LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGES IN THE TUMULTUOUS 1940S: 
INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND THE CHALLENGES 
OF WAR AND PEACE

A Dissertation in 
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by 
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the experiences of four private, liberal arts colleges – Dartmouth College, Earlham College, Franklin & Marshall College, and Swarthmore College – before, during, and after World War II to identify the adaptive policies implemented to meet the challenges that accompanied the war and its aftermath. Identification of these institutional experiences during the war period – as defined in this study as 1939 to 1950 – and the enrollment-driven policies and the processes by which these strategies were implemented also allows for an examination of how this period affected the colleges’ short- and long-term institutional identities (i.e., mission, organizational culture, and structure). The four colleges exemplify the effects of the war on student enrollment and the financial condition of liberal arts colleges. The extension of admissions opportunities, the adoption of war-time curricula, and the militarization of campus illustrate a few of the adaptive policies implemented at the institutions during World War II. The experiences of the four colleges also typify the role of institutional identity and the implications of institutional leadership, culture, and mission for decision-making during periods of crisis like World War II and its aftermath. Institutional adaptation during and after the war and the effects of World War II on institutional identity reveals the influence of the war on the transition from pre-war to post-war private, liberal arts college. In addition, analysis of liberal arts colleges during the war period also provides a historical context for understanding issues that continue to affect higher education today such as mission creep, institutional adaptation, and the role of institutional identity in crisis-responsive decision-making.
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“In Flanders Fields the poppies blow
   Between the crosses, row on row
That mark our place; and in the sky
   The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.”
   John McCrae, December 1915.
“A college is never static. Its purposes and policies are always changing to meet new demands and new conditions. Swarthmore, if it is to remain alive, must be forever changing.” A Statement of Purpose, 1948.

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

Sixty million Americans listened to their radios as President Roosevelt announced to Congress and the nation that December 7, 1941 was a day that would “live in infamy.” Only 24 hours earlier, bombs from a Japanese air squadron rained down on Pearl Harbor, killing over 2,400 servicemen and severely crippling the American Pacific fleet. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor thrust the United States into the middle of a war it had heretofore tried to avoid. Entrance into World War II brought a time of immense hardship for the nation as men and resources were sent abroad to fight the Axis powers. Sacrifice and change became a common part of life on the home front because of the conflict. Foods like sugar and coffee grew scarce, rationing of gasoline and tires made auto travel almost impossible, and a new diversified workforce entered factories that once manufactured automobiles but now assembled airplane engines.

The nation’s colleges and universities were not immune to the challenges presented and sacrifices required by the war. The enrollment growth that had erased the strains caused by the Great Depression ended suddenly after Pearl Harbor as colleges and universities – large and small – lost faculty and students to the war effort. By the middle of the war, three-fourths of the men over the age of 18 and formerly enrolled in institutions of higher education were serving in the armed services. The impact was greatest for private, men’s liberal arts colleges, which depended on student enrollment and subsequent tuition income for their day-to-day operations. In 1937, the nation’s 50+ liberal arts colleges accounted for over 61,000 (6.2 percent) of the
approximately 975,000 students pursuing postsecondary degrees. Enrollment numbers at the nation’s liberal arts colleges had increased by three and two percent respectively in the two years prior to Pearl Harbor, but World War II drew many of their male students into service, and enrollments decreased precipitously. A study of 31 private men’s colleges found that enrollment declined by 78.7 percent between the 1939-1940 and 1944-1945 academic years. Finances suffered accordingly. Average institutional revenues dropped from $16 million to $12.7 million, and many colleges faced the possibility of collapse during the war period if measures were not taken to account for these losses.

This study examined the experiences of four private liberal arts colleges before, during, and after World War II to identify the various adaptive policies implemented by these institutions to overcome the challenges that accompanied the war and its aftermath. The enrollment decreases and financial losses suffered by Dartmouth College, Earlham College, Franklin & Marshall College, and Swarthmore College during World War II demonstrate the effects of the war on liberal arts colleges. Identification and analysis of these institutions’ experiences during the war period – as defined in this study as 1939 to 1950 – allowed for an examination of the role institutional identity (i.e., mission, culture, structure) played in the adaptation of the four colleges. These experiences typify the role of institutional identity in threat resolution during periods of crisis like World War II and its aftermath.

Franklin & Marshall College was founded in Lancaster, Pennsylvania in 1850 after a merger of Franklin College, founded in 1787 in Lancaster and Marshall College founded in Mercersburg, Pennsylvania in 1836. The merger blended the missions of the two institutions, resulting in a college guided by the German Reformed Church and with a mission to promote “liberal and scientific learning” among Pennsylvania’s male German population. By the eve of
the war, both the college’s ties to the German Reformed Church and its liberal arts mission were tenuous. Within a month of the country’s entry into the war, 112 (13 percent) of the 881 students at Franklin & Marshall withdrew from the institution to fight in the conflict.\textsuperscript{10} Enrollment continued to decrease throughout the first year of the war, with only 702 men enrolling in the fall of 1942, a decrease of 179 students (20 percent) from the previous year.\textsuperscript{11}

In 1769, Eleazar Wheelock founded Dartmouth College – one of the nine college colleges – to educate the Indian and “English” youth of southern New England and New Jersey. Dartmouth never completely fulfilled this mission, educating primarily just white males until the mid-twentieth century. Upon their graduation, the “men of Dartmouth” – this largely all-white, male student body – joined a tight-knit community of alumni who routinely provided substantial levels of financial support to their alma mater. With the arrival of the war, this “living endowment,” as they were called by war-time president Ernest M. Hopkins, would assume an even greater role within the life of the institution. Traditions established and promoted through the college’s extensive history permitted Dartmouth, by the war period, to distinguish itself through the creation of one of the strongest, most supportive alumni bodies in all of higher education.\textsuperscript{12}

Enrollment declines at Dartmouth at the beginning of the war were modest when compared to other private, men’s liberal arts colleges like Franklin & Marshall. The 1941-1942 academic year began with 2,348 students enrolled at the college, but enrollment fell to 1,984 students (a decline of 16 percent) by the fall of 1942.\textsuperscript{13} Civilian student enrollment continued to drop with only 760 students enrolling in the fall of 1943. By March 1944, enrollment had dwindled to only 174 men, the College’s smallest enrollment in 125 years.\textsuperscript{14}
Earlham and Swarthmore Colleges, two private, liberal arts institutions whose Quaker affiliations promoted a pacifist stance toward the war, were not immune to its effects. Originally called the Friends Boarding School, Earlham was founded in 1859 as a result of the large migration of Friends to Indiana, who sought refuge from the institution of slavery and who wanted to acquire the state’s cheap farmland. The plain, unadorned style of fashion and simple religious practices that characterized the Quaker faith set this group apart from the evangelical Christians who shared the same lands, and the Friends sought to close off their community from the outside, non-Quaker world. Earlham advanced this ideal through its mission to serve the Friends population by preserving and promoting the tenets of the Quaker faith for its student body. This historic insular focus on the Quaker faith threatened the survival of the institution on the eve of World War II, and by 1945 enrollment at the institution totaled only 225 students, an 80 percent decrease from the College’s pre-war enrollment.15

Chartered in 1864 by Hicksite Quakers16 from Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore, Swarthmore College welcomed its first students to its rural campus west of Philadelphia in 1869. The initial decades of Swarthmore’s operations were considered an experiment as the purposes of Quaker higher education, especially Hicksite-sponsored higher education, remained unclear. Reports of the Board of Managers reveal indecision regarding the institution’s curriculum – sciences, mathematics, languages – and the methods by which this curriculum would be taught. Still, unanimity existed about the role of the Quaker faith within the life of the college. Tenets of Quakerism were woven throughout the institution, evidenced by the college’s co-educational mission; the inclusion of women on the college’s Board of Managers, and the weekly Friends Meeting requirement to which all Swarthmore students had to subscribe.17 The war would test the strength of the institution’s Quaker ties, however.
Like Earlham College, Swarthmore’s pacifist traditions built from its Quaker roots could not protect the institution from the effects of World War II. In the first year of the war, enrollment at Swarthmore totaled 718 students. By October 1943, enrollment declined to 527 students (a drop of 27 percent), of which 143 were male, and by the fall of 1944 the college enrolled only 481 students.\(^\text{18}\)

It would take the implementation of a number of institutional policy changes for colleges like Franklin & Marshall, Dartmouth, Earlham, and Swarthmore to overcome the threats presented by the enrollment and financial crises caused by the nation’s involvement in World War II. Unlike larger, research-oriented universities, many private, liberal arts colleges could not engage in the kinds of war-time research that helped many universities endure and survive the wartime conditions.\(^\text{19}\) Instead, these small, tuition-dependent institutions implemented a number of enrollment-driven, adaptive policies which were not always consistent with their historic missions. These policies included, but were not limited to, the decision to expand curricula to include defense courses; the accommodation of federal war-training programs; the re-definition of faculty teaching responsibilities; and/or the enrollment of Japanese-American, Black, and other “nontraditional” students.

Identification of the enrollment-driven, adaptive policies and the processes by which these strategies were implemented provide a context for examining both the short- and long-term effects of the nation’s involvement in the war on the institutional identity of these private, liberal arts colleges. The adoption of policies such as the addition of war-related, defense courses or the inclusion of Japanese-American or Black students, however temporary, had the potential to challenge, and possibly even change, the war-time and post-war institutional identities of each college. Thus, this study analyzed the challenges of World War II and examined the influence of
institutional identity on the decision-making that occurred during the adaptation of the four colleges throughout this period of international and institutional crisis.

**Research Questions**

Four related research questions guided this study. These questions address how the war period and its aftermath affected the liberal arts college and how institutional identity influenced the policies adapted by institutions during and after the war.

1) How did private liberal arts colleges like Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore survive the challenges presented by the nation’s involvement in World War II?

2) What were the post-war challenges each institution faced in the aftermath of the conflict?

3) What, if any, were the long-term effects of the war for liberal arts colleges?

4) What role did institutional identity (i.e., mission, culture, environment) play in the either the retention or rejection of the institutional changes proposed or adopted during and after World War II?

**Justification for Study**

Previous studies of institutions of higher education during World War II have focused primarily on the experiences of large, research universities and the role these institutions played in the war effort. Inherent differences exist, however, between research universities and liberal arts colleges and their experiences during this period. Studies of the experiences of small, non-research institutions are needed for a better overall understanding of both the short- and long-term consequences of the war on higher education. More specifically, an examination of the
effects of World War II on institutional identity can reveal the war’s role in promoting the post-war development and evolution of select liberal arts colleges.

In addition to contributing to the limited historiography on the experiences of non-research institutions during World War II, analysis of the war-time, adaptive policies of liberal arts colleges also provides a historical context for understanding issues that continue to affect higher education today. These issues include mission change, fiscal exigency, curricular development, institutional adaptation, and the role of institutional identity in decision-making during threat resolution. In addition, an understanding of the institutional changes that occurred during WWII presents a historical perspective from which to examine how institutions and leaders manage change during times of crisis.

**Literature Review**

Historian Peter Burke writes that the “universe of historians has been expanding at a dizzying rate,”\textsuperscript{20} and contends that the field of history is changing as a result. He asserts that “new history” or “history written in deliberate reaction against the traditional ‘paradigm’”\textsuperscript{21} is now replacing the “old” or “Rankean history” that has dominated the field for centuries. Burke contrasts the concepts of “old” and “new” history on seven different points, two of which are particularly salient for this study. The first is that “old” history has traditionally focused on the deeds of great men like General George Washington or great events like the Civil War battle at Gettysburg. Burke defines this scholarly approach as “history from above” and explains that it is the study of “history from below” or the study of ordinary people or minor events that distinguishes “new” history from “old” history. Burke’s second distinction is that history traditionally has been thought of as a narrative of events, a discussion of what happened and when. “New” history, in contrast, focuses on both an analysis of the structures involved within
such an event narrative and the long term implications of that event. These can include, but are not limited to, the economic, social, or political changes that result from a particular event or person.22

This study examined the effects of World War II on higher education from Burke’s “new history” approach, and the literature review that follows is indicative of this “history from below” perspective. The review begins with a discussion of the literature on the effects of the war on “the home front” and the subsequent changes in American culture that resulted from the conflict. An examination of the literature on higher education during the war period then follows and reveals that only modest attention has been given to the experiences of individual institutions, especially the liberal arts college, during and after the war period. Analysis of these works also shows that institution type (e.g., liberal arts college, research university) played an influential role in the individual war-time experiences and the subsequent challenges each institution faced. Finally, a discussion of the literatures on institutional adaptation, identity, and culture provides a context for this study’s examination of the processes and structures adapted during this period of crisis and its evaluation of the role institutional identity played in the decision-making that emerged throughout World War II and its aftermath.

“The Home Front”

Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, most Americans wished to avoid involvement in the emerging conflict and believed that the Government’s isolationist foreign policies would keep the war in Europe from affecting the United States. The morning of December 7, 1941, however, brought sudden and immediate changes to this mentality. By the following morning, the nation and its people were calling for war. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt addressed Congress at noon on Monday, December 8, 1941 and asked that war be declared on the Empire of Japan.

Even before Roosevelt’s address, long lines of men eager to enlist and fight in the yet-to-be-announced war had already formed outside recruiting centers throughout the nation. Thirty men enlisted at the Army recruiting center in New York City by 7:00 AM that day, and by noon over 500 men had done the same at the city’s Navy and Marine recruiting centers. With men rushing to answer the call for war, those remaining on “the home front” were left to create a wartime society that maintained life, but also provided the support necessary to bring victory in the conflict overseas.

Lewis Erenberg and Susan Hirsch, in their book, The War in American Culture: Society and Consciousness during World War II, argue that World War II was a major turning point in American culture. They examine the effects that the mobilization for war, the migration of peoples for jobs, and the introduction of a new industrial workforce that included increased numbers of women and African-American workers all had on American identity and attitudes toward racial and ethnic subgroups and women during the war. To do this, they explore the “much less examined territory of the home front and the meaning of the war in the lives of ordinary Americans.”

In Don’t You Know There’s a War On?: The American Home Front, 1941-1945, Robert Lingeman discusses the effects of the war from the same vantage point as Erenberg and Hirsch. Beginning with “the day before” (Saturday, December 6, 1941), and continuing through the return of soldiers following the armistices with Europe and Japan, Lingeman traces the changes to American culture that resulted from war-time demands such as rationing and shortages, mobilization, migration, and the emergence of a diversified workforce. Lingeman writes that
“war redirected American culture because of the interaction between ideology created by
government and media and the consciousness and self-assertion of various racial and culture
groupings in American life.” 25 He concludes that propaganda advanced by the government and
the rising voices of once marginalized peoples (e.g., women and Blacks) combined to create a
unified war effort on “the home front.”

Kenneth O’Brien and Lynn Hudson Parsons’ edited collection of essays, The American
Home-Front War: World War II and American Society, advances the same theme of a changed
American culture as posited by Erenberg, Kirsch, and Lingeman. O’Brien and Parsons contend
that the nation’s mobilization for and support of the war required the unified efforts of all
peoples, thus creating a common war-time experience for those individuals left on the “home
front.” Yet the authors also explain that there are differences between memories of the unified
“home front” and what history reveals – that American culture was not as united as has been
remembered. The contributing authors to O’Brien and Parsons’ work focus on the issues
regarding ethnicity and gender raised as a result of the government’s war propaganda and efforts
to create a unified “home front.” As O’Brien and Parsons’ explain:

The war’s varying impacts on American society and culture…were neither easily
defined nor understood. Rather than a single garment of one color, they formed,
instead, a patchwork quilt composed of different pieces that give the appearance
of unity, a fragile unity often achieved only by maintaining, rather than
challenging, many of the long-term bases upon which group distinction –
inequalities – had been built. 26

Thus, according to O’Brien and Parsons, experiences on the “home front” were not as uniform as
once commonly assumed by historians. From this one can then ask: Do the war-time experiences
of institutions of higher education represent a similar “patchwork quilt” of events and attitudes?
Together, these volumes attempt to re-create the American society, however united or divided, that was left behind on “the home front.” The nation’s shift to war-time production, the increase in availability of jobs, and the migration of peoples, all in the midst of extreme shortages and sacrifice, the authors contend, brought significant changes to the American “home front” culture. Yet the authors who write about this changed American society fail to discuss how these changes extended to the nation’s system of higher education, which also played an important role in maintaining life on “the home front.”

**Higher Education and the War**

The impact of World War II was felt throughout society, and the changes in lifestyle that the war produced permeated every home and factory. Institutions of higher education were also greatly affected by the changes to society that the war induced, yet the literature on these effects is slight. As foods grew scarce and a new workforce of women and Blacks flooded the burgeoning factories, leaders of the nation’s college and universities worked to identify higher education’s role in supporting the war effort. Within weeks of the nation’s entrance into the war, many leaders found themselves confronted with the need to develop institutional policies that would ensure the survival of their institutions during the war crisis. The effects of the war touched every institution of higher education, yet the existing literature that explores the outcomes of the war on higher education tends to tell only portions of the much larger story of higher education during World War II.

None of the standard texts on the history of higher education provide a detailed discussion of institutional experiences during and after this period. Although published in 1962, well after the conclusion of the war, Frederick Rudolph’s history, *The American College and University: A History*, makes no specific reference to the challenges presented to higher
education by World War II. The only mention of the war within this landmark text is made in the Epilogue in which Rudolph briefly traces: 1) the evolution of the relationship between higher education and the federal government following the war and 2) the still emerging effects of increased student access to higher education because of the GI Bill. For Rudolph, World War II serves only as point of delineation, a placeholder in the much larger timeline of the history of higher education he presents. The war period, its implications for higher education, and the experiences of individual institutions during the war are left unaddressed.

Writing over 40 years after Rudolph, John Thelin’s *A History of American Higher Education* provides more of a discussion on higher education during and after the war than Rudolph’s text, largely due to the passage of time and the resultant ability to construct a broader post-war narrative, but Thelin’s coverage of this period remains modest and superficial. In the two pages in which he discusses higher education during World War II, Thelin explores the impact of the war on “collegiate life” that he defines by extracurricular activities like football and the college athlete. He concludes this discussion with a brief description of ways that higher education mobilized for the war effort, which included the introduction of war-related courses often taught by faculty in non-related disciplines and the emergence of war-related research like the atom-bomb project. This is the extent of Thelin’s discussion of higher education during the war period, however, thus failing, in addition, to provide any discussion of the implications of the war for individual institutions.

Thelin’s discussion of the post-war landscape of higher education, a period that he contends was marked by the “three P’s” – prosperity, prestige, and popularity, is more detailed than his discussion of higher education during the war. The formulation of public policies at both the state and federal levels, he contends, contributed to the expansion of enrollment and the
curricular innovations experienced throughout higher education following the war period. More specifically, Thelin discusses the effects of the GI Bill on student access to higher education; the emergent role of the federal government in institution’s research endeavors and the establishment of the “federal grant university;” and undergraduate and campus life during the 1950s.

Christopher Lucas’s work, *American Higher Education: A History*[^30], also provides only minimal discussion of higher education during the Second World War. Like both Rudolph and Thelin, Lucas’ references to World War II are made only to set the context for a discussion of the broader post-war developments within higher education. He fails to provide any discussion of the state of higher education during the war period, instead concentrating on the effects of the war period on institutional enrollment, academic freedom, and federal funding of higher education. Lucas discusses the challenges to academic freedom that began prior to World War II, stopped because of the war, and then continued through the McCarthy era of the 1950s. In addition, he discusses the GI Bill and its effects on enrollment, institutional expansion, and student access, and the continuing relationship between the federal government and university research efforts. The story of the higher education’s struggles to overcome the enrollment and financial shortfalls caused by World War II, however, was left untold.

V. Cardozier’s book, *Colleges and Universities During World War II*, is the only text devoted solely to the exploration of the role of American higher education within the war. Cardozier’s work covers the entire war period, beginning with a discussion of higher education’s preparation for the war and ending with a discussion of the impact of the war on higher education. He discusses in great detail the Army, Navy, and Army Air Force training programs that provided many institutions with the replacement revenue needed to survive the loss of tuition dollars that accompanied the decline in civilian student enrollment. Cardozier also
explores how faculty contributed to the war effort through the development of war-related courses, the teaching of courses outside of their particular discipline of expertise, and their participation in war-related research projects.

In addition, Cardozier’s work examines how colleges and universities adjusted to the war period, yet his discussion of the effects of the war by institution type is quite limited. For example, Cardozier’s discussion of the impact of the war on state universities comprises only two paragraphs, and just two pages of his 230-page book explore the effects of the war on private liberal arts colleges. Moreover, of those two pages on liberal arts colleges, only one paragraph is devoted to a discussion of the implications of the war for men’s colleges, despite Cardozier’s assertion that these were the institutions most affected by the war. Thus, Cardozier’s exploration lacks any institutional specificity, and his discussion of the effects of the war on student enrollment, admission, curricula, and campus life and activities is modest in comparison to his much larger discussion of the military and defense training programs introduced by the war.

Willis Rudy, in *Total War and Twentieth-Century Higher Learning*, also examines how World War II affected student enrollment, institutional curricula, the faculty body, and campus life, but he does this on a much broader scale than Cardozier. Rudy’s work explores the impact of World War I and World War II on universities in both the U.S. and Western Europe. Using the experiences of universities during World War I as a point of contrast, Rudy discusses how French, German, English, and American universities were affected by the unique circumstances introduced by the Second World War. The large scale planning for and support required by the war, Rudy contends, caused universities in both the U.S. and Western Europe to adapt their enrollments, their campuses, and their curriculum to aid in the war effort. At U.S. universities,
these adaptations included the welcoming of military training programs to individual campuses; the introduction of vocational courses like map making and aeronautical science and new major fields of study like Oriental Studies and Latin American Studies to the curriculum; and the development of a relationship between the federal government and higher education through war-related research. Rudy also discusses how concerns over academic standards swirled throughout both continents as a result of universities’ implementation of acceleration programming and university-based military training programs.

Contrasted with his discussion of the American university, his examination of how such war-time challenges affected American colleges is almost non-existent within Rudy’s text. Like Cardozier, Rudy advances the claim that small, men’s liberal arts colleges suffered greatly as a result of the war, stating that enrollment at these institutions fell, in some cases, to only 10 percent of their 1939-1940 enrollment. Yet Rudy fails to elaborate on this claim, offering little discussion of how individual institutions like the liberal arts college worked to overcome these enrollment losses. Instead, his exploration of higher education during World War II remains at the university-level as presented within a global context.

Published shortly after the war in 1948, I. Kandel’s book, *The Impact of War Upon American Education*, examines how the war affected the nation’s entire system of education, of which higher education is just one component. As such, Kandel’s discussion of higher education during World War II is set within the context of a broader examination of the effects of the war on American education. Like other authors, Kandel examines how the Selective Service Acts and subsequent enrollment shortages, acceleration programs, and Army and Navy training programs affected higher education. Kandel’s 50-page discussion of higher education during the war remains only on the macro-level, however, with no attention given to any specific institution or
institutional type. The author’s only discussion of the liberal arts college comes as part of a much larger discussion of the changes to liberal education that came as a result of the war, and this change, Kandel contends, affected all of higher education. Consequently, like Cardozier and Rudy, Kandel’s examination of the effects of the war on higher education is incomplete due, in large part, to its lack of institutional specificity.

A few works provide segments of the broader story of higher education during and after the war. In *Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities Since World War II*, Roger L. Geiger explores the relationships between research universities and the federal government during and after the war. Geiger discusses how the federal government, under the auspices of the newly-established Office of Scientific Research and Design (OSRD), turned to research universities, their facilities, and their faculties to lead in the development of military weaponry such as radar and the atomic bomb. This newly-developed relationship between the federal government and the research university would continue after the war ended and would mark the beginning of the federal government’s involvement in higher education, yet Geiger’s work examines this emergent relationship only at the research university level.

Published during the war, J. Miller and Dorothy Brooks’ book, *The Role of Higher Education in the War and After*, is one of only a few works that explores the effects of World War II on different types of institutions (e.g., teachers colleges, liberal arts colleges, state universities). Their work examines the impact of the war on institutions of higher education within the state of New York and, as the authors write, “this volume does not presume to be a finished portrait; rather it is a series of candid-camera shots that attempt to record the kaleidoscopic changes the colleges have undergone in a time of a crisis”. The changes that Miller and Brooks’ summarize within their text include the declines in student enrollment; the
implications of the Selective Service Act of 1940 on male-student enrollment; the role of faculty in the war effort; the revisions made to an institution’s curriculum; and the role of civilian morale in advancing the war effort on campuses. The authors’ analysis of the effects of the war on the many institutions within New York begins to create a portrait of the plight of higher education during the war, but their attention to just one state, as the authors admit, leaves the portrait unfinished.

“The G.I. Challenges to the Colleges” by Roger Shaw posits questions about how higher education can adapt further to meet the needs of the returning World War II veterans. Published in 1947 just as GIs were beginning to flood college campuses, Shaw challenges institutions to think about how they will educate this new type of student, “Uncle Sam’s alumni” as he refers to them. Shaw asserts that veterans who have been educated in the “G.I. Way” (i.e., by military service) require a more vocational, world-conscience education than colleges currently are prepared (or willing) to provide. Therefore, he asks, “Can the colleges switch universally and at once to the G.I. Way?...Will the colleges change universally and at once for these mine-run student veterans?” Shaw responds to his own question by replying:

No. Colleges are conservative, slow-moving, deliberate. They run twenty years, some say two hundred, behind the educational frontier...The veteran students may take it or leave it – conform or go. The academicians will hold high the torch and keep the fire burning brightly on their own personal, scholastic altars...The colleges will not change fundamentally to meet the challenge of this horribly human group of new entrants to higher education.

Shaw concludes by stating that G.I. students are part of a “revolution” that will force higher education to adapt, but he asserts that this revolution will not be without a fight from the higher education community. “College will still be college...professors will still serve their specialties instead of their students. Let the doughfoot beware!” Shaw alleges. The question that remains
then is: Was Shaw’s prediction about the inadaptability of higher education following the war accurate?

Daniel Clark, in his article “‘The Two Joes Meet: Joe College, Joe Veteran’: The G.I. Bill, College Education, and Postwar American Culture,” does not attempt to answer the question posited by Shaw, but advances a number of the same claims regarding the demands made by GIs following their return to higher education. Clark uses advertisements, the popular media, and short stories from the 1940s to explore the widely-accepted claim that the GI Bill served to democratize higher education through a post-war shift in the cultural perception of the merit of a college education. Clark asserts that the media, through advertisements and stories that depict the veteran within his new elite, collegiate setting, helped to transform the image of higher education as a middle-class commodity. Yet Clark also contends that veterans themselves had a role in transforming higher education into a democratic good. This occurred, Clark claims, because of veterans’ demands for a streamlined education and a vocational curriculum geared toward real life issues, which, in turn, made higher education more appealing to middle-class America. Clark does not explore how these demands were answered by higher education, however, and thus fails to address how the adaptation of higher education to veterans’ demands may also have contributed to the democratization of the collegiate experience and the development of the post-war institution.

In *When Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and The Making of Modern America*, Michael Bennett supports Clark and Shaw’s claims about the demands of veteran students upon their return to college campuses. Bennett’s discussion of the implications of the G.I. Bill for higher education is just part of his larger discussion of the effects of this federal legislation, yet his examination of the demands made by GIs adds additional evidence to support Clark and Shaw’s
claims that veterans sought to change higher education. Upon their return from war, GIs were changing the social and economic structure of the nation. Of these 15.6 million returning veterans, 7.8 million of them also worked to reshape the course materials taught at colleges and universities.\(^{39}\) As Bennett explains:

> That didn’t mean that veterans weren’t interested in liberal arts or the values and traditions of the civilization they had fought for and some of their buddies had died for. Indeed, they wanted to know whether what they had been told was worth dying for and was worth living for. But they were skeptical as well as passionate.\(^{40}\)

This skepticism translated into a demand for a realistic, practical curriculum that would allow these men to obtain a place within the nation’s booming industrial economy, to obtain “credentials, not an educated mind,” Bennett writes.\(^{41}\) As one veteran explained, “Never mind the theory; that takes too long and we won’t understand it anyway; all we want is the know-how.”\(^{42}\) Veteran demands for practical education caused programs like engineering and business to swell as the men searched for courses believed to be most capable of bringing them financial success following their graduation. Faculty responded to GI demands both by adding more practical elements to their courses and by encouraging veterans to share their war-time experiences within the classroom. The institutional response to these demands is left unaddressed, however. Bennett discusses how institutions attempted to manage their swelling enrollments that caused over-crowded classrooms and dormitories, yet he fails to discuss how institutions responded to the veterans’ curricular demands. And, this is an important oversight when one seeks to understand how the returning veterans affected curriculum-driven institutions like the liberal arts college.
Institutional Histories and the Liberal Arts College

As seen above, only two comprehensive texts devote any attention to the liberal arts college during World War II despite numerous assertions about the extreme implications of the war for this institution. In their 1972 study, Alexander Astin and Calvin B.T. Lee define the small, private college as the “invisible college” for reasons inherent within the same disregard for study of the effects of the war for these institutions; “the invisible college is the third-class citizen, the unassimilated, the ‘outsider’.”43 As the authors continue to describe the historic neglect of this institutional type within studies of higher education and justify future research:

Although most Americans know the names of the prestigious private colleges, the state universities, and the distinguished private colleges, and while most are aware of the expanding state colleges and the burgeoning system of two-year colleges, few realize that one of the largest segments of the higher education population – at least one-third of all the four-year institutions – consists of relatively little-known private colleges. These colleges are worthy of study simply because of their large number; the fact that many of them may be in real danger of extinction makes a thorough examination of their problems and prospects imperative.44

Writing decades before Astin and Lee, J.H. Miller and D.V.N. Brooks advance a similar claim about the saliency of the liberal arts college. “What happens to the liberal arts colleges is of basic concern to our future welfare; they are nursery beds for the graduate professional schools and from their ranks come the future doctors, dentists, social workers, chemists, economists, and sociologists to whom we turn for expert service;”45 they contend. It is thus undeniable that attention should be given to exploring the war-time experiences of these arguably important institutions. Still, the only extended examination of the small college during World War II often comes as part of a much broader discussion of the individual institution’s history as told within the pages of institutional histories.
Institutional histories such as *A Salutary Influence: Gettysburg College, 1832-1985* by Charles Gladfelter; *A Small College in Maine: Two Hundred Years of Bowdoin* by Charles C. Calhoun; *Dickinson College: A History* by Charles Coleman Sellers; *Earlham College: A History, 1847-1997* by Thomas Hamm; *Juniata College: Uncommon Vision, Uncommon Loyalty* by Earl Kaylor, Jr.; *Liberalizing the Mind: Two Centuries of Liberal Education at Franklin and Marshall College* by Sally Griffith; *Mayflower Hill: A History of Colby College* by Earl Smith; *The College of William & Mary: A History, 1888-1993* by Susan Godson, et.al.; and *The Encyclopedia of Union College History* by Wayne Somers begin to uncover many of these untold stories of the implications of the war for liberal arts colleges. Each work briefly outlines the student enrollment and financial losses experienced throughout the war period and begins to establish how most colleges were forced to implement enrollment-driven, adaptive policies designed to sustain their institutions throughout the course of the war.

Each institutional history reveals that substantial declines in enrollment during the war years caused great concern amongst the administrators of these liberal arts colleges as they struggled to identify alternate means of generating the revenue their institution needed to remain in operation. One war-time adaptive strategy that emerges from examination of institutional histories is the development of a relationship between institutions and the military through the newly-established military training programs. These programs included the Navy V-12 program, Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), and the Civilian Pilot Training Program. Presidents of a number of liberal arts colleges campaigned in Washington to acquire one of these military training programs that would provide each institution with desperately-needed students, and, most importantly, financial revenue.
These institutional histories also document the changes in curriculum, admissions requirements, and faculty teaching responsibilities that accompanied the implementation of the federally supported war-training programs on campus. At a number of institutions, course offerings changed in an effort to support the war and offer courses that appealed to both civilian and military students. The most widespread change to the curriculum of these colleges was the introduction of a special “war curriculum” with courses often designed to provide students with practical, war-related skills and to allow them to explore topics related to the conflict abroad.

Examples of courses offered as part of this new curriculum were: *Home Nursing, The Principles of Radio Communication, Navy Accounting, Map Reading, Military Pyrotechnics,* and *Elementary Russian* and *Japanese.* The faculty asked to teach these courses often did so without complaint, even though these courses frequently were outside of the individual faculty member’s areas of expertise. Some faculty attended classes to learn the new material they would teach, but the war-time demands left limited time for preparation and often placed faculty in new classrooms with little more than what they had learned during their own days as undergraduate students. In addition, changes in admissions policies adopted at some institutions allowed community members and minority students (e.g., Black and women students) to attend the institution, often for the first time in the institution’s history.

Finally, implementation of a year-round operating schedule was an enrollment-driven policy that provided many of these colleges with an extended source of revenue. The goals of acceleration programs were often two-fold. Their first aim was to allow young men to graduate earlier, often completing their undergraduate degrees after only two or three years of academic study, thereby allowing them to both complete their degrees and enlist in the military. The second goal was to increase the ease with which students could begin their course of study at a
particular institution. New classes of students were often admitted year-round, with courses beginning for summer, fall, and winter terms.

In addition, institutional histories begin to reveal the influence of identity (i.e., mission, culture, and structure) on each institution’s adjustment to the challenges presented by the war and the post-war higher education landscape. At Juniata College, for example, the college’s administration and board of trustees declared that the institution would not host any military training programs during the course of the war as this was seen as an action antithetical to the college’s Brethren mission. Administrators at Juniata then chose to preserve the college’s mission by not soliciting to host the military program despite the challenges introduced by the enrollment shortage and fiscal crisis the college faced during the war.

Adherence to institutional mission varied throughout higher education; some leaders like those at Juniata sought to preserve institutional identity despite the war, whereas others chose to implement policies that were driven more by the need to maintain the institution rather than the need to maintain the institution’s mission. The implementation of a war-related curriculum and the hosting of military programs in addition to opening enrollment to women, community, and other minority students suggests a shift, even if just temporary, away from many institutions’ missions and identity.

Additionally, a number of institutional histories show that the experiences of World War II helped strengthen the liberal arts tradition after the war ended. A statement made by President Hanson of Gettysburg College is evidence of this post-war return to an institution’s liberal arts tradition. As the president announced to the college community in the final days of the war period:
It is my sincere hope and belief that, in the days that lie ahead, we shall together dedicate ourselves to the building of a greater Gettysburg College that will carry within its heart every noble and worthwhile ideal we have learned in the 112 years that are past.\textsuperscript{47}

Thus, institutional histories begin to expose the often complicated amalgamation of enrollment-driven policies implemented by institutions to survive the war period, but the purpose of these works is not to explore these actions in great detail; many therefore fail to tell the whole story. Frequently written to serve only an institution’s specific constituency (e.g. alumni, campus community), discussion of the effects of World War II is often only a small part of a much broader discussion of the history of a particular institution. In several of the institutional histories cited above, the war period received, at best, modest attention when compared with the rest of the text. This neglect may be the result of either authors lack of understanding of the saliency of the war period within higher education or their view of the war as inconsequential within the broader history of the institution. In addition, these works simply describe what happened during the tumultuous 1940s and consequently fail to explore the enrollment-driven, adaptive policies in any great detail. As such, this leaves a gap in institutional understanding about the war period, its affect on an institution, and the relevance of identity within the life of an institution.

**Institutional Adaptation, Mission, and Culture**

Organizational theories provide a lens through which institutional identity during and after the war can be studied. The open system perspective of organizational theory suggests that, as part of an open system, universities are complex, social organizations that are responsive to external environmental forces.\textsuperscript{48} Open systems, as defined by W. Richard Scott and Gerald Davis are those in which there is a “close connection between the condition of the environment and the
characteristics of the systems within it,” and organizations within an open system are “capable of self-maintenance on the basis of throughput of resources from the environment.” This perspective implies that institutions are affected by and must respond to external threats such as those created by World War II.49

Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch’s contingency theory provides an additional explanation for this relationship between an institution and its environment. Inherent in Lawrence and Lorsch’s theory is the influence of periods of crisis on institutional adaptation. Contingency theory “emphasizes that design decisions are dependent – or contingent – on environmental conditions… [and] different environments place different requirements on organizations.”50 As the authors continue, “environments characterized by uncertainty and rapid rates of change…present different challenges to organizations than do placid and stable environments.”51 Consequently, within this system, times of crisis present different challenges for organizations and, as such, organizations (e.g., colleges, universities) must adapt to external pressures, such as those that occurred during World War II, in order to survive.

Kim Cameron defines this process of organizational adaptation as the “modifications and alterations in the organization or its components in order to adjust to changes in the external environment.”52 He argues that adaptation can be divided into four categories, each based on the varying levels of importance given to the roles of the environment and the organization’s leader/s. The first is the “population ecology” approach in which the environment assumes a prominent role in the adaptation, yet the institutional management has no role in the process. This approach is also characterized by changes in the environmental “niches,” which Cameron defines as “subunits of the environment that support organizations.”53 Such changes can include a decrease in available resources or changes to particular programs.
The second is the “life cycles” approach, in which the environment maintains its prominent role in the adaptation of the organization, but leaders have a hand in trying to control the environment. In this approach, each organization experiences stages of development that often introduce certain problems that must be overcome before the organization can proceed to the next level of development. The role of management, then, is to lead the organization through the various stages of development, promoting the adaptation of the institution from each stage to the next.

In the “strategic choice” approach, both the environment and leaders assume a prominent role in the adaptation efforts, but institutional leaders tend to maintain more control over the situation. This approach encompasses a number of other models (e.g., “resource dependence,” “political economy,” “strategy-structure”), yet is defined in each by the fit between the environment and the organization’s structures and processes. Cameron argues that adaptation under the strategic choice approach can occur two ways – incrementally or in a revolutionary way. Under the first, adaptation occurs as a result of piecemeal changes implemented by leaders. Revolutionary change, on the other hand, occurs when “there are reversals in the direction of change across a significantly large number of variables of strategy and structure.”

Finally, the “symbolic action” approach occurs when leaders play the prominent role during the adaptation, and they use symbols and social definitions to influence the process. As Cameron explains further, “the logic of this approach is that organizations are glued together mainly by the presence of common interpretations of events, common symbols, common stories or legends, and so on.” Therefore, adaptation under symbolic action occurs through a leader’s use of an organization’s history, symbols, language, rituals, and the shared meanings held by its members to enact change.
Cameron argues that, based on his analysis of the state of higher education today, institutions will need to implement components of all four approaches as they adapt to this complex, technological, and turbulent environment. Yet Cameron and other researchers have not explored the approaches that institutions historically have taken during periods of required adaptation in times of crisis. Cameron concludes by saying, “liberal arts colleges, like other types of colleges and universities will survive and prosper as they become adept at implementing adaptive strategies in the required ways as they develop characteristics that match with the demands of the postindustrial environment.” The same can be said of liberal arts colleges during the war period. The question that remains unanswered by Cameron and others, however, is: By what processes have liberal arts colleges adapted historically?

Writing in the mid-1970s, Alexander Astin and Calvin B.T. Lee contend that the “plight of the small college” or the “invisible college” (i.e., small, private colleges) is survival. “Of all institutions of higher education, invisible colleges are most likely to become extinct,” Lee and Astin posit. Inherent within this need to ensure institutional survival is the saliency of institutional adaptation. Allan Pfnister writes that the free-standing liberal arts college has been “a study in persistence amid change, continuity amid adaptation.” He contends that the role of the liberal arts college has been questioned at three different points in the development of higher education. The first, Pfnister argues, occurred during the 19th century when colleges “were planted with an almost reckless abandon,” and leaders of liberal arts colleges were forced to differentiate their institutions from the burgeoning number of colleges being established throughout the nation.

The emergence of the land-grant institution and the American research university marked the second period of adaptation for the liberal arts college according to Pfnister. He contends that
“education in America was taking on new functions and structures” and the increased attention on the merits of the “people’s colleges” (i.e., land-grant institutions, research universities) made the liberal arts college “anachronistic.”\(^{61}\) The third period of adaptation, Pfnister asserts, began in the 1950s and continued on through the 1970s. He argues that the need for adaptation began with the implementation of the GI Bill and the increasing demand for vocational preparation being articulated by many of the returning GIs. This change, in conjunction with the emergence of the community college in the 1970s, therefore “left little place for the ‘single-purpose’ institution,” according to Pfnister.\(^{62}\) The literature discussed above, however, suggests the need to extend Pfnister’s third period of adaptation to include World War II, as the adaptation process at some liberal arts colleges may have begun as a result of the challenges provided by the emergence of the war in the early 1940s.

Nonetheless, through all three periods of external threat that necessitated institutional adaptation, the liberal arts college survived. Lewis Mayhew, in his 1962 volume of *The Smaller Liberal Arts College*, writes:

> For half a century it has been predicted that the privately supported liberal arts college will soon disappear from the American educational scene. Yet the four-year liberal arts college, rooted in American civilization, continues to exist and to educate an appreciable percentage of students seeking higher education.\(^{63}\)

The question that remains then is: How have liberal arts colleges repeatedly adapted to ensure survival despite their extreme vulnerability within the broader higher education landscape?

David Breneman began to tackle this question with his 1994 study of the implications of changing financial circumstances for the tuition-dependent liberal arts college. In *Liberal Arts Colleges: Thriving, Surviving, or Endangered?*\(^{64}\), Breneman analyzed the educational purposes, missions, histories, and institutional finances of 212 liberal arts colleges to evaluate the impact of
the extreme economic issues these institutions faced in the mid-1990s. His findings highlight the importance of institutional adaptation for the survival of the liberal arts colleges; the strongest will thrive, most will survive, and a few are endangered.65

Martin Finkelstein, David Farrar, and Allan Pfnister also addressed this question with their earlier 1981-1983 study that sought to understand how to synthesize the diversity of adaptive responses adopted by liberal arts colleges facing external threats. The researchers aimed to develop approaches to categorizing types of adaptive responses, to explain these types, and to assess the consequences for individual institutions. By studying the adaptive experiences of 12 liberal arts colleges during the 1970s, Finkelstein, Farrar, and Pfnister determined that common critical events, experiences, and/or threats could provide a common unit of analysis for describing the overall adaptive responses of the institutions. The researchers also determined that:

the adaptive responses of liberal arts colleges can be examined not only in terms of their substance (what and how much change they undertook), but in terms of their processes (how change was undertaken) as well….Via the use of critical events as the unit of analysis…it appears possible at once to preserve the context-specific meaning of particular events on a given campus and generalize processes across campuses.66

Therefore, the findings of Finkelstein, Farrar, and Pfnister’s study demonstrate that liberal arts colleges often implement similar adaptive strategies and hence can be studied as a collective unit when exploring the process of institutional adaptation. The results of the study thus provide a foundation upon which the common experiences of liberal arts colleges during World War II can be examined.

A study conducted by Barbara Sporn expands Finkelstein, Farrar, and Pfnister’s findings regarding the process of institutional adaptation within a higher education context. Sporn
conducted a case study of six European and U.S. universities to determine what factors/characteristics were crucial to the successful adaptation of an institution to external threats. Based on the experiences of each of the six institutions, Sporn identified seven factors that she determined to be most critical for the adaptation of higher education institutions. These are: 1) the environment in which an institution operates; 2) the mission and goals of the institution; 3) the specific culture that dominates the institution; 4) the institution’s structure; 5) the professionalization of the institution’s management; 6) the institution’s system of governance; and 7) the commitment of an institution’s leaders.67 From these seven characteristics, Sporn concludes that those institutions that have 1) a clear, well-defined mission and well-articulated goals; 2) a culture of mutual understanding, respect, and trust; 3) a system of shared governance; and 4) committed leaders are best suited to achieve successful adaptation in the face of crisis.

Gordon Davies challenges the first of Sporn’s assertions by claiming that it is in no one’s interest to have a clearly defined mission. Institutional mission, as Davies contends, is safer to talk about than to define. Allen asserts that mission is the broadest word used to describe a university’s basic purpose, and the varying interpretations of the meaning and importance of institutional mission supports Allen’s claim. Some researchers argue that mission statements are a “collection of stock phrases that are either excessively vague or unrealistic aspiration or both” or that mission statements “fail to follow through on or convey any noteworthy sense of an institution’s current identity.”68 Findings from a 1991 study conducted by W. Newsom and C. R. Hayes maintain this assertion. Their analysis of 93 mission statements revealed that most are “amazingly vague, evasive, or rhetorical, lacking specificity of clear purpose.”69 It is this lack of specificity that Davies contends is what allows institutions to adapt and grow. “The more
precisely an institution’s plans for growth are specified, the less latitude it has to respond to unanticipated opportunities,” Davies concludes.\textsuperscript{70} This assertion echoes Richard Chait’s contention that “the more one seeks specificity, the more various constituencies resist. In the end, vague and vapid goals able to attract consensus are preferable to precise aims that force choices and provoke serious disagreements.”\textsuperscript{71}

Matthew Hartley, in his study of four liberal arts colleges during the fiscal crisis of the 1980s, challenges these assertions and writes, “A well-defined mission is a touchstone, a kind of common law by which information is interpreted and decisions made. It is a means by which individuals and groups coordinate their common efforts and it reduces the likelihood that they will inadvertently act at cross-purposes.”\textsuperscript{72} A clear, well-defined mission achieves two ends, Hartley contends. The first is that a clear mission informs day-to-day decision-making, and the second is that it has the capacity to ennoble work by creating a shared sense of purpose through the communication of an institution’s characteristics, values, and history. Both of these, Hartley asserts, are of great benefit to an institution and its constituents, especially during a time of crisis when institutional identity may come into question.

Sporn defines this latter product of a clear, articulated mission as organizational culture and argues that it is also a key factor in the adaptability of an institution. William Tierney explored the concept of organizational culture in order to provide a working framework for determining the culture of an institution. Tierney defines organizational culture within a broader context as “what is done, how it is done, and who is involved in doing it. It concerns decisions, actions, and communication both on an instrumental and a symbolic level.” He continues by explaining that institutional culture is “grounded in the ‘shared assumptions of individuals participating in the organization’” and these assumptions can be identified “through stories,
special language, norms, institutional ideology, and attitudes that emerge from individual and organizational behavior.” Tierney contends, however, that a usable definition of organizational culture for a higher education context has yet to be developed. Thus, he suggests defining the organizational culture of an institution in terms of the institution’s environment, mission, socialization, information, strategies, and leadership. Gaining an understanding of how each of the six components of organization culture define and affect an institution, Tierney contends, allows administrators to better lead their respective institutions through times of crisis.

Despite Tierney’s claim about a lack of definition of culture within a higher education context, work conducted by Burton Clark decades earlier advanced a definition of organizational culture as it related to higher education. In his article “The Organizational Saga in Higher Education,” Clark identifies the prominent role of institutional culture on the campuses, but he does not label the norms, traditions, and values he observed as culture. Instead, he defines these items as components of an institution’s “organizational saga,” or “a unified set of publicly expressed beliefs about the formal group that (a) is rooted in history, (b) claims unique accomplishment, and (c) is held with sentiment by the group.” Clark contends that this sense of organizational saga is “a powerful means of unity” because it “becomes fixed in the minds of outside believers.” He also asserts that organizational saga is a valuable resource because its lays the “foundation for trust and loyalty” within an institution.

George Kuh and Elizabeth Whitt, in their article “Culture in American College and Universities,” build on Clark and Tierney’s work by advancing another definition of organizational culture as it relates to higher education. They define culture as the “social or normative glue that holds organizations together” and they state that culture serves four general purposes. These purposes include “(1) conveying a sense of identity, (2) facilitating
commitment to an entity other than self, (3) enhancing the stability of a group’s social system, and (4) acting like a sense-making device that guides and shapes behavior.”

As Kuh and Whitt continue to explain, culture is “always evolving, continually created and recreated by ongoing patterns of interactions between individuals, groups, and an institution’s internal and external environments.” Examples of culture, the authors contend, can be found within the norms, ceremonies, rituals, language, stories, and legends of an institution.

Dennis Gioia, Majken Schultz, and Kevin Corley argue that, despite other researchers’ assertions that identity is too static to change, institutional identity (or institutional culture) can (and should) change in order to ensure institutional survival. The authors attempt to “reconceptualize identity as a potentially precarious and unstable notion, frequently up for redefinition and revision by organization members.” They contend that the instability of identity is actually key in facilitating organizational adaptation in response to environmental demands. Therefore, the authors’ findings reinforce the saliency of identity in institutional adaptation.

Institutional Identity

The literatures discussed above present a number of definitions for culture, mission, and identity as explored within both an organizational theory and higher education context. I view none of these definitions as entirely sufficient for the context of this study because I believe each fails to convey the essence of the terms it is commonly used to describe; many of the definitions are either too vague or too specific. Thus, I have developed my own definition of institutional identity to guide this analysis.

Institutional identity, for the purposes of this study, is an umbrella term comprised of three components – mission, culture, and structure. The first element, mission, has been defined by combining two existing definitions. I used L. Pratt and D. Reichard’s definition of mission, “a
statement of educational philosophy which provides a long-term sense of institutional identity,“81 and then expanded the definition to include Hartley’s description of mission, which he contends is “a kind of a common law by which information is interpreted and decisions made.” Mission, within this context of this study, then has been defined as a stated, documented purpose of educational philosophy that acts like a common law to guide institutional policy development and implementation. Second, I defined institutional culture by blending Clark’s concept of “organizational saga” and Kuh and Whitt’s definition of culture. The result is an interpretation of culture that is based on the “normative glue” or the norms, traditions, rituals, and values held by an institution. Finally, organizational structure has been defined in terms of the pathways along which formal authority and responsibility flow, the systems (i.e., committees, departments, offices) and the peoples (i.e., president, faculty, staff, students, administration) that comprise each institution.

Conclusion

The literatures on the American home front during World War II tell a story of a culture and society that adapted to meet the many challenges generated by the war, yet the adaptation of higher education in this period remains a story told only on the macro-level. The literatures that explore higher education during World War II provide little discussion of how the war affected higher education at the institutional level. Even though the war pervaded all aspects of higher education, researchers have identified the private, liberal arts college as the institutional type most vulnerable to the effects of the war period. An examination of the implications of the war on these institutions remains limited, however, despite the identification of this institutions’ historic need for adaptation. Other than the work conducted by Finkelstein, Farrar, and Pfnister through their study of the adaptation of liberal arts colleges during the 1970s, Hartley’s study of
liberal arts colleges during the fiscal crisis on the 1980s, and Breneman’s examination of liberal arts colleges in the mid-1990s, there are no other studies that explore the adaptation of liberal arts colleges within a historical context such as World War II. Therefore, this study has attempted to fill all of these gaps by examining the experiences of Dartmouth College, Earlham College, Franklin & Marshall College, and Swarthmore College during and after World War II to identify 1) the various strategies implemented to survive the war period and 2) the effect of these strategies on the identities of each of the four institutions.

Methods

Design/Population/Sample

This study used historical methods and a multiple-case study design to examine the experiences of four liberal arts colleges during the war period. As W. Schramm posits, “the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result.” In addition, Robert Herriot and William Firestone assert that “the evidence from multiple cases is often more compelling, and the overall study is therefore more robust.”

A cross-case analysis of the enrollment-driven, adaptive policies implemented by selected liberal arts colleges during and after World War II thus can be expected to reveal both the shared and distinctive experiences of the institutions.

The institutions for inclusion in this study were selected after the examination of over 60 different institutional histories and presidential biographies. From these texts, I selected four institutions to include based upon four criteria revealed after analysis of each institution’s written history or presidential biographies. These criteria were: 1) the effect that the war had on the institution; 2) the adaptive policy changes made at the institution during the war crisis; 3) the
influence of the institutional identity on the implementation of war-time and post-war, adaptive policies; and 4) the long-term implications of the war period for the institution. Based on the preliminary findings from these secondary sources, the four institutions selected for this study are: Dartmouth College and Franklin & Marshall College – both of which were single-sex institutions and had tenuous religious ties throughout the war period – and Earlham College and Swarthmore College – both of which were Quaker and co-educational. Special attention was given to the missions of each college during the selection of institutions for inclusion in this study because religious ties and same sex traditions offer compelling frameworks within which institutions had to negotiate during the war period. By examining institutions with deeply-ingrained missions such as those promoted at Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore, one can then examine the implications of the war on this institutional identity and the role this identity played in the institutional decision-making that occurred throughout the war crisis.

Research Questions

After examining the literatures on “the home front;” higher education and World War II; and institutional adaptation and identity, four research questions guided this study.

1) How did private liberal arts colleges like Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore survive the challenges presented by the nation’s involvement in World War II?

2) What were the post-war challenges each institution faced in the aftermath of the conflict?

3) What, if any, were the long-term effects of the war for liberal arts colleges?
4) What role did institutional identity (i.e., mission, culture, environment) play in the either the retention or rejection of the institutional changes proposed or adopted during and after World War II?

**Data Collection Procedures/Analytical Methods**

This study relied on archival methods for the collection and analysis of the primary sources used to re-create the experiences of the four institutions during and after the war period. Data collection occurred through week-long site visits to the archives of each college selected for inclusion in the study. At each institution, the content of archived, institutional documents from 1939 to 1950 – the period before, during, and after the war – was analyzed. These documents included, but were not limited to, financial reports; reports/memorandum from the college president to the college community and/or board of trustees; minutes from faculty and board of trustee meetings; individual faculty committee reports; enrollment data; student newspapers and alumni magazines; and correspondence from alumni and community members to the president.

Analysis of the primary sources obtained from each archive entailed determination of the genealogy or origin of the document; the genesis of the document; and the authorial authority of each document. More specially, I identified the author/s and recipient/s of each document; the time frame in which the document was created; the type of document (e.g., memoir, letter, institutional memorandum); and the purpose of the document. I also examined each document for themes that relate to the research questions stated above. The themes that guided my research were: 1) student enrollment during the 1940s; 2) the financial state of the institution before, during, and after the war; 3) adaptive policies implemented to compensate for declines in enrollment and tuition revenue; 4) institutional response to the implementation of new policies
during the war period; 5) the role of institutional identity during the development and adoption of war-time, adaptive policies; and 6) the effects – both short- and long-term – of the implementation of policies on the institutional identity of the four colleges. In turn, the content of these documents was used to help 1) to reconstruct the individual experiences of each institution during the war period, and 2) to gain insight into the role that institutional identity played in the preparation for, acclimation to, and recovery from the challenges of World War II and its aftermath.

Overview of Chapters

Chapter 2 provides a brief synopsis of the histories of the four institutions within this study. Beginning with the founding of each college, the chapter details the mission and historical traditions of the colleges through the 1930s. Special attention is given to each college’s president and the institutional challenges he faced on the eve of the nation’s entrance into the war.

The historical context behind the nation’s and higher education’s preparation for the impending war is presented in Chapter 3. The lessons learned from WWI, the role of the federal government in the preparation for war, the impact of the Selective Service Act of 1940 on higher education, and the role of higher education associations during the pre-war years provide a context for the subsequent exploration of the four institutions’ individual experiences before, during, and after the war.

Chapter 4 begins to reveal the adaptive strategies that Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges employed in the initial years of the war. Discussion first explores how the war affected the American “home front” and how these changes began to affect higher education. Then, widely-implemented, adaptive policies such as the establishment of
special, war committees; the development of a “defense” curriculum; and the extension of admissions opportunities to minority students are examined. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the emergence of a relationship between the military and higher education through the creation of the Navy V-12 program.

The discussion of the colleges’ war-time adaptive policies is continued in Chapter 5 with an examination of the Navy V-12 program and its contribution to the survival of Dartmouth, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore during the war crisis. Within the chapter, Navy program requirements are juxtaposed with traditional college operations to develop a portrayal of the war college that emerged from the hosting of the V-12 program. The important role of alumni in sustaining Earlham College through the war is also presented. Discussion ends with an exploration of the ways in which the four colleges prepared for post-war operations as the end of the war drew near.

Chapter 6 reveals the long-term implications of the war on the four institutions. Issues of student enrollment; the returning veteran; and educational and curricular objectives are examined within this post-war context. The chapter concludes with the introduction of the new war period that each institution faced following President Truman’s declaration of war on Korea.

Finally, Chapter 7 provides the conclusion to this study, beginning with a discussion of the common, adaptive policies implemented at Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges during the war period. This chapter continues with an examination of the role of institutional identity in the decision-making that occurred at each college throughout the tumultuous 1940s. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of this study for higher education literature, theory, practice, and future research.
Endnotes

1 Swarthmore College: A Statement of Purpose and Policy, May 20, 1948.
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid, 212.
8 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid, 170.
16 In 1827, the Quaker church divided into two factions – Orthodox Quakers and Hicksite Quakers – during a time referred to as the Great Separation. Hicksite Quakers – named for preacher Elias Hicks – emphasized Quaker practice and subscribed to the authority of the Inner Light or an individual’s direct and personal experience with God. In contrast, Orthodox Quakers placed greater authority on scripture and scriptural teachings. By the 1850s, the Quaker church split a third time. Once Orthodox Quakers who now followed the teachings of Evangelical Quaker Joseph John Gurney instead of Orthodox leader John Wilbur became known as Gurneyites, resulting in a Gurneyite/Wilburite division. For more information on this division see: Pink Dandelion, The Quakers: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008); Thomas Hamm, The Transformation of American Quakerism: Orthodox Friends 1800-1907, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001).
18 Swarthmore College, Reports of the President, 1941-1944.
21 Ibid, 2.
22 Ibid, 4.
23 Robert Lingeman, Don’t you know there’s a war on?: The American home front, 1941-1945, (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1970), 29.
25 Robert Lingeman, Don’t you know there’s a war on?: The American home front, 1941-1945, 4-5.
29 Ibid., 260.
31 V. Cardoziere, *Colleges and Universities in World War II*, 114.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
40 Ibid, 238-239.
41 Ibid, 239.
42 Ibid.
44 Ibid, 1.
46 Only two institutional histories related to the four institutions within this study and from the period of study, 1939-1950, have been published. These are: Sally Griffith, *Liberalizing the Mind: Two Centuries of Liberal Education at Franklin and Marshall College, 1787-2002*. (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, Forthcoming). Thomas Hamm, *Earlham College: A History, 1847-1997*, (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997).
49 Ibid, 95.
51 Ibid.
53 Ibid, 125.
55 Ibid, 130.
56 Ibid, 141.
58 Ibid, 11.

Ibid, 149.

Ibid, 149.

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Ibid, 137.


Ibid, 183.

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Martha Howell and Walter Prevenier, *From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods*. 
CHAPTER TWO
Four Colleges on the Eve of World War II

Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges are four distinct institutions united by a common mission. Their originations span a century and reflect attempts to educate Indian, Quaker, and German-Reformed youths in traditions that blended liberal education with religious principles. By the eve of World War II, each institution was advancing distinct agendas based on traditional institutional values and current institutional needs. For example, Dartmouth College worked to strengthen ties with its alumni body; Earlham battled a tenuous relationship with the surrounding Richmond community; Swarthmore implemented a new honors curriculum; and Franklin & Marshall sought to bolster the academic caliber of its students. Still, as the reality of war grew more apparent, all four colleges and their leaders braced for a period of external conflict and institutional crisis.

Dartmouth College

Ernest Hopkins assumed the presidency of Dartmouth College in 1916 and inherited an institution steeped in tradition. Founded in 1769 by Reverend Eleazor Wheelock and named for Wheelock’s patron friend the Earl of Dartmouth, Dartmouth was originally chartered by the Royal Governor of New Hampshire “for the education and instruction of Youth of the Indian Tribes in this land…and also of English youth and any others.” Alexander Phelps, Wheelock’s son-in-law, told Wheelock after the signing of the Dartmouth’s charter that “it is thought by gentlemen here to be the most liberal charter in America.” Unlike the charters of Harvard College, College of William and Mary, and Yale College, for example, the Dartmouth charter made no mention of religion except that twelve of the college’s trustees must be laymen and that
no person should be denied access to the college on the basis of his “speculative sentiments in religion.”

White New Englanders’ increasing demand for the education of their sons caused a shift in the college’s primary mission of Indian education. The college graduated its first class of students in 1771 – a class of all-white New Englanders – and Dartmouth continued primarily to educate the sons of the New England gentry for much of the 18th and 19th centuries. Despite the national attention to the college garnered by the landmark Supreme Court case, Trustees of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, Dartmouth remained a small, New England college.

Reverend William Jewett Tucker, president of Dartmouth from 1893 to 1909, is lauded for bringing this regional college to the national landscape. Historians credit Tucker with the “refounding” of Dartmouth through his modernization of the college’s curriculum, faculty, and physical structure, which, in turn, helped to place Dartmouth in the national spotlight as a premier institution of higher education.

Hopkins’ biographer Charles Widmayer describes Hopkins and his predecessor Tucker as “kindred spirits” and maintains that the two leaders’ administrations had a “natural affinity.” Thus, in many respects, Hopkins’ administration was an extension of the modernization agendas and policies started by Tucker. Hopkins himself admitted this during a 1943 interview:

I can say very sincerely and without the slightest trace of affectation that I haven’t done anything except build upon foundations which were laid deep enough and solid enough during the administration of Dr. Tucker. Whatever merit there may be in Dartmouth today goes back to the work that he did under infinitely greater difficulties and calling for greater expenditure of thought and effort than has been required at any time since.

Despite the similarities between the two gentlemen, Hopkins’ election to the presidency marked a break in Dartmouth tradition. Other than his predecessor Dr. Ernest Fox Nicholas
(1909-1916), Hopkins was the only president in Dartmouth history who came to the position with experience in a field other than the ministry. This “break from tradition” caused a number of Dartmouth alumni and faculty – including the group known as “The Agnostics” - to question both the Trustees’ decisions to hire Hopkins and Hopkins ability to lead the institution. “He’s not even an educator,” one faculty member remarked.\(^94\) Hopkins’ indeed was a businessman,\(^95\) not an educator, yet the experiences he had both as a Dartmouth student and then as an alumnus provided Hopkins with the qualifications viewed by Trustees as necessary for the Dartmouth presidency.

During his time as a student, Hopkins worked in the president’s office for then president William Jewett Tucker (1892-1909). His work activities included planning events for Dartmouth’s College Club and acting as graduate manager for the college’s athletic teams. In 1905 Hopkins was named the first Secretary of the College and his duties now included alumni magazine editor and planning for academic occasions like Commencement and Convocation. Hopkins assumed even greater administrative responsibilities when, in 1907, President Tucker learned at the advice of his doctors that his ill health would require a reduction in his presidential activities. The remainder of Tucker’s presidential obligations fell to Hopkins who became responsible for the day-to-day operation of the office and often traveled to alumni events in place of Tucker. Tucker finally resigned from his position in July 1909, and Hopkins wished to also depart from the college at this time. The trustees asked Hopkins to remain, however, to help aid the new president. Hopkins reluctantly agreed, finally achieving in goal in August 1910 of leaving Dartmouth to begin a career in business.

The election of Hopkins in 1916 to the helm of an institution like Dartmouth sparked national intrigue. “The trustees have given the academic world its greatest recent surprise,” the
Journal of Education announced. Most national newspapers applauded the Board for their decision to hire Hopkins, each noting the change Hopkins’ presidency could bring to higher education. The *Seattle Times* wrote:

He [Hopkins] is essentially a businessman and his administration may reveal to Dartmouth and other institutions of learning a way to render a better and broader and more effective service in their relations to the practical side of life…His selection is a frank recognition not only of the fact that the administration of a college has become a business proposition, but of the fact also that the institutions of higher learning must get closer to the business, commercial, and industrial problems of man.96

Editors of the *Philadelphia Bulletin* similarly offered:

There is a new and stimulating conception suggested here as to the mental equipment necessary for the modern college president. To use President Wilson’s phrase, it is distinctly ‘forward-looking’ in its demand that a college president must be something more than a profound scholar, something else besides a collector of large endowments.97

Critics abounded and Hopkins thus began his presidency with a need to prove to opponents both on- and off-campus that a businessman – this businessman – could successfully lead Dartmouth.

Hopkins learned a great deal about university administration under Tucker yet he – like his critics – worried about his potential as Dartmouth president. His respect for his predecessor led Hopkins to seek advice from Tucker about the board’s offer. Tucker told Hopkins, “I just want to state one thing to you. You’re the last Dartmouth man on the list…and if you don’t care, the presidency is going to a non-Dartmouth man. Do you think that would be good?”98 Traditions established through annual events like the college’s ceremony of matriculation and student-led Winter Carnival were the mainstay of Dartmouth and thus, in many respects, the institutional pride and loyalty created by such events returned Hopkins to his alma mater. Hopkins admits this himself years later. In a collection of his addresses and articles, Hopkins wrote:
This decision [to accept the presidency] was based on the belief that Dartmouth in common with a limited few other independent colleges of like kind had the unique and indispensable function in the rapidly broadening field of higher education. This might…easily be lost sight of under administrative leadership not conditioned by influences and a philosophy such as had prevailed and proved dynamic at Dartmouth….I had found in the cultural environment, in the close-knit fellowship of human associations, and in the place loyalty induced in a small northern New England village a mental stimulus and an emotional content which I was reluctant to see subjected to the possible hazard of suddenly imposed and radical change.99

The text of his inaugural address reminded the college community that Hopkins was not ignorant of Dartmouth tradition and suggested that his actions as president would remain in accord with these principles. As a result, criticism of the businessman-turned-Dartmouth-president quickly abated.

Hopkins’ inaugural address also provided listeners with a foretaste of his vision for the college. A Dartmouth education, as Hopkins viewed it, would remain grounded within the liberal arts tradition upon which the college was founded. In his opinion, education was more than just utilitarian. As he explained further:

It is of the utmost importance that our higher education should not become materialistic through too narrow a regard for practical efficiency….I am emphasizing certain convictions about the older humanities.100

In addition, Hopkins called for “high-minded consecration to the needs of the state.” This required that “individualism give way to cooperation and group action for the good of society.”101 Taken together these ideals called for a liberal arts education that served the greater good. This would ultimately become one of the principles that guided the institution through the challenges of World War II.

A final hallmark of Hopkins’ inaugural address was his assertion of the importance of Dartmouth’s alumni body to the institution’s future. His emphasis on the role that Dartmouth
alumni would play in helping to sustain the institution illustrates his forward-thinking mentality.

He stated:

> The demands which will be made upon the college in the years immediately before us will be insistent and heavy. The knowledge of this compels us to strive with unwonted effort to realize all our resources….There will be few such possibilities of added vigor to the college as in the development of what has come to be known as the alumni movement until…the solicititude and the intelligence of the alumni – more truly than their financial means – are directed to furthering the true interests of the college.\(^{102}\)

Hopkins accordingly viewed an institution’s relationship with its alumni as a lasting one. As he continued:

> It is needless impoverishment for a man to be the recipient of the bounty of his college for the brief season of his membership and thereafter to miss being a participator in its affairs as a going concern….College has no less an opportunity to be of service to its men in their old age than in their youth….It at least seems clear that the formal educational contacts between the College and its graduates should not stop at the end of four years, never in any form to be renewed.\(^{103}\)

In a talk given later in his presidency Hopkins referred to alumni as the “living endowment” of an institution, and he aimed to treat these individuals with the same level of respect that a president treated an institution’s endowment\(^{104}\). Like his views on liberal education and service to the community, Hopkins’ respect for the role of alumni in institutional affairs would aid his administration during the trials that lay ahead.

The crises that Dartmouth faced during Hopkins’ administration were not unlike those experienced by all of higher education during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. The college’s dire financial state and the decreases in enrollment that accompanied World War I thwarted Hopkins’ initial attempts to focus on the objectives of his presidential agenda\(^{105}\). Yet by the 1930s Hopkins’ goals had become reality, and his presidency was deemed by many to be a success. A boom in financial support from gifts made to the college brought much-needed salary increases
for Dartmouth’s faculty while the fruits of Hopkins’ efforts to generate increasing alumni support for the college aided in the construction of eighteen new buildings on campus, including a renovated library. Moreover, Hopkins’ visits to Dartmouth alumni clubs scattered throughout the nation solidified alumni ties with the institution and contributed to the college’s attainment of its first million-dollar financial support figure. Increases in faculty and student numbers in addition to changes to the college’s curriculum and admissions process brought improvements to the Dartmouth’s scholastic achievements as well. Hopkins, with support from the Trustees, implemented a Selective Admissions Process\textsuperscript{106} for students interested in attending Dartmouth, and this process soon become a model imitated throughout higher education. Curricular changes he initiated included a revision of the Latin requirement, the introduction of two courses \textit{Problems of Citizenship} and \textit{Evolution} required of all Dartmouth freshmen, and the redefinition of the “major” within a student’s course of study. The latter change entailed the introduction of distribution requirements for the first two years of study and then a more intensive study of a major area of concentration that culminated in a comprehensive examination at the end of a student’s senior year. In addition, the faculty approved both the discontinuation of the B.S. degree - making the A.B. the sole degree awarded at the college - and the implementation of a honors curriculum for those students who wished to accelerate their studies through independent course work.\textsuperscript{107}

Hopkins’ efforts during the first decade of his administration protected Dartmouth from the blows of the Great Depression. Each year of the Depression brought increasing budgetary deficits for the college, but, by 1934, financial support from alumni; voluntary cuts in faculty salaries; and savings from decreased dormitory costs allowed Hopkins to eliminate all deficits and survive the fiscal crisis with a surplus of $3,000 ($46,675)\textsuperscript{108} in the college’s budget.\textsuperscript{109}
Enrollment steadily increased during this time as well and provided the college with a stable source of income. Even though the cost of tuition remained consistent though the years of the depression and the monies available for most students to attend college disappeared, the national reputation that Hopkins generated for Dartmouth sustained student requests for acceptance to the college. By the fall of 1935 the college’s enrollment exceeded 2400 students, the largest in the institution’s history to date.

The remaining war-free years of Hopkins’ administration were devoted to helping his students understand the realities of the looming European conflict. A 1935 trip to Europe showed Hopkins the dangers of facism and the threats to democracy that the nation faced. He returned to Dartmouth after two months with a mission to use the college and its curriculum to combat these evils. At an alumni dinner in Boston Hopkins announced his vision for a more socially conscious Dartmouth curriculum. He stated:

Prompt and radical modification of the curriculum must be made to adapt this to the magnitude, the complexity, and the tempo of modern life….I would argue that the curricula of our colleges should be rebuilt around the social sciences and that undergraduates should be required to learn the fundamental principles of government, economics, and social relations…110

Hopkins then turned to the Dartmouth faculty for the development of the curricular changes that would achieve these aims. The faculty chose to place a greater emphasis on the college’ social science requirements, adding required courses for freshmen and sophomores and introducing majors in International Relations; Democratic Institutions; National Problems, Economic and Social; and Local Institutions and Problems. This new social science program was implemented in the fall of 1936, and Hopkins described it as “designed to make it impossible for any Dartmouth man to graduate from college in complete ignorance in regard to the theory and practice of government and the sources from which this has sprung.”111
Curricular changes at the college continued as the threat of war grew more imminent. In April 1941 the Trustees established a Committee on Defense Instruction and by September a number of new courses and curricular revisions went into effect. This included the elimination of specific liberal arts requirements to allow students to take the college’s newly-developed defense courses. Students could choose from seven new defense courses including *Mathematics for Military Personnel; Modern war Strategy and Foreign Policy; and Components of Democratic Thought*. This marked the beginning of Dartmouth’s break with tradition to meet the demands of the impending conflict.

For a man who had reservations about his ability to lead his alma mater, Hopkins rose to the challenge, guiding Dartmouth through some of the most trying times in the college’s history. Hopkins’ leadership and vision helped the institution survive World War I, the Great Depression and the accompanying challenges of the 1930s. Together the college and Hopkins braced for another challenge. Tucker once told Hopkins, “You’re a gambler. Dartmouth’s at the stage where it needs gambling.”¹¹² Never would these words ring truer than during the war period that Hopkins and Dartmouth now faced.

**Earlham College**

Like Hopkins at Dartmouth, Earlham College president William Cullen Dennis (1929-1946) assumed his position years before World War II, and he guided the institution through the duration of the war. Dennis arrived at Earlham in 1929 at the conclusion of a very tumultuous period for the college. The 1920s and 1930s brought increasing pressures from students and faculty for Earlham to adapt to the changing times yet the principles of the Quaker faith upon which the institution was founded caused a dissonance between those individuals who demanded
change and those who saw such change as contrary to Quakerism. Thus, for over two decades, the college and the surrounding community battled over the religious tenets that guided Earlham.

Earlham College was founded in 1847 as the Friends Boarding School by Southern Quakers who moved to Ohio and Indiana to secure better farming opportunities and to preserve – as they saw it – their threatened religion. Good land, ample supplies of water, and a burgeoning Quaker community led many of the migrating Southerners to settle in Richmond, Indiana beginning in 1806. Quakers continued to settle in Richmond in droves and by 1821 the Quaker population of Indiana was so substantial that the Friends were granted permission to hold their own yearly meetings within Richmond. Richmond therefore quickly became the hub of Mid-West Quaker activity.

By 1832, talks began about the need for a school that would provide for the “guarded religious education of the children of Friends.”113 The Indiana Yearly Meeting agreed and Richmond’s role as the site of the yearly meetings made it the prime location for the new school. Consequently, in 1847, the Friends Boarding School was established and welcomed its first group of secondary-school-age children. The school continued to function only as a secondary school until shifts in the mentality of Quakers toward higher education called for the establishment of a Quaker-based college. Prior to this shift, most Quakers considered higher education to be “the abomination of desolation, a sop to the senses, [and] a distraction from the tried and trusted ways that led to holiness and salvation.114” The more “worldly” Quaker youth began to challenge this notion by seeking admission to institutions of higher education, and the Indiana Yearly Meeting finally conceded its position on higher education with the transformation of the boarding school to Earlham College in 1859.
Like most emerging institutions Earlham struggled financially in its first decades of operation. Yet guidance from the college’s overseeing Corporation composed of trustees from both Indiana and Western Yearly Meetings brought the institution to financial stability. As the physical size of the institution increased so too did the number of students, faculty, and courses offered. The co-educational college offered all the hallmarks of a liberal arts institution (e.g., history, English literature, religion) but quickly garnered a national reputation for the strength of its natural science curriculum. Students attending Earlham began to resemble other undergraduate students as well with the disappearance of the traditional Quaker plain dress and the welcoming of college activities like football, student literary societies, and even freshman hazing.\footnote{115}

Ties with the Indiana and Western yearly meetings through the governing corporation hindered the college in many ways, however. Students especially felt the limitations imposed upon them by the conservatively-minded Quaker trustees. The absence of fraternities, sororities, dancing, and smoking reflect the conventional mindset of the individuals who viewed such activities as contrary to the tenets of the Quaker faith.

The on- and off-campus debates that surrounded social activities like dancing are reflective of the much broader debate that plagued the institution prior to Dennis’ arrival. At the heart of this dispute was, as college historian Thomas Hamm defines it, the “intellectual liberty” of the college.\footnote{116} The issue centered around “whether Earlham would be committed to academic freedom or whether its curriculum would be determined by the sensitivities of fundamentalist-learning Friends in the two yearly meetings.”

On December 7, 1920, Earlham College, its teachings, and its principles came under attack by a group known as the “Committee of Ten.” Months of provocation over the “teachings,
policies, etc of Earlham College” began by the Portland Quarter of Indiana resulted in a two day hearing on the state of the college. The “Committee of Ten” began the hearings with their accusations toward Earlham:

For a number of years, and up to the present time, in common with much of the unguarded educational system of today, the integrity and authority of the Holy Scriptures have been discredited at Earlham...both by certain text books used, and by verbal teachings, especially in the biblical department, by an appeal to the unscientific and unproven ‘Evolutionary Hypothesis.’

“Earlham was ‘tearing the Bible to pieces to fit the theory of Evolution’ and had ‘caused many young people to lose their childhood faith in God and the Bible,’ the testimony continued.

“Friends generally do not want these things taught at Earlham…and Friends ought to be allowed to have what they want and what they pay for,” the Committee asserted. Allegations of ill-treatment by students and faculty of local Quaker pastors and concern over the inherent differences between the college and the yearly meetings’ interpretations of Quaker beliefs rounded out the list of accusations put forth by the Committee.

Earlham president David M. Edwards responded to the accusations, using three basic concepts to defend the institution. First, Edwards contended that the teaching that occurred at Earlham was not inconsistent with that of any other American college. Letters from the presidents of colleges like Oberlin, Grinnell, and Carleton illustrated that evolution and a critical study of the Bible were common at institutions of higher education similar to Earlham. He then asserted that Earlham should be judged “by the Christian character and commitment of its students” as they relate to the college’s mission as a liberal arts institution. Edwards stated that it was not the college’s role to tell the students how to think or what to believe. Instead, he stressed, Earlham’s aim was to teach students “how to think logically, and…operating along normal lines or processes of thought, arrive at…truth for themselves.” Earlham’s teaching was
consistent with Quakerism, Edwards concluded.

After more than four months, a report written by a joint committee composed of yearly meeting members was released. “Earlham instructors should endeavor to express themselves in the classroom in the more customary Quaker philosophies,” the report began by encouraging Earlham. It then continued by siding with the college, supporting the teaching within its biblical and biology departments and the principles of Quakerism that it encouraged. Reactions over the findings within the report were divided. The central question that remained for many was, “Shall the Church control and correct the College, or shall the College be allowed to control the Church and blast away the foundation stones of its Declaration?” This question was never answered.

The attack on Earlham’s “intellectual liberty” by the fundamentalist Friends had lasting effects on the college. Hamm reports that the hearing and subsequent report did little to affect the teachings in either the biology or biblical departments, yet the college’s relationship with the off-campus community, namely the Indiana Yearly Meeting, was greatly affected. In 1928 Edwards wrote, “I feel that the relationship between the college and the church is not ideal” and others shared the view of the yearly meeting as “increasingly unfriendly territory.” This relationship would again be tested in later years.

While Edwards and others battled to defend the college, enrollments declined and the institution’s finances suffered accordingly. Students and faculty grew increasingly discontent with the state of the college and the rules that still governed it, so they turned their aggressions toward Edwards. As a result, the Board asked Edwards to resign as president, and selected Dennis as his replacement.
William Dennis took over an institution teeming with problems. Low enrollment; financial deficits; low student and faculty morale; an unclear institutional identity; and a tenuous relationship with the community all accosted Dennis upon his arrival at the college. Despite the laundry-list of institutional problems he inherited, most of Dennis’s pre-World War II presidency would be consumed by issues brought on by the Earlham faculty and students.

Dennis’s conservative social and political views made him a typical 19th century Earlham alumnus. After graduating from Earlham in 1896, Dennis continued his studies at Harvard University where he received A.B. and law degrees. Dennis then taught law at Illinois and George Washington universities prior to his arrival at Earlham. He came to the college without any teaching or administrative experience at a Quaker institution, however.

“No one who knew William C. Dennis lacked strong feelings about him,” Hamm writes about campus sentiment toward Dennis. Dennis’s administrative style quickly put him at odds with the Earlham faculty who had for years operated under a system of collective governance. Only a year after he began, members of the Earlham faculty who were opposed to Dennis began meeting in secret and formed an organization known as the “Cave of Adullam.” Many of these individuals were angered by the erosion of faculty rights that Dennis’ policies had caused. For example, Dennis took over control of the hiring and firing of faculty and vetoed the faculty’s proposal of a tenure system. He was also openly opposed to many of the faculty rights emerging from work done by the Association of American Colleges and the American Association of University Professors.

Dennis’s pedagogical views only widened the chasm that separated him and the Earlham faculty. Hamm describes Dennis as “traditional” and “suspicious of innovation” when it came to matters relating to the Earlham curriculum. One faculty member, Millard Markle, said that
Dennis was “obsessed with the idea that we shall get into trouble by ‘tinkering with the curriculum’”.\textsuperscript{129} Dennis himself wrote in 1931, “I have relatively little confidence in the latest ‘new methods.’ I do not think the educational methods of Christ and Socrates can be improved on.”\textsuperscript{130} A few faculty began to challenge Dennis’ immovable stance on curricular change with proposals aimed at better aligning Earlham’s curriculum with its Quaker mission. These proposals all failed to garner any changes, however, due to the supporters Dennis had placed on the college’s Curriculum Committee. Dennis’s position against the proposals was due, in large part, to his belief that there was no single Quaker philosophy of education upon which the college should build its curriculum. In a report to two yearly meetings, Dennis wrote “There is not, cannot, and should not be any specific pattern of Quaker education.”\textsuperscript{131} He took this idea one step further when, in 1934, he encouraged the Earlham Board to pass a resolution that stated, “no one could ‘commit the College…to any statement, whether referring to Quaker belief, philosophy, or Quaker educational technique’”.\textsuperscript{132} The selection of Dennis as president therefore was a late victory for the Fundamentalist Friends who had challenged the college and its curriculum almost a decade earlier. This was a not a victory for the college, however. Dennis’ traditional views began to impede the institution’s curricular growth and placed the institution at a disadvantage to those institutions that were changing with the changing times.

While Dennis battled the college’s liberal faculty members, Earlham students worked to bring change to the stagnant institution. The student activists often followed the lead established by national organizations such as the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID); the American Student Union (ASU); and the American Friends Service Committee (ASFC). Initial student attention focused on peace activism. Students organized programs on peace; formed an Anti-War Club; raised money for the National Council for the Prevention of War; and joined the
ASFC’s emergency peace campaign. Despite the wide-ranging, on-campus peace activities and the Quaker belief in pacifism, student involvement remained limited and Dennis gave such activities little attention.

As student activism on campus grew throughout the 1930s, Dennis could no longer ignore the increasing demands arising from the student body. Despite his liberal attitude toward the college’s curriculum, former Earlham president Edwards provided students with limited freedom and few opportunities for self-expression. Edwards supported athletic competition for both male and female students and allowed a few select student organizations, but he strictly forbade on- and off-campus social activities like smoking and dancing. These bans persisted until student demands for their revocation reached Dennis.

Like Edwards, Dennis held contradictory positions on the college’s curriculum and student activities. With regard to social issues Dennis was a liberal Quaker. Hamm attributes this tolerant mentality to the years that Dennis spent studying and teaching in the non-Quaker world. Dennis supported “the widest practicable individual freedom and expression,” and this attitude manifested itself in his granting permission – for the first time in the institution’s history – dancing and smoking on campus. This decision caused much division both on- and off-campus. Earlham board members split in their support for Dennis’s decision, particularly as it related to the removal of the ban on smoking. Yearly meeting members were also deeply angered over the college’s break with Quaker tradition and protests from Indiana and Western Yearly meetings ensued. Consequently, despite his efforts to “bring about a sympathetic understanding between the College and the plain people of the country communities” as he declared at the beginning of his presidency, Dennis’ allowance of dancing and smoking further aggravated the already fragile relationship between the college and the community.
Shifts in student enrollment forced additional changes at the College in the years preceding the war. By 1939, a majority of the Earlham faculty was of the Quaker faith yet only a third of the student body was Quaker. Still Earlham remained as only one of two Quaker-based institutions that had a Friends student body of over 30 percent. Quaker students were a minority of the student population, however, and this marked a shift for the college. In addition, students began attending Earlham in greater numbers from areas along the eastern seaboard. By 1940, 63 of Earlham’s 519 students came from the east coast, which is a significant increase from the 14 who attended Earlham in 1910. Although the majority of these students came from Quaker boarding schools on the east coast, the experiences and mentality they brought with them further transformed the college.

Many worried about Earlham’s direction as the college braced for the impending war. As one man told Dennis, “In my mind…to some degree for a number of years we have been getting away further and further from some of the old Quaker principles.” This institutional identity crisis and the strained relations it thus caused accompanied Dennis and Earlham into the nation’s involvement in World War II.

**Swarthmore College**

Like Earlham, Swarthmore College was founded by Friends who sought to establish an institution to educate Quaker youth. Conversations about the need for a “Friends Boarding School” began as early as 1850 yet it was not until the chartering of Swarthmore College on May 4, 1864 that an institution was actually established. Named after Swarthmoor Hall in England, Swarthmore College was established as co-educational, liberal arts college that would “provide a ‘guarded education’ where Quakers could be nurtured and trained in an atmosphere where their beliefs and practices were understood and would not have to be confronted or tempted by the
‘worldly’ colleges of the day.” The college’s founding by Hicksite Quakers made the institution distinct from the neighboring Quaker institution, Haverford College, which was under the control of Orthodox Friends. Swarthmore’s relationship with the yearly meetings that helped to establish the college also made the institution distinct from both Earlham and Haverford College. Unlike Earlham College and the overseeing Indiana and Western yearly meetings, for example, Swarthmore was not directly controlled by a yearly meeting.

The first decades of the college’s operation were treated by the presidents and the founders much like an experiment. Institutional historian Christopher Dunsmore writes that “no one was quite sure what Quaker higher education, at least in its Hicksite manifestation, should be” and thus the college’s leaders were “flexible about the curriculum and practices of the new institution.” This flexibility extended to the institution’s treatment of women who, in marking a departure from the norm at many colleges, were allowed to attend the college and hold professorships and seats on the college’s Board of Managers. Still the college’s mission remained firmly rooted in educating through Quaker principles. Both Quaker and non-Quaker students – the latter a significant percentage – were required to attend daily meetings at the meetinghouse built on campus. The college’s board of members comprised of individuals from the Religious Society of Friends also helped to ensure that the college continued to promote Quaker principles despite its experimentation in other aspects of the institution.

Swarthmore’s curricular experimentation came to define the institution, especially during the administration of Frank Aydelotte, who assumed the presidency of Swarthmore College in 1921. A former professor of English at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Rhoades Scholar at Brasenose College, Oxford University, Aydelotte accepted the position as Swarthmore’s seventh president largely because of the institution’s character and financial
stability. Initially Aydelotte was unsure of his ability to lead an institution. During his initial visit to the college, Aydelotte saw that Swarthmore was “different from the ordinary college, more solidly founded on…character” yet on “a very sound basis financially.” Aydelotte also quickly noticed the college’s areas for potential growth. He wrote to a friend that Swarthmore “needs improvement on the academic side, but they have the money necessary to make that, and I gather from what I saw of the members of the Faculty that a good deal could be done in a very short time.” Still Aydelotte remained uncertain about his potential success as president of the college. To make his final decision, Aydelotte made a second visit to the college where he proposed to the Swarthmore faculty his “educational ideas” that were based, in large part, upon his experiences at Oxford. He then used their reactions to his plan as the basis for his final decision on whether to accept the position. As he recalled years later:

The proposal which I had in mind was to make a distinction between the Pass and the Honors degree. I thought of instigating something that would be called Honors work for the two final years of the undergraduate course, which would be both freer and more difficult that the ordinary course. For Honors work there were to be no term grades or examinations. Instead the whole Honors program was to be tested by final examinations at the end of the Senior year…to be conducted by external examiners. This was of course, simply an application of Honors work at Oxford to an American college. It was the answers I received from members of the Faculty…which determined me to accept the Swarthmore invitation.

Aydelotte’s first impressions about Swarthmore were accurate. When he arrived on campus to begin his presidency, Swarthmore had both financial stability and a steady stream of enrolling students. And size was important to Aydelotte. As Aydelotte biographer Frances Blanschard writes, Aydelotte believed that “American education had suffered from a mistaken regard for numbers. It was his idea that the growing throng of students in the United States should be cared for, not by building larger and larger institutions, but by a great number of small ones…. Aydelotte thus viewed the institution’s 510 students and 47 faculty as the perfect
number for a college like Swarthmore and, as a result, quickly determined that he would need to devote little of his attention to changing the size of the institution.\(^{144}\)

Instead Aydelotte promptly placed his attention on the college’s curriculum. In a letter he wrote to his friend Warner Fite, Aydelotte described Swarthmore’s curriculum as “not outstanding but good…a sound basis for what he wanted to do.\(^{145}\)” Swarthmore’s curriculum was not unlike that of other liberal arts colleges of its size. The first two years of study were devoted largely to the completion of specific liberal arts requirements such as English composition, mathematics, laboratory science, and social science whereas the final two years provided students with greater flexibility in their selection of courses. In a break from the traditional liberal arts curriculum, Swarthmore also offered vocational training in two subjects – education and engineering. It was not the specific offerings that Aydelotte sought to change, however; he wanted to change the structure.

The Swarthmore faculty became eager to implement Aydelotte’s curricular agenda after hearing about it in greater detail during his presidential inauguration. The president never mentioned the word “honors” yet the recommendations he put forth provided faculty with an understanding of the type of program he envisioned for Swarthmore. Shortly after his inauguration the faculty decided they were in support of Aydelotte’s proposal for a curriculum that aided the college’s more academically-gifted students, and they began to work together to bring the president’s concept to fruition. Hence, this curricular experiment as it was viewed by both Aydelotte and the Swarthmore faculty arose through efforts by the entire Swarthmore community.

Despite the faculty’s high levels of involvement with the development of the honor’s program, Aydelotte’s experiences as a Rhoades Scholar at Oxford heavily influenced the
educational philosophies that shaped the program. At its inception the program operated under the principles that:

Honors work should be restricted to the two upper classes and should replace the usual program of five courses meeting fifteen hours a week. Instead of ‘taking courses,’ an honors student would ‘study subjects,’ reading extensively from bibliographies provided by his teachers and writing frequent essays based on his reading. In place of ‘course examinations at the end of each semester, the measure of his achievement would be a special set of comprehensive examinations, written and oral, at the end of his two year’s work."

The faculty decided that these goals would be best attained through seminar-style teaching, thus establishing an additional connection between the educational styles of Swarthmore College and Oxford University. Other details of the program were left to evolve as each class of students and participating faculty encountered new or different problems. “It must continue to be a ‘living and growing thing, with just as little of the dull and mechanical about it as possible,’” the president stressed to the faculty committee charged with developing the honors program.

The first years of the program’s implementation were viewed by those at the college as an experiment. “In the early years at Swarthmore, reading for honors was a personal adventure for all alike: student, teacher, parent, administrator,” the Swarthmore faculty recollected. Two academic divisions – English literature and Social Sciences - launched the newly-devised honors program during the 1922-1923 academic year, and faculty selected eleven students to participate. In years two and three, the program grew to include two additional Divisions – French and Mathematics, Astronomy, and Physics – and eighteen and thirty students respectively. A question then arose, based, in large part, on the academic success shown by participating students. Should the honors program be made available to all students and not just to a select group? Aydelotte responded with both practical and theoretical answers. Practically speaking, Aydelotte believed the honors program to be too expensive to require of all
Swarthmore students. Theoretically, Aydelotte understood honors work to be just that – an honor. This meant that taking courses under the college’s new academic program should remain an honor that recognized the academic achievements of select students. As he explained in his inaugural address:

I do not believe that we should deny to the average, or below average student, the benefit of a college education. He needs this training, and we need his humanizing presence in the colleges, but we should not allow him to hold back his more brilliant companions from doing that high quality of work which will in the end best justify the time and money which we spend in education.150

Those outside of the Swarthmore community viewed the college’s new honors program as an experiment as well. The book, Reading for Honors at Swarthmore, by Professor Brooks brought much national attention to the college. Educators from colleges and universities around the country traveled to Swarthmore to learn first-hand of the program about which everyone within higher education was speaking. Although flattering, much of this attention was premature as the program remained in its experimental phases. And, as the faculty recalled, “the college lived under a spotlight of publicity, with many good and some less happy reactions from the undergraduates, faculty, and alumni.151,"

The implementation of an honors curriculum helped to raise Swarthmore’s academic standards, which pleased students, faculty, and alumni alike. One reason for this contentment was the program’s increasing success and subsequent need to hire additional faculty to meet the program’s demand. Aydelotte and the faculty committee he created established strict criteria for the selection of new faculty. In keeping with the principles of the honors program, Aydelotte and the committee wanted “men and women who were enthusiastic about their subject, who found students stimulating and research as a means to better teaching as well as a possible contribution to knowledge,” but they wanted candidates to be adept at teaching in the non-honors program as
well. The appointment of the twenty-nine faculty hired during this employment frenzy thus served to benefit the college as a whole - not just the honors program. These hires, in turn, greatly improved the college’s academic standards.

An unforeseen consequence of this increase in academic standards was its effect on less-able students. While the college continued on its new academic trajectory, students of less academic ability were too often left behind. Students who previously would have been able to progress through their studies to graduate from Swarthmore were instead forced to drop out due to academic failure. Unfortunately for the college and for Aydelotte, students of the Quaker faith comprised a disproportionate number of these drop-outs, and this statistic did not escape the attention of the college’s Board of Managers. However, the board remained in support of Aydelotte’s honors curriculum. In a letter addressed to Aydelotte they wrote:

The object of this letter is to make clear that the Board approves unreservedly the improvement in the level of academic work which has already been made at the college, and stands solidly hind the faculty in the effort…to raise this level.

Perhaps this is due, in large part, to the Board’s understanding of how the Quaker faith influenced the college’s honors program. “From the first to the last the Swarthmore experiment has drawn upon the Friendly traditions of individual freedom and the Friendly aspiration towards collective improvement,” the faculty explained.

By the end of Aydelotte’s administration the honors program had evolved to include increasing numbers of students, academic divisions, and faculty; its success grew with each academic year. The program’s accomplishments also led to changes in the curricular requirements for non-honors students. In 1934 the faculty voted to reduce the previous five course requirement to four courses, and they also decided to require non-honors students to study one minor subject. Both changes reflected the success students within the honors curriculum
experienced due to their smaller course load and study of a discipline outside of their area of concentration. In addition, the college continued to maintain its steady enrollment growth, which remained consistent with Aydelotte’s desire to preserve the “small campus” feel.

Aydelotte announced on October 14, 1939 that he had resigned from his position to become the Director at the Institute for Advanced Study. The announcement came as a shock to the Swarthmore community although many had been anticipating such a message for most of the decade. In a letter to her parents, student Barbara Ballou ’41 recounts her shock and sadness upon learning of Aydelotte’s resignation. She wrote:

The whole college is very upset and wondering what we’ll do without our prexy with the big ears and the lovable face…who has made Swarthmore what it is today, made it from a usual small coed college, not into a rah-rah footballishly well-known place, but into a place with high standards and real values.155

Aydelotte left Swarthmore a changed and a better institution. The implementation of the college’s nationally-recognized honors program was, without a doubt, the crowning achievement of Aydelotte’s presidency, but his accomplishments extended beyond the program. He also led Swarthmore alumni in a $4 million endowment campaign that increased the college’s endowment to $7.5 million; re-organized the engineering and psychology departments; and contributed to the construction of the state-of-the-art Edward Martin Biological Laboratory. In addition, Aydelotte encouraged the college and students to focus on athletics as a sport and not as a money-garnering and reputation-building enterprise. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Aydelotte demonstrated to the higher education community the academic benefits that honors work could provide to the entire college community. In a 1935 speech made at an Association of American Universities conference, Aydelotte explained the success of Swarthmore’s honors program as it related to the tenets of liberal education. He stated:
The honors plan ‘seems to our graduates a good liberal education because of the great interest it arouses, because they discover for themselves the pleasures of study, and become exited about learning…because they depend not upon the prodding of a teacher, but upon their own courage and self-reliance.\textsuperscript{156}

The departure of the college’s much-loved leader left Swarthmore with a new president just as World War II threatened the nation. Board of Managers selected Friend John W. Nason to succeed Aydelotte, and in June 1940 Nason became Swarthmore’s eighth president. Nason came to Swarthmore in 1931 as a philosophy instructor after he finished his studies as a Rhoades Scholar at Oriel College, Oxford University. In 1938 Nason became Assistant to the President under Aydelotte, and he served in this position until he was selected as Aydelotte’s replacement. Their shared experiences both as Rhoades Scholars and within the Office of the President created a uniformity between the two presidents’ views on liberal education and thus brought a smooth transition to the new administration. In addition, Nason’s familiarity with the institution and the Quaker principles upon which it was founded meant that Swarthmore entered the war period with a new leader who was, essentially, new in title only.

**Franklin & Marshall College**

Franklin & Marshall College, like Swarthmore, braced for war with a new leader at its helm. The unexpected death of the college’s president John C. Schaeffer on April 6, 1941 left the college without a president on the eve of the country’s entry into war. History professor H.M.J. Klein led the institution as interim president until a replacement was hired in the fall of 1941. The Board of Trustees selected Theodore A. Distler, former Dean of Lafayette College, as the college’s 12th president, and Distler arrived at the Franklin & Marshall campus for his first day as president on December 1, 1941. Only six days later Distler would find himself leading the college through a time of war.
Distler was the first president since John Williamson Nevin (former president of Marshall college and president of Franklin & Marshall from 1866 - 1876) who was not an alumnus of the institution. He earned his B.S. and Master’s degrees in Business Administration from New York University and had worked as a faculty member, secretary of the Committee of Admissions, Director of Student Welfare, and Director of Student Personnel at NYU until he took the position at Lafayette. Despite his non-alumni status, Distler came highly recommended and the Board believed him to be a fitting successor to Schaeffer who was held in high regard by the Board, faculty, and administration.

Arriving in August 1935, John Schaeffer began his presidency at a time when most institutions were still rebounding from the financial crises that followed the Great Depression. Schaeffer was surprised to learn of the institution’s financial stability, but quickly became concerned by the low enrollment that plagued the institution. Enrollment issues were not new at the College. Franklin & Marshall College was founded in 1852 after the merger of two institutions, Franklin College and Marshall College, the former of which suffered from persistently low or no enrollment since its establishment in 1787.

The 1852 merger of the two institutions was surprisingly swift given the distinct characteristics of both colleges. A battle over the religious affiliation of the new college complicated the initial stages of this merger, but the Lutheran trustees from Franklin College ultimately yielded to the Marshall College trustees, thereby allowing the newly established institution to be under the direction of the Synod of the German Reformed Church. Monies transferred from the sale of the site of Marshall College in Mercersburg and a pledge of funds from citizens in Lancaster County placed Franklin & Marshall College at the former site of
Franklin College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. The merger thus blended the two institutions in both name and mission, the latter reflecting the ideals and histories of both colleges.

The newly-established institution did not have a formal mission statement such as those that are traditionally described within college catalogs. In his address delivered at the opening of the college, Nevin expressed the college’s educational aim in terms of the benefits it was intended to provide to the German Reformed Church; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and the city of Lancaster. Like its mother institutions, Franklin & Marshall was to be “a nursery of liberal education in its more general form” aimed at serving the needs of the Anglo-German communities in Lancaster and Pennsylvania through the education of its sons in the German Reformed tradition. As Nevin explained further to those in attendance at the merged college’s opening:

> It will be the center of education for the whole body, at least on this side of the mountain; towards which, from every side, will be directed its eyes of expectation and hope, and on which must depend in fact all its future prosperity and success.

By the time of Schaeffer’s presidency the college had adopted a more formally articulated mission that drew, in large part, from the 1787 charter of Franklin College. The college catalogue presents the purpose and mission of the institution and reads:

> Perhaps the clearest statement that has motivated Franklin and Marshall College for than a century and a half is found in a passage in the charter granted to the founders of Franklin College….The charter declared: ‘The preservation of the principles of the Christian religion and of our republican form of government in their purity depends, under God, in great measure on the establishment and support of suitable places of education for the purpose of training up a success of youth who, by being enabled fully to understand the grounds of both, may be led the more zealously to practice the one and the more strenuously to defend the other.’…The college is dedicated to the task of training young men in the arts and sciences, in an atmosphere dominated by Christian ideals of service and conduct, and with full recognition of the vital part higher education always plays in the life of democracy.
Schaeffer sought to tackle the college’s enrollment dilemmas largely through means of the college’s mission. He believed the institution had fallen behind the times, and he worked to modernize the mission and, in turn, raise the prestige of the institution. This goal first required changes to be made “at home.” Schaeffer began by increasing support for extra-curricular activities like the Symphony Orchestra and the Green Room Club, the campus theater group. He thought these “valuable assets of college training” would help to attract students to the college, “to bring the cultural side of our college to the attention of prospective students.” The president realized that adding support for extra-curricular activities would not be enough to aid enrollment, however. He thus began work on the implementation of a scholarship plan to attract high-achieving students to the college.

By the 1920s colleges throughout the nation had sacrificed academic excellence in the pursuit for students. Lowering entrance requirements to allow students lacking in academic preparation to enroll became commonplace within higher education during this time. Franklin & Marshall filled its depression-era classrooms with a large number of transfer students, many of whom flunked out of other schools, and Franklin & Marshall faculty members quickly contended that the academic quality of the institution was suffering as a result. Schaeffer’s arrival as president and hinting of a plan for merit-based scholarships thus provided a much-needed response to both the faculty’s concerns about the quality of the Franklin & Marshall education and the college’s flailing enrollment.

When Schaeffer arrived at the college, 43 percent of students received some form of financial aid, but some within the faculty believed that this aid was not directed toward the appropriate individuals. Therefore a committee appointed by the president began to investigate
the possibility of implementing a more a merit-based scholarship program at the College. In the spring of 1936 the college launched its new scholarship program. Academic success was the key requirement of the new program, yet non-academic qualifications were highly desired of applicants as well. As institutional historian Sally Griffin explains:

> Recipients had to be in the top fifth of their high school classes, but ‘qualities of manhood and character, leadership, and physical vigor’ would be considered along with scholastic ability. Ten were to be distributed according to geographical regions within Pennsylvania and Maryland with two reserved for ‘at large’ candidates.¹⁶⁰

Within just a year of the implementation of the college’s merit-aid scholarships those at the college were already deeming the program a success. Education professor P. M. Harbold used placement tests administered to each incoming class as the basis for his assertion that the “scholastic average” of the newest freshman class had increased over the previous year by ten percent. If this trend continued Harbold claimed that “the College should continue to attract a larger per cent [sic] of high grade students, which is the primary point of beginning in the rather long process of raising still further the standards of scholarship in College.”¹⁶¹

The recruitment of a more academically-qualified Franklin & Marshall student body continued because of efforts by both faculty and alumni. Recruitment campaigns targeted at broadening the geographic distribution of students brought continued enrollment increases at the College. By the end of the 1939 – 1940 academic year enrollment reached 966 students, with students coming to Lancaster from throughout Pennsylvania and from the nearby states of New Jersey, New York, and Maryland. The college also embraced the “socially undesirable” students who were denied admissions at other institutions, namely Jewish students.¹⁶² Franklin & Marshall College welcomed these students, however, and by the 1935-1936 academic year
Jewish students formed 14 percent of the college’s student body, making them the second-largest denominational group at the college.\textsuperscript{163}

Merit-based scholarships, student-recruitment campaigns, and “socially tolerant” admissions policies all contributed to the stabilization of the college’s enrollment in the years preceding World War II. A more academically rigorous institution with highly-qualified students also emerged as a result of these policies. Bolstering the college’s already strong liberal arts curriculum marked a final component of Schaeffer’s presidential agenda to modernize the college.

The content of Shaeffer’s December 1935 inaugural address entitled “The Fundamentals in a Liberal Arts Education” illustrates his understanding of and appreciation for the tenets of a liberal arts education. His speech conveys a deep appreciation for a liberal education’s role in vocational preparation, and his agenda for the college’s curriculum reflects this appreciation.

Departments of education, religion, and business administration preceded Schaeffer’s arrival on campus, but Schaeffer worked to build these programs into areas of vocational success for students. Schaeffer accepted the principle of a “well-rounded student” but also recognized that businesses held opportunity and he tried to fill the college – and its Board of Trustees – with examples of success for students to see and with whom they could interact.

Changes in the General Synod of the German Reformed Church brought an opportunity for Schaeffer to bring powerful businessmen to the once-clergy-dominated Board. The Reformed Church of the United States and the Evangelical Synod of North America merged under a 1934 Plan of Union and, as part of this merger, the new Synod re-evaluated the church’s relationship with all of its educational institutions, including Franklin & Marshall. Schaeffer seized this merger as an opportunity for the college to amend its charter with relation to the church and its
representation on the Board of Trustees. The revised charter went into effect in 1940 and now required a majority of the Board’s members to be members of the Evangelical and Reformed Church, not specifically clergy. This step marked one of the first in the college’s long journey to dissolve its relationship with the German Reformed Church. The revision also allowed Schaeffer to bring influential businessmen to the Board. These additions included John K. Evans ’11, a vice-president of General Foods; Henning W. Prentis, Jr., president of the Armstrong Cork Company, and Wayne C. Yeager, vice president of the Atlantic Refining Company. The presence of the three executives on the Board helped Distler to reinforce to students the importance of the business sector as a career opportunity.

The hallmark of the college rested with its pre-medical program, however. Year after year graduates of the college were admitted to and won graduate fellowships to attend the top graduate and medical schools in the nation. For example, the Class of 1937 had 52 science majors and 21 were admitted to medical schools; eight to dental schools; three to schools of osteopathy or veterinary medicine; and ten received fellowships to graduate programs in chemistry, physics, geology, and biology. This graduate placement success came to define the college and, in turn, helped to draw interested students to the college. Schaeffer worked with the pre-medical program’s faculty to ensure the continued success of pre-medical students. Changes in the admissions policies of medical schools brought changes in the requirements of pre-medical majors at the colleges such as the reduction of required science course to allow for a broader education in areas like English, psychology, politics, and sociology.

There were few additional changes to the general education curriculum under Schaeffer’s presidency. General social science requirements came to replace the more specific courses in psychology and political science, and attempts were made to eliminate the required senior course
in ethics; these were to no avail. Schaeffer’s greatest triumph for general education came through the construction of a new library and a classroom and office building devoted to the liberal arts. Demands for a new library began as early as 1928 yet a lack of a benefactor hindered all plans. In March 1937 Board of Trustee president and long-time college supporter, Dr. Benjamin Franklin Fackenthal, Jr., announced that he would provide the funds necessary for the new library and construction of the new building commenced. The library was dedicated on May 31, 1938 and Fackenthal delivered a speech that put into words many of the ideals that Schaeffer sought to deliver during his presidency. As Fackenthal stated:

> It has always been a pleasure to be associated with this College, and its scholarly alumni, many of whom have risen to eminence and become outstanding men in the college, adding honor and luster to this old Institution….One of the things that has impressed me in my connection with Franklin and Marshall College is the development and evolution of the country boy, who comes here in a new atmosphere, unacquainted with comrades and surroundings but who soon adapts himself to a college life, becomes a leader, occupies a front seat at commencement, receives his degree, and goes out into life with a spirit of fidelity without which no one can rise to the top.¹⁶⁶

Fackenthal’s tragic death, while en route to the Board of Trustees’ meeting at which Theodore Distler was to be named Schaeffer’s successor, delivered the second of two blows to the institution on the eve of World War II. Still the modernization that both Schaeffer and Fackenthal envisioned for Franklin & Marshall had largely been realized by the time of the men’s untimely deaths in 1941. Theodore Distler thus acceded as president of a modernized, financially-sound liberal arts college with a stable enrollment of high-achieving, professionally-bound students. Five days into his presidency Distler met with the Board of Trustees where the first order of business was to elect a new president of the Board to replace Fackenthal. The Board elected Paul Kieffer ’01, and Franklin & Marshall now had two new leaders to guide the institution through the trying times that were ahead.
Endnotes

89 Ibid.
90 The Dartmouth College case arose in 1819 after the New Hampshire state legislature tried to seize control of the institution by amending the college’s charter to allow for the reinstatement of former president John Wheelock. This action, along with other actions by the state, led to the contention that the state legislature’s involvement was a violation of the college’s charter as a private institution. The issue went to the Superior Court of New Hampshire where it was to be determined if Dartmouth was a private or public corporation. On November 6, 1817 the court ruled that Dartmouth was, in fact, a public corporation, thus justifying the actions of the legislatures as they related to the college. Unsatisfied by this ruling, Dartmouth trustees, led by alumnus Daniel Webster, took the case to the Supreme Court. On February 12, 1819, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall reversed the Superior Court’s decision and ruled in favor of Dartmouth College. The Supreme Court’s decision determined Dartmouth to be a private institution that, although it served the public, was not under public control. The Trustees of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward case remains a landmark case in higher education. As Frederick Rudolph explains, “It became a ‘bulwark of private property’ by safeguarding private institutions from legislative interference…For higher education in America, the Dartmouth College decision put on the way toward clarification the distinction between private and public institutions…” Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University: A History, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 210.
91 Leon Burr Richardson, History of Dartmouth College, Volume II, (Hanover, Dartmouth College Publications, 1932);
92 Charles Widmayer, Hopkins of Dartmouth: The story of Ernest Martin Hopkins and his presidency of Dartmouth College, 15.
94 Charles E. Widmayer, Hopkins of Dartmouth: The story of Ernest Martin Hopkins and his presidency of Dartmouth College, 3.
95 After his departure from Dartmouth College in the summer of 1910, Hopkins held positions at Western Electric, William Filene’s Sons, Inc., Curtis Publishing Company, and the New England Telephone Company.
96 The Seattle Times as cited in Charles E. Widmayer, Hopkins of Dartmouth: The story of Ernest Martin Hopkins and his presidency of Dartmouth College, 5.
100 Ibid, 29.
103 Ibid, 31-32.

Hopkins’ presidential agenda entailed (1) increasing the compensation of faculty; (2) developing the college’s plant needs including the construction of a new library; (3) reorganizing the college’s administration, with particular attention to the delineation of responsibilities at the senior level; (4) promoting greater respect from both students and alumni for scholastic achievement; and (5) strengthening of the college’s relationship with its alumni.

Dartmouth’s new Selective Process for admission focused on achieving diversity at the college. With this process, Hopkins and the Dartmouth trustees sought to bring students to the campus from a variety of social, economic, and geographic backgrounds. The new admissions’ procedure examined an applicant’s “character,” “interests,” and “performance in school activities” in addition to the traditional “intellectual capacity” of an applicant. The process also gave preference to New England men and sons of alumni as well as applicants from west of the Mississippi and south of the Mason-Dixon line. The application included three forms, one from applicant, one from his principle or headmaster, and one from an alumnus. These, with the applicant’s scholastic record, formed the basis of the application for admission to Dartmouth. For more information see Charles Widmayer, *Hopkins of Dartmouth: The story of Ernest Martin Hopkins and his presidency of Dartmouth College*, 64.


Figures in parentheses throughout this document indicate monetary amounts adjusted for inflation according to the Consumer Price Index for 2009.


Ibid, 46.

Ibid.

Ibid, 49.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, 136.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid, 145.

Ibid, 148.


Ibid.

Ibid, 148-149.


The other Quaker institution of which over thirty percent of the student body was comprised of Quaker students was Penn College in Iowa. Thomas D. Hamm, *Earlham College: A History, 1847-1997*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).


Ibid, 59.

Helen Magill, daughter of Swarthmore President Edward Magill (1872-1884) was a 1873 graduate of Swarthmore College and the first woman in the United States to earn a Ph.D.

In 1908, Swarthmore College broke all religious ties with its governing board of members. This was not done because of any change in the institution’s mission, but rather for financial reasons. Under regulations established by the Carnegie Foundation’s retirement system, the college must be nonsectarian in order for Swarthmore faculty to be able to participate in Carnegie’s program. The board agreed to this change although members believed “the denominational restriction referred to is not needed; that the college will be absolutely under the management of Friends without the clause as with it.” Thus, on paper, the institution was nonsectarian yet, in actuality, Swarthmore remained a Quaker institution. Christopher Densmore, “Swarthmore College,” in John W. Oliver, Jr, Charles L. Cherry, and Caroline L. Cherry, *Founded by Friends: The Quaker Heritage of Fifteen American Colleges and Universities*, (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 2007).


Ibid, 147.

Ibid. 151.

Ibid, 152.

Frances Blanshard, *Frank Aydelotte of Swarthmore*, 189.


Swarthmore College Faculty, *An Adventure in Education: Swarthmore College under Frank Aydelotte*, 60.

The English literature division was comprised of English, history, and philosophy. The Social Science division was comprised of political science, economics, history, and philosophy.

Aydelotte as cited in Swarthmore College Faculty, “An Adventure in Education: Swarthmore College under Frank Aydelotte,” undated, 27.

Swarthmore College Faculty, *An Adventure in Education: Swarthmore College under Frank Aydelotte,* 36.


Ibid, 201.

Swarthmore College Faculty, “An Adventure in Education: Swarthmore College under Frank Aydelotte,” 25.

Barbara Ballou as cited in Frances Blanshard, *Frank Aydelotte of Swarthmore*, 292.
Aydelotte as cited in Frances Blanshard, *Frank Aydelotte of Swarthmore*, 151


Ibid, 358.


Ibid, 363.

The beat of war drums, muffled and distant at the opening of 1940, continually grew more distinct through the nation, and in New England their rat-a-tat was loudest.” – Ray Nash, Dartmouth College

CHAPTER THREE
The Calm Before the Storm:
A Nation and Its Colleges Prepare for War, 1939-1941

The Debate Over War

The fighting in Europe that would become World War II began on September 3, 1939 following Germany’s invasion of Poland and Hitler’s refusal of ultimatums to withdraw from the country. French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain responded the same day with declarations of war against Germany. While the two prime ministers declared war on behalf on their nations, U.S. President Roosevelt delivered a radio address on the ensuing war to the American public. Roosevelt began, “Until four-thirty o’clock this morning I had hoped that some miracle would prevent a devastating war in Europe and bring to an end the invasion of Poland by Germany.”167 “This nation will remain a neutral nation,” he continued. “The United States will keep out of this war…Let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields.”168

Roosevelt’s proclamation regarding the importance of American neutrality grew out of years of an isolationist foreign policy. Experiences during World War I and the hardships of the Great Depression provided the foundation upon which the principles of modern American isolationism were built. Proponents of neutrality maintained that, despite President Woodrow Wilson’s 1914 proclamation of neutrality, economic forces tied to the war trade with Allied and warring nations during the first world war made it impossible for the United States to avoid involvement in the conflict. The final blow to the nation’s neutral stance on the war came with the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915. In regard to the nation’s isolationist position, Senator
Bennett Champ Clark wrote, “In the end we were at a point where we have to choose: We could try to defend our neutral rights by force of arms or we could give up those rights and stay out.” Thus, advocates of neutrality and isolationism felt that the United States was dragged into World War I by economic greed and outdated international law. Warfare also changed during the course of World War I, and memories of the technological advances in combat that many experienced in the trenches of France caused reluctance and fear to engage in future conflicts. World War I was supposed to be the “war to end all wars.” Another war - a more technologically advanced war - thus was simply unimaginable and to be avoided at all costs.

The emergence of the Great Depression then elicited a shift in national concern away from militarization and toward economic preservation. Unemployment and lack of food – not guns and fighting – came to dominate the national agenda of the 1930s. With employment opportunities dwindling and food lines growing, attention was concentrated on the state of the nation, with few concerning themselves with events abroad. The Great Depression also siphoned resources from the military, leaving a national force depleted of both money and manpower. Future participation in a war, therefore, seemed impossible given the weakened states of the nation’s military and post-depression economy. Concerns over the need to mobilize for war and its effect on the nation’s fragile economy led many in Washington to consider isolationism as the country’s best policy option.

By the 1930s Republican and Democrat members of Congress representing citizens from across the country had developed platforms of unilateralism, isolationism, and neutrality. Both pro-Roosevelt publications like the New Republic and anti-Roosevelt publications like the Saturday Evening Post also supported the nation’s isolationist policies. American isolationism of the 1930s thus transcended political party, geographic differences, and economic background. A
uniform, widely-accepted single definition of the nation’s isolationist policy never existed within Washington, however. Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, ranking Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, outlined his interpretation of the nation’s isolationist policy in a speech made before the Council on Foreign Relations. Senator Borah explained:

In matters of trade and commerce we have never been isolationist and never will be. In matters of finance, unfortunately, we have not been isolationist and never will be. When earthquake and famine, or whatever brings human suffering, visit any part of the human race, we have not been isolationists, and never will be…..But in all matters political, in all commitments of any nature or kind, which encroach in the slightest upon the free and unembarrassed action of our people, or which circumscribe their discretion and judgment, we have been free, we have been independent, we have been isolationist.\(^{170}\)

Memories of World War I led some legislators to challenge Borah’s position and contend that a national policy on isolationism should include restrictions on war-time trade and commerce. Senator Homer T. Bone, a Democrat from Washington, stated “I would rather temporarily abandon all our world commerce than to have this Republic, which my father fought to preserve, destroyed or irreparably injured by another great war.”\(^ {171}\) Other anti-interventionist legislators differed from Senator Borah in that they were more willing to have the United States cooperate with foreign nations and the League of Nations. Still, differences in interpretations aside, all isolationists shared the view that “political commitments tying American policy to the policies of other nations were unnecessary and dangerous.”\(^ {172}\) Manfred Jonas, in Isolationism in America, 1935-1941, synthesizes the many perspectives on isolationism and thus defines American isolationism during the 1930s as “‘the nation’s insistence upon the sole authorship of its legal acts’ and thus ‘the non-judicial counterpart of sovereignty’ combined with a policy of subordinating virtually all other interests to that of avoiding war.”\(^ {173}\)
Germany’s invasion of Poland initially did little to change U.S. foreign policy. Problems at home continued to dominate national attention despite the escalating conflict in Europe. However, as the year progressed and Britain’s need for the weaponry and military resources needed to fight Germany increased, Roosevelt and his military leaders could no longer maintain the nation’s neutral stance. It was decided that the United States would support the Allied powers in Europe, but Roosevelt planned to do so with, as David Kennedy defines it, a “method-short-of-war” policy.\(^{174}\)

In March 1941, Congress passed what was initially called *An Act Further To Promote The Defense of the United States*. This act—or the Lend-Lease Act as it is most commonly referred—provided over $7 billion in aid to Britain.\(^{175}\) In his December 17, 1940 press conference given months before passage of the legislation Roosevelt explained:

> Suppose my neighbor’s home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire. Now, what do I do? I don't say to him before that operation, ‘Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it.’ What is the transaction that goes on? I don't want $15—I want my garden hose back after the fire is over. All right. If it goes through the fire all right, intact, without any damage to it, he gives it back to me and thanks me very much for the use of it. But suppose it gets smashed up—holes in it—during the fire; we don't have to have too much formality about it, but I say to him, ‘I was glad to lend you that hose; I see I can't use it any more, it's all smashed up.’ He says, ‘How many feet of it were there?’ I tell him, ‘There were 150 feet of it.’ He says, ‘All right, I will replace it.’ Now, if I get a nice garden hose back, I am in pretty good shape.\(^{176}\)

Roosevelt’s garden hose analogy provided citizens with an accurate description of how he intended for the United States to assist Britain. The Lend-Lease Act allowed for the U.S. to provide economic aid to Britain through the loaning of the weaponry and military bases Britain needed to fight the battles in Europe.\(^{177}\) Thus the Act signaled the beginnings of the country’s reversal of its isolationist policies because of the United States’ provision of aid to Britain. As a
New York Times article proclaimed, the Act “ended the great retreat which began with the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations.”\(^{178}\) “Our effort to find security in isolation has failed. By the final passage of the lend-lease bill we confess its failure,” the Times concluded.

Despite shifts in the mentality of the federal government, the first two years of the conflict abroad remained for most Americans as just that – abroad. National polls conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion in the years leading up to World War II reveal the extent of the American populace’s isolationist and anti-war mentalities. In a November 1936 poll participants were asked: “If another war like the World War develops in Europe, should America take part again?” Ninety-five percent of respondents answered “No” to the question. The following year 73 percent of respondents believed that there would be another World War, but 56 percent of those individuals still maintained that the United States would be able to stay out of the conflict. Finally, just months before Germany’s invasion of Poland, when asked the question “Do you think the United States will have to fight Germany again in your lifetime?” more than half of respondents (54 percent) responded “No.”\(^{179}\) Consequently, with hints of a war abroad surfacing, many Americans still believed that they would not and should not be affected. Jonas explains that this mentality suggests “both a general abhorrence of war and the clear assumption that the coming struggle involved no vital interests of the United States and could be settled in Europe and Asia.”\(^{180}\)

The Gallup and Robinson public opinion polls above suggest that isolationist views dominated American society, but the interventionist perspective also had its share of supporters. In many respects, the American populace was divided into two categories of people – isolationist individuals who were against U.S. involvement and interventionist individuals who supported
U.S. involvement in the conflict abroad. Two prominent leaders in higher education personify this divide.

Robert Maynard Hutchins, chancellor of The University of Chicago, was a fervent isolationist. On March 30, 1941, Hutchins delivered a national radio broadcast that attacked the shifting policies of the Roosevelt administration and suggested that an isolationist policy was the best for the country. As Hutchins explained to his national audience:

> Until we are engaged in military action we must continue to hope that we can avoid the ultimate catastrophe. We stand on the brink of war. But we have not been attacked. The burden of proof rests of those who claim we are about to be…\(^{181}\)

A year prior, James Bryant Conant, president of Harvard University, voiced his interventionist views on the same radio airwaves as Hutchins. In his May 29, 1940 address Conant campaigned for support of Roosevelt’s call to Congress for aid to the Allies. With Conant’s request also came an attempt to assuage listeners’ fears of the war that might result from the provision of the aid. As Conant implored to the radio listeners:

> I am advocating immediate aid to the Allies. I shall mince no words. I believe the United States should take every action possible to insure the defeat of Hitler. And let’s face honestly the possible implications of such a policy. The actions we propose might eventuate in war. But fear of war is not basis for a national policy. If a free state public opinion must guide the Government, and wise public opinion on matters of foreign policy can result only if there is a continuous, clearheaded, realistic discussion of all eventualities, including war.\(^{182}\)

Conant’s address ended with a simple plea for support of his interventionist cause. “I urge you, let your voice be heard,” Conant concluded.\(^{183}\)

The effects of Hutchins and Conant’s addresses on the perspectives of the American populace as they related to the war remain indiscernible yet the leaders’ positions reflect the divergent viewpoints that pervaded the nation during the 1930s.
presidents throughout the country used their positions as a platform to voice their opinions on the war and the country’s place within it. For example, Dickinson College president Fred P. Corson and 25 members of the faculty endorsed Conant’s interventionist radio message through letters mailed to Dickinson graduates and members of Congress. Two hundred Dartmouth College faculty, including President Ernest M. Hopkins, sent a letter to President Roosevelt that encouraged the president to provide aid to the allies. The president and 30 members of the Swarthmore College faculty went a step further, encouraging Roosevelt to make at least 2,000 planes and all United States military advances and “secrets” available to the Allied forces.\footnote{184} Presidents and faculty members at Yale University, Smith College, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, and College of the City of New York voiced similar interventionist messages either through letters to the President and Congress or through declarations made at their institution’s convocation and commencement ceremonies. Edwin Lewis, a prominent judge in Philadelphia, attacked these presidents and faculty for what he viewed to be an abuse of their power and position. While addressing a graduating class, Lewis ironically declared, “Why should college commencements be made the forum for advocacy of war. The present warmongering of college presidents and teachers is quite inconsistent with their ‘liberal’ or ‘left wing’ tendencies exhibited for the past decade.”\footnote{185}

Despite the disparate messages sent by college and university presidents and faculty, isolationist and anti-war views dominated the majority of college campuses throughout the 1930s. National newspaper articles reveal that anger over the post-World War I state of the nation, enthusiasm for building a career and life, and doubt about a war’s implications for the nation formed the basis for many students’ reluctance to see the United States engage in the conflict. Bowdoin College president Kenneth C. M. Sills reported in a 1940 \textit{Boston Herald}
article that the majority of the students at his college were against going into war. As Sill depicted the perspectives of his Bowdoin students,

…The great majority, confused, frustrated, besought, believed sincerely that this war as of yet is none of our affair, that they will fight on this side of the water if the United States is attacked, and probably if Canada is threatened, but that they hope that every effort will be made by our government to keep out of war; partly because they think that the elders are responsible, partly because they are naturally interested in getting on with their own careers, and largely because they cannot see peril to our institutions from a totalitarian victory.186

Students at Harvard University announced their isolationist views through petitions circulated throughout campus and then mailed to Roosevelt. With the petition, the students sought to remind Roosevelt of their “determination never…to follow in the footsteps of the students of 1917.”187 “Our demand [is] that the President bend his efforts toward peace and not war for America,” they concluded.188 A student from Yale University quoted within a Massachusetts Telegram article insinuated that the war in Europe was not a war to be fought by educated men like him. “I and colleagues refuse to throw out hard-earned (educational) assets, together with our blood, into the wreckage of Europe,” he stated.189 As he finished, “War is no doubt a great escape mechanism for those who are bored [and] for those whose lives have been unsatisfactory”.190

The same Massachusetts Telegram article suggests that the opinions illustrated by students such as those at Bowdoin, Harvard, and Yale marked a departure from the positions previously displayed by students during a time of impending war. As the article’s author contended:

In the past, youth has usually been eager for battle, and quickly responsive to an appeal of high sentiment. The change in attitude is profound….They are cynical about the virtues of war when they consider the results of the last war. They know that the middle-aged and elderly have run the post-war world, and have made a
mess of it…Under conditions which have existed since the last war, shining armor grows rusty.\textsuperscript{191}

Ernest Hopkins, Dartmouth College president, placed the blame for this change on the very people who were chastising the students for their isolationist views – their elders. Hopkins asserted, “The trouble with the attitudes of youth in our colleges today is that they are what we, their elders, have made them.” As Hopkins continued to explain:

In our concern that the obligations of life might never be heavily imposed upon them as these had been imposed upon many of our associates, in our desire that youth might be freed from hardships that previous generations had always assumed to be part of life to bear, and in our solicitude that youth might never have to undergo anxieties with which the minds of their elders had not infrequently been oppressed, we have in our affection for them done them great disservice.\textsuperscript{192}

Hopkins was quick to accept his own role in shaping the attitudes and opinions of the youth on his campus, and he thus defended the students and their hesitation toward war. For Hopkins the college, the university, the church, and the home all failed in their roles as places for students to learn about the world and their place within it. Hopkins concluded, “For now these many years it has been sweet pleasure to play that the protected life we offered our children was representative of a real world. In o[u]r hearts, however, we have known that this was not so. It has been unfair not to tell them.”\textsuperscript{193} Only months later it would be the Japanese Navy – not the church, the university, or the home – that would teach the entire nation about the harsh realities of a world at war.

**Higher Education Rallies for the War**

Even though their campuses swarmed with isolationist and anti-war sentiments, higher education’s leaders, like national leaders, saw war looming on the horizon. They thus collectively began to make plans for the war-period years before the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor.
Memories of experiences during World War I remained on the forefront of many leaders’ minds as preparation talks commenced. World War I had taught leaders that “war terminates or postpones the formal education of many, redirects that of others, converts both plant and curriculum to new uses, and permanently alters the nature of higher education.” Although the first Selective Service Act was passed in the first month of World War I, student volunteering for service in the first world war caused some institutions to lose as many as 70 percent of their students to the war effort. World War I also caused many colleges and universities to be “stripped of many of their most competent teachers.” In addition, leaders remained bitter over the relationship – or lack thereof – between higher education and the federal government during the war. Many within higher education believed that the government waited too long before establishing a relationship between the two entities, and, once a relationship was established, the government and the military took absolute control of the campuses. Thus, with talks of a selective service draft and military training programs swirling, college and university leaders knew that their institutions would be affected greatly if war arose. “Colleges quickly sensed that this war…was to demand the fullest contribution each could make,” J.H. Miller and D.V.N. Brooks explain of the uneasiness felt throughout higher education. Leaders did not want history to repeat itself, however, and many began to work tirelessly to ensure that this impending war would garner different results. As one leader articulated it, “We ask the government now that there be no repetition of the mistakes and delays that characterized the effort of a quarter a century ago.”

The memories of the experiences from the first world war formed the basis for a statement issued by a committee of the American Council on Education (ACE) in June 1940, months before Congress’s declaration of war against the Axis powers. This statement
recommended that the nation’s college and university campuses be used for defense training, marking the first of such declarations regarding the role of higher education in the war. Conversations about national defense and the role of higher education continued throughout the summer of 1940, and in August 1940 representatives from ACE and the National Education Association (NEA) met to discuss the developing situation. The result of this meeting was the organization of the National Committee on Education and Defense (NCED), led by George F. Zook, president of ACE, and Willard E. Givens, executive secretary of the NEA, and whose aim was to serve as the unified voice of and advocate for the diverse higher education community.

The U.S. Office of Education, led by Commissioner John Studebaker, worked during the pre-war years to disseminate information through national mailings on the effective preparatory steps being taken at institutions of higher education throughout the country. As Studebaker explained in one such mailing, “Every day bring fresh evidence, that American education accepts the challenge for leadership in the defense of American democracy.”

A survey administered by the Office of Education to the representatives of college and universities revealed both the “readiness of higher education to keep abreast of events” and the unanimous opinion that “(1) the main task is to carry on ‘by being the best possible instrument in the promotion of the ideas and ideals of civilized cultured life; [and] (2) normal programs and activities should be continued but adapted to meet the emergency.”

The survey also showed that institutions and their leaders were already preparing their campuses for the impending war. At the University of Pennsylvania, for example, the university named a group to coordinate the university’s activities for any emergency and to act as a liaison with Government agencies. Also, curricular changes were made at Brown University and the University of Chicago through the addition of courses such as *Naval Science Tactics*, the *History of Hispanic America*, and *United States Documents*. Finally,
faculty at Wellesley College launched a research initiative to study problems like food production; food conservation; and food transportation, which may – or may not – arise if the nation became involved in the war.202

Planning for the war by higher education leaders continued throughout 1941 with a series of national meetings. On February 6, 1941, ACE convened a conference in Washington, D.C. entitled “Organizing Higher Education for a National Defense.” Over 500 leaders from 370 college and universities attended this conference whose purpose was largely to remind the government of higher education’s readiness to “cooperate and aid” in national defense.203 Higher education leaders continued in their efforts to remind the government of their willingness to serve, and, at a July 30-31, 1941 conference entitled “Higher Education Cooperates in National Defense,” leaders from both higher education204 and the military sat down for the first time to discuss the impending war. The goal of these talks was to “elicit from military and other government officials’ policy statements about how colleges and universities might serve the defense effort.”205 An August 1941 mailing issued by the American Council on Education reported the results of the conference:

College and universities earnestly and sincerely seek to serve the national defense. They desire only that their extensive physical plant and equipment and highly skilled personnel shall be utilized to the fullest possible extent.206

Conference participants discussed the potential service of colleges and universities as it related to the solution of personnel and training problems of non-military defense agencies; civilian defense; and education as national defense. Based on these discussions the role of higher education in national defense was to remain largely educational. “It is of vital importance to maintain a continuous supply of men and women trained in mind and body; that the college, through more effective instruction and guidance, can make a most important and necessary
contribution to national defense,” the report stated.\textsuperscript{207} The report went on to delineate the ways in which the federal government believed higher education, through its educational mission, could aid in the national defense effort. These included:

1) Increasing curricular emphasis on mathematics, science, and technical skills but not to the detriment of a liberal education.

2) Preparation of lists of students, faculty, and alumni and the areas in which each could provide assistance to the nation, including interests, aptitudes, and special abilities.

3) Keep students and alumni informed of changing personnel needs in the defense training program.

4) Coordinate with local officials of the Office of Civilian Defense to determine specific needs of local communities.

Educational representatives responded with their own requests of the federal government. They asked that government agencies “(1) maintain a high degree of flexibility in any national program so that they may be adapted as far as possible to local institutions, and (2) to utilize all available personnel without regards to race, color, nation of birth, creed, or sex.”\textsuperscript{208}

The July conference thus failed to accomplish little more than the exchange of wish lists between representatives of higher education and the military. Higher education leaders offered their institutions and their resources to aid the nation, but governmental agencies rejected all offers with a “don’t call us, we’ll call you” response. Thus, the federal government and higher education continued with their preparations for the impending war yet they continued to do so as separate entities.
**War Becomes Reality**

By the eve of the country’s entrance into the war, student opinion on the nation’s involvement in the conflict had changed. A *New York Times* article published on November 8, 1941 illustrates this shift in student mentality. The article focused on Dartmouth College and the results of a recent campus poll on the country’s role in the war. Speaking before members of the Dartmouth Alumni Council, Hopkins announced that his students now favored interventionism, this position marking a profound shift from Dartmouth student views of just two years prior.

“Two years ago the college was overwhelmingly isolationist. Today it is overwhelmingly non-isolationist,” Hopkins told alumni. A letter written to Roosevelt by Dartmouth student Charles G. Bolté on behalf of students at the college further illustrates the shift in perspective of which Hopkins spoke. In his letter, Bolté implored for Roosevelt to take action by preparing his nation for and then declaring war. As Bolté wrote to the President:

> We ask you to set in motion the executive and legislative machinery which will stop the farce of producing automobiles, washing machines, gaudy fashions, and aluminum salad bowls while the peaceful world which is enhanced by these products is being blasted to pieces….The loudest voices are those crying peace, peace; when there is no peace….Having waited long, sir, we now ask you to override these voices: to override the personal distaste for death and armies held by every one of us: and to make our best selves by waging war….We can act now to save the last best hope on earth a nation ever had of staying free and bringing freedom.

A November 1941 article from the Virginia *Times-Dispatch* indicates that the changing student mentality at Dartmouth was reflective of the changes occurring on other college campuses. The author, Henry Staples, claims:

> Almost without dissent, undergraduates last year endorsed a stubborn isolationism. Believing in America for Americans, they poohpoohed [sic] jingolistic [sic] slogans, staged standpatters’ peace rallies and shouted defiantly, ‘The Yanks are not coming.’ Now they have junked their antiwar placards and slogans and are abandoning the isolationist camp by droves.
Charles P. Gyllenhaal, a student at the University of Pennsylvania, supported the author’s assertion:

…There has been a change, a change which has manifested itself in student war polls, in the editorial policies of student newspapers, and in the expressed attitude of all young people both in college and out of college.²¹²

Campus polls on the issue of the United States’ entry into the war substantiate the claim of a change in student opinion. Twenty-one percent of students at Yale and Harvard voted in favor of war in a November 1941 poll as compared to only six and five percent, respectively, in February 1941. Opinions at Columbia changed as well with 23 percent of students voting in favor of war in November 1941 against only 12 percent in April 1941.²¹³

Student support for U.S. involvement in the war did not always translate into support for total military intervention, however. Most students remained reluctant to go as far as to demand a declaration of war from Congress and Roosevelt. A 1941 national poll of students revealed that only one-fifth of polled students wanted war “now.”²¹⁴ Students instead overwhelmingly supported U.S. intervention through the provision of aid to Britain and the dispatch of divisions of the U.S. Navy abroad. The shift from total isolationism to total intervention was therefore incomplete. Staples contends that this reluctance from students was due, in large part, to the continuing lack of assurance regarding the implications of the war that they felt. “Proof,” Staples argued, “is what students still need.”²¹⁵ “Phrases like ‘the war to end all wars,’ and ‘make the world safe for democracy’ still leave them cold….They merely want concrete assurances that their sacrifices will not be in vain,” he contended. A student writing for the Cornell University newspaper, The Sun, explained Staples assertion further. He wrote:

This time we must have proof that, after our efforts, the world really will be a peaceful one, in which democratic standards may spread throughout the world.
That’s why we think that America and Britain should get together right now and draw up definite plans about the world we are going to build. Hitler will not acquiesce in those plans. They will not be put into effect without a fight. But with such plans we should at least have a motivation for sacrifice and battle, a spiritual basis which would carry us through. Without such plans, we can fight only that Hitler may join us in hell.216

The bombing of Pearl Harbor just weeks later marked the complete end of the American public’s isolationist position towards the war in Europe. The United States had been moving toward war since Germany’s invasion of Poland two years earlier, but the Japanese attack on Hawaii brought the war abroad to the nation’s doorstep. Millions of Americans listened on their radios as President Roosevelt announced to the nation on December 8, 1941 that:

No matter how long it may take to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through absolute victory….With confidence in our armed forces, with the unbounding determination of our people, we will gain the inevitable triumph – so help us God.217

Just as the attitudes of the nation changed, so too did the attitudes of the men and women on the nation’s college and university campuses. No longer were the student-published campus newspapers filled with articles and editorials that merely called for interventionism in the form of aid to the Allies; these papers now demanded war, and the students, like the rest of the nation, began to prepare for their role in the conflict.

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“...the worst ravages of war are in the realm of the intellect and the spirit.” Dr. Clyde Allee, October 31, 1942.

CHAPTER FOUR
Changing To Meet the Demands of War, December 1941- April 1943

War Changes the Nation

December 8, 1941 marked the beginning of a profound shift in American culture. Military training, rationing and shortages; new emerging workforces; and unprecedented productivity now defined the nation and its people. “People met new places, new situations, new jobs, new living conditions, new ways of life, new temptations, and new opportunities,” Richard Lingeman writes of the nation now at war. 218 “Use it up, wear it out, make it do, or do without” became the hallmark of American society during this time of war. 219 Shortages of goods began as early as 1942 when the rubber necessary to produce tires grew scare and the quantities of rubber available were needed to manufacture the tires to be sent abroad. The Office of Price Administration, founded in April 1941, established ration boards in 48 states to control the prices and availability of 90 percent of the goods manufactured and sold during the war. The sinking of American tankers by German submarines caused the rationing of gasoline and restrictions on driving followed. The government banned pleasure riding, and imposed a 35 mph speed limit for all of the nation’s highways. Most Americans, consequently, now stayed close to home.

Even those individuals lucky enough to secure the highest amount of gasoline as permitted each month by ration boards felt the effects of the war’s restrictions. Rationed food, unlike other rationed goods, “hit everyone alike”. 220 Sugar was rationed to only eight (later 12) ounces per person per week beginning in 1941, and rations on coffee to only one pound per person every five weeks then followed. Rationing of beef and poultry led to a newly-acquired taste for horsemeat and muskrat, and strikes by miners and lumberjacks angered over the meat
rations caused shortages of goods like paper manufactured from the wood pulp they produced. Clubs like the Patriotic Patches Club of Rockford, Illinois or the Homemakers’ Club of Harlan County, Kentucky also emerged throughout the country as wives searched for ways to “retool” garments for the men fighting overseas when clothing grew scarce.\textsuperscript{221}

The role of women in the battle against the Axis powers extended beyond participation in sewing clubs and the management of the family ration card. Between April 1940 and August 1943, 40,000 women entered the labor force in positions within agriculture, manufacturing, and clerical services to fill the vacancies caused by the departure of men for the armed forces.\textsuperscript{222} Over 15 million men left their homes, jobs, and education for military training and service during the course of the war.\textsuperscript{223} This exodus left the doors of industry open to individuals for whom the workplace had previously held limited opportunity. Working on the factory floor became a way for women to support their nation, their families, and their servicemen during this crisis. The majority of these women were between 20 and 44 years old, and over 50 percent were married with husbands overseas or in military training. The entrance of women into the workforce challenged existing stereotypes, and women quickly showed themselves to be capable of performing equally, if not better, than the men they replaced. After the war ended, almost 75 percent of these women would remain in the workforce.

Black workers also rushed to fill positions vacated by the men who had gone off to war. In 1940, Black workers held 500,000 of the jobs within manufacturing, but by 1944 that number had risen to over 1,250,000.\textsuperscript{224} The increase in available positions within the war industry allowed large numbers of Black men and women to leave their share-cropping and domestic service roots. The emergence of factory work for Blacks also caused a major migration as families moved from the South to the West, where industry jobs were most plentiful. Large
numbers of White men, women, and children left behind on the “home front” also joined in this migration. Between Pearl Harbor and March 1945, 5.5 million individuals left their farms to live and work in the city.\textsuperscript{225} One hundred companies held 82.6 percent of the war production, and areas like Mobile County, Alabama and Hampton Roads, Virginia, home to a handful of these companies, experienced immense growth in their populations due to this migration for jobs. For example, between 1940 and 1944, Mobile County and Hampton Roads increased in population by 64.7 percent and 44.7 percent respectively.\textsuperscript{226}

The shift to war-time production, the increase in availability of jobs, and the migration of peoples, all in the midst of extreme shortage and sacrifice, brought significant changes to American culture. A major result of the war, as Kenneth O’Brien and Lynn Parsons contend, was that “home-front workers were more representative of the general population than ever before.”\textsuperscript{227} This changing face of the American workforce that challenged old stereotypes and helped to raise national consciousness represents just one of the many war-time adaptations demanded on the “home front.” The nation, Cardozier writes, was now “unified by a common bond, a shared purpose, and a spirit that cemented relationships and concern for one another. There was conflict among individuals and groups as there had always been, but dedication to winning the war took precedence over all other concerns.”\textsuperscript{228} The soldiers who returned from battle would find a changed American society – a society united in the goal of bringing its men home and restoring world peace.

\textbf{College or Combat?}

The changes in lifestyle the war produced permeated every home and factory, and institutions of higher education were not immune to the changes the war demanded. As foods grew scarce and a new workforce flooded the burgeoning factories, leaders of the nation’s
college and universities worked to identify their role in the war effort. Within days of the nation’s entrance into the conflict, many leaders found themselves with the task of developing and adapting institutional policies both to aid in the war effort and to ensure the survival of their institutions through the war period.

The effects of the war touched every institution of higher education, public research universities and private liberal arts colleges alike. The emerging conflict brought decreases in student enrollment in the years preceding the nation’s entrance into the war yet most initial enrollment losses were minimal as the decision to abandon academic pursuits in favor of military service remained an individual choice for students to make. As enrollments and tuition revenue began to decline with the escalation of the war, the cost of institutional operations increased, thereby creating a difficult situation for college and university leaders to navigate. Writing to Swarthmore alumni, President Nason articulated the tenuous balancing act his institution faced in these first years of the war. He explained:

> On the one hand, we face a shrinking enrollment, how great and how rapid no one can tell. On the other hand, we face the rising costs of nearly everything we need to run the college….The two together create an almost desperate problem of making ends meet.²²⁹

Enrollment losses increased in the months prior to Pearl Harbor, however, as support for the war and a desire to aid in the escalating conflict abroad came to replace the isolationist mentality that had dissuaded many male students from joining in the war effort. At Franklin & Marshall, by the 1941-1942 academic year enrollment numbers had already decreased by 10 percent, with just 779 students enrolled at the institution.²³⁰ Earlham College, for example, began the 1941-1942 academic year with only 437 students, a 12 percent decline in enrollment from the previous year.²³¹ Enrollment losses at Swarthmore paled in comparison, with a decline of just 40
students (5 percent decrease) from the previous 1940-1941 academic year’s total of 758 students. And, Dartmouth College lost 145 of its approximately 2,300 students at the start of the 1941-1942 academic year.

With the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor came a surge in enlistments for service. Male college students were no exception in this rush to volunteer, and college and university leaders quickly realized that both the draft and enlistment threatened their institutions. As I. Kandel writes, “The uncertainties faced by the institutions of higher education were matched by the uncertainties of youth who were faced with the question of whether patriotic duty demanded that they enlist voluntarily or that they continue their program of study until their call came.”

Presidents throughout higher education addressed their student bodies in the days following Pearl Harbor, each encouraging students to consider the post-war needs of the nation before they decided to enlist. Service through continued education, presidents stressed, was as important to the war-cause as military service. In a memo addressed to Swarthmore course advisers, Professor Frederick Manning emphasized this point. Manning instructed advisers that:

Students are urged to stay in college as long as they possibly can, surely as long as they can see no other course which they are certain that they can do greater service to their country. Volunteering for any armed or non-combatant service should be discouraged except after most careful and deliberate consideration.

This sentiment was articulated further at convocation and commencement services held throughout the nation in the summer and fall of 1942 as the effects of the war on enrollment became more apparent, and the need to retain male students grew more imperative. President Theodore Distler, in his May 1942 commencement speech to Franklin & Marshall students, stressed the importance of continuing their education despite the war. He stated:

One of our basic jobs is the training of our young men for the horrible but necessary task of engaging in war. But we also have a nobler purpose, and it is very important that we
remember it. We must recognize that our most profound duty is to the world that will follow the peace. Besides training sailors and soldiers and technicians we must continue to train leaders in peace time pursuits. We must keep alive in our youth, even in times like these, a passionate love of and a devotion of all that is rich and pure and fine in the arts and literature of all lands. 234

President Ernest Hopkins’ address to the students of Dartmouth College echoed the sentiment expressed by Distler. As Hopkins explained at the College’s 1942 convocation ceremonies:

Both from the point of view of your own personal interest and of society’s future need, there rests upon you undergraduates of Dartmouth College the obligation not only to extract the last possible modicum of all educational advantage from your term in college but as well to cultivate appreciation of the needful values to a free people of liberal education, that though the light from this torch be reduced to a spark, it may speedily be blown again to a brilliant flame when first military victory is won and peace is brought back to earth. 235

The National Committee on Education and Defense (NCED) also issued a statement on the selective service versus “occupational desertion” question that plagued many students. Like the speeches heard on many campuses, the NCED encouraged consideration of the importance of a man’s service to his nation through his continuing education. The 1942 bulletin explained:

‘Shall I continue my education or enlist?’ Every college man feels the urgency of this question today….No simple, universal answer can be given to this question. Every student must face his own individual answer, through a searching appraisal of the alternative answers to another capacity, ‘In what capacity can I render the most effective service to the nation in this critical period’….No single factor should unduly influence a college man’s decision. There are many complex factors to be carefully weighed not only in light of immediate needs and opportunities, but also in light of the continuity of life and experiences of the individual, of long-range needs, and of the security and welfare of the nation. 236

Even General Lewis Hershey, executive director of the Selective Service System, issued a statement that encouraged male students to remain in higher education until they were called into service by the draft.
Conscientious Objectors

At Earlham and Swarthmore Colleges, the question of college versus combat was further complicated by the Quaker belief in pacifism maintained by many of the colleges’ students and faculty. In the first weeks after Pearl Harbor, President Dennis addressed the Earlham student body about the tough decision facing all of the college’s male students. “Each person should follow his own conscience, whether it leads him in the one extreme to voluntarily enlist or to take the course directly opposite by refusing even to register. All shades of opinion have been represented in the reaction of Earlhamites to the present situation,” Dennis reassured. The dissonance between the desire to serve and the desire to adhere to Quaker tenets that plagued many students was obvious on the Earlham campus. Consequently, Dennis and the faculty developed group conferences to provide faculty and students with a forum to discuss the issues of the draft and the role of a conscientious objector within the war.

Swarthmore President Nason also stressed to his largely Quaker-minded students their right to choose their position in the college versus combat debate. Regardless of the institution’s Quaker ties, Nason promised students the support of their institution should they decide to enlist in military service. “We allow our students and faculty complete individual freedom to decide upon their own line of conduct and are prepared to meet them more than half way if they decide to enter the armed services of the United States,” Nason explained in a letter to a colleague at Beloit College.

Similar conversations were occurring at Quaker institutions throughout the nation, and administrators began to discuss ways for their conscientious objector students to be of service to the nation during the present crisis. Just like their non-Quaker brothers in liberal arts education, the administrators of the Quaker institutions initially focused their attention on the
post-war needs of the nation and thus encouraged their students to do the same. Writing in *The Garnet Letter*, Swarthmore’s alumni magazine, Nason stressed it is the mission and obligation of Quaker institutions like Swarthmore to serve both the Conscientious Objector student and the post-war reconstruction of the world. He wrote:

> It would not become a Quaker college to adjust its program to war-needs without making equal or greater provision for the non-combat activities so close to the enduring work of the Society of Friends….We should be forgetting half of the student body and disregarding the convictions and talents of others if we did not plan for the relief of suffering, the binding up of wounds, both human and national, [and] the gigantic task of reconstruction….The present crisis is grave, but that of the post-war will be even graver.241

Quaker colleges like Swarthmore and Earlham thus began to search for ways to meld the mission of the institution, the needs of their students, and the demands of the post-war world.

**College and University Leaders Join Forces**

Many of the cautionary statements made by college presidents or national organizations came either too late or were not successful in their attempts to quell the initial rush in enlistment of male students into military service. Writing in June 1940, Yale University president Charles Seymour predicted that “they [undergraduates] will undergo anything asked of them if a leadership can be found burning with faith in an ideal and pointing clearly the way to its achievement. Once awakened, the young men themselves will carry through a renaissance of American ideals which is essential to the future of the nation.”242 The Japanese attack in Hawaii was the very awakening that some young men needed, and many ran to offer their services to the nation. The rush to enlist, in conjunction with those students called into service by the draft, began to have devastating effects on student enrollment. President Distler, like most college presidents, recognized that enrollment losses would only increase as the war continued. In his
first war-time Annual Report of the College, he stressed this point to the college’s Board of
Trustees. He wrote:

It is generally felt that the student-losses [sic] suffered thus far may be small in comparison with those to come. The selective service has taken, or will take in the near future, a large number of our students, especially those in the upper classes. All of this has serious implications for a college as dependent as ours is upon tuition revenue to meet operating expenses. 243

President Nason articulated a similar fear in his January 1942 letter to Swarthmore alumni.

We live today in the midst of total war, which effects [sic] every person, every institution, every aspect of our normal lives. ‘Business as usual’ is as obsolete for colleges as it is for automobile manufacturers. The college faces new problems of utmost gravity and with little precedent for guide…the future of the college depends on how we…face and solve the problems that lie ahead. 244

This loss of students and the financial stability their tuition dollars provided brought the reality of the war to higher education and, in turn, forced leaders to work collaboratively to develop strategies to sustain higher education through the war years.

Just weeks after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt made a statement to the leading national associations of colleges and universities in which he stressed the important role of higher education within the present conflict. In Roosevelt’s opinion, the nation needed higher education both to help win the war and to help ensure the country’s post-war success. As he explained:

We have one great task before us. That is to win the war. At the same time it is perfectly clear that it will be futile to win the war unless during its winning we lay the foundation for the kind of peace and readjustment that will guarantee the preservation of those aspects of American life for which the war is fought. Colleges and universities are in the particularly difficult position of balancing their contributions in these two ends. I am sure, nevertheless, that the leaders of our colleges and universities can be depended upon to find the wisest solutions for the difficult problem of how to make this two-fold contribution. I am anxious that this national crisis shall not result in the destruction or impairment of those institutions which have contributed so largely to the development of American
Planning efforts of higher education leaders thus intensified after Pearl Harbor as leaders sought to protect their institutions from the effects of the war and to fulfill Roosevelt’s requests for help. Within weeks of the declaration of war, the executive committee of the newly-formed National Committee on Education and Defense (NCED) re-articulated the question on the minds of leaders of higher education throughout the nation. The committee wrote in the December 20, 1941 Bulletin, *Higher Education and National Defense*:

> War changes values for the whole nation and for the individual. Some immediate goals become more urgent than long-range objectives. Traditions are less binding upon policies…Only one question is now uppermost in the minds of administrators, teachers, and students in our colleges and universities – ‘How can this institution, how can I, as an individual, best serve the nation?’

The NCED and the US Office of Education, seeking to find an answer to this question, brought together over 1000 college and university presidents on January 3-4, 1942 for a conference held in Baltimore entitled, “Higher Education and the War.” This meeting was the largest single gathering of college and university leaders to date. As George Zook, conference chair, explained to those in attendance during his introductory remarks, the conference served as a symbol of higher education’s “unity of spirit” in the face of the war-time crisis and showed the “determination on the part of the institutions to serve the government in every possible way in the prosecution of our common responsibilities in the winning of the war.” He continued by declaring, “We are anxious to render every service for the welfare of our country, no matter at what sacrifice.” This sentiment was echoed in a statement developed during the course of the conference and submitted to Roosevelt on behalf of all of higher education. Higher education via its leaders pledged:
To the President of the United States, Commander-in-Chief of our nation, the total strength of our colleges and universities - our faculties, our students, our administrative organizations, and our facilities. The institutions of higher education of the United States are organized for action, and they offer their united power for decisive military victory, and for the ultimate and even more difficult task of establishing a just and lasting peace.\textsuperscript{249}

The conference then presented a series of resolutions and recommendations to Roosevelt that outlined the ways in which higher education could aid in the war effort. These included the allocation of total manpower; the acceleration of educational programs; the exchange of information between the two entities; and credit for military service for those students called into military service.\textsuperscript{250} More specifically, the resolutions asked that: 1) Federal agencies conduct a study to determine how colleges and universities might best serve the war effort; 2) institutions implement accelerated programs; 3) academic credit be awarded for war-time service; 4) Federal financial aid be provided to colleges and universities during the war; and 5) the Selective Service be relied on to fill national needs “with the least disturbance of basic social institutions.”\textsuperscript{251}

The final section of the resolutions and recommendations presented to Roosevelt delineated the growing concern from leaders regarding the need for manpower during the war. The drafters asked the President to consider the post-war needs of the nation when calling men for military duty under the newly-passed Selective Service Acts. On September 16, 1940, President Roosevelt signed the Selective Training and Service Act into law in anticipation of the war. This Act originally provided for the registration of all male 21 to 30 year-olds for the draft, with a limit of 90,000 men to be selected by lottery for conscription into duty. Terms of military service were to be only 12 months, and deferments from service could be issued by the local draft boards for all college students until the end of their current academic year or semester, depending on their course of academic study.
The draft officially began in October 1940, marking the first time in American history that a draft had been implemented in a time of peace. Confusion over selective service regulations was abundant, and over six volumes of the service regulations were published to provide clarification on the deferment policies for students. Essentially, men would receive deferments from military service in two ways. First, a student enrolled in some form of postsecondary education could receive a deferment until the completion of his collegiate studies. In addition, males determined by their local draft boards to be “essential to national health, safety, or interest” were defined as “necessary men” and thus also granted a class II-A deferment from military service. Selective service policies would change with the escalation of the war, however, and these changes would greatly affect institutions and their male student enrollments.

In Service to the Cause

Each month of the war brought increasing enrollment losses, but the selective service educational deferment policies protected most institutions from extreme shortages of male students during the first year of the nation’s involvement in the war. With enrollments declining but at a rate that did not yet jeopardize institutional survival, leaders first directed their attention towards helping their institution, their faculty, and their students serve the nation’s emerging war needs. The actions taken at Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore in the initial years of the war are illustrative of this desire for higher education to be responsive to the country’s present needs.

The Swarthmore College Board of Managers adopted a policy that articulated the institution’s desire to be of service to the nation during the war crisis. The statement stressed the Board’s belief that it is possible for a liberal arts college like Swarthmore to make a significant
contribution to the war effort; a belief that rests on the premise that an education is as equally powerful a war tool as those being manufactured in defense plants. The statement emphasized:

It is the desire of Swarthmore College to make the maximum contribution to the nation in the present crisis. We recognize the demands of the country for adequately trained men in the armed forces….We feel also a responsibility for maintaining so far as possible a program of liberal arts education for the women who are now enrolled or who would normally anticipate enrolment [sic] and for the men who are not in military service. One of the chief contributions of higher education – perhaps the greatest for the small liberal arts colleges – is educating men and women for the work of building a more peaceful world. The liberal arts have been the basis of the best in our society; their maintenance is essential to our future welfare as a civilized nation.

The war-time institutional position advanced by leaders and the board of Dartmouth College echoes the sentiment of the Swarthmore statement. Like Swarthmore, Dartmouth pledged its total commitment to the war effort. However, preservation of the tenets of liberal education remained top priority despite the escalating conflict that threatened the institution’s survival. Dartmouth’s statement on the war and its role within it read:

It is the ambition and purpose of the College to adapt its program and to modify its procedures in every way possible to meet the necessities or even the convenience of its men about to be called for duty in the armed services of the country. The one qualification to this statement is that all modifications of the college program shall recognize the objectives of a liberal education and shall protect the validity of these that their values of a post-war world shall not be forgotten even under the stress and strain of a war-torn world.

Although the boards at Franklin & Marshall or Earlham did not publish eloquent statements like Dartmouth or Swarthmore about their position in the war, each of the four institutions shared the same motivation to marry war-service and the provision of a liberal arts education. The campus committees formed, the curricular changes adopted, and the community-serving programs implemented at all four institutions represent efforts to allow the liberal arts college to be of service to the nation during the war. Institutional attention was also directed at
implementing policies, programs, and procedures that provided students of a liberal education
with the tools necessary to heal the international wounds the war caused.

**Campus War-time Committees**

One of the first ways colleges adapted to war-time operation was through the
establishment of special, war-related faculty committees. At Franklin & Marshall, Swarthmore,
and Dartmouth, committees focused on helping the institution, its students, and often also the
surrounding community endure the trials of the war. Attention to preparing for attack; adjusting
the curriculum to the demands of war; assisting nervous or confused students; and establishing
community-serving programs filled committee agendas as faculty and administrators worked
collaboratively to adjust to the time of crisis under which their institutions now operated.

Fears of a repeat of the surprise bombing of Pearl Harbor pervaded Swarthmore College
and are reflected by the campus committees established at the college in the days after Japan’s
attack. By December 17, 1941 a Central Executive Committee on Emergency Defense had been
organized and produced its first report on an emergency preparedness plan for the college to
President Nason. This group of twenty faculty, administrators, and students were divided into
seven sub-committees – Air Raid Warning Committee; Black Out Committee; Committee on
Fire Protection; Committee on Medical Aid; Committee on Preservation of Property; Committee
on Defense Activities; and Committee on Emergency Use of College Buildings. Each sub-
committee produced a memorandum for Nason that outlined the ways in which their committee
would prepare the institution and its members for or would help the institutions and its members
recover from an air attack similar to that in Hawaii. The Report on the Safety of College
Buildings submitted to Nason on December 15, 1941 reveals the deep fears held by the
Swarthmore community about a possible air attack similar to Pearl Harbor. The Committee chair
began, “No building on the campus would withstand safely the direct hit of even a moderate size bomb which might be dropped by a carrier-based plane.” He then continued to list the various ways in which occupants of bombed campus buildings could be injured and concluded by listing all campus buildings ranked in descending order based on their “relative safety” as determined by committee members. Foreign attack, therefore, was on the forefront of the minds of many at Swarthmore, as it was for many throughout the nation at this time.

Other reports issued to Nason by committees like the Fire Protection Committee and Committee on Medical Defense outline other measures the college should take to prepare the institution and its members for an attack. For example, the Fire Protection Committee recommended the augmentation of the college’s fire brigade with staff and student volunteers in the event that there are multiple fires in the area of the college and the local fire company is unable to aid Swarthmore. And, the Committee on Medical Defense recommended that Swarthmore prepare for “cases of mass war in the region” by establishing on-campus first aid stations and volunteer blood donating systems to serve the institution should it be assaulted and have casualties.

The Committee on Medical Defense also advocated for the Swarthmore student whom the committee worried was being emotionally scarred by the recent events of Pearl Harbor and the ensuing conflict abroad. “We must not forget the mental health of the college,” the Committee wrote in their December 12, 1941 recommendation to Nason. The Committee then proceeded to offer two recommendations targeted at preserving the emotional well-being of the college’s students. These recommendations included the creation of faculty talks for students on topics like “The Normal Phenomenon of Fear” and the temporary elimination of the present grading system, the latter recommendation rested on the premise that grading added unnecessary stress to an
already stress-filled environment. As the Committee explained to Nason, “Since psychiatrists note an increase in the numbers of nervous complaints among students nearing examination periods even in times of peace, it is important that we spare them such strains when tension is already far beyond a healthful pitch.”\textsuperscript{257} This recommendation was never implemented.

A faculty committee established at Franklin & Marshall College in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor also targeted the jittery student whose world was turned upside-down by the Japanese attack and the nation’s entrance into the world war. The Franklin & Marshall faculty created a Selective Service Advisory Committee aimed at “help[ing] in every way possible the student who is or will be liable for military service.”\textsuperscript{258} As the committee’s mission continues to outline, the “committee endeavors to supply sympathetic counsel and accurate, up-to-date information to all students who face questions related to military service.” The committee was led by college librarian Herbert B. Anstaett and acted as a liaison between the college and the proper military authorities. Throughout the spring of 1942, the committee held hour-long conferences each week at which students could pose to committee members questions about the selective service, the draft, or military service.

The committee also worked to help “non-military students” feel of importance in a war-service-dominated campus and nation. Chairman Anstaett wrote in an April 1942 letter that most non-military students “generally feel that they are not doing their part; their friends and relatives are in the armed forces and they feel helpless.”\textsuperscript{259} Dister also spoke of this student sentiment in his fall 1942 commencement speech in which he tried to impart to his “non-military” students the special role that they, too, were playing in the war effort. He stressed:

You are not in the active army or navy or air force, that is true; but you are already engaged in the war effort. I prefer to think that you are here on special duty…You may rightly consider yourself detained to a special duty - the
unspectacular and from a financial standpoint the profitless duty of becoming leadership material….It is one of the most vital jobs that a young man can have at the present time….Wars are not won by drill and rifle-practice and field maneuvers alone….This country and its army and navy need intelligence…and intelligence is bred in the study of philosophy and language and literature and history…260

The surrounding Lancaster community, like many Franklin & Marshall students, also sought a way in which they could aid in the war effort. The college’s newly-created War Planning Committee, charged with the task of “adjust[ing] the immediate college program to pressing war conditions,” presented to Distler in the spring of 1942 a recommendation that the college “establish an integrated program of training for men and women now employed in Lancaster industries designed to facilitate war production in this area,” thereby offering the community a way in which they, too, could be of service to the nation during this time of war.261

The Franklin & Marshall faculty rejected this proposal generated by their colleagues, deeming it outside the college’s mission, but Distler viewed the program as an important initiative and thus presented it to the U.S. Office of Education for further consideration. The Office of Education recognized the importance of the program and agreed to fund the initiative beginning in the summer of 1942.

The “Free War Training Courses” program offered by Franklin & Marshall was part of the U.S. Office of Education’s broader Engineering Defense Training (EDT) program. On October 9, 1940, Congress passed an act appropriating $9 million to the U.S. Office of Education for:

…the cost of short engineering courses of college grade, provided by engineering schools or by universities of which the engineering school is a part….which plans shall be for courses designed to meet the shortage of engineers with specialized training in fields essential to the national defense.262
With a growing shortage of skilled and unskilled labor within the nation’s defense industries, the program was intended both to upgrade current industrial employees to make room for those individuals who were at present unemployed and also to provide pre-employment training for those men seeking to enter the workforce. Both of these goals were imperative to war-time national defense.

The national EDT program relied on the collaborative efforts of participating local industries and college and universities. Courses offered by the program varied based on the types of industries and institutions of higher education that chose to participate. Local industry leaders and college and university faculty worked together to develop the types of courses offered by the program and the content to be covered within each course. Scott Lilly, director of Swarthmore’s EDT program, described further the principles of this unique, cooperative relationship in his report to the U.S. Office of Education. He wrote:

The man from the plant is familiar with what the men must know in order that they may do what they are supposed to do. He, therefore, is in a position to state the problem. The college professor is an expert in education, and with his technical and educational background, can be sure that the course will be planned to solve the problem. 263

As Lilly’s description alludes, the EDT program was intended to serve the working man, and thus courses and course arrangements were designed and tailored to meet his needs. The U.S. Office of Education directed instructors to make each course of college-level, but any local man could participate in the EDT program if he had a high school diploma. Access was therefore virtually unlimited. Individual programs often offered both beginning and advanced courses so as to meet the varied educational backgrounds of participants. Classes covered topics like Industrial Management and Engineering Drawing and were offered each evening in buildings located in close proximity to the participating companies and their employees. The length of
each course varied from eight weeks to six months, the duration of each depended upon the type of course and the level of study required.

By August 31, 1941 over 50 institutions of higher education were participating in the EDT program, offering over 380 courses to approximately 21,000 students.264 Franklin & Marshall, Swarthmore, and Dartmouth Colleges were three of these institutions. As the war progressed and industrial production intensified, demand for EDT classes grew. Recognizing the success of this program, Congress voted to extend the program by allocating an additional $17.5 million to its efforts and to re-name it the Engineering, Science and Management Defense Training (ESMDT) program to better reflect ESMDT’s goals and the types of courses offered to help achieve those goals. The program continued to increase in size, with over 107,800 students participating in 2,354 courses at 144 institutions by April 1942.

The success of the ESMDT program was not limited to just the education and training of the local working man. As Franklin & Marshall’s Distler reported to his college’s Board of Trustees, participation in the ESMDT also allowed local institutions and industries to work jointly to serve the nation’s escalating war needs. Distler explained, “Through this program, it is hoped that the College may render valuable assistance in the war effort and that a closer relationship may develop between the College and Lancaster industry.”265 The working relationships fostered between local industries and institutions like Franklin & Marshall, Dartmouth, and Swarthmore as part of the ESMDT program strengthened ties between the community and the college campus. In the city of Lancaster, for example, over 1,500 men from local Lancaster companies were educated by Franklin & Marshall faculty through the ESMDT program.
The cordial relationship the ESMDT program fostered between the college and the surrounding Lancaster community was extended even further through Franklin & Marshall’s offering of free, non-credit evening courses to any individual “interested in improving their intellectual and cultural status”. As advertised to the community, these courses were “non-credit lectures in the field of liberal arts, to be given in the evening to men and women of the community who are deservous [sic] of spending one night a week in a consideration of cultural ideas which transcend the practical challenge of the war effort.” By December 1942, 45 different evening classes were offered to over 550 people from the Lancaster community.

War-time Curricula

In addition to establishing a relationship between the community and the college, the Franklin & Marshall War Planning Committee also explored ways in which the institution’s curriculum could be of service to the nation. While in its first full year of operation while the nation was at war, the Franklin & Marshall faculty along with President Distler considered two main questions as they related to the college and its liberal arts curriculum. These were: 1) What has the college done to gear the work of the college to war needs? and 2) What more can the college do? The result was a recommendation from the War Planning Committee that the College: 1) “change the content of present courses so as to better meet the needs of the times” and 2) “add new courses designed to provide pre-introduction training for college students who will, in the near future, be inducted into the armed forces of the nation, and training for the students who will go into defense industries”.

The faculty body overwhelmingly approved the Planning Committee’s recommendations, and the Planning Committee then called upon the college’s Curriculum Committee to implement the recommendations. During the spring of 1942 the Curriculum Committee worked to identify
where “teachable elements of defense” could be inserted into regular courses to render these courses more appropriate to the current state of national affairs. In addition, the Committee also focused on the creation of special defense training courses that would also allow the college to serve the nation’s emerging war needs. The Franklin & Marshall curriculum was thus transformed into a curriculum that offered three types of classes – 1) courses entirely unchanged by the war; 2) courses unchanged in name and number but “modified to include significant defense elements” and 3) new defense-focused courses.

Faculty responded to the committee’s requests by adding “teachable elements” to their traditional courses, thereby converting chemistry classes into courses entitled War Gases and English classes into courses entitled The Spoken and Written Word in Wartime. Defense-related electives in the subjects of aeronautics, accounting, Japanese, Portuguese, and Russian were also added to the college’s traditional liberal arts curriculum. In turn, the college’s course catalog now featured classes with titles like Diplomatic History of the World; Principles of Radio Communication; Army and Navy Accounting; Military Pyrotechnics; Military Science, Drill and Training; Analysis and Appraisal of The Various Proposal for the Post-War World and Elementary Japanese; courses that may never have appeared had the college not been immersed in a time of world war.

Dartmouth’s curriculum underwent similar changes at the hands of the college’s newly-established Committee on Defense Instruction. The Dartmouth College administration began to prepare for the challenges of war over a year before Pearl Harbor. In the late summer of 1940 President Hopkins called for the establishment of a committee called the American Defense Dartmouth Group. Comprised of six members of the college’s faculty and administration, the committee was charged with the coordination all of the college’s defense activities. As an
extension of this committee’s activities, Hopkins created the Committee on Defense Instruction in April 1941. He charged this committee “to study the problem of relating the curriculum of the College and of the Associated Schools to the emergency of national defense” and granted the Committee the authority “to take such action on behalf of the Trustees as may be necessary to make effective such conclusions as may be reached.”

The Committee began by tackling the issue of how the college’s curriculum could best prepare Dartmouth students for military service. As a memo from Hopkins to Dartmouth faculty explains further, the Committee must first “determine both in the immediate or the more long range view, in what ways within the curricular structure of the liberal arts college and in keeping with its traditional purposes, Dartmouth can best fit its students for service in this period of national crisis.” To achieve this aim, the committee implemented four major curricular changes.

The committee first eliminated the college’s requirement that all freshmen students take the Social Science I and II course sequence. With student attrition rates escalating due to the draft, the committee viewed the elimination of unnecessary coursework as an essential step in ensuring that students completed their degrees before being called into military service. Increasing national demands for well-trained scientists shaped the committees views on “necessary” coursework, thereby causing the committee to deem social science coursework as secondary in importance to the physical sciences. Social science course offerings were therefore eliminated or reduced to allow for increased study in other areas like chemistry, physics, and engineering.

Second, the committee called for the adaptation of courses to address pressing, war-related topics. Following this directive, courses like Defense Mathematics and Modern War
Strategy and National Policy replaced the more traditional mathematics and political science classes within the college’s new war-time curriculum. Other defense courses such as Radio Techniques; Map Interpretation; Components of Democratic Thought; Tests and Measurement for Military Personnel and Naval Orientation further reveal a liberal arts curriculum altered by war.

Finally, the committee recognized deficiencies within the college’s curriculum and created two new areas of academic study that would help to render Dartmouth’s curriculum of better service to the nation. To accommodate the growing need for young men with expert skiing ability within the military, the college implemented a program of professional ski instruction. This program allowed students to fulfill their physical education requirements on the ski slopes surrounding Hanover and also provided them with the training necessary to teach others the art of the sport. “In recognition of the global character of the war and of the responsibilities of the United States in the post-war world,” the committee also called for the establishment of a Department of Geography. By the spring of 1943, Dartmouth students could formally study the physical and economic factors that contributed to the current world crisis as explored by courses offered by the college’s new department. This knowledge, in turn, helped students to enter military service with an understanding of the very peoples and places they were fighting to protect. The new department also housed the college’s newly-implemented courses in Russian and Chinese languages.

Elimination, adaptation, and addition characterized Franklin & Marshall and Dartmouth’s curricular transformations during the early years of the war. Unlike these two institutions, Swarthmore made only limited changes to its curriculum. Educating students for the post-war state of the world trumped the education of students for the current demands of war at
Swarthmore, and the college’s curriculum reflected this premise. As a passage from the Swarthmore Bulletin insinuates:

Swarthmore College is attempting to meet its obligations in war time by training men and women to fulfill the demands of national service, and, at the same time, by continuing to emphasize the permanent values of a liberal education…Students are urged to carry on…in the kind of program in which they find their fullest personal development, confident that they will thereby become capable of making their richest contribution to their communities.\textsuperscript{272}

The college also recognized the importance of helping its women students feel of equal service to the nation as their male counterparts during this time of crisis. “We have an obligation to the women who naturally look to the college for their education,” Nason wrote in the college’s alumni magazine, \textit{The Garnet Letter}. “We have an even greater responsibility to them now that so many of their brothers are denied a liberal education…Women, too, must contribute to the war,” Nason continued.\textsuperscript{273} In turn, the college introduced a number of special and technical “war minors” to help women prepare for the roles they may perform in the war and after.

The continuation of its traditional liberal arts curriculum did not come without a cost to the institution, however. As the war progressed, Swarthmore lost increasing numbers of faculty to the war effort. Throughout higher education some faculty members resigned to take positions within defense industries whereas others left to fill academic positions vacated by faculty at other institutions or even to fight in the conflict abroad. This action left many colleges and universities with a faculty body declining often as quickly as its male student enrollment. To compensate for these losses, Swarthmore entered into a cooperative agreement with nearby Bryn Mawr and Haverford Colleges that permitted the sharing of faculty between the three institutions.

Conversations about collaboration between Swarthmore, Bryn Mawr, and Haverford began in the months before Pearl Harbor, but accelerated after the effects of the war on the
colleges became apparent. Declining faculty numbers and unchanged course offerings led to the establishment of a program of faculty exchange between the three colleges. As a “means of preventing overlapping curricula and duplication of instruction,” the faculty resources of the institutions were pooled so there would be “no undue strain on anyone” because of the loss of faculty members to war service.\textsuperscript{274} The exchange of faculty occurred in two ways. First, a faculty member could be “lent” to one of the partnership schools if the lending institution had enough faculty members to cover their courses and the receiving institution did not. But, on the other hand, if faculty numbers were too low at any of the three institutions, classes were offered jointly so students from the three colleges studied together and only one faculty member was needed. During the 1942-1943 academic year, for example, two Swarthmore professors taught history at Bryn Mawr, and a Bryn Mawr political scientist and Haverford economist taught courses at Swarthmore. That same year, the “Quaker combination,” as one newspaper reporter referred to the three institutions, also jointly hired a Peruvian to teach classes on South American history at all three colleges.\textsuperscript{275}

Through this collaboration, the once academic rivals who vied for top students, top faculty, and national prestige were transformed into allies and partners. On February 24, 1942, Presidents Nason (Swarthmore), Morley (Haverford), and Parke (Bryn Mawr) addressed a combined group of the three colleges’ alumni to discuss the merits of their collaboration, their plans for the future, and to garner the support of their respective alumni bodies. In his speech to the alumni, Nason described the schools’ collaboration as “a program where three colleges, rather jealous of one another in the past, sometimes rather antagonistic, come together to see one another [sic] problems and to work toward unity.” Unity of the three institutions was achieved
and the foundations of this collaboration helped Swarthmore, Haverford, and Bryn Mawr to navigate a few of the academic hurdles introduced by the war.

**Accelerated Programming**

Changes in the availability of academic study accompanied the addition of war-related courses to the curriculum on a number of campuses. Heeding the recommendations resulting from the Baltimore Conference, leaders throughout higher education worked with their Boards of Trustees/Managers and faculty to develop programming of accelerated study for their institutions. An accelerated academic calendar thus came to characterize institutional operations at many institutions during the war.

Acceleration programming emerged in three different forms. Institutions that implemented accelerated programming either 1) moved to a quarter system of study; 2) added a summer session to the traditional two semester academic year; or 3) changed to a year-round, three term plan. Regardless of the type of acceleration employed, this programmatic shift aimed to achieve the same two objectives. The first goal of acceleration was to extend the availability of academic study into the summer months, thus providing students with the opportunity to pursue their degrees on a year-round basis. This operating schedule, in turn, helped to decrease the length of academic study from the traditional four years to between two and a half or three years and helped to ensure that ambitious students could finish their undergraduate degrees before they were drafted or enlisted into military service.

The second purpose of accelerated programming was to provide colleges and universities with additional academic sessions from which much-needed financial resources could be drawn. Dartmouth, Franklin & Marshall, Swarthmore, and Earlham all added summer sessions to their accelerated academic calendars, creating four distinct academic sessions – fall, spring, summer
session 1, and summer session 2. These additional academic sessions permitted students to enter into or graduate from the institution at four different times throughout the academic year, thus establishing a continual flow of students into the institutions to help stabilize enrollment losses.

Unlike its liberal arts neighbors, Dartmouth administrators choose to limit entrance into the institution. Under the college’s accelerated programming, incoming freshmen students could begin their academic studies at only two points in the Dartmouth calendar. Motivated freshman had the opportunity to begin their studies early by attending a special freshman summer session that ran for eight weeks beginning each July. Those students choosing not to study during the summer instead began their academic pursuits in the college’s September term. This restriction of freshmen enrollment helped the institution to ensure that this new group of students received the proper tools to succeed academically despite the accelerated, “telescoped” schedule under which they studied. With this decision Dartmouth made its first statement that the college’s academic quality would not be sacrificed to the challenges of the war.

At all four institutions accelerated programming achieved the goals for which it was designed; declining enrollments began to stabilize through the implementation of the year-round operating schedule. On the Franklin & Marshall campus, for example, the start of the college’s accelerated schedule in the summer of 1942 helped to boost declining enrollment numbers by welcoming an additional 386 students to campus for the summer terms. At Swarthmore, 355 students enrolled in the college’s first summer session that ran from June 22 – September 26, 1942. The increase in attendance at Earlham during the college’s summer sessions was smaller in comparison to those of Franklin & Marshall and Swarthmore, but enrollment did increase by 86 students – an increase proportional to its smaller pre-war enrollment. Dartmouth experienced the largest increase in enrollment due to accelerated programming. In May 1942, over 1,100
students enrolled in the college’s first summer session. Two hundred freshmen then joined this group of summer students at the start of their special July term.

The acceleration of course work through the addition of summer sessions changed the campus atmosphere and, in many cases, provided the first visible signs of the war’s effects on higher education. As a contributing author to Earlham’s alumni magazine The Earlhamite described the Earlham campus during one of its summer sessions, “Everyone is working so earnestly that the atmosphere is somewhat that of a graduate school.” Hard-work was the hallmark of most campus acceleration programs. On the Earlham campus, like on many other campuses, implementation of accelerated programming in the summer of 1942 added a heavier course-load to the typical undergraduate’s academic year of study. Acceleration thus focused student attention on academic study and contributed, in part, to the temporary suspension of a number of student extra-curricular activities at many institutions during the war period. At Franklin & Marshall, for example, the college’s year-round operating schedule, declining numbers of male students, and dwindling finances combined to make the continuation of all athletic contests nearly impossible for the institution to sustain. Consequently, the decision was made in the spring of 1941 to suspend such activities for the duration of the war. This loss of athletics provided students with one of the first indications that the war would significantly change their collegiate life and their institution.

Students at Swarthmore, Earlham, and Dartmouth continued to engage in intercollegiate athletic competitions, but their competitors would change during the course of war as institutional programs were suspended and competitors became increasingly hard to find. The effects of the war did not go unnoticed by students at these institutions, however. Implementation of accelerated programming eliminated favorite annual events like the Winter Carnival and Green Key prom
weekend at Dartmouth. The loss of these beloved, student-led social events devastated the men of Dartmouth. The college’s first commencement ceremony conducted during the war period further emphasized the war’s effect on student collegiate life. Recreating the ceremony for Dartmouth alumni, Hopkins recalled:

They [graduating students] missed the pleasant final hours and days with parents eager to be shown the College and town. There was no long black robed line marching to the Bema. There was simply a senior banquet with many a toast among friends for luck in the uncertain future. Then came a departure in a cold gray day in December, [students] hurrying home for Christmas and immediate military service.  

The presence of faculty on campuses during the summer months served as a visual reminder at Swarthmore of the institutional changes the war demanded. Nason explained the new “feel” of the Swarthmore campus to its alumni and focuses on the college’s faculty as a sign of the changing times. Describing this change, he wrote:

Probably the most significant change is the presence of faculty in Swarthmore during the summer months. Tradition has conveniently arranged for the tired and worn professor to leave the scene of his labors in early June. Now he must stay and swelter with other suburbanites.

By the fall of 1942, faculty, students, and administrators all began to feel the effects of the war on their institutions. And policy changes at the federal level in the months and years to come would push institutional change even further.

*United We Stand, Divided We Endure*

The internal policy changes like curricular revisions and acceleration made in the first year of the nation’s involvement in the war provided the earliest indications of the changes the war would demand of higher education. Reforms to the deferment policies of the Selective Service Act made in the fall of 1942 pushed institutional leaders to implement additional policies that would allow their institutions to combat the increasing student losses the draft changes
introduced. Thus, by the fall of 1942, a shift emerged throughout higher education. The uniformity amongst institutions created by the Baltimore conferences dissipated as leaders now began to search for ways that their institutions could make a unique contribution to the war effort and survive. Across-higher-education collaborative efforts remained, yet individual actions came to dominate strategies to manage the war.

By the end of the summer of 1942, the military’s need for both resources and men increased drastically, and selective service policies changed to accommodate this growing need. On September 8, Secretary of War Henry Stimson announced that those students who had reached the age of 20 and who were enrolled in reserve programs could be called into active service by the end of the current academic semester. Two months later, on November 13, 1942, the selective service legislation was again amended so that all 18 and 19 year-olds who met physical qualifications were eligible to be drafted into military service. College and university enrollments were now left to be filled by just five types of students: 1) IV-F (or physically disqualified) men of draft age; 2) II-A & II-B (occupational deferment) males; 3) women; 4) conscientious objectors; and 5) men participating in emerging federal and military training programs like the Navy V-7 and V-12.

The 1942 changes to the deferment polices of the Selective Service Act had varying effects on institutions throughout higher education. Every institution experienced greater declines in student enrollment as a result of these policy changes yet the effects were felt more acutely at smaller institutions with traditionally lower enrollments. This disparity contributed to the emergence of varying strategies for overcoming the challenges created by these enrollment losses. The uniformity created, adopted, and promoted by the higher education community at the Baltimore conferences of 1942 thus began to disappear as institutional leaders worked to identify
individual strategies tailored to the emerging war-time needs of their respective institutions. The options available to college and university leaders who searched for strategies to sustain their institution through the war varied, in large part, upon institutional characteristics such as type, size, and mission.

With the country’s entrance into the war, the federal government, under the auspices of the newly-established Office of Scientific Research and Design (OSRD), turned to research universities, their facilities, and their faculties to lead in the development of military weaponry. Two of the largest war research projects conducted at universities were the development of radar at the Radiation Laboratory at MIT and the creation of the atomic bomb as part of the Manhattan Project (housed below the football stadium at the University of Chicago). Other projects of varying sizes and significance to the war effort emerged at other research universities throughout the nation. Mathematicians at Princeton, Berkeley, and then Columbia studied the mathematics behind aerial bombing. Scientists in laboratories at Michigan, Cornell, and Penn State worked to develop a more efficient process for the manufacturing of RDX – a powerful explosive – while physicians at Johns Hopkins developed a medication to prevent motion sickness - a common problem among airmen.280

Roger Geiger contends that this relationship between the ORSD and participating research universities was based on contracts “negotiated according to the principle of no-loss and no-gain,” thus suggesting that war-time research funded by the government did not contribute to the fiscal security of an institution during the war years. Christopher Lucas challenges Geiger’s assertion, however, by contending that the federal monies received for war-related research did help to sustain institutions. “Upwards of half of the income supporting certain academic institutions came from the national government…many colleges became almost
entirely dependent upon the government subsidies for their very survival,” Lucas writes. As a result, large public research institutions like Cornell University, MIT, Johns Hopkins University, and Penn State University relied, in part, upon their research capabilities and the federal government’s funding of research to overcome the fiscal challenges created by the nation’s involvement in the war. Smaller, less research-centered institutions without the means to conduct large-scale war-time research were left without such opportunities, however, despite the even greater losses in enrollment they were experiencing.

As a result, Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges began to make policy changes in these first years of the war that aimed both to serve the needs of the nation and to meet the growing needs of the respective institutions. Before this point, initial war-time policy changes at the colleges like the acceleration of the course of academic study and the addition of war-related courses to the traditional liberal arts curriculum mirrored national trends. Now, leaders of the four institutions began to implement war-time policies that diverged from national trends and reflected the individual needs and identities of their institutions.

Opening Access

The Nisei Student

Executive Order 9066, issued on February 19, 1942, changed the lives of all Japanese-Americans living in the United States during the war. Responding to growing national fears over the possibility of Japanese espionage, congressional debates and hearings, and calls by prominent organizations like the American Legion and the Native Sons of the Golden West, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which directed the removal of all Japanese-Americans from the West Coast. Weeks later on March 2, 1942, Public Proclamation No. 1 issued by General John L. DeWitt, commander of Western Defense Command (WDC),
designated military areas within Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona and demanded the removal of all German and Italian “aliens” as well as “any person of Japanese-Ancestry” from these areas into internment camps. Responsibility for the re-location of the displaced Japanese-Americans was granted to the War Relocation Authority (WRA) created by President Roosevelt on March 18, 1942 and led by Milton S. Eisenhower.

The removal orders issued by Roosevelt had devastating effects on the Japanese-American students (hereafter referred to as “Nisei”) studying at colleges and universities on the West Coast. Robert O’Brien, assistant dean of arts and sciences and advisor to the Japanese Student Club at the University of Washington during the war period, estimates that in 1941 there were 3,252 Nisei students enrolled in institutions of higher education in California, Washington, and Oregon. As news of the impending incarceration of Japanese-Americans spread throughout the West Coast, Nisei students began to withdraw from the colleges and universities they attended. A questionnaire circulated at the University of California in the spring of 1942 by the National Intercollegiate Christian Council reported that one quarter of the university’s 435 Nisei students had withdrawn from the institution prior to the start of the spring semester. Nisei student attrition grew exponentially throughout the spring of 1942. The government’s seizure of Japanese-American families’ finances left no money to fund the education of their children, and most Nisei students refused to abandon their incarcerated families to continue their studies. Nisei students desperately wanted to continue with their education, however. A questionnaire circulated amongst Nisei students in the San Francisco Bay area reported that 83 percent of the 257 students who responded wanted to continue their education, yet concern for the safety of their families and lack of financial supported thwarted their efforts to do so. As a result, campus-
based YMCAs and YWCAs became active in helping Nisei students continue their education at institutions outside of the West Coast.  

At the University of California, for example, the campus YMCA and YWCA provided data on the Nisei students to the university’s newspaper; sent letters to public officials on behalf of the students; and spoke to church groups about the Nisei’s plight. By the end of March 1942, efforts such as those by the University of California’s YMCA and YWCA resulted in the placement of 216 Nisei students at mid-west institutions of higher education. Their success continued with the placement of an additional 400 students by the end of April 1942. A reluctance to accept the Nisei students hindered large-scale placement efforts, however. Some institutions like the University of Nebraska welcomed transferring Nisei students with open arms whereas students like Jack Takeguchi and Maso Umino who transferred to Ohio University met threats of lynching from those who feared their presence in the community.

Placement efforts were also stalled by a lack of coordination between the various campus and church organizations working on behalf of the Nisei students. West Coast civil liberations recognized this lack of coordination and created, with the help of the YMCA and YWCA students, the Student Relocation Committee whose purpose was to centralize the relocation activities of the many participating organizations. The group selected Joseph Conrad, a Quaker involved with the American Friends Service Council (AFSC) and a graduate student at the University of California, to serve as executive secretary of the newly-established committee. As Conrad explained the need for the new committee he led:

…There was imperative need for a [coordinating] central office….Excellent work was being done by groups in some areas, but lack of information prevented other interested groups from doing likewise. Many jobs were being done in conflicting ways by groups unaware of what others were doing. Many others needed jobs
were not being done at all. Miscellaneous information was ‘floating around,’ and no one knew what was fact and what was fiction.\textsuperscript{287}

Conrad implemented a six point agenda to help guide his newly-established committee. This agenda included: 1) the identification of students who wanted to continue their studies; 2) the identification of a student’s financial situation; 3) the arrangement of credit for interrupted studies; 4) the procurement of funds from foundations, churches, and schools for student fees; 5) the investigation of job opportunities that would cover additional room and board costs; and 6) to serve as a clearinghouse for student resettlement information to avoid duplicate efforts.

Just as the Student Relocation Committee began to coordinate transfer efforts, Congress’ passage of additional legislation directed at the nation’s Japanese-American population hastened the need for such work. Public Proclamation No. 4 halted the movement of any Japanese-American living in Military Area No. 1 as of midnight on March 29, and incarceration efforts began on March 24 by order of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1. For the Relocation Committee, this legislation meant the movement of the Nisei population away from the committee and thus an increase in the difficulty for placement of the displaced students. Committee efforts continued nonetheless. The Relocation Committee placed its first students on May 9, 1942 with Grinnell College’s acceptance of four Nisei students – Barbara Takahashi, Akiko Hosoi, William Kiyasu, and Hisaji Sakai.

Calls for a national relocation organization with support from the federal government were finally answered in April 1942. Milton Eisenhower, director of the WRA, received throughout the spring of 1942 a number of pleas for a national organization from those involved in the relocation of Nisei students. He finally succumbed to the pleas in April by establishing the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council (NJASRC), and he chose Clarence
Pickett, former professor of Biblical Literature at Earlham College and executive secretary of the AFSC, to lead the council. Hoping to bolster the legitimacy of the council’s efforts, on May 5, 1942 Eisenhower wrote to Pickett and asked that the AFSC develop and then implement a program for student resettlement. Despite the AFSC’s disapproval of the government’s actions towards the Japanese-American population, the group agreed to Eisenhower’s request. As Allan Austin, author of *From Concentration Camp to Campus: Japanese American Students and World War II*, explains the AFSC’s decision further, “Pickett hoped that student resettlement would help alleviate some Nisei distress [and] prepare them ‘for useful membership in the American community [and] atone for the violence that has been done to the constitutional rights of American citizens.’”

The ASFC had begun its relocation efforts years before the creation of the NJASRC and Pickett’s selection as council head, but, with Eisenhower’s request, the organization gained the backing of the federal government. Initially upset by Eisenhower’s selection of the AFSC to coordinate national relocation efforts, Conrad and his Student Relocation Council soon agreed to allow the NJASRC to take over the efforts they started. As a first order of business, the AFSC called for a meeting to be held in Chicago on May 29, 1942 in which the organization of the Council would be determined. Representatives of various church organizations, the YMCA and YWCA, civilian agencies, the Japanese American Citizens League, and the AFSC all met in Chicago and worked jointly to develop the organizational structure and guiding principles of the NJASRC.

Those in attendance in Chicago decided to divide the NJASRC into two different offices, each charged with different assignments that would eventually lead to the overarching mission of the placement of Nisei students. The West Coast office, to be led by Conrad, was charged
with three main tasks – 1) the collection of student data; 2) the selection of students to be resettled; and 3) the securing of the federal releases for qualifying students – as they related to the Nisei student and his/her relocation at a new institution. Operation at the West Coast office was designed to function in following way. First, the records department assembled student data such as the GPA, years of academic study, gender, religion, and degree sought of interested Nisei students. A committee of college deans and registrars then analyzed this information and ranked the students in order of their scholastic and all-around abilities. Finally, the students were sorted by financial situation, extenuating circumstances, and overall personality, which included determination of traits like maturity, self-reliance, and adaptability. Once a student was ranked, the placement department then suggested specific colleges to students and recommended specific students to colleges. Those students receiving a higher ranking were placed first. After a student was accepted by an institution, the financial aid department of the office worked to raise any monies that the student would need during their time at their new institution. This work often entailed acquiring available scholarships and securing part-time employment opportunities. Lastly, the office negotiated with the Wartime Civilian Control Administration (WCCA) and the WRA for an indefinite leave for the student from his/her internment camp.

The east coast office’s mission was two-fold: the office worked to acquire colleges to host the Nisei students and also to build and then maintain the council’s relationship with the WCCA and the WRA. First, the office mailed questionnaires to colleges and universities throughout the nation to determine the institution’s willingness to cooperate with the council’s relocation efforts. Within each questionnaire, the office inquired about the courses of study available at the institution; the cost of attendance and the availability of any scholarship or work
opportunities; and the receptiveness of students, the faculty body, and the surrounding community to Nisei students. Responses to the council’s questionnaire from colleges and universities were mixed. Some institutions like Evansville College and Princeton University replied that “local conditions” prevented their acceptance of Nisei students whereas Hiram College and Massachusetts Institute of Technology cited proximity to military industry and training programs as their reasons for not accepting any Nisei students. Other institutions like Earlham and Swarthmore Colleges embraced the opportunity to aid the relocating students.

The east coast office also developed the procedure to be used to acquire a student’s release from an internment camp. For each student this procedure entailed submitting a dossier to the WRA that included evidence of 1) the student’s acceptance at a college; 2) adequate financial resources to support the student’s education; and 3) the community’s acceptance of the relocated student. Second, the east coast office negotiated with the War Department the process for clearing colleges to accept the Nisei students. All schools were first required to accept Nisei students before their names could be submitted for clearance to the War Department. Then, both the Army and the Navy had to clear the college.

This stage of the clearance process provided the council with the greatest amount of difficulty. Despite the council’s best efforts, restrictions placed by the Army and Navy made a number of schools ineligible to accept any Nisei students. In June 1942, the Navy announced that Nisei students could not enter schools with classified research programs or naval ROTC units. The Army followed with additional restrictions, stating that colleges within 25 miles of important power installations, defense industries, or railroad terminals could not enroll Nisei students. Thus, due to the large number of constraints and the languid pace of decision-making bodies, by June 1942 only one quarter of the colleges submitted had been cleared by the Army.
and Navy to accept Nisei students. This bureaucratic log jam infuriated council members, and the east coast office, in turn, worked tirelessly to hasten the clearance process. The office was successful in its efforts, and by September, 111 colleges had received approval to host Nisei students.

Earlham College became one of the colleges approved by the Army and Navy, but by this time the college had already begun to host Nisei students. The college welcomed its first two Nisei students as transfer students from Whittier College after a letter from Whitter’s president William O. Mendenhall encouraged Dennis to accept these qualified students. No formalities were required for the transfer of the two students except for the acquisition of the federal government’s approval for the students to travel to Earlham for educational purposes. The campus community embraced the new students. As Dennis described, “the two Japanese-American students have proved most acceptable citizens for our college community and have been the most cordially received by our college community.” An editorial in the college’s student newspaper, The Earlham Post, further illustrates the extent of student support for the Nisei students that arrived on campus. “We at Earlham should be glad to have these students on our campus so that we may show those guiding the war efforts of our country that here students are determined to look forward to a better world after the settlement of this war by promoting good will and a spirit of friendliness,” the contributing author wrote. An additional four Nisei students then arrived on campus as part of the NJSRC’s placement efforts.

Acceptance into Earlham was not easy. In addition to the requirements issued by the War Department, Earlham requested relocating Nisei students prove that they 1) measured up to the qualifications of other students; 2) were able “to make an affirmative and satisfactory showing of absolute loyalty to the United States;” and 3) could demonstrate that they were able to
finance themselves for one year without the benefit of scholarship funds or part-time employment from the college. All of the Nisei applicants to Earlham were superb students, and their letters of recommendation spoke of young men and women loyal to the nation and eager to continue their academic studies. One example of the letters of support written on behalf of Nisei applicants was that written by Matthew L. Simpson, a minister from Portland, Oregon. Simpson spoke of the student – Hide Tomita – with words of praise and reassurance:

Tomita is a young man of excellent character and intelligence, a good student, temperate in his habits, trustworthy in every way, and one who has a fine future if he can complete his schooling, and have anything approaching a fair chance after the war is over….This young man is the very finest type of Christian gentleman, and is very worthy. Any institution contributing to his life will, I am sure, one day find occasion for genuine pride in having had a part in shaping his career.291

Similar letters sent on behalf of Tomita stressed that he “has grown up in American communities and in association with white people so that he thinks of himself as American and in fact he feels and thinks America” and claimed that “few young men of ‘Aryan’ ancestry so well understand the meaning of democracy and are as devoted to its principles” as Tomita.292

Such letters stressed the loyalty of Nisei students to the country and attempted to assuage fears over the integration of these students into the community. Much fear remained, however, and Dennis fought to defend his institution’s decision to open enrollment to this group of students.

Institutional historian Thomas Hamm writes that at Earlham College “the presence of foreign students has been the rule rather than the exception” but Earlham’s acceptance of the Nisei students was met with much disapproval and anger. Letters of discontent from outraged Earlham alumni flooded the campus following Dennis’ decision. Vaughn Wise writes to Dennis:

Just how do you reconcile the fact that, while these Japanese students are enjoying your hospitality and security, many of our sons are being compelled to quit College and go into the Army of the U.S.?....This new action on your part in
sheltering and aiding the descendents of our enemys [sic] is just more than I can bear.293

Community tempers also flared with the admission of the first Nisei students at the college. A petition sent to Earlham by members of the surrounding Richmond community warned that “no Japanese can be trusted except a dead one.” Richmond community member Faye Whitenack railed at Dennis for accepting the Nisei students at Earlham. She wrote:

Just all of a sudden I’ve grown terribly weary of the males and females who keep insisting in sugary times that Uncle Sam play the game ‘nobly’….Frankly, I’m not interested in their qualifications for justifying their presence here even though those qualifications fill volumes….The Japs seem to be long on gall and we, especially too, far too many, in Richmond are long on ‘goo’ – which makes it very nice and cozy for the poor Japs.294

Whitenack signs her letter, “Remember Pearl Harbor, I am…”

The local Junior Order of American Mechanics echoed Whitenack’s sentiment and launched a protest against the introduction of the “foreign elements” into the community by holding a mass meeting and asking other Richmond “patriotic societies and fraternal groups” to join them in their efforts.295 Approximately 70 people – including President Dennis – attended the meeting, which resulted in a resolution directed at the Earlham College trustees and the War Relocation Authority that admonished the college for its decision. To the resolution the Richmond city Mayor John R. Britten responded, “I am not in sympathy with those people [Nisei] being here now, but you must remember that they are American citizens and have a perfect right to be here if the government says they can come.”296 The FBI was then alerted about the situation in Richmond, a situation not uncommon within communities where Nisei students had been relocated. “It’s up to the Federal Agency now, for they are the ones who permitted them to come here,” a Richmond community man remarked after the meeting.
Nothing significant developed from the resolution drafted at the Junior Order of American Mechanics’ meeting, but the discontent voiced by citizens attending the meeting illustrated the fear and hostility that accompanied the arrival of the Nisei students to Richmond. The greatest challenge to the integration of the “foreign elements” into the Richmond community came not as a result of anger over the Nisei students at Earlham, but rather from discontent over the addition of a Nisei couple to the all-white Indiana community. Lena Hiatt, the town board president, wrote an attacking letter regarding the couple’s place within her city. She wrote:

Many of our boys have been called to fight the Japanese, who are the most brutal inhuman people on the face of the Earth. Our tax payers object to harboring them here, regardless of where they were born, while their own sons are having to give their blood…in war against Japan.297

She continued by attacking Dennis and his decision to allow Nisei students at Earlham. She called him a disgrace and charged “if he is more for Japan than for Americans he had better go over and help them first-handed.”298 Hiatt’s letter and the anti-Japanese-American sentiment it conveyed echoed the attitudes of many of her fellow Richmond neighbors – Nisei individuals, whether students at Earlham or citizens in Richmond, were not welcome in their community.

Dennis answered Hiatt’s condemnation at the next town board meeting where he implored the community to end the ill sentiments being directed at the Nisei students and community members. “The so-called ‘foreign elements’ consist of the same rights of citizenship as other’s present,” Dennis charged. The Quaker Hill Association, a local refugee center that housed the Nisei couple, agreed with Dennis’ argument and adopted a resolution aimed at reminding those enraged by the Nisei about the tenets of the Quaker faith. The resolution stated:

The Quaker Hill Association reaffirms the traditional belief of the Society of Friends in the dignity of men and the equality of men. It affirms the special duty of our Association toward all racial minorities in these difficult times. It respectfully maintains its right and duty to cooperate with the government of the
United States in relocating loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry in suitable locations and in general its duty to respect and maintain the legal and moral rights of all men and women of every nationality, race, and creed...

Total acceptance of the Nisei by the Richmond community was never achieved; the relationship between the two became one of toleration.

Dennis also had to fight resentment over the Nisei students’ acceptance into Earlham. One common argument voiced by those outside of the Earlham community was that “other American students” were being deprived as a result of the admission of the Nisei students. To this assertion Dennis responded by claiming, “The Japanese-American students at Earlham are not taking the place of one student or taking one cent which would not otherwise be given to any other student. In fact, by paying their bills they are making it more possible for the college to educate other students.”

The external controversy over the admission of the Nisei students at Earlham did not seem to affect the overall spirit of the Earlham campus. Dennis, reporting to Earlham alumni about the receptivity of campus to the Nisei students, wrote: “They [the students] have been cordially received by students and faculty and are adjusting themselves satisfactorily in every way to campus activities and responsibilities.” One student described the friendly, tolerant campus atmosphere in his/her submission to the college’s student newspaper The Earlham Post. He/she wrote, “Earlham students have an informal spirit which makes everyone feel at home. There is no snobbish attitude on the part of anyone. You never pass anyone by without giving there a cheery ‘hey’.”

Dennis never faltered in his decision to accept Nisei students at Earlham. In a letter to a fellow Quaker, Dennis wrote: “If we do not do our best to help these students, I do not see why we should be called a Quaker college.” To another critique Dennis explained, “I think...that the
The fact that the Japanese, like the negro, were brought to this country for the personal profit of groups of white individuals does not lessen the obligation of the country as a whole to its loyal citizens of any color or national origin....Decent justice along these lines in our own small local situations certainly will give us more ability to handle wisely and well some of the problems of the after-war years.

H. G. Garber, in his letter to Dennis, also praised Earlham for its decision and chastised the local Richmond community for its lack of acceptance of the Nisei students. Garber wrote:

In mistreating these young men they are getting pretty close to imitating the worst there is in Germany and Japan....We are supposed to be trying to put the world on a more humanitarian basis....The best way to sell those young men with America is to admit them to college, to treat them right....We are not at war with everyone of Japanese, German, or Italian blood. We are at war with the governments and military machines of these countries.

Dennis also received letters of support and encouragement from Quaker churches and Yearly Meetings throughout the nation. Writing on behalf of the Western Yearly Meeting of the Friends Church, Ester Littler informed Dennis, “It was the unanimous desire of our Committee that you be informed of our full sympathy with your action in accepting these students.” In addition, the accepted Nisei students did not fail to show their appreciation for the opportunity extended to
them by their new institutional home. Hide Tomita, in a letter of thanks he wrote to Dennis shortly after receiving his acceptance to Earlham, gushed:

> It is with great joy that I write this letter of thanks. Your letter of a few days ago accepting me officially to Earlham College was literally a new lease on life for me….The dusty future that awaits my family and my friends should be my future also; but the long awaited chance to further schooling which has finally come is not to be refused.

A total of twelve Nisei students received the educational opportunity that Tomita so artfully praised Earlham for providing during the war period.

**Women Students and High School Seniors**

Not all attempts to open access to previously excluded populations were as successful as the Earlham example suggests. Declining enrollment numbers also plagued Franklin & Marshall, and, in an attempt to boost enrollment and to be of greater service to the surrounding Lancaster community, the Board of Trustees voted in favor of an accelerated program that extended course offerings throughout the summer and opened enrollment in such courses to individuals outside of the campus community. The implications of this decision were two-fold. First, the open enrollment for the college’s first summer session sustained enrollment by bringing additional students to campus to attend summer courses. Second, the institution’s open-enrollment policy allowed different populations of students to study at the college, thereby increasing the pool of potential students from which enrollment could be drawn. Men and women from the surrounding Lancaster community comprised the majority of the students registered for the first summer sessions, and this inclusion of women in the Franklin & Marshall student body marked the first time this group was permitted to study at the traditionally all-male institution.

Talk about the extension of full-time admission opportunities at Franklin & Marshall to women students began before the nation’s involvement in the war. These talks were short-lived,
however. Rumors about the possible admission of women students circulated through campus raising alarm and concern amongst the male population. “Coeds would be a nuisance as classmates, are not necessary socially, and would spoil our cherished traditions as a male institution,” a contributing author to the college’s student magazine, the Weekly, wrote in response to the rumors. Another student wrote that women students would interfere in classroom discussions of “everything from love poetry to biology.” This unenthusiastic, unresponsive student response brought an end to these initial discussions.

The issue arose again with the college’s implementation of its accelerated programming. Minutes from a 1942 Board of Trustees meeting suggest hesitancy by the board to admit women for the college’s summer session because of the previous response from students. The passage in the Trustees’ meeting register related to the implementation of the acceleration program reads, “to which – though hoary tradition shuddered – girls were admitted solely to earn credits to apply to their records in other institutions.” This line insinuates that the board recognized that their decision conflicted with the college’s mission and overarching campus sentiment, but they envisioned the much-needed women students to be only temporary additions to the Franklin & Marshall campus. As the war progressed, the question of extending admission to women for the entire academic year – not simply just summer sessions – would emerge once more. Again the board would find themselves debating the need to maintain enrollment versus the need to preserve the institution’s all-male identity.

In the initial years of the war, Dartmouth leaders also wrestled with the question of expanding access to the institution to compensate for enrollment losses. A number of institutions throughout the nation decided to open their doors to high school seniors for early collegiate study. At Gettysburg College, for example, the acceptance of high school seniors for early
admission to the college helped the institution to replace the large numbers of male students taken by the war. Leaders at Dartmouth observed this trend and considered the option of lowering admissions standards to secure classes of seventeen and eighteen year-old men, many of whom would normally be attending college within just a few months. The idea was quickly dismissed, however, as the Board and Hopkins deemed such an action as inconsistent with the mission and high standards of the institution. “To break into this circle by lowering admissions standards would immediately and adversely affect all,” Dean of Freshmen Robert C. Strong began in a memo. “The result, it is held, would be harmful now and would also raise serious difficulties in rebuilding standards after the war. These standards should be preserved. This is the hard and not the easy way out,” Strong concluded. Hopkins agreed with Strong and the Board on their positions. Writing to alumni, Hopkins explains that, despite the crisis, Dartmouth will not implement any policies that have the potential to alter drastically the institution. He wrote:

   Our objective must be to emerge from the war strengthened by critical problems faced and solved, and not come out of the conflict as an institution so weakened, changed, and emasculated as to be a pitiable miniature of what the College has become thru growth and cumulatively greater progress.311

Hopkins and the Board viewed the admission of high school seniors as a policy change that would negatively affect the institution and therefore the recommendation failed to receive much support in Hanover.

**Militarization of Campus**

   As student enrollment continued to decline and the desire to aid the U.S. military increased, leaders at Dartmouth, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore began to explore the option of further aiding in the war through the development of a relationship between the military and higher education. A number of institutions like these three looked to support the
war-effort, not through military research, but instead through other forms of service to the military and the nation. The federal government and Roosevelt’s lack of acknowledgement of higher education’s willingness to serve hindered initial attempts to aid in the war effort, however, and those within higher education were left anxiously waiting to hear if the federal government would turn to them for help. As a writer in the Franklin & Marshall alumni magazine described this waiting game, “The period from December 1942 to April 1943 will always be remembered on American campuses as that during which the great war of nerves came to its climax.”

The resolution presented to Roosevelt by the Baltimore conference committee in the winter of 1942 went unaddressed by either the President or military leaders for many months. On April 18, 1942, Roosevelt established the War Manpower Commission (WMC), which was charged with the coordination of manpower for utilization in military, industrial, governmental, and civilian arenas, yet no mention was made of manpower for colleges and universities. The NCED, angered by a lack of response, convened another conference of higher education leaders on July 15, 1942. This meeting became known as the Second Baltimore Conference as its aims were largely an extension of those begun at the first Baltimore conference held only months earlier. Seventy-five officers from throughout higher education worked for two days to draft a statement that stressed two main points. Leaders asked for: (1) better coordination of higher education’s efforts to serve the nation during the war period and (2) that the federal government utilize higher education’s resources to aid in the war effort.

As the statement began:

We deplore the continuing lack of any adequate, coordinated plan for the most effective utilisations of higher education toward winning the war, and we urge the establishment of such a coordinated plan at the earliest possible moment….The government is not utilizing the institutions of higher education to capacity and is,
therefore, impeding the flow of highly trained manpower essential to victory in a long war.\textsuperscript{314}

The eight-point statement also stressed how the measures already taken by higher education to adapt to the challenges of the war could be extended if a central agency coordinated the adaptation efforts. Leaders concluded by designating the American Council on Education (ACE) as the “appropriate nongovernmental agency to…serve in a continuous capacity for facilitating cooperation between higher education and government” and implored governmental leaders to turn to ACE, and ultimately all of higher education, for help. “The institutions of higher education stand ready to make such further adaptations of their programs and facilities as may be necessary to meet the objectives set up by the federal agencies concerned with the training of college students for war service,” the statement closed.\textsuperscript{315}

Response to this statement by the WMC stressed that the responsibility for coordinating such plans belonged to the Army and Navy, and not the federal government. In turn, Roosevelt wrote to the secretaries of the War and Navy and encouraged them to study how they might utilize colleges and universities during the course of the war. The Army and Navy responded to Roosevelt’s request with the announcement on December 12, 1942 of plans for the implementation of college- and university-based military training programs.

For a number of colleges, the announcement of the development of college- and university-based military training programs came none too soon. Enrollment numbers at many smaller institutions continued to decline as the war progressed and institutional finances were suffering as a result. As Dennis wrote of Earlham in October 1943, “the anticipated decrease in enrollment…has finally been fully realized.” In the spring of 1943, Earlham’s student enrollment totaled only 296 students – 97 men and 199 women. The institution had lost almost 48 percent of
its male students, most of whom left the institution to engage in national service. By October 1943, enrollment had decreased even further to 267 total students of which only 64 were men.\textsuperscript{316} Enrollment at Franklin & Marshall totaled 404 students by the end of the 1942-1943 academic year, a decline of 52 percent from September’s total enrollment.\textsuperscript{317} Swarthmore enrolled only 143 male students, leaving a total enrollment of only 527 students during this same period. Enrollment numbers reached their lowest levels in modern Dartmouth history by the fall of 1943. The institution’s civilian student enrollment now totaled just 229 men, a sizeable decline considering the college’s pre-war enrollment averaged 2,300 men.\textsuperscript{318} Having already exhausted a number of policy-change options, institutional leaders were thus left to search for externally-based measures that, when adopted, could help to stabilize their institutions for the remainder of the war period. Military training programs became one of the opportunities pursued by institutional leaders.

After the military’s announcement, presidents, governing boards, and faculty throughout higher education raced to prepare their campuses to meet the requirements of the newly-devised training programs. The male trainees and federal dollars each program would bring to a campus provided the motivation many leaders needed to transform their institutions of higher learning into war colleges. With only a select number of institutions to be chosen to host the military programs, leaders worked tirelessly to make their institution appear to be the “best” home for the new program. The latter months of 1942 were thus filled with efforts to shape up and then sell institutions to the military. Administrators toiled to convert fraternity houses and dormitories into barracks and cafeterias into small-scale mess halls. This was not an easy task, however, given the shortage of resources and dwindling institutional budgets.
Army and Navy College Training Programs

Institutions like Franklin & Marshall and Dartmouth did not wait for an invitation from the federal government to begin to develop working relationships with the military. While higher education and the federal government languished in their discussions over collaborative war efforts, Franklin & Marshall and Dartmouth entered into the first of their war-time contracts with the military. The monies earned from these programs did not protect the institutions from the hardships associated with the war. Instead, these initial partnerships acted more like a contribution to the war effort rather than as a contribution to institutional coffers.

On July 15, 1942, Dartmouth welcomed 1,000 Navy cadets to its campus. These men came to Hanover as part of the Navy’s Indoctrination School, which aimed to train young men to become Navy officers. The school ran in sixty-day training periods, with a new class of students arriving on campus at the end of each period, and courses on topics like seamanship, navigation, and ordinance were taught by senior Navy officers brought to the college. Bugle calls interrupted the Hanover mornings each day and military formations on the green made the campus look like a military barracks, but the institution remained unchanged by the Navy’s presence. The Indoctrination School really only needed Dartmouth for the housing and feeding capabilities the college possessed and, thus the two operated like separate entities for much of their year-long partnership. Before the program ended in July 1943, over 5,400 cadets were educated by the Navy on the Dartmouth campus. For their service as part of this program, Dartmouth received only $535,000, a sum that barely covered the costs of feeding and housing the Navy cadets.

Franklin & Marshall College also entered into a partnership with the military through the institution’s Civilian Aeronautics Authority (CAA) flight training program. In June 1942, the Navy contracted with the flight training program at Franklin & Marshall to provide beginning
and advanced aviation training to 90 Navy students per semester. The college began its CAA training program in September 1939 after receiving encouragement from the college’s student Aero Club. The CAA program, previously available only at engineering schools, offered the ground and air preparations required for aeronautic licensing and thus appealed to the Navy’s need to train increasing numbers of pilots. The Navy relied on the college’s civilian instructors to teach the program’s aviation courses and allowed the instructors great latitude in how they managed their courses. The lack of a strict Navy protocol left participating cadets feeling different from other war-training programs, however, and they consequently requested a more military-like learning environment than the program required. As a result, the cadets purchased khaki uniforms, devised insignia, and appointed officers creating, as Franklin & Marshall institutional historian Frederic Klein writes, “the first wartime atmosphere on campus.” Like Dartmouth’s Indoctrination School, the CAA Navy War Training Service lasted just one year running from June 1, 1942 to July 1, 1943.

Even with the funds the Navy’s contract provided to the college, Franklin & Marshall still required additional funding to compensate for the enrollment losses it experienced. Distler therefore impatiently awaited news of a more general military training program rumored to be under negotiation in Washington to which he could apply on his college’s behalf and which would bring much-needed funds to the college. The delay in Washington put Distler on edge. “I carried my resignation in my pocket for the first year of my presidency…In the quiet of the study, in my home my major concern was ‘Can we keep this College going?’” Distler confessed years later. Nason articulated similar fears about the future of his institution in a 1943 letter to Swarthmore alumni. As he wrote:
Nearly every college and university is operating within a rubber framework, as elastic as it is synthetic. It changes its shape with each weekly pronouncement from Washington….we worry along as best we can, becoming gradually inured to complete uncertainty.\textsuperscript{322}

In December 1942, Distler wrote to neighboring Haverford College president Felix Morley about his distress over the lack of progress with the federal government and higher education. He asked his colleague for advice on how best to proceed next. “I have still made no effort to get a special program [like the CAA contract], hoping that the general program might soon be announced. What is your opinion as to the wisdom of waiting?,” he inquired.\textsuperscript{323} Four days later Distler’s query was answered by the War Department’s announcement of the new Army and Navy Collegiate Training Programs.

Distler was attending a conference in Washington, D.C. when he received word of the newly-established military training programs, and, because of the college’s prior working relationship with the Navy, Distler directed his attention toward the Navy’s V-12 training program. While in Washington, he learned that the head of the Navy V-12 program was a man named Captain Behrens who just happened to be a native of the city of Lancaster. Having learned of Captain Behrens and his ties to Lancaster, Distler immediately returned to the College and looked to a member of Franklin & Marshall’s faculty for help.

Shober Barr, himself a native of the city of Lancaster, headed the athletics department at Franklin & Marshall College during the war period. Distler knew that Barr had many connections within the city, and he immediately turned to Barr for help in acquiring a V-12 program for the College. Barr knew Captain Behrens, and Distler immediately sent Barr to Washington, D.C. to meet with and convince Behrens to consider Franklin & Marshall as a V-12 site. As Distler recalled years later:
Barr replied, ‘Sure, I know him [Behrens].’ I then said, ‘Look, I’m going to ask you to pack a bag tonight. I’m going to ask you to call him and get to Washington to his home as fast as you can.’ The next thing I knew Captain Behrens himself came down [to Lancaster] for the inspection.\textsuperscript{324}

The initial steps of the national V-12 selection process were not as easy as the Franklin & Marshall College experience would suggest. When the Navy created the V-12 program, it assured small colleges like Franklin & Marshall that they would receive full consideration for participation in the program. The\textit{ Des Moines Register} reported that:

\begin{quote}
 We [The Navy] will not place at the top of the priority list the large state universities and privately endowed institutions of the country which should be able to carry on unaided…We will give special consideration to the small colleges whose financial resources are so meager that their existence may be threatened by the war.\textsuperscript{325}
\end{quote}

By the end of December 1942, the War Manpower Commission had developed a questionnaire that was dispatched to all postsecondary institutions and inquired about the housing and messing capabilities of the school. Institutions were encouraged to complete the questionnaire in a timely fashion in order to be considered for the program. By the end of March 1943, over 1,600 questionnaires had been completed and returned to the Commission. The Navy then divided the V-12 program selection process into two stages. The first stage involved the creation of an initial list of institutions classified by their academic qualities and housing and messing capabilities. Once an institution made it on to the initial selection list, the Navy would then conduct a site inspection to ensure that the institution met the qualifications required by the program.

The Joint Committee for the Selection of Non-Federal Educational Institutions, led by Purdue University president Dr. Edward C. Elliott, headed the selection of the institutions that would receive a site inspection. Throughout February and March of 1943, five hundred schools were notified of their selection for an inspection by Navy officials. As James Schneider, Navy V-12 historian, explains the inspection process further, “The resulting inspections, complicated by
the politically inspired need for broad geographical distribution of the schools, were far from uniform. Most were conducted by unqualified officers who produced a diverse set of recommendations.\textsuperscript{326} This lack of consistency resulted in the need for a second round of inspections at each institution. These second inspections provided many institutions with mixed messages – some sites were told after the first inspection that their facilities were acceptable but were then told just a few weeks later that their facilities were inadequate for the program. This error left many institutions that desperately sought to house a V-12 program scrambling to accommodate the Navy’s demands. The Navy assisted some institutions in acquiring the materials necessary for the institution to meet program standards – which often included hard-to-find kitchen equipment and building materials – but most presidents worked independently to ready their campuses for the program. Locating the required supplies was extremely difficult, however, given the immense shortages of resources and materials that resulted from the war effort.

Many college and university presidents still went to great lengths to make their institutions look attractive to the visiting Naval officers. One institution offered to build a swimming pool for the Navy cadets while another institution promised to provide V-12 trainees with free use of the town’s golf course. Political pressure and influence also tainted the site selection process as several State congressmen, senators, and other government officials campaigned for their “home” institution. Republican national chairman B. Carroll Reece, for example, worked diligently to secure a V-12 program for Milligan College, an unaccredited institution near Johnson City, Tennessee.

Dartmouth sent a number of its faculty back to the classroom in order to prepare itself for the V-12 program. A headline in the college’s alumni magazine in February 1943 read simply,
“The Faculty has Gone Back to College.” Changing student academic interests and faculty departures for war service caused overcrowded classrooms and instructor-less courses. Thus, Dean of Faculty E. Gordon Bill turned to his faculty body for help. In a November 1942 memo, Bill implored the Dartmouth faculty to return to the classroom to learn the tools necessary to meet the college’s curricular needs, reassuring them that they could succeed in his request. Bill wrote:

I greatly hope…that no one will hastily throw this memorandum into the wastebasket simply because he has never thought of being able to do this sort of work…Teaching is an art which members of the Dartmouth faculty have learned by such a long and necessary experience that the acquiring under expert guidance of an elementary knowledge of a new subject matter and laboratory method might well turn out to be comparatively easy….Please consider this.

Fifty-two Dartmouth faculty members answered Bill’s plea and volunteered to spend their four week winter vacation in the classroom as students. These social science faculty and those who taught, as one colleague described them, “the impractical humanities” learned the principles of elementary physics, calculus, and mechanical drawing from their expert colleagues. Each “retooled” faculty member would then teach the physical science and engineering courses demanded by the Dartmouth student body and required by the Navy’s V-12 program. Without the assistance of these individuals, Dartmouth would not have been able to meet the Navy’s curricular requirements for the program and therefore would not have been considered as a host site. (Institutions like Swarthmore and Franklin & Marshall were also able to expand their curriculum because of a similar “retooling” of faculty members.) The participating faculty’s willingness to serve both national and institutional needs, therefore, proved indispensable when it came time for the selection of institutional V-12 sites.
By the middle of April 1943, the Navy had produced a tentative list of 146 undergraduate institutions that officers had selected for the V-12 program. The final list was then narrowed down to 131 institutions, three of which were Franklin & Marshall, Dartmouth, and Swarthmore Colleges. Other liberal arts colleges selected to participate in the program included Bates College, Berea College, Oberlin College, Trinity College, Union College, Villanova College, and Wabash College.\textsuperscript{329}

Most schools celebrated after receiving the announcement on April 23, 1943 that they had been selected to participate in the program. However, all 131 institutions then had to move quickly to make the “planning, purchasing, remodeling, and hirings” necessary to accommodate the July 1 arrival of the V-12 students and officers. Franklin & Marshall was no exception. The Franklin & Marshall administration, for example, scrambled to prepare the college to accommodate the soon-to-arrive students as the college had never before housed or fed more than ninety students in on-campus housing and dining facilities. Distler later confessed that “things just fell into place” for the College during this time of hurried preparation.\textsuperscript{330} As Distler recalled:

In order to get the cooking and serving equipment which everybody was also looking for, we went to New York and Philadelphia. We weren’t getting far when I happened to read a blurb that the head of the Valley Forge Military Academy…was throwing an army program out. He had just bought new feeding equipment. So, I got our director of grounds to go down with a blank check to see him. Meanwhile I called him up. He said: ‘Here’s a price. You come down with a check and a truck and you can take it away today.’ That’s exactly what the superintendent of grounds did. He landed back here about midnight with equipment that we couldn’t get anywhere else…If that hadn’t come through, I don’t know whether we would have been able to get the equipment in time.\textsuperscript{331}

By the end of the selection process, the types of institutions chosen as V-12 program sites ranged from Ivy League institutions like Harvard and Yale to smaller, private colleges like Franklin & Marshall and Swarthmore. The list also included major research universities, state
teachers colleges, and publicly- and privately-funded institutions. The Navy obviously deviated from its original intention of only placing V-12 programs at colleges and universities in need of the resources that such a program could provide. The smaller, private institutions fortunate enough to be selected as a V-12 host site would benefit greatly from the resources that the Navy program supplied. The Navy’s arrival brought massive changes to most campuses, however, by transforming quiet, small-town liberal arts colleges like Franklin & Marshall and Dartmouth into war colleges.

Civilian Public Service Reserve Force

While Presidents Distler and Hopkins worked to transform their campuses into war colleges, President Dennis campaigned to have Earlham be of service to the nation as well. Instead of welcoming military trainees, however, Dennis and the Earlham community sought to open up the college campus to those individuals who would work to rebuild the nations devastated by the world war. “A Quaker college as such should not participate directly in the war effort but it should be everything short of direct participation to cooperate with the government,” Dennis explained in his 1942 address to the Indiana Yearly Meeting.  

For a brief period, the Earlham administration entertained the option of hosting a Provost Marshal training unit at the College. Unlike the military training programs for which colleges like Franklin & Marshall and Dartmouth campaigned, the proposed training unit was not a combat unit, but rather was responsible for the training of men in the constructive work of administering occupied territory. Response from the Earlham Board of Trustees, faculty, alumni, and local Friends community regarding the college’s hosting of such a unit was divided. In turn, the Board announced it could not support such a program at Earlham. The Board’s response to the proposal read:
Because of the divergent views among members of the Board and the Board’s inability to come to united opinion, and because there would evidently be serious dissent on the part of certain concerned members of the faculty and friends of the college, the Board agreed that it would not be wise at this time to secure such a unit….This decision is in harmony with the Quaker practice of respecting view of a concerned minority when these views are matters of deep principle.

Nonetheless, the board encouraged the Earlham administration and faculty to investigate other ways in which the college could be of service to the nation; the board agreed that the college had “adequate facilities” and a “remarkable tradition as part of a larger group of historic peace churches” and thus the institution should capitalize on these assets. As a result, Dennis and the Earlham administration shifted their attention to the emerging conversation amongst peace churches and institutions about Civilian Public Service (CPS) camps for conscientious objectors.

Conversations about the role of conscientious objectors in the conflict began before bombs ever fell on Pearl Harbor. As outlined within the Selective Service Act of 1940, religion was the only basis upon which an individual could claim Conscientious Objector status, and peace churches and organizations like the American Friends Service Committee (ASFC) were thus granted responsibility for overseeing the non-military service of these individuals during the war. The ASFC in cooperation with the Church of the Brethren, the Mennonites, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation started working on plans for substitute service of “public importance” for conscientious objectors. Such plans, as supported by the Act, included the creation of CPS camps where registered conscientious objectors would work on nationally- and locally-focused projects like reforestation; soil erosion control; slum clearance; and rural re-housing instead of engaging in military service. David Lyttle, in a letter to Earlham President Dennis, described his work at a CPS camp as entailing the following:

During the six days in which we work, we clean out land that leader throughout the Smoky Mountains. This consists of cutting out trees that have gotten across
the path, cutting out grass, and clearing away any miscellaneous junk on the trial. It’s a lot of work, but once a person gets used to it it’s rather entertaining.\textsuperscript{334}

According to government projections released in early 1942, approximately 5,400 men would engage in work similar to that which Lyttle described. The government predicted that 800,000 men would be drafted into military service during the course of the war, and 10,900 of these men would claim conscientious objector status. It predicted further that half of the conscientious objectors would perform noncombat service in the army, while the remaining half would, like Lyttle, be assigned to the emerging CPS camps. As a result, the peace group initially proposed to operate between 30 and 40 camps in states and on college campuses throughout the country, all of which would be funded privately by the four organizations. They appointed Thomas Jones, Earlham alumnus and president of Fisk University,\textsuperscript{335} as director of activities for the ASFC camps.

Word of the emerging CPS camps quickly spread through the Quaker college community. By the fall of 1942, the presidents of the Quaker institutions began to discuss how they, as a collective group, could develop a CPS program that was more academic in its service to the nation than the activity of the CPS work camps described by Lyttle. A September 1942 memo from Nason of Swarthmore College, invited all Quaker college presidents to help sort out the specific details of the CPS programs that could be located on their college campuses. According to Nason, the group needed to consider: 1) the merits of the program; 2) the quota of students each participating campus would receive; 3) the qualifications, if any, of those enrolled; 4) the content of the curriculum; and 5) the administrative set-up. On September 26, 1942, representatives of the seven Friends colleges – Earlham, Friends University, Haverford, Guilford, Swarthmore, William Penn, and Wilmington – met at Earlham College to discuss the
logistics of the CPS program as introduced by Nason. This meeting was a success. By the end of the multi-day conference, the presidents had named the program; outlined its purpose and goals; and identified the individuals to whom the program was targeted.

In an attempt to give the program the same level of legitimacy as the emerging military programs, the presidents decided to call their program the Civilian Public Service Reserve Force. The group explained their decision was based on a “desire on the part of the peace churches through their colleges to perform a service in training a reserve force for reconstruction work similar to the reserve forces being trained for by the various military services in other schools.” Rigorous program admissions requirements were also implemented to further legitimize the program. Acceptance in the Reserve Force would be determined by the physical fitness, academic ability, and personal qualifications of each candidate. The presidents agreed on such high standards because they did not want their program to be viewed as an easy alternative to military service. As the group wrote:

It is the desire of the group that this service as undertaken by our colleges shall be imbued with high idealism and enthusiasm for service and that at no point there can be any suggestion that men are entering this area of service as a way out of a distasteful situation in national obligation.

Eligibility for student participation, as decided by the group, would be determined by the following criteria:

Where men have been certified by their local boards as being Conscientious Objectors, they would be eligible to enroll in the Civilian Public Service Reserve Force. Candidates of this Reserve Force would be allowed to make application to certain colleges for carrying on a course of study which would revolve, in part, around subjects dealing with the administration of relief and reconstruction.
Therefore, interested students first had to acquire their 4-E classification from their local draft board and then each had to apply to the specific institution they wanted to attend in order to be considered for participation in the Reserve Force.

Brethren, Quaker, and Mennonite institutions all clamored to receive students as part of the CPS Reserve Force as these students would bring much needed tuition dollars to their campuses. Consequently, Nason, as chairman of the CPS Reserve Force Committee, announced the establishment of a quota system developed to divide the pool of students between interested institutions. The Quaker institutions, argued by their presidents to be the best academically amongst the schools, were allocated the highest proportion of students, greatly angering the presidents of a number of Brethren and Mennonite colleges who argued that a greater number of Conscientious Objectors were Brethren or Mennonite. Consensus amongst the schools had to be reached, however, in order for Selective Service Director Hershey to approve the program. Thus, by December, the group agreed that four Mennonite schools, four Brethren schools, and six Quaker schools – including Earlham and Swarthmore Colleges – were eligible to host the Reserve Force program.

By November 1942, Director Hershey approved the proposed CPS Reserve Force, and campus preparations for the program commenced. At Earlham, the first step in this preparation involved the development of a new curricular area of concentration entitled “Relief and Reconstruction” that all CPS students would study. The “Relief and Reconstruction” program of study was designed to be interdisciplinary, cutting across several departmental lines, and aimed to prepare students for post-war, foreign-service. Course time was divided between area studies; language acquisition; relief administration; philosophy of the Society of Friends; and various skills calculated to be useful in relief work. Students pursuing their studies in the Relief and
Reconstruction program were required to fulfill credit requirements in four different academic areas – History and Political Science; Sociology; Religion; and Foreign Languages – in addition to credit hours in general studies courses. The Relief and Reconstruction curriculum explored the countries of France, Germany, and the low countries of Central Europe and featured courses entitled *Contemporary World Problems; American Foreign Relations; Social Geography; Race and Culture Conflicts;* and *Relief Administration.* Students could also take classes in *First Aid; Public Health;* and *Group Recreation and Group Singing* that would aid in their abilities to engage in the activities necessitated during their service abroad.

Dennis was proud of this new addition to Earlham’s curriculum. In a letter addressed to Earlham’s alumni, Dennis explained the rationale and goals of the Relief and Reconstruction curriculum. He wrote:

Higher education has been accused of going too far in the direction of training people to ‘make a living.’ Earlham has traditionally tried to place more emphasis on training people to ‘make a better world in which to live.’…It is our considered judgment that the traditions of Earlham, the Society of Friends, the background and training of faculty, the pattern of the organized extracurricular activities, and the fact that we normally have students of several races and nationalities from many parts of the country and world, are all important factors in providing an atmosphere conducive to the study of the social problems of the world.  

Dennis continued validating Earlham’s ability to educate and train interested students for foreign-service by stressing the diversity of the college’s student and faculty and the role both would play in constructing an educational environment conducive to learning about those outside of Indiana and the United States. As Dennis continued:

It is our considered judgment that the traditions of Earlham and the Society of Friends, the background and training of the faculty, the pattern of the organized extracurricular activities, and the fact that we normally have students of several races and nationalities from many parts of the country and world, are all important factors in providing an atmosphere conducive to the study of the social problems of the world.
The introduction of this new curricular area of study affected the whole Earlham community as all Earlham students, not just Reserve Force students, could study the Relief and Reconstruction concentration.

Swarthmore College also implemented a similar Relief and Reconstruction area of concentration to its liberal arts curriculum. Like Earlham, Swarthmore viewed this program as a way in which the Quaker-based college could contribute to the war effort. Neighboring Quaker institution Haverford College announced in November 1942 that it would allow military occupation of the campus. This decision both outraged and worried those associated with Swarthmore as they feared that Swarthmore would make a similar choice. Nason’s solution, instead, was the announcement of the college’s Relief and Reconstruction concentration. He wrote to concerned alumni and friends in an attempt to assuage fears about the militarization of Swarthmore:

While not a pacifist myself, I have such respect for those who are and for the Quaker tradition of the college that I should prefer to see Swarthmore follow a course which would embody the highest ideals of the Society of Friends….If one believes, as I do, that the business of putting the world back together is as integral a part of total war as the business of blowing it to bits, then training in the field of relief and rehabilitation is an essential job and any institution which undertakes it is making an importance contribution.\textsuperscript{340}

**Business as Usual**

Despite the loss of male students, changes in curriculum, and controversies over access that accompanied the war, the Earlham campus appeared to many to be no different during these first years of the war than it was before Pearl Harbor. Students and faculty seemed to work harder, and social activities were practically non-existent, yet operationally war-time Earlham
appeared to be little changed by the conflict. In an October 20, 1943 editorial in *The Earlham Post*, a student shared his point of view on the current state of campus. He wrote:

There is among the students an atmosphere of greater maturity, of more serious thought, of consideration of events beyond the boundaries of the campus. Today the student who comes to college merely for the social life is as rare as a pair of nylon hose. In contrast with the Joe College type, a somewhat common species of a few years ago, today’s student has purpose and forethought in attending college….But Earlham remains fundamentally the same. Its spirit of tolerance and friendliness has not been lost. Its organizations and activities, though of necessity modified, continue much as before. Though students have seriousness of purpose, Earlham has not become a place of all work and no play….there are still skates and picnics, class parties, and mid-night feeds.\(^{341}\)

A ‘business as usual’ mentality on the Earlham campus also existed through its fund-raising activities that continued unabated during the early war years. In 1939, Earlham launched a campaign for the construction of a new women’s dormitory, and by July 1941 the campaign had raised $25,943 ($374,000).\(^{342,343}\) With the nation’s entrance into World War II, some on and off the campus feared the war would interrupt the progress the college had made on the campaign. The fundraising committee sought to assuage these concerns, however, by announcing that the campaign would “proceed full steam ahead” despite the war. Earlham’s commitment to the campaign touched some of its alumni and an additional $6,600 ($95,000) was contributed to the campaign within weeks of the committee’s announcement. By July 1942, the campaign raised $205,593 ($2.6 million) for the dormitory project and an additional $33,880 ($441,000) provided for general use by the college.\(^{344}\) Earlham’s dwindling financial resources received a much-needed boost from this latter contribution.

Franklin & Marshall also maintained its fundraising activities throughout the first years of the war, but these efforts now had more vital consequences; the college needed money to survive. A check received in 1942 from the Synods of the Evangelical and Reformed Churches
placed $9,909 ($129,000) in the college’s coffers and improved the institution’s financial situation. Tuition dollars from the college’s CAA training program and summer courses also provided some additional income, but this was not enough to sustain the institution. The college then appealed to its alumni body for help. In a letter sent to all Franklin & Marshall alumni, Distler implored alumni to financially support their alma mater during this time of crisis through contributions to the college’s Loyalty Fund. He wrote:

I do not think I am overstating the case when I say that there are few things more vital to the success of our war effort than the maintenance of war-adapted education at its present level. By contributing to the College Fund now, in whatever measure you are able, you will therefore be expressing a double loyalty. You will be helping your Alma Mater through a critical period; but even more important, you will be doing just a little more for your country.\textsuperscript{345}

Dister’s plea raised a total of $4,832.00 ($62,900), a much-welcomed sum given the college’s financial state.\textsuperscript{346}

Distler also used the college’s denominational ties to make an additional appeal for financial assistance. Franklin & Marshall joined eight other church-related schools in the eastern section of the Evangelical and Reformed Church to request funding from the church Synod. The group listed pre-war causes like decreased “big givers,” declining rates of income from endowment, increases in competition between schools, and rising costs of operation as factors that contributed to the schools’ financial need, and then stressed that the war had only exacerbated their dire financial states. Thus, they implored the church to help them “not for endowments nor for capital expenditures…but for supplementary funds to help meet current needs precipitated by the national emergency.”\textsuperscript{347} Distler specifically appealed, “Franklin & Marshall, which has prepared hundreds of young men for the ministry, and which has always stressed the value of religion in its teaching, deserves the assistance of the denomination to
which it has contributed so much during the years."\textsuperscript{348} The decision on funding from the synod remains undocumented.

The overwhelming financial support of the Dartmouth alumni body saved the college’s budget in these early war years. By the middle 1941-1942 academic year, the College was already operating at a deficit of between $150,000 ($1.95 million) and $200,000 ($2.6 million). Fears of increasing budget deficits led Hopkins to turn to his alumni body for help. “Dartmouth has an endowment more precious than great riches – it has a ‘living endowment’ made up of 20,000 alumni. This is an indestructible asset of immeasurable value….The plain facts are that the Alumni Fund is a solid rock upon which the security of the College is based,” Hopkins wrote in the April 1942 \textit{Dartmouth Alumni Magazine}.\textsuperscript{349} Dartmouth alumni answered Hopkins’ appeals for aid. Monies donated to the institution as part of the college’s 1942 campaign covered the college’s 1941-1942 operating deficit of $154,108.97 ($2 million) and provided an additional $23,000 ($300,000) for the establishment of a war emergency fund. Hopkins hailed alumni for their “truly magnificent accomplishment.”\textsuperscript{350}

As the war continued, Dartmouth alumni repeatedly asked, “What is the situation in Hanover and what can we do?” Each time Hopkins responded with a request for additional funding. He wrote in January 1943, “Perhaps the most significant of all Dartmouth’s resources is the disposition which Dartmouth alumni have shown in all times of past emergencies to render support to the College to the extent needful.”\textsuperscript{351} Again alumni responded, covering both the institution’s 1942-1943 operating deficit and adding monies to the now-formalized War Emergency Reserve Fund.

The war and the financial crisis it caused provided Swarthmore College with the opportunity to organize its previously piecemeal fundraising activities to generate monies for the
institution. Monetary support from alumni helped other institutions begin to navigate the financial strains associated with the war, and Swarthmore also sought to capitalize on its ‘living endowment.’ Unlike Dartmouth or Franklin & Marshall, however, Swarthmore first had to rebuild relationships with its alumni body before it could reach out to this constituency for the financial assistance it desperately needed.

Before the nation’s entrance into the war, Swarthmore administrators arranged for a complete evaluation of the college by external reviewers. The college received praise from the evaluators for its honors program; relationships established between faculty and students; and student advising, but the team criticized Swarthmore for its perceived ‘poor’ relations with its alumni. In the memo to Nason, the lead reviewer, Willard Elsbee, wrote:

Swarthmore need[s] a more vigorous and intelligent alumni program than the one now in force, a program that would stimulate and encourage the flow of ideas between the alumni and the President of the College, and one in which interested alumni might actually participate….Must not the College of necessity depend more and more on the rank and file of the alumni body for funds?352

Elsbee’s recommendation to rely on the “rank and file” of Swarthmore alumni had already been achieved by Swarthmore administrators by the time Elsbee’s recommendation reached the college. A month before Elsbee’s visit, the Garnet Letter, the college’s alumni magazine, announced the launch of the college’s first Alumni Fund campaign. The looming war provided the college with the opportunity to stress the important role alumni could play in aiding the institution through a time of financial hardship should such a time arise. “If every Swarthmorean will give what he or she can afford, however modest that amount might be, we can safely allow success to care for itself,” a magazine contributor emphasized to readers.353 Alumni responded by contributing $18,000 ($234,000) to the institution, a great response when one considers the infancy of the college’s program of alumni giving. Swarthmore would continue to build on this
initial fundraising success throughout the course of the war, with each new campaign providing much-needed financial assistance to the college.

**Summary of the Early War Years**

World War II brought a period of unimaginable change for both the nation and its system of higher education. Selective service policies implemented before Pearl Harbor protected most colleges from the enrollment losses and financial strains that threatened to injure institutions in the early years of the war. Institutional attention thus was initially directed at trying to aid in the national war effort. The creation of special, faculty-led committees, the implementation of war-related curricula and accelerated programming, and the establishment of community-serving educational programs all reflect attempts by Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore to be of service to the nation during this period of crisis.

The continuation of the war, combined with reform of the Selective Service Act in the fall of 1942, brought intensifying declines in male student enrollment at each of the four institutions. As a result, the uniformity created and promoted throughout higher education by the First Baltimore Conference began to dissipate as individual actions came to dominate strategies for overcoming the challenges of the war. Institutional leaders like Dennis, Distler, Hopkins, and Nason worked to identify adaptive approaches tailed to meet the unique war-time needs and identities of their individual institutions. At Earlham College, for example, student access was expanded to allow for the admission of Nisei students who had been forced to abandon their studies at institutions of higher education on the West Coast. Dartmouth, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges chose to welcome the U.S. military to their campuses through the hosting of the newly-established Navy V-12 program. Such adaptive strategies illustrate the beginnings of each institution’s blending of institutional need with war-time demands.
Relationships established and promoted between alumnus/a and alma mater in advance of World War II helped to bolster the dwindling institutional financial resources that accompanied the war period. Pleas for help to alumnae from Dennis, Distler, Hopkins, and Nason all resulted in monetary donations that helped to sustain each institution through the initial years of the war. The adaptive policies introduced by Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore during the first two years of World War II further helped each college to survive the early war-time challenges they faced.

Endnotes

218 Richard Lingeman, “Don’t you know there’s a war on?: The American home front, 1941-1945,” 248.
219 Ibid, 248.
221 Ibid, 258.
222 Ibid, 148.
224 Ibid, 162.
225 Ibid, 67.
226 Ibid, 69.
231 The Earlhamite, October 1941, 3.
233 Frederick Manning, Letter to Course Advisers, undated.
235 Nason, Commencement Address, May 1942.
237 Approximately 25,000 men defined by the Selective Service as “Conscientious Cooperators” chose to serve in the military during World War II in a non-combatant capacity. An additional 12,000 men entered Civilian Public Service as “Conscientious Objectors,” and over 6,000 men refused to serve in any military capacity, thus resulting in their incarceration through the war period.
238 The Earlhamite, January 1941, 15.
239 Nason, Letter for Dr. Louis Means, October 24, 1940.


Charles Seymour in “America and War: How the College Student Feels About It,” *The Boston Herald*, June 30, 1940.


Franklin D. Roosevelt as cited in Theodore A. Distler, Fall Commencement Address at Franklin and Marshall College, September 24, 1942.


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Edward Elliott, Memorandum Relative to the Committee on Resolutions and Recommendations, From NCED Conference, Higher Education and the War, (Baltimore, MD: February 1942), 154; I. Kandel, *The Impact of War Upon American Education*.

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Hopkins, Memo to Dartmouth Faculty, April 1941.

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Unnamed newspaper article, January 4, 1942.

Letter from Dr. Tyson to Nason, undated.

*The Earlhamite*, July 1943, 7.

Ibid.
280 Ibid, 11; V. R. Cardozier, *Colleges and universities in World War II*.
281 Ibid, 6.
284 Nisei are defined as American-born, second-generation Japanese Americans. They are American citizens.
289 Dennis, Statement Released for Publication, October 1, 1942.
290 “Win the War, or Peace?”, *The Earlham Post*, undated, 2.
291 Letter from Matthew L. Simpson to Dennis, August 3, 1942.
292 Letter from May Darling to Dennis, July 24, 1942.
293 Letter from Vaughn Wise to President Dennis, undated.
294 Letter from Faye Whitenack to Dennis, October 2, 1942.
295 *Cincinatti Inquirer*, September 30, 1942.
296 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
299 The Earlhamite, October 1943, p. 12.
300 Dennis, Statement Released for Publication, October 1, 1942.
301 The Earlhamite, October 1942, 2.
302 *The Earlham Post*, October 20, 1943, p.4.
303 Dennis, Personal Correspondence.
305 Earlham #75
306 Letter from Ester Littler to President Dennis, October 16, 1942.
307 Letter from Hide Tomita to Dennis, August 31, 1942.
310 Board of Trustees Meeting Minutes, Franklin & Marshall College, 1942.
311 *Dartmouth Alumni Magazine*, April 1942, 11.
312 V. R. Cardozier, *Colleges and universities in World War II*.
315 Ibid, 3.
Enrollment loss during 1942-1943 academic year totaled 297-62 students graduated at the college’s mid-winter commencement; 32 withdrew during the first semester; 68 did not return for the spring semester, and 135 withdrew during the course of the spring semester.


Letter from Distler to Felix Morley, October 1942.

Ibid.


*Dartmouth Alumni Magazine*, February 1943, 19.

Bill, Memo to Dartmouth Faculty, November 24, 1942.


Ibid.

*The Earlhamite*, January 1943, p. 3

Ibid.

Letter from David Lyttle to Dennis, undated.

Thomas Jones graduated from Earlham College in 1912. His foreign service includes time spent studying in England, teaching in Japan, serving as YMCA director in Siberia from 1918-1919, and engaging in Friends reconstruction work in Tokyo from 1923-1924. He then returned to the United States in 1926 to serve as president of Fisk University.

Quaker College Conference, *General Plan for CPS*, September 1942

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Letter to Earlham alumni from Dennis, undated.

Nason, December 7, 1942.


Figures in parentheses throughout this document indicate monetary amounts adjusted for inflation according to the Consumer Price Index for 2009.

*The Earlhamite*, July 1941, 15.

*The Earlhamite*, July 1942.


Ibid.


Dartmouth 1941-1942 Treasurer’s Report.

*Dartmouth Alumni Magazine*, January 1943, 17.
“The possible values of a liberal education and of cultural development are immeasurably greater now than in more stable times, and we must boldly carry on and keep faith with the ideals for which the College was founded.” – Ernest Hopkins, Dartmouth College

CHAPTER FIVE
Reading, Writing, and Reveille, May 1943 – August 1945

The Navy V-12 College Training Program

By May 1943, the nation had been at war for 17 months, and institutions of higher education had survived five semesters of decreasing enrollments, financial loss, and distorted war-time operations. With the end of the conflict still outside national and campus purview, colleges and universities continued to adapt to the changes the war demanded. Dwindling male student enrollments and the subsequent loss of tuition monies still threatened institutions of higher education throughout the country. At Dartmouth College, for example, a Spring 1943 enrollment of only 361 students equaled the institution’s lowest enrollment since 1894. In contrast, coeducational Swarthmore enrolled 783 students at the end of the 1942-1943 academic year, but plummeting male student attendance depleted enrollment to just 515 and 481 students respectively over the next two academic years. Thus, the Navy’s announcement on April 23, 1943 of the names of the 131 institutions selected to host the newly-established Navy V-12 College Training Program brought hope to many increasingly desperate colleges.

Preparation and negotiation filled the months between the Navy’s selection of host sites and the arrival of cadets on campus. Commissioning expenses paid by the Navy aided institutions in making the physical and material preparations required by the V-12 program. The extension of classroom and laboratory space, the renovation of plumbing for additional urinals and wash basins, and the purchase of kitchen and food supplies all topped the list of actions made in advance of the Navy’s arrival. Franklin & Marshall College, for example, used its Navy
Commissioning monies to pay for plumbing alterations to its Franklin-Meyran and Dietz-Santee dormitories and to purchase “mess” items like a meat slicer, potato peeler, and vulcan roast oven. Renovations and preparations at Franklin & Marshall totaled $18,311 ($238,000), but the Navy reimbursed the college for just $3,219.00 ($42,000) of the expenses. This deficit was not uncommon. Commissioning expenses paid by the Navy often were just a fraction of the total cost institutions incurred while preparing for the V-12 program. A letter to Franklin & Marshall President Distler from Gerald Swope, Jr., Assistant Counsel for the Bureau of Navy Personnel, explains the Navy’s position on the commissioning expenses it provided:

I am afraid that you have interpreted the Contract Manual in broader terms than that intended. The commissioning for which the government can reimburse the College must be limited strictly to alterations and equipment required solely by the Navy program and which will be of no residual value to the college. This policy left varying interpretations between an institution and the Navy regarding what changes were required solely by the Navy, were of no residual value to the college, and therefore were eligible for reimbursement by the Navy. The realization of this differing view often came only after all of the renovations and purchases had been made by an institution. Still, the promise the V-12 program held for the financial preservation of an institution through the war period led boards and presidents to look past this monetary miscommunication and toward the longer-term benefits such an investment would provide.

At many institutions, responsibility for campus improvements and purchases fell to the Chief Financial Officer or a newly-appointed Navy Liaison Officer. In addition to the physical changes he oversaw, the CFO or Liaison Officer was responsible for purchasing food for the institution and obtaining ration stamps for items like meat, coffee, canned goods, sugar, and
butter. He, along with the institution’s president, also worked to build and then maintain a good relationship between the school and the Navy.

Like the CFO and newly-created liaison officer, the college or university president also found himself fulfilling a new role because of the V-12 program. While campus prepared for the influx of cadets, the president engaged in negotiations with the Navy regarding the “Principles of Contract” established between the two entities. Contracts varied by institution. Under the Navy’s policy, each institution would receive monies from the Navy based on the book value of their buildings, the institution’s annual operating costs, and the number of cadets the institution hosted. As a standard, colleges and universities would be paid four percent per year of the pre-war book value of their buildings, and instructional, physical, and medical fees would be paid per man per month. At Franklin & Marshall, for example, this contract translated into $1,170 ($15,200) per month for the use of its facilities; $11,400 ($148,000) per month for instructional costs; $2,325 ($30,000) per month for maintenance fees; $2.00 ($26.00) per man per month for medical services; and $1.10 ($14.00) per man per day for housing, food, and other “subsistence” costs.

As evidence of the variation in contract between institutions, Swarthmore president Nason negotiated for his college to receive $2,516 ($33,000) per month for maintenance fees; $3.00 ($39.00) per man per month for medical services, and $1.10 ($14.00) per man per day for housing and food. Swarthmore also demanded one of the highest instructional fees of any participating V-12 institution because it viewed itself as an elite institution of higher education. Writing to Victor Butterfield, president of Wesleyan University, Nason articulated why he requested the higher instructional fees. He wrote, “The Navy will have to decide whether it wants to pay the price of good instruction or prefers to go where it can get a cheaper job.” For
reasons unknown, the Navy agreed with Swarthmore’s contention, paying the institution $51.80 ($674.00) per man per month for instruction as compared to the $49.63 ($646.00) that Williams College and the $37.50 ($488.00) that Oberlin College, colleges of arguably equally superb academic instruction, had negotiated to receive.

While presidents and liaison officers worked to prepare their campuses for the Navy’s invasion, Navy leadership developed the specifics of the V-12 program. Many institutions were not aware of the details of the Navy V-12 program prior to their selection as a host site because the Navy itself had just begun the process of designing the V-12 program when site selections for the program were being conducted. Admiral Randall Jacobs clarified to the nation and participating institutions for the first time the purpose of the V-12 program during a conference held on May 14 and 15, 1943. He stated, “This is a college program. Its primary purpose is to give prospective naval officers the benefits of a college education in those areas most needed by the Navy.”

To develop the program further, Jacobs hired Dr. Alvin C. Eurich, professor of education at Stanford University, to head the program’s Standards and Curriculum Section of the Training Division, which was created to devise the educational component of the V-12 program.

Student Selection

The first task facing the newly-formed Standards and Curriculum Section was the development of policies for the diverse types of students the program would educate. The V-12 student selection process did not discriminate on the basis of education; some of the young men who attended the program had just graduated from high school, while others had completed at least one semester of postsecondary education. In order to be considered for participation in the program, interested candidates first had to successfully pass the Navy’s “general intelligence
qualifying examination” that was offered throughout the country on just one day, April 2, 1943. Any male who met the following criteria could sit for the examination. He had to be:

1. A high school or preparatory school graduate who had his seventeenth but not his twentieth birthday by July 1, 1943, or
2. A high school or preparatory school senior who would graduate by July 1, 1943, or
3. A student who did not hold certificates of graduation from a secondary school but was continuing his education at an accredited college or university.

Civilian candidates also had to:

1. Be a male citizen of the United States,
2. Be morally and physically qualified, including a minimum visual acuity of 18/20,
3. Be unmarried and agree to remain unmarried until commissioning, and
4. Have evidence of potential officer qualifications.360

On the test date, 315,952 men – an estimated 60 percent of the eligible male population – arrived at 9:00 a.m. at testing sites throughout the country to take the Navy’s examination. With such large numbers of interested men, the Navy decided it would implement a quota system based on proportions in addition to the test scores to select participants for the program. From each state and from sections of larger states the Navy planned to select a number of students proportional to the population of that state. Students who successfully passed the Navy’s qualifying examination then faced a rigorous interview and physical examination before they were granted a place within the program. Consequently, test scores, hometowns, and interview skills, like draft numbers, determined the fate of many men.
The Navy notified successful candidates of their acceptance a week after their interview and physical examination. The letters that each accepted student received were brief, each stating simply:

You are hereby notified that you have been selected for enlistment in Class V-12, U.S. Naval Reserve. You are requested to report immediately for enlistment in this office or to the nearest main or semi-main Navy Recruitment Station if the travel is thereby reduced... You must enlist before your eighteenth birthday.\textsuperscript{361}

The signature of a Navy officer, no officer in particular, then closed the acceptance letter. For many young men, receipt of this letter provided not only the opportunity to obtain a college degree, but it also provided protection from the overseas combat.

The majority of the students selected to participate in the V-12 program were already enrolled in Navy V-1 or V-7\textsuperscript{362} programs and thus had received some form of postsecondary education at institutions throughout the country. These students had to pass the same qualifying examination in order to be considered for the V-12 program, and those individuals enlisted in the Navy and who failed the examination were given the choice to resign from the reserves or to be sent to general enlisted service (i.e., military combat). As James Schneider points out, “The failures were few.”\textsuperscript{363} Thus, V-1 and V-7 students who passed the Navy’s examination came to campus with varying levels of postsecondary education. Some students had just completed their first semester of their freshmen year while others were just one semester away from obtaining their bachelor’s degree.

Members of the Standards and Curriculum Section then needed to decide how to distinguish and then educate the very different groups of students that had been accepted into the program. The group proceeded to divide the V-12 program attendees into two groups – the “regulars” and the “irregulars.”\textsuperscript{364} “Regular” students were defined as those students who had no
college experience, and the Navy required these students to take the standard V-12 program curricula with no opportunity for elective courses. The standard curriculum included courses such as *Mathematical Analysis I – IV; English I-II; Historical Background of World War I-II; Engineering Drawing and Descriptive Geometry; Navigation and Nautical Astronomy; and Electrical Engineering*. Regular students were then divided further into two groups – basic and pre-medical – after their first year of academic study. Those students earning the pre-medical designation continued their education for five additional 16-week terms after which they would be assigned to medical and dental schools throughout the country. Students not deemed capable of pursuing pre-medical studies were screened after their second semester to discover special aptitudes that would help the Navy to determine their officer potential. These “basic” students could be placed in one of five different sub-programs, with each semester of additional education varying based on the program to which they were assigned. For example, deck candidates received two additional terms of education before going into active duty; NROTC students remained for five additional terms; engineering, physics, and aerology specialists studied for six additional terms; supply corps candidates remained for four terms; and Marine Corps line officers candidates stayed for only an additional two terms of study.

In contrast, the “irregular” students – those students who came out of Navy V-1 or V-7 programs and had some college experience – were not forced into a rigidly prescribed curriculum. As Dr. Eurich explained the rationale for this decision, “It would have placed an unreasonable demand upon the ‘irregulars’…if we had required them to start over with freshmen courses. This followed the Navy’s policy of recognizing fully any college work that the student had completed.” In turn, these students were permitted to take courses in their pre-war major
fields of study while also taking the math and science requirements needed for successful placement in Midshipmen’s or professional schools.

These dual curricular requirements, Schneider contends, helped to create a divide between the “regular” and the “irregular” students of the V-12 program. “The irregulars were permitted to pursue their existing majors with very little interference, thus demonstrating that the Navy firmly believed in the virtues of a liberal arts education,” Schneider explains further of this student divide. 367 “The regulars were given no choices and precious little exposure to the liberal arts as they pursued a difficult curriculum narrowly devoted to subjects considered more practical in equipping them for the duties of a naval officer,” Schneider continues. 368 Thus, very different groups of students would later graduate from the V-12 programs hosted throughout the nation.

Program Curriculum

The V-12 program prescribed a “no-nonsense, no-deviation curriculum” to train its future officers. 369 Like the accelerated programs implemented at many institutions during the war, the V-12 program ran on a year-round schedule, with terms beginning on July 1, November 1, and March 1. The program called for five and one-half full days of work each week, and every student was required to take a minimum of seventeen hours of course work (in addition to physical training) each term. Admiral Jacobs granted now-commissioned Lt. Commander Eurich total control over the development of the curriculum that would guide the V-12 program. In a letter to Eurich, Jacobs reminded him, however, of the importance of providing trainees with a good college education despite the program’s Navy home. Jacobs clarified to Eurich, “Al, we don’t want a Navy curriculum; we want the best college education you can sell us. We’ll take care of the Navy end but give these men a solid education.” 370 Eurich received recommendations
and assistance from other Navy personnel; college administrators and faculty; textbook publishers; and professional societies as he worked to develop the program’s curriculum. For example, Ivan Crawford, Dean of the College of Engineering at the University of Michigan, provided Eurich with valuable advice and guidance during the development of the curricular requirements for the program’s engineering specialties. By the time cadets arrived on campus, Eurich had developed a multi-level curriculum that educated students based on their designation – regular vs. irregular – and their resultant educational track.

All cadets, regardless of their educational designation, had to follow the program’s strict schedule of physical training. For the first term, each cadet underwent nine and a half hours of physical training per week. This amount decreased by an hour during subsequent terms, with each student training for eight and half hours per week until their graduation. Physical training programs varied based on institutional resources and geographic location. Navy V-12 students at Princeton, for example, spent some of their training hours rowing on the Delaware River while students at Mississippi College played “King of the Hill” in the hills surrounding the college. Regardless of these individual programmatic differences, calisthenics, muster and inspection, and conditioning and combative activities formed the basis of every V-12 student’s physical training requirements.

The Navy granted the 131 participating institutions immense autonomy over the implementation of the program’s curriculum. It was decided early on that the individual institutions would be responsible for establishing the content of the courses prescribed by the Navy, and the institution’s faculty would be permitted to teach and choose course materials as they saw fit. This freedom provided institutions like Franklin & Marshall, Dartmouth, and Swarthmore with a great deal of control over the curricular specifics of the program. For liberal
arts presidents like Distler, the Navy’s preservation of an institution’s liberal arts curricular mission was paramount. Distler wrote in his 1944 Annual Report to the Board of Trustees that “to our great satisfaction, the Navy has insisted from the beginning upon the College’s maintaining its normal peacetime standards of scholarship and instruction.” Swarthmore president Nason also acknowledged the importance of the Navy’s willingness to blend military training with liberal arts education:

…This is a great educational opportunity. It is a chance to combine the idealism of the Liberal Arts College with the efficiency necessary to win a great war. It establishes contacts between the wisdom of the past and the leadership of the future…The Navy is influencing the College and the College will undoubtedly influence the Navy.

Academic and Behavioral Discipline

Acceptance into the Navy V-12 program did not guarantee a college degree. V-12 students could be dismissed from the program at any time for failure to maintain adequate scholarship; for misconduct requiring disciplinary action; or for failure to demonstrate officer-like behavior. Like the curriculum, institutions had immense control over the discipline of cadets, and many institutions developed their own procedures for handling disciplinary and academic problems. At Franklin & Marshall, for example, the program’s Commanding Officer, Dean of the College, the college Navy-Liaison Officer, the Pre-Medical Advisor, and the Executive Office of the V-12 Unit met every two weeks to discuss the academic performance of each cadet. Before the bi-weekly meetings, Franklin & Marshall faculty members submitted to the committee “deficiency lists” that included the names of all men failing in any subject. The committee then discussed each man’s record to reach a decision as to whether the trainee should be separated from the program because of his academic deficiency. A poor academic,
disciplinary, and officer record could subject the student to removal from the program even though he was in no one respect a failure. Conversely, as the student manual explained further to cadets, “an exceptionally good officer-qualification and disciplinary record may swing the decision in favor of a further chance for a man whose academic record is spotty but not hopeless.” In most cases, under-performing students were retained in the program, but were encouraged to take remediation classes to improve their grades.

No cadet wanted to fail out of or be removed from the V-12 program because doing so would most likely result in a trip to the combat overseas. All associated with the program realized its magnitude. The Navy V-12 College Training Program was more than just an officer’s training program; for men the program was a temporary reprieve from the hells of the war abroad and for colleges it offered a safety net from the challenges the war provided.

The Navy Comes to Campus

On July 1, 1943, 70,000 young men reported to 131 Navy V-12 program sites in 43 states. Franklin & Marshall College, its faculty, and its administration welcomed 552 military service men to the campus on this day. These men, in addition to the 156 civilians already on campus, increased enrollment numbers to 708 students. This sudden increase in enrollment, although anticipated, still sent the Franklin & Marshall campus into a frenzy. Distler recalled, “For a couple of days, we had these poor sailors around here, carrying mattresses, going from one place to another. In other words, it was like a shakedown cruise. It took us some time, but we finally got the thing going.”

Dartmouth president Hopkins greeted the largest group of V-12 students housed at any participating institution on the same day as Distler. “I value the privilege of extending a hearty welcome to the newly arriving trainees,” Hopkins began as he addressed the two thousand men
who had just recently arrived in Hanover. “It [the V-12 program] must be a compromise between education not wholly as worthwhile as a normal college course and military training not completely as good as boot camp,” he finished, stressing of the program which the men were about to begin.374

Compromise would quickly become the hallmark of the V-12 program at many of the participating institutions. Whether inside the classroom or inside the mess hall, the need for college-wide compromise was apparent from the first day that cadets appeared on campus. The two thousand men – 1,400 Navy men and 600 Marines – new to Dartmouth arrived to find an institution scrambling to accommodate the large number of men it received. Writing to the Dartmouth Board of Trustees, Hopkins explained that his institution quickly “found most of the weeks of previous work in preparation useless and had to begin from scratch with the necessity of rescheduling all of the work for each of the 2000 men transferred from 109 different colleges.”375 Within just weeks of the cadets’ arrival, Dartmouth college administrators realized that the men they received were very different from what they had anticipated and for whom they had prepared. Dartmouth had planned to receive the following as part of its V-12 program:

1) A quota of 200 men that would not include more than 400 new V-12 or “regular” students taking the prescribed curriculum.

2) The balance of men consisting of those transferring from other colleges where they had been enlisted in V-1 and V-7 programs and thus would continue to pursue normal college courses.

3) The V-7 men would have completed the year of math required, and V-1 men would have completed the year of math and physics required.
4) The institution would receive the names and addresses of men assigned to the college before their arrival in order to communicate with the men and obtain their academic transcripts.

5) The college could schedule V-12 classes in the late afternoon and evening in order to increase the capacity of laboratories needed to fulfill academic demand.

The college quickly learned that what they had anticipated was inaccurate. In reality, Dartmouth received as part of its 2,000 V-12 students:

1) 650 “regular” men who required education within the Navy’s prescribed curriculum.

2) Men from colleges who had not enlisted in a Navy V-1 or V-7 program and thus had not taken the required courses in math and physics.

3) Revised curricular requirements including the addition of physics as a requirement for all V-7 men; and the addition of engineering drawing as a requirement for both V-1 and V-7 students.

4) More than 500 Marines who required study of courses in math, physics, and engineering drawing.

5) Less than half of the names of the men assigned to Dartmouth’s program. In addition, most of the transcripts received from men were incomplete or inaccurate.

6) News that the concentration of minimum military drill and naval routine made it impossible to conduct any classes after 1600 hours.

These unexpected demands caused Dartmouth to scramble not to meet the physical requirements of the program like at Franklin & Marshall, but instead to meet the curricular needs of its new students.
In contrast to Dartmouth, Franklin & Marshall’s curriculum appeared more-equipped to educate the Navy trainees it received. “The Navy V-12 program was a real 100 percent honest-to-goodness college program. The only courses that we had to add to our curriculum were mechanical drawing and navigation,” Distler recalled of his institution’s adaptation to serving as a war college.³⁷⁶ As he explained further to the trustees in his 1944 Annual Report, Franklin & Marshall’s academic routine changed little with the Navy’s arrival. Distler wrote, “The instruction in the classroom and laboratory differs little from that of pre-war days, and indeed the whole college routine, taken by and large, has been disturbed surprisingly little by the new role which the institution has been playing”.³⁷⁷ Still, a distinct division between the Navy and the college arose throughout the course of the program. “The Navy stopped once they entered an academic building. We were in complete charge of the academic programs,” Distler recalled years later.³⁷⁸ “However, once the student stepped out of an academic building, he was under Navy discipline.”

A memo to Dartmouth faculty paints a slightly different portrait of the Navy/College divide than depicted by Distler. Labeled “classroom decorum,” the memo explained to faculty members what they should expect from the Navy trainees within their classrooms. The memo began:

Instructors shall at all times exact a proper military bearing and manner from the trainees in their classes and report through the proper channels all deviations from such conduct. Particular attention shall be paid to the manner in which the sections enter and leave their rooms, the formalities of rising and taking seats at their direction, and the attitude and posture of the trainees whether seated or standing.³⁷⁹

It continued:
Promptly at the end of recitation or laboratory period, the instructors shall dismiss the section by giving the order to the section leaders, ‘Take charge of your section sir,’ who shall then command, ‘Rise, March out.’

Thus, although Dartmouth faculty maintained sole control of their classrooms according to the Navy’s protocol, military procedure and discipline still spilled into the learning environment.

College faculty banded together to educate this new cadre of students. Distler remembered fondly the sense of camaraderie exhibited by the Franklin & Marshall faculty during the war. “Our faculty was working day and night, literally to get these young men ready because the faculty had a sense of mission about this,” he remembered. “There wasn’t anything that we could ask the faculty to do that they wouldn’t do.” One example of this was the willingness of individual faculty to tutor men in the V-12 program to help keep them up to speed in courses like math and physics. Poor, basic understanding of subjects like mathematics and physics caused a significant number of V-12 students to require some form of remedial education. Faculty from Franklin & Marshall, Dartmouth, and Swarthmore all gladly volunteered to spend extra time on their respective campuses helping students for whom individualized academic attention could mean the difference between academic success and removal from the Navy’s program.

Many faculty members also rose to the occasion by agreeing to help teach courses that were traditionally outside of their academic specialty. At this time it was not uncommon to find a faculty member teaching a course on Diplomatic History even though his area of expertise was in English Literature. One student recounted the flexibility of the Franklin & Marshall faculty in an entry in the 1943 Oriflamme, the College’s yearbook. He wrote:

Instructors in many fields will abandon their favorite studies and go to school all over again, to be re-tooled so that they may learn the mysteries of mathematics, or the
subtleties of physics and chemistry. Such extra work is accepted as a patriotic duty, and is done cheerfully. ‘And gladly wolde he lerne, and gladly teche,’ Chaucer might well say of the modern college instructor.382

Distler complimented the faculty on their actions in his 1945 report to the Board of Trustees. His praise read:

The Board may well be proud of the way in which Franklin and Marshall’s staff of men and women has cooperated, accepting without demur teaching or other duties far in excess of their normal responsibilities, giving up summer vacations, and in other ways demonstrating their loyalty to the College and to the nation which the College is serving.383

In fact, Distler credits the Navy V-12 program with saving the jobs of many Franklin & Marshall faculty. As he explained, “We not only didn’t have to release any of our faculty members, with the exception of those who were reserve officers or those who wanted to enlist and go to war, but we actually took some professors at lend-lease.”384 Distler’s lend-lease program operated in the following way:

For example, we needed more physics professors and we borrowed the head of the physics department at X institution. We agreed to pay X institution his salary, so they would pay him, and we would pay him a nuisance value because he would have to live here five days a week. We took the highest salaried man off their faculty, which ultimately helped one of our sister institutions.385

Franklin & Marshall received help from faculty in a number of disciplines. Professors in math, physics, mechanical engineering, and drawing all temporarily joined the College faculty during the war.

Dartmouth faculty also embraced the educational challenges introduced by the new students the war brought into their classrooms. Long hours teaching unfamiliar courses pushed many faculty to engage in war service in ways they never envisioned before Pearl Harbor. For the V-12 program’s required physics courses, for example, Dartmouth needed an extra thirty
men to teach while the mathematics and engineering drawing courses required an additional sixteen professors each. These three courses alone placed 52 Dartmouth faculty in front of classes they had never taught before the war. But, like the Franklin & Marshall faculty, faculty at Dartmouth viewed such actions as the essence of the compromise that Hopkins stressed to the college community on the day of the cadets’ July arrival.

Enrollment at Franklin & Marshall, Dartmouth, and Swarthmore during the years of World War II included both military and civilian students, and the structure of the V-12 program allowed Navy students to study alongside civilian students often with few problems. Distler described the relationship between the civilian and military students at his institution as “cordial and friendly.” The creation of a training environment that blended military protocol with traditional collegiate life dominated the Navy’s agenda for its V-12 program. Vice Admiral Jacobs explained the rationale behind this agenda:

We are contracting not merely for classroom, dorm, and mess-hall space and for a stipulated amount of instruction, but for the highest teaching skill, the best judgment, and the soundest administration of which the colleges are capable. We desire our students to have the benefits of faculty counseling, of extracurricular activities – in short, the best undergraduate education the colleges can offer.

This programmatic mission meant that V-12 students were not a separate entity within but were actually part of the colleges they attended. Although they marched to meals and practiced military drills on the football field at 0600 hours, they also played in intercollegiate football games on the same fields upon which they drilled. Navy students also participated in other campus extracurricular activities such as the college newspaper or yearbook and, in some cases, “old student landmarks ha[d] been taken over for the benefit of the men soon to be sent to the seven seas.” For example, at Dartmouth College, the traditional, student-run college
newspaper *The Dartmouth* was temporarily replaced by the now cadet-run Navy paper, *The Dartmouth Log*, that conveyed the daily happenings at the war college.

War-time college yearbooks also reflect the infiltration of military life on the college campuses. For the first time – and in many cases the only time – in institutional history men in uniform comprise the majority of the photos on the yearbook’s pages. In addition, photos show a campus where uniformed men ate together in mess halls, marched together to class, or lined in formation in front of the institution’s landmark building. For example, the 1944 Swarthmore College yearbook *The Halcyon* showcases a photograph of Navy cadets marching through the college’s wrought iron entrance under the heading “Swarthmore in a changing world,” and lyrics from Franklin & Marshall’s alma mater provide the caption to a page from the college’s 1943 *Oriflamme* yearbook where photos of Navy cadets are juxtaposed with photos of campus landmarks.

Alumni magazines like the *Franklin and Marshall College Alumnus* and the *Dartmouth Alumni Magazine* further illustrate how the traditional liberal arts college was transformed into a war college. In the Swarthmore magazine *The Garnet Letter*, the commanding officer, the highest ranking Navy officer stationed at Swarthmore, offered his perspective on the happenings at the campus in his regular column “From the Skipper” that appeared alongside Nason’s column in the war-time editions of the magazine. Photos of and vignettes shared by students within the *Dartmouth Alumni Magazine* also helped to portray the changed Dartmouth environment for alumni, revealing a campus where Dartmouth tradition was blended with war-time necessity. For example, contributing undergraduate editor George H. Tilton III described for alumni readers a typical V-12 day at Dartmouth:
At six in the morning the V-12 boys are routed out of bed and within five minutes are stirring up the early morning fog with vigorous calisthenics. Rooms are then swept and picked up, beds made, and everything made ready for inspection. Breakfast comes about seven and the men march to it, as they do every meal. The rest of the morning is devoted to class as always. The afternoon sees classes also...At three-thirty comes an hour or more of drill and exercises and then evening ‘chow’ at five thirty.  

He concludes his description by stressing, “It [the V-12 program] is not easy. The routine makes college nothing like the pleasant four years of a man’s life that it used it be.” Franklin & Marshall Navy V-12 student Clarence C. Newcomer paints a similar picture of a military-invaded liberal arts campus for readers of the magazine *F&M Writing*:

‘All right, bugler, sound off.’ And with that remark the day begins for...trainees. It’s a far cry from the Franklin and Marshall and the college life we used to know. One doesn’t lie in bed any more after a few rounds the night before and decide that if he takes another cut the prof won’t particularly mind….He doesn’t have trouble deciding which pair of slacks, which tie, or which sport coat to wear, either….he doesn’t entertain those thoughts any more. They belong to another era, an ear that passed out of the picture like an old girl friend. Nothing remains but tender memories.

Flipping through the yearbooks of institutions that hosted a Navy V-12 program makes the enrollment benefits of the program undeniable. The overwhelming number of uniformed students contrasted with the “plain” students reveals institutions whose enrollments depended heavily upon these military men. At the beginning of the V-12 program at Franklin & Marshall, enrollment numbers averaged around 708 students, with 552 (78 percent) military students and only 156 (22 percent) civilian students. Enrollment numbers remained consistent throughout the duration of the V-12 program as approximately 70-80 percent of the students enrolled at Franklin & Marshall from July 1943 to February 1945 came as part of the V-12 program.
Dartmouth College opened its fall 1943 academic session with only 361 civilian students, the institution’s lowest enrollment since 1894, yet the arrival of the V-12 cadets in the summer of 1943 helped boost enrollment to over 2,300 students. Civilian student enrollment continued to decline throughout the subsequent terms, with only 240 and 225 civilian students enrolled for the Winter 1944 and Spring 1945 terms respectively. These enrollment deficits were ameliorated, however, by the V-12 student enrollment that averaged 1,100 cadets for the duration of the program’s existence on the campus. In the spring 1945 term, for instance, Dartmouth’s enrollment was comprised of 225 (20 percent) civilian students and 900 (80 percent) military students. Thus, at both Franklin & Marshall and Dartmouth, cadets from the Navy V-12 program sustained institutional enrollment during the latter years of the war.

**Quaker Ideals Meet War-Time Demands**

In July 1943, Earlham became one of the six colleges approved by the military to host a Civilian Public Service camp. Just days later, seventeen men arrived on the Earlham campus to begin their training for overseas duty. These men were to be the first of 260 men allocated to Earlham’s Reserve Force unit. Reinforcements never arrived at the campus, however. By mid-August 1943 the CPS Reserve Force had been eliminated. Riders attached to Congress’s War Appropriations Bill passed in August of 1943 aimed to abolish the Reserve Force. The two riders “prohibited the use of any money appropriated therein for the purpose of paying any expenses connected with the training at any college of conscientious objectors for overseas relief service” and also “prohibited any funds under the bill from being used for any expenses of overseas relief units made up of objectors to war or for the compensation of any military or civilian personnel performing any service connected with such training or service.”

Dennis and the Earlham
administration initially could not believe that the program had ended before it had barely begun.

Dennis announced to the community after learning of the riders:

It is earnestly believed that such a unit for preparation of conscientious objectors for relief and reconstruction work is absolutely consistent with the theory of the Selective Service Act and in accordance with sound public policy which requires the best use of all the manpower of the nation. It is not believed that the death sentence hastily imposed in the dying hours before the recess of Congress will be allowed to stand as the sober judgment of our national legislature.\(^\text{395}\)

Yet, with Congress’s passage of the much-needed Appropriations Bill, the CPS Reserve Force was eliminated and colleges like Earlham and Swarthmore were again left to search for ways to bring much needed income to campus.

**Beneficent Quakers**

The dream of a CPS program at Earlham had vanished, but earlier decisions made by Dennis proved to be life-saving for an institution rebounding from the blow Congress delivered. In his 1943 Free Will Fund Letter, Dennis described to alumni and friends of Earlham the dire situation the college faced. “Earlham College needs your help now more than ever before since I have been President of the College,” Dennis began. He continued by outlining the institution’s decreasing enrollment levels and the subsequent decision he and the Board made not to use the militarization of the Earlham campus as a means for overcoming these enrollment losses. As Dennis explained further to readers:

The reason for this [need] is plain. The war has taken some 40 percent of our students. This is the common lot of the American college, but many colleges have in part replaced the loss of student revenue by obtaining a military unit for instruction under the Army and Navy specialized training program. At Earlham we could not see our way to do this. It seemed to us inconsistent with our conception of our duty of a Quaker college in war time which is that the college *as such* should abstain from participation in the widest freedom for its students
and faculty to participate or refrain in accordance with the dictates of conscience.\textsuperscript{396}

He then concluded his solicitation letter by imploring, “Will not you, the alumni and friends of the college, do your part and enable us to carry aloft the torch of liberal Christian learning in a war-torn world?”\textsuperscript{397}

The college’s friends and alumni body answered Dennis’ pleas with unprecedented generosity. By July 1944, the 1943 Free Will Fund campaign had raised $10,462 ($126,000).\textsuperscript{398} This amount was three times as great as any amount generated by previous financial campaigns.\textsuperscript{399} The reasons for this extraordinary giving are two-fold. First, the plight of the college during this war period was undeniable. Countless articles in the college’s alumni magazine, \textit{The Earlhamite}, described how decreasing enrollment levels and declining tuition revenue plagued the institution. Friends and alumni were very aware of Earlham’s dire situation. However, more importantly, Dennis’ letter revealed to readers that the college would not sacrifice its Quaker principles to compensate for these losses. It was this declaration that had the greatest impact on alumni and friends.

A number of letters mailed to Dennis in the days, weeks, and months after his Free Will Fund appeal reveal the extent to which alumni were supportive of the position Dennis advanced. And, this support translated into financial support for the college. “I was so grateful that Earlham College had remained true to Quaker principles in not taking a military unit onto the campus, that it was my intention as soon as possible to respond with a contribution to the Free Will Fund,” Eleanor Wildman Lippincott wrote to Dennis.\textsuperscript{400} Enclosed with Lippincott’s letter was a check for $10.00. Similar letters flooded the Office of the President. Elizabeth Freeman extolled, “I am so proud of Earlham for the stand she has taken. It was a difficult situation to face but done
in true Quaker fashion. Earlham’s friends can do no less than meet your estimate of the need,” and Freeman herself helped to eliminate this need with a $25.00 gift to the fund.\textsuperscript{401} Dennis’ and the Board’s stand against militarization even encouraged participation from individuals who had previously never donated money to the college. “Merritt Webster and I are firmly back of Earlham College’s decision not to ask for a military unit. We are glad you are holding to Friends’ principles in this difficult time,” Margaret Weldman Webster began in her September 1943 letter to Dennis. She continued, “I don’t believe I have really contributed to the Free Will Fund before. If other sliders rally now Earlham will weather the storm.” Webster then closed her letter with “Congratulations on your stand” and included a $10.00 donation for the Fund.\textsuperscript{402}

Countless other letters illustrate how Dennis and the Board’s decision translated into a surprising level of generosity from friends and alumni of the College. As the January 1944 edition of \textit{The Earlhamite} clarified for readers, their $10,000 ($121,000) collective gift to the institution was the equivalent of approximately $350,000 of endowment monies. In turn, the money raised by Dennis’ appeal helped to sustain the institution in the aftermath of the elimination of the CPS Reserve Force.

\textbf{Fighting Quakers}

In the months before and after Pearl Harbor, Swarthmore President Nason – like Dennis – emphasized that the militarization of college campuses conflicted with his institution’s Quaker-based mission. In a letter written to U.S. Army Colonel W. Carter in September 1940, Nason explained his position on the hypothetical militarization of Swarthmore:

\begin{quote}
Swarthmore College will cooperate with the government in every way which is consistent with the Quaker principles by which it operates. You will appreciate, however, that it would be inconsistent with the general philosophy of the Religious Society of Friends to develop on our campus military or semi-military organizations or units.\textsuperscript{403}
\end{quote}
Nason makes this point a second time in a letter to Quaker friend Thomas Jones of Fisk University. He again stresses, “I write to you about our concern here at Swarthmore to maintain an educational policy consistent with the pacifist principles of the Religious Society of Friends….I am very eager to keep all actual military or training activity off the campus.”

Nason recognized that the militarization of Swarthmore may be a necessary move, however. Before the war he wrote to fellow Quaker president William Mendenhall at Whittier College, “We shall undoubtedly feel, as Quaker colleges, considerable pressure to perform actions or to lend our facilities for purposes which we consider inconsistent with our spiritual heritage.” Two years later in a 1942 letter to a local alumnus, Howard W. Elkerton, Nason again emphasized that the militarization of Swarthmore may be unavoidable due to the challenges the war continued to provide to his institution. “While not a pacifist myself, I have such respect for those who are and for the Quaker tradition of the college that I should prefer to see Swarthmore follow a course which would embody the highest ideals of the Society of Friends,” he began. Yet Nason concludes by saying, “I am just not sure that such a course will be possible.”

The 1943 failed attempt to create the Civilian Public Service Reserve Force pushed Nason to abandon the non-militarization position he advanced earlier. On July 1, 1943 Swarthmore College, like Franklin & Marshall and Dartmouth, welcomed 467 Navy V-12 training cadets to its campus. These cadets helped to boost enrollment to over 800 students for the next three academic years.

Despite the college’s Quaker affiliation, the Swarthmore V-12 program mirrored the programs hosted at other liberal arts colleges. Still, the Swarthmore program had one unique
distinction. At the end of October 1943, 49 Chinese Naval officers arrived at Swarthmore as part of a lend-lease agreement established between China and the U.S. government. The Navy paid Swarthmore to instruct the officers in English and to help the men learn American ways. To achieve these aims, the Navy instructed Swarthmore administration and faculty to treat the officers no differently than the V-12 students on its campus. Thus, the Chinese officers shared meals in the same mess hall, bunked in the same dormitories, and practiced the same morning military drills as the V-12 cadets. The only programmatic difference between the two groups of Naval students came in the type of academic instruction they received; the Chinese students received intense instruction in English in addition to the V-12 engineering and mathematics classes they attended.

In June 1944, the Chinese officers left Swarthmore after eight months of instruction at the college. The experience had been a positive one for both parties. Describing the officers’ departure to a friend in New York, Nason wrote, “We shall see them go with very deep regret, and I think that they, too, will feel a certain sadness at the parting.” The relationship built between Swarthmore and the Chinese officers extended beyond the campus. In a telegram to the Office of War Information, Nason expounded the benefits of the relationship built between China and the United States because of Swarthmore’s efforts. He maintained:

Together we [China and the United States] shall win the fight against aggression and tyranny. Together we can build a better world of peace and understanding, freedom and cooperation. This better world is already symbolized in the group of Chinese Naval officers who...have been students at Swarthmore College, preparing themselves to serve their country and the world and creating on this campus a bond of friendship which demonstrates what mutual liking and mutual respect can accomplish. We wish them, as we wish their country, a happy future in a free and peaceful world.\(^ {408}\)

The Chinese naval officers had made a lasting impact on the Swarthmore college community.\(^ {409}\)
Following the summer departure of the Chinese officers, Swarthmore continued in its Quaker-inspired efforts to work to rebuild a world torn apart by war. To achieve this goal, the college again opened its campus up to foreign students. This time, however, the college hosted officers and enlisted personnel of the proposed United Nations (former League of Nations) for weekend courses in the “American way” that aimed to correct any existing misinformation about the United States. The students lived in dormitories and attended lectures specifically designed for them that covered topics in American history and American politics. In addition, students were invited to spend time at the homes of Swarthmore faculty where they would engage in informal discussions about American society and American home life.

The first weekend course was held in November 1944, and 25 students from Great Britain, Greece, Australia, and Poland participated in the program. A March 1945 newspaper article aptly summed up the purpose of the weekend course. “…If any 30-day tourists from afar go back with odd ideas about America, it won’t be the fault of Swarthmore. They have the chance to learn, and many are eagerly taking it,” the author extolled. Deemed an immediate success, additional U.N. weekends were held at Swarthmore in January and March of 1945.

Enrollment “Management” and Student Access

The war introduced the opportunity for many institutions to re-consider or re-visit their admissions standards. For Swarthmore, hosting the Navy V-12 program allowed the college to tap into its Quaker roots and welcome a unique group of Chinese students to its campus and classrooms. Declining male civilian enrollment and the subsequent need to boost enrollment caused colleges like Franklin & Marshall also to re-evaluate their historic policies on the admission of students previously excluded from institutions. Still other institutions like Earlham
College welcomed new students to their campuses simply because the war provided an opportunity to do so.

Women Students

The Franklin & Marshall administration first explored the possibility of changing the institution’s historic all-male student mission in the initial years of the war, yet campus-wide concerns about the inclusion of women students quickly ended the discussion. As the war drew to a close, the topic re-emerged. Distler re-introduced the idea of extending admission opportunities to women as he and the Board began discussing long-range plans for the institution in the fall of 1944. This time the initiative was not so easily dismissed.

Distler and the Franklin & Marshall Board of Trustees implemented a three-pronged strategy for gauging internal and external sentiment on the issue of co-education. First, the college mailed questionnaires to 21 liberal arts institutions to “give full and comprehensive study to the possibility of complete co-education.” The questionnaire inquired about the institution’s admissions policies and the effect of co-education on the campus (if co-education existed). Questions like “Has your college been co-education since its founding? If changed, please comment on the success or the desirability of the change” provided the Franklin & Marshall board with an opportunity to learn about other institutions’ experiences during their transition from a single-sex to a co-educational institution. Other questions like “Do women participate in the student government? In athletics?” and “Is it the judgment of the Faculty that the achievement in scholarship of women students is superior, equal, or inferior to that of the men students” allowed Franklin & Marshall to measure further the social and academic impacts that women students made at a traditionally all-male institution.
While Distler and the Board awaited responses from the questionnaires they mailed, the Faculty Committee on Post-War Planning discussed the pros and cons of co-education for the college. The committee entertained three options as they related to Franklin & Marshall’s student population. These options were: 1) no co-education in any form; 2) limited co-education that granted local girls access to the college for evening courses; or 3) complete co-education. At the October 1944 faculty meeting, the Committee recommended to faculty the adoption of a policy of limited co-education. In a faculty meeting held two months later – on December 11, 1944 – the faculty body voted to send to the Board a recommendation for the implementation of a policy of limited co-education.

Distler also sought the views of current and former students during the discussion of the possibility of co-education. First, in his December 1944 newsletter to students, Distler questioned students about their attitudes toward co-education. “Don’t get excited about this topic,” Distler began his letter. He then asked students to vote on whether they would prefer no co-education, limited co-education, or complete co-education. Only twenty-two percent of the 1,500 students who received a survey responded to Distler’s inquiry, but 60 percent voted in favor of complete co-education. (Twenty-three percent voted in favor of remaining single-sex, and 17 percent voted in favor of limited co-education).

Simultaneously, Alumni Chair, Nevin Harner, solicited feedback from the college’s alumni body on the topic. In a January 10, 1945 mailing, Eardman wrote to his fellow alumni, “Your attitude on this question [co-education] will be most helpful in considering it, not as a temporary expedient, but as a long-range plan for the College.” Alumni were then presented with the same three options as considered by current students and the faculty Planning Committee. On May 21, 1945, Harner presented the results of the alumni survey on co-education.
to the board, the faculty, and to Distler. Three hundred and six alumni ranging from the class of 1885 to the class of 1943 responded to the survey, and 41 percent voted in favor of complete co-education. (Thirty-two percent of alumni voted in favor of remaining single-sex whereas 27 percent voted for limited co-education.)

Consequently, a plurality of both the college’s alumni and its current students, as indicated by the survey results, were in favor of co-education. Writing to prominent faculty member Joseph Appel, one alumnus articulated why he voted in favor of co-education. “I fear that the F&M situation is very grave, and that it will grow worse unless measures are taken to meet the new conditions which confront colleges,” the alumnus began. “One of the prevalent delusions is that now the war being over, we will go back to our former habits of life. We will never be the same as we were before this experience, however. The future of Franklin & Marshall will depend upon its being able to stand upon its own feet and having the foresight to adapt itself to the changed educational conditions,” he concluded.417 The voice of influential alumni like Reverend Lee M. Erdman, chair of the Board’s Committee on Instruction, carried greater influence in the debate, however. In a January 1945 letter to Distler, Erdman voiced his concerns about the enrollment decision the college was entertaining:

I have the feeling that the apparent balance in favor of co-education has been weighted by the factor of the financial consideration. It appears to me, as I am sure it will to you, that it would be less than honest to consider co-education purely as an emergency measure….I have tried to weigh the possibilities pro and con in as unbiased fashion as I could. And while I still feel that I should maintain a neutral position, I must admit in all honesty that I lean more and more toward the preservation of the under-graduate day division of the College as a Men’s Institution.418

Such concerns combined with the costs associated with adapting the physical resources of the all-male institution for a combined male/female student population raised doubts within the
Board about the feasibility of co-education. Finally, when the Board learned in the fall of 1945 that most of the prestigious institutions of the northeast would remain single-sex institutions following the war, tradition trumped change, and the issue of co-education was tabled for future discussion. The issue would not be raised again for twenty years and Franklin & Marshall would remain an all-male institution until 1969.

**Black Students**

While Franklin & Marshall tackled the question of coeducation, the Swarthmore community engaged in its own debate over the college’s racially-exclusionary enrollment policies. The first hints of interest in the possible admission of Black students at Swarthmore emerged during the 1940-1941 academic year. At this time, the college’s students asked the Swarthmore administration to consider allowing the admission of Blacks into their college. They turned to President Nason for help in their pursuit, but just months into his presidency, Nason was not, in his own words, willing to “pick a fight until he thought he could win it.” The students then withdrew their efforts, and the issue disappeared from campus discussions.

At the same time as this initial conversation about Black students surfaced on the Swarthmore campus, the Friends Council on Education was in the middle of a national review of enrollment of Black students within higher education. The Council’s 1941 *Study of the Admission of Negro Students to Private Schools and Colleges in the Middle Atlantic and New England States*, sent to 875 institutions, inquired about both institutional admission rates of Black students and the reasons institutions cited for not admitting Black students. The survey found that the reasons for the denial of admission most frequently offered by institutions included: 1) the admission of Black students was forbidden by the institution’s charter; 2) the presence of Black students would not be tolerated by White parents and students, thus causing
White students to withdraw from the institution; and 3) Black students could not adjust themselves to the life and demands of the specific institution.\textsuperscript{421} Despite the exclusionary rationales provided by institutions, the survey revealed that Black students could, in theory, attend 94 percent of the 494 institutions that responded to the Council’s inquiry. Of these institutions, however, only one Friends school considered Black applicants. This lone institution was Earlham College.

Earlham College began admitting Black students in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the first being Osborn Taylor who entered the college in 1880. Black students continued to enter and graduate from the college throughout the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, but their presence on campus remains largely undocumented. As institutional historian Thomas Hamm writes about these students, “We know nothing about their experiences, only their occasional appearances in campus photographs.”\textsuperscript{422} Community attitudes toward the enrollment of these students were largely indifferent. The large Quaker population that surrounded the institution maintained a position of open-mindedness and acceptance reminiscent of the abolitionist position advocated by earlier Quakers before and during the Civil War. Surprisingly, even the strong Ku Klux Klan membership within Indiana gave little resistance to the admission of Black students at Earlham College.

Life on campus was not easy for the Black students attending Earlham, however. By the mid-1920s, student accounts reveal an institution tolerant of but not completely open to the Black students it enrolled. The experience of Clarence Cunningham, the first Black graduate of Earlham in 1924, reflects this environment. Cunningham lived in the dormitory with the other White students, but he always had to room alone, and he was denied permission for involvement in certain extra-curricular activities like the Glee Club and the student drama club Mask and Mantle. Despite these indignities, Cunningham still described Earlham as “a pleasant place.”\textsuperscript{423}
By the time of Dennis’ arrival as president, Black students were a common sight on the Earlham campus. Dennis’ racial policy, described by Hamm as “a middle of the road policy, neither radical nor reactionary nor liberal,” greatly influenced the campus environment as it related to Black students. The admission of Black students continued, but informal policies established by Dennis regulated the activities of the Black students, in turn casting a haze over their experiences. Dormitories and dining room tables were segregated, and participation in certain extra-curricular activities remained limited. Of these institutional policies, Dennis was most adamant about maintaining the college’s position against interracial dating.

Dennis’ policy on interracial dating was not challenged until the middle of the war. By 1943 Earlham had both Nisei and Black students studying alongside its majority White student population, and with the war came a newfound interest in racial equality and social justice amongst the students at Earlham. Sentiments on segregation and racial discrimination trumpeted by national groups like the YWCA and the Peace Fellowship found their way to the Richmond campus where Earlham students advanced their own mission of racial equality. Thomas Hamm writes that the students at Earlham wanted their college to “‘take a definitive Christian stand on racial equality comparable in courage and vigor to that already taken…on a military unit and the admission of Nisei students’. ” Whether an extension of these ideas on racial equality or simply a symbol of the changing times, a series of interracial dating “scandals” then emerged at the college.

One such interracial incident involved James Turner, a black political science student, who asked a white girl to go with him to the college’s annual Ionian dance. When Dennis learned of Turner’s advances, he quickly put an end to Turner’s interest in attending the dance. This action upset Earlham students and spurred demands on campus for racial equality. Another
occasion for presidential intervention in student relations arose with the alleged “dating” of Ruthanna Farlow and Nisei student Edward Uyesugi. Tempers on and off campus flared as news of the relationship spread. One local college trustee called Farlow and Uyesugi “misguided students” in a letter she wrote to Dennis after she learned of the relationship. She continued by writing, “I have no patience with them, they need to be jolted out of their smugness and concept in thinking they are so absolutely right that they can take matters into their own hands.”

Led by fears over miscegenation, such responses from the community and governing members of the institution resulted in a tightening of Earlham’s policies toward its minority students just as student voices clamored for greater acceptance.

Despite the outrage caused by the allegations of interracial dating that surfaced at Earlham during the war, the college’s lengthy experience with the admission of Black students provided sound evidence to other institutions that the integration of these students could be achieved with few, if any, problems. A 1945 letter sent to Dennis by Fred G. Wale, an official with the Julius Rosenwald Fund – a foundation with a focus on black education, complimented Dennis and Earlham on their integration efforts. Earlham is “a pioneer in the matter of affording equal opportunity to men and women of all races and colors just as far as that is in any wise practicable in the world in which we are living,” Wale applauded. Reluctance to change persisted throughout higher education, yet Earlham’s positive experience as a “pioneer” of integration spurred students at Swarthmore to continue in the tradition set by its fellow Quaker institution. In the spring of 1943, student interest in integrating the Swarthmore campus returned. This time Nason did not balk at his students’ initiative, instead joining them in their efforts to bring change to the college.
The students began their integration attempts by forming a Student Committee on Race Relations. The Committee’s first actions entailed writing to high schools throughout the nation to inquire about the names of “qualified Negro girls” whom they could encourage to apply and then attend Swarthmore. As one line of their letter read, “Although no Negro students have been enrolled up to this time, we have been assured that good applicants will now be fully considered.”

This action by the students greatly angered a few members of the college’s Board of Trustees, however. A letter from board member Howard Cooper Johnson to President Nason emphasizes the discontent some members felt over the students’ solicitation of Black students for application to Swarthmore. He declared in anger:

The members of the Board who have spoken to me had no idea that the passage of the Resolution permitting the administration to accept Negro students meant that the administration would go out and hunt students to come in. It is one thing to admit a thoroughly qualified Negro who demands admission and another thing to go out and dig them out of the ground.

Johnson then concluded by reiterating his disgust over both the students’ action and the actual admission of Black students to Swarthmore:

I voted against the whole thing, am still as completely and unalterably opposed as I ever was…a number of the members of the Board would have joined me in voting against it [the Resolution] if they had known it was the scheme of the administration to go out and beg for Negro students.

Johnson’s irritation, however justified or not, was aimed at rather paltry results given the size of the Swarthmore student body. By January 1944, Swarthmore College had admitted just two Black students. Still, these two Black women attended the institution with, according to Nason, “no serious social or other problems.”

The success of the enrollment of these two women - although causing anger amongst some of the board - encouraged Swarthmore students to continue with their recruitment activities. In addition, the Swarthmore Student Assembly
established in the winter of 1944 the Negro Scholarship Fund as a way to use the organization’s dues to assist incoming Black students. In a letter to Swarthmore faculty, the Assembly explained the purpose of the fund it established further. It read, “The purpose of the Negro Scholarship Fund is to make an education at this college available to students who might not consider Swarthmore for financial reasons,” and “will enable the student body to represent a greater variety of cultural and racial groups.” In just three months, by March 29, 1944, the Assembly had raised $1,232 for the Scholarship Fund.

The college’s policy on admission had thus by 1944 become one of open inclusion. As Nason explained in a letter to fellow Quaker president Thomas Jones:

> It is the policy of Swarthmore College to accept students without discrimination as to race or color upon the bases of their ability to profit by residence here and to survive serious competition for place….We welcome foreign students from all over the world and we think that our student body should represent not only all income classes in this country but all groups of people within our citizenry.

Not all institutions agreed with the policy advanced by Swarthmore. In fact, the end of the war and the impending return of veterans would cause institutions like Dartmouth College to re-evaluate their admission policies. Unlike Swarthmore, however, Dartmouth and Hopkins would decide to limit rather than open access to the institution.

**The War Ends**

Japan’s August 1945 surrender brought an end to the nation’s four long years of sacrifice, toil, ingenuity, and camaraderie. College communities throughout higher education observed the end of the war with V-J Day celebrations that brought the campus together for a time of celebration and reflection. Many college and university presidents took these celebrations as opportunities to lead their students in a time of thoughtful discussion about the meaning of the
war and its long-term implications. Speaking before Earlham students in the College’s V-J chapel ceremony, Dennis exclaimed:

There are two thoughts which should take precedence over all others, two great commandments for this day – gratitude ‘to God who giveth us this victory,’ and gratitude to the men and women living and dead who in the field and the factory, in civil as well as military life, in the camp of the conscientious objector as well as in the armed forces, have lived and died for their country in accordance with the dictates of their consciences….The men and women of America have laid on the altar of their country more than a million casualties, more than a quarter of a million dead, three hundred billions of treasure which means the labor of countless men and women for almost innumerable years. This courage and this sacrifice go far to atone even for the faults of mankind.434

Discontinuation of the V-12 Program

The armistices with Europe and Japan signaled the beginning of a return to normal, peacetime operations for colleges and universities throughout higher education. On campuses like Dartmouth, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore, this return began with the removal of V-12 soldiers. The end of the Navy’s V-12 program was as abrupt as its beginning.

According to the U.S. Naval Administration in World War II, Bureau of Personnel Training Activity, Volume IV, by 1945 the Navy V-12 College Program educated and trained “more than 50,000 officer candidates.”435 As a result, even with the war continuing in the Pacific, the Bureau of Navy Personnel had determined that it had successfully trained the numbers of officers that it had needed for this period of crisis. The Bureau then began to change the V-12 program into what would become the post-war Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) program.436 The Navy first introduced a point system that would eventually provide for the orderly discharge of the older - longer enlisted - men following completion of the war. Provisions were also made so that V-12 students with five or less terms of study in the important fields of engineering, physics, and meteorology would be able to stay in the program until their
graduation. Each man was offered a choice, however; he could choose to remain with the program to finish his education or he could return to civilian life. For reasons unknown, most men chose not to finish their degrees.

The discontinuation of the V-12 program in the fall of 1945 almost completely erased military students from many campuses. Some V-12 students who had not completed their studies by the time of the program’s termination, however, chose to remain on campus as “civilian” students to finish their degree. Franklin & Marshall, for example, decided to make special financial arrangements to allow its remaining V-12 students to complete their degrees. College enrollment statistics from 1946 show that 21 former V-12 students required financial assistance to remain at the College because they were not entitled to the benefits provided by the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (GI Bill). The College then arranged for these students to receive scholarships ranging from $75 ($905) to $125 ($1,500) per semester until their graduation in the fall of 1946. The legacy of the V-12 program thus ran well beyond its termination on October 29, 1945.

Benefits of the V-12 Program

Franklin & Marshall, Dartmouth, and Swarthmore Colleges did not become rich as a result of the V-12 program; this was never the intention of the program. The V-12 program, however, did help colleges survive the financial hardships associated with the war. As Distler acknowledged years later:

We came out of that Navy experience without a penny of indebtedness, with the fraternities and other buildings in just as good, and in many instances better, shape than they had been when we went in on the program. It was a wonderful, wonderful program.
The financial resources provided by the V-12 program helped many colleges to replace much of the civilian tuition fees lost because of the conflict overseas. Perhaps more importantly, however, V-12 programs helped to preserve facilities and to maintain both faculty, administrative and student institutional loyalty and morale during the course of the war. On campuses throughout the nation, participation in the V-12 program provided students, faculty, and administration with an opportunity to personally aid in the war effort. An editorial in the November 2, 1945 *Lancaster Intelligencer Journal* aptly summed up Franklin & Marshall’s experience during the war with the following:

Franklin and Marshall College shared the vicissitudes of all the nation’s liberal arts colleges. It is doubtful whether any of the nation’s small colleges can offer a finer record of contribution to the war effort. 1518 students in uniform were enrolled since July 1, 1943 in the Navy V-12 unit. 2, 219 industrial employees of war plants were enrolled in the tuition-free war-effort courses offered in cooperation with the United States Department of Education. When all of this is added the fact that Franklin and Marshall kept up throughout the war its full curriculum for civilian students, the college’s wartime record is indeed outstanding. When the detailed history of World War II is written, one notable chapter will be that dealing with the contribution of the nation’s colleges and universities. And among them all, no one will shine with brighter glory than the name of Franklin and Marshall.439

This editorial also suggests an additional benefit of the V-12 program. At many of the participating institutions, college/community relationships were strengthened because of the demands of the V-12 program. The education and accommodation of the Navy cadets often entailed combined efforts from the two entities, and thus the Navy’s presence on campus had significant consequences for both the college and the surrounding community. At Dartmouth, for example, a 1944 yearbook photograph shows a group of V-12 cadets enjoying a Sunday afternoon in the adjacent town of Hanover. The Navy therefore did not just invade college
campuses; college campuses and towns alike were forced to adjust to the demands of the Navy’s V-12 program, and this condition helped to foster cooperation between the two. And, with the arrival of GIs back to college campuses following the end of the war, the foundations of these college/community relationships established by the presence of the V-12 program would become even more imperative in later years.

The Navy V-12 program had an even larger impact on higher education through its admission of a broad spectrum of students. Its acceptance of men and boys from throughout the nation and from varying economic backgrounds helped to introduce higher education to students for whom college had never been of interest or an option. For many men, the war and participation in the Navy V-12 program provided them with a once-impossible opportunity to pursue a college degree. In addition, the military’s decision to join forces with higher education during the war through programs like the Navy V-12 sent an important message to the nation. Despite its languid start, collaboration between the two entities showed the nation that a college education was viewed to be an important tool for national purposes. This message was emphasized further with Congress’s 1944 passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill), and its effects would soon be felt throughout higher education.

**The GI Bill**

Memories of the federal government’s treatment of veterans following World War I lingered in the minds of many Americans as World War II came to a close. In June 1932, thousands of World War I veterans marched on Washington to demand from the government compensation for their military service. The “Bonus Army,” as they were quickly labeled, camped in Washington for eleven days until federal troops forcibly removed the veterans from the Capitol. World War I veterans never received the benefits and compensation they sought
from Congress. Legislators and national organizations aimed to correct this injustice by working in the latter years of World War II to ensure that the veterans returning from this world war would not be neglected as the other veterans had been. This goal combined with fears over the consequences of the reintegration of approximately 15 million veterans into American society led Roosevelt to call for national planning for the return of veterans. In a July 28, 1943 fireside chat delivered to the American public, Roosevelt declared:

> We must plan now...‘for the return to civilian life of our gallant men and women in the armed service’ who ‘must not be demobilized into an environment of inflation and unemployment, to a place on the breadline or on a corner selling apples.”

The sacrifices made by these men and women on behalf of their nation, Roosevelt concluded, should not be ignored. He thus promised the American public that Congress would enact laws that would provide mustering-out pay, educational assistance, and other benefits to veterans upon their return from combat.

Roosevelt had initiated the first stages of his plan in the summer of 1942 by forming two committees charged with the task of identifying ways in which the federal government could provide post-war benefits to returning World War II servicemen. According to Roosevelt’s mandate, the Conference on Post-War Readjustments of Civilian and Military Personnel (PMC) and the Armed Forces Committee on Postwar Educational Opportunities for Service Personnel (commonly referred to as the Osborn Committee for chairman, Brigadier General Frederick H. Osborn) each worked to develop proposed legislation that would help avoid massive national unemployment by providing educational opportunities to veterans. In the end, the committees, although charged with the same task, developed two very different proposals to present to Roosevelt for his consideration. PMC proposed that educational benefits for veterans be
dependent upon the results of competitive, academically-based exams, thus restricting access to higher education to a small number of veterans. On the other hand, the Osborn Committee recommended a plan that would provide one year of education to all veterans who had served for at least six months and additional years of education to a limited number of “exceptionally able ex-service personnel” who demonstrated “unusual promise and ability.” Of the two documents presented to him, Roosevelt preferred the provisions outlined within the Osborn Committee’s plan, and thus he lent his support to send the Osborn proposal to Congress for legislative consideration.

At the same time that the PMC and Osborn Committee developed proposals for veterans’ benefits, a committee of the American Legion – a veterans’ organization created in 1919 after World War I - worked with the same aim. By the mid-1940s, the American Legion had approximately three million members nationwide. This large membership combined with the memories of the impetus for the Bonus Army’s march provided motivation for the Legion to have a voice in the conversation over the emerging veterans’ benefits legislation. In December 1943, a committee appointed by Legion national commander Warren Atherton began to draft legislation for the demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of returning veterans. The committee, led by former Legion national commander and World War I veteran Harry Colmery, used the recommendations within the Osborn Committee’s legislation as the foundation for their own benefits plan. The resulting legislation included proposals for: 1) mustering pay of up to $500 ($6,000) per man, depending on length of service; 2) government backed loans for veterans who wanted to purchase homes, farms, or businesses; 3) unemployment benefits for up to $25 ($302) per week for a maximum of 52 weeks; and 4) four years of educational funding, also contingent upon length of service, to any veteran whose education was interrupted by
his/her military service. On January 8, 1944, the Legion released the committee’s now titled “GI Bill of Rights”\textsuperscript{444} to the public.

Later that same month, Senator Joel Bennett Clark of Mississippi introduced the Legion’s proposal to Congress. Legion committee member Colmery then spoke to Congress on behalf of his committee. Focusing on the social rights the legislation would provide to veterans, Colmery began, “We recognized that the burden of war falls upon the citizen soldier, who has gone forth, overnight, to become the answer and hope of humanity; we seek to preserve his rights, to see that he gets a square deal.” He continued:

…This educational provision has a much deeper significance. The nation needs the trained mind and body attuned again to the peaceful pursuits of American life, because, trained in the art of destruction of both property and life in every known personal and mechanical method, the nation then will owe an obligation to them. It has to take them back sympathetically away from the horrors and stark reality of war and give them every opportunity to again become disciplined forces for peaceful progress through educational opportunity in its every aspect.\textsuperscript{445}

A legislative battle to get the proposed bill passed then ensued.

To garner national support for the legislation, the American Legion launched a six-month national publicity campaign for the legislation. Newspaper tycoon William Randolph Hearst lent three of his top reporters to cover the Legion’s legislation, and word of the proposal quickly spread throughout the nation. The Legion’s publicity efforts proved successful. Congressman John Gibson of Georgia cast the final vote needed for the legislation’s passage in the House of Representatives, and on June 22, 1944 Roosevelt signed the Legion’s GI Bill into law.\textsuperscript{446}

The Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944 provided for access to postsecondary education to:

Any person who served in the active military or naval service on or after September 16, 1940, and prior to the termination of the present war, and who
shall have been discharged or released there-from under conditions other than dishonorable, and whose education or training was impeded, delayed, interrupted, or interfered with by reason of his entrance into the service, or who desires a refresher or retraining course, and who either shall have served ninety days or more, exclusive of any period he was assigned for a course of education or training under the Army specialized training program or the Navy college training program, which course was a continuation of his civilian course and was pursued to completion, or as a cadet or midshipman at one of the service academies, or shall have been discharged or released from active service by reason of an actual service-incurred injury or disability, shall be eligible for and entitled to receive education or training….Such person shall be eligible for and entitled to such course of education or training as he may elect, and at any approved educational or training institution at which he chooses to enroll, whether or not located in the State in which he resides, which will accept or retain him as a student or trainee in any field or branch of knowledge which such institution finds him qualified to undertake or pursue.  

Passage of this piece of federal legislation would have profound implications for both returning veterans and higher education. Soon, an estimated one million veterans would flood campuses throughout the nation, leaving institutions to quickly make the transition from operating during a time of scarcity to a time of plenty.

Readjusting to Peacetime Operations

Within days of Pearl Harbor, colleges and universities prepared for war-time operations under the direction of newly-established faculty and administrative committees. Committees on war planning and defense instruction developed the policies and procedures that guided administrators, faculty, and students through the challenges the war provided. Yet, as armistice loomed, the need for such committees was replaced by the need for committees created to lead the institution through its adjustment to peace-time operations.

Institutions faced a multitude of issues as the war came to a close. An estimated 15 million servicemen would soon return to the shores of their home country, and over 70 percent of
these men and women would seek to return to the college and university campuses many of them had left behind. In addition, the newly-passed GI Bill promised to place an even larger percentage of these veterans onto higher education’s doorstep. Campus committees thus began to prepare for the return of servicemen while the war still raged in the Pacific.

In a presidential memorandum sent to a select number of Dartmouth faculty, Hopkins’ outlined his concerns about the institution’s return to peace-time operations. Enrollment management topped his list. Hopkins wrote, “It appears that one of the most perplexing matters with which we will have to deal is the subject of enrollment; namely, who shall be entitled to enrollment in the college and upon what basis the privilege of enrollment shall be extended.” Presidents throughout higher education shared Hopkins’ concern. Different “types” of students would come to seek admission to higher education once peace was realized both at home and abroad. Those individuals applying for college would largely consist of: 1) soldiers who left for the service and wanted to return to campus; 2) students who attended an institution as part of a military training program and wished to remain; 3) men who became of college age during the war and now wished to enter as a member of the freshman class; and 4) men who served during the war and now wanted to use the educational benefits afforded to them by the GI Bill. Institutions, therefore, had to determine how to develop admissions policies to handle the multitudes and variety of applications they would receive.

At Dartmouth, this admissions’ dilemma resulted in the creation of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Enrollment, a subcommittee of the college’s Committee on Educational Policy. A few faculty members along with the Director of Admissions, the Dean of the College, the Registrar, and Hopkins comprised this newly-established committee charged by the Board of Trustees with the task of developing the College’s new post-war admissions policies. Before the
committee began, Hopkins stressed the importance of the task before the committee by referring to Dartmouth’s admissions predicament as a “troublesome matter in which the prestige and repute of the College are involved as well as the maintenance of goodwill toward it of numerous groups.” Admissions decisions that would later emerge from this committee would test the very words of caution inherent in Hopkins’ description of Dartmouth’s enrollment challenges.

Facing their own unique post-war enrollment issues, Swarthmore, Franklin & Marshall, and Earlham would also eventually form special faculty/administrative committees to address the emerging admissions and veteran integration problems that accompanied the return of peace. Managing enrollment and the return of veteran students would quickly become one of the biggest post-war challenges institutions faced. The question of whom to admit would dominate institutional agendas for much of the immediate post-war years.

Educating for Democracy

With the question of who shall be enrolled in higher education also came the question of what should be taught. In his message to Congress on the importance of veterans’ benefits, Roosevelt stated, “We must replenish our supply of persons qualified to discharge the heavy responsibilities of the postwar world. We have taught our youth how to wage war; we must also teach them how to live useful and happy lives in freedom, justice, and democracy.” Roosevelt’s statement about freedom, justice, and democracy struck a chord with educators. His speech to Congress was not just a call for the provision of veterans’ benefits, but also a call to educators to bring the lessons learned on the beaches of Normandy or the assembly plant floors of Michigan into the classroom; freedom, justice, and democracy needed to become parts of higher education. Thus, while campus planners developed admissions and enrollment policies to handle the torrents of returning veterans seeking educational opportunity under the newly-passed
GI Bill, other planners began to scrutinize the objectives of the liberal arts curriculum under which veterans should learn about the democracy that they had just fought to preserve.

A letter sent to the Dartmouth Committee on Educational Policy from “a hitherto silent member of the faculty” presented questions about the goals of post-war education that echoed those asked throughout higher education in the aftermath of the world conflict. In his letter, faculty member Louis Benezet campaigned for change, for amending a curriculum that he viewed as out-dated and ineffective. He began by pointing out the nation’s most recent trials and the few of the lessons learned from them. Benezet asserted:

...If we fill up our time with study of the same subjects, in the main, that we have pursued in the past, why shall we not arrive at the same results? And which of us, looking back over the history of the last forty years, should be satisfied, - with the booms and depressions, the doles...the ghostly mistakes and shortcomings of leaders in business and statesmanship alike, the terrible wars ‘to end war’ which prove futile because the peace-makers have not been taught the lessons of history.451

He then continued by stressing exactly what people wanted to hear in the aftermath of war – how do we stop this from happening again? “There is ‘so little time,’ and there are so many and such important lessons for our young men to learn in four years, if they are to leave to their children a better world than our generation has bequeathed to them. What must be taught them if this result is to be achieved?” Benezet concluded.452

Benezet’s question was being asked throughout all of higher education as the war period came to a close. World War II had raised many questions about the role of education in preventing such future atrocities. The war also introduced the nation and its soldiers to the once-distant international arena, and soldiers would soon return to the classroom with knowledge and experiences that demanded a change from the “old ways” of higher education. Thus, Dartmouth,
like other institutions, developed a special faculty committee – Committee on Academic Adjustments – to begin to examine how the college could adapt its liberal arts curriculum to account for the lessons the war provided and to address the new post-war period in which its students now lived and would ultimately lead.

New Leadership

The end of the war also brought the end of presidencies. Both Hopkins of Dartmouth and Dennis of Earlham announced their resignations as the end of the war became a reality. These two leaders had artfully navigated their institutions through the crises the war provided, and the prospect of peace provided both with the opportunity to allow a new man to lead their respective colleges through the next chapters of their histories.

In the spring of 1944, Hopkins approached the Dartmouth Board of Trustees with his letter of resignation. Escalating health problems combined with a loving wife’s nagging finally convinced Hopkins that the time had come for him to end his 29 years of presidential service. The Trustees accepted Hopkins’ resignation and then began a secret search for Hopkins’ replacement. No committees were formed. Instead, individual trustees and small groups met with candidates over the next year, all without the wider college community’s knowledge.

On August 29, 1945, the Board announced that President Hopkins was retiring and would be replaced by John Sloan Dickey, Dartmouth Class of 1929 and Director of the Office of Public Affairs in the U.S. Department of State. The Trustees’ announcement took the entire college by surprise. No one knew that Hopkins was considering retirement or that a search had already been conducted for his replacement. Dartmouth faculty members were greatly angered by this action, calling it a breach in university governance because they viewed the selection of Hopkins’ replacement as a faculty function. They felt they had been ignored. The decision to appoint
Dickey had been made, however, and the end of the war meant that anger over this action had to be short-lived; there were bigger issues for the college – and its faculty – to undertake.454

The Earlham Board of Trustees received Dennis’ letter of resignation on February 3, 1945. Dennis had served for sixteen years as Earlham’s president, the second longest serving president in the institution’s history, and he felt that the end of war provided the perfect opportunity for his departure. Earlham, in Dennis’ opinion, needed new blood. He offered to remain as president until the summer of 1947 if the end of the war would complicate the Board’s ability to find a suitable replacement. This was far from the case, however. In just six short months, the Board had identified and then extended an invitation for Dennis’ replacement. On August 20, 1945, after a unanimous Board vote, Earlham College alumnus and former Fisk University president Dr. Thomas E. Jones became Earlham’s new president.

The war-time leadership provided by Dennis and Hopkins helped to guide their respective institutions through arguably some of the most difficult challenges the institutions had faced to date. Their departures thus caused a mix of gratitude and anxiety. Both institutions celebrated the lengthy accomplishments of their leaders and the new prospects that each had for their post-presidential lives, but it is unrealistic to think that trepidation over the institutions new leaders did not exist as well. The post-World War II environment would bring its own unique set of challenges to higher education, and Dartmouth and Earlham now had new leaders to guide their institutions.

While the end of the war signaled the end of Dennis and Hopkins’ presidencies, Distler and Nason continued in their positions as peace-time operations returned to higher education. Both men inherited their respective colleges on the eve of World War II, and thus the war’s conclusion introduced the first opportunity each man would have to guide their institution during
a time of peace. War-related challenges remained for Distler and Nason to tackle, yet the promise of returning to normal institutional operations meant that each man would finally be able to implement the vision that he brought to the college, but which was side-lined by the war crisis.

**Endnotes**

354 Figures in parentheses throughout this document indicate monetary amounts adjusted for inflation according to the Consumer Price Index for 2009.
355 Letter from Gerald Swope Jr. to Theodore Distler, August 12, 1943.
356 Instructional costs included direct teaching salaries and indirect costs like departmental expenses, laboratory apparatus, and classroom maintenance.
357 Franklin & Marshall Contract with the Navy, May 27, 1943.
358 Letter from Nason to Victor Butterfield, January 24, 1944.
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid, 75.
362 The Navy V-1 program was an accelerated college program established by the Navy in March 1942. The program allowed college students between the ages of 17 and 19 to enlist in the Naval Reserve, but remain on inactive duty until they completed their sophomore year. At this time, students were then eligible to transfer into either the V-5 (flight training) or V-7 (midshipman training) program. Under the Navy’s V-7 program, college juniors and seniors about to complete their degrees were accepted into the Navy as apprentice seamen. Following graduation from college, these men were then sent to one of the six reserve midshipman schools - Columbia University, Notre Dame, Northwestern, the Naval Academy, Cornell, and Plattsburg - where they would serve a month as apprentice seamen and then become midshipmen. Upon completion of their coursework at the midshipman schools, cadets were given an Ensign’s commission and put on active status.
363 Ibid, 67.
364 Ibid, 59.
365 Ibid, 58.
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid.
372 Letter from Nason to Admiral Fechteler, April 3, 1943.
374 Hopkins in *Dartmouth and the V-12*, 2-3.
375 Memo from Hopkins to Dartmouth College Board of Trustees, July 27, 1943.
377 Franklin & Marshall College Annual Reports, 1944, 2.
379 *Principles of the V-12 Program at Dartmouth College*, p. 6.
380 Ibid.
381 Ibid.
The latter years of the war period at Earlham remain less-well documented than the experiences of Dartmouth, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore during this same period. As such, discussion of Earlham in the final years of the war is seemingly disproportionate when compared to that of the other three institutions. Analysis of secondary sources (i.e., institutional histories) that examine these years shows that the lack of primary sources reflects the lack of any significant institutional developments during this period. From May 1943 to August 1945, Earlham’s survival depended largely upon the financial support it received from its alumni body.
Study of the Admission of Negro Students to Private Schools and Colleges in the Middle Atlantic and New England States, Friends Council on Education, 1941.


Ibid, 152.

Ibid, 175.

Ibid, 175.

Letter from Mrs. E. G. McQuinn to Dennis, Undated.

Letter from Fred G. Wale, Julius Rosenwald Fund, to Dennis, July 9, 1945.

Letter from Swarthmore Student Committee on Race Relations, 1943.

Letter from Howard Cooper Johnson, esq. to Nason, July 23, 1943.

Ibid.

Letter to Thomas Jones from Nason, January 24, 1944.

Negro Scholarship Fund Statement of Purpose, January 1944.

Letter to Thomas Jones from Nason, January 24, 1944.

Dennis, *V-J Day at Earlham*, Undated.


Figures in parentheses throughout this document indicate monetary amounts adjusted for inflation according to the Consumer Price Index for 2009.

The Legion’s veterans’ benefits legislation was originally called the “Omnibus Veteran’s Relief Bill” and “The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944.” Jack Cejnar, Legion chair of national publicity, argued that these names had “all the political sex of a castrated mule,” and thus recommended the legislation be called the “GI Bill of Rights.” This latter name was adopted. For more information see: Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, *The GI Bill: A New Deal for Veterans*, (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2009), 60.


448 Presidential Memorandum to Prof. Meneely, Messer, and Stone from Hopkins, December 30, 1943.
449 Ibid.
451 Letter from Louis P. Benezet to Dartmouth Committee on Educational Policy, undated.
452 Ibid.
453 Existing institutional documents and histories provide no indication as to why this presidential search was conducted in secrecy.
“All the nations, with the memories of a horribly devastating war still fresh, stand at the threshold of the opportunity to fashion a newer, a brighter, a better...a more civilized world.” – Theodore Distler, Franklin & Marshall College

CHAPTER SIX
Peace and Prosperity, May 1945 – June 1950

Even though many institutions’ experiences with the V-12 program had been positive ones, faculty members and administrators delighted at the prospect of having their campus returned to their pre-war states. As the Dean of Faculty at Franklin & Marshall wrote in his 1946 Annual Report:

The faculty felt a sense of relief at the prospect of being able to return to peacetime unaccelerated education. It was a relief to the members of the faculty to know that once again they would be free to devote themselves to their own work in the class room and laboratory.456

The end of World War II brought relief to a nation of peoples exhausted from the trials and tribulations of four years of war. This national sigh of relief that accompanied the armistices in Europe and Japan was echoed throughout higher education. Faculty members and administrators rejoiced in the thought of a return to the normal strains of academic and collegiate life. They had made it; they had survived the war.

The promise of international peace, however, did not erase the challenges caused by the world war. Instead, with peace came a new set of hurdles for both the country and higher education to navigate. Fifteen million returning veterans threatened to sink a national economy robust from the militarization the war demanded. Passage of the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944, however, took steps toward protecting the nation from the recession and massive unemployment that loomed. This same bill, while a savior for the nation and its returning veterans, forced colleges and universities throughout the country to quickly switch their attention
toward preparing their campuses for the impending deluge of students, for a time of prosperity that seemed unimaginable just months earlier.

The war also opened the door for conversations about democracy and liberal education. Two world wars and a depression – all in a span of thirty years – raised questions about the role of education in preventing future crises. World War II reinforced the concepts of freedom, democracy, and justice, but many argued that further study was required if lessons were to be learned from the international hell just experienced. Institutions thus began to examine their educational objectives and curricula within this new post-war context, scrutinizing the role and purpose of liberal education in a way not experienced within higher education since publication of the Yale Report of the 1828.457

Planning for a New Era in Education

“A small college has a character of its own which necessarily disappears as the student body becomes too large,” former Swarthmore president Frank Aydelotte wrote in a letter about the size of post-war Swarthmore College.458 Throughout World War II, boards and presidents worried about declining student enrollment; nothing challenged their institutions more during this period. The end of the war and the return of servicemen to campuses brought an end to these enrollment shortages, but with rebounding student enrollments came new questions about enrollment size and composition of the student body. At Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges, finding the answers to these questions was not an easy task. In fact, conversations about institutional size and student enrollment would continue at each institution into the next decade. The latter years of 1940, therefore, brought only the beginnings of conversations about institutional size, student enrollment, and curricular revisions. Some of these conversations would span decades.
The Admissions Game

The war was over, but no one knew how long it would take to bring the troops stationed abroad home. And, men were eager to get home. A letter sent to President Distler from a Franklin & Marshall student still stationed abroad reflects the sentiments shared by many of the soldiers anxious to return home and to the lives they left behind. Sergeant R. J. Stonesifer wrote to Distler:

Now that the war is over, both here and in the Pacific, all of us are wondering what is to come our way next….Demobilization will be slow….Personally, I don’t expect to get out for many months yet; a period of muddle, muddle, muddle is ahead….What annoys me more than anything else is that those of us who plan to go back to school (thus not affecting the unemployment problem) are going to be forced to sit around for six months to a year, uselessly wasting the valuable time that could be put to advantage in getting us on through the degree struggle. 459

Many soldiers like Stonesifer fervently awaited their return to the classroom, but the uncertainty that surrounded the military’s demobilization of its forces provided institutions of higher education with the time they desperately needed to prepare for the arrival of these men.

The anticipated inundation of men into higher education elicited concerns about institutional capacity to accommodate swelling enrollments. Classrooms and dormitories that were once only half-filled with students were soon crammed to capacity. “You can see that we are bulging at the seams,” Distler explained to Franklin & Marshall students during his fall 1946 convocation address. “The college has attempted to meet its responsibility to as many individuals as it reasonably can. This means that you and I will have to experience some inconveniences, that we will have to put up with some things,” Distler continued as he described the cramped college setting to which students returned after their reinstated summer vacations. 460 The inconveniences to which Distler referred were commonplace throughout higher education in the
early post-war years. Dartmouth men found themselves sleeping in make-shift, on-campus dormitory rooms; veterans attending Earlham were crammed into a living area constructed from Army surplus materials they called “Vetville;” and Swarthmore students ate lunch elbow-to-elbow with classmates at packed dining hall tables. For small liberal arts colleges like Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall and Swarthmore, this overcrowding raised questions about just how large the institutions should swell to meet the increasing demands for enrollment.

Campus committees began to address this issue before the war had even ended. At Dartmouth, the college’s Special Committee on Academic Adjustment examined the institution’s housing, classroom, and dining facilities to determine the extent of the college’s capacity for enrollment expansion following the war. Swarthmore’s Committee on the Size of the College worked on the same issue, exploring how the college’s physical space and budget affected its potential for enrollment growth. The results on both campuses were memoranda to the presidents that outlined the enrollment extremes at which institutional operations, although not ideal, were still possible.

These colleges did not want to operate at the extremes, however. The small classes; the personal association between students and faculty; and the sense of individual participation in the major activities of a college that formed the hallmark of the student experience at a private, liberal arts college would eventually be eliminated should enrollments reach the levels that tested institutional capacity. It was thus, with the ideals of a small college in mind, that administrators at all four institutions started to control enrollment through the establishment of post-war admissions policies and procedures. An examination of the changes in admission policies at Dartmouth College in the early post-war years illustrates just how administrators at private,
liberal arts colleges attempted to manage the increasing demand for enrollment at their institutions.

Before the war, Dartmouth College had been considered a leader in selective admissions. In 1933, the Dartmouth Board of Trustees enacted one of the first admissions statements in higher education that required admission through a committee-run selection process. The statement read:

All candidates who are admitted to Dartmouth College shall have satisfied the requirements of the selective process for admission and shall have presented evidence satisfactory to the Committee of Admissions that they are competent to carry on their course of study at Dartmouth College.\(^{461}\)

An eminent headmaster recalled the impact of Dartmouth’s policy within higher education. He wrote:

Up to 25 years ago all you had to go was pick your college, ‘pass’ the College Boards with the equivalent of the grade of C, and you were in. Then you people at Dartmouth introduced your selective process as a more adequate basis for selecting students from the enormously increasing number of applicants. Now all the colleges are doing just about the same thing.\(^{462}\)

Because of this legacy of attention to admissions and selectivity, it is not surprising that Dartmouth administrators devoted a large amount of time to developing specific policies that would govern the post-war admission of students.

The college’s Committee on Enrollment Facilities encouraged administrators to limit post-war enrollment at Dartmouth to 3,000 students, understanding that the committee’s ideal enrollment projection of 2,400 students would be unrealistic in the immediate post-war years. It was thus with this target number in mind that the Director of Admissions and the Committee on Academic Adjustments began to draft regulations for the admission of students into Dartmouth. Mathematic computations drove the initial stages of the committee’s policy development. The
committee meticulously calculated projections of the numbers of students who might seek admission at Dartmouth after the war. For example, the committee first estimated the number of men currently in military service who had at some time attended Dartmouth. The men were divided into four categories with each category assigned an estimate of the number of individuals who may seek admission at the college. These categories were:

1) Former civilian non-graduate currently in military service = 2,300
2) Student accepted but entered military service before matriculation = 500
3) Former V-12 student at Dartmouth with no previous college affiliations = 1,800
4) Former V-12 student at Dartmouth with other college affiliation = 1,900

From this, the committee projected that 65 percent of the total 6,500 military men with a pre-war or war-time Dartmouth affiliation would seek admission at the college following the war.

Second, the committee approximated the number of freshmen applications the college would receive. Based on its annual number of applications, the committee determined that Dartmouth would receive about 4,500 freshman applications per year, with 3,000 applications coming from veterans and 1,500 applications coming from boys graduating from high school. Based on these calculations alone, the committee anticipated that Dartmouth College could receive an estimated 11,000 applications for approximately 2,500 spaces.

The committee then proceeded to develop a triage system to evaluate applications. Applications would be divided into three different priority levels. The criteria for the three levels were as follows:

1) Attended Dartmouth before enlistment or induction and had satisfactory academic standing. (TOP PRIORITY)
2) Assigned to Dartmouth as Navy trainee, did not previously attend another college or university, and grades averaged 1.8 (the average required for graduation from Dartmouth).

3) Assigned to Dartmouth as Navy trainee, but attended other college as civilian.

“This system of priorities draws some fine distinctions and some that are illogical if examined without knowledge of the entire problem,” the committee explained to Dickey as they shared the proposed new system with him.\textsuperscript{463} “We believe, however, that we can avoid injustice most readily by accepting the principle that our obligation to a man whose original college experience and affiliation began at Dartmouth, either through his own choice or by assignment, is greater than our obligation to any man who started college else,” the committee continued as they justified the rationale behind the tiered system they created. As such, most students admitted to Dartmouth for post-war study at the college would come from the first and second priority levels.

The committee understood that the procedures they developed were not perfect, and as a result many qualified candidates would be denied admission to the college under this system. Writing to Dickey, the committee admitted:

\begin{quote}
We may have to reject all applications from other men regardless of their superior scholarship, superior character, the distinction of their military achievements, and their attractive personality. We may turn down hundreds of applications from men who are in every way desirable candidates for admission.\textsuperscript{464}
\end{quote}

The hallmark of the system they developed was Dartmouth loyalty and the committee sought to reward admission to those students with Dartmouth ties. Dartmouth alumni then asked, "But, what about our sons?" The response they received was a multi-page letter from Albert I. Dickerson, Alumni Council Chair, that outlined for alumni the principles of Dartmouth’s revised...
selective admissions process, its procedures, and the special consideration that the sons of
Dartmouth men would receive within the new system. Entitled “Enter Ye in by the Narrow
Gate,” Dickerson’s letter stressed the extreme environment in which admissions decisions were
currently being made. “The portals of the colleges and universities today are indeed narrow in
proportion to the number seeking entrance,” Dickerson began. “We cannot complain because
Dartmouth introduced the now prevalent competitive elements into college admissions. Having
made this bed, we must lie in it with all possible grace, however fitfully our admissions officers
may sleep in it,” he continued. Dickerson concluded his letter by reassuring alumni of the
special consideration their sons will continue to receive within the college’s revised admissions
procedures. “There is an intangible thing of great significance to the spirit and tradition of the
College in having these threads of family tradition run through successive generations – often
many of them,” Dickerson began as he described the importance of the alumni connection to
Dartmouth. He concluded by reminding alumni that space at the college is limited, however, and
even alumni sons must be of a superior aptitude to obtain admission into Dartmouth. Dickerson
shared part of a statement by the Committee on Admissions to reinforce his warning to alumni
fathers. The Committee wrote:

Dartmouth has always been an alumni college, but the College has grown and
changed since our day. Due to the increase in the number of applicants for
admission to the College and to the greatly increased numbers of Dartmouth sons
applying for admission, this committee feels that Dartmouth fathers and their sons
must recognize that from here on the sons will have to meet keener competition
for selection. The Selective Process…which has always given preference to
Dartmouth sons should continue to do so but the sons will have to meet the
competition of that year…

Dartmouth’s revised admissions policies clearly favored men with ties to the institution.
Whether a Dartmouth man by prior enrollment or through familial ties, qualified applicants who
bled “Dartmouth Green” had a definite advantage over other applicants during the admissions process. In the post-war years, however, alumni sons now had to compete with a greater number of applicants for enrollment, and alumni fathers throughout higher education worried about their child’s access to their beloved alma mater.

Like Dartmouth, Swarthmore College also had to quell alumni concerns about the admission of their sons and daughters into the college by releasing several statements about the college’s admissions policy as it related to the children of alumni. In its formal revised admissions procedures statement released in 1945, the Admissions Committee emphasized the competitiveness of admissions yet reinforced the special consideration the sons and daughter of alumni would continue to receive within the new system. As part of the statement read:

...Strong intellectual interests and excellence in some particular direction are preferable to high average without promise of unusual ability. Seriousness of purpose, health, initiative, and social responsibility are important factors. Final selection rests with the Admissions Committee of the Faculty, and in general is based on (1) high rank in school and in aptitude and achievement tests; (2) evidence of sturdiness of character and promise of growth. Children of Friends and alumni of the college are given preference.467

There is no indication, however, whether Earlham and Franklin & Marshall Colleges faced similar concerns over this emerging tension between the enrollment of veterans and the enrollment of the sons and daughters of alumni.

Aiding the Returning Veteran

Despite the limited spots each institution had within its incoming classes of students, all four institutions still reached out to returning veterans, largely because of each institution’s recognition of the war-time services rendered by these men and its desire to reward these services. Pamphlets and letters mailed to individual veterans – many of whom had never before
attended college – sought to demystify the seemingly complicated college admissions process. A 1945 brochure entitled “Educational Program for Veterans” generated by Franklin & Marshall College outlined for veterans the educational benefits to which they were entitled under the GI Bill; described what a liberal arts education could provide to them; explained how Franklin & Marshall promoted a liberal arts education; and suggested how they, as veterans, could become part of the Franklin & Marshall student body. The other three institutions produced similar mailings, each written for a man who presumably had little knowledge of higher education. These mailings served as just one of many ways in which institutions tried to cater to the needs of this new student population.

Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore also all developed special educational credit policies to reward veterans for the time they served within the military. After World War I, a blanket credit policy awarded all returning veterans the same amount of educational credits for their military service. This policy for granting credits to returning World War II veterans seemed ineffective, however, given the large numbers of men seeking (re-)admission into higher education. In addition, the establishment of military training programs like the Navy V-12 program and the introduction of correspondence courses taught through the Army General Education Development Program allowed servicemen to receive war-time, postsecondary instruction via either study in traditional classrooms or via correspondence instruction. Educational opportunities therefore varied amongst servicemen. In turn, institutions developed credit-awarding policies as individualized as the post-war admission policies they adopted.

At Franklin & Marshall College, the institution’s Veterans Advisory Committee developed a system of awarding credits to veterans that considered each veteran on a number of
criteria that included general intelligence; previous educational status; war-time educational accomplishments; interest; incentive; and educational objectives. “Credits will be determined on an individual basis and will be as generous as is compatible with the best interests of the veteran and consistent with established academic standards,” the Committee wrote in a pamphlet developed to help returning veterans understand their educational opportunities at the college.\(^469\)

Dartmouth’s Special Committee on Academic Adjustment published similar credit guidelines for returning veteran students. The committee’s “Questions and Answers for Former Dartmouth Students and Former Members of the Navy V-12 Unit at Dartmouth” outlined for veterans the procedures the committee chairman would use to award credit and to determine academic placement to them upon their return to the college.\(^470\) Like at Franklin & Marshall, each veteran case was to be evaluated individually. In some cases, degree requirements could be dismissed and some veterans could even be awarded their degrees based on the studies they completed outside of Dartmouth during the war.

**Quotas and Curriculum: Revisiting Tradition**

**Racial (In)Tolerance**

As the intricate Dartmouth admissions framework suggests, the door to higher education was not open to everyone equally after the war. The admission of Nisei students at Earlham and Black students at Swarthmore during the war period reflects shifting mentalities toward the inclusion of racial minorities within higher education. The war and the human atrocities being reported by American servicemen in Europe opened eyes and minds to the harsh reality of the implications of racial intolerance; the liberation of Nazi-run concentration camps by the American military revealed stories of anguish, torture, and genocide, all in the name of racial
superiority. Racial intolerance lingered on the home front, however, as evidenced by institutional admissions policies that continued to promote discrimination and prejudice.

James Karabel in his book, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale and Princeton, explores how Harvard, Princeton, and Yale used institutional admissions policies to create the ideal cohort of college students. Often the implementation of admissions quota systems allowed these institutions to shape each incoming class of students by selectively including and excluding specific races and gender, thereby advancing the institution’s goal of crafting the next generation of the nation’s social elite. The story of college admissions in the early twentieth century therefore was one of exclusion or getting “the right” people into the institution.

In the 1900s, admission into higher education was based largely on academic ability, ability to pay, and the mastery of the traditional curriculum. With the rise of national anti-immigrant sentiment and the emergence of an obsession with the idea of “100 percent Americanism” in the mid-1910s, many institutions began to develop exclusionary admissions policies designed to manage their student enrollment.471 The group most affected by both these rising anti-immigrant ideals and the implementation of restrictive admissions policies were Jews. A statement made by William Barclay Parsons, a Columbia University trustee, best illustrates the anti-Jewish sentiment that began to pervade higher education in the years before World War I. He alleged:

In character they [Jews] are truly persistent. They realize that there has been for 2000 years or more a prejudice against them, and they are always seeking after special privileges for themselves and their people…They form the worst type of our immigrants, [and] they supply the leaders to anarchistic, socialistic, and other movements of unrest.472
Anti-Semitic positions such as those advanced by Parsons translated into the implementation of institutional quotas that severely limited Jewish student enrollment within higher education. These quota policies were often undocumented. As Karabel asserts, the “cornerstones of the new system were discretion and opacity – discretion so that gatekeepers would be free to do what they wished and opacity so that how they used their discretion would not be subject to public scrutiny.”

Dartmouth College, like the “Big Three,” imposed in the 1920s a quota system to manage the enrollment of Jewish students at the college. It was not until the latter years of World War II that this quota became an issue that garnered national attention, however. Changing attitudes towards racial tolerance that accompanied the end of the war put Hopkins and Dartmouth’s quota system in the national spotlight, focusing attention on a policy now considered by many as both out-dated and unjust. This national controversy emerged at a time when both Dartmouth’s admissions policies became even more defined so as to accommodate the influx of veterans into higher education and as Hopkins was ending his 29-year presidency. Ultimately, the attention Hopkins and Dartmouth received in the spring and summer of 1945 would inspire national discussions on the morality of quota systems and the gate-keeping function of higher education that would continue into upcoming decades.

The Jewish quota controversy that emerged at Dartmouth in the summer of 1945 began with a petition that Hopkins received on February 10, 1945 from Dr. Alonzo Myers, Chairman of the Education Division of the Independent Citizens Committee of Arts, Sciences, and Professions. The petition arrived in the form of a telegram and read:

The recent action of the American Dental Association in trying to force Columbia and New York Universities to establish religious quotas clearly demonstrates the urgent need for a national fair education practice committee to eliminate quotas
and other forms of racial and religious discrimination in the nation’s colleges….Will you join with us and other educators throughout the country to urge immediate establishment of such a committee to abolish intolerance and discrimination from the higher education systems.474

On the same day that he received the telegram Hopkins replied:

Understand complexity of problem and am sympathetic with purposes you have in mind. Cannot join with you however if your protest is against proportionate selection for I believe nothing would so increase intolerance and focus racial and religious prejudice as to allow any racial group to gain virtual monopoly of educational advantages offered by any institution of higher education.475

Hopkins’ response to Myers’ telegram angered Mr. Herman Shumlin, a movie and theatrical producer, who withdrew in protest his financial support of an organization to which Hopkins was affiliated. Shumlin’s action then spawned an exchange of letters between himself and Hopkins. In an April 2, 1945 letter written to Shumlin, Hopkins tried to justify his position as it related to the petition he received. Within the letter, Hopkins used Stephen Roberts’ 1938 work The House that Hitler Built in conjunction with his own experiences abroad as a means of justifying his position on the limiting of Jewish student enrollment at Dartmouth. As Hopkins wrote about Roberts’ assertions, “He [Roberts] feels that the ill-advised concentration of Jews in the cities of Germany and their utilization of the war to take over all of the important posts in the cities created discontent which gave Hitler a nucleus around which to build his structure of hatred and evil.”476 Hopkins advanced Robert’s claim to rationalize Dartmouth’s use of a quota system to limit Jewish student enrollment; Hopkins contended that the more Jewish students the college admitted, the greater the possibility for the emergence of issues of intolerance on the campus. A phrase Hopkins included in his response to Shumlin that reflected his sentiments on the necessity of a quota would quickly come back to haunt the president. He wrote:
I have never been willing to deny that in the interest of avoiding racial prejudice and in the desire to maintain the age-long compatibility here at Dartmouth among boys of different races, I should not be willing to see the proportion of Jews in the College so greatly increased as to arouse widespread resentment and develop widespread prejudice in our own family.\textsuperscript{477}

Shumlin sent his correspondence with Hopkins to the \textit{New York Post}, which proceeded to publish on August 7, 1945 a story about Dartmouth’s Jewish quota and Hopkins’ support of it. Prominent within this article was the line from Hopkins’ response to Shumlin that began “I have never been willing….”

The \textit{Post} also conducted an interview with Hopkins for an additional article on the issue. In this interview, Hopkins’ used Dartmouth’s historic mission as an additional way to defend the college’s continuation of its quota system. Hopkins told the interviewer that the college he led was “a Christian college founded for the Christianization of its students” and thus he was justified in maintaining his and the college’s position on its use of a quota system to limit Jewish student enrollment by the college’s mission.

Letters voicing outrage and disgust quickly flooded Hopkins’ office. “If the American dead in Europe could speak, I wonder what they would say if they read your remarks concerning the admission of non-Christian students to Dartmouth,” Richard Kohn began in his August 9, 1945 letter to Hopkins.\textsuperscript{478} “It is unbelievable that an American educator can speak like Hitler’s pseudo-philosopher,” he charged in his conclusion. A letter mailed to Hopkins by Mrs. Grace M. Alpern reveals a similar feeling of outrage over Dartmouth’s quota system. She wrote to Hopkins:

I was amazed and truly horrified to read your recent statement yesterday regarding Jews at Dartmouth. It is incredible that such a bald advocacy of Nazi doctrine and Nazi thinking should come from the president of what I have always considered to be one of the finest educational institutions of its kind in the
country, at a time when our young citizens, many of them college students, are giving up their lives to eradicate such intolerant and uncivilized attitudes.\textsuperscript{479}

“You god damned good Christian pigs,” another letter exclaimed to Hopkins.\textsuperscript{480} “It’s about time you shut your mouth about religion, and recognized a man for what he is. It’s bigots like you who caused the war,” the author who closed his/her letter with “one of God’s chosen people” charged.

Such letters illustrate how the lessons about racial tolerance learned during the war on the battlefields of Europe had come to influence the public mentality on the home-front. Other letters mailed to Hopkins reflect comparable anger over Dartmouth College’s apparent disregard of and indifference to the sacrifices made by the nation’s youth in the name of democracy. A letter mailed to Hopkins from a “member of the armed forces” exemplifies this sentiment. The author asked Hopkins: “Is this what we are fighting for? I lost a brother in this war. Has he died in vain? I reiterate, has he died in vain?”\textsuperscript{481} The continuation of the college’s quota system also seemed to many to be an endorsement of the very ideals their country was fighting to eliminate in Europe; many letters equated Hopkins to Hitler and Dartmouth’s policy to Nazism.

Letters mailed to Hopkins also reveal support for the president’s position on the exclusion of Jewish students at Dartmouth. College trustee Dudley W. Orr wrote a letter to Hopkins that voiced his support for the institution’s quota system. “I have been thinking it over ever since it reached me. I agree completely with your policy,” Orr explained to Hopkins.\textsuperscript{482} “I have talked it over with a number of friends, including land grant university men from the middle west [sic] and…they agree too. A few of the younger, leftish men say that such a policy is admirable of all we are fighting for,” Orr continued as a way of reassuring Hopkins about the position he advanced. A letter to Hopkins from Joseph A. Ford also expressed acceptance and, in
fact, delight over Dartmouth’s continued use of a quota system. Ford wrote simply, “Whoopla! for letting the Jew question come right out into the open. The New York Post article Tuesday gives the Jew plenty to think about….Congratulations on your fearlessness.”

A series of newspaper articles and radio interviews followed the Post’s disclosure of Dartmouth’s admissions policy. For example, an editorial in The Nation referred to Dartmouth’s quota system as a “Recipe for Suicide,” and equated the college’s discriminatory practices to the atomic bomb; “If we do not destroy the one, the other will destroy us all,” the author asserted. Radio station WOV broadcast a half-hour discussion on Dartmouth and Hopkins that also equated Hopkins with the newly-invented atomic bomb. Entitled “Dr. Hopkins’ Atomic Bomb,” the broadcast claimed: “Hopkins has…become the champion of an explosive, destructive idea – the idea that in America racial and religious discrimination is justifiable. Prejudice – that is Dr. Hopkins’ atomic bomb.”

Hopkins was also challenged by Albert E. Kahn, who published an article in The Nation in which he contested Hopkins’ his statement about the historic mission of Dartmouth. “The quota system under which Dartmouth College is now operating, which limits the number of Jewish students permitted in the school, is a direct repudiation of the original charter of the college,” Kahn contended. New York Sun contributing writer George E. Sokolsky titled the Dartmouth College quota system scandal “The Newest Dartmouth College Case,” an obvious reference to the now-landmark 1819 Supreme Court decision. Sokolsky attacked private institutions like Dartmouth for their use of a quota system, contending such actions were an abuse both of their private institutional status and their missions as institutions of learning. “When a college or university departs from scholarship, it ceases to have any excuse for existence and those who are expending its funds are diverting them from the purpose for which
they were contributed,” Sokolsky concluded. The names Ernest Hopkins and Dartmouth College therefore were ever-present within the national media of August 1945.

Telegrams, newspapers articles, and letters voicing both opposition and support of Hopkins’ position welcomed John Dickey as he began his presidency of Dartmouth College. No institutional documents confirm this, but it is unlikely it was a coincidence that the Board of Trustees’ announcement of Hopkins’ resignation and Dickey’s selection as Hopkins’ replacement came on August 20, 1945, a time when national attention on Dartmouth and Hopkins had reached a fever pitch. A number of letters mailed to the Board in the days before its announcement called for Hopkins’ resignation; little did the authors know that the Board had quietly received this resignation over six months earlier.

Like most headline stories, the passage of time, combined with the return of veterans to American shores, allowed national attention on Dartmouth and its admissions system to fade. It is unclear what effect, if any, the quota scandal of August 1945 had on the college and its admissions policies. As evidenced by earlier discussion, the end of the war and the influx of veterans into higher education forced institutions like Dartmouth to revise their admissions policies. Dartmouth College’s post-war admissions policies made no reference to Jewish students or the limiting of their enrollment; however, the “discretion” and “opacity” of admissions policies to which Karabel refers may have persisted at Dartmouth even after the publication of its new admissions policies and guidelines. As Dartmouth’s admissions policy published in the November 1946 College Bulletin read:

…Dartmouth holds unreservedly that definite evidence of intellectual capacity is indispensable, but it believes that, after such evidence is established, positive qualities of character and personality, range of interests, and capable performance in outside activities should operate as determining factors in selection. All candidates, therefore are judged on the basis of the following
characteristics…scholarship, character, and personality….It is the obligation of those of us working in admission to seek with more eagerness than ever to make every man count and to seek men who will, in addition, to having well-developed mental equipment, have also the drive, the determination, the vigor, [and] the qualities of leaderships to make their influence effective.\(^{488}\)

There is no mention within this statement of race or ethnicity. Consequently, because existing enrollment documents do not identify the religious affiliations of students’ enrolled at Dartmouth in the post-war years, the termination of the college’s quota system remains unknown.

Dartmouth was not unique in its use of a quota system as a means of controlling student enrollment; Karabel’s work demonstrates that Princeton, Yale, and Harvard continued to use quota systems in the post-war years as well. When asked about such systems in response to the Dartmouth controversy, however, deans from the three institutions all denied the existence of quota systems at their university. The use of quota systems both as a means of limiting enrollment and as a way to shape the nation’s social elite thus had become a taboo practice by the end of the World War II although institutions continued to monitor – albeit largely in secret – their enrollment of Jewish students well into the 1960s.

Enrollment documents from Swarthmore College indicate that the college also engaged in the practice of monitoring the enrollment numbers of Jewish students. A March 1948 college memorandum parses out institutional enrollment based on a student’s status of Friend, alumnus or daughter, or Jew. As of the date of the memorandum’s publication, 12.5 percent of Swarthmore’s students were male Quakers; 11 percent were the sons of alumni; and 12 percent were Jewish. The college’s enrollment of women students reflects similar percentages, with 12.5 percent being women of the Friends faith; 8.3 percent were the daughters of alumni; and 8.5 percent were Jewish. In sum, as of March 1948, Jewish students comprised 20.5 percent of
Swarthmore’s total enrollment. These enrollment figures suggest two things. First, Swarthmore College’s percentage of Jewish students mirrors that of other institutions during the same time period. At Harvard College, for example, enrollment of Jewish students had risen to 25 percent by 1952. Other Swarthmore enrollment documents reveal that the college’s proportion of Jewish students had increased from just 3.7 percent in 1934 and 6.2 percent in 1938 to over 20 percent by 1948. Such percentages suggest the abandonment – either partial or total – of the restrictive quotas in place at the institution before and during the war years. However, the college’s continued recording of such enrollment figures possibly reflects a persisting need to monitor Jewish student enrollment even though national sentiment toward racial tolerance had changed greatly since quotas were first introduced in the 1910s.

Even with such strict admissions guidelines and quotas, post-war enrollments soared at most institutions. A headline in the fall 1946 *Earlhamite*, Earlham’s alumni magazine, read “Fall Student Body Makes History” after the college opened its fall semester with more than 650 full-time students, the highest enrollment in college history. Franklin & Marshall College began its 1946-1947 academic year with its own record-breaking enrollment, welcoming 1,267 students, 30 percent more students than ever before enrolled at the institution. Dartmouth rebounded from its lowest enrollments in history, enrolling 3,001 students by the fall of 1947. Post-war male student enrollment at Swarthmore College also surpassed pre-war levels, with male student enrollment averaging over 454 students per year and raising enrollment levels to over 1,050 students from 1946 to 1949.

The latter years of 1940 were thus filled with continued discussions about optimal institution size. At Swarthmore College, for example, the college’s Committee on the Size of the College engaged in lengthy examinations of the institution’s resources and educational costs to
determine the “optimum” size of the student body. The duration of the Committee’s work implies that their task was not any easy one. As the committee explained in its May 10, 1949 report to Nason, “So many factors bear on the determination of size that no one answer is obvious….The basic problem is not merely to maintain an educational program of high quality, but constantly to improve the program, in a period when inflated operating costs are creating severe budgetary difficulties.”

Elaborate line graphs comparing dollars per students and numbers of students with administrative and general expenses as percent of total expenditure illustrate the committee’s attempts at identifying a “magic” enrollment number. The committee ultimately determined that the optimal enrollment for Swarthmore College was 850 students, but the committee also issued a warning – “Conditions change so rapidly that a continual review of the factors affecting the size of the college will be very desirable.” This warning reflects the adaptability still required of institutions in the aftermath of the war.

Demands like expanding institutional size and curricular revisions made by the return of veterans to higher education would continue to influence institutions well into the next decade.

**Re-evaluation of Liberal Education**

A “continual review of factors” characterized much of the institutional planning conducted during these post-war years. Beyond admissions and enrollment policies, the end of the war and the lessons it provided inspired faculty committees and presidents to launch reviews of their institution’s liberal arts curriculum. In the case of the Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges, review of the institutions’ liberal arts curricula often began with a review of the mission and purpose of the college. The early post-war years therefore became a time to reflect on and to revise the meaning of what it meant to be a liberal arts college.
Earlham College institutional historian Thomas Hamm defines the years between 1946 and 1958 as “The Creation of Modern Earlham.” This label is due, in large part, to President Thomas Jones’ post-war vision for his alma mater. When Jones arrived at Earlham in the summer of 1945 to serve as the college’s newly-appointed president, he brought with him concerns about Earlham’s Quaker identity. Speaking before the college’s Board of Trustees during his interview for the presidency, Jones’ contended, “We had swung away from a deep spiritual interpretation…and were he ever to have anything to say about it he would do his best to swing Earlham back into life with the highest type of Quakerism.” It was thus with this concern about the erosion of Earlham’s Quaker identity in mind that Jones began his presidency and launched his agenda for the College.

Jones defined his vision for Earlham as “The Earlham Idea.” Hamm contends that Jones’ plan for the college rested within in the tenets of the Quaker religion brought to Richmond, Indiana and to Earlham College by the town’s and the college’s founders. “For Jones it was ‘an idea which lies at the heart of American faith,’ born in England, brought across the Atlantic, then up to Indiana from North Carolina,” Hamm writes. Jones’ own Quaker upbringing and education as a student at Earlham shaped his views on contemporary Quakerism, which translated into a blend of evangelical and liberal elements of the faith. A speech made before Earlham’s faculty and student bodies reveals that Jones viewed self-discipline, wholeness, integrity, simplicity, and belief in “that of God in every man” as the foremost of Quaker values, and these ideals became integral components of the plan he developed.

The principles of Jones’ eight-page-long “Earlham Idea” are a unification of Earlham’s past and the new president’s vision for its future. As the document began:
The Earlham Idea today can be traced back to the founders of Earlham. In their way of life there was no place for exploitation, pressure groups, and contenders for power. They emphasized the worth of the Individual, Sense of Mission, Discipline, and Agreement. These values constitute the Earlham Idea.\textsuperscript{504}

Understanding the importance of Earlham’s historic Quaker-based mission, Jones used each of the founders’ principles – worth of the individual; sense of mission; discipline; and agreement – as the foundations for his plan for the college. With regard to the worth of the individual, for example, Jones stressed the value of individual freedom; the value of inner guiding principles called “the Inner Light” or “Living Seed”; the belief that every man is of infinite value and is endowed with the means of choosing between right and wrong; and the importance of the Quaker belief in being “openers of the way” to a free society in a new world.\textsuperscript{505} Central to Jones’ idea was also his belief in the importance of agreement and the concept that truth could only be attained through spiritual as well as intellectual discipline. As he explained his position on discipline further:

\begin{quote}
Philosophy, literature, written and oral discourse have been regarded as vehicles of communication which, if rightly employed, shaped ideas and convey values. Discipline eliminates waste and fills gaps in knowledge. Discipline opens the way to visions of greatness – to a discovery of “the grain of things” at the heart of life.\textsuperscript{506}
\end{quote}

Tenets of the Quaker faith were woven throughout Jones’ “Earlham Idea.” The concepts of “Inner Light,” the importance of the search for truth; the belief in the value of each man; and the significance of reaching agreement and unity all reflect Jones’ attempt to return Earlham to the Quaker principles upon which the college was founded. Writing to Earlham faculty, Jones explained further his goal of marrying modern and historic Earlham within the Quaker tradition:

\begin{quote}
The purpose of this statement is to gather together and make articulate the ideals which were in the minds of the founders of the institution and which have always
animated those who have been charged with the responsibility of its management. This attempt is made in order that we may see more clearly our own objective and the means by which it may be reached. 507

Jones’ efforts to reinforce the principles of the Quaker faith within the academic and social life of the college led to a complete re-evaluation of the college’s educational and religious objectives. Beginning in October of 1945, members of the Earlham faculty launched a critical analysis of the college in order to develop a commonly-accepted statement about the college’s objectives that could then be used in conjunction with the “Earlham Idea” to shape the future of the institution. The resulting statement as developed by the faculty and Jones read as follows:

The fundamental purpose of Earlham College is to help its students acquire the skills, abilities, attitudes, and knowledge that will prepare them for complete living in a modern democratic society. The college assumes that it is possible and desirable to develop through planned educational experiences the vocational, personal, and social civic characteristics and abilities of its students. It is toward the realization of this purpose that the college provides for its students its many services, courses, and activities. In order to define the purposes of Earlham College, four main divisions of objectives are used: vocational competence, personal development, social and civic responsibilities, and human relationships. These objectives are stated in terms of the end point of the student’s progress; that is, the kind of individual that he should be upon God. 508

The “Earlham Idea” and the faculty body’s re-articulation of the college’s objectives affected policies throughout the institution. One way that Jones believed Earlham could bolster its Quaker mission was through the recruitment of students and faculty members whose lifestyles adhered to the tenets of Quakerism. “Earlham wants teachers who demonstrate social concern, who know what they believe, and who see the relation of their beliefs in Earlham’s aim,” Jones began to explain of the first way he envisioned his “Idea” operationalized. “Earlham wants students not for their money or social position but for their aspiration for something better…They must want to know more and to grow into mature persons….They should desire to
help sustain the Earlham tradition,” Jones continued to describe of his vision for incoming Earlham students.

Therefore, like Dartmouth with its selective exclusion of Jewish students, Jones encouraged Earlham admissions officers to continue to give special attention to the religious affiliations of applicants, namely to accept applicants with a Friends affiliation. Enrollment figures from the 1940s and 1950s reveal that the “Earlham Idea” did not substantially increase the total percentage of Friends students. Instead, Jones’ policy helped the institution to maintain a consistent enrollment of Friends students throughout the influx of veterans. During the 1941-1942 academic year, for example, 168 students (34 percent) out of the enrolled 494 students identified as Friends. By the 1953-1954 year, the percentage of Friends students was only slightly lower, with 219 students (33 percent) identifying as members of the Quaker church out of a total 661 students.

The biggest change that arose from Earlham’s restoration of its Quaker heritage occurred through the content of the college’s liberal arts curriculum. Jones and the faculty body recognized that the only guaranteed way to facilitate the achievement of the “Earlham Idea” would be through modification of Earlham’s curriculum and academic policies. Thus, the faculty began by first exploring a series of questions about the college’s curriculum as raised by the “Earlham Idea” and the new statement of purpose. Some of these questions were:

1) How can social sciences further the four principles outlined within the “Earlham Idea?” For example, what does discipline mean within a social science context?
2) What contribution can the currently required courses make toward the “Earlham Idea?”
3) How can the extra-curriculum and classes be integrated to the “Earlham Idea” and the student’s future life?

4) How can we [Earlham faculty] help the student to see the relationship of the courses, the curriculum, and the required subjects to the “Earlham Idea” and his own interpretation of the Idea?

The faculty body first responded by reinforcing the role of religion within existing courses. These courses “presented Christianity as ‘a philosophy and a way of life the value of which has been attested by the great minds of the world,’” Hamm explains of the reinfusion of religion within Earlham’s curriculum. The faculty continued by redesigning two courses in the social sciences in order to, in their opinion, better acquaint Earlham students with certain issues related to civilization on a broad and comprehensive scale. These general social science courses became required of all freshmen students and were organized around selected problems such as war, economic depression, racial conflict, and totalitarianism. In addition, Earlham faculty members also considered the adoption of a similarly broad course in the humanities that would be comparable in content to the general education courses being implemented at other colleges and universities.

Curricular changes at Earlham following adoption of the “Earlham Idea” extended beyond the redesign of existing courses as well. The experiences of World War II combined with the establishment of the United Nations and the aims of the “Earlham Idea” translated into a push for the beginnings of the internationalization of the college’s liberal arts curriculum. Earlham, like many institutions throughout higher education, acknowledged this educational need, and thus in the latter years of the decade, Jones and a handful of Earlham’s faculty members developed a proposal for the establishment of an interdisciplinary program of study called
International Relations and World Citizenship. The program was designed not to be a special division, major, or field of study, but rather an interdisciplinary series of courses that would allow any student, regardless of field of study, to be able to participate in the courses. Content of the program, as devised by faculty, would:

- require the students to gain a speaking and writing knowledge of some one modern, foreign language; to study something of the history, literature, and political and social institutions of that country or area; [and] to familiarize himself with some of the basic problems in international relations and their bearing upon the policies of the United States.\(^{513}\)

In addition, this course would depend on inter-departmental collaboration between the history, geography, economics, social anthropology, political science, and literature and language departments.

The college needed to obtain external funding to support the implementation of the program, however, and thus Jones wrote to J. Gardner, Vice President of the Carnegie Corporation, to request the $20,000 Jones projected Earlham would need to launch its program. “In view of the growing range and complexity of American relations with foreign countries and the pressing need for informed ‘world-minded’ citizens, we at Earlham believe that we have both an opportunity and a duty to broaden and intensify our program in the fields associated with international relations,” Jones began in his letter to Gardner.\(^{514}\) He then continued by stressing how Earlham’s Quaker-based educational mission situated the college to be a leader in the instruction of students in issues related to world problems and international understanding. Jones reinforced his assertion by sharing with Gardner a laundry list of the programs Earlham had already implemented to provide its students with an understanding of international affairs and foreign-service, including the college’s founding of a summer Institute of Foreign Affairs and its
creation of a program of summer work-camp seminars in which students and faculty traveled abroad for “grass roots experiences in living and working with people of another nationality.”

Gardner’s response to Jones’ request is uncertain, but examination of college Bulletins reveals that Earlham did successfully implement the program about which Jones’ wrote to the Carnegie Corporation. The principles upon which the International Relations and World Citizenship program was based can also been seen within the college’s Relief and Reconstruction and Rural Life areas of academic study implemented during and after the war. Within these programs, geology, sociology, political science, economics, English, and religion courses were woven together to establish an interdisciplinary area of study that explored topics situated both at home and abroad. In turn, the implementation of such curricular changes helped to bring the outside world a little closer to Earlham students.

By 1953, Earlham College, under Jones’ leadership, had fully implemented “The Earlham Idea.” The entire text of Jones’ “Idea” now appeared within each edition of the college’s Bulletin, its inclusion obviously intending to serve as a reference for students about the college’s past, present, and future. Although its stated mission did not change, the way that the college’s faculty and administrators operationalized Earlham’s mission did change given the new, post-war environment in which the institution now functioned. A statement made by Earlham faculty illustrates this marriage of tradition and change. As part of the statement read:

The purpose of a college is different from that of a university, where emphasis is placed upon research and specialized professional training. Earlham is interested in an educational fellowship where men and women, both young and old, live together, learn together, play together, and pray together. It emphasizes intellectual discipline and creative fellowship in a “home of free men,” which is the meaning of the word Earlham.
In the early post-war years, Swarthmore College made similar attempts to redefine and to reinvigorate the institution’s Quaker mission and liberal arts curriculum. “If we are not purely a secular institution, whether by legal fiat or by political expediency or by corporate conviction, then what is it we stand for and what should we be doing about it?,” Nason asked a friend in a 1947 letter.\footnote{517} To answer this question and the concerns it posed, Nason called for the establishment in the fall of 1947 of a faculty-led Committee on Objectives, which was charged with the task of defining and appraising the educational objectives of Swarthmore College. Before the committee could tackle the issue of the place of religion within the College, however, the committee first had to define the content and purposes of liberal education as interpreted at the institution.

Conversations about the content and objectives of a liberal arts curriculum at Swarthmore began years earlier in the months before Pearl Harbor. In March 1941, Nason appointed a special Curriculum Committee to explore the curriculum of the liberal arts college in general and Swarthmore in particular. More specifically, the task, as charged to the committee, was “to clarify and define the content, nature, and methods of liberal education at Swarthmore with respect to long-term objectives rather than present demands.”\footnote{518} Nason’s initiative to create this committee grew out of concerns over the purposes and future of liberal education. In a speech made to Swarthmore College faculty, Nason explained his anxieties about the college’s curriculum:

With the ever advancing investigation into the laws that govern nature and man, we have tended to choose one field for special study, and the area covered has shrunk from decade to decade. The result is that we are now turning out of our colleges and universities students with the insignia of a liberal education, but students who no longer live in a common universe of discourse…We no longer speak a common language as we no longer have a common intellectual
background….This is our problem and it is a real one. We must rethink our program and somehow devise a scheme which will give our students a common background and a common language.\textsuperscript{519}

Nason had spent a great deal of his time as president thinking about the objectives of a liberal arts education. In the same month that he established the special Curriculum Committee, Nason published an article in the *Association of American Colleges Bulletin* that explored, as his title read, “The Nature and Content of a Liberal Education.” Within the article, Nason argued that the disappearance of the classical curriculum in the early years of the twentieth century had caused “some of the worst confusions in our modern educational program.”\textsuperscript{520} The result, Nason contended, was that which he voiced to the Swarthmore faculty – “we are now turning out of our colleges and universities students with the insignia of a liberal education, but students who no longer live in a common universe of discourse….Our system is out of balance and if we would restore it to equilibrium we must give more attention to the social and human problems which we face.” He continued by asserting, “Modern education suffers from intellectual malnutrition.”\textsuperscript{521}

Nason’s solution to the problem plaguing modern education was liberal education, and he outlined three aspects of a liberal education he viewed as crucial and which would “save” education. The first of these three criteria was the curriculum’s ability to add breadth and depth to the student’s life. Nason relied on a Professor Greene’s thesis on liberal arts’ maintenance of a democratic way of life to justify his assertion. As one line of Greene’s thesis contends:

Our experience can be deepened, that is, enriched and intensified, through the acquisition of new and profounder insights, finer moral discernment and greater aesthetic sensitivity – in short, through the discovery and assimilation of new truths, beauties, and moral values. A liberal education is essentially an introduction to intrinsic values and cultural perspectives.\textsuperscript{522}
Nason’s second component of a sound liberal education entailed the provision of an understanding of the world in which students lived. He was concerned largely with understanding in the very broadest sense, an understanding of what he defined “the laws that govern nature, laws that govern social relationships, the ideals which men pursue, and the values they seek to realize.”

Third and finally, Nason viewed liberal education as a means of instilling students with a lasting mental discipline. “An educated mind is a disciplined mind,” he wrote, “one that can think in a straight line, one that has respect for the coercive power of fact, [and] one that has through training been made sensitive to the claims of value”.

Nason’s views on liberal education were shaped in large part by the experiences he had as a Rhoades Scholar at the University of Oxford in the years before he arrived as president of Swarthmore. Some of the courses he took while a visiting scholar at Oxford showed Nason how liberal arts courses could be developed so as to meet the curricular aims he desired. “It should be possible to combine the element of comprehensiveness with that of discipline if we approach the subject matter of each course in a liberal spirit,” Nason explained within his article. He continued by describing a hypothetical course on American culture that blended history, economics, political philosophy, religion, literature, fine arts, and science and technology as an illustration of his claim about the potential for liberal education.

The key to achieving this potential, according to Nason, rested not with the institution, however, but rather with its faculty. “There is little hope of producing liberally educated students if their instructors do not know in terms of their own inner experience the meaning of a liberal mind,” Nason asserted. “The economist must understand history, the historian, economics; and both must have acquaintance with theology and philosophy. It can be done, and something like it must be done if we are to have a liberal education,” he continued.
Consequently, Nason took much of his own advice when he initiated the task of revising his college’s liberal education curriculum; his views on liberal education and the role of faculty greatly informed the curriculum committee he created. Previous curricular revisions that resulted in the development of the college’s honors program had taken a more top down approach and had positioned Swarthmore as a leader in this type of curricular reform. Nason wanted Swarthmore to gain the reputation as a leader in the revision of the first two years of academic study as well. Thus, through Nason’s encouragement, the committee focused their attention at the first two years of the college’s curriculum; their goal defined more simply was the design of a curriculum “which can be tested at the end of about two normal years of college work, and which will provide, in addition to necessary skills and specific information, a broad basis of general education for all students without cramping their individual interests.”

The Curriculum Committee began their task by re-evaluating the purposes of general education. Similar conversations about the purposes of general education were being held throughout higher education during this period. One of the most salient conversations began in 1943 at Harvard College where a committee of faculty members from arts and sciences and education gathered under President James Bryant Conant’s instruction to explore the problems of general education within higher education. After lengthy conversations, the committee produced a report in 1945 entitled “General Education in a Free Society: Report of the Harvard Committee” that prescribed, amongst other things, “how general education should be carried out and which abilities should be sought above all others in every part of it.” According to the committee, hallmarks of general education included the ability “to think effectively;” “to communicate thought;” “to make relevant judgments;” and “to discriminate among values,” and
the committee believed these skills could be achieved through study of courses in three academic areas – humanities; social sciences, and physical and biological sciences.530

Swarthmore’s Curriculum Committee developed its own definition of general education to guide its curricular revisions, which stated:

It would be pleasant if we could accept the conclusions of that school of contemporary educational thought which holds that a purely literary acquaintance with the great achievements of the civilization which we inherit constitutes a general liberal education. While we seem to have adopted the term ‘general’ from them, we are not convinced that it is sufficiently liberal for the modern world, liberal in the sense that it offers the truth that makes us free, free by virtue of having a general conception of the way in which modern civilization functions. The student will not feel satisfied, nor are we doing our duty to him, if we do not see to it that his knowledge is more than literacy.531

From this, the committee outlined the aims of general education for Swarthmore College, which read, in part:

We are…committed to the following basic aim which should be accomplished by the end of the first two years of college:

To give the student an introduction to the methods of thinking and the content of knowledge of:

1) The traditional humanistic studies: those studies through which man learns to understand himself and his relationship to his fellows as individuals; and the enduring values in human experience.

2) The social sciences: those studies through which man learns to understand the nature of organized society, past and present, and the relationship of himself to it.

3) The natural sciences: those studies through which man learns to understand the world, both organic and inorganic, outside of his own individual and social being.

4) Foreign language: either ancient or modern.532

Then, the Committee issued a series of recommendations for the implementation and evaluation of the revised two year program. The first recommendation was a proposal:

That the college, as a first step in revising its curriculum, design an experimental program in the fundamental components of liberal education as a means of
completing the general education begun on the secondary level and of preparing for more advanced and more specialized work in the upper college year.\textsuperscript{533}

To design this experimental program, the committee called for the establishment of a new committee charged with the task of determining “the scope, content purpose and method of a group of related courses in the essentials of a general education on the college level.” Nason quickly responded to this recommendation, appointing in March 1944 a group of ten faculty members to the newly-created Committee on the Curriculum for the First Two Years. By June of 1944, the new committee had arrived at the conclusion that Swarthmore’s two year program of study should include the following courses: history; a physical and a biological science; philosophy; social science; literature; psychology; and a foreign language. In addition, the group determined that students should be required to take five courses each year. Finally, the committee encouraged the implementation of the revised curricular plan of study by July 1944.

The arrival of the Navy V-12 students interrupted the implementation of this curricular agenda, however, as focus shifted from curricular reform to maintenance of a war college. Still, liberal education was never far from the forefront of Nason’s mind. In fact, Nason used Swarthmore’s experiences as host of the Navy V-12 program as a lens through which he could examine potential curricular revisions to implement at his institution following the end of the war. A 1944 article entitled “What Have We Learned?” describes the lessons Nason took from his experiences with the Navy’s military program, which included an appreciation for the Navy’s system of intensive language instruction and for the value of oral and written communication the Navy promoted.\textsuperscript{534} Both, in Nason’s opinion, were educational concepts that he believed Swarthmore should consider when revising its liberal arts curriculum.
Following the war’s end, the Committee on Objectives returned to the unfinished task of curricular revision through its focus on the role of religion within the college’s curriculum while the Curriculum Committee continued its revision of the first two years of study. For Nason and members of the Committee on Objectives, religion and the purposes of liberal education were inextricably linked. This idea can be seen in both Nason’s writings to the committee and the resultant statements on religion generated by the committee. For example, in an October 23, 1947 letter to the faculty, Nason began to outline the purpose of education at Swarthmore in relation to its goals for its students as he viewed it. He wrote:

Any valid educational program or philosophy for Swarthmore must include a concern for the development of the individual as such and a concern for his social function, an effort to give him real help toward that ultimate understanding which we call a philosophy of life and a willingness to help him find and prepare for the role in which he can make his most effective contribution to society.

Months later the Committee on Objectives published a statement on religion that echoed the sentiment expressed within Nason’s statement and, in turn, justified the role of religion within the college’s curriculum. The statement read:

The purpose of Swarthmore College is to make its students more valuable human beings and more useful members of society….Swarthmore College was founded by the Religious Society of Friends, and it seeks to illuminate the life of its students with the spiritual principles of that Society. Although it has been sectarian in control since the beginning of the present century and although the children of Friends are in a minority the College seeks to preserve the religious tradition out of which it sprang.

The committee then continued to outline the ways in which Quaker principles like hard work, simple living, generous giving, personal integrity, and social justice were already entwined with the college’s educational environment such as through Swarthmore’s policy of coeducation and its honors study program. “A college is never static. Its purposes and policies are always
changing to meet new demands and new conditions…Swarthmore, if it is to remain alive, must be forever changing,” the committee warned, however, suggesting the need for Swarthmore not to rest on its laurels, but rather to embrace the post-war changes both it and the Curriculum Committee had developed.

While the Committee on Objectives evaluated the role of religion and Quaker principles within the life of the college, the Curriculum Committee in conjunction with the Committee on the Curriculum for the First Two Years maintained its work on the revision of the curricular plan for the first two years of study. Swarthmore’s new two year program of study was finally implemented in the fall of 1945. The two year plan of study worked as follows. Entering freshmen would now pursue a plan of work in which they would acquire a foundational knowledge in the subjects of history, literature, social science, natural science, and philosophy. In the sophomore year, students would, in addition to continuing their studies in the subjects above, elect to major in one of three divisions of college work – the humanities, the social sciences, or the natural sciences. Following designation of his/her major, each student would then follow a plan of work designed to provide him/her with a broad foundation for more advanced or specialized study in his/her final two years at Swarthmore.

Nason and the faculty body as whole were excited about the implementation of the two years’ plan at Swarthmore. Writing to the college’s alumni in a November 1944 article within *The Garnet Letter*, Curriculum Committee member Robert E. Spiller boasted about the college’s newest curricular innovation. “If you were to enter Swarthmore again as a Freshman next Fall, you would discover perhaps the most important change since the introduction of the honors plan of work back in 1922,” Spiller explained to the magazine’s alumni readers.537 He then continued
to outline for alumni in very simple, plain terms how this new curriculum operated for Swarthmore’s freshman and sophomore students:

Instead of asking you what you like best and, after accounting for a few general college requirements, making out for you a one-semester or a one-year schedule to suit your adolescent tastes, he [the student’s advisor] would lay before you an architect’s drawing of an ideal two-year course and ask you how far your schooling had prepared you to undertake it. You would still have a number of choices and decisions to make, but they would be aimed at achieving a result common to all other members of your class and to all broadly educated and intelligent humanity.538

Spiller’s description highlights for alumni two hallmarks of the college’s two years program. His use of the term “adolescent” to describe the freshmen or sophomore student reinforces the committee’s concerns about the youthful nature of the student and his/her ability to make the curricular decisions previously asked of first- and second-year students.

Implementation of this new program, as Spiller alludes, now removed much of this individual student choice, thereby achieving another of the committee’s goals – the construction of a common knowledge base upon which the final two years of course work at Swarthmore could be built.

By the spring of 1946, the Committee on the Curriculum for the First Two Years had begun to evaluate the program implemented just two years earlier. In its May 1946 report to the Swarthmore faculty body, the Committee discussed issues that had arisen during the course of the program’s initial years of operation. Of primary concern were the student work load required by the new curriculum and the anticipated increase in course failures. Within its report, the committee concluded that 1) there had been no significant change in amount of study required of students within the new program and 2) the number of students failing an “introductory” course had, in fact, increased. The committee concluded, however, that “in regard to these latter
deficiencies, this Committee feels that, while the problem is with us, it is not wide-spread enough to warrant detailed legislation at this present time."\textsuperscript{539}

A year later the Committee submitted an additional report to the faculty body that evaluated the first two years program. Again, the committee addressed concerns over student work load and course failures. Polling the student body, the committee determined that “the new curriculum does not impose an insuperable load on the normal Freshman or Sophomore” and “unless evidence to the contrary appears, it would seem that this phase of fact-gathering may be concluded.”\textsuperscript{540} With regard to concerns over the increase in student failures within the introductory courses, the committee determined, after surveying each department, that 15.2 percent of all students enrolled in these courses obtained D’s or E’s, thus failing the course. The committee also found that the percentage of failures varied amongst departments with a range that ran from 9.6 percent to 29 percent.\textsuperscript{541} After further investigation on each student failure, the committee concluded that the students who failed each course would, on average, have failed regardless of the change to the freshmen and sophomore course of study because they were, as the committee defined them, “weak” students. The committee therefore reported to the faculty their belief that there was no need to be concerned with the failure percentages; the curriculum, in their opinion, was sound, achieving the goals for which it was developed, and, ultimately, a great addition to the college’s liberal education curriculum.

While Nason and Swarthmore’s various curriculum committees worked to re-design the first two years of their students’ study, Dickey directed his attention toward revising the course work required of Dartmouth’s seniors. Dickey’s vision for Dartmouth’s curriculum began with his arrival at the college in August 1945. Years of planning and negotiation ultimately resulted in Dartmouth’s implementation of a new senior-seminar entitled “Great Issues” in October 1947.
Dickey’s “Great Issues” course was designed to address various issues confronting contemporary society. “For some years I have felt there was considerable room for improvement in the exposure which a student gets in our colleges to the contemporaneous world in which he is going to lead ‘the good life,’” Dickey contended in a 1945 statement to Dartmouth faculty. Dickey’s statement outlined his concerns about the preparedness of Dartmouth men to understand the problems inherent within the new post-war world. Institutions like Earlham College implemented programs in international studies or foreign relations in the early post-war years to begin to address just such concerns. Dickey acknowledged the emergence of these programs and the benefits they would provide to both students and society, but he viewed such programs as flawed, largely because of the programs’ inability to reach every student. He wrote:

They [majors in international or foreign relations] could not possibly meet the opportunity and it seems to me the high responsibility of the college to give all its men some measure of general education concerning the things which would really make a difference in their lives and actually determine in considerable measure the relevance or irrelevance of their having had the privilege of a liberal arts education.\(^{542}\)

Still, Dickey agreed with other liberal arts presidents in their contention that it was the obligation of liberal arts institutions and the goal of liberal education to introduce students to issues of contemporary society as they related to the post-war world. “External measure of the college’s purpose certainly requires constant attention to the current large needs of human society,” Dickey stressed. Thus, with these objectives in mind, Dickey recommended the development of a mandatory senior course aimed at “teach[ing] by demonstration and practice, the application to the contemporary world, through the definition and study of ‘issues,’” of the knowledge, experience and skill acquired in four years of higher education.\(^{543}\) He called his course “Great Issues.”
On October 6, 1947, Dickey welcomed approximately 700 Dartmouth seniors to the inaugural “Great Issues” course. “This evening I want to discuss with you, certainly very informally and reasonably briefly, the purpose of the American liberal arts college today and the relationship of that purpose, in the case of Dartmouth, to this experiment in general education which we call the Great Issues course,” Dickey began in his address to the students. In his speech, he outlined for the listening seniors the three objectives that would guide the new course for the duration of the year.

“The first objective of the Great Issues course is to attempt to provide while you are still here some transition from classroom general education to adult education both in the materials that you have been using, the subject matter, and the way we go about it,” Dickey began his explanation. “It has seemed to us that the point to do that for men is at the end of their general education, their college experience, and not necessarily at the beginning.” This first course objective reflects Dickey’s aim to create a senior-level, capstone-type course that would serve as a forum in which seniors could both synthesize and apply the ideas, concepts, and knowledge they had learned in their previous three years of study at the college.

Dickey also intended for the “Great Issues” course to bridge the gap between “student and citizen,” providing students with the tools and knowledge he believed they needed to become the nation’s next generation of leaders. “The second objective of the great issues course I stated to be the development of a greater sense of common public purpose on the part of each one of you and of a heightened sense of individual public-mindedness, or…public responsibility, as to the issues of the day,” Dickey continued to share with his senior students. To achieve this aim, Dickey designed a 3-hour per week, non-discipline-specific seminar that would explore some of the most pressing issues of contemporary society through lectures presented by
nationally-prominent educators, publicists, scientists, public officials, and labor and business leaders invited to attend the course. Themes developed to explore issues identified as most salient for the 1947-1948 course included: *Modern Man’s Political Loyalties; The Scientific Revolution and the Radical Fact of Atomic Energy; International Aspects of World Peace; American Aspects of World Peace; and What Values of Modern Man?* The year’s participating lecturers included academics and leaders of government such as former college president and delegate to U.N.E.S.C.O. Alexander Meiklejohn who presented a talk entitled, *Government by Consent and Government without Consent;* U.S. Congressman Christian Harter presenting on *Western Europe’s Needs and Loyalties Today;* and Herbert Marks, General Counsel for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, who delivered a talk on *Domestic Use and Control of Atomic Energy.* Other lectures featured titles like: *The Role of the U.N.; Minorities and Human Rights; Government Responsibility for Individual Security; Faith in the Scientific Age; and The Liberal College in Society.*

“The third objective of the course is one you’re probably not too much interested in; it is a pedagogical one,” Dickey admitted. “We are anxious to experiment with that most valuable aspect of learning, namely, self-learning which comes from men in any intellectual activity wrestling together with the question,” he continued. This objective arose from Dickey’s vision of creating an educational opportunity that united seniors for one final time in their undergraduate career and which provided them with a venue to discuss some of the world’s most vexing issues together as one body, the creation of a “common intellectual experience.” Dickey also intended for the mandatory senior seminar to generate such heated conversations about controversial issues that the conversations would continue well after the conclusion of each week’s course. As he explained:
…Here in this course we are attempting to give all of you fellows in the senior class again a common intellectual experience dealing with live issues presented by people who hold convictions on them, not so that you may get the doctrine here tonight or on any other night, but largely so that you may carry it out on the campus, into the street, and at meals, and in the dorms and the fraternities.550

Philip E. Booth ’47, Dartmouth senior and “Great Issues” participant, wrote an article for the Dartmouth Alumni Magazine that described his impressions on the inaugural “Great Issues” course. Entitled “A Senior’s Verdict: A Report on the First Year of “Great Issues” as Experienced in Seat 317 under the Balcony,” Booth explored whether the “Great Issues” course had been, in his opinion, successful in fulfilling the objectives Dickey outlined on the first day of the class. First, Booth emphasized the profound contribution each visiting lecturer made to the students’ understanding of and appreciation for some of the greatest problems of contemporary society. “The opportunity to question these men freely on their subject matter has given the contact with them double value,” Booth began as he described the advantages he discovered in meeting and talking with the distinguished gentlemen who participated in his class.551 “The majority have been so on their mettle as to transfer to the senior audience a sense of the urgency and importance of their topics…being in a position to judge the often divergent views and personalities of guest lecturers is perhaps the senior’s greatest opportunity,” he continued to gush about the course’s visiting lecturers and the dialogue shared between them and the students.552

Second, Booth highlighted the conversations that originated in the classroom, but continued into the fraternity house and dormitory. He wrote, “The debatable problems discussed in ‘Great Issues’ are usually carried back into other college classrooms, and the catalytic nature of the ‘Great Issues’ course is everywhere apparent.”553 Booth was quick to acknowledge the difficulty of the course and the struggles many seniors experienced within the mandatory
seminar, however. “The intellectual impact of a liberal arts education hits all Dartmouth men under the ‘Great Issues’ plan and many resent the course as a result,” Booth clarified. The phrase “It has me snowed” reflects, in Booth’s opinion, the sentiment shared by a number of the seniors about the academic challenge of the course, yet Booth asserts that even these men still learned important lessons from the seminar. “For those that complain most can often be heard discussing issues of which they knew nothing before this year, and their terminology is not infrequently an echo straight from 105 Dartmouth,” he explained.

Despite the difficulty of the course, Booth concluded by applauding the “Great Issues” course for achieving Dickey’s goal of bridging student and citizen. “The scope of the ‘Great Issues’ course has given all seniors a humbling sense of the central issues that confront their generation. They can relate what they hear in Dartmouth Hall not only to another course, but to their whole educational experience,” Booth wrote. He finally concludes his description of the course by admitting that even he is only beginning to realize the benefits of Dartmouth’s new course. “Ten years, perhaps, can prove something of its true significance,” Booth stressed, acknowledging that the impact of his experience within the “Great Issues” course would extend well beyond his upcoming graduation.

Booth’s description of “Great Issues” offered glowing praise for the course. New York Times articles published throughout the summer of 1948 presented similar praise for Dartmouth’s ground-breaking “Great Issues” course. By October 1948, the acclaim given to Dickey and his “Great Issues” course turned into criticism. Earlier that same month, Mr. Eugene Griffith, a reporter from The Chicago Tribune, had visited Dartmouth to do research, he claimed, for an article on the Ivy League. The resultant October 18, 1948 Tribune article entitled “New Dealism Forced on Dartmouth” revealed that Griffith instead came to Dartmouth to investigate
Dickey’s “Great Issues” course and its alleged “mess of propaganda” curriculum. Griffith condemned Dickey and Dartmouth for the mandatory nature of the course and charged Dickey with using the course as a way to promote his New Deal agenda to all Dartmouth students.

A series of similar articles written by Griffith appeared in the Tribune over the next week. Headlines such as: “Most of Profs at Dartmouth ‘New Dealish’: Socialist and Globalist Idea Predominant” and “One Worlder Holding Reins at Dartmouth: Dickey A Drum Beater for Utopia” reflect Griffith’s continuing attack of Dickey and Dartmouth for the New Deal ideals he contended were promoted within the “Great Issues” course. Under the heading, “Another Dartmouth College Case,” for example, Griffith wrote, “Today a group of New Dealers have taken over Dartmouth, not by legislative usurpation this time, but with the sanction of a legally constituted board of trustees….Under his [Dickey] regime, the little pink professors have become a much more prominent feature of the Hanover landscape than the Big Green Team.”

Dartmouth responded to Griffith’s allegations with a 5,000 word bulletin mailed to the college’s alumni. The bulletin recounted for alumni the circumstances under which Griffith visited Dartmouth; the interviews Dickey had with Griffith during Griffith’s time at the college; and Griffith’s attendance of a “Great Issues” course. The author – G.H.C. – made no apologies to alumni readers, maintaining within the Bulletin’s five pages that Dartmouth and Dickey had done nothing to warrant such criticism and such claims.

Despite the college’s attempt to “correct” the story, however, other newspapers carried Griffith’s banner. For example, the Indianapolis Star featured an article entitled “Teaching is not Propaganda.” “We are concerned that a great educational institution should propagandize students instead of teach them. If it is true that the ‘Great Issues’ course aims to make students more ‘liberal’ it is not an educational process, but a propaganda program,” the author of the Star
article contended. 559 “Colleges should teach, not train; educate, not propagandize. When any educational institution becomes the training ground for a specific political philosophy, it ceases to be free. That is what happened to the once great German universities. Two generations later came Hitler,” the author then concluded. 560

Dartmouth alumni remained loyal to their alma mater in spite of the allegations flying through the newspaper pages. Letters in praise of the “Great Issues” course flooded Dickey’s office throughout the fall and winter of 1948. Frank B. Cornell ’31, in a November 10, 1948 letter to Dickey, wrote “On the Great Issues course I agree with you most thoroughly. I have followed its intent in the alumni magazine with surprise and pleasure….I sincerely hope that the recently published slander by the Chicago Tribune [sic] does not cause you to deviate from your plan.” 561 Another Dartmouth alumnus A.G. Curtis expressed similar support for Dickey and his Great Issues course. As he extolled in his letter:

The morning’s mail brought reprints of Chicago Tribune’s stories and editorials on Dartmouth…This is the acid test of greatness. Dartmouth continues to move with the times as has always been her tradition. Had the Tribune’s stories been in any other vein, you would have faced with the very serious problem of explaining to your alumni what the hell goes on. You may be perfectly sure that Dartmouth Alumni are back of you…More power to you. 562

One final example is a letter sent to Dickey by Eugene Hotchkiss who concluded by offering his unfailing support of Dickey and his presidency. “Good luck John,” Hotchkiss wrote, “Remember that we have absolute confidence in you as President of Dartmouth and in your judgment in handling this whole unpleasant matter.” 563

Despite the criticism and challenges it received by the media, institutions throughout higher education recognized the relevancy of Dartmouth’s course and, in turn, began to implement similar senior seminars at their own institutions. A 1948 memorandum from the Dean
of the College to Dickey reveals that approximately 75 institutions had already begun the process of adding a Great Issues-type course to their curriculum, many modeling their courses after Dartmouth’s. Such institutions ranged from large, research-focused institutions like the University of California, Berkeley to smaller, private liberal arts institutions like Pomona College. The effects of Dartmouth’s “Great Issues” course, therefore, were far-reaching.

Dartmouth’s own “Great Issues” senior course would continue well into the 1960s, its longevity a testimony to the course’s saliency both in content and in relation to the objectives of liberal education. By the 1950-1951 academic year, course topics had evolved to explore problems such as McCarthyism, the media, and labor management, and lectures entitled “Mass Media in a Free Society” and “What Labor Wants and Why” reflect the course’s continuing aim to address the most salient issues of contemporary society. Regardless of its evolution, however, the lessons learned from the experiences of World War II had found an enduring place within Dartmouth’s liberal arts curriculum through the college’s “Great Issues” course.

In contrast to the other three institutions, Franklin & Marshall struggled to define itself and its curriculum in the early post-World War II years. Unlike Earlham or Swarthmore, little attention was devoted by Distler or other college administrators and faculty to the role of religion within the life of the institution despite the college’s continuing ties with the German Reformed Church. Instead, the years between the 1945 and 1950 were filled only with stalled efforts to re-design Franklin & Marshall’s curriculum.

Writing about the post-war curricular change attempts at Franklin & Marshall, institutional historian Sally Griffith contends:

Despite frequent statements about the importance of liberal arts education, the college was drifting toward vocationalism….Distler’s concern about long-term financial stability dove-tailed with his sincere desire to serve educational needs in
the wider community. He promoted an eclectic range of programs that sometimes had tenuous connection to liberal education.\textsuperscript{566}

Analysis of the curricular revisions implemented at Franklin & Marshall in the initial post-war years reveals that Griffith’s assertion about the institution’s shift toward vocationalism and Distler’s role in this shift is correct. Many of Distler’s curricular ideas involved capitalizing on the community-college relationships initiated during the war. Two examples highlight this agenda.

In 1947, Franklin & Marshall established a Division of Graduate Studies designed to provide graduate-level instruction in chemistry and physics and to lead to a Master of Science degree for participating students. Monies to fund this division came from nearby Lancaster employers Armstrong Cork (now Armstrong World Industries) and RCA (Radio Corporation of America), and the companies lent members of their staff with advanced science degrees to teach courses within the division. That same year, the college also transformed its Evening Division of studies founded during the war into the Division of Community Services. Like the Division of Graduate Studies, this program was housed on the Franklin & Marshall campus, but was funded by local businesses. The program offered a variety of vocational courses to both Franklin & Marshall students and men from the surrounding Lancaster community. The content of some of the courses offered by the Division were tailored to meet the requests of sponsoring local companies whereas other courses served simply as college-level classes open to the entire community. Distler viewed both divisions as great relationship-builders between his college and the surrounding Lancaster community. Writing to the Board of Trustees in June 1947, Distler explained, “It should be understood that this program will in no way change the day-time
program, but it will definitely demonstrate to our community that we want to be of educational service wherever we reasonably can.”

Despite his fixation on the Lancaster community, Distler worked to change the day-time program at the college as well. First, departments and partnerships were created to help expand the institution’s curricular offerings. For example, geography and music departments were established at the college in the fall of 1946, and by 1950 a cooperative program had been established with Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and the Carnegie Institute of Technology allowing students studying engineering at Franklin & Marshall to transfer to either program to complete their Master’s degrees after three years of study at the college.

Second, Distler aimed to revise the college’s general education program. In 1948, Distler suggested the formation of a committee to “undertake a basic and long range study of the whole curriculum”. Sixteen faculty members were appointed to this newly-established committee led by Dean of the College Daniel Z. Gibson, and they began their efforts by developing a two-year sequence of interdepartmental courses similar to the two years’ program implemented at Swarthmore College. Little progress was made, however. In a 1949 memo to the Board of Trustees, Gibson explained that his committee’s efforts had stalled due largely to the conflicting beliefs amongst committee members. “Major differences of opinion have arisen not about the ends to be achieved, but about the means to those ends,” Gibson wrote.

The committee continued its work into the next decade, finally implementing in the spring of 1951 an “experimental” three-semester series of humanities courses. These courses were developed based on the concepts of, as Griffith recounts, “the effects of pursuit of honor;” “the varieties of love;” “freedom and bondage;” and “justice, divine and human,” and were integrated into a curricular program modeled after the University of Chicago’s “Great Books”
Unfortunately, the effects of this experimental, curricular program remain unknown as existing institutional documents do not discuss this program further or elucidate its success or failure.

By the end of the 1940s, Franklin & Marshall still lacked a true liberal arts curriculum. Reviews from the Middle States Association’s March 1950 visit to the college claimed that Franklin & Marshall’s curriculum “lacked coherence” and did not fulfill its statement of objectives, which “resembled that of other liberal arts college which propose to develop Christian gentlemen and cultivated citizens.” The report continued to criticize the college for its lack of attention to religion within its curriculum and its apparent “pre-professional emphasis.” The reviewers concluded, “At present, one gets the definite impression that there is more interest in the work of the student in his major department than in the whole development of the individual,” and recommended that Franklin & Marshall return to a “truly liberal arts base.”

Distler was outraged by the Association’s assertions regarding the college’s curriculum. In his 1950 annual report to the Board of Trustees, Distler disputed the reviewers’ findings, contending that the liberal education Franklin & Marshall provided was the appropriate blend of general education, liberal education, and vocational training. He stated, “It is my feeling that in the best sense of a liberal education one does both liberal and vocational training.” By this time, however, it appears that Franklin & Marshall was no closer to reaching a consensus about the college’s objectives and the curriculum to which it subscribed; such debates, as we have already seen, continued well into the next decade.

Franklin & Marshall thus lagged behind its sister liberal arts colleges in its post-war establishment of revised liberal arts curriculum. According to Middle States, the college
professed to offer a traditional liberal arts curriculum, but, in reality, it offered a pre-professional curriculum. This “pre-professional” curricular focus that received criticism from the Middle States Association would in later years serve to distinguish the college from other liberal arts institutions, yet the curricular confusion and conflicting institutional visions that characterized the early post-war years at Franklin & Marshall would severely retard the college’s growth in the upcoming decade. Consequently, in the years following World War II, Franklin & Marshall was moving away from the liberal arts tradition upon which it was founded rather than re-infusing these principles into the college like occurred at Dartmouth, Earlham, or Swarthmore during this same period.

The Importance of “Living Endowment”

Writing to fellow Earlham alumni in the winter of 1945, President Jones described the current state of his institution as the following:

An overall [sic] view of the Earlham situation suggests a ship that has been riding out a storm with the hatches nailed down and the sails partly furled. One now senses that the hatches are up and that the sails have been caught by a new breeze. With proper devotion to duty, and full understanding of, and commitment to the course which we are undertaking to follow together, a period of genuine progress may be expected at Earlham.573

The Earlham ship was able to sail into its post-war success largely because of the support of its alumni body. The financial assistance provided by Earlham alumni during the war period through the college’s Free Will Fund allowed Earlham to stay afloat even though the war-time waters were turbulent and repeatedly threatened to capsize the college.

Dartmouth, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges also stayed afloat, in part, because of the support they received from their alumni bodies. Hopkins once referred to these important individuals as his institution’s “living endowment,” and nowhere was the strength of
an institution’s “living endowment” during World War II more apparent than at Dartmouth College. As Dickey boasted about his Dartmouth alumni in a 1947 appeal for the college’s Alumni Fund:

Dartmouth is men. More probably than any other American college of comparable standing the capacity of Dartmouth is the doing, the daily doing for her of her men as a whole. It ranges from the hard job of interviewing applicants for admission to the genuinely tender task of a class officer ministering to the fellowship of a small group whose Hanover reunions are over. It is the year around service of the Fund worker and the nearly 14,000 contributors whose annual giving gives reality to the greatest assets in Dartmouth’s capacity – her ‘living endowment.’

Although smaller in size, the alumni bodies of Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore were no less an integral part of the life of the institution than the alumni of Dartmouth, and both the war and post-war years illustrate the significance of this relationship.

Throughout the war period, institutions relied on mailings as a means of keeping their alumni body informed about the state of the college. Alumni magazines and campaign letters told of declining enrollments, dwindling coffers, and the strategies being employed to overcome both. “As enrollment shrinks income dwindles. Fully half of the College income flows from tuition fees and this source, already reduced by a half-million dollars, may practically dry up within the coming months. Meanwhile expenses mount under war-time conditions,” a contributing author explained the present condition at Dartmouth College to alumni readers of the *Dartmouth Alumni Magazine*. This policy of maintaining a well-informed alumni body did not originate during the war period or emerge as a result of the crisis the war created. Instead, this line of dialogue between institution and alumnus was established well before World War II – Dartmouth College, for example, launched its alumni magazine in 1905 – but the war provided
an impetus for solidifying the bond between the two and the solidification of this relationship had profound implications for each of the four colleges during the war period.

Chapter four outlines how Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore’s alumni bodies responded to early calls for support by opening their wallets and donating the monies their alma maters desperately needed to begin to replace lost tuition revenue. The generosity exhibited by alumni in the first years of the war continued through the remainder of the war period. A quick glance at any of the four institution’s financial statements for the war period shows the enormity of the monies received from alumni. Often these gifts came to the colleges through campaign appeals and the unrestricted designation under which they were received allowed the monies to be used by institutions in whatever way was most needed. At all four institutions these monies went directly toward offsetting – or partially offsetting – the loss of tuition revenue caused by the declines in male student enrollment they experienced. The gifts each institution received varied by year, and the amounts varied by institution, but all contributed significantly toward reducing deficits within institutional budgets. A few institutional examples illustrate this point.

At Franklin & Marshall College, monies generated from tuition declined sharply with each year of the war; for example, income from student fees dropped from $207,422 ($2.51 million) in 1943 to $71,436 ($862,000) in 1944. Fees received by the college from the Navy V-12 program helped to offset these declines in tuition dollars, but the $5,688 ($68,600) and $12,517 ($151,000) the college received from alumni contributions in 1943 and 1944 respectively further aided the college’s budget. By 1945, the amount donated by the college’s alumni had more than doubled previous donation sums, with contributions totaling $42,195 ($509,000). Earlham College’s budget reveals a similar story. The college ended its 1941-
1942 academic year with tuition fees totaling $98,987 ($1.2 million), but by the 1944-1945 academic year tuition fees generated by student enrollment totaled only $68,093 ($822,000). In turn, Earlham’s 1944 Free Will Fund helped to raise $10,000 ($121,000) to help balance the institution’s budget.\textsuperscript{578}

Swarthmore and Dartmouth have their own tales of an alumni body coming to the aid of an ailing institution. At Swarthmore, alumni campaign funds contributed between four and seven percent of the college’s total income during the war period – a fair amount given the infancy of this relationship. Alumni gifts were largest at Dartmouth. In the 1943-1944 academic year alone, Dartmouth alumni contributed $72,508 ($875,000) toward the college’s income. The next year contribution totaled $181,447 ($2.2 million), an increase of more than 150 percent, and in 1947 alumni donated an incredible $345,900 ($4.17 million) to the college. Dartmouth’s alumni proved to be an extremely generous group, providing enough financial support each year for the college to operate with a surplus, which was then banked to establish a Post War Reconversion Fund that by 1947 carried a balance of $778,563 ($9.4 million).\textsuperscript{579} The important financial role alumni played in ensuring the institutional survival of all four colleges during the war period thus is undeniable.

With checks for money came stories. Some financial gifts arrived at institutions with little more than a note asking the college to accept the alumnus’/alumna’s humble gift. As one Dartmouth alumnus wrote, “I enclose herewith my Alumni Fund check. Sorry it can’t be bigger but I did manage to double last year’s pittance. Hope to be able to do the same next year, whether Dartmouth is an army camp or a liberal college.”\textsuperscript{580} Other checks came accompanied by letters that told of satisfaction with institutional decisions being made or of remembrance of the institution the authors left behind. In a letter sent to Hopkins by a Navy ensign stationed in the
Pacific, the alumnus boasted of the Dartmouth ties that united alumni throughout the war arena. He exclaimed:

I believe it is about time for the usual acknowledgement of the responsibilities of all alumni. Please accept the enclosed as my share. It’s hackneyed by now, I know, yet the wonder of Dartmouth men making fact of the ‘round the girdled earth they roam, fancy is a constant one to me. When we are free to ask, there will be stories of Dartmouth men meeting on the remotest corners of the globe – and with a bond that makes those New Hampshire Hills seem close once more.\textsuperscript{581}

Each letter received, whether simple or detailed in its prose, tells the story of a unique relationship formed between institution and student. In his post-war appeal to Dartmouth alumni, Dickey asserted that his institution’s greatest asset was her living endowment. This concept was realized on many campuses before the war, but the experiences provided by World War II reinforced for those both on- and off-campus the importance of this relationship.

With the end of the war came attempts to further strengthen the bond between alma mater and alumnus/alumna. Financial support from alumni would remain a crucial component of the relationship between the two entities, but alumni in the post-war years were invited to participate in institutional decision-making as it pertained to issues like curriculum and facilities planning. In 1945, the Dartmouth Board of Trustees appointed a special Postwar Projects Committee formed by members of the Dartmouth Alumni Council for “the making of decisions on matters of policy of the greatest importance affecting the postwar program of the College and the ways in which the help of the alumni will be sought to achieve these objectives.”\textsuperscript{582} The Committee focused on addressing the question: “Granting that our aim must ever be the strengthening of the College, the keeping of it as a well-rounded college of liberal arts, what should be added to achieve this aim?”\textsuperscript{583} Months of committee work resulted in the recommendation to Dickey and
the Board of the addition of two buildings – a physics building and a building of drama and arts – to the campus to be paid for by funds from the Postwar Reconversion Fund.

The latter building, which would later be named The Hopkins Center, was intended to serve both as a tribute to Hopkins’ presidency and as a memorial to the students lost in World War II, but the building also reflected a conscious effort by the committee to reinforce the importance of arts within a liberal arts education. Speaking on behalf of the committee in justification of their decision for the arts and drama center, one committee member wrote:

The fear has been openly expressed that the very purposes of the liberal college were likely to be lost sight of in the post-war pressures for the development of science unless definite attempt was made to offset these by words and acts in which we asserted the education of the liberal college as indispensable to the development of American civilization.584

Curricular changes implemented at Dartmouth through the addition of the Great Issues courses reflected the national trend toward expanding the liberal arts canon, and the recommendation of the construction of a drama and arts center further strengthened the role of the humanities on campus at a time when science was coming to dominate higher education.

On the Swarthmore campus, with the post-war years came the ten year anniversary of the college’s collaboration with its alumni. This anniversary offered both the college and its alumni body the opportunity to reflect on the relationship they had recently created. In a May 31, 1948 memorandum to the President of the Alumni Association, Nason presented his views on the future of the college and the Association, outlining the ways in which he felt the Alumni Association could best contribute to the continued success of the institution. In addition to the financial support the Association could provide, Nason envisioned the Association continuing to play an important advisory role in institutional policy-making. He stressed the system of governance that gave the college’s board and faculty body final authority in all matters of
educational policy, but he believed that the united voice of the Swarthmore alumni body could provide helpful suggestions and advice in future decision-making. Thus, in many cases, World War II helped to cement the relationship between the college and its alumni body.

**War Returns**

The peace and prosperity that followed the end of World War II were short-lived within higher education. Writing in the summer of 1950, President Henry M. Wriston of Brown University declared the upcoming years a time of “financial hurricane” for the nation’s colleges. Increasing costs combined with declining enrollments threatened a return of the economic challenges colleges faced during the previous two world wars and the Depression. A June 1950 article in *Time* magazine presented a similar forecast for higher education. The article, “Crisis in the Colleges: Can They Pay Their Way,” left little question about the uncertain future institutions again faced. As the article outlined for readers, poor investment returns and the increasing costs of operation erased the years of financial prosperity that accompanied the end of World War II. In addition, the trickling of the flood of veterans into higher education by the mid-1950s combined with the low birth-rate years of the Great Depression meant diminished demands for admission and enrollment. The Defense Department’s 1950 Bill for Universal Military Training threatened male student enrollment further through its proposal that all young men acceptable to the Armed Forces be inducted at the age of 18 for eight years of service in the military. Consequently, by 1950 it appeared as if higher education had come full circle within the span of just a decade.

Then, in the early hours of Sunday, June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded the Republic of South Korea. Two days later, on June 27, 1950, President Harry S. Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to aid South Korea. The United States was again at war, and higher education,
again, found itself on the cusp of war-time operations. Male students would again be called to serve their nation, and their absences from campus would again challenge institutional survival.

The story of World War II and higher education thus may end, in part, with the emergence of this newest international conflict; with this new war would come new hurdles for higher education to surmount. Yet, the lessons taught by the experiences of World War II would be fundamental in negotiating institutional operations during this war, and the story of higher education during World War II therefore continues well past the nation’s 1945 armistices with Europe and Japan.

Endnotes

457 The entire Yale Report of 1828 can be accessed at the following web address: http://www.higher-ed.org/resources/Yale/1828_curriculum.pdf.
458 Frank Aydelotte, Excerpts from Board Letters on Size of College, undated.
461 1933 Admissions Policy as cited in the *Dartmouth Alumni Magazine*, October 1947, 1.
463 Memorandum to Dickey from Special Committee on Academic Adjustments, December 27, 1945.
464 Memorandum to Dickey from Special Committee on Academic Adjustments, December 27, 1945.
465 Albert I. Dickerson, “Enter Ye in by the Narrow Gate,” *Dartmouth Alumni Magazine*, October 1947, 1.
466 Ibid, 5.
468 For more information on the educational opportunities provided by the Army General Education Development Program to veterans stationed overseas during World War II, see Louis Harold Strehow, “History of the Army General Education Development Program: Origin, Significance, and Implications,” (Ed.D. Thesis, 1967).
470 Special Committee on Academic Adjustments, “Questions and Answers for Former Dartmouth Students and Former Members of the Navy V-12 Unit at Dartmouth,” 1946.
Reprint of Telegram in Statement Concerning Story in *New York Post*, Tuesday, August 7th, Relating to Dartmouth’s Admissions Policy, August 9, 1945.

Ibid.

Letter from Hopkins to Mr. Herman Shumlin, April 2, 1945, 1.

Letter from Hopkins to Mr. Herman Shumlin, April 2, 1945, 3.

Letter from Richard Kohn to Hopkins, August 9, 1945.

Letter from Grace M. Alpern to Hopkins, August 8, 1945.

Letter from “one of God’s chose people” to Hopkins, August 18, 1945.

Letter from “A member of the Armed Forces” to Hopkins, August 20, 1945.


Letter from Joseph A. Ford to Hopkins, August 9, 1945.


Dartmouth College Bulletin, Number 4, November 1946, 3.

Untitled enrollment document, Swarthmore College, March 1, 1928


Untitled enrollment document, Swarthmore College, March 1, 1928


Dartmouth Alumni Magazine, April 1948, 23.

Swarthmore College Statistical Record of Enrollment, 1949, 52.


Ibid, 6.


Ibid, 181.

Evangelical Quakers are unique in their belief that all people are in need of salvation, and they tie salvation to the authority of scripture and mission activities. In contrast, Liberal Quakers embrace experience, not scriptural understanding or mission, as the guiding principle of the faith. For more information on the differences between Quaker traditions see: Pink Dandelion, *The Liturgies of Quakerism*, (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2005); Pink Dandelion, *The Quakers: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Carole Spencer, *Holiness: The Soul of Quakerism* (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 2007).

Ibid, 185.

There are four theological ideas that comprise the pillars of the Quaker faith. These are: “1) the centrality of direct inward encounter with God and revelation, and forms of worship which allows this to be experienced; 2) a vote-less way of doing church business based on the idea of corporate direct guidance; 3) the spiritual equality of everyone and idea of the ‘the priesthood of all believers’; and 4) the preference for peace and pacifism rather than war, and a commitment to other forms of social witness.” Pink Dandelion, *The Quakers: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2.

Ibid, 185.

According to *Faith and Practice: Book of Discipline of the North Carolina Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends*, “Inner Light” or the “Seed” is “the center of the life of Friends and the ultimate source of all our testimonies. The Inner Light is what Friends call ‘that of God’ in every person, which Friends believe, can be known directly without another’s interpretation. The Inner Light gives illumination and clarity to conscience, generating an inward compulsion to follow the leadings of its Spirit….The Inner Light is our experience of and connection with God….Friends regard their religion in worship and daily life as being guided by the Inner Light.” *Faith and Practice: Book of Discipline of the North Carolina Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends*, (NC: 1983), 2.
6-9. Specific interpretations of the meaning of Inner Light vary slightly by individual and by Quaker tradition, however.

506 Ibid, 3.
507 Jones, The Ideals of Earlham College, undated.
509 Bulletin of Earlham College, 1941-1942, 123.
513 As cited within Letter from Jones to J. Gardner, V.P. of the Carnegie Corporation, December 16, 1950.
514 Letter from Jones to J. Gardner, V.P. of the Carnegie Corporation, December 16, 1950.
515 Ibid.
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518 Liberal Education and the Future of Swarthmore, Paper read at meeting of the Swarthmore Chapter of the Association of American University Professors, January 14, 1943, 1.
519 Nason as cited in Liberal Education and the Future of Swarthmore, Paper read at meeting of the Swarthmore Chapter of the Association of American University Professors, January 14, 1943, 1.
524 Ibid, 54.
525 Ibid, 59.
526 Ibid, 60.
527 Liberal Education and the Future of Swarthmore, Paper read at meeting of the Swarthmore Chapter of the Association of American University Professors, January 14, 1943, 5.
528 The entire text of “General Education in a Free Society: A Report of the Harvard Committee” can be accessed via the following link: http://www.archive.org/details/generaleducation032440mbp.
530 Ibid, 65, 181.
532 Ibid.
533 Ibid, 3.
535 Nason in letter to Swarthmore faculty, October 23, 1947.
538 Ibid.
539 Swarthmore College Committee on the Curriculum for the First Two Years, “Report to the Faculty,” May 27, 1946, 3.
540 Swarthmore College Committee on the Curriculum for the First Two Years, “Report to the Faculty,” April 11, 1947, 1.
541 Ibid, 1.
545 Ibid, 10.


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Ibid, 14.

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Figure 57: Eugene Griffith, “Another Dartmouth College Case,” *The Chicago Tribune*, October 22, 1948.


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563 Memorandum from Richard W. Morin to John Dickey, December 22, 1948.


567 Franklin & Marshall Faculty Minutes, February 1948.


574 Unnamed author, “Round the Girdled Earth” alumni mailing, 1943.

575 Figures in parentheses throughout this document indicate monetary amounts adjusted for inflation according to the Consumer Price Index for 2009.

576 Franklin & Marshall College Alumni Association Reports, 1941-1946.


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579 Unnamed 1933 alumni, “Round the Girdled Earth” alumni mailing, 1943.

580 Unnamed alumni, “Round the Girdled Earth” alumni mailing, 1943.

581 Sidney C. Hayward, Memorandum to Members of Alumni Fund and Committee from the Council of Alumni, December 12, 1945.

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583 Letter to Halsey C. Edgerton, June 12, 1944.

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The college which is overcautious in its method or overfearful of making a mistake in its policy withers intellectually and dies spiritually even more promptly than the college which is guilty of mistaken boldness suffers grievous harm. - Ernest M. Hopkins

CHAPTER SEVEN
With a Mission to Survive: Institutional Adaptation and the Role of Institutional Identity

“Mr. Churchill has said that our first objective is to survive…and that can be applied to Dartmouth College as well as to the United States and the nations and institutions which make up the democratic world,” Hopkins stated in a war-time address to Dartmouth College alumni.\textsuperscript{589} War and higher education is a recurring topic. From the Revolutionary War to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, higher education has operated during times of war, and each conflict brings new lessons about adaptation and institutional survival.

The experiences of Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges during World War II provide an historic lens through which we can examine how institutions negotiate periods of crisis. Declining enrollments and subsequent tuition losses challenged these four institutions in ways seldom before experienced in their institutional histories, and both issues required institutional decision-making that blended urgency with intentionality. The war-time stories of the four colleges, thus, are stories of adaptation, each a tale of institutional response to external pressures

\textbf{Chapter Review}

The influential role of institutional identity (i.e., mission, culture, and structure) unites each chapter of this study through the war-time narrative told within. Chapter 2 provided a brief synopsis of the histories of the four institutions within this study. Beginning with the founding of each college, the chapter detailed the mission and historical traditions of the colleges, which influenced, in part, the decision-making that emerged at Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin &
Marshall, and Swarthmore during the war period. In addition, discussion of the pre-war histories of the four colleges exposes an institutional identity predicated on both the near and more-distant past.

The historical context behind the nation’s and higher education’s preparation for the impending war was presented in Chapter 3. The lessons learned from WWI, the role of the federal government in the preparation for war, the impact of the Selective Service Act of 1940 on higher education, and the role of educational associations during the pre-war years provided a context for understanding the challenges Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore faced on the eve of the nation’s entrance into World War II.

With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor came the realization that higher education would have to adapt to a period of war-time operation. Chapter 4 revealed the adaptive strategies that Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges employed in the initial years of the war. Discussion first explored how the war affected the American “home front” and how these changes affected higher education. Then, an examination of widely-implemented, adaptive policies such as the establishment of special war committees, the development of a war-focused, “defense” curriculum, and the extension of admissions opportunities to “minority” students highlight higher education’s efforts to blend national and institutional need. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the emergence of a relationship between the military and higher education through the creation of the Navy V-12 program. For participating liberal arts colleges like Dartmouth, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore, the success of this relationship relied on the artful marriage of liberal arts and military tradition.

Discussion of the colleges’ war-time adaptive policies continued in Chapter 5 with an examination of the Navy V-12 program and its contribution to the survival of Dartmouth,
Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore during the war crisis. Within this chapter, Navy program requirements were juxtaposed with traditional college operations to develop a portrayal of the “war college” that emerged from the hosting of the V-12 program. In addition, discussion of the important role alumni played in sustaining colleges like Earlham through the war illustrated the continuing saliency of external constituents within the life and function of the four institutions despite the external crisis each institution negotiated. The chapter then closed with an exploration of the ways in which the four colleges prepared for post-war operations as the end of World War II drew near.

Finally, Chapter 6 revealed the long-term implications of the war on the four institutions. Issues related to student enrollment, the returning veteran, and the revision of educational and curricular objectives within this post-war context demonstrate how lessons learned from the war influenced each college on the eve of a new decade. Peacetime operations were short-lived, however, as the narrative of Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore during the 1940s concludes with the introduction of the new war period each college faced following Congress’ 1950 declaration of war on Korea.

**Institutional Identity and Adaptation**

This study of Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges from 1939-1950 was guided by the question: How did private, liberal arts colleges survive the challenges presented by the nation’s involvement in World War II? The answer reveals a complicated amalgamation of policies developed to allow the respective institutions to prevail over the challenges the war provided. No single institutional policy was universally adopted nor was a single institutional policy successful in achieving the ultimate goal of institutional preservation. Some policies were implemented in an attempt to serve the nation and meet
emerging war needs whereas others were adopted to provide each college with the students, money, and morale needed to preserve the institution for the duration of the war. Analysis of the policies implemented by the institutions to overcome the challenges of World War II, however, reveals commonalities amongst the four colleges. The establishment of special, faculty-led committees, the acceleration of operating schedules, the adjustment of curricula, the expansion of student access, and the militarization of campus all reflect adaptive strategies employed by Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore during the war period and underscores how institutions can act in similar ways while remaining true to individual institutional identity. Although Chapters 4 and 5 explore these adaptive policies in greater detail, a summary of the common policies is offered below to highlight these shared features and to emphasize the guiding role institutional identity played through these adaptive strategies.

**Creation of Faculty-Led, War Committees**

One of the initial ways colleges adapted to war-time operations was through the establishment of special war-related, faculty-led committees established to help navigate the institution and its students through the unique challenges ahead. The agendas and functions of each committee varied by purpose and by institution, yet each reflects institutional attempts to develop an administrative system whereby collaborative effort and consensus could continue to guide the institutional decision-making that occurred in the first years of the war. Even though a tradition of shared governance pre-dated the emergence of the war at all four institutions, the special committees established during World War extended the faculty’s role further within the war-time governance of the institution by including the faculty’s voice in non-curricular institutional issues like student enrollment management and campus emergency preparedness.
At Dartmouth and Franklin & Marshall, for example, the respective faculty-led Committee on Defense Instruction and War Planning Committee adapted institutional liberal arts curricula to better serve emerging war needs. Swarthmore College’s Central Executive Committee on Emergency Defense worked with seven sub-committees to prepare the campus for an enemy attack whereas the institution’s Committee on Medical Defense advocated for the Swarthmore students whose lives had been interrupted by the war. A similar committee – the Selective Service Advisory Committee – established at Franklin & Marshall in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor aimed to help students understand selective service policies and also to provide counsel to students plagued by guilt about their decision to choose academic study over military service. (It is not apparent from existing institutional records whether Earlham College established any special war-time committees.)

Committees like these were largely responsible for initial institutional adjustments to the demands introduced by the war. Through these groups, committee members, administrators, and college presidents worked jointly to develop the academic and administrative policies that allowed each institution to begin to adapt to the war period. In addition, this institutional collaboration reflects the creation of a shared purpose essential to institutional survival in a time of crisis like World War II.

**Implementation of a “Defense” Curriculum**

The war-time faculty committees at Dartmouth and Franklin & Marshall led their institutions in the development of a modified, war-time liberal arts curriculum designed to be of service to both the nation and the colleges’ students. Elimination, adaptation, and addition characterized the curricular transformations that occurred in the first years of the war. At Dartmouth, “non-essential” social science courses were eliminated to make room within the
curriculum for the increasing student demands for natural science courses that accompanied the war’s arrival. The conversion of traditional courses like general chemistry into a defense course on *War Gases* and English Literature into a course on *The Spoken and Written Word in Wartime* reflects institutional efforts to develop courses adapted to include teachable, relevant “elements of defense.” Newly-designed, defense-related courses like *Diplomatic History of the World; Army and Navy Accounting;* and *Military Pyrotechnics* were also added to the liberal arts curriculum at both Dartmouth and Franklin & Marshall.

Rather than adapting to meet present war-time needs, both Earlham and Swarthmore altered their liberal arts curricula during the war period to prepare students for the post-war needs of the world. The two Quaker institutions created a new area of curricular study entitled *Relief and Reconstruction.* The curriculum featured courses such as *Contemporary World Problems* and *American Foreign Relations,* each designed to teach students how to aid in the reconstruction of the war-torn world through their post-war service abroad.

The adaptation of the liberal arts curriculum during the war period to include new or modified courses illustrates a blending of institutional identity and war-time need. “Traditional” history and English courses, for example, gained new-found relevancy as classic topics like the Battle of Antietam and the writings of Shakespeare were adapted to address pressing issues related to war, peace, and international relations. In addition, the introduction of new, war-related courses to the “time-honored” liberal arts curriculum demonstrates how faculty members and administrators at Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore preserved an institutional identity rooted in the liberal arts curricular tradition while simultaneously adapting that identity to meet broader, war-related demands.
Adjustment of Collegiate Operating Schedules

The implementation of accelerated academic programming further reflects how institutional identity was extended to help aid in the national war effort. Recommendations that emerged from the January 1942 Baltimore Conference of higher education leaders stressed the utility of accelerated academic programming in the initial war years. With male student enrollment declining at an already alarming rate, conference attendees believed that an acceleration of academic calendars was necessary in order to begin to account for these enrollment losses and to preserve institutional finances. The result throughout higher education was the adoption of year-round operating schedules implemented for the duration of the war period.

At Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore, four distinct terms of study – fall, spring, summer session 1 and summer session 2 – created year-round operating schedules at each institution. This adaptive strategy was effective in maintaining student enrollment and subsequent tuition revenue in two main ways. First, the acceleration of academic schedules extended the availability of academic study into the summer months. This extension, in turn, allowed male students to pursue their degrees year-round, thus encouraging them to finish their degrees before they enlisted in the military. The acceleration of their studies and the promise of entering the military with an officer’s commission – which resulted from one’s earning of their college degree prior to enlistment – provided the enticement many male students needed to remain in college despite the widespread desire to enlist. Second, the implementation of four terms of academic study allowed four distinct opportunities for new students to enter the college. (The one exception to this claim is Dartmouth College who, despite its four sessions, only allowed freshmen students to begin their studies at two points in the college’s academic
calendar.) These additional “entry” points helped to establish a continual flow of students into the institutions despite the decreasing numbers of men seeking postsecondary education during the war period.

Accelerated programming became the first visual indication that World War II would demand higher education and individual institutional identity to change to meet the challenges the war provided. The absence of the traditional “summer vacation” created an environment of constant academic study characterized by heavy course loads and intense study. This new academic schedule, in turn, caused students to focus their priorities more on academics and less on extra-curricular activities. With this readjustment of priorities came the decline of campus activities like intercollegiate sports and the celebration of beloved institutional holidays. The absence of the annual Winter Carnival festivities at Dartmouth and the elimination of the Saturday afternoon football game at Franklin & Marshall, for example, signaled to those at the colleges that the war in Europe had now come to their campuses in New Hampshire and Pennsylvania.

Growth of Intentional Enrollment Management

The war provided all four institutions with the opportunity to re-evaluate their existing admissions policies and the institutional identities that guided those policies. Institutional mission, student demand, and the need to compensate for declining student enrollment elicited conversations at Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore about who could and who could not attend their institutions. The federal government’s incarceration of Nisei students and families within internment camps encouraged Earlham College to embrace its Quaker mission built on the premise of the “equality of man” and admit 12 Nisei students to study at the institution during the war. On the other hand, concerns about the abandonment of
Franklin & Marshall’s all-male mission and Dartmouth’s high academic standards thwarted conversations at these institutions about the extension of access to women and high school seniors respectively. The need to maintain enrollment levels, however, caused Franklin & Marshall to open its once-exclusive doors to local Lancaster community members who were permitted to study at the college part-time through its newly-established evening division of classes. Finally, Earlham’s long-term success with integration combined with increased student concern for racial equality translated into Swarthmore’s extension of educational opportunities to Black students for the first time in the institution’s history.

Through these access issues, we see how institutional identity affected resulting decisions as they relate to institutional enrollment management. In many cases, the preservation of institutional identity (i.e., the retention of an all-male college mission or a tradition of academic excellence) outweighed the enrollment needs generated by the loss of service-age male students. At two of the institutions – Dartmouth and Franklin & Marshall – faculty members, alumni, and students all voiced their discontent with the abandonment, however temporary, of the enrollment policies that helped to define the institution. Conversely, for Earlham and Swarthmore, preservation of institutional identity through adherence to Quaker traditions despite the war crisis contributed to the expansion of enrollment to minority populations previously excluded from the colleges.

Militarization of Campus

The Navy’s July 1943 arrival on campuses transformed the traditional liberal arts institution into a war college. While the elimination of extracurricular activities hinted at the war’s effects on higher education, the arrival of Navy V-12 cadets made the implications of the war undeniable. For Dartmouth and Franklin & Marshall College, previous relationships with the
military formed through Dartmouth’s Navy Indoctrination School and Franklin & Marshall’s CAA Pilot Training program laid, in part, the foundation for interest in the Navy’s V-12 program. The enrollment and financial security the Navy’s program promised also made the program too alluring to ignore. Thus, fraternity houses and cafeterias were converted into barracks and mess halls as the two institutions sought to attract and then accommodate the Navy V-12 program.

Swarthmore College was not as quick to try to attract the Navy as either Dartmouth or Franklin & Marshall. The 1943 elimination of the proposed CPS Reserve Force by Congress, however, left Swarthmore with few options as it struggled to maintain its declining male student enrollment. Thus, this Quaker institution also welcomed Navy V-12 cadets to its campus in July of 1943 after President Nason acknowledged the fiscal security the program could bring to his college.

With the Navy came innumerable institutional changes. Institutional leadership was now divided between a president responsible for the administration of the college and an Admiral or Vice Admiral responsible for administration of the V-12 program. Faculty returned to the college classroom as students where many were “re-tooled” to teach the mathematics, physics, and mechanical drawing courses required by the V-12 program’s blending of Naval instruction and the traditional liberal arts curriculum. Additionally, college yearbooks and newspaper articles show the infiltration of military life on the campuses through photos of uniformed men drilling on football fields and marching in formation to class. Still, individual institutional identity was maintained through each president’s skillful merger of the Navy’s demands and college traditions. Adapted curricula, “retooled” faculty, and a student culture dominated by military
routine all reflect an institutional identity adjusted but nonetheless largely preserved despite the
Navy’s presence on each campus.

**Institutional Identity and Crisis Management**

The emergence of World War II brought a unity within higher education. Led by the
recommendations generated by the January 1942 Baltimore Conference, presidents and
institutional governing boards implemented adaptive policies in the early war years that
integrated institutional and national need. The policy direction offered by the Baltimore
Conference resulted in the adoption of universal war-time policies (e.g., accelerated
programming, curricular revisions) throughout higher education.

The escalation of the war combined with reforms to the 1940 Selective Service Act and
the emergence of university-based war research shattered this unanimity, however. Institutions
like the small, private college that lacked the resources to engage in war research were left to
identify and then implement other non-research-based adaptive strategies that would preserve the
institution through the remainder of the war period. Thus, by the middle of World War II,
diverse adaptive strategies emerged not only between research (e.g., universities) and non-
research institutions (e.g., private, liberal arts colleges), but also among individuals institutions.
The policies that resulted were shaped predominantly by institutional identity.

The war-time experiences of Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore
exemplify the salient role of institutional identity in the implementation and rejection of the
adaptive strategies of the war crisis. Although seemingly uniform at first glance, a closer analysis
of the deviations in adaptive policies implemented or rejected by the colleges in this study makes
the influence of institutional identity on the unique, institution-based strategies proposed and/or
adopted during the war even more apparent. For example, all four institutions explored the
possibility of extending access opportunities through the war period, yet not all access-related
policy suggestions were actually implemented. Identity affected the decision to implement or to
reject each proposal. At Earlham College the decision to admit Nisei students raised few
objections from campus constituents because of the institution’s Quaker tradition whereas the
proposal to admit women at Franklin & Marshall met harsh criticism and was thus rejected as a
policy option because of its challenge to the college’s all-male mission. In these two cases,
institutional mission and tradition affected the distinct, war-time admissions policy adaptations
that emerged at the two colleges.

The structure, culture, and mission of each college therefore contributed to the creation of
an institutional identity that guided leaders and their institutions as they negotiated the demands
of war. The leadership displayed by each president, the influence of institutional norms and
traditions, and the impact of a college’s stated mission elicited variations in the adaptive policies
implemented at the four institutions after the initial year of the war. In turn, this divergence
allowed each college to manage the external crisis by blending institutional need, war-time
demand, and the preservation of institutional identity.

Persistence amid Change in Organizational Structure

On the day following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt addressed the
U.S. Congress and asked the body to declare war on the Empire of Japan. With Congress’
declaration of war, Roosevelt no longer needed to seek permission to act on behalf of his nation.
It was now a time of national emergency and Roosevelt, with aid from his military advisors,
proceeded to lead his nation through the trials that lay ahead.

Much like Roosevelt, Presidents Dennis, Distler, Hopkins, and Nason guided their
institutions through the war by an administrative structure adapted to address the war-time
challenges each college faced. The tradition of shared governance promoted by each institution, as evidenced by the establishment and function of the faculty-led, war committees, remained at all four colleges throughout the war. Still, the crisis provided each college president with the opportunity to garner greater functional autonomy as the institution’s leader. The war crisis often demanded quick decision-making, and the autonomy provided to the presidents through the administrative circumstances introduced by the war afforded each man the ability to implement many of the adaptive policies he developed for his college with little, in any, input from others on and off campus. For example, during the adoption of adaptive policies such as accelerated programming or the militarization of campus, voices of the institution’s faculty members and Board of Trustees/Managers remained largely silent. This adapted style of governance was due to the war emergency and each man’s ability to capitalize on the confidence and a trust he fostered amongst the constituencies he led throughout the war period.

During a time of crisis, the success of any leader depends heavily on his/her ability to instill confidence and build trust within the community he/she leads. In his radio address to the nation on the day following Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt stressed his confidence that the United States would emerge victorious from the conflict in which it was about to engage. “With confidence in our armed forces, with the unbounding determination of our people, we will gain the inevitable triumph – so help us God,” Roosevelt stated. Roosevelt’s national address delivered in the aftermath of Japan’s attack served both to re-assure a frightened populace and to rally the American masses on the eve of the nation’s entrance into World War II.

Throughout the war, Roosevelt’s fireside chats served as a link between the president and his people. These addresses did more than just keep the American public informed about the state of the war abroad and the state of the “home front,” however. The president’s radio
messages put the voice of the American president in living rooms throughout the nation and
provided vocal reminders of Roosevelt’s efforts to lead his nation through this time of
international crisis. With these messages, Roosevelt instilled confidence and established trust
with the American population by re-assuring them that peace and stability would eventually
return to their homes and their country. Roosevelt, as President, would see to this.

Like Roosevelt following Pearl Harbor, college presidents like William Dennis, Theodore
Distler, Ernest Hopkins, and John Nason amassed broad support592 for the policies and
procedures they implemented during the war period through the leadership they displayed on
their respective campuses. Just like the nation looked to Roosevelt to steer the country through
the turbulent waters of war, students, faculty members, and alumni looked to their president to
lead their college through the challenges introduced by the conflict. Consequently, an
administrative structure dominated by the president arose, in part, because of the leadership each
man displayed and the wide-spread support this leadership generated.

Letters, magazine articles, and institutional memoranda kept faculty, military and non-
military students, and alumni informed about the fate of their colleges and the decisions being
made by their respective presidents. In many cases, these presidential messages offered
reassurance that institutional identity – however altered by the war – would be preserved despite
the conflict. Franklin & Marshall President Distler’s note to alumni in a June 1944 edition of the
Franklin and Marshall Alumnus, for example, reassured the body about the fate of their alma
mater. Under the regularly-appearing heading, “The President’s Page,” Distler wrote:

As I sit at my desk and write this the skies are overcast and dark clouds are
hanging low...Now I would not have you feel that as captain of the good ship
Franklin and Marshall I am either gloomy or depressed, for while the seas may be
rough, we have a sturdy ship and we intend to sail true to our course with faith
and hope and courage...We at your Alma Mater are optimistic. We may have to
batten down the hatches and seal the portholes for sailing through the storms ahead, but the ship has weathered other storms and having sailed her through these perilous seas since Pearl Harbor, we are confident that she will make her port after a long journey and our American flag, as well as the Blue and White ensign, will be flying in the breeze.\textsuperscript{593}

The F&M ship alumni fondly remembered, Distler stressed, would remain unharmed by the war. An August 1943 letter from Distler to “Franklin and Marshall Men in the Service” conveyed a similar message about the security of the college these servicemen left in order to serve their country. “Franklin and Marshall men now in uniform would feel right at home were you to return to your old campus,” Distler began. “Although the buildings look much the same (at least outside), and most of your former teachers are still around, you would see immediately that the college too has gone to war,” the president continued to describe of an institution temporarily changed by the demands of war. He then concluded with a few final words of reassurance about the stability of the servicemen’s college and an invitation for these men to see their adapted “war college” for themselves:

All in all, F&M in war time has managed to combine the best features of both the college you used to know and the naval station you know now. Come and see it for yourself if you can; or if you can’t, write us, telling us all about your job in the war and giving us accurate mailing directions so we can keep on sending you news of the college.\textsuperscript{594}

This message to Franklin & Marshall servicemen established an important link between the former students and their college. Through such letters, Distler conveyed the sentiment that although gone from campus, these men were not gone from the minds of those they left behind, and he would preserve the institution for their return. In response, these men, like the alumni to which Distler also wrote regularly, offered the president their unfailing support, confidence, and trust.
Additionally, a September 1944 memorandum to Earlham faculty from Dennis highlights the line of dialogue maintained between the president and the faculty body he led throughout the war period. Dennis’ memorandum conveyed to faculty the current financial state of the college while also expressing his gratitude to the body for the unrelenting support they had shown throughout the war crisis. “I want to express on behalf of the Board the appreciation of the Board, the alumni, and friends of the college for the self-sacrificing devotion to Earlham which our faculty have manifested not only during the past year but always,” Dennis extolled. “Earlham has lived because men and women have been willing to serve her…So long as we are united in our love for our college and our regard for one another and in our belief in the high nature of the work in which we are engaged, Earlham can face alike the exigencies of peace and war. We can ‘thank God and take courage’,”595 the president boasted of the Earlham spirit that had thus far guided the institution through the war challenges it faced. In addition to the information it conveyed, this note also allowed Dennis to acknowledge that, in order to be a successful leader, he needed the support and cooperation of Earlham’s faculty, and he thanked the body who responded enthusiastically to his call for help.

The continuation throughout the war of pre-war forms of communication and the messages they conveyed helped both to reduce ambiguity and anxiety about the future of the institution and to instill faith and confidence in the president and his leadership. The promise of institutional security embedded within such messages also allowed each president to establish a sense of trust between him and the college’s various constituents. As a consequence, the president’s decision to alter the college’s operating schedule or to welcome the Navy to campus, for example, often was embraced without question. In addition, Dennis, Distler, Hopkins, and Nason all were able to use their leadership to inspire support and garner assistance from faculty,
students, and alumni alike. This capacity to encourage everyone to rally around a clearly, defined goal and common cause – institutional survival – proved vital to each college’s ability to successfully navigate the challenges World War II provided.

The ways in which presidents were able to mobilize support for their institutions during the war period are many. The continued attention shown to alumni elicited checks and letters that flooded each Office of the President throughout the war years, each reflecting a desire from alumni to aid their alma maters, often monetarily, in the face of the crisis the institutions confronted. Faculty members’ willingness to return to the classroom to re-tool themselves to teach classes otherwise outside their fields of expertise as demonstrated at Dartmouth and Franklin & Marshall further illustrate an eagerness to assist with both the war effort and the needs of the institution. Finally, current students’ compliant acceptance of institutional decisions to abandon traditional extra-curricular activities like football games and Winter Carnival celebrations for the duration of the war reflect their ability to embrace the changes to traditional student collegiate life the war demanded.

That being said, not all presidential decisions went unchallenged or were free from criticism. For example, Dennis’ decision to admit Nisei students at Earlham elicited a number of letters from alumni and community members that expressed anger and outrage over the president’s admission of “foreign threats” into the college. Distler’s proposal to admit women as full-time students at traditionally all-male Franklin & Marshall elicited similar expressions of discontent from students and alumni. Each president’s ability to temper and rebound from such criticism, however, is a testament to the support each man amassed through the leadership he displayed during the crisis.
Consequently, a war-time institutional governance structure emerged that blended tradition and necessity, resulting in a college largely defined by the president and his vision for the institution during the war period. This form of governance signaled a temporary departure from the traditional institutional governance of these institutions, yet this adaptation allowed each president to lead his institution in way that calmed, re-assured, and rallied his constituents. Faculty members aided in the development of war-time policies, but the president emerged as the principal leader responsible for guiding his institution through the obstacles the war introduced. The leadership each man displayed through the policies he implemented and the messages these policies conveyed assuaged fears and inspired a community ravaged by the war, all while each worked tirelessly to ensure the survival of his institution.

Each man’s attention to the organizational culture of his college further bolstered the support he received and his subsequent ability to guide his institution through the war-time challenges it faced. Although not the sole bearer of his institution’s culture, each president’s awareness and acknowledgement of his college’s artifacts, traditions, values, and norms helped to reassure faculty, students, and alumni that the president would try to ensure that their beloved institution would not be temporarily harmed or perpetually altered by World War II. Speaking before the Dartmouth College community just days after Pearl Harbor, President Hopkins stressed his confidence that, despite the conflict, Dartmouth would survive:

We shan’t play Hitler’s game by losing faith in our own institutions….The college has lived through crisis after crisis and the College will live….We don’t want to survive in a such a way that we will be incapable of meeting the deluge of problems which will be post-war problems and the kind of problems that the liberal college – this liberal college – is particularly qualified to prepare men to meet….the war will not change Dartmouth…so let us avoid moroseness, let us avoid melancholy, let us avoid pessimism…and look ahead…\textsuperscript{596}
The message conveyed by Hopkins’ address echoed that of Roosevelt’s first inaugural speech in which Roosevelt tried to reassure an American populace frightened by the continuing effects of the Great Depression. Roosevelt announced in his March 4, 1933 address:

This great Nation will endure as it has endured, will revive and will prosper. So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. In every dark hour of our national life a leadership of frankness and vigor has met with that understanding and support of the people themselves which is essential to victory…We face the arduous days that lie before us in the warm courage of the national unity; with the clear consciousness of seeking old and precious moral values; with the clean satisfaction that comes from the stern performance of duty by old and young alike.\(^597\)

Both presidents’ speeches helped to rally, to inspire, and to reassure their listeners; the nation, like Roosevelt promised, survived the strains of the Great Depression, and Hopkins promised his listeners that their college would emerge from the war period unchanged. At the end of his address, Hopkins encouraged the audience to join him in the singing of two stanzas of “Men of Dartmouth.” The singing of the institution’s alma mater to close Hopkins’ speech provided a crucial indication to the Dartmouth community that Dartmouth tradition and Dartmouth culture would continue and would help to guide the college and its leaders through the challenging years ahead. The words of this simple song conveyed to many participants more about the future and security of the college than any address Hopkins as president of Dartmouth could make to his student body. As the men sang in unison in the face of the crisis before them:

They were mighty men of old
That she nurtured at her side;
Till like Vikings they went forth
From the lone and silent North,
And they strove, and they wrought, and they died;
But the sons of old Dartmouth,
The laurelled sons of Dartmouth,
The Mother keeps them in her heart

And guides their altar flame;
The still North remembers them,
The hill-winds know their name,
And the granite of New Hampshire
Keeps the record of their fame;
And the granite of New Hampshire
Keeps the record of their fame.\(^598\)
Persistence amid Change in Organizational Culture

Theorist Edgar Schein contends that “the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture.” Distler, Dennis, Hopkins, and Nason, through the leadership they displayed, personify a leader’s ability to create and manage culture. For these presidents, preservation of their respective organizational cultures through the war-time policies they developed and implemented was a crucial component of the strategies they employed as they worked to ensure the survival of their institution during World War II.

An institution’s culture can serve as the metaphorical glue that binds the many facets and constituencies of a college or university together. In many cases, organizational culture is manifested through the institutional artifacts, norms, traditions, assumptions and values that convey a sense of institutional identity and, as a result, shape institutional behavior and guide administrative decision-making. Burton Clark, in 1964 his study found that colleges distinguish themselves, not by their programmatic differences, but instead by their “organizational saga” and how much the college believed in itself and what it was doing. This study substantiates Clark’s finding about the manner in which colleges use organizational saga and culture to distinguish themselves. Although Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore implemented similar programmatic strategies to overcome the challenges presented by the war, analysis of the adaptive strategies these colleges employed reveals the saliency of “organizational saga” or organizational culture in the resultant war-time decision-making that occurred at the four institutions. The organizational saga or institutional culture maintained by each institution shaped the resultant decision-making during the war crisis and also allowed each college to preserve its distinct identity despite the obstacles each endured.
The four colleges’ experiences during World War II illustrate the importance of a leader’s use of norms, traditions, rituals, and symbols to unite and to mollify constituents. Traditions and symbols create common ground, especially during a time of chaos, and Dennis, Distler, Hopkins, and Nason artfully used this common ground to rally constituents around the common, war-time goal of institutional preservation. The actions of these men therefore personify Kim Cameron’s “symbolic action” approach to organizational adaptation because, as Cameron defines this approach, “the logic…is that organizations are glued together mainly by the presence of common interpretation of events, common symbols, common stories or legends, and so on…”602 As Cameron continues, “The role of the manager, in turn, is to create, manipulate, or perpetuate these [common] meanings so that they are accepted in the organization and thereby influence organizational behavior.” Consequently, a symbolic action approach emerged during the war period at each of the four institutions because of each president’s use of their institutions “common meanings” to generate a “social consensus”603 that ultimately influenced their resultant policy decisions. In essence, the norms, traditions, and rituals created in advance of and sustained during the war at each of the four institutions affected the decision-making that allowed the colleges – and the presidents leading them – to navigate the challenges of the war period.

One example of the use of symbolic action to adapt to the war can be seen within the bond between Dartmouth and its alumni. Dartmouth College has a long-standing tradition of building and maintaining outstanding relationships with its alumni body; Dartmouth College, as Hopkins would contend, is its alumni. Therefore, with the escalation of the war and the crisis Dartmouth faced, no one body was more concerned about the survival of the institution than this “living endowment” of alumni. Hopkins recognized both the importance of this group of
individuals and the historic relationship fostered between his college and them. He thus was intentional in preserving this relationship through the use of letters, magazine articles, speeches, and photos that kept alumni informed about the state of their alma mater. Letters mailed from Hopkins to Dartmouth alumni told of the college’s financial blight and the steps being taken to overcome this challenge. Stories also recapped for readers the college’s spring 1943 Commencement ceremony altered to meet the demands of the war years. This adaptation, in turn, illustrated for alumni the juxtaposition in Hanover of traditional Dartmouth with new, war-time Dartmouth. Dartmouth alumni responded to Hopkins’ messages by providing the college with an unprecedented amount of financial support. Adherence to tradition, in part, saved this institution.

Tradition also helped to sustain Earlham College through the war period. Dennis’ decision to admit Nisei students into the college rested on the premise of the institution’s Quaker heritage that promoted the equality of man. He viewed the admission of these students as an extension of the Quaker tradition upon which Earlham was founded, and he and the Earlham community thus welcomed these ostracized students to campus despite outrage voiced from those within surrounding Richmond. Many Earlham alumni recognized the magnitude of Dennis’ decision and applauded the president for his attention to college tradition and values. In turn, they rewarded their alma mater with financial contributions that helped the institution endure the latter years of the war period.

Adherence to tradition thwarted suggestions for change as well. Efforts at Franklin & Marshall to extend full-time admission to women students stalled after the institution’s male students and Board of Trustees balked at the idea of ending the college’s tradition as an all-male institution of higher education. Fears over how women would change the all-male culture of the
campus therefore dominated the need for institutional preservation, thereby resulting in the rejection of this policy as a means of overcoming the challenges elicited by the war.

The continuation of traditional ceremonies and rituals like Convocation and Commencement further signaled to faculty, students, and alumni alike that the war would not completely disrupt collegiate life or injure the identities of their colleges. Student-run, weekly newspapers, intercollegiate competitions, and campus dances – artifacts of collegiate life – insinuated that the tenets of conventional student-life would also be preserved despite the conflict. Retention of these norms and artifacts helped to appease many who worried the current state and future of the college; the ability to allocate money for student dances suggested that financially things would, eventually, be okay, and the continuation of the student newspaper indicated that the war would not interrupt every hallmark of collegiate life.

Acknowledgement of important traditions and symbols helped to instill confidence in the president working to protect his institution. Presidents like Dennis, Distler, Hopkins, and Nason became symbolic leaders during the war period, in part, because of both their ability to communicate their vision and that vision’s attention to institutional history, culture, and values. Dennis’ decision to admit Nisei students at Earlham College reflects his desire to have his college both aid in the war effort and aid in a way fitting of the institution’s Quaker mission. Nason’s acceptance of the government’s request for his college to educate visiting Chinese Navy Officers as part of the college’s Navy V-12 program also demonstrates this leader’s attempts to blend institutional tradition and national need. Consequently, presidential attention to specific norms, rituals, traditions, and values – common meanings embraced by a social consensus – allowed for the development of adaptive strategies that merged institutional need with institutional tradition, thus helping to preserve the essence and identity of each college.
Persistence amid Change in Institutional Mission

In many respects, institutional mission can be viewed as an extension of organizational culture; the norms, traditions, and rituals of an institution often are guided by the mission upon which the institution was founded. Matthew Hartley defines mission as a “kind of common law by which information is interpreted and decisions made,” and one could contend that, based on the discussion above, organizational culture also acts like a form of common law that can guide decision-making. I contend, however, that lumping mission and culture together neglects the interpretative nuisances that distinguish the two concepts. I interpret mission as the stated, documented purpose of an institution and view organizational culture as a way in which an institution’s stated mission is interpreted. Therefore, the discussion of institutional mission that follows analyzes the role in which stated institutional mission was translated as adaptive policies were developed and implemented throughout the war period.

Nowhere was the role of mission in institutional decision-making more apparent than in the conversations about the militarization of Earlham and Swarthmore Colleges. Both institutions were founded with a mission built on the tenets of the Friends faith. As a result, the issue of adherence to the Quaker principle of pacifism came to the forefront of institutional decision-making as Dennis and Nason contemplated the militarization of their campuses during the war. For Dennis, Earlham’s need for both students and money combined with his desire for his institution to be of service to the nation led to his interest in having the college host a Provost Marshall Training Unit. This proposal met immediate criticism from Earlham’s Board of Trustees, however, who viewed the hosting of such a military unit as incompatible with the institution’s Quaker mission. The conversation about the unit thus went no further. The preservation of Earlham’s mission outweighed emerging institutional need.
Nason initially sought to preserve his institution’s Quaker mission when he refuted suggestions in the initial war years about the militarization of Swarthmore. When nearby Quaker-based Haverford College announced the militarization of its campus, Swarthmore alumni applauded Nason for his decision to stay true to the institution’s pacifist mission. With the continuation of the war and Swarthmore’s increasing need for students and tuition revenue, Nason’s position on militarization changed, however. The July 1943 arrival of Navy V-12 students to the campus illustrates Swarthmore’s temporary departure from a mission that promoted peace and not war. In this case, institutional survival offset adherence to mission.

At Franklin & Marshall and Dartmouth College, institutional mission guided the decision-making that surrounded the question of enrollment management that surfaced at both institutions during the war period. For Franklin & Marshall, the decision to retain its all-male mission despite the institution’s need to attract more students reflects the Board of Trustee’s desire to emerge from the war unchanged. Although local women were permitted to attend the college as part of its war-time, evening division of classes, Franklin & Marshall’s Board was not willing to alter the college’s all-male mission to extend admission to women on a regular, full-time basis. The issue re-emerged in the early post-war years, but the Board again remained steadfast in its decision to keep Franklin & Marshall an all-male, liberal arts college even though an overwhelming proportion of faculty, students, and alumni now supported the change.

Similar conversations about retention of its mission as an academically-demanding institution resounded on the Dartmouth campus during the war period. Some institutions like Gettysburg College decided to extend admissions opportunities to high school seniors months in advance of their spring graduation to increase student interest in enrolling at the college. Dartmouth briefly entertained implementing a similar policy, but ultimately came to view such a
decision as damaging to the educational standards embedded within its academic mission. Thus, like at Franklin & Marshall College, the proposal was abandoned and the college’s identity was protected.

Finally, Distler’s excitement about the Navy V-12 program’s blending of military training with the ideals of liberal education illustrate this president’s concern for the maintenance of his institution’s liberal arts mission. Hopkins of Dartmouth and Nason of Swarthmore expressed similar appreciation for the military’s willingness to marry its need with their college’s resources. Navy uniforms may have replaced freshman beanies at each of these institutions, but the tenets of the college’s liberal arts mission were preserved, thus creating a war college where Rousseau and reveille were skillfully united.

Eliminated courses, uniform-clad students, the presence of Black students on campus, and the absence of the Saturday afternoon football game all suggest a campus transformed by the demands of war. Still, at Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore, an institutional identity, rooted in decades of rules, procedures, norms, and traditions, remained and shaped, in large part, the policies developed as each institution negotiated the war years. Together, the leadership displayed by presidents and these presidents skillful merger of institutional mission, traditions, and values with war-time needs ultimately resulted in institutions, and an institutional identity, adapted to but not permanently altered by the challenges of World War II.

(Re)Adapting to Peace-Time Operations

The majority of the adaptations made by Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore during the war period were temporary. Summer vacations returned with the elimination of accelerated operating schedules; new faculty committees aimed at assisting
returning veterans replaced the special war-time committees formed; and the sound of reveille at
dawn disappeared with the departure of the Navy. The effects of the war were not all temporary,
however. For example, the admission of Black students at Swarthmore continued after the war
ended, and increased awareness about racial tolerance arising from the conflict aboard spurred
additional discussions about unjust admissions policies maintained at places like Dartmouth. In
addition, Franklin & Marshall continued to offer night course to the surrounding Lancaster
community despite its rebounding full-time student enrollment.

None of the four institutions in this study emerged from the war period unaffected by the
conflict. Institutional identity would be forever changed by World War II. However, the changes
to institutional identity that emerged post-war came not from the specific adaptive policies
implemented during the war, but rather from the questions presidents, faculty members, students,
and alumni asked about their institution as adaptive strategies were contemplated throughout the
war period.

With the end of the war came a period of institutional re-evaluation, an examination of
what it meant to be a Quaker institution or a purveyor of a liberal education. The emergence of
the war interrupted attempts at Swarthmore College to re-insert the Quaker faith into the life of
the institution. At the war’s conclusion, work to bolster the institution’s Quaker tradition
resumed and resulted in a revised statement of objectives that blended post-war curricular goals
with Quaker ideals.

At Earlham College, lessons generated by the institution’s war-time experiences
confirmed long-standing concerns about the erosion of Quaker principles at the college. The
arrival of a new president who had similar concerns about the college’s tenuous connection to
the Friends faith resulted in the development of the “Earlham Idea.” This statement of purpose
combined the college’s Quaker tradition with a vision for its future and, in turn, guided the post-war curricular and co-curricular changes implemented at the institution. The result was a curriculum and an institution re-infused with the religious principles upon which the college was founded.

The war also introduced questions about the purposes and goals of a liberal education. The meaning of general education came under intense scrutiny at places like Harvard College, where faculty members re-examined its objectives and redefined the resources needed to help achieve them within the emerging post-war context in which higher education now operated. Liberal education came under similar scrutiny at institutions like Swarthmore and Dartmouth who used the early post-war years to re-evaluate the first two years and the final year of their students’ course of study. Finally, the war’s placement of international problems on campus doorsteps made the incorporation of topics on international relations and foreign policy into a college’s liberal education curriculum a priority at Earlham, Swarthmore, and Dartmouth.

Therefore, the four institutions that braced for war in the fall of 1941 were not the same institutions at the end of the long 1940s. Their stated missions remained unchanged, but the norms and values used to interpret these missions – namely the liberal arts and religious traditions under which each institution was founded – did change in the years following World War II thereby altering each institution’s post-war identity. The war provided for the expansion of enrollment opportunities as well as the expansion of the purposes and content of liberal education. Lessons generated by the war also elicited the re-affirmation of the religious culture that, at institutions like Earlham and Swarthmore, had been lost well before the war began.
Implications of the War Period for Today

The tumultuous 1940s were clearly a unique period in American history. The camaraderie generated and national pride galvanized by the war in the automobile plants of Michigan and the college campuses of Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Indiana may never be replicated. Drawing implications from this war-filled decade for modern institutions thus is daunting, if not dangerous. Still, understanding the experiences of liberal arts colleges during World War II and its aftermath fills an important lacuna within the history of higher education and also provides lessons that can guide contemporary institutional policy and future research.

History of Higher Education

Alexander Astin and Calvin B.T. Lee define the small, private college as the “invisible college” because of the neglect these institutions often receive within studies of higher education. The existing narrative of institutional experiences during World War II reinforces Astin and Lee’s claim about the invisibility of the liberal arts college as previous studies of higher education during World War II have focused primarily on the experiences of large, research universities and the role that these institutions played in the war effort. Inherent differences exist, however, between the experiences of research institutions and the experiences of smaller, tuition-dependent institutions like the liberal arts college throughout the tumultuous 1940s.

Thus, arguably the greatest contribution of the study is its extension of the narrative of higher education during World War II to include the experiences of “invisible” colleges like Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore. The “new” history approach this study employed examined the experiences of understudied institutions and the processes and procedures through which these institutions adapted to the war period, thereby providing a better overall understanding of how World War II affected all of higher education. In addition, this
Fostering Culture

The experiences of Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore during the 1940s reveal the importance of culture, especially during times of crisis like World War II. Norms, traditions, and rituals provided stability in a time of chaos and helped to unite faculty, students, alumni, and administration to achieve a common goal. The war-time examples of this study reaffirm the role of norms and traditions on today’s college and university campuses. Traditions and symbols can unite a college community comprised of different races, ethnicities, social-economic backgrounds, and cultures. Creation of and attention to campus norms and rituals also helps to foster a bond or “normative glue” that binds students and alumni; alumni across decades; and alumni to alma mater. Consequently, colleges and universities need to be aware of and try to capitalize on the histories and traditions of their institutions. Continuing financial support and promotion of institutional traditions, rituals, and values like mascots, slogans, annual events, and historical stories and myths will aid in the transmission of culture from one generation of students to the next. This culture, in turn, creates an identity that will define many students for the duration of their lives. As Hopkins once stressed before a student audience, “You are now called student, but you will forever be a Dartmouth man.”

Building “Living Endowment”

The monies and verbal support alumni provided to their alma maters during World War II helped to sustain all four institutions examined within this study. This contribution suggests a need to remember the important role alumni can play within the life of an institution. Monetary support from alumni remains vital to institutional operations, and this study reinforces the
significance of maintaining relationships with alumni in order to preserve this valuable income stream. This study also affirms how important alumni voices can be during policy implementation. Listening to the opinions of alumni, however varied they may be, can provide valuable insight into the pros and cons of institutional decisions. While presidents, faculty, and administrators come and go, alumni remain. They are the one campus constituency whose status is permanent and whose loyalty is often unquestionable.

Just like the preservation of an institution’s monetary endowment, the preservation of an institution’s alumni body is one of the most significant contributions a president can make in ensuring the longevity of his/her institution. Support of the alumni advocacy groups promoted by an institution’s alumni association or the inclusion of alumni voices on campus committees, for example, can demonstrate an institution’s acknowledgement of the importance of these individuals. Reunion/alumni weekends, institutional-sponsored alumni publications, and annual state of the institution addresses shared by presidents are additional ways in which institutions can maintain a line of dialogue with alumni and thus promote the alumni/alma mater relationship. Fostering an institution’s “living endowment,” therefore, should remain an institutional policy and institutional priority regardless of whether it is a time of war or a time of peace.

Organizational Theory as a Historical Lens

Seldom is organizational theory used within a historic context like World War II. Traditional applications of organizational theory allow us to examine institutional responses to external pressures, the actions of leaders, and the role of culture within organizational operations. We also use organizational theory to unpack the structures and functions of organizations, to understand the workers within an organization, and to develop policies to guide organizations.
This study’s use of concepts like institutional adaptation and institutional identity to examine the war period suggests, however, that organizational theory can serve as a helpful lens in interpreting the past.

Appreciating the historic complexities of organizations, especially institutions of higher education, is just as important as understanding them within contemporary times. This study thus serves as an encouragement for other researchers to consider employing organizational theories to analyze historical peoples, places, and events. Are there other examples of historic presidents like Distler and Hopkins who employed symbolic leadership as one way to guide their institution through a crisis? Was the role of institutional identity any more salient at the end of the 19th century than it was during the tumultuous 1940s? How did mission change affect the evolution of the liberal arts college throughout the twentieth century? Research of questions such as these suggests a blending of historical methods and organizational theory as we strive to construct richer historical narratives about higher education.

**Limitations**

Historical research relies largely on the use of primary sources to recreate the past. The availability of these sources often varies by location and by topic. The large, robust Dartmouth College archives, for example, provided me with countless boxes of institutional documents, letters, memoranda, and articles that allowed me to piece together an almost complete narrative of Dartmouth during the tumultuous 1940s. The institutional archives at Earlham College offered fewer sources than at Dartmouth, and thus I had fewer documents in comparison to use as I attempted to reconstruct the war period at Earlham.

This study sought to provide a complete portrait of institutional experiences from 1939 to 1950, yet I acknowledge that my reliance on the availability of primary sources makes achieving
this goal impossible. There are stories that remain untold, voices that remain silent, and narratives that remain without conclusions. The story of Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges during the 1940s will never be complete, and this deficit is a limitation common within historical research. Still, my examination of hundreds of primary sources from each of the four institution’s archives, combined with the use of dozens of secondary sources (i.e., institutional histories, presidential biographies), helps to ensure the narrative told in the preceding pages is as complete as the available sources will allow.

In addition to a reliance on primary sources, this study is limited by the effects of “presentism.” Historians constantly worry about presentism, a term Philo Hutcheson defines as:

> the historical error of unknowingly, or more disconcerting, unthinkingly applying conditions of the present to the past, and thereby creating an interpretation that speaks little to the experiences, beliefs, and thoughts of who are the subject of the historical inquiry, but in fact offers a picture of what happened in the past as if were the present.

From my vantage point in 2010, I knew that the Empire of Japan would bomb Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and that the implications of Roosevelt’s declaration of war would thrust institutions of higher education into years of chaos. I also knew that all four institutions would successfully navigate the challenges of World War II and would face new trials with the emergence of the Korean War. I attempted to avoid presentism, however, by acknowledging its potential to affect the narrative I produced. Throughout the course of researching and writing the findings of this study, I intentionally tried to replace my 21st century vantage point with those of leaders like Distler and Nason for whom the war period was full of stress, turmoil, and uncertainty. For them, the implications of the war were unclear and the threat of institutional collapse was very real. Still, interpretation occurs with the analysis of each document and the re-
creation of each event and decision, and I would be remiss if I did not recognize that presentism may have influenced my resultant narrative.

**Future Research**

The findings of this study of Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore from 1939 to 1950 have identified commonalities in the adaptive strategies implemented by the institutions during the war period and have begun to reveal some of the long-term implications of World War II for higher education. For future research, I would first like to extend my examination of the four colleges through the end of the 1950s. I am interested in exploring what effects the nation’s involvement in the Korean War had on higher education to determine if similar adaptive strategies were implemented during this conflict. In an addition, I would like to discern further the long-term consequences of both war periods for Dartmouth, Earlham, Franklin & Marshall, and Swarthmore Colleges, giving specific attention to the selective admissions policies adopted and curricular reforms implemented during this period.

Second, I would like to continue my research on private, liberal arts colleges during World War II by examining the strategies implemented at other “invisible” institutions like women’s colleges or historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs). Such a study would be guided by research questions like: Were adaptive policies similar to those adopted during the war period at all-male or co-educational liberal arts colleges implemented at other types of institutions? What kind of adaptive policies were implemented that are unique to women’s colleges or HBCUs? What do the different policies adopted tell us about each institution and about each institutional type? What do the commonalities shared by all of these institutional types tell us about private colleges during World War II?
Finally, this study introduced the changes to higher education demanded by veterans returning to campus after the war. Existing literatures have explored the curricular and social changes elicited by these veterans, but little attention has been devoted to the actual adaptive, transitional experiences of these men following their return from combat to campus. As such, I would like to capture these stories to identify how veterans, like their institutions, adapted to the early post-war years of higher education.

Conclusion

December 7, 1941 was, as Roosevelt described to the nation, a day that would “live in infamy.” Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor signaled the beginning of war for the U.S. and the start of a national time of crisis. This crisis extended to higher education. But, like a nation that adapted to meet the challenges of war, higher education adapted to meet the demands generated by World War II and its aftermath. The stories of Dartmouth College, Earlham College, Franklin & Marshall College, and Swarthmore College from 1939-1950 as told on the preceding pages illustrate this institutional adaptation and are reflective of the changes that occurred within higher education during the tumultuous 1940s.

Institutional identity played a significant role in the implementation (and rejection) of war-time adaptive polices that aimed to sustain the four institutions. The leadership displayed by presidents Dennis, Distler, Hopkins and Nason through their attention to institutional norms, traditions, and values guided each of the four institutions and its constituents and greatly influenced the policies adopted as each college navigated the challenges of World War II. Consideration of institutional mission also allowed for the development and adoption of adaptive strategies that blended war-time necessity with institutional tradition.
Swarthmore College’s redrafted Statement of Purpose and Policy published in May 1948 emphasized the importance of the marriage of institutional adaptation and institutional identity by suggesting that both are integral to ensuring institutional survival. This paragraph is thus a fitting conclusion to the story of institutional adaptation during the war-filled 1940s, for without adaptation to the demands and conditions introduced by the war and post-war periods, the goals of the newest generation of higher education’s students and leaders could never be realized.

A college is never static. Its purposes and policies are always changing to meet new demands and new conditions. The founders of Swarthmore would find in it today many features they never contemplated when they shaped the College in the middle of the nineteenth century. Swarthmore, if it is to remain alive, must be forever changing. And many people are continually engaged in shaping its destiny – the Board of Managers, administration, faculty, students, alumni, parents, and the community as a whole. The goal is to achieve for each generation, by means appropriate to the times, that unique contribution and that standard of excellence which have been guiding ideals of Swarthmore since its founding.

From this, one can then argue that the history of higher education is nothing more than an extended tale of institutional adaptation that can be broken into smaller narratives. World War II and the long 1940s therefore are just two of these narratives.

Endnotes

589 Hopkins in Interview for Alumni Fund Issue, undated.
592 In his 1973 book War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, John Mueller introduces the concept of the Rally 'Round the Flag syndrome. Mueller devised this theory as a way to explain the increased popular support for U.S. presidents that emerges from their leadership during times of crisis. One of the most recent national examples of this theory was the boost in national support President George W. Bush received following the September 11, 2001 attacks. While often applied within a political science or international relations framework, Mueller’s Rally ‘Round the Flag syndrome offers an interesting perspective from which one can analyze the leadership of higher education presidents during World War II.
593 Franklin & Marshall Alumnus, Volume XX, No. 4, June 1944, 74.

Memorandum to the Members of the Faculty of Earlham College for William Dennis, September 28, 1944.

Earnest Hopkins’ Special Convocation Address taken from the recordings of the Public Speaking Department, December 15, 1941.


―Men of Dartmouth,‖ the Dartmouth Alma Mater, was written by Richard Hovey (Class of 1885) in 1894. The song was officially adopted as the college’s Alma Mater in 1926. This second verse of the “Men of Dartmouth” as written by Hovey is traditionally only sung during times of war. Retrieved from Dartmouth Online Archives at: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~library/rauner/dartmouth/alma_mater.html


Schein defines organizational culture as “the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an organization, that operate unconsciously, and that define in a basic and ‘taken-for-granted’ fashion an organization’s view of itself and its environment.” George Kuh and Elizabeth Whitt take Schein’s definition one step further, contending that organizational culture is the “normative glue that holds organizations together” with the purpose of “(1) conveying a sense of identity; (2) facilitating commitment to an entity other than self; (3) enhancing the stability of a group’s social system; and (4) acting like a sense-making device that guides and shapes behavior.”

F. C. Richardson uses these definitions to contend that culture is “a behavioral, cognitive and emotional concept that provides guidance to those persons, such as college and university presidents, who are in decision-making positions.” George D. Kuh & Elizabeth J. Whitt, “Culture in American College and Universities,” In M.C. Brown II, Organization & Governance In Higher Education (5th edition), ASHE Reader Series (Boston, MA: Pearson Custom, 2000), 161. F. C. Richardson, “The President’s Role in Shaping the Culture of Academic Institutions,” In J.D. Davis (Ed.), Coloring the Halls of Ivy: Leadership and Diversity in the Academy, (Bolton, MA: Anker Publishing Company, 1994), 14-24, 14.

Burton Clark in his book, The Distinctive College, sought to better understand the role of values and beliefs within an organization by examining the question: “How are values firmly embodied in organizations, there to guide the thoughts and steer the actions of various participants?” Clark’s historical analysis of the organizational character of three institutions – Reed College, Antioch College, and Swarthmore College – led to his development of the phrase “organizational saga,” which he defined as “a unified set of publicly expressed beliefs about the formal group that (a) is rooted in history; (b) claims unique accomplishment, and (c) is held with sentiment by the group”. As Clark continued to explain organizational saga: A saga begins as a strong purpose, introduced by a man (or small group) with a mission, and is fulfilled as it is embodied in organizational practices and the values of dominant organizational cadres…Believers give loyalty to the organization and take pride and identity from it. Burton Clark, The Distinctive College, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), vii; Burton Clark, “The Organizational Saga in Higher Education,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(2), 1972, 179.


Ibid.

Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. Deal define symbolic leaders as those individuals who 1) lead by example; 2) use symbols to capture attention; frame experience; communicate a vision; and respect and use history. For more on symbolic leadership, see their work: Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. Deal, Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2008).


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