from sharing with me “the most recent” policy issue he/she has been working on, simply because the details of the issue is not public. In this regard, my sample of issues, though somewhat representative of the issue universe, only includes the public, rather than informal part of the policy process.
this question provided the list of “the major actors” in the issue debate.\footnote{One note needs to be made about the way policymakers in Korea describe “the actors that play an important role in the issue debate.” When asked to list the major actors in the debate, respondents often referred to general bodies (the policy division), or the position the actor holds (the deputy director in the division of environmental policy), rather than the names of specific individuals. With the general information, however, I could easily identify who in the organization is responsible for the issue without being informed specifically of the names of the individuals.} If the respondent did not give any list of actors, saying that “nobody is really playing a role,” I asked further first by saying, “was anyone in the administration or major political parties interested?” and then later adding, “what about organizations outside the government?” Often, these questions reminded the respondent about the groups or government insiders that contributed to the issue debate. I then conducted additional interviews with the other important actors in the issue debate, forming the snowball portion of the sampling procedure. Other major actors could be any type of actor, such as citizen groups, trade and professional associations, corporations, or policymakers in other executive agencies.\footnote{My issue identifiers, as government insiders, were sometimes not fully aware of all the groups actively working on the issue from outside the government (though they knew exactly when other executive ministries and agencies were involved), and sometimes they had a hard time recalling the exact names of groups that were involved at the earlier stages of the issue debate, if the issue had a history of a year or so. Therefore, after my initial interview with the issue identifier, I conducted searches about the issues online to verify the content as well as the list of actors important to the issue debate before scheduling secondary interviews.}
Two simple rules determined the selection of secondary interviews: if there were multiple sides advocating different outcomes on the same policy issue, I tried to interview major actors advocating each side,\textsuperscript{13} and I made an effort to interview at least one nongovernmental actor involved in the issue. The goal was to hear from both perspectives on the same issue, and to pay close attention to activities outside the government. Overall, I interviewed three actors on average for each issue debate. The secondary interviews were structured in the same way as the initial interview with the issue identifier, except for asking to discuss the most recent issue they have been working on. Instead, I asked the respondent to discuss the issue of specific interest, in which the respondent plays a major role. Figure 2.4 summarizes the specific types of actors that became my interview subjects.

(Figure 2.4 about here)

All the interviews were done in background. That is, all the interview participants remain anonymous throughout my research. I use the information collected through face-to-face interviews in this project without making public names of individuals who provided the information. This is particularly important for establishing trust between the researcher and

\textsuperscript{13} A high-ranking staff member inside the office of the president (Blue House) was mentioned as playing an important role in one of the issues. The office of the president remains so highly secluded from the public that I could not find the name and the contact information of the person for interview. Though I could not hear directly from the staff member in the president’s office, I tried to hear their perspective by interviewing another major actor involved on the same side.
the interviewees. Though the interviews were tape recorded at the initial stage of the project, I stopped using the recorder for the same reason. The respondents expressed that they would feel more comfortable without it, and that details they can share in the conversation would be limited if I recorded the interviews.

**Supplemental Research**

Although I was able to gather detailed information regarding the background of issue debate and actors involved most of the times from personal interviews, I relied on the following sources to supplement interviews, which often confirmed information I had assembled during interviews. I archived all relevant materials I could find about each issue available through the National Assembly database (likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/jsp/main.jsp), Online Gazette (gwanbo.korea.go.kr), official portal for government policy (korea.go.kr). Additionally, I searched for press releases and organizational statements posted on the websites of nongovernmental groups. Finally, I developed keywords to track news reports on the issues using the Korea Integrated News Database (www.kinds.or.kr), which includes news coverage of 10 national print news outlets. Occasionally, I was provided with an official document or a booklet that summarizes the issue debate during meetings with the respondents. I utilized all the relevant materials gathered through secondary data searches, which clarified not only the content of the issue debate, but also the actors and groups playing important roles. Different types of materials were helpful for issue case studies in distinct ways—typically, news stories illustrated overall background of issue debates, governmental websites provided technical details of policy issues, and nongovernmental groups’ statements clarified their perspectives on the issue and the names of other groups sharing those ideas.
Coding

The following section lists the variables of key interest in this project, and the various ways in which they were coded. Because I aim to compare the policymaking process across political systems, many of the variables and coding methods emerging from the Korean policymaking project were taken directly from two previous projects (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney 2008). This was particularly the case for the variables related to the major participants.¹⁴

I had two primary goals in mind while conducting personal interviews and issue case studies. The first was to get a good sense of the content of the issue debate at hand, and the second to gather a list of the major actors involved. Because these two goals were equally important, there wasn’t necessarily a required order, in which coding of variables related to issue characteristics came first, or the list of actors second. But coding of the latter (variables related to the major actors) usually took less time because the list of major actors was relatively straightforward in comparison to variables associated with issue characteristics.

**Policy Issue:** Policy issues are defined by my issue identifiers—as the most recent issue he/she has spent time on. What qualifies as a policy issue is however listed by the respondent.

**Venue:** The venue indicates whether the issue was deliberated in the executive ministries, or the National Assembly.

¹⁴ Variables associated with issue characteristics, on the other hand, didn’t match so closely across political systems. How the measurements vary across three systems is clearly illustrated on table 5.2.
Policy Domain: Policy domain refers to the substantive policy area the issue falls under. The complete Policy Agendas Topics Codebook can be found at http://www.policyagendas.org/codebooks/topicindex.html. The variable is coded into one (and only one) of the following categories: Macroeconomics (1), Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties (2), Health (3), Agriculture (4), Labor, Employment and Immigration (5), Education (6), Environment (7), Energy (8), Transportation (10), Law, Crime and Family Policy (12), Social Welfare (13), Community Development and Housing (14), Banking, Finance and Commerce (15), Defense (16), Space, Science, Technology and Communication (17), Foreign Trade (18), International Affairs and Foreign Aid (19), Government Operations (20), Public Lands and Water Management (21).

Additionally, I coded 3 distinct variables regarding major actors. During the interview, I asked who else plays a major role in the policy issue. The question “who plays a major role,” of course, does not lead to a straightforward answer since it depends on the respondent’s judgment of who does and does not play an important role. In this project, major actors are defined as those actively advocating a certain perspective on the issue, acknowledged by others as being important. The major actors, then, are the players that are “agreed” to play an important role in the issue by the issue identifier as well as others whom I spoke with in my subsequent interviews (who are also actively engaged in the issue debate themselves). This was usually a much narrower set of actors compared to the list assembled from reading the news reports on the issue, or the list of all the actors that participated in the task forces or official meetings.
The answer to this question sometimes led to neutral decision makers inside the government. If the governmental body takes a purely neutral stance, then they are not included as a major participant. For instance, the Trade Commission, evaluating whether there was an unfair trade deal that hurt domestic industry, is an example of a neutral participant in the case of the imposition of an anti-dumping tax. But most of the time, governmental bodies are not neutral actors, and take a clear stance in the issue debate. Often, different government ministries, or different divisions within the same ministry take opposing sides on the same issue.

On other instances, my issue identifier spoke of a newly implemented regulation, which had passed the deliberation stages, and therefore did not involve much attention or activities from outside the government at the time of the interview. Even so, my issue identifiers clearly indicated to me the actors who were engaged in the issue debate during the initial stages of the discussion. I was able to schedule interviews with these leading actors and confirm the activities that had been undertaken.

Generally, the actors playing an important role in the issue debate remain stable over time. Sometimes, however, an issue interests a new prominent actor (such as the newly appointed prime minister), re-emerging as the focus of governmental and media attention after a period of inaction. Because my case studies continued for a full calendar year, when new participants emerged as playing an important role in the debate, I added them to the list of major actors.

The Number of Major Actors: The variable notes the total number of major participants in the issue debate.
The Name of Major Actors: The variable notes the names of actors (along with their rank and affiliation) listed as major actors in the issue debate.

The Type of Major Actor: For all major actors inside the government, I noted whether the actors represented the majority party, opposition parties, executive departments or agencies, the office of the President, the office of the Prime Minister, local governments, or other governmental actors. Similarly, for the actors outside the government, I noted whether they represented citizen groups, trade groups, business corporations, professional associations, issue coalitions, unions, research institutes, or other nongovernmental actors.

Sides: A side includes all actors inside and outside the government that agree on the same policy outcome. A side can include actors inside and outside of government working together to promote certain policy goals.

Conflict: Depending on the disagreement that exists among different sides to the same issue, the variable is coded one perspective (when there is no conflict at all and one viewpoint dominates the discussion), multiple but not opposing (when there are various perspectives but no viewpoints that directly contradict each other), and opposing perspectives (when multiple viewpoints are in opposition to one another).

Partisan Conflict: Depending on the disagreement among the major political parties, the variable is coded as nonpartisan (when there was little or no sign of partisan disagreement), somewhat partisan (when disagreement is subtle, issue doesn’t strike at the heart of the ideological debate, there is disagreement among actors as to whether the issue is partisan),
and strongly partisan (when most majority party members are on one side of the issue while most of the opposition party members advocate a different side).

**Salience:** The variable notes how much public attention the issue receives. For each issue, I developed a set of keywords and searched for the number of newspaper stories reporting the issue using Korea Integrated News Database (www.kinds.or.kr). The time frame applied in the searches is between March 2008 (start of the new administration) and May 2010 (end of the dissertation fieldwork). The variable is coded into one of the following categories: 0 stories; 1-10 stories; 11-100 stories; 101 or more stories.

**Scope:** Scope broadly refers to the size of the issue. The variable is a sum of three indicators: the group or the number of people affected (none or only few directly involved, groups of people affiliated with single or multiple business sectors, or the entire political system), degree of policy change (no change, marginal change, important change), and the proportion of the budget the issue affects (none, marginal portion of the annual budget, substantial portion of the annual budget).

**Influence:** Whether or not one was able to influence the policy outcome can be assessed by looking at how much an actor or a group of actors succeed in getting what they want. The variable notes whether each side—a group of actors supporting the same policy outcome—attained none of their objective, attained some of their objective, or fully attained their goal.

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15 The variable influence only applies to the 7 issues drawn from the Ministry of Strategy and Finance and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy.
Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the data collection process for the Korean policymaking project. I first began by discussing the procedure for sampling policy issues, taking into consideration the policymaking activities of different branches of government, as well as their subunits. Next, I presented two distinct research methods employed in the project—personal interviews with the major actors involved in policy debates, and case studies using publicly available records. Finally, I listed the variables and the various ways in which they were coded.

In the chapters to follow, I use the data set in addressing key research questions emerging from research on Korean politics (closely relevant to examining the accuracy of the East Asian model), and comparative policymaking generally. Specifically, chapter 3 analyzes the role of the state and society in contemporary policymaking in Korea, and chapter 4 addresses the question of policy influence and the ways in which groups attain policy success. Finally, chapter 5 situates Korean policymaking in a comparative context with the US and EU—examining to what extent participation patterns found in the Korean policy process differ from other political systems.
Figure 2.1: Policymaking Process for Laws and Orders (Ordinances)

1. Bill Proposal (can be proposed either by the government or the lawmakers).

   **When proposed by the government**
   A. Drafting of the bill by the ministry
   B. Consult with other ministries concerned
   C. The majority party in the legislature holds Party-Government Committee meetings (not for all laws, but for major ones)
   D. Review by the Ministry of Legislations (MOLEG)
   E. Deliberation by the State Council (cabinet)
   F. Approval by the President

   **When proposed by members of the National Assembly**
   A. A bill is proposed by a member (with co-sponsorship by at least 10 other members)

2. The bill is submitted to the National Assembly speaker. The bill proposals are publicly notified in the Official Gazette (gwanbo) or Announcements in the National Assembly (gukhoibo).

3. Special member (*junnum oiwon*) reviews the bill for technical details.

4. The speaker then refers it to the standing committee.  

5. Public hearings are held on the bill (if the proposal regards enactment of a law).

6. The committee votes on the bill.

7. Legislative and Judiciary Committee reviews the legality and wording of the bill before sending it to a floor-vote.

8. The bill is voted on during legislative sessions. Bills are passed into law only with the attendance of a majority of all the members on the register and by a concurrent majority vote of the members present.

9. The bill is sent back to the Ministry of Legislations (MOLEG).

10. Ministry of Legislations (MOLEG) promulgates the law.  

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16 There are 17 standing committees in the National Assembly. See National Assembly (www.assembly.go.kr) for further details.

17 MOLEG performs another important function the lawmaking process. MOLEG establishes and executes the Government Legislation Planning System for the effective processing of annual government legislation as well as to summarize all the legislations of various ministries. The Government Legislation Planning System controls the order of priority,
Source: Chart comes from Ministry of Legislations (www.moleg.go.kr).
Note: Orders (ordinances) of the president, prime minister, and ministries do not go through the National Assembly (Stage 2-8). Instead, after approval by the President, orders are promulgated by the Ministry of Legislation.

opportunity and contents of government legislative bills across the entire government spectrum.
Table 2.1: Bills Passed in the National Assembly Originating from the Legislative and Executive Branches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Session</th>
<th>Legislative Members</th>
<th>Executive Ministries</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13th (1988-1992)</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th (1992-1996)</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th (1996-2000)</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th (2000-2004)</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th (2004-2008)</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th (2008-2010)</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea National Assembly Online Information System on Legislative Bill Statistics. Note: Entries are numbers of bills passed into law in the National Assembly originally proposed by legislative members and executive ministries, two bodies that have the authority to introduce bills according to the Constitution. Ratio indicates the proportion of bills passed into law originating from legislative members relative to executive ministries. For the 18th National Assembly, numbers indicate bills passed into law from April 2008 until December 2010.
Figure 2.2: Orders (Ordinances) and Laws as a Percentage of Sum Total of Both

Note: Orders include orders of the president, prime minister, and ministries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry/Majority Party</th>
<th>Ministerial Orders</th>
<th></th>
<th>Issues Selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Transportation and Maritime Affairs</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, Welfare and Family Affairs</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration and Security</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Economy</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy and Finance</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Science and Technology</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, Sports and Tourism</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Equality</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposition Members of the National Assembly</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th></th>
<th>Issues Selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Forward Party (LFP)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Park Alliance (PPA)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Labor Party (DLP)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Korea Party (RKP)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Entries for the number of ministerial orders are recorded based on the Official Gazette (Gwanbo) between March 2008 and February 2009.

Note: For case selection in the executive ministries, the number of ministerial orders allows each ministry to be weighted by the level of policy activity. The number of cases selected from each ministry takes these weights roughly into account. For selection of cases in the legislature, opposition parties are weighed by the proportion of seats they hold in the National Assembly. The number of members selected from each party takes these weights into account.
Figure 2.3

Interview Questions

1A. (For the bureaucrats) Could you take the most recent policy issue you spent time on and describe the background of the issue? Any policy issue is fine other than simple implementation matters or things not discussed outside this division. (When necessary, elaborate by saying that this issue does not have to be associated with any specific regulations or laws).

(If the interviewee talks about an issue that is already mentioned by another government insider)

Could you tell me the next most recent work you have spent time on?

- Probe about the background of the issue
--Is there a problem to be solved or solutions to be considered?
--Was there an event that had occurred previously that motivated people to pay attention to this issue?
--When did the government become interested in this issue?

1B. (For the legislative staff of National Assembly members) Could you take the most recent policy issue you spent time on and describe the background of the policy issue?

(The rest is identical to 1A)

1C. (For the subsequent interviews) As I mentioned on the phone, I would like to talk about your involvement in the issue. Could you describe the background of this issue?

(The rest is identical to 1A)

2. Who else is involved in this issue? Could you tell me the names of the people or the organizations that are major players in this issue both inside and outside the government?

- Probe about the activities of the actors
- Probe about what is trying to be accomplished by the actors
3. Recap the actors involved and what they are trying to accomplish. Aside from the actors you have mentioned so far, was there anyone else involved?

- Probe about the actors and activities outside the government

4. Among the people that you listed as participants on this issue, would you say that they were in agreement over what needed to be done, or were there great conflicts?

- Probe what is the nature of conflict or consensus
  --Is there an agreement/disagreement about the very existence of a problem?
  --Is there an agreement/disagreement about the best solution to the problem?
  --Is there an agreement/disagreement over implementation?

5. How would you characterize the type of conflict that exists among the participants in relation to political parties? Is there disagreement among the major political parties?

- Probe about the approaches and involvement of the political parties

6. How would you describe this issue in terms of the consequences it brings to national policy?

- Probe about the estimated budget, the people affected, and the change in comparison to the status-quo policy

7. [Only asked to nongovernmental interviewees] Could you tell me about another issue you spent time on, other than the one we have spent time talking about and describe the background of the issue? This issue does not have to be associated with a particular regulation or a law, and it need not be receiving any attention in the media. Also, who else is involved in this issue?

8. Are there copies of documents released on this issue? Is that something that’s available? Could I get a copy?
Table 2.3: Policy Issues by Topic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Topic</th>
<th>Number of Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health (11)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Operations (10)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (1)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment (8)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Trade (9)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation (19)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, Finance and Domestic Commerce (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights (3)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (6)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy (7)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development and Housing (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor, Immigration and Employment (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomics and Taxation (15)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Lands and Water Management (16)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science, Technology and Communication (17)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare (18)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses are policy topic codes according to the codebook of Policy Agendas Project.
Figure 2.4: Interviews by Actor Type

Note: Total number of interviews equals 107. This number includes initial interviews with 20 bureaucrats, 13 majority party members’ staff, and 10 opposition party members’ staff.
Chapter 3

The Role of Civil Society in Relation to the State in Policymaking: The Case of Korea

This chapter explores the role of civil society in contemporary policymaking where the state has traditionally been the dominant force in the policy process using the case of Korea. The East Asian model suggests an exceptionally prominent role played by government insiders in policymaking (Johnson 1987; Evans 1995; Kohli 2004). By contrast, outside groups are generally less visible in the policy process (Schwartz and Pharr 2003; Pekkanen 2006). More recent studies, however, find increasing evidence of diverse sets of relevant actors in countries where the state has traditionally led the policymaking process, either as an outcome of democratic transition (in Korea, see Lee and Arrington 2008), or simply due to maturing of civil society (in Japan, see Tsujinaka and Pekkanen 2007).

After all, nongovernmental groups engaged in the policymaking process to have greater voice is not surprising, and is in fact what one would expect to happen in a democratic system—public preferences aggregated through organizations and political parties, producing policy outputs accordingly (Dahl 1956; 1989). It is for this reason that the growth of civil society is critical to democratic consolidation and governance (Diamond 1994). In line with this view, studies of civil society in Korea note that group mobilization in the areas of social and political reforms have led to more accountable politics (S Kim 2004).

Yet, two things remain unclear in concluding about the role of civil society in relation to the state in political systems where actors inside the government have been central to policy formulation and implementation (i.e., countries where the East Asian model of policymaking has frequently been applied). First, does the rising civil society suggest that the
power of the state in policymaking has declined? Second, what is the nature of the non-state public sphere? That is, what kind of interests operate within civil society, and how do they interact with the state in the contemporary policy process? Given the unique way in which civil society appeared and expanded in non-Western societies (i.e., negotiating its space with the state), does civil society mainly consist of groups advocating public interests at large, and have confrontational relations with the state in policymaking? In this chapter, I examine these questions using the case of Korea. Korea provides an ideal case to examine the relevance of the East Asian model in explaining current day policymaking, with a long history of state dominance (Amsden 1989; Mo and Moon 1999; Woo-Cumings 1999; Tiberghien 2007), yet undergoing dramatic changes in the state-society relations since democratic transition in 1987 (Alagappa 2004; S Kim 2004; Armstrong 2002).

I analyze participation of government and groups in overall policymaking in Korea by considering their involvement in a broad range of 43 policy issues. I find that the Korean policy community is diverse in terms of the issues debated and interests mobilized. Though predominance of state actors is noticeable across a wide range of issues, policy discussions are not at all exclusive to the state—a typical issue debate engage the participation of diverse sets of actors inside and outside the government.

Additionally, I analyze the interaction between the state and society in contemporary policymaking. Looking into 7 most prominent groups and their interactions with governmental actors across 9 issues, I notice a particular type of alliance and conflict structure emerging in the Korean policymaking process. That is, I find that civil society groups are in alliance with opposition parties and other public interest groups, and in adversarial relationships with the majority party members and the state bureaucracy. I argue
that such bi-polar conflict structure can be explained by oppositional legacies of Korean civil society.

Although I only analyze the case of Korea, the findings of this chapter have implications for understanding contemporary policymaking in political systems where the East Asian model has previously been applied. With the expansion of civil society recently taking place in these countries, participation in policymaking is likely to be broad, involving numerous nongovernmental interests. Similarly, how civil society develops in relation to the state (i.e., confrontational) greatly shapes the role of groups in overall policymaking by determining the pattern of alliance and opposition structures between groups and institutional actors.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I present questions regarding the role of state and society from past research on Korean policymaking, and briefly describe the ways in which I examine these questions. Next, I show patterns of participation found across 43 issues, demonstrating wide involvement of nongovernmental groups in policymaking. Additionally, I examine issue debates that involve the most prominent civil society groups in Korea, and show that confrontational legacies have had a long lasting effect on fostering alliance and opposition structures between civil society and the state. Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of my findings on comparative policymaking studies.

The East Asia model and the rise of civil society

Civil society is occupied by associations (i.e., economic actors such as employer associations and labor unions) and by a “public sphere” of institutions that encourage debate among private persons on matters of common concern (Habermas 1989). In this sense, the expansion of civil society is thought to positively contribute to democratic governance by assisting
groups independent of the state to aggregate policy demands—vibrant associational life enhances accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and legitimacy within a political system (Diamond 1994).

Despite growing research on Korean civil society, two questions remain unanswered. First, does an expanding civil society suggest that participation in the policy process is no longer restricted to state actors (thus, making the East Asian model no longer relevant)? Drawing conclusions about the roles of groups in relation to government insiders in Korea is difficult because research either focuses on the state (and partly business groups) or NGOs in policymaking. Second, what kinds of interests operate in the sphere of civil society? Finally, how does the unique context in which civil society appears affect groups’ interactions with the state in policymaking? That is, studies on Korean civil society often focus on a few public interest groups, analyzing how groups challenge the state in directing major social changes. These studies, however, provide a limited view of the civil society sector, as well as their activities in contemporary policymaking. In the next section, I elaborate on the two research questions.

The major actors in the Korean policymaking process

Central to the idea of the East Asian model of policymaking is a narrow set of participants found in the policy process. For instance, scholars writing on the policymaking process in East Asia—Korea, Japan and Taiwan—have repeatedly asked who plays important roles in the policymaking process (Johnson 1987; Clark and Chan 1994), noting the dominance of state actors. Specifically speaking of the Korean case, studies on economic policymaking stress the centrality of the president and the economic bureaucracy in the rapid industrialization of Korea’s economy (Johnson 1982; 1987; Amsden 1989; Haggard 1990;
Evans 1995; Woo-Cummings 1999; Kohli 2004). That is, policies of economic growth were made possible to a large extent by the impermeability of bureaucracy from outside interests (Evans 1995). The major findings of earlier research on development are generally reaffirmed in the later studies of economic reform in the face of a series of currency and financial crises in the 1990s—discussions of policy issues were limited and centralized to elite bureaucrats, the president, and a few large business groups (Mo and Moon 1999; Tiberghien 2007).

Though studies of policymaking mostly focused on actors inside the government, recent studies increasingly pay attention to the rise of civil society (Alagappa 2004; S Kim 2004). Korean civil society started gaining strength protesting against the authoritarian government during democratic transition in 1987, and since then has vigorously challenged the state in the policy processes in different areas (Lim and Tang 2002; Lee and Chin 2007; Shin 2003). The proliferation of numerous citizens groups in current day Korea, such as People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) is evidence of the growing influence of civil society in public policymaking. Generally, studies of Korean civil society argue that nongovernmental groups are significant players in today’s policy process, challenging the major arguments of economic policymaking research—that state actors along with powerful corporate interests dominate in Korean policymaking (Amsden 1989). However, assessing the role of civil society in overall policymaking is difficult for two reasons. First, the nongovernmental sector (or civil society) is often defined too narrowly, mostly focusing on a particular subset of nongovernmental groups seeking a collective good—a few prominent public interest groups at the center of citizen movements (see Lim and Tang 2007; Lee and Arrington 2008; Moon 2010; S Kim 2004), ignoring other important nongovernmental players in the policy community (Weller 2005). Thus, the question remains whether the policy activities of public
interest groups fully represent the entire civil society in Korea (Koo 2002). This narrow focus contrasts with the widely accepted definition of civil society, which includes all kinds of associations operating in the public sphere (Habermas 1989; also see Schwartz and Pharr 2003).\(^\text{18}\) Additionally, studies rarely discuss whether a rising civil society suggests a declining role of the state.

In addition to the research on civil society, legislative studies also suggest that the Korean policy process is no longer dominated by a narrow set of government insiders, and that participation within government has diversified. For instance, a number of studies point to the increasing roles of legislative members in policymaking (Kim and Woo 1976; Ahn 2003), and the proportion of bills coming from legislative members has increased dramatically in the past decade (see table 2 in chapter 2).\(^\text{19}\) Furthermore, the Administrative Procedure Act enacted in the 1990s allows interested parties to present their views (Baum

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\(^\text{18}\) A few studies on Japanese civil society are exceptional to this general trend. In their studies of civil society, Tsujinaka and Pekkanen (2007) and Pekkanen (2006) looked at the population of civil society by noting the number and types of active groups. Following this view, my study assesses overall participation in the policymaking process. However, the second half of the chapter specifically focuses on seven widely known civil society groups in Korea. While recognizing that the entire civil society sector is much wider than a few prominent groups, I narrowly focus on a few groups for the purpose of analyzing the interactions these groups have with government insiders at the issue level.

\(^\text{19}\) For recent statistics on the proportion of bills coming from legislative members versus the state bureaucracy, see Korea National Assembly Online Information System on Legislative Bill Statistics (http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/jsp/main.jsp).
2007), which speaks to the weakening of bureaucratic power in the Korean policymaking process. Is the East Asian model of policymaking no longer relevant in today’s policymaking in Korea?

Unfortunately, putting all the research into context—generalizing about the role of state and society in overall policymaking—is difficult, because most studies have a narrow research focus. In order to generalize about the role of government insiders and outside groups in overall policymaking, I argue that we must analyze participation across a wide array of issues, because it is not simply the types of interests in overall policymaking that deserves attention but the frequency at which involvement occurs.

Some of key expectations regarding participation in contemporary policymaking include the following. Scholars of the East Asian model of policymaking state that participation of bureaucratic ministries and the president is frequent in the Korean policy community. Additionally, growing research on legislative members suggests that elected members have become active in the policymaking process since democratic transition. According to these groups of research, we expect the participation of governmental actors—executive branch actors and elected members of the National Assembly—to be significant in the Korean policy process.

Although past research generally provides relatively little information as to the types of nongovernmental groups participating in the policy community, research on economic policymaking demonstrates the strength of large conglomerate corporations. On the other hand, most civil society studies focus on a particular type of group—public interest groups. Generally, I expect to find frequent participation of nongovernmental groups in today’s policymaking, and their involvement to be significant even in relation to state actors.

Furthermore, considering findings of previous groups of research on business corporations
and public interest groups, the nongovernmental sector is likely to consist of a wide range of economic as well as noneconomic interests.

Legacies of oppositional civil society in contemporary policymaking

Civil society research in emerging democracies argues that the expansion of the public sphere generates political change, which is defined as a movement towards a more open and participatory political system (Alagappa 2004, 9). Given such context, research on Korean civil society has naturally paid attention to civil society groups that have been the most visible and successful in demanding greater government accountability, including changes like economic reform (Lee and Arrington 2008), and monitoring inspection and hearings of the National Assembly (S Kim 2004). Overall, these studies infer that such dynamic relationships between civil society groups and the state contribute to producing policy outcomes in line with public preferences.

Previous studies, however, have rarely examined the interaction of prominent civil society groups with government insiders in specific policy debates. Rather, studies discuss state and civil society relations in general terms. For instance, studies note that the space of civil society was restricted, and its relations with the Korean state confrontational in the stages leading to democratic transition (S Kim 2000). However, state-society interaction underwent transformation, “from outright contestation, to issue based cooperation and policy-oriented coordination in the post-democratization period (S Kim 2004, 140).” Yet, existing studies of civil society do not pay attention to the forces within the state, typically assuming that the state responds to the demands of outside pressures (i.e., chaebol reforms, blacklist movement). That is, studies typically assume that civil society and the state stand in opposition to one another prior to democratization when the sphere of civil society remain
narrow, but develop cooperative relations as civil society expands quickly and negotiates its own space relative to the state in new democracies. This simplistic view of government-society relations in policymaking, however, falls short of providing in-depth understanding of how groups operating in the public sphere work with governmental actors to have greater voice in the policy process.

In a democratic system, both political parties and organizations (i.e., interest groups) strive to produce policy outcomes that reflect public demands (Burstein and Linton 2002). Given how policies are formulated in democratic systems, groups outside the government attempt to influence the policy process by developing allies with institutional actors. It is in this context that typical analysis of interest groups in policymaking pays attention to which actors inside the government outside groups interact with (Lowry 2007). That is, to understand the role of civil society in overall policymaking, we must analyze how groups interact with the state.

I argue that just as the state can shape the public sphere (Pekkanen 2006; S Kim 2000), the oppositional history of civil society affects the ways in which civil society groups interact with the state. For instance, ties between civil society and the state are strengthened by the fact that political parties have largely remained weak throughout Korean politics, undergoing formation, division and reorganization based on regional cleavages (Kihl 2005). Civil society groups that emerged in the process of democratic transition in the late 1980s have filled this institutional vacuum by providing alternative channels for interest aggregation (E Kim 2009). Previous studies on the growth of civil society in emerging democracies rarely pay attention to this fact, because studies typically consider civil society groups as essentially non-political entities.
I expect to find prominent public interest groups in Korea to engage in clear alliance and opposition structures given the unique context in which the groups originally appeared—confrontational legacies of civil society during the process of democratization. Thus, I expect these groups to advocate policy perspectives in line with left leaning political parties. Such an alliance structure may also explain why major civil society groups are viewed as too political by the public (E Kim 2009), despite an original commitment to remain politically neutral (Moon 2010).

To discuss to what extent public perceptions of civil society have changed, become less trusted than other political institutions, and how this affects civil society’s positive contribution to democratic governance, is beyond the scope of this chapter (see E Kim 2009 for further discussions on this topic). However, the argument highlighted here—the existence of an alliance and opposition structure between civil society groups and political parties—clearly explains why groups are viewed as being too close to the state by the public, and also how politically unbalanced the link between civil society and the state is in the Korean policy process. As democracy matures, NGOs will increasingly play an important role in emerging democracies, and the ties between the state and society will also become tighter as time passes. In this regard, civil society’s unequal relations with political parties raise some concerns in civil society’s role as aggregators of public interest.

**Data and methods**

Details of data collection methods appear in chapter 2. This chapter lays out the major findings regarding participation across 43 issues analyzed in the project (see table 3.1 for the list of issues studied). That is, I first illustrate the participation patterns found in the overall policymaking process in Korea across 43 issues. The goal is to get an overview of
participation (i.e., the relative dominance of the state and society generally, and specifically which types of actors are visible) in the Korean policy community. Additionally, I present participation occurring at the issue level—how many issues involve which type of actor—to see how much the aggregate findings find support at the issue level.

(Table 3.1 about here)

Next, I focus my attention to the nine issue debates (from a total of 43 issues) that involved the seven most well-known civil society groups. I relied on Kim (2009)’s study, which examined NGO-government relations in contemporary Korean politics, to identify a list of prominent civil society groups. The six groups included in Kim’s study are the following: People’s Solidarity of Participatory Democracy (PSPD), Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), Korea Federation of Teachers Association (KFTA), Korean Teachers & Education Workers Union (KTEWU), Korean Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU), and Lawyers for Democratic Society (LDS). I added Korea Federation of Environmental Movement (KFEM), an environmental group consistently proven to lead numerous policy changes by several scholars of the Korean civil society, to the original list of six civil society groups (Lee and Arrington 2008; S Kim 2004; S Kim 2000).

A number of studies on Korean civil society agree that civil society groups quickly gained strength in the process of democratization, playing significant roles in fostering social and political changes. However, studies generally find that the involvement of groups was limited to issues of political and social reforms. Thus, I look into the specific issue debates involving the seven major civil society groups to examine whether the involvement of groups is indeed narrowly restricted to a few issues.
Furthermore, I observe interactions between the seven prominent groups with state actors across nine issues to fully assess the dynamic interactions between groups and state in the overall Korean policymaking process. Research on Korean civil society assumes that there is issue and policy based competition and cooperation between state and society (S Kim 2004; E Kim 2009), although studies rarely discuss how groups work with state actors to influence policymaking. Looking at issue debates involving seven prominent civil society groups, I find a clear cooperation and conflict structure between groups and state actors. In the following section I present the major findings in turn.

The role of state and society in the Korean policy process

In this section, I give an overview of participation found in today’s policymaking process in Korea. On the one hand, a strong presence of the state is noticeable. In particular, bureaucrats play a dominant role in the policymaking process. However, participants found in the Korean policy community are heterogeneous, involving various kinds of government insiders and outside actors. The evidence suggests that focusing only on a few prominent civil society groups to study the role of civil society in policymaking can provide a biased view—the population of civil society is much broader than typically assumed in the research.

Additionally, the involvement of most well-known civil society groups in Korea is not limited to a few issues, or issues related to social and political reforms. However, the prominent groups engage in a particular kind of alliance structure with government insiders. The major civil society groups work only with parties leaning to the left and maintain adversarial relationships with other types of governmental and nongovernmental actors. In the Korean context, such a factionalized group structure can be explained by the origins of civil society. Emerging as an arena of contestation, Korean civil society has come to develop
a unique character as oppositional to the state, and sometimes even an alternative aggregator of interests to liberal political parties.

**Overall participation in policymaking**

A total of 457 actors were found across 43 policy issues analyzed. This indicates an average of 10 participants per issue. This number suggests an important fact about the current day policy process in Korea—participation is not narrowly restricted. Instead a wide array of interests get involved in the policymaking process to have their voices heard. Next, I further discuss whose interests are represented in the Korean policy community.

Participation of government insiders comprised 64% of total participation. By contrast, participation of nongovernmental actors in the policymaking process occurred less in proportion—36% of the times. On the one hand, this shows that the state no longer dominates the entire policy process, because diverse voices are represented in the policymaking process. In terms of the sheer number of voices represented, then, the East Asian model is no longer an adequate description of the policymaking process in Korea.

Who among government insiders and outside interests participate in the policy process? As noted on table 3.2, some of the major participants inside the government include actors in the executive ministry or agency—participation observed 104 times (23% of total participation) across 43 issues. This number, by far, is a clear indicator of bureaucratic dominance in the Korean policy process. More so than any other actor inside and outside the government, bureaucrats frequently get involved in policy debates. Also note that these numbers do not actually take into account the involvement of bureaucrats when they perform purely neutral functions. Though the policy process may not be exclusive to state actors, the
predominance of the bureaucracy holds true in the contemporary policymaking process in Korea.

(Table 3.2 about here)

On the other hand, opposition party members all together were found 75 times (16 %), whereas majority party members were found 51 times (11 %). The results are surprising given that the majority party holds more seats in the legislature than all of the opposition members combined in the current National Assembly (153 to 146). Yet, opposition party members are more visible as individual policy advocates. Additionally, the offices of the president and the prime minister as well as non-national governments were observed less frequently (5% and 6% respectively). To summarize, participation of executive ministries in policymaking is observed most frequently above any other type of actor as the research on Korea’s rapid industrialization and economic reform argues. At the same time, however, my data finds some evidence that the legislative members appear rather frequently in the policy process.

Additionally, nongovernmental groups generally play an important role in overall policymaking in today’s policy community in Korea. Whereas the research on economic policymaking in Korea stated that business corporations are the key players in policymaking, civil society scholars argued differently, finding public interest groups as important players. Surprisingly, neither group of studies seems to have accurately understood the Korean

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20 This number is the total number of seats held by the majority and opposition parties in the 18th National Assembly immediately after the 2008 general elections.
nongovernmental sector. Participation of trade groups and business corporations was observed 9% of the time. Similarly, involvement of citizen groups (also referred to as public interest groups throughout this chapter) occurred 9% of the time. Also, my data shows that issue coalitions (a specific type of group considered in the project) appear quite frequently in the Korean policymaking process. A total of 13 issue coalitions (3% of total participation) were noticeable across 43 issues studied. In truth, the nongovernmental sector includes not only a few business corporations or public interest groups, but rather mixed sets of actors and groups, including trade groups, issue coalitions, unions, and think tanks.

Next, I turn to the number of issues with the involvement of different types of actors in table 3.3. Participation patterns found in table 3.2 hold true in table 3.3. An executive ministry or agency played major roles in 42 out of 43 issues. Majority party members were involved in 23, and opposition party members in 24 issues. The offices of the president and the prime minister were involved in 14 issues. Among nongovernmental groups, citizen groups showed the widest involvement (involved in 20 issues), whereas participation of trade groups followed closely (observed in 17 issues), along with business corporations (10 issues).

Just as the predominance of governmental actors in the policymaking process seems like a pattern repeated in table 3.3, frequent participation of nongovernmental groups is also noticeable. The findings portrayed in tables 3.2. and 3.3. suggest that noneconomic interests, such as public interest groups, are as actively engaged in the policy process as economic interests. Whether business interests or public interest groups are more visible in policymaking, however, seems difficult to say. Public interest groups’ greater visibility in policy issue debates could result from citizen groups adopting more salient policy advocacy tactics and economic interest groups preferring to influence policy outcomes through less public means.
Overall, two major findings were presented in this section. First, nongovernmental actors are involved frequently in the contemporary policymaking process in Korea accounting for approximately 36% of participation. Second, my data shows that the nongovernmental sector is diverse including a mix of economic-based interests, as well as public interest groups aiming for broader social changes. Although public interest groups seem to frequently participate in overall policymaking, they do not represent civil society entirely. In sum, strong civil society actively engaged in policymaking is indeed observed in my data set, but the sphere of civil society is much broader than previously researched.

In the following section, I further investigate state-civil society relations in the contemporary policymaking process. Unlike the previous section, which provided a macro level overview of participation in policymaking, I now focus on the seven most prominent civil society groups. I look into detail the issues that the prominent groups participated in, and their interactions with state actors. Civil society scholars in Korea argue that groups have led significant policy changes, though restricted to areas of political and social reforms. Contrary to what is argued, however, my data shows that participation is not at all limited to issues of reform but spread across various policy areas. Common to the issue debates, however, are the unique alliance and opposition structures between groups and governmental actors. In sum, such an interaction pattern prevents civil society from drawing broader policy coalitions with politically conservative state actors.

_Alliance and opposition structure: legacies of oppositional civil society_
Research on Korean civil society notes that civil society groups’ policy activities are concentrated to issues of social and political reforms. In the following section, I look at the participation of the most prominent public interest groups in the policy process and demonstrate that this belief is untrue.

(Table 3.4 about here)

Table 3.4 lists names of seven key civil society groups in the Korean policymaking community. As table 3.4 shows, PSPD was involved in three, and CCEJ in two of the issues out of the 43 issues I studied. This is a surprisingly common participation, given the way in which issues were selected—from government insiders working on the issue rather than NGO representatives. Furthermore, the issues these groups participated in were not at all restricted to issues of social and political reforms. In sum, a quick look at the table shows that the roles of major civil society groups are quite significant in the overall Korean policymaking process.

The research design adopted here also allows me to systematically assess the relationship between civil society groups with other actors at the level of policy issues. How do confrontational legacies of civil society in Korea shape their interactions with government insiders? Table 3.6 summarizes the structure of conflict across 9 issues. A total of 110 participants—56 appearing as allies of civil society groups and 54 as opponents—were found.

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21 Three issues included on the table came from the bureaucrats as issue identifiers, three from the majority party and two from opposition party members. See chapter 2 for details of sampling procedure.
Whereas the number of allies and opponents do not vary much, the type of actors civil society groups stand in alliance with or in opposition to varies dramatically. Overall, a specific kind of conflict structure was found in issues that entailed involvement of seven prominent civil society groups. In the current right-leaning Grand National Party (GNP) led administration and National Assembly, executive ministries, majority party members and business interests are much more likely to be opponents of seven prominent civil society groups in any given issue debate. By contrast, the same groups are likely to find opposition party members, and other citizen groups as their key allies. These findings suggest that these prominent civil society groups are closely tied to one part of the political sphere—political parties oppositional to the past authoritarian regimes and the current conservative administration. This makes it difficult for groups to draw broad coalitions with state actors in general, especially when both the legislature and the executive are dominated by the GNP.

Additionally, clear coalition pattern between civil society groups and opposition party members illustrate the reasons why civil society is increasingly understood as political by the public—the major civil society groups are in fact politically partisan entities.

There were exceptions to this general trend—the death with dignity, and chair campaigns. However, the issue of chair campaign, which involved campaigning for service workers to take a sufficient amount of breaks during working hours, was truly unique, in the sense that there was only one perspective to the issue with no group standing in opposition. Similarly, the movement to legalize death with dignity is exceptional in that the perspective of the government—the president and the health ministry—was absent. Because the issue had significant religious and social implications, the health minister declared that the administration would not intervene, until agreement was fully reached among interests.
outside the government. Thus, given the unique attributes of the issue debate, the usual conflict and alliance structure was not observed.

(Table 3.5 about here)

Again, the seven prominent civil society groups are only a small component of the entire civil society sphere. At the same time, however, the important presence of these groups in policymaking in the post-democratic transition period suggests that the cooperation and conflict structure found here has significant implications for the overall policy process in Korea. The close interaction between prominent civil society groups and left-leaning parties signifies that the extent to which civil society groups participate in and influence policymaking varies by administration. Similarly, civil society is political, and unbalanced in its relations with the political sphere—major groups interact only with left leaning political parties.

Of course, analyzing only nine issues presents some limits in our ability to generalize. But the method in which issues were selected in the project (drawn from government insiders), and the fact that nine issues involving seven major civil society groups included issues of different characteristics suggests that the underlying alliance and opposition structure found between Korean civil society and the state is likely to be repeated had I analyzed a larger number of issues at a different point in time.

Conclusion

What is the role of civil society in relation to the state in the contemporary Korean policy process? A number of studies have emerged, arguing for the rising influence of civil society
groups in policymaking in countries where society has traditionally remained weak in comparison to the state (Pekkanen 2006; S Kim 2004). Given the rising significance of outside groups, voluntary associations in Asia were considered a vehicle for fostering and sustaining democracy (Alagappa 2004; Schwartz and Pharr 2003). These studies, however, typically had a narrow focus—looking only at a subset of well known advocacy groups in a few policy areas (Lee and Arrington 2008; Lim and Tang 2002). Thus, the role of civil society groups generally remains unknown, particularly in relation to state actors that have been the dominating force in policymaking in East Asia.

In this chapter, I analyzed the role of the state and society in the contemporary policymaking process in Korea, by drawing a representative set of 43 policy issues and analyzing the involvement of actors and groups at the level of policy issues. By providing a macro level overview of participation, I find that actors inside the state bureaucracy account for a significant portion of overall participation in policy discussions. At the same time, however, nongovernmental groups—including both economic and noneconomic interests—are actively engaged in policymaking. In relation to the past literature on civil society, the findings of this chapter show that the nongovernmental sector is more diverse than just a few civil society groups.

Furthermore, existing research falls short of explaining how the civil society interacts with the state in the policy process in bringing about political change—towards more open, participatory and accountable politics. The analysis in this chapter finds a stable pattern of interactions developing between civil society groups and political parties—close alignment with left leaning opposition parties, and conflictual relations with right leaning Grand National Party (GNP).
The findings of this chapter have two important implications for the study of state and civil society in emerging democracies where the sphere of civil society remained narrow. On the one hand, civil society, which includes more diverse sets of interests than previously argued, is frequently involved in the policymaking process. Thus, policymaking is no longer strictly controlled by the bureaucracy, nor government insiders in general. Additionally, the findings suggest that the history of state and society relations significantly affects how groups engage in advocacy in contemporary policymaking. Korean civil society dramatically expanded in the late 1980s in opposition to the state. Such confrontational legacies affect the ways in which civil society groups interact with the state in today’s policy community. These findings point to the importance of looking deeper into state-society relations in explaining how the growth of civil society translates into a greater presence of groups in the policy process.

Studies have previously noted the importance of analyzing civil society in relation to the state—which groups and in which areas they are active is greatly shaped by the state’s molding of the public sphere (Schwartz and Pharr 2003; Pekkanen 2006). Similarly, I argue in this chapter that the legacies of state-society relations affects the ways in which alliance and opposition structures are formed in the policymaking process between government insiders and outside groups. Thus, in countries where civil society maintains somewhat co-operational relations with the state due to the absence of civil society mobilization in overthrowing the regime (such as Japan), we expect the expanded civil society to illustrate a different kind of alliance structure with the government in policymaking than in Korea.

My study does present some limits. For instance, does the frequency of involvement truly represent the degree to which state actors and outside groups dominate in policymaking? The major shortcoming, then, is that the measure can’t capture the intensity of
involvement in an issue debate. Similarly, my data shows that business groups participate almost to equal extent as citizen groups. But, it is possible that business interests were less visible in my data, because they prefer to engage in advocacy covertly. Some of these questions I will return to in chapters 4 and 6. Nevertheless, the research presented here offers the benefit of providing an overview of participation at the macro level, providing clear indicators of participation in policymaking, as well as how groups develop cooperative or conflictual relations with one another, and with state actors.

Studies of the civil society are widely expanding in non-Western societies, and especially those that focus on explaining the development of civil society in the Asian context. However, the narrow scope of the studies and varying definitions of civil society makes it difficult to analyze civil society in relation to the state, and also comparatively. This chapter offers a departure for future comparative studies of civil society, by systematically analyzing patterns of participation across a range of policy issues.
Table 3.1: Issues sampled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Title</th>
<th>Issue Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wetland Preservation</td>
<td>Equal Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-cultural Families Bureau Integration</td>
<td>Disability Support Pension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review Board Examination of Mentally Ill</td>
<td>Illegal Circulation of Cosmetic Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sejong City Construction</td>
<td>Suicide Prevention Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage Loan Restriction</td>
<td>Abolition of the Upper Price Limit on a Sale of Lots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-dumping Tax on Particle-Board Imports</td>
<td>Illegal Imports of Construction Materials from China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycle Registration Enforcement</td>
<td>Transit Oriented Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Sales of Small-sized LP Gas</td>
<td>Development of Waterfront Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offering Chairs for Standing Service Workers</td>
<td>Death with Dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Average System for Auto Manufacturers</td>
<td>Merging the Two Medical Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Facilities to Neutralize Water Pollution</td>
<td>Clinical Trial Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Promotion of Local Travels</td>
<td>Modernizing Large Scale Netting Vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launching of Autonomous Private High-Schools</td>
<td>Pollution in the Former US Army Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesales Market System</td>
<td>Farming, Fishing, Food Industry Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring the Oil Distribution System</td>
<td>LCC (Low Cost Carrier) Promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposing VAT to Cosmetic Surgery</td>
<td>FTA Related Tax Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology Industry Promotion</td>
<td>Public Safety Offender Registry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security Number Management System</td>
<td>Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision of the Local Government Law</td>
<td>Corruption Scandal in the Government Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rare Disease Research Support</td>
<td>College Loans: Income-Contingent Loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Supply and Demand of Rice</td>
<td>Local Government Employee Wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Small Retailers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The list shows a total of 43 issues included in the study.
Table 3.2: The type and diversity of participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive ministry or agency</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the president and the prime minister</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority party member</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition party member</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-national government</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governmental actors</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen groups</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and business associations</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business corporations</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition specific to the issue</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think tanks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions and associations of institutions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-governmental actors</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A total of 43 issues were analyzed. Legislative opposition in Korea refers to all five opposition parties—Democratic Party, Liberty Forward Party, Future Hope Alliance, Democratic Labor Party, Korea Party—in the legislature. Legislative majority refers to the Grand National Party, the party holding majority seats in the 18th National Assembly.
Table 3.3: Number of issues with each type of actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive ministry or agency</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the president and the prime minister</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority party member</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition party member</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-national government</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governmental actors</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen groups</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and business associations</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business corporations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition specific to the issue</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think tanks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions and associations of institutions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-governmental actors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of issues notes the issues (out of a total of 43) that include the indicated type of actor.
Table 3.4: Prominent citizen groups and their involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Name</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy</td>
<td>Protection of small retailers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>College loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mortgage loan restriction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice</td>
<td>Medical malpractice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Death with dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Federation of Teachers Association</td>
<td>Autonomous private high-schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Teachers &amp; Education Workers Union</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Federation of Trade Unions</td>
<td>Chair campaign for service workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers for Democratic Society</td>
<td>Public safety offender registry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Federation of Environmental Movement</td>
<td>Development of waterfront areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The first column of the table notes seven prominent groups in Korean civil society (see E Kim 2009 for further discussions of most widely trusted civil society groups). The second column notes the issues these groups participated in. The PSPD was the most widely involved—observed in three issues, followed by the CCEJ in two issues. Two groups, KFTA and KTEWU, were found to be working on the same issue—autonomous private high-schools—but advocating different policy perspectives. The structure of alliance and opposition appearing on table 6 is calculated from the perspective of Korean Federation of Trade Unions.
Table 3.5: The structure of alliance and opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Type</th>
<th>Allies</th>
<th>Opponents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President/Bureaucracy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority party member</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition party member</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governmental actors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen groups/Issue coalitions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporations/Trade groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-governmental actors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of participants</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table summarizes the structure of alliance and opposition across 9 issues. Allies refer to participants involved in the issue debates sharing the same policy goals, and opponents the participants with opposing policy perspectives, such as the prominent public interest groups. The prominent public interest groups themselves are excluded from the list.
Chapter 4

Who Wins?: Mechanisms of Policy Success in Korea

Who wins in the Korean policy process and through what mechanism? The statist perspective prevailed in explaining the process of policymaking in East Asia. That is, the state—mainly the president and the bureaucracy—sets broad economic policy goals, such as development, and effectively implements those goals (Johnson 1982; 1987). Participation of business interests and legislative members in the policymaking process was rather limited, though large conglomerate groups (chaebols’ involvement in economic policymaking grew over time with economic prosperity. Whereas some recent studies find the state central to business and labor reform policies since the Asian financial crisis (Mo and Moon 1999; Mo 2001; Haggard 2000; 2004; Tiberghien 2007), others raise doubts that state actors can dominate the policy process, due to the growing power of business (EM Kim 1997), and societal interests (SH Kim 2000). Are state actors still central to the policy process in current day Korea despite the changing policy environment?

In this chapter, I examine the actors involved in a sample of policy issues in economic policymaking, closely analyzing who participated, what their goals were, and whether the objectives were successfully reflected in the policy outcomes. My approach that studies issues of different characteristics, such as size, salience, and conflict, significantly departs from the previous studies that mainly focus on a few issues of concentrated attention. The goal is to detect the average pattern of participation and influence in the policymaking process. Contrary to previous studies finding the president, the conglomerate groups, or the Federation of Korean Industries (the largest and most well-known trade association in the
country) central to the policy process, I find policy divisions within executive ministries and agencies, as well as small and medium sized corporations as the key players.

My research finds that despite a wide involvement of actors inside and outside the government, the state remains central to the policymaking process. The executive ministries are rarely neutral decision-makers, but often proponents seeking changes to existing policies. These policy objectives, however, are typically met by an opposition—actors and groups against the change. Usually, the government (bureaucratic ministries or agencies) is successful at pursuing their policy goals, regardless of the opposition, but not always so. When faced with an opposition that includes another government agency or the legislature, the policy goals of the bureaucratic ministries to bring changes to existing policy is prevented fully or partially.

The findings highlight the importance of venue shopping as a successful strategy to influence policy outcomes. Comparative policymaking studies have highlighted the importance of venue shopping as a way to disrupt an otherwise stable policymaking process in political systems with dispersed policymaking authorities, such as the US (Baumgartner, Green-Peterson, and Jones 2006). On the other hand, the case of Korea shows that looking for a favorable venue is important for policy success in a political system with highly concentrated policymaking power. Finally, the findings of the study urge scholars of East Asian politics to pay attention to the broader context in which policy advocacy occurs and influence takes place. A dynamic interaction of policy actors and their strategies to influence policy outcomes more adequately describes the current day policy process, than the static view that assumes the overwhelming power of the executive and the bureaucracy.

The Statist Perspective Revisited: Assessing Policy Influence
Do state actors dominate the policymaking process despite the growth of the nongovernmental sector in countries with strong state traditions? If the state yields so much power in the policy process, through what mechanism can policy influence be attained by outside groups? Below, I briefly give an overview of major bodies of research on Korean economic policymaking and the key questions arising from the previous literature. Mainly, I argue that past research fails to take into account the changes in the policy environment—the expansion of the nongovernmental sector, and its increasing engagement in policy advocacy. Furthermore, no prior attempt has been made to adequately conceptualize influence in order to assess the roles of the state and societal interests in the policy process.

The statist perspective was adopted in order to explain the rapid growth of East Asian economies, shaping the overall understanding of economic life in East Asia until today. The research goes back to Chalmers Johnson’s (1982; also 1987) characterization of industrialization in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, finding the state at the center of economic achievements in control of industrial finances, such as interest rates, bank loans, and foreign investment, as was the case with other late developers (Gerschenkron 1962). Also important to the development policies were large business groups—chaebol in Korea and zaibatsu in Japan—participating in economic policymaking as partners of the state.22 These groups were rewarded financially when they complied with the state’s goals of strengthening domestic

22 Chaebol is a family owned and managed group of companies that exercise monopolistic or oligopolistic control in product lines and industries, isomorphic to the Japanese zaibatsu Woo-Cumings 1999, 9). Whereas the Japanese zaibatsu include their own banks, the Korean chaebol relies heavily on government controlled credit institutions, making chaebols in Korea dependent on the state resources.
industry and increasing global competitiveness (also see Amsden 1989; Woo-Cumings 1999).

Johnson further adds that rapid development was possible particularly given two additional features common to the East Asian states. One was the executive dominance— with either the president or the prime minister at the top of the administrative authority— directing economic policy planning. The other aspect of the developmental state was the bureaucracy, who were recruited through highly competitive exams, and unified under national goals. Such unique characteristics of the bureaucracy minimized conflicts within the state elite, and prevented them from being bribed from outside groups (Johnson 1982; Haggard 1990).23 In sum, the research on economic development highlights the combined role of the executive and the bureaucratic ministries both having the authority to decide and implement economic policies. That is, the state’s decision-making was largely autonomous from business as well as other societal interests such as labor.

On the other hand, others notice that the chaebols and peak trade associations have broadly shaped economic policymaking (Chan, Clark, and Lam 1998; Moon and Prasad 1994; see specifically on sectoral corporatism McNamara 1999),24 and the influence of business interests in the policy process have grown over the years (EM Kim 1997). Unlike some of the earlier developmental research suggesting that the corporations are involved in the policy process entirely under the planning and guidance of the state, others argue that the

23 This form of bureaucracy in East Asia stands in contrast to the appointed bureaucracies in Latin America, where the powers of the bureaucrats are highly unstable and lack independent power bases (Schneider 1991).

24 For detailed discussions of state-business interactions in the process of development, see Evans (1995), and Kang (2002).
state-business relationship evolved throughout economic development. For instance, EM Kim (1997) maintains that the state’s encouragement of big business nurtured institutions in the private sector which eventually replaced the state’s economic role in certain areas—changing the state and business relationship from symbiosis to competition. An increasing business influence over policymaking seems more plausible given the recent changes—the limits placed on state power since democratic transition, and the independence of the private sector from state finances. All of the research agrees on one point—that societal interests play important roles in pressuring the government in today’s policy process.

To what extent is the state’s policymaking autonomous from societal interests, or subject to outside pressures in Korea? Findings from more recent research still offers mixed evidence. Whereas some scholars point to the still dominant role played by the president and the state bureaucracy particularly facing the Asian financial crisis (Mo 2001; Tiberghien 2007), others notice the growing influence of nongovernmental groups generally (Armstrong 2002; SH Kim 2004), and the declining role of the state bureaucracy as mediators of interests (for a discussion on the state bureaucracy arbitrating among business interests in information technology (IT) policymaking see KS Lee 2009).

There are some problems with inferring the major actors in the Korean policy process from the past research on East Asian political economy. That is, existing research relies on a set of observations drawn from the most salient policy issues at the height of the governmental agenda—the discussions evolving around the president, the upper level bureaucracy and the largest business corporations and the most powerful trade groups. Additionally, the policymaking environment in Korea has altered significantly over time. For instance, Clark and Chan note that state-led industrialization has been transformed (Clark and Chan 1994). One consequence of such change in the broader policy environment is the
increase in advocacy activities of outside groups to shape policy outcomes. A more fundamental problem, however, is that policy influence is typically assumed rather than directly measured, understood as an interaction between the state actors and business interests occurring behind the scenes (Kang 2002). Though what happens informally might still be the appropriate description of how issues are considered and decisions are made at times, it does not adequately describe who participates and wins in the overall policy process.

Studies of the policy process assess the influence of actors and groups in multiple ways—as setting the overall policy agendas of the government (Bachrach and Baratz 1962), engaging in a wide range of policy debates to have the policy views represented (Danielien and Page 1994; Golden 1998), or as shaping the policy decisions of individual policymakers (Smith 1995). Alternatively, we can gauge influence more directly by looking at the involvement of actors, their policy aims, and whether or not they were successful across a number of policy issues (Mahoney 2008; Baumgartner et al. 2009). Following this view, I conceptualize policy influence as having policy goals successfully reflected in the policy outcomes.

Detecting the underlying policy goals of actors involved in policy issues can be especially difficult to grasp, however, because basic indicators can be misleading. We can foresee two potential problems. One possibility is where an actor has a sincere policy goal in mind, but is deliberately trying to project another policy goal as if it were sincere. In trying to appease public interest groups demanding compensation from the US Forces in Korea for the purification of pollution in the former US army bases, the superficial goal of the Environment Ministry can side with the citizen groups in getting the US Forces to the bargaining table. However, the sincere goal is to maintain the status-quo policy to avoid conflict with the United States government in other domains, such as military and trade. Another example is
where the sincere goal of a bureaucratic ministry was originally to adopt measures to eradicate a market monopoly of oil refineries, but eventually they were provided incentives through bribery or direct informal connections to support the status-quo policy. This would be particularly worrisome, if the actions took place before the researcher started following the issue, making it look as if the policy goal of the bureaucratic ministry had always been in support of the status-quo. How can these inherent problems of the research be overcome?

One way to address this issue is to take all the indicators together before making descriptive and causal inferences (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 41). In order to get information on the issue debate, the researcher can rely on personal interviews with multiple actors playing important roles in the issue as well as going through publicly available sources. By doing so, the researcher could draw triangular conclusions—research procedure employing empirical evidence from multiple sources of data and methods. The benefit of triangulation is in strengthening the adequacy of inference (King, Keohane, and Verba 2004, 191-192). Following such a method, it becomes obvious that the sincere goal of the government agency was quite different from that described by the bureaucrat when verifying the information during interviews with the other major actors involved in the issue. At other times, the actors’ sincere policy goals are evident when carefully noting the sequence at which things happened—who mobilized first, and whether prior to decision-making the groups and governmental actors had different goals.

Having discussed the approach I take, the following is what I expect to find in studying who wins in the policy process. Given the recent changes in the policy environment, I hypothesize that a diverse set of actors and groups—including small businesses, trade groups, citizen groups, and government insiders (not simply those at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy, such as the president, or chaebol groups)—are often mobilized to
influence outcomes in the Korean policy process. Regardless, I still expect the bureaucracy to be the dominant actor for the following reasons. The bureaucracy in Korea enjoys great privilege in dominating both the formal institutional powers as well as the informal powers in policymaking. Regarding the formal powers, the ministries are still at the center of major public policymaking, such as drafting laws and legislations. Also, despite the change in the rule-making process to require the bureaucratic ministries to hear from outside interests in the rulemaking process, they are not obliged to incorporate outside opinions by any means.\(^{25}\) Furthermore, bureaucratic ministries are required to hold public hearings to collect evidence on the implications of policy outcomes before any major policy changes. Such a process favors the bureaucratic ministries giving them the evidence to support and justify their policy goals.

But does the state bureaucracy win all the time? Defining winners and losers in terms of either the state bureaucracy or the business is difficult, particularly because both business and the state bureaucracy have multiple policy goals and interests, rather than being a unified group. Furthermore, groups in the policy community constantly adopt different strategies to shape policy outcomes, such as inside and outside lobbying. How do outside groups attain policy success?

I argue that policy success is particularly likely when advocates find alternative images and venues to support their policy goals. Policy images are public and elite understandings of policy problems. Policy venues, on the other hand, are institutional locations where authoritative decisions are made concerning a given issue. The institutional

\(^{25}\) For details about the rulemaking process, see Golden 1998. On rulemaking process particularly in the Asian context, see Baum 2007a, 2007b.
structure within which policymaking occurs is related to these images, since different institutions may be more or less favorable toward a particular image of a policy (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 32). Policy images and venues are keys to policy development, because the interaction between changing images and venues of public policies leads to the cause of disequilibrium in politics (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 25). That is why venue shopping is often an important political strategy to achieving success in the policy process (Baumgartner 1989; Pralle 2003).

Studies of public policy provide evidence that political systems with multiple policy venues present obstacles to policy change, because such systems provide numerous sites where reforms can be reversed (Lindblom 1968). Therefore, venue shopping is an especially powerful strategy in political systems where institutional branches are designed to check and balance one another, and under federalism, where policymaking authority is shared among local, state, and national governments. Because policy reform often requires the involvement of multiple levels and branches of government, groups only need to prevent policy development in one venue to deter significant changes in policy.

I argue that venue shopping is an important advocacy strategy in the East Asian context for slightly different reasons. Though the executive branch has almost entirely dominated the policymaking process for the most part, the increase in the policymaking activities of the legislature indicates that the policy advocates can take advantage of multiple policy venues. Similarly, though policymaking powers are largely concentrated in the executive branch in general, bureaucratic agencies do not always share the same policy goals, often engage in inter-agency rivalries, and time-consuming negotiation (Clark and Chan 1994; Moon and Prasad 1994). That is, the intra-state dynamics leave room for a new set of venues to be explored. I argue that venue shopping is a successful advocacy strategy to
influence policy outcomes even in countries with concentrated policymaking powers like Korea. The proponents of the policy change will try to focus on one set of images, while opponents to another set of images. If the opponents are successful at gaining acceptance of a new image at a different institutional venue, they will disrupt the maintenance of a policy monopoly. I test the theory using the Korean case—a statist system where the government’s policy decisions are often thought to be insulated from pressures of societal interests.

Data and methodology

In order to learn about the complexities of policy dynamics, we must observe a number of policy problems of various characteristics (e.g. salience, size, conflict), observing the process over a period of time. To meet these aims, I studied seven economic policy issues in-depth from a total of 43 policy issues discussed in the current day policy community, following the debate closely for a year (June 2009-May 2010). The seven policy debates commonly dealt with changing or protecting the status-quo economic policies, involving active participation of the bureaucracy, business, as well as other forms of societal interests. Because these issue debates resemble the issues previously analyzed by scholars of the East Asian political

26 Here, I adopt a broad definition of economic policymaking—issues discussed in the executive ministries broadly responsible for planning and overseeing long-term economic policymaking in Korea. This is an extension of Okimoto’s definition of industrial policymaking—the government’s use of its authority and resources to administer policies that address the needs of specific sectors and industries (if necessary, companies) with the aim of raising the productivity of factor inputs (Okimoto 1989: 8).
economy, they offer interesting cases to assess whether the state actors or outside interests win in the contemporary policymaking process.

As noted in chapter 2, I interviewed a total of 20 policy actors involved in the 7 issue debates using snowball sampling techniques, and collected background information about the issue debates using publicly available records. Furthermore, I noted how the actors aligned according to distinct sides—an actor or a group of actors attempting to achieve the same policy outcome. I followed closely the discussions for a full calendar year to assess whether the policy goals of different sides were reflected in the outcome. In most instances, a number of participants can both win and lose at the same time, because sometimes advocates do not attain their policy goals fully, but successfully prevent a worse outcome (Mahoney 2008; Baumgartner et al. 2009). The goal is to see who wins more—the influence of different types of actors—by looking at the emerging pattern across policy issues. By analyzing the question of who wins in the policy process, my objective is to both reaffirm and challenge the long held beliefs about the statist perspective that has dominated the analysis of policymaking in East Asia.

In the following section, I present the findings of the in-depth case studies. No prior attempt has been undertaken to fully analyze the content of the issue debate, who gets involved, what their policy goals were and whether they were able to successfully shape policy outcomes before concluding who participates in and influences Korean policymaking. Generally, the terms of the issue debate are rather simple. A group of proponents advocate policy change, and their perspectives are opposed by another group of actors. Each group is typically a combination of government insiders as well as business interests, such as the office of the president, ministry bureaucrats, and trade group representatives. The bureaucratic ministries are often involved as the major proponents of changing the existing
status quo, and their policy goals were often reflected fully in the outcome. The groups standing in opposition—typically a mixture of corporations and trade groups—had a hard time attaining their perspectives. However, my research also finds that policy outcomes are less predictable especially when a certain perspective of the state is opposed by another executive ministry or multiple members of the legislature.

Policy influence—participation, policy goals, and success

The fieldwork necessary to completing this study was undertaken between June 2009 and May 2010, during which President Lee Myung-bak was in power. The new administration launched in February 2008 had made campaign promises to establish a stronger market economy and stimulate economic growth (Moon 2009).27 Seven economic policy issues discussed inside the government fell to my sample. The issues were the following: (1) imposing an anti-dumping tax on particle board imports, (2) simplifying FTA country of origin certification, (3) restructuring the oil retail system, (4) direct sales of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), (5) bringing competition to the agriculture wholesale market, (6) imposing value-added-tax to cosmetic surgery, and finally, (7) protection of small retailers.

As shown on table 4.1, the seven issues considered in this analysis involved a total of 80 participants—an average of 11 major players involved per issue. The bureaucracy,  

27 Each issue debate is listed and described briefly in the Appendix. The case regarding the agriculture wholesale market, strictly speaking, is not a purely economic policy issue. I decided to study the issue in depth nevertheless, because the terms of the debate—bringing more competition to the wholesale market—was very similar to the other economic issues included in this study, providing a meaningful comparison.
business interests, and trade groups were the frequent participants. Both the presidential agencies and bureaucratic ministries were actively involved in multiple issues. The office of the president and the prime minister were rarely involved directly, but often indirectly through the agencies that they oversee, such as Regulatory Reform Committee. Corporations are frequently mentioned as key players in the policy community. What is striking, however, is the extent to which small and medium sized businesses are mobilized to fight for or against policy changes. Surprisingly, large conglomerate groups were observed in only one of the issues (the issue referred to as protection of small retailers throughout this chapter). Similarly, trade groups, set up specifically for policy advocacy purposes, are mobilized in almost every issue. But again, trade groups representing a small industry sector were frequently observed, such as oil refineries, and particle-board manufacturers, rather than the Federation of Korean Industries.

Because almost every policy perspective is argued by a combination of government insiders and outside groups, it is difficult to conclude whether the state bureaucracy or business interests win. But what is clear is that each issue debate involved participation of at least one, if not multiple, bureaucratic ministries. In only one of the cases—an anti-dumping tax—the government ministry performed a purely administrative role as an arbitrator of interest. That is, their job was confined to determining whether a case of dumping can be found based on factual data. In all other issues, bureaucratic ministries were the key advocates.

(Table 4.1 about here)
Table 4.2 indicates some general findings about the structure of policy issue debates in Korea from my research. Only one issue—the FTA country of origin verification procedure—involved one perspective. But this was truly a unique issue, in that no one was opposed to simplifying an otherwise cumbersome process for all. The government undertook analysis to find out the impact of existing bilateral and multilateral FTA treaties on the domestic market, specifically how much tax incentives local business groups received. This seems an important question as the Korean government prepares to conclude FTAs with two of the largest economies in the world—the US and EU. Disappointingly, the government found that many small and medium sized businesses were unaware of the complicated steps that need to be taken in order to verify country of origin of the parts used in the final products, which is central to receiving tax benefits. The government proposed to change the related regulations, so that the entire procedures could be greatly relaxed and simplified. No actor or a group stood in opposition.

(Table 4.2 about here)

All other issues involved multiple perspectives. Typically, a group of advocates attempted to change an existing policy. On the other side, however, were another group of actors against the change. The case of the oil retail system exemplifies this point. Rising oil prices in the year 2008 became a grave concern for the government and the public. The domestic price of oil is determined by three factors: international oil price, an oil tax, and the retail cost. The price did not drop even after a decrease in international oil prices. And of course, the oil tax rate always remains constant. The proponents of changing the status-quo policy argued that the oil retail system needed to be restructured. The oil retail system in
Korea is highly monopolized by the four oil refineries. These companies are in control of the entire retail market, first supplying to the distributors, who then supply to individual retailers. Such a retail system is called a vertical retail structure, because the distributors and retailers can only be supplied oil from a single refinery. This system has been maintained as a way to control the quality of oil, preventing irregular oil from illegally entering the market (which was a problem in the early 2000s). However, the same system has kept oil distribution monopolized by a few major refineries who controlled both the supply and price of oil.

Groups mobilized, arguing that each distributor and retailer should be allowed to transact with alternative sources, not simply other oil refineries, but also other distributors and retailers, as long as they clearly indicate the original sources for the customers to recognize. What the advocates called “allowing a horizontal transaction structure” would lower the retail price of oil. Opponents, however, argued that changing the retail system would incur more losses (irregular oil), than benefits (dropping the price of oil).

As indicated in the above example, conflict—groups of actors aiming to achieve different policy goals to the same issue—is rather common in the Korean policy community. But despite the fight to protect or change the existing policy, there is a clear winner, in the sense that the perspectives of the government usually win in the end. This point is clearly illustrated on table 4.2. The outcomes of the four policy issues at the top show that the bureaucratic ministries, who were usually the proponent of changing the existing policies, were often successful in attaining the changes they sought. By contrast, those standing in opposition, failed to have their perspectives reflected in the outcome. One outside advocate I interviewed responded,
“When the government is determined to bring about changes, there is no way to stop them. It will happen. No matter how much we try to convince them that it won’t work. We then wait for the next round of battles (Personal interview, 2009).”

These remarks reveal important aspects about the policy process in Korea—the bureaucratic ministries are at the forefront of policy changes and usually it is difficult for those standing in opposition to stop the government. This also reaffirms previous findings about the dominant role played by the executive ministries in the policymaking process in Korea (Hahn and Kim 1976; Kim and Woo 1976; Jaung 2000; Kil and Moon 2001; Ahn 2003).

**Policy image, venue and success**

But the bureaucratic ministries do not win all the time. When are the opponents successful at influencing policy outcomes? Recall that a different understanding of the issue, coupled with an institutional venue can bring rapid changes to policy development. Some of my case studies show that groups often make an attempt to highlight a different policy image, and reach out for alternative venues. That is, sometimes the perspectives of the bureaucratic ministries were opposed by other government agencies, or members of the National Assembly. In the next section, I discuss what happened to these cases in detail. The bottom three case on Table 4.2 shows that when a different image and institutional venue entered the policy debate, opposing perspectives were either fully or partially reflected in the outcomes.

*Agriculture wholesale market*

In Korea, approximately 80% of the agriculture products consumed go through the wholesale market. Such a system indicates that producers rarely interact directly with the distributors or
consumers, but for the most part interact only with the wholesalers. The Korean agriculture retail system is often compared to the Japanese one, where the wholesale market also plays an important intermediary role between the producers and distributors. But in Japan, producers groups are well organized, giving the association much more leverage in the bargaining process between producers with wholesalers. By contrast, producers in the Korean agriculture market are very weakly organized. Furthermore, only a limited number of wholesalers are permitted by the government to participate in the retail process. The original purpose of restricting the number of wholesalers was to protect the stability of the market—guaranteeing a stable link between the producers, the distributors and ultimately the consumers. In practice, however, a lack of competition in the wholesale market hurts the distributors and consumers, because of the high prices resulting from market monopoly.

The problem can be solved by bringing competition to the agricultural wholesales market. Such a view was advocated by the Regulatory Reform Committee and the distributors’ association who argued that restructuring the retail system would drop the prices of agricultural products. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food, along with the wholesalers association were against this perspective. They highlighted a different aspect of the issue—protecting the producers. Given the current situation of the Korean agricultural market—dominated largely by small-sized agricultural producers, too poorly organized to have any bargaining leverage against the wholesalers—the only system that can manage the market is to let a fixed number of wholesalers develop stable relationships with the producers. The opponents were able to have their policy goals fully reflected in the outcome, as the plan to bring competition to the agriculture wholesale market was completely withdrawn.
Value-added-tax (VAT) on cosmetic surgery

The cosmetic surgery industry has a big market in Korea—an annual market of approximately 4000 billion Korean won, about 344 million US dollars. However, the precise market of the cosmetic surgery industry is unknown, because the cosmetic surgeries, as with all medical services, are tax-exempt in Korea. The proponents of change, mainly the Ministry of Strategy and Finance that has the decision-making authority over tax related matters, argued that cosmetic surgery is different from all other types of medical surgeries, and thus should be excluded from tax-exempt status beginning in July 2010. The movement reflected the broader aims of the administration to increase tax revenues.

Opponents, on the other hand, focused on a slightly different aspect of the issue—the implications of VAT tax on the consumers of cosmetic surgery. Opponents argued that VAT would create an extra burden on consumers in times of economic hardship, because VAT tax is paid by the consumers, not the service providers. At the forefront of the opposition were the medical practitioners who performed cosmetic surgery; mainly the Association for Plastic Surgeons. But the real momentum came when members of the National Assembly, Subcommittee of Finance and Tax stepped in to argue that the matter deserved further scrutiny. They argued that though the decision of what is to be tax exempt may be up to the respective ministry (Ministry of Strategy and Finance), whether or not specific items should be excluded from tax exempt status requires approval from the National Assembly. The reason for this being that the imposition of VAT on any item brings direct and significant consequences to the public. The opponents’ perspective was somewhat successfully reflected in the policy outcome a year later. The bureaucratic ministry’s plan to impose VAT on cosmetic surgery in 2010 was postponed for a year until July of 2011. In the mean time, the National Assembly, Subcommittee of Finance and Tax, was to discuss over the issue again.
Super super-marts (SSMs)

Super Super Marts (SSMs or corporate supermarkets) are supermarket chain stores usually owned by big domestic and international corporations, and their size ranges between 1000-3000 square meters. The number of SSMs has increased dramatically from 199 in 1998 to 447 in 2008. The expansion of SSMs is a direct threat to small and medium sized retailers, since SSMs that are located at the corners of streets, target the customers who have traditionally used retailers in traditional marketplaces. The number of small retailers (small stores—both independent stores and those doing business inside traditional market places) has decreased from 130 thousand to 80 thousand between 1998 and 2008. Similarly, between 2004 and 2008, the profits of corporate supermarkets have grown by 10 trillion Korean won (a little above 1 billion US dollars), whereas the revenues of the traditional markets have decreased by an almost equal amount.

A group of advocates argued that the government should come up with stricter regulation to protect the small and medium sized retailers. One solution to the problem is to regulate the opening of SSMs. That is, the government should allow SSMs to open only when it is proven not to hurt the local retailers. Such a perspective is advocated primarily by the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), one of the major public interest groups in Korea, aided by members of the Democratic Party and the Democratic Labor Party and the Grand National Party. This perspective was somewhat favorably perceived by the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy (with decision-making authority) at first, who agreed that some policy measures to prevent the further expansion of SSMs needed to be implemented.
However, that perspective is opposed by another set of advocates. The opponents argue that regulation of the SSMs fails to meet the equal competition guaranteed in the constitution, as well as international trade agreements that Korea is party to (WTO and bilateral FTAs). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), which oversees foreign treaties, is at the forefront of such opposition. The major conglomerate companies that own the chain supermarkets, of course, are in favor of the status quo policy, strongly against adopting regulations.

On the other hand, another group of advocates argued that the government should revitalize the traditional marketplaces. They argue that by creating a government budget to improve the facilities of traditional marketplaces, the competition between SSMs and traditional marketplaces would be leveled. This view is mostly backed by the members of the governing party—the Grand National Party.

Three distinct legislative proposals came out addressing the policy problem. One way to solve the problem would be to regulate the opening of SSMs in the nearby (500 meters) vicinity of traditional marketplaces (Retail Industry Development Amendment Act). The other, is to make laws preventing the expansion of SSMs from hurting local retailers through government intervention. That is, the Medium Business Agency can hear dispute cases, and prevent an opening of and give penalties to a SSM when the review committee finds that the big-sized chain stores are hurting local retailers by a significant amount. (Large, Medium, and Small Enterprises Cooperation Promotion Amendment Act). Finally, a slightly different approach was reflected in the legislation creating a budget to fund traditional marketplaces around the country. After more than a year, nothing had happened. All of the three proposals were pending in the respective committees.
The findings of my case studies have important implications for understanding policymaking in East Asian countries. Truly diverse sets of interests operate in the current day policy community in Korea, and they actively engage in advocacy behavior to influence the policymaking process. Despite changes in the policy environment, the statist perspective still prevails. Given the monopolistic power of policy decision-making, the state bureaucracy is usually successful in attaining policy outcomes they seek. However, the state is neither unitary, nor fully autonomous in the policymaking process. Opponents can successfully influence policy outcomes when finding the institutional venue favorable to a different policy image.

**Conclusion**

The statist perspective was the dominant approach to explaining the policymaking process in East Asia in the past few decades. First emerging to examine the actors central to rapid development, the statist perspective has later been applied to describing the process of economic reform policies in the face of the financial crisis. Generally, research on the East Asian political economy has found the state—the executive and the bureaucracy—at the center of economic policymaking. At the same time, however, a different group of research developed, arguing that the nongovernmental sector has grown in relation to the state, exercising significant influence in the policy process in East Asia. Are the state actors still central to the policymaking process despite the rise in the number of business interests and outside groups in political systems with a strong state tradition? In this chapter, I take the Korean case, and analyze diverse sets of relevant players involved in a range of economic policy issues to assess who wins in the contemporary policy process.
This chapter finds that diverse sets of actors from inside and outside the government participate in the policymaking process in Korea, much more so than previously stated. In the past, the conglomerate companies were the only key players in the policy process aside from state actors. The same does not hold true any longer. Small and medium-sized corporations—referring to businesses holding less than 250 employees—consist of 80% of the entire business sector and they were frequently observed promoting and protecting their interests in the policymaking process in the issues I studied.\textsuperscript{28} Trade groups, representing the interests of a particular industry, were also frequently involved. However, it is difficult to simply state whether the government’s policymaking follows the lead of state actors, or is subject to outside pressures, because government insiders and outside groups are often part of a coalition of advocates supporting the same policy outcome. The participation of all these groups suggests that the typical description of government-business relations (one influences the other) assumed in the previous research is not supported, at least in the sample of policy issues analyzed in this study.

At the same time, I find strong support for the bureaucratic dominance in the Korean policy process. The bureaucratic ministries were typically ardent advocates of a certain policy perspective, rather than serving purely an administrative role as arbitrators of interests. Usually, bureaucratic ministries are at the forefront of changing the existing policy, and the perspectives of the bureaucratic ministries win in the end—policy outcomes reflecting their policy goals. Though conflict—a group of actors trying to change the existing policy, and another group fighting to protect the status-quo—is generally common, the groups standing

in opposition to the perspectives of the bureaucratic ministries had a hard time in pursuing their policy aims which reflected in the outcomes.

There were exceptions to this general trend, however. As the cases regarding the agriculture wholesale market, the VAT on cosmetic surgery, and the protection of small retailers indicate, the movement to protect the status-quo policies was more successful when the opposition included another government agency or members of the National Assembly. That is, groups are more likely to attain policy success when finding an alternative institutional venue receptive to a different understanding of the issue. In such instances, the policy goals of the opponents of policy change were reflected either entirely or partially in the outcome.

Though I aimed at sampling a range of policy issues, it is true that most of the issues studied here were discussed in the bureaucratic ministries in the first place given the administration’s policy agenda, such as increasing market competition. Does that suggest that the findings of this chapter will fail to hold true across different administrations? I studied a range of policy issues discussed at different policy divisions in multiple bureaucratic ministries, going through various stages of the policy process. Therefore, the fundamental fact would remain unchanged even if I had sampled issues at a different point in time, under a different administration. The bureaucratic ministries are the major players in the policy process. However, policy success is much more uncertain when the opposition has support from another institutional venue.

These findings have broader implications for the understanding of East Asian political economy and comparative policymaking. Most importantly, the chapter points to the importance of considering a range of relevant actors engaged in policymaking at the level of the issue in analyzing who is central to the policymaking process. Based on case studies of a
number of issues, my study demonstrates that despite the rise in societal interests in Korea, the state bureaucracy remains central to the policy process as policy advocates. Furthermore, my research demonstrates that venue shopping is an important strategy to exercise influence in the policy process. The interactions between policy images and institutional venues are important to the policy development in political systems with multiple venues, because the interactions can foster stability or rapid changes in a policy. The case of Korea shows that seeking a favorable venue is important to exercise influence in the policy process even in political systems where policymaking power is concentrated to the executive branch, and specifically to bureaucratic ministries that typically have monopolistic control over policy decision-making.
Table 4.1: The Major Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Office of the President/Prime Minister</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bureaucratic Ministries</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Majority Party (Grand National Party)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Opposition Parties</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Corporations</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Associations</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table notes the major players engaged in the seven policy issues studied. The bureaucratic ministry includes a particular policy division, as well as particular people such as the head and the vice head. The office of the president includes the president himself or the agencies that the president has direct control over. The same holds true for the office of the prime minister. Usually, business corporations were not directly involved but worked through trade groups. However, sometimes names of specific business corporations were repeatedly mentioned by respondents and in the media coverage of the issue debate and these names were recorded.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Proponents</th>
<th>Opponents</th>
<th>Other Perspective</th>
<th>Winners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-dumping tax on particle board imports</td>
<td>Corporations (3), Trade groups (1)</td>
<td>Corporations (4), Trade groups (1)</td>
<td>Neutral decision-maker, Ministry of Strategy and Finance</td>
<td>Proponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplifying FTA country of origin verification</td>
<td>Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Trade groups (1), Others (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring oil retail system</td>
<td>Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Trade groups (2), Others (1)</td>
<td>Corporations (4), Trade groups (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Proponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct sales of LP gas</td>
<td>Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Corporations (2), Trade groups (1)</td>
<td>Trade groups (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Proponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring agricultural wholesale market</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Trade groups (1), Others (1)</td>
<td>Regulatory Reform Committee, Trade groups (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-added-tax on cosmetic surgery</td>
<td>Ministry of Strategy and Finance</td>
<td>National Assembly, Taxation Subcommittee, Others (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of small retailers</td>
<td>National Assembly, Knowledge Economy Committee, Trade groups (3), Others (3)</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Corporations (6)</td>
<td>Support traditional marketplaces, National Assembly, Knowledge Economy Committee</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table notes policy perspectives, participants, and winners for every issue. The number in parenthesis indicates the number of participants in each category.
In 2010, as members of the US Congress tried to finalize the financial reform bill to prohibit banks from investing in risky ventures, about 2,000 groups registered to specifically lobby in the area of finance trying to promote and protect their interests. Around the same time, two economic issues were discussed in the Korean policy community—one was relaxing mortgage loan restrictions to revitalize the sluggish housing market, and the other seeking policy measures to address growing social inequalities. Though the former discussion mainly revolved around the ministerial bureaucrats at the top of the hierarchy, the latter involved 81 nongovernmental groups joined in a coalition calling for the government’s heightened attention to the problem. These examples illustrate that though broad and narrow participation may be typical in the pluralist and statist policymaking systems respectively, the degree of participation varies depending on the issue.

Who participates in the policy process has been the core theme in the study of politics and policymaking (Dahl 1961; Truman 1951). Typically, comparative politics scholars argue that who gets involved in policymaking differs across political systems depending on government-group interactions (Lijphart 1999; Siaroff 1999) or state and society relations (Schwartz and Pharr 2003). However, growing research on this topic—applying national level typologies of policymaking to different countries and policy areas—have not been particularly fruitful, because studies focusing on a few issues in a single policy area often find mixed evidence as to whether a particular kind of policymaking type accurately describes participation patterns in the policy process.
This chapter shifts the focus of analysis from countries as a whole to a range of policy issues in assessing the type and diversity of participation across three political systems that show varying patterns of interactions among government insiders and outside groups. Empirical investigation is based on the data collected through personal interviews and public sources on representative sets of 43 issues in Korea and 98 issues in the US (Baumgartner et al. 2009). In addition, I bring in Mahoney’s data on 26 issues in the EU (Mahoney 2008) as points of comparison. Three political systems—Korea, the EU, and the US—offer ideal comparisons, representing varying degrees of government-group interactions and state-society relations. On the one hand, I find that the patterns of participation in the policy process in Korea, the EU, and the US vary as anticipated—average participation is most diverse and broad in the US, followed by the EU and Korea. At the same time, however, this chapter shows emerging similarities in the composition of the policy community across three political systems unnoticed in previous research.

The findings have two important implications for comparative policymaking research. On the one hand, the results show that distinct patterns of interactions do occur across political systems, confirming the long held belief that government-group interactions and state-society relations indeed have important implications for who participates in policymaking in a representative set of policy issues. Beyond such aggregate level generalizations, however, my study finds that policy communities look strikingly similar in terms of the diversity of interests represented—a point often neglected in comparative policymaking studies. Instead, policymaking studies often narrowly focus on the important sets of actors, such as groups in the pluralist systems (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998), government, business and labor in corporatist systems (Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982), and bureaucrats and politicians in statist systems (Pempel 1974; Krauss and Muramatsu 1984).
Given the diversity of interests commonly found across distinct policy communities, however, this chapter points to ways in which studies of policymaking with a narrow focus on the state and peak associations in corporatist and statist policymaking systems should consider a range of diverse actors relevant in the policymaking process.

In the following section, I present the development of two different strands of research on the comparative policymaking process, referring to both areas of advancements as well as limits. Next, I describe the data collection method used in the public policymaking projects in Korea, the EU, and the US. In addition, I present research findings on the policy communities of the three political systems. Finally, I conclude by discussing implications of my research findings on comparative policymaking studies, also suggesting avenues for future research.

Who participates in the policy process

Scholars in comparative policymaking have long investigated participation patterns in policymaking, because it has implications for whose interests are represented in a political system (Dahl 1961; Schattschneider 1960). Specifically, two major strands of research developed in comparative policymaking research, highlighting dimensions key to understanding varying patterns of involvement in public policymaking—one addressing the interactions between governments and groups, primarily in economic policymaking, and the other state and society relations (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 11). Despite significant advancements made by existing research in highlighting different patterns of interactions among government insiders and outside groups in national level policymaking, discussions in comparative policymaking research have not been particularly fruitful because studies focusing on specific issues and issue areas often yield contrasting results in describing the
involvement of actors in the policymaking process. In the next section, I outline the two
groups of studies.

*Diverging participation patterns in comparative policymaking*

Research in comparative policymaking highlights the average pattern of relations between
governments and groups in national policymaking, because these relationships are central to
understanding how policies are made. For instance, studies in comparative policymaking
categorize political systems into distinct types, such as corporatist, pluralist and statist
systems, depending on the degree to which groups are integrated into the policymaking
arenas of the state (Martin 1983; Lehmbuch and Schmitter 1982; Siaroff 1999; also see
Baumgartner and Leech 1998 for a review on this topic). Specifically, statist policymaking
refers to cases where the state takes the lead in policy formulation and other societal interests
follow (Amsden 1989), corporatist systems in which large interest groups cooperate with
each other and with the government in policy decision-making and implementation
(Lehmbruch 1979), and pluralist policymaking where a multiplicity of groups and actors
compete for greater influence in the policy process (Truman 1950).

Distinct typologies of policymaking have been widely applied to political systems
around the world. For instance, the pattern of relations between government and groups in
statist policymaking explains development policies of late industrialization in Europe, Asia,
and Latin America (Schneider 1991, Kohli 2004; Amsden 2003). Similarly, the variants of
corporatist policymaking, such as state and liberal corporatism—depending on the relative
strengths of government, business and labor (Schmitter 1979), and corporatism without labor
(Pempel and Tsunekawa 1979) explain wage and labor policies in Europe and Japan
respectively. Finally, pluralist policymaking has been almost exclusively analyzed in the
context of the US advocacy process (for empirical research see Dahl 1961; Schlozman 1984; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Golden 1998; Danielien and Page 1994; Caldeira and Wright 1988, but for evidence in Japan see Krauss and Muramatsu 1984). Mainly observing the interaction of government and groups in economic policymaking (with the exception of US research), these studies generally argue that cross-national differences in participation are found across political systems.

Similarly, another group of comparative politics scholars have long engaged in identifying the link between vibrant associational life and democracy, and argue that the relative strengths of state and society are important, because they have implications for who participates in the policy process (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1996). The civil society—the public sphere that allows citizens to aggregate demands—does not emerge independently from the state, but rather evolves in close interaction with the state (Skocpol et al. 2000; Crowley and Skocpol 2001). In this sense, expansion and contraction of civil society is largely determined by the strength of the state in shaping the public sphere (Alagappa 2004; Pekkanen 2004; S Kim 2004). Thus, group involvement in the policy process is restricted by the state’s control of groups operating in different sectors of the society in Japan (Schwartz and Pharr 2003). By contrast, the societal interests are actively engaged in the policy process in the US, where civil society remains strong and independent from the state (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). Similarly, relative strengths of the civil society also explain cross-national variation of associational life (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001), which ultimately affects the role of groups in overall policymaking. In sum, comparative research on state and society argues that the level of state and society dominance explain the extent to which the state and society engage in national level policymaking.
On the other hand, other studies point to the difficulty in making aggregate level generalizations. For instance, studies find evidence of growing coordination among government and groups in countries where corporatist traditions are weak. That is, social pacts among labor, business, and state emerged in countries where interest representation is much less coordinated and lacks centralized organizational capacities (e.g. see Hardiman 1988; O’Donnell and O’Reardon 1997; Tarantelli 1986; Han et al. 2011 for examples in Southern Europe, Ireland, South Africa and South Korea). Similarly, more recent research shows that strict typologies of policymaking may not adequately explain who participates in the policy process in quickly evolving policy communities. Grodsky (2009), for instance, finds evidence of delegative corporatism and empowerment of NGOs in post-communist societies.

Furthermore, corporatism is no longer limited to distinguishing countries by the relationship of business-labor-state, but is extended to policy areas of education, health, and environment (Wiarda 1997). Application of corporatist policymaking in policy areas other than labor and wages finds the prominence of actors other than government, business and labor interests, such as public interest groups in the policy process (Shipper 2006; Lim and Tang 2007).

The research on state-society relations in comparative policymaking similarly falls short of conceptualizing the relative dominance of state and society cross-nationally (Alagappa 2004). That is, civil society is typically defined narrowly—looking at a particular kind of group, such as public interest groups in Japan (Schwartz and Pharr 2003, but for exceptions, see Pekkanen 2006), and in Korea (S Kim 2004). Such varying focus of studies often limits valid comparisons across political systems. Furthermore, research on state-society relations does not offer a clear understanding of how varying state-society relations
affect participation in the policy process. For instance, does a strong state suggest that state actors play an important role in all issue debates? On the contrary, does a strong civil society suggest that non-governmental groups frequently participate in the policy process? In the next section, I further elaborate on ways to improve our understanding of comparative policymaking processes.

**Understanding comparative policymaking processes**

In this chapter, I compare the involvement of actors and groups across a range of issues across three political systems—Korea, the EU, and the US—in order to generalize about the average patterns of participation. Studies investigating government-group interactions and state and society relations offer country level generalizations on the varying kinds of interactions among actors in the policy process. Yet, few studies empirically demonstrate across a range of issues the varying roles of government insiders and outside groups, and the types of interests active in the policy community.

Baumgartner and Leech (2001) pointed out the importance of studying participation across a range of issues before generalizing about what kind of patterns among government insiders and outside groups hold in a given political system. That is, when observing the participation of groups across a range of policy issues within the pluralist US, only a few issues involve a large number of participants as the pluralist theory would predict, whereas a limited number of groups are found in most other issues (Baumgartner and Leech 2001). Similarly, considering a wide range of issues is important in comparative policymaking studies in generalizing about national level policymaking, because participation patterns found in one policy area might not hold in other areas. For instance, national level unions are poorly organized in Japan, rarely engaging in the bargaining process with the state and
business (Knoke et al. 1996). However, in the social welfare area, voluntary associations are highly visible in the policy community, because the Japanese state has long promoted the development of groups that provide welfare services (Pekkanen 2006). Thus, within a single political system, the policy process looks different across policy areas. That is why it is important to study a range of issues, in addition to studying multiple, rather than a single policy area. Given that participation varies depending on the issues and policy areas, the key is analyzing to what extent broad or narrow participation occurs in overall policymaking.

Issue level studies are frequently observed in studies investigating the role of groups in the policy process particularly in American politics research (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Mettler 2002; King, Cornwall, Dahlin 2005). Yet, studies typically analyze the interaction of groups with specific policymaking bodies of the state, such as the legislature (Hall and Wayman 1990), the bureaucracy (Yackee and Yackee 2006) and the courts (Caldeira and Wright 1988). However, focusing only on a certain policy venue limits the generalizability of the results, yielding patterns of interactions unique to a single policymaking body (Baumgartner 2007). In sum, generalizing about the policy process requires studying a range of issues going through different units across multiple policymaking bodies within a political system.

Collecting information at the level of policy issues further allows us to test whether there are differences in the nature of issues discussed in the policy communities across political systems. This is particularly interesting given that scholars find issue characteristics—scope, salience and conflict—determine the breadths and diversity of participation in the policy process (Baumgartner 1989; Schattschneider 1960; Hansen 1991). Therefore, analyzing issue characteristics is also important before making aggregate level comparisons across political systems, because issue characteristics have implications for the
participation in the overall policy process—varying patterns of participation found across three political systems could simply result from the differences in issue characteristics.

Finally, I argue that clear measures of participation allow us to investigate policy communities uniformly across political systems. I offer two distinct measures: the number of participants and type of participation. On the one hand, the number of participants is a clear indicator of the breadth (or the size)—broadness and narrowness—of participation (Baumgartner 1989). On the other hand, the type of participation reveals other key information about the policy community—the diversity of actors and interests mobilized in policymaking. A number of studies have previously used this strategy to investigate both the composition and dominance of a certain type of interest in a political system at a given point in time, though few comparative studies attempt to conceptualize the composition of the policy community (for an exception, see Salamon 1997). Such clear measures of participation allow us to analyze the relative dominance of governmental actors in relation to nongovernmental actors (Baumgartner et al. 2009), and more narrowly which interests (i.e., business or public interest groups) dominate in each policy community (Danielien and Page 1994; Golden 1998; Wonka et al. 2010). I take this strategy further to examine the type of actors operating in the policymaking communities across political systems.

Concrete measures of participation may also illustrate that the types of actors involved in policymaking, at least when it comes to nongovernmental interests, do not vary across political systems as previously argued. Whereas Walker (1991) and Schlozman (1984) observe limited diversity in the policy community in the US, finding the dominance of economic interests, Berry (1999) argues that citizens’ groups are highly represented in terms of the number of lobbying organizations. The same kind of efforts has been made in within the context of the EU policy community. Whereas most scholars find overrepresentation of
business interests (including Coen 1998; Eising 2009), Kohler-Koch finds growing representation of non-business interests in the EU (Kohler-Koch 1994; 2007). Thus, both economic as well as non-economic interests seem to be actively mobilized in the US and EU communities. Similarly, the Japanese case also shows that advocacy oriented groups are highly represented in political systems where economic interests historically dominated (Tsujinaka and Pekkanen 2007). This evidence suggest that though the overall size of the public sphere might vary the population of groups—the diversity in interests represented—might be similar.

This chapter has two major goals. First, I examine whether distinct participation patterns at the national level find support in Korea, the EU, and the US given the unique features each political system represents. An additional goal of the chapter is to look further into participation patterns beyond the dichotomy of state and society. That is, I illustrate that the differences across policymaking typologies might be overstated. While distinct patterns of participation emerge, focusing on the differences fails to capture striking similarities in the nongovernmental sector.

In the sections to follow, I describe case selection, the process of data collection, and present research findings. Specific questions I examine in this chapter are the following: do different categorizations of policymaking indicate that more actors and groups (in terms of both number and type) participate in pluralist systems, in comparison to corporatist and statist systems? Additionally, who among government insiders and outsiders get involved in policymaking?

Case Selection
I compare three political systems—South Korea, the EU, and the US—in this chapter. These three systems were selected because they represent varying degrees of government-group relations, and state-society dominance. Studies show strong statist traditions in Korean economic policymaking, where decision-making powers regarding policies of development were concentrated amongst political leadership and top level bureaucrats (Kohli 2004; Evans 1995). On the other hand, other interests, such as trade groups and unions, were weakly organized and excluded from the policy process (Johnson 1987; Woo-Cumings 1999). Moreover, Korea represents a case with a traditionally strong state and weak civil society (Armstrong 2007; S Kim 2000), although the Korean civil society is quickly expanding. Nongovernmental groups emerged as significant players in leading policy changes in the areas of political and social reforms (Lee and Arrington 2008).

Classic works in American politics classify the US as a pluralist system where a large number of interests compete to exert influence in the policy process (Dahl 1961; Truman 1951; Bauer et al. 1963). Indeed, Salisbury finds the pluralist form of policymaking most relevant in the US—dispersed powers of policymaking bodies as well as organized groups (Salisbury 1979). Additionally, the US represents a contrasting case to Korea, where society is strong in comparison to the state (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). Associational life in the US is one of the most vibrant (Putnam 1995), and organized groups also actively engage in the advocacy process (Andrews and Edwards 2004).

Finally, though the EU is a newly established political system with a short history, scholars notice corporatist policymaking traditions within the EU (Falkner 1998). In addition, the EU represents a case of both weak state and society. As a political system, the EU has divided policymaking powers with little democratic accountability, and societal interests operating in the EU policy community are also weakly organized at the EU level, although
numerous national-level groups increasingly tend to have offices in Brussels (Mahoney 2008; see also Dinan 1999; Dür and De Biévre 2007).

Making comparisons between Korea, the EU, and the US is rather unusual, because the EU as a non nation-state has rarely been included in previous studies of comparative policymaking (but for exceptions, see Mahoney 2008; Baumgartner 2007). Similarly, bringing in the Korean case is also unique, as previous research has typically compared the Korean policymaking process to other countries in Asia that share similar historical backgrounds (Tsujinaka et al. 1998). However, increasing attention has been paid to the expanding and emerging interest group system in EU, in a comparative context with the US (Berkhout and Lowery 2010; Wonka et al. 2010). Furthermore, given the distinct features each political system represents, using Korea, the EU, and the US allows us to draw broad implications about the actors involved in policy communities comparatively.

Data and Method

A large number of studies on comparative policymaking are small in scale, covering a single or a few policy areas. In contrast to the approaches taken by previous research, this chapter analyzes the policy process of Korea, EU and the US, by comparing the involvement of actors across a representative set of policy issues in each political system. The goal is to be able to generalize about the overall policy process. Next, I describe the process of data collection across three political systems in detail.

Locating a representative set of policy issues: moving from actors to issues

In order to define a set of issues that represents the issue universe in a given political system, three projects discussed in this chapter relied on the method of drawing issues from actors...
who are involved in the policymaking process. For instance, Lobbying and Policy Change constructed a sampling frame of organizations using the database created from the Lobbying Reports for 1996, where organizations were weighted by the amount of lobbying activity (Baumgartner et al. 2009). From the sampling frame, organizations were randomly selected to yield organizational issue identifiers, who provided a set of policy issues. Similarly, the sampling procedure for Brussels Versus the Beltway (Mahoney 2008) was identical for 21 issues in the US, but used the 2004 registry of the European Parliament, the 2004 Commission registry of civil society organizations (CONECCS), and the 2004 European Public Affairs Directory to construct the sampling frame for the EU issue identifiers.

As described in chapter 2, a set of 43 policy issues is the unit of analysis for the Korean case. The basis of the sampling frame used for Korea is different from previous studies in the US and EU, because I select issue identifiers from executive ministries and opposition parties in the legislature rather than from nongovernmental groups. Given that all three projects in Korea, the EU, and the US aimed at drawing a representative set of policy issues by asking the issue identifiers to discuss the most recent policy matter that they have worked on, whether government insiders or outside advocates are the basis of the sampling frame will not affect our ability to draw cross-national conclusions. However, given that bureaucratic rulemaking differs from legislative policymaking in that rulemaking entails matters of greater technical details which might be of little interest to the rest of the policy community (for how policymaking might differ from rulemaking see, Golden 1998; McKay and Yackee 2007 for the US case, and Pempel 1974 for Japan), there could be some
systematic bias in the Korean data set, such as a higher proportion of issues of smaller scope, lower salience and little conflict.  

As will be demonstrated in the sections to follow, the overall characteristics of issues sampled across three political systems look similar despite the differences in the ways in which issues were sampled. In sum, we can conclude that though the method of selecting issues in Korea was different from Baumgartner et al. (2009) and Mahoney (2008)’s projects by relying on government insiders (both bureaucrats and politicians) to identify issues, such different sampling strategies did not seem to have caused any systematic bias. This might be due to the fact government insiders—particularly bureaucrats—get involved in all aspects of policymaking and various kinds of issue debates in political systems like Korea where state actors traditionally have heavily dominated the policy process (see Pempel 1974). At the same time, however, one way in which relying on the bureaucrats to identify issues could possibly cause bias is sampling issue debates where policy perspectives are not divided along partisan lines. I turn to this point later in the chapter.

*The list of major participants*

A list of actors involved in the issue debate was assembled after the initial and secondary interviews, by including the names of actors that were mentioned by others as playing important roles in the issue debate. The list of participants was sometimes expanded after

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29 It is important to note that issues sampled by Baumgartner et al. (2009) and Mahoney (2008) also include issues involving bureaucrats in the government agencies. However, the chances of including highly technical issues are greater in the case of Korea, because I rely on bureaucrats themselves (rather than outside groups) to list the issue.
secondary data searches, by adding the names of actors who appear in the public sources as being key players to the issue debate. An identical data collection method was used for the US and Korean policymaking projects.\footnote{See the earlier chapter on research design (chapter 2), Baumgartner et al. (2009)’s methodological appendix, and Mahoney (2008)’s chapter 2 for further details.} On the other hand, the list of participants in Mahoney (2008)’s project includes only those mentioned by others. That is, the list only includes the actors mentioned by others as being key players in the issue debate—those personally interviewed in either the initial or snowballing interviews.\footnote{Refer to table 3.2 on Mahoney’s Brussels Versus the Beltway.} Because of the slightly different ways in which the list of participants was assembled, I analyze the results of the EU separately, rather than placing them side by side with the US and Korean policymaking data.

Specifically, I hypothesize that the pluralist US will show broader levels of participation in terms of total number of participants, than the statist Korea. Furthermore, given distinct levels of state and society dominance in the US and Korea, I expect to observe nongovernmental actors more frequently than governmental actors in the US policy community. By contrast, participation of governmental actors, particularly executive branch actors including the bureaucracy, should appear more frequently in Korea than the US. Finally, I expect the breadth and diversity of participation in the corporatist EU to be somewhat unique—labor and business interests, along with EU institutional actors, should appear frequently. Given the weakness of both the state and society in the EU, however, involvement of either governmental or nongovernmental interests will be observed to lesser extent in comparison to the US or Korea.
Beyond aggregate level differences, however, I also expect some similarities to appear across political systems when looking at the nongovernmental interests that are active in the policy communities. Given the dominance of economic interests, I expect all three policy communities to involve the frequent participation of trade groups, corporations and unions. At the same time, non-economic interests, such as citizen groups, will also get involved frequently in policymaking commonly across political systems. Thus, whereas the overall size of nongovernmental participation might vary, what kinds of societal interests are mobilized would look similar in the three political systems.

The composition of the policy community in Korea, the EU, and the US

In this section, I discuss the composition of the policy communities in Korea, the EU, and the US. I focus on two distinct aspects—the issues studied, and the actors involved. This overview illustrates that the issues studied in the three political systems are similar in characteristics. Thus, the varying participation patterns in the three political systems cannot be a function of the differences in the nature of issues analyzed in the data sets.

I also present the number and type of participants found across three political systems. The results confirm the long held belief that the typologies of policymaking and state-society relations are key to explaining aggregate patterns of participation in comparative policymaking. At the same time, the data shows some common features found across political systems, such as the frequent involvement of nongovernmental groups in the policy process, as well as the diversity of interests represented in the policy community. I discuss implications of such findings later in the conclusion.
Overview of issues

In this section, I first give an overview of the issues analyzed—the policy areas and issue characteristics, such as scope, conflict and salience. As table 5.1 illustrates, the issues studied in each political system come from a wide range of policy areas, evidenced in the number of issues distributed across rows that indicate 19 substantive policy areas. However, when looking at which policy area the policy community pays attention to, the three political systems differ slightly.

In both Korea and the US, the largest number of issues came from health (19% in Korea, and 21% in the US), followed by government operations (14%) in Korea and environment (13%) in the US. Governmental operations, an area that includes topics such as intergovernmental relations, government efficiency and bureaucratic oversight receives more attention in the Korean policy community than in the US (3%). On the other hand, attention was concentrated in the EU policy community—economic issues, such as banking, finance and domestic commerce (31%) and science, technology and communication (12%), along with government operations (19%) were popular topics. But then again, all three policy communities are paying attention to a wide range of issues across policy areas. This is rather surprising given that many comparative policymaking studies previously focused their attention on the economic policy area, and then applied their findings to the entire policy community. However, issues broadly related to macroeconomics and commerce comprise a large portion of the EU policy community, but not in Korea and the US.

(Table 5.1 about here)
What is clearly illustrated in table 5.2 is the extent to which similar patterns are observable across the three systems. For instance, the Korean data set (columns 2 and 3) and Mahoney’s EU comparative data set (columns 8 and 9) both illustrate that a mix of small and large scope issues are dealt with in all policy communities. Scope is defined as whether the policy proposal affects only a few individuals or sectors, numerous massive industries, or the entire political system (Mahoney 2008, 40).  

Mahoney makes a contrast between two issues—Effluent Limitation Guidelines for the Transportation Equipment Cleaning Industry and the US Farm Bill—to illustrate the difference between issues of narrow and wide scope. Whereas the former concerns specific EPA regulations on the amount and content of water runoff, the latter issue involves the nation’s macro-level agricultural policy (included in the policy are some key products like dairy, sugar, and peanuts) affecting a large number of groups.  

Similarly, issues included in the Korean policymaking project represent issues with distinct features. For instance, some issues had massive implications for the entire nation, such as the protection of small retailers—an issue that involves three important bills discussed in the 17th National Assembly, having direct implications for 6 million small and

32 The variable scope in the Korean dataset is based on Mahoney’s definition. However, it is measured slightly differently. For details, see the note that appears at the bottom of table 5.2.

33 For details of the wide range of issues included in Mahoney’s project see Mahoney (2008, 52-55, also appendix).
medium sized retailers in the country. By contrast, enforcement of the registration of motorcycles under 50cc displacement is an issue of narrow scope, because the issue entails little budget and has a limited impact on a small group of motorcycle producers and consumers. Comparisons of the measure of scope in the Korean data set, and Mahoney’s EU data sets show that issues of narrow and somewhat narrow scope are more common than large scope issues—those having a country-wide impact.

Also, conflict is rather common in all three systems—opposing perspectives are presented often. More than half the issue debates in Korea and the EU involve perspectives that are in direct opposition to one another. Similarly, Baumgartner et al. specifically note the simplicity of conflict structure in the US policy community—one perspective favoring the policy status-quo and the other opposing it (Baumgartner et al. 2009, chapter 6). The US data set shows that 58 out of 98 issues had two perspectives. Additionally, the authors noted that 23 issue debates involved multiple perspectives (usually 3-4) with competing policy goals. Even then, the conflict structure was straightforward—one perspective supporting the status-quo, and a few other perspectives attempting to change the policy in slightly different ways.

One way in which the three political systems diverge is in the level of attention issues receive publicly, indicated by the extent to which issue debates are covered in the news. Some issues, like banning human cloning in the EU, drew a large amount of public attention. On the other hand, issues like the Recreation Marine Employment Act—a bill aimed at exempting small marinas from having to pay a specific type of insurance—never attracted the interest of the larger public. Similarly, issues varied in terms of the amount of public attention received in Korea. Relocating Korea’s administrative capital city from Seoul to Sejong (a city scheduled to be built) received the most public attention during the period under study. By contrast, the Mental Health Act, a bill that aimed to require the mental
review board to examine the mentally ill before automatically barring them from taking government licensed exams, received no coverage in the news. Comparisons of issues discussed in Korea, the EU and the US policymaking communities show that about half the time, issues discussed in the EU community go unnoticed by the public, whereas most issues are likely to get some media coverage in the Korean (88%) and US policy communities (88%). But then again, the differences seem to largely result from the fact that only a single source was used to measure salience in Mahoney’s project, whereas the data bases used to record media attention in Korea and the US included multiple nation-wide news sources. More fundamentally, however, the differences can be explained by the fact that the EU as an intergovernmental political organization lacks broad reaching media coverage that raises the awareness of the public in all 23 member states (Mahoney 2008, 52).

Finally, issue characteristics in Korea and the US diverge in the sense that issues discussed in the US tend to be more partisan than in Korea. This point is demonstrated on the bottom of table 5.2. Issues discussed in the Korean community were mostly not partisan (70%). By contrast, in the US case, issues were frequently somewhat partisan (32%) or strongly partisan (24%).

Overall, this overview of issue characteristics for public policymaking projects in Korea, the US, and Mahoney’s project in the EU shows that what we find across political systems regarding the number and type of participants cannot entirely be a function of the specific attributes of issues studied in each project. Thus, the patterns of participation in overall policymaking presented in the following section should reflect the differences in the key dimensions that distinguish the three political systems—government group interactions and state-society relations.
Overview of participation

In this section, I present data on participation in the policymaking process based on representative sets of policy issues in Korea, the EU, and the US. Of primary interest in the data sets are the total numbers of participants in the policymaking process. If the expectations about the differences across policymaking types—pluralist, corporatist and statist systems and state-society dominance—hold true, such variances would be noticeable in the number of participants. That is, given the abundant interests operating in a pluralist system, we would expect the total number of participants to be the largest in the US, in comparison to Korea. Additionally, the number of participants should be lower in Korea, considering the lack of societal interests operating in the policy community due to the strong presence of the state.

Data presented in table 5.3 confirms the idea that the US is a pluralist society in comparison to Korea, demonstrated in the broadness of participation in policymaking. There are only twice as many issues drawn from the US, but about four times as many participants are found in the US (2117) than in Korea (457). On average, policy issue debates that occur in the policy community involve approximately 10 actors and groups per issue in Korea, whereas in the US it was twice as many—approximately 20 per issue. In the aggregate level, then, pluralist and statist policymaking systems do represent distinct levels of participation.34

(The Table 5.3 about here)

34 I do not compare Mahoney’s EU data in terms of total number of participation, because of the way in which the lists of participants were gathered in her project that differs from projects in Korea and the US.
Another important indicator of involvement in the policymaking process is the type of actor participating in a policy debate. If varying levels of state-civil society relations were important to explaining participation patterns in the policy process, we would find Korean policymaking dominated more by actors inside the government than outside groups. On the other hand, the proportion of nongovernmental groups should be greater in the US than in Korea. Thus, I look closely at the ratio—the participation of governmental actors versus nongovernmental interests. As expected, government actors comprise 63% of total participation in Korea, whereas only 40% in the US. Generally, these data confirm our expectations that the state-society relationship is an important dimension in explaining the participation patterns in the policy process.

On the other hand, given the contrast between the pluralist US and statist Korea, we expect to find distinct patterns of interaction among the government, business and labor. That is, given the government’s dominance in economic policymaking, we expect to see frequent participation of governmental actors and business groups (corporations and trade groups) in Korea, but little representation of other nongovernmental actors. By contrast, we expect to find a higher representation of trade groups, corporations and unions and less participation of government insiders in the US in comparison to Korea. We can see from table 5.3 that these expectations are generally confirmed. Business corporations, trade groups and unions were involved less frequently in the case of Korea (9%, 9%, and 1% respectively), than in the US (8%, 13% and 4% respectively). Among governmental actors, those inside ministries (23%) dominated in Korea along with legislative members (majority 16%, and opposition 11%). In the US, by contrast, participation of congressional members was prominent among actors inside the government (17% legislative majority, and 17% legislative opposition).
Furthermore, the research design adopted in the US and Korean policymaking projects allow us to compare participation at the level of policy issues—how many issues involve what type of participation. Thus, in addition to aggregating data for each political system to look at overall participation, I analyzed the number of issues that involve a certain type of participation.

(Table 5.4 about here)

From table 5.4 we notice that the exact same participation patterns hold at the level of policy issues. In the case of Korea, executive ministries were found as major participants in 41 out of 43 issues (95%). Similarly, members in the opposition parties and the majority party were found in 24 (56%) and 23 (53%) issues respectively. In the US, congressional members—members of both the majority and the opposition party—were involved in 67 (68%) out of 98 issues. Executive agencies participated in fewer number of issues—56 of them (57%). That is, as noted on table 5.3, among governmental actors, executive branch actors dominate in Korea whereas congressional members are more active in the US. Similarly, in accordance with the aggregate view from the previous table, trade groups, business corporations and unions were more frequently observed at the issue level in the US (76%, 56% and 30% respectively) in than in Korea (40%, 23% and 5% respectively).

(Table 5.5 about here)

Table 5.5 illustrates that the involvement of governmental actors—whether an EU agency, the EU parliament or actors affiliated with any of the member states—is relatively
rare in the EU. By contrast, the EU policy community is dominated by business interests, such as trade groups (49%) and corporations (6%). The EU, by and large, is a community dominated by business interests. This might be explained by the fact that issues discussed in the EU community heavily represent issues related to the economy and commerce (see issue summary presented on table 5.1).

Past comparative policymaking research on economic policymaking mainly highlights the role of prominent business and labor groups in their studies, paying little attention to a wider array of interests. If the patterns of participation hold in policy areas other than economics, we would see the dominance of corporations, trade groups and unions, along with the involvement of governmental actors in overall policymaking. Though such patterns partly hold in the comparative data sets across Korea, the EU, and the US, the findings deviate slightly from conventional expectations. That is, the actors and groups participating in the policy process include diverse sets of actors and groups inside and outside the government. Research on comparative policymaking that focused on economic policy areas only provide a partial view of the policy community. Next, I discuss the composition of the policy community further, with a focus on the non-governmental sector.

**Looking into the nongovernmental sector**

A closer look at the type of actors participating in the policy process illustrates striking similarities across political systems. Particularly interesting are the groups represented in the nongovernmental sector—the frequently observed economic interests (i.e., trade groups, professional associations, corporations, and unions) as well as noneconomic interests (i.e., citizen groups and issue coalitions).
Dominance of economic interests has received a vast amount of attention in American politics research. Data presented on tables 3 and 5 shows that the same pattern holds outside the US policy community. Economic interests all together composed 21% of the community in Korea, 32% in the US and 67% in the EU. The higher representation of business interests in the US than in Korea is surprising, because given our understandings of the statist and pluralist policymaking systems, we expect to find a higher representation of economic interests in Korea than in the US where a wide range of groups (including noneconomic interests) are active. Again, the findings show that typologies of policymaking based mainly on economic policymaking do not seem to apply to the entire policy community.

On the other hand, we also notice the frequent participation of noneconomic interests. Citizen groups and issue coalitions together composed 12% of the community in Korea, compared to 20% in the US. Similarly, the policy community of the EU is diverse, consisting of a wide array of interests—citizen groups (21%) and lobbying firms (4%) to list a few examples. This finding confirms Berry (1999)’s observation that the involvement of citizen groups in policymaking is growing even in political systems like Korea where societal interests generally have remained weak throughout history.

**Conclusion**

This chapter empirically analyzed the actors participating in the policymaking process in Korea, the EU, and the US. Existing studies with an emphasis on different categorizations of policymaking (e.g., statist, corporatist and pluralist) or levels of state-society dominance show both static and deterministic views of participation in the policy process. That is, studies typically generalize about national-level policymaking—diverse interests compete to
exert greater influence in one political system, whereas groups play marginal roles in policymaking due to presence of a strong state in another.

In line with previous research in comparative policymaking studies, the chapter shows that some distinct patterns emerge when looking at participation across political systems with varying levels of government-group relations and state-society dominance. For instance, a large number of participants and a great range of nongovernmental interests are found in the pluralist US, where the civil society remains the most vibrant. By contrast, economic interests and EU policymakers dominate in the corporatist EU, where the powers of both policymaking bodies and the society are both weak. Finally, in comparison to the US and EU, the breadth of participation remains narrow and actors inside the government are highly represented in the statist Korea, where the state has traditionally dominated all areas of policymaking.

At the same time, however, there were similarities across political systems, such as the diversity of groups participating in the policy community. Such similarities may explain why state-business-labor negotiations emerge in countries where corporatist form of interest intermediation has been absent (O’Donnell and O’Reardon 1997), nongovernmental groups play a prominent role in post-communist democracies (Grodsky 2009), and citizen groups are increasing in countries where civil society has traditionally been weak (Pekkenen 2006; S Kim 2000). In sum, aggregate generalizations at the national level narrowly focusing on a few issues and policy areas fall short of capturing a dynamically expanding nongovernmental sector, found uniformly across political systems.

Much comparative research on policymaking centers on explaining the differences among nations, such as policy outcomes and participation patterns (Lijphart 1999). The emphasis on the differences have further led to studies narrowly focusing on the sets of actors
playing major roles in the policy process, such as organized interests in pluralist systems (Truman 1951), state-business-labor in corporatist systems (Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982), and government insiders in statist systems (Krauss and Muramatsu 1984). Though the differences do indeed explain comparative policy processes, existing studies fail to note the emerging similarities in policy communities. This in part explains why common features among policymaking communities have been highlighted little, and rarely examined empirically.

This chapter offers the beginning of comparative policymaking research based on large data sets that make cross-regional comparisons possible, providing an overview of the actors and groups participating in the policy process in Korea, the EU, and the US. Comparative policymaking research typically analyzes government-group interactions in a single policy area or a few policy issues before making national level generalizations and cross-national comparisons. As discussed earlier in the chapter, however, which actors and groups get involved in the policymaking process vary across issues and policy areas. Therefore, generalizing about the policy process of a political system requires studying policy issues as units of analysis and considering a range of policy issues.

Finally, this chapter recommends that future scholars of comparative policymaking build onto larger data sets that make direct comparisons possible. Large cross-national data sets allow us to further investigate the growing similarities across policy communities demonstrated by the diversity in the interests represented outside the countries examined here. As shown in this chapter, the first step is moving toward creating a broad sample of policymakers at all levels of the policy process across various institutional venues weighted by their degree of involvement in the process, and asking them about their current policy
activities. Such a design makes possible the identification of issues at all levels and at all stages of the policy process, from which we can infer the overall policymaking process.
Table 5.1: Policy Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Topic</th>
<th>Yoon (Korea)</th>
<th>Baumgartner et al. (US)</th>
<th>Mahoney (EU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Operations</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Trade</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, Finance and Domestic Commerce</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science, Technology and Communication</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor, Immigration and Employment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development and Housing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomics and Taxation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Lands and Water Management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense and National Security</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law, Crime and Family Policy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Affairs and Foreign Aid</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Issues</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>98</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mahoney (2008)’s project originally did not contain any coding of policy topics. For the purpose of making comparisons, I coded the 26 issue topics in the EU after going through issue summaries published in the appendix (see Mahoney 2008).
Table 5.2: Issue Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very narrow scope</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat narrow scope</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat large scope</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Korea</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One perspective</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple but not opposing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing perspectives</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIND</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexis-Nexis</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not partisan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat partisan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly partisan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table notes the characteristics of the issues sampled. Two distinct features deserve further mention. The measure of scope in the Korean project is a sum of three distinct attributes of the issue—the number of people affected, the amount of budget involved and the degree of policy change sought. For Mahoney (2008)'s project, the variable measures the size of the industry. Additionally, Mahoney’s project uses a single source—the Financial Times—to measure salience. However, the Korean and the US projects relied on the Korean Integrated News Database (KIND) and Lexis-Nexis—a comprehensive news database containing 10 national daily news sources, and 29 major newspapers in the US—to measure salience.
Table 5.3: The Number and Type of Participants in the Policy Process: Korea and the US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Type</th>
<th>Korea (Issue N=43)</th>
<th>US (Issue N=98)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Ministries</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Opposition</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Majority</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Groups</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Corporations</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Groups</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-national Government</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the President/PM</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nongovernmental Actors</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Coalitions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Governmental Actors</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Associations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The US data comes from Baumgartner et al. (2009)’s Lobbying and Policy Change project table 1.1 and table 1.2. The Korean dataset was collected by author (June 2009-May 2010).

Note: Table notes the number and type of participants observed across a sample of 43 issues in Korea and 98 policy issues in the US. From Baumgartner et al.’s table 1.2., I merged two categories—rank-and-file, and ranking members of the republican party—to create an equivalent of Korea’s legislative opposition. Legislative majority, on the other hand, was a combination of three categories—rank-and-file, ranking members of the democratic party, and democratic leadership.
Table 5.4: Issues Per Participant: Korea and the US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Type</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Ministries</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Opposition</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Majority</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Groups</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Governmental Actors</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Groups</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the President/PM</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nongovernmental Actors</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Corporations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Coalitions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-national Government</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Associations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Issues</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers indicate the number of issues that include the indicated type of actor.
Table 5.5: The Number and Types of Participants in the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU (Issue N=26)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying Firm</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Agency</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional/Local Government</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm Rep</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Governmental Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Institution</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>82</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data comes from Mahoney’s advocacy in the EU project (2004-2005).
Chapter 6

Conclusion

My dissertation began with two empirical puzzles: should our understanding of the East Asian model be altered by the growth of civil society in the contemporary period, and is the participation pattern found in the East Asian model of policymaking distinct from that of other political systems? Analyzing a representative set of 43 policy issues in Korea, and making direct comparisons with 98 issues in the US, and 26 in the EU, the dissertation has uncovered key characteristics of the policy process in Korea, and comparative policymaking generally. Overall, the East Asian model of policymaking finds little support, both in terms of participation and influence in contemporary policymaking in Korea. Participation patterns found in overall policymaking are simply too diverse, and are no longer being dominated by a narrow set of government insiders and a few business groups. That is, policy debates in Korea are not exclusive to actors inside the government. In fact, nongovernmental groups, including diverse sets of economic and noneconomic interests, frequently participate in policymaking. Also, as noted by research on the rising civil society in Korea, prominent public interest groups that emerged since democratization are visible in today’s policy process, working closely with state actors in policy debates.

Similarly, it is difficult to declare whether the state or business has greater influence in policymaking—neither the state nor business is a unitary actor supporting a single policy goal. Both business and the state are divided when it comes to their positions on certain policy issues, and the same policy perspective is typically advocated by a mix of different kinds of actors. Furthermore, though state bureaucracy is often at the forefront of proposing
policy changes and getting the outcome it seeks, groups standing in opposition also attain policy influence by finding other institutional allies.

Finally, country level generalizations regarding participation in policymaking do find support. Generally speaking, state actors are more prominent than outside interests in the statist Korea, whereas nongovernmental groups actively engaged in the pluralist US, and economic peak associations dominate in the EU policy making process as the corporatist model would argue. Somewhat contrary to what the East Asian model would expect, however, some aspects of participation found in the Korean policy process resembles that of the US and EU. Specifically, the policy communities are much more diverse than previously thought, and interests operating in the nongovernmental sector look similar across political systems. In the following section, I discuss the major findings of my dissertation in turn. The core features of policymaking revealed here are not specific to Korea, but are likely to apply to other political systems where the East Asian model of policymaking has frequently been applied.

First, the bureaucracy dominates, but the Korean policy community is not exclusive to state actors. As the findings in chapter 3, based on a representative set of 43 issues, illustrates a policy issue debate involves an average of two to three bureaucrats in Korea. Participation of actors inside the bureaucracy in public policy debates appeared more frequently than any other actor inside and outside the government. Considering that the number does not take into account the involvement of bureaucrats when they perform neutral decision-making roles in the issue, the frequency of their participation clearly indicates bureaucratic dominance in the Korean policy process. To summarize, in line with the broad understandings provided by the
East Asian model of policymaking, state actors, and particularly the bureaucracy, plays an important role in the overall policy process.

At the same time, however, the policy community is no longer exclusive to state actors, nor a few business corporations. In fact, my dissertation found participation of many other relevant actors from both inside and outside the government. Among government insiders, for instance, elected representatives—both opposition party members and majority party members—were frequently found in the policy process, and so were actors in the office of the president. Most importantly, however, more than a third of total participation in the policy process came from the nongovernmental sector, including citizen groups, trade groups, and business corporations.

Second, civil society is much more diverse than a few business conglomerate groups or public interest groups. Generally, past research on public policymaking in Korea provided relatively little information as to the types of nongovernmental actors active in the policy community. On the one hand, research on Korea’s developmental policies and economic reform (thus, the East Asian model of policymaking) showed large conglomerate groups prominent among nongovernmental actors in policymaking. On the other hand, research on the rising civil society focused on a different type of group—public interest groups—that emerged since Korea’s democratic transition, playing a significant role in setting policy agendas related to social reform.

The results presented on chapter 3 show that corporations and public interest groups do indeed participate frequently in policymaking. However, the range of nongovernmental groups evidenced in the policy community is simply too diverse to be classified as either a few prominent public interest groups or large conglomerate business corporations. The
community includes not only the well-known, widely studied Samsung, or Hyundai corporations, or public interest groups like *People’s Solidarity of Participatory Democracy* (PSPD) or *Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice* (CCEJ), but also many lesser-known small and medium sized corporations (i.e., furniture manufacturers), trade groups and specific issue oriented public interest groups (i.e., reforming medical malpractice). The nature of the public sphere, mainly its diversity, has rarely been highlighted in the previous research.

*Third, a stable pattern of interaction is developing between government insiders and major civil society groups.* Though the East Asian model of policymaking originally paid little attention to nongovernmental actors in general (other than large business corporations), a number of studies focusing on the expansion of the NGO sector in Korea have pointed out the prominent role played by well-known public interest groups (*simindanche*)—organizations advocating the interests of the public at large. However, how frequently these groups appear as participants in the policy process, and how they interact with state actors in today’s policy process are questions that remain relatively unexplored.

Democratization in Korea not only resulted in greater participation of groups in public policymaking, but also the politicization of government-group interactions. Chapter 3 finds that confrontational legacies developed in the transition process come into play in determining the pattern of interaction between state actors and outside groups in the policymaking process. A clear conflict structure was noticeable in the nine issues that involved seven major civil society groups. Groups closely ally with opposition party members in the National Assembly, such as the *Democratic Party* and *Democratic Labor Party* (primarily parties leaning to the left), as well as other public interest groups. These groups maintain adversarial relationships with the *Grand National Party* (GNP), in control of
both the Blue House and the majority in the National Assembly during the period under study, and economic interests like corporations and trade groups. According to the findings presented in chapter 3, the politicization of civil society is becoming salient in the Korean policymaking process.

Given the unique way in which the prominent civil society groups emerged in Korea—challenging the authoritarian state and assisting democratization—groups primarily ally with left leaning political parties, rather than the right leaning *Grand National Party* (GNP). This alliance structure suggests that the ability of these groups to have a voice in policymaking will be greater when left parties are in power than vice versa. Indeed, the research noticing the rise of civil society occurred during the *Kim Dae-jung* and *Roh Moo-hyun* governments in 1997-2007, both of whom represented “liberal” ideas in politics. This, in turn, means that civil society groups are less visible in policymaking when a conservative party is in power (i.e., the current *Lee Myung-bak* administration). This emerging conflict structure raises some concerns regarding the functions of civil society as aggregators of public interest in a democratic system. Ultimately, it is not the politicization of civil society that is worrisome, but rather unequal development of civil society—a lack of groups representing moderate and conservative political views.

*Fourth, to say whether the state bureaucracy or business wins is difficult, because a policy perspective is advocated by a mix of government insiders and outsiders.* The East Asian model of policymaking offers somewhat contrasting expectations about policy influence, defined as the ability to have policy perspectives successfully reflected in the outcomes. Whereas research on Korea’s economic policymaking argues that state actors are successful in winning policy outcomes they support, another group of research finds that the direction of
influence has shifted since democratization—leaders of large corporations attain policy success by providing the resources necessary for politicians to win election campaigns. My analysis of seven economic policy issues broadly related to macroeconomics presented in chapter 4 finds that it is difficult to conclude whether the state bureaucracy or business interests win, because almost every policy perspective is advocated by a combination of government insiders and outside groups (i.e., trade groups and business corporations).

Specifically, each issue debate involved participation of at least one, if not multiple, bureaucratic ministries, who often took opposing perspectives to one another. The state is not a unitary actor with a single policy goal in mind. Similarly, the business sector represents a diverse set of interests. Whereas large conglomerate groups were observed in only one issue debate in my data, small and medium sized businesses were mobilized frequently to fight for or against policy changes, as well as trade groups, organized specifically to support the policy interests of a certain industry. But again, business is rarely a unified group. As was the case with bureaucratic agencies, corporations and trade groups favoring one policy outcome to an issue debate, face an opposition from another group of corporations and trade groups favoring a different outcome. Public accounts of policymaking leads us to expect a simplistic view of the policy process—business groups favoring a certain policy outcome are prevented from seeking such changes due to impermeable bureaucracy, or the state actors simply undertaking policy changes on behalf of business interests. The reality is much more complicated. A group of government insiders and outside groups favoring one policy outcome stand in opposition to another group of actors supporting a different outcome and both groups adopt various kinds of advocacy strategies to win.
Fifth, groups attain policy success by seeking institutional allies. As noted previously, bureaucratic ministries in Korea are typically involved in policy debates as advocates of a certain policy perspective, rather than performing a purely neutral role as mediators of interests. Additionally, somewhat in line with the arguments of the East Asian model, groups standing in opposition to the perspectives of the bureaucratic ministries generally have a hard time winning in the policy process. That is, when bureaucratic ministries wished to bring about changes to an existing policy, they got what they wanted—policy outcomes reflecting their policy goals—despite opposition.

At the same time, my study finds that the policy goals of the opponents were attained either entirely or partially in the outcome when finding other government agencies, or members of the National Assembly, supporting the same policy goal. These findings illustrate that seeking an alternative institutional venue is an important strategy to exercise influence in the Korean policy process. Contrary to the common belief that the Korean policymaking process is identified by concentrated policymaking powers to a single branch of government—specifically bureaucratic ministries having monopolistic control over policy decision-making—the evidence supports that the state has dispersed policymaking powers and divided policy goals often in conflict with one another.

Sixth, comparative policymaking typologies and the emphasis on state-society dimensions in explaining participation patterns across political systems find support at the general level, but with some qualifications. Chapter 5 shows that the US is more of a pluralist society than Korea, evidenced in the broadness of participation in policymaking. On average, approximately twice as many participants were found per issue debate in the US than in Korea—approximately 10 actors and groups per issue in Korea, 20 per issue in the US.
Additionally, distinct types of participation were also noticeable across Korea, the EU, and the US. As the East Asian model of policymaking would argue, governmental actors and business interests (corporations and trade groups) were frequently involved in the statist Korea, but unions and other societal interests much less. By contrast, a high representation of trade groups, corporations and unions, but a lower participation of government insiders was found in the pluralist US. Finally, participation patterns found in Korea and the US further illustrate that state-society relations represent an important dimension in explaining varying participation patterns in the policy process. That is, Korean policymaking is heavily dominated by actors inside the government than outside groups and the contrary holds true in the US. Overall, these findings support that the key dimensions explaining participation patterns in the comparative policymaking process do find empirical support across issues, and policy areas.

At the same time, however, the nongovernmental sector looks quite similar across political systems—the policy communities of Korea, the EU, and the US commonly illustrate diversity in interests represented. For instance, economic interests (i.e., trade groups, professional associations, corporations, and unions) dominated in all three policy communities. Additionally, frequent participation of noneconomic interests (i.e., citizen groups and issue coalitions) was also common across three political systems. Surprisingly, the visibility of citizen groups is evident even in Korea where societal interests have remained weak throughout history. Generally, comparisons across the three political systems illustrate the underlying similarities—a diversity of interests represented in the policy communities. Previous studies of comparative policymaking primarily focused on highlighting the differences, such as major players, providing only a limited view of the comparative policymaking process.
Implications for Future Studies of Comparative Policymaking

From the findings of my dissertation, I draw three major implications for future studies of comparative policymaking. First, the East Asian model of policymaking that assumes a narrow set of actors involved and a clear direction of policy influence falls short of describing today’s policymaking community. Second, stressing only the differences across policy communities prevent us from realizing underlying similarities. Finally, which policy areas are analyzed affects the findings regarding participation, and thus examining a single or a few policy areas may limit the ability to draw generalizable implications.

First, the East Asian model as we know it no longer accurately portrays the policymaking process in Korea. Not only does participation involve a diverse set of actors, but the direction of influence is also unclear. Most importantly, civil society consists of much wider array of actors than previously noted. This is not to suggest that the model was always a myth. Rather, these findings bring into attention the dynamic nature of the policy process since Korea’s democratization in 1987. As Korea moves further and further into a democracy, participation in policymaking is likely to become even more diverse. Policy outcomes will increasingly depend on advocacy strategies, and the alliance structure between outside groups and institutional actors will become more politicized.

The same kinds of changes are also likely to be occurring in other political systems where the East Asian model has frequently been applied. The model assumes a static view of participation and influence in policymaking. However, policy communities are expected to dramatically diversify mainly through the democratization that has taken place in East Asia,
Southeast Asia and Latin America (in the case of Japan, simply the growth of interest groups since 1990s).

Second, focusing on the differences has prevented scholars from realizing emerging similarities in policy communities. As illustrated in chapter 5 of the dissertation, policymaking typologies (stressed repeatedly by past comparative policymaking research) do find support across political systems. A large number of comparative policymaking studies focus on explaining the differences across political systems, such as policy outcomes and participation patterns. The emphasis on the differences have further led to studies narrowly focusing on the sets of actors playing major roles in the policy process, such as groups in pluralist systems, government-business-labor in corporatist systems, and governmental actors in statist systems. My dissertation argues that existing studies fail to note the emerging similarities in policy communities, largely due to researchers’ concentration in the distinct features displayed across policymaking systems. This in part explains why common features in the policymaking communities have been highlighted little, and rarely examined empirically. The findings of my dissertation encourage future scholars of comparative policymaking to move beyond explaining the differences across policymaking systems, investigating instead the implications of diverse interests represented similarly across policy communities.

At least in terms of overall participation (ironically the topic receiving the most attention in comparative policymaking research), policy communities today don’t vary much across political systems. What clearly differs across political systems, however, is the level of state involvement in policymaking, not the general landscape of civil society. These findings have significant implications for studies in comparative policymaking. Most lobbying
research in the US (and also other political systems like the EU) developed under the expectation that outside groups play an important role in the policymaking process. Though nongovernmental groups were thought to be marginal players in Korea, they frequently get involved in the policy process to shape policy outcomes today. Given different degrees of state involvement as well as various institutional branches having policymaking powers (i.e., the legislature and the executive) across policy communities, how groups interact with governmental actors is likely to vary across political systems. That is, finding institutional allies is obviously a likely and important advocacy strategy for groups in political systems where state actors play important roles in the policymaking process. Similarly, in countries like Korea where the bureaucracy is so central to the policymaking process, groups will bring attention to how much of an impact the policy issue has on the government (i.e., budget) than highlighting electoral aspects of the debate. Thus, future comparative policymaking research should pay attention to the behaviors and advocacy strategies employed by groups in analyzing similarities and differences across policy communities.

Finally, the policy areas examined greatly affects what one finds regarding participation in policymaking. The East Asian model of policymaking based on economic policy areas found policymaking largely dominated by actors in the executive branch (the president and elite bureaucrats) and economic based interests (corporations and trade groups). As illustrated in chapter 3 using the case of Korea, however, a macro-level overview across policy areas provides a distinct picture—participation involved not only actors in the executive branch, but also legislative members, as well as various kinds of nongovernmental groups. Similarly, comparative policymaking research categorizes countries into pluralist, statist and corporatist systems based on the type of participation found in the economic policy area, mainly
highlighting the roles of large business and labor groups, and paying little attention to a wider array of interests. If the economic policy area is representative of the entire policy community, corporations, trade groups and unions, along with governmental actors should be frequently observed across all issue areas. The findings of chapter 5, however, show that actors and groups participating in the policy process include diverse sets of actors inside and outside the government. These findings suggest that research focusing only on a single policy area runs the danger of providing a partial view of the policy community.

In this regard, generalizing about participation in policymaking requires studying the involvement of actors occurring at the level of issues across a wide range of policy areas. Similarly, we must consider a range of actors—both inside and outside the government—involved in policymaking in order to assess the role of government insiders and outside groups in policymaking. In sum, my dissertation suggests that developing large sized public policy projects across political systems studying a range of issues as well as actors would further strengthen our understandings of the comparative policymaking process.

**Limits to Research**

There are a few limitations to my dissertation research. Mainly, what’s hidden in the numbers is really the relative intensity of participation. For instance, just because a list of groups and actors are mentioned as playing important roles by others and in the news does not give us enough information to examine which actors lead and which ones simply support the same perspective without actively contributing to the debate. That is, despite the fact that a large number of NGOs are frequently mentioned as being involved, it could really be that at the core of the debate are a few state actors, business groups and public interest groups driving the policy process.
Additionally, though my dissertation attempted to measure influence by capturing what is observed—who participated in the debates, and whether they got their policy goals reflected in the outcome—the actual influence could actually take place in the unobservable arena (for instance, many studies in emerging democracies assume that influence takes the form of bribery). Furthermore, it may be the case that mobilizing to promote or protect interests (thus observed in the policy process) is unnecessary for some actors and groups, because the existing status-quo policy already reflects their preferences. Both are indeed plausible scenarios of policy influence at work in reality.

But within the limits, the conclusions drawn by the research—a representative set of issues, and the data collection process that relied on both personal interviews with policy advocates and case studies of issue debates using secondary data—remain solid: the view of current day policymaking in Korea suggests that the policy community has moved far beyond the original East Asian model. That is, the pattern of participation found in Korea today resembles that of the US and EU.

Future studies of comparative policymaking could expand major findings of my dissertation in two distinct ways. First, studies could reexamine the relevance of the East Asian model in other political systems where the model has frequently been applied and see whether the same findings hold true outside Korea. Second, studies could delve into the intricate nature of the policy process (different ways in which actors and groups attempt to win policy outcomes), adding to existing academic knowledge on participation and influence in the policy process across political systems with varying degrees of state dominance.
Appendix: Issue Summary

Protection of small retailers
Super Supermarkets (SSM)—large supermarket chains—have grown dramatically in number since the year 2005, threatening 4 million small and medium sized retailers in the country, and especially those doing business in traditional marketplaces—the past equivalents of SSMs. One group of advocates argues that the government should come up with stricter regulations. That is, the government should adopt a permit system—permitting SSM businesses to operate only when it is proven not to hurt the local economy. Another group of advocates favors the status quo arguing that any kind of regulation is against equal competition guaranteed in international trade agreements. Finally, another group of advocates argue that the government should instead develop a budget to restore traditional market places in order to level competition between corporate marts and small retailers situated in traditional market places.

College loans: income-based repayment
The current college loan system runs in such a way that as soon as one takes out a loan, interest must be paid starting the following month. Because students usually cannot afford to pay back the interest, the burden lies on the parents, making it difficult for low income families to take advantage of the loan system. Groups mobilized to adopt a measure postponing loan payment (including interest) until after graduation. The key to this new idea is that the government pays for the interest during the years in college, and that the repayment should be contingent on one’s income level.

Mortgage loan restriction
On average, mortgage assets comprise 81% of Koreans’ entire assets because property values are high in Korea. Korea has continuously suffered from rising property values, although the government attempts to adjust both loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) levels to prevent dramatic shifts in mortgage asset values. Given that mortgage loans caused the housing market crisis in the US, groups argue that it is important to have fixed mortgage interest rates rather than having them shift constantly. But constant mortgage loan interest rates are also problematic, because then it is difficult to be responsive to changing supply and demand in the housing market.

Offering chairs to standing service workers
The retail service sector employs over 3.5 million workers in Korea, most of which are female. A survey of service sector workers conducted by the Korea Federation of Trade Unions found that more than 90% of the respondents work between 9-12 hours a day, often without any proper physical breaks in-between. These working conditions resulted in different kinds of physical distress. Labor groups mobilized, arguing that service sector employees should be guaranteed their rights as stated in the Industry Safety and Welfare Act.

Autonomous high-schools
Korea maintains a highly selective and elitist education system. Private tutoring businesses thrive in Korea, which assist students in entering the few selective, private high schools, and highly ranked universities. Given the high cost of both private tutoring and school tuition, such an elitist education system favors students raised in high income families which can
afford to enter and attend these schools. Proponents of autonomous high schools argue that selective high-school education should be further encouraged, which would allow diverse educational curriculums, as well as promote self-directed learning, which is typically absent in public high schools that advocate a uniform school curriculum. Opponents argue that the very existence of private high-schools selected through competitive entrance examinations further divides students across socio-economic status.

**Death with dignity law**
In Korea, removing artificial respirators from patients who are in vegetated states requires an approval from the court. Waiting for the court’s decision is often a long process for the patients’ families already struggling to pay for medical bills. Can there be some kind of a guide for deciding when an artificial respirator can be removed (thus, death with dignity)? The issue became high on the public agenda when the Supreme Court ruled that the artificial respirator be removed from Kim (known publicly as the Kim case) in 2008. In the 17th National Assembly, a bill was proposed to specify the conditions and methods of death with dignity, a movement supported largely by the doctors’ and lawyers’ associations. On the other hand, the movement was fiercely opposed by religious groups, and groups representing the disabled.

**Public safety offender registry**
The public safety offender registry, also called the red code, was first created under the authoritarian Chun regime as a way of keeping records (i.e., family information, address, educational background, and religion) of public safety offenders. Such a registry is against the right to privacy guaranteed in the current democratic constitution. However, when a number of protest participants were charged with their involvement in a violent wave of protests in May 2008, the court referred to a registry of public safety offenders from decades ago to trace past criminal records of the protesters. Through this event, it was brought to public attention that the registry had remained in existence even after democratization in 1987. Groups mobilized to abolish such a registry, although other groups advocated legalizing the public safety offender registry for national security purposes.

**Medical malpractice law**
Dealing with medical malpractice is usually a taxing process for the victims. Patients can file cases of medical malpractice through a Conflict Resolution Board. However, because the board is not at all specific to medical malpractice cases, victims have a hard time addressing their problems and receiving appropriate compensation. Thus, the claimants often go directly to court. Even then, the claimants are in a disadvantaged position, because they not only have to prove the case before the court (the burden of proof lies on the victims) but medical practitioners can’t be charged with a crime. Groups mobilized to enact a medical malpractice law that enforces criminal charges on medical practitioners and also shares the burden of proof. Professional groups representing medical practitioners, however, are against any changes to the status quo policy.

**Development of waterfront areas**
Areas nearby water in Korea are strictly restricted from being developed into residential or commercial areas—to protect them from being ill-developed for commercial purposes. A group of advocates argue that the development of such areas could be strategically managed
in an environmentally-friendly manner by enacting a law. Another group of advocates, on the other hand, argue that the law would result in harm to the environment and profit only those who undertake development projects, such as construction companies.

**Imposing anti-dumping taxes on particle board imports**
Particle board is reprocessed wood that is used for producing furniture. The dumping (pricing of a product below the cost of production) of PB imports from Southeast Asia hurts the local PB producers. But imposing an anti-dumping tax drives up furniture costs, hurting both furniture manufacturers and consumers.

**Free Trade Agreement (FTA) country of origin certification**
How much have local businesses benefited from the bilateral FTAs Korea has signed with other countries? Surprisingly, the impact was found to be minimal, mainly because a large number of businesses were unaware of the necessary and complicated steps that need to be taken in order to verify country of origin—key to receiving tax incentives according to the FTA.

**Restructuring the oil distribution chain**
Rising energy prices, including oil, became the center of government attention. The vertical retail structure—the four refineries at the top, supplying to the distributors and then to individual retailers—was thought to be the cause of the high oil prices. Permitting horizontal transactions—distributors and individual retailers receiving supplies from multiple sources—could keep the cost of oil down.

**Direct sales of Liquefied Propane Gas (LPG)**
Increasing energy prices were a serious public concern in late 2008. In the case of LPG, one way to cut costs is to reform the current retail system, where only LPG retailers are authorized to sell and deliver LPG to consumers. That is, by allowing consumers direct access, the sale price of LPG could drop.

**Bringing competition to the agriculture wholesale market**
Agricultural products are collected by wholesalers from producers and then distributed by retailers to consumers. The agricultural wholesale market performs as an intermediary between producers and consumers. Only a restricted number of wholesalers with a permit can participate in the industry value chain. The original goal was to protect stability in the retail system, but it also generates the problems of a lack of competition and a market monopoly.

**Imposing value-added-tax on cosmetic surgery**
The precise size of the cosmetic surgery market is unknown, because all medical surgeries in Korea are tax exempt. A group of advocates argue that medical surgery undertaken for the purpose of beauty is different from all other types of medical surgeries, and should be excluded from tax exempt status.

**Wetland preservation**
Only 3.7% of the wetlands across the country have gained legal status as wetlands. The Wetland Preservation Act focuses on protecting wetlands that are already designated as wetlands by law. Proponents of the changes of the existing act advocate broadening the
definition of wetlands by categorizing them into core protection areas (an area of particular value as a wetland) and general protection areas (nearby area of core protection area). Furthermore, the proposal would also extend the role of local governments in protecting wetlands by giving them financial support.

**Integrating multicultural families bureau**

There is a large inflow of women from South Asia for marriage purposes to rural areas in Korea. Multicultural families resulting from such marriages, however, cause social problems that deserve the government’s attention, such as women suffering from domestic violence who are unable to seek help due to language barriers. Furthermore, children raised in these multicultural families also suffer from integration problems at school. Despite the fact that this issue has received high levels of attention in the media, no significant government action has taken place, and multicultural families still face problems in their local communities. One of the major issues is that five different ministries inside the government, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family, the Ministry of Gender Equality, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of Education all have respective policy divisions addressing multicultural family issues. These dispersed powers and authorities across numerous divisions need to be integrated so that the government can efficiently implement policies.

**Revising the mental health act**

The Mental Health Act defines mentally ill citizens as people suffering from mental illness and personality disorders, and drug addicts as people who rely on various narcotics such as heroin and cocaine. The act also forbids mentally disabled citizens and drug addicts from applying for government approved licenses, such as drivers, cooks, nurses, doctors, etc. However, mentally ill citizens and drug addicts are vaguely defined, suggesting that even those citizens who are perfectly capable of undertaking the required tasks are ineligible to apply for any kind of license. The revision of the Mental Health Act proposes that Mental Health Review Boards (located in all municipal districts that have mental rehabilitation centers) review the degree of mental illness and the level of drug addiction, and determine whether one is or is not eligible to apply for government issued licenses.

**Sejong city construction**

One of the major promises that former president Roh (2004-2008) made in his presidential campaign was to relocate the capital city from Seoul to Choongchung Province. Proponents of such a movement argued that relocating the capital city would balance lopsided regional development. In 2005, soon after Roh was elected as president, a proposal titled the ”Special Act Regarding Administrative City Construction” was proposed by Uri Party members (the party of the president). The proposal stated that the new administrative city of Sejong would include parts of government bodies. A total of 50 trillion won is the estimated budget for the setup of the city, which is to be constructed by 2014. Once the Lee Administration came into power in February 2009, however, opponents of the Sejong city construction had postponed deciding which parts of the government (specific ministries and agencies) are to be relocated. Ultimately, opponents suggest that the cost of moving government bodies is too high and thus advocate suspending the plan of building a new administrative capital.
Registration enforcement of motorcycles under 500cc
Motorcycles under 500cc are not required to be registered, nor insured—they are exempt from government regulations. But the usage of motorcycles under 500cc has been increasing for various purposes—leisure as well as delivery. At the same time, accidents and crimes involving these motorcycles were on the rise, often causing problems because motorcycles involved in accidents and crimes could not be easily tracked. A group of advocates argue that the enforcement of motorcycle registration and liability insurance is necessary. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that changes in the existing policy would incur extra costs to users of motorcycles under 500cc, who are typically low-income.

Fleet average system for auto manufacturers
Under the revision of the Clean Air and Environment Preservation Act, car manufacturers are required to follow environmental standards for emissions. A few car brands have been forced to discontinue, because they failed to meet these standards. Realizing the cost of such regulations, proponents argued for the adoption of a Fleet Average System (FAS), which is used to regulate exhaust gas in the United States and the EU. This way, manufacturers do not have to worry about the gas emission of each line, but instead, focus on the total emission of all lines they produce (which is more efficient from the perspective of manufacturers). However, opponents argue that this will only worsen environmental pollution. Worse yet, such a system benefits foreign car manufacturers that only sell a limited number of cars in the domestic market.

Government aid to local governments for the 4 rivers project
The 4 Rivers Project is one of the priority agendas of the Lee Myung-bak administration, which refers to restoring 4 major rivers. This project involves installing Total Phosphorus (TP) purification facilities in several local cities and municipalities. However, the size of the budget to build TP purification varies dramatically across local governments, depending on whether they are situated upstream or downstream of the rivers, as well as how much funding local governments are eligible to receive from the national government. One of the parties concerned is Daegu city which oversees Nakdong river. Daegu city (unlike small municipalities that can receive as much as 50% of their total budget from the national government) can only receive up to 10% of the total budget needed from the central government to build TP purification processes. But because the total necessary budget was too large, they demanded increased support from the central government.

Promotion of local travel
One of the big aims of the Lee Myung-bak government was to promote the travel industry, attracting tourists not only from China or Japan, but also within Korea. Attempts were made to create measures promoting the travel industry. Traditionally, the national government has been at the center of the tourism industry. One of the key aspects of the government’s plan is to set up a Local Tourism Board (LTB) made up of representatives of local governments, business groups and citizens. This bottom up approach, the government argues, is the genuine approach to promoting a local tourism industry that is suitable and unique across different parts of Korea. Although the grand scheme was endorsed by many, the approach failed to gather support from travel industry representatives because it lacked specific measures.
Information technology industry promotion act
As a result of government restructuring in 2008 with the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration, the Ministry of Information and Technology was abolished. Tasks undertaken under the ministry (the promotion of the IT industry, mainly through research and development) were instead divided into the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, the Ministry of Administration and Safety, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology as well as the newly established Korea Communications Commission. After the restructuring, however, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy and the Korea Communication Commission had a conflict over the Communication Technology Fund, mostly made up of contributions from Telecommunications Companies.

Revision of the social security act
The Korean social security system is unique in that it is entirely based on residence. That is, maintaining a social security number requires one to verify on a regular basis their residence. The system, however, has a serious problem because all kinds of social benefit programs, such as pensions and the national health care system rely primarily on one’s social security number. As a result, those people whose social security numbers had expired (people typically under extreme poverty who do not have a clearly defined residence) could not claim their benefits or rights as citizens. A group of advocates supports modification of the existing law, so that their social security number is no longer based on one’s residence. It became not simply an administrative issue, but that of human rights—citizens living in extreme poverty without a stable residence. There are no visible opponents.

Revision of local government law
Reclaimed lands—filled-in land—are becoming common in the western and southern coastlines of Korea. Local governments have engaged in intense conflicts over the reclaimed land, since it is usually not clear to which local government these territories belong. The usual process in the past was to follow coastal borders. This method, however, creates numerous problems, because it divides reclaimed land in an unusual way and the local governments claiming to have authority over the reclaimed lands are uniformly unhappy with the outcome. Furthermore, it creates confusion for local businesses and residents, because the taxing authority remains unclear. In order to solve this problem, a revision of local government law was proposed, so that a review board could declare a division of reclaimed lands, also allowing local governments to appeal decisions to the Supreme Court.

Rare disease research support
Unlike the United States, Taiwan and Japan, Korea has no laws to support individuals and families suffering from rare diseases. A group of actors proposed to designate funds in order to 1) closely examine the number of people suffering from various kinds of rare diseases, and 2) fund development of medical research and 3) assist patients suffering from rare diseases in paying their medical bills. Proponents of such legislation face no major opposition. However, there is disagreement over the scope of the program—rare disease, permanent disease, or permanent rare disease.

Stable supply and demand of rice
The government purchased 230,000 additional tons of rice from the market in the year 2009 in comparison to the previous year to stabilize a domestic rice market that is struggling with
declining consumption of the staple grain. Fundamentally, however, the rice price continued to fall after South Korea stopped sending rice to North Korea. A group of actors argue that sending aid to North Korea as in the previous years would solve the problem. Seoul had sent about 400,000 tons of rice each year to the North for 10 years until 2007. Rice aid to the North was aborted due to the Lee Myung-bak administration’s hard-line policy towards North Korea. Thus, no government-level talks between Seoul and Pyongyang took place after Lee took office. Another group of actors argue that South Korea’s rice supply and aid to North Korea are two different issues, and that sending rice aid to the North needs to be considered in the context of overall inter-Korean relations.

**Equal regional development**
The metropolitan area of Seoul has over 23 million people. Considering that the total population of South Korea is only about 49 million, the concentration of population in the Seoul/Kyoeng-gi Province is extremely high. Past governments have made numerous attempts to facilitate equal regional development. More recently, the issue has captured the attention of many due to the Roh Moo-hyun government’s plan to relocate the administrative capital city. The current president Lee Myung-bak, however, advocates reversing the plan—regional development should focus on the metropolitan area. Proponents of the original plan argue that the government should continue investing resources in the other regions, since the marginal returns for further developing Seoul are low. Most National Assemblymen from non-metropolitan area support this view. However, proponents of the original plan face a strong opposition from the elected representatives of the metropolitan area.

**Disability support pensions**
A coalition of groups—Action for the Enactment of Disabilities Pension Act—advocate the adoption of a pension system for the disabled, replacing existing disabilities benefits. Adoption of a disabilities pension aims to provide for economic costs resulting from disabilities. Under previous disabilities benefits, individuals were entitled to various kinds of benefits through municipalities (the amount varied across local governments). Proponents of a disabilities pension argue that the disabled citizens (defined as people with severe disabilities) need to maintain a life on their own. Proponents of the adoption of a disabilities pension face no major opposition. However, there are some disagreements regarding the total budget and the number of people entitled.

**Cosmetic law**
Major cosmetic companies in Korea increasingly rely on small and medium sized companies to manufacture their products, called “original equipment manufacturers,” or OEMs. The products are then sold to customers under the purchasing company’s brand name. This usually creates a discrepancy between the responsibility to maintain safety standards and marketing. That is, even when certain products are deemed inappropriate and in violation of safety standards, only OEMs are punished and not the brand companies. Customers rely on brand names when purchasing cosmetic products, rarely paying attention to OEMs. Proponents of stricter regulation argue that the retail company (brand companies) should be penalized for their misdoings as equally as OEMs. Government agencies having authorities in this issue—Korea Food and Drug Administration and Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs—agree that such regulations would ensure the quality of cosmetic products. The well-known cosmetic brands, however, favor the status quo.
Suicide prevention and respect for life
The suicide rate in Korea is currently the highest among OECD countries—31 per 100 thousand in the year 2009. Though the issue was originally given attention by lawmakers in the 17th National Assembly (2004-2008), bills were never passed into law, because there was no general agreement in the policy community that this was an important issue. However, things began to change with the suicides of a number of prominent figures, including the former president Roh Moo-hyun. A group of advocates argue that government action needs to be undertaken in order to prevent the spread of suicide. That is, government programs need to focus on 1) healing mental illness, 2) organizing social campaigns, and 3) operating an emergency call system that could be reached by individuals. Though not facing any strong opponents, some question whether enactment of such a law would actually have an effect on cutting down the suicide rate.

Abolition of the upper price limit on a sale of lots
An average household relies on a mortgage loan that amounts to 30 thousand US dollars (300 million Korean won) to purchase real estate. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, an upper price limit system on the sale of lots was adopted in order to prevent a dramatic surge in housing prices. The purpose was to discourage oversupply and heavy investment on property in the metropolitan area. But the policy had a long-term side effect—discouraging construction, resulting in an undersupply of apartments. The newly elected Lee Myung-bak administration aimed to reverse the policy—abolishing upper price limits—hoping to stabilize the supply and demand of houses and apartments. Opponents to the policy change are the original proponents of the upper price limit system, and argue that the policy reversal will again result in soaring real estate prices.

Barring illegal construction steel imports from China
Cheap construction steel from China is circulated illegally in Korea. A group of actors proposed to closely examine the safety of construction materials, and also to punish those who import and use illegal steel at construction sites. Proponents of strong enforcement argue that such action is necessary in order to meet safety standards. This perspective is backed by Korean steel manufacturers. On the other hand, construction companies (both small and large sized) oppose, arguing that strong enforcement raises the cost of construction dramatically.

Transit oriented development and spatial restructuring
City development and redevelopment has important implications, not simply in terms of the amount of budget entailed, but also the expected utility. Area development in Korea typically relates to laws governing railways, urban planning and restructuring. The newly proposed Transit Oriented Development Act approaches area development specifically focusing on transportation routes (i.e., subway or train stations). There is internal disagreement across government bureaus regarding details of the act, however. A group of advocates supports redevelopment—focusing on revitalizing areas nearby to major train stations that have worn down over time. Another group of actors, however, supports redevelopment focusing on previously underdeveloped areas.

Merging two medical systems
The Korean medical system is divided into two—Korean traditional (herbal) medicine and western medicine. Just like Chinese traditional medicine, Korean traditional medicine (called
hanyihak) has dominated Korean society for centuries, until the introduction of western medicine in the late 19th century. Integration of the two systems has been discussed previously, but not at all fruitfully. The current system forbids any kind of interaction between the two, such that western medical professionals’ use of IMS (intramuscular stimulation) and Korean Traditional medical professionals’ use of any modern medical facilities and technology is considered illegal. Medical doctors advocate an integration following their lead. However, the traditional doctors’ association is against this method. The government is as highly divided as the two major professional associations representing two medical systems. Two divisions within the Ministry of Health advocate different stances.

Clinical trial industry
The clinical trial industry—involving clinical tests of newly developed pharmaceutical items—is a high value market. The budget to promote clinical trials runs about 15 billion won a year (from 300 billion won devoted to an annual R&D budget in health) in Korea. In 2004, the government’s project to open clinical trial centers across the country emerged (like the GCRC in the US). In 2007, the National Committee for Clinical Research was established in order to build related infrastructure, such as providing educational training and organizing centers. The program was temporary, scheduled to be suspended by 2012. Proponents argue that with new competitors emerging, such as Thailand, the government should keep on investing money in the budget to promote the clinical trial industry.

Allocating government spending to modernize large-scale netting vessels
Fishing with large scale netting vessels is an important part of the fishing industry in Korea. There are 149 large scale netting vessels currently registered. Rules related to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) run in such a way that old, aged vessels are less competitive in the market. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Industry agrees with the idea that the government should help modernize the vessels. This usually takes the form of loans, subsidies, etc. The issue faces no opposition.

Pollution in the former US army base
Starting in 2005, the US army began downsizing and relocating its military force stationed in Korea. The problem of pollution in the former army bases is severe. The total cost entailed in cleaning the polluted army bases is still unknown, though some speculate as much as 500 billion won. The appendix of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the US and South Korea states that the US forces in Korea will bear the cost of cleaning contaminated army bases. But the specific conditions under which US forces will pay is murky—“known, imminent and substantial endangerment (KISE) to human health and safety.” A group of advocates seeks to change the original SOFA agreement to state that the polluter bears the cost of contamination. There is no apparent opponent to this issue. However, environmental groups argue that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade opposes this movement, largely in favor of strengthening the US-South Korea military alliance, and averting any tensions between the two countries.

Farming and fishing, farming and fishing area, food industry law
As a result of a reorganization of government ministries and agencies undertaken shortly after the Lee Myung-bak administration came to power, the Ministry of Fisheries was merged with the Ministry of Agriculture in order to create the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.
The Farming, Farming Area and Food Industry Law was rewritten to redefine fishing and fishing areas and incorporate means to support the fishing industry. The basic content of the revised law includes 1) protecting and preserving fishing resources, 2) planning of fishing industry development, and 3) supporting fishing industry workers through income substitution. The issue faces no opposition.

Low cost carriers and international flights
Policymakers have considered building an Asian air hub in Korea—an airport that is able to handle a large number of international flights (similar to Narita International Airport in Japan). This suggests hosting multiple low cost carriers in the Asian region flying to Korea. The airline industry in Korea, both international and domestic, has been strongly dominated by two big airline carriers—Asiana Flights and Korean Air. A few low cost carriers fly domestically, but not internationally because the requirements for low cost carriers to fly abroad are too strict. The existing regulations make it difficult for any third carrier to compete—20 thousand flights with no accidents resulting in the deaths of passengers within two years. Whereas some proponents of strong regulations argue that such measures are necessary to prevent accidents resulting from inexperienced carriers, others advocate relaxing restrictions—arguing that strict restrictions only makes it difficult for other domestic carriers to compete.

Special investigation of the Korea Employment Promotion Agency for the Disabled
The Korea Employment Promotion Agency for the Disabled was established under the Ministry of Labor, dedicated to promoting employment for the disabled. The Korea Employment Promotion Agency was accused of numerous corruption charges in 2009. The first charge was hiring unqualified consultants to undertake research projects related to disabled entrepreneurs (with a budget entailing 1 billion won). The second was gathering illegal campaign funds. Such events led to special investigations by Ministry of Labor, as well as the resignation of the chairperson of the Korea Employment Promotion Agency (which is an appointed position). All these events led to hiring a new chairperson to head the Korea Employment Promotion Agency. However, outside groups representing the disabled fiercely oppose the new head, arguing that the Lee Myung-bak administration made a highly political appointment.

Revising government employees’ wages and benefits systems
Government employees’ (national as well as local) salaries in Korea are comprised of basic wages plus additional benefits. Officially, benefits are defined as additional benefits depending on working environment and living conditions occurring from duties as government employees. Annual increases in government employees’ wages is subject to careful scrutiny because they serve as examples for wages in the private sector. However, the list of different kinds of benefits government employees are eligible for is extensive—including family and dangerous task-related benefits. On average, government employees receive salaries and benefits that are almost equal in amount. The newly appointed minister of Administration and Safety under Lee Myung-bak (ultimately having the authority over government employees and organizations) declared that the benefits system be simplified and reformed. Broadly, the issue faces no particular opposition. But the two major government employee unions advocate that changes in the wages and benefits system should be undertaken in close consultation with unions.
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