THE SPACES OF IDENTITY: THE ROLE OF MARXLOH MOSQUE IN SHAPING TURKISH-GERMAN WOMEN’S PERFORMATIVITY AND SENSE OF BELONGING

A Dissertation in
Architecture
by
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ABSTRACT

Judith Butler uses performativity to investigate the unconscious, unintentional and situational performances of gender through discourse. I argue that the built environment as a part of this discourse has the ability to transform and (re)produce identities. I focus on the diaspora mosque as the performative unit where multiple forms of gender and ethnoreligious identities are performed as everyday, embodied practices.

Using a feminist lens to analyze how gender, religion, and space intersect, I examine the Marxloh Merkez Mosque in Duisburg, Germany, as a cultural case study. Informed by ethnographic fieldwork conducted over a period of nine months between October 2018 and July 2019, I analyze how the performative character of the Marxloh mosque has come to shape Turkish-Muslim women’s everyday performances and sense of belonging in current-day Germany. More specifically, I examine Turkish-Muslim women’s discursive production and cultivation of ethnoreligious identities through gendered discourses produced in the Marxloh Merkez Mosque and the German public. I further explore how these gendered discourses influence Turkish-Muslim women’s spatial behavior, not only in the mosque space but also in the neighborhood of Marxloh and the urban space of Duisburg.

By using ethnographic data collected through ethnographic fieldwork, this dissertation uses Judith Butler’s notion of performativity both as a theoretical and analytical lens to investigate the imaginaries, experiences, and socio-spatial behavior of the mosque-going Turkish-Muslim women in Germany. The results of this effort identify heterogeneous patterns of identity reproduction, belonging, and boundary-making among different generations while simultaneously using the feelings of belonging developed through Turkish-Muslim women’s lived experiences to question the integration discourse that aims to forge belonging through top-down approaches.
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<th>Full Form</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>abla</td>
<td>sister, also used as a term of respect and endearment when referring to women slightly older than the referent</td>
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<tr>
<td>awra</td>
<td>the bodily areas that have to be covered</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ausbildung</td>
<td>apprenticeship training</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ausländer</td>
<td>foreigner</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ausländerproblem</td>
<td>foreigner problem</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge)</td>
<td>Federal Office of Migration and Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Begegnungssätte</td>
<td>Meeting Place / Dialogue Center</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BMI (Bundesministerium des Innern)</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands)</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>DITIB (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği)</td>
<td>Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diyanet</td>
<td>Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>EG-DU (Entwicklungsgesellschaft Duisburg)</td>
<td>Duisburg Development Company</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>e.V. (eingetragener Verein)</td>
<td>registered Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ezan</td>
<td>call for prayer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>fitrat</td>
<td>nature, disposition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fitna</td>
<td>upheaval, chaos, temptation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gastarbeiter</td>
<td>guest-worker</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>gavur</td>
<td>non-Muslim, infidel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gesamtschule</td>
<td>comprehensive school that includes both <em>Hauptschule</em>, <em>Realschule</em> and <em>Gymnasium</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gymnasium</td>
<td>academic-oriented secondary school for grades five through twelve/thirteen</td>
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<tr>
<td>hadith</td>
<td>collected traditions of the Prophet Muhammad based on his sayings and actions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hauptschule</strong></td>
<td>school that offers lower-secondary education preparing students for vocational school</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>hoca</strong></td>
<td>master, a word commonly used for teachers, professors and leaders in general</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs)</strong></td>
<td>Islamic Community Millî Görüs</td>
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<td><strong>Innenhafen</strong></td>
<td>the central harbor in Duisburg, used by my interviewees to refer to the city center</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>jahilliya</strong></td>
<td>the age of ignorance, pre-Islamic life and culture in Arabia</td>
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<td><strong>kahvehane</strong></td>
<td>coffeehouse, a neighborhood space where mostly poorly educated or unemployed men hang out, drink tea/coffee, play okey (a kind of Rummikub) or tavla (backgammon) and watch soccer</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>kürsü</strong></td>
<td>a small, elevated plateau used for preaching and speeches</td>
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<td><strong>Leitkultur</strong></td>
<td>guiding culture</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Leitungsphasen</strong></td>
<td>the nine phases an architect or engineer must follow in the implementation of construction projects</td>
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<td><strong>mahram</strong></td>
<td>an unmarriageable person with whom marriage is unlawful on the basis of kinship</td>
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<td><strong>mihrab</strong></td>
<td>the semi-circular niche in the wall of a mosque that indicates the qibla, the direction of Kaaba in Mecca</td>
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<td><strong>namahram</strong></td>
<td>marriageable people, it includes all people of the opposite sex who are not mahram</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>namus</strong></td>
<td>honor, sexual moral reputation, feminine sexual virtue, chastity</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NRW</strong></td>
<td>North-Rhine Westphalia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Realschule</strong></td>
<td>secondary school that is ranked between Hauptschule and Gymnasium</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>sofi</strong></td>
<td>the word used to refer to the members of the Menzil community, a strict Islamic cult. They define their religious orientation as political sufism</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>sohbet</strong></td>
<td>conversation, the Islamic lectures provided by the religious officers</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)</strong></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Süleymançı</strong></td>
<td>a word used to refer to the followers of VIKZ mosque community</td>
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<td><strong>teyze</strong></td>
<td>aunt/auntie, also used as a term of respect and endearment when referring to women older than the referent</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>VIKZ (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren)</strong></td>
<td>Association of Islamic Cultural Centers</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Chapter 1

Introduction

At the very beginning of my fieldwork, when I was still trying to get access to the field, after I explained my dissertation topic to the *imam* of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque, surprised, he asked me: “why would you want to interview women? They would not understand the extent and importance of what we do here. If you would like to find out what we do here, you should talk to us [the male members of the mosque administration]”. This religious officer, an influential figure in the community, is responsible for the mosque congregations’ religious and moral education. While I suspect he dwelled on what he said to me as much as I did, his words stayed with me throughout my fieldwork.

Mosque-centered embodied practices, especially those of Muslim women, are particularly understudied and are rarely considered apart from those of men. However, especially within the traditional communities, the experiences of women and men differ significantly. While men can assert their presence in the public spaces, women’s experiences are closely related to a sense of comfort and belonging. Within this context, this dissertation investigates how religious spaces have come to shape Turkish-German women’s sense of identity in current-day Germany. More specifically, it examines Turkish-Muslim women’s discursive production and cultivation of ethnoreligious identities through gendered discourses produced in the Marxloh Merkez Mosque and the German public. It further explores how these gendered discourses influence Turkish-Muslim women’s spatial behavior, not only in the mosque space but also in the neighborhood of Marxloh and the urban space of Duisburg. Using ethnographic data collected through fieldwork in 2018 and 2019, this dissertation uses Judith Butler’s notion of performativity both as a theoretical and analytical lens to investigate the imaginaries, experiences, and socio-spatial
behavior of the mosque-going Turkish-Muslim women in Germany. The results of this effort identify heterogeneous patterns of identity reproduction, belonging, and boundary-making among different generations while simultaneously using the feelings of belonging developed through Turkish-Muslim women’s lived experiences to question the dominant integration discourse that aims to forge belonging through top-down approaches.

The scholarship on Turkish guest-worker migration to Germany is extensive, and researchers have studied many aspects of it. Drawing from this comprehensive literature, this chapter provides the necessary background information on my research. This chapter begins by providing a summary of guest-worker migration from Turkey to Germany that started in 1961 (1.1). The next section (1.2) presents the history of Turkish-Islam in Germany by focusing on the foundation of DITIB, the largest Islamic umbrella organization in Germany. This section also explores how Turkish-Muslim women are situated in the transnational Turkish-German religious field. Moving on to the next section (1.3), I provide German perceptions of Turks through contextual and contemporary discourses and explain the process that led to their transformation from the much-expected guest-workers to the Muslim “other.” Section 1.4 investigates the literature on the spatial aspects of identity and integration discourses concerning the immigrant neighborhood and the diaspora mosques. Having presented the necessary historical, social and political framework, the following sections identify the gaps in literature and present research questions (1.5), introduce Marxloh, the case study neighborhood (1.6), and provides an outline of chapters (1.7).

1.1. Brief History of Turkish Migration to Germany

The systematic migration of Turks to Germany started in 1961 to answer the demand for cheap labor in West Germany’s growing post-war economy. After a screening process that
included interviews, medical exams, medical exams, and criminal screening Field, semi-skilled Turkish workers were recruited as Gastarbeiter (guest-workers) by German recruitment agencies (Oz & Staub, 2016). Upon their arrival to Germany, the guest workers were accommodated in temporary barracks close to the factories they had worked in. During this initial period, Turks’ contact with the German population was limited as their contract specified that they would go back to Turkey upon completion of their work (Hinze, 2013).

At first glance, every different party included in this process would benefit from this recruitment system. The German recruiters thought this process would allow the German economy to develop further without the burden of excessive financial investment and social costs. The policymakers in the sending countries believed that this system would educate and train their unskilled and unemployed workers and provide a foreign-currency flow into the country. The workers thought that they would earn more money than they would in their home countries, provide for their families, and economically become better, therefore gaining economic mobility upward. However, this system did not work as intended. As factories kept extending work contracts of the trained workers – as they did not foresee how much it would cost to train new workers – Turkish people did not go back to their homelands as intended; in fact, they started to bring their families. As the number of Turkish immigrants reached 1 million by 1974, what seemed like another phase in German economic history soon evolved into a multi-faced paradigm that was far more complex than ever envisaged (Hackett, 2013; Penninx, 2021).

After the recession caused by the oil crisis, the guest-worker program was suddenly ended by the German government in 1973. While this led to a decrease in the recruitment of Turkish workers (Table 1-1), the number of Turkish people in Germany continued to increase substantially (Table 1-2), partly due to their lack of free labor mobility that is granted to the guest-workers from other European countries (Zimmerman, 2014) but primarily because of the family reunification program (Panayi, 2000). The government supported the family reunification
law, who argued that bringing their families would facilitate immigrant workers’ integration to Germany (Yükleyn & Yurdakul, 2011). Parallel to the family reunification program, there was also an influx of Turkish immigrants (in the form of political refugees) due to the series of military coups and political instability in Turkey. This period after 1974 represents the change of social and political attitude towards Turkish people and the birth of the foreign problem (Auslanderproblem). Once welcomed as valuable guests that would aid in improving German economic structure, Turkish immigrants were now viewed as the problem group (Mandel, 1989).

The terminology used to categorize immigrant workers summarizes the attitudes of Germans towards non-Germans. Instead of using the term immigrant, which has integrative connotations, the term Ausländer (foreigner) is used to define the guest- workers, emphasizing their temporary stay in the country (Tol, 2008). Since this idea of temporariness also dominated the political discourse, the German government had not developed any integration programs such as language and integration training (Öcal, 2020; Sunier & Landman, 2015). Within the legal context, Germany refused to change the descent-based model of citizenship until 2000, denying citizenship to the “foreign guest-workers” it housed for 39 years (Brubaker, 1992; Hinze, 2013). This meant that children of the guest-workers who were born and raised in Germany were denied German citizenship. In contrast, people who had never lived in Germany but could prove their German descendence were granted citizenships. A significant change in terms of citizenship came in 2000, with the introduction of reforms as part of the European Union policies. With the evolution of the law, children who were born after 2000 were granted dual citizenships with the condition of choosing one when the child is between the ages of 18 and 23 (Yükleyn & Yurdakul, 2011), while adult immigrants can apply for naturalization after eight years of legal residence.
Within the first year of the citizenship law, many Turks acquired German citizenship, even though their naturalization was not necessary to get a permanent residency status or to be able to use social benefits. Hinze interprets this as their willingness to become a part of the German society (2010, pp. 20–26). However, in the period after 2000, the reform in the citizenship law, along with the integration discourse that increasingly culturized and ethnicized the religious identity of Turks, intensified the concerns regarding Turkish-Muslims’ incompatibility with the German society’s “guiding culture” (Leitkultur) (Çelik, 2015; Tibi, 2010). Especially with the events of 9/11, Turks were further marginalized and stigmatized as
Muslims, and their public image was shifted from the “foreigner problem” to the “Muslim other” that needs to be assimilated (Holtz et al., 2013).

Today, Turks represent not only the largest ethnic group in Germany but also the least assimilated (see Gonzales-Ferrer, 2006 for inter-group marriages, Kaas & Manger, 2012 for employment, Kristen & Granato, 2007 for education, Schacht et al., 2014 for inter-group friendships). The exact number of Turks living in Germany is unknown as the official national census does not collect data on ethnicity. However, according to the estimates, it is approximated that there are 4 to 5 million people of Turkish origin in Germany as of 2020 (Audretsch &

Figure 1-1 Turkish population in Germany by regions (source: https://www.ft.com/content/2a930076-1ae6-11e7-bcac-6d03d067f81f)
Lehmann, 2016; Caner & Pedersen, 2019). The majority of the Turkish population lives in the former West Germany, with a third of them living in the industrial area, North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) (Figure 1-1). While the largest concentrations of Turkish population could be found in the larger cities such as Frankfurt, Munich, Cologne, and Berlin, smaller towns in the NRW region such as Duisburg, Essen, Gelsenkirchen, and Herne house the largest percentage of Turks according to the census data (Migration Integration Regionen, 2020). Especially in these concentrated areas, the links between the diaspora and the homeland remained strong (Oldac & Fancourt, 2021).

1.2. The Emergence of Turkish Islam in Germany

With the changing composition of the Turkish population in the mid-1970s, with the family reunification period, the needs of the Turkish residents in Germany have also changed. As it became clear that their status in Europe was not temporary, one of the most critical aspect of their everyday practices, religion, required organization (Pederson, 1999, p. 24). To answer the changing societal needs, Turkish immigrants themselves started to organize under mosque associations that were established in apartments, garages, foyers of their workplaces, and shops (Figure 1-2 and Figure 1-3). While at first, these mosques were funded by their own congregations through donations, and as they started to acquire more funds, they began to turn larger spaces, such as warehouses and factory spaces that are not used, into mosques (Allievi, 2009).

While Islam is the largest non-Christian religion in Germany, it is not formally recognized as a religious community by the state (Tol, 2008). Recognized faith communities (Protestant, Roman-Catholic, Orthodox, and Jewish communities) are funded by taxes placed on their congregants (Loobuyck et al., 2013) and work closely with the state institutions in the
policy-making process in the areas of education, welfare, and health. Since Islam is not a formal religious community recognized by the state, the religious associations operate under the category of a registered association (eingetragener Verein, e.V.). To be recognized as a registered association, the organizations must meet some requirements, such as having a democratic structure with a membership list and a board of trustees that have regular inspections of the association (Nielsen, 2004). This means that while they can receive some funding from the state, which remains very limited, they cannot participate in the decision-making operations. In addition to this, since Islamic organizations lack the legal infrastructure, they do not have access to the public education system. Accordingly, Islamic education is administered by each Islamic association themselves, within the mosques, without proper supervision or curriculum (Tol, 2008). Ironically, this failure to incorporate Islam into the same legal frameworks governing other religions in Germany prevents official input into Islamic curricula, leading to the frequent German complaint that they are unaware of what is being taught in mosques and breeding suspicion (Bawer, 2006).

Islam’s status as a non-recognized entity in Germany led to the involvement of sending states for the organization of Islam in Europe (Kortmann & Rosenow-Williams, 2013), which is an enduring concern in debates about integration. While there are approximately 2800 local

Figure 1-2 (left) VIKZ Mosque in Rheinhausen, Duisburg (source: Schmitt, 2003, p. 70) and Figure 1-3 (right) The cafeteria space used as mosque before the construction of Marxloh Merkez Mosque in the 1980s (source: Ünalan, personal archive)
mosque associations in Germany (Figure 1-4), most operate under umbrella organizations that have institutionalized ties to the sending countries (Geschätzte Anzahl Der Moscheen in Deutschland 2020, 2021). The largest and most political of these umbrella organizations is DITIB (Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği – The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs), an affiliate organization of Diyanet (The Presidency of Religious Affairs) in Turkey (Mutluer, 2020). The following section introduces DITIB as the dominant actor of the Turkish-German transnational religious field and explains its relationship with Germany over the years.

Figure 1-4 Mosques in Germany that were built after 2012 (source: https://www.zeit.de/zeit-magazin/2020/05/moscheen-muslime-deutschlandkarte)
1.2.1. DITIB: The Dominant Actor of Turkish-Islam in Germany

Turkey has been sending imams to Europe since 1975; however, it was not until the establishment of DITIB in 1984 that the efforts to organize the religious life of the Turkish immigrants took effect (Pederson, 1999). The umbrella organization is based in Cologne and operates through 11 federal and 980 local mosque associations (e.V.) (Yıldırım, 2020) (Figure 1-5). In addition to the religious services, DITIB provides educational and cultural activities and reaches out to the majority of the Turkish-Muslim population living in Germany through its youth- and women branches (Hakkımızda, 2021). DITIB claims to represent 70% of the Muslims in Germany (Hakkımızda, 2021); however, according to the survey conducted in 2009, only 20% of Muslims felt that DITIB represented them. Despite this, it still represents the largest groups of Muslims than any other Muslim organization in Germany (Collins, 2011).

Being a branch of Diyanet, a Turkish state institution, DITIB follows the official Turkish view of Islam, which until the last decade, referred to as “reformed secular state Islam” that was considered to be adaptable to the European secular values (Mutluer, 2020, p. 109). Diyanet in Turkey was founded in 1924 to support the laicist structure of the newly founded Turkish Republic (Stoop, 2012) and was established as a religious authority against the radical Islamist groups. In line with this, Schiffauer discusses that the foundation of DITIB in the 1980s was by no means only to answer the religious needs of Turks living in Germany but, in fact, to prevent the emergence of radical Turkish-Islamic groups whose activities did not align with the Turkish government’s secular views, such as IGMG (Islamic Community Milli Görüş), VIKZ (Islamic Cultural Centre) and currently banned Kaplan Community (2004). This secular view of Islam was also strongly favored by Germany due to its alignment with European values. Despite the trend towards a more conservative Turkish-Islam in the last decade, among other Turkish-Muslim
mosques, DITIB in Germany still finds itself in a relatively neutral position serving Muslims who do not want to affiliate themselves with more radical groups (Mutluer, 2020).

DITIB repeatedly denies any ties to the Turkish government, and DITIB officials often argue that the umbrella organization operates independently from Diyanet (Arkilic, 2015; Bruce, 2013; Stoop, 2012), which was also what I was told when I conducted interviews with the DITIB Cologne officers. On the other hand, factors such as Diyanet training, sending and paying for religious officers working in DITIB mosques, the president of Diyanet being an honorary president of DITIB (Wunn & Mohaghegh, 2007), the president of DITIB being appointed directly by the Turkish government (Mutluer, 2020) indicate the opposite. This “non-existent” tie caused DITIB to lose the official recognition it attained in some states in 2012 following the rumors that claimed Turkish religious officers are collecting intelligence on Turks that might be related to the 2016 coup attempt. Following the espionage affair, the recognition agreements were suspended in 2017, and the German government cut the funding DITIB receives as a registered association.
Compared to the previous years, DITIB only received 20% of the funding in the 2018 (*Germany Cuts Funding to Largest Turkish-Islamic Organization*, 2018; Öcal, 2020).

The increasing influence of DITIB as a religious actor in Germany also coincides with the rise of Islamism in Turkey with Erdoğan’s coming into power in 2001. While in homeland, *Diyanet* slowly transformed from a decentralized and democratic institution that was necessary for the conservation of the secular character of the state into an authoritarian one with the reforms of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP); this process also influenced DITIB’s approach to its local associations in Germany. Mutluer’s informants, who were among former and current DITIB members, claimed that, especially after 2014, the organization went through a process of centralization and desecularization. The steps taken within this centralization process included DITIB headquarters’ (or rather the directly appointed Turkish officers’) intervention to the local mosque administration elections in Hessen in 2014 and restriction of the voting rights of the grassroot mosque communities in 2017. Mutluer’s informants express that the centralization policies went so far that anyone who objected to these actions against the organization's pluralist and transparent character were blamed by these mentioned officers as abandoning their Turkishness and becoming “Germanized” (2020, p. 116).

In addition to its centralization, the desecularization DITIB went through also directly influenced the organization’s community members by blurring the boundaries between the secular and the religious. Following *Diyanet’s* cooperation protocol with the Turkish government about the preservation of traditional values and promoting a version of family based on Islam, in 2014, DITIB demanded that women religious officers that work in Germany should be involved in social and communal activities about women and youth issues (Mutluer, 2018). While at the time, this was not welcomed by the community members on the grounds that it mixes religious and secular fields (Mutluer, 2020), the boundary that separates these two fields became less pronounced as religious officers took upon more responsibilities regarding social work. As local
mosques took on more responsibilities and started to offer non-religious services under normal circumstances were supplied by the German state (Schmitt, 2003), Turkish-Muslims in Germany began to rely more on mosques for their social needs, limiting their participation in their host communities.

With this self-defined role, DITIB mosques became effective in disseminating the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis\(^1\)” which became the unofficial ideology of the Turkish government. Diyanet’s – and by extension DITIB’s – rhetoric started to associate Turkishness with Muslimness, constructing Islam as an imperative that provides the national unity of Turks at home and abroad (Çitak, 2010; Landman, 1997). This synthesis, on the one hand, conflates culture with religion, presenting Turkish-Islam as the “real” Islam, while on the other, makes an emphasis on the Turkish ethnonational dimension, making it clear that it primarily serves the Turkish community (Bruce, 2013). In addition to separating the Turkish community from other Muslims in Germany, through the sermons and the religious education activities in the mosque, this rhetoric constructs an idealized Turkish-Muslim subject that is pious, de-secularized, and obedient, while discursively othering the ones (who can be German and non-Muslim Turks) who are secular, critical and rebellious, forming and reinforcing ethno-national boundaries (Bruce, 2013; Sözeri et al., 2021).

The transformations that have taken place in the social, political, and cultural fields in Turkey through its departure from republican laicism greatly impacted both DITIB’s approach to integration and Germany’s view of DITIB. Turkey expert Christoph Ramm refers to this situation as the transformation of DITIB from being “everybody’s darling” with its predictable and secular understanding of Islam into the “bad guys,” becoming one of the opaque mosque associations the (Heinrich, 2017). The research conducted prior to 2014 refers to DITIB’s approach to integration

\(^1\) See Çetinsaya, 1999 for the history of Turkish-Islam synthesis in Turkish political history
as “partially integrationist”; on the one hand, they encourage ethnic Turks living in Germany to improve their socio-economic statuses, on the other hand, they also reproduce the rhetoric that Turks should remain loyal to the Turkish state and do not tolerate any criticism towards Turkey. During this time, Islam was presented as a cultural component of Turkishness and a guideline for individual morality and piety, emphasizing its private character (Bruce, 2013; Gibbon, 2009; Yükleyen & Yurdakul, 2011; Yurdakul & Yükleyen, 2009). In his early analysis, Yükleyen attributes DITIB’s lack of mobilization power to its lax stance (2012).

With its transformation into an authoritative institution, DITIB started to operate as a German branch of Erdoğan’s political party (AKP) (Belinsky, 2020). While the secular Turkish model of Islam favored by European countries became AKP’s understanding of Islam, the identity discourse started to strongly emphasize the importance of remaining Turkish and pursuing the interest of the Turkish state (Öztürk, 2018). While mosques began to provide a platform for Turkish politicians’ speeches before elections, religious officers within this context became political pawns, transmitting the religio-political message during their sermons. Rodenburg-Yener, in her research about the political mobilization patterns among Turkish-Germans, reports that the religious officers are even formally assigned to work during Turkish elections in the consulates where they often engage in actions bordering on voter manipulation with statements such as “you know what you need to do” (2020).

From its foundation in the 1980s up until Turkey’s authoritarian turn under Erdoğan’s rule in the 2010s, DITIB was regarded as a reliable and secular civil society organization that had the potential to become the official administrator of Islam in Germany with its perception as a legitimate religious authority and substantial network that extends all over Europe (Bruce, 2013). After its transformation into a centralized and desecularized organization in the 2010s, DITIB’s primary loyalty to the Turkish state and their insistence on ethnonational Islam cost them the possibility of becoming the leading religious authority in Germany. DITIB has still been
attempting to erase its image as “Erdoğan’s long arm” in an attempt to reacquire the funding from the federal government that was cut due to the espionage affair in 2017. Still, so far, their attempts remain unsuccessful.

1.2.2. Situating Turkish-Muslim Women in the Transnational Religious Field

The secular-religious divide that governs the discussions about whether Islam is compatible with European values has always been both gendered and sexualized. Before Turkey’s turn to Islamism in the 2000s, Turkey’s laic approach, that was highly favored by Germany, presented the educated, civilized, and modern Turkish women as the symbolic embodiment of Turkish republicanism. While she represented an emancipated image with her western looks and high education, she was also expected to protect her honor and chastity (Müftüler-Baç, 1999; Berktay, 1998; Çağatay, 2016); women became emancipated but remained not liberated (Kandiyoti, 1987). During this time, Diyanet had not transformed into an international actor and had limited influence in and out of Turkey; however, this emancipated image with reformed gender values was why Turkish-Islam made its way to the German sphere without many reactions.

As Diyanet slowly transformed into a “domestic and external policy instrument of the Turkish state” under Erdoğan’s rule (Çitak, 2018, p. 11), the “discursive utilization of women’s bodies and sexualities” has become the primary tool to consolidate and maintain the conservative status-quo (Cindoglu & Unal, 2017, p. 40) under “yerli ve milli” (homegrown and national) values. Within this context, Diyanet became responsible for promoting a new set of gender and family values based on Islam, opposing the laic motifs of the republican period (Mutluer, 2018). Through this new rhetoric, the details of which are discussed in Chapter 2, Turkish-Muslim women are discursively confined into the boundaries of family and only recognized through their
ability to reproduce Turkish nation (Öztan, 2014). While in Turkey, a discourse that focuses on Islamic morality was formed, it was used to other groups that go against these moral norms, such as the LGBTQA+ community, feminists, non-Muslims, etc. As religious officers responsible for the promotion of this rhetoric were sent to Germany, Diyanet’s conservative discourse made its way into the diaspora mosques.

Despite the large number of Turkish religious officers working in German mosques, the research on this subject remains understudied with some exceptions focusing on the male religious officers (see Bruce, 2012; Çitak, 2010; Öztürk & Sözeri, 2018; Yerkazan, 2020) and even fewer ones on female religious officers (Demir, 2010; Maritato, 2018; Karakoç 2020). Demir’s study, which was funded and published by Diyanet itself, focuses on Turkish women’s everyday life in Germany. Demir’s research emphasizes the increasing role of the mosque in women’s life from 2000 to 2010 and describes female religious officers’ engagement with the congregation through subjects about women’s duties according to Islam and women’s role in the family. One of the most mentioned results of this study is Turkish-Muslim women’s fear that foreign influences will corrupt their children, and they expect countermeasures to be provided by DITIB officers (2010). In contrast to Demir’s study, Maritato’s and Karakoç’s studies display a less ideological perspective. While Karakoç’s study focuses on migration, teaching, and religious experiences of DITIB’s female religious officers in Germany themselves (2020), Maritato’s study explores the role these officers play in the diffusion of religiously conservative ideology in Austria and Sweden. In her ethnographic analysis, she found out that the female preachers channel an image of an ideal pious and modern (but not secular) Muslim woman celebrated by AKP to the diaspora communities. One of the ways the female preachers achieve this is by presenting a model of Turkish-Muslimness as antithetical to the secular European, through a very prejudiced view of European women as lacking morality and not being religious. During the preaching sessions, women are warned against the threat of assimilation to Europe, propagating
an a religious-national narrative (2018). Though useful, these studies highlight a blind spot in how religion-cultural discourse put forward by Diyanet and DITIB is disseminated to women and how it affects their behavior in and outside the diaspora mosques. Addressing this lacuna is the aim of Chapters 4 and 5.

1.3. Germany and its Turkish-Muslims

This chapter so far has explored how Turks settled in Germany as the largest immigrant group and how they established DITIB as a major actor in the transnational religious field between Turkey and Germany. As I mentioned in the previous section, since its establishment in 1984, DITIB slowly transformed into a discursive tool disseminating a Turkish-Muslim discourse among its congregants. However, DITIB is not the only discursive structure that shapes Turks’ integration and belonging in Germany. German public discourses are as effective as reproducing exclusionary rhetoric on integration that puts Turks in focus. Both discursive mechanisms, whether they are reproduced by the mosque-going Turkish-Germans or secular Germans, construct an image of Turkish-Muslim as the “other”, distancing this subject from the society he/she lives in. In Germany, this has been done in evolving ways: Turks have arrived in Germany as guest-workers, transformed into foreigners and eventually became the Muslim other that is painted antithetical to the liberal German subject.

Turkish-Muslim women, within this context, play a central role in the integration debates reproduced by Germany. Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler argue that “gender relations often come to be seen as constituting the essence of cultures as ways of life to be passed from generation to generation” (2000, p. 175). Following the evolution of the public discourses excluding Turks, the integrationist rhetoric othered Turkish-Muslim women, first through the incompatibility of patriarchal Turkish culture with the German values and then through reducing Turkish-Muslim
women to a victim that needs “western emancipation”. While these discourses strip Turkish-Muslim women from any agency, they also reproduce a rigid and imaginary separation of Turkish/Muslim and Western/Christian, not allowing the formation of hybrid identities (Ramm, 2010). Within the context of this chapter, the discourses on women were touched upon briefly. A detailed discussion on these discourses is presented in Chapter 2.

1.3.1. Being Guests, Being Workers

As in many European countries, in Germany, the debates on cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity often make an emphasis on immigrant integration. However, what immigrant integration suggests remains a mystery. The discourse on integration is dominated by debates about who needs to integrate and who are the members of the national group into which immigrants should integrate, reinforcing essentialized views both of the dominant group and the immigrant “other” (Moffit et al., 2018). McLean and Syed discuss that, in time, these discourses produce culturally shared master narratives that are perceived as “natural”, organizing the behavior and interaction of members of the society (2015). Within the context of nationalism, these master narratives form and reinforce boundaries around the immigrant “other”, forging exclusionary practices of belonging. In Germany (and in Europe), these exclusionary narratives of belonging usually construct Islam and Muslims as the “other” (Alba, 2005; Canan & Foroutan, 2016; Connor & König, 2015; Foroutan et al., 2014). While narratives that overtly discriminate against Muslims are replaced by the discourses of integration and “cultural preservation”, their exclusionary impact on the “other” remains the same (Reijerse et al., 2013).

To understand the relationship between nationality, belonging, and integration in Germany, it is crucial to explore the historical constructions of Germanness. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, from 1913 until the citizenship laws were changed in 2000, the criteria for
inclusion and exclusion were based on ancestry. Brubaker claims that a nation based on ancestry, not the territory, implies the construction and gatekeeping of a nation based on ethnocultural terms (1998, p. 28). This discursive construction of Germanness and the “other” can be seen in the creation and use of the term Gastarbeiter (guest-workers). The Turkish population in Germany was never referred to as immigrants, which implies an intention and right to stay (White, 1997), and the model of descent-based citizenship meant that Turks would never be able to become German citizens. The widespread use of the term Gastarbeiter reinforced their temporary status in the society (guests) who are only there to work in the labor market (workers) (Eghdamian, 2019).

An article published in one of Germany’s leading magazines, Der Spiegel, poses as an example of the discursive exclusion. The 1973 article is titled “The Turks are coming – whoever can save yourselves!” Despite it offering a deep insight into the lives and living conditions of the guest-workers, the article conveys the contemporary prejudice against the Turks by mentioning their inferiority to Germans. According to the article, Turkish immigrants are “an underdeveloped ethnic group” that comes from “primitive living conditions of their homelands” to “spoil the native quarters”. German natives who are bothered by Turks’ “strange cooking smells”, “lack of cleanliness” and “their involvement in crime”, do not want to “live wall to wall” with them as they devalue their neighborhoods (“Die Türken Kommen - Rette Sich, Wer Kann,” 1973).

Interestingly, the article neither mentions Islam as a distinguishing factor nor focuses on Muslim women as essential markers of difference (Ramm, 2010).

1.3.2. Becoming the Ausländer

In the 1980s and 1990s, the term Ausländer (foreigner) started to replace Gastarbeiter. Mandel argues that the replacement of the term does not mean much as the use of the term
foreigner still reflects an ideological agenda that intentionally distinguishes those who belong from those who do not, underscoring the difference between them (2008). With the increasing number of Turks in Germany, the foreigner discourse started to frame Turks as the typical foreigner, representatives of all the problems related to immigration. Especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Turkish immigrants received much negative attention and were blamed for non-immigration-related societal issues such as unemployment and rising crime rates. Journalists addressed the “foreigner problem” and politicians complained about the “crime rates of foreigners”, giving rise to an anti-immigrant discourse and associated anti-foreigner attacks (Ramm, 2010). A series of arson attacks, shootings, and bombings both in public and private quarters, targeted Turks living in Germany. The integration discourses that emerged during this time gradually replaced the anti-immigrant debate. The assimilatory understanding of integration required Turkish immigrants to meet some impossible requirements if they wanted to stay. To become a part of Germany, they should commit themselves to becoming one by shedding all traces of cultural and ethnic differences (Hinze, 2013). The responsibility of integration was put solely on the foreign “other”. Altogether, these discursive tools constructed Turks as the “others”, almost 30 years after their settlement in Germany.

This period also overlaps with the foundation of the European Union in 1993, which complicated the Turks’ outsider status even further. Italian and Spanish guest-workers were stigmatized as Turkish guest-workers during this time; however, the emergence of a supranational European identity shifted their perception to a more equal stance, despite significant differences in national discourse between Germany and Italy and Spain. This, in turn, allows them to coexist with the German identity on an equal basis (Hinze, 2013) and be kept out of the discrimination

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2 Some examples are far-right attacks in Mölln in 1992, an arson attack killing a woman and two children (Şimşek, 2017); arson attack in Solingen in May 1993 that killed five Turkish women and children (Ayvaz, 2018); and the series of firebomb attacks against Turks in Cologne, Mülheim, Osnabrück, and Frankfurt-am-Main in 1993 (Panayi, 1994).
discourses. Because Turkey remains outside the EU and is therefore largely excluded from the European identity, a similar shift in perception has never taken place, meaning that the perception of Turkish immigrants has remained ambivalent, if not outright hostile. Figure 1-6, taken from Duman’s book, demonstrates the anti-Turkish sentiment in German society 2018).

Figure 1-6 “Turks Out” with SS bolts in the 1980s in Cologne (source: https://twitter.com/diaspora_turk/status/533201716578353153)

The changing perception of guest-workers also brought gender issues into the public discourse. While academic scholarship during this time aimed to understand the structural causes for immigrant women’s isolation through a comparative framework (Brandt, 1977; Welzel, 1981), these efforts were quickly outweighed by the discourses that rely on fundamental cultural differences reproducing an image of an immigrant woman who was helpless and oppressed. The
focus here was on Turkish women and how the transfer of the Turkish cultural milieu and the cultural norms led to their subordination in the progressive Western world (Chin, 2011). As gender equality became a mainstream characteristic of German society in the 1990s, Turkish women’s subordinated status became a new market of immigrant integration (Ramm, 2010). Sexism was ethnicized (Jäger & Jäger, 2007, p. 110) in the media, and Turkish-Muslim women were defined as “inassimilable strange bodies” who “walk humbly two steps behind their man” and whose lives were “predetermined” by the men around them (Baumgartner-Karabak and Landesberger, 1978). Their oppressed existence posed a threat to German democracy, and the tradition and culture simply had to be discarded for their integration. While Turkish culture, especially the type practiced in the smaller towns and villages where the majority of the guest-workers are from, is essentially patriarchal, the German discourses, whether they explore the lives of Turkish women or detail the ways for them to integrate, left no room for Turkish-Muslim women’s agency. While the public discourse emphasized that the patriarchal traditions and customs within the Turkish culture that were unacceptable, during this period, it was open to cultural reform and co-existence of Turks and Germans (Chin, 2011).

1.3.3. Becoming the Muslim “Other”

The perception and conception of Turks after two important events shaped 2000: the change of citizenship law in Germany in 2000 and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In 2000, with the evolution of citizenship law from a descendancy-based one to a residence-based one, the conception of citizenship started to lose its function as gatekeeper for membership in the German community. Hinze discusses that in the absence of a barrier to becoming German, the concept of integration, which appears to have become the politically correct term for assimilation, evolved to replace ethnicity as a way of defining, controlling, and limiting who is German (2013). The
terrorist attacks that took a year after the change of the citizenship law, on September 11, 2001, and the fact that the terrorists involved in the attacks were based in a radical-Islamist group in Hamburg changed Germany’s look on Muslims completely.

With these events, the focus was shifted from the Ausländer towards the Muslims. With this shift, the exclusive discourses started to take the form of demarcation of the religious “other”. Within this context, the image of Turks started to be increasingly Islamized, reshaping the older discourses that defined their otherness on their ethnocultural difference (Ramm, 2010).

Interestingly, while the public discourse started to conflate Islam with Turkish immigrants, the majority of the Turks in Germany (two-thirds) did not define themselves as Muslims (Clark, 2011). The public discourse started to mention the “hidden danger” (Jonker, 2005, p. 119), “ethnic islands” and “parallel worlds of foreigners” (“Die Rückseite der Republik” [The Backside of the Republic, 2002] of “sinister guests” (Unheimliche Gäste – Die Gegenwelt der Muslime in Deutschland” [Sinister Guests – The Parallel World of Muslims in Germany], 2004), “minorities who are as religious as they are rootless” (Islam in Deutschland, 2004) who “have not yet settled in Germany” (Drinnen von der Tür [Just Inside the Door], 2004) (Figure 1-7).

The concepts of “parallel societies” and Leitkultur (the guiding culture) were the principal notions used in the political debates, suggesting that Muslims actively and deliberately isolate themselves in ethnic neighborhoods and refuse to acquire basic cultural tools (language, education) and reject wester-values (Cyrus & Vogel, 2005, p. 20). Leitkultur is a very vague concept: Bassam Tibi, a Syrian-German political scientist, describes it as “a consensus about western-oriented values” (2000, p. 72), while Edmund Stoiber, the prime minister of the state of Bavaria, provides a much more precise definition of it as “a Christian-Occidental culture” (1999 in Ramm, 2010, p. 187). Lanz argues that, in this sense, Leitkultur signals a discourse on integration, where Muslims, whose culture is deemed incompatible with Western values, are expected to adapt to the German values and distance themselves from their home cultures,
reproducing a mutually exclusive relationship between the West and Islam (Lanz, 2007; Rosenow-Williams, 2012).

The ambiguous nature of *Leitkultur* has some implications. The expectation that Muslims, who are all forced into one category regardless of their different backgrounds, would distance themselves from their home cultures and adopt the *Leitkultur*, eliminates the possibility of forming hybrid cultures. Rosenow-Williams argues that the “possibility of an “as well as” is ruled out by an “either/or” option,” which in turn makes it impossible for future hybrid

![Figure 1-7 Some magazine covers from the recent past](source: https://www.bayernkurier.de/kultur/834-ein-plaedoyer-fuer-mehr-vielfalt)
generations to function as potential bridges between the cultures (2012, p. 148). Ramm discusses that this causes *Leitkultur* to become a separatory and disciplinary mechanism to sustain the social hegemony based on the western societies’” superiority, with the underlying assumption of Turks being an “underdeveloped” collective. He further argues that such homogenizing depictions of Islam, in the end, cause the orthodox, patriarchal, and even extremist practices of Islam to be established as the standard by undermining the plurality of the immigrant group (2010, p. 195). Turks living in Germany become a part of the negative ideal of the villainized Islam by the integration, assimilation, and *Leitkultur* discourses.

On the other hand, despite this dominant separatory rhetoric, some more progressive voices tried to steer the integration discourse to a more constructive and unifying direction. Such discourses became specifically visible after the publication of Thilo Sarrazin’s book “*Deutschland Schafft Sich Ab: Wie wir Unser Land aufs Spiel setzen*” (2010) [Germany Abolishes Itself: We are Putting Our Country at Risk]. Sarrazin, who at the time was a member center-left social-democrat party (SPD), criticized his government for denying the reality that Muslim immigrants were conquering Germany. His book mentions many shortcomings of the Turkish-Muslims, such as but not limited to Turks’ lack of German knowledge, Turks (he refers to Turkish women as welfare queens and scarf girls) being merely parasites of the welfare system (p. 326), their intellectual deficiencies due to inbreeding (p. 316), their moral poverty (p. 123) (2010). While Sarrazin was promptly forced to resign, the reactions to his claims showed the changing discourses in Germany. A month after Sarrazin’s resignation, the German president at the time, Christian Wulff, gave a speech emphasizing that “Orient and Occident are inseparable” and “Islam is also a part of Germany” (2010). While his speech received much criticism from his center-right Christian-Democratic Union Party (CDU) on the basis that “shariah law cannot be the basis for successful integration in Germany” (*Kontroverse zu Wulff-Äusserung über Islam*, 2010).
CDU’s Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, supported Wulff’s claim, mentioning immigrants need the host country’s support, which has failed to do so far (Hinze, 2013).

During this period, the habit of measuring Turks’ integration concerning Turkish women’s subordinate status continued. However, this time, the emphasis shifted towards the religion, reproducing being Muslim as a marker of difference in the public discourse (Chin, 2011). The “fascination about how Islam treats its women” became the focus of the liberal integrationist rhetoric (Petzen, 2005, p. 162) with an “obsessive emphasis on domestic violence, forced marriages, honor killings, circumcision of girls” (Ramm, 2010, p. 194). These patriarchal practices, which are not very common even in immigrants’ homeland and mainly stem from traditional culture rather than religion, started to be reflected as the “norms” of Islam, fusing the “ethnicization of sexism” (Jäger & Jäger, 2017, p. 110) with religion. Headscarf debate has become the most popular subject as it is viewed as a disciplinary tool of the inherent sexism in Islam (Braun & Mathes, 2007). Mensink draws attention to the paradoxical nature of these debates on the one hand, and Muslim women must be freed from their patriarchal oppression through the ban of the headscarf; on the other hand, Western feminist advocates for women being free to dress however they would like (unless they are veiling) (2017). The voices of “Islam critics”3, feminists of Muslim origin who blames immigrant women’s subordination on Islam, are celebrated as they were able to “break the silence” (Schneider, 2005, p. 10), while Muslim feminists’ diverse voices are ignored (Haritaworn, 2005, p. 160). Through these discourses, an enlightened West is constantly pitted against antimodern Islam. Within this context, the German

3 These critics see Islam as the root of patriarchal violence in Muslim families. The most sought after Islam critics in Germany are Seyran Ateş, the Turkish-German lawyer who argues that Islam needs a sexual revolution and opened the first liberal mosque in 2017 in Germany, the Ibn Rushd-Goethe Mosque (Eddy, 2018); Necla Kelek, who is a social scientist and argues that Islam has proven to hinder the immigrants’ integration (Kelek, 2012) and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-Dutch activist who rejects the faith and sees Islam as a part of the political-military doctrine that is incompatible with European values (Anthony, 2015).
debate on Islam and Turkish-Muslim women has become increasingly fixed and non-negotiable, conceiving unidirectional acculturation as the only way to integrate (Chin, 2011).

As a final comment, it is essential to emphasize that Turkish culture, especially when conflated with Islam, is essentially patriarchal, which is explored in detail in Chapter 2. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to challenge this patriarchal construct within this culture. Denying this or assuming an apologetic position in identifying this patriarchal nature would lead to false identification of the roots of patriarchy, eventually causing the development of erroneous policies and mechanisms to challenge gender inequality. Reading Turkish-Muslim women’s situation through the lens of Western feminism eventually causes them to become another marker of differentiation between the East and the West (Chin, 2011). Fixating on Turkish-Muslim women’s subordination with a superficial and prejudiced point of view without understanding the underlying mechanisms leads to 1) unrecognition of moments of agency that are not always emancipatory, 2) homogenization of Turkish-Muslim women from different cultural, social, religious, generational groups and 3) unfruitful and unsuitable policies to emancipate these agents without agency. In this context, while Chapters 4 and 5 explore differentiation of Turkish-Muslim women’s socio-spatial behavior based on their generation both in Muslim and German contexts, Chapter 6 explores their alternative performances of agency that do not openly resist the patriarchal norms even reinforce such norms at times.

1.4. The Immigrant Neighborhood and the Diaspora Mosque

The “othering” discourses presented in the previous sections not only have social implications but also influence the use and perception of space. Urban researchers Gaffikin, Perry, and Kundu argue that the insider/outsider discourses lead to territorial contestation of identity, reproducing territories of socio-spatial exclusion. The reproduction of such discourses,
which they claim to be intentional while excluding those who do not belong to the dominant socio-cultural narrative, also brings about the formation of ethnic enclaves, where “othered” minorities come together in their shared exclusion from the national society (2010). Castells called this phenomenon “the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded” (1997, p. 9). The immigrants who are excluded from the national community by “othering” discourses isolate themselves spatially in the immigrant neighborhood/enclave/ghetto. The markers of difference that are emphasized repeatedly by the public discourses and those that distinguish immigrants from the members of the host society are rendered insignificant within this space, simultaneously making the immigrant neighborhood more visible based on these differences (Bauman, 1995). Especially with the public discourses that attach symbolic meaning to the physical space, the immigrant neighborhood becomes a site of contestation of identity and integration (Gottdiener, 1995; Richardson & Jensen, 2003).

On the other hand, the “othering” discourses are not the only ones that influence immigrants’ social existence in their host countries. Forder discusses that cultural identity is deterritorialized and reterritorialized in the process of migration. The discourses and practices attached to this cultural identity are reproduced in the diaspora space through performative acts. These performative acts that have been reiterated so many times that they are naturalized as “typical expressions of an ethnic identity” produce social categories and “the norms of membership” (1999, p. 1-2). Within the context of diaspora, the formation of group identity is woven through these practices of commonalities, marking the cultural and spatial boundaries of the minority population. The immigrant neighborhood (Figure 1-8), which disturbs the collective identity from the point of view of the host society for the minority group, becomes a terrain of belonging that empowers them through their shared group identity (Roy, 2005; Soja, 1999).
These two discourses, the one that immigrants transferred from their home countries and
the one that is produced in the host country that excludes the immigrants, reproduce a set of
norms for the immigrant “other” in their everyday performances. While these norms are
perceived as natural due to their constant repetition and internalization, they are also used to
construct and sustain imaginary separation between the ethnic group and the host society.
Diaspora mosques, especially the purpose-built Turkish mosques in Germany that operate under
DITIB, are examples of how these discourses come together and manifest physically. While
German discourses of exclusion conceive the mosque space as the space of the “other,” the
Turkish-Muslim discourse disseminated through DITIB transforms the mosque into a site of
belonging.

Figure 1-8 Marxloh as an immigrant neighborhood
(source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323639704579014013117977106)
The diaspora mosques in Germany have always been sites of contestation and conflict as they represent Muslims’ visible belonging to public life, which transgresses the insider/outsider boundary drawn by the exclusionary German public discourses. Göle argues that through the construction of diaspora mosques, Islam crosses the geographical borders while spatially transgressing the invisible cultural boundaries of the European public sphere (2011, p. 387). In addition to being an expression of the existence of a local Muslim community, diaspora mosques also represent the transformation of Islam from the private to the public sphere. In the past, the religious activities of Muslims in Europe were confined into invisible and private prayer rooms that usually went unnoticed. A purpose-built mosque, however, indeed cannot go unnoticed. Instead of going from invisible to visible, Islam goes from invisible to unwanted (Cesari, 2005). The conflicts arise from 1) the perceived otherness of the Muslims (Jonker, 2005), 2) the conflicting relationship between Islam, secularism, and Christianity (Saint-Blancat & Schmidt di Friedberg, 2005), and 3) architecture and symbolism of the building (Gale, 2004; Maussmen, 2009; Avcıoğlu, 2007).

While attempting to identify reasons of conflict, the previous research prioritizes the discourse about the diaspora mosques. While identification of socio-cultural factors leading to these conflicts is beneficial, they neglect to account for the active reproduction of the imaginary boundary that separates the diaspora mosque from the host community (Becker, 2017). Within the context of my dissertation, I argue that mosques are discursive and discursively-reproduced structures with the agency, taking an active role both in the reproduction of societal boundaries and positioning the immigrant communities in relation to this boundary.
1.5. Problem Definition and Research Questions

In the previous section, I have provided the historical framework that has informed my research. Within this context, two significant points that have been inadequately addressed in the literature were identified:

1. There is a disconnect between research focusing on transnational mosques' socio-political aspects and examining the transnational mosque from a purely spatial perspective. The scholarship on transnational mosques either focus on the architecture mosque (such as but not limited to Erkoçu & Buğdacı, 2009; Avçıoğlu, 2007; Eimen, 2015; Van Loan & Troelenberg, 2019) or politics of visibility and Islam’s compatibility in Europe (Başer & Öztürk, 2019; Mutluer, 2020; Yüksel, 2012 for the governance of the mosque; Ehrkamp, 2007 for the politics of Islam; Göle, 2011 for public visibility of Islam; Rosenow-Williams, 2014; Ceylan, 2017 for the organization of Islam in Germany, Allievi 2009 and 2010 for the mosque conflicts). As mentioned in the previous section, while this scholarship neglects the “agentive capacity” of the mosques (Becker, 2019, p. 390), overlooking how it can shape its users’ behavior in and out of this space and influence their cultivation of ethnoreligious identity within the context of the diaspora.

2. The scholarship on Muslim women and their existence in Europe is extensive. The research focus on headscarf debate, media portrayals of Muslim women, integration of Muslim women, debates about whether Islam subordinates or empowers women, and the politics of Muslim women’s visibility. While earlier studies tended to overgeneralize experiences of Muslim women through the lens of a Western feminist by and drawing conclusions based on limited observations despite this group’s high heterogeneity; the recent studies (such as but not limited to Nayel, 2017; Bibi, 2018;
Hinze, 2013; Mirza, 2013) go beyond the discursive boundaries to conceptualize cultural identity as a positional construct rather than an essence. However, the research on the experiences of mosque-going women in the diaspora is limited.

In the light of the problems presented above, my research contributes to the limited field of scholarship on women’s experiences in the transnational mosque spaces (for other studies, see Bano & Kalmbach, 2012; Brown, 2008; Jouili & Amir-Moazami, 2006; Lehmann, 2012; Minganti, 2012; Nyhagen, 2008 and 2019; Shannahan, 2014; Woodlock, 2010). By choosing Marxloh Merkez Mosque in Duisburg as my case study and exploring the experiences of Turkish-Muslim women who regularly attend this mosque, I examine the discursive production and cultivation of ethnoreligious identities in the transnational mosque and the reflection of related discourses on the spatial mobility of mosque going women within the neighborhood and urban contexts. The following questions guide my research:

1. How are the primary identity discourses that reproduce and shape gender relations operate in Marxloh Merkez Mosque?
   a. What was the original intent with the spatial configuration of the mosque, and how did these discourses permeate and shape the spatial use of the mosque?
   b. How do these discourses influence women’s social and spatial behavior within the mosque?
   c. What do such different discourses reveal about the integration of Turkish-Muslim women?

2. How does the exaggeration of gender discourses in Marxloh Merkez Mosque help determine Turkish-Muslim women’s mobility in the local neighborhood and broader urban context?
   a. How do different gender discourses influence Turkish-Muslim women’s perceptions of the Turkish and the German cultures?
b. How do these discourses influence women’s spatial behavior in Marxloh and Duisburg?

c. Does this allow for greater insularity or broader exposure in the neighborhood and urban contexts?

3. In the face of these discourses that organize their everyday behavior, how do Turkish Muslim women exercise their agency to negotiate their identities in the German public?

1.6. Setting the Scene: Marxloh, Duisburg

Having provided the research questions, this section introduces the case-study neighborhood in Duisburg, Marxloh, and DITIB’s first representative mosque established in this neighborhood, Marxloh Merkez Mosque. Duisburg-Marxloh is located in Germany’s Ruhr area (Figure 1-9), one of Europe’s conurbations characterized by its industrial landscape. Dominated by heavy industry, Duisburg is responsible for producing most iron and steel in the country (Figure 1-10). The city has been significantly affected by the oil crisis in 1973 and the economic restructuring in the 1990s, costing thousands of jobs and causing considerable economic decline (Ehrkamp, 2006). As a classic working-class district surrounded by industrial operations, Marxloh substantially suffered the adverse consequences of the economic downturn (Uslar, 2017).

Being surrounded by industrial areas and major manufacturing plants like ThyssenKrupp’s steel factory, Marxloh’s population grew substantially with the guest-worker migration in the 1960s. It was a thriving neighborhood benefiting from the surrounding industry and well-paid jobs during this time. With the oil crisis in 1973, the neighborhood was faced with rising unemployment, reduced incomes increased crime rates, and declining population
(Rommelspacher, 1998). While the neighborhood lost 22% of its population during the economic decline, the Turkish population continued to increase with the family reunification in the 1970s and the wave of political refugees in the 1980s and 1990s (Ehrkamp, 2007) (Table 1-3). According to the population statistics, as of 2021, Marxloh has a population of 20,957, with 58.3% of them being a foreigner. Accounting for the naturalized citizens living in the neighborhood, it is estimated that 76% of the population of Marxloh is immigrant/has an immigrant background, with 75% of whom are from Turkey (Einwohnerstatistik 2020, 2020; Uslar, 2017).

Figure 1-9 Location of Marxloh, Duisburg (source: Author)
The imprint of its immigrant population can be seen in the urban landscape of Marxloh (Ehrkamp, 2006). From restaurants to jewelers, from conservative clothing stores to Turkish markets, numerous Turkish businesses dominate the neighborhood. The Turkish dominance in the neighborhood is so prominent that it is possible to live in Marxloh without knowing German. In the last decade, with the increase of the Turkish bridal stores, the main street, Weseler Straße, has become west Europe’s “wedding mile,” attracting a lot of business (Figure 1-11 and Figure 1-12).
This Turkish dominance also extends into the religious field. Many immigrant groups have established community mosques in the neighborhood (Figure 1-13).

Within the public discourse, two things define Marxloh: 1) being a no-go area and 2) the “Miracle of Marxloh.” With the rise of its immigrant population and the economic decline, Marxloh started to be referred to as a “no-go zone,” an enclave of immigrants who live isolated lives with no respect to German values, by the German public discourse (Cadman, 2018; Schumacher, 2018; Machhaus, 2018). These areas are claimed to be lawless areas where police are afraid to enter and that are unsafe for outsiders, with their high crime rates. Cadman claims that these areas harbor jihadists and are run by sharia law (2018). On the other hand, some researchers challenge

Table 1-3 Population of Marxloh and population of foreigners in Marxloh (data retrieved from https://www.duisburg.de/w/03/medien/Einwohner_nach_Deutschen_und_Auslaendern)
Figure 1-11 City campaign “Made in Marxloh” promoting neighborhood’s wedding industry (source: www.madeinmarxloh.com)

Figure 1-12 Marxloh’s wedding-dress shops (source: www.maps.google.com)
these claims and argue that such right-wing populist claims do nothing by stigmatizing immigrant neighborhoods and fostering anti-immigrant views in society by representing social problems as immigrant-related issues (Wüllenweber, 2018). In fact, according to the criminality statistics published by the Federal Criminal Police (BKA) in 2016, non-Germans only make up 38% of the assaults. BKA’s report from 2018 further shows that petty theft and riding public transport without a ticker make up most of the crimes committed by foreigners (Martin, 2018).

In addition to being the most Turkified neighborhood in Germany, what distinguished Marxloh from the other Turkish neighborhoods is that it houses DITIB’s first and largest (at the time) representative mosque. Marxloh Merkez Mosque is considered different from other diaspora mosques and is referred frequently as the “Miracle of Marxloh” (Wunder von Marxloh) since it was built unusually fast without any public protests or conflicts and opened in 2008 (Deutschlands Größte Moschee Eröffnet in Duisburg, 2008; Spiewak, 2008). To avoid a conflict similar to the one in 1996 over the broadcast of the call for prayer, importance was given to the

![Figure 1-13 Mosques in Marxloh (source: maps.google.com)](image)

Figure 1-13 Mosques in Marxloh (source: maps.google.com)
close cooperation between the mosque association and the city government, the Christian community. The residents (Jonker, 2007), making Marxloh Merkez Mosque providing integration between Turks and Germans together (Allievi, 2010) (Figure 1-14). This mosque is also regarded as an exemplary project because of the integral involvement of women in its execution. As it was driven by women among later-generation immigrants, women were provided equal status with men within the mosque. In Chapter 4, I discuss the planning and construction process of Marxloh Merkez Mosque in detail and discuss the importance of women’s involvement during this period. I further argue that the changing discourse in Turkey and the desecularization of DITIB under this discourse influenced Turkish-Muslim women’s social and spatial behavior in the mosque, deteriorating the equal status they negotiated during the construction process.

Figure 1-14 Artist Norbert Thyssen fights against the image of Marxloh as a no-go area through his art (source: https://www.derwesten.de/staedte/duisburg/duisburg-no-go-area-marxloh-so-wie-hier-hast-du-den-stadtteil-noch-nie-gesehen-id227499959.html)
1.7. Outline of the Chapters

This dissertation is organized into seven chapters, briefly summarized below.

Chapter 1. Introduction: This chapter introduces the topic of the dissertation: the discursive production of identity and belonging within the Marxloh Merkez Mosque and the influence of these discourses on mosque-going women’s socio-spatial mobility in the neighborhood and urban space. This chapter provides the necessary background information on the discourses in question and introduces the research problem, research questions, and case study.

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework: The chapter introduces the central theoretical notion that I used throughout my analysis, “performativity” as a means to understand how Turkish-Muslim and German discourses reproduce norms on ethnicity and gender within the transnational mosque. While the first part of this chapter explains the theoretical construction of performativity concerning gender, ethnicity, belonging, and agency, the second part explores the main identity discourses that shape Turkish-Muslim women’s socio-spatial behavior in Germany.

Chapter 3. Methodology: This chapter follows the methods I used to collect data for this study. I describe the methods and techniques I employed to understand how discourses influence immigrants’ sense of belonging about their relationship with Germany and transnational ties to Turkey and their reproduction of space in the scales of building neighborhood and urban context. This chapter also discusses my positionality as a researcher, outlining the difficulties and dilemmas I encountered during my fieldwork and when interpreting my data.

Chapter 4. Reinforcing the Turkish-Islamic Paradigm: This chapter explores the constant competition between the Turkish-Muslim discourse that earlier-generations base their performances on and the Turkish-German discourse, which is formed as a hybrid discourse by the later-generation immigrants, and how it shapes and influence Turkish-Muslim women’s spatial
performances in the Marxloh Merkez Mosque. While the Turkish-German discourse guided the construction of the diaspora mosque, forming inclusive and integrative spaces and led to its unprecedented acceptance by the German public, with the inscription of the Turkish-Muslim discourse, inclusivity rapidly deteriorated, provoking stricter patterns of gendered territorialization and marginalization of women.

Chapter 5. Beyond the Mosque: Cultural Paradigms and Urban Behavior: In this chapter, I discuss the generational patterns regarding the adaptation of cultural discourses that shape women’s behavior in the mosque also shape their social and spatial acts of belonging. The discursive construction of the home- and host-cultures that follows the same generational pattern mentioned in the previous chapter causes earlier- and younger-generation women to have very distinct spatial footprints within the neighborhood and urban contexts. These different spatial acts of territorialization lead to the formation of diverse boundaries, fostering or limiting contact with German society.

Chapter 6. Reclaiming Agency: This chapter explores mosque-going Turkish-Muslim women’s moments of agency and how they take advantage of the guiding discourses and subvert its norms to carve out social and physical spaces for themselves in the mosque, neighborhood, and German public. While in this chapter, we continue to see the generational patterns, women’s transgressive and disruptive acts simultaneously take place in different scales.

Chapter 7. Conclusion: This chapter concludes the dissertation by briefly discussing the results, summarizing the findings, listing the contributions, and recommending directions for future research.
Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

This chapter introduces the central theoretical notion that I used throughout my analysis, “performativity” as a means to understand how gender and ethnicity are reproduced in the transnational mosque context and influence Turkish-German women’s spatial behavior. To understand this, this chapter is separated into two sections. Section 2.1 explores the theoretical conceptualization of performativity and how it relates to the notions of ethnicity, space, belonging, and agency. This first section starts by exploring the notion of performativity in how it is constructed according to Butler’s nominal work *Gender Trouble* (1990) and its possible applications to the construction of ethno-sexual identities. This part discusses how space is an integral part of discursive identity construction and the possibility of a discursive form of belonging. This section concludes by discussing the issue of agency by explaining that the constant repetition of performances reinforces the dominant norms while leaving room for subversion, resistance, and discipline. This section further explores how non-normative behavior is controlled through constant surveillance and how exclusion is used as a disciplinary mechanism. Section 2.2 grounds performativity by exploring the main discourses, both in Turkey and in Germany that construct and other Turkish-Muslim women in Germany. In this section, I discuss that the patriarchal structures and institutions in Turkey define a set of norms for Turkish-Muslim women that leads to their subordination in their everyday lives and that is transferred to Germany upon their migration. I further argue that this is not the only social construct that leads to their exclusion and the German discourse is as effective in distancing them from the German society by constructing them first as the Turkish other and then as the Muslim other.
2.1. Part I: Theoretical Constructs of Performativity

2.1.1. Performativity and Construction of Identity

The term performativity has come a long way since J.L. Austin coined the term in the 1950s. Austin conceptualized the term in linguistics to refer to the multiple functions of the spoken language. According to him, spoken language is not only used to describe the world outside, but it is, in fact, an active agent that shapes and transforms the world (Snickare, 2012). In other words, Austin establishes that “to say something is to do something” (1962, p. 12). He uses formal and ritual utterances as examples, such as ‘I declare you wife and husband’ or ‘I name the ship ‘Queen Elizabeth’ or an everyday phrase like ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow’. In these examples, language is used to perform various sorts of acts. While in the first two examples, the speaker performs the act of marrying or naming a ship, in the latter one, the sets the conditions of betting.

On the other hand, Austin also emphasizes that the performativity of an utterance still highly depends on the context. He illustrates this with the example of a judge, who can only utter performative speech in specific contexts and attire – the judge’s bench and robe (Austin, 1962). While any person can speak a judge’s words under any circumstances, it only becomes a legitimate performance when that utterance is said under the right circumstances by the right speakers with the right intentions. Miller builds upon this and suggests that for the successful outcome of performative acts, the gestures, movements, dresses, precious objects, and the architectural setting are essential (2000).

With the performative turn, the concept has moved away from linguistics and has been taken up and developed further within the fields of deconstruction, aesthetic theory, and gender theory (Burke, 2005). Jacques Derrida builds upon the concept to include all kinds of language
and cultural phenomena, from scholarly writing to utterance itself (1962). In his conceptualization, he moved away from the emphasis on the speaker, the “authorial intention” (Salih, 2002, p. 90), and the constraints on the performative act by context. Derrida finds these concepts – that are deemed essential by Austin for an act to be performative – limiting and asserts that the texts or speech acts can be used outside the original author’s intention, out of their original and intentional context; through reiteration and (re)citation. In this way, as an utterance can be cited later in different contexts, it produces and continues to create new meaning, even after the ‘death of the author’ – after it is decontextualized and becomes anonymous (Claeys & Keunen, 2007).

In the 1990s, the concept became firmly established within the humanities with the writings of Judith Butler, whose “gender performativity” is based on Derrida’s idea that language can be cited and reiterated. She specifically uses this concept to illustrate that gender identities are produced and inscribed through repeated acts and gestures within specific cultural contexts (Snickare, 2012). She echoes Simone de Beauvoir’s (1989) infamous proposition that one is not born but becomes a woman and questions the discursive mechanisms that transform the human subject into a gendered one (Butler, 1990). She does not deny the physiological differences between the male and the female sexes, reproductive organs, hormones, and chromosomes; however, she argues that it is the heteronormative gender discourse that is rooted in a culture that gives meaning and social consequences to these biological differences (Aly, 2010). “Gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which ‘sexed nature’ or ‘natural sex’ is produced and established as ‘pre-discursive’, prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts” (Butler, 1990, p. 112).

Butler argues that gender is not an internal way of being that can be read externally as an “identity”, but in fact, a cultural fiction. She argues that gender is not internal but a continuous, unstable, and socially constructed process, which is enforced through a series of repetitive and
performative acts. Performativity, simply, is the formation of the subjects, which creates what it tries to describe/categorize through embodied social practices (Cavanaugh, 2015):

Acts, gestures and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, that produce on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a cause. Such acts, gestures, enactments generally constructed are performative in the sense that the essence of identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means. That the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality. This also suggests that if the reality is fabricated as an interior essence, that very interior is an effect and function of a decidedly public and social discourse... an illusion discursively maintained for the purposes of the regulation of sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive heterosexuality (Butler, 1990, p. 173).

For Butler, the ‘script’ of gender performance is passed on from generation to generation through socially established meanings. As humans are social beings, most actions are witnessed, reproduced, and internalized, eventually taking on a performative quality (1998). In the acts of convention through repetition, we make them ‘real’ to some extent – the enactment of gender norms has real consequences. Gender is instituted through the stylization of the body; the enactment of the gender norms in the most mundane ways (our gestures, movements, the way we dress, with whom we socialize, how we talk, etc.) are accumulated, eventually becoming the normative standards, and through their continuous repetition they maintain power and hegemony. According to Butler, as those actions become internalized, the concept of gender (binary) is legitimized and eventually accepted as a natural (Butler, 1993). Therefore, gender becomes “not exactly what one is nor is it precisely what one has” (Butler, 2004, p. 42), but instead, it is a “doing” through an unending sequence of acts and performances (Garcia-Ventura & Zisa, 2017).

So, what does Butler mean when she says gender is performative? She intentionally avoids making explicit definitions of performativity as it is difficult to say what it is and what it is not and argues that it should be explored contextually: “Performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body,
understood, in part, as a culturally sustained temporal duration” (Butler, 1990, p. 15). Drawing from Austin (1962), she emphasizes notions of iterability and citationality through which normative standards of hegemonic identities are communicated through constant reiteration, which cites previous performances (1993). Leach also refers to these notions as a mime and the mimetic. The norms of female behavior are naturalized by constant repetition of the acts aiming to achieve the phantasmatic ideal heterosexual normativity (2004). The gendered actions define ideal norms for gender identity, which are constantly repeated and legitimize the existence of such norms causing them to be perceived as natural or instinctual. The behavior patterns of both sexes are propagated through a desire to conform to the dominant gender norms to belong and avoid conflict. In other words, before doing gendered acts, nobody is gendered, and gender as an identity is not stable, only constituted through a stylized repetition of acts (Butler, 1990, p. 179). There is no such thing as gender identity outside the “social temporality” it is constituted (Butler, 1990, p. 141).

But what dangers lie in assuming the gender identity is intrinsic, and women as an identity exist naturally? Butler and other feminist theorists answer this by saying that the existence of women brings men into being by women’s status of “otherness”; their relatively marginal and invisible status in society normalizes men’s dominance. Women’s existence as “not men” leads to a focus on women’s (lack of) rights marginality and causes the opposite effect it aims to achieve by constituting hegemonic manhood and subordinated womanhood (Grosz, 1994; Irigaray, 1985; Nagel, 2000).

2.1.2. Construction of Ethno-Sexual Identities

Butler anticipated applying these concepts outside the reach of gender identity and their redeployment in “urgent and expanding political purposes” (1993, p. 228). Feldman discusses
that Butler’s explanation of gender being the “reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constraints” (Butler, 1993, p. 2) can also be used to analyze different power relations (2005). Following these discussions, if gender is instituted through mimicry of the dominant gender norms, it can be discussed that imitation lies at the heart of all cultural practices (Leach, 2003). Butler’s notion of performativity not only explains the deep-rooted gender constructs in the society but also brings the possibility of conceptualizing the discursive construction of alternative identities, such as class, race, and ethnicity. Similar to gender, ethnicity is not simply a given, but it is something that is acted out and reproduced in everyday lives (Clammer, 2015).

Like gender, ethnicity is performed through various recognizable behaviors, cultural activities, and bodily presentations, and it is dynamic, unstable, and simulated as it relies on the reiteration of the ideal ethnic behavior, without knowing origins of the original “script” (Schechner, 2013, p. 34). Nagel asserts that “ethnicity is both performed – where individuals and groups engage in ethnic “presentations of self”, and performative – where ethnic boundaries are constituted by day-to-day affirmations, reinforcements, and enactments of ethnic differences” (2000, p. 111). In the performance of ethnic norms to fit into the related hegemonic construction of identity, the aim is not to find similarities within the group but to emphasize the differences from others, which can be used to construct and sustain boundaries between (ethnic) groups. Feldman further argues that essentialized subjects – nation, state, immigrant, minority, man, woman, etc. – are constructed socially through repetitive acts and by means of opposing positions in reference to each other. The viability of one identity requires the inscription of threat in the form of its putative opposite (2005). This allows for the separation of the insider from the outsider and the hegemonic from the counterhegemonic, revealing the dominant center where dominant ethnic ideals are performed (Nagel, 2000).
The boundaries created through performative acts that divide the population in terms of ethnic lines can be identified based on differences in religion, skin color, language, national origin, and culture. While in some cases, these differences can be unimportant, in other cases, they can be the basis for social and spatial segregation and conflict. For this reason, religion, skin color, language, and culture are not inevitable and automatic bases for ethnic differentiation but are “potential bases” where ethnic identities are separated (Nagel, 2000, p. 112). Explaining when boundaries become the source of conflict, Duara explains that the boundaries between two groups can be soft or hard. While soft boundaries between two groups do not cause any problems when one breaches the said border, the hardening of boundaries causes conflicts as boundary breaching is perceived as an invasion (1996). This can be observed within migratory contexts, with the diaspora populations. Within the context of German guest-worker migration, the reactions towards East European immigrants were much different from the reactions towards Middle Eastern and North African immigrants. Following Duara’s argument, the reason behind this can be interpreted as the lack of perceived difference in terms of skin color and religion. While East European immigrants had differences in terms of their ethnicity, especially the fact that they were Christian like Germans prevented such differences from forming hard boundaries. On the other hand, in the case of Turkish immigrants, we can observe the hardening of boundary, as they transformed from much-expected guest-workers, Gastarbeiter, to the problem group, Muslims of Germany.

Nagel connects ethnicity and gender and discusses that ethnic boundaries are also sexual boundaries as correct enactments of gender identities are the most regulated and enforced performances based on the constructed ethnic norms (2000). Gender is a key principle that stabilizes the immigrant ethnicities (Fortier, 1999). The cores of the ethnic cultures are usually based on the gender regimes constituted by appropriate heterosexual, masculine, and feminine behavior. “Our women” (pure, pious, mothers) and “our men” (strong, brave, hardworking) are
positioned against “their women” (impure, sinful, wicked) and “their men” (degenerate, cowardly, weak). Proper gender and sexual behavior are of utmost importance, not only for the honor and respectability of the subject but also for the survival of the entire minority group. Therefore, the sexual demeanor of group members is heavily surveilled and policed by the members of the ethnic group. In addition, this policing can also come from the people who occupy positions as outsiders to the ethnic group and have a highly stereotypical view of the constructed “other”. Nagel calls these simulated borderlands that lie between ethnic groups “ethno-sexual frontiers” that are heavily surveilled and supervised, regulated, and restricted to protect the idealized ethnic identities. As women are burdened with the responsibility to sustain ethnic and national identity, they usually end up at the receiving end of heavy control and policing (2000, pp. 112–114). This is illustrated by the pressure later-generation immigrant women feel. While first-generation immigrants bring their habitus their embodied cultural norms with them, later-generation women experience tension caused by their acculturation in two different (and sometimes contradicting) cultures based on two different sets of norms. Rudrappa (1999) exemplifies this by the experiences of young Indian-American women and the pressure they feel from trying to reconcile two sets of norms. On the one hand, their families expect them to perform their traditional conservative femininity as opposed to the “weak and promiscuous” American women, while on the other hand, American society expects them to resist their traditional gender roles that view Indian women as subservient to men and assimilate to the “superior” host-culture.

2.1.3. Performativity, Space, and Belonging

Butler’s emphasis on the discursive construction of performative acts does not exclude the value of the form. Contrary to the criticisms that Butler’s theory pays little attention to
material practices or the materiality of bodies (see Busby, 2000), Leach discusses that Butler’s work, *Bodies That Matter*, defines (gender) identity through what is essentially corporeal philosophy. He discusses that space provides a stage for the performances to be acted out, and certain associations are projected onto space forming spatial identities and identifications. He argues that defining the notion of belonging in terms of associations and identifications that are formed through everyday practices allows us to go beyond the limitation of simple narrative (2003). This notion of belonging as a product of performativity allows us to integrate social and spatial narratives of identification. By articulating belonging in terms of meaning given to the (built) environment through collective and individual behavior, the social act of belonging and the spatial act of territorialization are integrated and form a discursive and socio-spatial performance of belonging.

In Butler’s framework, matter does not exist outside of discourse (Leach, 2003). Echoing Leach, Fraser also observes that “matter does not “exist” in and of itself, outside or beyond discourse, but is rather repeatedly produced through performativity, which brings into being or enacts that which it names” (1999, p. 111). This has clear consequences on the discourses of identity and space. According to Butler, any identity is performed or “acted out” has the potential to alter space. The space where identity is performed can be conceptualized as a stage, and after several performances, the space loses its neutral character. It will be ingrained with the activities that occur there, deriving its meaning from the activities that take place (or have taken place) there. The space will no longer be defined by the imaginations and aspirations of who conceived it, but in fact, its definition will be altered by the lived performances of its users, being haunted by the memories and experiences associated with this space (Leach, 2003).

When discussing performativity and space, there is a misunderstanding that collapses particular political ideologies into certain physical forms. This flawed logic proposes that imbuement of certain forms with certain content, as in “democratic” forms or “feminine” forms.
Leach challenges this notion and asserts that forms do not carry any intrinsic meaning or political potential (1997). He further argues that it would be a mistake to map certain activities to certain norms, thinking those activities are consequences of those forms (2003). Extending this way of thinking to Butler’s performativity, the gendering of space depends more on the performances inscribed to that space rather than the forms themselves. As space is neutral initially, it can only become gendered through association. These associations are ascribed to space; however, these associations are not constructed based on the material properties of those spaces but rather activities and performances that take place there.

On the other hand, while the performative construction of the space causes it to be defined according to the dominant ideology, it also allows for its transformation. Based on the discussion above, a space used for particular activities will attain a specific character over time. However, as the memories and associations related to old performances fade and new activities start to be performed, the space can accrue a new character. The “masculine”, “fascist”, “colonial” spaces may transform into “feminine”, “democratic”, “postcolonial” spaces. Often such transformations are strategic in their reappropriations, aimed at erasing the memory of the previous associations (Leach, 2003).

This relationship between the performativity and the material space allows for the construction of a discursive form of belonging. The constant discursive performances that cite each other inscribe particular meanings and associations on space, and similarly, through these everyday performances, space is constantly reproduced and reinscribed on the individual forming patterns of attachments and belongings (see also (Fortier, 2000; Gregson & Rose, 2000; Leach, 2005). Vikki Bell, who explores the relationship between performativity and belonging, simply defines belonging as identification with a particular place. She expands this argument and suggests that communities mark their territory through spatial performances, which in turn causes
space to lose its neutral character and reproduces a now “meaningful” space forming place attachments and belongings (1999).

As in other performative acts, principles of repetition and citational reiterations are central to the formation of belongings. Leach draws from psychoanalytic theory and explains repetition through miming and mimicking, which in turn has the potential to control the trauma. With the repetition and performance of certain identities, one can overcome alienation within the unknown and inscribe the self in the space. Through repetition of spatial practices, certain groups appropriate the space and demarcate it as their own. This demarcated space becomes the site of projection, where memories of previous experiences are projected onto this physical space. While this projection takes place actively, at the same time, passive introjection of others’ experiences take place. As a result of these processes of projection and introjection, the norms of belonging to a certain group are defined and consequent identification is achieved (2003). What is important here is that, similar to the performative norms, these reiterative processes naturalize the rituals performed through the spatial acts of the body, making their reference and validity unclear. These corporal acts become so naturalized that they form the basis for belonging and exclusion while their original citations fade over time.

Applying this logic to diaspora communities, Anne-Marie Fortier explores how ethnic Italians in London create borders of their “imagined community” through highly stylized rituals, often conducted within the religious context, Catholicism in her context. She argues that these ritualized performances are not only about practicing Catholicism but about manufacturing historical and cultural belongings, through which the norms and borders of belonging are formed. Through corporal performances of these acts, members of this community reconnect and recall places elsewhere and achieve to fit in (1999). Especially within the diaspora contexts, where identification with a place is more complex, and the spatial boundaries are blurred, the vagueness of such boundaries leads to an increase in awareness of these boundaries. The fear of feeling
placelessness or in-betweenness provokes a stricter pattern of territorialization, forming more 
strict norms for identity performances among the members of the imagined communities. The 
performance of belonging in such strict communities depends on the correct repetition of the 
norms that differentiate them from the “other”. Ong and Peletz summarize this by saying that “the 
discursive constructions of bodies are frequently plotted against divisions that maintain social 
order” and women’s bodies specifically are used to symbolize the limits of the social boundaries 

However, Leach’s construction of belonging as a product of performative and discursive 
use of space does not consider the power differentials that exist in a community. In the previous 
section, I have discussed that gender is a crucial principle that stabilizes (ethnic) identities. 
Following this, if gender regimes dictate the construction of identities, then they would also lead 
to different formation of belongings for men and women. Being bound by the norms of 
communal identity and belonging makes members of the community hostages of the socio-
cultural power patterns that are remembered (Bell, 1999). Fenster challenges Leach’s 
construction of belonging as a form of “territorialization” and claims that “appropriation” of 
space is reserved for the people placed higher in the power relations, who have access to these 
spaces. Women, who commonly have relatively lower access and control over the space, forge 
their belonging in different ways (2005). With their “rightful” access to the public, men’s claims 
to the right to belong is a given, while women usually work surreptitiously within the layers of 
identity discourses that subordinate them to achieve their right to belong. The ways Turkish-
Muslim women among the congregation of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque reclaim their agency in 
different ways are discussed comprehensively in Chapter 6.
2.1.4. Agency, Discipline, and Resistance

If (gender) identity is grounded on stylized repetition of acts based on simulated norms, the possibility of a different sort of repeating that breaks, troubles, or subverts the established style, becomes possible (Butler, 1988). Vicky Bell notes that certain ideals of (gender) identity do not fit into the rules defined by the dominant normative matrix, and there are risks and consequences of transgressing these hegemonic norms and boundaries. In other words, the *phantasmic ideal* of the normative structure is surveilled and policed constantly (1999, p. 140). On the other hand, these alternative performative acts bring the possibility of resistance against the normative standards as they do not have any claim to justice and are historical and rely on their continuous citation and repetition by subjects to preserve their status quo (Butler, 1990). Since the (gender) identities are not stable, the norms of a group can change in time through constant different reiterations. Such acts of resistance that are heavily policed and punished initially have the potential to transform and replace the dominant norms.

Butler’s performativity, as it was conceptualized in Gender Trouble, was criticized by other feminist scholars (see N. Fraser, 1995; Nelson, 1999; Nussbaum, 1999 on lack of agency; Schwartzer, 2017 for lack of non-Western discourses; and Namaste, 2009 for lack of intersectionality). One of the significant criticisms of her work focuses on the lack of conscious agency and reflexivity in her conceptualization. Nelson specifically refers to her over-abstraction of the subject and argues that this sort of conceptualization leaves no space for “theorizing conscious reflexivity, negotiation or agency in the doing of identity” (1999, p. 331). She further discusses that conceptualizing the subject at this level of abstraction prevents us from seeing human behavior as a combination of different layers of institutions and practices. A more nuanced use of performativity would not separate the abstracted subject from the “lived” experience and account for subjects’ potential to perform social change (1999).
Responding to criticisms, Butler turns to Foucault to clarify her position on agency in The Psychic Life of Power (1997) by referring to the unattainability of perfect repetitions of the norms of the hegemonic ideal, which provides an opportunity for the agency. According to her, each structure of norms, with its iterability and repetition, simultaneously contains its possibility of undoing, through its failure, reappropriation, or resignification for purposes other than consolidation of norms (1993). Aly concludes Butler’s approach to the agency by saying, “the compulsion to repeat is where agency is located” (Aly, 2010, p. 74). As discussed previously, since imitation and mimicry lie in the heart of all cultural practice, and perfect reiterations are not possible, different versions of the performance defined by the idealized norms contain their own subversion and destabilization, reinforcing them (Leach, 2003).

But what does subversion mean, exactly? Subversion is related but cannot be reduced to the acts of parody, displacement, and resignification (Brickell, 2005). Although in Gender Trouble (1990), Butler does not explain what subversion really is, she refers to it later in Bodies That Matter and suggests that it is “working the weakness in the norms” (1993, p. 237). One of the examples Butler uses to explain subversion of the dominant gender norms is the performance of drag. According to Butler, drag is a “desire for a kind of radical theatrical remaking of the body and … a fully phantasmatic transfiguration of the body (Butler et al., 1993). The male subject that performs drag acts completely outside the norms of masculinity defined by the hegemonic discourse by showing that men are capable of acting out of their gendered identities. However, it is important to note that, while destabilizing this hegemonic power, the subject also reaffirms the female gender norms by accentuating the female glamor. In this case, subversion can be liberating as it allows “a” to be “b”, but it is also limiting as it limits what “b” is.

In his dissertation on British-Arabs, Aly likens the performance of hyphenated, hybrid identities to drag and conceptualizes it as subversive performance. In his analysis, he suggests that the performance of hybrid British-Arabness can be taken as a transgressive act, as it
“museumizes” and idealizes the cultures that make up the hybrid identity and leads to their parodied performance. Arabs in London, who are trying to perform their Arabness without the socio-cultural context that they can cite, try to find a point of reference for their performances. This leads them to yearn for the quasi-magical Arab golden age, which posits the British as the other. While this causes especially young British-Arabs to experience internal identity conflict, it also leads them to perform a strict Arabness in a way that even Arabs in their homeland do not practice (2010, p. 256-257). Drawing from my own research, within the context of Marxloh, I observed a similar trend. In an attempt to fix their Turkish identity, which is not possible according to Butler as identities are ever-changing, Turkish-Germans perform their Turkishness in a very exaggerated way, citing the values of the Ottoman society, which they consider as the “golden age” of Turkishness. This leads to parodied and exaggerated performances of Turkishness that even seem out of place in contemporary Turkey.

On the other hand, while Butler suggests that subversion is a part of performances of identity, it is a highly regulated process. Aly suggests that as agency lies in the heart of reiterative performances, repetition of norms is constantly policed and surveilled (2010), contrary to many interpretations of performativity providing identities that are “radically free” (Butler et al., 1993, p. 32). Butler questions the possibility of living outside the norms and limitations of the hegemonic discourse. She draws from her own experience and shows what happens to people who try to leave the act of being “normal”. She talks about her uncle, who was “anatomically anomalous” (she later refers to her uncle as gender-troubled (1992), which is interpreted as him being transgender), was taken away from his family and friends (1990, p. 20). This personal example she mentions in the prologue of her text signals Butler’s point of view on what happens to the rule- (or norm) breakers. The established norms in a society that are performed constantly prevents people from accepting alternative performances and lead them to discipline the deviants.
The rejection and removal of alternative performances of identity show that all forms of
gendering are constructed; only some are privileged as authentic (Aly, 2010).

According to Butler’s performativity, the dominant discourse and its “normal” subjects
are in fact created through the creation of their opposites; it is only through their exclusion, the
border for that separates “normal” from “abnormal”, or insider from the outsider, can be
constituted. At this point, she draws from Foucault’s (1977) disciplinary mechanisms, especially
panoptic surveillance (Butler, 1990). She explains that the aim of surveillance, according to
Foucault, is not to subjugate less powerful bodies but to ensure that individuals take control of
their own bodies and control them within the socially and culturally defined norms (Butler et al.,
1993). According to this system, discipline is attained through punishment and social
surveillance, and consequent self-surveillance, reinforcing the reproduction of embodied norms
and established standards within society. By practicing this form of surveillance, the members of
a group are socialized to practice the dominant norms, in terms of sexuality and ethnicity, so that
they would not become “abnormal” or “outsider” and be removed or excluded from the group
(Jordan & Aitchison, 2008). Bell discusses this insider/outsider dynamic in terms of visibility and
concludes that when other “abnormal” identities become visible, they endanger the existence of
the “norms” and “normals” of hegemonic order (1999). In other words, disciplining non-
normative performances is essential for the cultural survival of the normal.

Butler’s performativity, with its recently-conceptualized focus on agency, allowed for the
emergence of many analyses that focus on non-Western societies that moves beyond the
simplistic registers of submission and patriarchy (see Abu-Lughod, 1990 for a review of this
scholarship). This scholarship focused on the “oppressed” Muslim women and showed the
complex ways they reclaim their agency. While this approach was very productive in providing a
multi-dimensional insight into the lives of Muslim women, Mahmood argues that it limits agency
through the binary relationship between resistance and subordination. The female subject, if she
is not being subordinated by challenging the traditional male domination, resists and opposes the hegemonic order. In this form of analysis, Agency is reduced to resistance against the custom and tradition and becomes a feminist prescription for women to change their oppressed status. To overcome this, Mahmood suggests that the notion of agency should be detached from progressive politics. For this reason, it should be noted that agency does not always take the form of subversion and resistance, but the way one inhabits and chooses to adopt the norms should be considered as moments of agency (2006). This becomes a crucial comparative framework in my research, as discussed in Chapter 6, to recognize the various moments of agency in the daily lives of mosque-going Turkish-Muslim women; while some women openly subvert and challenge the existing norms, some women work within these norms to reclaim their agency.

2.2. Part II: Identity Discourses that Construct the Turkish-Muslim Women in Germany

The previous section focused on the theoretical construction of gender performativity and its relation to ethnicity, belonging, and resistance. On the other hand, without defining the norms and what influences their construction, it would not be possible to understand how they are performed. In the case of diaspora populations, who are faced with norms both from their home and host cultures, it becomes especially important to understand the identity discourses that reproduce and organize their everyday behavior. The following section focuses on the identity discourses that construct Turkish-Muslim women in Germany.

Immigrants, who relocate and try to find their ways in a new society, face many uncertainties. They find themselves in places with very much different lifestyles, morals, and values than they have been used to. In such circumstances where they are faced with contradicting performances, not surprisingly, they start to question their own identity and often find comfort in their familiar “authentic” identities that are defined by tradition and culture and
transferred and legitimized by descent (Akbar, 1995; Timmerman, 2006). It should be noted that the socio-cultural praxis that is cited during the performances of one’s identity can vary significantly within the same ethnic group. For example, when we consider Turkish women living in Western Europe, despite all of them being ethnically Turkish, the lifestyles and performances of younger Turkish women who identify more with the Western way of life and the ones that adopt a more Islamic way of life vary significantly. However, Timmerman’s study on young Turkish women in Belgium reveals that both groups consider themselves Turkish and claim that their socio-cultural praxis was the truly Turkish one (2000). This demonstrates that ethnic identity is somehow independent of the culture that these women were born into and defined through the perceived descent and the transfer of norms (Roosens, 1989). Whether they are more secular or religious-oriented, the Turkish communities living in Western Europe perceive tradition and culture as an important tool for modeling the “new” ethnic identity and defining norms of gendered performances.

On the other hand, it is not only the norms rooted in traditional “home” cultures that define women’s behaviors in immigrant contexts. The host cultures’ discourses on immigrants that define them and separate them as the “others” are as effective as immigrants’ loyalty to their home cultures. In fact, the othering discourse produced in the host countries is a push factor for immigrants to identify themselves with the culture of their home countries passionately. The othering discourse not only defines the “unintegable” immigrants as inferior while positioning the natives as superior but also puts the responsibility of integrating entirely on the immigrants themselves. Feeling excluded and separated, immigrant groups often find solace in the “familiar,” which leads to a reactive ethnicity/religiosity on their part.

Within this context, the experiences of Turkish-Muslim women in Germany are especially significant. Except for a small percentage of women recruited as guest-workers, the majority of the first-generation Turkish immigrant women came to Germany as wives and young
mothers. Unlike their male relatives and husbands, who made space for themselves in the German society through formal work, Turkish women were confined within the limited space of their homes and ethnic neighborhoods, where they were under constant surveillance of their relatives and neighbors. This, coupled with the lack of any integration initiatives from the German government up until the 2000s – almost 50 years after their migration – and the three-fold discrimination they faced in Germany by being Turks, Muslims, and women, led them to find comfort and safety by turning towards the “familiar”; their religion and culture as it is what they have known all their lives (Clarence, 2009; Poggioli, 2008). Imtoual and Hussein conclude that first-generation immigrant groups “freeze” their moral values at the moment of migration (2007) and raise their children with loyalty to this moral code (Ramadan, 2004). This acculturation pattern, which is different and contradicts in some respects to the culture of the society they actually live in, is reproduced as women raise their children according to the culture of their homelands. While later generations are able to break out of the constraints by their socialization in-between two cultures, they are still not able to break completely free from the norms of Turkish-Islam. As my research focuses on the everyday practices of conservative, mosque-going Turkish-Muslim women living in Marxloh, the first part of this section defines the Turkish-Islamic gender norms that are reproduced in Turkey, passed from one generation to another by descent, and are continuously cited by the Turkish residents of Marxloh in their everyday performances of gender and ethnicity. The second part of this section focuses on the discourse created in German media that transformed from an inclusive and welcoming discourse into a separating one that positions Turkish-Muslim women as the symbol of the “other.”
2.2.1. Turkey: Constructing Turkish-Muslim Women

In Turkey, religion, tradition, and politics have always had an interwoven and complicated relationship. The long-term transformation of Turkish society from the strongly Islamic Ottoman Caliphate to forced modernization and secularization post-1923 to the current trend of resurgent Islamic nationalism left women emancipated but not liberated (Arat, 1994; Kandiyoti, 1987; Tekeli, 1995). Müftüler-Baç explains that despite the modernization effects and legal changes, the seemingly bright picture that Turkish women are free of patriarchal norms is an illusion. There still exist serious obstacles to Turkish women’s liberation, and Turkish women remain oppressed by the patriarchal system. Whether it is the modernization efforts that took place in the first half of the 20th century or Erdoğan’s Islamic revivalism that has been taking place in the last two decades, Turkish women suffered from the consequences of both periods. She identified three main factors that lead to women’s subordinate status and comprise patriarchy in Turkey: the Mediterranean culture, Islam, and the Kemalism – secular Turkish nationalism (1999). Since Müftüler-Baç’s article was written during the very early stages of the Islamic revivalism when Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) had not yet become the hegemonic political power, I adapt and expand her framework and argue that the three factors that lead to women’s subordinate status are: the culture of honor in Turkey (Elgin, 2016), Islam and politicization of Islam in the last decade with Erdoğan’s government becoming the ruling power.

2.2.1.1. Turkish Honor Culture and Namus

Nisbett and Cohen propose that unlike in the Western cultural contexts where honor refers merely to strong individual moral character and strength (1996), in circum-Mediterranean regions, the notion of honor is more complex, and it is ingrained in one’s social world to the
extent that “… people automatically respond to events and build reputations, personalities and selves in its [honor’s] terms” (Gregg, 2005, p. 92). It is typically defined as moral and ethical standing and pride that constitutes one’s worth (Peristiany, 1965). In honor cultures, honor is the central value that defines the norms for everyday behavior (Uskul & Cross, 2019) and specifies gender-specific behavior that consolidates the hierarchical positions of men and women in the society.

Turkey’s brand of honor, namus, shares many characteristics with other honor cultures. Turkish namus values the same honor and shame norms that emphasize the patriarchal values, such as male strength, toughness, authority over women, and aggression and female subordination through purity, modesty, and obedience (Vandello & Cohen, 2003). While namus is defined through moral and ethical behavior for men, it refers to sexual purity for women. This sexual purity would not only refer to preserving one's virginity before marriage but also to not behaving in a way that might be interpreted sexually. A woman of namus would not have sexual relations before marriage, but also is a person who would not flirt, dress appropriately (non-revealing clothing), would not be among men whom she does not know, would not spend much time out alone, would not laugh out loud in public, would not go against the authority of men among her family, would not talk back (Arın, 2001). A woman is not only responsible for preserving her sexual purity but also responsible for acting in a way that would not tempt men. This understanding of namus also differs based on social class. While in the middle class, it is the extra-marital sexual behavior that is not tolerated, in the conservative lower-middle-class, even going out alone – even to the grocery store – can be unacceptable (Müftüler-Bac, 1999). This importance ascribed to namus traps women in their social classes and reproduces this patriarchal system of subordination; as women among lower classes are not able to access education and formal work as such institutions would require them to be in the presence of men, therefore
harming their *namus*, their freedom is very restricted, and they cannot escape this status quo because they never obtained the necessary economic and social means to do so.

In Turkey, women are not only responsible for preserving their *namus* for their own social standing and reputation. This responsibility extends to their husband, family, distant relatives, neighbors, and even to their living communities. Women who are reminded that their bodies do not belong to themselves through constant surveillance and control must also police their own behavior not to damage the collective *namus* (Kalav, 2012). Kandiyoti points out the paradoxical relationship of power and subordination and argues that women possess a great deal of power as their simple actions can have devastating effects on their (extended) families. However, this power is by no means a positive one as it is the reason for their continuous control. This power subjects them to external pressure that restrains their behavior and confines them into the private space of the home, limiting their access to the public and police their clothing (1997).

While in theory, both men and women’s improper behavior would damage the whole family’s/community’s honor, in practice, there are different sexual standards for men and women (Glick et al., 2016). This phenomenon is so ingrained in the Turkish culture that many examples can be seen in the everyday Turkish language. Expressions such as “one that does not beat [discipline] the daughter, beats own knees,” “women are the devil of men,” “if the female dog does not wag the tail, the male dog will not pursue” all paint women as innately dangerous and unvirtuous beings that need to be disciplined. On the other hand, the same does not apply to men. For example, the expressions such as “the disgrace of women, the henna of the men’s hand,” or “dirt on a men’s hand” is used to refer to men’s extra-marital sexual activity. While this sort of behavior can easily ruin a woman’s reputation and even lead to her punishment, for men, it is regarded as an expected behavior which even might give attractiveness to men (Sebnem, 2017; Tekeli, 1988).
The idea that a woman’s body does not belong to herself but to her family and society is also legitimized by the Turkish legal system (Kalav, 2012). Despite the efforts in the last decades to prevent the unequal treatment of men and women before the justice system, years of unjust legal practice consolidated sexism and patriarchy within the society. Until 2005, when the law was changed, the crimes committed against women were evaluated as crimes committed against family and social order, not against an individual. In addition to this, the justice system also operates to subordinate women through the value placed on family honor at the expense of women’s welfare. For example, in the case of rapes, the sentence of the rapist can be reduced or simply forgiven if he marries the victim. In this way, the namus of the woman was restored (Decker, 1998). Another example of this is the honor killings, which are commonplace in Turkey among groups of lower socioeconomic status. The existing laws work to victimize women and substantially reduce the sentences of perpetrators because they were defending the “family honor” (Koğacıoğlu, 2007).

All these norms that are presented as virtues to women trap women in such a small area of action that their frame of reference shrinks accordingly, and they internalize the honor-shame dynamic. Glick et al. suggest that Turkish men have straightforward motives for endorsing namus as it provides them social privilege and dominance. On the other hand, Turkish women still seem to support honor beliefs despite being disadvantaged by the same system. Glick et al.’s research questions why women might approve honor beliefs that disadvantage them and, through their model, find out that Islamic religiosity is the main predictor of honor beliefs. The similar gendered notions that are present both in Islam and namus culture blur the line between tradition and religion, making it hard to differentiate pure Islam from Turkish-Islam that introduces additional agents that contribute to women’s oppression. By justifying gender roles and norms of appropriate behavior as divinely mandated, religious belief contributes to the endorsement of namus culture (2016).
2.2.1.2. Islam

Islam is another socio-cultural institution that leads to Turkish women’s subordinate status in society. Despite being a secular country, as 99% of the population is Muslim according to the official numbers, the Islamic norms are highly ingrained in Turkish society. Islam as a religion supports the difference between the sexes and describes men and women as not equal but complementary to each other (Berktay, 1995; Tekeli, 1995). This approach defines different roles for women and men, and it also divides the Islamic social world into two as mahram and namahram, keeping women off the public sphere by conceptualizing them as sources of social disorder, fitna.

Qur’an clearly dictates the differences and inequality between sexes. According to Islam, equality between men and women is not possible due to their different dispositions (fitrat) that are complementary. Similar to the notion of namus, Islam prescribes the norms of Islamic femininity as obedience, loyalty, purity, and honor, and it is the responsibility of both men and women to protect that. In terms of the roles, Islam maintains that men are dominant and are responsible for providing for their wives. Qur’an emphasizes women’s roles as mothers and wives. In this way, Islam defines the public as men’s space as they have to work and provide and private as women’s realm since they are responsible for taking care of their husbands and raising good Muslim children. Women’s role as mothers was also mentioned by the Prophet by his saying: “Heaven is beneath mother’s feet” (Gürpınar, 2006).

Islamic law also endorsed male superiority in family matters and inheritance (Müftüler-Bac, 1999). One of the subjects that privileges men while subordinating women is the issue of testimony. In Islam, two women’s testimony is equated to a man’s:

And bring to witness two witnesses from among your men. And if there are not two men [available], then a man and two women from those whom you accept as witnesses - so that if one of the women errs, then the other can remind her. And let not the witnesses refuse when they are called upon. And do not be [too] weary
to write it, whether it is small or large, for its [specified] term. That is more just
in the sight of Allah and stronger as evidence and more likely to prevent doubt
between you, except when it is an immediate transaction which you conduct
among yourselves. (en-Bakara (2)-282)

Demirel discusses that this is due to the emotional disposition of women. Because they
are easier to get emotional, especially while giving testimonies, women might get excited and
misremember events. To support this claim, he cites another Islamic text and uses the example of
how women undergo biological, physiological, and psychological changes during pregnancy and
menstruation (2016), not based on any scientific studies or facts, instead citing another Islamic
text (Cessas, 1992).

Another subject that endorses inequality between sexes and gender-specific roles is the
subject of inheritance. Similar to women giving testimonies, in the matters of inheritance, women
are entitled to half of what their brothers are receiving. This is justified by the gender-specific
rules in Islam, where men are responsible for providing for their families, and there would be
husbands who would provide for women (Gürpınar, 2006). Diyanet, The Presidency of Religious
Affairs in Turkey also endorses this view and argue that this rule even puts women in a more
advantageous position as they are not responsible for providing for their families, which means
that the money inherited belongs to them only (“Miras ve Vasiyet” 2018). On the other hand,
strong emphasis on the gender-specific roles within the context of financial responsibility creates
social and economic conditions for women that justify their families’ decision to keep them at
home, limiting their access to education and employment.

In Islam, while Qur’an is the primary source of information, the Prophet’s hadiths are
also considered important references. Especially his views on fitna (disorder) reinforce the
inequality of men and women and justify their separation. Fitna can be translated as temptation,
trial, chaos, or discord and can refer to several subjects. The Prophet’s use of in in the hadith “I
leave no fitna after me more harmful to men than women” (Bukhari, 1864) identifies women,
more particularly women’s bodies and sexuality, as threats to social order (el-Cheikh, 1997). Hoffman-Ladd discusses that this aspect of women’s sexuality casts women as the aggressor and men as the victims and implies that women are an antagonistic element of society that must be controlled and separated from men for society to function properly (1987). The idea that women would cause fitna and is the source of chaos transforms women into passive beings that need to be controlled (Kalav, 2012; Mernissi, 1987).

This concept of fitna was used by medieval jurists to shape the early legal discourse on women’s presence in public space, which is still applicable in more conservative societies. As men are threatened by women causing fitna, Qur’an and hadiths advise women to protect men by covering their awra. Awra translates as a weak and vulnerable spot, and within the context of Islam, it refers to the parts of the body that needs to be covered as not to cause fitna (Hoffman-Ladd 1987). While less conservative scholars of Islam interpret this concept to explain that women need to cover their intimate parts (male and female genitals and female breasts), according to more conservative interpretations, women’s entire bodies, even their voices or the perfume they wear are awra and their exposure would bring shame to women and their families (see Fleischer, 1846).

To prevent fitna, Islam also organizes the socio-spatial world by dividing it into two: mahram and namahram. Mahram and namahram contextually define the private/public separation of space. Mahram refers to a specific category of people of the other sex with whom Islam forbids marriage (for a woman, it is her father, brother, grandfather, uncles, nephews, and father-in-law, and for a man, it is his mother, sister, grandmother, aunts, nieces, and mother-in-law) and namahram are those of the opposite sex whose kinship would not represent any impediment for the marriage. Islam restricts the interaction between namahram people (Mazumdar & Mazumdar, 2001). As men are responsible for providing for the family, their presence in public is legitimized, and women are assigned the domestic space where they can be
among mahram kin, away from the namahram public. If women cannot avoid going out or traveling, they are prescribed to do so accompanied by a male mahram relative and behave according to the norms of Islamic femininity, which would separate them from the non-Muslim women (Yıldız, 2019).

As a final comment, it should be noted that Islamic discourse on women is diverse and has evolved over time, making it impossible to separate original hadiths from the fabricated ones, leading to many interpretations. Turkish government’s interpretation and approach to Islam have transformed substantially with the changes that took place in the political sphere, which will be discussed in the following section. In addition to this, Islam as a belief system is confined mainly within the private domain of the believer, acting as suggestions for Muslim men and women, not norms. Kadıoğlu discusses that it is not the religious but the political views of Islam that pushes its way into the public realm transforming the personal into political (1994).

2.2.1.3. Politics

Since the outset of modernization attempts after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, women’s bodies, sexuality, and public visibility have been the focus of the social, cultural, and political discourses to create an authentic identity (Durakbaşa, 1998; Kadıoğlu, 1998). The tension between Turkey’s Kemalist (named after the founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) modernization project and the Islamic movement, which sees itself as an alternative to secular modernism, has always been the cause of political, socio-cultural, and identity crises in Turkey. This tension in the political sphere made itself public, creating and maintaining strict boundaries through ubiquitous dichotomies such as modern vs. conservative, veiled vs. unveiled, modest vs. sexually assertive while conceptualizing women’s bodies as markers of authenticity (for a complete discussion, see Göle, 1991). While Turkey, especially
during the republican period between 1923 and 1950, has attempted to distance itself from the traditional and conservative norms through several civil reforms and to align itself with Western modernism, these attempts led to polarization in the society as %75 percent of the population were living in the rural areas and were very attached to the traditional conservative norms. The migration of these conservative people from rural to urban areas eventually led to the rise of Islamism, bringing the tension between secular modernism project and conservative traditionalism into the urban scene (Oz, 2014). Utilizing this rising Islamism that started in the 1980s, Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2001, establishing a conservative regime that reinforced the secular vs. Islamist divide in the society. By distancing themselves from the secular national identity, AKP’s political project uses an anti-feminist and pro-Islamist discourse that emphasizes and consolidates the conservative values and establishes a highly regulatory gender regime (Altunok, 2016; Cindoglu & Unal, 2017; Korkman, 2015). In particular, to reinforce the conservative gender regime, they primarily utilize women’s bodies and sexualities.

AKP’s social, cultural, and political discourse, which has become more authoritarian after 2011 with Erdoğan’s presidency system, promotes a conservative Islamic lifestyle. One of the most effective instruments AKP uses to reinforce this conservative lifestyle and traditional gender roles is their stance on the family politics (Korkman, 2015; Yılmaz, 2015). In AKP’s conservative politics, women are first and foremost defined within the context of their families as they raise the good Muslim next generation and are prescribed traditional gender roles (Çtak & Tür, 2008). In this discourse, women became subservient to family unity, and their contribution to society was reduced to them being obedient mothers and wives (Cindoğlu & Ünal, 2017). This can specifically be seen from the transformation of the Ministry of Women and Social Policies into the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in 2011. The education resources for families provided in their website reinforce the subordinate status of women (Cinmen, 2011):
A working mother should never forget that her primary duty is being a housewife. The most important duty of a mother is to be a wife to her husband, a mother to her child, and a lady to her home. (Çalışan Kadınlar Rehberi [Handbook of Working Mothers], 2011)

The element that is a threat to the structure of the family is women imitating and mimicking what is trendy. (Aile Rehberi [Handbook of Family], 2005)

The father arrives home in the evening. The food is not ready. Mother did not cook while she was supposed to (...) It is tiring to come back home after dealing with the traffic in the big cities. This means that the head of the family is already stressed out from work and traffic when he arrives home. (Çakmakli, 1997 explaining the reasons behind domestic violence)

These publications were archived and taken off the website after many women activists filed and published complaints (Cinmen, 2011).

AKP’s regulatory gender regime can also be seen in their numerous declarations reproducing the traditional family roles and their increasing emphasis on family and women’s duties to preserve family unity. This discourse reproduces the heterosexual, conservative Turkish family structure and leaves alternative practices, including different sexual orientations, cohabitations, and even ethnicities outside (Baba, 2011; Erten, 2015). Some examples of these declarations are:

I don’t believe in gender equality. That’s why I prefer to say equal opportunities for men and women. Men and women are different but complementary to each other (Erdoğan’s speech from his meeting with women’s organizations reported by Vatan Newspaper, “Kadına Erkek Eşit Olamaz!,” 2010)

Our religion has given women the highest position in society: the position of motherhood. It has also laid heaven under mother’s feet, not your fathers’ but your mothers’ … You can’t explain this to the feminists because they reject motherhood. But those who understand are enough; we say, we continue with them (Erdoğan’s speech from the International Women and Justice Summit reported by BBC Türkçe, “Erdoğan: Kadın-Erkek Eşitliği Fıtrata Ters,” 2014)

Nobody knows what takes place in those houses [referring to co-ed student housing]. All kinds of dubious things may happen [in those houses] … Then, parents cry out, saying, ‘Where is the state?’ These steps are being taken to show that the state is there. As a conservative, democratic government, we need to intervene. (Erdoğan’s remark on co-ed student housing reported by Today’s Zaman, “Erdoğan Sets National Agenda with Remarks on Students’ Houses,” 2013)
Chastity is so important … It is an ornament for both women and men. [She] will have chasteness. Man will have it, too … He will be bound to his wife. He will love his children. [The woman] will know what is *haram* (i.e., sinful, forbidden) and not *haram*. She will not laugh in public. She will not be inviting in her attitudes and will protect her chasteness … Where are our girls, who slightly blush, lower their heads and turn their eyes away when we look at their face, becoming the symbol of chastity? (Statement by Bülent Arınç, who served as the Prime minister at the time reported by Hürriyet Daily News, “Women Should Not Laugh in Public, Turkish Deputy PM Says,” 2014)

Another critical institute that makes Erdoğan’s political and socio-cultural agenda visible and accessible is *Diyanet*, the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey (see Cornell, 2015) for a detailed analysis). Established in 1924, *Diyanet* has always been used as an ideological apparatus. While in the republican period, it was used to justify and consolidate Turkey’s secular structure, in Erdoğan’s “New Turkey” with its unprecedented expanded functions (and funding), it has become an indispensable instrument in the application of AKP’s conservative ideals (Öztürk, 2018). *Diyanet* functions as an authority to guide Turkish citizens to adopt an Islamic lifestyle by adopting traditional family values (Yanarocak, 2015). Legally speaking, *Diyanet*’s rulings carry no weight, but their discursive power is extremely influential on Turkish people who follow a traditional lifestyle (Cornell, 2015). In 2011, following the transformation of the Ministry of Women and the Family into the Ministry of Family and social policies, the president of *Diyanet* at the time, Mehmet Görmez, signed a corporation protocol with the ministry which aimed to preserve the values of the traditional Turkish family and strengthen the family bonds through social work. Through this protocol, *Diyanet* became an official authority in producing a moral discourse that draws norms from religio-cultural motifs rather than the secular and liberal ones (Mutluer, 2018). As *Diyanet*’s rhetoric moved towards a religious stance, their discourse on women’s roles and behaviors started redefining women as second-class citizens, who are only recognized as homemakers in the households. The confinement of women within the boundaries of the family was followed by a discourse that admonished their existence in public (Mutluer, 2019, p. 10).
The reach of *Diyanet* does not only stay at home, in fact, but it has also become the primary tool that transfers Turkish-Islamic norms to the diaspora populations. Abroad, *Diyanet* functions through the umbrella organization DITIB, described in detail in Chapter 1. Many Muslim-Turkish people living abroad rely on the diaspora mosques for their primary religious/ethical education and socialization. Turkey answers this demand by sending religious officers from Turkey and supplying them with guidelines and a list of topics to use in their practices. As these religious officers, who internalize the Turkish religio-cultural norms, occupy critical positions in the dissemination of an organizing discourse that echoes Diyanet’s (therefore AKP’s) religious and socio-cultural attitude, the Turkish-Muslims living in diaspora adopt and reproduce the norms of Turkish-Islam defined by namus culture, Islam, and politics.

### 2.2.2. Germany: Othering Turkish-Muslim Women

While immigrant identities are constructed through the norms prescribed to them by their home cultures, the host cultures’ discourses on the “other” are as effective in shaping the ways immigrants view themselves. This discursive construction of the “other” is relational; the hegemonic majority has the authority to label, categorize and create the other that is usually constructed as inferior to them. This allows the majority to exercise and assert power over the “other,” simultaneously consolidating their dominance (Foucault, 1977). In immigration debates, the host societies become host societies only in relation to immigrants, and their identities become dependent on immigrants’ perceived and produced differences. Therefore, the construction of immigrant identities becomes a dialectical process constructed by the home and the host culture through the definition of the respective other (Ehrkamp, 2006).

This othering allows natives to stabilize their identity while providing them a sense of superiority; the immigrants are the ones that failed as they were not able to live up to the
expectations of the normality the host societies set forth. In the case of the Turkish-Muslims living in Germany, this discursive construction framed them as other, however, the definition of the “otherness” did not remain stable. Turkish immigrants were welcomed to Germany as Gastarbeiter (guest workers), later became Ausländer (foreigners), and finally transformed into the problem group, “Muslims of Germany.” By constructing German as the opposite of the “traditional Turkish” (White, 1997), the requirements of assimilation and integration, which requires the Turkish immigrants to become similar to Germans, instead reproduces the differences between two cultures, making adaptation impossible. This, in turn, leads to the reproduction of the discourse that deems Turkish immigrants not integrable.

A striking aspect of European debates about integration is their focus on gender-related issues and the Muslim women, who are the visual expression of the difference between the native and the immigrant cultures. It is through the image of the Muslim women that the objections to Islam and Islamic difference are articulated in German discourse (Chin, 2010). However, this gendered framing is not a new phenomenon. Even before the Turkish women were assigned another layer of identity through Islam, the image of oppressed Turkish women became the symbolic representation of the incommensurable cultural difference by being portrayed both as passive victims of Turkish patriarchy and active threats to German modernity. This can clearly be seen in the sixteen-page article published in 1990, in Der Spiegel, one of Germany's most influential, center-left publications with the title “Knüppel im Kreuz, Kind im Bauch” [Yoke on the Shoulders, Child in the Womb]. The article has drawn many criticisms as it constructs a stark narrative of Turkish women’s life through violence, abuse, discrimination, and constant social control by basing it on a mix of crime reports, anecdotal evidence, and interviews with Turkey-experts and Qur’an (Yıldız, 2012). The excerpt taken from the article shows the objectifying attitude masked by a sentiment of concern:
The suffering of many Turkish women, whose flowing robes and old-woman-like headscarves often enough to cause mockery and malice, is not an issue for trade unions or political parties - it is suppressed. Turkish women are not voters; they are the very least of their [unions and parties] concerns.

On the street, they are subjected to the constant discrimination through open or hidden xenophobia, inside in their own four walls they are helpless against the violence of the men - hardly any other group of the population ekes out a more deplorable existence in the Federal Republic than the Turkish women and girls. They are terrorized and beaten, they live in constant fear of violent husbands, brothers, or male relatives who have total power over everything (“Knüppel im Kreuz, Kind im Bauch,” 1990, p. 44)

This article strips Turkish women from any agency and only paints them as powerless who have no say or control over their lives. The article mentions that Turkish women are discriminated; but never clarifies who or what the agents of discrimination are, nor suggests that it should be challenged (Yıldız, 2011). The article does not refer to these points but objectifies women and reduces them to out-of-fashion headscarves and helpless, powerless victims. This discourse of helpless Turkish women already started to appear in German media through Sanders-Braham’s 1975 movie “Shirins Hochzeit” [Şirin’s Wedding] and the influential social investigation by Baumgartner-Karabak and Landesberger called “Die Verkauften Bräute: Türkische Frauen zwischen Kreuzberg und Anatolien” [The Sold Brides: Turkish Women between Kreuzberg and Anatolia] (1978). Through these different forms of media, the gendered discourse establishes the notion of Turkishness that is inferior while distancing Germanness through its civilizational superiority. As a result, this discourse actively asserts Turk’s unalterable alienness and negates any potential Turkish claims of belonging to Germany because of the insurmountable differences it produces through the article (Chin, 2010; Yıldız 2012; Yıldız, 2011).

This discourse that posits Turks as the other has changed, as in the rest of the world, with the events of 9/11 bringing Islam into the focus of public interest. The growing obsession with Islam shifted the focus of these discourses from the Turkish Ausländer towards the Muslim other.
The image of Turkish immigrants in Germany became increasingly Islamized, replacing and reshaping old discourses that focused on ethnic and cultural differences of Turks (Ramm, 2010) (Ramm 2010). This shift can be seen from another Der Spiegel article published in 2004 that focuses on women: “Allah’s rechtlose Töchter: Muslimische Frauen in Deutschland” (Allah’s Daughters without Rights: Muslim Women in Germany) (Figure 2-1).

Figure 2-1 The cover of der Spiegel on November 2004 (source: https://www.pressenza.com/de/2015/10/dem-spiegel-magazin-deni-spiegel-vorgehalten/)
The text is similar to the 1990 article focusing on the violence and abuse Muslim women are subjected to. Although the text’s focus is on the Muslim women, the article is entirely on young women from Turkey, with names of every mentioned women being identifiably Turkish and captions mentioning only Turkish ethnicity, despite Germany being home to many immigrants from different Muslim nations (Figure 2-2). This use of Muslim and Turkish interchangeably is a trend also observed by Korteweg and Yurdakul on their analysis of German newspaper reports on honor-kilings (2009). The article does not explain Turkish-Muslim women’s subordination in terms of ethnic and cultural associations but uses religion as a category for an explanation. When explaining women’s position in society, the text does not cite the textual evidence or rituals but uses Islam as an identity-defining mechanism. Yıldız identifies that “Turkish” has been referenced in the article, but she discusses that it is either utilized synonymously for Muslim or became a subcategory of Muslim (2012).

Figure 2-2 The only image from the article representing Muslim women (source: Allahs rechtlose Töchter, 2004)
This discourse was reproduced in different media as well. The bestselling book “Erstickt an euren Lügen: Eine Türkin in Deutschland erzählt” (Silenced by Lies: A Turkish Women in Germany Tells the Story) which was written by a female Turkish author using the pseudonym İnci Y (2005). This book is usually referred to as an example of the suffering a women experiences because of the Muslim conventions (see Stillhart, 2005; Thelen, 2005), however, the book never mentions any motivations rooted in Islam in narrating the motivations of the women’s abusers. While İnci Y. narrates the highly peculiar story of sexual transgressions of her unstable mother, who forces her to marry a man so that she can continue her adulterous affair with the father-in-law, the reception of the book creates a narrative that prefers to cite Islam for the behavior of İnci Y.’s tormentors (Yıldız, 2012).

The othering Turkish-Muslim women experience through these discourses changed labels, but what does this shift mean for Turkish-Muslim women? As they were already othered, how does it affect their already disadvantaged social standing? The shift of the gendered discourse that other Turkish-Muslim women have multiple national and transnational dimensions—the initial discourse functions to other Turkish women by referring them to a clearly bordered ethnonational territory. The later discourse that conceived them as Muslim, on the other hand, puts them in a much more extensive transnational network. Following this, the discursive associations of being Muslim in Germany evokes many different sentiments connected to events such as September 11, Taliban, ISIS, the murder of Theo Van Gogh, the Danish caricature

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4 Theo van Gogh was a Dutch filmmaker who was killed in November 2004 when he was 26 years old by a Dutch-born Muslim extremist. His murder was sparked by a provocative documentary he made with Ayaan Hirsi-Ali, in which quotes from Qur’an were projected on to a naked women’s body, along with testimonies of abused Muslim women. The murderer, Mohammad B, was involved with radical Muslim groups. Van Gogh’s murder sparked a public debate on the cultural compatibility of Islam and the lack of control over mosques in Europe (The Murder That Shattered Holland’s Liberal Dream, 2004)
controversy\textsuperscript{5}, the attack on Charlie Hebdo\textsuperscript{6} and so on. Being associated with a much larger, globally extended, and threatening community, the discourse that emphasizes the difference between Turks and Germans becomes more pronounced and even becomes a source of anxiety.

The 2004 \textit{Spiegel} article expresses this anxiety:

\begin{quote}
The West has felt safe for far too long. Veiled women, forced marriages, oppression and honor killings? Something like this only exists far away, beyond civilization and democracy, somewhere in the Orient. Germany looks anxiously at the cultural implosion in the neighboring country, where the long-guarded consensus society is breaking down into its components (“Allahs Rechtlose Töchter: Muslimische Frauen in Deutschland,” 2004, p. 62)
\end{quote}

In the light of all the acts of terrorism and murders, it is striking that the article identifies veiled women or forced marriages as threats. The Turkish-Muslim women’s practices, bodies, and even their existence once more become the source of the European anxieties, othering discourse, the identity crises, and the break-down of the superior German society. While these discourses make the oppressed and subordinated statuses of first Turkish and then Turkish-Muslim women, their primary concern is not the abused women but the integrity of the German state.

These othering discourses are as influential in determining the everyday performances of Turkish-Muslim women in Germany as the norms defined by their home cultures. Such identity discourses not only separate them from the host society but also deem them unintegrable according to German ideals. Being othered by such discourses, the Turkish-Muslim women find

\textsuperscript{5} In September 2005, Danish newspaper \textit{Jyllands-Posten} made a call for Danish caricaturists and illustrators to draw Mohammad as they saw him and posted all submissions. While the newspaper claimed that it was an attempt to contribute to the debate on Islam and censorship, the caricatures led to protests in Denmark and Muslim countries. What made these caricatures so controversial were 1) the tradition of aniconism, the avoidance of visual depiction of sentient beings but, especially the Prophet, Mohammad, and 2) the sense that the cartoon insulted Mohammad, although not all caricatures were offensive. This issue received media attention from Muslim-majority countries, which escalated into violence led to 250 reported deaths worldwide. These violent acts included attacks on European diplomatic missions, churches, and Christian groups (Henkel, 2010).

\textsuperscript{6} In January 2015 two French-Muslim brothers belonging to the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda forced their way into the offices of weekly satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris, killed 12 people and injured 11 others. The newspaper was included in a number of controversies with their publication of \textit{Jyllands-Posten} cartoons of Mohammad in 2006 and several caricatures depicting Mohammad and making fun of Islamic leaders in 2011 and 2012. This was followed by several associated attacks in the Ile-de-France area killing additional 5 people and injuring 11 others (\textit{Charlie Hebdo attack: France seeks long jail terms in Paris trial}, 2020).
acceptance and belonging in their home culture, however patriarchal and subordinating it might be. While stripping them of any agency by constructing them as the Turkish-Muslim other, paradoxically, such discourses also put the responsibility of integration entirely on the immigrant group by signaling that they are the ones that are responsible for cultural change and adaptation and not disturb the identity of the majority.

2.3. Conclusion: Intersection of Performativity, Gender, and Ethnicity

This chapter introduced the central theoretical notions that I based my analysis on throughout this dissertation; “performativity” and “performance” as means to understand how gender and ethnicity are reproduced in the diaspora mosque and create different patterns of spatial mobility for Turkish-Muslim women. The intersection of ethnic and gender performativities becomes more than the unification of analogies as both refer to socially constructed categories with which people define and identify themselves. These notions are not essential and fixed attributes, but instead, they are discursively constructed through stylized repetitions of bodily acts and consolidated through normative discourses. In other words, subjects are regularly categorized while also categorizing themselves through certain ethnic- and gender-based schema and must reiterate norms associated with such ethnic and gendered designations through bodily acts such as modes of dress, bodily gestures, speech acts, and moral behavior so that they fit into the artificial categories that are defined. It ends up creating a causality dilemma (more commonly known as the chicken and egg paradox), where it becomes difficult to distinguish the causes from the effects. Within the framework of this dissertation, this dilemma occurs between the discourse and the norms where gender and ethnic discourses dictate pre-scripted norms, based on which subjects perform at the same time reproducing the mentioned norms. In contrast, the stylized repetitions of these norms consolidate the discourse. This eventually causes the “death of the
author,” where the origin of the gender and ethnic discourses are lost, and the survival of such norms relies on citations based on their internalizations by the majority. Performing the self becomes an obligation to do gender and ethnicity not as an act of intentionality but as an unknowing act of “performance,” which is set up by a pre-scripted rehearsal (Hey, 2006).

In the second part of this chapter, I argue that the discourses that shape the performances of Turkish-German women among the congregants of Marxloh Merkez Mosque not only rely on values from their homeland cultures but also on how they are perceived in their country of immigration. Peter Niedermüller explains that immigrants are usually not associated with a high social status in late modern societies and are generally viewed as “bearers of exotic cultures.” Through their cultural performances of ethnicity, they reclaim their positions as the “others,” which offers them a degree of self-representation and social respect. Rather than creating ideal blissful hybridity, this process usually leads to a conservatizing impulse where immigrants emotionally invest in their (often imaginary) “homeland” and resist the norms and practices of their host cultures (2000, p. 53-54). By investigating the recent socio-cultural history of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque, Chapter 4 discusses how this tension between the homeland and host-country discourses plays out in the microcosm of a diaspora mosque. The tensions caused by the discrepancy between the earlier generation Turkish-Muslim discourse and the more integrative later-generation Turkish-German discourse led to the breakdown of the inclusivity that drove the construction process of the mosque, eventually affecting Turkish-Muslim women’s use of the mosque space by reproducing different gender- and generation-based spatial regimes. Building on this, Chapter 5 investigates how these dual constructs of discourse influence the belonging and spatial behavior of Turkish-Muslim women within the neighborhood and urban contexts.

One of the main criticisms to the notion of performativity maintains that gender and ethnicity are performed according to pre-scripted practices; it leaves no space for theorizing conscious reflexivity, negotiation, and agency in doing of identity (Nelson, 1999). Butler answers
these criticisms by claiming each structure of norms contains its own undoing through repetition: the failure, reappropriation, and resignification of each repetitive performance open up space for subjects’ agency and resistance (1997). Chapter 6 looks into these moments of how the subjects of my study resist the existing discourses in different ways. My analysis identifies two different patterns Turkish-Muslim women among the congregants of Marxloh Merkez Mosque use to reclaim their agency both in the mosque and urban contexts and concludes that these modes of agency do not rely on the dominant discourse rather group affiliations.

To analyze and understand discourses and performances in play to their full extent, I have adopted an ethnographic methodology and spent a 9-month period as a member of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque congregation. The following chapter outlines the methodological methods, considerations, modes of analysis I have adopted (or arrived to) during my ethnographic encounter.
Chapter 3

Methodology

3.1. Research Approach: Modified Grounded Theory

This qualitative research inquiry aims to gain an in-depth understanding of the integration and sense of identity of Turkish-Muslim women living in Marxloh. To achieve this, I conducted an ethnographic fieldwork in Marxloh by putting the women among the congregation of Marxloh Merkez Mosque in the focus of my project. Through these women’s narratives and spatial behavior and my own observations, I identified patterns of Turkish-Muslim women’s experiences, perceptions, and reflections to explain how they construct and negotiate their dual identities. Specifically, this research addressed the following research questions:

1. How are the primary identity discourses that reproduce and shape gender relations operate in Marxloh Merkez Mosque?
   a. What was the original intent with the mosque's spatial configuration, and how did these discourses permeate and shape the spatial use of the mosque?
   b. How do these discourses influence women’s social and spatial behavior within the mosque?
   c. What do such different discourses reveal about the integration of Turkish-Muslim women?

2. How does the exaggeration of gender discourses in Marxloh Merkez Mosque help determine Turkish-Muslim women’s mobility in the local neighborhood and broader urban context?
a. How do different gender discourses influence Turkish-Muslim women’s perceptions of the Turkish and the German cultures?

b. How do these discourses influence women’s spatial behavior in Marxloh and Duisburg?

c. Does this allow for greater insularity or broader exposure in the neighborhood and urban contexts?

3. In the face of these discourses that organize their everyday behavior, how do Turkish-Muslim women exercise their agency to negotiate their identities in the German public?

A modified version of grounded theory (GT) was used as a process and product of my analysis. The GT approach was developed by sociologists Berney G. Glaser and Anselm L Strauss in 1967 (Kahraman, 2012) and introduced as a ground-breaking methodology (Cutcliffe, 2004). GT is a discovery-oriented research approach aimed at discovering theories through participants’ narratives. GT is an inductive approach where the theory is constructed from the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), as opposed to the deductive approach of the classical qualitative data analysis where a preconceived idea and hypothesis is tested through data (Dey, 2004).

Charmaz and Mitchell (2007, p. 160) summarize the core principles of grounded theory as:

1. Data collection and data analysis take place simultaneously,

2. Themes emerge from the early data analysis, and the research is directed accordingly,

3. Social processes are identified in the data,

4. Abstract categories that explain and synthesize these social processes are constructed inductively from the data,

5. These categories are integrated into a theoretical framework to explain specific causes, conditions, and consequences of the processes.
The early work conducted by Glaser and Strauss (1965 and 1968) used extensive ethnographic field research; however, since then, GT and ethnographic methods have gone into opposite directions despite complementing each other. Ethnographic methods prevent the over-abstraction of the data through GT and ensure rigor, and GT can be used to draw theoretical conclusions from ethnographic data (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2007).

While the earlier applications of the GT achieved to do so as they were more flexible in their systematic data analysis (Charmaz, 1990; Strauss, 1987), recently GT has become mechanical due to the rigid rules prescribing procedures (Creswell, 1998). Despite the many strengths and advantages of GT, such as the systematic data analysis, the inductive reasoning, and the data-driven research, the rigid (or even obtuse as Timonen et al. call it (2018)) structure of the approach dictated by the rules of coding/analysis and the disconnected role of the researcher, makes it unpractical approach to use in fieldwork. Glaser repeatedly declares that the GT researcher should enter the field to be explored, with nothing but an “abstract wonderment of what is going on” (1978, 1992, 1995, p. 22). He claims that the process will emerge during the study, entirely guided by the data, and the theory would be free from the previous research and theories. However, the contemporary research process makes it impossible to enter the field with a *tabula rasa*. Cutcliff mentions, when this is the case, the absence of a research question when entering the field would cause many problems, such as not being able to secure funding, get ethical approval, or even leading to the failure of the research due to lack of direction (2004). The second factor that causes the GT approach to be unpractical is related to the researcher's positionality. Glaser adopted a more positivist approach that placed heavy emphasis on the impartial and unbiased researcher, claiming the reality is objective. His rigid view caused a rift with Strauss, who suggests that it would be naïve to assume that the researcher’s educational and personal background would not affect the analysis and theories produced. At this point, Strauss
and Corbin (1998) developed a constructivist approach to GT, emphasizing the researcher's relationship to the research subject in generating knowledge.

In the light of these mentioned problems, as it is challenging to produce authentic GT research, contemporary applications of GT advocate for the use of adjustable and flexible strategies for data collection and analysis (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2007). Such strategies do not put too much importance on the highly abstract theorizations and take the existing theory, literature, and reflexive position of the researcher into account (Charmaz, 2007). Adapting GT and combining its analytic guidelines with an ethnographic methodology would allow researchers to conduct their fieldwork more efficiently (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2007) and provide an opportunity for research that is informed both by the data itself and literature.

Among the research that adapts GT, I have decided to follow Kinoshita’s (2003) approach that he refers to as modified grounded theory (M-GT). He preserves the core principles of GT: 1. The theory should be grounded on data, 2. Data is categorized using open coding and selective coding, 3. Constant comparison is used to determine categories, 4. Sampling is done through theoretical sampling, and 5. Sampling is completed when theoretical saturation is achieved (Kinoshita, 2003; Akiko, 2018). Kinoshita’s M-GT departs from Glaser’s pure GT in two ways: the role of the researcher and the fragmentation of data. He follows Strauss’s constructivist (and more realistic) approach and recognizes the researcher's interactive role during the data collection and analysis process. He also mentions that the preliminary literature review is necessary to define the research problem and researcher’s theoretical stance, with the condition that the researcher should keep an open mind during their own theory development process. M-GT also differs from GT in its coding procedure. M-GT’s data coding and analysis are not defined strictly, and during the two-phase analysis, the researcher generates open codes where they determine concepts and moves onto selective coding where themes are formed (2003). This
3.2. Data Collection

During the nine months I spent in Marxloh, my data collection combined several techniques used in ethnography. This combination of techniques allowed me to capture how Turkish-Muslim women, as residents of Marxloh perform and negotiate their identity as women, Turks, and pious Muslims. Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson suggest that by using ethnographic methods, the researcher is able to reveal the real meanings of social constructs as it allows him/her to understand people’s world through their everyday life (1983). In this way, it allows the researcher to explore how social spaces are produced and given meanings while bringing out the voices of research subjects (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). This is especially important in feminist research, as women’s daily life and routine are usually invisible and deemed “unimportant,” and ethnographic methods can be utilized to privilege their voices. The schedule of my research fieldwork can be seen in Appendix A.

3.2.1. Participant Observation

The purpose of observation is to provide complementary evidence that cannot be captured in the interviews. Kearns suggests that the rationale here is to gather additional information before, during, and after conducting the other data gathering processes. The aim is to provide a descriptive complement to support the more controlled and formalized methods such as interviews (2010). It also allows the researcher to reformulate the questions to understand the culture better that they study while increasing the internal and external validity of the findings.
acquired through interviews and other methods as it allows for the triangulation of the data (Bernard, 1995).

Following the definition, within the context of my fieldwork, I used participant observation as an initial and supplemental technique to in-depth interviews to capture the difference between what people say they do and what people really do. I conducted my participant observation based on Daphne Spain’s notion of “gendered space,” which theorizes that spatial segregation does not only cause physical distance but also limits women’s access to knowledge, which puts women in disadvantaged social positions. She further argues that in ideal circumstances, women create opportunities for themselves and improve their social standing in society (1992). My observations focused on the following:

a. The architectural character of the mosque and neighborhood space, the physical and non-physical elements that separate women and men both in the mosque and the neighborhood space of Marxloh,

b. The interactions between men and women in the mosque and the neighborhood,

c. The teachings in the mosque that concentrate on an idealized set of behaviors between genders,

d. The overt and covert techniques women use to resist the dominant gendered norms of Turkish-Islam.

Upon entering the field, I started to conduct my observations during the prayer times that take place five times a day. I have especially attended the noon (öğle), afternoon (ikindi), and sunset (akşam) prayers. I usually arrived ten to fifteen minutes before each prayer and stayed until fifteen minutes after their prayer, using the time in-between prayers to conduct my observations in the neighborhood. I also occasionally observed the weekly Friday prayer, which replaces the noon prayer on Fridays. My initial observations during the prayer times introduced me to the field and allowed people to slowly get used to my presence in the mosque, which later provided
rapport with my participants and facilitated my participation in structured mosque activities (Table 3-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>MON</th>
<th>TUE</th>
<th>WED</th>
<th>THU</th>
<th>FRI</th>
<th>SAT</th>
<th>SUN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8AM-10AM</td>
<td>Qur’an course</td>
<td>Qur’an course</td>
<td>Qur’an course</td>
<td>Cooking/baking activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10AM-12PM</td>
<td>Qur’an course</td>
<td>Qur’an course</td>
<td>Lecture for older women</td>
<td>Qur’an course</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12PM-2PM</td>
<td>Noon prayer</td>
<td>Noon prayer</td>
<td>Noon prayer</td>
<td>Noon prayer</td>
<td>Friday prayer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2PM-4PM</td>
<td>Afternoon prayer</td>
<td>Afternoon prayer</td>
<td>Afternoon prayer</td>
<td>Afternoon prayer</td>
<td>Afternoon prayer</td>
<td>Lecture for younger women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4PM-6PM</td>
<td>Sunset prayer</td>
<td>Sunset prayer</td>
<td>Sunset prayer</td>
<td>Sunset prayer</td>
<td>Sunset prayer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-1 Weekly activities in the mosque when the participant observation is conducted

Once I achieved the status as an insider by the mosque community, I found more opportunities to conduct my observations. Especially after I moved to Marxloh in December 2018, I had the chance to observe everyday life in the mosque and the neighborhood more comprehensively. I started to attend Qur’an courses and weekly lectures regularly (both for older and younger women), and women began to feel more comfortable with my presence. I developed a very friendly relationship with the woman mosque officer, Ayşe Hoca, who was a graduate student herself doing her master’s degree. While this factor allowed her to be more open and understanding to my study and even stand up for me against the mosque administration at times, her friendly attitude further increased my rapport in the mosque with other women. In addition to attending the lectures and Qur’an courses, I started to get invitations from mosque attending
women in their social outings or their house meetings. I also began to volunteer in the fund-raising cooking and baking activities that take place on Friday mornings. Finally, in the last months of my fieldwork, I started tutoring elementary and middle school students, mostly children of mosque-attending women, and helped them with their homework.

I refrained from “passive” observation during my observations and instead assumed an active observer role, regularly participating in the activities. As Nelson emphasizes, this was important to establish a normal position and eliminate being stigmatized by the community as an Outsider (1969). During my observations and participation, I avoided taking any notes. Once I was done for the day with my observations, I immediately took detailed field notes. In addition to field notes, when I could, I took pictures of my observations, which at times was difficult due to the setting of my research. In addition to this, whenever I had an outing with one of my participants, I mapped my interactions with women – both in the mosque and the neighborhood, which allowed me to see the areas women use while they did so.

3.2.2. Interviews

Interviews are the major source of data in this project. I used four different interviewing approaches that aimed to explore different kinds of information. Expert interviews aimed at providing context and information about how Turkish-Muslim women are perceived by institutions. Narrative interviews, go-along interviews, and informal conversations, on the other hand, provided information about Turkish-Muslim women’s perceptions of the mosque, the neighborhood, and the city. Over the October 2018 – July 2019 period, I conducted 9 expert interviews, 26 formal narrative interviews, 17 go-along interviews, and more than 50 informal conversations with Turkish-Muslim residents of Marxloh.
3.2.2.1. Expert Interviews

During the initial weeks of my research, as I was trying to get formal access to the mosque to conduct my in-depth interviews with women, I decided to start conducting expert interviews, which provided invaluable information, data, and insight into the lives of mosque-going women in Marxloh. In the context of this research, I define experts as individuals with specific contextual knowledge through their professional or political positions. Meuser and Nagel emphasize that experts derive their “expert status” from the researcher’s interest in their exclusive knowledge and have privileged access to specific information (Ehrkamp, 2002).

The experts that I have interviewed within the context of this study were chosen among people who 1) took part in the mosque construction process, 2) have expert knowledge on Marxloh, and 3) whose work requires them to interact with immigrant women (Table 3-2). Although they occupy privileged positions and have access to knowledge, experts are not free from the constructions of identity and place (Ehrkamp, 2002). The experts that I interviewed, especially those among the residents of the neighborhood, had very strong ties to local residents and institutions and have taken active roles in the social and cultural production of the space through their decision making-roles. For this reason, when analyzing these interviews, I did not assume that experts were impartial and considered how their belonging influenced their opinions and mosque/neighborhood politics.

During all of my expert interviews, I was able to record the conversations, which allowed me to capture the authentic factual information experts provided, which was the main motive to conduct them in the first place. Some of the experts I interviewed helped me establish contacts with the mosque congregation and other neighborhood institutions, and at times, they made contacts on my behalf. The help of the experts at the initial phases of my study both facilitated my access to the field and allowed me to establish a well-defined context for my case study. As I
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Expert Status</th>
<th>Interview Focus</th>
<th>Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Melih E.</td>
<td>Civil Engineer</td>
<td>He acted as the head engineer during the construction process of the mosque</td>
<td>The mosque construction and architecture of the mosque</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zülfüye Kaykın</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Former director of the mosque project</td>
<td>The mosque construction process and her role the Dialogue Center</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyla Özmal</td>
<td>Archive specialist</td>
<td>Worked as the integration officer at the time of the opening of the mosque and started the project</td>
<td>The mosque construction and Turkish immigrants' integration</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hülya Ceylan</td>
<td>Director of the Dialogue Center</td>
<td>Works both with the mosque administration and individually to provide educational programs that concentrate on interreligious dialogue</td>
<td>The role of the Dialogue Center, the social and educational programs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ercan İdik</td>
<td>Economist in Duisburg Development Agency</td>
<td>Worked as economic specialist in the plan to revitalize Marxloh</td>
<td>Transformation of Marxloh since 1999 (the start of the EU URBAN project)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Dietrich</td>
<td>Director of the EG-DU office in Marxloh</td>
<td>As the director of the EG-DU, she provided information on the development of Marxloh</td>
<td>Marxloh's immigrant character</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatma Güler</td>
<td>Director of Mabilda, educational center for young women between ages 6-18</td>
<td>Former lawyer, she works with the daughters of immigrant women and tries to help their mothers in the process</td>
<td>The problems immigrant women are faced with and how to help them through their daughter's education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marijo Terzic</td>
<td>Director of Integration in Duisburg government</td>
<td>Works in-between groups among different immigrant groups and the city and state government</td>
<td>Marxloh as a problem area from the city government's perspective</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursel Kayıkçı</td>
<td>Director of consultancy center in the Evangelical Church in Marxloh</td>
<td>Works in the consultancy office affiliated with the church providing service to the immigrant population in Marxloh</td>
<td>Immigrant problems and the mosque-church relationship</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-2 List of Experts
progressed with my research, I sustained my contact with most of the experts and formally and informally interviewed them whenever I felt like I needed more information or when they discovered information that might be useful for my research. The guide that I used during my expert interviews can be found in Appendix B.

3.2.2.2. In-Depth Interviews

The primary source of data for my research was the in-depth interviews that were conducted with the aim of having a comprehensive understanding of how Turkish-Muslim women living in Marxloh constructed and negotiated their identity in Germany across the spatial scales of the mosque, neighborhood, and the urban contexts. Eyles emphasizes the particular value of informal interviewing to access informants’ everyday lives (1988) and explore their complex experiences and interactions (Bryman, 1988). When used in the studies that explore the process of immigrant acculturation and ethnic identity formation, in-depth narratives have been proven to be particularly valuable as they encourage the informants to voice their stories and experiences in their own words (Ehrkamp, 2002; Yans-McLaughlin, 1990; Nagar, 1997), while providing them an opportunity to reflect upon their constructed identities.

3.2.2.2.1. Recruitment of Participants and Research Sample

For gathering data during my fieldwork, I employed a combination of purposeful and theoretical sampling (Merriam, 2002), which are commonly used methods in studies that use in-depth narrative as the primary source of inquiry (see Ewick & Silbey, 2003; Riessman, 2008). Theoretical sampling is an essential aspect of GT and even researchers who use the modified or adapted version of GT emphasize the significance of this step (Bulawa, 2013; Akiko, 2018; Whiteley, 2005; Cutcliffe, 2005). It is defined as the process whereby the researcher recruits
participants based on the concepts that emerge in the data analysis. However, due to the lack of data in the initial stages of the study, this usually presents a challenge (Timonen et al., 2018). For this reason, at the beginning of my fieldwork, I started with purposeful sampling, where the cases are selected based on their potential to provide rich information (Patton, 2014) based on an initial set of criteria (Appendix C). In the later stages of my fieldwork, as I accumulated more data and started to analyze them, my sampling strategy evolved and became more focused and theoretical.

The sample sizes in the GT approach are usually not very big, but more importantly, the deciding factor on the sample size is the “saturation” point – whether any additional data/interviews provide any further insights (Mack, 2005). If the researcher decides that additional interviews do not provide any new insight, then it means that the saturation point is achieved, and any additional data would not provide any change to the results of the study.

There are a number of purposeful sampling strategies to identify potential research participants (see Palinkas et al., 2015). I used a combination of criterion and snowball sampling strategies to recruit interviewees. I identified and selected my participants according to the predetermined criteria (criterion sampling), and my recruited participants helped me identify additional participants through referral (snowball sampling) (Blackstone, 2012). While my initial instinct was to start recruiting participants right from the start of my fieldwork, the problems I encountered getting formal access to the field slowed the process substantially. Although the issues concerning getting formal access to the field prevented me from conducting interviews, they did not affect my participation in the mosque. While this initial period enabled me to analyze the initial data that I gathered through participant observation and expert interviews and refine my sampling strategy, it also allowed me to build a very strong rapport with the women among the congregation of Marxloh Merkez Mosque. This established rapport was helpful as it made it easier for me to be selective in my sampling of individual cases later during the interviewing.
process, from which I could learn the most about the phenomenon of ethno-religious identity construction.

My participants for this study came from the Marxloh Merkez Mosque community (Appendix D). Although some of the women I interviewed had secondary affiliations with other Turkish mosque organizations, they used Marxloh Merkez Mosque as their primary site of worship. I initially expected only to interview Turkish-Muslim women among the second- and third-generation immigrants, assuming they would be more familiar with the religious institutions and would be easier to establish contact with as most first-generation would be older and would not come to the mosque as often. However, my initial analysis showed me that the concept of generation is independent of age and much more complex than I expected. Older women, who I thought would be among first-generation immigrants, turned out to be among later generation immigrants, or younger women, whom I assumed to be second- or third-generation immigrants, turned out to be first-generation immigrants.

Additionally, I have observed that first-generation immigrant women use the mosque as much as later-generation women do, and based on my informal conversations with them, I decided that their accounts would enrich my study substantially by providing a comparative framework. For this reason, after conducting my first set of interviews, I decided to include women among earlier generations in my research as well. Following Cresswell’s (2007) rule of thumb, I originally planned to conduct 20 to 30 in-depth interviews. In line with his rule, after I interviewed 26 women, I concluded that my sample reached the point of saturation as new interviews started not to add differentiation or any new insights (Mayring, 2016).

Marxloh Merkez Mosque had different social and educational programs for younger and older women. While the programs for older women addressed subjects related to marriage and raising children and were primarily attended by women over 40, the ones for younger women focused on appropriate moral behavior and were attended by women from the ages 15 to early
Interestingly, women in their mid- and late-30s mainly were absent from the mosque due to their chores related to their child-raising responsibilities, as explained to me by other women. This differentiation of programs also separated mosque-going women into two groups and provided a useful comparative framework for my research. I conducted 12 interviews with women over 40, whom I refer to as older-generation women, and 14 interviews with younger-generation women. The characteristics and socio-spatial behavior in each group were very homogeneous but differed significantly from each other; therefore, I have separated my data into two groups and discussed their characteristics separately.

The characteristics of the first group, older-generation women, are shown below in Table 3-3. Most of these women were born in Turkey and are among first-generation immigrants. On the other hand, as I mentioned previously, generation is a complex notion to understand; not all older-generation women are among the first-generation immigrants. Rumbaut coined the term half-generation to refer to this complex nature of the subject (2004). The term 1.5 generation in this context refers to immigrants who came to their host countries before or during their early teens (Asher, 2011). Out of 12 older-generation women I interviewed, 3 were among 1.5-generation and 2 were among second-generation. In terms of their education, most of the older-generation women (75%) completed their schooling in Turkey, with only 4 of them completing their high-school education. Only 3 women (25%) completed their education in Germany, 2 of them graduated from Hauptschule, which offers the lowest secondary-school education. Only one completed Realschule, which is ranked above Hauptschule below Gymnasium, and had some apprenticeship (Ausbildung) experience. Most older-generation women did not work; only 3 worked in family businesses, working as staff in family restaurants or shops. Only one woman among older-generation women worked independently from her family in retail.
Table 3-3 Older-generation women’s profile (women 40 and over)

The characteristics of the second group, younger-generation women are shown above in Table 3-4. All of the younger-generation women were born in Germany. 7 of them were born to parents born in Turkey (second-generation), 4 of them had one German-born parent (2.5 generation (Rumbaut, 2004)) and 3 of them were born to parents that were both born in Germany (third-generation). Patterns of younger-generation women’s education and occupations differ significantly from that of older-generation women. All of the younger women I interviewed completed their secondary education. Among 14 younger-generation women, 7 completed highest-ranked high-school Gymnasium, and currently 5 are continuing their higher education,
and 2 have completed their bachelor’s and master’s degrees. The remaining 7 women who did not go into higher education, 6 completed Realschule and their associated apprenticeship training, and only one graduated from the lowest-rank Hauptschule. In terms of their occupations, we see that only 5 out of 14 younger-generation women (approximately 35%) are housewives. 6 of them are still continuing their higher education with the intention to work in their related fields or continue to complete their post-graduate degrees. Two of them work independently and hold positions such in research and educational fields. Only one younger-generation woman work for their family business.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BORN IN</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERATION</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Generation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Generation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Generation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hauptschule</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realschule</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gymnasium</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works in Family Business</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otherwise Employed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-4 Younger-generation women’s profile (women between 18 and 39)

This older- and younger-generation separation was very useful to understand the dynamics within the Marxloh Merkez Mosque. On the other hand, while such separation carried
over in the local neighborhood and urban contexts, there were five particular cases where some women’s socio-spatial behavior fell outside of this dual pattern. Even though these five cases’ socio-spatial patterning differed from the dual generational patterns of mobility due to their specific circumstances, these five cases, in fact, reinforce the generational trends, which is discussed extensively in Chapter 5.

3.2.2.2. Conducting Narrative Interviews

When conducting narrative interviews, I followed Ann Oakley’s approach, which rejects the interview method used in classical sociology. Oakley opposes the classical method as it locates the researcher and the informant in different hierarchical positions, objectifying the participant as a data-collection tool through the researcher’s detached and neutral attitude (1981). While some feminist researchers challenge Oakley’s technique that emphasizes the importance of establishing personal relationships to access authentic personal accounts (see Ribbens, 1989; Phoenix, 1994), I found out that due to the nature of my research, following Oakley’s approach would allow me to access the lived reality of the women I aimed to interview. For this reason, during my interviews, I did not position myself as a formal researcher but rather a listener and learner interested in my participants’ everyday lives. While at the beginning of my interviews, many informants told me that I “would probably get bored as they live boring lives here in Marxloh” (Hacer., 45, housewife), at the end of our interviews, they expressed that they were happy someone was interested in their stories.

The narrative interview intended to find out the following within the context of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque, Marxloh neighborhood, and Duisburg:

a. Women’s approach to Islam, Turkish traditions and gender relations and whether they affect women’s mobility and behavior,
b. Women’s daily lives, religious practices, spatial behavior, and the verbal and non-verbal rules that organize their behavior in the mosque, the neighborhood, and the city,
c. The problems women encounter in their everyday interactions both with Muslims and non-Muslims,
d. Women’s belonging and their perception of Turks and Germans,
e. Women’s personal experience of disobeying the spoken and unspoken rules in the mosque, the neighborhood, and the city.

All narrative interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format that focused the interview on the topics mentioned above while allowing interviewees to talk freely about the subjects and issues they were interested in. Although I prepared a list of detailed interview questions (Appendix E), I rarely used it during my interviews. This interview guide prepared before the fieldwork and went through the IRB approval process served more as a checklist.

The narrative interviews took approximately 2 hours each, and at times, we had to meet once again for follow-up interviews. Most of the follow-up interviews were proposed by the interviewees as they felt like they wanted to express themselves more clearly and wanted to add more to our conversation. Before we started each interview, I spent 10 to 15 minutes introducing my research project and the purpose of the interview, and we went through the debriefing script (Appendix F). I answered their questions about the interview, informed them about their anonymity, and got their consent before starting the interview. I attempted to record all narrative interviews as I wanted to prevent the loss of any data and was successful in getting consent in the majority of my interviews; however, there were six instances interviewees did not want to have our conversation recorded. I took detailed notes, trying not to change anything in such cases. Despite contributing to overall knowledge gained in the process, these interviews did not provide as comprehensive information as the other interviews, as I had to interrupt the natural flow of the narrative at times to complete my notes.
The narrative interviews, in most cases, followed a structure composed of four sections. I started the interview by asking each interviewee to introduce themselves. My informants usually started by telling me their migration history, their occupation, and their families. The second part of the interview concentrated on their experiences in Germany as Turks. Women usually started talking about their education or job experiences in Germany (if they had any) and brought up their encounters with Germans. They discussed their relationships with the Germans and pointed out their positive/negative experiences. In this section of the interview, they usually talked about their perceived identity and belonging. The third part of the interview aimed to explore their neighborhood experience, where we talked about their daily lives, their spatial behavior of the neighborhood, and their perceptions of Marxloh. When discussing their spatial behavior, I asked women to draw mental maps of their neighborhood (Figure 3-1) as mental maps display people’s
perceptions clearer than the interviews (Montello, 2002). In some cases, women did not want to draw, fearing they would do a bad job or asked me to draw for them. In these cases, I asked the participants places they liked, feared, frequented mostly, shopped, met their friends, etc. I have taken detailed notes of these accounts and composed a summary map that shows the spaces of their everyday lives. I ended up with 16 mental maps and summary maps for each woman (Figure 3-2), as sometimes we talked about places they did not include in their mental maps. While summary maps included my interpretations of informants’ accounts, together with the mental maps, they provided a comprehensive picture showing Turkish-Muslim women’s perceptions of Marxloh. In the last part of the interview, which usually took the longest, we discussed their religious practices and use of the mosque. This gave me an insight into their approach to Islam and how big of a role religion plays in their lives. After the interview was finished, I usually continued talking with the interviewees. I have found these small talks immensely enriching for my study and made sure to write my notes about them as soon as the interview was over.

Figure 3-2 Summary maps drawn for two participants

All of my interviews were conducted in Turkish by participants’ choice and the time and the setting of the interview depended on the participant’s choice, as providing a comfortable environment so that they could talk freely was my priority (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Most of my
interviews took place in my informants’ homes, except for a few cases where we conducted our interview at the mosque or my own apartment. As I met most of my participants in the mosque, conducting interviews in participants’ houses allowed me to observe how women lived and conceived themselves outside the mosque. I was also able to see the difference between the interviews I conducted at home versus those in the mosque. As inviting me to their homes shows the level of trust, the interviews I conducted at home usually went into more depth and took much longer. Most of the interviews were conducted individually, except for two cases in which I interviewed both the mother and the daughter. These interviews provided an extra layer for my analysis as I observed the different points of view between generations.

3.2.2.3. Go-Along Interviews

Go-along (Kusenbach, 2003) interviewing technique, which is also referred to as bimbling (Anderson, 2004), walking probes (DeLeon & Cohen, 2005), shadowing (Hall, 2009), and walking interviews (Ross et al., 2016), is another method utilized during my fieldwork as a part of my narrative interviews. Kusenbach, who defines this method of interviewing extensively and coined the term “go-along,” defines this technique as “a hybrid between participant observation and interviewing” and is an effective research technique when studying spatial perceptions/practices and social architecture of the built environment. This interviewing technique provides participant observation in different spatial contexts and enables the researcher to identify spatial practices which otherwise would be difficult to explore through traditional narrative interviews. Additionally, it also triangulates the data by minimizing the gap between what interviewees say they do and what they really do (2003, p. 463).

In simple terms, go-alongs are informal interviews where the researcher accompanies the research subjects during their natural outings. During these outings, the researcher actively
explores participants’ experiences by asking questions, listening, and observing (Kusenbach, 2003). Clarke and Emmel emphasize the importance of participants being in control of the research process (2010) as it allows them to focus on areas that are more significant for them in terms of their spatial experience (Ross, 2016). Evan and Jones discuss that by combining the data acquired through narrative interviews and go-along interviews, they were able to produce qualitative data that is more spatially grounded (2011). Kusenbach mentions that while the researcher can provide a predefined tour during the interviewing process, go-alongs produce more natural results when the tour/trail is led by the research participant (2018).

I aimed the participants for my go-along interviews to be the same women I conducted narrative interviews with. At the end of my narrative interviews, I usually asked my informants whether I could accompany them in their daily outings as a part of my research. I informed them about the purpose, which is to understand their spatial mobility in the neighborhood. Although not everybody agreed to conduct go-along interviews, I conducted 17 go-along interviews. When conducting the interview, I gave my informants as little direction as possible, and when they insisted on more instructions, I asked them to take me to the spot where they frequented the most in the neighborhood and asked them how they felt about the place, usually pointing out a feature of that place. These go-alongs took from 30 minutes to 4 hours, depending on how we spent our time. While some of these outings were as simple as walking along the main street, Weseler Strasse, some of them were much more complicated as I basically spent all afternoon with them accompanying them in their household and childcare chores. As I wanted to capture the outing of my informants that would represent their actual experience, during the go-alongs I conducted I did not take any audio recordings or extensive notes. During these outings, I used a smartphone application that would track our movement in the neighborhood and quickly jotted down key phrases and facts without disrupting the process. I have turned these interviews into field notes and mapped them as soon as I completed the go-along (Figure 3-3).
3.2.2.4. Informal Conversations

In addition to the narrative and go-along interviews, I have conducted about 50 informal conversations with different residents living in Marxloh. The reason these interviews are referred to as informal is that they were never formally scheduled as interviews. The informal conversations usually focused on one aspect of their daily lives and did not provide as rich data as the formal narrative interviews. While at the beginning of my fieldwork, the informal conversations served to set the scene and further develop questions for narrative interviews, later they have helped me understand aspects that I was missing and refocus my interviews. In addition to this, from the point of view of the mosque community, these conversations allowed them to get to know me and my research project and build rapport.

Informal conversations took place in different contexts, varying from the mosque to mosque-going women’s house, whenever a person felt like talking to me. For example, at the beginning of my research, after one lecture, one of the mosque-going women took me to a hairdresser where her daughter works, and we had a very comprehensive conversation about which streets in Marxloh is safer to live as I was looking to move to the neighborhood at the time. In another instance, I entered a wedding-gown shop asking for directions, and I ended up having a

Figure 3-3 Examples of go-along sketches
lengthy conversation with the owners about the wedding business in Marxloh. At the beginning of my fieldwork, I initiated the majority of conversations as I was looking for participants, but later people among the mosque community started to approach me, asking questions and inviting me out for some conversation over tea. I neither used a recorder nor took extensive notes during these conversations as they were mostly spontaneous. However, once the conversation was over, I took detailed notes about them. For this reason, the majority of the data from these informal conversations comes from my field notes.

3.3. Positionality

The most pivotal phase in any ethnographic study is introducing and immersing oneself into the research community (Aryanti, 2013). Being born and raised in Turkey, I was familiar with both the Turkish and Islamic culture, and this factor made my immersion into the Turkish-Muslim community much easier than researchers coming from other cultural and religious backgrounds. However, the cultural and religious background that I share with the Turkish-Muslim women did not immediately transform me from an outsider to an insider within the mosque community. This insider-outsider dynamic was never static indeed. In fact, I have moved through different positions throughout my fieldwork and developed certain strategies to define my position when interacting with different groups consciously. In the end, I moved through several positions from a partial outsider to an insider, depending on my interactions. My flexible status, in the end, allowed me to take advantage of the strengths of each positionality while subjecting me to the disadvantages of both.

One of the strategies I used during my fieldwork was introducing myself differently depending on the group I was interacting with. To the experts and younger women who are university students/graduates, I introduced myself as a doctoral researcher coming from an
American university. As they had many encounters with researchers from universities, they were very accepting. However, my interactions with most of the mosque community were different. Most of the people I interacted with within the mosque had difficulty understanding what graduate degrees were about. For this reason, I tried to explain them in simpler terms that I was working on another degree to become a university instructor, and this research would be my graduation project. When I interacted with them, I also avoided using academic terminology or terms such as “feminism,” “subordination,” “empowerment,” “resistance” and “gender” as I experienced that it might be perceived as provocative. Instead of describing my research as a study looking at the gender dynamics in different contexts and how women reclaim their agency, I took a different approach and explained to them that I am looking at women’s social and religious activities in Marxloh and wanted to learn about their experiences so that I would not be perceived provocative or have an influence on their interactions with me.

Another strategy I used was to utilize different aspects of my identity when interacting with different groups. I usually maintained a researcher position for the experts and the mosque administration and remained as a partial outsider. While with some of the experts, I became an outsider trusted with the inside knowledge, especially with the local mosque administrators; throughout the year I spent attending the mosque, I remained an outsider and had to find alternative ways to access data. I found it easier to access younger women through our shared student status and my Turkish identity. However, to my surprise, despite being closer in age and social status and my friendly relationships with them, I only became a “partial insider” due to our fundamental differences in our acculturation patterns; me being born and raised in Turkey and them acculturated mainly in Germany. This especially manifested during the group conversations; sometimes, they would not understand some Turkish words (especially more archaic ones) I used as they are used to speaking a mixture of Turkish-German. This also became apparent when they
started to switch back and forth between Turkish and German; as I am not proficient in German, I had difficulty following some group conversations of younger-generation women.

To my surprise, I felt like I attained a full insider status within the older-generation women's group. While they found it odd that I was attending their groups, as I was the youngest among them and questioned my motives initially, they later empathized with me through my immigrant status in the US and my marital status. I achieved this breakthrough, more particularly after one instance when I brought my mother with me to one of the lectures during her visit. By coincidence, the lecturer could not come that day, and older-generation women asked my mother, a medical doctor, for a Q&A session. After the lecture, the dynamics shifted as women empathized with my mother. Most of them have daughters around my age and empathized with me as I was in Germany all alone by myself, without a family. Especially after this instance, they started to refer to me and introduce me to other potential participants as “our girl/daughter,” signaling I indeed became an insider. In my field notes, I have noted down two instances where I felt validated as an insider:

[describing a Friday when I was helping out in the kitchen with cooking/baking activities] … I left a little early because I had an appointment with Nazlı [whose daughter I tutored]. When I got up and headed to the door, Melike Abla jokingly said, “are you leaving? Don’t forget that we are expecting to see you next week; you are one of us now” (field notes from 02/01/2019)

[after not showing up at the mosque for a week) … Şengül Abla called me in the evening asking if everything was all right, that they worried about me since I hadn’t been around and invited me for some tea. She said, “you are our daughter now; next time let us know if you won’t be around, and don’t get us worried” (field notes 04/14/2019)

Although this flexible insider/outsider position allowed me to take advantage of the strengths of both positions, I was also subjected to the disadvantages of both as well. As I spent the initial first months of my research as an observer, my initial outsider position allowed me to make impartial observations which were crucial at the later stages of my research to be impartial during the participant recruitment and interviewing processes. In addition to this, through my
outsider-researcher identity, I was able to transgress certain boundaries. As I was free from the Turkish-Islamic norms that control women’s behavior in the mosque community, I was able to perform outside these norms. For example, I was able to enter the rooms of the local mosque administrators and discuss my research with them over some tea, which for most mosque-going women, would be deemed inappropriate. Similarly, as I was unaware of the fact that the teahouse in the mosque courtyard, which was regarded as an exclusively male space, so, I regularly entered there and even was able to have informal conversations with the men that frequent there.

As I entered the field without a trusted gatekeeper and had to introduce myself and cultivate relationships with the mosque-going women, I was free of any bias entering the field and establishing rapport. Later in my research, I was made aware of many cliques among mosque-going women, and they do not always have the best relationship with each other; however, as I cultivated relationships simultaneously with different groups, I was never asked to justify and defend these relationships. For example, in my first weeks, after the first lecture I attended, I was approached by Afife, who was very different in her conservative attire as she was the only woman in the mosque wearing a face veil. Throughout my fieldwork, my relationship with Afife became much more than a researcher-subject relationship, and she became by far the most interesting person I met in Marxloh. However, later as I started to talk more with other women, they told me that they found my relationship with Afife odd and told me they never expected me to associate with her.

Although my outsider position initially gave me an impartial approach, especially during participant observation, the lack of in-depth conversations led me to misinterpret women’s certain behaviors as my interpretations came through my own lens of prejudice. In this sense, Lather points out that “a strictly interpretive paradigm … is inadequate insofar as it is based on the assumption” (1986, p. 269). I especially became aware of this during my data analysis. As I was going over my field notes, there exists a striking discrepancy about how I perceived older-
generation women. Despite being born and raised in Turkey, a Muslim majority country, I came from a position of complete impiety. I was unaware of my own prejudiced view on pious Muslim women, which caused me to interpret most of their behavior as subordination. Once I achieved an insider status and was able to have in-depth conversations with women, I realized that many behaviors that I (mis)interpreted as subordination, in fact, were tactics these women use to resist the dominant norms and reclaim their agency, which is discussed extensively in Chapter 6.

On the other hand, my later insider status also came with some problems. Being an insider in the mosque community also meant being subjected to gossip. During my fieldwork, I followed the rules of the inside and tried not to go against the “normal” of Marxloh; in numerous occasions, I encountered interventions regarding my lifestyle. For example, despite wearing modest clothing, I was warned to cover my head in the mosque even when there was no need. Wolf reports that although many feminist researchers try to resist the codes regarding clothing set by the patriarchal power mechanisms, in the end, they have to consent to the community norms (2009). Parallel to this, in my case, as my resistance to wearing headscarf continuously in the mosque started to impact my research process, I ended up conforming to the dominant trend. Another instance when my insider status caused a problem was when I was told that I should complete my research at a faster pace and was made aware that as a proper woman, I should not be living alone without my husband for this long, and I should quickly have a child before it is too late. While this had advantages at first, as older-generation women actively sought participants for my research to accelerate my research process, and I was not bothered very much with such comments as they were coming from a place of care, in the later stages of my fieldwork, I found myself getting frustrated with such continuous comments. My insider position caused my body to leave the private sphere and become public open to other people’s claims (Ghannam, 2002).
### 3.4. Data Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERION</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>STRATEGY</th>
<th>APPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIES DURING FIELDWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>Credibility establishes whether the research findings represent plausible information drawn from the participants’ original data and is a correct interpretation of the participants’ original views.</td>
<td>Prolonged Engagement</td>
<td>Long lasting engagement with the community in a span of 9-months, becoming familiar with the setting and identifying which elements are most relevant to my analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Persistent Observation</td>
<td>Multiple methods - interviews, go-alongs, observations and mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Triangulation</td>
<td>Getting the data from different groups in terms of generation, age, immigration status and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple data sources - getting data in different contexts, days, scales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferability</td>
<td>The degree to which the results of qualitative research can be transferred to other contexts or settings with other respondents.</td>
<td>Thick description</td>
<td>Providing descriptions of not only the data and the experiences but also the context and background so that the outsider can be better informed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependability</td>
<td>The stability of findings over time.</td>
<td>Audit trail</td>
<td>Providing descriptions of all the steps taken throughout the research process and keeping the records of these steps and informing the participants about the process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmability</td>
<td>The degree to which the findings of the research study could be confirmed by other researchers.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The results of my fieldwork were discussed with several of the participants through follow-up interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflexivity</td>
<td>The process of critical self-reflection about oneself as researcher and the research relationship</td>
<td>Field diary</td>
<td>Research auditor - The results of my research were discussed with both my advisors from the University of Duisburg-Essen, Andreas Blaette and my advisor, Alexandra Staub throughout the field and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Being aware my own assumption, preconceptions and prejudices. Throughout the field work a color-coded field diary was kept separating objective data from my own conception. I also discussed these preconceptions in &quot;positionality&quot; section</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-5 Criteria ensuring trustworthiness of the data and the strategies used (adapted from Korstjens & Moser 2018, p. 121)
To assess the quality of the qualitative data, researchers put forward several definitions and criteria for trustworthiness. The best-known criteria are credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability defined by Lincoln and Guba (1985). In addition to Lincoln and Guba’s criteria, Korstjens and Moser include reflexivity as an integral part of the data quality enduring transparency. Table 3-5 shows the definitions of data quality assessment criteria by Korstjens and Mojer (2018) based on Lincoln and Guba’s research and the strategies I have used to ensure the trustworthiness of the qualitative data.

3.5. Data Analysis

M-GT follows the core principle of GT, the simultaneous collection of data, sampling, interpretation, and analysis of which factors in which direction the research will go (Flick, 2018; Timonen et al. 2018). The first stage of my data analysis was open-coding of the data, which uses line-by-line coding to identify concepts from the raw data (Oktay, 2012). Flick suggests that the researcher should try to code everything, even things that seem insignificant, and do it quickly without thinking too much about it (2018). In addition to the interviews, I also started to code my own field notes and the spatial data and started to produce preliminary maps. As a part of this process, after I was done with this first coding cycle, I also started to write analytical memos that would give me ideas on how to connect them together in the next step (Figure 3-4). This led me to modify some of my in-depth interview questions and sampling decisions further. For example, my first analysis showed me to alter my sampling; despite my initial instinct to interview only second- and third-generation immigrants, I realized that including first-generation immigrant women would provide a richer comparative framework after my initial analysis. The open coding continued throughout my fieldwork as I continued to introduce new data. The codes were studied carefully and were refined (some code categories were split or merged) until they were ready for
the second step of the coding process. At the end of the open-coding cycle, I had 324 codes that needed to be conceptualized.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RAW DATA</th>
<th>OPEN CODING</th>
<th>SELECTIVE CODING</th>
<th>THEME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They [administration] were jealous, malicious people. They couldn’t bear the idea that a woman was in charge</td>
<td>couldn't bear the idea of a women in charge</td>
<td>men not wanting women</td>
<td>women not allowed in the administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is like a men's club now, people just get into administration because of their friends among the community. It is not based on merit</td>
<td>men's club</td>
<td>not on merit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Building this mosque, cost me a lot in the end. I lost my whole career over this. But I do not regret, I would do it again</strong></td>
<td>lost my career</td>
<td>women being punished</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>why would you want to interview women? They would not even understand the extent and importance of what we [the mosque administration] do here</td>
<td>women wouldn't understand</td>
<td>men thinking women's place is at home</td>
<td>gender roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a better education than most of those men in the administration and my German is better. It is just they don’t want women to come forward. This is how they have seen from their parents but it doesn’t make sense to keep such thoughts alive</td>
<td>they don't want women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would like to be a part of the administration, I come here a lot and would like to have a say about how they do things. But I just don’t have time. Taking care of the kids and dealing with the house takes a lot of my time, my husband doesn’t help me with anything [although he works shifts and does not work everyday].</td>
<td>household chores and childcare chores</td>
<td>no help at home</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-6 An example of how one of the themes in Chapter 4 was constructed
The next stage of the coding process was selective coding, which was done by grouping open codes in terms of their relationship, variation, patterns and concepts. The selective coding process continued until the concepts were stabilized as conceptual categories. In the end, the 324 codes were weaved into categories (Table 3-6). In the last stage of the coding process, the categories that emerged from the selective coding process were integrated further into core-themes, generating theories that could be confirmed by the empirical data. In my data analysis, after the selective coding, three foci emerged from my data that were discussed in three different chapters. Figure 3-5 visualizes data analysis process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATA</th>
<th>INITIAL ANALYSIS</th>
<th>REFINED ANALYSIS</th>
<th>GROUNDED THEORY</th>
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Figure 3-5 Data analysis process used in this dissertation based on grounded theory

3.6. Limitations

First of all, this research is designed to be qualitative in nature and provides rich and in-depth data regarding women’s experiences within a transnational diasporic neighborhood. This
presents the first limitation of my research. The results and conclusions derived from this study can be generalized only to the extent that qualitative data can be (Rothe, 1993). In addition to this, the issue of access to different (and more conservative) Turkish-Muslim mosque communities in Marxloh led me to reframe the research. While at the beginning of my fieldwork, I aimed to conduct my research on three different Turkish-Muslim mosque communities; as my research progressed, the unwillingness of more conservative mosque communities to be included in my research and the unfeasibility of conducting the research across different congregations led me to shift the scope of my research. Although, in the end, it provides an in-depth analysis of one mosque community, it also limits the generalizability of the study.

Further, my upbringing as a secular Turkish woman can be a source of bias. I have discussed how it possibly causes biases in the positionality section; however, my identity also posed a limitation on how my participants produce knowledge. Riesman’s dialogic/performance approach suggests that narrative is produced through the interaction between the researcher and the participant (2008). Following this, the in-depth interviews produced narratives on ethnonational identity, and my research participants’ positioning me influenced their narrative. For example, in some cases, some of the participants expressed their opinion about the educated, secular women living in Turkey and their disapproval of modern Turkish youth losing their religion. During this talk, they used the words “you,” conceiving me a representative of such a group. In this case, women talked to me as a member of the secular-Turks, whom they disapproved of, rather than a researcher.

Finally, almost all the interviews were conducted in Turkish, with the exception of two expert interviews that were conducted in English. While with older women and the Turkish-speaking experts, we did not have any problem communicating in Turkish; some of my younger participants, who were born and raised bilingually, experienced difficulties expressing themselves or some of the concepts in Germany that I was not familiar with (such as the education system).
In addition to this, during the analysis and writing process, the constant translation of the interviews leads to some of the data losing its precise nuances and cultural meanings due to their culture-specificity.
Chapter 4

Reinforcing the Turkish-Islamic Paradigm

In this dissertation, following Butler’s performative framework, I argue that one is not born with an identity, but one’s identity becomes inscribed through an accumulation of discursive and corporal acts that are defined by different normative structures of subjection, including one’s family, religion, education, and community. These institutions maintain performative forces that one is subject to and the subject of and agents perform the prescribed norms to become socially intelligible and survive. In this chapter, I explore how the community of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque produces a variety of shifting discourses that influence women’s spatial behavior in the architectural space of the diaspora mosque. This chapter is composed of two main parts that provide a chronological account of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque. The first part of this chapter (section 4.1) focuses on the period between 1997 and 2008 and analyzes the second- and third-generation discourse reproduced during the construction and initial operation of the mosque as a result of efforts of two second-generation Turkish-German immigrant women. I argue that this progressive discourse aimed to construct the mosque as a space of integration, a hybrid-space, in-between secular German public, and traditional Turkish community. To achieve so, many administrative, educational and social opportunities were provided through intercultural and interreligious dialogue. At the time of its completion, this progressive vision was received extremely positively by the German public, and the Marxloh Merkez Mosque started to be referred to as the “Miracle of Marxloh.” In the second part of this chapter (section 4.2), I focus on the period after 2008 and explore the deterioration of the inclusivity achieved during the construction of the mosque. I argue that the tensions caused by the discrepancy between the first-generation Turkish-Muslim discourse and the second-and third-generation discourse (also
referred to as Turkish-German discourse) led to the breakdown of this inclusivity. The changes that took place in the social space of the mosque eventually affected Turkish-Muslim women’s spatial use of the mosque reproducing different spatial regimes based on gender and generation.

4.1. The Construction of the Mosque: Women Creating Spaces

Before the construction of the purpose-built mosque, Marxloh Merkez Mosque was known as Pollman Merkez Mosque, and it was one of the makeshift backyard mosques that usually repurposed unused spaces such as empty workshops, shops, cafeteria spaces, and apartments. Pollman Merkez Mosque was initially established in 1984, using an unused cafeteria space (Figure 4-1). In this makeshift mosque, the Turkish-Islamic conditions of gender segregation were applied: men and women were strictly separated through different praying areas, and even separate entrances, and men’s use of the mosque space was privileged over women’s use. One of my interviewees, Nur, who came to Marxloh in 1990 when she was 21 years old, vividly remembers the spatial organization of the Pollman Merkez Mosque and summarizes how they used the old mosque space through a sketch (Figure 4-2) as:

Figure 4-1 Pollman Merkez Mosque in 1998 (source: Ehrkamp & Leitner, 2003, p. 138)
We used to use this cafeteria space back in the day. The main cafeteria space was used by men as the prayer space. There was a structure, a later addition, almost like a shed, that was given to the women. We did not even see the men; we were placed in a separate room. Men would enter the mosque from the front street, and we used the side entrance. We would listen to the prayer from a speaker. I don’t even know what the men’s section looks like. There was no contact – visual or physical – between men and women at the time. (Nur, 45, housewife)

Figure 4-2 Nur’s sketch of the spatial organization of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque before the construction of the representative mosque in 2006 (source: author based on interviewees sketches)

This kind of spatial organization is not uncommon in the diaspora mosques. The diaspora mosques in Germany were primarily established by people who had internalized the Turkish-Islamic norms, which in turn define their social and spatial behavior in the mosque. Despite Islam or Qur’an not addressing the issue of women’s presence in the mosque (Reda, 2004), the Turkish-Islamic norms, that mix tradition, culture, and religious interpretation, define the mosque space as men’s space on the basis that women’s presence in the mosque would cause fitna (social disorder/conflict) (Sayeed, 2001). Although these norms started to be replaced in Turkey after 2001, as an attempt to make the mosque more accessible in the face of rising Islamism, the diaspora mosques and their congregants still continue the outdated practice of strict segregation as they did not experience the effects of the shifting dynamics. We see that these Turkish-Islamic norms started to be subverted, rejected, and challenged by the later generation immigrants, with their own conceptualizations of host and home cultures based on their hybrid identities. Marxloh Merkez
Mosque stands as an excellent example of how these identity dynamics between the first and the later generations played out, resulting in altering the mosque space.

In 1997, the congregation of Pollman Merkez Mosque came up with the idea of constructing a representative mosque as the cafeteria space that was used as the mosque space was no longer able to support the growing congregation’s needs. The prayer rooms in the Pollman Merkez Mosque could only accommodate 100-150 people at a time, which was not enough to support the congregation’s needs, which had 900 registered members. During the talks of reconstructing the mosque, the mosque congregation approached the Turkish-German architect Cavit Şahin, who was known by the community and had experience with mosque construction. Şahin took over the project and designed a mosque in traditional Ottoman style upon request from the community. The importance of building a mosque in traditional Ottoman style was expressed by the former chair of the local mosque association Mehmet Özay as: “Turkish people, who have been here for 40 years, did not see a single dome and they wanted to see a dome again” (interview with Özay on 06/11/2019).

Şahin’s design visually answered the demands of the congregation; however, he was never able to finish the project he started. The project that he prepared was not progressing as it was supposed to and was delayed substantially, which raised some questions and concerns from the congregation. The congregation approached Melih E., a young civil engineer among the mosque congregation, with their questions as Şahin failed to answer them. Melih E. narrates that:

In the second and third steps of the Leitungsphasen [a nine-step process that should be followed to implement construction projects], the architecture and spatial organization of a building become clear. Şahin was not experienced enough to take over such a project – and this was before the mosque project became very well known. He did not discuss the project with the congregation or mosque administration, just did what he wanted. This is why the people from the mosque congregation came to us. When we looked at the plans, we realized that what he planned had nothing to do with what the congregation wanted. There were also some bureaucratic problems too. When Leyla Özmal became a part of
the project, we [administration] decided to stop working with him. (Melih E., civil engineer)

Melih E. further reflects upon the construction process and assures that inclusion of Leyla Özmalm and Zülfüye Kayıkın was the major turning point for the realization of the project. With the efforts of these two women, the project was transformed from constructing a small neighborhood mosque into the biggest mosque project in Germany. The following sections discuss this instrumental role women played in the construction of the mosque, which happens in two ways and is discussed consecutively in sections 4.1.1. and 4.1.2.: 1) Özmalm’s involvement with the project through her work as the integration officer resolved the financial problems by coming up with a unique solution; she designed a dual socio-spatial structure for the mosque project, which allowed them to use the European Union funds; and 2) Kayıkın’s leadership and her unique approach to mosque organizations transformed the project into a transparent and inclusive one that is more compatible with German ideals and fostered integration, both for women and for Turks living in Germany. I argue that after the project was taken over by these later generation women in positions of power, it was transformed into the “Miracle of Marxloh” (Wunder von Marxloß), one of the few exemplary mosque projects in Germany. On the other hand, while this planning and construction process was praised by the media for not causing any problems at the greater societal level, the internal dynamics in terms of gender and generational differences created some problems for these women of power that could only be overcome by the involvement of supporting men, male allies. The inclusive and transparent discourse these women aimed for during the construction process of the mosque became an essential determinant of the spatial organization and use of the mosque space that contradicts the traditional designs. This discourse, which brings both Turkish-Islamic and German sensitivities, intended to blur the boundaries between the self and the other, both socially and spatially, and reduce segregation in the mosque space and more inclusive social programs, discussed in section 4.1.3. In short, women
becoming a part of the planning and construction process of the mosque made the “Miracle of Marxloh” unique and possible through the acquisition of funding and the creation of an inclusive atmosphere.

4.1.1. Women’s Role Establishing the Mosque

Although the mosque project started in 1997, it experienced significant financial and administrative difficulties until 2001, when Leyla Özmal got involved in the project, identifying new funding sources and introducing a new organizational structure. Özmal taking an interest in the project represents the beginning of a trend where the inclusion of women was essential not only to its completion, but also in its acceptance in the broader community.

In 2001, Özmal, a second-generation immigrant woman socialized in Germany, worked as an integration officer in EG-DU, Entwicklungsassisenschaft Duisburg (Duisburg Development Company). Her position required her to work in Marxloh, and as a part of her job, she had been in contact with local associations in Marxloh. While she was already in contact with the administration of Pollman Merkez Mosque, Özmal’s inclusion in the project starts after the public meetings required by a law that put into motion in 1999, according to which building projects that could accommodate more than a thousand people, must be presented to the public before it is built. She explains her motive of becoming a part of the project as:

I realized that they could use some help. You know, it was harder for them. The projects that are brought forward by a church have many advantages. They receive funds from the state and federal government; they have professional people dealing with this. But in the mosque, it was all voluntary [except for the architect], the money comes from donations, and people sacrifice their free time to develop this project… I realized that people didn’t know enough and would benefit from my knowledge as I have access to very valuable information that they don’t. I had this job in EG-DU that works with the city government and had

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7 The crisis in the steel industry in 1990s led to the loss of thousands of jobs. As an attempt to provide funding for the impoverished districts, a joint federal-state program called Soziale Stadt (Social city) was put into motion, which led to the creation of a local public corporation, EG-DU (Bruce, 2019).
a project in Marxloh that attempted to revitalize Marxloh’s already declined economy. So, I knew what to do to fund the project; we had a window of opportunity to get funds from the revitalization project. I know I was instrumental in providing communication between both parties, but frankly, all I did was give them information and show them how to access that. (Özmal, former project consultant)

The mosque organization had already been in contact with the city government of Duisburg; once Özmal took an interest in the project, EG-DU became one of the major stakeholders. Until Özmal got involved in the project, the local mosque organization planned to fund the project through donations from the community and congregation. This is the common practice among the mosque organizations in Germany as they cannot use federal or state funds for the construction of a mosque; however it becomes problematic as most of the time, the construction gets stalled by the lack of funds. To avoid this, Özmal suggested using the social functions that the mosque was already providing to justify applying for public funds reserved for organizations that include broader social functions. In other words, as the mosque had the potential to involve social work and intercultural dialogue in its operations, Özmal proposed to establish an independent association dealing with this social work. Establishing a second organization, the Dialogue Center (Begegnungsstätte), aimed to function as a cultural and educational center, increase the “intercultural/interreligious dialog” in the neighborhood, and allowed the mosque organization to justify their application to the European Union funds that come through the “Ruhr Initiatives in Districts and Settlements” (Ruhrinitiativen in Stadtteile und Siedlungen). Özmal explains this application process as:

It was not easy; although we didn’t come across any objection from the people living in the neighborhood, there was some tension in both the mosque association and the city government. The city government questioned the design and necessity of the mosque, and the mosque organization had their doubts about receiving funds from the government – they thought it would mean that they would be a part of the government. As I worked in EG-DU, I had experience mediating the government agencies and other parties. I explained that these people [mosque congregation] are investing quite a lot of money to develop the neighborhood; why not do it together? And when talking to the mosque organization, I emphasized that this is not a top-down process that we were going
to develop this project altogether. It was very important for me that we created this project with the community itself first, not the city government. (Özmal, former project consultant)

With Özmal’s mediation between different government agencies, the mosque project, now referred to as the Marxloh Merkez Mosque, gained the support of the city government and was incorporated into the urban and regional development plan. Separating the mosque organization from the Dialogue Center, which served as a community and educational center for the local population, allowed the project to receive funding from the state government and the EU in 2001. The cost of the project, 7.7 million euros, was shared between the mosque organization and the state of North-Rhine Westphalia. While the cost of construction of the mosque, 4.2 million euros, was provided by the association itself, through loans and donations, the share of the Dialogue Center’s construction, 3.5 million euros, was provided by the state of North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) and the EU (Shoppengerd, 2007).

Mosque projects getting financial support from state and government is a very uncommon occurrence (and was even more unusual during the time this project was proposed) in Germany. As Islam in Germany does not have an official status like Christianity or Judaism, which prevents them from financing their organizations through government funds, the state subsidies that the mosque project received from NRW State Government and the EU was unprecedented. Shoppengerd identifies some key factors that facilitated the project’s support from the German government, which also made Marxloh Merkez Mosque project different than other mosque projects. These key factors are: 1) the intensive information provided to the public, 2) intensive dialogue with all of the actors involved, 3) cooperation between the actors, 4) the support received from the mayor and the department heads of integration offices, 5) the involvement of the EG-DU and 6) the willingness to prevent any conflict between the German
and Turkish populations similar to the one experienced in the 1990s. However, the most significant factor that led to the social and financial support the mosque project received from many governmental institutions, from the local municipality level to the regional EU level, was the mosque’s unique dual operating structure proposed by Özmal, which located it as an indispensable actor for integration at the neighborhood, urban and regional levels through its activities and structure that target intercultural and interreligious dialogue. Based on Shoppengerd’s interviews with the primary stakeholders of the project, from the point of view of the state government, the Dialogue Center’s vision that makes the hidden, backyard mosques visible and their willingness to integrate German institutions in their activities were the key factors that facilitated the support received from the government. It must be noted that both Shoppengard’s and my own interviews with the Duisburg City Government’s Integration office emphasize that the essential factor of this project’s success was Özmal’s role as the mediator to create cooperation between mosque association, EG-DU, and government institutions (interview with Terzic on 02/19/2019).

Another factor worth mentioning related to the success of the mosque was the fortuitousness of the conditions. Schmitt explains in his work about mosques in Duisburg that the extent to which a mosque project is successful or not in terms of providing integration is related to the willingness of the different actors and how they deal with the conflicts that arise in the process (2003). Özmal explains this convenience of the conditions by: “We were at the right place at the right time and knew the right people. The officers in the municipality and the city government were very open-minded about the fact that Muslims did live in Duisburg and wanted

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8 In 1996, several Muslim communities in Duisburg came together and applied for approval from the municipal government to broadcast Ezan, the call for prayer via loudspeakers on Fridays. This process was led by Marxloh’s DITIB mosque congregation, the members of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque community today. This request caused a number of protests and stirred the debates about Islamization of Germany, on the basis that Turkish-Muslim groups insistence of bringing their way of life to Germany, threatens the local German identities. The heated debates and protests eventually led to the withdrawal of the request to prevent further conflicts and tensions (Ehrkamp, 2002).
them to feel more at home where they do not have to struggle for their right to practice religion.” (Özmal, former project coordinator). Melih E., the civil engineer of the project, mentions another condition and emphasizes how the political climate at the time permitted them to come up and negotiate such a plan, adding that “it would be impossible to build such a mosque project now, with the tensions that exist between Turkey, Germany, and DITIB” (Melih E., civil engineer of the project). Melih E. refers to DITIB’s leadership (under Rıdvan Çakır between 2003-2007) at the time that paid particular attention to its portrayal as an integration factor, Germany’s aims at integrating its immigrant population to achieve a more multicultural society and lack of conflicts between DITIB and German government that arose from DITIB’s later alignment with Turkish government rather than German government.

During this process, the project gained traction and received a great deal of public attention, both due to its foreign architecture and funding sources. While the funding was separate, the fact that it was logically impossible to disentangle which money was spent on which parts of the building caused criticism. To have a participatory and transparent process and prevent future problems before they start, Özmal proposed forming an advisory board with representatives from EG-DU, the University of Duisburg-Essen, political parties, local associations, neighborhood residents, other local religious institutions, and the local businesses. Following Özmal’s bottom-up vision of having a project created by the community, a formal advisory board was established in 2002 and under the leadership of Zülfüye Kaykıın, another second-generation immigrant woman among the mosque congregation who had the necessary social and political capital to negotiate the realization of the mosque project in the German public through her involvement in politics as a member and local representative for the political party SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands). The advisory board ensured that the community members actively participated in the planning process. This advisory board had many meetings, seminars, and workshops with the local residents, informing the public about the process while
being as transparent as possible. Through the work of this advisory board that answered any concern and prevented any conflict before they started, the project started to be referred to as the “Miracle of Marxloh.” Within this context, Kaykın, following the trend Özmal set, became another instrumental actor establishing women’s inclusion in the mosque.

The role Özmal assumed in the realization of the project has been recognized widely not only by the stakeholders that were involved with the project at the time but also by the congregation itself:

Leyla is the one that initiated this project. I am sure the mosque would have been built without her as well, but it was with her knowledge and guidance that this mosque became different than the other mosque in Europe and widely recognized everywhere… (Melih E, civil engineer)

We were fortunate to have Leyla; she was in a very critical position. I would like to think we played our part as well, but this mosque is Leyla’s big project. (Kaykın, former project coordinator)

Everybody knows and recognizes Ms. Leyla around here. She was here all the time, and she really worked hard on this project. I don’t know about the others, but she set an excellent example for my daughter [her daughter Aslı is very active in the neighborhood organizations and volunteers regularly]. (Rabia, 59, housewife)

Based on the evidence presented above, before the inclusion of Özmal, the project had become deadlocked and became a source of anxiety for the mosque congregation due to its uncertain future. Because Özmal occupies a liminal space between German and Turkish culture due to her Turkish background and socialization in Germany on the one hand, and between local organizations and government due to her professional position on the other, she assumed the role of mediator not only between different stakeholders but also between two cultures. While her inclusion at the beginning contributed financially to the project, her bottom-up vision and her collaboration with Kaykın made the project accessible to the German public, ultimately transforming this Islamic figure into a symbol of integration (Figure 4-3).
4.1.2. Creating Inclusivity

Despite Özmal’s familiarity with the neighborhood and her bottom-up approach to creating inclusivity, she ultimately was not an insider; therefore, she could not completely reach out to the members of the mosque community during the planning of the mosque. In this context, Zülfüye Kaykı became one of the project’s leaders and continued to be involved with the mosque after its opening as she became the manager of the Dialogue Center. Similar to Özmal, Kaykı, who came to Duisburg when she was nine and socialized in Germany, also occupied a liminal position. Being a member of the Social Democrat Party (SPD) since 1994, coupled with her active voluntary involvement in the Marxloh NGOs and her being a member of the mosque community itself, allowed her to use her broad social network to contribute to the project. On the other hand, when it came to the negotiations with the mosque congregation itself, despite having a leadership position, Kaykı still required the help of the male allies to proceed with the project.

Figure 4-3 Özmal (left) and Kaykı (right) during the construction of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque (source: Shraven, 2013)
This process was initiated by creating an advisory board led by Kaykın, starting in 2002 and until 2005. The advisory board organized many meetings that brought the community and stakeholders together with the ultimate aim of developing transparency and openness. Because the project drew funds from the German government, this included establishing an inclusive environment in terms of both the religious functions of the mosque and the development of secularized social functions. While the religious functions were organized by the mosque association, the Dialogue Center that was established in 2005 under the leadership of Kaykın was responsible for the social functions, including education, consultation, and intercultural/interreligious outreach. Based on the early meetings, one of the first steps that this advisory board took was to modify the design of the mosque in order to address the concerns that the mosque’s minarets and dome would overshadow the tower of the Catholic church nearby (interview with Melih E. on 12/18/2018).

While Kaykın said that Şahin designed the mosque based on the demands of the congregation, she criticized Şahin’s design for directly mimicking a standard Turkish mosque design and spatial organization (Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5). She referred to the project’s potential by saying: “We could have done much more! We complain that we are neither Turkish nor German, so we could have designed a project that expressed our in-betweenness.” While Şahin’s plan reified traditional Turkish spatial and social patterns, Kaykın saw a missed opportunity to redefine the purpose of the mosque to suit the Turkish-German identity. As Şahin had gotten the approval of the first three steps of the Leitungphasen, which includes the approval of its architectural design, changing the mosque substantially would have required them to go through all the approval processes again – which would mean more time and money. For this reason, Şahin’s plan, which mimics the design and spatial organization of mosques in Turkey, had to be used as a basis and could only be slightly altered (interview with Kaykın on 06/12/2019).
Figure 4-4 Şahin’s design of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque (source: DITIB Neubau einer Begegnungstätte und Moschee in Duisburg-Marxloh, 2003, p. 1)

Figure 4-5 Standardized mosque plans provided by the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey (source: Batuman, 2016, p. 331)
The plan was changed to support the ideals of openness and transparency by making alterations to the façade, however, the majority of the modifications included changing the spatial organization to reduce the sex segregation in the mosque. Melih E., who joined the advisory board after Şahin was dismissed, explains how they presented the idea of reducing sex segregation in one of the public meetings and the reactions they received as:

When we took over the project, people wanted to preserve the women-men segregation, and the initial project had this segregation; it was not like how it is built today. When we told the congregation in the public meetings that women and men would use the same entrance, they reacted badly! We had the support of the mosque administration, but the congregation would not accept it, they are old-fashioned and are used to a specific type of spatial use, and that is how it has been for years. The people here are still holding onto the traditions that they had back at home [Turkey] 50 years ago. We don’t see such traditions anymore in Turkey, but you can see it here where the time stops!

Things are different here. Women actually go to the mosque [in Turkey, women do not attend mosque very often] and contribute to the mosque. So, when you exclude women from the mosque space, it gives the impression that it is okay for them to voluntarily cook or bake in the mosque, but when it comes to praying, they have to use the backdoors, backstairs, like burglars. I was very against that. (Melih E., civil engineer)

Melih E. emphasizes that the mosque space functions differently in the diaspora space and questions the motives of people still holding onto the outdated traditions. Kaykın explains this by referring to both Şahin and the community and claims that it is because:

They get confused about religion and tradition. There are traditions that we see in our everyday life that we never question, and we misapply them to our lifestyle. Once you question them, for example, you can see that from a religious perspective, it is okay for women to go to the mosque, to go to Cuma [Friday prayer], to have a program here. But because we have never seen such practices, neither in Turkey nor here, they are foreign to us. We had already missed the opportunity to design our mosque in a way that would be more inclusive for women as much as it is for men. So, we did what we could do to foster women’s inclusion. We didn’t want to just go with Şahin’s plan that takes tradition for religion and altered the plan as much as we could. (Kaykın, former project coordinator)

According to Şahin’s original plan, women and men used separate entrances to access the mosque. These entrances were placed on opposite facades of the building (Figure 4-6), while
women were planned to use the entrance on the western façade and directly accessed the stairs that would directly take them up to the women’s prayer hall, men were intended to use the Eastern entrance, accessing the foyer before entering the main prayer hall. Kayıkın refers to the meeting Melih E. mentioned when the congregation reacted badly to the idea of men and women using the same door and pointed out that most of these reactions came from men (as women among the mosque congregation rarely attended to the meetings), claiming that they also talk for mosque-going women, and they would not feel comfortable about using the same entrance. When Kayıkın held a women-only meeting to provide a platform where women could also express their needs, it became clear that women did not have any objections about the issue and, in fact complained about the lack of programs and accessibility (interview with Kayıkın on 06/12/2019).

On that subject, Nur expresses that:

When the mosque was planned, there were many meetings. They [advisory board] even had a meeting with just us [women]. I really liked that what we thought also mattered. In that meeting, women complained about being shoved into the usually cold and dirty backrooms and demanded better areas. Also, educational programs, from literacy courses to handcrafts. You know, in the end, everybody knows that this is just a mosque where you come and pray, but all these programs sounded exciting… (Nur, 45, housewife)

Figure 4-6 The initial plan of the mosque, women’s entrance can be seen on the western façade of the building (source: https://www2.duisburg.de/micro/eg-du/marxloh_projekte/projekt_Moschee_BS_aktuell_mxl.php)
While Kaykın found a way to incorporate women’s voices into the mosque project, it was not easy to convince the men (especially older men) in the mosque congregation. Kaykın tried to explain to them total invisibility of women in the mosque does not have a root in the Islamic tradition. In addition to common entrances, she insisted on including common spaces which can be used by both men and women for socialization and education:

They planned areas for men and youth, but they never considered women. The only thing that they do for women is the Qur’an course. They only think that women would come just for the Qur’an course and leave. During the public meetings, men among the congregation claimed that they and men were segregated in the Prophet’s Mosque, and it was the right way of using the mosque. I know that is not right; I told them these claims have no root in Islamic tradition, that the Prophet’s wife used the mosque freely. I was never taken seriously. This put us in a disadvantageous position. We are doing this very public and inclusive project, but they are still trying to exclude women. The non-Muslim people in the advisory board were very against this. In the end, we brought Prof. Bardakoğlu from Turkey. Prof. Bardakoğlu said that, of course, women should use the mosque as much as men do; they can use the same entrance and have the rights to be a part of the Friday prayers. He showed some examples from the Ottoman mosques to convince them. (Kaykın, former project coordinator)

Despite her advantageous position within the mosque community due to her role in the project and her connection to the German public, in the end, she was not taken seriously until her claims were supported by a man willing to support her suggestions and project her vision. Until Prof. Bardakoğlu, a respected religious scholar from Turkey embodying both religious and traditional values for the Marxloh community stepped into the scene, her voice was invalidated by the men among the mosque congregation with their belief (which was not rooted in factual evidence) in the tradition that women should not be a part of the mosque. With Prof.

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9 Prof. Dr. Ali Bardakoğlu served as the Dean of Marmara University the School of Divinity (1993-2003) and the head of the Directorate of Islamic affairs (2003-2010). Bardakoğlu represents the “moderate” Islam in Turkey and was known for his inclusive view of women. In 2005, he appointed two women as vice mufti (second highest position for Islamic jurists) (Prof. Dr. Ali Bardakoğlu, 2013). In his hulus he talks about the social and economic participation of women in the community and makes an emphasis on how women should have their economic independence and how women can and should socialize in the mosques like men do. In November 2010, he was forced to resign from his position by Erdoğan, who served as the prime minister at the time. His resignation came right after his explanation that wearing a headscarf is not an indication of a woman’s religiosity and that it is a political symbol. This was interpreted as a reaction against Erdoğan’s divisive political rhetoric that positions seculars against Islamists in Turkey (Mert 2010, Yılmaz 2010).
Bardakoğlu’s involvement and support, much to the chagrin of the men, not only was the entrance of the mosque reorganized (Figure 4-7) but also other spaces were included in the mosque which women could use. Mustafa Küçük, who served in the advisory board at the time and later became the spokesperson of the Dialogue Center, adds that during this time of negotiation, as the last attempt, men proposed to put up curtains covering women’s prayer hall, so that they would not be tempted to see women, only to be faced with a threat from Prof Bardakoğlu: “If you do so, I will personally pull the curtains down myself” (interview with Küçük on 06/12/2019).

While the inclusion of Kayıkın was an essential step in planning the construction of the mosque and bringing the project in line with the expectations of the German government, the secular ideals the Dialogue Center embodied ultimately caused tension with the mosque community as it contradicted with their traditional gendered views with little basis in religious practice. Though Kayıkın, Özmal, and Melih E. favored a more inclusive, secularized project embodied in the dialogue center, traditional gendered patterns of participation resulted in a misinterpretation of congregational priorities in the early meetings. Once women were actually consulted, it became clear that they wanted a less segregated space and a more active role in the

Figure 4-7 Melih E.’s sketches of Şahin’s spatial organization (left) and the sketch of the plan changed by the advisory board (right) (source: Author based on Melih E.’s sketches)
mosque. While Özmal and Kaykı̇n were instrumental in getting the project accepted by the
German public, when it came to the congregation, they were not able to go forward without the
help of the men who supported their claims. The cooperation of Prof. Bardakoğlu, who lent
critical male and religious authority to the attempt to develop a more inclusive institution,
allowed them to move forward with the project. Men’s objections and their reluctance to include
women in the public meetings foreshadowed what happened once the mosque opened and
gendered borders became a physical reality.

4.1.3. The Final Product

Limited by Şahin’s initial design of spaces that segregated men and women spatially and
would otherwise have become another mysterious mosque to the German public, the revised
organization of the mosque reflects Kaykı̇n and Özmal’s persistence on creating a more inclusive
space that allows women to use the mosque space as much as men do and provides a space for
intercultural and interreligious dialogue. This section discusses how this inclusivity has been
achieved both spatially and socially in the areas of administration, education, and socialization.

Spatially, while the sexual separation dictated by the direct application of the spatial
programming of a standard Turkish mosque could not have been changed (Figure 4-8), Kaykı̇n
and Özmal took advantage of the public nature of the project to create more inclusive spaces for
women, culminating in the creation of the Dialogue Center. While they could not change the
areas that belonged to the mosque association, the spaces that belonged to the Dialogue Center
were all conceived as mixed-use spaces, which were planned to be used by both men and women.
This, coupled with the wide variety of social programs for women that would take place in these
mixed-use spaces, justified women’s use of the mosque space, not only for praying purposes but
also for their socialization and education.
Figure 4-9 shows that the spaces in the mosque are distributed between the mosque organization and the Dialogue Center. The areas allotted to the mosque organization are the prayer spaces (1 and 6), the mosque administration offices (2), wardrobe (5), foyer (4), and ablution areas (16 and 17). The rooms used as the kitchen (22) and classrooms (23) were later bought by the mosque. The areas belonging to the Dialogue Center are the Dialogue Center itself (3), the archive/library (8), offices for women (7), seminar rooms (9 and 10), bistro including kitchen, and an open area (11, 12 and 13), the youth branch room (14), office spaces for Dialogue Center (15) and the teahouse in the courtyard (19) with its open space (20).

The spaces owned by the mosque association follow the traditional pattern of mosque organization; the open lower floor being the main prayer hall used by men, where mihrab and kürsü are located, and a mezzanine surrounding the main prayer hall used as women’s praying hall. While the space allocated to women is much smaller than the area allocated for men by a ratio of 1:2 and lacked direct access to important components (mihrab and kürsü), the higher location of the women’s prayer area was meant to make it easier for them to see and hear the prayers and sermons. The only other space where sex segregation is followed is the ablution area (16 and 17). Overall, in terms of the organization of the prayer spaces, the mosque mimics a standard Turkish mosque, which makes it no different than the Turkish-commissioned purpose-built mosques in Germany.

Besides its size and capacity, what makes this project different than other purpose-built mosques in Germany is the incorporation of the Dialogue Center. In the spirit of transparency and openness, the main office of the Dialogue Center (3) is on Warbrückstrasse, where it also functions as a welcoming center for the mosque (Figure 4-10). The archive/library (8) found upstairs can be accessed through this main office. In addition to the archive/library room, two
Figure 4-8 The final plan of the mosque showing the spaces where segregation based on sex exist (Source: Author)
Figure 4-9 The final plan of the mosque showing the use of spaces by the mosque organization and the Dialogue Center (Source: Author)
office rooms (7) are located on the mezzanine floor, intended for the use of women. The basement was primarily planned to be a part of the Dialogue Center, therefore includes the majority of the mixed-use spaces, like Bistro including a kitchen and an open area (11, 12, and 13), a room for the youth-branch of the organization (14), seminar rooms (9 and 10) and four office rooms for the use of association (15). Similar to other mixed-use spaces, the tea-house (19), including its open section (20) located in the courtyard (18), also was planned to serve as a part of the Dialogue Center, directly facing the mosque entrance.

Figure 4-10 Marxloh Merkez Mosque, after its construction
(Source: duisburg.de/wohnenleben/geografischstadtbezirke/merkez-moschee.php)

Social inclusivity was planned to be achieved in three main areas: administration, education, and socialization:

Administration: The inclusivity in the area of administration was achieved based on the dual organization of the mosque. The Dialogue Center and the mosque organization were planned to have two separate administrations that worked together. This working together was aimed at achieving a member who would be included in both mosque and the Dialogue Center
administrations. The administration of the Dialogue Center was also planned to include German members involved in a different neighborhood and religious groups to contribute to the Turkish-Muslim-German intercultural and interreligious dialogue. In addition to this, the presence of women in the administration was specifically provided. According to the by-laws of the mosque administration that are provided from the DITIB Centre in Cologne, the mosque administration must include at least two women. While such a specification was not made for the administration of the Dialogue Center, women’s influence during the construction period continued, and the initial seats in the administration of the Dialogue Center were taken mainly by women. Especially right after the construction and opening, the administration of the dual center was provided mainly by women, making them important actors in the decision-making process (interview with Kaykın 06/12/2019).

*Education:* The educational programs in the mosque aimed to create opportunities for integration, to identify immigrants’ potential contribution to both the Turkish immigrant community and German society, and ameliorate existing problems. According to the information booklet that was presented in one of the advisory board meetings in 2003, the educational activities include language courses (both Turkish and German), reading and writing courses (as some of the congregants were illiterate), integration courses that focus on the foreigner’s law in Germany, the German school structure, social and cultural aspects, and additional physical activity and hobby courses. In addition to the institutional education activities, seminars and workshops aimed at creating intercultural and interreligious dialogue by bringing together different groups were planned. There is a specific section on activities for women in the booklet, such as celebrating Women’s Day and roundtable meetings with other women’s organizations in the neighborhood. In addition to this, the importance of providing counseling for women and putting them in contact with women’s shelters when necessary.
On the other hand, despite such activities that ultimately aim for Turkish-Muslim women’s emancipation, the way Turkish-Muslim women are defined in this context is problematic. The section of the booklet that describes the proposed activities for women opens up with a statement that Qur’an defines women and men as complementary beings. Rather than proposing specific activities, this section mostly relies on their vision to include women more, increase the female members of the congregation and focus on women’s education not because they are independent actors, but they are mothers first who are responsible for raising a religious and moral generation of Turkish-Muslims. The language used in this report helps construct a discourse where women can only exist as mothers and moral educators to become legitimate and visible members of the community. This discursive mechanism already defines a hierarchy where women are subordinate to men but can occupy a higher position in this hierarchy when they are legitimimized through motherhood. This hierarchy positions married women and mothers in between men and unmarried young women, which is a dynamic specifically influences both women’s behavior in the mosque, which will be discussed in this chapter, and women’s mobility in the neighborhood and urban contexts, which will be discussed extensively in the next chapter.

Socialization: The social programs that were planned to take place in the mosque space as a part of Dialogue Center’s mission aimed two things: Firstly, to provide a meeting place for people from different cultures and religions, and within the mosque community itself, the primary purpose is to bring forward the invisible members of the mosque community: women, elderly and youth. Within this context, the social programs for women constitute a substantial portion of the programs offered (Figure 4-11). The programs planned explicitly for women includes international women’s breakfast (monthly), a celebration of the International Women’s Day, participation in the Roundtable Discussion\textsuperscript{10} on Violence Protection Act, participation in

\textsuperscript{10} Marxloh Rundertisch, Marxloh Roundtable was founded in 2012 as a registered association and serves as a network and connection point for all people in the district. The association provide a space for its members (and member
women’s network in the neighborhood, cooperation with women’s shelters, and equal opportunity office (Yılmaz, 2010). While these programs aim to include women in the mosque, they also aim to reflect their presence in the mosque to the German public. These activities were mostly planned to occur in the areas, especially the basement floor where the bistro and seminar rooms are located. In addition to these formal programs, the Dialogue Center portion of the mosque was planned as an area that is open to the whole public. The handbook specifically mentions the character of this space as somewhere where Turks and Germans and women and men come together and spend time. The second aim of the social programs that took place, Dialogue Center was to secure its financial independence. Once built, the Dialogue Center was planned to self-finance itself through the money received by renting out the spaces that belong to the Dialogue Center and the profit generated by the bistro and tea houses. In addition to this, the non-religious activities that would take place in the Dialogue Center were crucial to draw public funds from Germany.

In short, though the Dialogue Center is physically part of the mosque, its purpose and organization set it apart as a different institution. As a set of spaces meant to afford opportunities for education and socialization to all congregation members as well as members of the general public, it set the Marxloh Merkez Mosque apart from its Turkish-funded counterparts around Germany. In this respect, Özmal and Kaykin were successful in leveraging the use of public funds to start the process of opening a traditionally conservative religious community by creating secularized, non-gendered space that did not require individuals, especially women, to justify their reasons for being there. From a more theoretical perspective, looking at the spatial and social organization of the mosque, as it was planned, we can see the effective staging and German civil ideals, loyalty, participation, and transparency (Becker, 2007; Oz & Staub 2018). The image organizations) to come together weekly to discuss the problems and to improve the living conditions in the neighborhood (RunderTisch Marxloh e.V., 2014).
and vision Kaykın and Özmal developed for the mosque managed to bridge both these German ideals and the Turkish-Muslim sensitivities. Being ethnically Turkish, but having grown up in Germany, both women were well aware of the discourses that define the Turkish-Muslimness and Germanness, which allowed them to develop such a plan that integrates two cultures in a manner that does not privilege one set of norms and behavior over the other but allowing them to coexist in the space of the mosque and the Dialogue Center.

Figure 4-11 The mission of the Dialogue Center (EG-DU 2004, taken from Shoppengard 2007, p. 87 and translated by the author)

4.2. After the Opening: Deterioration of Gender Inclusivity

The chapter so far has focused on the planning, construction, and initial operation of the mosque and the Dialogue Center, covering a period from 1997 to 2008. The second part of this chapter covers the period after 2008 and presents how the inclusivity Özmal and Kaykın’s
Dialogue Center represents did not carry into the practice of the mosque. The conflicts caused by the tension between the secular norms and values the Dialogue Center stands for that were defined by later generation women, and the overwhelming influence of Turkish-Muslim traditions of the earlier generations within the mosque association led to the breakdown of gender inclusivity. This started as the exclusion of women from the administrative spheres and later caused deterioration of educational and socialization opportunities for women, forcing them to restructure their behavior. This section explores the exclusion that started in the social space, in the areas of administration (4.2.1), education (4.2.2), and socialization (4.2.3), which influenced the spatial use of the mosque by women. While it did not influence the physical aspects of spatial organization, the implications of social exclusion led to a complete change in women’s spatial behavior, leading to complete opposite patterns of behavior than planned. However, the socio-spatial behavioral patterns of women in the mosque are not uniform. While older-generation women, socialized within Turkish-Muslim culture and internalized more conservative norms, submitted to the norms of Islamic femininity and performed within the limited sphere defined for them, later-generation women, socialized in German culture, found ways to negotiate their dual identities.

In terms of the bigger question of integration and belonging, the reinstitution of the patterns of separation created through gendered performances not only led to the deterioration of the gender inclusivity and divided the community in terms of gender differences but also created and redefined ethnic boundaries, as the core of ethnic cultures is usually based on the gender regimes. The reinstitution of Turkish-Muslim norms through the rejection of the Turkish-German norms defined during the construction of the mosque redefined ethnic boundaries between the Turkish and the German cultures and set new borders. These redefined borders are maintained by the exclusion (and even discipline) of people who do not properly perform Turkish-Muslim norms, where gender is used as a stabilizing agent.
4.2.1. Administration: Women between Visibility and Invisibility

Despite the instrumental role women played during the planning and the construction of the mosque, after the mosque was opened in 2008, the influence and inclusion of women in the political space of the mosque quickly broke down. This section explains the two practices that led to the exclusion of women from the political and administrative sphere: The first, which is discussed in section 4.2.1.1 is the exclusion of women from the administrative positions by men, including Kaykın’s resignation from her role as the director of the Dialogue Center and substantial reduction of women’s administrative responsibilities. While women are excluded from the administration, they are still used as representative figures for the positive publicity of the mosque. The second practice that is explored in section 4.2.1.2 that leads to women’s exclusion from the political sphere of the mosque is the reinscription of traditional norms that define gendered roles for both men and women, especially after the administration of the Dialogue Center was replaced by a conservative group upon Kaykın’s resignation. Without leadership that provided an alternative framework to the traditional Turkish-Islamic norms and values, beliefs and performances such as the primacy of male leadership were increasingly reinforced.

4.2.1.1. Exclusion of women from the positions of power

The seemingly complementary but contradictory values two associations represent, the mosque association embodying the Turkish-Islamic traditions and the Dialogue Center embodying the secular German values, led to the conflict, which eventually resulted in Kaykın’s resignation. After the resignation of Kaykın in 2010, the administration of the Dialogue Center was taken over by a more conservative group among the mosque congregation, transforming the non-gendered character of the Dialogue Center. In the aftermath of this conflict, the Dialogue
Center is rendered ineffective. Today, the Dialogue Center is managed by the customarily male-dominated administration of the mosque association, who successfully reinscribed the sex segregation in the secular space, leading to gendered performances in the mosque space that was planned to be used by both men and women. While women were effectively removed from any decision-making role, this exclusion also operated by assigning women to superficial public roles that would still make the mosque appear like an inclusive space for women for positive publicity.

The conflict stemmed from the antithetical representations and interests between the two associations and their adoption and embodiment of conflicting norms. On an administrative level, the secular reformed discourse of Islam created in the Dialogue Center and shared with the German public conflicted with the conservative views of the congregation embodied by the mosque administration. In other words, the vision of the Dialogue Center, which respected the norms of Turkish-Islam while also aligning itself with Euro-Islam that is regarded as more compatible with socially desirable Islam in Germany (Karıç, 2002), conflicted with the Turkish-Muslim ideals of the mosque administration that was influenced by the notions of namus, conservative Islam and the political Islam. On a communal level, the main aim of the Dialogue Center, openness and interreligious outreach, the focal selling and marketing point during the realization of the mosque project, raised many complaints both from the mosque administration and congregation. As the director of the Dialogue Center, Kaykın reached out to inform both the members of the congregation and the non-Muslim members of the Marxloh community about their activities. The mosque congregation complained about having non-Muslim people around in the mosque all the time. The same openness that was welcomed by the mosque congregation during the construction of the mosque became the major source of conflict (interview with Kaykın on 06/12/2019). From a theoretical perspective, the efforts of public figures such as Kaykın and Özmal, who were brought up with both Turkish and German norms and had the means to blur the distinctions and borders between these cultures, started to be perceived as
transgressions and deviant behavior by the conservative earlier-generation mosque community, who had constructed strict separations between cultures, ethnicities, and genders and disciplined accordingly which resulted in their exclusion.

Kaykın got caught in the middle of this subsequent dispute, which was covered extensively by the German and Turkish media and forced her to resign in 2010. Defamation and suspicions spread, and there was talk of personal interests and financial irregularities. Kaykın, who at the time also served as NRW’s State Secretary for Integration, was personally held responsible for the financial irregularities. Despite the support she got from the Dialogue Center, no longer being supported by the mosque administration and the congregation based on her ideas not compatible with the first-generation discourse, she was forced to resign from her position as the director of the Dialogue Center in 2010, which later led to her dismissal from her role as the State Secretary in 2013, in the aftermath of the dispute in the Dialogue Center (Gorzewski, 2015). In 2010, the administration of the Dialogue Center was taken over by a group working closely with the mosque administration.

The group that has taken over its administration (and their successors) has rendered the Dialogue Center largely ineffective. The conservative group replacing the secular administration in the Dialogue Center made it dependent on the mosque association on an administrative level; the mosque association stopped most of their collaborative activities and discontinued most of the social and intercultural programs that were planned to take place through this collaboration, which caused the Dialogue Center to be financially dependent on the mosque association. Today, Hülya Ceylan currently serves as the director of the Dialogue Center. She is one of the few full-time personnel working in the mosque with the vision that aims to bring together Turkish and German cultures and have the will and background to implement the interreligious and intercultural dialogue projects. However, the loss of Dialogue Center’s financial autonomy caused her to discontinue her programs on the institutional level and personally made her
livelihood dependent on the funds that would come from the mosque association, which relies on the congregation’s donations.

The evidence above suggests that both the Dialogue Center and Ceylan were co-opted by the mosque association as figureheads only to be used for positive publicity of the mosque. Today, while Ceylan appears in almost every piece of article related to the mosque, she is excluded from any decision-making processes, and her responsibilities in the mosque are reduced to providing tours for the visitors (interview with Ceylan on 01/31/2019). Despite these limitations, she continues to actively participate in the interreligious activities that take place in the neighborhood through her own personal network; however, she can no longer continue to implement her projects in the mosque. Melih E., who volunteered as a consultant during the construction phase and is still an active member of the mosque congregation, explains the motivation behind using women as figureheads:

Women do it much better when there is a need to promote a project. I mean this as a matter of likability, not as a matter of sexuality. There is a prejudice against Turkish men, that they are macho, that they beat their wives and kids. However, for this exact reason, Turkish-Muslim women are perceived as people to be protected, especially by Germans. They appear much more charming and likable than Turkish men. I think it might be a psychological thing, but Germans are especially receptive when Turkish women are involved, especially when they appear a little bit integrated. I mean, when the woman seems more modern, talks German well, it is easier for a Turkish woman to explain something to the German society. (Melih E., civil engineer)

As the mosque association’s administration rendered the Dialogue Center ineffective and became the decision-making authority, the inclusivity of the women at the administrative level was reduced drastically. The bylaws of the mosque association requires the nine-people administrative board to include at least two women (ideally one younger woman representing women’s youth branch and one older woman representing the women’s branch) and a member

11 The bylaws are the same for every local mosque organization and written and distributed by DITIB headquarters in Cologne
from the administration of the Dialogue Center to provide an organic link between two associations. Currently, Hülya Ceylan, the director of the Dialogue Center, and Gülbahar, the chairwoman of the women’s commission, occupy the two seats for women in the administration. Ceylan, within this context, both serve as the representative from the administration of the Dialogue Center and occupies the second seat for women, fulfilling both requirements. Despite being the most active and willing group in the mosque, the women's youth group remains unrepresented as the administration prefers a dominantly male group, thereby limiting the number of women occupying positions of power by assigning multiple duties to Ceylan, meeting their obligations on paper. It should be noted that the men’s youth group does have a representative in the mosque administration, who officially represents the whole “youth group” in the mosque despite not being active in the mosque at all.

Figure 4-12 shows how these administrative trends manifested spatially in women being placed superficially in a publicly visible part of the mosque (3), while most of their activity takes place in locations with little visual and physical access (7 and 22). The promotion of the mosque by using strong women leaders, especially during the time of its construction, is a trend that continues still today, albeit superficially. Especially to the outsiders to the community, especially to non-Muslims and the press, the Dialogue Center (3 in Figure 4-12 and Figure 4-13) is the initial point of access to the mosque and serves as the welcoming center, making the women working there the first thing visitors see, despite them being marginalized in the actual functioning of the mosque. In addition to the gendered spatialization of the mosque, there is a generational component in how the female spaces are used which can also be seen in the spatial use of younger women. Young women are very active, and they take part in many public events, such as visiting the nursing
Figure 4-12 Men’s administrative spaces (left) vs. women’s administrative spaces (right) in Marxloh Merkez Mosque (source: Author)

Figure 4-13 Marxloh Merkez Mosque from the Warbrückstrasse (source: https://structurae.net/en/structures/ditib-central-mosque)
homes and volunteering as guides in the Open-Door Day\textsuperscript{12}, and their visibility is encouraged and welcomed during those public events. However, when it comes to the use of administrative spheres, following their exclusion from the administration, they are also excluded from the youth branch room (14 in Figure 4-12) planned initially as a mixed-gender space as a part of the Dialogue Center. This situation led them to occupy another space in the mosque and transform that place into young women’s branch room, which they use very frequently, not only for administrative purposes but also for their education and socialization. However, this room’s visual and physical location is sequestered, which contradicts the active and visible role they assume for the promotion of the mosque to the German public.

4.2.1.2. The internalized gender norms

In the ten years since Kaykın was forced to retire in 2010, the mosque leadership in Marxloh Merkez Mosque has been male-dominated. Those women from later generations who had the social and cultural capital due to their socialization in Germany to compete against men in the political space of the mosque were effectively marginalized. Meanwhile, women among the mosque congregation, in general, are further discouraged from taking over administrative roles due to the internalization of gender roles. These internalized gender roles keep women from occupying decision-making roles in three ways: 1) privileging men as the administrative figures on the basis that their fitrat, which makes them emotional would prevent them from assuming leadership roles, 2) assigning older-generation women who hold administrative positions to domestic duties even in the mosque and 3) internalized Turkish-Islamic discourse that assigns the private space of home to women as their primary responsibilities are domestic duties.

\textsuperscript{12} Around 500 mosques and prayer houses take part in the annual Open Mosque Day (Tag der offenen Moschee) on the 3rd of October every year. During this day, non-Muslims can visit the mosques and talk with the volunteers. In 2019, Marxloh Merkez Mosque was visited by 200 people (Gatermann, 2020).
To start with privileging men as administrative figures, I have identified two good examples of male administrators exhibiting deeply internalized gender roles that privilege men in positions of power. Both of these took place during my encounter with Yunus, the current mosque administrator who, when I introduced my research and asked for help reaching out to the chairwoman of the women’s association in the mosque, asked: “why would you want to interview women? They would not even understand the extent and importance of what we [the mosque administration] do here.” His statement was supported by Salim, the current imam of the mosque sent from Turkey to Duisburg for two years, who said: “women really don’t do much here, they are not so much around either, they are at their homes mostly. The administration of here is on us [men]. If you want to get information correct information, you should talk with people in authority. We are the ones that can give you information. Women are emotional; they cannot be objective like we are so that they would misinform you about our activities” (field notes from 11/27/2018). Both of these statements reflect the deeply entrenched view of men in the mosque administration that positions of authority are reserved for men, based on the idea that the political space of the mosque is male and women’s place is the domestic space of the home, rooted in traditional Turkish-Muslim cultural practice. This attitude has been interpreted critically by one of my interviewees, Aslı, as:

They [mosque administration] think women cannot do what they do. And you know what, I know what they do, I see what they do, it is not hard. I have a better education than most of those men in the administration, and my German is better. It is just that they don’t want women to come forward. This is how they have seen from their parents, but it doesn’t make sense to keep such thoughts alive (Aslı, 21, student)

While younger generation women in the mosque, as Aslı, speak up openly about this favoritism based on gender, with the older generation women, we see that women also take an important role in reproducing this association of men with leadership positions. During our interview, Ceylan, the director of the Dialogue Center, complained that “even when women are in
the administration, they are too passive, they don’t want to take any responsibility” (interview on 01/28/2019). Unlike the younger-generation women who are willing but not given the opportunity, older-generation women have the opportunity but are reluctant to be in the administration. This is exemplified by Gülbahar’s attitude, narrated by one of my interviewees. After the former chairwoman of women’s group had to step down from her position in the mosque administration, Gülbahar was very reluctant to take over. She only agreed to take over the position with the condition that she would only be responsible for the cooking/baking organization and would not be expected to attend the board meetings or activities that involve other groups in the neighborhood (interview with Fatma, 64, housewife). In my own discussions with Gülbahar, she repeated this behavior in reply to my interview offer by saying: “What do I know? You should talk to the mosque administration; I don’t want to say anything without their consent…” (field notes from 11/27/2018). Gülbahar’s insistence on being responsible only for the domestic activities that take place in the mosque, coupled with her reluctance to talk to me without the knowledge of the mosque administration, separates women’s political sphere from men’s, reproducing the notion that public leadership positions are reserved for men and women’s responsibility is limited to the domestic sphere. This notion actually found its way into the discourse as the women’s group is usually referred to as the “kitchen team” by the administration (interview with Elif, 32, housewife). This idea is further reinforced with the spatial behavior of older-generation women, as Gülbahar primarily uses kitchen space for organizing women (22 in Figure 4-12), reproducing and strengthening women’s association with domestic spaces.

Finally, internalized gender roles also affect the participation of women in the creation of domestic expectations. Women’s presence in the mosque for reasons other than attending religious activities is usually regarded as time spent away from their domestic duties, and women end up having to negotiate time and reasons to justify their presence in the mosque. On this issue, Afife, a younger-generation, active and social member of the mosque, says:
I would like to be a part of the administration; I come here a lot and would like to have a say about how they do things. But I just don’t have time. Taking care of the kids and dealing with the house takes a lot of my time; my husband doesn’t help me with anything [although he works shifts and does not work every day]. He thinks that when I spend more time here, I neglect some of the housework, and he doesn’t like it. Even for the sohbet [religious lecture], I take the kids to the school and then come here when they are at school. I can’t do that on the days my husband doesn’t work; he expects me to come home when the kids are in school and take care of the housework (Afife, 34, housewife).

Similar to Afife, whose husband expects her to take care of the domestic duties even when it gets in the way of her social needs, Leman and Nazlı’s experiences show how these internalized gender roles and expectations change once they get married. Leman and Nazlı were both very active members of the women’s youth group in the mosque and assumed leadership positions in the group. Nazlı got married early when she was 22, and although she was still living very close to the mosque, she stopped participating in the activities that the young women’s group organized because she “felt like I couldn’t relate to the girls anymore… I mean once you are married, your life, what is expected of you, it all changes.” (Nazlı, 33, housewife). Leman, on the other hand, still continues her role as the leader of the young women’s group; however, she admits that she does not have time to be as active as she used to be. She jokingly narrates that: “My husband can’t even crack an egg! He cannot be trusted with the housework; I need to be there, so he doesn’t starve or burn the house down… (Leman, 32, works in the public sector). Nazlı and Leman’s stepping down from their roles as leaders was not received with surprise as it was expected of women to put their domestic duties and families above their other responsibilities once they get married.

The spatial behavior of women in terms of how they use the mosque space for administrative purposes (Figure 4-12) illustrates the marginalization of women and also reveals different patterns among generations. While internalized gender roles marginalize women in the political sphere, the spaces women use for administrative purposes reflect this marginalization with their peripheral locations in the mosque. The administrative duties of women take place in
the spaces that are used for other purposes. In addition to the Dialogue Center (3), where women contribute to the positive visibility of the mosque and the room (7) used by the younger women, which is also used for their education and socialization, especially older-generation women’s administrative activities take place in the kitchen area (22) located outside the mosque (Figure 4-14), usually during the time when women prepare food to sell. While men have administrative spaces that are used only for administrative purposes, women do not have a space that only serves for their administrative activities and use other spaces that are used for other functions. On the other hand, the offices (2) that men use for administrative purposes were initially planned for general administrative use during the construction of the mosque. Today, these offices are transformed into the personal offices of the mosque administrators. The centrality of men’s presence, inscribed into the Turkish-Islamic tradition through the centrality of men’s prayer hall in the mosque, is reproduced through the centering of men in positions of authority. This notion of centrality manifests physically in the central location of these administrative offices immediately adjacent to the prayer hall and highly accessible. Abid discusses that the physical manifestation of this segregation in the administrative sphere of the mosque institutionalizes the separation between men and women, legitimizing patriarchal privileges. Thus, the visual reinforcement of the prioritization of the male religious practice affects the construction of the social relations between men and women (Abid, 2011). Klausing builds upon this argument and asserts that spatially situating women at the periphery of the mosque also socially positions them on the periphery (2013).

The spatial behavior of women with respect to the use of administrative spaces reveals another dimension when analyzed through the generational lens (Figure 4-15). The evidence presented above reveals a clear pattern that younger-generation women want to be in administration but are excluded, while older women do not want to be in the administration but
Figure 4-14 The kitchen space (22 in Figure 4-12) (source: Author)

Figure 4-15 Older-generation women’s administrative spaces vs. younger-generation women’s administrative spaces in Marxloh Merkez Mosque (source: Author)
are included. This willingness of younger women is spatially represented by their use of the spaces found within the mosque itself for administrative purposes, contrary to the spatial behavior of older women that prefer to use the peripheral kitchen area (22) outside the mosque. Especially in the case of young women’s branch room (7), which is occupied by young women as an act of resistance for being excluded from the youth branch room (14) that was allocated to both young women and men but only used by men, the willingness of young women can be seen from their unauthorized and transgressive insertion of themselves into the mosque space.

In conclusion, the male-dominated administration is formally required to include women in their ranks. In practice, however, they only show a willingness to include older-generation women who do not challenge the dominance of the men because of their socialization. Younger-generation women, who might seek decision-making roles, are effectively kept out of administrative roles. This led to the deterioration of the inclusive vision that a more diverse administration, both in terms of gender and ethnicity, would blur and break the boundaries that were set as a result of the Turkish-Muslim discourse and instead reinforced the separation between men’s and women’s spheres.

4.2.2. Education: Defining Limits for Turkish Muslim Women

During the planning phase of the project, as a part of the Dialogue Center’s mission, many programs were planned to increase the visibility and inclusivity of the hidden members of the community and foster engagement with the German public. Until the Dialogue Center was taken over by the more conservative group and merged with the mosque association, such programs were successfully implemented, especially in the period between 2003 and 2008. Today, the number of educational programs available for female congregants in the mosque is reduced drastically. Far from expanding opportunities for women, as initially intended, the
content and execution of these limited programs instead establish significant limitations for women. This section discusses how inclusivity deteriorated in terms of education. Within the mosque, these programs limit women as they reproduce unequal gender relations by emphasizing the centrality of men and offering unequal opportunities for men and women, which is explored in section 4.2.2.1. Section 4.2.2.2 discusses the content of these educational programs and how they set limitations for women in the secular German public as they define norms of Islamic femininity based on Turkish-Islamic values fostering further division between Turkish and German cultures.

4.2.2.1. Unequal Opportunities for Women

Turkish-Muslim women’s educational opportunities in the mosque are limited as the emphasis is placed on men’s religious and cultural education. The unequal opportunities manifest in three ways: 1) unstructured organization of women’s educational programs, 2) the superiority of men’s educational spaces over spaces women use for their education, and 3) the attitude towards women during the programs that were planned to include both men and women. While having unequal access to educational opportunities in the mosque puts women in a relatively disadvantaged position compared to men, the internalization of Islamic gender norms prevents women from objecting to their disadvantaged position. However, the internalization of these norms shows different patterns in behaviors of older-generation and younger-generation women. While older-generation women among mosque congregation comply with these norms, assuming a submissive position, younger women negotiate these norms that allow them to appropriate spaces in the mosque, typically used for men’s educational purposes.

While many educational programs targeting women were planned during the planning phase of the mosque, today, the only educational programs that take place in the mosque are
classes on religious education. The educational programs were planned by Kaykın, and her team aimed to bring the mosque community closer to the German community by providing services the mosque congregation could not receive otherwise. Some of these programs, for example, integration courses, language courses, literacy courses, homework help for children, specifically aimed to increase the inclusivity, active participation, and visibility of women who had been rendered invisible for a long time based on the Turkish-Islamic framework that makes an emphasis on the isolation of women in the private sphere of the home. Despite women’s active participation in these programs after the mosque's opening, these programs, organized by the Dialogue Center, were eventually curtailed. Today, the only educational programs in the mosque available for women are religion. As these religious educational courses remain outside the secular mission of the Dialogue Center, the mosque association is responsible for its organization.

Table 4-1 Weekly schedule of the educational courses that take place in the mosque found on the announcement board of the mosque (translated from Turkish)

Table 4-1 shows the weekly schedule of classes and demonstrates the stark difference between the importance given to men’s and women’s religious education. While the mosque association created a systematic schedule for men’s classes, women’s classes remain
unstructured, and their schedule is left to the female religious officer on duty, Ayşe Hoca. This becomes even more important considering the fact that women’s attendance to the religious classes is much higher than men’s attendance, primarily due to their availability during the day, as many women among the mosque congregation are housewives. During my fieldwork, the classes that women participated were organized and scheduled by the only female religious officer in the mosque, Ayşe Hoca, as opposed to three imams that are responsible for men’s religious education. While men’s imams can share the workload, Ayşe Hoca is the only formal religious officer responsible for any religious activity pertaining to women. Some women among the congregation volunteer to teach children (ages 6-16) on the weekends, which lightens Ayşe Hoca’s heavy workload. In addition to her religious duties, she teaches different Qur’an courses that include reading, interpreting, and memorizing (these usually take place Monday-Friday mornings) and organizing and delivering Islamic lectures both for older (Thursday afternoons) and younger women (Sunday afternoons). Her heavy workload, with the added responsibility of organizing and scheduling the courses, leads to a less structured teaching program, both in terms of logistics (time and location) and content. Feyza explains how discouraging it gets without a structure as:

It is too crowded. Ayşe Hoca is a great teacher, but she is the only one. She cannot separate people based on their levels; she doesn’t have time. And she likes to help everyone, which means that everybody gets to read Qur’an and other people have to wait when Ayşe Hoca corrects her. But this also means that many of the classes go for more than 3 hours every day. I am actually good at it; I am already much more advanced than other women, and there are other women like myself. I wish we had a separate class where she teaches more of the advanced stuff. I feel like I don’t learn anything anymore. Most of the time, I skip it.

(Feyza, 44, housewife)

The spaces used for educational purposes also manifest this difference between men’s and women’s classes in terms of structure and highlight the centrality of men’s education in the mosque (Figure 4-16). Men use the main spaces of the mosque for their education; their classes take place in the main prayer hall (1), the library/archive (8), and occasionally in the conference
rooms (9 and 10) and in the office spaces that are converted into classrooms (15). For the Islamic lectures, men use the main prayer hall for the Friday sermon, and young men’s sohbet (Islamic lecture) takes place in the youth branch room (14), which was originally planned as a mixed-gender space and is now used exclusively by young men. Men’s use of the central space of the mosque for educational purposes, which highlights men’s centrality once again, coupled with the transformation of the spaces that were planned as a part of the Dialogue Center into men-only educational spaces, demonstrates men’s education being privileged over women’s education.

The spaces women use for educational purposes, on the other hand, are both unstructured, and marginally located. However, women’s use of the space cannot be as clearly generalized as men’s use, since clear patterns emerge when women’s generational differences are considered. Despite the fact that the archive/library room (8), which is planned as a space where such classes
would take place, is not occupied during when women’s classes take place, women are made to use children’s classrooms (23) in case archive/library might be needed for other purposes.

Younger-generation women simply do not accept this and take over the archive/library (8) room for their classes (Figure 4-17); however, older-generation women, despite their high attendance and daily use, comply with this not to violate perceived social conventions. Children’s classrooms are physically in much worse condition than the archive/library room, with the lack of enough lighting, ventilation, and heating and small desks designed for children (Figure 4-18). During my interviews, many women expressed their discomfort on the situation:

I don’t go to the classes in winter anymore, it is cold, so we can’t open a window. But the air also gets so stale, because we are there for almost 3-4 hours… (Seda, 50, works in the family business)

You can’t even take off your coat; it gets so cold in winter (Fatma, 64, housewife)

Duisburg is depressing enough as it is [referring to long, dark days during winter], and this classroom doesn’t help. (Hayriye, 59, works in the public sector)

For Islamic lectures, sohbet, younger-generation women use the room (7) they occupied after they were excluded from using the mixed youth branch room (14). While this occupied room serves multiple purposes and furnished by the mosque administration to answer young-generation women’s multiple needs, it is much smaller (21 m²) than the youth branch room used by men (44 m²), despite being used more often (Figure 4-19). On the other hand, older-generation women use the archive/library room for sohbet unless it is occupied or help is needed in the kitchen (22). In that case, women either use one of the children’s classrooms or if an event is approaching where baked goods are needed to be sold for fundraising purposes, sohbet takes place in the kitchen, where women help with the cooking/baking while listening to the Islamic lectures.

While we have seen that in segregated activities, men are given specialized spaces, and their participation is institutionalized through formal scheduling, women are given multipurpose
Figure 4-17 Young women using archive/library room for their classes (www.ditib-du.de/jugend)

Figure 4-18 Children's classrooms used by older-generation women (source: Author)

Figure 4-19 Images from (left) young men’s lecture that took place in the youth brach room (14) and (right) younger-generation women’s lecture that took place in young women’s group room (7) (www.ditib-du.de/jugend)
ill-suited spaces for educational activities, and their schedule is much prone to change based on the rooms’ availability. A similar imbalance can be seen in mixed-gender activities regarding how women occupy space. These mixed programs that are open to both women’s and men’s attendance are organized mainly by mosque association, and these programs take place in the main prayer hall, as it is the largest space in the mosque that can comfortably accommodate high attendance. During these programs, women stay upstairs, in their prayer space, while men have the opportunity to participate in these programs in the main prayer space. While, in theory, this mezzanine space was designed for them to oversee men’s prayer area and follow the programs that take place in the main prayer area without being seen, in practice, this does not work. As women stay upstairs during these programs, they cannot see what is going on downstairs, as their field of vision is cut by the partition surrounding women’s prayer area. Women can stand up and watch what is going on downstairs, but it is usually frowned upon both by men downstairs and other women, as this would subject them to the male gaze that they are prescribed to avoid. In other words, surveillance works as the disciplinary mechanism to prevent them from being subjected to the male gaze (Figure 4-20). In addition to not being able to see, women are not able to hear the programs that take place downstairs because of the echo. This women’s disadvantaged position was clearly illustrated during an educational program that included Nihat Hatipoğlu, a famous Turkish theologian and academician, who came to Marxloh Merkez Mosque as an invited speaker. While men had the opportunity to watch and hear clearly Hatipoğlu’s speech (Figure 4-21), women were not able to see or hear much (Figure 4-22). Derya and Feyza express their frustration as:

They put up a screen upstairs so that we can see, but we didn’t hear much. There was too much echo. It got worse when women got bored as they couldn’t hear and started to talk with each other. It was frustrating. We might as well have stayed home and watched him on TV; we could at least hear what he said…
(Derya, 22, student)
Figure 4-20 Women’s field of vision, when they are sitting (top) and when they are standing (bottom) (source: Author)
Figure 4-21 Men watching Hatipoğlu’s speech (www.postaktuel.com/duisburgda-hatipoglu-coskusu)

Figure 4-22 Women during Hatipoğlu’s speech (source: Author)

Figure 4-23 Young women and men attending a seminar on “Strengthening our Islamic Beliefs and Values” on 04/27/2019 (www.ditib-du.de/jugend)
I get so frustrated with women sometimes. Remember Hatipoğlu’s program. They [women] had the opportunity to watch and listen to him, yet they preferred to talk among each other. It is kind of hard to hear from upstairs, but we can understand some when women are silent, but they never are (Feyza, 44, housewife)

Derya and Feyza’s experience during Hatipoğlu’s speech reveals an interesting aspect: their frustration about not being able to hear or see is not directed toward men, but women, showing the internalization of sex segregation in the mosque. The internalized segregation also presents itself similarly but differently in the seminars that are organized for and by the mosque’s younger congregation and take place in the conference rooms that were originally planned as a part of the Dialogue Center. The older congregation of the mosque does not attend these seminars. During these seminars, young women and men occupy the same conference room; however they sit separately within the conference rooms (Figure 4-23). Such segregation is not enforced formally; there are no rules that prevent women from actually sitting where men are if they want; however the internalized norms of Turkish-Islam, dictate that women and men belong to separate spheres and should not interact, preventing them from doing so.

In the light of the evidence presented above describing the different sets of behaviors for younger- and older-generation women, the mapping of spaces shows how younger women, in fact, started to infiltrate into men’s spaces in the mosque (Figure 4-24). When using the mosque space for educational purposes, older-generation women comply with the sex segregation in the mosque and stay within the spaces that are defined as women’s area, or use spaces outside the mosque that are reserved for children. Meanwhile, younger women resist this pattern by appropriating space to meet their own needs. Spatially this can be seen in their use of spaces typically reserved for the use of men. Additionally, the spatial pattern of younger women’s use of space is much similar to men’s use, rather than older women’s, in terms of different spaces they use, indicating younger women’s subversion and redefinition of norms of Islamic femininity.
Figure 4-24 Men’s (left), older-generation women’s (middle) and younger-generation women’s (right) educational spaces in Marxloh Merkez Mosque (source: Author)
4.2.2.2. Fostering Division between Turkish and German Cultures

While the unequal opportunities offered to women in terms of education discussed above define limitations for them in the mosque, the content of what educational programs are available to create further limitations for women within German public space by entrenching Turkish-Islamic traditional norms. The weekly Islamic lectures, *sohbet*, frequently center on Turkish-Islamic conceptions of gender and the role of women in relation to men. In addition, these lectures also often advise women to distance themselves from the German “other” as a threat to Turkish-German women’s traditionalist identity.

For Turkish-Muslim people in Marxloh, shame and honor (*namus*) are the central values they define themselves. In this structure, women are perceived as guardians of such values through the preservation of culture and traditions. The main themes of the Islamic lectures that I attended during my fieldwork revolve around this guardianship and teaching women how to behave within their families and communities (Figure 4-25). The lectures offered to the older-generation women are different from the lectures for the younger-generation women. While these lectures can follow the same topic, which usually deals with women’s rights in Islam, moral values in Islam, gender relations in the family and women, or gender interaction in public space, the examples chosen to illustrate are often drawn from pre- and early-modern Islamic Ottoman society, to which Turkish-Muslim women living in Germany cannot relate.

Being the only religious officer for women in Marxloh Merkez Mosque, Ayşe Hoca is responsible for preparing and delivering Islamic lectures. She was born and raised in Turkey and only moved to Marxloh a year before taking on this job. She has been living in Marxloh for a year, works exclusively in Marxloh, does not speak German or English, and has almost no contact with the German public. Her prejudices become apparent in the following lectures.
Figure 4-25 Flyers for younger-generation women’s Islamic lectures
Top left: Moral sentiments in Ottomans
Top right: The contract that legitimizes marriage: Wedding
Bottom left: The relationship between morals and fitrat
Bottom right: The understanding of belief among youth and matters that distance youth from religion (source: www.ditib-du.de/jugend)
For example, to an audience of younger-generation women, she stressed the importance of surrounding themselves with familiar, moral, Muslim women:

You should be careful about whom you befriend. Try to choose people that are like you. You know, non-Muslim women are considered namahram, no different than men. You should be careful about how you act around them. Don’t forget, with whom you choose to associate with, tells a lot about you (from field notes on 05/05/2019 after young women’s lecture)

[Upon being asked by one of the young women on how she should act when her friends at school talk ill about the Prophet, the example she specified was on how her friend attacked her saying the Prophet married his wife when she was 9 years old] They don’t know our religion and they attack you. If I were you, I wouldn’t even explain myself; they are very prejudiced and set on not liking Muslims. You can’t change their minds, just don’t interact with him (from field notes on 02/17/2019 after young women’s lecture)

In a lecture for the cohort of the older-generation women, she further emphasizes the importance of preserving and transferring the Turkish-Islamic way of life and being aware of the threat that might come from the “other” Germans as:

The Ottoman woman was a loyal wife and a good teacher for her children. Back then, all the members of the families used to live together, and women always were very respectful to their elders, and these rules were transferred from generation to generation. They followed an Islamic lifestyle, and it was very happy and peaceful, contrary to how here, in Germany, Islam is presented. We should be careful here; our children live in this community that does not think well of Islam. We should teach them so that they wouldn’t forget. We should be examples for them so that they can be fed from the right source (from field notes on 03/14/2019 after older women’s lecture)

The separateness of Turkish-Muslim women from the non-Muslim world is repeatedly emphasized in these lectures, and the importance of not becoming like the “other” is advised.

Women are not only told to be careful in their interactions with German men; these lectures also reduce German women to the status of namahram, prescribing limited interactions with them.

While these sentiments are received with approval by the older-generation women, they spark lively discussions in younger-generation women’s lectures. The main reason for this conflict in younger-generation women’s lectures is the difference in socialization patterns between Ayşe Hoca and younger women. While Ayşe Hoca’s traditional upbringing does not clash with older-
generation women’s socialization experience, which either took place in Turkey or Germany with very limited interactions with Germans, younger-generation women’s socialization in Germany and their Turkish-German identity contrasts with Ayşe Hoca’s traditional Turkish-Muslim identity. After Ayşe Hoca’s lecture quoted above on 02/17/2019, Leman expresses that:

Ayşe Hoca, may Allah be pleased, teaches us very well, and she is a great public speaker. But because she didn’t grow up here or have daughters that go to school here, she doesn’t understand what kind of difficulties we might have at school. She also doesn’t understand how to interact with Germans. Unlike what she thinks, we are actually very friendly with most of our German classmates at school. But that is actually not something specific to Ayşe Hoca; all the previous Hocas sent from Turkey had the same problem. Most of them come from small towns or villages in Turkey. But even if they come from the most cosmopolitan places like Istanbul, they have the same issue: they don’t have the slightest idea about what life is like here. Nizami Hoca [one of the male religious officers] just started working here. He was born and raised here and went to Turkey for college - he has a great relationship with the young men’s group. You saw that some of the younger-generation women couldn’t even understand Turkish very well; I think we also need somebody that we can understand and that understands us (Leman, 32, works in the public sector)

Leman’s account shows another example of the inequality in religious education where there is a clear impetus toward trying to teach young women how to be “traditional” Turkish-Muslim women. Where their lecturer is entirely unacculturated to the German context and views it with great suspicion, the men’s lecturer is in a position to help his students effectively negotiate their position between two cultures. This is a continual theme in gender relations within the mosque community that creates significant cultural dissonance for the young women who find themselves being told to essentially to adopt the Turkish-Muslim values that they cannot relate to and disavow the hybrid cultural context they were raised in, that draws from both Turkish and German values and appropriates them. This has particularly strong implications for how these women use space outside the mosque, resulting in different patterns of mobility and gradually

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13 Leman’s husband was part of the International Theology Programme (UIP – Uluslararası İlahiyat Programı). UIP is a program that aims to attract young German-Turks to study Islam at Turkish universities. The program requires the participants to be citizens of their countries of residence and provides them the opportunity of being employed by DITIB as religious officers upon the completion of the program (Bruce, 2020). One of the religious officers mentioned in this text, Nizami Hoca was also a part of this program.
causing younger-generation women to avoid Turkish-Muslim space, which is discussed extensively in the next chapter.

4.2.3. Socialization: Reflecting Entrenched Values

Before Kaykı and Özmal took over the project, women were already excluded from the mosque at the planning phase. Kaykı explains this as: “The social spaces… They thought about men, they thought about children, they thought about young people, they even thought about Germans and non-Muslims, but they did not think about women.” (interview with Kaykı on 06/12/2019). The advisory board changed the mosque’s architectural programming and transformed it into a space that women can use as much as men by creating mixed-gender spaces where all people can socialize. Today, these mixed-gender spaces are used extensively by men, following the transformations that took place in the political and educational space of the mosque, not leaving many spaces for women to socialize. Two mechanisms facilitate women’s exclusion from the social spaces of the mosque: 1) The societal control, which works as a disciplinary mechanism, and 2) the internalization of the conservative values reproduced and reinscribed in the mosque confines women’s socialization into very limited spaces. Despite actively using mosque space for socialization purposes, women are both limited and limit themselves to socialize in the spaces they occupy for official purposes.

One of the main themes that came up in almost all of my interviews with the women who use the mosque space, regardless of their age and generation, was that they regarded the mosque space as a space of socialization:

You have probably seen by now that mosques here work much differently than the mosques in Turkey. In Turkey, they are only religious places, but here it is so much more. (Seda, 50, works in family business)
Here [in Germany], mosques are very actively used for social purposes. It is both an organization that you are a member of, a café where you socialize, a place where you see your friends. If you want to see your friends, tell them to meet you in the mosque. (Leman, 32, works in public sector)

I see the mosque as a meeting place where I can socialize and be with women that are similar to me in how they think. (Beyza, 22, student)

Our whole çevre\textsuperscript{14} is here. I met all of my friends here in the mosque. We become friends here, and we continue our friendship in this space. (Hayriye, 59, works in public sector)

Women’s accounts above demonstrate that they use mosque space to socialize, and even in most cases, as exemplified by Hayriye’s narrative, the mosque constitutes their primary socialization space. However, when we look at the spaces men and women use to socialize in the mosque, there is an interesting discrepancy insofar as women do not actually occupy a significant portion of the mosque (Figure 4-26). While women’s active socialization in the mosque takes place in the spaces that they use for educational and administrative purposes, the spaces that were planned as mixed-gender spaces were transformed into men-only spaces. Today, these mixed-gender social spaces, the courtyard of the mosque (18), the teahouse (19 and 20), the youth room (14), and the bistro (11 and 13), are used extensively by men for their everyday socialization. Women occasionally use the bistro (11 and 13) only when a women-only event is taking place (Figure 4-27). However, the rest of these spaces are used exclusively by men (Figure 4-28).

While there is no established rule that prevents women from using these spaces, the societal pressure and the entrenched values discourage them from doing so. Zeynep and Ceren’s accounts that narrate their exclusion from the youth branch room (14 in Figure 4-26) illustrates how both of these factors affected their use of space:

\begin{quote}
We used to use the youth branch room all together. We used to have great activities, like writing plays and acting them all together. Men’s youth branch used to be almost as active as ours once but not anymore. Then you know, we all started to go to universities and started working. Once we were not that young anymore, it became weird. I personally don’t see them any different than my
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} While çevre literally means environment, it is used contextually to refer to all the people that are found in one’s social circles, social networks and have influence them.
brothers, we grew up together, but some girls and boys started to feel weird about sharing the space, saying that they didn’t want to be subjected to any gossip. Later, some families also began to express that they felt uncomfortable with young men and women socializing in the same space; they said that it is a mosque, not a space for entertainment, and there are rules. But these rules seem to apply only to us [young women], that we had to change how we use the room. Boys are there all the time, playing computer games and play station; they can use the space for their entertainment. But when it came to us, we started to use this room less and less as some girls don’t want to use the room when boys are there. Eventually, it became their [young men’s] room; now I feel weird when I have to go there; I feel out of place. (Zeynep, 28, works in the private sector)

After I started wearing a headscarf [after she started her period at the age of 12], I began to feel uncomfortable and guilty continuing my old ways. Before you have your period, you are still considered a child, but after that, your sins do count. I started to feel conflicted about socializing with boys. My family and friends also started advising me not to interact with boys as much, as I am not a child anymore. At that time, the boys in the mosque took over the youth branch room, so I just stopped going there. Luckily a few years later, we found our own space and started using that room as a women’s youth branch room. (Ceren, 19, works at family business)

In terms of young women’s use of what used to be a mixed-gender space, there is a feedback loop between women’s occupation of space, entrenched values, and social control. In this loop, the societal control and entrenched Turkish-Muslim values define an appropriate set of norms regarding women’s spatial behavior, which excludes them from the mixed-use spaces in the mosque. As younger-generation women comply with these societal rules, their avoidance of what has become men’s spaces reproduces the same societal norms on appropriate behavior.

While women do not generally complain about the lack of space for official activities and education, they do often complain about a lack of space for socialization:

Men have more spaces in the mosque where they can spend time. Compared to men, women don’t have those spaces to socialize. I know that women like to spend time together sometimes after the Qur’an course. Because they don’t have a space to socialize, they either go to parks or stay in the classrooms (Derya, 22, student)

They [administration] don’t like it when we stay in the kitchen after we finish cooking [women usually stay later and have lunch together], they don’t like it when we talk in the women’s prayer space, they don’t like it when we stay in the classrooms after the class. My friends are here, how and where am I supposed to see them? (Fatma, 64, housewife)
Figure 4-26 Men’s socialization spaces vs. women’s socialization spaces in Marxloh Merkez Mosque (source: Author)

Figure 4-27 Women only event taking place in the bistro (source: www.ditib-du.de/jugend)
Women’s frustration over not being able to use the mosque space for socialization purposes leads to their deviance from appropriate form of behavior, which can be interpreted as acts of resistance. The details of women’s resistant acts will be discussed extensively in Chapter 6, however, in terms of spatial use it reproduces two patterns (Figure 4-29). The first pattern is older-generation women’s appropriation of their official and educational spaces for their socialization purposes, which layers yet another function onto these spaces. Older-generation women use the spaces that they use for their administrative and educational purposes also for their socialization. This allows older-generation women to socialize in the mosque while remaining invisible. Within this context, kitchen area (22) becomes one of the main spaces women use. However, the mosque administration frowns upon their use of the kitchen space when not being productive and as a result, when men come to use the space to socialize – mostly grill and eat together, women are obligated to vacate the space. As older-generation women’s do not have total control over this space, their existence in this kitchen space, remains conditional and temporal, further reducing their already limited social space in the mosque.
Figure 4-29 Older-generation women’s socialization spaces (left) vs. younger-generation women’s socialization spaces (right) (source: Author)

Figure 4-30 Younger-generation women using men’s socialization space (source: Author)
The resistant acts of younger women on the other hand, show a different pattern as they acquired full control of the spaces they appropriated. The room young women use (7) is also used as a classroom. While younger women started with the same strategies older-generation women use, coming earlier, leaving later, making small changes in the layout of the room, they eventually acquired complete control of the room and transformed it into their own space. The fact that younger generation women were able to occupy and appropriate a space solely for their own use stems from a generationally different approach to gender relations defined by their acculturation patterns. This can also be seen from their infiltration into men’s social spaces for their own socialization. Younger-generation women use occasionally use the spaces that are used by men and are avoided by older-generation women. They do this by strategically using the marginal areas found in men’s social spaces to stay out of men’s visual field (Figure 4-30).

4.3. Discussion: No Space for Idle Women

In this chapter, I have presented the constant contradiction and competition between the Turkish-Muslim discourse that organizes the behavior of the first-generation Turkish immigrants and the Turkish-German discourse from which later-generation immigrants draw their performances from and how it played out through the spatial performances of Turkish-Muslim women in the architectural space of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque. During the construction phase and the initial operation of the mosque, the inclusivity that was aimed to be attained by resisting the gendered Turkish-Muslim discourse by the second- and third-generation women and inscription of the hybrid Turkish-German discourse that would transform the mosque into a space of integration. However, once the mosque was built and its operation was left to the conservative mosque congregation, the Turkish-Muslim discourse was rapidly reinscribed, transforming the mosque space into an “ethno-sexual frontier,” a simulated borderland that lies in-between cultures and is heavily surveilled and regulated to protect the idealized ethnic identities (Nagel, 2000). As
a result of this, the inclusivity in terms of gender and ethnicity deteriorated with the re-inscription of the Turkish-Muslim paradigm in realms of administration, education, and socialization, provoking a stricter pattern of territorialization and forming even more rigid norms for women’s identity performances. In terms of the spatial behavior of women, this led to the reproduction of multiple spatial regimes based on gender and generational differences and reinforced the Turkish-Muslim paradigm it aimed to erase.

Before the construction of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque, the normative discourse that the Turkish-Muslim community in Marxloh used in their everyday performances for their acculturation as pious and moral subjects and that ensures the survival of their ethnic community was entirely based on the Turkish-Islamic values. This discourse and its viability were based on two principles: 1) the “ethnic presentations of self” in everyday behavior, which could be observed in Turkish-Muslims’ everyday use of the mosque, and 2) the inscription of threat in its putative opposite, which was conceptualized in the form of the German “other.” Since the boundaries of the self and the “other” within this imagined community are reproduced and maintained through women’s bodies (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Anderson, 1983), the proper gender and sexual behavior were held utmost importance, not only for the honor and respectability of the performer but to ensure the survival of the entire minority group in the face of the German threat. On the other hand, when this community wanted to replace the cafeteria space that they used as a mosque with a representative mosque symbolizing their attachment to the Turkish culture, this same introversion that so far preserved their conservative values as a group became the reason why they could not achieve their goals on their own before the involvement of actors such as Özmal and Kaykın.

The construction process of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque would have mainly been impossible without the inclusion of Özmal and Kaykın in planning, fundraising, and community engagement activities. A significant aspect of their efficacy in this role stemmed from their
position as members of the Turkish community who had been socialized in Germany. This meant that their performances were both influenced by the conservative Turkish-Muslim paradigm and the German discourse they were subjected to as a part of their acculturation in Germany, which allowed them to more effectively act within the European political and social sphere while being aware of the Turkish conservative sensitivities. While this dual socialization pattern caused several identity crises as it positions them at the liminal space between Turkish and German cultures and never grants them “insider” positions, it also provides them the perspective on how to bring them together. This cultural upbringing also influenced their spatial production of the mosque: they were more interested in establishing the mosque as something more than a Turkish-Muslim religious institution; a space for integration that would provide opportunities for intercultural socialization, education, and advancement for female members of the community, who were rendered isolated and invisible due to their responsibility to preserve and maintain the original Turkish-Muslim paradigm. In other words, they envisioned the mosque as a space symbolizing their dual cultural upbringing, which represents a Turkish-Muslim culture compatible with the secular German one. While this second- and third-generation discourse successfully situated the Turkish-Muslim Marxloh Merkez Mosque in the German urban landscape, it later led to a significant conflict within the mosque surrounding their efforts. Though the mosque association was happy to receive assistance in completing the project, the hybrid values these two women brought to the mosque were antithetical to those of the congregation at large, which eventually led to the re-inscription of the Turkish-Muslim values while deteriorating the uniquely achieved inclusivity. This cultural division foreshadowed the more noticeable divide that exists today, resulting in substantially different patterns of behavior for young, German-socialized members of the community.

Following the completion of the project, with the decreased public interest and external interventions to prevent the mosque from losing its character as the symbol of integration, the
operation of the mosque was left to the members of the congregation. However, once the mosque administration was taken over by men among first-generation immigrants, the introduced second- and third-generation discourse was rapidly replaced by the conservative first-generation Turkish-Muslim paradigm, as it was not possible for this new administration to form associations and performances based on this dual discourse that was foreign to them. The traditional Turkish-Muslim values defined by the namus culture, Islam, and political Islam were allowed greater prominence in defining the operation of the mosque. The educational and social programs in the mosque were consequently influenced and started to follow this conservative paradigm, reinforcing Muslim women’s subordinate position in the community. The discursive mechanisms not only transformed women subjects into gendered ones, but also established them as secondary to men (Butler, 1990, p. 11). The result was a significant re-definition of the role of the Dialogue Center in the mosque, as well as its submission under the mosque administration.

The transformations that took place in the mosque’s social, educational and administrative space also changed the designated neutral physical space of the mosque, converting it into a gendered one. Spatial use of the mosque shifted dramatically as women were progressively excluded from administrative, educational, and social spaces in the mosque except in exceptional circumstances. The result was the eventual relegation of Turkish-socialized women to peripheral spaces and annexes of the mosque, while men came to occupy most areas of the structure that had originally been conceived of as mixed-use areas. Figure 4- illustrates how this transformation of gender inclusivity affected women’s spatial behavior in the mosque. During the planning of the mosque, the spaces that were suggested for gender segregation were very limited, being only the prayer spaces and the ablution areas. The rest of the spaces were planned to be mixed-gender use spaces, where gender segregation would be erased, and women’s and men’s right to use this public space was no different from each other (left on Figure 4-31). However,
Figure 4-31 The spaces women use according to the original architectural program (left) vs. the spaces used by women today (right) (source: Author)
when we look at women’s use of the mosque today, we can see that the equity of the spatial use deteriorated significantly. Most of the spaces conceived as mixed-gender use excluded women and transformed into spaces women rarely use. One of the best illustrations of this deterioration can be seen in the use of the women’s prayer space which can be converted into a men’s space when necessary. This only space where women’s use was privileged and protected through the architectural design of the mosque can be occupied by men when there is a program in the mosque or during the crowded holiday prayers (Figure 4-32). With respect to women’s marginalization and exclusion in the administrative, educational and social spheres of the mosque, mosque-going women are mostly pushed to the marginal spaces of the mosque and its annexes, creating a vivid contrast to men’s central spaces.

![Figure 4-32 Women’s prayer space divided for the use of men (source: Author)](image)

Of particular importance in the transformation of space in the mosque was the traditional association of women with the domestic space and a fundamental belief that they are not and should not be suited to roles of authority. A key example of this is the removal of Kaykın, who was ultimately forced from her position because her secular German upbringing did not align with these norms and ultimately promoted values that the mosque association did not support,
such as women’s increased inclusion in the religious and educational contexts. Her vision that ultimately enabled the construction of the mosque was later considered transgressive and subversive, resulting in her discipline by being removed from the mosque administration. Without a political presence in the mosque that acts as a counter to the traditional values, the primacy of male leadership has only been reinforced. Although Kaykın’s involvement in the leadership of the mosque subverted the Islamic norms temporarily, with her removal, Marxloh Merkez Mosque regressed to a male territory. This was conditioned by the internalization of Turkish-Muslim discourse, and especially the notions of *fitrat* and *mahram/namahram*. As we saw above, many women were reluctant to participate in the administration unless they could perform roles that better suited traditional gender roles as defined by *fitrat*. In order to be political while remaining within the limits of religiosity, women refrained from engaging with *namahram* male political spaces characterized by contact with the secular world. This means that women’s engagement with politics in the mosque was limited to their operation within the *mahram* contexts, influencing their social and spatial behavior. While it prevents them from becoming active members of the decision-making process, it also limits their spatial presence in the mosque, depending on the level of conservativity, either confining them into relatively more private spaces of the mosque or to the domestic sphere of their homes. Those few women who remained in the administration were placed into peripheral areas of the mosque, in accordance with the spheres established by *mahram/namahram*. Paradoxically, another motivation for this relocation is to make these women more visible to the secular German public to maintain the positive image established during the initial planning of the mosque. This allows them to preserve an image of inclusivity while excluding women from the decision-making processes in the mosque, transforming Muslim women from actual agents that take place in the decision-making processes to pseudo-agents.
The segregation of educational opportunities is based on a similar adherence to Turkish-Muslim traditional values. From a relatively direct perspective, despite the initial educational programs that included both men and women, once the Turkish-Muslim discourse started to influence their performances, women began to be strictly separated in the educational sphere to prevent causing social disorder, *fitna*, among men. The separation of women from men, whose centrality is emphasized in the spatial use and administrative contexts, also reproduced a pattern of unequal opportunities for women in terms of education. This inequality in the educational sphere was primarily caused by the attempt to decrease the interaction between women and men that might take place in educational settings. This led to the reduction of the educational programs available for women and pushing women to the marginal spaces in the mosque; however, Turkish-Muslim women’s internalization of traditional values also reproduced their disadvantaged position. In order to avoid causing *fitna* by being visible or crossing the boundaries defined by *mahram/ namahram* by transgressing into men’s spaces, women deprive themselves of educational opportunities and further disadvantage themselves. The Islamic lectures that teach women the Islamic norms of femininity further define limitations from women, both in the mosque and in the German public.

While as demonstrated in Figure 4-32, the women’s use of space has been reduced substantially, a detailed analysis of the patterns of women’s exclusion of women in the mosque with respect to their marginalization in the administrative, educational and social spaces highlights a stark contrast between women’s and men’s use of space: women use the same spaces for all of their administrative, educational and social needs, while men use different spaces based on their activities (Figure 4-33). In other words, women are pushed into marginalized spaces within the mosque, and spaces that were vacated by women provided more space for men to use space in more specialized ways. This spatial pattern, women’s use of the same spaces for different purposes as opposed to men’s specialized spatial use, also signals to their purposeful use
Figure 4- 33 Men's (left) vs. women's (right) spaces

Top: Education
Middle: Administration
Bottom: Socialization
(source: Author)
of the mosque, which especially becomes clear when their socialization patterns are analyzed. These behaviors are strongly conditioned by the Turkish-Muslim notions of *fitrat* and *

*mahram/namahram*, which implies that the place of women is in the domestic sphere of the home rather than in public. As the mosque is a public place when women are there in the context of religious services or official capacities, their presence is acceptable; however, this also constitutes unacceptability of their presence in a context other than religious practice as it violates the *mahram-namahram* dichotomy. The women compensate for this by undertaking activities such as cooking or education that would theoretically fit into the description of religious duties by either servicing the mosque or studying Islam; women temporarily transform the space into a domestic *mahram* sphere while at the same time engaging in socialization.

The deterioration of inclusivity in the social spaces of the mosque with respect to the shifting discourses and how it affects the spatial behavior of women leads to a pattern where the shifting second- and third-generation discourse of inclusivity into a conservative one reproduce the mosque space as men’s space, excluding women and women’s performances in the mosque space institutionalizing and reinforcing the conservative Turkish-Muslim discourse. This mechanism establishes the performance of women’s exclusion from the mosque space as a natural phenomenon, especially by the people that internalized the conservative discourse (Figure 4-34).

On the other hand, the constant reiteration of women’s exclusion from the mosque space allows this performance to be subverted, reproducing different generational regimes. This phenomenon can be observed in the discrepancy between the spatial performances of the younger-generation German-socialized women and typically older-generation Turkish-socialized women (Figure 4-35). In the case of older-generation women, who are more strictly governed by the Turkish-Islamic notions of *fitne, fitrat, and mahram/namahram*, their spatialized behavior is characterized by a more complete withdrawal from the main structure of the mosque, instead
primarily inhabiting the annex areas. In the case of younger-generation women, however, who are socialized in a society where these types of gender segregation are not the norm, there is a lesser degree of adoption of these concepts, which appear more strongly rooted in Turkish cultural tradition than true Islamic tradition. This allows them to undertake roles such as those held by Kaykin and Özmäal or to inhabit typically male spaces as in the case of young women’s education room or their use of the courtyard. When looking at their spatial behavior, it can be seen that younger-generation women’s spatial performances overlap with men’s spatial performances and even transgress into the men’s spaces in the mosque, making their spatial footprint much different than that of older-generation women’s in the mosque.

![Figure 4-34 The shifting discourses (source: Author)](image)

What does this two-decade experience that revolves around the construction of one representative mosque tell us about the integration of Turkish-Muslim immigrants in Germany? Although this mosque-building process has been a positive and well-meaning attempt at integration that would allow for the Turkish-Muslim community’s social inclusion considering both the diaspora and host cultures’ sensitivities, it ended up causing some problems in terms of integration. The first problem was related to the attempt at rapidly replacing the conservative Turkish-Muslim discourse. Although Kaykin and Özmäal were very careful about abstaining from
Figure 4-35 Men’s (left), older-generation women’s (middle) and younger-generation women’s (right) spaces. Top: Educational spaces, Middle: Administrative spaces, Bottom: Socialization spaces (source: Author)
a top-down approach and attempted to build a mosque for the community with the community, they failed to consider that their second- and third-generation discourse that emphasizes integration and “living together” might cause conflict with the existing conservative first-generation paradigm. While the first-generation Turkish-Muslim discourse reproduces boundaries between the self and the other to ensure their cultural survival in foreign Germany, the second- and third-generation Turkish-German discourse aim to do the opposite, blurring and eventually erasing the boundaries. The vision of the mosque at the beginning of the project brought upon by people among later-generation members of the congregation aimed to replace the Turkish-Muslim discourse rapidly. While this substitution seemed to be approved by everybody at first as it facilitated the mosque’s construction, later, this attitude that disregards the conservative discourse became the major source of conflict, causing an even more passionate defense of conservative norms. I argue that the attempts of providing social inclusion through mosque, according to Kaykın and Özmal’s vision were brought to abruptly and their emphasis on bringing German secular values conflicted with the first-generation conservative discourse, eventually backfiring and reproducing an even stricter spatial gender regime. On the other hand, the Turkish-Muslim community is not monolithic, as in not each member of the mosque congregation adopts a conservative view. Younger-generation women’s behaviors of subversion and resistance show how two conflicting discourses could be internalized and performed. I argue that the reason behind such different patterns of behavior is simply the acculturation patterns. Younger-generation women were brought up with two separate and conflicting sets of norms and had the time to internalize them to create hybrid identities; therefore, did not feel Kaykın and Özmal’s vision of integration was conflicting with theirs, creating a pattern of behavior more compatible with their Turkish-German ideals. On the other hand, the attempt at synthetically replacing older-generation women’s conservative discourse with the progressive paradigm to achieve integration proved unfruitful as it disregarded their acculturation patterns.
The second problem related to integration was caused by the approach that aims to attain integration through space. The original vision of the planning team that aimed to transform the mosque into a space of integration was actually very different from how people used the space. The Turkish diaspora population in Marxloh was accustomed to using the space in their own ways to deal with their internal socio-cultural dynamics therefore an integration approach that revolves around the architectural space of the mosque did not work, which is evidenced by the re-inscription of the older-generation conservative discourse in the space once the mosque congregation was left to their own means. Shoppengerd even discusses that creating a religious space that would assume many functions that otherwise would be provided by the state, in fact, becomes a substitute for what the state offers in time and might even affect the integration process negatively (2007) by causing immigrants to use this substitute institution rather than participating into the host community through the use of the state institutions (Schmitt, 2003).

To sum up, this chapter explored the performativity of Turkish-Muslim women in Marxloh in the microcosm of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque project and analyzed how the cultural tension caused by shifting generational discourses influenced the spatial behavior of Muslim women in the mosque space. The next chapter investigates how these discourses that are so deterministic in women’s behavioral patterns in the mosque influence their perception of Germans and affect their mobility patterns in the neighborhood and the urban contexts.
Chapter 5

Beyond the Mosque: Cultural Paradigms and Urban Behavior

In the previous chapter, I have discussed that within the context of Marxloh Merkez Mosque, the shifting discourse that resulted in the dominance of imaginary conservative Turkish-Muslim cultural values not only resulted in the exclusion and marginalization of women from the mosque space but were also reinforced through staff selection, education, and patterns of socialization, affecting their spatial mobility and integration. In this chapter, I discuss that the generational-cultural discourses that forge women’s behavior in the mosque also shape Turkish-Muslim women’s socio-spatial performances of belonging within the context of Marxloh and Duisburg. I have discussed in Chapter 2 that social acts of belonging, together with the spatial act of territorialization, form discursive and socio-spatial performances of belonging. The first part of this chapter (section 5.1) starts with the social acts of belonging: Turkish-Muslim women’s imaginations of Turkey and Germany. Similar to the previous chapter, the generational-cultural differences caused by the internalization of different identity discourses also influence how Turkish-Muslim women view Turkey and Germany. In this section, we see that in the case of older-generation women, we see a prejudiced view of the German public as foreign and immoral and idealization of the Turkish culture, while younger-generation women consider German culture as a part of their identity and do not perceive German public as foreign.

The second part (section 5.2) focuses on the spatial acts of territorialization and explores Turkish-Muslim women’s spatial mobility patterns, first within the neighborhood space and then in the urban context. In this section, I argue that due to the Turkish-Islamic notions that sexualize younger-generation women through the notion of namus and their potential to cause fitna, younger-generation women’s use of the neighborhood space is spatially characterized by patterns
of avoidance as an attempt to escape the constant surveillance that comes from the community. Older-generation women, on the other hand, with their *teyze*\textsuperscript{15} status that locates them in a social position somewhere in between disadvantaged younger-generation women and privileged men, have more extensive use of the neighborhood following their rejection of the immoral German urban landscape. These different patterns of spatiality can also be seen in their mobility in the urban context. While older-generation women limit their entire realm of existence to Marxloh, which is seen as a substitute for the moral space of Turkey, younger-generation women do not see Turkey as being any more moral or desirable than Germany and, in some aspects, they see Germany as a more livable space. Beyond these two positions, there is a subset of women, with inverted behavioral patterns that I refer to as exceptions that prove the rule, that serve to emphasize the importance of education, cultural affinity, and sexualization in developing a sense of belonging and fostering integration. Finally, in the last part (section 5.3), I bring all my findings together and discuss them in terms of belonging and argue that the concept of integration, despite being a valuable concept to understand trends in the limited space of the mosque, emerges as a problematic notion when positioning Turkish-Muslim women within the context of the greater society.

### 5.1. Imaginations of Here and There: The Social Acts of Belonging

Generational differences resulting in distinct patterns of socialization cause older- and younger-generation women from the Marxloh Merkez Mosque to have widely divergent perceptions of Germany and Turkey and their related cultures. This section explores Turkish-

\textsuperscript{15} The word *Teyze* literally translates to aunt. However, addressing an older woman by using *teyze* does not have to have biological bases. In Turkish language as it is considered disrespectful to refer to an older person with their first name, it is a common practice to use the word *teyze* after the first name to show respect and endearment. While this term cannot be used in any formal way, Kaya argues that by creating a kinship through language, older Turkish women are stripped from their “dangerous” sexuality and the “other” women are re-conceived as a part of “us” (2012).
Muslim women’s attitudes and imaginations of Turkey and Germany, which effectively influences their use of the neighborhood and urban space in Duisburg. As discussed in the previous chapter, I argue that the generational-cultural divide stemmed from the internalization of different identity discourses also determines their views of their home (Turkey) and host (Germany) cultures.

Older-generation women, socialized with traditional first-generation Turkish-Islamic values and internalized the associated discourse, perceive Germans as the “other” and set up necessary boundaries to separate themselves from them. The prescribed set of Turkish-Muslim norms that are further reproduced in the mosque cause them to perceive much German behavior as immoral. For this reason, older-generation Turkish women categorize themselves as Turkish and moral while constructing Germans as the immoral “other,” creating a need to maintain social distance to avoid corruption. Younger-generation women, on the other hand, having been socialized in Germany and internalized both Turkish-Muslim and German discourses, consider German culture as a part of their identity and are comfortable in their everyday interactions with Germans. While older-generation women create categories to set up boundaries and divide, younger-generation women consider themselves a part of Germany, blurring such boundaries. In other words, older-generation women still imagine themselves as being from there (Turkey), while younger-generation women imagine themselves from here (Germany). While older-generation women consider themselves Turkish and express their ultimate aim as returning to Turkey, younger-generation women view Germany as their homeland and Turkey as a vacation spot – still a part of their identity but not their motherland.
5.1.1. Imaginations of Here

Turkish women’s perception of Germans and Germany is shaped by their socialization and acculturation processes; while older-generation women, socialized mainly internalizing the Turkish-Islamic discourse that they brought from Turkey, perceive Germans as the “other,” younger-generation German-socialized women perceive themselves as a part of the German public. Older-generation women’s categorization of Germans as the “other” based on the cultural practices and stereotypes leads to their self-exclusion and isolation from the German public. Younger-generation women, on the other hand, having been socialized with Germans from a very early age, do not hold the same stereotypes as the older-generation women and consider themselves a part of the German public. Younger-generation women’s adoption of both German culture and Turkish-Islamic norms allows them to construct a hybrid identity for themselves and makes them capable of conducting both in Turkish-Muslim and German spheres in Duisburg.

The older-generation women that I interviewed are usually among the first-generation immigrants that have completed their acculturation in Turkey before moving to Germany. Even when they are among second-generation, their socialization took place within the immigrant enclaves, under heavy Turkish influence. Their traditional Turkish acculturation, as described in Chapter 2, causes them to have a prejudiced view of Germans which is reinscribed in the mosque through the constant reiteration of Turkish-Islamic norms and the influence of Islamic lectures. Turkish cultural values and Islamic traditions prescribe a set of norms for Turkish women, which mostly focus on preserving one’s namus and morality. The norms of Islamic femininity constructed by the Turkish community and performed through many reiterations positions proper Turkish Muslim women against the “immoral” Germans by underscoring the differences in culture and definitions of moral behavior. Turkish-Muslim women’s construction of the German public as the “other” creates a self-reinforcing cycle where they distance themselves from the
Germans based on these differences, and their lack of contact with the Germans causes them to
entrench further stereotypical views based on prejudices. This results in continued maintenance of
distance between the two groups. In my interviews with older women, they express their views on
Germans as:

Our neighbors are German. They are very nice, but the culture and the lifestyle
are very different from ours. If we had Turkish neighbors, we could come and go
to each other’s houses as we pleased, but we could not be as intimate with
Germans. One searches for the others that are similar to themselves. I don’t think
we have much in common with Germans. As a most basic example, they do not
have any shame. They talk about everything [she refers to sexual relations], I
mean everything. It is not appropriate for us to talk about certain things (Fatma,
64, housewife).

I don’t see how we can be close friends with Germans anyways. The way they
socialize is very much different from ours. We socialize while drinking tea at
home. They go to nightclubs, drink [alcohol] and like to party; how can you
spend time with them when you are against that stuff? How can you be close
with them when your lifestyle is this different? Wouldn’t you get scared that you
would be influenced by their behavior? What if you lose your way? (Esma,
40, housewife)

These Germans denigrate our mosque all the time. Our religion tells us not to
speak ill of anybody, and we would never do that. They [Germans] don’t have
such a habit. They are gavur [a colloquial and often derogatory term used to refer
to non-Muslims and infidels]; that’s how they are used to do stuff. They believe
that there will be no repercussions to their immoral actions. When we do
something wrong, we believe that we would be punished; what do you expect
from people who don’t think they would be punished for their actions? Anything!
Muslims are not the bad ones; they [Germans] are just prejudiced. I am afraid to
become like them if I spend much time with them. (Şükran, 53, works in the
private sector)

Their religion and culture are different from ours. They are not like us. We are
Muslims, and Islam is the right way. If we mingle with them, we would be like
them, get used to their culture and tradition. It is even in our religion we are not
to aspire to become like non-Muslims and lose our way (Saadet, 44, housewife).

Older-generation women who are acculturated among Turks and adopted the Turkish-
Muslim traditional values perceive German culture as being fundamentally incompatible with the
Islamic norms of femininity. The accounts above demonstrate that older-generation women
internalized these Turkish-Islamic norms and deemed behaviors not compatible with their
moralities improper. Fatma and Esma define the behaviors of the “other” women, such as shamelessly talking about “everything” or going to nightclubs and drinking, as unacceptable for them, while Şükran and Saadet explain that they avoid contact with Germans as they fear adopting such inappropriate lifestyle. Older-generation women’s descriptions of Germans rely on the incompatible differences between two communities and demonstrate an effort of putting boundaries to distance themselves from the German culture. This distancing leads older-generation women to self-exclude and isolate themselves from the German public. Additionally, older-generation women’s perception of non-Muslim women and their separateness from themselves echo Ayşe Hoca’s prejudiced views on Germans, which was discussed in the previous chapter.

On the other hand, younger-generation women’s perception of Germans differs significantly from the older-generation women’s views. Having gone to school in Germany, younger-generation women have socialized in German culture very early on. Their acculturation in the German context resulted in their inclusion of German culture as part of their identity, not as something that stands opposite of their Turkish culture. Although younger-generation women also adopt and practice certain Turkish-Muslim norms, their attitudes towards Germans are much different. Unlike older-generation women, who categorize themselves as primarily Turkish and perceived Germans as the “other,” younger-generation women assumed a hybrid identity embracing certain aspects of both Turkish-Islamic traditions and German culture. Younger-generation women narrate their relationships with Germans as:

I have always been a social person. I have been a part of many different groups had many friends. I never had a circle of friends composed entirely of Turks. I never discriminated either, choosing one set of friends based on their ethnicity. I am both Turkish and German, so I have Turkish friends, German friends, and Turkish-German friends (Leman, 31, works in the public sector).

I started wearing a headscarf at 13, and it never got in the way of me making friends. I have both Turkish and German friends, and I never felt like my friends were excluding me because of my headscarf or religion. The other thing is that
we have been friends for so long; they are so used to me with my headscarf and Muslim identity. Just like me accepting the fact that they like to have a beer sometimes. It doesn’t bother me. We go to a café or restaurant; I usually ask for tea or coffee, and they have a beer. And in conversations, truthfully, religion hardly ever comes up. When you talk with your friends, you don’t talk about religion that much, right? It is like that… (Merve, 23, student)

Compared to my friends a family, I can say that I didn’t have much issue regarding my headscarf or my religion. I never had to compromise my lifestyle. I think it has something to do with me always having German friends and being open to them. Some of my best friends are Germans. I go to her house quite often; when my phone rings at the time of namaz [daily prayer], she goes and puts her yoga mat for me, she even learned the direction of kible [the direction of Mecca]. I actually got into her friend group – they are all German. At first, I was a little nervous, but I got accepted very quickly. I mean, we are not that different from each other. We went to the same schools; I was born and raised here like them. I am as German as they are! I think if you are open to other people, they get to know the real you and stop seeing you as Muslim and see you as who you really are. (Zeynep, 28, works in the private sector)

Some Germans do believe what they see in the media. But for my internship, I had to go to many German-owned businesses and talk to them. In my experience, many of them, especially younger ones, are very much used to Turks; they are familiar with Turkish culture and do not consider it something foreign. I think the important thing here is to talk with those people, try to understand their culture. I think sometimes it is us who are close-minded, not Germans. (Şule, 22, student)

Unlike older-generation women, younger-generation women’s opinions about Germans and Germanness are not negative. While Leman and Zeynep’s accounts even show that they identify themselves both as Turkish and German, Zeynep’s experience in her German friend’s house shows the level of accommodation her friend provides to her religious difference. Younger-generation women also do not blame Turkish women’s exclusion from the German public entirely on Germans but rather on mutual understanding and communication. They emphasize the importance of being open about one’s culture and identity, trying to find similarities and not categorizing either themselves as entirely Turkish or Germans as the “other.”

This difference in younger-generation and older-generation women’s approaches to the “other” became very obvious in one instance. This particular example came up in the mosque during one of the Islamic lectures for younger-generation women between Ayşe Hoca and two
young women, Leman and Burçin. At the end of the lecture, Burçin asked Ayşe Hoca for advice on dealing with some of her classmates when they speak ill of Islam and the Prophet. She mentioned the specific example of one of her classmates claiming that Mohammad married his wife when she was just 9 years old. Ayşe Hoca’s advice was: “You can try to explain, but you know these Germans, they are very prejudiced and close-minded. If I were you, I would not even bother to explain myself to that ignorant classmate and distance myself from him immediately”. Ayşe Hoca’s advice was not received well by the other young women in the lecture. Leman even openly contested Ayşe Hoca and advised Burçin to explain as well as she could. “How are they going to learn about real Islam if they don’t learn it from us? Our responsibility isn’t only to ourselves, to come here [mosque] and pray; we are representing Islam too. You should talk to him and calmly explain the controversy and how Islamic scholars explain this” (field notes from 12/09/2018). This example clearly demonstrates the contrast between the attitudes towards Germans; while Ayşe Hoca, with her internalized Turkish-Muslim discourse, advises her to set strict boundaries, Leman, who internalized and understood both Turkish and German discourses, suggests her to be open and explain. Another one of my interviewees, Merve, also refers to this specific moment and summarizes:

You go to both of the lectures, right? Both to ours and teyzes’ [aunties]. If you have paid attention, teyzes never challenge Ayşe Hoca. She sometimes talks about stuff that she doesn’t even know. She tries to seem knowledgeable about subjects she doesn’t have an idea about, and she usually messes it up. She tries, but it is impossible for her to understand what we go through here, and ends up giving wrong advice. She is much better with older women. Teyzes never

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16 The third wife of the Prophet, Aysha bint Abu Bakr’s age at marriage has been a source of controversy and debate among historians and Islamic scholars. Islam critics argue that Aysha was just 6 years old when she was betrothed to the Prophet, who was in his early 50s and she was nine-years old when the marriage was consummated (François-Cerrah, 2012). Islamic scholars have a defensive view argue that she was 18-19 years-old when she got married (Öztürk, 2008) and the misunderstanding is based on historical inaccuracies of records. Öztürk claims that such arguments are produced by Western Islamophobes to defame Islam (2008). Other Islamic scholars refer to the customs and traditions in the society back then and argue that it was not unusual for girls to get married early during those times (Yakut & Coşkun, 2014). In the lectures I attended, Ayşe Hoca had a different explanation: in Arab society women were not considered as a person before they started menstruating, therefore their ages started to be counted after they started menstruating. In this view, Mohammad married Ayşe 9 years after she started menstruating, which makes her around 19-20 at the time.
criticize her; they just take what she claims as the truth because their ideas are similar. But our group of girls thinks so differently from her. (Merve, 23, student)

5.1.2. Imaginations of There

Following their stereotypical image of Germany and Germans, many members of the older generation have an idealized and unrealistic view of Turkey and Turkish culture. Older-generation women consider themselves Turkish first and foremost and express that their ultimate aim after raising their kids in Germany is to move back to Turkey, where they assume they can live comfortably. Younger-generation women, who consider themselves as a part of Germany, express that being Turkish is an integral part of their identity; however, they do not consider Turkey as their homeland. Older-generation women’s view of Turkey as the nostalgic, idealized homeland contributes to their self-exclusion as they continue to identify themselves as Turkish people living in Germany as opposed to the hybrid Turkish-German identity younger women created for themselves. This is exemplified in the quotes below:

I came here when I was 6 years old. Theoretically, I should feel like this is my country, right? But I don’t. I feel like Germans don’t understand us. They make you feel like you don’t belong here. Even if they don’t say it, they make it clear with their looks. I feel so comfortable in Turkey when I go there. I would like to return, but also my kids are here, and until they grow up, I can’t go anywhere (Esma, 40, housewife)

I wish I was there. If I did not have kids or anything, I would move back to Turkey, where we do not have any pressure, prejudice, or oppression. We actually have a house back in … [a mid-size Turkish city] that we use in the summers. I think once my husband retires; we will stay there for longer periods of time, not only summers (Saaed, 44, housewife)

[She lived in Turkey for a year] I was so comfortable there! I don’t mean like a luxury, because we have better living conditions here, to be honest. What I am talking about is mental comfort. You don’t have to explain your single action or be prepared to defend yourself. On the other hand, we were living in … [a notoriously conservative neighborhood of Istanbul] and I think it would have been much different if we lived in Beşiktaş, Kadıköy or Nişantaşı [liberal neighborhoods of Istanbul], my husband worked there, and people were no different than Germans in those neighborhoods. I really miss it there. I used to
jokingly ask my husband, “why did you bring me back?” after we returned to Duisburg (Seda, 50, works in the private sector)

Older women often express that they consider Turkey their homeland, not Germany; however, they stay in Germany due to their family ties. Their idealized view of Turkey as somewhere where they can live comfortably as Muslim women without being subjected to any prejudice and criticism. This idealized view becomes clear in Seda’s case and her view of Turkey, even though she encountered the same prejudices coming from more liberal Turkish people. This ultimate aim to return to Turkey one day combined with the fear of “becoming like one of them” causes older women to self-exclude themselves within the boundaries of their ethnic neighborhoods and prevents them from becoming full members of the German public. This lack of embracing their lives being in Germany also manifests in their contradictory lifestyles in Turkey and Germany. As they never consider Germany as their home country, they never fully invest in living there:

Her [Nisa] house [in Marxloh] is very nice, very modestly furnished. She told me that they bought this apartment when the mosque construction started. She also showed me the house they bought in Turkey. They bought this huge house there and started renovating it. The contrast is striking. Their apartment in Marxloh is a simple 2-bedroom apartment, which is furnished very basically. Not many decorations. But the one in Turkey was a huge house. She showed me photos from at least 3 floors, 6 different rooms, and 3 different bathrooms. They are furnished so lavishly. It is kind of kitschy with all the heavy Ottoman-like furniture with intricate gold details, calligraphy on the walls, heavy lamps... Very unusual compared to their practically and comfortably decorated apartment here. Nisa tells me that they want to spend more time there once her husband retires. (field notes from 12/17/2018 after my visit to Nisa’s house for an afternoon tea)

Younger-generation women, contrarily, express that they feel loyalty to Turkey as it is a part of their identity but ultimately view Germany as their homeland. In their interviews, they express that they often feel like strangers in Turkey and even feel like they are Germans more so than Turks. They mostly view Turkey as a place where they go on vacations and express the difficulties they encounter in Turkey as they do not possess the know-how to conduct their lives in Turkey:
If you ask me [a third-generation Turkish-German], my homeland [Turkey] is very important to me. But if you ask me if I would like to move to Turkey permanently, no. If you ask my parents [second generation], they would say “if only.” If you ask my grandparents [first generation], that is what they live for. Their ultimate aim is to go back one day. But if you ask people my age, they would say no. We have become natives of Germany. I know how to live here; I know if I have children, they can go to kindergarten when they are two. I know which social activities they would take part in. I know where I would take them for sports or learn to play an instrument. I wouldn’t know any of this in Turkey (Leman, 32, works in the public sector).

People would ask me: which one do you like more when I was younger? Turkey or Germany? Now I know. I was born here. This is where my family and friends are; this is where I feel safe. Of course, I would say Germany now. Turkey is nice and all, but for vacations only. I would prefer to live here. I went on an exchange program last year to Turkey, and there I realized how German I have become! (Şule, 22, student)

It is when we go to Turkey I feel like a stranger. For example, they talk about school, the university entrance exams; I have no clue about those. Wherever I go here, I understand everything, know the language, but in Turkey, I can’t! My Turkish is not very good. Here I know what is good and what is not, but I don’t know it there. I don’t know which café to go, where to eat, etc…. (Burçin, 18, student)

As seen from the accounts above, younger-generation women do not feel as strongly about their belonging to Turkey. In fact, most of these young women express that they feel like they belong to Germany and how uncomfortable they feel in Turkey compared to their daily lives in Duisburg. While Leman’s account emphasizes how important her homeland is for her, she does not plan or dream to ever live there due to her perception of familiar living conditions being better in Germany. Şule’s and Burçin’s accounts follow a similar pattern pointing out how little know-how they have about Turkey and how German they have become – or have always been since they were both born and raised in Duisburg.

As I previously discussed in reference to women’s use of space in the mosque, there is a significant generational difference in perceptions of appropriate behavior and its links to specific cultures. Women’s perceptions of Turkey and Germany show the same contradictory pattern; while older-generation women claim their belonging to Turkey and have no interest in becoming
a part of Germany, younger-generation women express their belonging to where they live, as they possess the know-how on how to operate in Germany. While in the more limited space of the mosque, this acculturation pattern shaped how younger- and older-generation women created different spatial regimes within a controlled cultural environment; as we will see in the remainder of this chapter, these differences have significantly more significant implications for female use of public space in a larger scale. Moving forward, we will see how these imaginations of Turkey and Germany influence my participant’s patterns of mobility in the neighborhood and urban contexts, resulting in different levels of belonging. While older-generation women limit their social world to the area of Marxloh, perceived as a Turkish space, with mosque being the center of their socialization, younger-generation women display a stronger right to the city and an ambivalent relationship with Marxloh.

5.2. Patterns of Women’s Mobility: Spatial Acts of Territorialization

Following their imaginations of Turkish and German publics and similar to their use of space in the mosque, Turkish-Muslim women’s behavior outside the mosque constitutes distinct spatial regimes. The coding of the space as foreign/familiar or secure/dangerous by different generations of Turkish-Muslim women leads to the emergence of two spatial-use patterns that are related to feelings of avoidance, which can appear in the form of avoiding Turks to escape constant policing and judgment or evading Germans to refrain from becoming like one of “them.” The following section investigates these mobility patterns of Turkish-Muslim women. Starting with women’s use of the neighborhood space in section 5.2.1, this section continues to examine women’s mobility on larger scale, within the context of Duisburg and the NRW region in section 5.2.2. In these sections, we see that younger-generation women’s neighborhood use is defined by their patterns of avoidance rather than their use. I discuss that this constricted mobility within the
neighborhood is caused by surveillance that comes not only from men but from older-generation women. In order to avoid this constant policing, younger-generation women prefer to use the German space of Duisburg, resulting in much larger areas of activity compared to that of older-generation women. Older-generation women, on the other hand, due to their higher social statuses as *teyzes*, have a much larger spatial footprint in the neighborhood. However, when explored more in detail, we see that their use of the neighborhood space is conditional and purposeful, similar to their use of the mosque. Contrary to younger-generation women, their activity area is much smaller in the urban context due to their acculturation patterns that leave them with prejudiced views towards the German “other.” Section 5.2.3 looks into the specifics of five women’s spatial behavior, which fall outside the patterns described in the previous sections, only to find out that their unusual behavior works to prove the mentioned trends. The women whose behavior falls outside of these generational mobility patterns show how education and familial pressure, the two main factors that separate older-generation women from the younger-generation women, are significant determinants of women’s spatial behavior.

### 5.2.1. Women’s Use of the Neighborhood

This section explores the neighborhood use patterns of the women among the congregation of Marxloh Merkez Mosque in three sections. The first section, 5.2.1.1 introduces the neighborhood and describes the spatial layout, transportation lines, and the most common uses in the neighborhood. Section 5.2.1.2 introduces younger-generation women’s neighborhoods and discusses how the discomfort younger-generation women feel in Marxloh causes them to have a neighborhood print that relies on patterns of avoidance rather than patterns of use. My analysis shows that the discomfort that they feel in the neighborhood is related to two types of gazes, the first being the Turkish-Islamic gaze that has sexual undertones, comes both from men
and teyzes and have the ability to damage a woman’s social standing and the second one being the more generic form of the male gaze that causes them to feel unsafe. Younger-generation women often express their discomfort about the level of control and surveillance that takes place in the neighborhood and their preference of socializing in the German public. Their affinity with the German culture and the urban know-how on how to operate in the German public provides them an alternative space of socialization where they can avoid patterns of oppressive social control. Section 5.2.1.3 presents older-generation women’s neighborhood use and discusses that having achieved the status of teyze (auntie), which frees them from the pressure of being perceived as objects of sexual desire and provides them the social capital to be on the other side of the societal control, older-generation women use the neighborhood much more extensively. However, further analysis of my data reveals the catch: despite this extensive and seemingly free use of the neighborhood space due to their teyze statuses and household chores, they are not free in their use of the neighborhood. In fact, their use of the neighborhood is always conditional and purposeful.

5.2.1.1. Neighborhood Overview

Before describing women’s spatial uses of the neighborhood space, a spatial overview of the neighborhood is needed to understand women’s mobility within this space. Figure 5-1 shows the principal axes, transportation lines, borders, and the most commonly used spaces in Marxloh by Turkish-Muslim women.

Marxloh neighborhood has developed around the Bundesstraße 8 (B-8) or Weseler Straße, which lays on the North-South axis. While Weseler Straße works as the main street, Kaiser-Wilhelm Straße, which becomes Kaiser-Friedrich Straße on the eastern side of the Weseler Straße, is the second-important axis that defines the neighborhood. The main tram lines (901 and 903) that provide access to the neighborhood from the city center lie on these two main
streets. As there is no bus access to Marxloh from the city center, these tram lines are the only way the neighborhood is connected to the city. Within the Marxloh neighborhood, these tram lines also follow the hierarchy of the two main axes. Tram line 903, which runs along the north-south axis of Duisburg and merges with the subway line U-79 that goes to Dusseldorf, passes through Weseler Straße. The relatively shorter tram line 901 connects Marxloh to Duisburg's western and eastern parts and passes through the Kaiser-Wilhelm Straße (Figure 5-1).

Figure 5-1 further shows the limits of Marxloh in terms of its spatial use. Although the municipal borders of Marxloh are much larger than shown on the image below, the community use is limited to the area delineated by the mines on the north of the neighborhood, the Thyssen-Krupp Steel Plant on the west and south, and the freeway on the east.

Figure 5-2 demonstrates the most commonly used areas in Marxloh. The center of Marxloh is located at the intersection of the tram lines, creating a central public square, which is referred to as Pollman Kreuz (18). The center of the neighborhood extends towards the east, where the marketplace August-Bebel-Platz is located (19), and to the north along Weseler Straße, where the majority of the shops, retail businesses, services, restaurants are located. Most coffeehouses, which make Marxloh a no-go zone for Germans, are also located along this Weseler Straße. These central functions extend until the Warbrück Straße, where Marxloh Merkez Mosque is located.
Figure 5-1 Marxloh with main transportation axes (left) and the limits of the neighborhood (right) (source: Author)
Figure 5-2 Most commonly used spaces by the community in Marxloh (source: Author)
5.2.1.2. Younger-Generation Women’s Neighborhood

Younger-generation women among the participants of my research express that they feel uncomfortable in Marxloh. The discomfort younger-generation women feel in the neighborhood is related to the Turkish-Islamic norms and expectations on how pious Turkish-Muslim women should behave, based on the notions of namus, fitne, and the gaze. Younger-generation women’s use of Marxloh is minimal; their activity space in the neighborhood is limited to a linear segment along the main street. Rather than the areas they use, younger-generation women’s perceived neighborhood is shaped by the areas they avoid, which is determined by the social control that comes in the form of surveillance. The two types of surveillance, 1) the Turkish-Islamic gaze, which comes from both men and older-generation women which is reproduced in the mosque, and 2) the generic gaze, which can come from any man and threatens younger-generation women’s safety in the neighborhood, are identified as the main reasons behind their constrained use of the neighborhood. While younger-generation women do not prefer to socialize in the neighborhood, their avoidance and adherence to the social control while they are using the neighborhood, stabilizes Marxloh as a men’s space, justifying younger-generation women’s absence from the public space.

At a broad scale, younger-generation women use only a small portion of the neighborhood limited to a segment along the Weseler Straße (Figure 5-3). The most commonly used spaces among younger-generation women in Marxloh are religious. Although younger-generation women express that they primarily use Marxloh Merkez Mosque (A) for religious
purposes, they occasionally use other mosques (E and G) in the neighborhood. They also use some of the most popular restaurants, which have become landmarks in the neighborhood (D and L). Ali Baba (D) among these restaurants is the most popular one due to its long-lasting existence in the neighborhood. Younger-generation women that I interviewed either have worked there at some point or know who works in this restaurant through their families. With its 24-hour operation and the protection it brings through its familial atmosphere, it provides
one of the safe spaces in the neighborhood where younger-generation women feel like they can avoid sexualization. Younger-generation women also use the Catholic Church (C), as they attended its kindergarten when they were younger and continue attending their interreligious programs. These women also identify Turkish markets (F and H) located on Weseler Straße as spaces they frequent. The marketplace in August-Bebel-Platz (K), the small-scale shopping center (J) that includes Mediamarkt\textsuperscript{17} and Aldi\textsuperscript{18}, and a small mall (I) that includes EG-DU office and Aktion\textsuperscript{19} are among places younger-generation women frequently use.

![Figure 5-4 Medienbunker in Johannismarkt, Marxloh (source: http://www.bunkerland-ruhrgebiet.de/marxloh.htm)](image)

Among these frequently used spaces by younger-generation women, Medienbunker (B) Figure 5-4) is one of the most interesting ones. Being used as a bunker during WW2, today, this bunker is used by Halil Özet, who established a media company in this space. Having been born and raised in Marxloh, Özet was instrumental during the construction of the mosque with his

\textsuperscript{17} A popular technology market in Europe  
\textsuperscript{18} A popular supermarket in Europe  
\textsuperscript{19} A popular discount market in Europe
campaign “Made in Marxloh”. The WW2 bunker his company is based today is used as a creative space for artists in Duisburg. Many organizations aimed at the youth living in the neighborhood, concerts, plays, poetry, and rap slams take place in this space, drawing not only the Turkish people but also many German people living in Duisburg. While the German character of this space makes it a no-go zone for older-generation women, younger-generation women attend to the activities that take place in this space frequently.

Figure 5-5 Areas avoided by younger-generation women in Marxloh
On the other hand, more so than the areas younger-generation women use, the areas they avoid shape their neighborhood (Figure 5-5). This is supported by younger-generation women’s detailed descriptions of the areas they avoid or consider unsafe, compared to their superficial accounts on the areas that they use. Their avoidance of space is conditioned by what might be regarded as two types of male gaze, one being the Turkish-Islamic gaze and the other one being the more generic form of male gaze. Though both forms of gaze carry sexualized undertones, the Turkish-Islamic gaze carries with it an additional level of entitlement that allows men to feel justified in judging and policing women’s behavior by sexualizing them. Where the generic gaze carries a vague threat of physical violence, the Turkish-Islamic gaze carries a specific social connotation that can impact a woman’s standing in the mosque and the Turkish-Muslim community.

![Figure 5-6 Cafe Marxloh and TipWin on Weseler Straße (source: Author)](image)

The Turkish-Islamic gaze limits younger-generation women’s mobility in the main Weseler Straße. The gaze, in this case, comes from the men hanging out in front of the kahvehanes (coffeehouses) (D and E). All younger-generation women I interviewed identified
these two sections along the Weseler Straße, where kahvehanes are located in a concentrated manner, as an area they do not like and avoid if possible (Figure 5-6). Şule and Leman narrate that they are made uncomfortable by the looks of men who hang in front of these kahvehanes and express their fear that men will start gossips about them that would negatively affect their social standing:

I hate walking in front of those gambling places [in most kahvehanes, gambling take place]. I get very uncomfortable when I walk there, but it is on my way to the house, I cannot avoid them a lot of the time. Sometimes, I take other streets if I can, but that adds at least 15 minutes to my walking. There is always somebody in front of those places. Always! They watch you and stare at you, and then they gossip about you. I either act like I don’t see them or lower my stare so that they don’t get any ideas (Şule, 22, student)

At any given time, 15-20 men are hanging in front of those kahvehanes. They do nothing; they are no different from an electric pole. Just stand there all day and watch who goes where, who wears what. We usually change our direction or cross the street so that we wouldn’t have to pass in front of them. There are reasons for that, some of my friends’ brothers can be inside, and they don’t allow them to pass in front of the kahvehanes. In my case, because of my father’s job, most of those guys know me, but I usually keep my distance from them. I heard from others that they started gossiping about me because I passed by the coffee house twice in like an hour or so. They gossiped that I must be interested in someone [in the kahvehane] and trying to get them to notice me. I was engaged at the time. Do you have any idea what would have happened if my family or my fiancé heard about this gossip? Marxloh is really a no-go area for younger women (Leman, 32, works in the public sector).

Şule expresses her discomfort of being subjected to the Turkish-Islamic gaze and the tactics she uses to avoid it. Her discomfort of being watched constantly by the men in front of these coffeehouses even makes it to the mental map she has drawn of Marxloh in the form of watchful eyes and a cigarette (Figure 5-7). On the other hand, Leman’s narrative demonstrates how this gaze can affect her standing in society. Her passing in front of the coffeehouse is interpreted as a sexual act by the men in kahvehane, which can affect her reputation in the mosque and Turkish-Muslim community as it does not fit in the prescribed set of behaviors for pious Turkish-Muslim women. On the other hand, the experiences of Leman’s friends, how they are not allowed to walk in front of the kahvehanes, exemplifies the level of entitlement men feel
on women’s behaviors. This entitlement is not based on women’s behavior but based on men’s
sexual interpretation of women’s everyday activities. Men in these kahvehanes consider women
to be responsible for men’s sexualization of their everyday behavior and justify their policing by
protecting “women’s namus.”

This Turkish-Islamic gaze, however, does not always come from men. While when it
comes from men, this gaze spatially restricts younger-generation women’s use of the
neighborhood, the surveillant aspect of it that controls women’s behavior in the space of the
neighborhood comes from both men and older-generation women. The mosque-going older-
generation women do not only internalize the norms of Turkish-Islamic femininity but also
reproduce it by taking part in its performances of social control that come in the form of
surveillance and gossip, justifying it. Burçin and Aslı’s experiences exemplify how this social
control coming from older-generation women causes them discomfort:

Figure 5-7 Şule’s mental map of Marxloh (source: Şule’s mental map)
I would never go out wearing shorts here [in Marxloh]. My family does not really say anything about how I dress, but I never feel comfortable going out wearing a dress or shorts. Men look at you and disapprove of you, sometimes they turn their heads around so that they don’t see you. And teyzes pull you aside and give you “advice” on appropriate behavior. Instead of dealing with that, I just don’t wear shorts or dresses. They would probably talk to my father about it. My father [who acts as one of the community leaders due to his role in the mosque] is conservative, but he never tries to control what I wear, but I know the gossip would make him uncomfortable. Whenever we go to Turkey for our summer holidays, I dress however the way I want there. Nobody knows me there… (Burçin, 18, student).

They watch you all the time. Day and night. We have those neighbors, some older folk. I guess they have nothing else going on for them, so they have taken it upon themselves to watch what I do. If I come home late, they watch me behind their curtains. The next day, they go to my mom, and they say, “I saw your daughter coming in late at night, are you aware that she was out at that time of the night?” They imply that I was up to no good, that my mom was not keeping me on a tight leash. I am going on this exchange program for six weeks. We did not tell anybody; I know they would tell my mom that she was crazy to let me go on my own. (Aslı, 21, student)

The behaviors that are equated with the more liberal Western life, such as dressing like them or coming home alone late at night, are considered actions that deviate from the norms of the Turkish-Muslim community and are strictly controlled so that young women’s namus is not damaged. While Aslı’s case demonstrates a more direct attempt at social control, Burçin’s case illustrates internalized social control, leading her to preemptively self-surveil her own behavior. In her case, it is not the surveillance, but its expectation that causes her to police her own behavior. She changes her behavior not only to avoid the male gaze but to avoid provoking gossip that would harm her and her father’s social standing in the community.

The second form of gaze, the generic gaze, which also carries sexualized undertones, limits younger-generation women’s use of the neighborhood due to fear of violence. Younger-generation women abstain from using sparsely occupied parts of the neighborhood, such as parks (A, B, and C in Figure 5-5) and school grounds (F in Figure 5-5) to avoid the generic gaze. This has a strong element of ethnic discrimination because many of these spaces are occupied by men from Roma, Bulgarian, and other East European immigrant groups. These groups are often
associated with the rising criminal activity in the neighborhood, including robberies, drug use, gang activity, and rape by my research participants. Having arrived in Germany recently, most of these newcomers live on unemployment support, therefore occupy parks and school grounds during the day:

My father’s business used to be located in the more dangerous parts of Marxloh [area between E and F on Figure 5-5]. They [the men among other immigrant groups] harassed all of our customers, but especially female ones. Women complained that they were afraid to come; they were afraid of theft and especially sexual assault. A couple of months ago, a woman was raped on one of the more deserted streets not far from here. It scares people, especially women. We lost almost all of our customers due to these newcomers. My father ended up closing his business down. (Derya, 22, student)

There is this park very close to the school [F on Figure 5-5]. We live close to there. Up until like 6 years ago, we used to use that park constantly. We would meet with friends there; I would go for runs and work out there. In these 4-5 years, it became one of the most dangerous areas in the neighborhood. It is constantly occupied by Roma and Bulgarian men. They drink there all the time, and when they are drunk, they get extremely loud. We want to move to another place because of them. (Gizem, 30, housewife)

The walk-along interviews and mental maps young women have drawn demonstrate the extent to which the Turkish-Islamic gaze and generic gaze have on women’s spatial behavior. In Figure 5-8, representing the paths we have taken during my walk-alongs, the linearity and patterns of avoidance exhibited in these women’s use of the neighborhood are clearly illustrated. Younger-generation women avoid entirely going to the areas where they would be subjected to the generic gaze, however, because they cannot always prevent the Turkish-Islamic gaze entirely due to the location of kahvehanes on the main Weseler Straße. When they cannot take an alternative route (A), they cross the street (B and C) in order not to pass in front of the kahvehanes.

The Turkish-Islamic norms of femininity reproduced in the mosque, as discussed in Chapter 4 and reinforced by the socio-spatial behavior of men and older-generation women, not only controls younger-generation women’s spatial mobility within the neighborhood but also define the limits of “appropriate behavior” for younger-generation women. Younger-generation
Figure 5-8 Merve (23, student) (left) and Leman’s (32, trainer) (right) use of the neighborhood and their walk-along interview routes (source: Author)
women’s adherence to these Turkish-Islamic norms by avoiding certain areas or behaving in certain ways in order to protect their reputation reproduces the same Turkish-Islamic norms while putting them in a disadvantaged position and stabilizing their exclusion from the neighborhood space. In this way, Marxloh becomes stabilized as an arena for Turkish-Muslim cultural norms, which favors men. Elif’s interpretation summarizes this stabilization very accurately:

They [men] think that standing and hanging out in front of the shops, restaurants, and especially kahvehanes is in our culture. I know there are a lot of them back in Turkey too, but I think it is “men’s” culture, not “our” culture. It makes me uncomfortable, insecure, and self-conscious and makes me feel like I don’t belong (Elif, 31, housewife)

5.2.1.3. Older-Generation Women’s Neighborhood

In Marxloh, most neighborhood use is carried out by older-generation women. This circumstance is primarily facilitated by their status as teyzes within the Turkish-Muslim community. The status of teyze usually refers to the social position of women in the Turkish-Muslim community as women who are married and have children and are in turn expected to carry out the vast majority of domestic activities in line with Turkish-Muslim social norms. This teyze status allows women to use the neighborhood space more extensively in two ways: firstly, their “teyze-ness” desexualizes them. Being married and having children, these older-generation women can evade being sexualized, therefore allowing them to escape the Turkish-Islamic gaze, minimizing the areas that they avoid using in Marxloh. This desexualization and subsequent ascription of their roles as “mothers” provides them a social status above that of younger women but still below that of men, which places them on the other side – the giving end – of the Turkish-Islamic gaze. Being on the giving end of the Turkish-Islamic gaze, older-generation women interpret this gaze as protective rather than obtrusive. Secondly, this teyze status of older-generation women prescribes their primary responsibility as the management of the household,
which justifies their presence in the public space of the neighborhood through childcare and household chores, despite the Turkish-Islamic prescription that reduces their appearance in public. However, while these chores provide older-generation women an extended use of the neighborhood, justifying their use of the public space, it also means that older-generation women’s socialization is only acceptable when done in the context of productive daily activity, making their neighborhood use purposeful and conditional. Because much of the enforcement of this conditionality stems from self-policing by older-generation women themselves, the need to be busy (or seen as busy) with the household and childcare chores represents their internalization of the domestic roles.

As older-generation women’s neighborhood use is much more extensive, the areas they avoid are minimal compared to younger women’s (Figure 5-9). To illustrate this point, the area around the kahvehanes, unanimously marked as an area to avoid by younger women I interviewed, was marked as a place to avoid by only a small number of my older-generation interviewees. Older-generation women mostly complained about “those men ruining the image of the neighborhood, jobless, aimless… Smoking and watching all day everyday…” (Fatma, 64, housewife). While older-generation women express that they do not like to see so many young men gathered in front of the teahouses, they do not experience the same discomfort by being the subjects of the Turkish-Islamic gaze and need to modify their behavior as younger-generation women do. Their status as teyzes, which provides them a relatively more prestigious social position and frees them from the responsibility of causing fitna, desexualizes them in the eyes of the community leading to more respectful interactions with younger men while also freeing them from becoming the subject of gossip by the community.
Simultaneously, older-generation women’s desexualization allows them to wield the Turkish-Islamic gaze against younger-generation women and consider it a protective mechanism in the community. Older-generation women take part in the surveillance and policing of younger-generation women to ensure that the Turkish-Islamic norms are not transgressed and that younger-generation women adhere to these norms that would make them pious and proper.

Figure 5-9 Areas avoided by older-generation women in Marxloh (source: Author)
women in the future. In addition to this, older-generation women rely on these community surveillance mechanisms to feel protected in a land they consider “foreign” and to survive. These contradictory experiences of surveillance by a different generation of women become apparent during my interview with Aslı and her mother, Rabia:

Irem: How do you feel about living in Marxloh?
Rabia: I don’t think I could have survived anywhere else in Germany. I came here after I got married, and my husband died shortly after. My daughter was very young; I didn’t know German, didn’t know many people here. My neighbors became my family. I can’t tell you how important they are to me. If they don’t see me around for a couple of days, they immediately call me and ask if I am sick or need anything. They also watch over my daughter. It is nice to know someone is there for you, looking out for you. It makes me feel safer. (Rabia, 59, housewife)

Aslı: I disagree… I like our neighbors and everything, but they said some very nasty stuff about me when I was younger. Many people were giving their unwarranted opinions to my mom on how to raise me without my father. They said that without a father, I would become an indecent woman. Some teyzes even took it upon themselves to report everything I do to my mother. And when they see you with a man! Gossip right away and directly tell it to my mom. But I don’t think their intentions are good like my mom thinks; they are only after gossip. It is our life, nobody’s business! (Aslı, 21, student)

Aslı expresses that she does not like the control this surveillance brings and finds it limiting. For Rabia, however, being watched over is something she appreciates. She considers her neighbors her family, and for her, the lack of eyes on the street is what makes public spaces feel unsafe, justifying the social control the Turkish-Islamic gaze brings.

While older-generation women’s teyze status protects them from the Turkish-Islamic gaze, they still experience feelings of insecurity due to the generic gaze. The path that was transformed from the old railroad (A in Figure 5-9) is marked as an area to avoid by some older-generation women (Figure 5-10). The reasoning behind not using this path is related to the feelings of safety, similar to the feelings of younger-generation women, as women express that this path “is used by people who do/sell drugs. People don’t like going there because they are afraid and the more people don’t go, the scarier it becomes” (Şükran, 53, works in the private sector).
The Medienbunker (B in Figure 5-9) mentioned in the previous section once again emerges as an interesting element of older-generation women’s imaginations of the neighborhood. While younger-generation women marked the old bunker as a place they frequent, older women expressed that they are uncomfortable with the crowd Medienbunker attracts and avoid this area. The hybrid character of Medienbunker not only attracts the Turkish youth, but many young people among other immigrant groups or Germans also come to the area to attend the events that take place in this space, which is interpreted as the occupation of the moral Turkish-Islamic space by the immoral “other.” Rabia expresses her discomfort as:

That plaza, where the old bunker is… I am not happy living close to there. Whenever there is something there, people drink and smoke on the streets and are very loud. I don’t like it. Very weird people, weird hair colors, weird clothing, piercings… God knows what they are up to! My daughter sometimes goes to those events. I wish she would listen to me more and not associate with those
people, but she doesn’t listen. After all, she is a grown-up, after all, I can’t force her, but my neighbors tell me that they worry about my daughter going there later. I don’t like my neighbors to have low opinions about my daughter… (Rabia, 59, housewife)

When we look at older-generation women’s use of the neighborhood, we see that it has a much larger spatial footprint (Figure 5-11). Older-generation women do not limit their use of the neighborhood to the area around Weseler Straße like younger-generation women as their household and childcare duties allow them to access a larger portion of the neighborhood. On the other hand, despite many claims by older-generation women about how they can comfortably use the neighborhood, they always mention a condition or justification, mostly related to their daily chores, when talking about these spaces. In other words, older-generation women always talk about their activities in Marxloh within the context of their chores:

We usually go to Konya’lı Ayşe [one of the Turkish markets] to do our shopping… (Fatma, 64, housewife)

After I pick my daughter up from school, we go to the church, almost 3-4 times a week, they have great programs for children… (Esma, 40, housewife)

On my typical day, in the mornings, during the time my husband gets ready for work, I usually set up the table and leave to take the kids to school so he can have his breakfast in peace… (Nur, 48, housewife)

As women, especially those who are housewives, are responsible for maintaining the majority of the household and childcare chores, their use of the neighborhood is shaped around these errands, which becomes even more apparent when their neighborhood use is mapped based on their main daily activities (Figure 5-12). The schools, kindergartens, parks, and churches are the areas older-generation women use during their child-care-related chores and represent the widest dispersal of activity areas for these women. The markets, bazaars and the small mall are spaces women use for their shopping as a part of their household duties (Figure 5-13).

In terms of their socialization, whenever I asked older-generation women about their socialization habits, they always mentioned how busy they are and that they usually do not have
Looking at Figure 5-12, it may seem that there is a relatively equitable distribution of spaces for house-related work and socialization; however, this is indeed misleading, as many of the socialization spaces are actually private homes, not public spaces, and they are used only infrequently. Unlike small and impromptu gatherings of younger-generation women, older-generation women’s socialization requires thorough planning as they cannot avoid their daily chores. Mosque-going older-generation women’s gatherings are usually planned within
the mosque group and include 5-6 women who take turns in hosting the gathering. The rest of the areas older-generation women use for socialization include the small cafes and restaurants along the Weseler Straße, in fact, showing a similar character to the spaces younger-generation women use. On the other hand, older-generation women’s use of these spaces differs from younger-generation women’s use in how it is always conditional; they can only use those spaces between domestic activities, such as during the time they wait for their kids to get out of school, as the
norms of Turkish-Islamic femininity they have adopted prioritizes their household duties. Nur and

Esma express this as:

Now, I see my friends and neighbors mostly during güns [the planned meetings of a group of older-generation women that take place weekly where they take
turns to host]. We have a group, next week it is my turn to host people. It is very
hard to find a time that works for everybody. You know, with kids, their
activities and some women’s husbands that work shifts, it gets very hard to find a
time that works for everybody. (Nur, 48, housewife)

Esma: I am usually so busy! I can hardly find time to see my friends…
Irem: How do you spend your days?
Esma: You know, I have two kids that are 9 and 11. I don’t know how my days
go by between taking kids to school and their activities and the household chores,
I don’t know how my days go by…
Irem: Do you go out in Marxloh? Meet with your friends?
Esma: Eh… Maybe once a month? Sometimes when I take the kids to school,
with some of the other moms, we would sit around in a park or a café. But this is
not usual. Most of the time, we rush back to our houses and try to do more chores
before we come back to school and pick up our kids. We don’t have time to
waste; we can’t just hang out in a café all day long like young people or men…
(Esma, 40, housewife)

Older-generation women’s accounts about their use of the neighborhood suggest that
their socialization is only acceptable when done in the context of productive daily activity, and
sometimes they even manufacture an appearance of purpose so that they can access public space.
Esma’s interview suggests that if women are only idly socializing, they consider that time as
“wasted.” This purposeful and conditional use of the neighborhood also explains why younger-
generation women’s use of the neighborhood remains very limited; as they do not have families
of their own, they lack a legitimate reason for inhabiting public space. Younger-generation
women do not feel the need to create the need to use the space; instead, they are more
comfortable using space just to socialize. Coupled with older-generation women’s preference of
socialization in the private space of their homes, this suggests that in the Turkish-Muslim
conception, there is no legitimate public space for women to use for their socialization, and
women should use the private space of the home for their socialization purposes, which is why
younger-generation women’s socialization is frowned upon. Within this context, mosques in
Marxloh represent a space in-between private and public where women can socialize while performing norms of proper Turkish-Islamic femininity within the context of religious education and contributing to the mosque by taking part in cooking/baking activities.

The walk-along interviews and mental maps of older-generation women also demonstrate their purposeful use of the neighborhood. Although the areas they cover during these walk-along is much larger than younger-generation women’s and non-linear, this is due to them fulfilling their domestic activities during these outings (Figure 5-14). Nur’s walk-along starts in the park where she takes her kids (A), continues with the mosque (B), the church where she leaves her children (C) for their activities, other mosques (D), and ends with shopping (E and F) for her house. Similarly, Fatma’s walk-along starts at the mosque (G), continues with picking her granddaughter from the school (H), and ends with shopping in the Turkish market (I) and the discount market (J). Contrary to younger-generation women, older-generation women do not use the neighborhood
Figure 5-14 Nur’s (48, housewife) (left) and Fatma’s (64, housewife) (right) use of the neighborhood and their walk-along interview routes (source: Author)
solely for socialization purposes; however, as discussed in Chapter 6, older women take advantage of this purposeful use of the neighborhood and come up with strategies to reclaim their agency while staying within the norms of Turkish-Islamic femininity.

5.2.2. Women’s Use of the City

Moving to a larger scale, this section discusses Turkish-Muslim women’s mobility within the urban context and shows how generational differences once more produce different spatial patterns. Similar to their use of the neighborhood, younger-generation and older-generation women’s spatial behavior in urban contexts differ significantly. While with older-generation women, we see a field of activity is mainly constrained to Marxloh and the nearby neighborhoods and almost no unaccompanied use of the areas outside the neighborhood, with younger-generation women, we see much broader use of the city. This section investigates the reasons behind these different spatial patterns and identifies education and the acculturation it brings (or lack thereof) as the main determining factor in whether or not individuals will more readily engage with broader society and become a part of the German public through their spatial use. This section discusses the inversion in the perception of surveillance and the gaze. While the surveillance in the neighborhood is perceived by older-generation women to provide a sense of security, outside Marxloh, when the gaze comes from the German-other, they consider it judgmental and obtrusive, similar to younger-generation women’s perception of gaze in Marxloh. Younger-generation women, on the other hand, who are not free from the controlling Turkish-Islamic gaze in the neighborhood due to their sexualized nature, feel more comfortable in the German public, which provides them a level of anonymity and independence.

My interviews suggest that one of the most critical deciding-factor on women’s mobility within the urban context is their education and the acculturation it brings. As described in Chapter
3, the educational levels of older- and younger-generation women I interviewed differ significantly. The majority of my older-generation interviewees were born in Turkey and came to Germany either when they got married (Generation 1) or having completed most of their schooling in Turkey and continued their later education (high-school) in Germany (Generation 1.5). None of my older-generation interviewees continued their education after high school – half of which not even have a high-school diploma. This means that their early socialization and acculturation took place either in Turkey or in the immigrant neighborhood internalizing their home county’s norms, with limited exposure to their host country’s culture. Although most of the older-generation women learned some German to manage their daily lives, and some even participated in German public through their work, it, in most cases, was not enough to compensate for their lack of socialization within German culture. Having socialized to have a limited and prejudiced view of the German public, older-generation women retracted to the safe, familiar space of Marxloh, where they feel comfortable and safe. Interestingly, despite expressing that they are content with their lives in Marxloh, they also acknowledge their socialization patterns left them disadvantaged in the German society and report that they would not want their children to go through the same problems. Nur and Hayriye explain their experiences in Germany as:

I arrived here when I was 16 years old in the mid-1970s [date removed for anonymity purposes]. In Turkey, I was going to high school, but I came here before completing it. My father was among the first guest-workers that came here; he arrived in 1968. They didn’t know how things were here. And back in our little village in Turkey, the girls didn’t always go to school; even when they did, they would not continue after middle school. My parents didn’t trust the German system anyways; they thought it might confuse me. So, when we came here, they didn’t send me to school. It was also like a culture shock to me; I didn’t know the language, their ways… I learned German a couple of years later when I started working in a factory. Now, I know German enough to shop, go to the doctor’s, and make small talk with my neighbors … Lately, my son dropped out of college, which makes me sad. We are held in contempt here anyways; we start at a disadvantage. It is hard to find a job even with a college degree. I wanted my son to at least have better opportunities in the future... (Hayriye, 59, works at the family business)
I came here when I was 18 after I got married. I went to university for one year back in Turkey but dropped out when I got engaged. I came to this foreign place [Marxloh] whose language I didn’t know… I moved in with my husband’s family and lived with them for years when I first came here. That time was bizarre, a new country, a new family, a new language. Since I didn’t know anybody here, I actually liked living with my husband’s family in Marxloh. Eventually, we moved to our own place, but we always stayed in Marxloh. Here [Marxloh] was so different than what I was used to, so small, but you get used to it. Now I like Marxloh. I know who everybody is, where everything is. I can find everything I need here in Marxloh, but I still don’t even know how to speak German! (Nur, 48, housewife)

On the other hand, my younger-generation interviewees were all born in Germany and have always attended German schools. Being in the German education system since kindergarten, younger-generation women were introduced to German culture from a very early age. As they can benefit from what the German educational system offers, in addition to their parents’ efforts of providing a better life for their kids, the majority of the younger-generation women (75%) have or are on their way to having a university education. Growing up being exposed to both Turkish-Muslim norms from their own families and the “other” German ones through their education, younger-generation Turkish-Muslim women ended up forming hybrid Turkish-German identities, with a good understanding of cultural codes that belong to both cultures. While this allows them to identify unfair circumstances and resist them both in Turkish and German contexts, it also provides them the confidence to operate on equal footing with Germans in the German public.

Leman and Merve’s accounts show younger-generation women’s awareness of biases from both sides:

I always had a good relationship with my classmates. Of course, there is some prejudice on their side. I am Turkish, and they had this image of Turkish women who don’t study after 9th-10th grade, have arranged marriages, do domestic work, and have kids when they are very young. But I can’t blame them; I mean, this is the image our parents created. They had this idea instilled in them by their parents that women don’t need education. But our mothers suffered under these ideas, and now they don’t want us to go through the same thing. Now in our generation, it is actually hard to find people in Turkish community who don’t have a university education. Not only that but also, with our generation, Germans also started to be more used to living with us, their ideas about us are changing too. (Leman, 32, works in the public sector)
I have always been a very social person. I am very active both socially and in school and am included in many different groups and circles. But they were never composed of only Turkish people. I never had a friend circle that had only Turkish people. My headscarf never was a problem for my close friends. I never felt excluded at school; I think I was lucky, maybe? I think it is a mutual thing. My classmates, who are the same age as I am, are used to our existence. But now that I interact more with older German people as I look for a job, I see that, like our parents, they are much more prejudiced and never actually took the time to get to know Turks, with whom they have been living together for 60 years.

(Merve, 23, student)

What these four accounts illustrate in particular, is how education actually facilitates women’s engagement with the broader German society. From a more practical perspective, access to education fundamentally alters the potential life choices available to women. For older-generation women, who were socialized in rural Turkey, it was expected that they would not get an education and that they would marry and have children early. For this reason, many of the early immigrants did not feel the need to continue their daughters’ education once they moved to Germany, as exemplified by Hayriye’s case above. For younger-generation women, by contrast, through the encouragement of their mothers and their experience with the German education system, they came to view higher education and careers as an opportunity that was open to them.

The cultural affinities and exposure to different cultures during their education become a determining factor on women’s spatial behavior outside Marxloh. Older-generation women, not familiar with German culture, do not feel comfortable in the German public that is foreign to them, keeping their spatial mobility within the limits of Marxloh (Figure 5-15). This spatial behavior is further reinforced with the view of Marxloh as a moral space of socialization within the “other” German public, justifying older-generation women’s withdrawal to Marxloh. In addition to this, as discussed in the previous section, older-generation women’s daily activities that are structured around domestic chores also work to confine them to the private space of their homes while limiting the range of mobility they can potentially have. On the other hand, younger-generation women having the know-how of how to operate within the German public express that
they feel more comfortable outside Marxloh, having much more expansive use of the city. While this is widely influenced by their work and education, which takes place over a broader area, younger-generation women also consciously avoid spending time in the neighborhood due to the pressure that comes from the constant surveillance.

Older-generation women’s stereotypical imaginations of the Germans, as described at the beginning of this chapter, which is further reinscribed through Ayşe Hoca’s lectures in the mosque, do not only cause them to have an antithetical view on Marxloh and the German public but also have spatial implications. They constantly conceptualize Marxloh as the moral space while positioning it against the “immoral” space of the German public. Saadet and Rabia’s accounts illustrate their perception and positioning of the German public as:

We don’t go to the city center. What do I know…? I mean, I don’t feel comfortable. My sons told me that there are some very nice cafés in Innenhafen, but I would feel weird. I wouldn’t know what to order, don’t know what kind of meat they use, whether it is halal or not. Here in Marxloh, we know people; we trust people. Why would I make myself feel uncomfortable? (Saadet, 44, works in private sector)

I don’t go to the city center. We have everything here; we have our shops where we can find appropriate [Islamic] clothing, we have our restaurants where we can find halal meat, and our cafes where no alcohol is served. I think I would feel uncomfortable being in a place where they serve alcohol and where they cook pork. Also, there you see young people, both men and women being very intimate in public as if they have no shame or namus20! (Rabia, 59, housewife)

In Saadet’s case, the issue of trust presents as the insurmountable obstacle that prevents her from going to the city center; therefore prefers to stay in the familiar space of Marxloh, where she knows and trusts people. Rabia’s account also illustrates her distrust of Germans; however, in her case, it is her views on the impure German public that limits her mobility. The mere fact that alcohol and pork are served in those spaces, in addition to the improper behaviors of men and women, make her label the German public and, by extension, all Germans as impure. Their lack

20 The terminology she adds “kızlar oğlanlar alt alta üst üst” does not exactly translate to English. It translates literally as girls and boys being on top of each other but what Rabia means is that although she is not against seeing men and women together, she does not like it when they are physical with each other, kissing, hugging or holding hands.
of exposure to German culture that comes with their lack of education in their host country causes older-generation women to view this German other as impure and distance themselves from them. These views are reproduced through the only education that these older women have access to, the education in the mosque, which simply echoes Ayşe Hoca’s prejudiced recommendations of avoiding the “impure” Germans.

Another factor influencing women’s different mobility patterns is related to the perception of surveillance. Both older-and younger-generation women are subjected to constant surveillance, both in Marxloh and the city center; however, perceptions of surveillance vary significantly. It has been established that older-generation women perceive the constant surveillance in the neighborhood as a mechanism that provides a sense of security and protection. However, they perceive surveillance as hostile and judgmental when the German “other” is on the
other side of the gaze. Şükran and Seda’s accounts illustrate how they perceive this surveillance coming from Germans:

When I go to the city center, I feel uncomfortable. I don’t spend time in the city center, but I have to pass through there to go to work. I don’t like it. The city center is not like Marxloh. There, I feel like I am different from others. I can feel people looking at me as if I don’t belong or I came there by accident. It makes me uncomfortable (Şükran, 53, works in the private sector).

[She only wears headscarf when coming to the mosque] Sometimes, when I go back home from the mosque, I would still have my headscarf on. When I come to my street [she lives in a predominantly German part of Marxloh] like that, I see my neighbors staring at me. Once they understand that it is me, the look relieved and tell me, “oh it’s just you; I thought you were somebody else.” This really annoys me; they don’t do that to German people that they don’t know when they come to our street. What this says is that it is the Muslim ones that need to be watched, not the Germans (Seda, 50, works in the private sector)

In a similar fashion to the older-generation women, younger-generation women also experience discriminatory gazes coming from Germans, although it is primarily from older Germans. However, whereas this causes older-generation women to avoid the German sphere and withdraw to where they feel comfortable, younger-generation women have learned to live with it and confront it as they encounter it in every field of their daily life, in their work, education, and socialization. This stands in contrast to their behavior in reference to the Turkish-Islamic gaze, which they actively and consciously avoid in the neighborhood. This contrast can be explained by the fact that in the neighborhood, the surveillance they experience directly impacts their social standing due to their sexualization. But due to the anonymity younger-generation, women experience in the German public, the idea that their social status will not be impacted brings a sense of security and assurance. For this reason, contrary to older-generation women’s conception of “the other” being dangerous, for younger-generation women, the anonymity this “other” brings makes it safer. For younger-generation women, it is, in fact, the familiarity and masculinity of Marxloh’s public space that makes it unsafe:

We actually like hanging out in the city center. The cafes are much nicer. We go to this small city, Moers, about 10 km away from here. As long as people mind
their own business, I don’t care who drinks/eats what or who socializes with who. But here [in Marxloh], it is everybody’s business. I don’t like hanging out with my friends here [Marxloh]; our neighbors would start talking immediately, especially it is a male friend! (Aslı, 21, student).

I love those nice cafes in Innenhafen [city center]. You can go to any of these restaurants and cafes, and nobody would know you there. It is safer to have private conversations with your friends there without worrying that somebody would hear you. Or if the weather is nice, you can go for a walk by the river without worrying about which part to avoid or where to look – basically being the subject of the gossip like you would in Marxloh. (Gizem, 30, housewife).

For younger-generation women, who have adapted to constantly blend both Turkish-Muslim and German discourses in the course of their acculturation to develop a hybrid identity, the “othering” of the German seems unnatural. Being socialized in Germany, younger-generation women consider German culture as a part of their identity, as much as they view Turkish culture and therefore do not view it as immoral. This makes them experience a level of safety in the German public that older-generation women do not experience and make them active users of the urban space of Duisburg.

5.2.3. Exceptions that Prove the Rule

Among the women I interviewed, there are some older- and younger-generation women whose spatial behavior falls outside of the patterns described above. In the case of Ceren (19, works in the private sector), Nazlı (33, housewife), and Afife (34, housewife) (Group 1), we see younger-generation women with spatial patterns that reflect those of older-generation women. Meanwhile, Hacer (44, housewife) and Feyza (44, housewife) (Group 2) fall within the group of older-generation women due to their ages and education levels however their spatial behaviors are more closely approximate those of younger-generation women. The reasons for this patterning are rather diverse and do not lend themselves to easy classification; however, the
particular circumstances of each serve as exceptions that reinforce the trends discussed previously.

Ceren is one of the youngest women I have interviewed. Despite her age, generation, and socialization pattern, Ceren is also one of my interviewees with the most conservative views resulting in spatial behavior similar to older-generation women’s. The reasons for this are undoubtedly complex, but one commonality she shares with older-generation women is an exceptionally low level of education compared to that of other younger-generation women and socialization that took place almost exclusively in the Turkish setting in Marxloh. Unlike my other younger-generation interviewees who either continued their education at the university level or completed higher-level high school education (along with their vocational training), Ceren completed the lowest ranking *Hauptschule* and did not complete her vocational training. She recounts that she wanted to have her vocational training in pre-school education; however, her teachers advised her to take a year off since they did not think Ceren’s proficiency in German was enough to continue her apprenticeship. Although she would like to make her German better and complete her training, she expresses that that she lacks the resources to do so:

> Since I graduated high school, I didn’t do much in these two years. I mean, I need some guidance and some help, but I don’t know where to go or whom to ask. I feel very abandoned. My teacher told me to improve my German, but I don’t know how. My family is not much help. I am 19; I am expected to work in the family business and contribute. So, I put the education aside and started to work after I finished high school [her work is in Marxloh and caters to primarily the Turkish community]. Now because I am the eldest, I both work and help my mother with the housework, which leaves almost no time for me. Since I started working, I also have had very very little contact with Germans. How am I supposed to improve my German then? (Ceren, 19, works in the private sector)

Despite being born and raised in Germany, Ceren’s upbringing took place in a relatively isolated environment. She and her family live very close to the mosque, in an apartment building occupied entirely by her relatives – which is not very uncommon in Marxloh. This environment resulted in a very strict and conservative upbringing where she was also expected to help with the
domestic duties normally expected of wives. Because of this, unlike her 3 younger brothers, her 
education was never prioritized. While her brothers attend the Realschule, a higher-ranking high 
school, and are only expected to complete their apprenticeship, Ceren became responsible both 
for the housework and family business while also helping her mom with the care of her younger 
brothers. Her lack of education and her isolation from the German sphere in her formative years 
causes her to develop prejudiced imaginations of Germans. When I asked her what her opinion 
was about Germans, her response was very similar to what I would get from older-generation 
women, echoing Islamic lectures in the mosque:

I don’t have any German friends. I have two-three German girls that I keep in 
contact with that are Muslim converts. Even when I was in school, I always had 
Turkish friends. I don’t think it is intentional; they [Germans] are just so different 
than us. Their culture and religion are different; for example, they celebrate 
Christmas, but you don’t want to be influenced by them; I don’t want to lose my 
way or be influenced by them. As the Qur’an and the Prophet said: Whoever tries 
to imitate a tribe is one of them. 

While Ceren’s distant attitude towards Germans can be explained by her low education 
and accompanying lack of acculturation in the German public, in Nazlı and Afife’s case, 
however, what makes their spatial behavior similar to older-generation women’s is their 
premature teyzefication. Both younger-generation women have very similar backgrounds and 
upbringings. They are both second-generation immigrants and have both attended Realschule. 
They speak perfect German and expressed that they both had formed close friendships with 
Germans during their schooling. They decided not to continue with their apprenticeships and 
started working in Marxloh, in clothing stores, where they met their husbands. Both women got 
mARRIED VERY EARLY WHEN THEY WERE 18 YEARS OLD, DESPITE THEIR FAMILIES’ OBJECTIONS. AFTER THEY GOT

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21 Ceren refers to the Qur’an verse, “O you have believed, do not take the Jews or Christians as allies. They are allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you, then indeed he is one of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people” (Qur’an 5:51, Saheeh International) and hadiths, “He who copies any people is one of them” (Sunan Abu Dawood, 4/4031), “Whoever loves a tribe, Allah will raise him among them” (Heysemi, X/281) and “He is not one of us who resembles other than us, no who resembles the Jews nor the Christians” (Tirmizi, 7/2695).
married, they decided not to work and immediately had kids becoming stay-at-home mothers. Having kids at a very early age, their new roles as wives and mothers distanced them from other younger-generation women and placed them into a new social circle, very different from their Turkish and German friends’ who continued with their education. This pattern is an aberration because early marriage and childbearing are generally uncommon among the later generation Turkish-Muslim women in Germany, placing these two women as outliers. Having lost their only contact with the German public – through their education or the opportunity to work, these women’s social networks consisted almost exclusively of other (and much older) teyzes within the Marxloh area.

The relationship of Ceren, Nazlı, and Afife with the German public also impacts their spatial behavior. Due to their lack of education and early marriages, these women end up distancing themselves from the broader public. While Ceren prefers to stay within Marxloh due to her insecurity of her poor urban know-how skills stemming from her lack of education, Afife and Nazlı’s premature teyzeification confines them into the neighborhood space through their domestic roles, making their neighborhood use similar to that of older-generation women (Figure 5-16). In terms of their use of the city and its surroundings, rather than resembling younger-generation women’s use, their spatial pattern resembles that of older-generation women as well, with their narrow space of activity (Figure 5-17). On the other hand, compared to the older-generation women’s use of the city and its surroundings which is limited exclusively to Marxloh, we see a slightly larger activity space that extends to the south of the neighborhood, towards Hamborn district (Figure 5-18), which constitutes an alternative moral Turkish-Muslim space. However, Hamborn is located about 2 miles away from Marxloh, and while Ceren, Nazlı, and Afife either have access to public transportation and/or own vehicles, therefore easily go to Hamborn, this neighborhood remains inaccessible for older-generation women who do not have the urban know-how to travel there.
Figure 5-16 Ceren’s (left), Afife’s (middle) and Nazli’s (right) neighborhoods (source: Author)
Figure 5-17 Ceren, Afife and Nazlı’s use of the city (red) vs. younger-generation women’s use (blue) (source: Author)

Figure 5-18 Ceren, Afife and Nazlı’s use of the city (red) vs. older-generation women’s use (blue) (source: Author)
Meanwhile, the second group of exceptions, Feyza (44, housewife) and Hacer (45, housewife), who falls in the same category with the older-generation women in terms of their education and generation, show social and spatial patterns that are closer to that of younger-generation women. In their cases, while their limited neighborhood use can be explained by the excessive social control that comes from their families, their familiarity with the German culture allows them to have larger activity spaces within the context of Duisburg. Feyza was born to one of the first-generation guest-worker families and was raised in Marxloh. Due to her parents’ lack of knowledge of the German education system, despite being a very successful student, she studied in Hauptschule, which limited her future options from a young age. On the other hand, Hacer was born and raised in a nearby city, which is predominantly German. Hacer was a very successful student attending Gymnasium (highest ranking high school). Within the year after her father passed away when she was 16, her family arranged for her to marry her now-husband, who lives in Marxloh. Without proper discipline coming from a strong male figure in her home and being at the “marriageable age,” her extended family feared that her mother would not be enough to preserve her namus and felt the need to pass the responsibility to the future husband. Feyza and Hacer explain their upbringings in their own words as:

I was a good student, but I went to Hauptschule. I could have gone to Gesamtschule or even to Gymnasium, but my parents did not want it because they were not that close to where we lived, and they didn’t want me to go far from the neighborhood. In Marxloh, there was only Hauptschule, so that is where I went. Even if I wanted, my parents wouldn’t have let me go. My parents wanted to keep me where they could see me [literal translation]. (Feyza, 44, housewife)

I really wanted to keep studying. I was very successful, at the top of my class. I would have loved to go to the university, but I got engaged at 16 after my father died. I felt very weird afterward. I was embarrassed at school that my teachers would find out about it. I lost all my motivation. Eventually couldn’t get my Abitur [the degree one receives graduating from Gymnasium to continue education at a university] and left after 10th grade. I got married at 17. I continued my apprenticeship a couple of months after I got married, but my husband’s family eventually wanted me to stop working. At least when I was doing my apprenticeship, I was getting paid a little, but when I left, I suddenly got dependent on my husband. It was very weird to be dependent on a stranger all of
a sudden. It is all right now, but it was a very weird situation… I am not unhappy, but I miss my that freedom I had when I was younger. (Hacer, 45, housewife)

In both of these accounts, despite their desire to continue with their education, the control either coming from one’s own or husband’s family prevented both Hacer and Feyza from having access to further educational opportunities, which as a result prevented them from acquiring any necessary social and economic mobility. The familial control still continues today. Living in a family apartment with her brothers’ families, Feyza is still expected to behave in a certain way, this time not because of her parents’ but her brothers’ expectations. When her behavior is deemed inappropriate, the Turkish-Islamic gaze that comes from her extended family disciplines her. In Hacer’s case, the control that comes from her husband’s family still continues. Hacer and Feyza both express that they feel trapped in Marxloh, both socially and spatially:

There is nothing to do here. My days are the same. Every day, it’s either housework, kids, the mosque or the neighbors. I am tired of this place, the same people, the same things... People watch other people and gossip about other people; it gets old… (Feyza, 44, housewife)

When I got married and came to Marxloh, it was like a culture shock for me. I think I never realized how German I had become. When I came here, I was so shocked to see how much gossip was going on. I couldn’t go to my sister-in-law’s house [she lives very close] without people talking about it. Whatever I did, wherever I went, was reported to my husband and his family. I asked myself when I first came here, “How did I end up here?” I withdrew from the community at first; I felt like I was being watched all the time. I feel like I always have to be careful about how I behave here; I wouldn’t want to be misunderstood or become the subject of gossip (Hacer, 45, housewife)

Due to this excessive control and surveillance, they feel – similar to younger-generation women’s experiences, even in the neighborhood, which is considered as a moral space of socialization by the majority of my interviewees, their mobility is very limited (Figure 5-19). Unlike other older-generation women, the areas that they use are very limited, and most of their neighborhood outings take place accompanied (represented by blue in the figure). Despite having more limited mobility in the neighborhood due to familial pressure, both Hacer and Feyza’s
spatial mobility within the city is larger than that of older women’s, and even from the first group of exceptions discussed above (Figure 5-20). In addition to Hamborn, Hacer and Feyza extend their use to the Meiderich district, which still has a sizable Turkish population but is predominantly German. Especially Hacer, who expresses how much she misses being among Germans, as she feels more German than Turkish, prefers to socialize in this area, while avoiding the constant Turkish-Islamic gaze she feels in Marxloh. Being under constant surveillance from their families, Hacer and Feyza developed strategies to cope with this control by having and fabricating purposeful outings to occupy public spaces without being questioned, which is discussed further in Chapter 6.

How do these exceptions prove the rule? In order to understand this, first, the rules that are mentioned throughout this section must be laid out. For older-generation women, while we see a much larger spatial neighborhood use, the use of the space outside the neighborhood is very limited. The factors behind these patterns were identified as 1) their teyze statuses that prevent them from becoming the object of the gaze while also allowing them to justify their existence in the neighborhood due to their household and childcare duties and 2) their limited acculturation within the German public that stems from their lack of education. For younger-generation women, while we see a very restricted use of the neighborhood, we see a much larger urban mobility. The factors behind their specific mobility patterns are identified as 1) their disadvantaged social position that leads to their sexualization and subjects them to constant surveillance in the neighborhood space and 2) their acculturation patterns that provides them with urban know-how in how to operate in the German public. Following these rules, when we have a look at the first group of exceptions, we see that 1) lack of education in Ceren’s case and 2) early teyzefication that frees Nazlı and Afife from sexualized agents caused an older-generation women-like spatial patterning. In the second group of exceptions, 1) the relatively disadvantaged position Hacer and Feyza find themselves due to the familial pressure and 2) their different
Figure 5-19 Hacer’s (left) and Feyza’s (right) neighborhoods (source: Author)
acculturation patterns that resemble that of younger-generation women’s cause them to have restricted use of the neighborhood while having a larger-activity space in the urban context.

Figure 5-20 Hacer and Feyza’s use of the city (red) vs. older-generation women’s use (blue) (source: Author)

5.3. Discussion: Generational Patterns of Belonging

In the course of this chapter, I have worked to lay the foundation that the generational affiliation of most members of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque has a distinct impact on their sense of belonging relative to the surrounding German public and their status as members of the Turkish cultural collective. This sense of belonging results in distinct generational patterns of spatial use based on the coding of German public space as foreign and immoral and Turkish cultural space of Marxloh as familiar and moral. On the other hand, regardless of which generation group women belong to, the use of Marxloh, the Turkish space, and German public
space are always counter-indicated; where we see higher neighborhood mobility, we also see a smaller spatial footprint in the urban context and vice versa. In other words, the women I have interviewed always separate the Turkish space of Marxloh from the German public in their conceptions and use. This mental separation automatically leads to the formation of boundaries, however, not all boundaries are formed uniformly. Throughout this chapter, I showed the evidence that younger-generation women’s imaginations of Turkey and Germany, along with their mobility patterns in the neighborhood and urban contexts, indicate that they form fluid boundaries that allow for an expression of multiplicity and hybridity in their identity formation. On the other hand, older-generation women form more rigid boundaries that privilege an “imagined” Turkish subject, as can be seen from their accounts and spatial footprints (Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos, 2013).

The construction of boundaries is a process that is both performative and continuously performed and established norms of inclusion and/or exclusion that separates those who belong from those who do not (Yuval-Davis, 2003). These norms of inclusion and exclusion are based on cultural and ethnic discourses to protect the idealized ethnic identities and discursively reproduce “spaces of belonging and dis-belonging” (Fenster, 2005a, p. 246), separating “us” from “them.” Such definitions of “us” and the “others” that reflect where one’s belonging lies are performatively constructed through social acts of belonging and the spatial acts of territorialization. In the context of this dissertation, we encounter two dominant discourses and related acts of territorialization that Turkish-Muslim women among the congregants of Marxloh Merkez Mosque adopt: the first-generation Turkish-Islamic discourse that reproduces more rigid classes of “us” and “them” and the second- and third-generation discourse that forms more fluid boundaries and allows for the reproduction of hybrid identities that blurs such distinction.

The first part of this chapter, where I present women’s imaginations of here and there, discusses that, social acts of belonging differ significantly for older- and younger-generation
women. In order to do so, I have examined their conceptions of their home and host cultures. In older-generation women’s imaginations there exists very strict patterns of “othering”. This othering is achieved not only through a prejudiced view towards the Germans but also through privileging an imagined “Turkish-Muslim” subject, which is achieved through an idealized Turkish-Islamic gender regime. Through their interviews, we can see older-generation women’s internalization of Turkish-Muslim culture that define women with respect to notions such as *namus, fitrat, fitna, mahram/namahram* and their stereotypical views of the German women who is conceived to be shameless, immoral and promiscuous. The stark contrast between their internalized discourse and the prejudiced conceptions of the Germans causes them to separate themselves from the other. Within the diaspora context where separations are blurred, older-generation women become more aware of such boundaries. Their accounts of how they would not want to become like “one of them” also illustrate the reproduction of rigid boundaries that an ideal Turkish-Muslim women should not transgress. While this in part caused by their prejudices that are caused by their lack of socialization in Germany that, it is also caused by the Turkish-Islamic discourse reproduced and communicated in the mosque. This eventually creates a circular loop where older-generation women distance themselves from the German public based on their prejudices which are further consolidated in the mosque and their stereotypical prejudices become more ingrained with the lack of contact.

Younger-generation women, on the other hand, have much different conceptions of Turkey and Germany. Despite being born to parents who define themselves as strictly Turkish, these later-generation women consider themselves as either Germans with Turkish ethnicity or Turkish-German, not positioning these two cultures in opposition to each other. In their accounts, we still see them making the Turkish and German distinction when talking about their daily lives, which indicates a boundary between two cultures but in their case this boundary so fluid that it becomes trivial for them. While they still hold some opinions that stem from their Turkish-
Muslim upbringing and adhere to the norms this discourse brings, the German part of their identities acquired through their acculturation in Germany prevents them from being biased towards what their parents consider the “other”. In fact, as they mention repeatedly in their accounts, they do not feel the need to be one or the other, or Turkish or German in their cases. This allows them to go beyond the antithetical Turkish-German dichotomy, performatively form hybrid Turkish-German identities (and related discourses) move seamlessly within different parts of their identities.

The second part of this chapter explored the other component of discursive construction of belonging, the spatial acts of territorialization. In this second section, I have analyzed the spatial mobility of the Turkish-Muslim women and discussed that older- and younger-generation women form very different patterns through their spatial acts. Following their conceptions of Turkey and Germany, first, I pointed out that due to lower levels of education and poorer acculturation with surrounding German culture, many older-generation women perceive the space outside Marxloh to be ultimately foreign, threatening and immoral resulting in a stricter pattern of territorialization in the neighborhood and a constrained pattern of spatial behavior outside Marxloh. Meanwhile younger-generation women, who received a more extensive education and have been more thoroughly acculturated into German society have developed hybrid identities that cause them to feel not completely at home in the neighborhood of Marxloh, causing them to gravitate towards German spaces for socialization despite encountering periodic discrimination from older Germans. While these characterizations are broadly applicable, there is a small group of women who fall outside these patterns, where their particularities emphasize the underlying causes of the observed phenomena.

Fenster, in her article where she discusses Lefebvre’s right to the city in terms of gender, summarizes that “women’s spatial mobility is very much dictated, if not controlled” (2005, p. 226). In line with her argument, in my analysis, I discussed that younger-generation women’s
existence and mobility within the neighborhood space is controlled to the extent that their spatial footprint is dictated by the spaces that they ignore, more so than spaces that they use. The disadvantaged position that they occupy in the social order compared to that of men and older-generation women through their sexualization, causes younger-generation to be under constant surveillance in the neighborhood. Many of these younger-generation women do not fully accept and internalize the sexualizing Turkish-Islamic community norms causing them to be more acutely aware of the policing they undergo in the neighborhood due to their potential to cause fitna and their responsibility to uphold both their own and their families’ namus. Because of their hybrid identities, they consider this discipline and surveillance in the neighborhood an obtrusive part of their daily experience, resulting in their very circumscribed use of the space within Marxloh and their reliance on German public space for socialization purposes. Having formed a hybrid Turkish-German identity through their acculturation, younger-generation women do not view German public as foreign or feel foreign to German public and feel comfortable in broader public space resulting in their larger spatial footprint outside of Marxloh.

Older-generation women’s spatial behavior is largely structured by their teyze status in the neighborhood. As they have been married and had children, they are no longer seen as sexualized beings that are sources of fitna but do have a range of domestic obligations that result in a wider spatial footprint when compared to that of younger-generation women (Figure 5-21). On the other hand, while they seem to be using the neighborhood much more extensively, upon detailed analysis, their existence in Marxloh is conditional; their use of the neighborhood is only acceptable when done within the context of productive daily activity, such as household chores or child-care activities, similar to their experiences of socialization in the mosque. Older-generation women’s complicity in following the Turkish-Islamic norms along with prejudicial views towards the German public causes them to retract to the “moral” space of Marxloh which they consider antithetical to the space of the “other”. Their strong adherence to the first-generation Turkish-
Figure 5-21 Younger-generation women’s neighborhood limits are defined by the areas that they avoid (left) while older-generation women have a much larger spatial footprint in the neighborhood space (right) (source: Author)
Islamic norms to the point that they surveil and police each other’s behavior legitimizes this spatial containment and reproduces the separatory discipline mechanisms.

The group of women that did not fit into these generational patterns of mobility described above, act as noteworthy examples that emphasize the importance of points mentioned throughout the chapter, education, acculturation trends and internalized gendered discourses, on shaping spatial behavior and perceptions of German society. The first group of women, despite falling into younger-generation women’s group due to their age, shows belonging and mobility patterns that are similar to that of older-generation women. One of such cases is explained through my participant’s early acculturation that took place in a primarily Turkish environment due to her familiar situation which left her with insufficient economic and social mobility to participate in German public. For the remaining two cases in this group, their unusual spatial mobility patterns were caused by their early teyzefication. Despite developing hybrid-identities through their socialization, when these two younger-generation women got married and had kids much earlier compared to people in their age group, their household and child-care duties confined them into the space of neighborhood. However, because they both possessed significant cultural know-how and confidence their area of activity is still slightly larger than those of other older women. In the case of the two women, who would normally be considered among the older-generation women, but their spatial patterns are similar to that of younger-generation women, we see that their limited neighborhood use is related to the surveillance coming from their families. These two women’s educational histories have provided them with affinity with German culture and a certain degree of resentment towards enforced Turkish-Islamic norms that led to a limitation of their social and economic opportunities. In both cases, these women were prohibited from either attending more advanced schools or from completing their schooling altogether. As a result, their spatial patterns are similar to those of younger women as they use space outside of Marxloh to escape familial pressure.
In the light of these discussions, Figure 5-22 summarizes the generational patterns in terms of mosque-going women’s belonging and spatial mobility. Taken as a whole, the varying degrees of spatial mobility of older-generation women, younger-generation women and the exceptional cases presents as a series of nested regions of activity (Figure 5-23) which indicates varying degrees of belonging and integration.

This chapter, in a way, presents the problematic nature of the dominant integration discourses, or rather the rising trend of equating integration with assimilation. In Chapter 4, when I discussed my findings about the generational conflicts and their spatial implications within the microcosm of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque, the definition of integration was rather simple; it is increased contact between the Turkish-Muslim people and the German population, creating a hybrid space where they to achieve such contact and their ability to live together with one another without any conflict. However, when we move beyond this limited sphere, we see how this
Figure 5-23 Spatial mobility of women in urban context; Red: Older-generation women, Pink: Exceptions Group 1 (Nazlı, Afife, Ceren), Purple: Exceptions Group 2 (Hacer, Feyza), Blue: Younger-generation women (source: Author)
concept becomes problematic. Schinkel discusses that “the very discourse of integration is based on a common-sense differentiation between society and outside society” that is discursively performed (2013, p. 1157). In other words, integration, by definition, creates a dichotomous society composed of idealized subjects that belong and those who should try (harder) to belong. The ideal subjects (or the natives) are free from any pressure comes from the need to integrate and are never defined in terms of their integration. Non-natives, on the other hand, are always described referring to their integration; they can be well integrated, or even be very well integrated, but they can never become the rightfully belonging native; they are always on the other side of this discursive divide that is actively performed both by the society and the policy makers. This divide positions the native discourse as superior and diametrically opposed to immigrant discourse, preventing any possibility of their reconciliation. The responsibility of integration falls solely on the immigrant, who is expected to substitute all the values and cultural affinities his/her culture brings that are deemed unacceptable by the host society.

Germany’s integration discourse positions the Turkish-Muslim population living in Marxloh in a similar manner within the society. The definitions of integration by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge – BAMF) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Bundesministerium des Innern – BMI) are as follows:

Integration process aims to include everyone in one society who lives in Germany on a permanent and legal basis […] immigrants should have the opportunity to participate fully in all areas of society on an equal footing. Their responsibility is to learn German and to respect and abide by the Constitution and its laws (BAMF, 2010 in Brandt & Fincke, 2012)

The aim is to integrate all people permanently and lawfully living in our country into society and to grant them the related rights and duties. Integration means living together as one society, not in separate worlds. Our society should be characterized by respect, mutual trust, shared responsibility and a sense of community. […] To do so, people who come to Germany intending to stay must learn the German language and acquire basic knowledge of our history and our legal system, in particular the significance of Germany’s free and democratic order, the party system, the federal structure, the welfare system, equal rights, tolerance and religious freedom […] Immigrants should be able to become
integrated and take advantage of the opportunities offered to all citizens and new arrivals in Germany (Integration - In Gemeinschaft Zusammen Leben, n.d.).

While these narratives build “one” German society as a static object over individuals whose existence in that society requires a certain degree of integration, this discourse is underwritten by the essentialist idea that there exists the ideal German national group and the immigrant others and the immigrant others should always strive to belong or try to be able to become integrated. In addition to this, who these immigrant groups are is never really defined. While citizens of European countries like Italy, Greece and Poland have been among the top immigrants to Germany over the last 10 years (Table 5-1) as migration from Turkey has declined significantly, Turks are still seen as the immigrant other. The lack of visible markers that distinguish the former nationalities from the idealized subject frees them from the responsibility to integrate. The younger-generation women that I have interviewed, by all means and definitions presented above, have become fully functioning members of the German society, but their status in society remains as immigrants based on their visible differences. In other words, the second- and third-generation immigrants that are born and raised in Germany still face demands for integration and refer to everyday discrimination (Göttsche, 2017; Pollack et al., 2016). This constant othering and the unrealizable idea of integration creates a feedback loop that defines and construct boundaries within the society. For this reason, throughout this chapter, I refrained from using the term integration but rather referred to my participants’ ideas about “living together”: their conceptions of the other, their mobility, acculturation and belonging.

As a final comment, it is worth mentioning the similar role of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque and the discourse it reproduces on separation and forming boundaries. While, as discussed above, the integration discourse reproduces Turkish-Muslims as the “other”, the Turkish-Muslim discourse that organizes everyday performances of my participants operates similarly to define Germans as the “others”. In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated two later-generation women’s, Kaykın
and Özmal’s efforts to prevent such an occurrence and foster engagement between these seemingly opposite groups. However, with the re-adoptions of the Turkish-Muslim discourse, Marxloh Mosque, despite being intended as a symbol of unity and integration, regressed back to their conservative ways and has come to form the core of what these individuals view as moral Turkish space. The conservative norms of Turkish-Islamic femininity became very instrumental in the process of defining boundaries for Turkish-Muslim women. Throughout Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we have seen that older-generation women took these norms to heart and have problems even with engaging with their host societies. The younger-generation women on the other hand resist such constructions by reproducing a hybrid Turkish-German identities that embraces both of the cultures they feel belonging to and discourse that define norms not based on differences but their reconciliation. This patterns boundary-making and crossing become clearer in their acts of agency which I explore in Chapter 6.

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Table 5.1 Top nationalities that migrated to Germany between 2011-2019 (source: Federal Statistics Bureau (Statistisches Bundesamt))
Chapter 6

Reclaiming Agency

The previous two chapters examined the tension between the conservative Turkish-Muslim rhetoric and the more-hybrid later-generation Turkish-German discourse and how these two sets of imaginaries lead to significant differences in older- and younger-generation women’s use of space in the mosque, neighborhood, and the urban contexts. The regulating norms that women base their performances on are subject to change as they are enacted repeatedly. As discussed in Chapter 2, all normative behavior can be (and will be) resignified and changed through their different enactments (Butler, 1993). In the following chapter, I analyze these moments of disruption and explore how the gender norms associated with each discourse is taken advantage of and subverted by the mosque-going women through their performances of the agency. Following the trends mentioned in the previous chapters, we see that the generational patterns that determine women’s social and spatial behavior also determine their acts of agency. In my participants’ performances of agency, we see similar tactics employed at varying scales of analysis. This chapter presents how women adapt and use the same tactics they use in the mosque to reclaim their agency in the neighborhood and urban contexts.

This chapter (section 6.1) explores older-generation women’s agency and shows that their performances within this context do not resist the Turkish-Muslim discourse that leads to their subordinate status but rather reproduces it. I discuss that Butler’s notion of agency, emphasizing overt and public performances of resistance, does not apply to them. In discussing their agency, I follow Saba Mahmood’s reframing of the concept and identify moments of agency that remain covert but work to improve older-generation women’s status within the society while reproducing the same norms that lead to their subordinate status. Following this, older-generation women
reclaim their agency by working within the Turkish-Islamic norms through more passive and docile acts such as the domestication of the public space and retreat to the familiar in the face of exclusion they encounter. As a result, through their acts of agency, they contribute to the construction and strengthening of boundaries that separate men/women in the mosque and the neighborhood and Turkish/Germans in the urban context, ultimately reproducing their non-belonging.

The second part of this chapter, section 6.2, investigates younger-generation women’s obvious and public transgressive performances that are more in line with Butler’s notion of agency. Their performances of agency in this respect includes differentiating between true Islam and Turkish-Islam, transgression into spaces where their appearances are restricted through both Turkish-Muslim and German discourse, and redefining a new generation of Muslim women who are emancipated and compatible with the German ideas while not necessarily sacrifice from their Islamic piety. Paradoxically, younger-generation women’s redefinition of the Turkish-Muslim subject can only be achieved by subverting the same norms borne out of these two discourses that constrict their freedom in the German public. This allows them to redefine a Turkish-German culture compatible with their sense of identity while blurring and dissolving the boundaries older-generation women reproduce.

6.1. Keeping the Boundaries: Older-Generation Women’s Modes of Agency

Butler acknowledges that agency cannot always be conceptualized as “always and only opposed to power” (1997, p. 17); however, when we look at their theorization of agency, we see that they always drive her examples from acts of resistance to social norms and the subordinating dominant power. Mahmood summarizes that in Butler’s conceptualization, the agency is thought of only in terms of its ability to subvert norms of the dominant discourse. She further discusses
that subversion of norms is not an ingrained aspiration that motivates people at all times. She asserts that without knowing the specific cultural and historical conditions, capacities, desires, and needs of a group, the covert and sometimes contingent moments of the agency remain invisible to the eye. Viewed in this way, according to Mahmood, what seems like cases of passivity and subordination to the progressive eye may be very well acts of agency (2001). This section looks at such covert and contingent moments where older-generation women reclaim their agency. I discuss that the very techniques these women use to assert their agency either in the male- or German-dominated spaces are also those that lead to their subordination within the society through the reproduction of the separation and boundaries.

Following this, I discuss throughout this section that older-generation women are one of the major actors that participate in the reproduction of the Turkish-Muslim identity through their relatively superior positions in society compared to younger-generation women. Accordingly, their modes of the agency are characterized by their manipulation of socially acceptable patterns of behavior and expectations while carving out social space for themselves within limits reproduced by the same expectations. In the mosque and neighborhood space, older-generation women’s mode of the agency is expressed by their domestication of space which is done through the redefinition of public space by extending the domestic activity to such places. This allows women to exercise their agency while staying within the Islamic norms of femininity. The second mode of agency older-generation women exercise is their retreat to the familiar space of the neighborhood and the mosque. In order to cope with the everyday exclusion that they face, older-generation women distance themselves from German society. This is done through a self-othering process that reproduces a hyper Turkish-Muslim identity that causes them to retreat to the “moral” space of the neighborhood, with Marxloh Merkez Mosque being the social core. While this mode of agency further separates older-generation women from German society and leads to patterns of self-exclusion. Both of these acts of agency reclaimed by older-generation women led
to the construction and keeping of boundaries. The domestication of space reproduces the women-men separation inherent to the Turkish-Islamic culture and consolidates the social and spatial boundaries constructed to keep women and men separate. Similarly, the retreat to familiar aims to create a collective identity that separates women from the German culture, not integrates them.

6.1.1. Domesticating the Space

By extending domestic activity beyond the walls of a home, older-generation women are able to define public space as part of their realm of action, which allows them to carve out space for themselves within the political and public space that undoubtedly defined as men’s space by the Turkish-Islamic discourse while reproducing it simultaneously. This means that by extending the limits of the domestic space, they create space for women’s agency both in the mosque as well as in the broader public. They accomplish this in two different ways. The first act of agency is related to their purposeful use of space. Through their purposeful use of public space that allows them to redefine space in terms of public/private or mahram/namahram while simultaneously blur and reproduce such separation. Specifically, purposeful use of space refers to women occupying areas outside of the private home in service of broadly defined domestic activities and practices associated with Islamic piety. By placing many of their outings within the context of these activities, women are able to justify their existence in the “male” public space and their socialization in these spaces. The second approach older-generation women use is the extension of the domestic space. The many things women do in their daily lives that are confined into the domestic space of the home, such as eating, talking intimately, expressing emotions, entertaining oneself, childcare, are taken outside of the private space of the home and done outside in public spaces such as schoolyards, playgrounds, the mosque. While taking such acts to
the public space is not necessarily specific to women, what turns such activities into acts of the agency is how older-generation women temporarily transform the public space into a private space – as per Turkish-Islamic prescription – through their women-only occupation at certain times of the day. This allows older-generation women to blur the public/private or mahram/namahram separation by temporarily redefining public as private while also reproducing the Turkish-Islamic norms that define separate spaces for men and women through their exclusion of men from the temporarily defined space. In fact, this separation is justified and reproduced to the point that women’s existence within the public space becomes invisible.

Figure 6-1 Older-generation women cooking/baking for the mosque fair (source: Author)
As seen in the previous chapters, older-generation women’s use of the mosque and the neighborhood space is characterized by their purposeful use. This means that their use of the space outside the home, especially when they use it for their socialization, is only acceptable when done in the context of productive daily activity. In the mosque, I discuss that this takes place in the form of how older-generation women use the kitchen space and classrooms for many different purposes, while in the neighborhood, this takes place during women’s outings to conduct domestic-related work such as childcare or household chores. The time older-generation women spend outside the domestic space of the home, done in the context of these productive daily activities, allows them to claim their agency and justify their public appearance, not only to themselves and to their families/husbands (Figure 6-1). Two examples by Nur and Afife illustrate such justifications:

I spend the majority of my free time in the mosque. I mean, I don’t want to call it “spending time” or even “free time.” I do it on purpose, and I don’t consider the time I spend in the mosque as wasted or “free.” When I was younger, before I started coming to the mosque, then I wasted my days. Just spending my time with my friends, not doing much, chatting, gossiping… I mean, I wasn’t doing anything useful or good. I was just existing. It was my jahiliyyah period. When I started coming to the mosque, I realized that I was not living right. So, I stopped “wasting” my time. Now, I feel like I don’t have any time to spare. I am either at home doing housework or here doing Allah’s work. I look back to that period of my life; it was my cahiliye period. (Nur, 48, housewife)

My husband and my mother have a very good relationship. Sometimes they even gang up on me. My husband doesn’t like it when I go out. My mother lives across the hall from us and snitches for my husband if I go out. When my husband is not at home, I am under my mother’s watchful eyes. Wherever I go, whatever I do is questioned. But both my husband and my mother don’t say anything when I come to the mosque. They think that it is okay. (Afife, 34, housewife).

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22 *Jahiliya* (Arabic) or *cahiliye* (Turkish) means the age of ignorance. It is used to refer to the period in Arabian Peninsula before the advent of Islam in 610 AC. The word *jahiliyyah* is derived from the word *jahala* in Arabic, which means to be ignorant or act stupidly (Amros & Pochazka, 2004). In contemporary times, various Islam thinkers use the word to refer to practices that are un-Islamic (Doumato, 2009). In its current use, it is also used to refer to the secular modernity and define it as the “new *Jahiliyyah*” (“Jahiliyyah”, n.d.).
Nur’s interview shows that she considers the time spent idly socializing as wasted time, to the point that she compares it to the *jahilliya* period. During my fieldwork, as Nur had quite an active role in the mosque, I frequently observed that she took part in many activities, from assisting Ayşe Hoca in teaching to volunteering often in the cooking/baking activities. However, I have also observed that while she took part in those activities, they only took about half of her time while she spent the other half socializing. For example, she volunteers to teach younger girls (10-15 years old) Islamic morals and ethics on the weekends. The classes usually take around two hours, but she prefers to come in earlier and leave much later – usually in the pretense of waiting for her husband to pick her up – to be able to chat with other women who volunteer in teaching in the mosque. She eventually idly socializes with other women during this time, but since she does it in the context of productive work, she redefines the time as not “wasted.”

Unlike Nur, who is not pressured by her family or husband and only needs to justify her outings to herself, especially upon becoming more religious, Afife’s (34, housewife) situation is much different. I have discussed in Chapter 5 that Afife, who is a younger-generation woman, is forced into the older-generation women category due to her very early *teyzefication*. Her family is conservative but has never been strict with her until she got married. Her socialization and mobility are very limited due to her husband’s strict conservative beliefs, which her parents support and contribute to. This puts her under a great deal of familial pressure. She is extremely friendly and social, but her mobility is severely threatened by constant surveillance. As a result, she primarily uses the mosque for her socialization as it provides a space where she can reclaim her agency without being policed. She takes this a step further, and she actually takes advantage of her freedom of going to the mosque and uses this time to socialize in the neighborhood under the pretense of going to the mosque. During my fieldwork, I have become very friendly with Afife and had the opportunity to observe her daily routine. Her husband, who is a shift worker, would not allow her to come to the mosque on the days he was at home. On the days he was
working, Afife would come to the Qur’an course that takes place in the mosque, mostly much later than 8.30 am when the class starts, stay for an hour, and leave much earlier than when the class finishes at noon. She would take her daughter to school, which begins at 8.00 am, before the Qur’an class starts, but still comes in late as she prefers to socialize with other mothers in front of the school. She would leave the class early; most of the time, she would talk other women that come to the Qur’an class into leaving early too and prefers to spend time in the neighborhood, while her family and husband think that she is in the mosque. While she does not have any problem “wasting” her time just idly socializing, she has to justify her public appearance in the neighborhood to her mother and her husband by manufacturing a purpose. While I interpret Afife’s deviant behavior as an act of resistance, by refusing to challenge her husband’s or her family’s authority directly and continuing to couch her behavior within Turkish-Islamic norms, she is also reproducing the systems of power that disenfranchises her.

The purposeful use of the mosque and the neighborhood space within the context of productive daily activity, which for older-generation women means either household chores or religious duties, also has spatial implications. By bringing their children and occupying the space with a large number of women, the public space, which according to the Turkish-Muslim discourse belongs to men, transforms into mahram space that women can use, domesticating the space. This takes place only temporarily both at the mosque and the neighborhood and allows women to occupy the namahram space that they otherwise would not be able to occupy (Figure 6–2).

Following Afife’s story, many of my outings with her started with her talking me into leaving the class early to pick up her daughter from school. However, in most of our outings, we usually ended up picking her daughters up from school after we spent some time in Marxloh. During our time in the neighborhood, we would rarely go to a café and sit as she feared that one of her acquaintances would see her and tell her what she was doing in the neighborhood. For this
reason, the time we spent in the neighborhood took place either on the move, visiting different
discount stores, or pretending to be on the move, “hanging out” in the bus and tram stops. This
socialization pattern further explains why her neighborhood map was so extensive, unlike the
people in her age group. After our time in the neighborhood, we would usually arrive 15-20
minutes early at her daughter’s school. I have observed that Afife was not the only woman to
come much earlier to pick up their children; there would be quite a few women to come early and
utilize that time to socialize with other mothers. In a similar vein, one of my other interviewees,
Esma (41, housewife), had a different routine of waiting for her kids in a playground after the
Qur’an classes. Her children, who are 11 and 15, were not required to be picked off from the
school, so in Esma’s case, her use of the space in front of the school is not justified. I observed
that Esma manufactured a purpose for herself, “waiting for her kids in the playground,” which
many women do and use this time to socialize with her friends. In a way, she found a way to
socialize in the neighborhood space by extending her official childcare duties to the park.

In my observations, Afife and Esma were not the only women who would appropriate the
public spaces such as the playgrounds or schools for their socialization. Many women who spend
time in front of the schools or at playgrounds would arrive sooner than they needed to for
socialization. Such public areas would temporarily transform into private women-only spaces,
blurring the public/private or mahram/namahram differences. The public space of the playground
would become a private space for women’s socialization. In other words, women’s agency, in this
case, is manifested by extending their domestic duties to the public space through domestication
of the space. The mahram and domestic character of the home is extended to the namahram
public by the occupation of space only by women. This domestication of the public space
provides a space for women to socialize without overtly resisting the Turkish-Islamic norms.
Women still get to use the public space and socialize but also, they do it while carrying
Figure 6-2 Older-generation women coming together for breakfast at the conference room, which is spatially reproduced as men’s space (source: Author)

Figure 6-3 Older-generation women in Qur’an class with their kids (source: Author)
out the household-related roles defined to them by the Turkish-Islamic discourse, free of the fear of causing *fitna*.

The domestication of the space also takes place in the Marxloh Merkez Mosque through various practices. As mentioned in Chapter 4, older-generation women’s socialization in the mosque always occurs within the context of other (mostly productive) activities. Older-generation women’s domestication of the mosque space is best exemplified by their practices during *sohbet* and Qur’an classes. Women often come to the *sohbet* and Qur’an lectures much earlier and leave later than needed, bring their kids with them, and choose to schedule these activities during the deadest time for men’s presence in the mosque, between late morning and noon prayers (Figure 6-3). The mood during these lectures is very relaxed, both in terms of women’s interaction with Ayşe Hoca and their interactions with each other. These lectures usually take much longer than they are supposed to, as women do not pay much attention to the lectures and mostly use this time to socialize. Nur (48, housewife) explained that before the arrival of Ayşe Hoca, they did not have a female officer appointed to teach women therefore they used to be “taught by the male imam of the mosque, but it was very boring as he didn’t let the women chat among themselves.” Seda (50, works in the family business) also laughingly narrated that she was not able to learn anything from the male imam as “he avoided eye contact and his classes were just uncomfortable.” With the increasing demand from women on the basis that they cannot learn from a male imam, the administration and DITIB appointed a female imam, in addition to the two male imams in the mosque. Seda further compares the number of women that used to attend the lectures when male imam was teaching and asserts that “since Ayşe Hoca started to teach, the number of students doubled, even tripled.” Older-generation women’s request and preference for a female imam can be interpreted as an eagerness to follow Turkish-Islamic gender segregation norms; however, it was also an act where they reclaimed their agency with their refusal to have a
namehram element in these lectures. By eliminating the male element, they achieved to reproduce a private mahram field, temporarily domesticating the male space of the mosque.

Once the mosque space is domesticated, older-generation women feel more comfortable during these instances and even use lectures as moments where they can share their problems and seek support. The support women provide for each other does not remain as words or gestures; they collectively come up with solutions for specific problems. To mention a few: when Nazlı’s mother was diagnosed with cancer, Şengül stepped up to deal with their medical needs as her daughter is a doctor and a cancer-survivor; when Fatma was having difficulties accessing her social welfare money, Elif went with her to the government office as Elif’s German was much better; or when Nur’s close friend’s daughter needed babysitting as her mother was working, Rabia volunteered to take care of the daughter for a couple of days until the mother could come up with a solution.

While such covert and even contingent means of agency allow women to carve out space for themselves both in the neighborhood and the mosque space, their practices in these spaces end up reproducing the separation of men and women’s spaces based on Turkish-Islamic prescription. For example, Nur’s justification of spending free time in the mosque reproduces the notion that Turkish-Muslim women should not “waste their time” just by idly socializing, or Yeliz’s seemingly obedient act of using the mosque works to justify the pressure her husband is putting her through, especially in the eyes of her family. Correspondingly, the domestication of the mosque space strengthens the idea that the mosque is principally a namehram space for women and justifies the sex-based separation in the mosque, keeping the boundaries younger-generation women try to cross. In the same vein, it also consolidates the idea that pious Muslim women should not interact with men, even for educational purposes, and that she belongs to the domestic space of the home. For this reason, while older-generation women reinforce their subordinate status through their acts of agency, such acts take place so covertly and out of men’s view that
men often believe that older-generation women do not use the mosque space for socializing at all, as seen in my short encounter with Salim Hoca regarding my research:

When I explained to Salim Hoca my research, he said, “Why would you like to observe women for that long? You should just spend a week here and see what women do here. You don’t need to spend months here. I mean, they don’t use the mosque that often. They are not like men; they do not and should not spend much time here anyway. Our women are very busy; they have a lot to deal with, like their household duties, their kids, ....” How can they be so unaware of how much women use the mosque? Even more, than they do? (fieldnotes from my meeting with Salim Hoca on 12/18/2018)

6.1.2. Retreat to the Familiar

Moving beyond the mosque and the neighborhood, within the context of the German society that they live in, older-generation women’s primary mode of resistance against the everyday exclusion they encounter is constructing the Germans as the immoral “other” with whom associations should be kept minimum. As it has been signaled in the previous chapters, this othering is primarily realized through constructing the Turkish-Muslim women as the “normal” with respect to the gendered Turkish-Islamic discourse and defining the “others” as people who do not fit into these norms. This results in both active and passive modes of resistance; the active mode of resistance being represented by the “self-othering” process through the construction of a hyper Turkish-Islamic identity that is seen the opposite of the immoral German identity and the passive mode, including the retreat from the German public space with the use of Marxloh Merkez Mosque as the social core. These active and passive modes of resistance exist within a recursive relationship where they become both the reasons and outcomes of each other.

As the active mode of resistance, older-generation women actively resist becoming a part of the German public through a “self-othering” process. This self-othering includes positioning the “moral, just and conservative” Turkish-Islamic culture against the “immoral, unfair and liberal” German culture.
There is this issue of belonging to very different cultures. I really miss my home country… Germans are the opposite of us; everything is very different. They are prejudiced; we are accepting. I find Germans a little cold and uninviting. With the Turks, I feel more comfortable. They [Turks] offer you tea, and if you say you don’t want it, they bring it anyways. Germans are not like that… They offer you once; if you don’t want it, you don’t want it. Turks get offended by that, though, they expect the same level of hospitality. Also, the relationships with neighbors, Islam tells us that keeping a good and close relationship is very important. But you can’t really do that with Germans. (Saadet, 44, works in the family business)

My work colleagues are Christian. I am not allowed to wear my headscarf to work, but they can wear their crucifix necklaces. They talk behind my back about how I go to the mosque. Do I gossip about their religious practice? No! They are telling it as if I am doing something wrong. It has nothing to do with our [Turkish-Muslims] lack of integration; it is all the selfishness of these gavurs [non-Muslim]. The more you live among them, the more you witness selfishness. It is because they do not have faith in them. That is why they talk ill of Muslims because Muslims are moral due to their faith… If they had a fear of Allah in them, they would not speak so ill of us… (Şükran, 53, works in retail)

I’ll tell you the real reason why Germans don’t get along with Turks. It has nothing to do with integration. They still can’t get over the fact that a Muslim nation, the Ottomans conquered Istanbul and took Hagia Sophia. It used to be the capital of Christian Byzantine, but then it became a mosque. They, as Christians, are still holding it against us, the grandchildren of Ottomans… (Nazlı, 33, housewife)

Saadet’s account presents an ahistorical and romanticized view of the old country, including edited versions of home that pictures her life prior to arriving in Germany as an ideal one. Despite her conceptualization of Turkey as an ideal and harmonious place to live, Saadet also mentioned the difficulties she went through in Turkey as a woman wearing a headscarf. Due to the Turkish political atmosphere at the time, she was not allowed to go to high school or university wearing a headscarf. While she compromised from her beliefs to be able to attend high school, she recounted that she did not want to continue her higher education under such conditions. Despite the problems she encountered during her time in Turkey which eventually led to her departure, she developed an edited version of home that idealized Turkey as an accepting, hospitable, and friendly country and used that idealized imagination to separate herself from the “cold” and “unaccepting” Germans.
Şükran and Nazlı’s interviews present a more interesting picture. Both women are well acquainted with the German culture; Şükran arrived in Germany when she was 11 years old and attended German middle- and high school and Nazlı, who is among one of the younger-generation women with older-generation women’s spatial pattern due to her limited contact with Germans, was born and raised in Germany. Despite such familiarity with the German culture, their interviews present a strong self-othering stemming from the passionate defense of Islam. Both women’s interviews echo the rising anti-European discourse of Erdoğan and reduce the problems Turkish-Germans encounter in the German public to mere moral competition and envy of Islam. These accounts present very prejudiced views of “immoral and non-Muslim” Germans that reproduces the separation between two groups and form very strong group boundaries. In the case of my research, the older-generation women’s group boundary formed only to include Turkish-Muslims and used to exclude women who do not follow the norms of Islamic femininity, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, as they betrayed the group identity by becoming “westernized” or “Germanized.” Nur’s interview below shows an interesting aspect; how women separate themselves from the “other” once they adopt the Turkish-Islamic discourse. Previously being an outsider to the Turkish-Muslim group as she was too “westernized,” once she became an

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23 Erdoğan’s anti-Western and anti-European discourse started to appear with the large-scale Gezi protests of 2013 in Turkey. While started as a demonstration against the transformation of Gezi Park in Istanbul’s center, Taksim, Turkish government’s use of excessive force and police brutality led to the spread of protests to the other parts of the country. During these protests, Erdoğan and his advisor at the time, Yığit Bulut, started to accuse news channels such as BBC and CNN, as well as German airline Lufthansa, of having paid for the riots. The breakdown of alliance between Erdoğan and Gülen in 2013, which eventually led to the coup-attempt in 2016, created a new occasion for the anti-European rhetoric. Erdoğan blamed not only CIA but also Germany, the Netherlands and Norway for supporting Gülen and their infiltration into the government institutions. The lack of solidarity from the West after the coup-attempt in 2016, consolidated this anti-European rhetoric. Erdoğan started to blame Europe for sheltering terrorists because they wanted to prevent Turkey from becoming stronger. In the period following the failed coup-attempt this nationalist rhetoric became more prevalent. In his rallies, Erdoğan constantly mentioned the foreign plots against Turkey and how they pose a threat for the Turkish government’s integrity. After Germany and the Netherlands refused to allow Turkish ministers and members of the parliament to propagate his AKP in 2017, Erdoğan referred their policies as “Nazism and Fascism” (Zürcher, 2018). Pro-government media outlets followed Erdoğan’s lead and started to produce a rhetoric of an alleged pan-European effort to weaken Turkey and Erdoğan, which eventually led to a tendency within Turkish bureaucracy and AKP elites to associate any media outlet and civic society organization (including human rights organizations) that criticizes Erdoğan with the “secret arm” of Western governments (Aydıntaşbaş, 2018).
insider of the Turkish-Muslim women group Nur also started to separate herself from the “westernized” Turkish women:

There are some Turkish people here… How can I describe them? They are westernized, Germanized… They are scared of being associated with Islam. I was not religious when I was younger; I had a lot of friends like them. But once I became more religious, those people criticized me a lot. I mean, I don’t understand. Do they think denying your culture and religion proves that you belong to Germany more? I don’t approve of many behaviors of Germans, and I don’t mean to normalize their immorality. We know better; we have Islam that teaches us right from wrong… We shouldn’t strive to become like them… Once I started coming to the mosque, I ditched those friends who criticized me. I would rather live the way I think is right… Now, I feel like I am being fed from the right sources. I feel closer to my religion and culture. (Nur, 48, housewife)

This active reproduction of a hyper Turkish-Islamic identity is both caused by and causes a more passive form of resistance: the retreat to familiar. The reproduction of the hyper Turkish-Islamic discourse causes women to avoid German public spaces and use the Turkish neighborhood space for the majority of their purposes, as they are positioned antithetical to each other. More specifically, older women view the mosque space as the social core of their familiar Turkish-Muslim arena and use it to battle the everyday double-fold exclusion they encounter from both Turkish-Muslim men and Germans. The group solidarity they create in the mosque provides them with the feelings of acceptance and belonging:

What would I do without the mosque? Where would I go? It keeps me occupied, and it spiritually feeds me. It took away a lot of my loneliness since my arrival in Germany. I view it as a good source. I can find people like me here; we are from the same culture, we have the same ideas about what is right or wrong. I don’t have to worry about doing something wrong when I am here. It makes me feel like I belong. I know that I wouldn’t have to defend myself here. I know that I wouldn’t be discriminated against or approached by prejudice here. (Rabia, 59, housewife)

[She only wears a headscarf when coming to the mosque] Sometimes, when I go back home from the mosque, I still have my headscarf on. When I come to my neighborhood like that, I see my neighbors staring at me. Once they understand that it is me, the look relieved and tell me, “oh it’s just you; I thought you were somebody else.” This really annoys me, I have a good relationship with them, and I know that they don’t do that to German people that they don’t know that come to the neighborhood. The interesting thing is, when I come to the mosque
without wearing a headscarf, they don’t question me. I feel very accepted here (Seda, 50, works in the family business)

Rabia came to Germany after she got married and never learned German during her 35 years in Germany. She expressed multiple times the loneliness she feels in Germany. In her case, her retreat from society is related to her lack of socialization in Germany, and the mosque serves as a place that remedies her feelings of placelessness. Rabia views the mosque as a place where she can socialize without the fear of acting out of the norms of Islamic femininity. On the other hand, Seda’s retreat from the German society is related to the prejudice she encounters from Germans. Despite living among Germans for years, how her neighbors react to her veiled look, makes her feel discriminated against. She has a good relationship with her neighbors, and she does not have a problem communicating in German. However, when her neighbors see her with the Islamic symbol of the headscarf, they make prejudiced remarks. She views these reactions as discrimination as her neighbors do not react the same way when a German person that they do not know comes to their neighborhood. As a reaction to this discrimination, she retreats to the mosque, where she feels accepted.

In addition to its function as providing a safe and moral space, Marxloh Merkez Mosque is also viewed as a symbol of resistance that spatializes cultural differences. Göle refers to this notion and summarizes that the visibility of the mosque refers to the transgression of invisible cultural boundaries within the public sphere (2011). Older-generation women’s interviews support Göle’s conceptualization as we can see how they view the construction of a mosque representative of Turkish-Ottoman heritage as a triumph:

We are so privileged to have this big mosque, especially in a place like Germany! (Saadet, 44, works in the family business)

It really angers Germans that we have such a big mosque here in Germany. Islam is on the rise in Europe, thanks to our Turkish nation! This mosque, where we can rest under the shadow of its minaret, is not located in any town in Anatolia; it is in the middle of Germany. We have taken over the work of our ancestors, who came to Europe to spread Islam [referring to the 17th century Ottoman history
during their expansion], and we got to build our mosque here. I think this is the best inheritance we can pass to our children (Şükran, 53, works in retail)

If we wouldn’t have built this mosque, if this mosque wouldn’t have existed, our children, the new generations, would totally gotten lost. Our culture would vanish; they would forget our roots, culture, and religion. It is so easy in Germany to forget where you come from and betray your identity. We built this place so that our children wouldn’t lose their character identity. It is not enough to be Muslims here; we also should remember that we came from Turkey and we are Turkish. We aimed for a place where our children can find their way back to our culture, Islam, and language… At least we have the mosque here to connect us. (Hayriye, 59, retired from social work)

As we can see on the accounts above, the importance of Marxloh Merkez Mosque for older-generation women is not related to its character that creates a sense of belonging; it is also associated with the idea that it transgresses into the German public through years of struggle, which is perceived as a mode of resistance by women. Coupled with the active self-othering process discussed at the beginning of this section, this perspective that reproduces the German secular public as an arena to be invaded or transgressed, in the Turkish-Muslim imagination establishes an antagonistic relationship between Turkish-Germans and Germans. By emphasizing the differences whether it is cultural or religious, the imaginary boundaries that exist between Turks and Germans are reproduced and reinforced and lead older-generation women’s further (self)exclusion.

6.2. Crossing the Boundaries: Younger-Generation Women’s Modes of Agency

As members of the youth branch associated with the mosque, the younger-generation women express that they wish to impact not only Muslims but also non-Muslims. However, younger-generation women experienced challenges and conflicts in their relationships with both groups. In fact, all younger-generation women’s narratives included different levels of negative experiences that damaged their bonds to the German society, the Turkish-Islamic community in
Marxloh, and even to their families. Faced with such negative experiences, these younger-generation women’s narratives continuously emphasize their resistance against the “othering” they encounter in the mosque, in the neighborhood, and in German public with respect to their gender, religion, or ethnicity. Rather than being constructed as a part of the collective and forced into taking sides within the socially constructed dichotomies such as Muslim/secular, Turkish/German, or women/men, younger-generation women reclaim their agency by crossing the imaginary borders between such categories.

Accordingly, younger-generation women’s modes of the agency are characterized by openly resisting and contrasting the socially expected patterns of behavior in order to lay claims to spaces where they do not belong. Unlike older-generation women who end up taking sides and realize their discourse-defined roles within the subordinating dichotomies, younger-generation women choose to challenge the dominant norms from within. One of the techniques they use is redefining Islam by distinguishing between the religious norms and socially constructed religio-cultural traditions, which I refer to as Turkish-Islamic norms. While in the mosque, this mode of agency allows them to challenge the gendered norms that limit their visibility while also increasing their social capital; at the urban scale, this true religious knowledge that they have frees them from the familial pressure. The second technique that younger-generation women use to reclaim their agency is born out of this ability to break free from the religio-cultural norms, and it involves transgressing the imaginary boundaries constructed by the Turkish-Muslim traditions, which separates men from women in the mosque and Turks from Germans in Duisburg. Following this, the final mode of agency younger-generation women use is their reconstruction of the Turkish-Muslim women. By transgressing into different spheres, where their existence is constantly challenged, young Turkish-Muslim women reconstruct the Muslim women as subjects who live an emancipated life in Germany according to German standards while not sacrificing their Islamic piety. Such reconstruction provides women opportunities to break the stereotype of
oppressed and repressed Muslim women by emphasizing their individuality as independent agents.

6.2.1. Redefining Religion: True Islam or Turkish-Islam

During their religious education in the mosque, younger-generation women create opportunities to re-read and reinterpret Islamic texts and exercise their agency on what Islamic norms to adhere to and which Islamic norms to disseminate to others. In their reinterpretations of Islam, younger-generation women critically acknowledge that some of the old interpretations of Islam were made through culture-specific androcentric readings of the text, and they aim to counteract the gender bias found in these interpretations. In order to do so, they redefine their religious knowledge and distinguish between true Islam and Turkish-Islamic discourse.

Challenges to the Turkish cultural interpretations of Islam repeatedly triggers arguments during the sohbet for younger-generation women. While such challenges create a safe and judgment-free space for younger-generation women to question Islam’s gendered order while staying within that order. Beyond the mosque, it also influences their daily lives as such critical reevaluation of Islam allows them to challenge their families’ false ideas on women's role according to Turkish-Islam. In terms of their urban behavior, we see that younger-generation women become much more economically and socially emancipated through their (re)interpretation of Islam, resulting in their much larger spatial mobility within the German public.

First and foremost, we see younger-generation women’s agency in their choices of which Islam to associate with. Unlike older-generation women, who attended the same mosques as their parents or husbands, younger-generation women from an early age had the possibility to experience Turkish-Islam in different contexts. This is related to the fact that, at the early stages of settlement into Germany, there only existed a limited number of mosques and mosque
organizations to choose from. As the diaspora grew and communities became more permanently settled, the number of mosques increased accordingly, and many different mosque organizations started to establish their communities. The different circumstances provided younger-generation women many more options and freedom to choose. As Marxloh houses mosques among three of the biggest and well-established Turkish-Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany, younger-generation women have the freedom to experience different mosque communities and choose among them. Beyza and Leman explain their experiences with the other mosques and how they made informed decisions while choosing Marxloh Merkez Mosque as their primary site of worship:

I didn’t always come to this mosque. I have been to all the different groups here. At first, I was among the congregation of Süleymaniye’s [VIKZ], the one in Hamborn. I also went to Sofis [Menzil Group]. I have received all of my Islamic education with Süleymaniye’s. It started because we lived close to the mosque, but once I could travel alone using public transport when I was 14-15, I started going to the other mosques. Süleymaniye’s did not have any activities for the youth, so I started attending here [Marxloh Merkez Mosque] more and more. Their [Süleymaniye]’s education is very good, but they are also very much introverted. I mean, you have to be one of them. It is not enough if you started attending from an early age, they wouldn’t accept you if your parents went to another mosque. Also, their Islamic views don’t align so much with the Turkish government’s. I think some of their ideas are very extreme, and they were trying to impose such beliefs on us. Especially after the coup attempt in Turkey [in July 2016], I stopped going to the other ones. There were rumors that some mosques might be connected to the Fetö [a terrorist organization that attempted the coup in 2016]. You never know what groups are connected to where. I feel safer and more secure here as I know this mosque is associated directly with the Turkish government. I feel more comfortable in this mosque (Beyza, 22, student)

I attended all the mosque associations here. I went to Süleymaniye’s [VIKZ], to Milli Görüş [IGMG], to tekke [Menzil] and to Kaplan [the Islamic organization now is banned both in Turkey and Germany in 1999 due to their radical Islamist views]. I went on their weekend activities; I went to their Qur’an classes as a boarding student. Diyanet’s [DITIB – Marxloh Merkez Mosque] difference from other ones is that you have more freedom here. Just because you are coming to this mosque, you are not considered a part of a closed group or define yourself as a part of them. I learned a lot from the other groups, but after a while, they expect you to pledge your loyalty to them. You are required to spread their views, however extremist they are. And those views are usually not Islamic; they are like false cultural beliefs. They are not in Qur’an; they are the interpretations of X or Y person. When you are in those other groups, you are not allowed to
question certain things, they tell you to do something, and you are not allowed to criticize that thing, even if it makes no sense to you. You just follow it blindly. It almost feels like you have to leave your logic at home. I know that religion is submission [she refers to the etymology of the words Muslim and Islam, which comes from the Arabic word *aslama*, meaning submission], but they are also ignoring one of the most important commands of Islam: to think. *Diyanet* is not like that. They do not associate with extremist *Hocas*. You don’t have to go after X person’s views on Islam. For this reason, I chose only to come here since I was 15. (Leman, 32, works in the public sector)

Contrary to their parents’ experience with the religious institutions, younger-generation women had a variety of options regarding which religious organization to be a part of from an early age. Although some of my younger-generation interviewees did not choose to associate with certain mosque organizations due to their parents’ views on them, most of them attended different Islamic institutions and made a decision based on their experiences. Both Beyza and Leman attended different Islamic groups, from very conservative extremist ones to others that practice more moderate forms of Islam. They decided to cut ties with the more extremist ones due to their radical views, expressing that such views are not rooted in religion but rather in culture or certain individuals’ personal gains. Especially Leman’s interview emphasizes her discomfort about being made to follow one person’s interpretation rather than what Qur’an says. By going to different mosque organizations, younger-generation women are able to see different interpretations of the same subject and can distinguish between what is cultural tradition and what are religious facts. In her narrative, Tube further explains younger-generation women’s approaches to Islam and how their interpretations separate them from older-generation women:

… This is the biggest difference between us and *teyzes*. For us, reasoning and questioning always come first. I don’t like to do something just because *Hoca* said so. I research ask other people. I know that this mosque has more moderate views, but you also see yourself during *sohbet* [lectures]; Ayşe Hoca teaches us how she interprets stuff herself. Did you realize how *teyze’s* *sohbets* are different from ours? They usually accept everything Ayşe Hoca says and never argue with her; their *sohbet* is truly a lecture, while in our *sohbet*, it is more dynamic, almost like a discussion session. (Leman, 32, works in the public sector)
Having attended weekly *sohbet* both for both older- and younger-generation women, I observed the stark difference Leman mentions between their lectures. As Ayşe Hoca prepared and presented both the older-generation women’s *sohbet* on Thursday mornings and younger women’s *sohbet* on Sunday afternoons, they more or less followed similar themes. However, as Leman mentioned, the lecture dynamic was vastly different. For example, the multiple cases where marriage were discussed showed this stark difference accurately. After the lecture on marriage, where Ayşe Hoca talked about the roles of wives and husbands within the household, older-generation women asked her about practice of polygamy, specifically men being permitted to marry multiple women, in some Muslim countries. Ayşe Hoca explained this by referring to the time of the Prophet, when thousands of men died in wars, leaving many women homeless and without support. She further explained that during that time, men were allowed to take multiple wives in order to provide social and economic protection; in fact, they were encouraged to do so. She continued to explain that, outside wars, men’s marriage with multiple women is also permitted in the case of women’s serious sickness, fertility problems, and insanity. But, even when men decide to have multiple wives, he is not supposed to discriminate among these women.

While this did not raise many questions from her older audience when she presented the same explanation to younger-generation women, it sparked a lively discussion:

The discussion today we had at the lecture was so different from the one on Thursday [elder-generation women’s lecture]. Ayşe Hoca gave them the same explanation about how men can have multiple wives. Unlike *teyzes*, who were nodding along when Ayşe Hoca was talking, younger-generation women were very frustrated. People started murmuring when Ayşe Hoca explained that men can marry multiple women if they are sick or infertile. Then Meryem said, “But *Hocam*, those men that marry multiple women, they don’t do it because their wives are sick, they do it because they can. This is very unfair.” *Hoca* tried to explain that they were taking advantage of the religion for their own pleasure; in fact this rule was actually very fair to people if it was correctly applied. She further explained that despite it not being allowed in Turkey, according to Islam, it is a man’s right to have children, and if his wife cannot give it to him, it is his right to seek it somewhere else. Girls were not really into the idea. They expressed that even if they turned out to be infertile, they wouldn’t want their future spouses to marry another woman. Beyza said that I would instead adopt a
child than my husband marrying somebody else. Ayşe Hoca shut down this idea saying that adoption is not allowed in Islam. This sparked a whole new discussion about how to go about it. Finally, Zeynep interrupted and explained the complex solution she thought to bypass that rule that prevents adoption. It was pretty complex but made sense. Even Ayşe Hoca couldn’t come up with a counterargument and had to accept Zeynep’s solution. In the end, she said that instead of trying to find defects in Islam and trying to trick it, we should follow it. So, being foster parents would be more appropriate than adoption. Zeynep was sitting next to me, and she scoffed and commented so that only I would hear, “there is nothing inappropriate about that. So, men can bypass the rules, but when it comes from us, it is not very “appropriate,” what nonsense…” (field notes from 02/24/2019)

As presented in the cases above, younger-generation women do not only have the freedom to choose which version of Islam to follow based on their experiences in different mosque organizations, but even within their chosen institute where they practice Islam, they feel free to question ideas that they do not agree with. They are able to distinguish true Islam from its cultural interpretations. While Ayşe Hoca, who represents the Turkish-Islam due to her religious education and upbringing in Turkey, has a more biased approach to women regarding their rights, younger-generation women have a purer view of Islam which can be seen from their arguments based solely on Islamic texts and ethics. They seek logic behind some arguments, come up with modern solutions to them instead of blindly accepting them and even resisting authority figures.

Another interesting aspect of this discussion was how comfortable younger-generation women felt about criticizing the gendered order of Islam. Instead of trying to reason that such gendered ideas do, in fact, profit women, they acknowledge the unfair prescription and work within the religious discourse to find solutions. Although Ayşe Hoca was not very content about the level of

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24 Adoption is not allowed in Islam on the basis that adopted female child would be namahram to her adoptive father when she grows up, making their relationship not halal and vice versa for a male child and mother. While raising orphans are highly encouraged in Islam, the orphan child does not become a true child to “adoptive” parents (Huda, 2019).

25 In Islamic cultures, there is the concept of “milk kinship”. The unrelated children that are breastfed by the same mother due to circumstances are considered “milk siblings” and this “milk sibling” status puts them in the same status as a sibling. Zeynep’s solution included adopting a male/female child and having him breastfed by father’s/mother’s sister, which makes the father the “milk uncle/aunt”. Since according to Islam, one cannot marry their own niece/nephew and being related through milk works the same way, this provides an opportunity to adopt children.
criticism, the *sohbet* environment in the mosque provides a safe space for young women where they can question some aspects of religion and express their frustration.

Figure 6-4 Younger-generation women’s reading group (source: www.ditib-du.de/jugend)

Figure 6-5 Seminars organized by young-women’s group: Ramadan and Health (left) and Advices for the Young (right) (the seminars took place online due to COVID_19 (source: www.ditib-du.de/jugend)
Besides resisting the religious knowledge available in the mosque, younger-generation women also create different opportunities to access religious knowledge. Younger-generation women choose Marxloh Merkez Mosque as their primary site of religious practice; however as shown above, this does not mean that they follow the religious instruction blindly. In fact, they also find alternative ways to access and produce knowledge. In addition to the curriculum set by Ayşe Hoca, younger-generation women started their own activities. They run a book club, where they read and discuss Islamic literature (Figure 6-4); they meet outside the formal mosque activities and create lecture circles where they watch religious instruction videos and discuss them (Figure 6-5). In addition to these informal educational opportunities, younger-generation women create for themselves, they also seek formal religious education. Among my younger-generation interviewees, three women enrolled to the school of theology after completing their university education and three of them completed the religious education academy program offered by the IGMG mosque organization. This form of religiousness younger-generation women practice distinguishes their approach to religion from their parents’ and allows them to practice a purer form of Islam devoid of cultural traditions. This allows them to break free from the limiting Turkish-Islamic discourse and establish their own set of norms based on their upbringing.

Younger-generation women’s redefinition of religion through their formal and informal religious education results in patterns of behavior which allows them to cross boundaries. By increasing their true-Islamic knowledge, younger-generation women gain self-confidence and a legitimate foundation to resist and challenge the restrictive attitudes of older generation that stems from the Turkish-Islamic traditions. When their parents or the community try to restrict their actions, younger-generation women can “talk back” and counter such limitations by referring to Islam and Qur’an. This gives them a way to avoid restrictions Turkish-Islam brings, such as women’s limited education or their withdrawal from the public, without damaging their familial
relationships. This allows them to gain urban mobility and cross the cultural boundaries that separates Turkish and German publics. Leman explains this as:

My family was never very strict but when I was about 15-16, they would question me about where I am going with whom and sometimes wouldn’t let me. Especially if it was in the city center with my German friends. They would say “women don’t do this, don’t go there…” When I challenged, and asked them why, they would say good Muslim women wouldn’t act that way. The more knowledge I had about Islam, I started to ask them back “where does it say? Can you show it to me in Qur’an?” After a while I stopped asking them and started to just inform them where I am going. They know now I that I wouldn’t do anything bad… (Leman, 32, works in the public sector)

6.2.2. Transgressing Boundaries

Within the context of Marxloh, the Turkish-Muslim women find themselves inserted into a set of predetermined discourse and practices that shape and limit their spatial behavior through the construction of imaginary boundaries. The redefinition of true Islam allows younger-generation women to reclaim their agency by resisting and transgressing these imagined boundaries created by the Turkish-Islamic imaginations, which separates men and women in the mosque and Turks and Germans in the urban context. While in the mosque, such acts of resistance manifest in the form of gender-transgressive acts such as occupying the privileged men’s space within the context of the German public, it takes the form of blurring the boundaries of Turkish and German spheres. Through transgression into the taken-for-granted spaces, men’s area in the mosque and German space in the city, younger-generation women make their presence known in places where they do not belong and eventually normalize their deviant spatial behavior by transforming space.

As discussed in Chapter 4, during the planning phase of the mosque, space was designed for the use of younger-generation people in an attempt to increase their mosque attendance. However, younger-generation women were discouraged from using this youth branch room after
the mosque was opened. This room (Figure 6-6) was allocated only for the use of younger-generation mosque attendees and had a separate entrance so that they could use this space freely, even when they do not want to come to the mosque for religious purposes. While in the first years after the mosque was opened, this room was used both by younger-generation men and women, mostly by taking turns but on some occasions together, after a while younger-generation women were subtly and openly discouraged from using this space on the basis of Turkish-Islamic norms that prescribe separation of men and women. Being excluded from this space where they were supposed to socialize freely but still eager to use the mosque space for socialization purposes, younger-generation women started to seek an alternative space. In the end, they occupied a space which was initially used as a classroom and converted it into a women’s youth branch room.

Merve and Leman narrate the process and how they benefited from having their own space as:

I am not entirely sure, but I think it [the original room] was designed for men; women were never considered. I mean, even if they were, we never got to use that room. It was always a men’s room, which is a little weird because they hardly ever use the room as we do. In the end, we sort of occupied this room. It
was never formally given to us. We were using this room as a classroom and for our sohbet sometimes. Slowly we started transforming it. First, we got rid of the desks, and then we acquired the key [other than young women, only mosque administration has this key]. Once we had the key, nobody could use this room anymore. There were many objections from the administration, obviously. They said that this is a mosque, not a café for us to hang out. They said they don’t have to allocate space for our social activities. Very unfair. Younger-generation men use the room downstairs all the time to play games or watch soccer games. And they have a huge TV and several game consoles there, bought by the mosque administration itself! We pointed this out to them and explained that we really needed this room for our activities. They were salty at first, but we used the room regardless. They got used to it eventually. Slowly we started asking the mosque administration for money to transform this room into what it is today. Now, I think women’s room is better than men’s room (Merve, 23, student)

Valla, I will not be humble about this, but I actually transformed the younger-generation women’s group into what it is today. When I was much younger, we didn’t have many activities, mostly due to two reasons. First, because we didn’t have a space to get together, and second, the activities that we started were never continued. You know, you have to be a little older and experienced to start an activity [late 20s] so that administration has faith in you. But the problem was it is also the age most women get married, and once they got married, they stopped coming to the youth group. Most of the time, they started something, and that project stopped when they left. In my case, I never left, even after I got married. So, 4-5 years ago, I decided to make the younger-generation women’s group much more active. First, we acquired the space, we struggled a lot, but we did. Then we started to organize youth seminars; we invite authors, academicians, etc. Our seminar is open to both men and women, and it even draws other young people from nearby mosques. We also started a comedy club where I wrote some comedy sketches with a focus on Islam, and we acted them out. My main aim was to bring younger-generation women under the same roof. Instead of wasting their time on the streets and cafes, they can do something for Islam here. (Leman, 32, works in the public sector)

Leman’s account shows how the lack of a formally assigned space for the use of younger-generation women hindered their activities in the mosque. In fact, until she decided to be included and transform it, the younger-generation women’s group was invisible. The extent of this exclusion is exemplified by Merve’s account, where she does not even remember a time the youth room in basement was open to the use of both men and women. Younger-generation women’s request for space was met with disdain by the mosque administration on the basis that they should not socialize in the mosque, even though younger-generation men use the mosque space for the exact same reason. This double-standard once again establishes the mosque as
men’s space. Younger-generation women, however, continued to transgress into this men’s space until they established their dominance and control at this small part of the mosque. In addition to this, by using this space to organize educational programs which would contribute to the positive visibility of the mosque, within the Turkish-Muslim community. By using this social capital, younger-generation women successfully negotiated with the mosque administration to acquire funds to transform this space. Younger-generation women’s forceful but transgressive act of agency and its reluctant acknowledgment by the mosque administration, in the end, legitimized younger-generation women’s existence within the male space of the mosque (Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8).

Figure 6-7 Women’s youth branch room before transformation (source: www.ditib-du.de/jugend)

Figure 6-8 Women’s youth branch room after transformation (source: www.ditib-du.de/jugend)
Once this space was established as younger-generation women’s space, their avenues for resistance to authority became much stronger within the mosque’s boundaries. Younger-generation women started to seek to be on a more equal ground with younger-generation men in terms of their religious education. On more than one occasion, Nizami Hoca, the Turkish-German imam that taught younger-generation men, was invited for younger-generation women’s sohbet.

Derya (22, student) explained that although they really liked Ayşe Hoca, as she is Turkish, sometimes she cannot relate to them as she doesn’t really know what it means to be Turkish-German. For this reason, they invited Nizami Hoca, who was born and raised in Germany but studied theology in Turkey. Having Nizami Hoca made younger-generation women cross the prescribed men and women separation again by having this male presence within the reclaimed female space. In addition to this, events that took place during the sohbet he conducted also shows how younger-generation women were able to challenge (even undermined) the authority of this male religious figure:

Today Ayşe Hoca was absent from the sohbet. Instead, Nizami Hoca came to lecture women. Nizami Hoca is very young; he must be around 22-23 years old, which is not much older than the attendees of the lecture. When he came in, he closed the door and started to chat with young women. I think some of the older members of the youth group did not like him just socializing and kindly warned him that maybe he should start the lecture. I am not entirely sure what the central theme was today as he kept jumping from subject to subject. I don’t know if it was because he was not as experienced as other Hocas, but he was quite condescending to women in general. He had some remarks about how women only think about getting married. Leman tried to kindly steer the conversation, saying, “maybe we should continue with the subject,” but he seemed to find it funny. He continued to his subject, just to make another remark about how women are big gossips and how it is in their nature to talk about people. Leman got up and opened the door while telling Nizami Hoca that maybe he should not make such generalizations and go on with the subject. I looked around and saw a lot of skeptical faces. Zeynep was sitting next to me and told me jokingly, “I guess he doesn’t see that he is surrounded by women.” Leman later said to me that she opened the door because she didn’t like what he said wanted him to finish the lecture as soon as possible while making his sexist remarks heard by the other people in the mosque (field notes from 01/19/2020)
In this instance, women resisted the authority of Nizami Hoca by undermining his explicit religious authority and implicit male authority. Key to this interpretation is the act of holding him accountable for his statements. At first, they attempt to accomplish this through gentle redirection, attempting to let him know that he is overstepping his boundaries through subtle methods more in line with traditional Turkish-Muslim practice. When this failed, however, they moved to actively alter the environment by reducing the public/private separation to make him accountable to the rest of the mosque congregation while kindly trying to remove him from their safe space. By contrast, when Nizami Hoca presented a lecture to the older-generation women, though they were still not very enthusiastic about his message, they still allowed him the benefit of the doubt as he is still very young and inexperienced and did not necessarily challenge his authority directly, expressing their dissatisfaction among one another later on. In this respect, we see a clear crossing of both behavioral and traditional gender boundaries, with younger-generation women assuming an authoritative relationship to male moral authority in the community.

Similar to their transgression into men’s space in the mosque which blurs the imaginary women/men separation, younger-generation women use a similar tactic to establish their presence in the German public. The public appearance of women, who wear headscarves, and their claims to German urban space are seen as visible acts of Islamic transgressions and are not well received (Göle, 2006). Şule’s account in her university shows how this transgressive act is institutionalized in the university setting:

We have founded a Muslim students’ association at the university. Normally, the university gives you a little room when you have a student organization. We got a couple of complaints because apparently, people don’t want a Muslim organization because the university is a secular institution and the activities that we organize are not inclusive enough. Our activities are open to anybody who would like to come; we don’t require people to be Muslims to attend. Other organizations also throw many parties that we are not interested in. So, that also makes them non-inclusive. It is also weird that it is just against us – they do not attack the conservative Christian groups as they attack us. Most of these reactions
come from leftist groups that claim to be all liberals and inclusive. Because they see Islam as backward, I think they don’t like to think that we are a group at their level, equal rights, equal visibility. They criticized us for being uneducated, but they also wanted us to be invisible when we were in the university. We were sent numerous warnings from the university about how we were not being open. We were following their own guidelines to organize anything. We had many meetings with the administration; it took a lot to convince them because they were siding with the people that complained. After these problems, whenever we had a program, I personally invited the administration and the other student groups so that they could see what we were doing. Anyways, I didn’t like that we were made to jump through many hoops while the other groups didn’t, but by being this open, we were able to keep our room. It actually worked out for better in the end because we had to be in constant contact with different groups and became even more active. (Şule, 22, student)

Şule’s account shows that, despite being one of the many specialized student organizations that actively operate in the university, their organization was targeted by non-Muslim groups on the basis that they were not compatible with the German ideals, and they are transgressing into “their” claimed secular space. While the visibility of their student organization was singled out by the university administration, they reclaimed their agency and their space on the campus by using this same visibility and used that chance to redefine their student organization by being more inclusive and open. In the end, her struggles about not giving up her student organization’s space on the university campus positively contributed to their visibility. Their existence was accepted by the other student groups, and their initial “deviant” spatial behavior is normalized. It can be interpreted that younger-generation women’s existence in the German public initially sparked a debate as it was seen as an act of boundary-crossing according to the German discourse. Once Turkish-Muslim women’s acts of transgressions became constant and eventually became a normal occurrence, we see that the German discourse also transformed to make room for the Turkish-Islamic presence.
6.2.3. Redefining Muslim Women

Women among later generations in Marxloh are driven by the motivation to redefine and separate themselves from two opposing narratives; on the one hand, they aim to counter their popular image as oppressed and passive victims, while on the other distancing themselves from the self-proclaimed representatives of Islam in Germany who embody an image of docile socially acceptable Islam divorced from notions of piety. Younger-generation women would rather redefine themselves as autonomous agents capable of living an emancipated life in Germany according to German standards while staying within the limits of Islamic piety. Paradoxically, this redefinition of Turkish-Muslim women can only be attained by acting outside of both gendered Turkish-Islamic norms and German discourse that reduces them to subordinate agents. In the mosque, women achieve this by acting against the prescribed set of behaviors for Turkish-Muslim women and assuming leadership roles that are usually associated with men. In the context of Marxloh and Duisburg, resistance through redefinition manifests as acting out of their gender norms by adopting non-stereotypical roles. While such acts reinscribe their presence and exercise their right to the city, it also allows them to undertake an ambassadorial role and reconstruct perceptions of Islamic femininity by displaying an alternative Muslim subject compatible with both Islamic and German norms signaling reproduction of a Turkish-German discourse.

During the construction process of the mosque, women, especially ones in the leadership roles, were very visible. As discussed in Chapter 4, while this factor turned out to be highly beneficial to start the mosque project, have it accepted, and keep it going, younger-generation women had to overcome many obstacles to attain the leadership roles. Zülfüye Kaykın, a second-generation Turkish-German born and raised in Germany, achieved the leadership of the mosque project during its construction and at the time of its opening. Although the design and
construction process went seemingly unproblematic due to the lack of controversies, Kaykın expresses that as a woman in the leadership position, she struggled a lot and had to resist many cultural norms adopted by the mosque community:

I don’t wear a headscarf, and I don’t fit into the stereotypical image of Turkish-Muslim women in Germany, that is subordinate. When I first started coming to the old mosque to discuss with the mosque administration of the time, people judged me a lot. First, people were confused. How can a woman be the director of a project? They even refused to talk with me and asked to speak with my husband. Once they seemed to be convinced, they started to question my intentions. They asked what I, a seemingly well-integrated Turkish-German woman, was doing in the mosque, just because I don’t look like them, dress like them. In their imagination, they don’t understand why a seemingly non-Muslim woman would take part in the mosque administration. They think I cannot be religious or wish to provide Muslim women better conditions because I don’t look the part. Or I must be a spy. I mean, they are also right because a lot of Turkish women separate themselves from their religion when they become more “integrated” [using air quotes]. (interview with Kaykın on 06/12/2019)

Kaykın, in her leadership position, resists both of the opposing narratives. She opposed the Turkish-Muslim community by undertaking the project leadership, which is a position only men can access. Despite being against a woman assuming such an important role, the Turkish-Muslim community had to accept this leadership once they experienced the benefits of having a woman leader. In addition to this, she also opposed the stereotypical German imagination of helpless and oppressed Muslim women by presenting herself as an emancipated Turkish-German woman who is compatible with western modernity without compromising her faith or piety. In this way, she presented herself as an example to other women in the mosque congregation who sought to adopt positions of authority and, in a way, redefined the terms of being a religious Muslim woman in Germany. In a similar fashion, Hülya Ceylan, the director of the Dialogue Center, explicitly describes the importance of proactive engagement for the purpose of enacting change:

Germans, especially older Germans who only read the Bild newspaper, are very prejudiced. I doubt that they ever interacted with a Turkish person before. They

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26 Right-wing tabloid newspaper
come here and ask me those things that they see in the newspapers. I try to reason with them; I try to explain to them the right stuff. I even started a project on that. We brought 5000 residents from the neighborhoods that have absolutely no Turkish presence and gave them a tour of Marxloh. Those people who looked at me like I was some sort of an alien at the beginning and asked me all kinds of questions about Turkey and Erdoğan. I tell them that I am a German like them, and again, like them, I follow what is happening in Turkey from the German news. They usually change their minds at the end of our tour. But still, they think I, an educated and openly Muslim woman, am an exception. They come up to me and say, “you are such an exception to the Muslim women we see in newspapers.” I try to explain to them that I am in no way an exception, that there are a lot of Muslim women like me. I blame Turkish-Muslim women a little bit for these prejudices. Their lack of self-confidence prevents them from contradicting these prejudices. But I cannot say the same thing about our girls [referring to younger women]. Maşallah [as Allah willing], our girls are very outspoken and very active. They demanded to become guides for the mosque, and I trained them gladly. My advice to them is always this: if they want to change the community, they cannot remain in passive roles like their mothers and fathers; they have to be active and social. They are all very patient with those prejudiced Germans and always contradict them with grace and kindness.

(interview with Ceylan on 01/31/2019)

Despite her authority as the director of the Dialogue Center being limited substantially once the mosque administration was replaced by the more conservative group, Ceylan still creates opportunities both for herself and the younger-generation women that would help redefine their image as the Turkish-Muslim women within the limited sphere of action. Her project allows her to interact with Germans and counter their prejudices, while her guidance and training provide (Figure 6-9) opportunities for younger women to become more social and active. In addition to this, she volunteers as the supervisor of multiple projects that are done by the cooperation of the Evangelical Church. In this way, while she resists the Turkish-Islamic norms that limit Muslim women’s interaction with the “other” Germans, she also provides opportunities to make the next generation of Turkish-Muslim women more visible and redefine them as educated and well-spoken members of the community. This redefinition neither fits into the norms of Turkish-Islamic femininity nor the Turkish-Muslim image, according to Germans. Through these acts, younger-generation Turkish-Muslim women establish a new set of norms for themselves that
Figure 6-9 Ceylan training younger-generation women (source: www.ditib-du.de/jugend)

Figure 6-10 Young women’s group in Open-Door Day (source: www.ditib-du.de/jugend)
would allow them to be active members of the society that they live in while not compromising from their religion.

Having strong role models like Kayık and Ceylan influences and encourages younger-generation women to take over leadership roles in the mosque. The mosque administration promotes and encourages younger-generation women’s visibility during public events, especially the ones that are open to German public’s participation, as it contributes positively to the image of the mosque (Figure 6-10). However, when women’s presence in the mosque starts to threaten the gendered character of the mosque space, younger-generation women are faced with obstacles, as in the case of women’s exclusion from the mosque administration. Being aware of their potential to positively contribute to the image of the mosque, in such cases, younger-generation women reclaim their agency by making themselves indispensable figures in the mosque as educators, guides and volunteers. As the mosque association cannot afford to lose the representation of their mosque by well-spoken and well-mannered women who chose to become Muslim, younger-generation women use this as a leeway to transgress the boundaries and lay claims to men’s spaces in the mosque even further.

When engaging with a wider public, younger-generation women distance themselves from the image of their parents’ generation in order to break the passive victim Muslim women stereotype while also altering their own position within the society. They strive to redefine Turkish-Muslim women as visible and normal members of the society, similar to their German counterparts, who are present in public, taking part in social activities in cafes and cinemas and even taking part in activities traditionally linked to men, such as martial arts. Many women talked about how the moments of shock during their interactions with Germans:

I work at the university dorms as a part-time. Sometimes we run into the full-time staff there, who are mostly Germans. Once I started chatting with one older gentleman and after a couple minutes he said with a surprised look “You speak German so well!” I asked him why it was so surprising, as we are both Germans.
On the other hand, I cannot judge him that much because he speaks from his own experience as well (Merve, 23, student)

In my old workplace, I was the only Turk and Muslim person. I think some of my coworkers interacted with a Turkish-Muslim person for the first time in their lives. When I first started, the day I entered the office, everybody was shocked, I could feel them looking at me. They treated me no different from other people, but from time to time they would be shocked when they found out that I am not much different from them, like when I tell them I practice martial arts, drive or I like to read Goethe, Faust and Kafka. They ask me whether I am allowed to do this or do that… I just want them to know that yes, I do wear a headscarf, but it doesn’t stop me from doing anything! (Zeynep, 28, works in the private sector)

The intention of distinguishing themselves from the image of stereotypical Muslim women manifests in younger-generation women’s interactions with Germans. Being aware that their individual conduct can be interpreted by Germans as representative of collective identity, younger-generation women are careful to project openness and self-assurance to counteract negative expectations, as they would not want to avoid damaging the reputation of Turkish-Muslim women. At the same time, in constructing their physical appearance, they select more fashionable clothing and headscarf styles that distinguish them from earlier generations (Figure 6-11 and Figure 6-12). Unlike the older-generation women who wear old-fashioned dark long coats that became one of their distinguishing physical markers, younger-generation women choose to dress more in line with contemporary fashion. Furthermore, by wearing the headscarf differently by aestheticizing it, the headscarf becomes a symbol of personal choice, expressing one’s capacity to be an autonomous agent. By leveraging these practices in their close proximity and connection to Germans, younger-generation women undertake an ambassadorial role for a new generation of Muslims. This allows them to disassociate themselves from the cultural Turkish-Muslims and their gendered customs and educate their audience about true Islam. In this way, they engage in a process of self-fashioning according to two sets of norms commonly perceived both by Germans and Muslims to be mutually exclusive: that of living according to norms of true
Islamic femininity and that of living independently, emancipated life according to German standards.

However, this image younger-generation women construct for themselves, the modern and emancipated Turkish-Muslim women, does not mean that this self-fashioning is false or strategic. In fact, younger-generation women passionately oppose the strategic use of Islamic piety to manipulate the public. This became apparent during my interview with Merve when we
discussed the recent events that took place during the *Deutsche-Islam Konferanz 2019*. She expressed her disagreement over the chosen representatives of Islam in Germany, Cem Özdemir and Seyran Ateş. Merve insisted that Özdemir and Ateş were selected to represent Islam in the public sphere by the Germans strategically as they portray the kind of Muslims that Germans would like to see, embodying docile and governable Islam compatible with secular Germany. She interpreted that such political figures misrepresent Muslims in Germany and cause the emergence of false expectations on how Muslims should exist in the German public sphere. The image Özdemir and Ateş convey that the imaginary separation between Turkish and German communities can only be crossed through the efforts of one side; by making one’s self less Turkish and Muslim. Merve does not fit into this docile Muslim imaginary with her headscarf and outspoken personality. She is an excellent representative of the later-generation Turkish-Germans who identify themselves with Germany more than Turkey and still remain Muslim – and willing to resist when she encounters prejudice. She mentions that this idea of integration that requires her to give up aspects of her identity is unfair, and she is unwilling to do so. She adds that she is even more German than her many friends (she is a third-generation), is a productive member of the society, well-educated and working, and questions why she is still represented as a problem immigrant that needs to integrate. For this reason, she resists Özdemir and Ateş’s skewed

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27 After the meeting in 2019, German government was criticized for serving pork sausage, bacon and blood-sausage during the conference. The minister of internal affairs, Seehofer, said that they expected a diverse group and apologized by saying “if individuals felt offended in their religious feelings”. Turkish-German journalist, Tuncay Özdamar, criticized Seehofer for being insensitive and disrespectful and requested some respect from the German government of Muslim sensitivities (“Anger over Pork Sausages at Germany Islam event”, 2018).

28 Cem Özdemir is a German politician with Turkish ethnic roots. He served as a co-chair of the German Green Party between 2008 and 2018 and has been a member of the German parliament since 2013. Upon his resignation from the Green Party, Özdemir established Secular Islam Initiative, along with Ateş, who are known for their strict stance against Islam. He is known with his support for a German version of Islam, which “desires an enlightened modern humanistic Islamic theology”. This initiative raised many questions as its signatories are composed of Islam-critics such as Ateş and Kelek and right-wing politicians such as Michael Ley. Hafez argues that this initiative gives the impression that it is less about contributing to the discourse on Islam and more about assimilation that aims to transform of Islam through the views of radical right and Islamaphobes. The notion of secularism, as laid out in this initiative, is a totalitarian version of secularism that seeks to forbid all sorts of Islamic religious expression from the public space (2018).

29 Seyran Ateş is a Turkish-German human rights activist and a lawyer. Her stance of Islam as an Islam-critic was explained in Chapter 1.
representations that intensify the separation between Turks and Germans and advocates for a more inclusive representation where she does not have to be on one side of this separation but rather exist within their intersection, without having to sacrifice aspects of her identity.

6.3. Discussion: Boundary Issues

Throughout this chapter, I have presented two different forms of agency, one working within the predefined discourse, strengthening boundaries and limiting older-generation women’s social and economic mobility, and the second one led by younger-generation women, operating outside the predefined discourses to redefine a new one while blurring the imaginary boundaries that separate Turkish and German spheres of action. The two different practices, which follow the generational divide presented throughout this dissertation, both fit into and challenge Butler’s notion of agency. While younger-generation women’s obvious subversion and destabilization of the norms are in line with her arguments, older-generation women’s more subtle acts of agency that reproduce cultural norms challenge Butler’s binary conceptualization of agency that defines resistance and subordination as mutually exclusive. Following Mahmood’s approach that challenges Western feminist scholarship and divorces the notion of agency from progressive politics, I identified the performances of agency that are embedded in the religio-cultural tradition. While these religio-cultural discourses associate women with subordinate status and submissiveness, they are also used by women to secure their presence in the male-defined spheres. According to Mahmood, within the performances that seem to reinscribe what seemingly are “instruments of oppression,” one can identify moments of disruption and opposition to the dominant authority. Such acts of disruption and opposition may not always be overt acts of resistance against the perceived dominant authority; they can be directed against the authority located in the “interstices of a woman’s consciousness.” Agency, in this form of analysis, can be
conceptualized as the capacity to realize one’s interest both within and against the demands of custom, tradition, or other individual and collective obstacles (2001, p. 206). In the context of my dissertation, we find different forms of agency which range from very subtle acts such as extending the domestic space to the public to acts of resistance against the stereotypical prejudices in the German public. In the context of this chapter, we see that both Butler’s and Mahmood’s conceptualizations of agency apply to Turkish-Muslim women’s recognizable moments of resistance; however, in some cases, especially with respect to older-generation women’s practices of the agency, we see subtle performances that retrench the demands of custom and tradition while in the case of younger-generation women resistance against these concepts is emphasized.

Older-generation women’s modes of the agency are based primarily on traditional Turkish ways of behaving, thereby reproducing Turkish-Muslim power structures and gendered ways of behaving. In fact, older-generation women’s compulsion to repeat is where their agency lies. Avishai asserts that in order to understand agency, one does not have to identify acts of empowerment, subversion, or transgression, as these acts can as well be encountered in the moments of willingly becoming subjects of a particular discourse (2008). In this chapter, I have discussed that such moments of agency can be seen in the acts of older-generation women, where they consciously become subjects of the Turkish-Islamic discourse and contribute to its reproduction. This is first enacted through the domestication of space which still maintains the gender-based segregation in the mosque and in the neighborhood. Older-generation women’s purposeful outings to the mosque and the neighborhood that are done within the context of household and childcare duties work to reproduce women’s association with the domestic roles but also provides them moments of agency where they use these outings for the purpose of socialization. In a similar vein, the extension of the domestic activity beyond the walls of the home allows them to socialize outside their places of residence while preserving and reproducing
the notion that “women belong to home.” Here, I argue that older-generation women learned to leverage their traditional association with domestic work and child-rearing to temporarily redefine traditionally male spaces as female spaces, thereby granting them greater but still relatively limited mobility both in the mosque and the neighborhood.

The second mode of agency older-generation women use is identified as the more passive act of retreat to the familiar. Due to their own prejudiced views of Germans and the everyday exclusion they face in the German public, older-generation women living in Marxloh avoid German public spaces and prefer to stay within the confines of the familiar space they reproduced in Germany, with the mosque as the social core of this Turkish-Muslim arena. I interpret this introverted social and spatial behavior as an act of agency where older-generation women willingly become subjects of two particular discourses. They reproduce the prejudiced German discourse that frames them as members of the society that are incompatible with the secular Western norms with their refusal to become a part of the German public. Meanwhile, they also become subjects of the Turkish-Islamic discourse that subordinate them through their passionate defense of the religio-cultural norms.

As discussed above, older-generation women’s performances of the agency are very much related to the prescribed domestic roles and relevant spaces. While the Turkish-Muslim cultural norms presented in Chapter 2 define the mahram domestic space as female, which is inferior to the namahram male public space, this does not mean women exist passively in the former. In fact, as I have demonstrated through the discussion of older-generation women’s agency, they are active agents in perpetuating the same discourse that feminizes the home. Thus, contrary to the progressive narrative that Muslim women are uniformly oppressed in public and private spaces, the behavioral patterns we see are much more in line with ideas put forward by bell hooks. Specifically, they are able to use domestic spaces and re-coded spaces as a site of
subversion, resistance, and liberation struggle (bell hooks, 1990), especially in the face of exclusion and fear of placelessness they experience.

In contrast to older-generation women’s more subtle domestic performances, younger-generation women’s agency is expressed more publicly through overt acts of resistance. Younger-generation women perform, parade, and display the discourse that forms the collective identity, whether it is the Turkish-Muslim or German one however they also find ways to renegotiate, resist or reject the control that comes with them, despite occupying the weakest social position beneath men and older-generation women. Through what Butler calls slippages in their performances (1993), younger-generation women reinterpret the norms in ways not intended by the community and succeed in carving out space for themselves both in the male-dominated space of the mosque and in the German space where they are continuously excluded.

In order to accomplish this, at the level of the mosque, neighborhood, and the broader society, younger-generation women have developed a knowledge of “deculturalized” Islam that allows them to resist the means of control in the Turkish-Muslim community while behaving in a manner less foreign to broader German society. Younger-generation women access the knowledge of “deculturalized” Islam by attending a variety of mosques and approaching various knowledge sources on the topic. Whereas older-generation women accepted whatever they were taught in their own mosque, rendering themselves exclusively knowledge consumers, younger-generation women have made themselves knowledge producers through their digestion of a broader range of Islamic knowledge. This allows them to resist and eventually start to break down gender stratification by mastering socially valued knowledge, which has been traditionally controlled by men and withheld from women (Spain, 1992).

By separating their religiosity from Turkish cultural values, we have seen how younger-generation women are able first to lay claim to male space in the mosque mainly on their own terms, openly resist the knowledge produced by the male authority figures and even begin to
claim positions of authority in such spaces. These acts of agency allow them to blur the separation between male/female and mahram/namahram, deconstructing the types of boundaries that older-generation women operate within and reproduce. As presented in Chapter 4, this is why younger-generation women’s use of the spaces within the mosque diverges significantly from older-generation women’s and show a character much similar to that of men. In a similar fashion, younger-generation women’s abandonment of the cultural construction of Islam allows them to create a space for themselves within the German public by dissolving moral boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Finally, both of these processes are facilitated by younger-generation women’s redefinition of the Muslim female subject by using knowledge of Muslim holy scripture to undermine entrenched gendered stereotypes and gender roles originating from the initial cultural substratum of Islam. In this context, while they challenge the reductionist, essentialized representations of Muslim women as passive victims subordinated by Islam, they also counter the image self-proclaimed representators of Islam in Germany portray that involves compromising from their religious identity to attain cultural citizenship. In the face of two discourses that create an image that does not apply to them, younger-generation women resist such discourses by reproducing their own Turkish-German discourse that goes beyond the subordination versus resistance dichotomy and brings Islamic values and western ideals together.

These different modes of the agency have significant implications for the boundary-making processes of younger- and older-generation women. As discussed throughout the chapter, in older-generation women’s performances of agency, we have seen them using strategies designed to manipulate the Turkish-Islamic system to their best advantage, but one that leaves the system itself intact. They take part in reproduction of the discourse that contributes to their subordinate status within the mosque and the neighborhood, which produces rewards in the form of higher social status, approval and most importantly, belonging in the face of placelessness they
fear. On the other hand, the reproduction of the Turkish-Islamic discourse accentuates the differences between host and home communities, leading to the stabilization of imaginary cultural boundaries that ultimately hinder older-generation women’s effective functioning in the German society. Younger-generation women, due to their hybrid cultural status and critical approach to established discourse are able to operate effectively both in the Turkish-Muslim and German contexts. While in the mosque, their modified performances allow them to break free from the constraints imposed upon them by the Turkish-Islamic discourse, in the urban context, it enables them to blur and transgress the cultural boundaries and lay claims to the German space.

Echoing my argument from Chapter 5, younger-generation women’s emancipatory performances, such as their disdain for the culturally designated systems of oppression in the mosque and their participance in the German space, in addition to their many statements about their belonging to Germany (rather than Turkey) communicate very clearly that younger-generation women are well integrated to the German society, and they are already full members. The problem, as younger-generation women see it, is that they are not perceived as belonging by the German public. Thus, integration, with its equation to assimilation in the political discourse, becomes a concept that ignores whatever functional integration individuals coded as immigrants have achieved and reproduces cultural boundaries (Korteweg, 2017). As a result, on the one hand, segments of the German public view the otherwise normal performances of younger-generation women as transgressive because of their perceived “immigrant-ness”, while on the other, older-generation Turkish-Muslims view their behavior as a betrayal of religious and cultural norms – an integration into the namahram other and heretical. What this ultimately shows is the failure of integration discourse to move past anything more than a superficial assessment of an individual’s status based on appearance rather than realized behavior.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I examine the discursive production and cultivation of ethnoreligious identities within the context of Marxloh Merkez Mosque and the reflection of related discourses on the spatial mobility of mosque-going women within the neighborhood and urban contexts. By exploring the imaginaries, experiences, and socio-spatial behavior of the mosque-going women, this dissertation develops a comparative approach to the diaspora mosque that simultaneously addresses material, discursive and symbolic construction of the mosque space across multiple scales, with a specific focus on the daily performances of women among the congregants of Marxloh Merkez Mosque. Mosque-centered embodied practices, a relatively understudied subject, are central to my study. The findings of my research, on the one hand, expose different patterns of belonging and boundary-making that vary across generations, while on the other challenge the Euro-centric integration discourse by revealing its tendency to fix identities, thereby limiting the ability of immigrants and their descendants to become accepted members of the so-called host community.

I began this study with the simple motivation; to understand what it means to be the “other”; not only in terms of living as a Turkish-Muslim person in Germany but also being a woman in the male-dominated diaspora mosque. In Chapter 1, as an introduction, I started exploring how two discourses construct Turkish-Muslims in Germany: the Turkish-Islamic discourse disseminated through DITIB mosques and the German discourse that historically and continuously other the Turkish-Muslims under different labels. This chapter sought to address the gap in the literature regarding 1) the superficial reading of the transnational mosques as a product of discourses, rather than discursive structures with agency themselves, and 2) the
overgeneralizing studies on Turkish-Muslim women that interpret their experiences through a Western feminist lens, mainly through the dialectical debate about their subordination and empowerment. While these studies tend to focus on Muslim women, they also disregard Muslim women’s experiences, reproducing them as essentialized subjects.

Leaving aside the assumption that people are of a defined ethnicity or culture, which implies that these categories are static constructs that define essentialized identities, I moved towards the idea that gender, ethnicity, and culture are discursively constructed, and our actions and corporal acts fall within this performative matrix it creates. In order to do so, I use Butler’s theoretical formulation of gender as a product of regulatory discourses and explore its potential for the conceptualization of ethnicity. Through her conceptualization, Butler replaces the notion of “gender identity” with “gender performativity” and challenges its essentialist constructions. According to her, gender is a cultural fiction constructed through reiteration and mimesis of the heteronormative discourse, which eventually seems to be perceived as natural due to its constant repetition (Butler, 1993). Although Butler’s conceptualization was criticized for the lack of sexualized subjects’ agency, her further development of the theory locates the agency in constant compulsive repetition. The perfect repetition of gender norms is not attainable, therefore different performances of gender norms allow for its subversion and destabilization (Butler, 1997; Leach 2003; Aly, 2012).

In Chapter 2, I further argued that Butler’s approach to gender and performativity could be used to analyze culture and ethnicity, which are inherently performative within an “ethnonormative matrix” (Aly, 2010, p. 84). This approach provides a very useful analytical lens especially within the European context, where gender differences form the basis of ethnic differences. Feldman discusses that the dominant normative discourses, whether they reproduce gender or ethnic performativity, identities can only be articulated with respect to the differences, which separates the insider from the outsider, strengthening already existing societal boundaries
Gender(ed) norms, within this context, become fundamental regulatory principles that reproduce such differences, making ethnic boundaries also sexual boundaries. Strict norms of appropriate female behavior operate as guarantors of cultural survival, and the formation of group identity relies on the formation of particular (gendered) subjects (Fortier, 1999). In fact, Butler mentions that gender and race—which I believe can be applied to ethnicity as well—should be thought about non-sequentially, as one always operates as the “unmarked background” for the other (Bell, 1999). Within the context of my dissertation, from the perspective of Turkish-Muslims in Germany, the pious behavior of “our” women based on namus culture, Islam, and political Islam compared to the immoral behavior of “their” women is used to emphasize the difference. On the other hand, the German discourse reproduces differences in constructing the Turkish-Muslim community as the “other” by focusing on Turkish-Muslim women and their cultural incompatibility.

This notion of performativity not only informed my analytical perspective but it also became the key to conducting my research in the first place. As I was conducting my fieldwork, especially at the initial stages, despite my familiarity with Turkish culture, I found myself in difficult positions due to my unfamiliarity with the gender norms of Turkish-Muslim women. As I progressed in my fieldwork, I started to mimic some of the mosque-going women’s performances; I started using to include religious phrases in my daily language, such as inshallah (if Allah wills), mashallah (what Allah wishes), alhamdulillah (praise to Allah) and subhanallah (glory to Allah), I regularly attended the Quran course and Islamic lectures and I was careful not to dress in ways they would disapprove. In fact, after I started mimicking these performances, my status slowly began to change from outsider to insider. On the other hand, the more time I spent among mosque-going women, the more I saw two very distinct patterns of discourse and associated behavior that eventually became the core of my dissertation. In the face of two different discourses, older-generation women’s Turkish-Muslim discourse and younger-
generation women’s Turkish-German one, I found myself constantly code-switching. In some moments where my performances did not follow the dominant norms, my insider status was jeopardized. In these moments of slippage, such as when I did not wear a headscarf during Quran reading when my participants learned that I was in Germany without my husband or when I attended the mosque spring fair with a group that included male friends, I was either warned (that I should be more appropriate when I hold the Quran or I should be careful about with whom I was seen with) and questioned (whether my husband approves me being there alone).

In Chapter 3, I describe the ways I went about exploring and understanding Turkish-Muslim women’s reproduction of space and identities within the context of the local neighborhood and broader German society. Here, I discussed that using multiple techniques is crucial to construct an inclusive methodological framework to tackle issues around gender, identity, performativity, and belonging of Turkish-Muslim women living in Marxloh. Using an ethnographic approach that rejects the researcher’s role as a passive and distant outsider (Smith, 1990), from the beginning of my fieldwork, I expected that my interactions with my participants would influence my data collection and analysis. Therefore, I used a modified version of the grounded theory, as it provides a flexible approach to data collection by allowing me to direct my research based on the emerging data throughout my fieldwork. Finally, in this chapter, I also address the methodological issues around my shifting insider/outsider position and discuss how these positions were never fixed during my fieldwork, but in fact, they were overlapping and context-dependent. Within this group of women, I represented the insider part of them because of my familiarity with the Turkish-Muslim culture, but also not a part of them because I was conducting research about/with them. As I started to decipher the discourses that lead to certain types of behavior, I learned to find a “space between” and negotiate my insider/outsider position to access Turkish-Muslim women’s lived experiences (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009 in Saviddes et al. 2014, p. 413).
In Chapter 4, I explored the discursive practices of Turkish-Muslim women within the microcosm of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque by taking performative gender as a starting point from which the normative structure of ethnicity can be analyzed. The result was that I identified two different identity discourses; the first one being the Turkish-Muslim discourse among immigrants originating in Turkey, which defines a set of norms for women based on cultural Islam, and the second one being a Turkish-German discourse which is actively reproduced by later generation immigrants that bring together norms from both deculturalized Islam and German society. Following the history of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque from its inception to the present day, the interplay and tension between these discourses with respect to women’s spatial behavior in the mosque come to the fore. In the beginning, the project stood out with its inclusive character, primarily due to Kaykın and Özmal’s role during its construction. These two Turkish-German women, who completed their acculturation in Germany, successfully negotiated their liminal positions to bridge Turkish-Muslim and German discourses that have always been framed as irreconcilable. They were able to instigate a shift in the planned spatial organization of the mosque from a strictly separated one into a gender-inclusive one with minimal segregation. Once the project was well established, the progressive agenda it had started out with was cast aside by conservative elements that had taken over responsibility for administering the mosque. This manifested in three different spatial regimes for men, older-generation women, and younger-generation women.

While men were given free rein to use practically any space they wanted, even the women-only prayer areas at times, women were relegated to the peripheral spaces and annexes of the mosque. The inclusive discourse that enabled the construction of the mosque started to be considered transgressive and destructive to the community norms. Although it might seem like the Turkish-Muslim discourse completely superseded the Turkish-German one, to the point that strict gender segregation is recognized as the legitimate way, we also see how women among
each generation used a combination of manipulating social norms and outright defiance of those norms to gain access to specialized space. Older-generation women, who adhere to the Turkish-Muslim discourse, surreptitiously appropriate the norms accessing the mosque space within the context of productive daily activity. On the other hand, younger-generation women, who reproduce a hybrid Turkish-German discourse, blatantly undermine the norms and infiltrate into men’s spaces.

What do these competing gender discourses in the microcosm of the mosque tell us about ethnicity? Discourses of ethnicity can be extrapolated as normative sets of subjection from gender discourses. Similar to gender performativity, ethnicity is maintained by an “ethno-normative matrix,” which naturalizes cultural differences and is maintained through discourses of nationalism (Aly 2012, p. 84). The inclusivity Özmal and Kaykın strived to achieve during the construction process of the mosque did not only refer to gender inclusivity but also an ethnic one. While this idea of “living-together” seemed to work out as planned at the beginning, even decreasing the perceived difference of both the German and Muslim “other,” with the deterioration of gender inclusivity, we also see performances of ethnic norms that makes an emphasis on differences between “us” and “them” and construct boundaries with the “other” in order to fit into the current hegemonic Turkish-Muslim construction of identity. As Bhabha asserts, “the “other” is never outside of beyond us, it emerges forcefully within cultural discourse” (1994, p. 4).

Chapter 5 begins with further exploration of the binary construction of the other through gendered discourses by examining mosque-going women’s imaginations of Turkey and Germany. The Turkish-Muslim discourse that organizes older-generation women’s behavior in the mosque also influences their imaginary perceptions of their home- and host cultures. The two cultures are discursively conceived through the gender regulations, more specifically through the reproduction of norms of an idealized Turkish-Muslim femininity. In older-generation women’s imaginations,
German women are repeatedly contrasted against the ideal Turkish-Muslim women who are perceived as the guarantors of pious selfhood and collective continuity while German women symbolize the immoral other. These discursive constructions of difference also shape women’s use of space, creating terrains of (non)belonging. While they refrain from using the space of the “other,” older-generation women project an idealized – but imagined – version of the Turkish-Muslim community onto the diaspora space to assert their moral existence against the threat of immorality that the German “other” represents. In their eyes, the neighborhood space of Marxloh represents a space of trust, solidarity, and interdependence. With their teyze status, which grants them a higher socio-cultural position, they participate in the reproduction of the neighborhood as a community, in the identification of the cultural and moral codes, and even in the spatialization of surveillance to ensure its continuity. As older-generation women cannot and do not experience cross-cultural encounters, their identity performance brings to mind Stuart Hall’s assertion that “identities are the products of exclusion, because they are constructed through difference and in relation to the “Other” (1995, p. 76).

When we look at Turkish-Muslim women among later generations can construct multiple identities for themselves and are accustomed to living across cultural boundaries. Neither of their imaginations of Turkey or Germany is idealized or they do not perceive one culture as being better than the other. Younger-generation women’s cultural hybridity stands in opposition to “the myth of cultural authenticity” (Nayel, 2017, p. 25) older-generation women strive to preserve. Following Barker and Galasinski’s (2001) concept of hybridity, younger-generation women do not just juxtapose two cultures and code-switch between them but create a disruptive and alternative discourse that shifts power and questions discursive authority (Bhabha, 1994). This disruption can be seen in younger-generation women’s transgressive behavior in the mosque, in their rejection of using the moral space of the neighborhood, and in their preference for using the space of the “other,” the German public. While through this hybridity, younger-generation
women are capable of moving across discursive and spatial sites of identity, Aly (2012) likens this performance of hybrid identities to performances of drag in Butler’s framework (1993). Just like drag, hybridity is interpreted as a paradigm for transgressive performance against the ethno-normative matrix, conceiving hybrid subjects that are unintelligible by mainstream discourses, both Turkish and German. Consequently, just like any transgressive behavior, the hybridity of younger-generation women is heavily surveilled and even disciplined. In order to forge their unorthodox existence against all the normative discourses, younger-generation women resort to certain conscious transgressive performances.

Chapter 6 focuses on the mentioned transgressive performances and explores women’s agency in the face of normative discourses they are subjected to. All normative behavior shaped by the rules of the dominant discourses is bound to be resignified and altered through different and imperfect repetitions (Butler, 1993). In line with Butler’s definition, I discussed that younger-generation women exercised their agency through intentional and assertive ways. In their performances of agency, which is in parallel with acts of resistance, younger-generation women deconstruct gender(ed) norms and resignify them, destabilizing the hierarchies reproduced by the dominant power structures. Their deculturalization of Islam, redefinition of Muslim women, and their transgression of boundaries subvert both the Turkish-Muslim discourse that subordinates them and the German discourse that portrays them as oppressed passive victims. Through this subversion, younger-generation women define a new discourse that is not artificial, borrowed, or imposed but develops organically from their own experience. As opposed to the superficiality of the integration or Turkish-Muslim discourse, these young women are redefining the ontology of being Muslim children of immigrants several generations removed from the original migration. In line with Butler, “when one freely exercises the right to be who one already is, and one asserts a social category for the purpose of describing that mode of being, then one is, in fact, making freedom part of that very social category, discursively changing the very ontology in question”
As younger-generation women radically forge a new, imbricated identity, which I discussed to be unintelligible by the dominant discourses, they are able to move across the borders that separate ethnic identities, eventually leading to their blurring and displacement.

However, within the context of my research, not all performances of the agency are subversive. While Butler’s notion of agency always includes performances of resistance, Muslim feminist researchers theorized that agency could also be found within the acts that are not emancipatory against various patriarchal suppressions (Mahmood, 2008). I argued that older-generation women’s performances that associate them with submissiveness while reproducing the subordinating discourses are forms of agency as it allows them to attain higher social status, approval, and belonging. As older-generation women lack a lot of the tools younger-generation women as to forge their existence in the German public, such as education, language fluency, urban know-how, their performances of agency that provides them with whatever higher (social) status they can achieve, becomes a project of cultural survival between various discursive systems of subjection (Butler, 1990, p. 139). As ominous and melancholic as it seems, older-generation women’s agency broadens Butler’s theoretical framework that standardizes the subversive behavior and opens up a third space beyond the binary structure of subordination versus resistance. By reclaiming their agency through consciously reproducing their homeland’s culture and distancing themselves from the host-land’s, older-generation women embrace their right to remain different and preserve – if not reinforce – the boundaries that separate society on ethnic differences.

The boundaries older-generation women maintain and younger-generation women blur, despite being symbolic, constitute the foundation of social separation. The power of these boundaries, whether they are fluid or rigid, as discussed in Chapter 5, depends on the understandings of “us” and “them” (Simonsen, 2018). Alba theorizes that when the distinction between “us vs. them” is more discernible, individuals on the “wrong” side of the boundary are
expected to experience exclusion and hindrance of belonging (2005). Belonging in this context moves beyond the notion of self-categorization through social identity and refers to the feelings of connection and embeddedness related to the experience of being a part of a bigger community (Simonsen, 2018; Skey, 2013). Within this context, my older-generation participants, with their reproduction of rigid boundaries between “us, Turks” and “them, Germans,” very clearly express their belonging to Turkey. The imagined homeland that they consider home is always fixed in the past. This attachment to an essentialized view of Turkish identity ties their view of self to a static representation of culture and prevents the acceptance of change in terms of forming belongings to a different community. While these nostalgic sentiments augment the process of othering themselves, it also protects them from the othering that comes from Germans and provide a refuge from daily experiences of exclusion and marginalization.

Younger-generation women’s experiences of belonging are much more complicated. Most people, including my older-generation participants, are able to take their national belonging for granted and are considered as belonging without having to prove their loyalty or negotiate their right to belong (Skey, 2013); however, later-generation immigrants’ feelings of belonging are much more complicated. Throughout this dissertation, we have seen that my younger-generation participants carry a lot of markers associated with a German national belonging; they are born and raised in Germany, they have attended German institutions, their native tongue is German, and they are legal citizens. In their interviews, they do not use the “us vs. them” divide older-generation women use, and they express their belonging to Germany. So, despite all these factors signaling that they belong, why do they still experience discrimination based on their ethnicities and are still expected to prove their loyalty to Germany in a way a “German” is never expected to? Simonsen explains this by differentiating between the concepts “belonging in” and “belonging with” by referring to the experiences of her second-generation migrant participants in Denmark. Parallel to my findings, her participants do feel that they belong in Denmark, but they
do not feel that they belong with Danes as they do not feel accepted by/as their fellow nationals (2018). I argue that this separation is exacerbated by the discourses reproduced by the demands of integration.

Although the academic representation of integration is a generally valid, idealized concept, the political implementation of the concept has proven ineffective and damaging. With their ever-changing demands and unclear definitions, integration discourses operate to sustain social borders that separate immigrants and paradoxically render their own attainment impossible. Although it has been meticulously debated and researched, integration does not have a universal definition; it can be social, economic, political, and cultural and can mean anything from mobility in the labor market to participate in general elections. Despite its unclear definition, integration has become a political ambition and collective ideal in European Countries in the past decades (Olwig & Paerregaard, 2011). In Germany, we see that the demands of integration change constantly. While before 2001, integration was mostly concerned with the well-being of the immigrants, after 2001, it has actually started to be framed as a problem that needs to be solved. Within this context, demands of integration are almost always directed to specific immigrant groups – mostly Muslim – that are conceived as problematic (Rytter, 2019), and any transnational practice that represents their culture is perceived as hindrance of integration (Geissler & Pöttker, 2006). Especially with the rise of the right-wing discourses in Europe, there is a predominant sense in Germany that immigrants needed to adapt completely to German culture and society. I argue that such a complete adaptation is unrealistic and impossible while maintaining a sense of self that is derived from non-German discourses.

None of my participants, whether they feel more Turkish, German, or both, are willing to let go of their ethnic identities for the sake of integration. While they do not wish to be(come) Germans, they insist that they wish to be a part of the German society, and they see it as their right as functioning members of the society. In other words, no matter how “belonged in” they
feel, the normative ideas borne out of preferred integration outcomes question their legitimacy as Germans, undermining their ability to “belong with.” Simonsen discusses that this “unequal access to belonging” results in consequences parallel to social and economic inequality, preventing migrants from being on equal terms with people that “belong without question” (2018, p. 135). The experience of not being able to participate in the reproduction of a discourse that defines what it means to be German carries the risk of alienating subjects from the society they live in. Within the context of my research, we see that older-generation women, with their commitment to the Turkish-Muslim discourse, are not concerned with their belonging in Germany – which causes them to be positioned in the margins of society. On the other hand, younger-generation women take part in the reproduction of an alternative discourse that allows them to claim their belonging, but their belonging with the society is paradoxically rendered ineffective by the integration discourse.

My dissertation contributes to the recently growing body of research in integration studies that proposes a change in how we view and define integration. Rytter suggests writing against integration and views it as the root of the problem (2018). Schinkel advocates for more interdisciplinary and qualitative research in the area about the “immigrant other” that does not strive to be objective, as immigrants have been dehumanized through such studies that are focused on measuring and comparing achievements and positions in terms of integration. He argues that migration and its consequences can be discussed in ways that move beyond integration (2018). Korteweg also proposes an intersectional approach exploring integration “not as a category of analysis but study it as a category of practice.” She further argues for “the production of research that focuses on social, cultural and economic processes that produce

30 For further discussions, see Anthias & Pajnic, 2014; Dahinden, 2016; Erdal & Öppen, 2013; Favell, 2019; Fokkema & de Haas, 2011; Goodman & Wright, 2015; Kentmen-Cin & Erişen, 2017; Korteweg, 2017; Magazzini, 2020; Olwig & Paerregaard, 2011; Rytter, 2018; Schrover & Schinkel, 2013; Schinkel, 2017 and 2018; Sjorslev, 2011; Wieviorka, 2014
groups in ways that move beyond integration discourse” (2017, p. 440). In line with Korteweg’s approach, this research has demonstrated precisely that integration is much more a matter of practice and performance than anything resembling the statistical approaches currently favored in academic integration studies. As shown in Figure 7-1, the processes by which immigrants and their children engage in boundary making and discourse reproduction are multi-faceted and complex, showing significant variety within a community the media and academic studies often represent as homogeneous.

Figure 7-1 Boundary making and discourse reproduction of Turkish immigrants in Germany
From a broader migration studies perspective, by focusing on the experiences of pious Muslim women, this research contributes to the literature by both challenging the construction of mainstream Islam in Germany and bringing Muslim women from the margins to the center. Nayel discusses that studies that put Muslim women at their focus carry the burden of challenging many discourses in/of Islam (2017). The mainstream discourses in Germany highlight Islam’s gendered and patriarchal qualities and stigmatize Muslim women as passive victims. As I have discussed in Chapter 2, I do not argue against the notion of acknowledging Islam as an essentially and inherently patriarchal discourse (Mernissi 1975, Baffoun 1982). However, this does not mean that one either accepts the subordinate status or resists it. A performative approach to Muslim women’s experiences allows me to observe how they both reinforce and challenge this patriarchal construct from within. Different modes of identities presented in my dissertation show how Islam becomes a discursive construct allowing for various performances of pious femininity that do not confine women to a subordinate social status and can even be used to resist its own patriarchal existence. These discursive constructions of identity through alternative performances of gender, religion and ethnicity are integral to the broader discourse of social inclusion and exclusion.

Finally, from the perspective of architectural research, this dissertation contributes to the field by incorporating feminist perspectives on space and place through Butler’s conceptualization of performativity both as an analytical and methodological tool. In doing so, the use of ethnographic procedures and grounded theory allows the construction of an alternative approach where religious and ethnic identities are presented as discursive, fluid, fragmented, and negotiated. Many studies on transnational architecture regard the mosques as a material product and focus their research either on the power mechanisms that lead to its construction or take its architectural form as the primary object of investigation. These approaches view the mosque as a static monument and are assumed to carry fixed meaning even though the social context that envelopes them continues to evolve. The ethnographic approach I follow that is informed by the
performative approaches to space, allow me to contextualize the diaspora mosque as more than just passive objects that convey a static message, but rather as active agents that are dynamically formed in response to the shifts in discursive socio-political trends and belonging (in)between Turkey, Germany, and global Islam – which are also constantly redefined. Within this context, focusing on the women’s experiences in this transnational space allows me to look beyond narratives that see architecture as an end product but explore how space becomes a part of the regulatory frame that both influences and influenced from the gendered subjects’ experiences not only in the microcosm of the mosque space but also in the broader neighborhood and urban contexts. Herein, Turkish mosques in Germany are reproduced as significant sites where boundaries between culture and religion, women’s and men’s (gendered) performances, Turkishness and Germanness, as well as empowerment and subordination are constantly reproduced and shift in multiple ways.

In closing, this study that puts Marxloh in its focal point provides a model of analysis that may be broadly applicable to explore boundaries not in terms of difference but with respect to the processes that cause their formation. Researching various boundary-making processes from the perspective of those on the margin, especially through experiences of pious Turkish-Muslim women who are marginalized not only through their religious identity in Germany but also through their gendered identity in the mosque space, allows me to identify and recognize them as necessary and visible actors of cultural production. Situated in-between religion, which is personal and non-material, and architecture, which is societal and material, my study aims to bring together the personal and the societal, the public and the private, providing a model of analysis that would be applicable to promote social justice in the broader context. What I am suggesting, therefore, is that rather than having to choose between labeling minorities as integrated, which in the current discourses refer to total assimilation, or considering them as problematic due to their lack of integration, an alternative approach to identify structures of
subjection and position alternative performativities of immigrants on equal footing with the hegemonic discourses.
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## Appendix A

### Research Schedule

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<th>EVENTS / ACTIVITIES</th>
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<td>The 10th year anniversary of the mosque</td>
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<td>The celebration of Prophet Muhammad’s birthday (Mawlid Nabi) at the mosque</td>
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<td>Observations (DITiB, IGMG and VIKZ mosques)</td>
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Appendix B

Interview Guide for Experts (English)

Preliminary Questions (establishing rapport, building relationship)

1. Can you tell me a little bit about yourself – your education, your family, your employment, your life in Germany?
2. How long have you been living in Germany?
3. How long have you been living in Duisburg?

Questions Related to the Establishment of the Mosque

4. (If applicable) How long have you been working for the mosque?
5. Do you think women were taken into consideration during the planning phase of the mosque?
6. Can you tell me what is your relation to the mosque?
7. Were you included in the mosque-construction process? If so, how did you become included? What was your role after you became included?
8. What was here before the construction of the mosque? How did the mosque change its environment? Do you have any photos?
9. Can you tell me about the planning construction phase?
10. Did you encounter any problems during this process? If so, how did you overcome those problems?
11. Can you tell me about the women’s roles during the planning and construction phase?

Questions Related to the Activities in the Mosque

12. Can you tell me about the Dialogue Center?
13. Can you tell me about the guided tours in the mosque? Who is the audience? Who is interested in these tours? Who is giving the tours? What kind of questions do you get asked in the tours?
14. What do you think about the activities in the mosque? Does it lead to greater exposure or isolate the mosque community from the German public?
15. Do you think the mosque brings different groups in Marxloh together?
16. How does the mosque maintain relations with non-Muslim groups such as Alevites, Christian and Jewish communities?
17. Do you think the reaction towards the mosque has changed in the recent years?
18. What do you do to battle the prejudices?
19. Do you view Marxloh Merkez Mosque as a successful project?
20. How do you think people (Turkish or German) view the mosque?
21. How is your relationship with the other non-profit organizations?
22. Why are there Turkish religious officers in the mosque? Are there any plans on educating and employing Turkish-German religious officers?
23. Do you think the Dialogue center work as it was planned?
24. How does the mosque administration work? Is it independent?

Questions Related to the Architecture of the Mosque

25. Can you tell me about the design process?
26. Why a traditional style was chosen?
27. Did the contractors remain loyal to the original design by Şahin?
28. What do you think about the mosque architecture? How do you think the traditional style influenced the reception of the mosque?
29. Can you compare the Central Cologne Mosque and the Marxloh Merkez Mosque in terms of their design (contemporary vs. traditional)?
30. Do you have any area for the vacant land in front of the mosque?
31. Do you think the mosque has restructured the spatial hierarchy in the neighborhood?
32. Did the mosque change the neighborhood in the 10 years since its opening?

Questions Related to the Women in the Mosque

33. How do you think mosque influence the lives of Turkish-Muslim women? Can you compare the situation before and after the construction of the mosque?
34. For what purpose do women use the mosque?
35. Are women included in the mosque administration?
36. Do you think there is a difference between the women who attend the mosque and those who don’t?
37. What are women’s roles in the community and mosque congregation?
38. What are the activities for women in the mosque besides Qur’an lectures and Islamic lectures? Any work to improve their social status?
39. What does the mosque mean for women?
40. Can you tell me about the spatial use of the mosque space by women?
41. How is women’s participation in the mosque? How is their visibility? Are there any spoken/unspoken rules regarding the spatial use?
42. Are there any spaces in the mosque women are not welcome?
43. What are the problems women face in the mosque?

Interview Guide for Experts (Turkish)

Başlangıç Soruları (kişiyi tanımak için)

1. Kendinizi tanıtır mısınız? Eğitiminiz, aileniz, işiniz ve Almanya’daki yaşamınız hakkında biraz bilgi verebilir misiniz?
2. Ne zamandır Almanya’da yaşıyorsunuz?
3. Ne zamandır Duisburg’da yaşıyorsunuz?

Caminin Kuruluşu ile İlgili Sorular

4. (Uygunsa) Ne zamandan beri camide çalışıyorsunuz?
5. Caminin planlanması aşamasında kadınların dikkate alınacağı düşünüyor musunuz?
6. Cami ile ilişkininizi ne olduğunu söyleyebilir misiniz?
7. Cami inşa sürecine dahil oldunuz mu? Evet ise nasıl dahil oldunuz? Dahil olduktan sonra rolünüz neydi?
8. Cami yapılmadan önce burada ne vardı? Cami çevresini nasıl değiştirdi? Fotoğrafın var mı?
9. Planlama inşaat aşamasından bahseder misiniz?
10. Bu süreçte herhangi bir sorunla karşılaştınız mı? Eğer öyleyse, bu sorunları nasıl aşındınız?
11. Planlama ve yapım aşamasında kadınların rollerinden bahseder misiniz?

Camideki Etkinlikler Hakkında Sorular

12. Diyalog Merkezi hakkında bilgi verir misiniz?
14. Camide faaliyetler hakkında ne düşünüyor musunuz? Cami cemaatini Alman halkı ile daha fazla ilişkisini olmasına mı yoksa izole olmalarına mı yol açıyor?
15. Caminin Marxloh’da içerikli farklı grupları bir araya getirdiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
16. Cami, Aleviler, Hristiyan ve Musevi toplulukları gibi gayrimüslim gruplarla ilişkilerini nasıl sürdürür? 
17. Son yıllarda camiye yönelik tepkilerin değiştiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
18. Önyargılarla savaşmak için ne yaparsınız?
19. Marxloh Merkezi Camii’nin başarılı bir proje olarak görülüyor musunuz?
20. Sizce insanlar (Türk veya Alman) camiye nasıl bakıyor?
21. Diğer kâr amacı gütmeyen kuruluşlarla ilişkiniz nasıl?
22. Camide neden Türk din görevlileri var? Türk-Alman din görevlilerinin yetiştirilmesi ve istihdam edilmesi konusunda herhangi bir plan var mı?
23. Diyalog merkezinin planlandığı gibi çalışıtımı düşüncüyor musunuz?
24. Cami yönetimi nasıl çalışır? Bağımsız mı?

Cami Mimarisi Hakkında Sorular

25. Tasarım sürecinden bahseder misiniz?
26. Neden geleneksel bir tarz seçildi?
27. Muteahhitler Şahin’in özgün tasarımına sadık kaldı mı?
28. Cami mimarisi hakkında ne düşünüyor musunuz? Geleneksel üslubun caminin toplum tarafından kabulünü nasıl etkilediğini düşünüyor musunuz?
29. Köln Camii ile Marxloh Merkez Camii’ni tasarım açısından (çağdaş ve geleneksel) karşılaştırabilir misiniz?

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30. Cami önü boş araziniz için planınız var mı?
31. Caminin mahalledeki mekânsal hiyerarşiyi yeniden yapılandırdiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
32. Cami, açılışından bu yana geçen 10 yılda mahalleyi değiştirdi mi?

Cami ve Kadın Hakkında Sorular

33. Sizce cami Türk-Müslüman kadınların hayatlarını nasıl etkiliyor? Caminin yapılmadan önceki ve sonrası durumunu karşılaştırmabilir misiniz?
34. Kadınlar camiyi hangi amaçla kullanır?
35. Kadınlar cami yönetimine dahil mi?
36. Sizce camiye giden kadınlarla gitmeyen kadınlar arasında bir fark var mı?
37. Kadınların toplum ve cami cemaatindeki rolleri nelerdir?
38. Kuran dersleri ve İslami dersler dışında camide kadınlara yönelik faaliyetler nelerdir? Sosyal statülerini iyileştirmek için herhangi bir çalışma var mı?
39. Kadınlar için cami ne anlama geliyor?
40. Cami mekânının kadınlar tarafından mekânsal kullanımından bahseder misiniz?
41. Kadınların camiye katılımı nasıl? Görünürlikleri nasıl? Mekânsal kullanına ilişkin sözlü/sözsüz kurallar var mı?
42. Camide kadınların giremeyeceği yerler var mı?
43. Kadınların camide karşılaştıkları sorunlar nelerdir?
Appendix C

Screening Questions for Interviewees (English)

Are you over 18 years old?
Are you currently living in the Marxloh neighborhood in Duisburg?
Have you lived in Marxloh for more than 10 years?
When did you move to Germany and how old were you when you moved?
Are you from Turkey or is your family from Turkey?
Which mosque do you attend?
Do you attend the Marxloh Merkez Mosque regularly?
Do you consider yourself as a part of the Marxloh Merkez Mosque community?

Screening Questions for Interviewees (Turkish)

18 yaşımınız üzerinde misiniz?
Şu anda Duisburg şehrinin Marxloh mahallesinde mi yaşiyorsunuz?
Marxloh’da 10 yıldan fazladır mı yaşiyorsunuz?
Almanya’ya ne zaman taşındınız ve taşındığınızda kaç yaşındaydınız?
Türkiye’den mi geldiniz? Aileniz Türkiye’den mi geldi?
Hangi camiye gidiyorsunuz?
Marxloh Merkez Camii’ne düzenli olarak gidiyor musunuz?
Kendinizi Marxloh Merkez Camii cemaatinden sayiyor musunuz?
### Appendix D

#### List of In-Depth Interview Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Born</th>
<th>Gen.</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Younger-Generation Women (18-39)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td>continuing Realschule</td>
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<td>Student</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şule</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td><strong>Older-Generation Women (40+)</strong></td>
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<td>Saadet</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E

Interview Guide for Participants (English)

Preliminary Questions (establishing rapport, building relationship)

1. Can you tell me a little bit about yourself – your education, your family, your employment, your life in Germany?
2. How long have you been living in Germany?
3. How long have you been living in Duisburg?
4. When did you/your family move to Germany?
5. Are you a Turkish/German/dual citizen?
6. What do you do in your spare time?
7. What was it like growing up here? / What was it like to move here?

Core Questions (probing for description of the experience)

8. What is it like Turkish immigrants to live in Germany?
9. Do you feel like a part of Germany/Duisburg?
10. Do you have any challenges living here as a Turkish-Muslim? If so, what are they?
11. How do you manage these problems?
12. Has anything been helpful for you living in Germany? If so, what are they?
13. How did you arrive to this neighborhood (Marxloh)?
14. What did you expect when you first come here? (if applicable)
15. How do you define your neighborhood? Can you draw me a sketch of your neighborhood?
16. Do you feel comfortable in this neighborhood? If so, where do you feel the most comfortable? Can you mark them on your sketch?
17. Do you feel unwelcome in any place in the neighborhood?
18. Where do you socialize in the neighborhood? Can you mark them on the sketch?
19. Are there socialization places for women in the neighborhood?
20. What does (name of the place) mean for you? What feelings does (name of the place) awake in you?

Mosque-Related Questions

21. Do you go to mosque? If so, how often and why do you go to mosque, what do you do in the mosque? What activities do you do in the mosque?
22. What activities do you associate with the mosque?
23. What architectural elements do you associate with the mosque?
24. Are you a part of the mosque community?
25. Is mosque an important part of your community? Your life?
26. Which spaces in the mosque do you use?
27. Do you think women’s spaces in mosque is as important as the men’s spaces?
28. Do you encounter any challenges in the mosque as a woman?
29. As a woman, can you use the mosque space like a man does? Or do you encounter any limitations? If so, what should be done? What would you change?

Closing Questions

30. Is there anything else you would like to share with me?
31. In your opinion, do you think these questions are clear? Should I change anything?
32. May I contact you in the future in order to clarify some of the information you shared with me?
33. Do you know anybody who might be interested in participating?

Interview Guide for Participants (Turkish)

Başlangıç Soruları (kişiyi tanıma için)

1. Kendinizi tanıtır mısınız? Eğitiminiz, aileniz, işiniz ve Almanya’da kendi yaşadığı hakkında biraz bilgi verebilir misiniz?
2. Ne zamandır Almanya’da yaşuyorsunuz?
3. Ne zamandır Duisburg’da yaşuyorsunuz?
4. Siz/Aileniz ne zaman Almanya’ya yerleşmiş?
5. Çifte vatandaş mısınız?
6. Boş zamanlarınızda neler yaparsınız?
7. Burada yetiştirmek nasıl olur? / Buraya taşınmak nasıl oldu?

Ana Sorular (deneyimler hakkında bilgi almak için)

8. Almanya’da göçmen Türk olarak yaşamak nasıl?
9. Kendinizi Almanya’nın/Duisburg’un parçası olarak hissediyor musunuz?
11. Bu problemlerle nasıl başa çıkıyorsunuz?
12. Almanya’da yaşamınızda yardımcı olan şeyler var mı? Varsa bunlar nelerdir?
13. Bu mahallede (Marxloh) nasıl ve ne zaman geldiniz?
14. Buraya ilk geldiğinizde ne bekliyordunuz?
15. Mahallenizde nasıl tanımlırsınız? Bana bir skeç çizebilir misiniz?
16. Bu mahallede kendinizi rahat ve güvende hissediyor musunuz? Eğer evet ise, en rahat hissettiğiniz yerleri sket üzerinde gösterebilir misiniz?
17. Marxloh’da kendinizi rahat hissettmediğiniz yerler neresi?
18. Mahallenizde sosyalievren musunuz? Sosyalievren yerleri sket üzerinde gösterebilir misiniz?
19. Mahallenizde kadınlar özel sosyalievren alanları var mı? Varsa neresi?
20. (Mekanın adı) size ne ifade ediyor? (Mekanın adı) sizde ne gibi duygular uyandırıyor?

Cami ile İlgili Sorular

22. Cami ile hangi aktiviteleri ilişkilendirmiyorsunuz?
23. Hangi mimari elementleri cami ile ilişkilendirmiyorsunuz?
24. Cami cemaatinin bir parçası mınsınız?
25. Cami sizin hayatınızın ve toplumunuzun önemli bir parçası mı?
26. Camide en çok hangi mekanları kullanıyorsunuz?
27. Sizce camide kadınların mekanları erkeklerin mekanları kadar önemli mı?
28. Camide kadın olarak problem yaşıyorsunuz?

Kapanış Soruları

30. Paylaşmak istediğiniz başka bir şey var mı?
31. Sizce bu sorular yeterince açık mıydı? Sizce bir şey değiştirilmeli miym?
32. Gelecekte ek soruların olursa sizinle iletişime geçebilir miym?
33. Bu çalışmaya katılmayı isteyebilecek tanıklarınız var mı?
Appendix F

Debriefing Script (English)

I invite you to participate in a research study. My name is İrem Öz and I am from the Pennsylvania State University. The purpose of the study is to learn about the experience of being a Turkish-Muslim woman living in the Germany and identify how mosques play a role in the integration experience of women.

I am inviting you to be in this study because you are an adult eighteen years old or older, second or third generation migrating to the Germany and living in the Marxloh neighborhood for ten or more years. I would like to hear your story. I obtained your name and address from (insert referring person). Approximately 20 people will take part in this study.

If you agree to participate, I would like to meet with you and talk about questions that relate to being a Turkish-Muslim woman living in Germany such as why and when you came to Germany, what challenges you faced living here and your use of the mosque spaces. I will record our interview on a digital recorder. This interview will be about one to one and a half hours. You may skip any questions you do not wish to answer and you may stop the interview at any time by letting me know. After the interview, you will be asked if I may contact you for further clarification. If you agree I will keep your name and contact information so that I can tell you when and where the event will take place.

We will keep the information you provide confidential, however federal regulatory agencies and the Pennsylvania State University Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves research studies) may inspect and copy records pertaining to this research. To protect your privacy and keep all of your responses confidential, I will not use your real name in any of the notes or recordings made for the study. We will use a pseudonym and not your name to identify your responses in the interview. The study identification pseudonym will be linked to your name. The list linking your name and your study identification pseudonym will be stored in a secure location that is accessible only to me, the researcher İrem Öz. I will store all paper copies in a locked office and all electronic records in password protected computer files. If I write a report about this study we will do so in such a way that you cannot be identified.

You may not benefit personally from being in this study. However, we hope that others may benefit in the future from what we learn as a result of this study. You will not have any costs for being in this research study. You will not be paid for being in this research study.

Taking part in this research study is completely voluntary. If you decide not to be in this study, or if you stop participating at any time, you won’t be penalized or lose any benefits for which you otherwise qualify.

If you have any questions about the research study itself, please contact İrem Öz at (local address and phone number). If you have questions about the rights of research subjects, please contact the Office for Research Protections Human Research Protection Program, The 330 Building, Suite 205, The Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA 16802-7014, (814) 865-1775, or e-mail irb-orp@psu.edu. To offer input about your experiences as a research subject
or to speak to someone other than the research staff, call the Human Subjects Office at the number above.

If you agree to be in the study, by saying yes now we can begin the interview or we can arrange for a time to meet again after you have had a chance to consider your participation. We will schedule the study procedures at mutually convenient times. If you do not wish to be in the study, please let me know now or at any time.

Thank you very much for your consideration of my study.

Debriefing Script (Turkish)


Bu araştırma çalışmasına katılmak tamamen güvendiştir. Bu çalışmaya katılmamaya karar verirseniz veya herhangi bir zamanda katılmayı bırakırsanız, herhangi bir ceza almazsınız veya hak kazandığınız herhangi bir avantajı kaybetmezsiniz.

Araştırma çalışmasının kendisi hakkında herhangi bir sorunuz varsa, lütfen (yerel adres ve telefon numarası) adresinden İrem Öz ile iletişime geçin. Araştırma konularının haklarıyla ilgili sorularınız varsa, lütfen Office for Research Protections Human Research Protection Program, 330 Building, Suite 205, the Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA 16802-7014, (814) 865-1775, veya irb-orp@psu.edu e-posta gönderilebilir. Bir araştırma katılımcısı olarak deneyimleriniz hakkında bilgi vermek veya araştırma personeli dışında biriyle konuşmak için yukarıdaki numaradan Human Subjects Office’ı arayın.

Çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ederseniz, şimdi evet derseniz görüşmeye başlayabiliriz veya katılımınızı değerlendirme fırsatı bulduktan sonra tekrar görmek için bir zaman ayarlayabiliriz. Çalışma prosedürlerini karşılıklı olarak uygun zamanlarda planlayacağız. Çalışmaya katılmak istemiyorsanız, lütfen şimdi veya herhangi bir zamanda bana bildirin.

Çalışmamı dikkate aldığınız için çok teşekkür ederim.
VITA
İrem Öz

EDUCATION
Pennsylvania State University, Ph.D. of Architecture, (expected 2022)
Koç University, M.A. in Art History and Archaeology, 2014
Middle East Technical University, B.S. in City and Regional Planning, 2010

SELECTED ACADEMIC AWARDS
Research Fellowship, DAAD German Academic Exchange Services, (2018-2019)
Poster Award, Graduate Exhibition, Graduate School, Pennsylvania State University (2018)
Pohlant Graduate Student Fellowship, Stuckeman School of Architecture, Pennsylvania State University (2016)
International Travel Grant, Global Programs, Pennsylvania State University (2016)
University Graduate Fellowship, Graduate School, Pennsylvania State University (2015-2017)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Pennsylvania State University, Department of Architecture, Research and Teaching Assistant (2016-2021)
University of Duisburg-Essen, Political Sciences Institute, Visiting Researcher (2018-2019)
Koç University, Social Sciences Institute, Research and Teaching Assistant (2010-2014)

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

