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FROM THE SPATIALITY OF OPPRESSION AND RESISTANCE

TO THE DECOLONIALITY OF SPACE

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Abstract

This dissertation project stems from one central observation: María Lugones's *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions* (2003) is rife with spatial concepts and metaphors, but the significance of and connections between these concepts are not immediately evident—and what she means by "space" in general is not either. While Lugones's work has recently garnered more attention across a variety of academic circles and disciplines, her engagement with the notion of space itself remains profoundly under-examined and underappreciated. My dissertation intends to fill this gap and contribute meaningfully to the growing field of Lugonesian scholarship by developing a close reading of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* that focuses on her engagement with space. The aim of this dissertation is two-fold. First, to delineate the ways in which Lugones engages with space throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* and articulate what I refer to as her method of spatial theorizing. Second, to utilize my understanding of Lugones's spatial theorizing as a lens for developing an original, close reading of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* that traces critical connections between her ontologically plural accounts of subjects and realities and her complex understanding of oppression and resistance.

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Acknowledgements

Introduction

In 2019, María Lugones was interviewed by Claudia Acuña from *Lavaca*—a radical Argentinian, independent publishing cooperative—that took place in her childhood home, *la Antigua casa de los Lugones*. The resulting piece titled *"Maestra: María Lugones, teórica femenista,"* offers a unique rendering of Lugones's upbringing as a young woman in "a country governed by the military since 1930. Inspired by the ideology of Mussolini, they imposed a nationalist, corporatist, conservative, racist, and sexist regime with the help of the Catholic Church" (Vergès 2021, 117). After walking to her family home, Lugones begins to tell of the events that led her to the moment detailed in the excerpt[1] at the beginning of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*. I quote an excerpt from the interview below at length.[2]

> There, too, María learned to climb trees, kick the ball and play rough with her brothers, until one day she discovered that they were stronger than her. "It pissed me off. A lot," she now admits, sitting in the living room of the second house located several meters from the main one, and a few from the pool: the one that would correspond to the housekeepers. That means that we are at the scene of the crime and for that very reason, to start talking about the story that gives roots and wings to her theory, María raises her index finger and points to the small window with thick bars in front of her. "That's where they passed me food."
>
> What María begins to tell, then, is the story of which we are daughters, granddaughters, and sisters. What she did with it is, then, our inheritance.
>
> It all started when María started going to college, which she started at the age of 15 because she had already finished high school, having done two years in one. At 17 she met a boy who she was attracted to. She thought it prudent to announce to her parents that she had decided to have sex with him. "All the girls I knew were having sex, but they hid it. And I thought: it is not good to hide. For many reasons. But one of the main ones is safety: anything can happen, and you can't ask for help because you're lying."

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[1] The first brief vignette that appears in Lugones's introduction reads as follows: *"I am busy" she said, when they brought out the electro-shock machine, "I am busy." In a repetitious chant that we (not they) could understand, a busying of the mind that disrupts the brutal meddling, reminding oneself, after all, that one form of efficacious resistance lies in not being open to being "cured." She went "outside," around the streets, freely asking people to come "inside" her home and take all the furniture with them, the refrigerator, the stove, the bed, everything was up for grabs. She was put "inside" a different repressive enclosure. Her lack of sense consisted in believing her husband turned into a "lobizón" [werewolf] at night. The spatiality of her sense violated what could be tolerated as public discourse.* (Lugones 2003, 1-2).

[2] The original piece is in Spanish. The excerpt here is my original translation.

She said it at dinner.

And that night her father locked her in the servant's house.

"I spent a lot of time living here, alone," she says, now staring at the small window. During all that time she made, with what she had at hand, a tool capable of breaking it. When she succeeded, she escaped at dawn and took off. "I ran to the bus stop and asked the man to let me pass without a ticket, because I had no money. And so I went downtown to see the boy. And the boy and his father turned me into my father. And my dad put me in the car. My mother was there, I don't remember if any of my brothers were...and they took me to the asylum. And in the asylum, they gave me the treatment they gave me...I never saw a doctor, a psychiatrist, nothing. They were insulin shocks, which are now prohibited. Then they put the straitjacket on me and tied me to the bed. The mattress was soaked because you sweat a lot...And then I fell into a coma...And when I fell into a coma, they gave me sugar through my veins to wake me up. In one of those many falls into a coma, I was unconscious for ten days. There they decided to stop with the insulin shocks. And the electroshocks began. Then the pills. I could not move. My body did not respond to me. Every day I had to say to myself: why am I here? Every day I had to remind myself: they are not going to tame me. My concern was that they don't ruin my brain because I could no longer add or subtract. When someone from my family would come to visit, they brought me books, but they were taken away. Until they brought me an English dictionary and they didn't take it from me. So I asked for dictionaries in other languages. And I started to study that: languages. And I convinced myself that this could save my brain. And from then on, I was hooked. But do you know what I learned there that was important?"

"To give you an electroshock, first they made you pee. So, in a very perverse way, instead of telling you that they were taking you for an electroshock, they told you: 'Maria: go to the bathroom.' And you were trembling because you knew what that meant. And when you came back from the bathroom, they said to another: 'Now you go.' And then you no longer knew if it was your turn or hers. And in the midst of that desperation, of that terror, there was a woman who always gave them the same answer: 'I can't because I'm busy.' And then she started to move her hands like that (María starts to turn them like in the Antón Pirulero[3] game) and that was all...but it was too

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[3] Antón Pirulero is a traditional Argentinian nursery, musical, rhyme game where children are prompted to mimic the movements involved in various activities (e.g., playing instruments). To play the game, children sit in a semi-circle. One person (one of the children or one of their instructors) plays the role of Antón, the leader in the middle of the circle. All participants will sing the rhyme: "*Antón, Antón, Antón Pirulero, cada cual, cada cual, atienda a su juego, y el que no lo atienda, pagara una prenda*"—which translates to: "Antón, Antón, Antón Pirulero, each one, each one, pay attention to their game, and whoever does not, will pay a fine" (my translation). While the song is sung, the person designated to play Antón will roll their hands in a circular movement, while the participants in the semi-circle choose a particular activity to mimic (e.g., playing the piano or playing the violin). The leader will observe the movements of the participants and then choose to mimic one of the participants. The participant that is chosen will then stop their own movements and roll their hands in a circular movement (like the leader was doing at the beginning of the game). If the chosen participant does not notice that their movements were chosen, they lose the round. The rhyme and game will then start over for another round. The aim of the game overall is to teach young children to pay close attention, practice motor movements, and

much for a place and situation like that. She wasn't just saying no, but saying it to herself, in a repetition that did her good, calmed her down, isolated her from it. And that, at the same time, transmitted to you that there was something more than violence in that room. It was a way of putting into action a collective feeling and activating a force that united us."

For María, this is resistance: feeling the collective self. (Acuña 2019, my translation)

I chose to open my dissertation with this interview excerpt for a few reasons. First and foremost, it evidences the depth and candor with which we should engage María Lugones's philosophical works. Her works are not the shallow musings of an armchair theorist; they are the product of a serious, praxical-thinker committed to making sense of the senseless and carving out creative, resistant possibilities from even the most intolerable circumstances. I also chose this part of the interview in particular because, on Lugones's account, "The asylum is where [she] learned to read resistance" (Acuña, 2019). Lugones's description of her experience in the asylum captures, in a deeply concrete sense, her complex understanding of resistance as an ongoing, intersubjective social process whereby even the most miniscule, seemingly senseless gestures or actions are rich in resistant,

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develop social skills. (See: José Luis Parejo Parejo Llanos, María de la O Cortón de las Heras, and Andrea Giráldez Hayes, "La dinamización musical del patio escolar resultados de un proyecto de aprendizaje-servicio," *Revista Electrónica Complutense de Investigación en Educación Musical* 18 (2021): 167–94, https://doi.org/10.5209/reciem.69734.) More contemporary iterations of the game are orientated toward mimicking the movements involved in playing musical instruments. However, older iterations of the game reflect an explicitly gendered history. A 1944 explanation of Antón Pirulero characterizes it as a game for young girls. The leader in the middle plays the role of "the mother" and the participants will mimic the movements of a particular "trade." The example offered is the movement of a "dressmaker" or "seamstress." The overall educational aim of this feminized version seems to be less about the development of fine motor skills than it was about socializing young girls in a patriarchal society, training the specific "gendered" movements and actions designated to women's bodies (See: Marciano Curiel Merchán, "Juegos infantiles de Extremadura," *Revista de Tradiciones Populares* 1, no. 1 (January 1, 1944): 162–87.) I find this gendered history to be significant for Lugones's own story. The scene she describes (of being ordered to the bathroom before electroshock therapy) involves her and other women in the room. At the time the events would have taken place, it is much more likely that the gendered version of Antón Pirulero was culturally prominent. With this in mind, we can read the "busy" woman's defiant movements with a sense of deep irony. In that moment, the busy woman mimics the movements of a children's game—a game intended to condition the movements of the feminine body—in order to resist the gendered violence she encounters in the asylum. Perhaps even more tragic is the way the busy woman repeatedly traveled, in her own psyche, to a moment in the midst of playing Antón Pirurelo—shifting her attention away from the possibility that it was her turn to be electrocuted—and attending instead to repeating the gestures required to win the game.

communicative intention. This is evident in the painstaking detail with which Lugones interprets the "busy" woman's actions. Lugones does not just describe what the woman said/did; she describes the sense of "terror" and "desperation" from which the busy woman spoke/acted. She describes the way in which what the busy woman was saying/doing "did her good, calmed her down." And she describes the way in which what the busy woman said/did "transmitted to you that there was something more than violence in that room," in spite of the fact that what the busy woman was saying/doing was not necessarily directed at anyone in particular. The "busy" woman was, of course, responding to a directive from those in charge of administering the electroshock therapy, but her response was more than just a reaction to the directive. The intention of her activity moved in multiple directions—it suspended the possibility that it was her turn to receive electroshock; it "calmed her down," "did her good"; and it activated a "force that united" the women in the room. It is this sense of resistance and intentionality that Lugones articulates in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions* (2003), the project at the center of this dissertation.

This dissertation project is inspired by my earliest encounter with Lugones's work during my first semester of graduate school. When I first read *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, I was immediately struck by Lugones's persistent use of spatial metaphors and concepts, and I was even more surprised to find little to no engagement in secondary literature exploring this dimension of her work. While Lugones's work has recently garnered more attention[4] across a variety of academic circles and disciplines, her

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[4] From concepts like world-traveling to complex communication; active subjectivity to the colonial/modern gender system (among others)—Lugones's theoretical repertoire evidences the care and creativity of a philosopher whose influence is making waves across generations of critical thinkers. Guest editors Wanda Alarcón, Dalida María Benfield, Annie Isabel Fukushima, and Marcelle Maese write in the introduction to the 2020 Frontiers special issue that "María Lugones has had an enormous impact on diverse fields of research and action. Our process of peer-review reflected this diverse impact and activated a constellation of engaged and politically committed reviewers, many of whom have behind them decades of work as scholars, authors, and poets" (2020, xviii). The same year saw the publication of two more special issues dedicated to her work. The Critical Philosophy of Race Journal published a special issue titled: "Toward Decolonial Feminisms," an issue that branched off from a conference dedicated to Lugones's work (under the same title) held at The Pennsylvania State University in 2018. Lastly, Hypatia published a special issue in the summer of 2020 titled: "Toward Decolonial Feminisms: Tracing the Lineages of Decolonial Thinking through Latin American/Latinx

engagement with the notion of space remains profoundly underexamined. My dissertation intends to fill this gap and contribute meaningfully to the growing field of Lugonesian scholarship by developing a close reading of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* that focuses on her engagement with space. I contend, further, that developing a Lugonesian account of space opens up the potential for uncovering important connections between her "early" and "later" works—a difference characterized by her development of the colonial/modern gender system (2007) and decolonial feminisms (2010)—and her spatial theorizing offers rich resources for building a preliminary account of the decoloniality of space.[5] By developing this close reading of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, I am taking up Lugones's invitation to "read the text praxically, in the spirit of disruption, taking up the nonscripted possibilities in the cracks in domination" (2003, 30). I also develop this close reading because, as Lugones writes "Though the pieces can be read in isolation from each other and in a variety of orders, they articulate with each other" (31). By framing my own reading of her work through her engagement with space, I am inspired by her (and Mildred Beltré's[6]) desire "to upset the authority of words taking our minds/bodies in this or that direction, a determinate direction" (37). As they write together,

> Indeed, if the text takes possession of the direction of your thoughts, there is no company, no sociality, no solidarity except one that is obedient. The sociality we would like to elicit is one that responds with its own movements, a sociality that is formed rather than coerced or presupposed. (37)

In this dissertation, I respond to Lugones's text with my own movements, in the company of Lugones's resistant, creative theorizations. This project is, in other words, my own "pilgrimage," my

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Feminist Philosophy." The publication of these special issues evidences the recent surge in enthusiasm and engagement with Lugones's work.

[5] While I include this contention here (and, indeed, incorporate the term "decoloniality of space" in my dissertation title) my aim in this dissertation is to develop an original, close reading Lugones's work in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*. I will return to the notion of the "decoloniality of space" in my conclusion.

[6] Lugones invited Mildred Beltré to "make images for this book" (36). Beltré "created a series of etchings" throughout the book, each etching accompanying each chapter (36).

own journey to follow Lugones's resistant paths and cultivate a multiplicitous understanding of resistance and oppression.

In the spirit of this pilgrimage, the aims of my dissertation are twofold. First, to delineate the ways in which Lugones engages with space throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* and articulate what I refer to as her method of "spatial theorizing." Second, to utilize my understanding of Lugones's spatial theorizing as a lens for developing an original, close reading of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* that traces critical connections between her ontologically plural accounts of subjects and realities and her complex understanding of oppression and resistance. As I will demonstrate, by the end of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, Lugones articulates, a co-constitutive relationship between the logics of oppression/resistance and the social production of space—a relationship that accounts for the "production of multiple realities" (19). Her engagement with space, then, is motivated by and grounds her understanding of oppression and resistance as complex, overlapping, ongoing processes in tense relation—processes that constitute and are constituted by the collaboration of social subjects. To situate my arguments in this dissertation, I divide this introduction into two sections. In the first section, I explain what I mean by Lugones's engagement with space. In the second section, I offer an overview of the dissertation that outlines the main arguments of each chapter.

Introducing *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*

Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions is a collection of Lugones's works across several years (from 1987-2003) that represents her "many years of theoretical reflection within grass-roots radical political work" (2003, ix). Most of the chapters were published as separate journal articles or book chapters before being republished in the larger project.[7] There are four

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[7] "Playfulness, 'World'-Traveling, and Loving Perception," *Hypatia* 2, no. 2 (1987): 3–19; "Structure/Antistructure and Agency under Oppression," *The Journal of Philosophy* 87, no. 10 (1990): 500–507; "Purity, Impurity, and Separation," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 19, no. 2 (1994): 458–79; "Hard

chapters that were only published in the collection, beginning with the book's introduction—an essential chapter that connects the various written works, outlines her methodologies, and weaves together the various themes and movements dispersed throughout the book. The other three chapters are: Chapter 7: Boomerang Perception and the Colonizing Gaze: Ginger Reflections on Horizontal Hostility; Chapter 9: Enticements and Dangers of Community and Home for a Radical Politics; and Chapter 10: Tactical Strategies of the Streetwalker/*Estrategias Tácticas de la Callejera*. While each chapter has the potential to stand alone as a unique theoretical exploration—each incorporating its own sets of terms, arguments, and style—there exist fundamental threads of thought between and across them. Admittedly, the transparency of this shared articulation varies, some connections are more or less evident than others. However, the introduction to *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* is an indispensable aid for making sense of the connections between and across chapters. It may, in fact, be the most important chapter in the entire collection for a few reasons. First, it weaves together fundamental threads of thought found throughout her previously published works. Second, it performs a critical, self-reflection whereby Lugones makes sense of her own theoretical "pilgrimages"[8]—examining where she

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to Handle Anger," in *Overcoming Racism and Sexism*, ed. Linda Bell and David Blumenfeld (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 1995), 203–17; "*El Pasar Discontinuo de La Cachapera/Tortillera Del Barrio a La Barra al Movimento*/The Discontinuous Passing of the Cachapera/Tortillera from the Barrio to the Bar to the Movement," in *Daring to Be Good: Feminist Essays in Ethico-Politics*, ed. Bat Ami Bar-On and Ann Ferguson (New York: Routledge, 1998), 156–66; "*Hablando Cara a Cara*/Speaking Face to Face: An Exploration of Ethnocentric Racism," in *Making Face, Making Soul/Haciendo Caras: Creative and Critical Perspectives by Feminists of Color*, ed. Gloria Anzaldúa (San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute Books, 1990), 46–54; "On the Logic of Pluralist Feminism," in *Feminist Ethics*, ed. Claudia Card (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 35–44.

[8] Lugones takes up the term "pilgrimages" from Victor Turner's 1974 text *Drama, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society*. Lugones explains in her introduction that she "chose 'pilgrimages' as the way of movement because of Victor Turner's understanding of pilgrimages as movements that loosen the hold of institutional structural descriptions in the creation of liminal spaces. The possibilities of antistructural understandings of selves, relations, and realities became important to [Lugones]...as a way to think of resisters to structural, institutionalized oppressions. [Lugones thinks] of antistructural selves, relations, and practices as constituting space and time away from linear, univocal, and cohesive constructions of the social" (Lugones 2003, 8). To better understand her incorporation of the term pilgrimages, I find it helpful to consider Turner's definition of liminality: "In this interim of 'liminality,' the possibility exists of standing aside not only from one's own social position, but from all social positions and of formulating a potentially unlimited series of alternative social arrangements" (Turner 1974, 166–67).

has been, when she has been there, and why her thinking shifted the way it did. Lastly, the introduction explains the methodology of the project as a whole and her approaches to writing specific chapters and sections of the text.

One of the things that stands out while reading the introduction to *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* is the frequency of Lugones's references to space, spatiality, and her use of spatial metaphors.[9] More notable than the frequency of the terms themselves, however, is the range of terms that Lugones associates with them. In the introduction alone, Lugones references: liminal space, occupation of space, public space, relationality of space, abstract understandings of space, oppressive spaces, conceptual space, social construction of space, naturalization of space; spatiality of sense, spatiality of praxis, spatiality of resistances, spatiality of dominations, spatiality of everydayness, spatiality of relations, spatiality of power, spatiality of lives, spatiality of social fragmentation, spatiality of intercommunalism, spatiality of the street, and spatiality of cognition.[10] Lugones's move to incorporate all of these terms (in the introduction alone) is itself sufficient grounds for honing in on the theoretical import of space. Nonetheless, she also distinguishes the structure of the book's chapters on account of her engagement with space.

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[9] To offer a helpful, quantitative measure, the word *space* appears in the introduction 19 times, and the word *spatiality* appears 23 times. The word *space* appears in the entirety of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* around 130 times (give or take a few dispersed throughout her notes). *Spatial/spatiality* appear around 100 times. Of these appearances we find her using terms like: *spatiality of sense, spatiality of praxis, spatiality of resistance, spatiality of domination, spatiality of power, spatiality of oppressions, spatiality of social fragmentation, spatiality of the street, spatiality of cognition, spatiality of homeplace, spatiality of intercommunalism, spatiality of theory, liminal spaces, relationality of space, social construction of space, public vs. private space, intersubjective spaces, bounded spaces, naturalization of space, production of space, time/space, space-time, space of the callejera, appropriation of space, abstract space, differentiated spaces, social space, concrete space, border space*, and so on. Most of these appear in her introduction and last three chapters. Listing the various iterations of space and spatiality that Lugones forwards in *Pilgrimages//Peregrinajes* underscores just how important the terms are for making sense of her work.

[10] These terms appear on the following pages, respectively: liminal space (8), occupation of space (9), public space (10), relationality of space (11), abstract understandings of space (26), oppressive spaces (32), conceptual space (33), social construction of space (35), naturalization of space (35); spatiality of sense (2), spatiality of praxis (4), spatiality of resistances (8), spatiality of dominations (8), spatiality of everydayness (9), spatiality of relations (10), spatiality of power (10), spatiality of oppressions (11), spatiality of lives (12), spatiality of social fragmentation (16), spatiality of intercommunalism (36), spatiality of the street (36), and spatiality of cognition (36).

Early in the introduction, as Lugones introduces the concept of "'world'-traveling," she explicitly acknowledges her use of "spatial vocabulary," like traveling, to "engage a logic of resistance in reading histories, geographies, selves, relations, possibilities" (16). But her relationship to spatial vocabulary when she first coined the term "'world'-traveling" was very different to the relationship she had cultivated by the time she wrote the later *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* chapters. Lugones explains that, when she first wrote the essay on "world"-travelling[11] (which is then republished as chapter 4 in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*), she "abstained from reading any literature on space, including work on travel. Indeed, I abstained from new conversations on the subject with text" (16). She describes this choice as an "exercise" of departing from "philosophical literature that had emphasized...a nonspatial way of perception and conception of life, a unity of the self, a linear way of telling, and an abstract rhetoric" (16). She also describes the exercise as "an exposure of psychic multiplicity" wherein she worked to make sense of space "by locating the multiple self in space, conceiving of space itself as multiple, intersecting, cotemporaneous realities" (16). She then explains that after writing the essay on "world"-travelling, she "became aware of the politically contemporary interests in travel and spatiality" (16). I draw attention to her depiction of this exercise because it provides a useful perspective from which to understand her later move to engage more closely and conceptually with space. I think the exercise evidences the deliberateness with which Lugones formulates her own spatial theorizations. In addition, her explanation highlights the fact that there is a difference between the spatial undertone of her work in earlier essays and the spatial theorizing that she incorporates in later chapters.[12] I also draw attention to this exercise to emphasize the fact that, even when Lugones was not engaging explicitly with

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[11] In the original 1987 publication, Lugones uses "travelling" (with the double "l") but drops this spelling in later publications (and in the republished version that appears in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*).

[12] This is not to say, however, that we cannot draw important connections between this later spatial theorizing and her work in earlier chapters. As I will demonstrate throughout this dissertation, her later, more "spatial" investigations are deeply connected to and informed by her early works.

literature on space, she was *already* taking space into account to formulate her ontologically plural accounts of subjects and realities (16).

Lugones elaborates this shift in her engagement with space more explicitly in her description of the book's chapters. She distinguishes two major sections of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*: the "early" and "later" chapters. She explains that in the "earlier chapters [she] was learning to depart from the tradition of philosophical writing[13] in which [she] was schooled" (30). They also differ because "the latter writings dwell on movements of resistant intentions at the level of collectivities in formation, while the earlier ones emphasize the movements of resistant intentions between people at closer range, two connecting levels of the political" (30). Her reference to these "two connecting levels of the political" is an integral component of her work across the book project (30). As Lugones explains, there are "two interwoven interests that [she pursues] in the chapters of the book: an interest in motivational structure at the level of persons and readings of particular acts and an interest in the larger social movement of intentions" (15). Her interest in the motivational structures at "two connecting levels of the political" is something I attend to carefully throughout this dissertation (30). Furthermore, Lugones also distinguishes the two sections of the book as revealing an "important shift in interlocution" (30). The earlier chapters "are mainly in conversation with contemporary American feminist philosophers" and in the company of "the writings of many Chicanas and Asian American, Native American, and African American women" (30). In contrast, the later chapters, "evidence a deeper interdisciplinarity" and benefit most from "writings on space and coloniality" in a way that adds "greater complexity to the logical strands" she negotiates throughout the project (30). With this in mind, I contend that Lugones's explicit engagement with space in her later chapters allows her to

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[13] In endnote 13 of the introduction, Lugones elaborates on this departure from her traditional philosophical training: "One can find traces of conversations with Elizabeth Anscombe, the pragmatists (particularly James and Pierce), Aristotle, and rational moral philosophy (both modern and American twentieth century). I was not schooled in either nineteenth or twentieth century continental philosophy" (38).

both add "complexity to the logical strands" she delineates in earlier chapters and expand her understanding of the "movements of resistant intentions at the level of collectivities in formation" (30). This is, in part, evidenced by her reference to the last three chapters[14] in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* as "the most frankly spatial" (35). Taking account of the multiple spatial metaphors and concepts throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* and her move to distinguish the last three chapters of the books as the most frankly spatial, leads me to the question at the center of my dissertation: what is it about Lugones's project that calls for this much emphasis on space? I attend to and work to answer this question throughout three main chapters.

Chapter Summaries

In the first chapter, I begin outlining what I refer to as Lugones's spatial theorizing—an approach to theorizing oppression and resistance from within the social production of space. In the first part of the chapter, I outline some of the major aims and features of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* in order to begin distinguishing how my own account of her spatial theorizing enhances our understanding of her project as a whole. In particular, I examine Lugones's understanding of deep coalitions and interlocked/intermeshed oppressions. I argue that, on Lugones's account, deep coalitions (coalitions that can effect long-lasting social change) are only possible if coalitional members transform their understanding of oppression; instead of understanding oppressions as distinct and separate, they must recognize the ways in which oppressions are intermeshed and overlapping. I then outline what Lugones refers to as her method for incorporating stories throughout the book. Lugones integrates a number of italicized vignettes across *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (especially in her introduction),

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[14] The last three chapters of the book are Chapter 8: "*El Pasar Discontinuo de la Cachapera/Tortillera del Barrio a la Barra al Movimiento/*The Discontinuous Passing of the Cachapera/ Tortillera from the Barrio to the Bar to the Movement"; Chapter 9: "Enticements and Dangers of Community and Home for a Radical Politics"; and Chapter 10: "Tactical Strategies of the Streetwalker/ *Estrategias Tácticas de la Callejera.*"

but she does not provide additional context for the stories; she also does not explain what they mean or why she places them where she does. Instead, she integrates them in an "open-ended" manner and prompts the reader to form their own interpretation of their meaning. I argue that this method mirrors the type of "intersubjective attention" she deems necessary for building deep coalitions. That is, Lugones incorporates stories throughout the book in a manner that underscores their ambiguity such that the reader cannot necessarily come to a definitive conclusion about what the story means or about why Lugones placed it where she did. According to Lugones, social subjects should, likewise, resist the urge to perceive or interpret the actions or intentions of others with the aim of arriving at definitive conclusions about what those actions or intentions *mean*. What I argue we learn from Lugones's method for incorporating stories, then, is that there is a significant tension between the logics that order a space, the activity of subjects inhabiting that space, and the structures of meaning that influence the discernibility/indiscernibility of those activities within a given space.

In the second part of the chapter, I turn to Henri Lefebvre's (1974) *The Production of Space*, where he argues that "(social) space is a (social) product" (26). On Lefebvre's account, space is often represented as a closed or fixed realm where human beings interact with each other and/or engage in social activity—it is represented as a realm that exists *in spite* of social activity. He argues, instead, that space is actually a *product* of social activity; it is the outcome of social processes whereby the meaning of objects, subjects, and relations are continuously negotiated and contested. Moreover, the social production of space is hidden for the sake of preserving dominant political, social, and economic structures. While I do not think that Lugones explicitly takes up Lefebvre's account, implicit in her work is a conception of spaces and realities as socially produced—as products of complex, overlapping social processes. This is evident in her description of the map of oppression (in her introduction to *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*), a map the represents the ways in which social subject, social groups, and their relations are "spatially mapped by power" (8). Thus, Lefebvre's work offers a useful framework for

interpreting Lugones's "map of oppression" and her understanding of space as socially produced. In the last portion of my first chapter, I offer a practical and theoretical background for Lugones's map of oppression by turning to Cricket Keating's (2019) essay "Deep Coalition and Popular Education Praxis" and Lugones's (1998) essay "Motion, Stasis, and Resistant to Interlocked Oppressions." It is from her account of the map of oppression that I distinguish two types of spatialities that inform my second and third chapters: the spatiality of oppression and the spatiality of resistance.

I define the spatiality of oppression in my second chapter as the processes by which oppressive spaces are produced and the characteristics of oppressive spaces. In my third chapter, I define the spatiality of resistance as the processes by which resistance spaces are produced and the characteristics of resistant spaces. There are, however, two important caveats to these definitions. First and foremost, Lugones herself does not explicitly define or utilize the terms in the way I've just described them.[15] Nonetheless, I offer the definitions for the sake of exegetical clarity and as critical frameworks for elucidating Lugones's spatialized conception of oppression and resistance. Second, in her introduction Lugones argues that "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting construct space simultaneously" and "the tension of being oppressed⇔resisting oppression 'places' one inside the processes of production of multiple realities" (17). In other words, oppression and resistance are not exclusive logics or phenomena. Rather, they are ongoing processes in tense relation and interrelated logics that simultaneously "construct people's movements, interactions, desires and intentions" (13). As I will demonstrate in the second and third chapters of this dissertation, what Lugones's notion of the tense oppressed⇔resisting highlights is that if we understand oppression and resistance as ongoing processes, we can account for the ways in which subjects collaborate in the production of multiple

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[15] In fact, while Lugones refers to the "spatiality of oppression" and the "spatiality of resistance" at multiple points throughout her book, she does not define them explicitly. She also does not explicitly define "space" or explain what she means by "space." Part of my goal in this dissertation, then, is to clarify what these terms mean in the context of her project.

spaces and realities. That is, spaces and realities are not closed, stable realms of human activity; they do not exist in spite of the social activity of subjects. They are, instead, products of human activity and therefore deeply "permeable" (16). Subjects are able to shift between "different constructions, different spatialities" because they are always already "inside" the processes by which realities and spaces are produced (17). Thus, while I initially define the spatiality of oppression and the spatiality of resistance separately, by the end of the dissertation the boundaries between the two terms are effectively blurred.

The aim of my second chapter is to develop an account of the spatiality of oppression. I divide the chapter into two parts. In the first part of the chapter, I argue that oppressive spaces are produced, in part, through the instrumentalization of the logic of abstraction—a logic whereby social subjects and groups are understood to be unified, pure, and wholly discrete units. I also argue that, for Lugones, the instrumentalization of abstraction operates at two connecting levels of the political—at close range and at the level of collectivities. I illustrate this by turning to two specific vantage points Lugones articulates throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*: the vantage point of the lover of purity and the vantage point of the strategist. In the second part of the chapter, I focus on the characteristics of oppressive spaces (or the consequences of the processes by which oppressive spaces are produced), characteristics that should also be understood at both connecting levels of the political. I describe these characteristics by offering an account of the experiences of the cachapera/tortillera—a figure at the center of Lugones's eighth chapter: "*El Pasar Discontínuo de la Cachapera/Tortillera del Barrio a la Barra al Movimiento*/The Discontinuous Passing of the Cachapera/Tortillera from the Barrio to the Bar to the Movement." I then turn to Lugones's ninth chapter, "Enticements and Dangers of Community and Home for a Radical Politics," to articulate the ways in which abstract notions of space compromise the possibilities for building coalitions in resistance to intermeshed oppressions.

In my third chapter, I forward an account of the spatiality of resistance by investigating three main concepts in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*: world-traveling, trespassing, and streetwalker theorizing. Lugones defines these three concepts as "different and related forms of noticing oppression at its logic and moving against it" (121). According to Lugones, all of these concepts "include an epistemic shift" (12). I argue that these epistemic shifts are also perceptual shifts, insofar as they involve cultivating perceptual practices that disrupt the abstract spatiality of social fragmentation. As I investigate these three concepts, I will argue that the aforementioned "epistemic shift" involves the cultivation of a multiplicitous vantage point, a vantage point that is attuned to the complexity of the social "from up high" and "from inside the midst of people" (5). Taking up this multiplicitous view of the social makes possible what Lugones refers to a "duplicitous interpretation" or "duplicitous perception" and a resistant "multiple interpretive vein" that allows subjects to understand their own behavior and the behavior of others as "'issuing' from a resistant *and* an oppressed motivational structure" (13). As I will demonstrate, together, these epistemic/perceptual shifts open up possibilities for the transformation of relations and the production of alternative socialities and resistant spaces. That being said, the account of the spatiality of resistance I forward throughout this chapter is most clearly represented and substantiated in the account of streetwalker theorizing Lugones develops in her final chapter. With this in mind, my intention in this chapter is to delineate and examine that elements of Lugones's work that are necessary for understanding her account of streetwalker theorizing.

Chapter 1: Introducing Lugonesian Spatial Theorizing

> This not just a question of history, it is also a question of geography, of the social construction of space. The naturalization of space serves to create the illusion of territorial boundedness and isolation; the histories of connected peoples become spatially fragmented. So I argue for the importance of spatial particularity. If the theorizing is from inside the midst of people spatially placed in a spatiality that is produced, the history of that production becomes crucial to an understanding of interrelations. The production of resistant spatiality, the spatiality of intercommunalism can be understood as impure, against the grain of fragmentation and naturalization. (Lugones 2003, 35-36)

The purpose of this first chapter is to begin defining what I refer to as Lugones's *spatial theorizing*, an approach to theorizing oppression and resistance that prioritizes the "spatial particularity" of subjects, relations, and realities. I divide the chapter into two main parts. In the first part of the chapter, I outline some of the major aims and features of Lugones's arguments throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* as they appear in her preface. I also examine one of her methods for "concretizing" the logics of oppression and resistance—a method that highlights a significant tension between the logics that order a space, the activity of subjects inhabiting that space, and the structures of meaning that influence the discernibility/indiscernibility of those activities within a given space. The second part of the chapter establishes a more explicit Lugonesian account of space. It opens with an overview of Henri Lefebvre's argument in *The Production of Space* (1974) concerning the social production of space and space as a social product. Lefebvre's argument offers a helpful theoretical framework for the final section of this chapter, where I introduce Lugones's "map of oppression," a metaphor that highlights not only how Lugones understands space, but also how space informs her theorizations of oppression and resistance.

Part 1: *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*: Aims and Methods

María Lugones's Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions "represents many years of theoretical reflection within grass-roots radical political work"

(Lugones 2003, ix). Throughout her career as a philosopher and activist, Lugones grappled with a fundamental set of questions at the center of Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: what is the nature of resistance? How can we theorize resistance in a way that does not render abstract the concrete conditions from which individual subjects and communities engage in resistant activity? According to Lugones, "resistance hardly ever has a straightforward public presence. It is rather duplicitous, ambiguous, even devious. But it is almost always masked and hidden by structures of meaning that countenance and constitute domination" (x). The task of reading resistance is, therefore, "crucial for [constructing] an alternative understanding of the realities of the oppressed," or an understanding of the oppressed "as not consumed or exhausted by oppression" (x, 12). Throughout the various chapters of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, Lugones rejects conceptions of oppression as all-encompassing, conceptions that deem subjects as "trapped inescapably in the oppressive system" (53). At the center of this rejection, and what I contend is crucial for constructing "an alternative understanding of the realities of the oppressed," is Lugones's attention to space and spatiality (x). That is the point of departure for this section.

1. Grasping a Thematic for Coalitions Against Intermeshed Oppressions

Lugones articulates the aims and motivations for *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* in her preface:

> This book represents many years of theoretical reflection within grass-roots radical political work. It is my attempt to grasp a thematic for that work. The paths I have taken in popular education, issue organizing, and movement politics have found roadblocks at the crucial moment of taking up oppressions as intermeshed. Practicing and theorizing resistance to oppressions as intermeshed became the focus of the work, what made it most radical, and what made it work on coalition in a deep sense of the term. (ix)

As we move through Lugones's work more closely, it is essential to keep this background in mind. First, the ideas she develops and interrogates throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* emerge directly out of her experiences as an activist: "Each chapter has come from within political praxis among

people held in the fragility of our connectedness. Each has also gone back to praxis often informing popular education 'situations'" (5). Her philosophy is therefore firmly rooted in the concrete, lived experiences of political subjects. The work is, as Lugones writes, "theoretico-practical in every respect" and is guided by her maxim: "I won't think what I won't practice" (ix, 5). On account of Lugones's concrete experiences confronting "roadblocks at the crucial moment of taking up oppressions as intermeshed," the focus of her work became "practicing and theorizing resistance" at this "crucial" moment (ix). Lugones recognized that, whether she was working in popular education spaces, on issue organizing, or with movement politics, the ways in which people understood oppression compromised their ability to work together, communicate effectively, and cultivate coalitions "in a deep sense of the term" (ix).

The "deep" coalitions Lugones references are, as Cricket Keating (2019) explains, "those coalitions that go beyond short-term, interest-based alliances and challenge us to align our own self-understandings, interests, and goals, with other oppressed groups" (239). The purpose of deep coalitions is not only to "pool our collective resources in the fight against oppression," but also to promote "long-lasting change" and "transform our relationships with each other" (239). Deep coalitions demand more from their participants than political cooperation or compromise. It requires an openness to ambiguity and (as will be shown in the next section) the cultivation of practices that put us "in a position of intersubjective attention" (Lugones 2003, 28). This approach to coalition "highlights the ways our own understandings and potential enactments of our lives are deeply tied to one another and to the meanings that we create together, as well as the ways that the transformation of our relationships with one another has the potential to ground deep social change" (Keating 2019, 239-240). Lugones developed the concept of intermeshed oppressions, therefore, to address the issues that obstruct collective political organizing and prevent the formation of deep coalitions.

Intermeshed oppressions is one of many concepts Lugones introduces throughout her project to build a complex account of oppression. She defines the term by distinguishing it from "interlocking oppressions."[16] Lugones explains that "to say oppressions intermesh or coalesce is to say that no oppressing molds and reduces a person untouched by and separate from other oppressings that mold and reduce her" (Lugones 2003, 223). Oppressions interlock, on the other hand, when oppressions are "separable," "discrete," and "pure" (223). According to Lugones, the problem with the concept of interlocking oppressions is it relies on a logic of purity and fragmentation:

> According to the logic of purity, the social world is both unified and fragmented, homogenous, hierarchically ordered. Each person is either fragmented, composite, or abstract and unified—not exclusive alternatives. Unification and homogeneity are related principles of ordering the social world. Unification requires a fragmented and hierarchical ordering. Fragmentation is another guise of unity, both in the collective and the individual. (127)

If the social world is unified and ordered hierarchically, then we could (theoretically) break it up into its various constituent parts (or fragments) without changing its essentially unified nature. If the social world is constituted by different forms of oppression, then these could be separated out as distinct parts of the whole. The central relationship between these oppressive "parts" would therefore be that they belong to the same "whole." We can apply the same logic to marginalized groups. If, for example, we think of "lesbians" as an essentially unified group, then the various "parts" (or people) that makeup the group could be separated neatly without compromising the apparently unified nature of the group. The only measure for relating the various members of the group would be that they belong to the same, essentially unified category. The same applies when thinking of individual subjects. According to the logic of purity, all of the characteristics, (age, race, sex, class, sexuality, etc.) that make someone a unique person are distinct parts of an essentially unified whole, and the parts are related only insofar as they constitute this whole. If this is the framework by which a political coalition organizes itself and

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[16] This term that first appeared in the "Combahee River Collective Statement." Combahee River Collective. 1986. *The Combahee River Collective Statement: Black Feminist Organizing in the Seventies and Eighties.* 1st ed. Albany NY: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press.

its aims, then it will inevitably exclude members that do not fit neatly into whatever category they understand themselves to represent. This phenomenon is precisely what Lugones analyzes in Chapter 8 of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, where she examines "the fragmentation of Latina and Latino homoerotic subjects" that are alienated by both Latino nationalist movements and "the contemporary US Lesbian Movement in its various versions and enclaves" (35).

Alternatively, the notion of intermeshed oppressions is based on a "logic of curdling," impurity, and multiplicity: "According to the logic of curdling, the social world is complex and heterogeneous and each person is multiple, nonfragmented, embodied" (127). On this view, the social world, social groups, and social subjects are not simply distinct, immutable, unified wholes made up of various parts or fragments. They are complex, heterogeneous, and deeply permeable. Anna Carastathis (2019) provides an example in her essay, "Beyond the 'Logic of Purity': 'Post-Post-Intersectional' Glimpses in Decolonial Feminism," that is useful for clarifying Lugones's distinctions between interlocking and intermeshed oppressions; purity and impurity; and fragmentation and multiplicity.[17] She writes,

> Think of a pane of mirrored glass shattered into broken shards, which reflects an object in front of it only partially, distorting and occluding it. By contrast, think of a prism, which is inherently multiplicitous, but which diffracts light into its different constituent colors in a nonfragmented way. (90)

The image of a shattered pane of mirrored glass captures well the description I've just offered of how the social world, social groups, and social subjects are constituted according to a logic of purity and fragmentation. If a person were to stand in front of this shattered mirror, their "whole self" would merely be reflected back as a fragmented construction of a unified being. We could remove different fragments of the shattered glass and the reflection would then appear incomplete. The light diffracted

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[17] Fragmentation and multiplicity are core concepts in Lugones's work that call for a much more thorough analysis than the scope of this chapter allows for. I will return to them in the second chapter of this dissertation in more depth. I incorporate them here because they are essential to Lugones's definitions of intermeshed and interlocking oppressions.

from a prism, on the other hand, cannot be separated into distinct parts. We can, of course, distinguish many colors according to their density. I could point to the darkest blue or the deepest shade of red. I could not, however, easily locate a precise point at which red "ends" and orange "begins." I could not pluck out the purest yellow and remove it from the whole. We can understand the colors and their constitutions more by their relations to each other than we can by their relation to the white light from which the diffraction emerged. The colors diffracted from the prism are intermeshed, whereas the shards of shattered glass interlock to makeup the whole mirrored pane. The difference between intermeshed and interlocking oppressions ultimately "corresponds to the ontological difference between multiplicity and fragmentation" (87).

Now that we have a general sense of how intermeshed and interlocking oppressions differ, we must consider how they interact, for the interaction between the two is the crux of Lugones's concern. The distinction between oppressions is complicated by the fact that "oppressions intermesh but are represented as interlocking…" (Lugones 2003, 3). In other words, because the logic of purity is a dominant logic, so is the conception of oppressions as interlocking; and this disguises the fact that oppressions are, indeed, intermeshed. In fact, "interlocking is possible only if the inseparability of oppressions is disguised" (223). As Carastathis explains, "intermeshed oppressions are misrepresented as interlocking, both by systems of domination and by social movements" (2019, 88) that organize "along one axis of domination" (Lugones 2003, 222); and this mystifies "the fact that oppressed people's lives and struggles are interconnected" (Carastathis 2019, 88). The roadblocks Lugones references in her preface are rooted in the "horrifying coupling" of intermeshed and interlocking oppressions that form "a conceptual maze that is difficult to navigate" (Lugones 2003, 224). As Lugones explains,

> At every point, it seems as if in order to resist intermeshed oppressions, we must bind categorially, so we cloud our own heterogeneity and yield to a categorial self-understanding […] Everywhere we turn we find the interlocking of oppressions disabling us from perceiving and resisting oppressions as intermeshed. (224)

The notion of interlocking oppressions is more than just a theory of oppression; it is a powerful, instrumentalized concept that encourages and generates the separation and fragmentation of peoples. It is, as Lugones writes, "a mechanism of control, reduction, immobilization, disconnection that goes beyond intermeshed oppressions. It is not merely an ideological mechanism, but the categorial training of human beings into homogenous fragments…" (223).

In this section, I have examined the main aims of Lugones's project. *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* is a theoretico-practical investigation aimed at "grasping a thematic" for her "many years of theoretical reflection within grass-roots radical political work" (ix). It is therefore guided by Lugones's maxim "I won't think what I won't practice" (5). Moreover, Lugones is especially interested in theories and practices that can cultivate deep coalitions, coalitions that can effect long-lasting change by transforming relationships between people across and between their differences. Part of what is necessary for these transformations is a reconceptualization of oppressions as intermeshed, instead of interlocking. The challenge for Lugones is, then, that we must work to understand "ourselves and our activities in resistance to both the interlocking of oppressions and to intermeshed oppressions" (208). What remains to be shown is how Lugones's practico-theoretical commitments and aims shape her understanding of space. In the following section, I identify one of the ways in which space comes to the foreground by outlining her method for incorporating stories (or vignettes) and revealing the various "logics" she is engaging theoretically—a method for putting subjects "in a position of intersubjective attention" that can promote the relational transformations required for deep coalitional work (28).

2. Methods for Concretizing Oppression and Resistance

"I am busy" she said, when they brought out the electro-shock machine, "I am busy." In a repetitious chant that we (not they) could understand, a busying of the mind that disrupts the brutal meddling, reminding oneself, after all, that one form of efficacious resistance lies in not being open to being "cured."

She went "outside" around the streets, freely asking people to come "inside" her home and take all the furniture with them, the refrigerator, the stove, the bed, everything was up for grabs. She was put "inside" a different repressive enclosure. Her lack of sense consisted in believing her husband turned into a "lobizón" [werewolf] at night. The spatiality of her sense violated what could be tolerated as public discourse. (1, italics in original)

This brief narrative description is the first among many dispersed throughout the introduction. It is not immediately evident what is taking place, how the snippet fits into the chapter, or even who the subjects of the moment are. This moment (along with other italicized sections in the chapter) is one of Lugones's own recollections; each subsequent memory zooms in on a moment from her past in media res, when/where she, for example, experienced a collective sense of solidarity, understood some form of meaning hidden amongst a series of gestures, or witnessed the expression of a covert, resistant act. Lugones explains her reasons for and approaches to integrating these stories in the following excerpt:

> None of the examples I use in this book are uses of the hypothetical, nor are they ever used as counterexamples. Yet, though my examples are temporally and geographically located (i.e., they are never tenseless or in no-place), I do not use them as a historian or social scientist might. I usually zoom onto a slice of larger histories and geographies, always thinking of the open-ended quality of the "story," and I exhibit its logic. I exhibit the logic of the story/example with a possible modality in mind: oppressive, resistant, reactive, and so on. (27)

What is characteristic about Lugones's approach is that she does not try to impose particular logics onto a story to determine its meaning. The story "always needs to be interpreted; it never stands in our face, showing us anything without intervention" (27). She does not, as she writes, try to fit "the story into the modality resistance, as a particular fits into a universal" (27). Lugones uses modalities "to have an edge into the story," but her task is "really to enrich, complicate, give texture, and concretize these modalities, making them temporally and spatially concrete" (27). She accomplishes this "through a multiplicity of stories/examples into which [she looks] for what makes their logic, for

example, a logic of resistance" (27). In other words, she does not write the stories to instrumentalize them or use the stories as evidence in support of a specific claim. Rather, the stories conjure up multiple, possible threads of sense.

The stories detail the concrete activities of various subjects in particular spaces and times—like the woman in the opening story chanting "I am busy" (1); or they describe instances of complicated political situations—like those between translators and the communities they are intended to serve (3-4). All of the stories are open to multiple interpretations depending on the reader's perspective. "Indeed, part of the methodology of this book is to make clear why and how no slice of 'reality' can have a univocal meaning" (28). The "logic" of the story, then, does not refer to the story's meaning but to "its inner work—what thought paths lead where" (28). And grasping this logic "requires reaching for what makes the story move in a context at which the story hints" (27). As Lugones explains, she seeks "to unfold the story line, not by exhibiting it in a temporal sequence, but through dwelling in the meanings that one can reveal […] The trick in telling the story lies in revealing its logical intricacies" (28). To "concretize" this approach to uncovering the "logic" of a story, Lugones introduces a story about her mother, with whom she navigated an often-complex relationship.[18]

> *Whenever my mother would ask for something, she would say "It is on that thing next to that thing." If you were not in the habit of following her in her moves—maybe that was not what your relation to her asked of you or what you put into it—you would never be able to bring her "that thing." My father was related to her in such a way that not knowing how to follow her in her moves through the cleaning and the cooking and the making of a life for us was to his advantage and part of his patriarchal position. He would not bring her "that thing." For him to risk coming to know was to risk the lack of reciprocity, which was central to the relationship. And he did not risk it.*
>   *Late in life when he wanted to spend part of his day "ordering" his own things, things my mother had always ordered for him, my mother saw a threat to her order and her order had served her well. Because he could not follow her into it, she was in that sense, out of his reach. But if you did follow her into her moves, as we kids had to, you could easily get her "that thing." You see, she—someone who was to be unimportant, the perfection of whose makings was to lie in the making not being visible—managed to make herself important and to keep*

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[18] Lugones writes of her mother in multiple chapters in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (Introduction, Chapter 4, Chapter 6) and dedicates a section of her preface to her mother as well: "Among the resistant women who have woven the fabric of my possibilities, Mercedes, my mother, has occupied a central place in my praxical thinking. She gave me the ways to live a life that, with her every gesture, undid the meanings that were supposed to tie her to subordination" (xiii).

the makings both visible and invisible. "This," "on that," "next to it," were stations in her path[19], she was the pivotal directional subject.

This story contains multiple interpretive threads. In the same way that Lugones characterizes the method for grasping the logic of the story as "reaching for what makes the story move," her mother's requests could not be understood if "*you were not in the habit of following her movements*" (27, 28). Because the household relationships were bound to a patriarchal structure, Lugones's father did not follow her mother's movements in the same way Lugones and her siblings did; there was a limit to how much her father could understand her mother's "*order*" (28). Her mother's "logic" existed outside of the logic of patriarchy, rendering it *invisible* to Lugones's father, but *visible* to Lugones and her siblings. We could say, therefore, that there are logics that remain invisible if we do not follow specific movements in a story. If we were to follow only the movements of Lugones's father, for example, we would be unable to "make sense" of her mother's request for "*that thing next to that thing*" (28).

This story reveals the complex relationship between what the subjects mean, how they are related to each other, and how they inhabit the same, shared space. Even though all of the family members inhabited the same household, Lugones's father seemed to exist "outside" of the order Lugones shared with her mother and siblings. Because her father could not disrupt "*his patriarchal position*" he could not follow her mother into this order; he could not "*risk coming to know*" because doing so "*was to risk the lack of reciprocity, which was central to the relationship*" (28). Lugones's mother was

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[19] Lugones's reference to "life-paths" here is reminiscent of Torsten Hägerstrand's studies in time-geography. In *The Condition of Postmodernity*, (1989) David Harvey outlines a number of relevant theorists and concepts for building a complex understanding of space. He opens his 13th chapter, "Individual spaces and times in social life," with an explanation of Torsten Hägerstrand's "descriptor of daily practices in time geography" (Harvey 1989, 211). Harvey explains that, on Hägerstrand's account, individuals are viewed as "purposeful agents engaged in projects that take up time through movement in space. Individual biographies can be tracked as 'life paths in time-space,' beginning with daily routines of movement and extending to migratory movements over phases of a life-span…" (211). Studies of biographical life-paths involve tracking the "finite time resources and 'friction of distance' that constrain daily movement," interactions between individuals, and the "stations" or "domains" where these interactions take place (211). Hägerstrand's work offers a unique framework for thinking through the spatiality of individual subject's lives, a framework that traces their movements as if drawing out a four-dimensional, biographical map. While Lugones does not cite Hägerstrand specifically in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, she does cite Harvey (specifically in her 9th and 10th chapters).

therefore, "*in that sense, out of his reach*" (28). The relational dynamics that took place "inside" of Lugones's household—a private space—were therefore constituted by the patriarchal social order that existed "outside" of her household—the public space. I draw attention to this public/private distinction to draw a connection between this story and the first one mentioned. The "busy woman" that repeated a gesture and chant to avoid the electroshock machine "*went 'outside' around the streets, freely asking people to come 'inside' her home and take all the furniture with them, the refrigerator, the stove, the bed, everything was up for grabs*" (1). Because the busy woman violated the separation between the "inside" and "outside"—public vs. private space—her actions and beliefs could not "make sense." In other words, "*the spatiality of her sense violated what could be tolerated as public discourse*" (1). Her actions and words were completely obscured, and their "sense" rendered unintelligible.

To reiterate, Lugones's methodology is partly motivated by her aim to "make clear how and why no slice of 'reality' can have a univocal meaning" (28). According to Lugones, if a story's interpretation in a philosophical investigation "overdetermines the meaning of the story, the story shows us nothing new" (28). What her alternative, concretizing investigation offers instead is "the articulation of what the story revealed through the meanderings and moves of the investigation" (28). Moreover, Lugones argues that the investigation is "itself a political act" and it "puts us in a position of intersubjective attention, possibly a dialogical situation" (28). This type of intersubjective attention is a potential resource for overcoming the obstructions to cultivating "deep coalitions." Deep coalitions are challenging, in part, due to communicative impasses between subjects. In the same way that Lugones's mother was, in a sense, out of her father's reach—because their relationship was structured in such a way that he could not and would not "follow" her movements—social subjects may often be out of each other's reach and unable to interpret the meaning of each other's actions or statements.[20] Therefore, Lugones integrates stories in an open-ended manner not only because they

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[20] This fact—that social subjects may be out of each other's reach—is a crucial part of Lugones's understanding

concretize the concepts she is engaging with, but also because the approach itself illustrates an epistemic shift[21] that is necessary for overcoming the roadblocks to building coalitions and constructing "an alternative understanding of the realities of the oppressed" (x). That is, Lugones's methodology is itself a performance of the resistant practico-theoretical work she deems necessary for resisting oppressions as intermeshed.

To summarize this section, Lugones incorporates a number of vignettes throughout her project (and especially in her introduction) for the sake of "concretizing" the concepts at the center of her main arguments. The stories themselves depict a multitude of situations, actors, and issues that suggest we must reconsider "what counts as political" (2). Instead of offering definitive interpretations of each story, Lugones is interested in revealing the "logic" of a story by "reaching for what makes the story move in a context at which the story hints" (27). Furthermore, she refers to this interpretive approach as itself a "political act" that induces a state of "intersubjective attention," a type of attention that, in my view, may in fact be a critical resource for resisting oppressions as intermeshed and building deep coalitions (28). Most notably, Lugones's methodology highlights a significant tension between the logics that order a space, the activity of subjects inhabiting that space, and the structures of meaning that influence the discernibility/indiscernibility of those activities within a given space. In the next section, I explore the relationship between space, meaning, and social structures by drawing connections between Lugones's work and Henri Lefebvre's articulation of space as a social product.

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of resistance and the resistant practices she proposes throughout the project. I will return to and examine this feature of her work in my third chapter.

[21] In fact, Lugones characterizes the resistant practices she articulates throughout the book project (like "world"-traveling, trespassing, and streetwalker theorizing) as movements that "include an epistemic shift" (12). This is also something I will take up in my third chapter.

Part 2: Space and the Social

We have outlined two key features of Lugones's investigation thus far: her reconception of

oppressions as intermeshed and her method for concretizing the logics of oppression and resistance.

These features are rooted in a specific, spatialized understanding of the social. In the following section,

I provide an overview of Henri Lefebvre's main argument in *The Production of Space* (1974) for the sake

of both defining space (as Lugones understands it) and articulating the relationship between space and

the social. I turn to Lefebvre's work not only because Lugones explicitly cites Lefebvre's conception

of "abstract space"[22] (Lugones 2003, 235), but also because the other spatial theorists she engages with

are heavily influenced by Lefebvre's work—Fernando Coronil (1996), Michel de Certeau (1988),

David Harvey (1990), Ken Knabb (1981), Doreen Massey (1992), and Edward Soja (1989). As David

Harvey asserts (1990), "We owe the idea that command over space is a fundamental and all-pervasive

source of social power in and over everyday life to the persistent voice of Henri Lefebvre" (226). The

overview of Lefebvre's argument offers a helpful theoretical framework for the final section of this

chapter, where I introduce Lugones's "map of oppression," a metaphor for understanding oppression

and an embodied thought-experiment for sensing resistance (Lugones 2003, 9).

1. (Social) Space is (Socially) Produced

To begin describing space more explicitly, I turn now to Henri Lefebvre's (1974), *The Production*

of Space. In this text, Lefebvre articulates an analytic framework akin to a "science of space," which he

deems necessary because, "To date, work in this area has produced either mere descriptions which

never achieve analytical, much less theoretical, status, or else fragments and cross-sections of space"

(1974, 7). This work, he argues, "cannot ever give rise to a *knowledge of* space. And, without such a

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[22] Lugones references Lefebvre's notion of abstract space in the 22nd endnote of her tenth chapter (235).

knowledge, we are bound to transfer onto the level of discourse…a large portion of the attributes and 'properties' of what is actually social space" (7). The central issue for Lefebvre is that mainstream, "common sense" conceptions of space (throughout the history of Western civilization and philosophy) relegate it to the realm of the abstract; space is mistakenly conceived as a background or container for human activity, a realm that contains—but is ultimately indifferent to—the complex dynamics of the social.[23] What Lefebvre argues, instead, is that "(Social) space is a (social) product" (26). He explains, further:

> Social space will be revealed in its particularity to the extent that is ceases to be indistinguishable from mental space (as defined by philosophers and mathematicians) on the one hand, and physical space (as defined by practico-sensory activity and the perception of 'nature') on the other. What I shall seek to demonstrate is that such a social space is constituted neither by a collection of things or an aggregate of (sensory) data, nor by a void packed like a parcel with various contents, and that it is irreducible to a 'form' imposed by phenomena, upon things, upon physical materiality. (27)

Since the notion of social space is at the center of Lefebvre's main argument, we should first distinguish mental space from physical space. Mental space refers to "the space of philosophers and epistemologists," (6) "the (topological) space of thoughts and utterances," (26) or the "space of discourse and of the Cartesian *cogito*" (61). It is the space of concepts, imagination, and ideologies. Physical space refers to the concrete, material world, or the "practico-sensory realm" (200). Moreover, a science of space, Lefebvre argues, should "construct a theoretical unity between 'fields' which are apprehended separately […] The fields we are concerned with are, first, the *physical*—nature, the Cosmos; secondly, the *mental*, including logical and formal abstractions; and, thirdly, the *social*." (11) This unity is necessary because "we are concerned with logico-epistemological space, the space of social practice, the space occupied by sensory phenomena, including products of imagination such as projects and projections, symbols and utopias." (11–12)

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[23] To be clear, Lefebvre is interested in the ways in which space is (or is not) taken into serious consideration in social, political, and economic theories (especially as they relate to Marxist theory).

Important to note here is that Lefebvre rejects both a Kantian view of space—as an *apriori* category of human experience—and a Cartesian conception of space—as an empty receptacle to be "filled" with human subjects and actions. He is, rather, forwarding a sense of space as socially produced (26). Edward Soja's (1980) distinction between *contextual space* and *created space* is helpful here. Contextual space, or "space per se," refers to a "generalized and existential" understanding of space. (209) As Soja explains, "Contextual space is of broad philosophical interest in generating discussion about its absolute and relative properties, its character as 'container' of human life, its objectifiable geometry, and its phenomenological essence" (1980, 209). In contrast, created space concerns:

> …the concrete and subjective meaning of human spatiality. Space itself may be primordially given, but the organization, use, and meaning of space is a product of social translation, transformation, and experience. Socially produced space is a created structure comparable to other constructions resulting from the transformation of given conditions inherent in life-on-Earth. (210)

Lefebvre is concerned with space in this latter sense not only because it more accurately captures the complex human experience of space, but also because it opens up the possibility of analyzing the instrumentalization of space: "(Social) space is a (social) product…space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action…in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power…" (Lefebvre 1974, 26). In other words, the production of space is directly implicated in processes of social organization, domination, and repression. Furthermore, this fact is strategically concealed by what Lefebvre refers to as a "double illusion, each side of which refers back to the other, reinforces the other, and hides behind the other. These two aspects are "the *illusion of transparency* on the one hand and the *illusion of opacity*, or 'realistic' illusion, on the other" (27, emphasis added). The illusion of transparency has a "kinship with philosophical idealism" and suggests that space is "luminous," entirely "intelligible," and gives "action free rein" (30, 27). This illusion,

> …goes hand in hand with a view of space as innocent, as free of traps or secret places…Comprehension is thus supposed, without meeting any insurmountable

obstacles…Hence a rough coincidence is assumed to exist between social space on the one hand and mental space—the (topological) space of thoughts and utterances—on the other. (28)

The illusion of opacity, in contrast, "is closer to (naturalistic and mechanistic) materialism" (30). It is an illusion of "natural simplicity" that assumed everything simply refers back to the "real" (29). Furthermore, these illusions are not in an antagonistic or oppositional relationship. As Lefebvre writes,

> On the contrary, each illusion embodies and nourishes the other. The shifting back and forth between the two, and the flickering or oscillatory effect that it produces, are thus just as important as either of the illusions considered in isolation. Symbolisms deriving from nature can obscure the rational lucidity which the West has inherited from its successful domination of nature…The rational is thus naturalized, while nature cloaks itself in nostalgias which supplant rationality. (30)

To summarize briefly, Lefebvre critiques notions of space that distort its complexity and its constitutive relationship to social structures. He forwards an alternative definition of space as socially produced and as a tool for control, domination, and power (26). The fact that space is produced is disguised by two seemingly opposed but actually collaborative illusions: the illusion of transparency and the illusion of opacity. Together, these illusions mask the fact that space is conceptualized in ways that serve the aims and functions of dominant social structures. In other words, the ways in which we conceive of or theorize space are inseparable from the ways in which space is actually ordered; *ideas* about space have *material* effects.

Let us pause here to distinguish some preliminary connections between Lefebvre and Lugones. I find there to be a striking correlation between Lefebvre's illusions of opacity and transparency and Lugones's account of intermeshed and interlocking oppressions. In the same way that the illusions of opacity and transparency work to disguise the social production of space (and hence the processes of social domination), the interlocking of oppressions "is possible only if the inseparability of oppressions is disguised" (Lugones 2003, 223). If we consider Lefebvre's claim that "(social) space is a (social) product" (1974, 26), together with Lugones's claim that "oppressions intermesh but are represented

as interlocking" (2003, 3), then perhaps the fact that oppressions are commonly conceived as interlocked is itself a function of the production and instrumentalization of space.

After outlining his main proposition— "that (social) space is a (social) product"—Lefebvre articulates four implications and consequences that follow from it. I want to briefly consider the second implication: "…that every society—and hence every mode of production with its subvariants—produces a space, its own space" (Lefebvre 1974, 26, 31). These socially produced spaces, he argues, contain and assign "appropriate places" to two sets of relations: the "*social relations of reproduction*" and the "*relations of production*" (32, emphasis in original). I am less interested in the specifics of these relations as I am in the processes by which relations are "assigned" to particular spaces. In order for these assignments to take place, space must be represented in particular ways; these representations must be reproduced or maintained in such a way that social subjects both apprehend and (to a certain extent) submit to them: "Symbolic representation," he writes, "serves to maintain these social relations in a state of coexistence and cohesion" (32). Lefebvre then outlines a conceptual triad for understanding this complex relationship between the production of social space, the assignment of social relations to specific locations, and the subjects that make up or participate in those relations. The conceptual triad consists of 1) spatial practice, 2) representations of space, and 3) representational spaces.

Spatial practice refers to the "particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation" (33). The spatial practice of a society "secretes that society's space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it. From the analytic standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space" (38). Representations of space describe "conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent—all of whom identify what is lived with what is perceived with what is conceived" (38).

Lastly, representational spaces refer to "space as directly *lived* through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users'…" (39, emphasis in original). This space is "the dominated—and hence passively experienced—space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects" (39). What this conceptual triad ultimately reveals is that there is a complex relationship between space as it is perceived, space as it is conceived, and space as it is lived.

To elucidate this triad further and situate it within an important theme concerning the political nature of space, I turn briefly to geographer Stuart Elden's (2007) essay, "There is a Politics of Space because Space is Political: Henri Lefebvre and the Production of Space." Here, Elden explains that, for Lefebvre, "Space is produced in two ways: as a social formation (mode of production), and as a mental construction (conception)" (Elden 2007, 109). To understand space, then, "we need to grasp the concrete and the abstract together" because "space is a mental and material construct" (110). In other words, not only are the physical relations that make up our space produced and organized intentionally, but our ideas about what space *is* are also produced (and reinforced by our material conditions). The conceptual triad of spatial practices, representations of space, and representational spaces (or spaces of representation) correspond to three ways space is viewed; space as "perceived, conceived, and lived" (110). Elden argues that,

> This Lefebvrian schema sees a unity between physical, mental, and social space: The first of these takes space as physical form, *real* space, space that is generated and used. The second is the space of *savoir* (knowledge) and logic, of maps, mathematics, of space as the instrumental space of social engineers and urban planners, that is, space as a mental construct, *imagined* space. The third sees space as produced and modified over time and through its use, spaces invested with symbolism and meaning, the space of *connaisance* (less formal or more local forms of knowledge), space as *real-and-imagined*. (110–11, emphasis in original)

The schema Elden outlines above offers a rich framework for understanding and analyzing space. While mainstream conceptions of space may account for its physical properties or its abstract sense, they do not account for the ways in which space is perceived and lived by social subjects; nor

do they account for the fact that our very ideas about space are intentionally manipulated to obscure its complexity and implication in the organization of the social. As Elden argues, for Lefebvre, "Space is a social and political product," and it is, therefore, "the ultimate locus and medium of [political] struggle" (107). Furthermore, "social space" is inseparable from "abstract space." Abstract space represents a "view of space based on the division Descartes established between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. Space was formulated on the basis of extension, thought of in terms of coordinates, lines and planes, as Euclidean geometry. Kant further complicated the picture by conceiving of space and time as forms of sensibility, structuring all experience" (109). This brings us back to the critique of Western civilization and philosophy at the center of Lefebvre's argument—Western philosophy's conceptualization of space (as purely abstract) conceals the productive processes by which social structures are constructed and maintained. Furthermore, the abstraction of space establishes, Elden writes, an opposition "between our *conception* of space—abstract, mental, geometric—and our *perception* of space—concrete, material and physical" (110). For this reason, Lefebvre emphasizes the fact that, if we commit to the difference between "real, concrete space" and "conceptual, mental space," we avoid, "any confrontation between practice and theory, between lived experience and concepts, so that both sides of these dualities are distorted from the outset" (Lefebvre 1974, 95). In my view, Lugones, who is committed to theoretico-practico work, would surely agree with Lefebvre on this matter. Her own conception of space, then, should be understood as one that rejects the difference between concrete space and conceptual space. That is, one that recognizes and embraces the confrontation between "concrete" and "conceptual space" and between "practice and theory."

To close this section, I want to share one more quote from Lefebvre where he defines abstract space, because it will be crucial for understanding Lugones's move to *spatialize* her theorization of oppression and resistance. Lefebvre argues that abstract space is "a product of violence and war, it is political; instituted by a state, it is institutional. On first inspection it appears homogenous; and indeed

it serves those forces which make a *tabula rasa* of whatever stands in their way, of whatever threatens them—in short, of differences" (Lefebvre 1974, 285). If we grant Lefebvre's proposition that space is indeed produced and that this production—along with the concealment of the production—is political, then the ways in which social subjects exist in and move through space are politically significant. Because Lugones is invested in locating and theorizing resistance, and "resistance hardly ever has a straightforward public presence," she takes seriously the political nature of space and locates it at the center of her methodology (Lugones 2003, x).

As evidenced by Lefebvre, space is far from being a purely abstract concept or an indifferent realm within which human activity takes place. Instead, "Space is at once product and producer; it is also a *stake*, the locus of projects and actions deployed as part of specific strategies, and hence also the object of *wagers* on the future…" (Lefebvre 1974, 142-143). It should be of no surprise, then, that Lugones—who understood space as deeply implicated in the production of social and political domination—developed a spatial metaphor for articulating the ways in which subjects are oppressed and the possibilities for individual and collective forms of resistance. In the following section, I introduce the practical background of Lugones's "map of oppression," a map she developed in popular education workshops. This map serves as a focal point for the accounts of the "spatiality of oppression" and the "spatiality of resistance" I develop in my second and third chapters of this dissertation. I introduce it here to both synthesize the work developed in this first chapter and frame the forthcoming chapters.

2. The Map of Oppression: A Practical Background

The metaphor of the map of oppression is a tool for thinking through "the spatiality of resistances within and against the spatiality of dominations" (Lugones 2003, 8). A description of this map first appears as such in Lugones's 1998 essay: "Motion, Stasis, and Resistance to Interlocked

Oppression." She cultivates the idea, however, as a workshop with the *Escuela Popular Norteña*. In her essay, "Deep Coalition and Popular Education Praxis," (2019) Cricket Keating explores the popular education work Lugones developed with *la Escuela Popular Norteña* (EPN),[24] a grassroots organization Lugones co-founded in 1990 with Geoff Bryce and Sylvia Rodriguez (240). They founded EPN "as a 'school for political education at the grassroots, focused on the liberation of Latinos from poverty, violence and cultural extermination'" (240-241). Keating explains that EPN took a "coalitional approach to popular education," inspired by the works of Paulo Freire and Myles Horton, which "highlights the heterogeneity of people's positioning in relationship to power, and underscores the interlocking, intersecting, and intermeshing of multiple forms of oppression in people's lives" (240, 241). A coalitional approach to popular education "is grounded in a collective process of learning about each other's varied contexts and resistant practices and then thinking together about how to connect these practices so as to better sustain and amplify their effects in challenging oppressive conditions" (242). Keating goes on to explain that "Lugones, often in collaboration with other collective EPN members, designed more than 15 popular education workshops in her work with EPN" (242). Keating analyzes a few of these workshops[25] in her essay, including: the *Politicizing the Everyday* workshop, the *Complex Unity* workshop, the *Coalition: Linking Contexts of Resistance* workshop, *Fragmentation: A Workshop on the Political Uses of Popular* Education, and *The Map of Oppression: A Workshop on the Creation of Liberatory Awareness* (253–54).

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[24] Lugones describes her time with EPN in the preface to *Pilgrimage/Peregrinajes*: "The Escuela Popular Norteña is the most radical space I have inhabited with others seeking liberatory possibilities. In that space, a space we created together, I got to articulate and fashion my sense of possibilities with *compañeras* and *compañeros* who have a theoretico-practical disposition and who, as a group, have a wealth of experience taking that disposition into the popular education situation" (Lugones 2003, x).

[25] Most of Keating's sources are from the EPN archives in Valdez, NM. Keating's bibliography indicates that, while other workshops were written collaboratively by multiple members of the collective, *The Map of Oppression* workshop is solely credited to Lugones.

The Map of Oppression workshop asks participants to "draw a map reflecting the ways the spaces in their lives have been shaped by power in society. The aim of this workshop is to foster critical reflection and dialogue between community members about *both* the ways they are oppressed and the ways they resist this oppression. The workshop begins by asking participants "to draw lines on their map that indicate where they are allowed, enticed, or forced to go and where they are forbidden or discouraged from going" (243). This first step opens up an analysis of the spatiality of oppressive power relations as they operate in the participants' own maps. Then, Keating explains, the participants shift their "attention to the ways that they resist such power in their everyday lives" (243). Participants would then share their stories to gain a fuller appreciation about the ways in which *others* resist—which may be very different depending on the person and the context of their everyday lives. What is significant about this workshop is that it aims to cultivate a critical lens for perceiving resistance. That is, it is not enough to just teach people how oppression functions in their lives. That may, more often than not, be something oppressed groups are already well aware of. Learning to see oppression does not suffice precisely because, as Lugones argues in the second chapter of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, "If oppression theory is not liberatory, it is useless from the point of view of the oppressed person. It is discouraging, demoralizing" (Lugones 2003, 55). The *Map of Oppression* workshop, then, is a practical, collective exercise that encourages the development of an eye for resistance and liberation. For Lugones, it asks participants to look at their maps with a different lens or with a "magnifying glass" that shows: "How we are when we are following our own hearts and wills in resistance to the interests of those in power [...] With it you see that we're not just quiet and tired, but mischievous, energetic, active, creative" (Keating 2019, 243). Indeed, subject's capacity to cultivate an eye for their own resistant practices and the resistant practices of others is, as I will argue in my third chapter, a crucial feature of the spatiality of resistance.

I want to note a few things here. First, Lugones's "map of oppression" developed directly from her activist work—work grounded in popular education and committed to building "deep coalition" (239). This workshop highlights the fact that Lugones is interested in the extent to which subjects are willing (and able) to infuse the commitment to resistance against oppression in their daily lives.[26] It is necessary, of course, to organize against oppression in ways that may be more urgent and immediate. However, these immediate forms of organizing cannot, on Lugones's account, cultivate the "long-lasting change" relational transformations necessary for deep coalitions (239). In this way, liberatory struggle is just as much about the politics and practices we cultivate in our everyday lives as it is about working to dismantle systems of oppression by way of impressive shows of force. Additionally, this emphasis on the politics of the everyday shifts the burden of responsibility and accountability. That is, if we do intend to invest in liberatory struggle, we must do so in every dimension of our lives—both at home and on the streets. As Keating writes, Lugones's emphasis on deep coalition "highlights the ways that our own understandings and potential enactments of our lives are deeply tied to one another and to the meanings that we create together [...] the transformation of our relationships with one another has the potential to ground deep social change" (239). Furthermore, the fact that the notion of the map of oppression emerged from within this popular education context is a testament to Lugones's commitment to practico-theoretical work—she does not think what she does not practice—she theorizes from her concrete experiences and practical engagements with others (Lugones 2003, 5). The final section of this chapter will provide a theoretical background for the map of oppression; Lugones's 1998 essay, "Motion, Stasis, and Resistance to Interlocked Oppressions" is especially helpful for this task.

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[26] What I mean by this will become clearer in my third chapter on the spatiality of resistance. Lugones makes evident the fact that the task of seeing resistance in the spatiality of our everyday lives requires constant intersubjective attention and practice.

3. Map of Oppression: A Theoretical Background

Apart from her work with EPN, Lugones incorporates the map of oppression for the first time in a short essay titled, "Motion, Stasis, and Resistance to Interlocked Oppression," which was published in *Making Worlds: Gender, Metaphor, Materiality*, an edited collection for feminists texts grappling with the following question: "How, in sum, are the symbolic formations of 'place' and 'space' marked by cultural ideologies that carry across into the places and spaces we inhabit, the institutions we establish and maintain?" (Aiken 1998, 3). Lugones addresses this question by reflecting on "mobility" and its potential to be "used as a metaphor for resistance or as a metaphor for oppression" (Lugones 1998, 49). In this essay, mobility refers to "motion that is both real and metaphorical" through "spaces that are both real and metaphorical" (49). To open her reflection on mobility, Lugones asks a series of questions, the last of which is: "Why is it that I, for example, would go to places inhabited by other women of color?" (49). According to Lugones, the answer to this question depends on the concrete context from which women of color enact their movements.

To "locate" these movements "back and forth from motion to stasis, from bases or homes to the in-between, the roads, the margins, the borders," Lugones finds useful "the geographical metaphor of the map of oppression" (49). Moreover, Lugones argues that both motion and stasis can be understood to be metaphors for oppression and resistance to oppression. "Oppressed mobility," she writes, "is coerced mobility" and stasis can be "a metaphor either for resistance or oppression" (Lugones 1998, 49, 50). To explain the metaphor from a "point of view" that is "oppressive," Lugones offers an example of organizing politically in the Latino community: "It is easy to work in these communities as long as you are working in areas having to do with political tradition. But to work around issues of race, class, gender, and sexuality is a very, very hard thing to do" (50). Here, the metaphor of stasis refers to the stifling of movement that would benefit all members of a group—in spite of the differences within the group—as curbed by the group's traditions that align with logics of

domination and exclusion. After articulating the metaphors of stasis and mobility, Lugones offers a

brief description of the map of oppression. This description, while slightly different to the one she

provides in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes,* underscores the spatialized character of Lugones's understanding

of the social:

> The map of oppression is one of the possible maps of our society. It is a map with a high
> degree of reality. The map has been drawn by people who are shareholders in power or by
> others on their behalf, with a more or less hidden hand. The key to the map is that it is drawn
> for the power holders' benefit. (50)

From this first excerpt, we learn one of the main features of the map: the map is a conceptual

instrument of domination, created by and for those in power. It is safe to assume that, if the map is

drawn for the shareholder's benefit, then its effects will necessarily be detrimental to those without

power who, having no say in how the map is drawn, are the most vulnerable to its force. The social

order here is, therefore, a spatial order constructed by and for those in power. Lugones continues:

> Each member of the society—oppressed and oppressor—has a spot in the map. There are
> roads that go to and from different people's spots. But not all the roads are in good repair or
> open to everyone. Some roads are prescribed, and some are proscribed to different people,
> always for the power holders' benefit. (50)

> Here, Lugones shares a perhaps more inconspicuous feature of the map: it determines and

regulates both legitimate and illegitimate forms of movement. By assigning specific spots and roads

to *all* members of society, those who draw the map establish precedent for policing the movements

of all members. Movements that are not suited to the shareholder's benefits or interests are met with

scrutiny or punishment. This feature could be understood through a myriad of examples, some as

broad as property law that prohibits acts of trespass, or as specific as the rigid movements and quotas

expected of an Amazon factory worker, whose occupation of space is monitored closely enough to

determine the number of minutes they are allotted for even the most basic bodily functions.[27]

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[27] In a recent survey conducted by worker-rights online platform Organize, 74% of Amazon warehouse
employees survey participants agreed with the statement "Do you avoid going to the toilet at work?" Part of
the executive summary of the study highlights the following: In Wave 1, stories came to light of forced standing

In addition to the map's command over the physical activity of subjects, it upholds oppressive logics that overdetermine the meaning of subjects' lives:

> When we look at ourselves on the map through the "eyes" that draw the map, we see ourselves as tired, depressed, and quiet, except to the extent that we are obediently efficient in fulfilling the task of "our station." We are also marked in intricate and fragmenting ways that pull us apart from the possibility of personal integrity. There are complex relations between the ways in which we are tired, quiet, and obedient and the ways in which we are marked. (50)

Here Lugones is pointing to the ways in which the map represents subjects and imposes on them an abstract image of who they are according to their "station" (50). This image is not, of course, a faithful representation of who any given subject is in all their concrete complexity. Rather, it is a one-dimensional view of a subject's being, focused solely on their assigned task or activity. As Lugones explains, the ways subjects are marked on the map does not just refer to the ways in which their movements—their conscious activities—are restricted and regulated. It also refers to the "image" or meaning that is projected onto the activity. The oppressive logic here is a logic that, in determining the activity of subjects, also seeks to define them according to this coerced mobility. It is a self-referential logic: "you are what you do, and you must do this because of who you are." These are, in a sense, "stories" that overdetermine the meaning of a subject's life. Moreover, to say that subjects are "marked in intricate and fragmenting ways that pull [them] apart from the possibility of personal integrity" is to say that subjects experience a split between who they are and what they do; they are both coerced to engage in certain activities and convinced that who they are is inseparable from this coerced activity (50). This fragmenting power of the map is essential to Lugones's understanding of interlocking oppressions. On Lugones's account, subjects are tortured "into simple fragmented identities" because they are marked in ways that determine the relationship between their activity and

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through 10-hour shifts, timed bathroom breaks and abusive management at Amazon. But the thing that came up again and again was the impact of high (and ever increasing) targets. Unreasonable targets meant that people are constantly working in fear with the threat of being fired if they fell behind." (Amazon Associates from the BHX1 Warehouse 2017) 3.

their identity (51). Fragmentation is, in one sense, experienced as a severe dissonance between the abstract ways in which the map is drawn and the concrete ways in which subjects actually inhabit it. Nonetheless, subjects can perceive their activity (itself an embodied relationship in and to the world) in ways that may disrupt or contradict the overdetermined image of who they are on the map, and herein lies the possibilities for resisting the map of oppression.

According to Lugones, "each one of us occupies the map in tension and resistance. When we look at ourselves and others on the map through resistant 'eyes,' we see ourselves both as trespassers and followers of intentions that do not mesh with the logic of obedience" (50). In addition, reading the map with resistant "eyes" or "resistant perception" opens up "the possibility of a practice of collective transformation [...] from fragmentation into complex, nonfragmented identities" (50-51). What Lugones articulates here is, as I will demonstrate (especially in my third chapter), essential to her understanding of the spatiality of resistance in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*. She argues in her introduction that the map is actually constituted by *both* the logic of oppression and resistance, and that oppression and resistance are ongoing, co-constitutive processes in tense relation (2003, 208). In fact, on her account, "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting construct space simultaneously" and "the tension of being oppressed⇔resisting oppression 'places' [subjects] inside the processes of production of multiple realities" and spatialities (12, 17). Because subjects are already "inside" the processes of spatial production, they can cultivate a critical understanding of multiple spatialities and, as a result, cultivate a deeper sense of multiple resistant meanings and practices.

Overall, Lugones's description of the map of oppression in her 1998 essay underscores the inseparability of space and the social. As Lefebvre reminds us, space is a social product. We can understand the map of oppression, then, as socially produced by those in power to reinforce and maintain social domination. Her early essay also concretizes the features of Lugones's investigation in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* we have explored throughout this chapter. Her metaphor of stasis—illustrated

through the example of organizing politically in the Latino community—is a metaphor for the frequent roadblocks that obstruct political movements and the prevent the cultivation of deep coalitions. Moreover, Lugones also illustrates the ways in which subjects are marked and fragmented by the interlocking of oppressions. The fact that Lugones takes up this metaphor to articulate her understanding of oppression/resistance is an indication of how her understanding of the terms is deeply spatial.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to begin elucidating what I mean by Lugones's spatial theorizing. I opened the chapter with a general overview of the ways in which space appears through *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*. I then pinpointed some of the central aims and features of her book project including her theoretico-practical commitment, her concern with the possibilities of building deep coalitions, and her reconceptualization of oppressions as intermeshed. I followed this with a description of her method for incorporating stories that concretize the modalities of resistance and oppression. This method, above all else, highlights a significant tension between the logics that order a space, the activity of subjects inhabiting that space, and the structures of meaning that influence the discernibility/indiscernibility of those activities within a given space. In the last section of the chapter, I summarized some of the major concepts in Lefebvre's (1974) *The Production of Space* that support his thesis that (social) space is (socially) produced. His work offers a framework for interpreting Lugones's spatialized understanding of the social, which is epitomized in her account of the map of oppression. This map will ultimately serve as a starting point for my account of (what I contend are) two types of spatialities at the center of Lugones's spatial theorizing: the spatiality of oppression and the spatiality of resistance.

The spatiality of oppression and resistance will be examined in subsequent chapters. Important to note, however, is that Lugones does not separate oppression and resistance throughout her work. Rather than viewing them as mutually exclusive phenomena, Lugones understands oppression and resistance as co-constitutive processes that simultaneously "construct people's movements, interactions, desires, and intentions" (13). According to Lugones, the logics of oppression and resistance reflect "at least two realities: one of them has the logic of resistance and transformation; the other has the logic of oppression. But, indeed, these two logics multiple and encounter each other over and over in many guises" (12). For this reason, and following the spirit of Lugones's project, my own analyses of the two spatialities will frequently bleed into each other. I will not attempt to avoid these overlaps but will instead work to reinforce the specific account of each spatiality through the moments of overlaps themselves.

Chapter 2: The Spatiality of Oppression

> Categorial understandings of oppressions; unilinear, univocal, unilogical understandings of history; and abstract understandings of space are all mechanisms that produce atomic understandings of social groups and block interworld and intraworld communication. (Lugones 2003, 26)

> From the remodeling of Tenochtitlán after its destruction by Hernan Cortés in 1521, to the 1960 inauguration of that most fabulous dream city of the Americas, Lúcio Costa's and Oscar Niemeyer's Brasília, Latin American cities have ever been creations of the human mind. The ideal of the city as the embodiment of social order corresponds to a moment in the development of Western civilization as whole, but only the lands of the new continent afford a propitious place for the dream of the "ordered city" to become a reality. (Rama 1996, 1)

In *The Lettered City,* Angel Rama examines the ways in which Iberian conquerors and administrators devised, constructed, and maintained an ideal, "urban dream of a new age" through the erection of Latin American cities. The New World afforded Iberian colonizers a supposed *tabula rasa* upon which they could achieve this dream and correct all the mistakes of the "old cities of Europe" (2). Spanish conquerors "became aware of having left behind the distribution of space and the way of life characteristic of the medieval Iberian cities— 'organic,' rather than 'ordered'—where they had been born and raised" (1). On Rama's account, the development of "Iberian capitalism" following the "discovery" of the New World was guided by Neoplatonic idealism (characterized by an emphasis in the attainability of human perfection) and, "with Neoplatonic idealism came the influence of the quasi-mythical Hippodamus, Greek father of the ideal city—especially his 'confidence that the processes of reason could impose measure and order on every human activity'" (Rama 1996, 2-3; Mumford 1961, 172). The plans for the erection of colonial Latin American cities were therefore motivated by the desire to "right" the wrongs of the "Old cities of Europe" on the "blank slate" of the American landscape, and establish a "perfect" economic and social equilibrium through the development of sophisticated social and material structures that would promote rapid economic expansion without compromising the authority of the Spanish crown (2). In Rama's words, "the patterns of urbanization that they had known firsthand at home were superseded in America by ideal models implemented

with routine uniformity in accordance with the vastness and systematic planning of the imperial enterprise" (2). Rama argues further that the uptake of these ideal models corresponded with a "crucial moment in Western culture" when "words began to separate from things, and people's understanding of epistemology changed from one of triadic conjuncture to the binary relationship expressed in the *Logique* of Port Royal, published in 1662, theorizing the independence of the 'order of signs'" (3). The emergent significance of the order of signs laid the foundation for an "ordering principle" and rationalizing impulse through which an "idealized social order" could be transferred "onto the physical reality of the newly found cities" (3-4). The "ordering principle" refers to the idea that the erection of the "ideal" Latin American city "required that its inhabitants be organized to meet increasingly stringent requirements of colonization, administration, commerce, defense, and religion" (2). In other words, as colonial urban planners sketched the maps from which the new Latin American cities would be modeled on, they simultaneously drafted the plans for a new social morphology; "the ordering principle revealed itself as a hierarchal society transposed by analogy into a hierarchical design of urban space" (3).

This ordering principle, later "strengthened and institutionalized" by the Enlightenment, influenced "a whole series of transmitted directives (from Spain to America, from the governing head to the physical body of the city) so that the distribution of urban space would reproduce and confirm the desired social order" (5). Even more important, argues Rama "is the principle postulated in the quoted directives of the king: before anything may be built, the city must be *imagined* in order to avoid circumstances that might interfere with its ordained norms" (6, emphasis in original). The colonial history of urban planning in Latin America, then, is perhaps too well captured by Jorge Luis Borges's short story "On Exactitude in Science":

> …In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck

a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. (Borges 1998, 325)

What these abstract ideals of a "rationalized" social order and an "ordering impulse" accomplished, moreover, was not just a "perfect" sketch of an urban landscape on paper. As Rama explains, as Spanish conquerors swept across "nearly ten thousand kilometers of mountains, rivers, and tropical forests," they left in their wake "a scattering of cities, isolated and practically out of communication from one another, while the territory between new urban centers continued to be inhabited almost solely by the dismayed indigenous populations" (10). As conquerors destroyed and pillaged areas populated by indigenous communities, they lay claim to a network of "new urban centers" that "in the mechanism of military domination" served to "provide, first, bases for successive forays of conquering forces, and then, relay stations for the transmission of subsequent imperial directives" (11). Thus, urban centers were, at first, a fundamental strategic locations for the execution of colonial conquest. They then became the loci of Spanish colonial authority, the centers from which the control and regulation of social subjects would be executed. Once the landscape was secured, "the conquest triumphantly imposed its cities on a vast and unknown hinterland, certifying and reiterating the Greek conception that contrasted the civilized inhabitants of the polis to the barbarous denizens of the countryside" (11). This development of an urban network also "frequently resulted in the forced urbanization of settlers who, in their Iberian homeland, had been rural people, many of them never more to return to agrarian occupations" (11). Therefore, *all* inhabitants were subject to the dominion of urban life. As Rama explains,

> From the outset, then, urban life was the Spanish American ideal, no matter how insignificant the settlement where one lived. All now aspired to be *hidalgos*—minor nobility with the title *don* attached to their names—disdaining manual labor and lording it over their slaves and over the indigenous inhabitants who had been entrusted to them by the crown. These urban dwellers had the responsibility of organizing the agricultural production of the surrounding countryside, and they sought to generate wealth as quickly as possible through merciless exploitation of their coerced labor force. (11)

I find Rama's investigation to offer a concrete, spatio-temporally-situated example for introducing the spatiality of oppression. As Iberian conquerors devised written plans and maps for the planning of their "new" urban dream, they simultaneously conceptualized the rational, social order that was to accompany it. As Rama writes, "drawn plans have always been the best examples of operative cultural models. Behind their ostensible function as neutral registers of reality lies an ideological framework that validates and organizes that reality..." (9) Their ideas about how these new spaces were to be erected were always already constituted by the conqueror's desire to organize, manage, and regulate social subjects in ways that would best preserve the powers of the king and advance the economic expansion of the colonial empire. Their ideological domination was co-constitutive of their material domination and both functioned in tandem to shape the lived experiences of colonial subjects. I argued in the first chapter that Lugones's concretizing spatial theory highlights a significant tension between the logics that order a space, the activity of subjects inhabiting that space, and the structures of meaning that influence the discernibility or indiscernibility of activities in a given space. Furthermore, Lefebvre's work in *The Production of Space* underscores the fact that space is itself a social product—the outcome of social processes whereby the meaning of the objects, subjects, and relations within a given social structure are continuously negotiated and contested—most often for the benefit of dominant political, economic, and social institutions. In this chapter, I develop these arguments further by examining the spatiality of oppression or the ways in which Lugones understands oppression as *spatialized*.

More specifically, I argue that the "spatiality of oppression" refers to the processes by which oppressive spaces are produced and the characteristics of oppressive spaces. Oppressive spaces are closed, bounded, exclusive; they are produced (and preserved) when social subjects take up the oppressive logics (like a logic of exclusion, for instance) that constitute a particular space. To say that social subjects "take up" the dominant logics of a particular space, is to say that their "movements,

interactions, desires, and intentions" are at one with those logics (13). Their actions and intentions—the ways in which they move throughout the world and interact with others—are motivated by dominant epistemologies and patterns of perception.[28] These movements and interactions then reify the qualities of the oppressive space (and then this cycle repeats, over and over again). There are, however, two important caveats in this definition of the spatiality of oppression. First and foremost, Lugones herself does not explicitly define or utilize the term in the way I've just described it. Nonetheless, I offer this definition of "the spatiality of oppression" as a framework for elucidating Lugones's spatialized conception of oppression. Second, it is essential to keep in mind Lugones's insistence that "oppressing/being oppressed ⇔ resisting construct space simultaneously" and the logics of oppression and resistance simultaneously "construct people's movements, interactions, desires, and intentions" (12). Therefore, in saying that oppressive spaces are produced when subjects take up the oppressive logics that constitute a space, I do not mean to suggest that subjects are exhausted by those oppressive logics (there is, on Lugones's account, no such thing as a wholly oppressed or oppressing subject). Subjects do indeed "collaborate in the production" of oppressive spaces, but this collaboration is often unwilling and subjects may not be aware that their actions or intentions are at one with these dominant logics (10). As Lugones explains, subjects inhabit the spatiality of their everyday lives within the tense resisting ⇔ oppressing relation: "The tension of being oppressed ⇔ resisting oppression 'places' one *inside* the *processes* of production of multiple realities" (17). I propose the aforementioned definition of the spatiality of oppression for the sake of exegetical

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[28] I am intentional in my emphasis of both epistemologies and patterns of perception. If we recall Stuart Elden's discussion of Lefebvre's conceptual triad in the first chapter of this dissertation, to understand space "we need to grasp the concrete and the abstract together" because "space is a mental and material construct" (Elden 2007, 110). I draw attention to epistemologies and patterns of perceptions to account for the convergence of "mental" and "material" constructs in the production of space. To speak of the "qualities" of oppressed spaces, then, is to speak of the ways in which this convergence is lived by concrete subjects—how lived experience is shaped by the convergence of mental and material constructs.

clarity because my aim in this chapter is to build an account of Lugones's spatialized understanding of

oppression, but I do not want to forfeit the tension at the center of her project.

In the first chapter, I introduced a practical and theoretical background for the map—

describing *The Map of Oppression* workshop Lugones developed during her time with EPN and outlining

her incorporation of the map in an early essay "Motion, Stasis, and Resistance to Interlocked

Oppression" (1998). This background highlighted a few features of the map: first, that the map is an

instrument of domination that determines and regulates legitimate and illegitimate forms of

movements; second, that the map upholds and reifies oppressive logics; and lastly, the map represents

subjects and imposes on them an abstract image of who they are according to their functionality. In

this chapter, I return the map of oppression and utilize it as a springboard for articulating the spatiality

of oppression (the processes by which oppressive spaces are produced and the qualities of oppressive

spaces). In the first half of the chapter, I focus specifically on the processes by which abstraction is

instrumentalized; processes that, in turn, produce abstract, fragmented subjects and spaces. I contend

further that, for Lugones, the instrumentalization of abstraction operates at two connecting levels of

the political—at close range and at the level of collectives. These operations can be discerned from

the two vantage points Lugones articulates throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*: the vantage point of the

lover of purity[29] (depicting the process of abstraction at close range) and the vantage point of the

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[29] As I move between my second and third chapters, I shift between terms to describe this vantage point in particular. To be clear, Lugones references two types of vantage points throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*— each of which corresponds to the two connecting levels of the political: "the level of collectivities in formation" and the level "between people at closer range" (30). As Lugones argues early in her introduction, "The places and spaces [of liberatory praxis] are conceived quite differently by those who are part of the proceedings, as it were. There is the bird's eye view—the perspective from up high, planning the town, the takeover, or the analysis of life and history. There is the pedestrian view—the perspective from inside the midst of people, from inside the layers of relations and institutions and practices" (5). I contend, therefore, that the "bird's eye view" or "perspective from up high" coincides with the political "level of collectivities in formation" and with the "point of view" of the strategist, which I will refer to as a "vantage point" for the sake of continuity between my discussion of Lugones's sixth and tenth chapters (5, 30, 211). I will also generally use "vantage point" synonymously with "viewpoint" across the chapters of this dissertation. Lugones herself only uses the term "vantage point" in her introduction and sixth chapter. Furthermore, I contend that the "pedestrian view" or "perspective from inside the midst of people" coincides with the political level "between people at closer

strategist (depicting the process of abstraction at the level of collectivities). In my view, each vantage

point can also be understood in two ways: as a theoretical standpoint from which to read the abstract

dimensions of the map of oppression, or as an archetype of an oppressing social subject—a subject

that "takes up" the dominant logics of the spaces they inhabit; each vantage point therefore captures

the instrumentalization of abstraction in a theoretico-practical vein.[30]

The second half of the chapter is more focused on the characteristics of oppressive spaces (or

the consequences of the processes by which oppressive spaces are produced)—characteristics that

should also be understood at both connecting levels of the political. With this in mind, I first offer an

account of the experiences of the cachapera/tortillera—a figure at the center of Lugones's eighth

chapter: "*El Pasar Discontínuo de la Cachapera/Tortillera del Barrio a la Barra al Movimiento*/The

Discontinuous Passing of the Cachapera/Tortillera from the Barrio to the Bar to the Movement"

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range," the "vantage point of the lover of purity," and the vantage point of the "tactician" (5, 10, 130, 212).
There is, however, an important difference between the vantage point of the lover of purity and the vantage
point of the tactician. First of all, Lugones does not explicitly state that the vantage point of the lover of purity
is a perspective "from inside the midst of people" (5). This is a point of my own intervention that is tied
specifically to my definition of the spatiality of oppression. Because I am arguing that the spatiality of
oppression refers to the processes by which oppressive spaces are produced, and these processes operate at
both levels of the political, I turn to the lover of purity to describe the ways in which processes of oppressive
spatial production operate at the pedestrian view. In contrast, the vantage point of the tactician depicts a point
of view from which resistant spatialities are produced (at the pedestrian level). I will develop an analysis of the
tactician in my third chapter but distinguish it here from the vantage point of the lover of purity to help
foreground the analysis I develop in this second chapter.

[30] There is an important method across Lugones's *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* that I believe captures her commitment
to theorizing in a theoretico-practical vein. When discussing particular "logics" or ideological frameworks (like
the logic of purity) Lugones personifies these logics. That is, she names and analyses the logics as figures,
characters, or types of social subjects. For example, she articulates the logic of purity in her sixth chapter *through*
the figure of the lover of purity. More evident still is how she employs this approach in her tenth chapter with
the figures of the "tactician" and "strategist." Lugones borrows these terms from de Certeau's (1984) *The Practice
of Everyday Life*. Important to note, however, is that de Certeau himself only refers to "tactics" and "strategies"
throughout his project. His tactic/strategy dichotomy, then, is an ideological dichotomy. Nonetheless,
throughout her tenth chapter, Lugones refers to the terms in a personified form—the logic of the tactic
becomes the figure of the tactician and the logic of the strategy becomes the figure of the strategist. In doing
so, Lugones engages in a type of theorizing that disrupts the "theory/praxis" dichotomy because she takes up
and elaborates certain concepts by representing them as figurative subjects who engage in particular activities.
To articulate the "logic of purity," for instance, Lugones describes the practices of the lover of purity thereby
demonstrating how a particular view of the world determines the ways in which the lover of purity interprets
and interacts with himself and others in the world.

(166-180). I then turn to Lugones's ninth chapter, "Enticements and Dangers of Community and Home for a Radical Politics" (182-205) to articulate the ways in which abstract notions of space compromise the possibilities for building coalitions in resistance to intermeshed oppressions.

Part 1: The Map of Oppression: A Close Reading

In the introduction to *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, Lugones invites her reader to engage in the same embodied thought experiment as participants of EPN's *Map of Oppression* workshop would be invited to do. The reader is therefore invited to participate in a form of spatial theorizing that encourages them to recognize the ways their own lives are spatially mapped by power and bound to particular, dominant configurations of the social:

> Visualize, remember, and sense[31] a map that has been drawn by power in its many guises and directions and where there is a spot for you. All the roads and places are marked as places you may, must, or cannot occupy. Your life is spatially mapped by power. Your spot lies at the intersection of all the spatial venues where you may, must, or cannot live or move. Those intersections also spatialize your relations and your condition with respect to the asymmetries of power that constitute those relations. (Lugones 2003, 8)

Lugones opens this description of the map in a manner that is reminiscent of the description in her 1998 essay, sketching out the general spatial landscape of a map "drawn by power," or a map "drawn for the power holders' benefit" (2003, 8; 1998, 50). What Lugones underscores here is that power regulates the mobility of social subjects, the ways they may or may not move to and from particular

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[31] Lugones is very deliberate about the three actions she solicits from her reader here: 1) to visualize—denotes a conceptual action or movement. 2) to sense—denotes a perceptual action or movement—and 3) to remember—this act in particular stands out from the first two. At the end of the second chapter, after arguing that we must think of "realities and selves as multiple," she claims that "liberatory experience" lies in memory and in a subject's capacity to remember their different "selves," especially the selves that inhabit realities where she is not subservient: "So, the liberatory experience lies in this memory on these many people one is who have intentions one understands because one is fluent in several 'cultures,' 'worlds,' realities.'" (58). I will deal more closely with the relationship between Lugones's spatial theorizing and ontological pluralism in the third chapter, but I wanted to mark here a connection between the early foundations of her notions of ontological pluralism and the metaphor of the map. Lugones's incorporation of the task of "remembering" at the beginning of this embodied thought experiment is, I contend, a direct reference to her understanding of ontological pluralism.

locations, and the ways they may or may not relate to others. The spatiality of a subject's everyday life is rooted in dominant, oppressive logics—logics that separate these-subjects from those-subjects, these-spaces from those-spaces, and these-acts from those-acts. That is, while all subjects are "captured" by oppressive logics (even those who conceive them) oppressed subjects experience a higher degree of spatial containment and regulation than those who "benefit" from the map (1998, 50). The map of oppression represents (like the "Map of the Empire" in Borges's story) an ideal, conceptual configuration of the social that is reified by structures of power. The map is, as Lugones argues, "in a sense, abstract[32] since, in it, resistance and domination are conceptually separated. It is also abstract since the ways of power conceive domination through abstraction" (2003, 8).

To begin parsing these two key claims about the abstract dimensions of the map, I find it helpful to think of the map of oppression in Lefebvrian terms: the map of oppression is a *representation of space*—conceived by those in power—that orders the *spatial practices* of oppressed subjects—the concrete arrangements and movements of their everyday lives. Lefebvre (1974) argues that representations of space "have a substantial role and a specific influence in the production of space," and their intervention occurs "as a project embedded in a spatial context" (42). Furthermore, Lefebvre insists by the end of his project that the emergence of global capitalism and modernity brought forth "the growing material and representational abstraction of social practice" and the ascendancy of abstract space (Lefebvre 1974, 46; Wilson 2013, 363). This historical shift, he argues, prompted the disappearance of *representational space*[33] "into the representation of space—the latter swallows the

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[32] Lugones will ultimately develop a critical reading of the map that uncovers its multiplicity. There is, as Lugones explains, more than one logic "constructing the map," more than one way to "read" the map, and more than one way to inhabit it—and this is ultimately where the possibilities for resistance lie (11). Given that main concern in this chapter is with the spatiality of oppression, my focus will be on the map's "abstract" sense.

[33] Representational space is the third term in Lefebvre's conceptual triad (spatial practice, representations of space, representational spaces). Representational spaces refer to "space as directly *lived* through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users'..." (1974, 39). Representation spaces embody "complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life" (33). It can be most clearly understood as the "lived experience" of space.

former; and spatial practice, put into brackets along with social practice as a whole, endures only as the unthought aspect of the thought that has now pronounced itself sovereign ruler" (Lefebvre 1974, 398). In other words, abstract representations of space—like the map of oppression—have taken over as the dominant paradigms through which we understand and engage with space; and inscribe onto concrete space abstract, categorial constructions of social subjects and relations. I find Lefebvre's triad most helpful for making sense of the relationship between the abstract and concrete dimensions of Lugones's map, or the ways in which abstraction is an instrument of domination and the production of space is rooted in (and hidden by) abstract representations of space. He explains further:

> The space of a (social) order is hidden in the order of space. Operating-procedures attributable to the action of a power which in fact has its own location in space appear to result from a simple logic of space. There are beneficiaries of space, just as there are those excluded from it, those "deprived of space"; this fact is ascribed to the "properties" of a space, to its "norms," although in reality something very different is at work. (289)

Lugones characterizes the map of oppression as "one of the possible maps of society [...] with a high degree of reality" (1998, 50). With Lefebvre in mind, we can say that the map has a "high degree of reality" precisely because (in spite of being a purely abstract representation of space) it has a "substantial role and a specific influence" on the actual, concrete production of social spaces; the map of oppression is a "project embedded in a spatial context" (1974, 42). Furthermore, the map is "in a sense, abstract" because the powers that "draw" the map are hidden within the abstract logics ordering social spaces; these logics reduce the complexity of concrete, lived experience and constrain the possibilities for social subjects and their relations (Lugones 2003, 8). Given these points, I understand the logic of abstraction to be one of the logics that constitute the spatiality of oppression. As Lugones explains, the map of oppression "is, in a sense, abstract since, in it, resistance and domination are conceptually separated. It is also abstract since the ways of power conceive domination through abstraction" (8-9). That is, abstraction is a mechanism of domination that is instrumentalized through the social processes of spatial production. This is why, as Lugones writes, "There is no 'you' there [on

the map] except a person spatially and thus relationally conceived through your functionality in terms

of power. That you is understood as thoroughly socially constructed in terms of power" (9). She

argues, in addition, that "the naturalization of space[34] serves to create the illusion of territorial

boundedness and isolation; the histories of connected peoples become spatially fragmented" (35). I

contend, therefore, that oppressions are "spatialized" when abstraction is instrumentalized in the

service of social domination thereby fragmenting and detaching subjects from their historical and

spatial concreteness; promoting totalizing, essentialist models of complex social relations; and

projecting a rationalized conception of social order onto the material world.

To support this argument, I will draw a connection in this chapter between the logic of spatial

abstraction (most evident in Lugones's tenth chapter) and Lugones's early work on the logic of purity

and fragmentation in her sixth chapter. As she explains:

> The urge to control multiplicity is expressed in modern political theory and ethics in an
> understanding of reason as reducing multiplicity to unity through abstraction and
> categorization, from a particular vantage point. I consider this reduction expressive of the urge
> to control because of the logical fit between it and the creation of the fragmented individual.
> I understand fragmentation to be a form of domination. (127)

Lugones had yet to develop a spatialized account of abstraction at the time she first published her

sixth chapter, "Purity, Impurity, and Separation" (1994). Nonetheless, I find there to be a number of

crucial arguments throughout that chapter that lay the groundwork for her later spatial theorizing. To

be clear, in her sixth chapter, "Purity, Impurity, and Separation," Lugones argues that there is, at the

center of "modern political theory and ethics," an assumption that "reason" is synonymous with

"unity" and a "conception of reality as unified" (128). She then argues that "if we assume that the

world of people and things is unified, then we can conceive of a vantage point from which its unity

can be grasped" (128). Important to note is that she deems the "vantage point" to be "derivative from

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[34] The "naturalization of space" refers to the ways in which abstract constructions of space are conceived as
the "natural" order of space and the ways in which the social production of space is hidden by abstract
understandings of space. I will return to this notion in the second part of this chapter.

the conception of reality as unified" and the conception of reality as unified follows from "the urge to control" (128). There are, in other words, three levels of her argument here: 1) those in domination have an "urge to control the multiplicity of people and things"; 2) it is from this urge that reality and individuals are conceptually assumed to be "unified"; 3) and this assumption "generates and presupposed others. It generates the fictional construction of a vantage point from which unified wholes, totalities, can be captured. It generates the construction of a subject who can occupy such a vantage point" (127, 128). Lugones refers to this subject throughout her chapter as the "lover of purity." Moreover, in her tenth chapter, "Tactical Strategies of the Streetwalker/Estrategias Tácticas de la Callejera," Lugones forwards an account of two subjects who occupy particular vantage points (or viewpoints from which the social is theorized): the strategist and the tactician.[35] The strategist[36] is, on Lugones's account, a subject who "'sees' from a point of view characterized by the distance of height and abstraction [...] abstraction and the distance of height 'permit' a fictionalized seeing of a fictionalized city—'the concept-city' to appear real" (212). In addition, the "strategist perceives, or rather imagines, those who inhabit the city to inhabit a spatial order of the strategist's conception: ethnocentrically conceived, homogenous, and under his knowledgeable control" (213). With this in mind, I contend that Lugones's account of the "strategist" in her tenth chapter is, in a sense, a "spatialized" version of the "lover of purity" account in her sixth chapter. That is, while both chapters deal with the instrumentalization of abstraction, she forwards a "more frankly spatial" account of abstraction in her tenth chapter (35). Moreover, because Lugones's early chapters "emphasize the movements of resistant intentions between people at closer range" and her later chapters "dwell on movements of resistant intentions at the level of collectivities," I contend that her account of the lover

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[35] She develops this account by taking up and critiquing Michel de Certeau's (1984) discussion of the dichotomy between strategies and tactics.

[36] This vantage point is also one that resonates with Lefebvre's project, represented in "the logic of visualization" and "the rise of the 'theoretical man'—the rise of the human realm reduced to the realm of knowledge, conceptualization passed off as direct experience" (1974; 41, 398).

of purity highlights the ways in which abstraction is instrumentalized at the level "between people at closer range" and her account of the strategist highlights the ways in which abstraction is instrumentalized "at the level of collectivities" (30). This is essential to my account of the spatiality of oppression because the social production of space constitutes and is constituted by the activities of *both* individual subjects *and* collective groups[37]; and it is ultimately essential for understanding Lugones's account of interlocking/intermeshed oppressions because, as she writes, "oppressions interlock when the social mechanisms of oppression fragment the oppressed both as individuals and collectivities" and this interlocking disguises the fact that oppressions are actually "intermeshed" (223).

1. The Vantage Point of the Lover of Purity

We can begin tracing Lugones's development of a "privileged, simple, one-dimensional" vantage point by turning to chapter six, where she explains that the assumption of unity "generates the fictional construction of a vantage point from which unified wholes, totalities, can be captured" and it "generates the construction of a subject who can occupy such a vantage point" (128). This theoretical vantage point and its assumed subject (who she will subsequently refer to as the modern subject and the lover of purity) "are outside historicity and concreteness" (128). She argues further that "the fictitious character of the vantage point [...] is itself derivative from the conception of reality as unified. If we assume that the world of people and things is unified, then we can conceive of a vantage point from which its unity can be grasped" (128). The subject that is able to occupy this vantage point is an abstraction rooted in a rationalized conception of subjectivity and ontology. "Rationality is understood as this ability of a unified subject to abstract, categorize, train the multiple to the systematicity of norms, of rules that highlight, capture, and train its unity from the privileged

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[37] As Lugones argues in her sixth chapter: "Social homogeneity, domination through unification, and hierarchical ordering of split social groups are connected tightly to fragmentation in the person. If the person is fragmented, it is because the society is itself fragmented into groups that are pure, homogeneous [...] As the parts of individuals are separate, the groups are separate, in an insidious dialectic" (141).

vantage point. The conception of this subject is derivative from the assumption of unity and separability" (129). Lugones understands this rationalizing urge as an "urge to control" and contends that this urge is "conceptually related" to the "passion for purity" (129). She argues, moreover, that "if the modern subject is to go beyond conceptualizing the reduction to actually exercising control over people and things, then these fictions must be given some degree of reality" (129-130). It requires, in other words, a degree of reality afforded by its concrete incorporation into the processes of social-spatial production. Hence, this "lover of purity" or modern subject must be,

> [...] dressed, costumed, masked so as to appear able to exercise this reduction of heterogeneity to homogeneity, of multiplicity to unity [...] So, his own purification into someone who can step squarely onto the vantage point of unity requires that his remainder become of no consequence to his own sense of himself as someone who justifiably exercises control over multiplicity. Thus his needs must be taken care of by others hidden in spaces relegated outside of public view, where he parades himself as pure. And it is important to his own sense of things and of himself that he pay little attention to the satisfaction of the requirements of his sensuality, affectivity, and embodiment. (130)

There are several things to note from this explanation. First, the modern subject is *himself*[38] a fiction and his ability to control people and things depends on his capacity to maintain his own fictional character. The modern subject must make of himself and sustain, in the words of Audre Lorde, "*a mythical norm*" (Lorde 1984, 116). "In america, this norm is usually defined as white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, christian, financially secure" (116). At the center of this fiction is the idea that the modern subject is without difference. Lugones explains, the modern subject "cannot have symbolic and institutionalized inscriptions in his body that mark him as someone who is 'outside' his own production as the rational subject. To the extent that mastering institutional inscriptions is part of the program of unification there cannot be such markings of his body" (130). Difference is something that must therefore be inscribed onto others, onto those the modern subject seeks to control. "He is

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[38] I refer to the modern subject with masculine pronouns throughout this section to mirror Lugones's understanding of the modern subject as a fictional character that inhabits a dominant social position: a subject who is white, male, cis, heterosexual, etc. I find Lugones's understanding of this fictional character to be compatible with Lorde's notion of the mythical norm.

a fiction of his own imagination, but his imagination is mediated by the labor of others. He controls those who produce him, who to his eyes require his control because they are enmeshed in multiplicity [...] they are marked as other than himself, as lacking the relevant unity" (131). In sum, the existence and authority of the modern subject (the lover of purity) is contingent on a dual construction: the construction of his own pure and unified subjectivity, and the construction of "incomplete, unfit beings" marked as "gendered, racialized, and 'cultured'" (131). This dual construction is necessary for eliminating 'impurity, ambiguity, and multiplicity as they threaten his own fiction" (132). What should also be noted from Lugones's explanation is how these fictional abstractions are projected onto materials bodies—*both* the bodies of the supposedly pure, unmarked subjects *and* the bodies of the impure, marked subjects—while the modern subject himself remains inattentive to his own "sensuality, affectivity, and embodiment" (130). I highlight this relationship between abstractions and bodies so as to reference and reinforce the relationship between the conceptual (abstract) and material (concrete) in the social production of space. *Both* the pure, modern subject *and* the "incomplete, unfit beings" are social products, and they are produced through conceptual/material dialectic social processes (131). The lover of purity "controls those who produce him" because he controls the socio-spatial processes through which he and others are produced (53).

The lover of purity desires control: his method for exercising control is to analyze the social from an abstract vantage point and "categorize, train the multiple to the systematicity of norms, of rules that highlight, capture, and train its unity from the privileged vantage point" (129). There is, on Lugones's account, a contradictory nature to this method; "paradoxically, the lover of purity is also constituted as incoherent, as contradictory in his attitude toward his own and others' gender, race, culture. He must at once emphasize them and ignore them [...] His production as pure, as the impartial reasoner, requires that others produce him" (131). What she means by this is that the lover of purity cannot become a dominant subject if he does not have other social subjects under his control. He

needs subordinate subjects to be a part of the same social structures he inhabits so as to differentiate himself as a superior subject. These subordinate subjects must be both "inside" and "outside" of the lover of purity's social world. That is, because the lover of purity is a social product, he needs subjects to collaborate in the social processes by which he is produced; he needs impure, multiplicitous beings[39] that he can mold into fragmented, subjected subjects—but he must simultaneously disguise and deny their multiplicity in order to secure and maintain his control. In a word, he needs them to accept and reproduce his own fictional productions. He must make them *make themselves* into who he needs them to be so they can *make him* into who he wants to be.[40] As Lugones explains,

> Satisfying the modern subject's needs requires beings enmeshed in the multiple as the production of discrete units occurs amid multiplicity [...] To the extent that the modern subject succeeds in this attempt to control multiplicity, the production is impelled by his needs. Those who produce it become producers of the structuring "perceived" by the lover of purity from the rational vantage point as well as its products. So in the logic of the lover of purity they exhibit a peculiar lack of agency, autonomy, self-regulating ability. (130)

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[39] Important to note here is the "value" difference between impure, multiplicitous subjects and fragmented, subjected subjects. On Lugones's account, *all* subjects are actually multiplicitous. There are some subjects, like the lover of purity, who do not "see" themselves as multiplicitous (and see themselves, instead, as pure, unified subjects) because their position as dominant social subjects is contingent on their assumed purity. There are other subjects (subjects whose ambiguous identities are more apparent/stand out in a dominant social world) whose multiplicity is *reduced* by fragmentation. Moreover, As Lugones explains, "*According to the logic of purity, the social world is both unified and fragmented, homogenous, hierarchically ordered. Each person is either fragmented, composite or abstract and unified*" (127, emphasis in original). On the other hand, "*according to the logic of curdling, the social world is complex and heterogeneous, and each person is multiple, nonfragmented, embodied*" (127, emphasis in original). To conceive of subjects as multiplicitous is to embrace their heterogeneity (their ambiguous identities) and the heterogeneity of the social. To conceive of subjects as fragmented is to make of their multiplicitous, ambiguous identities a negative characteristic of their being (so as to make them "fit" into a hierarchically structured social order). The existence of ambiguous subjects is, ultimately, understood to be a challenge or disruption of a rational social order—their inhabitation of a rational social order reveals its logical contradictions; thus, ambiguous subjects are conceived as "fragmented" because their "being" is incompatible with the logics of the social order. To put it differently, to say that ambiguous subjects are "fragmented" subjects is to say: "the logic of the social order is not the problem, *they* are the problem." In contrast, to say that ambiguous subjects are multiplicitous (as Lugones urges us to do) is to say: "*They* are not the problem. The logic of the social order is."

[40] There are significant resonances here between Lugones's account of the lover of purity's paradoxical, contradictory attitude and her account of arrogant perception in her fourth chapter (see section 2 of part 1 in my third chapter). On Lugones's account, the lover of purity "must not himself be pulled in all or several perceptual directions; he must not perceive richly" (129). This is similar to her description of dominant subjects who are agents of arrogant perception.

Lugones's point concerning impure subject's "lack of agency" will become more important as we shift to her later work, but for now I want to draw a connection between her description of the "production of discrete units" and the production of public spaces "where [the modern subject] parades himself as pure" (130). To do so, we can turn to her example of the *Chicano* (a multiplicitous subject) versus the Mexican/American (a fragmented subject) who embodies a dual personality. On Lugones's account, "What Frank Chin calls a 'dual personality' is the production of a being who is simultaneously different and the same as postcultural subjects[41], a split and contradictory being who is a product of the ethnocentric racist imagination" (Lugones 2003, 134; Chin 1991) For Lugones, the term Chicano signifies a multiplicitous, impure, mestizo[42] subject. In contrast, she names "the dual personality *Mexican/American*, with no hyphen in the name, to signify that if the split were successful, there would be no possibility of dwelling or living in the hyphen[43]" (134, emphasis in original). In other words, on Lugones's account, the "Chicano" is a multiplicitous, ambiguous subjects but they are conceived and constructed as "Mexican/American" (a fragmented, incomplete subject) by US Anglo society. She develops a discussion on the dichotomy between the terms to elucidate and exemplify the ways in which the production of fragmented subjects serves the aims and desires of dominant social structures.[44] I am interested here in the latter (fragmented) construction.

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[41] Lugones uses the term "postcultural" to define the lover of purity as a subject (supposedly) without culture.

[42] Gloria Anzaldúa defines and re-claims the term "mestizo" in *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (1987). As Anzaldúa explains, "The *mestizos* who were genetically equipped co survive small pox, measles, and typhus (Old World diseases to which the natives had no immunity), founded a new hybrid race and inherited Central and South America. *Én 1521 nació un nueva raza, el mestizo, el mexicano* (people of mixed Indian and Spanish blood), a race that had never existed before. Chicanos, Mexican-Americans, are the offspring of those first matings" (1987, 5, emphasis in original). The term "mestizo" itself has problematic origins and connotations because it was intended to dilute the native (and African) ancestry of Mexican descendants. Nonetheless, Anzaldúa works to reclaim the term in her project to characterize the experiences of the "new mestiza," an ambiguous subject who is caught in-between contradictory cultures and histories (US Anglo and Mexico).

[43] Lugones borrows the phrase "living in the hyphen" from Sonia Saldivar-Hull (See Lugones endnote 11 in Chapter 6, 147).

[44] Here we find Lugones drawing an explicit connection between abstraction at the level of individuals and abstraction at the level of collectivities. Even though I have distinguished my own discussion of the "lover of purity" to be an account of the instrumentalization of abstraction at the level of individuals at close range, I do not mean to suggest that there is a clear separation between the two "connecting levels of the political" (30).

The Mexican/American is a "product of the Anglo imagination, sometimes enacted by persons who are the targets of ethnocentric racism in a unwilful parody of themselves" (134). The Mexican/American is conceived as being split into two personalities: "the authentic Mexican cultural self and the American self" (134). In this case, the Anglo occupies the position of the modern subject, and the Mexican/American is the impure Other who is neither fully Mexican or American—and therefore not fully constituted as a "complete," unified subject. As Lugones explains,

> The Anglo philosophy is that Mexican/Americans should both keep their culture (so as to be different and not full citizens) and assimilate (so as to be exploitable), a position whose contradictoriness is obvious. But as a split dual personality the authentic Mexican can assimilate without ceasing to be "cultured," the two selves complementary, the ornamental nature of the Mexican self-resolving the contradiction. (134-135)

What is crucial here is that neither side of the dual personality can be fully integrated into a unified subject— "the two sides of the split cannot be found without each other"— and integration is the condition for full cultural/political visibility and participation (135). Even the supposed "authentic" Mexican side is purely "ornamental," representing a "mythical portrait of the colonized" (135; Memmi 1967). The "authentic" Mexican culture is not understood (in the eyes of the Anglo subject) to be a living, dynamic culture; it is, rather, an abstract, static representation, frozen in time and space: "This authentic Mexican culture [...] is tradition filtered through Anglo eyes for the purposes of ornamentation [...] As American, one moves; as Mexican, one is static" (135). What is "authentically" American is therefore defined in opposition to what is deemed to be its Other; it emerges by ways of what Hayden White terms "the technique of ostensive self-definition by negation"—a technique that "arises out of the need for men to dignify their specific mode of existence by contrasting it with those of other men, real or imagined, who merely differ from themselves" (White

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Rather, I distinguish the two vantage points (lover of purity and strategist) on account of the two levels of the political throughout my analysis here for exegetical clarity. In my view, to understand the spatiality of oppression, we must understand the ways in which abstraction is instrumentalized at *both* levels of the political in order to account for the production of oppressive spatialities (productive processes that constitute and are constituted by both levels of the political).

1972, 5). This is not to say that there are not real, important differences between the Anglo and the Mexican/American. Rather, as Lorde (184) explains, "those differences have been misnamed and misused in the service of separation and confusion" (115). The Anglo projects onto those differences between him and the Mexican/American a particular, hierarchical logic—conceived from a vantage point "outside historicity and concreteness" (Lugones 2003, 128).

On Lugones's account, the mythical portrait of the "authentic Mexican" has, nonetheless, "acquired a degree of reality that both justifies and obscures Anglo dominance" (136). The portrait is tempting "because the portrait is heroic," and because it offers a false narrative of belonging that the Mexican/American can latch onto and be proud of—something uniquely "theirs" through which they can understand and distinguish themselves (136). The fact that this mythical image has been adopted by concrete subjects and "acquired a degree of reality" is evidence of Lefebvre's[45] claim that representational space—the space of myth, symbols, lived experience— "disappears" into dominant representations of space—the space of abstract concepts (Lugones, 136; Lefebvre 1974, 398). The mythical portrait of the authentic Mexican (essential to the dual personality of the Mexican/American) is absorbed by or disappeared into the abstraction of Anglo America as a space that "represents progress, efficiency, material well being" and then enacted materially through spatial practices (Lugones 2003, 136). In practice, Mexican/American communities are barred from participation in "public life because of their difference" (136). Lugones argues, furthermore, that "If [they] retreat and accept the 'between *Raza*' nonpublic status of [their] concerns, to be resolved in the privacy of [their] communities, [they] participate in the logic of the split. [Their] communities are rendered private space in the public/private distinction" (136). To retreat and accept the private/public distinction is, on

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[45] It is important to note that Lugones herself does not apply Lefebvre's triadic schema to the Mexican/American example in Chapter 6 or in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* as a whole. I apply the schema, nonetheless, because I find it to be useful for parsing out the dialectic between the abstract and concrete dimensions of the production of space (along with the abstract and concrete dimensions of the map of oppression).

Lugones's account, to (re)produce "the structuring 'perceived' by the lover of purity from the rational vantage point as well as its products" (130). To retreat and accept the distinction is to "collaborate in the production of that [oppressive] spatiality" (10).

In sum, the lover of purity, who I argue can be understood to inhabit a vantage point from "inside the midst of people," exemplifies the ways in which subjects take up unified conceptions of the self and, in turn, read others through a logic of fragmentation (5). The bodies of subjects like the Mexican/American are therefore marked by a difference produced by "pure" subjects like the Anglo (subjects who are ultimately invested in producing and preserving their own dominant social structures.) By turning to Lugones's account of the Mexican/American's exclusion from "public spaces," we find Lugones drawing an explicit connection between abstraction at the level of individuals and abstraction at the level of collectivities. Even though I understand my own discussion of the "lover of purity" to be an account of the instrumentalization of abstraction at the level of individuals at close range, I do not mean to suggest that there is a clear separation between the two "connecting levels of the political" (30). Rather, I distinguish the two vantage points (lover of purity and strategist) on account of the two levels of the political throughout my analysis for exegetical clarity. In my view, to understand the spatiality of oppression, we must understand the ways in which abstraction is instrumentalized at both levels of the political in order to account for the production of oppressive spatialities (productive processes that constitute and are constituted by both levels of the political). We must understand how the processes by which subjects like the lover of purity instrumentalize abstraction the level of individuals at close range (thereby producing fragmented, individual subjects) to justify the exclusion of these subjects from collective political participation (by producing public/private spaces) and vise versa. While the focus of this section has been on the instrumentalization of abstraction at close range, the next section explores the instrumentalization of abstraction at the level of collectivities.

2. The Vantage Point of the Strategist

While the vantage point Lugones describes in chapter six is the perspective of the modern subject—lover of purity—who exercises power over others and produces fragmented subjects through an instrumentalization of abstraction—the vantage point in chapter ten is the "bird's eye view" of the theoretician (the brother of the powerful) "perched up high" who looks at or makes the social from a disengaged position (10, 207).

> This crucial disengagement is not necessarily the disengagement of political impartiality or neutrality but a disengagement from the concrete. It is theoreticians so self-conceived who are understood to occupy the strategist position [...] Given this valorization of disengagement, the powerful are the theoretician's brothers: they get to play with the hand-me-downs of each other's imaginations. (207)

The vantage point depicted here is one that is still, in a sense, motivated by a "passion for purity" and an "urge to control" (129). Nonetheless, theoreticians are not necessarily as invested in the production of specific subjects (like the lover of purity) as much as they are invested in fixing and managing a place: "to 'empty' it of its concreteness and the meaning of that concreteness; to deterritorialize it, and to fix it in time, a place without history and without any properties that are not performed through the techniques of strategy" (213). The problem Lugones identifies with this disengaged vantage point is that it contributes to a "view of the social" wherein "subjected subjects are assumed to negotiate daily survival myopically from within the concreteness of body-to-body engagement" (207). That is, resistant subjects are deemed antithetical to the theorists and incapable of theorizing resistance to oppression. They are, instead, assumed to respond to oppression "myopically," moment-to-moment, without a comprehensive grasp of the social and structures of power. Lugones builds this critique through an engagement with Michel de Certeau's (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life* and his distinction between strategies and tactics. De Certeau defines the strategy as,

> [...] the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated. It postulates a *place* that can be delimited as its *own* and serve as the base from which relations

with an *exteriority* composed of targets or threats can be managed. (1984, 35-36, emphasis in original)

Strategies are, in other words, particular schemas that serve the aims of dominant institutions. As Lugones explains, "Strategies are devised by planners, managers, subjects of will and power, from a point of view that is positioned high above the street, being able to view the 'whole' to be structured, abstracting from the concrete in accordance with scientific rationality" (2003, 211-212). On the other hand, de Certeau defines the tactic as, "[...] a calculus which cannot count on a 'proper' (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a borderline distinguishing the other as a visible totality. The place of a tactic belongs to the other" (1984, xix). Tactics are the methods of resistant subjects, those de Certeau terms "the weak" (xix).

Lugones takes issue with and aims to "disrupt" this dichotomy because, even though de Certeau "understands the tactic/strategy dichotomy in spatial terms" and "draws the dichotomy to unveil room for resistance by the 'weak,' the resistor is trapped by the spatiality of the dichotomy" (212). That is, in the same way that certain theories of oppression leave "the subject trapped inescapably in the oppressive system," de Certeau's model reduces resistance to reaction (within the spatiality of oppression) and does not leave room for production of resistance spatialities (53). As Lugones explains, de Certeau's dichotomy relies on conceptually tying resistance to the "tactical" and theory to the "strategic," thereby "erasing the possibility of theorizing resistance from the subaltern position and from within the concreteness of body-to-body engagement" (207). At the center of this dichotomy is the assumption that the oppressed, bound to a limited vantage-point at "street-level" cannot "see" or impact the social in meaningful, structurally altering ways (209). As Lugones writes,

> Tacticians, the weak, must always tum alien forces to their own ends, in devious, hidden makings—hidden from the strategist's frame of reference—that constitute another production, a production that does not reject or alter systems the weak have no choice but to accept but rather subverts these systems by using them to ends and references foreign to them (212).

Lugones's aim in disrupting the dichotomy is to intervene "in the judgment that the oppressed cannot see deeply into the social" and reconfigure "what it is to see deeply into it" (212). While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully explicate this intervention, we must still examine what Lugones means by seeing "deeply into the social" insofar as it is central to her spatialized account of abstraction (and her subsequent critique of modern notions of agency). To "see" deeply into the social is precisely the capacity assumed to belong to the "strategist," the theoretician that looks at the social from a "disengaged position" (207).

The activity of the strategist is reminiscent of the Latin American colonial administrators and urban planners of Rama's (1996) *Lettered City* who visualized and projected onto "the distribution of urban space" their "desired social order." (5) On Lugones's account,

> The strategist "sees" from a point of view characterized by the distance of height and abstraction. He "sees" the immobile city, but the immobile, immutable city—a triumph of space over time—is presupposed in relation sight-abstraction-distance. The immutable city is both presupposed and reasserted as a project of control. Abstraction and the distance of height "permit" a fictionalized seeing of a fictionalized city— "the concept—city" to appear real. This is also the colonial strategist's viewpoint: the distance of maps accompanied by the power to "empty" lands of history and the concreteness of local histories. (2003, 212-213)

Like the lover of purity, the strategic theorist instrumentalizes abstraction, but his "eye" is not directed at individual subjects, it is directed at the "whole" with the aim of capturing a totalizing panorama of the social. His view is that of someone at the summit of an urban skyscraper. As de Certeau phrases it, "His elevation transfigures him into a voyeur. It puts him at a distance. It transforms the bewitching world by which one was 'possessed' into a text that lies before one's eyes. It allows one to read it, to be a solar Eye, looking down like a god" (de Certeau 1984, 92). I contend, moreover, that while the lover of purity is concerned with the abstraction of subjects, the strategic theorist is concerned with the abstraction of space. As Lugones writes: "the strategist perceives, or rather imagines those who inhabit the city to inhabit a spatial order of the strategist's conception: ethnocentrically conceived, homogenous, under his knowledgeable control" (Lugones 2003, 213). In sum, Lugones argues, for

"de Certeau, 'strategy' stands for distance mastered through sight and abstraction, 'tactic' stands for lack of distance, concreteness, for shortsighted creations. Without illusions, the tactician stands on the treacherous fictional immobility of the master's proper and 'makes do' (214). The problematic assumption Lugones identifies here is that "the distance of height and abstraction" affords the strategist a "deeply" comprehensive view of the social and the tactician can only act and form resistant intentions from within the strategist's reified abstract vision of the social (212). "There is a confusion here between 'keeping at a distance' and being able to perceive, sense, with the distance of depth., depth into the social. One does not have to keep social relationality 'at a distance' if one is to see into its depth" (214). It is from this critique that Lugones forwards what she refers to as "tactical strategies"—a reconfiguration of "what it is to see deeply" into the social that is "crucial to an epistemology of resistance/liberation" (212, 208). I will return to "tactical strategies" in the next chapter. I merely note it here for the purposes of orienting my upcoming arguments. For now, I wish to pause here to explain why I've drawn attention to the differences between the lover of purity and the strategic theorist—and how these two vantage points capture the processes by which the oppressive spaces are produced (an essential part of the spatiality of oppression)

I contend that the processes by which fragmented subjects and communities are produced—processes taking place, respectively, at both levels of the political—are mirrored in the different methods by which the lover of purity (a character in an early chapter) and strategic theorist (a character in a later chapter) instrumentalize abstraction. The lover of purity produces a series of fictions at the level "between people at closer range," a series of fictions "that hides the training of the multiplicity into unity as well as the survival of the multiple" (30, 128). The lover of purity is, himself, the subject that is assumed to occupy a fictional "vantage point from which unified wholes, totalities, can be captured" (128). In turn, he makes multiplicitous subjects into fictional, fragmented versions of themselves (like the Mexican/American). On the other hand, the strategic theorist produces fictions

"at the level of collectivities in formation," evidenced by "the distance of height and abstraction" that affords him "a fictionalized seeing of a fictionalized city" (212). Both the lover of purity and the strategic theorist instrumentalize abstraction, but each takes up the task on a different scale or level of the social. I want to suggest, therefore, Lugones's spatial theorizing both signals her shift toward examining the connections between these two levels of the political and is an essential framework for developing this type of analysis.

Let me pause here to give an overview of what has been established thus far and trace the theoretical trajectory of this chapter. The goal of this chapter is to offer an account of the spatiality of oppression as it appears throughout Lugones's *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*. I've opened this account by returning to her metaphor of the map of oppression—a map drawn by power. Her description of the map—framed as an invitation to her reader to engage in an embodied thought-experiment—begins with a few key claims (9). First, the lives of all social subjects are "spatially mapped by power" (8). All subjects are designated a "spot" on the map "at the intersection of all spatial venues where [they] may, must, or cannot live or move" (8). These intersections spatialize the relations of social subjects "with respect to the asymmetries of power that constitute those relations" (8). Thus, a key feature of oppression is the regulation of a subject's spatiality—their inhabitation of space, movements through space, and relations in space. Second, the map is, "in a sense, abstract since, in it, resistance and domination are conceptually separated" (8). The map is constructed according to a logic of purity, wherein resistance and domination are wholly separate; this separation can be interpreted in a couple of ways. Because the map delineates the places subjects may or may not go, it establishes boundaries of compliance and noncompliance. We can take private property as a straightforward example. If a subject trespasses a private property line, they are technically committing an act of legal defiance and would therefore be subject to arrest or penalty. The lines on a map that distinguish between private and public property are therefore simultaneously establishing boundaries for legal compliance and for

non-compliance. Legal restrictions on free speech are another helpful example. In the US, subjects technically have the right to organize protests and demonstrations, but these rights are conditional; protests must be confined to particular public spaces, cannot obstruct pedestrian or vehicular traffic, and cannot violate noise control ordinances. There are, in addition to these recognizable distinctions exemplified by legal restrictions, more elusive boundaries operating at the level of sense; boundaries that, for example, distinguish between "what counts as political," what counts as resistance, and what does not:

> As you dare to witness police arresting people, or dare to ask a woman who is saying "no" to a man's hold whether she's all right, whether she wants to leave, you notice that it is quite different to do that than to organize a demonstration against Anglo takeover of land and water in the U.S. Southwest. It is all beyond the pale, but the latter is more easily understood as political [...] (2)

The conceptual separation between resistance and domination is therefore "mapped out" both at the level of the concrete and at the level of sense. Subjects are confined to particular places and movements precisely because those spaces and movements are conceptually bound to particular structures of meaning. And this leads us to the final claim that the map is abstract "since the ways of power conceive domination through abstraction" (8-9). According to Lugones, abstraction is itself an instrument of domination, a method employed by the modern subject or lover of purity who, from a fictionalized vantage point (outside of space and time) rationalizes the world in order to control it. It is from this vantage point that fragmented subjects, like the Mexican/American are produced, and this production is one of the many outcomes of the instrumentalization of abstraction. Abstraction is also instrumentalized "from a point of view that is positioned high above the street" by the strategist theorist, the brother of the powerful (211). It is from this point of view, "characterized by the distance of height and abstraction," that the strategic theorist produces "a fictionalized seeing of a fictionalized city"—an immobile, immutable city—and "perceives, or rather imagines, those who inhabit the city to inhabit a spatial order of the strategist's conception" (212-213).

Part 2: Fragmented Subjects and Communities

In the previous section, I offered an account of the first key feature of the spatiality of oppression: the logics of purity and abstraction. Up to this point in the chapter, the discussion has been heavily theoretical. In this section—and in the spirit of Lugones's concretizing method—I will more carefully examine Lugones's argument concerning the production of fragmented subjects. I am specifically interested in answering the following questions: what does fragmentation mean for subjects themselves? That is, what is the experience of fragmentation, and how do subjects *live* and *negotiate* the spatiality of oppression? Returning to the map of oppression, Lugones asserts:

> There is no "you" there [on the map] except a person spatially and thus relationally conceived through your functionality in terms of power. That you is understood as thoroughly socially constructed in terms of power [...] And if "you" (always abstract "you") are one of the dominated, your movements are highly restricted and contained [...]The abstract "you" has desires, thoughts, inclinations, and relations that are all constructed by power with their collaboration, the collaboration of the you. That is, every "you" is of the "system," logically speaking. (9)

Here, I interpret Lugones as offering a spatialized account of the social construction of the self; that is, an account that calls attention to the spatialities from and within which social subjects are constituted. The abstract subject is a subject as they are "drawn" on the map—produced by an oppressive spatiality. We can think of this subject as a sort of figure, an abstract rendition of who the individual person is according to the role or "function" they serve on the map. For example, consider the category of "woman" as it relates to the map. We can imagine various individual "women" existing on the map, each one assigned to their corresponding spaces. The logic of patriarchy would, most likely, position these women in domestic spaces to fulfill their expected roles as homemakers, caretakers, and mothers. These women, as abstract subjects on the map, are conceived through their "functionality" and socially constructed "in terms" of patriarchal power, or on the patriarchy's terms (9). Furthermore, because subjects are constructed in a way that "fits" and can maintain an oppressive

social order, abstract subjects are accorded "desires, thoughts, inclinations, and relations" that are compatible with the "system" or social order (9). The spatiality of oppression, then, informs the very "movements, interactions, desires, and intentions" of subjects in such a way that oppressed subjects inevitably collaborate in its production (13). As Lugones writes:

> When you think about the map, you see that people are organized and channeled spatially in ways that contain them in a systematic way from getting together against the grain of power. Or you may not quite realize that. You may not reality how you collaborate in the production of that spatiality. (10)

To elucidate and concretize this point, I turn to Lugones's eighth chapter, "*El Pasar Discontínuo de la Cachapera/Tortillera del Barrio a la Barra al Movimiento*/The Discontinuous Passing of the Cachapera/Tortillera[46] from the Barrio to the Bar to the Movement," where Lugones "spatialize[s] the fragmentation of Latina and Latino homoerotic subjects" (35). In what follows, I argue that Lugones's account of the cachapera/tortillera is illustrative of fragmentation at the level of collectivities; the cachapera/tortillera is a multiplicitous subject who inhabits multiple oppressive spaces, a subject whose movements are bound to an alternating pattern, a shift between communities that reduce her multiplicity—emphasizing either her homosexuality or her Latinidad—and "diminish her subjectivity" (177).

1. The Discontinuous Geography of the Cachapera/Tortillera

Lugones performs a few key gestures in this chapter. First, she writes the piece by alternating between English and Spanish (evidenced in the title of the chapter itself) in a manner that could be jarring to a monolingual reader. While she provides translations for the sections in Spanish (found in italics at the end of a given section), her linguistic shifts often occur mid-sentence. This linguistic playfulness (and its effect on the reader) captures the experience of the cachapera who is forced to

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[46] These terms are (often derogatory) references to lesbians in Spanish.

negotiate persistent shifts in the ways she communicates, negotiates her identity, and is "read" by members of the multiple communities she inhabits. Second, Lugones structures the chapter in a compelling manner that seems to mirror the "discontinuous geography" of the cachapera. While Lugones often styles her chapters creatively throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, this chapter stands out from the rest for the brevity of its sections that, when read, could elicit in the reader a sense of undergoing sharp turns or jumps between moments and spaces. Overall, the chapter altogether is akin to conceptual quilt, a collection of textile fragments stitched together to embody the cachapera's discontinuous geography. Lastly, Lugones prefaces the main part of the chapter with a glossary and a section with three news-bites (like a news bulletin board). The glossary offers both a helpful set of terms that are used throughout the chapter, and as a conceptual frame for stepping into the cachapera's landscape. This is suggested by the chapter's epigraph which reads: "Necessary admonitions: guidelines into the landscape—Para saber de quien hablamos y que queremos decir por 'hablar[47]'" (167). The three news-bites are included in a section titled "Para su información[48] (*Nuevas*/News)," offering the concrete, spatio-temporal context for Lugones's reflections (168). I quote these below at length:

1. Gays and lesbians march in New York City in a joyous parade that brings together the city's enormous diversity of homosexual life. Participants—including white, Puerto Rican, African American, Asian, and Dominican gays and lesbians—are asked about their wishes and dreams for the year 2000. Each responds echoing everyone else like a chant: "an end to AIDS—equal rights for gays and lesbians." No matter the location: "an end to AIDS – equal rights for gays and lesbians." Nothing else informs the politics and dreams: "an end to AIDS—equal rights for gays and lesbians."

2. As the people of Cincinnati were preparing to vote on whether to keep or repeal the city's anti-discrimination ordinance that includes gays and lesbians, right-wing opponents of the ordinance produced a video in which spokespeople for the African American, Latino, and Native American communities spoke against what they saw as "special rights" for gays and lesbians (see Cincinnati video). In the video, one can follow the right wing's manipulations of lesbian/gay and particularly African American, but also Latino and Native American, identities, histories, and struggles. But the video also documents and

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[47] To know of whom we speak and what we mean by "speak" (my translation).
[48] For your information (my translation).

exploits the disconnection and fragmentation within and between those identities and struggles. The video begins with scenes from the Civil Rights march on Washington, DC, including King's delivery of his "I Have a Dream" speech. The images of the March on Washington are mixed with, and overwhelmed by, images of the Gay and Lesbian March on Washington. As the images depict the displacement, spokes people for the African American, Native American, and Latino communities decry the use of civil rights rhetoric by a group of people they identify as outsiders to their groups and struggles and whose lifestyles turn that use into an abomination. "There are no African American, Latino, Native American gays and lesbians" is part of the message. This is a declaration. The question I ask is whether there are any tortilleras, jotas, marimachas.

3. A tortillera is putting up posters in Tucson for an event sponsored by several organizations. As she asks a shop owner whether she can put a poster in his shop, he says: "Yes, if you cut out that sponsor," pointing to "Lesbianas Latinas de Tucson." La tortillera says, "What, are we not part of la raza?" "Not of my raza" says the man. (168-169)

These three stories represent three different collective intentions. The first story—of the gay pride parade in New York—stands out from the other two insofar as it does not depict an intention formed through an explicit negation. The collective intention is captured in the chant (repeated three times) "an end to AIDS—equal rights for gays and lesbians," uttered by the diverse group of participants "no matter the location" (168). Despite the lack of territoriality in this chant, it is notable that Lugones also characterizes the moment with the claim that, "Nothing else informs the politics and dreams," suggesting that there is still an absence or blindside in the movement, especially given the racial diversity of those in attendance (168). In contrast, the other two descriptions exemplify the practices of exclusion and territoriality Lugones critiques throughout the chapter. The second story depicts the contradictory history of racial minority groups who, while proclaiming their own desires for equality, simultaneously denounce those they deem "other" and reject appeals for equality from other oppressed groups (like gays or lesbians)—rendering invisible those members of their own community that experience oppression on multiple fronts. This exclusionary impulse is echoed and accentuated in the third story where, even though the shop owner is in favor of advertising the organized event (an event we can safely assume is pro-Latino), he would only do so if the "Lesbianas Latinas de Tucson" sponsors are removed from the advertisement; he does not think his interests are

aligned with those of the Latina Lesbian group (even though they are one of the organizations

sponsoring the event) because he refuses to accept them as part of his *raza*—his people. By framing

the chapter with these three stories, Lugones draws attention to the spatial politics the cachapera is

forced to negotiate, the discontinuous geography she must navigate on a day-to-day basis (especially

if she is invested in political organizing).

The aim of the chapter is, as Lugones writes, to "disturb the complacencies that uphold the

fusion of heterosexuality and colonization[49]," complacencies that she deems "unwitting or careless or

tyrannical collaborations between Latino nationalisms and the contemporary U.S. Lesbian Movement

in its various versions and enclaves" (169). On Lugones's account, both groups are bound to and

reproduce colonial logic of modernity and unity; they "repeat over and over in tired combinations the

traditions that 'constitute us as a people' even when these iterations are presented as defiant refusals

of mimicry of the colonizer/dominator" (178). She chooses to center the figure of the

cachapera/tortillera because her existence disrupts the abstract borders upheld by the communities

she inhabits—borders that compromise her sense of belonging and demand her fragmentation. The

cachapera/tortillera is both of and outside of the Latino nationalist and U.S. Lesbian movements. As

Lugones explains, Latino communities are wedded to heterosexuality and therefore refuse to recognize

the presence of lesbians as part of their communities. They speak of the cachapera only "*en el mitote*"

(in the midst of gossip), but they do not speak to her "as such" (173). Her inhabitation of Latino

communities is contingent on an insidious re-constitution of her subjectivity that renders invisible her

homosexuality.

> La tortillera passes as heterosexual, a status that is accorded to her face to face. She may be
> spoken about as a tortillera, but she is not spoken to as such. Heterosexual is a status that she
> may actually seek through her manner of presentation, including her speech, her compliance
> and allegiance to heterosexual norms, including explicit displays of homophobia. Or a status

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[49] Lugones's concern with the fusion of heterosexuality and colonization here can be interpreted as an early
iteration of her later work on the coloniality of gender and the colonial/modern gender system—revealing a
discernible relationship between her spatial theorizing and her work on coloniality.

that she allows to be hung on her, like a sign that negates what in her announces her transgression. She does not speak as and in a social sense, because in an outspoken, public social sense she is not a tortillera. (173)

There is a noticeable parallel here between the "public social sense" to which the tortillera is confined and the "public space" where the lover of purity "parades himself as pure" (173, 130). Like the Mexican/American, the cachapera "cannot participate in public life because of [her] difference, except ornamentally in the dramatization of equality" (136). What the Mexican/American wears as the ornament of "authentic" Mexican culture, the cachapera wears as the "status of heterosexual." Thus, her participation in Latino communities is, at best, artificial. At worst, "La tortillera exists en la comunidad only as a pervert. Perversion constitutes her and marks her as outside of countenanced relationality. Her sociality is alive and constructed *en el mitote* (in gossip), in her absence" (174). The cachapera is therefore invisible and voiceless in this community; "en la comunidad, under the reigns of nationalism, la cachapera is silent, her meaning is made by others" (174).

Given this rejection, the cachapera moves "way from comunidad Latina to the inside of the Lesbian Movement. Movement toward movement. Our movement guided by a dislike for pained stasis, looking for voice outside the confines of our tongues. Fantastic flight from our possibilities" (174). And yet, the cachapera does not experience relief when she makes it to the Lesbian movement. "Instead of cultivating her company toward impure shattering of colonized communions, la cachapera becomes the Latina/Lesbian" (174). The Lesbian Movement— "in white landscapes, locales, geography"—represents itself as being without location[50] (recall here the first story of the gay pride parade) in the same way the Anglo lover of purity represents himself as being "beyond culture" (175, 136). That is, the Lesbian Movement is constituted (strictly) on the basis of a shared sexuality. As Lugones writes,

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[50] It seems that Lugones represents the Lesbian Movement here as exemplifying Marilyn Friedman's (1989) concept of "community of choice." I examine this concept and Lugones's critique of it in the next section of this chapter.

The logic of modernity, of unity, takes a characteristic turn in the geographical setting of boundaries of the Lesbian Movement: 'Lesbian' becomes ideologically 'unified' even against much protesting and soul searching. The 'unification' is produced by avoiding border encounters. All encounters are within the geographical limits of master territories.[51] There, the one who has left the politics and geographies of the nations gets to protest the Movement's racism while enjoying the 'freedoms' of white/Anglo homo-erotic landscapes.

By avoiding any border encounters, the Lesbian Movement refuses to confront the racial and cultural histories of its members. And yet, this refusal itself constitutes the territoriality of the Lesbian Movement: "We are inside it, negatively, in a peculiar absence of relationality" (175). It is a Movement that "lacks a sense of geography and becomes aware of territoriality only when it stops outside the nations" and "finds in the nations both imagined and real, a fierce sense of geography in resistance to colonization, a sense that 'justifies' the Movement's retreat" (175). The cachapera's inhabitation of the Lesbian Movement therefore demands of her another split into the Latina/Lesbian. Silenced once more by her urge to "come out" as lesbian and join the Movement, the Latina/Lesbian "comes to a forced speaking in a bifid tongue[52]; because the eyes that see her coming out remake her in their own imagination. A bifid tongue: split, speaking out of both sides of her mouth" (176). In sum, the cachapera finds herself caught in an oppressive movement, oscillating between two conflicting territories that "diminish her subjectivity," refuse to see or hear her concrete complexity, and "reduce her to someone imagined both by the Latino heterosexual imagination and the lesbian imagination" (177). This territorial boundedness speaks to the naturalization of space—a spatial production that "serves to create the illusion of territorial boundedness and isolation" thereby spatially fragments "the histories of connected peoples" (200). The naturalization of space is at the center of Lugones's argument in the ninth chapter of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*. In the section that follows, I develop a close reading of this chapter; this close reading will expand my explanation of the key features of the

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[51] See Trinh T.Minh-Ha's (1995) "No Master Territories" *From When the Moon Waxes Red: Representation, Gender and Cultural Politics New York and London: Routledge, 1991.*

[52] This reference to a "bifid tongue" alludes to Gloria Anzaldúa's (1984) *Borderlands: The New Mestiza*, who writes of the new mestiza's "forked tongue," 55.

spatiality of oppression and emphasize Lugones's motivation for rejecting abstract notions of space and emphasizing the spatial particularity of subjects and communities.

To summarize, Lugones's account of *la cachapera/tortillera* captures the ways in which the instrumentalization of abstraction (at both levels of the political) shapes the lived experiences of multiplicitous subjects. At every turn, the cachapera must reckon with the contradictory terms upon which her "subjectivity" is constructed. Her existence as a member of the Latino community is in constant tension with her existence as a member of the Lesbian community. As she walks into Latino spaces, she is "made" into someone she is not. For example, when the tortillera "enters the church dressed in men's clothing—people respect her, they address her" but they only address her as a heterosexual (174). When she walks into lesbian spaces, she must similarly forfeit her sense of belonging to the Latino community. To understand the spatiality of the cachapera's oppression is, in my view, to understand the convergence between the abstraction of subjects and the abstraction of groups. It is to understand the ways in which the abstract construction of the Latino community (a collectivity constituted by nationalist boundaries) coupled with the heterosexist ideals that constitute her face-to-face interactions with other Latinos (at close range) shape her concrete being in the world and the perceptual gymnastics she must negotiate in her everyday life.

2. The Dangers of Abstract Space for Notions of Community and Home

In chapter nine of *Pilgrimages*, "Enticements and Dangers of Community and Home for a Radical Politics," Lugones explores "the relations between women and [their] communities" and "the possibilities that communities have or have not offered women" in support of their struggles against subordination (Lugones 2003, 183). She opens the chapter by turning to the work of Marilyn Friedman in her 1989 text, "Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating Community." In this essay, Friedman develops an account of a "communitarian self" to explain the ways in which subjects are

socially constituted by their communities, but not wholly determined by them. As Lugones explains, "The communitarian subject is constituted not just in relation to communities in which she is 'involuntarily bound'—communities of place—but also in relation to what Friedman calls 'communities of choice'" (Lugones 2003, 183). On Lugones's account, by communities of place, Friedman "has in mind community defined by family, neighborhood, school, church, and nation" (184). Communities of choice, on the other hand, are "voluntary and arise from own's own needs, desires, interests, and attractions…" (Lugones 2003, 184). These communities "help us counter oppressive and abusive relational structures" in communities of place "by providing models of alternative social relationships as well as standpoints for critical reflection on self and community" (184). Lugones appreciates the ways in which this distinction between community of place and choice seems to "capture the distance of critique" (185). As she explains, "communities of choice meant to me the 'place' where we became critical of institutions constitutive of communities of place and of 'common sense'" (185). Nonetheless, after trying to incorporate the distinction in popular education workshops with communities of color, she began to "see the problematic character of bringing that distinction to communities of place when folks were not about to leave them and when the point of the discussion was not to provoke them to leave, but rather to transform their communities of place, beginning by a structured critique of them" (185). From this, Lugones came to understand that "to think of choosing to leave communities of place is to think of the wrong activity in resistance to domination" (185). If the aim of resisting domination is merely to transform one's own sense of self and belonging, then it may perhaps suffice to "leave in order to discern who we really are" (184). However, if the aim of resisting domination is to transform the communities themselves (which I take to be Lugones's stance), then leaving the communities altogether does not suffice. What good does the critical standpoint one can cultivate by leaving communities of place do if one does not bring whatever is garnered from the critical stance back to the community? How can one discern who they

"really are" without also discerning who they are in both communities of choice and place? As Lugones phrases the question: "Does [Friedman] mean that women intent or in need of self-transformation should give up the task of transforming their communities?" (186-187).

Lugones identifies the issue with Friedman's conceptions as stemming from the view that some communities "constitute us passively," a view Friedman implicitly supports "by beginning her task conversing with [Michael] Sandel and [Alasdair] McIntyre" (185). According to Lugones, "instead of questioning [Sandel and McIntyre's] understanding of community, she renames that understanding 'community of place' and rejects the communities themselves. The sense she implicitly affirms is that history is given to us…but that gives us too passive an understanding of social relationships" (185). The assumption Friedman operates from, then, is that "real" resistance can only emerge from communities of choice that are not bound to specific institutional histories. This is especially evident at the end of Friedman's essay, when she explains that,

> A community of choice might be a community of people who share a common oppression. This is particularly critical in those instances in which the shared oppression is not concentrated within certain communities of place, as it might be, for example, in the case of ethnic minorities, but rather, is focused on people who are distributed throughout social and ethnic groupings and who do not themselves constitute a community of place. Women are a prime example of such a distributed group. Women's communities are seldom the original, nonvoluntary found communities of their members. (Friedman 1989, 290)

To be clear, Friedman identifies one of her goals in forwarding a discussion of communities of choice to be to "identify the sorts of communities which will provide non-oppressive and enriched lives for women" (Friedman 1989, 286). If, as Friedman maintains, communities of choice are typically *not* communities of ethnic minorities (given she considers them to be traditional communities of place), then it could be implied that those communities cannot "provide non-oppressive and enriched lives for women" (Friedman 189, 286). If we take "non-oppressive" to be synonymous with "resistant," then the implication is that ethnic communities are not the sorts of communities that can provide resistant lives and possibilities for women. While Lugones does not examine this particular

argument in Friedman's essay, my observation aligns with Lugones's critique that, what Friedman inevitably constructs by articulating the distinction between communities of place and choice is a limited and reductive conception of communities themselves. As Lugones argues, Friedman mistakenly,

> …sees passivity in community of place: ossified hierarchies and roles. She misses the ingenuity and constant creativity among neighbors, people in families, and in relations that cannot be easily placed in the understanding of communities of place that she shares with McIntyre and Sandel. She misses the resistant creativity with which women negotiate institutionalized life. The "foundness" of neighborly and family ties does not entail the "foundness" of norms, practices, beliefs, and desires of people in them. (Lugones 2003, 186)

What Lugones is keen to point out is that Friedman ultimately equates the abstract principles by which communities are categorized as corresponding to the ways in which concrete subjects actually live their daily lives in those communities. What Lugones wants to make evident, instead, is that "resistant negotiation of everyday life does not require the formation of associations that lift one from community of place; it rather constitutes life in communities of place" (Lugones 2003, 186). As Lugones wraps up her analysis of Friedman, she articulates the problem with Friedman's community distinction in spatial terms. She characterizes Friedman's text as a "modern" text, "containing a very abstract conception of space…" (188). Furthermore, Lugones argues that "it is as a modern text that one needs to understand Friedman's emphasis on choice. In communities of place, territory is emphasized; in communities of choice there seems to be a spatial flight. There is a sense that communities of choice and be just anywhere" (188). It is only by abstracting from space that Friedman can locate this "anywhere" as "the place for choice" (188). Communities of place, on this account, are as devoid of choice as they are bound to strict, territorial boundaries. There is, it seems, at the center of the notion of communities of choice, a presupposed ease with which subjects can traverse space, an ease that is essential for "choice" to be possible at all, an ease that relies on an abstract understanding of space. Lugones explains further that, "The abstraction from space as the place for choice helps [her] introduce a distrust of nomadism, of middle-class sojourners, of anthropologists,

of tourists" (188). She introduces this topic given what she refers to as, "the need to reflect on geography, movement, and stasis as one thinks of communities that would develop a noncolonialist account of complex, liberatory possibilities where movement to and from carries with it located responsibilities and commitments" (188). What needs to be noticed here is the difference between the community of choice forwarded by Friedman and the type of community that Lugones deems actually capable of developing a "noncolonialist account of complex liberatory possibilities" (188). Juxtaposing Lugones's characterization of these two types of communities makes evident that Friedman's communities of choice—which Lugones deems to be grounded in an abstract understanding of space—*cannot* develop noncolonialist accounts of liberatory possibilities precisely because the movement to and from communities located "anywhere" cannot carry with it "located responsibilities and commitments" (188). It seems, therefore, that Lugones remains wary of abstract understandings of space (and attempts to develop conceptions of liberatory communities with abstract spatial logics) because they cannot cultivate the sense of located responsibility and commitment, she deems necessary for liberatory projects.

We can take Lugones's distrust of "tourists" as an example to elucidate this point. A tourist (for the sake of example, I mean an international tourist), in the most general sense of the term, is someone who travels to and from various locations and inhabits them for the sake of leisure, entertainment, or perhaps a desire to garner a more "cultured" perspective of their being in the world. Their engagements with the locals of whatever locations they visit may be very well-intentioned, kind, and even respectful. Nonetheless, their movements to and from those visited locations are temporary, usually bound to some form of temporal limitation (a week or two depending on how many vacations days they've been granted by their employer). The activities they engage in as a tourist are therefore not bound to any responsibilities or commitments to the visited location or its locals, and they enjoy a certain form of freedom by virtue of this lack.

Just like the tourist, the communitarian subject in Friedman's account—whether they find themselves in a community of place or choice—is assumed to possess a capacity to "leave," easy access to a "spatial flight" with which they can move toward communities that best appeal to their desires and provide the best setting for their process of self-transformation. It seems that, in this case, the only responsibility or commitment this subject maintains is to themselves, such that, if a location ever ceases to fulfill their needs or meet their desires, they can simply "choose" to leave and find fulfilment elsewhere. This interpretation is not intended to reduce Friedman's project or deem it akin to a description of a tourist fantasy. Rather, my interpretation (as an extension of Lugones's argument) makes evident the stakes from which Lugones develops her critique of Friedman. The difficulty of developing a theory of liberatory community formation is that one must negotiate a tension between saying that one's belonging to any given community entails an unwavering commitment to inhabiting the community and a commitment to dismantling the oppressive logics with which that community is constituted. I do not think Lugones is arguing for this type of "duty" or required commitment. Instead, I find her critique of Friedman and her interest in theorizing the constitution of communities that can develop noncolonialist accounts of complex liberatory possibilities to be at once with the tension I've just articulated. Lugones's point is precisely that we must recognize this tension and theorize from within it instead of trying to theorize beyond it. I find this point to be best represented by a question Lugones forwards about Friedman's argument: "Why not think that as contradictory identities are formed within communities of place, these communities are revealed as not univocal, passing on and embodying an undisturbed common sense, but as complex and tense sites of identity formation?" (185-186).

Lugones follows her discussion of Friedman with an analysis of Sarah Hoagland's reflections on community in her 1988 book *Lesbian Ethics*, a text Lugones describes as "frankly and joyously addressed to other lesbian women in movement against heterosexualism" (188). Lugones understands

Hoagland to be addressing the ways in which lesbians are "cast-out" of various communities such that, "as in Friedman, there is a sense of 'elsewhere' to the reflection of community," but Lugones does not consider this elsewhere to be "understood by Hoagland as an exercise in choice" (189). As Lugones writes, "Hoagland is purposefully vague about the term 'community'" and she maintains a complex understanding of social reality as "constituted by several co-temporaneous, overlapping social contexts that contain different possibilities and stand in significant tension with respect to each other" (189). Instead of viewing communities as wholly separate, coherent social configurations, Hoagland develops a more fluid account of communities as constituting social contexts in which subjects may or may not act in particular ways. Her emphasis is on agency overall instead of choice. That is, while Friedman's account assumes the agency of the subject, such that "choice" is already available to them; Hoagland understands agency to be something the subject must continuously negotiate as they navigate various social terrains, some of which contest their agency more than others. In this way, "heterosexism" (which may be present throughout various communities in varying degrees) for Hoagland according to Lugones "constitutes an oppressive context that erases female agency," and "lesbian communities constitute an alternative context that not only does not make oppression credible but is constituted by and constitutes female agency" (189). In other words, even though heterosexism denies lesbian existence— "the idea of women loving women is impossible, inconceivable"—lesbians themselves do not cease to exist in social contexts infused with heterosexism; their agency may be in question, but they can still constitute themselves as lesbian. As Lugones explains, "Lesbian community is that context in which lesbian existence and female agency are both a reality and possibility" (189). Friedman's communitarian self must leave communities of place for communities of choice to make herself anew. But the self in community invoked by Hoagland can (and perhaps must) create herself in both communities that deny her existence and communities that affirm it. Lugones explains this by saying:

The sense of self that Hoagland invokes is inseparable from community, but this community does not fit in the distinction between community of place and community of choice, precisely because the distinction between the given and the to-be created is not possible in Hoagland's understanding of lesbian community. The self in community involves each lesbian making choices within a context created by community. Since the lesbian context overlaps the context of oppression, agency here is agency under oppression. The creation of new value outside the conceptual parameters of heterosexism and the avoidance of demoralization—the undermining of moral agency—constitute the tasks of the "auto-koenenous self," the self in community[53] (190).

Important to note here is that Lugones is drawn to Hoagland's account of a self that is constituted by its relations but not completely bound to a constitution by external forces, leaving room for agency and resistance in contexts of oppression. Just as Lugones calls for theories of oppression in her second chapter that do not "leave the subject trapped inescapably in the oppressive system," her concern in this ninth chapter is with uncovering a notion of community that does the same. The sense of community Lugones is building in chapter nine is one that, in rejecting abstract understandings of space, can "capture the subtleties of movement in resistance for those cast out" without locating "the source" of a subject's self-understanding "in rejection of systems of their exclusion" (190). In other words, for Lugones, a subject's self-constitution emerges from within their oppressive contexts, but they must not be understood as being "trapped" in this context in a way that makes resistance impossible (57). As she explains in chapter two, she is interested in the formation of intentions across and between oppressive and resistant realities: "the practical syllogisms that they go through in one reality are not possible for them in the other…given that the realities hold such different possibilities for them" (57). The correlations between her argument regarding the production of liberatory syllogisms in chapter two and her reflections of community in chapter nine will become clearer as we uncover the significance of "spatialities that constitute relations and are constituted relationally" in the next chapter of this project (191).

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[53] From the Greek "auto," meaning "self" and "koinonia" meaning "community."

To this end, "the importance of Hoagland's insights," for Lugones, "lies in revealing the possibilities of affirming contexts that are disjunctive from oppressive constructions of the self, relations, practices, locations" (191). Nonetheless, Lugones finds that, though there are "important differences between Friedman's and Hoagland's reflections on community," both accounts rely on abstract understandings of space (191). "There is an abstraction from place, environment, relations, multiple oppressions, and resistances understood in their historical, cultural, spatial concreteness, in both their uses of 'community'" (191). This is due to their lack of "insight into the concrete details of the journey, the material specificities, the difficulties of communication, the 'on whose terms is community possible'" (191). For this reason, Lugones is led to "abandon the community of place/community of choice distinction completely," but she wants to "retain Hoagland's understanding of the possibility of emancipation through a refocusing of attention, an epistemic shift but one—unlike hers—that understands spatialized communities in their complex concreteness" (191). In shifting toward this complex concrete notion of community, Lugones turns to the work of bell hooks in the essay "Homeplace: A Site of Resistance" (1990).

In this essay, hooks articulates a conception of homeplace that recognizes the ways in which "communities are places where people already exercise themselves in resistance…" (Lugones 2003, 191). Hers is an account that does not distinguish between communities of place and choice as it "makes clear why a distinction between communities where one is passive and others where one is active is problematic, why it misses resistance" (Lugones 2003, 191). Hooks characterizes her notion of "homeplace" in terms of black women's resistance by 'making homes where all black people could strive to be subjects, not objects…where we could restore to ourselves the dignity denied us on the outside in the public world'" (Lugones 2003, 191; hooks 1990, 42). In spite of the ways in which black women may be oppressed in their home communities, her aim is to re-envision "both woman's role and the idea of 'home' that black women consciously exercised in practice,'" and she "calls black

women to a renewal of their political commitment to homeplace" (Lugones 2003, 192; hooks 1990, 45). Nonetheless, hooks still recognizes the need for some black women to leave their homeplaces, but her description of homeplace "makes a parting from it not an abstract disengagement from reified institutions—as Friedman and Hoagland— "but a loss of bearing, of attachment, to sounds, smells, concrete spatial environments" (Lugones 2003, 192). As Lugones explains, hooks gives an account in her works "Choosing the Margin and *Yearning*, "of the silencing's of home and her need to both leave and return. The return is also a spatial description, a 'going up the rough side of the mountain on my way home'" (Lugones 2003, 192; hooks 1990, 148). According to Lugones, "this journey back reconfigures the very meaning of home," and the spatial "reconfiguration of home" entails a reconception of the margin as a "central location for resistance, for the production of a counterhegemonic discourse that is not just found in worlds but in 'habits of being and the way one lives'" (Lugones 2003, 193). For hooks, marginalization does not refer to an alienation from an abstract set of values, but as something that is lived, concrete, in the midst of our everyday lives—as indicated by her description of encounters with people who greeted her "as colonizers" as she ventured back home. Lugones understands hooks as invoking an "epistemic shift from oppression to resistance" (in the same way that Hoagland does). However, Lugones does not think hooks shows sufficient "attentiveness to the great diversity" among those people who, along her journey home, did *not* greet her "as colonizers," and she finds hooks to be invoking "a univocity to the traditions of resistance that bring her back to a reconfigured sense of home" (Lugones 2003, 193). This observation merits further examination.

To clarify Lugones's reading of hooks, I turn to hook's text itself, "Choosing the Margin as A Space for Radical Openness" in *Yearning* (first edition, 1990). What Lugones describes as the "journey from homeplace to choosing the margin" refers to hook's experience leaving home and going to the "predominately white university" where she pursued her graduate studies. This journey is one hooks

had to undergo multiple times, and it is through this continued journey to and from that hooks reconfigures the meaning of both home and the margin. She shares her mother's words of advice as she prepared to return to her university: "Once mama said to me… 'You can take what the white people have to offer, but you do not have to love them'" (hooks 1990, 150). Hooks interprets her mother as "speaking about colonization and the reality of what it means to be taught in a culture of domination by those who dominate…She was reminding [hooks] of the necessity of opposition and simultaneously encouraging [hooks] not to lose that radical perspective shaped and formed by marginality" (hooks 1990, 150). Hooks's recollection of her mother's words leads her to a discussion of marginality "as position and place of resistance" and not just as a "sign marking the despair" (hook 1990, 151). Her reconception of marginality is one that moves away from a view of the margin as an abstraction (a "sign") toward a concrete, spatialized notion of marginality as "position and place…" (hook 1990, 151). Herein lies what Lugones refers to as an "epistemic shift from oppression to resistance" in hooks's essay. (Lugones 2003, 193). Important to note here is that hooks insists she is not "trying to romantically reinscribe the notion of that space of marginality where the oppressed live apart from their oppressors as 'pure.'[54] [Hooks wants] to say that these margins have been both sites of repression and sites of resistance" (hook 1990, 151). Evidently, hooks does not insist on a dichotomy between the margin as a "site of deprivation" and the margin as a "site of resistance," and this stance aligns with the understanding of community Lugones is constructing throughout her chapter. Lugones does not take issue, therefore, with the way hooks articulates the spatiality of

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[54] I find here an apparent overlap between hooks's qualification of her understanding of marginality as not being a site where the oppressed live as "pure" apart from their oppressors and Lugones's discussion of "impurity" in the second part of her chapter. I find Lugones's oversight of this similarity to be a significant missed opportunity to draw connections between her own argument and that of hooks. Nonetheless, there are still marked differences between the way each thinker engages the notion of purity. While hooks uses the terms to distinguish her understanding of marginalized spaces, Lugones develops a more in-depth engagement with "impurity" as a characteristic of multiplicitous subjectivities. I will explain Lugones's understanding of impurity in the next section of my chapter.

resistance and oppression. Rather, it seems that Lugones is much more interested in whether or not hooks represents those inhabiting the margins in a way that captures their subjective multiplicity and the complexity of their own journeys against the grain of oppression.

Hooks's journey "up the rough side of the mountain" represents a dialectical movement between her inhabitation of the "concrete space in the margins"—the "segregated worlds across the tracks"—and the abstract margin to which she is relegated when inhabiting white spaces (hooks 1990, 150). The encounters with those who greet her "as colonizers" take place while hooks is a graduate student, inhabiting the white world of the university. As hooks describes her experiences with "scholars, most especially those who name themselves radical critical thinkers, feminist thinkers," she writes: "I was made 'Other' there in that space with them. In that space in the margins, that lived-in segregated world of my past and present. They did not meet me there in that space. They met me at the center. They greeted me as colonizers" (hooks 1990, 151). What she means by this is that she found those who greeted her as colonizers "now fully participate in the construction of a discourse about the 'Other,'" and are only interested in hearing the voice of the "Other" as an object of analysis: "Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you, I write myself a-new" (hooks 1990, 152). Hooks then shifts to using the pronoun "we" as she critiques these colonial re-inscriptions of otherness:

> Stop. We greet you as liberators. This "we" is that "us" in the margins, that "we" who inhabit marginal space that is not a site of domination but a place of resistance…This is an intervention. A message from that space in the margin that is a site of creativity and power, that inclusive space where we recover ourselves, where we move in solidarity to erase the category colonized/colonizer. (hooks 1990, 152)

It is clear that, when hooks writes of the "we who inhabit marginal space," her aim is to give voice to the silenced and bring light to the ways in which oppressed subjects negotiate their experiences in the margins (hooks 1990, 152). Nonetheless, Lugones finds in hooks's account "a univocity to the

traditions of resistance that bring her back to a reconfigured sense of home and consequently a stable, unproblematized sense of its possibility" (Lugones 2003, 193). In other words, even though hooks rejects the idea that oppressed subjects inhabit marginal spaces from a place of purity, Lugones is interested in uncovering the diversity amongst oppressed subjects who, by virtue of their multiplicity, embark on "extremely spatial, tortured, fragmenting journeys," to and from the margins (Lugones 2003, 193). That is to say, I find Lugones to be in agreement with the way hooks characterizes the inhabitation of marginal spaces, but Lugones is more invested in making sense of the way multiplicitous subjects move to and from those spaces. And she is invested in uncovering the ways in which subjects find resistant company along the way. As she explains, "In hooks, there is a singularity of resistance locales, a not seeing, for example, the Latina 'Lesbian,' nor for that matter, the black lesbian as any sort of companion in her journey home" (Lugones 2003, 194). As hooks reflects on her experiences with those who greeted her as colonizers, she writes: "I am waiting to learn from them the path of their resistance…" (hooks 1990, 152). In contrast, Lugones wants to learn the path of resistance taken by other multiplicitous, oppressed subjects. What Lugones is ultimately interested in is, what are the various forms of resistance hooks encounters along the way as she journeys home? Who does she learn from? Who doesn't she learn from? Whose resistance voices does she hear as she moves up and down the rough side of the mountain?

Before moving on the second part of Lugones's essay, I want to briefly summarize what she garnered from her readings of Friedman, Hoagland, and hooks. Lugones finds all three thinkers "emphasized shared experience as a ground for resistance" (Lugones 2003, 193). For Friedman, this is "accomplished by the move away from communities of place to communities initiated by shared needs, interests, and experiences" (193). While Lugones appreciates Friedman's insight regarding the "distance of critiques" made possible by the distinction between communities of place and communities of choice," she disagrees with Friedman's characterization of communities of place as

communities that constitute subjects passively. Friedman's emphasis on "choice" as the opening toward liberatory possibilities relies too heavily on an abstract conception of space and on the idea that a "spatial flight" away from communities of place is both a possible and necessary condition for resistance to oppression. In contrast Hoagland rejects a rigid conception of community and favors, instead, an understanding of social reality as "refracted," and "constituted by several *cotemporaneous*, overlapping social contexts…" (189). For Hoagland, resistance to oppression is not so much a matter of choice as it is about the varying degrees of agency available to a subject given the different social contexts they may find themselves in. In this way, lesbian community is, for Hoagland, "that context in which lesbian existence and female agency are both a reality and possibility" (189). Hoagland's account, then, offers a way of thinking of resistance as agency from within (instead of entirely apart from) conditions of oppression (189). Nonetheless, Hoagland still retains an "abstraction from the particular spatialities that constitute relations…" (191). In other words, Hoagland does not take up the concrete contexts from which lesbian communities are forged.

Lastly, hooks offers the most "spatialized" account of community with her notion of "homeplace," which calls for a reconfiguration of home as a space for the creation of resistant practices. Her description of the move to "leave" home Is the most concrete and sensual of the three thinkers given her emphasis on "a loss of bearing, of attachments, to sounds, smells, concrete spatial environments," instead of just a separation from the abstract values of "reified institutions" (192). Furthermore, hooks's reconfiguration of home involves a reconceptualization of the margin as mora than just a place of "despair where one's imagination is at risk of being fully colonized" (193). The margin is, for hooks, a site of both repression and resistance. Furthermore, Lugones does indeed find in hooks's account an attention to "spatiality, sensuality, historicity, as well as to the fragility of resistance spaces," but she still finds in hooks's account a unified understanding of resistant community (193). What Lugones is ultimately concerned with is constructing a sense of community

that can account for "the interplay between colonialism and fragmentation," which requires emphasizing "the journeys of lesbians of color from homeplace to lesbian communities as extremely spatial, tortured, fragmenting journeys" (193). What Lugones finds lacking in hook's description is a consideration of the company with which she undergoes the journey.

Lugones opens the second part of chapter nine titled, "Impure Communities," by articulating the stakes of her intervention into the discussion of community. Here, she elucidates the concrete motivations guiding her readings and critiques of Friedman, Hoagland, and hooks. She begins with a series of questions I quote here at length to make evident the ways in which she wants to think of "community" and her reasons for emphasizing the particular spatialities that constitute relations and the self in relation:

> Why does one write about community? For whom? With whom? In the midst of what company? From inside what collectivities? Given what traditions? From what "location"? Given what self-understandings? While doing what? Staying put or in movement? Resisting while moving? Preparing to move? To what extent is the writing one's own map for the direction of the movement? How many voices can one hear in the writing/planning? (194)

This series of questions can be understood to be the framework from which Lugones engages the work of the three thinkers in the first part of the chapter. As she traces the works in search of conceptions that aid her own understanding of community, she hones in on each thinker's attention to the company, traditions, locations, movements, and voices they invoke throughout their theorizing. These concerns speak to a core issue that Lugones explores in a number of ways throughout her career, a concern with subjects whose "belonging" to any given community is always tense and contested given their complex identities, subjects who do not "fit" neatly anywhere they go, subjects who are "at odds with home" (209). She refers to this kind of subject in a later essay titled, "Musing: Reading the Nondiasporic from Within Diasporas" (2014), where she reflects on the experiences of the "nondiasporic subject" or "someone not in relation to a diasporic community or nation," "someone without a peopled history" (Lugones 2014, 18). While she does not use the term in

Pilgrimages, the second part of Chapter 9 evidences concerns that are similar to those from which the term "nondiasporic subject" takes shape. After the short series of questions previously cited, she shares her own struggles with belonging to the various communities she engaged with politically. This description outlines the major concerns developed throughout the second part of this chapter:

> Though I am a tortillera mestiza, born in Argentina, relocating to the United States from various forms of egregious abuse, what marks my location in each community is grounded on the successes and failures of political insertion in a radical vein, not an insertion that makes me unproblematically of the community. I clearly lack a shared history, a vernacular, all the learned motilities and embodiments, a deep sense of space and its production… Insertion is then a learning and a clarity about my shortcomings and about what I do not understand. Insertion also includes the difficult, continuing, and often painful task of understanding myself as I am perceived in the worlds of sense that I am entering and inhabiting. The insertion often rereads me, reconstructs me, whatever my desires or intentions. (Lugones 2003, 194-95)

Important to note here is that Lugones emphasizes the spatial, historical, and sensual tensions that emerge as she negotiates her inhabitation of various communities and is tasked with reconstituting herself in relation to these communities. The possibility of her political insertion rests on this continual reconstitution and her awareness of the ways in which she is re-read by those communities. As she explains, "Political insertion is for me not a matter of choice or of a helping disposition; my possibilities lie in liberatory struggles with and in the midst of others also subjected" (195). In other words, Lugones's struggle for freedom is inseparable from the struggles of others. Herein lies what I believe to be a quintessential characteristic of Lugones's understanding of resistance—which I will return to in the next chapter—that all resistance to oppression is connected such that all subjects are inextricably bound to each other in the midst of their struggles for freedom. That is, resistance to oppression is the very condition from which our relations are constituted.

Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, I returned to the map of oppression to foreground my argument concerning the ways in which abstraction is instrumentalized in service of power and

domination. I argued that, to grasp this instrumentalization, it is helpful to think of the map in Lefebvrian terms—as a representation of space that reflects an abstract view of the social, a construction of the social grounded in abstract understandings of subjects, their movements, and their relations. I argued further that, for Lugones, the instrumentalization of abstraction operates at two connecting levels of the political—at close range and at the level of collectives. These operations can be discerned from two vantage points Lugones articulates throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*: the vantage point of the lover of purity and the vantage point of the strategist. Each vantage point can be understood in at least two ways: as a perspective from which to read the abstract dimensions map of oppression, and as a figure or archetype of an "oppressing" subject. The second half of the chapter focused on the qualities of oppressive spaces (or the consequences of the processes by which oppressive spaces are produced)—qualities that should also be understood at both connecting levels of the political. These qualities are apparent in the lived experience of subjects like the cachapera.

Chapter 3: The Spatiality of Resistance

> The starting point is different: the location of the theorizing subject is from within the midst of impure subjects negotiating life transgressing the categorial understandings of a logic of binaries that renders hard-edged, ossified, exclusive groups, as well as succumbing to the reductions of that logic. My starting point eludes abstraction, that theoretical temptress, and the logic of fragmentation as it sustains a perception against the grain of categorial fragmentation and perceives connections and practices of resistance that are otherwise unavailable. Thus, the possibilities, attractions, and dangers of communities are understood quite differently. (197)

> *Si la resistencia la pensás como oposición, es un caso. Pero si la pensás como tejido, es otro. Y se teje con lo que hay. Y hay malo y hay bueno. Y lo malo se ha incorporado a lo bueno, y vice versa. Eso es así. Pero también es así que en algún lado debe estar escondido nuestro yo comunal, aquello que nos hace sentir parte de algo inmenso. Si pudiéramos hacer florecer eso, todo sería distinto. Y eso no florece con palabras, quizá. Eso hay que hacerlo juntas.*[55] (Lugones, Acuña, 2019)

The aim of this chapter is to forward an account of the spatiality of resistance in defense of my overall argument that Lugones's engagement with space is integral to her complex account of oppression/resistance in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*. I contend that Lugones spatializes her account of oppression/resistance, in part, to forward an understanding of the terms as ongoing processes in tense relation. As she explains in her final chapter, "Resistance will be understood always in the gerund, a resisting. Oppression will also be understood as ongoing" (208). To understand oppression and resistance in the gerund requires, as Lugones writes, understanding the "spatiality of our lives" and "to understand the spatiality of our lives is to understand that oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting construct space simultaneously and that the temporality of each, at their infinite intersections, produces multiple histories/stories" (12). To understand the tense oppressing⇔resisting relation, we must be attuned to the spatiality of our lives because "the logics of oppression and resistance construct

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[55] "If we think of resistance as opposition, that is one case. But if we think of it as woven fabric, that is another. And one weaves with what is available. And there is bad and there is good. And the bad has been incorporated into the good, and vice versa. If we could find a way to make that flourish, everything would be different. And, perhaps, that cannot flourish with words. That must be done collectively (in company)" (my translation).

people's movements, interactions, desires, and intentions," the very "movements, interactions, desires, and intentions" through which space is produced (13).

I contend, further, that Lugones employs a spatial approach to theorizing oppression and resistance in a way that mirrors or performs the type of theorizing she deems necessary for resisting oppressions as intermeshed. Her work throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* is, as she phrases it, an "exhortation to practice" (29). We must therefore read her work throughout Pilgrimages with multiple movements and intentions in mind and trace the ways in which what she is saying about resistance (and *how* she says it) is meant to inspire what we can do to resist (and *how* we can do it). In other words, Lugones's spatial theorizing serves to both support the account of oppression/resistance she puts forward and represent the type of theorizing or interpretive framework she deems necessary for resisting intermeshed oppressions and building deep coalitions. This feature of her work is most evident in her final chapter on "streetwalker theorizing" where she forwards the figure of the "streetwalker theorist" (*la callejera*), a multiplicitous subject who "develops a sense of spatial complexity" and is therefore attuned to oppressed subjects' tense, resisting⇔oppressing inhabitation of space. That being said, the account of the spatiality of resistance I forward throughout this chapter is most clearly represented and substantiated in the account of streetwalker theorizing Lugones develops in her final chapter. With this in mind, my intention in this chapter is to outline and examine that elements of Lugones's work that are necessary for understanding her account of streetwalker theorizing.

With the aforementioned in mind, my aim in this chapter is to argue that the "spatiality of resistance" refers to the processes by which resistance spaces are produced and the characteristics of resistant spaces. Resistant spaces can be, as will be shown, spaces like those Lugones refers to as "hangouts" which are forged through a specific resistant spatial practice—a practice Lugones terms: "hanging out" (220). To defend this argument, I investigate three main concepts in

Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: word-traveling, trespassing, and streetwalker theorizing. Lugones defines these three concepts as "different and related forms of noticing oppression at its logic and moving against it" (121). Important to note is that, according to Lugones, "some of the movements are emphatically epistemic; all include an epistemic shift" (12). As I investigate these three concepts, I will argue that the aforementioned "epistemic shift" involves the cultivation of a multiplicitous vantage point, a vantage point that (like the vantage point from a tactical strategic stance, the stance of the streetwalker) is attuned to the complexity of the social "from up high" and "from inside the midst of people" (5). Taking up this multiplicitous view of the social makes possible the "duplicitous interpretation" of individual actions and intentions and a "duplicitous perception" that understands the ways in which heterogeneous communities are "bound, reduced by the fiction of isolation" (14, 35). As I will demonstrate, together, the duplicitous interpretation and perception open up possibilities for the transformation of relations and the production of alternative socialities and resistant spaces.

Introducing the Spatiality of Resistance

To frame my account of the spatiality of resistance, in this section I will identify how Lugones defines resistance overall and outline the ways in which this definition is tied to her spatial theorizing. In her introduction, Lugones insists that she wants to "dispel any sense that the logic(s)[56] of resistance lies in reaction" because "reaction does not add anything creative to the meanings contained in that which is resisted, except some form of 'no'" (29). There is, on Lugones's account, a danger in assuming

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[56] Lugones adds an endnote explaining her usage of the term "logic(s)" where she explains: "I write 'logic(s)' this way to capture both the 'type' and the many textured concrete logical moves" (38). To clarify what she means by this, we can recall her discussion of the "concretizing" methodology she employs throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (which I analyzed in my first chapter). Lugones writes, "Indeed, by logic of the story, [she does] not mean its point, but its inner work—what thought paths lead where. So, much like the syllogism or the propositional argument, which unfold what is contained in a set of states of belief or desire or in a set of propositions, I seek to unfold the story line, not by exhibiting it in a temporal sequence, but through dwelling in the meanings that one can reveal going in this or that tactical-strategic line. The trick in telling the story lies in revealing its logical intricacies" (28).

that "what there is to resistance is what is already contained in oppression plus an excess" (29). If resistance is only understood as reaction, then the terms from which resistance is enacted are the oppressor's terms. Lugones insists, instead that resistance is "thoughtful, often complex, devious, insightful response, insightful into the very intricacies of the structure of what is being resisted" (29). In other words, Lugones forwards a generative understanding of resistance and, as a result, an understanding of oppressed/oppressing/resisting subjects as capable of cultivating "insights" into the intricacies of oppressive structures and contributing something new or "creative to the meanings contained in that which is resisted" (29). Resistance is therefore, at least in part, an intervention at the level of meaning. As Lugones writes, "Getting ready to intervene at the level of meaning is *one of the strands* that I am putting out to worlds of resistance, to be taken up or transformed, but I hope to be considered" (3, emphasis added). Moreover, for Lugones, oppressed/oppressing/resisting subjects are not only capable of understanding the conditions of their oppression, they can also produce alternative systems of meaning and alternative socialities by cultivating what she refers to as "duplicitous" modes of interpreting and perceiving[57] their conditions and the conditions of other oppressed/oppressing/resisting subjects (225). By cultivating these alternative modes of interpretation and perception, oppressed subjects may be able to cultivate long-lasting resistant practices and learn to "read" resistance in their everyday lives—in moments as brief as "the movements of the hand of someone rendered frozen[58] by acts of extreme violation" (5). The commitment is, as Lugones writes,

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[57] As will be shown later in this chapter, these resistant capacities are embodied by Lugones's figure of the streetwalker theorist, a subject who "comes to understand, through a jarring, vivid awareness of being broken into fragments, that the encasing by particular oppressive systems of meaning is a process one can consciously and critically resist within uncertainty or to which one can passively abandon oneself" (231). Moreover, for Lugones, the streetwalker theorist exercises a "duplicitous perception that at once unveils and disarms the conceptual-institutional reduction of resistance to oppression" (210). This duplicitous perception allows subjects like the streetwalker to "keep both [the logics of resistance and oppression] in interpretation [...] as she inhabits differentiated geographies" (218). We will also find that what makes it possible for subjects like the streetwalker theorist to cultivate this duplicitous perception is the existence of alternative socialities, alternative social configurations that carry with them resistant structures of meaning.

[58] Like the movements of the "busy woman's" hands (1).

"to live differently in the present, to think and act against the grain of oppression" and her perspective is "in the midst of people mindful to the tensions, desires, closures, cracks, and openings that make up the social" (5). It is these very "tensions, desires, closures, cracks, and opening that make up the social" that I believe are brought to the foreground when we emphasize the social processes of spatial production.

In her preface, Lugones also refers to resistance as "the active state from which to seek collectivity and coalition" (x). For Lugones, then, resistance is both an intervention at the level of meaning and a mode of being or state wherein oppressed/oppressing/resisting subjects are open to the possibility of finding resistant company and political coalition. Moreover, what makes resistance difficult on Lugones's account is the fact that "resistance hardly ever has a straightforward presence. It is rather duplicitous, ambiguous, even devious. But it is almost always masked and hidden by structures of meaning that countenance and constitute domination" (x). Because resistance is so often hidden, there are dominant understandings of the realities of the oppressed (understandings of the oppressed as "consumed or exhausted by oppression") that influence the ways in which oppressed/oppressing/resisting subjects understand their own resistant possibilities and the resistant possibilities of others. Lugones argues therefore that the task of "'reading' resistance is crucial for an alternative understanding of the realities of the oppressed" (x). As will be shown, this is a task Lugones argues oppressed/oppressing/resisting subjects must take up themselves in order to "sense each other as possible companions in resistance" and avoid their own "collusion with power" (11). In sum, Lugones characterizes resistance as a process by which subjects come to understand and respond to oppression, and as an active state from which oppressed/oppressing/resisting subjects can find "possible companions in resistance" (11).

Important to note in my brief summary of resistance (as Lugones understands it) is my use of the phrase "oppressed/oppressing/resisting subjects." I use this phrase in keeping with another key

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feature of Lugones's notion of resistance (which speaks to the inseparability of oppression/resistance). As Lugones argues in her tenth chapter, "Resistance will be understood always in the gerund, a resisting. Oppression will also be understood as ongoing" (208). Lugones therefore forwards a particular conception of oppression/resistance as ongoing processes in tense relation, and this conception is grounded in her complex "interpretation of the social as heterogeneous" and her understanding of space as socially produced (25). On Lugones's account, "the logics of oppression and resistance construct people's movements, interactions, desires, and intentions" and "the social is itself crisscrossed" with "contradictory, in tension, temporo-spatialities" (13). If the social is constituted by the tense relation between the logics of oppression and resistance and space is a social product, then "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting construct space simultaneously" (12). Lugones also argues that "the tension of being oppressed⇔resisting oppression 'places' one *inside* the *processes* of production of multiple realities" (17, emphasis in original). What Lugones articulates, then, is a co-constitutive relationship between the logics of resistance/oppression and the social production of space—a relationship that accounts for the "production of multiple realities" (17).

Throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, Lugones critiques approaches to theorizing that emphasize "a nonspatial way of perception and conception of life, a unity of the self, a linear way of telling, and an abstract rhetoric"[59] (16). She is interested, instead, in "conceiving of space itself as multiple, intersecting, co-temporaneous realities" (16). To this end (and on account of her general commitment to disrupting traditional modes of thinking) Lugones grounds her work in ontological pluralism—the multiplicity of selves and reality. As she argues, "I am keen on not reproducing an atomistic understanding of heterogeneous reality [...] I want to understand reality as heterogeneous, and the

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[59] Lugones articulates her departure from this type of theorizing in a section of her introduction where she explains how she came to develop her notion of "world"-traveling. Nonetheless, I use her claim here since it captures the critiques she forwards throughout the book project.

heterogeneity to lie not just in interpretation." (16). As I will demonstrate throughout this chapter, there is a significant connection between Lugones's commitment to ontological pluralism and her spatialized account of oppression/resistance. This is already evident when we consider Lugones's aforementioned claim that "the tension of being oppressed⇔resisting oppression 'places' one inside the processes of production of multiple realities"[60] (17). The social processes by which spaces are produced are the very processes by which "multiple realities" are produced. Moreover, Lugones argues that "it is from within these processes that the practice of shifting to different constructions, different spatialities, is created. One inhabits the realities as spatially, historically, and thus materially different: different in possibilities, in the connections among people, and in the relation of power" (17). In my view, what Lugones's notion of the tense oppressed⇔resisting relation highlights is that if we understand oppression and resistance as ongoing processes, we can account for the ways in which subjects collaborate in the production of multiple spaces and realities. That is, spaces and realities are not closed, stable realms of human activity; they do not exist *in spite* of the social activity of subjects. They are, instead, *products* of human activity and are therefore deeply "permeable" (16). Subjects are therefore able to shift between "different constructions, different spatialities" because they are always already "inside" the processes by which multiple realities and spaces are produced. To reiterate, if "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting construct space simultaneously" and "the logics of oppression and resistance construct people's movements, interactions, desires, and intentions," then "the movements, interactions, desires, and intentions" of peoples produce multiple "co-temporaneous

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[60] I want to address the apparent overlap in Lugones's use of "realities," "spatialities," "worlds," and "socialities." While I do not think the terms are entirely synonymous, I do find striking similarities in her usage and understanding of the terms. I will, at times, use the terms synonymously—while preserving the differences between them—because I want to remain faithful to the way Lugones qualifies her use of the term "worlds" as "suggestive" (87).

realities" and spaces (12, 13, 16). I contend, therefore, that Lugones's commitment to ontological pluralism cannot be divorced from her understanding of the social production of space.

As I argued in the previous chapter, Lugones's spatialized account of oppression highlights the ways in which abstraction is instrumentalized in the service of domination: "the ways of power conceive of domination through abstraction" (8). The processes by which abstraction is instrumentalized are the very processes by which oppressive spaces are produced. Of course, because space is a social production, oppressive spaces cannot be produced without the collaboration of social subjects—subjects who (often unknowingly or unwillingly) take up the oppressive logics of a particular space; their behaviors, actions, and intentions are motivated by or grounded in dominant epistemologies and patterns of perception. I contend, moreover, that to analyze oppression spatially— to interpret the ways in which oppressive logics constitute the production of social spaces—allows us to account for the ways in which all social subjects are implicated in the creation and preservation of systems of oppression. By analyzing the spatiality of oppression, we invariably reveal resistant possibilities; we can uncover crucial moments within the processes of social/spatial production where subjects may or may not follow the epistemic and perceptual paths that have been laid out for them. When we see oppression and resistance as processes, as Lugones urges us to do, we can "map out" roads of "collusion with power" and distinguish alternative paths that have been carved onto our social/spatial landscapes by resistant subjects moving "against the grain of power" (11). Thus, we can also account for the ways in which subjects may resist these social processes. As Lugones writes, "in understanding this map"—understanding the social production of space— "one can also begin to understand all the ways in which oneself and others violate this spatiality or inhabit it in great resistance, without willful collaboration" (10). I want to suggest, therefore, that Lugones's spatial theorizing is significant because it allows her to construct an account of oppression/resistance that disrupts dichotomous understandings of the terms. That is, she is able to forward an account of the

tense oppressing⇔resisting relation because her analysis hones in on the social processes of spatial production. Oppression and resistance are not oppositional phenomena; they are logics in tense relation that are embedded in the complex processes of socio-spatial production.

In the same way that my account of the spatiality of oppression led me to examine the dominant epistemologies and patterns of perception that constitute the production of oppressive spaces, I want to explore the alternative epistemologies and perceptual practices that, on Lugones's account, make possible the production of resistant spaces. Lugones explains in her introduction that "the movements that this book [*Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*] imagines, describes, and exercises" are all in "a "tense oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting" vein (12). The movements are, as she writes, "forms of trespassing in the sense of violating the spatiality and logic of oppression" (12). These movements are motivated by Lugones's desire to "move against social fragmentation" (12). She then argues that "World-traveling, streetwalker theorizing, curdling, and trespassing are all different and related forms of noticing oppression *at* its logic and moving against it. Some of the movements are emphatically epistemic; all include an epistemic shift" (12). It is worth noting at this point that, as Lugones describes the aforementioned resistant movements and practices throughout the book, she frequently characterizes the practices as requiring a "duplicitous interpretation" or "duplicitous perception." For example, in her tenth chapter, Lugones argues that streetwalker theorists "exercise a duplicitous perception that at one unveils and disarms the conceptual-institutional reduction of resistance to oppression" (210). I contend, therefore, that these epistemic shifts are also perceptual shifts. In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I will examine the resistant practices of world-traveling, trespassing, and streetwalker theorizing to trace the epistemic and perceptual shifts Lugones deems necessary for cultivating "an alternative understanding of the realities of the oppressed" and for resisting intermeshed oppressions (ix). In sum, for Lugones, resistance involves intervention at the level of meaning and an active state from which subjects can find resistant company. This

understanding of resistance is grounded in the tense relation between the logics of oppression and resistance and the productive processes of multiple realities/spaces. Understanding resistance on these terms requires: embracing ontological pluralism and cultivating duplicitous interpretations and perceptions (or epistemic/perceptual shifts).

Part 1: "World"-Traveling, Multiple Worlds, and Multiple Selves

My aim in this part of the chapter is to uncover what Lugones's account of "world"-traveling contributes to an understanding of the spatiality of resistance. To this end, I will focus on two major features of her "world"-traveling account: ontological pluralism and loving/arrogant perception. To foreground this investigation, we must first consider what I understand to be an important connection between "world"-traveling, arrogant/loving perception, and space. Lugones explains in her introduction that as she developed the essay on "world"-traveling, she realized she could "make use of a spatial account in elucidating disruptions of isolation exclusions"—like the exclusion of WOC from mainstream Anglo constructions of life (16). These exclusions are made possible by oppressive logics of purity "that make boundary crossing inconceivable or an exercise in betrayal of 'one's own'" (16). She characterizes her work on "world"-travel then, as being work on "the logic of connection that is attentive to the deep multiplicity of 'worlds'" (16). As Lugones explains further, "a long time after writing that piece" (on world-traveling), she became aware of an engaged with contemporary literature on travel and spatiality. Of this literature, she was especially interested in the works of Janet Wolff (1992) and Caren Kaplan (1994, 1996) who "critique discourses on travel as a set of practices that have inscripted in them the logic of power" (16-17). Their work, Lugones argues, gave her a stronger sense of "why [her] understanding of travel is itself subversive" (17). Lugones then forwards a reflection on her understanding of "world"-traveling with the insights she garnered from the literature on travel and spatiality. She writes:

In the sense of travel that I use in "'world'-travel," all people who have been subordinated, exploited, and enslaved have been forced to travel to "worlds" in which they animate subordinate beings. This forced shift to a reality that reduces and contains one's subjectivity and possibilities as it arrogates one's substance is not restricted to women. Indeed, the mobility of those who are forced to travel to spatialities[61] produced with their own substance— substance consumed in the production—is rigidly disciplined. (17).

Here we find what is, in my view, a clear connection between Lugones's understanding of "world"-traveling and the account of the spatiality of oppression I forward in my second chapter. On Lugones's account, one of the mechanisms by which the mobility of oppressed subjects is regulated or "rigidly disciplined" is arrogant perception. That is, oppressed subjects are not able to "exercise their mobility without restriction" because they are continuously forced to travel to "worlds" in which they animate "subordinate beings," "worlds" that reduce and contain their subjectivity (17). Even more noteworthy is the connection Lugones draws between the processes of spatial production and arrogant perception; this connection is evidenced by her proposition that the substance of oppressed subjects is "consumed in the production" of the spatiality they are forced to travel to (17). The "worlds" or spaces where subjects are oppressed are therefore constituted by perceptual practices like arrogant perception. For example, as we have already shown, women of color are perceived arrogantly

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[61] Here Lugones appears to essentially be using the terms "'worlds,'" "realities," and "spatialities" synonymously, which is very important for my analysis in this part of the dissertation chapter moving forward. It is important to remember that there were nearly ten years between Lugones's 1987 "world"-travelling essay (she used the double "l" in travelling in the first publication but later drops it), and her 1998 essay on "Motion, Stasis and Resistance to Interlocked Oppressions" (the essay where we first see indications of her shift to more explicit engagements with space). And, indeed, her account of the map of oppression and interlocked oppressions in this 1998 essay evolves substantially by the time she publishes the "most frankly spatial" chapter in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*. Which is all to say, her move to use the three terms highlighted above synonymously in her introduction (a chapter that was also first published in 2003) indicates that she herself eventually understood these terms as deeply overlapping and interrelated (if not, nearly synonymous.) As will be seen in this part of my chapter, Lugones uses the term "worlds" most often in her fourth chapter, "Playfulness, 'World'-Traveling, and Loving Perception"; she uses the term "realities" most often in her second chapter, "Structure/Anti-structure and Agency under Oppression"; and she uses the term "spatialities" most often in her tenth chapter, "Tactical Strategies of the Streetwalker" (although, in this final chapter and in her introduction, she uses the three terms more interchangeably). In fact, Lugones's later move to use these terms interchangeably could be understood to be her own performance of streetwalker theorizing insofar as "Interchangeability of terms becomes a politics that the *callejera* participates in subverting and in so doing, she contests her own reduction to passivity or frivolity" (222). For the purposes of my own analysis, I will often use the three terms interchangeably and/or highlight their overlaps.

by white/Anglo women when they inhabit white/Anglo women's "worlds." As white/Anglo women engage in harmful perceptual practices like arrogant perception, they *produce* "worlds" that women of color cannot inhabit without being objects of arrogant perception. It is clear, then, that perception is an integral feature of Lugones's understanding of spatial production. This is essential to keep in mind as we examine Lugones's notions of "world"-traveling, ontological pluralism, and arrogant perception. I now turn to Lugones's notion of "world"-traveling, first introduced in her 1987 piece, "Playfulness, 'World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception" (republished as Chapter 4 in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*).

1. Introducing World Traveling

Lugones opens her fourth chapter as follows:

The chapter describes the experience of "outsiders" to the mainstream of, for example, white/Anglo organization of life in the United States and stresses a particular feature of the outsider's existence: the outsider has necessarily acquired flexibility in shifting from the mainstream construction of life where she is constructed as an outsider to other constructions of life where she is more or less "at home." This flexibility is necessary for the outsider. It is required by the logic of oppression. But it can also be exercised resistantly by the outsider or by those who are at ease in the mainstream. I recommend this resistant exercise that I call "world"-traveling and I also recommend that the exercise be animated by an attitude that I describe as playful. (77)

There are a few things to note in this explanation. Lugones develops the notion of "world"-traveling to capture what she considers to be a "particular feature" of the existence of outsiders (oppressed subjects). On her account, there are "mainstream constructions of life"[62] (like "white/Anglo organization of life in the United States") where subjects (like women of color) are "constructed as outsiders," and their existence as outsiders is "required by the logic of oppression" (77). What is notable is that these subjects are still "included" in mainstream constructions of life, but only as outsiders. Here the logic of oppression is a logic of inclusion-by-exclusion. Lugones therefore identifies a tense "insider-outsider" logic operating in mainstream constructions of life. Moreover,

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[62] I find Lugones's use of the phrase "constructions of life" to be synonymous with her notions of "worlds."

Lugones deems the outsider's acquisition of a "flexibility" (that allows them to shift from mainstream to alternative constructions of life) to be a requisite of the logic of oppression. These subjects must be flexible if they are to be included as outsiders.

Here we can recall Lugones's discussion of the Mexican/American in her sixth chapter (which I examined in my second chapter) where she argues: "The Anglo philosophy is that Mexican/Americans should both keep their culture (so as to be different and not full citizens) and assimilate (so as to be exploitable), a position whose contradictoriness is obvious" (134). Like the Mexican/American, women of color are included in mainstream Anglo constructions of life "so as to be exploitable," but they are still constructed as outsiders "so as to be different and not full citizens" (134). Nonetheless, Lugones finds there to be resistant potential in the outsider's "acquired flexibility" and contends that the flexibility can be "exercised resistantly" (77). From this brief excerpt, we can already begin to distinguish what Lugones means when she says that "world"-traveling is a form of "noticing oppression *at* its logic and moving against it" (12). What is noticed about oppression "*at* its logic" in this account is the fact that the outsider's flexibility is "required by the logic of oppression" (12, 77). Lugones recognizes that, on one hand, "as outsiders to the mainstream, women of color in the United states practice 'world'-traveling, mostly out of necessity" and much of their traveling "is done unwillingly to hostile white/Anglo 'worlds'" (77). On the other hand, she affirms the practice "as a skillful, creative, rich, enriching, and, given certain circumstances, loving way of being and living" (77). Thus, to move against the logic of oppression (the logic by which women of color are forced to travel) is to willingly exercise this flexibility as a resistant practice. We can therefore distinguish two forms of "world"-traveling, forced "world"-traveling—traveling that is required by the logic of oppression—and playful "world"-traveling—traveling exercised in resistance to oppression that is "animated by an attitude [Lugones describes] as playful" (77). I will return to these two forms of "world"-traveling in a later section but highlight them here for the purposes of orientation.

To grasp this notion of "world"-traveling, we must distinguish what Lugones means by worlds. Notably, Lugones qualifies her own "definition" of worlds in stating: "I do not want the fixity of a definition at this point, because I think the term is suggestive and I do not want to close the suggestiveness of it too soon[63]" (87). Instead of offering a cohesive definition of "worlds," she outlines some key characteristics that describe what she means by "worlds." On Lugones's account, "worlds" are not utopias, possible worlds, or world views (87). They must be "inhabited at present by some flesh and blood people." (87). A "world" may be "an actual society, given its dominant culture's description and construction of life" (87). It may also be "such a society given a non-dominant, a resistant construction, or it can be such a society or a society given an idiosyncratic construction" (87). In addition, a "world" may be "a construction of a tiny portion of a particular society," and be inhabited by just a few people" (88). Lastly, a world can be incomplete. "Things in it may not be altogether constructed or some things may be constructed negatively. Or the 'world' may be incomplete because it may have references to things that do not quite exist in it" (88). At the center of Lugones's notion of "worlds" is her understanding of "the social as heterogeneous, multiple" and "intersubjectively constructed in a variety of tense ways, forces at odds, impinging differently in the construction of any world" (20). "Worlds" emerge,[64] in other words, out of the tense interactions between concrete, multiplicitous subjects[65] who inhabit multiple, often conflicting worlds, realities, or spatialities.

How do oppressed subjects inhabit worlds, realities, or spatialities differently than those who are not constructed as outsiders to the mainstream? Lugones frames her definition of "worlds" by describing her own experience of being in a state of profound "ontological confusion" as she found

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[63] This is why Lugones uses the term "worlds" in quotes, an approach I have mirrored throughout this dissertation.

[64] I use the word "emerge" to suggest that worlds are not solid, self-contained, permanent structures but rather permeable, fleeting, unstable configurations.

[65] Whether or not they understand themselves to be multiplicitous.

herself "both having and not having a particular attribute"—the attribute of playfulness (86). She

writes: "I am sure I am a playful person. On the other hand, I can say, painfully, that I am not a playful

person. I am not a playful person in certain 'worlds.' One of the things I did as I became confused

was to call my friends, faraway people who knew me well, to see whether or not I was playful" (86).

As Lugones called a number of friends to help clear up her confusion, some friends expressed

adamantly that she *was* a playful person while others expressed adamantly that she was *not* a playful

person. Each person was "just as sure about what they said to [her] and could offer [her] every bit of

evidence that one could need to conclude that they were right" (86-87). As Lugones reflected on their

contradictory responses, she thought: "'Okay, maybe what's happening here is that there is an attribute

that I do have but there are certain 'worlds' in which I am not at ease and it is because I am not at

ease in those 'worlds' that I don't have that attribute in those worlds'" (87). This experience prompted

Lugones to think further about the terms she found herself using to describe this ontological

confusion (like "worlds" and "being at ease"). She argues that the problem could not simply be a

matter of her feeling at ease[66], "because if it was just a matter of lack of ease, [she] could work on it"

(87).

Important to note from this anecdote is the value Lugones gives to the ways in which other

people (people who she believed knew her well) perceive her. It is, moreover, significant that she

characterizes her state of confusion as ontological rather than epistemic. Lugones was not merely

grappling with the "idea" of who she was. Rather, she actually experienced herself as being a different

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[66] Lugones offers four possible ways a subject may be "at ease" in a world: "The first way of being at ease in a particular "world" is by being a fluent speaker in that "world." I know all the norms that there are to be followed. I know all the words that there are to be spoken. I know all the moves. I am confident. Another way of being at ease is by being normatively happy. I agree with all the norms, I could not love any norms better. I am asked to do just what I want to do or what I think I should do. I am at ease. Another way of being at ease in a "world" is by being humanly bonded. I am with those I love and they love me, too. It should be noticed that I may be with those I love and be at ease because of them in a "world" that is otherwise as hostile to me as "worlds" get. Finally, one may be at ease because one has a history with others that is shared, especially daily history..." (90).

person in different "worlds," an experience that was then confirmed by people who knew her well. This anecdote captures Lugones's understanding of "the self" as an intersubjective construction; subjects cannot simply will themselves to "be" who they want to or understand themselves to be. Who someone *is* is, of course, always open to interpretation, but what Lugones is interested in (and what she highlights in this anecdote) is that subjects are constructed intersubjectively.[67] The difference between Lugones's being a playful person in one "world" and a serious person in another "world" is not merely a matter of description. It is not just that she is perceived "incorrectly" in some "worlds" and "correctly" in others, because that would rest on the assumption that there is a "true" Lugones that some people simply fail to recognize. Rather, Lugones hones in on the fact that there are certain "worlds," (certain realities or spatialities when/where she is surrounded by certain "flesh and blood people") that she becomes a different person or "animates" different beings (87, 89). Furthermore, on Lugones's account, as subjects "travel" to and from different "worlds," they experience a "shift from being one person to being a different person" (89). This shift,

> [...] is not a matter of acting. One does not pose as someone else; one does not pretend to be, for example, someone of a different personality or character or someone who uses space or language differently from the other person. Rather, one is someone who has that personality or character or uses space and language in that particular way. The "one" here does not refer to some underlying "I": one does not experience any underlying I. (89-90)

If subjects experience themselves as being one person in one "world" and a "different person" in another world, then their inhabitation of any "world" is tense—they experience their own *being* as caught between multiple worldly constructions. They therefore do not "experience any underlying I" (90). Their tense inhabitation of multiple worlds (realities or spatialities) is such that they could always potentially *become* another person; their *being* may always potentially be (re)constituted by another

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[67] This description is reminiscent of Lugones's description in her introduction, concerning the various logics by which a subject's actions may be read: "Such a person will have a character and personality traits, relations to others, and histories that have interwoven contradictory logics that are understood by, revealed to, and recognizable by differential socialities" (13). Her playful character is recognizable in certain socialities or worlds, but unrecognizable in others.

world.[68] In fact, Lugones argues that "one can travel between these 'worlds' and one can inhabit more than one of these 'worlds' at the same time" (88). As Lugones explains,

> One can be at the same time in a "world" that constructs one as stereotypically Latina, for example, and in a "world" that constructs one as simply Latina. Being stereotypically Latina and being simply Latina are different simultaneous constructions of persons who are part of different "worlds." One animates one or the other or both at the same time without necessarily confusing them, though simultaneous enactment can be confusing if one is not on one's guard. (89)

It is fair to say that to experience oneself as being different people in different "worlds" could very well be "ontologically confusing" (as Lugones herself admits) and experiencing oneself as two contradictory people at once could surely be even more confusing. Why does Lugones insist that one could animate "one or the other or both at the same time without necessarily confusing them"? (89). The answer to this question has to do, in part, with memory. As Lugones writes, "When I travel from one 'world' to another, I have this image, this memory of myself as playful in this other 'world.' I can then be in a particular 'world' and have a double image of myself as, for example, playful and as not playful" (91). Lugones finds resistant potential in this double image because, on her account, in having the double image one can see the "double edges" of any particular world and "see absurdity in them" (92). To be aware of this "double image" is to be aware of the fact that one is not exhausted by the constructions in either "world." This is particularly valuable when oppressed subjects travel to "worlds" in which they are constructed as outsiders. To elucidate this further, we can turn to another of Lugones's examples that refers to the ways Latinas are "constructed in Anglo 'worlds' as stereotypically intense" (92). She writes:

> Given that many Latinas, myself included, are genuinely intense, I can say to myself "I am intense" and take a hold of the double meaning. Furthermore, I can be stereotypically intense or be the real thing, and, if you are Anglo, you do not know when I am which *because* I am Latin American. As a Latin American I am an ambiguous being, a two-imaged self: I can see that gringos see me as stereotypically intense because I am, as a Latin American, constructed that way but I may or may not *intentionally* animate the stereotype or the real thing knowing that you

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[68] This is precisely why Lugones characterizes her experience of confusion as "ontological" rather than epistemic.

may not see it in anything other than in the stereotypical construction. This ambiguity is funny and not just funny; it is survival-rich. (92, emphasis in original)

I contend that Lugones's taking "hold of a double meaning" is a resistant epistemic shift and her recognition that she "may or may not intentionally animate the stereotype of the real thing" is a perceptual shift (92). I understand this latter shift to be perceptual because what she recognizes is that white Anglos (gringos) may not *see* or perceive her as than a "stereotypically intense" Latina—whether or not she intentionally animates the stereotype (92). Even if she made a conscious effort to act in ways that do not fit the stereotype, white Anglos may still not perceive her on account of anything but this stereotypical construction. Furthermore, because Lugones's existence as a Latin American does not fit into the mainstream Anglo construction of life, she is constructed as a stereotypical Latina.[69] That is, white Anglos understand her *being* according to an insider-outsider logic. To be Latin American in the US is to automatically be understood as a Latina/o, a term that necessarily carries with it particular stereotypes. Lugones could therefore exist in the US and inhabit white/Anglo spaces (where she is constructed as being "simply Latina") while holding the memories of herself as a Latin American woman (89). She could also inhabit "worlds" (realities or spatialities) where she is constructed as a stereotypical Latina while holding memories of herself as being "simply Latina" (a person she probably experiences herself as being when she is in Latina/o "worlds") (89). What Lugones is able to recognize by cultivating a sense of this epistemic/perceptual ambiguity is the "absurdity" in white Anglo "worlds"; she can see the "double edges" of those worlds in a way that allows her to "inhabit" them

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[69] The social category of Latina/Latino is unique to the United States, and it poses significant challenges to traditional ideas of race, identity, nationality, etc. The term Latina/o can be applied to any person living in the United States from Latin American descent (regardless of which Latin American country they may be descended from). It is an umbrella term than completely flattens the multiplicity of Latin American cultures and histories. It applies to subjects who may be second or third generation immigrants or it may be applied to people (like Lugones) who migrated to the United States at some point as adults. Lugones's own experience of being perceived as a "Latina" is significant because she would not have ever understood herself as a "Latina" until she arrived to the US. It is a specific, spatio-geographical construction of her identity that highlights the ways in which space constitutes the ideological and perceptual frameworks with which subjects are constructed.

differently (92). What is absurd is not the fact that Lugones can hold the "double meaning" of who she is or see herself as a "two-imaged self" (92). What is absurd is the white Anglos cannot interact with her or perceive her without relying on stereotypical constructions.

Lugones therefore argues that her experience of being a "stereotypical Latina" in dominant white "worlds" is not a matter of her "lack of ease" in those "worlds" (93). We should recall here the claim we considered previously that Lugones's experience of ontological confusion could not simply be a matter of her feeling at ease "because if it was just a matter of lack of ease, [she] could work on it" (87). As Lugones explains, white Anglos may not perceive her to be anything other than a stereotypical Latina whether or not she "*intentionally* animates the stereotype or the real thing" (92, emphasis in original). Her experience of "being" a different, stereotypical person in white "worlds" is not a matter of choice or lack of ease because who she *is* is always constructed intersubjectively. She is, as she argues, a "plurality of selves" and this "explains [her] confusion because *it is to come to see it as a piece* with much of the rest of [her] experience as an outsider in some 'worlds' that [she inhabits] and of a piece with significant aspects of the experience of nondominant people in the 'worlds' of their dominators" (93, emphasis in original). Moreover, it may seem that Lugones's recognition of herself as a "plurality of selves" requires accepting or "believing" the oppressive ways in which she is constructed by and becomes different people in white "worlds." But her point is that to see herself as a "plurality of selves" is transgressive because she is often (simultaneously) constructed differently in nondominant "worlds," and she can hold onto these memories of being different people even when she inhabits "worlds" that only see her as *one* subordinate being. Lugones therefore insists that she is a "plurality of selves" to resist being understood as "consumed or exhausted by oppression" (12).

What is clear from the aforementioned discussion is that to grasp the notion of "world"-traveling it is essential to keep in mind that, for Lugones, the plurality of subjects cannot be divorced from the plurality of "worlds" (and, of course, the plurality of realities and spatialities). In my view,

what Lugones affirms throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* is that if we (as theorizers) are invested in developing "an alternative understanding of the realities of the oppressed," we must transform the ways in which we theorize and to do so, we must also transform the ways in which we understand the logics of oppression and resistance (x). Moreover, to insist that the plurality of subjects is inseparable from the plurality of worlds is transformative because it disrupts dichotomous understandings of oppression/resistance.

That is, if we understand that: subjects are constituted socially (their *being* is constructed by the worlds they inhabit), and the social is "intersubjectively constructed in a variety of tense ways..." (20). *And* we understand that worlds are "permeable" and "organize the social as heterogeneous, multiple" (16, 20). *And* we understand that "the tension of being oppressed⇔resisting oppression 'places' one inside the processes of production of multiple realities" (17). Then we can say that subjects are never *only* oppressed (and never resisting) or *never* oppressing (and only resisting) because they are never wholly constituted by any "one" (oppressive/resistant) world and because worlds themselves are never entirely constituted by *only* the logic of oppression or the logic of resistance. To elucidate this further, in the next section I will examine Lugones's engagement with ontological pluralism in more detail.

2. Ontological Pluralism and Theories of Oppression

In her fourth chapter, Lugones insists: "In describing my sense of a world, I am offering a description of experience, something that is true to experience even if it is ontologically problematic" (89). She insists, further, that to offer an "ontologically unproblematic" account of identity that could not be true to this experience of outsiders "would deem aberrant experience that has within it significant insights into non-imperialist understanding between people" (89). Lugones is therefore more invested in making sense of "non imperialistic understanding between people" than she is in articulating ontologically unproblematic accounts of oppressed subjectivity (89). In essence, what

Lugones is suggesting, in my view, is that if those subjects "who are 'world'-travelers have the distinct experience of being different in different 'worlds' and of having the capacity to remember other 'worlds' and themselves in them," then we should recognize the philosophical value of this experience and develop theories that are true to this experience even if they pose a philosophical challenge (89). Lugones embraces the possibility that she may be one person in "worlds" where she is playful and a different person in "worlds" where she is unplayful because this possibility is, on her account, "true to the experience of outsiders to the mainstream" (91). Now, her claim that this description is true to the experience of outsiders could be contested; nonetheless, in my view, we should be less concerned with whether or not her statement is true than we should be with the insights that concepts like "world"-traveling afford and the ways in which concepts like "world"-traveling transform the ways in which we theorize oppression/resistance. To begin grasping these insights and develop a closer reading of her understanding of ontological pluralism, we can turn to another chapter in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* where Lugones develops a different, related discussion of multiple selves and multiple "worlds."

Lugones forwards another account of ontological pluralism in her 1990 essay "Structure/Anti-structure and Agency under Oppression" (which is later republished as the second chapter in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*). In this essay, Lugones critiques two examples of theories that portray oppression as inescapable "through the subject's joint or separate exercise of their own volition, power, or agency" (53). Turning to the works of Karl Marx and Marilyn Frye, Lugones highlights the limits of the theories that "portray oppression in its full force, as inescapable" (55). Her issue is not necessarily with the thinkers' portrayal of oppression. She acknowledges that "much of the explanatory power of these theories of oppression resides in their depiction of the oppressions as inescapable," and that "it is a desideratum of oppression theory that it portray oppression in its full force" (55). Rather, her critique stems from her insistence that "if oppression theory is not liberatory, it is useless

from the point of view of the oppressed person. It is discouraging, demoralizing (55). Lugones therefore recommends "contradictory desiderata for oppression theory, desiderata that are in both logical and psychological tension" (56). What she proposes is a theory of oppression that *both* portrays oppression in its full force and is liberatory. On her account, "This recommendation, as well as the ontological possibility of liberation, depends on embracing ontological pluralism.[70]" (55)

Lugones's own understanding of ontological pluralism (as she articulates it specifically in this second chapter) is grounded in what she phrases as her interest in "the practical syllogism as explaining action or failure to act in the case of oppressed persons" and her interest in "the open-endedness of oppressed persons' acting in terms of appropriate practical syllogisms, given the context(s) or background(s) of the acting" (57). Important to note is that here Lugones takes up a particular type of oppressed subject: the "arrogantly perceived woman" (a term she borrows from Marilyn Frye's[71] book *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory*, published in 1983). As Lugones explains, Frye "depicts the arrogation of someone else's substance for one's own project. The arrogant perceiver in Frye's work is a man. The end of arrogant perception is the 'acquisition of the service of others'" (Lugones 2003, 54; Frye 1983, 64-65). On Frye's account (as Lugones understands it), the "logic of separation" gives women like "the lesbian—a nonarrogated woman, a woman who is not for men— agency" (Lugones 2003, 55). As the lesbian sees the woman from outside the logic of arrogation— outside of the spatiality that is produced through the "consumption" of the arrogated woman's

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[70] Lugones finds that ontological pluralism is already "suggested by many oppression theorists" like Nancy Harstock (1983), Marilyn Frye (1983), Sandra Bartky (1977), and Sarah Hoagland (1982) (55). She also argues that "ontological pluralism is suggested vividly by theories of racial oppression presented by men and women of color: think of Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man* (1972) and Gloria Anzaldúa's *Borderlands/La Frontera* (1987) es examples (56).

[71] Lugones also takes up and complicates Marilyn Frye's notion of arrogant perception and the figure of the arrogantly perceived woman in her fourth chapter on "world"-traveling. I will return to arrogant perception in the upcoming section and examine the ways in which the term informs Lugones's notion of "world"-traveling.

"substance"—she sees her as separate from men," and herein lies the possibility for women to resist arrogant perception (17, 55). Lugones critiques this point in Frye's account by arguing that,

> [...] given the logic of arrogation, it is unclear how it is possible for the arrogated woman to say "no" and separate, nor how the lesbian can be in her. The lesbian as the "outsider" changes the woman's self-perception because she is being seen as someone who is not arrogated. But how can the woman see the lesbian and see the lesbian seeing her? (55)

Lugones takes issue, in particular, with the way in which Frye characterizes agency. For Lugones, Frye inevitably forwards an account of an oppressed subject (the arrogantly perceived woman) who is "trapped inescapably in the oppressive system" because "as depicted [by Frye] the arrogantly perceived woman cannot be an agent of her own liberation" (55). In other words, if the arrogantly perceived woman exists in an oppressive system whereby her agency is constituted and reduced by men (who perceive her arrogantly), how could she act on her own behalf to effectively "separate" herself from this system? Moreover, if she does not have the agency to separate herself from the system on her own behalf, how could she meaningfully come into contact with women like lesbians who exist as "outsiders" to the system in order to be "seen as someone who is not arrogated"? (55). Lugones's solution to this conflict is to offer an alternative account of agency through which oppressed subjects like the arrogated woman can "form liberatory syllogisms"—an alternative account of agency rooted in the relation between "the practical syllogism" and ontological pluralism.

Lugones understands "the practical syllogism" as "Aristotle understood it in *Nicomachean Ethics*, as a reasoning that ends in action, not as propositions that entail other propositions" (56). She writes: "Because I am interested in oppression, I begin by paying attention to Aristotle's account of the slave keeping the practical syllogism in mind. Aristotle makes it clear that the slave can only obey or follow orders, but cannot reason his own syllogism. The master reasons and the slave does" (56). The slave's actions are therefore "not human acts since "they are not acts that are the end of practical syllogisms" (56). Lugones then identifies a "similarity and dissimilarity between the slave's action in relation to the practical syllogism and the action of the arrogantly perceived women in relation to the

practical syllogism" (56). On Lugones's account, "The act of arrogating someone's substance ends the possibility of the subject's giving a practical syllogism that she can put into action and is not severely affected by the practical syllogism of the arrogant perceiver" (56). In other words, because the arrogantly perceived woman is bound to the reasoning of the arrogant perceiver, she cannot form syllogisms that are not "severely affected by the practical syllogism of the arrogant perceiver" (56). To be clear, Lugones does recognize that the arrogantly perceived woman "can engage in practical reasoning. But because she can, the alternatives from which she can choose and thus her conception of her well-being at the moment of action must be altered, manipulated" (56). The arrogant perceiver therefore manipulates her choices and eliminates choices "that could not be 'mediated by his will and interest'" (57). This description is, of course, Lugones's application of the practical syllogism in her own critical interpretation of Frye's account of agency. What Lugones will suggest is necessary for developing theories of oppression that do not forward reductive accounts of oppressed agency is (as we've already learned) ontological pluralism.

Lugones insists that she "gives up the claim that the subject is unified. Instead, I understand each person as many" (57). Her motivation for forward this claim is similar to her motivation for developing her notion of "world"-traveling. As she explains, "I am guided by the experiences of bicultural people who are also victims of ethnocentric racism in a society that has one of those cultures as subordinate and the other as dominant" (57). Like "world"-travelers, these subjects are very "familiar with experiencing themselves as more than one: having desires, character, and personality traits that are different in one reality than in the other and acting, enacting, animating their bodies, having thoughts, feeling the emotions, in ways that are different in one reality than in the other" (57). Lugones therefore argues that "the practical syllogisms that they go through in one reality are not possible for them in the other" because an action they perform in one reality may "not have any meaning or has a very different sort of meaning than the one it has in the other reality" (57). Moreover,

in the same way that Lugones argues there is resistant potential in remembering herself being both a playful and unplayful person in different worlds, she argues here that "it is very important whether one remembers or not being another person in another reality"[72] (57). In fact, she argues in this (second chapter) that "the liberatory experience lies in this memory, on these many people one is who have intentions one understands because one is fluent in several 'cultures,' 'worlds,' realities" (58). On Lugones's account, to remember being different people in different realities opens up the possibility of forming practical syllogisms across realities. That is, subjects who experience themselves being one person in one reality and another person in different reality have access to different forms of "reasoning" through which they can form practical syllogisms. "At least some of the syllogisms of the different person one is in one world will be different in kind from those in another world..." (58). We can therefore "see that the very same person may remember herself in another reality and thus be able to form practical syllogisms that have intentions that the person she is in another reality would have" (58).

Some of the "worlds," realities, and spatialities we inhabit may indeed be oppressive and constituted by forms of reasoning that produce what Lugones refers to as "'subservient or 'servile' syllogisms, of which the syllogism of the arrogantly perceived woman is an example" (57). But there are other "worlds" that "construe social life and persons differently" and are constituted by alternative, nondominant forms of reasoning that produce liberatory syllogisms; these worlds "provide one with syllogisms that one can attempt to make actual in the worlds in which one is oppressed, given one's critical understanding of each world" (59). It is important to note, nonetheless, that not all oppressed subjects, "bicultural people," or "victims of ethnocentric racism" automatically develop this "critical

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[72] Here is an instance where we identify an apparent overlap between Lugones's use of "worlds" and "realities" (which I take to be synonymous with "spatialities"). I contend that if we recognize the similarities between the terms (while holding onto the fact that she uses them in different contexts), we can better trace the connections between and across chapters.

understanding of each world" (59). This critical understanding of the multiplicitous worlds, realities, and spatialities must be cultivated and, on Lugones's account it is "made possible, in part, by going into the limen when one 'travels' to other worlds. The limen is a space in-between spaces[73] where one becomes most fully aware of one's multiplicity" (59). Lugones takes up the possibility of cultivating a critical understanding of multiple worlds by turning to Victor Turner's distinction between structure and anti-structure and his definition of liminality.

As Lugones explains, "Victor Turner (1974) uses the distinction between structure and anti-structure to study pilgrimage" (60). She argues that, for Turner, structures are presented in ordinary life "as systematic, complete, coherent, closed socio-political-economic institutions or normative systems that construe persons" (60). Structures constitute persons "in the sense of giving them emotions, beliefs, norms, desires, and intentions that are their own" (60). In contrast, according to Lugones, "anti-structure is characterized by Turner as constituted by liminality..." (60). Turner himself argues that "in this interim of liminality, the possibility exists of standing aside not only from one's own social position but from all social positions and of formulating unlimited series of social arrangements" (Turner 1974, 14). What Lugones finds useful in Turner's account of liminality[74] is

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[73] Here we should note her reference to the limen as a "space" in between spaces as a clear indicator of her synonymous understanding of the terms "space" "worlds," and "reality."

[74] I find there to be some useful resonances between Lugones's discussion of structure/antistructure and the discussions of spaces and spatial production she integrates in later chapters. Like structures, spaces are often presented as "systematic, complete, coherent, close" systems, and they constitute the "emotions, beliefs, norms, desires, and intentions" of subjects (60). In addition, Lugones argues in later chapters that not only do social subjects collaborate in the production of space, but they also collaborate in the production of alternative, resistant spaces that—like anti-structures—constitute and are constituted by alternative epistemologies that disrupt the rigidity of oppressive, structural spaces. We should note here, however, that the account of potential resistant constructions Lugones describes in her second chapter does not fully capture the tense oppressing⇔resisting tension she elaborates by the end of the book project. As she explains, "Structure/Anti-structure and Agency under Oppression" is her first "exploration into oppressed subjectivity and the subjective possibility of liberation," but when published the piece (in 1990) she had not yet found a way of "writing from within the oppressing⇔resisting tension" (31). With this in mind, although I suggest there are some similarities in her discussion of structure/anti-structure and her understanding of the social production of space, I recognize that these are narrow similarities and do not sufficiently represent the complex account of spatial production she articulates in her later chapters.

that "he describes experiences that are of a piece with the experience of victims of ethnocentric racism and that he claims that liminal states are social states[75], just as much as structural states are" (Lugones 2003, 61). In other words, because liminal states are social states, they offer a sufficiently "stable" ground from which subjects can "stand critically toward different structures" and become "most fully aware of [their] multiplicity" (59). Lugones therefore contends that,

> The experience of victims of ethnocentric racism of moving across realities, of being different in each, and of reasoning practically differently in each, can be understood as liminal. To do so is to understand its liberatory potential because, when the limen is understood as a social state, it contains both the multiplicity of the self and the possibility of structural critique. (61)

Her account benefits from Turner's description of liminality because her suggestion that oppressed subjects experience themselves "as more than one" across and between different realities does not, on its own, reveal the potential for resisting oppression. Subjects must remember "being another person in another reality" if they are to form "practical syllogisms that are not subservient to the syllogisms of [their] dominator" (57, 58). For subjects to be aware of their own multiplicity is at one with their critical understanding of multiple worlds: "One understands oneself in every world in which one remembers oneself to the extent that one understands that world" (59). And, as Lugones argues, "the limen is the place where one becomes most fully aware of one's multiplicity" (59).

All things considered, Lugones's second chapter provides a useful framework for uncovering the insights that concepts like "world"-traveling afford and the ways in which concepts like "world"-traveling transform the ways in which we theorize oppression/resistance. As we have seen, Lugones argues that "embracing ontological pluralism" is essential for understanding "the ontological possibility of liberation" and for articulating a theory of oppression that can "portray oppression in its full force" without leaving "the subject trapped inescapably in the oppressive system" (55, 53). What is essential for Lugones, in other words, is a liberatory theory of oppression. She therefore

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[75] And, as we learn from her later spatial theorizing, if space is a social production, and the limen is a "social state" then the limen is also a social space.

recommends "contradictory desiderata for oppression theory, desiderata that are in both logical and psychological tension" because, on her account, "if oppression theory is not liberatory, it is useless from the point of view of the oppressed person. It is discouraging, demoralizing" (55). Moreover, if, as Lugones suggests, "the logic of the particular form of oppression leads [her] to understand [the oppressive system] as inescapable," then what must be transformed is our understanding and articulation of the logic of oppression (53).

3. Arrogant Perception, Loving Perception, and the Playful Attitude

We have already established that Lugones articulates her notion of "world"-traveling to account for the experiences of "outsiders to the mainstream" who acquire an ontological flexibility and travel to and from different "worlds" mostly "out of necessity" (77). We also found that Lugones locates in this practice the potential for resisting oppression. As "world"-travelers travel to and from different "worlds", as they shift "to different constructions, different spatialities," they may hold onto the memory of the different people they are in multiple worlds and therefore cultivate a critical understanding of those worlds and spatialities (17). They can, as she writes in her fourth chapter, see the "double edges" of any particular world and "see absurdity in them" (92). Or, as she writes in her second chapter, subjects may cultivate a "critical understanding of each world" and become more "fully aware of [their] own multiplicity" (59). As I've developed the aforementioned analysis, I've already explored some of the ways in which perception fits into this larger schema. Nonetheless, we have yet to investigate in detail the types of perceptual practices Lugones articulates throughout her account of "world"-traveling. In this section, I take a closer look at her account of "arrogant perception" and "loving perception" to distinguish, in part, the types of epistemic and perceptual shifts she argues are necessary for "reading" resistance—the types of shifts I have argued are also necessary for understanding the spatiality of resistance.

On Lugones's account, as women of color travel to "worlds" where they are constructed as outsiders, they become objects of arrogant perception (a notion Lugones borrows from Marilyn Frye). As Lugones writes, "According to Marilyn Frye, to perceive arrogantly is to perceive that others are for oneself and to proceed to arrogate their substance to oneself" (78). In other words, to perceive someone arrogantly is to perceive them in a self-serving way. It is to assume *who* they are on the basis of one's own self-understanding and/or own's own understanding of the "world" one inhabits; it is to perceive them in a way that best suits one's own interests and ideals. As Lugones develops her own account of arrogant perception, she makes "a connection between 'arrogant perception' and the failure to identify with persons that one views arrogantly or has come to see as the products of arrogant perception" (78). And she makes a further connection "between loving and identifying with another person" (78). She draws these connections, in part, by taking into consideration Frye's proposed solution to arrogant perception: loving perception. As Lugones explains, "Frye also proposes an understanding of what it is to love women that is inspired by a vision of women unharmed by arrogant perception. To love women is, at least in part, to perceive them with loving eyes" (79). But Lugones "modifies Frye's account of loving perception by adding what [she calls] playful 'world'-travel" (80). In addition, while Lugones understands Frye as focusing on women "as objects of arrogant perception," Lugones is more concerned with the ways in which women themselves become "arrogant perceivers" (79). In sum, Lugones complicates and enhances Frye's notions of arrogant and loving perception as she develops her own account of "world"-traveling to describe the ways in which women can "learn to love each other by learning to travel to each other's 'worlds'" (78). Part of what I want to outline in this section then, is how the type of "world"-traveling Lugones characterizes as "forced" is constituted by arrogant perception and the type of "world"-traveling she characterizes as "playful" is constituted by loving perception. Both forms of perception tell us something significant about the ways in which subjects take up oppressive and resistant logics.

Lugones argues that "women are taught to perceive many other women arrogantly" (80). They are taught to "be both the agent and object of arrogant perception" (80). She explains this by turning to her own upbringing in Argentina and her experiences relating to white/Anglo women in the U.S. In particular, she recounts her own experience of being taught to perceive other women arrogantly in Argentina by turning to her relationship to her mother:

> My love for my mother seemed to me thoroughly imperfect as I was growing up because I was unwilling to become what I had been taught to see my mother as being. I thought that to love her was consistent with my abusing her: using, taking her for granted and demanding her services in a far-reaching way that, since four other people engaged in the same grafting of her substance onto themselves, left her little of herself to herself. I also thought that loving her was to be in part constituted by my identifying with her, my seeing myself in her. Thus, to love her was supposed to be of a piece with both my abusing her and with my being open to being abused. (80)

Here, Lugones articulates the complex relationship between arrogant perception, identification, and love. She describes two features of her "thoroughly imperfect" love for her mother, the first of which relates to the ways in which she was taught to "see" or perceive her mother; the second relates to her failure to identify with her mother (80). That is, because Lugones perceived her mother as an "abused" subject, she could not identify with her mother because to identify or "see" herself in an "abused subject," Lugones would have to be open to seeing herself as an abused subject as well—as a subject "open to being abused" (80). What is wrong in this equation between perception, identification, and love is, on Lugones's account, that she was "taught to identify with a victim of servitude" so she could ultimately "learn to become a servant through this practice" (81). Here, I think Lugones is speaking specifically to the mechanisms by which patriarchy is preserved; as daughters learn to be like their mothers, they are compelled to accept the conditions constituting their mothers' lives (and learn to identify with these conditions as their own). Nonetheless, Lugones insists that she refused to learn these lessons, but instead of refusing the *idea* of *who* her mother was (an abused subject), Lugones separated herself from her mother (for the sake of, in a way, separating herself from the type of person Lugones did not want to become). As she writes, "I am glad I did not learn my lessons well, but it is

clear that part of the mechanism that permitted my not learning well involved a separation from my mother: I saw us as beings of quite a different sort" (82).

What Lugones articulates here is quite crucial. Her urge to separate from her mother was not motivated by a genuine desire to be apart from her mother: "I longed not to abandon her" (82). Rather, the urge was motivated by her refusal to *be* what she believed her mother to be—an abused "victim of servitude" (81). We should appreciate here the way in which an abstract idea (the image of Lugones's mother as a victim of servitude and patriarchy) became relationally concrete; that is, it took hold of Lugones's ability to perceive her mother (outside of the dominant "worlds" through which her mother was constituted) and motivated Lugones to "abandon" her mother (82). It shaped her concrete relationship and seized her motivations for acting in particular ways toward her mother. As Lugones writes, "To the extent that we learn to perceive others arrogantly or come to see them only as products of arrogant perception and continue to perceive them that way, we fail to identify with them—fail to love them—in this particular way" (78). Arrogant perception is therefore a constitutive feature of the logic of oppression; it is a perceptual practice grounded in oppressive logics that effectively separates women from each other and makes it difficult for women to see each other within the tense oppressing⇔resisting relation. That is, when women perceive other women arrogantly, they only see other women as *wholly* oppressed and are unable to see women as also resisting *and* oppressing.

Lugones argues, moreover, that there is a similar consequence at play in the relations between women of color in the US and white/Anglo women, but the relations are different insofar as Lugones felt "a sense of loss" when she separated from her mother (82). Lugones writes, "As I eluded identification with my mother, white/Angla women elude identification with women of color, identification with beings whose substance they arrogate without a sense of loss" (82) While white women arrogate the substance of women of color without "a sense of loss," Lugones was left feeling "not quite whole" when she made her mother an object of her arrogant perception (82). As she writes,

"because my mother and I wanted to love each other well, we were not whole in this independence" (83). In my view, Lugones focuses on the relationships between women of color and white women, in part, to describe the ways in which women of color are constructed as "outsiders" to white mainstream constructions of life. As she explains, she is interested in "those many cases in which white/Angla women do one or more of the following to women of color: they ignore us, ostracize us, render us invisible, stereotype us, leave us completely alone, interpret us as crazy. All of this *while we are in their midst*" (83, emphasis in original). To say that these dynamics unfold while women of color are in the midst of white women is to explain the dynamics that unfold when women of color inhabit white/Anglo women's "worlds" (83). As Lugones argues, "Their 'world' and their integrity do not require me at all. There is no sense of self-loss in them for my own lack of solidity" (83). Thus, when women of color inhabit the "worlds" of white women, white women perceive them arrogantly (they consume women of color's substance in the production of white women's "worlds"); they fail to identify with women of color and therefore fail to love them. Nevertheless, white women are not the only women who "learn to perceive other women arrogantly" (83). Women of color also learn to be "both the agent and the object of arrogant perception" and, in turn, perceive other women of color arrogantly (80).

Part of Lugones's aim in this chapter is to "give a new meaning to coalition and propose 'Women of Color' as a term for a coalition of deep understanding fashioned through 'world'-traveling" (78). This coalitional possibility requires, as Lugones argues, that women of color in the US "learn to love each other by learning to travel to each other's 'worlds'" (78). Lugones contends that, by traveling to each other's "worlds," women of color can learn to see their own and each other's "interrelating 'worlds' of resistant meaning" (85). This traveling is necessary because "the techniques of producing difference include divide and conquer, segregation, fragmentation, instilling mistrust toward each other for having been pitted against each other by economies of domination, instilling in us the

distinction between the real and the fake" (84). That is, the logic of domination does not only construct women of color as "outsiders" to mainstream constructions of life; it also instills a sense of separation between resistant communities themselves. Lugones articulates these dynamics more explicitly in her seventh chapter: "Boomerang Perception and the Colonizing Gaze: Ginger Reflection on Horizontal Hostility" (first published in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*).

In her seventh chapter, Lugones explains the ways in which resistant subjects have carved out alternative communities where they are not subject to the oppressive "racist/colonialist gaze" (159). As Lugones writes, people of color "have fashioned a variety of styles, values, beliefs, ways, which afford us perceptions within different seeing circles all of which are alternatives to the racist/colonialist gaze" (159). Unfortunately, while people of color have developed spaces, communities, or territories where they can "go to be seen" and cultivated "home-grown" perceptions, they have (perhaps inadvertently) become "fiercely tied" to their own "seeing" circles (154, 159). They have drawn "very tight, inflexible boundaries" around their circles (159). For example, Latinos draw tight boundaries around Latino communities, Black people draw tight boundaries around Black communities, and so on. This is because, as Lugones explains, "There is a felt connection between survival, resistance, the maintenance of double vision and who one sees as one's own, who is part of the resistant seeing circle, the nation. There is a felt sense that one can only keep double vision seeing and being seen through the eyes of one's particular circle" (159). Thus, even though oppressed subjects have built their own resistant communities and resistant "worlds," they are not open to other resistant "worlds" because "enlarging the circle to include those who do not have, or one does not have clear reason yet to believe they have, an alternative sense of self, is understood as endangering the circle itself" (160).

In this same vein, Lugones argues in her fourth chapter that women of color "do not understand each other as interdependent and we do not identify with each other since we lack insight into each other's resistant understandings" (85). Instead, "Separatism in communities where our

substance is seen and celebrated [...] combines with social fragmentation to keep our lines of resistance away from each other. Thus, it is difficult for women of color to see, know each other, as resistant rather than as constructed by domination." (85). Unfortunately, the very mechanisms by which women of color have worked to resist oppression and domination (and resist being constructed as "outsiders" in dominant worlds) have separated them from other women of color. In my view, this is a crucial insight for making sense of interlocked and intermeshed oppressions. When people of color foster "communities where [their] substance is seen and celebrated," but they build "tight boundaries" around these communities, they cannot move beyond the logic of "social fragmentation" that is necessary for resisting intermeshed oppressions (85, 159). As Lugones explains in her tenth chapter: "Social fragmentation in its individual and collective inhabitations is the accomplishment of the interlocking of oppressions. Interlocking is conceptually possible only if oppressions are understood as separable, as discrete, pure" (223). When subjects create socially fragmented resistant communities, they inadvertently collude with the logic of interlocked oppressions. That is, their own resistant practices inadvertently affirm their oppression. In order to resist interlocking oppressions, subjects must resist conceptions of oppressions as "separable," "discrete," and "pure" (223). They must foster critical understandings of multiple resistant "worlds" and avoid falling into the trap of social fragmentation. This is difficult because "at every point, it seems as if in order to resist intermeshed oppressions, we must bind categorially, so we cloud our own heterogeneity and yield to a categorial self-understanding" (224). This is precisely why Lugones argues that women of color must "travel to each other's 'worlds'" in order to "learn to love each other" (78). If they do not travel, they will continue lacking "insight into each other's resistant understandings" (85).

Now that we have established *why* Lugones argue women of color must travel to each other's "worlds," we must establish *how* she thinks this travel can take place and how women of color can

learn to perceive each other lovingly. To address the question: "What, then, is the loving playfulness I have in mind?" Lugones offers an illustrative example:

> We are by the riverbank. The river is very low. Almost dry. Bits of water here and there. Little pools with a few trout hiding under the rocks. But it is mostly wet stones, gray on the outside. We walk on the stones for a while. You pick up a stone and crash it onto the others. As it breaks, it is quite wet inside and it is very colorful, very pretty. I pick up a stone and break it and run toward the pieces to see the colors. They are beautiful. I laugh and bring the pieces back to you and you are doing the same with your pieces. We keep on crashing stones for hours, anxious to see the beautiful new colors. We are playing. (95)

This scene is one where the subjects engaged in playful activity do not enter the riverbank with a preconceived notion of "how" they are going to play. Rather, as Lugones explains, "*the attitude that carries us through the activity, a playful attitude, turns the activity into play*" (95, emphasis in original). Thus, the playfulness Lugones depicts in the scene is carried out through a particular disposition, an "*openness to surprise*" (95, emphasis in original). So, for Lugones, "the playful attitude involves openness to surprise, openness to being a fool, openness to self-construction or reconstruction and to construction or reconstruction of the 'worlds' we inhabit playfully..." (96). Playful "world"-traveling, then, is a type of traveling carried out with a "playful attitude" (96). For women of color to learn to perceive each other lovingly, they must travel to each other's worlds with this "playful attitude" (96). They must be open to "being a fool, which is a combination of not worrying about competence, not being self-important, not taking norms as sacred, and finding ambiguity and double edges a source of wisdom and delight" (96). They must be willing to loosen the ties to their own "seeing circle" and be open to the possibility of being perceived differently by other resistant subjects (159). In sum, the shift away from "arrogant perception" to "loving perception" requires an openness to epistemic ambiguity. That is, if women of color want to learn to perceive other women of color lovingly, they must be open to alternative resistant constructions and they must be willing to see/understand other women of color beyond the oppressing/resisting dichotomy.

To underscore my understanding of the relationship between ontological pluralism and the spatiality of resistance (and frame my upcoming examination of trespassing and streetwalker theorizing), I turn briefly to Mariana Ortega's book in *In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self* (2016). Here, Mariana Ortega takes up and challenges the role of ontological pluralism in Lugones's notion of world traveling. Ortega characterizes her critique in a succinct query:

> ...the key question that remains is why in Lugones's view *world*-traveling means *self*-traveling? That is, it is not clear why the experience of world-traveling that opens up possibilities of resistance requires an ontological pluralism of selves. Another way to think of this issue is whether in fact Lugones's account of world-traveling is more than an *epistemic* shift to different selves. (2016, 97)

Here, Ortega captures what, in my view, is the most challenging aspect of Lugones's work. I contend, nonetheless, that the key to answering Ortega's question (why does world-traveling mean self-traveling?) lies in Lugones's complex understanding of spatiality and sociality as they relate to the constitution of subjects. The key to Lugones's ontologically pluralistic notion of selfhood is that selves, like worlds, are *produced* through concrete, body-to-body engagements and through the formation of individual and collective intentions. Moreover, I do agree with Ortega that, "While Lugones does state that the self is one and many […] Lugones does not fully engage this particular understanding of the self as being one and many. Instead, she moves farther and farther from a consideration of the singular, individual aspect of the self" (97). As we have seen throughout this dissertation, Lugones's spatial theoretical shift corresponds to her shift in attention from the "movements of resistant intentions between people at closer range" to the "movements of intentions at the level of collectivities in formation" (30). Her work progressively hones in on the "sociality of resistance," on theorizing the complexity of experiences like the one she described of her time in the asylum—her experience of "feeling the collective self" (Lugones, Acuña 2019). I think it is fair to say that the sociality of resistance takes priority throughout Lugones's work in such a way that may appear as a diminished concern with articulating a comprehensive account of the multiplicitous self. However, I also think that what may

appear as an absence to those who are invested in theorizing multiplicitous selves may very well be Lugones's point. That is, to center the self in philosophical investigation (whether multiple or not) may still privilege, to some extent, a logic of purity and fragmentation, and exemplify an impulse (the driving force of Western philosophy) to translate the complex nature of reality into human terms—to name, characterize, and recognize the differences between all things—and, in so doing, vehemently resist the possibility that the boundaries between all things may be much blurrier than we could ever imagine. I do not think there is anything inherently "wrong" with wanting to understand our realities and our place in them, especially if that desire is motivated by a commitment to interrogating the histories of and processes by which groups of people have been forced into inhabiting unlivable worlds. But, as Lugones's work stresses, we should ask ourselves, why are we so wedded to the idea that we could ever fully grasp what it means to say or be an "I"? Whenever I am stuck grappling with Lugones's challenging claim to ontological pluralism, I remember her reference to mycelia in her 2019 interview "Carnal Disruptions" with Mariana Ortega:

> Mycelia stay in constant molecular communication with their environment, achieving the greatest mass of any organism in the planet. They partner with plants. As spores, they travel and attach themselves to anything moving. Animals, including human beings, breathe them as microbiospora. They form a communicative tree system as they connect trees together. In my view, they are the most clear and astonishing example of the permeability of living things, and rocks, water, as they all carry and are made, in part, by mycelia—sometimes very old mycelia turn to stone. I choose mycelia to think about permeability, because they are not as socially normed as many other organic and inorganic living beings. They exhibit clearly the porosity of our habitat, not just their own permeability. Thus they exhibit the porosity of the habitat itself. (276)

When I ask myself Ortega's question (why does world-traveling mean self-traveling?), I think of how mycelia "are not as socially normed as many other organic and inorganic living beings" and "exhibit clearly the porosity of our habitat, not just their own permeability" (276). To think of selves as multiplicitous is to recognize the permeability of selves and the porosity of our socialities. Like the "living things, and rocks, water" that "all *carry* and *are made* in part, by mycelia," selves carry and are made by their concrete relations to others, by their concrete inhabitation of "multiple, intersecting,

co-temporaneous realities" (Lugones 2019, 276; 2003, 16). As we move concretely to and from different spaces, we *carry* with us the various selves we are when we are with others, and we are continuously *made* and *re-made* intersubjectively by others. To think of "world"-traveling as an "*epistemic shift to different selves*" rests on the assumption that those selves are merely different conceptual, abstract constructions of a singular self. (Ortega 2016, 97, emphasis in original).

Part 2: Shifting the Spatiality of Cognition: Two Spatial Transgressions and the Tactical-Strategic Stance

In the first part of this chapter, I argued that Lugones articulates a co-constitutive relationship between the logics of resistance/oppression and the social production of space—a relationship that accounts for the "production of multiple realities" (Lugones 2003, 17). Moreover, in the second part of the chapter, I examined Lugones's notion of "world"-traveling to both explain what she means by ontological pluralism and outline what her account of "world"-traveling can contribute to our understanding of the spatiality of resistance. In my view, we must grasp the ways in which Lugones develops her understanding of the multiplicity of worlds and selves if we are to understand the tense oppressing⇔resisting relation she articulates in the later chapters of her book project (that is, the chapters that are first published in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*). As we have seen throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, Lugones forwards understandings of "reality as heterogeneous," "space itself as multiple," and "worlds" as deeply multiplicitous and "permeable" (16). What I hope to have made evident thus far is that, for Lugones, realities, spaces, and "worlds" are produced through complex, intersubjective social processes and it is through these processes that the conceptions and perceptions of social subjects become spatially or "worldly" concrete (15). To preface this next section, I want to reiterate what I outlined in the first part of this chapter: that resistance is (for Lugones) both the possibility of intervening at the level of meaning and an active state from "which to seek collectivity

and coalition" (x). Lugones also argues that "'reading resistance is crucial for an alternative understanding of the realities of the oppressed" (x). But, of course, resistance "is almost always masked and hidden by structures of meaning that countenance and constitute domination" (x). Resistance is, in other words, hidden in the very processes by which dominant social spaces are produced. Moreover, because "the tension of being oppressed ⇔ resisting oppression 'places' one *inside* the *processes* of production of multiple realities," we must learn to "read" resistance from *within* these multiplicitous processes and practice "shifting to different constructions, different spatialities" (17). This next section is therefore motivated by the question: what is required for subjects to read resistance (and oppression) from within the "processes of production of multiple" spatialities? (17)

To address this question, I will return to Lugones's account of the map of oppression to articulate two types of spatial transgression (a critical inhabitation of space and trespassing) and examine them alongside Lugones's discussion of the tactical-strategic stance (a stance that is necessary for understanding streetwalker theorizing) in her tenth chapter. Moreover, as I argued in my second chapter, Lugones insists upon the disruption of de Certeau's tactic/strategy dichotomy and proposes "to embrace tactical strategies in moving in disruption of the dichotomy" (208). Embracing tactical strategies is, on her account, "crucial to an epistemology of resistance/liberation" and "to do so is to give uptake to the disaggregation of collectivity concomitant with social fragmentation and to theorize the navigation of its peril, without giving up take to its logic" (208). She also argues that embracing tactical strategies is to "seek an epistemology that reconceives intentionality without falling into monological understandings of either individual or collective agency" (208). Lastly, she argues that to embrace tactical strategies is to seek an epistemology that "takes up embodied attention to the micro mechanisms of power and their being met with creative resistance. And it seeks to follow the paths of resistant intentionality" which requires "understanding intentionality as lying *between rather than in subjects*, subjects that are neither monolithically nor monologically understood" (208). To understand

intentionality as lying between subjects is, on Lugones's account, to understand that "the meaning, the sense of their intentions cannot be assumed to be always lying within one world of sense, but as possibly lying between worlds of sense, worlds of sense that are enmeshed with each other, even though they may be ideologized as distinct" (208-209). I contend and will demonstrate in the next sections of this chapter that in parsing out the distinction between the two spatial transgressions Lugones articulates in her description of the map of oppression, we can better understand what she means by "tactical strategies" and, as a result, distinguish one of the main features of what she refers to as "streetwalker theorizing" in her tenth chapter.[76]

1. Stepping into the Map of Oppression/Map of Resistance

In Lugones's discussion of the map of oppression, she outlines two possible transgressions against the spatiality of oppressions. The first transgression—a critical inhabitation of space—involves, on Lugones's account, "sensing, recognizing, and moving through the spatiality of your everydayness" (9). She refers to the second transgression—trespassing—as one of the resistant practices that entail "noticing oppression *at* its logic and moving against it" and "include an epistemic shift" (12). Lugones argues that the first step in the embodied thought experiment (to "visualize, remember, and sense a map drawn by power […] where there is a spot for you") constitutes an initial "transgression" against the spatiality of oppression (8). This first step unveils the abstract dimensions of the map. As she writes:

> But though the map must contain this abstraction [abstract you], in engaging in this embodied
> thought experiment, you are sensing the geography looking for signs of power and of

[76] Important to note as I begin this examination is that there are many points at which my analyses of trespassing (the second of two spatial transgression) and streetwalker theorizing will overlap. My aim is not to offer entirely separate accounts of the two practices but rather to offer an interrelated, co-enhancing account of both. Of the many resistant practices Lugones articulates throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, these two are perhaps the most similar. In my view, Lugones's streetwalker theorist is a subject who "trespasses" against the spatiality of oppression, but not all trespassers are necessarily streetwalker theorists.

limitations, reductions, erasures, and functionalist constructions. This is, in terms of logical levels, the first transgression, since you are sensing, recognizing, and moving through the spatiality of your everydayness as possibly reductive, demoralizing, containing and eliminating your possibilities. Your having that double consciousness about yourself in space is transgressive. (9)

This first transgression is characterized by a critical inhabitation of space, a moving through space with an eye for the ways in which a subject's life is "spatially mapped by power" (8). Lugones describes this awareness as a "double consciousness," referring to W.E.B. Du Bois's (1903) conception (first introduced in *The Souls of Black Folks: Essays and Sketches*) of "a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity" (Du Bois 1903, 2). What the subject engaged in the embodied thought experiment becomes aware of, then, is how their concrete spatiality—their day-to-day movements—is bound to spatiality in an abstract sense, that is, to the dominant, "mostly hidden" meanings attributed to their movements and relations: "too little time, unsafe, only for smart people who are seeking degrees, for whites only, too little money, not my community or my people, illegal, for heterosexuals only, or simply just private property" (Lugones 2003, 9). Furthermore, as the subject garners an awareness of their own abstract spatiality, they may also come to "see that people are organized and channeled spatially in ways that contain them in a systematic way from getting together against the grain of power" (9-10). However, this second possibility, Lugones argues, may not come to fruition: "You may not realize how you collaborate in the production of that spatiality [...] You may, from your vantage point (not from 'up high') not recognize any containment; thus *there may be no trespassing* in your walking the map of oppression" (10, emphasis added). In other words, a subject may be able to recognize the ways in which their own lives are "spatially mapped by power"—a mapping that necessarily involves their day-to-day relations and interactions with people at close range—but that recognition may not extend beyond the spatiality of an individual's "everydayness" (9). That is, their understanding of the spatiality of oppression and

resistance does not extend beyond the level of "people at closer range" one of two "connecting levels of the political" (30). Even though this initial transgression is important insofar as it entails subjects having a "double consciousness" of themselves in space, that initial transgression may not allow subjects to recognize the ways in which they "collaborate in the production" of spatialities that "contain" groups of peoples, a containment that forecloses the possibilities for groups of people to move "together against the grain of power" (10, 9). And without "recognizing any containment" there may be "no trespassing in [a subject's] walking the map of oppression" (10). I contend that, here, Lugones signals a significant distinction between the first transgression (critical inhabitation of space) and a second transgression (the act of trespassing), and this difference is, in part, related to "vantage point" from which a subject examines the ways in which their lives are spatially mapped by power. This distinction requires careful examination.

As Lugones explains, "There is the bird's-eye view–the perspective from up high, planning the town, the takeover, or the analysis of life and history. There is the pedestrian view[77]—the perspective from inside the midst of people, from inside the layers of relations and institutions and practices" (5). The first transgression, in my view, refers to a movement through the map of oppression at street-level with a "pedestrian view" (5). Lugones provides important insights into this subject who theorizes their spatiality from "street-level" with a pedestrian view in her tenth chapter, where she writes,

> Street level sociality can provide a despairing, demoralizing "picture" of the complexities and depth of oppression and of the barrier to emancipatory change [...] Not infrequently, the pedestrian theorist is tempted to favor a mode of comportment that speaks the languages of systems of oppression, seeking within them redress or assistance [...]
>
> The oppressed, erased, subordinated, abused, criminalized negotiate their survival in many spaces, including "support" agencies of social control. The pedestrian theorist is often overwhelmed into legitimating these agencies by learning to earn a living in them and thus gaining from-above access to the oppressed. (229-230)

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[77] Her description of these two viewpoints or perspectives in her introduction is a reference, in my view, to the tactical and strategic viewpoints she discusses in her tenth chapter.

These "agencies" Lugones refers to are agencies like "economic development organizations, battered women shelters, crisis lines, legal advocacy centers, homeless shelters, and alternative organizations for wayward 'youth'" (230). On Lugones's account, then, because subjects like the "pedestrian theorist" are surrounded by a "despairing, demoralizing, 'picture' of the complexities and depth of oppression," they may turn to and rely on institutionalized "agencies" to resist oppression, agencies that require deploying "homogenizing language of the therapeutizing of politics, of expertise, of social control" (230). The experience Lugones describes here is, in my view, a function of the interlocking of oppressions since, "at every point, it seems as if in order to resist intermeshed oppressions, we must bind categorially, so we cloud our own heterogeneity and yield to a categorial self-understanding" (224). In other words, on Lugones's account, oppressed subjects (who are invested in the possibility of resisting their oppression) are constantly confronted with "modern conceptions of justice and sociality" that give them "a face, a character, an authority, a worth, a value 'system'" (230). These conceptions are "unbearably seductive" because they offer oppressed subjects clear-cut paths to possibilities for changing their conditions. But these paths are also under constant surveillance by the very oppressive system they are attempting to resist. As Lugones writes, "On the bodies and souls of contemporary America's *marginales,* 'political' strategists play at rearranging and justifying the divisions of the spoils of social 'cooperation.' In the process, they must rearrange and redefine who is left out of any shares. The process does not include those to be sacrificed" (230). The pedestrian theorist (the subject walking the map without trespassing) is, therefore, a subject who may be able to recognize and transgress against the spatiality of their everyday lives; but if they do not recognize the ways in which they collaborate in the production of multiple spatialities, they may invariably engage in "legitimated" resistant practices that do not "include those to be sacrificed" (230). I now want to take a closer look at the difference between a "pedestrian theorist" and a trespasser.

To be clear, in my view, trespassing still requires the first transgression, but the insights a subject's garners from that first transgression are not sufficient for "trespassing against the spatiality of oppressions" (11). Trespassing requires a more complex, multiplicitous understanding of the spatiality of oppression—an understanding that cannot be garnered from either the pedestrian level or the "bird's eye view" (10). As Lugones writes, "Taking in the map is not to occupy a 'from the top position,' a bird's-eye view. It is rather to study one's spatiality, the spatiality of one's relations, of one's productions and their meaning in both a concrete and an abstract sense" (10). The first transgression already involves studying "one's spatiality and the spatiality of one's relations" but not the study "of one's productions and their meaning in both a concrete and abstract sense" (10). The difference between the first and second levels of transgression is, therefore, a matter of whether or not a subject realizes how they "collaborate in the production" of multiple spatialities and must do so without engaging dichotomous conceptions of oppression/resistance (10). They must, instead, recognize that "the tension of being oppressed⇔resisting oppression 'places' one inside the processes of production of multiple realities" (17). That is, subjects must understand themselves and others as never *wholly* oppressed, *wholly* oppressing, or *wholly* resisting but as always "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting" simultaneously (11). While the first transgression involves "sensing, recognizing, and moving through the spatiality of your everydayness as possibly reductive"; the second transgression involves putting "the two logics constructing the map together and sens[ing] the terrain in a tension of oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting, concrete beings abstractly constructed refiguring their concreteness in complex dealings with abstraction" (9, 11). The transgression at the first level, insofar as it involves "moving through the spatiality of your everydayness," can offer subjects insights into the first of two connecting levels of the political, "from between people at closer range" (10, 30). In contrast, the second level of transgression (when the "two logic constructing the map" are brought together) can offer subjects insights into *both* the first level and the second of two

connecting levels of the political—"the level of collectivities in formation" because it involves moving through a broader oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting "terrain" (30) By putting the "two logics constructing the map together" subjects can recognize that "to understand the spatiality of [their] lives is to understand that oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting construct space simultaneously and that the temporality of each, at their infinite intersections, produces multiple histories/stories" (12). Herein lies, in my view, one dimension of the "epistemic shift" included in trespassing. Before I outline additional dimensions of this epistemic shift, I want to turn to Lugones's account of the tactical strategist to enhance the description of trespassing I've just put forward. If, as Lugones argues, "taking in the map is not to occupy a 'from the top position,'" but subjects may not "recognize any containment" (and their collaboration in spatial productions) from a street level vantage point, then what sort of "vantage point" is necessary for the trespasser? (10).

2. The Tactical/Strategic Stance

To reiterate briefly, the vantage point of de Certeau's strategist[78] is "a point of view that is positioned high above the street" (211). Therefore, as Lugones explains, "the strategist 'sees' from a point of view characterized by the distance of height and abstraction" (212). On the other hand, the vantage point of the tactician is a point of view at street level. On Lugones's account, "in de Certeau, 'strategy' stands for distance mastered through sight and abstraction, 'tactic' stands for lack of distance, concreteness, for shortsighted creations. Without illusions, the tactician stands on the treacherous fictional immobility of the master's proper and 'makes do'" (214). According to de Certeau, the strategist's "proper" is a "place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats can be managed" (1984, 36). The tactician,

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[78] Important to note is that de Certeau himself does not personify the logics of strategies and tactics. Nonetheless, Lugones personifies these logics by referring to the figures of the "strategist" and the "tactician." See footnote 30 for further explanation.

in contrast, cannot rely on a proper because "the space of a tactic is the space of the other. Thus [the tactician] must play on and with a terrain imposed on [them] and organized by the law of a foreign power [...] This nowhere gives a [tactician] mobility to be sure, but a mobility that must accept the chance offerings of the moment" (de Certeau 1984, 37). Therefore, on de Certeau's account, the tactician is bound to the "proper" space of the strategist, and they can only resist from within that space by seizing "the chance offerings of the moment" (de Certeau 1984, 37). Lugones's aim in disrupting de Certeau's dichotomy is, in part, motivated by his understanding of the "space of a tactic" (de Certeau 1984, 37). As Lugones writes:

> *De Certeau understands the tactic/strategy dichotomy in spatial terms. The spatialization of each term and its consequences is important. In disrupting the dichotomy, I want to trouble the terms' organization of the spatiality of resistance to domination. Though de Certeau draws the dichotomy to unveil room for resistance by the "weak," the resistor is trapped by the spatiality of the dichotomy. In disrupting the dichotomy, I am particularly keen on intervening in the judgment that the oppressed cannot see deeply into the social.* (212, emphasis in original)

In other words, to disrupt the tactic/strategy dichotomy is, in part, to reconfigure the ways in which we understand oppressed/resistant subjects' inhabitation of space and the spaces from which they theorize oppression and resistance.[79] As Lugones argues, "*The urban planner's city, the 'concept-city' is the strategist's 'proper.' A tactic cannot count on a 'proper,' it rather 'insinuates itself into the other's place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance*" (Lugones 2003, 212, emphasis in original; de Certeau 1984, xix). On Lugones's account, then, de Certeau's strategy/tactic dichotomy rests on the assumption that the tactician cannot act from any space of their own production. For de Certeau, it is only the strategist that produces a "proper" space "that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats can be managed" (1984, 36). On the other hand, as we have emphasized throughout this chapter, for Lugones, subjects are always already "*inside* the *processes*" of spatial production and therefore collaborate

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[79] This reconfiguration affirms the idea that oppressed subjects have some level of agency— "what looks like a very attenuated sense of agency by the standards of liberal morality"—in the production of resistant spaces (5). I will focus on the role of agency in the next part of this chapter.

in the production of multiple spatialities (Lugones 2003, 17). They do not passively inhabit oppressive spatialities but often inhabit them "in great resistance, without willful collaboration" (10). Subjects are also, in fact, capable of producing and inhabiting resistant spaces—like hangouts that are "worldly, contestatory concrete spaces within geographies sieged by and in defiance of logics and structures of domination" (221). Lugones therefore argues that "the logic of tactical strategies makes possible a recreation of spatiality" (215). What Lugones is ultimately interested in, by proposing a disruption of the strategy/tactic dichotomy, is a "pivoting" of "the spatiality of theorizing" (226).

According to Lugones, "Theoreticians of society and politics have often conceived of themselves as perched up high, looking at or making up the social from a disengaged position" (207). It is from this disengaged position, she argues, that "subjected subjects are assumed to negotiate daily survival myopically from within the concreteness of body-to-body engagement" and "resistance within this concreteness is reduced to the tactical" (207). Lugones therefore insists that the strategy/tactic dichotomy ties "'theory' to 'strategy' and 'resistance' to 'tactic,' and erases the possibility of theorizing resistance from the subaltern position and from within body-to-body engagement" (207). Thus, to accept the dichotomy is to accept the idea that the oppressed cannot theorize resistance because it assumes that the oppressed are conceptually and perceptually bound to a street-level vantage point—the vantage point of the tactician—and that they are bound to the space of the strategists proper. The strategy/tactic dichotomy ultimately reduces resistant "to reaction" (29). As I argued in the first part of this chapter, Lugones "wants to dispel any sense that the logic(s) of resistance lies in resistance," and she insists, instead, that "resistance is not reaction but response—thoughtful, often complex, devious, insightful response, insightful into the very intricacies of the structure of what is being resisted" (29). I contend, therefore, that Lugones wants to disrupt the strategy/tactic dichotomy because it presupposes that resistance is reaction and that the oppressed cannot theorize "resistance from the subaltern position and from within body-to-body engagement" (207). This disruption is

both a challenge to the idea that the oppressed cannot theorize resistance and to the idea that subjects do not collaborate in the production of multiple spatialities (and therefore cannot produce resistant spaces).

Thus, Lugones characterizes the tactical strategist as a subject whose inhabitation of space disrupts the strategy/tactic dichotomy. As she explains, the tactical strategist "meets power in the guise of the illusory 'concept city,' abstract space, the emptying of space, as well as in the guise of its infinitesimal mechanisms [...] the tactical strategist keeps a duplicitous tactile-audio-olfactory-visual insight into the depth of the social" (215). The tactical strategist's duplicitous insight[80] "does not lose sensory contact" with the social (215). The tactical strategist is therefore able to "theorize resistance from the subaltern position and from within the concreteness of body-to-body engagement" (207). Lugones explains, further, that the "tactical strategist acquires a practiced, long sense of the social

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[80] I find, in this duplicitous insight, a deep sense of conceptual/perceptual ambiguity. To explain what I mean by this, we can turn back to the figure of the "world"-traveler. When the world traveler shifts to dominant, Anglo worlds, where she is "constructed as an outsider," she becomes an object of arrogant perception (77). The abstract "idea" of who she is in the Anglo world may indeed be nothing more than an idea, a fiction, but this idea takes shape, becomes concrete when, for example, a Latina walks into a room full of white women who only perceive her arrogantly (as a stereotypical Latina) (89). And the Latina—having a "double consciousness of herself in space"—experiences herself as both being and not being the stereotypical Latina the white women perceive her to be (9). Another way to think of this conceptual/perceptual ambiguity is to turn to the cachapera/tortillera (herself a sort of "world"-traveler). When the tortillera enters Latino communities "face-to-face," she is "accorded" the status of heterosexual because she cannot exist in that community as a lesbian. "La tortillera exists en la comunidad only as a pervert. Perversion constitutes her and marks her as outside of countenanced relationality" (74). To mitigate the contradiction that the cachapera embodies (as a Latina who is also lesbian), the heterosexist Latino community "erases and denies her lesbian existence" (174). Like the "world"-traveler, the cachapera/tortillera is perceived arrogantly when she enters her Latino community; she is made into something or someone else (in this case, heterosexual), a something or someone who (again) in spite of being nothing more than an abstract fiction is accorded a type of concreteness when she inhabits particular spaces. When the tortillera "enters the church dressed in men's clothing—people respect her, they address her" but they only address her as a heterosexual (174). As Lugones explains, "the cachapera's "sociality is alive and constated en *el mitote* (in gossip), in her absence" because "*el mitote* imagines her as most lividly social and anomalous, but the anomaly is tamed through a lack of direct add ness, through a denial of dialogue" (174). The tactical strategist holds this tense, duplicitous insight into the social because "for the tactical strategist resisting $\Leftrightarrow$ oppressing has volume, intricacy, multiplicity of relationality and meaning, and it is approached with all the sensorial openness keenness that permits resistant, liberatory, enduring if dispersed, complexity of connection" (215). This duplicitous insight characterizes an essential epistemic shift in Lugones's notion of the tactical strategist.

spatiality of particular resistances and resistant meanings" (218). I contend, moreover, that it is this very sense "of the social spatiality of particular resistances and resistant meanings" that is necessary for trespassing against the spatiality of oppression (218). And, therefore, trespassing requires a tactical strategic vantage point.

On Lugones's account, trespassing requires noticing "resistance to oppressions in their complex interactions, including their interlocking to fragment people categorially [...] noticing the tensions from within a logic of resistance enables one to acquire "a multiple sensing, a multiple perceiving, a multiple sociality" (11). This multiple sensing, perceiving, and sociality opens up the possibilities for cultivating a deep sense of multiple spatialities of resistance. Furthermore, in becoming more attuned to resistance in multiple forms, "we can sense each other as possible companions in resistance, where company goes against the grain of sameness as it goes against the grain of power" (11). This is the most important part of trespassing because to trespass is to move *with* others in resistant company "against the grain of power" (11). On Lugones's account, "trespassing against the spatiality of oppressions is also a redrawing of the map, of the relationality of space" (11). Thus, to trespass is, ultimately, to refuse the relational limitations imposed by the spatiality of power and defy the fragmenting logics with which we understand and cultivate our own resistant relationality.

Moreover, important to note is Lugones's claim that: "Trespassing is very difficult to achieve, since there are great many ways to entice one back to the road of collusion with power" (11). How is it, as Lugones suggests, that one "colludes" with power? Does the way one "reads" the map determine whether or not one is "colluding" with power? As will become clearer in the next section, the resistant practices Lugones articulates throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* (like trespassing, world-traveling, and streetwalker theorizing) are grounded in her understanding of resistant collective intentionality. As Lugones asserts: "This stepping into the map of oppression/map of resistance logics exhibits two interwoven interests that I pursue in the chapters of this book: an interest in motivational structure at

the level of persons and readings of particular acts and an interest in the larger social movement of intentions" (15). To grasp further what the act of "trespassing" entails (what it means to redraw the relationality of space), we must consider Lugones's interest in the aforementioned motivational structures.

3. Duplicitous Insights and Interpretations

As I've argued, to trespass, subjects must recognize the ways in which they collaborate in the production of multiple spatialities: both resistant and oppressive spatialities. Of course, it is from within the same complex, spatial-social processes that multiple (even contradictory) spatialities are produced. Thus, all spatialities (realities, and worlds) are constituted by the tense oppressed⇔resisting relation and subjects "inhabit these realities as spatially, historically, and thus materially different: different in possibilities, in the connections among people, and in the relation to power" (17). If, moreover, there is more than one logic constructing the map, then there is more than one way to "read" the map and to read the subjects and their relations on the map. I've also argued that subjects collaborate in these productive processes by taking up particular epistemic frameworks and perceptual practices—frameworks and practices that I contend correspond to particular approaches to "reading" the map. To elucidate the ways in which subjects may collude with power (which, in my view, is akin to saying subjects may collaborate in the production of oppressive spatialities), I want to examine Lugones's account of intentions in her introduction. According to Lugones,

> If we think of people who are oppressed as not consumed or exhausted by oppression, but also as resisting or sabotaging a system aimed at molding, reducing, violating, or erasing them, then we also see at least two realities: one of them has the logic of resistance and transformation; the other has the logic of oppression. But, indeed, these two logics multiply and encounter each other over and over in many guises. (12)

Implicit in this explanation is the fact that we can only "see at least two realities" *if* we "think of people who are oppressed as not consumed or exhausted by oppression, but also as resisting" (12). Thus, to

see the two realities and cultivate a multiplicitous understanding of the map—we must transform the way we "think of people who are oppressed" (12). This is not to say, however, that we should pretend like they are not oppressed, nor should we see them as never oppressing; we must see them as oppressed, oppressing, "but also as resisting" (12). We must, therefore, interpret our own behaviors, intentions, and actions and the behaviors, intentions, and actions of others *against* the oppression/resistance dichotomy. To understand that "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting construct space simultaneously" goes hand in hand with understanding subjects as "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting" (12). But this is, of course, incredibly challenging because, as Lugones explains, "there is an epistemic tendency, unless one has cultivated a resistant multiple interpretive vein, to see behavior as either resistant or oppressed" (13). On Lugones's account, it is already "epistemically difficult to understand the intention constitutive of resistant behavior and see the same behavior as responding to the motivational structure of oppression" (13). But, as Lugones notes, "it is one thing to see oppression and another to understand a bit of one's behavior or someone else's as 'issuing' from a resistant *and* an oppressed motivational structure" (13). Thus, to understand "people who are oppressed" as also oppressing *and* resisting (outside of an "either/or" logic) requires cultivating "a resistant multiple interpretive vein" (12, 13).

The issue Lugones highlights here is that the interpretation of behaviors overdetermines the interpretation of the intention. That is, there is a tendency to assume the reasons for which a subject may have engaged in a particular activity. If we see someone performing (what we interpret to be) a resistant action, that does not necessarily mean that the person who performed the action was motivated by a resistant logic. Similarly, if we see another person acting in a particular way and we interpret them to be "acting oppressed," that does not necessarily mean that the person themselves was motivated by an oppressed logic (13). The problem is the tendency to assume that a person's intentions are immediately apparent or follow logically from their behavior. The tendency becomes

even more problematic when we are trying to interpret or read resistance because, in the same way that "if you see oppression, you tend not to see resistance," if you see resistance, you tend not to see oppression (13). As Lugones explains:

> The person who is resisting, when understood as resisting, is *not* understood as someone with subservient or servile intentions, while the person understood as acting oppressed—within the logic of oppression—is *assumed* to be responsive to the oppressor's orders, wishes, desires, suggestions, or expectations. (13, emphasis added)

What is so striking (and challenging) about Lugones's insights here is that, if we perceive someone to be resisting, but we are not open to the possibility that their behavior is issued from "a resistant *and* an oppressed motivational structure," then we may still be unwillingly or unknowingly colluding with power (13). Moreover, cultivating a "resistant multiple interpretive vein" is not only difficult because "there is an epistemic tendency" to see "behavior as either resistant or oppressed" (13). There is, on Lugones's account, a "tension, incompatibility, or oddity between the perceptions produced" by the logics of oppression and resistance, perceptions "that are hard to sustain in conjunction with each other" (13). But we must work to sustain these perceptions "in conjunction with each other" in order to cultivate a "resistant multiple interpretive vein" (13).

Taken together, these complex, convergent processes make necessary an openness to conceptual/perceptual ambiguity in social relations. If the goal is—as Lugones suggests—for subjects to see people who are oppressed as also resisting and yet while resisting also be oppressing, and this possibility entails recognizing the ways in which a person may act in accordance with *both* oppressed and resistant logics, then we must be open to the possibility that our own epistemic and perceptual tendencies often betray us. According to Lugones, "both readings may coexist and one person may read the act both ways and, importantly, intend the act to be read both ways" (14). We must therefore be conceptually/perceptually attuned to this ambiguous reading/intention; we must be able to cultivate, what Lugones terms, a "duplicitous interpretation" (14). Thus, I contend that to collude with power is, in part, to leave our epistemic and perceptual tendencies unchecked. To collude with power

is to read one's own actions/intentions and the actions/intentions of others in accordance with a resistant/oppressed dichotomy. As Lugones explains in her fourth chapter, when women of color do not practice "traveling" to each other's "worlds" (when they "are kept apart by social fragmentation"), they do cannot learn to perceive each other lovingly and are therefore left "unwittingly colluding with the logic of oppression" (85).

Furthermore, Lugones argues that there is a "sense of integrity, moral integrity included, that is lived as violated by this duplicitous interpretation, *if* one's understanding of the moral presupposes the unification of the self, as much of mainstream, institutionalized morality does" (14, emphasis added). Fostering a duplicitous understanding of actions and intentions, then, corresponds with a multiplicitous understanding of subjects and relations; it defies the presupposition that subjects are always already whole and unified when they form intentions (because to interpret intentions and behaviors as only ever *wholly* resistant or oppressed rests on the assumption that subjects are pure, efficient agents whose actions are motivated by clear-cut, transparent intentions). Important to note in addition is that this duplicitous interpretation is multi-directional—one must apply this interpretive framework to oneself and others. As Lugones writes, "it is difficult to look at one's oppressed behavior in the flesh and the face. Even if the oppressed readings confront one as constructing a reality that one struggles to undermine, or dismantle, the power of the reading in constructing us is often inescapable" (14). This is precisely where Lugones accounts for the ways in which "oppressors" fit into the interpretive framework she puts forward. It is easier for oppressors to rely on mainstream, conceptions of the self and preserve their epistemic/perceptual tendencies—tendencies that erase resistant logics and promote readings of actions/intentions "that are incompatible with the logic of oppression" as incompetent (12). The power of the oppressor, moreover, lies in the potency and influence of their reading: "If the act is one of sabotage and it is read as incompetence, the reading

makes it incompetent if done by people who have the power to declare something to be real. It makes

it incompetent in at least one reality—one that emphasizes the logic of oppression" (13-14).

The move Lugones makes here is quite significant. Because Lugones insists on the existence

of multiple realities, she is able to acknowledges the force of the dominant readings— readings "done

by people who have the power to declare something to be real"—without foregoing the fact that the

oppressed are not exhausted by these dominant readings (13-14). These readings may make an action

incompetent "in at least one reality" but they do not render the action incompetent in other, resistant

realities. Thus, even though the oppressor "has a lot to gain from not seeing sabotage or resistance"

they cannot "erase resistance, because to be erased, resistance needs to be seen" (14). For an oppressor

to erase the resistant logic of action they must be able to read it, but they can only read it if they

acknowledge (at least in part) that the action makes "sense" as resistant in at least one reality. Thus, as

Lugones explains, "There is often a lapse, a forgetting, a not recognizing oneself in a description, that

reveals to those who perceive multiply that the oppressor is in self-deception, split, fragmented [...] As

a self-deceiving multiple self, the oppressor does not remember across realities" (14). When Lugones

speaks of multiple realities (or spatialities), then, she is not just referring to the lived experiences of

oppressed subjects. That is, Lugones's insistence on the plurality of selves, realities, and spatialities is

a descriptive claim—a theory of the social that applies to all subjects (oppressors included).

I want to pause here to draw some conclusions about the notion of trespassing and summarize

what we have explored in this section. What Lugones's account of the "duplicitous interpretation"

highlights is that to trespass, to recognize and move with others in resistant company is difficult, in

part, because the spatiality of oppression trains us into taking up harmful epistemic dispositions and

perceptual practices—like the tendency to read the actions and behaviors of others as "either resistant

or oppressed" (13). To summarize what we have explored in this section and concretize the differences

between "reading oppression," "reading resistance" and engaging in a "duplicitous interpretation," I want to examine the following example:

> *I couldn't figure out what to do except to move with him to make him get off me a little bit faster. But all the while I despised him, there was not once a touch that didn't repel me. We lived together for years. He would fuck me always after beating me up or as part of beating me up. To figure out how to leave was something that took all my imagination. But you know how small your imagination gets after being beaten up and fucked over and over for years. You know how hard you have to try to make it grow. But all the while; I didn't make myself like it. That's why my imagination could grow. I didn't make myself like it.* (10-11, italics in original)

Firstly, if we read a woman's act of "*moving with him*" through an oppressive logic, we may assume that that woman was engaging in a consensual sexual activity (10, italics in original). Likewise, if we read the woman's claim that "*we lived together for years,*" we may assume that the woman either did not recognize the severity of her situation or that she was willingly accepting a situation where she was consistently subject to violence (10, italics in original). If we read her "*moving with him*" through a logic of resistance, we can recognize a resistant intention motivating this movement, an intention aimed at getting him off her "*a little bit faster*" (10, italics in original). To read her claim that "*we lived together for years*" with a resistant logic, we may conclude that the woman stayed in a situation of domestic violence to resist other forms of violence she would encounter if she did not live with her abuser. Furthermore, one could assume (as many people unfortunately do) that for a woman to truly "resist" a situation of domestic abuse, all she has to do is "leave" her abuser. If she does not leave, one could assume that she is completely consumed by her oppression; that she is either unable or unwilling to recognize her oppression. Nonetheless, to read the woman's situation with a "duplicitous interpretation" requires recognizing the tension between the resistant/oppressive dimensions of her lived experience—a tension captured by the description: "*To figure out how to leave was something that took all my imagination. But you know how small your imagination gets after being beaten up and fucked over and over for years* [...] *But all the while; I didn't make myself like it. That's why my imagination could grow. I didn't make myself like it*" (11, italics in original). The woman's claim that she did not make herself "like it" may be incomprehensible without a "resistant multiple interpretive vein" (13). That is, there are various elements in this story

that would be lost and incoherent if we were to interpret the woman's behavior as *only* "either resistant or oppressed" and if we were to assume that her intentions were easily discernible or logically issuing from her behaviors (13). In a word, without a multiplicitous understanding of oppression/resistance, it is impossible to count "as resistance" the fact that the woman lived with her abuser for years but "*all the while,*" didn't make herself like it (10).[81] And it would be impossible to recognize the woman in a domestic abuse situation as an oppressed⇔oppressing/resisting subject.

In sum, essential to Lugones's understanding of trespassing is her complex notion of the oppressing ⇔ resisting relation. She suggests that, in order to trespass (to "sense each other as possible companions in resistance" and move with resistant company "against the grain of power") we must cultivate a "resistant multiple interpretive vein" (11, 13). We must cultivate a sensitivity to the tension between oppression/resistance and become attuned to the ways in which this tension constructs "people's movements, interaction, desires, and intentions" (13). To trespass, then, one must acquire a capacity for reading the actions and intentions of others without falling back on the resistant/oppressed dichotomy. To avoid being enticed "back to the road of collusion with power" requires "duplicitous" interpretations of our own actions/behaviors/intentions and the actions/behaviors/intentions of others. All things considered, I contend that the act of trespassing is one of many resistant practices that both makes the spatiality of resistance intelligible *and* allows subjects to move with resistant company against the spatiality of oppression. It is a resistant spatial practice that violates the spatiality of oppression, redraws the "relationality of space," and makes possible the production of resistant spatio-socialities.

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[81] The way situations like these (of domestic abuse) are read is politically significant because it ultimately informs the ways in which we may understand this woman's particular situation, her relationship to the man, and the resources she may or may not need to address their situation. As will be shown in the final section of this dissertation, Lugones takes seriously the resistant practices of women (like those in domestic abuse situations) who are "at odds with 'home'" (209).

Part 3: The Spatiality of Resistance in Theoretical-Practice: Streetwalker Theorizing, Hang Outs, and Active Subjectivity

As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, the account of the spatiality of resistance I have worked to develop throughout this chapter is most clearly represented and substantiated in Lugones's account of the streetwalker theorist (*la callejera*). My intention thus far has been to delineate and examine that elements of Lugones's work that are necessary for understanding her account of streetwalker theorizing. In my account of world-traveling, I highlighted the fact that, for Lugones, the plurality of selves cannot be divorced from the plurality of "worlds." Without an understanding of ontological pluralism (the multiplicity of selves and the multiplicity of realities) we risk developing theories of oppression that leave subjects trapped in the oppressive system. Part of her motivation for embracing ontological pluralism, then, is to account for the ways in which subjects are not bound to the systems of meaning the constitute oppressive realities or spatialities. There are, as Lugones insists, multiple, overlapping worlds, realities and spatialities. As subjects travel to and from different worlds, while "noticing the tensions from within the logic of resistance," they both animate and become different types of persons *and* they are able to access multiple meaning-making structures (11). Subjects like the "world"-traveler, then, can form practical syllogisms or intentions in one "world" that they would not be able to form in another. They can remember the different selves they are in different worlds and, in doing so, may even be able to form liberatory syllogisms while inhabiting oppressive "worlds." Overall, my aim in developing an account of world-traveling with the spatiality of resistance in mind was to highlight the fact that, for Lugones, realities, spaces, and "worlds" are produced through complex, intersubjective social processes and it is through these processes that the conceptions and perceptions of social subjects become spatially or "worldly" concrete (15).

In the second part of this chapter, I examined Lugones's description of two spatial transgressions and her account of tactical strategies. I argued that the very sense "of the social spatiality

of particular resistances and resistant meanings" cultivated by the tactical strategist is necessary for trespassing against the spatiality of oppression (218). Thus, to trespass against the spatiality of oppression, we must take up a tactical strategic vantage point. I ended the second part of the chapter by delineating the duplicitous insight and interpretation cultivated by trespassers and tactical strategists. This duplicitous insight/interpretation is necessary for subjects to avoid colluding with power; it requires understanding that "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting construct space simultaneously," and it requires understanding subjects as simultaneously "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting" (12). In my view, and as I will demonstrate in this final section, Lugones's account of the streetwalker theorist brings all of insights derived from the aforementioned accounts together. Lugones incorporates two main concepts in her tenth chapter that are integral to her understanding of streetwalker theorizing: tactical-strategies and active subjectivity. Since I covered much of her account of tactical strategies in the previous part of this chapter, I want to begin here with her account of active subjectivity.

1. Active Subjectivity and Collective Intentionality

In her introduction, Lugones argues that she is "keen on theorizing what, from the standpoint of liberalism, would look like an almost inconsequential or attenuated sense of agency" but that is, in fact "a very powerful one" (5). She refers to this attenuated sense of agency as "active subjectivity," a conception of agency that "does not presuppose the individual subject and it does not presuppose collective intentionality of collectivities of the same" (6). Instead, it is "adumbrated to consciousness by a moving with people, by the difficulties as well as the concrete possibilities of such movings" (6). She explains further that she came to this understanding of agency by asking herself, "from within the midst of multiple political relations," the following question: "*how much and what sort of 'agency' do we need to move with others without falling into a politics of the same, a politics that values or assumes sameness or homogeneity;*

without mythologizing place; attempting to stand in the cracks and intersections of multiple histories of domination and resistances to dominations? (6, emphasis in original). She attends to and answers this question in her tenth chapter.

Lugones grounds her account of active subjectivity in a critique of the later modern "fiction of effective individual agency," a fiction that "hides the institutional setting and institutional backing of individual agency" (210). This is a conception of agency that fits "both the strategist, the powerful, and those who act as managers, foremen, lesser officials, and upholders of its institutional 'apparatus'" (210). On Lugones's account,

> In hiding the institutional setting, the narrative of individual agency entices subjects understood as individuals with the power and efficacy of their deliberations and decisions. Valorizing single authorship, individual responsibility, individual accountability, and self-determination, freedom is lived as this efficacy of individual agency. Intentionality is understood as residing in and emanating from the individual or from monolithic collectivities. (210)

At the center of this fiction, then, is the idea that individual agents are able to effectively form intentions and perform actions without any institutional or social backing that makes their intentions and actions intelligible. Because these agents are subjects that are constructed as "insiders" to mainstream constructions of the social, the successful agent "reasons practically" in a dominant "world of meaning" (211). What remains hidden, however, are the "social, political, and economic institutions that back him up and form the framework for his forming intentions that are not subservient to the plans of others" so that "he is able to carry into action unimpeded and as intended" (211). The modern agent's effective individual agency is, on Lugones's account, "a mirage of individual autonomous intentional action" (211). His intentionality does not *actually* reside in and emanate from within his own individual being—it only appears as such because he is backed by dominant institutions and meaning-making structures. Nonetheless, this mirage achieves a high degree of reality precisely because his actions and intentions are intelligible to a dominant world of sense.

Furthermore, "since the modern conception of agency as autonomous subjectivity cannot countenance resistance by the oppressed, and since agency is the precondition of modern understandings of morality, resistance to oppression is conceptually disallowed as moral" (211). What Lugones highlights here is, first of all, that the very conditions for the possibility of effective individual agency are predicated on the exclusion of oppressed subjects from the realms of moral and political participation. The oppressed (who are constructed as outsiders to dominant constructions of the social) "cannot exercise agency since they either enact a subordinate or a resistant intentionality. The subservient nature of the intentions disqualifies the oppressed from agency in the first case. Lack of institutional backing disqualifies the resister from having agency" (211). This lack of institutional backing also bars oppressed subjects from full moral consideration and participation. That is, because their actions and intentions are deemed incomprehensible, those actions and intention cannot be evaluated as being moral or immoral; they simply do not *fit* into dominant ethical and political schemas.

Part of the reason why oppressed subjects are so often tempted by dominant mainstream conceptions of "justice" and institutionalized "'support' agencies of social control" is because they are overwhelmed by the "demoralizing 'picture' of the complexities and depth of oppression" and because, when they inhabit dominant "worlds" or spaces, they are constructed as demoralized, subordinate beings (229-239). Their experience of inhabiting dominant worlds is one where they are constantly understood as acting or intending "outside" of mainstream moral frameworks and, therefore, not understood as ethical agents. This is also, in part, why oppressed groups create (and then fiercely guard) their own exclusive communities. These "home-grown" communities afford oppressed subjects refuge from the constant ethical, political, and social repression they experience when they inhabit racist/colonialist "worlds" (159). While Lugones certainly recognizes the ways in which "a sense of home, place, and heritage has been crucial for those who are targets of racism," she is wary of the tendency cultivated by folks in "home-grown" communities to engage in politics of

exclusion and social fragmentation because "enlarging the circle" is understood as "endangering the

circle itself" (156, 160). This tendency, unfortunately, leaves subjects like the *cachapera/tortillera* in a

state of virtual, social exile; and it re-affirms the very oppressive logics those that work to create home-

grown communities are attempting to evade (when all they have done is, effectively, re-direct the

oppressive racist/colonialist gaze onto other subjects or engage in "boomerang perception[82]"). It is

not that "home-grown" communities are themselves harmful; it is paramount for oppressed groups

to carve out their own spaces of survival. What is harmful is being seduced into the idea that those

communities should be fiercely safeguarded and preserved for the sake of resisting oppression. To

stay in and safeguard those homegrown spaces will not only leave out "those to be sacrificed," it also

makes it much easier for those who are interested in destroying those communities to find them (230).

As Bernice Johnson Reagan argues in her renowned essay "Coalitional Politics: Turning the Century":

> Now every once in awhile there is a need for people to try to clean out corners and bar the
> doors and check everybody who comes in the door, and check what they carry in and say,
> "Humph, inside this place the only thing we are going to deal with is X or Y or Z." And so

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[82] While I did not dedicate much space in this dissertation to boomerang perception (from Lugones's seventh chapter on pages 151-166 of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*), I think it is a crucial part of Lugones's argument regarding the logic of social fragmentation and naturalization of space. As Lugones explains in her summary of chapter nine, "The naturalization of space serves to create the illusion of territorial boundedness and isolation; the histories of connected peoples become spatially fragmented" (35). When space is "naturalized," the ways in which "people are organized and channeled spatially in ways that contain them in a systematic way from getting together against the grain of power" becomes hidden in the very order of space itself; is taken for granted as a natural quality of space (10). That is, because the production of space is hidden (as we learn from Lefebvre), we are led to assume that the separation of peoples into distinct groups is just "the way things are." The power of this assumption is then intensified when oppressed groups segment themselves off into separatist groups or engage in narrow identity politics in the effort to resist oppression. Furthermore, in my view, Lugones offers insights in her "world"-traveling chapter that capture part of what she is arguing in her boomerang perception chapter. As women of color are taught to be "both the objects and agents of arrogant perception," they are taught to perceive other women of color arrogantly and therefore fail to identify and love other women of color (80). This tendency to perceive other women of color arrogantly is reinforced when they inhabit and defend their own separatist communities. As Lugones argues, "To the extent that we face each other as oppressed, we do not want to identify with each other, we repel each other as we are seeing each other in the same mirror" (85) This description reinforces my claim that those who fiercely safeguard their home-grown communities effectively redirect the oppressive racist/colonialist gaze onto other oppressed subjects. Women of color, "to the extent that they face each other as oppressed, do not want to identify with each other" and they therefore redirect the arrogant perceiver's gaze back onto the women of color they are facing (84). On a final note, Lugones herself takes up the notion of "boomerang perception" from Elizabeth Spelman's 1988 text *Inessential Woman: Problems of exclusion in feminist thought.*

only the X's or Y's or Z's get to come in. That place can then become a nurturing place or a very destructive place. Most of the time when people do that, they do it because of the heat of trying to live in this society where being an X or Y or Z is very difficult, to say the least [...]

There is no chance that you can survive by staying *inside* the barred room. That will not be tolerated. The door of the room will just be painted red and then when those who call the shots get ready to clean house, they have easy access to you. (1983, 357-358).

Now, because the modern conception of agency "cannot countenance resistance by the oppressed" (and because this modern conception of agency is grounded in unified conceptions of the subject), Lugones introduces active subjectivity as a necessary, conceptual alternative to that modern conception (Lugones 2003, 211). Furthermore, Lugones insists that oppressed subjects' lack of institutional backing is actually "the crucial source of the possibility of an alternative sociality" (211). Her point in highlighting "the collectivity backing up the individual" is not just to critique the "illusory quality" of the modern conception of individual agency, but rather to emphasize "the need of an alternative sociality for resistant intentionality" (216). Thus, her notion of active subjectivity and the possibilities for producing an alternative sociality go hand in hand; and the possibility for *both* rests on a reconception of intentionality as "lying *between rather than in subjects*, subjects that are neither monolithically nor monologically understood" (208, emphasis in original). As Lugones writes, "Intending may 'feel' as arising in a subject, but surely the production of intentions is itself a haphazard and dispersed social production. Subjects participate in intending, but intentions acquire life to the extent that they exist between subjects" (216-217).

The sense of intentionality Lugones proposes here is "a sense of intentionality that we can reinforce and sense as lively in paying attention to people and to the enormously variegated ways of connection among people without privileging the word or a monological understanding of sense" (6). Important to note here is Lugones's reference to cultivating a "resistant multiple interpretive vein" in my previous discussion of the trespasser's duplicitous interpretation (13). What Lugones is ultimately arguing in her tenth chapter is that if we cultivate resistant, epistemic and perceptual practices whereby we learn to resist the "epistemic tendency" to see "behavior as either resistant or oppressed"; and we

learn to see "people who are oppressed" as *also* oppressing *and* resisting"; and we therefore become attuned to "the tensions from within a logic of resistance"; then we can effectively produce and animate a different—attenuated yet powerful—form of agency and subjectivity (that in turn produces and is backed up by alternative socialities). As Lugones argues,

> Active subjectivity is possible because of alternative socialities that have an unseen, hidden quality to them, even if they live in the worldliness of the street, unseen from the conceptual perspectivism of strategic understandings of power. Active subjectivity is alive in the activity of dispersed intending in complex, heterogeneous collectivities, within and between worlds of complex sense. (217)

Moreover, even though oppressed subjects are not "backed up" by dominant institutions in a way that renders intelligible their resistant actions and intentions (and they therefore cannot be agents in a modern sense), their resistant actions and intentions can be understood if they are backed by alternative socialities. They can form "intentions that are not subservient" and carry out these intentions into actions "in transgression of dominant sense" (211).

To understand active subjectivity, we cannot forget Lugones's insistence that "though resisters are not agents, they are active subjects" (211). Resisters are not agents because to "be" agents (in the modern, dominant sense) is to assume that they are unified subjects whose intentions reside in and emanate from their own individual, unified being. Instead, resisters are active subjects because their intentions "acquire life to the extent that they exist between subjects"; their intentions and actions are meaningful because they emanate from *within* complex, dispersed, intersubjective meaning-and-space-making processes (217). They do not, in other words, form meaningful intentions and carry out meaningful actions independently. The possibility for resisters to form meaningful intentions and carry out meaningful actions rests on their belonging and participation in complex, intersubjective socio-spatialities. Thus, the sense of intentionality Lugones articulates here (which is necessary for active subjectivity) is "sensorially rich, alive in the midst of different worlds of sense, multiple histories and multiple spatial paths. The histories and spatialities intersect in a liveliness of possibilities of

connection and direction that can bear the fruit of a moving that is intentionally tense with complexity" (217). Furthermore, because active subjectivity is made possible by this collective sense of intentionality and the production of alternative socialities, Lugones argues that she proposes "the concept of active subjectivity for the activity of those who disturb the abstract spatiality of social fragmentation" (215). To parse out what Lugones means by this, we can return briefly to one of her claims in her fourth chapter, where she argues that "resistant understandings do not travel through social fragmentation" (85).

As I discussed earlier, part of what Lugones highlights in her fourth chapter is that women of color must "travel" to each other's "worlds" in order to "see" and "know each other, as resistant rather than as constructed by domination" (85). The "lines of resistance" between women of color are kept "away from each other" through the combination of the "separatism in communities where [their] substance is seen and celebrated" and the logic of social fragmentation (85). They are kept "away from each other" in ways that foreclose the possibilities for their understanding of each other's resistant meanings (85). In other words, in the same way that Lugones's father was out of her mother's reach because he did not *"follow her into her moves*," and "*not knowing how to follow her moves* [...] *was to his advantage and part of his patriarchal position*," social fragmentation (and separatism) render women of color out of each other's reach (28). To "disturb the abstract spatiality of social fragmentation" is, then, to disturb the abstract ways in which subjects are made to relate to each other within the map of oppression (215). It is, like trespassing, "a redrawing of the map, of the relationality of space" (11).

2. Streetwalker Theorizing and Hangouts

> Streetwalkers include women who are at odds with "home." The home-shelter-street-police-station/jail/insane asylum-cemetery circle, in ever so many permutations, is their larger understanding of home. Home is lived as a place inseparable from other places of violence, including the street. One could punctuate any other place in this circle. I count myself among the women who have found myself more skillful at dodging violence in the street.
>
> At a time of significant violence in my life, I found company, embodied solace, with a young woman who worked both in prostitution and as a maid, jobs that were inseparable in her life. She had no home, I did. She was the only person to see my naked body covered in deep bruises, who did not inflict injury on me; I was one of the women with whom she could talk about the violence of being raped by cops without pay. In this spatiality of home-shelter-street-police station/jail/insane asylum-cemetery, I occupied home and insane asylum; she occupied other people's homes and police stations as places of extreme violence. We both found more expressive and "freer" motility, and meaning in the street.
>
> It is also important to note that conversations in the street are not subject to the same rules of sense, nor to the same expectations. This circle, trajectory of violence exposes, places in the open, the public/private distinction as a trick played on women's imaginations. The circle also spatializes violence and points to the need to create spaces in disruption of the public/private dichotomy. Shelters fit in the dichotomy only too well. They stabilize it. I am suggesting hangouts as places that perform the disruption. (Lugones 2003, 209)

Lugones incorporates this description as a footnote in her tenth chapter. The streetwalker[83] is another important figure in Lugones's theoretical arsenal whose complex spatial inhabitation opens up the potential for "resistance to intermeshed oppressions" (210). As Lugones explains, streetwalkers are women who "are at odds with 'home'" and must (as a matter of survival) negotiate their tense inhabitation of both public/private spaces (209). The spatiality of their everyday lives is itself a testament to the fiction of the public/private space dichotomy. That is, their complex spatial

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[83] Lugones's notion of streetwalker theorizing evidences her commitment to theorizing in a "theoretico-practical" vein (ix). As I argued in the previous chapter, Lugones employs a unique method throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* whereby she personifies certain concepts. The notion of streetwalker theorizing is itself, a resistant theoretical practice—a practice Lugones argues is possible for the figure of the streetwalker. The "streetwalker" is itself a figure or character, but one that represents the lived experiences of concrete persons (like Lugones herself). The other personified figures we've discussed throughout this dissertation are figures like the lover of purity, the strategist, and the tactical strategist).

inhabitation reveals the gaps and cracks in the boundaries between public/private spaces. The crux of the matter here is the streetwalkers' vulnerability to violence.

What must be noted in the excerpt above is that the terms of the streetwalkers' belonging (like Lugones and the young woman she was in company with) are compromised by their exposure to violence. From a commonsense point of view, a "home" (a private space) is supposed to be a place where subjects are protected from violence. Nonetheless, as Lugones explains, for streetwalkers, "home is lived as a place inseparable from other places of violence, including the street" and she counts herself "among the women who have found [themselves] more skillful at dodging violence in the street (209). Both her and the young woman with whom she found company were subject to violence in ways that disrupted the public/private dichotomy. That is, they were more vulnerable to violence in private spaces than they were in the public, "in the street" (209). What is even more crucial to this account is that Lugones and the young woman reflected, *together*, on their experiences in such a way that made evident the falsity of the public/private dichotomy. As Lugones explains, the young woman "was the only person to see my naked body covered in deep bruises, who did not inflict injury" (209). And Lugones "was one of the women with whom [the young woman] could talk about the violence of being raped by cops without pay" (209). Instead of finding safety in homes, insane asylums, or police stations, Lugones and the young woman "both found more expressive and 'freer' motility, and meaning in the street" (209). Thus, on Lugones's account, the "circle, trajectory of violence" both exposes "the public/private distinction as a trick played on women's imaginations" and reveals the need for creating "spaces in disruption of the public/private dichotomy" (209). To "spatialize" resistance, then, is both to expose the fictional nature of spatial boundaries (like the public/private dichotomy) and promote the cultivation of resistance spaces. Moreover, subjects like the "streetwalker theorist" are subjects who, in their daily negotiations (like Lugones and the young

woman) "draw trajectories that concretize, differentiate space, that defy its abstract production and administration" (222).

Now, as I argued at the opening of this chapter and this section, the account of the spatiality of resistance I have worked to develop throughout this chapter is most clearly represented and substantiated in Lugones's account of the streetwalker theorist (*la callejera*). That is, the streetwalker theorist is a theoretico-practico figure that takes up the alternative epistemic and perceptual practices that are necessary for the production of resistant spaces, and she is attuned to the relation between the tense logics that constitute space. Part of what is most meaningful about her use of the term "streetwalker" is that it radically disrupts the idea of who "counts" as a theorizer. The terms streetwalker and *callejera* often carry with them the connotation of sex-work. At the very least, streetwalkers are, as Lugones writes, "women who are at odds with 'home'"—women whose inhabitation of space defies spatial dichotomies (209). They do not "belong" in any one particular space; they simultaneously move between and inhabit multiple spaces in resisting⇔oppressing tension. They are, therefore, subjects who are attuned to multiple "worlds" of sense and the multiple simultaneous logics by which spaces and realities are produced. As Lugones writes, the streetwalker theorist cultivates "an ear for multiplicity in interlocution: multiplicity in the interactive process of intention formation, in perceptions, in meaning-making" (222). She "devises the tactical strategic practice of hearing interactive contestatory acts of sense making as negotiated from within a complex interrelation of differences. She hears contestations that are univocal as at the same time defiant of and compliant with the logic and systems of domination" (222). In other words, the streetwalker theorist cultivates "a resistant multiple interpretive vein" (13). She sees her own behaviors and the behavior, of others "as 'issuing' from a resistant and an oppressed motivational structure" because she recognizes the fact that subjects are always "oppressing, being oppressed⇔resisting" and "*inside* the processes or production of multiple realities" (13, 17, emphasis in original).

The streetwalker theorist is a subject who inhabits the "mobile spatiality of the street," a spatiality that is "lived in hangouts" (221). As I argued previously, in disrupting de Certeau's strategy/tactic dichotomy, Lugones wants to find a middle ground between the spatial permanence of the strategist's proper and the temporal spontaneity of the tacticians nowhere. (215) She defines hangouts as "worldly, contestatory concrete space within geographies sieged by and in defiance of logic and structures of domination" (221). Hangouts are resistant spaces that are formed through the spatial practice[84] of "hanging out," a spatial practice that "is in transgression of territorial enclosures" and always takes place "with/among others in an openness and intensity of attention, of interest, sensorially mindful in each other's direction" (220). On Lugones's account, "hanging out, as used here is a practice of persistent appropriation of space; a tactical strategic activity that informs space against the construal of bounded territories that mythologize sameness" (220). The practice of hanging out, which involves the "movement from hang out to hang out," encourages "the carrying of intentions to tentative and open ended completions" and opens up the attention of those hanging out "to transmutations of sense, borders of meaning, without the enclosures and exclusions that have

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[84] To consider a helpful, concrete example of a collective, resistant spatial practice, we can turn to Guy Debord's 1958 essay, "Theory of the Dérive" where he offers an account of the Situationist International practice of the dérive, "a technique of rapid passage through varied ambiences" (62). In the preface of Ken Knabb's (2006) edited and translated collection, *The Situationist International Anthology* (first published in 1981), he gives a historical background for the group: "In 1957 a few European avant-garde groups came together to form the Situationist International. Over the next decade the SI developed an increasingly incisive and coherent critique of modern society and of its bureaucratic pseudo opposition, and its new methods of agitation were influential in leading up to the May 1968 revolt in France. Since then—although the SI itself was dissolved in 1972—situationist theses and tactics have been taken up by radical currents in dozens of countries all over the world" (ix). According to Debord, "in a dérive one or more persons during a certain period drop their relations, their work and leisure activities, and all their other usual motives for movement and action, and let themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the encounters they find there" (62). He explains further that "one can dérive alone, but all indications are that the most fruitful arrangement consists of several small groups of two or three people who have reached the same level of awareness, since cross-checking these different groups' impressions makes it possible to arrive at more objective conclusions" (63). While the average duration of a dérive is one day, there may be "sustained series of dérives over a rather long period of time" with one of the longest sequences lasting "without noticeable interruption for around two months" (64). The overall distance or "spatial field of a derive may be precisely delimited or vague, depending on whether the goal is study a terrain or to emotionally disorient oneself" (64). Important to note is that Lugones herself references the dérive in endnote seven of her introduction (2003, 37).

characterized a politics of sameness" (Lugones 2003, 220). Lugones argues further that the practice of hanging out—a practice that forges the resistant spaces of hang outs—is aimed at passing on resistant knowledge and "passing on tools of resistance that enable us to see deeply into the social from the pedestrian level" (226). For Lugones, being in the company of others is an end in itself. The purpose of hanging out is not just to compile a collection of experiences to arrive at "objective conclusions" about the spatiality of oppression and resistance. Rather, "hanging out opens up possibilities for fostering "an intensity of attention" and sensorial mindfulness towards others (220).

In the same way that a concretizing investigation into the logics of a story "puts us in a position of intersubjective attention, possibly a dialogical situation," to hang out "is to encounter others concretely, face-to-face" from "within a street walking multitude" in a way that "permits one to learn to listen, to transmit information, to participate in communicative creations, to gauge possibilities, to have a sense of the directions of intentionality, to gain social depth" (28, 222, 215, 209). To engage in the spatial practice of hanging out is also akin to playful "world"-traveling, a resistant practice through which multiplicitous subjects (like WOC) can come to see themselves and others as multiplicitous and gain insight into "each other's resistant understandings" (84-85). As Lugones explains, playful "world"-traveling is necessary because "it is difficult for women of color to see, know each other, as resistant rather than as constructed by domination. to the extent that we see each other as oppressed, we do not want to identify with each other, we repel each other as we are seeing each other in the same mirror" (85). Playful "world"-traveling, like the practice of hanging out, is about cultivating an interest and investment in each other's resistant journeys; it is about challenging not only the way we think about oppression, but also the way we think about resistance.

To be clear, I am drawing connections between "hanging out" and "world"-traveling here because both practices reveal crucial elements of the spatiality of resistance. As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, the spatial of resistance refers to both the processes by which resistant

spaces are produced and the qualities of resistant spaces. The practices of hanging out and playful "world"-traveling are two similar and interrelated processes of resistant spatial production—processes that forge resistant spaces (like hang outs) and resistant "worlds" of sense that are characterized by the presence of resistant dispositions like the playful attitude. An attitude which, as Lugones explains, involves an "openness to surprise, openness to being a fool, openness to self-construction or reconstruction and to construction or reconstruction of the 'worlds' we inhabit playfully, and thus openness to list the ground that constructs us as oppressors or as oppressed or as collaborating or colluding with oppression" (96). To engage in these resistant practices is to collaborate in the production of resistant spatialities that are ultimately essential to the cultivation of deep coalitions— coalitions rooted in the idea that "our own understandings and potential enactments of our lives are deeply tied to one another and to the meanings that we create together" (Keating 2019, 239-240). These resistant practices make possible the transformation of our relations with others because they shift the ways in which we conceive and perceive the subjectivity of others. This transformative possibility is epitomized in the transformation of Lugones's relationship to her mother, of which she writes at the end of her fourth chapter:

> My mother was apparent to me mostly as a victim of arrogant perception. I was loyal to the arrogant perceiver's construction of her and thus disloyal to her in assuming that she was exhausted by that construction [...] I came to realize through traveling to her "world" that she is not foldable and pliable, that she is not exhausted by the mainstream Argentinian patriarchal construction of her. I came to realize that there are "worlds" in which she shines as a creative being. Seeing myself in her through traveling to her "world" has meant seeing how different from her I am in her "world." (97-98)

In sum, the streetwalker is a "world"-traveler, a trespasser, a tactical strategist, and active subject, an agent of loving perception. She is a subject that keeps both the logic of oppression and the logic of resistance "in interpretation but valorizes the logic of resistance as she inhabits differentiated geographies carrying with others contestatory meanings to praxical completion" (218). She is a subject who engages in the theoretico-practice of streetwalking, a "practice of sustained intersubjective

attention" (222). This practice disrupts the abstract spatiality of social fragmentation because it is "sustained in the midst of the concrete" and "countenances no possibility of making resistant sense except among people" (224, 225). The streetwalker theorist is therefore, according to Lugones, a subject who "develops a vivid sense of the inadequacy of an individualist understanding of agency, intentionality, and meaning to one's situation" and a subject who "develops, maintains, communicates a duplicitous perception that co-temporaneously perceives the strategists' and the tactical strategists' conceived or lived spaces" (225). Her disruptive, critical, intersubjectively attuned inhabitation of space pivots "the spatiality of theorizing" in a way that makes evident the "possibility of tactical strategies and the tie between the strategist's location and domination or the maintenance of domination" (225). The streetwalker theorist is therefore, in my view, a subject who is concretely aware of both the spatiality of oppression and the spatiality of resistance. In closing this section, I want to echo Lugones's final claim in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*: "The streetwalker theorist asks over and over again: Within which conceptual, axiological, institutional, material set of limitations is the meaning of the possible being construed? (231)

Conclusion

On Lugones's account, streetwalker theorizing is a resistant, spatial, theoretico-practice. The streetwalker, *la callejera*, is a figure that cultivates and performs this particular practice from a concrete, theoretico-practico locus (the tactical strategic vantage point). Furthermore, the notion of an alternative sociality she forwards in her tenth chapter is a type of sociality that defies the logic of social fragmentation; it is a sociality that does not rely on the logic of exclusion, closure, boundedness, etc. (as she explains in her ninth chapter). And it is the type of sociality where subjects like the *tortillera/cachapera* would not be constructed as a fragmented subject but, instead, a multiplicitous subject. What Lugones forwards in this tenth chapter overall are the alternative constructions of

individuals and collectives and the alternative socio-spatial productions made possible by the rejection and disruption of the oppression/resistance dichotomy, the theory/praxis dichotomy, and the strategy/tactic dichotomy. Lugones articulates the alternative subjectivities, socialities, and spatialities made possible by understanding: 1) the tense oppressing⇔resisting relation; 2) the complex intersubjective processes by which multiple realities and spatialities are produced, and 3) the alternative interpretive, perceptual practices that constitute and are constituted by these complex processes. What these alternative subjectivities, socialities, and spatialities make possible, according to Lugones is: the disentangling of the intermeshed/interlocking coupling (and therefore, a disruption of the logic of social fragmentation), the "unmaking and remaking of sense" that is necessary "for participation in a delicate production" of alternative socialities and spatialities (225, 221).

Conclusion: Tracing Resistant Paths Toward a Decoloniality of Space

My aim in this dissertation has been to articulate the role of space and spatiality in María Lugones's *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions* (2003) and develop a close reading of her text that attends to her engagement with space. I have argued that at the center of her project is a spatial approach to theorizing oppression and resistance—an approach that underscores the complex processes of socio-spatial production. To conclude and reinforce the arguments I've developed throughout this dissertation, I will address the following question: what do we—as readers of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* and scholars invested in Lugones's philosophical legacy—lose sight of if we do not take seriously her engagement with space? To begin answering this question, I return to Lugones's preface. Here, Lugones argues that practicing and theorizing resistance to intermeshed oppressions requires:

> [...] a metamorphosis of self in relation as well as a metamorphosis of relations in defiance of both individualism and privacy as the domain of one's affective longings. It also requires a reconception of socialities that have stood in resistance to oppression in a univocal mode, a reimagining that understands that socialities are both more complex and more permeable. And it requires a humbling and honing of perception. That humbling and honing is sensorially rich, up close, in the midst of one's contemporaries, people who are historically interrelated. (ix)

To reiterate, on Lugones's account, we cannot resist intermeshed oppressions if we do not resist the interlocking of oppressions—if we do not resist the logic of social fragmentation. As she explains in her final chapter, "Oppressions interlock when the social mechanisms of oppression fragment the oppressed both as individuals and collectivities. Social fragmentation in its individual and collective inhabitations is the accomplishment of the interlocking of oppressions" (223). When oppressed subjects are socially fragmented, they cannot cultivate meaningful, durable connections with other oppressed subjects (across and between multiple resistant communities); they cannot get "together against the grain of power" (10). In essence, the logic of social fragmentation is a strategic instrument of domination; if the oppressed are divided, they are more easily surveilled, regulated, and dominated.

If the oppressor can convince oppressed subjects that they are, indeed, a part of one homogeneous whole or another, then the preservation of dominant social structures is a much more straightforward enterprise. How can the oppressor accomplish this? He paints a seductive, palatable picture[85] of the social world as homogeneous, of social subjects as unified, and of oppressions "as separable, as discrete, pure" (223). Thus, in order to practice/theorize resistance to intermeshed oppression we must resist this seductive portrait of the social world and transform our understanding of the social itself. And transforming our understanding of the social requires, as Lugones explains in her preface, transforming our conceptions of selves, relations, socialities, and perception. I contend, moreover, that if we do not attend to Lugones's spatial theorizing, we cannot fully appreciate the significance of or connections between these vital reconceptions and we cannot fully grasp the ways in which she paints an alternative portrait of the social.

What Lugones's spatial theorizing underscores, above all else, is that all social subjects collaborate in the production of multiple, overlapping socio-spatialities[86]; they inhabit multiple, overlapping socio-spatialities; and they are continuously reconstituted by their inhabitation of multiple, overlapping socio-spatialities. That is, her spatial theorizing emphasizes the complex *processes* by which subjects, socialities, and spatialities are produced, and this is inseparable from her commitment to ontological pluralism and her claim that "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting construct space simultaneously" (12). As Lugones writes, "the tension of being oppressed⇔resisting oppression 'places' one *inside* the *processes* of production of multiple realities. It is from within these processes that the practice of shifting to different constructions, different spatialities, is created" (17, emphasis in original). In other words, on Lugones's account, oppressed social subjects do not merely exist inside

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[85] A picture epitomized in Lugones's "map of oppression."
[86] I use the term "socio-spatialities" in my conclusion to accentuate the arguments I've developed throughout the dissertation concerning the overlap between realities, spatialities, and "worlds" in Lugones's complex account of the social throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*.

the oppressor's homogeneous portrait of the social world; they do not simply "inhabit a spatial order of the strategist's conception: ethnocentrically conceived, homogenous, under his knowledgeable control" (213). Rather, oppressed subjects *make* that portrait a reality; they *concretize* the oppressor's imaginative abstractions; and they *collaborate* in the production of oppressive socio-spatialities when their behaviors, actions, and intentions are motivated by or grounded in dominant epistemologies and patterns of perception. However, because social subjects exist *within* the processes by which socio-spatialities are produced, they can inhabit oppressive socio-spatialities in "great resistance, without willful collaboration" (10). They can also develop a critical understanding of multiple socio-spatialities (or multiple "worlds") through the practice of shifting between them; and they can cultivate and inhabit their own resistant socio-spatialities. More importantly, their inhabitation of oppressive and resistant spatialities are not mutually exclusive. That is, they do not inhabit exclusively oppressive socio-spatialities or exclusively resistant socio-spatialities at any given time/place because "oppressing/being oppressed⇔resisting construct space simultaneously" and "the social is itself crisscrossed" with "contradictory, in tension, temporo-spatialities defined and defining multiple intersections that constitute different social beings who are some of the time [abstract] 'you' and [concrete] you" (12, 13). If we do not take seriously Lugones's engagement with space and her application of spatial theorizing, we cannot account for the way in which her alternative portrait of the social is one where fragmented, oppressed/resisting subjects (subjects that are either *only* oppressed *only* resisting) become multiplicitous, oppressed/oppressing⇔resisting subjects.

By taking account of Lugones's spatial theorizing, we are also better equipped to make sense of "two interwoven interests that [she] pursues in the chapters of this book: an interest in motivational structure at the level of persons and readings of particular acts and an interest in the larger social movement of intentions" (15). As I argued in my third chapter, because subjects collaborate in the production of multiple socio-spatialities, they often (unwillingly and/or unknowingly) collaborate in

the production of oppressive spatialities; they often take "the road of collusion with power" (11).

Subjects collude with power when they maintain an "epistemic tendency [...] to see behavior as either

resistant or oppressed" (13). To collude with power is, then, to leave our epistemic and perceptual

tendencies unchecked, to read our own actions/intentions and the actions/intentions of others in

accordance with the oppressed/resisting dichotomy. To resist colluding with power, we must

recognize the fact that the logic of oppression and resistance simultaneously "construct people's

movements, interactions, desires, and intentions" such that subjects "may be both oppressed and

resistant and act in accordance with both logics" (13). To resist colluding with power, we must cultivate

"a resistant multiple interpretive vein" (13). We must, like the trespasser, recognize both the ways in

which our own everyday lives are "spatially mapped by power" and recognize the ways in which we

"collaborate in the production" of socially fragmented spatialities (8, 10). We must—like the

streetwalker theorist—cultivate "an ear for multiplicity in interlocution: multiplicity in the interactive

process of intention formation, in perceptions, in meaning-making" (222). These perceptual and

epistemic shifts are what make possible the production of complex, intersubjective, alternative

socialities that back up the resistant intentions of active subjects—socialities that give subjects who

are "at odds with 'home'" (like the callejera/cachapera) spaces they may "go to be seen" (209, 154).

These shifts and the resistant practices Lugones articulates throughout *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* make

possible the relational transformations that are necessary for forming deep coalitions, coalitions

grounded in the idea that "our own understandings and potential enactments of our lives are deeply

tied to one another and to the meanings that we create together" (Keating 2019, 239-240). Ultimately,

if we do not attend to Lugones's engagement with and understanding of space, we also risk losing

sight of the complex, theoretical tapestry she weaves together between and across the chapters in

Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes. That is, we risk losing sight of integral connections between the "movements

that this book imagines, describes, and exercises" and between concepts like world-traveling,

streetwalker theorizing, and trespassing (Lugones 2003, 12). And, as I want to suggest briefly in closing this dissertation, we lose sight of the ground from which her later decolonial work emerged.

Now, even though I have not centered Lugones's later accounts of the colonial/modern gender system or decolonial feminism in this dissertation, I do not think the insights I've forwarded throughout my project are in any way disconnected from or unrelated to Lugones's decolonial work. As I mentioned briefly in my introduction, I contend that a Lugonesian account of space opens up the potential for uncovering important connections between her "early" and "later" works. In fact, in my view, the impact of her later interventions in decolonial thought becomes all the more pronounced when we attend to and expand our understanding of her early works. That is, by examining the underappreciated dimensions of Lugones's work in earlier projects like *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, we can more fully appreciate the fact that feminists of color were already reckoning with the need for and possibilities of decolonizing our ways of thinking and being long before "the decolonial turn" was felt in Western academic circles and disciplines.[87] To be frank, what I am suggesting is that the substance

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[87] In "Thinking through the Decolonial Turn: Post-continental Interventions in Theory, Philosophy, and Critique—An Introduction," Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2011) explains that "Decolonial thinking has existed since the very inception of modern forms of colonization—that is, since at least the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries—, and, to that extent, a certain decolonial turn has existed as well, but the more massive and possibly more profound shift away from modernization towards decoloniality as an unfinished project took place in the twentieth century and is still unfolding now. This more substantial decolonial turn was announced by W.E.B. Du Bois in the early twentieth century and made explicit in a line of figures that goes from Aimée Césaire and Frantz Fanon in the mid-twentieth century, to Sylvia Wynter, Enrique Dussel, Gloria Anzaldúa, Lewis Gordon, Chela Sandoval, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith, among others, throughout the second half of the twentieth to the beginning of the twenty-first century" (1-2). While decolonial thinking itself is not a "new" mode of critical thought/practice, there was a noticeable shift in radical, postcolonial/anticolonial scholarship toward the development of explicit "decolonial" theories beginning in the late 20th/early 21st century. Since then, there have been a number of shifts, movements, and tensions across decolonial thinkers and groups. Of these, there are many internal critiques like those forwarded by Mariana Ortega (2017) in "Decolonial Woes and Practices of Un-knowing." In this essay, Ortega cautions that the "very practices of decolonial thinkers in the U.S. academy can themselves replicate colonial impulses and erasures" (504). The practices she is concerned with here are those whereby "the work of some scholars is regarded as more important than that of others— while other work is not regarded and becomes or is made invisible" (506). As Ortega explains, "unfortunately, the intellectual production of U.S. women of color is part of the work not getting appropriate attention" (506). She argues by the end of the essay, echoing the words of Laura Pérez (2010), that we must "engage more fully with gender and sexuality within the decolonial vision" and "remember the important work of U.S. women of color who have indeed walked their decolonizing talk" (514).

of what Lugones argues in her decolonial writings can already be found on the pages of works[88] like

Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes (albeit in a different theoretical tone and with reference to different historical

contexts) and that we must be aware of the ways in which she *brings* her own rich, multiple, "worlds"

of sense *into* the philosophical arena of decolonial thought. I also argued in my introduction that an

account of Lugones's spatial theorizing offers rich resources for building a preliminary account of the

decoloniality of space. I will briefly expand upon this claim in the final pages of this dissertation.

What Lugones accomplishes in her later essays like "Heterosexualism and the

Colonial/Modern Gender System" (2007) and "Toward a Decolonial Feminism" (2010) is a powerful

intervention in decolonial thought—an intervention that, in the words of Ofelia Schutte (2020),

"brings to bear [Lugones's] powerful feminist intellect to a theory that was both outdated in its

presuppositions of gender and sexuality and had relegated the sex/gender axis to a subordinate and

relatively unimportant place in its analytical system" (104). Nonetheless, Schutte notes that "by taking

the decolonial turn as [Lugones] reads Quijano[89] something curious happens. When Lugones

introduces her own thesis of coloniality of gender, one historical event happening over five hundred

years ago is prioritized over and above any other analysis of race and gender" (Schutte 2020, 104).

What Schutte finds "curious" about this moment is that "As Lugones's earlier impure mestiza takes

the Decolonial Turn, what appears so liberating and globally helpful to her may paradoxically feel to

others like a narrowing, not a broadening, of theoretical opportunities and critical perspectives" (104-

105). Schutte then asks, "Can this tension be resolved? Can it at least be acknowledged and address

explicitly?" (105). To be clear, Schutte is pointing here to a tension that emerges (between Lugones's

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[88] This is not to say that her decolonial works are not incredibly impactful and influential in their own right, but rather, that we should appreciate and recognize the value of Lugones's philosophical contributions across the span of her career as a radical activist and critical thinker.

[89] Here Schutte is referencing Lugones's critique in her essay "Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System" (2007) of Anibal Quijano's notion of "the coloniality of power," first defined explicitly in his essay "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America" (2000).

early and later works) as Lugones begins engaging seriously with decolonial thought. Schutte questions "whether Lugones's use of Quijano's world systems theory leads to an overdetermining historical approach that disables the spirit of inquiry for diversely situated Latinas, even as the theory itself invokes the heterogeneity of their experiences" (102). In other words, Schutte questions[90] whether Lugones's attention to women who are "at odds with home,'" and her openness to shifting the spatiality of theorizing is compromised when she takes up the historically-situated, theoretical locus at the center of decolonial thought—the European colonization of the Americas (Lugones 2003, 209). I bring Schutte's query into consideration here in to identify what I understand to be a preliminary framework for developing an account of the decoloniality of space.

Another resource for this framework are the insights from geographers engaging with decolonial thought. In *Geografia e Giro descolonial experiências, ideias e horizontes de renovação do pensamento crítico* (2017), Valter Do Carmo Cruz argues:

> [...] authors of decolonial thought have incorporated categories, concepts and geographical notions in a partial and precarious way, reducing geographicity to spatial metaphors. Categories and concepts like space, territory, place, scale, etc. are of great cognitive and political potential for the renewal of critical thinking and for the expansion and enrichment of decolonial studies. However, its use needs to go beyond the metaphorical sense and gain theoretical-methodological consistency capable of considering geographicity as an essential element in ontological and epistemological terms to compress our societies. We need to make a real spatial/territorial turn to fully realize a decolonial turn" (30, my translation).

Furthermore, in "On decoloniality and geographies," (2020) geographer Sarah Radcliffe echoes Do Carmo Cruz's concerns, arguing that "If by taking seriously decoloniality's impetus to decentre and pluralise our ways of knowing the world, spatial metaphors' partiality and particularity become less a linguistic ambiguity and more a central epistemological challenge, one that has yet to receive systematic

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[90] Schutte is clear, however, that "[...] it is not just the case that Lugones openly identifies with some of the tenets of Quijano's and Mignolo's positions. Her roots are deeply imbedded in feminist communities of resistance against patriarchal, racist, and heteronormative forms of oppression, dating back years and long before her dialogue with Quijano's theory of the coloniality of power" (2020, 108). Schutte is interested in interrogated the ways in which the position of Lugones's later "decolonial feminist" may differ from the position of her earlier "impure mestiza" (Schutte 2020, 104-105).

attention" (Radcliffe 2020, 586). On Radcliffe's account, even though "spatial metaphors powerfully convey that location matters in decolonial thinking and action," they "often occlude the multistranded nature of processes that co-produce an outcome, glossing over the overlapping and entangled material, lived, social, and more-than-human processes and relationships that constitute the world" (586). She insists, therefore, that spatial metaphors "should be as subject to critical reflection and openness to Other forms of knowledge as dominant concepts of state, race, and the universal," and that decolonial epistemologies would benefit from "a rich substantive focus on the spatial processes of coloniality as constitute of worldly socio-spatial relations" (586, 587). In closing, she offers the following questions: "Which spatial processes and geographical imaginations facilitate or impede decolonial thinking and praxis? How might a geographical lens shed light on the variegated politics of decolonisation, coloniality and decoloniality both theoretically and in practice?" (587).

While I cannot develop a preliminary account of the decoloniality of space here, I shed light on the queries forwarded by Schutte, Do Carmo Cruz, and Radcliffe to identify a potential, fruitful starting point for this work and to underscore the stakes and significance of my own reading of Lugones's spatial theorizing. As I've argued, by the end of *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes*, Lugones articulates, a co-constitutive relationship between the logics of oppression/resistance and the social production of space—a relationship that accounts for the "production of multiple realities" (Lugones 2003, 19). Her engagement with space, then, is motivated by and grounds her understanding of oppression and resistance as complex, overlapping, ongoing processes in tense relation—processes that constitute and are constituted by the collaboration of multiplicitous social subjects. A productive starting point for an account of the decoloniality of space would take up these insights from Lugones's work, together with Radcliffe's call to "focus on the spatial processes of coloniality" and Schutte's insight that the "decolonial feminist voice appears to shift the ground of her discourse to a *fixed designator in history*" (Radcliffe 2020, 587; Schutte 2020, 103). By doing so, my own account of the decoloniality of space

would start, in the spirit of Lugones's own pilgrimage, by taking up a playful attitude and reflecting on what it would mean for "the decolonial feminist voice to shift the ground of her discourse" *away* from a fixed designator in history and *with* concrete, spatial/geographical imaginations that could facilitate "decolonial thinking and praxis" (Radcliffe 2020, 587; Schutte 2020, 103).

Of course, a project committed to María Lugones's work in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes* can only end by echoing the words she left for us on the pages of the book (and I've saved the best for last). As I ruminated for several months on the lasting message Lugones intended to make clear throughout her book, I found myself continuously returning to one of the vignettes she shared with us in her introduction—a vignette were she reflects on the possibilities made available to her by her concrete experiences of "world"-traveling. She writes:

> *I relocated to the United States from violence. My location is that of someone who relocated away from battering, systematic rape, extreme psychological and physical torture, by those closest to me. I relocated in the sense of going for a new geographical place, a new identity, a new set of relations. Of course, the geographical places, the identity (or identities}, the relations were not for me to choose. Choice, in the liberal sense of the word, had nothing to do with any of it. But though they were not for me to choose, I didn't just become overwhelmingly and irrevocably and passively inscripted by them. The relocation has become necessarily a transgressive and resistant negotiation with, rather than away from violence and abuse. But I have looked for migrations and positionings and rehearsals that give me more room or more ground for maneuvering. Going back and forth gives me a* **possibility of tenderness with those that I am destined to hate.** (Lugones 2003, 19; italics in original)

Whether we theorize/practice resistance to oppression with the voice of an impure mestiza or a decolonial feminist; whether we theorize/practice resistance to oppression from the walls of our own "homes" or from the exposed pavements of city streets; we must not forget that to theorize/practice resistance to oppression is to do our best to safeguard ourselves and others from harm—to do our best to cultivate the possibility of tenderness with those we are destined to hate. Of everything Lugones shared with us while she inhabited our multiple, shared, concrete worlds, I believe this last clause above captures in beautiful prose the generous intentions at the heart of all her philosophical investigations.

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