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POLICY INNOVATION AND PUBLIC LEADERSHIP: THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION’S COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY INITIATIVE

A Thesis in
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by
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This dissertation examines the Clinton Administration’s attempts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction through the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative. This study of policy innovation and public leadership includes an analytical framework with elements drawn from transformational, transactional, and participative leadership concepts (Bass 1990; Burns 1979; Kaufman 1981; Kotter 1995; Selznick 1984; Terry 2003; Wilson 1989; Van de Ven 2000; Van Wart 2005).

Calls for both policy innovation and new public management placed significant demands on leaders during the 1990s. Throughout the Clinton era there were demands for major public management reforms in government (Gore 1993; Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Cohen and Eimicke 1995; Roberts and King 1996). Reforming, reinventing, and transforming public organizations remain popular political and academic approaches to enhancing government efficiency and effectiveness (Thompson and Jones 1994; Kettl and DiFulio 1995; Altshuler and Behn 1997; Light 1997, 1998, 2005; Lynn 1996, 1998; Ingraham, Thompson, and Sanders 1998; Kellerman 1999; Heinrich and Lynn 2000; Barzelay 2001; Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue 2003; Kamensky 2004; Bertelli and Lynn 2006).

This dissertation uses a qualitative, case study research methodology (Allison and Zelikow 1999; Bates 1998; Eckstein 1992; Elman and Elman 2001; George 1993, 1979; George and Bennett 2005; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Polsby 1984; Van Evera 1997; and Yin 1994). The cases include the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework; the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for Russia and the Former Soviet Republics; and the U.S. and U.N. efforts for eliminating weapons of mass destruction in Iraq under Saddam Hussein.

The U.S.’s role and the roles of its internal government agencies are most significant in international affairs, especially in an age of globalization. U.S. interagency coordination and alignment are indispensable to the creative design and effective implementation of national security policy and strategy. Interagency coordination and long-range planning by the U.S. government, including the national security council and defense, state and other cabinet departments remain major shortcomings, as suggested in each of these cases. This study also reinforces the importance of a public administration framework of public leadership and management, in terms of setting strategic direction, aligning and integrating the efforts of various domestic and international stakeholders, and emphasizing performance measures – both for scholarly research and policymaking. Finally, the reform of the U.N. and the international arms control regime remains an important research agenda for the fields of international relations and public administration. It is at the juncture of these two disciplines of political science that offers great potential for understanding the theory and practice of policy innovation and public leadership to meet the challenges of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the 21st Century.
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If, in any way, this study contributes to a deeper understanding public administration and management, and international affairs -- and the potential to improve conditions for international peace and security -- then I gratefully acknowledge my many debts to my family and the educational institutions where I have been able to walk many paths, while led by my curious nature, to follow my interests in lifelong learning in national security, public, and international affairs.
Chapter 1: Introduction—Patterns in Policy Innovation and Public Leadership

Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth (Burns, 2)…. The ultimate test of practical leadership is the realization of intended, real change that meets people’s enduring needs.

James MacGregor Burns (1978, p. 461)

We have grounds for believing that political innovation in America is a phenomenon separable from other aspects of political life, with preconditions, contours and consequences of its own that have only begun to be mapped.

Nelson W. Polsby (1984, pp. 172-173)

There is a need for research in the national security policy domain in the field of public administration.¹ This dissertation contributes to meeting this need by examining policy innovation in national security policymaking during the Clinton administration. The period of the Clinton presidency spans two terms, and, therefore, allows a relatively long period to address leadership patterns in innovative national security policymaking.² The research contributes to the knowledge of the national security domain -- especially in public policy and public management -- by providing insights into the U.S. and U.N.

¹ For instance, see Mayer and Khademian (1996, p. 180). The authors note that there are few public administration studies of military organizations and defense issues. They criticize the field of public administration for neglecting to pay attention to the domestic political aspects of defense, along with displaying a minimal understanding of the administration and organizational aspects of defense policy. Zegart, in Flawed By Design (1999, pp. 2-3), notes the shortcomings of political science in the national security domain: “U.S. foreign policy agencies in general and national security agencies in particular have been vastly understudied in the discipline. The omission is both substantive and theoretical…. We know far more about mobile nuclear missile silos than we do about the original setup of the National Security Council system, the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. More important, these agencies are absent from the larger theoretical debates in the fields of both international relations and American politics… U.S. national security organizations have fallen between the cracks of international relations and American politics.”

² Sabatier notes “understanding the process of policy change – and the role of policy-oriented learning therein— requires a time perspective of a decade or more…. ” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, p. 16) The eight-year period is close to this goal and is appropriate to study policymaking during a single presidential administration of two terms.
executive and organizational leadership patterns during attempts at policy innovations to meet the emerging threats of the post-Cold War era.

This dissertation uses a qualitative case study research methodology. Three specific case studies provide important insights on the development and implementation of a new policy for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, called the Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI). A primary focus of this study is on the Clinton Administration’s Defense Department and the Secretaries of Defense – Aspin, Perry, and Cohen – in their roles as organizational leaders in developing and implementing the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative. The cases include the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework; the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for Russia and the Former Soviet Republics; and the U.S. and U.N. efforts for eliminating weapons of mass destruction in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. A final case, on Iraq, extends the study to examine the critical roles of U.N. arms control inspection agency chiefs – Butler and Blix.

The complexity of the leadership challenges facing presidential administrations, including U.S. and U.N. public managers, has grown in the post-Cold War era. In addition to the normal pressures for improving the substance of national security policy, the 1990s included additional demands for major public management reforms throughout government (Gore 1993; Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Cohen and Eimicke 1995). Reforming, reinventing, and transforming public organizations are popular political and academic approaches to enhancing government efficiency and effectiveness (Thompson and Jones 1994; Kettl and DiJulio 1995; Altshuler and Behn 1997; Light 1997; Lynn 1998; Ingraham, Thompson and Sanders 1998; Kellerman 1999, Heinrich and Lynn
 Calls for both policy innovation and new public management placed significant demands on leaders engaged in the public’s business. These demands called for stretching public leadership and policymaking in both vertical and horizontal directions.3

Horizontally, expectations increased for interagency coordination throughout the federal government (Bardach 1998; Haass 1999; O’Toole 1997, 2000). This was especially true in the national security domain, where transnational economic, environmental, technological, criminal, and terrorist activities became of increasing importance -- rivaling traditional defense concerns about conventional and nuclear forces. Vertically, all layers of government were involved, in new ways, in national defense efforts directed against emerging security threats. Thus, from interagency and intergovernmental relations standpoints, officials at all levels of government engaged in the defense domain more actively than ever before.

The convergence of international and domestic forces during the 1990s marks it as a turbulent period that calls for research in policy innovation and public leadership in national security affairs. From a public policy and management standpoint, the Department of Defense (DOD) provides an important source for the study of innovation and leadership in large, complex, organizations. A popular stereotype is of DOD as an industrial age, hierarchical organization, with top-down leadership predominant, and

3 The U.S. government’s response to the 911 (2001) terrorist attacks, with the creation of the cabinet level Department of Homeland Security, further stretched the roles and responsibilities of the federal system of government, with states and local governments called on to participate more directly in homeland security and defense preparedness (see Kettl 2004).
tremendous internal forces resisting change. If the stereotype matches the reality of 1990s DOD performance, then are new approaches advisable in cases of significant innovation, or even incremental policy change? Given the external shocks of the 1990s global environment and the internal demands for reinventing government, a study of public leadership and policy innovation in defense bureaucracies is a significant area for research.

Model for Current Thinking

This dissertation’s literature review examines the interdisciplinary scholarship on public leadership and policy innovation and includes an analytical framework with elements drawn from transformational, transactional, and participative leadership concepts. The framework guides the study of multiple, competing, and overlapping processes and provide a deeper understanding of underlying patterns in public leadership.

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4 This stereotype even finds its way into Secretary of Defense criticism of the Defense Department bureaucracy in official public affairs press releases. For instance, see Garamone, “Rumsfeld Attacks Pentagon Bureaucracy, Vows Changes,” American Forces Press Service, 10 September 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi (10/16/2001). Note also that in this speech to DOD employees Rumsfeld sought to enlist the bureaucrats’ participation in his quest for defense organizational transformation.

5 Meier (2000), in Politics and the Bureaucracy, argues that from an institutional perspective, the federal bureaucracy is a fourth branch of government. Rohr (1986) in To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State also stresses the critical role of senior public officials in American government and policymaking.

6 For instance, see Van de Ven, Angle, and Poole (2000) Research on the Management of Innovation: The Minnesota Studies. The finding from the extensive Minnesota Innovation Research Program (MIRP) suggests the significance of the relationship between organizational leadership and effective innovation. MIRP’s quantitative studies and case studies agree that leadership matters. MIRP research reports that: ‘Indeed, the only factor that is consistently and significantly positively correlated with perceived effectiveness for originations versus adaptations, small or large, and idea versus implementation stages of innovations is leadership. Strong team leadership appears to be the only consistent “universal” predictor of perceived innovation effectiveness’ (Van de Ven and Chu, in Van de Ven, p. 79). The MIRP framework includes a rhetorical-visionary or top-down leadership perspective; a transactional or reciprocal perspective; and a participative or bottom-up perspective. Manz and his coauthors conclude their MIRP leadership chapter with a call for additional research. In particular, they offer questions as “preliminary suggestions for future research on the role of leadership within the unfolding of innovation processes” (Manz, p. 634). In short, these questions address the ability to research the combination of organizational leadership styles that facilitate innovative processes, the differences in leadership styles in small versus large innovations, the multiple leadership roles for facilitating innovations, and the kinds of training needed to equip leaders to contribute to innovation processes. While the MIRP focused on a wide range of cases, there is a need for additional study of organizational leadership in attempts at innovative national security policymaking.
and policy innovation. The nature of national security policies, such as the Counterproliferation Initiative, involves the interplay of many forces. Studying leadership and innovation patterns in light of transformational, transactional, and participative perspectives, and as guided by the public management, public policy, and international relations literatures, provide opportunities to compare the relative effectiveness of the Clinton Administration in its attempt at innovative national security policymaking.

**Study Value**

This study contributes value to the academic and defense intellectual communities engaged in research in national security policymaking and public management. Focusing on the presidential administration, the defense department, and other agency chief’s roles in the selected three Counterproliferation Policy Initiative cases provides important insights into the nature and extent of executive and organizational leadership in attempts at innovative 1990s defense policymaking. Examining the executive leadership and management roles, as part of the administration’s as well as the U.N.’s organizational leadership, requires research into official strategy and agency documents; internal and external policy reviews, oversight hearings and assessments; as well as speeches, reports and testimony by government officials, policy experts, Congress members, and others in the national security policy community. This dissertation provides observations and findings in analytically structured and theoretically informed cases focused on attempts at

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7 Allison and Zelikow, in *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, conclude that given the “flux” in the post-Cold War international system: “Multiple, overlapping, competing conceptual models are the best that the current understanding of foreign policy provides” (1999, p. 389).
implementing major shifts in national security policymaking. In addition, the cases are also guided by selected international relations theories, including coercive diplomacy and institutionalism. The study is especially valuable for both governmental and nongovernmental leaders in national security, including those in the defense and foreign policy communities, preparing to engage in future attempts at innovation, reform, and change in large, complex public organizations.

**Study Purpose, Objectives, and Perspectives**

The purpose of this study is to contribute to four areas in public affairs research. First, it extends the use of a multidimensional leadership framework to examine an attempt at innovative national security policymaking. Second, the research provides insights into public leadership\(^8\) patterns in large, complex, federal, executive departments, such as the department of defense. Third, this study draws on the literatures in public management and public policy as well as international relations, making this an interdisciplinary study of U.S. and U.N. public agencies engaged in international affairs. Fourth, this research has value for policymakers interested in learning from the Clinton administration’s experiences in developing and implementing new, innovative policies to counter the threats of weapons of mass destruction -- that continues to be one of the most important challenges facing national security policy makers.\(^9\)

\(^8\) An assumption of this study is of “public leadership” as a service to a broad community in a political context of serving the national interest that is, therefore, distinct from private sector leadership.

The main expectation is that this research, including theoretically-informed contemporary case studies, contributes to knowledge in the public administration fields of public policy and public management. This dissertation uses a qualitative methodology to develop a deeper understanding of innovation and leadership patterns in 1990s national security policymaking. The research observations and findings provide insights for several different audiences. Primary focus is on academic researchers in public administration, management and leadership; organization theory; policy innovation; and international relations and security studies. The research is also useful for government officials engaged in national security policymaking. A third audience includes educators seeking insights from contemporary case studies for courses in public administration and management, international relations, and security studies.

This qualitative research includes structured, focused cases studies that reflect on transformational, transactional and participative perspectives for constructing analytical narratives to describe, identify, and explain executive and organizational leadership patterns in public policymaking.\textsuperscript{10} As discussed in more detail in the Chapter 2 literature review, research suggests that multiple levels and perspectives are significant for identifying leadership patterns when attempting policy innovations, such as in the Counterproliferation cases.

**Guiding Research Areas and Questions**

Creswell advises that given the exploratory nature of qualitative research the literature is usually “used inductively so that it does not direct the questions asked by the researcher” (Creswell 1994, p. 21). In Creswell’s view, a qualitative research methodology that prejudges the most significant aspects of a case study and directs questions that reinforce preconceptions would not be valid. Given the vast literature on leadership and innovation, and the complexity of national security policymaking in public and international affairs, however, this study included a guiding, conceptual framework for the initial research phase. Chapter 2 reviews of the interdisciplinary literature on executive leadership and policy innovation in large, complex organizations that provides a starting point for continuing research using an analytical and theory-building approach.

While there is no agreed upon theory of organizations, especially for national security agencies, there has been important theoretical work in this area. James Q. Wilson doubts that a comprehensive theory of organizations will ever be possible (Wilson 1989, p. xix). Authors addressing national security organizations, such as Zegart, regard their work as contributing to the early stages of theory building (1999, p. 233). While not prejudging the direction or degree of influence of public leadership for evaluating or explaining the counterproliferation policy outcomes, previous research and analytical frameworks serve to guide this research – as a theoretically informed, contemporary study of the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative.

This research project continues in the directions identified in previous research and builds on the existing body of knowledge in policy innovation and public leadership, as well as theoretical insights drawn from international relations. For instance, in terms of public management and leadership, this approach follows James Q. Wilson’s guidance
to study what we know about organizational performance in real world bureaucracies --
in this case by describing events, identifying patterns, and exploring alternative
explanations regarding the influence of organizational, public leadership on policy
innovations and outcomes during the Clinton era (Wilson 1989, p. xx). It may be that
organizational leadership patterns discovered in comparable research on leadership and
innovation, such as the Minnesota studies on innovation, exist in similar forms in the
1990s Defense Department. It is also possible that counterproliferation policymaking
reveals other and even very different patterns from those found in other public
organizations, in other times and contexts.

The Literature on Public Leadership and Policy Innovations

Creswell (1994) writes that a literature review varies according to the type
of research design and the amount of material. Given the large amount of
interdisciplinary writing on leadership and innovation, the next Chapter provides
a literature review of the public leadership and policy innovation literature in
detail. This two track approach broadens the scope of this study and contributes
to a deeper understanding of the background necessary for cross-disciplinary
research.

This study examines key scholars’ writing on public leadership patterns found in
cases of policy innovations.11 As Creswell recommends, the literature review section

11 For instance, Van de Ven and Angle, in “An Introduction to the Minnesota Innovation Research Program,” stress a
managerial perspective to study converting ideas into action (in Van de Ven, Angle and Poole 2000, pp. 3-5). They see
the need for studying a temporal sequence of activities, which they call “process theory.” Thus, they propose research
that: (1) examines a manager’s frame of reference with studies in real time; (2) observes and tracks innovative
processes over time; and (3) shows evidence relating innovative and processes. Van Evera also suggests a “process
tracing” method for explaining a chain of events that involves decisionmaking processes by which initial case
conditions are translated into case outcomes (1997, p. 52, 54 & 64).
serves to set the stage and frame the problem for research (1994, p. 23). The interdisciplinary, theoretical review provides a critical review of key scholars’ research and writing about organizational leadership patterns in managing innovation. The dissertation’s literature review addresses specific research questions regarding executive leadership in innovative national security policymaking.

**The Case Study Method**

This dissertation uses a contemporary, case study methodology. Interdisciplinary literature, from political science, international relations, comparative politics, and history provide insights on the case method in qualitative research. Research on organizational leadership suggests that effective patterns in successful policy innovation cases include three distinct processes. These include visionary-rhetorical (top-down), transactional (reciprocal), and participative (bottom-up) influence processes. Scholarly research has examined the significance of executive and organizational leadership in a wide range of public organizations, in a variety of policy domains. This dissertation extends this previous research to the national security policy domain and focus on the Clinton administration’s policy leadership as well as the Defense Department’s organizational leadership in developing and implementing the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative. An important part of this analysis includes examining the roles of the Clinton

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administration’s three Secretaries of Defense (Aspin, Perry, and Cohen) to provide a comparative analysis of executive leadership in large, complex organizations.

Yin (1994), Bates (1998), George (1979, 1993, 2005), Eckstein (1992), Van Evera (1997) and others note that case studies are a rigorous method of research. Case studies are useful for public policy, political science and public administration research, as well as organizational and management studies (Yin 1994). Yin defines the usefulness of the case study method as follows: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994, p. 13). He goes on to write that case studies cope with technically distinctive situations, with more variables of interest than data points. The analysis, therefore, must rely on multiple sources of evidence to converge on the unit of analysis in triangulating fashion.

The form of triangulation in this research project is investigative (Yin, p. 78). The investigation includes examining academic and policy literatures; archival records; and government documents. The dominant technique is exploratory. As Yin notes, case study research benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin 1994, p. 102). The theoretically-informed framework developed in the literature review section outlines the organizational leadership pattern in the development and implementation of innovative public policy. This three dimensional framework guides this study to address and further develop the research questions discussed in the next section. Yin notes a problem in case study research in that
there is no method for developing criteria for interpreting findings. By examining the Clinton administration’s policy leadership, the Defense Department’s organizational leadership under three secretaries of defense, along with U.N. arms control inspection agency chiefs, this research provides a basis for comparing the relative effectiveness of different leadership experiences and patterns in counterproliferation policymaking.

Yin addresses the four common tests to establish the quality of case study research as a form of empirical social research (Yin 1994, p. 32). These are construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. To improve the quality of research design, Yin suggests several case study tactics. The common definitions of the four tests and the case study tactics are as follows (Yin 1994, p. 33).

**Construct validity** is establishing correct operational measures for studying the selected concepts. Tactics during data collection are to use multiple sources of evidence. For this study, the triangulation of evidence is from archival and official records, academic and policy expert analyses, and participant and observers/analysts interviews.

**Internal validity** is for explanatory or causal studies only. Since this is primarily an exploratory study, there is no attempt to develop causal relationships in the scientific sense. For future research, developing more precise causal explanations based in part on this study’s findings should be possible. **External validity** is establishing the domain for generalizing research findings. For this study, the defense domain is the single focus point. Some generalizations may be applicable to the other federal cabinet departments and agencies. The study design should be applicable for analyzing the organizational
leadership patterns and roles of public administrators in policy innovation. To do this, Yin suggests using replication logic in multiple case studies. As discussed previously, the 1990s era of public sector reinvention and reform sparked numerous internal and external policy studies, and pilot tests involving innovative leaders and organizations. This dissertation thus examines three different counterproliferation initiatives in cases of WMD policy innovations with respect to North Korea, Russia and the Former Soviet Republics, and Iraq. This research project identifies the Defense Department as a relatively unique public organization—to the extent that generalizations to other public bureaucracies and policy domains may not be feasible. Reliability is demonstrating that the operations of a study can be repeated with the same results. Tactics to improve reliability include the use of a case study protocol and the development of case study analytical narratives. Using qualitative research, by establishing the theoretically-grounded narratives, this study methodically compiles evidence systematically for future research.

**The Research Approach**

As discussed above, this research employs a qualitative, exploratory, case study approach to examine patterns of leadership and innovation during Clinton administration counterproliferation policymaking. Initially the research is guided by a conceptual framework, which includes three, overlapping leadership processes. Visionary-rhetorical leadership includes identifying an organization’s latent vision to develop new organizational views and themes, amplify future leadership activities and promote support, as well as a sense of ownership, throughout the organization. Transactional leadership processes involve reciprocal influence relationships that couple vision-rhetoric
with compliance mechanisms to engage, or control, agency energies and support. Participative leadership processes includes bottom-up internalization, input, involvement, and self-leadership. Types of participative involvement include corresponding member initiatives, clear responsibilities, feedback, task emphasis, human resources emphasis and, overall, the development of trustworthy followers.

During the Clinton administration, in the chronology of counterproliferation policy development, the innovative idea began with Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. The policy continued and evolved under the direction of the two subsequent Defense Secretaries, Dr. William Perry and former Senator William Cohen. Comparing the executive leadership of these three individuals, within the context of the Defense Department, provides important insights into organizational leadership patterns in guiding the Administration’s policy for countering the threats from weapons of mass destruction – seen as a growing danger during the 1990s.

How effective was the Clinton administration and its senior cabinet officials responsible for defense counterproliferation policymaking? The expectation is that each defense secretary’s personal direction and involvement in counterproliferation policy was different. To what extent did the Department’s executive and organizational leadership follow, or fail to follow, the patterns reflected in other case studies of successful innovative? The cases provide evidence for confirming, or revising, the expected leadership patterns by providing “empirical information about the world” as found in
counterproliferation case for the purpose of later making “descriptive or explanatory inferences” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, p. 7).13

The following Chapters provide important insights into leadership patterns in large, complex, public organizations. This research is intended to add to the body of knowledge, and theory building in public management and policymaking in the defense domain. The supporting literature is examined in more detail in Chapter 2. The following three case studies then provide observations and findings on the management of defense innovation during the Clinton administration attempts to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Research also provides evidence to identify barriers to innovation and attempts to overcome those barriers, in national security policymaking. The next section discusses the sources of empirical evidence for this project.

**Source Material and Documents**

Government official documents, including policy statements, reports, and speeches are important sources for studying the Administration’s policy or top-down leadership. Official, government policy documents are primary sources of evidence for this research. There is an obvious drawback in not having access to classified documents. In addition, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is in the process of slowly releasing the government records and working papers for this period.

13 King, Keohane, and Verba, in *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, write: “The goal is inference. Scientific research is designed to make descriptive or explanatory inferences on the basis of empirical information about the world. Careful descriptions of specific phenomena are often indispensable to scientific research, but the accumulation of facts alone is not sufficient...our particular definition of science requires the additional step of attempting to infer beyond the immediate data to something broader that is not directly observed. That something may involve descriptive inference—using observations from the world to learn about other unobserved facts. Or that something may involve causal inference—learning about causal effects from the data observed” (1994, pp. 7-8).
Important, internal classified documents are not available for this research project. Nonetheless, much documentation is available through what the government calls open source literature. In fact, given the relative importance placed on transparency in democratic governance many government documents, especially those concerning leadership and management issues, are in the public domain. These include the Administration’s national security and military strategies; Secretary of Defense reports to the president and the Congress; Defense Department and General Accounting Office reviews of counterproliferation policy and programs; and congressional oversight hearings. These official Administration documents are significant events for process tracing the evolution of counterproliferation policymaking.

Several significant panels of defense experts reviewed national security policymaking during this period. These included internal and external commissions and panels, such as Aspin’s Bottom-up Review, White’s Roles and Missions Commission, the Lieberman-Coats directed Quadrennial Defense Reviews and National Defense Review, and the Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security/21st Century. Following 911 there were numerous reports by the Duelfer Commission, the Kean-Hamilton 911 Report, and others. There were also several groups focused on nuclear weapons and related intelligence issues. These reviews provide evidence of the extent inside and outside experts addressed leadership and management issues in assessing and recommending changes for improving counterproliferation policymaking.

Congressional oversight hearings contribute significant sources of research evidence. These include the several committees that oversee Department of Defense, Department of State, and Department of Energy policy, programs, and budgets. For
instance, the hearings of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, and their attention, or lack of attention, to organizational and program leadership and management issues also provide important insights for evidence to support, refute or modify the analytical framework’s research areas and questions.

The General Accountability Office (GAO, formerly called the General Accounting Office) provides congressionally directed investigations of federal government performance. The GAO mission includes evaluating federal programs and activities. In its own words, the GAO is “dedicated to good government” [http://www.gao.gov/]. Duties include providing analysis, options, recommendations and assistance to Congress to improve the “economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the federal government” through audits, program reviews and evaluations. Examining GAO reports on defense activities related to counterproliferation policies highlight policy and leadership issues. GAO reports also provide direct assessments of various departments’ organizational, policy, program and budgetary performance.

Throughout the Clinton administration, there were many external policy analyses of the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative. Policy organizations with specific research interests on WMD include the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, RAND, the Brookings Institution, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Other think tanks focus more directly on defense and nuclear policy issues, such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center, and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Policy analysis studies and articles published in-house and in defense journals provide important sources for external Defense Department policy reviews. These resources
provide additional, unofficial and external sources for assessing and evaluating the relative effectiveness of the Department’s leadership in counterproliferation initiative policymaking.

**Data Collection**

Following are the primary source material for this dissertation’s research source material.

(1) Presidential and Secretary of Defense statements of national security policy and strategy regarding counter proliferation initiative(s): official documents, such as the President’s National Security Strategies, the Annual Reports of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, presidential decision directives, and speeches provide a record of counterproliferation policy development (See Enclosure 1).

(2) National Security Council, Department of Defense, and Defense supporting agencies official documents: these sources provide the Administration’s counterproliferation policies, programs, and budgets. Once supporting Defense organizations and agencies are identified, their public records reveal the extent of their transactional and participative relationships within the Department structure. For international perspectives, data is collected from United Nations documents, official reports, and official speeches; along with the writings of agency chiefs involved in nonproliferation and counterproliferation policymaking and implementation.

(3) Key Congress members and staff counterproliferation program evaluations: the congressional oversight process of hearings, as well as the speeches, papers, articles, and interviews of key congressional national security experts and staffers provide important critiques of Defense policy and program development.
Evidence in unofficial policy research analyses and documents; including academic research, think tank analyses, interest group position papers, and academic and policy journals that address counterproliferation efforts. The foreign and defense policy institutes, known as think tanks, or sometimes referred to as the defense intellectual community, are deeply engaged in the debates regarding counterproliferation policy. These institutes provide important sources of policy analyses and data for comparing and contrasting with Clinton administration and DOD officials’ views with those of U.S. and international policy experts.

**Introduction to the Clinton Counterproliferation Initiative**

Contemporary reviews of the Counterproliferation Initiative are developing a particular story line regarding executive leadership patterns in the Clinton administration. A critical, conventional wisdom is coalescing around the following sequence of events. The extent of Iraqi WMD discovered following the Persian Gulf War surprised the first George H.W. Bush administration. The Clinton administration assumed office with what it advertised as a mandate for change, given the end of the Cold War era. In the national security arena, former Congressman Les Aspin, the new Secretary of Defense and a leading defense intellectual, introduced a bold initiative for countering the dangers of weapons of mass destruction (Aspin 1993). Aspin intended to

build significant new counterproliferation programs to meet the new dangers of WMD. After the initial burst of enthusiasm for an aggressive counterproliferation initiative, extending through the tenure of Aspin’s successor, William Perry, and his principal assistant, Ashton Carter -- the counterproliferation programs, in effect, ran out of steam during William Cohen’s tenure as defense secretary.

Critics, in and outside the Administration, criticized the president, bureaucracy, and Congress for stifling the initial, aggressive counterproliferation initiatives. Critics of President Clinton point to a lack of executive leadership, or even paying attention to foreign affairs, in general, and defense policy, in particular (Drew 1994; Holbrooke 1999; Gergen 2000; Clark 2001). Critics of the Defense Department’s organizational leadership characterize it as a somewhat undifferentiated federal bureaucracy, fostering its self-interest at the expense of the national interest. In turn, the initial defense counterproliferation ideas were seen as too threatening and aggressive, and were met with hostility by the Department of State, which fought to retain its ultimate bureaucratic control of nonproliferation policy as a keystone of its international arms control diplomacy. These critical accounts highlight a deal brokered by the National Security Council, using a lowest common denominator approach in segmenting State and Defense Departments efforts, giving each a piece of the pie. In addition, critics point to the parochial armed services’ self-interests, in protecting turf and budgets for traditional roles

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15 The George H.W. Bush administration identified the threat of WMD proliferation following the 1990 Persian Gulf War, but programs were not developed extensively. Initial efforts were cut short by the first President Bush’s 1992 electoral defeat.

16 For a perspective on the proposition that all Cold War national security organizations are “flawed by design” and routinely place bureaucratic over national interests, see Zegart’s (1999).
and missions, which led to the Defense Department under funding the Secretary of Defense’s budget targets for counterproliferation programs.

On the congressional side, critics point to the failure to build upon the initial successes of the Nunn-Lugar legislation, to reach beyond the short-term, albeit successful efforts with Russia and Former Soviet Republics.\(^\text{17}\) Furthermore, they argue that calls for national security policy and organizational reform, such as the Lieberman-Coats Amendment and the resulting Quadrennial Defense Review, only served to reinforce existing programs and maintain a Cold War “legacy” defense posture (Wilson 2000, Lacquement 2003). In the end, the critics write that a lack of executive and organizational leadership in the face of a powerful array of competing bureaucratic forces served to preserve the status quo and limit the effectiveness of the initial drive for serious and far reaching national security policy innovation.

In fact, these early reports may be accurate. A lack of executive, bureaucratic, and legislative leadership may account for a relative lack of effectiveness in the counterproliferation initiatives. On the other hand, through more research, scholars can discover if the preponderance of evidence supports these assertions regarding the effectiveness of the actual policy outcomes. It just may be that the extent of innovation and change, especially within the Clinton Era’s Defense Department, were greater than these contemporary accounts have acknowledged.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{17}\) The Former Soviet Republics are also known as the Newly Independent States.

\(^{18}\) Goldman and Berman’s chapter on the Clinton defense and foreign policy, in Campbell and Rockman’s *The Clinton Legacy* note these common, critical themes (2000, p. 226). They write that “time will tell” as to whether the Clinton administration’s national security initiatives were successful. Even in a pro-administration book, *Preventive Defense* (1999) by Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and his Assistant Secretary, Ashton Carter, the President’s role in significant national security policymaking events is not clearly visible.
The research approach in this study provides a clearer examination of the successes and failures of the Clinton Administration, its defense secretaries, and their department’s organizational leadership in counterproliferation policymaking. Identifying and understanding the sources and extent of public leadership is important for learning about innovation in national security policymaking. Describing, evaluating and searching for explanations of the interrelationships of organizational leadership patterns and effective policymaking outcomes are important for understanding current national security challenges. This research effort thus provides important insights as the defense policy community continues to search for innovative policies, strategies, and programs for countering the dangers presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Leadership patterns can be traced in three particular cases where the Counterproliferation Initiative was implemented in different geographical regions during the Clinton Era. The three most critical cases studied here include the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework and proliferation in Northeast Asia; the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs for Russia and Former Soviet Republics’ “loose nukes”; and Iraq and the proliferation threats posed by Saddam Hussein. Each of these cases illustrates patterns in the conduct of counterproliferation policy in the shifting post-Cold War international landscape. Each case provides a significant test for examining the leadership and innovation processes of the Administration and senior U.S. and, in the Iraq

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Polsby offers three criteria for his selection of cases to study policy innovations: ‘(1) they are relatively large-scale phenomena, highly visible to political actors and observers; (2) they embody from at least one point of view a break with preceding governmental responses to the range of problems to which they are addressed; and (3) unlike major “crises,” with which they share the preceding traits, “innovations” have institutional or societal effects that are in a sense “lasting”’ (1984, p. 8). In addition to meeting Polsby’s selection criteria, I would add that the three selected counterproliferation cases include a significant international dimension, as well as a specific time focus on the initial post-Cold War, Clinton presidency.
case, U.N. agency officials. Finally, each case is important for studying the interaction of policy and organizational leadership in an important attempt at national security policy innovation in public and international affairs during the Clinton era.
Enclosure 1:  *Chronology of Clinton Era Key Strategy Documents and Reports* 20

- 1991
  - Base Force Review
  - National Security Strategy (August)
- 1992
  - National Military Strategy (January)
- 1993
  - National Security Strategy (January)
  - Bottom-Up Review Report (September)
- 1994
  - National Security Strategy (July)
- 1995
  - National Security Strategy (February)
  - Commission on Roles and Missions (May)
  - National Military Strategy
  - Joint Vision 2010
- 1996
  - National Security Strategy (February)
- 1997
  - National Security Strategy (May)
  - Quadrennial Defense Review (May)
  - Concept for Future Joint Operations (May)
  - Defense Reform Initiative Report (November)
  - National Defense Panel Report (December)
- 1998
  - National Security Strategy (October)
- 1999
  - Defense Science Board Report on Warfighting Transformation (August)
  - U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase I Report (September)
  - National Security Strategy (December)
- 2000
  - Joint Vision 2020 (May)
  - National Security Strategy

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20 This Chronology was compiled originally by Dr. Steven Metz (2002) Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. NOTE: This chronology includes only unclassified documents. The Secretary of Defense’s Annual Reports to the President and Congress are also an important bellwether of American strategy and are covered in detail in subsequent chapters.
Bibliography


Chapter 2: Policy Innovation and Public Leadership – A Literature Review

There is no more delicate matter to take in hand, nor more dangerous to conduct, nor more doubtful in its success, than to be a leader in the introduction of changes. For he who innovates will have for enemies all those who are well off under the old order of things, and only lukewarm supporters in those who might be better off under the new.

Machiavelli (1985, p. 44)

We have learned that what we normally think of as political innovation can be described as a combination of two processes. The first, the process of invention, causes policy options to come into existence. This is the domain of interest groups and their interests, of persons who specialize in acquiring and deploying knowledge about policies and their intellectual convictions, of persons who are aware of contextually applicable experiences of foreign nations, and of policy entrepreneurs, whose careers and ambitions are focused on the employment of their expertise and on the elaboration and adaptation of knowledge to problems. The second process is a process of systemic search, a process that senses and responds to problems, that harvests policy options and turns them to the purposes, both public and career-related, of politicians and public officials. As we have seen, in the American political system, search processes can be activated by exogenously generated crises and by constitutional routines, by bureaucratic needs and by political necessities. Describing political innovation in any particular instance thus entails describing how these two processes interact.


Indeed, the only factor that is consistently and significantly positively correlated with perceived effectiveness for originations versus adaptations, small or large, and idea versus implementation stages of innovations is leadership. Strong team leadership appears to be the only consistent “universal” predictor of perceived innovation effectiveness.

Andrew H. Van de Ven and Yun-han Chu (2000, p. 79)

As cited above, Machiavelli, Polsby, and Van de Ven are just a few of the interdisciplinary theorists, throughout history, who have addressed the subject of leadership and innovation. The longstanding interest in the subject and the problems
associated with change in public and international affairs continues to draw attention from scholars and practitioners. In the recent, post-Cold War era, the complexities of national security policy-making facing presidential administrations, Congress members, and public managers have grown more challenging. In addition to the normal pressures for improving the substance of national security policy, the 1990s included additional demands for major, public management and leadership, government reforms (Gore 1993; Cohen and Eimicke 1995; Kettl and DiIulio 1995; Thompson and Jones 1994; Light 1997; Kellerman 1999; Heinrich and Lynn 2000). Reforming, reinventing, and transforming governance continue to be popular political and academic topics for improving government efficiency and effectiveness (Plant 2002; Kettl 2003; Ingraham and Lynn 2004; Bertelli and Lynn 2006). Calls for policy and management innovations placed significant demands on leaders involved in the public’s business, different than when Polsby considered innovation as a separate phenomenon of political life in 1984. These demands call also for integrating and aligning leadership roles among a variety of agencies – despite the lack of clarity in the literature as to what leadership is and how best to study it. In James MacGregor Burns book Leadership’s prologue, titled “The Crisis of Leadership,” he refers to leadership as the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth (Burns 1979, p. 2). Van Wart, in his more recent assessment of public-sector leadership theory, writes that there is “a striking need for a comprehensive leadership model that integrates transactional and transformational elements” (Van Wart 2003, p. 225).

Adding to this complexity and lack of conceptual clarity is the increasing significance of the involvement of a growing number of stakeholders, such as interest
groups, especially in defense policymaking. The expansion of policy institutes and interest groups is documented in the public administration literature (MacRae and Whittington 1997; Cigler and Loomis 1998). In addition, commentaries on the on-going trends in world politics, economics, and society, usually called “globalization,” routinely include a discussion of the interdependence of transnational political, economic, diplomatic, and information issues in international affairs, national, and homeland security networks (Friedman 1999; Jervis 1997/2005; Nye and Donahue 2000; Rosenau 2005; Haass 2005). This broad scope for conceptualizing post Cold War international security problems brings additional internal and external audiences into the defense policy domain, adding pressures to bear on policymakers as well. In comparison with Polsby’s 1984 study, today there are even more demands on policymakers, as leaders and problem solvers, involved in the dual processes of invention and systematic search for creating and implementing innovative national security policies and programs.

The convergence of these forces, during the 1990s, marks it as an especially turbulent period that calls for research into important aspects of national security policymaking (Rosenau 1990). Is it reasonable to expect that these forces of external and internal change, occurring during the tenure of the Clinton administration, should have had a considerable impact on defense policies and programs and the government’s

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21 Keohane and Nye define globalization as “a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances. These networks can be linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biological relevant substances (such as acid rain or pathogens)” (in Nye and Donahue, 2000, p. 2).

capacity to lead in creating new approaches to increasingly complex problem sets? To be sure, the interconnected theoretical threads among public leadership and policy innovation are complex. In studying the interactions of systems in political and social life, in the words of one influential political scientist, “Effective action is often made possible by employing multiple policies that constrain and work with the dynamics of the system” (Jervis 1997, p. 291). From a conceptual standpoint, then, an influential political scientist and historian, in reviewing the literature on governmental policy and decisionmaking, recommend using multiple, competing, and overlapping models (Allison and Zelikow 1999, p. 389). Studying the changing patterns in the overlapping roles of executive, bureaucratic, legislative, and interest group leaders, in the dynamic U.S. national security policymaking system, in the context of a turbulent international environment, provides important perspectives on attempts at innovative national security policymaking during the Clinton administration.

This chapter reviews the public administration literature – drawn from the fields of public policy, public management, organization theory, and political institutions – to begin this study of policy innovation and public leadership in national security policymaking. Recent research in public administration focuses a good deal of attention on the subject innovation. To set the stage then, this review introduces the relevant public administration literature on executive and organizational leadership, especially in large, complex, public organizations.

**What is Leadership?**

The *Handbook of Leadership* presents numerous definitions and conceptualizations of the terms leader and leadership. Bass writes that the search for the
“one and only proper and true definition of leadership seems to be fruitless…” (Bass 1990, pp. 18-20). The Handbook’s definition identifies several broad observations about leadership. First is that leadership is an interaction between members of a group. Second is that the interaction often involves a restructuring of the situation. Third is that leaders are agents of change who direct others goals and paths to achieve them. Fourth is that any member of a group can “exhibit some amount of leadership.”

Bass offers that the “definition used in a particular study of leadership depends on the purposes of the study” (Bass, p. 19). Management innovation researchers write that the more than “100 accepted academic definitions of leadership” provide a multitude of changing perspectives for study (Manz, in Van de Ven, 2000, pp. 613-4). Organizational leadership theories emphasize positions and roles within hierarchies and, therefore, this approach is suitable for leadership research focused on a large, complex bureaucracy, such as the Defense Department. For the purposes of this research then, certain conceptual themes are fundamental to the study of leadership in the organizational context.

One important concept is that leadership involves influence relationships among leaders and followers. These influence relationships are not unidirectional. In other words, leadership may be top-down, reciprocal, or bottom-up. A multidirectional view of leadership varies with perspectives that emphasize an executive leadership direction of influence; with a corresponding interest in driving significant change from the top-down. In contrast, this research begins by assuming that the direction of influence and the type of involvement varies. Both the direction of influence and type of involvement depends
in part on the situation and context that includes complex interrelationships within which people -- the leaders and the led -- interact.

In this research project’s timeframe, the general situation includes the external environment of the turbulent, post Cold War era, after the fall of the Soviet Union, when national security policymakers sought new directions for national defense. A main area of inquiry in this study is to examine policy processes in terms of change, as innovations for redirecting and guiding organizational policy towards new goals and along new paths. The research begins by considering strategic (top-down), reciprocal (transactional), and participative (bottom-up) organizational influence relationships, as well as different types of involvement at the executive, middle, and bottom layers in large, complex, public bureaucracies. The next sections discuss each of the three major perspectives, or levels of analysis, along the lines outlined by visionary-rhetorical or transformational leadership; transactional leadership; and participative leadership -- to

23 Kellerman, in Reinventing Leadership: Making the Connection between Politics and Business writes that: “Leadership is the effort by leaders—who may hold, but do not necessarily hold, formal position of authority—to engage followers in the joint pursuit of mutually agreed-on goals. These goals represent significant, rather than merely incremental, change.” In contrast, “Management is the effort by managers—who always hold a position of authority at some level—to get the trains to run on time. While it may, or may not, involve an element of coercion, management does not, in and of itself, involve significant change” (1999, p. 10) A popular management text, Developing Management Skills notes, “leadership has been used traditionally to describe what individuals do under conditions of change…. Management, on the other hand, has traditionally been used to describe what executives do under conditions of stability” (Whetten and Cameron 2005, p. 15-16). While acknowledging the leader as change agent and manager as status quo distinctions, the textbook authors conclude that recent research suggests that these distinctions are no longer useful and “Effective management and leadership are inseparable” (p. 16).

24 Types of involvement include top-down ownership and identification with the innovation; reciprocal compliance and engagement within the bureaucracy; and bottom-up internalization, input, involvement, and self-leadership. Of these types, Manz identifies primary types of involvement as: rhetorical-visionary identification, transactional compliance, and participative internalization (in Van de Ven 2000, p. 615).

25 The notion of using multiple frameworks, or levels of analysis, is drawn from several works in political science, especially in the study of international affairs and policy analysis including Waltz (1959), Allison and Zelikow (1999), and Heineman, Bluhm, Peterson and Kearney (2001). Heineman et al. write: “Standing back from habitual predispositions, whether the utilitarianism of cost-benefit analysis or the egalitarian stance of Kantianism and welfare liberalism, forces one to look at the policy situation in its multifaceted complexity and pragmatically decide what must be done for the public good” (p. 180).
guide the reader’s initial overview of the leadership and policy literatures. Following the discussion of this overview, the review and analysis focuses more directly on the foundation theories and concepts in the literature on public leadership and policy innovation, and the role of public executives as change agents.

**Level 1: Strategic Direction or Visionary-Rhetorical Leadership**

The first leadership perspective is at the strategic or visionary-rhetorical level. The primary research question to address is: Did the Clinton administration and its three defense secretaries provide effective strategic direction through visionary-rhetorical leadership in counterproliferation initiative policymaking? How effective were the secretaries in communicating a guiding vision, mission, purpose, direction, goal and path during counterproliferation policy development? Given that Secretary Aspin initiated the Administration’s counterproliferation policy, did the President and Secretary’s vision-rhetoric aim at building support for the initiative across a wide range of employees to promote effective implementation? The type of involvement in the policy development and implementation most likely varied across the subordinate staffs and organizations, as well as international organizations engaged in arms control inspections. Were communicating the strategic vision, emphasizing the priority and objectives of counterproliferation efforts, and building broad agency identification with counterproliferation policymaking and implementation an important leadership task for all three secretaries? In addition, as suggested by the Minnesota studies research discussed in Chapter 1, did the vision include a discovery and articulation of the __________________

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26 The discussion below on Minnesota research case findings are summarized from Van de Ven/Angle/Poole (2000), Research on the Management of Innovation: The Minnesota Studies (hereafter the Minnesota, or MIRP, studies).
department’s vision? In other words, did the rhetoric consciously complement traditional organizational viewpoints, patterns and themes? Finally, did the secretaries show ownership of the counterproliferation policy and did the department followers identify with and internalize the secretaries’ policy goals and program direction? In sum, research suggests that the leaders’ rhetorical-visionary effectiveness increases by connecting the organization’s vision and core tasks with the proposed policy innovation – and creating a sense of the leaders personal ownership, as well as a sense identification (across a wide range of defense and Washington interagency officials, as well as those officials in international agencies).

A second line of questioning involves the vision’s influence on subsequent major system changes. In addition to words, were there significant actions? Did these actions - as forced major system changes -- adapt and amplify the latent vision to change the implementing organizations in ways appropriate for accomplishing the guiding rhetoric-vision? Major system changes would include setting conditions for future activities to promote support and organizational members’ sense of ownership. Evidence of changes would also include modifying the Defense Department and other agencies power structure, ways of performing work, and the tasks assigned. Again, Minnesota (MIRP) researchers suggest that major system changes would facilitate the workers/agency identification with the policy innovations. Research also suggests that without major system changes the organization is likely to perceive the vision as empty rhetoric.

Level 2: Transactional Leadership

The study’s second major research perspective addresses the question of whether the Clinton administration and the three defense secretaries engage in effective
transactional leadership in counterproliferation initiative policymaking. These questions relate the relative effectiveness of transactional leadership processes to the type of member/worker involvement, or engagement, necessary, especially for effective implementation. Each involves reciprocal directions of influence. Prior research in this area suggests that a higher level of effectiveness for reciprocal leadership occurs under conditions when compliance is necessary to implement an innovation, and is more important than agency identification and internalization. Minnesota research suggests that compliance approaches would be most effective in vertical hierarchies, such as the Defense Department, when there are clear-cut missions and tasks for subordinate leaders and organizations, clearly defined and measurable organizational goals, limited attention to contractual incentives for motivation, and strict rules regarding performance measurement reporting to top management.

In contrast, when full member/agency involvement is necessary for success, then compliance-centered, transactional leadership is not likely to be effective. As suggested in the Minnesota cases, compliance approaches are inadequate in situations involving major changes in culture and the basic organizational power structure – those situations most frequently characterized as holistic, innovative policymaking. In a “non-compliance” situation, where bureaucratic principal-agent, or leader-follower, reciprocal engagement is necessary, the research suggests the need for stronger horizontal relationships, with organizational leadership working from within the organization’s structure in a coordinated effort to develop mutual organizational goals and performance measures. These would not include top-down, executive driven efforts. Instead, a reciprocal form of leader-follower engagement and bargaining among several
organizational layers would stand out. In counterproliferation policymaking then, did the administration and agency chiefs attempt transactional engagement, as mutually supporting, reciprocal relationships?

Research also suggests that an effective transactional process emphasizes engagement over compliance orientations, especially when innovation requires major cultural and structural changes (Stephenson, Plant 1991). For instance, were there effective transactional-engagement processes at work horizontally among the department and other agency policy leaders and subordinate organizations? Did the subordinate leaders and organizations engage actively in counterproliferation policy development? Did work within the organization’s middle-layers reflect the policy and priorities? This research offers evidence of how agency chiefs emphasized transactional-compliance, and/or transactional-engagement, reciprocal leadership relationships. The third dimension of the study’s conceptual framework investigates leadership as a bottom-up process.

**Level 3: Participative Leadership**

The third major research perspective is to view the Clinton administration’s inclusion of agency “followers” as participative leaders in Counterproliferation Initiative policymaking. Research in the leadership framework’s third dimension, of participative leadership, notes that participatory processes are effective when intellectual input and physical implementation are necessary for completing the innovation process successfully. The type of employee or agency involvement would include internalization, input, involvement, and what is termed as “self-leadership” (Manz/Sims, 2001, p. 78). To what extent were employees with DOD and other agencies involved in
providing intellectual input as well as physical implementation for counterproliferation policy development and implementation? For instance, did the defense secretaries, as principals, encourage, recognize and reward employee/agency participation? From the bottom-up, did employees seek to participate (using their intellectual input and/or physical implementation) in developing and achieving the counterproliferation vision, mission, goals, and performance measures?

The final series of participative leadership questions involve any external constraints that conflict directly with the degree of discretion necessary for effective innovation. Research suggests that if compliance and constraints are high, then participative leadership is not effective in promoting innovations. Did the Defense Department stereotype of a rigid hierarchy, with tight organizational compliance and control mechanisms, match the 1990s experience and hinder innovation in the counterproliferation efforts? In addition, does the research identify obstacles to innovation at the bottom, middle, or top levels of the Defense Department?

In Clinton administration, who were the important players engaged in identifying and overcoming constraints and obstacles in pursuit of effective counterproliferation policy? For effective innovation, MIRP research suggests the significance of follower participation, as the writings of Gardner (1990), Mosher (1967) and others in the human relations school stress. Research suggests that observations reflecting the level of agency buy-in and bottom-up input provide important evidence about the executive leaders’ abilities to capitalize on the level and degree of effective participatory leadership involved.
In sum, the literature and research suggests studying a complex interplay of influence relationships -- top-down, reciprocal, and bottom-up -- to develop a deeper understanding of the role of leadership in policy innovation. In extensive, longitudinal research cases of effective leadership in innovation, such as the Minnesota studies; all three dimensions were in evidence. Studying the Clinton administration efforts in developing innovative policy for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction provides an important opportunity for additional research. When comparing the earlier cases and administration policy innovation and organizational leadership patterns then, what are the key similarities and differences? To what extent did the administration, the three defense secretaries, and U.N. agency chiefs conform to the leadership patterns suggested by the other studies of successful innovation?

The Public Administration Literature on Public Leadership and Policy Innovation

Several important theorists in the public administration literature reinforce these three broad leadership levels, while emphasizing the particular significance of leader-follower relationships; organizational goals and paths; and internal and external environments; as well as historical contexts. Selznick’s *Leadership in Administration* provides a sound starting point. Selznick differentiates, and extends the relationship between organizations and institutions. His main argument is that executive leaders

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27 Using a conceptual framework, MIRP cases further illustrate the leadership patterns expected in successful innovation cases (Schroeder in Van de Ven 2000, pp. 129-130). Leadership from the top-down was more complex than is commonly characterized by the terms “entrepreneur” or innovation “champion.” Successful cases reveal a top management that was very knowledgeable and interested in innovative ideas. Innovation managers did not immediately recognize the contributions of different technological, managerial and institutional roles -- all critical to the innovation effort. In effect, multiple levels of managers were involved. Cases revealed a hierarchy of teams of managers. Management teams placed constant attention and substantial time over the innovation life cycle. In short, the successful cases of effective innovation required a high level of personal interest and ownership in innovation, by several layers of managers -- those with the clout to get things done.
become statesmen when they transition from administrative management to institutional leadership (Selznick 1957, pp. 4-6). Selznick presents a view of organizations as technical instruments for mobilizing human energies, directed towards an articulated set of aims. Thus, from an engineering perspective, an organization is a tool, a rational instrument, to perform a set of tasks. In Selznick’s view, managers focus primarily on performance, as efficiency and effectiveness, and not on organizational change.

Selznick differentiates organizations from institutions, which he describes as the natural products of larger social needs and pressures. In contrast to his views on the relatively static nature of organizations, Selznick views institutions as responsive and adaptive organisms – operating within the bounds of their social environments. Selznick’s writing thus characterizes high-level, organizational leadership as institutional leadership. In Selznick’s conceptualization, leadership is a “kind of work done to meet the needs of a social situation” (Selznick 1957, p.22). Institutional leadership then is an activity, function, or work done by executives in large, complex organizations operating within a broader social environment. This then begs the question: What are the roles of senior leaders, or more specifically, what kinds of work do leaders perform?

Selznick prescribes four major work functions for institutional leaders. First, they define the organizational mission and goals -- the goals that influence the “total structure of the enterprise” (Selznick 1957, p. 26). Leaders balance, but do not “confound” organizational achievement (in terms of building resources, stability, and reputation) and define institutional success (in terms of promoting a clear sense of values). They also do not confuse interpersonal and institutional skills. By interpersonal skills he refers to communication, motivation, and conflict resolution. More importantly for institutional
leaders, as statesmen, is their expertise in promoting and protecting fundamental and overarching organizational values (Selznick 1957, p. 28).28

Selznick views institution building as a critical role for senior executives to “create an integrated social organism” (Selznick 1957, p. 152). He writes that: “The art of the creative leader is the art of institution-building, the reworking of the human and technological materials to fashion an organism that embodies new and enduring values” (Selznick 1957, pp. 152-153). Selznick notes that gaining consent for new organizational tasks depends upon how secure the participants, or followers feel. Most importantly, he writes that leaders achieve these feeling of security among participants by distinguishing between those important to a sense of security and those essential to the aims of the enterprise. Leaders’ first responsibilities are to solve the “many routine problems of technical and human organization” (Selznick 1957, p. 153). These are lower order, but necessary functional requirements for leaders as managers. Once the organizational engineering is in operational order, then change can take place – and new ideals, or values put into practice for long-range planning and experimentation. In Selznick’s words, once secure, an organization can release it “energies for creative change” (Selznick 1957, p. 153).

Among the “great functions of administration” Selznick notes the leader’s role in providing a “cohesive force in the direction of institutional security,” or the organization’s engineering function (Selznick 1957, pp. 153-154). For a future orientation, he prescribes that the executive direct changes towards essential

28 Terry, in Leadership of Public Bureaucracies: The Administrator as Conservator (2003), stresses that the administrator’s role as “conservator” of core values is of overriding importance for executive leaders.
organizational aims or goals. In addition, he writes, “another great function is the creation of conditions that will make possible in the future what is excluded in the present” (Selznick 1957, p. 154). Nevertheless, change must be grounded in fulfilling “truly felt needs and aspirations” or institutional values (Selznick 1957, p. 154). In sum, executives, as institutional leaders, focus on the core work, or engineering functions of the organization, while creating conditions for continued, future successes, with past, present and future linked by values ingrained in both leaders and followers.

Thus, Selznick’s 1957 writing highlights the general categories the contemporary leadership literature continues to stress, that is, conceptualizing leadership as transformational, transactional and participative. In the literature since the late 1950s, these three types continue to be predominant in leadership studies. Most famously, Burns’ (1978) writing on high-level political leaders, based mainly on his study of Franklin Roosevelt, focused on the differences between a glorified transformational and a more common transactional form of leadership. Neustadt (1990) also contributed to the emphasis on the high order politics of rhetorical leadership in his study of the importance of the president’s power to persuade. Burns and others also reinforce aspects of transactional leadership, but primarily from a top-down perspective. Followers matter in the transformational school, but mainly as mass publics, moved to supportive actions designed by visionary-rhetorical leaders, mostly progressive politicians and especially American presidents.

Going further back in time, to the progressive, good government era of the early 20th Century, we find the roots of what is now commonly described as transactional leadership. In the writings of classical public administration scholars, transactional
leadership processes were described as functions of leaders and managers in private and public organizations. Taylor’s scientific management, Barnard’s functions of the executive, and Gulick’s POSDCORB\textsuperscript{29} prescriptions, all focused on the leader-manager’s roles in contributing to organizational efficiency (Taylor 1947; Barnard 1938/1968; Gulick 1937). In contemporary literature, public administration scholars, such as Moe (1984), Waterman and Meier (1998), West (1995), Wood and Waterman (1994), and others, especially in their writings on bureaucratic control and principal agency theories, reinforce the importance of transactional processes for enhancing organizational effectiveness and efficiency. Whether to control or inspire bureaucratic actors, as leaders and followers, the public bureaucracy scholars study significant transactional themes, such as hierarchy, roles, contracts, motivation, and rules. As a prime example, Terry’s (2003) writing on public leadership, centered largely on leadership from an elevated view of bureaucratic-transactional processes, stresses the leader’s role as conservator -- in directing the core organization’s work competencies while articulating, maintaining, and defending its traditional values.

In what is now considered classic public administration, participative leadership generally stems from work by Follett, Fayol, Mayo\textsuperscript{30} and others in the human relations school of public administration (Fry 1989; Harmon and Mayer 1986). A key concept in this school includes Barnard’s notions of informal organizations. Mosher’s analysis of 1960s-era reorganization case studies precedes more recent research regarding the

\textsuperscript{29} POSDCORB refer to public management functions in terms of planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting. (Gulick 1937, p. 12).

\textsuperscript{30} Especially cited is Mayo’s research in the Western Electric, Hawthorne experiments (Fry 1989, p. 136).
significance of participatory leadership. Authors writing on Mosher’s legacy note his emphasis on participatory leadership -- that is “underscored and clarified” in the main hypothesis of his 1967 book, Government Reorganization. Stephenson and Plant highlight his finding: “that participation in the reorganization process is most relevant to persons and groups directly affected by change; that participation is most effective if it leads to a close correspondence of individual group and organizational goals; and that participation should begin as early in the reorganization process as possible to be effective” (Stephenson and Plant 1991, p. 102).

In fact, the roots of participative leadership extend earlier in human history. Two leading organizational theorists point out participative leadership notions in the writing of medieval and renaissance practitioners as diverse as St. Benedict and Machiavelli (Vroom and Jago 1988, p. 7). Writing that is more recent includes King and Stivers (1998) examination of the citizen’s roles as participants in representative government and public administration. Nye, Zelikow and King (1997) address concerns about citizen’s lack of trust in government. Cleveland (2002) writes from the perspective of followers as knowledge workers in participatory leadership processes.

These three leadership perspectives or processes – visionary-rhetorical, transactional, and participative – continue to inform the leadership literature in multiple disciplines. Scholars tend to emphasize a top-down perspective (especially in presidential studies), a reciprocal perspective (especially in bureaucracy), and a participative perspective (especially in studies of citizenship and information age, knowledge workers). Recent writing does acknowledge the integrative and overlapping nature of organizational leadership. Gardner, for instance, places strong emphasis on the
importance of visionary-rhetorical leadership from the top while also emphasizing the critical nature of follower support.

Scholars such as Downs (1967/1994), Kaufman (1981), Wilson (1989), Doig and Hargrove (1990), Moore (1995), Riccucci (1995), Lynn (1996), Aberbach and Rockman (2000), and Nye (2006) emphasize the significance of public executives and agency heads operating on the boundary of transformational and transactional perspectives. In their writing, the leader is a constrained agent of change who has to select their innovative projects carefully, as they wade through the primordial swamp of bureaucratic politics. They note that change is possible, but only through careful negotiations with political authorizers, and bargaining with risk-averse organizations and bureaucrats (Moore 1995).

Scholars who emphasize participative leadership are more likely to emphasize the joint roles of both leaders and followers as change agents. Organizational scholars, such as Manz and Sims, research and write about self-leadership as the path to future organizational success. They argue that when individuals and organizations use proper leadership the future knowledge workers provides the essential bottom-up influences necessary in fostering teamwork, creativity, innovation, and, overall, enhance effectiveness at the individual, team, and organizational levels (Manz and Sims 2001, pp. 228-9).

While each of these authors tend to emphasize one process as most influential, in portions of their leadership research and writing, they touch on the three processes as suggested in the interdisciplinary literature -- from Selznick and Burns foundational, qualitative research books to the more recent, extensive and quantitative research projects
Again, the Minnesota researchers observed that all three leadership processes are involved in efforts promoting organizational innovations. Thus, the organizational leadership patterns observed in the MIRP project, focused on leadership and innovation reinforces other research findings. Their three-dimensional framework, with a supporting pattern-matching logic, provides an integrative framework for conceptualizing and comparing leadership influence processes in innovation cases (Manz, in Van de Ven 2000, p. 615).31

The next sections address the public administration literature on innovation in terms of policies and programs. The literature is reviewed by contrasting the authors who stress incremental approaches with those who view innovation as whole-system change efforts. In essence, innovations can be thought of as existing along a continuum, from small, incremental changes, to large, radical transformations.

The Continuum of Policy Innovation: Policymaking as “Muddling Through”

Lindblom’s 1959 ‘The Science of “Muddling Through”’ is included in the classics of public administration literature for its “statement and defense of incremental decisionmaking” in the American policy process (Heineman et al. 2002, p. 20). His article addresses an administrator’s capability for formulating policy when faced with solving complex problems. As the title of the article suggests, Lindblom proposes what he calls the branch approach (as opposed to the more theoretical rational-comprehensive,

31 Manz offers the double-loop conceptual framework as a model for additional research. MIRP researchers also provide questions as “preliminary suggestions for future research on the role of leadership within the unfolding of innovation processes” (Manz, in Van de Ven 2000, p. 634). In short, their questions seek to address the ability to generalize what they refer to as a double loop model, or the combination of leadership styles that facilitates complimentary innovative and routine work processes, the differences in leadership styles in small versus large innovations, the multiple leadership roles for facilitating innovations, and the kinds of training needed to equip leaders to contribute to innovation processes.
or root approach) or “the method of successive limited comparisons” (Lindblom, in Shafritz and Hyde 1992, p. 225). The Lindblom minimalist perspective is to conserve, adapt, and encourage small changes in government policymaking and management, given “limits on human cognitive capacity, and the pluralism in our administrative system” (Plant 1986, p. 76).

Other scholarship also addresses the subject of change management in the public sector in terms of small scale innovation. For instance, writing in the early 1980s, Herbert Kaufman stresses the agency and executive’s capability for incremental change and, correspondingly, a limited capacity for large scale innovations or system transformation. Kaufman’s study of six bureaus or agencies over a one-year period challenged the then (1981) conventional wisdom about the autonomy and authority of agency chief executive officers. He notes that prominent political scientists, such as Leonard D. White, Francis E. Rouke, and Richard E. Neustadt have written about the presumed power of bureau chiefs, stemming from their autonomy as heads of independent, hierarchical organizations. During his one-year study, using direct observations, document reviews, and interviews, Kaufman discovered the important role of the agency chiefs in external relations and, especially, the decentralized nature of formal, hierarchical relations (Kaufman 1981, p. 46).

At the federal level, hierarchy certainly comes into play in the lines of authority that extend from the president through the cabinet secretary to the agency chiefs. The president can directly influence the agency directly using the hierarchical chain of

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32 The agencies studied included the Internal Revenue Service, Customs Service, Federal Drug Agency, Social Security Administration, Forest Service, and Plant Health Inspection Service.
command. There are also indirect channels, such as using the Office of Management and Budget, to exert executive branch influence (West 2006). Kaufman more often found that the departments did not write commands in military fashion with direct orders for agency chiefs to follow. In fact, his finding was that as much time was spent working in lateral intergovernmental relations, what today are normally called networks, working across agency boundaries as well as within the vertical hierarchy of the departments or the executive branch (Kaufman 1981, p. 62).

Kaufman found that overall, hierarchical, command, and control functions were not used in an authoritative fashion. Agency heads had the legal authority to do so, but did not use outright orders to subordinates (Kaufman 1981, p. 86). Instead, the chiefs used their position to formulate and announce decisions, to gather information, for public relations, and to inspire their agency work force. Coordination and communications were used to convey their wishes clearly and designed to bring people together, ask questions, distribute information, and settle signature rules. In sum, “Cracking the whip and personally regulating the flow of work were not ways in which the chiefs spent their working days” (Kaufman 1981, p. 87).

In Kaufman’s view part of the explanation stems from the stability found in the upper echelons of the civil service. There the continuity of personnel reinforces a hierarchy that is schooled and conditioned in accordance with established agency policies and practices (Kaufman 1981, p. 122). Presumably, the status quo contributes to the continuity of standard operating procedures, which in turn reinforces the agency hierarchy. Also important for explaining continuity, while restraining the power of the agency heads, are the preeminence of Congress and its web of constraints on agency
behavior. Kaufman argues that given the power of the purse, Congress has the upper hand (Kaufman 1981, p. 161).

In short, Kaufman highlights the characteristics of decentralized administrative systems – writing that weak forces pull the parts together, while stronger forces can pull them apart. Therefore, cooperation is necessary for the vast majority of government work, which has interagency and interdepartmental dimensions (Kaufman 1981, p. 190). Kaufman’s study describes the concurrent pulling of both centralizing and decentralizing forces. Centrifugal forces tend to spin organizations apart and therefore require stronger leadership. Alternatively, there is what he calls “system statis” which he describes as promoting a loose system controlled by organizational precedents and procedures.

Kaufman notes that the idea of a government system driven by somewhat static organizational imperatives does not sit well with some cherished beliefs about active and strong leadership and human purpose (Kaufman 1981, p. 194). In his view, individual behavior conforms to the organizational situation and greater weight is given to organizational goals, with organizational templates shaping individual behavior.

Kaufman emphasizes the theoretical insights of the homeostatic and cybernetic models of organizational behavior – organizations as self-regulating mechanisms that tend toward a steady state. Rather than a system that responds to directions from the hierarchy and leadership, Kaufman views organizations as ruled by their internal logic and resistant to change from the top.

As a result of his study, Kaufman calls for a constrained and circumscribe role for leadership. He writes: “One of the ironies of life is that people may perform better if they recognize how little they can do than if they approach their tasks believing the myth that
they can impose their will on the world” (Kaufman 1981, pp. 196-7). He suggests that one approach to improve theory, advice, and research is to admit that we have more to learn.

As is discussed next, new research does in fact tackle the issues of public leadership and policy innovation from holistic and even transformational perspectives. For example, Roberts and King (1996) conceptualize innovation as a systemic, change process. Their book provides a broad and more recent context for thinking about innovation. Roberts and King are interested in researching the transformation of public policy. The book focuses on large-scale system changes. They also differentiate between two kinds of change. First-order change involves incremental measures (they cite Lindblom, Cobb and Elder, Ripley and Franklin). Second-order change involves fundamental systemic discontinuity. Transformation involves “jumps” to new systems and is also characterized as root, radical, revolutionary, and paradigm change. The authors present examples of second-order change, including the development of British and Swedish welfare states; mid-1970s U.S. clean air legislation, tobacco regulation, and airline deregulation. Roberts and King’s cover previous theorists’ attempts to explain radical change—as policy designs of political actors deliberately framing radical new public programs (by chance windows of opportunity—Kingdon; by learning—Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith; and by consensus.—Coyle and Wildavsky). Roberts and King offer an innovative process to guide research on radical, or root change.

**The Continuum of Policy Innovation: Transformational Change**

For Roberts and King, policy innovation is a major part of the process of transformation—or “creating an irreversible transformation based on a new set of
ordering principles” (Roberts and King 1996, p. xii). The innovation process includes the following stages:

1. **Phase (1) Creation**: an emerging innovative idea, associated with a need, problem or concern; policy initiation, or defining the problem and proposing a solution.
2. **Phase (2) Design**: placing the idea into a concrete form, a paper, prototype, or model.
3. **Phase (3) Implementation**: putting the idea into practice; or incorporation, routinization, and diffusion of an idea.

Roberts and King provide a holistic, longitudinal, policy innovation process model. They also provides a typology for examining the role of individuals as policy entrepreneurs and provides a typology of innovative entrepreneurs as both individuals and teams whose leadership brings forth new ideas, mobilizes resources, and moves the idea through the political process. In short, research must look into the interaction of the various entrepreneurs during each stage in the process of innovation.

In addition, Roberts and King provide two interrelated models for understanding the role(s) of individuals and teams in the policy innovation process (Roberts and King 1996, p. 12, 14) Their model includes the following five categories: system maintainer, policy intellectual, policy advocate, failed entrepreneur, and public entrepreneur. Each phase of the innovation process requires different contributions from each participant. For phase 1--in creating new ideas--the policy intellectuals, policy advocates, and policy entrepreneurs are in the forefront. For phase 2--the design and prototype development phase--advocates, entrepreneurs and champions, are most important. Finally, for phase 3--the implementation phase--policy entrepreneurs, champions and administrators take the lead in the innovation process.
One of their key research findings is what they term the “problem of political
dynamics.” To address these political problems associated with policy innovation, they
connect the barriers to radical policy change with their process phases. For instance,
during policy initiation, her research suggests that the political debate will center on
values (see also Polsby 1984). At the time of design and implementation, they found
explosive issues resulting in the interaction of power and politics in the formal legislative
process. During design and implementation, it was necessary for policy champions to
arise, such as the state governor’s critical role in pushing changes requiring legislation for
domestic policies. Throughout, conflict and consensus building must be managed -- there
must be coordination among the idea generators, designers, implementors, and evaluators
for a radical idea to survive to become a full-blown innovation (Roberts and King 1996,
p. 198).33

While acknowledging the roles played by individuals as intellectuals, champions,
and entrepreneurs, Roberts and King also note the growing importance of teams and
collective entrepreneurship. Given the length of the policy cycle in their study and the
large numbers of individual and groups involved, they write of the “close of the age of
heroic entrepreneurship and the beginning of the age of collective entrepreneurship”
(Roberts and King 1996, p. 162). Other authors characterize entrepreneurial teams as
learning and self-organizing systems (Van de Ven 1986; Senge 1990; Argyris 1999;
Morgan 2006). In addition, they highlight Walker’s writing (1969) on diffusion and the

33 The authors also conducted research using psychometric instruments (Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, and Loevinger
Sentence Completion Test, see p. 140, Table 6.1 Results) to test entrepreneurial personality traits. In general terms,
young that change agents in their case were intuitive, individualistic, and analytical. Change agents excelled at
critical thinking and problem solving. They found that these traits are both learned and innate. They contend that
expertise can be acquired through the study of their process model and developing current knowledge and skills.
importance of a community resource base. Thus, because radical change includes risk and uncertainty, Roberts and King suggest the need for large coalitions and extensive resources—an ecology of organizations that provides seed money and political support for issue analysis and experimentation (Roberts and King 1996, pp. 169-171).

The Roberts and King study findings provide a direction for future research needs. They write the following: “Given the complexity of innovation in government, we suspect that collective entrepreneurship is a more common phenomenon than individual entrepreneurship. This will be an important area for future research” (Roberts and King 1996, p. 180). In their view, the collective talents of policy intellectuals, advocates, champions, and administrators are all required to lead innovation in a policy system. As is discussed next (subsequent to Lindblom, Kaufman and Roberts and King’ research) detailed, empirical studies of innovation suggest several additional factors involved in successful programs.

**Research Studies of Policy Innovation in American Government**

Since 1986, the Ford Foundation and Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government’s “Innovations in American Government” awards program has recognized achievements in government problem-solving and public innovation, and in communicating their practices. They classify innovative programs as those demonstrating the art of public sector, creative problem-solving. The development, execution, and evaluation of the innovative programs, especially at the state and local levels, have sparked research and writing on innovations in public management.

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34 Now the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation, see http://www.ashinstitute.harvard.edu/Ash/.
Harvard faculty members, Altshuler and Behn’s edited book on *Innovation in American Government* includes essays by public management scholars involved in the formative years of the Ford Foundation-Kennedy School program. Their collaborating authors highlight the difficulties in arriving at a common definition of innovation, as well as the dilemmas facing public managers who are being pressured to change, improve, and reinvent government by being innovative. Zegans’ defines innovation narrowly. In his view, innovation is a new idea put into practice. Lynn views innovation as involving significant change. In Lynn’s words, innovation is a fundamental transformation of an organization’s core tasks: “Innovation changes deep structures and changes them permanently” (Lynn, in Altshuler & Behn 1997, p. 7). Moore focuses on the ends of innovative programs and the values\(^{35}\) that they reflect. Altshuler and Behn do not attempt to synthesize these contrasting definitions or attempt to categorize types of change, such as Roberts and King’ distinction between first and second order change. Altshuler and Behn also do not provide a single model for the innovation process. Instead, they offer a long list of what they call innovation dilemmas (Altshuler and Behn 1997, pp. 9-36).\(^{36}\)

*Innovations in American Government*’s essays address how these different dilemmas confront public managers in domestic public policy cases. In one essay, Altshuler develops what he calls “Meta-Innovation” as a strategy for overcoming the

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\(^{35}\) Heineman, Blum, Peterson, and Kearny (2002, p. 5) also cite the significance of values in policy making and analysis. They refer to values as the beliefs and attitudes that guide individual behavior in public policy and include three categories: culture, ideology, and role. The idea of a policy role includes an actor’s norms and expectations about goals and appropriate forms of behavior.

\(^{36}\) These innovation dilemmas are framed as “quandaries” that complicate public executives’ decisionmaking in addressing the need for innovation and change. Their broad dilemmas framework includes questions regarding categories including: accountability, paradigms, analytical, structural, replication, and motivation (Altshuler and Behn 1997, pp. 9-36).
political-incentive problem (Altshuler and Behn 1997, pp. 51-52). He links innovation with contemporary reinvention, or new public management movements, through a framework of six general approaches to managerial reform, including: citizen participation, customer focus, consumer choice, privatization, public-private competition, and performance benchmarking. Altshuler does not construct an innovation model or process. Instead, he offers the six approaches as “umbrella strategies...to tap into popular themes of American culture...and address macro problems.” At this point in time, he writes that the six meta-innovations are potential “harbingers of a shift in the fundamental paradigm of American public management toward performance and innovation” (Altshuler 1997, pp. 63-64).

Harvard public management professor, Mark Moore, addresses the subject of innovation in depth in, *Creating Public Value* (1995). In this book, he stresses the practical side of his approach to the subject of achieving excellence in public management. Moore writes about the significance of using case studies during twenty years of teaching in Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government’s executive development programs. Over time, he claims to have developed a set of lessons learned in the art of public management. His purpose is threefold. First, he makes an argument for a philosophy of public management to guide public policy toward adding social value. Second, he develops a diagnostic framework to guide managers. Moore’s framework includes three interrelated concepts: (1) the manager’s authorizing environment; (2) the organization’s operational capability; and (3) the overarching goal of delivering public value. Moore’s third purpose is to identify kind of interventions, or decisions, managers
can make to “exploit the potential of their political and organizational settings for creating public value” (Moore 1995, p.1).

Moore’s orientation is on public executives as high-level officials. He is most interested in those at the most visible levels of accountability, including politically elected and appointed officials and senior civil servants in executive branch agencies. He notes that his methodology is interdisciplinary and includes ideas drawn from political science, economics, organization theory, public administration, administrative law, and business management. He finds the public administration literature as the best, described as a “treasure trove” -- crucial as a starting point for guiding public executives (Moore 1995, p. 6). From the classic literature he highlights the importance of traditional public administration scholars, including White, Herring, White, Waldo, Mosher, March, Simon and Kaufman. He also endorses several current theorists, including Fesler, Kettl, Barzelay, Wilson, and Dilulio (Moore 1995, p. 315).

The central problem for Moore’s research is to address how high-level, public executives make and implement policy. Moore seeks to integrate the traditional public administration’s focus on public organizations with public policy’s focus on specific issues. In his longitudinal review of case studies and the lessons learned by comparing innovative programs successes and failures, he deduces three key prescriptions. First, managers must remain purposeful. Second, political management is necessary for policy development. Finally, the view of operational management must be recast to concentrate on stimulating innovations of various kinds (Moore 1995, pp. 11-12).

Moore loosely defines innovation as a new approach or purpose in policy development. He views innovation, or experimentation, as an instrument to overcome
the limited capability of organizations to change (Moore 1995, p. 55). The reader is cautioned to consider the scope and pace of innovative programs. Moore worries about the strain involved in change and an organization's capacity to absorb a large number of innovative programs and ideas. He includes a typology of the kinds of innovation as (Moore 1995, pp. 233-235):

1. Policy or program innovation--this includes new ways to use an organization’s resources to achieve the overall mission.
2. Administrative innovation--new methods of organizing, accounting, or controlling operations.
3. Strategic innovation--redefining the basic purposes or core technologies of organizations.

Moore’s notion of strategic innovation conforms to Roberts and King’s notion of transformational change. Strategic innovation can include a new purpose, a new method, or a new capacity for learning. On the subject of organizational learning, he cites the work of Argyris, Schein, Senge and Kanter (Moore 1995, p. 382). He writes that strategic innovations normally include many lesser policy or administrative innovations. Cumulative policy and administrative innovations may also guide the path for strategic change. On the question of innovation by systematic planning or groping along, Moore sides with the groping or incremental “branch” characterization. His analysis of the variety of cases points him toward advising managers to innovate, but mainly when the opportunities present themselves (Moore 1995, p. 292).

Moore, along with Altshuler and Behn, tend to draw their concepts in broad strokes. They write of public management and innovation as an art form. A more empirical, social scientific approach is provided by Borins in Innovating with Integrity (1998). There is a strong institutional connection between these four authors. Like the

Briefly, the Ford-Kennedy School semi-finalists included programs in the six areas of informational technology, organization change, energy and environmental policy, building communities, social services, and education. The initial screening criteria for defining the program’s innovativeness included its novel significance in addressing a public (state or local) problem, its value to clients and citizens, and its transferability and replication. For finalists, the innovativeness was further defined in terms of its relationship or impact on organizational structure, implementation process, obstacles, supporters and opponents, program evaluation, and future implications. From

\(^{37}\) Bertelli and Lynn (2006, p. 156) discuss the best and worst interpretations of new public management in their section on “Management Reform Perspectives.” Citing Lynn’s previous research, they capture the extreme views on the new public management movement as follows: ‘Beginning in the 1990s, the increasingly intense interest in public management freeform, like craft perspectives, is more traditional in the sense that it reflects pragmatic concerns for government performances. As it became global phenomenon (termed the “new public management”), it was manifest, at worst, in a babble of slogans and panaceas: “steering, not rowing,” “results, not process,” “production, not politics,” “empowerment, not power,” “collaboration, not conflict” (Lynn 1998). At best, it contained thoughtful reflections on political structures and their implications founded on the conviction that “a stronger emphasis on performance-motivated administration and inclusion in the administrative canon of performance-oriented institutional arrangements, structural forms, and managerial doctrines fitted to particular contexts” (Lynn 1998, p. 232). The analysis in this study keeps an open mind on the potential contributions of the new public management constructs for more effective agency performance in developing effective national security policy. This is discussed later in this chapter and in the subsequent case studies.
this set of questions, Borins identified 13 characteristics of innovative programs, as described by the applicants themselves (Borins 1998, p. 21).  

The empirical data showed that 61% of the applicants considered their programs as holistic. That is, they used a systems approach, included several organizations, and included multiple services. Characteristics 2 through 4 were on 33% of the applications, and 5 through 13 were on less than 20%. Borins cites this data as, with reasonable accuracy, verifying Osborne and Gaebler reinvention principles, such as customer and mission driven government, community owned and empowering government, and enterprising and anticipatory government (Borins 1998, p. 30).

Additionally, Borins’s statistical analysis provides more empirical evidence regarding the who, why, and how of innovation. Some of his insights are somewhat surprising and go against the grain of conventional wisdom. On the question of “Who innovates?” the Ford-Kennedy School applicants stress the role of career public servants or those Borins call “local heroes” (Borins 1998, p. 37). He compares them to mavericks identified as innovators, or entrepreneurs, in the private sector by Peters and Waterman (1982). Borins highlights that this finding goes against political expectations of the need for elected officials to guide change, as well as the notion that public management bureaucrats fear change.

Borins identifies four conditions to answer the question of “Why innovate?” The first and most frequent was due to *internal problems*, cited on 49% of the applications.

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38 The 13 characteristics describe the best of innovative programs as: holistic; technological; process improving; empowering; primarily preventative, not problem-solving; incentive based, not regulatory; emphasizing private-public partnerships; including volunteers; stressing new management philosophies; encouraging attitudinal change; setting groundwork for other programs; including spillover effects; and beginning with pilot programs.
Less than 10% of the cases cited resource constraints as a condition. A second condition was *opportunity* listed on 33% of the questionnaires. Crisis or failure was a third condition on 30% of the applications. The fourth condition, political factors, was on 19%, with only 2% of those due to electoral mandates, while most frequently, 11% were due to legislative action. The fifth and final condition noted was *new leadership*, which was recorded on 9% of the responses (Borins 1998, pp. 42-45). These findings challenge some conventional wisdom in two areas in particular. First, it downplays the proposition that crises cause innovation, as Levin and Sanger (1994) stress. Second, Borins points out that problems and opportunities are not two sides of the same coin. Innovation is not an either or proposition. Each condition can motivate innovation on its own, that is, in terms of solving problems, as well as taking advantage of windows of opportunity.

Borins addresses the two major alternative hypotheses used to explain the questions about “How to innovate?” (Borins 1998, pp. 49-64). Here again, the two alternatives include the planning model and the groping model. The planning model encompasses a strategic vision and plans to organize a comprehensive program for innovation. The groping along model is stressed in the writing of Behn (1988) and Levin and Sanger (1992 & 1994). Borins found that 59% of the cases included comprehensive plans, while 30% were characterized by groping. Only 7% were described as a result of truly large scale “strategic planning,” which corresponds to Mintzberg’s (1994) finding about the myth of significant strategic planning in the private sector. Borins further identified a third model for how to innovate that stressed using pilot programs. This also conforms to Weick’s (1984) writing about the importance of beginning with small wins.
The consensus suggests then that pilot tests provide the opportunity for compromise, for learning incrementally, and for experimentation.

To add explanatory power to these two models, Borins also identified conditions under which each approach worked most effectively. Conditions present for the planning model include those situations where there were large capital investments, coordination of a large number of organizations, theory-driven programs, and an impetus from the political system. In contrast, the context for groping includes little resource commitment and inter-organizational coordination, and a lack of a guiding theory and political direction or support. Groping tended to occur in situations where there were new programs and leaders, and innovation spearheaded by public servants.

The empirical data from Borins study thus provides important insights into those KSG semi-finalists from 1991-1994. Importantly -- especially in this era of bureaucrat bashing -- mid-level management in the public sector initiated 50% of the innovations studied. This conforms to private sector experience that highlights innovation “bubbling up from below” (Borins 1998, p. 284). This emerging trend goes against the traditional public service model of change being driven along command lines, vertically, from the top-down. This finding also is counter to crises as the “royal road to public sector innovation.” Borins writes further of a trichotomy of innovation initiators and circumstances:

1. Politicians—in the forefront in crises.
3. Mid and frontline managers—responding to internal problems and opportunities.
Another significant finding is that theories derived from research matter in innovation. Borins’s research stresses the importance of theories derived from the several disciplines: psychology, for instance, family system theory; pedagogy, such as standards driven education; and criminal justice, such as community policing. Also important is the finding that estimating quantitative goals, measurement, data analysis and clients needs are all important for the innovation process. Borins’ regression analysis suggests that programs with formal evaluations from outsiders, with clear measures and outcomes, could be replicated and were rewarded. Finally, Borins found that the most significant opposition to public service innovation came from within organizations. Conflicts were due to differing philosophies and ideologies, as well as bureaucratic and material self-interest. Gaining support for innovation required the use of persuasion as well as experimentation to build acceptance.

Borins concludes that his book adds evidence to support the new paradigm of New Public Management in the field of public administration (Borins 1998, pp. 289-290). In his view, the empirical analysis confirms the significance of the Osborne and Gaebler themes. Borins further identified additional research needs in the form of questions for future studies, several of which are addressed directly in later in this dissertation:

1. What is the importance of agency heads in planning change?
2. Are small programs more likely to succeed if given distance from executive scrutiny?
3. How do local heroes build support in their authorizing environment?
4. What are the differences in program initiation at different levels of government?
5. What is the role of politicians in the New Public Management?
6. What are the findings of studying innovative organizations over time, and in different jurisdictions?
7. What is the role of the private sector in innovative public-private partnerships?
8. What are the findings of extending studies beyond 1994, in developing new instruments to develop data, and a comparative, international database?

**Executive Leadership and Management: Policy Innovation in Public Organizations**

To this point, this chapter has focused primarily on studies of innovative programs and processes in public policy and management. Let’s now return more directly to the relationship of executive leadership and innovation in public organizations. The nature of leadership roles and functions is an important theme in public administration. Chester Barnard’s “functions of the executive” and Luther Gulick’s POSDCORB\(^{39}\) continue to serve as foundation concepts in the study of executive leadership (Barnard 1938/1968, Gulick 1937). Other major conceptualizations of the leader’s role, outside of traditional public administration, includes the literature on transformational leadership that emphasizes visioning, goal setting, team-building, and information flows (Burns 1978; Bass 1996; Bennis and Nanus 1997). To what extent do the stark distinctions between transformational and transactional approaches define leadership today? Does the complex environment facing current leaders require a synthesis of transformational and transactional approaches as Van Wart argues (2003, p. 225)?

Much of the literature on executive leadership in innovation is advertised as very “practical” for policy implementation – that is, as advice on how practitioners can become effective change agents in public organizations. For instance, In *Creating High-Performance Government Organizations*, from the “Alliance for Redesigning

\(^{39}\) POSDCORB refers to public management functions in terms of planning, organizing, staffing, directing, co-coordinating, reporting and budgeting (Gulick 1937, p. 12).
Government,” Popovich and his writing team provide a handbook, or “concrete steps” for reinventors to use to transform their organizations” (Popovich 1998, p. xiv). The Alliance is part of the congressionally chartered National Academy of Public Administration. Their intent is to provide a “Practical Guide” for those administrators to use performance management to follow the leadership of the legislative branch as evidenced by the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) (Popovich 1998, p.4). Thus, the book is intended for assisting managers in climbing on board the congressionally mandated reinvention bandwagon. The Guide includes guidance regarding scanning the environment, identifying stakeholders, building a commitment to change, and writing organizational vision, mission, and values statements. The authors stress that assessments are the keys to motivating change by selecting targets of opportunity and monitoring progress. They offer techniques, such as giving voice to the customer and benchmarking. In their acceptance of congressional wisdom, as reflected in GRPA and the performance management literature (Ingraham, Joyce, Donahue 2003; White and Newcomer 2005; Light 2005; Kamensky and Morales 2005) they write that: “what is measured gets done; what is rewarded gets done well” (Popovich 1998, p. 78).40

Cohen and Eimicke (1998) provide similar prescriptions in their book, Tools for Innovators. Here they provide ways, or, as the subtitle states, “Creative Strategies for Managing Public Sector Innovations.” The authors divide their innovative instruments into two categories, described as functional and innovation tools. Functional tools include budgeting, human resources, and innovation management. Innovation tools

40 For a review of the Clinton era management reform initiatives and GRPA, see Bertelli and Lynn (2006, pp. 157-158).
include reengineering, privatization, and total quality management (TQM) (Cohen and Eimicke 1998, p. 187). Rather than stress innovation dilemmas, Cohen and Eimicke highlight lessons learned from their cases of innovative public sector organizations “managed by the government, managed using the nonprofit form of organization, and operated as a business” (Cohen and Eimicke 1998, p. 198). They conclude that all three organizational forms (public, nonprofit, and public) can innovate in the process of delivering effective policies and programs. Their conclusions are prescriptive, as seen in the following list:

1. Leadership is a critical variable.
2. Change is gradual, and failure often precedes success.
3. Innovators use multiple tools.
4. Results must be measured.
5. Innovation must quickly become commonplace.
6. Standard operating procedures remain important.

Cohen and Eimicke refer to leadership as an essential part of public management. They write that, “Leadership is not a mystical quality possessed by charismatic individuals but a function of management” (Cohen and Eimicke 1995, p. 207). They cite Barnard’s *The Function of the Executive* (1938/1968) and Selznick’s *Leadership in Administration* (1957) as the best leadership work in the social sciences. In particular, they offer perspectives for looking both “up” to the environment and “down” to the organization. In other words, the manager’s role in the environment is to obtain resources and defend the organization’s “distinctive competence” (Cohen and Eimicke 1995, p. 205). Leaders then provide money, staff, authority and turf while performing political tasks. These tasks include promoting organizational work to the legislature, throughout the executive branch, and with interest groups and the public. By looking
down into the organization, they prescribe four principal functions: (1) to infuse the organization with value, (2) to develop the organizations’ distinctive competence, (3) to distribute incentives, and (4) to structure and mediate internal conflicts (Cohen and Eimicke 1995, p. 208). These ideas reflect Moore’s typology discussed above, regarding the public managers’ roles in managing internal organizational capabilities along with the external political environment, with all efforts directed towards creating public value.

Using a similar framework, Light’s research bridges the work previously discussed on public policy, management, and organizations. He defines innovation as “acts that challenge the prevailing wisdom as it creates public value” (Light 1998, p. xvi). Light also emphasizes a holistic view of innovation. For innovative organizations, he developed a four part model including: (1) the environment; (2) the internal structure; (3) leadership; and (4) internal management systems (Light 1998, p. 13). Like others in the public management school, he defines characteristics for each of the four subsystems. For describing the external environment, he cites factors such as turbulence, shocks, support, collaboration, and slack. The internal environment includes shaping ideas and actions, demographics, internal turbulence, boundaries, and resources. Components of leadership include vision, temperament, communications, durability, and innovation skills. Finally, for internal management he points to mission, pay and personnel, learning, idea generation, budget, and accountability and governance. Like the public management and organization theorists focused on discovering best practices, Light points out lessons learned rather than key variables or hypotheses to develop causal relationships. Nevertheless, his observations correspond with other writers reviewed in this chapter. Stressing a holistic approach, he concludes that innovation tends to be less
the product of heroic leaders than the “natural” and “tight alignment” of the four parts of his innovation model.

Light also provides insights into the barriers facing innovators in each of the four areas. He also provides a long list of innovation *myths*. These include the propositions that suggest the following (Light 1998, pp. 44-55):

1. Innovation is the gift of the few (think systematically and collaboratively).
2. Innovation is the product of perfection (think trial and error).
3. Innovation is best under extreme stress (think of shocks to alert, not terrify).
4. Innovation is best done alone (again think collaboratively).
5. Strong adversity makes for strong innovation (think debate, not harassment).
6. Innovation means always saying yes (think about winnowing ideas purposefully).
7. Innovation involves a choice between art and science (think both).
8. Good management is hostile to good innovation (think management encouraging and protecting new ideas).
9. Innovative organizations keep secrets (think collaboration, cooperation, and coordination).
10. Innovation is the path to organizational bliss (think tough work and innovation as a disruptive act).

Light also lists ten best practices for achieving innovation and preventing what he terms “organizational thickening.”41 This includes more prescriptive advice for leaders, such as stay thin, create room for experiment, push authority down, lower barriers to internal communication, democratize, prepare for stress, maximize diversity, prime the organization for innovation, and age gracefully. Leaders are also provided with a list of more best practices including: being clear about decision making; giving permission to fail; communicating to excess; paying attention to sequencing; teaching the organization how to say no and why to say yes; keeping faith and intuition alive; staying balanced; and keeping innovation in perspective (Light 1998, p. 135).

Light’s concluding advice takes on spiritual tones (Light 1998, 245-254). He ends with a section on values for innovators, such as trust, honesty, rigor, and faith. Light, like Moore and the other public management theorists, highlights the importance of both internal and external perspectives for innovative organizations and their leaders. Finally, he provides the following steps for sustaining an innovative organization:

1. Become a well-performing organization with a strong management system.
2. There is no substitute for mission focus.
3. Turn to the outside world.
4. Lower the barriers to internal and external collaboration, through experiments and calls for ideas.
5. Faith is important (forgive, endure, imagine—sustain a culture that includes a vision of a just society with confidence in human capacity).

Let’s now examine more precisely what leadership means in terms of the influence relationships among people, as leaders and followers, in hierarchical organizations and networks. Given the nature of both U.S. and international, hierarchical governmental organizations involved in the selected case studies, this next section addresses the relevant literature on the subjects of public sector hierarchies and networks that is relevant for studying leadership patterns in both domestic and international agencies.

**The Structural Relationships of Leaders and Followers in Hierarchies and Networks**

In *On Leadership*, John Gardner defines leadership as the process of persuasion or example by which individuals and teams induce a group to pursue objectives held by the leaders or shared by the leaders and followers (Gardner 1990, p. 1). The leader has a role in establishing the group and should be evaluated within their particular historical context, setting, and system. Referring to the importance of an historical perspective,
Gardner writes that “Leaders act in the stream of history” (Gardner 1990, p. 8). For settings, he urges including the “nature” of the elected official’s position. For system, he includes whether the leader serves at the city, state, or national levels. Gardner implies that the history, position, and system serve to delineate the leader’s roles as well as their constraints.

Gardner suggests six specific roles for leaders (Gardner 199, p. 4). First, they are the organizations, community, or groups’ long-term thinkers. Leaders manage the groups’ relationship with what he calls its “larger reality” that includes the larger organization, external conditions, or global trends. The leader also influences larger constituencies, outside of their organization. Gardner stresses the importance of intangibles, such as the leader’s role in shaping the groups’ values, vision, and motivation. These nonrational and often unconscious elements of the leader’s role are vital in the interactions between leaders and followers. Another leader role is their political skill in influencing multiple constituencies, as networks. Finally, he emphasizes the process of renewal or revising group and organizational structures and processes required by an ever-changing reality. Gardner finds that this new model of “dispersed” leadership is found in more forward-looking businesses and is not as prevalent in government agencies (Gardner 1990, p. 9).

Gardner devotes a full chapter to defining and describing the tasks of leadership that coincide with the National Performance Review principles (Gardner 1990, pp. 11-21). In summary form, leader tasks include:

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42 Gardner describes leader roles in generic fashion. He does not differentiate significantly when discussing leaders of large or small organizations, elected or appointed public officials, or between the private and public sectors.
1. Envisioning goals.
2. Affirming and regenerating values.
3. Motivating.
5. Designing plans and priorities – traditional tasks such as formulating goals, framing courses of action, selecting aides, and delegating.
6. Organizing and institution building.
7. Keeping the system functioning.
8. Agenda setting and decision-making.
9. Exercising political judgment (such as preventing secondary conflict from blocking progress).
10. Achieving a workable unity (especially in a highly pluralistic society).
11. Building trust through observing customs, following rules, and behaving predictably.
12. Explaining and teaching, especially through the media.
13. Serving as symbols of collective identity and continuity.
14. Representing the group and crossing boundaries.
15. Renewing the organization and changing to meet to reality of a dynamic environment.

Of these, Gardner views the core tasks of leaders as their efforts to envision goals and serve as symbols (Gardner 1990, p. 21). He argues that these two tasks cannot be delegated. Later in the book, Gardner examines more closely the notions of the functions of leaders in pluralistic settings, as community builders, and in leader development.

The leaders’ roles and tasks in pluralistic societies with competing systems are more complex. Leadership authors, such as Gardner, address the dual nature of hierarchical relationships within organizations. Gardner highlights as “the heart of the matter” that leadership is the interaction of the leader and the follower (Gardner 1990, p. 23). He notes that Weber’s writing on charismatic leaders points out “In a sense, leadership is conferred by followers” (Gardner 1990, p. 24). In Gardner’s view, leaders operate within the limits of their followers and within a system of norms, beliefs, and
expectations. He writes that “executives are given subordinates; they have to earn followers” (Gardner 1990, p. 24).

This then begs the question of which patterns of leader-constituent interaction, in the infinite variety of contexts, are most effective in establishing norms, beliefs and expectations that contribute to accomplishing group purposes? In addressing this question, Gardner characterizes American culture as favoring individualism, equality, and participation. Therefore, he stresses effective leadership in terms of two-way communications and face-to-face interactions. Leaders are judged on their capabilities to solve problems, meet needs, symbolize norms, and present images (real and perceived) that are congruent with the group’s inner environment of myth and legend. The flip side of Gardiner’s interpretation of American culture is that it uncomfortable with hierarchy and status differences (Gardner 1990, pp. 26, 28-9).

Yet, hierarchy exists and retains a strong influence in public organizations. Gardner acknowledges “Organizational position is probably the most common source of power in the modern world” (Gardner 1990, p. 60). Gardner stresses that in the bidirectional, leader-follower relationship, each is shaper and shaped. Additionally, Gardner points to the pluralistic pressures of multiple constituencies and interest groups. Gardner agrees with Burns concern about the search for “one-man leadership” (Burns 1978, p. 452; Heifetz 1994). Nevertheless, Gardner stresses the importance of developing strong followers by means of the leader’s gift for inspiration, non-rational

43 Gardner defines power as the capacity to ensure the outcome one wishes and prevent those one does not wish (1990, p. 60).
communications. This includes building in the constituents a response that is usually thought of as charismatic, including feelings of awe, reverence, and devotion.\textsuperscript{44}

In contrast to those calling for strong, centralized leadership, Gardner cautions that unrelenting autocracy down the chain of command undermines initiative. Therefore, leaders need to bring alive in individuals the capacity to share leadership tasks (Gardner 1990, p. 79). The modern world of pluralism, with multiple, competing and collaborating systems, means that hierarchical position is of less value than traditionally thought. Critical leader tasks require boundary-crossing activities for managing multiple systems, associated with terms such as collaborative networking and partnering (Gardner 1990, pp. 98-99; Kamensky and Burlin 2004). While Gardner notes the presence and importance of hierarchy, his advice is for leaders to seek workable arrangements with external systems to serve their groups’ long-term interests.

Public administration scholars have resurrected the subject of hierarchy, for instance, during the Fourth National Public Management Research Conference, in October-November 1997. The resulting book, \textit{Advancing Public Management: New Developments in Theory, Methods, and Practice} (2000) by Brudney, O’Toole, and Rainey, address the topic from the perspective of the new public management.

O’Toole’s chapter addresses public management in different structural contexts, as hierarchies versus networks. In sum, the claim of the new public management school is that network contexts are assumed to be more important than traditional hierarchical,

\textsuperscript{44} James MacGregor Burns believes the concept of the charismatic or heroic leader is too ambiguous to be of value, and applies more to ancient mythology (1978, pp. 241-2). In the modern era, he fears charisma is more likely to descend into idolatrous-demagogic forms, especially in developing nations (1978, pp. 246-7).
bureaucratic settings. O’Toole points out problems in verifying empirically the importance of networks over hierarchies (O’Toole 2000, pp. 19-20). He characterizes public management broadly, defining the term as management efforts that affect operational behavior and the flow of standard work processes, along with assumptions adopted in shifting government from ideas into action. This would include the consideration of structural and hierarchical factors.

O’Toole defines structures as relatively stable patterns of social relations that provide channels within which actions take place in the world of practice. He notes that bureaucratic agencies provide some structural context for public management, but that bureaucratic structure is dynamic and still important: “Structure matters, as new institutionalists have been arguing and debating for some time” (O’Toole 2000, p. 24). O’Toole notes that structure provides public managers with influence and constraints (including organizational culture and trust). The direction of action he calls “bi-directional causality” or the integration (in terms of means-ends rationality) of institutional context and structural controls, and public management roles in shaping constraints. It is not that networks replace hierarchies completely. O’Toole argues that today standard hierarchical arrays are “enmeshed in lattices of complex network arrangements” (O’Toole 2000, p. 26). In other words, public managers have organizational homes within hierarchies, while directing programs of agencies that span other units – all while the structural contexts retain their traditional, vertical linkages.

O’Toole suggests the need for theoretical foundations regarding horizontal networks in the public management literature (O’Toole 2000, p. 27). He points out the limits of interorganizational theory, as needing more work on the relationship of
networks to government outputs. He also discounts transaction-cost theory derived from economics as too narrowly focused on markets and hierarchy. For future work, O’Toole recommends five theoretical approaches, including: game theory; institutional rational choice (Ostrom 1996); actor-centered institutionalism (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995); advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1997; Scharpf 1997); and resource dependent based network theory (Provan/Milward 1995). All de-emphasize one-direction causal forces from the “top” through the managers’ authority and hierarchy.

Networks, of course, place public managers within a context of multidirectional actions and interactions. These interactions lead to paradoxes in the study of public management structure. Under networks, the structural context is more complex and the public manager’s potential influence increases. At the same time, the manager’s methods for documenting the flow of influence decreases and the potential influence of other actors increases. O’Toole argues that the ability to trace government performance to managements’ position and influence, therefore, is much harder to measure and document (O’Toole 2000, p. 31).

Gardner notes the growth and importance of networks as “communities” and discusses the leader’s skill in conflict resolution and coalition building, over what he calls convergence issues (Gardner 1990, pp. 101-5). He also calls on leaders to develop networks of responsibility that include representation by all respected members of the diverse segments of society. He terms these all-inclusive groups as “constituencies of the whole” (Gardner 1990, p. 109). He also emphasizes the theme of community building (Gardner 1990, pp. 119-20). As far as leader tasks, he augments his list above with additional considerations. Leaders build agreements through conflict resolution,
mediation, compromise, and coalition building. Leaders build networks to create links in a fast-paced, changing environment. Leaders exercise nonjurisdictional power through the media, public opinion and the power of their ideas. Instead of micromanaging, leaders engage in institution building with a sense of where their organization’s wider system is going. Lastly, leaders are flexible; they lead fast moving groups through the white water hazards of modern life and systems. “The day of the hard-shelled military leader who never bothered to understand civilians is over, as is the day of the hard-nosed business executive who never bothered to understand government, and the day of the leader who never bothered to think internationally” (Gardner 1990, p. 119).

Without providing evidence for his assertion, Gardner suggests that most, if not all, senior leaders have adopted James Macgregor Burns’ concept of transformational leadership. He stresses that an important leader task is to assist the organization and its people achieve the continuous renewal necessary for institutional adaptation. To accomplish this renewal task leaders renew values, liberate energies by changing habits of outmoded thinking, set goals, and develop new understanding of the increases possible in human potential through education and personal growth (Gardner 1990, p. 122).

Leaders guide followers to look towards the visible future, to observable, premonitory events.

Leadership is not reserved for those in the management hierarchy. Gardner views leadership as a function within any organization. Leadership is distributed throughout the group and leaders and followers blend their efforts to reach group goals. He extends the leadership function to teams. Leadership teams are important to widen the circles that supplement leader tasks, especially in large organizations. By identifying problems and
solving them, the leaders share tasks and responsibilities through teamwork and making
power accountable (Gardner 1990, pp. 150-3). If every member of a group is a leader,
then should they all have their leadership skills developed? According to Gardner the
answer is yes. He believes that most of the capabilities that enable outstanding leaders
can be learned.

He makes his argument of how best to develop leaders by first highlighting what
he views as obstacles to leadership. The first obstacles are presented by modern times,
which tend towards creeping crises, and not the major events that shaped great leaders,
such as the Revolutionary War, the Great Depression, or the World Wars. Second are the
growing size and complexity of organizations. He points out that bureaucratic
complexity in government “discourages initiative, innovation and boldness” (Gardner
1990, p. 159). Specialization and the prestige of narrow, professional training have
driven colleges and universities to specialized, and narrowly focused educational
programs. Given these constraints on developing leadership he calls for new modes of
organizing, especially in the development of smaller work units. He also proclaims that:
“Leaders have always been generalists” and develop whole system perspectives (Gardner
1990, p. 159).

Gardner calls obstacles to effective leadership anti-leadership vaccines (Gardner
1990, pp. 160-1). These obstacles include an educational system that favors individual
over group work, and narrow expertise and knowledge over general leadership skills.
Overall, he stresses the importance of a liberal arts education and the knowledge of
culture (Gardner 1990, pp. 164-5). Specific skills include the ability to mediate among
subcultures, build coalitions, and negotiate in an interdependent world, across national
boundaries (Gardner 1990, p. 175). Gardner also comments on preparing future leaders for the rigors of public life including their hardening against the constant criticism to be expected from political opponents, the press and interest groups, as well as the low pay and red tape associated with the public sector. In short, Gardner emphasizes the difficulties of leadership in traditional, American, hierarchical, bureaucracies, and the need for flexible leaders who can adapt to the complex realities of a more interconnected, or networked, world.

**Bureaucratic Leadership: from Machine Models to a New Public Management?**

Kaufman has a less global perspective than Gardner. By focusing on the yearlong activities of selected federal agency chiefs, Kaufman’s research provides grounded insights into the practicing leaders’ roles and tasks. Kaufman found the six bureau chiefs activities strikingly similar and describes their leadership approaches as variations on a theme (Kaufman 1981, pp. 17-24). The first of four major roles was in deciding things. If narrowly defined as making major policy decisions, then the chiefs spent relatively little time in formal decision-making. The other three activities that contributed to decision-making consumed more of their time. The second major role was in receiving and reviewing information about their organization and its relationship with its environment. The third role was in external relations, or communicating and representing the organization to the external environment. Fourth was the leader’s role in motivating the work force.

The tasks of public agency leaders were shaped by the common demands, expectations, and formal requests that came from their institutional role. In allocating time to activities, Kaufman reports that external relations took approximately 25-30%,
motivation 10-20%, and information processing and decision-making 55-60% (Kaufman 1981, Figure 1, p.86). All six chiefs’ days were highly fragmented and their controls over their schedules were highly constrained, due primarily to outside demands on their time. One area of constraints came from the continuation of programs that defined the tasks of their work force. Bureaucratic history and rules mandated certain expected roles. A second set of constraints stemmed from agendas that were outside of the chief’s control, including the requirements of executives higher in the hierarchy and maintaining intergovernmental relations and, especially, relations with Congress (Kaufman 1981, p. 91) The imposed agenda included the regular cycle of organizational processes, such as budgets and routine, rule-based, workload requirements (Kaufman 1981, p. 124).

Kaufman does offer advice for public managers who seek to seize the initiative. He counsels executives to be highly selective in using their time and to delegate routine activities to subordinates. To free up time for innovation and strategizing, Kaufman urges bold and active leaders to give subordinates broad discretion and responsibility (Kaufman 1981, p. 123). More difficult to follow is his general advice to find and open “strategic opportunities” and devise measures to take advantage of windows of opportunity. He sees change as possible, but since programming is closely linked to behavior he recommends changing programs first and then to modify the agencies work habits and behavior. Kaufman also notes that each agency’s core program is distinct, with a defining identity and character (Kaufman 1981, p. 159). Halperin calls this an organization’s “essence” (Halperin 1974). In highly stable core areas, therefore, programs maintain their continuity over time and change occurs on a small scale
(Kaufman 1981, p. 174). For Kaufman the potential for organizational change is a matter of scale and smaller is better (Kaufman 1981, p. 139).

Kaufman’s observations of the day-to-day work of agency chiefs leaves him pessimistic regarding the feasibility of executives making big differences in their organizations. Rather than serving as entrepreneurs or change agents, Kaufman proposes that the chiefs’ role is most important in setting their agency’s tone and contributing to its image and prestige (Kaufman 1981, p. 140). The timing and sequence of certain actions contribute to the overall tone. In turn, a skilled chief can improve morale and task performance and shape policy consensus. Kaufman uses a series of terms to describe an agency with the right tone, including unity, pride, confidence, dedication, enthusiasm, conscientiousness, industry, crispness, speed, accuracy, efficiency, and comprehensiveness.

In addition to intellect, personality, and style, Kaufman cites the significant role of a leader who can make decisions and stand behind them (Kaufman 1981, p. 146). Given the alternatives, he notes that agencies prefer consistent SOB’s. He presents the example of David Kennedy of the Federal Drug Agency who was able to shape the image of his agency through the force of his personality and personal conduct. On a less dramatic scale, Kaufman suggests “nudging” to shape the order, timing, and substance of work (Kaufman 1981, p. 149).

The implications of Kaufman’s study led him to focus on four personal qualities for bureau chiefs (Kaufman 1981, pp. 175-9). Agency chiefs require:

1. A juggler’s disposition – the ability for rapid-fire shifts and handling a variety of tasks simultaneously.
2. Patience – given that bureaucratic and political battles are frustrating. There is little to no control over personal schedules, given pressures from external groups and congressional oversight. The environment is dynamic. In addition, chiefs must give deference to people with power, regardless of their respect for higher ups intellect, commitment, or judgment.

3. Self-control – resisting the impulse to meddle when things are going well, especially when confronted with directions to follow various management fads.

4. Interrogatory Skills – are critical since most time is spent in receiving and reviewing information. Dealing with the press is also important, as is the ability to communicate with a variety of specialists and technicians.

Other scholars of what some call the “new public management” identify the leadership role as a part of managerial responsibilities. Bertelli and Lynn provide an historical narrative of “The New Management” whose roots they retrace back to writings in the 1920s referring to calls for “the new administration,” “the new management,” and “the new public administration” (Bertelli and Lynn 2006, p. 41). Citing public administration scholar Leonard White’s monograph for the 1933 Hoover Committee on Social Trends, the term of “new management” referred to an administrative philosophy “favoring consolidation of the administrative powers of the elected chief executive and the city mangers” (p. 41). In more recent history, the Bertelli and Lynn narrative on the 1990s version of a new public management school is highly critical of what they refer to as the “Barzelay-Osborne-Gaebler line of argument,” as captured by the influence of Osborne and Gaebler’s 1992 book, Reinventing Government (Lynn 2001, 146). In brief, their argument is that a “myth” has evolved about traditional public administration’s stress on a bureaucratic paradigm of “politically neutral competence.” Therefore, they call for a “reconsideration of traditional literature” that in the view of Lynn, and later
Lynn and Bertelli, must highlight the political and especially constitutional values that infused the writings of early public administration theorists (Lynn 2001, p. 154; Bertelli and Lynn 2006, p. 158). In sum, the Lynn critique of new public management centers on his characterization that: ‘In the guise of “performance,” efficiency as the ultimate value permeates the New Public Management more than it did the old public administration. There are far more principles in the reinvention literature—lists and lists of them—than there ever were in Willoughby or Gulick’ (Lynn 2001, 155).

Bertelli and Lynn do offer a way out -- for new public management to redeem itself and correct the “constitutional error in normative, experiential, and manage reform schemes” that in turn result in an over reliance on “marketlike managerial strategies” and mechanisms (Bertelli and Lynn 2006, p. 158). One challenge then is for the proponents of a new public management, especially in light of the Clinton-Gore government performance initiatives and the congressional initiatives in the government performance and results legislation, is for Madison’s Managers to demonstrate the constitutional underpinnings of their reforms for improving agency performance in light of the normative and structural roots of the republican founding as well as the separation of powers (p. 164).

One expression of new public management that suggests a broader and more textured approach favored by Lynn is found in the research efforts on network theory. For instance, O’Toole defines management as a “set of conscious efforts to concert actors and resources to carry out established collective purposes” (O’Toole 2000, p. 21). In his terms, leadership appears to be subsumed as a management function. His list of management functions includes acquiring resources, crafting information systems,
motivating and coordinating actors – all to perform consistently with established intent. Other functions O’Toole cites include the familiar Gulick’s POSDCORB (1938) and Simon’s (1976) description of the social-psychological dimensions of management. In addition, O’Toole emphasizes the importance of the institutional context in defining management roles. Here again, downplaying the significance of formal organizational structures, he notes that management is not exclusively executed through the institutional setting of formal hierarchy. He returns to the growing importance of networks, defined as “structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations, or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of others in a larger superior-subordinate arrangement” (O’Toole 2000, p. 22). While not specifically addressing the constitutional dimensions of Madison’s Managers, O’Toole’s network provide an opportunity to think conceptually about the fundamentals of separation of powers governing structures -- and for public leaders and managers to provide direction and influence in terms of engaging multiple sources of authority to gain power in the pursuit of their agency’s programmatic activities.

In O’Toole’s view then, for public management research, networks should be studied as units of analysis since networks more closely describe the reality of work in public organizations than do formal organizational structures. Research, therefore, should also question the traditional assumptions about management roles in terms of responsibilities, jurisdiction, and authority within the U.S. constitutional framework. In research, as well as within the real world, the manager’s role is more open and ambiguous than when thinking in terms of formal organizations and political institutions. Management roles are now “entangled” in terms the roles of coordinating operations and
the crafting of structures, or institution building (O’Toole 2000, pp. 25-26). “The coordination challenge remains [for public managers] whether the setting is Weberian bureaucracy or fluid and intricate networks” (O’Toole 2000, p. 30).

Scholars point out that this perceived lack of public sector innovation and creativity contributed in part to the initiation of the National Performance Review by the first Clinton administration (Terry 1998, p. 195). Gore writes: “From the 1930s through the 1960s, we built large, top-down, centralized bureaucracies to do the public’s business. They were patterned after the corporate structures of the age: Hierarchical bureaucracies…. And in today’s world of rapid change, lightning-quick information technologies, tough global competition, and demanding customers, large, top-down bureaucracies—public or private—don’t work very well…Many federal organizations are also monopolies, with few incentives to innovate or improve” (1993, p. 3). In 1993, “The Gore Report on Reinventing Government” helped to shape the debate for the possibilities of a new public management included principles to “invent a government that puts people first” along with an action agenda. The National Performance Review’s principles included promoting a government that: cuts spending serves its customers, empowers employees, helps communities solve their own problems, and fosters excellence. The action items include: creating a clear mission, steering not rowing, delegating, incentive structures over regulations, outcome based budgets, competition in federal operations, market solutions, and measuring customer satisfaction. (Gore 1993, p. 7). The National
Performance Review and its principles have been subject to continuing research, debate and criticism among public administration scholars.\textsuperscript{45}

What then are the implications of networks for agency leaders in the arena of collective choice and policymaking, especially at political levels? Do networks weaken public management? Can public managers shift from the “traditional” functions, such as prescribed by POSDCORB, into more ambiguous areas such as bargaining, knowledge creation, conflict mediation, and internal and external coalition building? In terms of Bertelli and Lynn’s argument: Can U.S. agency chiefs, as leaders, manage responsibly in keeping with the intent and ideals of the Constitutional framework?\textsuperscript{46} Is there a synthesis in the ideas behind new public management within a constitutional framework that suggest successful pattern of leadership for designing and implementing innovative programs in national security policy (in light of the new public management’s emphasis on network structures, performance, values, as well as the significance of the managers’ political judgment in the pluralistic, federal, U.S. political institutions)? The writings on new institutionalism provide one additional perspective, especially regarding the significance of cultural and environmental factors to consider in thinking about these ideas regarding the changing roles for public leaders.

\textbf{Public Leadership and the New Institutionalism: The Complex Interactions of Organization, Regime, Culture and Environment}

\textsuperscript{45} See especially the May/June 1998 (58/3) issue of \textit{Public Administration Review}, which includes six articles from a “Symposium: Leadership, Democracy, and the New Public Management.”

\textsuperscript{46} Bertelli and Lynn conclude \textit{Madison’s Managers} with the prescription that: “The precept of managerial responsibility must become it head, and the head must draw its power for the willingness of every administrator in the public service to earn legitimacy in the only way open to them under the Constitutions’ separation of powers” (Bertelli and Lynn 2006, p. 166).
Khademian provides insights into the role of public managers in accordance with the new institutionalism, which stresses the interaction of the organization and its environment (Khademian 2000, p. 44). Culture is seen as an important dimension of organizational life that underlies the meshing of tasks, people, the environment, as well as the historical context. New Institutionalist sociologist, Ronald Jepperson, “delimits three primary carriers of institutionalization: formal organization, regimes, and culture” (In Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p. 150). The overlapping connections between the new public management and new institutional approaches then cross conceptually, and most complementary, in their contributions to the understanding of organizations and regimes. The importance then to this research then is in the new institutional

47 The most cited reference work on the new institutionalism is *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). As in the public administration and management disciplinary perspectives provided by Lynn and Bertelli -- rather than a “new” form of inquiry, the characterization perhaps more accurately describes a rediscovery of old ideas, or a revision to counter a current focus predominant in the discipline’s research agenda. For instance, in the case of new public management, the Bertelli and Lynn history of the disciplines of public administration and management can trace the “new” public management and administration back to the 1920s and 1930s. The same argument is made in the review by sociologists Powell and DiMaggio, who similarly intend to reclaim an earlier research emphasis using institutional analysis. Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p. 2) describe ‘The “New Institutionalism” in Disciplinary Context’ as follows: ‘The study of institutions is experiencing a renaissance throughout the social sciences. In some quarters, this development is a reaction against the behavioral revolution of recent decades, which interpreted collective political and economic behavior as the aggregate consequence of individual choice. Behavioralists viewed institutions as epiphenomenal, merely the sum of individual level properties. But their neglect of social contexts and the durability of social, and economic institutions came at a high cost, especially in a world in which “social, political and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima facie more important to collective life” (March and Olsen 1984: 734). The resurgence of interest in institutions also harkens back to an older tradition of political economy, associated with Veblen and Commons, that focused on the mechanisms through which social and economic action occurred; and to the efforts of functionalists like Parsons and Selznick to grasp the enduring interconnections between the polity, the economy and the society.’ In addition, Selznick’s 1996 *Administrative Science Quarterly* article, comparing the old and new institutionalism, includes a review of the Powell and DiMaggio book, and reflects Selznick’s views that there more continuity than change in the new institutionalism.

48 Public management scholars would recognize the sociologists’ references to organization and regime type. Jepperson provides evidence of common terminology in reflecting on institutionalism’s primary carriers of organization, regime and culture. For instance, by regimes he refers “to institutionalization in some central authority system—that is, in explicitly codified rules and sanctions…. A legal or constitutional system can operate as a regime in this sense….” (In Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, p. 150). Another area of overlap is evident in Selznick’s call for a “policy-centered approach” in institutional analysis and theory: “Problems of accountability and responsiveness, public and private bureaucracy, regulation and self-regulation, management and governance, and many others will require new understandings of administrative, political, legal, and more experience.” Continuing in words that Bertelli and Lynn also would be comfortable with, his article’s concluding sentences argue that: “it would be odd indeed, and quite
literature’s focus for illuminating the leaders’ role in developing, shaping, or changing the organizational culture. Khademian’s view is that the leader’s role varies in accordance with the significance of the culture for organizational governance. Leadership has a larger significance in organizations operating in a complex environment, where work is distinct and specialized, and where it is difficult to assess its value in the organization’s work. In fact, some of the sociology (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) and political science (Wilson 1989) literature suggests a more remote role for leaders in shaping organizational culture.

Writers also suggest that external forces also may have greater influence than organizational leaders in shaping behavior and culture. Khademian notes that new institutionalism suggests that the ability of managers to influence organizational change depends on their deep understanding of culture and context. She cites Ellen Schall, who calls the institutional context a “swamp” (Khademian 2000, pp. 47-48). Internally, the context can bog down the leaders. Externally, like a flood, the environment can demand rising tides of interaction with political overseers, constituents, professional groups, the press, and the public. Rather than viewing the organization’s culture as silly putty that can be shaped by the leader in their role as a “strong executive,” Khademian and the new institutionalists highlight the importance of understanding the complexity of public management in its rich institutional and organizational settings, which include different and at times unique cultures and subcultures – all making different demands, with a
variety of needs, and best addressed using multiple leadership approaches. This is a tall order for public leaders.

At the other extreme is the large body of research that reveals political leaders as causing organizational change and skillfully avoiding or overcoming the constraints of political and institutional forces. These writers on strong, effective, and, at times, entrepreneurial leaders include Caro (1974), Burns (1979), Lewis (1980), Doig and Hargrove (1987), Levin and Sanger (1994), Behn (1991), Riccucci (1995), and Giuliani (2002). These writers profile forceful leaders who were able to alter the relationship of their organizations and their political environment, and shape the activities of middle and lower level managers.

Gardner’s approach also stresses the importance of the personal leadership skills of high level public executives. He argues that the leader must foster a positive attitude about the future to provide motivation for action and work. He suggests a two-tracked approach (Gardner 1990, p. 194). Track one is to maintain a positive attitude about what the organization and its people can accomplish. Track two is to provide a realistic perspective that life is not easy and no activity is completely safe. His compromise is to call for leaders who are “tough-minded optimists” who mix natural American optimism with a dose of realism: “The first and last task of a leader is to keep hope alive” (Gardner 1990, p. 195). He points to similar prescriptions by Harlan Cleveland -- that leaders must be optimists -- and the example of George C. Marshall -- that leaders set goals, expect high standards and maintain their organization’s morale (Gardner 1990, pp. 96-7).

New public management also addresses motivation as an important leader/manager function (O’Toole 2000, p. 21). Khademian links motivation to
organizational culture. She starts with Barnard’s 1938 writing on the importance of the informal organization and interpersonal harmony in work processes (Khademian 2000, p. 34; Barnard 1968, p. 279). Barnard viewed maintaining the organization’s culture, or in his terms its “personality,” as an executive function. He believed culture to be a tool to motivate and control that was greater than sanctions, implementing structural processes, or using material rewards. Modern organization theorists, such as Schein, view creating, maintaining, and changing culture as the leader’s primary responsibility (Schein 1990, 115).

While writers, such as Schein, Pfeffer, Scott, and Kettl, have emphasized the importance of culture, Khademian points out that there is no consensus on what culture is, on the role of culture in organizations, or how to study culture. Yet scholars believe organizational culture is a key to motivation. For instance, Wilson (1989, p. 213) suggests that successful public managers have clear vision, communicate effectively, and motivate civil servants to act on their vision. Khademian points to issue framing as a tool to define reality and get others to look at the world in ways useful to the executive serves to motivate as well (Khademian 2000, p. 59).

In practices, however, Kaufman found fluid, informal practices. In particular, in several agencies the chief’s delegated authority to ranking career civil service officials who managed internal administration. In all cases, Kaufman found a search for quantitative measures of performance and goals (Kaufman 1981, p. 31). In the special case of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Kaufman highlighted the importance of executive-agency relationships. The president was focused on the budget and the agency on overseeing compliance with appropriations legislation. Clear agency
policy positions were necessary for congressional testimony and reports on pending legislation.

Khademian also cites the influence of rules at the operational levels of public organizations. She emphasizes the link between context and culture in rule making and organizational behavior (Khademian 2000, pp. 40-41). Her argument is that the institutional context is key for understanding the formal and informal rules and requirements to which organizations conform to receive support and legitimacy from the environment. In early public administration she returns to the attempts to “rope off politics” with the political-administrative dichotomy creating a focus on the internal and formal structures and processes of government organizations as key to effective performance.

Kaufman sketches an ideal of hierarchy, a pyramid of authority with the president at the apex. He goes on to write that the hierarchical ideal is a mental construct and not a vision of reality (Kaufman 1981, p. 166). Lateral relations with Congress do not conform to the ideal pattern and, in fact, Kaufman believes that the ideal cannot work within the American system of government. Kaufman argues that congressional influence makes the hierarchical ideal unattainable, and the struggle between branches serve to weaken agency executive power overall. Furthermore, the demands on cabinet officers pit their work in department management in competition with their work in presidential policy councils. Typically, presidential responsibilities rank first (Kaufman 1981, p. 188).

Regarding the overlap in new public management and new institutionalism, Khademian aligns with Roberts and King (1996, p. 292) and Moore (1995) and the many other scholar who reject the political-administrative dichotomy and view top executives
as operating in the political world. As discussed previously, Moore emphasizes
management in the political context and criticizes the field for its lack of knowledge of
the impact of “outside organizations” and the importance and effects of external-internal
interactions and relations. Khademian also cites the political science literature (Kaufman
1981, Wilson 1989) on the notion of organizational culture as a constraint on public
managers and as bureaucratic culture as a force that “clogs” management innovation
(Khademian 2000, p. 41).

Khademian encourages the study and elaboration of the institutional environment
focused on the formation of rules and structures (Khademian 2000, p. 43). She calls for a
formal accounting of rules in government agencies and looking into their impact on the
mores, custom, and practices on organizational behavior. Khademian also cites the
importance of symbols as systems of meaning and motivation and the incorporation of
elements of the institutional environment that confer legitimacy on the organization and
its various activities. She calls this a new institutional perspective. This new perspective
is significant for examining the formation of organizational rules, structure, processes as
well as norms, values, and customs that influence relations with other agencies and
constituencies, as well as public perceptions. Important is forming judgments about an
agency's contributions, its perceived value as “expert,” and its responsiveness to its
clientele. The new institutional perspective is useful for future research, especially for
gauging the impact of 1990s efforts, such as the National Performance Review, to lionize
the importance of entrepreneurship and innovation in terms of institutionalist approaches
conceptually reflecting the interaction of organization, regime, and culture.
Public Leadership and Innovation: New Theoretical Insights from International Cases?

The finding by Van de Ven and Chu at the beginning of this Chapter, and the literature reviewed, support the significance and complexity of the influence relationships among the visionary-rhetorical, transactional, and participative levels for understanding policy innovation and public leadership. The Minnesota and Borins quantitative studies add weight to the qualitative findings of public management scholars, like Light, Lynn, Moore, Khademian, Gardner, Kaufman, and Roberts and King. All of these in-depth studies of public and nonprofit organizations agree that “leadership matters” in policy innovation. While these extensive research programs have focused on a wide range of studies, there is a need for additional research on the role of public leadership in cases involving innovative national security policymaking.

For example, recent research on government performance as developed in the field of public administration deserves additional attention by international relations and security studies scholars. The ties among executive leadership, policy effectiveness, and government performance are the subject of important on-going research in the public management literature. This public management focus should be extended into the context of international relations and security studies. The Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue (2003) book, Government Performance: Why Management Matters, offers a performance framework and finds “Big Lessons” such as “Management Matters” and “Effective Leadership is Vital.” The Ingraham studies highlight performance management at the federal, state and local levels. This study offers a similar focus on policy leadership, in terms of senior executives in public organizations working as what Ingraham terms of
leaders as policy makers and implementers, integrators and results managers, or what she terms “grounded leadership” (Ingraham 2003, p. 152). That is, in studying the senior or strategic leaders’ role in charting the direction and degree of influence for implementing effective public policy in cases involving international relations and security issues. Executive responsibilities include the leaders’ role in coordinating management efforts to support a vision for achieving government missions, goals and objectives. Ingraham’s public management research highlights the relevance of strategic leadership and management for coordinating complex administrative systems across agencies and within government – which they find “is clear” from their studies of U.S. government organizations (Ingraham 2003, pp. 20-21). Ingraham’s research on U.S. public managements provides valuable insights for government and bureaucratic behavior of agencies engaged in interstate and international relations.

This study of the Counterproliferation Initiative Policy provides important insights into the patterns and processes of leadership and innovation in national security policymaking during the 1990s. Evidence is needed -- from official strategy and agency documents, academic and policy research, and leading public officials, policy experts, Congress members, and others in the U.S. and international defense intellectual communities. This research establishes whether or not there was a new strategic direction -- that is, real policy innovation and effective public leadership -- in the national security policymaking process during the 1990s. Identifying and understanding the sources and extent of policy innovation and public leadership are important for learning about effective national security policymaking.
The following Chapters extend this analysis to case studies of Clinton era innovative policies, strategies, and programs for countering the dangers presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The next Chapter reviews major national security documents to provide a narrative of the Clinton administration’s strategic direction, at the visionary-rhetorical level, for counterproliferation policymaking. The three case studies then extend this analysis into the literature in the fields of international relations and security studies. As addressed above, case studies must address context, setting and history. In each case, therefore, the relevant foreign and defense, or national security, theory and concepts are introduced to complement the theoretical insights provided by the literature on public leadership and management, and policy innovation. The concluding chapter of this dissertation returns to these theories, frameworks, concepts, and ideas, as presented in this Chapter, to provide findings and inferences based on the evidence drawn from the following case study analyses.
Bibliography


Chapter 3: Strategic Narrative

The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States. Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following: (1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objective of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States. (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States. (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1). (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy. (5) Such other measure as may be helpful to inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

Introduction: The U.S. National Security Documents

This chapter provides a narrative of the key strategic events involved in counterproliferation policy development during the Clinton administration. The term “strategic event” refers to policy decisions made by the president or Secretary of Defense in the formulation and articulation of counterproliferation policy. These events are significant when the president and secretary, as strategic leaders, direct defense policymaking from the top-down.

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On the surface it appears that the Clinton administration counterproliferation policy failed. In 2003, a major war objective of George W. Bush’s Administration was to eliminate the threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Certainly, terrorist efforts to purchase and develop WMD capabilities were a strong undercurrent in the war in Afghanistan. On the international scene there were also perceived failures in freezing or reversing WMD developments and proliferation, in Iran, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Does this chain of events suggest a failure in the Clinton administration’s policy? If not outright failure, then is there evidence that the counterproliferation policy was well intentioned and even well planned, but implemented ineffectively? Evaluating the causes of relative success or failure is important for understanding the interrelationship of policy and implementation in a case where the top leadership attempts to introduce innovative policy initiatives. This chapter uses a narrative form to establish the key strategic events in executive leadership that provides the top-down direction and degree of influence for Clinton era counterproliferation policymaking.

In this chapter, strategic counterproliferation policies include setting program goals and objectives addressed in official National Security Strategy (hereafter, NSS) documents. These official strategy documents were initiated in 1987 as a result of the Goldwater Nichols Act defense reforms (Locher 2002; Snider and Nagl, in Cerami and Holcomb 2001). A review of these documents provides an overview of the U.S. administration’s perceptions of the international security environment including WMD threats and arms control opportunities. The review also traces the presidential vision and rhetoric regarding several administrations’ counterproliferation policy goals, objectives
and initiatives. The strategic narrative traces the presidential administrations’ historical record of post-Cold War counterproliferation policies.

**The 1987 National Security Strategy: The First Reagan Administration NSS**

The requirement of 1986 Goldwater Nichols legislative allows for tracing the founding and evolution of U.S. national security strategy documents. The first, official, 1987 NSS reflects the overriding threat of the Soviet Union and stresses the U.S. “goals of world freedom, peace, and prosperity” (NSS 1987, p. 1). The document does refer to working with the U.S.S.R. to prevent war and preserve world peace. The Administration’s authors point out that the NSS is only a guide, but is rooted in broad U.S. national interests and objectives, integrating all facets of national power to achieve objectives. Thus the NSS was designed to provide a framework with both specific and detailed objectives to be identified by executive branch agencies. Similarly, the notion of the NSS as a guide is in the context of providing the starting point for creating specific agency plans to attain the Administration’s security objectives.

Overarching national interests focus on: (1) U.S. survival; (2) the U.S. economy; (3) democratic growth and free trade; (4) world stability and security; and (5) U.S. alliances. These general interests are supplemented by major objectives in support of U.S. national interests. The number one objective is to deter hostile attacks on the U.S. homeland. Objective 3 cites dealing effectively with threats including international terrorism and objective 4 specified preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Reflecting the Cold War context, the NSS highlights the U.S.S.R. as the principle threat to U.S. interests and notes its intent to alter the international system and promote Soviet global hegemony. For the purpose of this study it is also significant to note the NSS mentioned
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and international terrorism, which is depicted as worldwide, frequent, indiscriminate and state supported (p. 7). The NSS singles out terrorism as a prominent feature of the international landscape for the remainder of the century and identifies the effective counterterrorism as a major U.S. national security objective. The document’s section on foreign and regional policies emphasizes the need to curb state-sponsored terrorism, specifically in Libya, Syria, and Iran (p. 17).

The defense policy section cites the ability of U.S. forces to defend against aggression across the entire spectrum of potential conflict, to “forward deploy” to defend U.S. interests “as far from North American as possible,” and to seek security though “America’s national genius for technological innovation” (p. 19). U.S. defense policy is to be furthered by advancing U.S. strengths against Soviet weakness, driven by (1) U.S. technology, (2) a competitive strategies\(^\text{50}\) approach; (3) alliances; and (4) strong individuals (highlighted as a characteristic of people in Western societies (p. 21). The NSS characterizes U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic competition and nuclear balance with the President Reagan’s words: “I have repeatedly emphasized that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” (p. 22). The remaining section on arms control once again emphasizes ongoing negotiations with the U.S.S.R. and does not address directly the threats of other potential proliferators.

One section of the 1987 NSS addresses improving efficiency, in terms of the defense establishment’s management and operational effectiveness (pp. 39-40). The NSS cites overriding objectives from David Packard’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense

\(^{50}\) For an explanation of the Reagan Administration’s competitive strategies approach see David J. Andre, “Competitive Strategies: An Approach against Proliferation” (Sokolski 2000, pp. 3-26).
Management, to include improving the quality of strategic planning; promoting a tighter linkage among strategy, military requirements, and acquisition programs; and maximizing the military benefits for each defense dollar spent. The Packard Commission also recommends organizational changes, including unified (four star) joint commands for transportation and special operations, including new DOD staff positions for special operations and coordinating boards at the National Security Council level. Additional organizational reforms included an Undersecretary of Defense for acquisition in order to reorganize DOD procurement functions. Finally, the Commission called for a two-year budget cycle to enhance stability. Final points in the 1987 NSS included better integrating national security capabilities through the National Security Council’s interagency working groups and its production of national security decision directives, and improving Administration and congressional collaboration.51

The 1988 National Security Strategy: The Last Cold War NSS

The 1988 NSS continued many of these themes from the previous year, noting, “The fundamentals of our strategy change little from year to year; our interests and objectives are derived from enduring values” (NSS 1988, p. iv). The 1988 NSS of George H.W. Bush’s Administration continues a realist framework based on U.S. values and interests, along with willingness to dialogue with adversaries (p. 2). The 1988 NSS highlights a major objective: “To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons” as well as to aid in combating threats from “state-sponsored terrorism” (p. 4). In the year prior to the fall

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51 David Packard (1986) “President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management Final Report.” Note that the Packard Commission published a series of reports that are found on the National University Library on line at [http://www.ndu.edu/library/pbrc/pbrc.html].
of the Berlin Wall, the official strategy notes that the U.S.S.R. is still the primary threat. The document also recognizes other threats with the potential for nuclear proliferation and international terrorism as well as from “radical politico-religious movements,” including Iranian sponsored terrorism in the Persian Gulf and Lebanon (p. 5). The use of terror against U.S. personnel and facilities in the Middle East and the spread of nuclear weapons in exacerbating regional conflict are also security concerns.

The 1988 NSS also addresses the importance of intelligence in controlling and reducing the threats of terrorism and drugs. In addition, the document cites the importance of a Mid East strategy to curb state sponsored terrorism, especially in Libya and Iran. It describes Iran as the cause of the continuity and escalation in the Iran-Iraq War, and acknowledges the Administration’s tilt towards Iraq (p. 29). In executing U.S. strategy, the NSS expresses themes of gaining an innovation-technological edge through a revolution in military technology and of leveraging U.S. economic power and technology in the third world during a period of international security transition (p. 8). According to the document, a more innovative United States can do more with less defense spending. The NSS offers implementing 1986 Packard recommendations for U.S. global net assessments, while arguing that it has no illusions of quick fixes to reduce military requirements, (p. 39).

**The 1990 National Security Strategy: The Fall of the Berlin Wall**

Published immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 1990 NSS notes the breath of changes in the international landscape (NSS 1990, p. v). Nevertheless, the document sticks to a theme of constants in goals and interests, and geopolitical necessities alongside the historic opportunity of the post Cold War environment.
Consistent with previous NSS documents is the emphasis on dealing effectively with threats short of war, including international terrorism, and on the transfer of critical military technologies, especially in the spread of weapons of mass destruction (p. 2). Returning to the George H.W. Bush administration’s earlier themes, the document foresees the significance of global economic trends and the increasing difficulty of slowing the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range delivery systems. Concerns with religious fanaticism continue: “The scourge of terrorism, and of states who sponsor it, likewise remain a threat” (p. 6). The 1990 NSS claims a commitment to curb the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the associated long-range delivery systems (p. 13) Regarding arms control, the document emphasizes a “comprehensive approach” featuring stringent controls and emphasizes multilateral cooperation, particularly the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.\textsuperscript{52}), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT\textsuperscript{53}), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR\textsuperscript{54}). The arms control section includes using diplomacy, economics, and security assistance instruments to address the underlying causes of tension and insecurity, including the causes for states to seek advanced weaponry (NSS 1990, p. 17).

In addition to classical grand strategy calculations of relating means to ends (in terms of the Administration’s political and economic agendas, p.15), the 1990 NSS discusses management reforms in a separate section titled “Public Trust” (p. 31). Here

\textsuperscript{52} For information on the I.A.E.A. see [http://www.iaea.or.at/].

\textsuperscript{53} For information on the NPT see [http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/].

\textsuperscript{54} For information on the MTCR see [http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/].
the NSS proposes implementing the five major reforms proposed by the Packard Commission’s Defense Management Review. First is to reduce overhead by improving the acquisition structure and providing clear lines of authority and responsibility within DOD. This includes proposals for streamlining logistics and support services, contracting out administrative services through the Defense Logistics Agency, and adapting corporate information management techniques. The second management reform area is to enhance program performance. This includes creating the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition position. Acquisition reforms include improving milestone management, developing criteria for phasing programs, and creating the armed service’s acquisition corps branch. A third proposal is to reinvigorate planning and budgeting. A specific proposal is to have the Secretary of Defense form an executive committee for overall policy reviews. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is to serve as the chief of the defense planning and resources board and to conduct a thorough review of the Pentagon’s planning, programming and budgeting system.

A fourth proposal is to reduce “micromanagement” by overhauling the statutory framework for defense acquisition and congressional oversight of DOD. The fifth proposal is to strengthen the defense industrial base and improve the observations of ethical standards. This includes the establishment of a DOD ethics program. Overall, these evolutionary reforms are intended to improve DOD’s internal productivity. The NSS notes that cultural changes are necessary at the core of defense management and would require several years of significant effort. The 1990 NSS marks the last of the Cold War strategy documents. The realization of the fall of the Soviet Union as well as
the upcoming 1992 presidential election would lead to a more revolutionary national
security strategy, one calling for a new approach for the post Cold War era.55


The 1991 NSS preface includes a reference to creating a “New World Order”
(NSS 1991, p. v). The hope expressed is that the Persian Gulf War would serve as a
“crucible of the new world order.” The main concern continues to focus on the U.S.S.R.
and its six thousand strategic nuclear weapons and three million soldiers. The early
pages continue to stress continuity in countering the threat of international terrorism (p.
3). New in the document is the demand that Iraq comply with United Nations Security
Council Resolution 687, which stipulates that Iraqi WMD, including biological weapons
related facilities, have to be destroyed. The NSS also discusses the potential for
improving relations with Iran, based on the condition that they not support terrorism.
Another state highlighted is Libya, which was put on notice that the Administration is
monitoring their terror and WMD proliferation programs. The final state highlighted is
Pakistan and the NSS emphasizes the influence of the Presler Amendment in preventing
the resumption of full political and economic relations without an Administration
certification of the termination of the Pakistani nuclear program (p. 10).56

The final George H.W. Bush administration’s NSS includes a new section titled,
“stemming proliferation” (p. 15). The section states that of all arms control objectives

55 See George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft (1998) memoir, A World Transformed, for first-hand accounts of the
development of the notion of the emergence of a new world following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification
of Germany.

56 For information on the Pakistan proliferation issue and executive-legislative roles, including the Presler and Brown
Amendments, see Rebecca K.C. Hersman (2000) Friends and Foes, Chapter Five: “Pakistan, Proliferation, and the
Brown Amendment.” The Presler Amendment included sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear weapons development
efforts.
none was more urgent than stopping global proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the missiles to deliver them. The NSS offers three major Persian Gulf War lessons regarding WMD proliferation and arms control. First, that international agreement helps compliance, but is not enough to insure it. The Administration cited evidence that Iraq has signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1968 Non Proliferation Treaty, yet they had used chemical weapons and pursued nuclear ambitions. Second was the need for stronger export controls. Third is the finding that a successful nonproliferation strategy must address underlying security concerns. The Administration’s prescription is to call for advanced weapons and develop contingency plans to deal with proliferators should prevention fail.

To address these Gulf War lessons the Administration proposes a three tiered nonproliferation strategy. Tier one includes strengthening existing nonproliferation arrangements. Tier two includes expanding membership in the multilateral regimes directed against proliferation. The most extensively developed third tier includes pursuing new initiatives. These include the May 1990 initiatives for the Middle East and a new program approach. The new approach includes revising guidelines for responsible conventional weapons transfers; proposing freezing WMD weapons production and testing, including supersonic missiles; expanding he membership in the Nonproliferation Treaty and Chemical Weapons Convention; and strengthening the application of arms control and counterproliferation agreements in force.

Other areas for program development include a long list of technology transfer and trade issues. The initiatives include tightening export controls and streamlining export licenses. They also propose new standards for exporting super computers and
increasing penalties to countries contributing to proliferation. More muscular language is included to thwart exporting chemical and biological weapons related material and technology, with stringent international controls and multilateral measures to counter proliferation technology transfers (NSS 1991, p. 15). One example of a program exhibiting success is the twenty-nine nation Australian Group of major chemical suppliers for controlling common lists of chemical weapons precursors and equipments for chemical weapons manufacturing. A second international agreement cited is the 1990 Missile Technology Control Regime. The NSS proposes including new members to form an emerging international consensus. Additional ideas are to continue building a consensus on the importance of the Non Proliferation Treaty for global stability, as well as the importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s institutional role in technical assistance for civilian use nuclear energy and safeguards of material for developing nuclear weapons.

The 1991 NSS also provided a progress report on the George H.W. Bush administration’s counterproliferation and arms control policies (p. 16).57 The report notes the setback of Iraq’s WMD programs. The report notes the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 and a U.N. Special Commission’s efforts to dismantle all nuclear weapons and related activities in Iraq. It also positively endorses Argentina and Brazil’s acceptance of I.A.E.A. safeguards on their nuclear facilities and the Treaty

57 In a presidential election year, the NSS serves as a form of campaign literature. See Snider and Nagl, who note that “any Presidential document must be viewed in the context of how it contributes, both in terms of substance and presentation, to the overall agenda of the President” (Cerami and Holcomb 2001, p. 131). In addition to setting national security strategy and priorities, and communicating the President’s vision to internal and external audiences, Snider and Nagl view the communication of the President’s larger vision, or themes, as an appropriate function of the NSS documents.
of Tlatelolco, which declares Latin America a nuclear weapons free zone. It goes on to approve of India and Pakistan’s agreement to ban attacks on each others nuclear facilities. The Administration also claims intelligence successes in tracking threats from narco-traffickers, terrorists and advanced weapons proliferators.

Section V, on the defense agenda for the 1990s, highlights the four fundamental demands of the new era that reflect a Cold War legacy, including: strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and the capacity for reconstitution (pp. 25-26). This section includes the need for civil defense programs for dealing with the consequences of a nuclear attack and improving the capability for responding to natural and man made catastrophes. The Administration also calls for improving the safety, testing, and modernization of nuclear weapons and production facilities. They also point out the success of the NATO London Declaration of July 1990 that called for removing short range nuclear weapons from Europe.58

The 1991 document’s concluding section notes that “The 20th century has taught us that security is indivisible” (NSS 1991, p. 33). It points to the interdependence of people and the threat of proliferation of weapons of enormous destruction has “begun to draw the communities of nations together in common concern” (p. 33). The 1991 NSS, as a self-proclaimed strategy for a new era, concludes by emphasizing a principle of working with others in the global community to resolve regional disputes and stem

weapons proliferation. The election of President Clinton would extend the George H.W. Bush administration’s internationalist world view in both its rhetoric and policy.

**The 1993 National Security Strategy: Bill Clinton’s First NSS**

The first Clinton administration NSS document, published in January 1993, opens with a sense of optimism in its preface titled “American Leadership for Peaceful Change” (NSS 1993, p. i). The preface echoes previous administration themes regarding world leadership in an interdependent world. The new Administration notes one overriding U.S. goal as “peace” as a “summon to national greatness” (p. ii). Threats are also consistent with previous strategy documents and listed in order as: the proliferation of advanced conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction; terrorism; and the international drug trade.

The first Clinton NSS also notes that “There is a peace dividend” and an interdependence of international opportunities to promote U.S. interests and domestic imperatives. (NSS 1993, p. 2). The new section on “The Domestic Imperative” highlights national well-being and the significance of domestic issues for national security. Domestic issues include the budget deficit, the tax and legal systems, crime and drugs, social peace and racial harmony, education, job training health care, and welfare reforms. This marks the first NSS document that pays attention to the notion of the direct impact of U.S. domestic issues on national security.

The Clinton administration’s NSS also emphasizes a significant role for international institutions in countering weapons of mass destruction. The 1993 document stresses an expanded role for the United Nations given the end of the Cold War. The Administration offered U.S. assistance in improving U.N. capabilities, especially in
strengthening international efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by “making the U.N. Security Council a key forum for nonproliferation activity” (p. 7).

Another new wrinkle in the Clinton NSS is attention to the issue of U.S. government reform. A new section addresses “Building Government Institutions to Serve the Future” (p. 11). The NSS reflects themes in the Clinton-Gore National Performance Review in its section on public management reform. It calls for streamlining and restructuring Cold War government institutions, improving coordination within government, and eliminating duplication. The section calls for an examination of the entire government apparatus, including agency structure, personnel and practices, and efficient policymaking -- all designed to support an increasingly active U.S. international role. The subject of innovation is addressed, but under a section on the defense industrial base in reference to innovative manufacturing technologies (p. 15). Other initiatives include science and technology programs called the “National Technology Initiatives” and the “Defense Conversion Commission.”

The initial Clinton administration NSS proposes a long list of programs designed to reinforce nonproliferation policy. The document cites the spread of WMD and delivery means as a most threatening national security challenge (NSS 1993, p. 16). The NSS emphasizes four principle U.S. proliferation policies. First, is to build, strengthen, and broaden existing norms against proliferation. Second, is to make specific efforts versus the acute proliferation dangers in the Middle East, South and Southwest Asia, and

Korea. Third, is to broaden multilateral support while maintaining a capability for unilateral action. Fourth and most ambitiously, is to address the underlying security concerns motivating the acquisition of WMD, including a range of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, military, security assistance, and other foreign and defense instruments.

The 1993 nonproliferation section includes a number of wide-ranging activities. It includes a long list of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation agreements. Program initiatives include updating and expanding control lists for the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australian Group (for chemical and biological weapons); improving the verification ban on chemical weapons as part of the Chemical Weapons Convention; expanding the 27 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and strengthening the bans on dual use equipment. More directly focused on nonproliferation are actions to work with the U.N. Special Commissioner (UNSCOM) and I.A.E.A. to dismantle Saddam Hussein’s nonconventional weapons programs.

Other arms control actions include gaining North Korea’s acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) inspectors and broadening the participants in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NSS again cites the South American Treaty of Tlatelolco as an example of nonproliferation policy success. The NSS calls for continuing other U.S. led efforts to enhance proliferation control initiatives by strengthening regional barriers against missile, chemical, biological weapons and technology proliferation. The Administration also calls for a Middle East arms control initiative. In leading by example, the Administration pledges that the U.S. will not
produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and will encourage other countries to do the same.

For organizational initiatives, the Administration pledges to refocus the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on nonproliferation. The document also discusses providing civilian opportunities for Soviet nuclear scientists in Moscow and Kiev through the development of local science and technology centers in the former Soviet republics. Importantly, the NSS calls for shifting from old, Cold War, intelligence targets to state sponsors of terrorism and the new challenges of WMD proliferation (p. 18).

The 1993 NSS highlights the links between terrorism and proliferation. The document notes that the post Cold War restructuring and reshaping of the entire Department of Defense must continue (pp. 19-20). The NSS highlights the technological opportunities for military-technological revolution in weapons, electronics, and organization. From a regional perspective the document calls for focusing on the Middle East and South Asia to continue work to deter terrorism. The Administration more broadly stresses continuing world-wide efforts with four goals: first, to constrain the proliferation of WMD; second, to reduce the spread of militarily useful technologies for WMD and ballistic missiles; third, to implement international agreements; and fourth, to develop an international accounting of dangerous materials and equipment, as well as methods for protecting them from theft and diversions. The 21 page document lays out

60 The 1990s included major debates on the use of force and the role of the armed forces in the post Cold War era as well as in future warfare. The debates ranged from the notions of an ongoing military technological revolution (in computers and informational technologies, robotics, and precision guided weapons) to those of a whole-system defense transformation. Two of many books examining these concepts are H.W. Brands, editor (2000) The Use of Force After the Cold War and Richard A. Lacquement, Jr. (2003) Shaping American Military Capabilities After the Cold War.
an ambitious agenda and an optimistic vision of national security in working towards an “age of democratic peace” in the 21st Century (p. 21).

The 1994 National Security Strategy: Engagement and Enlargement

The 1994 NSS was published in July, after the normal annual January date, but in time for the 1994 congressional elections. The 1994 version is subtitled as a strategy of “Engagement and Enlargement.” Starting with traditional statements about the executive’s foremost constitutional duty and role in protecting the nation’s security, including the American people, territory and way of life, the Preface notes the rise of ethnic conflict and rogue states. The Preface also points out that “The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security” (NSS 1994, p. i). The Administration also addresses traditional military, economic, and political goals in calling for a military ready to fight, enhancing security while bolstering America’s economic revival, and promoting democracy abroad.

The document’s opening highlights the Administration’s Mid East peace initiatives, denuclearizing agreements with the Ukraine and Russia, and “firm strategy for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula” (NSS 1994, p. ii). The document also notes that the NSS reflects both U.S. interests and values, and the need for American leadership abroad along with a willingness to build a U.S. public consensus necessary to sustain active international engagement.

The Introduction, Section I, emphasizes the spread of WMD posing new transnational threats and phenomena, such as the potential for WMD armed terrorists (NSS, 1994, p. 1). The document advertises the “tangible results” of the first 17 months of the Clinton administration (p. 2). Results include a bureaucratic assessment of defense
forces and systems for the new security environment; the January 1994 NATO Summit and the Partnership for Peace initiative; and President Clinton’s launching of “a comprehensive policy to combat the proliferation of WMD and the missiles that deliver them” (p. 2). Two more specific initiatives include the opening of formal negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the “landmark” commitment to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

The 1994 document emphasizes the importance of engagement, as using U.S. influence in participating in collective decision making over unilateralism. The Administration notes that the central thrust of the strategy of engagement is to cooperate with allies and sustain as well as adapt security relations with key allies (NSS 1994, p. 6). The document also calls for developing integrated approaches for dealing with post Cold War threats, for instance in proliferation efforts coordinating WMD counterproliferation, arms control and intelligence activities.

In specifying tasks for military forces the document lists: (1) major regional contingencies;61 (2) overseas presence; (3) counter-WMD and “stemming the proliferation of WMD” and delivery means; (4) multilateral peacekeeping; (5) supporting counter-terrorism efforts [with general purpose and special operations forces]. In addition, the NSS specifies hostile regional powers as the focus for major regional contingencies, including North Korea, Iran and Iraq (p. 7). The 1994 NSS is the first to explicitly link terrorism and WMD threats (p. 8). The section on counterterrorism, fighting drug traffickers, and other missions highlights the new transnational threats.

61 Formerly referred to as major theater wars in post Cold War, 1990s national and military security strategy documents.
With respect to counterterrorism the document calls for special units to strike terrorists at their bases abroad. The section makes specific terrorism policy pronouncements, including: no concessions, pressuring state sponsors, exploiting legal means to punish international terrorism, and helping other governments’ counterterrorism efforts. The 1994 document also points to organizational efforts required for “close day-to-day coordination among Executive Branch agencies” including the State, Defense and Justice Departments, along with the FBI and CIA. The Administration notes that “Terrorism involving WMD represents a particularly dangerous potential threat that must be countered” (p. 8).

The Clinton administration also points out “concerted efforts” in its counterterrorism activities (p. 9). Actions include June 26, 1993 cruise missile attacks versus Iraqi intelligence headquarters in response to the alleged assassination plot against former President George H.W. Bush. They also list the March 4, 1994 conviction of four World Trade Center bombers; the U.N.’s sanctions versus Libya for Pan Am 103 and other counterterrorist activities. Finally, they highlight two counterterrorism treaties, including protocols for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international aviation and for acts against the safety of maritime navigation.

The 1994 NSS includes a major new section titled: “Combating the spread and use of WMD and Missiles” (p. 11). Here, the Administration emphasizes WMD as a major threat and a key part of the Administration’s security strategy to “stem” the proliferation of weapons and develop an effective capability to deal with proliferation threats. The subsection titled “Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation” emphasizes a “critical priority” to counter proliferation. Goals include an indefinitely extending the
Nonproliferation Treaty beginning in 1995, achieving the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and ending the unsafeguarded production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes. Additional goals include strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group, I.A.E.A., and MTCR, combating missile weapons proliferation, supporting the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, and improving export controls.

In terms of international affairs, the NSS addresses regional and bilateral relationships. First mention is of Northeast Asia, and the Administration’s desire for North Korean compliance with nonproliferation under the NPT, I.A.E.A., and North-South Korean denuclearization accord. Second listed is preventing Iran’s advanced WMD program. Third is thwarting Iraq’s reconstitution prevention programs. Fourth is capping, reducing or eliminating India and Pakistan nuclear and missile capabilities. Fifth and last is the call for a Middle East regional arms control agreement.

At the top of the bilateral list are relations with Russian and the Ukraine and encouraging their participation in the MTCR, as well as discouraging any missile technology transfers to India. Other arms control measures include gaining South African acceptance of the NPT, entering Argentina and Brazil into MTCR guidelines, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Next are encouraging dismantling intercontinental missiles in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and pressing China to join the MTCR. Finally, they call for a trilateral accord among the U.S., Russia and the Ukraine for eliminating Ukrainian nuclear weapons. The Administration notes that “The U.S. will retain the capability to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction…” (p. 11). The Administration also notes that it will continue to improve defensive
capabilities, and give high priority to locate, identify, and disable WMD arsenals, production, storage and delivery systems (p. 12).

While there is no mention of homeland defense, the 1994 NSS does highlight the significance of intelligence capabilities, noting that intelligence is critical versus terrorism and WMD counterproliferation. Therefore, it calls for improving technical capabilities to detect, identify and deter “the efforts of foreign nations to develop WMD” (p. 14). It also calls for focusing support from law enforcement to counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and counter-illegal technology transfers. The intelligence section concludes with encouraging integrating and streamlining intelligence organizations and operations.

The 1995 National Security Strategy: Assertive Multilateralism

The February 1995 NSS continues Clinton administration national security themes and provides a track record of their successes (1995 NSS, p. ii). The preface highlights the accession to the former Soviet republics of the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus into the Nonproliferation Treaty, along with agreeing to eliminate nuclear weapons from their territory. The NSS also refers to negotiations with North Korea as a demonstration of the effectiveness of economic incentives and the threat of economic sanctions to achieve U.S. objectives at part of a determined diplomacy. The preface reemphasizes the U.S.’s special responsibilities as a great power with global interests and historical ideals. In hindsight, especially after ten years, critics would question the Administration’s claims of success in its diplomacy backed by force in trumpeting Iraq, North Korea, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia as examples of U.S. effectiveness in international affairs.
Section I, the Introduction, again reinforces the spread of WMD as a serious security threat, along with world wide militant nationalism, ethnic and religious conflict and terrorism (p.1). The list of non-military security risks includes illegal narcotics, environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, rapid population growth, and refugee flows. The document also stresses the importance of U.S. engagement and leadership abroad. Adopting the rhetoric of democratic peace theory, the Administration points to democracy as the foundation and purpose of international structures. Again, it points to successes in expanding the pool of democratic nations, free markets, and increasing economic opportunities and trading partners, while reducing war (p. 2).

The 1995 NSS points to numerous tangible results of what it terms its “comprehensive policies in combating the proliferation of WMD and missiles” (p. 3). Specific program results include several previous NSS highlights: eliminating nuclear weapons from the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan and their joining the NPT; opening formal negotiations on the CTBT; negotiating with the ABM Standing Consultative Commission to seek ways that would allow for the deployment of an advanced missile defense system; moving the CWC to the Senate; and strengthening the BWC. The 1995 document also declares success in negotiating the Agreed Framework with North Korea, projecting halting and even eliminating the North Korean nuclear program.

The NSS emphasizes the Administration’s leadership in stressing a preventive diplomacy to resolve problems before they become crises. It also addresses enhancing security to maintain strong defensive capabilities, including the tasks of counter-WMD and counter-terrorism (p. 8). The subsection on countering terrorism also addresses creating special units and attacking bases and assets of terrorism supporting governments
In addition, the 1995 NSS stresses the importance of executive branch coordination to insure policy effectiveness.

The 1995 NSS broke some new ground in identify categories of national interests. Various typologies of the concept of “national interest” include terms such as survival, vital, important, secondary and peripheral. The Administration chose three categories of national interests: (1) vital; (2) important; and (3) humanitarian. Vital interests are broad and of overriding importance to national survival and security, those essential to the vitality of the national entity. Vital interests include “the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and economic well-being” (p. 12). Important interests are those affecting national well being and the “character” of the world we live in. Humanitarian interests include those cases, such as Rwanda, where natural and human catastrophes and government failures require U.S. attention. In relating interests to the use of force the Administration notes that the decision to use force is dictated by national interests. For vital/survival interests the U.S. will use decisive force. For other interests categorized as important or humanitarian, the use of force would be based on a policy of selective engagement.

In a section on “Combating the Spread and Use of WMD and Missiles” the 1995 NSS again characterizes WMD as a major threat and calls for stemming proliferation.

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13-14). The subsection on nonproliferation and counterproliferation highlights Administration efforts and achievements. First up is the success of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts. The NSS points out the successful transfer of 600 kilograms of vulnerable nuclear material from Kazakhstan to the U.S. under a joint Defense and Energy Department mission. Second is the Russian conversion of highly enriched uranium into commercial reactor fuel along with enhanced control and accounting of Russian nuclear materials. Third is the listing of international efforts including the NPT, CTBT, NSG, and I.A.E.A.. These international initiatives include the September 1994 Clinton speech calling for U.N. efforts to seek a global ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Fourth are the regimes to combat missile proliferation, including the MTCR, CWC and BWC. Fifth is a list of regional approaches.

Regional efforts include the North Korean Agreed Framework along with counterproliferation efforts aimed at Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan. The NSS also mentions a Middle East arms control initiative, along with bilateral agreements. The bilaterals include work with Russia, the Ukraine, and South Africa on the MTCR. Other bilateral partners for expanding the Australia Group include Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Poland. The NSS points to Hungary, Argentina, and Brazil as additions to the MTCR. Again the Administration highlights the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the South American nuclear free zone along with dismantling intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In European proliferation efforts the NSS emphasizes the January 1994 NATO Summit calling for a political framework to
deter, prevent, and defend against the use of NBC weapons and reduce proliferation threats.

Foreshadowing the post-911 Bush 2002 NSS, the 1995 document notes the importance of the U.S. retaining a capacity to retaliate against threats that “contemplate” using WMD (p. 14). The section on intelligence repeats calls for coordinating a world-wide capacity for detecting, identifying, and deterring efforts for foreign nations to develop WMD capabilities (p. 18). Also, in a familiar voice, the section on integrated regional approaches combines the Middle East, Southwest and South Asia as a single region (pp. 30-31). Regional WMD threats include Iraq, Iran, and the India-Pakistan conflict.

The 1998 National Security Strategy: The QDR and Shaping, Responding, Preparing

No national security strategy documents were published in 1996 and 1997. The Clinton administration published a longer, 59 page, NSS in 1998, subtitled a NSS for a New Century. This next to last Clinton NSS points to the Administration’s five years in networking institutions and arrangements, including building multilateral coalitions for combating terrorism (NSS 1998, p. iii). The NSS also acknowledges the 1997 Department of Defense report, called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The NSS mentions meeting the priority of military challenges addressed in the QDR. The preface also notes the significance of constraining defense spending within the

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64 The 1997 Quadrennial Review is addressed in a later chapter.
parameters of the 1997 balanced budget agreement. Another new aspect is the specific mention of what is now known as homeland security: “Protecting our citizens and critical infrastructure at home is an essential element of our strategy” (p. iv). The preface highlights threats from adversarial nations, terrorist groups, criminal organizations, as well as those tempted to use WMD against civilians. The Administration points out that these threats require close cooperation at federal, state, and local levels of government, and across a wide range of agencies, including the Defense and State Departments, the intelligence and law enforcement communities, along with emergency and medical care providers. The Administration also calls for new public and private sector partnerships, especially between government and industry for critical infrastructure protection.

The document’s rhetoric is even stronger in terms of an internationalist approach to U.S. national security policy. The first chapter addresses the “imperative of engagement” and calls for the U.S.’s role as the global leader of the international community (p. 1). The 1998 document reinforces consistent core political, economic and military objectives. It emphasizes transnational threats of a global concern. The document also reinforces founding Constitutional requirements, including the protection of lives and the personal safety of Americans at home and abroad; the sovereignty and political freedom and independence of the U.S.; and the protection of U.S. democratic values, institutions and territory. The role of domestic security is singled out in new ways. The NSS notes: “Protection of our citizens and critical infrastructure at home is an

intrinsic and essential element of our security strategy” (p. 2). In accordance with interdependence theory, the report notes the blurring of foreign and domestic politics.66

The 1998 NSS also reinforces the notion of globalization as presenting new threats to U.S. security: “Globalization enables other states, terrorist, criminals, drug traffickers and others to challenge the safety of our citizens and the security of our borders in new ways” (p. 2). The NSS goals include “protecting the lives and safety of Americans”…and “preventing” the spread of NBC weapons and materials for producing them, in addition to controlling destabilizing technologies, such as long range missiles (p. 5). Again, the NSS emphasizes developing effective means to counter and respond to terrorism. The early section of the NSS lists five threats to U.S. national interests (p. 6). Three of the five specifically mention WMD threats. First are regional state-centered threats including NBC weapons and long range delivery systems. Specific threatening states mentioned include Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Second are transnational threats. Listed first is terrorism, including possible terrorist WMD use as a “special concern,” and the importance of critical infrastructure including global information, electrical power, and transportation networks.

Ranked third on the threat list is the spread of dangerous technologies. WMD related technologies are seen as a great potential threat to global stability and security. Also cited is the threat of the proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies in the

hands of rogue states, terrorists, and criminal organizations. Following threats include
fourth, the threat of foreign intelligence collection, and fifth, that of failed states.
Borrowing a phrase first popularized in the national security community by the first
quadrennial defense review, the NSS section on integrated approaches addresses the
U.S.’s efforts to “shape the international environment” (p. 7). This includes increasing
intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and denying enemy safe havens. WMD
threats are also emphasized. The NSS writes of the potential for terrorist groups
increasing the likelihood of “attacking U.S. territory and the America people in
unconventional ways” (p. 7). The document also notes threats to disrupt critical
infrastructure and the potential use of WMD against civilians in cities. Again
foreshadowing the George W. Bush preemption doctrine, the Clinton NSS notes that the
U.S. must defend itself by striking terrorist bases and states supporting terrorist acts. In a
preview of post-911 policy the 1998 NSS notes that “at home, we must have effective
capabilities for thwarting and responding to terrorist acts” (p. 8).

In shaping the environment, the Administration addresses the significance of
integrating its diplomatic intelligence, military, and law enforcement efforts. In
diplomacy, the NSS emphasizes preventive diplomacy, international assistance, and arms
control, as an essential element of “defense by other means” (p. 8). The Administration
points to arms control successes with Russia, highlighting the Clinton – Yeltsin, Helsinki
Summit of March 1997. The strategic level arms control efforts between the Cold War
superpowers include: singing the START II Protocol on September 26, 1997 and starting
immediately on START III; START III guidelines of two to two thousand five hundred
strategic nuclear warheads by 2007; completing the destruction of additional warheads by
2007; and codifying the Helsinki Agreement. Also cited are Clinton and Yeltsin’s joint official recognition of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program for facilitating the deactivation of former Soviet Union strategic nuclear delivery systems in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan (p. 11).

The Administration emphasizes Nunn-Lugar’s role in enhancing the safety, security, accounting, and central control measures for former Soviet Union nuclear and fissile materials. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program is also credited with eliminating and preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union. Also cited are the Helsinki agreements reaffirming U.S. and Russia’s commitment to the ABM Treaty (later overturned by the George W. Bush administration). The Administration’s support of arms control regimes is also highlighted, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Conventional Forces Europe Treaty (CFE⁶⁷). The Administration’s support for the Anti-Personnel Landmine (APL) Treaty is covered in Presidential Decision Directive 64, that calls for ending the use of APL outside of Korea by 2003 (p. 10).

The Nonproliferation section continues an emphasis on strengthening international institutions and arms control regimes as well as fostering federal, internal interagency coordination. The nonproliferation goal is to prevent the spread of WMD and the materials for production and delivery systems (p. 11). The international treaty regimes prohibiting the acquisition of WMD include the NPT, CWC, and BWC. The

⁶⁷ See the Federation of American Scientists web site for the CFE Treaty text at [http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/].
NPT successes are again highlighted in the cases of the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Byelorussia, and South Africa. Treaty efforts listed include strengthening I.A.E.A. safeguards and achieving a fissile material cutoff to cap the amount of weapons grade nuclear materials. The nonproliferation section again points to the crucial nature of coordinating counterproliferation efforts between the intelligence and law enforcement agencies and using their joint efforts to detect, prevent, and deter illegal traffic in fissile materials. The section expands these efforts to include limiting the availability of sensitive technology information, equipment, and technicians.

The NSS lists several arms control initiative. These include the Wassenaar Agreement on the export controls for conventional arms and dual use goods and technologies. Other agreements include the Australia Group on chemical and biological weapons controls, the MTCR and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Regional nonproliferation efforts highlighted include the 1994 Korea Agreed Framework, and ongoing Middle East and Southwest Asia regional arms control regimes to thwart Iraq WMD programs. Claimed Nunn-Lugar successes include strengthening weapons use fissile material controls; preventing the theft and diversions of WMD, related materials and technology; strengthening the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material; purchasing highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons; and working with the Russians to redirect Soviet facilities and scientists for peaceful purposes (p. 11).

The counterproliferation section also links intelligence and law enforcement concerns. The Administration claims success in deterring WMD proliferation by organized crime groups in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Other law enforcement efforts include DOD–FBI joint counterproliferation assistance programs for training foreign law enforcement officials (pp. 11-12). The initiatives program objectives include: (1) establishing professional cadres of law enforcement personnel to train for preventing, deterring and investing in criminal proliferation and diversions of WMD and delivery systems; (2) assisting cities in developing laws and regulations to prevent the illicit acquisition or trafficking of WMD and appropriate enforcement mechanisms; and (3) building legal and organizational frameworks enabling governments to attack proliferation at home, while participating in international efforts.

Concerns about terrorism led to the creation of a May 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 62. The NSS reviews the key points of PDD 62 (p. 15). This PDD is designed to reinforce agency missions and roles in the U.S. defense against terrorism and clarify counter-terrorism programs and activities. The NSS emphasizes the U.S. policy to apprehend and prosecute terrorists and the Administration’s intent on “increasing transportation security” (p. 15). The Administration again clarifies principles for countering international terrorism including: (1) granting no concessions; (2) increasing pressures on state sponsors of terrorism; (3) exploiting all legal mechanisms; and (4) helping other governments. More specific goals include uncovering and eliminating foreign terrorists and networks in the U.S.; eliminating terrorist sanctuaries; and countering states supporting terrorism subverting moderate regimes through a comprehensive program of diplomatic, law enforcement, economic, military, and intelligence instruments. In particular, the NSS states that “We are working to improve aviation security at airports in the U.S. and worldwide” (p. 15). Furthermore, the
Administration stresses its role in providing better security for the U.S. transportation system and notes that “Foreign terrorists will not be allowed to enter the U.S..” The Administration also seeks to end terrorist fundraising activities. Again the NSS emphasizes the importance of interagency (DOS, DOJ, DOD, DOT, DOE) integration on intelligence and transportation, and the need for congressional support.

The NSS continues with a multilateral, arms control approach in its counterterrorism policy. It cites the January 1998 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (p. 16). This Convention reaffirms the right of national self defense, including the right to strike terrorist bases. The example cited is the 1993 attack of Iraqi intelligence headquarters in response to the George H.W. Bush assassination plot. Also cited is the August 1998 missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the Kenya and Tanzanian embassy bombings that killed 12 Americans and 300 foreign nationals. Mentioned by name is Osama bin Laden, as the leader of the “preeminent organization and financier of international terrorism” affiliated with the African embassy bombings. The NSS characterizes the strikes against terrorist facilities and infrastructure as “necessary and proper responses” against imminent threats and a warning that there are no safe havens for terrorists.

The NSS also points out that terrorism was at the “top of the agenda” at the June 1997 Denver Summit of the Group of Eight, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and U.S.. In Denver, the Group agreed that by 2000 they would join an international terrorist convention called for in a 1996 U.N. resolution on measures to promote counterterrorism. They also agreed to exchange information on technologies to deter the use of WMD in terrorist attacks (p. 16).
The Administration also addresses domestic threats in a section on emerging threats at home. The future terror threats include more vulnerable civilian U.S. targets, which is more probable than the threat of conventional military operations. The NSS also reports that terrorists will be tempted to use WMD to threaten cities and critical infrastructure. They highlight additional effort in the May 1998, PDD 62 to address managing the consequences of WMD incidents (p. 19). In an important decision over agency lead responsibilities, the NSS notes the Justice Department’s primary responsibility to work through the FBI for operational responsibility for WMD incidents in U.S. territory. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is designated in a supporting role to the FBI.

The section on domestic terrorism outlines several other policies. The FBI, FEMA and state and local governments all are to have roles in consequence management. The domestic terrorism program goal is for 120 major U.S. cities to receive first responder training to prepare by 2002 for WMD incidents. The NSS notes that in 1997 DOD trained 1500 metropolitan emergency responders; including fire fighters, police and emergency medical technicians in four cities. The 1998 goal is to complete 31 cities. Another stated goal is to connect all U.S. cities via information technologies, including the Internet, video and CD-ROMs. DOD is charged with providing augmenting forces (p. 20). In May 1998, DOD trained selected Army National Guard forces to assist state and local governments. Other agencies involved included DOE for nuclear and radiation incidents, the EPA for hazardous materials, HHS (through the Public Health Service and Department of Veterans Affairs) for medical emergencies, including mass casualties. The NSS notes President Clinton’s emphasis, in his May 1998 Annapolis speech, on the
emerging threat of biological weapons. The document returns to the significance of national security emergency preparedness, calling it an “imperative” being met with comprehensive, all-hazard emergency plans by all federal departments, agencies, and the military (p. 26).

WMD proliferation is addressed finally in the concluding 1998 NSS sections on integrated regional approaches. The NSS makes special mention of WMD threats in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. It notes the threats to regional stability and the importance of countering WMD threats, especially in Iraq and Iran. The Administration calls for Iraq to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions for ridding Saddam’s regime of WMD. The Administration notes also that “Iran’s support of terrorism has not yet ceased” (p. 53). It claims evidence of destabilizing developments, such as the testing of long range missiles, the Shahab 3 with a 1300 kilometer range and test flights conducted in 1998. It also notes the continuing Iranian efforts to acquire WMD.

**The 2000 National Security Strategy: The Last Clinton Era NSS**

The 67 page, 2000 NSS is the Clinton administration’s longest strategy document (NSS 2000, p. i). This final strategy statement of the two-term presidency serves as a summary record of the Administration’s national security policy. The document includes four sections. Section I is on the “Fundamentals of the Strategy” and reinforces the Administration’s central international theme of global engagement. Section II, “Implementing the Strategy,” reinforces the three goals of the engagement strategy. These include reinforcing the previous DOD Quadrennial Defense Review’s construct of
enhancing security at home and abroad by “shaping the international environment,” “responding to threats and crises” and “preparing for an uncertain future.”

The second section includes two familiar administration themes regarding capitalist economics and democratic governance. For promoting economic prosperity the document highlights trade and markets; including strengthening financial coordination, promoting free trade, enhancing American competitiveness, providing for energy security, and promoting sustainable development. In accordance with the international relations theory of the democratic peace, the Administration call for democracy and the protection of human rights, to include humanitarian activities, especially in new and emerging democratic governments. 68 The third section covers integrated approaches focused on regional groupings of Europe and Eurasia; East Asia and the Pacific; the Middle East, North Africa, Southwest and South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Preface includes very optimistic rhetoric regarding the U.S.’s superpower status and future prospects. 69 Regarding international affairs, the Preface also reinforces traditional alliance structures, such as European multilateralism in NATO, and Asian bilateralism. The Administration emphasizes the separate strategic alliances with Japan and South Korea as well as the potential for building new, constructive relations with Russia and China. It points especially to enhancing cooperation with South Korea to

68 Among the many scholars writing in the 1990s on democratic peace theory, see Doyle, Fukuyama, Russett, and Levy. For critics of democratic peace theory, see Desch, Mearsheimer, Singer and Waltz.

69 The opening and closing sentences are: “As we enter the new millennium, we are blessed to be citizens of a country enjoying record prosperity with no deep divisions at home, no overriding external threats abroad, and history’s most powerful military ready to defend our interests around the world…. America today has the power and authority never seen before in the history of the world. We must continue to use it, in partnership with those who share our values, to seize the opportunities and meet the challenges of a global age” (NSS 2000, pp. iii – iv).
“encourage North Korea’s emergence from isolation and continue to diminish the missile threat” (p. iii).

The Preface addresses directly the new challenges of technology and open borders, and the “contemporary threats” of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, along with terror and international crime (p. iii – iv). The early portion of the NSS also reemphasizes the Administration’s support for arms control agreement in calling for extending the Nonproliferation Treaty and encouraging initiatives to contain nations seeking to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. Other international initiatives include efforts to increase “antiterrorism cooperation” as well as “stepped up efforts” to combat international crime, Cyberterrorism, global warming and infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS (p. iv). The Preface’s points of emphasis are developed in more detail in the document’s subsequent chapters.

The fundamental elements of the strategy include positive assessments of the U.S. role in “shaping the international environment” (NSS 2000, p. 1). In bold print the document proclaims the engagement strategy’s efforts to “fashion a new international system” including “adapting alliances and encouraging the reorientation of other states” (Italics and bolding in the original document, p. 1). For “preventing conflict” the focus is not on threats, but on using the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of statecraft “as tools for promoting peace” (p. 2) In the section on threat and crisis response again there is a discussion of “countering potential regional aggressors” on “the Korean peninsula” and in the Persian Gulf, however, individual states are not mentioned. Vague enemies are also inferred in the document’s language on “confronting new threats.” First in the listing of new threats is the “potential use and continued proliferation of weapons for
mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery” (p. 2). The remainder of the list includes small arms proliferation, cyber security, migrant smuggling and people trafficking, and critical infrastructure protection. Domestic security follows next and includes concerns about WMD terrorism and homeland efforts imperative at the Federal, state and local levels (p. 3). The administration touts its Domestic Preparedness Program along with ongoing National Missile Defense developments, noting that: “Prevention remains or first line of defense to lessen the availability of weapons of mass destruction being sought by such aggressor nations” (p. 3).70

The Administration also notes its vigorous pursuit of arms control regimes. The include the “strengthening of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, the Missile Technology Regime, and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” (p. 3). The Administration claims credit for having “made great strides in restructuring its national security apparatus to address new threats with diplomatic, economic, and military tools” (p. 3). The document also emphases the U.S. leadership role in the fragmented post Cold War world. Again using bold print, the Administration recalls the significance of “U.S. leadership in steering international peace and stability operations” clearly claiming successes in Bosnia and Kosovo (p. 3).

The notion of leadership is highlighted in the section on preparing for the future. The Administration’s addresses its initiatives to transform military capabilities and organizations. It announces “new approaches to foster a culture of bold innovation and

70 Note again that aggressor states are unnamed.
dynamic leadership” (p. 3). It also proclaims its intent to extend the process of transformation beyond the Defense Department to its diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and economic efforts -- all to meet threats and technological change and deal with “potential contingencies.” In terms of prevention, the document again uses the context of preventive diplomacy to “contain or resolve problems before they erupt into crises” (p. 3).

New terminology regarding “asymmetrical threats” is included in a section on the “Efficacy of Engagement” subsection on “Enhancing Our Security at Home and Abroad” (p. 5). The Administration emphasizes nonproliferation programs such as the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative which within the START I framework will lead to deactivating numerous nuclear weapons.71 They also point to the importance of international engagement in addressing asymmetric threats, including acts of terrorism and the procurement of WMD by regional aggressors. The Administration credits a strong U.S. overseas presence along with multilateral agreements and arrangements for containing threats from WMD weapons and delivery means.

Chapter II of the 2000 NSS echoes the theme of building bridges for the 21st century and addresses the instruments for building a stable, peaceful international security environment (p. 9). The principal elements of the strategy of shaping the international environment, responding to threats and crisis, and preparing for the uncertain future are articulated again. Instruments for shaping the international environment include: diplomacy, public diplomacy, international assistance, arms control

71 The Administration's claim reductions of more than 5,000 nuclear warheads, 600 missile launchers, 540 intercontinental missiles, 64 heavy bombers and 15 missile submarines (NSS 2000, p. 6).
and nonproliferation, military activities, international law enforcement cooperation, and environmental and health initiatives (pp. 9-19).

The document describes a “panoply of arms control agreements” (p. 16) in its five page section on Arms Control and Nonproliferation (pp. 11-16). The early parts highlight an emerging partnership between the U.S. and Russia in strategic arms control through the strategic arms reductions talks (START I, II and III). Additional nonproliferation measures focuses primarily on space launches and ballistic missiles and mentions several diplomatic agreements, such as the June 4, 2000 Joint Statement on Principles on Strategic Stability; September 6, 2000 Joint Statement on the Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative and Implementation Plan; and the December 16, 2000 Bilateral Pre-Launch Notification Agreement (p. 12).

Most of the Administration’s formal agreements and program are focused on friendly nations and long-standing multilateral security organizations. Beyond specific new agreements with the Russians, former Soviet republics, and newly independent states, the NSS highlights existing arms control regimes. These include the relatively long-standing Comprehensive Test Band Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty. The NSS also addresses initiatives under the United Nation’s International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.). These initiatives seek transparency, control, and reprocessing or destruction of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Working initiatives include: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament; and Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program. All are related directly to attempts to secure former Soviet nuclear materials (p. 13).
Additional programs target former Soviet materials under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program (p. 14). Other programs addressing former Soviet weapons and materials proliferation include the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund including three priority requirements: to halt the spread of WMD; limit the spread of advanced conventional weapons and technologies; and eliminate existing weapons. A second Administration program is the 1999 Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI). This program seeks to expand CTR successes to enhance the security of fissile materials. Also mentioned is the June 2000 Clinton–Putin Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.

In addition to the long listing of U.S.-Russian agreements, the NSS also addresses multilateral cooperation measures. The agreements listed focus on existing arrangement and organizations. First in order is the G-8’s Nonproliferation Experts Group (NPEG) with a Plutonium Disposition Planning Group to engage in Russian conversion of highly enriched uranium for commercial reactor fuel (p. 14). Part of the program redirects former Soviet facilities and scientists from military to civilian research. In a related program, the NSS relates U.S. interagency efforts to assist foreign governments to develop export controls and capabilities to prevent, deter, or detect proliferation through training, equipment, advice, and services to law and border security enforcement agencies. U.S. agencies involved include the Departments of Defense, Energy, Commerce; the U.S. Customs Service and the FBI (p. 14).

Other internally directed U.S. government efforts include the executive branches efforts to bring Congress along in arms control efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons and Chemical Weapons Conventions. The NSS notes Congress’s October 1998
implementing legislation for the BWC and CWC (p. 15). Other executive branch efforts include the 1999 Executive Order (EO 13128)\textsuperscript{72} and Presidential Decision Directive 70 (PDD 70).\textsuperscript{73} These Administration efforts relate specifically to procedures for commercial declarations and facility inspections.

The NSS points out initiatives with European partners. A major section is devoted to conventional arms, dual use technologies, and existing international regimes.\textsuperscript{74} The NSS includes new European initiatives, including several proposals adopted at NATO’s 50\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary Summit.\textsuperscript{75} New initiatives include establishing a NATO WMD Center and “promote invigorated discussions of nonproliferation issues in the NATO Senior Political Military and Defense Groups on Proliferation” (p. 15).

One relatively short paragraph discusses other regional proliferation efforts. The NSS emphasizes “three critical proliferation zones: the Korean Peninsula, Southwest Asia and South Asia” (p. 15). These critical areas do not reflect the agreements, organizational or institutional efforts and initiatives discussed in the previous sections on Russia and Europe.

\textsuperscript{72} For an in depth study of executive orders see Phillip J. Cooper (2002) \textit{By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action}.

\textsuperscript{73} Presidential Decision Directive 70 has not been made public according to the Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) Intelligence Resource Program. The FAS notes that there is nothing unusual about PDD’s used for interagency coordination and executive branch policy guidance, but kept classified for security reasons.

\textsuperscript{74} The international arms control regimes include: the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Australia Group for chemical and biological weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Zangger Committee (the NSG and Zangger Committed “ensure that I.A.E.A. safeguards are applied to nuclear exports” (NSS 2000, p. 15).

\textsuperscript{75} A complete listing of NATO 50\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary activities can be found at [http://www.nato.int/nato@50/calendar.htm]. The Summit was held in Washington DC in April 1999.
On the Korean peninsula, in addition to the 1994 Agreed Framework, “which requires full compliance by North Korea to live up to its nuclear nonproliferation obligations,” the Administration seeks “to convince North Korea to halt its indigenous missile program and exports of missile systems and technologies” as “emphasized during a November 2000 visit to Pyongyang by the Secretary of State” Madeline Albright (p. 15). For the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the Administration emphasizes its efforts to “encourage regional confidence-building measure and arms control agreements that address the legitimate security concerns of all parties” (p. 15). For Iran the Administration pledges its commitment to “continue efforts to thwart and roll back both Iran’s development of NBC weapons and long range missiles.” In the last half of a sentence, the NSS offers continuing to roll back “Iraq’s efforts to reconstitute its NBC programs” (p. 15). For South Asia, the document mentions the Administration’s seeking “to persuade India and Pakistan to refrain from weaponizing or deploying nuclear weapons, testing or deploying missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further producing fissile material for nuclear weapons” (p. 15). The Administration also “urge[s] India and Pakistan to adhere fully to international nonproliferation standards and to sign and ratify the CTBT” (p. 15).

In the following section on military activities the bulk of the discussion centers on overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities. One sentence states that “the primary mission of our Armed Forces is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened (p. 16). However, the section stresses that the U.S. military is not a substitute for diplomatic, scientific, economic, technological, cultural and education activities. One military initiative is the 1997
President approval for developing theater (or regional) engagement plans. This new Defense Department planning process is portrayed as a way to prioritize threats and opportunities against available resources. The remainder of the section includes paragraphs on counterterrorism, strategic nuclear deterrence, freedom of navigation and personnel issues (p. 18).

The 2000 NSS includes one paragraph of eight lines covering the Defense Department counterproliferation programs. The Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) is summarized as “another example of how U.S. military capabilities are used effectively to deter aggression and coercion against U.S interests” (p. 18). The wording notes that the CPI prepares U.S. forces to work with allies “to ensure that we can prevail on the battlefield despite the threatened or actual use of NBC weapons by adversaries” (p. 18).

After eight years of policy development, it appears that the lack of any details in terms of CPI goals, programs, performance results, or other internal or multilateral accomplishments is a recognizable signal of its diminished role in the Clinton administration’s national security policy and strategy.

Chapter III of the 2000 NSS on “Integrated Regional Approaches” reinforces the pattern of decline in the Counterproliferation Initiative’s importance as a maturing policy innovation. The early portions highlight Administration claims successes in Europe in program with the EU and NATO and especially in the Balkans (p. 39). The European section restates the NATO WMD initiative and efforts with NATO’s senior groups on proliferation (p. 41). The section on East Asia and the Pacific has more of a discussion of WMD. It notes the significance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance that “anchors the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region” (p. 48). Also of note are the bilateral treaty alliances
with the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. Multilateral organizations mentioned include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and supporting regional dialogues under the ASEAN Regional Forum.

The WMD issue is addressed directly in the section on regional approaches. The NSS calls for working with Japan on regional peace and stability and seeking adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This section also mentions $1 billion Japanese investment in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) as part of the U.S.-Korean Agreed Framework. Following Japan, the Asia section lists the Korean Peninsula and specifically the “tensions” there as the “leading threat to peace and stability in East Asia” (p. 49). The pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict is addressed. The document stipulates that a “democratic, non-nuclear, reunified peninsula … is clearly in our strategic interest” (p. 49). The section on enhancing security highlights the diplomatic goal of normal relations and points to the success of Secretary Albright’s “historic meeting with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in late October 2000” (p. 49). The NSS does specify several conditions for normal relations: “We are firm that North Korea must maintain the freeze on production and reprocessing of fissile material, dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, and fully comply with its NPT obligations under the Agreed Framework” (p. 50). The Administration notes that the U.S. must live up to its end of the agreements and work with Congress to insure success. The NSS goes beyond the Agreed Framework to call for North Korea’s elimination of its missile program and their weapons of mass destructions. The NSS also calls for the continuation of North-South summitry as well as Four Party Talks among the U.S., North and South Korea, and China.
The China section points to small steps in improving U.S. – China relations regarding WMD proliferation in East Asia. The NSS reports that: “We have advanced our dialogue on nonproliferation and arms control through exchanges as the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and sub-cabinet level in 1999 and 2000” (p. 51). Importantly, the dialogues have led to agreements to not target strategic nuclear weapons at one another and confirmed a common goal of “halting the spread of WMD”76 (p. 51). The Administration applauds China’s support for international arms control, including the CTBT, the MTCR, the CWC and BWC, as well as controlling WMD and missile related technologies. The NSS points out China’s work with the U.S. in support of the June 2000 North-South Summit, as well as working together to “convince North Korea to freeze its dangerous nuclear program” and importance of peace talks as an important tool in establishing peace and security in Northeast Asia (p. 51).

Oddly, the section on “The Middle East, North Africa, Southwest, and South Asia,” arguably the regions with the greatest security threats and issues, contains a relatively short discussion of national security issues and programs.77 WMD threats are highlighted with regards to Southwest Asia, in Iraq and Iran, and in South Asia, in India and Pakistan. Iraq policy includes three elements: (1) contain Saddam; (2) provide relief for the Iraqi people through the U.N. oil-for-food program; and (3) support Iraqi efforts to replace Saddam’s regime (p. 59). Containment is the foundation of the U.S.’s Iraqi

76 Note that the wording does not address stopping, preventing, containing, reversing, stemming or thwarting the development of nuclear weapons and related technologies. As recorded in the preceding analysis, these were U.S. objectives at various times in the development of both national security and counterproliferation policies and strategy.

77 The section on Europe is ten pages long, on East Asia and the Pacific it is seven pages, and on the Middle East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia section is four pages, which is equivalent to the four page sections on Africa and the Americas. These differences are indicative of those areas where the Administration articulates a perceived degree of achievement and success in national security strategy and policymaking.
policy as addressed in the December 1999 U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1284. In addition to measures regarding containment and humanitarian relief operations the Administration writes that: “It provides for a robust new inspection and monitoring regime that would finish the work begun by UNSCOM” (p. 59). The NSS goes further in noting: “It would allow for a suspension of the economic sanctions in return for full Iraqi cooperation with U.N. arms inspectors and Iraqi fulfillment of key disarmament tasks.”

The Administration also addressed modifying the behavior of the Iranian regime as well. The NSS states, “Our policy toward Iran is aimed at changing the practices of the Iranian government in several key areas, including its efforts to obtain WMD and long-range missile, its support for terrorism and groups that violently opposed the Middle East peace process, and its human rights practices” (p. 59). The Administration voices its concerns over Iranian WMD acquisition efforts and missile program development. It emphasizes Iran’s testing their 1,300 kilometer-range Shahab-3 missile in July 1998, July 2000, and September 2000 of. The Administration also refers to multilateral efforts with “Arab allies threatened by WMD to develop a defense through efforts such as the Cooperative Defense Initiative” (p. 59).

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78 A first person account of the Iraq UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) WMD inspection activities, and the follow on UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) efforts just prior to the 2003 Iraq War is found in Hans Blix (2004) Disarming Iraq.

79 The Cooperative Defense Initiative is a DOD program launched by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in March 1999. The Initiative’s main focus is on raising awareness and reducing the WMD threat in the Middle East. The program includes “five pillars: active defense, passive defense shared early warning, consequence management and medical countermeasures.” Proposed partner nations include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Egypt and Jordan. Note: the fact that the NSS only mentions it is likely a reflection of its early stage of development and perhaps a sign of its limited success with U.S. regional allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council. See Jim Garamone, “Cooperative Defense Initiative Seeks to Save Lives” (April 10, 2000) American Forces Information Service News Articles (Washington, DC: Defense Link News) [http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2000/n04102000_20004104.html].
The Administration also mentions multilateral efforts to alter WMD proliferation in South Asia. The U.S. states a position that it “does not believe that nuclear weapons have made India or Pakistan more secure” (p. 60). The Administration’s suggestion is: “We hope they will abandon their nuclear weapons programs and join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.” Proposed multilateral initiative regarding India and Pakistan include working with the U.N. and G-8 Nations to bring India and Pakistan into the international nonproliferation mainstream, including signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the multilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material “pending the conclusion of a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMTC) (p. 60). In sum, the Administration policy with respect to India and Pakistan seeks to cut off fissile material production, strengthen export controls, refrain from an arms race, and engage in a direct dialogue to reduce tensions.

The final South Asia security section addresses Afghanistan directly. The NSS points to the Taliban’s support of terrorism as a serious threat to U.S. interests. It notes that: “Afghanistan remains a primary safehaven for terrorists threatening the United States, including Usama bin Ladin” (p. 60). The NSS call on enforcing U.N. and U.S. sanctions on the Taliban regime for harboring bin Ladin and notes that the U.S. will “continue to pressure the Taliban until it complies with international requests to bring bin Ladin to justice” (p. 60). The NSS also notes concerns with Pakistan’s support of the Taliban, including harboring radicals. For countering the bin Ladin and Taliban threat the Administration writes: “We are engaged in energetic diplomatic efforts, including through the United Nations and with Russian and other concerned countries, to address these concerns on an urgent basis” (p. 61). In the first post-Cold War decade, America’s
energy, allied concerns, and the Clinton administration’s sense of urgency in countering the new threats of terrorism, as well as WMD proliferation were all to be called into question after the events of September 11, 2001.

There is an overall program analysis and evaluation by the General Accountability Office (GAO) in 2000 that is significant for validating this chapter’s narrative on the development and decline of counterproliferation policymaking in the 1990s. In sum, the GAO’s internal U.S. government review reinforces the findings of this narrative. The overall results were not favorable, and the GAO recommendations and Defense Department response reveals the difficulties of policy innovation in federal agencies when addressing complex issues like counterproliferation. A summary of the GAO review is significant, therefore, for gaining an understanding and appreciation of the issues and gaps in counterproliferation policymaking leadership and reinforcing the findings of this strategic narrative.\(^80\)


The GAO cover letter emphasizes the Secretary of Defense, William Cohen’s description of the threat and use of WMD versus U.S. and allied forces as the “greatest and most complex challenge facing the Department of Defense (DOD)” (GAO 2000, p. 3). GAO notes that this point was underscored by Director Tenet of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI) in February 2000 congressional testimony. In light of that high level of emphasis, the GAO notes that DOD had not developed key strategic

\(^80\) Zegart (in Nolan, Finel and Finlay 2003, p.20) points out that in the 1999-2001 timeframe there were numerous studies of WMD proliferation issues including “four blue-ribbon commissions, one Senate study, an Energy Department task force, and fifteen General Accounting Office (GAO) reports.” Zegart categories WMD policy problems into two categories: policy coordination and programmatic coherence. These problems are highlighted in greater detail in the review of the 2000 GAO report that follows in this Chapter.
documents and management plans to direct and manage the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative (GAO 2000, p. 6). Overall, given the nature of the threat as expressed by the defense secretary, the GAO notes that the department lacks a comprehensive strategy for WMD and counterproliferation.

The Review’s recommendations for DOD include the following categories for fixing counterproliferation policy: (1) develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy; (2) examine the DOD organization for counterproliferation in the next quadrennial defense review; (3) improve nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) doctrine, weapons systems, and equipment; and (4) develop mechanisms for identifying and eliminating undesirable redundancies in the departments of defense, energy and the intelligence community (GAO 2000, p. 7). In terms of top-down, strategic leadership, the GAO faults the DOD for a lack of overall guidance, oversight and integration of multiple, department-wide counterproliferation programs.

Even at the operational level, the GAO emphasizes a lack of consistency in the application, direction, and consideration of counterproliferation in the department’s (DOD) and the joint staff’s (JCS) participation in planning and programming. The GAO notes four operational dimensions of counterproliferation: counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. While not questioning the validity of these programmed activities, the GAO does reflect on the lack of both strategic direction and management tools for achieving consistency in providing effective policy direction and implementation.81

81 GAO notes that this is not a new finding in their reviews of DOD policymaking and program implementation and reveals that this issue surfaced in the 1985/6 congressional studies of defense organization that led to the Goldwater-
GAO is specific in criticizing the “DOD counterproliferation initiative’s lack of overarching strategies and a management plan” (GAO 2000, p. 18). The Review points out four missing management tools. These include the lack of: (1) a comprehensive DOD strategy to counter NBC threats; (2) an integrated military strategy to link offensive and defensive capabilities versus threats; (3) a management plan to guide, oversee, and integrate DOD’s counterproliferation programs; and (4) qualitative and quantitative measures included in a program reporting and evaluation process.

The Review’s recommendation for the first leadership dimension -- for strategic direction and visionary-rhetorical leadership -- points directly to the role of the office of the Secretary of Defense. The GAO conclusions recommend that the Secretary of Defense take actions to develop first, a department-wide strategy to align ends, ways and means for integrating counterproliferation policies and programs, and second, to integrate offensive and defensive capabilities (GAO 2000, p. 24). On a second tier of recommendations, the Review calls for the defense secretary to develop a management plan that “delineates responsibilities [including] explicit and outcome-oriented goals” along with a process for reporting, evaluating and validating progress and a resource strategy for funding (GAO 2000, p. 24). One additional recommendation calls for qualitative and quantitative performance measures for assessing DOD’s progress in achieving counterproliferation policy goals.

For specific recommendations, the GAO Review addresses the opportunity for strengthening the effectiveness of the Secretary of Defense as the Chair of the Nichol reform legislation. For more on Goldwater-Nichols legislation and the department of defense and armed services resistance to congressional reform efforts see Locher (2002).
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. The Review recommends that the secretary “devise and implement a procedural mechanism that establishes clear criteria, procedures, and a process for making such decisions” regarding the identification and elimination of unnecessary and redundant counterproliferation programs (GAO 2000, p. 25).

The response of the Defense Department to the GAO recommendations is recorded in the Review. The DOD comments are not promising. While the Review states that the Defense Department acknowledges the merits of the findings in the external evaluation, in the GAO’s view the department was “noncommittal on most of them” and the discussion of proposed DOD’s corrective actions are “limited” (GAO 2000, p. 25). In sum, the GAO finds that the WMD threats and challenges are long term and require “more concerted, focused, and integrated efforts by DOD” (GAO 2000, p. 25). The Review also points out that the department of energy replied to the GAO initial report with no comments and the Central Intelligence Agency only provided oral comments.

Organizational Performance Management

GAO is also strongly critical of DOD efforts in the area of organizational performance management. They are especially strident in their review of DOD as an organization with a well-deserved for hierarchical command and control structures, during a period of executive branch efforts for reinventing government, including Secretary of Defense Cohen’s own rhetoric for defense reform initiatives (William Cohen 1997; Gore 1993). The new public management approach (in terms of: managing people and structures; structuring systems tasks and responsibilities; shaping organizational
goals and strategies; and using management approaches, like total quality management to improved performance) did not take hold in DOD’s organizational approach for addressing its performance in counterproliferation policy and programs (Cohen and Eimicke 1995).

Bluntly stated, GAO reports that DOD had “no management plan” to guide, oversee, and integrate department-wide initiatives (GAO 2000, 7). In addition, they found no reporting and evaluation process or performance measures for continual assessments of department progress in achieving goals and objectives. For the senior military joint staff (JCS) they found no review process to ensure the “entire body of doctrine satisfactorily addresses the NBC threat” (GAO 2000, p. 11). In short, there was no guidance published as overarching joint counterproliferation doctrine.

GAO also finds a gap between DOD pronouncements and its actions. For instance at the operational level, GAO notes DOD’s official statement that equipment must be able to survive and operate in an NBC environment. Yet GAO points out that the DOD regulations only say that NBC survivability should be “addressed” in the acquisition process without including a “process milestone exit criteria” (GAO 2000, 12). That is, within the acquisition development cycle there are no gates, or performance measures, to ensure operational counterproliferation efforts are achieved before proceeding to later phases, such as equipment testing and fielding. GAO also reinforces that these are not new findings on their part. In 1995, the same comments were included in a DOD Inspector General Report (GAO 2000, p. 12, fn 16). The Inspector General also pointed out that the department lacked specific standards for NBC survivability in the armed services acquisition processes, and no criteria for guiding program managers.
In contrast, there were existing NATO standards, for interoperability with other European armies, adopted by the Army, but not used by the other U.S. armed services.

GAO notes the many management challenges given DOD’s “diverse organizational elements” functions and activities (GAO 2000, pp. 14-15, figure 1). The review of the organizational elements for the Defense Department shows an office for counterproliferation policy that reports, along with a dozen other offices, to an assistant Secretary of Defense. The Defense Department did establish an interdepartmental Counterproliferation Council chaired by the deputy defense secretary to provide a venue for discussing counterproliferation policy. GAO’s finding is that this Council serves largely as an “information gathering body” for interagency information sharing among the departments of defense and energy and the Central Intelligence Agency. There was no evidence of Council efforts to provide performance management, or other tools, to guide counterproliferation policy development or implementation across multiple U.S. departments and supporting agencies.

The GAO review also emphasizes the Defense Department’s shortcomings in terms of a lack of quantitative and qualitative reporting and evaluation process to assess DOD progress towards counterproliferation goals and objectives. GAO reports that program evaluation tools “have not been developed” (GAO 2000, p. 18). Without management tools, then, GAO finds it “very difficult to ascertain” the strategic direction and status of the counterproliferation initiative (GAO 2000, p. 18). Moreover, the need for such program evaluation practices were cited in both the 1996 Joint Staff review of the strategic environment and the following 1997 DOD’s own Quadrennial Defense Review. The GAO extended the discussion of these other internal reviews in calling for a
single, integrated, master, or management plan to guide, oversee, and integrate
department wide counterproliferation efforts. The GAO findings call for DOD to
develop a list familiar in the management and planning literature: specific
responsibilities, goals, objectives, timetables, reporting processes, and other management
tools to guide counterproliferation policy execution and progress (GAO 2000, p. 19).
GAO also notes the progress of the U.S. Air Force in these areas, however, pointing out
the opinion of an unnamed Defense Department senior policy official, who noted that the
Defense Department once considered a comprehensive department-wide master plan, but
decided against a policy and performance approach in favor of placing more general
guidance in the annual defense planning guidance.

GAO also points out that the development and use of goals and performance
measures would be consistent with congressional legislation in terms of the 1993
Government Performance and Results Act (GAO 2000, p. 20, fn 25). The GAO Review
concludes that without a mechanism for developing a comprehensive strategy, military
strategy, and management plan with reporting and evaluation processes, it is difficult for
anyone inside or outside of the Defense Department to gauge progress in
counterproliferation policy goals and objectives (GAO 2000, p. 25).

**Organizational Integration and Alignment**

The GAO is also highly critical of the ability of the department department’s
capacity to integrate and align counterproliferation policymaking internally. The Report
states that the department’s organizational structure is “too diffuse to effectively manage
and integrate the Department’s counterproliferation mission” (GAO 2000, pp. 6-7). The
Report points out that given the Defense Department’s large, complex organizational
structures, numerous activities, and multiple functions, there is a need for
counterproliferation guidance to coordinate the department’s efforts. The suggested
guidance from GAO is to provide a major department planning and policy document -- to
establish and clarify office relationship and organizational elements activities and
functions for all counterproliferation issues. These integrating efforts would include
increasing the attention and direction for nuclear, biological and chemical warfare
training, exercises and education. In addition, the Report calls for improving intelligence
integration and alignment.

The GAO recommends extensive internal reforms as well. The Report lists
several large shortcomings (GAO 2000, p. 9). First, they note that there is no
overarching joint doctrine for the comprehensive integration of DOD activities – to
include a picture of DOD operations and responses planned across the spectrum of
military operations. Other GAO findings include: a lack of systemic NBC approval
processes for weapons system design; a diffuse organizational structure that constrains
counterproliferation policy efficiency and effectiveness; and a lack of key strategic
documents, or those documents that would guide, oversee, and integrate the work of
multiple offices and agencies within DOD. GAO points out that while there are more
than 100 joint doctrinal publications, there is no single, synthesis stating overarching
counterproliferation doctrine.

82 The spectrum of military operations is used in defense and joint doctrine to categorize the range and scope of major,
different kinds of military activities, from global nuclear war on one end of the spectrum to peace keeping, and support
and stability operations on the other end.

83 The GAO reports that of the armed services, only the U.S. Air Force has made a concerted effort to systematically
review and integrate its counterproliferation doctrine. The GAO rated the Air Force doctrine as “adequate” (GAO
2000, p. 11).
The military’s senior staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is also criticized by GAO for not systematically reviewing and integrating counterproliferation doctrine (GAO 2000, p. 11). The Reports cites examples of the many related counterproliferation tasks involved in the missions, functions, and types of military operations. These include military intelligence support, rear area operations, joint special operations, space operations, base defense, airlift support, nuclear operations, amphibious operations, operations other than war, and anti-terrorism. The 2000 Report reinforces problems of inefficient joint service mission integration, as raised in the 1985 defense organization studies leading to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation (Locher 2002). The inefficiencies include: gaps in service capabilities; wasted resources due to duplication of efforts; interoperability problems; unrealistic planning; inconsistent doctrine; inadequate training; and, overall, an ineffective fighting force in the event of operations in a WMD threat environment. These harsh descriptors reflect a litany of issues that the GAO wants the department to address. The GAO does provide recommendations for addressing these problem areas.

Without specifically citing the new public management literature, or GRPA legislation, the GAO highlights the need for qualitative and quantitative reporting and evaluation processes. The Report notes that the “absence of such tools” makes it difficult for ascertaining the performance of DOD counterproliferation planning and integration. Overall, the GAO notes that there is not a visible process for integrating “organizations, plans, policies, requirements, and programs of the diverse, but complementary, counterproliferation area” (GAO 2000, p. 18).
The one committee designed for integration, The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) also fall short in the GAO review. The CPRC was formed by Congress to provide a mechanism for the Defense Department to coordinate with the energy department and the intelligence agencies to coordinate research and development programs. GAO insists that the CPRC has not taken necessary steps to identify and eliminate redundancies or uncoordinated efforts in counterproliferation programs (GAO 2000, 20). GAO does note their finding that the CPRC does serve as a good forum for information exchange. They add that this does not fit their original charter, going back to the identification of lapses that led to the creation of the committee in 1994. The GAO also refers to a 1999 Joint Forces Command assessment of organizations and project involved in the military’s research and development efforts to develop capabilities for attacking critical mobile targets, including those with the capacity to launch ballistic and cruise missiles with NBC warheads. The Joint Forces Command’s findings included 525

84 Congress directed the formation of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee in the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act. The congressional intent was to provide a high level national commitment to counter proliferation threats as reflected in the CPRC’s membership, chaired by the Secretary of Defense and including the Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1997 Congress broadened the CPRC activities and program review to include organizations to counter paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats. For a complete description of the CPRC charter see Counterproliferation program Review Committee “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism,” Executive Summary (April 2000, p. ES-1).

85 The integration and alignment function of Joint Forces Command continues as a significant task for coordinating the efforts of the individual armed services on behalf of the DOD and JCS. Their web page notes that: ‘The Unified Command Plan designates U.S.JFCOM as the "transformation laboratory" of the United States military to enhance the combatant commanders' capabilities to implement the president's strategy. U.S.JFCOM develops joint operational concepts, tests these concepts through rigorous experimentation, educates joint leaders, trains joint task force commanders and staffs, and recommends joint solutions to the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines to better integrate their warfighting capabilities. The benchmark of U.S.JFCOM's efforts is to create effects in the battlespace in support of campaigns designed and conducted by the combatant commanders in pursuit of presidentially-approved policy goals. This work builds on and strengthens service efforts, draws on the best of industry, and flows directly from the president's National Security Strategy, the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy and the chairman of the Joint Staff's National Military Strategy.’ Accessed: 9/2/2006 [http://www.jfcom.mil/about/about1.htm].
projects and 113 associated projects for experimentation, demonstrations, studies, simulations, exercise and war games (GAO 2000, p. 21).

**Participatory Leadership: Networks and Oversight**

The House of Representatives Armed Services Committee requested the GAO Report to review the Defense Department’s implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative (GAO 2000, p. 3). The GAO instructions from the House included assessing the actions of the interagency CPRC and reviewing its performance since 1995 with attention to counterproliferation program shortfalls, redundancies and uncoordinated efforts, as well as program and funding priorities. In brief, the GAO found no CPRC process for making decisions regarding the committee’s primary talk of eliminating counterproliferation program redundancies.

The GAO also found fault with the DOD implementation of Congress’s direction regarding the organizational structure for counterproliferation policymaking (GAO 2000, p. 7). For instance, the Congress had created a position for and Assistant Secretary of Defense for nuclear, chemical and biological programs (CPRC 2000, ES-1). The Defense Department, however, attempted to abolish the position as part of Secretary Cohen’s 1997 defense reform initiative. The Secretary’s recommendation was opposed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, which viewed the position as necessary to provide oversight to insure congressional mandates were being observed in the implementation of DOD counterproliferation programs (GAO 2000, p. 16).

The GAO has established an audit trail of previous efforts to improve DOD’s leadership and management of its counterproliferation programs. The Report notes that in 1996 the CPRC itself recommended developing more integrated chemical and biological research
and development plans for the defense and energy departments and the intelligence community. Again, in May 1999, the Senate Armed Services Committee, in “seeing no action,” directed the CPRC to submit plans to the congressional defense committees and the GAO notes that “the March 1, 2000 deadline was not met” (GAO 2000, 22). The reason for the lack of action is noted as the difficulty of integrating the research and development programs for different departments, such as DOD, DOE and CIA. Even internally, the GAO found a lack of oversight of counterproliferation equipment acquisitions by the Defense Department, the JCS and the military services. While the GAO found “good” coordination in the interagency process for linking the defense and energy departments and the intelligence community, the Report concludes that the CPRC had not realized its potential and provided no procedural mechanism for decisionmaking across the multiple counterproliferation areas (GAO 2000, p. 23). In short, the GAO Report reinforces those critics who suggest that there is a lack of policy leadership across the U.S. government in implementing effective counterproliferation innovations.

Next Chapters: Case Studies

This dissertation continues to study U.S. counterproliferation policymaking using the qualitative method of the analytic narrative in three case studies. The narrative form “pays close attention to stories, accounts, and contexts” (Bates et al 1998, p. 10). Bates and his coauthors write that this method of research is “problem driven” and devoted to exploring cases and credits the case study approach of Alexander George. They write that, “In seeking to build such accounts [constructing logically persuasive and empirically valid accounts that explain how and why events occurred], we follow Alexander George in tracing the historical processes that characterized the unfolding of the events of
concern” (Bates et al. 1998, p. 13). They credit Fenno (1990) for his encouraging a “soak and poke” approach, and Geertz (1973) for seeking “thick description” (Bates et al. 1998, p. 14). They also note that in studying political problems, “In effect, our cases selected us, rather than the other way around” (Bates et al. 1998, p. 13). Tracing the development of U.S. counterproliferation policy in this chapter, as explained in the context of national security strategy documents and GAO program evaluation, drives this analysis towards several cases necessary to thicken the narrative and analysis of counterproliferation policymaking.

The Clinton administration’s attempt at a policy innovation was initiated with Secretary Aspin’s 1993 speech on the new dangers threatening national security. Thereafter, the Clinton administration focused its policy leadership and executive branch efforts on regional threats. These priority WMD proliferation threats included North Korea’s open hostility and brinksmanship; Russia and Former Soviet Republics “loose nukes;” and Iraq’s intransigence following the Persian Gulf War. Each of these cases was recognized as a problem and threat to U.S. national security, and was met with Clinton administration counterproliferation policy responses.

Through these three case studies, this dissertation analyzes the policy and leadership patterns in the Administration’s efforts. In terms of an analytical narrative method, “By reading documents, laboring through archives, interviewing, and surveying the secondary literature, we seek to understand actors’ preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, the expectations they form, the strategies they adopt, and the constraints that limit their actions” (Bates et al. 1998, p. 11). Thus the analytical narrative, case study approach is useful to “seek to account for
outcomes by identifying and exploring the mechanisms that generate them. We seek to cut deeply into the specifics of a time and place, and to locate and trace the processes that generate the outcome of interest.” The following chapters build narratives: “By modeling the processes that produced the outcomes [and] capture the essence of stories” (Bates et al. 1998. p. 12). The series of cases that follow include the Clinton Administration’s national security policymaking when facing the regional WMD proliferation threats in North Korea, Russia and the Former Soviet Republics, and Iraq.


Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, JFK School of Government, Harvard University.


**U.S. Government Documents:**


Chapter 4: The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework

We were about to give the president a choice between a disastrous option—allowing North Korea to get a nuclear arsenal…and an unpalatable option, blocking this development, but thereby risking a destructive non-nuclear war.


No one believed that Pyongyang could be “trusted” to carry out its agreements. But when viewed in the cold, calculating light of not only the U.S. national interests but also those of America’s close allies in the region, the quest for a negotiated settlement seemed to be the “least worst alternative” as the first line of defense against North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons—compared to military action against North Korea, containing Pyongyang through isolation, or forcing its collapse. Importantly, resorting to the diplomatic options precluded no others. To the contrary, in order to be effective a strategy of coercive diplomacy would require an integrated use of carrots and sticks. And if diplomacy failed, American officials would be ready—and justified—to switch from carrots to sticks.

Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci (2004, pp. xiv-xv)

Case studies on post-Cold War, Clinton administration national security policymaking are an important area for policy relevant research. The 1993-1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework case provides a study of top-down leadership in the theory and practice of national security policymaking and coercive diplomacy. In the following analysis, Alexander George’s theory of coercive diplomacy serves as a guiding framework to study the practice of national security policy making in negotiating and implementing the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. George refers to coercive diplomacy is a strategy that is sometime employed by policymakers in the hope of securing a peaceful resolution of a serious dispute (George 1991, p. xi). One way of assessing the Clinton administration’s effectiveness in post-Cold War policy innovation
is to examine closely the Administration’s leadership patterns, that is, the direction and
degree of influence senior policymakers exerted in the Agreed Framework Case. Would
a more theoretically-informed approach, based on the scholarly literature on coercive
diplomacy, have improved the practical options for effective policy and decisionmaking
in the Agreed Framework case? Did U.S. national security practitioners, the senior
leaders in the Clinton administration, make errors that a theoretically-informed approach
would have avoided?

**International Relations and National Security Policymaking: A Theory-Practice
Gap?**

The literature regarding gaps in international relations theory and national security
policymaking highlights common themes regarding the importance of integrating
scholarly and policy approaches, as well as the utility of case study research in addressing
the relevance of the substance and process of national security policymaking.86 This
study examines questions regarding the linkages between innovative executive leadership
and national security policymaking in the Clinton administration’s major efforts to halt

In October 1994, the Administration signed the Agreed Framework that was
designed to end the standoff between the United States and North Korea, after the
Pyongyang regime announced their withdrawal from the Non Proliferation Treaty in
March 1993. The George W. Bush administration challenged the North Koreans over
violating their commitments under the Agreed Framework as a result of events
culminating in late 2002, when the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly,

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confronted the North Koreans directly on the North’s secret uranium enrichment program.\(^87\) Several questions should be addressed to learn from the Clinton administration’s national security policy leadership, as demonstrated by its diplomatic efforts, and especially in light of the recent historical events that critics regarded as a “failed” process for halting WMD proliferation in northeast Asia. First, what was the U.S. policy and strategy in the Agreed Framework case? From an academic perspective, was there a theoretical basis for the Clinton administration’s policy and strategy making? Furthermore, did the Administration’s approach match or differ from what theory and knowledge suggests for effective executive leadership in the successful pursuit of national security interests and objectives? Finally, was there a knowledge–action gap in the nature of executive leadership in this application of coercive diplomacy in the Agreed Framework case?

**Context: The Turbulent Environment in Northeast Asia**

In the early 1990s, the incoming Clinton administration recognized the need for updating national security policies in a dynamic, post-Cold War security environment, including emphasizing the growing threats posed by nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missiles possessed by “irresponsible states or terrorist groups.”\(^88\) On Pearl Harbor Day, December 7, 1993, the first Clinton Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, spoke

\(^{87}\) “October 16, 2002: The United States announces that North Korea admitted to having a clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons after James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, confronted representatives from Pyongyang during an October 3-5 visit. Kelly later explained that the North Korean admission came the day after he informed them that the United States was aware of the program. North Korea has denied several times that it admitted to having this program.” Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association, “Fact Sheets: Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.” Accessed 24 May 2004 [www.armscontrol.org/pdf/dprkchron.pdf].

to the National Academy of Science, emphasizing: “The new nuclear danger we face is perhaps a handful of nuclear devices in the hands of rogue states or even terrorist groups. The engine of this new danger is proliferation” (Aspin 1993, in Sokolski 2001, p. 141).

The speech included naming North Korea as a state with nuclear ambitions. Aspin’s successor, William Perry reports that on June 16, 1994, after four months as Secretary of Defense, he, President Clinton, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman John Shalikashvili and U.S. Korea Forces Commander Gary Luck were “deep in the crisis that would prove to be the most serious during my tenure” (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 123). The Administration addressed the escalating North Korean proliferation threats and Northeast Asian security concerns with top-down leadership and decisionmaking. In the international relations and security studies literature the most developed theory for addressing this crisis is in the coercive diplomacy literature. For this analysis then, was the Administration’s leadership approach in keeping with the conditions and contexts that suggest achieving a successful outcome?

International relations scholars Lepgold and Nincic, in *Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance* (2001, pp. 21) argue that researchers “have produced a wide body of empirical literature that might, if appropriately packaged, provide them [policymakers] with guidance.” In sum, in the Agreed Framework case did the Clinton administration’s actions provide effective top-down leadership in pursuit of its new Counterproliferation Initiative policy?

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89 In terms of scholarly international relations literature, this crisis presents an opportunity for studying “issue specific puzzles” (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, pp. 19-22).
Bridging the Theory-Practice Gap: Coercive Diplomacy and Visionary-Rhetorical Leadership

Alexander George’s ideas on the bridging the gap between theory and practice, especially his writings on coercive diplomacy, provide a framework for analyzing these questions. This case study examines questions for scholars and practitioner to evaluate executive branch, national security policymaking. In general, scholars are interested in assessing how correctly their concepts, frameworks and hypotheses contribute to theory building. Policy makers should be interested in learning more from intensive research efforts on the conditions and contexts for success policy outcomes, especially given the high-level threats posed by hostile states with the potential for developing weapons of mass destruction in the near and long terms. The relative successes and failures in post-Cold War counterproliferation efforts provide important case studies for the scholarly and policy communities to pause, reflect, and engage in renewed efforts to bridge their gaps and look for insights for determining effective leadership patterns in policymaking and implementation.

In Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy, Alexander George highlights what he characterizes as a great divide between academia and practitioners. On the practitioner side, he points to fears concerning the academy’s “high level of abstraction” and overly scientific, research bias, along with a general lack of understanding of “how policy is actually made” (George 1993, p. 7). On the academic side George writes of several reasons for scholar’s aversion to the policymaking world. These include concerns about policymakers oversimplifying well-developed theories, over generalizing and misusing inferences from specific case studies, the distorting
effects of political pressures, and scholars’ skepticism about the role of “intuitive judgment and experience” (George 1993, p. 12).

George’s prescription for bridging the gap “is to focus on the relationship between knowledge and action in the conduct of foreign policy” (George 1993, p. 16). He points to three types of knowledge concerning a given strategy that are needed by the practitioner and can be provided, in part, by the academic: (1) an abstract conceptual model; (2) generic, or theoretical, knowledge; and (3) actor-specific knowledge. George’s points out that conceptual models should include the principle logic and plan for relating to an historical case. Generic knowledge, more formally called theory, includes the details of the conditions that favor the successful use of a specific analytical approach. Lastly, actor specific knowledge includes the unique aspects of the adversary against which the strategy-plan-analytical concept is to be used to ascertain the “correct image” of the opponent (George 1993, p. 125).

George’s prescription includes an evaluation tool for gauging the broad reasons for coercive diplomacy failures. These would include failure as a result of strategic misunderstanding (in applying the theory to a specific case), a lack of knowledge concerning the requirements or conditions for a successful strategy an incorrect image of the opponents or actors, a faulty implementation scheme, or some combination of all of the above. In Forceful Persuasion (1991), George provides a case study on the use of coercive diplomacy in the 1991 Gulf War to illustrate his method. George thus demonstrates that there is a wealth of existing conceptual and generic knowledge in the international relations literature to study the use or threat of force and coercive diplomacy. Of course, other international relations scholars, such as Art and Cronin, also
address coercive diplomacy. They refer to coercive diplomacy as “the attempt to get a
target…to change its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the
actual use of limited force” (Art and Cronin 2003, p. 6).90 Their concept includes two
forms of compellence: the use of diplomatic threats and the demonstrative use of limited
force. In the Art and Cronin conceptualization then, like George, full-scale force is
considered a failure of a coercive diplomacy policy.

George reinforces the notion of a distinct separation between coercive diplomacy
and war in Forceful Persuasion’s subtitle Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War.
He presents seven conditions favoring the successful use of coercive diplomacy (George
1991, pp. 75-81). Chief among these are the asymmetry of motivation between the
coercer and the adversary, a sense of urgency in the mind of the adversary, and the
adversary’s fear of unacceptable escalation. Other considerations include the clarity of
the coercer’s objectives, the strength of the coercer’s motivation, adequate domestic and
international support, and clarity concerning the precise terms of crisis settlement.

Making the coercive diplomacy conceptualization even more complex, George
lists eight contextual variables for consideration (George 1991, pp. 69-71). These include
identifying the type of provocation, the magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests,
the adversary’s image of war, the time pressure to achieve an objective. Further
considerations include the pursuit of unilateral or coalition action and strong leadership.
George leaves this notion of “strong leadership” undefined except to point out the success

90 This sort of forceful diplomacy does not include war, which they classify differently as a full-scale use of force. This
begs questions however about the use of coercive diplomacy in a wartime setting, which should be the subject of
further study.
of President John F. Kennedy’s leadership in the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as the
success of President George H.W. Bush’s leadership in the Persian Gulf War, despite his
Administration’s failed attempt at coercive diplomacy initially (George 1991, p. 71).
George also includes assessing the adversary’s isolation in the international community,
and the coercer’s clarity in envisioning the preferred post-crisis relationship with the
adversary, as well as coalition partners.

National Security Policymaking and Executive Leadership

This study thus addresses several questions regarding the role of executive,
policymaking leadership in the case of the Clinton administration’s use of coercive
diplomacy toward North Korea in 1993-4, in the context of the first Clinton Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin’s attempted policy innovation, called the Counterproliferation
Initiative (CPI). In the Agreed Framework case, did the Administration’s policymaking
match the theoretical/conceptual requirements for a successful strategy of coercive
diplomacy? Related questions include whether U.S. leaders had a suitable conceptual
framework for understanding and applying the complexities of coercive diplomacy
approach? Did the U.S. policy leaders demonstrate a sufficient or significant amount of
what George calls conceptual, generic (theoretical), and actor specific knowledge of the
conditions that would make a favorable outcome more likely?

Based on what we now know about the negotiations outcome, back in the early
1990s it appears that U.S. executive policy leaders believed that they had a correct image
of North Korea’s concerns and motivations. Although from current events, it appears
that the U.S. leadership team was operating on flawed assumptions regarding the North
Korean’s intentions regarding nuclear technology research and development, given the
revelations of continuing a secret nuclear WMD program in violation of the Agreed Framework. In this respect the outcome represents a failure in achieving one original Counterproliferation Initiative objective of “improving counterproliferation intelligence” (Aspin 1993, in Sokolski 2001, p. 145). U.S. and North Korean post-framework implementation included conflicts regarding U.S. compliance that also contributed to raising tensions and ending the Framework. Again, the question here is: Did environmental conditions and U.S. leaders’ behavior before and during the initial Agreed Framework negotiations align with scholarly thinking? Does this case reflect an example of improved U.S.–North Korean relations, and a successful counterproliferation policy that were achieved due to effective innovations in policymaking and leadership?

**Continuity in U.S. Policy Objectives Towards North Korea: From the George H.W. Bush to the William J. Clinton Administrations**

The first post-Cold War U.S. policy objectives regarding North Korean proliferation were developed by the George H.W. Bush administration’s National Security Council. The first Bush administration decided to reverse course from the “U.S. policy of isolating Pyongyang—which had been in place for three decades following the Korean War” to a policy of “comprehensive engagement” (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, pp. 6-7). The U.S. objectives were recorded in National Security Review 28, titled: “United States Policy Toward North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program, 06 February
The overarching goal was to have North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons development programs. The ways the Administration intended to pursue this goal was to maintain a “strong deterrent against North Korean aggression, promoting North-South dialogue, and locking Pyongyang into its nuclear nonproliferation obligations while preventing its access to dangerous enrichment or reprocessing technologies” (Wit, Poneman and Gallucci 2004, p. 7). The 1991 National Security Review also reinforced the first Bush administration’s concerns with the threat of proliferation coupled with the threat of terrorism. The Review included a supporting goal of persuading “North Korea to abjure terrorism and to constrain sales related to nuclear and chemical weapons as well as ballistic missiles” (Wit, Poneman and Gallucci 2004, p. 7).

The first Bush administration National Security Review 28 is also significant for the fact that it remained the policy of the new Clinton administration. In a section titled, “Steady as She Goes,” Wit, Poneman and Gallucci address the continuity in North Korean policy between the first Bush and Clinton administrations. Clinton’s National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, in conducting an early review of the new president’s foreign policy placed North Korea “near but not at the top of the new administrations’

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91 “National Security Review” list, accessed: 10/14/2006 [http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/pdf/nscbush2.pdf]. Note that the University of Michigan library source points out that this national security council “document has not been reviewed for release or release has been denied in full.” The release of official records from the U.S. National Archives or its Presidential Libraries continues to be a matter of concern for scholars. See, for instance, the National Archives.gov Press Release “National Archives Sponsors Mandatory Declassification Review Workshop,” June 28, 2006, accessed 10/14/2006 [http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2006/nr06-104.html]. For official Administration accounts then the quasi-official accounts here come from sources such as Wit, Poneman and Gallucci’s 2004 book, Going Critical. In the Preface, the authors, who served as U.S. Agreed Framework negotiators, point out that “We then requested and were granted access to our former government files related to Korea, to form the backbone of documentary evidence required to tell the story thoroughly and accurately” (2004, p. x). They go on to write: “The research entailed an exhaustive review of decision memoranda, minutes, and summaries of conclusions from meetings of cabinet and subcabinet officials under the auspices of the National Security Council (NSC); memoranda of conversations involving U.S. officials form the president on down; contemporaneous notes scribble during the actual negotiations with the North Koreans; and diplomatic correspondence, reporting cables, and more” (2004, p. x). Until official and classified documents are released, these first-party accounts provide the most accurate accounts available for research.
busy nonproliferation agenda” (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, p. 17). In facing the organizational problems of any new administration, as well as the complexities in U.S.-North Korean relations, the “initial steps of the new Clinton administration maintained continuity with the approach of its predecessor” (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, p. 18).92 As is addressed next, the pursuit of the primary goal -- of finding ways to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programs -- shaped the Clinton administrations efforts at coercive diplomacy in the Agreed Framework case.

**The Strategic Narrative in the Agreed Framework Case**

A narrative on the course of key events, during the 1993 to 1994 timeframe, in the Agreed Framework case follows.93 As a starting point, this analysis begins with the March 1993 North Korean announcement that it intended to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (Kerr 2003, p. 2). The announcement occurred after the North Koreans had denied inspections of its nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) earlier in 1993. In response, Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, countered that the U.S. would consider economic sanctions on North Korea. This led to the further escalation of threats including a report that the Pyongyang regime would consider sanctions as a “declaration of war” (Sigal 1998, p. 121).

92 Note also that one of the *Going Critical* authors, Daniel Poneman, served in both the first Bush and Clinton administrations. “Daniel Poneman was one of the few holdovers from the Bush administration. Also a lawyer by training, Poneman had served in the Department of Energy for a year before joining the NSC staff to work on nonproliferation issues under Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control Arnold Kanter, before Kanter moved over to the State Department as under secretary” (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, p. 17).

93 The key events here are summarized from several sources. These include the Nuclear Threat Initiative's Chronologies [http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/nuc/chron/] and the Arms Control Association's "Fact Sheets: Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy" by Paul Kerr (2003) [http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron/]. Barilleaux and Kim (1999) provide an excellent summary of these events from primary source material. For detailed accounts of this period see Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci (2004), for first-hand negotiators accounts and official records, including national security council documents; Oberdorfer (2001) for a contemporary history; and Sigal (1998) on the U.S. nuclear diplomacy with North Korea.
After the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT, in May 1993 North Korea began talks with the U.S.94 These preliminary talks included a joint statement that the North would suspend its NPT withdrawal in return for security assurances. The I.A.E.A. inspectors returned to North Korea, but were not allowed full access and in November 1993 the U.S. threatened sanction and cut off all talks. In that same month President Clinton announced that positive incentives would be offered, but only if the North Koreans backed down. By January 1994, the U.S. announced that preparations for sending Patriot air defense systems to South Korea would continue, signaling the deployment as a defensive measure and transporting the missiles from Hawaii to Korea by ship to not heighten the crisis atmosphere (Sigal 1998, p. 101).

The U.S., along with the United Kingdom, France and Russia all threatened sanctions against North Korea if I.A.E.A. inspectors were not allowed back by February 21, 1994. The North responded by announcing that it would not allow inspectors to return unless the U.S. postponed annual Team Spirit military exercises. To demonstrate its willingness to negotiate the U.S. cancelled Team Spirit. The North Koreans, however, did not permit the inspectors full access and so President Clinton asked the U.N. to impose sanctions on North Korea, reinstated Team Spirit, and formally announced the Patriot deployments to reinforce South Korean missile defenses.

Responding to the building international pressure, North Korea shut down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor in April 1994 and for a second time, the U.S. postponed Team

Spirit exercises. The North proceeded to remove spent fuel rods from its reactors, without any agreement or international inspectors present, and in June the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Russia all called on the U.N. to impose sanctions.

After a high-profile visit by former President Jimmy Carter in June 1994, North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung agreed to a package deal in which the North would freeze its nuclear program in return for further talks with the U.S. Administration.95 In early July, Kim Il-Sung died and his son, Kim Jong-Il succeeded him after an interval for national mourning caused a temporary halt to negotiations. Talks resumed and on October 21, 1994 the Agreed Framework was signed in Geneva. In brief, the North was promised annual oil shipments and peaceful nuclear power technology in the form of two light water reactors to be provided by a U.S., South Korean, Japanese consortium called the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In return, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear weapons program. That same day Team Spirit was cancelled once again.

Findings and Inferences: The Conditions for Successful Coercive Diplomacy?

The chronology continues here by addressing a more specific question. How did these actions on the part of the U.S. government reinforce or detract from the previously mentioned conditions for a successful policy leadership in conducting a strategy of

95 Details of the Carter visit to North Korea, from the U.S. negotiators perspective, is in Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci (2004, pp. 200-246). According to their account, the former president’s visit strained relations with the negotiation team and members of the Clinton inner circle, especially national security adviser Anthony Lake, as well as with the U.S. regional allies. In the end, however, the authors of Going Critical write: “President Carter, despite all the difficulties his involvement created for the administration, did provide a way for the North Koreans to return to the path of compliance with global nonproliferation norms.... Given the national security benefits provided by the accord that eventually resolved the nuclear problem that fall, we conclude that the results of the Carter mission justified both the risks and the costs it entailed” (p. 246).
coercive diplomacy? First of all, the specific objective of the U.S. leadership team was clear throughout the negotiations, calling for the cessation of the nuclear program and for I.A.E.A. inspections of the North’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the U.S. policy emphasized an intolerance of future nuclear weapons development on the Korean peninsula. Second, although the Clinton administration claimed there was no saber rattling and the U.S. was committed to peaceful negotiations, the strong motivation of the U.S. is evident through repeated attempts at imposing international sanctions and a willingness to deploy air defense missiles to reinforce South Korean defenses (Clinton 1994, p. 1027). The North was also very much aware of the U.S. ultimatums and the previous Bush administration’s military actions in Iraq in the Persian Gulf War. Third, the U.S. had demonstrated its resolve to up the ante on nuclear issues, given the increasing visibility of counterproliferation programs (under the CPI). While the Pyongyang regime continued to affirm its willingness to go to war in its public statements, the intensity of its public statements lessened in the face of credible threats from the U.S.

Fourth, the U.S. created a sense of urgency with its ultimatums regarding sanctions and its plans for continuing major military exercises. In addition, have just succeeded his father, Kim Jong-Il may have felt internal, domestic pressure to conclude a negotiation that his father was expected to complete in a timely matter. Fifth, the U.S. worked intensely to gain domestic and international support for its proliferation policies. Chief negotiator, Robert Gallucci, used a domestic, legislative strategy to gain
congressional support for the Administration’s negotiating approach.\footnote{Gallucci remarks at Harvard University in 1995 in a presentation attended by the author. It should also be noted that Gallucci also notes the significant influence of individual senators, such as Senator Nunn (D-Ga), in assisting the negotiating teams’ efforts. For instance, Nunn was asked to facilitate meetings between the negotiating team and Clinton’s Chief of Staff, Mac McLarty, at a critical point in time when the State Department was unable to arrange a White House meeting (Wilt, Poneman and Gallucci 2004, p. 166). Oberdorfer also highlights the significance of concerns over congressional support writing, “Although it [the Agreed Framework] was virtually a treaty in form and substance...the accord was styled an Agreed Framework because the Clinton administration worried that it might not win approval if submitted to the Senate as a treaty” (Oberdorfer 2001, p. 356). Sigal points out the attention to the Korea issue by congressional “hawks.” For examples, Sigal cites Senator Robb (D-Va), in his tough re-election contest with Oliver North, called for a reintroduction of nuclear warheads to South Korea to bolster Robb’s defense credentials; the House Republican Policy Committee accused the Clinton administration of not paying sufficient attention to threats to U.S. forces in Korea and called for immediate Patriot missile reinforcements; and Senator McCain (R-Az), who also called for returning nuclear weapons to South Korea (Sigal . pp. 102-103).} Nations such as South Korea, Japan, and Russia as well as the United Kingdom and France, were voicing their support. Moreover, international opinion favored the direction of prevailing nonproliferation efforts.

Sixth, the North had a fear of escalation, as it stood to lose in face of economic sanctions and by all accounts was aware of certain defeat and an end of the Kim regime in the event of a conventional war. With 37,000 U.S. troops in the theater, a large South Korean Army, and the overwhelming U.S. air and sea power capabilities, there was little doubt that Northern conventional aggression versus the south would be suicidal.

Seventh, there was clarity regarding the terms that would end the crisis on favorable terms. The U.S. had repeatedly stated for North Korean and worldwide audiences that it was willing to provide positive incentives in the form of peaceful nuclear technology through KEDO. All parties knew that in return for the immediate freeze and eventual destruction of the North Korean nuclear weapons program the KEDO international consortium would replace the old graphite reactor with a light water reactor and in the interim would provide annual oil shipments for lost energy resources.
Findings and Inferences: The Context for Successful Coercive Diplomacy?

Are George’s contextual variables, those affecting the conduct of coercive diplomacy, also apparent in reviewing key events in this case? Overriding to the contextual issues was the fact that the North was clearly in the process of developing nuclear weapons and missile technologies, but had not yet developed the capability for enriching uranium or building nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{97} A fait accompli of producing bombs would be more difficult to reverse than altering the status quo of research and development. The North’s rejection of the NPT and continuation of nuclear and missile development was rocking the boat. The magnitude of the conflict of U.S. and North Korean interests was substantial, but not non-negotiable. The U.S. viewed nuclear weapons proliferation as a serious threat to U.S. and Asian security, but North Korea appeared to offer their program for a negotiated deal. The North’s image of war was based on the horrors of the Korean War and kept alive by the regime’s propaganda. The U.S. homeland was for the time being out of North Korea’s striking distance. War for the North and South as well would mean large scale bombings, invasions, and ultimately regime collapse for the North.

\textsuperscript{97}At the end of the Clinton era, the unclassified intelligence estimates suggested the existence of one or two North Korean nuclear bombs, although many questions remain about the size and weaponization of North Korea’s nuclear technology. The Federation of American Scientists report that: “Prior to the establishment of the Agreed Framework, intelligence sources believed that North Korea could have extracted plutonium from their reactors for use in nuclear weapons; perhaps enough for one or two nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it has remained unclear whether North Korea had actually produced nuclear weapons due to difficulties in developing detonation devices.” Assessed 30 September 2006 [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html]. The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control reports that as of “April 2004: U.S. intelligence prepares to revise its estimate of the number of nuclear weapons possessed by North Korea from "possibly two" to at least eight.” Accessed 30 September 2006 [http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/nkorea/nukemstones04.html].
The U.S. decision to engage in coercive diplomacy and use ultimatums was influenced by the urgency the U.S. placed on resolving the issue within a reasonable time frame and prior to the North’s development of weapons grade nuclear materials, bombs and missiles. In 1994 then, the U.S. was highly concerned about the continued development of nuclear weapons over time and U.S. negotiators were motivated to use significant pressures to achieve U.S. objectives in a relatively short time frame.

Given a larger number of players involved, coalitions engaged in coercive diplomacy make the game more complex. However, in 1994 the unity and sense of purpose of the U.S.’s regional and global partners were strongly against a nuclearized Korean peninsula. In this case, the Clinton administrations and their negotiating team showed strong resolve and effective handling of the complex issues, including balancing the North Korean demands, regional concerns, and American congressional and domestic opinion. In this sense, in George’s framework: “The choice, implementation, and outcome of coercive diplomacy may depend on the presence of strong and effective top-level political leadership” (George 1991, p. 71).

Alternatively, a coercive diplomacy strategy would have been more difficult if significant forces would have supported the North Korean adversary. By 1994 the North had been isolated effectively from all states, except China. The Chinese support was by

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98 George focuses predominantly on the importance of presidential leadership. As examples of policy successes he highlights President John F. Kennedy’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis and President George H.W. Bush’s role in the first Persian Gulf War (George 1991, p. 71). Secretary of Defense Perry’s firsthand account of the 1994 North Korean crisis emphasizes the role of several key members of the Clinton administration’s top team, including his own efforts along with President Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and chief negotiator, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, as well as senior military officers, such as Generals Shalikashvili and Luck (Carter and Perry 1999, pp.123-142).
no means unconditional and official statements from Beijing did not favor the idea of new nuclear neighbors on its borders.

To continue the contextual analysis, the type of post-conflict relationship the coercer desires with its adversary affects the objective of and means used. Again, in 1994 the U.S. clearly voiced a desire for improved relation with North Korea as well as sensitivity to the South Korean Sunshine Policy and desires for forms of reunification. In turn, the U.S. softened its approach to the North and engaged in a series of less aggressive actions, including postponing major military exercises, and conferring extensively with both South Korea and Japan. Even the augmentation of air defense forces was accomplished by deploying the Patriot batteries by slower, sea transportation so as to temper the crisis atmosphere. The use of implicit rather than overt military as well as economic threats looked forward to resolving the impasse diplomatically and even suggested the possibility of future normalization of U.S. and North Korean relations.

An Effective Pattern of Counterproliferation Policy Innovation and Public Leadership?

The pattern of events and the analysis of contextual factors align with successful coercive diplomacy as presented by George. Three aspects of U.S. policy leadership in this comparative analysis of theory and practice in the Agreed Framework case are most significant for addressing this study’s main research question. The asymmetry of motivation favored the U.S. U.S. negotiators and top policymakers showed their resolve to pressure the North and present a united front of Northeast Asian coalition partners to force a North Korean agreement. The U.S. created a sense of urgency for North Korea’s
compliance with continual calls for economic sanctions on the destitute Pyongyang regime, with continued military exercises, and increased military reinforcements. Lastly, the threat was credible as seen by the U.S. dramatic success in the recent Persian Gulf War.

In broad terms, the U.S. position relative to the North was overwhelming. The U.S. vast economic resources, military force presence and projection capabilities, and international diplomatic support clearly favored the Clinton administration. There was solidarity in the unified positions of the President and Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as in Congress. In addition, the coercive coupling of negative incentives followed by positive inducements contributed to what was hailed at the time as a successful negotiation and significant exercise in counter proliferation. Art and Cronin write that “Positive inducements are likely to be most effective after coercion has already begun to change the target’s calculus of cost and benefit. This means that positive inducement should not, in general be offered before threats or limited use of force” (Art and Cronin 2003, p. 388). In the Agreed Framework case, the U.S. negotiations raised threats of high prospective costs to the North Koreans prior to offering positive inducement.

What then are the key findings from this analysis, given the assessment of relative success, based on theoretical concepts from the coercive diplomacy literature? Though the coercive diplomacy strategy concluded in successful 1994 negotiations, the post-conflict phase was disrupted by faulty implementation by both sides and included additional crises in 1998, with a North Korean experimental missile firing over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean, reportedly landing near Alaska (Barilleaux and Kim 1999, p. 10). In sum, there was little forward momentum towards increasing the engagement with the
North or completing previous successes under the Sunshine Policy. The International Atomic Agency did not expand the scope of their inspections to preclude additional nuclear developments. The U.S. and the other Northeast Asia actors did not seek to improve the overall effectiveness of a regional counterproliferation regime, neglecting the potential for further innovations in regional institutional or arms control regime-building. The U.S.’s oversight of KEDO efforts was spotty. In essence, KEDO’s efforts at constructing the light water reactors was seen as slow, and clearly seen as a sign of a lack of U.S. resolve to live up to its end of the bargain. On the North Korean side, the CIA’s discovery of a secret weapons program and the North’s withdrawal from the Agreed Framework only served to heighten tensions and convince opponents of the flawed Clinton administration efforts. In some estimates there is a view that clever North Korean negotiations were confused with reality and doubts were raised regarding the Kim regime’s original intentions. In other words, the U.S. desire for a peaceful solution was confused with the reality of North Korean and Kim Jong-Il’s deep-seated insecurity. That is, the U.S. focused on important nuclear weapons and technology issues and security interests, while Kim’s North Korean regime was focused on vital security and survival interests.

Trust and perception issues are also significant in this case. Now knowing the actual outcomes and North Korean behavior we see that the U.S. trusted the North Koreans far more than was warranted. Martin’s study of the negotiations questions whether the U.S. should have offered any positive inducement at all (Martin 2002).

Finally, there are findings regarding long-term policy and leadership issues. For instance, 

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99 The cultural obstacles to building an Asian NATO are highlighted in Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002).
were the Administration’s efforts focused exclusively on forcing a successful negotiation without regard to long term implementation and organizational issues? Was the outcome hampered by electoral issues, a dysfunctional State and Defense Department with respect to CPI implementation? Were there too many issues on the U.S. agenda, including the Balkans and Iraq crises, international economic issues, and domestic politics? Answering these questions requires studying the entire 1992-2000 period of Clinton era counterproliferation efforts.

The Agreed Framework case illustrates the nature of the complexities in international security. The intellectual equivalent of winning the battle yet losing the war is one analogy that comes to mind. The seeming success of the negotiations has been overcome by the recent events and the need for six-party talks. A key finding then of this analysis suggests that the Clinton administration’s approach toward North Korea was a short-term success. George’s contribution of specific conditional and contextual variables is valuable for suggesting effective policy planning in the foreign policy arena. George’s framework provides core concepts, such as the asymmetry of motivation, a sense of urgency, and the credibility of threats. In particular, the idea of getting inside the adversary’s decisionmaking process by envisioning their perceptions of costs and benefits is of prime importance in the practical application of coercive diplomacy to alter perceptions, change behavior, and prevent war. Kissinger calls managing your adversary’s calculations as a principal task of strategic leadership and diplomacy.100

100 Kissinger writes: “One of the principal tasks of statesmanship is to understand which subjects are truly related and can be used to reinforce each other. For the most part, the policymaker has little choice in the matter; ultimately, it is reality, not policy that links events. The statesman’s role is to recognize the relationship when it does exist—in other words, to create a network of incentives and penalties to produce the most favorable outcome” (1994, p. 717).
Though George’s coercive diplomacy framework is useful in determining the success of an individual case-in-time such as this 1994 case, it is limited and not a complete “how to” in reaching an effective counterproliferation policy. Though the events of 1994 ended with the Agreed Framework, the roots of the breakdown of that agreement (that became null in late 2002) are not addressed by the generic knowledge base outlined by George. First, reliability and trust issues were important in the unraveling of the accomplishments of 1994. The U.S. had little reason to take North Korea’s word. Second, the coerer’s perception of the true intentions of the adversary in this case ultimately was proved to be flawed. George included the variable of magnitude and depth of the conflicts of interest, but there remains the question of how this conceptual element addresses the situation in which the coerer’s perception of that rift is radically different from the adversary’s perception. In this case, there is are the crucial distinctions between U.S.’s perceptions of important interests (i.e., “The North Koreans want an energy resource for creating nuclear WMD”); while North Korea may have calculated based on vital, survival interests (“They want to weaken and destroy the Kim Regime”). Third, the variable of strong executive leadership is mentioned by George, but is not fleshed out in detail. The importance of strong, continual leadership on an issue can be seen in the failed implementation phase of the Agreed Framework. The Clinton Administration and Kim Jong-Il regime may have focused intense energy toward reaching a successful negotiation, but the fact that both states dragged their feet over implementing KEDO projects and other confidence building measures could only have buttressed suspicions or expectations of unreliability and a lack of trust – and demonstrates a lack of executive leadership.
Acknowledging both the usefulness and limitations of George’s coercive diplomacy conception in this case helps identify further research needs in this area. Clearly, as seen in this case, George’s third type of knowledge—actor-specific—is of prime importance. Even with its limitations, the generic knowledge base for coercive diplomacy in single instances is fairly adequate, but faulty perceptions in both coercer and adversary eventually become highly important on down the line. How much about an opponent’s intentions and perceptions does one need to know in order to assess the effectiveness of a given strategy such as coercive diplomacy? Therefore, even if the conceptual and generic knowledge of this strategy may be explained in depth, specific knowledge of one’s adversary is essential in its execution. In addition to more specific knowledge on North Korean intentions, more extensive information on the conduct of the negotiations could prove useful in discerning how the agreement fell apart later on.\(^\text{101}\)

The assessment of coercive diplomacy theory in the case of the Agreed Framework provides more than a ray of hope that the theory-practice gap may not be as wide as some writers assert. Other studies also illustrate the utility of other main theoretical approaches in what Lepgold and Nincic (2001) call the scholarly international relations literature. In *Beyond the Ivory Tower*, they address the theoretical foundations and policy implications of both inter-democratic peace, and international institutions and

\(^{101}\text{In addition, there are research needs for more study of political psychology as well as history in this case to understand the more subtle factors at play in high level negotiations. Issues relating to executive leadership could also be further investigated: in addition to pressures to come to a successful conclusion to talks, did electoral or domestic issues come into play for each? Could those pressures have hampered the development of a fuller agreement that could have included more extensive agreements on implementation schedules? In addition to election cycles and regime maintenance, could both Clinton and Kim have had too much on their plates at the time (i.e., the Balkans and the North Korean economy and recent transfer of power, respectively)? The answers to questions like these would certainly open up a fuller understanding of the success as well as seeds of failure in the Clinton administration’s 1994 approach. See, for instance, the research of Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and Hermann (2001).}
international cooperation. This scholarly international relations literature suggests a significant range of ideas to improve policy making. For those scholars who take the time to provide ideas for the policy communities in practitioner’s terms, and informed policymakers who have the time to read and reflect prior to policy and decisionmaking, there appear to be many ways to span the theory practice gap.

Advancing the Counterproliferation Research Agenda in Policy Innovation and Public Leadership in U.S. - Northeast Asia Relations

Let’s return to the Agreed Framework case from a policy leaders or practitioner’s standpoint. The pressing questions of the moment have to do with the perceived failures involved in U.S.–North Korean relations and difficulties in the episodic six-party talks. That is, the failure of the Agreed Framework negotiations to bring about an outcome over time that provides a minimal sense of security and stability to a complex set of bilateral and regional relationships. In addition, there are continuing concerns over the obstacles in moving on going six-party talks at a rate that achieves success in terms of the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and long range missile programs prior to their weaponization. In addition, can current U.S. policymakers overcome domestic stakeholders in opposition to any new agreements given the demonstrated lack of trust and verification controls experienced in implement the Agreed Framework? A variety of policy options have been suggested within the wider academic and national security communities.

Options for the Future: Strategic Direction and Visionary-Rhetorical Leadership?

One option would be to in effect do the polar opposite of the Clinton negotiating approach. That is to “isolate, contain, and await the collapse of the North Korean
regime” (Carter 2003, p. 1) A hard line realist option can be argued along several lines. First, given the demonstrated untrustworthiness of the North Korean regime, coupled with the current Bush administration’s “axis of evil” rhetoric, then it is not possible to negotiate successfully. An apparent lesson learned from the Agreed Framework experience is that you cannot bargain with the North Koreans and only regime change will do. Also, the obstacles to stringent verification procedures in the closed North Korean society would require extraordinary efforts on the part of the U.S., the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency, or some other multilateral implementation organization. The time to develop a new non-proliferation regime with standards and verifiable implementation procedures would not beat the North Korean nuclear research and development clock. So, in facing the probability of a nuclear North Korea, this option would stress returning to containment and the problems of deterrence and defense. For the near term, this suggested policy option would build on the U.S.’s early Cold War approach to containing the Soviet Union, along with an even more rigorous set of policies to prevent trade in nuclear technology and weapons.

**Options for the Future: Transactional Leadership Approaches?**

Another option presented is to think smarter and more broadly. That is, to design a new grand strategy for dealing with northeast Asian security (Cha and Yang 2003). A grand strategy approach would stress geopolitics and the traditions of great power diplomacy. The U.S. would use all of its diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments to pursue its national and regional interests. In an historic sense, the

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102 Ashton Carter was not recommending this option for policymakers and offered it as but one of several courses of action. His recommendation was for an incremental, diplomatic approach of direct U.S.-North Korea talks.
U.S. would pursue a new Asian great game to leverage carrots and sticks to the U.S. advantage. This option would subsume a series of bilateral engagements with large and small Asian states. Along the lines of the often criticized Clinton era national security policy goal of “shaping the international environment,” the U.S. would pursue bilateral relations and an informal coalition of willing partners to balance China’s growing power, maintain Japan and South Korea as allies, and diplomatically maneuver North Korea into a position of taking offers they cannot refuse. A sophisticated, multidimensional, grand strategic approach would be an important experiment, but some would argue, goes against the grain of U.S. diplomatic traditions.

**Options for the Future: Participative Leadership Approaches?**

A third option is a more direct bilateral engagement with North Korea while maintaining a coalition of the interested if not willing regional actors. This option is more evolutionary in the sense of correcting the problems of the Agreed Framework, but build on it in a series of incremental steps (Gallucci, in Eberstadt and Ellings 2001). This option would include placing a U.S. face on the interactions, coupled with behind the scenes efforts to gain the direct advice and consent of South Korea and Japan and the indirect tacit acceptance of China and Russia. Those, such as Ashton Carter, who favor direct U.S.-North Korea talks, have suggested the importance of a prominent, direct U.S. leadership role. Bilateral negotiations also appear to be what the North Koreans prefer. In the end, the U.S. would call the shots, but have to negotiate further with coalition partners to “burden-share” and pay the economic, political and military costs for underwriting the necessary incentives.
The Next Case Study: Policy Innovation, Public Leadership, and New Institutionalism

A fourth option is to leverage on going issues and concerns, the six-party talks, the episodic crisis atmosphere -- and build an institutional approach. Lepgold and Nincic (2002) address the theory and history of international institutionalism. The theoretical knowledge and practical experiences they recount suggests a roadmap for proceeding with institutional development. In brief, they propose a pattern of success based on international relations functionalist theories, as well as the recent history of the EU and NATO. Hemmer and Katzenstein (2001) also compare differences in U.S. Cold War approaches to successful regional arrangements in Europe and the lack of similar approaches in Asia. The option here is to nurture a small group of like-minded states and statesmen, focused around specific functional areas (perhaps energy, trade, counterterrorism and/or counterproliferation) and build effective rules, organizations and enforcement mechanisms.

Despite the difficulty of forecasting the future, determining the correct option or mix of options in the Korean case is critical for the conduct of U.S. counterproliferation policy. This one episode itself is not sufficient for developing a depth of knowledge for recommending policy, which is one purpose for bridging the theory-practice gap in public affairs. In addition, the practical utility of applying coercive diplomacy theory “successfully” may have been necessary for mitigating the North Korean crisis in 1994, but was not sufficient for effective long-term policymaking. Additional case studies from the Clinton era are important for assessing the role of executive leadership in innovative national security policymaking. Other counterproliferation efforts in Russia and former
Soviet Republics (Nunn-Lugar programs), and in Iraq under Saddam, provide additional insights. The 1994 North Korean case study illustrates the highest levels of top-down policy leadership, as examined through a theoretically informed analysis of national security policy making. The following cases provide important contributions for scholars and practitioners’ understanding of the effectiveness in the leadership patterns in Clinton era Counterproliferation Initiative policymaking. The next Chapter focuses on the counterproliferation policy innovations and public leadership in the case of the U.S. and Russia and the former Soviet Republics. Chapter 5 also expands on the ideas of “new institutionalism” to further examine the relationship of policy innovation and public leadership in counterproliferation policy making.
Bibliography


[In 1991] President George H.W. Bush undertook what was later called the “unilateral-reciprocal” initiative, announcing that the United States would unilaterally remove all tactical nuclear weapons from its operational forces and challenging the Soviet Union to do likewise…. In the next twelve months, more than 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons were removed from the fourteen newly independent states that had formerly been part of the Soviet Union and returned to storage facilities in central Russia. To facilitate this process, Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, without hearings of legislative action by any committee of the Senate, managed to attach to the Defense Authorization Bill a special rider authorizing $400 million of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for securing Soviet (soon Russian) nuclear warheads. The Nunn-Lugar program continues to this day, and has been a major factor causing both governments to focus on the danger of loose nukes and facilitating actions to address the threat.

Graham Allison (2004, p. 144)

As examined in the previous case study on North Korea, bilateralists may point to the earlier success of the Agreed Framework (Perry 1999, p. 123). Critics of the Agreed Framework can point to the breakdown of the Framework in 2000. The Clinton memoir cites the success of the Framework as well as his failed attempts to continue diplomacy with North Korea to reduce tensions and pave the way for additional arms controls negotiations regarding long-range missiles (Clinton 2004). Certainly, the stalling of the six-party talks in 2006 provides some pause for reflecting on alternatives for continuing along the current path. The alternative path in this Chapter is suggested by using institutional theory as a guide for studying counterproliferation policy challenges.

103 Then Secretary of Defense William Perry called the North Korean crisis the most serious in the first Clinton administration. Again, his first hand perspective is that the real potential for war was prevented because of the Agreed Framework negotiation (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 123-124).
In addition to an institutional theoretical perspective, there is a practical example of a perceived counterproliferation success for comparison purposes.

One widely recognized counterproliferation success is from the Clinton era is the experience of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs with Russia and the former Soviet republics. Reviews of Nunn-Lugar programs note that after a decade their projects have “gained the kind of political, bureaucratic, and budgetary support that has all but institutionalized them” (Sokolski and Riisager 2002, p. 2). In this view, the question is how to enhance these programs to gain additional benefits beyond the early projects for consolidating and controlling Soviet nuclear weapons in Russian territory. Graham Allison and other proliferation experts call for extending the Nunn-Lugar approach to eliminate nuclear weapons, control fissile materials and production facilities, deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons and technology, etc. (Allison 2004, p. 166).

This chapter examines the policy development and implementation of the Clinton era Nunn-Lugar programs to provide insights into this positive example of success in counterproliferation policy. The institutionalist theory provides scholarly insights for analyzing the Nunn-Lugar framework for further developing the potential for linking international relations theory with the practical lessons to be learned from a successful case of counterproliferation policy. Another insight to be gained is contrasting

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104 A 2004 Carnegie Endowment study reports: ‘The “Nunn-Lugar” or cooperative threat reduction programs to dismantle and secure WMD in Russia and the former Soviet Union have been remarkably cost-effective investments in U.S. security’ (Perkovich et al. 2004, p. 54).

105 The institutionalist approach also provides a framework for thinking about a regional security regime that goes beyond the current six-party framework in Northeast Asia.
competitive strategies, such as addressed in coercive diplomacy theory in the previous chapter on the Agreed Framework, versus a cooperative strategic approach, as suggested in institutionalist theory.

One option for counterproliferation policymaking is to leverage ongoing issues and concerns, for instance in the six-party talks and the episodic crisis atmosphere in Korea, while building an institutional approach. Lepgold and Nincic (2002) address the theory and history of international institutionalism; the theoretical knowledge and practical experiences they recount suggest a roadmap for proceeding with institutional development. In brief, they propose a pattern of success based on international relations functionalist theories, as well as the recent history of the European Union and NATO. The option here is to nurture a small group of like-minded states and statesmen focused around one specific functional area (counterproliferation) and build effective rules, organizations and enforcement mechanisms.

**International Institutionalism as a Cooperative Strategy for Change**

As discussed in the previous chapter, in the North Korean case of the Agreed Framework negotiations, the Clinton administration engaged in a traditional, diplomatic approach, stressing principles and techniques similar to those drawn from the scholarly international relations theories of coercive diplomacy. The North Korean Agreed Framework case is representative of top-down policy leadership. President Clinton,

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107 Hemmer and Katzenstein (2001) also compare differences in U.S. Cold War approaches to successful regional arrangements in Europe and the lack of similar approaches in Asia. Their paper is significant for its emphasis on the impact of cultural and historical differences in contrasting favoring multilateral approaches for the U.S. in Europe, and bilateral approaches for the U.S. in Asia.
Secretary of Defense Perry, Secretary of State Christopher, and other high level executive branch stakeholders were engaged in developing the Administration’s policy and overseeing the bilateral U.S. – North Korean negotiations. Other U.S. officials and allied governments were consulted, including the U.S. Congress and the governments of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan. The implementation of the Agreed Framework included the significant involvement of the United Nation’s International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) as well as active monitoring by the U.S. government, especially the intelligence agencies.

This second case study of Nunn-Lugar programs to examine alternative approaches is significant for gaining insights into the conditions for developing effective national security counterproliferation policies. As argued previously, given the history of the past decade, the Agreed Framework case suggests a failed counterproliferation effort. Given the lack of institutional and organizational roots, the Agreed Framework failed to achieve lasting effects in accordance with the U.S. objective of ending the North’s nuclear weapons program. In comparison then, why is the Nunn-Lugar policy outcome generally agreed to be more successful than the Agreed Framework experience? To gain these insights it is significant to study the leadership influence relationships from the middle as well as from the top-down – or by examining the Defense Department organizational processes at work in the Nunn-Lugar case.108

A more successful case--one led more directly by the Secretary of Defense, along with DOD staff and influenced by other organizational stakeholders, including an

108 For a comprehensive literature review of organizational processes, see Allison and Zelikow (1999), Chapter 3: Model II: Organizational Behavior.
engaged Congress and regional players--suggests additional insights into the components
of effective leadership in counterproliferation policymaking. What insights does the
Nunn-Lugar case provide in terms of an instance where executive and organizational
leadership (leadership from the top and middle) contributed to successful and lasting
policy innovation? What were the roles of the Defense Secretary and the DOD
bureaucracy, as well as the roles of the key senators?

To gain theoretical insights to guide this case study, this chapter introduces
concepts drawn from the literature on international institutions. First, the narrative
describes briefly the American outlook on international security institutions in the past
century. Next, the Chapter reviews the major ideas and views in institutional theory.
Then, the Chapter discusses known conditions for success or failures in institution
building. Lastly, these ideas and conditions guide an examination of U.S. policy as
developed by the Secretary of Defense and other involved in the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Programs to prevent WMD proliferation in the Former Soviet Republics.

The twentieth-century history of the U.S. posture toward international institutions
includes three cycles of engagement followed by withdrawal (Schlesinger 2003, Ruggie
1993, Doyle 1997). In the early twentieth-century, the United States became heavily
engaged with Europe through its participation in World War I. Following the Great War,
President Wilson sought to construct a new world order sustained by an institutional
regime of collective security through the formation of the League of Nations
organization. To Wilson’s chagrin, the U.S. government later withdrew its support for
this significant attempt at forming formal international institutions to maintain
international security and peace. Thus began a period of withdrawal from such
international organizations throughout of the interwar period between World Wars I and II.

The next cycle began abruptly as America entered World War II. Breaking a traditional of no entangling alliances dating from George Washington’s presidency, the United States became directly involved in a military alliance with Great Britain, and then other nations, including the Soviet Union. At the end of this war, guided first by President Franklin Roosevelt and then Harry Truman, the U.S. used its superpower status and international diplomacy to create the conditions for establishing the United Nations (Schlesinger 2003). During most of the Cold War period, U.S. involvement with other Western European nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also a profound push toward multilateral institution and organization building.

There was a conservative backlash against international institutions that came about with the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 (Kirkpatrick 1997). This conservative bias against international organizations, and especially the United Nations was echoed in the United Kingdom with the election of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union during the George H.W. Bush (hereafter, George Bush) presidency, international institutions came to be viewed more favorably once again. In 1991, George Bush called for a renewed international order under U.N. guidance after a successful international coalition contributed to the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces in the Gulf War (Bush and Scowcroft 1998). President Clinton continued this wave of engagement, promoting a policy of assertive multilateralism, especially pronounced in the coalition diplomacy and difficulties with
The cycle again showed signs of again reversing away from international institutions as the second-term Clinton administration concerns grew regarding U.S. strength being overextended, especially after experiencing difficulties in international peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans. During the 2000 presidential election, American engagement and intervention abroad through international institutions came under intense criticism in George W. Bush’s campaign. With the second Bush’s election, there was evidence of a neoconservative backlash against international institutions (Frum and Perle 2003). Soon after the election, the United States pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Russians. Antipathy toward international institutions could be observed even more clearly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For instance, in a 2002 U.N. speech, George W. Bush clearly signaled his intention for the U.S. to go it alone if the U.N. did not act against Saddam Hussein. He said: “We will work with the U.N. Security Council … But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced – the just demands of peace and security will be met – or action will be unavoidable” (George W. Bush 2002).

The watershed moment for the new posture was highlighted in America’s war in Iraq starting in 2002, which the U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, viewed as illegal in terms of international law. In response to a BBC journalist’s pointed questions about the U.S. war in Iraq, Annan replied: “Yes, I have indicated it is not in conformity with the U.N. Charter, from our point of view and from the Charter point of view it was illegal”
(Annan 2004). The second Bush administration had certainly not reduced involvement abroad as promised in the 2000 presidential campaign, and its apparent lack of patience for the diplomacy necessary for gaining U.N. approval for war (as authorized by the U.N. Charter’s Chapter VII) is cited as a cause for the rush to war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Given the prominence of the U.N. and NATO since World War II as well as the differing views of various U.S. Administrations on the efficacy of international institutions and multilateral organizations, insights on international institutions are important to guide an understanding of the conditions for promoting effective policymaking. For instance, the literature on international institutions addresses the notion of these shifting world views in U.S. foreign and national security policies. Legro explores “why states fundamentally change their long-held ideas toward international affairs” and identifies two stages in such an ideational shift (Legro 2000, p. 254). The “reigning consensus” must collapse, and then follows the consolidation of a new dominant and viable idea (Legro 2000, pp. 263, 265-266). If there is a new shift toward reengagement on the horizon, it remains to be learned what conditions tend to precipitate the collapse of one Administration’s views and on the other hand what conditions lead to the emergence of a new strategic approach. Despite periodic American anxiety over institutional attachments, the threats of nuclear weapons and technology proliferation and terrorism require policymakers address these issues. The recent history of U.S.-North Korean relations suggests that the lack of supporting institutional structures account in part for the breakdown in the Agreed Framework. Were there supporting institutional structures that account for the relative success of Nunn-Lugar programs?
International Institutions Theory: Incremental or Transformational Change?

This Chapter next reviews the major contending scholars’ ideas regarding international institutions in order to inform an understanding of U.S. policy regarding existing and emerging international institutions. The literature on international institutions frames an examination of the origins and purposes of institutions in several ways. In the realist world view, the pursuit of power forms the basis of any institutions that may arise (Mearsheimer 2001). Institutions are, in essence, a formalization of the distribution of power in the international system (Ikenberry 2001, p. 11). In the realist or power politics framework, states define their interests competitively and institutions are weak in comparison with states (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, pp. 148-149). Neorealism, as formulated by Waltz, emphasizes the importance of the balance of power among an anarchical world of states (Waltz 1959, Art and Waltz 1999). Neorealism regards institutions as part of an international order, that is, the “unintended outcome of balancing pressures or a reflection of learned and formalized rules of equilibrium and balance” (Ikenberry 2001, p. 11). One strain of neorealism stresses the important role that a hegemonic power plays in institution formation: preponderant power may allow the hegemon to offer incentives to weaker states that cooperate in the building of a particular order.

In contrast to realism, a liberal-internationalist approach proposes that a natural harmony of interests facilitates institution building (Doyle 1997). According to the liberal worldview, overlapping values and goals are the originators of international norms, regimes, and organizations. Neoliberalism argues that institutions act “as agreements or contracts between actors that function to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and
solve collective action problems” (Keohane 2002; Ikenberry 2001, p. 15). Increased efficiency is at the core of neoliberalism: by eliminating the need to attend multiple bilateral forums for every single issue, the transaction costs of doing international political business are lowered. Keohane first formulated this view, which stresses the importance of information flows, enforcement, and monitoring. A key concern of neoliberalism is that “institutions provide information to states and reduce the incentives for cheating” (Ikenberry 2001, p. 16).

Following the liberal traditions is a concept known as functionalism, which elevates individual issues as the primary source of institutions. A functionalist argues that the most effective institutions are those that serve practical functions as opposed to “grand political objectives” (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, p. 144). According to functionalist international relations scholars, an institution arises to address a specific concern through a “spontaneous, bottom-up process” (p. 144).109

Apart from both the realist and liberal traditions stands the more sociologically-based concept called constructivism. According to Ikenberry, institutions are “diffuse and socially constructed worldviews that bound and shape the strategic behavior of individuals and states,” which serve as “cognitive maps” for state actors (Ikenberry 2001, p. 15). Constructivism does not assume that the interests of actors are fixed, but asserts that social structures shape preferences (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, p. 150). Institutions

109 Lepgold and Nincic are bullish on the utility of international institutions, writing: “In principle, well-designed international institutions provide a way to develop and implement common policies to deal with collective problems, and it is hard to find an international issue that has not become increasingly institutionalized in recent decades.” Furthermore, for breaching the international relations theory-practice gap, they emphasize that “the theoretical and empirical literature on international institutions should carry important practical implications” (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, p. 139). They go on to urge continued scholarship: “If scholarly work on international institutions can shed light on these issues [globalization and the backlash] by illuminating the opportunities, constraints, and consequences of multilateral actions, it should help officials shape external pursuits though multilateral means” (p. 139).
define the group identity of a set of states by embodying and propagating shared norms (p. 151).

Given these major approaches to institutional theory, what do we know about what makes a successful institution? What factors should be taken into account? Ikenberry addresses the initial context for institutions in writing that “Stable political orders tend to be those that have low returns to power and high returns to institutions” (Ikenberry 2001, p. 266). Orders that have low returns to power feature “systematic institutional limits” on what participants can do with their individual power (p. 266). High returns to institutions result in working organizations, which become hard to replace (p. 268). According to Ikenberry then, “The more complex, adaptable, and autonomous” an institution is, the more it can lower the returns to power (p. 269).

Ruggie also addresses the initial conditions for institutional formation and survival, writing that “A permissive domestic environment” in the leading world state or states is very important for setting the scene for a successful institution (Ruggie 1993, p. 8). For example, Ruggie claims that American hegemony was more important than the mere existence of an international hegemon to the flourishing of recent multilateral institutions (p. 8). Thus, a leading state that looks on multilateral institutions in a very unfavorable manner may sow the seeds of destruction, or at least of weakening, for certain institutions that for whatever reasons are perceived as not serving the hegemon’s state interests. In Zegart’s institutional analysis of the overriding importance of initial

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110 Ikenberry refers to an institutions’ “stickiness,” a term which he does not define. The wording implies those institutions that last, such as the United Nations, NATO, the WTO, etc. as opposed to those develop in concept, but do not survive the initial founding conditions, such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which ceased to function during the U.S. disengagement from the War in Vietnam.
conditions for institution building, she emphasizes the critical influence of founding moments in the creation of both successful and unsuccessful security agencies (Zegart 1999).

Related to neoliberalism’s emphasis on effective enforcement and monitoring Lepgold and Nincic emphasize four key dimensions to take into account when crafting an institution. First, the manner in which information is pooled inside the institution is important. Good pooling of information can mitigate cooperation problems. Second, to what extent are rules crafted so as to be easily enforced? Regulations that come with incentives to comply are easier to enforce. Third, the number of members in an institution is important. The smaller the group’s membership, the easier it is to resolve difficulties. Fourth, the precision of rules and monitoring procedures are significant. Are rules mildly, modestly, or heavily elaborate or detailed? In general of course, more elaborate rules are more difficult to enforce.

In addition to these dimensions, several other issues raised by neoliberal thought may affect the success of institutions, according to Lepgold and Nincic. How many issues does the institution intend to address? The degree of bundling together of different issues is important. This question is highly relevant to the functionalist approach, which view institutions as essentially issue-based forums. Additionally, the way that issues are organized internationally figures into the calculus. How an issue is treated, and by whom, is important to how other actors respond. Lastly, the choice of partners figures prominently. How like-minded is the membership of an institution? Is it generally true

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111 Ideas in this paragraph on these four key dimensions are summarized from Lepgold and Nincic (2001, pp. 154-159).
that members must share the necessary values to accomplish a particular end with efficiency?

A summary of several key points guides the remainder of this Chapter. Observations include both macro and micro perspectives on the areas guiding an analysis of the Nunn-Lugar case. From the macro-political level the notion of a world view, and especially a hegemon’s world view, is significant. This builds on Legro’s idea regarding changes resulting from the collapse of a reigning consensus and the emergence of a new dominant and viable idea in world politics. Scholars’ interpretations of worldviews revolve around the four dominant perspectives discussed above: realism, liberalism, functionalism, and constructivism. Each proposes alternatives for policymaking as well as assumptions regarding the relevance of institutions as instruments of statecraft. The state leaders’ worldviews, especially for presidents and secretaries of defense, has important policy implications. For realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer, the state is the focus of attention and its pursuit of self-interest in an anarchic world is of supreme importance. In Ikenberry’s characterization of neo-realism, however, balance of power matters as much as self-interest as a moderator of state power. In a neo-realist administration for instance, institutions may serve the states interests to the extent that the arrangements reflect learned and formal rules of equilibrium and balance – that reinforce stability and order, and, therefore, the position of dominant nation-states, or great powers.

Liberalism stresses a harmony of interests among nations in an international community. For liberals, institution building is a natural sign of progress. For neoliberals there are more specific considerations than notions of community for its own sake. The neoliberals look for agreements and contracts to underpin international
relations. Agreements include formal ways to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and serve to solve problems of collective actions. In this regard the neoliberal, the functionalist, as well as the realist approaches align in terms of a harmony of interests in solving problems through collective action that ultimately serves state’s purposes or self interests. Thus, Keohane (2002, p. 3) argues forcefully that international institutions perform state tasks vital for enabling cooperation. In fact, Keohane disdains liberal or neoliberal labels for his theorizing and instead considers himself a staunch institutionalist.

Constructivism is another approach with more emphasis on creating and developing shared values in world politics. Katzenstein and Ikenberry characterize institutions as a product of diffuse and socially constructed world views. Again there is some overlap with realists in the sense of effective institutions providing high returns to power, or as Katzenstein characterizes it, containing a lasting quality that makes them hard to replace because they further both state values and interests.

Multilateralist Ruggie and neoinstitutionalist Zegart provide further insights regarding the importance of initial or founding conditions as most significant for determining institutional effectiveness. These initial conditions normally reflect the domestic environment of the leading state, or hegemon. Examples would include the importance of the U.S. in the founding of the United Nations post World War II (Schlesinger 2003). Other neoliberal thoughts linked to functional approaches include the idea of bundling together issues and the number of partners involved. Ruggie and other authors, especially in the functionalist school, argue that fewer partners, chosen
because they share values (as in the European Union) and focused issues that serve common interests (as in halting the spread of nuclear weapons), is more likely to succeed.

Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case

In terms relative to the international security studies literature discussed above, and the Agreed Framework experience, Nunn-Lugar represents a narrative of leadership, primarily as leadership from the top and middle. It includes a varied group of players involved in the program’s founding and evolution throughout the 1990s. The process of tracing Nunn-Lugar’s development provides insights into Gottemoeller’s observation that: “Stable cooperation, therefore, is likely to require both attention from on high and bureaucratic commitment at a lower level” (Gottemoeller in Nolan, Finel and Finlay 2003, p. 145). One key concept for examining the conditions for achieving stable cooperation includes the notion of policy relevance.

The literature on international institutions offers two aspects of policymaking “relevance” (Lepgold and Nincic 2001). These include policy and instrumental relevance. Policy relevance refers to the macro or strategic aspects of policy design in international relations. Instrumental relevance refers to micro or tactical perspectives. The neoliberalist and constructivist theorists summarized above note the significance of actors’ preferences to shape policy choices. The literature highlights five areas that suggest the necessary and sufficient conditions for policy relevance including first and foremost, complementary national interests. That is, the institution includes accepted values, the goals are compatible for the long term, and there is an investment in any changes in preferences. International institutions can change relations though regimes, defined as “norms and rules that regulate behavior in specific issue areas involving
international activities” (Lepgold and Nincic, p. 139). As Ruggie suggests, the institution is more likely to be successful if it assures the hegemon’s support. Hegemon in this context and in this case refers to the United States as the most powerful nation-state in the post Cold War period, as defined in realist terms regarding national power (Morgenthau 1968, Mearsheimer 2001, Nuechterlein 1985).

The second aspect of policy relevance addresses the hegemon’s committing resources and supporting rules. These rules include a commitment to essential principles and rules of order, along with partners to share burdens and coordinate policy. Third is the perception of the institution as a carrier of norms, identity and knowledge. This includes codifying and augmenting legal norms, and especially norms that empower what are perceived as legitimate claims. One additional condition is that preferences regarding norms, identity and knowledge evolve through interaction and presumably not through domination or forcing. Fourth are the expectations regarding the costs and consequences of activities conducted through international institutions. In brief, are there stable expectations for joint coordination that serve agreed upon state purposes? The fifth variable involves the role of the institution within the policymaking community. The literature suggests that the domain is limited to situations where the states already agree on the policy objectives or ends. Again, the functionalist school suggests the important influence of special, expert agencies.

Instrumental relevance refers to the micro dimensions of policy formation, including: incentive structures, monitoring and enforcement, calculations of future
benefits and costs, and tools for facilitating effective, productive bargains. Incentive structures include positive factors to make cooperation more likely, as well as negative factors to prevent defectors. Calculations of future benefits and costs serve to lengthen the “shadow of the future” to increase participants’ rational choices supporting institution building for the long term (Fearon 1998). Scholars point to eight factors for strengthening effective and productive agreements. In brief, these include:

1. Rules that stabilize expectations;
2. Information to send and receive signals;
3. Clear standards;
4. Information about compliance;
5. Credible penalties;
6. Enforcement mechanisms;
7. Cooperation through information sharing; and
8. Regulating the number of participants.

Policy and instrumental relevance provide a lengthy list of variables for examining the conditions for successful leadership from the top and middle for effective policy and institution building.

Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case: Visionary-Rhetorical Leadership, Strategic Direction and Forging Complementary National Interests

This chapter proceeds by examining the Nunn-Lugar, Cooperative Threat Reduction case, as a key program in the Clinton Counterproliferation Policy Initiative. Government policymakers and national security scholars engaged in proliferation policymaking were among the first to seize the opportunity for forming new relationships among the U.S., Russia, and the former Soviet republics (FSR) following the fall of the Berlin Wall. George H.W. Bush’s notion of a new world order was significant for the

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112 Ideas in this paragraph are drawn from Lepgold and Nincic (2001).
executive branch and especially the state and Defense Departments’ promotion of new initiatives (Bush & Scowcroft 1998). In the following Clinton administration, in reflecting on his experiences as Secretary of Defense, Perry notes the significance of the post Cold War period for establishing an “effective U.S. partnership with Russia in the security sphere” (Carter & Perry 1999, p. 51). Carter and Perry point to the early post Cold War discussions urging Russia’s policy elite to become “integrationists” to achieve a new, “self-respecting place in the world order” (p. 51).

The early, fluid nature of international environment during the first Clinton administration required adjustments to identify the complementarities of U.S. and Russian national interests. The Defense Department engaged in repeated redesigns of Nunn-Lugar programs in the initial stages to “adapt its existing patterns of cooperation to the realities of Russia at this stage of its continuous revolution” (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 79). The pattern includes the Administration’s interest in shaping the new Russian government’s preferences. Perry writes that the Nunn-Lugar programs were launched when the new Russia was in its early state and needed immediate assistance: the “political backdrop and economic motivation of Russian’s leaders” in the early post Cold War period was, as we now know, “totally different” from the values and preferences of the Soviet regime (p. 79).

In the early Nunn-Lugar period the nation’s involved also introduced unique, new situations. The Defense Department efforts had to proceed in accordance with a three

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113 In several articles prominent international relations scholars argued for the increased stability and security of post Cold War Europe, with the Ukraine as a nuclear weapons state (see in particular writings by international relations theorists Mearsheimer and Waltz).
party foreign policy approach involving the U.S., Russia, and the Ukraine (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 83). The U.S. approach evolved quickly into from bilateral to trilateral diplomacy, extending the Nunn-Lugar approach to denuclearize the Ukraine, and engage the Ukrainians in extensive military-to-military contacts. Working along constructivist lines, Administration diplomacy and policymaking attempted to reform Russian and Ukrainian values and preferences regarding traditional and long-standing security threats, as well as offer opportunities for a more cooperative future for all participants in the new world, or at least new regional order.

Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case: Transactional Leadership as Rulemaking, Resourcing, and Supporting Innovation

The idea of specific, cooperative foreign policies and defense programs continued to expand the complexity of shaping complementary national interests. For instance, in negotiating the START II Cold War arms control regime, the U.S. had to engage the still forming Russian democracy with its new, active, and fragmented Duma -- a markedly different environment than the iron rule of the Soviet Communist Party leadership in Cold War era. The parliamentarians concerns about the status of the continuity of the Nixon era Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty were further complicated by historical Russian security concerns reawakened by the initiatives for NATO’s eastward expansion. Administration counterproliferation policy efforts with the Russians continued along the path started by Nunn-Lugar to include programs of greater complexity and depth over time.\footnote{For example, in the second Clinton administration, Defense Secretary Cohen points to the continuation of arms control programs, such as the 1998 Clinton-Yeltsin Moscow Summit, and the development of a joint U.S.-Russian Moscow center for information sharing on ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The center included the}
In their book, *Preventive Defense*, Ashton Carter and William Perry discuss early administration approaches and their experiences as Defense Department officials in the first Clinton administration. As discussed above, the George Bush and then Clinton administrations, in supporting Senators Nunn and Lugar’s initiative, responded quickly to the new threat of nuclear armed former Soviet republics. Under the authorizing Nunn-Lugar legislation, DOD policymakers addressed “loose nukes” issues with programs to eliminate nuclear weapons and fissile material in the Ukraine, and then in Kazakhstan, and Belarus (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 69). Special projects, such as Project Sapphire removed weapons grade plutonium and enriched uranium from Kazakhstan and included internal U.S. collaboration among the Departments of Defense, Energy, State, and the CIA (p. 67). A pattern of similar efforts were taken to incorporate new members to the U.S.’s preferred world order are also evident in the second Clinton administration, for instance with respect to China.¹¹⁵

During the second Clinton administration, Defense Secretary Cohen continued the trend toward international institution building, or multilateralism (Ruggie 1993). From the defense policy documents, such as the *Annual Reports to the President and Congress*, there was a drumbeat for the U.S.’s leading role in supporting international institutions.¹¹６

¹¹⁵ Secretary Cohen noted similar intentions for bringing China into the international community by: seeking Chinese adherence to international standards on weapons proliferation; international trade and human rights initiatives; and increasing China’s transparency as well as confidence building measures such as military-to-military exchanges (Cohen 2000, p. 11).

¹¹６ Examples below from the 2000 Report are illustrative of the Administration’s consistently stated policies in Annual DOD Reports from 1996 through 2000.
The 2000 document highlights the significance of the U.S. role in “shaping” the international environment through multilateral alliances, transparency, trust, and confidence building, as well as through limiting dangerous military technologies (Cohen 2000, pp. 4-5). The dangers, or threats, section focus on reducing or eliminating nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Report supports existing arms control agreements including the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework; Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs with Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Nonproliferation Treaty; and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Report also highlights the significance of identifying and controlling nuclear fissile materials that can be used for nuclear biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and delivery systems.

The Defense Department also refers to the Administration’s nuclear posture statements and reports. The 2000 Report emphasizes the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons to deter aggression through a wide range of responses along with the ability to hedge against future threats (Cohen 2000, pp. 5-6). Secretary Cohen also reinforces the U.S. commitment to the strategic arms control regime and the Administration’s intent to conduct further arms control talks with Russia by beginning a round of START III negotiations. For instance, the START III initiative was announced after a Clinton-Yeltsin summit in 1997 in Helsinki (Cohen 2000, p. 6).

Cohen continues to address U.S. support for a multilateral, regional order in Europe (Cohen 2000, p. 9). He highlights U.S. defense objectives in Europe and the

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117 The idea of “Shaping the International Environment” was introduced as an element of Defense Strategy (alongside “responding” and “preparing”) in the 1997 “Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review” (p. 9). This idea was controversial at the time, especially among NATO allies who perceived this as an expression of overt U.S. dominance and hegemonic intent and who objected in particular to being thought of as being the object of U.S. directed change (or of being “shaped” or changed by an external state).
significance of cooperative relations with Russia, Ukraine, Central and Eastern Europe, and NATO. The 2000 Report points out that the U.S., Russia, and Europe “should also work together” with all the “new independent states” to counter the proliferation of WMD and missile delivery systems (Cohen 2000, p. 9-10).

Cohen singles out Asian regional relations as well. He cites the importance of traditional defense relationships with Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, as well as engaging China (Cohen 2000, p. 10-11). Again the significance of the Agreed Framework is trumpeted. The Secretary places special emphasis on the U.S. – Japanese security relationship, which he refers to as the “linchpin” of U.S. security in Asia (Cohen 2000, p. 11). Cohen’s final DOD Annual Report focuses on maintaining “traditional” relationships, but does not emphasize plans or programs for reforming or transforming European and Asian security alliances.118

**Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case: Participatory Leadership and Constructing Shared Norms, Identity, and Knowledge**

The importance of the need for building the norms, identities, and knowledge for developing institutionally relevant policy are not highlighted in DOD documents. There are no references in the 2000 Report to the Defense Department or U.S.’s broader role in institution building for promoting legal norms, legitimate claims, and preferences for positive interactions and change. The Report does mention early Nunn-Lugar barriers in overcoming fifty years of Cold War mistrust with the Russians (Cohen 2000, p. 76). In Carter and Perry’s account some mention is also made of Clinton and Gore interventions

118 Note: This is a curious omission given the drumbeat within the Defense Department to transform the American armed forces throughout the post-Cold War era, from Clinton to the present George W. Bush Administrations.
to develop trust with the new governments of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. But the official DOD documents are largely silent on building institutional norms, identity and knowledge. Nevertheless the Nunn-Lugar programmatic successes are not tied to the larger issues regarding building a community of shared norms, values and identities in terms of international institutions, arms control and security regimes, or multilateral organizations.¹¹⁹

Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case: Change and Performance Management

The key costs and consequences of international institutions are also not mentioned in detail in DOD Annual Reports. Carter and Perry (1999, p. 76) do note some of the consequences of Nunn-Lugar in terms of budgetary and performance results. For instance, they highlight $2.4 billion in funding as of mid-1998. They go on to point to the success of 40 engineering projects in Russia to build safeguards for existing stockpiles, dismantle weapons and missiles and convert defense industry to civilian purposes. Carter and Perry also write of the success of destroying 4800 nuclear weapons, removing nuclear weapons from all non-Russian former Soviet republics and eliminating proliferation threats in Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine. Perry and Carter stress that they “never expected this astounding degree of success” and credit Nunn-Lugar initiatives for no early post-Cold War loose nukes problems (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 77). In addition, Carter and Perry attribute part of these great successes to the extraordinary cooperation inside the Washington policy making community.

¹¹⁹ In a similar manner, a 2004 Carnegie Report also highlights the hard statistics of Nunn-Lugar’s success without paying similar attention to the institution building aspects. The Report notes that: “As of December 31, 2003, the Nunn-Lugar program had deactivated 6,252 nuclear warheads and destroyed 527 ballistic missiles, 455 ballistic missile silos” … etc. (Perkovich et al. 2004, fn 58, p. 90).
The fifth dimension of policy relevance relates international institutions and the role of the policymaking community. The national security “policymaking community” can be thought of as an open ended network. The community in this case includes specific U.S. government legislators, departments and agencies as well as universities and research institutes as players or stakeholders in counterproliferation policymaking. The phrase “policymaking community” here is not limited to only the U.S. Defense Department and special agencies involved in Nunn-Lugar implementation. As discussed next, one example of effective policy implementation within the wider policymaking community is the DOD’s top-secret Operation Sapphire, conducted in 1994.

Sapphire was the first special operation implemented as part of Nunn-Lugar. Carter and Perry strongly emphasize the success of Operation Sapphire in the first Clinton term (Carter and Perry 1999, pp. 65-68). The operation resulted in the removal from Kazakhstan of 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, or the equivalent of enough fissile material for 60 Hiroshima-Nagasaki nuclear bombs. The U.S. government policy community, or Washington interagency players, included the departments of defense, energy, and state, along with the CIA and U.S. Air Force. Carter and Perry report the successfully internal and external coordination with the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan -- all made possible due to the 1992 Nunn-Lugar legislation and implementing programs.

Carter and Perry trace the genesis of the Nunn-Lugar approach to the senators 1980s, Cold War concerns about nuclear accidents (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 70). The
senators were at the forefront of U.S. congressional activities regarding establishing nuclear risk reduction centers. Their early efforts involved agencies and organizations outside of government. Early efforts, by Senators Nunn and Lugar and their staffs, included work with think tanks and universities. Ashton Carter’s late 1980s Harvard proliferation studies on the Soviet nuclear arsenal led to a series of meetings hosted by Harvard’s Belfer Center along with Perry’s affiliation with Stanford University (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 77). Workshops included experts from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Brookings Institution. This loosely coupled nonproliferation community set the stage for concerns about nuclear and fissile material safeguards following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The astonishingly rapid progress of Nunn-Lugar legislation, passed within nine days of its first draft, included Senate passage on November 28, 1991 on an 86-6 vote. The House version of the bill, supported by House Armed Services Committee Chairman, and later Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, passed in the House of Representative through a voice vote.

These preliminary efforts, in building proliferation knowledge and legislation, were extended though the 1993 shift of Carter and Perry from academia to government service. Carter notes that to spearhead Nunn-Lugar implementation, to assist Russia in safeguarding nuclear stockpiles, required “a whole new organization” (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 73). He points also to starting by “crafting a set of objectives” and identify officials in partner countries to coordinate efforts.

Initiating a new national security program required forming a coordinating interagency group as well as overcoming barriers to implementation. Carter and Perry go on to emphasize the significant barriers that challenged Nunn-Lugar implementation.
The notoriously cumbersome Pentagon acquisition system had to extend to spending dollars in overseas engineering project, which in turn according to Carter and Perry required something “history had never before permitted,” that is, running U.S. programs with and within the Soviet Union (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 74).

The early Nunn-Lugar period also meet some resistance in the U.S. Congress. The congressional barrier involved reversing a mindset from defense versus the Soviet threat to spending for Russian military housing and defense industry conversion to civilian, commercial pursuits. Given the rapid pace of Nunn-Lugar legislation, implementation money had to be reprogrammed from the 1993 defense budget, which requires much bureaucratic work in adjusting appropriations (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 74). In addition, the old arms control bureaucracy, centered in the Defense and State Departments had to shift from Cold War arms control perspectives and patterns to new approaches.

There were also of course barriers within the new and relatively unstable Russia. For instance, Carter and Perry note the problems of coordination with the Ministry for Atomic Energy\(^{120}\) (MINATOM), the former Soviet nuclear research and development agency, especially in regard to new tasks of dismantling nuclear weapons and the long term safeguards and storage of fissile materials (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 80).

The writing in later Defense Department documents reveals a moderation, or decline, in the Secretary of Defense’s initiatives for extending the DOD role and building on the early Nunn-Lugar successes. For instance, by the time of the 2000 Annual Report,

\(^{120}\) See Federation of Atomic Scientist description, accessed: 30 November 2006 [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/minatom.htm].
Cohen focuses on a narrower range of issues with respect to counterproliferation policy. He cites the importance of the armed forces capacity to respond to “asymmetric threats” and is mainly concerned with fighting on a NBC battlefield, with a vague sentence on increasing unspecified dollar amounts for “institutions of counterproliferation” (Cohen 2000, p. 19).

Counterproliferation as counter-NBC operations for battlefield forces is a significant operational capability, but at the strategic level falls short of the Nunn-Lugar objectives of eliminating and safeguarding nuclear weapons and stockpiles. The focus of the 2000 document and defense policy is mainly directed towards continuing the modernization of existing Cold War “legacy” weapons systems, or platforms, such as tanks, helicopters, aircraft carriers and submarines and jet aircraft, while conducting research and development for cutting edge technologies (Cohen 2000, p. 8). The Report proposes the need for weapons system development using Persian Gulf War scenarios. The Report also presents information regarding on-going modernizations, such as updating internal management, and research and development programs as revolutionary, citing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as the driving force for acquiring new technologies, and the Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) for adopting the presumed better business practices of the 1990s corporate sector. Critics charge that these are actually minor and insignificant changes and a normal part of the Pentagon’s internal “fight for defense dollars” (Wilson 2000). The evidence from official documents reveals a downward trend, or at the very least a leveling off, in DOD’s emphasis on counterproliferation policy and programs.
Findings and Conclusions: Policy Innovation, Public Leadership and Transformational Change

The documentary evidence suggests an early peak in Clinton era counterproliferation policymaking. The essential role of key department leaders, such as Defense Secretary Perry and Assistant Secretary Carter in influencing the Washington policymaking process is most significant. Adding weight in terms of political initiative and legislation, as well as budgetary support, was provided by experienced, senior legislators. In terms of policy relevance several points stand out in addition to the overall assessment of effective leadership from several levels, including the defense secretary, Congress, think tanks, and implementing bureaucracies -- along with similar leadership levels within the other foreign governments involved.

National interests in the Nunn-Lugar case were complimentary and expressed clearly by the governmental leaders involved in policymaking. The values of controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons were seen as compatible with long term goals that in the Russian case included radically transforming its defense posture and international diplomacy. There were significant investments in terms of time and money to change preferences for an institutional approach to change relations through a regime change in arms control and fundamental roles of nuclear weapons in a new, post-Cold War order. The remaining superpower, or in institutional terms, the U.S. as hegemon, assured its support of this new order. Additional resources were committed to reinforce the essential principles of the new order to eliminate nuclear weapons from non-Russian, former Soviet Republics. Importantly, the former republics were engaged in the process to share the burdens of coordinating the policy and its implementation.
The largely bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the newly emerging Russia solidified the norms, identity, and knowledge for institutionalizing the Nunn-Lugar counterproliferation policies. Ironically, the long Cold War history of nuclear mirror-imaging and arms control contributed to common frames of references regarding the process and substance for conducting interstate negotiations on nuclear weapons issues. Common preferences were revealed through interactions that included the former Soviet Republics. The evolving norms regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons, and some fissile materials empowered the diplomats and defense officials to complete counterproliferation policymaking in accordance with shared and legitimate claims of policy relevance. In the Nunn-Lugar case, the emergence of shared norms, identity, and knowledge in the window of opportunity following the end of the Cold War empowered U.S., Russian and FSR policymakers to conduct revolutionary counterproliferation policies.

The costs and consequences of action through the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs also stabilized expectations for joint coordination. Funding through the congressional budget process, reinforced through the Defense Department’s highly regulated planning, programming and budgeting system, provided a degree of stability and transparency for implementing programs, as well as established mechanisms for engaged congressional oversight. In essence, the programmatic processes of the U.S. Congress and bureaucracy for implementing Nunn-Lugar programs served the agreed upon Administration’s counterproliferation objectives in visible ways.

The Nunn-Lugar case also provides evidence of the significance of the network aspects of the counterproliferation policymaking community. The functional role of a
wide variety of specialized agencies in the early Nunn-Lugar period, all influenced policymaking in a common direction towards clarifying goals and programs, and guiding the policymaking community.\footnote{In a similar manner Graham Allison 2004 book, \textit{Nuclear Terrorism} follows a similar leadership pattern, as an expert’s “outside-in” efforts to influence Bush administration counterproliferation and terrorism policy.} The overarching and clear program goals regarding eliminating nuclear weapons in former Soviet Republics at a unique time in history served as a strong foundation for counterproliferation policy efforts.

One area where Nunn-Lugar reveals a shortcoming in institution building is as an early successful innovation, or pilot test, to build on in terms of expanding geographically beyond Russia and the former Soviet Republics to other areas of proliferation concern, such as South (India and Pakistan) and Northeast (North Korea) Asia and the Middle East (Iraq and Iran). In other words, the early Nunn-Lugar successes were not replicated in other areas of proliferation concern. Additional insights into the difficulties of institution building are revealed in examining the nature and scope of what theorists call the instrumental relevance of institutions. The high costs of developing effective and efficient institutions to serve as an instrument of state policy can be seen in the complexities in the four dimensions for assessing instrumental relevance including: incentive structures; monitoring and enforcement processes; calculations of future benefits; and facilitating bargaining.

\textbf{Finding and Conclusions: Transactional Change and Incentive Structures}

U.S. incentives for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs were fairly obvious. The timing of the Nunn-Lugar initiatives was of course related directly to a unique opportunity at the end of the Cold War to eliminate dangerous proliferation threats. The
weakness of Soviet safeguards and stockpile security were already known in the defense expert community as a result of the 1980s Harvard Belfer Center studies. While there were a number of international relations scholars debating the increased stability of multiple nuclear powers, including the Ukraine and others as a hedge against future Russian aggression\(^ {122} \) the conventional wisdom in the policy community coalesced around the idea of providing incentives to eliminate nuclear weapons threats in an uncertain post Cold War environment. The U.S. and Russian debates over Nunn-Lugar included calculations of the benefits and costs of a new, innovative approach.

Carter and Perry write of the high transaction costs of early Nunn-Lugar negotiations (1999, p. 73). The U.S. was mainly interested in dismantling Soviet missiles as a way to serve U.S. national security interests. The Russian and former Soviet republics were interested in social assistance to convert military forces, scientists, and its vast military-industrial complex to civilian, commercial uses. Incentives were also important to chart a future direction for Nunn-Lugar to include fissile materials as well as existing missiles and bombs. In this sense, institution building includes improving the incentives for likely cooperation as well as for preventing later defectors who would still possess materials useful for so-called dirty bombs as well as nuclear merchandise for the terrorist black market. Thus, institution building initiated through Nunn-Lugar provides incentives for continuing to engage Russia and the former Soviet republics in an ongoing process for ideas such as forming international fissile material repositories with funds

\(^ {122} \) See Mearsheimer (1993) and Sagan/Waltz (2003) for instance.
from an international consortium to manage the global stockpile for peaceful purposes, such as producing non-weapons-grade nuclear reactor fuel (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 80).

Incentive structures in the Nunn-Lugar case actually involved a wider range of options than were visible through the lens of traditional arms control negotiations. In the case of the Ukraine, a wide angle perspective reveals three separate sets of incentives Carter and Perry 1999, p. 83). The first level included trilateral diplomacy conducted by the United States, Russia and the Ukraine. These negotiations focused on economic incentives for defense conversions, market reforms, and economic development. At a second level, incentives were necessary to meet the Ukraine’s security concerns. U.S., European and Russian relations were all involved in the resulting defense programs for military-to-military training for Ukrainian and other Eastern European forces, NATO Partnership for Peace programs, and ensuing programs for NATO expansion (Ulrich 1999). The third and final piece included the Nunn-Lugar denuclearization program.

**Chapter Finding and Conclusions: Transactional and Participatory Leadership and Change -- Monitoring and Enforcement Processes**

Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for institution building include aspects of intra and interstate as well as international relations. For instance, in the Nunn-Lugar case, early support was lacking from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 80). On the U.S. side, new organizations were formed within existing Cold War agencies, such as the reorganization and new missions assigned in the transition from the U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which included the newly chartered On-Site Inspection Agency
(OSIA), which was founded to support early post Cold War counterproliferation initiatives.\textsuperscript{123}

In comparison, the later failed North Korean framework relied on the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) for monitoring and enforcement. Later, in 2000, the last Cohen Defense Report points out the significance of the Agreed Framework freezing North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon under I.A.E.A. inspections (Cohen 2000, p. 11). The resulting collapse of the North Korean international monitoring and enforcement again provides a contrast to the effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the Nunn-Lugar programs with included host agencies, such as MINATOM and DTRA, engaged directly. In comparing these two cases, the evidence to date suggests the critical importance of host country involvement in actively supporting monitoring and enforcement arrangements.\textsuperscript{124}

The phrase “lengthening the shadow of the future” again portrays the important perception of institutional arrangements as enhancing the prospects of future benefits and costs. In other word, the potential for future payoffs lends support for institution building. Writing in 1999, Carter and Perry emphasize the successes of Nunn-Lugar in the early post Cold War period (pp 77-79). In addition, they project forward to highlight continuing counterproliferation work. In particular, they note that Russia still possesses enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium to produce between 25,000 and 80,000 nuclear weapons. Therefore, they propose reinventing Nunn-Lugar with expanding


\textsuperscript{124} For a comparison of difficulties in arms control inspection, monitoring and verification when the host country refuses to cooperate see recent firsthand accounts of the United Nations’ Special Commission for Iraq (UNSCOM) executive directors, Richard Butler (2000) and Hans Blix (2004).
program budgets with greater latitude for nuclear audits and inspections and a new arms
control regime. The call is for an expansion of Nunn-Lugar for safeguarding fissile
materials. The initiative in expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
proliferation regimes is echoed in recent work by the Carnegie Foundation and again by
Allison of Harvard’s Belfer Center (Perkovich et al. 2004, Allison 2004,).

Chapter Finding and Conclusions: Linking Visionary-Rhetorical, Transactional,
and Participatory Leadership in Policy Innovation -- Facilitating Bargaining

The final dimension for assessing the instrumental relevance of international
institutions concerns facilitating bargaining. Facilitation includes establishing rules,
procedures, principles and precedents, as well as creating high costs for no agreement.
The extensive nature of the eight components cited for successful negotiations reveals the
importance of institutions and regimes, along with supporting organizations, for effective
policymaking and implementation. The eight components drawn from the literature on
bargaining and negotiations include: (1) rules; (2) information; (3) standards; (4)
information about compliance; (5) credible penalties; (6) enforceable rules; (7)
cooperation through information sharing; and (8) limiting the number of participants.

In the Nunn-Lugar case, making the CTR effective policy instruments required
extensive negotiations for rules to stabilize expectations. Carter and Perry point out that
managing expectation included more players than the engaged international negotiating.
For instance, on the U.S. side there were expectations from the Congress to overcome
their traditional, Cold-War security concerns. The new Russian Duma also had to be kept
on board. Similarly, in the Agreed Framework negotiations, Ambassador Gallucci
highlights the critical nature of his negotiating team’s liaison with influential senators and congress members (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004).

The signaling of information is also cited as important by the Nunn-Lugar negotiators. Carter and Perry point out that it took an official Pentagon internal study, the 1994 “Nuclear Posture Review,” to clearly signal “a new phase of arms control “ that was fundamentally different for the Cold War balance of terror (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 85). The Nuclear Posture Review was meant as a clear signal to players domestically and internationally, that the Cold War was over and nuclear weapons would play a smaller role in U.S. defense planning. This new approach includes calls for dramatic cuts in the U.S. strategic arsenal and would drive down the total number of strategic weapons in on-going iterations of strategic arms reduction talks.

Two other factors in the Nunn-Lugar bargaining do stand out. Traditional Cold War concerns about security and secrecy had to be overcome. Information about compliance arrangements was crucial for building trust and confidence for continuing the program. In this respect, Carter and Perry (1999, p. 88) emphasize the significance of mutual information between the U.S. and Russia regarding the “technical implementation” of the de-alerting and de-targeting of strategic missiles. The complexity and high degree of transparency necessary insured that each side had to step up to new challenges for continuing to shape a new post-Cold War relationship.

In a similar manner, the activities required for the success of Operation Sapphire also contributed to lowering the barriers to gaining information about compliance, as well as increasing cooperation by increasing information flows. The cooperative advantages of information sharing led to a cascading effect for additional Nunn-Lugar program
initiatives. Sapphire was followed by the Russian dismantling of SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Theses security initiatives were then complemented by medical diagnostic programs for cancer tests in and around former Soviet nuclear facilities; by research grants for Russian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian scientists; and by defense industry conversions to commercial pursuits.

This chapter focused on the study of the Clinton administration’s Nunn-Lugar, Counterproliferation Policy Initiatives for reducing the threats of “loose nukes” in Russia and the Former Soviet Republics. The Russian case, as guided by institutional theory, examined U.S. and, in particular, the U.S. Defense Department’s leadership efforts in countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, from 1992 to 2000. This chapter’s findings suggest the significance and influence of institution and organization-building approaches, for effective counterproliferation policymaking. Certainly, developing a framework for synthesizing both competitive strategies versus an enemy regime, as in the North Korean case, and cooperative strategies for promoting a common counterproliferation policy and strategy, as in the Nunn-Lugar case, reveals important differences in terms of conditions and contexts for effective policymaking, institution building and organizational development. Russian relations remain a challenge. At the same time more study is needed of the organizational, or agency mechanisms for improving an institutional approach.

The next chapter analyzes executive leadership and agency performance in pursuit of Administration counterproliferation policy objectives in both the contexts of U.S. agencies and international organizations. The leadership role of public executives as integrators for international organizations and national government policy development
and implementation are examined in terms of utilizing the DOD’s management capacity for coordinating and implementing various U.S. and international agencies programs in achieving the policy results for countering WMD proliferation in North Korea, Russia, Iraq and elsewhere. The aligning and integrating roles of public executives extend across U.S. government agencies as well as international organizations. The Iraq case requires examining the relationship of U.S. efforts along with the roles and functions of the United Nations and its organization for nuclear matter, the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.).


Chapter 6: The United States Versus Iraq and the Challenges of Aligning and Integrating U.S. and the U.N. Counterproliferation Efforts

If you distinguish the personal qualities you think you would like a bureau chief (or other public servant) to have from those you think he needs on the job, you would probably come up with two very different lists. The first would sound like a description of an ideal Boy Scout. The other would sound like Machiavelli’s prince.

Herbert Kaufman (1981, p. 175)

This Chapter continues to examine Clinton era executive leadership and counterproliferation policymaking. The ties among executive leadership, policy effectiveness and government performance are the subject of continuing research in the public management literature. For instance, the Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue (2003) book, *Government Performance: Why Management Matters*, offers a performance framework and finds “Big Lessons” such as, “Management Matters” and “Effective Leadership is Vital.” The Ingraham studies highlight performance management at the federal, state and local levels. This Chapter offers a similar focus on leadership, in terms of senior executives in public organizations working as policy makers and implementers, aligners, integrators and results managers, or what Ingraham terms as “grounded leadership” (Ingraham 2003, p. 152) -- the senior or strategic leaders role in charting the direction and degree of influence in implementing effective public policy.125

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125 Ingraham notes that although her research groups’ extensive examination of federal and state government performance and management capacity ‘had not originally intended to studying leadership—indeed, were advised not to do so—leadership surfaced as an important influence in the effective governments we studied.’ She goes on to write that “we found that strong leadership in public organizations was most often best described as a team effort, spanning political and career staff boundaries... We found further that these leaders and teams had the ability and the will to move from strategic vision-setting to a very practical view of making the vision happen. This included a willingness to be involved with implementation.... Leadership was somewhat situational, in the sense that effective leaders and leadership teams captured opportunities for change or created them if necessary. One consistent characteristic of strong
responsibilities include the leaders’ skills in coordinating management efforts for achieving governmental policy goals and program objectives. Ingraham’s public management research stresses the vital role of strategic leadership and management for coordinating complex administrative systems across agencies and within government – which they find “is clear” from their studies of U.S. government organizations (Ingraham 2003, pp. 20-21).

This paper extends the analysis of executive and agency performance in studying Clinton era counterproliferation policymaking. This Iraq case focuses on the vision, mission, goals and objectives of the Clinton administration’s Counterproliferation Initiative, as well as the policy’s implementation through the United Nation’s inspection agencies. The leadership roles of U.S. and U.N. public executives, as aligners and integrators of counterproliferation policies, are examined in terms of their skills in directing and utilizing the management capacity of various U.S. and international agencies to achieve the articulated policy results for countering nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation in Iraq. The executives’ integrating and aligning roles extend within and across U.S. government agencies, as well as international organizations. In the Iraq case, this Chapter examines the roles and functions of U.S. efforts, along with those of the U.N.’s WMD inspectors and the U.N.’s functional organization for nuclear regulation, the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.).

The Iraq case proceeds along three lines. First, in establishing the official U.S. policy, as it evolved during the 1990s, the analysis traces policy development from leaders and teams, however, was a sound organizational base. Understanding the organization and the management capacities it required well enough to foster and sustain effective system creation was central. We called this leadership model “grounded leadership’” (Ingraham 2003, 152).
government documents, including: the Clinton era national security and national military strategies; the annual reports of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress; and official U.S. government WMD strategy and policy review documents. A second line of inquiry follows the narrative from the perspective of United Nations proliferation policymaking. The U.N. Security Council resolutions from the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 through 2002 and the start of the War in Iraq provide open-source documents to assess the alignment or misalignment of U.S. and U.N. policy. In addition, published biographies by U.N. chief inspectors Richard Butler and Hans Blix add insights into the inspection executives’ roles in directing, integrating and implementing U.N. policy in Iraq. A third line of inquiry includes a variety of U.S. government and nongovernmental oversight reports on WMD policy issues. In addition to internal executive branch and DOD of U.S. policy in Iraq, there have been numerous external evaluations of U.S. proliferation policy. These oversight functions provide a check on executive branch self-assessments and include congressional committee hearings and studies, Government Accounting Office (GAO) reviews, as well as university and research institutes, or think tank, policy reviews.¹²⁶

The aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon sparked a number of government reports, commissions, and personal accounts reporting on issues related to national security and terrorism that provide additional unclassified information on Clinton era WMD proliferation efforts. Of particular value

¹²⁶ For instance, the variety of perspectives on WMD from leading scholars sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation of New York, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs -- all offer important insights for evaluating government policymaking and organizational performance (Allison 2004; Levi and O’Hanlon 2005; Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss 2004).
are two extensive research reviews by high-level government commissions. One is the 2004 Kean-Hamilton et al. committee’s “The 9/11 Commission Report.” A second authoritative 2004 report focusing on Iraq and WMD was begun by former U.S. government official and U.N. weapons inspector David Kay and completed by another former I.A.E.A. weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer. Duelfer’s three volumes, entitled the “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] on Iraq’s WMD” provides a detailed review of U.S. counterproliferation policy and the U.N.’s implementation by the two weapons inspections teams during the 1990s in the period prior to the 2003 War in Iraq.

**Strategic Direction and Visionary-Rhetorical Leadership: The 1993 Annual Defense Report**

The first Clinton administration reinforced the lessons learned by the George H.W. Bush administration, from the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991. On page one the report notes that the “enforcement of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolutions against Iraqi defiance required persistent and determined diplomatic and political pressures backed up by military force” (DOD Annual Report 1993, p. 1). The relative newness of the concept of “counterproliferation” is revealed in the section on nonproliferation and technology security. There the Report notes that the “proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, missile, and advanced conventional weapon technologies is emerging as one of the greatest and most intractable threats to international security” (DOD Report 1993, pp. 17). The Report points to DOD’s involvement in bilateral diplomacy along with economic and technical sanctions important to “dissuade proliferators” and block exports (DOD Report 1993, p. 18).
Combinations of diplomatic, economic, and military approaches are included into this emerging area for DOD’s “central role in these counterproliferation efforts” including support and participation in “U.N.-directed inspections and destruction operations in Iraq” (DOD Report 1993, p. 18). The expanding scope of DOD’s involvement in nonproliferation programs is cast in terms of “instruments such as dissuasion, export controls, bilateral and multilateral negotiations and inspection and destruction missions as illustrated in a case like Iraq, will help contain and even reduce the proliferation threat” (DOD Report 1993, p. 18). The 1993 document does not prescribe a DOD role in preventive or preemptive warfare to counter the spread of WMD.

In Part III on “Defense Components,” the report returns to nonproliferation themes, such as the Persian Gulf War’s lessons. The section on ballistic missile proliferation notes the significance of political and military programs to protect against the threat or use of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The Report notes: “The Gulf War demonstrated that we face such a direct threat today and foreshadowed the possible consequences should a dictatorially-governed regime gain the capability to threaten the United States” (DOD Report 1993, p. 72).

The Report includes the possibility of additional missions for special operations forces in terms of “some change in mission emphasis, such as in meeting the evolving threat of chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons proliferation” (DOD Report 1993, p. 104). The Report’s later section on research, development, test and evaluation comments on the role of the Defense Nuclear Agency in supporting nonproliferation activities. The Report notes that “To help contain proliferation the agency has participated in developing on-site inspections regimes as well as assessments of safety, security and control of
nuclear, biological, and chemical materials or weapons in the possession of potential or actual proliferators” (DOD Report 1993, p. 118).

The 1994 Annual Defense Report

The 1994 document launched the Aspin counterproliferation initiative. The Report highlights U.S. counterproliferation policy as a significant innovation. The language emphasizes treating WMD as a “danger as a real and present military threat in addition to the traditional approach of dealing with proliferation as a diplomatic problem (DOD Report 1994, p. 6). The report notes the Secretary of Defense’s direction to the Defense Department to “undertake a new Counterproliferation Initiative” that includes the following measures to improve:

1. Intelligence on the spread of WMD;
2. The U.S.’s ability to deal with NBC arsenals and delivery systems;
3. The development of missile defense systems;
4. Passive defenses; and
5. Detection technologies.

To improve leadership and management the Report also urges strengthening DOD cooperation with government agencies, including efforts to improve and expand “international mechanisms and agreements” for controlling the spread of WMD (DOD Report 1994, p. 7).

Part II on Defense Initiatives emphasizes two strategies involving counterproliferation and threat reduction (DOD Report 1994, p. 34). The first strategy is the Counterproliferation Initiative to adapt defense policy, technology and acquisition, and military organization and planning. This policy is intended to augment and improve the U.S.’s ability to prevent the initial acquisition of WMD, and, if necessary, protect against threats from proliferators, “whether states or subnational groups” (DOD Report
The second announced strategy is Cooperative Threat Reduction for coordination between the former Soviet Union and U.S. in following arms control pledges.

The 1994 document lists two main goals for the Counterproliferation Initiative. The first goal is “to “strengthen DOD’s contribution to government-wide efforts to prevent the acquisition of these weapons in the first place” (DOD Report 1994, pp. 35-36). The second goal is to “protect U.S. interests and forces, and those of its allies, from the effects of WMD in the hands of hostile forces” by preparing U.S. forces to deal with a WMD event (DOD Report 1994, p. 36). The Report reemphasis the “preeminent goal of U.S. proliferation efforts” is the prevention of the spread of WMD.

The 1994 Report also lists specific programs as part of the Counterproliferation Initiative (DOD Report 1994, pp. 39-41). For policymaking, the Report notes the significance of institutionalizing the counterproliferation mission in DOD’s organizational structure. This includes creating a new Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for nuclear security and counterproliferation within OSD’s policy directorate. The stated intent of the new ASD position “assures this issue proper visibility” in the Defense Department. The Report calls for conducting surveys among the armed services to determine needs of program changes for the DOD acquisition and technology research and development base. In terms of military planning and doctrine, the Report notes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the regional Commanders-in-Chief “will initiate dedicated planning efforts aimed at the specialized need of contingencies involving WMD.” For intelligence, the Report points to past, focused prevention efforts with on the need for new initiatives aimed to “expand intelligence efforts to the
protection role” and stressing that intelligence must be useful militarily and not only diplomatically. This includes a joint agreement between the deputy defense secretary and the director of central intelligence to create a deputy director for military support in a CIA nonproliferation center. Finally, for international outreach, the Report notes efforts underway between the U.S., NATO, and Japan to implement the counterproliferation initiative.

The Report includes a section on the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) (DOD Report 1994, pp. 49-50). This section notes that 1991 U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 established UNSCOM to eliminate Iraq’s WMD and ballistic missile capabilities with ranges greater than 150 kilometers, and ensure that Iraq does not reacquire WMD. The UNSCOM role is to assist and support the I.A.E.A. and DOD acknowledges its “lead role in providing technical expertise in support of long-term monitoring efforts in Iraq.” Part III of the Report points out that “One of the lessons of the Persian Gulf War with major implications for future regional contingencies is the political and military importance of possessing a capability to protect against threats or actual use of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.” The Report goes on to say that “The Gulf War demonstrated that we face such a direct threat today and foreshadowed the possible consequence should a dictatorially-governed regime gain the capability to threaten the United States with long-range missile attack” (DOD Report 1994, p. 72).

Finally, the 1994 Report refers to the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) and its role in support to nonproliferation activities. The support function for DNA includes participating in “developing on-site inspection regimes as well as assessments of safety,
security, and control of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials or weapons in the possession of potential or actual proliferators” (DOD Report 1994, p. 118). Subsequent documents continue to address the beginnings of the counterproliferation policy initiatives and programs, the restructuring of DOD organizations, and the roles and missions of a variety of DOD agencies in support of counterproliferation.

The 1995 Annual Defense Report

Part II of the 1995 Report is titled “Challenges in the New Security Environment” and includes a subsection on “Preventing the Reemergence of a Post-Cold War Nuclear Threat.” The Part II summary of the Counterproliferation Initiative includes DOD’s “motivation” as its reaction to being surprised by the extent of Iraqi WMD development after the Gulf War. The section lists a “paramount objective” to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile technologies (DOD Report 1995, p. 9). The Report notes that DOD is integrating its efforts to ensure that WMD threats are included in all aspects of defense planning, programming, and acquisition. Four key areas are highlighted for DOD counterproliferation policymaking, including: (1) policy and doctrine formation; (2) military responses; (3) new technologies; and (4) international cooperation.

The Report’s Part III includes the roles of military policy in combating the spread and use of WMD. The military aspects of counterproliferation include deterrence, intelligence, ballistic and cruise missile defenses, passive defenses, force protection and power projection, improved detection and disarmament abilities, and counterforce. The

127 The 1995 Report is available at http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr95/toc.html. The following section is a summary of selected portions of the 1995 document.
1995 document focuses on START treaty with Russia, and the significance of pressing for the elimination of nuclear weapons and strategic, offensive arms in the Former Soviet Union’s, or the problem of “loose nukes” in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus (DOD Report 1995, pp. 25-26). The 1995 Report does not address directly the threats of WMD proliferation in the Middle East and Iraq.

Part IV includes an extended section on counterproliferation and arms control. This part presents background information along with a conceptual framework, as well as a new organization for counterproliferation program review. The conceptual framework for counterproliferation policy includes a range of responses, including export and arms controls (DOD Report 1995, p. 72). The military element also includes preparedness along with active and passive defense capabilities. The need for expanded organizational capacity is met through the creation of a DOD chaired Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC).

Congress mandated the CPRC in accordance with the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (DOD Report 1995, pp. 73-74). The 1994 Act directs the executive branch to form an interagency study group chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Act also specifies two supporting committees. First, a Senior Standing Committee on Nonproliferation and Export Controls. This Standing Committee operates as an executive committee of the National Security Council’s (NSC) interagency working group (IWG) on Nonproliferation and Export Controls. The second committee is Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group to report to the NSC’s other IWG’s within the National Science and Technology Council (DOD Report 1995, p. 74).
Congress designed the CPRC to include the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The congressional design of the committee structure included specific tasks to force interagency cooperation with respect to integrating and aligning counterproliferation technologies and programs across agencies. The Act included reporting requirements due in May 1995 and 1996 to address counterproliferation acquisition funding. The fiscal year 1994 legislation also stipulates funding levels for counterproliferation programs.

**The 1996 Annual Defense Report**

The 1996 Report’s Chapter 7 covers “Counterproliferation and Treaty Initiatives.” The 1996 Report twice mentions Iraqi WMD programs specifically. Once again, the Report highlights the Gulf War’s lessons and the “primary goal” of U.S. counterproliferation policy of preventing nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation. The focus of the 1996 version is the implementation of counterproliferation programs, described as a “sign of the initiative’s maturity.” The report stresses internal Pentagon and interagency activities, as well as international partners, treaties and norms.

Within the Pentagon, the Report assigns counterproliferation responsibilities to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff’s Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study delegates tasks to geographical or regional combatant commanders, assigning them the main responsibility for counterproliferation missions. The Report refers to the regional military commanders’ role in developing integrated

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128 The 1996 Report is available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr96/toc.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr96/toc.html). The following section is a summary of selected portions of the 1996 document. Note that Chapter 8 is on “Cooperative Threat Reduction” and provides a summary of Nunn-Lugar programs discussed in the previous chapter.
force requirements for counterproliferation. Integration includes giving the regional military commanders a say in reporting their needs for counterproliferation and tasking them to work with a new Pentagon review committee. This counterproliferation coordinating committee is included as part of the quadrennial review (QDR) process and termed as a Joint War Fighting Capabilities Assessment team.129

DOD’s counterproliferation organizational capacity was also expanded in 1995, when a Counterproliferation Support Program was developed as part of the Defense Department’s acquisition, research and development planning. The intent for the Support Program is to address shortfalls in DOD’s deployed force capability and leverage exiting capabilities by accelerating ongoing programs and enhance development of “high payoff” technologies in the five counterproliferation mission areas, including prevention, passive and active defense, counterforce and covert/counterterror. This Section of the Report also addresses the significance of increasing intelligence support for counterproliferation. The Report clusters Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea as countries of concern (DOD Report 1996, p. 56). As such, the Report places a high priority on assessing these regimes’ intentions, programs, operational practices and supporting infrastructure.

Internationally, the Section highlights cooperation with partners in addressing shared risks. The Report discusses working with allies in Europe and the Pacific region. DOD gives itself credit for playing a key role in moving counterproliferation to the top of the NATO agenda. The Section notes the efforts of the NATO Senior Defense Group on

Proliferation (DGP), established in 1994, to determine the range of alliance and national capabilities, including counterproliferation doctrine and training (DOD Report 1996, p. 57). In Asia, the Report mentions work with Japan and Australia to forge common approaches to counter NBC risks. In sum, the DOD Report stresses its commitment to building international partnerships, along with norms and treaties.

The 1996 Report includes a section on DOD’s role in strengthening international nonproliferation norms and treaties. It includes enhancing technology and export controls, for instance, through the 1995 approval of the Wassenaar agreement mentioned in Chapter 2. One Section, on “Strengthening International Nonproliferation Norms,” highlights the significance of threat reduction through arms control and notes that DOD is responsible “for ensuring U.S. compliance with its international arms control obligations” and that it “plays a key role” in related arms control policy development (DOD Report 1996, pp. 57-59). The role of DOD’s subordinate On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), established in 1988, is tasked with responsibilities for ensuring U.S. readiness for and implementation of inspection escort, monitoring and verification activities. The OSIA is also earmarked as the executive agent for DOD support to the United National Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq to fulfill the requirements for Security Council Resolutions 687 and 715. The Report notes the agency’s tasks for the procurement or provision of DOD equipment, services, labor, and facilities to further UNSCOM goals.

In Chapter 6’s concluding section points out the importance of the DOD role in supporting the Counterproliferation Initiative as well as in implementing and verifying arms control agreements and treaties. The 1996 Report concludes by restating its mission of using the “Department’s aggressive leadership in counterproliferation and threat
reduction.” The Department’s counterproliferation tasks include program and activities that are “vital in achieving national objective in this area” (DOD Report 1996, p. 62).

**The 1997 Annual Defense Report**

The 1997 Report repeats many of the same points from the 1996 Report. It does highlight DOD’s efforts in fully integrating the counterproliferation mission into its military planning, acquisition, intelligence and international cooperation activities. Chapter 6 covers “Counterproliferation and Treaty Activities” and Chapter 7 covers “Cooperative Threat Reduction” (DOD Report 1997, pp. 47, 61) The 1997 Report also includes a new section on improving technology security and export controls. This section points to the U.S. policy to “prohibit and curtail” the proliferation and delivery of NBC weapons and DOD’s supporting role in “actively promoting an effective export control regulatory system (DOD Report 1997, p.49). Stressing the technical side of arms control, the Report claims DOD will bring to bear its technical expertise to strengthen multilateral nonproliferation regimes and U.S. export controls.

One section highlights President Clinton’s 1996 executive order requiring DOD and other reviewing agencies to examine dual-use export license applications submitted to the Department of Commerce for all applications related to national security, proliferation, and regional stability. This section also reinforces the international export control efforts, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement to complement the existing multilateral export regimes, including the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group. The Report again names the greatest

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threats to international peace and stability, including the “rogue states” of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea (DOD Report 1997, p. 50).

The Report emphasizes the internal, or integrating of the counterproliferation mission within DOD as well as for guiding CPI implementation. The 1996 legislation establishing the DOD Counterproliferation Committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is lauded as a way to ensure broad policy objectives are met and that CPI implementation is integrated and focused. The Report also reinforces the new organizational role of the CJCS, resulting from the 1995 Counterproliferation Mission and Functions Study, as well at the Counterproliferation and Program Review Committees work on the fifteen (15) areas for capabilities enhancements (called ACEs).\textsuperscript{131}

The interagency organization of the Counterproliferation Review Committee (CPRC) is noted with the inclusion of the “Secretary of Defense (Chairman), the Secretary of Energy (Vice-Chair), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence” (DOD Report 1997, p. 51). The Report notes the congressional charter for the CPRC to review research, development and acquisition activities of the various departments and the requirement to recommend programmatic and management initiative to address shortfalls in the U.S.’s capability to counter proliferation threats. DOD invites the reader to review the CPRC May 1996 report, available over the Internet.

\textsuperscript{131} For an updated version see the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (2002) \textit{Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism}. 
The 1997 Report also reinforces the DOD role in working counterproliferation programs with international parties and within treaty arrangements. The role of European and other English speaking countries dominates the discussion. In addition to the NATO initiatives, the Report emphasizes technical cooperative programs with Australia, Canada, New Zealand the United Kingdom. New in the 1997 version is a report of On-site Inspection Agency treaty activities. For 1996, these included efforts in former Warsaw Pact countries and in Iraq. OSIA participated in more than 52 inspections under the Conventional Forces Treaty (CFE) Treaty in former Warsaw pact states and escorted foreign teams with 11 inspections of U.S. forces in Europe. Details of these OSIA efforts are not provided. The concluding section is a restatement of the 1996 Report with the addition of the word “active” in describing the involvement of DOD in leading counterproliferation initiatives as well as implementing and verifying arms control treaties and agreements.


The 1998, 1999 and 2000 Reports reveal a marked decline in the sections addressing counterproliferation activities. From the 15 pages in the previous two years Annual Reports, the 1998 through 2000 Reports each contain less than a page. The 1998 Report focuses more directly on U.S. force structure issues. It emphasizes counterproliferation and export control effort to slow the spread of technologies that threaten U.S. forces and infrastructure. Regarding the new threats of WMD armed

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terrorists, the 1998 Report highlights that the “nexus of such lethal knowledge [of proliferation technologies useful for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and delivery systems] and the “emergence of terrorist movements dedicated to massive casualties represents a new paradigm for national security.” The Report goes on to note that “Zealotry creates the will to carry out mass casualty terrorist attacks; proliferation provides the means” (DOD Report 1998, p. 2)

The 1998 Report raises two key challenges to counterproliferation strategy: (1) that DOD must institutionalize counterproliferation as an organizing principle in all military activity; and (2) that counterproliferation efforts must be internationalized (DOD Report 1998, p. 21). These challenges are repeated in the next two Reports. Neither of these two challenges is elaborated further in any of the subsequent documents. The 1998 Report again refers the reader to the CPRC Committee’s Report. Later, Chapter 4 notes the role of Special Operations Forces as a “principal part” of the DOD CPI activities (DOD Report 1998, p. 51). Chapter 6, on missile defenses, characterizes the proliferation of WMD weapons and missiles as a “major threat” to the security of U.S. forces, allies and friendly nations, and offers that the U.S. is exploring theater ballistic missile defense cooperation with allies with the objective of enhancing the U.S. counterproliferation strategy (DOD Report 1998, p. 63). The 1999 Report follows the format and key points of the 1998 version. The 2000 version continues along the same lines. One addition in 2000 is noting the U.S. Strategic Command’s role in support the geographic/regional
combatant commanders for shaping their environments through theater CPI “planning and intelligence collection and exploitation efforts”\(^\text{133}\) (DOD Report 2000, p. 30).

In sum, the Clinton administration continued to emphasize and develop its CPI programs throughout the 1990s. The DOD and other cabinet agencies started on an aggressive path initiated by Secretary Aspin.\(^\text{134}\) Official documents throughout the Clinton era outlined the Administration’s policies and programs. Congress became more active in pushing structural, budgetary, and strategic direction for CPI programs. Internally, from the U.S. government’s perspective then, DOD and its subordinate agencies along with other Washington interagency players were engaged in implementing counterproliferation policies and programs; but the level and degree of top-down influence in counterproliferation policy innovations declined significantly during the 1990s. This analysis next examines an external, U.S. government sponsored review of the Administration’s efforts to counter proliferation in the Iraq case during this period.

**Mr. Duelfer’s Comprehensive Report**

The Duelfer Report is especially instructive for examining the Iraq counterproliferation case during the Clinton era. Duelfer, a former Deputy Director for the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq under Richard Butler, and the preceding study director, and a former UNSCOM arms control inspector, David Kay, had access to significant documentary records for this period. In addition, Duelfer reviewed

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\(^{133}\) Note that the meaning of “exploitation efforts” is not further defined in the Report.

\(^{134}\) While his tenure as secretary lasted less than two years, Les Aspin’s aggressive leadership in founding the counterproliferation initiative was initiated formally with his December 7, 1993 speech at the National Academy of Sciences. There he focused attention on the WMD issue as one of four top security concerns for the immediate post Cold War period and announced the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative to spearhead Defense Department efforts against the new dangers facing U.S. national security. The 1994 DOD Annual Report recorded the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative as established U.S. policy.
interviews with key Iraqi official and scientists. Given Duelfer and Kay’s expertise as subject matter experts, along with their first hand experience on United Nations inspections during the period of heightened activities following the Persian Gulf war, their insights are important to understanding counterproliferation efforts in Iraq.

One of the key areas of the Duelfer report regards the assessment of the U.S. intelligence regarding the Iraqi weapons programs and threat perceptions. For instance, one of the key findings regarding Iraq’s strategic intent is that Iran’s WMD programs were considered the highest threat by the Saddam Hussein regime (Duelfer 2004, Regime Strategic Intent, p. 29). In terms of interstate relations, it also is reported that Saddam was most concerned about French and Russian companies support to the Iranians (Duelfer, pp. 39-40). As far the U.S. was concerned, Saddam had little knowledge of the United States and his regime relied primarily on television and the Internet for information (Duelfer, p. 32).

The United Nations was active throughout this period in setting multilateral counterproliferation policies, objectives, goals and tasks. Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) served as the primary communication mechanism and policy process that carried the most weight in terms of the international communities’ efforts for influencing the Iraqi threat perceptions, policy processes, and calculations of costs and benefits. The negative impact of the impressions of “cat-and-mouse” game aspects of U.S. and U.N. relations with Iraq is evident in the progression of the multiple versions of Security Council Resolutions over the Clinton era (Blix 2004, p. 30).\(^\text{135}\)

\(^{135}\) U.N. Iraq inspection chiefs Richard Butler (UNSCOM) and Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) write extensively about their difficulties in obtaining Saddam Hussein regime’s full disclosure of their past programs and activities in developing as
The Duelfer Report provides a summary of the resolutions dealing with Iraqi weapons programs (Duelfer, p. 43). UNSCR 687 (April 1991) led to the creation of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq. UNSCR 687 charged the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) with abolishing Iraqi nuclear weapons programs. All WMD programs were to be destroyed or removed under UNSCOM supervision. Later in that year (October 1991) UNSCR 715 reinforced the UNSCOM role and responsibilities for ongoing monitoring and verification as well as preventing the reconstruction of Iraqi WMD programs. With the collapse of the UNSCOM inspections by November 1998, UNSCR 1205 found Iraq to be in flagrant violation of the previous UNSCRs and suspended U.N. monitoring. By December 1999, another modification to the U.N. inspection program introduced a new format replacing the previous UNSCOM approach under UNSCR 687. Finally, in November 2002, under UNSCR 1441 Iraq was found in material breach of its obligations under UNSCR 687. The Duelfer finding was that Saddam Hussein had in fact ordered the destruction of all non-declared weapons while at the same time ordering the concealment of past WMD capabilities and programs (Duelfer, p. 46). Duelfer further speculates that it was Saddam’s desire to keep WMD programs “on the shelf” to retain his scientific organization and technical knowledge with the intent of resuming WMD programs within two years of the end of the U.N. sanctions (Duelfer, p. 51).
First hand accounts from U.N. executives Richard Butler and Hans Blix reflect the intensity of this period of heightened activity. The efforts of passing a U.N. Security Council resolution, which requires the unanimous consent of the five permanent members is, of course, no small undertaking. Given the Security Council’s “primary function” of maintaining “international peace and security” this extensive involvement in counterproliferation reveals the level and depth of concern over Iraq’s WMD potential (Bennett and Oliver 2002, p. 72). This level of intense activity at the top of the world’s leading security committee includes a direct and leading U.S. policy role as one of the Security Council’s permanent five veto-power members. While the visibility of nonproliferation efforts are clearly based on the focus of both U.N. and U.S. attention on Iraqi WMD efforts, questions can be raised about their focused attention on the effective implementation of Security Council policy resolutions.

A major issue in organizational implementation and accountability concerns the sources used for obtaining or impeding information. In the Iraqi case, according to the Duelfer Report, there was a great deal of overt and covert activity and information gathering by various intelligence agencies both covert and overt. Blix writing reveals extensive intelligence efforts involving his UNMOVIC team, which in some instance supported inspection activities and in Blix’s account in other instances disrupted Blix’s efforts. Duelfer notes Saddam’s use of the Iraqi Intelligence Service to monitor the U.N. inspectors (Duelfer, Vol. I, p. 52). In addition, Duelfer reports comments about Saddam directing his intelligence officers to recruit U.N. inspectors with promises of future business opportunities in Iraq. Blix writing reveals his concerns about the extensive
intelligence efforts involving his UNMOVIC team, which in some instance supported inspection activities and in other instances disrupted Blix’s efforts.

The coercive nature of the Iraqi regime also worked against the potential for host nation cooperation. For instance, Duelfer reports the sentencing of an Iraqi Air Force brigadier to five to ten years in prison for allowing a U.N. inspector to “capture” a document regarding the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War (Duelfer, p. 54). These Iraqi activities acted against the successful completion of U.N. inspection and verification mandates, and precluded a sincere cooperative relationship between the U.N. and Iraqi experts. The lack of trust, information sharing, and accountability then all contributed to Saddam’s halting of UNSCOM activities in August 1998. In short, Iraq was unable and unwilling to satisfy U.N. inspectors and the U.N. was unable to convince Saddam that even successful inspections would lift the economic sanctions. The U.S. and U.K.’s response with Operation Desert Fox air attacks in December 19, 1998, again emphasizes the use of active measures to counter proliferation. From the Iraqi perspective then, the bombing served to reinforce Saddam’s perception of the hostility of the U.S. to the survival of his regime. The heightened activity of the U.N. throughout 1999 suggests the engagement of top-level policymakers is pursuing counterproliferation policies and programs against the Iraq regime. From January through December 1999, when the U.N. passed SCR 1284, three high level panels had convened to work the Iraq inspection stalemate. The result was the January 2000 formation of the new, reformed, United Nations Monitoring Verification & Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), under the executive direction of Hans Blix, the Swedish lawyer, diplomat and former I.A.E.A. chief executive.
Duelfer’s role as head of the CIA’s sponsored Iraqi Survey Group and as an external reviewer of the United Nations 1990s efforts provides a U.S. subject matter expert’s perspective on the effectiveness of U.N. inspections. The early part of the Report’s “key findings” includes sections on Regime Finance and Procurement, Delivery Systems, and Nuclear and Chemical Programs. Each section includes a program assessment of insights into attempts to counter-proliferation in Iraq.

Understanding the impact of the economic sanctions is highlighted in the section on Regime Finance and Procurement. In short, by 1996, Duelfer concludes that Saddam Hussein realized that the oil for food program of U.N. sanctions was of great economic value to his and his Regime’s survival. Oil for food provided Saddam the opportunity to attempt to manipulate and gain influence using those provisions of UNSCR 661, and especially for targeting “friendly” sanctions committee states, such as Russia, France, China, Syrian and Ukraine. In Duelfer’s view, the sanctions were turning into a “paper tiger.” Saddam engaged in a strategy of circumvention, by using government-to-government protocols, or trade agreements, to increase revenue for Iraq, outside of the oil for food framework. According to Duelfer, this strategy assisted in raising funds for Iraq’s military reconstruction from 1997 to 2001. Duelfer estimates that Saddam raised approximately $11 billion from the early 1990s through illicit revenue outside of oil for food that was directed to purchase conventional weapons, dual use technology, and fund some WMD-related programs.

136 Information in this paragraph is from the Duelfer Report, Vol. I, pp. 1-3, Section on Key Findings regarding Regime Finance and Procurement.
The U.N.’s abilities to gain transparent, accurate information on Iraq’s capabilities proved problematic. According to Duelfer’s investigation, Saddam Hussein directed his ministries to “obfuscate Iraq’s refusal to reveal the nature of its WMD and WMD-related programs, their capabilities, and his intentions” (Duelfer, Vol. 1, Key Findings, p. 2). Without a sense of fundamental trust along with verification procedures, the results were bound to be disappointing for the U.N. and the U.S. in terms of building a cooperative working inspection process in Iraq. Regarding the role of the oil for food program and attempts to influence the Hussein regime, while minimizing the harm to Iraq civilians, the economic diplomacy failed in meeting both the U.N. and U.S.’s intended objectives. Duelfer reports that by 2000-2001 Iraqi government officials claimed that U.N. sanctions had collapsed. Duelfer cites deceptive trade practices by Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Duelfer goes further to cite government support of deceptive trade practices in the cases of Syria and Yemen.

Duelfer elaborates on the relationship between economic sanctions and WMD development in the Report’s section on Delivery Systems. By 1996, Iraq had accepted the oil for food program while grudgingly allowing UNSCOM inspections to continue. By 1998, Iraq had ceased cooperation with UNSCOM and the I.A.E.A. Until Blix’s UNMOVIC inspectors reentered Iraq in late 2002, under UNSCR 1441, there was no reliable WMD program information coming out of Iraq. During the inspection hiatus, Duelfer notes that Russian, Polish, Belarusian, and former Yugoslavian technicians and engineers specializing in missile development consulted for Iraqi development programs.

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Upon reentry, Blix directed U.N. inspectors to provide more information and transparency on Iraqi research and development and delivery system production. The new U.N. acronym of “CAFCD,” per UNSCR 1441, was created to explain the information requirements for a current, accurate, full and complete declaration by Iraq. The Iraq Survey Group finding is that from 1998 to 2002 Saddam Hussein “clearly intended” to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and the potential for WMD development as soon as economic sanctions were lifted (Duelfer, Vol. I, Key Findings: Delivery Systems, p. 2).

Duelfer’s investigation on ongoing nuclear and chemical weapons programs is less critical of Iraq. On nuclear programs, the Iraqi Survey Group’s key finding is that Saddam’s nuclear weapons programs ended with the 1991 Gulf War and that there was no evidence of attempts to reconstruct the nuclear program during the rest of the decade of the 1990s (Duelfer, Vol. I, Key Findings: Nuclear, p 1). The Duelfer Report offers that as far as nuclear weapons programs, the Iraqis retained the “intellectual capacity” for a future nuclear program. In short, Iraq’s nuclear engineers were retained in knowledge-based jobs with their nation’s Military Industrial Commission and the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission. The evidence on chemical and biological weapons program is also thin and points to a diminished focused during the 1990s U.N. inspection regime.

The Key Findings on Chemical includes that there is “ambiguous evidence” of chemical weaponizing activities (Duelfer, Vol. I, Key Findings: Chemical, p 2). Duelfer also reports that during the 1991 to 2003 timeframe, the Iraqi Intelligence Service converted Iraqi chemical labs, but never declared their existence or conversion to the U.N. as required by various Security Council Resolutions. The Duelfer Report also
highlights the success of the U.N. inspection regime in terms of biological weapons programs. Duelfer notes that by 1995 Iraq had destroyed its biological weapons program and facilities (Duelfer, Vol. I, Key Findings: Biological, p 1). The Report goes on to say that acting in accordance with UNSCR 687 (April 1991) Iraq had destroyed evidence of its prior biological program and clandestinely destroyed existing biological weapons agents. Duelfer cites evidence of Iraqi laboratories in the Baghdad area that were undeclared to UNSCOM or UNMOVIC, but also reports no evidence as to the scope and nature of their work or the military development of biological weapons (Duelfer, p. 3).

The Duelfer Report’s 23 September 2004 “Transmittal Message” provides a summary of “key inflection points” for a narrative context of the dates and events that sketch the direction of the Iraqi WMD programs under Saddam Hussein in the 1990s. Duelfer finds that Saddam was convinced of the effectiveness of WMD based on his experiences. Saddam used chemical weapons versus Iran and assumed estimates that Iraq’s use of 101,000 chemical weapons was affective in the Iran-Iraq War. Duelfer also reports that Saddam believed that the threat of chemical and biological weapons deterred the U.S. from attacking Baghdad in the first Persian Gulf War. The Report notes that Saddam also thought that the use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Shia was effective in maintaining domestic control following the Gulf War. Duelfer notes that during the initial post Gulf War inspection phase of intrusive UNSCOM inspections “Baghdad was found blatantly cheating” and Saddam’s regime as a result continued to “mix compliance with defiance.” Even the War’s follow on resolutions, such as UNSCR 707 (August

138 Information in this paragraph is from the Duelfer Report, Transmittal Message, and pp. 8-9.
1991) reveal an ability of the Security Council to “agree on demands but not on
enforcement.” In sum then, Saddam saw the utility of WMD and the threat of WMD
throughout his time as the leader of Iraq. Importantly, over time his regime found ways
to use corrupt practices to gain oil for food annual revenues, from approximately $250

Duelfer’s summary of the events following the end of inspections in 1998
provides a narrative of the important events from a U.S. standpoint.139 By 1998
Saddam’s Iraqi regime had decided that the combination of sanctions and inspections
were too much to put up with. Baghdad ended any semblance of cooperation on
inspections to initiate a high-level dialogue with the U.N. Secretary General and Security
Council. They were counting on firm support from France and Russia. The U.S. and
U.K.’s bombing in Operation Desert Fox had convinced Saddam that the U.S.’s desire for
regime change meant he would have to rely on U.N. support to survive, regardless of his
compliance with the inspection regime. The December 1999 UNSCR 1284 included
language from Russian diplomats about the potential for compliance leading to the
ending of sanctions. By 2000, the erosion of sanctions provided opportunities for a
degree of rearmament, for instance, the Iraqi purchase of 380 liquid fuel rocket engines.

In 2001, the new George W. Bush administration initiated a new policy of so-
called “smart sanctions” that let to a reopening of the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline. The
regional view was that by 2001, in the arena of public diplomacy, Saddam had developed
a “powerful lever” versus the rival Saudi Arabian and Egyptian regimes by standing up to

139 Information in this paragraph is from the Duelfer Report, Transmittal Message, and pp. 10-12.
the United States. The 2001 UNSCR 1441 was tougher in terms of reporting requirements and coupled with the U.S. military build up in the Gulf States presented a ratcheting up of threats against the Hussein regime. Bowing to this increasing pressure in 2002, Saddam accepted the new UNMOVIC inspection format. In the words of Duelfer: “the work of UNMOVIC inspectors on the ground was pursued energetically” however, it must be added too late to reverse the U.S. drive to eliminate Saddam’s regime through the use of armed force.

Duelfer and Blix also write about the difficulties of including Iraqi scientists in the U.N. as well as the U.S. Iraqi Survey Group’s inspections and review. Duelfer notes Saddam’s top-down influence and interest in nuclear programs. In the early 1970s, as Iraq’s Vice President, Hussein was in charge of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) (Duelfer, Key Findings, Strategic Intent, p. 19). The implications of Saddam’s statements reinforce the pressures on the Iraqi scientists to cooperate with Western and U.N. inspectors. Duelfer’s Acknowledgement raises these dilemmas, noting that the Iraqi experts included many “energetic and brilliant people” (Duelfer, p. 1). For Iraq’s best and brightest, the moral dilemmas of reporting accurate information to external countries, in light of the documented brutality of the Saddam Regime, posed a moral dilemma, even for those with no love of their governing regime (Duelfer, p. 4). Further, the Survey Group found no written instructions or orders from Saddam regarding WMD, even in the 1980s, which included an active phase of Iraqi weapons development. In addition, Duelfer reports Saddam’s lack of conviction on nonproliferation with audio taped statements in support of nuclear development such as “I am the Godfather of the IAEC and I love the IAEC” (Duelfer, p. 24).
In terms of the CIA-sponsored Iraqi Survey Group, their research includes a broad examination of a variety of U.S. agencies engaged in counter both Saddam and WMD proliferation counterproliferation efforts in Iraq. The composition of the Duelfer group reflects its attempt to widen the organizational and international scope of the investigation. The Group’s efforts extended from June 2003 through September 2004 and included Australian, American, and British soldier, analysts, and support personnel, along with their intelligence services (Duelfer, Acknowledgment, p.1). The Group did not include experts from Iraq or the region. The Defense Department lent its organizational capacity to support the efforts. Duelfer notes the significant role of Army Major General Keith Dayton and his analytical staff of 900, which recorded 36 million pages of documents, an unspecified number of interrogations and debriefing at Camp Cropper in Iraq, along with supporting explosive ordnance demolitions experts and laboratory personnel (pp. 1-2). David Kay, no friend of the U.N. inspection process or of U.N. and I.A.E.A. leadership, was the first overall director of the Group.

Whatever Saddam’s true feelings about the IAEC and the role of WMD in Iraq’s security policy, in the words of Duelfer: the work of UNMOVIC inspectors on the ground was pursued energetically” however, it was too late to reverse the U.S. drive to eliminate Saddam’s regime by armed force.\textsuperscript{140} Another line of inquiry is to examine in more detail the U.S. government’s policy leadership role in terms of influencing and being influenced by the efforts of the United Nations. For insights into the U.N.’s policy

\textsuperscript{140} Blix speculates that the Bush administration had been leaning towards the use of force against Iraq after the 911 attacks of 2001 (2004, p. 230).
leadership role, Hans Blix provides a third lens for examining counterproliferation policy in Iraq.

**Another View: Blix and the United Nations**

Hans Blix, a United Nations WMD weapons inspector, and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, provides an important second view on the evolution of U.S. counterproliferation policy in Iraq. His charter as head of the U.N. Monitoring and Verification (UNMOVIC) required a review of past practices and challenges in Iraq. Several obstacles regarding the policy process stand out in Blix’s account. First, is the notion that multiple principals hampered a direct channel of communications from the inspections chief to the secretary general in past U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) efforts. In receiving policy direction, there was the question of direct reports to the United Nations. For instance, would the head of UNMOVIC report to the U.N. Secretary General, the Security Council, or the I.A.E.A. body? Blix insisted that UNMOVIC be removed from the U.N. bureaucracy and placed under the personal direction of the U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Blix also insisted on receiving formal orders from the corporate executive committee, the U.N. Security Council (Blix 2004, p. 8). In one sense, this enhanced the visibility of UNMOVIC inspections, but on the other hand, it meant that for new or additional guidance he would have to gain a consensus through a Security Council resolution, as well as reporting to the 15 member Council, which included the Permanent 5 (or P-5) members, those with veto powers.

The voting, decision-making and communications with the Security Council are all more complex in the diplomatic/political world of the United Nations than is normally assumed for in the efficient and effective best practices of public management in U.S.
government agencies. In tracing the progress, or the lack of progress, in the inspection regime between 1997 through 2003, the ambiguity of goals and purpose are highlighted in Blix’s book. In hindsight, Blix is able to recount that Iraq eradicated most of its nuclear weapons program before the end of 1992 (Blix 2004, p. 30). In his report to the Security Council in October 1997, he notes that the I.A.E.A. had a “technically correct” picture of the evolution of the Iraqi nuclear program, in accordance with Iraq’s public declarations (p. 28). Nevertheless, as the U.N.’s chief inspector, Blix found it hard to prove the absence of concealable objects and activities. Tracing inspection activities forward to a March 2003 Security Council meeting on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, Blix highlights the implicit nature of the threat of armed intervention, even with a U.N. understanding that because of the veiled threat of vetoes by China, Russia, and France, a stronger resolution “would not be put to a vote” (Blix 2004, pp. 7-8). Target reporting deadlines were also ambiguous. Blix points out that the U.N. prepared to pull the UNMOVIC inspectors out of Baghdad after three and a half months, even though the guiding Security Council Resolution (Blix 2004, p. 10) had not set a deadline.

Similar patterns of conflicting and ambiguous signaling appear in the earlier decision in enacting U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284 in 1999 (Blix 2004, p 53). Even in passing the R-1284, Blix notes that the Security Council was not in full agreement with four abstentions, including veto holders China, France and Russia, along with Malaysia. The wording of the resolution also reflects the lack of consensus. Blix notes the subtleties in the wording that the sanctions would be “suspended” not lifted with cooperation and progress on key, yet undefined, disarmament issues. The outcome of this Security Council inconsistency resulted in Blix’s view of an Iraqi attitude of “wait
and see and chat” (Blix 2004, p. 53). This Iraqi attitude due in part to the U.N.’s lack of firm policy direction by 200 was coupled with what Blix calls “sanctions fatigue” at a time when outside business contacts with Baghdad were expanding due to the billions of dollars being generated for the regime through the U.N.’s oil for food program (Blix 2004, p. 54).

Another example of policy ineffectiveness involves the U.N.’s requirements for Iraq to make full declarations on their WMD programs. For instance, the final U.N. Resolution 1441 called for a complete Iraqi declaration due to New York on December 8, 2002. According to Blix this requirement produced a good deal of work by the U.N., I.A.E.A., U.S., and Iraqi governments, but mainly piles of paper, often repeating the same papers in other Iraqi declarations (Blix 2004, p. 99). Results also included a “wild circus” of media in New York as well as resentment in the inspections regime for demanding a drill that was not doable in a serious way in the 30-day limit while producing 12,000 pages of information of little value (Blix 2004, p. 106).

By January 2003 then, in pre-update and update reporting to the Security Council after the first 60 days of resuming inspections, Blix’s UNMOVIC, and ElBaradei’s I.A.E.A., were unable to provide credible support for either the presence of WMD in Iraq or for the validity of the inspections regime (Blix 2004, p. 111). In short, there was no progress in the policy and decisionmaking process since the end of UNSCOM activities in 1998. The two U.N. senior inspectors were unable to report the discovery of a smoking gun, linking Iraq to WMD activities or programs. Blix notes that in spite of the lack of evidence the U.S. and U.K. continued “flat assertions” that WMD items did exist in Iraq. In a case of strange bedfellows, Blix describes his agreeing with Rumsfeld, the
U.S. Secretary of Defense’s line that “the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence” (Blix 2004, p. 112). The result according to Blix was to place the burden on Iraq to win back the confidence of the U.N. for their reentry into the international community.

There is, however, reason to understand Iraq’s confusion caused to a certain extent by the inadequacy of the Security Council’s policy direction. In Blix’s in depth review from a U.N. perspective, he notes the “various clocks” of different resolutions. In addition to the sanctions fatigue and what Blix describes as the overall “tiredness” of the Iraq Regime in 1999 caused by the splits on the Security Council and the conflicting signals sent in the various resolutions. Still Blix admits that despite the lack of evidence from more than ten year of serious U.N. attention, by January 2003, when meeting with national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, at the U.N. in New York, Blix writes that “At this stage my gut feeling was still that Iraq retained weapons of mass destruction” and that Iraq had missed it opportunity to declare a true picture of its programs in it 12,000 pages of declarations (Blix 2004, p. 116).

There is also a problem of an inconsistent direction – in terms of conflicting signals -- of U.S. and U.N. policy regarding Iraq. Blix points out that both Clinton and Bush’s insistence on regime change in Iraq was never endorsed in a U.N. Security Council resolution (Blix 2004, p. 136). Blix notes that such a position regarding regime change would have given Saddam no incentive to comply. Similar confusion is addressed in Blix’s review of Deputy Secretary of State Wolfowitz speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, calling for the necessity for a “massive change of attitude” by Saddam as the equivalent of regime change (Blix 2004, pp. 136-7).
The contradictions and conflict in U.S. and U.N. policy direction are discussed in more detail in Blix’s book. For instance, he notes that the addition of the U.S. military’s regional buildup up during the following Bush administration was working in the summer of 2002, in the sense of gaining Iraq’s attention about the credible threat that armed intervention posed to the regime. This is in contrast to the Clinton over the horizon bombing and missile attacks during the 1990s. In Blix’s estimate, this military force reached invasion strength by the summer of 2003, but by then all possibilities for a Security Council agreement on a new policy direction has collapsed (Blix 2004, p. 5).

These conflicts in policy direction stemmed in part from poor planning for the implementation of policy guidance. The 1999 guidelines for UNMOVIC regime called for 120 days for inspections followed by reports to the Security Council. In contrast, UNSCR 1441 (November 2002) stipulated a “limited time” for compliance or serious consequences would result (Blix 2004, p. 5). In Blix’s account, most members of the Security Council, except the U.S., U.K. and Spain wanted a collective decision about what those serious consequences would be. Nevertheless, by March 16, 2003, at a meeting in the Azores, President Bush and Prime Ministers Blair and Aznar, engaged in high-level diplomacy in making a last appeal to the other members of the Security Council for collective action.

Past experience in negotiating with Iraq had led to unexpected and at time promising results. After the first Persian Gulf War, when confronted with an aggressive UNSCOM inspection regime, the Iraqi’s did write a letter to the I.A.E.A. explaining more details about their uranium enrichment experiments during the 1980s. In October of 1998, with the intervention of Kofi Annan, the Iraqi’s again provided some concessions
for inspecting their presidential sites. After Annan’s visit, then President Clinton had called back an “in air” U.S. bombing mission. In fact, the U.S. led diplomatic efforts did draw and Iraqi response. Saddam made a television speech again denying the presence of WMD, and that he had said in the past that Iraq had no WMD, and had none now. Nevertheless, this did not meet the Bush administration’s threshold for a “dramatic gesture.” Soon after, Blix was called by Assistant Secretary of State, John Wolf, from Washington DC, and told to withdraw the UNMOVIC inspectors (Blix 2004, p. 6).

In 2003, in 1998, and throughout this period then, there is evidence of fragmented and contradictory policy direction and leadership. The stark contrast and competition for a leadership role in setting counterproliferation policy direction pitted George W. Bush against the collective Security Council as well as the Secretary General. In an organizational sense, Hans Blix idea of reporting to and receiving guidance from the Security Council confused the chain of command. The Clinton administration was clearer in its intent of working in a collective manner with the Security Council and the Secretary General. The counterproliferation inspection regime had not provided the clarity and transparency for providing policy leadership as policy direction or signaling clear intentions backed by force to the Iraqi Regime. By October of 2002, even Blix was lobbying the P-5 for a new Security Council Resolution to bolster the inspections (Blix 2004, pp. 80-81). Despite the extensive efforts of the 1990s, Blix wanted a new chapter, a fresh start, to avoid the cat and mouse that had become routine in the UNSCOM period. One way to view this then is an admission of the failings of the previous counterproliferation regime with in hindsight shortcoming in the U.S. and U.N. policy leadership as well as the inspection regime implementation. Blix’s direction was to call
for a new inspection concept shifting from “they open doors, we search” to “they declare, we verify” (Blix 2004, p. 82). Certainly, the Iraqi’s efforts to be obstructionists had taken a toll and to a large extent added to the conflict through their diplomacy of brinksmanship. The lack of alignment and integration in the policy direction provided in the welter of views held by the U.S., U.N., I.A.E.A., and UNSCOM all contributed to the decline in the opportunities for a successful counterproliferation inspection regime.

As far as a unified Iraq counterproliferation policy direction it turns out that UNSCR 1441 (November 2002) was the high water mark for U.N. cooperation (Blix 2004, p. 89). Passed by unanimous vote, the resolution provided a last opportunity for Iraq. The call went to Iraq for immediate, unconditional, and active cooperation. The resolution pointed out that any additional U.N. Security Council findings of a “material breach” in Iraqi compliance would lead the Security Council to consider the use of force to achieve compliance. Blix notes that strong Security Council support. Nevertheless, given the decline in the perception of the inspection regime, a cause of concern especially given the lack of inspections in the 1998 to 2002 period, the inspection regime was not taken as an effective or even workable mechanism for countering the proliferation of Iraqi WMD.141

The period of the 1990s through the George W. Bush administration then marked a period of relatively extensive, but inconclusive inspections in Iraq. The lack of effectiveness in terms of U.S. and U.N. counterproliferation policy leadership is more pronounced given the terrorist attacks of 911 in 2001. Blix notes that 911 hit the U.S.

141 Blix notes, senior U.S. policy makers such as Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld viewed inspections as “useless” and were more likely to find Iraqi defectors more persuasive than the discovery resulting from over a decade of on site inspections (Blix 2004, pp. 12-13).
like an earthquake and immediately raised questions about what if terrorists or rogue states possessed WMD. From Blix’s internationalist perspective, the U.S. concluded that given the nature of catastrophic terrorism, the U.S. must therefore “strike first-preemptively” (Blix 2004, p.57). While the evidence to date from the UNSCOM inspections reinforced and “concluded by all that his [Saddam’s] nuclear program was finished” still defectors and satellite images offered the potential that Iraq had reconstructed various facilities and programs. After the shock of 911, in Blix’s assessment, “mind-sets were transformed around the world” especially in the U.S. and Bush administration (Blix 2004, pp. 57-58). The perception that U.N. inspections had failed to find WMD and the Security Council had failed to effectively manage for results only reinforced the Administration view that inspections were a lost cause and in the word of senior U.S. policy makers relatively useless for countering WMD proliferation.

**Performance Management: Assessing UNSCOM**

Looking back on the period of the post-911 period highlights an intense period of reexamination of the 1990s Iraq inspection regime. The 911 shock reawakened the U.S. presidential level of interest in counterproliferation as well as counterterror policies. Blix devotes considerable attention in summarizing an “important document,” the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Blix 2004, p. 70). Blix highlight the section of the official U.S. strategy document that addressed the concept for preemptive action. He also emphasizes Vice President Cheney’s August 2002 speech that in Blix’s view relied heavily in information from defectors and led to advocating invasion over a continuation of U.N. inspections. The organizational tasks that Blix had
planned to improve the effectiveness of the U.N. team had not impressed the U.S. senior policymakers.

Blix recognized the challenge he would face in accepting the position of chief executive officer for the new inspection regime. From the December 1999 establishment of the UNMOVIC charter, Blix planned a series of activities to organize, train, equip and support a new inspection team to start a new and improved round of inspections in November 2002. As described in the earlier cases, by 1999 there was what Blix refers to as a sense of tiredness in both the U.N. and U.S. efforts to develop a credible account of the status of past WMD developments as well as the potential that there were ongoing, clandestine programs. The U.N. Security Council, with U.S. support, “recognized that there might still be weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq” despite the disarmament that had been documented through U.N. inspections dating back to the George H.W. Bush administration in 1991 (Blix 2004, p. 3). What then does the record of Blix’s activities in his capacity as organizational leader and manager of UNMOVIC say about the effectiveness of his inspection team’s effectiveness in serving U.S. and U.N. interests in countering the proliferation of WMD? Throughout his firsthand account, Blix emphasizes positive steps toward improving organizational effectiveness. The account also informs the reader as to the complexities of providing policy and organizational leadership in the context of an international organization when addressing national security policy.

Early in his account, Blix emphasizes the significance of UNMOVICs core of “solid professionals” from around the world (Blix 2004, p. 4). The international cast included a Greek, Perricos, as head of operations with 20 years of inspection experience
with the I.A.E.A.; a Sri Lankan, Sanmuganathan from the I.A.E.A.; a Scot, Buchanan, a former UNSCOM spokesperson in charge of media relations; and Swedes, Stierlof and Skoog, both diplomats. Missing from the team were senior members from the U.S. or the other P-5. At several instances, Blix points out wanting to avoid direct P-5 involvement in UNMOVIC operations, both to avoid P-5 conflicts as well as to gain credibility with the Iraqi regime. The previous UNSCOM regime has inspectors from the P-5 and especially aggressive inspectors from the U.S. As is addressed below, the view from the I.A.E.A. was that these efforts hurt efforts to gain Iraqi cooperation and in fact made UNSCOM less effective.

The operational chain of command was complex (Blix 2004, p. 6). Blix was to be based in New York at U.N. headquarters. The head of mission in Baghdad was Dr. Gregoric. Blix notes that U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan had the highest managerial responsibilities for all of the U.N. staff in Baghdad. In addition, the Director-General of the I.A.E.A., ElBaradei, was responsible for all of the nuclear inspectors in Iraq. Finally, based on Blix preference and the wording of the U.N. Security Council Resolution, UNMOVIC worked most directly for the Security Council. Therefore, Annan, Blix, ElBaradei, all had to receive Security Council orders and decisions to change or augment the inspections charter or significantly change the inspection policies, processes, or activities.

Given the complexities of this chain of command as well as the highly technical nature of WMD programs, along with the grudging and often hostile reception by the Iraqi’s, Blix emphasized the expertise, international experience, and nonpartisan nature of his team. He points to his previous 16 years of work in Vienna as director general of the
I.A.E.A. (Blix 2004, p. 15). He also notes his learning because of observing the inspection and enforcement difficulties under the NPT safeguards system (Blix 2004, p. 21).

In comparison with the safeguards approach, the rules and processes of the UNSCR 687 (1991) mark a more extensive set of activities for inspections than had ever been attempted before. The Iraqi defeat, if not surrender, and the survival of the regime put into play a unique set of circumstances for extending the size and scope of intrusive inspections. UNSCR-687 specified giving the UNSCOM inspectors unlimited access, not just to declared sites. The UNSCOM’s original director, Rolf Ekeus, assisted by his deputy, U.S. diplomat, Robert Gallucci, was authorized to select inspection sites. National intelligence assets were to provide information. UNSCOM would have a separate budget line, outside of the regular U.N. budget channels. The inspectors would operate under the Security Council and not directly under the Secretary General. Staff and equipment support was to be volunteered by member states and not allocated on a geographic basis. In Blix’s view, the fact that previously staff had been solicited from member’s state volunteers contributed to a negative perception of the inspection program’s legitimacy, since only the richer, western states could offer up qualified inspectors.

Integrating and aligning the activities of UNSCOM and the I.A.E.A. turned out to be a major problem, especially in the early 1990s. Blix refers to these as tensions between the Rambo cowboys of UNSCOM versus the civil service, bunny huggers of the I.A.E.A. (p. 23). In addition to Gallucci, later the head of the U.S. delegation to the North Korean Agreed Framework negotiations, several other recognized U.S. experts
were involved in the UNSCOM activities. This early period of so-called cat and mouse games included the “dramatic” 1991 missions under assistant chief inspector David Kay’s “outsmarting Iraqi minder” and finding “smoking gun” documents about the Iraqi nuclear program (Blix 2004, pp. 24-5). Ironically, Blix points out that Kay’s 1991 success may have contributed to Iraq’s learning about the necessity for hiding documents. Blix also points the Iraqi’s irritation of Kay, perceived as a red cape to a bull, as opposed to an impartial inspector along the lines later envisioned by Blix for the UNMOVIC approach. Blix also notes that later Kay would be a strong critic of Blix and highly skeptical of the I.A.E.A. and UNMOVIC roles (Blix 2004, p. 27). Another U.N. inspector, Scott Ritter, was also noted for his combative inspecting style and abrasive relations with both the I.A.E.A. and the Iraqis (Blix 2004, p. 33). Blix characterizes this as Ritter’s private war and personal campaign to reveal Iraq’s “concealment mechanisms” (Blix 2004, p. 33).

The 1997 transition from Ekeus to Butler corresponded with continuing UNSCOM confrontations with Iraq over negotiating modalities or protocols for inspecting presidential palaces and other sensitive sites. Blix points to what he terms Butler’s “controversial” December 1998 Security Council report that included the assessment that Iraq was not fully cooperating with UNSCOM (Blix 2004, p. 34). Butler’s earlier concerns had triggered the personal diplomacy of Kofi Annan, which resulted in the February 1998 visit to Baghdad to negotiate a memorandum of understanding for access to eight presidential sites. Nevertheless, by December of 1998 Butler ordered the UNSCOM evacuation of Baghdad, which was followed closely by the December 17-20, 1998 U.S. and U.K. Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign,
including 100 cruise missiles (Blix 2004, p. 35). After these attacks, Iraq declared an end to the UNSCOM regime. Blix surmises that Saddam had concluded (as reinforced by U.S. congressional resolutions) that the U.S. wanted him and his regime to “disappear” and therefore decided to take his chances with the then eroding sanctions while courting favor with other members of the P-5. Later reports confirmed Blix’s and the Iraqi’s suspicions about the intelligence activities of some of the UNSCOM inspectors. Blix notes Ritter’s admission in early 1999 of working clandestinely with U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies (Blix 2004, p. 37).

In any event, following the 1998 bombing and termination of UNSCOM, Blix reports that there was no agreement among the P-5 on the next steps. There was a January 1999 agreement on forming three panels under Ambassador Amorim of Brazil. The first report noted that the bulk of Iraqi WMD programs had been eliminated. Nevertheless, there was a recommendation to reestablish an inspection process to monitor and inspect inside Iraq, therefore, in December of 1999, under UNSCR 1284 UNMOVIC was established as a new and improved inspection regime, or as Blix puts it, a “renovated” UNSCOM (Blix 2004, p. 39). At that time UNSCOM’s Deputy Director, Charles Duelfer, was asked to resign by the newly appointed UNMOVIC director, Hans Blix (Blix 2004, p. 46).

Mr. Blix’s Leadership and Management: Organizing UNMOVIC

In his role as UNMOVIC inspections chief, Blix offers important insights on his management philosophy and actions. In discussing the importance of effective leadership and management, Blix writes that organization and administration sound dull, but for results you need competent people, as sense of order in operations, and decent human
relations (Blix 2004, p. 48). For the usually critical area of budgets, UNMOVIC’s operational budget was tied directly to the oil for food program. Financing was pegged to .8% of the revenue from oil for food and resulted in a projected budget of $100 million dollars per year, in essence making money no object for the size of the inspection team. In several moves designed to enhance the perception of impartiality, as well as refute the potential for the spying charges made against UNSCOM, Blix distanced himself from the P-5. This non-partisan approach makes sense if the objective was to overcome the frictions of P-5 interference and intelligence meddling during the UNSCOM period. In hindsight, the fencing off direct P-5 involvement in the actual inspections served to exacerbate U.S. and other P-5 members understanding of the actual WMD situation in Iraq. Engaging more P-5 UNSCOM administrators and inspectors would have probably continued tensions with the Iraqis, but in all likelihood would have promoted better relations with the P-5, as well as within the Security Council.

Specific measures taken by Blix directly sought to drive a wedge between the UNMOVIC inspection team and the P-5 nations (Blix 2004, pp. 48-53). As Director of the inspection team, Blix rejected representation from each of the P-5 nations, claiming that political battles would paralyze the team’s effectiveness. Blix also eliminated the post of deputy executive chair, which had been held by U.S. representatives, including Gallucci and Duelfer previously with UNSCOM. He wanted to cut the direct link from the U.S. deputy to Washington. To avoid the U.N. political appointments process of geographical representation, Blix sought the applications of inspectors from outside government channels. For budgetary resources, given UNMOVIC’s guaranteed income from the oil for food program, Blix would not have to rely on separated funding from
voluntary contributions by member states. Blix also developed a separate inspector training program, to be run by UNMOVIC. For continuity purposes Blix retained several key UNSCOM administrators for UNMOVIC operations. His organizational plans called for several staff members to be based in Baghdad to serve as a forward operating base. Further distancing the UNMOVIC organization from the U.S., Blix rejected using the normal UNSCOM regional gateway military base at Bahrain in favor of basing out of Cyprus (Blix 2004, p. 90). On the sensitive issue of intelligence support, Blix initiated a policy of one-way intelligence traffic. That is, the UNMOVIC team would request intelligence support from member states, but UNMOVIC would not report back to member states on any in country findings outside of U.N. and Security Council reporting requirements. In addition, only the Chair/Director or his specially designated staffer would receive all intelligence from member states. Blix included the capacity to use both commercial and government satellite imagery and banned the use of electronic eavesdropping.

Internal to U.N. operations Blix also instituted some additional initiatives. In preparing for inspections in Iraq, he developed an organizational database and plan for inspection routines (Blix 2004, p. 53). He also initiated a handbook for the inspectors. Within the U.N., he insisted on building “excellent” relations with the Secretary General’s Secretariat staff on the New York headquarters 38th floor. This was in contrast with his UNSCOM predecessor Richard Butler’s prickly relationship with the U.N.’s Secretariat and other staff.

Blix made a concerted effort to resist outside advice to increase the size and scope of UNMOVIC’s efforts, beyond Blix’s reading of the requirements of UNSCR 1441
His idea was to train his own experts, coordinate intelligence activities, and to walk before they tried to run. So he kept the teams to about 10 people on each team and capped the total number at what his experience told him was a manageable size, a total of 200 inspectors in Iraq (Blix 2004, p. 90). Blix direct engagement as Director was demonstrated by his insistence on speaking personally to each inspection team-training course, including speaking at the seventh course graduation during a period of intense negotiations following Colin Powell’s U.N. presentation on January 27, 2003 (Blix 2004, p. 158).

**UNMOVIC and Measuring Performance Outcomes**

The Duelfer Report and Blix’s firsthand account ironically agree that the overall objective of eliminating Iraqi WMD and especially its nuclear weapons program had been achieved, even prior to the UNSCR authorizing a round of monitoring and verification inspections under UNMOVIC. Blix writes that by March 18, 2003, when he received the order to withdraw the inspectors from Iraq he was disappointed and UNMOVIC had “not been given a reasonable amount of time to achieve the mission with which we had been entrusted” (Blix 2004, p. 10). Blix’s review of the more than 10 years of inspection effort in Iraq reflects some of the difficulty of combining diplomacy, nonproliferation, politics and organizational development. By 2003, Blix had led three years of efforts in building a new inspection organization. His assessment was that the inspectors where now certified experts and well equipped to function as an independent tool of the U.N. Security Council. Nevertheless, the three years of effort in building his organization’s capacity resulted in only three-and-a-half months of inspections and the collapse of the UNMOVIC regime.
As evidence of the potential for the successful completion of the UNMOVIC mission, Blix clearly felt that the inspections in that short period of time were going well and that Iraqi’s had given up their cat and mouse activities (Blix 2004, p. 11). Blix expresses his regret over the U.S. decision to open a “quick campaign of armed counter-proliferation” without completing the 120 days of inspections called for in the December 2002 resolution. Blix also recounts that U.S. decision as precluding the continuation of additional options for further strengthening the counterproliferation inspection regime.

In comparison to the failed efforts in 2002 and 2003 then, Blix contrasts the “spectacular” nuclear inspections of the early UNSCOM period from May 15-21, 1991 (Blix 2004, pp. 23-24). Then the UNSCOM team discovered three nuclear enrichment programs for nuclear weapons development, despite Iraqi deception efforts. In Blix’s account, these three discoveries “shook the world” and included dramatic presentations by inspector Perricos to the Security Council and the I.A.E.A. Board. Further, by October 1997, then I.A.E.A. director Blix reported to the U.N. that the Iraqi WMD programs had been eliminated (Blix 2004, p. 28). Those impressive results reported by the U.N.’s chief watchdog agency was achieved despite the “cat and mouse” of Iraq’s resistance to transparency and inspections. Ironically, one source reinforcing the reporting that WMD programs had ended in effect in 1991 was provided by Saddam’s son-in-law and defector General Hussein Kamel who noted that under his direction all chemical and biological weapons were destroyed in Iraq and that an attempted crash program on nuclear weapons had failed (Blix 2004, pp. 29-30). Nevertheless, Blix points out that regardless of UNMOVIC’s inability to find evidence of Iraqi WMD and especially nuclear weapons programs, by March 17, 2003 George W. Bush presented an
ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Baghdad within 48 hours. Vice President Cheney’s view regarding Saddam was that “We [the Bush administration] believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons” which Blix found to be both a firm and unfounded position (Blix, p.8). In terms of cooperation then Blix and the Bush administration were not communicating effectively regarding the evidence, or lack of evidence on Iraqi WMD programs. The failure to integrate and align the U.S. and U.N. efforts clearly led to the confusion and conflict regarding the need for the use of force in countering proliferation in Iraq.

Grounded Leadership: Organizational Integration and Alignment

One key dimension of leadership is the leader and organizations ability to integrate and align its efforts with those of supporting agencies. While Blix himself would classify his relationship with Washington as a failure, his book reflects his sincere intent to improve relations between UNMOVIC and the U.N. Secretariat 38th floor staff. He points to his excellent internal relations at the U.N., which he classifies as “excellent,” while noting the “so-so” relations between Butler’s UNSCOM staff and the U.N. Secretariat (Blix 2004, p. 53). Integrating and aligning the efforts of UNMOVIC on behalf of the U.N. Security Council members as well as the U.N. Secretariat is of course a complex affair. Blix mentions several high-level secretariat chiefs as having significant relations with him as UNMOVIC director. These included Iqbal Riza, Annan’s chef de cabinet; Jayantha Dhanapala, head of the disarmament department; and Danilo Turk, deputy head of the political department. In addition, Blix notes the close contacts with the I.A.E.A. including its director, Mohammed ElBaradei and the I.A.E.A.-Baghdad chief inspector Jacques Baute. This international caste at the U.N. is significant in that it did
not include any members of the P-5, including the U.S. Blix’s intention of protecting the inspection regime from charges of spying and being dominated by U.S. and western powers seems to have been directed towards the idealistic goal of retaining the inspectors’ neutral competence.

This is also reflected in his positive relations with the Clinton administration in comparison with his rocky relationship with the Bush 43 Administration. In this sense then Blix’s actions and writing reflect an earlier public administration view of the role of public agencies in separating the political and administrative nature of their tasks. Much public administration literature is devoted to disputing this separation (Harmon and Mayer 1986, p. 22; West 1995, pp. 5-8). Blix on the other hand stresses the significance of attempting political neutrality with his inspectors cast as a-political scientists. No doubt, these efforts would serve to ease the criticisms from the Saddam Hussein regime. At the same time, it widened the gap between Blix and UNMOVIC and the previous UNSCOM inspectors and, most importantly, the distance between the U.N. and the Bush administration.

Blix returned to an August 22, 2000 decision by Secretary of State Albright and National Security Advisor Berger to the then U.S. view that no re-write was necessary regarding the resolutions regarding the U.N. inspection regime. Less than a year later, Blix notes Secretary of Defense Cohen’s January 10, 2001 report that Iraq had been rebuilding its chemical-biological weapons infrastructure. Blix points out that Cohen provided “no hard proof or hard evidence to substantiate the charges” (Blix 2004, p. 55). In essence then, the lack of on site inspections since December 1998 meant there were no means for verifying Cohen or anyone else suspicions regarding Iraq’s WMD programs.
Blix concludes that by the time of his April 2001 meetings with Bush, Rice and Powell, the earlier Administration’s position were established and never reexamined to determine their accuracy.

**Bureaucratic Leadership and Accountability**

Blix’s account stresses his leadership roles, including improving the effectiveness of the inspection organization as well as improving internal relations within the U.N. His actions are instructive for examining the notion of accountability in terms of improving the effectiveness and U.N. oversight of the inspection regime. Blix emphasizes steps he took to make UNMOVIC more accountable to the U.N. (Blix 2004, p. 39). Steps included more broadly recruiting of inspectors to clarify their role as international civil servants with loyalty to the U.N. only. Under the previous UNSCOM personnel process, inspectors were voluntarily recruited from member states and included more P-5 representation. Blix ended the “gratis” staff from what he terms the “big” states. To reinforce the U.N. chain of command Blix insisted on a clear U.N. identity without the perception of any remote control from a P-5 state. He therefore reinforced the reality and perception of international legitimacy for the UNMOVIC inspectors. Blix want the inspections to be conducted effectively and intrusively while avoiding unnecessary confrontation within Iraq (Blix 2004, p. 40). There were no initial suggestions in the inspection resolution regarding mechanisms for swapping information and intelligence. Blix sought to isolate the UNMOVIC process as an independent arm of the U.N. per the counterproliferation reforms recommended in the Amorim Report. All staff officer and inspectors were to come through U.N. funding (Blix 2004, p. 49).

**Participatory Leadership: Oversight and Other Network Stakeholders**
The significant influence of Harvard’s Belfer Center research on the Soviet nuclear stockpile is apparent in the development of Nunn-Lugar threat reduction programs. In contrast Blix’s notes the influence of two other U.S. policy research institutes in calling for a change in the director of U.S. counterproliferation policy in the Iraq case. Blix points to the March 2001 Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies report on “Smart Sanctions” reforms (Blix 2004, p. 56). Blix notes this report as a blueprint to U.S. efforts to reform the U.N. economic sanctions system that contributed to the November 29, 2001 U.N. Resolution 1382.

The Harvard studies in the late 1980s had contributed to the debate in the defense intellectual community and resulted in the Nunn-Lugar programs. In that instance of attention and concern about the proliferation concerns regarding the Soviet nuclear stockpile, engaged researchers, such as Ashton Carter, went on to significant government policy position. As termed in the literature on bureaucratic innovation and entrepreneurship, leaders are expected to become change agents, as “advocates” or “champions” as part of the policy formation and implementation process (Doig and Hargrove 1990; Downs 1967; Haass 1999; Light 1998; Riccucci 1995; Roberts and King 1996).

Blix notes that by the fall of 2002 the rhetoric had headed with Europeans favoring inspections over invasion while the U.S. administration was in opposition, especially in the public statements of Vice President Cheney. At the same time other foreign policy elites, notably former president Bush’s highly respected national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft “urged caution” in public statements and editorials (Blix 2004, p. 72). Blix also noted policy splits over Iraq within the U.S. senior administration, with
Colin Powell’s State Department seeming to favor inspections and multilateralism in opposition to Donald Rumsfeld’s Defense Department active invasion planning. The one staunch U.S. allied leader, the U.K.’s Tony Blair called publicly for letting the U.N. inspectors back in to do the job properly.

Other key stakeholders involved in the breakdown of the Iraq counterproliferation regime included U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who also came out in opposition to U.S. unilateralism (Blix 2004, p. 73). In Blix’s view Annan did not see the significance of multilateralism as a matter of convenience. Annan’s September 12, 2002 U.N. speech emphasized the importance of international legitimacy for self-defense as guaranteed by Article 5 of the U.N. Charter that could serve as a rationale for an invasion. The next U.N. resolution was influence directly then by those favoring a multilateral approach under the direction of a revised Security Council resolution.

Again, Blix notes that outside governmental research think tanks had an important role in shaping the U.S. administration’s position. In the case of the September 23-27, 2002 discussions of draft resolution, Blix writes that the draft seemed to be drawn from a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) workshop held in April 2002. In essence, the CEIP call for a more muscular sanctions and “coercive inspection approach” regime to Blix read more like a Defense Department document than a normal U.N. draft (Blix, 76). Blix describes two “startling” points in the report, first, that UNMOVIC

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was a weak inspection program and, second, that multilateral “cover” was needed for legitimacy and support through P-5 unity (Blix 2004, p. 77).

Being a conscientious program manager, Blix points to the first inspections in Iraq under the new resolution and UNSCOM organization occurred on November 27, 2002, ahead of schedule by 25 days (Blix 2004, p. 95). Nevertheless the political underpinnings for a unity of effort among the P-5 and the U.N. were not in the offing, as we now know. Interestingly, Blix notes that of all the Western leaders, the French Prime Minister, Chirac had the best picture of the reality of the situation in early January 2003 (Blix, 128). Blix records a meeting with Chirac and ElBaradei on January 17th. Blix writes that French intelligence was reporting that Saddam had WMD. But Chirac disagreed and thought that the UNMOVIC 1998 inspections had revealed that Iraq was disarmed and the inspections had been effective. He forecast that an invasion of Iraq would have the worst effect of fueling additional anti-western feelings in the Muslim world. As a multilateralist, Chirac also believed that only the Security Council was entitled to decide on military action. In addition, Chirac pointed out that Saddam was “locked up in an intellectual bunker” (Blix 2004, p. 128). Therefore approaching diplomacy as a game of rational action did not seem likely. Blix notes that in terms of the use of intelligence “one would expect” that given decisions over war and peace there would be some senior “quality control” and at least an examination of the intelligence with “critical minds and common sense” (Blix 2004, p. 157). In sum, Blix then fixes blame on the U.S. for failing to achieve the clear view of Chirac and have the wisdom to perceive the western intelligence failures as well as underestimating the relevance of the UNMOVIC inspections for ascertaining the evidence, or lack of evidence of the Iraq
WMD programs. The Iraq case provides an example of mixed results in terms of the effectiveness of U.S. and U.N. policy leadership.

Concluding Thoughts

The policy process, as sometimes addressed in the policy innovation literature as linear and consistent is, as expected, both complex and dynamic. The leadership dimensions of this study also reveal complexity and dynamism. Policy experts, such as Aspin, Perry, Gallucci, Butler, and Blix matter, as do the faceless public officials in public agencies as well as international organizations, such as the I.A.E.A. American political institutions also matter, including the significant role that Congress plays when they are engaged in setting the conditions for effective policy innovations that can be sustained over time with resources, attention, and oversight. Finally, the policy and strategy processes highlight the necessity of different mindsets, as well as different approaches, in cooperative versus competitive environments.

Rather than think of the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative as a success or failure then, this study suggests a national security counterproliferation policy that remains incomplete. Further studies should continue along the lines suggested by this research. U.S. interagency coordination, integration and alignment are indispensable to the implementation of security policies in terms of agenda setting, negotiations and policy implementation. Long-range planning by the U.S. government, including the national security council and defense, state, homeland security and other cabinet departments remains a shortcoming of the national security policy process. This study also reinforces the importance of a public management framework of leadership and management, in terms of setting strategic direction, integrating and aligning the various
stakeholders, and emphasizing performance measures – both for scholarly research and practical policymaking. Finally, the reform of the U.N. and the international arms control regime remains an important research agenda for the fields of international relations and public administration and management.
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**Department of Defense Annual Reports**


Chapter 7: Findings and Conclusions

Political scientists generally agree that research in their field should address important real-world problems.

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005, p. 263)\textsuperscript{143}

The [Deutch] Commission recognizes that organization alone will not determine the overall success or failure of our efforts to combat proliferation. However, good organization and good leadership will have a profound impact on our prospects for success. They constitute the cornerstone of a comprehensive, integrated approach to the WMD problem that will be indispensable to safeguarding our vital national security interest and protecting our military forces and citizens at home and abroad.

Suzanne E. Spaulding, Executive Director (1999, p. 178)

The patterns of organizational leadership in each of the three cases studied here follow different contours, with differing degrees of success and failure. The North Korea case reflects both the significance of leadership in the foreign policy negotiations process, as well as the lack of effective implementation in terms of providing a workable organizational capacity for monitoring and verifying arms control agreements.

Additionally, the Agreed Framework negotiations met the objective of securing a “framework” for a transactional exchange without a first-order agreement on the all important security arrangements on the Korean peninsula -- more than fifty years after

\textsuperscript{143} George and Bennett cite the works of notable political scientists who support this position, including Hugh Helco, Robert Dahl, Edward Banfield, Glenn Paige, Robert Yin and other scholars of public policy, international relations, and American government (George and Bennett 2005, p. 263). James Q. Wilson writes: ‘After all these decades of wrestling with the subject, I have come to have grave doubts that anything worth calling “organization theory” will ever exist…. Nothing would please me more than to have a comprehensive, systematic, and tested theory that really explains a lot of interesting things about a great variety of organizations. In the meantime, I think it might be helpful to public discourse and to college students if someone were to set forth what we now know about government agencies in all (or at least most) of their complexity, and to do so by sticking as close as possible to what actually happens in real bureaucracies’ (1989, pp. xix-xx).
the end of major combat operations in the Korean War. Since 1993, the Framework has collapsed and there is little progress in achieving either of its major objectives of halting North Korea’s nuclear development and weapons programs or providing for North Korea’s energy needs. There is still heated debate over the causes of this failure. Some critics cite the Clinton administration’s lack of a diplomatic follow-through -- to continue the negotiations and attempt to resolve the underlying security dilemmas. Other critics highlight the slow response of KEDO and U.S. government, especially the perception of congressional foot dragging in providing funding support for the development of light water nuclear reactors in North Korea. The criticisms of presidential efforts in WMD nonproliferation continue, more recently, in 2006, when the George W. Bush administration received similar criticism for failing to stop North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons program.\footnote{For instance, in a September 2, 2006 editorial on “Mr. Bush’s Nuclear Legacy,” The New York Times points out that “Unless something changes soon, by the end of President Bush’s second term North Korea will have produced enough plutonium for 10 or more nuclear weapons while Iran’s scientists will be close to mastering the skills needed to build their own. That’s quite a legacy for a president sworn to keep the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous regimes.” The Times recommendation is for directs U.S. talks with Pyongyang and Tehran, for what the editors call “some real diplomatic horse trading.” Accessed: 2 September /2006 [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/02/opinion/02sat1.html].}

The Nunn-Lugar case continues to be cited by national security experts as a successful program for confidence building as well as a significant effort at nuclear threat reduction. Nunn-Lugar extended over the course of several presidential administrations, starting with George H.W. Bush and continuing today. Of the three examined cases, the leadership pattern of Nunn-Lugar stands out from the other two. Under Nunn-Lugar, the role of engaged congressional leadership and oversight is more pronounced than in either the Agreed Framework or the Iraq case. While Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill
Clinton supported the threat reduction initiatives, it was the United States Senate and especially Senators Nunn, Lugar, and later Domenici, who provided essential policy leadership as well as program stewardship for ingraining counterproliferation efforts with Russia and the Former Soviet Republics in the annual cycles of hearings and budgeting processes.

In contrast to the North Korea and Iraq cases, the arms control role of the Defense Department in the Nunn-Lugar programs was extensive. Defense implementation included the Defense Nuclear Agency’s reinvention as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Defense department involvement spanned the strategic, organizational and participatory leadership levels in developing and implementing the threat reduction initiatives as part of the Defense Department’s engagement in counterproliferation programs. This finding of the U.S. Senate’s important role in national security policy and strategy, is also noted in Polsby’s earlier case study work on policy innovations. Polsby writes that “In the modern Senate the three central activities include: (1) the cultivation of national constituencies by political leaders; (2) the formulation of questions for debate and discussion on a national scale…and (3) the incubation of new policy proposals that may at some time find their way into legislation” (Polsby 1984, p. 162). Certainly the Nunn-Lugar case illustrates the further extension of Senate leadership in providing policy initiatives as well as the funding resources to develop an organizational capacity within U.S. government agencies to implement significant counterproliferation policies. The continued oversight of agency implementation is another important role for powerful Senate policy experts, such as Nunn and Lugar, in the case of Russia. There were no
widely recognized Senate leaders praised for their expertise in championing counterproliferation efforts in either the North Korea or Iraq cases.

The Iraq case, especially during the Clinton era, reflects a mixed outcome. As in the case of North Korea, the organizational center of gravity shifted after the first Persian Gulf War to the United Nations and the I.A.E.A. The narrative of the work by the U.N. inspections regimes, both UNSCOM and then UNMOVIC, provides contrasting perspectives on the leadership roles of public executives. After the Gulf War, when counterproliferation and arms control moved into the international arena, the Defense Department’s engagement faded to the background. The counterproliferation efforts versus Iraq then shifted to more traditional and conventional roles for the Defense Department and the armed services in terms of conventional containment as well as programmatic efforts directed primarily at the narrow areas of defensive measures to protect U.S. military forces from the threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.

A significant finding, then, is the relative lack of policy and organizational leadership\textsuperscript{145} in the development of counterproliferation efforts by the secretaries of defense over the extent of the two Clinton administrations, except in the case of Nunn-Lugar, where the complimentary efforts of congressional leadership was essential. Yet, even in this more narrowly circumscribed policy area, according to the Deutch Commission and the General Accountability Office’s (GAO) review discussed in Chapter 3, the Defense Department -- overall -- has failed to address key counterproliferation

\textsuperscript{145} This finding is also addressed in the Deutch Commission Report, which highlights failures in presidential, U.S. interagency, and international leadership in combating WMD proliferation (1999, p. 17). A specific finding regarding the defense department is bluntly stated: “Finally, DoD lacks both the organizational leadership and an integrated plan to relate new requirements, like chemical and biological defense, to other priorities” (1999, p. 68).
policy issues and achieve its primary goals of stopping the spread of WMD. Leadership here is addressed in terms of three major dimensions; including failures by the DOD and, more broadly, U.S. government and interagency process in terms of: (1) strategic leadership and management; (2) organizational performance management, integration, and alignment; and (3) participation and oversight. Overall, the evidence provided in the selected case studies reveals significant gaps in pursuing policy initiatives for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Three Levels of Leadership

This research has traced the U.S. counterproliferation policy process during the two terms of the Clinton administration. As the first post Cold War presidency, the period from 1992 to 2000 provides a unique window of opportunity to study policy innovation in the time period between the passing of the threats of the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union and the reenergized concerns with international terrorism after the 911 attacks on U.S. soil. Despite major efforts under the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative umbrella, the one area of agreement of the two 2004 presidential candidates, Bush and Kerry, was that the greatest security threat facing the U.S. continued to be the potential for WMD attacks by terrorists on the U.S. homeland. In light of post-911 developments then, rather than consider the relative merits of Clinton era counterproliferation policy making in terms of degrees of failures or of limited successes, it is most appropriate to consider the Administration record in each case study as incomplete. While the Nunn-Lugar efforts have been praised in U.S. circles, ironically it turns out that the U.S. efforts in Iraq, with results verified during the George W. Bush’s administration’s 2003 preventive war, may be considered the most
successful in terms of meeting the primary policy objective of eliminating a rogue or enemy state’s WMD programs. Certainly, the short term effectiveness of the North Korea Agreed Framework has not met the long term security interests of either the U.S. or North Korea, or Korea’s neighbors in East Asia or, as far as we know, halted the spread of North Korean nuclear weapons and nuclear development programs.

In each of the three case studies, then, this research illuminates the importance of the influence of American politics and the U.S. political system for understanding the nature of national security policymaking. In addition, the importance of an approach that bridges the theory-practice gaps reveals the utility of a structured, focused, and theoretically informed study of counterproliferation policymaking. The process tracing approach that starts with the counterproliferation policy’s founding moment and traces trends in policy development and implementation over time, provides an important method for learning about public policy -- especially in cases of innovation as a process and as the result of a variety of leaders and of leadership as a collective enterprise, as discussed earlier in the literature’s notion of collective entrepreneurship. In essence, studying the interactions among policies, policymaking and organizational processes, and public officials provide fundamental insights into policy innovations.146

146 As addressed in Chapter 2, Polsby’s study of policy innovations reveals similar findings: “we have learned that what we normally think of as political innovation can be described as a combination of two processes (1984, p. 173). The first, the process of invention, causes policy options to come into existence. This is the domain of interest groups and their interests, of persons who specialize in acquiring and deploying knowledge about policies and their intellectual convictions, of persons who are aware of contextually applicable experiences of foreign nations, and of policy entrepreneurs, whose careers and ambitions are focused on the employment of their expertise and on the elaboration and adaptation of knowledge to problems. The second process is a process of systemic search, a process that senses and responds to problems, that harvests policy options and turns them to the purposes, both public and career-related, of politicians and public officials. As we have seen, in the American political system, search processes can be activated by exogenously generated crises and by constitutional routines, by bureaucratic needs and by political necessities. Describing political innovation in any particular instance thus entails describing how these two processes interact.”
**Bridging Theory-Practice Gaps**

The first case, of the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, emphasizes the utility of the coercive diplomacy construct. The underlying competition and conflict between the two sides should have telegraphed the subsequent (and continuing) difficulties in turning the Framework into an effective counterproliferation program. The use of institutional theory, especially relevant in the second case study of Nunn-Lugar threat reduction initiatives, illustrates the greater potential for policy effectiveness when the parties agree on fundamental goals and values as the basis for negotiations, policy making and policy implementation. While perhaps obvious in hindsight, it should be noted that at the time they were initiated, both the Agreed Framework and Nunn Lugar were viewed as risky ventures, given the U.S. government’s lack of trust of the Kim regime, as well as the lingering anti-Soviet Cold War perceptions, especially in the U.S. Congress. The Iraq case suggests mixed signals in assessing the use of public and performance management insights. The underlying and heated conflict in the relationship between the U.S. and the Saddam regime undercut attempts by the U.N. inspection chiefs to attempt a cooperative approach in the transition from UNSCOM to UNMOVIC.

These cases suggest three main findings regarding the interplay of the forces at work in the processes of policy innovation and public leadership. First, the role of the founding diplomatic efforts is most significant for initiating new strategic directions to develop and sustain policy efforts for the long term. As experts have noted, the significance of the president’s guiding vision in national security policy innovations is
most important to the success of efforts, especially for the short term initiation phase. The policy initiatives during the Clinton era did not come from the president himself. The evidence in this study suggests the importance of the Secretaries of Defense, especially Aspin and Perry, in the invention of the counterproliferation policy initiative. As the three individual cases reveal, however, the notion of collective entrepreneurship is closer to the mark in identifying the number and evolving nature of the multiple players in the counterproliferation policy process. In the Agreed Framework case, the main actors included the State Department negotiators for the short term. In the Nunn-Lugar case, the Senate was the focus of action initially. The Iraq case requires extending the analysis to include the Secretary General as well as the agency chiefs of international organizations.

Another finding is that for the mid and long-terms, institutions and organizations become the centers of gravity. The fact that the Agreed Framework lacked an institutional home or a champion outside of the executive branch contributed to its ineffectiveness over time. Without a clear proponent in the U.S. Senate, or a fully engaged organizational agent, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in implementing the Nunn-Lugar programs, in effect the policy withered on the vine as other international crises crowded it out of the national security agenda.

The third case of Iraq reinforces the necessary conditions and the critical roles of ownership, of policy champions who as collective entrepreneurs guide the extensive

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147 The Deutch Commission recommendation supports the significance of top-level leadership as a major change in counter WMD policymaking: "Presidential leadership is essential to ensure that a strategy for combating proliferation is formulated, understood, and implemented by the many agencies involved" (Deutch 1999, p. 9).
policymaking process -- from the initiation through the implementation phases for an effective and sustainable policy innovation. The Iraq case also reveals the difficulty of transferring ownership to an international agency. Mr. Blix’s efforts notwithstanding, the lack of a significant U.S., U.K., and other Western “allied” participants in the UNMOVIC inspection team, along with a lack of visible, credible and networked U.S. policymakers – especially without consciously aligning support within the Congress, or in the U.S. departments of defense and state, or on the national security council staff -- were shortsighted and counterproductive decisions by both U.S. and U.N. policymakers. Expanding the roles of stakeholders among the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council, as was practiced during the previous UNSCOM regime under Mr. Butler’s leadership, is more likely to have increased the shared sense of engagement, responsibility, and accountability for the effectiveness of the inspection regime over time. The three cases all reinforce traditional public management concerns about leadership and management in terms of relating politics and administration, as well as encouraging stakeholder participation, performance, and accountability.

**Improving Government Performance**

In terms of a U.S. governmental management philosophy, the Clinton era marked a reform-minded period that included the Gore National Performance Review, as prescribed by management initiatives, such as reinventing government, government performance and results. The writings of Osborne and Gaebler, Cohen and Eimicke, Light and other academic researchers focused government attention on the possibilities for a “new” public management. In international relations, the post Cold War era provided opportunities for additional congressional attention on defense policy and
strategy that had, for the most part, been the focus of the executive branch during the high threat atmosphere of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry. The legislative process reflected growing congressional engagement starting with 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation that mandated addition interservice cooperation for joint operations, as well as requiring the executive branch to public an annual national security strategy document to serve as the guiding statement of U.S. strategic direction, goals and objectives for foreign and defense policies. Indeed the review of national security strategy documents reveals attention to the importance of policy innovations in the post Cold War period.

The policy innovation literature provides significant insights into the research of the opportunities for large scale, or transformational, as well as incremental change in policymaking. Notions of a linear cycle of policy creation, design and implementation provides too simple framework when applied within the complex and fragmented American political system. The new emphasis on the significance of team or collective leadership and the extended length of policy cycles to achieve progress over time, all signal the end of patterns of heroic individual leadership and the growing importance of issue and leadership networks in policy innovation efforts. Diverse groups of individuals emerge in roles as policy champions, intellectuals, advocates and entrepreneurs. Significant roles vary, given the variety of contexts involving individuals, positions, time, and circumstances. The literature identifies different roles in differing circumstances, for instance, with politicians taking the lead in crises, agency heads leading in the context of organizational change, and mid and front line managers responding to solving problems as well to capitalizing on opportunities for realigning organizational goals and performance to new conditions. These general frameworks only provide a starting point
and fail to include a comprehensive and holistic understanding of the realities of the number of individual and organizational players involved, especially in national security policymaking.

**Executive Leadership**

In studying the counterproliferation initiative, especially in its creation or founding phase, the timing of the end of the Cold War must be coupled with the selection of Les Aspin as the first Clinton Secretary of Defense. Aspin’s defense background and expertise included his doctorate in economics from M.I.T., his time as a McNamara whiz kid in the 1960s Defense Department, along with a congressional career that included his chairmanship of the House Armed Services Committee. He entered the secretary’s position with an established reputation as a defense intellectual and policy entrepreneur. While his tenure as secretary lasted less than two years, his leadership in founding the counterproliferation initiative was firmly established with his December 7, 1993 speech at the National Academy of Sciences. There he focused attention on the WMD issue as a key security concern for the immediate post Cold War period and announced the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative to spearhead Defense Department efforts against the new dangers facing U.S. national security. That speech also highlighted North Korea as a rogue state with nuclear ambitions. Thus, throughout the 1990s the idea of nuclear armed and proliferating rogue or states of concern, including North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the potential for collusion with terrorist groups, became central to the Administration’s national security policies and strategies. Certainly, the elevation of Aspin’s successor, William Perry, reinforced this level of concern and focus. Perry’s was personally engaged in both the Agreed Framework and Nunn Lugar cases. The relative
lack of engagement in guiding Administration counterproliferation policy efforts by second term defense secretary, the former Maine Republican Senator, William Cohen, reflects a decline in Defense Department policy leadership. Governmental reviews of Clinton era WMD policy all cite the inability of the DOD to integrate and align U.S. government interagency efforts. The Iraq case reflects an attempt to delegate the U.S. role to U.N. inspectors and the U.N. Security Council – in effect diminishing the U.S. and DOD roles in counterproliferation implementation on the ground in Iraq.

In the North Korean case, the importance of negotiations and the use of preventive, coercive diplomacy may, in fact, have prevented a U.S. war, as former Secretary Perry argues. Of additional significance was the recognition by both negotiating parties that they were engaged in a strategic interaction underscored by competition and conflict. In terms of scholarly international relations theory, the North Korean case suggests that the gap between theory and practice, in terms of the utility of coercive diplomacy theory to understand and explain U.S. and North Korean relations, is not that wide at all. The Agreed Framework case illustrates the essence of coercive diplomacy, which is using negotiations to change objective behavior of a state, short of war. The pattern of events suggested by the theoretical construct adds to our deeper understanding of the conditions as well as obstacles to implementing an effective policy. One particular factor that stands out is the strength of the U.S. top leaders’ motivation to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem of North Korean nuclear development. The timing and sense of urgency as conveyed by the Secretary of Defense and chief negotiator’s accounts are a second key insight. Third, the spillover effects of the U.S.
military success in the preceding Persian Gulf War added a sense of credibility to the threat of war as an incentive for a diplomatic solution.

The Agreed Framework case then reveals a top-level diplomatic success in U.S. counterproliferation policy. Subsequent events reveal the weakness of the Framework for the longer haul. Over the course of the second Clinton term, including the 1998 North Korean firing of an experimental rocket over Japan, the U.S. Congress’s weak support of the Agreement, the limited KEDO progress and oversight, the continuing concerns about the North Korean secret nuclear programs, the failure to make diplomatic progress all signaled the weakness of a Framework grounded within a competitive and threatening context. This lack of trust and confidence was exacerbated by the use of international arms control inspectors, who were separated from extensive and continuous oversight by U.S. governmental agencies and the American political process, especially the annual congressional appropriations and authorization budget cycles. Perhaps most importantly in this case, there was no progress in resolving the underlying bilateral and regional security concerns. Diplomacy did not continue to further define, defend, or extend the rule of the Kim regime, by providing security guarantees for regime survival. The overall lack of trust and the perceptions of continued competition and hostility only reinforced the forces acting to destabilize the Agreed Framework and its potential for serving as a roadmap for improving Korean security relations. Additional efforts in Clinton’s second term, such as Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s trip to North Korea, and President Clinton’s expressed personal interest in building a more stable security arrangement by considering meeting with Kim Jong Il, failed to build on the momentum of the successful Agreed Framework negotiations. In sum, the short term efforts in using coercive
diplomacy in North Korean counterproliferation efforts were not followed by an effective
implementation phase and certainly failed to bring about a wider regional security
arrangement through focused diplomatic or arms control efforts.

The Nunn-Lugar case reinforces the salience of public leadership in policy
innovation. In particular, this case highlights the observations of veteran U.S.
policymakers, that stable cooperative threat reduction regimes requires attention from on
high along with a bureaucratic commitment at lower levels for implementation. In terms
of linking theory and practice, Nunn-Lugar suggests the utility of the relevance of both
policymaking and instrumental methods for developing and implementing the innovation
process. In other word, the conditions for effective Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
programs included both policy and instrumental dimensions. The U.S. and Russia and
the former Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelorussia were all
engaged in negotiating to meet complementary national interests. The remaining great
power, the U.S., committed resources and supported the rules of the road. The specific
CTR arms control regime was perceived as the embodiment of legitimate international
norms, identity and knowledge for a new and stable partnership that stabilized
expectations among all of the parties regarding the costs and consequences of an
agreement. Two underlying conditions account for the relative effectiveness of the
counterproliferation policy in the Nunn-Lugar case. These include the participating
states’ up front agreements on policy ends and objectives, as well as the unique timing, or
window of opportunity opened because of changes in the Russian regime and ideology.

No doubt the end of the Cold War did not mark the end of history, but it did
provide a shock to the international system that included the opportunity for a new world
order, as well as a new Russian relationship with the West and the U.S. The complementary nature of the Russian and former Soviet Republics motivation to join the emerging global community and engage collaborative with the U.S. to end hostilities and gain international aid as well as legitimacy in terms of democratic reforms -- all provide a unique set of circumstances for innovation. Ironically, the long cycles of U.S.-Soviet, Cold War arms control negotiations provided a common language and negotiations procedures for fostering Nunn Lugar negotiations and program developments. That is, providing a common understanding for developing the rules, regulations, information sharing, compliance standards, and enforcement mechanisms that provided for credible and verifiable arrangements to stabilize U.S. and Russian expectations and build trust.

As far as the U.S. government is concerned, the Nunn-Lugar case most clearly embodies the significance of the role of an agency chief, that is, Dr. William Perry, in leading interagency and non-governmental efforts to implement policy. The work of the defense, state, and energy departments, the CIA, and subordinate defense field agencies, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the On-Site Inspection Agency -- all involved in complex negotiation processes and field operations -- were led in large measure by Defense Secretary Perry and his chief assistant, Ashton Carter. Their early issue network included, of course, the significant expertise and political leadership of Senators Nunn, Lugar and Domenici, as well as the support of the House of Representative and the House Armed Services Chair, Les Aspin. Especially in the early period of the late 1980’s, that government network was preceded by work in university and research institutes, including Harvard’s Belfer Center, the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, the Brookings Institution along with other non-governmental experts in the defense and foreign policy communities.

Nunn-Lugar policymakers faced early barriers to implementing innovative counterproliferation programs. Pentagon internal reforms were necessary for extending funding to programs in the former Soviet Union and Republics. The Pentagon’s planning, programming, and budgeting system was circumvented with non-standard procedures for reprogramming annual Defense Department budget allocations. In addition, there were reports of initial congressional opposition to appropriating U.S. defense dollars for new initiatives, such as build housing for Russian military officers as well as for converting Soviet defense industries to civilian production. Russia’s internal barriers included the Cold War legacy of secrecy in the cultural DNA of the offices of MINATOM, the former Soviet nuclear agency. Barriers on both the U.S. and Russian sides were overcome in large part because of the high-level incentives for all parties to complete successful counterproliferation programs. The calculations of “lengthening the shadow of the future” provided the positive incentives, at the right time, for capitalizing on the changes in the international environment and constructing new, positive, cooperative relationships among the U.S., Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

The cooperative conditions in the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Initiatives were certainly not present in the Iraq case study. In fact, a main finding here is that attempts by Hans Blix to gain Iraqi cooperation hindered U.N. efforts to complete the WMD inspections and fulfill UNMOVIC’s role as an agent of the U.S. Security Council. The public management, organizational performance literature provides the guiding
framework for examining the inspection regime in Iraq using the methodology of a
structured, focused, case analysis.

Public Leadership and Management Matter for Effective Policy Innovation

After more than a decade of what some scholars call a new public management
agenda the government performance subfield stresses a return to some of the traditional
roots of public administration to essential notions, such as, “management matters” and
“effective leadership is vital” to strategy and organizational performance in national
security policymaking and implementation. Thus, the literatures on public leadership and
policy innovation highlight the significance of agency chiefs in charting strategic
direction, integrating and aligning the efforts of organizational and individual
stakeholders, and monitoring performance. This third, Iraq case shifts from the U.S.
focus of the first two cases, to examine the role of public agency leadership in
international organizations.

Because of the events of 911 and the search by internal agencies, as well as public
and governmental oversight committees calls for transparency in government, there is a
body of research on the narrative of the events leading to 911 to seek to discover the roots
of failures in stopping the terrorists attack on the U.S. homeland. The additional
concerns about intelligence failures in light of the U.S. invasion of Iraq are also a cause
for government reviews and reports. The Kean-Hamilton 911 Commissions Report, the
Duelffer Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central
Intelligence on Iraq WMD, annual Defense Department reports to the President and
Congress, the Counterproliferation Program Review committees annual reports, as well
as first hand accounts by policymakers have all let to additional information on the conduct of counterproliferation programs.

Throughout the Clinton era, the U.N. and especially the Secretary General and Security Council maintained a focus on Iraq and issued numerous resolutions to halt the progress of Iraqi WMD programs, to verify the destruction of existing weapons, and even to eradicate their scientists’ research and development base for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile projects. High level U.N. panels studied Iraqi behavior and an array of instruments, from international economic sanctions to threats of escalation to air force bombings, were used to gain Saddam’s compliance with the U.N.’s resolutions. Experts agree that these efforts largely resulted in raising Iraqi hostility and encouraging a lack of cooperation especially with UNSCOM under Ambassador Richard Butler. By January 2000, Butler’s replacement, Hans Blix, a former head of the I.A.E.A., decided to change course. As agency chief, Blix decided to transform the role and direction of the U.N. inspection regime in Iraq.

Blix created several conditions that, in his view, professionalized the conduct of U.N. inspections. He embarked on a two year planning process for selecting, training and designing high standards for inspections under the UNMOVIC inspections. At all times he stressed seeking a technically correct picture of Iraqi WMD programs. Blix insisted that overall policy direction come from the U.N. Security Council, as opposed to the Secretary General and the U.N.’s internal staff secretariat. While gaining a sense of independence from the Secretary General and the U.N. staff, Blix’s also sought to isolate UNMOVIC from great power politics. Thus he also excluded inspectors from the U.S., U.K. and the other veto-power, P-5 nations, of the U.N. Security Council. This attempt at
neutral competence in effect contributed to a lack of trust between the U.S. executive branch, under Bill Clinton’s successor George W. Bush, and the UNMOVIC regime.

Observations for Future Research

This study concludes with five observations for future research. First, the theory-practice gap is smaller than some think. The cases examined here reflect the significance of using scholarly research and theory to bridge the theory-practice gap, and gain both analytical depth as well as a practical understanding of the processes of policy innovation and leadership. The policy process, as sometimes addressed in the policy innovation literature as linear and consistent is, as expected, both complex and dynamic. The leadership dimensions of this study also reveal complexity and dynamism. Leaders, as policy experts, such as Aspin, Perry, Gallucci, Butler, and Blix matter, as do the faceless officials in public agencies, such as DTRA and OSIA, as well as international organizations, such as MINATOM and the I.A.E.A. Political institutions also matter; including the significant role that Congress plays when they are engaged in setting the conditions for effective policy innovations that can be sustained over time with resources, direction, and oversight. The policy and strategy processes in each of the three cases highlight the necessity of different mindsets, as well as different approaches, in cooperative versus competitive environments.

Overall, rather than think of the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative as a success or failure then, the three cases reveal a national security counterproliferation policy that remains incomplete. Further studies should continue along the lines suggested by this research. The U.S.’s role and the roles of its internal government agencies are most significant in international affairs, especially in an age of globalization. U.S. interagency
coordination and alignment are indispensable to the articulation and implementation of security policies in terms of agenda setting, negotiations and policy implementation. Long-range planning by the U.S. government, including the national security council and defense, state and other cabinet departments remains a shortcoming, as suggested in each of these cases. This study also reinforces the dynamics of public leadership and management in policy innovations -- in terms of addressing changing policy environments by setting, assessing and recalibrating U.S. national security policy’s strategic direction, stakeholder alignment and integration, and performance measures – both for scholarly research and practical policymaking. Finally, the reform of the U.N. and the international arms control regime remains an important research agenda for the fields of international relations, and public administration and management. It is at the juncture of these two disciplines of political science that offers great potential for understanding as well as designing policy innovations that public leaders must create, design and implement to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the 21st Century.
Bibliography


### Appendix

**Table 1: Glossary and Acronyms**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term or Acronym</th>
<th>Meaning or Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Husayn Project</td>
<td>Project under Husayn Kamil to identify the steps required to develop a nuclear weapon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthrax</td>
<td>A disease caused by the bacterium Bacillus Anthracis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakout capability</td>
<td>Knowledge, infrastructure, and materiel, which usually lie beneath the threshold of suspicion, but which can be rapidly adapted or reorganized to allow for weaponization processes to be undertaken. Such capabilities require pre-disposed resources and often employ dual-use technology, equipment, or knowledge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>Biological Weapon—an item of materiel that disperses or disseminates a biological agent including arthropod vectors; Biological Warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFCD</td>
<td>Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration. The declaration presented to the UN by Iraq, as required by UN Resolution 1441. The 12,000-page document was presented to the UN on 7 December 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBW</td>
<td>Chemical and Biological Weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDG</td>
<td>Chemical Destruction Group, a UN body operating in Iraq from 1992 to 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command, (US).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (US).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>Chemical Weapon—an item of materiel that disperses or disseminates a chemical agent; Chemical Warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delivery System</strong></td>
<td>The means of delivering or transporting conventional or unconventional weapons in the form of weapons platforms, such as rockets, missiles, spray devices, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other types of vehicle. Delivery is defined as the positioning of the weapon to a point from which it was designed to operate independently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DCI</strong></td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DIA</strong></td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency (US).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DPRK</strong></td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dual Use</strong></td>
<td>Technology, materials, equipment, or knowledge capable of use for both legitimate and proscribed purposes. The object per se is not one or the other—it is dependent on intentions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU</strong></td>
<td>European Union.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EW</strong></td>
<td>Electronic Warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAO</strong></td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FFCD</strong></td>
<td>Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure. The series of Declarations Iraq presented to the UN, detailing its WMD programs. Separate documents were submitted for CW, BW, nuclear, and ballistic missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fissile material</strong></td>
<td>Material (e.g., uranium) capable of undergoing nuclear fission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROG-7</strong></td>
<td>Free Rocket Over Ground (Mk 7). A battlefield artillery Rocket (also known as LUNA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Front Company</strong></td>
<td>A firm or commercial enterprise purposefully established and owned by Iraqi procurement authorities to purchase or otherwise illicitly acquire items prohibited by UN sanctions. The front company would operate in a covert and clandestine fashion with the intention of avoiding international scrutiny and deceiving any monitoring authorities concerning the nature of goods procured, the source of goods, the transport routes used for importation, the financial aspects of illicit trade, and the eventual Iraqi end use and end user.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FSU  Former Soviet Union.
GPS  Global Positioning System.
HE  High Explosive.
HEU  Highly Enriched Uranium—a term indicating a high percentage (>80%) of U235 isotope; generally weapons-grade material.
HUMINT  Human Intelligence.
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency—the UN’s nuclear watchdog organization.
IAEC  Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.
IAF  Iraqi Armed Forces.
IED  Improvised Explosive Device.
IMF  International Monetary Fund.
INP  Iraqi Nuclear Program.
INS  Inertial Navigation System.
Intellectual capital  A cadre with engineering and scientific knowledge.
ISG  Iraq Survey Group. The organization stood up by the Coalition in June 2003 to conduct a survey of Iraq’s WMD programs and to locate Captain Speicher. It is a multiagency intelligence collection and analysis organization, formed of military and civilian personnel from the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Its mission is to organize, direct, and apply capabilities and expertise in Iraq to discover, take custody of, and exploit information and material of intelligence value on individuals, records, WMD samples, weapons systems materials, facilities, networks, and operations.
LEU  Low Enriched Uranium—a term designating uranium with a low (<5%) percentage of U235 isotope.
MoD  Ministry of Defense.
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding.
MTCR  Missile Technology Control Regime.
NBC  Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NPT  Non-Proliferation Treaty.
NSC  National Security Council.
Nuclear Weapon  A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun
type, or thermonuclear type) in its intended
ultimate configuration which, upon completion
of the prescribed arming, fuzing, and firing
sequence, is capable of producing the intended
nuclear reaction and release of energy.
ODF  Operation Desert Fox.
ODS  Operation Desert Storm.
OIF  Operation Iraqi Freedom.
OFF  Oil for Food program.
Oil for Food Program  The program established by UNSCR 986 in
December 1996. The scheme allowed the UN
to authorize sales of Iraqi oil, with the intention
of allowing the Iraqis to buy food supplies with
the revenues gained. In practice, trade under the
OFF process opened the door for Iraq to
develop numerous kickback and illicit money-
earning schemes. A percentage of OFF money
was used to finance UNMOVIC.
PPE  Personal Protective Equipment.
Protocol  Official set of rules and guidelines established
by state parties to regulate activity. In this
instance, it refers to a systematic code of
behavior for organizing trade between Iraq and
its protocol partners: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and
Turkey.
R&D  Research and Development.
RDT&E  Research, Development, Test and Evaluation.
Reconstituted Program  A term describing the restart or renewal of a
program based upon and using technology,
materials, equipment, and knowledge from a
dormant, hidden, or previously interrupted
program.
RG  Republican Guard.
Ricin  A toxin used as a BW agent, derived from the
castor bean.
RPG  Rocket-Propelled Grenade.
RPV  Remotely Piloted Vehicle.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAFF</td>
<td>Safe, Arm, Fuze, and Fire—a term used in weaponry including nuclear weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>Short Range Ballistic Missile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Surface Missile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSO</td>
<td>Special Security Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Uranium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U#</td>
<td>UNSCOM inspection number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>Destruction of weapons, equipment, or documents by one party only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOVIC</td>
<td>United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission. Set up by UNSCR 1284 on 17 December 1999 as a replacement for UNSCOM. Its first Executive Chairman was Dr. Hans Blix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>United Nations Special Commission. Set up by UNSCR 687 on 3 April 1991 “. . . to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical, and missile capabilities.” Inspections of nuclear capabilities were carried out by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the two sometimes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
worked alongside each other.

UNSYG  United Nations Secretary General.
VX      A highly toxic CW nerve agent.
Weaponization  The application of technology, materials, equipment, and knowledge to harness the effects or physical principles that have been proven in laboratory or otherwise controlled conditions to create a weapon.
WFP     World Food Program.
WHO     World Health Organization.
WMD     Weapons of Mass Destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or being used in such a manner as to kill large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapons where such means are a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons need to be of a certain size to count as WMD—single chemical or biological artillery rounds would not be considered to be WMD, due to the limited damage they could produce.
Yellowcake  A form of uranium ore concentrate.
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